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* @license
* Copyright 2025 Google LLC
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*/
import {
escapeShellArg,
getShellConfiguration,
ShellExecutionService,
flatMapTextParts,
PolicyDecision,
} from '@google/gemini-cli-core';
import type { CommandContext } from '../../ui/commands/types.js';
import type { IPromptProcessor, PromptPipelineContent } from './types.js';
import {
SHELL_INJECTION_TRIGGER,
SHORTHAND_ARGS_PLACEHOLDER,
} from './types.js';
import { extractInjections, type Injection } from './injectionParser.js';
import { themeManager } from '../../ui/themes/theme-manager.js';
export class ConfirmationRequiredError extends Error {
constructor(
message: string,
public commandsToConfirm: string[],
) {
super(message);
this.name = 'ConfirmationRequiredError';
}
}
/**
* Represents a single detected shell injection site in the prompt,
* after resolution of arguments. Extends the base Injection interface.
*/
interface ResolvedShellInjection extends Injection {
/** The command after {{args}} has been escaped and substituted. */
resolvedCommand?: string;
}
/**
* Handles prompt interpolation, including shell command execution (`!{...}`)
* and context-aware argument injection (`{{args}}`).
*
* This processor ensures that:
* 1. `{{args}}` outside `!{...}` are replaced with raw input.
* 2. `{{args}}` inside `!{...}` are replaced with shell-escaped input.
* 3. Shell commands are executed securely after argument substitution.
* 4. Parsing correctly handles nested braces.
*/
export class ShellProcessor implements IPromptProcessor {
constructor(private readonly commandName: string) {}
async process(
prompt: PromptPipelineContent,
context: CommandContext,
): Promise<PromptPipelineContent> {
return flatMapTextParts(prompt, (text) =>
this.processString(text, context),
);
}
private async processString(
prompt: string,
context: CommandContext,
): Promise<PromptPipelineContent> {
const userArgsRaw = context.invocation?.args || '';
if (!prompt.includes(SHELL_INJECTION_TRIGGER)) {
return [
{ text: prompt.replaceAll(SHORTHAND_ARGS_PLACEHOLDER, userArgsRaw) },
];
}
const config = context.services.agentContext?.config;
if (!config) {
throw new Error(
`Security configuration not loaded. Cannot verify shell command permissions for '${this.commandName}'. Aborting.`,
);
}
const injections = extractInjections(
prompt,
SHELL_INJECTION_TRIGGER,
this.commandName,
);
// If extractInjections found no closed blocks (and didn't throw), treat as raw.
if (injections.length === 0) {
return [
{ text: prompt.replaceAll(SHORTHAND_ARGS_PLACEHOLDER, userArgsRaw) },
];
}
const { shell } = getShellConfiguration();
const userArgsEscaped = escapeShellArg(userArgsRaw, shell);
const resolvedInjections: ResolvedShellInjection[] = injections.map(
(injection) => {
const command = injection.content;
if (command === '') {
return { ...injection, resolvedCommand: undefined };
}
const resolvedCommand = command.replaceAll(
SHORTHAND_ARGS_PLACEHOLDER,
userArgsEscaped,
);
return { ...injection, resolvedCommand };
},
);
const commandsToConfirm = new Set<string>();
for (const injection of resolvedInjections) {
const command = injection.resolvedCommand;
if (!command) continue;
if (context.session.sessionShellAllowlist?.has(command)) {
continue;
}
// Security check on the final, escaped command string.
const { decision } = await config.getPolicyEngine().check(
{
name: 'run_shell_command',
args: { command },
},
undefined,
);
if (decision === PolicyDecision.DENY) {
throw new Error(
`${this.commandName} cannot be run. Blocked command: "${command}". Reason: Blocked by policy.`,
);
} else if (decision === PolicyDecision.ASK_USER) {
commandsToConfirm.add(command);
}
}
// Handle confirmation requirements.
if (commandsToConfirm.size > 0) {
throw new ConfirmationRequiredError(
'Shell command confirmation required',
Array.from(commandsToConfirm),
);
}
let processedPrompt = '';
let lastIndex = 0;
for (const injection of resolvedInjections) {
// Append the text segment BEFORE the injection, substituting {{args}} with RAW input.
const segment = prompt.substring(lastIndex, injection.startIndex);
processedPrompt += segment.replaceAll(
SHORTHAND_ARGS_PLACEHOLDER,
userArgsRaw,
);
// Execute the resolved command (which already has ESCAPED input).
if (injection.resolvedCommand) {
const activeTheme = themeManager.getActiveTheme();
const shellExecutionConfig = {
...config.getShellExecutionConfig(),
defaultFg: activeTheme.colors.Foreground,
defaultBg: activeTheme.colors.Background,
};
const { result } = await ShellExecutionService.execute(
injection.resolvedCommand,
config.getTargetDir(),
() => {},
new AbortController().signal,
config.getEnableInteractiveShell(),
shellExecutionConfig,
);
const executionResult = await result;
// Handle Spawn Errors
if (executionResult.error && !executionResult.aborted) {
throw new Error(
`Failed to start shell command in '${this.commandName}': ${executionResult.error.message}. Command: ${injection.resolvedCommand}`,
);
}
// Append the output, making stderr explicit for the model.
processedPrompt += executionResult.output;
// Append a status message if the command did not succeed.
if (executionResult.aborted) {
processedPrompt += `\n[Shell command '${injection.resolvedCommand}' aborted]`;
} else if (
executionResult.exitCode !== 0 &&
executionResult.exitCode !== null
) {
processedPrompt += `\n[Shell command '${injection.resolvedCommand}' exited with code ${executionResult.exitCode}]`;
} else if (executionResult.signal !== null) {
processedPrompt += `\n[Shell command '${injection.resolvedCommand}' terminated by signal ${executionResult.signal}]`;
}
}
lastIndex = injection.endIndex;
}
// Append the remaining text AFTER the last injection, substituting {{args}} with RAW input.
const finalSegment = prompt.substring(lastIndex);
processedPrompt += finalSegment.replaceAll(
SHORTHAND_ARGS_PLACEHOLDER,
userArgsRaw,
);
return [{ text: processedPrompt }];
}
}
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