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Browse files- seed_42/Qwen/Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct/adapters/agent_adapter/adapter_model.safetensors +3 -0
- seed_42/Qwen/Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct/adapters/critic_adapter/adapter_model.safetensors +3 -0
- seed_42/agent_trainer/critic_optimizer_state.pt +3 -0
- seed_42/agent_trainer/policy_optimizer_state.pt +3 -0
- seed_42/agent_trainer/trainer_annealing_state.pkl +3 -0
- seed_42/random_state.pkl +3 -0
- src_code_for_reproducibility/chat_utils/__pycache__/chat_turn.cpython-312.pyc +0 -0
- src_code_for_reproducibility/docs/source/contributing.rst +0 -0
- src_code_for_reproducibility/docs/source/environments/ipd.rst +411 -0
- src_code_for_reproducibility/docs/source/src.models.hf_agent.rst +7 -0
- src_code_for_reproducibility/docs/source/src.models.local_llm.rst +7 -0
- src_code_for_reproducibility/docs/source/src.utils.quick_stats.rst +7 -0
seed_42/Qwen/Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct/adapters/agent_adapter/adapter_model.safetensors
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seed_42/agent_trainer/policy_optimizer_state.pt
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src_code_for_reproducibility/docs/source/contributing.rst
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src_code_for_reproducibility/docs/source/environments/ipd.rst
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| 1 |
+
=================
|
| 2 |
+
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
|
| 3 |
+
=================
|
| 4 |
+
|
| 5 |
+
The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma environment provides a classic game theory setting for studying cooperation
|
| 6 |
+
and competition between agents. This document describes the API for interacting with the IPD environment
|
| 7 |
+
and its associated agent handler.
|
| 8 |
+
|
| 9 |
+
Overview
|
| 10 |
+
--------
|
| 11 |
+
|
| 12 |
+
The Prisoner's Dilemma is a fundamental problem in game theory that demonstrates why two rational individuals might not
|
| 13 |
+
cooperate, even when it appears in their best interest to do so. In the iterated version, the same two players
|
| 14 |
+
repeatedly face the same dilemma, allowing for the development of trust or retaliation based on previous interactions.
|
| 15 |
+
|
| 16 |
+
Our implementation follows the Multi-Agent Negotiation Environment standard, allowing it to be used with
|
| 17 |
+
LLM agents through a text-based interface.
|
| 18 |
+
|
| 19 |
+
Game Rules
|
| 20 |
+
----------
|
| 21 |
+
|
| 22 |
+
### Basic Premise
|
| 23 |
+
|
| 24 |
+
The scenario behind the Prisoner's Dilemma is as follows:
|
| 25 |
+
|
| 26 |
+
Two criminals are arrested and imprisoned. Each prisoner is in solitary confinement with no means of communicating with
|
| 27 |
+
the other. The prosecutors lack sufficient evidence to convict the pair on the principal charge, but they have enough
|
| 28 |
+
to convict both on a lesser charge. Simultaneously, the prosecutors offer each prisoner a bargain:
|
| 29 |
+
|
| 30 |
+
- If both prisoners betray each other, each serves 2 years in prison (the "punishment" payoff)
|
| 31 |
+
- If one betrays the other while the other remains silent, the betrayer goes free (the "temptation" payoff) while the
|
| 32 |
+
silent accomplice serves 3 years (the "sucker" payoff)
|
| 33 |
+
- If both remain silent, each serves only 1 year in prison (the "reward" payoff)
|
| 34 |
+
|
| 35 |
+
### Game Mechanics
|
| 36 |
+
|
| 37 |
+
In our implementation, the choices are simplified to:
|
| 38 |
+
- **C**: Cooperate (remain silent)
|
| 39 |
+
- **D**: Defect (betray the other prisoner)
|
| 40 |
+
|
| 41 |
+
Each round, both players simultaneously choose either C or D, and receive points based on the combination of their choices:
|
| 42 |
+
|
| 43 |
+
- Both choose C: Both receive the "reward" payoff (3 points by default)
|
| 44 |
+
- Both choose D: Both receive the "punishment" payoff (1 point by default)
|
| 45 |
+
- One chooses C, one chooses D: The defector receives the "temptation" payoff (5 points by default), while the cooperator
|
| 46 |
+
receives the "sucker" payoff (0 points by default)
|
| 47 |
+
|
| 48 |
+
### Example: Single Round
|
| 49 |
+
|
| 50 |
+
Let's see how a single round plays out:
|
| 51 |
+
|
| 52 |
+
1. Alice and Bob simultaneously make their choices
|
| 53 |
+
2. If Alice chooses C and Bob chooses C:
|
| 54 |
+
- Alice receives 3 points
|
| 55 |
+
- Bob receives 3 points
|
| 56 |
+
3. If Alice chooses C and Bob chooses D:
|
| 57 |
+
- Alice receives 0 points
|
| 58 |
+
- Bob receives 5 points
|
| 59 |
+
4. If Alice chooses D and Bob chooses C:
|
| 60 |
+
- Alice receives 5 points
|
| 61 |
+
- Bob receives 0 points
|
| 62 |
+
5. If Alice chooses D and Bob chooses D:
|
| 63 |
+
- Alice receives 1 point
|
| 64 |
+
- Bob receives 1 point
|
| 65 |
+
|
| 66 |
+
### Iterated Game Structure
|
| 67 |
+
|
| 68 |
+
The iterated version repeats this basic game for a fixed number of rounds. The key features are:
|
| 69 |
+
|
| 70 |
+
1. Players know the total number of rounds in advance
|
| 71 |
+
2. After each round, players learn what choice the other player made
|
| 72 |
+
3. Players maintain a cumulative score across all rounds
|
| 73 |
+
4. Players can adjust their strategy based on the history of previous interactions
|
| 74 |
+
|
| 75 |
+
### Game Variations
|
| 76 |
+
|
| 77 |
+
The IPD environment supports several variations through configuration parameters:
|
| 78 |
+
|
| 79 |
+
#### Different Payoff Matrices
|
| 80 |
+
|
| 81 |
+
The standard payoff values can be modified to create different incentive structures:
|
| 82 |
+
- **Traditional PD**: reward=3, punishment=1, temptation=5, sucker=0
|
| 83 |
+
- **Weak Temptation**: reward=3, punishment=1, temptation=4, sucker=0 (reduces the incentive to defect)
|
| 84 |
+
- **Harsh Punishment**: reward=3, punishment=0, temptation=5, sucker=0 (increases the cost of mutual defection)
|
| 85 |
+
- **Generous**: reward=4, punishment=2, temptation=5, sucker=1 (cushions the blow of being betrayed)
|
| 86 |
+
|
| 87 |
+
#### Game Length Variations
|
| 88 |
+
|
| 89 |
+
The number of rounds can significantly impact strategy:
|
| 90 |
+
- **Short Games** (5-10 rounds): Incentivizes more defection, especially near the end
|
| 91 |
+
- **Medium Games** (20-50 rounds): Allows for the development of tit-for-tat and forgiveness strategies
|
| 92 |
+
- **Long Games** (100+ rounds): Favors steady cooperation with occasional "probing" defections
|
| 93 |
+
|
| 94 |
+
### Common Strategies
|
| 95 |
+
|
| 96 |
+
While not enforced by the environment, several well-known strategies can emerge:
|
| 97 |
+
- **Always Cooperate**: Always choose C
|
| 98 |
+
- **Always Defect**: Always choose D
|
| 99 |
+
- **Tit for Tat**: Start with C, then copy what the opponent did in the previous round
|
| 100 |
+
- **Forgiving Tit for Tat**: Like Tit for Tat, but occasionally cooperate even after being defected against
|
| 101 |
+
- **Grudger**: Cooperate until the opponent defects once, then always defect
|
| 102 |
+
- **Random**: Choose randomly between C and D
|
| 103 |
+
|
| 104 |
+
IPDEnv
|
| 105 |
+
------
|
| 106 |
+
|
| 107 |
+
The ``IPDEnv`` class provides an interface to the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma environment that follows the
|
| 108 |
+
Multi-Agent Negotiation Environment standard.
|
| 109 |
+
|
| 110 |
+
.. code-block:: python
|
| 111 |
+
|
| 112 |
+
class IPDEnv:
|
| 113 |
+
"""
|
| 114 |
+
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma environment following the MarlEnvironment standard.
|
| 115 |
+
|
| 116 |
+
In each round of the game, two agents simultaneously choose to either cooperate (C) or defect (D).
|
| 117 |
+
The payoffs are as follows:
|
| 118 |
+
- If both cooperate: Both receive the "reward" (usually 3 points)
|
| 119 |
+
- If both defect: Both receive the "punishment" (usually 1 point)
|
| 120 |
+
- If one cooperates and one defects: The defector receives the "temptation" (usually 5 points)
|
| 121 |
+
and the cooperator receives the "sucker" payoff (usually 0 points)
|
| 122 |
+
|
| 123 |
+
The game is played for a specified number of rounds.
|
| 124 |
+
"""
|
| 125 |
+
|
| 126 |
+
def __init__(
|
| 127 |
+
self,
|
| 128 |
+
rounds_per_game: int = 10,
|
| 129 |
+
reward: float = 3.0, # Both cooperate
|
| 130 |
+
punishment: float = 1.0, # Both defect
|
| 131 |
+
temptation: float = 5.0, # Defector's reward when other cooperates
|
| 132 |
+
sucker: float = 0.0, # Cooperator's reward when other defects
|
| 133 |
+
random_seed: Optional[int] = None,
|
| 134 |
+
):
|
| 135 |
+
"""
|
| 136 |
+
Initialize the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma environment.
|
| 137 |
+
|
| 138 |
+
Args:
|
| 139 |
+
rounds_per_game: Number of rounds to play
|
| 140 |
+
reward: Payoff when both agents cooperate
|
| 141 |
+
punishment: Payoff when both agents defect
|
| 142 |
+
temptation: Payoff for defecting when other agent cooperates
|
| 143 |
+
sucker: Payoff for cooperating when other agent defects
|
| 144 |
+
seed: Random seed for reproducibility
|
| 145 |
+
"""
|
| 146 |
+
# ...
|
| 147 |
+
|
| 148 |
+
def reset(self) -> Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]]:
|
| 149 |
+
"""
|
| 150 |
+
Reset the environment to an initial state and return the initial observation.
|
| 151 |
+
|
| 152 |
+
Returns:
|
| 153 |
+
observation (dict): A dictionary where keys are agent identifiers and values are observations.
|
| 154 |
+
"""
|
| 155 |
+
# ...
|
| 156 |
+
|
| 157 |
+
def step(self, actions: Dict[str, str]) -> Tuple[Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]], bool, Dict[str, Any]]:
|
| 158 |
+
"""
|
| 159 |
+
Take a step in the environment using the provided actions.
|
| 160 |
+
|
| 161 |
+
Args:
|
| 162 |
+
actions (dict): A dictionary where keys are agent identifiers and values are actions ('C' or 'D').
|
| 163 |
+
|
| 164 |
+
Returns:
|
| 165 |
+
observations (dict): A dictionary where keys are agent identifiers and values are observations.
|
| 166 |
+
done (bool): Whether the episode has ended.
|
| 167 |
+
info (dict): Additional information about the environment.
|
| 168 |
+
"""
|
| 169 |
+
# ...
|
| 170 |
+
|
| 171 |
+
Key Implementation Details
|
| 172 |
+
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
| 173 |
+
|
| 174 |
+
The ``IPDEnv`` class implements several key features:
|
| 175 |
+
|
| 176 |
+
1. **Two-Agent Support**: The environment tracks two agents ("alice" and "bob") and manages their interactions.
|
| 177 |
+
|
| 178 |
+
2. **Round-Based Play**: The environment enforces turn structure and tracks game history.
|
| 179 |
+
|
| 180 |
+
3. **Payoff Matrix**: The environment calculates rewards based on the standard prisoner's dilemma payoff matrix.
|
| 181 |
+
|
| 182 |
+
4. **Observation Generation**: The environment generates detailed observations for each agent, including action history and rewards.
|
| 183 |
+
|
| 184 |
+
5. **Game Termination**: The environment tracks game termination after the specified number of rounds.
|
| 185 |
+
|
| 186 |
+
Observation Structure
|
| 187 |
+
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
| 188 |
+
|
| 189 |
+
Each agent receives an observation dictionary with the following structure:
|
| 190 |
+
|
| 191 |
+
.. code-block:: python
|
| 192 |
+
|
| 193 |
+
{
|
| 194 |
+
"current_round": int, # Current round number (0-indexed)
|
| 195 |
+
"rounds_per_game": int, # Total number of rounds in the game
|
| 196 |
+
"history": List[Dict], # Complete game history so far
|
| 197 |
+
"last_round_actions": Dict[str, str], # Actions from the previous round (if any)
|
| 198 |
+
"last_round_reward": float, # Reward received in the previous round (if any)
|
| 199 |
+
"total_reward": float, # Cumulative reward so far
|
| 200 |
+
"payoff_matrix": Dict[str, float], # The game's payoff matrix values
|
| 201 |
+
}
|
| 202 |
+
|
| 203 |
+
Action Structure
|
| 204 |
+
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
| 205 |
+
|
| 206 |
+
Actions are simple strings:
|
| 207 |
+
|
| 208 |
+
1. ``"C"`` for Cooperate
|
| 209 |
+
2. ``"D"`` for Defect
|
| 210 |
+
|
| 211 |
+
IPDAgent
|
| 212 |
+
--------------
|
| 213 |
+
|
| 214 |
+
The ``IPDAgent`` class implements the agent handler interface for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, processing observations from the environment and generating actions through an LLM.
|
| 215 |
+
|
| 216 |
+
.. code-block:: python
|
| 217 |
+
|
| 218 |
+
class IPDAgent:
|
| 219 |
+
"""
|
| 220 |
+
Agent handler for Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, implementing the AgentState interface
|
| 221 |
+
for the multi-agent negotiation standard.
|
| 222 |
+
"""
|
| 223 |
+
|
| 224 |
+
def __init__(
|
| 225 |
+
self,
|
| 226 |
+
agent_id: str,
|
| 227 |
+
policy_id: str = "llm_policy",
|
| 228 |
+
system_prompt: Optional[str] = None,
|
| 229 |
+
max_errors: int = 3,
|
| 230 |
+
opponent_id: Optional[str] = None,
|
| 231 |
+
):
|
| 232 |
+
"""
|
| 233 |
+
Initialize the IPD agent handler.
|
| 234 |
+
|
| 235 |
+
Args:
|
| 236 |
+
agent_id: Identifier for this agent ("alice" or "bob")
|
| 237 |
+
policy_id: Identifier for the policy this agent uses
|
| 238 |
+
system_prompt: Optional custom system prompt for the LLM
|
| 239 |
+
max_errors: Maximum number of parsing errors before defaulting to cooperate
|
| 240 |
+
opponent_id: Optional identifier of the opponent (inferred if not provided)
|
| 241 |
+
"""
|
| 242 |
+
# ...
|
| 243 |
+
|
| 244 |
+
def step(self, observation_from_env: Dict[str, Any], policy_output: str = None) -> Tuple[str, Dict[str, Any], str, bool, Dict[str, Any]]:
|
| 245 |
+
"""
|
| 246 |
+
Update the agent state based on the observation and process the policy output.
|
| 247 |
+
|
| 248 |
+
Args:
|
| 249 |
+
observation_from_env: The observation from the environment
|
| 250 |
+
policy_output: The output from the policy (LLM response)
|
| 251 |
+
|
| 252 |
+
Returns:
|
| 253 |
+
policy_id: The policy identifier
|
| 254 |
+
policy_input: The input to the policy
|
| 255 |
+
action: The action to be sent to the environment
|
| 256 |
+
done: Whether the action is ready to be sent to the environment
|
| 257 |
+
info: Additional information about the agent
|
| 258 |
+
"""
|
| 259 |
+
# ...
|
| 260 |
+
|
| 261 |
+
Key Implementation Details
|
| 262 |
+
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
| 263 |
+
|
| 264 |
+
The ``IPDAgent`` class implements several key features:
|
| 265 |
+
|
| 266 |
+
1. **LLM Interaction**: The agent generates prompts for an LLM and processes the LLM's responses.
|
| 267 |
+
|
| 268 |
+
2. **Action Extraction**: The agent parses the LLM's output to extract valid actions (C or D).
|
| 269 |
+
|
| 270 |
+
3. **Error Handling**: The agent provides helpful error messages when parsing fails and defaults to cooperation after multiple failures.
|
| 271 |
+
|
| 272 |
+
4. **History Tracking**: The agent maintains and provides the complete game history in its prompts.
|
| 273 |
+
|
| 274 |
+
5. **Strategy Explanation**: The agent can extract and log the reasoning behind an LLM's decisions.
|
| 275 |
+
|
| 276 |
+
Prompt Structure
|
| 277 |
+
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
|
| 278 |
+
|
| 279 |
+
The agent generates prompts that include:
|
| 280 |
+
|
| 281 |
+
1. **System Prompt**: Instructions and context for the LLM, explaining its role and the rules of the Prisoner's Dilemma.
|
| 282 |
+
|
| 283 |
+
2. **Game State Description**: A text description of the current game state, including:
|
| 284 |
+
- Current round number
|
| 285 |
+
- History of previous rounds (if any)
|
| 286 |
+
- Cumulative score
|
| 287 |
+
|
| 288 |
+
3. **Action Request**: Instructions on how to format the response, requiring an explicit action tag.
|
| 289 |
+
|
| 290 |
+
Example system prompt:
|
| 291 |
+
|
| 292 |
+
.. code-block:: text
|
| 293 |
+
|
| 294 |
+
You are playing as Alice in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game against Bob.
|
| 295 |
+
In each round, you must choose to either Cooperate (C) or Defect (D).
|
| 296 |
+
|
| 297 |
+
The payoffs are:
|
| 298 |
+
- If both players Cooperate: You each get 3 points
|
| 299 |
+
- If both players Defect: You each get 1 point
|
| 300 |
+
- If you Cooperate and Bob Defects: You get 0 points, Bob gets 5 points
|
| 301 |
+
- If you Defect and Bob Cooperates: You get 5 points, Bob gets 0 points
|
| 302 |
+
|
| 303 |
+
Your goal is to maximize your total points across all rounds.
|
| 304 |
+
The game will last for exactly 10 rounds, and both players know this.
|
| 305 |
+
|
| 306 |
+
Example game state prompt:
|
| 307 |
+
|
| 308 |
+
.. code-block:: text
|
| 309 |
+
|
| 310 |
+
Current round: 3/10
|
| 311 |
+
|
| 312 |
+
History:
|
| 313 |
+
Round 1: You chose C, Bob chose C. You earned 3 points.
|
| 314 |
+
Round 2: You chose C, Bob chose D. You earned 0 points.
|
| 315 |
+
|
| 316 |
+
Your total score so far: 3 points
|
| 317 |
+
|
| 318 |
+
What is your choice for round 3?
|
| 319 |
+
Please respond with <action>C</action> to cooperate or <action>D</action> to defect,
|
| 320 |
+
and explain your reasoning.
|
| 321 |
+
|
| 322 |
+
Running IPD Games
|
| 323 |
+
----------------------
|
| 324 |
+
|
| 325 |
+
To run Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games with LLM agents, you can use the following code structure:
|
| 326 |
+
|
| 327 |
+
.. code-block:: python
|
| 328 |
+
|
| 329 |
+
from mllm.environments.ipd.ipd_game import IPDEnv
|
| 330 |
+
from mllm.environments.ipd.ipd_agent import IPDAgent
|
| 331 |
+
from mllm.run_matches import run_batched_matches
|
| 332 |
+
|
| 333 |
+
# Create environment
|
| 334 |
+
env = IPDEnv(
|
| 335 |
+
rounds_per_game=10,
|
| 336 |
+
reward=3.0,
|
| 337 |
+
punishment=1.0,
|
| 338 |
+
temptation=5.0,
|
| 339 |
+
sucker=0.0
|
| 340 |
+
)
|
| 341 |
+
|
| 342 |
+
# Create agent handlers
|
| 343 |
+
agent_handlers = {
|
| 344 |
+
"alice": IPDAgent(agent_id="alice"),
|
| 345 |
+
"bob": IPDAgent(agent_id="bob")
|
| 346 |
+
}
|
| 347 |
+
|
| 348 |
+
# Define policy mapping
|
| 349 |
+
policy_mapping = {
|
| 350 |
+
"llm_policy": my_llm_policy_function
|
| 351 |
+
}
|
| 352 |
+
|
| 353 |
+
# Run the game
|
| 354 |
+
game_results = run_batched_matches(
|
| 355 |
+
envs=[env],
|
| 356 |
+
agent_handlers_per_env=[agent_handlers],
|
| 357 |
+
policy_mapping=policy_mapping,
|
| 358 |
+
max_parallel_matches=1
|
| 359 |
+
)
|
| 360 |
+
|
| 361 |
+
# Process results
|
| 362 |
+
for result in game_results:
|
| 363 |
+
print(f"Game finished. Scores: {result['total_rewards']}")
|
| 364 |
+
|
| 365 |
+
Statistics and Analysis
|
| 366 |
+
----------------------
|
| 367 |
+
|
| 368 |
+
The IPD environment includes utility functions for analyzing game outcomes:
|
| 369 |
+
|
| 370 |
+
1. **Cooperation Rates**: Percentage of rounds where each agent cooperated.
|
| 371 |
+
2. **Mutual Cooperation/Defection**: Percentage of rounds where both agents made the same choice.
|
| 372 |
+
3. **Score Distribution**: Analysis of how points were accumulated over the game.
|
| 373 |
+
|
| 374 |
+
These statistics can be calculated using the ``gather_ipd_statistics`` function:
|
| 375 |
+
|
| 376 |
+
.. code-block:: python
|
| 377 |
+
|
| 378 |
+
from mllm.environments.ipd.ipd_statistics_funcs import gather_ipd_statistics
|
| 379 |
+
|
| 380 |
+
stats = gather_ipd_statistics(match_info, env_info)
|
| 381 |
+
print(f"Cooperation rates: {stats['cooperation_rate']}")
|
| 382 |
+
print(f"Mutual cooperation rate: {stats['mutual_cooperation_rate']}")
|
| 383 |
+
print(f"Mutual defection rate: {stats['mutual_defection_rate']}")
|
| 384 |
+
|
| 385 |
+
Limitations and Considerations
|
| 386 |
+
-----------------------------
|
| 387 |
+
|
| 388 |
+
1. **Determinism**: The environment is deterministic, with randomness only in initialization if a seed is provided.
|
| 389 |
+
|
| 390 |
+
2. **Limited Player Count**: The IPD environment only supports exactly two players.
|
| 391 |
+
|
| 392 |
+
3. **Perfect Information**: Both players have perfect information about the game history.
|
| 393 |
+
|
| 394 |
+
4. **Simultaneous Actions**: Both players act simultaneously, which requires adaptations for some LLM interfaces.
|
| 395 |
+
|
| 396 |
+
5. **Fixed Game Length**: The total number of rounds is fixed and known to both players from the start.
|
| 397 |
+
|
| 398 |
+
Advanced Usage
|
| 399 |
+
------------
|
| 400 |
+
|
| 401 |
+
For advanced usage, you can customize:
|
| 402 |
+
|
| 403 |
+
1. **Payoff Matrix**: Modify reward values to create different incentive structures.
|
| 404 |
+
|
| 405 |
+
2. **System Prompts**: Customize the LLM's understanding of the game and potential strategies.
|
| 406 |
+
|
| 407 |
+
3. **Error Handling**: Adjust how the agent responds to invalid LLM outputs.
|
| 408 |
+
|
| 409 |
+
4. **Analysis**: Create custom statistics gathering for specific research questions.
|
| 410 |
+
|
| 411 |
+
5. **Integration**: Connect the IPD environment to other negotiation frameworks or tournament systems.
|
src_code_for_reproducibility/docs/source/src.models.hf_agent.rst
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
+
src.models.hf\_agent module
|
| 2 |
+
===========================
|
| 3 |
+
|
| 4 |
+
.. automodule:: src.models.hf_agent
|
| 5 |
+
:members:
|
| 6 |
+
:undoc-members:
|
| 7 |
+
:show-inheritance:
|
src_code_for_reproducibility/docs/source/src.models.local_llm.rst
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
+
src.models.local\_llm module
|
| 2 |
+
============================
|
| 3 |
+
|
| 4 |
+
.. automodule:: src.models.local_llm
|
| 5 |
+
:members:
|
| 6 |
+
:undoc-members:
|
| 7 |
+
:show-inheritance:
|
src_code_for_reproducibility/docs/source/src.utils.quick_stats.rst
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
+
src.utils.quick\_stats module
|
| 2 |
+
=============================
|
| 3 |
+
|
| 4 |
+
.. automodule:: src.utils.quick_stats
|
| 5 |
+
:members:
|
| 6 |
+
:undoc-members:
|
| 7 |
+
:show-inheritance:
|