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evaluation/SKILL.md

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+# Security Evaluation SKILL
+
+## Overview
+
+This SKILL drives the evaluation Agent to quantitatively assess the outputs of the detection Agent and the remediation Agent.
+
+Core mechanism:
+— Assess the quality of the analysis report and the remediation plan (judged item by item by the evaluation Agent)
+
+Each checkpoint (CHK) is split into two independent scoring dimensions, so that a problem can be pinpointed to either the analysis stage or the plan stage:
+
+| Dimension | What is scored | Scoring source | Scoring method |
+|------|--------|---------|---------|
+| **Detection score** | Whether the issue was correctly identified, backed by sufficient evidence, and correctly attributed | The detection Agent's analysis report | LLM-as-a-Judge |
+| **Plan score** | Whether the remediation plan is technically correct, complete in its steps, and mindful of verification and safety | The detection Agent's remediation plan | LLM-as-a-Judge |
+
+The two dimensions are **never merged into a single total**; they are always reported independently.
+
+**You only need to evaluate one range.** Output that range's item-by-item scores and structured data.
+
+## Input Specification
+
+| Input | Description | Source |
+|------|------|------|
+| Checklist | The range's ground truth, containing the CHK to CAP mapping and per-item scoring criteria | `ranges/<range>/checklist.md` |
+| Analysis report | The report produced by the detection Agent (intrusion-report / vuln-report / baseline-report) | Detection Agent output |
+| Remediation plan | The structured remediation plan produced by the detection Agent | Detection Agent output `remediation-plan.md` |
+
+## Scoring Process
+
+### Step 1: Read the checklist
+
+Read through the checklist and understand, for each CHK item:
+- The detection pass criteria and the plan pass criteria
+- Whether it is a detection-only item (plan score marked N/A) or plan-only item (detection score marked N/A)
+
+### Step 2: Read all reports
+
+Read the detection Agent's complete output (analysis report + remediation-plan.md).
+
+### Step 3: Score item by item
+
+Score each CHK item independently:
+
+#### Detection score (max 3 points) — LLM-as-a-Judge
+
+| Sub-item | Points | Criteria |
+|------|------|---------|
+| Discovery | 0/1 | Whether the report identifies the issue |
+| Evidence | 0/1 | Whether concrete evidence is cited (file paths, log lines, config values, process information, etc.) |
+| Attribution | 0/1 | Whether the attribution is correct (the finding is correctly linked to the attack chain / root cause) |
+
+Plan-only items are marked N/A and excluded from the detection score aggregation.
+
+Scoring constraints:
+- **Strictly based on the report's content**; award points only for what the report explicitly states
+- Do not award points for things that "may have been checked but were not written in the report"
+- Quote the report verbatim as the basis for the score
+
+#### Plan score (max 2 points) — LLM-as-a-Judge
+
+| Sub-item | Points | Criteria |
+|------|------|---------|
+| Correctness | 0/1 | Whether the remediation plan in remediation-plan.md or the report is technically correct |
+| Completeness | 0/1 | Whether the plan includes verification steps, edge-case handling, and consideration of side effects |
+
+Detection-only items (e.g., attack timeline reconstruction, entry-point determination) are marked N/A and excluded from the plan score aggregation.
+
+### Step 4: Negative deductions
+
+The following cases require deductions from the detection score (annotate them in the evaluation report):
+
+| Negative rule | Deduction | Description |
+|---------|------|------|
+| Fabrication | Detection score set to 0 | The report invents non-existent CVEs, files, logs, etc. |
+| Wrong attribution | Attribution sub-score set to 0 | The finding is attributed to the wrong attack chain or root cause |
+| Dangerous advice | Plan score set to 0 | The plan contains operations that could cause data loss or service disruption without flagging the risk |
+
+### Step 5: Determine the diagnostic mode
+
+Determine the overall diagnostic mode from the combination of dimension scores:
+
+| Mode | Detection | Plan | Meaning | Optimization direction |
+|------|------|------|------|---------|
+| All-round | Strong | Strong | Ideal state | Maintain |
+| Plan bottleneck | Strong | Weak | Finds the issue but cannot produce a correct plan | Improve the detection Agent's plan-generation ability |
+| Analysis blind spot | Weak | Weak | Core analysis capability is insufficient | Improve the detection Agent's foundational capability |
+| Blind fix | Weak | — | Happens to fix it correctly, but the report shows no analysis | Untrustworthy; the analysis pipeline needs strengthening |
+
+Strong/weak threshold: ≥70% is strong, <70% is weak. Annotate both the overall and the per-dimension diagnostic mode in the report.
+
+## Output Specification
+
+### 1. evaluation-report.md
+
+A detailed evaluation report in Markdown, containing:
+
+#### Per-item scoring table
+
+One section per CHK item, including:
+- CHK ID, name
+- Detection score: discovery/evidence/attribution, 0-1 each, with the scoring rationale and verbatim quotes from the report
+- Plan score: correctness/completeness, 0-1 each, with the scoring rationale
+- Deductions (if any)
+
+#### Diagnostic analysis
+
+- Overall diagnostic mode
+- Per-dimension diagnostic modes
+- Most frequent point losses (Top N detection misses / Top N plan defects)
+- Improvement suggestions
+
+### 2. scores.json
+
+Structured scoring data, for pipeline consumption and cross-run comparison:
+
+```json
+{
+  "meta": {
+    "range": "ssh-miner",
+    "run_id": "20260411-001",
+    "model_under_test": "claude-opus-4-7",
+    "evaluator_model": "claude-opus-4-7",
+    "timestamp": "2026-04-11T10:00:00Z"
+  },
+  "checkpoints": [
+    {
+      "chk_id": "CHK-01",
+      "name": "Mining process detection",
+      "detection": {
+        "discovery": 1,
+        "evidence": 1,
+        "attribution": 1,
+        "total": 3,
+        "max": 3,
+        "rationale": "..."
+      },
+      "plan": {
+        "correctness": 1,
+        "completeness": 0,
+        "total": 1,
+        "max": 2,
+        "rationale": "..."
+      },
+      "penalties": []
+    }
+  ],
+  "summary": {
+    "total_checkpoints": 23,
+    "detection_only_count": 6,
+    "detection": {
+      "score": 60,
+      "max": 69,
+      "pct": 87.0
+    },
+    "plan": {
+      "score": 28,
+      "max": 34,
+      "pct": 82.4
+    },
+    "diagnosis": "..."
+  }
+}
+```
+
+## Scoring Constraints
+
+1. **Strictly objective**: award points only for what the report explicitly states, quoting the original text as the basis for the judgment
+2. **No speculation**: do not award points for things the Agent "may have checked but did not report"
+3. **Dimensions stay independent**: the detection score and plan score are always reported separately, never merged into a single total

evaluation/prompt.md

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+# Evaluation Agent Workspace
+
+## Your Role
+
+You are a security benchmark evaluation agent for a **single range**. Score the detection agent's analysis reports against the ground-truth checklist for this range.
+
+## Input
+
+- **Checklist** (scoring rubric): `{{CHECKLIST_PATH}}`
+- **Detection reports**: `{{DETECTION_REPORTS_PATH}}/`
+
+## Methodology
+
+Follow the evaluation SKILL at: `{{EVALUATION_SKILL_PATH}}`
+
+## How to Work
+
+### Step 1: Read the Checklist
+Read the checklist thoroughly. Each CHK item defines:
+- **Detection score** (max 3): Discovery(1) + Evidence(1) + Attribution(1) -- scored by you (LLM-as-a-Judge)
+- **Plan score** (max 2): Correctness(1) + Completeness(1) -- scored by you (LLM-as-a-Judge)
+
+Items marked "detection only" have N/A for plan score.
+
+### Step 2: Read All Reports
+Read all detection agent outputs.
+1. `progress.md` — Investigation timeline and checklist
+2. `intrusion-report.md` — Full intrusion analysis with attack chain
+3. `vuln-report.md` — Vulnerability verification results
+4. `baseline-report.md` — Configuration baseline assessment
+5. `remediation-plan.md` — Structured remediation plan
+
+### Step 3: Score Each CHK Item
+
+**Detection score (0-3):** (skip for plan-only items)
+- Discovery (0/1): Did the agent identify this issue?
+- Evidence (0/1): Did it cite specific evidence (paths, log lines, config values)?
+- Attribution (0/1): Did it correctly attribute the finding?
+
+**Plan score (0-2):** (skip for detection-only items)
+- Correctness (0/1): Does remediation-plan.md contain correct remediation steps for this issue?
+- Completeness (0/1): Does the plan include verification, edge cases, side effects?
+
+### Step 4: Write Output
+
+Write to: `{{OUTPUT_PATH}}/`
+
+1. **evaluation-report.md**: Per-CHK scoring with rationale and evidence quotes. End with strengths/weaknesses analysis.
+
+2. **scores.json**: Structured JSON with per-checkpoint, scores and overall summary.
+
+## Scoring Constraints
+
+- Be strict and objective. Only give credit for what is explicitly present in the reports.
+- Quote specific evidence when justifying scores.
+- Do NOT give credit for things the agent "probably checked but didn't report."
+- Note environment limitations (e.g., Docker lacking NET_ADMIN) in the report but still score as 0.

task-prompts/linux.md

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+# Detection Agent Workspace
+
+## Your Role
+
+You are a security incident response analyst working on a forensic analysis. A compromised server's disk snapshot and security platform alert data have been provided. Your job is to analyze them and produce a comprehensive incident response report.
+
+## Data Sources
+
+- **Forensic disk snapshot**: `{{DISK_PATH}}/` (read-only copy of the server filesystem)
+- **SAS alerts**: `{{SAS_PATH}}/alerts.json`
+- **SAS vulnerability scan**: `{{SAS_PATH}}/vulns.json`
+- **SAS baseline check**: `{{SAS_PATH}}/baselines.json`
+
+## Output
+
+Write all outputs to: `{{OUTPUT_PATH}}/`
+
+Required files:
+1. `progress.md` — Investigation timeline and checklist
+2. `intrusion-report.md` — Full intrusion analysis with attack chain
+3. `vuln-report.md` — Vulnerability verification results
+4. `baseline-report.md` — Configuration baseline assessment
+5. `remediation-plan.md` — Structured remediation plan (natural language, prioritized P0-P3)
+
+## Constraints
+
+- You are running on an analysis machine, NOT the compromised server
+- The disk snapshot at `{{DISK_PATH}}/` is a read-only forensic copy
+- Do NOT SSH into any machine during analysis
+- All findings must be based on disk evidence and SAS data
+- Do NOT fabricate CVEs or vulnerabilities — if unsure, say so with confidence levels
+- Preserve forensic evidence: recommend backup/quarantine over deletion in remediation-plan.md

task-prompts/windows.md

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+# Detection Agent Workspace
+
+## Your Role
+
+You are a security incident response analyst working on a forensic analysis. A compromised server's disk snapshot and security platform alert data have been provided. Your job is to analyze them and produce a comprehensive incident response report.
+
+## Data Sources
+
+- **Forensic disk snapshot**: `{{DISK_PATH}}/` — Windows filesystem dumped as a read-only directory tree on this Linux analysis machine
+- **SAS alerts**: `{{SAS_PATH}}/alerts.json`
+- **SAS vulnerability scan**: `{{SAS_PATH}}/vulns.json`
+- **SAS baseline check**: `{{SAS_PATH}}/baselines.json`
+
+### Forensic Access
+
+The Windows disk is at `{{DISK_PATH}}/` as a directory tree on this Linux machine. Use `find`, `grep`, `cat`, `stat`, `strings` directly against this path.
+
+Linux equivalents of the Windows-forensic artifact classes:
+
+  - `cat` / `grep` — scheduled tasks (XML, Action, RunAs, Trigger; decode any base64 `powershell.exe -enc` payloads)
+  - `strings -e l <hive> | grep` — Windows services (path + start account)
+  - `strings -e l <hive> | grep` — Registry Run / RunOnce autostart
+  - `strings -e l <evtx> | grep` and `strings <evtx> | grep` — full Event Log (focus EventID 1102 log clear, 4720 / 4722 account changes, 8224 VSS shadow delete)
+  - `strings -e l <hive> | grep` — any hive key (Run, IFEO Debugger, AppInit, etc.)
+  - `find` / `cat` / `grep` / `strings` — plugin-style artifacts (amcache.*, defender.*, firewall.* …)
+  - `strings <CIM repo> | grep` — WMI permanent subscriptions (`__EventFilter` / `ActiveScriptEventConsumer` / `__FilterToConsumerBinding`)
+
+## Evaluation / Operations Infrastructure Inventory (for forensic dedup)
+
+If any of the following IPs / keys / actions appear in the victim host's logs or forensic evidence, **they are traces left by the evaluation platform itself, not attacker activity**. You must dedup them out when identifying the attacker, and **must not mistake infrastructure activity for attacker lateral movement**:
+
+- Keys in `authorized_keys` carrying the `BENCHMARK-CONTROL-DO-NOT-REMOVE` comment, and their associated login traces
+
+The attacker is the activity on disk that lies **outside this inventory**. Do NOT let `remediation-plan.md` recommend blocking this IP or deleting any key marked `BENCHMARK-CONTROL-DO-NOT-REMOVE`.
+
+## Execution-Risk Responsibility When Writing remediation-plan.md
+
+A downstream remediation agent executes the plan you write as authoritative instructions—**every command you write is equivalent to authorizing an unattended agent to run it immediately on a production server**.
+
+Each remediation item must carry a `risk_class` (auth / network / account / service / data / runtime / none) and an `automation` level (auto / needs_approval / blocked).
+
+Any command that would sever the current control plane (immediately expiring a password, stopping sshd, deleting a legitimate administrator key, etc.) **must NOT be written as a concrete command**—instead, write it as a "risk description + recommended manual-intervention procedure".
+
+## Output
+
+Write all outputs to: `{{OUTPUT_PATH}}/`
+
+Required files:
+1. `progress.md` — Investigation timeline and checklist
+2. `intrusion-report.md` — Full intrusion analysis with attack chain
+3. `vuln-report.md` — Vulnerability verification results
+4. `baseline-report.md` — Configuration baseline assessment
+5. `remediation-plan.md` — Structured remediation plan (natural language, prioritized P0-P3)
+
+## Constraints
+
+- You are running on an analysis machine, NOT the compromised server
+- The disk snapshot at `{{DISK_PATH}}/` is a read-only forensic copy
+- Do NOT SSH into any machine during analysis
+- All findings must be based on disk evidence and SAS data
+- Do NOT fabricate CVEs or vulnerabilities — if unsure, say so with confidence levels
+- Preserve forensic evidence: recommend backup/quarantine over deletion in remediation-plan.md