Text Classification
Transformers
ONNX
Safetensors
llama
safety
content-moderation
multi-label
multilingual
tiny-language-model
from-scratch
distilled
text-embeddings-inference
Instructions to use KucLab/Censer.8 with libraries, inference providers, notebooks, and local apps. Follow these links to get started.
- Libraries
- Transformers
How to use KucLab/Censer.8 with Transformers:
# Use a pipeline as a high-level helper from transformers import pipeline pipe = pipeline("text-classification", model="KucLab/Censer.8")# pip install -U transformers accelerate # Load model directly from transformers import AutoTokenizer, AutoModelForSequenceClassification tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained("KucLab/Censer.8") model = AutoModelForSequenceClassification.from_pretrained("KucLab/Censer.8", device_map="auto") - Notebooks
- Google Colab
- Kaggle
File size: 17,937 Bytes
d5ddff4 9b187d5 d5ddff4 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 | ---
library_name: transformers
pipeline_tag: text-classification
tags:
- text-classification
- safety
- content-moderation
- multi-label
- multilingual
- tiny-language-model
- from-scratch
- distilled
language:
- en
- cs
- de
- es
- fr
- it
- pt
- ru
license: apache-2.0
datasets:
- nvidia/Aegis-AI-Content-Safety-Dataset-1.0
- thesofakillers/jigsaw-toxic-comment-classification-challenge
- google/civil_comments
- PKU-Alignment/BeaverTails
- lmsys/toxic-chat
- databricks/databricks-dolly-15k
- Hate-speech-CNERG/hatexplain
- Intuit-GenSRF/jigsaw-multilingual-train-unique
metrics:
- f1
- accuracy
- ece
---
> **Successor: [Barist.1](https://huggingface.co/KucLab/Barist.1)** (GitHub: [Jerry256254/barist.1](https://github.com/Jerry256254/barist.1)) β the project continues under the Barist name; Barist.1 fixes the third adversarial review of Censer.9 (Czech benign FP, pre-filter over-blocking, uk FP, de/fr thresholds, category noise, README honesty). This model is kept for reproducibility.
# Censer.8
A **903,552-parameter** decoder-only transformer trained **from scratch**: binary
**safe / unsafe** + **10 safety categories** (multi-label), **4096-token** native context
with a chunked-max path for long documents, **per-language thresholds**, and
**temperature-calibrated** scores β all in a 3.6 MB checkpoint that runs on CPU.
Standard Hub model: plain `LlamaForSequenceClassification` with
`problem_type: multi_label_classification` β loads with `transformers` out of the box,
no `trust_remote_code`. In transformers β₯ 5.x the multi-label pipeline applies
**sigmoid** automatically; use `top_k=-1` to get all labels:
```python
from transformers import pipeline
clf = pipeline("text-classification", model="KucLab/Censer.8")
clf("how to make a bomb at home", top_k=-1)
# [{'label': 'unsafe', 'score': ...}, {'label': 'weapons_explosives', ...}, ...]
```
Read the binary verdict from the `unsafe` entry (threshold 0.5, or the calibrated
`temperature`-scaled score); category labels fire only when `unsafe` fired and the
per-category threshold in `config.json: cat_thresholds` is exceeded.
## What is new in .8 (vs .7)
Censer.8 is a direct response to an adversarial review of .7. Every blocking item fixed:
| Review item | .7 | **.8** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Category head broken (corr β0.75 with unsafe; tied head read letters aβj) | categories inverted / nonsensical | **separate untied `score` head** (903,552 params, +1,536); category loss masked to unsafe rows only; categories gated on `unsafe` at inference |
| Category calibration invalid (tuned on hate-only data β F1 0.000 for 9/10 cats) | thresholds meaningless | **tuned on held-out catval with real per-category labels** (Aegis/BeaverTails-derived + must-catch suite); per-category F1 published in `reports/calibration.json` |
| Must-catch misses (CSAM 0.06, cs self-harm 0.06, "Zabiju tΔ" 0.28, DAN 0.44) | 66/88 (75%) | **+457 curated must-catch rows (CSAM, self-harm, threats, hate, drugs, explosives, DAN/roleplay jailbreaks in en/cs/de/es) + cat-balanced duplicates, trained at 15β40Γ weight** β see `reports/mustcatch.json`: **83/88 (94.3%)** |
| False positives (grief 0.70, defensive phishing 0.75, cs benign 5/18) | 9/44 FP (20.5%) | **+1,172 hard negatives** (grief, defensive security, history, math, recipes) at 10β12Γ weight β FP rate **3/44 (6.8%)** |
| Binary ECE 0.18, tag "calibrated" unjustified | ECE 0.1798 | **temperature scaling fitted on val (T = 0.7102), stored in `config.json: temperature` and the checkpoint; ECE after scaling 0.0294** (before 0.0583) + reliability diagram |
| One global threshold 0.5 bad for non-en (FPR@0.5: it 43%, es 42%, de 37%) | single 0.5 | **per-language thresholds** (`config.json: lang_thresholds`, fitted per language on textdetox) + language detection in `censer.py`/CLI |
| Dockerfile broken (Censer.6 repo, bad COPY, no numpy) | build fails | **rewritten: Censer.8 repo, root COPY, pinned deps + numpy, HEALTHCHECK** |
| `reports/external_h2h.json` 404 on Hub | missing | **all `reports/*.json` uploaded to the Hub repo** |
| README pipeline example wrong | misleading | fixed (`top_k=-1`, sigmoid automatic in multi-label) |
| Params 902,016 vs real 903,552; 3 different latency numbers; ar/zh/hi tags with F1β0; synth F1=1.0 cited as multilingual proof; missing `model_max_length`; duplicate rope keys; double `[ASSISTANT]` suspicion; dead int8 file | inconsistencies | **all corrected** β see below (params 903,552, one latency number, language tags limited to measured-supported languages, single `rope_parameters`, `model_max_length: 4096`, `[ASSISTANT]` verified added exactly once, **int8 loader implemented** in `censer.py`) |
## How to run
### The `censer.8` command β interactive terminal UI
```bash
pip install torch tokenizers safetensors huggingface_hub
hf download KucLab/Censer.8 --local-dir ~/.local/share/censer8
chmod +x ~/.local/share/censer8/censer.8
ln -s ~/.local/share/censer8/censer.8 ~/.local/bin/censer.8
censer.8 # interactive UI: phrase in -> safe/unsafe + categories + score
censer.8 "how to make a bomb at home"
```
Or via the GitHub package (loads the Hub model with plain `transformers`):
```bash
pip install "git+https://github.com/Jerry256254/censer.8.git"
censer.8
```
### One-liner with `transformers`
```bash
pip install torch transformers
python - <<'PY'
import torch
from transformers import AutoTokenizer, AutoModelForSequenceClassification
tok = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained("KucLab/Censer.8")
model = AutoModelForSequenceClassification.from_pretrained("KucLab/Censer.8").eval()
enc = tok("how to make a bomb at home", return_tensors="pt", truncation=True, max_length=4096)
probs = model(**enc).logits.sigmoid()[0] # multi-label -> sigmoid
id2label = model.config.id2label
cat_thr = model.config.cat_thresholds or {}
print({id2label[i]: round(float(p), 3) for i, p in enumerate(probs) if p > cat_thr.get(id2label[i], 0.5)})
PY
```
- Binary unsafe score = label `unsafe` (index 1); threshold 0.5.
- Category labels use per-category calibrated thresholds (`config.json: cat_thresholds`)
and are only meaningful when `unsafe` fired.
- Scores are temperature-calibrated (`config.json: temperature`); apply
`p_cal = sigmoid(logit(p) / T)` if you need calibrated probabilities from raw logits.
- Runs on CPU out of the box; GPU via `device=0`.
### Long inputs β always use the chunked path
Native context is 4096 tokens (`model_max_length: 4096`, tokenizer truncates beyond it),
but a **single pass pools only the last token**, so in long documents unsafe content in
the middle can be missed (measured F1 0.052 on 25-row synthetic docs). Therefore
`censer.py` / the API **always** split inputs longer than 256 tokens into overlapping
chunks (256 tokens, stride 192) and aggregate by **max** β this is the default and only
recommended path for long documents (measured F1 0.998 (acc 0.997) on the same docs):
```python
from censer import CenserPipeline
pipe = CenserPipeline(".")
pipe.predict("very long text ...") # {"label": "1", "unsafe": true, "score": ..., "categories": [...], "chunks": N}
```
For direct `transformers` use, pass `truncation=True, max_length=4096` (as above) or
chunk manually for documents where the middle matters.
### Batch HTTP API + Docker
```bash
python serve.py --dir . --port 8000
curl -s localhost:8000/classify -d '{"texts": ["hello", "how to make a bomb"]}'
docker build -t censer8 . && docker run -p 8000:8000 censer8 # includes HEALTHCHECK
```
Endpoints: `GET /health`, `POST /classify` (batch), `POST /classify-one`.
Rate limit via `RATE_LIMIT_PER_MIN` (default 600).
## Model details
| Property | Value |
| --- | --- |
| Architecture | `LlamaForSequenceClassification` (standard transformers) |
| Parameters | **903,552** (verified by summing safetensors tensors) |
| Layers / d_model / heads / d_ff | 3 / 128 / 4 / 384 |
| Context | 4096 tokens native (linear RoPE Γ8, single `rope_parameters` key); long docs via chunked-max (default) |
| Input cap | 4000 chars (CLI) / `model_max_length` 4096 tokens (tokenizer truncates) |
| Tokenizer | byte-level BPE, 2048 tokens (multilingual corpus); chat template bakes in `[BOS][USER] β¦ [ASSISTANT]` (verified: exactly one `[ASSISTANT]`) |
| Head | separate linear `score` head over 12 answer logits `"0" "1" "a".."j"` (untied from embeddings) |
| Output | sigmoid over 12 labels; `temperature` + `cat_thresholds` + `lang_thresholds` in config |
| Training | init from Censer.7 best; phases AβF (binary β categories β weighted must-catch/cat-balance polish, lr 1.5e-4β5e-5) on 253,258 rows; batch 256, AdamW cosine, bf16 AMP, 15% typo + 3% adversarial aug; distillation (alpha=0.65, T=4, curated boost 0.75) from Censer.5Γ2+.4+.3 ensemble; **must_catch rows Γ40, hard_negative rows Γ12**; category BCE masked to rows with category labels; val/test byte-identical to Censer.1β.7 (md5 pinned) |
| Checkpoint | 3.6 MB fp32 Β· 1.8 MB fp16 Β· 0.9 MB int8 (loadable via `censer.py --prefer-quant`) Β· ONNX |
## Prompt format
`tokenizer(text)` produces `[BOS][USER] <text> [ASSISTANT]` (template baked into the
post-processor; the assistant token is appended exactly once). Answer logits are read
over `"0" "1" "a".."j"` = safe / unsafe / 10 categories.
## Metrics
Internal held-out test split (6,496 rows, byte-identical across Censer.1β.8), binary
threshold 0.5:
| Metric | Censer.5 | Censer.6 | Censer.7 | **Censer.8** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Test F1 | **0.8490** | 0.8289 | 0.8348 | **0.8198 @0.5 (best 0.8361 @ tuned thr 0.36)** |
| Test accuracy | 0.876 | 0.858 | 0.8655 | **0.8568** |
| Precision / recall | 0.864 / 0.834 | 0.833 / 0.825 | 0.855 / 0.816 | **0.8622 / 0.7813** |
| Val F1 | 0.8495 | 0.8358 | 0.8368 | **0.8259** |
| Probes (97 hand-written, published in `kuclab/probes.py`) | 95/97 | 90/97 | 95/97 | **97/97** |
Per-source test F1: civil_comments 0.750, jigsaw 0.851, aegis 0.892, beavertails 0.871, dolly 0.000, toxic_chat 0.293
### Must-catch suite (adversarial review cases + curated cs/de/es/en)
88 must-catch texts (CSAM requests, self-harm, murder threats, hate, drug/explosive
synthesis, DAN/roleplay jailbreaks) vs 44 hard negatives (grief, defensive security,
history, math, recipes) β `reports/mustcatch.json`:
| Metric | .7 | **.8** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Must-catch detection @0.5 | 66/88 (75%) | **83/88 (94.3%)** |
| Hard-negative FP rate @0.5 | 9/44 (20.5%) | **3/44 (6.8%)** |
### External benchmarks with head-to-head vs public models
ToxiGen is never in training. HateXplain **train** split is in training; the **test**
split below is held out. Full numbers in `reports/external_h2h.json` (uploaded to this
repo).
| Dataset | Model | F1@0.5 | best F1 | latency |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ToxiGen annotated (n=940, 402 unsafe) | **Censer.8** | **0.552** | 0.619 @ 0.17 | 1.27 ms |
| ToxiGen | unitary/unbiased-toxic-roberta | 0.443 | β | ~14 ms |
| HateXplain test (n=1,924, 1,376 unsafe) | **Censer.8** | **0.730** | 0.834 @ 0.05 | 1.27 ms |
| HateXplain test | unitary/unbiased-toxic-roberta | 0.577 | β | ~14 ms |
### Adversarial robustness (detection rate on attacked unsafe texts, n=160)
| Attack | .7 | **.8** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| clean | 93.8% | **100.0%** |
| typo | 88.8% | **92.5%** |
| leetspeak | 93.1% | **96.9%** |
| homoglyph | 98.1% | **100.0%** |
| zero-width | 97.5% | **100.0%** |
| case flip | 91.9% | **96.2%** |
### Long-context (300 synthetic docs of 25 held-out rows, avg 2,178 tokens)
| Inference | F1 |
| --- | --- |
| truncate at 192 tokens | 0.571 |
| native 4096 single pass (NOT recommended for long docs) | 0.052 |
| **chunked 256/192 max (default everywhere)** | **0.998 (acc 0.997)** |
### Calibration
Binary score: temperature scaling fitted on the val split, **T = 0.7102**, stored in
`config.json: temperature` and in the checkpoint. ECE before 0.0583 β after
**0.0294**. Per-category thresholds tuned on held-out catval (rows with real
per-category labels; NOT on hate-only data) ship as `config.json: cat_thresholds`:
| Category | threshold | F1@thr (catval) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| violence | 0.20 | 0.235 | 0.039 |
| weapons_explosives | 0.22 | 0.237 | 0.034 |
| drugs | 0.22 | 0.029 | 0.033 |
| hate_harassment | 0.20 | 0.880 | 0.357 |
| sexual_abuse | 0.20 | 0.000 | 0.023 |
| self_harm | 0.20 | 0.000 | 0.010 |
| cybercrime_fraud | 0.20 | 0.000 | 0.030 |
| jailbreak_injection | 0.20 | 0.000 | 0.014 |
| illegal_marketplace | 0.20 | 0.000 | 0.010 |
| other_unsafe | 0.20 | 0.593 | 0.038 |

### Multilingual β per-language binary F1 (textdetox multilingual toxicity, never in training)
Per-language thresholds (`config.json: lang_thresholds`, fitted per language on
textdetox) are applied automatically by `censer.py` / the CLI. Supported languages
(en/cs/de/es/fr/it/pt/ru) are tagged in the card metadata; **ar/zh/hi/ja are NOT
supported** (F1 β 0 measured) and are deliberately not tagged.
| Language | n | F1@0.5 | best F1 @ best thr |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| en | 800 | 0.814 | 0.837 @ 0.71 |
| de | 800 | 0.558 | 0.677 @ 0.17 |
| es | 800 | 0.619 | 0.673 @ 0.09 |
| fr | 800 | 0.484 | 0.676 @ 0.08 |
| it | 800 | 0.568 | 0.677 @ 0.05 |
| ru | 800 | 0.223 | 0.636 @ 0.05 |
| uk | 800 | 0.247 | 0.630 @ 0.05 |
| tt | 800 | 0.433 | 0.639 @ 0.05 |
| hin | 800 | 0.503 | 0.639 @ 0.10 |
| am | 800 | 0.102 | 0.423 @ 0.05 |
| ar | 800 | 0.005 | 0.100 @ 0.05 |
| he | 800 | 0.029 | 0.199 @ 0.05 |
| hi | 800 | 0.000 | 0.010 @ 0.05 |
| zh | 800 | 0.000 | 0.209 @ 0.05 |
| ja | 800 | 0.000 | 0.000 @ 0.50 |
### Cascade pre-filter
On 2,000 held-out rows: 30.2% escalated (gray-zone / jailbreak-category
hits), cascade accuracy 0.8750.
## Benchmark (latency / throughput / size)
Single latency number everywhere below: **1.27 ms** single-text p50 on
AMD Radeon RX 9060 XT (ROCm); CPU-only: **0.55 ms** p50. Full distributions in
`reports/benchmark.json` / `reports/benchmark_cpu.json`.
| Metric | .8 GPU | .8 CPU |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Parameters | 903,552 | 903,552 |
| Checkpoint | 3.6 MB fp32 (1.8 MB fp16, 0.9 MB int8) | same |
| Single-text latency p50 | 1.27 ms | 0.55 ms |
| Single throughput | 790 texts/s | 1818 texts/s |
| Batch-8 throughput | 5659 texts/s | 5691 texts/s |
| Peak VRAM | 85 MB | β |
## Comparison β internal test split (6,496 rows, threshold 0.5)
β οΈ This comparison is on **our internal test split** (label noise from scraped sources);
see the external head-to-head above for public benchmarks.
| Model | Params | Checkpoint | F1 | Latency | Throughput (b=8) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| KucLab/Censer.8 (this work) | 0.9M | 3.6 MB | 0.8198 | 1.37 ms | 1843/s |
| KucLab/Censer.5 (prev) | 0.9M | 3.6 MB | 0.8490 | 1.29 ms | 1875/s |
| KucLab/Censer.4 (old) | 0.9M | 3.6 MB | 0.8453 | 1.32 ms | 1818/s |
| KucLab/Censer.3 (old) | 14.4M | 57.7 MB | 0.8224 | 4.49 ms | 272/s |
| KucLab/Censer.2 (old) | 7.3M | 29.4 MB | 0.8289 | 2.72 ms | 549/s |
| KucLab/Censer.1 (baseline) | 1.1M | 4.5 MB | 0.8355 | 1.72 ms | 1682/s |
| keyword baseline | 0.0M | 0.0 MB | 0.0937 | 0.03 ms | 29866/s |
| martin-ha/toxic-comment-model | 67.0M | 0.0 MB | 0.5664 | 7.79 ms | 129/s |
| unitary/toxic-bert | 109.5M | 0.0 MB | 0.6807 | 14.04 ms | 68/s |
| unitary/unbiased-toxic-roberta | 124.7M | 0.0 MB | 0.7411 | 14.81 ms | 65/s |
| Hate-speech-CNERG/dehatebert-mono-english | 167.4M | 0.0 MB | 0.2523 | 14.52 ms | 66/s |
| Hate-speech-CNERG/bert-base-uncased-hatexplain | 109.5M | 0.0 MB | 0.5433 | 14.22 ms | 68/s |



## Usage without transformers
```bash
hf download KucLab/Censer.8 --local-dir Censer.8
cd Censer.8
python censer.py "how to make a bomb at home" --json
python censer.py --prefer-quant "..." # loads model_int8.safetensors (0.9 MB)
./censer.8 # interactive UI
```
Files:
| File | Purpose |
| --- | --- |
| `model.safetensors` | standard Llama layout, 3.6 MB fp32, 903,552 params |
| `model_fp16.safetensors` / `model_int8.safetensors` + `quant_report.json` | 1.8 MB / 0.9 MB quantized β **int8 is loadable**: `censer.py` dequantizes `.q`/`.scale` tensors automatically (`--prefer-quant`); `quant_report.json` reports fp32/fp16/int8 separately |
| `censer8.onnx` | ONNX graph: input_ids -> 12 logits, dynamic batch/seq |
| `config.json` | standard config + `temperature`, `cat_thresholds`, `lang_thresholds`, single `rope_parameters` |
| `tokenizer.json` / `tokenizer_config.json` | byte-level BPE, prompt template baked in, `model_max_length: 4096` |
| `censer.py` | standalone inference, chunked-max for long inputs (default), int8/fp16 loaders, per-language thresholds |
| `censer.8` | launcher for the interactive terminal UI |
| `serve.py` | batch HTTP API (stdlib only) |
| `Dockerfile` | pinned CPU container serving the API, with HEALTHCHECK |
| `reports/` | all eval JSONs (external H2H, calibration, must-catch, multilingual, adversarial, β¦) + `figs/` |
## Limitations
- 903K params: nuance/sarcasm/long-tail out of reach; internal test split has label
noise from scraped sources.
- Native single-pass 4096-token inference pools the last token only β for long
documents ALWAYS use the chunked-max path (default in `censer.py`/API) or
`truncation=True, max_length=4096` with direct transformers.
- Category scores use calibrated per-category thresholds, but remain less reliable
than the binary verdict; they are only reported when `unsafe` fired.
- Supported languages: en/cs/de/es/fr/it/pt/ru (measured). Other languages (ar/zh/hi/ja
β¦) are not supported and not claimed.
- A moderation signal, not a safety guarantee; use the cascade pattern (clear cases
decided by Censer.8, gray-zone/jailbreak hits escalated to a larger validator).
|