---
license: mit
---

# TFLite (.tflite) — Integer Overflow in Buffer offset+size Bounds Check → OOB Read

**Vulnerability Class:** CWE-190 Integer Overflow → CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read  
**Affected:** tensorflow/tensorflow (TFLite interpreter) @ HEAD  
**Status:** ASAN-verified (3 variants: SEGV, heap-buffer-overflow READ)

## Summary

Integer overflow in TFLite `InterpreterBuilder` at `interpreter_builder.cc:671` — 
`offset + buffer->size()` wraps `uint64_t`, bypassing the bounds check. The resulting
pointer `allocation_->base() + offset` goes OOB. Same pattern at line 378 for
`large_custom_options_offset + large_custom_options_size`.

Key factor: **InterpreterBuilder does NOT invoke the flatbuffer verifier by default.**
Even the optional verifier does not validate `Buffer.offset`/`Buffer.size` fields.

## Files

- `poc/harness_tflite_offset.cpp` — Self-contained ASAN harness (3 modes)
- `evidence/buffer_offset_segv.txt` — ASAN log: OOB pointer access
- `evidence/large_custom_options_oob.txt` — ASAN log: heap-buffer-overflow READ
- `evidence/buffer_offset_heap_oob.txt` — ASAN log: heap-buffer-overflow variant
- `REPORT.md` — Full vulnerability report

## Reproduction

```bash
g++ -std=c++17 -fsanitize=address -g -O0 -o harness_tflite poc/harness_tflite_offset.cpp
./harness_tflite         # Buffer offset overflow → OOB
./harness_tflite custom  # large_custom_options overflow → heap OOB
./harness_tflite heap    # near-end offset → heap-buffer-overflow READ
```