# Testing plan ## What a "win" means Untargeted attack: make the VLM's label **wrong and far from the truth**. We do NOT require forcing a specific decoy. The metric is semantic distance of the model's returned label from the true label. A trial is a **success** only if all three hold: 1. semantic distance to truth >= tau (report tau in {0.3, 0.5, 0.7}), 2. the render passed the stealth gate at that level, and 3. it still succeeds after `scraper_sim` (JPEG Q85 + light blur). Reporting strength without stealth (or vice versa) is misleading, so we always report the pair. ## Targets - Black-box: `openai/gpt-5.5` and `google/gemini-3.5-flash` (OpenRouter), the two strongest vision models. Report per-model and the transfer between them. - Surrogates (free Tier A search): `qwen-3.5-4b` + `gemma-4-4b` on klaus-3. ## Image set (standard, comparable to literature) ~30-50 images with human-verified one-word truths, from a standard source (ImageNet/COCO-style), spanning a difficulty gradient: - ambiguous / cluttered scenes (easiest to poison), - ordinary single-subject photos (the realistic use case), - iconic / unambiguous subjects (the hard ceiling; keeps us honest). CSV format for the harness: `image_path,truth_label` per line. ## Stealth sweep (the headline experiment) Run every image at three gate levels and plot the strength-vs-visibility frontier (`veil-pgd sweep images.csv`): | level | PSNR>= | SSIM>= | LPIPS<= | dE2000 p95<= | |--------|--------|--------|---------|--------------| | strict | 38 | 0.94 | 0.10 | 2.0 | | medium | 32 | 0.90 | 0.20 | 5.0 | | loose | 26 | 0.82 | 0.40 | 12.0 | Expected shape: success rate rises as stealth loosens. The literature's ~41-64% band is for faint-but-typographic (roughly our strict/medium). ## Metrics reported - poison success rate at each tau, per stealth level; - distance-to-truth CDF; - per-model success + transfer matrix (gpt-5.5 vs gemini-3.5-flash); - stealth pass rate per level; - robustness delta: success on clean render vs after JPEG/blur, plus the `hard_transforms` ceiling (heavy blur, downscale, rotation) for context. ## Known robustness ceiling OCR-stripping / Dyslexify-style text removal, heavy blur, aggressive downscale, and rotation can neutralize the overlay. These are reported, not defended against; the tool raises scraping cost, it is not permanent protection.