json/Responsa/Modern/Responsa Benei Banim/English/merged.json

{
    "title": "Responsa Benei Banim",
    "language": "en",
    "versionTitle": "merged",
    "versionSource": "https://www.sefaria.org/Responsa_Benei_Banim",
    "text": {
        "Volume I": {
            "Approbations and Letters": [],
            "Introduction": [],
            "": [
                [
                    "<big><strong><i>Mechitzah</i> in the Synagogue and Whether It Must Separate <i>Reshut</i></strong></big>",
                    "",
                    "",
                    "Some synagogues use a curtain as a <i>mechitzah</i> between the men's and women's sections. Often the curtain fails to establish the women's gallery as a separate <i>reshut</i> (\"domain\") because its bottom is higher than three <i>tefachim</i> off the floor, or it is not tied down and could not withstand a normal breeze without flapping. Those who use it apparently rely on Rambam's commentary on the Mishnah in <i>Sukkah</i> 5:2, where he explained that the reason for separating men and women at the <i>Simchat Beit haSho'eivah</i> celebrations in the Temple was \"in order that the men not look at the women.\" They take this to mean that nothing else is needed, and their curtain indeed prevents looking.<br><br>I am not surprised, for the question of whether the <i>mechitzah</i> in the synagogue needs to separate one <i>reshut</i> from another is not discussed by the <i>poskim</i>. In fact, the <i>rishonim</i> do not deal at all with the nature of the <i>mechitzah</i> in the synagogue. The whole issue was first raised in recent generations, in order to counter those who sought to do away with the <i>mechitzah</i> altogether.",
                    "",
                    "In his commentary on the Mishnah in <i>Sukkah</i> 5:2 Rambam explained as mentioned above. However, in his <i>Mishneh Torah</i> he did not mention men looking at women. He wrote in <i>Hilchot Lulav</i> 5:12 that the reason for the separation was \"so that they should not mingle with each other\" (<i>k'dei shelo yitarvu eilu im eilu</i>), and similarly in <i>Hilchot Beit haBechirah</i> 5:9, \"so that they should not be intermingled\" (<i>k'dei shelo yiheyu me'uravin</i>), following the language of the Mishnah in <i>Middot</i> 2:5.<br><br>Some <i>achronim</i> view the commentary in <i>Sukkah</i> as primary, see Resp. <i>Maharam Shick, Orach Chayim</i>, no. 67; while others copied only the language of the <i>Mishneh Torah</i>, see <i>Aruch haShulchan haAtid, Hilchot Beit haMikdash</i>, chapter 11. R. Kuk <i>z\"l</i> in <i>Halachah Berurah</i> similarly cited only the language of the <i>Mishneh Torah</i>. If the <i>Mishneh Torah</i> disagrees with the commentary on the Mishnah, Halachah is obviously in accordance with the <i>Mishneh Torah</i>. Do the two disagree here? Resp. <i>Tzitz Eliezer</i>, vol. 7, no. 8, wrote that they do not disagree about the purpose of the <i>mechitzah</i>, while Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim</i>, part 1, no. 39, is uncertain.",
                    "I think that they do disagree. Rambam based his commentary in <i>Sukkah</i> on his description of the Temple in the second chapter of <i>Middot</i>. He wrote in <i>Sukkah</i>, \"when I sketch the Temple as a whole, <i>Ezrat Nashim</i> and the other places will become clear to you.\" He wrote in <i>Middot</i>:<br><br>There was no wall around [the <i>Ezrat Nashim</i> in the Temple]. It has already been explained at the end of <i>Sukkah</i> that there was a joyous convocation during the days of the holiday [<i>Sukkot</i>] and, out of concern lest the men intermingle with the women, they encompassed it with <i>shkufim atumim</i> and constructed a sort of steps, so that the women could watch from them when Israel gathered for <i>Simchat Beit haSho'eivah</i>, as was explained at the end of <i>Sukkah</i>.",
                    "In his commentary in <i>Sukkah</i> he referred to <i>Middot</i> and in <i>Middot</i> he referred back to <i>Sukkah</i>, and according to his description in <i>Middot</i> the men were indeed prevented from looking at the women. That is the meaning of \"<i>shkufim atumim</i>,\" which is taken from I Kings 6:4, \"He [Shlomoh] made windows <i>shkufim atumim</i> for the [Temple] building.\" In <i>Menachot</i> 86b the Sages explained that the windows were wide (<i>shkufim</i>) outside and narrow (<i>atumim</i>) inside so that light could go out but not come in; see the textual variants there and Rashi's commentary. According to Rambam's commentary on the Mishnah, then, during <i>Simchat Beit haSho'eivah</i> the women were positioned behind the <i>shkufim atumim</i> so that they could see but not be seen, just as light could go out of the Temple but not enter.<br><br>Rambam further explained that they made \"a sort of steps, so that the women could watch from them when Israel gathered,\" i. e., the women stood on the steps and watched, through the <i>shkufim atumim</i> and over the heads of the men, the <i>chasidim</i> who were dancing in the center. This may be the reason he wrote that the women \"could watch from them (<i>meihen</i>)\" in the feminine, \"them\" referring to the steps (<i>ma'alot</i>) the women stood on. Rambam was careful in his use of masculine and feminine; see his commentary to <i>Sukkah</i> there in the paragraph beginning \"On the first day of <i>Yom Tov</i>,\" although one can distinguish between the two cases.",
                    "Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe</i> objected that Scripture mentions \"windows <i>shkufim atumim</i>,\" while Rambam mentioned <i>shkufim atumim</i> but not windows. Based on this, <i>Igrot Moshe</i> denied that there was any connection between the Gemara's explanation in <i>Menachot</i> and Rambam's commentary in <i>Middot</i>, and proposed a novel interpretation in an attempt to buttress his <i>chidush</i> that a <i>mechitzah</i> need be only eighteen <i>tefachim</i> high. But I think there is no basis for his objection. There were indeed no windows <i>shkufim atumim</i> nor windows of any other kind at <i>Simchat Beit haSho'eivah</i>, but the principle of <i>shkufim atumim</i>, i. e., that light and vision go in one direction but not the other, certainly applied.<br><br>This is clear from Meiri in <i>Middot</i>, who wrote:<br><br>[The <i>Ezrat Nashim</i>] was originally flat, that is to say exposed, without an encompassing wall…. They enclosed it with <i>ketzotzera</i> which is a partition like a mesh (<i>sevachah</i>).<br><br>Meiri follows Rambam's commentary there that there was no wall around the <i>Ezrat Nashim</i>, and he explained that the <i>ketzotzera</i> mentioned in the Mishnah as having been constructed for <i>Simchat Beit haSho'eivah</i> was a mesh or latticelike barrier, through which women could peer but not be seen. This is precisely the nature of <i>shkufim atumim</i>. From this we can return to Rambam's commentary and state that his intention, too, was that the women were completely hidden behind the <i>mechitzah</i>, which is the understanding of the <i>achronim</i> who followed the simple meaning of his words. It is very tenuous indeed for Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe</i> to attempt to sever Rambam's use of <i>shkufim atumim</i> from its Scriptural roots, and apparently he overlooked the Meiri.",
                    "Another objection raised by Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe</i> and by Resp. <i>Seridei Eish</i>, vol. 2, no. 14, was that at all times and in all places men are forbidden to pleasurably gaze at women, even at their little fingers, as Rambam ruled in <i>Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah</i> 21:2. Why, then, erect a <i>mechitzah</i> only in the Temple and only for <i>Simchat Beit haSho'eivah</i>? They used this question to buttress their view that even according to Rambam's commentary on the Mishnah the <i>mechitzah</i> was not intended to prevent the women from being visible, and that the proper height of a <i>mechitzah</i> is eighteen <i>tefachim</i>, a view I think is completely without foundation.<br><br>But this, too, represents no difficulty. First, according to Rambam's commentary on the Mishnah a man is indeed permitted to pleasurably gaze at an unmarried women who is not an <i>ervah</i> to him, and no prohibition is involved even though it is immodest to do so, as he wrote in chapter 7 of <i>Sanhedrin</i>. At this juncture we are arguing about Rambam's views in his commentary and not in his <i>Mishneh Torah</i>, where he ruled otherwise.<br><br>Second, and this is the main point, <i>Sukkah</i> 51b gives <i>kalut rosh</i> (lightheadedness, frivolity) as the reason for enacting the separation between the sexes in <i>Simchat Beit haSho'eivah</i>, as does Tosefta <i>Sukkah</i> in chapter 2. For Rambam <i>kalut rosh</i> is a matter of joking and jesting, see <i>Hilchot Tefillah</i> 11:6. He wrote in <i>Hilchot De'ot</i> 2:7, \"a person should not be of a joking and jesting nature…. This is what the Sages said: joking (<i>sechok</i>) and <i>kalut rosh</i> accustom a person to <i>ervah</i>.\"<br><br>In <i>Berachot</i> 30b, \"Abaye was seated before Raba, who saw that he was full of mirth…. He [Abaye] said, '[the reason I am so happy is that] I am laying <i>tefillin</i>.'\" R. Tzvi Hirsh Chayot <i>z\"l</i> in his glosses cited Rambam's <i>Hilchot Tefillah</i> 4:25:<br><br>Whenever <i>tefillin</i> are on his head and arm he is submissive and fears Heaven, and is not drawn after joking (<i>sechok</i>) and idle conversation, and does not harbor forbidden thoughts.<br><br>The reason there was so much concern about looking at women during <i>Simchat Beit haSho'eivah</i> was that as a joyous occasion it lent itself to <i>kalut rosh</i> more than other times, and <i>kalut rosh</i> leads to forbidden thoughts and gazing at women. A similar distinction was made in the book <i>Ir haKodesh vehaMikdash</i>, part 4, chapter 17. But Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe</i> wrote in the name of <i>Tosafot Yom Tov</i> that \"looking at women leads to <i>kalut rosh</i>.\" Begging his pardon, I think Rambam's view is that <i>kalut rosh</i> and excessive merriment lead to forbidden thoughts and gazing at women and not the other way around. For more on this point, see Resp. <i>Zekan Aharon</i>, vol. 1, <i>Yoreh De'ah</i> no. 61.",
                    "According to Rambam's commentary on the Mishnah, then, the women were hidden behind <i>shkufim atumim</i> which was a mesh or latticework, as Meiri explained. However, in <i>Mishneh Torah</i> Rambam made no mention of <i>shkufim atumim</i> but wrote only \"so that they should not be intermingled,\" which corresponds to the wording of the Mishnah in <i>Middot</i>, \"<i>velo hayu m'urbavin</i>.\" This phraseology denotes a separation of <i>reshut</i> such as by a <i>mechitzah</i> ten <i>tefachim</i> high, as Rambam wrote in <i>Hilchot Tum'at Tzara'at</i> 10:12:<br><br>[When the leper] enters the synagogue they make him a <i>mechitzah</i> ten <i>tefachim</i> high and four cubits in width. He enters first and leaves first, so that he can be seated by himself and not be intermingled (<i>b'irbuv</i>) with the people and make them ritually impure.<br><br>From his commentary to <i>Nega'im</i> 13:12 it appears that the <i>Mishneh Torah</i> is to be read <i>a-c b–d</i>, i. e., they make him a <i>mechitzah</i> ten <i>tefachim</i> high and four cubits wide so that he can sit by himself, and he enters first and leaves first so as not to intermingle with the people. But regardless, it shows that sitting behind a <i>mechitzah</i> ten <i>tefachim</i> high, which is the minimum height that separates <i>reshut</i>, is called not being intermingled. From this it can be determined that the language in <i>Hilchot Lulav</i> and <i>Hilchot Beit haBechirah</i>, \"<i>velo yihyu m'urbavin</i>,\" also connotes a separation of <i>reshut</i>. On what basis in Rambam, then, can we permit a synagogue <i>mechitzah</i> that does not separate <i>reshut?</i>",
                    "Furthermore, I think that Rambam's commentary on the Mishnah and his <i>Mishneh Torah</i> do not disagree on this point at all, for even according to his commentary in <i>Sukkah</i> in practice the <i>shkufim atumim</i> separated <i>reshut</i>. There was no need for Rambam to mention this explicitly because it was nothing new: the <i>beraita</i> in <i>Sukkah</i> records that at first the Sages enacted that the women were to be inside the <i>Ezrat Nashim</i> and the men outside in the <i>Chayil</i>, and when this proved ineffective they enacted that the men were to be inside the <i>Ezrat Nashim</i> and the women outside.<br><br>In both cases there was a separation of <i>reshut</i> between the sexes, because the <i>Chayil</i> and <i>Ezrat Nashim</i> were separate domains, their floors separated by a height of six and one-half cubits at the latter's northeastern and southeastern corners. Since the Temple Mount was sloped upwards but the <i>Ezrat Nashim</i> was level, the difference in levels gradually decreased along the sides of the <i>Ezrat Nashim</i>; see the second chapter of <i>Middot</i> and the sixth chapter of <i>Hilchot Beit haBechirah</i>. Nevertheless, there was a separation of <i>reshut</i> between them throughout; see <i>Tosafot Yom Tov</i> and <i>Rashash</i> there in <i>Middot</i>.<br><br>Rambam did not need to mention in his commentary that the women were located in a separate <i>reshut</i> from the men at <i>Simchat Beit haSho'eivah</i>, since this was true even before the final and \"major enactment\" (<i>tikkun gadol</i>) of building a balcony for the women. However, although his commentary and <i>Mishneh Torah</i> agree on the need to separate <i>reshut</i>, they certainly disagree as to the reason for the enactment. In <i>Mishneh Torah</i> he depicts nothing more than a balcony (<i>gezuztra</i>) at least ten <i>tefachim</i> high that separates <i>reshut</i>, as is evident from <i>Hilchot Tum'at Tzara'at</i>, and this does not indicate hiding the women behind a screen to prevent them from being seen.",
                    "Clearly, Rambam changed his mind about the nature of the separation, and I think the reason is a contradiction about the <i>gezuztra</i> on which the women stood. See Rashi in <i>Sukkah</i>, who explained that brackets or protrusions (<i>zizim</i>) were attached to the walls and that planks were laid on them. Everywhere in the Talmud <i>gezuztraot</i> involve walls and protrusions from walls. Rambam himself explained them as such: in his commentary to the Mishnah in <i>Shabbat</i> 11:2 he wrote, \"<i>gezuztraot, ketzotzerot</i>: a wooden structure protruding from the wall.\" In his commentary to <i>Eiruvin</i> 7:4 he wrote, \"<i>ketzotzra</i> and <i>gezuztra</i> are one and the same: a ceiling protruding from an individual's domain to over the communal domain.\" In <i>Eiruvin</i> 8:8 he wrote, \"<i>gezuztra</i>, we have already explained its nature: it is a covered area protruding from a wall of an individual's domain.\" And in <i>Bava Batra</i> 3:11 he wrote, \"<i>gezuztraot</i> are large beams that protrude from a wall and are able to support plastering and a ceiling.\"<br><br>Sometimes Rambam defined <i>gezuztra</i> as the beams that protruded from a wall and sometimes as the whole structure that rested on the beams, but it was always a matter of walls and protrusions. ",
                    "According to Meiri in <i>Sukkah</i>, the Gemara itself states that <i>zizim</i> were attached to the walls of the <i>Ezrat Nashim</i> and that the <i>gezuztra</i> rested on them, although this is not found in our texts of <i>Sukkah</i>. I think that what Meiri meant is that since the Gemara quoted the Mishnah as using the term <i>gezuztra</i>, it is as if it stated explicitly that they attached <i>zizim</i> to the walls, for that is what a <i>gezuztra</i> always entails.<br><br>How, then, could Rambam in <i>Middot</i> describe the <i>gezuztra</i> as steps women stood on to watch from, involving neither walls nor protrusions? He had to, because according to his commentary the <i>Ezrat Nashim</i> had no walls! Rambam wrote in <i>Middot</i>, \"there was no wall around it … they encompassed it with <i>shkufim atumim</i>,\" and this is explicit there in Meiri.",
                    "For good reason, therefore, Rambam retracted in <i>Mishneh Torah</i> what he wrote in his commentary in <i>Middot</i> about the women standing on steps behind <i>shekufim atumim</i> rather than on a balcony. [In R. Kapach's translation of Rambam's commentary, <i>shekufim atumim</i> is missing entirely.] He also retracted his statement there that there was no wall around the <i>Ezrat Nashim</i>, since the two matters are linked. In <i>Mishneh Torah</i> Rambam agrees with Rashi that there was indeed a wall around the <i>Ezrat Nashim</i> and that <i>zizim</i> protruded from it and balconies for the women were built on them. See <i>Hilchot Klei haMikdash</i> 7:6 where he wrote, \"They blew three [trumpet] blasts at the opening of the lower gate, which is the gate of the <i>Ezrat Nashim</i>,\" and the presence of a gate implies that there were walls, as <i>Beit haMiddot</i>, chapter 2, noted in the name of <i>Ezrat Kohanim</i>. Tosefta <i>Parah</i> in chapter 3 also refers to \"the gate of the stairs of <i>Ezrat Nashim</i>,\" which Gra emended to read \"the gate of <i>Ezrat Nashim</i>.\"",
                    "But regardless, it makes no difference for our discussion. Whether or not Rambam's commentary on the Mishnah and his <i>Mishnah Torah</i> disagree and whether or not he changed his mind, a separation of <i>reshut</i> between men and women always existed at <i>Simchat Beit haSho'eivah</i>. So, too, throughout the Diaspora and throughout the centuries we do not find any <i>ezrat nashim</i> that did not constitute a separate <i>reshut</i> from the men's section, regardless of whether or not the women were visible. In most cases the women were in a balcony or in a different room altogether. It never occurred to anyone to say that separation of <i>reshut</i> is secondary and only the prevention of looking is essential. In the Temple, the <i>Ezrat Nashim</i> was separate from both the <i>Ezrat Yisrael</i> and the <i>Chayil</i>, and from there we learn the basic requirements of the <i>ezrat nashim</i> in the synagogue.<br><br>Therefore, a synagogue that uses curtains of the sort I described should fix its <i>mechitzah</i>. One should not be surprised at equating a <i>mechitzah</i> that separates <i>reshut</i> with a <i>mechitzah</i> in the synagogue, for in <i>Eiruvin</i> 92b the two are equated in a number of matters, and see Resp. <i>Maharit</i> part 2, no. 4. Forestalling possible <i>yichud</i> is also a consideration.",
                    "What remains to be explained is what Maharil cited in <i>Hilchot Shabbat:</i><br><br>[Concerning the opinion of] Ravyah to permit unfurling <i>talitot</i> on <i>Shabbat</i> during the <i>derashah</i>, in order to separate between men and women for <i>tzni'uta</i> (modesty or privacy).<br><br>This is also quoted by <i>Mordechai</i> in <i>Shabbat, remez</i> 311. The implication is that simply unfurling <i>talitot</i> to separate men and women is sufficient, even though they do not separate <i>reshut</i>. However, Maharil was not discussing prayer, as the words \"during the <i>derashah</i>\" show. This is also indicated by his language \"for <i>tzni'uta</i>,\" which is a praiseworthy but voluntary practice. If the <i>mechitzah</i> of the <i>ezrat nashim</i> used for prayer is being discussed, what was voluntary about it?<br><br>Rather, the unfurled <i>talitot</i> during the <i>derashah</i> had nothing to do with the <i>mechitzah</i> of the <i>ezrat nashim</i> that was fixed and permanent. In fact, in those days they had altogether separate prayer rooms for women, as mentioned in Resp. <i>Maharil</i>, no. 53, and in <i>Minhagei Maharil</i> in the laws of Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. The <i>derashah</i> for men and women probably did not take place in the synagogue at all. [The <i>derashah</i> was a separate activity and is not the present-day Sabbath morning sermon.]<br><br>This is further indicated in <i>Mordechai</i>, who wrote:<br><br>Making any <i>mechitzah</i> that is not merely for the sake of modesty (<i>litzniuta b'alma</i>) is forbidden on <i>Shabbat</i>…. But making a <i>mechitzah</i> merely for the purpose of modesty is permitted. For instance, making the <i>mechitzah</i> between men and women at the time of the <i>derashah</i> is permitted on <i>Shabbat</i>, as we say [in <i>Eiruvin</i> 94a] that Shmuel [who made a <i>mechitzah</i> on <i>Shabbat</i>] did so merely for the sake of privacy.<br><br>As described in the Gemara, Shmuel put up a wholly optional partition that was not required by Halachah. If it was forbidden to deliver the <i>derashah</i> without unfurling a <i>talit</i> between the men and the women, what proof was there from Shmuel? Also, the language <i>litzniuta b'alma</i> (\"merely\" <i>tzniut</i>) does not fit, and see the language of Rambam's commentary to the seventh chapter of <i>Sanhedrin</i>. It certainly does not apply to the <i>mechitzah</i> of the <i>ezrat nashim</i>, and on the contrary, it is forbidden to erect such a <i>mechitzah</i> on Shabbat because it serves to permit prayer. It must have the status of a <i>mechitzah that</i> separates <i>reshut</i> and not one that is too high off the ground or would flap in a normal breeze."
                ],
                [],
                [
                    "<big><strong><i>Mechitzah</i> in the Synagogue: Torah Law or Rabbinical Enactment?</strong></big>",
                    "",
                    "",
                    "",
                    "The <i>mechitzah</i> in the synagogue is of rabbinical origin. This is the sense of what Rashi wrote in <i>Sukkah</i> 51b, \"they found a [basis in] Scripture that it is necessary to separate men from women and to take precautions, so that Israel not be corrupted.\" Maharsha explained: <br><br>This regulation [separating men and women in the <i>Simchat Beit haSho'eivah</i>] was not needed for the Temple service but [only in order] to distance them from the prohibition of <i>ervah</i>, [therefore] it [the innovation of a <i>gezuztra</i>] was not prohibited by \"Everything was in writing from the hand of <i>haShem</i>\" (<i>Divrei haYamim-aleph</i>, 28:19).",
                    "Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim</i>, part 1, no. 39 challenged Maharsha on the basis of <i>Chulin</i> 83b, where the Gemara exempted those who sacrificed doves in the Temple from the Torah commandment of covering the blood, because no earth was available for doing so. The Gemara did not suggest heaping earth on the altar in order to enable fulfillment of the <i>mitzvah</i>; ergo, we are forbidden to make any changes in the Temple on our own even in order to enable people to fulfill the commandments. By this argument he sought to prove that separating the sexes via the <i>gezuztra</i> must have been a Torah requirement inherent in the design of the Temple, for otherwise it would have been forbidden to build anything new, even if the intention was to prevent <i>kalut rosh</i>.<br><br>However, I think that is no argument against Maharsha, for there is an excellent reason to distinguish between heaping earth for use in covering the blood and building a balcony or a <i>mechitzah</i>. The Torah commanded the sacrificing of fowl, and the Torah also stipulated that fowl's blood be immediately covered; if, nevertheless, God revealed the exact contours of the Temple in a prophecy to David without making any provision for storing the earth needed for covering the blood, it is as if He gave specific instructions to disregard the need to cover blood in the Temple.<br><br>But no such instructions can be inferred regarding dealing with other problems that developed later and were not inherent in the Temple service. Building a <i>gezuztra</i> in order to prevent the intermingling of men and women was not prohibited by the verse in <i>Divrei haYamim-aleph</i>, 28:19, \"Everything [about the building of the Temple] was in writing, from <i>haShem</i>,\" because it was only because of the changed circumstances of <i>Simchat Beit haSho'eivah</i> that it became necessary to build one. This is what Maharsha meant when he wrote, \"this regulation was not needed for the Temple service,\" i. e., in contrast to the need to cover the blood, which stemmed directly from the sacrifices. This explanation also nullifies the proof brought by Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe</i> from <i>Zevachim</i> 33a and <i>Tosafot</i> there.",
                    "As for the question why cite verses from Zechariah to inform us that <i>kalut rosh</i> is prohibited in the Temple, since this is something we could know on our own? Scripture left it to the Sages to determine what would constituted proper awe of the Temple, as <i>Minchat Chinuch</i> wrote in <i>mitzvah</i> 254 and as <i>Sefer Yeraim haShalem</i> had already written in <i>Mitzvah</i> 409 and <i>haKatzar</i> in 324. Although the Sages relied on their own authority to at first enact that the women be inside the <i>Ezrat Nashim</i> during the <i>Simchat Beit haSho'eivah</i> celebration and the men outside, and then to enact that the men be outside and the women inside, this was as long as they did not add anything to the Temple structure. But when it came to building a <i>gezuztra</i>, although not precluded by \"Everything was in writing, from <i>haShem</i>\" as I have explained, nevertheless they cited the verses in Zechariah as proof that such an enactment was essential.",
                    "We also find in Meiri in <i>Sukkah</i>:<br><br>Although the whole building was [built] through prophecy, and they should not have added to it, they relied on this [to build] a temporary structure in order to repair breaches, so as not to frivolously intermingle men and women.<br><br>That is to say, building a balcony for the women was a precaution initiated by the Sages to forestall intermingling, Since this is clearly Meiri's opinion, and Rashi appears to say so as well and there is no difficulty with Maharsha's explanation, the conclusion to be reached is that the <i>gezuztra</i> in the Temple was not of Torah origin, and consequently neither is the <i>mechitzah</i> in the synagogue.",
                    "A <i>mechitzah</i> is not mandated even by <i>divrei kabbalah</i>, in my opinion. The Gemara cites Zechariah 12:12, \"The whole land will mourn, all the families separately (<i>levad</i>): the family of the House of David separately, and their women-folk separately.\" Where is there any hint of a <i>mechitzah</i>? All the verse requires is that men and women not be actually intermingled, but rather men on one side and women on the other. We find the same language in <i>Bereishit</i> 43:32, \"they placed [food] for him separately (<i>levado</i>) and for them separately and for the Egyptians who ate with him separately,\" and certainly all that means was that they sat at different tables.<br><br>This can also be seen from Tosefta <i>Sukkah</i> 4:1, \"the women sat and watched <i>Simchat Beit haSho'eivah</i> and were not intermingled (<i>velo hayu m'uravin</i>),\" which is similar to the Mishnah in <i>Middot</i> 2:5, \"they enacted that the women sit above and the men below, and they were not intermingled.\" The same phraseology is found in Tosefta <i>Sukkah</i> 4:4 concerning the great synagogue in Alexandria: \"They did not sit intermingled, (<i>m'urbavin</i>), but rather goldsmiths by themselves (<i>bifnei atzmun</i>) and silversmiths by themselves,\" and so on. There is no hint of any partitions within the men's section, only that members of each guild sat by themselves. Similarly, the language in the Jerusalem Talmud in <i>Sukkah</i> 5:2 concerning <i>Simchat Beit haSho'eivah</i>, \"men by themselves (<i>bifnei atzmun</i>) and women by themselves,\" is the same as in the Tosefta, \"goldsmiths by themselves,\" and so forth. It would be tenuous to attempt to distinguish in the Tosefta between <i>m'uravin</i> with one letter <i>bet</i> and <i>m'urbavin</i> with two, and see the Meiri quoted above and Rambam in <i>Hilchot Beit haBechirah</i> 5:9.",
                    "See, as well, <i>Ma'asim l'Bnei Eretz Yisrael</i>, brought by <i>Otzar haGeonim</i> in <i>Sukkah</i> 52a:<br><br>If the women sit together by themselves (<i>bifnei atzmun</i>) and the men by themselves, this is permitted as long as the men do not pour wine for the women or the women for the men, and similarly regarding serving the portions and the dessert. But they are forbidden to dine [together], in order that they [not] be intermingled, the men with the women.<br><br>A slightly different version is quoted in <i>Sefer haPardes</i>:<br><br>It is forbidden to have men and women intermingle, whether at a feast or on any occasion. Rather, the men should be separate (<i>levad</i>) and the women separate. <i>Kal vechomer</i>, if it is written concerning a time of mourning, \"the whole House of Israel will mourn by families, the family of the House of David separately, and their womenfolk separately,\" [then during] feasting and jollity, how much more so!<br><br>It is forbidden to have men and women intermingle, whether at a feast or on any occasion. Rather, the men should be separate (<i>levad</i>) and the women separate. <i>Kal vechomer</i>, if it is written concerning a time of mourning, \"the whole House of Israel will mourn by families, the family of the House of David separately, and their womenfolk separately,\" [then during] feasting and jollity, how much more so!<br><br>The concern is solely that men and women should not sit actually intermingled, again without any hint of a <i>mechitzah</i>.",
                    "I found it necessary to dwell on this because there are <i>achronim</i> who seem to view the requirement of a <i>mechitzah</i> as being explicit in the verses in Zechariah. Some even wrote that the need to prevent men from seeing women is derived from Zechariah; see Resp. <i>Maharam Shick, Orach Chayim</i> no. 77, and similarly in Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe</i>. I have made clear my own opinion.",
                    "As for the question why, indeed, require a separation of <i>reshut</i> between men and women? First, because such was the case in the <i>Ezrat Nashim</i> in the Temple, and from there we apply it by analogy to the synagogue. But the crux of the matter is as follows: The verses in Zechariah require that men and women not be intermingled, although as far as Scripture is concerned it is enough that they sit apart from each other, as we have shown. Nevertheless, it was still necessary to define what in practice is considered apart and what together, and for that reason a separation of <i>reshut</i> was enacted for prayers, for if men and women are in separate domains they certainly cannot be considered intermingled. This can be seen from Rambam in <i>Hilchot Tum'at Metzora</i> 10:12, whose source is the Mishnah in <i>Nega'im</i> 13:12.<br><br>To bring a parallel from a different Halachah, there are many different specifications of the distance required between various types of plants in order that they not be regarded as <i>kilayim</i>, but if a <i>mechitzah</i> ten <i>tefachim</i> high separates them it is permitted to plant different types right up to both sides of the fence, as stated in Mishnah <i>Kilayim</i> 2:8. Rambam and <i>Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah</i> 297:25, wrote that the reason is that they appear separated (<i>nir'im muvdalim</i>); however, I think this refers to the other types of separation mentioned there, such as a pit or an unplowed area. By contrast, a proper fence constitutes a separation for the purpose of <i>kilayim</i> even if it is not visible, as stated in the Jerusalem Talmud in <i>Kilayim</i> there, \"Two fields, one above the other—the School of Yanai said, 'Where there is a fence it is permitted to sow all kinds of combinations,' \" and see <i>Mareh haPnim</i>'s explanation.",
                    "It should be no cause for surprise that in order to permit prayer a <i>mechitzah</i> inside a synagogue has to start within three <i>tefachim</i> from the floor and be able to withstand a normal breeze. Rabbinical enactments do not distinguish between individual cases. Were men and women to sit next to each other separated by an invalid <i>mechitzah</i>, we would be unsure as to whether they are considered separate or intermingled with regard to the prohibition derived from Zechariah; therefore, even when they are sitting at a distance from each other we make no exceptions (<i>lo plug</i>), but require a valid <i>mechitzah</i>."
                ],
                [
                    "<big><strong>Women in the Men's Section</strong></big>",
                    "",
                    "A rabbi asked me about a synagogue that had a proper <i>ezrat nashim</i> in a balcony, but below in the men's section there was a bench for elderly women who were unable to walk up the stairs. May he pray there, and was it proper to have such an arrangement to start with? It is not generally known that the synagogue discussed in the book <i>Sanctity of the Synagogue</i> had such an arrangement. It was mentioned in the judgment delivered by the state court, but none of the rabbis quoted in the book remarked on it and they may have been unaware of it.<br>In my opinion one should not initiate such an arrangement, but <i>bedi'eved</i> and on an irregular basis the presence of individual women in the men's section does not invalidate the prayers. When I served as a district rabbi in Beit Shean, some of the synagogues had no <i>ezrat nashim</i> because Sephardic women did not usually come to pray. On a number of occasions one or two women entered and sat at the side. It was not possible to make them leave and we were in the middle of prayer, and I let the prayers continue.",
                    "Two Halachic discussions informed this, the first regarding the Torah reading in the synagogue and the second regarding the courtyards of the Temple. In <i>Megillah</i> 23a:<br><br>The Rabbis taught, everyone can be included in the seven [<i>aliyot</i> to the Torah], even a minor and even a woman, but the Sages said: a woman should not read from the Toah because of community honor (<i>kevod tzibur</i>).<br><br>Evidently, her going into the men's section and standing at the reading desk was not in itself prohibited. Resp. <i>Maharam miRottenberg</i>, no. 108, wrote that in a town whose inhabitants were all <i>kohanim</i>:<br><br>A <i>kohen</i> reads the [first] two [<i>aliyot</i>] and women read the rest…. The Sages said that a woman should not read from the Torah because of <i>kevod hatzibur</i>. Where there is no alternative, <i>kevod hatzibur</i> is set aside because of [the need to prevent] a stain on the reputation of the <i>kohanim</i>, so that it not be said that they are the children of divorcees [i.e., that they are disqualified from the priesthood and for that reason given <i>aliyot</i> normally reserved for non-<i>kohanim</i>].<br><br>Were it forbidden for women to be in the men's section at all, he would not have permitted them to read the Torah there. Maharam is cited by <i>Mordechai</i> in <i>Gittin, remez</i> 404, R. Yerucham in <i>netiv</i> 2:3 and <i>Beit Yosef</i> in <i>Orach Chayim</i> sec. 135.<br><br>",
                    "Similarly, <i>Hagahot Ya'avetz</i> wrote that a woman can go up to the Torah if there is no alternative, such as if there are not enough men present who know how to read from the Torah. And <i>Chasdei David</i> on Tosefta <i>Megillah</i> 3:5 wrote that since in principle women could read from the Torah if not for for <i>kevod tzibur</i>, therefore a woman who is called up to the Torah, even though improperly, need not step down.<br><br>This needs to be examined, however. The Tosefta also states that if there are not enough men able to read all the <i>aliyot</i> from the Torah, one man reads and sits down and gets up again and reads and sits down again, even if he has to do this for all seven <i>aliyot</i>. This is codified in <i>Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim</i> 143:5. In the case brought by <i>Hagahot Ya'avetz</i>, therefore, if some of the men know how to read, why not have one of them read several times and not violate <i>kevod tzibur</i> by calling up women?<br><br>I think the answer is in keeping with what <i>Bach</i> wrote at the end of <i>Orach Chayim</i> 143 that a man is permitted more than one <i>aliyah</i> only in case of pressing need; the reason, apparently, is that it is not in the honor of the community to give the impression that insufficient men know how to read from the Torah and therefore one man had to read several times. This is the same reason a woman may not read from the Torah because of <i>kevod tzibur</i>, because her doing so suggests that not enough men know how to read themselves. If, then, there are in fact not enough men who know how to read, <i>kevod hatzibur</i> will be affected regardless of whether women read in place of men or one man reads several times. In such a case, better to revert to the original Halachah that women may read from the Torah, in order to preserve the framework of seven separate <i>aliyot</i>.<br><br>The wording of the <i>beraita</i> is precise: \"a woman should not <i>read</i> from the Torah\"; what serves as a reproach to the community is her reading, not her being called up to the reading desk or reciting the blessings. But it follows that if enough men know how to read, a woman should step down even if she already has been called up, for as long as she has not actually begun reading, <i>kevod hatzibur</i> has not yet been damaged and the situation is still one of <i>lechat'chilah</i>. This contradicts the view of <i>Chasdei David</i>.<br><br><i>Chasdei David</i> claimed support for his position from the Tosefta which concluded, \"a woman may not be brought to read for the congregation\" (<i>ein mavi'in et ha'ishah likro berabim</i>); this is also <i>Or Zarua</i>'s version, contrary to Gra's emendation. The inference is that she may read if she goes up on her own without being called, for as long as the men do not call her there is no admission that not enough qualified men are available and, therefore, no reproach to the community. But I think this is no argument, for everyone is prohibited from going up to read from the Torah without being called, as <i>Shulchan Aruch</i> ruled in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 139:4 and the source for this, too, is the Tosefta. \"A woman may not be brought\" simply reflects the normal procedure that no one goes up to read on his own. It may be that the wording \"brought\" was used because she would have to come all the way from the <i>ezrat nashim</i> or from outside the synagogue.",
                    "All this is in accordance with the custom in the time of the Gemara that the person who was called up read from the Torah, and even today the proper procedure is to read along with the <i>ba'al koreh</i> in an undertone. Nevertheless, it is commonplace today that the person reciting the blessings does not read from the Torah at all. Accordingly, the Tosefta's ruling that one person can take a number of <i>aliyot</i> no longer applies, as the <i>achronim</i> have written. From an different perspective, the <i>gaon</i>, my grandfather and teacher <i>z\"l</i>, noted that today's practice is based entirely on the Tosefta, since the same <i>ba'al koreh</i> reads all seven times; see <i>Eidut leYisrael</i>, no. 67, in <i>Kitvei haGri\"a Henkin</i>, vol. 1, pages 163–64.<br><br>That being the case, it would seem that the consideration of <i>kevod hatzibur</i> does not apply to women's <i>aliyot</i> today. The reproach to the community lies in a woman's reading, but nowadays the <i>ba'al koreh</i> reads and not she. Nevertheless, the established custom is that women do not have <i>aliyot</i>. And since women's <i>aliyot</i> have become an opening for the assimilationists, she should step down even if she has been called up, even for <i>maftir</i>.",
                    "Maharam also quoted R. Simchah that a woman could read the Torah not only as one of the seven <i>aliyot</i> on Shabbat but also as one of the three on weekdays; in which case she would have the third <i>aliyah</i> after the <i>kohen</i> and Levite and would certainly recite the blessings, following the opinion of <i>Tosafot</i> in <i>Eiruvin</i> 96b and R. Shmuel of Falaise in <i>Hilchot Pesachim</i> in <i>Or Zarua</i>. She might even say <i>Barchu et haShem hamevorach</i> which constitutes a <i>davar shebikedushah</i>. In any case, her physical presence in the men's section was not prohibited.",
                    "To return to the question of a woman in the men's section of a synagogue, the basic design of separate sections for men and women in the synagogue is derived from the Temple. In <i>Kiddushin</i> 52b, \"R. Yehuda said … 'What is a woman doing in the <i>azarah</i> [<i>Ezrat Yisrael</i>, the men's court]?' \"<br><br>Rashi explained that \"women do not enter it [the <i>azarah</i>],\" but his meaning is unclear. <i>Sha'ar haMelech</i> in <i>Hilchot Beit haBechirah</i>, no. 17, understood Rashi to mean that it was never considered necessary for a woman to enter the <i>azarah</i>. If so, <i>Tosafot</i> disagrees with Rashi on two counts: first, that sometimes women did need to enter the <i>azarah</i>, and second, that women were permitted to enter even if there was no need for them to do so. This is clear from <i>Tosafot</i>'s language, \"What is a woman doing in the <i>azarah</i>? It is not usual for her to enter in order to become [more] sanctified.\" They did not write that she was forbidden to enter, only that it was not commonplace.",
                    "<i>Tosafot haRosh</i>, however, wrote that according to Rashi, \"the same way that an Israelite does not enter the <i>Ezrat Kohanim</i> except when he needs to, so, too, a woman [does not enter] in [to] the <i>Ezrat Yisrael</i>.\" According to this, Rashi and <i>Tosafot</i> agree that women entered the <i>azarah</i> when necessary, and disagree only about unnecessary entry. In all likelihood this was indeed Rashi's position, for Tosefta <i>Archin</i> 2:1 states that \"a woman was never seen in the <i>azarah</i> except at the time of her sacrifice\"—but at the time of her sacrifice, clearly, yes. Similarly, in <i>Niddah</i> 6b, \"It happened that R. Gamliel's maidservant baked loaves of <i>terumah</i>,\" and the Gemara explains this as referring to loaves of the <i>Todah</i> sacrifice that were baked only in the <i>azarah</i>. Some women, then, did enter the <i>azarah</i> for cause.",
                    "",
                    "",
                    "",
                    "Since Rashi and <i>Tosafot</i> agree that a woman could enter the <i>azarah</i> when necessary (<i>l'tzorech</i>), by analogy they would agree that she may enter the men's section of the synagogue if the need arises, such as to read from the Torah. There is therefore no contradiction between Maharam's ruling on women reading the Torah and his ruling, cited in <i>Sefer Tashbatz</i> 397, that a woman should not enter the synagogue to be a <i>sandakit</i>:<br><br>For it is not proper for a festively adorned (<i>mekushetet</i>) woman to enter among the men and before the <i>Shechinah</i>. For that reason we object \"what is a woman doing in the <i>azarah</i>?\" lest adolescent <i>kohanim</i> accost her…. Was the <i>Ezrat Nashim</i> separate for no reason?<br><br>Maharam Rottenberg shared Rashi's opinion that unnecessary entry into the <i>azarah</i> was forbidden, and equated the Temple and the synagogue. Nevertheless, in the case of a town full of <i>kohanim</i> he ruled that women may read in place of men, because there it was indeed necessary.",
                    "Even according to Rashi's opinion that women were forbidden to enter the men's courtyard in the Temple unless it was necessary, and by extension would be similarly prohibited from entering the men's section of the synagogue, there is no indication that a woman's presence rendered the Temple service invalid or would prohibit prayers in the synagogue. And if this is true according to Rashi, how much more is it so according to <i>Tosafot</i>'s opinion that women were permitted even unnecessary entry to the <i>azarah</i>, which is also the view of <i>Tosafot Rid</i> and Meiri. Maharil, too, in <i>Hilchot Milah</i>, cited Maharam Rottenberg regarding a <i>sandakit</i>, \"it is forbidden that a woman should go among the men [during the circumcision ceremony], because of a breach of morals (<i>pritzut</i>),\" but did not invoke the principle \"what is a woman doing in the <i>azarah</i>?\" and see Rema in <i>Yoreh De'ah</i> 265:11.<br><br>Tosefta <i>Archin</i> 2:1, however, states that \"a woman was never seen in the <i>azarah</i> except at the time of her sacrifice.\" How can this be reconciled with <i>Tosafot</i>'s position that women could enter even without recourse to a sacrifice? The answer is that, as is often the case, \"never\" (<i>l'olam</i>) is not to be taken literally. The Tosefta refers to what was commonplace, and it was not commonplace for women to enter the Temple grounds unnecessarily.<br><br>This is shown by the continuation of the Tosefta, \"and a minor was not seen in the <i>azarah</i> except when the Levites spoke in song.\" The Mishnaic parallel to this is in <i>Archin</i> 13b, \"a minor did not enter the <i>azarah</i> for service except when the Levites spoke in song,\" which implies that they did enter at other times when not for service. Should we invent a disagreement between the Mishnah and the Tosefta on this point? Rather, the Tosefta was referring to minors only in general terms and so, also, to women. Alternatively, the Tosefta meant that it was never considered necessary for a woman to be in the <i>azarah</i> except in connection with her sacrifices.<br><br>Another source concerning women in the Temple grounds is the Jerusalem Talmud in <i>Ma'aser Sheini</i> 5:3. R. Elazar b. Azariah proposed that the verse \"You shall eat it everywhere\" in <i>Bamidbar</i> 18:31 means that the <i>ma'aser</i> usually given to the Levite can be eaten by the priests anywhere in the <i>azarah</i>. R. Yehoshua countered that the verse stipulates \"you and your houses,\" that is, wives, and asked, \"Does a woman enter the <i>azarah</i>?\" <i>Gilayon haShas</i> and <i>Tziyun Yerushalayim</i> noted that this seems to support Rashi's opinion as opposed to that of <i>Tosafot</i>. But I think this is no argument, for just as <i>Tosafot</i> explained that \"What is a woman doing in the <i>azarah</i>?\" means that women were usually not there, although they were permitted to be, they would explain the <i>Yerushalmi</i> in the same way. R. Yehoshua's objection was that if the priests could eat <i>ma'aser</i> with their families only in the <i>azarah</i>, women would be found there all the time, and that certainly was not the case in practice.",
                    "Rashi and <i>Tosafot</i> agree, then, that women were not often found in the <i>Ezrat Yisrael</i> in the Temple. The question \"what is a woman doing in the <i>azarah</i>?\" is equally appropriate to ask of the synagogue. For that reason one should not establish a permanent bench for elderly women in the men's section. However, the occasional presence of individual women does not prevent communal prayer.<br><br>Resp. <i>Teshuvah Me'ahavah</i>, part 2, no. 229, wrote that it is forbidden to bring any female into the men's section, even a baby; however, this is based on esoteric lore and is not commonly accepted. The custom is to permit girls in the men's section up to a certain age. On the other hand, it may be that the custom applies only to irregular visits, while to seat women permanently in the men's section is forbidden for either adult or child. I have already written that if a few elderly women cannot walk upstairs to the <i>Ezrat Nashim</i>, their occasional presence in the men's section does not invalidate the prayers. If they come regularly, however, a <i>mechitzah</i> should be built around their bench.",
                    "",
                    "The rabbi also reported that a <i>beit din</i> in a certain country permitted a congregation to pray in a rented hall on Shabbat with men sitting on one side and women on the other without a <i>mechitzah</i>, the reason being that it was only a temporary synagogue. This is a mistaken ruling, and in my opinion it should be put completely out of mind. By this logic, the obligation of <i>mora mikdash</i> and the prohibition of idle chatter would also not apply in a temporary synagogue. Rather, the only distinction between a permanent and a temporary synagogue is that the latter does not have the status of a synagogue when not being used as one. When in use for prayer, all the laws of a synagogue apply, and it is forbidden to pray there without a <i>mechitzah</i>.<br><br>Outside of a synagogue a <i>mechitzah</i> is mandatory when two conditions are met: first, both the men and the women intend to participate in the prayers, and second, the place is being used at the time solely for prayer. These are the circumstances regarding the eulogies described in Zechariah 12:12, and where these conditions do not apply, a <i>mechitzah</i> is not required. For this reason no <i>mechitzah</i> is required in a wedding hall when a <i>minyan</i> of men gather in one corner, both because the women do not participate and the hall is not being used exclusively for prayer."
                ],
                [
                    "<big><strong>Mothers Who Wish to Come to Synagogue</strong></big>",
                    "",
                    "",
                    "A weekly exposition of Halachah distributed in one community stated, \"it is an error on the part of mothers who desire to pray and therefore bring their children who disturb the synagogue, since for this reason the Torah freed them from positive time-bound <i>mitzvot</i>.\" If it meant that a woman is exempt from regular prayer because prayer is a time-bound rabbinical commandment, that is true only according to Rambam as understood by <i>Magen Avraham</i> (see above, chapter 4), but according to Ramban and most other <i>rishonim</i>, women are obligated to pray <i>Shmoneh Esreh</i> mornings and afternoons. And if the intention was say that the Torah freed women from positive time-bound commandments so that they can occupy themselves with their young children, and that they should conclude from this that going to synagogue is not their mission in life and they can just as well pray at home, it was at the least inappropriate to state that it was an \"error\" on their part.",
                    "Women go everywhere today, and would that they went to synagogues and places of holiness. I asked the <i>gaon</i>, my grandfather <i>ztz\"l</i>, why we find among the kings of Judah that a righteous king begot a wicked son who in turn begot a righteous son, and so on. He replied that queens were also involved, i. e., the mothers were a decisive influence. That is certainly the case today, and so it is important to encourage them to come to synagogue. The exception would be if the synagogue were a place of idle talk; see the Testament of the Vilna Gaon.",
                    "If women wish to come to synagogue they should be taken seriously. In the <i>Terumat haDeshen</i>'s time, menstruating women did not enter the synagogue, but in <i>Pesakim</i> 132 he permitted them to attend on the High Holy Days and other times when they would be distressed to have to remain outside. Rema in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 88 wrote \"great distress\" (<i>etzvon gadol</i>), but the word \"great\" is not found in <i>Terumat haDeshen</i>. Rema also wrote \"when many [men] gather\" (<i>rabim mit'asfim</i>), in the masculine, but <i>Terumat haDeshen</i> wrote \"when many [women] gather\" (<i>rabot mit'asfot</i>), in the feminine, because whenever many women go to synagogue, the others are distressed to have to stay home, and every <i>Shabbat</i> is that way in many communities. It would be proper to arrange baby-sitting to enable young mothers to come to the synagogue."
                ],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [
                    "<big><strong>Nursing and Birth Control</strong></big>",
                    "",
                    "",
                    "I read in a widely circulated pamphlet:<br><br>In the time of the Gemara, a woman's period generally did not return until 24 months after the onset of pregnancy. The then-common practice of nursing the baby for two years was a further factor in delaying the period. Today, at any rate, even among nursing mothers, regular periods begin within six months of childbirth. Our generation's improved standards of nutrition and health-care have diminished the physical difficulties of pregnancy, childbirth, and nursing. The nursing mother, like the mother who does not nurse, is therefore required to follow all the laws of <i>nidah</i>.",
                    "This is not so, and perhaps the author only knew mothers who fed their babies formula and juice along with nursing them; in their case, menstruation would indeed resume a few months after childbirth. But women who nurse exclusively for the first six months and afterwards continue to nurse as much as the baby demands while adding solid foods, may not resume menstruation for up to eighteen months, as in the time of the Gemara. It is not a question of nutrition but of hormones. I have seen this in my own family and heard so from other nursing mothers.",
                    "It should be corrected in future printings, especially since the pamphlet also states, \"In general, only the health needs of the woman, physical or mental, can influence the Halachah's opposition to all means of birth control.\" This follows the opinion of Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe, Even haEzer</i>, part I, no. 64, who wrote that he never saw anyone who permitted birth control except in the case of danger to the mother. However, I heard otherwise from my grandfather, the <i>gaon</i> R. Yosef Eliyahu Henkin <i>zt\"l</i>, and was present a number of times when he ruled that a mother may use contraceptives for two or more years after a live birth. I also heard this in the name of a <i>gadol</i> in Eretz Yisrael, and many follow this in practice. ",
                    "But since the pamphlet follows Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe</i>'s opinion, the only birth control it can permit is nursing, and therefore it is important to publicize that nursing often serves as a contraceptive.<br><br>The usual situation today, of women having monthly periods for much of their married lives, was unusual in the time of the Bible and the Talmud. When women fully nursed their babies, fifteen or twenty years could pass with their only rarely being <i>nidot</i> other than after childbirth. Nor did they have an inordinate number of pregnancies. Where do we find mention of women with ten or twelve children? Scripture says \"until a barren women gives birth to seven\" (I Samuel 2:5), and this was considered a large number.<sup class=\"footnote-marker\">3</sup><i class=\"footnote\"> Milkah's eight sons in <i>Bereishit</i> 22:23 are the most that the Bible attributes to one mother. The ten sons of Haman were not necessarily from the same mother, nor were the ten sons of R. Yohanan in <i>Berachot</i> 5b, nor the ten sons of Papa mentioned in the <i>hadran</i>, as <i>Sefer haEshkol</i> wrote in the name of R. Hai Gaon. Elkanah's statement to Chanah, \"am I not better to you than ten sons?\" (I Samuel 1:8) means, \"am I not better to you more than any number of sons you could possibly have?\" and does not prove that women actually had that many. However, the midrash in <i>Psikta Rabati</i> 43 does state that Peninah had ten sons. A woman who married young, had her first child at age fourteen or fifteen, and nursed full-time would have a baby every three years or so, and ten children in the course of thirty years of childbearing. Today, women do not marry before they are eighteen to twenty years old, and at the above rate they would have no more than seven or eight children.<br>The rate of one child every three years or so also explains Chanah's song, \"until a barren woman gives birth to seven.\" Why not ten? The answer is that a barren woman (<i>akarah</i>) is one whose first ten years of marriage passed without issue, as in <i>Bereishit</i> 16:2–3. By then a woman would normally have had three children. If after ten years an <i>akarah</i> became fertile, she would have twenty or so childbearing years left, enough to bear seven offspring at the above rate.</i>",
                    "Repeated monthly periods create problems and stress, especially for young couples, as do too-frequent births, and it is important that women know that neither is inevitable. The women who nurse today are often the younger and more educated ones, and they should be encouraged to do so, as it is healthy for mother and child."
                ],
                [],
                [
                    "1. The husband's presence in the delivery room, and comfort measures for a birthing mother, and natural birth",
                    "2. b\"h 20 Tamuz 5737 (July 6, 1977)",
                    "3. To the Rabbi of one settlement",
                    "4. Regarding your question about a husband who wants to be present in the delivery room, which is a question that is raised often in recent times, and several events have come to me as well. In my humble opinion, if there is no need for the husband to be there, we should not permit him to, because he could easily come to look at the private body parts, and we tell a Nazirite, \"Go, go, travel, travel, do not come close to a vineyard.\" Even though the Responsa Iggrot Moshe Orach Chaim vol. 3:95 he wrote briefly that he does not see any prohibition in this situation, on the condition that he does not look as the baby emerges, etc. even by way of a mirror, we should not use this as a general permission, His Honor knows the nature of his own congregation. But if he knows someone who is certainly able to handle it, then it is possible to permit. There are different types of situations, as in many hospitals, they tie down a woman's legs to a kind of stirrup, so she is immobilized, and they cover everything with a sheet except for the place where the baby will emerge, and then it is easier to be careful not to look, since the husband stands by her head. This is unlike in a natural birth in some places, where they do not tie down the woman's legs, but rather she holds her legs up by her knees and pulls strongly when the contractions push out the baby, and all of her is revealed from the waist down.",
                    "5. But if the woman is afraid (NOTE: One Rabbi has written about this in a quarterly that it is more correct to call a woman's fear \"willpower\" or \"forceful will\" rather than fear, but it seems that he is trying to make a generalization on the basis of women that he knows, in a situation that the Sages have established to be life-threatening, and it is not correct, because there are other women who do have a great amount of fear over being alone, so the judge has to evaluate each situation. He also wrote there that if women know that their husbands are not halachically permitted to enter during the delivery, etc. that they will not even begin to consider fearing. Respectfully, they might not ask the halachic question, but where has their fear gone? Following this logic, in the Gemara's case of a blind woman, we should say that it is forbidden to ask for someone to light a candle for her when her friends do not need the candle, then she should not ask. He also brought evidence from earlier generations, when the husband was not present, which is no good evidence, because she was surrounded by her female relatives and friends, which is not the case today. Study Tractate Sotah 21b, \"how is this? etc,\" in the case where a woman is drowning in a river and a man says, \"it's not appropriate to look at her and save her.\") and therefore wants her husband to be present with her, we do not need to find grounds to permit him to be with her in the delivery room, and in my humble opinion, he is obligated to be there, because of the threat to her life, as our Sages z\"l upheld the fear of a birthing mother to be a danger to life, and we even violate Shabbat to prevent her fear, as we said in Tractate Shabbat 128b in the Mishna, \"We may assist birth for a woman on Shabbat, and call a midwife for her from one place to another, and break Shabbat for her, etc.\" The Gemara asks, \"After the tannaitic teaching that 'we may assist birth for a woman on Shabbat, and call a midwife for her from one place to another,' what does 'and we violate Shabbat for her' add?\" and answers, \"It includes that which the Sages taught- if she needs a candle, her friend lights a candle for her, and if she needs oil, her friend brings her oil, etc.\" They challenged that this is too obvious, and responded that it is necessary to teach it for a case of a blind woman, as we might have thought that since she cannot see, it would be forbidden to light her a candle, so it comes to teach us that it is still comforting to her, thinking, \"If anything happens, my friend will see and help me.\" Thus- even lighting a candle on Shabbat for a woman who cannot see the candle, and is only concerned for a possible complication is permitted, in order to comfort her mind, even though she has no physical benefit from it, and the rule is the same here, where she fears being without her husband, he is obligated to be with her, and this, in short, is the halacha. ",
                    "6. However, there are many questions on this topic, and in order to clarify the topic of comforting the mind of the birthing woman, there is a need to elaborate. First, look closely at that beraita- \"Our Sages taught- if she needs a candle, her friend lights a candle for her, and if she needs oil, her friend brings her oil by hand, and if this is not enough, she brings it in her hair, and if this is not enough, she brings it in a container.\" In the Gemara, they challenge this, \"Take out this part, because it is forbidden to bring it in her hair, because it requires squeezing,\" and they responded, \"Rava and Rav Yosef both said- The action of forbidden squeezing cannot be done on hair. Rav Ashi said- Even if you think hair is squeezable, she can still bring it in a container using her hair, because as much as it is possible to deviate from the normal way of carrying, we deviate.\" From here, we learn that we need to do things for the woman who is giving birth on Shabbat using abnormal methods. Furthermore, the beraita mentioned this deviation in the context of bringing oil, and did not mention deviation in lighting the candle, which makes it seem that only bringing oil requires deviation, and Rav Ashi too, speaks about bringing the oil. Except, the Tur writes in ch. 330 \"We light a candle for her, and in any case, as much as it is possible to deviate from the normal way, we deviate.\" In his words, the \"deviating\" is also referring back to lighting the candle, and not just bringing the oil. Similarly the Meiri writes in accordance with the Tur's phrasing, and it seems that they pick up on specificity in what Rav Ashi said, \"as much it is possible to deviate from the normal way, we deviate,\" in the plural form, indicating that it is speaking not just about the one friend bringing the oil, but about everyone. But necessarily the Rambam's opinion differs, as he wrote in Laws of Shabbat 2:11, \"And if she needs oil or other similar things, we bring it to her, but as much as it is possible to deviate from the normal way, we deviate while bringing it, for example, her friend brings it in a container hanging from her hair. But if this is not possible, she brings it in the normal way.\" Here he has added words \"while bringing it,\" which proves that only in that case would we deviate. The SM\"aG wrote similarly, using the same words in Laws of Shabbat, Negative Rules 65, and it appears that the SMa\"K, KolBo, and Eshkol agree as well. In the SMa\"K Mitzvah 221 is written, \"If she needs a candle, we light it for her, even if she is blind, and if she needs oil, her friend brings it, but as much as it is possible for her to deviate from the normal way, she does.\" He specifically teaches this in the phrasing of Rav Ashi, changing from plural to singular female, referring to the one who brings the oil, in contrast to the phrasing of \"we light the candle.\" This is not to say that there is never a deviation to be made in lighting a candle, because it is certainly possible for two friends to light it at once, as the Rambam wrote in Laws of Shabbat 1:15, or it is possible to light it with the back of the hand, or other kinds of deviations. Given this, we need to understand the opinion of the Rambam and his group, which follows the simplest read of the beraita- why is bringing (oil), which is done with a deviation, different from lighting (the candle) or other forbidden labors which are done for a birthing mother?",
                    "7. Secondly, we must understand how a birthing mother is different from other kinds of people with dangerous illnesses, whose cases do not mention the concern for deviation in the Talmud, for example, in Tractate Avoda Zara 28b, regarding a problematic eye, that we may bring medicine for it through the public domain, without mentioning deviations. The Rambam, too, mentioned deviation only regarding a birthing mother, and the Tur and Shulchan Aruch mention deviation only about a birthing mother in ch. 330 but not about an ill person in ch. 328. They even write, \"A birthing mother is like a person with a dangerous illness, and we violate Shabbat for her...but in any case, as much as it is possible to deviate from the normal way, we deviate,\" and from the words \"but in any case\" it is proven that the birthing mother is not like someone with a dangerous illness. Only the Ramban, in Torat HaAdam, in the section on Danger, he writes, \"We learn from this regarding all the needs of the ill person, even if they are in danger, where it is possible to do forbidden labor in an abnormal way, so that Shabbat will not be violated, we deviate, to avoid violating Shabbat.\" The ReM\"A wrote similarly in 328:12 in the name of the Or Zarua, and in their opinion, there is no difference between a birthing mother and an ill person, in contradistinction to the opinion of the Rambam, Tur, and Shulchan Aruch, who follow the simplest read of the Gemara. ",
                    "8. The Maggid Mishneh offers a resolution to this in Laws of Shabbat ch. 2, ibid, saying that the reason for this distinction appears to be that the pain of the birthing mother and her contractions are like a natural thing for her, and fewer than one in a thousand die from giving birth, and therefore they were stricter, requiring deviation in the places where it is possible, while they were not as strict with an ill person, and all the Achronim quote this. It is not sufficient, in my humble opinion, because, why does it matter that it is natural, given that it is also dangerous? If it is because fewer than one in a thousand die, we have written from Rabeinu Tam in the Hagahot Mordechai on Tractate Shabbat 464 that there are several things that we can observe are not deadly, and even so the Sages gave leniencies for them. Even the words of Maggid Mishneh are surprising, saying that fewer than one in a thousand birthing mothers die- this is something contradicted by our instincts, and even in our day, more than one in a thousand are endangered, how much more so in their day?! (From edits/errata: n.b. See Tosafot on Tractate Ketubot 83b, \"Death is common, because most of the time, they are put into danger while birthing.\") ",
                    "9. In the MaHaRSHa\"L's glosses on the SMa\"G, Laws of Shabbat, he offered a solution to the Rambam's words, saying that the reason that we introduce deviation into acts we do for a birthing mother, is that these acts are unrelated to danger, because even if there never were these items, the ill person would not be endangered because of it, while in the earlier case regarding an ill person, if they had not done that thing, he would have been in life-threatening danger. This aligns with the Gemara; which challenges, \"what does 'and we violate Shabbat for her' add?\" and answers, \"It includes the candle...the candle is too obvious,\" and responded, \"it is necessary to teach it for a case of a blind woman...\" If the oil was related to a life-threatening danger, it would have challenged \"this is too obvious\" about the oil too, the way it challenged the candle. From the lack of challenge, we can learn what is excluded from this- that oil is not one of the items that are so necessary that we should break Shabbat for them. But regarding anything that is necessary, and that is depended on in a life-threatening danger- it is a mitzvah to be quick, and to do it not in an abnormal way at all. This is how, in my opinion, the Rambam and the SMa\"G could be solved using the words of the MaHaRSha\"L, and according to his words, there is no distinction between the case of a birthing mother and an ill person in the Rambam's opinion, and bringing oil just is not related to life-threatening danger, which is why she brings it in an abnormal way. I do not understand his words, since, did the Rambam not conclude with, \"But if this is not possible, she brings it in the normal way\"? And, too, the Gemara's, \"as much as it is possible to deviate,\" sounds like it means that if it is not possible, we bring it without a deviation, through the public domain, and if there was no life-threatening danger connected to bringing the oil, how was it permitted to break Shabbat for her? And, too, when reading with this gloss, the beraita's phrasing becomes difficult- \"if she needs a candle, her friend lights a candle for her, and if she needs oil, her friend brings her oil,\" makes it sound like they are both stated about the same kind of situation, and it is a stretch to interpret the first one to be about a life-threatening danger, and the second case not about a non-life-threatening danger. And regarding the challenge, when the Gemara should have raised, \"this is too obvious\" about the oil also, in my humble opinion, this does not deserve a \"this is too obvious\" challenge, since the Rambam and SMa\"G's opinions really seem to mean that she does need to bring the oil in an abnormal way, which is different from the candle. ",
                    "10. Thirdly, we must understand, how is a birthing mother different from someone with a life-threatening illness, given that there is no permission mentioned in the Gemara to settle the mind, except for birthing mother? Similarly, the Rishonim cite the ruling about settling the mind about a birthing mother and not an ill person. Even according to the Ramban, in the Torat HaAdam, who wrote that \"based in the treatment of a birthing mother, we can learn that in order to settle the mind of a regular ill person, we violate Shabbat in the ways that relate to danger,\" the birthing mother is still different from someone with a dangerous illness, because it seems that the ill person requires assessment as to what are items that related to danger. (NOTE: This aligns with the responsa attributed to the RaShB\"A ch. 281, but in the Responsa of the RaShB\"A vol. 4 ch. 245, in the name of the RA\"H, it seems he aligns with the TaShBe\"Tz.) However, for a birthing mother, the Sages established that she can be endangered by fear, as the Tosafot write in Tractate Shabbat ibid. Only the Ta\"ShBe\"Tz vol. 1 ch. 54 wrote uncited that \"even to settle the mind of an ill person, even if it is not necessary for his health, but only to settle his mind, we light a candle even if he is blind and will not benefit from the light, and the rule is the same for other forbidden labors, which an ill person might comfort himself with, which we do for him on Shabbat.\" The same appears from the responsa of the RaDBa\"Z, vol. 4 ch. 66. ",
                    "11. The Rambam rules on settling the mind of an ill person on Shabbat in three locations. The first one is regarding a birthing mother, as he wrote in Laws of Shabbat Ch.2 Law 11, \"A birthing mother who is bending down to give birth is in life-threatening danger, and we violate Shabbat for her, call her a midwife from one location to another, cut the umbilical cord and tie it, and if she needs a candle when she is crying out during labor, we light the candle for her even if she is blind, because it settles her mind to have a candle even though she cannot see it, and if she needs oil or things like that, we bring them to her, and as much as it is possible to deviate from the normal way we, deviate while bringing them, for example, her friend might bring a container hanging from her hair, but if this is not possible, she brings it the normal way.\" The Rambam wrote the words \"bending down to give birth\" and wrote the words \"crying out during labor.\" It is obvious that a woman cries out due to contractions for a long time, sometimes a day or two days, before she bends down to give birth, and, as is written in the Beur Halacha ch. 330 titled \"and we light\" and the Responsa Iggrot Moshe Orach Chaim vol. 1 ch. 132, see those, which is unlike what is written in the Aruch HaShulchan Ch. 330:4. Although the Issur V'Heter 59:2 includes \"crying out during labor\" with \"bending down to give birth,\" the SMa\"G and Kolbo and Orchot Chaim all differentiate in their phrasing between \"bending down to give birth\" and contractions, and follow the simplest read of the Rambam, which is also attested to by our observations. According to this, we violate Shabbat to settle the mind of a birthing mother quite a long time before the birth. ",
                    "12. Necessarily, then, according to the Rambam, our violation of Shabbat for her when she is crying out during labor is just to settle her mind, but not for her physical needs, and his language specifically indicates, \"A birthing mother who is bending down to give birth is in life-threatening danger, etc.,\" meaning that while she has not yet bent down to give birth, she is not in life-threatening danger, aside from what is necessary to settle her mind, and we will explain the reason for this presently. Thus we can reason as well, given that according to the Rambam's position, we violate Shabbat for her for any reason, already from the time her labor begins, then why does the Gemara take the trouble of explicating when the womb has opened enough to violate Shabbat for her, for which the Amoraim give three signs in Shabbat 129a? Doesn't crying out during labor precede all of these? So why would it matter when the womb opens? We are forced to say that the Gemara went through this trouble to address the minority of a minority of women who do not suffer at all with their contractions. However, certainly at the time that she is only crying out during labor, we should permit violating Shabbat to settle her mind, and at the time she is only bending down to give birth, too, because then she is like an ill person in every respect. Thus the challenge of the Magen Avraham 330:2 is settled, as he challenged, \"Why does the Gemara need to give the reason that we light the candle to settle her mind? Don't we need to light the candle so that her friends can see what she needs?\" Truly, we would not violate Shabbat for that, but only in order to settle her mind. And as for the idea that the friends need to see when the womb has opened, see the Responsa Iggrot Moshe vol. 1 ibid. In my humble opinion, in order to know when the womb has opened, they do not need a candle, because the three signs are 'from when her friends carry her by her limbs,' 'from when the blood flows down,' and 'from when she sits on the birthing stool,' and all of these can be observed even in the dark. It is true that what we call the 'opening of the womb' for purposes of violation of Shabbat for a birthing mother is not the same 'opening of the womb' from the topic of menstrual prohibition. (NOTE: The Rambam's opinion is that the 'opening of the womb' does not refer to blood, but rather to the time when something is emerging from the womb during the birth process, and not before the birth, even if the womb is already open. See his Commentary on the Mishna Tractate Nidda at the beginning of chapter 3, where he wrote, \"It is impossible for the womb to open without blood- at the point that something is emerging from the womb, it is impossible for this to happen, without some blood emerging.\" And the Rambam follows his own position from Tractate Ohalot 7:4, \"A woman who was struggling during childbirth and they moved her from house to house- the first house is doubtfully impure, and the second is definitely impure. Rabbi Yehuda says: In what case? When she is carried by her limbs. But if she could still walk, the first one is pure, because once her womb has opened, she has no opportunity to walk.\" The Rambam interpreted that, \"The first house is doubtfully impure, as perhaps, her womb opened there and the offspring came out stillborn and the house became impure,\" and he similarly interprets Rabbi Yehuda's statement, \"If she was too weak to walk, etc. it is possible that the womb has opened and the offspring has come out.\" In the Rambam's interpretation, the phrase 'opening of the womb' in the Mishna includes also the passage of the offspring through the cervix to the birth canal. See the Tosfot Yom Tov. This accords with the opinion of the Halachot Gedolot in Laws of Circumcision, the Halachot of Rabbi Abba brought in the Otzar HaGaonim on Tractate Shabbat ibid, and this is how they said it, \"A pregnant woman who cannot walk- it is known that the fetus has put his head out into the birth canal, as once the womb has opened, there is no opportunity to walk.\" It is explained there that the Rambam in his Commentary on the Mishna in Nidda wrote according to the position of the Gaonim, but according to his own in Ohalot, that the opening of the womb means that something comes out of it, and this is why they say that it is not possible for the womb to open without blood, when something is coming out of the womb. This is also what appears from the Eshkol in Laws of Nidda, where he wrote, \"It is not possible for a miscarried fetus to emerge without blood, etc. and Rava thinks that a small piece can emerge with no blood.\" He connects the blood to something emerging, and not to the womb opening. This is not the same as the discussion of 'opening of the womb' in Tractate Shabbat, and similarly in several contexts we have found distinction between the language of the Tanaim and the language of the Amoraim, and even the phrase 'opening of the womb' in Tractate Shabbat is not exactly the same, but rather means 'at a time when the womb is open,' Notice there that at first Rav Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel, \"A parturient, the whole time that the womb is open...\" and they explained in the Gemara about this, \"From when does the womb open and until when is the womb open?\" ",
                    "13. The second location in the Rambam is in the context of forbidden sorcery, as he wrote in the Laws of Foreign Worship 11:11, \"If someone was bitten by a snake or scorpion, it is permissible to whisper over the site of the bite, even on Shabbat, in order to settle his mind and strengthen his heart. Even though this practice achieves nothing, since he is in danger, they permitted it to him in order to prevent his mind from tearing him apart.\" The Kesef Mishneh interpreted there that they permitted it for him from the angle of Shabbat, even though useless speech is forbidden on Shabbat. The Achronim understood that the Rambam is speaking about the Torah prohibtion of sorcery, and therefore they had extreme difficulty with these words of the Rambam's, and see the Minchat Chinuch Mitzvah 512, for if they permit a negative Torah prohibition in order to save a life, of course they should permit useless speech on Shabbat, which is a Rabbinic-level prohibition, making this an unnecessary teaching. What I have to write about this topic, in my own humble opinion, I will write later, if it please God (Section 45) because this is not the right place for it. ",
                    "14. The third location in the Rambam is in the context of someone imminently dying, as he wrote in the Laws of Acquisitions and Gifts 8:2, \"Someone imminently dying who commanded, saying: Give this and this to Ploni- whether it is a weekday or Shabbat, whether he wrote it or did not write it, they acquire it all when he dies, of all that he gave them, and they do not require formal acquisition, etc. so that his mind will not tear him apart, knowing that his words are not being upheld. Therefore, if he says, 'acquire it from me' we acquire it from him even on Shabbat, because this act of acquisition is unnecessary.\" And the language of preventing tearing-apart of the mind as written here is equivalent to the settling of the mind, as the Rambam has written in Laws of Foreign Worship ch. 11 in the laws about sorcery that we cited above. They are also equated in the Responsa of the RaDBa\"Z vol. 4 ch. 66, cited above. The Rambam's position as he interpreted it, writing that we acquire it from him because this act of acquisition is unnecessary, shows that if there was a need for the act of acquisition, they would not permit it on Shabbat, even in order to prevent his mind from tearing him apart, because the acquisition is similar to business transactions, as the Lechem Mishneh explained there in Law 4, and like the Maor's position in Tractate Bava Batra 156b. For this reason, we must understand why in the Laws of Foreign Worship, in the case of someone bitten by a snake, the Rambam permits at minimum a Rabbinic-level prohibition of useless speech, but in the the case of someone imminently dying, who is also ill and in danger, he did not permit even a Rabbinic-level Shabbat prohibition (acquiring a gift). See the Pnei Yehoshua on Tractate Gittin 77b, titled \"Tosafot\" where he wrote in another context that the Rabbinic-level prohibitions of Shabbat are treated more stringently because they are a fence protecting Biblical forbidden labors, but this reason does not accord with the Rambam's words about someone bitten by a snake, where he made the permission dependent on the reasoning that he is in danger.  ",
                    "15. In my humble opinion, there are two types of \"tearing apart of the mind.\" The first type is when the ill person is afraid for his body, that perhaps he might die, which is what the Rambam wrote about, regarding someone bitten by a snake: \"in order to settle his mind and strengthen his heart\" which is phrased as preventing fear, as is written in Joshua 11, \"to strengthen their heart to face war, etc.\" The second type is when the ill person is distressed and worried that his words will not be upheld, in matters unrelated to his body, which is written about regarding someone imminently dying, \"so that his mind will not tear him apart, knowing that his words are not being upheld.\" In the second type, there is no life-threatening danger at all, and for this reason the Rambam did not even permit Rabbinic-level acts of acquisition, in a place where an act of acquisition would be necessary. Through this, we have also gained according to the other Rishonim, who disagree with the Rambam, and think, like the Rashbam in Tractate Bava Batra, that even in places where an act of acquisition is necessary, it is permissible to make acquisition from someone who is imminently dying, in order for his mind not to tear him up, because even they only permitted Rabbinic-level violations of Shabbat and not Biblical prohibitions, because this is not true life-threatening danger. See (Shulchan Aruch) Orach Chaim 306:9, indicating that someone who is ill and overpowered by the world who tells them to send for his relatives, they are permitted to send for them through a non-Jewish intermediary on Shabbat. Als0 see 339:4, indicating that someone who is imminently dying is permitted to issue a divorce on Shabbat, so that his mind will not tear him apart. In all of these, they only permitted him Rabbinic-level prohibitions, but not for the Jew to travel himself, or for the relatives to travel on Shabbat, or similarly not to write the bill of divorce on Shabbat, see Achronim there. Since the tearing apart of the mind of the ill person and the person who is imminently dying is the second type that we mentioned, where he is afraid not for his body but for his words to be upheld, therefore there is nothing life-saving that would allow violation of Shabbat. This is unlike what indicated by the Levush 306:3, see there in Eliyahu Zuta section 4. ",
                    "16. What emerges from these locations is that the Rambam codifies a permission to violate Shabbat's Biblical prohibitions in order to settle the mind of only a birthing mother and did not write similarly for an ill person, and even regarding someone who was bitten by a snake, he wrote about only useless speech. This proves that settling the mind is not life-saving, even though the bite is dangerous and he is afraid for his body. This is similarly proven in the Lechem Mishneh there in Laws of Foreign Worship 11:12, where he wrote that even though they permitted whispering over the site of the bite, they certainly did not permit him to whisper over the bite if it would have been possible to instead recite a verse from the Torah, see there. If settling the mind over a bite through whispering were life-saving, what would be the relevance that it would have been possible to recite a verse from the Torah? The whispering would still be permissible, and the verse would be forbidden. Moreover, the verse itself would have to be permissible as well, as the Tosafot wrote in Tractate Shevuot 15b, and as was ruled in the Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 179:5. But in the Rambam's opinion, certainly the whispering is not life-saving, even though it comes to settle the mind of the person who has been bitten. Given this, we must understand how a birthing mother is different from other people with life-threatening illnesses: that settling her mind is truly life-saving. There is also a contradiction according to the Maggid Mishneh in either of two directions- for if they did not permit violating Shabbat for a birthing mother except in an abnormal way, because it is the natural way, why did they permit specifically for her violation of Shabbat to settle her mind? ",
                    "17. In my humble opinion, blessed is the One who provided some of His wisdom to those who fear Him! For the Sages recognized how a birthing mother is different from someone with a life-threatening illness: an ill person just needs to rest and eat what he is given, etc. and his healing is in the hands of Heaven and the hands of other people, as opposed to the birthing mother, who must herself expel the offspring, which is hard labor, which is incomparable to any other challenge in the life of a man or woman, as is known. If she pushes when she should be resting, or does not push when she should push, she would be exhausting her strength and endangering herself, and she requires a settled mind, in order to listen to the instructions of the midwife or expert during the birth. If she did not have a settled mind during the time of the contractions, she also will not during the time she bends down to give birth. Thus a woman exhausts her strength if she does not have the emotional calm to rest during the contractions while she is experiencing pains. (NOTE: n.b. Also, fear strengthens pain, as written in the Moreh Nevuchim vol. 3 ch. 49 regarding circumcision.) This explains the Rambam's position, that we may violate Shabbat for her when she is crying out during labor, quite some time before the birth, because of the eventuality that she must expel her offspring. ",
                    "18. The Sages' words need no reinforcement, and the Rambam was an expert doctor, however, I will write what I see after saying all this. In the research literature, a cohort of birthing mothers was divided into two groups. The first group was tracked during labor by machines measuring every minute the maternal and fetal heart rate etc., while in the second group each woman was tracked during labor by nurses standing next to the birthing mother from the time of contractions to the time of birth. The second group experienced a significant reduction of episodes of bleeding and c-sections in the birthing mother, as compared to the first group, and they explained this as the women having more settled minds, because of the nurses standing near them. Everything on this topic is known by those who know about birth, and this is why our Sages z\"l established that settling the mind of a birthing mother is really life-saving, and overrides Biblical Shabbat prohibitions, which is different from the standard treatment for any other ill person, as accords with the simplest read of the Gemara, and the conclusion of most Rishonim and the Rambam. Even though today they are able to extract the offspring with forceps or through a c-section, the ruling has not changed due to this, because every one of these methods introduces additional danger to the mother or infant, and doctors and the health-conscious are careful to avoid them. ",
                    "19. However, the woman herself during labor has not yet entered life-threatening danger, and it is possible that this is what the Maggid Mishneh meant when he wrote \"that the pain of the birthing mother and her contractions are like a natural thing for her,\" speaking about the time of her contractions, when, truly, \"fewer than one in a thousand die,\" as he wrote later, except, his phrasing is not quite correct, as he wrote, \"during birth,\" and earlier used the term \"birthing mother,\" see there. Therefore, we break Shabbat for her in an abnormal way in a place where that is possible, since she is not like an ill person who is already in danger. Further, for any other ill person, we would violate Shabbat for his physical needs, but for a birthing mother, we violate it also to settle her mind. If you contend that perhaps requiring things do be done in an abnormal way will lead to them being not done at all- this is not something that is urgent. And if you contend that it would not provide her with a settled mind- when she knows that they will get her whatever she needs, that will settle her mind. And if you contend that people might come to confuse her case with that of another kind of ill person in life-threatening danger, and do things for him too through abnormal ways- these cases are not similar, since she is not in danger, since that begins only when her womb opens, which happens later. Additionally, according to the Rambam's position in Laws of Shabbat 2:3, \"regarding other types of ill people, we do not violate Shabbat using women as intermediaries, so that they will not view Shabbat lightly.\" In that case, for birthing mothers, since we would in an ideal case want the Shabbat violations to be done by women, since all the needs of birthing mothers were done by women in Talmudic times, it would be appropriate for them to do them in an abnormal way, to indicate not to learn from this case to other ill people. ",
                    "20. The Beraita mentioned deviating from the normal way only regarding bringing oil and not regarding lighting the candle, and this aligns with the opinions of the Rambam, SMa\"G and KolBo. Even the opinions of the SMa\"K and Eshkol are this way, as I wrote above. Although the SMa\"K and Eshkol do not record the Rambam's other distinction, that between someone \"crying out during labor\" and someone \"bending down to give birth,\" it is obvious in my humble opinion that there is a great difference between the acts of transporting and lighting, because transporting is not in the birthing mother's presence, so why would she mind if the friend brings it in an abnormal way? But the lighting, which is in her presence, it would be opposite, and if her friends light a candle in an abnormal way, how much more would the birthing mother not have a settled mind, when she sees them being so \"pious\" not to violate Shabbat for her, which is why they are doing things abnormally! She would fear even more, worrying that they might not do for her what she needs. Therefore, all acts of labor that are done in the presence of the birthing mother must be done with no deviation from the normal way. This is opposed to transporting, which is out in public and not in her presence, as the Rambam specifically wrote \"while she brings it\" specifically. Even if she is blind and cannot see how they light it, in any case, perhaps she might sense that her friends are acting in an abnormal way, as the Magen Avraham wrote in 330 ibid., and it will not settle her mind. However, in my humble opinion, if we knew that she would not notice the deviation, we truly would light for a blind woman in an abnormal way, because the distinction between lighting and transporting was stated in the Beraita, and the Beraita was discussing a sighted woman, not a blind woman, and the rule for a blind woman was learned from the extra word in the Mishna's phrasing, where this distinction was not mentioned. ",
                    "21. The position of the Rambam and co., that we violate Shabbat for her during her contractions in order to settle her mind, because of the eventuality that she must be able to expel the offspring, has apparent basis in the Mishna, which teaches, \"and call a midwife for her from one place to another, and break Shabbat for her,\" and calling a midwife for her occurs a great while before the birth, as the Achronim have written, that if they wait until the womb opens, the midwife would not arrive in time. Given this, \"we violate Shabbat for her,\" which they said, refers to also during the contractions, because of the eventual result, according to the Rambam, and they learned from this in the Gemara about settling her mind. "
                ],
                [],
                [
                    "<big><strong>Seating Men and Women at Weddings</strong></big>",
                    "",
                    "",
                    "I was asked my opinion on the seating of men and women at weddings. There are different customs: in some communities, men and women sit in separate halls or with a partition between them; in others, they sit at separate tables in the same hall; while in still others, they sit together at the same tables. ",
                    "Those who use separate rooms or a <i>mechitzah</i> follow <i>Kitzur Shulchan Aruch</i> 149:1:<br><br>One must be careful that men and women do not eat together in one room, for if they eat together in one room, <i>shehasimchah bime'ono</i> (\"in Whose abode there is joy\") is not said, for there is no joy when the <i>yetzer hara</i> reigns.<br><br>This is taken from <i>Beit Shmuel</i> in <i>Even haEzer</i> 62:11 in the name of <i>Bach</i>. But <i>Bach</i> wrote in <i>Even haEzer</i>:<br><br>In Cracow it is the custom that at the feast on the second day [after the wedding] they recite the blessing \"<i>asher bara</i>\" but not \"<i>shehasimchah bime'ono</i>.\" This is very surprising. I have not found any reason for their practice, other than that the feast is a small one and they seat men and women together in one room, and the <i>Minhagim</i> wrote that <i>shehasimchah bime'ono</i> is not said where there is the likelihood of sinful thoughts. According to this, if men alone are at the feast, they certainly need to recite <i>shehasimchah bime'ono</i>.<br><br>Note that <i>Bach</i> wrote this not as a rebuke or admonition, but only to explain a custom. Also, although <i>Beit Shmuel</i> and <i>Kitzur Shulchan Aruch</i> prohibit men and women from being in one room, <i>Bach</i> wrote \"together in one room\" the sense of which is together specifically at the same tables, as indeed a small room normally has only one table. He hinted at this when he wrote, \"if men alone are at the feast\" (<i>mesibah</i>), i. e., they are gathered around (<i>mesubim</i>) the same table.",
                    "Support for this interpretation can be elicited from the source for not saying <i>shehasimchah bime'ono</i> in mixed company. In <i>Sefer Chasidim</i> 393:<br><br>Everyone who recites <i>shehasimchah bime'ono</i> has to inquire whether he has fulfilled \"they shall rejoice in trembling,\" whether there is trembling together with the rejoicing. But if a man takes himself an unworthy wife or is unworthy, or both of them are unworthy, or there is no culture there, or there is profanity or women are seated among the men [in which case] there are sinful thoughts, it is inconceivable to bless <i>shehasimchah bime'ono</i>. It is said concerning these and the like, \"I have not sat in the circle of revelers and been jubilant\" (Jeremiah 15:17) and it is written, \"all the tables are full of vomit and excrement, without room [for anything else]\" (Isaiah 28:8).<br><br>\"Women are seated among the men\" implies that they are intermixed at the same tables, and for that reason <i>Sefer Chasidim</i> cited verses dealing with seating and with tables.",
                    "<i>Bach</i> did not cite <i>Sefer Chasidim</i> directly, however, but only the \"<i>Minhagim</i>\" (customs). The reference is to the <i>Minhagim</i> at the end of <i>Levush</i> on <i>Orach Chayim</i>:<br><br>They said in <i>Sefer Chasidim</i>, \"wherever men and women see each other such as at wedding feasts, <i>shehasimchah bime'ono</i> is not said, for there is no joy before God when there are sinful thoughts.\" We are not careful about this nowadays, and perhaps [the reason is that] nowadays the women are greatly accustomed [to being] among the men and sinful thoughts are not present so much, for [women] are like \"white geese\" to us because of the extent they are among us. And what was done, was done (<i>keivan shedashu, dashu</i>).<br><br>From <i>Levush</i>'s language \"wherever men and women see each other,\" it seems that he understood <i>Sefer Chasidim</i> as prohibiting <i>shehasimchah bime'ono</i> even if they sat at separate tables.<sup class=\"footnote-marker\">2</sup><i class=\"footnote\"> <i>Bach</i> also addressed the issue in <i>Yoreh De'ah</i> 391: \"On the second night, the custom in Cracow is not to bless <i>shehasimchah bime'ono</i>…. It appears that [the reason is that] a small number of men and women gather in one room and there are sinful thoughts, and there is no joy in His abode where there is [violation of] a prohibition, as <i>Sefer Chasidim</i> says, in contrast to <i>Shabbat</i> at <i>Minchah</i> when there are many people and men and women are separate.\"<br>Here <i>Bach</i> did not say \"together\" in one room as in <i>Even haEzer</i>. Similarly, he wrote in Resp. <i>Bach haChadashot, Yoreh De'ah</i>, no. 55: \"In my opinion, [the way] to explain the custom is that it developed on the basis of <i>Sefer Chasidim</i>, who wrote, 'Anywhere that men and women see each other such as at a wedding feast, <i>shehasimchah bime'ono</i> should not be said, for there is no joy in His abode when there are sinful thoughts.'… The feast on the second night is only for relatives and they all dine with the groom and there are a number of men and women [there]. This is in contrast to the third meal on <i>Shabbat</i>, when they prepare a large feast and the men and women are separate…. Therefore they do not say <i>shehasimchah bime'ono</i> [on the second night], even though the wedding [celebrations] are not yet over and they recite <i>asher bara</i>.\"<br><i>Bach</i> described a situation in which \"men and women see each other,\" and this would seem to apply whenever they are in the same room even if seated at separate tables. However, his language is not that of <i>Sefer Chasidim</i> directly but that of the <i>Minhagim</i> at the end of <i>Levush</i> in <i>Orach Chayim</i>, as <i>Chida</i> wrote in Resp. <i>Yosef Ometz</i>, no. 47 (1). Perhaps <i>Levush</i> himself understood <i>Sefer Chasidim</i> as prohibiting men and women from even seeing each other.<br>However, I think it is more likely that <i>Sefer Chasidim, Levush</i> and <i>Bach</i> all refer to looking or gazing at women and not simply to seeing them. The phrase \"<i>Lir'ot b'nashim</i>\" with a <i>bet</i> used by <i>Sefer Chasidim</i> in 393 means to gaze at women, as in <i>Sefer Chasidim</i> 10, \"<i>chasidim einam ro'im b'nashim</i>\" (<i>chasidim</i> do not gaze at women). It is the same as in <i>Bereishit</i> 34:1 which relates that Dinah went out sightseeing \"<i>lir'ot b'vnot ha'aretz</i>.\" <i>Sefer Chasidim</i> objected to seating men and women at the same tables, for then it is impossible to avoid looking at the women, but he does not require separate rooms. This is implicit in his conclusion \"If he cannot be [present] without seeing women, he should not be there,\" i. e., the women are visible, only he should not be looking at them.<br>Whatever the meaning of men \"seeing\" women, in all three places <i>Bach</i> explained the custom he saw in Cracow but did not decry it. Men and women continued to dine together on the second night after a wedding, and why didn't <i>Bach</i> try to dissuade them? The likely answer is that <i>Bach</i> agreed with <i>Levush</i> that in practice there was no <i>hirhur</i>.</i> But even if so, <i>Levush</i> himself wrote \"We are not careful about this nowadays.\" If <i>Bach</i> copied from <i>Levush</i> but rejected his conclusion, he should have said so.",
                    "Some <i>rishonim</i>, in any case, certainly permitted men and women to feast in the same room. Maharil wrote in <i>Hilchot Nisu'in:</i><br><br>It was the custom of the ancients to leave them [the groom and the bride] alone in one room during the feast, and everyone went out; this was done in order that he should be familiar with her. Only one of her female relatives remained there to wait on them. Afterwards all the relatives reentered along with anyone else who wanted to and they, too, dined with them in order to make them rejoice.<br><br>The men and women left the room and a relative remained to wait on the newlywed couple, and afterwards the other relatives returned together with anyone who wished to and they all feasted together. One can interpret this to mean that men and women were at separate tables but certainly not in separate rooms, nor is there any hint of a partition.<br><br>If you ask my opinion, therefore, one who declines to follow <i>Beit Shmuel</i> and <i>Kitzur Shulchan Aruch</i> in the matter of separate halls, in favor of separate tables in the same hall, is none the poorer for it. Even someone who formerly was stringent can change his custom, for feasting in the same hall is close to being a permitted practice mistakenly thought to be forbidden as ruled in <i>Yoreh De'ah</i> 214:1, since <i>Bach</i> did not declare it forbidden and all the more so if <i>Bach</i> copied from <i>Levush</i>, and this is also the sense of <i>Sefer Chasidim</i> and Maharil that there is no stricture against men and women being in the same room. See Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim</i> part 1, no. 41, who wrote that no partition is necessary at weddings, and see below.<br><br>Nevertheless, those who are used to sitting in separate halls should not lightly abandon their practice, for why increase closeness between men and women? <i>Levush</i> was lenient because men and women were already accustomed to being together, but those who are accustomed to sitting in separate rooms at weddings may be subject to <i>hirhur</i> if they suddenly change their custom. And if they choose to forbid it in full awareness that there are grounds for being lenient, it becomes an obligatory custom.",
                    "There is one custom that should be changed, however: the practice of keeping the bride outside the room and only bringing her in for <i>sheva berachot</i>. This is proper at the actual wedding feast where there are many men to rejoice with the groom in one hall and many women to rejoice with the bride in the other hall, and this is what <i>Yam Shel Shelomoh</i> is referring to in <i>Ketuvot</i> 1:20. But on subsequent days when <i>sheva berachot</i> are said in private homes, if the groom feasts in the dining room with the men while the bride remains in the kitchen or the hallway with only a handful of women, not to mention that the women are occupied in serving the food, where is the rejoicing of the bride?<br><br>Even according to <i>Eizer Mekudash</i> in <i>Even haEzer</i> 65 who wrote that to fulfill the <i>mitzvah</i> of rejoicing the bride and groom it is enough to recite one of the <i>sheva berachot</i> at the end, there is no logic in rejoicing the groom during the entire meal and the bride only at the very end. In <i>Ketuvot</i> 17a we find the opposite: \"How does one dance before the bride?\" without mention of the groom at all. There is a printer's error in <i>Shulchan Aruch, Even haEzer</i> 65:1: instead of \"<i>leraked lifneihem</i>\" (to dance before them) it should say \"<i>leraked lifaneha</i>\" (to dance before her), as is the version of <i>Tur</i> and the <i>achronim</i>.<br><br>If the concern is lest the men have impure thoughts when the bride is present, this applies equally during the <i>sheva berachot</i> when she does come in, and in any case the Sages prohibited looking at the face of the bride. And see Ran in <i>Ketuvot</i>, who wrote: \"this is our practice nowadays, to bless in each wedding-hall as long as the bride or groom is there,\" i. e., even if the bride is in the wedding-hall without the groom, The <i>mitzvah</i> is not just to have the bride join the groom at the end, for Ran wrote, \"when the groom exits the synagogue the bride is brought out of her room and they enter the <i>chupah</i>; this is the main rejoicing.\" He cited the Jerusalem Talmud that they brought the bride from her <i>chupah</i> all seven days to rejoice with her.",
                    "When <i>sheva berachot</i> were held at my grandfather's apartment on one of the nights after our wedding, the organizers seated my wife in a corner outside the dining room with a handful of women. I protested, and some of what I wrote here I said there. I cited the case of R. Acha in <i>Ketuvot</i> 17a and Ritva at the end of <i>Kidushin</i>. Even according to those who hold that no one today can claim that a woman is like a \"wooden beam\" to him, i. e., that he has no <i>hirhur</i>, this applies to extraordinary circumstances such as carrying a bride on one's shoulders as described in the Gemara, but for a woman to sit in the same room or even at the same table with men is an everyday occurrence.<br><br>Everywhere in the <i>rishonim</i> the feast is called \"the feast of the groom and bride\" or \"the rejoicing of the groom and bride,\" and the blessing reads \"who rejoices the groom [together] with the bride.\" Where is the rejoicing of the bride? My grandfather accepted my words but said that it is difficult to contest an established practice, but I think anyone who is able to should protest.",
                    "What emerges from this discussion is that men and women who sit at separate tables in one room but without a <i>mechitzah</i> are entirely without fault, for this meets <i>Sefer Chasidim</i>'s concern and this is what <i>Bach</i>'s language implies. Regarding mixed seating at the same tables, however, <i>Sefer haPardes</i> quoted the Gaonic work <i>Ma'asim l'Bnei Eretz Yisrael</i>:<br><br>It is forbidden to mix men and women whether at a feast or in any matter, but rather men and women [should be] separate, from a <i>kal vechomer</i>: if during a time of mourning it is written, \"the House of Israel will eulogize separately by families; the House of David separately and their womenfolk separately,\" how much more so [during a time of] drinking and laughter!<br><br>The reference is to <i>Sukkah</i> 52a, which cites Zechariah 12:12–14. According to this, not only should men and women sitting together at the same tables not say <i>shehasimchah bime'ono</i>, following <i>Sefer Chasidim</i>, but they are in violation of a prohibition derived from <i>divrei kabalah</i>.",
                    "If the question was only whether or not to say <i>shehasimchah bime'ono</i>, it could be argued that people today rely on <i>Levush</i>. Even if <i>Levush</i> himself was referring to seating at separate tables, his reasoning applies to sitting at the same tables as well: sinful thoughts are not prevalent because everyone is used to sitting together, regardless of whether or not they should have gotten used to it in the first place; as <i>Levush</i> wrote, \"what was done, was done.\" Compare <i>Aruch haShulchan</i> in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 75:7 on reciting the <i>Shema</i> facing the uncovered hair of a married woman.<br><br>In addition, the current practice of saying <i>shehasimchah beme'ono</i> in all circumstances may be based on <i>Sefer ha'Itur</i> in <i>Birkat Chatanim</i>, chapter 4, who wrote that <i>shehasimchah beme'ono</i> has the status of a blessing—in which case it should be recited in any case, just as <i>asher bara</i> and the rest of <i>sheva berachot</i> are not omitted. Resp. <i>Chatam Sofer</i>'s statement in <i>Choshen Mishpat</i>, no. 150, that \"all the <i>mitzvot</i> are set aside because of sinful thoughts\" does not mean that blessings should not be recited; otherwise, why stop at <i>shehasimchah beme'ono</i>? Forbid <i>asher bara</i> as well, or even <i>birkat hamazon</i>! Rather, he meant that one should not perform a <i>mitzvah</i> if the act itself causes <i>hirhur</i>, such as his case of women singing in public in honor of the emperor's visit.",
                    "However, the verses in Zechariah are a problem, and here <i>Levush</i> is of no help. Even if men and women seated at a wedding feast have no sinful thoughts at all, are they better than those future mourners mentioned in Scripture, from whom the Gemara in <i>Sukkah</i> learned a <i>kal vechomer</i>? \"If in the time to come, when they are involved in mourning and the <i>yetzer hara</i> does not reign, … today … how much more so!\" Take away the evil inclination and sinful thoughts, Zechariah nonetheless stipulates separating the men and the women. It seems remarkable that no one pays attention to this.<br><br>However, why focus only on weddings? The <i>kal vechomer</i> from Zechariah should apply equally to meetings, dinners and innumerable occasions every day, as <i>Ma'asim l'Bnei Eretz Yisrael</i> wrote, \"whether at a feast or in any matter.\" But it is clear that we do not follow <i>Ma'asim liBnei Eretz Yisrael</i> in this matter, just as we do not follow it on others. <i>Otzar haGaonim</i> in <i>Sukkah</i> quoted them as follows:<br><br>When the women are seated together by themselves and the men by themselves, [they are] permitted on condition that the men not pour [wine] for the women nor the women for the men, and similarly in giving out the main dish and the side dishes.<br><br>Our Halachah does not forbid putting out food on the table for members of the opposite sex. See <i>Even haEzer</i> 21:5, that only pouring wine is forbidden, and then only by a woman for a man.",
                    "As for the <i>kal vechomer</i> from Zechariah, I think the verses refer only to gatherings in synagogues and study-halls that have sanctity, and not to other locations. See <i>Megillah</i> 28b, \"Synagogues, large funerals are held in them,\" and Rashi's explanation, \"it is necessary to gather together to eulogize a scholar who died, and the synagogue is suitable for this because it is a large building.\" Large funerals were held in the synagogue, and such is is the sense of the Gemara there which reported that Rafram eulogized his daughter-in-law and R. Zeira eulogized one of the rabbis in the synagogue, \"because everyone came.\"<br><br>The verses in Zechariah describe mass funeral gatherings, as is written, \"the country eulogized,\" and these would naturally take place in the synagogues. This has no bearing on wedding-halls and other locations that have no inherent sanctity. On the other hand, I think that actual mixed seating in the sanctuary of a synagogue is prohibited even during lectures and other non-prayer activities, <i>kal vechomer</i> from Zechariah. Only separate seating even without a <i>mechitzah</i> is permitted on such occasions.",
                    "There is indirect proof from Rashi and a number of other <i>rishonim</i> that the verses in Zechariah refer only to synagogues. The <i>beraita</i> in <i>Sukkah</i> 51b said regarding the <i>Simchat Beit haSho'eivah</i> celebrations in the Temple:<br><br>At first the men were inside and the women outside, and <i>kalut rosh</i> [lightheadedness, frivolity] resulted. They enacted that the women be inside and the men outside, and <i>kalut rosh</i> still resulted. [Finally,] they enacted that the women be above [in a balcony] and the men below.<br><br>Rashi's position throughout the Talmud is that <i>kalut rosh</i> includes all manner of untoward behavior and lack of respect. Sometimes a man treats even himself with <i>kalut rosh</i> as Rashi explained in <i>Ketuvot</i> 17a, and if he treats Heaven that way it reflects a lack of submission on his part. See <i>Megillah</i> 28a, which according to Rashi should be read with a colon after <i>kalut rosh</i>:<br><br>Synagogues—one does not behave in them with <i>kalut rosh</i>: one does not eat (<i>ein ochlin</i>) in them, nor drink in them, nor derive benefit from them, nor take a stroll in them nor enter them to escape the sun in the summer or the rain in the winter.<br><br>The <i>beraita</i> should <i>not</i> be read \"one does not behave in them with <i>kalut rosh</i> and one does not eat (<i>v'ein ochlin</i>) in them\" with a <i>vav</i>, because according to Rashi eating, drinking and so forth are all examples of <i>kalut rosh</i> and are not separate prohibitions, and see Resp. <i>Zekan Aharon</i>, vol. 1, no. 61. <i>Tosafot</i> in <i>Megillah</i> 28b punctuated the <i>beraita</i> as Rashi did, and the same can be seen in <i>Mordechai</i> 830 and <i>Terumat haDeshen</i> in <i>teshuvah</i> 284. This is as opposed to the claim by Resp. <i>Zichron Yehudah</i> (Grunwald), no. 69, that Rashi's is a lone opinion.",
                    "On this basis we can understand Rashi there in <i>Sukkah</i>. The Gemara states:<br><br>[It is written in Zechariah,] \"the country will eulogize separately by families, the family of the House of David separately and their womenfolk separately….\" The Sages said, isn't it a <i>kal vechomer</i>? If in the time to come when they are involved in mourning and <i>yetzer hara</i> does not reign, [nevertheless] Scripture said, \"the men separately and their womenfolk separately,\" today when they are involved in rejoicing and <i>yetzer hara</i> reigns, how much more so!<br><br>Rashi wrote that there are two differences between now and the time to come. At the eulogies in the future, \"the sorrowing person will not easily act in a light-headed way, and in addition (<i>v'od</i>) Scripture stated that the evil inclination will not reign.\" Some commentators were puzzled by Rashi's words \"and in addition,\" as if <i>kalut rosh</i> and <i>yetzer hara</i> were two separate matters. Isn't <i>kalut rosh</i> dependent on <i>yetzer hara</i>?<br><br>Not according to Rashi. Even without <i>yetzer hara</i>, it is <i>kalut rosh</i> if a person does things that are out of place even if not inherently sinful or disrespectful, as seen in <i>Megillah</i>.<br><br>There is, therefore, a double <i>kal vechomer</i>. That is what Rashi meant when he wrote, \"they found [a source] in Scripture that it is necessary to separate the men from the women, and to create a protective barrier in Israel so that they will not degenerate.\" He wrote \"and\" because they are two different things, for men and women should be separated even when there is no danger of untoward behavior. Similarly, Meiri wrote that putting men and women together in the Temple grounds is inherently <i>kalut rosh</i>.",
                    "But if so, why did the Gemara not state a third <i>kal vechomer</i>: if men and women are to be separated at the eulogies in the future, which are not specifically in the Temple, how much more should they be separated at <i>Simchat Beit haSho'eivah</i> in the Temple grounds where <i>mora mikdash</i> applies? The answer is that since the eulogies in the time to come will be held in the synagogues, <i>mora mikdash</i> applies there the same as it does in the Temple and therefore no additional <i>kal vechomer</i> is involved. Rashi, according to this, agrees with Rambam, <i>Sefer Yerei'im</i>, Raviah and other <i>rishonim</i> that the sanctity of the synagogue is of Torah origin, for if not, the problem of the third <i>kal vechomer</i> remains.",
                    "",
                    "However, Rambam in <i>Hilchot Tefillah</i> 11:6 adopted the reading that Rashi rejected: \"Synagogues and study-halls—one does not behave in them with <i>kalut rosh</i> such as laughter and levity and idle talk, and one does not eat in them.\" Unlike Rashi's explanation that <i>kalut rosh</i> is disrespect and that eating and drinking in a synagogue are examples of <i>kalut rosh</i>, Rambam holds that <i>kalut rosh</i> is a separate matter of sinful thoughts and ogling at women; therefore, the Sages' statement \"when they are involved in rejoicing and the <i>yetzer hara</i> reigns\" involves only one <i>kal vechomer</i> and not two. Nor can anything be proved from the absence of an argument from <i>mora mikdash</i>, which is a different matter entirely from <i>kalut rosh</i>.<br><br>Nevertheless, Rambam would agree that the verses in Zechariah do not apply to any and all gatherings, for he nowhere records any blanket prohibition of men and women being together. Nor does any <i>rishon</i> other than <i>Sefer haPardes</i> cite <i>Ma'asim l'Bnei Eretz Yisrael</i>.",
                    "Rambam wrote in <i>Hilchot Yom Tov</i> 6:21:<br><br><i>Beit Din</i> must appoint officers during the festivals to patrol the gardens and orchards and along the rivers to prevent men and women from gathering there to eat and drink, lest they fall into sin. They should warn all the people that men and women should not gather together in their homes in celebration and not extend themselves in [drinking] wine, lest they fall into sin.<br><br>He did not forbid all mixing of men and women. He wrote in <i>Hilchot Isurei Bi'ah</i> 22:8 that when many women are with many men \"we are not concerned about <i>yichud</i>.\" In matters of <i>yichud</i> Rambam did not distinguish between respectable people and those of casual morals: one woman among many men or one man among many women is forbidden but many men and women together are not, see <i>Even haEzer</i> 22 and the <i>achronim</i> there.<br><br>The festivals are special occasions, however, for people celebrate with food and wine, and wine leads to drunkenness and drunkenness leads to sin. Rambam warned that people should not \"extend themselves in [drinking] wine.\" He wrote in the preceding sentence, \"when a person eats and drinks and rejoices on a festival he should not extend himself in wine, levity, and <i>kalut rosh</i>\"; he included wine together with the levity and <i>kalut rosh</i> that lead to <i>ervah</i> as he wrote in <i>Hilchot De'ot</i> 2:7.",
                    "Drunkenness can be an even weightier factor than <i>yichud</i>. Even the righteous sin when they are drunk, as <i>Sanhedrin</i> 70a remarked about Noach. See <i>Sotah</i> 7a, \"wine is a major cause,\" and <i>Yoma</i> 75a, \"For someone who focuses on his wine, all the forbidden sexual relationships seem on the level.\" Even when there are many men and women together, their numbers do not guard them against sin if they are involved in drinking. But a gathering of men and women , not involved in feasting and drinking [and not inside a synagogue], is not forbidden. This is unlike what a number of <i>achronim</i> have written, see <i>Mishnah Berurah</i> at the end of 529.",
                    "Still, even according to this, mingling of men and women should be forbidden at weddings where there is often <i>kalut rosh</i> and drunkenness, as Rashi wrote in <i>Sukkah</i> 25b. Perhaps the community relies on the fact that drunkenness at weddings today is not common.<br><br>Rambam's source in <i>Hilchot Yom Tov</i> is <i>Kiddushin</i> 81a, \"the weak-point of the year is [during] the festivals\" (<i>sakva deshata rigla</i>), as <i>Magid Mishneh</i> noted. There is no indication that the concern extends beyond the festivals. This explains why Rambam warned against gatherings in <i>Hilchot Yom Tov</i>, and not in <i>Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah</i> with the other laws regulating contact between the sexes. <i>Kolbo</i> wrote in chapter 61 that the concern is linked specifically to the seven days of <i>Pesach</i> and <i>Sukkot</i>, and see <i>Sefer haEshkol</i>. <i>Levush</i> in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 492 wrote that the \"weak-point\" refers to the change in seasons and the danger of illness. I think that Rambam interpreted the Gemara in an entirely different way: \"<i>shata</i>\" in <i>sakva deshata rigla</i> is from the verb <i>sh-t-a</i> \"to drink,\" and the statement means, \"the weak-point of drinking is [during] the festivals,\" i. e., that is when drinking most often leads to sin.",
                    "I have thus presented many reasons to exonerate the practice of mixed seating. Nonetheless, when it is not completely necessary one should not purify the impure. <i>Hirhur</i> exists at many weddings today, especially among unmarried youths who are never free of it, as Rashi stated in <i>Sukkah</i> 26b. For this reason it would be better to seat male and female teenagers separately, even if couples sit together.<br><br>See Rashi in <i>Kidushin</i> 81a concerning <i>golfi</i>, from which it appears that their custom was to separate men and women in two instances: first, during the <i>derashah</i>, which requires focusing on Heavenly affairs, and second, at weddings which are places of feasting and rejoicing. This fits both Rambam's and Rashi's interpretations of <i>kalut rosh</i>. However, there is no clear-cut rabbinical obligation to do so, and certainly none can be derived from the verses in Zechariah."
                ],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [
                    "<big><strong><i>Kal Kevudah:</i> May Women Go Out?</strong></big>",
                    "",
                    "",
                    "Rambam wrote in <i>Hilchot Ishut</i> 13:11:<br>In a place where a woman does not normally go to market with only a cap on her head until she wears a shawl over it that covers most of her body like a <i>talit</i>, [her husband] gives her the least expensive type of shawl as part of her clothing. If he is wealthy, he gives her one commensurate with his wealth, so that she can wear it to her father's house, to a house of mourning or to a wedding-hall. Every woman should go to her father's house to visit him, or to a house of mourning or a wedding-hall to do <i>chesed</i> to her friends and relatives so that they will respond in kind, for she is not in prison that she may not go out and in. However, it is degrading for a woman to be always going out, \"one time outside and [another] time in the streets\" (<i>Mishlei</i> 7:12). A husband should prevent his wife from doing so, and not let her go out more than once or twice a month or so, as needed. There is beauty in a woman only if she remains in the corner of her house, for it is so written, \"<i>kal kevodah bat melech penimah</i> [the honor of a princess is all inward]\" (<i>Tehillim</i> 45:14).",
                    "Rambam describes two types of excursions: (a) going out for cause, to market, to visit her family or to go to a mourner's house or a wedding-hall, and (b) going out in general, \"once outside and once in the streets.\" [The verse in Proverbs refers to loose women.] According to Rambam, a husband should prevent his wife from going out in the streets just for the sake of it more than once or twice a month, but this has no bearing on the times she goes out for a useful purpose or for a <i>mitzvah</i>.<br>This explains the statement that \"the husband … should not let her go out more than once or twice a month or so, as needed.\" If only once or twice a month, what is \"as needed,\" and if \"as needed,\" why only once or twice? If she has a number of relatives or friends each of whom happens to have a <i>simchah</i> or is in mourning, should she be prevented from visiting more than one or two of them? Rather, \"once or twice\" refers only to going out without cause: it is degrading for her to do so often, for \"<i>kal kevodah bat melech penimah</i>.\" But going out for benefit or for a <i>mitzvah</i> is not degrading, and attractiveness is irrelevant to performing a <i>mitzvah</i>.",
                    "Support for this can be brought from the source cited by <i>Magid Mishneh</i> and <i>Beit Yosef</i> for a husband preventing his wife from going out. They cited R. Yochanan b. Broka's statement in <i>Midrash Rabah</i> that \"<i>v'chivshuha</i>—they shall conquer it [the earth]\" in <i>Bereishit</i> 1:28 should be vocalized differently:<br>\"<i>V'chivshah</i>—he shall conquer her,\" to teach [us] that a man prevents his wife from going out to the market, for a woman who goes out to the market will eventually stumble [into sin].<br>This applies only to going out to the marketplace, and certainly not to going her father's house or to a house of mourning and the like.",
                    "However, I think it unlikely that this was Rambam's source, for if so, why did he cite <i>kal kevudah bat melech penimah</i> rather than <i>vechivshah</i>, particularly as the latter is from the Torah and the former only from the Writings? Also, he should have mentioned the danger of stumbling into sin, which is a far weightier consideration than honor or attractiveness. Rather, Rambam's point is just the opposite. He disagrees with R. Yochanan b. Broka, who held that a woman should not go out to market at all. This is the point of Rambam's language \"for she is not in prison that she may not go out and in,\" i. e., she is not a captive in her own home, in contrast to R. Yochanan b. Broka's exposition of \"<i>vichivshah</i>—he shall conquer her.\" Just as in <i>Yevamot</i> 65b we disagree with R. Yochanan b. Broka's Halachic exposition of this verse regarding procreation, so we disagree with his Midrashic exposition. We are therefore left with \"<i>kal kevodah bat melech penimah</i>,\" which relates only to honor and attractiveness.",
                    "Based on the distinction between the two types of going out, we can resolve a difficulty in Rambam. <i>Magid Mishneh</i> explained Rambam's words, \"in a place where a woman usually does not go out to market\":<br>Our master [Rambam] did not need to go into detail, but only to say that even though [women] stay at home without a shawl, since they do not go out to the market without one [her husband] is required to give her one, since she has to go out to a house of mourning and the like.<br>Even without going to market, a woman needs a shawl to go to a house of mourning, and so on. But if so, why mention market at all? Rambam should simply have written \"in a place where a woman would normally not go out with only a cap on her head,\" which is indeed <i>Tur</i>'s language in <i>Even haEzer</i> 73. What Rambam means is that in places where a woman would not go to market without a shawl, her husband has to provide her one, for although she should not go there often, she may do so once or twice a month. And even if she never goes to the marketplace at all—as was the custom in some places, as Rambam wrote in <i>Hilchot Ishut</i> 25:2—she nonetheless needs to go out to visit her father's house or to a house of mourning, and so on.",
                    "A better explanation is that \"so that she can wear it to her father's house, to a house of mourning or to a wedding-hall\" modifies the preceding phrase, \"if he is wealthy, he gives her one commensurate with his wealth.\" That is to say, Rambam first establishes that a woman must be given at least an inexpensive shawl suitable for wearing to market. But if her husband can afford a better one, he must give her one commensurate with his wealth so that she can wear it to her father's house or to a house of mourning or a wedding-hall, where it is not proper to wear the cheapest shawl available. And he cannot prevent her from going there, for she is not in prison.",
                    "From this to what I concluded in my eulogy \"A Woman's Place\" (<i>Bnei Banim</i>, vol. 1, <i>ma'amar</i> 6) in memory of Esther Ben-David, <i>haShem yikom damah</i>. Although Scripture praises <i>bat melech penimah</i> and the Sages cautioned that a woman should stay at home, this applies to most women, but a woman who can be both \"a woman of valor\" and \"a woman who fears <i>haShem</i>\" may go out freely. To stay in is not an absolute imperative, but is determined by circumstances and custom. A woman who goes out too often may be corrupted, and she can incur no greater dishonor; in addition, Rambam viewed a woman's charm as contingent on her remaining a private person. But this does not prevent her from going out when necessary or for a <i>mitzvah</i>.",
                    "If one comes across statements that seem to differ with this, do not jump to conclusions unless the statements are explicit. <i>Tur</i> and <i>Shulchan Aruch</i> in <i>Choshen Mishpat</i> 96 and 124 do not contradict this when they write that some authorities exempt respectable women from appearing in court, even though there is a good reason and a <i>mitzvah</i> to appear, as Scripture urges, \"Hear [the litigation] between your brothers\" (<i>Devarim</i> 1:16). A court appearance is by its nature degrading, as the Sages said, \"A man does not want his wife to be disgraced in court,\" especially when she does not want to go and we compel her, and the same holds for <i>Shevuot</i> 30a."
                ]
            ],
            "Essays": [],
            "Miscellanea": []
        },
        "Volume II": {
            "Approbations": [],
            "Introduction": [],
            "": [
                [],
                [],
                [
                    "<big><strong><i>Talit</i> for Women</strong></big>",
                    "",
                    "",
                    "A woman may wear <i>tzitzit</i> in private or under her outer clothes, for then there is no suspicion that she wishes to appear like a man. Were that the case we would apply <i>Targum Yonatan</i>'s dictum in <i>Devarim</i> 22:5 that a woman wearing <i>tzitzit</i> violates the prohibition of wearing men's clothing, and see Resp. <i>Maharam Shick, Yoreh De'ah</i>, no. 176. [<i>Targum Yonatan</i> on the <i>Chumash</i> dates from Gaonic times.]<br><br>I think <i>Targum</i>'s source is in the verse \"A man's accessories shall not be on a woman and a man shall not wear a woman's garment.\" The verb regarding the woman is not <i>l-v-sh</i> (to wear) as it is regarding the man, but <i>h-y-h</i> (to be).\" This alludes to <i>tefillin</i> and <i>tzitzit</i> which both employ the verb <i>h-y-h</i>: regarding <i>tefillin</i>, \"they will be (<i>vehayu l-</i>) <i>totafot</i> between your eyes\" (<i>Devarim</i> 4:8) and similarly in the other three references to <i>tefillin</i> in the Torah, and regarding <i>tzitzit</i>, \"it will be (<i>vehayah lachem</i>) <i>tzitzit</i> for you\" (<i>Bamidbar</i> 15:39).",
                    "If a woman's sole intention is to perform a <i>mitzvah</i>, however, wearing a garment with <i>tzitzit</i> can be compared to wearing a man's garment to protect against sun and rain; <i>Bach</i> and <i>Taz</i> permitted this in <i>Yoreh De'ah</i> 182:5 and see <i>Bnei Banim</i>, vol. 1, no. 37 (5). Although she certainly intends that the garment be considered clothing in order to fulfill the <i>mitzvah</i>, clothing is not defined the same way regarding <i>tzitzit</i> as it is regarding the prohibition of wearing clothes of the opposite sex. A man who wears a women's four-cornered garment only in order to protect himself from sun and rain is not released from the obligation to put <i>tzitzit</i> on it. This obligation devolves on any clothing worn in the daytime, while the prohibition of wearing garments of the opposite sex entails the element of resemblance. For that reason, a full-size men's <i>talit</i> is more problematic than a small <i>arba kanfot</i>, because the former is made for decorative purposes.<br><br>See <i>Shabbat</i> 65a which states, \"Sometimes a man hands his wife a ring [of his]… she leaves it on her hand until she reaches the jewelry-box.\" Rashi explained that she puts the ring on her finger to carry it home. The implication is that other than the question of carrying on Shabbat, she is permitted to wear her husband's ring on her finger even though it is a male ornament, since her intention is not to adorn herself.",
                    "However, she should not lay <i>tefillin</i>, as the <i>poskim</i> conclude in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 38:3. <i>Talmud Torah</i> for women was permitted because it was necessary but <i>tefillin</i> are not necessary, and she should strengthen her ties to Judaism through other means."
                ],
                [],
                [],
                [
                    "<big><strong>Women and <i>Shemoneh Esreh</i></strong></big>",
                    "",
                    "",
                    "<i>Magen Avraham</i> wrote in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 106:2 that according to Rambam women are exempt from the regular <i>Shemoneh Esreh</i> prayers. But I think <i>Hilchot Tefillah</i> 6:10 proves this is not the case. Rambam lists women, slaves and children together, and since children are not Biblically obligated in prayer or any other <i>mitzvah</i>, when he writes that \"women, slaves and children\" are obligated in prayer he must mean the rabbinical obligation of <i>Shemoneh Esreh</i>. This contrasts with chapter 1:2 where Rambam discusses the Biblical commandment of prayer, and accordingly mentions only women and slaves but not children.<br><br>I later saw this in <i>Sefer Bnei Tzion</i> (Lichtman) in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 106:1. He also cited Rambam's commentary on the Mishnah in <i>Kiddushin</i> 1:7 where Rambam wrote that women are obligated in the time-bound <i>mitzvah</i> of prayer. Since Biblical prayer is not time-bound, he must be referring to the rabbinically-enacted <i>Shemoneh Esreh</i>. In addition, Meiri in <i>Berachot</i> 20a wrote that anyone who is of the opinion that women are Biblically obligated in prayer (i.e., Rambam) nevertheless holds that they are rabbinically obligated as well. This is contrary to Resp. <i>Yabi'a Omer</i>, vol. 1, <i>Orach Chayim</i> no. 15, who claimed that Rambam in <i>Mishneh Torah</i> retracted what he had written on the Mishnah.",
                    "There is, then, no warrant for citing Rambam as a source to exempt women from <i>Shemoneh Esreh</i>. However, <i>Bnei Tziyon</i> and others justified women who do not pray <i>Shemoneh Esreh</i> if they are burdened with tending children and household tasks and cannot concentrate on their prayers. According to Talmudic law anyone who cannot concentrate fully is exempt from <i>Shemoneh Esreh</i>, see <i>Tur</i> in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 98, and although men subsequently took it upon themselves to pray even without proper concentration, women did not. Also, whatever difficulties men may have in concentrating on prayer in the synagogue cannot compare with the distractions faced by women at home. However, unmarried women and others who are not overburdened must pray <i>Shemoneh Esreh</i>."
                ],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [
                    "<big><strong><i>Kevod Tzibur</i>, Women's Megillah Readings and Prayer Groups</strong></big>",
                    "",
                    "",
                    "In <i>Megillah</i> 23a:<br><br>Everyone counts toward the quota of seven [<i>aliyot</i> in the Torah reading on the Sabbath], even a minor and even a woman. But the Sages declared, \"a woman should not read from the Torah because of <i>kevod tzibur</i> (community honor).\"<br><br>I explained in <i>Bnei Banim</i>, vol. 1, no. 4 (chapter 14, below) that this was considered demeaning because it gave the impression that there were not enough men who knew how to read themselves. Subsequently I found this explanation in <i>Petach haDvir</i> 282:9. It is also clear from Ritva in <i>Megillah</i> 4a:<br><br>We follow the opinion of R. Yehoshua b. Levi that they [the women] are themselves obligated [to read the Megillah] and can even discharge others from their obligation. However, it is not <i>kevod tzibur</i>, and they are in the category of <i>m'eirah</i>.<br><br><i>M'eirah</i> (a curse) comes from <i>Berachot</i> 20b:<br><br>A son can recite <i>birkat hamazon</i> for his father, a slave for his master and a wife for her husband, but the Sages said, \"<i>m'eirah</i> should befall one whose wife and sons bless for him.\"<br><br>Rashi explained that the son may recite the blessings after meals for his father if the latter does not know how to read, but the father is cursed for not having learned. From Ritva's linking <i>kevod tzibur</i> with <i>m'eirah</i>, it follows that <i>kevod tzibur</i> regarding women's <i>aliyot</i> is similarly a matter of the ignominy involved in having to rely on others to read on one's behalf. [R. Avraham <i>Min haHar</i> in <i>Megillah</i> 19b is even more explicit in connecting women's Torah reading with <i>m'eirah</i>.] This is also <i>Tosafot</i>'s meaning in <i>Sukkah</i> 38a, which will be discussed below.<br><br><i>Sefer haMeorot</i> in <i>Berachot</i> 45a and R. Manoach in <i>Hilchot Berachot</i> 5:7 flatly deny that <i>kevod tzibur</i> with regard to women's <i>aliyot</i> is connected with immodest behavior (<i>pritzut</i>). All this contradicts the claim made in a book in English about women in Jewish law that <i>kevod tzibur</i> means preventing sexual <i>hirhur</i> on the part of the men, that would supposedly result were a woman to read the Torah in public.",
                    "Nowhere in the Talmuud is <i>kevod tzibur</i> connected with <i>hirhur</i>. Regarding women's <i>aliyot</i> It refers to avoiding what reflects ill on the community, as it also does in <i>Megillah</i> 24b, \"a person in ragged clothing … may not read from the Torah because of <i>kevod tzibur</i>,\" Similarly, in <i>Gittin</i> 60a, \"one may not read [the weekly portion] in a synagogue from a <i>chumash</i> because of <i>kevod tzibur</i>\" in that it might give the impression that the community does not own a complete Torah scroll, whether out of poverty or lack of interest. Elsewhere it involves not keeping the public waiting unnecessarily, as in <i>Yoma</i> 70a, \"a Torah scroll should not be rolled in public, because of <i>kevod tzibur</i>,\" and in <i>Sotah</i> 39b, \"a <i>shaliach tzibur</i> may not strip [the decorations from] the ark in public, because of <i>kevod tzibur</i>.\" It is never found in the context of illicit thoughts or <i>pritzut</i>.",
                    "One might attempt to support that book's claim by citing <i>Sefer haEshkol</i> (ed. Auerbach) in <i>Hilchot Chanukah vePurim</i> that women may not read the Megillah for men on Purim because \"<i>kol b'ishah ervah</i>\" (a woman's voice is erotic). This reason is also given by <i>Orchot Chayim</i> and <i>Kolbo</i>. A woman's voice is considered <i>ervah</i> because it causes <i>hirhur</i> in men, as Rashba explained in <i>Berachot</i> 24b; accordingly, just as a woman may not read the Megillah for men because of <i>hirhur</i> she may not read the Torah for them.",
                    "But the sense of <i>Sefer haEshkol</i> is just the opposite, that <i>kevod hatzibur</i> is an entirely different matter than <i>kol be'ishah ervah</i>. <i>Sefer haEshkol</i> wrote:<br><br>According to this opinion, the statement [in the Gemara] \"All are obligated in the reading of the Megillah—this includes women,\" means that women can read and discharge other women from their obligation [to hear the reading of the Megillah], while the Tosefta \"they do not discharge the obligation of others\" refers to [their discharging the obligation of] men. If you ask, why is this different from Chanukah, when a woman can light the candles and discharge the obligations of her household? One can answer that reading the Megillah is different because it resembles the reading of the Torah, and for that reason [the Sages] decreed that she should not discharge the obligation of men. And there are those who explain that the reason she does not discharge the obligation of men [in reading the Megillah] is <i>kol b'ishah ervah</i>.<br><br>The opinion mentioned is that of <i>Halachot Gedolot</i>, who wrote that women are required to hear the Megillah reading but they are not obligated to <i>read</i> it; this is in contrast to men who are obligated to read, and for that reason women cannot read the Megillah for men. <i>Sefer haEshkol</i> contrasted this with Chanukah where women also benefited from the same miracles as did the men, but where women may indeed light candles for them. What difference is there between Chanukah and Purim? He answered, first, that reading the Megillah is similar to reading the Torah, and just as women's <i>aliyot</i> were prohibited because of <i>kevod tzibur</i> so, too, were women prohibited from reading the Megillah for men.<br><br><i>Sefer haEshkol</i> then brought a second explanation, that women may not read the Megillah for men because of <i>kol b'ishah ervah</i>. The two explanations are not the same. <i>Sefer haEshkol</i>'s wording, \"And there are those who explain,\" indicates a new and different explanation. Also, if the two were the same, he should have written concisely \"there are those who explain that the reason is <i>kol b'ishav ervah</i>,\" without repeating \"the reason she cannot discharge the obligation of men.\" Finally, if the two are the same, the whole discussion belongs in the laws of reading the Torah and not only in the laws of Purim.<br><br>In a later <i>rishon</i> we find only the reason of <i>kol b'ishah ervah</i>, without any mention of reading the Torah. In <i>Orchot Chayim</i> and <i>Kolbo</i> (both written by the same author), <i>Hilchot Megillah v'Purim</i>:<br><br>Women, since they too benefited from the same miracle, it can be said that they can discharge the men['s obligation], but nevertheless it is improper for them to complete the [quorum of] ten [required for a public reading of the Megillah]…. The author of <i>Aseret haDibrot</i> wrote that women do not discharge men['s obligation] through their reading, and the reason is \"a woman's voice is <i>ervah</i>.\" Even though [women do] recite the blessings and light Chanukah candles [for everyone] it is not comparable, for the men do not have to be present at candle-lighting time.",
                    "One may indeed ask, why should reading the Torah be different with regard to <i>kol b'ishah ervah</i> than reading the Megillah? I think the Megillah reading is different because of the special affection people have for it, as stated in <i>Megillah</i> 21b regarding two or more people reading the Megillah in unison, something not permitted in other readings; see <i>Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim</i> 690:2. Also, Purim is a time of feasting and drinking, which lead to impropriety (see below, chapter 19). In addition, a woman reading the Megillah for men would presumably do so not in the synagogue but at home, where there are fewer restraints; this is somewhat similar to what <i>Yafeh Laleiv</i> suggested in 690:16, that according to <i>Orchot Chayim</i> and <i>Kolbo</i> women should not be counted as part of the ten needed for a public reading of the Megillah, because of the possibility of <i>yichud</i>.",
                    "<i>Orchot Chayim</i> and <i>Kolbo</i> themselves rule in <i>Hilchot Kiddush</i> that women can recite <i>kiddush</i> for men, and make no mention of <i>kol b'ishah ervah;</i> this was overlooked by <i>Birkei Yosef</i> in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 271:1. Accordingly, when they wrote that reading the Megillah is not comparable to lighting Chanukah candles because men do not have to be present for the blessings, they were not implying that <i>kol b'ishah ervah</i> does apply whenever men have to listen, for a woman may recite <i>kiddush</i> for men even though the men do have to listen. Rather, Chanukah candles evoke special affection (<i>chavivut</i>), as <i>Tosafot</i> wrote in <i>Sukkah</i> 46a, just as the Megillah reading does, and for that reason <i>Orchot Chayim</i> and <i>Kolbo</i> explained that nonetheless Chanukah is different from Purim in that the men need not listen to the blessings on candle-lighting. But they agree that other <i>mitzvot</i> that do not have this special attraction do not involve <i>kol b'ishah ervah</i> even when men must listen, as shown by <i>kiddush</i>.",
                    "Moreover, when <i>Orchot Chayim</i> and <i>Kolbo</i> mentioned <i>kol b'ishah ervah</i>, I think they were using the term in a borrowed sense. If actual <i>kol b'ishah ervah</i> was involved there would be no room to distinguish between Megillah reading and Torah reading or <i>kiddush</i>. This is contrary to what Resp. <i>Eitz Chayim</i> wrote as cited in <i>Otzar haPoskim</i>, that reading the Megillah requires cantillation, that a woman reading the Megillah with cantillation involves <i>kol b'ishah ervah</i> and that for that reason <i>Orchot Chayim</i> and <i>Kolbo</i> forbade women from reading it to men. If so, why did <i>Orchot Chayim</i> and <i>Kolbo</i> explain that Chanukah blessings are different because men do not have to listen to them? A simpler answer would be that Chanukah blessings do not require cantillation.",
                    "For the crux of the matter, Rashi in <i>Archin</i> 19a, <i>Sefer haMeorot</i> and <i>Chidushei Nimukei Yosef</i> in <i>Megillah</i> 4a, Rambam in <i>Hilchot Megillah</i> 1:1, <i>Or Zarua</i> in part 2 no. 368 and <i>Ohel Moed</i> in <i>Hilchot Megillah</i> all rule that women can read the Megillah for men, and this is the first opinion cited by <i>Shulchan Aruch</i> in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 689:2. <i>Halachot Gedolot</i> and other <i>rishonim</i> wrote that women are obligated to hear the reading but not to read it themselves and therefore cannot read for men, which is the second opinion cited in the <i>Shulchan Aruch</i>. None of these <i>rishonim</i> mentions cantillation.<br><br>It is highly unlikely that the <i>rishonim</i> disagreed over the facts, i. e., whether women do or do not read the Megillah with cantillation. Therefore, however one approaches the question the result is the same: <i>Either</i> women chant the Megillah with cantillation, and nevertheless according to Rashi and Rambam <i>et al</i>. they may read for men and no <i>kol b'ishah ervah</i> is involved, and even according to <i>Halachot Gedolot</i> and others who prohibited women from reading for men the reason was not <i>kol b'ishah ervah</i>. If so, the reason given by <i>Orchot Chayim</i> and <i>Kolbo</i> as explained by Resp. <i>Eitz Chayim</i> that actual <i>kol b'ishah ervah</i> is involved, represents a small minority opinion and is not Halachah.<br><br>Or women do <i>not</i> read to men with cantillation, in which case there is no chanting at all, and on what basis should their reading be considered <i>kol b'ishah ervah</i>, and what difference is there between women reading the Megillah and reciting <i>kiddush</i>? We must conclude that even according to <i>Orchot Chayim</i> and <i>Kolbo</i>, actual <i>kol b'ishah ervah</i> is not involved and the term is used only in a borrowed sense. Their intention was to say that when reading the Megillah on Purim we are more wary of <i>hirhur</i> than at other times, and therefore women may not read for men. [Reading the Megillah also takes far longer than either an <i>aliyah</i> to the Torah or <i>kiddush</i>.] This has no bearing on reading the Torah.",
                    "In our editions of <i>Halachot Gedolot</i>, also referred to as <i>Bahag</i>, we find in <i>Hilchot Megillah</i>, \"Women … are not required to read the Megillah but are obligated to hear [it],\" and he is so quoted by <i>Sefer haEshkol, Sefer ha'Itur</i> (<i>Aseret haDibrot</i>), <i>Tosafot</i> in <i>Archin</i> 3a, Rashba and <i>Piskei haRosh</i> to <i>Megillah</i> 4b, and other <i>rishonim</i>. Since a woman's obligation is less than that of a man, she cannot discharge his obligation by reading the Megillah to him, even <i>bedi'eved</i>.",
                    "Most <i>rishonim</i> cite this version of <i>Halachot Gedolot</i>. However, Meiri and <i>Shiltei haGiborim</i> in <i>Megillah</i> 4b and <i>Tur</i> in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 689 cite a different wording in his name, \"even though women are obligated to read the Megillah, they do not discharge men [from their obligation],\" and see the footnotes to <i>Megillah</i> 4a in the Dimitrovski edition of <i>Chidushei haRashba</i>. According to this, women are indeed obligated to read the Megillah and not just to hear the reading. Technically they can discharge men's obligation by reading the Megillah for them, and it is only for secondary reasons that they are not permitted to do so. This is also the approach of <i>Semag</i> in <i>Hilchot Megillah, Orchot Chayim</i> and <i>Kolbo</i> mentioned above, and Ritva in <i>Megillah</i>, although none of them cited <i>Halachot Gedolot</i> by name. This is also the opinion of <i>Tosafot</i> in <i>Sukkah</i> 38a which does cite <i>Bahag</i>, on the question of women saying <i>birkat hamazon</i> for men:<br><br>Even though a man can discharge women's obligation [in <i>birkat hamazon</i>], a man is different because he is more important, or else because it is demeaning for the many (<i>d'rabim zila beho milta</i>). For are not women obligated in [reading the] Megillah, and [nevertheless] <i>Bahag</i> explained that women do not discharge men's obligations in the Megillah?<br><br>This version also underlies <i>Bach</i> in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 271, who contrasted <i>Bahag</i>'s opinion on women not reading the Megillah for men with the law that women can recite <i>kiddush</i> for men. If <i>Bach</i> followed the version of <i>Bahag</i> that men and women have different obligations regarding the Megillah, there would have been no basis for the comparison.",
                    "<i>Korban Netanel</i> on Rosh in <i>Megillah</i> 1:40 had difficulty with <i>Tosafot</i>'s citing <i>Bahag</i>. According to the more common version of <i>Bahag</i>, women cannot read for men because women have a lesser obligation than men do, even without the factor of <i>ziluta</i> (\"cheapening\"). For that reason <i>Korban Netanel</i> explained that \"it is demeaning for the many\" in <i>Tosafot</i> refers to many <i>women</i>; i. e., a woman can read the Megillah for another woman individually but not for a group of women. He wrote this in his <i>Netiv Chayim</i> on <i>Orach Chayim</i> 689, and <i>Mishnah Berurah</i> cited him there in <i>Sha'ar haTziyun</i>.<br><br><i>Korban Netanel</i> reached this conclusion because he assumed that <i>Tosafot</i> in <i>Sukkah</i> had the same version of <i>Bahag</i> as <i>Tosafot</i> in <i>Archin</i>. But <i>Tosafot</i> in different tractates are not necessarily by the same author, and in this case <i>Tosafot</i> in <i>Sukkah</i> had the version of <i>Bahag</i> found in Meiri and <i>Tur</i>, unlike <i>Tosafot</i> in <i>Archin</i> that cites the more common version. This is clear from <i>Tosafot haRosh</i> in <i>Sukkah</i>:<br><br>Or else, it is demeaning to men if women discharge their obligation for them, similar to [reading the] Megillah that women are obligated in, and [nevertheless] <i>Bahag</i> stated that women do not discharge the obligation of the many (<i>harabim</i>) in Megillah.<br><br><i>Tosafot haRosh</i> is based on the regular <i>Tosafot</i>, and states clearly that the \"many\" for whom women may not read the Megillah are <i>men</i> and not women, that the reason is that it is demeaning for men, and that this is the opinion of <i>Bahag</i>. [Further proof is found in <i>Sefer haAgudah</i> in <i>Sukkah</i> which makes the same statement in the name of Ri, author of the <i>Tosafot</i>]. <i>Korban Netanel</i> was first published in 1766, <i>Mishnah Berurah</i> in 1883 and <i>Tosafot haRosh</i>, from a manuscript, only in 1903; had <i>Korban Netanel</i> and <i>Mishnah Berurah</i> seen it, they would not have written what they did.",
                    "<i>Tosafot</i>'s language in <i>Sukkah</i>, \"<i>d'rabim zila beho milta</i>, because it is demeaning for the many,\" i. e., for many men, suggests that women may read the Megillah for individual men, only not for a group. Ritva's linkage of the Megillah with <i>kevod tzibur</i> also implies that a woman is prohibited only from reading the Megillah to a group of men, similar to reading the Torah which requires a <i>minyan</i>. [Although <i>m'eirah</i> applies even to an individual who needs to hear <i>birkat hamazon</i>, the reason is that <i>birkat hamazon</i> is an everyday obligation that everyone should know how to fulfill himself. But it is no disgrace if an individual does not know how to read the Megillah.] On the other hand, <i>Semag</i>, who also compares reading the Megillah to reading the Torah, wrote that a woman may not read the Megillah even for a solitary male.<br><br>In this context see <i>Sefer haBatim , Sha'arei Kriat haTorah</i> 2:6:<br><br>There is [someone] among the <i>gedolim</i> [who wrote that] a woman can read the Torah when praying in [a <i>minyan</i> of] ten [men] in their homes, for only when praying in the synagogue is it considered in public (<i>tzibur</i>).<br><br>In <i>Bnei Banim</i> , vol. 2, no. 7, I noted that this follows the definition of <i>tzibur</i> used by Rashi, <i>Machzor Vitry, Sefer ha'Itur</i> and <i>Rokeach</i>. From here we can return to our starting-point, that <i>kevod tzibur</i> in the reading of the Torah is not a question of <i>hirhur</i>. This is <i>Sefer haBatim</i>'s opinion as well, for if <i>hirhur</i> were the issue there would be no advantage to reading the Torah at home over reading it in a synagogue; on the contrary, a home setting is more conducive to <i>hirhur</i>. And while most <i>rishonim</i> agree with <i>Tur</i> in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 691 that ten men are considered a <i>tzibur</i> even in a home, and accordingly a woman may not read the Torah even in a private <i>minyan</i>, contrary to <i>Sefer haBatim</i>—there is no reason to suppose they disagree with him on the meaning of <i>kevod tzibur</i>.",
                    "",
                    "",
                    "In some places in the United States and elsewhere, women gather once a month in a hall or a private home and conduct prayer services by themselves. It is forbidden to recite prayers requiring a <i>minyan</i> or to recite the blessings preceding and following the reading of the Torah without ten men present. For example, in <i>Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim</i> 55:1, \"<i>Kaddish</i> is not said except in the presence of ten free adult [Jewish] males.\"<br><br>Ran's argument in <i>Megillah</i> 19b, \"How is it possible that women can read the Megillah for men, but cannot join [men in constituting the required ten]?\" cited by <i>Beit Yosef</i> in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 689, deals only with publicizing the miracle of Purim, which can be effected equally through men or women. It does not refer to a quorum for a <i>davar sheb'kedushah</i>. It refers neither to prayer, see <i>Orach Chayim</i> 55:4, nor to reading the Torah, see <i>Magen Avraham, Bi'ur haGra</i> and <i>Levushei Srad</i> there. It certainly does not countenance a wholly female <i>minyan</i>. Also, see <i>Orach Chayim</i> 282:3, which cites the view of Ran that even prior to the enactment concerning <i>kevod hatzibur</i>, when women could still participate in reading the Torah, not all the <i>aliyot</i> were by women. This is cited by <i>Beit Yosef</i> in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 689.",
                    "However, a custom exists in many places, even among men, that if there is no <i>minyan</i> in the morning, one of those present recites <i>pesukei d'zimra</i> as if he were a <i>shaliach tzibur</i>, reads the blessings of <i>Shema</i> in a loud voice as a <i>shaliach tzibur</i> would have done, but skips <i>Kaddish, barechu</i>, and the repetition of the <i>Shemoneh Esreh</i>. This is done in order to give some minimal resemblance to public prayer, and it has a precedent in Joshua 22:28, \"we will build an altar for ourselves, [but] not for [offering] burnt-offerings or sacrifices [on it].\" This is also the practice in girls' schools, and older women may do the same.<br><br>Some rabbis object to these women's prayer groups because they lack the Halachic status of public prayer. But women have no obligation of public prayer, as Resp. <i>Shevut Ya'akov</i>, part 3, no. 54, and others wrote. The Sages expounded the verse \"I will be sanctified among <i>Bnei Yisrael</i>\" instituted the sanctification of <i>haShem</i>'s name in prayer by ten men, but did not obligate women. According to Meiri in <i>Rosh HaShanah</i> 28a, women are not regarded as participating in public prayer even if they pray in the women's section in the synagogue along with the men; this is hard to understand, but what difference does it make? In many communities women did not go to synagogue at all. The Vilna Gaon's testament to his daughters in this respect is well known. Unfortunately, many women's sections and men's sections alike are places of idle gossip.",
                    "Those who object to women's prayer groups also cite <i>Magen Avraham</i> in 282:6, that women are required to hear the men's reading of the Torah. I think, however, that this applies only to women who are already in the synagogue. According to most authorities, the reading of the Torah is an obligation of the <i>tzibur</i> and not of the individual. Men who constitute the <i>tzibur</i> are thus required to listen to the reading of the Torah, but women, who need not seek out public prayer, are not obligated to come and hear the reading of the Torah.",
                    "Moreover, the basis for <i>Magen Avraham</i>'s remarks is unclear. He cited <i>Masechet Soferim</i> 18:4:<br><br>There are those who read the Book of Lamentations in the evening [of <i>Tish'a b'Av</i>] and there are those who delay it until the morning after the reading of the Torah … if the reader knows how to translate it himself, good, and if he doesn't [know] he gives it to someone who knows how to translate well, and he translates in order that the rest of the people and the women and children can understand. For women are as obligated as men are to understand (<i>l'shmo'a</i>) book-reading (<i>kri'at sefer</i>) like men… and they are also obligated in prayer, <i>birkat hamazon</i> and <i>mezuzah</i>. If they do not know Hebrew, one teaches them in whatever language they can understand and learn [in].<br><br>The point of <i>Masechet Soferim</i> is that women have to be able to understand the readings, and for this reason we translate it for them. ",
                    "Perhaps <i>Magen Avraham</i> noted the sentence \"women are as obligated as men to hear the reading of [the] book, and they are also obligated in prayer, <i>birkat hamazon</i>, and <i>mezuzah</i>,\" and understood it as implying that just as the latter three are obligatory for women, so, too, is hearing the reading of the book. But \"book\" in this context means the Book of Lamentations and not just the Torah. Are women all required to go to hear the reading of <i>Megillat Eichah</i>?<br><br>Rather, <i>Masechet Soferim</i> means that it is necessary to enable those women who are already present in the synagogue to understand the readings, just as in 14:14 \"it is a <i>mitzvah</i> for all the men and the women to see the script [of the <i>sefer Torah</i>]\" refers only to those present. This is contrary to <i>Mikra'ei Kodesh</i> (Grodzinsky), part 1, rule 4:1, who learned from <i>Magen Avraham</i> that since women are obligated in the reading of the Torah they can, in principle, be included in the quorum of ten needed for that purpose. Resp. <i>Hillel Omer</i>, no. 187, wrote that when necessary this can be relied on in practice. Begging their pardon, this is not so.<br><br>Nevertheless, <i>Masechet Soferim</i> does provide a source for the practice mentioned by <i>Magen Avraham</i> for women to exit the synagogue during the reading of the Torah: if they remained they would need translation, and translation is no longer practiced. Today, however, everyone has a printed <i>Chumash</i> with translation, and <i>chalilah</i> that women should walk out during the reading.",
                    "There are also rabbis who object to women's prayer groups on the grounds that they are inspired or influenced by the non-Jewish women's liberation movement, in violation of the prohibition in <i>Vayikra</i> 18:3 against adopting non-Jewish practices. However, the Torah prohibits actions and not movements. Motivation alone is not a violation, as indicated by <i>Devarim</i> 12:30, \"and I will <i>do</i> so myself,\" and see Ramban's commentary. Since Christian women do not pray by themselves but with men, Jewish women's prayer groups without men do not violate <i>ubechukoteihem lo teileichu</i>.<br><br>Nor is any change in the customs of the synagogue involved if the prayer groups are held in an adjacent hall or private house, and indeed they should not be held in the sanctuary. Also, a communal <i>sefer Torah</i> should not brought from one location to another for one-time use. As for the charge that the women are deluding themselves into thinking that they are conducting public prayer when in fact they have only the status of individuals, whether or not they are deluded depends on the circumstances in each community.",
                    "A final objection to women's prayer groups is based on Maharshal in <i>Yam Shel Shlomoh, Bava Kama</i> 4:19, who wrote that misrepresentation of the Torah (<i>zi'uf haTorah</i>) is a matter of <i>yeihareg ve'al ya'avor</i>. Maharshal, however, is referring to misrepresentation of Torah laws, while public prayer is rabbinical. Besides, his view is problematic. The <i>beraita</i> in <i>Bava Kama</i> 38a relates:<br><br>The Roman government sent two <i>sardiotot</i> (high officials) to the Sages. They asked, \"Teach us your Torah.\" They learned, repeated and reviewed a third time. As they were leaving they said, \"We carefully examined (<i>dikdaknu</i>) your whole Torah and it's all true, except for one thing that you teach: 'if a Jew's ox gores a Canaanite's ox the Jew does not have to pay [anything], but if a Canaanite's ox gores a Jew's ox the Canaanite has to pay the entire value.…' But we won't tell the government about it.\"<br><br>Maharshal explained that it was dangerous to let the Romans know that Torah law discriminates against non-Jews, and that nevertheless R. Gamliel, who was the Sage involved as mentioned in other sources, was ready to suffer martyrdom rather than misrepresent the Torah. But if so, why did he teach the officials at all? Better to refuse to teach them and endanger only himself, rather than teach them and endanger the whole community! Rather, it must be assumed that R. Gamliel knew that in his particular case there was little danger.<br><br>In any event, the <i>poskim</i> have not accepted Maharshal's ruling, as shown by the many changes forced by church and government censors in printed editions of the Talmud, Rambam and other works; for instance, in Rambam <i>Hilchot Rotze'ach</i> 1:1. [Compare the standard printed texts with the <i>Rambam La'am</i>, Kapach and Frankel editions.] No one ever suggested that publishers should suffer martyrdom rather than comply. I later found this argument in the <i>Talmudic Encyclopedia</i>, s.v. <i>yeihareg v'al ya'avor</i>, note 193, in the name of R. Moshe Feinstein <i>z\"l</i>, although it is not in his Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe</i>.",
                    "Nevertheless, I am not endorsing women's prayer groups, because one cannot rule from a distance without knowing the operative souls (<i>hanefashot ha'osot</i>). This issue is in the province of <i>gedolim</i>. The principle \"the power of leniency is superior\" means that, everything else being equal, greater certainty and conviction are demanded to permit something than to forbid it, and therefore we can rely on the permissive authorities, as Rashi explained in <i>Beitzah</i> 2b. It is easier to prohibit, which is perhaps why some of the rabbis ruled on this issue although they are not recognized <i>poskim</i>, since they only sought to forbid and stand fast against what appeared to them to be an incipient breach in Judaism.<br><br>Another reason for not issuing a <i>heter</i> now is that I saw an article in which one of the rabbis expounded at length on the dangers he anticipates from women's prayer groups. However, his accompanying statement that a woman may not recite <i>Kaddish</i> because she is not included in a <i>minyan</i> of men is incorrect; were it not for <i>kevod tzibur</i> she could even recite the blessings and read from the Torah. The <i>gaon</i>, my grandfather <i>ztz\"l</i>, permitted women to recite <i>Kaddish</i> from the women's section together with the male mourners."
                ],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
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                [],
                [
                    "<big><strong>Limiting Family Size</strong></big>",
                    "",
                    "",
                    "My grandfather's ruling permitting contraception between births is no secret, and many people rely on it. He was not alone in his <i>psak</i>. R. Ruderman <i>z\"l</i> of <i>Ner Yisrael</i> ruled the same way, and there are other great scholars who reportedly do so. This apparently was not known to Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe</i> in <i>Even haEzer</i>, part 1, no. 64,<sup class=\"footnote-marker\">4</sup><i class=\"footnote\"> A remarkable instance of overlooking the other side to a controversy concerned Reform and Conservative marriages. In his <i>Sefer Peirushei Ivra</i>, my grandfather wrote that a <i>get</i> is required after a civil marriage if the couple lived together publicly as man and wife. R. Feinstein <i>z\"l</i> disagreed with this in Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe, Even haEzer</i>, part 1, no. 74, and added that all the more so, those married by a Reform rabbi do not need a <i>get</i>.<br>R. Henkin protested in the journal <i>haPardes</i>: \" It is utterly amazing, it makes the hair on one's head stand up, [to see] how [Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe</i>] is lenient in the matter of Reform marriages. Is there any need [for a rabbi] to perform the marriage? If a Jew says to a woman in the presence of witnesses, \"You are my wife,\" she becomes the man's wife. And if there were no witnesses at the time, when they live together for many years and are known as man and wife [it is as if] there were witnesses…. This [ruling] constitutes releasing a married woman [to remarry] without a divorce, and all who are experts in Halachah are in an uproar about it.\"<br>Despite this, six years later Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe, Even haEzer</i>, part 3, no. 23 claimed, \"Even if we say that in the case of wicked people and unbelievers their <i>kidushin</i> is valid, following the reasoning of <i>haGri\"a</i> Henkin <i>shlita</i>, … in the case of disciples of Conservatism and Reform, this, too, amounts to nothing … since it is as if they actually and specifically intended that their marital relations should not be for the [purpose] of <i>kidushin</i> according to the Torah. When there is such an intention even <i>haGri\"a</i> Henkin [agrees] there is nothing [to their <i>kidushin</i>].\"<br>He wrote again in part 3, no. 45: \"Because the marriage was conducted by a Conservative rabbi, it stands to reason there were no valid witnesses…. here even <i>haGri\"a</i> Henkin would agree.\" He repeated this claim another three times, in <i>Even haEzer</i>, part 4, nos. 75–77. At least five times, then, R. Feinstein ascribed to R. Henkin a view that was diametrically opposed to what was actually my grandfather's position.<br>[Resp. <i>Mishneh Halachot</i>, vol. 7, no. 214 wrote that he heard from an unidentified second-hand source (<i>ish mepi ish</i>) that even though my grandfather required a <i>get</i>, he ruled that when a woman's first marriage, performed by a Reform rabbi, was terminated without one, the children born to a second marriage have no disabilities.. This claim was aired four years after my grandfather's death and is the result of wishful thinking. Nothing my grandfather wrote or said supports it.]</i> who wrote that he had never seen anyone who permitted birth control except in cases of danger to the mother.<sup class=\"footnote-marker\">5</sup><i class=\"footnote\"> R. Feinstein wrote in <i>Igrot Moshe, Even haEzer</i>, part 4, no. 74 (2): \"Concerning taking birth control pills … when care is taken so that the woman does not stain, if they have already fulfilled the <i>mitzvah</i> of procreation and there is an economic reason or other pressing need, or even if they have not fulfilled the <i>mitzvah</i> but the woman is weak, she may take birth control pills since there is no aspect of wasting seed.\"<br>This is unlike his categorical prohibition of birth control in <i>Even haEzer</i>, part 1, no. 64 (see previous chapter). The earlier <i>teshuvah</i> related only to the use of a diaphragm which he prohibited except in cases of danger, but he later permitted the use of foam and subsequently pills, see <i>Even haEzer</i>, part 4, no. 74 (1) and (4). (But see at length in <i>Bnei Banim</i>, vol. 1, no. 30, that my grandfather permitted the use of a diaphragm.) Even so, it is remarkable for Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe</i> to have permitted birth control because of \"economic reason or other pressing need,\" since raising any child involves economic sacrifice. It also contradicts what he wrote 19 years later in part 4, no. 71 not to permit birth control merely because of \"difficulties in raising children or making a living,\" even though the question concerned one who had already fulfilled the <i>mitzvah</i> of procreation. Similarly, in no. 72 he wrote that birth control pills should not be taken except in cases of great need. One has to force the sense of no. 71 and say that it refers only to use of a diaphragm, and of no. 74 (2) and say it refers only to a case of great need.</i>",
                    "",
                    "On the question of how many children a couple is required to have and whether at some point they can cease having more, I cannot respond in my grandfather's name since we did not discuss the topic. I will nevertheless write my humble opinion, and perhaps I will merit approximating his exalted view.",
                    "The discussion centers on <i>Yevamot</i> 62b:<br><br>R. Yehoshua said, \"[Even if] a man married a wife in his youth, he should marry a wife in his old age; if he had children in his youth he should have children in his old age, as it is said (<i>Kohelet</i> 11:6), 'sow your seed in the morning, and do not rest your hand in the evening (<i>vela'erev al tanach yadecha</i>). For you do not know who will prove worthy, this one or that, or whether both are equally good.' \" … R. Matna said, \"Halachah is according to R. Yehoshua.\"",
                    "According to many <i>rishonim</i>, the injunction \"do not rest your hand in the evening\" (\"<i>la'erev</i>\") is less binding than other rabbinical enactments. In <i>Beitzah</i> 37a, Rashi wrote that it is only \"a bit of a <i>mitzvah</i>.\" Similarly, Ramban wrote in <i>Milchamot haShem</i> in <i>Yevamot:</i><br><br>It is a rabbinical injunction reflecting natural behavior (<i>minhag derech eretz</i>), for the Talmud brings \"sow your seed in the morning.\" They did not mention any prohibition; rather, \"marry a wife [and have children in his old age]\" is a <i>mitzvah</i> that preferably (<i>lechat'chilah</i>) should be carried out, [but] we do not coerce [someone] or label him a violator if he does not want to engage in it. However, he should never be without a wife.<br><br>According to Rashi, Ramban, Ritva and others, R. Yehoshua refers to someone who already has children and whose wife is past childbearing age; in such circumstances, there is \"a bit of a <i>mitzvah</i>\" to take an additional wife who is capable of bearing children, so that he can continue to procreate. If his wife died, on the other hand, he is obligated to remarry whether or not he will have more children.",
                    "Rambam, however, ruled that <i>la'erev</i> is as binding on the husband as any other rabbinical commandment, and that the obligation is independent of the question of remarriage. He wrote in <i>Hilchot Ishut</i> 15:16:<br><br>Even though a man has fulfilled the [Biblical] commandment of procreation, it is a rabbinical commandment that he should not cease from procreation as long as he has strength, for anyone who adds a soul to Israel is as if he built the world. It is also a rabbinical commandment that a man not remain without a wife, so that he does not reach the state of <i>hirhur</i>.",
                    "The view that a man is commanded to procreate \"as long as he has strength,\" is earlier found in <i>She'iltot d'Rav Achai</i> 165, who asked:<br><br>A man who has children and knows in his heart that he is capable of having more, is he obligated to [continue to] fulfill the <i>mitzvah</i> of procreation? Do we say that since he has children he has already fulfilled the <i>mitzvah</i> of procreation, or perhaps, even though he has [children] he is obligated to be involved in procreation and beget [more] children, for he does not know whether the children of his youth will succeed or the children of his old age will succeed?<br><br>The question is asked in a general fashion, and deals with having additional children from his first or any other wife. In answering, <i>She'iltot</i> cited a slightly different version of the <i>beraita</i> in the name of R. Yehoshua:<br><br>Even though he married a wife in his youth, he should marry a wife in his old age; and even though he had children in his youth he should have children in his old age, as it is said, \"sow your seed in the morning.\"<br><br>He should remarry in his old age <i>and</i> should have children in his old age; they are two separate obligations. According to this, a man is obligated to continue to have children as long as he is able to, and this is Rambam's opinion.",
                    "What remains to be explained is why Rambam omitted the verse from <i>Kohelet</i> cited in the <i>beraita</i> and substituted his own reason, that anyone who adds a soul to Israel is as if he has built the world. I think the answer is that the verse is only a peg. This can be seen from <i>Tanchuma haYashan</i> in <i>Chayei Sarah</i>, paragraph 8, and <i>Bereishit Rabah</i> 61:3, which applied the verse in <i>Kohelet</i> to <i>Bereishit</i> 25:1, \"Avraham persisted and took himself a wife.\" \"For you do not know who will prove worthy, this one or that\" does not apply here, for Avraham <i>did</i> know: God had promised him, \"your seed will be called through Yitzchak.\" If the Sages nevertheless applied <i>la'erev</i> to Avraham , it follows that one is obligated to continue to have children even if the results are known in advance. Rambam, therefore, gave a different reason.",
                    "However, on the question of <i>la'erev</i> most <i>rishonim</i> did not follow Rambam, including those who usually do so; see <i>Semag</i> in <i>Aseh</i> 49, <i>Orchot Chayim</i> in <i>Hilchot Ketuvot</i> 34, Meiri in <i>Yevamot</i>, and <i>Tur</i> and <i>Shulchan Aruch</i> in <i>Even haEzer</i> 1:8. I have not found anyone who copied Rambam's language other than <i>Sefer Eitz Chayim</i> in <i>Hilchot Pri'ah uRevi'ah</i>. Since this is a controversy over a rabbinical law, Halachah follows the lenient view. Therefore, one need not continue to fulfill <i>la'erev</i> if there is some impediment to doing so, and one will not be considered a violator of rabbinical law, as Ramban wrote.",
                    "Furthermore, the sense of R. Yehoshua's words is that he refers specifically to having children from a second marriage. In <i>Avot d'R. Natan</i> 3:6:<br><br>R. Yehoshua says: Marry a wife in your youth and marry a wife in your old age, have children in your youth and have children in your old age. Do not say, I will not marry a [second] wife, but marry a wife and have sons and daughters, and increase procreation in the world.<br><br>Similarly, in <i>Kohelet Rabah</i> 11:6:<br><br>R. Natan explained the verse as [referring to] a wife: if you took a wife in your youth, take a wife in your old age. Why? Because you do not know which children will survive, and see <i>Maharzu</i> there. And in <i>Tanchuma haYashan</i>:<br><br>R. Dostai said, if you took a wife and she bore children and she died, don't remain without a wife in your old age…. learn from Avraham, who in his youth had only one son and in his old age, twelve.",
                    "In all of these, the lesson is applied to a second marriage with a wife who can bear children. This is not to say that there is no <i>mitzvah</i> to have additional children from a first marriage; however, doing so is only a voluntary <i>mitzvah</i> (<i>mitzvah kiyumit</i>) of the sort that the Jerusalem Talmud in <i>Beitzah</i> 5:1 called <i>reshut shehi mitzvah</i>. It may be that the Sages made <i>la'erev</i> obligatory primarily in the case of a second marriage because it is a \"custom based on natural behavior\" that every marriage should result in children, even if the husband has previously fulfilled his obligation of procreation with his first wife. I have not seen anyone who commented on this.<br><br>Also, while according to Rambam there is no limit to the number of children mandated by <i>la'erev</i> \"as long as he has strength,\" it seems likely that according to other <i>rishonim</i> the rabbinical <i>la'erev</i> resembles the Torah <i>mitzvah</i> of <i>pru u'revu</i> in having one son and one daughter, in keeping with the principle \"Everything the Sages enacted, they enacted in resemblance to the Torah.\" This fits the exposition of the verse in <i>Kohelet</i>, \"sow your seed in the morning, and in the evening do not rest your hand,\" that is, the same obligation you had in the morning to have a son and a daughter in fulfillment of <i>pru u'revu</i> is the obligation you have in the evening in fulfillment of <i>la'erev</i>. It follows that a man who has two sons and two daughters has fulfilled both the Torah obligation of <i>pru u'revu</i> and the rabbinical <i>vela'erev al tanach yadecha</i>.",
                    "One need not endlessly have children, then, following the opinions of most of the <i>rishonim</i> and <i>Tur</i> and <i>Shulchan Aruch</i>, and contrary to Rambam. What I wrote in <i>Bnei Banim</i>, vol. 1, no. 30, was in order to explain the ruling of my grandfather, who permitted spacing births even when the <i>mitzvah</i> of procreation has not yet been fulfilled. When it has been fulfilled, it is not difficult to establish that one need not have many additional children in the face of personal or economic hardship.",
                    "For good measure, I will bring three arguments to permit using birth control that even Rambam might agree with. First, he wrote in <i>Hilchot Ishut</i> 15:1:<br><br>A woman who, after marrying, gives permission to her husband not to have relations—this is permitted. In what circumstances? When he [already] has children and has fulfilled the <i>mitzvah</i> of procreation.<br><br><i>Beit Shmuel</i> in <i>Even haEzer</i> 1:1 contrasted this with <i>Hilchot Ishut</i> 15:16:<br><br>Even though a man has fulfilled the [Biblical] commandment of procreation, it is a rabbinical commandment that he should not cease from procreation as long as he has strength.<br><br>If it is a rabbinical commandment to continue to have children, how can his wife grant permission to not have relations? <i>Birkei Yosef</i>, in paragraph 2, answered that from the standpoint of <i>la'erev</i> a man s not required to have relations regularly and it is enough to have them once in a long while; \"in the evening do not rest your hand\" requires only not to rest completely. Therefore, if his wife permits him and he has already fulfilled the Torah <i>mitzvah</i> of procreation, he can put off marital relations for an unspecified time (<i>l'eit min ha'itim</i>).<br><br>In our question, what difference is there between not having relations at all and using a permitted form of birth control? Procreation is deferred in either case. It follows that having additional children can be postponed; however, this is on condition that the wife will still be of childbearing age and that the intention is to eventually have more children.",
                    "",
                    "",
                    "The second argument concerns circumstances when having more children would threaten <i>shelom bayit</i> (\"family tranquility\"). <i>Terumat haDeshen</i>, cited by Rema in <i>Even haEzer</i> 1:5, discussed a widower who had wanted to marry a certain woman but was afraid that quarrels would break out between her and the children from his first wife. For that reason, he decided to marry a different woman who was not of a quarrelsome nature but who was, however, infertile. <i>Terumat haDeshen</i> ruled that he could marry her, because the need to avoid domestic strife overrode the requirement for him to have more children in his old age. Similarly, a couple should not fight if one of them refuses to have more children, and the same applies if having more children will create economic difficulties severe enough to threaten <i>shelom bayit</i>.",
                    "The third argument pertains to the dangers of late births. <i>Yam Shel Shelomoh</i> in <i>Yevamot</i> 6:24 wrote that a woman may drink medicine which will make her sterile \"if she has distress in childbirth or is afraid of having children who are unworthy (<i>ainum hagunim</i>).\" He concluded, \"All the more so, if her children have strayed from the proper path and she is afraid of producing more offspring of this sort, she is permitted [to prevent conception].\" This applies even if the husband has not fulfilled the <i>mitzvah</i> of procreation; see Resp. <i>Chatam Sofer, Even haEzer</i> no. 20, cited by <i>Pit'chei Teshuvah</i> in <i>Even haEzer</i> 5:11.<br><br>Children born with serious defects such as Down's syndrome are \"unworthy\" in some respects, too, and the mother would be more than distressed. On the one hand, one should not refrain from procreation merely because of unsubstantiated fears. The woman described by <i>Yam Shel Shelomoh</i> already had children who had strayed from the proper path, and so there were concrete grounds for her to worry. On the other hand, if the doctors say that because of genetic makeup or age or other factors there is a high probability that defective children will be born, <i>Yam Shel Shlomoh</i> would permit contraception even when the <i>mitzvah</i> of procreation has not been fulfilled."
                ]
            ],
            "Essays": [],
            "Miscellanea": []
        },
        "Volume III": {
            "Responsa by Rabbi Yosef Eliyahu Henkin": [],
            "Introduction": [],
            "": [
                [
                    "<big><strong>Women's <i>Zimun</i> When Men Are Present</strong></big>",
                    "",
                    "I occasionally encounter someone who thinks that men must leave the room when women recite their own <i>zimun</i> (the call to say the blessings after meals). I have never seen any source for this, but if one exists it is probably similar to <i>Sefer haMeorot</i> in <i>Megillah</i> 19b, who cited <i>Sefer ha'Itur</i> as ruling that women cannot read the Purim Megillah for men. He explained that doing so would constitute a breach in morals (<i>pritzuta</i>), just as a <i>zimun</i> of women, slaves and children together is considered a breach of morals in <i>Berachot</i> 45b.<br><br><i>Orchot Chayim</i> in <i>Hilchot Megillah</i> and <i>Kol Bo</i> in chapter 45 seem to quote <i>Sefer ha'Itur</i> as citing \"<i>kol b'ishah ervah</i>,\" (a woman's voice is <i>ervah</i>) as the reason why women cannot read the Megillah for men, although this is not found in our editions of <i>Sefer ha'Itur</i>. [A close reading of <i>Orchot Chayim</i> and <i>Kol Bo</i> shows that they do not explicitly attribute this reason to <i>Sefer ha'Itur</i>.] Therefore, just as men should not listen to a woman reading the Megillah, they should not listen to women's <i>zimun</i>. <i>Sefer haMeorot</i> explained:<br><br>According to this opinion, that which [the Sages] held that a woman may recite the blessings [after meals] for her husband refers only to her husband, but not to men in general, because of a breach in morals. Because [the Sages] said, \"a woman's voice is <i>ervah</i>\" and it is appropriate to create some distance between a woman and other men even with regard to inquiring about each other's welfare, and all the more so with regard to other matters.<br><br>But it would be surprising to rule this way. <i>Sefer ha'Itur</i> did not mention <i>zimun</i> at all, and <i>Sefer haMeorot</i> himself objected to equating <i>zimun</i> with reading the Megillah. He continued:<br><br>It is possible that only regarding slaves and women [dining together] do we say that we are concerned about a breach in morals … but regarding other [free] men [dining together with women], no.",
                    "Nor did other <i>rishonim</i> prohibit a man from listening to women's <i>zimun</i>. Ritva in <i>Hilchot Berachot</i> 4:2 explicitly permitted him to listen: \"A woman recites the blessing [<i>birkat hamazon</i>] for a man through the <i>zimun</i>.\" He meant that when a woman recites <i>zimun</i> for men she can also discharge their obligation to recite <i>birkat hamazon</i>.<br><br>Ritva's position is that women are obligated in <i>birkat hamazon</i> from the Torah just as men are, and this is also Ravad's view. In <i>Orach Chayim</i> 689, <i>Bach</i> wrote that according to Ravad a woman who dined with three men can lead <i>zimun</i> for them. Against this, we follow the ruling of Rambam in <i>Hilchot Berachot</i> 5:1 and <i>Tur</i> in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 186 that women cannot discharge the obligation of <i>birkat hamazon</i> for men, and the same applies to <i>zimun</i>. But none of these authorities considered a woman's voice to be a factor.<br><br>This can be learned <i>kal vechomer</i> from the reading of the Megillah. According to Rashi, Rambam and other <i>rishonim</i>, a woman may discharge a man's obligation even <i>lechat'chilah</i> by reading the Megillah for him, despite the fact that Purim is a time of merriment and there would seem to be extra reason to be concerned about the possible effect on men of a woman's voice. Even <i>Halachot Gedolot</i>, who disqualifies women from reading the Megillah for men, does so for a wholly different reason and not because of \"a woman's voice is <i>ervah</i>,\" and <i>Sefer ha'Itur</i> in <i>Hilchot Megillah</i>, p. 226, appears to agree with <i>Halachot Gedolot</i> (see below, chapter 9).<br><br>Even according to <i>Chidushei Nimukei Yosef</i>'s contrary exposition in <i>Megillah</i> 4a,<br><br>Women [form a quorum to] recite the <i>zimun</i> [only] by themselves because of a breach of morals, because intoxication is frequent at meals. But the reading of the Megillah takes place before the meal and so there is no intoxication, according to which one cannot reason <i>kal vechomer</i> from the Megillah reading to <i>zimun</i> but just the opposite, nevertheless, his concern is not with woman's voice <i>per se</i> but with the dangers of intoxication.",
                    "Most authorities view <i>zimun</i> as a rabbinical law, contrary to Ravad's opinion cited in <i>Tur</i> 188. It is accepted Halachah that women's <i>zimun</i> is optional, see <i>Shulchan Aruch</i> in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 199:7. Consequently, men are not required to respond to their <i>zimun</i>, and indeed it would be strange for men to be ritually dependent on women. But if men wish to respond, what grounds are there to forbid it? The <i>gaon</i> R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach [<i>z\"l</i>] also ruled that men may be present and respond to women's <i>zimun</i>, as quoted in a compendium of laws concerning women, <i>Halichot Beitah</i>, p. 94.",
                    "By contrast, a statement found in a different compendium, <i>Hilchot Bat Yisrael</i>, that \"women have the option to recite the <i>zimun</i> for themselves but customarily do not do so when men are present,\" is confused. For generations, women did not recite <i>zimun</i> for themselves—<i>Aruch haShulchan</i> wrote in 199:2 that he never heard of any women who actually did so—while the <i>zimun</i> that some women have recently reinstituted is independent of the presence or absence of individual men.",
                    "<big><strong>Can a Man Lead Women's <i>Zimun?</i></strong></big><br>What remains to be clarified is whether a man who dined together with women can lead their <i>zimun</i> or must one of the women lead it. This is in dispute among the <i>rishonim</i>. Ritva wrote in <i>Hilchot Berachot</i> 7:2 that a man can lead <i>zimun</i> for women only as part of a <i>mezuman</i> of three men:<br><br>Women say <i>zimun</i> for themselves. They also discharge their obligation through the blessing of the man who fulfills it for them, when there is a <i>zimun</i> of men without them.<br><br>Ritva's reason can be explained as follows: He wrote in <i>Megillah</i> 4a that men and women may not form a quorum for <i>zimun</i> because it represents a marked change in <i>birkat hamazon;</i> if brought about by men joining women, it would constitute a breach of morals (<i>pritzuta</i>) by rewarding the mingling of the sexes. Now, if three or more men dined with women and one man leads <i>zimun</i>, no <i>pritzuta</i> is involved, since the men were obligated in <i>zimun</i> regardless. But if one or two men dined with three or more women and a man leads <i>zimun</i>, from the man's perspective there is a change, since he could not have recited <i>zimun</i> without the women. Therefore, according to Ritva, one of the women should lead <i>zimun</i> and not he.",
                    "Other r<i>ishonim</i> disagree. <i>Sefer haMeorot</i> in <i>Berachot</i> 45a wrote that a lone man may indeed lead <i>zimun</i> for a group of women:<br><br>Where there are ten minors and one adult [male] with them, and also [if there are ten] women, it is apparent that the adult [male] says the [<i>zimun b'Shem</i>] blessing \"Let us bless our God\" for them. Since he ate with them and he is obligated in <i>birkat hamazon</i>, he may say the [<i>birkat hamazon</i>] blessing for them and also discharge their obligation in the blessing of <i>zimun</i>.<br><br>This is cited in <i>Sefer Ohel Moed</i> in <i>Sha'ar Berachot</i> 7:1 (p. 107b) in the name of R. Avraham. Underlying the disagreement is the fact that in <i>Berachot</i> 20a, <i>Sefer haMeorot</i> is uncertain whether or not women are Biblically obligated in <i>birkat hamazon</i>, unlike <i>Ritva</i> who determined that men and women are equal in this regard. The Mishnah in <i>Berachot</i> 45a states \"regarding women, slaves and children, [freemen] do not join with them for a <i>zimun</i>\"; i. e., women, slaves and children are not to be included with men in forming a quorum of three. The <i>beraita</i> in 45b adds \"women, slaves and children who wish to form a <i>zimun</i> [together] may not do so\"; i. e., members of each of these groups may not be counted together for <i>zimun</i> with members of the others. The Gemara explains that the reason for the latter prohibition is <i>pritzuta</i>.<br><br>Ritva's view is that men and women are both obligated from the Torah in <i>birkat hamazon</i> and can discharge each other's obligation. The reason they may not be counted together for <i>zimun</i> must therefore be <i>pritzuta</i>, just as it is in the <i>beraita</i>. As he wrote in his <i>Hilchot Berachot</i> 7:2:<br><br>Women are obligated in <i>birkat hamazon</i> from the Torah, and therefore a woman may say the blessing [after meals] for a man through [her] <i>zimun</i> … but they do not join with men to form a <i>zimun</i>, because of a breach in morals.",
                    "But this does not follow according to the view of other <i>rishonim</i> that a woman's obligation in <i>birkat hamazon</i> from the Torah is doubtful. The fact that women's obligation in <i>birkat hamazon</i> may be different from that of men is sufficient reason why they cannot be counted with men in a quorum for <i>zimun</i>, and <i>pritzuta</i> need not be involved. P<i>ritzuta</i> is necessarily involved only in the <i>beraita</i>, to explain why women and slaves may not join for <i>zimun</i> even though the obligations of these two groups are the same.",
                    "That is what Rambam meant in <i>Hilchot Berachot</i> 5:7:<br><br>Women, slaves and children do not recite <i>zimun</i> [with men] but recite it for themselves. There should not be a group of women, slaves, and children [for the purpose of <i>zimun</i>] because of a breach in morals; rather, women by themselves and slaves or children by themselves.<br><br>He used two separate clauses, and was careful to mention a breach in morals only in the second clause regarding women, slaves and children, but not in the first regarding men and women. ",
                    "Similarly, <i>Sefer haMichtam</i> wrote in <i>Berachot</i> 45a:<br><br>Women, slaves and children do not form a <i>zimun</i> together [with men]. The explanation is that they are not obligated like men.… it is doubtful whether they are Biblically obligated or rabbinically, while men are obligated from the Torah.<br><br>A difference in obligations and not a breach in morals, then, is why men and women cannot join in a quorum for <i>zimmun</i>.<sup class=\"footnote-marker\">1</sup><i class=\"footnote\"> <i>Sefer haMichtam</i> continued: \"Even if they wish to say <i>zimun</i> together, women and slaves may not do so because of a breach in morals, meaning, in order to distance them from each other so as not to create a social gathering of women and slaves.\" That is to say, even when three slaves and three women dine together they may not recite <i>zimun</i> for each other, even though each group has its own quorum. This is implied in the <i>beraita:</i> \"Women recite the <i>zimun</i> for themselves and slaves recite the <i>zimun</i> for themselves; women, slaves and children who wish to form a <i>zimun</i> [together] may not do so,\" i. e., the groups of women, slaves and children that can each recite <i>zimun</i> by themselves may nevertheless not combine. This appears to be <i>Sefer haHashlamah</i>'s view, and it is implied by Rambam's wording \"there should not be a group of women and slaves,\" i. e., in any fashion, and so wrote <i>Magen Avraham</i> in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 199:4.<br>It is also implicit in Rashi in <i>Berachot</i> 45b, albeit for a different reason: \"Their forming together [a quorum for <i>zimun</i>] is not appropriate because of <i>pritzut</i>, whether of women [with slaves] or of homosexual acts between slaves and children.\" According to Rashi, why did the Gemara introduce the factor of breach of morals to explain the <i>beraita</i>? Even without it, we could determine that women and slaves cannot form a quorum together because their versions of <i>birkat hamazon</i> are different, as Rashi wrote in <i>Archin</i> 3a: \"Women or slaves do not combine for a <i>zimun</i> with men, because an element [of <i>birkat hamazon</i>] is present for men that is not present for women and slaves, in that women do not mention <i>brit</i> while slaves do not mention <i>al nahalat'cha</i>.\" <i>Or Zarua</i>, part 2, no. 368 explained that according to Rashi women are Biblically obligated in <i>birkat hamazon</i> just as men are, but the second blessing of <i>birkat hamazon</i> is worded differently for freemen than for either women or slaves: a woman cannot recite \"your covenant\" [i.e., circumcision] that You impressed on our bodies,\" and a converted slave cannot recite \" the…land You gave our forefathers.\" For that reason, a freeman cannot join for <i>zimun</i> with either of them. But women and slaves also differ in their blessings from each other! Why, then, invoke a breach in morals?<br>Rashi's point is that even if three slaves and three women dined together and so each group has its own quorum for <i>zimun</i>, the groups may not join. The reason is <i>pritzuta</i>. Were it not for this reason, a slave or a woman could indeed lead <i>zimun</i> for both groups together, and the two groups would complete <i>birkat hamazon</i> separately, each using the relevant version of the second blessing.</i>",
                    "To sum up: following the accepted Halachah that women are only doubtfully obligated by the Torah in <i>birkat hamazon</i>, the Gemara's concern with a breach in morality does not apply to men and women dining together. <i>Sefer haMeorot</i> and <i>Ohel Moed</i> explicitly permit a man who dined with women to recite <i>zimun</i> for them. Since we find no one who prohibits it other than Ritva—following his view that women are equal to men in <i>birkat hamazon</i>—therefore, a man who dined with three women may lead them in <i>zimun</i>.<br><br>To summarize the laws of women and <i>zimun</i>, in my opinion:<br><br>1. A woman and two men, or a man and two women, do not constitute a quorum for <i>zimun</i>.<br>2. When three or more women have dined with one or two men, one of the women may lead <i>zimun</i> and the men may listen and respond.<br>3. One or two women who have dined with three men are obligated to respond to the men's <i>zimun</i>.<br>4. Three or more women who have dined with from three to nine men may either respond to the men's <i>zimun</i> or recite their own.<br>5. Ten women may not recite <i>zimun b'Shem</i> (the form of <i>zimun</i> said in the presence of a <i>minyan</i>) but only the regular <i>zimun</i>, following the ruling of Rambam and <i>Shulchan Aruch</i>, and contrary to the opinion of <i>Sefer haMeorot</i> and others.<br>6. When ten men have dined with any number of women, a man leads <i>zimun b'Shem</i> for all.<br>7. Women may recite their own <i>zimun</i> or not recite it, as they wish. Even if they occasionally recite their own <i>zimun</i>, they are not required to do so at every opportunity.<br>8. However, if they recite it at three consecutive meals (not counting meals where women's <i>zimun</i> is not possible or is superseded by men's <i>zimun</i>), it becomes obligatory for them, unless they stipulate that their intent is <i>bli neder</i>—that is, not to give it binding status. Compare <i>B'nei Banim</i> vol. 2, no. 19 concerning the <i>Ma'ariv</i> prayer for women."
                ],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [
                    "<big><strong>Women's Immersion Before Yom Kippur</strong></big>",
                    "",
                    "",
                    "Women who wish to immerse themselves before Yom Kippur may do so, since <i>Minhagei Maharil</i> states explicitly that women and girls immerse themselves on the day before Yom Kippur, and only a few <i>achronim</i> prohibit it based on a comparison with Resp. <i>Rivash</i> that can be disputed, as I will show. <i>Ben Ish Chai</i> wrote that women should immerse themselves before both Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur \"to bring upon themselves the radiance of the holiness of the day,\" and in his Resp. <i>Rav Pe'alim</i>, vol. 4, no. 16, he reported that all the women and girls of his household did so. <i>Mo'adim uZemanim haShalem</i>, whose author lives today in Jerusalem, states in vol. 5, no. 55 that \"[women] do not have to immerse themselves, and such is the custom in a number of places,\" implying that in other places they do immerse themselves.<br><br>Nevertheless, few women actually do so. Only seventy-two did so in the Kiryat Moshe neighborhood of Jerusalem on <i>erev</i> Yom Kippur in 5756 [1995], including girls who came with their mothers and women who came from other neighborhoods, in contrast to hundreds of men. Rema in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 606:4 does not mention women's <i>tevilah</i> before Yom Kippur, nor does <i>Aruch haShulchan</i>, and apparently it was not common. I think <i>Mishnah Berurah</i> left room for error when he cited <i>Magen Avraham</i> as if this was the ongoing custom, for <i>Magen Avraham</i> only cited Maharil to that effect but did not say what the custom was in his own generation.",
                    "We find three reasons for <i>tevilah</i> before Yom Kippur: as a step toward repentance, to be purified from semen and to resemble the angels. The first, as part of <i>teshuvah</i>, is relevant to everyone from the age of <i>bar</i> or <i>bat mitzvah</i>, men and women alike, as Maharil wrote. Similarly, <i>Shibolei haLeket</i> 283 wrote in the name of R. Simchah of Speyer that \"everyone who repents must immerse himself\" and brought support for this from <i>Avot d'Rabi Natan</i> 8:8. <i>Tanya Rabati</i> 78 and <i>Sefer haAgur</i> 924 also cited R. Simchah. <i>Nimukei Yosef</i> in <i>Yevamot</i> 47b wrote that an Israelite who sinned and now repents \"immerses himself by rabbinical [law], as an added [measure of repentance],\" and this was cited by Rema in <i>Yoreh De'ah</i> 268.<br><br>Just as <i>tevilah</i> should accompany an individual's repentance at any time of the year so, too, everyone should immerse himself or herself in preparation for Yom Kippur, the time of repentance for all",
                    ". The source for this immersion goes back to the Talmud. R. Amram Gaon wrote in his <i>siddur</i>:<br><br>On the day before Yom Kippur a person immerses himself at the seventh or eighth hour. The Rabbis taught (<i>tanu rabanan</i>): \"The <i>mitzvah</i> of confession on Yom Kippur starts at nightfall, but the Sages said, 'A person immerses himself on [the eve of] Yom Kippur before he comes in to eat…. He stops and confesses.' \"<br><br>This <i>beraita</i> is missing in our editions of the Talmud that in <i>Yoma</i> 88b make no mention of <i>tevilah</i>, but according to R. Amram Gaon, immersion during the day before Yom Kippur is a Talmudic enactment the same as confession following the afternoon prayers.<br><br>Similarly, R. Sa'adiah Gaon wrote, as quoted in <i>Teshuvot haGe'onim Sha'arei Tzedek</i>, no. 202, that \"each and every individual immerses himself on the eve of Yom Kippur, and upon emerging makes a blessing on the <i>tevilah</i>,\" and he is so cited in <i>Tur</i>. R. Simchah of Speyer also ruled that one should pronounce a blessing when immersing for repentance, and this is the sense of Maharil who compared such <i>tevilah</i> to that of a convert, who recites a blessing. And although Ri\"tz Gayot and Rosh objected that no blessing should be made on a custom that has no basis in the Talmud, according to R. Amram Gaon immersing before Yom Kippur is indeed a <i>beraita</i>, and R. Sa'adiah Gaon probably had the same <i>beraita</i>. It should be noted, however, that <i>Shibolei haLeket</i> 310 ruled that one says a blessing on <i>tevilah</i> on the day before Yom Kippur, even though in 319 he copied the <i>beraita</i> as it appears in our editions and which does not mention immersion.",
                    "The second reason, to be purified from semen, is relevant to married men and to youths who have emissions. It is also relevant to married women; see the Mishnah in <i>Berachot</i> 26a and Rambam in <i>Hilchot Avot haTum'ah</i> 5:9 and 5:11. R. Tzvi Pesach Frank <i>z\"l</i> in his <i>Mikra'ei Kodesh</i> explained R. Sa'adiah Gaon's position as being that although Ezra's enactment requiring <i>tevilat keri</i> before praying was revoked for the rest of the year, it remains in force on Yom Kippur, and therefore one who immerses in preparation for Yom Kippur recites the blessing. Following <i>Tosafot</i> in <i>Chulin</i> 136b, one could also argue that although there is no longer any obligation to immerse after a nocturnal emission, nevertheless, one who chooses to do so may recite the blessing.<br><br>Still, I doubt that purification from semen was R. Sa'adiah Gaon's only reason, for he wrote that \"each and every individual\" should immerse himself, and not just those who had emissions. It is more likely that his view is the same as that of <i>Shibolei haLeket</i> 310, who wrote, \"One says a blessing on <i>tevilah</i> on the day before Yom Kippur, like all those who repent or like all those who emit semen,\" i. e., the blessing can be for immersion either for repentance or to purify from semen.<br><br>However, the Halachah is that no blessing is recited on immersion, whether for repentance or for purification from semen. One should also remember that purification from semen does not require <i>tevilah</i>; it is enough to pour or shower nine <i>kavim</i> of water on oneself, as <i>Orchot Chayim</i> and <i>Sefer Tashbatz</i> 122 wrote in the name of R. Meir of Rottenberg and as is cited by Rema.",
                    "The third reason is in order to resemble the angels. According to the <i>Hagahot</i> to <i>Minhagei Mahari Tirna, Erev Yom Kippur</i>, no. 142, this applies only to men and not to women:<br><br>Women should not immerse themselves before Yom Kippur because they cannot resemble angels; they are mistaken [if they immerse themselves], for it is irrelevant to them.<br><br>This was cited by <i>Mateh Moshe</i>, who was cited in turn by <i>Eliyahu Rabah</i> in 606:9. Raviah in 628, <i>Or Zaru'a</i> in part 2, no. 276, and <i>Mordechai</i> in <i>remez</i> 723 also mentioned resembling the angels, while Rosh and <i>Tur</i> wrote that the main reason for <i>tevilah</i> before Yom Kippur was to be purified from seminal emission and that resembling angels was a side issue.",
                    "According to many <i>rishonim</i>, then, immersion on the eve of Yom Kippur is irrelevant to unmarried women, because they do not come into contact with semen. Even regarding married women, the only <i>rishon</i> who explicitly states that they immerse themselves is Maharil. The language of Raviah and <i>Mordechai</i> \"the abstemious (<i>perushim</i>) are accustomed to immerse themselves\" excludes most men, let alone women. The phrase \"all Israel\" used by <i>Orchot Chayim</i> and <i>Kolbo</i> can be taken to mean only men, and even R. Sa'adiah Gaon's \"each and every individual\" does not necessarily include women.<br><br>Moreover, <i>Orchot Chayim</i> and <i>Kolbo</i> wrote that \"all Israel[ites] are accustomed to immerse themselves in the river,\" and similarly is found in the Zohar in <i>Pinchas</i> (p. 214b): \" 'Sons of the Palace' should rejoice on the ninth day of the month [<i>Tishrei</i>] and immerse themselves in the river.\" The implication is that only men immersed themselves, for modest women would hardly immerse themselves in a river in the daytime. Only <i>Tanya Rabati</i> in the name of R. Simchah of Speyer mentions <i>tevilah</i> \"before entering the <i>mikvah</i> or river or sea,\" and <i>Shibolei haLeket</i> 283 should be emended accordingly. This is consistent with R. Simchah's view that <i>tevilah</i> on the eve of Yom Kippur is for the purpose of repentance, which applies equally to men and women; he therefore specifies a <i>mikvah</i>, which is indoors and suitable for women during the day.",
                    "Moreover, <i>Orchot Chayim</i> and <i>Kolbo</i> wrote that \"all Israel[ites] are accustomed to immerse themselves in the river,\" and similarly is found in the Zohar in <i>Pinchas</i> (p. 214b): \" 'Sons of the Palace' should rejoice on the ninth day of the month [<i>Tishrei</i>] and immerse themselves in the river.\" The implication is that only men immersed themselves, for modest women would hardly immerse themselves in a river in the daytime. Only <i>Tanya Rabati</i> in the name of R. Simchah of Speyer mentions <i>tevilah</i> \"before entering the <i>mikvah</i> or river or sea,\" and <i>Shibolei haLeket</i> 283 should be emended accordingly. This is consistent with R. Simchah's view that <i>tevilah</i> on the eve of Yom Kippur is for the purpose of repentance, which applies equally to men and women; he therefore specifies a <i>mikvah</i>, which is indoors and suitable for women during the day.",
                    "Besides, the assumption of the <i>Hagahot</i> that women cannot resemble the angels on Yom Kippur is itself problematic. As its source the <i>achronim</i> cite <i>Yalkut Shimoni</i> on Proverbs 21 which is based on <i>Vayikra Rabah</i> 31:5, \"the angels are all males, there is no female among them.\" I think that is no proof, however, for we are not trying to emulate the angels' masculine qualities, but only what pertains to Yom Kippur.<br><br>This is clear in <i>Pirkei d'R. Eliezer</i> 46 as cited by <i>Or Zaru'a</i> and Rosh:<br><br>As the ministering angels are barefoot, so [the people of] Israel are barefoot on Yom Kippur; as the ministering angels do not bend, so [the people of] Israel stand on their feet on Yom Kippur; as the ministering angels do not eat or drink, so [the people of] Israel do not eat and drink on Yom Kippur; … as the ministering angels are cleansed from all sin on Yom Kippur, so are [the people of] Israel on Yom Kippur.<br><br>In not eating or drinking, going barefoot and being cleansed from sin on Yom Kippur there is no difference between men and women, and all can resemble the angels in these matters.",
                    "This can also be seen from the custom that both men and women say <i>baruch shem kevod malchuto l'olam va'ed</i> out loud on Yom Kippur. No one objects to women doing this, although its source is in <i>Devarim Rabah</i> 2:36: \"on Yom Kippur, when they [Israel] are cleansed like ministering angels, they pronounce it publicly.\"",
                    "We now come to <i>Sdei Chemed, Ma'arechet Yom haKipurim</i>, no. 1 (6), who prohibited unmarried women and girls from immersing themselves before Yom Kippur lest this lead to sexual license: having been purified from the status of <i>nidah</i> and with the threat of <i>karet</i> removed, they would be more likely to sin. But why rely on such reasoning to reject an explicit <i>heter</i> of Maharil? If Maharil did not abolish the custom of women immersing on the eve of Yom Kippur, he must not have considered it dangerous, and why should we? One can reply, however, that in the time and place of Maharil the communities were cohesive and parents closely supervised their children and married them off early. Circumstances have changed, and for that reason <i>Sdei Chemed</i> declared that unmarried women and girls should not immerse themselves.",
                    "<i>Sdei Chemed</i> 's source is Resp. <i>Rivash</i>, no. 425. Rivash rejected a proposal that unmarried women should be made to go the <i>mikvah</i> in order to lessen the possibility that men might have relations with an unmarried <i>nidah.</i> He answered that, to the contrary, such an enactment would increase promiscuity and <i>yichud</i>.<br><br>To illustrate the severity of violating even rabbinical prohibitions in these matters, Rivash cited <i>Shabbat</i> 13b about a scholar who died young because he slept in the same bed with his wife during her clean days, even though no Torah prohibition was involved. <i>Tosafot</i> explains that the custom had been that a woman went to the <i>mikvah</i> after the seventh day from the onset of menstruation in order to be permitted to touch ritually pure food (<i>taharot</i>) in accordance with Torah law, and a second time after counting seven clean days to permit marital relations in accordance with rabbinical stringencies. The scholar permitted himself to touch his wife after the first <i>tevilah</i>, although not to have relations with her. He violated rabbinical strictures against any physical contact before the second <i>tevilah</i>, and for that reason he died.<br><br>If so, why prohibit only unmarried women and girls from immersing themselves? All the more so, married women should be forbidden to immerse before the end of their seven clean days lest a mishap result, as happened in <i>Shabbat</i>. That is what I answered at first over the telephone. Afterwards I saw that someone has indeed written that married women should immerse themselves before Yom Kippur only when they are not <i>nidah</i>.",
                    "But this is not so. In the time of the Gemara people distinguished between <i>nidah</i> and <i>zavah</i>. The scholar mentioned in <i>Shabbat</i> certainly knew that his wife was only a <i>nidah</i> and that Torah law did not require seven clean days. Today, however, since we do not differentiate between <i>nidah</i> and <i>zavah</i> all menstruating women have the status of possible <i>zavot</i>, and everyone knows that immersion without first counting seven clean days does not accomplish anything. Nor are we concerned lest premature immersion may confuse some women and lead them to mistakenly having relations in violation of Torah law. This is evidenced by Ezra's enactment according to which even actively menstruating women immersed themselves to be purified from semen, let alone those who were counting clean days, without fear that doing so might lead to mishap.",
                    "For the same reason, single women should be permitted to immerse themselves before Yom Kippur. In fact, there is less likelihood for confusion in their regard than there is with regard to married women, for on occasion a married woman may definitely <i>not</i> be a <i>zavah</i> and may not require seven clean days according to Torah law; for example, if she stained for only one or two days after having been <i>tehorah</i>. By contrast, the likelihood is remote that a single woman who goes to the <i>mikvah</i> once a year before Yom Kippur will not have stained three consecutive days during the course of that year, making her a possible <i>zavah</i>.<br><br>I think married women may immerse themselves before Yom Kippur at any point in their monthly cycles. The local <i>mikvah</i> authorities acted with proper caution in posting a notice that the immersion has no effect on family purity status.<br><br>One might still argue that a single woman should not go to the <i>mikvah</i> before Yom Kippur because she has not studied the laws of <i>nidah</i> and might not even know that seven clean days are required. However, this cannot be inferred from Resp. <i>Rivash</i>, who was asked not about merely permitting <i>tevilah</i> but about ensuring that unmarried women be ritually pure in compliance with Halachic requirements: a <i>hefsek taharah</i>, seven clean days, and then immersion. As for the possibility that a single woman might count seven clean days and then use the opportunity of going to the <i>mikvah</i> before Yom Kippur in order to be promiscuous afterwards, we are not responsible for intentional sinners. Such a woman would not be dependent on a <i>mikvah</i> in any case but could bathe in the sea.",
                    "Our concern is different from that in Resp. <i>Rivash</i> for yet another reason. The proposal there was that unmarried women should frequent the <i>mikvah</i> on a monthly basis, which undoubtedly would increase promiscuity. Similarly, in the time of the Gemara the custom was for women to immerse themselves regularly for <i>taharot</i> as Rivash wrote, following the opinion of Ramban and Rashba and unlike Ritva. This is not the same as going to the <i>mikvah</i> only once a year prior to Yom Kippur.<br><br>This distinction is made by Resp. <i>Rav Pa'alim</i>, part 4, no. 16: \"Women who immerse themselves on the eve of Rosh Hashanah and on the eve of Yom Kippur should not be rebuked, as it is not a permanent matter.\" However, he seems to contradict himself in part 3, no. 12: the question there concerns a woman who wanted to immerse herself during the seven clean days so that she could care for her ailing husband; and based on Resp. <i>Rivash</i> he forbade it, even though the woman was a nursing mother who had stained only once and no general or permanent <i>heter</i> was involved. Similarly, Resp. <i>Maharam Shick, Yoreh De'ah</i>, no. 364, cites Resp. <i>Rivash</i> in discussing a woman who was in mourning, which is also not a permanent situation. I think that Resp. <i>Rivash</i> is irrelevant to their questions, but in any case, they did not rely solely on Resp. <i>Rivash</i> for their rulings.",
                    "Finally, there is another, basic difference between what Rivash discussed and immersion before Yom Kippur. Citing Ramban in <i>Shabbat</i> 13b concerning the rabbinical violations that resulted from the scholar's wife's early immersion, Rivash wrote:<br><br>In later generations they abolished this immersion for <i>taharot</i> because it was a stringency which lead to a leniency, for as a result they were likely to stumble by taking a rabbinical prohibition lightly.<br><br>The view of Ramban and Rivash is that early immersion to permit handling <i>taharot</i> was abolished because of the pitfalls involved, even though people still ate their food in ritual purity—for if they no longer ate in purity, in what way could continuing to immerse be considered a stringency rather than a meaningless vestige? Resp. <i>Rav Pa'alim</i>, too, wrote that early immersion was abolished even though the reasons for it were still valid, contrary to Resp. <i>Maharam Shick</i>.<br><br>Only when a woman immerses herself in order to avoid a major transgression are we concerned lest she consequently ignore minor ones, as was the case in <i>Shabbat</i>. According to Resp. <i>Rivash</i>, as well, if single women went to the <i>mikvah</i> this would minimize sexual relations with <i>nidot</i> but foster the lesser sins of <i>yichud</i> and promiscuity. The prohibition against unmarried women going to the <i>mikvah</i> cited by <i>Be'er Heitev</i> in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 303:1 refers to <i>tevilah</i> in order to release a woman from being a <i>nidah</i>, and so does the question in Resp. <i>Rav Pa'alim</i>, part 3. This does not apply to immersion for <i>keri</i> in accordance with Ezra's enactment, for immersion merely to permit prayer and study will not normally lead to permitting forbidden relations. All the more, it does not apply to immersion before Yom Kippur that is not in order to permit anything.",
                    "For all the above reasons, in my opinion there is no Halachic objection to women and girls immersing themselves before Yom Kippur, although a local rabbi can still prohibit such immersions if he feels it necessary. In the category of good but not binding advice, however, single women under the age of twenty should not immerse themselves unless they go with their mothers. Beyond that age women know their own minds and it is unlikely that any ill will result; a hint of this is <i>Chazal</i>'s statement that Heaven judges a person only from the age of twenty; see <i>Shabbat</i> 89b."
                ],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [
                    "<big><strong>Talmud Study by Women</strong></big>",
                    "",
                    "",
                    "The Lubavitcher Rebbe <i>z\"l</i> wrote that women should prepare for the imminent rebuilding of the Temple by studying even <i>Kodeshim</i> and <i>Taharot</i>; R. Yosef Dov Soloveichik <i>z\"l</i> recommended teaching them sections that pertain to everyday life, such as parts of <i>Mo'ed</i>; while many others, including R. Moshe Feinstein <i>z\"l</i>, prohibited the teaching of Talmud to women at all, as was the norm for many generations.",
                    "Underlying the controversy is <i>Tehillim</i> 119:126, \"<i>eit la'asot laShem</i>, it is a time to act for <i>haShem, h-f-r-u Toratecha</i>.\" The Mishnah in <i>Berachot</i> 54a understands <i>h-f-r-u</i> in two ways. Read in the past tense, <i>heiferu</i>, \"they have violated,\" the verse means that it is time to act on behalf of <i>haShem</i> and punish those who have violated His Torah. But read as an imperative, <i>hafeiru</i>, \"violate!\" it means the opposite: there is a time to violate His Torah, as it were, and introduce needed changes in order to save it. The Talmud employs this second sense in a number of instances: in <i>Berachot</i> 54a to permit using <i>haShem</i>'s name in everyday greetings, even though that might seem to be irreverent; in <i>Yoma</i> 69a to permit wearing priestly garments outside the Temple, in order to save the community from danger; in <i>Gitin</i> 60a to permit writing selections from the Prophets, even though normally only complete books of the Bible may be written; and in <i>Temurah</i> 14a to permit transcription of the Oral Law, which had previously been forbidden. This has no direct application to our time, however, as the Sages of the Talmud had the authority to legislate changes, while we do not. No rabbi or group of rabbis today, however well meaning, is authorized to introduce permanent changes in Halachah.",
                    "Nevertheless, the second sense of <i>eit la'asot laShem</i> teaches us to make every effort to find a basis in Halachah for steps needed to preserve Torah observance. For that reason, seventy years ago, a number of <i>gedolim</i> permitted what was then the novelty of teaching girls <i>Tanach</i>, ethics and laws (although not Talmud) in classrooms in an organized fashion, even though the Jewish education of girls had traditionally been in the home. See <i>Likutei Halachot</i> to <i>Sotah</i> 21 and Resp. <i>Moznayim Lamishpat</i>, vol. 1, no. 45.",
                    "Often there is no unanimity on such steps, for what is necessary in one community may be superfluous or even harmful in another. On a given issue, one community will expound <i>eit la'asot laShem, hafeiru Toratecha</i> in order to introduce changes, while another community will expound <i>heiferu Toratecha? eit la'asot laShem</i> to block innovation.",
                    "Rambam wrote in his <i>Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Talmud Torah</i> 1:13:<br><small>A woman who learned Torah is rewarded, although not as much as a man. The reason is that she was not commanded to do so, and one who does something when not commanded to is not rewarded as much as one who was commanded and carried it out, but is rewarded less. Although she is rewarded, the Sages commanded (<i>tzivu</i>) that a man not teach his daughter Torah, because most women are not oriented to learn and instead transform Torah discussions into trivia due to the poverty of their intellects. The Sages said, \"anyone who teaches his daughter Torah is as if he has taught her <i>tiflut</i> [frivolity].\" What does this apply to? The Oral Torah. But regarding the Written Torah, he should not teach it to her <i>lechat'chilah</i>, but if he taught her it is not as if he taught her <i>tiflut</i>.</small><br>This was copied in abbreviated form in <i>Semag, Mitzvot Aseh</i> 12 and in <i>Tur</i> and <i>Shulchan Aruch</i> in <i>Yoreh De'ah</i> 246:6.",
                    "First, note that the prohibition is on teaching her but she is not forbidden to learn, just as one may not teach Torah to a slave but he may learn by himself, as the Jerusalem Talmud states in <i>Ketuvot</i> 2:10. Women may teach other women and learn together in <i>chevruta</i>, without restriction. It also follows that a woman is permitted to listen to men learning among themselves; for instance, a man giving a <i>sheur</i> to men need not stop if a woman is present. Support for this comes from the Jerusalem Talmud in <i>Sukkah</i> 2:1, where no one objected to R. Gamliel's slave, Tavi, sitting underneath a table in the <i>sukkah</i> in order to listen to the Sages' discussions.",
                    "A further inference from Rambam is that the prohibition is specifically against teaching one's own daughter. He began, \"A woman who learned Torah is rewarded …\" but continued, \"the Sages commanded that a man not teach his <i>daughter</i> Torah…. The Sages said, 'anyone who teaches his <i>daughter</i> Torah.' \" He both paraphrased and quoted the Mishnah, and since even in his paraphrase he mentioned a father teaching his daughter rather than stating that it is forbidden to teach women, it is clear that he was being exact. Otherwise, he would have written, \"The Sages commanded not to teach a <i>woman</i> Torah…. The Sages said, 'anyone who teaches his daughter Torah …' \"",
                    "This may also be the view of <i>Ma'ayan Ganim</i>, printed in 5313 (1553), which <i>Torah Temimah</i> quoted in <i>Devarim</i> 11:19:<br><small>What was said in <i>Sotah</i> 20a, \"anyone who teaches his daughter Torah is as if he has taught her <i>tiflut</i>,\" perhaps applied when the father taught her when she was a child…. However, women whose hearts prompt them to approach the labor of <i>haShem</i> through conscious choice of the good—it is incumbent on the scholars of their generation to praise and cherish them, to organize and strengthen them.</small><br>That is to say, the scholars of the generation must teach them, as opposed to the fathers, who may not teach their daughters. <i>Torah Temimah</i> questioned only the distinction drawn by <i>Ma'ayan Ganim</i> between a father teaching his daughter as a child and teaching her as an adult, for if that were the case, Rambam should have written that most \"girls\" are not oriented to learn, and not most \"women.\"",
                    "If the prohibition is only against teaching one's daughter—perhaps because the father might not be rigorous enough in teaching her—this would explain the instances of women who were proficient in Talmud; others must have taught them, for it is improbable that they could have learned completely on their own. See the list of scholarly women in <i>Mekor Baruch</i> by the author of <i>Torah Temimah</i>, and at greater length in <i>Alei Tamar</i> on the Jerusalem Talmud in <i>Sotah</i> 3:4. As related in <i>Pesachim</i> 62b, Bruriah recounted three hundred Halachic teachings from three hundred rabbis. <i>Birkei Yosef</i> to <i>Choshen Mishpat</i> 7:12 wrote that a learned woman may issue Halachic rulings, and <i>Minchat Chinuch</i> wrote at the end of <i>mitzvah</i> 78:<br><small>If the scholars of a generation disagree on any law in <i>issur veheter</i>, excluding laws for which a formal <i>beit din</i> is needed … there is no distinction. Even child scholars join [in determining the majority view] … and learned women as well, such as Devorah…. There is no distinction; anyone who is a scholar has his opinion considered, whoever he is.</small><br>These inferences from Rambam are as opposed to <i>Sefer Chasidim</i>, no. 313, which states that \"the profundities of the Talmud, the reasons for the <i>mitzvot</i>, and the secrets of Torah—these one does not teach to a woman or a child.\" On the one hand, according to <i>Sefer Chasidim</i> there is no difference between teaching one's daughter and other women; on the other, a man may teach Talmud to women up to whatever level of study boys can achieve by their <i>bar mitzvah</i>, which is considerable. If a talented woman is taught that much, it is likely she will be able to continue learning on her own. But Rambam did not distinguish between different levels of Talmud study, and accordingly a distinction must be made between teaching one's daughter and teaching others.",
                    "It is unclear what was Rambam's source for the view that <i>lechat'chilah</i> one should not teach one's daughter even the Written Torah. In the Jerusalem Talmud in <i>Sotah</i>, a wealthy lady asked R. Eliezer, \"Why do we find three different types of deaths [as punishment] for the one sin of the Golden Calf?\" He responded, \"A woman's wisdom is only in her spindle.\" He did not answer her question, although he later answered it privately to his students. He remarked to his son, \"Torah discussions are better burned than given over to women.\" Why didn't he answer her? In the Mishnah R. Eliezer cited <i>tiflut</i>, but he did not mention <i>tiflut</i> here. Moreover, the woman's question dealt with understanding Scripture and constituted study of the Written Torah; this is clear according to the <i>Taz</i> in <i>Yoreh De'ah</i> 246:4 as opposed to <i>Birkei Yosef</i> in 246:8, and see <i>Nedarim</i> 36b. Teaching her the Written Torah apparently did not involve <i>tiflut</i>, yet R. Eliezer still did not want to answer her. This could be the source for Rambam's ruling that <i>lechat'chilah</i> a man should not teach his daughter even the Written Torah.",
                    "The difficulty is that the wealthy lady was not R. Eliezer's daughter. Why, then, did R. Eliezer not answer her? Meiri wrote in <i>Yoma</i> 66b that R. Eliezer did not answer because he felt that people should not show off by seeking out great rabbis to ask them simple questions. This is consistent with Meiri's own explanation in <i>Sotah</i>, that <i>tiflut</i> in a woman means that \"she prides herself on the few things she knows, and rings like a bell to show her wisdom.\" A bell is empty but makes a lot of noise. Accordingly, it was indeed because of <i>tiflut</i> that R. Eliezer did not want to teach her the Written Torah. But this does not accord with Rambam's definition of <i>tiflut</i>.",
                    "Another solution is R. Sherira Gaon's explanation that R. Eliezer did not answer the woman because it was his custom not to teach anything he had not heard from his teachers. R. Tzvi Hirsh Chayot in his <i>hagahot</i> to <i>Yoma</i> 66b objected that according to the Jerusalem Talmud R. Eliezer did answer the woman's question to his own students. But I think this poses no difficulty, because the answer attributed in the <i>Yerushalmi</i> to R. Eliezer is attributed in the Babylonian Talmud to Rav and Levi instead. According to the <i>Bavli</i>, then, R. Eliezer did <i>not</i> answer the woman's question, and that is R. Sherira Gaon's view.",
                    "With all this, I have not found a clear source for Rambam's view that <i>lechat'chilah</i> one should not teach his daughter even the Written Torah. <i>Bi'ur haGra</i> in <i>Yoreh De'ah</i> 246:25 does not cite any. Rambam may have had some source in <i>Chazal</i> that is unknown to us, as R. Kapach wrote in his commentary to <i>Hilchot Talmud Torah</i>.",
                    "<i>Bach</i> and <i>Taz</i>, on the other hand, wrote in section 246 that the source for not teaching women the Written Torah is <i>Hakhel</i>, the septennial reading of the Torah in the Temple, regarding which R. Elazar b. Azariah said in <i>Chagigah</i> 3a that \"the men came to learn and women came [only] to hear.\" Since there was only one Torah reading for everyone, the reason the women only came to \"hear,\" rather than to learn as the men did, could be that women were prohibited <i>lechat'chilah</i> from learning even the Written Torah. But this is not the sense of Rambam, nor did <i>Tosafot</i> explain it this way; see <i>Tosafot</i> in <i>Sotah</i> 20a beginning \"Ben Azai.\" Also, the distinction advanced by <i>Taz</i> between simple things in the Torah that women may learn without restriction, and ingenious or closely reasoned explanations that men are forbidden to teach them <i>lechat'chilah</i>, is not supported by Rambam's categorical statement that \"regarding the Written Torah, he should not teach her <i>lechat'chilah</i>.\"",
                    "The basis for this entire discussion is the Mishnah in <i>Sotah</i> 20a:<br><small>If she has independent merit, it postpones [the punishment]…. Ben Azai said, \"From this [we learn that] a man must teach his daughter Torah, so that if [a guilty <i>sotah</i>] drinks [the bitter waters] and nothing happens, [the daughter] will know that merit postpones [the punishment].\" R. Eliezer said, \"Anyone who teaches his daughter Torah is as if he has taught her <i>tiflut</i>.\" Rabbi Yehoshua said, \"A woman prefers one measure [of material goods] accompanied by <i>tiflut</i>, more than nine measures accompanied by <i>perishut</i> [abstinence].\"</small><br>Ben Azai's reasoning seems obscure. What does a daughter's knowing that merit postpones a <i>sotah</i>'s punishment have to do with teaching her Torah? Teach her that one fact, and nothing else! A similar difficulty arises from the statement in the Jerusalem Talmud that R. Elazar b. Azariah and Ben Azai disagreed on the question of teaching women Torah, in that the former taught that women come to <i>Hakhel</i> only to listen and not to learn. Yet <i>Hakhel</i> had nothing to do with <i>sotah</i>: the king read publicly only from the book of <i>Devarim</i>, while the laws of <i>sotah</i> are in <i>Bamidbar</i>. I find this problematic in <i>Tosafot</i>'s discussion there.",
                    "Rather, Ben Azai's opinion was that in general women should be taught Torah, and he cited the Halachah in <i>Sotah</i> only as an example of the benefits that would ensue. \"From this, Ben Azai said (<i>mikan amar</i>)\" is only an illustration; it does not mean that his view was based on it. Compare it with the same language, \"<i>mikan amru</i>,\" in <i>Avot</i> 1:5, and see <i>Nega'im</i> 14:6.",
                    "R. Eliezer disagreed with Ben Azai; in R. Eliezer's opinion, teaching women Torah was like teaching them <i>tiflut</i>, and the loss outweighed the gain. The Jerusalem Talmud concludes that R. Elazar b. Azariah also disagreed with Ben Azai, because at <i>Hakhel</i> the king read to the men and women together; R. Elazar b. Azariah expounded that men come to learn but women come only to listen. Why not also to learn, as the men did? One explanation would be that women lack the intellect or the orientation to do so, and this conforms to R. Eliezer's argument of <i>tiflut</i>. But I think a better explanation is that if there was an obligation to teach women Torah, there would be no difference between the responses of the men and the woman at <i>Hakhel</i>. From R. Elazar b. Azariah's exposition that the men come to learn while the women come only to listen, therefore, it is clear that women need not receive an education that will enable them to learn along with the men. This runs counter to Ben Azai's position that fathers are obligated to teach their daughters the same as they teach their sons.",
                    "The two explanations are very different. According to the first, R. Elazar b. Azariah agreed with R. Eliezer in objecting to teaching women Torah. According to the second, however, although R. Eliezer b. Azariah held that there is no obligation to teach women, there is no indication that he ruled that there was any <i>prohibition</i> against doing so. The wording of the <i>Yerushalmi</i> supports this: \"[The view of] Ben Azai is not that of R. Elazar b. Azariah,\" i. e., R. Elazar b. Azariah disagreed with Ben Azai, but he did not necessarily agree with R. Eliezer.",
                    "Furthermore, Rambam wrote that \"the Sages commanded (<i>tzivu chachamim</i>) that a man not teach his daughter Torah.\" Everywhere in Rambam's <i>Mishneh Torah</i> the phrase \"the Sages commanded\" signifies proper and desirable behavior but not an enforceable <i>issur veheter</i>. Thus, in <i>Hilchot De'ot</i> 2:3, \"The Sages commanded to be extremely meek…and they also commanded to distance oneself from anger,\" and in 3:1, \"The Sages commanded that a person not refrain from anything but what the Torah prohibited\"; and see 2:4, 3:3, 5:10 and 6:2. In <i>Hilchot Talmud Torah</i> 2:5: \"The Sages commanded, limit your business and occupy yourself with Torah.\" In <i>Hilchot Ishut</i> 14:4: \"Therefore the Sages commanded that a person never marry more than four wives,\" and see 15:18–19, 20:1 and <i>Aruch haShulchan</i> in <i>Even haEzer</i> 58:3. In <i>Hilchot Matnot Ani'im</i> 10:17: \"The Sages commanded that poor people and orphans should be part of his household,\" and see also 10:18. In <i>Hilchot Malveh v'Loveh</i> 1:3: \"The Sages commanded, your friend's property should be as dear to you as your own.\" And in <i>Hilchot Nachalot</i> 7:13: \"The Sages commanded that during his lifetime a man should never display preference for some of his children over others.\"",
                    "With a possible exception concerning multiple wives, all of these statements are hortatory and are not formal <i>halachot</i>. In the same way, Rambam's statement \"The Sages commanded that a man not teach his daughter Torah, because most women are not oriented to learn\" is not a categorical decree but a general recommendation. Its source is R. Eliezer's statement \"anyone who teaches his daughter Torah,\" which is also not in the form of a Halachic decree; R. Eliezer did not say, \"It is forbidden to teach one's daughter Torah.\" It therefore comes as no surprise that there have been exceptions, and that some scholars taught Talmud directly to their daughters.",
                    "Why, then, was R. Eliezer's opinion that teaching women involves <i>tiflut</i> accepted by the <i>poskim</i>, even though he was a <i>shamuti</i> and other rulings of his were rejected? Rashi, <i>Tosafot Ivra</i>, and Bartenura explained that R. Yehoshua in the Mishnah agreed with him, making them a majority of two to one against Ben Azai. But R. Yehoshua's \"a woman wants one <i>kav</i> together with <i>tiflut</i>\" is a generalization. There can be exceptions, as Resp. <i>Ramah</i> wrote in no. 304, although the example there was <i>lechumra</i>. In exceptional cases R. Yehoshua would agree that there is no <i>tiflut</i>, and in those cases Halachah would not be in accordance with R. Eliezer.",
                    "Similarly, <i>Prishah</i> in 246:15 wrote that if the daughter has shown herself to be an exception to the majority, there is no <i>tiflut</i> involved in teaching her. The catch is that \"her father is forbidden to teach her, because he does not know what is in her heart,\" i.e., he does not know what she will be like when she grows up and whether she will be frivolous or not. But this does not apply to teaching a grown woman, whose behavior and character can be evaluated. Rambam's statement that most \"women\" rather than most \"girls\" are not oriented to learning comes only to explain why a father should not teach his daughters when they are children, lest when they grow up they turn out to belong to the majority of women who do not take the intricacies of Torah seriously. But in the case of a serious woman who wishes to learn Talmud, even her father would be permitted to teach her. This resolves the difficulty raised by <i>Torah Temimah</i> against <i>Ma'ayan Ganim</i> that I mentioned above.",
                    "A source for permitting the teaching of Scripture to women would seem to be the Mishnah in <i>Nedarim</i> 35b, \"One whose vow prohibits him from receiving benefit from another, [the other] should not teach him Scripture, but teaches his [minor] sons (<i>banav</i>) and daughters (<i>bnotav</i>) Scripture.\" There is a variant reading that omits the words \"and daughters,\" but <i>Tosafot</i> and Rosh in 36b wrote that even so, <i>banav</i> in the plural means all his children, including daughters. This is also the opinion of Ran and the pseudo-Rashi commentary to <i>Nedarim</i>, and of Ri\"tz as quoted in <i>Shitah Mekubetzet</i>.",
                    "However, Rambam in <i>Hilchot Nedarim</i> 6:7 wrote that \"he teaches his son (<i>bno</i>)\" in the singular; <i>bno</i> usually means only a son and not a daughter, and <i>bno</i> and not <i>banav</i>, presumably, was in Rambam's text of the Mishnah. This is also the version of Rif, <i>Semag</i> in <i>Lo Ta'aseh</i> 242, and <i>Tur</i> in <i>Yoreh De'ah</i> 221. Gra explained that daughters are not mentioned because <i>lechat'chilah</i> one should not teach them even the Written Law, following Rambam's ruling in <i>Hilchot Talmud Torah</i>. Yet in the case in <i>Nedarim</i> the teacher is neither the daughters' father nor is he acting on the father's behalf; see Resp. <i>haRashba</i>, vol. 1, no. 645. Nevertheless, Rambam does not allow for teaching the girls the Written Torah. Doesn't this disprove our understanding of Rambam that the prohibition is only against a father teaching his daughters?",
                    "Not necessarily. The Mishnah in <i>Nedarim</i> specifies teaching Scripture (<i>mikra</i>), which <i>Nimukei Yosef</i> explains as referring to all twenty-four books of the Bible. A teacher is allowed to teach the children in spite of their father's vow, because a <i>mitzvah</i> does not produce any volitional benefit (<i>mitzvot lav leihanot nitnu</i>), as <i>Tosafot</i> explained. Since learning Torah is a <i>mitzvah</i>, teaching it does not technically violate the father's vow. But what <i>mitzvah</i> is there to teach a girl <i>Tanach</i>? See Resp. <i>Maharil</i>, no. 199, who wrote, \"What do they need [the book of] Chronicles for? … [What they need is] only the Torah, which contains the <i>mitzvot</i>.\" And although women are rewarded for Torah study even though they are not commanded to study, reward is irrelevant in the case of minors. Rambam permitted teaching Scripture to the sons and not to the daughters, then, for in the absence of a <i>mitzvah</i> to do so, teaching the latter would violate their father's vow. But this says nothing about teaching them when there is no vow.",
                    "I am hesitant to rely on the above alone or on Rambam's distinction between teaching one's daughter and women in general, since <i>Tosafot, Sefer Chasidim</i> and Resp. <i>Maharil</i> do not distinguish between daughters and other women. However, the distinction between most women and exceptional women can be relied upon.",
                    "I will add something new in this regard. Rashi explained <i>tiflut</i> as meaning that \"through [study] she understands how to be crafty, and is able to sin without [it] being revealed,\" and <i>Aruch</i> also interpreted <i>tiflut</i> as \"sin.\" This would account for the difference between teaching a woman Scripture and teaching her Talmud, for only the latter could equip her with the casuistic skills and the knowledge she would need in order to dissemble successfully. As the Mishnah in <i>Avot</i> 1:9 warned, \"Be careful with your words, lest others learn from them how to lie.\" However, Rambam did not mention sin in his commentary in <i>Sotah</i>, but instead wrote that <i>tiflut</i> means \"vanities and parables.\" In <i>Hilchot Talmud Torah</i> he wrote that women \"transform Torah discussions to trivia, due to the poverty of their intellect.\" Why should this concern apply only to the Oral and not to the Written Torah?",
                    "I think the answer is based on what was said in <i>Beitzah</i> 30a concerning \"<i>mutav sheyihiyu shogegin ve'al yehiyu meizidin</i>, it is better that they sin out of ignorance rather than willfully,\" regarding women who continued to eat and drink up to the last minute before Yom Kippur:<br><small>Does not this [injunction not to admonish unintentional violators] apply only to rabbinical matters, but not to Torah matters? This is not so, for whether [the violation is] of Torah or rabbinical origin, we do not say anything to them. The extension (<i>tosefet</i>) of Yom Kippur is of Torah origin, and [nevertheless] they eat and drink until dusk [and we do not admonish them].</small><br><i>Sefer ha'Itur</i> explained that <i>mutav sheyihiyu shogegin</i> applies only to prohibitions not explicitly written in the Torah, similar to the <i>tosefet</i> of Yom Kippur; but where a prohibition is clearly spelled out, we admonish and restrain even unintentional violators until they desist. Such is also the opinion of Rashba, Rosh, Ran, <i>Magid Mishneh</i> in <i>Hilchot Shevitat Asor</i> 1:7 and other <i>rishonim. Sefer haMeorot</i> in <i>Beitzah</i> and Resp. <i>Tashbatz</i>, vol. 2, no. 47, explained that the unintentional violator would accept the rebuke when shown that the prohibition is explicit in the Torah; and see my discussion in <i>Bnei Banim</i>, vol. 2, no. 27.",
                    "This distinction accounts for the difference between teaching women the Written and the Oral Torah. Women accepted what was shown to them in black-and-white, but not what was transmitted orally. They were liable to view the expositions of the Oral Torah as \"parables\" and to \"transform Torah discussions into trivia.\" But today it is permitted to teach Talmud to women, because when the Talmud became fixed in writing it acquired the status of Written Law.",
                    "Support for this can be brought from Rosh's ruling on the commandment to write a <i>Sefer Torah</i>, in his <i>Hilchot Sefer Torah</i>, chap. 1:<br><small>Today, when we write <i>Sifrei Torah</i> and deposit them in synagogues … it is a positive commandment [incumbent] on every man in Israel who can afford to, to write [a copy of] the Pentateuch, Mishnah, Gemara, and Rashi's commentary, so that he and his children can study them. For the commandment to write the Torah is in order to use it to learn from, as is written (<i>Devarim</i> 31:19), \"Teach it to the children of Israel, put it in their mouths.\" Through [studying] the Gemara and Rashi's commentary he will have a clear grasp of the reasons for the commandments and the laws: therefore, they are the very books that a man is commanded to write.</small><br>His ruling is cited by <i>Tur</i> and <i>Shulchan Aruch</i> in <i>Yoreh De'ah</i> 270:2. The <i>achronim</i> disagree as to whether according to Rosh there is no longer a commandment to write a Torah Scroll, which is the view of <i>Prishah</i> and <i>Shach</i>, or whether the original commandment is still in force but today there is an additional <i>mitzvah</i> to copy the other books, which is the opinion of <i>Beit Yosef</i> and <i>Taz</i>. All agree, however, that Rosh ruled that there is a positive commandment to write copies of the other books. The difficulty is that when the Torah was given at Sinai it was forbidden to transcribe the Oral Torah, as stated in <i>Gittin</i> 60b, \"you are not permitted to write things that were spoken.\" How could there be a commandment to write what was forbidden to be written at the time the commandment was given? The answer must be that once written, the Oral Torah acquired the status of Written Torah.",
                    "The same applies to teaching women: now that the Talmud is in writing, <i>tiflut</i> no longer applies because women take the written word seriously. Those who teach women excerpts from the Mishnah and Talmud orally and make a point of not using regular printed texts, thus do the exact opposite of what is required. And while Rambam did not explicate any of this, it certainly deserves to be used as a supporting argument to remove women's Talmud study today from the category of <i>tiflut</i>.",
                    "The more that women today can be seen as different from women of past generations, the more they can be taught the Oral Torah. Women who seek to learn and are not studying Torah for the sake of an academic degree, and all the more so when they are no longer supported by their parents, are not part of the historical majority of women and may be taught Gemara. It is certainly better to draw them to study in a women's <i>beit midrash</i> than have them study Talmud in a secular framework.",
                    "All this, in a generation that needs it. Rashi explained <i>tiflut</i> as meaning that a woman might use her learning to help her sin without being caught, and Resp. <i>Maharil</i> wrote that even were there a <i>mitzvah</i> to teach women, it would be necessary to abrogate it because of <i>eit la'asot laShem</i>. In their time, everyone was outwardly religious, and hidden deviations were the concern. That is not the case today, when anyone who wants to becomes openly nonobservant.",
                    "Women who are highly educated in secular subjects but lacking in Torah, contrast the shallowness of their Jewish knowledge with the depth and interest they find in other fields. In the opposite of the situation described by Rambam, the poverty of their Torah education leads them to imagine that the Torah is trivial. \"<i>Eit la'asot laShem</i>\" today calls for the expansion and deepening of women's Torah studies, and there are Halachic grounds for doing so as I have shown. To prevent all women from learning Talmud as in earlier generations is an example of foolish piety and causes souls to be lost, God forbid. But even without this consideration, to the extent that they are exceptions to what was once the majority, it is permitted to teach women Talmud."
                ],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [
                    "<big><strong>Women's Hair Covering</strong></big>",
                    "",
                    "",
                    "There are two separate <i>Halachot</i> involved in the question of women's hair covering. The first is that a married woman may not go bareheaded in public; this is derived in <i>Ketuvot</i> 72a in the name of <i>Tana d'Vei Yishmael</i>, based on <i>Bamidbar</i> 5:18, \" [He] shall uncover the head of the woman.\" The <i>Sifrei</i> states that the verse \"comes to teach [us] that Jewish women cover their heads.\" Rashi explained in <i>Ketuvot</i>:<br><br>Since they do this to her to disgrace her … it follows that it is [normally] forbidden. Or else, since it is written \"[he] shall uncover,\" it follows that up to that point [her head] was covered, and it is evident from this that it is not the practice of Jewish women to go bareheaded. This is the main [explanation].<br><br>Similarly, Meiri wrote that the wording \"the head of the woman\" (<i>rosh ha'ishah</i>), as opposed to simply \"her head,\" implies that only that particular woman's head was uncovered.<br><br>I find this problematic. The description in <i>Bamidbar</i> is of the ritual a <i>sotah</i> underwent in the courtyard of the Sanctuary, as the Torah states, \"the priest shall have her stand before <i>haShem</i>, and shall uncover the woman's head.\" All we can conclude from this is that women must cover their heads in the Temple grounds, just as today many cover their heads in the synagogue out of respect even if they go bareheaded elsewhere. This presents no difficulty for Rambam, whose opinion is that the verse is only an <i>asmachta</i> for a rabbinical decree, as <i>Terumat haDeshen</i> wrote in <i>teshuvah</i> 242. The Sages decreed whatever they wanted to and used the verse as a peg, even if it did not fit the enactment exactly. But according to <i>Shaltei haGiborim</i> and others who consider going bareheaded in public to be an actual Torah prohibition even outside the Temple, how is this derived from Scripture?<br><br>Instead, we have to rely on Rashi's first explanation in <i>Ketuvot</i>, which is the only one he brings in his commentary on the Torah: \" '[he] shall uncover her head' in order to disgrace her. From here [we learn] that going bareheaded is demeaning to [women],\" and compare this with Ritva's quotation of Rashi. If women normally went about bareheaded in public, the accused <i>sotah</i> would not be so embarrassed by having her head uncovered in the Temple grounds. Since she was thoroughly disgraced, it follows that women normally covered their heads in public.",
                    "Uncovering her head means uncovering all or most of it, in keeping with the Halachic rule \"most is like all.\" Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe</i> wrote in <i>Even haEzer</i>, part 1, no. 58, that the Torah does not prohibit a married woman from uncovering part of her head, as long as most of it is covered. I also think that the use of the word \"head\" in the Torah rather than \"hair\" indicates that the priest uncovered her head even if she had no hair, and consequently that a married woman who shaves her head must still cover it in public. By the same token, hair not on the head, i. e., tresses and braids falling on the neck and shoulders, should not be included when calculating whether most of the head is covered.",
                    "Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe</i> also wrote that the head is considered one of the normally covered parts of her body. This is the second law pertaining to covering a married woman's head: it is immodest for her to uncover more than a handbreadth of her hair in public because \"a <i>tefach</i> in a woman is <i>ervah</i>\" and \"hair in a woman is <i>ervah</i>,\" as stated in <i>Berachot</i> 24a.<br><br>The language of the Gemara is:<br><br>R. Yitzhak said: \"An [uncovered] <i>tefach</i> in a woman is <i>ervah</i>.\" In what context [did he say that]? If regarding looking [at a woman], did not R. Sheshet say: \"Anyone who gazes even at a woman's little finger is as if he gazes at her private parts\"? Rather, regarding his wife and reading <i>Shema</i>. R. Chisda said: \"A woman's leg (<i>shok</i>) is <i>ervah</i>, as it is written, 'Uncover <i>shok</i>, pass over rivers,' and 'Your <i>ervah</i> will be uncovered and you will also reveal your shame' \" (Isaiah 47:3–4). Shmuel said: \"A woman's voice is <i>ervah</i>, as it is written, 'your voice is pleasing and your appearance is attractive'\" (<i>Shir haShirim</i> 2:14). R. Sheshet said: \"A woman's hair is <i>ervah</i>, as it is written, 'Your hair is like a herd of goats' \" (<i>Shir haShirim</i> 4:1).",
                    "R. Yitzhak's statement \"regarding his wife and reading <i>Shema</i>\" means that an exposed handbreadth, even in his wife, is considered <i>ervah</i> if normally covered by women in public, and he may not recite <i>Shema</i> facing it.",
                    "Regarding R. Chisda's statement \"a woman's leg (<i>shok</i>) is <i>ervah</i>,\" why was <i>shok</i> singled out for mention more than other normally covered parts of the body? Ravad explained that this passage comes to teach that a woman's <i>shok</i> is <i>ervah</i> even though a man often does not cover his own. <i>Shitah Mekubetzet</i> explained that even though the <i>shok</i> of a woman is occasionally uncovered, as when she raisies her skirt to cross a river as mentioned in Scripture, nevertheless it is considered <i>ervah</i>. <i>Bach</i> in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 75 wrote that we might have thought it is not <i>ervah</i> because it is a part of the body that is often soiled.<br><br>I think there is another reason why <i>shok</i> is singled out. Because Scripture explicitly calls it <i>ervah, shok</i> is always considered <i>ervah</i> and <i>Shema</i> may not be recited facing it even if women in that time and place are accustomed to exposing it. A similar distinction can be found in <i>Sefer haEshkol</i> (ed. Auerbach), part 1, section 7. This would apply to other parts of the body that Scripture labels <i>ervah</i>, such as Ezekiel 16:7 \"your breasts are ready and your [pubic] hair is grown, and you are naked and <i>ervah</i>.\" For this reason it would be forbidden for a man to recite <i>Shema</i> facing a woman's uncovered breasts even in islands or among tribes where women go topless.<br><br>According to this, there is no necessary correspondence between <i>shok</i>, which is labeled <i>ervah</i> by Scripture and hair, which is not. This is contrary to the view of Resp. <i>Tzemach Tzedek, Even haEzer</i>, no. 139, and <i>Mishnah Berurah</i> 75:10. <i>Aruch haShulchan</i> disagreed with <i>Mishnah Berurah</i>, and Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim</i>, part 1, no. 42, adduced a proof for <i>Aruch haShulchan</i>'s position, and see my comments in <i>Bnei Banim</i>, vol. 2, no. 8.",
                    "Shmuel said, \"A woman's voice is <i>ervah</i>,\" and R. Sheshet said, \"A woman's hair is <i>ervah</i>,\" and they cited verses in chapters 2 and 4 of <i>Shir haShirim</i>. Rashi explained, \"from the fact that Scripture praised it, it follows that it is [an object of] desire.\" This does not mean that everything Scripture deems attractive in a woman is rabbinically considered to be <i>ervah</i>. <i>Shir haShirim</i> praises additional features: \"your eyes are like doves … your teeth are like a uniform flock …. like a crimson thread are your lips … like a slice of pomegranate are your temples\" (4:2–3). It is not forbidden to recite the <i>Shema</i> facing any of these. Rather, the Sages decided which features to subsume under <i>ervah</i> and which not, and the verses cited are only pegs.<br><br>An alternative explanation might be that a woman's eyes, teeth, lips and temples are each less than a <i>tefach</i> (hand-breadth) in size, and for that reason the Sages did not single them out as <i>ervah</i>. [However, a woman's neck is not cited in the Talmud as <i>ervah</i> in spite of its size, even though <i>Shir haShirim</i> praises it in 4:4 and again in 7:5.]",
                    "Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe</i> further suggested that hair outside the hairline, such as hair falling on the shoulders, is not considered <i>ervah</i> even if more than a handbreadth is exposed. He cited Ravad, who wrote:<br><br>[It is forbidden] only in a hidden (<i>tzanua</i>) area, but her face, hands and feet and her speaking voice and the hair outside her plaits (<i>mihutz letzamatah</i>) that is not covered are not causes for concern, because he is used to them and is not distracted.<br><br>Just as a woman's face, hands and feet are not forbidden even if more than a handbreadth, so, too, Ravad permitted hair outside the hair region to be exposed even if more than a handbreadth.<br><br>But I think this is no proof. Ravad is referring what was practiced in his day, and women then certainly did not leave more than a handbreadth of hair uncovered. This is evident from Resp. <i>Maharam Alashkir</i>, no. 35, who contended with those who objected to a woman showing even strands of hair outside her <i>tzamah</i>: if so, he wrote, they should also forbid eyebrows, which are obviously not forbidden. Now, if those who permitted hair outside the hair region permitted more than a <i>tefach</i> of hair, then those who disagreed with them were also referring to more than a <i>tefach</i>. How, then, could Resp. <i>Maharam Alashkir</i> counter with an argument from eyebrows that are less than a <i>tefach</i> in size? Clearly, he was discussing strands of hair that amounted to less than a <i>tefach</i> and so, too, was Ravad.",
                    "Some <i>achronim</i> understood Rambam in <i>Hilchot Sotah</i> 3:5 as requiring a woman to wear a headcovering even in her home. But his language is:<br><br>She [the <i>sotah</i>] stands among them without a shawl and without a kerchief, but only in her clothes and with a cap on her head, as if the woman [was] in her home (<i>kmo sheha'isha betoch beitah</i>).<br><br>He means that she stands among them in the Temple courtyard as if they were with her in her home, where in the presence of strangers she would wear at least a cap. Married woman did not appear completely bareheaded before non-family members even inside their homes, as can be seen from the incident with On ben Pelet's wife in <i>Sanhedrin</i> 109b. This is what Rambam intended by writing \"as if <i>the woman</i> was in her home\" (<i>kmo sheha'ishah betoch beitah</i>), using the definite article and referring to the particular <i>sotah</i> under discussion. He did not write \"as a woman [is] in her home\" (<i>k'mo ishah betoch beitah</i>) which would have referred to women in general. Rather, a woman must wear a cap in her home only in such circumstances as the <i>sotah</i>, who was in the presence of strangers, but by herself or with her husband and immediate family she need not cover her hair.",
                    "On the other hand, apropos of Resp. <i>Tzemach Tzedek</i>'s astonishment over Resp. <i>Maharam Alashkir</i> having permitted a woman to show strands of hair outside her <i>tzamah</i> in public, I think the opposite is true. Resp. <i>Maharam Alashkir</i> permitted this only to a woman <i>inside</i> her home, as he wrote, \"Come, let us raise an outcry against those who forbid such [uncovered] hair of a woman inside her home.\" This can also be seen from his statement \"we are not dealing with an <i>eishet ish</i>,\" i.e., but only with one's own wife, and inside her home. His mention that the custom of Jewish women in Islamic countries was to leave uncovered strands of hair outside their <i>tzamah</i> does not indicate that in public they uncovered any hair at all. By the same token, his contrast of this with the custom of Jewish women in Christian countries to cover all strands of hair, even those outside the <i>tzamah</i>, applies even in the home. In this he agrees with Resp. <i>Tzemach Tzedek</i>.",
                    "Nevertheless, according to basic Talmudic law a woman is not obligated to cover every last strand of hair, even outside her home. To do so is only a later custom that became obligatory in many communities over the course of time, as stated in Resp. <i>Chatam Sofer, Orach Chayim</i> no. 36.<br><br>This can be seen in <i>Yoma</i> 47a concerning Kimchit, who said, \"the beams of my house have never seen the plaits of my hair.\" Why did she specify her plaits, and not say that the beams of her house never saw any of her hair at all? The inference is that the beams of her house indeed saw strands of her hair outside her plaits. It follows that other women, who were not as punctilious as she was, uncovered even their plaits at home. This supports the position of Rashi and <i>Tosafot</i> that a woman may go bareheaded in the privacy of her home, which is also Rambam's view as stated above, and is the opposite of how some <i>achronim</i> understood both Kimchit and Rambam.<br><br>There is no contradiction to this in the Jerusalem Talmud in <i>Megillah</i> 1:10 which quotes Kimchit differently, \"the beams of my house have never seen the hairs of my head (<i>s'arot roshi</i>).\" She did not say that the beams never saw a hair of her head (<i>s'arat roshi</i>) but rather hairs (<i>s'arot</i>) in the plural, and the inference is the same as in <i>Yoma</i>. Moreover, had the custom been to cover loose strands of hair in public, Kimchit, who conducted herself more rigorously than other women, would have covered them inside her house as well; from the fact that she did not do so, we can infer that other women did not cover loose strands even in public.",
                    "",
                    "If a woman who until now has covered all her hair wants to change her custom, she may not do so, as it is a custom that has been practiced for many generations as a barrier against immodesty. However, in our sins, for well over a century married women in many communities went about completely bareheaded, even the most respectable among them. The remonstrances against this by all the <i>poskim</i> were of no avail, as <i>Aruch haShulchan</i> wrote in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 75. Only in the last generation have many young married women abandoned the mistaken behavior of their mothers and grandmothers in this regard. In such circumstances, it is enough to insist only on the basic Halachah and rely on Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe</i> to permit women to expose up to a handbreadth of hair in public. At home, when no strangers are present, they may remain completely bareheaded.<br><br>A handbreadth (<i>tefach</i>) is eight centimeters squared, the equivalent of 8 × 8 cm, following the custom in Jerusalem and the rulings of the <i>gaon</i> R. Naeh and so, too, ruled my grandfather and teacher, <i>z\"l</i>. According to <i>Chazon Ish</i> and Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe</i> it is over nine and one-half centimeters squared. A handbreadth is measured as a square or its equivalent of whatever shape, such as one-half handbreadth high and two wide, as Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe</i> wrote and contrary to Resp. <i>Mekadshei haShem</i>, no. 97. The area should be measured regardless of how thick the hair is; however, if the hair is tied in a ponytail, I think one should measure the circumference in order to determine the <i>tefach</i>, and not the diameter.",
                    "In photographs taken a few generations ago, daughters and wives of prominent rabbis are seen wearing hats that left more than a handbreadth of hair exposed. If a hat covers most of the head there is no violation of Torah law, as I explained above, and regarding <i>ervah</i>, since in their day most women went bareheaded, hair was no longer in the category of normally covered parts of the body and the stricture of \"a [uncovered] handbreadth in a woman is <i>ervah</i>\" did not apply. No custom can abrogate a Torah prohibition. Even according to Rambam's opinion that haircovering for married women is only a rabbinical decree, custom cannot abrogate it. But among women who wore hats only the <i>ervah</i> aspect remained, and in this regard women's custom was enough to turn hair into a normally uncovered part of the body. However, I know of no way to justifiy those who went completely bareheaded.",
                    "If a married woman appears in public with loose hair reaching down to her shoulders, even if her head is covered she is violating Jewish practice (<i>dat Yehudit</i>) according to the Gemara. The Torah states \" [He] shall uncover (<i>ufara</i>) the woman's head.\" This involves both removing her headcovering and undoing her plaits or tresses so that her hair falls loosely, as in <i>Sotah</i> 7a, \"[he] undoes her hair.\" Rashi explained, \"from its plait.\" This is the plait (<i>tzamah</i>) mentioned above and in innumerable places; women had long hair, and in order to fit it under their hats and keep it there, they had to plait it.<br><br>The commentators disagree about whether loose strands of hair need to be covered, but letting unplaited hair hang down to the shoulders was certainly prohibited. The Mishnah in <i>Ketuvot</i> 15b states, \"A virgin [bride] goes out in a <i>hinuma</i>, with her head uncovered\" (<i>roshah paru'a</i>), and Rashi explained, \"with her hair [falling] on her shoulders.\" <i>Roshah paru'a</i> is the same term that is used in <i>Ketuvot</i> 72b concerning a married woman who goes about bareheaded. In 17b the Gemara asks \"what is a <i>hinuma</i>?\" R. Yohanan answered \"<i>karita dimenamnema kalata</i>,\" and Rashi explained, \"a kerchief on her head extended over her eye, as is the practice in our location.\" Even though her head was covered with a kerchief, if her hair hung down to her shoulders she was considered <i>roshah paru'a</i>, and in a married woman this would be a violation of <i>dat Yehudit</i>.",
                    "Regarding the type of head covering required, the Gemara in <i>Ketuvot</i> 72 asked, following the Mishnah's reference to <i>roshah paru'a</i> as violating only Jewish practice (<i>dat Yehudit</i>), \"Is not <i>roshah paru'a</i> a violation of Torah law?\" It answered that from the Torah's standpoint a <i>kaltah</i> is a sufficient haircovering; however, Jewish practice forbids going in public in even a <i>kaltah. Kaltah</i> means \"basket,\" as in <i>Bikurim</i> 3:8 and <i>Ketuvot</i> 82b, \"baskets (<i>kalatot</i>) of gold and silver.\" A basket is usually woven of straw or other materials, is round, and is used as a receptacle to hold things. On this basis we can understand the different explanations of <i>kaltah</i> found in the <i>rishonim</i>.<br><br>Rivan, whose commentary referred to in <i>Shitah Mekubetzet</i> 72a as \"Rashi, first edition,\" wrote that a <i>kaltah</i> is \"a basket, in which she puts her spindle…. it is impossible that her hairs will not be seen [in the spaces] between the mesh.\" <i>Terumat haDeshen</i> in <i>chelek haTeshuvot</i> 10 similarly explained, \"a basket [that] does not at all resemble the covering of a garment, since it is perforated in a number of places.\" They saw the deficiency of the <i>kaltah</i> as being in the <b>quality</b> of the haircovering, in that its mesh construction was insufficiently opaque.",
                    "<i>Shitah Mekubetzet</i> brought a second explanation, a <i>kaltah</i> is \"a cap (<i>kipah</i>) she puts on her head to cover her hair.\" <i>Aruch</i>, too, wrote, \"a cap on her head is sufficient from the standpoint of Torah law.\" According to this, a <i>kaltah</i> is a cap, and its similarity to a basket lay in being round. See <i>Shabbat</i> 56b, where the Gemara mentions \"a woolen cap\" and Rashi explains it as \"a hat [which women wear] under their <i>sevachah</i> (hair-net),\" and see also in <i>Gittin</i> 20b. Elsewhere, <i>Aruch</i> explained that a cap is \"a piece of clothing that a woman puts on her head to absorb the grime.\" In none of this is there any mention of a <i>kaltah</i> being a web or mesh, and in fact <i>Aruch</i> explicitly differentiates between a <i>kaltah</i> and a <i>sevachah</i>.<br><br>A cap is a small hat, as Rashi explained in <i>Chulin</i> 138a regarding the High Priest's woolen cap. According to this, the difference between an inadequate <i>kaltah</i> and a proper head-covering lay in the <b>quantity</b> of hair that was covered; the cap covered only most of a woman's hair which was sufficient from the standpoint of Torah law, but Jewish practice forbade going out in public without covering all of it. R. Yehonatan of Lunel wrote explicitly: \"Even if she puts a cap on her head, some of her hair is outside it [protruding] from underneath the cap, and this is [forbidden because of] <i>dat Yehudit</i>.\" This is as opposed to the view of Rivan and <i>Terumat haDeshen</i> that the deficiency of <i>kaltah</i> lay only in its having perforations. Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe</i> and many <i>achronim</i> apparently took <i>Terumat haDeshen</i>'s view for granted, and overlooked the fact that according to another opinion <i>dat Yehudit</i> requires that all of the hair be covered.",
                    "A third approach is found in Rashi, who explained, \"<i>kaltah</i> is a basket which has a receptacle underneath to fit the head, and a receptacle above to hold flax and a spindle,\" like two bowls joined together base-to-base. According to this, the <i>kaltah</i> was not a hat resembling a basket, but an actual basket women carried on their heads when they went to market. Similarly, Meiri wrote in the name of \"there are those who explain\" that <i>kaltah</i> is \"a piece of clothing that a woman puts on her head when she wants to carry a burden on her head,\" that is, a cushion or pad placed on top of her head, on which she balances the burden.<br><br>According to Rashi and the opinion in Meiri, the deficiency of a <i>kaltah</i> lay in its <b>identity</b>. It was a headcovering made for functional reasons, for carrying something in it or on it; therefore, its use did not indicate that the woman was married, since girls and women of any age and status used it when going to market. For a woman to regularly go to market wearing only a utilitarian <i>kaltah</i> would be immodest, because people might think she was still single and accost her. See <i>Sanhedrin</i> 58b, \"From what point is a Gentile woman released from being married to a Gentile? When he uncovers her head in the marketplace,\" and Rashi explains, \"even non-Jewish married women did not go out bareheaded,\" i. e., covering the head was a sign of marriage.",
                    "What is Rambam's position? He wrote in <i>Hilchot Ishut</i> 24:12 that a woman violates Jewish practice \"[if] she goes out to market … and her head is uncovered without a shawl (<i>redid</i>) on it like other women, even though her hair is covered by a kerchief.\" <i>Bach</i> in <i>Even haEzer</i> 115 explained, \"the kerchief has perforations in it like the cracks in a basket, like the hair-nets\" (<i>sevachot</i>). He ascribed to Rambam the opinion of Rivan and <i>Terumat haDeshen</i>, but in my opinion there is not the slightest hint of this in Rambam. As for <i>Bach</i>'s equating the views of Rambam and <i>Aruch</i>, this can apply only to the fact that both require an additional headcovering on top of the <i>kaltah</i>. It does not mean that <i>Aruch</i> maintains that a <i>kaltah</i> is the same as a <i>sevachah</i>, for <i>Aruch</i> wrote that the <i>kaltah</i> is a cap underneath the <i>sevachah</i>.<br><br>Elsewhere <i>Aruch</i> stated that a cap is \"a piece of clothing that a woman puts on her head to absorb the grime, and on top of it is the <i>sevachah</i>,\" and explained <i>sevachah</i> as \"the shawl that women put on when they go out to market.\" This suggests yet a fourth reason a <i>kaltah w</i>as unacceptable as a head covering in public: <b>propriety</b>. Its deficiency was not in what it covered but in the fact that it was like an undergarment. This is the meaning of the <i>Aruch</i>'s statement that to go out only in a cap is a violation of Jewish practice \"until she puts something else (<i>davar acher</i>) on her head.\" He did not require that the \"something else\" cover more than the cap did, and in fact the cap may have covered the head more or better than the <i>sevachah</i> which was over it and resembled a net; see <i>Shabbat</i> 57. Nevertheless, it was not modest to go out only in such a cap, as it is by nature a private garment, just as it is not proper for a woman to go outside dressed in only a housecoat even if she is completely covered. I have seen many women err in this.",
                    "Rambam wrote in <i>Hilchot Ishut</i> 13:11:<br><br>In a place where a woman would normally not go out to market with only a cap (<i>kofach</i>) on her head unless she [also] wore a shawl (<i>redid</i>) that covers most of her body like a <i>talit</i>, her husband gives her a shawl.<br><br>It would seem that the three terms are interchangeable: <i>kaltah</i> in the Gemara, cap in <i>Hilchot Ishut</i> chapter 13 and kerchief in chapter 24. However, in <i>Hilchot Sotah</i> 3:5 Rambam wrote, \"She stands among them without a shawl and without a kerchief, but only in her clothes and with a cap on her head.\" A cap is one thing, then, and a kerchief is another. There are indeed those who concluded that according to Rambam a married woman needs <i>three</i> head-coverings: a cap, a kerchief and a shawl. But it is more probable that Rambam means that in her own home she need wear only a cap, while outside she needs a kerchief as well, except where it is customary for her to go out in public with a shawl rather than just a kerchief. This is the meaning of <i>Tur</i> in <i>Even haEzer</i> 115:<br><br>If she goes out with a <i>kaltah</i> on her head, since she is not covered by a kerchief, she can be divorced. Rambam wrote, \"Even though she is covered by a kerchief, since she is not wearing a shawl over it like all the [other] women, she can be divorced without [being paid her] <i>ketuvah</i>.\"",
                    "Pay close attention to Rambam's wording. He wrote in <i>Hilchot Ishut</i> 24:12 \"even though her hair is covered by a kerchief,\" i. e., even though her hair was completely covered she still needs a shawl, while from his language in 13:11, \"In a place where a woman would normally not go out to market with only a cap on her head,\" it appears that there are other places where women do go out wearing only a cap. Also, what relevance to hair covering is \"a shawl that covers most of her body like a <i>talit</i>\"? This apparently refers to the outer garment or <i>chador</i> that women in some Islamic countries wear today. In some places they cover their faces, and even Jewish women did so, as in the Mishnah in <i>Shabbat</i> 65a.<br><br>I think the explanation in Rambam follows what I explained in <i>Hilchot Sotah</i>: that a woman wears a cap in her home when strangers are present. The cap, that is, the <i>kaltah</i>, was not inadequate in how much hair it covered or how it covered it, but since women did not go out of the house wearing only a <i>kaltah</i>, to do so became a violation of Jewish practice, as I explained in reference to <i>Aruch's</i> opinion. ",
                    "According to this, if a kerchief or a shawl covers the head adequately a woman may go out wearing it alone without a cap underneath it, as nowadays women shampoo frequently and do not use a cap to absorb grime. Another function of the cap was to hold the plaits in so that they would not dangle outside the hat, and this is not needed today because most women do not have long tresses or plaits. When Rambam and <i>Aruch</i> wrote that it is forbidden to wear a <i>kaltah</i> or cap in public and that a kerchief or shawl is needed, they meant that the first is not enough without the second, but not that the second is insufficient without the first.",
                    "Jewish practice (<i>dat Yehudit</i>) depends on the time and place. We have seen this in Rambam, who in <i>Hilchot Ishut</i> 13:11, wrote that in some locations women went out wearing only a cap, even though in other places doing so violated <i>dat Yehudit</i> as he wrote in 24:12, and see <i>Prishah</i> in <i>Even haEzer</i> 115:10. It is clear from many <i>rishonim</i> that the category of <i>dat Yehudit</i> depends on custom. Rashi wrote that it is \"what daughters of Israel were accustomed to do, even though it is not written.\" <i>Tosafot Rid</i> explained that \"no prohibition is involved, only the women do so out of modesty,\" using the present tense. <i>Semag</i> wrote in <i>Mitzvot Aseh</i> 48 in the laws of divorce and was cited in <i>Shiltei haGiborim</i>, that <i>dat Yehudit</i> obtains \"if ever she has no kerchief like the rest of the women [have].\"<br><br>Accordingly, the details of <i>dat Yehudit</i> recorded in Rambam and <i>Shulchan Aruch</i> mirror the customs of their times. This has both a stringent and a lenient side to it. The stringency is that if, in a particular place or time, women cover all of their hair even outside their <i>tzamah</i>, this becomes mandatory Jewish practice, and see Resp. <i>Chatam Sofer</i> cited above. In such a case a woman could be divorced for regularly exposing even strands of hair, as her husband need not acquiesce in her being less modest than the rest of the women in his community.<br><br>The leniency is that if at a particular time and place women expose more than a handbreadth of hair, or even hair down to their shoulders, this too becomes legitimate Jewish practice. According to <i>Aruch haShulchan</i>, custom even obviates \"hair in a woman is <i>ervah</i>\" which is stated in <i>Berachot</i> without qualification, and certainly <i>dat Yehudit</i> which is grounded in custom. <i>Be'er Heiteiv</i> wrote in <i>Even haEzer</i> 115:10:<br><br>The principle is that if her hair is covered with a <i>kaltah</i> or something else but is not covered in conformance with women's custom, this is <i>dat Yehudit</i>.\"<br><br>Ergo, where the custom is to cover the hair with only a <i>kaltah</i>, there is no violation, as we noted in Rambam. This principle determines the ongoing Halachah, and see Resp. <i>Mahari Shteif</i> no. 56 (3), as opposed the opinion of Resp. <i>Vayashav Yosef, Yoreh De'ah</i> no. 2, and <i>Mekadshei haShem</i> no. 85 in <i>Devar Tzvi</i> (1) that what was prohibited in the Gemara as <i>dat Yehudit</i> cannot subsequently be permitted.",
                    "However, this line of reasoning can only serve to justify women who already uncover more than a handbreadth of their hair, but not to permit them to initiate such a practice <i>lechat'chilah</i>. It is not God-fearing to seek out leniencies when there is no pressing need for them, and a modest woman should behave like other modest women. Certainly in Jerusalem it is not proper to uncover more than a hand-breadth.<br><br>It is also clear that only the practices of otherwise modest and observant women determine what is <i>dat Yehudit</i>. In this respect <i>dat Yehudit</i> is more stringent than \"hair in a woman is <i>ervah</i>,\" for regarding the latter, if most Jewish women including the nonobservant uncover their hair, then in the final analysis there is no <i>hirhur</i>. But in all cases a married woman must cover most of her head in public so as not to violate Torah law, which no custom can abrogate."
                ],
                [
                    "<big><strong>More on Women's Hair Covering</strong></big>",
                    "",
                    "",
                    "Recently some have tried to defend married women who go hatless in public, by noting that Rosh and <i>Tur</i> do not list going bareheaded under the category of <i>dat Moshe</i> (Mosaic practice) but only under <i>dat Yehudit</i>. Since <i>dat Yehudit</i> is merely a custom that Jewish women adopted on their own, as Rashi explained, and since nowadays most women do not cover their hair, there is no longer any <i>dat Yehudit</i> not to go bareheaded.",
                    "Now, even if Rosh and <i>Tur</i> really were of this opinion we would still forbid women to go bareheaded, since the view of R. Yerucham in <i>Sefer haMeisharim</i> 32:8, Rashbatz in <i>Zohar haRaki'a, aseh</i> 137 and Riaz in <i>Shaltei haGiborim</i> in <i>Ketuvot</i> 72 is that going bareheaded is an actual Torah prohibition. Such is also Rivan's opinion as cited in <i>Shitah Mekubetzet</i> under the name of \"Rashi, first edition.\" The issue would therefore be in the category of a disputed Torah law, where stringency is mandatory.<br><br>In addition, Rambam, <i>Magid Mishneh, Semag, Sefer Etz Chayim, Orchot Chayim</i>, Meiri and other <i>rishonim</i> do list going bareheaded in public under the category of <i>dat Moshe</i>. The <i>beraita</i> in <i>Ketuvot</i> 72a derives from the Torah \"a warning to the women of Israel not to go out bareheaded.\" And even according to the view that women's headcovering is a rabbinical enactment and that the verse is only a peg, such an enactment remains in force unless formally abrogated.",
                    "However, neither Rosh nor <i>Tur</i> ever held such a position in the first place. Rosh wrote in <i>Ketuvot</i>:<br><br>The [law] that [a woman who] violates <i>dat Moshe</i> and <i>Yehudit</i> forfeits her <i>ketuvah</i> refers to something in which she leads him [her husband] astray as in the cases in the Mishnah and whatever else resembles them, such as if she feeds him forbidden animal fats or blood. But in the case of other transgressions such as if she herself ate something forbidden, she has not forfeited her <i>ketuvah</i>. [If she violates] <i>dat Yehudit</i>, she forfeits [her <i>ketuvah</i>] because of brazenness and suspicion of sexual license.<br><br>According to Rosh, a woman who goes bareheaded in the marketplace has indeed violated only <i>dat Yehudit</i>. But one cannot then argue that the prohibition of going bareheaded applies only in a time and place where brazenness is involved but not today, and cite Rashi as proof that <i>dat Yehudit</i> is a matter of custom. ",
                    "Rosh and <i>Tur</i> do not cite Rashi and nowhere do they define <i>dat Yehudit</i> as a matter of custom.",
                    "To understand Rosh's opinion, see in the Mishnah:<br><br>The following [women] can be divorced without receiving their <i>ketuvah</i>: one who violates <i>dat Moshe or Yehudit</i>. What is <i>dat Moshe</i>? [If] she feeds him [food] that is not tithed, or has relations with him when she is <i>nidah</i>…. What is <i>dat Yehudit</i>? [If] she goes out with her head uncovered, or knits in the market place and talks with everybody.<br><br>The Gemara asks:<br><br>Isn't \"with her head uncovered\" a Torah prohibition? as it is written, \"He shall uncover the head of the woman,\" and the school of R. Yishmael taught that [this is] a warning to the women of Israel not to go about with their heads uncovered. R. Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel that according to Torah law [wearing] a <i>kaltah</i> is enough, but <i>dat Yehudit</i> prohibits even that.<br><br>Rashi explained that R. Yehuda distinguished between going bareheaded which violates <i>dat Moshe</i>, and wearing an inadequate head-covering called a <i>kaltah</i> which violates only <i>dat Yehudit</i>. But if so, why does the Mishnah mention going bareheaded only in connection with <i>dat Yehudit</i>? It should also spell out that going completely bareheaded in public violates <i>dat Moshe!</i><br><br>Because of this difficulty, Rosh explained that the difference between <i>dat Moshe</i> and <i>dat Yehudit</i> lies not in the source of the prohibition, whether from the Torah or not, but that in <i>dat Moshe</i> the woman actively causes her husband to sin such as in the examples given in the Mishnah, \"she feeds him [food] which is not tithed\" and so on [and for that reason he is required by the Torah to divorce her]. By contrast, in <i>dat Yehudit</i>, there is only a presumption that because of her immodesty she may be a stumbling block to him later on. For this reason going bareheaded in public violates <i>dat Yehudit</i>, even though the prohibition is itself from the Torah.<br><br>This is precisely the Gemara's question: \"Is not 'with her head uncovered' a Torah prohibition?\" Since going bareheaded is a Torah prohibition, why call it <i>dat Yehudit</i>? The Gemara answers that the term <i>dat Yehudit</i> is appropriate because going bareheaded includes non-Torah violations such as wearing a <i>kaltah</i> in the marketplace. <i>Dat Yehudit</i> can refer to both Biblical and rabbinical prohibitions, but <i>dat Moshe</i> cannot. This is also the approach of <i>Semak</i> in <i>mitzvah</i> 184. But certainly, the notion that going completely bareheaded in public is forbidden only by custom never occurred to anybody.",
                    "This analysis by Rosh resolves a difficulty in the Gemara in <i>Ketuvot</i>:<br><br>R. Asi said in the name of R. Yochanan, \"[wearing] a <i>kaltah</i> does not involve <i>pri'at rosh</i>.\" R. Zeira raised the question, where [does R. Asi's statement apply]? If in the marketplace, [wearing only a <i>kaltah</i>] is [a violation of] <i>dat Yehudit</i>. And if in a [private] courtyard, not one daughter of Abraham will be left living with her husband!<br><br>R. Asi's statement that wearing a <i>kaltah</i> does not involve <i>pri'at rosh</i> implies that not wearing one <i>does</i> involve <i>pri'at rosh</i>. Ran explained R. Zeira's question as being that if a woman must wear a <i>kaltah</i> even in a private courtyard to avoid being considered <i>pru'at rosh</i>, then all women are liable to be divorced because none of them do so. Yet Ran also cited Rashi's explanation that <i>dat Yehudit</i> is \"a custom that daughters of Israel practiced.\" If women did not cover their hair in their courtyards, then by definition it was not \"a custom that daughters of Israel practiced,\" and what was R. Zeira's problem?<br><br>However, <i>Semak</i>, Rosh and <i>Tur</i> never wrote that <i>dat Yehudit</i> is only a matter of custom. Their interpretation would be that <i>dat Yehudit</i> was a rabbinical decree like any other, and the difficulty is resolved."
                ],
                [
                    "<big><strong>Uncovered Hair of the Bride at the Wedding Feast</strong></big>",
                    "",
                    "",
                    "Someone expressed astonishment that the custom in America at the time of the <i>gaonim</i> my grandfather <i>z\"l</i> and R. Feinstein <i>z\"l</i> and continuing today was that the bride need not cover her hair during the wedding feast, and they did not protest it. ",
                    "But such is the sense of all the <i>poskim</i> who did not instruct the bride to cover her hair in advance of the <i>chupah</i>, when she would become a married woman.<br><br>It can be countered that the canopy we call <i>chupah</i> is not what effects the marriage. Rambam wrote that <i>chupah</i> is the sequestering together of the bride and groom. There is thus no problem according to the Sephardic custom that <i>yichud</i> takes place only after the wedding feast, for until then she is not considered married and does not have to cover her hair. But according to our Ashkenazic custom that <i>yichud</i> takes place before the meal, if there was an obligation to cover her hair from that point on, the commentators should have noted it. There is no problem only according to Ran's definition of <i>chupah</i> as the bride entering the home of her husband, which takes place after the meal.",
                    "However, the custom can be explained even according to the popular view that the <i>chupah</i> is the marriage canopy. In <i>Ketuvot</i> 72a the Sages derived a Torah obligation for a married woman to cover her head from the verse \"He shall uncover the woman's head\" regarding a <i>sotah</i>, which implies that up to that point her hair was covered. Obviously, it is impossible to adduce a Torah requirement from <i>sotah</i> except for women who are themselves liable to the laws of <i>sotah</i>. In <i>Sotah</i> 24b the Sages expounded <i>Bamidbar</i> 5:20, \" 'and a man other than your husband lay with you'— this teaches that [only a woman] whose husband lay with her first [can become a <i>sotah</i>].\" Therefore, a bride cannot become a <i>sotah</i> before the consummation of her marriage, and until then she is not obligated by Torah law to cover her hair. This has nothing to do with <i>yichud</i> before the wedding feast, and it therefore became customary for the bride not to cover her hair until the next morning. [However, the bride should cover her head the next morning morning whether or not the marriage has been consummated, for reasons of privacy and modesty.]",
                    "Subsequently I saw this proof from <i>Sotah</i> in <i>Otzar haPoskim</i>, vol. 9, page 33a (65) in the name of Resp. <i>Yad Eliyahu</i>, who wrote that since a betrothed woman cannot become a <i>sotah</i> she need not cover her hair. But why stop there? Many women cannot become a <i>sotah</i> according to Halachah: the wife of a crippled, blind, deaf or dumb husband or a woman who is herself crippled, blind, deaf or dumb, and a barren woman or an elderly woman whose husband has no children. Are they all exempt from the Torah obligation to cover their hair?<br><br>Conceivably, yes. This explains why the Mishnah in <i>Ketuvot</i> 72a lists the prohibition of going bareheaded only under the rabbinical category of <i>dat Yehudit</i> and not also under <i>dat Moshe</i>. Since the latter is derived from \"He shall uncover the woman's head\" and applies only to women who are liable to the laws of <i>sotah</i>, the Mishnah preferred not to list a prohibition that was not clear-cut, as opposed to <i>dat Yehudit</i> which applies to all married women. Rambam, who did list going bareheaded under <i>dat Moshe</i>, did so in accordance with his opinion that women's haircovering is a wholly rabbinical enactment and the verse is only a peg; in their enactment, the Sages obligated all married women.",
                    "Moreover, everyone agrees that only going bareheaded outdoors and in public violates the Torah prohibition. This is learned from the nature of the courtyard of the Sanctuary where the <i>sotah</i>'s head was uncovered: the courtyard was open and had the status of a public domain frequented by great numbers of people, and see Resp. <i>Beit Yitzchak, Orach Chayim</i> no. 14 (2). In countries where the <i>chupah</i> is held indoors and the bride does not go outside, if the wedding feast is held in the same or an adjacent hall she has as yet incurred no Torah obligation to cover her hair.",
                    "Also, see Rosh in <i>Ketuvot</i> 2:3 concerning the Mishnah \"[the bride] goes out veiled, with her head uncovered,\" where he seems to be saying that with a daytime <i>chupah</i> her hair remains uncovered until night-time. The above is also implied in Resp. <i>Chatam Sofer, Yoreh De'ah</i> no. 195:<br><br>Women's custom is not to cut their hair until after the actual consummation of the marriage; [the bride] takes care to come to the groom with long hair. Perhaps they derived this from \"[the bride] goes out veiled, with her head uncovered.\"<br><br>He equates cutting a bride's hair with covering her hair, and she need not do either until after consummation.<br><br>Also see Resp. <i>Shevut Ya'akov</i>, part 1, no. 10, who wrote that unmarried girls may not go bareheaded in public unless their hair is braided. He then posed a problem: if so, how could the Mishnah declare that the bride goes out veiled but with her head uncovered (<i>paru'a</i>), which means not just an uncovered head but also loose and unbraided hair? He answered that during the wedding procession when the bride is surrounded by friends and relatives there is no cause for concern, and \"a bride is not so wretched as to whore on her wedding day.\" That is to say, since <i>dat Yehudit</i> is forbidden because of brazenness and the suspicion of sexual license, as Rosh explained, and these concerns are not operative on her wedding day, she was permitted to temporarily unbraid her hair. The same would apply to leaving her hair uncovered until the following morning.",
                    "Do not cast aspersions on those spiritual giants who did not protest the current practice. Leave Israel alone, if they are not themselves prophets, they are the descendants of prophets."
                ],
                [],
                [],
                [],
                [
                    "<big><strong>Women and <i>Sheva Berachot</i></strong></big>",
                    "",
                    "",
                    "A woman wrote that she is pained because there is no place at her wedding for female relatives and other women who are dear to her to participate in the marriage ceremony. She asked a number of rabbis whether women can be among those reciting the <i>sheva berachot</i> under the <i>chupah</i>, and they all answered that they did not know the reason but that doing so is not accepted. It upsets her that Halachah is decided on the basis of \"social criteria, and apprehension lest one be labeled a Feminist or a Conservative,\" and that there is no room for ordinary people to express their belief in <i>haShem</i> by taking part in religious ceremonies within the Halachic framework.",
                    "I wrote to her, first, that women can certainly read the <i>ketuvah</i> under the <i>chupah</i>, for it is simply a contract and not a consecration or blessing. This is in accordance with our custom and the sense of Rema in <i>Even haEzer</i> 82:10 that anyone can read the <i>ketuvah</i>, and not just the rabbi who conducts the ceremony. In places where women never speak publicly it would be immodest for a woman to read the <i>ketuvah</i> in public, but she can certainly do so in communities where women and men alike lecture and report on communal affairs and other matters. [A woman may also deliver a <i>d'var Torah</i> under the <i>chupah</i>.]<br><br>Second, she can be the master of ceremonies and announce who is the officiating rabbi, who the witnesses are and who will recite the various <i>sheva berachot</i>. However, those involved should be told of all this in advance..",
                    "Regarding reciting <i>sheva berachot</i> under the <i>chupah</i> before the entire assemblage, however, I think women should not do so even though a basis for it can be found in Halachah. Resp. <i>Chavot Ya'ir</i>, no. 222, wrote regarding a daughter saying <i>Kaddish</i> that even though it is technically permissible, one must be concerned with the possibility that through this Israel's customs, which are also Torah, will be weakened. Everyone will construct his own private altar following his own reasoning, and the words of the Sages will seem a joke and [people] will disregard [them].<br><br>My grandfather <i>ztz\"l</i> permitted women in the <i>ezrat nashim</i> to say <i>Kaddish</i> together with the men who say Kaddish, because circumstances had changed in a way that even Resp. <i>Chavot Ya'ir</i> would agree with, as I wrote in <i>Bnei Banim</i>, vol. 2, no. 7. However, <i>Chavot Ya'ir</i>'s warning is still relevant today regarding women and public <i>sheva berachot</i>. Preventing communal ferment is also Halachah. However, when women dine with the bride and groom they certainly can recite the <i>asher bara</i> blessing, as I will explain.",
                    "The discussion focuses on Rambam's <i>Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Berachot</i> 2:9–10:<br><br><i>Birkat chatanim</i> is said in the newlyweds' hall after these four blessings [<i>birkat hamazon</i>], at every meal. This blessing [<i>asher bara</i>] is recited neither by slaves nor by children. Added in the newlyweds' hall, this blessing is the last of the seven blessings of marriage. When [is <i>asher bara</i> alone recited]? If those at the meal were at the wedding during the marriage blessings and heard the blessings. But if there are others at the meal who did not hear the marriage blessings at the wedding, on their account [all] seven blessings are recited after <i>birkat hamazon</i> just like at the wedding, on condition that ten [men] are present.<br><br>As opposed to this, Rambam wrote in <i>Hilchot Ishut</i> 10:5, \"<i>birkat chatanim</i> is said only if there are ten adult freemen [present], including the groom.\" The difference is marked: the term \"adult freemen\" in <i>Hilchot Ishut</i> excludes women, slaves and children, as it does also in <i>Hilchot Tefilah</i> 8:4 and 12:3; this is with regard to constituting the quorum of ten needed for the marriage blessings. But with regard to reciting the blessing <i>asher bara</i>, the wording \"neither by slaves nor by children\" in <i>Hilchot Berachot</i> clearly does not exclude women.",
                    "Perhaps because of this question, <i>Sefer Ohel Moed</i> wrote in <i>Sha'ar Berachot</i> 9:3, \"These blessings are recited neither for slaves nor for children (<i>lo la'avadim velo liketanim</i>).\" This explains for whom marriage blessings are recited but not who recites them. If this was Rambam's wording the problem is solved, for <i>Gittin</i> 23b states that the laws of marriage and divorce do not apply to Gentile slaves, and consequently <i>sheva berachot</i> are not said when a slave marries. Similarly, in <i>Hilchot Isurei Bi'ah</i> 21:24 Rambam wrote that it is forbidden to marry a woman to a child, and see <i>Otzar haPoskim</i> 34:1:2.<br><br>However, <i>Ohel Moed</i>'s wording is not found anyhere else. R. Manoach and <i>Sefer haBatim</i> both cite Rambam as writing \"this blessing is recited neither by slaves nor by children\" (<i>lo avadim velo ketanim</i>), and so do all the manuscripts and printed editions of Rambam's <i>Mishneh Torah</i>.",
                    "An article in a rabbinical journal contended that Rambam did not mean that a woman can recite <i>asher bara</i> on behalf of others, but only that she can recite it for herself in <i>birkat hamazon</i> in the same way she recites <i>retzeih</i> on <i>Shabbat</i> and <i>ya'aleh veyavo</i> on <i>Rosh Chodesh</i>. By contrast, slaves and children, who have no connection with marriage, cannot recite <i>asher bara</i> at all. But I think this is mistaken, for two reasons. First, why should children not recite <i>asher bara</i> as part of their education, just as we teach them to recite <i>retzeih</i> and <i>ya'aleh veyavo</i> in order to train them to do so when they mature? One cannot argue that <i>Shabbat</i> is different because children do observe <i>Shabbat</i>, as opposed to marriage which is irrelevant to them, for we are not dealing with marriage as such but with the <i>mitzvah</i> of rejoicing the bride and groom. This certainly is relevant to children, who dance at weddings like everyone else.",
                    "Second, Rambam requires a quorum of ten men even to recite <i>asher bara</i> by itself. Rambam's son, in Resp. <i>R. Avraham ben haRambam</i>, no. 65, wrote that this was his father's position, as R. Kapach noted, and Ri of Corbeil also understood Rambam in this way as cited by <i>Orchot Chayim</i> in <i>Hilchot Birkat haMazon</i> par. 58 and by <i>Kolbo</i> in chapter 25. This is as opposed to R. Manoah who wrote that for <i>asher bara</i> Rambam required only a <i>mezuman</i> of three.<br><br>Moreover, in <i>Hilchot Berachot</i> 5:3 Rambam wrote that when there is <i>zimun</i> the person who leads <i>zimun</i> also recites <i>birkat hamazon</i>, and the others listen and answer amen. <i>Kolbo</i>, too, wrote that according to Rambam those responding to <i>zimun</i> do not recite <i>birkat hamazon</i> by themselves. It follows that they do not recite <i>asher bara</i> separately either, but rather one of those present recites it and the others answer amen. Since no one recites it only for himself, \"this blessing is recited neither by slaves nor by children\" must mean that slaves and children cannot recite <i>asher bara</i> for others, as opposed to women who can.",
                    "How can a woman recite <i>asher bara</i>, since in Rambam's view ten men are needed, and she is not counted among the ten? I think the one is independent of the other. A woman gives thanks after childbirth, and the Sages instituted <i>birkat hagomel</i> for such purposes and required that ten men be present, yet everyone agrees that she recites the blessing even though she is not counted in the ten. [If not for <i>kevod tzibur</i> she could also read from the Torah, even though a <i>minyan</i> of men is required and women are not counted.] So, too, women have the <i>mitzvah</i> of rejoicing the bride and groom as men do, and the Sages instituted <i>birkat chatanim</i> for that purpose and required that ten men be present and not ten women, but a woman can still recite the blessing.",
                    "Moreover, the inference from Rambam is that women may recite all seven marriage blessings and not just <i>asher bara</i>. His statement in <i>Hilchot Berachot</i> 2:9, \"This blessing is recited neither by slaves nor by children\" which does not exclude women, applies as well to the <i>sheva berachot</i> mentioned immediately afterwards in 2:10, since Rambam made no other statement as to who may or may not recite them. [For the same reason, \"on condition that ten [men] are present\" in 2:10 also refers to 2:9].<br><br>A hint from Scripture that women and men alike can recite <i>birkat chatanim</i> can be brought from <i>Bereishit</i> 24:6, where Rivkah's mother and brother both blessed her after she agreed to marry Yitzchak. <i>Masechet Kalah</i> explained, \"Where [is there a source] in the Torah for <i>birkat chatanim</i>? As it is said, 'They blessed Rivkah.' \" This even clearer in <i>Pirkei d'R. Eliezer</i>, chapter 16, \"they stood and blessed Rivkah as a <i>chazan</i> stands and blesses the bride in her <i>chupah</i>\" and see <i>Tosafot</i> in <i>Ketuvot</i> 7b and at length in <i>Shitah Mekubetzet</i>. Although <i>Masechet Kalah</i> concludes that this is only a Scriptural peg and not an actual derivation, it certainly suggests that women have a role in blessing the marriage couple.",
                    "This is contrary to R. Kapach, who in his commentary assumed, without any proof, that only those who can constitute the ten can recite the blessings.<br><br>This is even clearer in <i>Shulchan Aruch. Even haEzer</i> 62 juxtaposes Rambam's statements in <i>Hilchot Ishut</i> and <i>Hilchot Berachot:</i> in paragraph 4, \"<i>birkat chatanim</i> is only said if there are ten adult freemen [present],\" and in paragraph 5, \"<i>birkat chatanim</i> is said at every meal in the newlyweds' house…. this blessing is recited neither by slaves nor by children.\" If only those freemen who can constitute the ten in paragraph 4 can recite the blessings, why repeat this in paragraph 5? Rather, in paragraph 4 women, slaves and children are excluded from forming the quorum of ten, while in paragraph 5 slaves and children are barred from reciting the blessings but women are not.",
                    "Concerning the \"new faces\" at each meal needed to recite all seven <i>berachot</i>, Ritva in <i>Ketuvot</i> 7b wrote in the name of <i>Tosafot</i>:<br><br>It is considered \"new faces\" (<i>panim chadashot</i>) only when an important person comes who was not there previously, for whom it is proper to increase the rejoicing. [However,] a woman is not relevant to this even if she is important, because new faces consist only of those who can be counted among the ten [needed] for <i>birkat chatanim</i>.<br><br><i>Chidushei Nimukei Yosef</i> also wrote that women and children are not considered \"new faces,\" contrary to <i>Chidushei Chatam Sofer</i> in <i>Ketuvot</i> there. However, although they wrote that only those who can constitute the quorum of ten can be <i>panim chadashot</i>, neither Ritva nor <i>Nimukei Yosef</i> claimed that only those who can be new faces can recite <i>birkat chatanim</i>. The distinction is apparent: new faces and a quorum are both factors in enabling <i>sheva berachot</i> to be recited, and it therefore makes sense to equate them and to say that only those who can be counted for the ten can be considered new faces, and vice versa. But the question of who may recite blessings is separate from the question of who constitutes a quorum for those blessings, as is shown by <i>birkat hagomel</i> and the reading of the Torah. The reverse is also true: according to Rambam in <i>Hilchot Berachot</i> 5:7 a child can be counted in a quorum of ten for <i>zimun</i> even through he may not lead it, and see <i>Beit Yosef</i> in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 55.",
                    "The clear sense of Rambam and <i>Shulchan Aruch</i>, then, is that women can recite any of the <i>sheva berachot</i>. However, \"just because we imagine something does not mean we act on it.\" Also, see <i>Shitah Mekubetzet</i> in <i>Ketuvot</i> 7b in the name of the <i>gaonim</i>, that Boaz gathered ten men for his marriage to Ruth because the marriage blessings are a <i>davar shebikedushah</i>, contrary to <i>Aruch haShulchan</i> in <i>Even haEzer</i> 62:11.<br><br>Nevertheless, during the week of rejoicing following the wedding, if there is a women's <i>zimun</i> and the bride or groom is present, the women may certainly recite <i>asher bara</i> themselves. This follows the ruling of <i>Shulchan Aruch</i> in <i>Even haEzer</i> 62:4 that a quorum of ten is not required for <i>asher bara</i>, as opposed to Rambam's view mentioned above. The question of who recites <i>asher bara</i> is thus independent of the question of who constitute a quorum of ten, and when women say <i>zimun</i> for themselves they can recite <i>asher bara</i>.",
                    "",
                    "The author of <i>Halichot Beitah</i> also reached this conclusion, as he wrote in a private correspondence:<br><br>If three women dined together with the bride and groom they can indeed recite this blessing [<i>asher bara</i>], because only regarding <i>zimun b'Shem</i>, which requires a <i>minyan</i> of ten men, is a woman not included. But regarding <i>zimun</i> with three, where women can form a quorum and are permitted to say <i>zimun</i> (and according to Gra, are required to), they are also permitted to recite <i>asher bara</i>. Still, it appears that [this applies] only if in fact they said <i>zimun</i> [by themselves] … but if they did not recite <i>zimun</i> [by themselves, but only the men said <i>zimun</i>] they [i.e., a woman] should not say this blessing either."
                ],
                [
                    "<big><strong>Unintentional <i>Tevilah</i> in the Ocean</strong></big>",
                    "",
                    "A scholarly woman questioned what I wrote (in chapter 10) that unmarried women today are suspected <i>zavot</i> because all have stained three days in a row at some point. She objected that this is true only according to Rambam's method of counting the days of <i>nidah</i> and <i>zavah</i>, but not according to the view of the great majority of <i>rishonim</i> that a woman is a <i>zavah</i> only if she stains in-between periods. According to the majority view, actual <i>zavot</i> are rare; most women are only <i>nidot</i> and do not have the Torah requirement of counting seven clean days, and it is therefore likely that a woman who immerses herself between periods without counting clean days will be ritually pure by Torah law. Even if she simply dives in the ocean she will become <i>tehorah</i>, for intention is unnecessary for <i>tevilah</i> as <i>Shulchan Aruch</i> ruled in <i>Yoreh De'ah</i> 198:48, and see paragraph 46 concerning loose-fitting clothes.",
                    "I replied that the Halachah in this regard has not been decided between Rambam and his opponents, because the difference between <i>nidot</i> and <i>zavot</i> today is only a theoretical question. In practice, women count seven clean days in accordance with R. Zeira's stringency if they see even a speck of blood. R. Zeira's stringency itself is more understandable according to Rambam, and see <i>Aruch haShulchan</i> at length in <i>Yoreh De'ah</i> 183, where he adduces many proofs from the Gemara in support of Rambam's position.<br><br>But even if women have the Torah status only of <i>nidot</i> and not of <i>zavot</i>, they cannot become ritually pure by <i>tevilah</i> in the ocean if they have not first checked themselves internally to determine that menstruation has stopped, The need for a <i>hefsek taharah</i> is implied in the Mishnah in <i>Nidah</i> 68a, \"A <i>nidah</i> who examined herself,\" from which it follows that if she did not examine herself she remains a <i>nidah</i>, as Rosh explained. Rashi in 99a wrote that a <i>hefsek taharah</i> is required, because \"since her fount [of menstrual blood] was known to have opened, she cannot be presumed to be pure until she checks and finds that [the flow] has stopped, as stated in the Mishnah.\" The sense of this is that a <i>hefsek taharah</i> is a Torah requirement, as <i>Sidrei Taharah</i> 196:15 wrote citing Resp. <i>Shav Ya'akov</i>, no. 36, that \"without question, by Torah law she needs a <i>hefsek taharah</i>.\"",
                    "A student-colleague of mine subsequently showed me Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe</i> in <i>Even haEzer</i>, part 4, no. 14, concerning a man who wished to marry a certain modest and God-fearing woman, but was concerned that since her parents were nonobservant, she was a \"daughter of a <i>nidah</i>\" (<i>bat hanidah</i>). He responded that one can be lenient if it is not known with certainty that she is indeed a <i>bat hanidah</i>:<br><br>For the immersion of a <i>nidah</i> [to be valid] does not require that she intend to become purified…. it is certainly common that during the days when the mother was between periods, which is known to Heaven, the mother bathed in the ocean and in lakes, etc. [and became ritually pure], and then had relations with her husband and became pregnant with this daughter.<br><br>Presumably the mother became pregnant during the warmer months, when people go swimming. In any case, there is no reason to suppose that she examined herself internally to make a <i>hefsek taharah</i>. This seems to contradict what I stated above. What removed the presumption of an \"open fount,\" and how did she become <i>tehorah</i>?",
                    "I replied that presumption (<i>chazakah</i>) determines the law but does not determine reality. For example, regarding a woman and a man who was commonly held to be her son: if they had sexual relations together they could be executed by a <i>beit din</i> for incest, since \"we execute based on presumptions,\" although it is possible that in reality he was <i>not</i> her son. Heaven knows the truth; the practical consequences of this distinction lie in matters of divine punishment, such as <i>karet</i>.<br><br>In the case discussed by Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe</i>, although according to Halachah the mother remained a <i>nidah</i> because she did not examine herself or perform a <i>hefsek taharah</i>, nevertheless, it may have been known to Heaven that the mother had in fact ceased staining and that her <i>nidah</i> days had passed before she went swimming and subsequently conceived.",
                    "",
                    "Similarly, according to Torah law as derived in <i>Bava Kama</i> 82b and codified in <i>Yoreh De'ah</i> 199:9, a woman must visually examine her body before immersion.. The reason is that she must ensure that no foreign matter (<i>chatzitzah</i>), which might invalidate the <i>tevilah</i>, remains on the skin. The mother in question presumably did not check her entire body before she went swimming; nevertheless, it may have been known to Heaven that in fact there was no <i>chatzitzah</i> on her. Since the question of <i>bat hanidah</i> is supra-natural with no Halachic implications, this possibility can be relied upon. Added to this was the consideration that the young woman in question did not exhibit the negative character traits traditionally ascribed to a <i>bat hanidah</i>",
                    "So much concerning a <i>ben</i> or <i>bat hanidah</i>. But youths who have relations based on the girl's having gone swimming or even having immersed herself in a <i>mikvah</i>—without her performing a <i>hefsek taharah</i>, counting seven clean days and examining herself for <i>chatzitzah</i>—probably incur <i>karet</i>, and their sin is far graver than that of the student described in <i>Shabbat</i> 13b who was killed by Heaven. It is important that this be known."
                ],
                [
                    "<big><strong>Differences in <i>Minhagim</i> Between Husband and Wife</strong></big>",
                    "",
                    "",
                    "On the question of whether a woman must adopt the customs of her husband, many <i>poskim</i> consider a married woman to be in the category of someone who has moved from one place to another with no intention of returning and therefore adopts the customs of his or her new location. This is cited in Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe, Orach Chayim</i>, part 1, no. 158, and <i>Yabi'a Omer</i>, vol. 5, <i>Orach Chayim</i>, no. 37. Resp. <i>Yabi'a Omer</i> quotes Resp. <i>Tashbatz</i>, part 3, no. 179:<br><br>Where communities that are divided in their regulations (<i>takanot</i>), which is the equivalent of their having separate <i>batei din</i> … and a man from one community marries a woman from another, without doubt this woman is included with her husband in all his obligations, for \"his wife is like his body\" (<i>ishto k'gufo</i>) in all matters, and she is released from [membership in] her father's community. This is obvious and there is no doubt about it, so that if the communities are split over a difference in regulations, there should not be two people sitting at the same table but divided by their dough, what is forbidden to one being permitted to the other.<br><br>We thus find three reasons why a wife should adopt the customs of her husband: because she is considered as having moved from one place to another, because \"his wife is like his body,\" and to avoid marital strife, \"being divided by their dough.\"",
                    "However, the author of Resp. <i>Yabi'a Omer</i>, R. Ovadiah Yosef, took a somewhat different position in the journal <i>Or Torah</i> in <i>Iyar</i> 5751:<br><br>Regarding customs which the husband must observe in keeping with his family's traditions, such as the Sephardim who have accepted the rulings of <i>Maran</i> [the <i>Beit Yosef</i>] and are not permitted to be lenient against his opinion even through a release [of vows], the Ashkenazic wife is to follow her husband and even adopt his leniencies; see what I wrote in <i>Yabi'a Omer</i> (vol. 5, <i>Orach Chayim</i>, no. 37).<br><br>But regarding <i>chumrot</i> the husband has adopted on his own and could cancel by securing a release [of his vows], there is no requirement for the woman to accept his customs. He cannot force a stringency on her that she does not want to accept, when she has a basis [in her own customs] to rely on. Therefore, if she wants to continue to use Tnuva milk she may do so. Her husband can be strict for himself if he wants to be, but he has no authority to force her to also be stringent and not bring Tnuva products into the house. Similarly, concerning fruits of the <i>Shemitah</i> year, if she relies on the <i>heter</i> of selling the land, since many world-renowned <i>gaonim</i> permitted it, she may continue to rely on it. She cannot be compelled to agree to use only products that have the kashrut seal of the <i>Badatz</i>.<br><br>If the husband cannot maintain his stringencies because his wife does not accept them, he should seek a release [of vows] for not having said \"without [accepting it as] a vow\" at the outset, and then be lenient himself, for marital peace is very great [in importance].<br><br>He distinguished between customs that reflect major communal differences, such as permitting <i>kitniyot</i> on Pesah or forbidding lung-adhesions in animals, in which case the wife follows the husband's lead, and individual practices she may maintain on her own. He did not, however, reconcile this with what he earlier quoted in Resp. <i>Yabi'a Omer</i> from Resp. <i>Tashbatz</i>. If the husband is unable to eat in her kitchen because he relies on a different <i>kashrut</i> standard, this would certainly seem to be what Resp. <i>Tashbatz</i> referred to as \"there should not be two people sitting at the same table but divided in their dough.\"",
                    "The argument that a wife is considered to haved moved from one place to another also requires examination, in my opinion. It appears contingent on the disagreement among the <i>rishonim</i> cited by Rosh in <i>Ketuvot</i> 110a and <i>Tur</i> in <i>Even haEzer</i> 75. According to R. Tam, \"the rights of the wife are greater than those of her husband,\" and we force him to leave his domicile and take up residence in hers, other things being equal. In such a case the husband would <i>ipso facto</i> have to adopt the customs of his wife's community. However, most <i>rishonim</i> disagreed with R. Tam and ruled that \"the rights of the husband are greater than those of the wife,\" and we force her to leave her domicile and take up residence in his.<br><br>Resp <i>Tashbatz</i> is being consistent, for in part 1, no. 97, he rejected R. Tam's ruling entirely. This, however, is no proof as far as we are concerned, for although Maharam Rottenberg and <i>Mordechai</i> also disagreed with R. Tam's interpretation of the Gemara, they took his position seriously. In practice we do not force a wife to follow her husband or a husband to follow his wife, as Rema ruled in <i>Even haEzer</i> 75:1. A woman, then, should not automatically be considered as having moved to her husband's location.<br><br>I do not understand what Resp. <i>Igrot Moshe</i> meant by \"from the Torah, a woman's place is to be with her husband.\" A woman's place is with her husband but by the same token a man's place is with his wife, as in the verse \"therefore a man leaves his father and mother\" (<i>Bereishit</i> 2:24). The Torah does not discuss where a couple should live. \"He will send her away from his house…. She shall leave his house\" (<i>Devarim</i> 24:1–2) with regard to divorce reflects usual circumstances (<i>diber hakatuv b'hoveh</i>) but is not a law [e.g., there is no law that he must have his own house in order to be able to divorce his wife], and so, too, for similar verses.<br><br>The Mishnah in <i>Ketuvot</i> 48a that states that a bride \"leaves her father's domain and enters her husband's domain\" refers to her entering the <i>chupah</i>, as Rashi explained, and not to the ownership or location of the building. Similarly, <i>Tosafot</i> in <i>Kiddushin</i> 30b explained that a woman is free of some of the requirements of honoring her father and mother \"because she is not on her own; she is unable to fulfill [the commandment of] honoring a father and mother, because she is not with her father but with her husband.\" This means that she often cannot go to her parents' home because \"a woman's honor is all [in staying] indoors\" and because she has obligations to her husband and her family, but does not say anything about where they should live.",
                    "Moreover, Resp. <i>Tashbatz</i> did not say that the wife is considered as having moved from one place to another, but only that she \"is released from [membership in] her father's community.\" He was asked about two communities with conflicting regulations living in one town. Presumably, they never intended in the first place for the regulations to accompany women from one community who married into the other. This is the sense of his repetition that \"the communities were split over a difference in regulations between them,\" i.e., only in such a case, as opposed to maintaining her father's customs which, unlike communal regulations, have the status of a personal vow. They should be no different than vows she made before she was married that her husband cannot cancel, as ruled in <i>Yoreh De'ah</i> 234:35. See Resp. <i>Chatam Sofer, Yoreh De'ah</i>, no. 107, whose opinion is that a custom has the Torah status of a vow.<br><br>Also, see <i>Yevamot</i> 37b about scholars who had wives in distant communities they frequently traveled to. Presumably, those women did not change their customs just because they had married. If a wife moves with her husband to a new community, they both must follow local practice, but if she stays in her own place, or even if she moves to where there are a number of different customs with no clear general practice, why should she abandon her own?",
                    "\"His wife is like his body\" (<i>ishto k'gufo</i>) also requires examination. The Gemara mentions <i>ishto k'gufo</i> primarily in the context of physical familiarity in <i>Berachot</i> 24a, family ties, bearing witness and, some say, appointing agents; see under <i>ishto k'gufo</i> in the <i>Talmudic Encyclopedia</i>. It is not mentioned in the context of personal obligations. Can a woman fulfill a personal vow made by her husband, or vice versa, or can the one obligate the other in a vow because of <i>ishto k'gufo</i>?<br><br>An exception appears to be on Chanukah, where the custom is for women to rely on their husbands to light candles for them. Resp. <i>Sha'ar Efraim</i>, no. 42, asked why this is different from hearing the Megillah and other matters where a husband cannot discharge the wife's obligation in her absence. Unfortunately, the end of the <i>teshuvah</i> is missing and we do not know his answer. <i>Eliyahu Rabah</i> in 671:3 explained \"because of <i>ishto k'gufo</i>,\" without, however, clarifying why this should apply to Chanukah, and similarly in <i>Mishnah Berurah</i>. Neither Ravan, <i>Mateh Moshe</i> nor Resp. <i>Maharshal</i> cited by <i>Eliyahu Rabah</i> mentions <i>ishto k'gufo</i>. Moreover, even if <i>ishto k'gufo</i> is applicable to husbands lighting Chanukah lights for their wives, the Halachah is that one light suffices for the entire household and it is only a custom that each family member lights his own. This would not prove anything about a Torah obligation or even a rabbinical enactment.",
                    "Still, the universal practice is that a married woman is released from the customs she grew up with and can adopt her husband's customs. [As noted by <i>Resp. Tashbatz</i>, this is analogous to the Torah law that an Israelite woman who married a <i>kohen</i> is permitted to eat <i>terumah</i>.] But nowadays a woman may also rely on R. Ovadiah Yosef's ruling in the article mentioned above. In matters that do not interfere with her relationship with her husband and do not constitute <i>inuy nefesh</i>, she may continue to observe her previous customs, since even after she married she could adopt them in the form of a vow that her husband would not be able to abrogate. However, it is best that the couple reach agreement on these matters prior to the marriage."
                ]
            ],
            "Essays": [],
            "Miscellanea": []
        },
        "Volume IV": {
            "Introduction": [],
            "": [
                [
                    "<big><strong><i>Shelo Asani Ishah</i></strong></big>",
                    "",
                    "",
                    "For many years I have recited the blessing \"<i>shelo asani ishah</i>, who did not make me a woman\" in an undertone, and I have taught my sons to do so. However, that pertains to saying <i>birchot hashachar</i> privately, while the question now is how the <i>shaliach tzibur</i> should act in the synagogue.",
                    "Let me begin by discussing the meaning of the blessing. In <i>Menachot</i> 43b:<br><br>Rabbi Meir said, \"A man must recite three blessings daily: 'who did not make me a Gentile,' 'who did not make me a woman' and 'who did not make me a boor (<i>bur</i>).' \" … R. Acha b. Yaakov heard his son reciting the blessing \"who did not make me a boor.\" He said to him, \"Is it indeed so (<i>kuli hai nami</i>)?\" He [the son] said to him, \"Then what blessing should I say? If it is 'who did not make me a slave,' [a slave] is the same as a woman (<i>hainu ishah</i>)!\" [His father replied,] \"a slave is much inferior (<i>eved zil t'fei</i>).\"",
                    "Rashi explained this in two different ways in the course of three entries:<br><br><i>Kuli hai nami</i>: The son was praising himself that he was not an ignoramus. An alternative explanation is that the blessings on [not being] a Gentile or a woman make sense because neither of them is obligated in <i>mitzvot</i> [the way a Jewish male is], but an ignoramus is as bound by the <i>mitzvot</i> [as any other male].<br><br><i>Hainu ishah</i>: A woman is a maidservant to her husband as a slave is to his master. An alternative explanation is that a woman and a slave are equal with regard to the <i>mitzvot</i>.<br><br><i>Zil t'fei</i>: Even so, the slave is more degraded than the woman. An alternative explanation is: go (<i>zil</i>) and add (<i>t'fei</i>) the blessing \"who did not make me a woman\" in order to complete [the three blessings].",
                    "The three initial explanations constitute one distinct interpretation and the alternative explanations another. According to the first, R. Acha b. Yaakov's son recited \"who did not make me a boor\" grateful that he was not an ignoramus. His father remarked that he should not be so puffed up about that, and in <i>Kiddushin</i> 29b we see that the son was, in fact, not much of a scholar. The son then asked whether in order to fulfill the requirement of three blessings he should instead recite the blessing \"who did not make me a slave,\" even though he had already recited \"who did not make me a woman\" and a slave and a woman are similar in that both are subordinate to others. His father responded that he should nevertheless recite \"who did not made me a slave\" separately, because a slave's status is much inferior to that of a woman. This also answers the question of why the two are not combined into one blessing, \"who did not make me a woman or a slave,\" and compare <i>Orchot Chayim, Hilchot Me'ah Berachot</i>, 6–7.<br><br>According to the second interpretation, the son recited \"who did not make me a boor (<i>bur</i>)\" thankful that he was not an uneducated, common person who did not observe the commandments properly. His father objected that scholars and boors alike are under equal obligation to observe all the commandments; as for his son observing them better than a <i>bur</i> does, that was no grounds for a blessing \"who did not make me,\" for God does not make anyone more observant or less observant, as in <i>Berachot</i> 33b, \"everything is in the hands of Heaven except for the fear of Heaven.\" This seems to me to be Rashi's intention. The son then asked what blessing should he substitute, since he had already recited \"who did not make me a woman\" and women and slaves are equally obligated in the <i>mitzvot</i>. His father replied that he should nevertheless recite \"who did not make me a slave\" separately, in order to complete the quota of blessings.",
                    "According to the first explanation, the three blessings acknowledge the free Jewish male's superior social status over the others. This makes \"who did not make me a Gentile\" seem anomalous, because since the destruction of the Second Temple most Jews have been subordinate to the Gentiles and not the reverse. Perhaps the blessing anticipates messianic times when Israel will be a banner to the nations and \"kings will be their attendants.\" According to the second explanation, on the other hand, the blessings thank God for having given men more <i>mitzvot</i> to observe than women or slaves and, all the more so, Gentiles.",
                    "Which of the two is correct? Tosefta <i>Berachot</i> 6:23 and the Jerusalem Talmud 9:1 mention only the second rationale: \"Blessed … who did not made me a woman, for a woman is not commanded by the <i>mitzvot</i>,\" i. e., she is not commanded to observe as many <i>mitzvot</i> as men are. [Rashi's <i>Siddur</i>, as well, mentions only this explanation.]",
                    "<i>Beit Yosef</i> in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 46 also cited only Rashi's second explanation: \"Rashi explained, '<i>hainu ishah</i>—because regarding the commandments a woman and a slave are the same.' \" When it came to R. Acha b. Yaakov's concluding response <i>zil t'fei</i>, however, <i>Beit Yosef</i> copied Rashi's first explanation, \"even so, the slave is more degraded,\" and not the alternative \"go and add the blessing.\" Why did <i>Beit Yosef</i> begin with Rashi's second explanation and then switch to the first?<br><br>The reason is that Rashi's text of the Gemara read \"<i>zil t'fei</i>\" without the word <i>eved</i> (\"slave\"). <i>Zil</i> is a verb, and <i>zil t'fei</i> is R. Acha b. Yaakov's command to his son, and the phrase means \"go (<i>zil</i>) add (<i>t'fei</i>) [the blessing].\" This reading is also found in <i>Halachot Gedolot, Tosafot, Siddur Rashi, Sefer haPardes</i> and <i>Machzor Vitry</i>. Our printed texts of the Gemara, however, read \"<i>eved zil t'fei</i>\": here <i>zil</i> is an adjective referring to the slave, and the phrase means \"a slave is much inferior.\" This was in the text of the Gemara that Rif, Rosh and <i>Beit Yosef</i> had, and for that reason <i>Beit Yosef</i> did not copy Rashi's alternative explanation of <i>zil t'fei</i>.",
                    "Rif, Rosh and <i>Beit Yosef</i>, in any case, agree that the blessing <i>shelo asani ishah</i> refers to differences in the number of <i>mitzvot</i> incumbent on the person, as stated in the Tosefta and the Jerusalem Talmud. ",
                    "Similarly, although <i>Tur</i> in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 46 apparently had the same text as we do, \"<i>eved zil t'fei</i>,\" he nevertheless explained the blessings on the basis of different obligations in the <i>mitzvot</i>:<br><br>\"Blessed … who did not make me a slave\"—although he recites the blessing \"who did not make me a woman\" who [like a slave] is not obligated to fulfill time-bound positive commandments, he also has to bless \"who did not make me a slave,\" because a slave is much inferior.",
                    "However, there seems to be a contradiction in <i>Tur</i>, who continues:<br><br>Women are accustomed to say the blessing \"who made me according to His will.\" It may be that they do so because they are like someone who upholds a [Heavenly] ruling against himself, [upholding] the bad.<br><br>This is also found in <i>Sefer Avudraham. Tur</i> is discussing the blessing adopted by women, \"<i>she'asani kirtzono</i>, who made me according to His will,\" and from his description of women's lot as bad—Heaven forbid that the Torah's exemption of women from time-bound positive commandments be labeled \"bad\"—it seems that he is referring to their subordination to men or to other social disabilities. If so, then the blessing recited by the man, \"who did not make me a woman,\" also refers to disabilities, and it emerges that <i>Tur</i> employs <i>both</i> of Rashi's explanations.",
                    "This is explicit in <i>Peirush haTefillot vehaBerachot</i> of R. Yehuda b. R. Yakar, part 2, in the entry \"<i>shelo asani ishah</i>.\" He first explains that women are not obligated by some of the <i>mitzvot</i> and cites additional reasons connected with observance. He then lists wholly social considerations: that male babies are hugged more than female ones, and that it is said \"woe to him whose children are all female,\" and so forth. At the end he reiterates that women are not commanded to observe some of the <i>mitzvot</i>, and cites the Jerusalem Talmud.",
                    "Everyone, then, agrees with Rashi's second explanation that \"<i>shelo asani ishah</i>\" refers to a man's greater obligation in <i>mitzvot</i>. A number of <i>rishonim</i> also cite social reasons in keeping with Rashi's first explanation, but they, too, accept the second explanation as primary. The sole exception is R. Manoach in <i>Hilchot Tefillah</i> 7:6 who cited a variant \"who did not make me a slave to others\" that clearly refers to dominance and subordination. He further wrote that the Sages \"decreed the recitation of these three blessings as a form of warning, so that a man will refrain from intermingling with them\" i. e., with women, slaves and Gentiles. I have not found this explanation anywhere else.",
                    "When a man recites \"who did not make me a woman,\" then, he must first of all intend to give thanks for having to observe more of the commandments, which is the primary meaning of the blessing. The problem is that while the Sages' entire joy lay in the worship of <i>haShem</i> and the fulfillment of His commandments, over the course of centuries men read other connotations into the blessing. Some were unaware that the blessing related to the observance of <i>mitzvot</i>, and even those who knew often made the primary meaning secondary, and vice versa.",
                    "We can now proceed to our question. In some communities women resent the blessing <i>shelo asani ishah</i>, and it has even become an obstacle that distances some of them from Judaism, God forbid. ",
                    "Various remedies have been suggested. Some want to eliminate the blessing entirely. But we cannot abrogate a blessing found in the Talmud except in a case of great need and \"a time to act for <i>haShem</i>,\" and this would require a broad consensus.",
                    "Others want to change the blessing from \"who did not make me a woman\" in the negative to \"who made me a man\" in the positive. I doubt that it is permitted to recite such a blessing with <i>Shem</i> and <i>malchut</i>, because it changes the format set by the Sages for these blessings. In this regard it is more problematic than the new blessing adopted by women, \"who made me according to His will,\" which at least does not displace any previous blessing. Nor can grounds for such a change be brought from the variant \"who made me an Israelite\" found in some old printed texts in place of \"who did not make me a Gentile,\" for that change was forced by censorship. However, there is nothing to prevent women from reciting \"who made me a woman\" or \"who did not make me a man\" without <i>Shem</i> and <i>malchut</i>.",
                    "That notwithstanding, I will address the possibility of changing the blessing <i>shelo asani ishah</i> itself, although only in theory.",
                    "The point of departure is that originally men recited the three blessings \"who did not make me a Gentile,\" \"who did not make me a boor\" and \"who did not make me a woman,\" as is clear from the <i>beraita</i>, Tosefta and Jerusalem Talmud. This is also implicit in R. Acha b. Yaakov's conversation with his son. There is nothing to suggest that he sought to emend the <i>beraita</i> retroactively and correct an erroneous wording to read \"slave\" instead of \"boor.\" Rather, on the strength of his own arguments, he changed what was accepted until then. How was he able to change a blessing that had been established by the <i>tanaim</i>?<br><br>The answer is that the <i>beraita</i> did not fix the wording of the blessings, but only their number and general nature. This is what Rashi meant when he explained, \"go and add the blessing 'who did not make me a woman,' in order to complete [the three blessings].\" Although there was an obligation to recite three blessings concerning one's personal status, their content could be changed.",
                    "Support for this can be brought from the custom of Ashkenazic women to recite \"<i>she'asani kirtzono</i>, who made me according to His will\" with <i>Shem</i> and <i>malchut</i>, which is a matter of controversy among the <i>poskim</i>. How could women introduce a blessing not found in the Talmud? Apparently, because we are less concerned with the exact wording of these blessings as long as their general nature is maintained.<br><br>In <i>Leket Yosher</i> on <i>Orach Chayim</i>, page 7, the author of <i>Terumat haDeshen</i> is quoted as preferring that women say \"who did not make me an animal (<i>shelo asani beheimah</i>)\" rather than \"who made me according to His will.\" His reason, presumably, was that one should maintain the negative format of \"who did not make me a …\" as found in the Talmud, but he agreed that the blessing itself could be changed.",
                    "Another source for permitting change is the first explanation of <i>Tosafot</i> in <i>Menachot</i> 43a:<br><br>We do not make a blessing concerning a <i>bur</i> for they are not common, since [a <i>bur</i> is defined as] \"whoever is involved with neither Scripture, Mishnah nor the way of the world.\" A better explanation (<i>yoter nir'eh</i>) is that he makes the blessings [only] about a slave and a woman, who are not as commanded [to do <i>mitzvot</i> as much] as he is.<br><br>The first explanation seems difficult: statements regarding a <i>bur</i> are found throughout the Talmud and apparently there were many such people. Otherwise, why introduce the blessing \"who did not make me a <i>bur</i>\" in the first place?<br><br>The answer is that <i>Tosafot</i> were not writing about R. Acha b. Yaakov's generation but about their own. Their point was to disagree with the practice mentioned by Meiri in <i>Berachot</i> 62b that \"many are accustomed to recite all four blessings\" i.e., who did not make me a Gentile, boor, slave <i>or</i> woman. The \"many\" understood R. Acha as objecting to his son reciting \"who did not make me a <i>bur</i>\" but not to others doing so. <i>Tosafot</i> agreed in principle but wrote that nevertheless the blessing over a <i>bur</i> should no longer be recited, because a <i>bur</i> in their day was not common. Their wording is precise: in the first explanation, which refers to circumstances in their own time, they wrote \"we do not bless (<i>lo mevarchinan</i>)\" in the first-person plural; while in the second, which refers to R. Acha b. Yaakov, they wrote \"[he] blesses (<i>mevarech</i>)\" in the third-person singular.",
                    "The answer is that <i>Tosafot</i> were not writing about R. Acha b. Yaakov's generation but about their own. Their point was to disagree with the practice mentioned by Meiri in <i>Berachot</i> 62b that \"many are accustomed to recite all four blessings\" i.e., who did not make me a Gentile, boor, slave <i>or</i> woman. The \"many\" understood R. Acha as objecting to his son reciting \"who did not make me a <i>bur</i>\" but not to others doing so. <i>Tosafot</i> agreed in principle but wrote that nevertheless the blessing over a <i>bur</i> should no longer be recited, because a <i>bur</i> in their day was not common. Their wording is precise: in the first explanation, which refers to circumstances in their own time, they wrote \"we do not bless (<i>lo mevarchinan</i>)\" in the first-person plural; while in the second, which refers to R. Acha b. Yaakov, they wrote \"[he] blesses (<i>mevarech</i>)\" in the third-person singular.",
                    "In <i>Tosafot</i>'s day it was proper to recite the blessing \"who has not made me a slave\" because slavery was widespread, but not \"who did not make me a <i>bur</i>\" because there were few people in that category. In our day the situation is just the opposite: there are no slaves, but boors and ignoramuses are everywhere. Following this reasoning, the blessing should again be recited concerning a <i>bur</i> and not concerning a slave. It might even be proper to say \"<i>shelo asani mitbolel</i>, who did not make me an assimilating Jew\" or \"<i>shelo asani chiloni</i>, who did not make me a secularist.\"<br><br>This is in accordance with <i>Tosafot</i>'s first explanation. However, <i>Tosafot</i> themselves preferred their second explanation, that we do not say \"who did not make me a <i>bur</i>\" because the blessing refers to the degree of obligation in the <i>mitzvot</i> and the <i>bur</i> is as obligated as anyone else. R. Natronai Gaon and R. Amram Gaon emphatically rejected any renewed use of the blessing concerning a <i>bur</i>. They are cited not only by <i>Siddur Rashi, Sefer haPardes</i> and <i>Machzor Vitry</i>, whose Gemaras read <i>zil t'fei</i>, but also by <i>Sefer haManhig</i>, whose version read <i>eved zil t'fei</i>. I have expounded the minority view about the leeway permitted in wording these <i>berachot</i> only for use as a <i>snif</i> if the need arises.",
                    "In practice, without abolishing or changing the blessing <i>shelo asani ishah</i>, there are two ways to avoid reciting it in public. The first is to discontinue the public recital of <i>birchot hashachar</i>. Although <i>Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim</i> 46:2 wrote that the custom is to say these blessings out loud, in many synagogues the <i>shaliach tzibur</i> begins with \"R. Yishmael says.\" This dates back at least to the time of the <i>rishonim</i>; see R. Peretz's gloss to <i>Sefer Tashbatz</i> no. 217. In case of great need, a congregation may change from one custom to the other. The danger is that as a result some individuals may skip <i>birchot hashachar</i> completely.",
                    "The second way is for the <i>shaliach tzibur</i> to recite the whole blessing \"<i>Baruch atah haShem Elokeinu melech haolam shelo asani ishah</i>\" quietly. This is not a new idea. According to <i>Sefer Me'orei Or</i> from 5579 (1829), part 4, p. 20, one should not publicly recite \"who did not make me a Gentile\" because of the danger of creating antipathy between Gentile and Jew, nor \"who did not make me a woman\" because of the likelihood of shaming women. He noted that while <i>Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim</i> 46:1–2 rules that the other <i>birchot hashachar</i> should be recited out loud in the synagogue, the three blessings \"<i>shelo asani</i> …\" are introduced only afterwards, in 46:4. <i>Shulchan Aruch</i>, therefore, did not rule that these blessings must be recited out loud, and see <i>Tur</i>, where this distinction is even more pronounced.",
                    "It is unclear whether <i>Me'orei Or</i> is referring only to occasions when women are actually present in the synagogue during <i>birchot hashachar</i>. If they are likely to be present, in any case, the <i>shaliach tzibur</i> should recite <i>shelo asani ishah</i> inaudibly. ",
                    "This has nothing to do with the opposition of my grandfather <i>z\"l</i> to the <i>shaliach tzibur</i> ending <i>ga'al Yisrael</i> in a whisper before the morning <i>Shemoneh Esreh</i>, for there he is obligated to recite the blessings of <i>kri'at Shema</i> out loud as part of public prayer. By contrast, reciting <i>birchot hashachar</i> out loud in the synagogue is only a custom."
                ],
                [],
                [],
                [
                    "<big><strong>Wording of Women's <i>Zimun</i></strong></big>",
                    "",
                    "",
                    "<i>Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim</i> 199:7 rules that women may recite their own <i>zimun</i> if they want to, and according to Rosh and Gra they have to. I think women should be encouraged to recite their own <i>zimun</i> because it will lead them to recite <i>birkat hamazon</i> more carefully. It should therefore be included in the <i>birkon</i>. However, it is important to clearly label it \"Optional <i>Zimun</i> for Women,\" and to specify at the least that three or more women may recite their own separate <i>zimun</i> when there is no <i>zimun</i> by men. This is an oversimplification, since three women may recite their own <i>zimun</i> separately even if up to nine men say <i>zimun</i>, but it will cause no harm. If it is possible to further expand on the laws of <i>zimun</i> without confusing the reader, so much the better.",
                    "<i>Zimun</i> has no fixed text except for the key \"<i>baruch she'achalnu mishelo uvetuvo chayinu</i>.\" I think there is nothing to prevent a woman who is leading a women's <i>zimun</i> from addressing both women and men \"<i>gevirotai verabotai nevarech</i>\" and \"<i>b'reshut gevirotai verabotai nevarech she'achalnu mishelo</i>,\" and so forth. This is despite what <i>Shulchan Aruch haRashaz</i> wrote:<br><br>It appears to be a breach of morals (<i>pritzut</i>) when the joining of women with men is apparent, when the leader of <i>zimun</i> says \"let us bless, with all of us joined together\" (<i>nevarech bitzeiruf kulanu</i>).<br><br>He cites Ran's commentary on the Rif at the end of the second chapter of <i>Megillah</i>. Similarly, <i>Levush</i>, who is the source for many rulings by <i>Shulchan Aruch haRashaz</i>, wrote that \"it appears to be a breach of morals to call a woman to join with them.\"<br><br>However, that is not what Ran wrote. Ran distinguished between reading the Megillah which is the same regardless of who is listening, and <i>zimun</i> which represents a change in the coinage of the Sages in <i>birkat hamazon</i> and, therefore, \"since women's joining with men [to form a quorum] is apparent, there is concern about a breach of morals.\" He is referring to adding <i>zimun</i> itself to <i>birkat hamazon</i> and not to a change in the wording of <i>zimun</i>. ",
                    "This is clear from <i>Beit Yosef</i> 199, who quoted Ran:<br><br>[Regarding <i>birkat hamazon</i>] it is different, because by [women] joining [with men for a quorum] there is a change in the coinage of the blessing in that there is <i>zimun</i>, which is a change in the coinage of <i>birkat hamazon</i>.<br><br>That is to say, the addition of <i>zimun</i> itself is the change in the coinage of <i>birkat hamazon</i>.<br><br>Ritva in <i>Megillah</i> 4a is even more explicit:<br><br>The case there is different, because there is a major act of joining (<i>tzeiruf rabah</i>) in that there is a change in <i>birkat hamazon</i> on their [the women's] account, adding the <i>zimun</i> blessing…. Whenever there is a quorum of three men for <i>zimun</i> without them, the women join the men and fulfill their obligation of <i>zimun</i> through them. It is not considered joining (<i>tzeiruf</i>) as long as there is <i>zimun</i> [even] without the women and the men do not need them at all.<br><br>Merely mentioning men together with women in <i>zimun</i> is not a \"major act\" of joining, but the reciting of <i>zimun</i> is.",
                    "Moreover, I think that even <i>Shulchan Aruch haRashaz</i> objected only to calling on women to join men in forming the quorum for <i>zimun</i>, but not to calling on them to merely respond to <i>zimun</i>. He wrote that the leader of <i>zimun</i> should not say \"let us bless with all of us joined together\" (<i>nevarech bitzeiruf kulanu</i>), as opposed to simply \"let us all bless,\" which would be permissible. Likewise, <i>Levush</i> specified not \"to call a woman to join\" (<i>lezamein l'ishah lehitztaref</i>) with men, i. e., in forming a quorum, as opposed to merely calling on her to respond to the <i>zimun</i> of the others.<br><br>Besides, the calls to men and women in <i>zimun</i> are only polite usages and are not to be taken literally. \"<i>Gevirotai verabotai, nivarech</i>\"—are they his \"masters and mistresses\"? And the custom of saying \"<i>b'reshut meranan verabanan verabotai</i>\"—are leaders and rabbis always present? It would be best to avoid meaningless formulae in <i>zimun</i>, but such is the custom.",
                    "Nevertheless, I think it is better that when three or more women dine with one or two men, the woman leading <i>zimun</i> should say \"<i>gevirotai nevarech</i>\" or \"c<i>havrotai nevarech</i>\" without mentioning the men, since they are not obligated to join in her <i>zimun</i>. But she can say \"<i>b'reshut</i>,\" asking the men's permission as well, and a man reciting <i>zimun</i> can ask <i>reshut</i> also from women. One usually asks <i>reshut</i> from those more important than he or from the head of the household, but today some people ask <i>reshut</i> from everyone present (<i>b'reshut hamesubim</i>). One can also simply say \"<i>nivarech</i>, let us bless\" and \"<i>b'reshut</i>, with permission\" without specifying who and from whom.",
                    "Regarding what I wrote previously (chapter 6, above), that a man who dined with three women may lead <i>zimun</i> for them, I now see that the <i>gaon</i> R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach <i>z\"l</i> disagreed, and one must weigh his opinion. He is quoted on this issue in <i>Halichot Beitah</i>, page 94, note 14:<br><br>If the women know how to say <i>zimun</i> for themselves, then it is improper <i>lechat'chilah</i> [for a man to recite a blessing] on behalf of someone who knows how to make a blessing for himself (see <i>Mishnah Berurah</i>, section 273:20). And if they do not know how to say <i>zimun</i> for themselves, then it gives the impression that he is joining the women [to enable <i>zimun</i>], and that is unseemly.",
                    "I think that section 273 is not comparable. The discussion there concerns someone who knows how to make <i>kiddush</i> on his own, in which case he should do so and not rely on someone else who has already made <i>kiddush</i> to say it for him. But this applies to <i>kiddush</i> or other blessings where the person either recites it himself or someone recites it for him and he merely answers amen. In <i>zimun</i>, by contrast, both the one who leads <i>zimun</i> and those who respond <i>baruch she'achalnu mishelo uvetuvo chayinu</i> are active participants.",
                    "This can be seen in <i>Sefer haMeorot</i> to <i>Berachot</i> 45a. While discussing his view that ten women or ten children can recite <i>zimun b'Shem</i>, he mentioned the case of three men who dined together with seven children and one of the children led <i>zimun</i> and recited <i>birkat hamazon</i> for all of them. He wrote:<br><br>The three have to recite <i>birkat hamazon</i> for themselves since they did not discharge their obligation through the blessings of the child, for [someone obligated only by] a rabbinical obligation cannot discharge [the obligation of others obligated by] a Torah obligation. [But] should they recite a <i>zimun</i> of three by themselves? It seems [correct] to say that since they participated with the children in a <i>zimun</i> of ten and responded \"we will bless God from whose [bounty] we have eaten,\" their obligation of <i>zimun</i> has evaporated. They do not recite a <i>zimun</i> of three, but only <i>birkat hamazon</i> without <i>zimun</i>.<br><br>Even though the child who led <i>zimun</i> and recited <i>birkat hamazon</i> was Halachically nonexistent for the adults and for that reason they had to repeat <i>birkat hamazon</i>, nevertheless, because they responded <i>baruch Elokeinu she'achalnu mishelo uvetuvo chayinu</i> they fulfilled their obligation of <i>zimun</i>.",
                    "",
                    "Rather—and this would seem to be the thrust of R. Auerbach's objection—the question is, How can a man lead <i>zimun</i> for women <i>lechat'chilah</i> when he is not part of their quorum and is not required to participate in their <i>zimun</i>?<br><br>However, I think that anyone who can say <i>birkat hamazon</i> for others can also lead <i>zimun</i> for them, just as originally women read from the Torah even though they are not part of the quorum of ten. This, too, is clear from the above-mentioned <i>Sefer haMeorot</i>:<br><br>Where there are ten children and one man [who all dined together], and similarly [ten] women, it seems correct to say that the man blesses \"<i>nevarech Elokeinu</i>\" [i.e., <i>zimun b'Shem</i>] for them. Since he dined with them and is [himself] obligated in <i>birkat hamazon</i>, he can say <i>birkat hamazon</i> for them and similarly lead them in <i>zimun</i>.",
                    "",
                    "This ruling is also cited in <i>Sefer Ohel Moed</i>, p. 107b in the name of R. Avraham, apparently Ravad. [This can be seen from <i>Sefer Ohel Moed</i> on p. 8b, which cites in the name of R. Avraham a ruling found in Ravad's <i>hasagot</i> on Rambam's <i>Mishneh Torah</i>.] Accordingly, a man who himself has to say <i>birkat hamazon</i> can say it for women and also lead <i>zimun</i> for them, even though he cannot join them in forming their quorum.",
                    "That all this is unconnected with Ravad's position that women are Biblically obligated in <i>birkat hamazon</i>, is attested to by the fact that <i>Sefer Ohel Moed</i> cites Ravad on <i>zimun</i> but not on women's <i>birkat hamazon</i>. Similarly, <i>Sefer haMeorot</i> in <i>Berachot</i> 20b lists three different opinions regarding women's <i>birkat hamazon</i> and concludes that the matter requires further study. It is therefore likely that regardless of their views on the nature of women's <i>birkat hamazon</i>, other <i>rishonim</i> agree with the ruling of Ravad, <i>Sefer haMeorot</i> and <i>Sefer Ohel Moed</i> that a man can lead <i>zimun</i> for women,.",
                    "The only one I found who clearly disagrees is Ritva, who wrote that men and women cannot join to form a quorum for <i>zimun</i> because of a breach of morals (<i>pritzuta</i>), and who prohibited a man from leading <i>zimun</i> for three women because of the appearance of <i>pritzuta</i>, as I explained (see previous chapter). As opposed to Ritva, Ravad wrote in <i>Temim Dei'im</i>, no. 1, that men and women cannot join to form a quorum because women \"<i>einan bnei keviut</i>\" (are not regular partners). Even if one interprets this as a synonym for <i>pritzuta</i>, Ravad only applied it to men and women who actually joined together to constitute a quorum.",
                    "I wrote that for <i>rishonim</i> who take the view that women's obligation in <i>birkat hamazon</i> is not identical to men's, that in itself is sufficient reason for men and women not to be counted together for <i>zimun</i>, and <i>pritzuta</i> is not necessarily involved. Afterwards I saw this in Resp. <i>Sho'el uMeishev</i>, vol. 1, part 3, nos. 165–66. ",
                    "This is not a unanimous view, however. In <i>Berachot</i> 20b R. Yonah wrote that women are only rabbinically obligated in <i>birkat hamazon</i>, yet in 45a he wrote that men and women cannot form a quorum for <i>zimun</i> together, not even husbands with wives, because \"their being grouped together is unseemly\" (<i>ein chevratan naeh</i>). Similarly, <i>Orchot Chayim</i> in <i>Hilchot Birkat haMazon</i>, par. 41, wrote in the name of R. Zerachiah that women are not Biblically obligated in <i>birkat hamazon</i>, yet he wrote in par. 43 that men and women cannot combine for <i>zimun</i> because of a breach in morals. ",
                    "For R. Yonah and <i>Orchot Chayim</i>, then, the difference between obligations of men and women in <i>birkat hamazon</i> does not in itself preclude their forming a quorum for <i>zimun</i> together; contrary to what I wrote.<br><br>Their view may be that regardless of the nature of women's obligation in <i>birkat hamazon, zimun</i> itself is a wholly rabbinical enactment and men's and women's obligations therein are identical. This is similar to what <i>Beit Yosef</i> and <i>Magen Avraham</i> wrote in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 197, that someone who ate only a <i>kezayit</i> (olive-size) piece of bread can recite <i>zimun</i> for others who have eaten their full because their obligations in <i>zimun</i> are the same, even though the one who ate a <i>kezayit</i> was only rabbinically obligated in <i>birkat hamazon</i> while those who ate their fill were Biblically obligated.",
                    "Nevertheless, my conclusion stands regarding <i>zimun</i> led by a man who dined together with three women. For who is to say that R. Yonah and <i>Orchot Chayim</i> agree with Ritva that a breach in morals applies even when there is only an appearance of men joining women, without actual <i>tzeiruf</i>? Ritva wrote that it does apply, but opposing him are Rambam, Ravad, <i>Or Zarua</i> in the name of Rashi, <i>Sefer haMichtam, Sefer haMeorot</i>, and <i>Sefer Ohel Moed</i>, none of whom viewed such circumstances as <i>pritzuta</i>.",
                    "Still, it is better to wait to hear the opinions of other scholars before publicizing the wording for a man leading <i>zimun</i> for women. Also, why should three literate women today need a man to lead <i>zimun</i> for them?<br><br>My advice, therefore, is not to print the relevant wording in the <i>birkon</i>. It is enough to cite what I wrote here, and anyone who wants to can word the <i>zimun</i> himself."
                ],
                [
                    "<big><strong>Women and <i>Birkat haGomel</i></strong></big>",
                    "",
                    "",
                    "Can a woman recite <i>birkat hagomel</i> in the presence of ten women? In <i>Berachot</i> 54b Abaye said that one must give thanks before ten, and he cited <i>Tehillim</i> 107:32, \"They will praise Him in an assemblage of people (<i>kehal am</i>).\" However, he did not specify men and not women, and his use of the number ten (<i>asarah</i>) in the masculine form is inconclusive.",
                    "<i>Gilyon haShas</i> brought a parallel from the marriage blessings in <i>Ketuvot</i> 7b where R. Nachman cited Ruth 4:20 which states explicitly that Boaz assembled ten men, and R. Abahu cited <i>Tehillim</i> 68:27, \"Bless God in <i>makheilot</i> [assemblages], <i>haShem</i> from the <i>makor</i> (source) of Israel.\" How does the second verse indicate ten men? Rashi explained:<br><br>For a blessing on the <i>makor</i> a <i>kahal</i> is needed; this refers to \"Gather the congregation (<i>Hakheil et ha'eidah</i>)\" (<i>Bamidbar</i> 20:8). <i>Hakheil</i> involves at least an <i>eidah</i> and an <i>eidah</i> is ten, as we learn from the spies [who were ten] not counting Calev and Yehoshua, [and about whom it is written,] \"How long for this evil <i>eidah?</i>\" (<i>Bamidbar</i> 14:27).<br><br>This still does not explicitly mention men, but Ritva wrote:<br><br>Certainly they have to be adult males, since it is written [in Ruth] \"ten men,\" or from what is written [in <i>Tehillim</i>] \"b'<i>makheilot</i>,\" and <i>kahal</i> means a minimum of ten adult males.<br><br>Just as <i>makheilot</i> indicates that ten adult males are needed for the marriage blessings, <i>kehal am</i> indicates that they are needed for <i>birkat hagomel</i>. ",
                    "And <i>Aruch haShulchan</i> wrote in <i>Orach Chayim</i> 219:6:<br><br>Women are accustomed not to bless [<i>hagomel</i>]. There is no reason for this, except that because the custom [of men] is to bless [<i>hagomel</i>] at the time of the Torah reading, and [women do not read the Torah,] they imagine that they are not obligated in this blessing. It is therefore proper that they [women] should say this blessing. Or perhaps because <i>kehal am</i> is written and women are not considered a <i>kahal</i>—while to say the blessing before men is not the modest way, and therefore they refrained from [doing] so.<br><br>However, this is not so simple: does <i>kahal</i> indeed signify only men? In <i>Kiddushin</i> 73a and elsewhere the Sages said, \"A <i>kahal</i> of proselytes is not called a <i>kahal</i>,\" but nowhere is it stated that a <i>kahal</i> of women is not considered a <i>kahal</i>. In <i>Devarim</i> 23:3, \" a <i>mamzer</i> may not enter <i>kehal haShem</i>\" prohibits both a male <i>mamzer</i> from marrying a legitimate woman and a female <i>mamzeret</i> from marrying a legitimate man. One could argue that a <i>kahal</i> of men alone or a <i>kahal</i> of men and women together is considered a <i>kahal</i>, but a <i>kahal</i> of women alone is not. But if so, if one can imagine a situation in which only legitimate females remained alive but not legitimate males, would they then be permitted to marry <i>mamzerim</i> because women by themselves are not a <i>kahal</i>?<br><br>One could also argue that the term <i>kehal haShem</i> regarding not marrying a <i>mamzer</i> is not the same as <i>kahal</i> or <i>kehal am</i>, and that the first includes women but the latter two do not. But it can equally be claimed that <i>makheilot</i> and even <i>kehal am</i> are not the same as <i>kahal</i>. Moreover, Rashi learned from \"<i>Hakheil et ha'eidah</i>\" that the minimum number of people to whom the verb <i>hakheil</i> applies is ten, as in the case of the <i>eidah</i> of the spies. But how do we know that the ten must be men? The spies were indeed only men, but in <i>Devarim</i> 31:12 the Torah states, \"Gather the people (<i>hakheil et ha'am</i>), men, women and children,\" and there <i>hakheil</i> explicitly includes women. The language <i>kehal am</i> in <i>Tehillim</i> regarding <i>birkat hagomel</i> is clearly closer to \"<i>Hakheil et ha'am</i>\" in <i>Devarim</i> than it is to \"<i>Hakheil et ha'eidah</i>\" in <i>Bamidbar</i>. It seems to me that from <i>Hakheil et ha'eidah</i> and the spies we learn only that <i>k-h-l</i> is a minimum of ten people but not whether they are men or women, and see my note in <i>Bnei Banim</i>, vol. 2, no. 9. Rather, the source for requiring men and not women for <i>birkat hagomel</i> is the one other passage in <i>Tanach</i> where the term <i>kehal am</i> is found, in <i>Shoftim</i> 20:2: \"They mustered … an assemblage of the people of God (<i>kehal am haElokim</i>), four hundred thousand infantrymen with drawn swords.\" This explicitly identifies <i>kehal am</i> as being men, and from there that <i>kehal am</i> regarding <i>birkat hagomel</i> are also men.",
                    "It seems to me that from <i>Hakheil et ha'eidah</i> and the spies we learn only that <i>k-h-l</i> is a minimum of ten people but not whether they are men or women, and see my note in <i>Bnei Banim</i>, vol. 2, no. 9. Rather, the source for requiring men and not women for <i>birkat hagomel</i> is the one other passage in <i>Tanach</i> where the term <i>kehal am</i> is found, in <i>Shoftim</i> 20:2: \"They mustered … an assemblage of the people of God (<i>kehal am haElokim</i>), four hundred thousand infantrymen with drawn swords.\" This explicitly identifies <i>kehal am</i> as being men, and from there that <i>kehal am</i> regarding <i>birkat hagomel</i> are also men.",
                    "A source in <i>Chazal</i> requiring ten men for <i>birkat hagomel</i>, on the other hand, is <i>Midrash Tehillim</i> (Buber) on chapter 107: \"R. Yehuda said, one must give thanks in [the presence of] ten in public (<i>b'tzibur</i>),\" i. e., the ten regarding <i>birkat hagomel</i> must be males thirteen years and older who constitute a <i>tzibur</i> for prayer.",
                    "There are three different customs regarding <i>birkat hagomel</i> by women. Some never recite the blessing. The <i>achronim</i> wondered about this, and <i>Magen Avraham</i> in 219 wrote that the women rely on the view that these blessings are voluntary, i. e., Ravad's opinion that all the blessings of praise mentioned in the last chapter of <i>Berachot</i> are voluntary. I think it more likely that only <i>birkat hagomel</i> was made voluntary and that all the <i>rishonim</i> agree that it is. Why exempt women? Since a woman usually does not have access to ten men within her household and it was not considered modest for a woman to go and assemble them, the Sages exempted her altogether from the obligation of reciting <i>birkat hagomel</i>, although they did not forbid it. Even according to the view that <i>bidi'eved</i> ten men are not required for <i>birkat hagomel</i> they are at least required <i>lechat'chilah</i>, and the Sages did not want to obligate women in a way that would make <i>bidi'eved</i> into <i>lechat'chilah</i>.<br><br>Support for this proposal comes from the fact that there is no mention in the <i>rishonim</i> of a woman reciting <i>birkat hagomel</i>, as indeed <i>Tehillim</i> 107, its Scriptural basis, does not mention women. ",
                    "The first to raise the question of women and <i>birkat hagomel</i> was <i>Knesset haGedolah</i> in 5418 (1658), and other <i>achronim</i> followed. I wonder why they took it for granted that women are obligated in <i>birkat hagomel</i>, something not mentioned in the Talmud and <i>rishonim</i>. If women were obligated it would have been an everyday occurrence, and someone would have clarified the issue of women reciting it in the presence of men. And while other blessings of praise are also recorded in the <i>rishonim</i> without specific reference to women and nonetheless we rule that women are obligated to recite them, no equivalent rationale exists to exempt women from those blessings.",
                    "A second custom, common among women today, is to recite <i>birkat hagomel</i> only following childbirth. After recovering from the birth the woman gathers ten men in her home, or recites it in the women's gallery in the synagogue with the men responding or even momentarily enters the men's section to do so; see Resp. <i>Yechaveh Da'at</i>, vol. 4, no. 15. This certainly seems difficult to understand. Why recite it only after childbirth and not after the other dangers that equally necessitate <i>birkat hagomel</i>, such as a severe illness or a dangerous journey? However, if <i>birkat hagomel</i> for women is voluntary there is room for such a custom.",
                    "I think there is an additional reason women recite <i>birkat hagomel</i> after childbirth even if not at other times: they are fulfilling R. Abahu's midrash of \"Bless God in <i>makheilot, haShem</i> from the <i>makor</i> of Israel\" that we noted as a source for the marriage blessings. The Gemara in <i>Ketuvot</i> 7b explains that <i>makor</i>, which in Talmudic usage also means \"uterus,\" refers to matters of procreation. The most salient manifestation of a man's involvement in procreation is his taking a wife, and therefore the Sages instituted the marriage blessings at the wedding. But for women the most salient manifestation of procreation is childbirth, and when women recite <i>birkat hagomel</i> after childbirth they fulfill not only <i>Tehillim</i> 107:22, \"They will praise Him in <i>kehal am</i>,\" but also 68:17, \"Bless God … from the <i>makor</i> of Israel.\"<br><br>In support of this proposal, note that in <i>Tehillim</i> 68 the verse immediately preceding the above refers to both men and women:\"The singers went first, after [them the] musicians, in the midst of maidens drumming\" (68:26). Chapter 68 also conveys a greater obligation to praise God than does chapter 107, in that the former employs the imperative <i>barechu</i> while the latter uses only the future/past descriptive <i>v'yismechu … yoru … v'yeromemenhu</i>. This fits in well with the Halachah that ten men are requisite for the marriage blessings and that if they were absent the blessings have to be repeated. By contrast, if <i>birkat hagomel</i> was recited without ten men present it is repeated without <i>Shem</i> and <i>malchut</i>.",
                    "A third custom is for women to recite <i>birkat hagomel</i> after escaping danger of any kind, just as men do. This follows <i>Knesset haGedolah</i>'s opinion that <i>Birkei Yosef</i> endorsed and many <i>achronim</i> have declared to be the preferred custom. However, few women actually do so, perhaps because of the difficulty in gathering ten men each time.",
                    "Here our question enters: Can women recite <i>birkat hagomel</i> with <i>Shem</i> and <i>malchut</i> before other women, without the presence of men? There is a disagreement as to whether <i>birkat hagomel</i> is valid if recited without ten men present. According to Raeh, <i>Tur</i> and <i>Sefer Ohel Moed</i> it is valid <i>bedi'eved</i>, and it seems likely that the circumstances of women who find it difficult or immodest to assemble ten men can be considered <i>bedi'eved</i>. However, according to R. Yonah, R. Yerucham and Meiri <i>birkat hagomel</i> without ten men present is invalid even <i>bedi'eved</i>.<br><br>Since the <i>rishonim</i> disagree it would seem that the blessing should not be recited, following the principle <i>safek berachot lehakeil</i>. No proof to the contrary can be brought from <i>Knesset haGedolah</i> who wrote that a woman should recite <i>birkat hagomel</i> \"before a man, or before other women,\" for he held that <i>bedi'eved</i> the blessing is valid without ten men even for a man. However, we rule that it is a <i>safek</i> and accordingly the blessing should not be recited, as <i>Kaf haChayim</i> wrote in 219:1, paragraph 3.",
                    "That notwithstanding, see <i>Sdei Chemed, Ma'arechet Berachot</i> (II), <i>Pe'at haSadeh</i> 12 (p. 434) in the name of <i>Petach haDvir</i>, who cited several arguments why <i>birkat hagomel</i> should be recited even in the case of a <i>safek</i>, but rejected them on the grounds that they are all in dispute and, therefore, <i>shev v'al ta'aseh adif</i>, it is better not to recite the blessing. However, in <i>Ma'arechet Berachot</i> (I), <i>Aseifat Dinim</i> 18:3 (p. 315) <i>Sdei Chemed</i> brought an additional argument: when a blessing is itself the <i>mitzvah</i>, such as the blessing on the new moon, and the person is clearly obligated to recite it and the <i>safek</i> is only whether in his particular circumstances the blessing is valid—in such a case <i>safek berachot lehakeil</i> does not apply, and the blessing should be recited. <i>Sdei Chemed</i> does not cite anyone who disagrees with this, and <i>birkat hagomel</i> is also a case where the blessing is itself the <i>mitzvah</i>. ",
                    "Accordingly, <i>Knesset haGedolah</i>'s ruling would be correct in spite of the disagreement among the <i>rishonim</i>. Since in his view women are clearly obligated in <i>birkat hagomel</i> and the disagreement is only about the validity of the blessing made without ten men, women may recite it in any case.<br><br>One could still object that this applies only according to <i>Knesset haGedolah</i> who ruled that women are definitely obligated in <i>birkat hagomel</i>. But <i>Mishnah Berurah</i> and other <i>achronim</i> cite his opinion only as a possibility, not to mention what I have suggested about <i>birkat hagomel</i> for women being altogether voluntary. According to those <i>achronim</i>, would there not still be the risk of a blessing made in vain, if a woman recites <i>birkat hagomel</i> in the absence of ten men?<br><br>I think not, because ten men are required only when there is an obligation to say <i>birkat hagomel</i>, but not when it is recited voluntarily. ",
                    "This can be shown from the Gemara in <i>Berachot</i>:<br><br>R. Yehuda took ill and was recuperating. R. Chanan Bagta'ah and other rabbis came to visit him. They said to him, \"Blessed [be God,] who returned you to us and not to dust.\" He replied, \"You have released me from [my obligation] to give thanks.\"<br><br>The Gemara then asks how R. Yehuda was able to fulfill his obligation to give thanks by listening and answering amen to a blessing made without the presence of ten men. What it does <i>not</i> ask is how R. Chanan Bagta'ah and the others were permitted to recite it in the first place. Taking note of this, R. Yonah wrote, \"it appears that they can say it [<i>birkat hagomel</i>] even without [the presence of] ten, even though the person who was sick does not fulfill his obligation thereby.\" [The Gemara later concludes that there had indeed been ten men present, and so R. Yehuda had fulfilled his obligation.] And see <i>Bnei Banim</i>, vol. 2, no. 15, where I argued that the prohibition of altering the wording of <i>birkat hagomel</i> similarly applies only to someone obligated to recite it.",
                    "Yet the same R. Yonah holds that normally <i>birkat hagomel</i> requires ten men, even <i>bedi'eved!</i> Regardless of how one approaches the question, then, the results are the same: according to <i>Tur</i>, ten men are required only <i>lechat'chilah</i>, while according to R. Yonah who requires ten even <i>bedi'eved</i>, this applies only to those who are obligated to recite <i>birkat hagomel</i> but not to women for whom the blessing is voluntary. And should one claim that <i>birkat hagomel</i> is in fact obligatory for women, <i>safek berachot lehakeil</i> does not apply in this case where the blessing is itself the <i>mitzvah</i>.",
                    "Therefore, in my opinion women may recite <i>birkat hagomel</i> with <i>Shem</i> and <i>malchut</i> after illness, air travel and so forth in the presence of other women. However, where it is customary for women to recite the blessing in the synagogue following childbirth they should continue to do so, so that the entire community can respond."
                ]
            ],
            "Essays": []
        }
    },
    "versions": [
        [
            "Responsa on contemporary Jewish women's issues. Yehuda Henkin, Ktav 2003",
            "http://beta.nli.org.il/he/books/NNL_ALEPH002324672/NLI"
        ],
        [
            "Sefaria Community Translation",
            "https://www.sefaria.org"
        ]
    ],
    "heTitle": "שו\"ת בני בנים",
    "categories": [
        "Responsa",
        "Modern"
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    "schema": {
        "heTitle": "שו\"ת בני בנים",
        "enTitle": "Responsa Benei Banim",
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                "heTitle": "חלק ראשון",
                "enTitle": "Volume I",
                "nodes": [
                    {
                        "heTitle": "הסכמות ומכתבים",
                        "enTitle": "Approbations and Letters"
                    },
                    {
                        "heTitle": "פתח דברים",
                        "enTitle": "Introduction"
                    },
                    {
                        "heTitle": "",
                        "enTitle": ""
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                        "enTitle": "Miscellanea"
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            {
                "heTitle": "חלק שני",
                "enTitle": "Volume II",
                "nodes": [
                    {
                        "heTitle": "הסכמות",
                        "enTitle": "Approbations"
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                    {
                        "heTitle": "פתח דברים",
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                        "heTitle": "",
                        "enTitle": ""
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            {
                "heTitle": "חלק שלישי",
                "enTitle": "Volume III",
                "nodes": [
                    {
                        "heTitle": "מקצת תשובות הגמו\"ז זצלה\"ה",
                        "enTitle": "Responsa by Rabbi Yosef Eliyahu Henkin"
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                    {
                        "heTitle": "פתח דברים",
                        "enTitle": "Introduction"
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                        "heTitle": "",
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            {
                "heTitle": "חלק רביעי",
                "enTitle": "Volume IV",
                "nodes": [
                    {
                        "heTitle": "פתח דברים",
                        "enTitle": "Introduction"
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                    {
                        "heTitle": "",
                        "enTitle": ""
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