[ { "id": 1, "name": "Default Service Account Privilege Escalation to Cluster Admin", "category": "PrivilegeEscalation", "description_fr": "Exploitation du service account par défaut disposant de cluster-admin pour compromettre le contrôle plane.", "description_en": "Exploiting default service account with cluster-admin to compromise control plane.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Obtenir un pod exécuté dans le cluster avec le service account par défaut", "action_en": "Get a pod running in the cluster with default service account", "tools": [ "kubectl", "docker" ], "technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Localiser le token d'API automatiquement monté dans /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token", "action_en": "Locate auto-mounted API token at /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token", "tools": [ "cat" ], "technique_mitre": "T1552: Unsecured Credentials" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Utiliser le token pour créer un ClusterRoleBinding donnant cluster-admin à un nouvel utilisateur", "action_en": "Use token to create ClusterRoleBinding granting cluster-admin to new user", "tools": [ "kubectl", "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1098: Account Manipulation" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Accéder à l'API Server avec les permissions cluster-admin", "action_en": "Access API Server with cluster-admin permissions", "tools": [ "kubectl", "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1133: External Remote Services" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Créer un nouveau service account avec un secret et exfiltrer les données du cluster", "action_en": "Create new service account with secret and exfiltrate cluster data", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1020: Automated Exfiltration" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Pod exécuté avec le service account par défaut, automountServiceAccountToken: true", "prerequisites_en": "Pod running with default service account, automountServiceAccountToken: true", "detection_fr": "Auditer les ClusterRoleBinding pour cluster-admin. Vérifier l'accès API Server aux tokens.", "detection_en": "Audit ClusterRoleBinding for cluster-admin. Check API Server access to tokens.", "difficulty": "Easy" }, { "id": 2, "name": "Container Escape via Privileged Container", "category": "ContainerEscape", "description_fr": "Échappement du conteneur via le flag privileged pour accéder à l'hôte.", "description_en": "Container escape via privileged flag to access host.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Identifier un conteneur exécuté avec securityContext.privileged: true", "action_en": "Identify container running with securityContext.privileged: true", "tools": [ "kubectl", "docker" ], "technique_mitre": "T1611: Escape to Host" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Accéder aux périphériques hôtes via /dev (ex: /dev/sda)", "action_en": "Access host devices via /dev (e.g., /dev/sda)", "tools": [ "fdisk", "mount" ], "technique_mitre": "T1578: Modify Cloud Compute Instances" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Monter le système de fichiers hôte pour accéder aux données", "action_en": "Mount host filesystem to access data", "tools": [ "mount" ], "technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Localiser et modifier /etc/passwd et .ssh/authorized_keys de l'hôte", "action_en": "Locate and modify host /etc/passwd and .ssh/authorized_keys", "tools": [ "nano", "echo" ], "technique_mitre": "T1098: Account Manipulation" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Établir une connexion SSH persistante à l'hôte", "action_en": "Establish persistent SSH connection to host", "tools": [ "ssh" ], "technique_mitre": "T1021: Remote Services" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Conteneur exécuté en mode privilegé avec capacités Linux complètes", "prerequisites_en": "Container running in privileged mode with full Linux capabilities", "detection_fr": "Détecter les montages de /dev ou du système de fichiers hôte. Surveiller les modifications de fichiers système.", "detection_en": "Detect /dev or host filesystem mounts. Monitor system file modifications.", "difficulty": "Easy" }, { "id": 3, "name": "Network Policy Bypass via hostNetwork", "category": "LateralMovement", "description_fr": "Contournement des politiques réseau en utilisant hostNetwork: true.", "description_en": "Network policy bypass using hostNetwork: true.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Créer un pod avec spec.hostNetwork: true", "action_en": "Create pod with spec.hostNetwork: true", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1611: Escape to Host" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Accéder directement au namespace réseau de l'hôte, contournant les NetworkPolicy", "action_en": "Access host network namespace directly, bypassing NetworkPolicy", "tools": [ "ip", "netstat" ], "technique_mitre": "T1557: Man-in-the-Middle" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Écouter sur les ports hôtes et intercepter le trafic réseau", "action_en": "Listen on host ports and intercept network traffic", "tools": [ "tcpdump", "wireshark" ], "technique_mitre": "T1040: Network Sniffing" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Effectuer une attaque man-in-the-middle contre d'autres pods", "action_en": "Perform man-in-the-middle attack against other pods", "tools": [ "arpspoof", "tcpdump" ], "technique_mitre": "T1557: Man-in-the-Middle" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Exfiltrer les secrets en interceptant le trafic Kubernetes API", "action_en": "Exfiltrate secrets by intercepting Kubernetes API traffic", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1020: Automated Exfiltration" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Capacité à créer des pods avec hostNetwork: true", "prerequisites_en": "Ability to create pods with hostNetwork: true", "detection_fr": "Auditer les pods avec hostNetwork: true. Surveiller le trafic réseau anormal.", "detection_en": "Audit pods with hostNetwork: true. Monitor abnormal network traffic.", "difficulty": "Medium" }, { "id": 4, "name": "Secrets Extraction via ConfigMap", "category": "DataExfiltration", "description_fr": "Extraction de secrets stockés dans des ConfigMap ou variables d'environnement.", "description_en": "Secrets extraction from ConfigMap or environment variables.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Identifier les pods avec des secrets en variables d'environnement", "action_en": "Identify pods with secrets in environment variables", "tools": [ "kubectl", "env" ], "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Utiliser kubectl exec pour accéder à un pod et lire les variables d'environnement", "action_en": "Use kubectl exec to access pod and read environment variables", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1552: Unsecured Credentials" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Lire les volumes montés contenant les secrets", "action_en": "Read mounted volumes containing secrets", "tools": [ "cat" ], "technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Exfiltrer les secrets via des requêtes DNS ou HTTP", "action_en": "Exfiltrate secrets via DNS or HTTP requests", "tools": [ "curl", "nslookup" ], "technique_mitre": "T1020: Automated Exfiltration" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Utiliser les secrets compromis pour accéder à des services externes", "action_en": "Use compromised secrets to access external services", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Accès à des pods contenant des secrets. Permissions de lecture sur les ConfigMap/Secrets", "prerequisites_en": "Access to pods containing secrets. Read permissions on ConfigMap/Secrets", "detection_fr": "Surveiller l'accès aux Secrets et ConfigMap. Détecter les fuites de credentials en logs.", "detection_en": "Monitor access to Secrets and ConfigMap. Detect credential leaks in logs.", "difficulty": "Easy" }, { "id": 5, "name": "RBAC Misconfiguration Exploitation", "category": "PrivilegeEscalation", "description_fr": "Exploitation de ClusterRole/Role avec permissions trop larges.", "description_en": "Exploitation of ClusterRole/Role with overly broad permissions.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Énumérer tous les Roles et ClusterRoles disponibles", "action_en": "Enumerate all available Roles and ClusterRoles", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Identifier les roles avec wildcards (*) pour les verbes ou ressources", "action_en": "Identify roles with wildcards (*) for verbs or resources", "tools": [ "kubectl", "jq" ], "technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Vérifier quels rôles sont bindés au service account actuel", "action_en": "Check which roles are bound to current service account", "tools": [ "kubectl", "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Utiliser les permissions octroyées pour créer un nouveau ClusterRoleBinding avec cluster-admin", "action_en": "Use granted permissions to create new ClusterRoleBinding with cluster-admin", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1098: Account Manipulation" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Obtenir l'accès complet au cluster", "action_en": "Obtain full cluster access", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1133: External Remote Services" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Service account avec permissions de lecture sur les Roles/ClusterRoles ou cluster-wide", "prerequisites_en": "Service account with read permissions on Roles/ClusterRoles or cluster-wide", "detection_fr": "Auditer les Roles/ClusterRoles régulièrement. Alerter sur les modifications RBAC.", "detection_en": "Audit Roles/ClusterRoles regularly. Alert on RBAC modifications.", "difficulty": "Medium" }, { "id": 6, "name": "Kubelet API Exploitation", "category": "LateralMovement", "description_fr": "Exploitation de l'API Kubelet non sécurisée pour accéder à d'autres pods.", "description_en": "Exploitation of unsecured Kubelet API to access other pods.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Identifier les nœuds Kubernetes via la découverte de services", "action_en": "Identify Kubernetes nodes via service discovery", "tools": [ "kubectl", "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Accéder au port kubelet par défaut (10250) sans authentification", "action_en": "Access default kubelet port (10250) without authentication", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1199: Trusted Relationship" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Énumérer tous les pods s'exécutant sur le nœud", "action_en": "Enumerate all pods running on the node", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Utiliser /exec endpoint pour exécuter des commandes dans d'autres pods", "action_en": "Use /exec endpoint to execute commands in other pods", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Accéder aux logs et données sensibles des pods", "action_en": "Access logs and sensitive data from pods", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Accès réseau au port kubelet 10250. Authentification faible ou inexistante.", "prerequisites_en": "Network access to kubelet port 10250. Weak or missing authentication.", "detection_fr": "Surveiller l'accès au port 10250. Vérifier que l'authentification est requise.", "detection_en": "Monitor access to port 10250. Verify authentication is required.", "difficulty": "Medium" }, { "id": 7, "name": "Etcd Data Extraction", "category": "DataExfiltration", "description_fr": "Extraction directe des données sensibles depuis etcd.", "description_en": "Direct extraction of sensitive data from etcd.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Accéder au contrôle plane du cluster (généralement via un pod privilégié)", "action_en": "Access cluster control plane (usually via privileged pod)", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1133: External Remote Services" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Localiser le service etcd et son endpoint", "action_en": "Locate etcd service and its endpoint", "tools": [ "kubectl", "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Se connecter à etcd sans TLS ou avec une authentification faible", "action_en": "Connect to etcd without TLS or with weak authentication", "tools": [ "etcdctl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1199: Trusted Relationship" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Extraire tous les secrets et configurations stockés dans etcd", "action_en": "Extract all secrets and configurations stored in etcd", "tools": [ "etcdctl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Exfiltrer les données compromises", "action_en": "Exfiltrate compromised data", "tools": [ "curl", "scp" ], "technique_mitre": "T1020: Automated Exfiltration" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Accès réseau à etcd. Communication non chiffrée ou certificats compromis.", "prerequisites_en": "Network access to etcd. Unencrypted communication or compromised certificates.", "detection_fr": "Chiffrer la communication etcd. Auditer l'accès à etcd. Surveiller les connexions réseau.", "detection_en": "Encrypt etcd communication. Audit etcd access. Monitor network connections.", "difficulty": "Hard" }, { "id": 8, "name": "Container Image Supply Chain Attack", "category": "InitialAccess", "description_fr": "Compromission d'images de conteneurs via des registries non sécurisées.", "description_en": "Container image compromise via unsecured registries.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Identifier les images utilisées par les pods du cluster", "action_en": "Identify images used by cluster pods", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Déployer une image malveillante depuis une registry non fiable", "action_en": "Deploy malicious image from untrusted registry", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1525: Supply Chain Compromise" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Exécuter le code malveillant lors du démarrage du conteneur", "action_en": "Execute malicious code during container startup", "tools": [ "docker" ], "technique_mitre": "T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Établir une porte dérobée persistante dans le conteneur", "action_en": "Establish persistent backdoor in container", "tools": [ "curl", "bash" ], "technique_mitre": "T1547: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Exfiltrer les données du cluster via la porte dérobée", "action_en": "Exfiltrate cluster data via backdoor", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1020: Automated Exfiltration" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Capacité à déployer des pods. Images sans signature ou provenant de registries non fiables.", "prerequisites_en": "Ability to deploy pods. Unsigned images or from untrusted registries.", "detection_fr": "Mettre en place une validation d'images signées. Scanner les images pour les vulnérabilités.", "detection_en": "Enforce signed image validation. Scan images for vulnerabilities.", "difficulty": "Medium" }, { "id": 9, "name": "Pod Escape via Container Runtime", "category": "ContainerEscape", "description_fr": "Exploitation du runtime de conteneur pour échapper du pod.", "description_en": "Container runtime exploitation to escape pod.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Identifier les vulnérabilités connues du runtime (containerd, Docker, CRI-O)", "action_en": "Identify known runtime vulnerabilities (containerd, Docker, CRI-O)", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Accéder au socket du runtime (ex: /var/run/docker.sock) si accessible", "action_en": "Access runtime socket (e.g., /var/run/docker.sock) if accessible", "tools": [ "cat" ], "technique_mitre": "T1611: Escape to Host" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Utiliser le socket pour créer et exécuter des conteneurs privilégiés", "action_en": "Use socket to create and execute privileged containers", "tools": [ "docker" ], "technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Monter le système de fichiers hôte depuis le nouveau conteneur", "action_en": "Mount host filesystem from new container", "tools": [ "mount" ], "technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Obtenir un accès root à l'hôte", "action_en": "Obtain root access to host", "tools": [ "chroot" ], "technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Socket du runtime accessible. Runtime avec des vulnérabilités non patchées.", "prerequisites_en": "Runtime socket accessible. Runtime with unpatched vulnerabilities.", "detection_fr": "Supprimer l'accès au socket du runtime. Patcher régulièrement le runtime.", "detection_en": "Remove access to runtime socket. Regularly patch runtime.", "difficulty": "Hard" }, { "id": 10, "name": "API Server Impersonation Attack", "category": "PrivilegeEscalation", "description_fr": "Usurpation d'identité d'utilisateurs ou de service accounts via l'API Server.", "description_en": "User or service account impersonation via API Server.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Obtenir un token valide d'un service account", "action_en": "Obtain valid token from service account", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1552: Unsecured Credentials" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Vérifier que l'Impersonation est autorisée par RBAC", "action_en": "Verify Impersonation is allowed by RBAC", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Utiliser les headers X-Impersonate-User et X-Impersonate-Group", "action_en": "Use X-Impersonate-User and X-Impersonate-Group headers", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Effectuer des actions en tant qu'utilisateur usurpé", "action_en": "Perform actions as impersonated user", "tools": [ "kubectl", "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1098: Account Manipulation" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Escalader vers cluster-admin via la création de RoleBinding", "action_en": "Escalate to cluster-admin via RoleBinding creation", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1098: Account Manipulation" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Token d'un service account. Permissions d'impersonation activées dans RBAC.", "prerequisites_en": "Service account token. Impersonation permissions enabled in RBAC.", "detection_fr": "Auditer les requêtes d'impersonation. Désactiver l'impersonation si non nécessaire.", "detection_en": "Audit impersonation requests. Disable impersonation if not needed.", "difficulty": "Medium" }, { "id": 11, "name": "Node Takeover via Kubelet", "category": "LateralMovement", "description_fr": "Prise de contrôle d'un nœud en exploitant kubelet.", "description_en": "Node takeover by exploiting kubelet.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Accéder à l'API kubelet sur le port 10250", "action_en": "Access kubelet API on port 10250", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1199: Trusted Relationship" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Exécuter des commandes avec privilèges nœud via /exec", "action_en": "Execute commands with node privileges via /exec", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Créer un nouveau compte utilisateur sur le nœud", "action_en": "Create new user account on node", "tools": [ "useradd" ], "technique_mitre": "T1098: Account Manipulation" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Installer une clé SSH pour un accès persistant", "action_en": "Install SSH key for persistent access", "tools": [ "ssh" ], "technique_mitre": "T1021: Remote Services" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Utiliser le nœud pour accéder à d'autres nœuds et au contrôle plane", "action_en": "Use node to access other nodes and control plane", "tools": [ "ssh" ], "technique_mitre": "T1570: Lateral Tool Transfer" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Accès réseau à kubelet. Authentification faible ou désactivée sur kubelet.", "prerequisites_en": "Network access to kubelet. Weak or disabled authentication on kubelet.", "detection_fr": "Activer l'authentification TLS sur kubelet. Surveiller les connexions au port 10250.", "detection_en": "Enable TLS authentication on kubelet. Monitor connections to port 10250.", "difficulty": "Hard" }, { "id": 12, "name": "DNS Spoofing to Redirect Traffic", "category": "LateralMovement", "description_fr": "Usurpation DNS pour rediriger le trafic vers des services malveillants.", "description_en": "DNS spoofing to redirect traffic to malicious services.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Obtenir un accès à un pod avec capacités réseau étendues", "action_en": "Obtain access to pod with extended network capabilities", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1133: External Remote Services" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Déployer un serveur DNS malveillant dans le pod", "action_en": "Deploy malicious DNS server in pod", "tools": [ "dnsmasq", "bind" ], "technique_mitre": "T1557: Man-in-the-Middle" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Rediriger le trafic DNS vers le serveur malveillant", "action_en": "Redirect DNS traffic to malicious server", "tools": [ "iptables" ], "technique_mitre": "T1557: Man-in-the-Middle" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Effectuer une attaque man-in-the-middle sur le trafic Kubernetes", "action_en": "Perform man-in-the-middle attack on Kubernetes traffic", "tools": [ "tcpdump" ], "technique_mitre": "T1557: Man-in-the-Middle" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Capturer les credentials en interceptant la communication", "action_en": "Capture credentials by intercepting communication", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1552: Unsecured Credentials" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Pod avec capacités réseau ou hostNetwork: true. Plugins DNS configurables.", "prerequisites_en": "Pod with network capabilities or hostNetwork: true. Configurable DNS plugins.", "detection_fr": "Surveiller les changements de configuration DNS. Implémenter des NetworkPolicy strictes.", "detection_en": "Monitor DNS configuration changes. Implement strict NetworkPolicy.", "difficulty": "Medium" }, { "id": 13, "name": "Service Account Token Theft via Pod Logs", "category": "DataExfiltration", "description_fr": "Vol de tokens de service account à partir des logs de pod.", "description_en": "Service account token theft from pod logs.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Identifier les pods loggant les tokens de service account", "action_en": "Identify pods logging service account tokens", "tools": [ "kubectl", "grep" ], "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Accéder aux logs du pod via kubectl logs", "action_en": "Access pod logs via kubectl logs", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Extraire les tokens des logs", "action_en": "Extract tokens from logs", "tools": [ "grep", "sed" ], "technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Utiliser les tokens volés pour s'authentifier à l'API Server", "action_en": "Use stolen tokens to authenticate to API Server", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Accéder aux ressources du cluster avec les permissions du service account", "action_en": "Access cluster resources with service account permissions", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1133: External Remote Services" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Permissions de lecture sur les logs de pods. Pods loggant les tokens.", "prerequisites_en": "Read permissions on pod logs. Pods logging tokens.", "detection_fr": "Auditer les pods. Ne pas logger les tokens. Implémenter une rotation des tokens.", "detection_en": "Audit pods. Don't log tokens. Implement token rotation.", "difficulty": "Easy" }, { "id": 14, "name": "Horizontal Pod Autoscaler Resource Exhaustion", "category": "DataExfiltration", "description_fr": "Attaque par épuisement de ressources via HPA pour causer une fuite de données.", "description_en": "Resource exhaustion attack via HPA causing data leakage.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Identifier les déploiements avec Horizontal Pod Autoscaler", "action_en": "Identify deployments with Horizontal Pod Autoscaler", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Déclencher une augmentation de la charge avec des requêtes malveillantes", "action_en": "Trigger load increase with malicious requests", "tools": [ "curl", "ab" ], "technique_mitre": "T1499: Endpoint Denial of Service" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Faire monter en charge automatiquement le nombre de pods", "action_en": "Auto-scale up pod count", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1499: Endpoint Denial of Service" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Exfiltrer les données via des pods supplémentaires", "action_en": "Exfiltrate data via additional pods", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1020: Automated Exfiltration" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Arrêter l'attaque une fois les données exfiltrées", "action_en": "Stop attack once data exfiltrated", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1202: Indirect Command Execution" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Déploiements avec HPA. Capacité à générer de la charge.", "prerequisites_en": "Deployments with HPA. Ability to generate load.", "detection_fr": "Définir des limites sur HPA maxReplicas. Surveiller les patterns d'autoscaling.", "detection_en": "Set limits on HPA maxReplicas. Monitor autoscaling patterns.", "difficulty": "Medium" }, { "id": 15, "name": "Malicious DaemonSet Deployment", "category": "Persistence", "description_fr": "Déploiement d'un DaemonSet malveillant s'exécutant sur tous les nœuds.", "description_en": "Deployment of malicious DaemonSet running on all nodes.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Obtenir les permissions pour créer des DaemonSet", "action_en": "Obtain permissions to create DaemonSet", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Créer un DaemonSet avec un conteneur malveillant", "action_en": "Create DaemonSet with malicious container", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1547: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Configurer le DaemonSet pour s'exécuter avec privilèges", "action_en": "Configure DaemonSet to run with privileges", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "S'assurer que le DaemonSet persiste après les redémarrages", "action_en": "Ensure DaemonSet persists after restarts", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1547: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Utiliser le DaemonSet pour exécuter des commandes sur tous les nœuds", "action_en": "Use DaemonSet to execute commands on all nodes", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1570: Lateral Tool Transfer" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Permissions de création de DaemonSet. Accès à l'API Server.", "prerequisites_en": "DaemonSet creation permissions. Access to API Server.", "detection_fr": "Auditer les DaemonSet créés. Surveiller les images utilisées.", "detection_en": "Audit DaemonSet creation. Monitor images used.", "difficulty": "Easy" }, { "id": 16, "name": "Persistence via CronJob", "category": "Persistence", "description_fr": "Établissement de la persistance via CronJob exécutant du code malveillant.", "description_en": "Persistence establishment via CronJob executing malicious code.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Obtenir les permissions pour créer des CronJob", "action_en": "Obtain permissions to create CronJob", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Créer un CronJob exécutant un script malveillant", "action_en": "Create CronJob executing malicious script", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1053: Scheduled Task/Job" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Configurer une fréquence d'exécution régulière", "action_en": "Set regular execution frequency", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1053: Scheduled Task/Job" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "S'assurer que le CronJob persiste entre les redémarrages", "action_en": "Ensure CronJob persists between restarts", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1547: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Exécuter des commandes malveillantes selon la planification", "action_en": "Execute malicious commands on schedule", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1053: Scheduled Task/Job" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Permissions de création de CronJob. Accès à l'API Server.", "prerequisites_en": "CronJob creation permissions. Access to API Server.", "detection_fr": "Auditer les CronJob créés. Vérifier les conteneurs utilisés.", "detection_en": "Audit CronJob creation. Verify containers used.", "difficulty": "Easy" }, { "id": 17, "name": "API Server Health Check Exploitation", "category": "InitialAccess", "description_fr": "Exploitation des endpoints de santé de l'API Server.", "description_en": "Exploitation of API Server health check endpoints.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Scanner les ports de l'API Server (6443)", "action_en": "Scan API Server ports (6443)", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Accéder à l'endpoint /healthz sans authentification", "action_en": "Access /healthz endpoint without authentication", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Énumérer les versions et les capacités de l'API Server", "action_en": "Enumerate API Server versions and capabilities", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Identifier les versions vulnérables de Kubernetes", "action_en": "Identify vulnerable Kubernetes versions", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Exploiter les vulnérabilités connues", "action_en": "Exploit known vulnerabilities", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Accès réseau à l'API Server. Endpoints non sécurisés.", "prerequisites_en": "Network access to API Server. Unsecured endpoints.", "detection_fr": "Restreindre l'accès aux endpoints de santé. Utiliser un firewall.", "detection_en": "Restrict access to health endpoints. Use firewall.", "difficulty": "Easy" }, { "id": 18, "name": "RBAC Denial of Service", "category": "DataExfiltration", "description_fr": "Attaque par déni de service via RBAC en supprimant les permissions.", "description_en": "Denial of service attack via RBAC by removing permissions.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Obtenir des permissions pour modifier les RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding", "action_en": "Obtain permissions to modify RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Supprimer ou modifier les ClusterRoleBinding critiques", "action_en": "Delete or modify critical ClusterRoleBinding", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1562: Impair Defenses" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Rendre le cluster inutilisable par les administrateurs", "action_en": "Make cluster unusable for administrators", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1562: Impair Defenses" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Supprimer les traces de l'attaque en modifiant les audit logs", "action_en": "Remove attack traces by modifying audit logs", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1562: Impair Defenses" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Extorquer la rançon pour restaurer les permissions", "action_en": "Extort ransom to restore permissions", "tools": [], "technique_mitre": "T1657: Financial Theft" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Permissions de modification RBAC. Accès à l'API Server.", "prerequisites_en": "RBAC modification permissions. Access to API Server.", "detection_fr": "Auditer les modifications RBAC. Maintenir des sauvegardes des configurations.", "detection_en": "Audit RBAC modifications. Maintain configuration backups.", "difficulty": "Hard" }, { "id": 19, "name": "Network Policy Evasion via Port Forwarding", "category": "LateralMovement", "description_fr": "Contournement des NetworkPolicy via port forwarding kubectl.", "description_en": "NetworkPolicy evasion via kubectl port forwarding.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Obtenir l'accès à kubectl exec sur un pod", "action_en": "Obtain kubectl exec access on a pod", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Utiliser kubectl port-forward pour contourner les NetworkPolicy", "action_en": "Use kubectl port-forward to bypass NetworkPolicy", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1570: Lateral Tool Transfer" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Accéder aux services restreints via la redirection de port", "action_en": "Access restricted services via port forwarding", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1570: Lateral Tool Transfer" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Exécuter des commandes sur les services distants", "action_en": "Execute commands on remote services", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Exfiltrer les données des services restreints", "action_en": "Exfiltrate data from restricted services", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1020: Automated Exfiltration" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Permissions exec sur des pods. Accès à kubectl ou l'API Server.", "prerequisites_en": "Exec permissions on pods. Access to kubectl or API Server.", "detection_fr": "Auditer l'utilisation de port-forward. Restreindre les permissions exec.", "detection_en": "Audit port-forward usage. Restrict exec permissions.", "difficulty": "Medium" }, { "id": 20, "name": "Custom Resource Definition Exploitation", "category": "PrivilegeEscalation", "description_fr": "Exploitation des Custom Resource Definitions (CRD) pour l'escalade de privilèges.", "description_en": "Custom Resource Definition (CRD) exploitation for privilege escalation.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Identifier les CRD déployées dans le cluster", "action_en": "Identify deployed CRD in cluster", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Rechercher les CRD avec des webhooks de validation/mutation", "action_en": "Find CRD with validation/mutation webhooks", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Créer une instance de CRD malveillante", "action_en": "Create malicious CRD instance", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Déclencher le webhook malveillant via la création/modification du CRD", "action_en": "Trigger malicious webhook via CRD creation/modification", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Exécuter du code arbitraire avec les permissions du webhook", "action_en": "Execute arbitrary code with webhook permissions", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "CRD avec webhooks mal configurés. Permissions de création de CRD.", "prerequisites_en": "CRD with misconfigured webhooks. CRD creation permissions.", "detection_fr": "Auditer les webhooks. Vérifier les certificats. Surveiller les appels aux webhooks.", "detection_en": "Audit webhooks. Verify certificates. Monitor webhook calls.", "difficulty": "Hard" }, { "id": 21, "name": "Operator-based Backdoor Installation", "category": "Persistence", "description_fr": "Installation d'une porte dérobée via un Kubernetes Operator malveillant.", "description_en": "Backdoor installation via malicious Kubernetes Operator.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Créer un Operator malveillant en tant que conteneur", "action_en": "Create malicious Operator as container", "tools": [ "docker" ], "technique_mitre": "T1525: Supply Chain Compromise" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Déployer le Operator malveillant dans le cluster", "action_en": "Deploy malicious Operator in cluster", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1525: Supply Chain Compromise" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Configurer le Operator pour créer des ressources malveillantes", "action_en": "Configure Operator to create malicious resources", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1547: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "S'assurer la persistance via le manifeste du Operator", "action_en": "Ensure persistence via Operator manifest", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1547: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Utiliser l'Operator pour exécuter du code malveillant", "action_en": "Use Operator to execute malicious code", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1053: Scheduled Task/Job" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Permissions pour déployer des Operator. Accès au registre d'images.", "prerequisites_en": "Permissions to deploy Operators. Access to image registry.", "detection_fr": "Auditer les Operator installés. Vérifier les images utilisées.", "detection_en": "Audit installed Operators. Verify images used.", "difficulty": "Hard" }, { "id": 22, "name": "Helm Chart Injection Attack", "category": "InitialAccess", "description_fr": "Injection de code malveillant via une Helm Chart compromettre le cluster.", "description_en": "Malicious code injection via compromised Helm Chart.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Identifier les Helm Charts utilisées dans le cluster", "action_en": "Identify Helm Charts used in cluster", "tools": [ "helm" ], "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Créer une Helm Chart malveillante ou compromettre une existante", "action_en": "Create malicious Helm Chart or compromise existing one", "tools": [ "helm" ], "technique_mitre": "T1525: Supply Chain Compromise" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Déployer la Helm Chart malveillante", "action_en": "Deploy malicious Helm Chart", "tools": [ "helm" ], "technique_mitre": "T1525: Supply Chain Compromise" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Exécuter des hooks post-installation malveillants", "action_en": "Execute malicious post-install hooks", "tools": [ "helm" ], "technique_mitre": "T1547: Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Obtenir l'accès au cluster via le code exécuté", "action_en": "Obtain cluster access via executed code", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1133: External Remote Services" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Helm Charts non signées. Permissions pour déployer des Helm Charts.", "prerequisites_en": "Unsigned Helm Charts. Permissions to deploy Helm Charts.", "detection_fr": "Valider les Helm Charts. Utiliser les signatures. Auditer les dépendances.", "detection_en": "Validate Helm Charts. Use signatures. Audit dependencies.", "difficulty": "Medium" }, { "id": 23, "name": "Kubelet Certificate Exploitation", "category": "PrivilegeEscalation", "description_fr": "Exploitation des certificats kubelet pour l'accès non autorisé.", "description_en": "Kubelet certificate exploitation for unauthorized access.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Accéder à un nœud avec les certificats kubelet", "action_en": "Access node with kubelet certificates", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1133: External Remote Services" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Localiser les certificats kubelet sur le nœud", "action_en": "Locate kubelet certificates on node", "tools": [ "find" ], "technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Copier les certificats depuis le nœud", "action_en": "Copy certificates from node", "tools": [ "scp" ], "technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Utiliser les certificats pour impersonifier le nœud", "action_en": "Use certificates to impersonate node", "tools": [ "openssl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1021: Remote Services" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Accéder à l'API Server en tant que nœud", "action_en": "Access API Server as node", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T​1021: Remote Services" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Accès physique ou shell sur le nœud. Certificats non protégés.", "prerequisites_en": "Physical or shell access to node. Unprotected certificates.", "detection_fr": "Protéger les certificats avec permissions restrictives. Auditer l'accès.", "detection_en": "Protect certificates with restrictive permissions. Audit access.", "difficulty": "Hard" }, { "id": 24, "name": "Sidecar Injection via Admission Controller", "category": "LateralMovement", "description_fr": "Injection de sidecars malveillants via les contrôleurs d'admission.", "description_en": "Malicious sidecar injection via admission controllers.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Identifier les MutatingAdmissionWebhook installés", "action_en": "Identify installed MutatingAdmissionWebhook", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Créer ou modifier un contrôleur d'admission malveillant", "action_en": "Create or modify malicious admission controller", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Configurer le webhook pour injecter un sidecar dans tous les pods", "action_en": "Configure webhook to inject sidecar into all pods", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Le sidecar s'exécute avec les permissions du pod", "action_en": "Sidecar runs with pod permissions", "tools": [], "technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Utiliser le sidecar pour accéder aux données du pod", "action_en": "Use sidecar to access pod data", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1552: Unsecured Credentials" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Accès à créer des MutatingAdmissionWebhook. Sidecar image malveillante.", "prerequisites_en": "Access to create MutatingAdmissionWebhook. Malicious sidecar image.", "detection_fr": "Auditer les MutatingAdmissionWebhook. Vérifier les webhooks autorisés.", "detection_en": "Audit MutatingAdmissionWebhook. Verify authorized webhooks.", "difficulty": "Hard" }, { "id": 25, "name": "Service Account Impersonation via RBAC", "category": "PrivilegeEscalation", "description_fr": "Usurpation d'identité de service account via les permissions RBAC.", "description_en": "Service account impersonation via RBAC permissions.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Identifier les service accounts avec permissions d'usurpation", "action_en": "Identify service accounts with impersonation permissions", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Vérifier que l'usurpation est autorisée pour le cluster-admin", "action_en": "Check if impersonation allowed for cluster-admin", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Créer une requête API avec l'header Impersonate-User", "action_en": "Create API request with Impersonate-User header", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Exécuter des commandes en tant que service account usurpé", "action_en": "Execute commands as impersonated service account", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1078: Valid Accounts" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Escalader vers cluster-admin", "action_en": "Escalate to cluster-admin", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1098: Account Manipulation" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Permissions d'usurpation d'identité RBAC. Token d'un service account.", "prerequisites_en": "RBAC impersonation permissions. Service account token.", "detection_fr": "Auditer les permissions d'usurpation. Désactiver si non nécessaire.", "detection_en": "Audit impersonation permissions. Disable if not needed.", "difficulty": "Medium" }, { "id": 26, "name": "Resource Quota Evasion", "category": "DataExfiltration", "description_fr": "Contournement des ResourceQuota pour une consommation excessive de ressources.", "description_en": "ResourceQuota evasion for excessive resource consumption.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Identifier les quotas de ressources du namespace", "action_en": "Identify namespace resource quotas", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Créer des pods temporaires pour consommer les ressources", "action_en": "Create temporary pods to consume resources", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1499: Endpoint Denial of Service" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Supprimer les pods une fois les ressources consommées", "action_en": "Delete pods after consuming resources", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1562: Impair Defenses" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Utiliser les ressources libérées pour exfiltrer les données", "action_en": "Use freed resources for data exfiltration", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1020: Automated Exfiltration" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Nettoyer les traces de l'attaque", "action_en": "Clean up attack traces", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1070: Indicator Removal" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Permissions pour créer/supprimer des pods. ResourceQuota configurable.", "prerequisites_en": "Permissions to create/delete pods. Configurable ResourceQuota.", "detection_fr": "Surveiller les créations/suppressions de pods. Alerter sur les patterns anormaux.", "detection_en": "Monitor pod creation/deletion. Alert on abnormal patterns.", "difficulty": "Medium" }, { "id": 27, "name": "Kubernetes Dashboard Exploitation", "category": "InitialAccess", "description_fr": "Exploitation du dashboard Kubernetes exposé sans authentification.", "description_en": "Kubernetes Dashboard exploitation exposed without authentication.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Découvrir le dashboard Kubernetes", "action_en": "Discover Kubernetes Dashboard", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Accéder au dashboard sans token", "action_en": "Access dashboard without token", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1199: Trusted Relationship" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Naviguer dans l'interface du dashboard pour obtenir des informations", "action_en": "Navigate dashboard UI to gather information", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Utiliser le dashboard pour déployer des pods malveillants", "action_en": "Use dashboard to deploy malicious pods", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Obtenir l'accès au cluster via les pods déployés", "action_en": "Obtain cluster access via deployed pods", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1133: External Remote Services" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Dashboard exposé sur internet. Authentification désactivée ou très faible.", "prerequisites_en": "Dashboard exposed on internet. Authentication disabled or very weak.", "detection_fr": "Désactiver ou restreindre le dashboard. Exiger une authentification forte.", "detection_en": "Disable or restrict dashboard. Require strong authentication.", "difficulty": "Easy" }, { "id": 28, "name": "Log Manipulation and Cover-up", "category": "Persistence", "description_fr": "Manipulation des logs Kubernetes pour couvrir les traces de l'attaque.", "description_en": "Kubernetes log manipulation to cover attack tracks.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Obtenir l'accès au système de logs (etcd, fichiers)", "action_en": "Obtain access to logging system (etcd, files)", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1562: Impair Defenses" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Identifier les logs pertinents à l'attaque", "action_en": "Identify logs relevant to attack", "tools": [ "grep" ], "technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Modifier ou supprimer les logs d'audit", "action_en": "Modify or delete audit logs", "tools": [ "rm", "sed" ], "technique_mitre": "T1562: Impair Defenses" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Désactiver temporairement la journalisation", "action_en": "Temporarily disable logging", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1562: Impair Defenses" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Réactiver la journalisation après le nettoyage", "action_en": "Re-enable logging after cleanup", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1562: Impair Defenses" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Accès à etcd ou aux fichiers de logs. Permissions de modification.", "prerequisites_en": "Access to etcd or log files. Modification permissions.", "detection_fr": "Envoyer les logs centralisés. Implémenter l'immuabilité des logs.", "detection_en": "Send logs to centralized system. Implement log immutability.", "difficulty": "Hard" }, { "id": 29, "name": "Webhook Timeout Exploitation", "category": "LateralMovement", "description_fr": "Exploitation des timeouts des webhooks pour contourner la validation.", "description_en": "Webhook timeout exploitation to bypass validation.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Identifier les ValidatingAdmissionWebhook et leurs timeouts", "action_en": "Identify ValidatingAdmissionWebhook and timeouts", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1087: Account Discovery" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Créer un webhook malveillant qui répond lentement", "action_en": "Create malicious webhook that responds slowly", "tools": [ "python" ], "technique_mitre": "T1557: Man-in-the-Middle" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Configurer le webhook pour causer un timeout", "action_en": "Configure webhook to cause timeout", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1557: Man-in-the-Middle" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Profiter du timeout pour contourner la validation", "action_en": "Exploit timeout to bypass validation", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Déployer des ressources malveillantes", "action_en": "Deploy malicious resources", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T​1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Webhooks avec timeouts configurables. Capacité à créer des webhooks.", "prerequisites_en": "Webhooks with configurable timeouts. Ability to create webhooks.", "detection_fr": "Monitorer les timeouts des webhooks. Alerter sur les timeouts suspects.", "detection_en": "Monitor webhook timeouts. Alert on suspicious timeouts.", "difficulty": "Hard" }, { "id": 30, "name": "Metrics Server Data Extraction", "category": "DataExfiltration", "description_fr": "Extraction des données de métriques du Metrics Server.", "description_en": "Metrics data extraction from Metrics Server.", "steps": [ { "step_num": 1, "action_fr": "Accéder au Metrics Server via l'API Server", "action_en": "Access Metrics Server via API Server", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" }, { "step_num": 2, "action_fr": "Énumérer les métriques disponibles", "action_en": "Enumerate available metrics", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" }, { "step_num": 3, "action_fr": "Extraire les données de consommation de ressources", "action_en": "Extract resource consumption data", "tools": [ "kubectl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1005: Data from Local System" }, { "step_num": 4, "action_fr": "Analyser les patterns pour identifier les services critiques", "action_en": "Analyze patterns to identify critical services", "tools": [ "python" ], "technique_mitre": "T1526: Network Service Discovery" }, { "step_num": 5, "action_fr": "Cibler les services critiques pour une attaque", "action_en": "Target critical services for attack", "tools": [ "curl" ], "technique_mitre": "T1499: Endpoint Denial of Service" } ], "prerequisites_fr": "Accès à l'API Server. Permissions de lecture sur les métriques.", "prerequisites_en": "Access to API Server. Read permissions on metrics.", "detection_fr": "Restreindre l'accès au Metrics Server. Surveiller l'accès aux métriques.", "detection_en": "Restrict Metrics Server access. Monitor metrics access.", "difficulty": "Medium" } ]