Milvus is an open-source vector database built for generative AI applications. Prior to 2.5.27 and 2.6.10, Milvus exposes TCP port 9091 by default, which enables authentication bypasses. The /expr debug endpoint uses a weak, predictable default authentication token derived from etcd.rootPath (default: by-dev), enabling arbitrary expression evaluation. The full REST API (/api/v1/*) is registered on the metrics/management port without any authentication, allowing unauthenticated access to all business operations including data manipulation and credential management. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.5.27 and 2.6.10.


Vulnerability in the Oracle Applications Framework product of Oracle E-Business Suite (component: Attachments / File Upload). Supported versions that are affected are 12.1.3 and 12.2.3-12.2.9. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTPS to compromise Oracle Applications Framework. Successful attacks require human interaction from a person other than the attacker and while the vulnerability is in Oracle Applications Framework, attacks may significantly impact additional products. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized update, insert or delete access to some of Oracle Applications Framework accessible data. CVSS 3.0 Base Score 4.7 (Integrity impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N).


Cachet is an open source status page. With Cachet prior to and including 2.3.18, there is a SQL injection which is in the `SearchableTrait#scopeSearch()`. Attackers without authentication can utilize this vulnerability to exfiltrate sensitive data from the database such as administrator's password and session. The original repository of Cachet <https://github.com/CachetHQ/Cachet> is not active, the stable version 2.3.18 and it's developing 2.4 branch is affected.


Uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in MELSEC iQ-R Series modules (R00/01/02CPU firmware version '19' and earlier, R04/08/16/32/120 (EN) CPU firmware version '51' and earlier, R08/16/32/120SFCPU firmware version '22' and earlier, R08/16/32/120PCPU firmware version '25' and earlier, R08/16/32/120PSFCPU firmware version '06' and earlier, RJ71EN71 firmware version '47' and earlier, RJ71GF11-T2 firmware version '47' and earlier, RJ72GF15-T2 firmware version '07' and earlier, RJ71GP21-SX firmware version '47' and earlier, RJ71GP21S-SX firmware version '47' and earlier, and RJ71GN11-T2 firmware version '11' and earlier) allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to cause an error in a CPU unit and cause a denial-of-service (DoS) condition in execution of the program and its communication, or to cause a denial-of-service (DoS) condition in communication via the unit by receiving a specially crafted SLMP packet


In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Drivers: hv: vmbus: Fix initialization of device object in vmbus_device_register()

Initialize the device's dma_{mask,parms} pointers and the device's
dma_mask value before invoking device_register().  Address the
following trace with 5.17-rc7:

[   49.646839] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 189 at include/linux/dma-mapping.h:543
	netvsc_probe+0x37a/0x3a0 [hv_netvsc]
[   49.646928] Call Trace:
[   49.646930]  <TASK>
[   49.646935]  vmbus_probe+0x40/0x60 [hv_vmbus]
[   49.646942]  really_probe+0x1ce/0x3b0
[   49.646948]  __driver_probe_device+0x109/0x180
[   49.646952]  driver_probe_device+0x23/0xa0
[   49.646955]  __device_attach_driver+0x76/0xe0
[   49.646958]  ? driver_allows_async_probing+0x50/0x50
[   49.646961]  bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xd0
[   49.646964]  __device_attach+0xed/0x170
[   49.646967]  device_initial_probe+0x13/0x20
[   49.646970]  bus_probe_device+0x8f/0xa0
[   49.646973]  device_add+0x41a/0x8e0
[   49.646975]  ? hrtimer_init+0x28/0x80
[   49.646981]  device_register+0x1b/0x20
[   49.646983]  vmbus_device_register+0x5e/0xf0 [hv_vmbus]
[   49.646991]  vmbus_add_channel_work+0x12d/0x190 [hv_vmbus]
[   49.646999]  process_one_work+0x21d/0x3f0
[   49.647002]  worker_thread+0x4a/0x3b0
[   49.647005]  ? process_one_work+0x3f0/0x3f0
[   49.647007]  kthread+0xff/0x130
[   49.647011]  ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20
[   49.647015]  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[   49.647020]  </TASK>
[   49.647021] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---


A flaw was found in dnsmasq before 2.83. A buffer overflow vulnerability was discovered in the way dnsmasq extract names from DNS packets before validating them with DNSSEC data. An attacker on the network, who can create valid DNS replies, could use this flaw to cause an overflow with arbitrary data in a heap-allocated memory, possibly executing code on the machine. The flaw is in the rfc1035.c:extract_name() function, which writes data to the memory pointed by name assuming MAXDNAME*2 bytes are available in the buffer. However, in some code execution paths, it is possible extract_name() gets passed an offset from the base buffer, thus reducing, in practice, the number of available bytes that can be written in the buffer. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well as system availability.


In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nvme-core: fix memory leak in dhchap_secret_store

Free dhchap_secret in nvme_ctrl_dhchap_secret_store() before we return
fix following kmemleack:-

unreferenced object 0xffff8886376ea800 (size 64):
  comm "check", pid 22048, jiffies 4344316705 (age 92.199s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    44 48 48 43 2d 31 3a 30 30 3a 6e 78 72 35 4b 67  DHHC-1:00:nxr5Kg
    75 58 34 75 6f 41 78 73 4a 61 34 63 2f 68 75 4c  uX4uoAxsJa4c/huL
  backtrace:
    [<0000000030ce5d4b>] __kmalloc+0x4b/0x130
    [<000000009be1cdc1>] nvme_ctrl_dhchap_secret_store+0x8f/0x160 [nvme_core]
    [<00000000ac06c96a>] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12b/0x1c0
    [<00000000437e7ced>] vfs_write+0x2ba/0x3c0
    [<00000000f9491baf>] ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
    [<000000001c46513d>] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
    [<00000000ecf348fe>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
unreferenced object 0xffff8886376eaf00 (size 64):
  comm "check", pid 22048, jiffies 4344316736 (age 92.168s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    44 48 48 43 2d 31 3a 30 30 3a 6e 78 72 35 4b 67  DHHC-1:00:nxr5Kg
    75 58 34 75 6f 41 78 73 4a 61 34 63 2f 68 75 4c  uX4uoAxsJa4c/huL
  backtrace:
    [<0000000030ce5d4b>] __kmalloc+0x4b/0x130
    [<000000009be1cdc1>] nvme_ctrl_dhchap_secret_store+0x8f/0x160 [nvme_core]
    [<00000000ac06c96a>] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12b/0x1c0
    [<00000000437e7ced>] vfs_write+0x2ba/0x3c0
    [<00000000f9491baf>] ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
    [<000000001c46513d>] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
    [<00000000ecf348fe>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc


In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/mlx5: DPLL, Fix possible use after free after delayed work timer triggers

I managed to hit following use after free warning recently:

[ 2169.711665] ==================================================================
[ 2169.714009] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __run_timers.part.0+0x179/0x4c0
[ 2169.716293] Write of size 8 at addr ffff88812b326a70 by task swapper/4/0

[ 2169.719022] CPU: 4 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2jiri+ #2
[ 2169.720974] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 2169.722457] Call Trace:
[ 2169.722756]  <IRQ>
[ 2169.723024]  dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0xb0
[ 2169.723417]  print_report+0xc5/0x630
[ 2169.723807]  ? __virt_addr_valid+0x126/0x2b0
[ 2169.724268]  kasan_report+0xbe/0xf0
[ 2169.724667]  ? __run_timers.part.0+0x179/0x4c0
[ 2169.725116]  ? __run_timers.part.0+0x179/0x4c0
[ 2169.725570]  __run_timers.part.0+0x179/0x4c0
[ 2169.726003]  ? call_timer_fn+0x320/0x320
[ 2169.726404]  ? lock_downgrade+0x3a0/0x3a0
[ 2169.726820]  ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x14/0x20
[ 2169.727257]  ? ktime_get+0x92/0x150
[ 2169.727630]  ? lapic_next_deadline+0x35/0x60
[ 2169.728069]  run_timer_softirq+0x40/0x80
[ 2169.728475]  __do_softirq+0x1a1/0x509
[ 2169.728866]  irq_exit_rcu+0x95/0xc0
[ 2169.729241]  sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6b/0x80
[ 2169.729718]  </IRQ>
[ 2169.729993]  <TASK>
[ 2169.730259]  asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20
[ 2169.730755] RIP: 0010:default_idle+0x13/0x20
[ 2169.731190] Code: c0 08 00 00 00 4d 29 c8 4c 01 c7 4c 29 c2 e9 72 ff ff ff cc cc cc cc 8b 05 9a 7f 1f 02 85 c0 7e 07 0f 00 2d cf 69 43 00 fb f4 <fa> c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 93 04 00
[ 2169.732759] RSP: 0018:ffff888100dbfe10 EFLAGS: 00000242
[ 2169.733264] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff888100d9c200 RCX: ffffffff8241bd62
[ 2169.733925] RDX: ffffed109a848b15 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff8127ac55
[ 2169.734566] RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed109a848b14
[ 2169.735200] R10: ffff8884d42458a3 R11: 000000000000ba7e R12: ffffffff83d7d3a0
[ 2169.735835] R13: 1ffff110201b7fc6 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888100d9c200
[ 2169.736478]  ? ct_kernel_exit.constprop.0+0xa2/0xc0
[ 2169.736954]  ? do_idle+0x285/0x290
[ 2169.737323]  default_idle_call+0x63/0x90
[ 2169.737730]  do_idle+0x285/0x290
[ 2169.738089]  ? arch_cpu_idle_exit+0x30/0x30
[ 2169.738511]  ? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x80
[ 2169.738917]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x12e/0x200
[ 2169.739417]  cpu_startup_entry+0x30/0x40
[ 2169.739825]  start_secondary+0x19a/0x1c0
[ 2169.740229]  ? set_cpu_sibling_map+0xbd0/0xbd0
[ 2169.740673]  secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x15d/0x16b
[ 2169.741179]  </TASK>

[ 2169.741686] Allocated by task 1098:
[ 2169.742058]  kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 2169.742456]  kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
[ 2169.742852]  __kasan_kmalloc+0x83/0x90
[ 2169.743246]  mlx5_dpll_probe+0xf5/0x3c0 [mlx5_dpll]
[ 2169.743730]  auxiliary_bus_probe+0x62/0xb0
[ 2169.744148]  really_probe+0x127/0x590
[ 2169.744534]  __driver_probe_device+0xd2/0x200
[ 2169.744973]  device_driver_attach+0x6b/0xf0
[ 2169.745402]  bind_store+0x90/0xe0
[ 2169.745761]  kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1df/0x2a0
[ 2169.746210]  vfs_write+0x41f/0x790
[ 2169.746579]  ksys_write+0xc7/0x160
[ 2169.746947]  do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x140
[ 2169.747333]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e

[ 2169.748049] Freed by task 1220:
[ 2169.748393]  kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 2169.748789]  kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
[ 2169.749188]  kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x50
[ 2169.749621]  poison_slab_object+0x106/0x180
[ 2169.750044]  __kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x50
[ 2169.750451]  kfree+0x118/0x330
[ 2169.750792]  mlx5_dpll_remove+0xf5/0x110 [mlx5_dpll]
[ 2169.751271]  auxiliary_bus_remove+0x2e/0x40
[ 2169.751694]  device_release_driver_internal+0x24b/0x2e0
[ 2169.752191]  unbind_store+0xa6/0xb0
[ 2169.752563]  kernfs_fo
---truncated---


Budibase is a low code platform for creating internal tools, workflows, and admin panels. Prior to version 3.30.4, an unsafe `eval()` vulnerability in Budibase's view filtering implementation allows any authenticated user (including free tier accounts) to execute arbitrary JavaScript code on the server. This vulnerability ONLY affects Budibase Cloud (SaaS) - self-hosted deployments use native CouchDB views and are not vulnerable. The vulnerability exists in `packages/server/src/db/inMemoryView.ts` where user-controlled view map functions are directly evaluated without sanitization. The primary impact comes from what lives inside the pod's environment: the `app-service` pod runs with secrets baked into its environment variables, including `INTERNAL_API_KEY`, `JWT_SECRET`, CouchDB admin credentials, AWS keys, and more. Using the extracted CouchDB credentials, we verified direct database access, enumerated all tenant databases, and confirmed that user records (email addresses) are readable. Version 3.30.4 contains a patch.


In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: cfg80211: restrict NL80211_ATTR_TXQ_QUANTUM values

syzbot is able to trigger softlockups, setting NL80211_ATTR_TXQ_QUANTUM
to 2^31.

We had a similar issue in sch_fq, fixed with commit
d9e15a273306 ("pkt_sched: fq: do not accept silly TCA_FQ_QUANTUM")

watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 26s! [kworker/1:0:24]
Modules linked in:
irq event stamp: 131135
 hardirqs last  enabled at (131134): [<ffff80008ae8778c>] __exit_to_kernel_mode arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:85 [inline]
 hardirqs last  enabled at (131134): [<ffff80008ae8778c>] exit_to_kernel_mode+0xdc/0x10c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:95
 hardirqs last disabled at (131135): [<ffff80008ae85378>] __el1_irq arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:533 [inline]
 hardirqs last disabled at (131135): [<ffff80008ae85378>] el1_interrupt+0x24/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:551
 softirqs last  enabled at (125892): [<ffff80008907e82c>] neigh_hh_init net/core/neighbour.c:1538 [inline]
 softirqs last  enabled at (125892): [<ffff80008907e82c>] neigh_resolve_output+0x268/0x658 net/core/neighbour.c:1553
 softirqs last disabled at (125896): [<ffff80008904166c>] local_bh_disable+0x10/0x34 include/linux/bottom_half.h:19
CPU: 1 PID: 24 Comm: kworker/1:0 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-gfda5695d692c #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Workqueue: mld mld_ifc_work
pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
 pc : __list_del include/linux/list.h:195 [inline]
 pc : __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:218 [inline]
 pc : list_move_tail include/linux/list.h:310 [inline]
 pc : fq_tin_dequeue include/net/fq_impl.h:112 [inline]
 pc : ieee80211_tx_dequeue+0x6b8/0x3b4c net/mac80211/tx.c:3854
 lr : __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:218 [inline]
 lr : list_move_tail include/linux/list.h:310 [inline]
 lr : fq_tin_dequeue include/net/fq_impl.h:112 [inline]
 lr : ieee80211_tx_dequeue+0x67c/0x3b4c net/mac80211/tx.c:3854
sp : ffff800093d36700
x29: ffff800093d36a60 x28: ffff800093d36960 x27: dfff800000000000
x26: ffff0000d800ad50 x25: ffff0000d800abe0 x24: ffff0000d800abf0
x23: ffff0000e0032468 x22: ffff0000e00324d4 x21: ffff0000d800abf0
x20: ffff0000d800abf8 x19: ffff0000d800abf0 x18: ffff800093d363c0
x17: 000000000000d476 x16: ffff8000805519dc x15: ffff7000127a6cc8
x14: 1ffff000127a6cc8 x13: 0000000000000004 x12: ffffffffffffffff
x11: ffff7000127a6cc8 x10: 0000000000ff0100 x9 : 0000000000000000
x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : ffff80009287aa08 x4 : 0000000000000008 x3 : ffff80008034c7fc
x2 : ffff0000e0032468 x1 : 00000000da0e46b8 x0 : ffff0000e0032470
Call trace:
  __list_del include/linux/list.h:195 [inline]
  __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:218 [inline]
  list_move_tail include/linux/list.h:310 [inline]
  fq_tin_dequeue include/net/fq_impl.h:112 [inline]
  ieee80211_tx_dequeue+0x6b8/0x3b4c net/mac80211/tx.c:3854
  wake_tx_push_queue net/mac80211/util.c:294 [inline]
  ieee80211_handle_wake_tx_queue+0x118/0x274 net/mac80211/util.c:315
  drv_wake_tx_queue net/mac80211/driver-ops.h:1350 [inline]
  schedule_and_wake_txq net/mac80211/driver-ops.h:1357 [inline]
  ieee80211_queue_skb+0x18e8/0x2244 net/mac80211/tx.c:1664
  ieee80211_tx+0x260/0x400 net/mac80211/tx.c:1966
  ieee80211_xmit+0x278/0x354 net/mac80211/tx.c:2062
  __ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xab8/0x122c net/mac80211/tx.c:4338
  ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xe0/0x438 net/mac80211/tx.c:4532
  __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4903 [inline]
  netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4917 [inline]
  xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3531 [inline]
  dev_hard_start_xmit+0x27c/0x938 net/core/dev.c:3547
  __dev_queue_xmit+0x1678/0x33fc net/core/dev.c:4341
  dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3091 [inline]
  neigh_resolve_output+0x558/0x658 net/core/neighbour.c:1563
  neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:542 [inline]
  ip6_fini
---truncated---


An exploitable code execution vulnerability exists in the rendering functionality of Nitro Pro 13.13.2.242 and 13.16.2.300. When drawing the contents of a page and selecting the stroke color from an 'ICCBased' colorspace, the application will read a length from the file and use it as a loop sentinel when writing data into the member of an object. Due to the object member being a buffer of a static size allocated on the heap, this can result in a heap-based buffer overflow. A specially crafted document must be loaded by a victim in order to trigger this vulnerability.


In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

crypto: ccp - Fix null pointer dereference in __sev_platform_shutdown_locked

The SEV platform device can be shutdown with a null psp_master,
e.g., using DEBUG_TEST_DRIVER_REMOVE.  Found using KASAN:

[  137.148210] ccp 0000:23:00.1: enabling device (0000 -> 0002)
[  137.162647] ccp 0000:23:00.1: no command queues available
[  137.170598] ccp 0000:23:00.1: sev enabled
[  137.174645] ccp 0000:23:00.1: psp enabled
[  137.178890] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000001e: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI
[  137.182693] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000f0-0x00000000000000f7]
[  137.182693] CPU: 93 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1+ #311
[  137.182693] RIP: 0010:__sev_platform_shutdown_locked+0x51/0x180
[  137.182693] Code: 08 80 3c 08 00 0f 85 0e 01 00 00 48 8b 1d 67 b6 01 08 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d bb f0 00 00 00 48 89 f9 48 c1 e9 03 <80> 3c 01 00 0f 85 fe 00 00 00 48 8b 9b f0 00 00 00 48 85 db 74 2c
[  137.182693] RSP: 0018:ffffc900000cf9b0 EFLAGS: 00010216
[  137.182693] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000000001e
[  137.182693] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 00000000000000f0
[  137.182693] RBP: ffffc900000cf9c8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff58f5a66
[  137.182693] R10: ffffc900000cf9c8 R11: ffffffffac7ad32f R12: ffff8881e5052c28
[  137.182693] R13: ffff8881e5052c28 R14: ffff8881758e43e8 R15: ffffffffac64abf8
[  137.182693] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff889de7000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  137.182693] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  137.182693] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000001cf7c7e000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
[  137.182693] Call Trace:
[  137.182693]  <TASK>
[  137.182693]  ? show_regs+0x6c/0x80
[  137.182693]  ? __die_body+0x24/0x70
[  137.182693]  ? die_addr+0x4b/0x80
[  137.182693]  ? exc_general_protection+0x126/0x230
[  137.182693]  ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x2b/0x30
[  137.182693]  ? __sev_platform_shutdown_locked+0x51/0x180
[  137.182693]  sev_firmware_shutdown.isra.0+0x1e/0x80
[  137.182693]  sev_dev_destroy+0x49/0x100
[  137.182693]  psp_dev_destroy+0x47/0xb0
[  137.182693]  sp_destroy+0xbb/0x240
[  137.182693]  sp_pci_remove+0x45/0x60
[  137.182693]  pci_device_remove+0xaa/0x1d0
[  137.182693]  device_remove+0xc7/0x170
[  137.182693]  really_probe+0x374/0xbe0
[  137.182693]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  137.182693]  __driver_probe_device+0x199/0x460
[  137.182693]  driver_probe_device+0x4e/0xd0
[  137.182693]  __driver_attach+0x191/0x3d0
[  137.182693]  ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
[  137.182693]  bus_for_each_dev+0x100/0x190
[  137.182693]  ? __pfx_bus_for_each_dev+0x10/0x10
[  137.182693]  ? __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20
[  137.182693]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  137.182693]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x50
[  137.182693]  driver_attach+0x41/0x60
[  137.182693]  bus_add_driver+0x2a8/0x580
[  137.182693]  driver_register+0x141/0x480
[  137.182693]  __pci_register_driver+0x1d6/0x2a0
[  137.182693]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  137.182693]  ? esrt_sysfs_init+0x1cd/0x5d0
[  137.182693]  ? __pfx_sp_mod_init+0x10/0x10
[  137.182693]  sp_pci_init+0x22/0x30
[  137.182693]  sp_mod_init+0x14/0x30
[  137.182693]  ? __pfx_sp_mod_init+0x10/0x10
[  137.182693]  do_one_initcall+0xd1/0x470
[  137.182693]  ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10
[  137.182693]  ? parameq+0x80/0xf0
[  137.182693]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  137.182693]  ? __kmalloc+0x3b0/0x4e0
[  137.182693]  ? kernel_init_freeable+0x92d/0x1050
[  137.182693]  ? kasan_populate_vmalloc_pte+0x171/0x190
[  137.182693]  ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[  137.182693]  kernel_init_freeable+0xa64/0x1050
[  137.182693]  ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10
[  137.182693]  kernel_init+0x24/0x160
[  137.182693]  ? __switch_to_asm+0x3e/0x70
[  137.182693]  ret_from_fork+0x40/0x80
[  137.182693]  ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x1
---truncated---


In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: atm: fix crash due to unvalidated vcc pointer in sigd_send()

Reproducer available at [1].

The ATM send path (sendmsg -> vcc_sendmsg -> sigd_send) reads the vcc
pointer from msg->vcc and uses it directly without any validation. This
pointer comes from userspace via sendmsg() and can be arbitrarily forged:

    int fd = socket(AF_ATMSVC, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
    ioctl(fd, ATMSIGD_CTRL);  // become ATM signaling daemon
    struct msghdr msg = { .msg_iov = &iov, ... };
    *(unsigned long *)(buf + 4) = 0xdeadbeef;  // fake vcc pointer
    sendmsg(fd, &msg, 0);  // kernel dereferences 0xdeadbeef

In normal operation, the kernel sends the vcc pointer to the signaling
daemon via sigd_enq() when processing operations like connect(), bind(),
or listen(). The daemon is expected to return the same pointer when
responding. However, a malicious daemon can send arbitrary pointer values.

Fix this by introducing find_get_vcc() which validates the pointer by
searching through vcc_hash (similar to how sigd_close() iterates over
all VCCs), and acquires a reference via sock_hold() if found.

Since struct atm_vcc embeds struct sock as its first member, they share
the same lifetime. Therefore using sock_hold/sock_put is sufficient to
keep the vcc alive while it is being used.

Note that there may be a race with sigd_close() which could mark the vcc
with various flags (e.g., ATM_VF_RELEASED) after find_get_vcc() returns.
However, sock_hold() guarantees the memory remains valid, so this race
only affects the logical state, not memory safety.

[1]: https://gist.github.com/mrpre/1ba5949c45529c511152e2f4c755b0f3


In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Defer work in bpf_timer_cancel_and_free

Currently, the same case as previous patch (two timer callbacks trying
to cancel each other) can be invoked through bpf_map_update_elem as
well, or more precisely, freeing map elements containing timers. Since
this relies on hrtimer_cancel as well, it is prone to the same deadlock
situation as the previous patch.

It would be sufficient to use hrtimer_try_to_cancel to fix this problem,
as the timer cannot be enqueued after async_cancel_and_free. Once
async_cancel_and_free has been done, the timer must be reinitialized
before it can be armed again. The callback running in parallel trying to
arm the timer will fail, and freeing bpf_hrtimer without waiting is
sufficient (given kfree_rcu), and bpf_timer_cb will return
HRTIMER_NORESTART, preventing the timer from being rearmed again.

However, there exists a UAF scenario where the callback arms the timer
before entering this function, such that if cancellation fails (due to
timer callback invoking this routine, or the target timer callback
running concurrently). In such a case, if the timer expiration is
significantly far in the future, the RCU grace period expiration
happening before it will free the bpf_hrtimer state and along with it
the struct hrtimer, that is enqueued.

Hence, it is clear cancellation needs to occur after
async_cancel_and_free, and yet it cannot be done inline due to deadlock
issues. We thus modify bpf_timer_cancel_and_free to defer work to the
global workqueue, adding a work_struct alongside rcu_head (both used at
_different_ points of time, so can share space).

Update existing code comments to reflect the new state of affairs.


In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/smc: do not leave a dangling sk pointer in __smc_create()

Thanks to commit 4bbd360a5084 ("socket: Print pf->create() when
it does not clear sock->sk on failure."), syzbot found an issue with AF_SMC:

smc_create must clear sock->sk on failure, family: 43, type: 1, protocol: 0
 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5827 at net/socket.c:1565 __sock_create+0x96f/0xa30 net/socket.c:1563
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5827 Comm: syz-executor259 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-next-20241106-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
 RIP: 0010:__sock_create+0x96f/0xa30 net/socket.c:1563
Code: 03 00 74 08 4c 89 e7 e8 4f 3b 85 f8 49 8b 34 24 48 c7 c7 40 89 0c 8d 8b 54 24 04 8b 4c 24 0c 44 8b 44 24 08 e8 32 78 db f7 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 e9 d3 fd ff ff 89 e9 80 e1 07 fe c1 38 c1 0f 8c ee f7
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003e4fda0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 099c6f938c7f4700 RBX: 1ffffffff1a595fd RCX: ffff888034823c00
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 00000000ffffffe9 R08: ffffffff81567052 R09: 1ffff920007c9f50
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff520007c9f51 R12: ffffffff8d2cafe8
R13: 1ffffffff1a595fe R14: ffffffff9a789c40 R15: ffff8880764298c0
FS:  000055557b518380(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fa62ff43225 CR3: 0000000031628000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
  sock_create net/socket.c:1616 [inline]
  __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1653 [inline]
  __sys_socket+0x150/0x3c0 net/socket.c:1700
  __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1714 [inline]
  __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1712 [inline]

For reference, see commit 2d859aff775d ("Merge branch
'do-not-leave-dangling-sk-pointers-in-pf-create-functions'")


Envoy is an open source L7 proxy and communication bus designed for large modern service oriented architectures. In affected versions Envoy transitions a H/2 connection to the CLOSED state when it receives a GOAWAY frame without any streams outstanding. The connection state is transitioned to DRAINING when it receives a SETTING frame with the SETTINGS_MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS parameter set to 0. Receiving these two frames in the same I/O event results in abnormal termination of the Envoy process due to invalid state transition from CLOSED to DRAINING. A sequence of H/2 frames delivered by an untrusted upstream server will result in Denial of Service in the presence of untrusted **upstream** servers. Envoy versions 1.19.1, 1.18.4 contain fixes to stop processing of pending H/2 frames after connection transition to the CLOSED state.


`gix-path` is a crate of the `gitoxide` project (an implementation of `git` written in Rust) dealing paths and their conversions. Prior to version 0.10.11, `gix-path` runs `git` to find the path of a configuration file associated with the `git` installation, but improperly resolves paths containing unusual or non-ASCII characters, in rare cases enabling a local attacker to inject configuration leading to code execution. Version 0.10.11 contains a patch for the issue.

In `gix_path::env`, the underlying implementation of the `installation_config` and `installation_config_prefix` functions calls `git config -l --show-origin` to find the path of a file to treat as belonging to the `git` installation. Affected versions of `gix-path` do not pass `-z`/`--null` to cause `git` to report literal paths. Instead, to cover the occasional case that `git` outputs a quoted path, they attempt to parse the path by stripping the quotation marks. The problem is that, when a path is quoted, it may change in substantial ways beyond the concatenation of quotation marks. If not reversed, these changes can result in another valid path that is not equivalent to the original.

On a single-user system, it is not possible to exploit this, unless `GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM` and `GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL` have been set to unusual values or Git has been installed in an unusual way. Such a scenario is not expected. Exploitation is unlikely even on a multi-user system, though it is plausible in some uncommon configurations or use cases. In general, exploitation is more likely to succeed if users are expected to install `git` themselves, and are likely to do so in predictable locations; locations where `git` is installed, whether due to usernames in their paths or otherwise, contain characters that `git` quotes by default in paths, such as non-English letters and accented letters; a custom `system`-scope configuration file is specified with the `GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM` environment variable, and its path is in an unusual location or has strangely named components; or a `system`-scope configuration file is absent, empty, or suppressed by means other than `GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM`. Currently, `gix-path` can treat a `global`-scope configuration file as belonging to the installation if no higher scope configuration file is available. This increases the likelihood of exploitation even on a system where `git` is installed system-wide in an ordinary way. However, exploitation is expected to be very difficult even under any combination of those factors.


Deserialization of Untrusted Data, Improper Input Validation vulnerability in Apache UIMA Java SDK, Apache UIMA Java SDK, Apache UIMA Java SDK, Apache UIMA Java SDK.This issue affects Apache UIMA Java SDK: before 3.5.0.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.5.0, which fixes the issue.

There are several locations in the code where serialized Java objects are deserialized without verifying the data. This affects in particular:
  *  the deserialization of a Java-serialized CAS, but also other binary CAS formats that include TSI information using the CasIOUtils class;
  *  the CAS Editor Eclipse plugin which uses the the CasIOUtils class to load data;
  *  the deserialization of a Java-serialized CAS of the Vinci Analysis Engine service which can receive using Java-serialized CAS objects over network connections;
  *  the CasAnnotationViewerApplet and the CasTreeViewerApplet;
  *  the checkpointing feature of the CPE module.

Note that the UIMA framework by default does not start any remotely accessible services (i.e. Vinci) that would be vulnerable to this issue. A user or developer would need to make an active choice to start such a service. However, users or developers may use the CasIOUtils in their own applications and services to parse serialized CAS data. They are affected by this issue unless they ensure that the data passed to CasIOUtils is not a serialized Java object.

When using Vinci or using CasIOUtils in own services/applications, the unrestricted deserialization of Java-serialized CAS files may allow arbitrary (remote) code execution.

As a remedy, it is possible to set up a global or context-specific ObjectInputFilter (cf.  https://openjdk.org/jeps/290  and  https://openjdk.org/jeps/415 ) if running UIMA on a Java version that supports it.

Note that Java 1.8 does not support the ObjectInputFilter, so there is no remedy when running on this out-of-support platform. An upgrade to a recent Java version is strongly recommended if you need to secure an UIMA version that is affected by this issue.

To mitigate the issue on a Java 9+ platform, you can configure a filter pattern through the "jdk.serialFilter" system property using a semicolon as a separator:

To allow deserializing Java-serialized binary CASes, add the classes:
  *  org.apache.uima.cas.impl.CASCompleteSerializer
  *  org.apache.uima.cas.impl.CASMgrSerializer
  *  org.apache.uima.cas.impl.CASSerializer
  *  java.lang.String

To allow deserializing CPE Checkpoint data, add the following classes (and any custom classes your application uses to store its checkpoints):
  *  org.apache.uima.collection.impl.cpm.CheckpointData
  *  org.apache.uima.util.ProcessTrace
  *  org.apache.uima.util.impl.ProcessTrace_impl
  *  org.apache.uima.collection.base_cpm.SynchPoint

Make sure to use "!*" as the final component to the filter pattern to disallow deserialization of any classes not listed in the pattern.

Apache UIMA 3.5.0 uses tightly scoped ObjectInputFilters when reading Java-serialized data depending on the type of data being expected. Configuring a global filter is not necessary with this version.


In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tracing/hist: Fix out-of-bound write on 'action_data.var_ref_idx'

When generate a synthetic event with many params and then create a trace
action for it [1], kernel panic happened [2].

It is because that in trace_action_create() 'data->n_params' is up to
SYNTH_FIELDS_MAX (current value is 64), and array 'data->var_ref_idx'
keeps indices into array 'hist_data->var_refs' for each synthetic event
param, but the length of 'data->var_ref_idx' is TRACING_MAP_VARS_MAX
(current value is 16), so out-of-bound write happened when 'data->n_params'
more than 16. In this case, 'data->match_data.event' is overwritten and
eventually cause the panic.

To solve the issue, adjust the length of 'data->var_ref_idx' to be
SYNTH_FIELDS_MAX and add sanity checks to avoid out-of-bound write.

[1]
 # cd /sys/kernel/tracing/
 # echo "my_synth_event int v1; int v2; int v3; int v4; int v5; int v6;\
int v7; int v8; int v9; int v10; int v11; int v12; int v13; int v14;\
int v15; int v16; int v17; int v18; int v19; int v20; int v21; int v22;\
int v23; int v24; int v25; int v26; int v27; int v28; int v29; int v30;\
int v31; int v32; int v33; int v34; int v35; int v36; int v37; int v38;\
int v39; int v40; int v41; int v42; int v43; int v44; int v45; int v46;\
int v47; int v48; int v49; int v50; int v51; int v52; int v53; int v54;\
int v55; int v56; int v57; int v58; int v59; int v60; int v61; int v62;\
int v63" >> synthetic_events
 # echo 'hist:keys=pid:ts0=common_timestamp.usecs if comm=="bash"' >> \
events/sched/sched_waking/trigger
 # echo "hist:keys=next_pid:onmatch(sched.sched_waking).my_synth_event(\
pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,\
pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,\
pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,\
pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid,pid)" >> events/sched/sched_switch/trigger

[2]
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff91c900000000
PGD 61001067 P4D 61001067 PUD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 2 PID: 322 Comm: bash Tainted: G        W          6.1.0-rc8+ #229
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:strcmp+0xc/0x30
Code: 75 f7 31 d2 44 0f b6 04 16 44 88 04 11 48 83 c2 01 45 84 c0 75 ee
c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 00 31 c0 eb 08 48 83 c0 01 84 d2 74 13 <0f> b6 14
07 3a 14 06 74 ef 19 c0 83 c8 01 c3 cc cc cc cc 31 c3
RSP: 0018:ffff9b3b00f53c48 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffba958a68 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: ffff91c943d33a90 RDI: ffff91c900000000
RBP: ffff91c900000000 R08: 00000018d604b529 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff91c9483eddb1 R11: ffff91ca483eddab R12: ffff91c946171580
R13: ffff91c9479f0538 R14: ffff91c9457c2848 R15: ffff91c9479f0538
FS:  00007f1d1cfbe740(0000) GS:ffff91c9bdc80000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffff91c900000000 CR3: 0000000006316000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __find_event_file+0x55/0x90
 action_create+0x76c/0x1060
 event_hist_trigger_parse+0x146d/0x2060
 ? event_trigger_write+0x31/0xd0
 trigger_process_regex+0xbb/0x110
 event_trigger_write+0x6b/0xd0
 vfs_write+0xc8/0x3e0
 ? alloc_fd+0xc0/0x160
 ? preempt_count_add+0x4d/0xa0
 ? preempt_count_add+0x70/0xa0
 ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f1d1d0cf077
Code: 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb bb 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e
fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00
f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74
RSP: 002b:00007ffcebb0e568 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000143 RCX: 00007f1d1d0cf077
RDX: 0000000000000143 RSI: 00005639265aa7e0 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 00005639265aa7e0 R08: 000000000000000a R09: 0000000000000142
R
---truncated---


In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: core: Remove the /proc/scsi/${proc_name} directory earlier

Remove the /proc/scsi/${proc_name} directory earlier to fix a race
condition between unloading and reloading kernel modules. This fixes a bug
introduced in 2009 by commit 77c019768f06 ("[SCSI] fix /proc memory leak in
the SCSI core").

Fix the following kernel warning:

proc_dir_entry 'scsi/scsi_debug' already registered
WARNING: CPU: 19 PID: 27986 at fs/proc/generic.c:376 proc_register+0x27d/0x2e0
Call Trace:
 proc_mkdir+0xb5/0xe0
 scsi_proc_hostdir_add+0xb5/0x170
 scsi_host_alloc+0x683/0x6c0
 sdebug_driver_probe+0x6b/0x2d0 [scsi_debug]
 really_probe+0x159/0x540
 __driver_probe_device+0xdc/0x230
 driver_probe_device+0x4f/0x120
 __device_attach_driver+0xef/0x180
 bus_for_each_drv+0xe5/0x130
 __device_attach+0x127/0x290
 device_initial_probe+0x17/0x20
 bus_probe_device+0x110/0x130
 device_add+0x673/0xc80
 device_register+0x1e/0x30
 sdebug_add_host_helper+0x1a7/0x3b0 [scsi_debug]
 scsi_debug_init+0x64f/0x1000 [scsi_debug]
 do_one_initcall+0xd7/0x470
 do_init_module+0xe7/0x330
 load_module+0x122a/0x12c0
 __do_sys_finit_module+0x124/0x1a0
 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x46/0x50
 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0


TensorFlow is an end-to-end open source platform for machine learning. An attacker can trigger undefined behavior by binding to null pointer in `tf.raw_ops.ParameterizedTruncatedNormal`. This is because the implementation(https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/3f6fe4dfef6f57e768260b48166c27d148f3015f/tensorflow/core/kernels/parameterized_truncated_normal_op.cc#L630) does not validate input arguments before accessing the first element of `shape`. If `shape` argument is empty, then `shape_tensor.flat<T>()` is an empty array. The fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.5.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.4.2, TensorFlow 2.3.3, TensorFlow 2.2.3 and TensorFlow 2.1.4, as these are also affected and still in supported range.


TensorFlow is an end-to-end open source platform for machine learning. An attacker can write outside the bounds of heap allocated arrays by passing invalid arguments to `tf.raw_ops.Dilation2DBackpropInput`. This is because the implementation(https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/afd954e65f15aea4d438d0a219136fc4a63a573d/tensorflow/core/kernels/dilation_ops.cc#L321-L322) does not validate before writing to the output array. The values for `h_out` and `w_out` are guaranteed to be in range for `out_backprop` (as they are loop indices bounded by the size of the array). However, there are no similar guarantees relating `h_in_max`/`w_in_max` and `in_backprop`. The fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.5.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.4.2, TensorFlow 2.3.3, TensorFlow 2.2.3 and TensorFlow 2.1.4, as these are also affected and still in supported range.


Vulnerability in the Oracle VM VirtualBox product of Oracle Virtualization (component: Core). Supported versions that are affected are Prior to 5.2.44, prior to 6.0.24 and prior to 6.1.12. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with logon to the infrastructure where Oracle VM VirtualBox executes to compromise Oracle VM VirtualBox. Successful attacks require human interaction from a person other than the attacker. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle VM VirtualBox. Note: The CVE-2020-14711 is applicable to macOS host only. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.5 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).


authentik is an open-source Identity Provider. Prior to versions 2023.4.3 and 2023.5.5, authentik does not verify the source of the X-Forwarded-For and X-Real-IP headers, both in the Python code and the go code. Only authentik setups that are directly accessible by users without a reverse proxy are susceptible to this. Possible spoofing of IP addresses in logs, downstream applications proxied by (built in) outpost, IP bypassing in custom flows if used.

This poses a possible security risk when someone has flows or policies that check the user's IP address, e.g. when they want to ignore the user's 2 factor authentication when the user is connected to the company network. A second security risk is that the IP addresses in the logfiles and user sessions are not reliable anymore. Anybody can spoof this address and one cannot verify that the user has logged in from the IP address that is in their account's log. A third risk is that this header is passed on to the proxied application behind an outpost. The application may do any kind of verification, logging, blocking or rate limiting based on the IP address, and this IP address can be overridden by anybody that want to.

Versions 2023.4.3 and 2023.5.5 contain a patch for this issue.


In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

block: Fix possible memory leak for rq_wb on add_disk failure

kmemleak reported memory leaks in device_add_disk():

kmemleak: 3 new suspected memory leaks

unreferenced object 0xffff88800f420800 (size 512):
  comm "modprobe", pid 4275, jiffies 4295639067 (age 223.512s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    04 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    00 e1 f5 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
  backtrace:
    [<00000000d3662699>] kmalloc_trace+0x26/0x60
    [<00000000edc7aadc>] wbt_init+0x50/0x6f0
    [<0000000069601d16>] wbt_enable_default+0x157/0x1c0
    [<0000000028fc393f>] blk_register_queue+0x2a4/0x420
    [<000000007345a042>] device_add_disk+0x6fd/0xe40
    [<0000000060e6aab0>] nbd_dev_add+0x828/0xbf0 [nbd]
    ...

It is because the memory allocated in wbt_enable_default() is not
released in device_add_disk() error path.
Normally, these memory are freed in:

del_gendisk()
  rq_qos_exit()
    rqos->ops->exit(rqos);
      wbt_exit()

So rq_qos_exit() is called to free the rq_wb memory for wbt_init().
However in the error path of device_add_disk(), only
blk_unregister_queue() is called and make rq_wb memory leaked.

Add rq_qos_exit() to the error path to fix it.


Prism is vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting. The easing preview of the Previewers plugin has an XSS vulnerability that allows attackers to execute arbitrary code in Safari and Internet Explorer. This impacts all Safari and Internet Explorer users of Prism >=v1.1.0 that use the _Previewers_ plugin (>=v1.10.0) or the _Previewer: Easing_ plugin (v1.1.0 to v1.9.0). This problem is fixed in version 1.21.0. To workaround the issue without upgrading, disable the easing preview on all impacted code blocks. You need Prism v1.10.0 or newer to apply this workaround.


In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

powerpc/qspinlock: Fix deadlock in MCS queue

If an interrupt occurs in queued_spin_lock_slowpath() after we increment
qnodesp->count and before node->lock is initialized, another CPU might
see stale lock values in get_tail_qnode(). If the stale lock value happens
to match the lock on that CPU, then we write to the "next" pointer of
the wrong qnode. This causes a deadlock as the former CPU, once it becomes
the head of the MCS queue, will spin indefinitely until it's "next" pointer
is set by its successor in the queue.

Running stress-ng on a 16 core (16EC/16VP) shared LPAR, results in
occasional lockups similar to the following:

   $ stress-ng --all 128 --vm-bytes 80% --aggressive \
               --maximize --oomable --verify  --syslog \
               --metrics  --times  --timeout 5m

   watchdog: CPU 15 Hard LOCKUP
   ......
   NIP [c0000000000b78f4] queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x1184/0x1490
   LR [c000000001037c5c] _raw_spin_lock+0x6c/0x90
   Call Trace:
    0xc000002cfffa3bf0 (unreliable)
    _raw_spin_lock+0x6c/0x90
    raw_spin_rq_lock_nested.part.135+0x4c/0xd0
    sched_ttwu_pending+0x60/0x1f0
    __flush_smp_call_function_queue+0x1dc/0x670
    smp_ipi_demux_relaxed+0xa4/0x100
    xive_muxed_ipi_action+0x20/0x40
    __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x80/0x240
    handle_irq_event_percpu+0x2c/0x80
    handle_percpu_irq+0x84/0xd0
    generic_handle_irq+0x54/0x80
    __do_irq+0xac/0x210
    __do_IRQ+0x74/0xd0
    0x0
    do_IRQ+0x8c/0x170
    hardware_interrupt_common_virt+0x29c/0x2a0
   --- interrupt: 500 at queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x4b8/0x1490
   ......
   NIP [c0000000000b6c28] queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x4b8/0x1490
   LR [c000000001037c5c] _raw_spin_lock+0x6c/0x90
   --- interrupt: 500
    0xc0000029c1a41d00 (unreliable)
    _raw_spin_lock+0x6c/0x90
    futex_wake+0x100/0x260
    do_futex+0x21c/0x2a0
    sys_futex+0x98/0x270
    system_call_exception+0x14c/0x2f0
    system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec

The following code flow illustrates how the deadlock occurs.
For the sake of brevity, assume that both locks (A and B) are
contended and we call the queued_spin_lock_slowpath() function.

        CPU0                                   CPU1
        ----                                   ----
  spin_lock_irqsave(A)                          |
  spin_unlock_irqrestore(A)                     |
    spin_lock(B)                                |
         |                                      |
         ▼                                      |
   id = qnodesp->count++;                       |
  (Note that nodes[0].lock == A)                |
         |                                      |
         ▼                                      |
      Interrupt                                 |
  (happens before "nodes[0].lock = B")          |
         |                                      |
         ▼                                      |
  spin_lock_irqsave(A)                          |
         |                                      |
         ▼                                      |
   id = qnodesp->count++                        |
   nodes[1].lock = A                            |
         |                                      |
         ▼                                      |
  Tail of MCS queue                             |
         |                             spin_lock_irqsave(A)
         ▼                                      |
  Head of MCS queue                             ▼
         |                             CPU0 is previous tail
         ▼                                      |
   Spin indefinitely                            ▼
  (until "nodes[1].next != NULL")      prev = get_tail_qnode(A, CPU0)
                                                |
                                                ▼
                                       prev == &qnodes[CPU0].nodes[0]
                                     (as qnodes
---truncated---


Vulnerability in the Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition product of Oracle Java SE (component: Libraries).  Supported versions that are affected are Oracle Java SE: 8u361, 8u361-perf, 11.0.18, 17.0.6, 20; Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 20.3.8, 21.3.4 and  22.3.0. Difficult to exploit vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition.  Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in  unauthorized update, insert or delete access to some of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition accessible data. Note: This vulnerability applies to Java deployments, typically in clients running sandboxed Java Web Start applications or sandboxed Java applets, that load and run untrusted code (e.g., code that comes from the internet) and rely on the Java sandbox for security. This vulnerability does not apply to Java deployments, typically in servers, that load and run only trusted code (e.g., code installed by an administrator). CVSS 3.1 Base Score 3.7 (Integrity impacts).  CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N).


In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

RDMA/rtrs-clt: destroy sysfs after removing session from active list

A session can be removed dynamically by sysfs interface "remove_path" that
eventually calls rtrs_clt_remove_path_from_sysfs function.  The current
rtrs_clt_remove_path_from_sysfs first removes the sysfs interfaces and
frees sess->stats object. Second it removes the session from the active
list.

Therefore some functions could access non-connected session and access the
freed sess->stats object even-if they check the session status before
accessing the session.

For instance rtrs_clt_request and get_next_path_min_inflight check the
session status and try to send IO to the session.  The session status
could be changed when they are trying to send IO but they could not catch
the change and update the statistics information in sess->stats object,
and generate use-after-free problem.
(see: "RDMA/rtrs-clt: Check state of the rtrs_clt_sess before reading its
stats")

This patch changes the rtrs_clt_remove_path_from_sysfs to remove the
session from the active session list and then destroy the sysfs
interfaces.

Each function still should check the session status because closing or
error recovery paths can change the status.


In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ocfs2: fix NULL pointer dereference in ocfs2_journal_dirty()

bdev->bd_super has been removed and commit 8887b94d9322 change the usage
from bdev->bd_super to b_assoc_map->host->i_sb.  This introduces the
following NULL pointer dereference in ocfs2_journal_dirty() since
b_assoc_map is still not initialized.  This can be easily reproduced by
running xfstests generic/186, which simulate no more credits.

[  134.351592] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
...
[  134.355341] RIP: 0010:ocfs2_journal_dirty+0x14f/0x160 [ocfs2]
...
[  134.365071] Call Trace:
[  134.365312]  <TASK>
[  134.365524]  ? __die_body+0x1e/0x60
[  134.365868]  ? page_fault_oops+0x13d/0x4f0
[  134.366265]  ? __pfx_bit_wait_io+0x10/0x10
[  134.366659]  ? schedule+0x27/0xb0
[  134.366981]  ? exc_page_fault+0x6a/0x140
[  134.367356]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
[  134.367762]  ? ocfs2_journal_dirty+0x14f/0x160 [ocfs2]
[  134.368305]  ? ocfs2_journal_dirty+0x13d/0x160 [ocfs2]
[  134.368837]  ocfs2_create_new_meta_bhs.isra.51+0x139/0x2e0 [ocfs2]
[  134.369454]  ocfs2_grow_tree+0x688/0x8a0 [ocfs2]
[  134.369927]  ocfs2_split_and_insert.isra.67+0x35c/0x4a0 [ocfs2]
[  134.370521]  ocfs2_split_extent+0x314/0x4d0 [ocfs2]
[  134.371019]  ocfs2_change_extent_flag+0x174/0x410 [ocfs2]
[  134.371566]  ocfs2_add_refcount_flag+0x3fa/0x630 [ocfs2]
[  134.372117]  ocfs2_reflink_remap_extent+0x21b/0x4c0 [ocfs2]
[  134.372994]  ? inode_update_timestamps+0x4a/0x120
[  134.373692]  ? __pfx_ocfs2_journal_access_di+0x10/0x10 [ocfs2]
[  134.374545]  ? __pfx_ocfs2_journal_access_di+0x10/0x10 [ocfs2]
[  134.375393]  ocfs2_reflink_remap_blocks+0xe4/0x4e0 [ocfs2]
[  134.376197]  ocfs2_remap_file_range+0x1de/0x390 [ocfs2]
[  134.376971]  ? security_file_permission+0x29/0x50
[  134.377644]  vfs_clone_file_range+0xfe/0x320
[  134.378268]  ioctl_file_clone+0x45/0xa0
[  134.378853]  do_vfs_ioctl+0x457/0x990
[  134.379422]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x6e/0xd0
[  134.379987]  do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x170
[  134.380550]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  134.381231] RIP: 0033:0x7fa4926397cb
[  134.381786] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d bd 56 38 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 8d 56 38 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[  134.383930] RSP: 002b:00007ffc2b39f7b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[  134.384854] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007fa4926397cb
[  134.385734] RDX: 00007ffc2b39f7f0 RSI: 000000004020940d RDI: 0000000000000003
[  134.386606] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00111a82a4f015bb R09: 00007fa494221000
[  134.387476] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[  134.388342] R13: 0000000000f10000 R14: 0000558e844e2ac8 R15: 0000000000f10000
[  134.389207]  </TASK>

Fix it by only aborting transaction and journal in ocfs2_journal_dirty()
now, and leave ocfs2_abort() later when detecting an aborted handle,
e.g. start next transaction. Also log the handle details in this case.


OpenSTAManager is an open source management software for technical assistance and invoicing. OpenSTAManager v2.9.8 and earlier contains Reflected XSS vulnerabilities in invoice/order/contract modification modals. The application fails to properly sanitize user-supplied input from the righe GET parameter before reflecting it in HTML output.The $_GET['righe'] parameter is directly echoed into the HTML value attribute without any sanitization using htmlspecialchars() or equivalent functions. This allows an attacker to break out of the attribute context and inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript.


In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: ufs: ufs-qcom: Fix UFS OCP issue during UFS power down (PC=3)

According to UFS specifications, the power-off sequence for a UFS device
includes:

 - Sending an SSU command with Power_Condition=3 and await a response.

 - Asserting RST_N low.

 - Turning off REF_CLK.

 - Turning off VCC.

 - Turning off VCCQ/VCCQ2.

As part of ufs shutdown, after the SSU command completion, asserting
hardware reset (HWRST) triggers the device firmware to wake up and
execute its reset routine. This routine initializes hardware blocks and
takes a few milliseconds to complete. During this time, the ICCQ draws a
large current.

This large ICCQ current may cause issues for the regulator which is
supplying power to UFS, because the turn off request from UFS driver to
the regulator framework will be immediately followed by low power
mode(LPM) request by regulator framework. This is done by framework
because UFS which is the only client is requesting for disable. So if
the rail is still in the process of shutting down while ICCQ exceeds LPM
current thresholds, and LPM mode is activated in hardware during this
state, it may trigger an overcurrent protection (OCP) fault in the
regulator.

To prevent this, a 10ms delay is added after asserting HWRST. This
allows the reset operation to complete while power rails remain active
and in high-power mode.

Currently there is no way for Host to query whether the reset is
completed or not and hence this the delay is based on experiments with
Qualcomm UFS controllers across multiple UFS vendors.


Tekton Pipelines project provides k8s-style resources for declaring CI/CD-style pipelines. Versions 0.60.0 through 1.0.0, 1.1.0 through 1.3.2, 1.4.0 through 1.6.0, 1.7.0 through 1.9.0, 1.10.0, and 1.10.1 have a denial-of-service vulnerability in that allows any user who can create a TaskRun or PipelineRun to crash the controller cluster-wide by setting .spec.taskRef.resolver (or .spec.pipelineRef.resolver) to a string of 31+ characters. The crash occurs because GenerateDeterministicNameFromSpec produces a name exceeding the 63-character DNS-1123 label limit, and its truncation logic panics on a [-1] slice bound since the generated name contains no spaces. Once crashed, the controller enters a CrashLoopBackOff on restart (as it re-reconciles the offending resource), blocking all CI/CD reconciliation until the resource is manually deleted. Built-in resolvers (git, cluster, bundles, hub) are unaffected due to their short names, but any custom resolver name triggers the bug. The fix truncates the resolver-name prefix instead of the full string, preserving the hash suffix for determinism and uniqueness. This issue has been patched in versions 1.0.1, 1.3.3, 1.6.1, 1.9.2 and 1.10.2.


In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

md: don't dereference mddev after export_rdev()

Except for initial reference, mddev->kobject is referenced by
rdev->kobject, and if the last rdev is freed, there is no guarantee that
mddev is still valid. Hence mddev should not be used anymore after
export_rdev().

This problem can be triggered by following test for mdadm at very
low rate:

New file: mdadm/tests/23rdev-lifetime

devname=${dev0##*/}
devt=`cat /sys/block/$devname/dev`
pid=""
runtime=2

clean_up_test() {
        pill -9 $pid
        echo clear > /sys/block/md0/md/array_state
}

trap 'clean_up_test' EXIT

add_by_sysfs() {
        while true; do
                echo $devt > /sys/block/md0/md/new_dev
        done
}

remove_by_sysfs(){
        while true; do
                echo remove > /sys/block/md0/md/dev-${devname}/state
        done
}

echo md0 > /sys/module/md_mod/parameters/new_array || die "create md0 failed"

add_by_sysfs &
pid="$pid $!"

remove_by_sysfs &
pid="$pid $!"

sleep $runtime
exit 0

Test cmd:

./test --save-logs --logdir=/tmp/ --keep-going --dev=loop --tests=23rdev-lifetime

Test result:

general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6bcb: 0000 [#4] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 0 PID: 1292 Comm: test Tainted: G      D W          6.5.0-rc2-00121-g01e55c376936 #562
RIP: 0010:md_wakeup_thread+0x9e/0x320 [md_mod]
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 mddev_unlock+0x1b6/0x310 [md_mod]
 rdev_attr_store+0xec/0x190 [md_mod]
 sysfs_kf_write+0x52/0x70
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x19a/0x2a0
 vfs_write+0x3b5/0x770
 ksys_write+0x74/0x150
 __x64_sys_write+0x22/0x30
 do_syscall_64+0x40/0x90
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Fix this problem by don't dereference mddev after export_rdev().


In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: hci_codec: Fix leaking content of local_codecs

The following memory leak can be observed when the controller supports
codecs which are stored in local_codecs list but the elements are never
freed:

unreferenced object 0xffff88800221d840 (size 32):
  comm "kworker/u3:0", pid 36, jiffies 4294898739 (age 127.060s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    f8 d3 02 03 80 88 ff ff 80 d8 21 02 80 88 ff ff  ..........!.....
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
  backtrace:
    [<ffffffffb324f557>] __kmalloc+0x47/0x120
    [<ffffffffb39ef37d>] hci_codec_list_add.isra.0+0x2d/0x160
    [<ffffffffb39ef643>] hci_read_codec_capabilities+0x183/0x270
    [<ffffffffb39ef9ab>] hci_read_supported_codecs+0x1bb/0x2d0
    [<ffffffffb39f162e>] hci_read_local_codecs_sync+0x3e/0x60
    [<ffffffffb39ff1b3>] hci_dev_open_sync+0x943/0x11e0
    [<ffffffffb396d55d>] hci_power_on+0x10d/0x3f0
    [<ffffffffb30c99b4>] process_one_work+0x404/0x800
    [<ffffffffb30ca134>] worker_thread+0x374/0x670
    [<ffffffffb30d9108>] kthread+0x188/0x1c0
    [<ffffffffb304db6b>] ret_from_fork+0x2b/0x50
    [<ffffffffb300206a>] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30


In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv4: ip_tunnel: Fix suspicious RCU usage warning in ip_tunnel_init_flow()

There are code paths from which the function is called without holding
the RCU read lock, resulting in a suspicious RCU usage warning [1].

Fix by using l3mdev_master_upper_ifindex_by_index() which will acquire
the RCU read lock before calling
l3mdev_master_upper_ifindex_by_index_rcu().

[1]
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.12.0-rc3-custom-gac8f72681cf2 #141 Not tainted
-----------------------------
net/core/dev.c:876 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by ip/361:
 #0: ffffffff86fc7cb0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x377/0xf60

stack backtrace:
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 361 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3-custom-gac8f72681cf2 #141
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0xba/0x110
 lockdep_rcu_suspicious.cold+0x4f/0xd6
 dev_get_by_index_rcu+0x1d3/0x210
 l3mdev_master_upper_ifindex_by_index_rcu+0x2b/0xf0
 ip_tunnel_bind_dev+0x72f/0xa00
 ip_tunnel_newlink+0x368/0x7a0
 ipgre_newlink+0x14c/0x170
 __rtnl_newlink+0x1173/0x19c0
 rtnl_newlink+0x6c/0xa0
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3cc/0xf60
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x171/0x450
 netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7f0
 netlink_sendmsg+0x8c1/0xd80
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x8f9/0xc20
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x197/0x1e0
 __sys_sendmsg+0x122/0x1f0
 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f


containerd is an open source container runtime. A bug was found in containerd's CRI implementation where a user can exhaust memory on the host. In the CRI stream server, a goroutine is launched to handle terminal resize events if a TTY is requested. If the user's process fails to launch due to, for example, a faulty command, the goroutine will be stuck waiting to send without a receiver, resulting in a memory leak. Kubernetes and crictl can both be configured to use containerd's CRI implementation and the stream server is used for handling container IO. This bug has been fixed in containerd 1.6.12 and 1.5.16.  Users should update to these versions to resolve the issue. Users unable to upgrade should ensure that only trusted images and commands are used and that only trusted users have permissions to execute commands in running containers.


Signal K Server is a server application that runs on a central hub in a boat. Versions prior to 2.19.0 of the access request system have two related features that when combined by themselves and with an information disclosure vulnerability enable convincing social engineering attacks against administrators. When a device creates an access request, it specifies three fields: `clientId`, `description`, and `permissions`. The SignalK admin UI displays the `description` field prominently to the administrator when showing pending requests, but the actual `permissions` field (which determines the access level granted) is less visible or displayed separately. This allows an attacker to request `admin` permissions while providing a description that suggests readonly access. The access request handler trusts the `X-Forwarded-For` HTTP header without validation to determine the client's IP address. This header is intended to preserve the original client IP when requests pass through reverse proxies, but when trusted unconditionally, it allows attackers to spoof their IP address. The spoofed IP is displayed to administrators in the access request approval interface, potentially making malicious requests appear to originate from trusted internal network addresses. Since device/source names can be enumerated via the information disclosure vulnerability, an attacker can impersonate a legitimate device or source, craft a convincing description, spoof a trusted internal IP address, and request elevated permissions, creating a highly convincing social engineering scenario that increases the likelihood of administrator approval. Users should upgrade to version 2.19.0 to fix this issue.


OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to version 2026.2.15, `normalizeForHash` in `src/agents/sandbox/config-hash.ts` recursively sorted arrays that contained only primitive values. This made order-sensitive sandbox configuration arrays hash to the same value even when order changed. In OpenClaw sandbox flows, this hash is used to decide whether existing sandbox containers should be recreated. As a result, order-only config changes (for example Docker `dns` and `binds` array order) could be treated as unchanged and stale containers could be reused. This is a configuration integrity issue affecting sandbox recreation behavior. Starting in version 2026.2.15, array ordering is preserved during hash normalization; only object key ordering remains normalized for deterministic hashing.


Parse Server is an open source backend that can be deployed to any infrastructure that can run Node.js. The MongoDB `explain()` method provides detailed information about query execution plans, including index usage, collection scanning behavior, and performance metrics. Prior to version 8.5.0-alpha.5, Parse Server permits any client to execute explain queries without requiring the master key. This exposes database schema structure and field names, index configurations and query optimization details, query execution statistics and performance metrics, and potential attack vectors for database performance exploitation. In version 8.5.0-alpha.5, a new `databaseOptions.allowPublicExplain` configuration option has been introduced that allows to restrict `explain` queries to the master key. The option defaults to `true` for now to avoid a breaking change in production systems that depends on public `explain` availability. In addition, a security warning is logged when the option is not explicitly set, or set to `true`. In a future major release of Parse Server, the default will change to `false`. As a workaround, implement middleware to block explain queries from non-master-key requests, or monitor and alert on explain query usage in production environments.


Post-Quantum Secure Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing provides a Python implementation of Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) scheme. In versions 0.8.0b2 and prior, the `secure_redundant_execution` function in feldman_vss.py attempts to mitigate fault injection attacks by executing a function multiple times and comparing results. However, several critical weaknesses exist. Python's execution environment cannot guarantee true isolation between redundant executions, the constant-time comparison implementation in Python is subject to timing variations, the randomized execution order and timing provide insufficient protection against sophisticated fault attacks, and the error handling may leak timing information about partial execution results. These limitations make the protection ineffective against targeted fault injection attacks, especially from attackers with physical access to the hardware. A successful fault injection attack could allow an attacker to bypass the redundancy check mechanisms, extract secret polynomial coefficients during share generation or verification, force the acceptance of invalid shares during verification, and/or manipulate the commitment verification process to accept fraudulent commitments. This undermines the core security guarantees of the Verifiable Secret Sharing scheme. As of time of publication, no patched versions of Post-Quantum Secure Feldman's Verifiable Secret Sharing exist, but other mitigations are available. Long-term remediation requires reimplementing the security-critical functions in a lower-level language like Rust. Short-term mitigations include deploying the software in environments with physical security controls, increasing the redundancy count (from 5 to a higher number) by modifying the source code, adding external verification of cryptographic operations when possible, considering using hardware security modules (HSMs) for key operations.


In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

btrfs: reject ro->rw reconfiguration if there are hard ro requirements

[BUG]
Syzbot reports the following crash:

  BTRFS info (device loop0 state MCS): disabling free space tree
  BTRFS info (device loop0 state MCS): clearing compat-ro feature flag for FREE_SPACE_TREE (0x1)
  BTRFS info (device loop0 state MCS): clearing compat-ro feature flag for FREE_SPACE_TREE_VALID (0x2)
  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000003: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
  KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f]
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:backup_super_roots fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1691 [inline]
  RIP: 0010:write_all_supers+0x97a/0x40f0 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:4041
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   btrfs_commit_transaction+0x1eae/0x3740 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2530
   btrfs_delete_free_space_tree+0x383/0x730 fs/btrfs/free-space-tree.c:1312
   btrfs_start_pre_rw_mount+0xf28/0x1300 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:3012
   btrfs_remount_rw fs/btrfs/super.c:1309 [inline]
   btrfs_reconfigure+0xae6/0x2d40 fs/btrfs/super.c:1534
   btrfs_reconfigure_for_mount fs/btrfs/super.c:2020 [inline]
   btrfs_get_tree_subvol fs/btrfs/super.c:2079 [inline]
   btrfs_get_tree+0x918/0x1920 fs/btrfs/super.c:2115
   vfs_get_tree+0x90/0x2b0 fs/super.c:1800
   do_new_mount+0x2be/0xb40 fs/namespace.c:3472
   do_mount fs/namespace.c:3812 [inline]
   __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4020 [inline]
   __se_sys_mount+0x2d6/0x3c0 fs/namespace.c:3997
   do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
   do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

[CAUSE]
To support mounting different subvolume with different RO/RW flags for
the new mount APIs, btrfs introduced two workaround to support this feature:

- Skip mount option/feature checks if we are mounting a different
  subvolume

- Reconfigure the fs to RW if the initial mount is RO

Combining these two, we can have the following sequence:

- Mount the fs ro,rescue=all,clear_cache,space_cache=v1
  rescue=all will mark the fs as hard read-only, so no v2 cache clearing
  will happen.

- Mount a subvolume rw of the same fs.
  We go into btrfs_get_tree_subvol(), but fc_mount() returns EBUSY
  because our new fc is RW, different from the original fs.

  Now we enter btrfs_reconfigure_for_mount(), which switches the RO flag
  first so that we can grab the existing fs_info.
  Then we reconfigure the fs to RW.

- During reconfiguration, option/features check is skipped
  This means we will restart the v2 cache clearing, and convert back to
  v1 cache.
  This will trigger fs writes, and since the original fs has "rescue=all"
  option, it skips the csum tree read.

  And eventually causing NULL pointer dereference in super block
  writeback.

[FIX]
For reconfiguration caused by different subvolume RO/RW flags, ensure we
always run btrfs_check_options() to ensure we have proper hard RO
requirements met.

In fact the function btrfs_check_options() doesn't really do many
complex checks, but hard RO requirement and some feature dependency
checks, thus there is no special reason not to do the check for mount
reconfiguration.


In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv6: avoid possible NULL deref in modify_prefix_route()

syzbot found a NULL deref [1] in modify_prefix_route(), caused by one
fib6_info without a fib6_table pointer set.

This can happen for net->ipv6.fib6_null_entry

[1]
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037]
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5837 Comm: syz-executor888 Not tainted 6.12.0-syzkaller-09567-g7eef7e306d3c #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
 RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0xe4/0x3c40 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5089
Code: 08 84 d2 0f 85 15 14 00 00 44 8b 0d ca 98 f5 0e 45 85 c9 0f 84 b4 0e 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 e2 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 96 2c 00 00 49 8b 04 24 48 3d a0 07 7f 93 0f 84
RSP: 0018:ffffc900035d7268 EFLAGS: 00010006
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: 1ffff920006bae5f RDI: 0000000000000030
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: ffffffff90608e17 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000030
R13: ffff888036334880 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  0000555579e90380(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffc59cc4278 CR3: 0000000072b54000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
  lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x380 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849
  __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline]
  _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x33/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178
  spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline]
  modify_prefix_route+0x30b/0x8b0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:4831
  inet6_addr_modify net/ipv6/addrconf.c:4923 [inline]
  inet6_rtm_newaddr+0x12c7/0x1ab0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:5055
  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3c7/0xea0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6920
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x16b/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2541
  netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1321 [inline]
  netlink_unicast+0x53c/0x7f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1347
  netlink_sendmsg+0x8b8/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1891
  sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]
  __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:726 [inline]
  ____sys_sendmsg+0xaaf/0xc90 net/socket.c:2583
  ___sys_sendmsg+0x135/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2637
  __sys_sendmsg+0x16e/0x220 net/socket.c:2669
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fd1dcef8b79
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 c1 17 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffc59cc4378 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fd1dcef8b79
RDX: 0000000000040040 RSI: 0000000020000140 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00000000000113fd R08: 0000000000000006 R09: 0000000000000006
R10: 0000000000000006 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffc59cc438c
R13: 431bde82d7b634db R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001
 </TASK>


Jupyter Notebook is a web-based notebook environment for interactive computing. Prior to version 6.4.12, authenticated requests to the notebook server with `ContentsManager.allow_hidden = False` only prevented listing the contents of hidden directories, not accessing individual hidden files or files in hidden directories (i.e. hidden files were 'hidden' but not 'inaccessible'). This could lead to notebook configurations allowing authenticated access to files that may reasonably be expected to be disallowed. Because fully authenticated requests are required, this is of relatively low impact. But if a server's root directory contains sensitive files whose only protection from the server is being hidden (e.g. `~/.ssh` while serving $HOME), then any authenticated requests could access files if their names are guessable. Such contexts also necessarily have full access to the server and therefore execution permissions, which also generally grants access to all the same files. So this does not generally result in any privilege escalation or increase in information access, only an additional, unintended means by which the files could be accessed. Version 6.4.12 contains a patch for this issue. There are currently no known workarounds.


In IntensityCompare() of /magick/quantize.c, there are calls to PixelPacketIntensity() which could return overflowed values to the caller when ImageMagick processes a crafted input file. To mitigate this, the patch introduces and uses the ConstrainPixelIntensity() function, which forces the pixel intensities to be within the proper bounds in the event of an overflow. This flaw affects ImageMagick versions prior to 6.9.10-69 and 7.0.8-69.


A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way that Microsoft browsers access objects in memory. The vulnerability could corrupt memory in a way that could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code in the context of the current user. An attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could gain the same user rights as the current user. If the current user is logged on with administrative user rights, the attacker could take control of an affected system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new accounts with full user rights.
An attacker could host a specially crafted website that is designed to exploit the vulnerability through Microsoft browsers, and then convince a user to view the website. The attacker could also take advantage of compromised websites, or websites that accept or host user-provided content or advertisements, by adding specially crafted content that could exploit the vulnerability. In all cases, however, an attacker would have no way to force users to view the attacker-controlled content. Instead, an attacker would have to convince users to take action, typically via an enticement in email or instant message, or by getting them to open an email attachment.
The security update addresses the vulnerability by modifying how Microsoft browsers handle objects in memory.


In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: typec: ucsi: Retrieve all the PDOs instead of just the first 4

commit 4dbc6a4ef06d ("usb: typec: ucsi: save power data objects
in PD mode") introduced retrieval of the PDOs when connected to a
PD-capable source. But only the first 4 PDOs are received since
that is the maximum number that can be fetched at a time given the
MESSAGE_IN length limitation (16 bytes). However, as per the PD spec
a connected source may advertise up to a maximum of 7 PDOs.

If such a source is connected it's possible the PPM could have
negotiated a power contract with one of the PDOs at index greater
than 4, and would be reflected in the request data object's (RDO)
object position field. This would result in an out-of-bounds access
when the rdo_index() is used to index into the src_pdos array in
ucsi_psy_get_voltage_now().

With the help of the UBSAN -fsanitize=array-bounds checker enabled
this exact issue is revealed when connecting to a PD source adapter
that advertise 5 PDOs and the PPM enters a contract having selected
the 5th one.

[  151.545106][   T70] Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
[  151.545112][   T70] Internal error: BRK handler: f2005512 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
...
[  151.545499][   T70] pc : ucsi_psy_get_prop+0x208/0x20c
[  151.545507][   T70] lr : power_supply_show_property+0xc0/0x328
...
[  151.545542][   T70] Call trace:
[  151.545544][   T70]  ucsi_psy_get_prop+0x208/0x20c
[  151.545546][   T70]  power_supply_uevent+0x1a4/0x2f0
[  151.545550][   T70]  dev_uevent+0x200/0x384
[  151.545555][   T70]  kobject_uevent_env+0x1d4/0x7e8
[  151.545557][   T70]  power_supply_changed_work+0x174/0x31c
[  151.545562][   T70]  process_one_work+0x244/0x6f0
[  151.545564][   T70]  worker_thread+0x3e0/0xa64

We can resolve this by instead retrieving and storing up to the
maximum of 7 PDOs in the con->src_pdos array. This would involve
two calls to the GET_PDOS command.


In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ubi: fastmap: Fix duplicate slab cache names while attaching

Since commit 4c39529663b9 ("slab: Warn on duplicate cache names when
DEBUG_VM=y"), the duplicate slab cache names can be detected and a
kernel WARNING is thrown out.
In UBI fast attaching process, alloc_ai() could be invoked twice
with the same slab cache name 'ubi_aeb_slab_cache', which will trigger
following warning messages:
 kmem_cache of name 'ubi_aeb_slab_cache' already exists
 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 7519 at mm/slab_common.c:107
          __kmem_cache_create_args+0x100/0x5f0
 Modules linked in: ubi(+) nandsim [last unloaded: nandsim]
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 7519 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G 6.12.0-rc2
 RIP: 0010:__kmem_cache_create_args+0x100/0x5f0
 Call Trace:
   __kmem_cache_create_args+0x100/0x5f0
   alloc_ai+0x295/0x3f0 [ubi]
   ubi_attach+0x3c3/0xcc0 [ubi]
   ubi_attach_mtd_dev+0x17cf/0x3fa0 [ubi]
   ubi_init+0x3fb/0x800 [ubi]
   do_init_module+0x265/0x7d0
   __x64_sys_finit_module+0x7a/0xc0

The problem could be easily reproduced by loading UBI device by fastmap
with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y.
Fix it by using different slab names for alloc_ai() callers.


In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

x86/platform/uv: Use alternate source for socket to node data

The UV code attempts to build a set of tables to allow it to do
bidirectional socket<=>node lookups.

But when nr_cpus is set to a smaller number than actually present, the
cpu_to_node() mapping information for unused CPUs is not available to
build_socket_tables(). This results in skipping some nodes or sockets
when creating the tables and leaving some -1's for later code to trip.
over, causing oopses.

The problem is that the socket<=>node lookups are created by doing a
loop over all CPUs, then looking up the CPU's APICID and socket. But
if a CPU is not present, there is no way to start this lookup.

Instead of looping over all CPUs, take CPUs out of the equation
entirely. Loop over all APICIDs which are mapped to a valid NUMA node.
Then just extract the socket-id from the APICID.

This avoid tripping over disabled CPUs.


An Unchecked Input for Loop Condition vulnerability in a NAT library of Juniper Networks Junos OS allows a local authenticated attacker with low privileges to cause a Denial of Service (DoS). When an inconsistent "deterministic NAT" configuration is present on an SRX, or MX with SPC3 and then a specific CLI command is issued the SPC will crash and restart. Repeated execution of this command will lead to a sustained DoS. Such a configuration is characterized by the total number of port blocks being greater than the total number of hosts. An example for such configuration is: [ services nat source pool TEST-POOL address x.x.x.0/32 to x.x.x.15/32 ] [ services nat source pool TEST-POOL port deterministic block-size 1008 ] [ services nat source pool TEST-POOL port deterministic host address y.y.y.0/24] [ services nat source pool TEST-POOL port deterministic include-boundary-addresses] where according to the following calculation: 65536-1024=64512 (number of usable ports per IP address, implicit) 64512/1008=64 (number of port blocks per Nat IP) x.x.x.0/32 to x.x.x.15/32 = 16 (NAT IP addresses available in NAT pool) total port blocks in NAT Pool = 64 blocks per IP * 16 IPs = 1024 Port blocks host address y.y.y.0/24 = 256 hosts (with include-boundary-addresses) If the port block size is configured to be 4032, then the total port blocks are (64512/4032) * 16 = 256 which is equivalent to the total host addresses of 256, and the issue will not be seen. This issue affects Juniper Networks Junos OS on SRX Series, and MX Series with SPC3: All versions prior to 19.4R3-S10; 20.1 version 20.1R1 and later versions; 20.2 versions prior to 20.2R3-S6; 20.3 versions prior to 20.3R3-S6; 20.4 versions prior to 20.4R3-S5; 21.1 versions prior to 21.1R3-S4; 21.2 versions prior to 21.2R3-S3; 21.3 versions prior to 21.3R3-S3; 21.4 versions prior to 21.4R3-S1; 22.1 versions prior to 22.1R2-S2, 22.1R3; 22.2 versions prior to 22.2R2.


Pimcore is an Open Source Data & Experience Management Platform. Prior to 12.3.1 and 11.5.14, the application fails to enforce proper server-side authorization checks on the API endpoint responsible for reading or listing static routes. In Pimcore, static routes are custom URL patterns defined via the backend interface or the var/config/staticroutes.php file, including details like regex-based patterns, controllers, variables, and priorities. These routes are registered automatically through the PimcoreStaticRoutesBundle and integrated into the MVC routing system. Testing revealed that an authenticated backend user lacking explicit permissions was able to invoke the endpoint (e.g., GET /api/static-routes) and retrieve sensitive route configurations. This vulnerability is fixed in 12.3.1 and 11.5.14.


In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ip6_tunnel: use skb_vlan_inet_prepare() in __ip6_tnl_rcv()

Blamed commit did not take care of VLAN encapsulations
as spotted by syzbot [1].

Use skb_vlan_inet_prepare() instead of pskb_inet_may_pull().

[1]
 BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:253 [inline]
 BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:275 [inline]
 BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in IP6_ECN_decapsulate+0x7a8/0x1fa0 include/net/inet_ecn.h:321
  __INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:253 [inline]
  INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:275 [inline]
  IP6_ECN_decapsulate+0x7a8/0x1fa0 include/net/inet_ecn.h:321
  ip6ip6_dscp_ecn_decapsulate+0x16f/0x1b0 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:729
  __ip6_tnl_rcv+0xed9/0x1b50 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:860
  ip6_tnl_rcv+0xc3/0x100 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:903
 gre_rcv+0x1529/0x1b90 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:-1
  ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x1c89/0x2c60 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438
  ip6_input_finish+0x1f4/0x4a0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:489
  NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:318 [inline]
  ip6_input+0x9c/0x330 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:500
  ip6_mc_input+0x7ca/0xc10 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:590
  dst_input include/net/dst.h:474 [inline]
  ip6_rcv_finish+0x958/0x990 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79
  NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:318 [inline]
  ipv6_rcv+0xf1/0x3c0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:311
  __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:6139 [inline]
  __netif_receive_skb+0x1df/0xac0 net/core/dev.c:6252
  netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:6338 [inline]
  netif_receive_skb+0x57/0x630 net/core/dev.c:6397
  tun_rx_batched+0x1df/0x980 drivers/net/tun.c:1485
  tun_get_user+0x5c0e/0x6c60 drivers/net/tun.c:1953
  tun_chr_write_iter+0x3e9/0x5c0 drivers/net/tun.c:1999
  new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline]
  vfs_write+0xbe2/0x15d0 fs/read_write.c:686
  ksys_write fs/read_write.c:738 [inline]
  __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:749 [inline]
  __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:746 [inline]
  __x64_sys_write+0x1fb/0x4d0 fs/read_write.c:746
  x64_sys_call+0x30ab/0x3e70 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:2
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0xd3/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Uninit was created at:
  slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4960 [inline]
  slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5263 [inline]
  kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x9e7/0x17a0 mm/slub.c:5315
  kmalloc_reserve+0x13c/0x4b0 net/core/skbuff.c:586
  __alloc_skb+0x805/0x1040 net/core/skbuff.c:690
  alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1383 [inline]
  alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc5/0xa60 net/core/skbuff.c:6712
  sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xacc/0xc60 net/core/sock.c:2995
  tun_alloc_skb drivers/net/tun.c:1461 [inline]
  tun_get_user+0x1142/0x6c60 drivers/net/tun.c:1794
  tun_chr_write_iter+0x3e9/0x5c0 drivers/net/tun.c:1999
  new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline]
  vfs_write+0xbe2/0x15d0 fs/read_write.c:686
  ksys_write fs/read_write.c:738 [inline]
  __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:749 [inline]
  __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:746 [inline]
  __x64_sys_write+0x1fb/0x4d0 fs/read_write.c:746
  x64_sys_call+0x30ab/0x3e70 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:2
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0xd3/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6465 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(none)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025


OpenPrinting CUPS is an open source printing system for Linux and other Unix-like operating systems. In versions 2.4.16 and prior, an integer underflow vulnerability in _ppdCreateFromIPP() (cups/ppd-cache.c) allows any unprivileged local user to crash the cupsd root process by supplying a negative job-password-supported IPP attribute. The bounds check only caps the upper bound, so a negative value passes validation, is cast to size_t (wrapping to ~2^64), and is used as the length argument to memset() on a 33-byte stack buffer. This causes an immediate SIGSEGV in the cupsd root process. Combined with systemd's Restart=on-failure, an attacker can repeat the crash for sustained denial of service.


eGovFramework/egovframe-common-components versions up to and including 4.3.1 contain an unauthenticated file upload vulnerability via the /utl/wed/insertImage.do and /utl/wed/insertImageCk.do image upload endpoints. These controllers accept multipart requests without authentication, pass the uploaded content to a shared upload helper, and store the file on the server under a framework-controlled path. The framework then returns a download URL that can be used to retrieve the uploaded content, including an attacker-controlled Content-Type within the limits of the image upload functionality. While a filename extension whitelist is enforced, the attacker fully controls the file contents. The response MIME type used is also attacker-controlled when the file is served up to version < 4.1.2. Since version 4.1.2, it is possible to download any image uploaded with any whitelisted content type. But any file uploaded other than an image will be served with the `application/octet-stream` content type (the content type is no longer controlled by the attacker since version 4.1.2). This enables an unauthenticated attacker to use any affected application as a persistent file hosting service for arbitrary content under the application's origin. KISA/KrCERT has identified this unpatched vulnerability as "KVE-2023-5280."


Duende.AccessTokenManagement is a set of .NET libraries that manage OAuth and OpenId Connect access tokens. Duende.AccessTokenManagement contains a race condition when requesting access tokens using the client credentials flow. Concurrent requests to obtain an access token using differing protocol parameters can return access tokens obtained with the wrong scope, resource indicator, or other protocol parameters. Such usage is somewhat atypical, and only a small percentage of users are likely to be affected. Duende.AccessTokenManagement can request access tokens using the client credentials flow in several ways. In basic usage, the client credentials flow is configured once and the parameters do not vary. In more advanced situations, requests with varying protocol parameters may be made by calling specific overloads of these methods: `HttpContext.GetClientAccessTokenAsync()` and `IClientCredentialsTokenManagementService.GetAccessTokenAsync()`. There are overloads of both of these methods that accept a `TokenRequestParameters` object that customizes token request parameters. However, concurrent requests with varying `TokenRequestParameters` will result in the same token for all concurrent calls. Most users can simply update the NuGet package to the latest version. Customizations of the `IClientCredentialsTokenCache` that derive from the default implementation (`DistributedClientCredentialsTokenCache`) will require a small code change, as its constructor was changed to add a dependency on the `ITokenRequestSynchronization` service. The synchronization service will need to be injected into the derived class and passed to the base constructor. The impact of this vulnerability depends on how Duende.AccessTokenManagement is used and on the security architecture of the solution. Most users will not be vulnerable to this issue. More advanced users may run into this issue by calling the methods specified above with customized token request parameters. The impact of obtaining an access token with different than intended protocol parameters will vary depending on application logic, security architecture, and the authorization policy of the resource servers.


Unhead is a document head and template manager. Prior to 2.1.13, useHeadSafe() is the composable that Nuxt's own documentation explicitly recommends for rendering user-supplied content in <head> safely. Internally, the hasDangerousProtocol() function in packages/unhead/src/plugins/safe.ts decodes HTML entities before checking for blocked URI schemes (javascript:, data:, vbscript:). The decoder uses two regular expressions with fixed-width digit caps. The HTML5 specification imposes no limit on leading zeros in numeric character references. When a padded entity exceeds the regex digit cap, the decoder silently skips it. The undecoded string is then passed to startsWith('javascript:'), which does not match. makeTagSafe() writes the raw value directly into SSR HTML output. The browser's HTML parser decodes the padded entity natively and constructs the blocked URI. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.1.13.


In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

af_unix: fix use-after-free in unix_stream_read_actor()

syzbot reported the following crash [1]

After releasing unix socket lock, u->oob_skb can be changed
by another thread. We must temporarily increase skb refcount
to make sure this other thread will not free the skb under us.

[1]

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in unix_stream_read_actor+0xa7/0xc0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2866
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88801f3b9cc4 by task syz-executor107/5297

CPU: 1 PID: 5297 Comm: syz-executor107 Not tainted 6.6.0-syzkaller-15910-gb8e3a87a627b #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/09/2023
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:364 [inline]
print_report+0xc4/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:475
kasan_report+0xda/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:588
unix_stream_read_actor+0xa7/0xc0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2866
unix_stream_recv_urg net/unix/af_unix.c:2587 [inline]
unix_stream_read_generic+0x19a5/0x2480 net/unix/af_unix.c:2666
unix_stream_recvmsg+0x189/0x1b0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2903
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1044 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0xe2/0x170 net/socket.c:1066
____sys_recvmsg+0x21f/0x5c0 net/socket.c:2803
___sys_recvmsg+0x115/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2845
__sys_recvmsg+0x114/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2875
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
RIP: 0033:0x7fc67492c559
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 51 18 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fc6748ab228 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000001c RCX: 00007fc67492c559
RDX: 0000000040010083 RSI: 0000000020000140 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007fc6749b6348 R08: 00007fc6748ab6c0 R09: 00007fc6748ab6c0
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fc6749b6340
R13: 00007fc6749b634c R14: 00007ffe9fac52a0 R15: 00007ffe9fac5388
</TASK>

Allocated by task 5295:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x81/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:328
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:188 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:763 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x180/0x3c0 mm/slub.c:3523
__alloc_skb+0x287/0x330 net/core/skbuff.c:641
alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1286 [inline]
alloc_skb_with_frags+0xe4/0x710 net/core/skbuff.c:6331
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x7e4/0x970 net/core/sock.c:2780
sock_alloc_send_skb include/net/sock.h:1884 [inline]
queue_oob net/unix/af_unix.c:2147 [inline]
unix_stream_sendmsg+0xb5f/0x10a0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2301
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x180 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x6ac/0x940 net/socket.c:2584
___sys_sendmsg+0x135/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2638
__sys_sendmsg+0x117/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2667
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:82
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

Freed by task 5295:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:522
____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:236 [inline]
____kasan_slab_free+0x15b/0x1b0 mm/kasan/common.c:200
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:164 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1800 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x114/0x1e0 mm/slub.c:1826
slab_free mm/slub.c:3809 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0xf8/0x340 mm/slub.c:3831
kfree_skbmem+0xef/0x1b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1015
__kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1073 [inline]
consume_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1288 [inline]
consume_skb+0xdf/0x170 net/core/skbuff.c:1282
queue_oob net/unix/af_unix.c:2178 [inline]
u
---truncated---


In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv6: Fix ECMP sibling count mismatch when clearing RTF_ADDRCONF

syzbot reported a kernel BUG in fib6_add_rt2node() when adding an IPv6
route. [0]

Commit f72514b3c569 ("ipv6: clear RA flags when adding a static
route") introduced logic to clear RTF_ADDRCONF from existing routes
when a static route with the same nexthop is added. However, this
causes a problem when the existing route has a gateway.

When RTF_ADDRCONF is cleared from a route that has a gateway, that
route becomes eligible for ECMP, i.e. rt6_qualify_for_ecmp() returns
true. The issue is that this route was never added to the
fib6_siblings list.

This leads to a mismatch between the following counts:

- The sibling count computed by iterating fib6_next chain, which
  includes the newly ECMP-eligible route

- The actual siblings in fib6_siblings list, which does not include
  that route

When a subsequent ECMP route is added, fib6_add_rt2node() hits
BUG_ON(sibling->fib6_nsiblings != rt->fib6_nsiblings) because the
counts don't match.

Fix this by only clearing RTF_ADDRCONF when the existing route does
not have a gateway. Routes without a gateway cannot qualify for ECMP
anyway (rt6_qualify_for_ecmp() requires fib_nh_gw_family), so clearing
RTF_ADDRCONF on them is safe and matches the original intent of the
commit.

[0]:
kernel BUG at net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1217!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6010 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025
RIP: 0010:fib6_add_rt2node+0x3433/0x3470 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1217
[...]
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 fib6_add+0x8da/0x18a0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1532
 __ip6_ins_rt net/ipv6/route.c:1351 [inline]
 ip6_route_add+0xde/0x1b0 net/ipv6/route.c:3946
 ipv6_route_ioctl+0x35c/0x480 net/ipv6/route.c:4571
 inet6_ioctl+0x219/0x280 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:577
 sock_do_ioctl+0xdc/0x300 net/socket.c:1245
 sock_ioctl+0x576/0x790 net/socket.c:1366
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
 __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:583
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xfa/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f