Text Classification
Transformers
PyTorch
English
deberta-v2
cybersecurity
ai-security
prompt-injection
jailbreak-detection
llm-security
red-team
prompt-defense
ai-firewall
instruction-override
system-prompt-protection
deberta-v3
multitask-learning
nlp
security-ai
ai-defense
secure-llm
adversarial-ai
detection-system
Eval Results (legacy)
text-embeddings-inference
Instructions to use blackXmask/RedLockX-DeBERTa-v3-Prompt-Injection-Detector with libraries, inference providers, notebooks, and local apps. Follow these links to get started.
- Libraries
- Transformers
How to use blackXmask/RedLockX-DeBERTa-v3-Prompt-Injection-Detector with Transformers:
# Use a pipeline as a high-level helper from transformers import pipeline pipe = pipeline("text-classification", model="blackXmask/RedLockX-DeBERTa-v3-Prompt-Injection-Detector")# Load model directly from transformers import AutoModel model = AutoModel.from_pretrained("blackXmask/RedLockX-DeBERTa-v3-Prompt-Injection-Detector", dtype="auto") - Notebooks
- Google Colab
- Kaggle
File size: 7,802 Bytes
d317648 b752801 d317648 b752801 d317648 b752801 d317648 b752801 d317648 b752801 d317648 b752801 d317648 b752801 d317648 b752801 d317648 b752801 d31e158 b752801 d31e158 b752801 d317648 d31e158 b752801 7bd9a4a b752801 d31e158 b752801 7bd9a4a d31e158 b752801 d317648 b752801 d317648 b752801 d317648 b752801 d317648 b752801 d317648 b752801 d317648 b752801 d317648 b752801 7bd9a4a b752801 d317648 7bd9a4a d317648 b752801 d317648 b752801 d317648 b752801 d317648 b752801 d31e158 b752801 d317648 b752801 d317648 7bd9a4a d317648 7bd9a4a d317648 b752801 d317648 b752801 d317648 b752801 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 | import os
import torch
import torch.nn as nn
import torch.nn.functional as F
import joblib
from transformers import AutoTokenizer, AutoModel
from typing import Dict, List, Any
# =========================================================
# 1. Multi-Task Architecture
# =========================================================
class MultiTaskModel(nn.Module):
def __init__(self, model_name, num_fine, num_family):
super().__init__()
self.encoder = AutoModel.from_pretrained(model_name)
hidden = self.encoder.config.hidden_size
self.dropout = nn.Dropout(0.2)
self.binary_head = nn.Linear(hidden, 1)
self.multi_head = nn.Linear(hidden, num_fine)
self.family_head = nn.Linear(hidden, num_family)
def mean_pooling(self, hidden, attention_mask):
mask = attention_mask.unsqueeze(-1).float()
return (hidden * mask).sum(1) / mask.sum(1).clamp(min=1e-9)
def forward(self, input_ids, attention_mask):
outputs = self.encoder(
input_ids=input_ids,
attention_mask=attention_mask
)
pooled = self.mean_pooling(
outputs.last_hidden_state,
attention_mask
)
x = self.dropout(pooled)
return (
self.binary_head(x),
self.multi_head(x),
self.family_head(x)
)
# =========================================================
# 2. Hugging Face Endpoint Handler
# =========================================================
class EndpointHandler:
def __init__(self, path=""):
self.device = torch.device(
"cuda" if torch.cuda.is_available() else "cpu"
)
print(f"[INFO] Using device: {self.device}")
# Load encoders
self.fine_le = joblib.load(os.path.join(path, "fine_encoder.pkl"))
self.family_le = joblib.load(os.path.join(path, "family_encoder.pkl"))
# Tokenizer
self.tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained(path)
# Model
self.model = MultiTaskModel(
model_name="microsoft/deberta-v3-small",
num_fine=len(self.fine_le.classes_),
num_family=len(self.family_le.classes_)
).to(self.device)
checkpoint = torch.load(
os.path.join(path, "multitask_model_FINAL.pt"),
map_location=self.device
)
state_dict = checkpoint.get("model_state", checkpoint)
self.model.load_state_dict(state_dict)
self.model.eval()
print("[INFO] Model loaded successfully")
# ============================================
# Threshold Config — TIGHTENED
# ============================================
self.config = {
"HIGH_ATTACK": 0.80, # ← RAISED from 0.75
"MEDIUM_ATTACK": 0.55,
"HIGH_CONF": 0.85,
"LOW_CONF": 0.30,
"EXTREME_CONF": 0.95
}
# =====================================================
# Decision Logic
# =====================================================
def decide(self, danger_prob, fine_score, family_score):
"""
Binary head (danger_prob) is the authority.
Attack type scores only matter if binary head is already suspicious.
"""
cfg = self.config
# 1. Definite safe zone
if danger_prob <= cfg["LOW_CONF"]:
return False
# 2. Danger zone — binary head must be confident it's dangerous
if danger_prob >= cfg["HIGH_CONF"]:
# Strong attack type confidence → dangerous
if fine_score >= cfg["HIGH_ATTACK"] or family_score >= cfg["HIGH_ATTACK"]:
return True
# Medium attack type confidence → dangerous only if binary is EXTREMELY confident
if fine_score >= cfg["MEDIUM_ATTACK"] or family_score >= cfg["MEDIUM_ATTACK"]:
if danger_prob >= cfg["EXTREME_CONF"]:
return True
# 3. Gray zone — always safe
return False
# =====================================================
# Predict Single
# =====================================================
def predict_single(self, text: str):
tokenized = self.tokenizer(
text,
return_tensors="pt",
truncation=True,
padding=True,
max_length=512
)
tokenized = {k: v.to(self.device) for k, v in tokenized.items()}
with torch.no_grad():
binary_logits, multi_logits, family_logits = self.model(
tokenized["input_ids"],
tokenized["attention_mask"]
)
# ================================
# Probabilities
# ================================
danger_prob = torch.sigmoid(binary_logits).item()
multi_probs = F.softmax(multi_logits, dim=1)
family_probs = F.softmax(family_logits, dim=1)
fine_idx = torch.argmax(multi_probs, dim=1).item()
family_idx = torch.argmax(family_probs, dim=1).item()
fine_score = multi_probs[0][fine_idx].item()
family_score = family_probs[0][family_idx].item()
# ================================
# Decision
# ================================
is_dangerous = self.decide(
danger_prob,
fine_score,
family_score
)
# ================================
# Labels — only predict attack type if dangerous
# ================================
if is_dangerous:
attack_type = self.fine_le.inverse_transform([fine_idx])[0]
attack_family = self.family_le.inverse_transform([family_idx])[0]
else:
attack_type = "none"
attack_family = "none"
fine_score = 0.0
family_score = 0.0
# ================================
# Explainability
# ================================
suspicious_keywords = [
"ignore", "override", "reveal", "system prompt",
"developer mode", "bypass", "disable",
"forget instructions", "pretend", "simulate", "jailbreak"
]
found_keywords = [
kw for kw in suspicious_keywords
if kw in text.lower()
]
# ================================
# Response
# ================================
return {
"status": "DANGEROUS" if is_dangerous else "SAFE",
"binary_confidence": round(danger_prob, 4),
"confidence": round(
danger_prob if is_dangerous else (1 - danger_prob),
4
),
"attack_type": {
"label": attack_type,
"score": round(fine_score, 4)
},
"attack_family": {
"label": attack_family,
"score": round(family_score, 4)
},
"trigger_words": found_keywords
}
# =====================================================
# Main Entry
# =====================================================
def __call__(self, data: Dict[str, Any]) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
inputs = data["inputs"] if isinstance(data, dict) else data
if isinstance(inputs, str):
inputs = [inputs]
return [self.predict_single(text) for text in inputs] |