Text Generation
Transformers
Safetensors
qwen2
security
code-vulnerability-detection
evaluation
interpretability
conversational
text-generation-inference
Instructions to use Zeineb12/evaluation-artifacts with libraries, inference providers, notebooks, and local apps. Follow these links to get started.
- Libraries
- Transformers
How to use Zeineb12/evaluation-artifacts with Transformers:
# Use a pipeline as a high-level helper from transformers import pipeline pipe = pipeline("text-generation", model="Zeineb12/evaluation-artifacts") messages = [ {"role": "user", "content": "Who are you?"}, ] pipe(messages)# pip install -U transformers accelerate # Load model directly from transformers import AutoTokenizer, AutoModelForCausalLM tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained("Zeineb12/evaluation-artifacts") model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained("Zeineb12/evaluation-artifacts", device_map="auto") messages = [ {"role": "user", "content": "Who are you?"}, ] inputs = tokenizer.apply_chat_template( messages, add_generation_prompt=True, tokenize=True, return_dict=True, return_tensors="pt", ).to(model.device) outputs = model.generate(**inputs, max_new_tokens=256) print(tokenizer.decode(outputs[0][inputs["input_ids"].shape[-1]:])) - Notebooks
- Google Colab
- Kaggle
- Local Apps Settings
- vLLM
How to use Zeineb12/evaluation-artifacts with vLLM:
Install from pip and serve model
# Install vLLM from pip: pip install vllm # Start the vLLM server: vllm serve "Zeineb12/evaluation-artifacts" # Call the server using curl (OpenAI-compatible API): curl -X POST "http://localhost:8000/v1/chat/completions" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ --data '{ "model": "Zeineb12/evaluation-artifacts", "messages": [ { "role": "user", "content": "What is the capital of France?" } ] }'Use Docker
docker model run hf.co/Zeineb12/evaluation-artifacts
- SGLang
How to use Zeineb12/evaluation-artifacts with SGLang:
Install from pip and serve model
# Install SGLang from pip: pip install sglang # Start the SGLang server: python3 -m sglang.launch_server \ --model-path "Zeineb12/evaluation-artifacts" \ --host 0.0.0.0 \ --port 30000 # Call the server using curl (OpenAI-compatible API): curl -X POST "http://localhost:30000/v1/chat/completions" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ --data '{ "model": "Zeineb12/evaluation-artifacts", "messages": [ { "role": "user", "content": "What is the capital of France?" } ] }'Use Docker images
docker run --gpus all \ --shm-size 32g \ -p 30000:30000 \ -v ~/.cache/huggingface:/root/.cache/huggingface \ --env "HF_TOKEN=<secret>" \ --ipc=host \ lmsysorg/sglang:latest \ python3 -m sglang.launch_server \ --model-path "Zeineb12/evaluation-artifacts" \ --host 0.0.0.0 \ --port 30000 # Call the server using curl (OpenAI-compatible API): curl -X POST "http://localhost:30000/v1/chat/completions" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ --data '{ "model": "Zeineb12/evaluation-artifacts", "messages": [ { "role": "user", "content": "What is the capital of France?" } ] }' - Docker Model Runner
How to use Zeineb12/evaluation-artifacts with Docker Model Runner:
docker model run hf.co/Zeineb12/evaluation-artifacts
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## Q1
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I noticed that most AI companies announcing that their models discovered zero-day vulnerabilities rarely prove the real truth of their claims — even when they involve an independent third party. There is a difference between saying *"our model alone, unaided, discovered this zero-day"* and *"some engineer in the background noticed something and told the model to look for this zero-day."* Most companies honestly prove that the vulnerability is a zero-day because it was never found before — but they do not actually prove that their model, alone and without humans leaking it hints, was able to discover it. This is exactly why I chose this small example.
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## Q3
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My results show the model fails because it judges code by its *visual surface*, not by its *logic*: it reacts to how the code looks rather than tracing what the data actually does. So my proposed direction is a **data curation and fine-tuning strategy built on look-alike, different-meaning examples.**
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## Q1 : The Blind Spot
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I noticed that most AI companies announcing that their models discovered zero-day vulnerabilities rarely prove the real truth of their claims — even when they involve an independent third party. There is a difference between saying *"our model alone, unaided, discovered this zero-day"* and *"some engineer in the background noticed something and told the model to look for this zero-day."* Most companies honestly prove that the vulnerability is a zero-day because it was never found before — but they do not actually prove that their model, alone and without humans leaking it hints, was able to discover it. This is exactly why I chose this small example.
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## Q3 : A Path Forward
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My results show the model fails because it judges code by its *visual surface*, not by its *logic*: it reacts to how the code looks rather than tracing what the data actually does. So my proposed direction is a **data curation and fine-tuning strategy built on look-alike, different-meaning examples.**
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