Update README.md
Browse files
README.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -83,7 +83,6 @@ LoRA adapters (r=32, α=32) were trained on 2× Tesla T4s and then merged back i
|
|
| 83 |
>
|
| 84 |
> - **Still a 30M model.** Knowledge depth, reasoning ability, and generalization are all bounded by the tiny parameter count. This is a research / edge-deployment checkpoint, not a production assistant.
|
| 85 |
> - **Modest safety coverage.** Automated probe testing measured a **harmful-refusal rate of ~16.7%** and a **benign-helpful rate of ~82.4%** on a fixed 35-prompt evaluation suite. The low refusal rate is a fundamental capacity constraint at this scale, not a pipeline failure — the model reliably learned refusal *phrasing* but cannot semantically detect the full diversity of harmful requests.
|
| 86 |
-
> - **Short responses.** The stop-calibration phase encourages concise, sentence-level output. Typical generations are 10–30 tokens.
|
| 87 |
> - **512-token context window** (inherited from the base model).
|
| 88 |
> - **No RLHF.** Trained with supervised fine-tuning only.
|
| 89 |
|
|
|
|
| 83 |
>
|
| 84 |
> - **Still a 30M model.** Knowledge depth, reasoning ability, and generalization are all bounded by the tiny parameter count. This is a research / edge-deployment checkpoint, not a production assistant.
|
| 85 |
> - **Modest safety coverage.** Automated probe testing measured a **harmful-refusal rate of ~16.7%** and a **benign-helpful rate of ~82.4%** on a fixed 35-prompt evaluation suite. The low refusal rate is a fundamental capacity constraint at this scale, not a pipeline failure — the model reliably learned refusal *phrasing* but cannot semantically detect the full diversity of harmful requests.
|
|
|
|
| 86 |
> - **512-token context window** (inherited from the base model).
|
| 87 |
> - **No RLHF.** Trained with supervised fine-tuning only.
|
| 88 |
|