| [ |
| { |
| "issue_index": 0, |
| "location": null, |
| "title": "Vulnerable dependencies in the Substrate parachain", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/parallel", |
| "audited_commit": "5ca8e13b7b4312855ae2ef1d39f14b38088dfdbd", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Medium", |
| "reported_likelihood": "Difficulty-High", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Patching", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Dependency", |
| "description": "1. Vulnerable dependencies in the Substrate parachain\nSeverity: Medium\nDifficulty: High\nType: Patching\nFinding ID: TOB-PLF-1\nTarget: parallel repository\nDescription\nThe Parallel Finance parachain node uses the following dependencies with known vulnerabilities. (All of the dependencies listed are inherited from the Substrate framework.)\nDependencyVersionIDDescription\nchrono 0.4.19 RUSTSEC-2020-0159 Potential segfault in localtime_r invocations\nlru 0.6.6 RUSTSEC-2021-0130 Use after free in lru crate\ntime 0.1.44 RUSTSEC-2020-0071 Potential segfault in the time crate\nnet2 0.2.37 RUSTSEC-2020-0016 net2 crate has been deprecated; use socket2 instead\nOther than chrono, all the dependencies can simply be updated to their newest versions to fix the vulnerabilities. The chrono crate issue has not been mitigated and remains problematic. A specific sequence of calls must occur to trigger the vulnerability, which is discussed in this GitHub thread in the chrono repository.\nExploit Scenario\nAn attacker exploits a known vulnerability in the Parallel Finance node and performs a denial-of-service attack on the network by taking down all nodes in the network.\nRecommendations\nShort term, update all dependencies to their newest versions. Monitor the referenced GitHub thread regarding the chrono crate segfault issue.\nLong term, run cargo-audit as part of the CI/CD pipeline and ensure that the team is alerted to any vulnerable dependencies that are detected.", |
| "description_summary": "The Substrate parachain uses dependencies with known vulnerabilities, including chrono, lru, time, and net2, which may lead to potential segfaults or memory issues.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 1, |
| "project_name": "Parallel", |
| "auditor": "Trail of Bits", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/auditing-report/blob/main/Trail%20of%20Bits_Parallel%20Finance_Final%20Report.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 1, |
| "location": "pallets/loans/src/lib.rs:1057-1087,1106-1121", |
| "title": "Users can avoid accruing interest by repaying a zero amount", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/parallel", |
| "audited_commit": "5ca8e13b7b4312855ae2ef1d39f14b38088dfdbd", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Medium", |
| "reported_likelihood": "Difficulty-Low", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Data Validation", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "2. Users can avoid accruing interest by repaying a zero amount\nSeverity: Medium\nDifficulty: Low\nType: Data Validation\nFinding ID: TOB-PLF-2\nTarget: pallets/loans/src/lib.rs\nDescription\nTo repay borrowed funds, users call the repay_borrow extrinsic. The extrinsic implementation calls the Pallet::repay_borrow_internal method to recompute the loan balance. Pallet::repay_borrow_internal updates the loan balance for the account and resets the borrow index as part of the calculation.\nfn repay_borrow_internal(\nborrower: &T::AccountId,\nasset_id: AssetIdOf<T>,\naccount_borrows: BalanceOf<T>,\nrepay_amount: BalanceOf<T>,\n) -> DispatchResult {\n// ... <redacted>\nAccountBorrows::<T>::insert(\nasset_id,\nborrower,\nBorrowSnapshot {\nprincipal: account_borrows_new,\nborrow_index: Self::borrow_index(asset_id),\n},\n);\nTotalBorrows::<T>::insert(asset_id, total_borrows_new);\nOk(())\n}\nFigure 2.1: pallets/loans/src/lib.rs:1057-1087\nThe borrow index is used in the calculation of the accumulated interest for the loan in Pallet::current_balance_from_snapshot. Specifically, the outstanding balance, snapshot.principal, is multiplied by the quotient of borrow_index divided by snapshot.borrow_index.\npub fn current_balance_from_snapshot(\nasset_id: AssetIdOf<T>,\nsnapshot: BorrowSnapshot<BalanceOf<T>>,\n) -> Result<BalanceOf<T>, DispatchError> {\nif snapshot.principal.is_zero() || snapshot.borrow_index.is_zero() {\nreturn Ok(Zero::zero());\n}\n// Calculate new borrow balance using the interest index:\n// recent_borrow_balance = snapshot.principal * borrow_index /\n// snapshot.borrow_index\nlet recent_borrow_balance = Self::borrow_index(asset_id)\n.checked_div(&snapshot.borrow_index)\n.and_then(|r| r.checked_mul_int(snapshot.principal))\n.ok_or(ArithmeticError::Overflow)?;\nOk(recent_borrow_balance)\n}\nFigure 2.2: pallets/loans/src/lib.rs:1106-1121\nTherefore, if the snapshot borrow index is updated to Self::borrow_index(asset_id), the resulting recent_borrow_balance in Pallet::current_balance_from_snapshot will always be equal to snapshot.principal. That is, no interest will be applied to the loan. It follows that the accrued interest is lost whenever part of the loan is repaid. In an extreme case, if the repaid amount passed to repay_borrow is 0, users could reset the borrow index without repaying anything.\nThe same issue is present in the implementations of the liquidated_transfer and borrow extrinsics as well.\nExploit Scenario\nA malicious user borrows assets from Parallel Finance and calls repay_borrow with a repay_amount of zero. This allows her to avoid paying interest on the loan.\nRecommendations\nShort term, modify the code so that the accrued interest is added to the snapshot principal when the snapshot is updated.\nLong term, add unit tests for edge cases (like repaying a zero amount) to increase the chances of discovering unexpected system behavior.", |
| "description_summary": "Users can avoid paying interest on loans by repaying a zero amount, resetting the borrow index without repaying anything.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 1, |
| "project_name": "Parallel", |
| "auditor": "Trail of Bits", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/auditing-report/blob/main/Trail%20of%20Bits_Parallel%20Finance_Final%20Report.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 2, |
| "location": "pallets/loans/src/lib.rs:539-556", |
| "title": "Missing validation in Pallet::force_update_market", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/parallel", |
| "audited_commit": "5ca8e13b7b4312855ae2ef1d39f14b38088dfdbd", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Informational", |
| "reported_likelihood": "Difficulty-High", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Data Validation", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "3. Missing validation in Pallet::force_update_market\nSeverity: Informational\nDifficulty: High\nType: Data Validation\nFinding ID: TOB-PLF-3\nTarget: pallets/loans/src/lib.rs\nDescription\nThe Pallet::force_update_market method can be used to replace the stored market instance for a given asset. Other methods used to update market parameters perform extensive validation of the market parameters, but force_update_market checks only the rate model.\npub fn force_update_market(\norigin: OriginFor<T>,\nasset_id: AssetIdOf<T>,\nmarket: Market<BalanceOf<T>>,\n) -> DispatchResultWithPostInfo {\nT::UpdateOrigin::ensure_origin(origin)?;\nensure!(\nmarket.rate_model.check_model(),\nError::<T>::InvalidRateModelParam\n);\nlet updated_market = Self::mutate_market(asset_id, |stored_market| {\n*stored_market = market;\nstored_market.clone()\n})?;\nSelf::deposit_event(Event::<T>::UpdatedMarket(updated_market));\nOk(().into())\n}\nFigure 3.1: pallets/loans/src/lib.rs:539-556\nThis means that the caller (who is either the root account or half of the general council) could inadvertently change immutable market parameters like ptoken_id by mistake.\nExploit Scenario\nThe root account calls force_update_market to update a set of market parameters. By mistake, the ptoken_id market parameter is updated, which means that Pallet::ptoken_id and Pallet::underlying_id are no longer inverses.\nRecommendations\nShort term, consider adding more input validation to the force_update_market extrinsic. In particular, it may make sense to ensure that the ptoken_id market parameter has not changed. Alternatively, add validation to check whether the ptoken_id market parameter is updated and to update the UnderlyingAssetId map to ensure that the value matches the Markets storage map.", |
| "description_summary": "The force_update_market method lacks sufficient validation, potentially allowing unintended changes to immutable market parameters.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 1, |
| "project_name": "Parallel", |
| "auditor": "Trail of Bits", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/auditing-report/blob/main/Trail%20of%20Bits_Parallel%20Finance_Final%20Report.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 3, |
| "location": "pallets/liquid-staking/src/types.rs:199-219,223-226,230-253", |
| "title": "Missing validation in multiple StakingLedger methods", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/parallel", |
| "audited_commit": "5ca8e13b7b4312855ae2ef1d39f14b38088dfdbd", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Undetermined", |
| "reported_likelihood": "Difficulty-High", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Data Validation", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "4. Missing validation in multiple StakingLedger methods\nSeverity: Undetermined\nDifficulty: High\nType: Data Validation\nFinding ID: TOB-PLF-4\nTarget: pallets/liquid-staking/src/types.rs\nDescription\nThe staking ledger is used to keep track of the total amount of staked funds in the system. It is updated in response to cross-consensus messaging (XCM) requests to the parent chain (either Polkadot or Kusama). A number of the StakingLedger methods lack sufficient input validation before they update the staking ledger\u2019s internal state. Even though the input is validated as part of the original XCM call, there could still be issues due to implementation errors or overlooked corner cases.\nFirst, the StakingLedger::rebond method does not use checked arithmetic to update the active balance. The method should also check that the computed unlocking_balance is equal to the input value at the end of the loop to ensure that the system remains consistent.\npub fn rebond(&mut self, value: Balance) {\nlet mut unlocking_balance: Balance = Zero::zero();\nwhile let Some(last) = self.unlocking.last_mut() {\nif unlocking_balance + last.value <= value {\nunlocking_balance += last.value;\nself.active += last.value;\nself.unlocking.pop();\n} else {\nlet diff = value - unlocking_balance;\nunlocking_balance += diff;\nself.active += diff;\nlast.value -= diff;\n}\nif unlocking_balance >= value {\nbreak;\n}\n}\n}\nFigure 4.1: pallets/liquid-staking/src/types.rs:199-219\nSecond, the StakingLedger::bond_extra method does not use checked arithmetic to update the total and active balances.\npub fn bond_extra(&mut self, value: Balance) {\nself.total += value;\nself.active += value;\n}\nFigure 4.2: pallets/liquid-staking/src/types.rs:223-226\nFinally, the StakingLedger::unbond method does not use checked arithmetic when updating the active balance.\npub fn unbond(&mut self, value: Balance, target_era: EraIndex) {\nif let Some(mut chunk) = self\n.unlocking\n.last_mut()\n.filter(|chunk| chunk.era == target_era)\n{\nchunk.value = chunk.value.saturating_add(value);\n} else {\nself.unlocking.push(UnlockChunk {\nvalue,\nera: target_era,\n});\n};\nself.active -= value;\n}\nFigure 4.3: pallets/liquid-staking/src/types.rs:230-253\nSince the staking ledger is updated by a number of the XCM response handlers, and XCM responses may return out of order, it is important to ensure that input to the staking ledger methods is validated to prevent issues due to race conditions and corner cases.\nWe could not find a way to exploit this issue, but we cannot rule out the risk that it could be used to cause a denial-of-service condition in the system.\nExploit Scenario\nThe staking ledger's state is updated as part of a WithdrawUnbonded request, leaving the unlocking vector in the staking ledger empty. Later, when the response to a previous call to rebond is handled, the ledger is updated again, which leaves it in an inconsistent state.\nRecommendations\nShort term, ensure that the balance represented by the staking ledger\u2019s unlocking vector is enough to cover the input balance passed to StakingLedger::rebond. Use checked arithmetic in all staking ledger methods that update the ledger\u2019s internal state to ensure that issues due to data races are detected and handled correctly.", |
| "description_summary": "StakingLedger methods lack sufficient input validation and unchecked arithmetic, potentially leading to inconsistent states or race conditions.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 1, |
| "project_name": "Parallel", |
| "auditor": "Trail of Bits", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/auditing-report/blob/main/Trail%20of%20Bits_Parallel%20Finance_Final%20Report.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 4, |
| "location": "pallets/liquid-staking/src/lib.rs:1071-1159", |
| "title": "Failed XCM requests left in storage", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/parallel", |
| "audited_commit": "5ca8e13b7b4312855ae2ef1d39f14b38088dfdbd", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": "Difficulty-High", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Data Validation", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "5. Failed XCM requests left in storage\nSeverity: Low\nDifficulty: High\nType: Data Validation\nFinding ID: TOB-PLF-5\nTarget: pallets/liquid-staking/src/lib.rs\nDescription\nWhen the liquid-staking pallet generates an XCM request for the parent chain, the corresponding XCM response triggers a call to Pallet::notification_received. If the response is of the Response::ExecutionResult type, this method calls Pallet::do_notification_received to handle the result.\nThe Pallet::do_notification_received method checks whether the request was successful and then updates the local state according to the corresponding XCM request, which is obtained from the XcmRequests storage map.\nfn do_notification_received(\nquery_id: QueryId,\nrequest: XcmRequest<T>,\nres: Option<(u32, XcmError)>,\n) -> DispatchResult {\nuse ArithmeticKind::*;\nuse XcmRequest::*;\nlet executed = res.is_none();\nif !executed {\nreturn Ok(());\n}\nmatch request {\nBond {\nindex: derivative_index,\namount,\n} => {\nensure!(\n!StakingLedgers::<T>::contains_key(&derivative_index),\nError::<T>::AlreadyBonded\n);\nlet staking_ledger =\n<StakingLedger<T::AccountId, BalanceOf<T>>>::new(\nSelf::derivative_sovereign_account_id(derivative_index),\namount,\n);\nStakingLedgers::<T>::insert(derivative_index, staking_ledger);\nMatchingPool::<T>::try_mutate(|p| -> DispatchResult {\np.update_total_stake_amount(amount, Subtraction)\n})?;\nT::Assets::burn_from(\nSelf::staking_currency()?,\n&Self::account_id(),\nAmount\n)?;\n}\n// ... <redacted>\n}\nXcmRequests::<T>::remove(&query_id);\nOk(())\n}\nFigure 5.1: pallets/liquid-staking/src/lib.rs:1071-1159\nIf the method completes without errors, the XCM request is removed from storage via a call to XcmRequests<T>::remove(query_id). However, if any of the following conditions are true, the corresponding XCM request is left in storage indefinitely:\n1. The request fails and Pallet::do_notification_received exits early.\n2. Pallet::do_notification_received fails.\n3. The response type is not Response::ExecutionResult.\nThese three cases are currently unhandled by the codebase. The same issue is present in the crowdloans pallet implementation of Pallet::do_notification_received.\nRecommendations\nShort term, ensure that failed XCM requests are handled correctly by the crowdloans and liquid-staking pallets.", |
| "description_summary": "Failed XCM requests are left in storage indefinitely if not handled properly by the notification_received method.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 1, |
| "project_name": "Parallel", |
| "auditor": "Trail of Bits", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/auditing-report/blob/main/Trail%20of%20Bits_Parallel%20Finance_Final%20Report.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 5, |
| "location": "pallets/loans/src/lib.rs:1430-1441", |
| "title": "Risk of using stale oracle prices in loans pallet", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/parallel", |
| "audited_commit": "5ca8e13b7b4312855ae2ef1d39f14b38088dfdbd", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": "Difficulty-High", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Data Validation", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "6. Risk of using stale oracle prices in loans pallet\nSeverity: Low\nDifficulty: High\nType: Data Validation\nFinding ID: TOB-PLF-6\nTarget: pallets/loans/src/lib.rs\nDescription\nThe loans pallet uses oracle prices to find a USD value of assets using the get_price function. The get_price function internally uses the T::PriceFeeder::get_price function, which returns a timestamp and the price. However, the returned timestamp is ignored.\npub fn get_price(asset_id: AssetIdOf<T>) -> Result<Price, DispatchError> {\nlet (price, _) = T::PriceFeeder::get_price(&asset_id).ok_or(Error::<T>::PriceOracleNotReady)?;\nif price.is_zero() {\nreturn Err(Error::<T>::PriceIsZero.into());\n}\nlog::trace!(target: \"loans::get_price\", \"price: {:?}\", price.into_inner());\nOk(price)\n}\nFigure 6.1: pallets/loans/src/lib.rs:1430-1441\nExploit Scenario\nThe price feeding oracles fail to deliver prices for an extended period of time. The get_price function returns stale prices, causing the get_asset_value function to return a non-market asset value.\nRecommendations\nShort term, modify the code so that it compares the returned timestamp from the T::PriceFeeder::get_price function with the current timestamp, returns an error if the price is too old, and handles the emergency price, which currently has a timestamp of zero. This will stop the market if stale prices are returned and allow the governance process to intervene with an emergency price.", |
| "description_summary": "The loans pallet may use stale oracle prices, leading to incorrect asset valuations.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 1, |
| "project_name": "Parallel", |
| "auditor": "Trail of Bits", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/auditing-report/blob/main/Trail%20of%20Bits_Parallel%20Finance_Final%20Report.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 6, |
| "location": "pallets/crowdloans/src/lib.rs:718-765", |
| "title": "Missing calculations in crowdloans extrinsics", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/parallel", |
| "audited_commit": "5ca8e13b7b4312855ae2ef1d39f14b38088dfdbd", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Undetermined", |
| "reported_likelihood": "Difficulty-High", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Undefined Behavior", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "7. Missing calculations in crowdloans extrinsics\nSeverity: Undetermined\nDifficulty: High\nType: Undefined Behavior\nFinding ID: TOB-PLF-7\nTarget: pallets/crowdloans/src/lib.rs\nDescription\nThe claim extrinsic in the crowdloans pallet is missing code to subtract the claimed amount from vault.contributed to update the total contribution amount. A similar bug exists in the refund extrinsic: there is no subtraction from vault.contributed after the Self::contribution_kill call.\npub fn claim(\norigin: OriginFor<T>,\ncrowdloan: ParaId,\nlease_start: LeasePeriod,\nlease_end: LeasePeriod,\n) -> DispatchResult {\n// ... <redacted>\nSelf::contribution_kill(\nvault.trie_index,\n&who,\nChildStorageKind::Contributed\n);\nSelf::deposit_event(Event::<T>::VaultClaimed(\ncrowdloan,\n(lease_start, lease_end),\nctoken,\nwho,\namount,\nVaultPhase::Succeeded,\n));\nOk(())\n}\nFigure 7.1: pallets/crowdloans/src/lib.rs:718-765\nExploit Scenario\nThe claim extrinsic is called, but the total amount in vault.contributed is not updated, leading to incorrect calculations in other places.\nRecommendations\nShort term, update the claim and refund extrinsics so that they subtract the amount from vault.contributed.\nLong term, add a test suite to ensure that the vault state stays consistent after the claim and refund extrinsics are called.", |
| "description_summary": "The claim and refund extrinsics do not update the vault's total contribution, leading to incorrect calculations.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 1, |
| "project_name": "Parallel", |
| "auditor": "Trail of Bits", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/auditing-report/blob/main/Trail%20of%20Bits_Parallel%20Finance_Final%20Report.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 7, |
| "location": "pallets/crowdloans/src/lib.rs:424-472,599-616", |
| "title": "Event emitted when update_vault and set_vrf calls do not make updates", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/parallel", |
| "audited_commit": "5ca8e13b7b4312855ae2ef1d39f14b38088dfdbd", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Informational", |
| "reported_likelihood": "Difficulty-High", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Auditing and Logging", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "8. Event emitted when update_vault and set_vrf calls do not make updates\nSeverity: Informational\nDifficulty: High\nType: Auditing and Logging\nFinding ID: TOB-PLF-8\nTarget: pallets/crowdloans/src/lib.rs\nDescription\nThe update_vault extrinsic in the crowdloans pallet is responsible for updating the three values shown. It is possible to call update_vault in such a way that no update is performed, but the function emits an event regardless of whether an update occurred. The same situation occurs in the set_vrfs extrinsic.\npub fn update_vault(\norigin: OriginFor<T>,\ncrowdloan: ParaId,\ncap: Option<BalanceOf<T>>,\nend_block: Option<BlockNumberFor<T>>,\ncontribution_strategy: Option<ContributionStrategy>,\n) -> DispatchResult {\nT::UpdateVaultOrigin::ensure_origin(origin)?;\nlet mut vault = Self::current_vault(crowdloan).ok_or(Error::<T>::VaultDoesNotExist)?;\nif let Some(cap) = cap {\n// ... <redacted>\n}\nif let Some(end_block) = end_block {\n// ... <redacted>\n}\nif let Some(contribution_strategy) = contribution_strategy {\n// ... <redacted>\n}\nSelf::deposit_event(Event::<T>::VaultUpdated(crowdloan,(lease_start, lease_end),contribution_strategy,cap,end_block));\nOk(())\n}\nFigure 8.1: pallets/crowdloans/src/lib.rs:424-472\npub fn set_vrfs(origin: OriginFor<T>, vrfs: Vec<ParaId>) -> DispatchResult {\nT::VrfOrigin::ensure_origin(origin)?;\nlog::trace!(target: \"crowdloans::set_vrfs\", \"pre-toggle. vrfs: {:?}\",vrfs);\nVrfs::<T>::try_mutate(|b| -> Result<(), DispatchError> {\n*b = vrfs.try_into().map_err(|_| Error::<T>::MaxVrfsExceeded)?;\nOk(())\n})?;\nSelf::deposit_event(Event::<T>::VrfsUpdated(Self::vrfs()));\nOk(())\n}\nFigure 8.2: pallets/crowdloans/src/lib.rs:599-616\nExploit Scenario\nA system observes that the VaultUpdate event was emitted even though the vault state did not actually change. Based on this observation, it performs logic that should be executed only when the state has been updated.\nRecommendations\nShort term, modify the VaultUpdate event so that it is emitted only when the update_vault extrinsic makes an actual update. Optionally, have the update_vault extrinsic return an error to the caller when calling it results in no updates.", |
| "description_summary": "The update_vault and set_vrfs extrinsics emit events even when no actual updates are made.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 1, |
| "project_name": "Parallel", |
| "auditor": "Trail of Bits", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/auditing-report/blob/main/Trail%20of%20Bits_Parallel%20Finance_Final%20Report.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 8, |
| "location": "pallets/crowdloans/src/lib.rs:502-594", |
| "title": "The referral code is a sequence of arbitrary bytes", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/parallel", |
| "audited_commit": "5ca8e13b7b4312855ae2ef1d39f14b38088dfdbd", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Informational", |
| "reported_likelihood": "Difficulty-High", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Data Validation", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "9. The referral code is a sequence of arbitrary bytes\nSeverity: Informational\nDifficulty: High\nType: Data Validation\nFinding ID: TOB-PLF-9\nTarget: pallets/crowdloans/src/lib.rs\nDescription\nThe referral code is used in a number of extrinsic calls in the crowdloans pallet. Because the referral code is never validated, it can be a sequence of arbitrary bytes. The referral code is logged by a number of extrinsics. However, it is currently impossible to perform log injection because the referral code is printed as a hexadecimal string rather than raw bytes (using the debug representation).\npub fn contribute(\norigin: OriginFor<T>,\ncrowdloan: ParaId,\n#[pallet::compact] amount: BalanceOf<T>,\nreferral_code: Vec<u8>,\n) -> DispatchResultWithPostInfo {\n// ... <redacted>\nlog::trace!(\ntarget: \"crowdloans::contribute\",\n\"who: {:?}, para_id: {:?}, amount: {:?}, referral_code: {:?}\",\n&who,\n&crowdloan,\n&amount,\n&referral_code\n);\nOk(().into())\n}\nFigure 9.1: pallets/crowdloans/src/lib.rs:502-594\nExploit Scenario\nThe referral code is rendered as raw bytes in a vulnerable environment, introducing an opportunity to perform a log injection attack.\nRecommendations\nShort term, choose and implement a data type that models the referral code semantics as closely as possible.", |
| "description_summary": "The referral code in the crowdloans pallet is arbitrary and unvalidated, potentially allowing log injection attacks.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 1, |
| "project_name": "Parallel", |
| "auditor": "Trail of Bits", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/auditing-report/blob/main/Trail%20of%20Bits_Parallel%20Finance_Final%20Report.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 9, |
| "location": "pallets/crowdloans/src/lib.rs:1429-1464", |
| "title": "Missing validation of referral code size", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/parallel", |
| "audited_commit": "5ca8e13b7b4312855ae2ef1d39f14b38088dfdbd", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": "Difficulty-Low", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Data Validation", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "10. Missing validation of referral code size\nSeverity: Low\nDifficulty: Low\nType: Data Validation\nFinding ID: TOB-PLF-10\nTarget: pallets/crowdloans/src/lib.rs\nDescription\nThe length of the referral code is not validated by the contribute extrinsic defined by the crowdloans pallet. Since the referral code is stored by the node, a malicious user could call contribute multiple times with a very large referral code. This would increase the memory pressure on the node, potentially leading to memory exhaustion.\nfn do_contribute(\nwho: &AccountIdOf<T>,\ncrowdloan: ParaId,\nvault_id: VaultId,\namount: BalanceOf<T>,\nreferral_code: Vec<u8>,\n) -> Result<(), DispatchError> {\nXcmRequests::<T>::insert(\nquery_id,\nXcmRequest::Contribute {\ncrowdloan,\nvault_id,\nwho: who.clone(),\namount,\nreferral_code: referral_code.clone(),\n},\n);\nOk(())\n}\nFigure 10.1: pallets/crowdloans/src/lib.rs:1429-1464\nExploit Scenario\nA malicious user calls the contribute extrinsic multiple times with a very large referral code. This increases the memory pressure on the validator nodes and eventually causes all parachain nodes to run out of memory and crash.\nRecommendations\nShort term, add validation that limits the size of the referral code argument to the contribute extrinsic.", |
| "description_summary": "The contribute extrinsic lacks validation on the referral code size, potentially leading to memory exhaustion.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 1, |
| "project_name": "Parallel", |
| "auditor": "Trail of Bits", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/auditing-report/blob/main/Trail%20of%20Bits_Parallel%20Finance_Final%20Report.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 10, |
| "location": "pallets/crowdloans/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Code duplication in crowdloans pallet", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/parallel", |
| "audited_commit": "5ca8e13b7b4312855ae2ef1d39f14b38088dfdbd", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Informational", |
| "reported_likelihood": "Difficulty-High", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Patching", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "11. Code duplication in crowdloans pallet\nSeverity: Informational\nDifficulty: High\nType: Patching\nFinding ID: TOB-PLF-11\nTarget: pallets/crowdloans/src/lib.rs\nDescription\nA number of extrinsics in the crowdloans pallet have duplicate code. The close, reopen, and auction_succeeded extrinsics have virtually identical logic. The migrate_pending and refund extrinsics are also fairly similar.\nExploit Scenario\nA vulnerability is found in the duplicate code, but it is patched in only one place.\nRecommendations\nShort term, refactor the close, reopen, and auction_succeeded extrinsics into one function, to be called with values specific to the extrinsics. Refactor common pieces of logic in the migrate_pending and refund extrinsics.\nLong term, avoid code duplication, as it makes the system harder to review and update. Perform regular code reviews and track any logic that is duplicated.", |
| "description_summary": "Code duplication in the crowdloans pallet increases the risk of inconsistent patches and complicates maintenance.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 1, |
| "project_name": "Parallel", |
| "auditor": "Trail of Bits", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/auditing-report/blob/main/Trail%20of%20Bits_Parallel%20Finance_Final%20Report.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 0, |
| "location": null, |
| "title": "Need to upgrade the module", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/parallel", |
| "audited_commit": "a223cd7910af3540048b58f958fea5b784876468", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "fc6d8042ba51719e0f1bca40631e4649a6100510", |
| "reported_impact": "low-risk", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Dependency", |
| "description": "5.1 Need to upgrade the module [low-risk]\nID:RUSTSEC-2021-0067\nCrate:cranelift-codegen\nVersion: 0.71.0\nDate:2021-05-21\nURL:https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2021-0067\nTitle: Memory access due to code generation flaw in Cranelift module\nSolution: upgrade to >= 0.73.1 OR >= 0.74\nDependency tree: cranelift-codegen 0.71.0\nFixed in: https://github.com/parallel-finance/parallel/pull/210", |
| "description_summary": "Memory access vulnerability in Cranelift module due to code generation flaw, fixed by upgrading to >= 0.73.1 or >= 0.74.", |
| "reported_status": "Fixed in: https://github.com/parallel-finance/parallel/pull/210", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 2, |
| "project_name": "Parallel", |
| "auditor": "Slow Mist", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/auditing-report/blob/main/Slow%20Mist%20-%20Parallel%20Security%20Audit%20Report.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 1, |
| "location": "parallel/pallets/loans/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Numeric overflow", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/parallel", |
| "audited_commit": "a223cd7910af3540048b58f958fea5b784876468", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "386b0e7e1eea19c143900d4127daa8c475266dad", |
| "reported_impact": "enhancement", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Arithmetic", |
| "description": "5.2 Numeric overflow[enhancement]\nparallel/pallets/loans/src/lib.rs\nlet total_reserves_new = total_reserves - reduce_amount;\n//...snip code...//\nlet total_reserves_new = total_reserves + add_amount;\nIt is recommended to use `checked_add/checked_sub` to prevent numerical overflow.\nFixed in: https://github.com/parallel-finance/parallel/pull/241", |
| "description_summary": "Numeric overflow vulnerability due to lack of checked_add/checked_sub, fixed by adding these methods.", |
| "reported_status": "Fixed in: https://github.com/parallel-finance/parallel/pull/241", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 2, |
| "project_name": "Parallel", |
| "auditor": "Slow Mist", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/auditing-report/blob/main/Slow%20Mist%20-%20Parallel%20Security%20Audit%20Report.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 2, |
| "location": "parallel/pallets/loans/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Lack of bounds checking", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/parallel", |
| "audited_commit": "a223cd7910af3540048b58f958fea5b784876468", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "2bb80a4e75416e27a03ffb9f8d3100aca548d8b2", |
| "reported_impact": "weakness", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "5.3 Lack of bounds checking[weakness]\n`mint_amount` has no boundary limit, it is recommended to enhance.\nFixed in: https://github.com/parallel-finance/parallel/pull/258", |
| "description_summary": "Lack of bounds checking for mint_amount, recommended to enhance.", |
| "reported_status": "Fixed in: https://github.com/parallel-finance/parallel/pull/258", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 2, |
| "project_name": "Parallel", |
| "auditor": "Slow Mist", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/auditing-report/blob/main/Slow%20Mist%20-%20Parallel%20Security%20Audit%20Report.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 3, |
| "location": "parallel/pallets/prices/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Oracle price feed risk", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/parallel", |
| "audited_commit": "a223cd7910af3540048b58f958fea5b784876468", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "weakness", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "5.4 Oracle price feed risk[weakness]\nDue to the lack of time parameter, if the price is not feed in time, the price may be inaccurate.\nparallel/pallets/prices/src/lib.rs\npub enum Event<T: Config> {\n/// Set emergency price. [currency_id, price_detail]\nSetPrice(CurrencyId, PriceWithDecimal),\n/// Reset emergency price. [currency_id]\nResetPrice(CurrencyId),\n}\nFeedback: At present, the source of price feeding is controlled by authority and credible. The range of trustworthiness includes the accuracy and real-time of the price, that is, outdated prices will not be sent to the chain, but the price feeding transaction sent is through operational on the chain. Transaction level guarantees will be packaged in real time, that is, the current block.", |
| "description_summary": "Oracle price feed may be inaccurate due to lack of a time parameter.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 2, |
| "project_name": "Parallel", |
| "auditor": "Slow Mist", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/parallel-finance/auditing-report/blob/main/Slow%20Mist%20-%20Parallel%20Security%20Audit%20Report.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 0, |
| "location": "pallets/automation-time/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Calculate inaccurate risk", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/OAK-Foundation/OAK-blockchain", |
| "audited_commit": "643342e936bbc821d2fb91be69872e4fcecd2273", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "cba1acd6961fce877cef95c6b6a198ea8b415a0f", |
| "reported_impact": "Suggestion", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Integer Overflow", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Arithmetic", |
| "description": "[N1] [Suggestion] Calculate inaccurate risk\nCategory: Integer Overflow Audit\nContent\npallets/automation-time/src/lib.rs\nThere are some risks of value overflow.\nsaturating_mul, saturating_sub, saturating_add and +-*/, +=, -=\nsaturating at the numeric bounds instead of overflowing, The returned result is inaccurate.\nSolution\nUse checked_add/checked_sub/checked_mul/checked_div instead of\nsaturating_add/saturating_sub/saturating_mul/saturating_div and +-*/, +=, -= .\nStatus\nFixed", |
| "description_summary": "Inaccurate calculation risk due to potential integer overflow; replace saturating operations with checked operations.", |
| "reported_status": "Fixed", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 3, |
| "project_name": "AvaProtocol", |
| "auditor": "Slow Mist", |
| "audit_link": "https://avaprotocol.org/docs/papers/SlowMist.Audit.Report.-.Turing.Network.-.June.2022.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 1, |
| "location": "pallets/automation-time/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "User balance is not checked before transfer", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/OAK-Foundation/OAK-blockchain", |
| "audited_commit": "643342e936bbc821d2fb91be69872e4fcecd2273", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Suggestion", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Others", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "[N2] [Suggestion] User balance is not checked\nCategory: Others\nContent\npallets/automation-time/src/lib.rs\nThe amount transferred by the user is not compared with the user's balance here, and the user may not have enough NativeToken.\npub fn schedule_native_transfer_task(\norigin: OriginFor<T>,\nprovided_id: Vec<u8>,\nexecution_times: Vec<UnixTime>,\nrecipient_id: T::AccountId,\n#[pallet::compact] amount: BalanceOf<T>,\n) -> DispatchResult {\nlet who = ensure_signed(origin)?;\n// check for greater than existential deposit\nif amount < T::NativeTokenExchange::minimum_balance() {\nErr(<Error<T>>::InvalidAmount)?\n}\n// check not sent to self\nif who == recipient_id {\nErr(<Error<T>>::TransferToSelf)?\n}\nlet action =\nAction::NativeTransfer { sender: who.clone(), recipient: recipient_id, amount };\nSelf::validate_and_schedule_task(action, who, provided_id, execution_times)?;\nOk(().into())\n}\nSolution\nCompare the user's transfer amount with the balance\nStatus\nIgnored; This is expected behaviour.", |
| "description_summary": "User balance is not checked before transfer, allowing potential insufficient funds.", |
| "reported_status": "Ignored; This is expected behaviour.", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 3, |
| "project_name": "AvaProtocol", |
| "auditor": "Slow Mist", |
| "audit_link": "https://avaprotocol.org/docs/papers/SlowMist.Audit.Report.-.Turing.Network.-.June.2022.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 2, |
| "location": "pallets/parachain-staking/src/lib.rs:962,1004,1390\npallets/parachain-staking/src/types.rs:463\npallets/parachain-staking/src/delegation_requests.rs:279,648-651\npallets/parachain-staking/src/migrations.rs:404", |
| "title": "Return value not checked", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/OAK-Foundation/OAK-blockchain", |
| "audited_commit": "643342e936bbc821d2fb91be69872e4fcecd2273", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Others", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "[N3] [Low] Return Value Not Checked\nCategory: Others\nContent\npallets/parachain-staking/src/lib.rs\n//#L962\nT::Currency::unreserve(&bond.owner, bond.amount);\n//#L1004\nT::Currency::unreserve(&candidate, state.bond);\n//#L1390\nT::Currency::unreserve(&delegator, amount);\npallets/parachain-staking/src/types.rs\n//#L463\nT::Currency::unreserve(&who, request.amount.into());\n//#L648:651\nT::Currency::unreserve(&lowest_bottom_to_be_kicked.owner, lowest_bottom_to_be_kicked.amount);\npallets/parachain-staking/src/delegation_requests.rs\n//#L279\nT::Currency::unreserve(&delegator, amount);\npallets/parachain-staking/src/migrations.rs\n//#L404\nT::Currency::unreserve(&owner, *amount);\nThe return value of unreserve needs to be checked.\nSolution\nCheck the return value.\nStatus\nIgnored; If the account has less than that locked up. Not only is this unlikely to happen, there's nothing for parachain-staking to do if it occurs.", |
| "description_summary": "Return value of unreserve function is not checked, risking unhandled errors.", |
| "reported_status": "Ignored; This is unlikely to happen, and no specific handling is required.", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 3, |
| "project_name": "AvaProtocol", |
| "auditor": "Slow Mist", |
| "audit_link": "https://avaprotocol.org/docs/papers/SlowMist.Audit.Report.-.Turing.Network.-.June.2022.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 3, |
| "location": "pallets/parachain-staking/src/types.rs\npallets/parachain-staking/src/lib.rs\npallets/parachain-staking/src/delegation_requests.rs", |
| "title": "Calculate inaccurate risk", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/OAK-Foundation/OAK-blockchain", |
| "audited_commit": "643342e936bbc821d2fb91be69872e4fcecd2273", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Suggestion", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Integer Overflow", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Arithmetic", |
| "description": "[N4] [Suggestion] Calculate inaccurate risk\nCategory: Integer Overflow Audit\nContent\npallets/parachain-staking/src/types.rs\npallets/parachain-staking/src/lib.rs\npallets/parachain-staking/src/delegation_requests.rs\nThere are some risks of value overflow.\nsaturating_mul, saturating_sub, saturating_add and +-*/, +=, -=\nsaturating at the numeric bounds instead of overflowing, The returned result is inaccurate.\nSolution\nUse checked_add/checked_sub/checked_mul/checked_div instead of\nsaturating_add/saturating_sub/saturating_mul/saturating_div and +-*/, +=, -= .\nStatus\nIgnored; These functions are performed on the Balance type. Since the same type is used for total_issuance I don't think we need to be worried about a portion of the issuance overflowing the data type.", |
| "description_summary": "Potential inaccurate calculation due to integer overflow; replace saturating operations with checked operations.", |
| "reported_status": "Ignored; Overflow is not considered an issue due to the data type used.", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 3, |
| "project_name": "AvaProtocol", |
| "auditor": "Slow Mist", |
| "audit_link": "https://avaprotocol.org/docs/papers/SlowMist.Audit.Report.-.Turing.Network.-.June.2022.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 4, |
| "location": "pallets/parachain-staking/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Missing logic", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/OAK-Foundation/OAK-blockchain", |
| "audited_commit": "643342e936bbc821d2fb91be69872e4fcecd2273", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Others", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "[N5] [Low] Missing logic\nCategory: Others\nContent\npallets/parachain-staking/src/lib.rs\nIt is necessary to make a judgment in the case of deposit_into_existing failure. If the transfer fails, the entire transaction needs to be rolled back.\nfn prepare_staking_payouts(now: RoundIndex) {\n// payout is now - delay rounds ago => now - delay > 0 else return early\nlet delay = T::RewardPaymentDelay::get();\nif now <= delay {\nreturn;\n}\nlet round_to_payout = now.saturating_sub(delay);\nlet total_points = <Points<T>>::get(round_to_payout);\nif total_points.is_zero() {\nreturn;\n}\nlet total_staked = <Staked<T>>::take(round_to_payout);\nlet total_issuance = Self::compute_issuance(total_staked);\nlet mut left_issuance = total_issuance;\n// reserve portion of issuance for parachain bond account\nlet bond_config = <ParachainBondInfo<T>>::get();\nlet parachain_bond_reserve = bond_config.percent * total_issuance;\nif let Ok(imb) = T::Currency::deposit_into_existing(&bond_config.account, parachain_bond_reserve) {\n// update round issuance iff transfer succeeds\nleft_issuance = left_issuance.saturating_sub(imb.peek());\nSelf::deposit_event(Event::ReservedForParachainBond {\naccount: bond_config.account,\nvalue: imb.peek(),\n});\n}\nlet payout = DelayedPayout {\nround_issuance: total_issuance,\ntotal_staking_reward: left_issuance,\ncollator_commission: <CollatorCommission<T>>::get(),\n};\n<DelayedPayouts<T>>::insert(round_to_payout, payout);\n}\npub(crate) fn pay_one_collator_reward(paid_for_round: RoundIndex, payout_info: DelayedPayout<BalanceOf<T>>, ) -> (Option<(T::AccountId, BalanceOf<T>)>, Weight) {\n// TODO: it would probably be optimal to roll Points into the DelayedPayouts storage\n// item so that we do fewer reads each block\nlet total_points = <Points<T>>::get(paid_for_round);\nif total_points.is_zero() {\n// TODO: this case is obnoxious... it's a value query, so it could mean one\n// of two different logic errors:\n// 1. we removed it before we should have\n// 2. we called pay_one_collator_reward when we were actually done with deferred payouts\nlog::warn!(\"pay_one_collator_reward called with no <Points<T>> for the round!\");\nreturn (None, 0u64.into());\n}\nlet mint = |amt: BalanceOf<T>, to: T::AccountId| {\nif let Ok(amount_transferred) = T::Currency::deposit_into_existing(&to, amt) {\nSelf::deposit_event(Event::Rewarded {\naccount: to.clone(),\nrewards: amount_transferred.peek(),\n});\n}\n};\nlet collator_fee = payout_info.collator_commission;\nlet collator_issuance = collator_fee * payout_info.round_issuance;\nif let Some((collator, pts)) = <AwardedPts<T>>::iter_prefix(paid_for_round).drain().next() {\nlet mut extra_weight = 0;\nlet pct_due = Perbill::from_rational(pts, total_points);\nlet total_paid = pct_due * payout_info.total_staking_reward;\nlet mut amt_due = total_paid;\n// Take the snapshot of block author and delegations\nlet state = <AtStake<T>>::take(paid_for_round, &collator);\nlet num_delegators = state.delegations.len();\nif state.delegations.is_empty() {\n// solo collator with no delegators\nmint(amt_due, collator.clone());\nextra_weight += T::OnCollatorPayout::on_collator_payout(paid_for_round, collator.clone(), amt_due, );\n} else {\n// pay collator first; commission + due_portion\nlet collator_pct = Perbill::from_rational(state.bond, state.total);\nlet commission = pct_due * collator_issuance;\namt_due = amt_due.saturating_sub(commission);\nlet collator_reward = (collator_pct * amt_due).saturating_add(commission);\nmint(collator_reward, collator.clone());\nextra_weight += T::OnCollatorPayout::on_collator_payout(paid_for_round, collator.clone(), collator_reward, );\n// pay delegators due portion\nfor Bond { owner, amount } in state.delegations {\nlet percent = Perbill::from_rational(amount, state.total);\nlet due = percent * amt_due;\nif !due.is_zero() {\nmint(due, owner.clone());\n}\n}\n}\n(Some((collator, total_paid)), T::WeightInfo::pay_one_collator_reward(num_delegators as u32) + extra_weight, )\n} else {\n// Note that we don't clean up storage here; it is cleaned up in handle_delayed_payouts()\n(None, 0u64.into())\n}\n}\nSolution\nIf the transfer fails, the transaction should be rolled back.\nStatus\nIgnored; The project party considers that it will be updated in subsequent versions.", |
| "description_summary": "Missing rollback logic for failed transfers in staking payouts.", |
| "reported_status": "Ignored; Planned for future updates.", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 3, |
| "project_name": "AvaProtocol", |
| "auditor": "Slow Mist", |
| "audit_link": "https://avaprotocol.org/docs/papers/SlowMist.Audit.Report.-.Turing.Network.-.June.2022.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 5, |
| "location": "pallets/parachain-staking/src/types.rs", |
| "title": "Missing error message", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/OAK-Foundation/OAK-blockchain", |
| "audited_commit": "643342e936bbc821d2fb91be69872e4fcecd2273", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Malicious Event Log", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "[N6] [Suggestion] Missing error message\nCategory: Malicious Event Log Audit\nContent\npallets/parachain-staking/src/types.rs\nlet new_bottom_delegation = top_delegations.delegations.pop().expect(\"\"); missing error message.\npub fn add_top_delegation<T: Config>(&mut self, candidate: &T::AccountId, delegation: Bond<T::AccountId, BalanceOf<T>>) -> Option<Balance> where BalanceOf<T>: Into<Balance> + From<Balance>,\n{\nlet mut less_total_staked = None;\nlet mut top_delegations = <TopDelegations<T>>::get(candidate).expect(\"CandidateInfo existence => TopDelegations existence\");\nlet max_top_delegations_per_candidate = T::MaxTopDelegationsPerCandidate::get();\nif top_delegations.delegations.len() as u32 == max_top_delegations_per_candidate {\n// pop lowest top delegation\nlet new_bottom_delegation = top_delegations.delegations.pop().expect(\"\");\ntop_delegations.total = top_delegations.total.saturating_sub(new_bottom_delegation.amount);\nif matches!(self.bottom_capacity, CapacityStatus::Full) {\nless_total_staked = Some(self.lowest_bottom_delegation_amount);\n}\nself.add_bottom_delegation::<T>(true, candidate, new_bottom_delegation);\n}\n// insert into top\ntop_delegations.insert_sorted_greatest_to_least(delegation);\n// update candidate info\nself.reset_top_data::<T>(candidate.clone(), &top_delegations);\nif less_total_staked.is_none() {\n// only increment delegation count if we are not kicking a bottom delegation\nself.delegation_count = self.delegation_count.saturating_add(1u32);\n}\n<TopDelegations<T>>::insert(&candidate, top_delegations);\nless_total_staked\n}\nSolution\nRecord the corresponding error message.\nStatus\nIgnored; The project party considers that it will be updated in subsequent versions.", |
| "description_summary": "Missing error message in delegation handling, leaving potential issues unlogged.", |
| "reported_status": "Ignored; Planned for future updates.", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 3, |
| "project_name": "AvaProtocol", |
| "auditor": "Slow Mist", |
| "audit_link": "https://avaprotocol.org/docs/papers/SlowMist.Audit.Report.-.Turing.Network.-.June.2022.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 0, |
| "location": "runtime/foucoco/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "ChainExtension Implementation Lacks Weight Charging", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/pendulum-chain/pendulum", |
| "audited_commit": "d01528d17b96bf3de72c36deb3800c2ed0cf2afb", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "5b922a210b2a6705d3ea6fefbf67b317698f7b80", |
| "reported_impact": "Medium", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Denial-of-Service (DoS)", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Weight Management", |
| "description": "ChainExtension Implementation Lacks Weight Charging\nThe current implementation of the ChainExtension trait fails to charge weight when allowing smart contracts to call into the runtime.\nIDPDM-006\nScope: Chain Extension\nSeverity: MEDIUM\nVulnerability Type: Denial-of-Service (DoS)\nStatus: Fixed (5b922a210b2a6705d3ea6fefbf67b317698f7b80)\nDescription:\nThe call method in the ChainExtension trait defines how smart contracts can interact with the runtime. When a contract makes state changes by calling into the runtime, the corresponding weight should be charged. However, the current implementation of ChainExtension lacks any weight charging mechanism. It allows smart contracts to make calls such as transfer, approve_transfer, and transfer_approved, which are not queries and result in state changes.\nBy not charging weight for these operations, the system becomes vulnerable to potential security issues, particularly Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. Malicious contracts can exploit this lack of weight charging by flooding the system with a high volume of calls, overloading the network and disrupting its normal operation.\nRecommendation:\nTo mitigate this vulnerability, it is crucial to incorporate weight calculations and invoke the charge_weight function before accessing contract memory. Here is an example of how to integrate this in the code:\nlet charged_weight = env.charge_weight(sufficient_weight)?;\ntrace!(target: \"runtime\", \"[ChainExtension]|call|func_id / charge_weight:{:?}\", charged_weight);\nlet input = env.read(256)?;\nBy implementing weight charging for contract calls, the system", |
| "description_summary": "The ChainExtension implementation does not charge weight for runtime calls, making the system vulnerable to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks.", |
| "reported_status": "Fixed (5b922a210b2a6705d3ea6fefbf67b317698f7b80)", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 4, |
| "project_name": "Pendulum", |
| "auditor": "Hacken", |
| "audit_link": "https://audits.hacken.io/pendulum/l1-pendulum-pendulum-chain-jun2023/" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 1, |
| "location": "pallets/orml-currencies-allowance-extension/src/lib.rs:134", |
| "title": "Vector of unlimited size in the pallet", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/pendulum-chain/pendulum", |
| "audited_commit": "d01528d17b96bf3de72c36deb3800c2ed0cf2afb", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "05607a1a9cd2ad3cebeff1294b2e4c34fa3e4721", |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Memory exhaustion / DoS", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Denial of Service (DoS) and Spamming", |
| "description": "Vector of unlimited size in the pallet\nThe orml-currencies-allowance-extension pallet employs the usage of the Vec data structure without incorporating any size checks.\nID: PDM-007\nScope: orml-currencies-allowance-extension pallet\nSeverity: LOW\nVulnerability Type: Memory exhaustion / DoS\nStatus: Fixed (c1a20acd965cc024ac756effbff8a12522dac87a and 05607a1a9cd2ad3cebeff1294b2e4c34fa3e4721)\n\nDescription:\nWithin the orml-currencies-allowance-extension pallet, the Vec structure is utilized in the enum Event and struct GenesisConfig. Additionally, the extrinsic functions add_allowed_currencies and remove_allowed_currencies accept a vector as a parameter. Here's an example:\npallets/orml-currencies-allowance-extension/src/lib.rs:134:\n\n#[pallet::call_index(0)]\n#[pallet::weight(<T as Config>::WeightInfo::add_allowed_currencies())]\n#[transactional]\npub fn add_allowed_currencies(\n origin: OriginFor<T>,\n currencies: Vec<CurrencyOf<T>>,\n) -> DispatchResult {\n ensure_root(origin)?;\n for i in currencies.clone() {\n AllowedCurrencies::<T>::insert(i, ());\n }\n Self::deposit_event(Event::AllowedCurrenciesAdded { currencies });\n Ok(())\n}\n\nIf an excessively large vector is provided as input to these functions, it can result in node overload due to the necessity of iterating through the entire vector. This poses a significant risk, leading to potential memory exhaustion and creating a vulnerability for denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Although the function is restricted to root access, it's important to note that if the root account is compromised or controlled by a malicious actor, they can exploit this vulnerability by deliberately supplying large vectors. This would cause the node to consume excessive resources, potentially disrupting the normal operation of the system.\n\nRecommendation:\nTo mitigate the risks associated with the use of unlimited-sized vectors, it is strongly recommended to revise the implementation in the orml-currencies-allowance-extension pallet. We advise against the use of the Vec data structure within any part of the pallet. Instead, consider utilizing frame_support::BoundedVec, which offers a bounded-size variant of a vector. Alternatively, it's important to impose a cap on the length of the vector during each of its instances. By ensuring a maximum limit, the vector's length stays within manageable bounds, preventing excessively long processing times or resource consumption during iterations over this data structure.\n\nBy proactively addressing this issue, you can enhance the stability and security of the orml-currencies-allowance-extension pallet, ensuring the robustness and reliability of the overall system.", |
| "description_summary": "Unrestricted vector size can lead to memory exhaustion and DoS attacks.", |
| "reported_status": "Fixed (c1a20acd965cc024ac756effbff8a12522dac87a and 05607a1a9cd2ad3cebeff1294b2e4c34fa3e4721)", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 4, |
| "project_name": "Pendulum", |
| "auditor": "Hacken", |
| "audit_link": "https://audits.hacken.io/pendulum/l1-pendulum-pendulum-chain-jun2023/" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 2, |
| "location": "runtime/foucoco/src/lib.rs:1509\nnode/src/chain_spec.rs:229", |
| "title": "Employment of Sudo Pallet", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/pendulum-chain/pendulum", |
| "audited_commit": "d01528d17b96bf3de72c36deb3800c2ed0cf2afb", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": null, |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Centralization", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "Employment of Sudo Pallet\nThe current implementation of the sudo FRAME pallet in the runtime employs it as an alternative to the governance mechanism.\nID: PDM-010\nScope: Decentralization\nStatus: Acknowledged\n\nDescription:\nThe sudo pallet is integrated into the runtime configuration:\nruntime/foucoco/src/lib.rs:1509:\nconstruct_runtime!(\n pub enum Runtime where\n Block = Block,\n NodeBlock = opaque::Block,\n UncheckedExtrinsic = UncheckedExtrinsic,\n {\n /* ... */\n // Governance\n Sudo: pallet_sudo::{Pallet, Call, Storage, Config<T>, Event<T>} = 12,\n /* ... */\n }\n);\n\nThe root account, initially set at genesis, is defined as follows:\nnode/src/chain_spec.rs:229:\nlet sudo_account =\n pallet_multisig::Pallet::<foucoco_runtime::Runtime>::multi_account_id(&signatories[..], 3);\n\nThis configuration allows the use of the ensure_root method for operations such as add_allowed_currencies and remove_allowed_currencies. Although there is no immediate security risk associated with this setup, it raises concerns regarding potential centralization.\n\nRecommendation:\nUtilizing a root account for governance purposes is considered a less favorable design choice due to its potential for centralization and the security risks associated with compromised private keys.\n\nTo address this issue, we recommend the following actions:\n1. Comprehensive Documentation: It is crucial to thoroughly document the intended use of the sudo pallet and the root account within the project. This documentation should provide clear explanations of the potential risks and limitations associated with their usage. Both the development team and end-users should be adequately informed to ensure transparency and informed decision-making. If there are plans to deactivate the sudo functionality after the network launch, a detailed process similar to the sudo removal outlined by Polkadot should be documented.\n\n2. Auditing and Monitoring: Prior to the removal of the sudo pallet, it is essential to establish regular auditing and monitoring processes. These measures will help ensure that the sudo pallet and the root account are not misused or compromising the system's security. By conducting thorough audits and continuous monitoring, any potential vulnerabilities or misuse can be identified and addressed promptly.\n\nBy following these recommendations, you will mitigate potential centralization concerns and enhance the overall governance and security aspects of the project.", |
| "description_summary": "The use of the sudo pallet risks centralization and security vulnerabilities due to potential misuse of root access.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 4, |
| "project_name": "Pendulum", |
| "auditor": "Hacken", |
| "audit_link": "https://audits.hacken.io/pendulum/l1-pendulum-pendulum-chain-jun2023/" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 3, |
| "location": "runtime/foucoco/src/lib.rs:None", |
| "title": "Error Handling in Chain Extension", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/pendulum-chain/pendulum", |
| "audited_commit": "d01528d17b96bf3de72c36deb3800c2ed0cf2afb", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": null, |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Code Quality", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "Error Handling in Chain Extension\nImplementation of ChainExtension often utilizes DispatchError::Other(\"Explanatory string\") error, which makes error handling difficult.\nID: PDM-009\nScope: Code Quality\nStatus: Acknowledged\n\nDescription:\nThe current implementation of ChainExtension frequently relies on the generic DispatchError::Other() error. This approach makes error handling challenging, particularly for developers working with smart contracts. The indiscriminate use of this error type makes it difficult to monitor and diagnose specific errors, impeding efficient troubleshooting and code improvement.\n\nRecommendation:\nTo improve error handling in the ChainExtension implementation, we recommend implementing a custom enum that covers all the required error types. This custom enum will provide a more structured approach to error handling by encapsulating specific errors and enabling precise identification and resolution of issues.\n\nBy implementing the custom enum and incorporating it into the RetVal result, developers will have access to more detailed error information, allowing them to effectively identify and handle different error scenarios. This approach enhances the overall robustness and maintainability of the codebase, as well as facilitates troubleshooting and future improvements.", |
| "description_summary": "Use of generic DispatchError::Other hampers error handling and troubleshooting.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 4, |
| "project_name": "Pendulum", |
| "auditor": "Hacken", |
| "audit_link": "https://audits.hacken.io/pendulum/l1-pendulum-pendulum-chain-jun2023/" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 4, |
| "location": "runtime/foucoco/src/lib.rs:964", |
| "title": "Hardcoded Constants in match", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/pendulum-chain/pendulum", |
| "audited_commit": "d01528d17b96bf3de72c36deb3800c2ed0cf2afb", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": null, |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Code Quality", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "Hardcoded Constants in match\nThe presence of hardcoded constants in the match statement within the implementation of ChainExtension hampers code readability.\nID: PDM-008\nScope: Code Quality\nStatus: Acknowledged\n\nDescription:\nThe following code segment has drawn our attention:\nruntime/foucoco/src/lib.rs:964:\n\nmatch func_id {\n // transfer\n 1105 => { /* ... */ },\n // balance\n 1106 => { /* ... */ },\n // total_supply\n 1107 => { /* ... */ },\n // approve_transfer\n 1108 => { /* ... */ },\n // transfer_approved\n 1109 => { /* ... */ },\n // allowance\n 1110 => { /* ... */ },\n // dia price feed\n 7777 => { /* ... */ },\n _ => { /* ... */ },\n}\n\nWhile the code comments provide some understanding of the functionality associated with each func_id, it is recommended to enhance the code logic in this section to improve comprehensibility, rather than solely relying on comments.\n\nRecommendation:\nWe recommend creating a separate enum to handle all the supported func_id options, using descriptive names that correspond to each function. This approach enhances code readability and maintainability:\n\nenum FuncId {\n Transfer,\n Balance,\n TotalSupply,\n ApproveTransfer,\n TransferApproved,\n Allowance,\n DiaPriceFeed,\n}\n\nimpl TryFrom<u16> for FuncId {\n type Error = DispatchError;\n fn try_from(func_id: u16) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {\n let id = match func_id {\n 1105 => Self::Transfer,\n 1106 => Self::Balance,\n 1107 => Self::TotalSupply,\n 1108 => Self::ApproveTransfer,\n 1109 => Self::TransferApproved,\n 1110 => Self::Allowance,\n 7777 => Self::DiaPriceFeed,\n _ => {\n error!(\"Called an unregistered `func_id`: {:?}\", func_id);\n return Err(DispatchError::Other(\"Unimplemented func_id\"));\n }\n };\n Ok(id)\n }\n}\n\nThis enum allows for easier handling of the logic within the match statement in the call implementation.\n\nFurthermore, it is good practice to implement the logic for each function in a separate method instead of encapsulating all the code within the match arms. This promotes code modularity and readability.\n\nHere's an example of how the code would look with the recommended changes:\n\nlet func_id = FuncId::try_from(env.func_id())?;\nmatch func_id {\n FuncId::Transfer => /* Call method that performs transfer */,\n FuncId::Balance => /* Call method that returns balance */,\n FuncId::TotalSupply => /* ... */ ,\n FuncId::ApproveTransfer => /* ... */,\n FuncId::TransferApproved => /* ... */,\n FuncId::Allowance => /* ... */,\n FuncId::DiaPriceFeed => /* ... */,\n}\n\nWith these improvements, the code becomes more comprehensible, maintainable, and follows best practices.", |
| "description_summary": "Hardcoded constants in match statements reduce code readability and maintainability.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 4, |
| "project_name": "Pendulum", |
| "auditor": "Hacken", |
| "audit_link": "https://audits.hacken.io/pendulum/l1-pendulum-pendulum-chain-jun2023/" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 5, |
| "location": "pallets/orml-currencies-allowance-extension/src/lib.rs:245,246", |
| "title": "Linter Warnings", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/pendulum-chain/pendulum", |
| "audited_commit": "d01528d17b96bf3de72c36deb3800c2ed0cf2afb", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": null, |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Linters", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "Linter Warnings\nThe codebase has generated several warnings when analyzed using cargo clippy, indicating areas where improvements can be made to enhance the code quality.\n\nID: PDM-002\nScope: Linters\nStatus: Acknowledged\n\nDescription:\nDuring the static analysis process using cargo clippy, the following warnings within the scope of the audit were identified:\n- //rust-lang.github.io/rust-clippy/master/index.html#needless_return\">needless_return\n- //rust-lang.github.io/rust-clippy/master/index.html#needless_borrow\">needless_borrow\n\nLocation:\npallets/orml-currencies-allowance-extension/src/lib.rs:245-246:\n&owner,\n&destination,\n\nRecommendation:\nTo maintain a high-quality and easily maintainable codebase, it is advised to address the warnings generated by cargo clippy. Resolving these linter warnings will improve the overall code quality, facilitate troubleshooting, and potentially enhance performance and security within the project.", |
| "description_summary": "Codebase has linter warnings that impact maintainability and should be resolved to enhance quality and security.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 4, |
| "project_name": "Pendulum", |
| "auditor": "Hacken", |
| "audit_link": "https://audits.hacken.io/pendulum/l1-pendulum-pendulum-chain-jun2023/" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 6, |
| "location": "runtime/foucoco/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Logging in Runtime", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/pendulum-chain/pendulum", |
| "audited_commit": "d01528d17b96bf3de72c36deb3800c2ed0cf2afb", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": null, |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Code Quality", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "Logging in Runtime\nThe implementation of ChainExtension contains a lot of unnecessary warn!() macros.\nID: PDM-011\nScope: Logging\nStatus: Acknowledged\n\nDescription:\nUpon reviewing the runtime code, it was observed that numerous instances of the warn!() macro are present. While the warn macro can be useful during testing or debugging phases, it is unnecessary in the final version of the code. These superfluous warn macros clutter the codebase and can impede code readability and maintenance.\n\nUnneeded logging statements add noise to the code and distract developers from critical information. In the absence of proper justification, excessive logging can obscure important log messages and make it more challenging to identify and address genuine issues.\n\nRecommendation:\nTo enhance the code quality and maintainability of the runtime, we recommend refining the use of warn macros. By limiting the use of these macros to critical and important situations, the codebase will become more concise and easier to comprehend. This targeted approach will enable developers to focus on essential log messages that offer meaningful insights into the system's behavior, rather than being overwhelmed by extraneous warnings. Therefore, unnecessary warn macros should be reviewed and removed, with a priority on retaining only those that provide critical and important warnings.", |
| "description_summary": "Excessive warn!() macros in the implementation of ChainExtension clutter code and reduce maintainability.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 4, |
| "project_name": "Pendulum", |
| "auditor": "Hacken", |
| "audit_link": "https://audits.hacken.io/pendulum/l1-pendulum-pendulum-chain-jun2023/" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 7, |
| "location": "Cargo.toml", |
| "title": "Pendulum build", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/pendulum-chain/pendulum", |
| "audited_commit": "d01528d17b96bf3de72c36deb3800c2ed0cf2afb", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": null, |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Build Process", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "Pendulum build\nThe Pendulum chain demonstrates a smooth and error-free build process.\nID: PDM-001\nScope: Build Process\nStatus: Fixed\n\nDescription:\nThe build process for the Pendulum chain is efficient and error-free. When executing the cargo build --release command, the output confirms a successful build with only one minor compiler warning related to an unused import. The build process adheres to sound Rust coding practices and follows idiomatic conventions.\n\nDuring the assessment, it was observed that the orml-currencies-allowance-extension pallet is not included as a member of the workspace, although it should be.\n\nRecommendation:\nTo address this issue, we recommend adding pallets/orml-currencies-allowance-extension to the members list in the main Cargo.toml file of the workspace.\n\nPlease note that this issue does not encompass the results of linting tools, such as Clippy, which may provide additional warnings and recommendations for improving code quality. These will be addressed separately in PDM-002.", |
| "description_summary": "Missing a member in the workspace configuration.", |
| "reported_status": "Fixed", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 4, |
| "project_name": "Pendulum", |
| "auditor": "Hacken", |
| "audit_link": "https://audits.hacken.io/pendulum/l1-pendulum-pendulum-chain-jun2023/" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 8, |
| "location": "pallets/orml-currencies-allowance-extension/src/lib.rs:99", |
| "title": "Superfluous Implementation of Hooks Trait", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/pendulum-chain/pendulum", |
| "audited_commit": "d01528d17b96bf3de72c36deb3800c2ed0cf2afb", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": null, |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Code Quality", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "Superfluous Implementation of Hooks Trait\nThe Hooks trait has been declared in the orml-currencies-allowance-extension pallet, but no custom implementations have been provided.\nID: PDM-005\nScope: Code Quality\nStatus: Acknowledged\n\nDescription:\nThe following code snippet raises concerns:\npallets/orml-currencies-allowance-extension/src/lib.rs:99:\n\n#[pallet::hooks]\nimpl<T: Config> Hooks<T::BlockNumber> for Pallet<T> {}\n\nThe Hooks trait is typically used to perform logic on every block initialization, finalization, and other specific actions. However, in the case of the orml-currencies-allowance-extension pallet, no methods from the Hooks trait are implemented. While this does not cause any immediate detrimental effects, it can reduce code readability and increase complexity.\n\nRecommendation:\nTo improve code clarity and readability, it is recommended to eliminate the use of the Hooks trait in the orml-currencies-allowance-extension pallet. Since no custom implementations are provided, removing the Hooks trait declaration will simplify the code and remove unnecessary complexity.", |
| "description_summary": "The Hooks trait has been declared in the orml-currencies-allowance-extension pallet, but no custom implementations have been provided.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 4, |
| "project_name": "Pendulum", |
| "auditor": "Hacken", |
| "audit_link": "https://audits.hacken.io/pendulum/l1-pendulum-pendulum-chain-jun2023/" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 9, |
| "location": "pallets/orml-currencies-allowance-extension/src/lib.rs\nruntime/foucoco/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Test Coverage", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/pendulum-chain/pendulum", |
| "audited_commit": "d01528d17b96bf3de72c36deb3800c2ed0cf2afb", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": null, |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Code Quality / Testing", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "Test Coverage\nThe current test coverage of the orml-currencies-allowance-extension pallet is insufficient, with only 22.22% coverage. Moreover, the implementation of ChainExtension in the runtime lacks any test coverage.\n\nID: PDM-003\nScope: Code Quality / Testing\nStatus: Acknowledged\n\nDescription:\nTo evaluate the test coverage, we recommend using the cargo tarpaulin command:\ncargo tarpaulin --out Html --output-dir ./tarpaulin-report\n\nRunning this command generates an HTML file that provides detailed coverage information for all packages. Specifically, it highlights the orml-currencies-allowance-extension pallet, which currently has a coverage of only 22.22%. Additionally, it reveals the absence of tests for the methods utilized in the runtime to implement ChainExtension, including is_allowed_currency, allowance, do_approve_transfer, and do_transfer_approved, as well as the lack of testing for the overall ChainExtension implementation in the foucoco runtime.\n\nRecommendation:\nTo address the low test coverage in the orml-currencies-allowance-extension pallet and the lack of test coverage in the runtime implementation of ChainExtension, it is essential to develop a comprehensive test suite. This suite should include thorough testing to ensure the security, stability, and maintainability of the project.\n\nImplementing continuous integration (CI) systems to automate the execution of the test suite is highly recommended. This practice enables the team to identify areas with insufficient test coverage, detect regressions, and uncover areas that require improvement. By incorporating CI into the development workflow, valuable feedback is obtained, ultimately enhancing the overall quality of the codebase.", |
| "description_summary": "Insufficient test coverage in key areas affects security, stability, and maintainability.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 4, |
| "project_name": "Pendulum", |
| "auditor": "Hacken", |
| "audit_link": "https://audits.hacken.io/pendulum/l1-pendulum-pendulum-chain-jun2023/" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 10, |
| "location": "pallets/orml-currencies-allowance-extension/Cargo.toml", |
| "title": "Vulnerable and Unmaintained Dependencies", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/pendulum-chain/pendulum", |
| "audited_commit": "d01528d17b96bf3de72c36deb3800c2ed0cf2afb", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": null, |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Dependency Management", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Dependency", |
| "description": "Vulnerable and Unmaintained Dependencies\nThe orml-currencies-allowance-extension pallet has dependencies that include one vulnerable crate plus three unmaintained crates.\nID: PDM-004\nScope: Dependencies\nStatus: Acknowledged\n\nDescription:\nThe orml-currencies-allowance-extension pallet has several dependencies that raise concerns regarding their security and maintenance. The following table provides details about these dependencies:\n\nDependency | Version | Id | Type | Remediation\n------------|---------|---------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------\ntime | 0.1.45 | RUSTSEC-2020-0071 | Vulnerability | Upgrade to >=0.2.23\nansi_term | 0.12.1 | RUSTSEC-2021-0139 | Unmaintained | Use alternative crates: anstyle, console, nu-ansi-term, owo-colors, stylish, yansi\nmach | 0.3.2 | RUSTSEC-2020-0168 | Unmaintained | Switch to mach2\nparity-wasm | 0.45.0 | RUSTSEC-2022-0061 | Unmaintained | Switch to wasm-tools\n\nAlthough these dependencies may not have an immediate impact on the security aspect and are part of the Substrate project, it is essential to regularly review dependencies and monitor for updates to ensure the overall security and maintenance of the project.\n\nRecommendation:\nTo address these concerns and maintain a secure codebase, it is recommended to take the following actions:\n\n1. Use cargo audit to check for any new vulnerabilities or outdated packages in your project's dependencies. Regularly perform these checks to stay updated on potential security issues.\n2. Monitor for new releases of Substrate and update your project accordingly. Keeping your project up to date with the latest Substrate releases ensures that you benefit from bug fixes, security patches, and improvements.\n\nAdditionally, it is worth noting that the latest available Substrate release at the time of writing is v0.9.43. Stay informed about new releases and evaluate the feasibility of updating your project to benefit from the latest features and improvements.", |
| "description_summary": "Dependency includes one vulnerable and three unmaintained crates requiring updates or replacements.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 4, |
| "project_name": "Pendulum", |
| "auditor": "Hacken", |
| "audit_link": "https://audits.hacken.io/pendulum/l1-pendulum-pendulum-chain-jun2023/" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 0, |
| "location": null, |
| "title": "TCR voting design should be improved", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/NodleCode/chain", |
| "audited_commit": "de356170bfe2eb9f537e3c4861d6752dd099f43e", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "3", |
| "reported_likelihood": "3", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "3.1 (HAL-01) HAL-01 TCR VOTING DESIGN SHOULD BE IMPROVED - MEDIUM \n Description:\nIt was observed that it is possible to:\n\u2022 Vote with 0 amount\n\u2022 Challenge yourself\n\u2022 Counter yourself\n\u2022 Vote for yourself\nBy combining these properties, some scenarios might be possible:\n\u2022 A whale can influence any challenge/counter decision by voting for itself.\nA whale can also farm additional tokens upon success by countering any application and then voting to itself.\nBy countering your application and voting with 0 amount, it is possible to fill up the storage since the values are pushed into vector\nTo remove yourself from members in the root of trust.\n\nRisk Level:\nLikelihood - 3\nImpact - 4\n\nRecommendation:\nConsider improving the design by not letting the same account to:\n\u2022 Vote to itself\n\u2022 Counter itself\n\u2022 Challenge itself\n\u2022 Vote with 0 deposit\n\nRemediation Plan:\nNOT APPLICABLE: The issue is marked as not applicable by the Nodle team as the TCR and root of trust pallets will be removed.", |
| "description_summary": "TCR voting design allows self-voting, zero-amount votes, and potential manipulation by large token holders.", |
| "reported_status": "NOT APPLICABLE: The issue is marked as not applicable by the Nodle team as the tcr and root of trust pallets will be removed.", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 5, |
| "project_name": "Nodle", |
| "auditor": "Halborn", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/HalbornSecurity/PublicReports/blob/master/Substrate%20Audits/Nodle_Nodl_Substrate_Pallet_Security_Audit_Report_Halborn_Final.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 1, |
| "location": "pallets/staking/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Denomination logic should be improved", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/NodleCode/chain", |
| "audited_commit": "de356170bfe2eb9f537e3c4861d6752dd099f43e", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "2db8b4707606bf88b8fdefbe616d67a720e434ea", |
| "reported_impact": "2", |
| "reported_likelihood": "4", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "3.2 (HAL-02) HAL-02 DENOMINATION LOGIC SHOULD BE IMPROVED - MEDIUM\n Description:\nIt was observed that if a nominator has a single validator, it is not possible to remove a validator through nominator_denominate since it has a check for <StakingMinNominatorTotalBond<T>>. In that case, nominator_denominate_all has to be used, which bypasses that check, which is not intentional.\n\nCode Location:\nListing 1: pallets/staking/src/lib.rs\n1 if !do_force {\n ensure!(\n remaining >= <StakingMinNominatorTotalBond<T>>::get(),\n <Error<T>>::NominatorBondBelowMin\n );\n}\n\nRisk Level:\nLikelihood - 4\nImpact - 2\n\nRecommendation:\nConsider having a conditional statement in nominator_denominate that allows the forced removal of a validator if the nominator has only one validator.\n\nRemediation Plan:\nSOLVED: The issue was solved by the Nodle team.\n\u2022 Fix Commit", |
| "description_summary": "Denomination logic bypasses minimum bond check when only one validator is nominated.", |
| "reported_status": "SOLVED", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 5, |
| "project_name": "Nodle", |
| "auditor": "Halborn", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/HalbornSecurity/PublicReports/blob/master/Substrate%20Audits/Nodle_Nodl_Substrate_Pallet_Security_Audit_Report_Halborn_Final.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 2, |
| "location": "pallets", |
| "title": "Emergency shutdown not used in critical functions", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/NodleCode/chain", |
| "audited_commit": "de356170bfe2eb9f537e3c4861d6752dd099f43e", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "4", |
| "reported_likelihood": "3", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Denial of Service (DoS) and Spamming", |
| "description": "3.3 (HAL-03) HAL-03 EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN NOT USED IN MANY CRITICAL FUNCTIONS - MEDIUM\n Description:\nIt was observed that the emergency shutdown pallet is used only in the allocate function in the allocations pallet. However, there are more public functions across different pallets that might be problematic if, at any point in time, there is a bug (security/non-security) discovered within them. There should be a functionality to shut them down before new fixes are pushed.\n\nCode Location:\nThese functions should have a shutdown functionality:\n\nGrants pallet\n\u2022 add_vesting_schedule\n\nStaking pallet\n\u2022 validator_join_pool\n\u2022 validator_exit_pool\n\u2022 validator_bond_more\n\u2022 validator_bond_less\n\u2022 nominator_nominate\n\u2022 nominator_denominate\n\u2022 nominator_bond_more\n\u2022 nominator_bond_less\n\u2022 nominator_move_nomination\n\u2022 unbond_frozen\n\u2022 withdraw_unbonded\n\u2022 withdraw_staking_rewards\n\nRisk Level:\nLikelihood - 3\nImpact - 4\n\nRecommendation:\nConsider enabling shutdown functionality in critical public functions.\n\nExample Code:\nListing 2\n1 ensure!(\n !pallet_emergency_shutdown :: Pallet::<T>::shutdown(),\n Error::<T>::UnderShutdown\n);\n\nRemediation Plan:\nPENDING: In a future release, the Nodle team will modify the emergency shutdown pallet to better generalize.", |
| "description_summary": "Emergency shutdown functionality is missing in multiple critical public functions across different pallets.", |
| "reported_status": "PENDING: In a future release, the Nodle team will modify the emergency shutdown pallet to better generalize.", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 5, |
| "project_name": "Nodle", |
| "auditor": "Halborn", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/HalbornSecurity/PublicReports/blob/master/Substrate%20Audits/Nodle_Nodl_Substrate_Pallet_Security_Audit_Report_Halborn_Final.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 3, |
| "location": "pallets/staking/src/lib.rs:201-208", |
| "title": "Missing sanity checks", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/NodleCode/chain", |
| "audited_commit": "de356170bfe2eb9f537e3c4861d6752dd099f43e", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "2db8b4707606bf88b8fdefbe616d67a720e434ea", |
| "reported_impact": "2", |
| "reported_likelihood": "3", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "3.4 (HAL-04) HAL-04 MISSING SANITY CHECKS - LOW\n Description:\nIt was observed that the set_staking_limits privileged function is missing sanity checks on provided values. Even though it is a protected function, it is still advised to have some sanity checks to avoid any human error.\n\nCode Location:\nListing 3: pallets/staking/src/lib.rs\n201 pub fn set_staking_limits (\n origin: OriginFor<T>,\n max_stake_validators: u32,\n min_stake_session_selection: BalanceOf<T>,\n min_validator_bond: BalanceOf<T>,\n min_nominator_total_bond: BalanceOf<T>,\n min_nominator_chill_threshold: BalanceOf<T>\n) -> DispatchResultWithPostInfo {\n\nRisk Level:\nLikelihood - 3\nImpact - 2\n\nRecommendation:\nIt is recommended to add sanity checks to ensure:\n\u2022 max_stake_validators != 0\n\u2022 min_stake_session_selection != 0\n\u2022 min_validator_bond != 0\n\u2022 min_nominator_total_bond != 0\n\nRemediation Plan:\nSOLVED: The issue was solved by the Nodle team.\n\u2022 Fix Commit", |
| "description_summary": "Missing sanity checks in set_staking_limits function may allow invalid parameter values.", |
| "reported_status": "SOLVED", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 5, |
| "project_name": "Nodle", |
| "auditor": "Halborn", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/HalbornSecurity/PublicReports/blob/master/Substrate%20Audits/Nodle_Nodl_Substrate_Pallet_Security_Audit_Report_Halborn_Final.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 4, |
| "location": "pallets/grants/src/lib.rs:157-168", |
| "title": "Vesting to yourself is allowed", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/NodleCode/chain", |
| "audited_commit": "de356170bfe2eb9f537e3c4861d6752dd099f43e", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "91cfe0cb3300811bb02a47c4cf70f68c7e48f94d", |
| "reported_impact": "2", |
| "reported_likelihood": "3", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "3.5 (HAL-05) HAL-05 VESTING TO YOURSELF IS ALLOWED - LOW\n Description:\nIt was observed that you can create a vesting schedule to yourself.\n\nCode Location:\nListing 4: pallets/grants/src/lib.rs\n157 pub fn add_vesting_schedule (\n origin: OriginFor<T>,\n dest: <T::Lookup as StaticLookup>::Source,\n schedule: VestingScheduleOf<T>\n) -> DispatchResultWithPostInfo {\n let from = ensure_signed(origin)?;\n let to = T::Lookup::lookup(dest)?;\n Self::do_add_vesting_schedule(&from, &to, schedule.clone())?;\n Self::deposit_event(Event::VestingScheduleAdded(from, to, schedule));\n Ok(().into())\n}\n\nRisk Level:\nLikelihood - 3\nImpact - 2\n\nRecommendation:\nPlease add a check that ensures that from != to in fn add_vesting_schedule.\n\nRemediation Plan:\nSOLVED: The issue was solved by the Nodle team.\n\u2022 Fix Commit", |
| "description_summary": "Vesting schedule allows setting up a vesting to oneself without restrictions.", |
| "reported_status": "SOLVED", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 5, |
| "project_name": "Nodle", |
| "auditor": "Halborn", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/HalbornSecurity/PublicReports/blob/master/Substrate%20Audits/Nodle_Nodl_Substrate_Pallet_Security_Audit_Report_Halborn_Final.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 5, |
| "location": "pallets/grants/src/lib.rs:88", |
| "title": "Missing zero value check", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/NodleCode/chain", |
| "audited_commit": "de356170bfe2eb9f537e3c4861d6752dd099f43e", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "f31c19a06ab0047f0c533c83ba67654eedfa6147", |
| "reported_impact": "2", |
| "reported_likelihood": "2", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "3.6 (HAL-06) HAL-06 MISSING ZERO VALUE CHECK - LOW\n Description:\nIt was observed that the allocate function should have a zero value check on the amount argument.\n\nCode Location:\nListing 5: pallets/grants/src/lib.rs (Line 88)\n85 pub fn allocate (\n origin: OriginFor<T>,\n to: T::AccountId,\n amount: BalanceOf<T>,\n proof: Vec<u8>\n) -> DispatchResultWithPostInfo {\n Self::ensure_oracle(origin)?;\n ...\n\nRisk Level:\nLikelihood - 2\nImpact - 2\n\nRecommendation:\nConsider adding zero value checks to these functions to avoid performing redundant operations if a zero value is received.\n\nRemediation Plan:\nSOLVED: The issue was solved by the Nodle team.\n\u2022 Fix Commit", |
| "description_summary": "Allocate function lacks a zero-value check for the amount argument.", |
| "reported_status": "SOLVED", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 5, |
| "project_name": "Nodle", |
| "auditor": "Halborn", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/HalbornSecurity/PublicReports/blob/master/Substrate%20Audits/Nodle_Nodl_Substrate_Pallet_Security_Audit_Report_Halborn_Final.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 6, |
| "location": null, |
| "title": "Vesting schedules less than a current block can be created", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/NodleCode/chain", |
| "audited_commit": "de356170bfe2eb9f537e3c4861d6752dd099f43e", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "1", |
| "reported_likelihood": "1", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "3.7 (HAL-07) HAL-07 VESTING SCHEDULES LESS THAN A CURRENT BLOCK CAN BE CREATED - INFORMATIONAL\n Description:\nIt was observed that the pallet allows the creation of vesting schedules that are less than the current block number. Those vesting schedules are not more than the regular transfers with extra steps. Therefore, those are redundant.\n\nExample:\nListing 6\n1 Current Block: 100\n\n3 Vesting Schedule Start: 1st Block\n5 Period: 10 Blocks\n7 Period_count: 2\n9 Per Period: 1 knodl\n\n13 Vesting Duration: 10 * 2 + 1 = 21 Blocks\n14 Initial Transfer sent: 2 knodl\n16 Next Claims: 0 since Vesting Duration < Current Block\n\nRisk Level:\nLikelihood - 1\nImpact - 1\n\nRecommendation:\nConsider adding a check that ensures that:\n(period * period_count) + start > current_block_number\n\nRemediation Plan:\nNOT APPLICABLE: The issue was marked as not applicable by the Nodle team, stating:\nThis can be useful to keep as it is. In fact, we may have to create retroactive awards that may have been partially vested.", |
| "description_summary": "Vesting schedules can be created with start blocks earlier than the current block, making them redundant.", |
| "reported_status": "NOT APPLICABLE: The issue was marked as not applicable by the Nodle team saying: This can be useful to keep it as it is. In fact, we may have to create retroactive awards that may have been partially vested.", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 5, |
| "project_name": "Nodle", |
| "auditor": "Halborn", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/HalbornSecurity/PublicReports/blob/master/Substrate%20Audits/Nodle_Nodl_Substrate_Pallet_Security_Audit_Report_Halborn_Final.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 7, |
| "location": "pallets/grants/src/lib.rs:253", |
| "title": "Redundant check", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/NodleCode/chain", |
| "audited_commit": "de356170bfe2eb9f537e3c4861d6752dd099f43e", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "91cfe0cb3300811bb02a47c4cf70f68c7e48f94d", |
| "reported_impact": "1", |
| "reported_likelihood": "1", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "3.8 (HAL-08) HAL-08 REDUNDANT CHECK - INFORMATIONAL\n Description:\nIt was observed that the grants pallet contains a redundant check.\n\nCode Location:\nThere is no need for a second new_lock.is_zero() since it was already checked prior. Removing of the vestingSchedule can be performed within the first check.\n\nListing 7: pallets/grants/src/lib.rs (Line 253)\n247 if new_lock . is_zero () {\n248 T :: Currency :: remove_lock ( VESTING_LOCK_ID , & target );\n249 }\n250 else {\n251 T :: Currency :: set_lock ( VESTING_LOCK_ID , & target , new_lock , WithdrawReasons :: all () );\n252 }\n253 if new_lock . is_zero () {\n254 // No more claimable , clear\n255 VestingSchedules :: <T >:: remove ( target . clone () );\n256 }\n257 else {\n258 T :: Currency :: set_lock ( VESTING_LOCK_ID , & target , new_lock , WithdrawReasons :: all () );\n}\n\nRisk Level:\nLikelihood - 1\nImpact - 1\n\nRecommendation:\nPlease remove the second new_lock.is_zero() check and remove the vestingSchedule within the first check.\n\nListing 8: pallets/grants/src/lib.rs\n247 if new_lock . is_zero () {\n248 T :: Currency :: remove_lock ( VESTING_LOCK_ID , & target );\n249 VestingSchedules :: <T >:: remove ( target . clone () );\n250 }\n251 else {\n252 T :: Currency :: set_lock ( VESTING_LOCK_ID , & target , new_lock , WithdrawReasons :: all () );\n\nRemediation Plan:\nSOLVED: The issue was solved by the Nodle team.\n\u2022 Fix Commit", |
| "description_summary": "Redundant check of new_lock.is_zero() found in grants pallet.", |
| "reported_status": "SOLVED", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 5, |
| "project_name": "Nodle", |
| "auditor": "Halborn", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/HalbornSecurity/PublicReports/blob/master/Substrate%20Audits/Nodle_Nodl_Substrate_Pallet_Security_Audit_Report_Halborn_Final.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 8, |
| "location": "pallets/tcr/src/lib.rs:138-152,478", |
| "title": "Redundant variable", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/NodleCode/chain", |
| "audited_commit": "de356170bfe2eb9f537e3c4861d6752dd099f43e", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "91cfe0cb3300811bb02a47c4cf70f68c7e48f94d", |
| "reported_impact": "1", |
| "reported_likelihood": "1", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "3.9 (HAL-09) HAL-09 REDUNDANT VARIABLE - INFORMATIONAL\n Description:\nIt was observed that the old1 variable in on_finalize function in tcr pallet is redundant. Tuple returned from commit_applications is Ok(( new_members, Vec::new())). Therefore, old1 is always going to be an empty vector. Hence, extending it with old2 does not make any difference. In this scenario, we only care about new_1.\n\nCode Location:\nListing 9: pallets/tcr/src/lib.rs\n138 fn on_finalize ( block : T :: BlockNumber ) {\n139 let ( mut new_1 , mut old_1 ) =\n140 Self :: commit_applications ( block ) . unwrap_or (( Vec :: new () , Vec :: new () ) );\n141 let ( new_2 , old_2 ) =\n142 Self :: resolve_challenges ( block ). unwrap_or (( Vec :: new () , Vec :: new () ) );\n143 // Should never be the same , so should not need some uniq checks\n145 new_1 . extend ( new_2 ) ;\n146 old_1 . extend ( old_2 ) ;\n148 new_1 . sort () ;\n149 old_1 . sort () ;\n151 Self :: notify_members_change ( new_1 , old_1 ) ;\n\nListing 10: pallets/tcr/src/lib.rs (Line 478)\n460 fn commit_applications ( block : T :: BlockNumber ) -> FinalizeHelperResultFrom <T > {\n461 let new_members = < Applications <T , I > >:: iter ()\n462 . filter (|( _account_id , application )| {\n463 block\n464 . checked_sub (& application . clone () . created_block )\n465 . expect ( \" created_block should always be smaller than block ; qed \")\n466 >= T :: FinalizeApplicationPeriod :: get ()\n})\n468 . map (|( account_id , application ) | {\n469 < Applications <T , I > >:: remove ( account_id . clone () );\n470 < Members <T , I > >:: insert ( account_id . clone () , application . clone () ) ;\n471 Self :: unreserve_for ( account_id . clone () , application . candidate_deposit );\n472 Self :: deposit_event ( Event :: ApplicationPassed ( account_id . clone () ) ) ;\n474 account_id\n475 })\n476 . collect :: < Vec <T :: AccountId > >() ;\n478 Ok (( new_members , Vec :: new () ) ) // === HERE ===\n}\n\nRisk Level:\nLikelihood - 1\nImpact - 1\n\nRecommendation:\nConsider omitting old1 and remove all actions performed on it.\n\nListing 11: pallets/tcr/src/lib.rs\n247 fn on_finalize ( block : T :: BlockNumber ) {\n248 let ( mut new_1 , _ ) =\n249 Self :: commit_applications ( block ) . unwrap_or (( Vec :: new () , Vec :: new () ) );\n250 let ( new_2 , mut old ) =\n251 Self :: resolve_challenges ( block ). unwrap_or (( Vec :: new () , Vec :: new () ) );\n253 // Should never be the same , so should not need some uniq checks\n254 new_1 . extend ( new_2 ) ;\n257 new_1 . sort () ;\n258 old . sort () ;\n260 Self :: notify_members_change ( new_1 , old ) ;\n\nRemediation Plan:\nSOLVED: The issue was solved by the Nodle team.\n\u2022 Fix Commit", |
| "description_summary": "Redundant variable old1 in on_finalize function.", |
| "reported_status": "SOLVED", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 5, |
| "project_name": "Nodle", |
| "auditor": "Halborn", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/HalbornSecurity/PublicReports/blob/master/Substrate%20Audits/Nodle_Nodl_Substrate_Pallet_Security_Audit_Report_Halborn_Final.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 9, |
| "location": null, |
| "title": "Usage of vulnerable crates", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/NodleCode/chain", |
| "audited_commit": "de356170bfe2eb9f537e3c4861d6752dd099f43e", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "1", |
| "reported_likelihood": "2", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Dependency", |
| "description": "3.10 (HAL-10) HAL-10 USAGE OF VULNERABLE CRATES - INFORMATIONAL\n Description:\nIt was observed that the project uses crates with known vulnerabilities.\n\nCode Location:\nID\nRUSTSEC-2020-0159\nRUSTSEC-2020-0071\nRUSTSEC-2021-0130\nRUSTSEC-2021-0067\nRUSTSEC-2021-009\nRUSTSEC-2021-0079\nRUSTSEC-2021-0078\nRUSTSEC-2021-0076\nRUSTSEC-2021-0070\nRUSTSEC-2021-0073\nRUSTSEC-2021-0013\nRUSTSEC-2021-0089\nRUSTSEC-2021-0124\nRUSTSEC-2021-0110\nRUSTSEC-2021-0115\n\nFINDINGS & TECH DETAILS\npackage: chrono\nShort Description: Potential segfault in 'localtime_r' invocations\npackage: time\nShort Description: Potential segfault in the time crate\npackage: lru\nShort Description: Use after free in lru crate\npackage: cranelift-codegen\nShort Description: Memory access due to code generation flaw in Cranelift module\npackage: crossbeam-deque\nShort Description: Data race in crossbeam-deque\npackage: hyper\nShort Description: Integer overflow in hyper's parsing of the Transfer-Encoding header leads to data loss\npackage: hyper\nShort Description: Lenient hyper header parsing of Content-Length could allow request smuggling\npackage: libsecp256k1\nShort Description: libsecp256k1 allows overflowing signatures\npackage: nalgebra\nShort Description: VecStorage Deserialize Allows Violation of Length Invariant\npackage: prost-types\nShort Description: Conversion from prost_types::Timestamp to SystemTime can cause an overflow and panic\npackage: raw-cpuid\nShort Description: Soundness issues in raw-cpuid\npackage: raw-cpuid\nShort Description: Optional Deserialize implementations lacking validation\npackage: tokio\nShort Description: Data race when sending and receiving after closing a oneshot channel\npackage: wasmtime\nShort Description: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Wasmtime\npackage: zeroize-derive\nShort Description: #[zeroize(drop)] doesn\u2019t implement Drop for enums\n\nRisk Level:\nLikelihood - 2\nImpact - 1\n\nRecommendation:\nEven if those vulnerable crates cannot impact the underlying application, it is advised to be aware of them and attempt to update them to non-vulnerable versions. Furthermore, it is necessary to set up dependency monitoring to always be alerted when a new vulnerability is disclosed in one of the project\u2019s crates.\n\nRemediation Plan:\nACKNOWLEDGED: The issue was acknowledged by the Nodle team and will be fixed later.", |
| "description_summary": "Usage of crates with known vulnerabilities identified.", |
| "reported_status": "ACKNOWLEDGED", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 5, |
| "project_name": "Nodle", |
| "auditor": "Halborn", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/HalbornSecurity/PublicReports/blob/master/Substrate%20Audits/Nodle_Nodl_Substrate_Pallet_Security_Audit_Report_Halborn_Final.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 10, |
| "location": "Cargo.toml", |
| "title": "Outdated Rust edition", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/NodleCode/chain", |
| "audited_commit": "de356170bfe2eb9f537e3c4861d6752dd099f43e", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "41ce7de56ff6dd701de1f5d247c91aaff6803954", |
| "reported_impact": "1", |
| "reported_likelihood": "1", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "3.11 (HAL-11) HAL-11 OUTDATED RUST EDITION - INFORMATIONAL\n Description:\nIt was observed that the project is using outdated rust edition (2018). Recently, 2021 rust edition came out, which includes a lot of stability improvements and new features that might make the code more readable.\n\nCode Location:\n\u2022 Cargo.toml\n\nRisk Level:\nLikelihood - 1\nImpact - 1\n\nRecommendation:\nConsider updating the Rust to the latest edition to use the latest features and stability improvements.\n\nReference:\nRust 2021 Edition Guide\n\nRemediation Plan:\nSOLVED: The issue was solved by the Nodle team.\n\u2022 Fix Commit", |
| "description_summary": "Project is using an outdated Rust edition (2018).", |
| "reported_status": "SOLVED", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 5, |
| "project_name": "Nodle", |
| "auditor": "Halborn", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/HalbornSecurity/PublicReports/blob/master/Substrate%20Audits/Nodle_Nodl_Substrate_Pallet_Security_Audit_Report_Halborn_Final.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 0, |
| "location": "modules/evm-accounts/src/lib.rs:182,313,314\nmodules/evm-bridge/src/lib.rs:183,186,191", |
| "title": "Integer overflow", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/reef-defi/reef-chain", |
| "audited_commit": "393d0c0821cc25ea5c6912d9cac8f61a9232c9a3", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "6e4153498a28d03b8600739709cb200065c88781", |
| "reported_impact": "3", |
| "reported_likelihood": "3", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Arithmetic", |
| "description": "3.1 (HAL-01) INTEGER OVERFLOW - MEDIUM\nDescription:\nAn overflow happens when an arithmetic operation reaches the maximum size of a type. For instance, in the ethereum_signable_message() method, an if statement is summing up a few u32 values, which may end up overflowing the integer. In computer programming, an integer overflow occurs when an arithmetic operation attempts to create a numeric value that is outside of the range that can be represented with a given number of bits\u2014either larger than the maximum or lower than the minimum representable value.\n\nCode Location:\nListing 1: modules/evm-accounts/src/lib.rs (Lines 182)\n180 pub fn ethereum_signable_message(what: &[u8], extra: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {\n181 let prefix = b\"reef evm:\";\n182 let mut l = prefix.len() + what.len() + extra.len();\n183 let mut rev = Vec::new();\n\nListing 2: modules/evm-accounts/src/lib.rs (Lines 313,314)\n312 pub fn to_ascii_hex(data: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {\n313 let mut r = Vec::with_capacity(data.len() * 2);\n314 let mut push_nibble = |n| r.push(if n < 10 { b'0' + n } else { b'a' - 10 + n });\n\nListing 3: modules/evm-bridge/src/lib.rs (Lines 183,186,191)\n182 let offset = U256::from_big_endian(&output[0..32]);\n183 let length = U256::from_big_endian(&output[offset.as_usize()..offset.as_usize() + 32]);\n184 ensure!(\n// output is 32-byte aligned. ensure total_length >= offset + string length + string data length.\n186 output.len() >= offset.as_usize() + 32 + length.as_usize(),\n187 Error::<T>::InvalidReturnValue\n188 );\n189 let mut data = Vec::new();\n191 data.extend_from_slice(&output[offset.as_usize() + 32..offset.as_usize() + 32 + length.as_usize()]);\n\nRisk Level:\nLikelihood - 3\nImpact - 3\n\nRecommendations:\nIt is recommended to use vetted safe math libraries for arithmetic operations consistently throughout the smart contract system. Consider replacing the addition and multiplication operators with Rust\u2019s checked_add and checked_mul methods.\n\nRemediation:\nSOLVED: Reef fixed the issue in commit 6e4153498a28d03b8600739709cb200065c88781.", |
| "description_summary": "Integer overflow vulnerability due to unchecked arithmetic operations in ethereum_signable_message and to_ascii_hex functions.", |
| "reported_status": "SOLVED", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 6, |
| "project_name": "ReefChain", |
| "auditor": "Halborn", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/HalbornSecurity/PublicReports/blob/master/Substrate%20Audits/Reef_Chain_Substrate_Security_Audit_Report_Halborn_v1_1.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 1, |
| "location": "modules/currencies/src/lib.rs:168", |
| "title": "Total issuance not updated on mint", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/reef-defi/reef-chain", |
| "audited_commit": "393d0c0821cc25ea5c6912d9cac8f61a9232c9a3", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "3", |
| "reported_likelihood": "3", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "3.2 (HAL-02) TOTAL ISSUANCE NOT UPDATED ON MINT - MEDIUM\nDescription:\nThe update_balance dispatchable defined in modules/currencies/src/lib.rs does not update the total issuance of the currency (identified by user-supplied ID) which is minted to the target address. This may lead to discrepancies in token data.\n\nCode Location:\nListing 4: modules/currencies/src/lib.rs (Lines 168)\n159 #[pallet::weight(T::WeightInfo::update_balance_non_native_currency())]\n160 pub fn update_balance(\n161 origin: OriginFor<T>,\n162 who: <T::Lookup as StaticLookup>::Source,\n163 currency_id: CurrencyIdOf<T>,\n164 amount: AmountOf<T>,\n165 ) -> DispatchResultWithPostInfo {\n166 ensure_root(origin)?;\n167 let dest = T::Lookup::lookup(who)?;\n168 <Self as MultiCurrencyExtended<T::AccountId>>::update_balance(currency_id, &dest, amount)?;\n169 Ok(().into())\n170 }\n\nRisk Level:\nLikelihood - 3\nImpact - 3\n\nRecommendations:\nTotal issuance should be updated every time tokens are minted or burned.\n\nRemediation Plan:\nACKNOWLEDGED: Reef states that the affected function is sudo only and will be deprecated in a future release.", |
| "description_summary": "Total issuance is not updated on mint, causing potential discrepancies in token data.", |
| "reported_status": "ACKNOWLEDGED: Reef states that the affected function is sudo only and will be deprecated in a future release.", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 6, |
| "project_name": "ReefChain", |
| "auditor": "Halborn", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/HalbornSecurity/PublicReports/blob/master/Substrate%20Audits/Reef_Chain_Substrate_Security_Audit_Report_Halborn_v1_1.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 2, |
| "location": "modules/evm-bridge/src/lib.rs:183,186,191", |
| "title": "Casting overflow", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/reef-defi/reef-chain", |
| "audited_commit": "26ed9e88e773f5d628c01d558945cd38cd5a7d5a", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "313439bb7940afa0f0d5060fbcbbe26d5a3e5298", |
| "reported_impact": "3", |
| "reported_likelihood": "2", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Arithmetic", |
| "description": "3.3 (HAL-03) CASTING OVERFLOW - LOW\nDescription:\nWhen converting or casting between types, an \u201coverflow\u201d/wrapping may occur and result in logic bugs leading to thread panic. The decode_string utility method defined in modules/evm-bridge/src/lib.rs does not validate if the values of the offset and length variables can be cast to the usize type. Although the method is not exported and available externally, the method is vulnerable still and the risk could increase in the future if the method is used before it\u2019s patched.\n\nCode Location:\nListing 5: modules/evm-bridge/src/lib.rs (Lines 183,186,191)\n182 let offset = U256::from_big_endian(&output[0..32]);\n183 let length = U256::from_big_endian(&output[offset.as_usize()..offset.as_usize() + 32]);\n184 ensure!(\n// output is 32-byte aligned. ensure total_length >= offset + string length + string data length.\n186 output.len() >= offset.as_usize() + 32 + length.as_usize(),\n187 Error::<T>::InvalidReturnValue\n188 );\n189 let mut data = Vec::new();\n191 data.extend_from_slice(&output[offset.as_usize() + 32..offset.as_usize() + 32 + length.as_usize()]);\n\nRisk Level:\nLikelihood - 2\nImpact - 3\n\nRecommendations:\nCheck the value against maximum type value before casting.\n\nListing 6:\n1 if (x <= usize::MAX) {\n2 // logic ...\n3 }\n\nRemediation:\nSOLVED: Reef fixed the issue in commit 313439bb7940afa0f0d5060fbcbbe26d5a3e5298.", |
| "description_summary": "Casting overflow vulnerability due to unchecked type conversion in decode_string method.", |
| "reported_status": "SOLVED", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 6, |
| "project_name": "ReefChain", |
| "auditor": "Halborn", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/HalbornSecurity/PublicReports/blob/master/Substrate%20Audits/Reef_Chain_Substrate_Security_Audit_Report_Halborn_v1_1.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 3, |
| "location": "modules/currencies/src/lib.rs:396", |
| "title": "Slash amount validation missing", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/reef-defi/reef-chain", |
| "audited_commit": "393d0c0821cc25ea5c6912d9cac8f61a9232c9a3", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "bd43bec58890be763b32bfdfd18ba85a8c0ef9e5", |
| "reported_impact": "2", |
| "reported_likelihood": "2", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "3.4 (HAL-04) SLASH AMOUNT VALIDATION MISSING - LOW\nDescription:\nThe slash_reserved method defined in modules/currencies/src/lib.rs does not validate if the value of the user-supplied value parameter exceeds the actual balance of the account owned by the address that is to have its ERC20 tokens slashed.\n\nCode Location:\nListing 7: modules/currencies/src/lib.rs (Lines 396)\n394 fn slash_reserved(currency_id: Self::CurrencyId, who: &T::AccountId, value: Self::Balance) -> Self::Balance {\n395 match currency_id {\n396 CurrencyId::ERC20(_) => value,\n397 CurrencyId::Token(TokenSymbol::REEF) => T::NativeCurrency::slash_reserved(who, value),\n398 _ => T::MultiCurrency::slash_reserved(currency_id, who, value),\n399 }\n400 }\n\nRisk Level:\nLikelihood - 2\nImpact - 2\n\nRecommendations:\nThe slashed amount should always be lesser or equal to the account balance that is to be slashed.\n\nRemediation:\nSOLVED: Reef fixed the issue in commit bd43bec58890be763b32bfdfd18ba85a8c0ef9e5.", |
| "description_summary": "Missing validation in slash_reserved method allows slashing beyond account balance.", |
| "reported_status": "SOLVED", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 6, |
| "project_name": "ReefChain", |
| "auditor": "Halborn", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/HalbornSecurity/PublicReports/blob/master/Substrate%20Audits/Reef_Chain_Substrate_Security_Audit_Report_Halborn_v1_1.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 4, |
| "location": "modules/currencies/src/lib.rs:125,178,186,199,217,235,290,303,316,324,336,376,386,394,402,423,445", |
| "title": "Currency ID validation missing", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/reef-defi/reef-chain", |
| "audited_commit": "393d0c0821cc25ea5c6912d9cac8f61a9232c9a3", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "2", |
| "reported_likelihood": "2", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "3.5 (HAL-05) CURRENCY ID VALIDATION MISSING - LOW\nDescription:\nMany dispatchables and helper methods defined in modules/currencies/src/lib.rs do not check if the user-supplied currency ID matches any of the existing ones before calling the possibly resource-intensive underlying utility functions.\n\nCode Location:\nListing 8: modules/evm-accounts/src/lib.rs (Lines 125)\n121 #[pallet::weight(T::WeightInfo::transfer_non_native_currency())]\n122 pub fn transfer(\n123 origin: OriginFor<T>,\n124 dest: <T::Lookup as StaticLookup>::Source,\n125 currency_id: CurrencyIdOf<T>,\n126 #[pallet::compact] amount: BalanceOf<T>,\n127 ) -> DispatchResultWithPostInfo {\n128 let from = ensure_signed(origin)?;\n129 let to = T::Lookup::lookup(dest)?;\n130 <Self as MultiCurrency<T::AccountId>>::transfer(currency_id, &from, &to, amount)?;\n131 Ok(().into())\n132 }\n\nList of all the functions that fail to validate the currency ID:\nListing 9: (Lines 2,3)\n1 auditor@halborn:~/projects/reef/reef-chain/modules/currencies$ \\\n2 > grep -ne 'fn.*CurrencyId' src/lib.rs \\\n3 > | cut -d '-' -f 1\n4 178: fn minimum_balance(currency_id: Self::CurrencyId)\n5 186: fn total_issuance(currency_id: Self::CurrencyId)\n6 199: fn total_balance(currency_id: Self::CurrencyId, who: &T::AccountId)\n7 217: fn free_balance(currency_id: Self::CurrencyId, who: &T::AccountId)\n8 235: fn ensure_can_withdraw(currency_id: Self::CurrencyId, who: &T::AccountId, amount: Self::Balance)\n9 290: fn deposit(currency_id: Self::CurrencyId, who: &T::AccountId, amount: Self::Balance)\n10 303: fn withdraw(currency_id: Self::CurrencyId, who: &T::AccountId, amount: Self::Balance)\n11 316: fn can_slash(currency_id: Self::CurrencyId, who: &T::AccountId, amount: Self::Balance)\n12 324: fn slash(currency_id: Self::CurrencyId, who: &T::AccountId, amount: Self::Balance)\n13 336: fn update_balance(currency_id: Self::CurrencyId, who: &T::AccountId, by_amount: Self::Amount)\n14 376: fn remove_lock(lock_id: LockIdentifier, currency_id: Self::CurrencyId, who: &T::AccountId)\n15 386: fn can_reserve(currency_id: Self::CurrencyId, who: &T::AccountId, value: Self::Balance)\n16 394: fn slash_reserved(currency_id: Self::CurrencyId, who: &T::AccountId, value: Self::Balance)\n17 402: fn reserved_balance(currency_id: Self::CurrencyId, who: &T::AccountId)\n18 423: fn reserve(currency_id: Self::CurrencyId, who: &T::AccountId, value: Self::Balance)\n19 445: fn unreserve(currency_id: Self::CurrencyId, who: &T::AccountId, value: Self::Balance)\n\nRisk Level:\nLikelihood - 2\nImpact - 2\n\nRecommendations:\nIt is recommended to validate all user-supplied input in order to avoid executing unnecessary operations and mitigate the risk of resource exhaustion.\n\nRemediation Plan:\nACKNOWLEDGED: Reef states that there is only 1 currency id in use, and there likely won\u2019t be more going forward.", |
| "description_summary": "Missing validation for currency ID in multiple methods could lead to resource exhaustion.", |
| "reported_status": "ACKNOWLEDGED: Reef states that there is only 1 currency id in use, and there likely won\u2019t be more going forward.", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 6, |
| "project_name": "ReefChain", |
| "auditor": "Halborn", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/HalbornSecurity/PublicReports/blob/master/Substrate%20Audits/Reef_Chain_Substrate_Security_Audit_Report_Halborn_v1_1.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 5, |
| "location": "modules/evm-accounts/src/lib.rs:313", |
| "title": "Vector capacity validation missing", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/reef-defi/reef-chain", |
| "audited_commit": "393d0c0821cc25ea5c6912d9cac8f61a9232c9a3", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "6b826f7ca16d1a30f3fa55f0606d0b94b69b2b3a", |
| "reported_impact": "2", |
| "reported_likelihood": "1", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "3.6 (HAL-06) VECTOR CAPACITY VALIDATION MISSING - INFORMATIONAL\nDescription:\nThe to_ascii_hex utility function defined in modules/evm-accounts/src/lib.rs when creating a new Vec<u8> from the user-supplied data slice with a Vec::with_capacity method does not validate if the capacity of the new vector exceeds the maximum allowed capacity.\n\nCode Location:\nListing 10: modules/currencies/src/lib.rs (Lines 313)\n312 pub fn to_ascii_hex(data: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {\n313 let mut r = Vec::with_capacity(data.len() * 2);\n314 let mut push_nibble = |n| r.push(if n < 10 { b'0' + n } else { b'a' - 10 + n });\n315 for &b in data.iter() {\n316 push_nibble(b / 16);\n317 push_nibble(b % 16);\n318 }\n319 r\n320 }\n\nRisk Level:\nLikelihood - 1\nImpact - 2\n\nRecommendations:\nValidate if the new capacity (data.len() * 2) does not exceed isize::MAX bytes.\n\nRemediation:\nSOLVED: Reef fixed the issue in commit 6b826f7ca16d1a30f3fa55f0606d0b94b69b2b3a.", |
| "description_summary": "Missing validation in to_ascii_hex function allows vector capacity to exceed maximum limit.", |
| "reported_status": "SOLVED", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 6, |
| "project_name": "ReefChain", |
| "auditor": "Halborn", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/HalbornSecurity/PublicReports/blob/master/Substrate%20Audits/Reef_Chain_Substrate_Security_Audit_Report_Halborn_v1_1.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 0, |
| "location": "parachain-staking/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Static fee charged despite dynamic storage accesses", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "45ba60e1d940dbf3491ce0f1223e44c84d5b7218", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Medium", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Bad Extrinsic Weight", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Weight Management", |
| "description": "4.1.1 V-MANC-VUL-001: Static fee charged despite dynamic storage accesses\n\nSeverity: Medium\nType: Bad Extrinsic Weight\nCommit: 45ba60e1d\nStatus: Acknowledged\n\nFile(s): parachain-staking/lib.rs\nLocation(s): go_online, go_offline, candidate_bond_more\n\nBlockchain computations must have appropriate fees to prevent network congestion. For substrate extrinsics, these fees are set by computing an associated weight for the operation where the weight is intended to capture the maximum computational cost. As reads from and writes to storage are expensive, these weights should consider the number of these operations that are performed. The following extrinsics, however, have a fixed weight despite requiring a dynamic number of reads or writes due to insert or remove operations being performed on CandidatePool.\n\n- go_online\n- go_offline\n- candidate_bond_more\n- execute_candidate_bond_less\n- delegate\n- execute_leave_delegators\n- delegator_bond_more\n- execute_delegation_request\n- schedule_leave_delegators\n- schedule_delegator_bond_less\n- cancel_leave_delegators\n\nAlso note that similar functions in the same pallet, such as schedule_leave_candidates charge the users dynamic fees. An example can be seen in Snippet 4.1.\n\nImpact: As the size of the CandidatePool grows, the cost of insert and remove will increase linearly since vector inserts in Rust are linear in the size of the vector. This allows malicious actors to add many candidates to the pool for a fixed monetary cost despite an increasing computational cost. If the size of the pool becomes too large, this could effectively create a DoS.\n\nRecommendation: Similar to schedule_leave_candidates, calculate the weights dynamically rather than charging a fixed cost.\n\nDeveloper Response: The developers have acknowledged the issue and are determining how to address it.\n\nSnippet 4.1: go_offline calls remove on the CandidatePool but charges users a fixed weight in WeightInfo::go_offline\n\n#[pallet::call_index(12)]\n#[pallet::weight(<T as Config>::WeightInfo::go_offline())]\n/// Temporarily leave the set of collator candidates without unbonding\npub fn go_offline(origin: OriginFor<T>) -> DispatchResultWithPostInfo {\n let collator = ensure_signed(origin)?;\n let mut state = <CandidateInfo<T>>::get(&collator).ok_or(Error::<T>::CandidateDNE)?;\n ensure!(state.is_active(), Error::<T>::AlreadyOffline);\n state.go_offline();\n let mut candidates = <CandidatePool<T>>::get();\n if candidates.remove(&Bond::from_owner(collator.clone())) {\n <CandidatePool<T>>::put(candidates);\n }\n <CandidateInfo<T>>::insert(&collator, state);\n Self::deposit_event(Event::CandidateWentOffline { candidate: collator });\n Ok(().into())\n}", |
| "description_summary": "Fixed fees are charged for dynamic storage operations, potentially leading to DoS as CandidatePool size grows.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 7, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Veridise", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Veridise-Chain.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 1, |
| "location": "pallets/manta-pay/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Users can use any previously seen Merkle root", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "45ba60e1d940dbf3491ce0f1223e44c84d5b7218", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Medium", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Hash Collision", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Dependency", |
| "description": "4.1.2 V-MANC-VUL-002: Users can use any previously seen Merkle root\n\nSeverity: Medium\nType: Hash Collision\nCommit: 45ba60e1d\nStatus: Acknowledged\n\nFile(s): pallets/manta-pay/src/lib.rs\nLocation(s): has_matching_utxo_accumulator_output\n\nThe MantaPay protocol maintains a Merkle tree on the ledger where the leaves of the ledger are the hashes of the UTXOs generated during the protocol\u2019s lifetime. In order to spend a UTXO, users must supply a ZK proof that the UTXO belongs to the Merkle tree on the ledger. The membership proof takes as input the root of the Merkle tree (public input), the inner node hashes (private inputs), and proves that the root can be derived from the inner node hashes and leaf.\n\nIdeally, the ledger would check that the root provided is equal to the latest root on-chain. However, this isn\u2019t done in practice as the transaction could easily be front-runned since every transaction changes the root. Instead, the ledger maintains a set of all previously generated roots and just checks that the root provided belongs to that set.\n\nHowever, by allowing the root provided by the user to be any previously generated root, an attacker simply needs to find a hash collision with any previously generated root to steal assets. The likelihood of finding a collision grows quadratically with the number of previously seen hashes. In particular, given an output size of b bits and n previously generated hashes, the likelihood of finding a collision with any of the n hashes is approximately n^2/2^(b+1).\n\nThe current version of the Protocol uses the Poseidon hash function, which produces 255-bit hashes and, in theory, should be safe even with billions of previously seen roots. However, this is contingent on the safety of the Poseidon hash. While there has been a significant amount of research and analysis conducted on the function, including various attacks and optimizations, there is no formal proof of its security and correctness, let alone any proofs about concrete implementations.\n\nImpact: Storing all previously seen roots significantly increases the likelihood of collisions. If any attack or weakness is found in the Poseidon hash, this can be an additional means of attacking the protocol.\n\nRecommendation: There are a few ways to mitigate this. Protocols like Semaphore maintain a timeout period TIMEOUT and associate each root with a timestamp indicating when it was created. Any root created before now() - TIMEOUT is rejected. Another option is to only store the N previously generated roots and only allow a root if it belongs to the set of N previously generated roots. The latter option would have the additional benefit of not needing to store every root on-chain.\n\nDeveloper Response: The developers acknowledged the issue and will either use a timestamp or only maintain the N previously generated roots.", |
| "description_summary": "Allowing any previously seen Merkle root increases the risk of hash collisions, potentially allowing asset theft.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 7, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Veridise", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Veridise-Chain.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 2, |
| "location": "pallets/manta-pay/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "MantaPay weights calculated with a small database", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "45ba60e1d940dbf3491ce0f1223e44c84d5b7218", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Medium", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Bad Extrinsic Weight", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Weight Management", |
| "description": "4.1.3 V-MANC-VUL-003: MantaPay weights calculated with a small database\n\nSeverity: Medium\nType: Bad Extrinsic Weight\nCommit: 45ba60e1d\nStatus: Acknowledged\n\nFile(s): pallets/manta-pay/src/lib.rs\nLocation(s): to_private, to_public, private_transfer\n\nTransactions to_public, to_private, and private_transfer take as input nullifiers and membership proofs and generate UTXOs. These UTXOs are then added to a Merkle tree on the ledger.\n\nMantaPay shards this Merkle tree into 256 buckets where each bucket has its own Merkle tree. Instead of storing the entire tree at each bucket, the Ledger just stores the last path added to the tree. When adding a UTXO, the Ledger first computes its corresponding bucket, then computes the new path pointing to that UTXO, and finally adds that path to the bucket.\n\nComputing the new path should take time proportional to log(n) where n is the size of the Merkle Tree. The current benchmarking scheme only covers cases where the previous path is small, i.e., at most size 1. However, if the number of transactions gets large, on the order of hundreds of millions or billions, then the size of the path can get to 24-28 (taking shards into account). If the tree grows to this size, this means each execution of the extrinsic will perform 24-28 hashes, multiplied by the number of UTXOs to be added.\n\nThe benchmarking scheme should take into account the size of the tree to ensure that the existing weights are sufficient to offset the computation of the new Merkle tree path.\n\nImpact: Setting the weight too low can allow users to perform a large number of transactions with little cost, potentially allowing malicious users to launch a DoS attack.\n\nRecommendation: There are several ways to address this. One strategy is to take an additional parameter corresponding to the logarithm of the Merkle Tree's size on the ledger. The weight charged can be proportional to this value. In the implementation, this value (technically 2^value) can be compared against the actual size, and the transaction will only proceed if it is larger than or equal to the actual size.\n\nAnother strategy is to benchmark the pallets by taking into account the tree's size. If MantaPay is expected not to exceed more than a billion transactions, then the pallet could be benchmarked assuming the current path length is around 24-28.\n\nDeveloper Response: The developers acknowledged that the weights should be recalculated with a more saturated database.", |
| "description_summary": "Inadequate benchmarking of weights for MantaPay's Merkle tree could lead to DoS attacks as the tree grows.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 7, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Veridise", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Veridise-Chain.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 3, |
| "location": "pallets/asset-manager/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Total supply of native assets can exceed the set limit", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "45ba60e1d940dbf3491ce0f1223e44c84d5b7218", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Medium", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Logic Error", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "4.1.4 V-MANC-VUL-004: Total supply of native assets can exceed the set limit\n\nSeverity: Medium\nType: Logic Error\nCommit: 45ba60e1d\nStatus: Acknowledged\n\nFile(s): pallets/asset-manager/src/lib.rs\nLocation(s): mint_asset\n\nOne invariant underlying the correctness of MantaPay is that the total supply of an asset cannot exceed the maximum amount that can be held in a particular account. This is because MantaPay uses a dedicated account A to store the value of all the private assets. As such, A should, in principle, be able to hold all the supply in the case where all of that asset is privatized.\n\nIn more detail, when privatizing a user\u2019s public assets (via to_private), MantaPay constructs opaque UTXOs to encode the amount privatized, and then transfers those public assets into A. This transfer is expected not to fail because of the invariant described above. However, we found a case where the transfer can fail.\n\nManta enforces this invariant for NonNative assets because every time an asset is minted into an account, the total supply is increased. If the total supply would exceed the maximum that can be held in an account, the mint fails with the error Overflow. However, there is no such check for Native assets. Thus, if the total supply of Native assets exceeds the maximum that can be held in an account, u128::MAX, then to_private calls that should succeed can fail if the amount held in A is close to the maximum allowed. This is demonstrated in Snippet 4.2.\n\nImpact: By not constraining the amount of Native assets to be less than the maximum amount that can be held in an account, to_private transactions that should succeed will fail.\n\nRecommendation: We recommend a similar check be done for Native assets as is done for NonNative assets to enforce that the total supply cannot exceed the maximum that can be held in a given account.\n\nDeveloper Response: The developers have acknowledged the issue and are determining how to address it.\n\nSnippet 4.2: Failed to_private due to count of native assets exceeding u128::MAX\n\n#[test]\nfn public_account_issue() {\nlet mut rng = OsRng;\nnew_test_ext().execute_with(|| {\nlet asset_id = NATIVE_ASSET_ID;\nlet value = 1000u128;\nlet id = NATIVE_ASSET_ID;\nlet metadata = AssetRegistryMetadata {\nmetadata: AssetStorageMetadata {\nname: b\"Calamari\".to_vec(),\nsymbol: b\"KMA\".to_vec(),\ndecimals: 12,\nis_frozen: false,\n},\nmin_balance: TEST_DEFAULT_ASSET_ED2,\nis_sufficient: true,\n};\nassert_ok!(MantaAssetRegistry::create_asset(\nid, metadata.into(), TEST_DEFAULT_ASSET_ED2,\ntrue\n));\nassert_ok!(FungibleLedger::<Test>::deposit_minting(id, &ALICE, 2*value));\nassert_ok!(FungibleLedger::<Test>::deposit_minting(id, &MantaPay::account_id(), u128::MAX));\nlet mut utxo_accumulator = UtxoAccumulator::new(UTXO_ACCUMULATOR_MODEL.clone());\nlet spending_key = rng.gen();\nlet address = PARAMETERS.address_from_spending_key(&spending_key);\nlet mut authorization =\nAuthorization::from_spending_key(&PARAMETERS, &spending_key, &mut rng);\nlet asset_0 = Asset::new(Fp::from(asset_id), value);\nlet (to_private_0, pre_sender_0) = ToPrivate::internal_pair(\n&PARAMETERS, &mut authorization.context,\naddress, asset_0,\nDefault::default(), &mut rng,\n);\nlet to_private_0 = to_private_0\n.into_post(\nFullParametersRef::new(&PARAMETERS, utxo_accumulator.model()),\n&PROVING_CONTEXT.to_private,\nNone, Vec::new(), &mut rng,\n)\n.expect(\"Unable to build TO_PRIVATE proof.\")\n.expect(\"Did not match transfer shape.\");\nassert_ok!(MantaPay::to_private(\nMockOrigin::signed(ALICE),\nPalletTransferPost::try_from(to_private_0).unwrap()\n));\n}\n}\n", |
| "description_summary": "Native asset supply can exceed the maximum limit for an account, causing to_private transactions to fail.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 7, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Veridise", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Veridise-Chain.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 4, |
| "location": "pallets/asset-manager/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Missing updates in update_asset_metadata", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "45ba60e1d940dbf3491ce0f1223e44c84d5b7218", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Medium", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Logic Error", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "4.1.5 V-MANC-VUL-005: Missing updates in update_asset_metadata\n\nSeverity: Medium\nType: Logic Error\nCommit: 45ba60e1d\nStatus: Acknowledged\n\nFile(s): pallets/asset-manager/src/lib.rs\nLocation(s): update_asset_metadata\n\nManta Chain has an asset-manager pallet responsible for registering and minting assets. Each asset has a unique id and is associated with various metadata like a name, symbol, decimal places, etc. One important metadata is called min_balance. To store an account with some quantity of assets on the ledger, it must have more than min_balance quantity. This metadata is also used when validating transfers.\n\nIn particular, many asset transfers take an \u201cexistential parameter\u201d as input, called KeepAlive, which decides what to do if the transfer would take the account\u2019s balance (with respect to the asset) below min_balance. If KeepAlive is set, the transfer will fail if the amount goes below the min_balance. If it is not set, other configurations come into play, and the account may be removed and the remaining balance burned.\n\nThe asset-manager pallet exposes an extrinsic called update_asset_metadata, which takes as input the new metadata for that asset and updates the ledger to associate the asset with that metadata. While the implementation took a new min_balance as input, it did not update the ledger to associate the asset with this metadata.\n\nAdditionally, this API also took as input a new value for the metadata is_sufficient, but similarly did not update the ledger to associate the asset with this metadata.\n\nImpact: While it is rare for the min_balance to be changed, it is sometimes necessary if it was originally set too high, for example. The current API made it appear that min_balance could be changed, so users might think the min_balance was changed when, in fact, it wasn\u2019t.\n\nRecommendation: The main issue with this extrinsic is its interface makes it appear as though the metadata min_balance and is_sufficient could be changed when it actually didn\u2019t. Either the API should be changed to only take the metadata that should be changed, or it should appropriately update min_balance and is_sufficient.\n\nDeveloper Response: The developers acknowledged this issue and are discussing two possible fixes. The first is to update both parameters in the asset pallet, and the second is to change the interface to prevent updating the min_balance or is_sufficient parameters.", |
| "description_summary": "update_asset_metadata does not apply updates to min_balance and is_sufficient metadata as expected.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 7, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Veridise", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Veridise-Chain.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 5, |
| "location": "parachain-staking", |
| "title": "No slashing mechanism for collators", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "45ba60e1d940dbf3491ce0f1223e44c84d5b7218", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Medium", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Consensus", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "4.1.6 V-MANC-VUL-006: No slashing mechanism for collators\n\nSeverity: Medium\nType: Consensus\nCommit: 45ba60e1d\nStatus: Acknowledged\n\nFile(s): parachain-staking\nLocation(s): N/A\n\nProof of Stake blockchains often have a slashing mechanism to detect poorly performing stakers and punish them. Typically, a significant portion of the staker\u2019s stake is taken by the chain as punishment for poor performance.\n\nCurrently, Manta Chain does not have any slashing mechanism. Instead, it uses a combination of social pressure and manual slashing to incentivize good behavior. Specifically, when the owners detect a poorly performing collator, they contact the collator over Discord and warn them of the poor performance. If their performance does not improve, the owners manually slash the collator\u2019s funds.\n\nWhile this approach may work when the blockchain is small, it will be challenging to enforce as the chain grows. Therefore, we recommend that Manta Chain implement a slashing mechanism.\n\nImpact: Manta Chain\u2019s current method of using social pressure will only work with a small set of trusted collators. However, as the chain expands, this mechanism is unlikely to sufficiently incentivize collators to perform well.\n\nRecommendation: We recommend that Manta Chain establish a slashing mechanism to implement if/when the current process becomes inadequate.\n\nDeveloper Response: The developers acknowledged the lack of a slashing mechanism and plan to include one in the future if/when the current process stops working.", |
| "description_summary": "No automated slashing mechanism exists to penalize poorly performing collators, relying on social pressure and manual intervention.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 7, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Veridise", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Veridise-Chain.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 6, |
| "location": "pallets/parachain-staking/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Collators given full rewards regardless of quality", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "45ba60e1d940dbf3491ce0f1223e44c84d5b7218", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Medium", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Consensus", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "4.1.7 V-MANC-VUL-007: Collators given full rewards regardless of quality\n\nSeverity: Medium\nType: Consensus\nCommit: 45ba60e1d\nStatus: Open\n\nFile(s): pallets/parachain-staking/src/lib.rs\nLocation(s): pay_one_collator_reward\n\nManta Chain rewards collators by first allocating a fixed number of points (20) for every block they author and then giving the collator a fixed percentage of those allocated points as rewards. However, there is no check on the quality of the blocks authored by the collator: an empty block will result in just as many rewards as a full block.\n\nCurrently, Manta relies on the owners to monitor the blocks on-chain and manually punish collators who perform poorly. However, as the chain grows, this misbehavior may not be easy to detect.\n\nOne relatively simple way to address this issue is to adjust the reward system to incentivize high quality blocks.\n\nImpact: Collators can effectively steal funds from Manta by authoring low-quality blocks (i.e., empty or partial blocks) and reaping full rewards.\n\nRecommendation: We recommend the developers adjust the rewards system to either reward the collators for high-quality blocks or punish them for authoring poor ones.\n\nDeveloper Response: TBD", |
| "description_summary": "Collators receive full rewards regardless of block quality, allowing low-quality blocks to earn the same as high-quality ones.", |
| "reported_status": "Open", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 7, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Veridise", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Veridise-Chain.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 7, |
| "location": "pallets/manta-pay/src/lib.rs:593", |
| "title": "Missing validation in pull_ledger_diff", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "45ba60e1d940dbf3491ce0f1223e44c84d5b7218", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Data Validation", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "4.1.8 V-MANC-VUL-008: Missing validation in pull_ledger_diff\n\nSeverity: Low\nType: Data Validation\nCommit: 45ba60e1d\nStatus: Acknowledged\n\nFile(s): pallets/manta-pay/src/lib.rs\nLocation(s): Line 593\n\npull_ledger_diff takes as input a Checkpoint, which is a struct with two fields: receiver_index and sender_index. It pulls sender and receiver data from the ledger, starting at sender_index (resp. receiver_index) up to at most sender_index + PULL_MAX_SENDER_UPDATE_SIZE (resp. receiver_index + PULL_MAX_RECEIVER_UPDATE_SIZE). However, there is no check to ensure that this sum cannot overflow for both the sender and receiver index in pull_senders, pull_receivers, pull_senders_for_shard, and pull_receivers_for_shard.\n\nImpact: If the code is compiled without the --release flag, a malicious user could crash the node by passing in bad values. If it is built with --release, the call will be reported as successful and no senders or receivers will be returned. However, if a benign end user calls the API with incorrect indexes, it might be preferable to return an Error informing them that the index is invalid.\n\nRecommendation: We recommend adding bounds checks for safety and to return an Error.\n\nDeveloper Response: The developers are aware and agree that it would be better to check and return an error.", |
| "description_summary": "Missing bounds checks in pull_ledger_diff could lead to overflow, potentially crashing the node.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 7, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Veridise", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Veridise-Chain.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 8, |
| "location": "pallets/asset-manager/src/lib.rs:590", |
| "title": "increase_count_of_associated_assets can overflow", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "45ba60e1d940dbf3491ce0f1223e44c84d5b7218", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Logic Error", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Arithmetic", |
| "description": "4.1.9 V-MANC-VUL-009: increase_count_of_associated_assets can overflow\n\nSeverity: Low\nType: Logic Error\nCommit: 45ba60e1d\nStatus: Acknowledged\n\nFile(s): pallets/asset-manager/src/lib.rs\nLocation(s): Line 590\n\nThe asset_manager pallet maintains a mapping of paraids to a count of assets associated with that paraid. Each paraid can be associated with at most u32::MAX assets. When registering an asset or moving its location, the pallet calls increase_count_of_associated_assets, which takes as input a paraid and increments the number of assets associated with that paraid. However, this function does not check whether increasing the number of assets will result in an overflow.\n\nImpact: If the runtime is compiled using --debug, this can crash the node. However, if built under --release, the asset count will go to zero.\n\nRecommendation: Make this function check if the addition will result in an overflow, i.e., check if the current count is u32::MAX and return an error.\n\nDeveloper Response: Acknowledged", |
| "description_summary": "increase_count_of_associated_assets lacks overflow check, risking node crash or reset to zero in certain cases.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 7, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Veridise", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Veridise-Chain.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 9, |
| "location": "pallets/manta-pay/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Account checks are incorrect", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "45ba60e1d940dbf3491ce0f1223e44c84d5b7218", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Logic Error", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "4.1.10 V-MANC-VUL-010: Account checks are incorrect.\n\nSeverity: Low\nType: Logic Error\nCommit: 45ba60e1d\nStatus: Acknowledged\n\nFile(s): pallets/manta-pay/src/lib.rs\nLocation(s): check_sink_accounts, check_source_accounts\n\nWhen validating a transaction, the source and sink accounts are checked by check_sink_accounts and check_source_accounts. These functions iterate over pairs (account, value) and check that value can be safely deposited (withdrawn) from account. The logic is correct only if every account appears in at most one pair. While this is fine for the current APIs, if the APIs change to allow multiple sink or multiple source accounts, then this code needs to be refactored or the uniqueness needs to be enforced elsewhere.\n\nImpact: Currently there is no impact since the current APIs only allow one account for the source and sink accounts.\n\nRecommendation: To be safe, we recommend adding an additional check in the validation step to ensure the accounts are distinct for both sources and sinks.\n\nDeveloper Response: The developers acknowledged the issue and plan to add a check during validation to ensure that the accounts are distinct.", |
| "description_summary": "Account checks in transaction validation assume unique accounts, which may lead to issues if APIs change to allow multiple accounts.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 7, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Veridise", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Veridise-Chain.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 10, |
| "location": "parachain-staking/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Unstaked user may be selected as collator", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "45ba60e1d940dbf3491ce0f1223e44c84d5b7218", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Logic Error", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "4.1.11 V-MANC-VUL-011: Unstaked user may be selected as collator\n\nSeverity: Low\nType: Logic Error\nCommit: 45ba60e1d\nStatus: Acknowledged\n\nFile(s): parachain-staking/lib.rs\nLocation(s): select_top_candidates\n\nParachains use collators to combine transactions into blocks that are then checked by Validators on the relay chain. Notably, this allows collators to remain relatively untrusted as validators ensure blocks are created correctly. On Manta\u2019s chain, collators are selected from a group of staked users who receive rewards for creating blocks. Requiring that collators be staked provides additional security guarantees as, if a collator misbehaves (e.g., submits no blocks for validation, submits multiple conflicting blocks), governance can step in and slash the user\u2019s staked funds. As such, unstaked collators have less incentive to maintain parachain stability and should be avoided.\n\nHowever, in the collator selection process, if no sufficiently staked collator can be found, collators from the previous round will be selected. As there is no validation on the current state of the previous collators\u2019 stake, this could select unstaked validators who lack the incentive to ensure network stability.\n\nHere is a simple test case demonstrating this:\n\n#[test]\nfn test_failed_candidate_selection() {\n ExtBuilder::default()\n .with_balances(vec![(10, 10)])\n .with_candidates(vec![(10, 10)])\n .build()\n .execute_with(|| {\n roll_to(2);\n assert_ok!(ParachainStaking::schedule_leave_candidates(Origin::signed(10), 6u32));\n roll_to(5);\n let candidate: Vec<u64> = ParachainStaking::selected_candidates();\n assert_ne!(candidate[0], 10u64);\n });\n}\n\nImpact: Collators will not be incentivized to ensure network stability. Another set of partially staked or \u201ctrusted\u201d collators could provide better stability.\n\nRecommendation: Consider maintaining a set of \u201ctrusted\u201d collators to fall back on if no staked collators can be found.\n\nDeveloper Response: Acknowledged.", |
| "description_summary": "Unstaked users may be selected as collators if no sufficiently staked collators are available, reducing network stability.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 7, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Veridise", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Veridise-Chain.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 11, |
| "location": "runtime/calamari/src/weights/xcm/mod.rs\nruntime/dolphin/src/weights/xcm/mod.rs", |
| "title": "XCM instructions can charge 0 weight", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "45ba60e1d940dbf3491ce0f1223e44c84d5b7218", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Bad Extrinsic Weight", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Weight Management", |
| "description": "4.1.12 V-MANC-VUL-012: XCM instructions can charge 0 weight\n\nSeverity: Low\nType: Bad Extrinsic Weight\nCommit: 45ba60e1d\nStatus: Acknowledged\n\nFile(s): runtime/(calamari, dolphin)/src/weights/xcm/mod.rs\nLocation(s): Every use of weigh_multi_assets\n\nThe Polkadot ecosystem uses the XCM messaging standard to enable parachains and the relay chain to communicate with each other. For example, if a parachain P1 wants to deposit an asset onto another parachain P2, they can construct an XCM message stating they wish to deposit an asset into an account associated with P1 and send it to P2.\n\nEach XCM message consists of a sequence of low-level XCM instructions that get executed by the XCM executor on the destination parachain. To offset the cost of executing these instructions, parachains set weights for each instruction, so the sender of the XCM message is charged fees for the destination parachain executing their message.\n\nManta Chain configured the weights of multiple instructions so that senders could generate messages with a total weight of 0. For example, in the code snippet below, the function deposit_asset sets the weight for the XCM instruction deposit_asset based on a parameter called assets. When assets is an empty vector, the weight_multi_assets function returns 0, resulting in a total weight of 0 for the instruction:\n\nfn deposit_asset(\n assets: &MultiAssetFilter,\n _max_assets: &u32,\n _dest: &MultiLocation,\n) -> Weight {\n let hardcoded_weight: u64 = 1_000_000_000;\n let weight = assets.weigh_multi_assets(XcmFungibleWeight::<Runtime>::deposit_asset());\n cmp::min(hardcoded_weight, weight)\n}\n\nThis setup allows malicious or incompetent senders to spam Manta with messages costing 0, even though the instruction is successfully executed by the XCM executor. While a denial of service may be unlikely due to the fast execution of 0-length vectors, spam prevention is recommended. Adding a minimal base fee for instructions that can be executed with 0 weight would help prevent spam.\n\nImpact: Malicious users may spam Manta with XCM messages of weight 0, potentially slowing down blockchain performance and risking denial of service.\n\nRecommendation: We recommend always charging a base fee to prevent spam.\n\nDeveloper Response: The developers acknowledged the issue and plan to change weigh_multi_assets to charge the benchmarked weight of a single asset execution for any successfully executed multiasset XCM message.", |
| "description_summary": "XCM instructions can be executed with zero weight, allowing potential spam through 0-cost messages.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 7, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Veridise", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Veridise-Chain.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 12, |
| "location": "pallets/asset-manager/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Missing validation in set_units_per_second", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "45ba60e1d940dbf3491ce0f1223e44c84d5b7218", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Data Validation", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "4.1.13 V-MANC-VUL-013: Missing validation in set_units_per_second\n\nSeverity: Low\nType: Data Validation\nCommit: 45ba60e1d\nStatus: Acknowledged\n\nFile(s): pallets/asset-manager/src/lib.rs\nLocation(s): set_units_per_second\n\nThe asset-manager pallet manages a hashmap called UnitsPerSecond which maps assetIds to a u128 value units_per_second, used to determine the price for an XCM transfer. It provides a function, set_units_per_second, to set the units_per_second for a given asset. This value determines the cost (in the corresponding asset) to purchase a certain weight for a transaction. The following code snippet calculates the amount:\n\nlet units_per_second = M::units_per_second(&asset_id).ok_or({\n log::debug!(\n target: \"FirstAssetTrader::buy_weight\",\n \"units_per_second missing for asset with id: {:?}\",\n id,\n );\n XcmError::TooExpensive\n})?;\n\nlet amount = units_per_second * (weight as u128) / (WEIGHT_PER_SECOND as u128);\n\nif amount.is_zero() {\n return Ok(payment);\n}\n\nThis calculation of amount uses multiplication, which can overflow. Currently, both units_per_second and amount are of type u128. If units_per_second exceeds u128::MAX / u64::MAX, a large weight (u64::MAX) can be bought for a small asset amount, allowing a malicious parachain to potentially perform a DoS attack.\n\nThere is currently no validation in set_units_per_second to ensure units_per_second is small enough. Although only the root can call set_units_per_second, there is a risk if the root user mistakenly sets an excessive value or is tricked into doing so.\n\nImpact: If units_per_second is set above u128::MAX / u64::MAX, large amounts of weight can be purchased at low cost, potentially enabling a DoS attack on the chain.\n\nRecommendation: Change the type of units_per_second to map assetId to a u64 value or validate that the amount is sufficiently small.\n\nDeveloper Response: The developers acknowledged the issue and plan to fix the weight calculation to use saturating arithmetic, which should address this vulnerability.", |
| "description_summary": "Missing validation in set_units_per_second allows potential overflow, enabling weight to be purchased at low cost, risking DoS.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 7, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Veridise", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Veridise-Chain.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 13, |
| "location": null, |
| "title": "Collator is a single point of failure for a round", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "45ba60e1d940dbf3491ce0f1223e44c84d5b7218", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Consensus", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "4.1.14 V-MANC-VUL-014: Collator is a single point of failure for a round\n\nSeverity: Low\nType: Consensus\nCommit: 45ba60e1d\nStatus: Acknowledged\n\nThe Manta parachain uses the Aura consensus mechanism to select collators to author blocks. Aura selects a primary collator for a round, and only that collator is allowed to produce blocks in that round. However, if that collator goes down, then no blocks will be produced, making that collator a single point of failure.\n\nOther parachains, like Moonbeam, address this by selecting multiple collators for a given round.\n\nImpact: If a collator goes down, no blocks will be produced for that round, thereby impacting the transaction throughput of Manta.\n\nRecommendation: We recommend that Manta adopt a consensus mechanism that selects multiple collators, ideally geographically separated, so if one collator fails, the likelihood of others failing remains low.\n\nDeveloper Response: The developers are aware of this issue and have plans to move away from the Aura consensus mechanism.", |
| "description_summary": "Single collator selection creates a point of failure, risking block production halt if the collator goes down.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 7, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Veridise", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Veridise-Chain.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 14, |
| "location": "pallets/manta-pay/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Unchecked index calculation in spend_all", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "45ba60e1d940dbf3491ce0f1223e44c84d5b7218", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Warning", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Logic Error", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Arithmetic", |
| "description": "4.1.15 V-MANC-VUL-015: Unchecked index calculation in spend_all\n\nSeverity: Warning\nType: Logic Error\nCommit: 45ba60e1d\nStatus: Acknowledged\n\nFile(s): pallets/manta-pay/src/lib.rs\nLocation(s): spend_all\n\nThe spend_all function in the Manta-Pay pallet does the following:\n1. Adds the nullifier commitments in the TransactionPost to the NullifierCommitmentSet.\n2. Inserts each (nullifier, outgoingNote) pair into the NullifierSetInsertionOrder structure.\n3. Updates a global variable, NullifierSetSize, which stores the size of the nullifier commitment set.\n\nThe index where the pair gets inserted, along with the new nullifier size, is calculated as index + i, where i is the index of the corresponding SenderPost, and index is the current size of the set. However, this arithmetic is unchecked and could result in an overflow.\n\nImpact: When the size of the commitment set reaches u64::MAX, the index calculation may overflow, causing the pair to be inserted at the beginning of the list and setting the nullifier set size to 1. However, reaching this value through normal execution is extremely unlikely.\n\nRecommendation: Add an overflow check and return an error.\n\nDeveloper Response: TBD.", |
| "description_summary": "Unchecked index calculation in spend_all may cause overflow, leading to incorrect data insertion.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 7, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Veridise", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Veridise-Chain.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 15, |
| "location": "parachain-staking/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Excess fees not refunded", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "45ba60e1d940dbf3491ce0f1223e44c84d5b7218", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Warning", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Bad Extrinsic Weight", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Weight Management", |
| "description": "4.1.16 V-MANC-VUL-016: Excess fees not refunded\n\nSeverity: Warning\nType: Bad Extrinsic Weight\nFile(s): parachain-staking/lib.rs\nLocation(s): (cancel_leave, execute_leave, schedule_leave, join)_candidates\nCommit: 45ba60e1d\nStatus: Intended Behavior\n\nWhen a substrate extrinsic is created, its weight must be carefully considered to ensure it correctly reflects the computational cost of the operation as extrinsic weight is directly related to the fees that are charged to the user. This weight should capture the maximum number of computational resources that will be consumed by the extrinsic as excess fees can be returned. In several functions, though, the weights are computed based on the value of an argument provided by the user which might not always reflect the true cost of the computation.\n\nFor example, consider the following:\n\n1#[pallet::call_index(11)]\n2#[pallet::weight(<T as Config>::WeightInfo::cancel_leave_candidates(*candidate_count))]\n3/// Cancel open request to leave candidates\n4/// - only callable by collator account\n5/// - result upon successful call is the candidate is active in the candidate pool\npub fn cancel_leave_candidates(\n7origin: OriginFor<T>,\n8#[pallet::compact] candidate_count: u32,\n) -> DispatchResultWithPostInfo {\n...\n12let mut candidates = <CandidatePool<T>>::get();\n13ensure!(\n14candidates.0.len() as u32 <= candidate_count,\n15Error::<T>::TooLowCandidateCountWeightHintCancelLeaveCandidates\n);\n...\n18Ok(().into())\n}\n\nIn this function, the weight is computed using the candidate_count argument, and in order for the function to execute successfully, candidate_count must be greater than or equal to the current size of the candidate pool. A user might need to call this function with a candidate_count that is larger than the size of the pool to prevent a front-running attack where a malicious user would add candidates to prevent the transaction from executing successfully. In such a case, the weight would be larger than necessary, but no fees are returned to the user.\n\nImpact: Such functions can charge unnecessary fees to the user.\n\nRecommendation: Refund the user additional fees that are not consumed.\n\nDeveloper Response: Since these extrinsics are likely to be executed sparingly and since the additional fees are likely to be small, we feel like the additional computational cost of determining the excess does not.", |
| "description_summary": "Extrinsics may charge unnecessary fees without refunding excess.", |
| "reported_status": "Intended Behavior", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 7, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Veridise", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Veridise-Chain.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 16, |
| "location": "pallets/asset-manager/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Assets can be registered at unsupported locations", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "45ba60e1d940dbf3491ce0f1223e44c84d5b7218", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Warning", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Data Validation", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "4.1.17 V-MANC-VUL-017: Assets can be registered at unsupported locations\n\nSeverity: Warning\nType: Data Validation\nFile(s): pallets/asset-manager/src/lib.rs\nLocation(s): register_asset\nCommit: 45ba60e1d\nStatus: Acknowledged\n\nThe asset-manager pallet allows assets to be registered, managed, and minted. In particular, register_asset takes as input an asset, location, and corresponding asset_metadata and registers the asset. Every asset must be associated with a location; however, Manta only supports assets from specific locations. The current implementation of asset-manager does not perform any validation on the locations passed into register_asset, potentially allowing assets to be registered from untested locations. The pallet also exposes a method called update_asset_location, which is supposed to update the location of an asset. It similarly does not perform any validation on the new location of the asset.\n\nImpact: The current implementation allows assets to be registered from untested locations.\n\nRecommendation: The asset-manager pallet already implements the Contains trait, which exposes a method contains that takes as input a location and returns true if and only if the location is supported. Currently, that method is unused and can be used to validate the locations passed in.\n\nDeveloper Response: The developers acknowledged the issue and plan to add a check in register_asset.", |
| "description_summary": "Assets can be registered without validating their location.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 7, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Veridise", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Veridise-Chain.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 17, |
| "location": "parachain-staking/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Minimum delegator funds is not MinDelegatorStk", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "45ba60e1d940dbf3491ce0f1223e44c84d5b7218", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Warning", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Logic Error", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "4.1.18 V-MANC-VUL-018: Minimum delegator funds is not MinDelegatorStk\n\nSeverity: Warning\nType: Logic Error\nFile(s): parachain-staking/lib.rs\nLocation(s): N/A\nCommit: 45ba60e1d\nStatus: Acknowledged\n\nIn the case where MinDelegation < MinDelegatorStk, it is possible for the delegator\u2019s staked funds to be less than MinDelegatorStk. This can occur through the following sequence of calls:\n\n1. delegate amount N from delegator D to candidate C1 where N >= MinDelegatorStk\n2. delegate amount M from delegator D to candidate C2 where M < MinDelegatorStk and M >= MinDelegation\n3. schedule_leave_candidates and execute_leave_candidates for C1\n\nThis results in D having M funds staked, where M < MinDelegatorStk.\n\nImpact: If MinDelegation is less than MinDelegatorStk, a delegator may end up with less than MinDelegatorStk funds actually staked.\n\nNote: This is not currently exploitable because MinDelegation == MinDelegatorStk in all production runtimes. However, if these values are adjusted in the future, this bug may become exploitable.\n\nRecommendation: There are two options:\n\n1. When starting a runtime, ensure that MinDelegation >= MinDelegatorStk\n2. Whenever a delegation is removed (such as in execute_leave_candidates), ensure that the remaining locked funds for the delegator are at least MinDelegatorStk.\n\nDeveloper Response: The developers acknowledged the issue and are considering removing MinDelegation as there is no apparent reason for it being different from MinDelegatorStk.", |
| "description_summary": "Delegators can have staked funds below the required MinDelegatorStk.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 7, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Veridise", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Veridise-Chain.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 18, |
| "location": "pallets/manta-pay/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Unintended test crashes", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "45ba60e1d940dbf3491ce0f1223e44c84d5b7218", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Info", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Maintainability", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "4.1.19 V-MANC-VUL-019: Unintended test crashes\n\nSeverity: Info\nType: Maintainability\nFile(s): pallets/manta-pay/src/lib.rs\nLocation(s): to_private_should_work\nCommit: 45ba60e1d\nStatus: Open\n\nMany of the manta-pay tests randomly generate an asset id, total supply, and an amount to make private. To ensure the total supply of the asset is greater than the minimum balance, the minimum balance is always added to the randomly generated total supply, as seen in this test:\n\nfn to_private_should_work() {\n let mut rng = OsRng;\n for _ in 0..RANDOMIZED_TESTS_ITERATIONS {\n new_test_ext().execute_with(|| {\n let asset_id = rng.gen();\n let total_free_supply = rng.gen();\n initialize_test(asset_id, total_free_supply + TEST_DEFAULT_ASSET_ED);\n mint_private_tokens(\n asset_id,\n &value_distribution(5, total_free_supply, &mut rng),\n &mut rng,\n );\n });\n }\n}\n\nIf the random number generator generates a value for the total_free_supply which is greater than u128::MAX - TEST_DEFAULT_ASSET_ED, then the test will fail even though it is expected to succeed.\n\nImpact: May cause tests to fail when they are expected to succeed.\n\nRecommendation: Change the test to generate a value for total_free_supply between [0, u128::MAX - TEST_DEFAULT_ASSET_ED).\n\nDeveloper Response: TBD", |
| "description_summary": "Randomized test may fail due to unintended overflow in total supply generation.", |
| "reported_status": "Open", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 7, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Veridise", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Veridise-Chain.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 0, |
| "location": "pallets/manta-sbt/src/lib.rs:376", |
| "title": "Loss of Reserved SBT IDs", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "ceb9e46cd53b77eb914ba6c17452fc238bc3a28f", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "4.1 (HAL-01) LOSS OF RESERVED SBT IDS - LOW (2.5)\\nDescription:\\nCode Location:\\nThe reserve_sbt function calculates a range of IDs and stores this range in the ReservedIds storage map, using the caller\u2019s address as the key. It was identified that users lose their reserved SBT IDs when they call the reserve_sbt function without first minting their previously reserved SBT IDs. This occurs because the previous reserved range is overwritten.\\nBody of the reserve_sbt function:\\nListing 1: pallets/manta-sbt/src/lib.rs (Line 376)\\n368 let asset_id_range : Vec < StandardAssetId > = (0.. T :: MintsPerReserve :: get () )\\n369 . map (| _ | Self :: next_sbt_id_and_increment () )\\n370 . collect :: < Result < Vec < StandardAssetId > , _ > >() ?;\\n\\n372 // The range of ` AssetIds ` that are reserved as SBTs\\n373 let start_id : StandardAssetId = * asset_id_range . first () . ok_or ( Error :: <T >:: ZeroMints ) ?;\\n374 let stop_id : StandardAssetId = * asset_id_range . last () . ok_or ( Error :: <T >:: ZeroMints ) ?;\\n375 ReservedIds :: <T >:: insert (& who , ( start_id , stop_id ) ) ;\\nBVSS:\\nAO:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:N/D:L/Y:N/R:N/S:U (2.5)\\nProof Of Concept:\\nThis test reserves ids two times and mints one zkSBT. The first zkSBT token will not have the id 1, it will have the id 6 instead.\\nListing 2: pallets/manta-sbt/src/tests.rs\\n1 #[ test ]\\n2 fn hal01 () {\\n3 let mut rng = OsRng ;\\n4 new_test_ext () . execute_with (|| {\\n5 assert_ok! ( Balances :: set_balance (\\n6 MockOrigin :: root () ,\\n7 ALICE ,\\n8 1 _000_000_000_000_000 ,\\n9 0\\n10 )) ;\\n11 // Reserve IDs from 1 to 5\\n12 assert_ok! ( MantaSBTPallet :: reserve_sbt ( MockOrigin :: signed ( ALICE ) ) ) ;\\n13 // Reserve IDs from 6 to 10\\n14 assert_ok! ( MantaSBTPallet :: reserve_sbt ( MockOrigin :: signed ( ALICE ) ) ) ;\\n15\\n16 let value = 1;\\n17 let id = field_from_id ( ReservedIds :: < Test >:: get ( ALICE ) . unwrap () .0) ;\\n18 let post = sample_to_private ( id , value , & mut rng ) ;\\n19 assert_ok! ( MantaSBTPallet :: to_private (\\n20 MockOrigin :: signed ( ALICE ) ,\\n21 Box :: new ( post ) ,\\n22 bvec! [0]\\n23 )) ;\\n\\n25 // The first zkSBT minted has the id 6.\\n26 assert_eq! (\\n27 SbtMetadata :: < Test >:: get (6) . unwrap () . extra ,\\n28 Some ( bvec! [0])\\n29 );\\n30 });\\n31 }\\nRecommendation:\\nTo resolve this issue, it is recommended to restrict users from reserving additional SBT IDs if they have not minted their previously reserved IDs.", |
| "description_summary": "Users lose previously reserved SBT IDs if they reserve new ones without minting the old.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 8, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Halborn", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Halborn-zkSBT.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 1, |
| "location": "pallets/manta-sbt/src/lib.rs:369,883", |
| "title": "Last SBT IDs Cannot Be Reserved", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "ceb9e46cd53b77eb914ba6c17452fc238bc3a28f", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "4.2 (HAL-02) LAST SBT IDS CANNOT BE RESERVED - LOW (2.5)\\nDescription:\\nWhen users invoke the reserve_sbt function, it reserves a specific number of IDs - quantified by MintPerReserve. The reserve_sbt function achieves this by repeatedly calling the next_sbt_id_and_increment function - as many times as the MintPerReserve value. This next_sbt_id_and_increment function serves to return the next available ID and concurrently increment the NextSbtId storage value by 1.\\nA potential problem arises if the incrementing process results in an overflow, causing the next_sbt_id_and_increment function to throw an overflow exception, which in turn fails the ongoing transaction. In this scenario, previously identified IDs that did not contribute to the overflow situation remain unreserved. This issue presents a concern as it could potentially lead to resource allocation inefficiencies and transaction failures.\\nCode Location:\\nBody of the reserve_sbt function, where the next zkSBT id is incremented.\\nListing 3: pallets/manta-sbt/src/lib.rs (Line 369)\\n356 pub fn reserve_sbt ( origin : OriginFor <T >) -> DispatchResult {\\nlet who = ensure_signed ( origin ) ?;\\n// Charges fee to reserve AssetIds\\n<T as pallet :: Config >:: Currency :: transfer (\\n& who ,\\n& Self :: account_id () ,\\nT :: ReservePrice :: get () ,\\nExistenceRequirement :: KeepAlive ,\\n) ?;\\n// Reserves uniques AssetIds to be used later to mint SBTs\\n368 let asset_id_range : Vec < StandardAssetId > = (0.. T :: MintsPerReserve :: get () )\\n369 . map (| _ | Self :: next_sbt_id_and_increment () )\\n370 . collect :: < Result < Vec < StandardAssetId > , _ > >() ?;\\nnext_sbt_id_and_increment function will overflow if the max number for u128 is surpassed\\nListing 4: pallets/manta-sbt/src/lib.rs (Line 883)\\n875 fn next_sbt_id_and_increment () -> Result < StandardAssetId , DispatchError > {\\n876 NextSbtId :: <T >:: try_mutate (| maybe_val | {\\n877 match maybe_val {\\n878 Some ( current ) = > {\\n879 let id = * current ;\\n880 * maybe_val = Some (\\n881 current\\n882 . checked_add ( One :: one () )\\n883 . ok_or ( ArithmeticError :: Overflow )? ,\\n884 );\\n885 Ok ( id )\\n886 }\\n887 // If storage is empty , starts at value of one ( Field cannot be zero )\\n888 None = > {\\n889 * maybe_val = Some (2) ;\\n890 Ok ( One :: one () )\\n891 }\\n892 }\\n893 })\\n894 }\\nBVSS:\\nAO:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:L/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:U (2.5)\\nProof Of Concept:\\nNote: For this Proof of Concept (PoC), the codebase was modified such that the zkSBT IDs are now u8 instead of u128. This alteration reduces the time needed to demonstrate that the function fails in this edge-case scenario.\\nListing 5: pallets/manta-sbt/src/tests.rs\\n236 #[ test ]\\n237 fn hal02 () {\\n238 new_test_ext () . execute_with (|| {\\n239 assert_ok! ( Balances :: set_balance (\\n240 MockOrigin :: root () ,\\n241 ALICE ,\\n242 1 _000_000_000_000_000 ,\\n243 0\\n244 )) ;\\n245 for i in (1..51) {\\n246 assert_ok! ( MantaSBTPallet :: reserve_sbt_bis ( MockOrigin :: signed ( ALICE )) );\\n247 println! (\" First id : {} - Last id : {} \" , ReservedIdsBis :: < Test >:: get ( ALICE ) . unwrap () .0 , ReservedIdsBis :: < Test >:: get ( ALICE ) . unwrap () .1) ;\\n248 }\\n250 assert_noop! ( MantaSBTPallet :: reserve_sbt_bis ( MockOrigin :: signed ( ALICE )) , ArithmeticError :: Overflow );\\n251 });\\n252 }\\nIn this test, we reserve all available IDs, excluding the last five. Attempting to reserve the last ID will cause the StandardAssetId value to overflow, resulting in a failure.\\nRecommendation:\\nTo address this issue, it is recommended to implement a check to determine whether the value of the StandardAssetId has reached the maximum value for u128 can prevent overflow. This measure will stop the occurrence of an exception.", |
| "description_summary": "Overflow in next_sbt_id_and_increment causes unreserved IDs and transaction failure.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 8, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Halborn", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Halborn-zkSBT.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 2, |
| "location": "pallets/manta-sbt/src/lib.rs:783\npallets/manta-support/src/manta_pay.rs:874,1095,1096\nruntime/calamari/src/migrations/staking.rs:70", |
| "title": "Downcasting of 64-Bit Integer", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "ceb9e46cd53b77eb914ba6c17452fc238bc3a28f", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Arithmetic", |
| "description": "4.3 (HAL-03) DOWNCASTING OF 64-BIT INTEGER - LOW (2.5)\\nDescription:\\nIt was observed that in certain circumstances, usize values are cast to types such as u8 and u32. The usize data type in the Rust programming language represents a pointer-sized unsigned integer. The actual size of usize is dependent on the platform: it\u2019s 32 bits on a 32-bit platform and 64 bits on a 64-bit platform. Consequently, depending on the system, there could be a cast from an u64 to an u32. This implies that an attempt could be made to store a value larger than the maximum value that can be held in an u32, leading to unexpected consequences.\\nCode Location:\\nFINDINGS & TECH DETAILS\\nUsize is casted to u8:\\nListing 6: pallets/manta-sbt/src/lib.rs (Line 783)\\n768 fn pull_receivers (\\n769 receiver_indices : [ usize ; MerkleTreeConfiguration :: FOREST_WIDTH ],\\n770 max_update_request : u64 ,\\n771 ) -> ( bool , ReceiverChunk ) {\\n772 let mut more_receivers = false ;\\n773 let mut receivers = Vec :: new () ;\\n774 let mut receivers_pulled : u64 = 0;\\n775 let max_update = if max_update_request > Self :: PULL_MAX_RECEIVER_UPDATE_SIZE {\\n776 Self :: PULL_MAX_RECEIVER_UPDATE_SIZE\\n777 } else {\\n778 max_update_request\\n779 };\\n781 for ( shard_index , utxo_index ) in receiver_indices . into_iter () . enumerate () {\\n782 more_receivers |= Self :: pull_receivers_for_shard (\\n783 shard_index as u8 ,\\n784 utxo_index ,\\n785 max_update ,\\n786 & mut receivers ,\\n787 & mut receivers_pulled ,\\n788 );\\n790 if receivers_pulled == max_update && more_receivers {\\n791 break ;\\n792 }\\n794 ( more_receivers , receivers )\\n795 }\\nUsize is casted to u32:\\nListing 7: pallets/manta-support/src/manta_pay.rs (Line 860)\\n867 impl TryFrom < merkle_tree :: CurrentPath < MerkleTreeConfiguration > > for CurrentPath {\\n868 type Error = Error ;\\n871 fn try_from ( path : merkle_tree :: CurrentPath < MerkleTreeConfiguration >) -> Result < Self , Error > {\\n872 Ok ( Self {\\n873 sibling_digest : fp_encode ( path . sibling_digest )? ,\\n874 leaf_index : path . inner_path . leaf_index .0 as u32 ,\\n875 inner_path : path . inner_path . path . into_iter () . map ( fp_encode ) . collect :: < Result <_ , _ > >() ? ,\\n881 })\\n883 }\\nListing 8: pallets/manta-support/src/manta_pay.rs (Lines 1095,1096)\\n1091 impl From < RawCheckpoint > for Checkpoint {\\n1094 Self :: new ( checkpoint . receiver_index . map (| i| i as usize ) . into () , checkpoint . sender_index as usize ,)\\nListing 9: runtime/calamari/src/migrations/staking.rs (Line 70)\\n70 let n_of_candidates = manta_collator_selection :: Pallet :: <T >:: candidates () . len () as u32 ;\\nRecommendation:\\nTo address this issue, it is recommended to check the value against the maximum value before casting.", |
| "description_summary": "Casting usize to smaller types may cause data loss and unexpected behavior.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 8, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Halborn", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Halborn-zkSBT.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 3, |
| "location": "runtime/calamari/src/fee.rs:76\nprimitives/manta/src/xcm.rs:183,251,252\nruntime/manta/src/fee.rs:47,52\nruntime/common/src/lib.rs:115\nprimitives/manta/src/constants.rs:110", |
| "title": "Unchecked Math Could Impact Weight Calculation", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "ceb9e46cd53b77eb914ba6c17452fc238bc3a28f", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Weight Management", |
| "description": "4.4 (HAL-04) UNCHECKED MATH COULD IMPACT WEIGHT CALCULATION - LOW (2.5)\\nDescription:\\nIt was identified that several areas in the buy_weight and the refund_weight functions that could potentially benefit from enhanced computational checks. Currently, despite numerous instances of proven arithmetic calculations, the function does not have a mechanism to handle situations where underflow or overflow states might occur.\\nWhile these states haven\u2019t been identified as potential risks for exploitation, implementing additional safeguards to account for them will be beneficial.\\nAnother point of consideration pertains to the WEIGHT_PER_SECOND value. This value serves as a divisor in computing the number of tokens required for payment or refund during the weight purchasing procedure. While it is predetermined as a constant during the system\u2019s compilation, it currently lacks a constraint to assure that it never equals zero. This is a significant potential risk as it could result in a system panic if the value happens to be zero, causing a division by zero error. Moreover, as the WEIGHT_PER_SECOND value is also used in calculations elsewhere in the system, this issue could potentially affect other sections of the codebase as well.\\nCode Location:\\nUnsafe multiplication in the tests multiplier_growth_simulator_and_congestion_budget_test:\\nListing 10: runtime/calamari/src/fee.rs (Line 76)\\n69 #[ test ]\\n#[ ignore ] // This test should not fail CI\\n71 fn multiplier_growth_simulator_and_congestion_budget_test () {\\n72 let target_daily_congestion_cost_usd = 100 _000 ;\\n73 let kma_price = fetch_kma_price () . unwrap () ;\\n74 println! (\" KMA / USD price as read from CoinGecko = { kma_price } \") ;\\n75 let target_daily_congestion_cost_kma =\\n76 ( target_daily_congestion_cost_usd as f32 / kma_price * KMA as f32 ) as u128 ;\\nUnsafe multiplication in buy_weight function\\nListing 11: primitives/manta/src/xcm.rs (Line 183)\\n146 fn buy_weight (& mut self , weight : Weight , payment : Assets ) -> Result < Assets > {\\n153 let first_asset = payment . fungible_assets_iter () . next () . ok_or ({\\n160 XcmError :: TooExpensive }) ?;\\n183 let amount = units_per_second * ( weight as u128 ) / ( WEIGHT_PER_SECOND as u128 ) ;\\nUnsafe subtraction in refund_weight function\\nListing 12: primitives/manta/src/xcm.rs (Line 251)\\n248 fn refund_weight (& mut self , weight : Weight ) -> Option < MultiAsset > {\\n251 self . weight -= weight ;\\n252 let amount = * units_per_second * ( weight as u128 ) / ( WEIGHT_PER_SECOND as u128 ) ;\\nPlaces where WEIGHT_PER_SECOND is used as a divisor:\\n\u2022 Function refund_weight\\nListing 13: primitives/manta/src/xcm.rs (Line 252)\\n\u2022 Function buy_weight:\\nListing 14: primitives/manta/src/xcm.rs (Line 183)\\nThe following snippets show how the q divisor is calculated and how it\u2019s equal to zero if WEIGHT_PER_SECOND is zero too.\\nListing 15: runtime/manta/src/fee.rs (Lines 47,52)\\nRecommendation:\\nWe recommend a review of these identified areas to ensure that adequate arithmetic checks are in place and a safety constraint is set for WEIGHT_PER_SECOND to prevent it from reaching zero. These improvements will further fortify the system, ensuring stability, reliability, and secure operation.\\n\u2022 It is recommended to add a constraint to ensure that WEIGHT_PER_SECOND is never 0.\\n\u2022 In \u201crelease\u201d mode, Rust does not panic! due to overflows and overflowed values simply \u201cwrap\u201d without any explicit feedback to the user. It is recommended to use vetted safe math libraries for arithmetic operations consistently throughout the smart contract system. Consider replacing the multiplication operator with Rust\u2019s checked_mul method, the subtraction operator with Rust\u2019s checked_subs method, and so on.", |
| "description_summary": "Unchecked math in weight calculations may lead to overflow, underflow, or division by zero errors.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 8, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Halborn", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Halborn-zkSBT.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 0, |
| "location": "pallets/manta-sbt/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "SBT reservations can be overwritten", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "ceb9e46cd53b77eb914ba6c17452fc238bc3a28f", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "be7f1c7a8b7d35a84f657854032b2bf3b7e01ab8", |
| "reported_impact": "Medium", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Logic Error", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "4.1 Detailed Description of Issues\n\nV-MSBT-VUL-001: SBT reservations can be overwritten\n\nSeverity: Medium\nType: Logic Error\nCommit: ceb9e46\nStatus: Fixed\nFile(s): pallets/manta-sbt/src/lib.rs\nLocation(s): reserve_sbt\n\nThe manta-sbt pallet exposes a method reserve_sbt whereby callers pay MANTA tokens to reserve the right to mint N SBTs. This reservation is enforced by allocating reservation ids to the caller of the method so that when users mint an SBT, Manta Chain uses one of the reserved ids to track the number reserved. In particular, Manta Chain maintains a map called ReservedIds which maps users to an interval of reservation ids such that the length of the interval indicates the number of SBTs they can mint.\n\nHowever, reserve_sbt does not check whether a user has already reserved SBTs to mint when calling the method and simply updates the mapping to a new interval of length N. This can be seen in the method implementation below:\n\n/// Reserves AssetIds to be used subsequently in 'to_private' above.\n\n/// Increments AssetManager\u2019s AssetId counter.\n\n#[pallet::call_index(1)]\n#[pallet::weight(<T as pallet::Config>::WeightInfo::reserve_sbt())]\n#[transactional]\npub fn reserve_sbt(origin: OriginFor<T>) -> DispatchResult {\n let who = ensure_signed(origin)?;\n\n // Charges fee to reserve AssetIds\n <T as pallet::Config>::Currency::transfer(\n &who,\n &Self::account_id(),\n T::ReservePrice::get(),\n ExistenceRequirement::KeepAlive,\n )?;\n\n // Reserves unique AssetIds to be used later to mint SBTs\n let asset_id_range: Vec<StandardAssetId> = (0..T::MintsPerReserve::get())\n .map(|_| Self::next_sbt_id_and_increment())\n .collect::<Result<Vec<StandardAssetId>, _>>()?;\n\n // The range of 'AssetIds' that are reserved as SBTs\n let start_id: StandardAssetId = *asset_id_range.first().ok_or(Error::<T>::ZeroMints)?;\n let stop_id: StandardAssetId = *asset_id_range.last().ok_or(Error::<T>::ZeroMints)?;\n\n ReservedIds::<T>::insert(&who, (start_id, stop_id));\n Self::deposit_event(Event::<T>::SBTReserved { who, start_id, stop_id });\n Ok(())\n}\n\nThus, if a user calls the method M times to reserve M*N SBTs, then they will only be able to mint N.\n\nImpact: Users can lose money because they may think they have reserved M*N SBTs when they in fact can only mint N. Furthermore, if a user calls reserve_sbt M times in a row, then M*(N-1) SBTs can no longer be minted. This is due to the fact that reserved ids are always incremented.\n\nFor example, suppose someone sets up a relayer account which users could use to purchase zkSBTs for themselves without being linked to the transaction. That relayer account would only receive SBTs on its last call reserve_sbt. Implementations in which the relayer reserves and sends the SBTs separately may be error-prone.\n\nRecommendation: If at most N SBTs can be reserved at a time for a user, then reserve_sbt should check whether a user has already reserved SBTs. If the protocol permits more than N SBTs to be reserved at a time for a user, then the mapping should be changed. One option might be to map each user to a set of intervals corresponding to ids reserved for them.\n\nDeveloper Response: The developers have acknowledged the issue and a fix has been proposed in this pull request. The fix changes the function to revert if the user has SBT ids already reserved.", |
| "description_summary": "SBT reservations can be overwritten, causing users to lose reserved tokens.", |
| "reported_status": "Fixed", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 9, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Veridise", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Veridise-zkSBT.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 1, |
| "location": "pallets/manta-sbt/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Extrinsics charge static fees that do not account for Merkle tree updates", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "ceb9e46cd53b77eb914ba6c17452fc238bc3a28f", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "f0ed5957c3bc87b4a4a2631f26aceefb9607f069", |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Bad Extrinsic Weight", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Weight Management", |
| "description": "4.1.2 V-MSBT-VUL-002: Extrinsics charge static fees that do not account for Merkle tree updates\n\nSeverity: Low\nType: Bad Extrinsic Weight\nCommit: ceb9e46\nStatus: Fixed\nFile(s): pallets/manta-sbt/src/lib.rs\nLocation(s): to_private, mint_sbt_eth\n\nTransactions to_private and mint_sbt_eth take membership proofs and store UTXOs to a Merkle tree on the ledger. manta-sbt shards this Merkle tree into 256 buckets where each bucket has its own Merkle tree. Instead of storing the entire tree at each bucket, the Ledger just stores the last path added to the tree. When adding a UTXO, the Ledger first computes its corresponding bucket, then computes the new path pointing to that UTXO, and finally adds that path to the bucket.\n\nComputing the new path should take time proportional to log(n) where n is the size of the Merkle Tree. The current benchmarking scheme only covers cases where the previous path is small i.e, at most size 1. However, if the number of transactions gets large i.e, is on the order of hundreds of millions or billions, then the size of the path can get to 24-28 (taking shards into account). If the tree grows to this size, this means each execution of the extrinsic will perform 24-28 hashes, multiplied by the number of UTXOs to be added.\n\nThe benchmarking scheme should take into account the size of the tree to make sure that the existing weights are enough to offset the computation of the new Merkle tree path.\n\nImpact: In general, it is important to set the weights to account for both computation and storage; setting the weight too low can allow users to perform a large number of transactions with little cost. In particular, malicious users may take advantage of the low fee to launch a DOS attack.\n\nRecommendation: We recommend that the weights be computed with a larger database that reflects the state of the chain after a year\u2019s worth of use.\n\nDeveloper Response: In progress open PR for manta-pay right now that will be extended to pallet SBT. The manta-pay PR can be found here.", |
| "description_summary": "Static fees for extrinsics do not account for Merkle tree updates, risking underpriced transactions.", |
| "reported_status": "Fixed", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 9, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Veridise", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Veridise-zkSBT.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 2, |
| "location": "pallets/manta-sbt/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Missing validation in pull_ledger_diff", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "ceb9e46cd53b77eb914ba6c17452fc238bc3a28f", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Warning", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Data Validation", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "4.1.3 V-MSBT-VUL-003: Missing validation in pull_ledger_diff\n\nSeverity: Warning\nType: Data Validation\nCommit: ceb9e46\nStatus: Acknowledged\nFile(s): pallets/manta-sbt/src/lib.rs\nLocation(s): pull_ledger_diff\n\npull_ledger_diff takes as input a Checkpoint which is a struct of two fields receiver_index and sender_index and pulls receiver data from the ledger starting at receiver_index up till at most receiver_index + PULL_MAX_RECEIVER_UPDATE_SIZE. However, there is no check that this sum cannot overflow for both the sender and receiver index in pull_receivers and pull_receivers_for_shard.\n\nImpact: If the code is compiled without the --release flag then a malicious user could crash the node by passing in bad values. If it is built with --release then the call will be reported as successful and no senders or receivers will be returned. However, if a benign end user is calling the API with incorrect indexes it might be better to return an error informing them that the index is invalid.\n\nRecommendation: We recommend adding bounds checks to be safe and to return an Error.\n\nDeveloper Response: The developers acknowledged the issue and will fix this prior to release.", |
| "description_summary": "Missing bounds check in pull_ledger_diff could allow overflow and node crash.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 9, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Veridise", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Veridise-zkSBT.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 3, |
| "location": "pallets/manta-sbt/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Off-by-one error in to_private", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "ceb9e46cd53b77eb914ba6c17452fc238bc3a28f", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Warning", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Logic Error", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Arithmetic", |
| "description": "4.1.4 V-MSBT-VUL-004: Off-by-one error in to_private\n\nSeverity: Warning\nType: Logic Error\nCommit: ceb9e46\nStatus: Acknowledged\nFile(s): pallets/manta-sbt/src/lib.rs\nLocation(s): to_private\n\nThe manta-sbt pallet has a user-callable extrinsic, to_private, which allows users to mint reserved SBT tokens. To facilitate minting tokens, the pallet maintains a mapping from users to an interval [l, u] where l \u2264 u and l and u refer to minimum and maximum asset ids that can be minted by the user. The function does two things. First, it mints an asset with id l and then updates the interval to [l + 1, u]. If l + 1 > u, it removes the user from the map since this indicates they don\u2019t have any more user ids to reserve.\n\nThere is an edge case where l = u = 2^128 - 1 where this function\u2019s behavior is incorrect. In this case, the extrinsic will revert because l + 1 would result in an overflow as it is of type u128. However, this prevents the user from minting a token reserved for them.\n\nCurrently this should not be a problem because it is unlikely that all 2^128 ids will get reserved anytime soon.\n\nImpact: A user may not be able to mint an SBT token reserved for them.\n\nRecommendation: We recommend adding an edge case for when l = 2^128-1. In that case, the token should be minted and user removed from the map.\n\nDeveloper Response: Not to be resolved. What the auditors point out is correct that the last id will not get minted; however, the resolution is unnecessary as once we hit this edge case the entire zkSBT protocol is unable to function. Furthermore, this value is extremely large and unlikely to ever be reached.", |
| "description_summary": "Off-by-one error in to_private may prevent users from minting reserved tokens.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 9, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Veridise", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Veridise-zkSBT.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 4, |
| "location": "pallets/manta-sbt/src/lib.rs:382", |
| "title": "Unnecessary Storage Variable", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "ceb9e46cd53b77eb914ba6c17452fc238bc3a28f", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "fa10f39afcd8882d14252f55ce08ffcab6321911", |
| "reported_impact": "Warning", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Gas Optimization", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "4.1.5 V-MSBT-VUL-005: Unnecessary Storage Variable\n\nSeverity: Warning\nType: Gas Optimization\nCommit: ceb9e46\nStatus: Fixed\nFile(s): pallets/manta-sbt/src/lib.rs\nLocation(s): 382\n\nThe storage variable UtxoAccumulatorOutputs keeps track of all Merkle roots generated by manta-sbt; however, this variable is unnecessary. It seems to be taken from the manta-pay pallet which uses it to keep track of previous Merkle roots so that when users provide membership proofs for asset transfers, the ledger can check that the root provided was a legitimate one.\n\nHowever, the tokens in manta-sbt are non-transferable so there isn\u2019t any logic which should use it. In particular, the only two places which use this storage variable are in the functions has_matching_utxo_accumulator_output and register_all. The former will never be invoked in manta-sbt because the asset is non-transferable. The latter just adds a newly created Merkle root to UtxoAccumulatorOutputs.\n\nSince this storage variable keeps track of every root generated, it is a non-trivial amount of storage to keep on-chain. Moreover, every minting transaction, namely to_private and mint_sbt_eth, will incur an extra cost of writing to storage, which is unnecessary.\n\nImpact: Unnecessarily high transaction fees for every mint transaction and bloated storage.\n\nRecommendation: We recommend removing this storage variable.\n\nDeveloper Response: This has been fixed in the following commit.", |
| "description_summary": "Unnecessary storage variable increases transaction fees and storage usage.", |
| "reported_status": "Fixed", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 9, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Veridise", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Veridise-zkSBT.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 5, |
| "location": "pallets/manta-sbt/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Missing validation when setting mint info", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Manta", |
| "audited_commit": "ceb9e46cd53b77eb914ba6c17452fc238bc3a28f", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Info", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Data Validation", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "4.1.6 V-MSBT-VUL-006: Missing validation when setting mint info\n\nSeverity: Info\nType: Data Validation\nCommit: ceb9e46\nStatus: Acknowledged\nFile(s): pallets/manta-sbt/src/lib.rs\nLocation(s): new_mint_info, update_mint_info\n\nWhen setting metadata for a mint type, the functions new_mint_info and update_mint_info set the start_time and end_time associated with the mint type. The functions validate the start and end times by making sure start_time < end_time. However, they don\u2019t check whether those make sense with respect to the current time. In particular, it seems like you would want now < end_time.\n\nImpact: Setting end_time < now means that nobody can mint for that mint type until it gets changed again.\n\nRecommendation: We recommend adding the additional validation which shouldn\u2019t be too expensive.\n\nDeveloper Response: This is intended behavior for now. The only way to pause a mint is to set end_time < now. This however could be improved by using an Option<> and remove the need for this invariant. This is low priority, but we could fix it in the future.", |
| "description_summary": "Missing validation allows minting periods to be set in the past, blocking minting.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 9, |
| "project_name": "MantaNetwork", |
| "auditor": "Veridise", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/Manta-Network/Atlantic-Audits/blob/main/Atlantic-Veridise-zkSBT.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 0, |
| "location": "precompiles/dispatch-lockdrop/src/lib.rs:88-90", |
| "title": "Missing benchmarking for the lockdrop precompile dispatch", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/AstarNetwork/Astar", |
| "audited_commit": "282485aa2d50f12f42463bba1d393fce4c57c2a3", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Info", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Weight Management", |
| "description": "3.2.1 Missing benchmarking for the lockdrop precompile dispatch\nAttack scenario\nLocation\nTracking\nAttack impact\nSeverity\nStatus\nStatic ref_time used for weight calculation leading to underestimation\nof the weights can enable an attacker to perform denial of service\nprecompiles/dispatch-lockdrop\n[2]\nAn attacker may spam and conduct denial of service attacks cheaply in\ncomparison to the actual weight_to_gas price\nInfo\nClosed [4]\nThe precompile dispatch-lockdrop has un-benchmarked weight_to_gas estimation with\nref_time configured to 1_000_000_000 [5].\n// Record a fixed amount of weight to ensure there is no free execution\nhandle.record_cost(Runtime::GasWeightMapping::weight_to_gas(\n Weight::from_parts(1_000_000_000u64, 0),\n))?;\nThis estimation doesn\u2019t reflect the actual runtime environment and can aid an attacker to spam\nthe chain.\nWe suggest to appropriately benchmark the precompile dispatch to reflect the accurate\nweight_to_gas estimation for ref_time and POV_size.\nThe issue was acknowledged by the Astar team and remediation is currently in progress\nthrough collaboration with the Frontier team [6]", |
| "description_summary": "Underestimated weight_to_gas estimation due to missing benchmarking allows attackers to perform denial of service attacks.", |
| "reported_status": "Closed [4] [Online].Available: https://github.com/AstarNetwork/dappstaking-v3-audit/issues/7#issuecomment-2034174383.", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 10, |
| "project_name": "Astar", |
| "auditor": "Security Research Labs", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/polkadot-assurance-legion/pal-docs/blob/main/audits/24h1/astar-srl-2403.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 1, |
| "location": "precompiles/dispatch-lockdrop/src/lib.rs:74,104", |
| "title": "Unbounded call length limit in lockdrop dispatch call", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/AstarNetwork/Astar", |
| "audited_commit": "282485aa2d50f12f42463bba1d393fce4c57c2a3", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Denial of Service (DoS) and Spamming", |
| "description": "3.2.2 Unbounded call length limit in lockdrop dispatch call\nAttack scenario\nLocation\nTracking\nAttack impact\nSeverity\nStatus\nAn attacker may create multiple nested calls bloating the call_length\nbefore call decoding\nprecompiles/dispatch-lockdrop\n[3]\nUnbounded call length can aid an attacker to cause heap overflow when\ncall data is moved to the vector\nLow\nClosed [7]\nThe precompile dispatch call uses the UnboundedBytes [8] type without any call_length being\nset for the call object parameter. During runtime-call decoding, a stack overflow is prevented\nthrough usage of DecodeLimit [9] however, a heap overflow might occur even before decoding\nif an unbounded call with large call_length is moved into the u8 vector.\nAn attacker can use this to create multiple nested calls bloating the call_length and cause heap\noverflow even before call decoding.\nWe recommend using BoundedBytes<call_length> instead of UnboundedBytes. A best practice\nimplementation from Moonbeam may be adopted for setting CallLengthLimit similar to\nGetProposalLimit [10] and implementing additional guard condition for call_length validity\nsimilar to proposal_length [11] before decoding the call for additional safety.", |
| "description_summary": "Unbounded call length in dispatch call allows attackers to cause heap overflow and perform denial of service attacks.", |
| "reported_status": "Closed [7] [Online].Available: https://github.com/AstarNetwork/Astar/pull/1208.", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 10, |
| "project_name": "Astar", |
| "auditor": "Security Research Labs", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/polkadot-assurance-legion/pal-docs/blob/main/audits/24h1/astar-srl-2403.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 0, |
| "location": null, |
| "title": "Weight calculation", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/AstarNetwork/Astar", |
| "audited_commit": "fc14b13401e1fb5e7391715fc76a308204173802", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": "Low", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Coding Mistakes", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Weight Management", |
| "description": "All the assets pallet functions exposed by the chain extension are weighted with a constant amount. The weight of some operations is charged using the same quantity that the assets pallet benchmarks have computed. However, other operations only charge the weight of one runtime database read operation \u2014 T::DbWeight::get().reads(1_u64).\nTwo functions, MetadataSymbol and MetadataName, operate on a variable amount of data, but they also only account for one runtime database read operation.", |
| "description_summary": "Constant weight for functions, ignores variable data in MetadataSymbol & MetadataName.", |
| "reported_status": "The Astar team acknowledged this issue and stated that the gas weight currently being charged for one read is equivalent to a read of length 80 bytes. They also pointed out that the MetadataName and MetadataSymbol are bounded by the AssetsStringLimit config variable, which is set to 50 bytes. Therefore, charging for one read is fine in this instance.", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 11, |
| "project_name": "Astar", |
| "auditor": "Zellic", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/polkadot-assurance-legion/pal-docs/blob/main/audits/24h1/astar-zellic-2401.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 0, |
| "location": "pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs:782-800", |
| "title": "Static calculation of weights for the claim_reward extrinsic enables DoS attack vector", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/bifrost-finance/bifrost", |
| "audited_commit": "fcf0acbaa93b631a3618af07e986c5c9c1c4ed38", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "a0aef4bb83bab000cb99b8fb96e38b58afce432d", |
| "reported_impact": "Major", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Weight Management", |
| "description": "1. Static calculation of weights for the claim_reward extrinsic enables DoS attack vector\nSeverity: Major\nThe claim_reward function, defined in pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs:782-800, iterates over all the existing markets to collect rewards from each of them. However, since the number of registered markets is not bounded, the execution could exceed the computation limit if too many markets are registered. Since the calculation of the extrinsic weights does not take into account the cardinality of the markets, the fee charged to the origin will be uncorrelated with the actual computational resource usage. This leads to a situation where the execution of multiple claims within the claim_reward extrinsic will cost the same as a single claim done with the claim_reward_for_market extrinsic. Consequently, attackers could leverage this behavior to overload chain nodes by executing claim_reward on multiple markets paying a smaller fee, potentially allowing a denial-of-service attack.", |
| "description_summary": "Static weight calculation in claim_reward allows potential DoS due to unbounded market iterations.", |
| "reported_status": "Resolved", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 12, |
| "project_name": "Bifrost", |
| "auditor": "Oak Security", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/polkadot-assurance-legion/pal-docs/blob/main/audits/24h1/bifrost-oak-2401.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 1, |
| "location": "pallets/prices/src/lib.rs:120-143", |
| "title": "Price feeder centralization risks", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/bifrost-finance/bifrost", |
| "audited_commit": "fcf0acbaa93b631a3618af07e986c5c9c1c4ed38", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Minor", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "2. Price feeder centralization risks\nSeverity: Minor\nIn the prices pallet, the FeederOrigin can set arbitrary emergency prices by executing the set_price and reset_price extrinsics defined in pallets/prices/src/lib.rs:120-143. However, prices are not validated before being stored and every value is accepted.\nAs a consequence, this could lead to the following scenarios:\n1. Privilege abuse: An attacker may get access to the private key of the FeederOrigin. He can then use the account to manipulate prices, for example by setting the price for all assets to a small value, which would allow the attacker to liquidate all users at their loss.\n2. Input error: Since the provided Price is not validated, incorrect values could be provided as input and stored in the contract. Even a Price equal to zero is allowed.\nWe classify this issue as minor since only a privileged account can perform the aforementioned operations.\nRecommendation\nWe recommend performing validation on the provided prices. For instance, there could be a maximum allowed delta per time unit, such that a price of zero would not be accepted.\nWhile this does not fully resolve the centralization issue, privilege abuse would be more involved and require multiple transactions over a longer time span. This would allow operators and users to react.\nStatus: Acknowledged\nThe client states that they use multi-signature accounts for privileged roles to reduce centralization risks.", |
| "description_summary": "Price feeder allows unvalidated emergency prices, risking privilege abuse and input errors.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 12, |
| "project_name": "Bifrost", |
| "auditor": "Oak Security", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/polkadot-assurance-legion/pal-docs/blob/main/audits/24h1/bifrost-oak-2401.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 2, |
| "location": "pallets/prices/src/lib.rs:149-157", |
| "title": "Multiple foreign_asset_id can be mapped to the same asset_id", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/bifrost-finance/bifrost", |
| "audited_commit": "fcf0acbaa93b631a3618af07e986c5c9c1c4ed38", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "a0aef4bb83bab000cb99b8fb96e38b58afce432d", |
| "reported_impact": "Minor", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "3. Multiple foreign_asset_id can be mapped to the same asset_id\nSeverity: Minor\nIn pallets/prices/src/lib.rs:149-157, the set_foreign_asset extrinsic permits the UpdateOrigin origin to establish a mapping within the pallet, associating a foreign_asset_id with an asset_id. However, it lacks a verification mechanism to ensure that the given asset_id is not already linked to a different foreign_asset_id. As a result, an asset_id can be associated with multiple foreign assets which would lead to market misconfigurations. We classify this issue with minor severity since only a privileged account can perform the aforementioned operation.\nRecommendation\nWe recommend introducing a verification mechanism checking that the asset_id is not already linked to a different foreign_asset_id.\nStatus: Resolved\nThe client removed set_foreign_asset and get_special_asset_price from the codebase.", |
| "description_summary": "Lack of verification allows multiple foreign_asset_id to map to the same asset_id, risking market misconfigurations.", |
| "reported_status": "Resolved", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 12, |
| "project_name": "Bifrost", |
| "auditor": "Oak Security", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/polkadot-assurance-legion/pal-docs/blob/main/audits/24h1/bifrost-oak-2401.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 3, |
| "location": "pallets/prices/src/lib.rs:149-157", |
| "title": "Missing check that foreign_asset_id is specifically of the ForeignAsset type", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/bifrost-finance/bifrost", |
| "audited_commit": "fcf0acbaa93b631a3618af07e986c5c9c1c4ed38", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "a0aef4bb83bab000cb99b8fb96e38b58afce432d", |
| "reported_impact": "Minor", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "4. Missing check that foreign_asset_id is specifically of the ForeignAsset type\nSeverity: Minor\nIn pallets/prices/src/lib.rs:149-157, the set_foreign_asset extrinsic enables the UpdateOrigin origin to establish a mapping within the pallet that associates a foreign_asset_id with an asset_id. However, it does not verify that the provided foreign_asset_id is specifically of the ForeignAsset type; it is only identified as a CurrencyId. As a result, the UpdateOrigin can map any asset type, not just foreign assets. We classify this issue with minor severity since only a privileged account can perform the aforementioned operation.\nRecommendation\nWe recommend verifying that the provided foreign_asset_id is specifically of the ForeignAsset type.\nStatus: Resolved\nThe client removed set_foreign_asset and get_special_asset_price from the codebase.", |
| "description_summary": "Missing validation allows mapping of non-ForeignAsset types, risking misconfigurations.", |
| "reported_status": "Resolved", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 12, |
| "project_name": "Bifrost", |
| "auditor": "Oak Security", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/polkadot-assurance-legion/pal-docs/blob/main/audits/24h1/bifrost-oak-2401.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 4, |
| "location": "pallets/prices/src/lib.rs:179-186", |
| "title": "Default mantissa precision can lead to an incorrect price", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/bifrost-finance/bifrost", |
| "audited_commit": "fcf0acbaa93b631a3618af07e986c5c9c1c4ed38", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Minor", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "5. Default mantissa precision can lead to an incorrect price\nSeverity: Minor\nIn pallets/prices/src/lib.rs:179-186, the get_asset_mantissa function is designed to calculate the mantissa for a given asset by attempting to retrieve the asset's decimal precision from multiple sources. However, if it fails to find any decimal information for the specified asset_id, it automatically assumes a default precision of 12 decimals. As a result, this approach poses a risk, as the function plays a crucial role in asset valuation, and an incorrect mantissa calculation would lead to the determination of an erroneous price.\nRecommendation\nWe recommend returning an error if the decimal precision for a particular asset cannot be retrieved.\nStatus: Acknowledged\nThe client states that a misconfiguration of the decimal precision is unlikely since it is set during the asset registration in the bifrost-asset-registry pallet.", |
| "description_summary": "Default mantissa precision assumption can lead to incorrect asset price calculation.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 12, |
| "project_name": "Bifrost", |
| "auditor": "Oak Security", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/polkadot-assurance-legion/pal-docs/blob/main/audits/24h1/bifrost-oak-2401.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 5, |
| "location": "pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs:656-680", |
| "title": "Missing validation for the lend_token_id", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/bifrost-finance/bifrost", |
| "audited_commit": "fcf0acbaa93b631a3618af07e986c5c9c1c4ed38", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "a0aef4bb83bab000cb99b8fb96e38b58afce432d", |
| "reported_impact": "Minor", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "6. Missing validation for the lend_token_id\nSeverity: Minor\nIn pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs:656-680, the force_update_market function enables the UpdateOrigin to assign a new lend_token_id to a specified market. However, it fails to verify whether the lend_token_id is not already a market, a validation that is performed in the ensure_lend_token method in line 1843. As a consequence, this oversight could lead to inconsistencies in market configuration since the lend token is not designed to be used in a market. We classify this issue with minor severity since only a privileged account can perform the aforementioned operation.\nRecommendation\nWe recommend verifying whether the lend_token_id is not already utilized in a market.\nStatus: Resolved", |
| "description_summary": "Missing validation for lend_token_id may lead to market configuration inconsistencies.", |
| "reported_status": "Resolved", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 12, |
| "project_name": "Bifrost", |
| "auditor": "Oak Security", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/polkadot-assurance-legion/pal-docs/blob/main/audits/24h1/bifrost-oak-2401.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 6, |
| "location": "pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs:659", |
| "title": "The force_update_market extrinsic could break existing markets", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/bifrost-finance/bifrost", |
| "audited_commit": "fcf0acbaa93b631a3618af07e986c5c9c1c4ed38", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "a0aef4bb83bab000cb99b8fb96e38b58afce432d", |
| "reported_impact": "Minor", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "7. The force_update_market extrinsic could break existing markets\nSeverity: Minor\nIn pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs:659, the force_update_market function permits the UpdateOrigin to forcibly replace an existing market with another, without ensuring the coherence of the provided data. This poses a risk since UpdateOrigin is allowed to modify markets with any data, including malicious ones that could break invariants. As a consequence, the current approach could result in the acceptance of markets with a collateral_factor or liquidation_threshold outside of the [0,1] range, which could break market operations and potentially cause a loss of funds. We classify this issue as minor since only a privileged account can perform the aforementioned operation.\nRecommendation\nWe recommend removing the force_update_market extrinsic and utilizing the update_market one to handle market updates.\nStatus: Resolved", |
| "description_summary": "force_update_market extrinsic allows data inconsistencies that could break market operations.", |
| "reported_status": "Resolved", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 12, |
| "project_name": "Bifrost", |
| "auditor": "Oak Security", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/polkadot-assurance-legion/pal-docs/blob/main/audits/24h1/bifrost-oak-2401.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 7, |
| "location": "pallets/lend-market/src/interest.rs:1123-1130", |
| "title": "Static calculation of weights for the update_liquidation_fee_collateral extrinsic", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/bifrost-finance/bifrost", |
| "audited_commit": "fcf0acbaa93b631a3618af07e986c5c9c1c4ed38", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "a0aef4bb83bab000cb99b8fb96e38b58afce432d", |
| "reported_impact": "Minor", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Weight Management", |
| "description": "8. Static calculation of weights for the update_liquidation_fee_collateral extrinsic\nSeverity: Minor\nIn pallets/lend-market/src/interest.rs:1123-1130, the update_liquidation_fee_collateral extrinsic takes a collaterals vector as a parameter. However, the calculation of the extrinsic weights does not take into account the length of the collaterals vector. As a result, the update_liquidation_fee_collateral extrinsic will charge the same fee for vectors of different sizes leading to an uncorrelated relation between fees and computational resource usage. We classify this issue as minor since only a privileged account can perform the aforementioned operation.\nRecommendation\nWe recommend dynamically calculating the weight of the update_liquidation_fee_collateral extrinsic based on the collaterals vector's cardinality.\nStatus: Resolved", |
| "description_summary": "Static weight calculation for update_liquidation_fee_collateral ignores vector length, causing uncorrelated fee charges.", |
| "reported_status": "Resolved", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 12, |
| "project_name": "Bifrost", |
| "auditor": "Oak Security", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/polkadot-assurance-legion/pal-docs/blob/main/audits/24h1/bifrost-oak-2401.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 8, |
| "location": "pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs:381,610,1757", |
| "title": "Missing validation of liquidate_incentive_reserved_factor during market update", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/bifrost-finance/bifrost", |
| "audited_commit": "fcf0acbaa93b631a3618af07e986c5c9c1c4ed38", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "a0aef4bb83bab000cb99b8fb96e38b58afce432d", |
| "reported_impact": "Minor", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "9. Missing validation of liquidate_incentive_reserved_factor during market update\nSeverity: Minor\nIn pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs:381 the add_market function checks the correct allowed ranges for the provided market parameters, including liquidate_incentive_reserved_factor. This value is forced to be in the (0,1) range. However, in the update_market function in pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs:610, this validation is not performed. As a consequence, when updating the market, it is possible to set the liquidate_incentive_reserved_factor value outside the (0,1) range, which will have implications in the form of incorrect calculations of incentives when liquidating positions within the liquidated_transfer function in pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs:1757. We classify this as minor since only a privileged account can perform the aforementioned operation.\nRecommendation\nWe recommend validating the liquidate_incentive_reserved_factor in the update_market function.\nStatus: Resolved", |
| "description_summary": "Missing validation in update_market allows liquidate_incentive_reserved_factor outside valid range.", |
| "reported_status": "Resolved", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 12, |
| "project_name": "Bifrost", |
| "auditor": "Oak Security", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/polkadot-assurance-legion/pal-docs/blob/main/audits/24h1/bifrost-oak-2401.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 9, |
| "location": "pallets/lend-market/src/interest.rs:58,75", |
| "title": "Incorrect interest is calculated if requested before market initialization", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/bifrost-finance/bifrost", |
| "audited_commit": "fcf0acbaa93b631a3618af07e986c5c9c1c4ed38", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "a0aef4bb83bab000cb99b8fb96e38b58afce432d", |
| "reported_impact": "Minor", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "10. Incorrect interest is calculated if requested before market initialization\nSeverity: Minor\nIn pallets/lend-market/src/interest.rs:58, the get_market_status function calculates and returns information about the queried market. However, in case the market has not been used yet, the last_accrued_interest_time variable, when retrieved in line 75 from the LastAccruedInterestTime on-chain storage, would default to zero. Consequently, when get_market_status is called without the market being previously initialized, the interest accrual period is inaccurately computed from January 1, 1970, despite the asset not being used yet leading to a wrong calculation.\nRecommendation\nWe recommend handling the case of last_accrued_interest_time equal to zero in the get_market_status function.\nStatus: Resolved", |
| "description_summary": "Incorrect interest calculation occurs if requested before market initialization.", |
| "reported_status": "Resolved", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 12, |
| "project_name": "Bifrost", |
| "auditor": "Oak Security", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/polkadot-assurance-legion/pal-docs/blob/main/audits/24h1/bifrost-oak-2401.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 10, |
| "location": "pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs:1801-1806", |
| "title": "Inefficient active markets search", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/bifrost-finance/bifrost", |
| "audited_commit": "fcf0acbaa93b631a3618af07e986c5c9c1c4ed38", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "a0aef4bb83bab000cb99b8fb96e38b58afce432d", |
| "reported_impact": "Informational", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "11. Inefficient active markets search\nSeverity: Informational\nThe ensure_active_market function, defined in pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs:1801-1806, searches for a market by comparing identifiers one by one in a loop through all markets with an asymptotic complexity of O(n). However, the same operation could be performed in constant time by using the market method, defined in pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs:1946. Consequently, this would cause the execution to incur higher costs due to unnecessary iteration.\nRecommendation\nWe recommend replacing the iteration with a call to the market function.\nStatus: Resolved", |
| "description_summary": "Active market search is inefficient due to O(n) iteration; can be optimized with constant time method.", |
| "reported_status": "Resolved", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 12, |
| "project_name": "Bifrost", |
| "auditor": "Oak Security", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/polkadot-assurance-legion/pal-docs/blob/main/audits/24h1/bifrost-oak-2401.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 11, |
| "location": "pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs:1145-1151,1407", |
| "title": "Inefficient market data aggregation", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/bifrost-finance/bifrost", |
| "audited_commit": "fcf0acbaa93b631a3618af07e986c5c9c1c4ed38", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Informational", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "12. Inefficient market data aggregation\nSeverity: Informational\nThe get_lf_base_position function, defined in pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs:1145-1151 iterates through all active markets, aggregating collateral for underlying assets. However, the markets queried are not retained, despite being re-queried later by the current_collateral_balance function in line 1407. Consequently, this would cause the execution to incur higher costs due to unnecessary calculations.\nRecommendation\nWe recommend either passing the query results down to the called functions without alteration, or redesigning the storage layout to only retrieve the necessary data at the point of call.\nStatus: Acknowledged", |
| "description_summary": "Inefficient market data aggregation leads to unnecessary re-queries and higher execution costs.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 12, |
| "project_name": "Bifrost", |
| "auditor": "Oak Security", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/polkadot-assurance-legion/pal-docs/blob/main/audits/24h1/bifrost-oak-2401.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 12, |
| "location": "pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs:315,945-946,1280-1283,1312-1315,2105-2106,1146", |
| "title": "Redundant storage queries", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/bifrost-finance/bifrost", |
| "audited_commit": "fcf0acbaa93b631a3618af07e986c5c9c1c4ed38", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Informational", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "13. Redundant storage queries\nSeverity: Informational\nThe pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs file exhibits redundant uses of on-chain storage. For instance, the AccountDeposits storage, introduced at line 315, undergoes redundant queries in lines 945-946, 1280-1283, 1312-1315, and 2105-2106. In each case, the storage is first checked for the key's presence, followed by a separate query to fetch the key's value. Another example of redundant queries can be seen in line 1146, where the storage query Self::liquidation_free_collaterals is called on every iteration of the loop despite having the same value on each iteration. Minimizing the number of storage queries would enhance both performance and code clarity.\nRecommendation\nWe recommend employing the OptionQuery type for business logic that needs to check for the existence of a key. Additionally, duplicated queries in the same scope should be avoided.\nStatus: Acknowledged", |
| "description_summary": "Redundant storage queries impact performance and code clarity.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 12, |
| "project_name": "Bifrost", |
| "auditor": "Oak Security", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/polkadot-assurance-legion/pal-docs/blob/main/audits/24h1/bifrost-oak-2401.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 13, |
| "location": "pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs:1144-1152,1158-1166,1280-1293,1312-1325", |
| "title": "Code duplication", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/bifrost-finance/bifrost", |
| "audited_commit": "fcf0acbaa93b631a3618af07e986c5c9c1c4ed38", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Informational", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "14. Code duplication\nSeverity: Informational\nThe pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs file contains multiple code duplicates:\n1. The code fragments in lines 1144-1152 and 1158-1166 are nearly identical, with the only distinction being the function called on the iterated values: collateral_asset_value (line 1149) in one instance and liquidation_threshold_asset_value (line 1163) in the other.\n2. The code fragments in lines 1312-1325 and 1280-1293 are nearly identical, with the only distinction being the type parameter: BalanceOf in one instance and FixedU128 in the other.\nCode duplication undermines maintainability, thereby expanding the potential for security vulnerabilities.\nRecommendation\nWe recommend refactoring the codebase to avoid duplications. Generic type parameters and function-type parameters could be used to streamline the data flow.\nStatus: Acknowledged", |
| "description_summary": "Code duplication impacts maintainability and increases potential for security issues.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 12, |
| "project_name": "Bifrost", |
| "auditor": "Oak Security", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/polkadot-assurance-legion/pal-docs/blob/main/audits/24h1/bifrost-oak-2401.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 14, |
| "location": "pallets/prices/src/lib.rs:188", |
| "title": "The get_special_asset_price function consistently returns None", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/bifrost-finance/bifrost", |
| "audited_commit": "fcf0acbaa93b631a3618af07e986c5c9c1c4ed38", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "a0aef4bb83bab000cb99b8fb96e38b58afce432d", |
| "reported_impact": "Informational", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "15. The get_special_asset_price function consistently returns None\nSeverity: Informational\nIn pallets/prices/src/lib.rs:188, the get_special_asset_price function is designed to return a TimeStampedPrice value, but it consistently returns None instead. As a consequence, this behavior is misleading and renders the function ineffective.\nRecommendation\nWe recommend eliminating the function get_special_asset_price if it\u2019s not being utilized.\nStatus: Resolved", |
| "description_summary": "The get_special_asset_price function consistently returns None, making it ineffective.", |
| "reported_status": "Resolved", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 12, |
| "project_name": "Bifrost", |
| "auditor": "Oak Security", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/polkadot-assurance-legion/pal-docs/blob/main/audits/24h1/bifrost-oak-2401.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 15, |
| "location": "pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs:1045", |
| "title": "Inefficient reduce_reserves extrinsic execution in case of reduce_reserves parameter equal to zero", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/bifrost-finance/bifrost", |
| "audited_commit": "fcf0acbaa93b631a3618af07e986c5c9c1c4ed38", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "a0aef4bb83bab000cb99b8fb96e38b58afce432d", |
| "reported_impact": "Informational", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "16. Inefficient reduce_reserves extrinsic execution in case of reduce_reserves parameter equal to zero\nSeverity: Informational\nIn pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs:1045, the reduce_reserves extrinsic takes reduce_amount as a parameter. However, if this amount is zero, the function will perform all operations unnecessarily, which is inefficient and may be misleading to the function caller.\nRecommendation\nWe recommend verifying whether reduce_amount is greater than zero and, if not, returning an error that terminates the transaction.\nStatus: Resolved", |
| "description_summary": "Inefficient execution occurs if reduce_reserves parameter is zero, performing unnecessary operations.", |
| "reported_status": "Resolved", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 12, |
| "project_name": "Bifrost", |
| "auditor": "Oak Security", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/polkadot-assurance-legion/pal-docs/blob/main/audits/24h1/bifrost-oak-2401.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 16, |
| "location": "pallets/lend-market/src/farming.rs:28\npallets/lend-market/src/rate_model.rs:173", |
| "title": "Use of magic numbers decreases maintainability", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/bifrost-finance/bifrost", |
| "audited_commit": "fcf0acbaa93b631a3618af07e986c5c9c1c4ed38", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Informational", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "17. Use of magic numbers decreases maintainability\nSeverity: Informational\nThroughout the codebase, hard-coded number literals without context or a description are used. Using such 'magic numbers' goes against best practices as they reduce code readability and maintenance as developers are unable to easily understand their use and may make inconsistent changes across the codebase.\nInstances of magic numbers are listed below:\n- pallets/lend-market/src/farming.rs:28\n- pallets/lend-market/src/rate_model.rs:173\nRecommendation\nWe recommend defining magic numbers as constants with descriptive variable names and comments, where necessary.\nStatus: Acknowledged", |
| "description_summary": "Use of magic numbers decreases code readability and maintainability.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 12, |
| "project_name": "Bifrost", |
| "auditor": "Oak Security", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/polkadot-assurance-legion/pal-docs/blob/main/audits/24h1/bifrost-oak-2401.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 17, |
| "location": "pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs:678,778", |
| "title": "State change events are emitted even if no change has occurred", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/bifrost-finance/bifrost", |
| "audited_commit": "fcf0acbaa93b631a3618af07e986c5c9c1c4ed38", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Informational", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "18. State change events are emitted even if no change has occurred\nSeverity: Informational\nIn pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs:778 and pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs:678, when updating market parameters, the event about success is emitted regardless of whether anything has been changed. If none of the optional values are specified, then the function will end without changing the state, but the MarketRewardSpeedUpdated or UpdatedMarket event will be emitted, which is inconsistent with the function's logic.\nRecommendation\nWe recommend emitting an event only in case the state has been updated.\nStatus: Acknowledged", |
| "description_summary": "State change events are emitted even when no actual change has occurred.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 12, |
| "project_name": "Bifrost", |
| "auditor": "Oak Security", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/polkadot-assurance-legion/pal-docs/blob/main/audits/24h1/bifrost-oak-2401.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 18, |
| "location": "pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs:959,1894\npallets/leverage-staking/src/lib.rs:129\npallets/lend-market/src/interest.rs:141", |
| "title": "Miscellaneous comments", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/bifrost-finance/bifrost", |
| "audited_commit": "fcf0acbaa93b631a3618af07e986c5c9c1c4ed38", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "a0aef4bb83bab000cb99b8fb96e38b58afce432d", |
| "reported_impact": "Informational", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "19. Miscellaneous comments\nSeverity: Informational\nMiscellaneous recommendations can be found below:\n- In pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs:1894 there should be an Overflow error, not an Underflow one, causing exchange_rate to be between (0.02, 1) range, so the division of amount value and exchange_rate could cause overflow only.\n- In pallets/lend-market/src/lib.rs:959, it should be used asset, instead of assert.\n- In pallets/leverage-staking/src/lib.rs:129, NotSupportTokenType should be reworded to NotSupportedTokenType.\n- In pallets/lend-market/src/interest.rs:141, the inequality should be greater than or equal to 0.02, not only greater, based on code implementation.\nRecommendation\nWe suggest following the aforementioned suggestions.\nStatus: Resolved", |
| "description_summary": "Various code recommendations to fix minor errors and improve clarity.", |
| "reported_status": "Resolved", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 12, |
| "project_name": "Bifrost", |
| "auditor": "Oak Security", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/polkadot-assurance-legion/pal-docs/blob/main/audits/24h1/bifrost-oak-2401.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 0, |
| "location": "pallets/transaction-multi-payment/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Potential spamming attack via unsigned dispatch_permit extrinsic", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/galacticcouncil/HydraDX-node", |
| "audited_commit": "e3821e078bdb72a0416f8aebca21ba4a7a599f64", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Medium", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Denial of Service (DoS) and Spamming", |
| "description": "4.1 Potential spamming attack via unsigned dispatch_permit extrinsic\nAttack scenario\nAn attacker spams the network with unsigned transactions.\n\nLocation\npallet-transaction-multi-payment\n\nAttack impact\nSlowing down the chain.\n\nSeverity\nMedium\n\nStatus\nOpen\n\nThe dispatch_permit extrinsic in the HydraDX node allows for unsigned transactions that perform heavy computational validation (e.g.: validate_permit, decode_all_with_depth_limit). This extrinsic is part of the transaction-multi-payment pallet and utilizes the validate_unsigned function to ensure the transaction's validity. The computationally intensive nature of this validation process can be exploited by submitting numerous unsigned extrinsics, potentially leading to a denial-of-service (DoS) attack on the network.\n\nMoreover, the validate_unsigned logic duplicates the same code as the actual extrinsic, dispatch_permit, which adds even more computation time and resources for the entire call.\n\nAs the dispatch_permit is an unsigned extrinsic, there are no fees to be paid, increasing the attack surface.\n\nThe following risks can be attributed to this vulnerability:\n1. Spam vector: An attacker can use a node to submit a large number of unsigned extrinsics, which will be gossiped across the network. This can lead to:\n - High computational load on collators/validators\n - Potential denial-of-service (DoS) attack, delaying or dropping legitimate transactions\n - Network congestion and performance degradation\n\n2. Resource consumption: The heavy computation required for validating unsigned extrinsics can consume significant node resources, impacting overall network stability and performance.\n\nChanging this extrinsic to be an ensure_signed extrinsic will remove the spamming vector by ensuring the payment of the computation from the caller's account.", |
| "description_summary": "Unsigned dispatch_permit extrinsic can be exploited for network spam and DoS attacks due to lack of payment requirement.", |
| "reported_status": "Open", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 13, |
| "project_name": "HydraDX", |
| "auditor": "Security Research Labs", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/polkadot-assurance-legion/pal-docs/blob/main/audits/24h1/hydradx-srl-2405.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 1, |
| "location": "pallets/evm-accounts/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "The mapping between Ethereum and Substrate addresses could create unwanted behavior", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/galacticcouncil/HydraDX-node", |
| "audited_commit": "e3821e078bdb72a0416f8aebca21ba4a7a599f64", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Info", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "4.2 The mapping between Ethereum and Substrate addresses could create unwanted behavior\n\nAttack scenario\nLegitimate user transfers tokens to an EVM address without a bound Substrate account.\n\nLocation\npallet-evm-accounts\n\nAttack impact\nThe user could lose their funds as the destination address cannot be claimed by a Substrate account.\n\nSeverity\nInfo\n\nStatus\nOpen\n\nHydraDX defines three types of addresses:\n1. Truncated address: A substrate address created from an EVM address by prefixing it with \"ETH\\0\" and appending with eight 0 bytes\n2. Full Substrate address: Original 32 bytes long native address (not a truncated address)\n3. EVM address: First 20 bytes of a Substrate address\n\nThis method of mapping EVM addresses to Substrate addresses raises a number of concerns:\n- Taking the raw bytes of an address is against best practices (i.e.: the first 20 bytes of a Substrate address are being used to represent an EVM address)\n- The entropy of truncated addresses is reduced by 12 bytes as the address always begins with \"ETH\\0\" and ends with eight zero bytes\n- Transferring funds to an EVM address which was not bound to a Substrate address results in the funds being transferred to a truncated address, which cannot be claimed by any user\n\nLegitimate users might lose funds by submitting a transfer to an EVM address that is not bound to a Substrate address. This could decrease the trust of the users in the HydraDX network. By reducing the addresses' entropy, the chances of collision attacks increase significantly.\n\nOur mitigation suggestion is to deprecate the usage of truncated addresses and make sure that every EVM address is bound to a Substrate address.", |
| "description_summary": "Mapping Ethereum to Substrate addresses can lead to unclaimable funds and reduced address entropy, increasing collision risks.", |
| "reported_status": "Open", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 13, |
| "project_name": "HydraDX", |
| "auditor": "Security Research Labs", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/polkadot-assurance-legion/pal-docs/blob/main/audits/24h1/hydradx-srl-2405.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 0, |
| "location": "pallets/laos-evolution", |
| "title": "Unrestricted URI", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/freeverseio/laos", |
| "audited_commit": "16bd9e56d20c206cf927d961c8ec58f299308473", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "High", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": "CWE-1269", |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "CWE-1269: Product Released in Non-Release Configuration", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "High Severity Issues\nHI-01 Unrestricted URI\nFound on commit: 16bd9e56d20c206cf927d961c8ec58f299308473\nLocation:\n- pallets/laos-evolution\nClassification:\n- CWE-1269: Product Released in Non-Release Configuration\nIf a collection created via the EvolutionCollectionFactory precompile is set to allow public minting, any user of the LAOS blockchain may create new collection items corresponding to any slot not being used, pointing to any malicious URI, including URIs pointing to:\n1. Browser exploits\n2. Client-side attacks\n3. Illegal images\n4. Gross images\n5. URIs that would only appear in the item after an evolution.\nThese may appear in the NFT related to the collection, and shown in the websites where NFTs are traded.\nThe severity of this issue was lowered given that public minting is not enabled by default.\nRecommendation\nEither whitelist the URIs (and owners) of the minted items when the minting is not made by the owner or disallow minting by a non-owner account.\nIf the second option is implemented an intermediate contract may be set as the owner and handle both the access and the allowed URIs to mint and or evolve items.\nStatus\nAcknowledged. The development team informed us that they are aware of this issue but do not want to remove it yet, as it allows them to test bridgeless minting.", |
| "description_summary": "Public minting allows any user to create collection items with potentially malicious URIs.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 14, |
| "project_name": "LAOS", |
| "auditor": "CoinFabrik", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/CoinFabrik/coinfabrik-audit-reports/blob/main/Laos/CoinFabrik-LAOS_Audit-2024-08.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 1, |
| "location": "pallets/asset-metadata-extender\npallets/laos-evolution", |
| "title": "Lack of URI Validation", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/freeverseio/laos", |
| "audited_commit": "16bd9e56d20c206cf927d961c8ec58f299308473", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Medium", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": "CWE-1286", |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "CWE-1286: Improper Validation of Syntactic Correctness of Input", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "ME-01 Lack of URI Validation\nFound on commit: 16bd9e56d20c206cf927d961c8ec58f299308473\nLocation:\n- pallets/asset-metadata-extender\n- pallets/laos-evolution\nClassification:\n- CWE-1286: Improper Validation of Syntactic Correctness of Input\nThe URIs received in the functions of the AssetMetadataExtender precompile and the EvolutionCollection precompile are not being validated nor canonized. These URIs are then stored and can be consulted from the state of the blockchain by other systems.\nThis may lead to exploiting these other systems with malformed URIs.\nThis issue makes the HI-01 Unrestricted URI issue more dangerous, as any account may write malformed URIs to be read by other systems.\nRecommendation\nIn order to solve this issue, we recommend the string parameter receiving the URI parameter to be parsed to check that it conforms to the URI format.\nIn order to mitigate this issue, you may choose to document in the .sol files that document the interfaces of the precompiles that the format of the URI is not being validated on-chain.\nStatus\nUnresolved.", |
| "description_summary": "URIs are not validated or canonized, allowing malformed URIs to be stored and potentially exploited by other systems.", |
| "reported_status": "Unresolved", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 14, |
| "project_name": "LAOS", |
| "auditor": "CoinFabrik", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/CoinFabrik/coinfabrik-audit-reports/blob/main/Laos/CoinFabrik-LAOS_Audit-2024-08.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 2, |
| "location": "pallets/parachain-staking/src/rewards/mint_rewards.rs:50-55", |
| "title": "No Logging on Minting Error", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/freeverseio/laos", |
| "audited_commit": "16bd9e56d20c206cf927d961c8ec58f299308473", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Minor", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": "CWE-778", |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "CWE-778: Insufficient Logging", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "Minor Severity Issues\nMI-01 No Logging on Minting Error\nFound on commit: 16bd9e56d20c206cf927d961c8ec58f299308473\nLocation:\n- pallets/parachain-staking/src/rewards/mint_rewards.rs: 50-55\nClassification:\n- CWE-778: Insufficient Logging\nIf funds are not deposited for the collator when making a new block, the error is not registered anywhere.\nThis can be seen in the following code, where there is no else clause\nif let Ok(amount_transferred) = T::Currency::deposit_into_existing(&collator_id, amt) {\nSelf::deposit_event(Event::Rewarded {\naccount: collator_id.clone(),\nrewards: amount_transferred.peek(),\n});\n}\nRecommendation\nEither generate an event showing the error or at least log the error.\nStatus\nUnresolved.", |
| "description_summary": "Minting errors are not logged, leaving issues untraceable.", |
| "reported_status": "Unresolved", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 14, |
| "project_name": "LAOS", |
| "auditor": "CoinFabrik", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/CoinFabrik/coinfabrik-audit-reports/blob/main/Laos/CoinFabrik-LAOS_Audit-2024-08.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 3, |
| "location": "pallets/asset-metadata-extender", |
| "title": "Lack of Universal Location Validation", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/freeverseio/laos", |
| "audited_commit": "16bd9e56d20c206cf927d961c8ec58f299308473", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Minor", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": "CWE-1286", |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "CWE-1286: Improper Validation of Syntactic Correctness of Input", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "MI-02 Lack of Universal Location Validation\nFound on commit: 16bd9e56d20c206cf927d961c8ec58f299308473\nLocation:\n- pallets/asset-metadata-extender\nClassification:\n- CWE-1286: Improper Validation of Syntactic Correctness of Input\nWhen extending or updating an universal location with an URI using the extendULWithExternalURI or updateExtendedULWithExternalURI functions, the string where the universal location is received is not validated. This string is then reflected in the emitted events that can be processed by other systems. This may lead to exploiting these other systems with malformed universal locations.\nThis issue has less severity than the ME-01 Lack of URI Validation issue given that the universal location is reflected only in events.\nRecommendation\nIn order to solve this issue, we recommend the string parameter receiving the universal location parameter to be parsed to check that it conforms to the URI format.\nIn order to mitigate this issue, you may choose to document in the .sol files that document the interfaces of the precompiles that the format of the universal location is not being validated on-chain.\nStatus\nUnresolved.", |
| "description_summary": "Universal location strings are not validated, risking exploitation through malformed inputs in emitted events.", |
| "reported_status": "Unresolved", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 14, |
| "project_name": "LAOS", |
| "auditor": "CoinFabrik", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/CoinFabrik/coinfabrik-audit-reports/blob/main/Laos/CoinFabrik-LAOS_Audit-2024-08.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 0, |
| "location": "src/orml/rewards/src/lib.rs:326", |
| "title": "transfer_share_and_rewards allows for self transfer", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-acala", |
| "audited_commit": "9c71c05cf2d9f0a2603984c50f76fc8a315d4d65", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "High", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "[H-01] transfer_share_and_rewards allows for self transfer\nSubmitted by ZanyBonzy, also found by ihtishamsudo\nThe rewards library holds the transfer_share_and_rewards allows for self transfer which can be used to double shares and rewards. Important to note that the function, for now is not in use by the in-scope contracts. However, I still believe it\u2019s worth pointing out.\nProof of Concept\nCopy and paste the below test into tests.rs. It shows how users Alice and Bob, by invoking this function, can increase their share/rewards balance.\nfn transfer_to_self() {\n ExtBuilder::default().build().execute_with(|| {\n // Open a pool with bob holding 100 shares in the pool\n RewardsModule::add_share(&BOB, &DOT_POOL);\n // Accumulate rewards\n assert_ok!(RewardsModule::accumulate_reward);\n // Alice deposits into the pool and gets shares\n RewardsModule::add_share(&ALICE, &DOT_POOL);\n // Assert that rewards still exist\n assert_ok!(RewardsModule::accumulate_reward);\n // Gets pools info\n let pool_info = RewardsModule::pool_infos;\n // Ensures that reward transfer doesn't affect pool\n let new_pool_info = RewardsModule::pool_infos;\n assert_eq!(pool_info, new_pool_info, \"reward transfer does not affect the pool\");\n // Assert that Alice's share/rewards transfer to self succeeds\n assert_ok!(RewardsModule::transfer_share_and_rewards);\n // Assert that Alice's share/reward balance has now increased\n assert_eq!(RewardsModule::shares_and_withdrawn_rewards, (190, vec![(NATIVE_COIN, 190)].into_iter));\n // Alice has discovered infinite money glitch? She tries again...\n assert_ok!(RewardsModule::transfer_share_and_rewards);\n assert_eq!(RewardsModule::shares_and_withdrawn_rewards, (370, vec![(NATIVE_COIN, 370)].into_iter));\n // She transfers some of her shares/rewards to Bob\n assert_ok!(RewardsModule::transfer_share_and_rewards);\n assert_eq!(RewardsModule::shares_and_withdrawn_rewards, (300, vec![(NATIVE_COIN, 300)].into_iter));\n assert_eq!(RewardsModule::shares_and_withdrawn_rewards, (170, vec![(NATIVE_COIN, 70)].into_iter));\n // Bob decides to try it out himself\n assert_ok!(RewardsModule::transfer_share_and_rewards);\n assert_eq!(RewardsModule::shares_and_withdrawn_rewards, (270, vec![(NATIVE_COIN, 111)].into_iter));\n assert_ok!(RewardsModule::transfer_share_and_rewards);\n assert_eq!(RewardsModule::shares_and_withdrawn_rewards, (370, vec![(NATIVE_COIN, 152)].into_iter));\n });\n}\nRecommended Mitigation Steps\nInclude a check in the function that returns if who == other.\nLambda (judge) increased severity to High.\nxlc (Acala) confirmed and commented:\nFixed by this PR. Just want to highlight that transfer_share_and_rewards is not currently used.", |
| "description_summary": "The transfer_share_and_rewards function allows self-transfer, enabling users to double their shares and rewards, posing a high-severity risk.", |
| "reported_status": "Fixed by [this PR](https://github.com/open-web3-stack/open-runtime-module-library/pull/990). Just want to highlight that transfer_share_and_rewards is not currently used.", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 15, |
| "project_name": "Acala", |
| "auditor": "Code4Arena", |
| "audit_link": "https://dotpal.io/assets/files/acala-c4-2401-b63c6608d331de3f06fa256b22556968.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 1, |
| "location": "src/modules/incentives/src/lib.rs:511-523", |
| "title": "Early user can break pool via inflation attack due to no minimum liquidity check in the incentive contract", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-acala", |
| "audited_commit": "9c71c05cf2d9f0a2603984c50f76fc8a315d4d65", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "High", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "[H-02] Early user can break pool via inflation attack due to no minimum liquidity check in the incentive contract\nSubmitted by carrotsmuggler, also found by zhaojie\nThe incentive contract does not enforce a minimum liquidity limit. This means users can have as little as 1 share in the pool. This can lead to inflation attacks as described below.\nLet\u2019s imagine the state of the pool is as follows:\nThere is a single depositor, with 1000 shares deposited. Rewards have been accumulated up to 500 tokens. The user can then withdraw 998 shares, leaving 2 shares. They will also claim the rewards, and leave 1 reward token in the pool. This is the setup for the inflation attack. The user can then deposit 1 share.\nThe inflation is calculated as shown below:\nU256::from(add_amount.to_owned().saturated_into::<u128>()).saturating_mul(total_reward.to_owned().saturated_into).checked_div(initial_total_shares.to_owned().saturated_into.unwrap_or_default().as_u128().saturated_into()\nHere total_reward=1, add_amount=1 and initial_total_shares=2. So the result is calculated to 0; so inflation is 0.\nAfter this step, the initial_total_shares is updated to 3. Now the user can deposit 2 wei of shares without changing the inflation amount. Next iteration, they can deposit 4 shares. This way, the user can deposit 2**n shares each iteration, and inflate the initial_total_shares without affecting the reward inflation. This leads to the situation where the total_shares keeps growing according to the deposit, but the entire reward inflation mechanism is broken. This lets users steal reward tokens from other users, and is a high-severity issue.\nIn fact, whenever the total_reward value is less than the total_shares, this issue can be triggered. This is because in those conditions, users can create deposits and have the reward_inflation evaluate to 0. A reward_inflation of 0 basically means later users can steal rewards of earlier users, as is outlined in the docs. However, this donation attack is more effective the lower the total_shares in the system.\nProof of Concept\nThe situation can be created via the following steps:\n1. Since there is no minimum deposit, we can create a situation where total_reward < total_shares and total_shares = 2. This also works for higher values of total_shares but is most potent at this stage.\n2. User deposits 1 share, or any number of shares as long as deposit * total_reward / total_shares is less than 1. The reward_inflation will be 0, while the user gets their shares accounted for.\n3. Since total_shares has now increased, the user can deposit more shares and still have the reward_inflation be 0. This way, the user can keep depositing shares and increasing the total_shares without affecting the reward inflation.\n4. Since reward_inflation and thus total_reward has not increased, but total_shares has increased, users will lose rewards, since the rewards are calculated as total_reward * user_shares / total_shares. This means older users lose shares.\nWhile this vector is generally applicable and can lead to small losses when there\u2019s a lot of liquidity, this becomes more potent when there is very low liquidity in the pool. This was the method of attack for the Wise Lending hack and is a high-severity issue. More details can be found in the blog post outlining the attack scenario with more numbers and examples.\nTools Used\nSubstrate\nRecommended Mitigation Steps\nAdd a minimum liquidity limit. This will ensure the pool never reaches a liquidity amount so low that rounding errors become significant.\nxlc (Acala) confirmed and commented:\nIt is actually almost impossible to trigger this in production because anyone can deposit into the incentives pool at any time, i.e., before rewards start accumulating.\nFixed by this PR.", |
| "description_summary": "The incentive contract allows deposits with no minimum liquidity, enabling an inflation attack where users can inflate share counts and steal rewards from others.", |
| "reported_status": "Fixed by [this PR](https://github.com/open-web3-stack/open-runtime-module-library/pull/991).", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 15, |
| "project_name": "Acala", |
| "auditor": "Code4Arena", |
| "audit_link": "https://dotpal.io/assets/files/acala-c4-2401-b63c6608d331de3f06fa256b22556968.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 2, |
| "location": "src/orml/rewards/src/lib.rs:341-343", |
| "title": "transfer_share_and_rewards can be used to transfer out shares without transferring reward debt due to rounding", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-acala", |
| "audited_commit": "9c71c05cf2d9f0a2603984c50f76fc8a315d4d65", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "High", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Math", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Arithmetic", |
| "description": "[H-03] transfer_share_and_rewards can be used to transfer out shares without transferring reward debt due to rounding\nSubmitted by carrotsmuggler, also found by AM\nThe function transfer_share_and_rewards can be used to split up the position in a single account into multiple accounts. The contract sends some of the shares to be held by the second account, and similarly also updates the reward debt of the receiving account so that the receiver cannot take out more rewards than they deserve.\nThis is calculated in the following snippet. move_balance is the amount of the reward debt that is to be transferred to the receiver.\nlet move_balance = U256::from(balance.to_owned().saturated_into) * U256::from(move_share.to_owned().saturated_into::<u128>) / U256::from(share.to_owned().saturated_into::<u128>());\nHere we see the calculation is simple and by default is rounded down. So if balance * move_share is lower than share, move_balance evaluates to 0. So the receiving account\u2019s reward debt is not increased at all!\nincreased_rewards.entry(*reward_currency).and_modify(|increased_reward| {\n *increased_reward = increased_reward.saturating_add\n});\nSince move_balance is 0, the increased_reward is not updated. This means the new account now has shares, but no reward debt. So the receiving account can claim rewards that were already claimed.\nThis can be done multiple times to drain the reward pool.\nThe criteria is that balance * move_share has to be lower than share. This can be achieved by sending a small fraction of the funds to the receiving account, such that move_share is much lower than share. Also, if balance, the reward debt of the sender, is low, this facilitates the attack more.\nProof of Concept\nA short POC is shown here demonstrating the issue. The attacker sends to the receiver a small share of their total. The receiver is shown to have no reward debt, while the sender does have reward debt. This shows that the receiver can claim rewards already claimed by the sender.\n#[test]\nfn test_rounding() {\n ExtBuilder::default().build().execute_with(|| {\n RewardsModule::add_share(&ALICE, &DOT_POOL, 1000);\n assert_ok!(RewardsModule::accumulate_reward(&DOT_POOL, NATIVE_COIN));\n RewardsModule::claim_rewards(&ALICE, &DOT_POOL);\n let user_stat = RewardsModule::shares_and_withdrawn_rewards;\n println!(\"ALICE stat before transfer: {:?}\", user_stat);\n let user_stat = RewardsModule::shares_and_withdrawn_rewards;\n println!(\"BOB stat before transfer: {:?}\", user_stat);\n assert_ok!(RewardsModule::transfer_share_and_rewards(&ALICE, &DOT_POOL));\n let user_stat = RewardsModule::shares_and_withdrawn_rewards;\n println!(\"ALICE stat after transfer: {:?}\", user_stat);\n let user_stat = RewardsModule::shares_and_withdrawn_rewards;\n println!(\"BOB stat after transfer: {:?}\", user_stat);\n });\n}\nOutput:\n# Output is of the form ( ${share_balance}, {0: ${reward_debt}} )\nALICE stat before transfer: (1000, {0: 100})\nBOB stat before transfer: (0, {})\nALICE stat after transfer: (995, {0: 100})\nBOB stat after transfer: (5, {0: 0})\ntest tests::test_rounding ... ok\nThe output shows that ALICE has 1000 shares and 100 reward debt, since ALICE just claimed her rewards. Alice sends BOB 5 shares. BOB ends up with 5 shares and 0 reward debt. So BOB can claim rewards again, even though it\u2019s the same money!\nTools Used\nSubstrate\nRecommended Mitigation Steps\nThe calculation of move_balance should be changed to saturated round up instead of rounding down. This will ensure that the receiving account\u2019s reward debt is updated correctly. The saturated rounding up is important since the reward debt should never be larger than the reward pool, or it will cause underflow errors when subtracting.\nAnother option is to revert transfer_share_and_rewards operations if the reward debt of the receiving account is calculated to be 0, unless the sending account ALSO has a reward debt of 0.\nAssessed type\nMath\nxlc (Acala) confirmed and commented:\nJust want to highlight that transfer_share_and_rewards is not currently used.\nWe will choose to not fix this issue as the impact is relatively small and a complete fix is non-trivial. I don\u2019t think it is possible to make a profit that is more than the transaction fee anyway.", |
| "description_summary": "The transfer_share_and_rewards function can be exploited to transfer shares without updating reward debt, allowing users to drain the reward pool.", |
| "reported_status": "Just want to highlight that transfer_share_and_rewards is not currently used. We will choose to not fix this issue as the impact are relatively small and a complete fix is non-trivial. I don\u2019t think it is possible to make profit that is more than transaction fee anyway.", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 15, |
| "project_name": "Acala", |
| "auditor": "Code4Arena", |
| "audit_link": "https://dotpal.io/assets/files/acala-c4-2401-b63c6608d331de3f06fa256b22556968.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 3, |
| "location": "src/modules/incentives/src/lib.rs:451-457", |
| "title": "Claiming rewards while the deduction rate is != 0 , allows for repeated withdrawal of redistributed rewards", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-acala", |
| "audited_commit": "9c71c05cf2d9f0a2603984c50f76fc8a315d4d65", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Medium", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "[M-01] Claiming rewards while the deduction rate is != 0 allows for repeated withdrawal of redistributed rewards\nSubmitted by n4nika, also found by ABAIKUNANBAEV and djxploit\nIf a participant in a pool claims rewards while the deduction rate is not equal to 0, the deducted rewards are redistributed between all participants.\n\nfn payout_reward_and_reaccumulate_reward(\n pool_id: PoolId,\n who: &T::AccountId,\n reward_currency_id: CurrencyId,\n payout_amount: Balance,\n reaccumulate_amount: Balance,\n) -> DispatchResult {\n if !reaccumulate_amount.is_zero() {\n <orml_rewards::Pallet<T>>::accumulate_reward\n }\n T::Currency::transfer(reward_currency_id, &Self::\n Ok(())\n}\n\nSince the deduction is redistributed between all participants (including the one claiming the reward), they can repeatedly claim rewards and receive more from the rewards pool than intended.\n\nProof of Concept:\n\n#[test]\nfn repeated_claiming() {\n ExtBuilder::default().build().execute_with(|| {\n assert_ok!(TokensModule::deposit(BTC, &VAULT::get()));\n assert_ok!(IncentivesModule::update_claim_reward_deduction(RuntimeOrigin::signed(ROOT::get()), vec![(PoolId::Dex(BTC_AUSD_LP), Rate::new(400)]));\n \n // 40% deduction rate\n assert_ok!(IncentivesModule::update_claim_reward_deduction(RuntimeOrigin::signed(ROOT::get()), vec![(PoolId::Dex(BTC_AUSD_LP), Rate::new(400)]));\n\n // Add participants with equal shares\n TokensModule::deposit(BTC_AUSD_LP, &ALICE::get());\n TokensModule::deposit(BTC_AUSD_LP, &BOB::get());\n IncentivesModule::update_incentive_rewards();\n\n // ALICE claims her reward and should receive the full deduction-adjusted amount\n assert_ok!(IncentivesModule::claim_rewards(&ALICE));\n let btc_before = TokensModule::total_balance();\n\n // ALICE claims again after redistribution\n assert_ok!(IncentivesModule::claim_rewards(&ALICE));\n let btc_after = TokensModule::total_balance();\n\n assert_eq!(btc_before, btc_after);\n });\n}\n\nRecommended Mitigation Steps:\nAdd the claiming user to accumulate_rewards and implement reaccumulating rewards excluding the calling user.\n\nxlc (Acala) disputed and commented: This is intended behavior and not an issue.", |
| "description_summary": "Participants can repeatedly claim redistributed rewards when the deduction rate is not zero, allowing them to gain more rewards than intended.", |
| "reported_status": "This is intended behaviour and non issue.", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 15, |
| "project_name": "Acala", |
| "auditor": "Code4Arena", |
| "audit_link": "https://dotpal.io/assets/files/acala-c4-2401-b63c6608d331de3f06fa256b22556968.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 4, |
| "location": "src/modules/incentives/src/lib.rs:188-217", |
| "title": "Incentive accumulation can be sandwiched with additional shares to gain advantage over long-term depositors", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-acala", |
| "audited_commit": "9c71c05cf2d9f0a2603984c50f76fc8a315d4d65", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Medium", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "MEV", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "[M-02] Incentive accumulation can be sandwiched with additional shares to gain advantage over long-term depositors\nSubmitted by 0xTheC0der, also found by zhaojie, djxploit, and carrotsmuggler\nIncentives are accumulated periodically in intervals of T::AccumulatePeriod blocks. A fixed incentive reward amount, which is set via update_incentive_rewards(...), is accumulated among all deposited shares of a respective pool. If only 1 share is deposited, it is entitled to all the rewards of this period; if N shares are deposited, the rewards are split among them.\nTo be eligible for rewards, it is sufficient to deposit (DEX) shares before accumulate_incentives(...) is called via the on_initialize hook. Afterward, rewards can be immediately claimed, and (DEX) shares can be withdrawn without any unbonding period or other block/time-related restrictions.\n\nConsequences:\n\u2022 Users can sandwich the incentive accumulation via deposit, claim, and withdraw.\n\u2022 Adversaries can borrow vast amounts of (DEX) shares to crowd out honest users during incentive accumulation and gain an unfairly high share of the fixed rewards.\n\nProof of Concept:\nThe provided diff modifies the existing test case transfer_reward_and_update_rewards_storage_atomically_when_accumulate_incentives_work() to demonstrate that the same total reward amount is accumulated even if twice as many total shares are deposited.\n\n```diff\n@@ -1171,10 +1171,11 @@ fn transfer_reward_and_update_rewards_stora\n assert_eq!(TokensModule::free_balance(AUSD, &VAULT);\n RewardsModule::add_share(&ALICE::get(), &PoolId::Loans);\n+\n RewardsModule::add_share(&BOB::get(), &PoolId::Loans);\n assert_eq!(\n RewardsModule::pool_infos(PoolId::Loans(LDO)),\n PoolInfo {\n- total_shares: 1,\n+ total_shares: 2,\n ..Default::default()\n }\n );\n```\n\nRecommended Mitigation Steps:\nTrack deposited shares in between accumulation intervals and scale the incentive rewards according to the actual deposit duration.\n\nAssessed type: MEV\nxlc (Acala) disputed and commented: To exploit this, an attacker would need to acquire a large number of DEX shares and wait for a block, which incurs costs. It is economically unfeasible to profit from this behavior.\nLambda (judge) commented: While external conditions (like liquidity availability) may not always align, the described scenario demonstrates a valid medium severity leak under reasonable assumptions.", |
| "description_summary": "Incentive rewards can be exploited by depositing and withdrawing large shares around accumulation periods, crowding out long-term depositors.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 15, |
| "project_name": "Acala", |
| "auditor": "Code4Arena", |
| "audit_link": "https://dotpal.io/assets/files/acala-c4-2401-b63c6608d331de3f06fa256b22556968.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 5, |
| "location": "src/modules/earning/src/lib.rs:188-196", |
| "title": "Unbond_instant removes incorrect amount of shares", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-acala", |
| "audited_commit": "9c71c05cf2d9f0a2603984c50f76fc8a315d4d65", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Medium", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "[M-03] Unbond_instant removes incorrect amount of shares\nSubmitted by TheSchnilch, also found by Aymen0909\nWith unbond_instant, a user can unbond a bonded amount directly without having to wait. However, they must pay a fee for this:\n\nlet amount = change.change;\nlet fee = fee_ratio.mul_ceil(amount);\nlet final_amount = amount.saturating_sub(fee);\nlet unbalance = T::Currency::withdraw(&who, fee, WithdrawReasons::T);\nT::OnUnstakeFee::on_unbalanced(unbalance);\nT::OnUnbonded::happened(&(who.clone(), final_amount));\n\nHere, the mistake is that T::OnUnbonded::happened is called with final_amount, meaning without a fee. As a result, a portion of the shares that were added as shares during bonding can no longer be removed. This, in turn, leads to these shares still receiving rewards that other users cannot receive.\n\nIf you insert a println! statement into the functions bond and unbond_instant to display the amounts with which OnBonded::happened and OnUnbonded::happened are called, you will see when you execute the following code that not all shares are removed when the bonded amount of a user is removed with unbond_instant:\n\nFor bond:\n+ println!(\"change.change: {:?}\", change.change);\nT::OnBonded::happened(&(who.clone(), change.change));\nSelf::deposit_event(Event::Bonded { who, amount: change.change });\n\nFor unbond_instant:\n+ println!(\"final_amount: {:?}\", final_amount);\nT::OnUnbonded::happened(&(who.clone(), final_amount));\nSelf::deposit_event(Event::InstantUnbonded { who, amount: final_amount, fee });\n\nCode to test both functions:\n#[test]\nfn poc() {\n ExtBuilder::default().build().execute_with(|| {\n assert_ok!(Earning::bond(RuntimeOrigin::signed(...)));\n assert_ok!(Earning::unbond_instant(RuntimeOrigin::signed(...)));\n });\n}\n\nThe code can be executed with the command: cargo test poc -- --nocapture.\n\nImpact:\nEvery time a user calls unbond_instant, some shares will remain in the reward system and continue to accumulate rewards that other users who actually bond can no longer get. These shares can no longer be removed and are stuck. With a maximum fee of 20%, some shares could accumulate over time and continue to accumulate rewards. The owners of these stuck shares can still claim these rewards, causing an imbalance where one share is no longer equivalent to one underlying token.\n\nRecommendation:\nFor unbond_instant, the final_amount should not be used to remove the shares, but change.change should be used instead.\n\nxlc (Acala) confirmed and commented: See the fix here.", |
| "description_summary": "The unbond_instant function removes fewer shares than intended due to an incorrect fee deduction, causing stuck shares to accumulate rewards unfairly.", |
| "reported_status": "See the fix [here](https://github.com/AcalaNetwork/Acala/pull/2735).", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 15, |
| "project_name": "Acala", |
| "auditor": "Code4Arena", |
| "audit_link": "https://dotpal.io/assets/files/acala-c4-2401-b63c6608d331de3f06fa256b22556968.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 6, |
| "location": "src/modules/incentives/src/lib.rs:230", |
| "title": "Storage can be bloated with low liquidity positions", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-acala", |
| "audited_commit": "9c71c05cf2d9f0a2603984c50f76fc8a315d4d65", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Medium", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Denial of Service (DoS) and Spamming", |
| "description": "[M-04] Storage can be bloated with low liquidity positions\nSubmitted by ZanyBonzy, also found by Bauchibred and carrotsmuggler\nThe deposit_dex_share function enforces no minimum amount that can be deposited into the pool, allowing for the creation of multiple low-liquidity positions. This enables a coordinated effort where users or attackers, for a relatively low cost, can create numerous low-liquidity positions, bloating the runtime storage.\n\nThis issue is significant as the Substrate framework requires storage optimization to prevent bloat, which can lead to high maintenance costs for the chain and potential denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.\n\nProof of Concept:\nThe test case below demonstrates how a user can create multiple 1 wei positions:\n\n#[test]\nfn open_low_liquidity_positions() {\n ExtBuilder::default().build().execute_with(|| {\n assert_ok!(TokensModule::deposit(BTC_AUSD_LP, &ALICE::get(), 1));\n assert_ok!(IncentivesModule::deposit_dex_share(RuntimeOrigin::signed(ALICE::get()), BTC_AUSD_LP, 1));\n assert_ok!(IncentivesModule::deposit_dex_share(RuntimeOrigin::signed(ALICE::get()), BTC_AUSD_LP, 1));\n assert_ok!(IncentivesModule::deposit_dex_share(RuntimeOrigin::signed(ALICE::get()), BTC_AUSD_LP, 1));\n assert_eq!(RewardsModule::pool_infos(PoolId::Dex(BTC_AUSD_LP)).total_shares, 3);\n });\n}\n\nThe user creates three 1 wei positions, effectively bloating the pool's storage with minimal cost.\n\nRecommended Mitigation Steps:\nIntroduce a minimum deposit amount to prevent the creation of low-liquidity positions.\n\nxlc (Acala) confirmed and commented: Fixed here.", |
| "description_summary": "The deposit_dex_share function allows creating multiple low-liquidity positions, leading to storage bloat and potential denial-of-service risks.", |
| "reported_status": "Fixed [here](https://github.com/open-web3-stack/open-runtime-module-library/pull/991).", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 15, |
| "project_name": "Acala", |
| "auditor": "Code4Arena", |
| "audit_link": "https://dotpal.io/assets/files/acala-c4-2401-b63c6608d331de3f06fa256b22556968.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 7, |
| "location": "/src/modules/incentives/src/lib.rs:83-85", |
| "title": "Admin is a single point of failure", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-acala", |
| "audited_commit": "9c71c05cf2d9f0a2603984c50f76fc8a315d4d65", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "[01] Admin is a single point of failure\nMultiple instances in code where the admin logic could lead to a brick in normal functionality.\nFor example, take a look here.\n The origin which may update incentive related p\ntype UpdateOrigin: EnsureOrigin<Self::RuntimeOrigin\nThis is an instance where a somewhat admin logic has been applied, note that this is passed in the config\u2019s constant paller. Now using this search command, we can see that there are three function calls where the expected caller is only accepted to be the update incentive related params.\nImpact\nInaccess to update incentive related params if anything was to happen to the UpdateOrigin.\nRecommended Mitigation Steps\nConsider implementing a backdoor that the admins could use to change the incentive related params if anything were to happen to UpdateOrigin.", |
| "description_summary": "Admin logic creates a single point of failure, risking loss of access to update incentive-related parameters if the UpdateOrigin becomes inaccessible.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 15, |
| "project_name": "Acala", |
| "auditor": "Code4Arena", |
| "audit_link": "https://dotpal.io/assets/files/acala-c4-2401-b63c6608d331de3f06fa256b22556968.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 8, |
| "location": "/src/orml/rewards/src/lib.rs:143-190", |
| "title": "Consider adding better documentation", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-acala", |
| "audited_commit": "9c71c05cf2d9f0a2603984c50f76fc8a315d4d65", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "[02] Consider adding better documentation\nThis is very rampant in code, for example, take a look here.\npub fn add_share(who: &T::AccountId, pool: &T::PoolId, add_\nif add_amount.is_zero() {\nreturn;\n}\nPoolInfos::<T>::mutate(pool, |pool_info| {\nlet initial_total_shares = pool_info.total_\npool_info.total_shares = pool_info.total_sh\nlet mut withdrawn_inflation = Vec\npool_info\n.rewards\n.iter_mut()\n.for_each(|(reward_currency, (total\nlet reward_inflation =\nZero::zero\n} else {\nU256::from\n.\n.\n.\n.\n.\n};\n*total_reward = total_rewar\n*total_withdrawn_reward = t\nwithdrawn_inflation.\n});\nSharesAndWithdrawnRewards::<T>::mutate\n*share = share.saturating_add\n// update withdrawn inflation for e\nwithdrawn_inflation\n.into_iter()\n.for_each(|(reward_currency\nwithdrawn_rewards\n.\n.\n})\n.\n});\n});\n});\n}\nEvidently, this function is somewhat complex, i.e. the type of mathematical operations attached with it. However, that isn\u2019t the main case here. There are completely no documentations as to why some steps are taken, this heavily stalls the auditing process as we and other security researchers don\u2019t know what the intended behaviour is and can\u2019t really sit to break it.\nImpact\nHard time understanding code for users/devs/auditors lead to bad integration.\nRecommended Mitigation Steps\nConsider adding better documentations to even if not all functions then at least the core/complex ones.", |
| "description_summary": "Lack of documentation in complex functions makes it difficult for developers, users, and auditors to understand the intended behavior, leading to potential misinterpretation and bad integration.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": false, |
| "audited_project_id": 15, |
| "project_name": "Acala", |
| "auditor": "Code4Arena", |
| "audit_link": "https://dotpal.io/assets/files/acala-c4-2401-b63c6608d331de3f06fa256b22556968.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 9, |
| "location": "src/orml/rewards/src/lib.rs:252-262\nsrc/modules/incentives/src/lib.rs:280-312,320", |
| "title": "Setters should always have equality checkers", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-acala", |
| "audited_commit": "9c71c05cf2d9f0a2603984c50f76fc8a315d4d65", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "[03] Setters should always have equality checkers\nTake a look here.\npub fn set_share(who: &T::AccountId, pool: &T::PoolId, new_\nlet (share, _) = Self::shares_and_withdrawn_rewards\nif new_share > share {\nSelf::add_share(who, pool, new_share.\n} else {\nSelf::remove_share(who, pool, share.\n}\n}\nThis function sets a new share value for a pool, now there are no checks that new_share != share and as such whenever new_share == share the protocol unnecessarily (wrongly) attempts to remove via share.saturating_sub(new_share).\nAnother instance can be seen here, where the protocol in all instances of updating the amounts doesn\u2019t check if the provided amount is not already the stored amount and as such unnecessarily updates v, see here.\npub fn update_incentive_rewards(\norigin: OriginFor<T>,\nupdates: Vec<(PoolId, Vec<(CurrencyId, Bala\n) -> DispatchResult {\nT::UpdateOrigin::ensure_origin(origin)?;\nfor (pool_id, update_list) in updates {\nif let PoolId::Dex(currency_id) = p\nensure!(currency_id.\n}\nfor (currency_id, amount)\nIncentiveRewardAmounts::<T>\nlet mut v = maybe_a\nif amount != v {\nv = amount;\nSelf\n});\n}\nif v.is_zero\n*maybe_amou\n} else {\n*maybe_amou\n}\n});\n}\n}\nOk(())\n}\nThe same idea can also be applied to this update_claim_reward_deduction_rates() function.\nImpact\nUnnecessary code execution, flawed implementation.\nRecommended Mitigation Steps\nAs a rule of thumb, all setters should always have equality checkers as passing an equal value to the already stored value hints a mistake and maybe this attempt to add/remove was meant for a different pool.", |
| "description_summary": "Missing equality checks in setters can lead to unnecessary code execution and flawed implementation when the new value is equal to the stored value.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 15, |
| "project_name": "Acala", |
| "auditor": "Code4Arena", |
| "audit_link": "https://dotpal.io/assets/files/acala-c4-2401-b63c6608d331de3f06fa256b22556968.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 10, |
| "location": "src/modules/incentives/src/lib.rs:578-587", |
| "title": "OnUpdateLoan::happened() should check for when adjustment == 0", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-acala", |
| "audited_commit": "9c71c05cf2d9f0a2603984c50f76fc8a315d4d65", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "[04] OnUpdateLoan::happened() should check for when adjustment == 0\nTake a look here.\nfn happened(info: &(T::AccountId, CurrencyId, Amount, Balan\nlet (who, currency_id, adjustment, _previous_amount\nlet adjustment_abs = TryInto::<Balance>::\nif adjustment.is_positive() {\n<orml_rewards::Pallet<T>>::add_share\n} else {\n<orml_rewards::Pallet<T>>::remove_share\n};\n}\nThis function has been used to settle adjustments in the protocol. The main issue about this report is the fact that adding/removing the share is dependent on if the adjustment is positive or not. This is a somewhat flawed implementation, as the is_positive() getter would actually return false for when adjustment == 0 and as such lead to an unnecessary attempt of removing 0 shares.\nImpact\nNot enough input validation is applied, not the best code structure.\nRecommended Mitigation Steps\nConsider checking in the function to ensure that for instances where adjustment == 0, neither add_shares() nor remove_shares() is called.", |
| "description_summary": "The function does not handle cases where adjustment == 0, leading to unnecessary calls to add_shares() or remove_shares().", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 15, |
| "project_name": "Acala", |
| "auditor": "Code4Arena", |
| "audit_link": "https://dotpal.io/assets/files/acala-c4-2401-b63c6608d331de3f06fa256b22556968.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 11, |
| "location": "/src/modules/incentives/src/lib.rs:511-543", |
| "title": "Protocol does not apply deadlines when dealing with critical operations", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-acala", |
| "audited_commit": "9c71c05cf2d9f0a2603984c50f76fc8a315d4d65", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "[05] Protocol does not apply deadlines when dealing with critical operations\nConsider the code here.\nfn do_deposit_dex_share(who: &T::AccountId, lp_currency_id:\nensure!(lp_currency_id.is_dex_share_currency_id\nT::Currency::transfer(lp_currency_id, who, &\n<orml_rewards::Pallet<T>>::add_share(who, &PoolId::\nSelf::deposit_event(Event::DepositDexShare {\nwho: who.clone(),\ndex_share_type: lp_currency_id,\ndeposit: amount,\n});\nOk(())\n}\nfn do_withdraw_dex_share(who: &T::AccountId, lp_currency_id\nensure!(lp_currency_id.is_dex_share_currency_id\nensure!(\n<orml_rewards::Pallet<T>>::shares_and_withd\nError::<T>::NotEnough,\n);\nT::Currency::transfer(lp_currency_id, &Self\n<orml_rewards::Pallet<T>>::remove_share(who, &PoolI\nSelf::deposit_event(Event::WithdrawDexShare {\nwho: who.clone(),\ndex_share_type: lp_currency_id,\nwithdraw: amount,\n});\nOk(())\n}\n}\nBoth functions are used to either deposit/withdraw dex shares from the LPs by passing in the currency, which is in short just like a swap. The issue is that these functions do not include any deadline protection whatsoever. The transaction could be left hanging for a long time and end up being executed in unfavorable situations.\nImpact\nThis is a pretty popular bug case, where no deadlines have been applied and could lead to users losing funds, sometimes in USD equivalent, since their transactions might execute under less favorable conditions than intended.\nRecommended Mitigation Steps\nConsider requesting a deadline to which a user would like their transaction to be hanging for, and ensure that if the deadline has passed, the function does not get executed.", |
| "description_summary": "Critical operations lack deadline protection, allowing transactions to hang and potentially execute under unfavorable conditions, leading to possible user losses.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 15, |
| "project_name": "Acala", |
| "auditor": "Code4Arena", |
| "audit_link": "https://dotpal.io/assets/files/acala-c4-2401-b63c6608d331de3f06fa256b22556968.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 12, |
| "location": "/src/modules/earning/src/lib.rs:153-158\nsrc/modules/incentives/src/lib.rs:258-269", |
| "title": "Fix typos", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-acala", |
| "audited_commit": "9c71c05cf2d9f0a2603984c50f76fc8a315d4d65", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "[06] Fix typos\nTake a look here.\n Start unbonding tokens up to `amount`.\n If bonded amount is less than `amount`, then al\n unbonding. Token will finish unbonding after `U\n#[pallet::call_index(1)]\n#[pallet::weight(T::WeightInfo::unbond())]\npub fn unbond(origin: OriginFor<T>, #[pallet::compa\n//..sip\nThe sentence: \u201cToken will finish unbonding after UnbondingPeriod blocks.\u201d should instead be: \u201dTokens will finish unbonding after UnbondingPeriod blocks.\u201d\nAnother instance can be seen here.\n Claim all available multi currencies rewards fo\n\n The dispatch origin of this call must be `Signe\n\n - `pool_id`: pool type\n#[pallet::call_index(2)]\n#[pallet::weight(<T as Config>::WeightInfo::claim_r\npub fn claim_rewards(origin: OriginFor<T>, pool_id:\nlet who = ensure_signed(origin)?;\nSelf::do_claim_rewards(who, pool_id)\n}\nThe first line should be 'Claim all available multi currencies rewards for specific PoolId.' instead.", |
| "description_summary": "Typos in comments and documentation can lead to confusion and misinterpretation of intended functionality.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": false, |
| "audited_project_id": 15, |
| "project_name": "Acala", |
| "auditor": "Code4Arena", |
| "audit_link": "https://dotpal.io/assets/files/acala-c4-2401-b63c6608d331de3f06fa256b22556968.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 13, |
| "location": "src/orml/rewards/src/lib.rs:21-26", |
| "title": "Consider using BST instead", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-acala", |
| "audited_commit": "9c71c05cf2d9f0a2603984c50f76fc8a315d4d65", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "[07] Consider using BST instead\nTake a look here.\npub struct PoolInfo<Share: HasCompact, Balance: HasCompact, CurrencyId> {\n Total shares amount\n pub total_shares: Share,\n Reward infos <reward_currency, (total_reward, total_withdrawn)>\n pub rewards: BTreeMap<CurrencyId, (Balance, Balance)>,\n}\nEvidently, the reward infos are stored in a B-Tree map, which is, in short, an ordered map based on a B-Tree.\nB-Trees represent a fundamental compromise between cache-efficiency and actually minimizing the amount of work performed in a search. In theory, a binary search tree (BST) is the optimal choice for a sorted map, as a perfectly balanced BST performs the theoretical minimum amount of comparisons necessary to find an element (log2n).\nImpact:\nNon-optimized method of finding elements.\nRecommended Mitigation Steps:\nConsider using binary search trees instead.", |
| "description_summary": "Non-optimized element lookup due to the use of a B-Tree map instead of a more efficient binary search tree (BST).", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 15, |
| "project_name": "Acala", |
| "auditor": "Code4Arena", |
| "audit_link": "https://dotpal.io/assets/files/acala-c4-2401-b63c6608d331de3f06fa256b22556968.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 14, |
| "location": "src/orml/rewards/src/lib.rs:1-3", |
| "title": "Consider not switching o\ufb00 important clippy protection methods", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/code-423n4/2024-03-acala", |
| "audited_commit": "9c71c05cf2d9f0a2603984c50f76fc8a315d4d65", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "[08] Consider not switching off important clippy protection methods\nTake a look here.\n#![cfg_attr(not(feature = std), no_std)]\n#![allow(clippy::unused_unit)]\n#![allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]\nProtocol disallows clippy to run the auto tool to warn about unused units or too many arguments; whereas too many arguments could be understandable since it\u2019s for the claim_one() function here. A justification can\u2019t be made for not wanting to use clippy::unused_unit.\nImpact:\nBad code structure.\nRecommended Mitigation Steps:\nIn most cases, implementations that have unused units are mostly flawed and should be sorted out.\nLambda (judge) commented:\nSome of the other ones are opinionated, but not necessarily invalid.\nxlc (Acala) disputed and commented:\n[01], [05], and [07] are completely invalid. Others are super minor.\n[01] - is 100% not an issue. This is how Substrate pallet works.\n[05] - doesn\u2019t make sense. There is no swap happening. The LP tokens are minted already and this only stakes the already minted token.\n[07] - doesn\u2019t make sense and wouldn\u2019t make any difference anyway for the given amount of expected items. It is a premature optimization.", |
| "description_summary": "The code disables important Clippy protection methods, allowing potential bad code structures due to unused units and excessive function arguments.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 15, |
| "project_name": "Acala", |
| "auditor": "Code4Arena", |
| "audit_link": "https://dotpal.io/assets/files/acala-c4-2401-b63c6608d331de3f06fa256b22556968.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 0, |
| "location": "evm-template/runtime/src/configs/xcm_config.rs", |
| "title": "EVM runtime template waives XCM message delivery fees", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates", |
| "audited_commit": "c9a2c76a9db2e114eecaeba07195f9c2bdfaa094", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "29c6332022c2b84a19de14356e4adc942484ea64", |
| "reported_impact": "High", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Denial of Service (DoS) and Spamming", |
| "description": "3.2.1 EVM runtime template waives XCM message delivery fees\n\nAttack scenario:\nEVM runtime template waives XCM message delivery fee\n\nLocation:\nevm-template/runtime/src/configs/xcm_config.rs\n\nAttack impact:\nAn attacker can cause network congestion causing delay in message deliveries or discards and storage exhaustions\n\nSeverity:\nHigh\n\nStatus:\nFixed [6]\n\nTo avoid congestion and spamming of messages in the network via XCM, a fee is charged for message delivery to ensure fairness and optimal message delivery time amongst all the participants. This fee is configured in the runtime construct through use of FeeManager type.\n\nIn the EVM template for XCM runtime configuration for OpenZeppelin, the FeeManager [7] is set to the Rust unit type \"()\". In the Polkadot-SDK, this implementation effectively waives the delivery fees [8].\n\nThereby all fee-based congestion control mechanisms become ineffective since the fees are not actually charged. An attacker can cause congestion, possibly leading to long delays in message delivery, storage exhaustion and/or dropping of messages.\n\nWe recommend implementing a fee for XCM message delivery and follow the fix implemented in the OpenZeppelin generic template [9].", |
| "description_summary": "XCM message delivery fees are waived, allowing attackers to cause network congestion and message delays.", |
| "reported_status": "Fixed [6] [Online]. Available: https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates/pull/239", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 16, |
| "project_name": "PolkadotRunetimeTemplates", |
| "auditor": "Security Research Labs", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates/blob/main/audits/2024-07.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 1, |
| "location": "generic-template/runtime/src/configs/mod.rs", |
| "title": "Incorrect runtime weights for treasury pallet", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates", |
| "audited_commit": "c9a2c76a9db2e114eecaeba07195f9c2bdfaa094", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "5e61a2d8a6ddeaf0258c664d11205494227a4273", |
| "reported_impact": "High", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Weight Management", |
| "description": "3.2.2 Incorrect runtime weights for treasury pallet\n\nAttack scenario:\nIncorrect runtime weights for treasury pallet\n\nLocation:\ngeneric-template/runtime/src/configs/mod.rs\n\nAttack impact:\nExtrinsic weights in treasury pallet are not dependent on the actual runtime configuration, this could lead to underweight extrinsics\n\nSeverity:\nHigh\n\nStatus:\nFixed [10]\n\nOpenZeppelin\u2019s runtime template constructs runtime logics with FRAME pallets in its configuration. Appropriate benchmarking is required for the pallets to ensure its actual runtime performance. This will effectively transform into charging adequate fee for extrinsics execution.\n\nFor example, the runtime weights for the pallet treasury [11] in the EVM runtime template are configured using the default SubstrateWeight.\n\nAs these pallet extrinsic weights are not dependent on the actual runtime configuration and using default Substrate weights could lead to underweight extrinsics. An attacker may spam and bloat network storage freely using these underweight extrinsics.\n\nThe WeightInfo of the treasury pallet should be configured using actual runtime benchmarks. A best practice example for configuring the weights of the treasury pallet can be found in the Kusama runtime implementation [12].", |
| "description_summary": "Incorrect runtime weights for the treasury pallet could lead to underweight extrinsics, allowing attackers to spam and bloat network storage.", |
| "reported_status": "Fixed [10] [Online]. Available: https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates/pull/240.", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 16, |
| "project_name": "PolkadotRunetimeTemplates", |
| "auditor": "Security Research Labs", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates/blob/main/audits/2024-07.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 2, |
| "location": "evm-template/runtime/src/constants.rs", |
| "title": "Existential deposit of EVM template could suggest setting it to 0", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates", |
| "audited_commit": "c9a2c76a9db2e114eecaeba07195f9c2bdfaa094", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Denial of Service (DoS) and Spamming", |
| "description": "3.2.3 Existential deposit of EVM template could suggest setting it to 0\n\nAttack scenario:\nExistential deposit configuration is suggested to be zero\n\nLocation:\nevm-template/runtime/src/constants.rs\n\nAttack impact:\nExistential deposit of 0 could lead to spamming through creating a high number of accounts and thereby slowing down the chain operation\n\nSeverity:\nLow\n\nStatus:\nRisk accepted [13]\n\nThe minimum balance that an account must maintain to be considered a valid active account in Polkadot is EXISTENTIAL_DEPOSIT (ED). If an account\u2019s balance falls below this threshold, all its funds are lost, and the account is removed by the network.\n\nIn the EVM template, ED is set [14] to zero for no benchmark feature build. A new runtime developer may accidentally set the ED value to zero. This could lead to an attacker creating multiple free accounts, occupying network resources and slowing down the chain. Allowing an account to remain active with zero ED could also lead to a spam attack.\n\nIt is recommended to remove the ED value of zero from the runtime template and document in inline comment that its value must be above zero. Every parachain will have its own threshold for ED, either in their native token or DOT. Furthermore, we recommend explaining these two configurations in the inline comment for the ED parameter in the runtime template. This will benefit new runtime developers by helping them avoid misconfiguring this safety-critical parameter.\n\nA guideline on choosing a suitable ED value may be provided as below:\n\ud835\udc38\ud835\udc37 = \ud835\udc40\ud835\udc56\ud835\udc5b \ud835\udc41\ud835\udc62\ud835\udc5a\ud835\udc4f\ud835\udc52\ud835\udc5f \ud835\udc5c\ud835\udc53 \ud835\udc5f\ud835\udc52\ud835\udc51\ud835\udc62\ud835\udc5b\ud835\udc51\ud835\udc4e\ud835\udc5b\ud835\udc61 \ud835\udc50\ud835\udc5c\ud835\udc59\ud835\udc59\ud835\udc4e\ud835\udc61\ud835\udc5c\ud835\udc5f\ud835\udc60 \u00d7 \ud835\udc46\ud835\udc61\ud835\udc5c\ud835\udc5f\ud835\udc4e\ud835\udc54\ud835\udc52 \ud835\udc51\ud835\udc62\ud835\udc5f\ud835\udc4e\ud835\udc61\ud835\udc56\ud835\udc5c\ud835\udc5b (\ud835\udc66\ud835\udc52\ud835\udc4e\ud835\udc5f\ud835\udc60) \u00d7 \ud835\udc46\ud835\udc61\ud835\udc5c\ud835\udc5f\ud835\udc4e\ud835\udc54\ud835\udc52 \ud835\udc50\ud835\udc5c\ud835\udc60\ud835\udc61 \ud835\udc5d\ud835\udc52\ud835\udc5f \ud835\udc66\ud835\udc52\ud835\udc4e\ud835\udc5f", |
| "description_summary": "Existential deposit set to zero could allow attackers to spam the network by creating multiple free accounts.", |
| "reported_status": "Risk accepted [13] [Online]. Available: https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates/issues/195.", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 16, |
| "project_name": "PolkadotRunetimeTemplates", |
| "auditor": "Security Research Labs", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates/blob/main/audits/2024-07.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 3, |
| "location": "evm-template/runtime/src/configs/mod.rs", |
| "title": "Incorrect parameter could lead to runtime panic", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates", |
| "audited_commit": "c9a2c76a9db2e114eecaeba07195f9c2bdfaa094", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "526adb32c5809862ec4cce5cf50d8bd57d906808", |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Arithmetic", |
| "description": "3.2.4 Incorrect parameter could lead to runtime panic\n\nAttack scenario:\nMisconfiguration of dependent critical parameters in runtime\n\nLocation:\nevm-template/runtime/src/configs/mod.rs\n\nAttack impact:\nRuntime crash or wraparound of gas limit ratio causing runtime panics\n\nSeverity:\nLow\n\nStatus:\nFixed [15]\n\nThe GasLimitPovSizeRatio [16] is the ratio of the amount of Gas (BlockGasLimit) to the Proof Size (MAX_POV_SIZE) for a block. The GasLimitPovSizeRatio is used in GasWeightMapping [17] to obtain the weight of the corresponding proof size.\n\nIn the EVM runtime template, GasLimitPovSizeRatio may reach a large value or wrap to zero causing runtime crash. This can be enabled through setting the dependent parameter BlockGasLimit to zero or Max value in the runtime.\n\nEnsure that GasLimitPovSizeRatio is bounded within U64 data following the implementation in Frontier template from Polkadot [18]. Also consider documenting the risk of deviating outside the range such that the runtime developer is aware of potential risk from misconfiguring this value.", |
| "description_summary": "Misconfigured GasLimitPovSizeRatio could cause runtime crashes or wraparounds due to improper parameter values.", |
| "reported_status": "Fixed [15] [Online]. Available: https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates/pull/246.", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 16, |
| "project_name": "PolkadotRunetimeTemplates", |
| "auditor": "Security Research Labs", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates/blob/main/audits/2024-07.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 4, |
| "location": "runtime/src/configs/mod.rs", |
| "title": "Usage of deprecated CurrencyAdapter in transaction_payment", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates", |
| "audited_commit": "c9a2c76a9db2e114eecaeba07195f9c2bdfaa094", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Dependency", |
| "description": "3.2.5 Usage of depreciated CurrencyAdapter in transaction_payment\n\nAttack scenario:\nUsage may result in unexpected behavior and future edge-cases.\n\nLocation:\nruntime/src/configs/mod.rs\n\nAttack impact:\nThere may be inconsistencies in the computation of transferable balances, and future undefined behavior.\n\nSeverity:\nLow\n\nStatus:\nOpen [19]\n\nThe runtime configuration for pallet_transaction_payment relies on the deprecated (since v1.6.0) CurrencyAdapter [20].\n\nThe discrepancy this introduces may result in unexpected behavior and inconsistencies when calculating transferable balances. We recommend migrating to the supported FungibleAdapter and Fungible traits.", |
| "description_summary": "Deprecated CurrencyAdapter may cause inconsistencies in balance calculations and undefined behavior.", |
| "reported_status": "Open [19] [Online]. Available: https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates/issues/251.", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 16, |
| "project_name": "PolkadotRunetimeTemplates", |
| "auditor": "Security Research Labs", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates/blob/main/audits/2024-07.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 5, |
| "location": "runtime/src/configs/xcm_config.rs", |
| "title": "Misconfiguration of MaxRemoteLockConsumers in pallet_xcm", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates", |
| "audited_commit": "c9a2c76a9db2e114eecaeba07195f9c2bdfaa094", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "1d429ee3ea542c22bbf0014753646da12e095e19", |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "3.2.6 Misconfiguration of MaxRemoteLockConsumers in pallet_xcm\n\nAttack scenario:\nMisconfiguration may result in unintended side-effects and failed assumptions\n\nLocation:\nruntime/src/configs/xcm_config.rs\n\nAttack impact:\nUnintentional behavior may be present in pallet_xcm\n\nSeverity:\nLow\n\nStatus:\nFixed [21]\n\nIn pallet_xcm::Config both MaxLockers [22] and MaxRemoteLockConsumers [23] types have been set to the constant MaxLockers: u32 = 8.\n\nThe standard configuration of MaxRemoteLockConsumers is zero [24], which is declared in an unused constant MaxRemoteLockConsumers: u32 = 0.\n\nBased on this analysis and the lack of documentation around the deviation from the standard configuration, we assume this MaxRemoteLockConsumers was misconfigured to 8 not 0.\n\nThis may result in unintended side-effects that are unknown to users implementing the template. If this configuration was intentional, the rationale behind it should be explicitly stated.\n\nWe recommend configuring MaxRemoteLockConsumers to the declared constant MaxRemoteLockConsumers: u32 = 0.", |
| "description_summary": "Misconfiguration of MaxRemoteLockConsumers may cause unintended side-effects in pallet_xcm.", |
| "reported_status": "Fixed [21] [Online]. Available: https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates/pull/268.", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 16, |
| "project_name": "PolkadotRunetimeTemplates", |
| "auditor": "Security Research Labs", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates/blob/main/audits/2024-07.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 6, |
| "location": "runtime/src/configs/", |
| "title": "Missing documentation undermines the templates' use-case", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates", |
| "audited_commit": "c9a2c76a9db2e114eecaeba07195f9c2bdfaa094", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "fa017a7204ec60016c0683d4d1ded1b7dbe8f418", |
| "reported_impact": "Info", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "3.2.7 Missing documentation undermines the templates' use-case\n\nAttack scenario:\nNovice substrate developers may unknowingly alter sound security design due to ambiguity of rationale\n\nLocation:\nruntime/src/configs/\n\nAttack impact:\nConfiguration alteration could result in preventable vulnerabilities being re-opened.\n\nSeverity:\nInfo\n\nStatus:\nFixed [25]\n\nThroughout the runtime configurations, design rationale is frequently undocumented. Considering the runtime templates' use-case, to offer an entry point for secure substrate development, we believe the lack of documentation negatively impacts these intentions by introducing design ambiguity.\n\nWe recommend documenting all critical configurations to outline: the current design rationale; the security considerations for modification; and disclaimers around incompatible modifications.\n\nSpecifically, we have identified the following key areas that require specific justification, although more likely exist:\n1. In xcm_executor the mutual exclusivity of IsReserve [26] and IsTeleport [27] should be documented, alongside the importance of non-null FeeManager [28].\n2. In cumulus_pallet_xcmp_queue PriceForSiblingParachainDelivery [29], the ramifications of null configuration should be described.\n3. The rationale and risk of not including a non-zero ExistentialDeposit [30] in pallet_balances should be fully described.\n4. The configuration options for FeeMultiplierUpdate [31] in pallet_transaction_payment should be explained (e.g., SlowAdjusting / FastAdjusting).\n5. All pallets' WeightInfo configuration should have a disclaimer to perform benchmarking in the context of the user\u2019s specific runtime.\n6. The process for calculating GasLimitPovSizeRatio [16] in pallet_evm should be outlined.", |
| "description_summary": "Lack of documentation for critical configurations may lead to preventable security vulnerabilities.", |
| "reported_status": "Fixed [25] [Online]. Available: https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates/pull/250.", |
| "is_substrate_finding": false, |
| "audited_project_id": 16, |
| "project_name": "PolkadotRunetimeTemplates", |
| "auditor": "Security Research Labs", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates/blob/main/audits/2024-07.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 0, |
| "location": null, |
| "title": "Insecure configuration for running Acala node in a Docker container", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/AcalaNetwork/Acala", |
| "audited_commit": "da5aeeafd0d0de1345f5693269cfd684d9058c36", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": "Difficulty-High", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Configuration", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "TBD", |
| "description": "1. Insecure configuration for running Acala node in a Docker container\\nSeverity: Low\\nDifficulty: High\\nType: Configuration\\nFinding ID: TOB-ACA-001\\nTarget: documentation for running node in a Docker container\\n\\nDescription\\nThe Acala documentation describes how to launch an Acala node in a Docker container, from the acala/acala-node docker images. While those images run the node process as a non-root user, the documented way to run them does not prevent the user to gain more privileges. This may allow an attacker who gets code execution access within the container to escalate their privileges in certain scenarios.\\n\\nThe first docker invocation can be found at the integration-guide/node-management documentation page:\\n\\ndocker run -p 9944:9944 acala/acala-node:0.6.2 --name \\\"calling_home_from_a_docker_container\\\" --rpc-external --ws-external\\n\\nWhile the second at the network-maintainers/mandala-maintainers-guide page:\\n\\ndocker run -d --restart=always -p 30333:30333 -p 9933:9933 -p 9944:9944 -v node-data:/acala/data acala/acala-node:latest --chain mandala --base-path=/acala/data/01-001 --ws-port 9944 --rpc-port 9933 --port 30333 --ws-external --rpc-external --ws-max-connections 1000 --rpc-cors=all --unsafe-ws-external --unsafe-rpc-external --pruning=archive --name \\\"Name of Telemetry\\\"\\n\\nBoth of those invocations do not set the \\\"No New Privileges\\\" flag and do not drop all Linux capabilities. Those features prevent the user from gaining more privileges through e.g. suid binaries and from gaining more Linux capabilities. The current value of those settings can be inspected by reading the /proc/$PID/status file as shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, where the second figure shows those settings with security flags applied to the docker run invocation.\\n\\n$ docker run --rm -it --entrypoint bash acala/acala-node:latest acala@d7720fb273ce:/$ cat /proc/$$/status | egrep 'Cap|NoNewPrivs|Seccomp'\\nCapInh: 00000000a80425fb\\nCapPrm: 0000000000000000\\nCapEff: 0000000000000000\\nCapBnd: 00000000a80425fb\\nCapAmb: 0000000000000000\\nNoNewPrivs: 0\\nSeccomp: 2\\n\\nFigure 1.1: Inspecting the parent process (here: bash) Linux capabilities sets, the \\\"No New Privileges\\\" flag and its Seccomp status. While the process has no effective Linux capabilities (CapEff) currently, it may gain them through e.g. suid binaries.\\n\\n$ docker run --rm -it --cap-drop=ALL --security-opt=no-new-privileges:true --entrypoint bash acala/acala-node:latest acala@aeec10d88e66:/$ cat /proc/$$/status | egrep 'Cap|NoNewPrivs|Seccomp'\\nCapInh: 0000000000000000\\nCapPrm: 0000000000000000\\nCapEff: 0000000000000000\\nCapBnd: 0000000000000000\\nCapAmb: 0000000000000000\\nNoNewPrivs: 1\\nSeccomp: 2\\n\\nFigure 1.2: Inspecting the process status after passing in docker run flags which drops all Linux capabilities and sets the \\\"No New Privileges\\\" flag.\\n\\nExploit Scenario\\nAlice runs an Acala node in a Docker container. Eve finds a bug that allows her to run arbitrary code on Alice's node. She then uses the bug and runs a suid binary to gain more privileges in the container to attack the host system.\\n\\nCurrently, the only suid binaries present in the acala/acala-node:latest (93c46b70e208) image are /bin/mount, /bin/umount, /bin/su and /usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign. Analyzing these binaries was outside the scope of this assessment.\\n\\nRecommendations\\nShort term, add the \\\"--cap-drop=ALL --security-opt=no-new-privileges:true\\\" flags to all docker run invocations listed in the Acala documentation for running a node in a Docker container. This will increase the security of containers run by the users.\\n\\nLong term, consider using a multi-stage Docker image build for Acala docker image and adding only the necessary binaries to the resulting image. This will decrease the attack surface for an attacker who gains code execution in the container and should also result in smaller Docker images. Additionally, review the Appendix C: Docker Recommendations for further Docker guidance.", |
| "description_summary": "Docker containers are not configured with the 'No New Privileges' flag or dropped Linux capabilities, allowing privilege escalation.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": false, |
| "audited_project_id": 17, |
| "project_name": "Acala", |
| "auditor": "Trail of Bits", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/AcalaNetwork.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 1, |
| "location": "bin/acala/service/src/chain_spec/acala.rs:164", |
| "title": "Sudo is enabled on the Acala chain", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/AcalaNetwork/Acala", |
| "audited_commit": "da5aeeafd0d0de1345f5693269cfd684d9058c36", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Informational", |
| "reported_likelihood": "Difficulty-Medium", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Configuration", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "2. Sudo is enabled on the Acala chain\\nSeverity: Informational\\nDifficulty: Medium\\nType: Configuration\\nFinding ID: TOB-ACA-002\\nTarget: Acala/bin/acala/service/src/chain_spec/acala.rs#L164\\n\\nDescription\\nThe Acala chain spec uses the sudo module (Figure 2.1), which allows for robust testing but should not exist in a production network. The existence of a sudo functionality, or, a lack of clear documentation of a sudo removal step may decrease the users' trust in the Acala Network.\\n\\nacala_runtime::GenesisConfig {\\n // (...)\\n pallet_sudo: Some(SudoConfig { key: root_key.clone() }),\\n}\\n\\nFigure 2.1: The sudo pallet enabled in Acala chain specification (Acala/bin/acala/service/src/chain_spec/acala.rs#L164).\\n\\nRecommendation\\nShort term, either remove the sudo functionality from the Acala chain specification or document how it will be disabled or removed after the network goes live, similarly to what Polkadot did during its launch.", |
| "description_summary": "The sudo module is enabled, which should not be present in a production network due to security concerns.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 17, |
| "project_name": "Acala", |
| "auditor": "Trail of Bits", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/AcalaNetwork.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 2, |
| "location": "packages/sdk-homa/src/staking-pool.ts:165-179,275-289", |
| "title": "Changed but unused liquidAmountToBurn value", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/AcalaNetwork/acala.js", |
| "audited_commit": "7f2f4c930d2006538ee1bb9ccb17098eb4183b80", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Informational", |
| "reported_likelihood": "Difficulty-High", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Undefined Behavior", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "3. Changed but unused liquidAmountToBurn value\\nSeverity: Informational\\nDifficulty: High\\nType: Undefined Behavior\\nFinding ID: TOB-ACA-003\\nTarget: acala.js/packages/sdk-homa/src/staking-pool.ts\\n\\nDescription\\nThere are two places in the acala.js codebase where a variable of liquidAmountToBurn is introduced, used, changed but unused further in the flow (Figures 3.1-2). Those cases should be further investigated as they could be real bugs.\\n\\npublic getStakingAmountInRedeemByFreeUnbonded(/* (...) */): { /* (...) */ } {\\n // (...)\\n let liquidAmountToBurn = amount;\\n let demandStakingAmount = liquidExchangeRate.times(liquidAmountToBurn);\\n // (...)\\n if (!demandStakingAmount.isZero() && !availableFreePool.isZero()) {\\n if (demandStakingAmount.isGreaterThan(availableFreePool)) {\\n const ratio = FixedPointNumber.fromRational(availableFreePool, demandStakingAmount);\\n liquidAmountToBurn = ratio.times(liquidAmountToBurn);\\n demandStakingAmount = availableFreePool;\\n }\\n }\\n // (...) - the liquidAmountToBurn value is unused\\n}\\n\\nFigure 3.1: The getStakingAmountInRedeemByFreeUnbonded function (acala.js/packages/sdk-homa/src/staking-pool.ts#L165-L179).\\n\\npublic getStakingAmountInClaimUnbonding(/* (...) */): { /* (...) */ } {\\n // (...)\\n let liquidAmountToBurn = amount;\\n let demandStakingAmount = liquidExchangeRate.times(liquidAmountToBurn);\\n // (...)\\n if (!demandStakingAmount.isZero() && !availableUnclaimedUnbonding.isZero()) {\\n if (demandStakingAmount.isGreaterThan(availableUnclaimedUnbonding)) {\\n const ratio = FixedPointNumber.fromRational(availableUnclaimedUnbonding, demandStakingAmount);\\n liquidAmountToBurn = ratio.times(liquidAmountToBurn);\\n demandStakingAmount = availableUnclaimedUnbonding;\\n }\\n }\\n // (...) - the liquidAmountToBurn value is unused\\n}\\n\\nFigure 3.2: The getStakingAmountInClaimUnbonding function (acala.js/packages/sdk-homa/src/staking-pool.ts#L275-L289).\\n\\nRecommendation\\nShort term, evaluate the change of liquidAmountToBurn value in the getStakingAmountInRedeemByFreeUnbounded and getStakingAmountInClaimUnbonding functions in the acala.js codebase.", |
| "description_summary": "The variable liquidAmountToBurn is changed but remains unused, potentially indicating a bug.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": false, |
| "audited_project_id": 17, |
| "project_name": "Acala", |
| "auditor": "Trail of Bits", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/AcalaNetwork.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 3, |
| "location": null, |
| "title": "Transferring 'MAX' ACA tokens through Acala-dapp fails and only burns the fees", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/AcalaNetwork/acala-dapp", |
| "audited_commit": "bdb240968b15350ff7097b97e5cabe94d8536786", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": "Difficulty-Low", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Data Validation", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "4. Transferring \"max\" ACA tokens through Acala-dapp fails and only burns the fees\\nSeverity: Low\\nDifficulty: Low\\nType: Data Validation\\nFinding ID: TOB-ACA-004\\nTarget: Acala / Acala-dapp\\n\\nDescription\\nThe Acala-dapp UI provides a way of transferring all tokens to a given account via the \"MAX\" button in its \"Transfer\" dialog (Figure 4.1). However, trying to perform a transfer of ACA tokens with the \"MAX\" amount always fails with a \"balances.InsufficientBalance\" result (Figure 4.2) and the sender ends up losing the transfer fees.\\n\\nFigure 4.1: The \"Transfer\" dialog with the \"MAX\" button.\\n\\nFigure 4.2: The \"balances.InsufficientBalance\" error displayed in the top right corner of Acala-dapp when attempting to transfer \"MAX\" ACA tokens amount.\\n\\nExploit Scenario\\nAlice wants to transfer all of her ACA tokens into another account. She uses the \"MAX\" transfer option through the Acala-dapp application. The transfer fails and Alice ends up with the transfer fees deducted from her ACA tokens balance.\\n\\nRecommendations\\nShort term, fix the inability of transferring \"MAX\" ACA tokens amount to another account through Acala-dapp. This can be done by adding a special \"transfer of all ACA tokens\" extrinsic that would first deduct the fees and then perform the transfer of the remaining tokens, and using that extrinsic when sending a \"MAX\" ACA tokens transfer in the Acala-dapp UI.\\n\\nLong term, add tests to ensure the \"MAX\" ACA and other tokens transfer succeeds. This will prevent similar bugs from appearing if the code changes. All financial transactions should be tested with both use cases and misuse cases.", |
| "description_summary": "Transferring the 'MAX' token amount fails, resulting in lost transfer fees.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": false, |
| "audited_project_id": 17, |
| "project_name": "Acala", |
| "auditor": "Trail of Bits", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/AcalaNetwork.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 4, |
| "location": "Cargo.toml:from,to", |
| "title": "The Substrate dependency 'chaostests' contain out of date dependencies that have security vulnerabilities", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/AcalaNetwork/Acala", |
| "audited_commit": "da5aeeafd0d0de1345f5693269cfd684d9058c36", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Informational", |
| "reported_likelihood": "Difficulty-Undetermined", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Patching", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Dependency", |
| "description": "5. The Substrate dependency \"chaostests\" contain out of date dependencies that have security vulnerabilities\\nSeverity: Informational\\nDifficulty: Undetermined\\nType: Patching\\nFinding ID: TOB-ACA-005\\nTarget: Acala's dependency substrate/.maintain/chaostests dependencies\\n\\nDescription\\nThe Substrate dependency version 6b600cdeb used by Acala uses two outdated dependencies that contain security vulnerabilities in its testing framework called \"chaostests\".\\n\\nThe outdated dependencies are:\\n- Node-fetch version 1.7.3, with a DoS vulnerability (CVE-2020-15168), fixed in 2.6.1.\\n- Node-forge version 0.8.5, with a prototype pollution vulnerability (CVE-2020-7720), fixed in 0.10.0.\\n\\nThe severity of this finding is set to Informational as we believe this issue does not impact the security of the Acala blockchain since the vulnerable code is not used by Acala code.\\n\\nRecommendations\\nShort term, update the Substrate dependency used in Acala to the latest version as its newer version doesn't contain the chaostests framework that contains security vulnerabilities in its dependencies.\\n\\nLong term, implement dependency checks for Acala's dependencies (and their dependencies) as part of the CI/CD pipeline of application development. Do not allow builds to continue with any outdated dependencies.", |
| "description_summary": "The 'chaostests' dependency includes outdated libraries with known security vulnerabilities.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 17, |
| "project_name": "Acala", |
| "auditor": "Trail of Bits", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/AcalaNetwork.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 5, |
| "location": null, |
| "title": "Lack of proper development guidance on using Acala-dapp with Acala", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/AcalaNetwork/apps", |
| "audited_commit": "eea2c1baa02cac07ac028e84455458951a6336b6", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Informational", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Documentation", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "6. Lack of proper development guidance on using Acala-dapp with Acala\\nSeverity: Informational\\nDifficulty: Undetermined\\nType: Documentation\\nFinding ID: TOB-ACA-006\\nTarget: Acala development documentation\\n\\nDescription\\nThe Acala Development Guide lacks proper documentation on how to use a local build of Acala-dapp and Acala node to test or develop the Acala blockchain. It is also not clear how to match the versions of the two, as the git commits that change corresponding dependencies versions are not having clear commit messages.\\n\\nIn Appendix D we describe steps for testing Acala and Acala-dapp with its test/development accounts (Alice, Bob, etc.) that could be added to the development guide.\\n\\nRecommendations\\nShort term, add steps for testing Acala and Acala-dapp locally with blockchain test/development accounts (Alice, Bob, etc.) into Acala's README or/and Development Guide. This will help developers to bootstrap a working environment and test features faster.", |
| "description_summary": "The development guide lacks clear steps for testing and matching dependencies between components.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": false, |
| "audited_project_id": 17, |
| "project_name": "Acala", |
| "auditor": "Trail of Bits", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/AcalaNetwork.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 6, |
| "location": null, |
| "title": "CSRF in Acala/apps settings which allows changing the RPC endpoint URL", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/AcalaNetwork/apps", |
| "audited_commit": "eea2c1baa02cac07ac028e84455458951a6336b6", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Informational", |
| "reported_likelihood": "Difficulty-Medium", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Data Validation", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "7. CSRF in Acala/apps settings which allows changing the RPC endpoint URL\\nSeverity: Informational\\nDifficulty: Medium\\nType: Data Validation\\nFinding ID: TOB-ACA-007\\nTarget: Acala/apps\\n\\nDescription\\nThere is a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in the settings page of the polkadot.js/apps project on which the Acala/apps project is based upon. This allows an attacker to send a malicious link to the victim, which will change the victim's RPC endpoint URL.\\n\\nThe issue has been reported to the upstream repository in polkadot.js/apps#4465.\\n\\nRecommendations\\nShort term, fix the CSRF issue in Acala/apps which was reported in polkadot.js/apps#4465. This will prevent an attacker from sending a malicious link to its victim that will change the RPC endpoint URL. If possible, send a patch that fixes this issue to the upstream repository.\\n\\nLong term, keep track of the polkadot.js/apps changes and update the Acala/apps repository regularly. This will help prevent similar issues to occur in the future.", |
| "description_summary": "CSRF vulnerability allows changing the RPC endpoint URL via a malicious link.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": false, |
| "audited_project_id": 17, |
| "project_name": "Acala", |
| "auditor": "Trail of Bits", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/AcalaNetwork.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 7, |
| "location": null, |
| "title": "Missing security-related HTTP headers in the Acala-dapp application", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/AcalaNetwork/apps", |
| "audited_commit": "eea2c1baa02cac07ac028e84455458951a6336b6", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": "Difficulty-High", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Configuration", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "8. Missing security-related HTTP headers in the Acala-dapp application\\nSeverity: Low\\nDifficulty: High\\nType: Configuration\\nFinding ID: TOB-ACA-008\\nTarget: Acala/acala-dapp\\n\\nDescription\\nThe responses from the Acala-dapp website are missing the following security-related HTTP headers:\\n\u25cf Content-Security-Policy. The lack of this header could allow for an attacker to exploit XSS vulnerabilities that a CSP might otherwise mitigate.\\n\u25cf X-Frame-Options that can prevent the site from being rendered e.g. in an iframe and mitigates clickjacking attacks. Currently, if the site is rendered in an iframe, it won't work properly e.g. with the Polkadot{.js} extension as it doesn't work in iframes. The extension has an issue for it in polkadot-js/extension#531 and if it gets fixed, it will make Acala-dapp less secure due to lack of the X-Frame-Options setting.\\n\\nExploit Scenario\\nEve finds a bug in Acala-dapp which allows her to trigger an XSS attack on Alice's browser when she executes an action. Eve then prepares a custom-crafted XSS payload. Due to a lack of CSP header, Alice's browser executes Eve\u2019s attack and Eve executes actions on behalf of Alice's account.\\n\\nRecommendation\\nShort term, add the missing security-related HTTP headers to Acala-dapp. Prevent the site from being rendered in iframes with X-Frame-Options: DENY header and implement the CSP policy and validate it with a CSP Evaluator. This will help mitigate the effects of attacks such as clickjacking or XSS.\\n\\nLong term, track the further developments of CSP and similar web browser features that help with mitigating security risk. As new protections are developed, ensure they are adopted as quickly as possible.\\n\\nReferences\\n\u25cf Mozilla developer docs: Content Security Policy\\n\u25cf CSP evaluator from Google", |
| "description_summary": "Missing HTTP headers such as Content-Security-Policy and X-Frame-Options allow XSS and clickjacking attacks.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": false, |
| "audited_project_id": 17, |
| "project_name": "Acala", |
| "auditor": "Trail of Bits", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/AcalaNetwork.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 8, |
| "location": null, |
| "title": "Small amounts are not displayed in Acala-dapp or are displayed in a scientific notation", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/AcalaNetwork/apps", |
| "audited_commit": "eea2c1baa02cac07ac028e84455458951a6336b6", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Informational", |
| "reported_likelihood": "Difficulty-Low", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Undefined Behavior", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "9. Small amounts are not displayed in Acala-dapp or are displayed in a scientific notation\\nSeverity: Informational\\nDifficulty: Low\\nType: Undefined Behavior\\nFinding ID: TOB-ACA-009\\nTarget: Acala/acala-dapp\\n\\nDescription\\nThe Acala-dapp presents small amounts of values in a scientific notation (Figures 9.1-2) and if a value is too small, e.g. 0.00000001 it may not be presented at all (Figure 9.2). This behavior may be confusing for users who don't understand the rules of displaying the values present in the system.\\n\\nFigure 9.1: Small amount is displayed in a scientific notation.\\n\\nFigure 9.2: While the account has 0.00000001 XBTC which can be seen by trying to transfer \\\"MAX\\\" XBTC tokens, the UI does not have an option to display this value at all.\\n\\nRecommendations\\nShort term, change the way small values are displayed in the Acala-dapp. Allow the user to specify the amount of decimal places to be displayed and inform the user if they have a small, non-zero value of a given token which is not currently displayed.\\n\\nLong term, add tests to Acala-dapp to see if it allows the user to see a small amount of tokens.", |
| "description_summary": "Small token values are not displayed or are shown in scientific notation, causing potential user confusion.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": false, |
| "audited_project_id": 17, |
| "project_name": "Acala", |
| "auditor": "Trail of Bits", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/AcalaNetwork.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 9, |
| "location": null, |
| "title": "Providing too small value renders Acala-dapp unresponsive", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/AcalaNetwork/apps", |
| "audited_commit": "eea2c1baa02cac07ac028e84455458951a6336b6", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Informational", |
| "reported_likelihood": "Difficulty-Low", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Denial of Service", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Denial of Service (DoS) and Spamming", |
| "description": "10. Providing too small value renders Acala-dapp unresponsive\\nSeverity: Informational\\nDifficulty: Low\\nType: Denial of Service\\nFinding ID: TOB-ACA-010\\nTarget: Acala/acala-dapp\\n\\nDescription\\nPassing in a too small value into the \\\"Receive\\\" form field in the \\\"Swap\\\" tab renders the Acala-dapp application unresponsive. This prevents the user from performing an action which is valid within the system.\\n\\nThis can be reproduced by going to the \\\"Swap\\\" tab, choosing e.g. the XBTC currency and pasting in the \\\"0.000000001\\\" (or smaller) value into the \\\"Receive\\\" form as shown in Figure 10.1.\\n\\nFigure 10.1: Providing a too small value into the \\\"Receive\\\" field caused the page to hang.\\n\\nRecommendations\\nShort term, fix the unresponsiveness of Acala-dapp when a small number is provided into the \\\"Receive\\\" form of the \\\"Swap\\\" functionality.\\n\\nLong term, add functional tests against forms in Acala-dapp to see if they correctly handle small values or malicious inputs.", |
| "description_summary": "Providing too small a value causes the application to become unresponsive; fixing this requires updating input validation in the 'Receive' form of the 'Swap' functionality.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": false, |
| "audited_project_id": 17, |
| "project_name": "Acala", |
| "auditor": "Trail of Bits", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/AcalaNetwork.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 10, |
| "location": null, |
| "title": "Documentation is incomplete", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/AcalaNetwork/Acala", |
| "audited_commit": "da5aeeafd0d0de1345f5693269cfd684d9058c36", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": "Difficulty-High", |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "Documentation", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Code Quality", |
| "description": "11. Documentation is incomplete\nSeverity: Informational\nDifficulty: High\nType: Documentation\nFinding ID: TOB-ACA-011\nTarget: documentation\n\nDescription:\nSeveral areas of the Acala system would benefit from more thorough documentation. Comprehensive documentation of the system's behaviour is important for informing users of how the system operates, onboarding new employees, as well as verifying correctness of functionality.\n\nThe following areas were identified that would benefit from improved documentation:\n- Governance processes, which are described both in the wiki and in a hackmd note but neither is comprehensive and there are some points of conflict.\n- The various network incentives managed by the incentives module.\n- Gas fees.\n\nExploit Scenario:\nBob joins Acala as a new developer. Unaware of the expected behavior of a particular module, he modifies system parameters as part of a pull request and introduces unexpected behavior into the system.\n\nRecommendation:\nShort term, expand and unify the documentation to better cover governance, incentives, and gas fees.\nLong term, regularly review public documentation to ensure it is kept up to date with the current system.", |
| "description_summary": "The system's documentation is incomplete, missing details on governance, incentives, and gas fees, which could lead to unexpected behavior.", |
| "reported_status": null, |
| "is_substrate_finding": false, |
| "audited_project_id": 17, |
| "project_name": "Acala", |
| "auditor": "Trail of Bits", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/trailofbits/publications/blob/master/reviews/AcalaNetwork.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 0, |
| "location": "frame/custom-signatures/Cargo.toml:23", |
| "title": "Overflow on The Libsecp256k1", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/PlasmNetwork/Astar", |
| "audited_commit": "7bb088bd6be8dd8c06823729fbbaf71a507095ab", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "a0e446097557a479cc90e2be969cd45d7f77812b", |
| "reported_impact": "High", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Dependency", |
| "description": "QSP-1 Overflow on The Libsecp256k1\nSeverity: High Risk\nStatus: Fixed\nFile(s) affected: frame/custom-signatures/Cargo.toml\nDescription: In frame/custom-signatures/Cargo.toml (L23): Libsecp256k1 accepts signatures whose R or S parameter is larger than the secp256k1 curve order, which differs from other implementations. This could lead to invalid signatures being verified. This error is resolved in 0.5.0 by adding a check_overflow flag.\nRecommendation: Update the Libsecp Library to the latest version (Greater than 0.5.0).", |
| "description_summary": "Libsecp256k1 allowed invalid signatures due to lack of parameter size checks.", |
| "reported_status": "Fixed", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 18, |
| "project_name": "Astar", |
| "auditor": "Quantstamp", |
| "audit_link": "https://certificate.quantstamp.com/full/a-star-network-custom-signature.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 1, |
| "location": "frame/custom-signatures/src/ethereum.rs:44", |
| "title": "Lack of Validation in the 'what' Parameter", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/PlasmNetwork/Astar", |
| "audited_commit": "7bb088bd6be8dd8c06823729fbbaf71a507095ab", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "a0e446097557a479cc90e2be969cd45d7f77812b", |
| "reported_impact": "Medium", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "QSP-2 Lack of Validation in the what Parameter\nSeverity: Medium Risk\nStatus: Mitigated\nFile(s) affected: frame/custom-signatures/src/ethereum.rs\nDescription: In frame/custom-signatures/src/ethereum.rs (L44): the signable_message function takes as parameters the variable what and then it executes a loop N times such that N is the length of the variable what. The problem here is that there is no limit on the length of this variable, which can cause a denial of service during the execution of this function call.\nRecommendation: Enforce a limitation on the size of the what parameter.\nUpdate: 2021-09-17: The original issue was solved by using a double-hashing approach. However, the admin team should be aware that this approach increases the probability of collision and could thus introduce additional risk to the system.", |
| "description_summary": "Lack of length validation in the 'what' parameter could cause a denial of service.", |
| "reported_status": "Mitigated", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 18, |
| "project_name": "Astar", |
| "auditor": "Quantstamp", |
| "audit_link": "https://certificate.quantstamp.com/full/a-star-network-custom-signature.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 2, |
| "location": "frame/custom-signatures/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "Cross Chain Replay Attack is Possible", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/PlasmNetwork/Astar", |
| "audited_commit": "7bb088bd6be8dd8c06823729fbbaf71a507095ab", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "a0e446097557a479cc90e2be969cd45d7f77812b", |
| "reported_impact": "Medium", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "QSP-3 Cross Chain Replay Attack is Possible\nSeverity: Medium Risk\nStatus: Fixed\nFile(s) affected: frame/custom-signatures/src/lib.rs\nDescription: Cross chain replay attack is possible for the current custom signature design because there is no information in the signature which blockchain a signature is intended for.\nRecommendation: Include the chainId into the signature to distinguish a signature for a specific blockchain from the other blockchains. Reference: Signing Data with MetaMask.\nUpdate: 2021-09-17: The admin team stated that ChainId will be used to fill in the magic number field.", |
| "description_summary": "Cross chain replay attack possible due to lack of blockchain identification in the signature.", |
| "reported_status": "Fixed", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 18, |
| "project_name": "Astar", |
| "auditor": "Quantstamp", |
| "audit_link": "https://certificate.quantstamp.com/full/a-star-network-custom-signature.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 3, |
| "location": "frame/custom-signatures/src/lib.rs:113", |
| "title": "Order Logic In Nonce Increment", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/PlasmNetwork/Astar", |
| "audited_commit": "7bb088bd6be8dd8c06823729fbbaf71a507095ab", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "a0e446097557a479cc90e2be969cd45d7f77812b", |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Business Logic", |
| "description": "QSP-4 Order Logic In Nonce Increment\nSeverity: Low Risk\nStatus: Fixed\nFile(s) affected: frame/custom-signatures/src/lib.rs\nDescription: In frame/custom-signatures/src/lib.rs (L113): in the call function, the first thing verified is the validity of the transaction with the help of the nonce. Once the verification has been done, this nonce will be incremented, and if the following lines have some problems or errors, the nonce will still be incremented, causing improper execution.", |
| "description_summary": "Improper nonce increment logic could cause incorrect transaction execution.", |
| "reported_status": "Fixed", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 18, |
| "project_name": "Astar", |
| "auditor": "Quantstamp", |
| "audit_link": "https://certificate.quantstamp.com/full/a-star-network-custom-signature.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 0, |
| "location": "Cargo.lock", |
| "title": "Potential segfault in localtime_r invocations", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/PlasmNetwork/Astar", |
| "audited_commit": "6d8c38a0c3a9f7d24e0f11cab2fff65c0e5558ec", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Medium", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": "SWC-RUSTSEC-2020-0159", |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Dependency", |
| "description": "QSP-1 Potential segfault in localtime_r invocations\nSeverity: Medium Risk\nStatus: Acknowledged\nFile(s) affected: Cargo.lock\nRelated Issue(s): SWC-RUSTSEC-2020-0159\nDescription: In the Cargo.lock file the package chrono with the version 0.4.19 is used, in fact this version is affected by a data race between localtime_r and setenv. You can refer to more details of the vulnerability in the following link: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2020-0159\nRecommendation: The team should update the chrono version to the latest version.", |
| "description_summary": "Potential segfault in localtime_r invocations due to a data race in chrono 0.4.19.", |
| "reported_status": "Acknowledged", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 19, |
| "project_name": "Astar", |
| "auditor": "Quantstamp", |
| "audit_link": "https://certificate.quantstamp.com/full/a-star-network-staking.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 1, |
| "location": "/frame/dapps-staking/src/pallet/mod.rs:244,393,408,413,549,552,593,683", |
| "title": "Mathematical Operations That Lead To Overflow", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/PlasmNetwork/Astar", |
| "audited_commit": "6d8c38a0c3a9f7d24e0f11cab2fff65c0e5558ec", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Medium", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Arithmetic", |
| "description": "QSP-2 Mathematical Operations That Lead To Overflow\nSeverity: Medium Risk\nStatus: Fixed\nFile(s) affected: /dapps-staking/src/pallet/mod.rs\nDescription: In the on_initialize function (file /dapps-staking/src/pallet/mod.rs, L244), the next_era variable is incremented using the + operator, which can cause an overflow. If one uses the debug build, it can cause a panic; however, in release build it will overflow silently. Same issue in lines 393, 408, 413, 549, 552, 593, 683\nRecommendation:\n\u2022 Instead of using the + operator, we recommend using the checked_add function to prevent an overflow.\n\u2022 Instead of using the x operator, we recommend using the checked_mul function to prevent an overflow.\nUpdate: The team has fixed all the issues except for the era index overflow and number of stakers overflow since these scenarios aren't feasible.", |
| "description_summary": "Overflow risk in mathematical operations using the + operator in on_initialize function.", |
| "reported_status": "Fixed", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 19, |
| "project_name": "Astar", |
| "auditor": "Quantstamp", |
| "audit_link": "https://certificate.quantstamp.com/full/a-star-network-staking.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 2, |
| "location": "/frame/dapps-staking/src/pallet/mod.rs:327,390,578", |
| "title": "Missing Validation In Some Variables", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/PlasmNetwork/Astar", |
| "audited_commit": "6d8c38a0c3a9f7d24e0f11cab2fff65c0e5558ec", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Low", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "QSP-3 Missing Validation In Some Variables\nSeverity: Low Risk\nStatus: Fixed\nFile(s) affected: dapps/src/pallet/mod.rs\nDescription:\n\u2022 In dapps/src/pallet/mod.rs (L327): the unregister function executes a loop N times such that N is the length of the stakers. The problem here is that there is no limit on the length of this variable, which can cause a denial of service during the execution of this function call. Same issue in line 578\n\u2022 In dapps/src/pallet/mod.rs (L390): the bond_and_stake function verifies if the value value_to_stake is equal to Zero value; if it's the case, the transaction reverts. This verification is not sufficient; we should enforce it by verifying if the value_to_stake is greater than 0.\nRecommendation:\n* Enforce a limitation on the number of the stakers.\n\u2022 Verify if value_to_stake is greater than the zero value.\nUpdate:\n* The number of stakers is limited by a configurable constant.\n\u2022 The team did the verification using value_to_stake > Zero::zero()", |
| "description_summary": "Missing validation for stakers length and value_to_stake, leading to potential denial of service.", |
| "reported_status": "Fixed", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 19, |
| "project_name": "Astar", |
| "auditor": "Quantstamp", |
| "audit_link": "https://certificate.quantstamp.com/full/a-star-network-staking.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 3, |
| "location": "/frame/dapps-staking/src/pallet/mod.rs:400", |
| "title": "Order of Validation in Maximum Number of Stakers", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/PlasmNetwork/Astar", |
| "audited_commit": "6d8c38a0c3a9f7d24e0f11cab2fff65c0e5558ec", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": null, |
| "reported_impact": "Informational", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Error Handling and Validation", |
| "description": "QSP-4 Order of Validation in Maximum Number of Stakers\nSeverity: Informational\nStatus: Fixed\nDescription: In the bond_and_stake function (L400), after updating the ledger value and getting the latest era staking point the number of stakers is verified if it is less than the maximum number of stakers. If it's not the case, the transaction will revert. This verification should be done before updating the ledger value.\nRecommendation: The team should verify if we exceed the MaxNumberOfStakersPerContract before setting any variables or doing calculations.", |
| "description_summary": "Validation of maximum number of stakers occurs after updating ledger values, risking improper transactions.", |
| "reported_status": "Fixed", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 19, |
| "project_name": "Astar", |
| "auditor": "Quantstamp", |
| "audit_link": "https://certificate.quantstamp.com/full/a-star-network-staking.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 0, |
| "location": "runtime/src/xcm_configs.rs", |
| "title": "Runtime template waives XCM message delivery fees", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates", |
| "audited_commit": "c9a2c76a9db2e114eecaeba07195f9c2bdfaa094", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "30930edda586506d2f18e673d383fa69afab5ed6", |
| "reported_impact": "Critical", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Denial of Service (DoS) and Spamming", |
| "description": "3.2.1 Runtime template waives XCM message delivery fees\nAn attacker can cause network congestion causing delay in message deliveries or discards and storage exhaustions.\n\nTo avoid congestion and spamming of messages in the network via XCM, a fee is charged for message delivery to ensure fairness and optimal message delivery time amongst all the participants. This fee is configured in the runtime construct through use of FeeManager type.\n\nIn the template for XCM runtime configuration for OpenZeppelin, the FeeManager was set to the Rust unit type \"()\". In the Polkadot-SDK, this implementation effectively waives the delivery fees.\n\nThereby all fee-based congestion control mechanisms become ineffective since the fees are not actually charged. An attacker can cause congestion, possibly leading to long delays in message delivery, storage exhaustion and/or dropping of messages.\n\nRecommendation: Implement a fee for XCM message delivery and follow the fix implemented in the runtime update v1.3.", |
| "description_summary": "The runtime waives XCM message delivery fees, enabling attackers to cause network congestion and storage exhaustion.", |
| "reported_status": "Closed [3] [Online]. Available: https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-generic-runtime-template/pull/159.", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 20, |
| "project_name": "PolkadotRunetimeTemplates", |
| "auditor": "Security Research Labs", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates/blob/main/audits/2024-04.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 1, |
| "location": "runtime/src/lib.rs", |
| "title": "No XCM delivery fees configured for sibling parachain messages", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates", |
| "audited_commit": "c9a2c76a9db2e114eecaeba07195f9c2bdfaa094", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "30930edda586506d2f18e673d383fa69afab5ed6", |
| "reported_impact": "High", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Denial of Service (DoS) and Spamming", |
| "description": "3.2.2 No XCM delivery fees configured for sibling parachain messages\nAttackers may send spam messages across chains without paying a fee.\n\nTo ensure fairness among users and prevent spamming of messages across chains, an adequate fee mechanism must be implemented for sending the XCM message.\n\nCurrently, there are no fees charged for delivering XCM messages across parachains. In the template runtime configuration, this is configured through PriceForSiblingDelivery by NoPriceForMessageDelivery.\n\nAttackers may send spam messages across chains without paying a fee. Excessive messages could lead to XCM queue size exhaustion by excessive storage usage until messages are delivered. This could also lead to delays in message delivery for other users.\n\nRecommendation: Charge adequate message delivery fees in the runtime configuration template. To prevent excessive delivery times and storage exhaustion, an exponential fee mechanism should be used as configured in Kusama.", |
| "description_summary": "No XCM delivery fees allow attackers to spam sibling parachains, causing queue exhaustion and delays.", |
| "reported_status": "Closed [7] [Online]. Available: https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-generic-runtime-template/pull/156/files.", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 20, |
| "project_name": "PolkadotRunetimeTemplates", |
| "auditor": "Security Research Labs", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates/blob/main/audits/2024-04.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 2, |
| "location": "runtime/src/xcm_configs.rs", |
| "title": "Incorrect runtime weights for XCM and the Message Queue pallet", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates", |
| "audited_commit": "c9a2c76a9db2e114eecaeba07195f9c2bdfaa094", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "30930edda586506d2f18e673d383fa69afab5ed6", |
| "reported_impact": "High", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Weight Management", |
| "description": "3.2.3 Incorrect runtime weights for XCM and the Message Queue pallet\nAs these pallet extrinsic weights are not dependent on the actual runtime configuration, this could lead to underweight extrinsics.\n\nOpenZeppelin\u2019s runtime template constructs runtime logics with FRAME pallets in its configuration. Appropriate benchmarking is required for these pallets to ensure its actual runtime performance. This will effectively transform into charging adequate fees for extrinsics execution.\n\nFor example, the runtime weights for pallet XCM are configured using TestWeightInfo. Similarly, for Generalized Message Queue, runtime weights are configured to be Zero as type WeightInfo = ().\n\nAs these pallet extrinsic weights are not dependent on the actual runtime configuration, this could lead to underweighted extrinsics. Setting the weights to () effectively makes it a zero-cost execution for extrinsics. Both scenarios lead to attackers spamming and bloating the network storage for free.\n\nRecommendation: All pallet extrinsics, even the Substrate ones, should be benchmarked with the actual runtime configuration by including them in the define_benchmarks! block. A best practice example can be found in the Kusama runtime implementation.", |
| "description_summary": "Incorrect runtime weights allow zero-cost extrinsics, enabling spamming and network storage bloat.", |
| "reported_status": "Closed [9] [Online]. Available: https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-generic-runtime-template/pull/153.", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 20, |
| "project_name": "PolkadotRunetimeTemplates", |
| "auditor": "Security Research Labs", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates/blob/main/audits/2024-04.pdf" |
| }, |
| { |
| "issue_index": 3, |
| "location": "runtime/src.rs", |
| "title": "Insufficient benchmarking for runtime pallets", |
| "repository": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates", |
| "audited_commit": "c9a2c76a9db2e114eecaeba07195f9c2bdfaa094", |
| "reported_remediated_commit": "30930edda586506d2f18e673d383fa69afab5ed6", |
| "reported_impact": "High", |
| "reported_likelihood": null, |
| "cwe_classification": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_audit": null, |
| "vulnerability_class_scout": "Weight Management", |
| "description": "3.2.4 Insufficient benchmarking for runtime pallets\nMissing or incorrect runtime benchmarks result in overweight or underweight extrinsics. This can lead to low-effort attacks such as spamming, storage bloating, and block stalling.\n\nPallets with extrinsics must have an accurate weight function which factors in storage, database access, and computation. The reuse of the substrate template and failing to benchmark weights may result in a mismatch of computational requirements and the cost of execution.\n\nSome pallets use pre-defined weights in the runtime configuration but are not included in the runtime benchmarks. The pallets affected are:\n- cumulus_pallet_parachain_system\n- parachain_info\n- pallet_proxy\n- pallet_utility\n- pallet_multisig\n- pallet_transaction_payment\n- pallet_xcm\n\nAdditionally, the benchmarks for all the pallets are using SubstrateWeights, which were benchmarked according to the substrate-node template, instead of the actual template runtime.\n\nExcluding pallets with configured weights from benchmarking and using the substrate-node template runtime weights may result in overweight or underweight extrinsics in the runtime environment. This potentially leads to low-effort attacks such as spamming, storage bloating, and block stalling when invoking extrinsics.\n\nRecommendation: Include the above-mentioned pallets in the try_benchmarks! macro for appropriate runtime benchmarks. Fix all the default benchmarking with actual runtime; please refer to the Glutton-Kusama parachain as a best practice example.", |
| "description_summary": "Insufficient benchmarking results in overweight or underweight extrinsics, enabling spamming and block stalling.", |
| "reported_status": "Closed [13] [Online]. Available: https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-generic-runtime-template/pull/149/files#diff-0ec06ea58bd455f09ce6b3bb4c2c1c0d37bda51c1e1be2151c560c9c973959ec.", |
| "is_substrate_finding": true, |
| "audited_project_id": 20, |
| "project_name": "PolkadotRunetimeTemplates", |
| "auditor": "Security Research Labs", |
| "audit_link": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/polkadot-runtime-templates/blob/main/audits/2024-04.pdf" |
| } |
| ] |
