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Civil Appeal No. 2199 of 1977.
From the Judgment and Decree dated 29 11 1976 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 378 of 1974.
G. B. Pai and O. P. Rana for the Appellant.
R. K. Garg, V. J. Francis) , Madan Mohan, K.P. Aggarwal and Mrs. Manju Gupta, for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2.
Manoj Swarup and Miss Lalita Kohli for the Intervener.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.
The case is primarily concerned with the age of retirement of two obscure workmen but it raises question of general importance concerning workmen employed by most statutory bodies and corporations.
It is on such chances that the development of our law depends.
The two workmen were originally employed by Messrs Seth Ram Gopal and Partners who were licensees for the distribution of electricity under the .
There were certified Standing orders for the industrial establishment of M/s. Seth Ram Gopal and partners.
The certified Standing orders did not prescribe any age of superannuation for the employees.
I ht, according to the workmen meant that they could continue to work as long as they were fit and able to discharge their duties.
The electricity undertaking of Ms. Seth Ram Gopal and Partners was purchased br The U.P. State Electricity Board, with effect from 15 12 1964, under The provisions of the .
The employees of Seth Ram Gopal and Partners became the employees of the U.P. the Electricity Board.
The U.P. State Electricity Board which it is no longer disputed is an industrial establishment to which the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946, applies, neither made nor got certified any Standing orders as it was bound so to do under that Act.
But it is evident, though no admitted from two letters, one from the Superintending Engineer in reply to a letter dated 31 12 166 from the Executive Engineer and the other from the Certifying officer for Standing orders and Labour Commissioner to the General Secretary of the Employees ' Union that the Board and the workmen considered the certified Standing orders of the establishment of Seth Ran 359 Gopal and Partners as applicable to them even after the purchase of the undertaking by the Board.
This, however, is not very material.
The Board, as we said earlier, made and not certified no standing orders either in regard to age or superannuation or in regard to any other matter Mentioned in the schedule to the Standing orders Act.
We may mention here that by reason of a notification dated 17 1 1959 "age of superannuation or retirement, rate of pension or ally other facility which the employers may like to extend or may be agreed upon between the parties ' is one of` the matters in respect of which an employer to whom the Standing orders Act applies is bound to make Standing orders and get them certified.
However, on May 28, 1970.
the Governor of Uttar Pradesh notified.
under Section 13 B of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946.
a regulation made by the U.P. State: Electricity Board under Section 7(c) of the , ]948.
The notification was as Follows. "No. 3822 2/70/XXIII PB 15EH 67 May 28, 1970.
In pursuance of the provision of Section 13 B of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1948 (Act No. 20 of 1946), the Governor is pleased to notify in the official Gazette that the U.P. State Electricity Board has made the following Regulations under sub section (c) of Section 79 of the ) (Act No. 54 of 1948) ``Notwithstanding any rule if one order or practice hitherto followed, the date of compulsory retirement of an employee of the Board will be the date on which he attains the age of 58 years; provided that (i) in the case of the inferior servants of the Board, whose counterparts under State Government are at present entitled to serve upto the age of 60 years, the age of compulsory retirement will be the date on Which they attain the age of 60 years.
(ii) the Board or its subordinate appointing authority may require an employee to retire after he attains or has attained the age of 55 years on three months ' ' notice or three months ' salary in lieu thereof without assigning any reason".
Acting in pursuance of this regulation as notified by the Governor, the Board sought to retire the two respondents on July 2, 1972 and July 7, 1972 respectively on their attaining the age of 58 years.
The respondents thereupon filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court challenging the regulation mad by the Board and its notification by 360 the Governor.
Their contention was that the Board was not competent to make a regulation in respect of a matter covered by the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act.
The writ petition as dismissed by a learned Single Judge.
The respondents preferred a special appeal and the Division Bench which heard the Special Appeal in the first instance referred the following three questions tc a Full Bench: " (1) Whether the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946 applies to the Industrial establishments of the State Electricity Board ? (2) Whether the standing orders framed for an Industrial establishment of an electrical undertaking cease to be operative on the purchase of the undertaking by the Board or on the framing of regulations under section 79(c) of the ? (3) Whether section 13 B of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946, applies only to industrial establishments of the Government or also to other industrial establishments ? The Full Bench answered the questions as follows: "l.
The Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act 1946 applies to the industrial establishments of the Ste Electricity Board.
The Standing Orders framed in an industrial establishment by an electrical undertaking do not cease to b operative on the purchase of the undertaking by the Board or on framing of the regulations under section 79(c) of the . 3.
Section 13 B of the , applies only to the industrial establishments of the government and to no other establishments".
Following the opinion of the Full Bench, the Division Bench allowed the Special Appeal and issued a Writ quashing the notification dated May 28, 1970 and directing the U.P. State Electricity Board not to enforce the regulation against the appellants before them.
The U.P. State Electricity Board, having obtained a Certificate from the High Court under Article 133(1) of the Constitution, has preferred this appeal.
361 Shri G. B. Pai learned Counsel for the appellant did not canvass A the correctness of the answer of the Full Bench to the first question referred to it.
He confined his attack to the answers to the second and third questions.
Relying upon the decisions of this Court in Sukhdev Singh vs Bhagat Ram(1), and Rajasthan Electricity Board vs Mohan Lal(2), Shri Pai argued that the U.P. State Electricity Board was an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and that the regulations made b the Board under Section 79(c) of the Act had the 'full force and effect of the statute and the force of law" so as to displace, over ride or supersede Standing Orders made and certified under the Industrial Employment (Stanching orders) Act.
which, he submitted wee mere contractual conditions of service subjected to a quasi judicial process and which, therefore, could not take precedence over legislative processed regulations.
The learned Counsel further submitted that Section 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act was a special law and that it prevailed over the provisions of the Industrial Employment Standing orders Act.
Alternately, he submitted, the notifying of the regulation regarding age of superannuation under Section 13 B of the Industrial Employment Standing orders Act excluded the applicability of that Act in regard to the subject of age of superannuation.
He urged that Section 13 B was no confined in its application to Government undertakings only or to cases where there were comprehensive sets of rules, as was thought by the High Court.
Shri R. K. Garg, for the Workmen contended that the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act was an act specially designed to define and secure reasonable conditions of service for workmen in industrial establishments employing one hundred or more workmen and to that end to compel employers to make Standing orders and to et them certified by a quasi judicial authority.
It was, therefore, a special Act with reference to its subject matter.
The Electricity Supply Act, on the other hand, was intended "to provide for the rationalisation of the production and supply of electricity, and generally for taking measures conducive to electrical development. ' ' It was not specially designed to define the conditions of service of employees of Electricity Board or to displace the Standing orders Act.
The power given to an Electricity Board under Section 79(c) to make regulations providing for "the duties of officers and servants of the Board and their salaries, allowances and other conditions of service" was no more than the usual, general power possessed by every (1) ; (2) ; 362 employer.
Shri Garg argued that the Industrial Employment Standing orders Act was a special Act which dealt with the special subject of conditions of employment of workmen in industrial establishments and, therefore, in the matter of conditions of employment of workmen in industrial establishments, it prevailed over the provisions of the Electricity Supply Act.
He urged that under Section 13 B of the Standing orders Act, Government undertakings which had a comprehensive set of rules alone could be excluded from the applicability of the Act.
He submitted that to permit a single rule or regulation made for limited purpose to be notified under Sec.
13 B would have the disastrous effect of excluding the applicability of the whole of the Standing Orders Act.
Before examining the rival contentions, we remind ourselves that the Constitution has expressed a deep concern for the welfare of workers and has provided in Art, 42 that the State shall make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work and in article 43 that the State shall endeavour to secure, by suitable legislation or economic organization or in any other way, to all workers, agricultural or otherwise, work, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment or leisure etc.
These are among the "Directive Principles of State Policy".
The mandate of Article 37 of the Constitution is that while the Directive Principles of State Policy shall not be enforceable by any Court, the principles are `nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country ' and `it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws '.
Addressed to Courts, what the injunction means is that while Courts are not free to direct the making of legislation, Courts are bound to evolve, affirm and adopt principles of interpretation which will further and not hinder the goal set out in the Directive Principle of St Policy.
This command or the Constitution must be over present n the minds of judges when interpreting statutes which council them selves directly or indirectly with matters et out in the Directive principles of State Policy Let us now examine the various provisions their proper contact with a view to resolve the problem before us.
l the , 194(.
Before the passing of the Act conditions or service of industrial employees s were invariably ill defined and were hardly over know with even a slight Degree of precision to the employees.
There was no uniformity of conditions of service f(hr employees discharging identical duties in fl the same establishment.
Conditions of service were generally e and the result of oral arrangements which left the employees t Te mercy of the employer.
With the growth of the trade union move 363 ment and the right of collective bargaining, employees started putting A forth their demands to end this sad and confusing state of affairs.
Recognising the rough deal that was being given to workers 1 employers who would not define their conditions of service and he inevitability f industrial strife in such a situation, the legislature intervened and enacted the Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act.
It was stated in the statement of objects and reasons; "Experience has shown that "Standing orders" defining the conditions of recruitment, discharge, disciplinary action, holidays, leave etc., go a long way towards minimising, friction between the management and workers ill industrial undertakings.
Discussion on the subject at the tripartite Indian Labour Conferences revealed a consensus of opinion in favour of legislation.
The Bill accordingly seeks to pr vide for the framing of "Standing orders" in all industrial establishments employing one hundred and more workers".
It was, therefore, considered, as stated in the preamble "expedient to require employers in industrial establishments to define with sufficient precision the conditions of employment under them and to make the said conditions known to workmen employed by them".
The scheme or the Act, as amended in 1956 and as it now stands, requires every employer of an industrial establishment as defined in the Act to submit to the Certifying officer draft Standing orders, that is, "Rules relating to matters set out in the schedule", proposed by him for adoption in his industrial establishment.
This is mandatory.
It has to be done within six months after the commencement of the Act. 'Failure to do so is punishable and is further made a continuing offence.
The draft Standing orders are required to cover every matter set out in the schedule.
The schedule enumerates the matters to be provided in the Standing orders and they include classification of workmen, Shift working, attendance and late coming.
Leave and holidays, termination of employment, suspension or dismissal for misconduct, means of redress for wronged workmen etc.
Item No. 11 of the Schedule IS "Any other matter which may be prescribed".
By a notification dated 17 1959 the Government of Uttar Pradesh has prescribed "Age o superannuation or retirement, rate of pension or any other facility which the employer may like to extend or may be agreed upon between the parties" as a matter requiring to be provided in the Standing orders.
On receipt o the draft Standing Orders from the employee, the Certifying officer is required to forward a copy of the same to the trade union concerned or the workmen inviting them to prefer objections, if any.
Thereafter the Certifying officer is required to give a hearing to the employer and the trade union or workmen as the case may be 7 526SCI/78 364 and to decide "whether or not any modification of or addition to the draft submitted by the employer is necessary to render the draft Standing orders certifiable under the Act '.
Standing orders are certifiable under the Act only if provision i made therein for every matter set out in the schedule, if they are in conformity with the provisions of the Act and if the Certifying officer adjudicates them as fair and reason 3 able.
The Certifying officer is invested with the powers of a Civil Court for the purposes of receiving evidence, administering oaths, enforcing the attendance of witnesses etc.
The order of the Certifying Officer is subject to an appeal to the prescribed appellate authority.
The Standing orders as finally certified are required to be entered in a Register maintained by the Certifying officer.
The employer is required to prominently post the Certified Standing orders on special boards in.
maintained for that purpose.
This is the broad scheme of the Act.
The Act also provides for exemptions.
About that, later.
The Act, as originally enacted, precluded the Certifying officer from adjudicating upon the fairness or reasonableness of the draft Standing orders submitted by the employer but an amendment introduced in 1956 now casts a duty upon the Certifying officer to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the Draft Standing orders.
The Scheme of the Act has ben sufficiently explained by this Court in Associated Cement t Co. LTD.
vs f. D. Vyas(l), Rohtak Hissar District Electricity Supply Co. Ltd '.
vs State of U.P. & Ors.(2), and Western dia Match Co. Ltd. vs Workmen.
The Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act is thus seen he an Act specially designed to define the terms of employment of workman in industrial establishments, to give the workmen a collective voice in defining the terms of employment and to subject the terms of employment to the scrutiny of quasi judicial authorities by the application of the test of fairness and reasonableness.
It is ar Act giving recognition and form to hard won and precious rights of workman.
We have no hesitation in saying that it is a Special Act expressly and exclusively dealing with the schedule enumerated conditions (hf service of workmen in industrial establishments.
Turning net to the Electricity Supply Act, it is, as its preamble says.
An Act to provide for the rationalisation of the production and supply of electricity, and generally for taking measures conducive to electrical development".
The statement of objects and reasons and a lance at the various provisions of the Act show that the primary object (1) ; (2) ; (3) [1974] I SCR 434 365 Of the Act is to provide for the coordinated, efficient and economic development of electricity in India on a regional basis consistent with the needs of the entire region including semi urban and rural areas.
Chapter II of the Act provides for the constitution of the Central Electricity Authority and Chapter III for the constitution of state Electricity Boards.
Chapter IV prescribes the powers and duties of state Electricity Boards, and Chapter V the Boards ' works and trading procedure.
n Chapter VI deals with the Board 's finance, Accounts and Audit.
Chapter VII (from S, 70 to section 83) which is headed "Miscellaneous" contains various miscellaneous provisions amongst Which are section 78 which empowers the Government to make rules and section 79 which empowers the Board to make regulations in respect of matters specific in clauses (a) to (k) of that Section.
Clause (c) of section 79 is "the duties of officers and servants of the Board, and their salaries, allowances and other conditions of` service".
This, of course is no more than the ordinary general power, with which every employer is invested in the first instance, to regulate the conditions of service of his employees.
It is an ancillary or incidental power of every employer, The Electricity Supply Act does not presume to be an Act to regulate the conditions of service of the employees of state Electricity Boards.
It is an act to regulate the coordinated development of electricity.
It is a special Act in reread to the subject of development of electricity, even as the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act is a special Act in regard to the subject of Conditions of Service of workmen in industrial establishments.
If Sec.
79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act generally provides for the making of regulations providing for the conditions of service of tile employees of the Board, it can only be regarded as a general provides which must yield to the special provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act in respect of matters covered by the latter Act.
The maim "Generalia specialibus non derogant" is quite well known.
The rule flowing from the maxim has been explained in Mary Seward vs The owner of the "Vera Cruz"(l) as follows: "Now if anything be certain it is this, that where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of such general worlds without any indication of a particular intention to do so".
(1) at 68.
366 The question in Seward vs Vera Cruz was whether Sec. 7 of the Admiralty Court Act of 1861, which gave jurisdiction to that Court over "any claim for damage done by any ship" also gave jurisdiction over claims for loss of life which would otherwise come under the Fatal Accidents Act.
It was held that the general words o Sec. 7 of the Admiralty Court Act did not exclude the applicability of the Fatal Accidents Act and therefore, the Admiralty Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a claim for damages for loss of life.
The reason for the rule that a general provision should yield to a specific provision is this: In passing a Special Act, Parliament devotes its entire consideration to a particular subject.
When a General Act is subsequently passed, it is logical to presume that Parliament has not repealed or modified the former Special Act unless it appears that the Special Act again received consideration from Parliament.
Vide London and Blackwall Railway vs Lighthouse District board o Works(l) and Thorpe vs Adams(2).
In J. K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. vs state f Uttar Pradesh(3), this Court observed (at p. 1174): "The rule that general provisions should yield to specific provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers and judges but springs from the common understanding of men and women that when the same person gives two directions one covering a large number of matters in general and an other to only some of them his intention is that these latter directions should prevail as regards these while as regards us the rest the earlier direction should have effect".
We have already shown that the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act is a Special Act dealing with a Specific subject, namely the conditions of service, enumerated in the Schedule, of workmen in industrial establishments.
It is impossible to conceive that Parliament sought to abrogate the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act embodying as they do hard won and precious rights of workmen and prescribing as they do an elaborate procedure, including a quasi judicial determination, by a general, incidental provision like Sec.
79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act.
It is obvious that Parliament did not have before it the Standing orders Act when it passed the Electricity Supply Act and Parliament never meant that the Standing orders Act should stand protanto re pealed by Sec.
79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act.
We are clearly of the view that the provisions of the Standing orders Act must prevail over section 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act, in regard to matters to which the Standing orders Act applies.
(1) = ; (2) (1871) L. R. (3) A. r. R.
367 Shri G. B. Pai, relying on what was said in the Rajasthan state A Electricity Board case and Sukhdev Singh & Ors 's case argued that the regulations made under Sec.
79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act being statutory in nature stood on so high a pedestal as to override, by their very nature, the Standing orders made under the Standing orders Act.
The observations on which he relied are, in the Rajasthan State Electricity Bard case: "The state, as defined in article 12, is thus comprehended to include bodies created for the purpose of promoting the educational and economic interests of the people.
The State, as constituted by our Constitution, is further specifically empowered under article 298 to carry on any trade or business.
The circumstance that the Board under the Electricity Supply Act is required to carry on some activities of the nature of trade or commerce does not, therefore, give any indication that the Board must be excluded from the scope of the word "state" as used in article 12.
On the other hand, there are provisions in the Electricity Supply Act which clearly Show that the powers conferred on the Board include power to give directions, the disobedience of which is punishable as a criminal offence.
In these circumstances, we do not consider it at all necessary to examine the cases cited by Mr. Desai to urge before us that the Board cannot be held to be an agent or instrument of the Government.
The Board was clearly an authority to which the provisions o Part III of the Constitution were applicable".
and in Sukhdev Singh 's case (at p. 627): "Rules, regulations, schemes, Bye laws, orders made under statutory powers are all comprised in delegated legislation" at p. 628) "Subordinate legislation has, if validly made, the full force and effect of a. statute" and (at p. 684 685) "Rules and Regulations of the oil and Natural Gas Commission, Life Insurance Corporation, Industrial Finance Corporation have the force of law.
The employees of these statutory bodies have a statutory status and they are entitled to a declaration o being in employment when their dismissal or removal is in contravention of statutory provisions.
368 These statutory bodies are authorities within the meaning of article 12 o the Constitution".
The proposition that statutory Bodies are 'authorities ' within the meaning of article 12 of the Constitution, that the employees of these bodies have a statutory status and that regulations made under the statutes creating these bodies have the force of law are not in dispute before us.
The question is not whether the employees and the Board have a statutory status; they undoubtedly have.
The question is not whether the regulations made under Sec.
79 have the force of law; again, they undoubtedly have.
The question is whether Sec.
79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act is a general law and therfore regulations cannot be made under it in respect of matters covered by the Industrial employment (Standing order) Act, a special law.
That question we have answered and the answer to that question makes irrelevant the submissions based on the statutory status of the employees and the statutory force of the regulations.
Next, we turn to the submission based on the notification made under Sec.
13 B of the Standing orders Act.
Section 13 B reads as follows: "13B. Nothing in this Act shall apply to an industrial establishment in so far as the workmen employed therein are persons to whom the Fundamental and Supplementary Rules, Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, Revised Leave Rules, Civil Service Regulations, Civilians in Defence, Service (Classiffication, Control and Appeal) Rules or the Indian Railway Establishment Code or any other rules or regulations that may be notified in this behalf by the appropriate Government in the official Gazette, apply".
The notification made by the Government has already been extracted by us.
Some doubts were expressed whether the U.P. state electricity Board had in fact made the regulation and whether the Government merely notified the relation without applying its mind.
The learned counsel appearing for the Board and the Government placed before us the relevant records and note files and we are satisfied that the Board did make the regulation and the Government did apply its mind.
The High Court expressed the views that the expression any other rules or regulations" should be read ejusdem generis with the expressions "Fundamental and Supplementary Rules", "Civil Services, Control, Classification and Appeal Rules" etc.
So read, it was said, the provisions of Section 13 B could only be applied to industrial establish 369 ments in which the workmen employed could properly be described as Government servants.
We are unable to agree that the application of the ejusdem generis rule leads to any such result.
The true scope of the rule of "ejusdem generis" is that words of a general nature following specific and particular words should be construed as limited to things which are of the same nature as those specified.
But the rule is one which has to be "applied with caution and not pushed too far".
It is a rule which must be confined to narrow bounds so as not to unduly or unnecessarily limit general and comprehensive words.
If a broad based genus could consistently be discovered, there is no warrant to cut down general words to dwarf size.
If giant it cannot be, dwarf it need not be.
It is true that in Sec.
13 B the specie specie spacifically mentioned happen to be Government servants.
But they also possess this common characteristic that they are all public servants enjoying a statutory status, and governed by statutory rules and regulations.
If the legislature intended to confine the applicability of Sec.
13 B to industrial undertakings employing Government servants only nothing was easier than to say so instead of referring to various rules specifically and following it up with a general expression like the one before us.
The words 'rules and regulations ' have come to acquire a special meaning when used in statutes.
They are used to describe subordinate legislation made by authorities to whom the statute delegates that function.
Te words can have no other meaning in Sec.
1 3 B. Therefore, the expression "workmen . t whom. any other rules or regulations that may be notified in this behalf means, in the context of Sec.
13 B, workmen enjoying a statutory status, in respect of whose conditions of, service the relevant statute authorities the making of rules or regulations.
The expression cannot be construed so narrowly as to mean Government servants only; nor can it be construed so broadly as to mean workmen employed by whomsoever including private employers, so long a their conditions of service are notified by the Government under Sec.
13 B. Shri Garg relied on certain observations of the Madras High Court in Raman Nambissan vs State Electricity Board(l), and Thiruvenkataswami vs Coimbatore Municipality().
In Raman Nambissan 's case it was held that the mere fact that the Electricity Board had adopted the rules and regulations if the Government of Madras a its transitory rules and regulations did not bring the workmen employed in industrial establishments under the Board within the mischief of Sec.
1 3 P. Of the Industrial Establishment 's (Standing order) ct.
In Thiru Venkataswami 's '.
ca it was held that rules made by the Government fl (1) [1967] I L.L.J. 252.
(2) [1968] I L.L.J. 361 370 under the District Municipalities Act could not be considered to he rules notified under Se.
13 B of the Standing orders Act merely because the rules were made by the Government and published in the Government Gazette.
We agree with the conclusion in.
both case.
In Thiru Venkataswami case Kailasam J., also observed that the industrial employment (Standing order) Act was a special act relating exclusively to the service conditions of persons employed in industrial establishments, and, therefore, its provisions prevailed over The provisions of the District Municipalities Act.
We entirely agree.
But, the learned judge went on to say "section 13 B cannot be availed of for purposes of framing rules to govern the relationships in an industrial establishment under private management or in a statutory Corporation.
This rule can apply only to industrial establishments in respect of which the Government is authorised to frame rules and regulations relating to the conditions of employment in industrial establishments".
There we disagree.
Our disagreement is only in regard to industrial establishment in statutory Corporations and not those under private management.
Our reasons are mentioned in the previous paragraph.
Shri Garg suggested that the rules, and regulations specific mention of which has been made in Sec.
13 B were all comprehensive sets of rules.
, and, therefore, "any other rules or regulations" that might be notified by the Government should also satisfy the test of eomprehensiveness.
He argued that a single rule or regulation could not be notified under Sec.
13 B as it would be too much to say, he said, that the notifying of a single rule or regulation would exclude the applicability of all the provisions of the Standing orders Act.
We do not think that the notifying of one or many regulations has the effect that Shri Garg apprehends it has.
The words 'Nothing in this Act shall apply ' are not to be interpreted too literally as to lead to absurd results and to what the legislature never intended.
In our view the only reasonable construction that we can put upon the language of Sec.
13 B is that a rule or regulation, if notified by the Government, will exclude the applicability of the Act to the extent that the rule or regulation corse the field.
To that extent and to that extend only 'nothing in the Act shall apply '.
To understand Sec.
13B in by other manner will lead to unjust and uncontemplated results.
For instance, most of the Service Rules and Regulations expressly mentioned in Sec.
13 B do no deal with a large number of the matters enumerated in the schedule such as 'Manner of intimating to workman periods and hour 11 of work, holidays, pay days and wage rates ', 'shift working ', 'Attendance and late coming ', 'conditions o, procedure in applying for, and e authority which may grant leave and holidays '. 'Closing and 371 reopening of Sections of the industrial establishments and temporary stoppages of work and the rights and liabilities of he employer and workman arising therefrom ' etc.
To exclude the applicability of Standing orders relating to all these matters because the Fundamental Rules, the Civil Service Rules or the Civil Services Control, Classification an Appeal Rules provide for a few.
matters like 'Classification of workmen ' or 'suspension or dismissal for misconduct ' would be to reverse the processes of history, apart from leading to unjust and untoward results.
It will place workmen once again at the mercy of the employer be he ever so benign and it will certainly promote industrial strife.
We have indicated what according to us is h proper construction of Sec.
13 B. That is the only construction which gives meaning and sense to Sec.
13 B and that is a construction which can legitimately be said to conform to the Directive Principles of state Policy proclaimed in Articles 42 and 43 of the Constitution.
We, therefore, hold that the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act is a special law in regard to the matters enumerated in the schedule and the regulations made by the Electricity Board with respect to any of those matters are of no effect unless such regulations are either notified by the Government under Sec.
13 B or certified by The Certifying officer under Sec.
5 o the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act.
In regard to matters in respect of which regulations made by the Board have not been notified by the Governor or in respect o which n regulations have been made by the Board, the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act shall continue to apply.
In the present case the regulation made by the Board with regard to age o superannuation having been duly notified by the Government, the regulation shall have effect notwithstanding the fact hat it is a matter which could be the subject matter s) Standing orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act.
The respondents were therefore, properly retired when they attained the age of is years.
the appeal is, therefore, allowed.
The Writ Petition field in the Light Court is dismissed.
The appellants will pay the costs of the respondents as directed by this Court on 28 9 1977.
The costs are quantified at Rs. 3,500/ .
S.R. Appeal allowed.

Output:
Respondents were two workmen originally employed by M/s Seth lam Gopal and Partners, who were licensees for the distribution of electricity under the Electricity Act, 1910.
There were certified Standing orders for the industrial establishment of the said licensees; but they did not prescribe any age of superannuation for the employees with the result the workmen could continue to hours long as they were fit and able to discharge their duties Pursuant to The purchase by the appellant with effect from 1 12 1964 of the electricity undertaking of M/s Seth Ram Gopal, the employees in their industrial establishment including the respondents became the employee of the appellant.
I he appellant board which ii admittedly an industrial establishment to which the Industrial Employment (Standing orders Act.
1946 applies neither made nor got certified any standing orders as it was bound so to do under hat Act.
The Board however considered the certified Standing orders of the establishment Seth Ram Gopal as applicable to their employees even after the purchase of the undertaking by the Board.
However.
On lay 2. 1970 the Governor of Uttar Pradesh notified under Section 13 B o the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946.
a regulation made by the U.P. State Electricity Board under Section 79(c) of the electricity Suppl.
Act, 1948 fixing the age of superannuation as S and 60 on a par with the other State Govt.
employees.
Action in pursuance of the regulation as notified by the Governor the appellant sought to retire the respondents on July 2, 1972 and July 7. 1972 respectively.
On their attaining the age of 58 years.
The respondents filed a Writ Petition in the Allahabad High Court challenging the regulation male by the Board and its notification by the Governor which was dismissed.
But the Division Bench which heard the special appeal preferred by then.
Referred three questions to a Full Bench The Full Bench answered the questions as follows: ``(l) The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders 1946 applies to the industrial establishment of the State Electricity Board.
(2) The Standing Orders framed, in an industrial establishment by an electrical undertaking, do not cease to be operative on the purchase of the undertaking by the Board or on framing of the Regulations under Section 79(c) of the electricity (Supply) Act 1918 and (3) Section 13 B of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders Act.
applies only to the industrial establishments of the Government and to no other establishments.
356 Following the opinion of the Full Bench, the Division Bench allowed the special Appeal and issued a writ quashing the notification dated May 28, 197) and directing the appellant not to enforce the regulation against the respondents.
he appellant obtained a certificate under article 133(1) of the Constitution and has preferred the appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court ^ HELD : 1.
The Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act.
1946 (Act 20) is a special law in regard to the matters enumerate(l in the schedule and the regulations made by the Electricity Board with respect to my of those matters are of no effect, unless such regulations are either notified by the Government under Section 13 B or certified by the certifying officer under Section 5 of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, 1946.
In regard to matters in respect of which regulations made by the Board have not been notified by the Governor or in respect of which no regulations have been made by the Board the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders Act shall continue to apply.
In the present case, the regulation made 1.
the Board with retired to the age of superannuation having been duly notified by the government , the regulation shall have effect.
notwithstanding the fact that it is a matter which could be the subject matters of Standing orders under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act.
The respondents were, therefore, properly retired when they attained the are of 58 years.
[371A F] 2.
The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act is an Act specially designed to define the terms of employment of workmen in industrial establishment, to give the workmen a collective voice in defining the terms of employment and to subject the terms of employment to the scrutiny of quasi judicial authorities by the application of the test of fairness and reasonableness.
It is an Act giving recognition and hard won and precious right of workmen.
It is a Special Act expressly and exclusively dealing with the schedule enumerated conditions of service or workmen in industrial establishment.
[364E G] Associated Cement Co. Ltd. vs P. D. Vyas, [196(] 2 S.C.R. 974; Rohtak Hissar district Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. vs , State of U.P. an(l ors.
; , ; Western India Match Co. Ltd. vs Workmen, [1974] 1 S.C.R. 434; referred to.
The Electricity Supply Act does not presume to be an Act to regulate the conditions of service of the employees of State Electricity Board.
It is an act to regulate the coordinated development of electricity.
It is a special Act in regard to the subject of development of electricity, even as the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act is a special act in regard to the subject of conditions of service of workmen in industrial establishments.
If section 79 of he Electricity Supply Act generally provides for the making o regulations providing for the conditions of service of the employees of the Board, it can only be regarded as a general provision which must yield o the special provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act in respect of matters covered by the latter.
[365D F] 4.
The reason for the rule "Generalis specialibus non derogant", that a general provision should yield to specific provision is this: In passing a special Act, Parliament devotes its entire consideration to a. particulars subject.
When a 357 General Act is subsequently passed, it is logical to presume that Parliament has A not repealed or modified the former special Act unless it appears that the Special Act again levied consideration from Parliament [366 D] The provisions of the Standing orders Acts therefore, must prevail over Section 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act in regard to matters to which the Standing (Orders Act applies.
It is impossible to conceive that Parliament sought to abrogate the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act, embodying as they do hard won and precious rights of workmen and prescribing as they do an elaborate procedure, including a quasi judicial determination, by a general, incidental provision like Section 79(c) of the Electricity Supply Act.
lt is obvious that Parliament did not have before it the Standing orders Act, when it passed the Electricity Supply Act and Parliament never meant that the Standing orders Act should stand pr alto repealed by Section 79(c of the Electricity Supply Act.
[366F H] Sukhdev Singh vs Bhagat Ram, ; ; Rajasthan Electricity Board n. Mohan Lal, [1967] 3 S.C.R. 277; held inapplicable.
The true scope of the rule of "ejusdem generis" is that words of a general nature following specific and particular words should be so construed as limited t things which are of the same nature as those specified.
But the rule is one which has to be "applied with caution aud not pushed too far".
It is a rule which must be confined to narrow bounds so as not to unduly or necessarily limit general and comprehensive words.
If a broad based genus could consistently be discovered there is no warrant to cut down general words to dwarf size.
If giant it cannot be, dwarf it need not be.
[369 A B] It is true that in Section 1 3 B the specie specifically mentioned happen to be Government servants.
But they also possess this common characteristic that they are all public servants enjoying a statutory status and governed by statutory rules and regulations.
If the legislature intended to confine the applicability of Section I 3 B to industrial undertakings employing government servants only nothing was easier than to say so instead of referring to various rules specially and following it up with a general expression like the one in the instant case.
[369B D] 6.
The words 'rules and regulations ' have come to acquire a. special meaning when used in statutes.
They are used to describe subordinate legislation made by authorities to whom the statute delegates that function.
The words can have MV other meaning in Sec.
1 3 B. Therefore, the expression "workmen .
whom . any other rules or regulations that may be notified in this behalf means, in the context of Sec.
13 B, workmen enjoying a statutory status, in respect of whose conditions of service the relevant statute authorises the making of rules or regulations.
The expression cannot be construed so narrowly as to mean Government servants only; nor can not be construed so broadly as to mean workmen employed by whomsoever including private employers, so long as their conditions of service are notified by the Govt.
under Sec.
13 B [369D F] The words 'nothing in this Act shall apply ' are not to be interpreted to literally as to lead to absurd results.
The only reasonable construction that an be put upon the language of Section 13 B is that a rule of regulation, it 358 notified by the Government, will exclude the applicability of the Act to the extent that the rule or regulation covers the field.
To that extent and to that extent only "nothing in the Act shall apply".
[307 F G] Raman Nambissan vs State Electricity Board and Thiruvenkataswami vs Coimbatore Municipality, explained.


Input:
Civil Appeal No. 1831 of 1973.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 4 5 1970 of the Allahabad High Court in Spl.
Appeal No. 453/69.
B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the Appellants.
Ex Parte for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA, J.
This appeal is directed against a judgment, dated May 4, 1970, of the High Court of Allahabad.
It arises in these circumstances: One Matadin, father of Ram Lochan, respondent 6 herein, was a fixed rate tenant of the plots in dispute measuring 2.11 acres.
One Ram Naresh Singh (deceased), brother of appellant 1 herein, 735 namely Mahadeo Prasad Singh, obtained a money decree against Matadin on February 18, 1953 from the Judge, Small Causes Court, Varanasi suit No. 847 of 1953.
Ram Naresh Singh sought to execute the decree.
As a consequence, the decree was transferred from the Court of the Judge of Small Causes to the Court of Munsif, Varanasi, for execution.
The plots in dispute were put to auction by the executing court, and were purchased by the decree holder on July 20, 1956.
The sale was confirmed on August 29, 1956 and the sale certificate was issued on September 8, 1956.
The decreeholder purchaser, Ram Naresh Singh, took delivery of possession over these plots on March 14, 1957.
Thereafter, he further sold the plots to appellant 2 and respondents 6 to 10.
Matadin, however, died sometime in 1960.
Thereafter his son Ram Lochan respondent 1, herein, instituted a suit on June 14, 1961 i.e. more than three years after the delivery of possession to the decree holder purchaser, Ram Naresh Singh, under section 229B read with Section 209 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act in the Revenue court against the present appellants, for a declaration that he is in possession of the suit land as Bhoomidar.
In the alternative, he claimed the relief of possession on the same basis.
He pleaded that his father, Ram Naresh Singh was the original Bhoomidar and remained in possession of the suit land till his death and thereafter, the plaintiff as the heir of the deceased continue in possession as Bhoomidar.
He further alleged that the sale in favour of Ram Naresh Singh was without jurisdiction and a nullity; as it had been made without the knowledge of or notice to his father.
The suit was resisted by the appellant, who is original defendant 1, and respondents 7 to 10, who are original defendants 2 to 5, inter alia on the ground that the suit was barred as res judicata and also under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and Article 181 of the Limitation Act.
Defendants 2 to 5 further pleaded that they were bona fide purchasers for value and, therefore, their rights in the suit land were protected under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act.
They also, alleged that they had made improvements on the suit land and were entitled to the benefit of Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act.
The trial court, by its judgment, dated August 30, 1965.
dismissed the suit, holding, inter alia, that It was barred by the principle of constructive res judicata as also under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure; that the Revenue Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit; that the appellants 6 to 736 10 were bona fide purchasers for value and, as such, were entitled to the benefit of Sections 41 and 51 of the Transfer of Property Act; that the suit was barred by Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 as well as by Section 34(5) of the U.P. Land Reforms Act; and that Ram Naresh Singh had been in possession since March 14, 1967, i.e., the date on which he obtained delivery of possession in execution of his decree as auction purchaser.
Aggrieved, the plaintiff (respondent 1) preferred an appeal to the Court of the Additional Commissioner, Varanasi, who by his judgment dated December 28, 1965, allowed the appeal and held that the executing court had no jurisdiction to sell the suit land under Section 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act.
1954 and that the suit was not barred as res judicata or under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The Additional Commissioner further held that the possession of Ram Naresh Singh was unlawful as it was on the basis of the void sale, dated March 4, 1960, which could not confer any title on him; that the judgment debtor had no knowledge about the execution proceedings; that the suit property worth Rs. 6,000 was for a very meagre amount and the sale was vitiated by fraud in publishing and conducting the sale.
Ram Lochan and Ram Naresh Singh carried a second appeal against the decision to the Board of Revenue.
During the pendency of that second appeal, Ram Naresh Singh died and Mahadeo Prasad Singh, appellant 1, was substituted in his place.
The Board dismissed the appeal on the ground that the auction sale with regard to the suit land in pursuance of the decree of the Judge, Small Causes Court, was void and, as such, did not invest the decree holder purchaser with any title and consequently, the possession of the appellant was without any title.
The Board further held that the auction sale did not affect the suit under Section 209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and the Land Reforms Act.
To impugn the judgment of the Board, Mahadeo Prasad Singh, appellant herein, as well as respondents 6 to 10 filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Allahabad.
A learned Single Judge, who heard the writ petition, allowed it by his judgment, dated April 23, 1969, and quashed the judgments of the Board of Revenue as well as of the Additional Commissioner, who are respondents 2 and 3 herein.
Following an earlier judgment of a Division Bench of the same Court in Suraj Bux Singh vs Badri Prasad & Anr.
the learned Judge held 737 that the execution sale of the suit land was proper as per the provisions of Section 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure; that prior to its amendment in U.P. by the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act 1954, the executing court had the same powers in relation to execution as it would have had if the decree had been passed by itself; that the decree in the present suit was passed on February 18, 1953, i.e. prior to the coming into force of the Amendment Act of 1954 and, as such, the amended Section 42 did not apply to it; and that the decree having been passed prior to the date of the amendment, should be executed in accordance with the provisions of Section 42 as it stood prior to its amendment; and that as a result, the suit for declaration as well as for possession would have to fail.
The learned Single Judge did not go into the question as to whether the suit was barred by Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Against the judgment of the learned Single Judge, respondent 1, herein, preferred a Special Appeal which was referred to a Full Bench of the High Court consisting of three learned Judges.
The two Judges, in majority, held that the Small Cause Court had no power to execute the decree by attachment and sale of immovable property; that the transferee court, namely, the court of the Munsif had the same powers as that of the Small Cause Court and, therefore, that court also had no jurisdiction to execute the decree by attachment and sale of the immovable property; that the right to execute a decree by attachment and sale of immovable property is a matter of procedure, while the right to realise the decretal amount by attachment and sale is a substantive right of the decree holder, that the date on which the decree was put into execution, the amendment of Section 42 had already come into force and the power of the transferee court had become co terminus with that of the transferor court; and that the amendment did not save the right of the appellant to execute the decree of the Small Causes Court by attachment and sale of immovable property.
Sinha, J. however, dissented.
He took the view that the Amendment Act did not apply to the present suit and that a substantive right had accrued to Ram Naresh Singh on the passing of the decree to execute it by attachment and sale of the immovable property and that right was clearly saved to him by virtue of Section 3 of the Amendment Act.
In accordance with the view of the majority, the appeal of respondent 1 was allowed and the Order of the learned Single Judge was set aside.
Hence this appeal by special leave by the appellants.
738 Thus, the principal question that falls to be considered in this appeal is whether the High Court was right in holding that the execution sale of the land in dispute was totally without jurisdiction and null and void.
Some relevant dates may be noted.
Ram Naresh obtained the decree from the Court of Small Causes on February 18, 1953.
On the decree holder 's application under Section 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the decree was transferred to the Court of the Munsif on January 24, 1955 and was put into execution after the U.P. (Amendment) Act XXIV of 1954 had come into force.
This sale in favour of the decree holder himself took place on July 20, 1956.
It was confirmed on August 29, 1956 and the sale certificate was issued to the purchaser on September 8, 1956.
The auction purchaser took delivery of possession as per Dakhalnama on March 24, 1957.
The decree holder purchaser further sold the plots in dispute to defendants 2 to 5.
Next, at this stage, the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the U.P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act (Act No. XXIV of 1954) may be noticed.
Section 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "a decree may be executed either by the Court which passed it or by the Court to which it is sent for execution".
In the instant case, as already seen, the decree was passed by the Small Cause Court which was competent to execute it, but (in view of Order 21, Rule 82 of the Code) not by attachment and sale of the immovable property of the judgment debtor.
That is to say, that Court could execute it by attachment and sale of the movable property of the judgment debtor, if it was, of course, not exempt under Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure or under any other law.
Section 39 of the Code deals with transfer of decree.
Its material part reads thus: "39(1).The Court which passed a decree may, on the application of the decree holder, send it for execution to another Court of competent jurisdiction (a) if the person against whom the decree is passed actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business, or personally works for gain, within the local limits of the jurisdiction of such other Court, or (b)if such person has not property within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court which passed the decree sufficient to satisfy such decree and has property 739 within the local limits of the jurisdiction of such other Court, or (c)if the decree directs the sale or delivery of immovable property situate outside the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court which passed it, or (d)if the court which passed the decree considers for any other reason, which it shall record in writing, that the decree should be executed by such other Court.
(2)The Court which passed a decree may of its own motion send it for execution to any subordinate Court of competent jurisdiction.
(3) . . . . . " In the instant case, the decree was transferred under clause (d) of sub section (1) of Section 39.
Unlike the other clauses (a) to (c) of the sub section, it seems that under clause (d), the Court has a rational discretion to transfer or not to transfer the decree passed by it.
This is apparent from the word "may" used in the opening part of sub section (1), and the requirement of recording reasons for the transfer under clause (d).
It follows therefore, that under Section 39 (1) a decree holder has no indefeasible right to get his application for transfer of decree to another Court ipso facto accepted by the Court which passed it, particularly in a case which is not covered by clauses (a), (b) and (c) of that sub section.
Section 42 of the Code indicates the powers of the transferee court for executing a transferred decree.
The material part of this section, prior to its amendment by the U.P. Act (No. XXIV) of 1954, reads as under: "The Court executing a decree sent to it shall have the same powers in executing such decree as if it had been passed by itself.
All persons disobeying or obstructing the execution of the decree shall be punishable by such Court in the same manner as if it had passed the decree.
And its order in executing such decree shall be subject to the same rules in respect of appeal as if the decree had been passed by itself.".
(emphasis added) The provisions in sub sections (2), (3) and (4) of the Section are not relevant for our purpose.
The U.P. Act (No. XXIV of 1954) amended with effect from November 30, 1954, Section 42 of the Code, and after that amendment sub section (1) of the Section read as under: 740 "The Court executing the decree sent to it shall have the same power in executing such decree as if it had been passed by itself.
All persons disobeying or obstructing the execution of decree shall be punished by such Court in the same manner as if it had passed the decree and its order in executing such decree shall be subject to the same rules in respect of appeal as if the decree had been passed by itself." (emphasis added) Thus, for the words "as if it had been passed by itself" occurring in the first sentence of sub section (1) of Section 42, the Amending Act 24 of 1954 substituted the words "as the Court which passed it".
The effect of such substitution was that the powers of the transferee Court in executing the transferred decree became coterminous with the powers of the Court which had passed it.
The result was that if the power of the transferor Court to execute its own decree were in any respect restricted, the same restriction would attach to the powers of the transferee Court in executing the transferred decree, notwithstanding the position that the powers of the transferee Court in executing its own decree were not so restricted.
Section 3 of the U.P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act, saves certain rights already acquired or accrued.
It is in these terms: "3(1)Any amendment made by this Act shall not affect the validity, invalidity, effect or consequence of anything already done or suffered, or any right, title, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred or any release or discharge of or from any debt, decree, liability, or any jurisdiction already exercised, and any proceeding instituted or commenced in any Court prior to the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding any amendment herein made, continue to be heard and decided by such Court.
(2)Where by reason of any amendment herein made in the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, or any other enactment mentioned in column 2 of the schedule, the period of limitation prescribed for any suit or appeal has been modified or a different period of limitation will hereafter govern any such suit or appeal, then, notwithstanding any amendment so made or the fact that the suit or appeal would now lie in a different Court, the period of limitation applicable to a suit or appeal, as aforesaid, in which time has begun to run before the commencement of this Act, shall continue to be the period 741 which but for the amendment so made would have been available.
Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, we may remind ourselves of some well known principles of interpretation in regard to the retrospective operation of statutes.
As a general rule, a statute which takes away or impairs substantive rights acquired under the existing law is construed to have a prospective operation unless the language of that statute expressly or by inevitable intendment compels a contrary construction.
But this presumption as to prospective operation of a statute does not apply to an enactment affecting procedure or practice such as the Code of Civil Procedure.
The reason is that no person has a vested right in any course of procedure.
"The general principle indeed seems to be that alterations in the procedure are always retrospective, unless there be some good reason against it".
(See Mulla 's Code of Civil Procedure, 13th Edn.
I, page 6, and In the light of the above principles, the question posed for our decision, resolves itself into the two fold issue : whether the decree holder had acquired a substantive right (a) to get the decree passed by the Court of Small Causes, transferred to the Court of the Munsif and (b) thereafter to have is executed by the transferee Court in any of the modes provided in Section 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure, including the mode by attachment and sale of the immovable property of the judgment debtor.
As before the High Court, here also, it is contended on behalf of the decree holder that he had acquired this two fold substantive right before the coming into force of the U.P. (Amendment Act XXIV) of 1954, and, as such, it was saved by Section 3(1) of this Amendment Act.
It is maintained that the two fold right aforesaid is a substantive right and not merely a matter of procedure.
Support for this argument has been sought from a decision of this Court in Garikapati vs Subbiah Choudhry.
Reference has also been made to a Division Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Suraj Bux Singh vs Badri Prasad.
In the alternative, it is submitted that assuming the sale was without jurisdiction, then also, that question would relate to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree and, as such, the remedy of the judgment debtor was to proceed by an application 742 under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and not by a suit as has been done by the plaintiff in the instant case.
In short, the argument is that in any event, the present suit was barred by Section 47 of the Code.
It appears to us that none of these contentions stands a close examination.
It may be noted that the fasciculus of Sections 51 to 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure appear under the heading "PROCEDURE IN EXECUTION".
Section 51 is captioned "Powers of Court to enforce execution".
It reads thus : "Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, the Court may, on the application of the decree holder, order execution of the decree (a) by delivery of any property specifically decreed; (b) by attachment and sale or by sales without attachment of any property; (c) . . . . . . . . (d) by appointing a receiver; or (e) in such other manner as the nature of the relief granted may require : Provided that, where the decree is for the payment of money, execution by detention in prison shall not be ordered unless, after giving the judgment debtor an opportunity of showing cause why he should not be committed to prison, the Court, for reasons recorded in writing, is satisfied. . . ." This Section "merely enumerates the different modes of execution in general terms while the conditions and limitations under which alone the respective modes can be availed of are prescribed further on by different provisions".
I.R. Commentaries Vol.
I, 9th Edn.
p. 863).
The opening words of the Section "Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed" put it beyond doubt that there is no wide or unrestricted jurisdiction to order execution or to claim execution in every case in all the modes indicated therein. 'Prescribed ' has been defined in Section 2(16) of the Code to mean "prescribed by rules", and "rules", under Section 2(18) means "rules and forms" contained in the First Schedule of the Code or framed by the respective superior Courts in different States under Section 122 or Section 125.
743 We are one with the High Court (majority) that this phrase cannot be construed to mean that the powers of the executing Court under this Section are not subject to the other conditions and limitations enacted in the other sections of the Code.
For instance, the mode, (b), by attachment and sale of the property of the judgment debtor, may not be available in respect of property which falls within the exemption of section 60 of the Code.
Although ordinarily the decree holder has an option to choose any particular mode for execution of his money decree, it will not be correct to say that the Court has absolutely no discretion to place any limitation as to the mode in which the decree is to be executed.
The option of the judgment debtor, for instance, to apply under Order 21.
Rule 30, C.P.C. for execution of a decree simultaneously against both the person and the property of the judgment debtor is subject to exercise by the Court of a judicial discretion vested in it under Order 21, Rule 21, C.P.C. We have already noticed, that under Section 39(1) (d), the decree holder has no indefeasible, substantive right to get a decree of a Court of Small Causes passed in his favour transferred to another Court.
Cases are conceivable where the decree is of such a petty amount that the Court of Small Causes thinks that it can easily be executed by it by attachment and sale of the movable property of the judgment debtor.
In the instant case, also the decree was for a small amount of Rs. 300 and odd and we understand that the application for transfer was made under clause (d) of Section 39(1).
Thus, the decree holder 's right to make an application for transfer of his decree under section 39(1) (d) is a mere procedural right.
The Court of Small Causes could in its discretion, for reasons to be recorded, refuse to transfer it to the Court of the Munsif.
In other words, the decree holder had no vested or substantive right to get the decree transferred to the Court of the Munsif for execution.
The first limb of the issue is therefore answered against the appellant.
As regards the second limb of the issue, we find ourselves entirely in agreement with the High Court that the provisions of Section 51 are merely procedural in character.
A decree holder gets a right to execute the decree only in accordance with the 744 procedure provided by law in force at the time when the execution is sought.
If a mode of procedure different from the one which obtained at the date of the passing of the decree, has been provided by law, the decree holder is bound to proceed in execution according to the altered procedure.
The Amendment Act XXIV of 1954 had taken away the power of the transferee court to execute the transferred decree by attachment and sale of the immovable property by making it coterminous with that of the transferor Court which, in the instant case, was the Small Cause Court and in view of the prohibition contained in Order 21, Rule 82, Code of Civil Procedure, had no power to execute its decree by sale of immovable property.
That being the position, the Court of the Munsif to whom the decree had also been transferred for execution, had also no jurisdiction to order sale of the immovable property of the judgment debtor.
Thus considered, the sale of the immovable property ordered by the Munsif in execution of the decree of the Court of Small Causes transferred to him, was wholly without jurisdiction and a nullity.
Once we come to the conclusion that the sale in question was totally null and void, the alternative contention of the appellants with regard to the suit being barred by Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, does not survive.
This is not a case of an irregular or voidable sale which continues to subsist so long as it is not set aside, but of a sale which was entirely without jurisdiction.
It was non est in the eye of law.
Such a nullity does not from its very nature, need setting aside.
As pointed out by this Court in Kiran Singh vs Chaman Paswan, ". it is a fundamental principle, well established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction, is a nullity; and that its invalidity could be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution, and even in collateral proceedings".
Most of the rulings which have been cited in support of their alternative contention by the appellants, were also cited before 745 the High Court and have been rightly distinguished.
We need not go into the same.
Before we part with the judgment, we may, however, note that the amendment made by the U.P. (Act XXIV) of 1954 was deleted by another U.P. (Amendment) Act XIV of 1970, and the unamended sub section (1) of Section 42, as it existed before the amendment of 1954, was revived.
But, this Amendment Act (XIV of 1970) was not given retrospective operation.
It did not affect the previous operation of the Amendment Act XXIV of 1954 or anything suffered or done thereunder.
For the foregoing reasons, we uphold the impugned judgment and dismiss this appeal.
In view of the law point involved, we leave the parties to pay and bear their own costs.
P.B.R. Appeal dismissed.

Output:
A decree, according to section 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure, may be executed either by the Court which passed it or by the Court to which it is sent for execution.
Section 39(1)(d) provides that the Court which passed a decree may, on the application of the decree holder, send it for execution to another Court of competent jurisdiction, if the Court, which passed the decree, considers for any other reason, which it shall record in writing, that the decree should be executed by such other Court.
Section 42 of the Code, which indicates the powers of the transferee Court for executing the transferred decree, before its amendment in 1954, provided that the Court executing the decree sent to it, shall have the same powers in executing such decree "as if it had been passed by itself." After the amendment the words "as the Court which has passed it" were substituted for the words "as if it has been passed by itself".
Section 3 of the U.P. Civil Laws (Reform and Amendment) Act saved certain rights already acquired or accrued.
In February, 1953 the brother of appellant No. 1 obtained a decree from the Court of Small Causes which on his application under section 39 of the Code, was transferred to the Court of Munsif in January, 1955 and put into execution after the U.P. (Amendment) Act XXIV of 1954 had come into force.
In the sale the decree holder himself purchased the land in July, 1956 and took possession of the property.
He later sold the property to defendant nos.
2 to 5.
The suit of respondent No. 1 for a declaration that the sale in favour of appellant No. 1 was without jurisdiction and therefore a nullity was dismissed by the trial Court.
On appeal the Additional Commissioner held that the executing court had no jurisdiction to sell the suit land under section 42 of the C.P.C. as amended by the U. P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1954 Dismissing the appeal, the Board of Revenue held that the auction sale in pursuance of the decree of the Judge, Small Causes Court was void and did not invest the decree holder purchaser with any title.
733 On the appellant 's writ petition a single Judge of the High Court quashed the judgment of the Revenue Board as well as of the Additional Commissioner holding that the execution sale of the land was proper under section 42 of the Code, that prior to its amendment by the U. P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1954, the executing court had the same powers in relation to execution as it would have had if the decree had been passed by itself and the decree having been passed prior to the amendment of section 42 this section did not apply and the decree should have been executed in accordance with the provisions of section 42 prior to its amendment.
On appeal a Full Bench of the High Court (by majority) held that since the Small Causes Court had no power to execute the decree by attachment and sale of immovable property, the Munsif 's Court to which the decree was transferred for execution, possessing the same powers as the Small Causes Court, had no jurisdiction to execute the decree by attachment and sale of the immovable property.
It was contended before this Court on behalf of the decree holder that he had acquired a substantive right to get the decree of the Court of Small Causes transferred to the Court of Munsif for execution and thereafter to have it executed by the transferee court in any of the modes provided in section 51 C.P.C. and this two fold substantive right having accrued to him before the coming into force of the 1954 Amendment, it was saved by section 3 of this Amendment Act.
Dismissing the appeal, ^ HELD: 1 (a) Under section 39(1)(d) a decree holder has no indefeasible substantive right to get his application for transfer of a decree to another Court ipso facto accepted by the Court which passed it, particularly in a case which is not covered by clauses (a), (b) & (c) of that sub section.
The effect of substitution of the words "as the court which passed it" for the words "as if it had been passed by itself" was that powers of the transferee Court in executing the transferred decree became co terminus with the powers of the Court, which passed it.
Therefore, if the power of the transferor Court to execute its own decree were in any respect restricted, the same restriction would attach to the powers of the transferee Court in executing the transferred decree notwithstanding the position that the powers of the transferee Court in executing its own decree were not so restricted.
[739E; 740C D] (b) The opening words of section 51 (subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed) put it beyond doubt that there is no wide or unrestricted jurisdiction to order execution or to claim execution in every case in all the modes indicated therein.
The High Court (per majority) was right in construing it to mean that the powers of the executing court under this section are not subject to the other conditions and limitations enacted in the other sections of the Code.
Although ordinarily a decree holder has an option to choose any particular mode for execution of his money decree it may not be correct to say that the Court has absolutely no discretion to place any limitation as to the mode in which the decree is to be executed.
[742G, 743A B] In the instant case, the decree holder 's right to make an application for transfer of his decree under section 39(1)(d) is a mere procedural right.
The Court of Small Causes could, in its discretion for reasons to be recorded, 734 refuse to transfer it to the Court of Munsif.
In other words the decree holder had no vested or substantive right to get the decree transferred to the Court of the Munsif for execution.
[743F G] (c) The well settled principle in regard to the retrospective operation of statutes is that as a general rule, a statute which takes away or impairs substantive rights acquired under the existing law is construed to have a prospective operation unless the language of that statute expressly or by inevitable intendment compels a contrary construction.
But this presumption as to prospective operation of a statute does not apply to an enactment affecting procedure or practice such as the Code of Civil Procedure because no person has a vested right in any course of procedure.
[741 B C] 2.(a) The High Court was right in holding that the provisions of section 51 are merely procedural in character.
A decree holder gets a right to execute the decree only in accordance with the procedure provided by the law in force at the time when execution is sought.
If a mode of procedure different from the one which obtained at the date of passing of the decree has been provided by law, the decree holder is bound to proceed in execution according to the altered procedure.
[744A B] (b) The Amendment Act XXIV of 1954 had taken away the power of transferee Court to execute the transferred decree by attachment and sale of the immovable property by making it co terminus with that of the transferor Court (the Small Cause Court) and in view of the prohibition contained in Order 21 Rule 82 C.P.C. it had no power to execute its decree by sale of immovable property.
That being the position, the Court of the Munsif to which the decree had been transferred for execution had no jurisdiction to order sale of the immovable property of the judgment debtor.
The sale ordered by the Munsif in execution of the decree of the Court of Small Causes transferred to him was, therefore, wholly without jurisdiction and a nullity.
[744 B D] Kiran Singh vs Chaman Paswan, ; referred to.


Input:
Civil Appeal No. 3966 of 1987.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.1.1987 of the High Court of Orissa of O.J.C. No. 3300 of 1986.
A.K. Panda for the Appellant.
J.
R. Das for the Respondent The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHARMA, J. Special leave granted.
Arguments heard.
The respondent A.C. Jena was a Sarpanch of Padanipal Grama Panchayat, Orissa.
He was removed from the office under section 115 of the Orissa Grama Panchayat Act, 1964 by the order of the State Government (petitioner No. I before us) dated 24.10.86, as contained in Annexure D to the special leave petition, which has been quashed by the impugned judgment of the Orissa High Court dated 20.1.1987 in o.
J.c No. 330()/86.
The relevant provisions of section 115 of the Act read as follows: "115(1).
If on the report of the Sub Divisional 179 Officer the Collector is of the opinion that circumstances exist to show that the Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch of a Grama Panchayat wilfully omits or refuses to carry out or violates the provisions of this Act, or the rules or orders made thereunder or abuses the powers, rights and privileges vested in him or acts in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the inhabitants of the Grama and that the further continuance of such person in office would be detrimental to the interest of the Grama Panchayat or the inhabitants of the Grama, he may, by order, suspend the Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, as the case may be, from office and report the matter to the State Government.
(2) The State Government, on the report of the Collector under sub section (1) shall, or if the State Government themselves are of the opinion that the circumstances specified in the said sub section exist in relation to a Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, then on their own motion, may, after giving the person concerned a reasonable opportunity of showing cause, remove him from the office of Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, as the case may be.
(3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . (4) A Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch on removal from office under sub section (2) shall also cease to be a member of the Grama Panchayat, and such person shall not be eligible for election as a member for a period not exceeding four years as the State Government may specify.
(5). . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Collector, Cuttack, petitioner No. 2, before us, received a report (Appendix to Annexure A) from the Sub Divisional officer, Kendra Pada, stating the facts and circumstances which clearly satisfy the conditions mentioned in section 115 of the Act, for the suspension and removal of the respondent.
The Collector, Cuttack, thereupon suspended the Sarpanch by his order dated 24.4.1985 (Annexure A) and while so doing he expressly mentioned that on going through the 180 report of the Sub divisional officer he was satisfied that the Sarpanch acted in a manner as detailed in the Appendix and "his further continuance in office would be detrimental to the interest of the said Grama Panchayat as also of the inhabitants of the Grama." Accordingly a notice as required by sub section (2) was served on the Sarpanch, who filed his detailed reply and was also personally heard.
His explanation however was not considered satisfactory and an order dated 24.10.1986 bearing No. 19032/GP was passed removing him from the office of the Sarpanch.
A second notification of the same date bearing No. 19039/GP was issued under sub section (4).
The Sarpanch in these circumstances moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The High Court at the stage of admission by a short order quashed the notification issued against the petitioner "on the sole and simple ground that the order does not specify one of the mandatory requirements, i.e., his further continuance in the office would be detrimental to the interest of the Gram Panchayat or the inhabitants of the Gram".
Elaborating the point the High Court observed as follows: ".
One of the circumstances mentioned in sub section ( I) is just indicated above.
As the existence of the circumstances mentioned in sub section (1) is condition precedent for passing an order of removal by the State Government, its absence makes the order wholly illegal and without jurisdiction . , .".
As has been stated earlier, the Collector, while passing the order of suspension under sub section (1) of section 115 expressly stated that the further continuance of the petitioner in office would be detrimental to the interest of the Grama Panchayat and the inhabitants of the Grama.
He relied upon the report of the Subdivisional officer mentioning serious allegations against the Sarpanch which undoubtedly, if true, satisfied the conditions for exercise of the power.
Since it has not been suggested before us otherwise, we do not consider it necessary to deal with them except mentioning that besides many serious allegations, the report also said that certain money belonging to the Grama Panchayat which had been received at an auction was not deposited.
In the order of removal, the State Government after mentioning the allegations stated that the explanation of the Sarpanch was not acceptable and he was, therefore, being removed from the office.
The allegations made against him, 181 thus were accepted as correct.
In other words the State Government was of the opinion that the circumstances specified in sub section ( I) existed.
It will be noticed that the language of sub section (2) does not require a repetition of the necessary satisfaction in the same language as referable to sub section (1).
Besides, the section cannot be interpreted to mandatorily lay down a rule for the authority concerned to express his conclusion in relation to the fulfilment of the conditions mentioned therein in a particular form using a particular set of words.
What is contemplated by the section is the formation of an opinion in this regard after giving a reasonable opportunity to the sarpanch in question to meet the allegations suggested and to announce the conclusion in unambiguous and express terms.
All that has been done in this case.
We do not.
therefore, see any justification in the High Court quashing the orders impugned before it.
Accordingly the appeal is allowed, High Court 's judgment is set aside and the writ application filed before the High Court is dismissed.
N.P.V. Appeal allowed.

Output:
% The respondent was a Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat.
Consequent upon a report made by the Sub Divisional officer, against the respondent stating the facts and circumstances which satisfied the conditions mentioned in section 115 of the orissa Gram Panchayat Act, 1964 for his suspension and removal, the second appellant, by his order dated 22.4.85, suspended the respondent.
A notice, as required by sub section (2) of section 151, was served on the Sarpanch who filed his detailed reply and was also personally heard.
As the explanation was not considered satisfactory, an order dated 24.10.86 removing him from the office of the Sarpanch was passed, in which it was mentioned that the appellant 's further continuance in office would be detrimental to the interest of the Gram Panchayat as also of the inhabitants of the Grama.
A second notification dated 24.10.86 under sub section (4) was also passed.
The Sarpanch challenged the above notifications before the High Court.
The High Court quashed the notifications on the sole and simple ground that the order did not satisfy one of the mandatory requirements, i.e. the appellant 's further continuance in the office would be detrimental to the interest of the Gram Panchayat or inhabitants of the Grama.
Allowing the appeal, ^ HELD: The language of sub section (2) does not require a repetition of the necessary satisfaction in the same language as referable to sub section (1).
Besides, the section cannot be interpreted to mandatorily lay down a rule for the authority concerned to express his conclusion in relation to the fulfilment of the conditions mentioned therein in a particular form using a particular set of words.
[181B] 178 What is contemplated by the section is the formation of an opinion in this regard after giving a reasonable opportunity to the Sarpanch in question to meet the allegations suggested and to announce the conclusion in unambiguous and express terms.
All that has been done in the instant case.
1 [181B C] The second appellant, while passing the order of suspension under sub section (l) of section 115, expressly stated that further continuance of the appellant in the office would be detrimental to the interest of the Gram Panchayat and the inhabitants of the Grama.
The State Government was of the opinion that the circumstances specified in sub section (1) existed.
In the order of removal, the State Government after mentioning the allegations, stated that the explanation of the Sarpanch was not acceptable and he was, therefore, being removed from the office.
The allegations made against him thus were accepted as correct.
The High Court was, therefore, not justified in quashing the impugned orders.[180 H; 181A,C]