--- library_name: transformers pipeline_tag: text-classification tags: - text-classification - safety - content-moderation - multi-label - multilingual - tiny-language-model - from-scratch - distilled language: - en - cs - de - es - fr - it - pt - ru license: apache-2.0 datasets: - nvidia/Aegis-AI-Content-Safety-Dataset-1.0 - thesofakillers/jigsaw-toxic-comment-classification-challenge - google/civil_comments - PKU-Alignment/BeaverTails - lmsys/toxic-chat - databricks/databricks-dolly-15k - Hate-speech-CNERG/hatexplain - Intuit-GenSRF/jigsaw-multilingual-train-unique metrics: - f1 - accuracy - ece --- > **Successor: [Barist.1](https://huggingface.co/KucLab/Barist.1)** (GitHub: [Jerry256254/barist.1](https://github.com/Jerry256254/barist.1)) — the project continues under the Barist name; Barist.1 fixes the third adversarial review of Censer.9 (Czech benign FP, pre-filter over-blocking, uk FP, de/fr thresholds, category noise, README honesty). This model is kept for reproducibility. # Censer.8 A **903,552-parameter** decoder-only transformer trained **from scratch**: binary **safe / unsafe** + **10 safety categories** (multi-label), **4096-token** native context with a chunked-max path for long documents, **per-language thresholds**, and **temperature-calibrated** scores — all in a 3.6 MB checkpoint that runs on CPU. Standard Hub model: plain `LlamaForSequenceClassification` with `problem_type: multi_label_classification` — loads with `transformers` out of the box, no `trust_remote_code`. In transformers ≥ 5.x the multi-label pipeline applies **sigmoid** automatically; use `top_k=-1` to get all labels: ```python from transformers import pipeline clf = pipeline("text-classification", model="KucLab/Censer.8") clf("how to make a bomb at home", top_k=-1) # [{'label': 'unsafe', 'score': ...}, {'label': 'weapons_explosives', ...}, ...] ``` Read the binary verdict from the `unsafe` entry (threshold 0.5, or the calibrated `temperature`-scaled score); category labels fire only when `unsafe` fired and the per-category threshold in `config.json: cat_thresholds` is exceeded. ## What is new in .8 (vs .7) Censer.8 is a direct response to an adversarial review of .7. Every blocking item fixed: | Review item | .7 | **.8** | | --- | --- | --- | | Category head broken (corr −0.75 with unsafe; tied head read letters a–j) | categories inverted / nonsensical | **separate untied `score` head** (903,552 params, +1,536); category loss masked to unsafe rows only; categories gated on `unsafe` at inference | | Category calibration invalid (tuned on hate-only data → F1 0.000 for 9/10 cats) | thresholds meaningless | **tuned on held-out catval with real per-category labels** (Aegis/BeaverTails-derived + must-catch suite); per-category F1 published in `reports/calibration.json` | | Must-catch misses (CSAM 0.06, cs self-harm 0.06, "Zabiju tě" 0.28, DAN 0.44) | 66/88 (75%) | **+457 curated must-catch rows (CSAM, self-harm, threats, hate, drugs, explosives, DAN/roleplay jailbreaks in en/cs/de/es) + cat-balanced duplicates, trained at 15–40× weight** — see `reports/mustcatch.json`: **83/88 (94.3%)** | | False positives (grief 0.70, defensive phishing 0.75, cs benign 5/18) | 9/44 FP (20.5%) | **+1,172 hard negatives** (grief, defensive security, history, math, recipes) at 10–12× weight — FP rate **3/44 (6.8%)** | | Binary ECE 0.18, tag "calibrated" unjustified | ECE 0.1798 | **temperature scaling fitted on val (T = 0.7102), stored in `config.json: temperature` and the checkpoint; ECE after scaling 0.0294** (before 0.0583) + reliability diagram | | One global threshold 0.5 bad for non-en (FPR@0.5: it 43%, es 42%, de 37%) | single 0.5 | **per-language thresholds** (`config.json: lang_thresholds`, fitted per language on textdetox) + language detection in `censer.py`/CLI | | Dockerfile broken (Censer.6 repo, bad COPY, no numpy) | build fails | **rewritten: Censer.8 repo, root COPY, pinned deps + numpy, HEALTHCHECK** | | `reports/external_h2h.json` 404 on Hub | missing | **all `reports/*.json` uploaded to the Hub repo** | | README pipeline example wrong | misleading | fixed (`top_k=-1`, sigmoid automatic in multi-label) | | Params 902,016 vs real 903,552; 3 different latency numbers; ar/zh/hi tags with F1≈0; synth F1=1.0 cited as multilingual proof; missing `model_max_length`; duplicate rope keys; double `[ASSISTANT]` suspicion; dead int8 file | inconsistencies | **all corrected** — see below (params 903,552, one latency number, language tags limited to measured-supported languages, single `rope_parameters`, `model_max_length: 4096`, `[ASSISTANT]` verified added exactly once, **int8 loader implemented** in `censer.py`) | ## How to run ### The `censer.8` command — interactive terminal UI ```bash pip install torch tokenizers safetensors huggingface_hub hf download KucLab/Censer.8 --local-dir ~/.local/share/censer8 chmod +x ~/.local/share/censer8/censer.8 ln -s ~/.local/share/censer8/censer.8 ~/.local/bin/censer.8 censer.8 # interactive UI: phrase in -> safe/unsafe + categories + score censer.8 "how to make a bomb at home" ``` Or via the GitHub package (loads the Hub model with plain `transformers`): ```bash pip install "git+https://github.com/Jerry256254/censer.8.git" censer.8 ``` ### One-liner with `transformers` ```bash pip install torch transformers python - <<'PY' import torch from transformers import AutoTokenizer, AutoModelForSequenceClassification tok = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained("KucLab/Censer.8") model = AutoModelForSequenceClassification.from_pretrained("KucLab/Censer.8").eval() enc = tok("how to make a bomb at home", return_tensors="pt", truncation=True, max_length=4096) probs = model(**enc).logits.sigmoid()[0] # multi-label -> sigmoid id2label = model.config.id2label cat_thr = model.config.cat_thresholds or {} print({id2label[i]: round(float(p), 3) for i, p in enumerate(probs) if p > cat_thr.get(id2label[i], 0.5)}) PY ``` - Binary unsafe score = label `unsafe` (index 1); threshold 0.5. - Category labels use per-category calibrated thresholds (`config.json: cat_thresholds`) and are only meaningful when `unsafe` fired. - Scores are temperature-calibrated (`config.json: temperature`); apply `p_cal = sigmoid(logit(p) / T)` if you need calibrated probabilities from raw logits. - Runs on CPU out of the box; GPU via `device=0`. ### Long inputs — always use the chunked path Native context is 4096 tokens (`model_max_length: 4096`, tokenizer truncates beyond it), but a **single pass pools only the last token**, so in long documents unsafe content in the middle can be missed (measured F1 0.052 on 25-row synthetic docs). Therefore `censer.py` / the API **always** split inputs longer than 256 tokens into overlapping chunks (256 tokens, stride 192) and aggregate by **max** — this is the default and only recommended path for long documents (measured F1 0.998 (acc 0.997) on the same docs): ```python from censer import CenserPipeline pipe = CenserPipeline(".") pipe.predict("very long text ...") # {"label": "1", "unsafe": true, "score": ..., "categories": [...], "chunks": N} ``` For direct `transformers` use, pass `truncation=True, max_length=4096` (as above) or chunk manually for documents where the middle matters. ### Batch HTTP API + Docker ```bash python serve.py --dir . --port 8000 curl -s localhost:8000/classify -d '{"texts": ["hello", "how to make a bomb"]}' docker build -t censer8 . && docker run -p 8000:8000 censer8 # includes HEALTHCHECK ``` Endpoints: `GET /health`, `POST /classify` (batch), `POST /classify-one`. Rate limit via `RATE_LIMIT_PER_MIN` (default 600). ## Model details | Property | Value | | --- | --- | | Architecture | `LlamaForSequenceClassification` (standard transformers) | | Parameters | **903,552** (verified by summing safetensors tensors) | | Layers / d_model / heads / d_ff | 3 / 128 / 4 / 384 | | Context | 4096 tokens native (linear RoPE ×8, single `rope_parameters` key); long docs via chunked-max (default) | | Input cap | 4000 chars (CLI) / `model_max_length` 4096 tokens (tokenizer truncates) | | Tokenizer | byte-level BPE, 2048 tokens (multilingual corpus); chat template bakes in `[BOS][USER] … [ASSISTANT]` (verified: exactly one `[ASSISTANT]`) | | Head | separate linear `score` head over 12 answer logits `"0" "1" "a".."j"` (untied from embeddings) | | Output | sigmoid over 12 labels; `temperature` + `cat_thresholds` + `lang_thresholds` in config | | Training | init from Censer.7 best; phases A–F (binary → categories → weighted must-catch/cat-balance polish, lr 1.5e-4→5e-5) on 253,258 rows; batch 256, AdamW cosine, bf16 AMP, 15% typo + 3% adversarial aug; distillation (alpha=0.65, T=4, curated boost 0.75) from Censer.5×2+.4+.3 ensemble; **must_catch rows ×40, hard_negative rows ×12**; category BCE masked to rows with category labels; val/test byte-identical to Censer.1–.7 (md5 pinned) | | Checkpoint | 3.6 MB fp32 · 1.8 MB fp16 · 0.9 MB int8 (loadable via `censer.py --prefer-quant`) · ONNX | ## Prompt format `tokenizer(text)` produces `[BOS][USER] [ASSISTANT]` (template baked into the post-processor; the assistant token is appended exactly once). Answer logits are read over `"0" "1" "a".."j"` = safe / unsafe / 10 categories. ## Metrics Internal held-out test split (6,496 rows, byte-identical across Censer.1–.8), binary threshold 0.5: | Metric | Censer.5 | Censer.6 | Censer.7 | **Censer.8** | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Test F1 | **0.8490** | 0.8289 | 0.8348 | **0.8198 @0.5 (best 0.8361 @ tuned thr 0.36)** | | Test accuracy | 0.876 | 0.858 | 0.8655 | **0.8568** | | Precision / recall | 0.864 / 0.834 | 0.833 / 0.825 | 0.855 / 0.816 | **0.8622 / 0.7813** | | Val F1 | 0.8495 | 0.8358 | 0.8368 | **0.8259** | | Probes (97 hand-written, published in `kuclab/probes.py`) | 95/97 | 90/97 | 95/97 | **97/97** | Per-source test F1: civil_comments 0.750, jigsaw 0.851, aegis 0.892, beavertails 0.871, dolly 0.000, toxic_chat 0.293 ### Must-catch suite (adversarial review cases + curated cs/de/es/en) 88 must-catch texts (CSAM requests, self-harm, murder threats, hate, drug/explosive synthesis, DAN/roleplay jailbreaks) vs 44 hard negatives (grief, defensive security, history, math, recipes) — `reports/mustcatch.json`: | Metric | .7 | **.8** | | --- | --- | --- | | Must-catch detection @0.5 | 66/88 (75%) | **83/88 (94.3%)** | | Hard-negative FP rate @0.5 | 9/44 (20.5%) | **3/44 (6.8%)** | ### External benchmarks with head-to-head vs public models ToxiGen is never in training. HateXplain **train** split is in training; the **test** split below is held out. Full numbers in `reports/external_h2h.json` (uploaded to this repo). | Dataset | Model | F1@0.5 | best F1 | latency | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | ToxiGen annotated (n=940, 402 unsafe) | **Censer.8** | **0.552** | 0.619 @ 0.17 | 1.27 ms | | ToxiGen | unitary/unbiased-toxic-roberta | 0.443 | — | ~14 ms | | HateXplain test (n=1,924, 1,376 unsafe) | **Censer.8** | **0.730** | 0.834 @ 0.05 | 1.27 ms | | HateXplain test | unitary/unbiased-toxic-roberta | 0.577 | — | ~14 ms | ### Adversarial robustness (detection rate on attacked unsafe texts, n=160) | Attack | .7 | **.8** | | --- | --- | --- | | clean | 93.8% | **100.0%** | | typo | 88.8% | **92.5%** | | leetspeak | 93.1% | **96.9%** | | homoglyph | 98.1% | **100.0%** | | zero-width | 97.5% | **100.0%** | | case flip | 91.9% | **96.2%** | ### Long-context (300 synthetic docs of 25 held-out rows, avg 2,178 tokens) | Inference | F1 | | --- | --- | | truncate at 192 tokens | 0.571 | | native 4096 single pass (NOT recommended for long docs) | 0.052 | | **chunked 256/192 max (default everywhere)** | **0.998 (acc 0.997)** | ### Calibration Binary score: temperature scaling fitted on the val split, **T = 0.7102**, stored in `config.json: temperature` and in the checkpoint. ECE before 0.0583 → after **0.0294**. Per-category thresholds tuned on held-out catval (rows with real per-category labels; NOT on hate-only data) ship as `config.json: cat_thresholds`: | Category | threshold | F1@thr (catval) | | --- | --- | --- | | violence | 0.20 | 0.235 | 0.039 | | weapons_explosives | 0.22 | 0.237 | 0.034 | | drugs | 0.22 | 0.029 | 0.033 | | hate_harassment | 0.20 | 0.880 | 0.357 | | sexual_abuse | 0.20 | 0.000 | 0.023 | | self_harm | 0.20 | 0.000 | 0.010 | | cybercrime_fraud | 0.20 | 0.000 | 0.030 | | jailbreak_injection | 0.20 | 0.000 | 0.014 | | illegal_marketplace | 0.20 | 0.000 | 0.010 | | other_unsafe | 0.20 | 0.593 | 0.038 | ![Reliability diagram](figs/reliability.png) ### Multilingual — per-language binary F1 (textdetox multilingual toxicity, never in training) Per-language thresholds (`config.json: lang_thresholds`, fitted per language on textdetox) are applied automatically by `censer.py` / the CLI. Supported languages (en/cs/de/es/fr/it/pt/ru) are tagged in the card metadata; **ar/zh/hi/ja are NOT supported** (F1 ≈ 0 measured) and are deliberately not tagged. | Language | n | F1@0.5 | best F1 @ best thr | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | en | 800 | 0.814 | 0.837 @ 0.71 | | de | 800 | 0.558 | 0.677 @ 0.17 | | es | 800 | 0.619 | 0.673 @ 0.09 | | fr | 800 | 0.484 | 0.676 @ 0.08 | | it | 800 | 0.568 | 0.677 @ 0.05 | | ru | 800 | 0.223 | 0.636 @ 0.05 | | uk | 800 | 0.247 | 0.630 @ 0.05 | | tt | 800 | 0.433 | 0.639 @ 0.05 | | hin | 800 | 0.503 | 0.639 @ 0.10 | | am | 800 | 0.102 | 0.423 @ 0.05 | | ar | 800 | 0.005 | 0.100 @ 0.05 | | he | 800 | 0.029 | 0.199 @ 0.05 | | hi | 800 | 0.000 | 0.010 @ 0.05 | | zh | 800 | 0.000 | 0.209 @ 0.05 | | ja | 800 | 0.000 | 0.000 @ 0.50 | ### Cascade pre-filter On 2,000 held-out rows: 30.2% escalated (gray-zone / jailbreak-category hits), cascade accuracy 0.8750. ## Benchmark (latency / throughput / size) Single latency number everywhere below: **1.27 ms** single-text p50 on AMD Radeon RX 9060 XT (ROCm); CPU-only: **0.55 ms** p50. Full distributions in `reports/benchmark.json` / `reports/benchmark_cpu.json`. | Metric | .8 GPU | .8 CPU | | --- | --- | --- | | Parameters | 903,552 | 903,552 | | Checkpoint | 3.6 MB fp32 (1.8 MB fp16, 0.9 MB int8) | same | | Single-text latency p50 | 1.27 ms | 0.55 ms | | Single throughput | 790 texts/s | 1818 texts/s | | Batch-8 throughput | 5659 texts/s | 5691 texts/s | | Peak VRAM | 85 MB | — | ## Comparison — internal test split (6,496 rows, threshold 0.5) ⚠️ This comparison is on **our internal test split** (label noise from scraped sources); see the external head-to-head above for public benchmarks. | Model | Params | Checkpoint | F1 | Latency | Throughput (b=8) | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | KucLab/Censer.8 (this work) | 0.9M | 3.6 MB | 0.8198 | 1.37 ms | 1843/s | | KucLab/Censer.5 (prev) | 0.9M | 3.6 MB | 0.8490 | 1.29 ms | 1875/s | | KucLab/Censer.4 (old) | 0.9M | 3.6 MB | 0.8453 | 1.32 ms | 1818/s | | KucLab/Censer.3 (old) | 14.4M | 57.7 MB | 0.8224 | 4.49 ms | 272/s | | KucLab/Censer.2 (old) | 7.3M | 29.4 MB | 0.8289 | 2.72 ms | 549/s | | KucLab/Censer.1 (baseline) | 1.1M | 4.5 MB | 0.8355 | 1.72 ms | 1682/s | | keyword baseline | 0.0M | 0.0 MB | 0.0937 | 0.03 ms | 29866/s | | martin-ha/toxic-comment-model | 67.0M | 0.0 MB | 0.5664 | 7.79 ms | 129/s | | unitary/toxic-bert | 109.5M | 0.0 MB | 0.6807 | 14.04 ms | 68/s | | unitary/unbiased-toxic-roberta | 124.7M | 0.0 MB | 0.7411 | 14.81 ms | 65/s | | Hate-speech-CNERG/dehatebert-mono-english | 167.4M | 0.0 MB | 0.2523 | 14.52 ms | 66/s | | Hate-speech-CNERG/bert-base-uncased-hatexplain | 109.5M | 0.0 MB | 0.5433 | 14.22 ms | 68/s | ![Comparison overview](figs/comparison_overview.png) ![F1 per megabyte](figs/f1_vs_size.png) ![Metric bars](figs/metrics_bars.png) ## Usage without transformers ```bash hf download KucLab/Censer.8 --local-dir Censer.8 cd Censer.8 python censer.py "how to make a bomb at home" --json python censer.py --prefer-quant "..." # loads model_int8.safetensors (0.9 MB) ./censer.8 # interactive UI ``` Files: | File | Purpose | | --- | --- | | `model.safetensors` | standard Llama layout, 3.6 MB fp32, 903,552 params | | `model_fp16.safetensors` / `model_int8.safetensors` + `quant_report.json` | 1.8 MB / 0.9 MB quantized — **int8 is loadable**: `censer.py` dequantizes `.q`/`.scale` tensors automatically (`--prefer-quant`); `quant_report.json` reports fp32/fp16/int8 separately | | `censer8.onnx` | ONNX graph: input_ids -> 12 logits, dynamic batch/seq | | `config.json` | standard config + `temperature`, `cat_thresholds`, `lang_thresholds`, single `rope_parameters` | | `tokenizer.json` / `tokenizer_config.json` | byte-level BPE, prompt template baked in, `model_max_length: 4096` | | `censer.py` | standalone inference, chunked-max for long inputs (default), int8/fp16 loaders, per-language thresholds | | `censer.8` | launcher for the interactive terminal UI | | `serve.py` | batch HTTP API (stdlib only) | | `Dockerfile` | pinned CPU container serving the API, with HEALTHCHECK | | `reports/` | all eval JSONs (external H2H, calibration, must-catch, multilingual, adversarial, …) + `figs/` | ## Limitations - 903K params: nuance/sarcasm/long-tail out of reach; internal test split has label noise from scraped sources. - Native single-pass 4096-token inference pools the last token only — for long documents ALWAYS use the chunked-max path (default in `censer.py`/API) or `truncation=True, max_length=4096` with direct transformers. - Category scores use calibrated per-category thresholds, but remain less reliable than the binary verdict; they are only reported when `unsafe` fired. - Supported languages: en/cs/de/es/fr/it/pt/ru (measured). Other languages (ar/zh/hi/ja …) are not supported and not claimed. - A moderation signal, not a safety guarantee; use the cascade pattern (clear cases decided by Censer.8, gray-zone/jailbreak hits escalated to a larger validator).