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-Introduction: Show Me
-the Arguments
-Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone
-“ We are going to ruin undergraduate philosophy. ” That was what we told
-our friends and teachers when we pitched the idea of this book to them. It
-was our experience that for almost any given philosophy class that we took
-as undergraduates, there were only a handful of arguments, totaling no
-more than a few pages of carefully crafted notes, that we needed to know.
-We imagined a rolodex of arguments in front of us, which we could spin
-through with ease to fi nd the argument and move on. Midterm or fi nal
-examinations in one of these classes would be reduced to presenting a philosopher
-’ s argument, followed by a critique – usually another philosopher ’ s
-argument. The ability to state an argument clearly and concisely, in a term
-paper, for example, demonstrates that one succinctly understands the material.
-The following arguments can be viewed as answers to such test questions
-and also to some of life ’ s questions as well.
-“ Show me the argument ” is the battle cry for philosophers. Everyone
-has subjective personal experiences, sentiments, and opinions, so philosophy
-appeals to the common ground of reason to evaluate claims objectively.
-Logical reasoning is independent of political and religious commitments.
-Put simply, an argument is valid or it is not. (Whether or not it is convincing
-is another issue.) When one analyzes a position in terms of its argument,
-one responds with a certain level of rigor and attention. Uncompelling
-arguments can be dismissed out of hand as absurd and forgotten; however,
-arguments that evoke strong reactions, often due to the potential consequences
-of the argument, are countered by a restatement of the initial
-argument, explicitly displaying the inferences, assumptions, and justifi cations
-and why the conclusions do not follow. When things become serious,
-one wants just the arguments .
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-2 Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone
-The time has long passed when it was possible for one to read the entire
-Western philosophical canon. Philosophy needs new didactic tools to
-address the fact that the quantity of infl uential arguments will increase while
-the number of hours that a student at any level has will remain relatively
-the same. Philosophy as a formal discipline will increasingly need to “ get
-smart ” about how it selects which arguments deserve more attention than
-others in the classroom and then how to teach them. Outside of the classroom,
-there are little - to - no resources that function as study guides. Detailed
-study guides are made for everything – the Bible, calculus, grammar, biology
-– except for philosophy. There are laminated sheets in bookstores that list
-all the standard mathematical equations, sheets that have common Spanish
-verbs, and even one on “ Golf for Women, ” but not one has arguments on
-the existence of God, free will, or moral responsibility. Many books present
-important philosophical arguments, but it is often the case that these books
-outline only a single argument or a string of related arguments. Encyclopedias
-of philosophy are great for limited descriptions of philosophers and concepts,
-but there is a need for reference tools that offer specifi c arguments.
-In the end, these secondary sources often bury the argument in commentary
-and analysis and do not lend themselves to concise and effi cient referencing.
-It can take just as long to fi nd an argument in the analysis as it would to
-go to the original text. This volume acts as a compact and accessible companion
-to both sources.
-It deserves to be underscored that this volume showcases 100 of the most
-important arguments and that this list is not exhaustive or uncontroversial.
-This is the fi rst project of its kind. There are not standardized accounts of
-arguments that are univocally accepted in the fi eld. Experts in every fi eld
-disagree – perhaps even more so in philosophy. Arguments that are valued
-now may not be considered to be as equally important in the future. Even
-when there is an agreement that an argument is important, it can be far
-from clear how the argument goes or what the correct conclusion is.
-Authors in this volume have selected representative quotations in support
-of their versions of the arguments. The following arguments are not ranked
-against each other as more or less important. Aquinas ’ Five Ways should
-not be considered more important than other arguments based on the fact
-that it comes fi rst. There are many more, important arguments that are not
-included here, and we hope to provide these in forthcoming installments.
-We have selected arguments that an undergraduate philosophy major
-would be likely to encounter, though many of the issues arise in general
-education classes outside of philosophy. A majority of the arguments employ
-intuitive logical inferences, allowing readers without formal training in logic
-to follow the argument. The inference rule used to draw each conclusion is
-named to enable the reader to see explicitly the argument ’ s valid structure.
-We provide an overview of the inferences in the appendices. There are a
-Introduction: Show Me the Arguments 3
-few arguments that require a more advanced understanding of logic, and
-readers will benefi t from the introduction and commentary that provide the
-general strategy.
-This volume is divided into six parts: philosophy of religion, metaphysics,
-epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind, and philosophies of science
-and language. There are more branches of philosophy than there are sections
-in the volume, and there are other important arguments within the
-given domains than those presented here. It is common that arguments in
-one area are also important and infl uence arguments in another. Many
-arguments could have been included in multiple sections. These divisions
-are provisional, and arguments will reference related arguments in the book,
-signaled by “ # ” and then the number of the argument. The bibliographic
-information in each article will also be instructive for further reading. The
-following are introductions to the arguments in the form of the questions
-that they address. In other words, we provide the questions that would
-naturally lead one to the argument. For example, “ Is change real (#14)? ”
-directs readers to the article “ Parmenides ’ Refutation of Change, ” argument
-#14.
-Philosophy of Religion
-What were Aquinas ’ “ Five Ways ” to prove the existence of God (#1)? Must
-there be at least one self - existent being that explains why there is something
-rather than nothing (#2)? If something begins to exist, then does it have a
-cause (#3)? If God is something than which nothing greater can be thought,
-does that mean that God must exist in reality (#4)? What was Pascal ’ s
-Wager (#5)? Is it rational to have religious belief without suffi cient evidence
-(#6)? Does the existence of evil in the world disprove the existence of God
-(#7)? What if God permits evil so that humans have the greater good of
-free will (#8)? Does free will entail the power to sin (#9)? Is it justifi able
-to believe in a miracle on the basis of empirical evidence (#10)? Is what is
-holy holy because the gods approve it, or do they approve it because it
-is holy (#11)? What did Nietzsche mean when he said “ God is dead ” and
-where does this leave truth (#12)? What is Ockham ’ s Razor (#13)?
-Metaphysics
-Is change real (#14)? If change is not real, then is time real (#15)? Are only
-things that are perceived real (#16)? How did Kant argue against this kind
-of idealism and skepticism (#17)? What is the relationship between necessity
-and possibility in terms of the past, present, and future (#18)? If things
-4 Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone
-could have been different in the past, does that mean that there are different
-possible worlds (#19)? What are “ persons ” and what makes a person
-maintain her numerical identity over time (#20)? Is there a decisive factor
-– for example, body mass, brain mass, or memories – for personal identity
-(#21)? In what way do things both persist over time and change (#22, 23)?
-Do humans have nonbodily immaterial parts called souls (#24)? Is it irrational
-to fear death (#25)? How do we know things if they are in constant
-fl ux (#26)? How did Aristotle argue against Plato ’ s Forms (#27)? Is the
-same logical theory to be applied in all domains, or do different domains
-require different logics (#28)? Can there be a totality of true propositions
-without running into paradoxes (#29)? What is the connection between free
-will and moral responsibility (#30)? Do I have free will only if I had the
-option to do otherwise (#31)? Are free will and determinism compatible
-(#32)? If everything is either going to happen or not, isn ’ t fatalism tenable
-(#33)? How does Sartre ’ s existentialism – “ Man is condemned to be free ”
-– enter into the conversation (#34)?
-Epistemology
-How do I know that I exist (#35)? Am I certain that I am not dreaming
-(#36)? Am I directly conscious of features of sensations or experiences
-(#37)? Does every belief need to be justifi ed by other beliefs and will that
-lead to an infi nite regress (#38)? Isn ’ t there a commonsense response to
-skepticism (#39)? If there can be no justifi ed procedure for normatively
-distinguishing among competing epistemic views, then are all accounts are
-epistemically equal (#40)? How does the traditional account of knowledge
-being a true justifi ed belief fail (#41)? Is something true solely because
-people agree that it is true (#42)? Is it possible to differentiate knowledge
-or experience between a conceptual component and an empirical component
-(#43)? Is there a sharp division between analytic truths and synthetic
-truths (#44)? Is there a rational justifi cation for inductive inferences and
-the foundation of modern science (#45)? If things are similar in certain
-observable or identifi ed cases, are they are also similar in some other unobservable
-or unidentifi ed cases (#46)? Should philosophy look to science to
-explain and justify our knowledge of the world (#47)? Are some cognitive
-states in direct contact with reality and form a fi rm foundation that supports
-the rest of our knowledge (#48, #49)? Are there limitations to what reasoning
-can accomplish (#50)?
-Ethics
-Does the just life bring happiness (#51)? Is the happy life one in accord with
-reason (#52)? Is the Good one thing or many (#53)? What is the best posIntroduction:
-Show Me the Arguments 5
-sible life that a person can lead (#54)? Did Kant have an argument for the
-categorical imperative (#55)? And why did he think that autonomy deserves
-respect (#56)? Should the Good be conceived of in terms of utility (#57)?
-Are humans just hedonists, who champion pleasure over everything else
-(#58)? Is all morality relative or are there objective principles across cultures
-(#59)? Can the good be defi ned (#60)? Should we accept the authority of
-the state (#61)? Is taxation forced labor (#62)? Do we have a moral duty to
-give to charity (#63)? Would it be better if, in the future, a greater rather
-than lesser number of people lived (#64)? Is a great loss to one person justifi
-ed by smaller benefi ts to a great many others (#65)? Is it better to bring
-everyone down to the same level than to accept an inequality (#66)? Does
-justice demand preserving a patterned distribution of property (#67)?
-What are the central arguments of liberal feminism (#68)? What is the
-moral status of marginal cases; that is, when is there not a clearly drawn
-line between human and nonhuman animals (#69)? What is the most robust
-argument in favor of vegetarianism (#70)? What does a famous violin player
-have to do with the most discussed argument in the abortion debate (#71)?
-Is abortion immoral due to the loss of future experiences, activities, projects,
-and enjoyments (#72)? Does something need to be able to desire or conceive
-of something in order to have the right to something; for example, life
-(#73)? Is there an ethical difference between active and passive euthanasia
-(#74)?
-Philosophy of Mind
-Is the mind a blank slate or are there innate ideas (#75)? What is Cartesian
-dualism and is the mind distinct from the body (#76)? What is the mind –
-body problem (#77)? What is property dualism and how is it different than
-substance dualism (#78)? Are mental events identical with physical events
-(#79, #80)? Is every mental property realized in exactly one physical way
-(#81)? How does the nonphysical mind move the physical body (#82)? Do
-I have privileged access to my mental states and can I know the mental
-states of others (#83)? Does physicalism capture all the essential facts of
-experience (#84, #85)? If a zombie world is metaphysically possible, how
-would that critique physicalism (#86)? Does the sensation of color reveal
-intrinsic features about color (#87)? If a computer had the right programs,
-would it have a mind; in other words, is true artifi cial intelligence possible
-(#88)?
-Science and Language
-How do we discern science from pseudo - science (#89)? Do scientifi c paradigms
-build from previous ones; that is, are they commensurable (#90)? Is
-6 Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone
-the shift from one paradigm to another a rational process (#90)? Is scientifi c
-realism the only way that makes progress in science and technology not
-miraculous (#91)? How did Galileo know that all objects fall at the same
-rate of speed regardless of their respective weights without experimenting
-(#92)? If a theory is fallible, should it be eliminated (#93)?
-Is there such a thing as a completely private language (#94)? Does learning
-a language require learning a rule (#95)? Does learning a rule require
-learning a language (#96)? When there is translation, is there also interpretation
-(#97, #98)? If there are true statements that contain abstract objects,
-does that mean those abstract objects exist (#99)? Is mathematical Platonism
-the best way to explain mathematical knowledge (#100)?
-How to Use This Book
-Block quotations are provided to show how the argument is presented in
-the text.
-P1. Premises are marked “ P. ”
-P2. A premise is a statement that is either true or false and is given as evidence
-or a reason for accepting the conclusion; a conclusion is the statement
-that is argued for and supported by the premises.
-C1. Conclusions, of which there may be many, are marked with “ C ”
-and are indented. Conclusion indicators – for example, “ therefore ”
-and “ hence ” – have been omitted. The rule of inference or replacement
-is listed after deductive conclusions.
-In the boxed area that precedes the arguments, you will fi nd a reference
-list of original and secondary sources.
-Part I
-Philosophy of Religion
-1
-Aquinas ’ Five Ways
-Timothy J. Pawl
-St. Thomas Aquinas (1224/5 – 74) offered his Five Ways, or fi ve proofs for
-the existence of God, near the beginning of his magnum opus , the Summa
-theologiae (Part 1, Question 2, Article 3, the response). The Summa (ST),
-as it is often called, was written as a textbook for men in their priestly
-formation. It is well over 2,500 pages in a standard English translation from
-the Latin, but the Five Ways take up only slightly more than one page.
-All quotations from Aquinas are taken from Alfred Freddoso ’ s translation of
-the Summa theologiae , available online at www.nd.edu/ ∼ afreddos/summa -
-translation/TOC - part1.htm
-Baisnee , Jules . “ St. Thomas Aquinas ’ s Proofs of the Existence of God
-Presented in Their Chronological Order , ” in Philosophical Studies in
-Honor of the Very Reverend Ignatius Smith, O.P. , edited by John K.
-Ryan , 29 – 64 . Westminster : The Newman Press , 1952 .
-Bochenski , Joseph M. “ The Five Ways , ” in The Rationality of Theism , edited
-by Adolfo Garc í a de la Sienra , 61 – 92 . Atlanta, GA : Rodopi , 2000 .
-Kenny , Anthony . The Five Ways: Saint Thomas Aquinas ’ Proofs of God ’ s
-Existence . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1969 .
-Pawl , Timothy . “ The Five Ways , ” in The Oxford Handbook of Thomas
-Aquinas , edited by Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump . Oxford : Oxford
-University Press , 2011 .
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-10 Timothy J. Pawl
-Nevertheless, they are almost assuredly the most commented on section of
-the Summa and some of the most well - known arguments for the existence
-of God.
-One should note that while each Way concludes with some variation of
-“ and this we call God, ” Aquinas did not intend the Five Ways to be demonstrations
-of a uniquely Christian God. In fact, he warns against attempts
-to prove, for instance, that God is triune (three persons but one being, as
-Christians affi rm), since such arguments, he explains, will fall short and
-lead unbelievers to scoff (see his Summa contra gentiles , Book 1, Chapter
-9, paragraph 2). Furthermore, Aquinas did not take the Five Ways to show
-that this thing we call “ God ” is perfect, good, immutable, eternal, powerful,
-knowledgeable, or even that there is just one such thing. As a consequence,
-some common criticisms of the Ways – for instance, that they do not demonstrate
-an omnipotent being – clearly miss the mark. Aquinas goes on later
-to devote many pages to whether the thing we call “ God ” in the Five Ways
-is omnipotent. And the same is true for the other abovementioned attributes.
-Rather, Aquinas ’ intent in the Five Ways is to show that there is something -
-or - other that, for instance, causes things but is itself uncaused, or something
-that is necessary and does not have that necessary existence from another.
-In fact, he does not argue that the Five Ways conclude to the same thing
-– rather than fi ve different things – until later in the Summa (Part 1,
-Question 11, Article 3, the response).
-Finally, it is important to note that while the Five Ways are Aquinas ’
-most often cited arguments for the existence of God, they are not his most
-detailed or nuanced. The Summa , as said above, is a textbook of sorts, and
-written for an audience of common men in formation for the priesthood
-– not academics, scholars, atheists, or agnostics. To judge Aquinas ’ best and
-most powerful arguments for the existence of God, one would do better to
-look at the parallel passages from his other works rather than at his Summa
-(see Baisnee for a helpful list of these passages). That said, it is the arguments
-in the Summa that have received the most attention and have become,
-by any reasonable standard, some of the most important arguments in the
-Western intellectual tradition.
-The First Way – The Argument from Motion
-The First Way focuses on motion. By “ motion, ” Aquinas means the three
-sorts of accidental change that Aristotle differentiates: change of location
-(e.g., moving across the room), change in quality (e.g., heating up), and
-change in quantity (e.g., getting fatter). The general thrust of the argument
-is that anything changed in one of these ways is changed by something else.
-That something else, in changing the fi rst thing, either is itself changed or
-Aquinas’ Five Ways 11
-remains changeless. A series of changing changers cannot proceed infi nitely.
-So there must be some fi rst, unchanging being. That being we call “ God. ”
-The argument below uses ‘ F ’ as a variable governing end states of being
-correlated with the three sorts of motion mentioned above. For instance,
-one could substitute “ across the room, ” “ hot, ” or “ fat ” for F. Aquinas
-provides three detailed defenses of C3 in the Summa contra gentiles , Part
-1, Chapter 13. He considers the common objection that a thing can move
-itself (e.g., the runner moves himself when sprinting from the starting line)
-by saying that such cases are instances of a part moving a whole and not
-a thing moving itself. In P3, Aquinas says that the mover must be in a
-state of actuality relevant to F in order to make something F. The argument
-would be more forceful if Aquinas could say that the mover must
-be actually F, but he cannot say that, at least not with perfect generality.
-For Aquinas thinks that God can move things in many ways that God is
-not actually: God can fatten a man without himself being fat. In that case,
-God is said to be virtually F, where something is “ virtually F ” if it is not
-itself F but it has the power to make others F. One may say, then, that
-something is in a state of actuality relevant to F when it is either actually
-F or virtually F.
-It is certain, and obvious to the senses, that in this world some things are
-moved. But everything that is moved is moved by another. For nothing is
-moved except insofar as it is in potentiality with respect to that actuality
-toward which it is moved, whereas something effects motion insofar as it is
-in actuality in a relevant respect. After all, to effect motion is just to lead
-something from potentiality into actuality. But a thing cannot be led from
-potentiality into actuality except through some being that is in actuality in a
-relevant respect; for example, something that is hot in actuality – say, a fi re
-– makes a piece of wood, which is hot in potentiality, to be hot in actuality,
-and it thereby moves and alters the piece of wood. But it is impossible for
-something to be simultaneously in potentiality and in actuality with respect
-to same thing; rather, it can be in potentiality and in actuality only with
-respect to different things. For what is hot in actuality cannot simultaneously
-be hot in potentiality; rather, it is cold in potentiality. Therefore, it is impossible
-that something should be both mover and moved in the same way and
-with respect to the same thing, or, in other words, that something should
-move itself. Therefore, everything that is moved must be moved by another.
-If, then, that by which something is moved is itself moved, then it, too,
-must be moved by another, and that other by still another. But this does not
-go on to infi nity. For if it did, then there would not be any fi rst mover and,
-as a result, none of the others would effect motion, either. For secondary
-movers effect motion only because they are being moved by a fi rst mover, just
-as a stick does not effect motion except because it is being moved by a hand.
-Therefore, one has to arrive at some fi rst mover that is not being moved by
-anything. And this is what everyone takes to be God. (ST I, q2, a3, response)
-12 Timothy J. Pawl
-P1. Some things are moved.
-P2. If something is moved to being F, then it is potentially but not actually
-F.
-P3. If something moves a thing to be F, then it (the mover) is in a state of
-actuality relevant to F.
-C1. If something were to move itself to be F (e.g., be both moved and
-its own mover), then it would be both potentially but not actually F
-and also in a state of actuality relevant to F (conjunction, and modus
-ponens , P1, P2, P3).
-P4. But it is not possible for something to be both potentially but not actually
-F and also in a state of actuality relevant to F.
-C2. It is not possible for something to move itself to be F ( modus tollens,
-C1, P4).
-P5. If it is not possible for something to move itself to be F, then if something
-is moved, it is moved by something else.
-C3. If something is moved, it is moved by something else ( modus ponens ,
-C2, P5).
-P5. If B moves A and B is moved, then B must be moved by some other
-thing, C. And if C is moved, then C must be moved by still some other
-thing, D. And so on.
-P6. If the series of movers were to go on to infi nity, then there would be
-no fi rst mover.
-P7. If there were no fi rst mover, then there would be no motion.
-C4. There is a fi rst mover ( modus tollens , P1, P7).
-C5. That fi rst mover is the thing that everyone takes to be God
-(defi nition).
-The Second Way – The Argument from Causation
-Whereas the First Way focused on accidental changes, the Second Way
-focuses on ordered series of effi cient causation. An effi cient cause is that
-which produces something or an alteration in something. The composer is
-the effi cient cause of the sonata; the fi re is the effi cient cause of the heating
-of the kettle. An ordered series is a series in which the causal work of later
-members in the series depends on the simultaneous causal work of earlier
-members in the series. If the fi re heats the kettle and the kettle heats the
-water, it is an ordered series, since the kettle ’ s heating the water depends
-upon the causal activity of the earlier cause, the fi re. Likewise, a system of
-gears is an ordered causal series, since the causal action of one intermediate
-gear spinning another, later gear depends upon the causal activity of previous
-gears in the system. Aquinas argues in the Second Way, to continue
-with the gear image, that the system cannot be gears all the way back. An
-Aquinas’ Five Ways 13
-infi nite series of gears, without a fi rst cause of their spinning, would not be
-in motion.
-We fi nd that among sensible things there is an ordering of effi cient causes,
-and yet we do not fi nd – nor is it possible to fi nd – anything that is an effi cient
-cause of its own self. For if something were an effi cient cause of itself, then
-it would be prior to itself – which is impossible.
-But it is impossible to go on to infi nity among effi cient causes. For in every
-case of ordered effi cient causes, the fi rst is a cause of the intermediate and the
-intermediate is a cause of the last – and this regardless of whether the intermediate
-is constituted by many causes or by just one. But when a cause is
-removed, its effect is removed. Therefore, if there were no fi rst among the
-effi cient causes, then neither would there be a last or an intermediate. But if
-the effi cient causes went on to infi nity, there would not be a fi rst effi cient
-cause, and so there would not be a last effect or any intermediate effi cient
-causes, either – which is obviously false. Therefore, one must posit some fi rst
-effi cient cause – which everyone calls God. (ST I, q2, a3, response)
-P1. There is an ordered series of effi cient causes.
-P2. Necessarily, if X is an effi cient cause of Y, then X is prior to Y.
-C1. Necessarily, if X is an effi cient cause of X, then X is prior to X
-(instantiation, P2).
-P3. It is not possible for X to be prior to X.
-C2. It is not possible for X to be an effi cient cause of itself ( modus tollens ,
-C1, P3).
-P4. If something is an ordered series of effi cient causes, then the fi rst cause
-causes the intermediate cause(s), and the intermediate cause(s) cause(s)
-the last effect.
-P5. If a cause is removed from an ordered series of effi cient causes, then
-the effects after that cause are removed as well.
-C3. If there were no fi rst cause, then there would be no subsequent effects
-(instantiation, P4, P5).
-P6. If an ordered series of effi cient causes could precede infi nitely, then there
-would be no fi rst cause.
-C4. If an ordered series of effi cient causes could precede infi nitely, then
-there would be no subsequent effects (hypothetical syllogism, C3, P6).
-P7. But there are subsequent effects.
-C5. An ordered series of effi cient causes cannot precede infi nitely ( modus
-tollens , C4, P7).
-P8. An ordered series of effi cient causes either precedes infi nitely, terminates
-in a cause that causes itself, or terminates in an uncaused cause.
-C6. An ordered series of effi cient causation terminates in an uncaused
-cause (disjunctive syllogism, C2, C5, P8).
-C7. We call that uncaused cause “ God ” (defi nition).
-14 Timothy J. Pawl
-The Third Way – The Argument from Possibility
-and Necessity
-Aquinas has a specifi c understanding of possibility and necessity in mind
-in the Third Way, and it is not the common understanding in today ’ s philosophical
-discussions. When Aquinas calls something “ necessary, ” in this
-argument, he means that it is not subject to generation or corruption. A
-necessary being exists, but it does not come into existence by composition,
-and it cannot cease existing by way of decomposition. Similarly, a possible
-being, in this context, exists, but it does or could have come into existence
-by way of composition, and it can cease to exist by way of decomposition.
-The most debated inference in this argument is the inference from P3 to
-C2. Most commentators who attempt to justify it do so by arguing that
-Aquinas had in mind an implicit premise which, together with P3, entails
-C2. As it stands, without the help of an implicit premise, the inference is
-invalid and commits the fallacy of composition.
-Certain of the things we fi nd in the world are able to exist and able not
-to exist; for some things are found to be generated and corrupted and, as a
-result, they are able to exist and able not to exist.
-But it is impossible that everything should be like this; for that which is
-able not to exist is such that at some time it does not exist. Therefore, if
-everything is such that it is able not to exist, then at some time nothing existed
-in the world. But if this were true, then nothing would exist even now. For
-what does not exist begins to exist only through something that does exist;
-therefore, if there were no beings, then it was impossible that anything should
-have begun to exist, and so nothing would exist now – which is obviously
-false. Therefore, not all beings are able to exist [and able not to exist]; rather,
-it must be that there is something necessary in the world.
-Now every necessary being either has a cause of its necessity from outside
-itself or it does not. But it is impossible to go on to infi nity among necessary
-beings that have a cause of their necessity – in the same way, as was proved
-above, that it is impossible to go on to infi nity among effi cient causes.
-Therefore, one must posit something that is necessary per se , which does not
-have a cause of its necessity from outside itself but is instead a cause of necessity
-for the other [necessary] things. But this everyone calls God. (ST I, q2,
-a3, response)
-P1. Some things are able to be generated or corrupted.
-P2. If some things are able to be generated or corrupted, then it is possible
-for those things either to exist or not to exist.
-C1. It is possible for some things to exist or not to exist ( modus ponens ,
-P1, P2).
-Aquinas’ Five Ways 15
-P3. If, for each thing, it is possible that it not exist, then at some time it
-does not exist.
-C2. If, for each thing, at some time it does not exist, then at some time
-nothing exists (universal generalization, P3).
-P4. If at some time nothing exists, then there would have been nothing to
-cause another thing to exist.
-P5. If there had been nothing to cause another being to exist, then nothing
-could have come into existence.
-P6. If nothing could have come into existence, then nothing would exist
-even now.
-P7. But something does exist now.
-C3. Something could have come into existence ( modus tollens , P6, P7).
-C4. There had to have been something to cause another thing to exist
-( modus tollens, P5, C3).
-C5. At no time did nothing exist ( modus tollens , P4, C4).
-C6. It is not true that, for each thing, at some time it does not exist
-( modus tollens , C2, C5).
-C7. There must be something that is not possible not to exist – that is,
-there must be a necessary being ( modus tollens , P3, C6).
-P8. A necessary being has a cause for its necessity from something else or
-it does not.
-P9. It is not possible for there to be an infi nite series of beings with their
-necessity from something else.
-C8. There must be some necessary being with its necessity not from
-something else (disjunctive syllogism, P8, P9).
-C9. We call that necessary being whose necessity comes from nothing
-else “ God ” (defi nition).
-The Fourth Way – The Argument from Gradation
-In the Fourth Way, Aquinas relies on two arguments from Aristotle, which
-he does not provide in the text, to justify two of his premises (P3 and P4).
-P1 is observably true. P2 requires a scope restriction. Aquinas seems to be
-saying that any comparative predications of a property entail that there
-exists something that is maximally that property. If this were true, then if
-Bob is fatter than Tom, then there must be something that is maximally fat.
-Worse still, from P4, it would follow that this fattest thing would be the
-cause of all other fat things. It seems better to restrict P2 to perfections and
-then take heat (his example) to be a form of perfection (note that this is
-just an example; one can grant his point while denying that heat is a perfection).
-C4 seems to commit the fallacy of composition. Even if it were proven
-16 Timothy J. Pawl
-that there is a thing that is most good, and a thing that is most noble, and
-a thing that is most true, it has yet to be shown why this must be the same
-thing. Aquinas perhaps had in mind a principle requiring the cause of a
-thing ’ s being also to be the cause of its other positive attributes or the cause
-of its perfections. If so, such a premise would need to be inserted into the
-argument before C4.
-In the world some things are found to be more and less good, more and
-less true, more and less noble, etc. But more and less are predicated of diverse
-things insofar as they approach in diverse ways that which is maximal in a
-given respect. For instance, the hotter something is, the closer it approaches
-that which is maximally hot. Therefore, there is something that is maximally
-true, maximally good, and maximally noble, and, as a result, is a maximal
-being; for according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 2, things that are
-maximally true are maximally beings.
-But, as is claimed in the same book, that which is maximal in a given genus
-is a cause of all the things that belong to that genus; for instance, fi re, which
-is maximally hot, is a cause of all hot things. Therefore, there is something
-that is a cause for all beings of their esse , their goodness, and each of their
-perfections – and this we call God. (ST I, q2, a3, response)
-P1. There are some things that are more or less good, more or less true, or
-more or less noble.
-P2. If something is more or less F, then there is something maximally F.
-C1. There is something maximally good, something maximally true, and
-something maximally noble (substitution, and modus ponens , P1, P2).
-C2. There is something maximally true (simplifi cation, C1).
-P3. If something is maximally true, then it is maximally being.
-C3. Something is maximally being ( modus ponens , C2, P3).
-P4. If something is maximally F, then it is the cause of all things that are F.
-C4. There is something that is the cause for all beings, their goodness,
-and each of their perfections ( modus ponens , C1, P4).
-C5. We call that thing which is the cause of the being, goodness, and
-perfection of all other things “ God ” (defi nition).
-The Fifth Way – The Argument from the Governance
-Aquinas argues in the Fifth Way that if things always or for the most part
-act for a particular end, that is evidence of their being directed at that end
-by an intelligent agent. In nature, most natural things act always or for the
-most part for a particular end, and so nature is directed by an intelligent
-agent. Note that, for Aquinas, to act for the sake of an end does not require
-intentionality. In Aquinas ’ way of speaking, fi re acts for the sake of the end
-Aquinas’ Five Ways 17
-when it burns upwards and the stone acts for the sake of the end when
-falling down to the earth. One might think that evolutionary biology allows
-a way out of the design or chance dilemma, since, given evolutionary
-biology, something could always or for the most part act for the sake of an
-end but not due to either design or chance but rather natural selection.
-Aquinas ’ argument, however, is not aimed solely at biological entities. An
-electron, for instance, attracts positively charged particles always or for the
-most part, but it did not acquire this property via some evolutionary
-process. So even if natural selection narrows the scope of Aquinas ’ argument,
-it alone does not defeat the argument.
-We see that some things lacking cognition, viz., natural bodies, act for the
-sake of an end. This is apparent from the fact that they always or very frequently
-act in the same way in order to bring about that which is best, and
-from this it is clear that it is not by chance, but by design, that they attain
-the end.
-But things lacking cognition tend toward an end only if they are directed
-by something that has cognition and intelligence, in the way that an arrow is
-directed by an archer. Therefore, there is something intelligent by which all
-natural things are ordered to an end – and this we call God. (ST I, q2, a3,
-response)
-P1. If something always or for the most part acts in the same way in order
-to bring about that which is best, then it acts for the sake of an end.
-P2. Beings in nature always or for the most part act in the same way in
-order to bring about that which is best.
-C1. Beings in nature act for the sake of an end ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
-P3. If beings in nature act for the sake of an end, then beings in nature are
-directed by something that has cognition and intelligence.
-C2. Beings in nature are directed by something that has cognition and
-intelligence ( modus ponens , C1, P3).
-C3. We call that director of unthinking things “ God ” (defi nition).
-2
-The Contingency
-Cosmological Argument
-Mark T. Nelson
-The Contingency Argument is a version of the cosmological argument for
-the existence of God, proposed by Samuel Clarke (1675 – 1729) and rescued
-from obscurity by William Rowe (b. 1931). The cosmological argument is
-not, in fact, a single argument but a family of arguments that attempt to
-prove, or at least render plausible, the existence of God based on the existence
-of the cosmos. Typically, these arguments have two stages: the fi rst
-arguing from the existence of the cosmos to the existence of a necessary
-being or fi rst cause of this cosmos; the second arguing that this necessary
-being or fi rst cause is God. Regarding the fi rst stage of the argument, scholars
-sometimes distinguish between two versions: those based on the idea
-that infi nite causal regresses do not exist and those not based on this idea.
-The fi rst three of Thomas Aquinas ’ (1224/5 – 74) “ Five Ways ” (#1) are
-examples of the former; Clarke ’ s contingency argument is an example of
-the latter. Aquinas argues, for example, that an uncaused fi rst cause of
-Clarke , Samuel . A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God and
-Other Writings , edited by Enzio Vailati . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge
-University Press , 1998 .
-Rowe , William L. The Cosmological Argument . Princeton, NJ : Princeton
-University Press , 1975 .
-___. Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction . Belmont, CA : Wadsworth ,
-1978 .
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-The Contingency Cosmological Argument 19
-“ sensible beings with effi cient causes ” must exist, because, if it did not,
-there would be an infi nite regress of caused causes, but such infi nite causal
-regresses do not in fact exist. Many critics fi nd Aquinas ’ argument on this
-point unconvincing, so one advantage of Clarke ’ s argument is that it simply
-sidesteps this issue. According to Clarke, the problem with the idea of
-everything ’ s being just an infi nite regress of dependent beings caused by
-other dependent beings (equivalent to Aquinas ’ “ sensible beings with effi -
-cient causes ” ) is not that such regresses are impossible but that this would
-violate the Principle of Suffi cient Reason, an intuitive principle according
-to which (roughly) there is an explanation for every being and every fact.
-In such a case, there would be an explanation of the existence of every
-particular dependent being, and there would even be an explanation of the
-existence of that particular collection of dependent beings. There would
-not, however, be an explanation of the fact that there are any dependent
-beings at all, since no particular existing dependent being (or set of dependent
-beings) could explain this. That is, we would lack an explanation of the
-fact that there is something rather than nothing. Thus, there must be at
-least one self - existent being that explains why there is something rather
-than nothing. Elsewhere, Clarke undertakes to prove that this being has the
-other attributes that we normally associate with divinity.
-There has existed from eternity some one unchangeable and independent
-being. For since something must needs have been from eternity, as has been
-already proved and is granted on all hands, either there has always existed
-some one unchangeable and independent being from which all other beings
-that are or ever were in the universe have received their original, or else there
-has been an infi nite succession of changeable and dependent beings produced
-one from another in an endless progression without any original cause at all.
-Now this latter supposition is so very absurd that, though all atheism must
-in its accounts of most things [ . . . ] terminate in it, yet I think very few atheists
-ever were so weak as openly and directly to defend it. For it is plainly
-impossible and contradictory to itself. I shall not argue against it from the
-supposed impossibility of infi nite succession, barely and absolutely considered
-in itself, for a reason which shall be mentioned hereafter. But, if we consider
-such an infi nite progression as one entire endless series of dependent beings,
-it is plain this whole series of beings can have no cause from without of its
-existence because in it are supposed to be included all things that are, or ever
-were, in the universe. And it is plain it can have no reason within itself for
-its existence because no one being in this infi nite succession is supposed to be
-self - existent or necessary (which is the only ground or reason of existence of
-anything that can be imagined within the thing itself [ . . . ]), but every one
-dependent on the foregoing. And where no part is necessary, it is manifest the
-whole cannot be necessary – absolute necessity of existence not being an
-extrinsic, relative, and accidental denomination but an inward and essential
-property of the nature of the thing which so exists. (Clark, 10)
-20 Mark T. Nelson
-Rowe ’ s terminology:
-“ dependent being ” = “ a being whose existence is explained by the causal
-activity of other things ”
-“ self - existent being ” = “ a being whose existence is explained by itself,
-that is, by its own nature ”
-“ positive fact ” = “ a fact whose obtaining entails the existence of at least
-one contingent being ”
-“ contingent being ” = “ a being such that it is logically possible for that
-being to exist and it is logically possible for that being not to exist ”
-Principle of Suffi cient Reason (PSR):
-PSR1. For every being that exists or ever existed, there is an explanation
-of the existence of that being.
-PSR2. For every positive fact, there is an explanation of that fact.
-P1. Every being (that exists or ever existed) is either a dependent being or
-a self - existent being.
-P2. Not every being is a dependent being.
-C1. There exists a self - existent being (disjunctive syllogism, P1, P2).
-The argument is valid if it is interpreted as follows:
-P1 * . Every being is a dependent being or some being is a self - existent being.
-[Or: If no being is a self - existent being, then every being is a dependent
-being.]
-P2 * . It is not the case that every being is a dependent being.
-C1 * . Some being is a self - existent being (disjunctive syllogism, P1 * , P2 * ).
-The case for P1 * :
-P1 may appear to be a tautology, but it is not, because it rules out one type
-of case, namely, things whose existence is explained by nothing at all.
-Thus, it is equivalent to PSR1.
-The case for P2 * :
-P3. If every being is a dependent being, then if there is an explanation for
-the fact that any dependent beings exist (rather than nothing at all), this
-will be in terms of the existence of either the totality of dependent beings
-or some subset of that totality.
-P4. That any dependent beings exist at all (rather than nothing) is a positive
-fact (defi nitions of “ dependent being ” , “ positive fact ” ).
-The Contingency Cosmological Argument 21
-P5. There is an explanation of every positive fact (PSR2).
-C2. There is an explanation for the fact that any dependent beings exist
-at all (instantiation, P4, P5).
-C3. If every being is a dependent being, then there is an explanation for
-the fact that any dependent beings exist (rather than nothing at all),
-in terms of the existence of either the totality of dependent beings or
-some subset of that totality (instantiation, P3, C2).
-P6. It is not possible to explain the fact that any dependent beings exist at
-all (rather than nothing) simply in terms of the existence of either the
-totality of dependent beings or of some subset of that totality.
-C4. It is not the case that every being is a dependent being ( modus tollens ,
-C3, P6).
-Thus, P1 * depends on PSR1 and P2 * depends on PSR2, so, according
-to Rowe, the success of Clarke ’ s contingency argument turns on the truth
-or rational acceptability of the Principle of Suffi cient Reason itself.
-3
-The Kalam Argument for the
-Existence of God
-Harry Lesser
-One of the most interesting arguments for the existence of God was developed
-by the philosopher – theologians of the Kalam, the tradition of mediaeval
-Muslim theology, and has recently been revived by William Craig,
-among others. It is a version of the cosmological argument, being an argument
-from the mere existence of the universe to the existence of God, as
-opposed to arguing from the concept of God, as the ontological argument
-does, or from particular features of the universe, such as evidence of design.
-William Craig ’ s formulation of the argument is particularly concise, and
-runs as follows:
-Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
-The universe began to exist.
-Therefore, the universe has a cause. (63)
-This argument is clearly a valid modus ponens ; but how certain is the
-truth of the premises? The major premise seems unproven. It is not self -
-contradictory to assert that something could, or did, begin to exist without
-any cause. There is, of course, a powerful empirical inductive argument
-Craig , William L. The Kalam Cosmological Argument . London : Macmillan ,
-1979 .
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-The Kalam Argument for the Existence of God 23
-from the fact that there are billions upon billions of examples of something
-beginning to exist and having a cause of its existence, and not a single
-observed or recorded example of something coming to exist without a
-cause. But this is insuffi cient for proof for two reasons. First, no inductive
-argument gives us more than very good evidence that something is always
-the case: however many confi rming instances we fi nd, an exception is
-always a possibility, even if an unlikely one. Second, even if every individual
-entity in the universe that began to exist has a cause of its existence, it does
-not follow that this is true of the universe as a whole, since what is true
-even of every part is not necessarily true of the totality and vice versa.
-A third argument for the claim that whatever begins to exist has a cause
-would be that though it is not self - contradictory that something might come
-into existence without a cause, it is unimaginable. To this two replies might
-be made. One is that this might be a feature of our minds rather than a
-feature of how the world really is, that is, simply a limit on what we can
-conceive and not a limit on what can happen. Secondly, the universe as a
-whole is something totally beyond our experience: hence it might be said
-that we simply have no idea what might or might not be possible. Hence,
-the major premise of the argument cannot be proven by either logic or
-experience. Nevertheless, the notion that something could come into being
-from nothing, without a cause, seems close to incredible, so that the premise,
-though unproven, seems very plausible.
-On the other hand, the minor premise, that the universe has a beginning,
-for a long time looked very vulnerable: there seemed to be no reason to
-assert that the universe came into being rather than having always existed,
-as most of the Greeks, including Aristotle, thought. The Kalam philosophers
-themselves, and those who followed them, tried to argue that the notion of
-an infi nite series of events back in time, with no fi rst event, is incoherent
-or in some way impossible, but no convincing argument on these lines has
-been produced. It is true that the idea that time has no beginning creates
-problems for the mind, but there are equal problems in supposing that it
-does have a beginning, since one can always ask, “ What happened before
-that? ” What has reestablished the argument in a contemporary version, by
-no means confi ned to Muslims, is the increasing scientifi c evidence that the
-universe did have a beginning. This does not yet amount to proof: indeed,
-it is not clear what astronomical or other observations could absolutely
-prove the “ big bang ” theory of the beginning of the universe. But it makes
-the proposition, that the universe had a beginning, plausible, something for
-which there is evidence and which is believed by many who have studied
-the evidence. So the Kalam argument for the existence of God is a valid
-argument from two premises of which neither is proven nor certain, but
-both are plausible. The jury is still out, and much depends on how science
-develops and whether the minor premise looks increasingly plausible.
-24 Harry Lesser
-We should note, though, that the argument is incomplete. Even if the
-universe has a cause outside itself, further argument is needed to establish
-that the cause is an eternal and good being; in other words, that it is God.
-Some who accept the argument think that one also has to show that the
-cause is a personal being and have offered arguments for this. Certainly it
-could be argued that only an eternal being could precede the universe and
-therefore only an eternal being could cause it. It can also be argued that
-the only kind of cause that could operate on the universe from outside, as
-opposed to being part of it, would be the act of a personal being and only
-a good personal being would wish to create a universe. But it is fair to say,
-I think, that we have not yet got a full and rigorous working - out of this
-part of the argument, though the above indicates the lines it might take.
-Once again, we might say that it is plausible, but not proven, that the cause
-of the universe is a good personal Creator, just as it is plausible, but not
-proved, that the universe has a cause.
-P1. If something begins to exist, then it has a cause.
-P2. The universe began to exist.
-C1. The universe has a cause ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
-4
-The Ontological Argument
-Sara L. Uckelman
-In philosophy of religion, arguments that attempt to prove the existence of
-God on the basis of God ’ s essence are called ontological arguments because
-they appeal only to the nature or essence of God ’ s being. The fi rst such
-argument was given by Saint Anselm of Canterbury (1033 – 1109) in Chapter
-II of his Proslogion (written c .1077 – 8). Saint Anselm defi nes God as “ that
-than which nothing greater can be thought ” and seeks to derive from this
-defi nition a contradiction with the assumption that God does not exist.
-Some modern commentators have also found another similar argument in
-Proslogion III, which purportedly shows not only that God exists but that
-God ’ s existence is necessary. However, it is the argument in Proslogion II
-that is usually referred to simply as “ the ontological argument. ”
-Anselm of Canterbury . Proslogion, in S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi
-Opera Omnia , vol. 1 , edited by F. S. Schmitt , 93 – 104 . Seccovii : Abbatia ,
-1938 – 61 .
-Anselm of Canterbury . Proslogion, in Anselm of Canterbury: The Major
-Works , edited by B. Davies and G. R. Evans , translated by M. J.
-Charlesworth, 82 – 104 . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1998 .
-Davies , Brian. “ Anselm and the Ontological Argument , ” in The Cambridge
-Companion to Anselm , edited by B. Davies and B. Leftow , 57 – 178 .
-Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 2004 .
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-26 Sara L. Uckelman
-Many authors since Anselm have objected to the argument on the
-strength of its conclusion and have attempted to show that it is either invalid
-or unsound. During Anselm ’ s lifetime, Gaunilo, a monk from Marmoutier,
-criticized the argument by showing that an argument of the same structure
-could be used to demonstrate the existence of the best possible island, which
-conclusion is taken to be absurd. While this criticism does not point to a
-specifi c error in Anselm ’ s argument, it casts some doubt on its structure,
-since the same structure can be used to derive absurd conclusions. One
-famous counterargument is given by Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804), who
-argues that Anselm mistakenly uses “ existence ” as a predicate, which it is
-not. However, there is no agreement as to the status of the validity of the
-argument or the soundness of its premises; even among those who believe
-the argument is problematic do not agree on what is the problem.
-Well then, Lord, You who give understanding to faith, grant me that I may
-understand, as much as You see fi t, that You exist as we believe You to exist,
-and that You are what we believe You to be. Now we believe that You are
-something than which nothing greater can be thought. Or can it be that a
-thing of such a nature does not exist, since ‘ the Fool has said in his heart,
-there is no God ’ [Ps. 13: 1; 52: 1]? But surely, when this same Fool hears
-what I am speaking about, namely ‘ something - than - which - nothing - greater -
-can - be - thought ’ , he understands what he hears, and what he understands is
-in his mind, even if he does not understand that it actually exists. For it is
-one thing for an object to exist in the mind, and another thing to understand
-that an object actually exists. Thus, when a painter plans beforehand what
-he is going to execute, he has [the picture] in his mind, but he does not yet
-think that it actually exists because he has not yet executed it. However, when
-he has actually painted it, then he both has it in his mind and understands
-that it exists because he has now made it. Even the Fool, then, is forced to
-agree that �� something - than - which - nothing - greater - can - be - thought exists in
-the mind, since he understands this when he hears it, and whatever is understood
-is in the mind. And surely that - than - which - a - greater - cannot - be - thought
-cannot exist in the mind alone. For if it exists solely in the mind, it can be
-thought to exist in reality also, which is greater. If then that - than - which -
-a - greater - cannot - be - thought exists in the mind alone, this same that -
-than - which - a - greater - cannot - be - thought is that - that - which - a - greater - can - be -
-thought. But this is obviously impossible. Therefore there is absolutely no
-doubt that something - than - which - a - greater - cannot - be - thought exists both in
-the mind and in reality. (Anselm trans. Charlesworth, 87)
-P1. God is something than which nothing greater can be thought
-(defi nition).
-P2. Existence in the understanding and existence in reality are two separate
-things.
-P3. Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding.
-The Ontological Argument 27
-(P3a. Something existing in reality is greater than something that only exists
-in the understanding.)
-P4. Even the fool understands the concept of “ something than which none
-greater can be imagined. ”
-P5. If something is understood, then it exists in the understanding
-(defi nition).
-C1. “ Something than which none greater can be imagined ” exists in the
-understanding ( modus ponens , P4, P5).
-P6. “ Something than which none greater can be imagined ” can exist only
-in the understanding (assumption for reductio ).
-P7. It is greater for “ something than which none greater can be imagined ”
-to exist in reality than for it to just exist in the understanding.
-C2. There is something greater than “ something than which none greater
-can be imagined ” (instantiation, P6).
-C3. “ Something than which none greater can be imagined ” cannot exist
-only in the understanding. It must also exist in reality ( reductio ,
-P6 – C2).
-C4. God exists (substitution of defi niendum for defi niens , C3, P1).
-5
-Pascal ’ s Wager
-Leslie Burkholder
-Unlike some other arguments about God ’ s existence, Pascal ’ s Wager doesn ’ t
-try to prove that God exists. It is intended to show that you are better off
-believing that God exists and leading the life of a believer than not doing
-so. More particularly, it tries to show that it is worthwhile to believe in the
-existence of a Christian God and lead the life of a Christian believer.
-The following is a modern presentation of Pascal ’ s thinking. The Christian
-God either exists or does not. It is diffi cult to prove the existence of God
-by philosophical argument. Is it worthwhile for you to live a Christian life
-– acting as though you are a believer – in the hope of attaining eternal life
-and of becoming a believer in the process of living that life? If God exists
-and if you live the Christian life, you will be saved. This has nearly infi nite
-value to you. If God exists and if you do not lead the Christian life, you
-will be damned, a result whose negative utility is also large. If God does
-not exist and if you live the Christian life, you lose at most a little worldly
-Pascal , Blaise. Pens é es , translated by John Warrington. London : Dent , 1960 .
-Hacking, Ian . “ The Logic of Pascal ’ s Wager . ” American Philosophical
-Quarterly 9 ( 1972 ): 186 – 92 .
-McClennan , Edward F. “ Pascal ’ s Wager and Finite Decision Theory , ” in
-Gambling on God , edited by Jeff Jordan , 115 – 33 . London : Rowman &
-Littlefi eld , 1994 .
-Whyte , Jamie. Crimes against Logic . New York : McGraw - Hill , 2004 .
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Pascal’s Wager 29
-pleasure compared to what you would get if God did exist. Hence the
-expected gain from living the Christian life is higher than that of living
-otherwise, so long as the probability of God ’ s existence is greater than 0.
-It is foolish not to lead the Christian life.
-Parts of the wager argument – whether in Pascal ’ s own version or this
-modern one – are best presented using a device called a “ decision table ”
-(below). The words at the top of each column describe a possible state of
-the world or universe. There are just two, and each one has some chance
-or probability of being the truth. We can ’ t eliminate either, according to
-Pascal. Each box tells the result you get if the state named in the column
-is true and you make the choice in the row. So, for example, the result for
-you if the Christian God exists and you lead the Christian life and believe
-this God exists is a gain or benefi t of all – in Pascal ’ s words – or infi nite
-positive value – in the words of the modern argument – and a loss of either
-nothing – which seems to be what Pascal thinks – or something very small,
-some worldly pleasure – as the modern argument has it. Pascal doesn ’ t
-explicitly tell us what goes into some of the boxes. For example, he doesn ’ t
-say what the results for you are if the Christian God exists but you don ’ t
-believe this. The modern statement of the wager fi lls this in for us.
-The third and fourth premises of the argument below are implicit or
-hidden. This argument is certainly deductively valid once these hidden
-premises are added. Each simple step in the reasoning in the argument is
-truth - functionally valid. So any criticism of the argument must tell us that
-one or more of the premises are false. Here are some examples of
-criticisms:
-(a) The fi rst premise says that anyone who leads the Christian life and
-believes, no matter why he does this, gets the benefi t. That ’ s what is
-in Table 1 and the fi rst premise tells us that everything in the table is
-true. But it ’ s false. The Christian God would not reward someone who
-believes or leads the life of a believer solely in order to gain the benefi t
-of infi nite happiness.
-(b) According to the reasoning, the table completely describes the possible
-states of the world and says what will result in each of these states if
-you do believe and lead an appropriate life or you don ’ t believe and
-do not lead the Christian life. But is that correct? Suppose, when the
-Christian God doesn ’ t exist, it is also true that another type of god
-does. This god punishes severely those who believe in the Christian
-God or lead a Christian life. This is a possibility; it is not ruled out by
-logic any more than the existence of the Christian God is ruled in or
-out by logic. If that happens, then what is said in Table 1 down column
-2 aren ’ t certain results. They are merely one among many possible sets
-of results. These are the results that would happen when the Christian
-30 Leslie Burkholder
-God doesn ’ t exist and no other god does either. What is said about
-the state when the Christian God doesn ’ t exist also holds for when
-that God does exist. Other kinds of gods could possibly exist as well,
-even when the Christian God exists. The results listed in column 1 of
-the table are only the ones that happen when the Christian God exists
-and no other kind of god does. So either premise 1 is false because
-what the table states is that the results are really only one of indefi nitely
-many possible results, or premise 2 is false because the columns do
-not cover all the possibilities. They only really cover the case when the
-Christian God exists and no other does and the case when the Christian
-God does not exist and no other does either.
-(c) Suppose that there is no problem with either premise 1 or premise 2.
-Then there is a problem with the implicit or hidden premise 3.
-According to the table, the benefi t gained from believing in the case
-when the Christian God exists is infi nitely positive and the loss from
-not believing in this case is infi nitely negative. Using these facts and
-the rest in the table, we are supposed to be able to calculate that we
-are better off believing in the existence of the Christian God than not
-believing. But there is no way to make sound calculations involving
-infi nite gains and losses. So premise 3 may be false – or at least it is
-very uncertain that it is true.
-God is, or He is not. Reason can decide nothing here. [ . . . ] A game is
-being played at the extremity of this infi nite distance where heads or tails will
-turn up. [ . . . ] Which will you choose then? [ . . . ] Let us weigh the gain and
-the loss in wagering that God is. [ . . . ] If you gain, you gain all; if you lose,
-you lose nothing. Wager, then, without hesitation that He is. ( § 233)
-P1. The information in Table 1 is true.
-P2. The information in Table 1 is complete.
-C1. The information in Table 1 is true and the information in Table 1
-is complete (conjunction, P1, P2).
-Table 1
-Christian God exists
-(Prob > 0)
-Christian God doesn ’ t
-exist (Prob > 0)
-Lead Christian life
-and believe
-Christian God exists
-Gain = all, infi nite
-good; loss = small
-or nothing
-Gain = nothing;
-loss = small or nothing
-Don ’ t lead Christian
-life and believe
-Christian God exists
-Gain = nothing;
-loss = all, infi nite bad
-Gain = nothing;
-loss = nothing
-Pascal’s Wager 31
-P3. If the information in Table 1 is true and the information in Table 1 is
-complete, then you are better off having the life of a believer and believing
-in the Christian God than not doing so.
-C2. You are better off having the life of a believer and believing in the
-Christian God than not doing so ( modus ponens , C1, P3).
-P4. If you are better off having the life of a believer and believing in the
-Christian God than not doing so, then you logically should choose the
-Christian kind of life and believe in God.
-C3. You logically should choose the Christian kind of life and believe in
-God ( modus ponens , C2, P4).
-6
-James ’ Will to Believe Argument
-A. T. Fyfe
-William James (1842 – 1910), in his 1896 lecture, “ The Will to Believe, ”
-gave an argument for holding onto religious belief even in the face of insuffi
-cient evidence that is second in prominence only to Pascal ’ s Wager (#5).
-James ’ stated target in his lecture is W. K. Clifford (1845 – 79), a philosopher
-who had recently argued in his “ The Ethics of Belief ” that “ It is wrong
-always, everywhere and for everyone to believe anything upon insuffi cient
-evidence. ” James ’ strategy in “ The Will to Believe ” is fi rst to identify what
-he thought would be a point of agreement with Clifford; specifi cally, that
-our two fundamental duties as believers are to believe truth and avoid falsehood.
-James then goes on to agree partially with Clifford that at least
-ordinarily, when someone believes upon insuffi cient evidence, he is irrational.
-This is because while believing upon insuffi cient evidence does con-
-James , William. The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy .
-New York : Dover , 1956 .
-Welchman , Jennifer. “ William James ’ s ‘ The Will to Believe ’ and the Ethics of
-Self - Experimentation . ” Transactions of the Charles S. Pierce Society 42 ,
-2 (Spring 2006 ): 229 – 41 .
-Wernham , James C. S. James ’ Will - to - Believe Doctrine: A Heretical View .
-Montreal : McGill - Queen ’ s University Press , 1987 .
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-James’ Will to Believe Argument 33
-tribute to the pursuit of true belief (since the belief might be true), when
-someone believes upon insuffi cient evidence, he is usually violating his duty
-to avoid false belief (since he didn ’ t wait for suffi cient evidence before
-believing).
-Where James disagrees with Clifford is on whether believing upon insuffi
-cient evidence always involves violating our duty to avoid false belief.
-Specifi cally, James argues that there exist beliefs for which the evidence of
-their truth (if they were true) would only become available after we believed
-them and, therefore, waiting to believe until we had suffi cient evidence
-would be a self - defeating wait. To illustrate with an example, suppose that
-you have just fi nished medical school and that you are trying to decide
-whether to join a research team working to discover a cure for cancer. Now,
-to make such a substantial commitment to the search for a cure, James
-would argue that you must believe that a cure exists to be found. That is,
-you ’ d be fooling yourself if you thought you could make such a momentous
-career choice while continuing to suspend belief about the existence of the
-cure you ’ re looking for. At the very least, most people would need such a
-belief to sustain them during the times in which their research was going
-poorly. That being said, suffi cient evidence that such a cure exists won ’ t be
-available until well into the search for one. Therefore, a belief in the existence
-of a cure for cancer is a belief for which the evidence of its truth (if it
-is true) only becomes available after we believe a cure exists.
-Similar to a cancer researcher ’ s belief in the existence of a cure, James
-holds that religious belief is required before evidence of its truth (if it is
-true) can become available. While this would seem to justify religious belief
-only for those who make a career of religious research, James argues that
-religious belief is justifi ed even for ordinary believers in virtue of the peculiar
-way its evidence depends upon their belief. In the preface to the published
-version of his “ The Will to Believe ” lecture, James fi lls in this last step of
-his argument:
-If religious hypotheses about the universe be in order at all, then the active
-faiths of individuals in them, freely expressing themselves in life, are the
-experimental tests by which they are verifi ed, and the only means by which
-their truth or falsehood can be wrought out. The truest scientifi c hypothesis
-is that which, as we say, ‘ works ’ best; and it can be no otherwise with religious
-hypotheses. Religious history proves that one hypothesis after another has
-worked ill, has crumbled at contact with a widening knowledge of the world,
-and has lapsed from the minds of men. Some articles of faith, however, have
-maintained themselves through every vicissitude, and possess even more vitality
-to - day than ever before [ … ]. [T]he freest competition of the various faiths
-with one another, and their openest application to life by their several champions,
-are the most favorable conditions under which the survival of the fi ttest
-can proceed. (XII)
-34 A. T. Fyfe
-P1. It is not rational to have religious belief without suffi cient evidence if
-and only if having religious belief without suffi cient evidence violates our
-duty to avoid false belief.
-P2. Having religious belief without suffi cient evidence violates our duty to
-avoid false belief if and only if I could withhold religious belief for the
-purpose of waiting until I had suffi cient evidence.
-C1. If it is not rational to have religious belief without suffi cient evidence,
-then having religious belief without suffi cient evidence violates our
-duty to avoid false belief (equivalence, simplifi cation, P1).
-C2. If having religious belief without suffi cient evidence violates our duty
-to avoid false belief, then I could withhold religious belief for the
-purpose of waiting until I had suffi cient evidence (equivalence, simplifi
-cation, P2).
-C3. If it is not rational to have religious belief without suffi cient evidence,
-then I could withhold religious belief for the purpose of waiting until
-I had suffi cient evidence (hypothetical syllogism, C1, C2).
-P3. Access to the evidence for religious belief requires already having religious
-belief.
-P4. If access to the evidence for religious belief requires already having
-religious belief, then I cannot withhold belief for the purpose of waiting
-until I had suffi cient evidence.
-C4. I cannot withhold religious belief for the purpose of waiting until I
-had suffi cient evidence ( modus ponens , P3, P4).
-C5. It is rational to have religious belief without suffi cient evidence
-( modus tollens , C3, C4).
-7
-The Problem of Evil
-Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone
-In the philosophy of religion, the “ problem of evil ” (sometimes referred to
-as “ theodicy ” ) is one of the oldest and most interesting areas of study. There
-have been numerous reformulations and solutions proposed, most of which
-try to reconcile the existence of evil in the world with the concept of God
-as omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent (all powerful, all knowing,
-and all loving). Epicurus (341 – 270 bce ) is usually cited as the fi rst author
-to articulate this tension. Following Epicurus, we present a generic argument
-that more explicitly shows the inferences. Starting with the premise
-of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God, the argument
-shows only that the defi nition is incoherent by confl ict with the existence
-of evil and the relevant collective attributes of God. A common mistake in
-interpreting this argument is to suppose that it shows that “ God ” does not
-exist tout court ; what this argument in fact shows is that “ God ” as defi ned
-in a certain way is contradictory and therefore cannot exist as such.
-Inwood , Brad , and L. P. Gerson . Hellenistic Philosophy . Indianapolis :
-Hackett , 1988 .
-Hume , David. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion . Indianapolis : Hackett ,
-1980 .
-Mackie , J. L. “ Evil and Omnipotence . ” Mind 64 ( 1955 ): 200 – 12 .
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-36 Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone
-God either wants to eliminate bad things and cannot, or can but does not
-want to, or neither wishes to nor can, or both wants to and can. If he wants
-to and cannot, he is weak – and this does not apply to god. If he can, but
-does not want to, then he is spiteful – which is equally foreign to god ’ s nature.
-If he neither wants to nor can, he is both weak and spiteful and so not a god.
-If he wants to and can, which is the only thing fi tting for a god, where then
-do bad things come from? Or why does he not eliminate them? (Epicurus as
-recounted by Lactantius, qtd. in Inwood and Gerson, 94)
-P1. God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.
-P2. If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to eliminate all evil.
-C1. God has the power to eliminate all evil ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
-P3. If God is omniscient, then God knows evil exists.
-C2. God knows evil exists ( modus ponens , P1, P3).
-P4. If God is morally perfect, then God has the desire to eliminate all evil.
-C3. God has the desire to eliminate all evil ( modus ponens , P1, P4).
-P5. Evil exists.
-P6. If evil exists, then either God doesn ’ t have the power to eliminate all
-evil or doesn ’ t know evil exists or doesn ’ t have the desire to eliminate
-all evil.
-C4. God doesn ’ t have the power to eliminate all evil or doesn ’ t know
-evil exists or doesn ’ t have the desire to eliminate all evil ( modus
-ponens , P5, P6).
-P7. If God doesn ’ t have the power to eliminate all evil or doesn ’ t know evil
-exists or doesn ’ t have the desire to eliminate all evil, then God does not
-exist.
-C5. God does not exist ( modus ponens , P7, C4).
-8
-The Free Will Defense to the
-Problem of Evil
-Grant Sterling
-The free will defense is a response to the problem of evil (#7). This defense
-is designed to show that there is no contradiction in supposing that God
-would allow evil to exist (even if God is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly
-good), because even a perfectly good being might have reason to
-permit an evil to exist if there is some greater good that cannot be achieved
-without allowing it. The proponent of the free will defense thinks that free
-will is such a good – it is logically impossible for even God to give a creature
-free will and at the same time guarantee that it will always choose rightly,
-and yet free will is a very great good (or is necessary for the existence of
-great goods).
-Note that for many advocates of this argument, it is only necessary to
-show that such a story is coherent, not that it is true. That is, since the
-problem of evil claims that it is impossible for God and evil both to exist,
-to refute the argument, it is only necessary to show that the existence of
-both God and evil is a coherent possibility. On this understanding, a
-“ defense ” claims to lay out a coherent possibility, whereas a philosopher
-who undertakes a “ theodicy ” aims to show that this possibility is the actual
-reason God allows evil.
-van Inwagen , Peter. The Problem of Evil . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 2006 .
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-38 Grant Sterling
-I grant that, in some sense of the word, the non - existence of evil must
-be what a perfectly good being wants. But we often don ’ t bring about states
-of affairs we can bring about and want to bring about. Suppose, for example,
-that Alice ’ s mother is dying in great pain and that Alice yearns desperately
-for her mother to die today and not next week or next month. And suppose
-it would be easy for Alice to arrange this – she is perhaps a doctor or a
-nurse and has easy access to pharmaceutical resources that would enable
-her to achieve this end. Does it follow that she will act on this ability that
-she has? It is obvious that it does not, for Alice might have reasons for not
-doing what she can do. Two obvious candidates for such reasons are: she
-thinks it would be morally wrong; she is afraid that her act would be discovered,
-and that she would be prosecuted for murder. And either of these
-reasons might be suffi cient, in her mind, to outweigh her desire for an
-immediate end to her mother ’ s sufferings. So it may be that someone has a
-very strong desire for something and is able to obtain this thing, but does
-not act on this desire – because he has reasons for not doing so that seem
-to him to outweigh the desirability of the thing. The conclusion that evil
-does not exist does not, therefore, follow logically from the premises that
-the non - existence of evil is what God wants and that he is able to bring
-about the object of his desire – since, for all logic can tell us, God might
-have reasons for allowing evil to exist that, in his mind, outweigh the desirability
-of the non - existence of evil. (van Inwagen, 64 – 5)
-God made the world and it was very good. An indispensable part of the
-goodness he chose was the existence of rational beings: self - aware beings
-capable of abstract thought and love and having the power of free choice
-between contemplated alternative courses of action. This last feature of
-rational beings, free choice or free will, is a good. But even an omnipotent
-being is unable to control the exercise of the power of free choice, for a choice
-that was controlled would ipso facto not be free. In other words, if I have a
-free choice between x and y , even God cannot ensure that I choose x . To ask
-God to give me a free choice between x and y and to see to it that I choose
-x instead of y is to ask God to bring about the intrinsically impossible; it is
-like asking him to create a round square, a material body that has no shape,
-or an invisible object that casts a shadow. Having this power of free choice,
-some or all human beings misused it and produced a certain amount of evil.
-But free will is a suffi ciently great good that its existence outweighs the evils
-that have resulted and will result from its abuse; and God foresaw this. (van
-Inwagen, 71 – 2)
-Problem of Evil, Conclusion 3: * C3 * . God has the desire to eliminate
-all evil.
-P1. God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.
-P2. If God is morally perfect, then if it is impossible to secure a great good
-without permitting an evil, God will not desire to eliminate that evil.
-The Free Will Defense to the Problem of Evil 39
-P3. Free will in created beings is a great good (or is a necessary precondition
-for great goods).
-P4. It is impossible to secure the existence of free will in created beings
-without permitting evil to exist.
-C1. If it is impossible to secure a great good without permitting an evil,
-God will not desire to eliminate that evil ( modus ponens, P1, P2).
-C2. It is impossible to secure a great good (free will) without permitting
-an evil (semantic substitution, P3, P4).
-C3. God will not desire to eliminate all evil ( modus ponens , C1, C2,
-with slight semantic variation).
-C4. * C3 * (Conclusion 3 of the Problem of Evil) is false (double negation,
-C3).
-C5. The Problem of Evil is unsound. (All arguments with a false premise
-are unsound by defi nition.)
-9
-St. Anselm on Free Choice and
-the Power to Sin
-Julia Hermann
-Anselm ’ s argument for the claim that freedom of choice does not entail the
-power to sin is still of great philosophical interest regarding the problem of
-free will. Interested in how free will bears on the human responsibility for
-sin and the need for grace, Anselm ’ s reasons for dealing with the issue differ
-from those of contemporary philosophers. Yet, we do not have to share his
-interests in order to see the force of his arguments.
-The argument presented here can be found at the beginning of Anselm ’ s
-dialogue “ On Freedom of Choice, ” which is the second of three “ treatises
-pertaining to the study of Holy Scripture ” (S I: 173; Dialogues , 1), all of
-which deal with closely related subject matters: truth and justice ( De
-Veritate ), freedom of choice ( De Libertate Arbitrii ), and the fall of the devil
-( De Casu Diaboli ). The speakers are the same in all three dialogues: a
-teacher asking questions and a student responding to them.
-At the beginning of the second dialogue, the teacher rejects the view put
-forward by the student that “ freedom of choice is ‘ the ability to sin and
-not to sin ’ ” (S 208; Dialogues , 32). He starts with a reductio ad absurdum :
-S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia . Edited by Franciscus
-Salesius Schmitt , 3 vols. Stuttgart – Bad Cannstatt : Friedrich Fromann
-Verlag , 1968 . (S)
-Anselm . Three Philosophical Dialogues , translated by Thomas Williams.
-Indianapolis : Hackett , 2002 . ( Dialogues )
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-St. Anselm on Free Choice and the Power to Sin 41
-If freedom of choice was that ability, “ neither God nor the angels, who
-cannot sin, would have free choice – which it is impious to say ” (ibid.). He
-then provides a further argument for the claim that “ the power to sin is
-neither freedom nor a part of freedom, ” which will be reconstructed below
-(ibid.).
-Initially, the student believes that a will capable of both sinning and not
-sinning is freer than a will which lacks the former capacity. This reveals the
-assumption, prominent in recent debates about the compatibility of free
-will and determinism, that the capacity to do otherwise is a necessary condition
-for freedom of will ( “ Principle of Alternative Possibilities, ” #31).
-Anselm rejects this assumption, holding that freedom does not depend on
-the possibility to will both what is just and what is unjust but on the ability
-to initiate one ’ s own actions. It is a necessary condition for a person ’ s
-will to be free that his actions have their origin in him and not in any
-external power (S I: 209f; Dialogues , 33f.). Freedom of will (or choice) is
-only impeded by external compulsion, not by the lack of alternative possibilities.
-Today, we fi nd elaborated versions of this idea in accounts of
-“ agent - causality. ”
-Starting from the premise that “ if someone has what is fi tting and expedient
-in such a way that he cannot lose it, he is freer than someone who
-has it in such a way that he can lose it and be seduced into what is unfi tting
-and harmful, ” Anselm argues that a will that lacks the ability to sin is freer
-than a will that has it. He then continues arguing that since something that
-diminishes the will ’ s freedom when added to the will cannot be freedom or
-a part of it, and since the power to sin diminishes freedom when added to
-the will, that power is neither freedom nor a part of freedom.
-Initially, the fi rst premise of the argument seems controversial. It must
-be seen in the light of Anselm ’ s teleological conception of freedom. Later
-in the dialogue, freedom of choice is defi ned as “ the power to preserve
-rectitude of will for the sake of rectitude itself ” (S I: 212; Dialogues , 36).
-This defi nition, in turn, cannot be understood independently of Anselm ’ s
-discussion of truth in the fi rst dialogue. There he argues that truth consists
-in rectitude, or correctness ( rectitudo , S I: 177; Dialogues , 5). He speaks of
-truth not only in statements and opinions but also in actions, the will, the
-senses, and the essences of things. According to his teleological understanding
-of rectitude, a will has rectitude if it wills what it ought to will, that is,
-what God wants it to will (S I: 181f; Dialogues , 8f).
-Anselm then defi nes justice as “ rectitude of will preserved for its own
-sake ” (S I: 194; Dialogues , 24). Given that in the second dialogue freedom
-of choice is defi ned as “ the power to preserve rectitude of will for the sake
-of rectitude itself, ” freedom of choice turns out to be identical with a capacity
-for justice. This illuminates why the ability to sin, when added to the
-will, diminishes its freedom. Also, we can now see clearly that, like his
-42 Julia Hermann
-understanding of truth, Anselm ’ s understanding of freedom is teleological.
-This distinguishes him from most contemporary philosophers.
-In the way in which Anselm presents his argument, it is incomplete. To
-be formally and semantically valid, it has to be supplemented by a number
-of premises that are merely implicit in the text. The original argument is
-contained in the following passage from “ On Free Will ” :
-T: Which will do you think is freer: one whose willing and whose ability
-not to sin are such that it cannot be turned away from the rectitude of
-not sinning, or one that in some way can be turned to sin?
-S: I don ’ t see why a will isn ’ t freer when it is capable of both.
-T: Do you not see that someone who has what is fi tting and expedient in
-such a way that he cannot lose it is freer than someone who has it in
-such a way that he can lose it and be seduced into what is unfi tting
-and inexpedient?
-S: I don ’ t think anyone would doubt that.
-T: And you will say that it is no less indubitable that sinning is always unfi tting
-and harmful.
-S: No one in his right mind thinks otherwise.
-T: Then a will that cannot fall away from the rectitude of not sinning is
-freer than a will that can abandon that rectitude.
-S: I don ’ t think anything could be more reasonably asserted.
-T: Now if something diminishes freedom if it is added and increases freedom
-if taken away, do you think that it is either freedom or a part of
-freedom?
-S: I cannot think so.
-T: Then the power to sin, which if added to the will diminishes its freedom
-and if taken away increases it, is neither freedom nor a part of freedom.
-S: Nothing could be more logical. (S I: 208f; Dialogues , 32f)
-P1. If someone has what is fi tting and expedient in such a way that he
-cannot lose it, he is freer than someone who has it in such a way that
-he can lose it and be seduced into what is unfi tting and harmful.
-P2. Rectitude is fi tting and expedient.
-C1. If someone has rectitude in such a way that he cannot lose it, then he is
-freer than someone who has it in such a way that he can lose it and be
-seduced into what is unfi tting and harmful (substitution, P1, P2).
-P3. Sinning is always unfi tting and harmful.
-C2. If someone has rectitude in such a way that he cannot lose it, then
-he is freer than someone who has it in such a way that he can lose it
-and be seduced into sinning (substitution, C1, P3).
-P4. Someone who has rectitude in such a way that he cannot lose it is
-someone who has a will that cannot fall away from the rectitude of not
-sinning.
-St. Anselm on Free Choice and the Power to Sin 43
-P5. If someone has a will that cannot fall away from the rectitude of not
-sinning, then he is freer than someone who has it in such a way that he
-can lose it and be seduced into sinning (substitution, C2, P4).
-C3. Someone who has a will that cannot fall away from the rectitude of
-not sinning is freer than a will that has rectitude in such a way that
-he can lose it and be seduced into sinning ( modus ponens , P5, P4).
-P6. A will that can abandon rectitude is a will that has rectitude in such a
-way that it can lose it and be seduced into sinning.
-C4. A will that cannot fall away from the rectitude of not sinning is freer
-than a will that can abandon rectitude (substitution, C3, P6).
-P7. The power to sin diminishes freedom if it is added to the will and
-increases freedom if it is taken away from it (implied by C2).
-P8. If something diminishes freedom if it is added and increases freedom if
-taken away, then it is neither freedom nor a part of freedom.
-C5. The power to sin is neither freedom nor a part of freedom ( modus
-ponens , P7, P8).
-10
-Hume ’ s Argument against
-Miracles
-Tommaso Piazza
-Originally planned to appear in the earlier Treatise of Human Nature
-(1739 – 40), Hume ’ s argument against miracles fi rst went to press as Chapter
-X of An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding in 1748. Since then,
-mainly as a separate text, it has been granted continued attention. The
-argument is part of Hume ’ s philosophy of religion. In particular, it is
-inserted within a discussion about whether some religious belief could be
-Hume , David. An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding . Indianapolis :
-Hackett , 1997 .
-Buckle , Stephen. Hume ’ s Enlightenment Tract: The Unity and Purpose of An
-Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding . Oxford : Oxford University
-Press , 2001 .
-Fogelin , Robert J. A Defense of Hume on Miracles . Princeton, NJ : Princeton
-University Press , 2003 .
-Levine , Michael P. Hume and the Problem of Miracles: A Solution . Dordrecht :
-Kluwer , 1989 .
-___. “ Miracles . ” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2005
-edn.), edited by Edward N. Zalta, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/
-entries/miracles/#Hum
-Swinburne , Richard. The Existence of God . Oxford : Oxford University
-Press , 2004 .
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Hume’s Argument against Miracles 45
-established by revelation; the argument purports to vindicate a negative
-answer to this question, by showing that miracles – the very foundation of
-revealed religion – are not (could not be) credible. Importantly, it is independent
-of any metaphysical claim about whether a miracle is or is not
-possible, and it is just premised on Hume ’ s empiricist views in epistemology.
-Here is how Hume summarizes the argument:
-A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature [DEF - m]; and as a fi rm and
-unalterable experience has established these laws [DEF - l], the proof against
-a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from
-experience can possibly be imagined. (Hume, 76)
-It is scarcely controversial, although it has not remained unchallenged
-(see Swinburne), that Hume ’ s argument is to be read as addressing the
-question about whether we could be justifi ed in believing in a miracle on
-the basis of empirical evidence; in fact, he leaves to a different part of the
-Inquiry a discussion of whether we could have knowledge of God (and so,
-on its basis, indirectly of miracles) other than by revelation. It is a bit more
-controversial, though, whether Hume is trying to establish the conclusion
-that we could be justifi ed in believing in a miracle on the basis of no empirical
-evidence whatsoever – and so, in particular, not even if we had an
-experience of a miracle – or the considerably weaker conclusion that we
-could not be justifi ed in believing in a miracle on the basis of the testimony
-of others. In what follows, the argument will be presented as it is more
-customarily discussed, that is, as aimed to establish the weaker conclusion.
-It is also unclear whether Hume ’ s argument is meant to be a priori or a
-posteriori . This difference is worth taking into consideration for the following
-reason: while many philosophers think that a priori justifi cation is
-indefeasible by experience, it is quite uncontroversial that a posteriori justifi
-cation can be so defeated; since the conclusion of an argument cannot
-be justifi ed more fi rmly than its premises, this implies that Hume ’ s argument,
-depending on whether we read it as a priori or a posteriori , is aimed
-to establish a conclusion that cannot – respectively can – be overturned by
-further experiences. A possible irenic solution that will be adopted here is
-to divide Hume ’ s argument in two parts (corresponding to the parts into
-which Chapter X is divided), 1 and to read the fi rst of them as aimed to
-assess the question whether testimony (possibly) justifi es belief in a miracle
-(at least in part) in light of a priori considerations, and to read the second
-1 Buckle explains that both parts refl ect to some degree a division of probability arguments
-which was common in Hume ’ s time: that among “ internal ” and “ external ” evidences. The
-internal part of any such argument examines the internal credibility of a claim, the external
-part examines this claim in light of the evidence available.
-46 Tommaso Piazza
-as aimed to assess the very same question in light of additional considerations
-of a clearly a posteriori nature. As we will see, the (sub)conclusion of
-the fi rst part is logically weaker than the conclusion of the second. By the
-same token, the conclusion of the fi rst argument has appeared more resistible
-than the conclusion of the second. (For this reason, Fogelin contends
-that Hume just wanted to offer the second argument and not the fi rst.) The
-fi rst argument purports to show that no testimony could ever provide evidence
-that is strong enough to undermine our expectation that events that
-have always been experienced in conjunction with one another will not (and
-did not) appear in conjunction with one another; the second argument aims
-just to show that no testimony has provided such evidence. Finally, it is
-worth mentioning that some controversy surrounds the scope of the conclusion
-that (the fi rst part of) Hume ’ s argument, if successful, would actually
-establish. In particular, it has been suggested that the argument quickly (and
-undesirably) generalizes to the conclusion that it is always irrational to
-accept testimony of something which is very unlikely in light of past experience
-(such as water ’ s becoming ice, if you live in a very warm region).
-Hume ’ s insistence on the distinction among extraordinary (yet natural)
-events and miracles is often invoked to resist this objection (Levine): given
-its supernatural origin, a miracle cannot be judged to be analogous to any
-other event in experience; on the contrary, an extraordinary event can bear
-the relevant similarity to past experience and then become acceptable by
-analogy. Yet, it is controversial whether this strategy – since it implies that
-Hume ’ s argument should feature as a premise the claim that we could not
-have had an experience of a miraculous event – creates more problems for
-Hume ’ s argument than it helps to solve.
-P1. That A is the case provides evidence E for B ’ s being the case if and only
-if the number of times in which we have observed A, and then have
-observed B, is greater than the number of times in which we have
-observed that A was not followed by B.
-P2. The strength of E is proportional to the ratio among the number of
-times in which we have observed A, and then have observed B, and the
-number of times in which we have observed that A was not followed by
-B.
-P3. The existence of testimony of type K (henceforth K - testimony) to the
-effect that B was not the case provides evidence ET for the proposition
-that B was not the case only if the number of times in which we have
-received K - testimony for a proposition, and then have observed that the
-proposition was true, is greater than the number of times in which we
-have received K - testimony for a proposition and then have observed that
-the proposition was not true (instantiation, P1).
-Hume’s Argument against Miracles 47
-P4. The strength of ET is proportional to the ratio among the number of
-times in which we have received K - testimony for a proposition and then
-have observed that the proposition was true and the number of times in
-which we have received K - testimony for a proposition and then have
-observed that the proposition was not true (instantiation, P2).
-P5. Whenever one ’ s global evidence is constituted by E1 and E2, and E1 is
-evidence in favor of a given p, and E2 is evidence for non - p, it is rational
-to believe that p only if E1 is stronger than E2, it is rational to disbelieve
-that p only if E2 is stronger than E1, and it is rational to withhold belief
-as to whether p only if the strength of E1 is the same as the strength of
-E2.
-P6. There is K - testimony to the occurrence of a miracle M.
-P7. There is a law of nature L – say that every A is followed by B – and
-the K - testimony is to the effect that A was not followed by B
-(DEF – m).
-P8. It is rational to accept that M occurred (assumption for reductio ).
-P9. That A was the case provides evidence E * for the proposition that B
-was the case, which is weaker than the evidence ET, provided by the
-K - testimony, for the proposition that B was not the case.
-P10. If it is rational to accept that M occurred, then that A was the case
-provides evidence E * for the proposition that B was the case, which is
-weaker than the evidence ET, provided by the K - testimony, for the
-proposition that B was not the case (instantiation, P8, P9).
-P11. L has been established by a “ fi rm and unalterable experience ” of many
-instances of A ’ s that were followed by many instances of B ’ s without
-exception (DEF - 1).
-P12. That A was the case provides the strongest possible evidence E * for
-the proposition that B was the case (instantiation, P2, P11).
-P13. ET is stronger than the strongest possible evidence E * (conjunction
-P9, P12).
-C1. It is not the case that ET is stronger than E * .
-C2. It is not rational to accept that M occurred ( modus tollens , P10,
-C1).
-The (sub)conclusion above is derived without further specifying the
-nature of the K - testimony in favor of a miracle (namely, independently of
-the number, reliability, opportunity, etc. of the witnesses reporting M that
-identify the relevant K). So, at least to this extent, the argument is a priori .
-Importantly, the conclusion is still compatible with its being rational, on
-the basis of testimony, to withhold belief as to whether a miracle occurred.
-As already anticipated, however, in the second part of Chapter X of the
-Inquiry , Hume presents empirical considerations about the K - testimony
-48 Tommaso Piazza
-which is actually available that allow one to derive a logically stronger
-conclusion.
-There is not to be found, in all history, any miracle attested by a suffi cient
-number of men, of such unquestioned good - sense, education and learning as
-to secure us against all delusion. [ … ] The passion of surprise and wonder,
-arising from miracles, being an agreeable emotion, gives a sensible tendency
-towards the belief of these events. (Hume, 78)
-Empirical observation of the nature of the witnesses who have testifi ed
-to a miracle and the general psychological remark that men are far too
-prone to believe in the marvelous suggest that the testimony for a miracle
-that is actually available is of a kind K that is unable to deliver evidence
-ET that is strong enough to equal to (not to say to outweigh) the evidence
-we have to expect nature to proceed along the course we have always
-experienced. So, it arguably enforces:
-C1. Evidence ET is weaker than E * .
-C2. It is (more) rational to believe that M did not occur ( modus ponens ,
-P5, C1).
-11
-The Euthyphro Dilemma
-David Baggett
-Antony Flew once said that the test of one ’ s aptitude in philosophy is one ’ s
-ability to grasp the force and point of the “ Euthyphro Dilemma, ” a traditional
-objection to theistic ethics traceable to an early Socratic dialogue.
-The dilemma has long been thought to be an effective refutation of the
-effort to locate the authority of morality in the will or commands of God
-(or the gods). In the original context, the dilemma referred to the Greek
-pantheon of gods and what they loved and hated, whereas in more recent
-times the formulation is typically in terms of God and God ’ s commands.
-The point of the dilemma is that God, even if God exists, does not function
-as the foundation of ethics. At most, God satisfi es a prudential or epistemic
-function when it comes to morality, but not an ontological one, if the argument
-goes through.
-About halfway into Plato ’ s Euthyphro , Socrates asks the young Euthyphro
-a question that has come to be known as the “ Euthyphro Dilemma. ”
-Expressed in contemporary and monotheistic terms, it can be put like this:
-Plato . The Collected Dialogues of Plato , edited by Edith Hamilton and
-Huntington Cairns . Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press , 1961 .
-Adams , Robert . Finite and Infi nite Goods: A Framework for Ethics . Oxford :
-Oxford University Press , 2000 .
-Baggett , David , and Jerry L. Walls . Good God: The Theistic Foundations of
-Morality . New York : Oxford University Press , 2011 .
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-50 David Baggett
-Does God command something because it is moral, or is something moral
-because God commands it? In the original context, Euthyphro, a fi rm
-believer in the Greek pantheon of gods, argues that the essence of holiness
-is what the gods love. After Socrates elicits from Euthyphro the admission
-that the gods, according to legend, could disagree, Euthyphro ’ s view became
-that the holy is what all the gods loved and the unholy what all the gods
-hated. At this point, Socrates shifts gears and introduces the Dilemma, both
-horns of which are problematic for the theistic ethicist: for either God is
-merely reporting what ’ s moral apart from God or God can render as moral
-whatever God ’ s whim happens to choose.
-Many classical theists fi nd both horns of the dilemma unacceptable,
-because as moral realists they are unwilling to think of morality as infi nitely
-malleable, and as robust supernaturalists they resist the notion that God is
-essentially irrelevant to a matter so important as moral truth. One common
-effort at the solution is to disambiguate “ morality ” between its deontic and
-axiological dimensions, distinguishing between obligation and value, and
-rooting God ’ s commands only in the former. God ’ s commands thus provide
-a way to delimit among what ’ s good what ’ s also obligatory, since some
-such mechanism is necessary because not everything that ’ s morally good is
-also morally obligatory (otherwise there would no room for the category
-of supererogation, moral actions that go above and beyond the call of
-duty, a category that act utilitarians have a notoriously hard time
-accommodating).
-A principled affi rmation of divine impeccability (sinlessness) helps resolve
-arbitrariness and vacuity concerns, because if God is essentially good and
-loving, then God would never issue commands in irremediable tension with
-nonnegotiable moral intuitions.
-A series of six additional distinctions can also be useful in diffusing the
-Euthyphro Dilemma. A scope distinction between defi nition and analysis,
-a semantic distinction between univocation and equivocation, a modal
-distinction between conceivability and possibility, an epistemic distinction
-between diffi culty and impossibility, a metaethical distinction between
-knowing and being, and an ontological distinction between dependence and
-control collectively can enable the theistic ethicist to defend her view against
-the Euthyphro Dilemma. Therefore, God ’ s commands can provide the right
-analysis of moral obligations even if not a defi nition of “ moral obligation, ”
-which allows atheists to use deontic language meaningfully without believing
-in God. God would, moreover, retain moral prerogatives that human
-beings wouldn ’ t, so God ’ s behavior, though ultimately recognizable as
-moral, need not be exactly like human morality (contrary to John Stuart
-Mill ’ s claim to the contrary). Although God ’ s issuing irremediably evil commands
-is vaguely conceivable, it wouldn ’ t be genuinely possible; reconciling
-God ’ s commands with ineliminable moral intuitions may be diffi cult but
-The Euthyphro Dilemma 51
-can ’ t be impossible if it ’ s rational to believe in God ’ s moral perfection; and
-our grasp of necessary moral facts is an epistemic issue that would underdetermine
-the metaphysical foundations of morality. And fi nally, the dependence
-of morality on God does not entail God ’ s volitional control over the
-contents of morality to make it just anything at all; divine impeccability
-would rule some things out. Armed with such distinctions, the theistic ethicist
-and divine command theorist has not been shown to be irrational in
-light of the Euthyphro Dilemma.
-Is what is holy holy because the gods approve it, or do they approve it
-because it is holy? (Plato, 10a)
-P1. What is moral is either moral because God commands it or it is not.
-P2. If what is moral is moral because God commands it, then morality is
-arbitrary and vacuous.
-P3. If what is moral is moral for reasons other than that God commands
-it, then God is superfl uous from the standpoint of morality.
-C1. Either morality is arbitrary and vacuous or God is superfl uous to
-morality (constructive dilemma, P1, P2, P3).
-12
-Nietzsche ’ s Death of God
-Tom Grimwood
-While Nietzsche resists easy logical formulation, the signifi cance of his
-critique of the ideas of truth and morality in Western philosophy makes
-him one of the most important thinkers in modern times. Perhaps no other
-philosopher has been defi ned through his legacy as has been Nietzsche: the
-assault on the metaphysical nature of truth in this argument not only lays
-foundations for existentialism, poststructuralism, and postmodernism, but
-it also provides moral philosophy with an emblematic fi gure of moral skepticism
-(in the work of MacIntyre or Williams, for example).
-For Nietzsche, the contemporary age (Northern Europe at the end of the
-nineteenth century) was witnessing a radical undermining of its philosophical
-foundations. On the one hand, the traditional beliefs in God were
-rendered unbelievable by developments in science. But on the other hand,
-the gap this left in existence had merely being fi lled by a substitute, science
-itself, which for Nietzsche maintained the same illusory suppositions over
-the sacred nature of “ truth. ” On the one hand, the rise of the middle classes
-in the industrial age was undermining traditional structures of society,
-revealing the importance and malleability of power to the development of
-humanity. On the other hand, Nietzsche saw that this great shift had produced
-not radical change but only apathy. The real problem, Nietzsche
-argued, was not that God had ceased to be believable, but – given the way
-Nietzsche , Friedrich . The Gay Science , translated by Josefi ne Nauckhoff.
-Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 2001 .
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Nietzsche’s Death of God 53
-in which science seamlessly slotted into the same foundational space –
-nobody had really noticed the signifi cance of the event. Nietzsche is not a
-nihilist: for him, the death of God is the greatest event of recent times,
-enabling “ Free Spirits ” to throw off their metaphysical shackles and embrace
-a genuinely open future (although Nietzsche ’ s – necessary – ambiguity over
-the precise nature of this future has undeniably led to such diverse readings
-of his work).
-Hence, despite its subject matter, Nietzsche does not argue for the Death
-of God itself in his work in a way that would engage traditionally with the
-philosophy of religion – it is, rather, a proclamation of an event which is
-witnessed or reported (for example, in The Gay Science, § 125, § 343, and
-in the prologue to Thus Spoke Zarathustra ). He is more interested in how
-we, as humans, react to the event: whether we embrace its full signifi cance
-or continue to place a similar “ faith ” in concepts that remain dependent
-upon the same metaphysical assumptions, such as science and/or morality.
-Central to these assumptions is the affi rmation of “ another world, ” that of
-“ truth, ” which lies behind our immediate world of experience (for
-Christianity, this is “ heaven ” ; for morality, the abstract “ good ” ; for science,
-atomic structures; and so on). This “ beyond ” removes us from our own
-sensibilities and retains us in a quasi - religious state in reverence to the
-scientifi c and/or the moral. Given that such an ordering of the world infects
-both our language and practice, Nietzsche consequently views the importance
-of truth as metaphorical rather than rational: the sense we make of
-the world is always limited by our perspective (indeed, in his early work he
-argues that truth is itself a mixed metaphorical construction, a point much
-elaborated on by later poststructuralists), and as such images, fi gures, and
-motifs authorize this sense long before we construct a justifi catory logic for
-it. Nietzsche ’ s style of arguing is at once rigorously philological, tracing
-the historical development of concepts with intense academic skill, and
-at the same time almost hopelessly generalizing, aiming broad shots across
-the bows of our expectations of what a philosophical argument should be.
-This style must be borne in mind when approaching the logic of Nietzsche ’ s
-argument: his argument over the Death of God is far more a polemic than
-it is an exercise in close reasoning, and at least one of its aims is to open
-our eyes to a world without fi xed parameters of meaning and truth, and in
-its place, a raw fl ux of energy and power.
-The greatest recent event – that “ God is dead ” ; that the belief in the
-Christian God has become unbelievable – is already starting to cast its fi rst
-shadow over Europe. [ … ] But in the main one might say: for many people ’ s
-power of comprehension, the event is itself far too great, distant, and out of
-the way even for its tidings to be thought of as having arrived yet. Even less
-may one suppose many to know at all what this even really means – and,
-54 Tom Grimwood
-now that this faith has been undermined, how much must collapse because
-it was built on this faith, leaned on it, had grown on it – for example, our
-entire European morality. ( § 343)
-Wouldn ’ t the cultivation of the scientifi c spirit begin when one permitted
-oneself no more convictions? That is probably the case; only we need still
-ask: in order that this cultivation begin , must there not be some prior conviction
-– and indeed one so authoritative and unconditional that it sacrifi ces all
-other convictions to itself? We see that science, too, rests on a faith; there is
-simply no “ presuppositionless ” science. The question whether truth is necessary
-must get an answer in advance, the answer “ yes ” , and moreover this
-answer must be so fi rm that it takes the form of the statement, the belief, the
-conviction: “ Nothing is more necessary than truth; and in relation to it, everything
-else has only secondary value. ” [ … ] But why not deceive? But why
-not allow oneself to be deceived? Note that the reasons for the former lie in
-a completely different area from those for the latter: one does not want to let
-oneself be deceived because one assumes it is harmful, dangerous, disastrous
-to be deceived; in this sense science would be a long - range prudence, caution,
-utility, and to this one could justifi ably object: How so? Is it really less
-harmful, dangerous, disastrous not to want to let oneself be deceived? [ … ]
-Precisely this conviction could never have originated if truth and untruth had
-constantly made it clear that they were both useful, as they are. So, the faith
-in science, which after all undeniably exists, cannot owe its origin to such a
-calculus of utility; rather it must have originated in spite of the fact that the
-disutility and dangerousness of the “ will to truth ” or “ truth at any price ” is
-proved to it constantly. [ … ] Consequently, “ will to truth ” does not mean “ I
-do not want to let myself be deceived ” but – there is no alternative – “ I will
-not deceive, not even myself ” ; and with that we stand on moral ground .
-( § 344)
-Thus the question “ Why science? ” leads back to the moral problem: Why
-morality at all , if life, nature, and history are “ immoral ” ? No doubt, those
-who are truthful in that audacious and ultimate sense which faith in science
-presupposes thereby affi rm another world than that of life, nature, and
-history; [ … ] it is still a metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science
-rests – that even we knowers of today, we godless anti - metaphysicians, still
-take our fi re, too, from the fl ame lit by the thousand - year old faith, the
-Christian faith which was also Plato ’ s faith, that God is truth; that truth is
-divine [ … ] But what if this were to become more and more diffi cult to believe,
-if nothing more were to turn out to be divine except error, blindness, the lie
-– if God himself were to turn out to be our longest lie? ( § 344)
-The opening part of this reconstructed argument is not Nietzsche ’ s but
-rather a standard motif of modernity, which Nietzsche takes to task:
-P1. If we accept or commit to something as an organizing principle of our
-lives, then it should be rational, true, or believable.
-Nietzsche’s Death of God 55
-P2. God ’ s existence is not rational, true, or believable ( “ The belief in the
-Christian God has become unbelievable, ” § 343).
-C1. We should not accept and commit to God as an organizing principle
-of our lives ( modus tollens , P1, P2).
-The majority of people are happy with this, Nietzsche thinks, because they
-substitute other, more believable principles – science, morality, and so on – in
-the place of ‘ God ’ s existence ’ . P2 then becomes an affi rmation rather than a
-negation – ‘ science is rational ’ , for example – albeit creating a fallacy of
-affi rming the consequent. It is these substitutions that Nietzsche sees as remnants
-of belief that are really challenged by the idea of the Death of God.
-Thus, Nietzsche is not interested in discussing the existence or nature of God
-(P2 or C1). His issue is rather with the claim made in P1: our desire to seek a
-“ truth ” in the world beyond our immediate sensations, or, as Nietzsche terms
-it, the Will to Truth, and why this conditions our lives in the way it does.
-P3. If science, morality, or religion contains assumptions, then these will
-affect the outcome of its inquiry.
-Again, here Nietzsche is using the principles of the Enlightenment (the
-“ scientifi c spirit ” ) that knowledge should be objective and without assumptions
-(or, in Nietzsche ’ s words, “ convictions ” ). “ Wouldn ’ t the cultivation
-of the scientifi c spirit begin when one permitted oneself no more convictions?
-” But Nietzsche probes this premise, “ we need still ask: in order that
-this cultivation begin , must there not be some prior conviction – and indeed
-one so authoritative and unconditional that it sacrifi ces all other convictions
-to itself? ” ( § 344).
-P4. Science, morality, and religion contain the same assumption: the Will
-to Truth (the unspoken assumption of science, for example, is that truth
-is worth discovering: the “ yes ” in advance); “ There is simply no ‘ presuppositionless
-’ science. ”
-C2. The Will to Truth affects the outcome of (moral, scientifi c, religious)
-inquiry ( modus ponens , P3, P4).
-Nietzsche is noting here that our understanding is conditioned by the
-need to discover a “ truth ” beyond our immediate perception, which he
-considers most moral, scientifi c, and religious understanding to do (he
-writes more on this in the section of Beyond Good and Evil entitled “ On
-the prejudices of philosophers ” ).
-P5. If the Will to Truth is essential to our understanding (i.e., we can have
-no knowledge without it), then we will have a reason for following it.
-P6. But we do not have a moral or utilitarian reason for following it.
-56 Tom Grimwood
-When Nietzsche asks whether it is “ really less harmful, dangerous, disastrous
-not to want to let oneself be deceived? ” we can see that lying and
-deception can, in fact, be very useful (e.g., when raising children, absolute
-truth is unnecessary and sometimes unhelpful).
-C3. The Will to Truth is not essential to our understanding ( modus
-tollens , P5, P6).
-As Nietzsche refl ects, “ you only have to ask yourself carefully, ‘ Why do
-you not want to deceive? ’ especially if it should seem – and it does seem!
-– as if [ … ] life on the largest scale has actually always shown itself to be
-on the side of the most unscrupulous polytropoi . ” (201) “ Polytropoi ”
-means devious, cunning, deceptive. It comes from The Odyssey , where it is
-used to describe the hero who uses these traits to survive the wrath of the
-gods. In other words, Nietzsche is suggesting that “ life ” in general does not
-favor truth in the way that scientifi c or moral knowledge seems to.
-The argument then makes two interrelated points surrounding the status
-of “ truth ” itself:
-P7. If we do not have moral or utilitarian reasons for following the Will to
-Truth, our reasons must be other than these.
-“ Should both be necessary – a lot of trust as well as a lot of mistrust –
-then where might science get the unconditional belief or conviction one
-which it rests? ” (200 – 1).
-C4. Our reasons for following the Will to Truth are other than moral or
-utilitarian ( modus ponens , P7, P6).
-P8. If we do not have moral or utilitarian reasons for following the Will to
-Truth, then it cannot be rational, true, or believable
-C5. The Will to Truth cannot be rational, true, or believable ( modus
-ponens , P8, P6).
-In the place of “ rational ” justifi cation, which is but an aspect of the Will
-to Truth, Nietzsche suggests that “ truth ” is merely a guise for the expression
-of our power. It rests on a metaphysical faith which is no different, at heart,
-to the Christian belief in God. The Will to Truth is, thus, a means for limiting
-our expression of such power: this is symptomatic in the “ slave morality
-” of Christianity. With this connection established between science,
-morality, and faith, Nietzsche returns to the fi rst part of the argument. If
-God has become unbelievable, then our faith in the divinity of “ truth ” is
-also placed in question. The question that Nietzsche leaves us with suggests
-that this is what the death of God “ really means. ”
-13
-Ockham ’ s Razor
-Grant Sterling
-“ Ockham ’ s Razor ” is frequently cited as an argument and attributed to
-William of Ockham. It is typically rendered as “ Entities are not to be multiplied
-without necessity. ” It is sometimes understood to mean that when
-given a choice between two theories, one should choose the one that
-employs fewer entities (or, sometimes, fewer different types of entities). At
-other times, it is understood to state that if a given entity is not necessary
-to explain anything, then we should deny its existence. This common conception,
-however, is a misunderstanding in several ways.
-First, Ockham never said those words – the name “ Ockham ’ s Razor ”
-was invented in 1852, and the words attributed to Ockham do not appear
-in any of his known works. (The two statements above represent Ockham ’ s
-actual position.) Second, the idea that we shouldn ’ t believe in things without
-a good reason is by no means original to Ockham or distinctive of him.
-Third, the Razor is not really an argument but rather a premise or principle
-used to create arguments of a certain form. Finally, Ockham himself did
-not actually use the argument to deny the existence of any possible entities,
-only to doubt them. Ockham allowed for three sources of knowledge
-William of Ockham . Theory of Terms: Part I of the Summa Logicae , translated
-by Michael J. Loux. Notre Dame, IN : University of Notre Dame
-Press , 1974 .
-___. Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum (Ordinatio) , Distinctiones
-XIX – XLVIII, in Opera Theologica , vol. IV , edited by Girard Etzkorn
-and Francis Kelly . St. Bonaventure, NY : St. Bonaventure University ,
-1979 .
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-58 Grant Sterling
-(self - evidence, empirical evidence, and biblical revelation), and held that if
-we cannot know that something exists through one of these three sources,
-we should not believe that the thing exists (which does not necessarily mean
-that we believe that it doesn ’ t exist – without positive evidence that the
-thing is not there, we should simply remain neutral).
-Plurality should not be postulated without necessity. ( Commentary on the
-Sentences of Peter Lombard , Part I, dist. 1, q. 1 and 2)
-For nothing ought to be posited without a reason given, unless it is known
-through itself or known by experience or proven by the authority of Sacred
-Scripture. ( Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard , Part I, dist. 30,
-q. 1)
-“ Ockham ’ s Razor ” as it is commonly employed:
-P1. Two theories, T1 and T2, explain the observed facts equally well (and
-better than all rival theories), and T1 requires us to postulate the existence
-of more entities (or more types of entities) than T2.
-P2. “ Ockham ’ s Razor ” : If two theories explain the observed facts equally
-well (and better than all rival theories), believe the theory that postulates
-fewer entities than a rival theory with no loss in explanatory force.
-C1. We ought to believe T2 and disbelieve T1 ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
-Or
-P1. We do not need to postulate the existence of object X in order to explain
-any of the phenomena we are attempting to explain.
-P2. “ Ockham ’ s Razor ” : If we do not need to postulate the existence of any
-particular object in order to explain any of the phenomena we are
-attempting to explain, we should disbelieve the existence of any putative
-object not needed to explain phenomena.
-C1. Disbelieve the existence of X ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
-Ockham ’ s Razor as Ockham himself would employ it:
-P1. The existence of object X is not self - evident, nor do we have empirical
-evidence for its existence, nor is it required by the Bible.
-P2. Ockham ’ s Razor: If the existence of object X is not self - evident, nor do
-we have empirical evidence for its existence, nor is it required by the
-Bible, then we should not believe in the existence of object X.
-C1. Do not believe in the existence of object X (though it is still possible
-that X does exist) ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
-Part II
-Metaphysics
-14
-Parmenides ’ Refutation
-of Change
-Adrian Bardon
-Parmenides was a Greek scholar living in the Italian colony of Elea in the
-fi fth century bce . The Eleatic school that he championed was known for
-its claim that reality is a timeless unity. Change, along with the passage of
-time, is just an illusion or projection of the mind. Only fragments of
-Parmenides ’ work survive; they include his refutation of change, which may
-constitute the earliest surviving example of extended philosophical
-argumentation.
-The main fragment contains a series of connected points intended to
-show the impossibility of change. According to Parmenides, any change
-involves destruction or creation, in that it either involves an item going from
-being to not being (or vice versa) or a property going from being (instantiated)
-to not being (uninstantiated) (or vice versa). So any change involves
-something that both is and is not, which is an apparent contradiction. He
-anticipates the obvious proposed resolution to this claim: there is no contradiction
-in an item or property both being and not being, since it can,
-say, “ be ” in the present while “ not be ” in the future or past. He replies that
-this just relocates the contradiction inherent in change to the level of change
-Palmer , John . Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy . Oxford : Oxford
-University Press , 2009 .
-Hoy , Ronald . “ Parmenides ’ Complete Rejection of Time . ” Journal of
-Philosophy 91 ( 1994 ): 573 – 98 .
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-62 Adrian Bardon
-over time. Taking change seriously requires us to think in terms of past and
-future times as real; but the past and future are distinguished from the
-present in that the present “ is ” while the past and future “ are not. ” The
-only way to think of the past and future as real (Parmenides would claim)
-is to think of them as real now, which would make them present. So thinking
-about change requires us to think about the past and future as both
-present and not present, real and not real.
-Parmenides ’ resolution of the contradiction is to deny the reality both of
-change and of the passage of time. (Note this line of reasoning is a very
-close precursor to J. M. E. McTaggart ’ s (#15) early - twentieth - century argument
-to the same conclusion. Sense - perception is characterized by change,
-so sensation is fundamentally deceptive. The only way to know the truth
-about the world is by disregarding sensation and using reason and logic
-alone.
-Note that Parmenides does not consider rejecting P2 or P4 instead of P1;
-he does not, in other words, consider any defi nition of change that would
-be consistent with a static theory of time. The static theory denies dynamic
-nonrelational temporal properties (such as past/present/future) but allows
-static relational temporal properties (such as earlier/simultaneous/later).
-This is the same omission later made by McTaggart. This omission does
-not affect the validity of this argument when considered as an attack specifi -
-cally on the dynamic theory of time.
-As yet a single tale of a way
-remains, that it is; and along this path markers are there
-very many, that What Is is ungenerated and deathless,
-whole and uniform, and still and perfect;
-but not ever was it, nor yet will it be, since it is now together entire,
-single, continuous; for what birth will you seek of it?
-How, whence increased? From not being I shall not allow
-you to say or to think: for not to be said and not to be thought
-is it that it is not. And indeed what need could have aroused it
-later rather than before, beginning from nothing, to grow?
-Thus it must either be altogether or not at all.
-Nor ever from not being will the force of conviction allow
-something to come to be beyond it: on account of this neither to be born
-nor to die has Justice allowed it, having loosed its bonds,
-but she holds it fast. And the decision about these matters lies in this:
-it is or it is not; but it has in fact been decided, just as is necessary,
-to leave the one unthought and nameless (for no true
-way is it), and [it has been decided] that the one that it is indeed is genuine.
-And how could What Is be hereafter? And how might it have been?
-For if it was, it is not, nor if ever it is going to be:
-thus generation is extinguished and destruction unheard of.
-(Parmenides, qtd. in Palmer, 143)
-Parmenides’ Refutation of Change 63
-P1. Change is real (assumption for reductio ).
-P2. If change is real, then it involves either (a) an object ’ s coming into existence
-or beginning to have some property or (b) an object ’ s becoming
-nonexistent or ceasing to have some property.
-P3. If (P2), then there are different times, that is, past/present/future.
-C1. There are different times, that is, past/present/future (hypothetical
-syllogism, P1,P2, P3).
-P4. There are not different times – only the present exists.
-C2. There are different times and there are not different times (conjunction
-C1, P4).
-C3. Change is not real ( reductio , P1 – C2).
-15
-McTaggart ’ s Argument against the
-Reality of Time
-M. Joshua Mozersky
-McTaggart ’ s argument begins with the rather simple observation that there
-are two ways in which moments and events in time may be characterized.
-First, they may be past, present, or future, in which case they form what
-McTaggart calls the “ A - series ” (this is a series because these properties
-order events with respect to each other). Second, times or events may be
-earlier than, simultaneous with, or later than other times/events; McTaggart
-calls this ordering the “ B - series. ” These two series differ. A - series properties
-are transitory; an event might be future, but soon it will be present, then
-past. B - series relations are permanent. If, for example, it is true that X
-follows Y, then it is always true that X follows Y; there is never a time at
-which X precedes Y or at which X and Y are simultaneous. On the B - series,
-McTaggart concludes, there is no genuine change – no temporal variation
-in facts – since whatever is true is always true. McTaggart also claims,
-however, that time can only exist if change exists; hence, if time is real, then
-McTaggart , J. M. E. The Nature of Existence , vol. II . Cambridge, UK :
-Cambridge University Press , 1927 .
-Broad , C. D. An Examination of McTaggart ’ s Philosophy , vol. II . Cambridge,
-UK : Cambridge University Press , 1938 .
-Le Poidevin , Robin , and Murray MacBeath (eds.). The Philosophy of Time .
-Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1993 .
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-McTaggart’s Argument against the Reality of Time 65
-moments and events in time must be characterized by A - series properties.
-In short, any series that is ordered solely by B - series relations could not be
-temporal in nature.
-The problem, according to McTaggart, is that the assumption that anything
-exhibits A - series properties leads to a contradiction. On the one hand,
-these properties are mutually incompatible: if something is present, for
-example, it is neither past nor future. On the other hand, each event in time
-must possess all three A - series properties: anything present, for instance,
-was future and will be past. McTaggart notes that one may object that there
-is no diffi culty here, for surely it is not really a contradiction to suppose
-that an event is present, was future, and will be past. He responds as
-follows. Suppose that an event, M, is present, was future, and will be past.
-To say that M will be past is to say that at some future time, T, M is past.
-Nonetheless, since M is present, there is no moment of past time at which
-M is past. However, T itself will eventually be past, and when it is, M will
-then be past at a moment of past time. So it turns out that M is not past
-at a moment of past time but is past at a moment of past time, namely T,
-and this is a contradiction. Now, of course, one will want to reply that
-when T is fi nally past, then it is possible for M to be past at a moment of
-past time, so there is no contradiction even if now M cannot be past at any
-moment of past time. This move, replies McTaggart, simply reintroduces
-the contradiction, because if T itself will be past, then T must be past,
-present, and future, and to make that coherent we must suppose that it is
-past, present, and future at different times. But each of those times will be
-past, present, and future, which is a contradiction unless we suppose that
-they are past, present, and future at different times; and so on. Every
-attempt to eliminate the contradiction leads back to it.
-Accordingly, the A - series does not escape contradiction and, therefore,
-cannot characterize anything. But time is real only if moments and events
-are characterized by A - series properties. Hence, concludes McTaggart, time
-itself is unreal.
-McTaggart ’ s argument is valid, but there are three main sources of
-concern over its soundness. First, McTaggart presents the fi rst premise
-without substantial support. In fact, his defense is simply the following: “ It
-would, I suppose, be universally admitted that time involves change [ … ]
-there could be no time if nothing changed ” (11). But even if this were universally
-admitted, perhaps universal opinion is wrong. It is, moreover, not
-universally admitted. Some philosophers have argued that it is possible for
-time to exist without change (see Le Poidevin and MacBeath 63 – 79).
-Additionally, the second premise has been questioned. McTaggart argues
-that if it is always true that, say, a fi replace poker is hot on Monday and
-cold on Tuesday, then nothing has changed because the sum total of truths
-remains unchanged. But it is beliefs, sentences, or propositions that are true;
-66 M. Joshua Mozersky
-in other words, truth, whatever it is, is a property of entities that represent
-something else. But couldn ’ t something have a property that our representation
-of it lacks? After all, we can represent a red fl ower with black and
-white words, so perhaps we can represent a changing world with a set of
-nonchanging, eternal truths. In other words, it seems that McTaggart is
-wrong to assume that the B - series is incompatible with real change, and as
-a result many philosophers have rejected the A - series without rejecting the
-existence of time. Such philosophers are typically called “ B - theorists. ”
-Finally, premise six is controversial. Many philosophers have wondered
-why we should follow McTaggart and analyze “ M will be past ” as “ M is
-past at a moment of future time, T ” (see Broad). Perhaps tense modifi ers
-such as ‘ was ’ and ‘ will be ’ have no need of further analysis and are easily
-understood as they are. In other words, if we allow for tensed descriptions
-of time such as ‘ M is present ’ , ‘ M was future ’ , and ‘ M will be past ’ to stand
-as basic and fundamental, then no contradiction arises that needs to be
-eliminated by McTaggart ’ s suggested analysis, because all such descriptions
-are mutually compatible. “ A - theorists ” agree with McTaggart that the
-B - series is inadequate as a description of time but reject his claim that there
-is a contradiction in the A - series.
-To this day, most philosophers who think about time are either A - theorists
-or B - theorists. Though few agree with the whole of McTaggart ’ s reasoning,
-almost every subsequent philosopher of time has been infl uenced by it.
-It truly stands as one of the most important arguments in Western
-philosophy.
-Past, present and future are incompatible determinations. Every event must
-be one or the other, but no event can be more than one. If I say that any event
-is past, that implies that it is neither present nor future, and so with the others.
-And this exclusiveness is essential to change, and therefore to time. For the
-only change we can get is from future to present, and from present to past.
-The characteristics are, therefore, incompatible. But every event has them all.
-If M is past, it has been present and future. If it is future, it will be present
-and past. If it is present, it has been future and will be past. Thus all the three
-characteristics belong to each event [ … ]. The attribution of the characteristics
-past, present and future to the terms of any series leads to a contradiction,
-unless it is specifi ed that they have them successively. This means, as we have
-seen, that they have them in relation to terms specifi ed as past, present and
-future. These again, to avoid a like contradiction, must in turn be specifi ed
-as past, present and future. And, since this continues infi nitely, the fi rst set of
-terms never escapes from contradiction at all [ … ]. The reality of the A series,
-then, leads to a contradiction, and must be rejected. And, since we have seen
-that change and time require the A series, the reality of change and time must
-be rejected. And so must the reality of the B series, since that requires time.
-(McTaggart, 20 – 2)
-McTaggart’s Argument against the Reality of Time 67
-P1. If time is real, then change is real.
-P2. If change is real, then what is true at one time differs from what is true
-at other times.
-C1. If time is real, then what is true at one time differs from what is true
-at other times (hypothetical syllogism, P1, P2).
-P3. If moments and events are characterized only by B - series relations, then
-it is not the case that what is true at one time differs from what is true
-at other times.
-C2. If it is not the case that what is true at one time differs from what
-is true at other times, then it is not the case that time is real (transposition,
-C1).
-C3. If moments and events are characterized only by B - series relations,
-then it is not the case that time is real (hypothetical syllogism, P3,
-C2).
-C4. If time is real, then it is not the case that moments and events are
-characterized only by B - series relations (transposition, C3).
-P4. If it is not the case that moments and events are characterized only by
-B - series relations, then moments and events have A - series properties.
-C5. If time is real, then moments and events have A - series properties
-(hypothetical syllogism, C4, P4).
-P5. A - series properties are mutually incompatible.
-P6. If A - series properties are mutually incompatible, then the attribution of
-A - series properties to moments and events entails a contradiction.
-C6. The attribution of A - series properties to moments and events entails
-a contradiction ( modus ponens , P5, P6).
-P7. If the attribution of A - series properties to moments and events entails
-a contradiction, then it is not the case that moments and events have
-A - series properties.
-C7. It is not the case that moments and events have A - series properties
-( modus ponens , C6, P7).
-C8. It is not the case that time is real ( modus tollens , C5, C7).
-16
-Berkeley ’ s Master Argument for
-Idealism
-John M. DePoe
-Much of the philosophical writings of George Berkeley (1685 – 1753) is
-dedicated to arguing for metaphysical idealism, the position that everything
-that exists is composed of thought, mind, or God. As Berkeley understood
-it, being composed of thought is contrary to being composed of matter, and
-therefore he aimed to show that believing in the existence of matter is
-unreasonable, if not unintelligible. Matter, according to Berkeley, exists
-independently of thought. He described matter as inert, senseless, and
-having what the British empiricists called “ primary qualities, ” roughly
-defi ned as properties that exist independently of a mind ’ s perception of them
-(e.g., mass, extension, motion, etc.).
-One of Berkeley ’ s most famous arguments against the existence of matter
-is commonly called “ the master argument ” because if it is successful, it
-refutes the existence of matter with a single masterstroke. The argument
-can be summed up with a challenge: can you imagine or conceive of a tree ’ s
-(or any material object ’ s) existing without its being perceived (or thought
-about)? While you might think you have succeeded in conceiving of a tree
-that is not being perceived, a little refl ection will reveal that you haven ’ t
-done so, because in the process of conceiving of the tree, you are perceiving
-Berkeley , George . Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues ,
-edited by R. S. Woolhouse . London : Penguin , 1988 .
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Berkeley’s Master Argument for Idealism 69
-it. So, it seems that it is impossible to conceive of something ’ s existing truly
-unperceived. But if it isn ’ t even possible to conceive of something existing
-unperceived, why should we think that matter can and does exist this way?
-Since it is impossible to conceive of matter ’ s unperceived existence, Berkeley
-concluded that the existence of matter is unreasonable.
-But say you, surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees, for
-instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and no body by to perceive
-them. I answer, you may so, there is no diffi culty in it: but what is all this, I
-beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call
-books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one
-that may perceive them? But do not you your self perceive or think of them
-all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose: it only shows you have
-the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind; but it doth not shew
-that you can conceive it possible, the objects of your thought may exist
-without the mind: to make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them
-existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. When
-we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the
-while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no notice of
-itself, is deluded to think it can and doth conceive bodies existing unthought
-of or without the mind; though at the same time they are apprehended by or
-exist in it self. (Berkeley, 60)
-P1. If material objects exist, then material objects exist independently of
-any mind ’ s thinking of them.
-P2. If material objects exist independently of any mind ’ s thinking of them,
-then it is conceivable for material objects to exist without any mind
-thinking of them.
-P3. It is not the case that it is conceivable for material objects to exist
-without any mind thinking of them.
-C1. It is not the case that material objects exist independently of any
-mind ’ s thinking of them ( modus tollens , P2, P3).
-C2. It is not the case that material objects exist ( modus tollens , P1, C1).
-17
-Kant ’ s Refutation of Idealism
-Adrian Bardon
-In the second edition of his Critique of Pure Reason , Kant offers a refutation
-of Cartesian epistemological skepticism that draws (albeit somewhat
-cryptically) on his insights regarding the necessary conditions of time -
-consciousness. While the details remain under dispute, the key claim seems
-to be that we would be unable to order all or some of our subjective experiences
-in time unless we were relating their sequence in some way to changes
-in objects external to the mind. The contents of our perceptual states do
-not come marked with the time of their occurrence; further, all experience
-is successive in form regardless of whether it represents sequences of events
-or static states of affairs. Thus we need some guide to reconstructing past
-events beyond the mere subjective contents of perception and memory. Only
-objective states of affairs and events – conceived of as part of a law -
-governed system – could function as a guide to this reconstruction by dictating
-one interpretation over another. Consequently, the fact that we are
-Kant , Immanuel . Critique of Pure Reason , translated by Paul Guyer and
-Allen Wood. Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 1998 .
-Dicker , Georges . “ Kant ’ s Refutation of Idealism , ” No û s 42 , 1 ( 2008 ):
-80 – 108 .
-Guyer , Paul . Kant . New York : Routledge , 2006 .
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Kant’s Refutation of Idealism 71
-able to assign a determinate order to our experiences shows that they are
-the result of contact with states of affairs and events independent of the
-mind.
-Kant ’ s refutation of idealism is a classic example of an argument form
-known as a “ transcendental argument. ” Transcendental arguments are
-usually aimed at some form of epistemological skepticism. They begin with
-some uncontroversial fact about our mental life – such as our having some
-knowledge, belief, or cognitive capacity – and add the claim that some fact
-about the extra - mental world questioned by the skeptic is a necessary condition
-of that indisputable fact about our subjective mental life.
-Many contemporary commentators think that transcendental arguments
-are not likely to be successful as proofs of any extra - mental fact since they
-characteristically involve an implausible leap from knowing how we must
-represent the world to knowing how the world must really be. However,
-some also think that more modest versions of similar arguments may hold
-promise. A “ modest ” transcendental argument attempts to show only that
-some conceptual framework is indispensable to experience as we know it,
-not that the world must actually conform to that framework. The most
-common contemporary objection to Kant ’ s reasoning in the refutation of
-idealism is that it establishes, at best, that we must conceive of our experiences
-as being related to external objects and events, not that those experiences
-are actually caused by external objects and events. Kant ’ s apparent
-lack of concern over the difference between these conclusions may be due
-to his “ transcendental idealism, ” according to which the distinction between
-how things are and how we must, constitutionally, represent them to be is
-intelligible on a certain level but inoperative from any experiential or practical
-standpoint.
-I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. All determination
-of time presupposes something persistent in perception. This persistent
-thing, however, cannot be an intuition in me. For all grounds of determination
-of my existence that can be encountered in me are representations, and as
-such require something persistent that is distinct even from them, in relation
-to which their change, thus my existence in the time in which they change,
-can be determined. Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible
-only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of
-a thing outside me. Consequently, the determination of my existence in time
-is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive
-outside myself. Now consciousness in time is necessarily combined with the
-consciousness of the possibility of this time - determination. Therefore it is also
-necessarily combined with the existence of the things outside me, as the condition
-of time - determination; i.e., the consciousness of my own existence is at
-the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things
-outside me. (Kant, B276)
-72 Adrian Bardon
-P1. I am aware of myself as a subject of experiences with a determinate
-temporal order that represent a world of objects and events distinct from
-my mental states; that is, I have self - consciousness.
-P2. If (P1), then I make judgments about the temporal order of my own
-mental states.
-C1. I make judgments about the temporal order of my own mental states
-( modus ponens , P1, P2).
-P3. There are no grounds for ordering my own mental states to be found
-either in the form or content of those states.
-P4. If (P3), then if I have self - consciousness, then there is something distinct
-from my mental states to which their changes can be referred and their
-order thereby determined.
-C2. If I have self - consciousness, then there is something distinct from my
-mental states to which their changes can be referred and their order
-thereby determined ( modus ponens , P3, P4).
-C3. There is something distinct from my mental states to which their
-changes can be referred and their order thereby determined ( modus
-ponens , C2, P1).
-P5. If (C3), then objects of experience exist outside me.
-C4. Objects of experience exist outside me ( modus ponens , C3, P5).
-P6. If objects of experience exist outside me, they must exist in space.
-C5. Objects of experience exist in space ( modus ponens , P6, C4).
-18
-The Master Argument of Diodorus
-Cronus
-Ludger Jansen
-Aristotle . The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation ,
-edited by Jonathan Barnes , 2 vols. Princeton, NJ : Princeton University
-Press , 1984 .
-Boethius . Commentarii in librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias , vols. I – II , edited
-by C. Meiser . Leipzig : Teubner , 1877 – 80 .
-Cicero . De Fato , translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA : Harvard
-University Press , 1982 .
-Epictetus . Discourses , in The Hellenistic Philosophers , edited and translated
-by A. Long and D. Sedley , vol. 1 . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University
-Press , 1987 .
-Gaskin , Richard . The Sea Battle and the Master Argument: Aristotle and
-Diodorus Cronus on the Metaphysics of the Future . Berlin : de Gruyter ,
-1995 .
-Psellos , Michael . Theologica , Vol. I., edited by P. Gautier. Leipzig: Teubner,
-1989 .
-Sedley , David . “ Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic Philosophy . ” Proceedings
-of the Cambridge Philological Society 203 ( 1977 ) 74 – 120 .
-Vuillemin , Jules . Necessity or Contingency: The Master Argument . Stanford,
-CA : CSLI , 1996 .
-Weidemann , Hermann . “ Aristotle, the Megarics, and Diodorus Cronus on
-the Notion of Possibility . ” American Philosophical Quarterly 45 ( 2008 )
-131 – 48 .
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-74 Ludger Jansen
-The “ Master argument ” ( ho kurieu ô n logos ) is usually credited to Diodorus
-Cronus, a philosopher of the Dialectical school in the fourth century bce .
-Its name is probably derived from the stock example used but connotes also
-its sophistication: It was a masterly argument about a master (see Michael
-Psellus, Theologica , 3.129 – 35). Together with Aristotle ’ s sea - battle argument
-( De Interpretatione 9), it belongs to a series of arguments pertaining
-to the discussion of possibility and necessity and their bearing on the determination
-of the future. The master argument hinges on the alleged logical
-incompatibility of three intuitively valid conceptions:
-(1) The necessity of the past: What is past cannot be changed; thus truths
-about the past seem to be necessary.
-(2) The closure of the possible over entailment: A possible proposition
-does not entail any impossible propositions but only possible ones;
-this can be used as a test for checking whether something is indeed
-possible (cf., Aristotle, Metaphysics IX 3 – 4).
-(3) The existence of unrealized possibilities: There seem to be plenty of
-unrealized possibilities. For example, it seems both to be possible that
-I sit at noon and that I stand at noon, but at most one of these possibilities
-will be realized.
-Diodorus ’ aim is to disprove (3), that is, to show that it is inconsistent
-to assume that a statement such as “ You are a master ” may be possible,
-although it neither is nor will be true. On this basis, Diodorus was able to
-argue for his characterization of the possible in temporal terms as that
-which either is or will be (Cicero, On Fate 13; Boethius, On De
-Interpretatione 234.22). But it leads also to a form of “ logical determinism,
-” because if there are no unrealized possibilities, everything is necessary.
-His fellow Dialectician Panthoides and others, however, used (2) and (3) to
-reject (1), and the Stoic Chrysippus used (1) and (3) to reject (2). Anterior
-to this debate, Aristotle was able to hold all three ideas by distinguishing
-absolute necessity (of, e.g., logical truth) from time - relative necessity. For
-it is only now that singular past facts are unchangeable; when they were
-still in the future, they were contingent and thus nonnecessary, because they
-could have been changed. As we have no ancient sources about the structure
-of Diodorus ’ argument, its reconstruction is somewhat speculative, and
-several competing reconstructions have been suggested, using different
-modern logical systems such as tense logic or quantifi ed temporal logic with
-or without indexicals.
-These seem to be the sort of starting - points from which the Master
-Argument is posed. The following three propositions mutually confl ict: ‘ Every
-past truth is necessary ’ ; ‘ Something impossible does not follow from someThe
-Master Argument of Diodorus Cronus 75
-thing possible ’ ; and ‘ There is something possible which neither is nor will be
-true. ’ Diodorus saw this confl ict and exploited the convincingness of the fi rst
-two to establish the conclusion that ‘ Nothing which neither is nor will be true
-is possible. ’ (Epictetus, 38A)
-P1. If α is or has been the case, then it is necessary that α is or has been
-the case.
-C1. If α is or has at least once not been the case, then it is not possible
-that α is and has always been the case (contraposition, P12).
-P2. If α necessarily implies β , and α is possible, then β is possible.
-C2. If α necessarily implies β , and β is not possible, then α is not possible
-(contraposition, P2).
-P4. There is a proposition, p , that is possible but neither is nor will be the
-case (assumption for reductio ).
-C3. p is possible (simplifi cation, P4).
-C4. p neither is nor will be the case (simplifi cation, P4).
-P5. If p neither is nor will be the case, then it is or has at least once not
-been the case that p will be true (tense logic).
-C5. It is or has at least once not been the case that p will be true ( modus
-ponens , C4, P5).
-C6. It is not possible that it is and has always been the case that p will
-be true ( modus ponens , C1, C5).
-P6. p necessarily implies that it is now and has always been the case that
-p will be true (tense logic).
-C7. p is not possible ( modus ponens , conjunction, C2, P6, C6).
-C8. There is no proposition that is possible but neither is nor will be
-true ( reductio , P4 – C7).
-19
-Lewis ’ Argument for
-Possible Worlds
-David Vander Laan
-Lewis , David . Counterfactuals . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press ,
-1973 .
-___. On the Plurality of Worlds . Malden, MA : Blackwell , 1986 .
-van Inwagen , Peter . “ Two Concepts of Possible Worlds , ” in Ontology,
-Identity and Modality: Essays in Metaphysics . Cambridge, UK :
-Cambridge University Press , 2001 .
-Lycan , William . “ The Trouble with Possible Worlds , ” in The Possible and
-the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality , edited by Michael
-J. Loux , 274 – 316 . Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press , 1979 .
-In the middle of the twentieth century, the notion of possible worlds demonstrated
-its power by providing a semantics for modal logic, and the idea
-has since become standard equipment in the analytic philosopher ’ s toolbox.
-Naturally, the notion of possible worlds raises ontological questions. Are
-there really such things? If so, what kinds of things are they? David Lewis
-was one of the fi rst to take on these questions. In Counterfactuals , Lewis
-defended the ontological foundations of his possible worlds analysis of
-counterfactual conditionals. Later, in On the Plurality of Worlds , Lewis
-made a sustained case for possible worlds and more fully developed his
-“ modal realist ” account of what possible worlds are.
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Lewis’ Argument for Possible Worlds 77
-Lewis ’ earlier argument for possible worlds is characteristically concise.
-Lewis notes that we already believe that there are many ways things could
-have been, takes this as an affi rmation that certain entities exist, and calls
-these entities “ possible worlds. ”
-One reason the argument has been controversial is that Lewis took the
-actual world to be what we ordinarily call “ the universe ” and took other
-possible worlds to differ from the universe “ not in kind but only in what
-goes on in them ” (Lewis Counterfactuals , 85). Worlds are thus concrete
-objects, and anything that could possibly happen really does happen in
-some world or another. The thought that Lewis ’ argument establishes such
-a view has seemed incredible to some philosophers. Peter van Inwagen, for
-one, writes, “ [T]o suppose that the existence of a plurality of universes or
-cosmoi could be established by so casual an application of Quine ’ s criterion
-of ontological commitment has been regarded by most of Lewis ’ s readers
-as very exceptionable indeed ” (87).
-Others have suggested that Lewis ’ argument is not even an argument,
-properly speaking, at all. For example, William Lycan calls it a “ brief paean
-to the hominess and familiarity of nonactual worlds ” and goes on to say
-that Lewis ’ “ ‘ natural as breathing ’ talk, like Meinong ’ s, thinly masks a
-formidable theoretical apparatus which must be evaluated on theoretical
-grounds ” (277 n.7).
-The argument Lewis later offered in On the Plurality of Worlds was an
-argument from utility: the notion of possible worlds is useful, and this is a
-reason to think that there are possible worlds. The earlier argument, as
-construed below, anticipates the later one in at least two ways. First, the
-earlier argument concludes not that there are possible worlds but rather
-that there is a presumption in favor of accepting the existence of possible
-worlds. Similarly, Lewis ’ argument from utility was not intended as a conclusive
-case for the existence of possible worlds (Lewis On the Plurality ,
-viii). Second, premise four of the below argument stands in clear need of
-further support. Much of On the Plurality of Worlds consists of a defense
-of modal realism and a critique of the alternatives and thus attempts to
-provide the support that premise four needs. Lewis ’ later argument might
-thus been seen as a development of his earlier one.
-I believe that there are possible worlds other than the one we happen to
-inhabit. If an argument is wanted, it is this. It is uncontroversially true that
-things might have been otherwise than they are. I believe, and so do you, that
-things could have been different in countless ways. But what does this mean?
-Ordinary language permits the paraphrase: there are many ways things could
-have been besides the way they actually are. On the face of it, this sentence
-is an existential quantifi cation. It says that there exist many entities of a
-certain description, to wit ‘ ways things could have been ’ . I believe that things
-could have been different in countless ways; I believe permissible paraphrases
-78 David Vander Laan
-of what I believe; taking the paraphrase at its face value, I therefore believe
-in the existence of certain entities that might be called ‘ ways things could have
-been ’ . I prefer to call them ‘ possible worlds ’ . (Lewis Counterfactuals , 84)
-P1. Things could have been different in many ways.
-P2. If things could have been different in many ways, then there are many
-ways things could have been besides the way they actually are.
-C1. There are many ways things could have been besides the way they
-actually are ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
-P3. If (C1), then if it is not the case that both (i) taking (C1) at face value
-is known to lead to trouble, and (ii) taking (C1) in some other way is
-known not to lead to trouble, then there is a presumption in favor of
-accepting (C1) at face value.
-C2. If it is not the case that both (i) taking (C1) at face value is known
-to lead to trouble, and (ii) taking (C1) in some other way is known
-not to lead to trouble, then there is a presumption in favor of accepting
-(C1) at face value ( modus ponens , C1, P3).
-P4. It is not the case that both (i) taking (C1) at face value is known to lead
-to trouble, and (ii) taking (C1) in some other way is known not to lead
-to trouble.
-C3. There is a presumption in favor of accepting (C1) at face value
-( modus ponens , C2, P4).
-P5. “ There exist many possible worlds ” expresses (C1) taken at face value.
-C4. There is a presumption in favor of accepting that there exist many
-possible worlds (substitution, C3, P5).
-20
-A Reductionist Account of
-Personal Identity 1
-Fauve Lybaert
-Descartes , Ren é . Meditations on First Philosophy . New York : Classic Books
-America , 2009 .
-Locke , John . An Essay concerning Human Understanding . Indianapolis :
-Hackett , 1996 .
-Nagel , Thomas . The View from Nowhere . Oxford : Oxford University Press ,
-1986 .
-Parfi t , Derek . “ Experiences, Subjects and Conceptual Schemes , ” Philosophical
-Topics 26 , 1/2 ( 1999 ): 217 – 70 .
-___. “ Is Personal Identity What Matters ? ” The Ammonius Foundation.
-http://www.ammonius.org/assets/pdfs/ammoniusfi nal.pdf
-(accessed December 31, 2007 ).
-___. Reasons and Persons . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1984 .
-___. “ The Unimportance of Identity , ” in Identity , edited by H. Harris ,
-13 – 46 . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1995 .
-Quine , W. V. “ Identity and Individuation . ” The Journal of Philosophy 69
-( 1972 ): 488 – 97 .
-Shoemaker , Sydney . “ Persons and Their Pasts . ” American Philosophical
-Quarterly 7 ( 1970 ): 269 – 85 .
-Williams , Bernard . Problems of the Self . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge
-University Press , 1973 .
-Wittgenstein , Ludwig . Zettel . Oxford : Blackwell , 1967 .
-1 The exposition of this account draws heavily on the work of Derek Parfi t. The exposition
-of the different kinds of reductionism is in large part inspired by Parfi t ’ s “ Experiences, Subjects
-and Conceptual Schemes ” as well as his “ Is Personal Identity What Matters? ” in which he
-slightly revises the argument which he makes about personal identity in Reasons and Persons .
-The formalized argument at the end of this chapter is an abbreviated version of the argument
-which Parfi t develops in his Reasons and Persons . Both the commentary and the formalized
-argument have benefi ted from the comments of Derek Parfi t, Cheryl Chen, Filip Buekens,
-Lorenz Demey, and Roger Vergauwen.
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-80 Fauve Lybaert
-For ages, philosophers have argued over the nature of persons and what
-is involved in the numerical identity of persons over time. To understand
-the concept of numerical identity, consider this. The two chairs at my
-kitchen table, which look exactly alike and are made of the same material,
-may be qualitatively identical, but they are not numerically identical.
-Contrast this with the one chair in my room. If someone paints that chair
-while my eyes are closed, then the chair I see when I open my eyes will
-be qualitatively different from but numerically the same as the chair I saw
-before.
-Apply this to persons. When a relative tells you that you have changed
-over the years, he recognizes that you are still numerically the same person.
-He does not think that you have passed away. But he sees that you are
-qualitatively a bit different now.
-There is more debate over whether someone is still numerically the same
-person when complete loss of memory and radical change of character
-occur. Philosophers disagree over whether the resulting person is only qualitatively
-different or also numerically different than the person before having
-a brain hemorrhage. Philosophers, such as Derek Parfi t, who hold that we
-are only the same as long as there is psychological continuity, say that we
-would in such a case be confronted with a numerically different entity.
-Philosophers, such as Bernard Williams, who state that someone stays the
-same as long as there is bodily continuity, claim the opposite.
-How do we decide what determines the numerical identity of someone?
-We will fi rst have to agree on how the concept “ person ” gets its meaning.
-John Locke ( An Essay , 148 II.xxvii.26) stated that the concept ‘ person ’ is
-a forensic concept. “ Forensic ” is often equivocated with “ legal ” , but its
-meaning stretches further than this. The term is derived from the Latin term
-‘ forum ’ and means “ public ” . Locke refers to “ person ” as a public concept
-because he takes its meaning to be determined by how we use it – or, to be
-more precise, by how we ought to use it if we want our speaking to be in
-accordance with our common beliefs, attitudes, and practices. The meaning
-of the word ‘ person ’ in a legal context is one instance of this. It has, for
-example, been held that, in this context, someone cannot be found guilty
-of committing a crime unless he remembers committing it. One idea behind
-this is that it only makes sense to penalize someone for doing something if
-he can take responsibility for doing this. Remembering what you did is
-supposed to be a precondition for the latter.
-However, not all philosophers agree on whether the meaning of the
-concept “ person ” is determined by our common use of it. Derek Parfi t, for
-instance, contests this assumption. He warns that our use of this term may
-be wrongheaded and holds that philosophers are in a position to assess this.
-They can unveil inconsistencies in our use of this concept, examine whether
-there is a real entity in the world to which it refers, as well as determine
-A Reductionist Account of Personal Identity 81
-whether this concept names what matters when we are concerned about
-our survival – as we usually think it does. 2
-This being said, philosophers will mostly start their examination of what
-the concept “ person ” refers to with an assessment of how we commonly
-use this concept. They will either describe our use of this concept as precisely
-as possible and let this description function as a determination of the
-meaning of this term, or they will explain why our application of this
-concept is not entirely accurate.
-This has led to two main philosophical approaches to the questions of
-what persons are and what makes a person maintain her numerical identity
-over time: the reductionist and the nonreductionist approach.
-There are different versions of reductionism. Constitutive reductionism 3
-is likely to be the most defensible version of reductionism with regard to
-persons. Constitutive reductionists admit that persons exist but argue that
-they are fully constituted by their physical and/or psychological continuity,
-and nothing over and above these continuities.
-To say that persons are fully constituted by their physical and/or psychological
-continuity is not to say that persons are nothing but this continuity.
-According to Sydney Shoemaker, the case is analogous to the relationship
-between a statue and the lump of clay of which it is made. The statue is
-constituted by the clay and has no separate existence apart from the clay.
-Yet it is not the same as the lump of clay. For, if this lump loses its shape,
-it will still be there, but the statue will not be. 4
-Constitutive reductionists are metaphysical reductionists, not conceptual
-reductionists. 5 They claim that persons are not separately existing entities
-over and above their physical and/or psychological continuity, even though
-we may not be able to get rid of the term “ person ” when we want to give
-a complete description of the world. It is possible that we ascribe experiences
-to subjects and that we should call these subjects “ persons ” not
-“ physical ” and/or “ psychological continuities. ”
-Another way to state what constitutive reductionists hold is this. They
-claim that what makes different experiences belong to one person is not the
-fact that they belong to a single separately existing entity. Rather, what
-makes experiences intrapersonal should be explained in terms of other facts,
-such as the fact that they are psychologically continuous with one another
-or the fact that they are associated with a single body.
-3 For the term ‘ constitutive reductionism, ’ see Parfi t “ Experiences ” and Parfi t “ Is Personal ” .
-2 This is why Parfi t calls for a revisionary metaphysics, rather than a descriptive metaphysics:
-he claims that we have to revise the use of certain of our concepts (see, e.g., Parfi t
-Reasons, ix).
-5 For a distinction between these two kinds of reductionism, see Parfi t “ Experiences ” (223).
-4 For this reference to Shoemaker, see Parfi t “ Experiences ” (268 n.9).
-82 Fauve Lybaert
-A metaphysical nonreductionist, on the other hand, claims that persons
-are separately existing entities over and above their physical and psychological
-continuity. An example of a metaphysical nonreductionist would be
-someone who identifi es persons in accordance with their soul and does not
-take this soul to be fully constituted by any combination of further entities.
-This metaphysical nonreductionist could believe in the transmigration of
-the soul: perhaps she believes that she is identical to some past person from
-whom her soul has migrated, even though that person ’ s body is not continuous
-with her current body, that person ’ s character is radically different, and
-she has no memory of that person ’ s experiences.
-Let ’ s return to reductionism. Within constitutive reductionism, there is
-still one big division to be made. Some reductionists, such as Bernard
-Williams and Thomas Nagel, argue that a person stays the same person as
-long as there is a certain degree of physical continuity. Other reductionists,
-such as Sydney Shoemaker and Parfi t, hold that a person stays the same as
-long as there is a certain degree of nonbranched psychological continuity.
-Below, we will look at Parfi t ’ s argument for his position. Parfi t argues
-for his view by stating that we should be either nonreductionists or reductionists,
-by advancing that there is no evidence for the nonreductionist view,
-and by demonstrating how we can describe psychological continuity in a
-way that does not presuppose personal identity.
-Even when Parfi t ’ s argument is considered formally valid, discussion
-about the truth of his premises and his method is possible.
-Two of the premises that could be questioned are premise 6 and premise
-7. Can quasi - memories really be called ‘ memories ’ , or are they only bits of
-information? If the latter is the case, could quasi - memory then still be said
-to be an instance of psychological continuity?
-As far as Parfi t ’ s method is concerned, one could question his appeal to a
-thought experiment. Parfi t imagines a world in which we could have memories
-of experiencing an event at which we were in fact not present. Philosophers
-develop thought experiments like these to become clear on our intuitions
-about a certain concept. They ask something like “ If x were the case, what
-would we then think about A? ” There is controversy over whether it is
-legitimate to appeal to thought experiments in philosophical arguments.
-Some philosophers, such as Quine ( “ Identity, ” 490) and Wittgenstein ( Zettel ,
-proposition 350), claim that doing so would mean that we attribute a power
-to words which they in fact do not have. They argue that, being in this world,
-we cannot really predict what our attitudes in another world would be. They
-also question what our attitudes in a world unlike ours could possibly say
-about our attitudes in the world in which we actually live.
-We are not separately existing entities, apart from our brains and bodies,
-and various interrelated physical and mental events. Our existence just
-A Reductionist Account of Personal Identity 83
-involves the existence of our brains and bodies, and the doing of our deeds,
-and the thinking of our thoughts, and the occurrence of certain other physical
-and mental events. Our identity over time just involves (a) Relation R – psychological
-connectedness and/or psychological continuity – with the right
-kind of cause, provided (b) that this relation does not take a ‘ branching ’
-form, holding between one person and two different future people. (Parfi t
-Reasons , 216)
-Defi ning Premises
-P1. When we ask what persons are, and how they continue to exist, the
-fundamental choice is between two views: the nonreductionist view and
-the reductionist view (Parfi t Reasons , 273).
-P2. “ On the non - reductionist view, persons are separately existing entities,
-distinct from their brain and bodies and their experiences ” (ibid., 275).
-On this view, persons are entities whose existence must be all - or - nothing
-(cf., ibid., 273).
-P3. On the reductionist view, “ persons exist. And a person is distinct from
-his brain and body, and his experiences. But persons are not separately
-existing entities. The existence of a person, during any period, just consists
-in the existence of his brain and body, the thinking of his thoughts,
-the doing of his deeds, and the occurrence of many other physical and
-mental events ” (cf., ibid.).
-Arguments in Defense of the Reductionist View
-P4. The reductionist view is true (A) if the occurrence of psychological
-continuity does not presuppose that a person holds these psychological
-events together and (B) if we should reject the belief that persons are
-separately existing entities.
-A. The occurrence of psychological continuity does not presuppose that
-a person holds these psychological events together.
-P5. We could think of memories as instantiations of quasi - memories.
-P6. I would have an “ accurate quasi - memory of past experience if I seem
-to remember having an experience; someone did have this experience;
-and my apparent memory is causally dependent on that past experience ”
-(ibid., 220). An example of my quasi - memory of another person ’ s past
-experience could be this: this person experiences something; a memory
-of this experience is formed; this memory gets stored on some device and
-is then downloaded to my brain.
-84 Fauve Lybaert
-P7. The continuity of quasi - memory is an instantiation of psychological
-continuity. Or, in other words: if there is continuity of quasi - memory
-(P( x )), then there is an instantiation of psychological continuity (Q( x )).
-Formalized, this gives: ( ∀ x (P( x ) → Q( x )).
-P8. If we were aware that our quasi - memories may be of other people ’ s
-past experiences, as well as of ours, these quasi - memories would and
-should not be automatically combined with the belief that these memories
-are about our own experiences. In logical language, this means that
-the continuity of quasi - memory (P) is consistent with the idea that this
-continuity can be shared by different persons (R). This relationship of
-consistency can be formalized as: ∃ x (P( x ) & R( x )).
-C1. A certain continuity of quasi - memory can be shared by different
-persons. Or: P( a ) & R( a ) (elimination of the existential quantifi er, P8).
-C2. There is continuity of quasi - memory (P( a )) (simplifi cation, C1).
-C3. The occurrence of a certain continuity of quasi - memory implies the
-occurrence of a certain psychological continuity: P( a ) → Q( a ) (elimination
-of the universal quantifi er, P7).
-C4. There is an instantiation of psychological continuity (Q( a )) ( modus
-ponens , C2, C3).
-C5. Something has the property of being shared by different persons
-(R( a )) (simplifi cation, C1).
-C6. The property of being psychologically continuous is consistent with
-the property of being shared: Q( a ) & R( a ) (conjunction,C4, C5).
-C7. Psychological continuity is consistent with this continuity not being
-shared by different persons: ∃ x (Q( x ) & R( x )). Or, in other words: the
-occurrence of psychological continuity does not presuppose that one
-person holds these psychological events together) (introduction of the
-existential quantifi er, C6).
-B. We should reject the belief that persons are separately existing
-entities.
-P9. If we do not have evidence for the claim that persons exist as separately
-existing entities, then we should reject this belief (ibid., 224).
-P10. We do not have any awareness of the continued existence of a separately
-existing subject.
-P11. We do not have “ evidence for the fact that psychological continuity
-depends chiefl y, not on the continuity of the brain, but on the continuity
-of some other entity ” (ibid., 228).
-P12. We do not have good evidence for the belief in reincarnation (ibid.).
-Neither do we have evidence for the existence of Cartesian egos (i.e.,
-thinking nonmaterial substances); it seems like they are neither “ publicly
-observable ” nor “ privately introspectible facts ” (ibid.).
-A Reductionist Account of Personal Identity 85
-P13. There are no other reasons than the ones in P10, P11, and P12 to
-believe in the existence of a separately existing subject of experiences.
-C5. We have no evidence for the claim that we are separately existing
-entities (P10, P11, P12, P13).
-C6. We should reject the belief that persons exist as separately existing
-entities ( modus ponens , P9, C5).
-C7. The reductionist view is true ( modus ponens , P4, C1, C6).
-21
-Split - Case Arguments about
-Personal Identity
-Ludger Jansen
-Parfi t , Derek . Reasons and Persons . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1984 .
-Shoemaker , Sydney , and Richard Swinburne . Personal Identity (Great
-Debates in Philosophy) . Oxford : Blackwell 1984 .
-In the empiricist tradition, it is a common move to account for the diachronic
-identity of a person in terms of shared mental properties or continuity
-of memories (e.g., Locke) or in terms of shared matter, especially of
-the brain. But all these criteria allow for “ split cases, ” that is, for two or
-more candidates fulfi lling the requirements, which cause trouble with the
-formal properties of the identity relation (i.e., refl exivity, symmetry, and
-transitivity). For example, a brain can be divided and both halves implanted
-in different bodies: which of these, if any, is the same person as the original
-one? Two individuals could even share most of their memories – but this
-does not make them the same person. Thus, none of these criteria can be
-the decisive factor for personal identity. Some philosophers, such as Richard
-Swinburne (#24), argue for dualism and conclude that there must be some
-immaterial factor, the soul, that accounts for personal identity. Others, such
-as Derek Parfi t, conclude that we should discard the concept of personal
-identity altogether and rather replace it with a nonsymmetric successor
-relation that allows for such split cases.
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Split-Case Arguments about Personal Identity 87
-There are no logical diffi culties in supposing that we could transplant one
-of [a person] P 1 ’ s [brain] hemispheres into the skull from which a brain had
-been removed, and the other hemisphere into another such skull, and that
-both transplants should take, and it may well be practically possible to do
-so. [ … ] If these transplants took, clearly each of the resulting persons would
-behave to some extent like P 1 , and indeed both would probably have some
-of the apparent memories of P 1 . Each of the resulting persons would then be
-good candidates for being P 1 . After all, if one of P 1 ’ s hemispheres had been
-destroyed and the other remained intact and untransplanted, and the resulting
-person continued to behave and make memory claims somewhat like those
-of P 1 , we would have had little hesitation in declaring that person to be P 1 .
-The same applies, whichever hemisphere was preserved [ … ]. But if it is, that
-other person will be just as good a candidate for being P 1 . [ … ] But [ … ] that
-cannot be – since the two persons are not identical with each other. (Shoemaker
-and Swinburne, 15)
-P1. A 1 and A 2 are two distinct persons.
-P2. At t 2 > t 1 , A 1 and A 2 are such that each of A 1 and A 2 share exactly the
-same amount of the X that A had at t 1 .
-P3. X is the decisive factor for personal identity (e.g., body mass, brain
-mass, memories, character traces), that is, for any persons A 1 and A 2 and
-any times t 1 and t 2 , if A 2 has at t 2 most of the X that A 1 had at t 1 , then
-A 1 and A 2 are the same person (assumption for reductio ).
-C1. A 1 is the same person as A ( modus ponens , P3, P2).
-C2. A 2 is the same person as A ( modus ponens , P3, P2).
-P4. If X is the same person as Y, then Y is the same person as X (symmetry
-of identity).
-C3. A is the same person as A 2 ( modus ponens , P4, C2).
-P5. If A 1 is the same person as A and A is the same person as A 2 , then A
-is the same person as A 2 (transitivity, C1, C3).
-C4. A 1 is the same person as A 2 ( modus ponens , conjunction, P5, C1,
-C3).
-C5. No such X can be the decisive factor for personal identity ( reductio ,
-P1 – C4).
-22
-The Ship of Theseus
-Ludger Jansen
-Hobbes , Thomas . “ De corpore , ” in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes ,
-Vol. 1 , edited by Sir William Molesworth . London : John Bohn , 1839 .
-Plato . Phaedo , in Five Dialogues , 2nd edn. , translated by G. M. A. Grube,
-revised by J. M. Cooper, 93 – 154 . Indianapolis : Hackett , 2002 .
-Plutarch . “ Life of Theseus , ” in Lives , translated by Bernadotte Perrin, vol.
-I , 1 – 87 . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press , 1967 .
-The “ Ship of Theseus ” is an intriguing puzzle about identity through time.
-It is based on the custom of the Athenians to send Theseus ’ ship each year
-on a sacred voyage to Delos, because it was believed that Apollo once saved
-the lives of Theseus and his fourteen fellow - travellers. The ritual was annually
-repeated for a long time, and hence the ship needed continual repair,
-new planks being substituted for the old ones. Plutarch relates to us that
-already the Athenian philosophers had discussed whether the ship is still
-the same ship although it consists, after a while, entirely of new planks
-(Plutarch, “ Life of Theseus ” § 22 – 3; cf., Plato, Phaedo 58a – c). Hobbes put
-a sophisticated twist to the story: Suppose, he said, that someone collected
-the old planks and put them together again in the end, thus restoring the
-old ship. The same ship, then, seems to exist twice, which is absurd. Hobbes
-used this argument to support his version of relative identity: the original
-ship T1 and the restored ship T2 share the same matter, whereas the original
-ship and the repaired ship T3 share the same form.
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-The Ship of Theseus 89
-[I]f, for example, that ship of Theseus, concerning the difference whereof
-made by continual reparation in taking out the old planks and putting in new,
-the sophisters of Athens were wont to dispute, were, after all the planks were
-changed, the same numerical ship it was at the beginning; and if some man
-had kept the old planks as they were taken out, and by putting them afterwards
-together in the same order, had again made a ship of them, this, without
-doubt, had also been the same numerical ship with that which was at the
-beginning; and so there would have been two ships numerically the same,
-which is absurd. (Hobbes Chapter 11, 136)
-P1. T1 is identical with T2.
-P2. It is not the case that T2 is identical with T3.
-P3. T3 is identical with T1 (assumption for reductio ).
-C1. T3 is identical with T2 (transitivity of identity, P1, P3).
-C2. T2 is identical with T3 (symmetry of identity, C1).
-C3. It is not the case that T2 is identical with T3 and T2 is identical with
-T3 (conjunction, P2, C2).
-C4. It is not the case that T3 is identical with T1 (r eductio , P3 – C3).
-23
-The Problem of
-Temporary Intrinsics
-Montserrat Bordes
-Lewis , David . On the Plurality of Worlds . Oxford : Blackwell , 1986 .
-Lowe , E. J. “ The Problems of Intrinsic Change: Rejoinder to Lewis . ” Analysis
-48 ( 1988 ): 72 – 7 .
-Moore , G. E. Philosophical Studies . London : Oxford University Press , 1922 .
-Our pre - theoretic beliefs tell us that ordinary things such as trees, people,
-or chairs change their properties during their existence. We can say that
-ordinary things persist – they exist at different times – and change; that is,
-they persist and have complementary properties (P, not - P) at distinct times.
-What remains controversial, however, is the way in which ordinary things
-persist. We commonly distinguish between ordinary things and events.
-Some think that unlike football games, weddings, and smiles, ordinary
-things persist by having only spatial, not temporal parts; they appear to
-endure rather than perdure. Something endures if and only if it persists by
-being wholly present at different times; something perdures if and only if
-it persists by having distinct temporal parts at different times (Lewis).
-Opponents of endurantism think that ordinary things endure, whereas their
-histories, which are types of events, perdure (Lowe). Perdurantists hold that
-both events and ordinary things have not only three spatial dimensions but
-also a temporal one: they have (the worm view) or are (the stage view)
-temporal parts.
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics 91
-Is there a rationale for preferring one theory of persistence to another?
-Lewis thought that the argument from temporary intrinsics (ATI) shows
-compellingly that endurantism is untenable. His reasoning can be presented
-as follows. Ordinary things undergo change of their temporary intrinsic
-properties; that is, they gain or lose (monadic) properties, that they have in
-virtue of the way they themselves are, not in virtue of their relations to
-other things. Put differently, A ’ s intrinsic properties are properties shared
-by every duplicate of A (Moore and Lewis).
-Endurantist and perdurantist explanations of change are incompatible.
-To illustrate this, let us suppose that A is P at time t and that A also
-existed at a past time t ’ when A was not - P. For a perdurantist, this amounts
-to A ’ s having a temporal part that is P at t and A ’ s having another part
-that is not - P at t ’ . For an endurantist, A itself (not a proper part of it) is
-P at t and not - P at t ’ . Supporters of endurantism, then, face a contradiction,
-that A itself is both P and not - P, that is also at odds with Leibniz ’
-Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals: given that A endures from t ’ to
-t , A must therefore be the same from t ’ to t (A at t ’ is diachronically
-identical to A at t ), and A should have the same properties at both
-times (A at t ’ should be indiscernible from A at t ). Lewis states that endurantism
-cannot account for the existence of temporary intrinsic properties
-demanded by ATI, since the efforts to solve the contradiction deny either
-the nonrelational nature of properties, their instrinsicality, or their
-temporality.
-P1. Ordinary things change their intrinsic properties (properties that ordinary
-things have in virtue of the way they themselves are, not in virtue
-of their relations to other things).
-P2. Properties can be either of two mutually exclusive types: extrinsic or
-intrinsic.
-P3. If ordinary things change their intrinsic properties, then ordinary things
-persist; that is, they exist at different times.
-C1. Ordinary things persist ( modus ponens , P1, P3).
-P4. If ordinary things persist, then they either endure (persist by being
-wholly present and numerically identical at more than one time) or
-perdure (persist by having temporal parts or being partially present at
-more than one time).
-C2. Ordinary things either endure or perdure ( modus ponens , P4, C1).
-P5. Indiscernibility (having the same intrinsic properties) is a necessary
-condition of numerical identity (the Law of Indiscernibility of Identicals
-implied by Leibniz ’ Law).
-P6. If ordinary things endure, then ordinary things cannot remain numerically
-identical if they have incompatible (like P and not - P) intrinsic
-properties (general instantiation, P5).
-92 Montserrat Bordes
-P7. If ordinary things cannot remain numerically identical if they have
-incompatible properties, then either intrinsic properties are either disguised
-relations to times or the only intrinsic properties of ordinary
-things are those they have in the present.
-C3. If ordinary things endure, then either intrinsic properties are either
-disguised relations to times or the only intrinsic properties of ordinary
-things are those they have in the present (hypothetical syllogism, P6,
-P7).
-P8. If ordinary things perdure, then their incompatible properties belong to
-different things (i.e., their different temporal parts).
-P9. If intrinsic properties are disguised relations to times, then all properties
-are extrinsic.
-C4. Intrinsic properties are not disguised relations to times ( modus
-tollens , P9, P2).
-P10. If intrinsic properties are those properties which ordinary things have
-in the present, then there is no other time than the present; that is, presentism
-is true.
-P11. If presentism is true, then ordinary things do not persist.
-C5. Presentism is false ( modus tollens , P11, C1).
-C6. Ordinary things do not endure ( modus tollens , P9, C4, C5).
-C7. Ordinary things perdure (disjunctive syllogism, C2, C6).
-C8. The incompatible properties of ordinary things belong to their different
-temporal parts ( modus ponens , P8, C8).
-24
-A Modern Modal Argument
-for the Soul
-Rafal Urbaniak and Agnieszka Rostalska
-Alston , W. P. , and T. W. Smythe . “ Swinburne ’ s Argument for Dualism . ” Faith
-and Philosophy 11 ( 1994 ): 127 – 33 .
-Hasker , W. “ Swinburne ’ s Modal Argument for Dualism: Epistemically
-Circular . ” Faith and Philosophy 15 ( 1998 ): 366 – 70 .
-Nagasawa , Y. 2005 . “ Critical Notice of Richard Swinburne ’ s ‘ The Evolution
-of the Soul (Revised Version) ’ . ” Available at www.infi dels.org/library/
-modern/yujin_nagasawa/soul.html (accessed 27 July, 2010).
-Reames , K. “ A Response to Swinburne ’ s Latest Defense of the Argument for
-Dualism . ” Faith and Philosophy 16 ( 1999 ): 90 – 7 .
-Stump , E. , and N. Kretzmann . “ An Objection to Swinburne ’ s Argument for
-Dualism . ” Faith and Philosophy 13 ( 1996 ): 405 – 12 .
-Swinburne , Richard . The Evolution of the Soul . Oxford : Clarendon Press ,
-1986 .
-___. “ Dualism Intact . ” Faith and Philosophy 13 ( 1996 ): 968 – 77 .
-Swinburne , Richard , and Sydney Shoemaker . Personal Identity . Oxford :
-Blackwell , 1984 .
-Urbaniak , R. , and A. Rostalska . “ Swinburne ’ s Modal Argument for the
-Existence of a Soul: Formalization and Criticism . ” Philo 12 ( 2009 ):
-73 – 87 .
-Zimmerman , D. W. “ Two Cartesian Arguments for the Simplicity of the
-Soul . ” American Philosophical Quarterly 3 ( 1991 ): 217 – 26 .
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-94 Rafal Urbaniak and Agnieszka Rostalska
-Richard Swinburne, one of the most prominent representatives of dualism
-in the twentieth century, formulated his modal argument for the existence
-of the soul as an improvement of Descartes ’ (#76) analogous argument.
-Roughly speaking, Swinburne argues that human beings currently alive
-have nonbodily immaterial parts called souls, using the assumption that it
-is logically possible that a human being survives the destruction of the body
-(and a few additional supposedly quite innocent premises). The modern
-twist to the argument that makes it technically interesting is that it employs
-a quantifi ed propositional modal logic. The argument raises also a general
-philosophical interest, like all seemingly simple and correct philosophical
-arguments for strong conclusions.
-The argument employs quantifi ed propositional modal logic T, a rather
-straightforward extension of classical propositional logic. We extend the
-language with two modal operators: ‘ ◊ ’ read as “ it is possible that, ” and
-‘ □ ’ read as “ it is necessary that ” and quantifiers binding propositional variables.
-On top of the classical rules of inference, one needs to add two axiom
-schemata (called traditionally K and T):
-(K) □ ( A → B ) → ( □ A → □ B )
-(T) □ A → A
-We also add two rules of inference: necessitation, which tells us that if
-something is a thesis of the system, it is necessary, and propositional universal
-quantifi er elimination, which works like universal quantifi er elimination
-in classical predicate logic, except that it applies to propositional
-variables and formulae. We ’ ll start with a brief presentation of the argument
-in its original formulation. Then, we ’ ll reconstruct the argument in more
-detail. Next, we ’ ll describe main known objections to the argument, describe
-how one of the objections (usually considered to be lethal) can be avoided,
-and fi nally, provide our own brief assessment of what we think the main
-weakness of the argument is.
-The argument was originally designed to prove that I [Swinburne] have a
-soul in 1984, and I leave it in that form. Updating is always possible for any
-year in which Premiss one is manifestly true. Likewise any name or other
-referring expression can be substituted for ‘ I ’ , so long as Premiss 1 remains
-manifestly true. [ … ] I defi ne:
-p = ‘ I am a conscious person and I exist in 1984 ’
-q = ‘ my body is destroyed in the last instant of 1984 ’
-r = ‘ I have a soul in 1984 ’
-s = ‘ I exist in 1985 ’
-x ranges over all consistent propositions compatible with ( p & q ) and
-describing 1984 states of affairs.
-A Modern Modal Argument for the Soul 95
-‘ ( x ) ’ is to be read in the normal way as ‘ for all x ’ .
-The argument is then as follows:
-p (Premiss 1)
-( x ) ◊ ( p & q & x & s ) (Premiss 2)
-∼ ◊ ( p & q & ∼ r & s ) (Premiss 3)
-Premiss 2 says that it is possible that I survive into 1985, given that I am
-conscious in 1984, even if my body is totally destroyed and whatever else
-might be the case in 1984, compatible with these last two suppositions.
-Premiss 3 says that it is not possible that I who am conscious in 1984 survive
-into 1985 if my body is totally destroyed, unless there is a non - bodily part
-of me in 1984, namely, a soul. It follows from Premiss 2 and Premiss 3 that
-∼ r is not within the range of x . But since ∼ r describes a 1984 state of affairs
-it follows that it is not compatible with ( p & q ). Hence ( p & q ) entails r . But
-the addition to p of q , which describes what happens to my body at the end
-of 1984 can hardly affect whether or not p entails r . So I conclude that p by
-itself entails r . Hence, from Premiss 1, r . (Swinburne Evolution , 322 – 3)
-Once we point out tacit assumptions, the argument comes out valid in
-a rather modest modal logic T with universal propositional quantifi er elimination.
-First, a few abbreviations:
-C ⇔ Swinburne is a Conscious person and exists in 1984.
-D ⇔ Swinburne ’ s body is (completely) Destroyed in the last instant of
-1984.
-S ⇔ Swinburne has a Soul in 1984.
-E ⇔ Swinburne Exists in 1985.
-84 ( p ) ⇔ Sentence p is about 1984.
-Now, the premises are as follows:
-P1. C.
-P2. ∀ p[84(p) & ◊ (p & C & D) → ◊ (C & D & p & E)].
-P3. ∼ ◊ (C & D & ∼ S & E).
-P4. 84( ∼ S).
-P5. □ ((C & D) → S) → □ (C → S).
-The fi rst premise is straightforward. The second one now incorporates
-the restrictions that Swinburne put on quantifi cation in metalanguage (now
-we are able to substitute any proposition whatsoever for p ). (2) says that
-any proposition about 1984 compatible with the claim that Swinburne is
-conscious and his body is (afterwards) destroyed is compatible with his
-being conscious, his body being (afterwards) destroyed, and his having a
-soul in 1984. P3 says that it ’ s impossible for Swinburne to survive the
-complete destruction of his body if he doesn ’ t have a soul. P4 says that the
-96 Rafal Urbaniak and Agnieszka Rostalska
-claim that he doesn ’ t have a soul in 1984 is a claim about year 1984. P5
-says that if his being conscious and his body ’ s being destroyed entail that
-he has a soul, his being conscious itself entails the same claim (thus capturing
-the intuition that whether his body is destroyed has no impact on
-whether he has a soul).
-P6. 84( ∼ S) & ◊ ( ∼ S & C & D) → ◊ (C & D & ∼ S & E) (universal quantifi er, P2).
-P7. ∼ (84( ∼ S) & ◊ ( ∼ S & C & D)) ( modus tollens , P3, P6).
-P8. ∼ 84( ∼ S) ∨ ∼ ◊ ( ∼ S & C & D) (De Morgan ’ s Law, P7).
-P9. ∼ ◊ ( ∼ S & C & D) (disjunctive syllogism, P8, P4).
-P10. □ ∼ ( ∼ S & C & D) (defi nition of □ , P9).
-P11. □ ((C & D) → S) (substitution of provable equivalents, P10).
-P12. □ (C → S) ( modus ponens , P5, P11).
-C1. S (schema T; i.e., □ A → A; modus ponens , P1, P12).
-The argument has been attacked from various angles. Swinburne and
-Shoemaker ( Personal Identity ) point out that P2 involves a de re possibility
-claim that cannot be justifi ed by bare thought experiments. They complain
-that no conclusion about the actual world can follow from mere possibility
-claims. Swinburne (1996) insists that not all premises are merely modal (P1
-isn ’ t). Swinburne also argues that the story in which he himself survives is
-consistent and that this is enough to support the de re claim.
-Hasker argues that Swinburne ’ s argument is epistemically circular.
-Swinburne (1996) attempted to defend against this sort of insinuation that
-someone may accept premise 2 without even understanding the conclusion
-or without accepting premise 3. The strength of this criticism is rather
-unclear because the notion of epistemic circularity is rather vague.
-Reames gives a parallel argument for the opposite conclusion, switching
-∼ S with S and E with ∼ E. Some space is still left for Swinburne, for he can
-argue that one of the premises is false on this reading.
-Nagasawa disagrees with the so - called “ quasi - Aristotelian premise, ”
-which says that there is no identity through time between two objects if
-they have no part in common (Swinburne used it to defend P3).
-Probably the best known objection, which is most often considered to
-be lethal, is the substitution objection formulated against the truth of P2
-(Zimmerman, Alston, Smythe, Stump, and Kretzmann). These authors
-point out that if we substitute for p a sentence that states ‘ Swinburne is
-purely material in 1984 ’ (let ’ s abbreviate it by M) or ‘ Swinburne is identical
-with his body or some part of it ’ , premise 2 comes out false, for (arguably)
-it is not possible that Swinburne is purely material and yet he survives the
-destruction of his body, even though it is possible that he is purely material
-and yet conscious.
-A Modern Modal Argument for the Soul 97
-Dealing with the substitution objection proceeds as follows. First of all,
-one cannot try to save P2 by insisting that the consequent of the problematic
-substitution instance is true, for on the assumption that being material
-entails not having a soul, this move would falsify P3.
-Swinburne himself tried a slightly different strategy. He insisted that no
-such p is compatible with C & D, for any such p amounts to the denial of
-his conclusion. This defense doesn ’ t seem too convincing. To say that it is
-possible that Swinburne is conscious and material (and his body is later
-destroyed) is not to state a philosophical thesis about the very issue in
-dispute. One can admit such a possibility without asserting that conscious
-beings actually are (purely) material. Another worry is that if you reject the
-compossibility of being material and conscious, you no longer even need
-Swinburne ’ s argument: from the mere claim that Swinburne is conscious,
-you ’ ll be able to conclude that he is not purely material.
-As it turns out, a slight modifi cation to one of the premises yields a valid
-argument that doesn ’ t fall prey to the substitution objection. Instead of
-‘ being about 1984 ’ , let ’ s use ‘ being true about 1984 ’ in P2 and let ’ s leave
-other premises intact. If we use 84(p) & p instead of 84(p) we get: P2 * . ∀
-p[84(p) & p & ◊ (p & C & D) → ◊ (C & D & p & E)], which says that no true sentence
-about 1984 compatible with C & D excludes C & D & E. The fi rst thing
-to observe is that we still can derive S (see Urbaniak and Rostalska for more
-details).
-The second thing to note is that P2 * , as a case of strengthening the
-antecedent, is properly weaker than P2. Last but not least, P2 * is not susceptible
-to the substitution objection. For to believe that substituting M for
-p will falsify P2 * , one has to believe that the antecedent of such an instance
-will be true:
-84(M) & M & ◊ (M & C & D).
-Does this move completely immunize the argument to criticism? Alas, it
-only shows that the main fault doesn ’ t lie where the substitution objection
-claimed it did. Clearly, the key premises here are P2 * and P3. The former
-says that no true sentence about 1984 excludes Swinburne ’ s survival in
-1985, and the latter says that such a survival is impossible if one doesn ’ t
-have a soul. If presented with those sentences separately, we might feel
-compelled to say, Sure, there is no (logical) reason why sentences purely
-about 1984 should exclude sentences about 1985! Sure, there is no way
-one could survive the complete and instantaneous destruction of one ’ s body
-if one didn ’ t have a soul! The key question here is whether the modalities
-underlying those intuitions are the same. It seems that the modality that
-motivates us to accept P3 is a rather strong metaphysical modality with
-quite a few metaphysical assumptions built in, whereas the one that compels
-98 Rafal Urbaniak and Agnieszka Rostalska
-us to buy into P2 * looks defi nitely weaker (would a modality that makes
-it impossible to survive into 1985 if you didn ’ t have a soul in 1984 make
-you think that no true sentence about 1984 excludes your survival into
-1985?)
-Swinburne ( Evolution , 314) himself admits only one type of possibility
-and explicitly identifi es the metaphysical and the logical. The mere fact,
-however, that Swinburne didn ’ t want to accept such a distinction doesn ’ t
-mean that we ourselves should make no distinction between the kinds of
-modalities involved in the intuitive assessment of P2 * and P3. And in fact,
-if this distinction is made, we not only have an explanation of why the
-argument initially might seem compelling (we don ’ t notice that our intuitions
-employ two different modalities), but also the argument itself cannot
-be interpreted as a sound argument.
-25
-Two Arguments for the
-Harmlessness of Death
-Epicurus . “ Letter to Menoeceus , ” in Greek and Roman Philosophy after
-Aristotle , edited by Jason Saunders , 49 – 52 . New York : The Free Press ,
-1966 .
-Epicurus ’ Death is Nothing to Us Argument
-Steven Luper
-Epicurus (341 – 270 bce ) is most famous for arguing that death is nothing
-to us. His position is still discussed today, partly because it is not immediately
-clear where his argument fails and partly because the implications of
-his conclusion would be important. For example, it seems to follow that
-we have no reason to avoid death and also that if we save people from
-death, we are not doing them any good. If death is not bad for us, it seems,
-living is not good for us.
-Epicurus makes his argument in the course of defending a more substantial
-thesis, namely that anyone can achieve, and then maintain, ataraxia , or
-perfect equanimity. The achievement of complete equanimity requires so
-situating ourselves that nothing will harm us, so that we have nothing to
-dread. Since death appears to be harmful indeed, and hence something that
-a reasonable person will dread, Epicurus needed to explain why it is not.
-His argument can be found in the following passage, taken from his
-“ Letter to Menoeceus ” :
-Death [ … ], the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we
-are, death is not come, and, when death is come, we are not. (50)
-Unfortunately, it is not clear that this argument accomplishes what
-Epicurus wanted it to do. The problem is that the term ‘ death ’ might mean
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-100 Steven Luper and Nicolas Bommarito
-at least two different things. First, it might signify an event: our ceasing to
-live. Call this “ dying. ” Second, it might signify a state of affairs: the state
-of affairs we are in as a result of our ceasing to live. Call this “ death. ” Both
-dying and death appear to harm us, and hence both threaten our equanimity.
-But Epicurus ’ argument shows, at best, that death is nothing to us.
-This argument is directed at death rather than dying, but it is possible
-to substitute ‘ dying ’ for ‘ death ’ .
-P1. We are not affected by an event or state of affairs before it happens.
-P2. Death is an event or state of affairs.
-C1. Death does not affect us before it happens (instantiation, P1, P2).
-P3. If death affects us while we are alive, it affects us before it happens.
-C2. Death does not affect us while we are alive ( modus tollens , P3, C1).
-P4. If death affects us while we are dead, it affects us when we do not exist.
-P5. We are not affected by anything when we do not exist.
-C3. We are not affected by death when we do not exist (instantiation,
-P5).
-C4. Death does not affect us while we are dead ( modus tollens , P4, C3).
-C5. It is not the case that death affects us while we are alive or while
-we are dead (conjunction, C2, C4).
-P6. If death affects us, it affects us while we are alive or while we are dead.
-C6. Death does not affect us ( modus tollens , P6, C5).
-P7. What does not affect us is nothing to us.
-C7. Death is nothing to us ( modus ponens , P7, C6).
-It is possible to substitute ‘ dying ’ for ‘ death ’ in this argument, but the
-resulting argument will clearly be unsound. The problem, of course, is P6,
-which can easily be challenged on the grounds that dying can affect us while
-we are dying.
-Lucretius ’ Symmetry Argument
-Luctretius . On the Nature of Things , translated by Martin Ferguson Smith.
-Indianapolis : Hackett , 2001 .
-Kaufman , Frederick . “ Death and Deprivation; or, Why Lucretius ’ Symmetry
-Argument Fails . ” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 , 2 ( 1996 ):
-305 – 12 .
-Nagel , Thomas . “ Death ” in Mortal Questions . Cambridge : Cambridge
-University Press , 1997 .
-Warren , James . Facing Death . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2004 .
-Nicolas Bommarito
-Two Arguments for the Harmlessness of Death 101
-Symmetry arguments attempt to show the fear of death to be irrational by
-appeal to similarities between time before our birth and the time after our
-death. This type of argument has its origin in the philosophy of Epicurus
-(341 – 270 bce ), but its most famous statement is in Lucretius ’ ( c .99 bce –
-c .55 bce ) philosophical epic De Rerum Natura ( On the Nature of Things ).
-The scope of the poem is wide, dealing with physics, metaphysics, psychology,
-and other fi elds. The clearest statement of the symmetry argument
-comes near the end of book III:
-Look back now and consider how the bygone ages of eternity that elapsed
-before our birth were nothing to us. Here, then, is a mirror in which nature
-shows us the time to come after our death. Do you see anything fearful in it?
-Do you perceive anything grim? Does it not appear more peaceful than the
-deepest sleep? (Lucretius III, 972 – 75)
-The argument draws a similarity between pre - natal nonexistence and
-post - mortem nonexistence; they both are simply states in which we fail to
-exist. It then notes that we do not fear the time before our birth in which
-we did not exist, so the time after our death warrants a similar attitude. It
-is important to remember that the argument is about the fear of death (the
-state of nonexistence), not the fear of dying (the process of going out of
-existence).
-There are several criticisms of this kind of argument. Thomas Nagel
-suggests that post - mortem nonexistence is a deprivation in a way that pre -
-natal nonexistence is not; one who dies is robbed of life in a way that those
-yet to be conceived are not. Someone whose watch has just been stolen is
-not in the same state as someone who never owned a watch; they are both
-watch - less, but one of them has lost something. One might also think that
-fear itself has a temporal aspect and is essentially future - directed in the way
-it is natural to fear being fi red next week but not to fear having been fi red
-last week.
-Another response to the argument is to grant the symmetry, but use our
-fear of death as a premise rather than our lack of fear of the time before
-we existed. Another way to have similar attitudes toward both states is to
-fear both the time before we existed and the time after our death.
-P1. The pre - natal state is a kind of nonexistence.
-P2. The post - mortem state is a kind of nonexistence.
-C1. Pre - natal and post - mortem states are relevantly similar; both are
-states of nonexistence (conjunction, P1, P2).
-P3. If states are relevantly similar, then they warrant similar attitudes.
-C2. The pre - natal and post - mortem states warrant similar attitudes
-( modus ponens , C1, P3).
-P4. The pre - natal state does not warrant fear.
-C3. Post - mortem nonexistence does not warrant fear (instantiation, C2,
-P4).
-26
-The Existence of Forms: Plato ’ s
-Argument from the Possibility
-of Knowledge
-Jurgis (George) Brakas
-Plato . The Collected Dialogues of Plato , edited by Edith Hamilton and
-Huntington Cairns . New York : Bollington Foundation , 1963 .
-Cornford , F. M. The Republic of Plato . Oxford : Oxford University Press ,
-1941 .
-Ross , William David . Plato ’ s Theory of Ideas . Oxford : Clarendon Press ,
-1951 .
-The existence of Forms is at the heart of Plato ’ s philosophy. Take them
-away, and no philosophy that could reasonably be called Plato ’ s would
-remain. To the layman (not to mention many philosophers), they are strange
-creatures indeed. This demands that any discussion of them attempt not
-only to make clear what these Forms are supposed to be like but also why
-we should believe they exist at all. Plato gives us several arguments for their
-existence, but the most important one is arguably what may be called his
-“ argument from the possibility of knowledge. ” Its premises can be found
-in several of his dialogues. The argument, naturally enough, is the product
-of his own passionate convictions and the infl uence of his predecessors upon
-his thinking.
-Deeply infl uenced by Socrates, he took from him the love of wisdom,
-the love of genuine knowledge, with its corresponding withering contempt
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-The Existence of Forms 103
-for pretensions to it – including the relativism and subjectivism of many of
-his contemporary thinkers, the Sophists. He also realized that he had to
-come to grips with the views of two other major thinkers, Heraclitus and
-Parmenides – Heraclitus claiming that nothing is, only becoming, Parmenides
-(#14) claiming that change does not exist, only what does not change (a
-certain One). If – as Plato believed with Heraclitus – everything in this world
-is constantly changing in every way, constantly “ morphing, ” never, ever
-remaining what it is, how could it ever be possible for us to “ grasp ” anything,
-to know what any thing is? By the time you think you have grasped
-it, it has already slipped out of your hands.
-To know something must therefore be to know something that does not
-change, something that always remains what it is (something Parmenidean).
-Only such a thing can be known, and only such a thing – Plato agrees with
-Parmenides – is really real. Since such things do not exist in this world, they
-must exist in, and constitute, a nonspatial, nontemporal dimension. These
-are what Plato calls “ Forms. ” (Note that the structure of Plato ’ s argument
-is not that Forms exist because knowledge exists; it is, rather, that knowledge
-exists because Forms exist. Knowledge is not the source of the existence
-of Forms; the reverse is true: the existence of Forms makes the existence
-of knowledge possible. Plato ’ s argument, therefore, is not epistemic; it is
-ontological.) They are also perfect, eternal, the source of the existence of
-this world, and many other things as well, but Plato gives other reasons for
-their possession of these attributes.
-[Socrates asks Cratylus] Tell me whether there is or is not any absolute
-beauty or good, or any other absolute existence? Certainly, Socrates, I think
-there is. Then let us seek the true beauty, not asking whether a face is fair, or
-anything of that sort, for all such things appear to be in fl ux, but let us ask
-whether the true beauty is not always beautiful. Certainly [ . . . ]. Then how
-can that be a real thing which is never in the same state? [ . . . ]. They cannot.
-Nor yet, can they be known by anyone; for at the moment that the observer
-approaches, then they become other and of another nature, so that you can
-no longer know their nature or state. [ . . . ]. Nor can we reasonably say [ . . . ]
-that there is knowledge at all, if everything is in a state of transition and there
-is nothing abiding. For knowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge
-unless continuing always to abide and to exist. But if the very nature
-of knowledge changes, at the time when the change occurs there will be
-no knowledge, and if the transition is always going on, there will always
-be no knowledge. ( Cratylus , qtd. in Ross, 439C – 440C; Ross ’ s trans., slightly
-modifi ed using Jowett ’ s in The Collected Dialogues )
-In the Republic , Plato gives us the same argument in more explicit form
-– or, if you like, a different version of the same argument in more explicit
-form.
-104 Jurgis (George) Brakas
-[Addressing Glaucon, Socrates asks] [If] a man believes in the existence of
-beautiful things, but not of Beauty itself [ . . . ], is he not living in a dream?
-[ . . . ]. Contrast him with the man who holds that there is such a thing a Beauty
-itself and can discern that essence as well as the things that partake of its
-character, without ever confusing the one with the other – is he a dreamer or
-living in a waking state? He is very much awake. So we may say that he
-knows, while the other has only a belief in appearances; and might we call
-their states of mind knowledge and belief? Certainly. [ . . . ] When a man
-knows, must there not be something that he knows? [ . . . ] [T]here must.
-Something real or unreal? Something real. How could a thing that is unreal
-ever be known? [ . . . ]. So if the real is the object of knowledge, the object of
-belief must be something other than the real. Yes. Can it be the unreal? Or
-is that an impossible object even for belief? Consider: if a man has a belief,
-there must be something before his mind; he cannot be believing nothing, can
-he? No. [ . . . ]. So what he is believing cannot be real nor yet unreal. True.
-[ . . . ]. It seems, then, that what remains to be discovered is that object which
-can be said both to be and not to be and cannot properly be called either real
-or purely unreal. If that can be found, we may justly call it the object of belief
-[ . . . ]. (Plato Republic , 476C – 479A; Cornford ’ s trans.)
-Socrates then goes on to identify that object as the world in which we
-live, a world which he earlier implicitly referred to as a world of appearances.
-Although one of the basic operating premises here is not that all
-things in this world are in constant fl ux, but rather that they are neither
-fully real nor fully unreal, it is not a far stretch to argue that they are neither
-fully real nor fully unreal because they are in constant fl ux. If so, then the
-argument is fundamentally the same as the one given in the Cratylus ; if not,
-then it is another version of it. In the latter case, premise 4 would have
-to be modifi ed accordingly as well as the wording in all the lines relying
-on it.
-P1. Knowledge is possible.
-P2. Knowledge is knowledge of some object. That is, if a (putative) piece
-of knowledge does not have an object, then that (putative) piece of
-knowledge does not exist.
-P3. All knowledge (unlike opinion) is stable. That is, all pieces of knowledge
-are stable: they do not change, being one thing at one time, another at
-another.
-P4. If the object of knowledge could change (for example, if beauty, the
-object I know, could become something other than beauty), then the
-knowledge of that object would not be stable (my knowledge of beauty
-would not be stable).
-P5. All things in this world, as Heraclitus says, are in constant fl ux. That
-is, all things in this world are things that are always changing in every
-way, or, all things in this world are not things that are stable.
-The Existence of Forms 105
-P6. Some objects of knowledge exist among things in this world (assumption
-for reductio ).
-C1. Some objects of knowledge change; they are not stable (syllogism,
-P5, P6).
-C2. Some pieces of knowledge are not stable ( modus ponens , P4, C1).
-C3. All knowledge (unlike opinion) is stable and some pieces of knowledge
-are not stable (conjunction, P3, C2).
-C4. No objects of knowledge exist among things in this world ( reductio ,
-P6 – C3).
-P7. If objects of knowledge do not exist in this world and do not exist in
-another, then objects of knowledge do not exist.
-P8. Objects of knowledge do not exist in another world (assumption for
-indirect proof).
-C5. Objects of knowledge do not exist in this world, and objects of
-knowledge do not exist in another (conjunction, C4, P8).
-C6. Objects of knowledge do not exist ( modus ponens , P7, C5).
-C7. Knowledge is not possible ( modus ponens , P2, C6).
-C8. Knowledge is possible, and knowledge is not possible (conjunction,
-P1, C7).
-C9. Objects of knowledge – called “ Forms ” – do exist in another world
-( reductio , P6 – C8).
-27
-Plato, Aristotle, and the Third Man
-Argument
-Jurgis (George) Brakas
-Aristotle . Peri Ideon ( On Ideas ) , in Aristotle Fragmenta Selecta , edited by
-William D. Ross . Oxford , 1963 : 84.21 – 85.6 .
-Fine , Gail . “ Owen, Aristotle and the Third Man . ” Phronesis 27 ( 1982 ):
-13 – 33 .
-Lewis , Frank A. “ On Plato ’ s Third Man Argument and the ‘ Platonism ’ of
-Aristotle , ” in How Things Are , edited by J. Bogen and J. McQuire ,
-133 – 74 . Dordrecht : Reidel , 1985 .
-Plato . Plato: Parmenides , translated by R. E. Allen. New Haven, CT : Yale
-University Press , 1998 .
-Strang , Colin . “ Plato and the Third Man . ” Proceedings of the Aristotelian
-Society , vol. 1 ( 1963 ): 147 – 64 .
-Many scholars believe that the Third Man Argument (the TMA) is one of
-the most powerful arguments against the existence of Plato ’ s Forms, many
-going so far as to maintain that it is successful. It exists in two versions.
-One, preserved to us only in a commentary on Aristotle ’ s Metaphysics by
-Alexander of Aphrodisias, uses the Form Man as an example; the other –
-offered fi rst, to his great credit, by Plato himself – uses the Form Large. The
-difference between the versions is signifi cant, because the fi rst uses Forms
-of entities or substances as examples whereas the second uses attributes or
-properties.
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Plato, Aristotle, and the Third Man Argument 107
-Both versions use just three major premises (in addition to fi ve that most
-people would fi nd uncontroversial) to generate a regress that is vicious. For
-any group of things to which the same “ name ” (word) may be truly applied,
-there exists a Form having the same “ name ” in virtue of which that “ name ”
-may be truly applied to them. (This may be called the “ Existence
-Assumption ” or “ One - over - many Assumption. ” ) This Form is not a member
-of the group of things of which it is the Form. (This is usually called the
-“ Non - identity Assumption. ” ) Finally, this Form may be predicated of itself.
-(This is usually called the “ Self - predication Assumption. ” It should be
-pointed out that both the formulation of this premise and its name are
-misleading. It is not the very same Form that is predicated of itself but
-rather another Form having the same name as the fi rst, with the same point
-applying as the regress proceeds.) Since an infi nite regress is impossible (at
-least, so both Plato and Aristotle agree), one or more of the three major
-premises must be false, if we take the additional fi ve to be uncontroversial.
-The problem is that it is extremely diffi cult, if not impossible, to see how
-Plato could give up any of those premises and be left with anything that
-resembles his philosophy.
-Controversy does surround both versions. Scholars interpret them differently,
-and, while some fi nd one or both to be successful, others do not
-(see Strang, Fine, and Lewis).
-The third man is proven also in the following way. If the thing predicated
-of some group of things also is another thing in addition to the things of
-which it is predicated, having been separated from them (for this [is what]
-those who posit the Forms think they prove; this is why, according to them,
-a certain man - itself exists – because the man being truly predicated of the
-many individual men also is other than the individual men) – if this is so,
-there will be a third man. For if the thing predicated is other than the things
-of which it is predicated, and exists on its own, and man is predicated both
-of the individual men and of the Form, there will be a third man in addition
-to both the individuals and the Form. In the same way, [there will be] also
-a fourth man, predicated of both this [man] – that is, the Form – and the
-individual [men], and in the same way also a fi fth, and so on to infi nity.
-(Aristotle, 84.21 – 85.6; author ’ s translation)
-P1. If a group of things exists (individual men, 1 for example) to each
-member of which the same name ( “ man ” ) may be truly applied, then a
-Form (Man or man - himself) exists in virtue of which that name may be
-truly applied to them (existence or one - over - many assumption).
-1 “ Men ” and “ man ” are used in a gender - neutral sense.
-108 Jurgis (George) Brakas
-P2. If a Form (Man) exists in virtue of which the same name may be truly
-applied to a group of things (individual men), then the Form in virtue
-of which the same name may be truly applied to that group is not
-included in it (nonidentity assumption).
-P3. If the same name ( “ man ” ) may be truly applied to each member of a
-group of things (individual men), then the name that may be truly applied
-to each member of that group may also be truly applied to the Form in
-virtue of which that name may be applied to each member of that group
-(self - predication assumption).
-P4. A group of things (e.g., men) exists to each member of which the name
-“ man ” may be truly applied.
-C1. A Form, Man, exists (in virtue of which “ man ” may be truly applied
-to each member of the group of individual men) ( modus ponens , P1,
-P4).
-C2. The Form Man is not included in the group of individual men
-( modus ponens , P2, C1).
-C3. The name “ man ” may be truly applied to the Form Man. That is,
-the Form Man is [a] 2 man ( modus ponens , P3, P4).
-P5. The Form (Man) in virtue of which the same name ( “ man ” ) may be
-applied to a group of things (individual men) is added to that group.
-P6. If the Form (Man) in virtue of which the same name ( “ man ” ) may be
-applied to a group of things (individual men) is added to that group,
-then the Form and that group constitute a new, different group.
-C4. Man and the group of individual men constitute a new, different
-group ( modus ponens , P6, P5).
-C5. The name “ man ” may be truly applied to Man and each of the
-individual men. In other words, a group of things exist (Man and the
-individual men) to each member of which the same name ( “ man ” )
-may be truly applied (conjunction, C3, P4).
-C6. Another Man (The Third Man 3 ) exists (in virtue of which “ man ”
-may be truly applied to each member of this new group) ( modus
-ponens , P1, C5).
-P7. If a third Man exists, then also a fourth Man exists (by the same reasoning
-that the third Man exists: P1 – C6).
-C7. A fourth Man exists ( modus ponens , P7, C6).
-P8. If a fourth Man exists, then an infi nite number of such Forms exist.
-C8. An infi nite number of such Forms exist ( modus ponens , P8, C7).
-2 Brackets are placed around “ a ” because the indefi nite article does not exist in ancient
-Greek. Depending on the context, the Greek would therefore allow the same set of words to
-be translated as “ Man is a man ” or “ Man is man. �� Clearly, the argument will not go through
-if “ self - predication ” is understood along the lines of “ Man is man. ”
-3 Although this Form is not the third Form Man to appear, it is the third man to appear if
-we take any one of the individual men to be the fi rst man – as Aristotle does.
-Plato, Aristotle, and the Third Man Argument 109
-P9. If an infi nite number of Forms exist, then an infi nite regress is
-possible.
-C9. An infi nite regress is possible ( modus ponens , P9, C8).
-P10. An infi nite regress is not possible.
-C10. An infi nite regress is possible and an infi nite regress is not possible
-(conjunction, C9, P10).
-C11. One or more of P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, P9, or P10 are false
-( reductio , P1 – C10).
-Plato presents what may be called the “ self - characterization ” version of
-the TMA in the Parmenides . Parmenides is questioning Socrates:
-“ [W]hen some plurality of things seem to you to be large, there perhaps
-seems to be some one characteristic that is the same when you look over them
-all, whence you believe that the large is one. ”
-“ True, ” he said.
-“ What about the large itself and the other larges? If with your mind you
-should look over them all in like manner, will not some large one again appear,
-by which they all appear to be large? ”
-“ It seems so. ”
-“ Therefore, another character of largeness will have made its appearance
-alongside largeness itself and the things that have a share of it; and over and
-above all those, again, a different one, by which they will all be large. And
-each of the characters will no longer be one for you, but unlimited in multitude.
-” (Plato, 132a – b; Allen ’ s translation)
-In reconstructing this argument, I have used beautiful things and their
-corresponding Forms instead of the “ larges ” and their Forms. This should
-make Plato ’ s argument more “ down to earth, ” without distorting it in any
-way.
-P1. If a group of things exists (individual beautiful things, for example) to
-each member of which the same name ( “ beautiful ” ) may be truly applied,
-then a Form (the beautiful itself or Beauty) exists in virtue of which that
-name may be truly applied to them (existence or one - over - many
-assumption).
-P2. If a Form (Beauty) exists in virtue of which the same name may be truly
-applied to a group of things (individual beautiful things), then the Form
-in virtue of which the same name may be truly applied to that group is
-not included in it (non - identity assumption).
-P3. If the same name ( “ beautiful ” ) may be truly applied to each member
-of a group of things (individual beautiful things), then the name that
-may be truly applied to each member of that group may also be truly
-110 Jurgis (George) Brakas
-applied to the Form in virtue of which that name may be applied to each
-member of that group ( “ self - predication ” assumption).
-P4. A group of things (individual beautiful things, for example) exists to
-each member of which the name ( “ beautiful ” ) may be truly applied.
-C1. A Form, Beauty, exists (in virtue of which “ beautiful ” may be truly
-applied to each member of the group of individual beautiful things)
-( modus ponens , 1, 4).
-C2. The Form Beauty is not included in the group of individual beautiful
-things ( modus ponens , P2, C1).
-C3. The name “ beautiful ” may be truly applied to the Form Beauty. That
-is, the Form Beauty is beautiful ( modus ponens , P3, P4).
-P5. The Form (Beauty) in virtue of which the same name ( “ beautiful ” ) may
-be applied to a group of things (individual beautiful things) is added to
-that group.
-P6. If the Form (Beauty) in virtue of which the same name ( “ beautiful ” )
-may be applied to a group of things (individual beautiful things) is added
-to that group, then the Form and that group constitute a new, different
-group.
-C4. Beauty and the group of individual beautiful things constitute a new,
-different group ( modus ponens , P6, P5).
-C5. The name “ beautiful ” may be truly applied to Beauty and each of
-the individual beautiful things. In other words, a group of things exist
-(Beauty and the individual beautiful things) to each member of which
-the same name ( “ beautiful ” ) may be truly applied (conjunction, C3,
-P4).
-C6. Another Beauty (The Third Beauty) exists (in virtue of which “ beautiful
-” may be truly applied to each member of this new group) ( modus
-ponens , P1, C5).
-P7. If a third Beauty exists, then also a fourth Beauty exists (by the same
-reasoning that the third Beauty exists: P1 – C6).
-C7. A fourth Beauty exists ( modus ponens , P7, C6).
-P8. If a fourth Beauty exists, then an infi nite number of such Forms exist.
-C8. An infi nite number of such Forms exist ( modus ponens , P8, C7).
-P9. If an infi nite number of Forms exist, then an infi nite regress is
-possible.
-C9. An infi nite regress is possible ( modus ponens , C8, P7).
-P10. An infi nite regress is not possible.
-C10. An infi nite regress is possible and an infi nite regress is not possible
-(conjunction, C9, P10).
-C11. One or more of P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, P9, or P10 are false
-( reductio , P1 – C10).
-28
-Logical Monism
-Luis Estrada - Gonz á lez 1
-Beall , J. C. , and Greg Restall . Logical Pluralism . Oxford : Oxford University
-Press , 2006 .
-Haack , Susan . Philosophy of Logics . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University
-Press , 1978 .
-Priest , Graham . Doubt Truth to Be a Liar . Oxford : Oxford University Press ,
-2006 .
-Read , Stephen . “ Monism: The One True Logic , ” in A Logical Approach to
-Philosophy , edited by David DeVidi and Tim Kenyon , 193 – 209 .
-Dordrecht : Springer , 2006 .
-Logical monism is the view that there is only one correct logic or, alternatively,
-the view that there is only one genuine consequence relation, only
-one right answer to the question on whether and why a given argument is
-valid, only one collection of valid inferences (or of logical truths), or only
-one right way of reasoning. Logic is at the center of philosophy and many
-theoretical and practical pursuits, for they proceed by the way of argument,
-inference, and their evaluation. Thus, the problem of knowing whether
-there is only one correct logic is central in philosophy and of crucial importance
-to philosophy and other activities.
-There is a simple argument for logical monism, put forward, among
-others, by Graham Priest and purported to follow from the pre - theoretical
-notion of validity – an inference is valid if and only if whenever its premises
-1 Thanks to Axel Barcel ó , John Corcoran, Claudia Olmedo - Garc í a, Agust í n Rayo, and
-Stephen Read for valuable comments on earlier versions of this text. Needless to say, those
-mistakes that remain are mine alone.
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-112 Luis Estrada-González
-are true, so is the conclusion. He works with a broad notion of logic in the
-sense that he is ready to accept that inferential tools for certain particular
-cases or domains augmented with principles specifi c to those domains count
-as logics, but he says that there is nonetheless one true logic, a logic whose
-inferences are valid in all domains and that lacks principles depending on
-specifi c domains.
-Some logical pluralists try to wriggle out of this monist argument by
-claiming that the quantifi cation “ all cases (domains) ” is not absolute but
-should be read “ all cases (domains) of a kind. ” For example, classical
-predicate logic would stem from taking cases to be the consistent and complete
-worlds, whereas constructive logic would be given when cases are
-taken to be possibly incomplete bodies of information or warrants or constructions,
-and relevance logic would be given when cases are taken to be
-possibly incomplete or inconsistent (or both) ways the world might or might
-not be. Thus, there could be different collections of inferences valid in all
-cases, for they could be valid in all cases but of different kinds.
-This pluralist reply seems not to be a good one, for then ‘ all the cases ’
-does not mean “ all the cases ” and makes logic dependent on the content
-or particularities of the case under consideration, which goes against the
-generality and topic - neutrality expected from logic. Moreover, the inferences
-valid in all the (different kinds of) cases would be regarded as the real
-valid inferences, for they are indeed valid in all cases, do not vary from case
-to case, and hence hold independently of the particularities of each case.
-Another pluralist option, not very well developed yet, is to bite the bullet,
-to take the pre - theoretical notion of validity at face value and then try to
-show that it might be inapplicable. The logical monist assumes that the
-collection of valid inferences, defi ned as inferences holding in all cases, is
-not empty. We have seen in the preceding paragraph that a logical monist
-might insist on the existence of one true logic, claiming that the inferences
-valid across all the cases of every kind are the real valid inferences. This
-move rests on the third premise below. But what if it were false; that is,
-what if there were no inferences valid in all cases (of all kinds)? Would there
-be no logic at all? Some arguments by trivialists and possibilists seem to
-imply that there are no inferences holding in all cases. However, this hardly
-entails the inexistence of any logic at all. Even though there were no inferences
-valid in all of them, cases might need special inferences as inferential
-patterns ruling right reasoning in them. To complicate things, premise 3
-requires further an “ enough ” number of valid inferences, for even though
-if the collection of valid inferences were not empty – if it consisted of, say,
-only one or just few inferences – it would be vacuous in practice to call
-“ logic ” to such a small number of valid inferences. However, the greater
-the collection of inferences, the more likely that they could not hold together
-in all cases.
-Logical Monism 113
-It seems, then, that logic should be better characterized as an inferential
-device and the universal quantifi er on the notion of validity should be
-explicitly restricted:
-An inference X => Y is k - valid if and only if it holds in all k - cases. As it
-is, this notion of validity is compatible with both the existence of one
-true logic (since it does not prevent the nonemptiness of the case of all
-cases) and the idea that logics may be inferential devices for specifi c
-domains.
-Priest rejects the idea that, in practice, every principle of inference – or
-at least a large amount of them so as to make speaking of a logic vacuous
-– fails in some situation. His argument for this, premise 3, is that to the
-extent that the meanings of connectives are fi xed, there are some principles
-that cannot fail. The discussion of this reply would lead us quite far from
-our present concern, though, for it introduces the problem of the meaning
-of logical connectives.
-The pluralist replies considered hitherto tried to provide a special account
-of the phrase ‘ all cases (or domains) ’ or attempted to give reasons to reject
-premise 3. There is an additional way of challenging logical monism, not
-necessarily incompatible with the former and just recently being taken into
-account in the specialized literature. It consists of challenging premises 1
-and 2, that is, challenging at least the uniqueness of the pre - theoretical
-notions of holding in a case and validity. For example, the following characterizations
-of validity turn out to be equivalent in classical logic, which
-has just two, sharply separable truth values (true and false), but in general
-they are not:
-V1. An inference X => Y is valid if and only if in all cases in which X is
-true then Y is true too.
-V2. An inference X => Y is valid if and only if in all cases in which X is
-not false then Y is true.
-V3. An inference X => Y is valid if and only if in all cases in which X is
-true then Y is not false.
-These different notions of validity may give rise to different collections
-of valid inferences and hence to a plurality of logics with very different
-properties. This last pluralist strategy surely has its shortcomings, but in
-order to discuss it in detail, it is necessary to introduce further and more
-technical remarks on truth values and the ways the collections of truth
-values can be partitioned. However, I hope this brief note is helpful for
-anyone looking to enter the fascinating problem of whether there is only
-one correct logic.
-114 Luis Estrada-González
-Priest expresses his logical monism in the following terms:
-Is the same logical theory to be applied in all domains, or do different
-domains require different logics? [ … ] Even if modes of legitimate inference do
-vary from domain to domain, there must be a common core determined by the
-syntactic intersection of all these. In virtue of the tradition of logic as being
-domain - neutral, this has good reason to be called the correct logic. But if this
-claim is rejected, even the localist must recognise the signifi cance of this core.
-Despite the fact that there are relatively independent domains about which we
-reason, given any two domains, it is always possible that we may be required
-to reason across domains. (Priest, 174f; emphasis in the original)
-I hereby present a version of the argument using valid inferences, but it
-can be easily turned into an argument about logical truths. ‘ X => Y ’ is read
-“ Y is inferred from X. ” I use also the word ‘ case ’ , but you can read ‘ domain ’
-if you prefer.
-P1. An inference X => Y holds in a case if and only if, in that case if X is true,
-then Y is true (the pre - theoretical notion of holding in a case).
-P2. An inference X => Y is valid if and only if it holds in all cases (the pre -
-theoretical notion of validity.)
-P2 ′ . X => Y is not valid if and only if it does not hold in all cases (contraposition,
-P2).
-P3. There is at least one collection of (enough) inferences holding in all
-cases (existence of a logic).
-P4. If two collections of all inferences holding in all cases are different, then
-there is at least one inference X => Y such that it belongs to a collection
-but not to the other (extensionality of collections).
-P5. There are at least two different collections of all inferences holding in
-all cases (logical pluralism, hypothesis to be reduced).
-C1. Since they are different collections of valid inferences, there is an
-inference X => Y belonging to one of the collections but not to the other
-( modus ponens , P4, P5).
-C2. If X => Y is a valid inference, then it holds in all cases (equivalence,
-simplifi cation, P2).
-C3. If X => Y is not a valid inference, then it does not hold in all cases
-(equivalence, simplifi cation, P2 ′ ).
-C4. X => Y holds in all cases ( modus ponens , C1, C2).
-C5. X => Y does not hold in all cases ( modus ponens , C1, C3).
-C6. X => Y holds in all cases and X => Y does not hold in all cases (conjunction,
-C4, C5).
-C7. There are not even two collections of inferences that are different
-and hold in all cases ( reductio , P5 – C6).
-C8. There is exactly one collection of inferences holding in all cases
-(disjunctive syllogism, P3, C7).
-29
-The Maximality Paradox
-Nicola Ciprotti
-Adams , Robert . “ Theories of Actuality , ” No û s 8 ( 1974 ): 211 – 31 . Reprinted
-in The Possible and the Actual. Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality ,
-edited by Michael Loux , 190 – 209 . Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press ,
-1979 . (All subsequent references are to this edition.)
-Chihara , Charles . The Worlds of Possibility: Modal Realism and the Semantics
-of Modal Logic . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1998 .
-Davies , Martin . Meaning, Quantifi cation, Necessity: Themes in Philosophical
-Logic . London : Routledge & Kegan Paul , 1981 .
-Divers , John . Possible Worlds . London : Routledge , 2002 .
-Grim , Patrick . The Incomplete Universe. Totality, Knowledge, and Truth .
-Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press , 1991 .
-The suggested label for the argument to follow, the “ maximality paradox, ”
-is tentative. As a matter of fact, there currently is no consensus as to what
-the most appropriate label might be; what ’ s more, there is not even consensus
-as to who fi rst formulated it. Robert Adams is credited with having
-been the fi rst to touch on it in print, while the fi rst detailed formulation is
-due to Martin Davies.
-Such uncertainties about name and origin have possibly to do with the
-fact that the maximality paradox is actually a family of closely related, yet
-distinct, arguments. For, while each argument relies on a common body of
-tenets, namely, well - established facts of standard set theory, it nevertheless
-is the case that the salient targets of maximality paradox can, and do, differ.
-What is common to each argument, and so what the maximality paradox
-essentially consists in, is that a reductio of the hypothesis that a set A exists
-of a given sort, namely a totality - set, is arrived at. Different maximality
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-116 Nicola Ciprotti
-paradox - style arguments can be wielded, however, against the existence of
-distinct set - theoretic (or set - like) totalities, such as, for example, the set of
-all possible worlds, the set of all truths, or the set of all states of affairs
-(whether or not the maximality paradox also threatens the existence of the
-members of such sets, not only the sets themselves, is an issue we shall
-briefl y address in closing).
-In what follows, we shall focus on Adams ’ original outline of maximality
-paradox as subsequently given rigorous shape by John Divers. This version
-of the maximality paradox is specifi cally concerned with a particular conception
-of possible worlds as world - stories, namely, peculiar sets of propositions.
-After due modifi cations, however, the argument can be conferred
-wider in scope so as to apply to set - like totalities including elements that
-are different from possible worlds.
-According to a good deal of philosophers (#99), abstract entities of
-various sorts exist. Among them are sets, numbers, states of affairs, propositions,
-and properties, to name the ones referred to most often. The majority
-of philosophers who believe in abstract objects also include possible worlds
-among them. In particular, the suggestion is that possible worlds can be
-analyzed as world - stories, that is, sets of propositions that are both (i)
-consistent and (ii) maximal collections thereof.
-Generally speaking, a set A is consistent if and only if it is possible for
-its members to be jointly true (or jointly obtain); a set A is maximal if and
-only if, for every proposition p , either A includes p or A includes the contradiction
-of p . Such two conditions seem constitutive of the notion of a
-possible world: a possible world ought to be possible, that is, a contradiction -
-free entity; a possible world ought to be maximal, that is, a complete
-alternative way things might be, or have been – one fi lled in up to the
-minutest detail.
-According to this conception, then, the explicit defi nition of “ possible
-world ” is as follows:
-(DF) w is a possible world = df w is a set A of propositions such that: (i)
-for every proposition p , either p is an element A or p is not an element
-A (maximality condition); (ii) the conjunction of the members of A is
-consistent (consistency condition).
-The main asset of (DF) is that, through it, the existence of possible worlds
-is made compatible with an ontology that eschews quantifi cation over
-nonactual objects, generally regarded as entia non grata . Qua sets of propositions,
-in fact, it is alleged that no more than actually existing abstract
-objects – indeed, sets and propositions – is needed for accommodating possible
-worlds within a respectable actualist ontology; that is, one free of mere
-possibilia . (DF), though, gives rise to the maximality paradox.
-The Maximality Paradox 117
-Notoriously, the development of a satisfactory logic theory of propositions
-[ . . . ] is also beset by formal problems and threats of paradox. One such threat
-particularly concerns the [ . . . ] theory [of possible worlds as maximal sets of
-propositions]. The theory seems to imply that there are consistent sets composed
-of one member of every pair of mutually contradictory propositions.
-Furthermore, it follows from the theory, with the assumption that every possible
-world is actual in itself, that every world - story, s , has among its members
-the proposition that all the members of s are true. Here we are teetering on
-the brink of paradox [ . . . ]. This may give rise to a suspicion that the [ . . . ]
-theory could not be precisely formulated without engendering some analogue
-of the semantical paradoxes. (Adams, 207 – 8)
-Adams ’ point is as follows. If w is a possible world, namely, a maximal
-consistent set of propositions (call it ‘ S ’ ), then qua set S must have a size
-– in set - theoretic jargon, a cardinality. What is the cardinality of S? We
-know from standard set theory that the power set of S – that is, the set
-whose members are all of the subsets of S – has a cardinality that is greater
-than S ’ s. It follows that for each member B of the power set, there is the
-proposition that B is a set (in fact, it is true that B is a set). Accordingly,
-there is a consistent set of propositions that has a cardinality greater than
-S, which was supposed to be a maximal consistent set – reductio . Thus, we
-have started from the supposition that w was a maximally comprehensive
-object, one “ than which nothing greater can be conceived, ” and we have
-ended up with an object greater than w. (Taking the union of S and B as
-the real maximal consistent set won ’ t do, of course, since by standard set
-theory again, there is a set whose cardinality is greater than the union of S
-and B.) This is the maximality paradox.
-As already hinted at, the maximality paradox has possibly more bite;
-while the case below is only concerned with possible worlds as maximal
-consistent sets of propositions, structurally identical arguments can be
-constructed to question the existence of other set - like totalities. As soon as
-some given totality is construed set - theoretically, in fact, there follows by
-Cantor ’ s Theorem that such a totality cannot exist. Thus, parallel arguments
-have been mounted for proving, for example, that: (i) there is no set
-of all truths (Grim); and (ii) there is no set of all possible states of affairs
-(Chihara).
-Notice that, strictly speaking, maximality paradox - style arguments do not
-rule out the (possibility of the) existence of the members involved. As regards,
-for example, possible worlds as maximal consistent sets of propositions, their
-nonexistence actually follows from the maximality paradox only if the further
-premise is taken aboard that, for every possible world, there necessarily is a
-corresponding maximal consistent set of propositions. In other words, the
-stronger conclusion – that is, the nonexistence of the worlds themselves –
-would follow only if the further principle is assumed that, for every domain
-118 Nicola Ciprotti
-of discourse, the objects in that domain necessarily make up a set or some
-set - like object. Unless this is assumed, a possible way out of the maximality
-paradox is to treat possible worlds not as sets but proper classes, that is, such
-that they cannot in turn be members of a more inclusive collection. Maximality
-paradox - style arguments cannot exclude by themselves the (possibility of
-the) existence of all - inclusive domains of discourse of a given sort (e.g., the
-domain of all possible worlds, the domain of all existent objects, the domain
-of all truths, etc.), provided that such domains be (treated as) nonsets. What
-maximality paradox - style arguments do rule out is the existence of a set (or
-set - like entity) of which all objects of the domain of discourse at stake are
-members. Notice fi nally though that regarding possible worlds, the suggested
-way out is not trouble free because it seems to undermine a basic tenet of
-possible - worlds semantics, that is, that a set W of possible worlds is both
-mathematically well defi ned and manageable. This strategy would then
-require us to revise robustly our views on what constitutes an acceptable
-applied semantical system, like possible - worlds semantics.
-The power set of A, symbolized as ℘ (A), is the set of all subsets of a set
-A. Thus, ℘ (A) is short for {B |B ⊆ A}. ℘ (A) has 2 n members if A has n
-members.
-(Example: suppose that A = {1, 2, 3}. Hence, ℘ (A) = {A, {1, 2}, {1, 3},
-{2, 3}, {1}, {2}, {3}, Ø }.)
-Theorem (so - called “ Cantor ’ s Theorem, ” CT): For any set A, every
-subset of A is smaller than ℘ (A). (Emphasis on “ every ” because every
-set A is a subset of itself.)
-The Proposition Assumption, PA: For each set A i that is a member of
-℘ (A), a proposition p exists that is about that set, namely, the proposition
-that A i is a set; if A i ≠ A j , then the proposition that A i is a set and
-the proposition that A j is a set are different propositions.
-P1. There is a maximal consistent set S of propositions (assumption for
-reductio ).
-P2. For each set S i that is a member of ℘ (S), there is the proposition p that
-S i is a set (Proposition Assumption).
-P3. For each such p , either p is an element of S or p is not an element of S
-(defi nition of maximality condition).
-P4. S includes at least as many propositions as there are elements in ℘ (S)
-(P2, P3).
-P5. S is a subset of S (standard set theory).
-P6. S has a subset that is at least as large as ℘ (S) (P4, P5).
-P7. S has no subset as large as ℘ (S) [CT].
-C1. There is no maximal consistent set S of propositions ( reductio ,
-P1 – P7).
-30
-An Argument for Free Will
-Gerald Harrison
-Clarke , Randolph . “ Toward a Credible Agent - Causal Account of Free Will . ”
-No û s 27 ( 1993 ): 191 – 203 .
-van Inwagen , Peter . An Essay on Free Will . Oxford : Oxford University Press ,
-1983 .
-___. “ How to Think about the Problem of Free Will . ” Journal of Ethics 12
-( 2008 ): 327 – 41 .
-Reid , Thomas . Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind . Cambridge,
-MA : The MIT Press , 1969 .
-Strawson , Peter F. “ Freedom and Resentment . ” Proceedings of the British
-Academy 48 ( 1962 ): 1 – 25 .
-Some philosophers think that our decisions are free only if uncaused, others
-that causation is needed to prevent our decisions being uncontrolled; some
-think that the causation needs to be indeterministic, others that it needs to
-be deterministic, and others that it does not matter either way.
-Nevertheless, there is near unanimous agreement that free will is needed
-to ground moral responsibility. That is to say, free will is required if we are
-to deserve praise, blame, reward, or punishment for our deeds, and if a host
-of so - called “ reactive attitudes ” such as resentment, guilt, and forgiveness
-are appropriate.
-This common ground among disputants provides the basis for a positive
-argument for free will. Versions of this argument (which has no specifi c
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-120 Gerald Harrison
-name) have been presented by Thomas Reid, Randolph Clarke, Peter van
-Inwagen ( Essay ), and Peter Strawson, among others.
-Just as it is widely agreed that moral responsibility requires free will, it
-is also widely agreed that we are morally responsible for at least some of
-what we do some of the time. For Reid, it was a fi rst principle “ that some
-aspects of human conduct deserve praise, others blame ” (361). According
-to Peter Strawson, our commitment to moral responsibility is so deeply
-rooted that it is simply inconceivable that we could give it up, and thus the
-reality of moral responsibility sets a boundary condition for where rational
-argument can lead.
-If our moral responsibility is beyond reasonable doubt, then it must be
-beyond reasonable doubt that we possess free will, as the former presupposes
-the latter. Thus, we get our positive argument for free will.
-Not everyone accepts this argument. A signifi cant minority of philosophers
-deny that we are morally responsible. There are, after all, powerful
-arguments both for thinking that free will is incompatible with determinism
-and for thinking that it is incompatible with indeterminism. Such arguments
-can be used to raise doubts about whether we have free will, and so to raise
-doubts about moral responsibility.
-For most, however, the belief that we are morally responsible has greater
-initial plausibility than any of the premises of an argument leading to the
-denial of free will. Moral responsibility therefore provides the best positive
-argument for thinking that we do have free will.
-There are, moreover, seemingly unanswerable arguments that, if they are
-correct, demonstrate that the existence of moral responsibility entails the
-existence of free will, and, therefore, if free will does not exist, moral responsibility
-does not exist either. It is, however, evident that moral responsibility
-does exist: if there were no such thing as moral responsibility nothing would
-be anyone ’ s fault, and it is evident that there are states of affairs to which one
-can point and say, correctly, to certain people: That ’ s your fault. (van Inwagen
-“ How to Think ” )
-P1. If we are morally responsible then we have free will.
-P2. We are morally responsible.
-C1. We have free will ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
-31
-Frankfurt ’ s Refutation of
-the Principle of Alternative
-Possibilities
-Gerald Harrison
-Frankfurt , Harry . “ Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility . ” Journal
-of Philosophy 45 ( 1969 ): 829 – 39 .
-Fischer , John M. “ Frankfurt - Style Compatibilism , ” in Free Will , edited by
-Gary Watson , 190 – 211 . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2003 .
-Widerker , David , and Michael McKenna , (eds.). Moral Responsibility and
-Alternative Possibilities . Farnham, UK : Ashgate , 2006 .
-Endorsed by Aristotle, Hume, Kant, and many others the “ Principle of
-Alternative Possibilities ” (PAP for short) states:
-PAP: A person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she
-could have done otherwise.
-Historically, PAP has been one of the most popular routes to “ incompatibilism
-” about moral responsibility (incompatibilism is the view that
-moral responsibility and causal determinism – the thesis that there is only
-one future compatible with the past and the laws of nature – are incompatible).
-After all, if determinism is true, there ’ s a sense in which no one could
-ever have acted differently. “ Compatibilists ” (those who believe determinism
-and moral responsibility to be compatible) resisted this argument by
-arguing that PAP should be given a controversial “ conditional ” interpretation
-according to which an agent could have done otherwise if he would
-have done so had he desired.
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-122 Gerald Harrison
-But in 1969, the philosopher Harry Frankfurt devised an argument to
-refute PAP. Frankfurt argued that it is possible for circumstances to arise
-in which it is clear that a person could not have done otherwise yet also
-clear that he is morally responsible for his deed. The defi ning feature of
-what has now become known as a “ Frankfurt - style case ” is that an intervention
-device does not intervene in a process leading to an action but
-would have intervened if the agent had been about to decide differently.
-The presence of the intervention mechanism rules out the possibility of the
-agent ’ s deciding differently, yet because the intervention mechanism plays
-no role in the agent ’ s deliberations and subsequent action, it seems clear
-that the agent is fully morally responsible for his action; hence PAP is
-refuted.
-By refuting PAP, Frankfurt ’ s argument closes off one of the major routes
-to incompatibilism and allows compatibilists to bypass the debate over the
-correct interpretation of PAP.
-Frankfurt ’ s argument remains the focus of considerable debate, with
-detractors arguing that it is impossible to construct a Frankfurt - style case
-in which all relevant alternative possibilities have been expunged.
-Suppose someone, Black, let us say wants Jones to perform a certain
-action. Black is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but he
-prefers to avoid showing his hand unnecessarily. So he waits until Jones is
-about to make up his mind what to do, and he does nothing unless it is clear
-to him (Black is an excellent judge of such things) that Jones is going to decide
-to do something other than what he wants him to do. If it does become clear
-that Jones is going to decide to do something else, Black takes effective steps
-to ensure that Jones decides to do, and that he does do, what he wants him
-to do. Whatever Jones ’ s initial preferences and inclinations, then, Black will
-have his way [ … ].
-Now suppose that Black never has to show his hand because Jones, for
-reasons of his own, decides to perform and does perform the very action Black
-wants him to perform. In that case, it seems clear, Jones will bear precisely
-the same moral responsibility for what he does as he would have borne if
-Black had not been ready to take steps to ensure that he do it. (Frankfurt,
-835 – 6)
-P1. An agent is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could
-have done otherwise (PAP).
-P2. If PAP is true, then a Frankfurt - style case will absolve its subject from
-moral responsibility.
-P3. Frankfurt - style cases do not absolve their subjects from moral
-responsibility.
-C1. PAP is false ( modus tollens , P2, P3).
-32
-Van Inwagen ’ s Consequence
-Argument against Compatibilism
-Grant Sterling
-van Inwagen , Peter . An Essay on Free Will . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1983 .
-One of the most famous recent arguments in the free will and determinism
-debate is Peter van Inwagen ’ s consequence argument, which aims to show
-that compatibilism is false. Compatibilism is the view that all our actions
-could be fully determined by the laws of physics and yet at the same time
-we could have free will in the sense necessary for moral responsibility. Van
-Inwagen introduces the essence of this argument near the beginning of his
-book on free will and then goes on to gives three detailed technical versions
-of the argument. Included here is the simple version and the fi rst technical
-formalization (which aims to show that under determinism we could never
-act in any way other than the way in which we do act).
-If determinism is true, then our acts are consequences of the laws of nature
-and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were
-born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences
-of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us. (16)
-Consider any act that (logically) someone might have performed. If it
-should turn out that this act was incompatible with the state of the world
-before that person ’ s birth taken together with the laws of nature, then it
-follows that that person could not have performed that act. Moreover, if
-determinism is true, then just any deviation from the actual course of events
-would be incompatible with any past state of the world taken together with
-the laws of nature. Therefore, if determinism is true, it never has been within
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-124 Grant Sterling
-my power to deviate from the actual course of events that has constituted my
-history. (75)
-P1. If determinism is true, then our acts are consequences of the laws of
-nature and events in the remote past.
-P2. The laws of nature and events in the remote past are not up to us.
-P3. If something is not up to us, then its consequences are not up to us.
-C1. If the laws of nature and events in the remote past are not up to us,
-then their consequences are not up to us (substitution, P2, P3).
-C2. Consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past
-are not up to us ( modus ponens , P2, C1).
-C3. If determinism is true, then our acts are not up to us (in our control,
-within our ability) (substitution, C2, P1).
-P4. If our acts are not up to us, then we ’ re not responsible for them.
-C4. If determinism is true, we ’ re not responsible for any of our acts
-(hypothetical syllogism, C3, P4).
-Van Inwagen ’ s First Formalization
-Defi nitions:
-Let ‘ U ’ be a complete description of the state of the universe right now.
-Let ‘ U – 1 ’ be a complete description of the state of the universe the day
-before some person ‘ X ’ was born.
-Let ‘ A ’ be some action that X did not perform.
-Let ‘ L ’ be the laws of nature.
-P1. X cannot change U – 1 (no one can change the past state of the universe
-at a time before she was even born).
-P2. X cannot change L (no one can change the laws of nature).
-P3. If determinism is true, then {(U – 1 plus L), entails U} (follows from the
-concept of determinism).
-P4. If X had done A, then not - U (A is an action that didn ’ t occur, so if it
-had occurred the universe wouldn ’ t be exactly the same as it is now).
-C1. If X could have done A, X could have made U false (follows semantically
-from P4).
-C2. If X could have made U false, then X could have made (U – 1 plus
-L) false (transposition, P3).
-C3. If X could have made (U – 1 plus L) false, then X could have made
-L false (De Morgan ’ s, C2, P1, and disjunctive syllogism).
-C4. X could not have made L false (P2).
-C5. X could not do A ( modus tollens , C3, C4, and a series of implicit
-hypothetical syllogisms).
-33
-Fatalism
-Fernando Migura and Agustin Arrieta
-Aquinas , Thomas . Summa Theologiae , translated by Fathers of the English
-Dominican Province, The Summa Theologiae , 2nd rev. edn., 22 vols.
-London : Burns, Oates & Washbourne , 1912 – 36. Reprinted in 5 vols.,
-Westminster: Christian Classics, 1981 . E - text in HTML available at
-www.newadvent.org/summa
-Aristotle . Aristotle Categories and De Interpretatione , translated with notes
-and glossary by J. L. Ackrill. Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1961 .
-Augustine , Saint . On Free Choice of the Will , translated, with introduction
-by Thomas Williams. Indianapolis : Hackett , 1993 .
-Rice , Hugh . “ Fatalism . ” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ( Fall
-2009 edn.), edited by Edward N. Zalta , available at http://
-plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/fatalism
-According to the philosophical doctrine called “ fatalism, ” everything that
-happens does so inevitably. Suppose that something is going to happen
-tomorrow; let ’ s say that it is going to rain. If it is true now that tomorrow
-it is going to rain, then it can ’ t be true that it won ’ t rain tomorrow, so it is
-necessary to rain tomorrow. On the other hand, if it is false now that tomorrow
-it is going to rain, then it can ’ t be true that it will rain tomorrow, so
-it is impossible to rain tomorrow; that is, it is necessary that it won ’ t rain
-tomorrow. Since the same reasoning can be applied to every event, everything
-that happens does so necessarily and inevitably.
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-126 Fernando Migura and Agustin Arrieta
-Let us see the structure of the argument from which fatalism is concluded.
-Let p be: “ It is going to rain tomorrow ” (or whatever declarative
-sentence that describes an event that you think that can happen tomorrow).
-Then the argument has the following structure:
-P1. If it is true now that p , then necessarily p .
-P2. If it is true now that not p , then necessarily not p .
-P3. It is true now that p or it is true now that not p .
-C1. Necessarily p or necessarily not p (constructive dilemma, P1, P2,
-P3).
-This argument is unsound because it is clear that the conclusion is false,
-but it is not so clear where it goes wrong. The classical solution has to do
-with a known ambiguity (amphiboly) associated with conditional sentences
-of the form: “ If X, then, necessarily Y. ” This can be interpreted as (a) “ It
-is a necessary truth that if X, then Y ” or as (b) “ If X, then it is a necessary
-truth that Y. ” On the one hand, if premises 1 and 2 are read as (a), they
-are clearly true but, then, the conclusion doesn ’ t follow from premises. On
-the other hand, if premises 1 and 2 are interpreted as (b), the conclusion
-does follow from them, but they presuppose fatalism. So, either the argument
-is not logically valid or it begs the question.
-The fi rst and best known argumentative version of fatalism can be found
-in the sea - battle argument formulated by Aristotle in Chapter IX of On
-Interpretation ( Peri Hermeneias , also De Interpretatione ):
-For if every affi rmation or negation is true or false it is necessary for everything
-either to be the case or not to be the case. For if one person says that
-something will be and another denies this same thing, it is clearly necessary
-for one of them to be saying what is true – if every affi rmation is true or false;
-for both will not be the case together under such circumstances. [ … ] It follows
-that nothing either is or is not happening, or will be or will not be, by chance
-or as chance has it, but everything of necessity and not as chance has it (since
-either he who says or he who denies is saying what it is true).
-I mean, for example: it is necessary for there to be or not to be a sea - battle
-tomorrow, but it is not necessary for a sea - battle to take place tomorrow, not
-for one not to take place – though it is necessary for one to take place or not
-to take place. (Aristotle On Interpretation , IX 18a34, 19a23)
-But there are also other known formulations due to St. Augustine and
-Thomas Aquinas relating to the associated problem of free will. St. Augustine
-in On Free Choice of the Will (Book Three), considers an argument that
-could be paraphrased as follows:
-If God foreknows that Pope Benedict XVI will sin tomorrow, then necessarily
-Pope Benedict XVI will sin tomorrow. God foreknows that Pope
-Fatalism 127
-Benedict XVI will sin tomorrow. So necessarily Pope Benedict XVI will sin
-tomorrow.
-Another example of this is Thomas Aquinas ’ discussion of the argument
-that God ’ s Providence ( Summa Theologiae , First Part, Question 22) implies
-fatalism. The argument is built from a supposition like this: During the
-Creation, God foresaw everything, including, for example, Pope Benedict
-XVI sinning tomorrow. So, necessarily Pope Benedict XVI will sin
-tomorrow.
-Assuming that what God foreknows or sees is always true, these versions
-of fatalist arguments are essentially analyzed in the same way. Both arguments
-count as modus ponens : “ If X, then, necessarily Y, and X, so, necessarily
-Y. ” In both cases, the key issue has to do with the correct interpretation
-of conditional sentence properly understood as “ It is necessarily true that
-X, then Y. ”
-Let us consider a more familiar example:
-(e) “ If I know George Clooney is a bachelor, then necessarily George
-Clooney is unmarried. ”
-Given that I know George Clooney remains Hollywood ’ s most famous
-bachelor today (September 1, 2010), if I don ’ t interpret correctly the conditional,
-I can conclude by modus ponens , “ Necessarily, George Clooney
-is unmarried. ” But this conclusion would be equivalent to saying, “ There
-are no possible circumstances in which George Clooney is married, ” and
-so a strong conclusion is not justifi ed by the premises. Obviously the correct
-interpretation of (e) is, “ Necessarily, if I know George Clooney is a bachelor,
-then George Clooney is unmarried. ”
-One of the most known practical consequences of fatalism has to do
-with the uselessness of decision - making. If someone assumes fatalism, why
-should she bother making decisions if the outcome is already fi xed? This
-direct consequence of fatalism is clearly illustrated in the famous “ lazy
-argument. ” For instance, if you feel sick now, it is true now that you will
-either recover or it is now true that you will die. In any case, by direct
-application of the fatalist argument, necessarily you recover from your
-illness or necessarily you die because of it. So, why should you call the
-doctor or do anything at all? (As is easy to see, this argument has the form
-of a dilemma too.)
-Aristotle was entirely aware of this consequence of fatalism when he said
-that if everything is and happens of necessity, there would be no need to
-deliberate or to take trouble thinking that if we do this, this will happen,
-but if we do not, it will not (see On Interpretation , IX 18b26).
-34
-Sartre ’ s Argument for Freedom
-Jeffrey Gordon
-Sartre , Jean - Paul . Being and Nothingness , translated by Hazel Barnes. New
-York : Philosophical Library , 1956 .
-Sartre ’ s argument for freedom is unique in the history of philosophy because
-it treats freedom as the essential characteristic of human consciousness as
-opposed to a property or capacity of consciousness or mind. In one of
-Sartre ’ s famous formulations, “ Man is freedom, ” the idea is that consciousness
-has no properties at all, that it is nothing more than a relation to real
-existent things, and it relates to those things by defi ning their signifi cance.
-The conscious person must interpret the signifi cance of the existent thing;
-he must construct a coherent world from what is given. The given has no
-meaning in itself; whatever meaning it will have derives from the agent ’ s
-interpretation. For a given state of affairs to function as a cause of my
-conduct, I must fi rst confer upon that state of affairs a certain meaning,
-which in turn informs that situation with its power to cause. I, then, am
-the source of its causal effi cacy. But determinism requires that the nature
-and compelling power of the cause exist in themselves, quite independently
-of any characteristic of the entity undergoing the cause – effect process. Since
-this necessary condition of determinism is never met by consciousness,
-determinism is inapplicable to human experience. Experience cannot be
-caused. To experience is to appropriate, to interiorize the given, to make it
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Sartre’s Argument for Freedom 129
-one ’ s own. In virtue of the relationship between consciousness and the
-given, my freedom to choose is inescapable. Sartre therefore concludes,
-“ Man is condemned to be free ” (439).
-Suppose that a boy is born into poverty; that is, the socioeconomic condition
-of his family is much lower than the average. (The idea of poverty,
-fraught with connotations of disvalue, already presupposes an interpretation.)
-Trying to explain his later extraordinary drive, we might well cite this
-early circumstance as formative – indeed, as determinative. But Sartre
-would insist that such an explanation is quite misleading. The poverty could
-not have had this effect had the young boy not understood the condition
-as shameful. Had he thought of it instead as the source of the strong mutual
-dependency in his family and their consequent bonds of solidarity, the drive
-for wealth might very well have seemed to him an empty pursuit. Sartre ’ s
-point would be that a given socioeconomic circumstance must await the
-interpretation of consciousness before it could function as a cause. Life
-circumstances cannot impel an effect without the assent of consciousness.
-Always to have to interpret the given, to have to forge of the given a motive
-and cause, is the inescapable condition of consciousness. The uncaused
-source of its own actions, the human being is irremediably free.
-No factual state whatever it may be (the political and economic structure
-of society, the psychological “ state, ” etc.) is capable by itself of motivating
-any act whatsoever. For an act is the projection of [consciousness] toward
-what it is not, and what is can in no way determine by itself what is not.
-[ . . . ] This implies for consciousness the permanent possibility of effecting a
-rupture with its own past, of wrenching itself away from its past so as to be
-able to consider it in the light of a non - being and so as to be able to confer
-on it the meaning which it has in terms of the project of a meaning it does
-not have . Under no circumstances can the past in any way by itself produce
-an act [ . . . ]. In fact as soon as one attributes to consciousness this negative
-power with respect to the world and itself [ . . . ] we must recognize that the
-indispensable and fundamental condition of all action is the freedom of the
-acting being. (436)
-P1. In order for a given state of affairs deterministically to cause a human
-action, the causal effi cacy of that state of affairs would have to derive
-exclusively from characteristics of that state of affairs.
-P2. A given state of affairs has no meaning in itself.
-P3. If a given state of affairs has no meaning in itself, then its meaning must
-be conferred upon it by the person experiencing it.
-C1. The meaning of a given state of affairs must be conferred upon it
-by the person experiencing it ( modus ponens , P2, P3).
-P4. The meaning of the state of affairs is the source of its power to motivate
-(or cause) the action.
-130 Jeffrey Gordon
-P5. If the meaning of the state of affairs is the source of its power to motivate
-(or cause) the action, then in the case of human action, the causal
-effi cacy of the state of affairs does not derive exclusively from characteristics
-of that state of affairs.
-C2. In the case of human action, the causal effi cacy of the state of affairs
-does not derive exclusively from characteristics of that state of affairs
-( modus ponens , P4, P5).
-C3. No given state of affairs can deterministically cause a human action
-( modus tollens , P1, C3).
-P6. If no given state of affairs can deterministically cause a human action,
-then one ’ s actions are free.
-C4. Human beings are inescapably free ( modus ponens , C3, P6).
-Part III
-Epistemology
-35
-The Cogito Arguments of Descartes
-and Augustine
-Descartes , Ren é . Meditations , edited by David B. Manley and Charles S.
-Taylor , translated by John Veitch, available at www.wright.edu/cola/
-descartes/index.html (accessed June 2010).
-Descartes ’ Cogito
-Joyce Lazier
-Since Descartes ’ argument, “ I think therefore I am, ” presented in Meditation
-II, is often taken as the foundation of idealism and also the source of the
-mind – body problem, it is a core philosophical argument. The Meditations
-are presented as a stream - of - consciousness style of writing, and the arguments
-are diffi cult to follow when just reading it straight through. When
-put in premise and conclusion form, it is easier to see both the argument
-as well as some of its fl aws. After Descartes discards God as the cause of
-his thoughts in the fi rst argument, the assumption of the “ evil deceiver ” in
-the fi fth argument is the most obvious fl aw, since it contradicts the logic
-given in the fi rst argument. If we believe the fi rst argument, that Descartes
-is capable of producing thoughts himself so he needn ’ t presume a God, then
-we could also think Descartes is capable of producing his own deceit so he
-needn ’ t presume a deceiver. So, either the evil demon could be discarded as
-the cause of Descartes ’ deceit along with God as the cause of his thoughts,
-or God could be presumed to exist along with the deceiver. Furthermore,
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-134 Joyce Lazier and Brett Gaul
-besides deceit, which we could cause ourselves, we have no evidence for the
-evil deceiver and therefore good reason to doubt (by Descartes ’ own standard
-of knowledge) and throw out such an assumption. Another fl aw that
-stands out after the reconstruction is an equivocation with “ exist ” as well
-as with “ I. ” Most interestingly, this formulation shows that the typical “ I
-think therefore I am ” interpretation of Descartes ’ argument is too broad in
-two senses. First, as the argument shows, he claims to know he exists when
-he is thinking, which allows for the possibility of his not knowing he exists
-when he is not thinking. Second, the “ I am ” in “ I think, therefore, I am ”
-suggests existence of the “ I ” independent of thought. But Descartes ’ argument
-does not prove this “ I ” ; it just proves thought. At most, his argument
-proves “ thought exists. ”
-But how do I know that there is not something different altogether from
-the objects I have now enumerated, of which it is impossible to entertain the
-slightest doubt? Is there not a God, or some being, by whatever name I may
-designate him, who causes these thoughts to arise in my mind? But why
-suppose such a being, for it may be I myself am capable of producing them?
-Am I, then, at least not something? But I before denied that I possessed senses
-or a body; I hesitate, however, for what follows from that? Am I so dependent
-on the body and the senses that without these I cannot exist? But I had the
-persuasion that there was absolutely nothing in the world, that there was no
-sky and no earth, neither minds nor bodies; was I not, therefore, at the same
-time, persuaded that I did not exist? Far from it; I assuredly existed, since I
-was persuaded. But there is I know not what being, who is possessed at once
-of the highest power and the deepest cunning, who is constantly employing
-all his ingenuity in deceiving me. Doubtless, then, I exist, since I am deceived;
-and, let him deceive me as he may, he can never bring it about that I am
-nothing, so long as I shall be conscious that I am something. So that it must,
-in fi ne, be maintained, all things being maturely and carefully considered, that
-this proposition [ pronunciatum ] I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time it
-is expressed by me, or conceived in my mind.
-P1. Either God or I cause thoughts to arise in my mind.
-P2. If I can produce the thoughts myself, I needn ’ t suppose such a God.
-P3. I can produce the thoughts myself.
-C1. I needn ’ t suppose God ( modus ponens , P2, P3).
-P4. If I can produce thoughts myself, then I am something.
-P5. I can produce thoughts myself.
-C2. I am something ( modus ponens , P4, P5).
-P6. I was persuaded that there was nothing in the world.
-P7. If I am persuaded, then I existed.
-P8. I was persuaded.
-C3. I existed ( modus ponens , P7, P8).
-The Cogito Arguments of Descartes and Augustine 135
-P9. There is an evil demon who is constantly deceiving me that I ’ m
-something.
-P10. If I am deceived, then I am conscious that I am something.
-P11. I am deceived.
-C4. I am conscious that I am something ( modus ponens , P10, P11).
-P12. If I am conscious that I ’ m something, then I cannot be nothing.
-P13. I am conscious that I ’ m something.
-C5. I am not nothing ( modus ponens , P12, P13).
-P14. If I am not nothing, then I exist.
-P15. I am not nothing.
-C6. I exist ( modus ponens , P14, P15).
-Augustine ’ s “ Si fallor, sum ” Argument (If I Am Mistaken,
-I Exist)
-Augustine . The City of God against the Pagans , edited and translated by R.
-W. Dyson . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 1998 .
-Descartes , Ren é . The Philosophical Writings of Descartes , translated by John
-Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge, UK :
-Cambridge University Press , 1999 .
-Menn , Stephen . Descartes and Augustine . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge
-University Press , 1998 .
-Brett Gaul
-Saint Augustine of Hippo (354 – 430) occupies an interesting place in the
-history of philosophy. A bishop in the Roman Catholic Church, Augustine
-is one of the main fi gures responsible for incorporating elements of Greek
-and Roman philosophy into Christianity, and his ideas still exert a powerful
-infl uence in Christian philosophy even today. In The City of God , his
-longest and arguably his most important and infl uential work, Augustine
-defends Christianity against the criticisms of unbelievers and displays his
-considerable knowledge of classical thought. One of the many classical
-views Augustine addresses is skepticism – the belief that no genuine knowledge
-is possible. Augustine defends the possibility of genuine knowledge by
-arguing that he cannot be mistaken about his own existence ( “ Si fallor,
-sum ” ). The argument is signifi cant because it predates by about 1,200 years
-Descartes ’ more famous French “ Je pense, donc je suis ” and Latin “ Cogito,
-ergo sum ” ( “ I think, therefore I am ” ) arguments from the Discourse on
-Method and Principles of Philosophy , respectively. Although it is unclear
-136 Joyce Lazier and Brett Gaul
-whether Descartes bases his versions of the argument on Augustine ’ s, we
-know from Descartes ’ own correspondence that he did read Augustine.
-It is, however, without any delusive representation of images or phantasms
-that I am wholly certain that I exist, and that I know this fact and love it. So
-far as these truths are concerned, I do not at all fear the arguments of the
-Academics when they say, What if you are mistaken? For if I am mistaken, I
-exist. He who does not exist clearly cannot be mistaken; and so, if I am
-mistaken, then, by the same token, I exist. And since, if I am mistaken, it is
-certain that I exist, how can I be mistaken in supposing that I exist? Since,
-therefore, I would have to exist even if I were mistaken, it is beyond doubt
-that I am not mistaken in knowing that I exist. (Augustine, 484)
-P1. If I can consider whether I might be mistaken about my own existence,
-then I know that I exist because the ability to consider something is a
-suffi cient condition for existence.
-P2. I can consider whether I might be mistaken about my own existence.
-C1. I know that I exist ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
-Alternatively:
-P1. If I do not exist, then I cannot consider whether I might be mistaken
-about my own existence because existence is a necessary condition for
-the ability to consider anything.
-P2. I can consider whether I might be mistaken about my own existence.
-C1. I exist ( modus tollens , P1, P2).
-36
-The Cartesian Dreaming Argument
-for External - World
-Skepticism
-Stephen Hetherington
-Descartes , Ren é . “ Meditation I , ” in Meditations on First Philosophy , in The
-Philosophical Works of Descartes , vol. I , edited and translated by E. S.
-Haldane and G. R. T. Ross . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University
-Press , 1911 .
-___. Discourse on the Method , in The Philosophical Works of Descartes ,
-vol. I , edited and translated by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross .
-Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 1911 .
-Sosa , Ernst . A Virtue Epistemology . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 2009 .
-Stroud , Barry. The Signifi cance of Philosophical Scepticism . Oxford :
-Clarendon Press , 1984 .
-Wilson , M. D. Descartes . London : Routledge & Kegan Paul , 1978 .
-Descartes ’ was not the fi rst worried philosophical reference to dreaming as
-an epistemological issue. But he made the worry especially famous. It has
-since developed into an argument – usually deemed Cartesian, at least in
-spirit – which many epistemologists regard as needing to be defeated if
-external - world knowledge is to be possible. (Descartes ’ use of the worry
-helped even to defi ne the category of external - world knowledge in the fi rst
-place. Such knowledge amounts, in his treatment of it, to knowledge of the
-physical world.) Even if not always in the suggestive but elliptical way used
-by Descartes, the skeptical argument is routinely taught in introductory
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-138 Stephen Hetherington
-philosophy courses – general ones, as well as metaphysics and epistemology
-ones.
-This argument is epistemological, skeptically so. It challenges the thesis
-– one which, for most of us, is an unquestioned presumption – that people
-are able to have even some knowledge of a physical world, including of
-their own physical aspects. The argument is generally called “ Cartesian ” in
-honor of Ren é Descartes (1596 – 1650), even though a much earlier version
-of the argument was advanced by Socrates in Plato ’ s dialogue Theaetetus
-(at 158a – e). Descartes ’ version has been the historically infl uential one.
-Most famously presented in his 1641 Meditations on First Philosophy
-( “ Meditation I ” ), it was a dramatic moment within philosophy ’ s most celebrated
-expression and exploration of sustained doubt. These skeptical
-thoughts by Descartes – followed immediately within the Meditations by
-his attempts to resolve them – were pivotal in the formation of modern
-philosophy, let alone modern epistemology.
-The argument has since been formulated more fully within contemporary
-epistemology, along the way acquiring the status of a paradigm form of
-skeptical challenge. Whenever contemporary epistemologists seek to defuse
-skeptical reasoning, this particular piece of skeptical reasoning – the
-Cartesian dreaming argument for external - world skepticism – often serves
-as their representative target. This is partly because knowledge of the physical
-world is something that people seem so manifestly and so often to have
-and to use.
-The importance of the Cartesian argument is also due partly to its apparent
-metaphysical ramifi cations. It has either refl ected or suggested the possibility
-of people living only as thinking things – within their “ inner ” worlds
-of thoughts and apparent sensations, not knowing if there is any “ outer ”
-world beyond these.
-Descartes ’ argument reaches that stage by seizing upon the possibility of
-something – dreaming – that can strike us as being a vivid yet deceitful sort
-of experience. We believe we can be deceived, when dreaming, into thinking
-that we are really experiencing the physical world as it is. The skeptical
-argument challenges us to know that this is not happening whenever we
-think we are really experiencing the physical world. If we do not know that
-this is not happening, do we know that the world is at all as it seems to us
-to be? The skeptical conclusion is that we do not, even when everything
-seems normal to us.
-That argument has inspired many attempted refutations because most
-epistemologists are not skeptics. Many, even so, treat it as an important
-way of challenging us, not to prove that we have knowledge of the physical
-world, but to explain how we have such knowledge. We seem to rely just
-on our sensory experiences. How could these be adequate, though, if they
-can be mimicked in dreaming?
-Cartesian Dreaming and External-World Skepticism 139
-At the same time I must remember that I am a man, and that consequently
-I am in the habit of sleeping, and in my dreams representing to myself the
-same things or sometimes even less probable things, than do those who are
-insane in their waking moments. How often has it happened to me that in
-the night I dreamt that I found myself in this particular place, that I was
-dressed and seated near the fi re, whilst in reality I was lying undressed in bed!
-At this moment it does indeed seem to me that it is with eyes awake that I
-am looking at this paper; that this head which I move is not asleep, that it is
-deliberately and of set purpose that I extend my hand and perceive it; what
-happens in sleep does not appear so clear and distinct as does all this. But in
-thinking over this I remind myself that on many occasions I have in sleep
-been deceived by similar illusions, and in dwelling carefully on this refl ection
-I see so manifestly that there are no certain indications by which we may
-clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep that I am lost in astonishment. And
-my astonishment is such that it is almost capable of persuading me that I now
-dream. (Descartes Meditation I, 145 – 6)
-Technical terms used in the ensuing argument:
-Experience: an occurrence within someone ’ s awareness or consciousness.
-Sensory experience: an experience resulting from the use of one or more
-of the person ’ s senses (sight, hearing, etc.)
-Content (of an experience): the details of what (according to the experience)
-reality is like in some respect; how, in some respect, the experience
-portrays the world as being.
-Conclusive: rationally conclusive: ruling out all possible rational doubts
-about the accuracy of the content at hand.
-Certainty: rational certainty: having ruled out all possible rational doubts
-about the accuracy of the content at hand.
-P1. Consider at random any actual or possible experience (call it E) that
-does or would feel like a sensory experience of the physical world.
-P2. Any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a sensory
-experience of the physical world has a content to the effect that the
-physical world is thus - and - so in some more or less specifi c respect.
-C1. E has a content to the effect that the physical world is thus - and - so
-in some more or less specifi c respect (instantiation, P2).
-P3. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
-sensory experience of the physical world, if it has a content to the effect
-that the physical world is thus - and - so in some more or less specifi c
-respect, then it includes no further content.
-C2. If E has a content to the effect that the physical world is thus - and - so
-in some more or less specifi c respect, then E includes no further
-content (instantiation, P3).
-140 Stephen Hetherington
-C3. E includes no further content ( modus ponens , C1, C2).
-P4. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
-sensory experience of the physical world, if it includes no further content,
-then in particular it includes no further and conclusive mark or indication
-of not being an instance of dreaming.
-C4. If E includes no further content, then in particular E includes no
-further and conclusive mark or indication of not being an instance of
-dreaming (instantiation, P4).
-C5. In particular, E includes no further and conclusive mark or indication
-of not being an instance of dreaming ( modus ponens , C3, C4).
-P5. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
-sensory experience of the physical world, if in particular it includes no
-further and conclusive mark or indication of not being an instance of
-dreaming, then it is not providing conclusive evidence of not being an
-instance of dreaming.
-C6. If, in particular, E includes no further and conclusive mark or indication
-of not being an instance of dreaming, then E is not providing
-conclusive evidence of not being an instance of dreaming (instantiation,
-P5).
-C7. E is not providing conclusive evidence of not being an instance of
-dreaming ( modus ponens , C5, C6).
-P6. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
-sensory experience of the physical world, if it is not providing conclusive
-evidence of not being an instance of dreaming, then the person who is
-or would be having the experience does not know with certainty that it
-is not an instance of dreaming.
-C8. If E is not providing conclusive evidence of not being an instance of
-dreaming, then the person who is or would be having E does not know
-with certainty that it is not an instance of dreaming (instantiation,
-P6).
-C8. The person who is or would be having E does not know with
-certainty that it is not an instance of dreaming ( modus ponens , C7,
-C8).
-P7. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
-sensory experience of the physical world, if the person who is or would
-be having it does not know with certainty that it is not an instance of
-dreaming, then she does not know at all that it is not an instance of
-dreaming.
-C9. If the person who is or would be having E does not know with
-certainty that it is not an instance of dreaming, then she does not
-know at all that E is not an instance of dreaming (instantiation, P7).
-C10. The person who is or would be having E does not know at all that
-it is not an instance of dreaming ( modus ponens , C8, C9).
-Cartesian Dreaming and External-World Skepticism 141
-P8. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
-sensory experience of the physical world, if the person who is or would
-be having it does not know at all that it is not an instance of dreaming,
-then he does not know at all that it is a sensory experience of the physical
-world.
-C11. If the person who is or would be having E does not know at all
-that it is not an instance of dreaming, then he does not know at all
-that E is a sensory experience of the physical world (instantiation, P8).
-C12. The person who is or would be having E does not know at all that
-it is a sensory experience of the physical world ( modus ponens , C10.
-C11).
-P9. For any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
-sensory experience of the physical world, if the person who is or would
-be having the experience does not know at all that it is a sensory experience
-of the physical world, then it is not providing her with any knowledge
-of the physical world.
-C13. If the person who is or would be having experience E does not
-know at all that it is a sensory experience of the physical world, then
-E is not providing her with any knowledge of the physical world
-(instantiation, P9).
-C14. E is not providing any knowledge of the physical world to the
-person who is or would be having experience E ( modus ponens , C12,
-C13).
-C15. Any actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
-sensory experience of the physical world is not providing any knowledge
-of the physical world to the person who is or would be having
-the experience (universal generalization, P1, C14).
-C16. No actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
-sensory experience of the physical world is providing knowledge of
-the physical world to the person who is or would be having the experience
-(quantifi er - negation, C15).
-P10. If no actual or possible experience that does or would feel like a
-sensory experience of the physical world is providing knowledge of the
-physical world to the person who is or would be having the experience,
-then knowledge of the physical world is impossible.
-C17. Knowledge of the physical world is impossible ( modus ponens ,
-C16, P10).
-37
-The Transparency of Experience
-Argument
-Carlos M. Mu ñ oz - Su á rez
-Block , Ned . “ Mental Paint and Mental Latex , ” in Philosophical Issues 7,
-Perception , edited by E. Villanueva , 19 – 49 . Atascadero, CA : Ridgeview ,
-1996 .
-Dretske , Fred . Naturalizing the Mind . Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press ,
-1995 .
-Harman , Gilbert. “ The Intrinsic Quality of Experience , ” in Philosophical
-Perspectives 4 , Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind , edited by J.
-Tomberlin , 53 – 79 . Atascadero, CA : Ridgeview , 1990 .
-___. “ Explaining Objective Color in Terms of Subjective Reactions , ” in
-Philosophical Issues 7 , Perception , edited by E. Villanueva , 1 – 17 .
-Atascadero, CA : Ridgeview , 1996 .
-Kind , Amy . “ What ’ s so Transparent about Transparency? ” Philosophical
-Studies no. 115 ( 2003 ): 225 – 44 .
-Moore , G. E. “ The Refutation of Idealism . ” Mind , New Series 12 , 48 ( 1903 ):
-433 – 53 .
-Robinson , Howard . Perception . London : Routledge , 1994 .
-Russell , Bertrand . The Problems of Philosophy . Oxford : Oxford University
-Press , 1980 .
-Shoemaker , Sydney . “ Color, Subjective Relations and Qualia , ” in Philosophical
-Issues 7 , Perception , edited by E. Villanueva , 55 – 66 . Atascadero, CA :
-Ridgeview , 1996 .
-Tye , Michael . Ten Problems of Consciousness . Cambridge, MA : The MIT
-Press , 1995 .
-___. Consciousness, Color and Content . Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press ,
-2000 .
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-The Transparency of Experience Argument 143
-This is one of the main arguments in the philosophy of perception and
-epistemology. It was canonically presented by G. E. Moore. This argument
-challenges the thesis that by having sensations we are directly conscious of
-features of sensations or experiences. It makes explicit a commonsense
-intuition on what appears to be diaphanous by having sensations, that is,
-sensory awareness relations – in the words of Moore: “ in respect of which
-all sensations are alike ” (444). In general, the argument is about what it is
-epistemically available by having sensations.
-In principle, this is an epistemic argument, but it has metaphysical conclusions
-depending on the theoretical framework. In general, the transparency
-of experience argument (henceforth, TEA) is often understood as going
-against the reduction of the contents of sensations (say, colors) to a kind
-of “ veil of perception ” or “ mental paint ” (Harman, “ Intrinsic Quality ” and
-“ Explaining ” ) – in other words, in Berkeley ’ s empiricism, something constituting
-the external world itself. Other philosophers have criticized such
-a conclusion (see Block).
-The intuition framing the TEA was sketched by Moore as follows: when
-“ we try to fi x our attention upon consciousness and to see what, distinctly,
-it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness.
-When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue:
-the other element is as if it were diaphanous ” (Moore 450). This quote is
-often used to uphold the following: (a) An epistemological inference: by
-merely having sensations, we are never able to introspect sensory awareness
-relations; therefore, we are directly aware of what our sensations are about,
-for example, the color green (Tye Ten Problems , 30). (b) A metaphysical
-inference: by merely having sensations, we are never able to introspect
-sensory awareness relations or features of sensations themselves; therefore,
-there are no perceptual intermediaries. The consequent of (a) is not necessarily
-the consequent of (b), despite the antecedent being the same. To
-clarify the relations between such antecedent and such consequents is the
-core issue in the debate (see Dretske, Harman “ Explaining, ” Block, and
-Shoemaker). The antecedent was not defended by Moore. I shall return to
-this issue below.
-The abstract structure of the reasoning behind the TEA is as follows:
-P1. [Content Premise:] If a subject, S, has a sensation, v , v is a sensation of
-x .
-P2. [Transparency Premise:] By having v , S only has direct knowledge of y .
-C1. [Epistemological conclusion] S is directly aware of y .
-C2. [Metaphysical conclusion]
-(If v = y or ( y = P and Pv )) There are y - like entities between S and x .
-(If v ≠ y or ( y = P and 􀀝 Pv )) There are no y - like entities between S and x .
-144 Carlos Mario Muñoz-Suárez
-The TEA is not an argument concluding that transparency is true but
-takes it as a premise. The argument has ab initio two plausible interpretations
-depending on the metaphysical character and role ascribed to that
-what sensation are about: (i) The strong content version: what fi gures as
-the content of a sensation is a subject - independent particular and its properties.
-(ii) The weak content version: what fi gures as the content of a sensation
-is a subject - dependent entity (e.g., sensory properties, qualia , and so on).
-Philosophers endorsing (i) appeal to TEA to justify objective (physical)
-relations between sensations and external mind - independent physical entities
-(Harman “ Intrinsic, ” Dretske, and Tye Consciousness ]. Accordingly,
-philosophers endorsing (ii) appeal to TEA to justify (mental) relations
-between sensations and mind - dependent entities (Robinson IX § 3). Further
-on, “ transparency ” has ab initio two plausible interpretations depending
-on the epistemic role ascribed to sensations (see Kind): (i * ) Strong transparency:
-by having a sensation, V, one cannot introspect features of v , but just
-what v is about. (ii * ) Weak transparency: by having a sensation, V, one
-could introspect some feature of V. The latter was the version endorsed by
-Moore and the former is the antecedent of the epistemological inference
-and the metaphysical inference.
-(i) and (i * ) can be coupled, and we obtain a version of TEA motivating
-direct realism. Call this version strong TEA: by having a sensation, V, one
-cannot introspect features of V but just the subject - independent entity that
-v is about (Tye Consciousness and Harman “ Intrinsic, ” 39). It might be
-synthesized as follows:
-P1. If a subject, S, has the sensation, V, then, V is a sensation of a subject -
-independent entity, X (strong content version).
-P2. By having V, S cannot introspect features of V but just what V is about
-(strong transparency).
-C1. There are no perceptual intermediaries between S and X (metaphysical
-inference * ).
-Accordingly, (ii) and (ii * ) can be coupled, and we obtain a version of
-TEA motivating idealism. Weak TEA holds that by having a sensation, V,
-one is sensory aware of a mind - dependent entity and one could introspect
-features of V. The argument would be as follows:
-P1. If a subject, S, has the sensation, V, then V is a sensation of a subject -
-dependent entity, Z (weak content version).
-P2. By having V, S cannot introspect features of V, but just what V is about,
-that is, Z (strong transparency).
-C1. There are no perceptual intermediaries between S and Z (metaphysical
-inference * * ).
-The Transparency of Experience Argument 145
-There is another version about content; this is a version of the weak
-content version. Call this the “ property - content ” version (iii): what fi gures
-as the content of a sensation are subject - dependent properties (say, colors)
-which look like being instantiated in subject - independent particulars (say,
-tables). This version can be coupled with weak transparency. We obtain a
-third version of TEA: call this “ sense - data ” TEA.
-P1. If a subject, S, has the sensation, V, then V is a sensation of a subject -
-dependent property, Q, looking like instantiated on a mind - independent
-particular X (property - content version).
-P2. By having a sensation, V, S could introspect Q (Weak Transparency).
-C1. There are perceptual intermediaries between S and X.
-Sense - data TEA differs from weak TEA since the former specifi es that
-perceptual intermediaries can only be sensory properties, say qualia , and
-cannot be concrete physical particulars (see Russell). The debate about
-transparency and the right comprehension of the content of sensations is
-far from being solved; however, there are many detailed theories trying to
-do it.
-38
-The Regress Argument for
-Skepticism
-Scott Aikin
-Sextus Empiricus . Outlines of Scepticism . Translated by Julia Annas and
-Jonathan Barnes. Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 2000 .
-Oakley , I. T. “ An Argument for Scepticism Concerning Justifi ed Beliefs . ”
-American Philosophical Quarterly , 13 , 3 ( 1976 ): 221 – 8 .
-Cling , Andrew . “ Reasons, Regresses and Tragedy . ” American Philosophical
-Quarterly , 46 , 2 ( 2009 ): 333 – 46 .
-The basic thought behind the regress argument is familiar to anyone who
-has spoken with an inquisitive child, “ Why? ” is always a good question.
-Since the question can be asked of any answer, a recursive pattern very
-quickly emerges. For example, “ Eat your vegetables. ” “ Why? ” “ Because
-they are good for you. ” “ Why? ” “ Because you want to he healthy. ” “ Why? ”
-And then we are off to the races. Translated to an epistemological context,
-the regress problem arises because of the simple requirement that if you are
-to hold reasonably a belief, you must be able to answer satisfactorily a
-“ why ” question with another reasonably held belief or group of beliefs.
-This, of course, invites another “ why ” question, which requires another
-satisfactory and justifi ably held answer. And then the regress ensues (#49).
-It seems that the demand that we go on to infi nity is excessive, that answers
-that go in a circle are vicious, and that anytime someone says she does not
-need to give further answers, she is acting unreasonably. Skepticism seems
-to follow – if we cannot give the adequate backing for our claims, we do
-not know those claims to be true.
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-The Regress Argument for Skepticism 147
-Sextus Empiricus classically framed the regress problem in his Outlines
-of Pyrrhonism as the coordination of fi ve “ modes, ” or strategies, of skeptical
-argument. Two of these modes, sometimes called the “ material modes, ”
-are those to challenge someone who believes something to defend it. These
-are the modes of relativity and dispute. Once a believer starts to defend the
-belief, there are only three options for the argument to proceed: either in
-(i) a vicious regress, which Sextus calls “ ad infi nitum , ” (ii) a question -
-begging circle, which Sextus calls “ reciprocality, ” or (iii) unsupported dogmatic
-assertion, which Sextus calls “ hypothesis. ” These three fi nal modes
-for argument are called the “ formal modes ” or “ the trilemma. ”
-According to the mode deriving from dispute, we fi nd that undecidable
-dissension about the matter proposed has come about both in ordinary life
-and among philosophers. Because of this we are not able either to choose or
-to rule out anything, and we end up with suspension of judgment. In the mode
-of deriving from infi nite regress, we say that what is brought forward as a
-source of conviction for the matter proposed itself needs another source,
-which itself needs another, and so ad infi nitum, so that we have no point from
-which to begin to establish anything, and suspension of judgment follows. In
-the mode deriving from relativity, [ … ] the existing object appears to be such -
-and - such relative to the subject judging and to the things observed together
-with it, but we suspend judgment on what it is like in its nature. We have the
-mode from hypothesis from the Dogmatists, being thrown back ad infi nitum,
-begin from something which they do not establish but claim to assume simply
-and without proof in virtue of a concession. The reciprocal mode occurs when
-what ought to be confi rmatory of the object under investigation needs to be
-made convincing by the object under investigation; then, being unable to take
-either in order to establish the other, we suspend judgment about both.
-(Empiricus PH I.165 – 9)
-Given the structural problems that come with knowing, we are forced
-to suspend judgment about our beliefs generally because they are not justifi
-ed. Justifi cation is structurally vexed, and as a consequence, something we
-cannot possess. General skepticism about knowledge, then, follows. The
-argument ’ s premises are all inherently plausible. The principle of inferential
-justifi cation is something that comes with being a responsible believer – if
-you believe something, then you should be able to explain why you do so;
-that is, you should be able to give a reason that counts in favor of the truth
-of your belief. This is simply what it is to be accountable for and in charge
-of your beliefs. The responsibility iterates, because the reasons we give must,
-themselves, pass this test. And so these chains of reasons are just part of
-what it is to be a rational being – we give justifying stories for what we do,
-what we say, and what we believe. Without those stories, it is hard to see
-ourselves as responsible, reasonable, or rational.
-148 Scott Aikin
-The principle of noncircular justifi cation comes from the informal argumentative
-thought that arguments that have their conclusions function in
-their premises fail because they beg the question. Reasoning should be a
-kind of progress, where we get somewhere, increase our knowledge, resolve
-disagreements, and answer questions. If we assume our conclusions at the
-beginning and tell our justifying stories for them in light of them, we have
-at most been consistent, but that is about as much as we can say in favor
-of the reasoning.
-The principle of fi nite justifi cation is simply that infi nite series of reasons
-are not completable by fi nite creatures such as us. We do not have infi nite
-time, nor do we have infi nite reasons for our beliefs – our minds are limited
-only to the things we ’ ve experienced, thought about, and learned. The
-requirement that knowledge be more than that is absurd. Further, it seems,
-as Sextus notes above, even were there an infi nite chain of reasons, we are
-unsure how reasoning on such a chain of reasons could either ever get
-started or ever fi nish.
-The corollaries of no unjustifi ed justifi ers and no unjustifi ed chain - enders
-are contrapositives of the principle of inferential justifi cation and the corollary
-of recursive justifi cation. The requirement of inferential justifi cation is
-that (in epistemology lingo) if S has a justifi ed belief that p, S has a justifi ed
-belief that q that justifi es p. The corollary is that without a justifi ed belief
-that q that justifi es p, S does not have a justifi ed belief that p. There are no
-unjustifi ed justifi ers.
-The trilemma is that once chains of reasons begin to be extended, there
-are only three options: they either (a) stop with some belief or other, without
-further support, (b) circle back on themselves, or (c) go on to infi nity. So
-long as we think that reasons must come in recursive chains, these are the
-only three options.
-Despite the fact that all the premises of the argument are each individually
-appealing, they together entail an unappealing conclusion, namely, that
-we have no justifi cation for any of our beliefs. This unacceptable conclusion
-has forced many to return to the premises of the argument with a more
-critical eye. One of the premises, if we do in fact know things, must be
-false. The project of anti - skepticism, in light of the regress problem, is that
-of making the case for the falsity of at least one of these premises.
-The oldest and most widely favored anti - skeptical strategy is called
-“ foundationalism. ” The foundationalist holds that premise 1 is false, or at
-least, that there are notable exceptions. There are some beliefs that stand
-on their own, and they can then serve as a foundation for further beliefs.
-Call these beliefs with autonomous justifi cation “ basic beliefs. ” The foundationalist
-accepts that reasons come in chains, but if the reasons are justifying,
-those chains of reasons all end with beliefs that are justifi ed
-independently of other reasons. Take three examples, your beliefs: (i) that
-The Regress Argument for Skepticism 149
-you exist, (ii) that you have a book in front of you, and (iii) that 2 + 2 = 4.
-Each of these beliefs is justifi ed because you just see that they it is true.
-You, in believing (i), furnish the reason for its truth (it can ’ t be false if you
-believe it). Your visual experiences of this book in front of you give you a
-reason to believe (ii), and you don ’ t need more reasons for that. Your concepts
-of addition, equality, two, and four give you the understanding to
-make it so that you don ’ t need any more reason to believe (iii) than just
-that you understand it. Beliefs such as these are regress - enders.
-The “ coherentist ” accepts the principle of inferential justifi cation and
-holds that only justifi ed beliefs can justify beliefs. However, the coherentist
-denies the principle of the noncircularity of justifi cation. Justifying stories
-come as packages, in that we reasonably believe things when they fi t well
-enough with other things that we believe. And once these systems of belief
-are up and running, the beliefs in them are mutually supporting. For
-example, you believe that there are physical forces, such as gravity. You
-also believe that a bowling ball falling down on a fragile porcelain mouse
-will crush it. You also believe that the last time you dropped your keys,
-they fell on the ground. These beliefs all hang together, and they function,
-with many others, as a system for you to make sense of your past experiences
-and make predictions about future ones. Justifi cation emerges from
-these interdependent and mutually supporting systems of beliefs.
-The “ contextualist, ” like the foundationalist, holds that there are exceptions
-to the principle of inferential justifi cation. However, the beliefs that
-need no further reasons are dependent on what kinds of questions our
-justifi cations are out to answer. For example, if you ’ re trying to decide
-whether to go to Las Vegas for your holiday, it may be reasonable to doubt
-that your year - old information about hotel prices is accurate. So you may
-go to a recent source. But you ’ re not going to worry about whether they
-accept American dollars or whether you can expect that you can get service
-in English. But if you were thinking about going to Monte Carlo (in
-Monaco), instead, you ’ d not only want to get better information about
-hotel prices, but you ’ d also want to check into what kind of currency you ’ ll
-need and whether you ’ ll need to take a crash course in French. Depending
-on what ��� s at issue, some questions aren ’ t worth asking, because their
-answers are reasonably assumed in the context. But in others they are worth
-asking, because you cannot reasonably assume their answers.
-“ Infi nitism ” is a recent development in epistemology, as for the over
-2,000 years folks have been thinking about the regress problem, it wasn ’ t
-until the last 10 years that anyone ’ s tried to work this view out in any detail.
-The infi nitist denies the principle of fi nite justifi cation. And so the infi nitist
-holds that only an infi nite series of reasons can yield justifi ed belief. The
-basic thought is that the person who really knows something can answer
-“ why ” questions until there just aren ’ t any more. And, in principle, there
-150 Scott Aikin
-is no reason why such questions must end. This is certainly a heavy task,
-and it seems troublesome, because it is clear that we don ’ t ever actually give
-those very long arguments. But the infi nitist holds that one may not have
-to give those arguments but only be able to give them as far as they are
-needed by critical questioners. Persistent questioners are troublesome, but
-they are useful to us in that they allow us to plumb the depths of our
-reasons. They may break certain rules of context in questioning things we
-don ’ t normally question, but that is how we really know – we can answer
-questions that otherwise we ’ d just say we ’ d assumed.
-The success of the regress argument for skepticism hinges on whether
-these four anti - skeptical programs are correct in denying or modifying the
-argument ’ s premises. If these anti - skeptical programs are right, they must
-be able to answer some simple questions. The question for the foundationalist
-is whether, in arguing that there are regress - ending basic beliefs, the
-foundationalist has actually continued the regress. This is sometimes called
-the “ meta - regress problem ” for foundationalism. The question for the
-contextualist is whether these systems of mutually supporting beliefs have
-anything to do with the truth, as it seems that systems of crazy beliefs (e.g.,
-conspiracy theories) are coherent and function similarly but are terribly
-wrong. This is called the “ alternate systems problem ” for coherentism. The
-question for the contextualists is whether contextually appropriate assumption
-amounts to justifi cation – surely some contexts are defi ned by the fact
-that people make assumptions in them, but that doesn ’ t mean they have
-knowledge. This is called the “ problem of credulity ” for contextualists. The
-question for the infi nitist is whether infi nitism is simply another form of
-skepticism, as it seems that no one ever actually has an infi nite series of
-justifying reasons and so no one actually knows anything. This is called the
-problem of “ crypto - skepticism ” for infi nitists. The regress skeptic is, for
-lack of a better term, skeptical as to whether there are adequate answers
-to these challenges.
-P1. If any believer is reasonably (or justifi ably) to hold a belief, then that
-believer must do so on the justifying basis of another justifi ed belief.
-P2. If a believer reasonably holds a belief, then that believer must reasonably
-hold another belief to justify that fi rst belief, and a third belief to
-hold that second one, and a further fourth belief to hold that third one,
-and so on. Call this a “ chain of reasons. ”
-C1. If a believer reasonably holds a belief, that believer must have a
-justifying chain of reasons (hypothetical syllogism, P1, P2).
-P3. If any believer is reasonably to hold a belief, it cannot be on the basis
-of a circular chain of reasons.
-P4. If any believer is reasonably to hold a belief, it cannot be on the basis
-of an infi nite chain of reasons.
-The Regress Argument for Skepticism 151
-P5. If any believer holds a belief on the basis of a belief without justifi cation,
-that believer does not reasonably hold the fi rst belief.
-C2. No believers with chains of reasons with unjustifi ed beliefs at their
-ends are justifi ed (universal generalization, P2, P5).
-P6. Chains of reasons either (a) are circular, (b) end with unjustifi ed beliefs,
-or (c) are infi nite.
-C3. For any believer ’ s chain of reasons, it either (a) goes in a circle, (b)
-ends with an unjustifi ed commitment, or (c) goes on to infi nity (instantiation,
-P6).
-C4. There are no beliefs for which believers are justifi ed in holding them
-(destructive trilemma, P3, P4, P6).
-39
-Moore ’ s Anti - Skeptical
-Arguments
-Matthew Frise
-Moore , G. E. “ Four Forms of Scepticism, ” and “ Proof of an External
-World, ” in Epistemology: An Anthology , edited by Ernest Sosa , Jaegwon
-Kim , and Matthew McGrath , 24 – 8 . Malden, MA : Blackwell , 2000 .
-Reid , Thomas . Philosophical Works . Hildesheim : Olms , 1983 .
-External - world skepticism – the view that we do not know that anything
-outside our minds exists – has always been a central issue in epistemology.
-G. E. Moore, one of the most infl uential analytic philosophers of the twentieth
-century, popularized two types of arguments against skepticism that
-make reference to commonsense claims, claims such as “ I know this is a
-pencil ” and “ Here is a hand. ” The strategy of the fi rst type of argument is
-to point out that commonsense claims are more certain than the skeptic ’ s
-assumptions (at least some of them). The conclusion is not that commonsense
-knowledge disproves skepticism, but that our commonsense knowledge
-is in no danger of being undermined by skepticism. The strategy of
-the second type of argument is to cite things in the external world that we
-clearly know to exist, thereby demonstrating knowledge that the external
-world itself exists. An argument of this type is formally valid, but many
-think it fails to disprove skepticism because it “ begs the question ” ; knowledge
-of its premises allegedly presupposes knowledge of its conclusion.
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Moore’s Anti-Skeptical Arguments 153
-Below, we give the skeleton of both types of arguments, making the reasoning
-and conclusion of each explicit.
-What I want, however, fi nally to emphasize is this: Russell ’ s view that I do
-not know for certain that this is a pencil or that you are conscious rests, if I
-am right, on no less than four distinct assumptions: (1) That I don ’ t know
-these things immediately; (2) That they don ’ t follow logically from any thing
-or things that I do know immediately; (3) That if (1) and (2) are true, my
-belief in or knowledge of them must be ‘ based on an analogical or inductive
-argument ’ ; and (4) That what is so based cannot be certain knowledge . And
-what I can ’ t help asking myself is this: Is it, in fact, as certain that all these
-four assumptions are true, as that I do know that this is a pencil and that you
-are conscious? I cannot help answering: It seems to me more certain that I do
-know that this is a pencil and that you are conscious, than that any single
-one of these four assumptions is true, let alone all four. That is to say, though,
-as I have said, I agree with Russell that (1), (2), and (3) are true; yet of no
-one even of these three do I feel as certain as that I do know for certain that
-this is a pencil. Nay more: I do not think it is rational to be as certain of any
-one of these four propositions as of the proposition that I do know that this
-is a pencil. (Moore, 28)
-P1. The skeptic ’ s assumptions imply that propositions such as “ I know this
-is a pencil ” are false.
-P2. If proposition A is more certain than proposition B, B cannot falsify A.
-P3. “ I know this is a pencil ” is more certain than any of the skeptic ’ s
-assumptions.
-C1. The skeptic ’ s assumptions cannot falsify that “ I know this is a
-pencil ” ( modus ponens , P2, P3).
-I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist. How? By
-holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the
-right hand, ‘ Here is one hand ’ , and adding, as I make a certain gesture with
-the left, ‘ and here is another ’ . (Moore, 24)
-P1. Here is a hand, here is another.
-P2. If hands exist, then external objects exist.
-C1. External objects exist ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
-40
-The Bias Paradox
-Deborah Heikes
-Antony , Louise . “ Quine as Feminist , ” in A Mind of One ’ s Own , edited by
-Louise M. Antony and Charlotte Witt , 110 – 53 . Boulder, CO : Westview ,
-2002 .
-Heikes , Deborah . “ The Bias Paradox: Why It ’ s Not Just for Feminists
-Anymore . ” Synthese 138 , 3 ( 2004 ): 315 – 35 .
-The bias paradox arises from arguments that reject or decisively revise
-standard Cartesian conceptions of pure objectivity and impartiality. Such
-conceptions require that we move beyond particularity and contingency in
-order to acquire knowledge that is free from bias. Feminist philosophers
-are generally concerned with rejecting notions of objectivity that require
-this complete elimination of subjectivity. As a rule, feminists believe that
-subjectivity can never be entirely eliminated. However, this rejection of a
-notion of pure (nonsubjective) neutrality has led the dilemma that Louise
-Antony calls the “ bias paradox. ”
-For feminists, two fundamental commitments give rise to a dilemma that
-seems to require a commitment either to objectivism or relativism. The fi rst
-of these commitments is the explicit rejection of the concept of impartial
-objectivity, and the second one is the desire to assert the reality and injustice
-of women ’ s oppression. The problem is that in the absence of impartiality
-(at least as an ideal), there appears to be a lack of principled, normative
-criteria for evaluating beliefs across differing epistemic perspectives. At the
-same time, feminist philosophers almost unanimously reject the possibility
-of impartiality. The dilemma, as Antony presents it, is this: either we
-endorse the ideal of objectivity so that we can provide a ground for evaluating
-bias or we cease criticizing bias (i.e., we cease distinguishing between
-“ good ” biases and “ bad ” biases), since there can be no standard for evaluating
-competing biases.
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-The Bias Paradox 155
-While this tension is dealt with most straightforwardly in discussions of
-naturalized feminist epistemology and feminist philosophy of science, the
-bias paradox is not merely a problem for feminists. Any view that rejects
-the Cartesian ideals of pure objectivity and value - neutrality will ultimately
-be forced to confront the dilemma that seemingly results from the paradox,
-namely, either to endorse pure impartiality or to accept an “ anything goes ”
-relativism. The problem, of course, is that most philosophical views deny
-that pure impartiality can be achieved, and many argue that it is not even
-useful as an ideal. However, the alternative view is that just about every
-claim to knowledge is as good as any other claim, and almost no one wishes
-to adopt this view. Hence, we encounter the bias paradox.
-According to many feminist philosophers, the fl aw in the ideal of impartiality
-is supposed to be that the ideal itself is biased: Critics charge either that
-the concept of ‘ objectivity ’ serves to articulate a masculine or patriarchal
-viewpoint [ … ], or that it has the ideological function of protecting the rights
-of those in power, especially men. But how is it possible to criticize the partiality
-of the concept of objectivity without presupposing the very value under
-attack? Put baldly: If we don ’ t think it ’ s good to be impartial, then how can
-we object to men ’ s being partial ? (Antony, 114)
-P1. Impartiality is untenable as an ideal of epistemic practice.
-P2. If impartiality is untenable as an ideal of epistemic practice, then all
-epistemic practices are biased.
-C1. All epistemic practices are biased ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
-P3. If all epistemic practices are biased, there can be no impartial criteria
-for evaluating the epistemic worth of biases.
-C2. There can be no impartial criteria for evaluating the epistemic worth
-of biases ( modus ponens , C1, P3).
-P4. If there are no impartial criteria for evaluating the epistemic worth of
-biases, then all biases are equal.
-C3. All biases are equal ( modus ponens , C2, P4).
-Generic bias paradox:
-P1. The ideal of impartiality should be rejected.
-P2. If we reject the ideal of impartiality, there can be no justifi ed procedure
-for normatively distinguishing among competing epistemic views.
-C1. There can be no justifi ed procedure for normatively distinguishing
-among competing epistemic views ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
-P3. If there can be no justifi ed procedure for normatively distinguishing
-among competing epistemic views, then all accounts are epistemically
-equal.
-C2. All accounts are epistemically equal ( modus ponens , C1, P3).
-41
-Gettier ’ s Argument against
-the Traditional Account
-of Knowledge
-John M. DePoe 1
-Gettier , Edmund . “ Is Justifi ed True Belief Knowledge? ” Analysis 23 ( 1963 ):
-121 – 3 .
-The Gettier problem has drawn the attention of epistemologists since
-Edmund Gettier (1927 – ) published his three - page article in 1963. The point
-of Gettier ’ s argument is to show that the concept of knowledge cannot be
-defi ned as justifi ed true belief, and Gettier set out to disprove the traditional
-account of knowledge by showing that there are counterexamples to it. If
-the traditional account of knowledge is correct, then it is not possible for
-a person to have a justifi ed true belief that isn ’ t knowledge (P1). Since the
-account maintains that all instances of knowledge are justifi ed true beliefs
-and vice versa, in order to refute the traditional account, Gettier needed to
-provide an example of a justifi ed true belief that no one would think is an
-example of knowledge.
-In order to understand Gettier ’ s counterexample, it is fi rst important to
-see how advocates of the traditional account understood justifi ed belief.
-The correct analysis of justifi cation is a matter of great controversy, but
-as a preliminary attempt it may be helpful to think of a person ’ s having a
-justifi ed belief as that person ’ s having some evidence or good reasons to
-think that the belief is true or likely to be true. Importantly, to have a justi-
-1 The author wishes to thank Michael O ’ Rouke (University of Idaho).
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Gettier and the Traditional Account of Knowledge 157
-fi ed belief, one ’ s good reasons do not necessarily need to guarantee that the
-belief is true. For example, one may be justifi ed in believing that one is
-seeing a zebra based on the evidence of a black - and - white - striped - equine
-sensory experience, and one would still be justifi ed, in believing one is seeing
-a zebra, even if the animal were not a zebra but a cleverly painted mule
-instead. Consequently, for a belief to be justifi ed, it is not necessary for the
-belief to be true. As (P2) states, it is possible for one to be justifi ed in believing
-a false proposition.
-The next part of Gettier ’ s counterexample follows from the principle
-expressed by (P3): if one is justifi ed in believing some proposition, then one
-is justifi ed (at least to the same degree) in believing any proposition that
-one competently deduces from the original one. Since when deductive reasoning
-is performed competently it preserves truth infallibly, one ’ s justifi cation
-does not diminish across deductive inference. Perhaps this is best
-illustrated by a variation from one of Gettier ’ s examples. Imagine a case
-where a trustworthy friend, Mr. Nogot, provides suffi ciently strong evidence
-to his friend Jackson for being justifi ed in believing that he (Nogot) owns
-a Ford. For example, imagine that in addition to his typically trustworthy
-testimony, Mr. Nogot shows Jackson his registration papers, he takes
-Jackson for a ride in the Ford, and Jackson has no reason to doubt his
-testimony or any of the additional evidence that he has to support the
-proposition that Mr. Nogot owns a Ford. Now, Mr. Nogot does not own
-a Ford (unbeknownst to Jackson), but this does not prevent Jackson from
-being justifi ed in believing that Mr. Nogot owns a Ford, since according to
-(P2) it is possible for a person to be justifi ed in believing a false proposition.
-And now to the part relevant to (P3) – suppose that as Jackson is pondering
-his justifi ed belief (that Mr. Nogot owns a Ford) with Mr. Nogot in the
-room, he deductively reasons that if Mr. Nogot owns a Ford, then someone
-in the room owns a Ford; therefore, Jackson concludes, someone in the
-room owns a Ford. On the basis of (P3), Jackson is at least as justifi ed in
-believing that someone in the room owns a Ford as he is for the proposition
-that Mr. Nogot owns a Ford since he deduced the former from the latter,
-which is stated in (C1).
-The fi nal claim needed to underwrite Gettier ’ s counterexample is stated
-in (P4): If a person is justifi ed in believing a proposition that is true by
-accident or luck, then her justifi ed true belief is not knowledge. It has
-already been stipulated that Mr. Nogot does not own a Ford. Now let ’ s
-suppose that at the time that Jackson deductively reasons from the proposition
-that Mr. Nogot owns a Ford to the proposition that someone in the
-room owns a Ford, Mr. Havit happens to be the room. Mr. Havit – a person
-Jackson has never met or has any justifi cation for believing what kind of
-car he owns – is sitting quietly in the corner of the room, and he happens
-to own a Ford. So, it turns out that Jackson ’ s belief that someone in the
-158 John M. DePoe
-room owns a Ford is both justifi ed and true. Recall that it is justifi ed because
-he deduced it from a proposition that he is justifi ed in believing. The belief
-is true since Mr. Havit owns a Ford and he is in the room. But since Jackson
-has no beliefs whatsoever about Mr. Havit, the truth of his justifi ed belief
-appears to be accidental or lucky. After all, Jackson would have still believed
-that someone in the room owns a Ford even if Mr. Havit wasn ’ t in the
-room. Thus, it seems that Jackson ’ s justifi ed belief is true by luck or accident.
-In other words, the belief ’ s being true has nothing to do with the
-justifi cation Jackson has for holding the belief. For this reason, it would be
-wrong to accept that Jackson ’ s justifi ed true belief (that someone in the
-room owns a Ford) counts as knowledge.
-Since Jackson ’ s belief that someone in the room owns a Ford is a justifi ed
-true belief (C2), and it is plainly wrong to think that it counts as knowledge,
-Gettier ’ s argument is widely accepted as demonstrating why knowledge
-cannot be defi ned as justifi ed true belief (C3).
-These [ . . . ] examples show that defi nition (a) [knowledge is justifi ed true
-belief] does not state a suffi cient condition for someone ’ s knowing a given
-proposition. (Gettier, 123)
-P1. If knowledge is justifi ed true belief, then it is not possible for a person
-to have a justifi ed true belief that isn ’ t knowledge.
-P2. A person can be justifi ed in believing a false proposition.
-P3. If a person is justifi ed in believing some proposition, then she is justifi ed
-(at least to the same degree) in believing any proposition that she competently
-deduces from the original.
-C1. A person is justifi ed (at least to the same degree) in believing any
-proposition that she competently deduces from the original ( modus
-ponens , P2, P3).
-P4. If a person is justifi ed in believing a proposition that is true by accident
-or luck, then his justifi ed true belief is not knowledge.
-P5. Jackson is justifi ed in believing that someone in the room owns a Ford,
-which is true by accident or luck.
-C2. It is possible for a person to have a justifi ed true belief that isn ’ t
-knowledge ( modus ponens , P4, P5).
-C3. It is not the case that knowledge is justifi ed true belief ( modus tollens ,
-P1, C2).
-42
-Putnam ’ s Argument against
-Cultural Imperialism
-Maria Caama ñ o
-Putnam , Hilary . “ Why Reason Can ’ t Be Naturalized , ” in Epistemology: An
-Anthology , edited by Ernest Sosa , Jaegwon Kim , and Mathew McGrath ,
-314 – 24 . Malden, MA : Blackwell , 1999 .
-Putnam introduces this argument in the context of criticizing the different
-attempts to naturalize reason by reducing it to those standards accepted by
-a culture. According to Putnam, reason always results from a balance
-between immanence to culture and traditions and transcendence to them.
-The fi rst would be manifest in the inherited cultural background in which
-any reasoning always takes place; the second would become obvious in our
-ability to criticize such cultural background. Both cultural relativism and
-cultural imperialism would break the above balance as a result of their
-emphasis on immanence. However, facts related to the transcendent side of
-reason are precisely the ones that would show the self - refutability of both
-views. Cultural relativism would need to make, inconsistently, a transcendent
-assumption regarding the symmetry of the epistemic situation between
-different cultures. Cultural imperialism, on the other hand, would require
-us to assume an immanent agreement that is contradicted by experience.
-So while the argument for cultural relativism turns out to be analytically
-fl awed, the one to support cultural imperialism proves empirically faulty.
-In this context, Putnam formulates his argument against cultural imperialism
-and continues by pointing out two of its important features: fi rst, its
-contingent character, since the goodness of the argument depends on the
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-160 Maria Caamaño
-contingent fact that people disagree about something – that is, about truth ’ s
-dependency on cultural standards (P2 below); and second, its extensibility
-to all theories which equate truth or right assertability with what people
-(would) agree. The importance of the argument, therefore, does not only
-lie on its rebuttal of cultural imperialism but also on its more general refutation
-of any defi nition of truth in terms of (possible) agreement among
-people. The argument follows a reductio ad absurdum strategy, by refl exively
-applying the requirement established in the principle of cultural imperialisms
-to that very principle and thereby showing that the assumption
-violates the very requirement that it establishes. Finally, a more general aim
-of Putnam ’ s argument consists in supporting the view that modern European
-and American culture does not have “ norms ” that decide philosophical
-questions, as would happen in totalitarian or theocratic cultures.
-A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable according to
-the norms of modern European and American culture is itself neither assertable
-nor refutable in a way that requires assent by everyone who does not
-deviate from the norms of modern European and American culture. So, if this
-statement is true, it follows that it is not true QED. (Putnam, 319)
-P1. A statement P is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable according
-to the norms of modern European and American culture (assumption for
-reductio ).
-C1. If “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable
-according to the norms of modern European and American culture ”
-is true (rightly assertable), then it is assertable according to the norms
-of modern European and American culture (substitution of ‘ P ’ with
-“ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable according
-to the norms of modern European and American culture ” in P1).
-P2. “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable according
-to the norms of modern European and American culture ” is not assertable
-according to the norms of modern European and American culture.
-C2. “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable according
-to the norms of modern European and American culture ” is not
-true, that is, rightly assertable ( modus tollens , C1, P2).
-C3. A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is assertable according
-to the norms of modern European and American culture and it is
-not the case that a statement is true (rightly assertable) only if it is
-assertable according to the norms of modern European and American
-culture (conjunction, P1, C2).
-C4. It is not the case that a statement is true (rightly assertable) only if
-it is assertable according to the norms of modern European and
-American culture ( reductio , P1 – C3).
-Putnam’s Argument against Cultural Imperialism 161
-Extension of Putnam ’ s Argument
-In order to bring Putnam ’ s discussion of his own argument to completion,
-it may be interesting to show how it naturally extends to arguments equating
-truth with what people (would) agree. Let us see how the refutation
-would work in that case:
-P1. A statement P is true (rightly assertable) only if everybody agrees with
-it (assumption for reductio ).
-C1. If “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if everybody agrees
-with it ” is true (rightly assertable), then everybody agrees with it
-(Substitution of ‘ P ’ by “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if
-everybody agrees with it ” in P1).
-P2. Not everybody agrees that “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only
-if everybody agrees with it. ”
-C2. “ A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if everybody agrees with
-it ” is not true, that is, rightly assertable ( modus tollens , C1, P2).
-C3. A statement is true (rightly assertable) only if everybody agrees with
-it and it is not the case that a statement is true (rightly assertable)
-only if everybody agrees with it (conjunction, P1, C2).
-C4. It is not the case that a statement is true (rightly assertable) only if
-everybody agrees with it ( reductio , P1 – C3).
-43
-Davidson on the Very Idea of a
-Conceptual Scheme
-George Wrisley
-Davidson , Donald . “ On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme . ” Proceedings
-and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47 ( 1974 ):
-5 – 20 ; reprinted in Davidson (2001).
-Davidson , Donald . Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation , 2nd edn. Oxford :
-Clarendon Press , 2001 .
-Case , Jennifer . “ On the Right Idea of a Conceptual Scheme . ” Southern
-Journal of Philosophy 35 ( 1997 ): 1 – 18 .
-Malpas , Jeff . “ Donald Davidson . ” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
-(Fall 2009 edn.), edited by Edward N. Zalta , available at http://
-plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/Davidson
-One of Immanuel Kant ’ s (1724 – 1804) central philosophical concerns was
-the relationship between mind and world. He famously inverted the idea
-that in knowing the world the mind attempts to mirror a “ mind - independent ”
-world, claiming instead that the world we experience necessarily conforms
-to certain categories of the mind. While such categories were essentially
-universal for Kant, later philosophers replaced the idea of the world ’ s conforming
-to the categories of the mind with the idea of the world ’ s conforming
-to linguistic or conceptual categories. This change allowed for the idea
-of a very strong conceptual/linguistic relativism whereby either the content
-of experience or the world itself is relativized to conceptual frameworks or
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Davidson on the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme 163
-schemes – the central idea of which is that different conceptual schemes
-result in different worlds.
-Donald Davidson (1917 – 2003) argues that conceptual relativism is incoherent
-because the very idea of a conceptual scheme is incoherent. Davidson
-reaches these conclusions by arguing that the idea of a conceptual scheme
-depends on the notion of failure of translation between differing schemes.
-According to Davidson, sense cannot be made of either complete or partial
-failure of translation, and so it does not make sense to speak of different
-conceptual schemes. Since it does not make sense to speak of different
-conceptual schemes, he claims that it does not make sense to speak of
-there being only one conceptual scheme.
-Davidson ’ s argument against the intelligibility of the idea of a conceptual
-scheme, and thus the possibility of conceptual relativism, is important given
-its implications for the way that we know the world, the relationship
-between us and the world, and the relationship between language and
-world. For if he is right, then there is not a dualism of conceptual scheme
-and content (world/experience), and it becomes even more diffi cult to make
-sense of the idea that radically different accounts of what exists and how
-the world is could all be true, and those forms of skepticism that depend
-on a dualism of scheme and content are also called into question.
-We may accept the doctrine that associates having a language with having
-a conceptual scheme. The relation may be supposed to be this: where conceptual
-schemes differ, so do languages. But speakers of different languages
-may share a conceptual scheme provided there is a way of translating one
-language into the other. Studying the criteria of translation is therefore a way
-of focusing on criteria of identity for conceptual schemes. [ . . . ]
-I consider two kinds of cases that might be expected to arise: complete,
-and partial, failures of translatability. There would be complete failure if
-no signifi cant range of sentences in one language could be translated into
-the other; there would be partial failure if some range could be translated
-and some range could not. [ . . . ] My strategy will be to argue that we cannot
-make sense of total failure, and then to examine more briefl y cases of partial
-failure.[ . . . ]
-[Regarding partial failure], when others think differently from us, no
-general principle, or appeal to evidence, can force us to decide that the difference
-lies in our beliefs rather than our concepts.
-We must conclude, I think, that the attempt to give a solid meaning to the
-idea of conceptual relativism, and hence to the idea of a conceptual scheme,
-fares no better when based on partial failure of translation than when based
-on total failure. (Davidson Inquiries , 197)
-Both the shorter version (Part I) and longer version (Part II) consist of
-three arguments: (1) an argument against the idea of complete failure
-of translation; (2) an argument against partial failure of translation; and
-164 George Wrisley
-(3) a capstone argument drawing on (1) and (2) for the conclusion that the
-very idea of a conceptual scheme is unintelligible rather than its being false
-that there is only one conceptual scheme or that there could be different
-conceptual schemes.
-Part I : Shorter Version (Leaves Key Premises Unsupported)
-P1. If the idea of different conceptual schemes is intelligible, then we can
-make sense of a difference in conceptual schemes consisting in complete
-failure of translation between schemes, or If the idea of different conceptual
-schemes is intelligible, then we can make sense of a difference in
-conceptual schemes consisting in partial failure of translation between
-schemes.
-P2. If the idea of complete failure of translation as a way to individuate
-conceptual schemes makes sense, then we can make sense of the idea of
-the scheme organizing the content, or If the idea of complete failure of
-translation as a way to individuate conceptual schemes makes sense, then
-we can make sense of the idea of the scheme fi tting the content.
-P3. We can neither make sense of the idea of the scheme organizing the
-content, nor the idea of the idea of the scheme fi tting the content.
-C1. We cannot make sense of the idea of complete failure of translation
-as a way to individuate conceptual schemes (destructive dilemma,
-P2, P3).
-P4. If the idea of partial failure of translation as a way to individuate conceptual
-schemes makes sense, then there is either a general principle or
-evidence that could determine whether our disagreement with those
-operating with a purportedly different scheme about the truth of sentences
-X, Y, Z is a difference in scheme or a difference in belief.
-P5. There is neither a general principle nor evidence that could determine
-whether our disagreement with those operating with a purportedly different
-scheme about the truth of sentences X, Y, Z is a difference in
-scheme or a difference in belief.
-C2. We cannot make sense of the idea of partial failure of translation as
-a way to individuate conceptual schemes ( modus tollens , P4, P5).
-C3. The idea of different conceptual schemes is not intelligible (destructive
-dilemma P1, C1, C2).
-P6. If there is only one conceptual scheme, then it is false that there are
-different conceptual schemes.
-P7. If the idea of different conceptual schemes is not intelligible, then it is
-not false that there are different conceptual schemes.
-P8. It is not false that there are different conceptual schemes ( modus ponens ,
-C3, P7).
-Davidson on the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme 165
-P9. There is not only one conceptual scheme ( modus ponens , P6, P8).
-P10. If the idea of different conceptual schemes is not intelligible and there
-is not only one conceptual scheme, then the very idea of a conceptual
-scheme is unintelligible.
-C4. Therefore, the very idea of a conceptual scheme is unintelligible
-( modus ponens , P10, C3, P9).
-Part II : Detailed Version
-P1. If the idea of different conceptual schemes is intelligible, then we can
-make sense of a difference in conceptual schemes consisting in complete
-failure of translation between schemes, or If the idea of different conceptual
-schemes is intelligible, then we can make sense of a difference in
-conceptual schemes consisting in partial failure of translation between
-schemes.
-Complete Failure of Translation
-P2. Let us consider the possibility of complete failure of translation between
-languages.
-P3. A conceptual scheme implies a dualism of scheme and (uninterpreted)
-content. The scheme is the conceptual apparatus of a language, where a
-language consists of sentences held to be true. The content is either the
-world/reality or experience/evidence understood as uninterpreted, that
-is, a neutral something to which the scheme stands in a relation.
-P4. If the idea of complete failure of translation as a way to individuate
-conceptual schemes makes sense, then we can make sense of the idea of
-the scheme ’ s organizing the content, or If the idea of complete failure of
-translation as a way to individuate conceptual schemes makes sense, then
-we can make sense of the idea of the scheme ’ s fi tting the content.
-P5. If sense can be made of the scheme ’ s organizing the content, then
-the content is a nonindividuated object, or if the scheme organizes the
-content, then the content consists of parts.
-P6. A nonindividuated object cannot be organized.
-P7. The content cannot consist of parts prior to being organized by the
-scheme, since it is supposed to be the scheme that organizes the content
-into parts.
-C1. We cannot make sense of the idea that a scheme organizes the
-content (destructive dilemma, P5, P6, P7).
-P8. Consider the possibility of the scheme ’ s fi tting the content. Saying that
-a scheme fi ts the content just means that it is borne out by the evidence,
-166 George Wrisley
-which simply means that the scheme is true (or largely true to allow for
-error).
-P9. From P8, this means that a scheme X will be different from, for
-example, that of the English language if and only if X is (largely) true
-but untranslatable into English.
-P10. However, we cannot separate the concepts of truth and translation in
-this way. Here is why, according to Davidson:
-P11a. Following Alfred Tarski ’ s work on the concept of truth (and
-Tarski ’ s work gives us the best understanding of truth), the true sentences
-of a language must conform to Tarski ’ s Convention T, which
-says that for every sentence s of (the language) L, a theorem can be
-given of the form ‘ s is true if and only if p ’ where ‘ s ’ is replaced by a
-description of s and ‘ p ’ by s itself if L is English, and by a translation
-of s into English if L is not English. An example using English and
-German: “ ‘ Es schneit ’ is true if and only if it is snowing. ” All true
-sentences of a language conforming to Convention T constitute a
-“ theory of truth ” for that language.
-P11b. In the case we are considering, X is a conceptual scheme different
-from English, which means (a) X is true, but untranslatable. But (b)
-if X is true, then a theory of truth for X can be given. And (c) if a
-theory of truth for X can be given, then, by Convention T, translations
-of sentences of X into English can be given. However, by the supposition
-that X is a different conceptual scheme from English, its sentences
-are untranslatable into English.
-P11c. We cannot make sense of the claim that X is true (two instances
-of modus tollens from 11b, beginning with (c) and (a), and then the
-negation of the antecedent of (c) together with (b)).
-P12. We cannot make sense of the idea that a scheme fi ts the content, for
-if the scheme fi ts the content, then it is true and untranslatable into
-another language. But, by P11c, we cannot make sense of a true and
-untranslatable language.
-C2. We cannot make sense of the idea of complete failure of translation
-as a way to individuate conceptual schemes (destructive dilemma P4,
-C1, P12).
-Partial Failure of Translation
-P13. Let us consider the possibility of partial failure of translation between
-languages. Two languages that have partial failure of translation will
-embody different schemes to the extent that they have parts that are not
-intertranslatable.
-Davidson on the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme 167
-P14. The proper way to approach the translation of an unknown language
-into a known language is by interpreting the utterances of the speakers
-of the unknown language from the perspective of speakers of the known
-language. Such interpretation will consist in forming hypotheses as to
-what the speakers ’ utterances mean.
-P15. The formation of such hypotheses requires attributions of both
-meaning and belief. As a matter of interpretation, we know what a person
-’ s utterances mean in relation to knowing what he believes in a given
-context. For example, if a speaker utters “ Hartchep ” right after a thunderclap,
-our hypothesizing that “ Hartchep ” means thunder consists in
-attributing the belief that the sound that occurred was thunder to the
-speaker. If we thought the speaker believed the sound to have been an
-explosion (even though we knew it had been thunder), we would likely
-not hypothesize that “ Hartchep ” means thunder.
-P16. Assume that even when we cannot know what a speaker believes or
-means, we can know whether a speaker holds a particular utterance to
-be true.
-P17. To facilitate the possibility of interpretation, we should employ the
-principle of charity and assume that the beliefs of the people we are
-interpreting are by and large true (by our lights).
-P18. If it is a reasonable assumption that there will be sentences uttered by
-speakers of language X that those speakers reject as truths, and we are
-to interpret those rejected sentences, then depending on the evidence
-available, we will either translate them into sentences that we accept or
-sentences that we reject.
-P19. If the evidence available for interpreting those rejected sentences of X
-leads us to translate them into sentences that we accept as true, then this
-can be taken to mean either that our schemes differ at this point or that
-our beliefs differ.
-P20. If we are in a position in which we can either take our schemes to
-differ or our beliefs to differ at a particular point, then there is neither
-a general principle nor evidence that could possibly determine whether
-it is a difference in scheme or a difference in belief.
-P21. If there is neither a general principle nor evidence that could possibly
-determine whether it is a difference in scheme or a difference in belief,
-then we could never be in a position to judge whether speakers of X
-have concepts or beliefs radically different from our own.
-P22. If we could never be in a position to judge whether speakers of X have
-concepts or beliefs radically different from our own, then we cannot
-make sense of the idea of there being partial failure of translation.
-P23. It is a reasonable assumption that there will be sentences uttered by
-speakers of language X that those speakers reject as truths, and we are
-to interpret those rejected sentences.
-168 George Wrisley
-C3. We cannot make sense of the idea of partial failure of translation
-(hypothetical syllogism of P18 – P22, and modus ponens , P22, P23).
-The Unintelligibility of the Very Idea of a
-Conceptual Scheme
-C4. The idea of different conceptual schemes is not intelligible (destructive
-dilemma, P1, C2, C4).
-P24. If there is only one conceptual scheme, then it is false that there are
-different conceptual schemes.
-P25. If the idea of different conceptual schemes is not intelligible, then it is
-not false that there are different conceptual schemes.
-P26. It is not false that there are different conceptual schemes ( modus
-ponens , C4, P25).
-P27. There is not only one conceptual scheme ( modus tollens , P24, P26).
-P28. If the idea of different conceptual schemes is not intelligible and there
-is not only one conceptual scheme, then the very idea of a conceptual
-scheme is unintelligible.
-P29. The idea of different conceptual schemes is not intelligible and there
-is not only one conceptual scheme (conjunction, P27, C4).
-C4. The very idea of a conceptual scheme is unintelligible ( modus ponens ,
-P28, P29).
-44
-Quine ’ s Two Dogmas of
-Empiricism
-Robert Sinclair
-Quine , W. V. “ Two Dogmas of Empiricism , ” in From a Logical Point of
-View , 20 – 46 . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press , 1981 .
-Originally published in Philosophical Review 60 (1951): 20 – 43.
-Hylton , Peter . Quine . New York : Routledge , 2007 .
-Kemp , Gary . Quine: A Guide for the Perplexed . New York : Continuum ,
-2006 .
-Russell , Gillian . “ The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction . ” Philosophy Compass
-2 ( 2007 ): 712 – 29 .
-There appears to be an intuitive difference between these two claims:
-(1) All bachelors are unmarried.
-(2) All bachelors are less than 15 feet tall.
-While both of these statements are true, the way in which they are taken
-to be true highlights what many philosophers have seen as a signifi cant
-difference. The fi rst is an “ analytic ” truth, whose truth is determined solely
-through the meanings of the terms involved and independently of any
-empirical fact. The second “ synthetic ” truth is true because of empirical
-facts about the world. In his famous and widely read article, “ Two Dogmas
-of Empiricism, ” W. V. Quine declared that the use of this distinction in
-modern empiricism was an unsupported dogma, and he further argued that
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-170 Robert Sinclair
-what he calls “ reductionism, ” roughly, the view that theoretical statements
-can be logically reduced to statements about experience, is a second dogma
-that should also be rejected. These criticisms target the views of Rudolf
-Carnap, C. I. Lewis, and others who used analyticity to make sense of the
-a priori elements of human knowledge and, more specifi cally, advocated its
-importance in clarifying and understanding the language of science.
-In “ Two Dogmas, ” Quine ’ s main concern is with clearly explicating the
-distinction in question, and he argues that there is no such sharp division
-between analytic truths and synthetic truths. His argument has been usefully
-described as analogous to the kind one might fi nd offered in the physical
-sciences (Kemp, 19 – 20). A scientist might reject a type of physical phenomena
-because it cannot be explained in ways that do not already assume its
-existence. It might be further argued that the evidence cited in support of
-such phenomena can be accounted for in other ways without them. In
-general, it is this type of attitude that informs the structure of Quine ’ s
-overall argument, where he begins by surveying a number of attempts to
-explain the concept of analyticity and fi nds them all uninformative. Here,
-he appeals to what has been called the “ circularity argument, ” where analyticity
-is defi ned in terms of sameness of meaning or synonymy (Russell,
-718).
-Two expressions are synonymous when sentences containing them
-remain true when one is substituted for the other, what is here described as
-interchangebility salva veritate . When applied to necessity statements in
-English, this view seems to work, since the sentence ‘ Necessarily, every
-unmarried man is unmarried ’ and ‘ Necessarily, every bachelor is unmarried ’
-is a case where truth is preserved when we switch ‘ unmarried man ’ for
-‘ bachelor, ’ and these terms are also synonyms. The problem is that such
-sentences are understood as true in virtue of being analytic. The attempt to
-explain analyticity by an appeal to synonymy is then circular.
-Quine criticizes the second dogma of reductionism by claiming that theoretical
-sentences have connections to experience only as a collective body
-and not when isolated from each other. This then prevents the type of
-phenomenalist reduction of science to experience advocated by the logical
-empiricists and further prevents us from defi ning synthetic statements as
-true when confi rmed by sets of experience and analytic truths as those
-confi rmed by any experience whatsoever. With each of these attempts to
-clarify analytic truth found wanting, Quine claims that the reasonable thing
-to conclude is that the distinction itself is an unempirical dogma. In the last
-section of his paper, he outlines his alternative view of empiricism, often
-described as “ epistemological holism, ” which is further developed in his
-later work. Here, he indicates how the alleged a priori necessity of mathematics
-and logic can be explained by its deep entrenchment within our
-overarching system of theoretical commitments rather than by an appeal to
-Quine’s Two Dogmas of Empiricism 171
-analyticity. This deep entrenchment is what further explains our reluctance
-to revise such truths. Quine would come to emphasize that the main issue
-surrounding the analytic – synthetic distinction turns less on the availability
-of its sharp delineation (he later suggests and endorses his own way of
-marking the difference), but rather with its general epistemological signifi -
-cance. Here he claims that no such distinction is of any real import in
-helping us to understand the structure of human knowledge (Hylton,
-68 – 80).
-Many philosophers infl uenced by logical empiricism and its specifi c conception
-of scientifi c philosophy viewed some form of the analytic – synthetic
-distinction as central for making sense of a priori truth. After Quine ’ s
-famous criticisms, it became increasingly diffi cult simply to assume that
-some form of this distinction was viable. This also led to a fundamental
-change in conceptions of philosophy and philosophical practice. Carnap ’ s
-use of the analytic – synthetic distinction supported his view of philosophy
-as concerned with the logical structure of scientifi c language and as distinct
-from empirical science. Quine ’ s criticisms of analyticity further challenged
-this view of philosophy by rejecting any sharp difference between philosophy
-and empirical science. The result was Quine ’ s infl uential naturalistic
-view of philosophy, which conceives of philosophical pursuits as continuous
-with those found in the empirical sciences.
-There have been many critical responses to Quine ’ s circularity argument
-against analyticity, and there are various ongoing attempts to resurrect
-alternative conceptions of analyticity. It has been recently suggested that
-new innovations in the theory of meaning offer support for an account of
-analytic truth in terms of meaning (Russell, 712 – 29).
-In formal and informal work alike, thus, we fi nd that defi nition [ . . . ]
-hinges on prior relations of synonymy. Recognizing then that the notion of
-defi nition does not hold the key to synonymy and analyticity, let us look
-further into synonymy and say no more of defi nition [ . . . ] we must recognize
-that interchangeability salva veritate , if construed in relation to an extensional
-language, is not a suffi cient condition of cognitive synonymy in the sense
-needed for deriving analyticity. [ . . . ] If a language contains an intensional
-adverb ‘ necessarily ’ [ . . . ] then interchangeability salva veritate in such a
-language does afford a suffi cient condition of cognitive synonymy; but such
-a language is intelligible only in so far as the notion of analyticity is already
-understood in advance [ . . . ]. The dogma of reductionism, even in its attenuated
-form, is intimately connected with the other dogma – that there is a
-cleavage between the analytic and synthetic [ . . . ] the one dogma clearly supports
-the other in this way: as long as it is taken to be signifi cant in general
-to speak of the confi rmation and information of a statement, it seems signifi -
-cant to speak also of a limiting kind of statement which is vacuously confi
-rmed, ipso facto , come what may; and such a statement is analytic [ . . . ].
-172 Robert Sinclair
-My present suggestion is that it is nonsense, and the root of much nonsense,
-to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component in the truth of
-any individual statement. Taken collectively, science has its double dependence
-upon language and experience; but this duality is not signifi cantly traceable
-into the statements of science taken one by one. (Quine 27, 31, 41 – 2)
-P1. Analytic truths are defi ned as true in virtue of the meaning of their
-terms and independently of empirical fact.
-P2. Meaning is not to be confused with reference (e.g., ‘ creature with a
-heart ’ and ‘ creature with kidneys ’ refers to the same class of objects, but
-the expressions differ in meaning).
-P3. There is no need to appeal to a special set of things called “ meanings ”
-to explain this difference, since the concept of meaning can be shown to
-be theoretically adequate if we focus on cases of sameness of meaning
-or synonymy (where we say that x and y are alike in meaning). If we
-proceed to use the concept of “ meaning ” to defi ne analyticity, we should
-then appeal to synonymy between terms.
-C1. We can now defi ne analytic truths as logical truths achieved by
-substituting synonyms for synonyms ( ‘ No bachelor is married ’ becomes
-the logical truth ‘ No unmarried man is married ’ if we substitute
-‘ unmarried man ’ for ‘ bachelor ’ ) ( modus ponens , P1, P3).
-P4. If truth - by - sameness of meaning (C1) relies on our understanding of
-truth - by - meaning, which in turn rests on a prior understanding of
-‘ meaning ’ , then this explanation of analyticity by use of synonymy is no
-clearer than our starting point.
-C2. This explanation of analyticity by use of synonymy is no clearer than
-our starting point ( modus ponens , C1, P4).
-P5. What if we understand synonymy as involving the defi nition of terms?
-P6. If we understand synonymy as involving the defi nition of terms, then
-this only provides a report of which terms mean the same as others, but
-no further indication of what synonymy or sameness of meaning consists
-in.
-C3. Synonymy defi ned as defi nition is then no help in clarifying analyticity
-( modus ponens , P5, P6).
-P7. What if we take two phrases or expressions as synonymous when sentences
-containing them remain true when one is substituted for the other?
-P8. If we take two phrases or expressions as synonymous when sentences
-containing them remain true when one is substituted for the other, then
-in extensional languages, where substituting co - extensive expressions
-preserves truth - value, the interchangeability does not give us sameness
-of meaning (e.g., substituting ‘ creature with a heart ’ with ‘ creature with
-kidneys ’ preserves truth - value, but we would not claim that these expressions
-have the same meaning).
-Quine’s Two Dogmas of Empiricism 173
-C4. In extensional languages, interchangeability does not give us sameness
-of meaning and is no help in understanding analyticity ( modus
-ponens , P7, P8).
-P9. However, English is not extensional and in such nonextensional
-languages, interchangeability salva veritate is the right criterion for
-synonymy; that is, it preserves sameness of meaning (e.g., ‘ Necessarily,
-every unmarried man is unmarried ’ and ‘ Necessarily, every bachelor is
-unmarried ’ is a case where truth value is preserved when we switch
-‘ unmarried man ’ for ‘ bachelor ’ , and they are also synonyms).
-P10. But necessity statements of this kind are thought to be true precisely
-because the statement in question ( ‘ every unmarried man is unmarried ’ )
-is already taken to be analytic. In this way, interchangeability salva veritate
-provides the right account of synonymy, but only by already relying
-on the intelligibility of analyticity. This is circular, and so analytic truth
-is still not clarifi ed.
-P11. If English is not extensional (P9), and necessity statements are taken
-to be analytic (P10), then this view of synonymy does not then explain
-analyticity.
-C5. This view of synonymy does not then explain analyticity ( modus
-ponens , P11, conjunction, P9, P10).
-P11. Reductionism claims that any signifi cant nonanalytic statement is
-equivalent to a statement about sensory experience. The meaning of a
-statement is then directly tied to a set of sensory experiences.
-P12. Given this view, we can defi ne analytic truths as those statements
-confi rmed by every experience or, in other words, as statements that
-contain no empirical content or information.
-P13. However, the reductionism project cannot be completed because of
-holistic considerations that prevent a simple reduction of theoretical
-sentences to specifi c sensory experiences.
-P14. But if reductionism is untenable, then we cannot assign specifi c empirical
-content to individual sentences or then specify when a sentence is
-analytic in the sense of being confi rmed by any experience whatsoever.
-C6. There is then no way to use reductionism to clarify those statements
-which depend on sensory experience for their confi rmation and those
-that do not, that is, analytic truths. Reductionism then fails to clarify
-the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements ( modus
-ponens , P13, P14).
-C7. A consideration of these various proposals for clarifying analytic
-truths has shown them all to be wanting. We have no reason to hold
-such a fi rm distinction or the form of reductionism often used to
-support it. Both are dogmas of modern empiricism that should be
-rejected (conjunction, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6).
-45
-Hume and the Problem
-of Induction
-Hume , David . An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding . Indianapolis :
-Hackett , 1993 .
-Editors ’ note: We have included two versions of Hume ’ s argument concerning
-induction in order to highlight different approaches to the seminal issue.
-Hume ’ s Problem of Induction
-James E. Taylor
-Hume ’ s argument for skepticism about induction presupposes his distinction
-between “ relations of ideas, ” which are intuitively or demonstratively
-certain because their denials are contradictory (e.g., “ All bachelors are
-unmarried ” ) and “ matters of fact and existence, ” which are not certain
-because their denials are possibly true (e.g., “ The sun will rise tomorrow ” ).
-Hume holds that all of our beliefs about matters of fact and existence are
-based on either the present testimony of our senses, our memories of what
-we have experienced on the basis of our senses, or reasoning about relations
-of cause and effect on the basis of our senses and memory beliefs. For
-instance, we infer that a friend of ours is in a distant place on the grounds
-that a letter we are currently looking at indicates that it was sent by our
-friend from that place; so we infer a currently unobserved cause from a
-currently observed effect of that cause. We also infer more generally from
-cause - and - effect relationships we have observed in the past that similar
-causes will have similar effects in the future. Thus, according to Hume,
-the foundation of all our reasoning about matters of fact and existence is
-experience. But Hume argues that these sorts of inferences from experience
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Hume and the Problem of Induction 175
-are not based on any further reasoning. The way this claim is typically put
-today is that there is no rational justifi cation for inductive inferences. If this
-claim is true, then no one can be rationally justifi ed in believing anything
-that goes beyond what one is currently observing, and if that is the case,
-then there is no rational justifi cation for any theory of empirical science.
-Since Hume was the fi rst philosopher to make this claim and argue for it,
-the problem facing philosophers who deny it is called “ Hume ’ s Problem of
-Induction. ” Though many attempts have been made to solve this problem,
-none of these attempts is widely believed to be successful. Consequently,
-Hume ’ s problem of induction continues to be a central topic of philosophical
-conversation.
-All reasonings may be divided into two kinds, namely, demonstrative
-reasoning, or that concerning relations of ideas, and moral reasoning, or that
-concerning matter of fact and existence. That there are no demonstrative
-arguments in the case seems evident; since it implies no contradiction that the
-course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those which
-we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects. May
-I not clearly and distinctly conceive that a body, falling from the clouds, and
-which, in all other respects, resembles snow, has yet the taste of salt or feeling
-of fi re? Is there any more intelligible proposition than to affi rm, that all the
-trees will fl ourish in December and January, and decay in May and June?
-Now whatever is intelligible, and can be distinctly conceived, implies no
-contradiction, and can never be proved false by any demonstrative argument
-or abstract reasoning a priori .
-If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to put trust in past experience,
-and make it the standard of our future judgement, these arguments must be
-probable only, or such as regard matter of fact and real existence, according
-to the division above mentioned. But that there is no argument of this kind,
-must appear, if our explication of that species of reasoning be admitted as
-solid and satisfactory. We have said that all arguments concerning existence
-are founded on the relation of cause and effect; that our knowledge of that
-relation is derived entirely from experience; and that all our experimental
-conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable
-to the past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this last supposition by
-probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must be evidently
-going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in question.
-(IV.ii)
-An example of an inductive inference employed by Hume (which can
-represent all inductive inferences) is the inference from (a) “ All the bread
-I have eaten has nourished me ” to (b) “ The bread I am about to eat
-will nourish me. ” I will refer to this example in my reconstruction of
-Hume ’ s argument for his claim that no such inferences have a rational
-foundation.
-176 James E. Taylor and Stefanie Rocknak
-P1. If the (inductive) inference from (a) to (b) has a rational foundation,
-then it must be based on intuition, reasoning that is based on intuition
-( “ demonstrative ” or deductive reasoning) or reasoning that is based on
-direct observation ( “ experimental ” or inductive reasoning).
-P2. The (inductive) inference from (a) to (b) is not based on intuition, reasoning
-that is based on intuition, or reasoning that is based on direct
-observation.
-C1. The (inductive) inference from (a) to (b) does not have a rational
-foundation ( modus tollens , P1, P2).
-Argument for P2:
-P3. The connection between (a) and (b) of the example inference is not
-intuitive (i.e., it isn ’ t self - evident that if (a) is true, then (b) is true).
-P4. The inference from (a) to (b) is not based on demonstrative reasoning
-(since demonstrative reasoning can only establish claims that are not
-possibly false and the claim that if (a) is true, then (b) is true is possibly
-false).
-P5. The inference from (a) to (b) is not based on experimental reasoning
-(because all experimental reasoning presupposes that similar causes have
-similar effects and the inference in question is an instance of this very
-presupposition, so an experimental (inductive) argument for that inference
-would be circular).
-C2. P2 is true: the (inductive) inference from (a) to (b) is not based on
-intuition, reasoning that is based on intuition, or reasoning that is
-based on direct observation (conjunction, P3, P4, P5; De Morgan ’ s).
-Hume ’ s Negative Argument concerning Induction
-Hume , David . A Treatise of Human Nature , edited by D. F. and M. J. Norton.
-Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2002 .
-Arnold , N. Scott . “ Hume ’ s Skepticism about Inductive Inferences . ” Journal
-of the History of Philosophy 21 , 1 ( 1983 ): 31 – 55 .
-Baier , Annette . A Progress of Sentiments . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University
-Press , 1991 .
-Beauchamp , Tom , and Alexander Rosenberg . Hume and the Problem of
-Causation . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1981 .
-Broughton , J. “ Hume ’ s Skepticism about Causal Inferences . ” Pacifi c
-Philosophical Quarterly 64 ( 1983 ): 3 – 18 .
-Stefanie Rocknak
-Hume and the Problem of Induction 177
-Where does the necessity that seems to accompany causal inferences come
-from? “ Why [do] we conclude that [ … ] particular causes must necessarily
-have such particular effects? ” (Hume, 1.3.2.15) In 1.3.6 of the Treatise ,
-Hume entertains the possibility that this necessity is a function of reason.
-However, he eventually dismisses this possibility, where this dismissal consists
-of Hume ’ s “ negative ” argument concerning induction. This argument
-has received, and continues to receive, a tremendous amount of attention.
-How could causal inferences be justifi ed if they are not justifi ed by reason?
-If we believe that p causes q , isn ’ t it reason that allows us to conclude with
-some assurance – that is, with some necessity – that q whenever we see p ?
-The responses to these questions are many, but they may be parsed into
-four groups. (1) Some argue that Hume ’ s negative argument shows that he
-thought that inductive inferences are worthless. Hume was actually a closet
-“ deductivist, ” where he meant to show that any method that does not rely
-on a priori principles is useless (e.g., Stove). (2) Others have alleged that
-Hume ’ s negative argument only meant to show that we cannot use demonstrative
-reason to justify inductive inferences, but we can, apparently, justify
-them with probable reason (e.g., Beauchamp and Rosenberg, Arnold,
-Broughton, and Baier). (3) Still others argue that Hume ’ s notion of justifi cation
-(in regard to beliefs in general, including beliefs in causal inferences)
-should be understood in two stages in Book I of the Treatise . In the fi rst,
-Hume does lay out a theory of justifi cation. In the second (particularly in
-1.4.7), he retracts it (e.g., Passmore, Immerwahr, Schmitt, and Loeb). (4)
-Finally, there are those who claim that no “ justifi cation ” is needed for
-causal inferences. In fact, asking for it amounts to a misplaced demand for
-Garrett , Don . Cognition and Commitment in Hume ’ s Philosophy . Oxford :
-Oxford University Press , 1997 .
-Immerwahr , John . “ The Failure of Hume ’ s Treatise . ” Hume Studies 3 , 2
-( 1977 ): 57 – 71 .
-Loeb , L. E. Stability and Justifi cation in Hume ’ s Treatise . Oxford : Oxford
-University Press , 2002 .
-Owen , David . Hume ’ s Reason . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1999 .
-Passmore , John . Hume ’ s Intentions . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University
-Press , 1952/1968 .
-Schmitt , F. E. Knowledge and Belief . London : Routledge , 1992 .
-Smith , Norman K. The Philosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study of its
-Origins and Central Doctrines . New York : Macmillan , 1941 .
-Stove , D. C. Probability and Hume ’ s Inductive Skepticism . Oxford : Oxford
-University Press , 1973 .
-Strawson , P. F. Introduction to Logical Theory . London : Methuen , 1952 .
-178 James E. Taylor and Stefanie Rocknak
-epistemic explanation; to some degree, this is what the negative argument
-shows us. What we must do instead is give a descriptive psychological
-explanation where this explanation consists of Hume ’ s “ positive ” account
-of induction; see, for instance, Treatise 1.3.14, “ of the idea of necessary
-connexion ” (e.g., Strawson, Garrett, and Owen).
-In the arguments that rule out demonstrative and probable reasoning,
-Hume assumes that the principle of uniformity is justifi ed by, respectively,
-demonstrative reason and probable reason, and then he respectively shows
-why these assumptions are incorrect. In the concluding argument, he
-shows that this means that the principle of uniformity is not justifi ed by
-reason, nor is the necessity that obtains of our causal inferences a function
-of reason. To do so, he draws on the premises established in his introduction
-and the conclusions established in the arguments that rule out demonstrative
-and probable reason.
-[We must now] discover the nature of that necessary connexion, which
-makes so essential a part of [the relation of cause and effect] [ . . . ]. Since it
-appears, that the transition from an impression present to the memory or
-senses to the idea of an object, we call cause and effect, is founded on past
-experience, and our resemblance of their constant conjunction, the next question
-is, whether experience produces the idea by means of the understanding
-or of the imagination; whether we are determin ’ d by reason to make the
-transition, or by a certain association of perceptions. If reason determin ’ d us,
-it wou ’ d proceed upon that principle, that instances, of which we have had
-no experience must resemble those, of which we have had experience, and
-that the course of nature continues always uniformly the same. In order
-therefore to clear up this matter, let us consider all the arguments, upon which
-such a proposition may suppos ’ d to be founded ’ and as these must be deriv ’ d
-either from knowledge or probability, let us cast our eye on each of these
-degrees of evidence, and see whether they afford any just conclusion of this
-nature. (Hume, 1.3.6.3, 1.3.6.4)
-P1. When the mind makes what appears to be a necessary transition from
-a present impression, or a memory of an impression, to a given idea, we
-call that transition “ cause and effect. ” The question is, on what is this
-seemingly necessary transition founded? Of what is it a function: understanding
-(i.e., reason) or the imagination?
-P2. If reason does determine us to make these causal transitions, then this
-reasoning must proceed upon the principle that instances (e.g., particular
-associations of any two objects) that occurred in the past will continue
-to occur as such in the future (the principle of uniformity).
-P3. If causal necessity is a function of reason, where that reason is based
-on the principle of uniformity, then the principle of uniformity must,
-in some fashion or other, be justifi ed ; it too must be “ founded ” on
-Hume and the Problem of Induction 179
-reason. In symbolic form, this reads (N ⊃ P) ⊃ J, where ‘ N ’ stands for
-causal necessity is a function of reason, ‘ P ’ stands for a principle of
-uniformity, and ‘ J ’ stands for “ the principle of uniformity is justifi ed by
-reason. ”
-P4. There are only two kinds of reason that may justify a principle, including
-the principle of uniformity: (a) “ knowledge ” (demonstrative reasoning)
-or (b) “ probable ” reasoning.
-P5. Assume that the principle of uniformity is justifi ed by demonstrative
-reasoning.
-P6. If the principle of uniformity is justifi ed by demonstrative reasoning – in
-other words, it is an instance of demonstrative reasoning – then the
-principle of uniformity cannot be imagined otherwise.
-P7. We can imagine that nature will not continue uniformly in the future,
-while simultaneously imagining that nature has always continued the
-same in the past, without contradicting ourselves.
-C1. The principle of uniformity is not proved; that is, justifi ed by demonstrative
-reasoning ( modus tollens , P6, P7).
-P8. The principle of uniformity is justifi ed by probable reasoning (assumption
-for reductio ).
-P9. Probable reasoning is actually causal reasoning, since both are cases
-where we are automatically led to think of an idea in virtue of experiencing
-an impression or remembering an impression.
-P10. If the reasoning at hand is an instance of causal reasoning, then such
-reasoning is justifi ed by the principle of uniformity.
-C2. Probable reasoning is justifi ed by the principle of uniformity ( modus
-ponens , P9, P10).
-C3. The principle of uniformity is justifi ed by probable reasoning (i.e.,
-causal reasoning) and justifi es probable reasoning (i.e., causal reasoning)
-(conjunction, P7, C2).
-C4. The principle of uniformity is not justifi ed by probable reason
-( reductio , P7 – C3).
-C5. The principle of uniformity is not justifi ed by either demonstrative
-or probable reasoning (conjunction C1, C4).
-P11. If the principle of uniformity is not justifi ed by either demonstrative
-or probable reasoning, then we must reject the claim that the principle
-of uniformity is justifi ed by reason.
-C6. We must reject the claim that the principle of uniformity is justifi ed
-by reason ( modus ponens , C5, P11).
-P12. If we must reject the claim that the principle of uniformity is justifi ed
-by reason, then we must reject the claim that the necessity that seems to
-accompany causal relations is a function of reason.
-C7. We must reject the claim that the necessity that seems to accompany
-causal relations is a function of reason ( modus ponens , P12, C6).
-46
-Argument by Analogy in Thales
-and Anaximenes
-Giannis Stamatellos
-Aristotle . On the Heavens , translated by W. K. C. Guthrie. Cambridge, MA :
-Harvard University Press , 1939 .
-Barnes , Jonathan . The Presocratic Philosophers . London : Routledge , 1979 .
-Diels , Hermann . Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker , 6th edn. , revised with
-additions and index by W. Kranz . Berlin : Weidmann , 1951 – 52 . (DK)
-Kirk , Geoffrey Stephen , John Earl Raven , and Malcolm Schofi eld . The
-Presocratic Philosophers . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press ,
-1983 .
-Lloyd , Geoffrey Ernest Richard . Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of
-Argumentation in Early Greek Thought . Bristol : Bristol Classical Press ,
-1992 .
-Pachenko , Dmitri . “ Thales and the Origin of Theoretical Reasoning . ”
-Confi gurations 3 ( 1993 ): 387 – 484 .
-Wright , M. R . The Presocratics . Bristol : Bristol Classical Press , 1985 .
-If x is P and Q , and y is P , we infer that y is also Q .
-An argument by analogy relies on inductive inference. Arguing by analogy
-is arguing that since things are similar or alike in certain respects, they are
-similar or alike in others. An analogical argument is based on hypothetical
-similarities between distinct cases: in other words, since things are similar
-in certain observable or identifi ed cases, they are also similar in some other
-unobservable or unidentifi ed cases.
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Argument by Analogy in Thales and Anaximenes 181
-An argument by analogy is not deductively valid. It is considered as a
-weak form of argumentation due to the arbitrary presupposition of similarities
-between things. However, analogy is not only used in literal cases but
-also in cases of metaphor and explanatory purposes. Moreover, an argument
-by analogy is considered as an indispensable accompaniment of scientifi
-c thought as far as induction forms the basic scientifi c method.
-In early Greek philosophy, analogy is a pattern of thought that underlies
-the fi rst attempts for an explanation of the cosmos. This is initially found
-in the Milesians thinkers Thales ( fl . c. 585 bce ) and Anaximenes ( fl . c. 546
-bce ). Thales argued that “ as a piece of wood fl oats on a pond, so the whole
-earth fl oats on water ” (DK 11A14; cf., DK 11A12). According to Aristotle:
-Others say that the earth rests on water. For this is the most ancient
-account we have received, which they say was given by Thales the Milesian,
-that it stays in place through fl oating like a log or some other such thing (for
-none of these rests by nature on air, but on water) – as though the same argument
-did not apply to the water supporting the earth as to the earth itself.
-(Aristotle B13, 294a28)
-Thales ’ inductive reasoning refl ects an argument by analogy: if two
-things have certain properties in common on a small scale, then they have
-the same properties in common on a cosmic scale:
-Small scale: a piece of wood fl oats on a pond.
-Large scale: the Earth fl oats on Okeanos.
-Likewise, Anaximenes claims an analogy between human soul and the
-cosmos:
-As our soul, which is air, maintain us, so breath and air surround the whole
-world. (DK, 13B2)
-Anaximenes offers an argument by analogy:
-Small scale: the human soul (human breath) maintains the single individual
-organism (microcosm).
-Large scale: the soul of the cosmos (universal breath) surrounds and
-maintains the whole universe.
-Analogy as a pattern of thought seems to underlie Anaximenes ’ inductive
-thinking used for rhetorical, metaphoric, and explanatory purposes. This is
-evident in some of his extant fragments and testimonies ( Die Fragmente der
-Vorsokratiker ):
-182 Giannis Stamatellos
-The stars move around the earth, just as turban winds round our head.
-[A7]
-The universe whirls like a mill - stone. [A12]
-The stars are fi xed in the crystalline in the manner of nails. [A14]
-The sun is fl at like a leaf. [A15]
-In the above examples, analogy is used by Anaximenes to explain macrocosm
-through common observation. Thales ’ and Anaximenes ’ arguments
-by analogy are considered as one of the fi rst incidences of inductive reasoning.
-The relationship between microcosm (small scale) and macrocosm
-(cosmic scale) refl ects Thales ’ hylozoism and mathematical expertise
-(e.g., measurement of the pyramids and predictions of the eclipses) and
-Anaximenes ’ natural philosophy and cosmological discoveries. Early Greek
-philosophical argumentation by analogy, as a form of induction, marks the
-beginning of scientifi c explanation and thought.
-47
-Quine ’ s Epistemology
-Naturalized
-Robert Sinclair
-Quine , W. V. “ Epistemology Naturalized , ” in Ontological Relativity and
-Other Essays , 69 – 90 . New York : Columbia University Press , 1969 .
-Gregory , Paul . Quine ’ s Naturalism: Language, Theory and the Knowing
-Subject . New York : Continuum , 2008 .
-Roth , Paul . “ The Epistemology of ‘ Epistemology Naturalized ’ . ” Dialectica
-53 ( 1999 ): 87 – 109 .
-In his highly infl uential article “ Epistemology Naturalized, ” W. V. Quine
-argued that the problems found in the history of modern empiricism should
-lead us to rethink the overall aims of contemporary epistemology. More
-specifi cally, he offered a historical reconstruction of post - Humean empiricism,
-highlighting where attempts to support or to justify our knowledge
-of the world through sensory experience fell into insurmountable problems
-and suggesting further the need to locate the grounds of knowledge within
-science itself. On his view, epistemology should then be “ naturalized ” in
-the sense that it becomes a scientifi c project where philosophers must use
-the resources of science to explain, to describe, and to justify our knowledge
-of the world.
-His basic argument appeals to an analogy between studies in the foundations
-of mathematical knowledge and the empiricist attempt to provide a
-sensory foundation for scientifi c knowledge. The project in the philosophy
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-184 Robert Sinclair
-of mathematics that is Quine ’ s focus is known as “ logicism, ” which held
-that mathematical truths could be defi ned in terms of a more basic logical
-language. Here, on what Quine calls the “ conceptual ” side, mathematical
-concepts could be rewritten and, in that sense, reduced to what was thought
-to be a more certain and obviously true logical vocabulary. This would also
-help deal with a further “ doctrinal ” concern over the justifi cation of mathematical
-truths, since they could be restated as basic logical truths with a
-similar degree of logical certainty. Unfortunately, this project cannot be
-completed, since the proposed reduction of mathematical concepts requires
-set theory, which contains its own logical paradoxes and does not then have
-the same obviousness or certainty assumed to be had within logic. Moreover,
-G ö del ’ s famous incompleteness theorems undermine the doctrinal aim,
-since they demonstrate that no logical rendering of all the truths of mathematics
-is possible.
-With this as background, Quine proceeds to develop further his analogy
-between logicism and empiricism. Like logicism, the empiricist attempt to
-validate scientifi c truths within sensory experience contains a conceptual
-side focused on defi ning concepts in sensory terms and a doctrinal side that
-seeks to justify truths of nature through sensory experience. However, these
-two aims cannot be met. The conceptual side falters because of “ holism, ”
-the view that terms and sentences have implications for experience only
-through their interconnections and never by themselves in isolation. What
-this suggests is that, in general, no concept or theoretical claim has its own
-consequences for experience, and thus no single concept or statement could
-then be assigned to or reduced to its own specifi c element of experience.
-The doctrinal aim fails because of what Quine calls “ Hume ’ s problem, ”
-where even simple general claims based on our experience of things claim
-much more than any empirical evidence we could have to justify them. So,
-empiricism suffers from incompleteness in an analogous way to logicism in
-the philosophy of mathematics, but, importantly, Quine suggests that the
-epistemology of empirical knowledge is no worse off than mathematical
-knowledge (see Roth, 96). Studies in mathematics lowered its epistemic
-standards in fruitful ways, and given this analogy, empiricism can follow
-suit. This requires moving from the attempt to reconstruct science logically
-from experience, something which Quine accepts would be more epistemologically
-adequate, and instead seeking a validation for scientifi c knowledge
-from within the methods of science.
-Quine ’ s argument is then an invitation for us to reconsider what empiricist
-epistemology looks like once we adopt a holistic view of human knowledge
-and accept the way this undermines an empiricist reduction of
-knowledge to experience, while further viewing science as providing the
-best remaining resources for addressing justifi catory issues in epistemology
-(see Roth, 96 – 100). Within such constraints, he stresses the importance of
-Quine’s Epistemology Naturalized 185
-using the methods of science to justify scientifi c truths and to develop
-explanatory accounts of the causal mechanisms responsible for the creation
-of scientifi c theories.
-The infl uence of this argument can be measured in terms of two contrasting
-responses, one positive, the other critical. With regard to the fi rst,
-Quine ’ s suggested reconstruction of epistemology has spawned numerous
-attempts to offer more empirically informed accounts of human knowledge.
-Such views appeal to a variety of different sciences such as evolutionary
-biology, psychology, and neuroscience, and in the fi eld of philosophy of
-science further use has been made of history and sociology. More generally,
-Quine ’ s philosophical naturalism, where philosophy is to be conceived as
-part of empirical science, has further infl uenced the development of work
-in the philosophy of mind, language, ethics, and elsewhere. The second
-more critical response has claimed that Quine ’ s suggested naturalization of
-epistemology results in a curt dismissal of the central aims of epistemology.
-Here, much of the attention has focused on Quine ’ s apparent rejection of
-the normative aims of justifi cation leading to what many have viewed as a
-radical changing of the subject. The result is the so - called “ replacement
-interpretation, ” where Quine is taken as advocating the replacement of
-normative epistemology, which seeks to assess critically and rationally the
-evidential basis of our beliefs, with a psychological description of the causal
-processes of belief acquisition (Gregory, 85 – 121).
-Recent scholarship has suggested that this critical reading is mistaken
-and has further emphasized that, in general, Quine ’ s proposal does not seek
-to eliminate such normative concerns but, rather, explains how epistemology
-can still remain normative in light of empiricism ’ s failures and the
-ongoing progress of science.
-[T]here remains a helpful thought, regarding epistemology generally, in
-that duality of structure which was especially conspicuous in the foundations
-of mathematics. I refer to the bifurcation into a theory of concepts, or
-meaning, and a theory of doctrine, or truth; for this applies to the epistemology
-of natural knowledge no less than to the foundations of mathematics.
-The parallel is as follows. Just as mathematics is to be reduced to logic, or
-logic and set theory, so natural knowledge is to be based somehow on sense
-experience. This means explaining the notion of body in sensory terms; here
-is the conceptual side. And it means justifying our knowledge of truths of
-nature in sensory terms; here is the doctrinal side of the bifurcation. [ . . . ]
-Philosophers have rightly despaired of translating everything into observational
-and logico - mathematical terms. They have despaired of this even when
-they have not recognized, as the reason for this irreducibility, that the statements
-largely do not have their private bundles of empirical consequences.
-And some philosophers have seen in this irreducibility the bankruptcy of
-epistemology [ . . . ] But I think at this point it maybe more useful to say rather
-186 Robert Sinclair
-that epistemology still goes on, through in a new setting and a clarifi ed status.
-Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of
-psychology and hence of natural science. It studies a natural phenomenon,
-viz., a physical human subject. This human subject is accorded a certain
-experimentally controlled input – certain patterns of irradiation in assorted
-frequencies, for instance – and in the fullness of time the subject delivers as
-output a description of the three dimensional external world and its history.
-The relation between the meager input and the torrential output is a relation
-that we are prompted to study for somewhat the same reasons that always
-prompted epistemology; namely, in order to see how evidence related to
-theory, and in what ways one ’ s theory of nature transcends any available
-evidence. (Quine 71, 82 – 3)
-P1. There are important parallels between studies in the foundations of
-natural science and studies in the foundations of mathematics that can
-help illuminate the epistemology of empirical knowledge.
-P2. The logicist project of constructing logical procedures for the codifi cation
-of mathematical truths contained two elements: a conceptual one
-that defi ned mathematical notions in terms of logic, and a doctrinal
-component that derived mathematical truths using logical techniques.
-C1. The empiricist attempt to provide an evaluation or derivation of
-scientifi c truths on the basis of sensory experience contains the same
-general features: a conceptual side concerned with the defi nition of
-concepts in sensory terms, and a doctrinal side focusing on the justifi
-cation of truths of nature in sensory terms (analogy, P1, P2).
-P3. If the empiricist program is to be successful, it then needs to address:
-(A) The conceptual requirement of showing how theoretical concepts
-(e.g., body) can be defi ned in terms of sensory experience.
-(B) The doctrinal requirement of showing how scientifi c laws or generalizations
-can be derived from sense experience.
-P4. (A) cannot be achieved because concepts and sentences have experiential
-consequences only as a collective body, and not in isolation from each
-other (holism). (B) cannot be achieved because even the simplest generalizations
-based on experience outrun the empirical evidence (Hume ’ s
-problem).
-C2. No independent philosophical foundation for science is then available
-within empiricism ( modus tollens , P3, P4).
-P5. There are no better standards of justifi cation available between formal
-derivation and the standards of empirical science itself (Quine ’ s scalar
-hypothesis; see Roth 98).
-P6. If empiricism cannot successfully implement its foundationalist project
-and there is no better justifi catory standards than those found in science,
-then epistemology should appeal to science in justifying scientifi c results
-and practices.
-Quine’s Epistemology Naturalized 187
-P7. No independent philosophical foundation for science is then available
-within empiricism, and there are no better standards of justifi cation
-available between formal derivation and the standards of empirical
-science itself (conjunction, C2, P5).
-C3. Epistemology becomes science self - applied where we use the methods
-of science to justify scientifi c truths and develop an explanatory
-account of the causal mechanisms responsible for the development of
-scientifi c theories. In sum, epistemology should be naturalized ( modus
-ponens , P6, P7).
-48
-Sellars and the Myth of
-the Given
-Willem A. deVries
-Sellars , Wilfrid . “ Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind , ” in Minnesota
-Studies in the Philosophy of Science , vol. I , edited by Herbert Feigl and
-Michael Scriven , 253 – 329 . Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press ,
-1956 . (EPM) Reprinted with additional footnotes in Science, Perception
-and Reality . London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963; reissued by
-Ridgeview Publishing Company in 1991. (SPR) Published separately as
-Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind: With an Introduction by
-Richard Rorty and a Study Guide by Robert Brandom , edited by Robert
-Brandom. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997. Also
-reprinted in W. deVries and T. Triplett, Knowledge, Mind, and the
-Given: A Reading of Sellars ’ “ Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. ”
-Cambridge, MA: Hackett, 2000. (KMG)
-Alston , William P. “ What ’ s Wrong With Immediate Knowledge? ” Synthese
-55 ( 1983 ): 73 – 96 . Reprinted in Epistemic Justifi cation: Essays in the
-Theory of Knowledge . Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989.
-___. “ Sellars and the ‘ Myth of the Given ’ , ” 1998 . http://www.ditext.com/
-alston/alston2.html (accessed July 27, 2010).
-Meyers , R. G. “ Sellars ’ Rejection of Foundations . ” Philosophical Studies 39
-( 1981 ): 61 – 78 .
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Sellars and the Myth of the Given 189
-Knowledge has a structure: there are relations of dependency among a
-person ’ s (and a community ’ s) cognitive states. Skeptical challenges easily
-arise; for example, if every piece of knowledge is dependent on others,
-how could we acquire our fi rst piece of knowledge (#38)? Many philosophers
-have held that knowledge has a hierarchical structure not unlike
-that of a well - built house. There must be some cognitive states that are
-in direct contact with reality, and that form a fi rm foundation that supports
-the rest of our knowledge. For obvious reasons, this has been called
-the “ foundationalist picture ” of knowledge ’ s structure. Philosophers cash
-this metaphor out via two requirements on knowledge, as follows. (1)
-There must be cognitive states that are basic in the sense that they possess
-some positive epistemic status independently of their epistemic relations
-to any other cognitive states. Call this the Epistemic Independence
-Requirement [EIR]. Positive epistemic statuses include being an instance
-of knowledge, being justifi ed or warranted, or (more weakly) having some
-presumption in its favor. (Many have claimed that basic cognitions must
-possess an unassailable epistemic warrant – certainty, incorrigibility, or
-even infallibility.) Epistemic relations include deductive and inductive
-implication. (2) Every nonbasic cognitive state with positive epistemic
-status possesses that status only because of the epistemic relations it bears,
-directly or indirectly, to basic cognitive states. Thus the basic states provide
-the ultimate support for the rest of our knowledge. Call this the Epistemic
-Effi cacy Requirement [EER]. Call such basic – that is, independent
-and effi cacious – cognitive states the “ given. ” Many philosophers have
-believed that there has to be such a given if there is to be any knowledge
-at all.
-The EIR and the EER together put constraints on what could play the
-role of basic knowledge. Traditionally, philosophers required that basic
-knowledge have an unassailable warrant. Although Sellars was a fallibilist
-and believed that any cognitive state could be challenged, his argument
-against the given, contrary to some interpretations, does not worry about
-this issue. If there are no foundations, we need not worry about the strength
-of foundational warrant.
-A foundationalist structure has been attributed to logical and mathematical
-knowledge, which is formal and a priori , as well as to empirical knowledge.
-For millennia, Euclidean geometry, which starts with defi nitions and
-axioms and derives numerous theorems by long chains of reasoning, has
-provided a paradigmatic foundationalist structure. But no axioms – self -
-evident general truths – seem adequate to provide the basis for empirical
-knowledge. Rather, the common assumption is that particular truths can
-be known through direct experience and provide the basis for all empirical
-knowledge. Thus, experience supposedly provides us with epistemically
-independent and effi cacious cognitive states that form the foundation of
-190 Willem A. deVries
-empirical knowledge. Empiricism claims that all substantive knowledge
-rests on experience.
-Sellars ’ argument against the given denies not only that there must be a
-given but that there can be a given in the sense defi ned. It is thus an attack
-on the foundationalist picture of knowledge, especially its empiricist version.
-The argument claims that nothing can satisfy both EIR and EER. To satisfy
-EER, a basic cognition must be capable of participating in inferential relations
-with other cognitions; it must possess propositional form and be
-truth - evaluable. To meet EIR, such a propositionally structured cognition
-must possess its epistemic status independently of inferential connections
-to other cognitions. No cognitive states satisfy both requirements.
-Many philosophers have believed in self - evident cognitive states that are
-epistemically independent. Mathematical axioms were traditionally called
-self - evident, but is any empirical proposition self - evident? According to
-Sellars, the standard candidates for basic empirical knowledge (knowledge
-of sense - data, knowledge of appearances, etc.) all presuppose other knowledge
-on the part of the knower and thus fail EIR. He argues that such
-states count as cognitive states only because of their epistemic relations to
-other cognitive states. Because he argues by cases, it is unclear whether
-some other candidates might pass EIR. For instance, some claim that externalism
-evades his critique because then the epistemic status of basic cognitive
-states is determined solely by their causal status and they pass EIR (see
-Meyers). Just assuming that there are (much less must be) Epistemically
-Independent cognitive states, however, begs the question against his argument.
-A fi nal resolution of this dispute requires a positive theory of the
-suffi cient conditions for possessing a positive epistemic status (see Alston).
-Sellars offers one, but this reaches beyond the critique of the given. At very
-least, Sellars ’ critique of the given shifts the burden of proof onto those who
-believe in epistemically independent cognitive states. They owe us a good
-theory of such states and why they have their epistemic status.
-Some foundationalists believe that basic cognitive states are not propositionally
-structured but are cases of direct knowledge of an object – what
-Russell called “ knowledge by acquaintance. ” Such states violate EER: How
-could such knowledge justify further knowledge? If John knows O, for some
-object O, no proposition seems to be warranted for John solely on that
-basis.
-If Sellars ’ argument works, knowledge cannot be acquired incrementally
-from initial encounters with the world in experience that are already full -
-fl edged cognitive states. The epistemic status of our perceptions and introspections
-belongs to them because they belong in a complex system of
-mutually supporting cognitive states that mediate our practical engagement
-with the world around us – though Sellars also rejects standard coherentism
-as well. The argument is not a conclusive, once - and - for - all refutation of the
-Sellars and the Myth of the Given 191
-foundationalist picture of knowledge, but it is a signifi cant challenge to that
-picture. Sellars ’ argument, in combination with arguments by Quine and
-Davidson, among others, have put foundationalism on the defensive since,
-roughly, the mid - point of the twentieth century.
-Sellars ’ argument has infl uenced a wide range of late - twentieth - century
-philosophers, including Richard Rorty, Paul and Patricia Churchland,
-Laurence Bonjour, David Rosenthal, Jay Rosenberg, John McDowell, and
-Robert Brandom.
-If I reject the framework of traditional empiricism, it is not because I want
-to say that empirical knowledge has no foundation. For to put it this way is
-to suggest that it is really “ empirical knowledge so - called, ” and to put it in
-a box with rumors and hoaxes. There is clearly some point to the picture of
-human knowledge as resting on a level of propositions – observation reports
-– which do not rest on other propositions in the same way as other propositions
-rest on them. On the other hand, I do wish to insist that the metaphor
-of “ foundation ” is misleading in that it keeps us from seeing that if there is
-a logical dimension in which other empirical propositions rest on observation
-reports, there is another logical dimension in which the latter rest on the
-former.
-Above all, the picture is misleading because of its static character. One
-seems forced to choose between the picture of an elephant which rests on a
-tortoise (What supports the tortoise?) and the picture of a great Hegelian
-serpent of knowledge with its tail in its mouth (Where does it begin?). Neither
-will do. For empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated extension, science, is
-rational, not because it has a foundation but because it is a self - correcting
-enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not all at once. (EPM
-VIII, § 38, in SPR, 170; in KMG, 250)
-The doctrine of the given requires that for any empirical knowledge P,
-some epistemically independent knowledge G is epistemically effi cacious
-with respect to P.
-P1. If X cannot serve as a reason for Y, then X cannot be epistemically
-effi cacious with respect to Y.
-P2. If X cannot serve as a premise in an argument for Y, then X cannot
-serve as a reason for Y.
-P3. If X is nonpropositional, then X cannot serve as a premise in an
-argument.
-P4. If X is nonpropositional, then X cannot serve as a reason for Y (hypothetical
-syllogism, P3, P2).
-C1. If X is nonpropositional, then X cannot be epistemically effi cacious
-with respect to Y (hypothetical syllogism, P1, P4).
-P5. If X cannot be epistemically effi cacious with respect to Y, then the
-nonpropositional cannot serve as the given.
-192 Willem A. deVries
-C2. The nonpropositional cannot serve as the given ( modus ponens , C1,
-P5).
-P6. No inferentially acquired, propositionally structured mental state is
-epistemically independent.
-P7. The epistemic status of noninferentially acquired, propositionally structured
-cognitive states presupposes the possession by the knowing subject
-of other empirical knowledge, both of particulars and of general empirical
-truths.
-P8. If noninferentially acquired empirical knowledge presupposes the possession
-by the knowing subject of other empirical knowledge, then noninferentially
-acquired, propositionally structured cognitive states are not
-epistemically independent.
-C3. Noninferentially acquired, propositionally structured cognitive states
-are not epistemically independent ( modus ponens , P7, P8).
-P8. Any empirical, propositional cognition is acquired either inferentially
-or noninferentially.
-C4. Propositionally structured cognitions, whether inferentially or noninferentially
-acquired, are never epistemically independent and cannot
-serve as the given (conjunction, P6, C3).
-P9. Every cognition is either propositionally structured or not.
-C5. Neither propositional or nonpropostitional cognitions can serve as
-the given (conjunction, C2, C4).
-P10. If neither propositional nor nonpropostitional cognitions can serve as
-the given, then it is reasonable to believe that no item of empirical
-knowledge can serve the function of a given.
-C6. It is reasonable to believe that no item of empirical knowledge can
-serve the function of a given ( modus ponens , C5, P10).
-49
-Sellars ’ “ Rylean Myth ”
-Willem A. deVries
-Sellars , Wilfrid . “ Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind , ” in Minnesota
-Studies in the Philosophy of Science , vol. I , edited by Herbert Feigl and
-Michael Scriven , 253 – 329 . Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press ,
-1956 . (EPM) Reprinted with additional footnotes in Science, Perception
-and Reality . London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963; reissued by
-Ridgeview Publishing Company in 1991. (SPR) Published separately as
-Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind: With an Introduction by
-Richard Rorty and a Study Guide by Robert Brandom , edited by Robert
-Brandom. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997. Also
-reprinted in W. deVries and T. Triplett, Knowledge, Mind, and the
-Given: A Reading of Sellars ’ “ Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. ”
-Cambridge, MA: Hackett, 2000. (KMG)
-___. “ Intentionality and the Mental , ” a correspondence with Roderick
-Chisholm, in Minnesota Studies in The Philosophy of Science , vol. II ,
-edited by Herbert Feigl , Michael Scriven , and Grover Maxwell , 507 – 39 .
-Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press , 1957 . Reprinted in
-Intentionality, Mind and Language , edited by Ausonio Marras. Chicago:
-University of Illinois Press, 1972.
-Marras , Ausonio . “ On Sellars ’ Linguistic Theory of Conceptual Activity . ”
-Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2 ( 1973 ): 471 – 83 .
-___. “ Reply to Sellars . ” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2 ( 1973 ):
-495 – 501 .
-___. “ Sellars on Thought and Language . ” Nous 7 ( 1973 ): 152 – 63 .
-___. “ Sellars ’ Behaviourism: A Reply to Fred Wilson . ” Philosophical Studies
-30 ( 1976 ): 413 – 18 .
-___. “ The Behaviourist Foundation of Sellars ’ Semantics . ” Dialogue
-(Canada) 16 ( 1977 ): 664 – 75 .
-Perner , Josef . Understanding the Representational Mind . Cambridge, MA :
-The MIT Press , 1991 .
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-194 Willem A. deVries
-The Cartesian tradition teaches that people have direct, privileged knowledge
-of their own mental states and that such knowledge possesses the
-highest epistemic warrant. For example, Descartes ’ wax example argument
-in the Second Meditation concludes that he knows his own mental states
-“ fi rst and best. ” The concepts employed in such knowledge are usually
-assumed to be either innate or derived by abstraction from the occurrence
-of those mental states. This is crucial to theories that make our knowledge
-of our own subjective mental states basic , for the foundation of our knowledge
-must be independent of all other knowledge. Thus, according to such
-foundationalist theories, both our knowledge of particular mental states
-and our knowledge of the concepts employed in the knowledge of particular
-mental states are “ givens. ” [See the argument that the given is a myth
-(#48).]
-Early in “ Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, ” Sellars attacked the
-idea that there could be a given in the sense that the Cartesian tradition
-demands, but that critique could not be very convincing without an alternative
-explanation of how we acquire concepts of the mental and why knowledge
-of our own mental states is immediate and privileged. So Sellars needs
-to establish that there is a coherent alternative to the traditional view that
-mentalistic concepts are given, either innately or abstracted directly from
-particular mental states. This is the point of the Rylean Myth. The Rylean
-Myth and the critique of the Myth of the Given reinforce each other,
-strengthening the conclusion that not even knowledge of subjective mental
-states is given.
-Concepts of the mental, therefore, are not fundamentally different in
-kind or mode of acquisition and application from other empirical concepts.
-Early - twentieth - century psychology (#93) sought to legitimate the empirical
-investigation of mind by construing psychology as the science of behavior
-and eschewing the need to talk of inner, subjective states. But by the time
-of Sellars ’ essay, it was increasingly acknowledged that a narrowly behavioristic
-approach to mind, both in philosophy and in psychology, was
-inadequate. Sellars ’ Rylean Myth shows how intersubjective, empirical concepts
-of subjective states are possible, arguing that they are like theoretical
-Triplett , Timm , and Willem deVries . “ Is Sellars ’ s Rylean Hypothesis Plausible?
-A Dialogue , ” in The Self - Correcting Enterprise: Essays on Wilfrid
-Sellars , Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the
-Humanities, vol. 9 , edited by Michael P. Wolf , 85 – 114 . New York :
-Rodopi , 2006 .
-Wellman , Henry M. The Child ’ s Theory of Mind . Cambridge, MA : The MIT
-Press , 1990 .
-Sellars’ “Rylean Myth” 195
-concepts. If so, the mental is as open to intersubjective empirical investigation
-as any other realm within the empirical world. Furthermore, if our
-concepts of the mental are empirical concepts acquired via theory postulation,
-like the concepts of unobservable micro - objects postulated in the
-natural sciences, then there is little reason to think that they apply to objects
-of an entirely different kind from other natural objects. This removes a
-motivation for Cartesian dualism.
-Sellars ’ approach to mentalistic concepts has been important for cognitive
-science, for it legitimates a naturalistic approach to the mind that
-nonetheless respects the internality of mental states. Indeed, it inspired the
-“ theory theory ” approach to folk psychology, a research program in cognitive
-science that develops the idea that in early childhood people acquire
-and learn to apply a theory - like conceptual structure that enables them to
-interpret the behavior of other people (see Perner and Wellman).
-Sellars ’ argument takes the form of a thought experiment. He asks us to
-imagine a community that lacks concepts of inner psychological states,
-although it possesses a complex language for describing and explaining
-objects and events in the world. This community also possesses a behaviorist
-’ s ability to describe and to explain human behavior, as well as metalinguistic
-abilities to describe and to prescribe linguistic behavior. Such a
-community, Sellars then argues, can reasonably increase its explanatory
-resources by extending its language/conceptual system by postulating unobservable
-states internal to each person. Further, there is a motive to postulate
-two different kinds of internal states: one kind – thoughts – has properties
-modeled on the semantic properties of overt linguistic events, while the
-other – sense impressions – has properties modeled on the properties of
-perceptible objects. If Sellars ’ story is coherent, then the traditional view
-that our concepts and knowledge of the mental is simply given is not
-compulsory.
-The principal objections to Sellars ’ Rylean Myth have been that the situation
-described in his thought experiment is either incoherent (Marras) or
-so empirically implausible as to be unworthy of serious consideration
-(Chisholm, Triplett). Could there really be people who have a rich physical
-language as well as a metalanguage yet lack all conception of internal psychological
-states, thoughts, and sense impressions?
-We [can] characterize the original Rylean language in which they described
-themselves and their fellows as not only a behavioristic language, but a behavioristic
-language which is restricted to the non - theoretical vocabulary of a
-behavioristic psychology. Suppose, now, that in the attempt to account for
-the fact that his fellow men behave intelligently not only when their conduct
-is threaded on a string of overt verbal episodes – that is to say, as we would
-put it when they “ think out loud ” – but also when no detectable verbal output
-is present, Jones develops a theory according to which overt utterances are
-196 Willem A. deVries
-but the culmination of a process which begins with certain inner episodes.
-And let us suppose that his model for these episodes which initiate the events
-which culminate in overt verbal behavior is that of overt verbal behavior itself.
-In other words, using the language of the model, the theory is to the effect
-that overt verbal behavior is the culmination of a process which begins with
-“ inner speech. ” (EPM § 56, in SPR, 186; in KMG, 266 – 67)
-P1. Concepts of mental states can be acquired only innately or by direct
-and privileged access to and abstraction from immediate experience of
-mental states, which are given by direct intuition (assumption for
-reductio ).
-P2. Consider a community of behaviorists with an intersubjectively available
-language that contains, besides object - level concepts, semantic ( ergo
-metalinguistic) concepts as well. Such a community would possess no
-concepts of the psychological.
-P3. Such a community would have available to it only the resources of
-narrow behaviorism to explain human behavior.
-P4. The resources of narrow behaviorism are not suffi cient to explain all
-human behavior.
-P5. If such a community would have available to it only the resources of
-narrow behaviorism to explain human behavior, then such a community
-would, therefore, face substantial puzzles about numerous forms of
-human behavior.
-C1. Such a community would, therefore, face substantial puzzles about
-numerous forms of human behavior ( modus ponens , P4, P5).
-P6. Such a community could enrich its explanatory resources by utilizing
-postulational scientifi c methodology.
-P7. If such a community could enrich its explanatory resources by utilizing
-postulational scientifi c methodology, then using utterances as a model,
-this technique could give rise to concepts of inner, speech - like episodes
-that cause some of the puzzling forms of behavior, and, indeed, cause as
-well the overt linguistic episodes they are modeled on.
-C2. Using utterances as a model, this technique could give rise to concepts
-of inner, speech - like episodes that cause some of the puzzling
-forms of behavior, and, indeed, cause as well the overt linguistic episodes
-they are modeled on ( modus ponens , P6, P7).
-P8. If other puzzling behaviors need to be explained, then the application
-of normal postulational scientifi c methodology, using perceptible objects
-as a model, could give rise to concepts of inner, qualitative states that
-are normally present when one perceives the perceptible object that is its
-model but can be present in one when the external object is absent.
-P9. If (P6) such a community could enrich its explanatory resources by
-utilizing postulational scientifi c methodology, and using utterances as a
-model, this technique could give rise to concepts of inner, (C2) speech -
-Sellars’ “Rylean Myth” 197
-like episodes that cause some of the puzzling forms of behavior, and,
-indeed, cause as well the overt linguistic episodes they are modeled on,
-and (P8) the application of normal postulational scientifi c methodology
-can explain other puzzling behaviors, then it is possible (and not in the
-sense of bare logical possibility, but in the sense that there is a coherent
-story with some empirical plausibility) that our concepts of the psychological
-are acquired in perfectly normal, intersubjectively available,
-empirical ways.
-C3. It is possible (and not in the sense of bare logical possibility, but in
-the sense that there is a coherent story with some empirical plausibility)
-that our concepts of the psychological are acquired in perfectly
-normal, intersubjectively available, empirical ways ( modus ponens ,
-P9, conjunction, P6, C2, P8).
-P10. It is not the case that concepts of mental states can be acquired only
-innately or by direct and privileged access to and abstraction from immediate
-experience of mental states which are given by direct intuition
-( reductio , P1 – P9).
-50
-Aristotle and the Argument to End
-All Arguments
-Toni Vogel Carey
-Aristotle . Metaphysics , translated by W. D. Ross. Oxford : Clarendon Press ,
-1908 .
-Friedman , Milton . Essays in Positive Economics . Chicago : University of
-Chicago Press , 1953 .
-Mill , John Stuart . A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive , in Collected
-Works of John Stuart Mill , vols. VII and VIII , edited by J. Robson .
-Toronto : Toronto University Press , 1973 .
-Parsons , Charles . “ Reason and Intuition , ” Synthese 125 ( 2000 ): 299 – 315 .
-This argument, which comes down from Aristotle, is one of the most fundamental
-in the history of thought. It is also one of the most abbreviated,
-however, which makes it easy to overlook. In the Metaphysics , Aristotle
-merely says:
-It is impossible that there should be demonstration of absolutely everything;
-[for then] there would be an infi nite regress, so that there would still
-be no demonstration. (1006a, 8 – 10)
-Here is an abridged version of Aristotle ’ s implicit reductio ad infi nitum
-argument:
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Aristotle and the Argument to End All Arguments 199
-P1. For any p , if p is a proposition, then reasons can be given for/
-against p .
-P2. p is a proposition.
-C1. Reasons can be given for/against P ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
-P3. q and r are reasons for/against p .
-P4. If q and r are propositions, then reasons can be given for/against q
-and r .
-P5. q is a proposition.
-C2. Reasons can be given for/against q ( modus ponens , P1, P5).
-P6. s and t are reasons for/against q .
-P7. If s and t are propositions, then reasons can be given for/against s
-and t .
-P8. s is a proposition.
-C3. Reasons can be given for/against s ( modus ponens P1, P8).
-P9. u and v are reasons for/against s .
-P10. If u and v are propositions, then reasons can be given for/against u
-and v .
-P11. u is a proposition.
-C4. Reasons can be given for/against u ( modus ponens , P1, 11).
-And so on, ad infi nitum (omitting r , t , and v for the sake of brevity).
-If we demand reasons for/against every proposition, in other words, we
-will be stuck in an endless process of justifi cation, unable to assert anything
-at all. As the philosopher of logic and mathematics Charles Parsons put it,
-“ The buck has to stop somewhere. ”
-This argument does not, of course, prevent us from giving reasons for
-many, indeed most, propositions. And even where we cannot give reasons
-for a proposition, it does not follow that we are therefore unjustifi ed in
-believing it. Some propositions may be self - evident – known intuitively, as
-“ evident without proof or reasoning, ” to quote Webster ’ s Ninth . That is
-how Aristotle viewed the logical law of noncontradiction and how others
-have treated moral rules like promise keeping. The American Declaration
-of Independence famously begins: “ We hold these truths to be
-self - evident. ”
-Then, too, while the buck has to stop somewhere, it need not always
-stop in the same place. We can assume the truth of a proposition merely
-conditionally, for the sake of argument. We can even assume that p is true
-for one argument and false for another. As the economic theorist Milton
-Friedman notes in his Essays in Positive Economics , “ there is no inconsistency
-in regarding the same fi rm as if it were a perfect competitor for one
-problem, and a monopolist for another, just as there is none in regarding
-the same chalk mark as a Euclidean line for one problem, a Euclidean
-surface for a second, and a Euclidean solid for a third ” (36).
-200 Toni Vogel Carey
-It is important, though, to know what proposition(s) one is taking as
-given. People are often unaware of their underlying premises or think them
-too obvious to mention. But marriages, friendships, and political alliances
-can come to a bad end simply because of unarticulated disagreements about
-where the buck stops.
-We hold some truths to be more self - evident than others, not only for
-the sake of argument, but without qualifi cation. Scientists operate on the
-assumption that whatever laws hold for the universe today will continue to
-hold tomorrow. And that the buck has to stop somewhere is even more
-foundational than this principle of induction. Philosophers have traditionally
-supposed there are some necessary truths; that is, propositions that
-could not, in any possible world, be false. If so, the Aristotelian argument
-we are considering is one of these.
-On the other hand, in “ Two Dogmas of Empiricism, ” the philosopher
-W. V. Quine put forward the idea that so - called necessary truths are merely
-those propositions we would be most reluctant to give up (#44). For many,
-the existence and benevolence of God is a belief to keep when all else fails.
-For Quine, though, no statement, not even a law of logic, is “ immune to
-revision. ”
-The argument we are considering is important because it shows that
-there are limitations to what reasoning can accomplish, which goes against
-our cherished belief that the exercise of reason can, in principle, settle all
-disputes. If the buck has to stop somewhere, then even in logic the ultimate
-appeal is not to reason, deductive or inductive, but to something closer to
-intuition. Aristotle had no trouble accepting this; nor, for that matter, did
-Einstein. But John Stuart Mill and others have made ‘ intuition ’ a term of
-ill repute – notwithstanding Mill ’ s assertion in A System of Logic that
-“ truths known by intuition are the original premises from which all others
-are inferred ” ( § 4).
-The trouble with intuition is that people are often loath to brook any
-challenge, however well taken, to their entrenched intuitive beliefs, making
-further discussion pointless, if not impossible; and this can lead to toxic
-forms of fanaticism. That one bases a belief on intuition does nothing to
-guarantee its truth. But fallible, and even dangerous, as intuitive beliefs can
-be, it does not follow that intuition should simply be discredited. As George
-Bealer notes in his entry on “ Intuition ” in the Supplement to the Encyclopedia
-of Philosophy , perception too is fallible (even dangerous at times), but no
-one thinks we should therefore discount it. On the contrary, it is a truism
-that “ seeing is believing. ”
-Valid logical inference is safe, while the appeal to intuition carries some
-risk. But what Aristotle ’ s argument shows is that valid logical inference
-itself rests on propositions (axioms) whose truth we accept intuitively; that
-is perforce where the buck stops.
-Part IV
-Ethics
-51
-Justice Brings Happiness in
-Plato ’ s Republic
-Joshua I. Weinstein
-Plato . Republic , translated by G. M. A. Grube and C. D. C. Reeve.
-Indianapolis : Hackett , 1992 .
-Cooper , John . “ Plato ’ s Theory of Human Motivation . ” History of Philosophy
-Quarterly 1 ( 1984 ): 3 – 21 .
-Korsgaard , Christine. “ Self - Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant . ”
-Journal of Ethics no. 3 ( 1999 ): 1 – 29 .
-Sachs , David. “ A Fallacy in Plato ’ s Republic . Philosophical Review 72 ( 1963 ):
-141 – 58 .
-Santas , Gerasimos . Understanding Plato ’ s Republic . Oxford : Wiley - Blackwell ,
-2010 .
-In its 300 - plus pages, Plato ’ s Republic addresses nearly every topic under
-the sun: tyranny and democracy, feminism and abortion, Homer and carpentry,
-musical scales and solid geometry, immortality and the afterlife, and
-why we hate ourselves for screwing up. But all these issues come up in the
-context of answering one big question: How should one live? What is the
-best kind of life to lead? In particular, why should one live a life of justice
-if the wicked seem to be better off?
-The main claim in the dialogue is that justice is an excellence or virtue
-( aret ê ) that brings eudaimonia , some integration of happiness, success, and
-contentment; one lives well if and only if one is a just person. Justice, on
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-204 Joshua I. Weinstein
-Plato ’ s account, is founded on how a person ’ s soul or psyche holds together,
-since only a person whose priorities are all straight can be counted on to
-behave properly. Also, only such a person can really live life to its fullest.
-The signifi cance of this argument extends beyond the fact that the
-Republic has been one of the most infl uential texts in the history of philosophy.
-Arguments of this general kind become more important as one becomes
-less confi dent that God rewards the virtuous and punishes the wicked. This
-argument had many successors in the ancient world and has been taken up
-in various ways in contemporary thought. (For a fuller introduction to the
-Republic and its main argument, see Santas. For a contemporary use of the
-Republic ’ s strategy, see Korsgaard.)
-The basic sketch of the argument is presented by Socrates at the end of
-Book 1, where he introduces the concept of ergon , the activity, work or
-function that typifi es a thing:
-And could eyes perform their function ( ergon ) well if they lacked their
-peculiar virtue ( aret ê ) and had the vice instead?
-How could they, for don ’ t you mean if they had blindness instead of
-sight? [ … ]
-So ears, too, deprived of their own virtue perform their function badly?
-That ’ s right. [ … ]
-Come, then, and let ’ s consider this: Is there some function of a soul that
-you couldn ’ t perform with anything else, for example, taking care of things,
-ruling, deliberating, and the like? Is there anything other than a soul to
-which you could rightly assign these, and say that they are its peculiar
-function?
-No, none of them.
-What of living? Isn ’ t that a function of the soul?
-It certainly is.
-And don ’ t we also say that there is a virtue of the soul?
-We do.
-Then, will a soul ever perform its function well, Thrasymachus, if it is
-deprived of its own peculiar virtue, or is that impossible?
-It ’ s impossible.
-Doesn ’ t it follow, then, that a bad soul rules and takes care of things
-badly and that good soul does all these things well?
-It does.
-Now we agreed that justice is a soul ’ s virtue, and injustice its vice?
-We did.
-Then, it follows that a just soul and a just man will live well, and an
-unjust one badly.
-Apparently so, according to your argument.
-And surely anyone who lives well is blessed and happy ( eudaim ô n ), and
-anyone who doesn ’ t is the opposite.
-Of course.
-Justice Brings Happiness in Plato’s Republic 205
-Therefore, a just person is happy, and an unjust one wretched.
-So be it.
-It profi ts no one to be wretched but to be happy.
-Of course.
-And so, Thrasymachus, injustice is never more profi table than justice.
-(Plato, 353b – 354a)
-P1. Every thing performs its activity or function ( ergon ) well if and only if
-it has its virtue or excellence ( aret ê ).
-P2. The activity of the soul is to live; that is, one lives by the soul.
-C1. One lives well if and only if one has the virtue of the soul (instantiation,
-P1).
-P3. Justice is the virtue of the soul.
-C2. One lives well if and only if one is just (substitution, P3 into C1).
-P4. One who lives well is happy; one who lives poorly is miserable.
-C3. The just person lives happily, the unjust lives miserably (substitution,
-P4 into C2).
-This sketch leads into the main body of the dialogue, which elaborates,
-clarifi es, and defends these premises and conclusions (among many other
-things!) Even the seemingly innocuous P4 comes in for examination (578a –
-592b). Though one might also wonder about P2 (does one really live only
-by the soul and not at all by the body?), the main diffi culty in this argument
-is clearly P3: how is justice the specifi c virtue of the soul? Much of the
-Republic is devoted to explaining and defending this premise.
-The defense of P3 is based on an analysis of the human psyche or soul.
-In particular, a human being is shown to be full of confl icting impulses and
-abilities so that only by ordering and integrating them can a person be “ at
-one. ” Thus, for example, one can both feel a bodily thirst and simultaneously
-know (say, from a medical expert) that it would be bad to drink
-(439a – d). Confl icts such as this need to be resolved by the principle that
-each part of oneself does what it should and does not meddle in the business
-of the other parts. Deciding is the job of reason, not of thirst. This
-principle makes possible self - unifi cation and psychic health, and when it is
-identifi ed as justice, P3 begins to look somewhat better:
-Even if one has every kind of food and drink, lots of money, and every
-sort of power to rule, life is thought to be not worth living when the body ’ s
-nature is ruined. So even if someone can do whatever he wishes [ … ] how can
-it be worth living when his soul – the very thing by which he lives – is ruined
-and in turmoil? (Plato, 445a)
-The fuller version of the argument, as it appears in Book 4 (434d – 445b),
-can be analyzed like this:
-206 Joshua I. Weinstein
-P1 ′ . The activity of the soul is to live.
-P2 ′ . Living consists of potentially contradictory sub - activities.
-C1 ′ . The soul performs potentially contradictory activities (substitution,
-P2 ′ into P1 ′ ).
-P3 ′ . Everything that performs potentially contradictory activities consists
-of parts.
-C2 ′ . The soul is composed of parts (instantiation, P3 ′ ).
-P4 ′ . Everything that is composed of parts performs its activity well if and
-only if each of its parts performs, and only performs, its own
-activities.
-C3 ′ . The soul performs its activity well if and only if each of its parts
-performs, and only performs, its own activity (instantiation, P4 ′ ).
-P5 ′ . Justice is doing what is one ’ s own, and not doing what is not one ’ s
-own.
-C4 ′ . The soul performs its activity well if and only if it is just (substitution,
-P5 ′ into C3 ′ ).
-C5 ′ . One lives well if and only if one is just (substitution, P1 ′ into C4 ′ ).
-P6 ′ . One who lives well is happy, one who lives poorly is miserable.
-C6 ′ . The just person lives happily, the unjust lives miserably (substitution,
-P6 ′ into C5 ′ ).
-This version of the argument is far more muscular and compelling than
-the original. The range of impulses it claims to integrate includes everything
-from the desire for sweet pastries and attractive partners, through the competitive
-urge to succeed and be respected (especially according to one ’ s
-parents ’ expectations), and on to the desire to overcome perplexity, escape
-one ’ s own ignorance, and contemplate eternity.
-But this version also has problems which remain hotly contested to this
-day. P3 ′ and the inference to C2 ′ are defended in a complex and controversial
-argument based on the principle that no one thing can do or undergo
-both one thing and its opposite at the same time in the same sense and
-respect (436b – 441c). This sub - argument is notable for probably being the
-fi rst recorded use of the principle of noncontradiction. Plato also argues
-here that the number of activities – and hence parts of the soul – is exactly
-three : sustenance by the appetites; control and stability by the spirited part;
-and guidance through deliberation and reason. (Cooper is a good place to
-begin examining this tripartition of the soul.) C4 ′ has also drawn much fi re,
-since it seems to depend on an equivocation on the meaning of a soul ’ s
-being “ just. ” Can one be just because all of one ’ s psychic parts work properly
-and together, even as one goes out to rob, cheat, and steal? Or is
-Socrates right in asserting that this is impossible? (See Sacks.)
-Do living well and treating others properly both depend on “ justice in
-the soul ” ; that is, minimizing internal discord and being “ in tune ” with
-Justice Brings Happiness in Plato’s Republic 207
-oneself? Freudian psychoanalysis and Eastern schools of yoga or meditation
-derive much of their appeal from similar arguments: “ You can ’ t live well
-without being an authentic, honest, person. ” “ A thief never sleeps well at
-night. ” “ You must fi nd inner peace and be at one. ” Plato ’ s version is not
-only older and more deeply rooted in Western culture, but the Republic
-also includes a detailed explication of how philosophy, politics, and pleasure
-all fi t into the one whole thing which is “ living one ’ s life well through
-achieving psychic harmony ” – that is, justice.
-52
-Aristotle ’ s Function Argument
-Sean McAleer 1
-Aristotle . Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics , translated by Terence Irwin.
-Indianapolis : Hackett , 1999 .
-The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (384 – 322 bce ) remains infl uential
-today, especially among advocates of virtue ethics (roughly, the view that
-moral philosophy should focus primarily the virtues rather than on duties
-or rights or good consequences). The Function Argument – so - called because
-it relies on the notion of a thing ’ s function or characteristic activity – is the
-centerpiece of the fi rst of the Nicomachean Ethics ’ ten books; Aristotle
-spends the remaining nine books elaborating on its conclusion by investigating
-its key terms (soul, virtue, etc.). The Function Argument concerns the
-nature of happiness ( eudaimonia ), which for Aristotle means not a momentary
-psychological state or mood but a life of fl ourishing or well - being. We
-all want to be happy, Aristotle thinks; happiness is the fi nal good or end
-that we seek, the ultimate reason we choose other things and which we
-don ’ t choose for the sake of anything else. But these formal features of
-happiness don ’ t give us a clear target to aim at in leading our lives. The
-task of the Function Argument, an ambitious and infl uential attempt to
-1 Work on this chapter was supported by the University of Wisconsin – Eau Claire Faculty
-Sabbatical Leave Program, for which the author is most grateful.
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Aristotle’s Function Argument 209
-arrive at moral truths by considering human nature, is to provide such a
-target; it boldly concludes that human beings can ’ t be happy without being
-virtuous.
-Some more conceptual background might be helpful. For Aristotle, the
-essence of a thing isn ’ t what it ’ s made of, or its DNA or chemical structure,
-but what activities it characteristically performs and ends it characteristically
-pursues: in other words, its function ( ergon ). This organ is a heart
-because its function is to pump blood, while that organ is a kidney because
-its function is to clean blood. Once you know a thing ’ s function, you have
-a standard by which to evaluate it: something is good when it performs its
-function well – when it achieves the good it characteristically seeks. For
-example, a knife ’ s function is to cut, so a good knife cuts well. A virtue or
-excellence ( aret ê ) is the condition or state that enables a thing to perform
-its function well. Thus the virtue of a knife is sharpness, since being sharp
-is what enables a knife to cut well. Aristotle takes these insights about the
-functions of artifacts and organs and applies them to human beings. He
-argues that human beings have a distinctive function, “ activity of the soul
-in accord with reasons ” – what we ’ ll simply call “ rationality, ” remembering
-that it has both theoretical and practical (action - oriented) aspects. Since the
-good for human beings is happiness, and the human function is rationality,
-Aristotle concludes that happiness is rationality in accord with virtue –
-though he concedes that external factors beyond our control can affect
-whether we fl ourish.
-Aristotle ’ s claim that rationality is the human function is controversial.
-Some philosophers think that human beings are too complex to have a
-single, distinctive function; others doubt that the function is rationality.
-Readers will also want to be sensitive to the various senses ‘ good ’ can
-have: a teleological sense, in which a good is an end or goal pursued or
-desired; a benefi cial sense, in which a thing is good for someone; an evaluative
-sense, in which a thing is good when it performs its function well; a
-moral sense, which goes beyond mere functional effi ciency.
-But presumably the remark that the best good is happiness is apparently
-something generally agreed, and we still need a clearer statement of what the
-best good is. Perhaps, then, we shall fi nd this if we fi rst grasp the function of
-a human being. For just as the good, i.e., doing well, for a fl autist, a sculptor,
-and every craftsman, and, in general, for whatever has a function and characteristic
-action, seems to depend on its function, the same seems to be true
-for a human being, if a human being has some function [ … ].
-Now we say that the function of a kind of thing – of a harpist, for instance
-– is the same in kind as the function of an excellent individual of the kind
-– of an excellent harpist, for instance. And the same is true without qualifi cation
-in every case, if we add to the function the superior achievement in accord
-with the virtue; for the function of a harpist is to play the harp, and the
-210 Sean McAleer
-function of a good harpist is to play it well. Moreover, we take the
-human function to be a certain kind of life, and take this life to be activity
-and actions of the soul that involve reason; hence the function of the excellent
-man is to do this well and fi nely.
-Now each function is completed well by being completed in accord
-with the virtue proper to that kind of thing. And so the human good proves
-to be activity of the soul in accord with virtue, and indeed with the best
-and most complete virtue, if there are more virtues than one. (I.7:
-1097b23 – 1098a18)
-P1. The good for members of a kind is to perform well the function distinctive
-of their kind.
-P2. To perform well the function distinctive of one ’ s kind is to perform it
-in accord with the relevant virtue(s).
-C1. The good for members of any kind is to perform their distinctive
-function in accord with the relevant virtue(s) (transitivity of identity,
-P1, P2).
-P3. The function distinctive of humans is rationality.
-C2. The good for humans is rationality in accord with virtue (substitution,
-C1, P3).
-P4. Happiness is the good for humans.
-C3. Happiness is rationality in accord with virtue (transitivity of identity,
-C2, P4).
-53
-Aristotle ’ s Argument that Goods
-Are Irreducible
-Jurgis (George) Brakas
-Aristotle . Nicomachean Ethics , translated by W. D. Ross, revised by J. O.
-Urmson, and edited by Jonathan Barnes . Princeton, NJ : Princeton
-University Press , 1984 .
-Brakas , Jurgis . Philosophiegeschicte und logische Analyse/Logical Analysis
-and History of Philosophy , VI ( 2003 ): 23 – 74 .
-For most philosophers seeking to discover the nature of the good, the
-assumption underlying their quest is that the good is one thing – certainly
-when they are seeking the good for human beings, if not the good in general.
-This is a very natural assumption to make. If you say “ health is a good (or
-a value), ” “ wealth is a good, ” and “ my life is a good, ” it is reasonable to
-think that “ a good ” (or “ a value ” ) means the same thing when you make
-such claims. Aristotle, however, disagrees. While discussing the good for
-humanity in the Nicomachean Ethics , he suddenly shifts to a discussion of
-the good in general and argues that it cannot be one thing. In other words,
-for Aristotle, the senses of the good – or “ value ” – are irreducible (#60).
-His target here is not just his teacher, Plato, who did believe that the good
-is one thing (the Form of the good), but, more broadly, anyone who believes
-that the good is one thing (whatever that may be). Many would say that
-this is a very undesirable outcome, since it would mean that goods by nature
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-212 Jurgis (George) Brakas
-are “ fragmented, ” not capable of being placed in a hierarchy consistently
-derived from one fundamental good.
-Aristotle ’ s basic strategy is to argue that goods fall into every one of his
-categories of being – that is, into substance (or “ the what ” ), quality, quantity,
-and the rest because “ the good ” signifi es things in all of them. If they
-really do fall into all the categories, then they cannot be reduced to one
-thing, since they do not have anything in common. For example, although
-human being and ox can be reduced to animal (a substance) and blue and
-yellow to color (a quality), human being and blue cannot be reduced to one
-thing because they have no genus in common. There is just one problem
-here: why does Aristotle believe that goods exist in all the categories if “ the
-good ” signifi es things in all of them? You can make any word signify whatever
-you please, but that does not mean that what it signifi es exists – in the
-categories or anywhere else. However, a good case can be made that “ the
-good ” signifying things in all the categories that Aristotle has in mind here
-is the one signifying real, not apparent, goods – doing so by using his
-method of endoxa (interpreted in a certain way), a method which allows
-him to separate opinion from knowledge and the apparent from the real.
-The interpretation offered here of the passage where Aristotle makes this
-argument is new. The passage has been remarkably resistant to satisfactory
-interpretation, defying the efforts of scholars for about a century (see
-Brakas).
-[S]ince “ the good ” is uttered signifying something in as many ways as
-“ being ” [is] {for it is uttered signifying things in [the category of] the “ what ”
-(for example, god – that is, mind) and in [the category of] quality (the virtues)
-and in [the category of] quantity (the moderate[ - amount]) and in [the category
-of] the relative (the useful) and in [the category of] time ([the] opportune - time)
-and in [the category of] place ([an] abode) and other things such as these}, it
-is clear that it cannot be some common universal – that is, one thing; for
-[then] it would not be uttered signifying things in all the categories but in one
-only. (Aristotle A6: 1096a23 – 9; author ’ s translation)
-In fairness to Aristotle, I must add that he does not remain content
-with this negative conclusion. After having fi elded fi ve or six arguments to
-prove that the good cannot be one thing, he goes on in the same chapter
-to ask:
-But what, then, does [ “ the good ” ] signify? 1 It certainly is not like the things
-bearing the same name by chance. But then do absolutely all goods belong
-to one class at least by being [derived] from one thing or [by being] relative
-to one thing? Or [do they belong to one class] rather by analogy (for as sight
-1 Literally: “ But how, then, is it uttered signifying something? ”
-Aristotle’s Argument that Goods Are Irreducible 213
-is in the body, so reason is in the soul, and so on in other cases)? (Aristotle,
-1096b26 – 9; author ’ s translation)
-He dismisses such questions “ for now, ” since exact statements about
-them “ would be more appropriate to another branch of philosophy ”
-(Aristotle, 1096b30 – 1). His promise, unfortunately is not fulfi lled – at least
-not in the extant works. Even so, I believe a plausible reconstruction of his
-answers to these questions can be given. However, no such reconstruction
-is in print yet.
-P1. “ The good ” signifi es things in all the categories of being.
-P2. If “ the good ” signifi es things in all the categories of being, then goods
-exist in all the categories of being.
-C1. Goods exist in all the categories of being ( modus ponens , P2, P1).
-P3. If goods exist in all the categories of being, then goods cannot be
-reduced to some universal common to all goods.
-C2. Goods cannot be reduced to some universal common to all goods
-( modus ponens , P3, C1).
-P4. If goods cannot be reduced to some universal common to all goods,
-then the good is not one thing.
-C3. The good is not one thing ( modus ponens , P4, C2).
-54
-Aristotle ’ s Argument for
-Perfectionism
-Eric J. Silverman
-Aristotle . Nicomachean Ethics , translated by Martin Ostwald. Upper Saddle
-River, NJ : Prentice Hall , 1999 .
-Anscombe , G. E. M. “ Modern Moral Philosophy . ” Philosophy 33 , 24 ( 1958 ):
-1 – 19 .
-Aquinas , Thomas . Treatise on Happiness , translated by John A. Oesterle.
-South Bend, IN : University of Notre Dame Press , 1983 .
-Broadie , Sarah . Ethics with Aristotle . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1993 .
-Cahn , Steven M. , and Christine Vitrano . Happiness: Classic and Contemporary
-Readings in Philosophy . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2008 .
-One long - disputed issue in ethics concerns the nature of the supreme good
-for humanity. In other words, what is the best possible life that a person
-can lead? This supreme good is commonly referred to as “ happiness ” or
-“ the happy life. ” Several of the ancient Greek philosophers held a view
-called “ perfectionism, ” which claims that the ongoing exercise of moral
-and intellectual virtue constitutes the best possible life for humanity.
-Aristotle ’ s Nicomachean Ethics offers the most infl uential of the ancient
-arguments for viewing the life of virtue rather than the life of pleasure,
-wealth, honor, or amusement as humanity ’ s supreme good. Aristotle ’ s perfectionistic
-views infl uenced the ethics of medieval theists such as Thomas
-Aquinas and Moses Maimonides. While his views were less infl uential
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Aristotle’s Argument for Perfectionism 215
-during the modern era, some of them were reintroduced when G. E. M.
-Anscombe ’ s “ Modern Moral Philosophy ” inaugurated the contemporary
-virtue ethics movement.
-Aristotle ’ s argument for perfectionism is grounded in a controversial
-account of human nature. Since he holds a teleological view of the universe,
-he claims that all things – including human beings – have an ultimate function
-or purpose for which they exist. Aristotelian terminology refers to this
-ultimate purpose as a “ fi nal cause. ” Therefore, he claims that the supreme
-good for humanity is to achieve this ultimate purpose. He establishes two
-criteria for recognizing the supreme good for humanity: it must be desired
-as an end in itself rather than as a means to some further good, and it must
-be suffi cient in itself for making life good. Finally, he claims that the virtuous
-life fulfi lls humanity ’ s ultimate purpose by actualizing the intellectual
-and moral potentials distinctive of our species. Accordingly, he argues that
-the virtuous life better fi ts the criteria for happiness than other lifestyles.
-Since there are evidently several ends, and since we choose some of these
-– e.g., wealth, fl utes, and instruments generally – as a means to something
-else, it is obvious that not all ends are fi nal. The highest good, on the other
-hand, must be something fi nal. Thus, if there is only one fi nal end, this will
-be the good we are seeking; if there are several, it will be the most fi nal and
-perfect of them. We call that which is pursued as an end in itself more fi nal
-than an end which is pursued for the sake of something else; and what is
-never chosen as a means to something else we call more fi nal than that which
-is chosen both as an end in itself and as a means to something else. What is
-always chosen as an end in itself and never as a means to something else is
-called fi nal in an unqualifi ed sense. This description seems to apply to happiness
-above all else: for we always choose happiness as an end in itself and
-never for the sake of something else. Honor, pleasure, intelligence, and all
-virtue we choose partly for themselves – for we would choose each of them
-even if no further advantage would accrue from them – but we also choose
-them partly for the sake of happiness, because we assume that it is through
-them that we will be happy. On the other hand, no one chooses happiness
-for the sake of honor, pleasure, and the like, nor as a means to anything
-at all.
-We arrive at the same conclusion if we approach the question from the
-standpoint of self - suffi ciency. For the fi nal and perfect good seems to be self -
-suffi cient. (Aristotle, 1097a26 – 1097b8)
-P1. There is a supreme good for humanity, commonly referred to as
-happiness.
-P2. If a good is desired as an end in itself and is suffi cient for making life
-good, then that good constitutes happiness.
-P3. The virtuous life fulfi lls a human being ’ s function by actualizing that
-person ’ s full potential.
-216 Eric J. Silverman
-P4. If some good fulfi lls a human being ’ s function by actualizing that person
-’ s full potential, then that good is desired as an end in itself.
-C1. The virtuous life is desired by human beings as an end in itself
-( modus ponens , P3, P4).
-P5. If some good fulfi lls a human being ’ s function, then it is suffi cient for
-making that being ’ s life good.
-C2. The virtuous life is suffi cient for making a human being ’ s life good
-( modus ponens , P3, P5).
-C3. The virtuous life is desired as an end in itself and is suffi cient for
-making life good (conjunction, C1, C2).
-C4. The virtuous life constitutes happiness, the supreme good for humanity
-( modus ponens , P2, C3).
-55
-Categorical Imperative as the
-Source for Morality
-Joyce Lazier
-Kant , Immanuel . The Metaphysics of Morals , translated by Mary Gregor.
-New York : Cambridge University Press , 1991 .
-Kant ’ s deontological ethical theory relies on two assumptions used to
-deduce the categorical imperative. The fi rst is that morality is for all, or
-what is wrong for one to do is wrong for everyone to do. The second is
-that morality is grounded on reason and not experience. Combining these
-two assumptions, Kant arrives at the categorical imperative. The following
-reconstruction of Kant ’ s arguments for the categorical imperative brings to
-the forefront two major problems. First, the use of disjunction opens up
-Kant ’ s argument to the fallacy of the excluded middle, and second, the
-reconstruction also makes more apparent Kant ’ s reliance on teleology. Not
-many thinkers today believe that everything has a specifi c, defi ned end that
-belongs only to it. The arguments are taken from The Metaphysics of
-Morals, parts 216, 222, and 225.
-But it is different with the teachings of morality. They command for everyone,
-without taking account of his inclinations, merely because and insofar
-as he is free and has practical reason. He does not derive instruction in its
-laws from observing himself and his animal nature or from perceiving the
-ways of the world what happens and how men behave (although the German
-word Sitten , like the Latin mores , means only manners and customs). Instead,
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-218 Joyce Lazier
-reason commands how men are to act even though no example of this could
-be found and it takes no account of the advantages we can thereby gain,
-which only experience could teach us. For although reason allows us to seek
-our advantage in every way possible to us and can even promise us, on the
-testimony of experience, that it will probably be more to our advantage on
-the whole to obey its commands than to transgress them especially if obedience
-is accompanied with prudence, still the authority of its precepts as commands
-is not based on these considerations. Instead it uses them (as counsels)
-only as a counterweight against inducements to the contrary, to offset in
-advance the error of biased scales in practical appraisal, and only then to
-ensure that the weight of a pure practical reason ’ s a priori grounds will turn
-the scales in favor of the authority of its precepts. (216)
-An imperative is a practical rule by which an action in itself contingent is
-made necessary. An imperative differs from a practical law in that a law
-indeed represents an action as necessary but takes no account of whether this
-action already inheres by an inner necessity in the acting subject (as in a holy
-being) or whether it is contingent (as in man); for where the former is the
-case there is no imperative. Hence an imperative is a rule the representation
-of which makes necessary an action that is subjectively contingent and thus
-represents the subject as one that must be constrained (necessitated) to
-conform with the rule. A categorical (unconditional) imperative is one that
-represents an action as objectively necessary and makes it necessary not indirectly
-through the representation of some end that can be attained by the
-action but through the mere representation of this action itself (its form), and
-hence directly. No other practical doctrine can furnish instances of such
-imperatives than that which prescribes obligation (the doctrine of morals).
-All other imperative are technical and are, one and all, conditional. The
-ground of the possibility of categorical imperative is this: that they refer to
-no other property of choice (by which some purpose can be ascribed to it)
-than simply to its freedom. (222)
-The categorical imperative, which as such only affi rms what obligation is,
-is: Act upon a maxim that can also hold as a universal law. You must therefore
-fi rst consider your actions in terms of their subjective principles; but you can
-know whether this principle also holds objectively only in this way: That
-when your reason subjects it to the test of conceiving yourself as also giving
-universal law through it, it qualifi es for such a giving of universal law. (225)
-P1. A human is free and has practical reason.
-P2. Either practical reason or experience uses perceptions of the ways of
-the world and actions of humans as sources of its laws.
-P3. Practical reason does not use the ways of the world and actions of
-humans as sources of its laws.
-C1. Experience uses perceptions of the ways of the world and actions of
-humans as sources of its laws (disjunctive syllogism, P2, P3).
-Categorical Imperative as the Source for Morality 219
-P4. Either practical reason or experience teaches us how to act given the
-advantages we can gain.
-P5. Practical reason does not teach us how to act given the advantages we
-can gain.
-C2. Experience teaches us how to act given the advantages we can gain
-(disjunctive syllogism, P4, P5).
-P6. Either practical reason or experience bases the authority of its precepts
-on how much advantages we can gain.
-P7. Practical reason does not use perceived advantages as the basis of the
-authority of its commands.
-C3. Experience does use perceived advantages as the basis of the authority
-of its commands (disjunctive syllogism, P6, P10).
-P8. Either experience or a priori grounds are the source of practical reason ’ s
-authority.
-P9. Experience is not the source of practical reason ’ s authority.
-C4. A priori grounds are the source of practical reason ’ s authority (disjunctive
-syllogism, P8, P9).
-P10. If practical reason ’ s source of authority is a priori , then it commands
-for everyone without taking into account one ’ s inclinations.
-P11. Practical reason ’ s source of authority is a priori (C4).
-C5. Practical reason commands for everyone without taking into account
-one ’ s inclinations ( modus ponens , P10, P11).
-P12. Either morality comes from experience or it comes from practical
-reason.
-P13.The teachings of morality do not stem from experience.
-C6. The teachings of morality stem from practical reason (disjunctive
-syllogism, P12, P13).
-P14. If practical reason is the source of morality ’ s commands, then morality
-commands for everyone without taking into account one ’ s inclinations.
-P15. Practical reason is the source of morality ’ s commands.
-C7. The teachings of morality command for everyone without taking
-into account one ’ s inclinations ( modus ponens , P14, P15).
-P16. If a law represents an action as necessary, then it is not a practical law.
-P17. Imperatives are laws that represent an action as necessary
-C8. Imperatives are not practical laws ( modus ponens , P16, P17).
-P18. If something is an imperative, then it necessitates an action.
-P19. If something necessitates an action, then it must constrain the subject
-to conform to that rule.
-C9. If something is an imperative, then it is a rule that necessitates an
-action through constraint of the subject to conform to that rule (hypothetical
-syllogism, P18, P19).
-P20. If an imperative is categorical, then it represents an action as objectively
-necessary.
-220 Joyce Lazier
-P21. If an action is represented as objectively necessary, then it is not
-because of some end that can be attained.
-C10. If an imperative is categorical, then it is not because of some end
-that can be attained (hypothetical syllogism, P20, P21).
-P22. If an imperative is categorical, then it makes an action necessary
-directly through representation of the action itself (its form).
-P23. If an action is made necessary directly through representation of the
-action itself (its form), then it is grounded in freedom of choice (and not
-a subjective end).
-C11. If an imperative is categorical, then it is grounded in freedom of
-choice (and not a subjective end) (hypothetical syllogism, P22, P23).
-P24. If an imperative is grounded in freedom of choice (and not some subjective
-end), then reason subjects the maxim of action as conceiving itself
-as a universal law.
-P25. If the maxim of action can be conceived as a universal law, then it
-holds objectively.
-C12. If an imperative is grounded in freedom of choice, then it holds
-objectively (hypothetical syllogism, P24, P25).
-P26. A categorical imperative is grounded in freedom of choice.
-C13. A categorical imperative holds objectively ( modus ponens , C12,
-P26).
-P27. If the categorical imperative holds objectively, then it is the source of
-morality.
-C14. A categorical imperative is the source of morality ( modus ponens ,
-P27, C13).
-56
-Kant on Why Autonomy
-Deserves Respect
-Mark Piper
-Guyer , Paul . “ Kant on the Theory and Practice of Autonomy , ” in Autonomy ,
-edited by Ellen Frankel Paul , Fred D. Miller , Jr. , and Jeffrey Paul , 70 – 98 .
-Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 2003 .
-Kant , Immanuel . Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals , translated and
-edited by Mary Gregor . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press ,
-1998 .
-According to a widespread view, there is something important about autonomy
-in virtue of which it deserves special respect. More often than not, the
-claim that autonomy deserves respect comes into play in relation to particular
-autonomous choices or acts of will. An autonomous choice is not a
-thoughtless or offhand choice; rather, it is a choice that expresses a person ’ s
-nature, freedom, preferences, or values – a person ’ s “ deep self ” – in a powerful
-and signifi cant way. As such, it is a choice that seems, according to
-many philosophers and nonphilosophers alike, to generate special demands
-of respect on others. This notion of the special respect owed to autonomy
-is pervasive throughout popular culture and philosophical discourse. It has
-application in debates concerning the ground of human dignity, the ground
-of human rights (including the defense of specifi c rights such as the right
-to free speech), the limits of intersubjective interference, medical ethics
-debates (including debates surrounding euthanasia and the physician –
-patient relationship), the justifi cation of liberal education, the justifi cation
-of liberal government, and the justifi cation of the wrongness of paternalism.
-The classic source for the view that autonomy deserves special respect is
-Immanuel Kant, and the following is a reconstruction of the core aspects
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-222 Mark Piper
-of Kant ’ s argument for this claim. It should be noted that the reconstruction
-of this argument is, given Kant ’ s dense and sometimes labyrinthine writing
-style, a diffi cult task, sometimes requiring reading between the lines or supplying
-premises that Kant does not provide explicitly. The key to the argument
-is Kant ’ s insistence that the only acts of will that deserve respect are
-those acts of will that are truly free (according to Kant ’ s understanding of
-“ freedom ” ). It should quickly be added that Kant understood the concept
-of “ respect ” in a very robust way: according to Kant, to say that something
-deserves respect is to say that it is an object of true and proper esteem.
-Moreover, it is important to note that for Kant, what it means for a person
-to be free is for that person not to be dominated by his or her inclinations
-or desires but rather to will and to act in accordance with universal laws
-of reason. Lastly, it should be noted that a number of philosophers have
-agreed with Kant that autonomy deserves respect but have disagreed with
-Kant about what autonomy fundamentally is. More specifi cally, some philosophers
-have claimed that it is possible for autonomous acts of will to
-contain, or to be based on, inclinations.
-For an object as the effect of my proposed action I can indeed have inclination
-but never respect, just because it is merely an effect and not an activity
-of the will. In the same way I cannot have respect for inclination as such,
-whether it is mine or that of another; I can at most in the fi rst case approve
-it and in the second sometimes even love it, that is, regard it as favorable to
-my advantage. Only what it connected with my will solely as ground and
-never as effect, what does not serve my inclination but outweighs it or at least
-excludes it altogether from calculations in making a choice – hence the mere
-law for itself – can be an object of respect and so a command. (Kant AK
-4:400)
-P1. If an act of will is free, then it deserves respect.
-P2. If an act of will is not free, then it does not deserve respect.
-P3. If an act of will is dependent on an object of desire, then it is not a free
-act of will.
-P4. If an act of will is in no way infl uenced by any object of desire but is
-rather exercised in accordance with its own law, then it is a free act of
-will.
-P5. An inclination is dependent on objects of desire.
-C1. Inclinations are not free acts of will ( modus ponens , P3, P5)
-C2. Inclinations do not deserve respect ( modus ponens , P2, C1).
-P6. An autonomous act of will is in no way infl uenced by any object of
-desire but is rather exercised in accordance with its own law.
-C3. Autonomous acts of will are free acts of will ( modus ponens , P4,
-P6).
-C4. Autonomous acts of will deserve respect ( modus ponens , P1, C3).
-57
-Mill ’ s Proof of Utilitarianism
-A. T. Fyfe
-Mill , John Stuart . “ Of What Sort of Proof the Principle of Utility Is
-Susceptible , ” in Utilitarianism . London : Parker, Son, and Bourn , 1863 .
-___. “ Excerpt from a Letter to Henry Jones , ” in The Classical Utilitarians:
-Bentham and Mill , edited by John Troyer . Indianapolis : Hackett , 2003 .
-Millgram , Elijah . “ Mill ’ s Proof of the Principle of Utility . ” Ethics 110 ( 2000 ):
-282 – 310 .
-Sayre - McCord , Geoffrey . “ Mill ’ s ‘ Proof ’ of the Principle of Utility: A More
-than Half - Hearted Defense . ” Social Philosophy & Policy 18 , 2 ( 2001 ):
-330 – 60 .
-Utilitarianism, as summarized by one of its chief proponents, John Stuart
-Mill (1806 – 73), is the moral theory that “ actions are right in proportion
-as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the
-reverse of happiness. ” Therefore, viewing matters as Mill would, Robin
-Hood is not immoral for stealing from the rich to give to the poor, because
-in doing so he is able to produce more happiness in the world than would
-have otherwise existed. Likewise, if I possess excess wealth, it would be
-immoral of me to withhold that wealth from others for whom it would do
-more good. If, for example, I am considering new shoes when my present
-pair is fully functional, I should instead donate that excess wealth to famine
-relief. In both instances, Mill would have the agent in question perform
-whichever available action would best reduce unhappiness and promote
-happiness in the world.
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-224 A. T. Fyfe
-Utilitarianism is generally understood to be the combination of two
-separate moral theories. First, utilitarianism is a form of “ consequentialism,
-” since it holds that the rightness or wrongness of an action depends
-solely upon the goodness or badness of that action ’ s consequences. Second,
-utilitarianism is a form of “ welfarism, ” since it holds that the goodness or
-badness of an action ’ s consequences depends solely upon the amount of
-happiness and unhappiness brought about by that action (i.e., the action ’ s
-effect on people ’ s welfare). Therefore, any argument for utilitarianism must
-aim to prove not one but two separate claims: a consequentialist “ theory
-of the right ” (i.e., what is right and wrong) and a welfarist “ theory of the
-good ” (i.e., what is good and bad).
-Examining J. S. Mill ’ s famous argument for utilitarianism, it is clear that
-Mill simply takes for granted a consequentialist theory of the right rather
-than providing an argument for it. As a result, even if Mill ’ s argument for
-utilitarianism succeeds, it will only prove half of what utilitarianism consists
-in, a welfarist theory of value. Taking what Mill says at face value, his
-argument begins with the claim that the only way we come to know that
-something is visible or audible is through seeing or hearing it. Mill then
-concludes, by analogy, that the only way to prove that something is desirable
-(i.e., worth desiring; good) is by appealing to what we actually do
-desire. After using this analogy with audibility and visibility to establish the
-only method for proving that something is desirable, Mill argues that happiness
-is the only intrinsic good in existence since (1) people do desire it,
-and (2) it is the only thing that people desire for its own sake. With this
-result in hand, Mill then concludes his argument for utilitarianism – or at
-least utilitarianism ’ s welfarist aspect – by inferring that since an increase in
-a person ’ s happiness is good for that person, an increase in all persons ’
-happiness is good for all persons.
-This is a notoriously bad argument. If this straightforward reading accurately
-refl ects the argument Mill means to give, then he has committed a
-number of elementary logical mistakes. In the fi rst part of his argument,
-Mill states that because people desire happiness, it follows that happiness
-must be “ desirable. ” However, “ desirable ” has two possible meanings, and
-Mill seems to be equivocating between them. Since “ audible ” just means
-“ possible to hear ” and “ visible ” just means “ possible to see, ” in order for
-his analogy to work, Mill must mean “ possible to desire ” when he talks of
-something as being “ desirable. ” However, to prove that what we desire is
-good, by “ desirable ” Mill must mean “ worthy of desire ” or “ good. ” While
-it is possible that Mill is not confused and not equivocating between these
-two senses of “ desirable, ” this would only mean that he is instead guilty of
-committing the “ naturalistic fallacy ” ; that is, the fallacy of either inferring
-how things should be merely from how things actually are (in this case,
-what we should desire from what we do desire) or trying to defi ne a moral
-Mill’s Proof of Utilitarianism 225
-concept with a nonmoral concept (in this case, Mill would be defi ning
-“ worthy of desire ” and “ good ” as just amounting to “ desired ” ).
-Mill ’ s apparent logical errors continue when, at the tail end of his argument,
-Mill seems to commit the “ fallacy of composition. ” One commits
-this fallacy whenever one tries to infer something about a whole simply
-because it is true of the whole ’ s parts. For example, I would be guilty of
-the fallacy of composition if I were to infer that tables were invisible to the
-naked eye just because tables are made of atoms, and atoms are invisible
-to the naked eye. Mill seems to be committing this fallacy when he infers
-that the general happiness is good for the group of all persons simply from
-the fact that he has proven that personal happiness is good for an individual
-person.
-Is this straightforward reading of Mill ’ s argument for utilitarianism
-correct? Did Mill really put forth an argument for half of utilitarianism that
-is itself riddled with the simplest of logical mistakes? This is unlikely. As a
-result, philosophers have developed a number of more charitable alternative
-interpretations in an attempt to uncover what Mill actually intended. One
-possible way in which philosophers have thought to alter our interpretation
-of Mill ’ s argument for the better is by taking his analogy to be an attempt
-to show that desire functions as an “ indicator ” or “ evidence ” of goodness.
-For example, when someone thinks she hears something and there is no
-reason to think that she is mistaken, then it plausible for us to conclude
-that there actually is a sound present. On this reading of Mill ’ s argument,
-desire similarly serves as an indicator of something worthy of desire actually
-being present. Such an interpretation would avoid equivocating between
-the two senses of “ desirable ” and would also prevent Mill from falling prey
-to the naturalistic fallacy. This more charitable interpretation also has the
-advantage of fi tting in well with Mill ’ s empiricist philosophical attitude.
-Another way in which we might alter our interpretation of Mill ’ s argument
-for the better is by reinterpreting his apparent commitment of the
-fallacy of composition to instead be an argument concerning how the value
-of happiness for an individual must depend on its intrinsic value. Specifi cally,
-Mill could be interpreted as arguing that if happiness is good for an individual
-to possess, then happiness itself must be good. But if happiness itself
-is good and if we are to judge the moral rightness of our actions by how
-much good they produce, then the rightness of my actions would depend
-not only on how much of my happiness they result in, but also on how my
-actions affect the happiness of others.
-However, this does not exhaust the numerous alternative interpretations
-of Mill ’ s argument. In fact, Mill ’ s remarks about the impossibility of providing
-a proof of utilitarianism have led some philosophers to conclude
-that Mill never meant to be giving an argument for utilitarianism in the
-fi rst place. Of course, no matter how successful Mill ’ s argument for
-226 A. T. Fyfe
-utilitarianism might be under some particular interpretation (if we interpret
-him to be giving one at all), Mill is still only arguing for utilitarianism ’ s
-welfarist aspect. As we noted at the outset, Mill ’ s argument fails to address
-consequentialism entirely. Mill simply takes for granted that it is “ the doctrine
-of rational persons of all schools ” that “ the morality of actions
-depends on the consequences which they tend to produce. ” This has become
-increasingly regrettable, since much of the controversy surrounding utilitarianism
-has come to concern precisely its consequentialist aspect, something
-that Mill found so uncontroversial that he didn ’ t even provide an
-argument for it.
-The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that
-people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people
-hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend,
-the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is
-that people do actually desire it. If the end which the utilitarian doctrine
-proposes to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an
-end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so. No reason can
-be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so
-far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however,
-being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all
-which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each person ’ s
-happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a
-good to the aggregate of all persons. Happiness has made out its title as one
-of the ends of conduct, and consequently one of the criteria of morality. (Mill
-“ Of What Sort of Proof, ” 61)
-As to the sentence [ . . . ] when I said the general happiness is a good to the
-aggregate of all persons I did not mean that every human being ’ s happiness
-is a good to every other human being, [ . . . ] I merely meant in this particular
-sentence to argue that since A ’ s happiness is a good, B ’ s a good, C ’ s a good,
-etc., the sum of all these goods must be a good. (Mill “ Excerpt from a Letter, ”
-270)
-Generic Argument for Traditional Utilitarianism
-P1. Consequentialist Theory of the Right. An action is right for someone
-to perform if and only if, of the available actions, it is the action that
-would maximize total net good over bad in existence – otherwise, the
-action is wrong.
-P2. Welfarist Theory of the Good. The only intrinsic good is someone ’ s
-happiness while the only intrinsic bad is someone ’ s unhappiness.
-C1. Traditional Utilitarianism. An action is right for someone to perform
-if and only if, of the available actions, it is the action that would
-Mill’s Proof of Utilitarianism 227
-maximize total net happiness over unhappiness in existence – otherwise,
-the action is wrong (substitution, P1, P2).
-Mill ’ s Proof of Utilitarianism (Straightforward Interpretation)
-P1. The only proof that an object is visible is that people actually see it.
-P2. The only proof that a sound is audible is that people actually hear it.
-C1. The only proof that a thing is desirable is that people actually desire
-it (analogical inference, P1, P2).
-P3. If the only proof that a thing is desirable is that people actually desire
-it and each person actually desires happiness for herself, then each person
-’ s happiness is desirable for herself.
-P4. Each person actually desires happiness for herself.
-C2. The only proof that a thing is desirable is that people actually desire
-it and each person actually desires happiness for herself (conjunction,
-C1, P4).
-C3. Each person ’ s happiness is desirable for herself ( modus ponens , P3,
-C2).
-C4. The general happiness is desirable for the aggregate of all persons
-(fallacy of composition, C3).
-Mill ’ s Proof of Utilitarianism (One Alternative Interpretation)
-P1. The only proof that a visible thing exists is that people actually see it
-and there is no reason to think they are mistaken.
-P2. The only proof that an audible sound exists is that people actually hear
-it and there is no reason to think they are mistaken.
-C1. The only proof that a desirable thing exists is that people actually
-desire it and there is no reason to think they are mistaken (analogical
-inference, P1, P2).
-P3. Each person actually desires happiness for himself and there is no reason
-to think he is mistaken.
-C2. Each person ’ s happiness is desirable for himself (semantic consequence,
-C1, P3).
-P4. If each person ’ s happiness is desirable for himself, then happiness is a
-desirable thing itself.
-P5. If happiness is a desirable thing itself, then the general happiness is
-desirable.
-C3. If each person ’ s happiness is desirable for himself, then the general
-happiness is desirable (hypothetical syllogism, P4, P5).
-C4. The general happiness is desirable ( modus ponens , C2, C3).
-228 A. T. Fyfe
-Mill ’ s Proof of Utilitarianism (Another Alternative
-Interpretation)
-P1. If everyone desires happiness for herself, then everyone thinks of happiness
-itself as good and everyone selfi shly wants happiness for herself.
-P2. Everyone desires happiness for herself.
-C1. Everyone thinks of happiness itself as good and everyone selfi shly
-wants happiness for herself ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
-C2. Everyone thinks of happiness itself as good (simplifi cation, C1).
-P3. If everyone thinks of happiness itself as good, then everyone should
-think of the happiness of herself and others as good.
-C3. Everyone should think of the happiness of herself and others as good
-( modus ponens , C2, P3).
-P4. No one desires anything other than happiness for herself and/or happiness
-for others.
-P5. If no one desires anything other than happiness for herself and/or happiness
-for others, then no one should think of anything other than the
-happiness of herself or others as good.
-C4. No one should think of anything other than the happiness of herself
-or others as good ( modus ponens , P4, P5).
-C5. Everyone should think of the happiness of herself and others as good,
-and no one should think of anything other than the happiness of
-herself or others as good (conjunction, C3, C4).
-58
-The Experience Machine
-Objection to Hedonism
-Dan Weijers
-Nozick , Robert . Anarchy, State, and Utopia . New York : Basic Books , 1974 .
-De Brigard , Filipe . “ If You Like It, Does It Matter if It ’ s Real? ” Philosophical
-Psychology 23 , 1 ( 2010 ): 43 – 57 .
-Kymlicka , Will . Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction . New
-York : Oxford University Press , 1990 .
-Sobel , David . “ Varieties of Hedonism . ” Journal of Social Philosophy 33 , 2
-( 2002 ): 240 – 56 .
-Robert Nozick ’ s Experience Machine thought experiment describes a fantastic
-machine that can simulate any kind of experience for anyone who
-plugs herself into it. A life attached to an Experience Machine could be full
-of immensely pleasurable experiences; however (as Nozick correctly notes),
-the thought of actually living such a life is one that nearly everyone fi nds
-unappealing.
-Although Nozick originally devised the Experience Machine thought
-experiment to make a point about how animals should be treated, it was
-quickly adopted by anyone who wanted to argue for the falsity of hedonism
-as a theory of the good. The Experience Machine thought experiment is
-equally effective against any kind of theory that posits the internal aspects
-of our experiences as the only valuable things in a life, but hedonism is
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-230 Dan Weijers
-often singled out because it is the most widely discussed exemplar of this
-type of theory. The adoption of the Experience Machine thought experiment
-for the purpose of discrediting hedonism has been extremely successful.
-Indeed, virtually everyone who has written about hedonism since the
-mid - 1970s cites the Experience Machine thought experiment as a (and often
-the) decisive objection against it. Hedonism comes in many guises, but all
-hedonistic theories share the foundational claims that pleasure is the only
-thing of intrinsic value in a life and that pain is the only thing of intrinsic
-disvalue. The reason why the Experience Machine Objection to Hedonism
-was (and still is) considered to be decisive is because the widespread judgment
-that a life plugged into an Experience Machine is not appealing is
-thought to give overwhelming reason to reject this central claim.
-As with many other arguments in ethics, the Experience Machine
-Objection to Hedonism presents a thought experiment and relies on the
-readers ’ agreeing with the author ’ s judgment about it. The Experience
-Machine Objection to Hedonism garners near - complete agreement on the
-judgment that a life plugged into an Experience Machine is not something
-that we would choose for ourselves. It should be noted that this widespread
-judgment arises despite Nozick ’ s attempts to rule out some of the possible
-reasons that we might not want to plug in, such as allowing those who
-depend on us to plug in too. Even in modern reproductions of the Experience
-Machine Objection to Hedonism, which tend to place more emphasis than
-Nozick did on that fact that the experiences available in an Experience
-Machine would be far more pleasurable and less painful than those of a
-real life, hardly anyone admits to wanting to plug in to an Experience
-Machine.
-Despite the nearly unanimous judgment that plugging into an Experience
-Machine for life would be a mistake, substantial disagreement remains on
-the question of why we think that our current life would be better for us
-than a life in an Experience Machine. Many philosophers have offered different
-suggestions as to why we do not, and should not, choose a life in an
-Experience Machine. Nozick ’ s rationale is that plugging in would deprive
-us the chance really to do and be certain things (as opposed merely to having
-the internal experiences of doing and being them). Some (e.g., De Brigard)
-have suggested that the feelings we experience in response to the thought
-of the Experience Machine are based on an subconscious fear of change,
-as shown by reversing the thought experiment (imagine that you have actually
-been living an Experience Machine life all along). Until the disagreement
-about why nearly all of us judge a life plugged into an Experience
-Machine to be so ghastly is resolved, we cannot be confi dent that premise
-3 of the argument (below) is correct or be sure that the Experience Machine
-Objection to Hedonism should really be considered as decisive as it generally
-is.
-The Experience Machine Objection to Hedonism 231
-Suppose that there were an experience machine that would give you any
-experience you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate your
-brain so that you would think and feel you were writing a great novel, or
-making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time, you would be
-fl oating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your brain. Should you plug
-into this machine for life, preprogramming your life ’ s experiences? If you are
-worried about missing out on desirable experiences, we can suppose that
-business enterprises have researched thoroughly the lives of many others. You
-can pick and choose from their large library or smorgasbord of such experiences,
-selecting your life ’ s experiences for, say, the next two years. After two
-years have passed, you will have ten minutes or ten hours out of the tank, to
-select the experiences of your next two years. Of course, while in the tank
-you won ’ t know that you ’ re there; you ’ ll think it ’ s all actually happening.
-Others can also plug in to have the experiences they want, so there ’ s no need
-to stay unplugged to serve them. (Ignore problems such as who will service
-the machines if everyone plugs in.) Would you plug in? What else can matter
-to us, other than how our lives feel from the inside? Nor should you refrain
-because of the few moments of distress between the moment you ’ ve decided
-and the moment you ’ re plugged. What ’ s a few moments of distress compared
-to a lifetime of bliss (if that ’ s what you choose), and why feel any distress at
-all if your decision is the best one? (Nozick, 42 – 3)
-P1. Plugging into an Experience Machine would make the rest of your life
-dramatically more pleasurable and less painful than it would otherwise
-have been (stipulated in thought experiment).
-P2. Given the choice to plug into an Experience Machine for the rest of
-your life, ignoring any responsibilities you might have to others, you
-would decline (appeal to readers ’ judgment).
-P3. If, ignoring any responsibilities you might have to others, you would
-decline the chance to plug into an Experience Machine for the rest of
-your life, then pleasure and pain are not the only things of intrinsic value
-(or disvalue) in a life.
-C1. Pleasure and pain are not the only things of intrinsic value (or disvalue)
-in a life ( modus ponens , P2, P3).
-P4. If hedonism is true, then pleasure and pain are the only things of intrinsic
-value (or disvalue) in a life.
-C2. Hedonism is false ( modus tollens , C1, P4).
-59
-The Error Theory Argument
-Robert L. Muhlnickel
-Mackie , John . “ A Refutation of Morals . ” Australasian Journal of Philosophy
-24 ( 1946 ): 77 – 90 . Reprinted in Twentieth Century Ethical Theory ,
-edited by Steven Cahn , Jeram Haber , and Joram Haber , 145 – 52 . Upper
-Saddle River, NJ : Prentice - Hall , 1995 .
-___. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong . Harmondsworth : Penguin , 1977 .
-Metaethics is the philosophical inquiry into the nature and status of morality.
-A basic question about the nature and status of morality is whether
-expressions of moral approval and disapproval are objective. Moral objectivism,
-generally and simply stated, is the view that moral expressions (in
-speech, writing, or thought) are cognitive judgments, which are true or false
-because of their relations to moral facts. Moral skepticism is the view that
-there are no such moral facts. Many philosophers think that commonsense
-morality presumes moral objectivism, and many philosophers defend versions
-of moral objectivism. Defending moral skepticism requires showing
-that the belief that moral facts exist is in error, even though our ordinary
-language presumes they do exist. The aim of showing this belief as erroneous
-gives the argument its name. The error theory argument is a “ destructive
-” argument; it aims to show that moral objectivism is false. J. L. Mackie
-defends the error theory argument and claims it shows that moral skepticism
-is more reasonable than moral objectivism.
-The error theory argument fi rst derives C1 by modus ponens that commonsense
-morality assumes and many moral philosophers defend moral
-objectivism. That C1 is the presumptive belief forestalls the objection that
-the error theory argument attacks a straw man. The error theory argument ’ s
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-The Error Theory Argument 233
-destructive aim is advanced by two component arguments: the argument
-from relativity and the argument from queerness.
-The argument from relativity extends from P3 to C2. P3 states the unimpeachable
-fact of moral relativity: moral judgments observed in behavior,
-described in records of deliberation, and stated in authoritative moral codes
-of different societies and historical eras are different and often incompatible
-with one another. Moral skeptics and moral objectivists offer different
-explanations of the relativity of morals. Moral skeptics argue that moral
-relativity is best explained by the fact that there are no objective moral principles;
-rather, people assert moral codes based on their familiarity with the
-moral codes they learn in their societies (P4 (i)). Moral objectivists argue
-that factual differences in the circumstances of various societies result in
-different applications of objective moral principles. Such different applications
-yield distinct moral codes despite agreement on objective moral principles
-(P4 (ii)).
-Mackie supports explanation (i) by appealing to a sentimentalist theory
-of the origins of moral expressions. Although Mackie does not call his
-argument an Inference to the Best Explanation, the reasoning here involves
-a comparative claim that the skeptical explanation accounts for the observed
-phenomena of moral expression better than the objectivist one. Inference
-to the Best Explanation arguments are comparisons of two or more explanations
-of observed phenomena and evaluations of each explanation on
-common standards. Commonly cited standards for comparing explanations
-are greater simplicity, greater explanatory power, and more coherence with
-other hypotheses and phenomena. Philosophers dispute what Inference to
-the Best Explanation argument implies, so the argument below includes P6
-and C2 and P6 * and C2 * for comparison. P6 and C2 make a stronger
-claim, that explanation (i) shows that the belief in the existence of objective
-moral facts is unjustifi ed, rather than merely not as well justifi ed as disbelief
-in the existence of objective moral facts.
-The objection to the argument from relativity on behalf of moral objectivism,
-though unsuccessful according to Mackie, leaves moral skepticism
-in need of further argument. The argument from queerness claims there are
-two necessary conditions of the existence of objective moral facts. The fi rst
-condition is a claim about the ontology of moral facts. Putative moral facts
-would consist of a different kind of entity or relation than those known
-by scientifi c observation and hypothesizing, ordinary perception, and quasi -
-scientifi c methods. The second condition claims that mental ability humans
-would have to possess in order to have knowledge of moral facts would be
-something specifi cally moral. Such ability would be different in kind from
-other human mental abilities. Since neither necessary condition of the
-existence of objective moral facts is true, the antecedent of the conditional
-in P7 is false by modus tollens .
-234 Robert L. Muhlnickel
-The error theory argument concludes in C4 by conjoining C3, that objective
-values no not exist, and C2, the belief that objective moral facts is not
-justifi ed. The conjunction (C4) is put in the antecedent of a conditional (P9)
-to argue that the presumptive belief in the existence of object moral facts
-is erroneous. The presumptive belief is the target of the error theory argument,
-and the combined argument from relativity and argument from
-queerness presented here, form a valid argument that the presumptive belief
-is erroneous.
-Mackie fi rst presented the error theory argument in 1946 in “ A Refutation
-of Morals. ” He expanded the argument in Ethics: Inventing Right
-and Wrong (30 – 42). The selections below are from the latter work.
-Mackie states that an error theory argument is required against moral
-objectivism:
-[T]he traditional moral concepts of the ordinary man as well as the main
-line of western philosophers are concepts of objective value. But it is precisely
-for this reason that linguistic and conceptual analysis are not enough. The
-claim to objectivity, however engrained in out language and thought, is not
-self - validating. But the denial of objective values will have to be put forward
-not as the result of an analytic approach, but as an ‘ error theory, ’ a theory
-that although most people in making moral judgments implicitly claim,
-among other things, to be pointing to something objectively prescriptive, these
-claims are all false. ( Ethics , 35)
-The argument from relativity follows:
-The argument from relativity has as its premiss the well - known variation
-in moral codes from one society to another and from one period to another,
-and also the differences in moral beliefs between different groups and classes
-within a complex community. Such variation is in itself merely a truth of
-descriptive morality, a fact of anthropology which entails neither fi rst order
-nor second order ethical views. Yet it may indirectly support second order
-subjectivism: radical differences between fi rst order moral apprehensions
-make it diffi cult to treat those judgments as apprehensions of objective truths.
-But it is not the mere occurrence of disagreements that tells against the objectivity
-of values. [ … ] Disagreement about moral codes seems to refl ect people ’ s
-adherence to and participation in different ways of life. The causal connection
-seems to be mainly that way round: it is that people approve of monogamy
-because they participate in a monogamous way of life rather than that they
-participate in a monogamous way of life because they approve of monogamy.
-( Ethics , 36)
-Defenders of moral objectivism claim that moral relativity is explained
-by the application of objective moral principles to specifi c conditions rather
-than the nonexistence of objective moral principles. “ It is easy to show, ”
-The Error Theory Argument 235
-Mackie writes, “ that such general principles, married with differing concrete
-circumstances, different existing social patterns, or different preferences,
-will beget different specifi c moral rules ” ( Ethics , 37). This argument
-fails, Mackie writes:
-[P]eople judge that some things are good or right, and others are bad or
-wrong, not because – or at any rate not only because – they exemplify some
-general principle for which widespread implicit acceptance could be claimed,
-but because something about those things arouses certain responses immediately
-in them, though they would arouse radically and irresolvably different
-responses in others. ( Ethics , 37)
-The argument from queerness:
-If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or
-relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the
-universe. Correspondingly, if we are aware of them, it would have to be by
-some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from
-our ordinary ways of knowing anything else. [ … ] When we ask the awkward
-question, how we can be aware of this authoritative prescriptivity, of the truth
-of these distinctively ethical premisses or of the cogency of this distinctively
-ethical pattern of reasoning, none of our ordinary accounts of sensory perception
-or introspection or the framing and confi rming of explanatory hypotheses
-or inference or logical construction or conceptual analysis, or any combination
-of these, will provide a satisfactory answer; ‘ a special sort of intuition ’
-is a lame answer, but it is the one to which the clear - headed objectivist is
-compelled to resort. ( Ethics , 38)
-P1. If ordinary language, commonsense morality, and philosophical theories
-indicate belief in objective moral facts, then there is a presumptive belief
-that objective moral facts exist.
-P2. Ordinary language, commonsense morality, and philosophical theories
-indicate belief that objective moral facts exist.
-C1. There is a presumptive belief that objective moral facts exist ( modus
-ponens , P1, P2).
-P3. There is moral relativity among different societies and historical eras.
-P4. Moral relativity is explained by either but not both of explanations (i)
-or (ii):
-(i) People participate in different ways of life that lead them to believe
-that distinct moral rules are correct.
-(ii) People apply objective moral principles to different circumstances.
-P5. Explanation (i) is a better explanation of moral relativity than explanation
-(ii).
-236 Robert L. Muhlnickel
-P6. If (i) explains moral relativity better than (ii), then the belief that objective
-moral facts exist is not justifi ed.
-C2. The belief that objective moral facts exist is not justifi ed ( modus
-ponens , P5, P6).
-P7. If there are objective moral values, then they are specifi cally moral entities
-or relations and we know of their existence by a specifi cally moral
-cognitive ability.
-P8. There are no specifi cally moral entities or relations, and we have no
-specifi cally moral cognitive ability.
-C3. There are no objective moral values ( modus tollens , P7, P8).
-C4. There are no objective moral values and the belief that objective
-moral facts exist is not justifi ed (conjunction, C3, C2).
-P9. If there are no objective values and the belief that objective moral facts
-exist is not justifi ed, then the presumptive belief that objective moral
-facts exist is in error.
-C5. The presumptive belief that objective moral facts exist is in error
-( modus ponens , C4, P9).
-P6 * . If (i) explains moral disagreement better than (ii), then disbelief that
-objective moral facts exist is better justifi ed than belief that moral facts
-exist.
-C2 * . Disbelief that objective moral facts exist is better justifi ed than
-belief that moral facts exist ( modus ponens , C2, P5).
-60
-Moore ’ s Open Question
-Argument
-Bruno Verbeek
-Moore , George E. Principia Ethica . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University
-Press , 1903 .
-Frankena , W. K. “ The Naturalistic Fallacy . ” Mind 48 , 192 ( 1939 ): 464 – 77 .
-Miller , Alexander . An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics . Cambridge,
-UK : Polity Press , 2003 .
-The Open Question Argument was fi rst formulated by G. E. Moore in his
-Principia Ethica (1903). It marks the beginning of a branch of ethical theory
-now referred to as metaethics. One of the central problems in metaethics
-– or indeed the central problem for this sub - discipline – is an analysis of
-the central concepts and terms in ethics, such as ‘ ought ’ and ‘ good ’ . Moore
-argued that the property of goodness is an undefi nable property. The
-reason, according to Moore, is that goodness is a simple, unanalyzable
-property. So - called “ real defi nitions ” of ‘ good ’ , which attempt to defi ne
-‘ good ’ in terms of a kind with specifi c characteristics, will fail. Anyone who
-claims to give a defi nition of ‘ goodness ’ is attributing goodness to something
-rather than identifying what goodness is. Moral naturalists – that is, those
-philosophers who believe that moral properties exist and can be studied by
-the sciences – are particularly guilty of this fallacy: hence the name “ naturalistic
-fallacy. ” As a result, the argument is typically invoked to reject
-moral naturalism. However, Moore was quick to point out that theists who
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-238 Bruno Verbeek
-claim that good is what God commands are prone to the same fallacy. (Note
-that a common misunderstanding is to think that the naturalistic fallacy is
-the invalid inference of an “ ought ” statement from factual [ “ is ” ] premises.)
-The test that Moore proposed to determine whether an attempt at defi ning
-‘ good ’ is correct and not an attribution in disguise is the so - called “ Open
-Question Argument. ” The basic idea is that a correct defi nition of a term
-cannot be rephrased as a question without betraying conceptual incompetence.
-For example, the defi nition of a ‘ bachelor ’ is “ unmarried man of the
-marriageable age. ” If I rephrase this defi nition as an open question ( ‘ Is a
-bachelor an unmarried man of the marriageable age? ’ ), it shows that I don ’ t
-know what a bachelor is (or ‘ man ’ or ‘ married ’ , etc.). However, suppose
-somebody offers the following defi nition of ‘ good ’ : “ the property we refer
-to as ‘ good ’ is the property of being pleasurable, ” or “ good is pleasurable ”
-for short. If you rephrase this as an open question: “ Is good pleasurable? ”
-this does not indicate that I don ’ t know what ‘ good ’ or what ‘ pleasurable ’
-is. I am asking a meaningful question. This demonstrates, according to
-Moore, that the proposed defi nition is (at best) in fact an attribution of
-goodness to all pleasurable things.
-My point is that ‘ good ’ is a simple notion, just as ‘ yellow ’ is a simple
-notion; that, just as you cannot, by any manner of means, explain to any one
-who does not already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain what
-good is. Defi nitions of the kind that I was asking for, defi nitions which
-describe the real nature of the object or notion denoted by a word, and
-which do not merely tell us what the word is used to mean, are only possible
-when the object or notion in question is something complex. (Moore, 7)
-When a man confuses two natural objects with one another, defi ning the
-one by the other, if for instance, he confuses himself, who is one natural
-object, with ‘ pleased ’ or with ‘ pleasure ’ which are others, then there is no
-reason to call the fallacy naturalistic. But if he confuses ‘ good, ’ which is not
-in the same sense a natural object, with any natural object whatever, then
-there is a reason for calling that a naturalistic fallacy; its being made with
-regard to ‘ good ’ marks it as something quite specifi c, and this specifi c mistake
-deserves a name because it is so common. (Moore, 13)
-The general form of the Open Question Argument is the following:
-P1. Suppose that the predicate ‘ good ’ is synonymous with some other
-predicate N (e.g., ‘ pleasurable ’ ).
-P2. ‘ X has the property N ’ will mean ‘ X is good ’ .
-C1. Anybody who would ask whether an X with property N is good,
-would ipso facto betray conceptual confusion. She is unaware what
-‘ good ’ means (symmetry of identity, P2).
-Moore’s Open Question Argument 239
-P3. However, for every N it is always an open question whether an X with
-property N is good. It is a meaningful question that does not demonstrate
-conceptual confusion.
-P4. If for every N it is always an open question whether an X with property
-N is good, then ‘ N ’ cannot be synonymous with ‘ good ’ .
-C2. ‘ N ’ cannot be synonymous with ‘ good ’ ( modus ponens , P3, P4).
-P5. If N cannot be synonymous with ‘ good ’ , then only ‘ good ’ can be synonymous
-with ‘ good ’ ; therefore, good is a simple (primitive) concept and
-cannot be defi ned.
-C3. Only ‘ good ’ can be synonymous with ‘ good ’ ; therefore, good is a
-simple (primitive) concept and cannot be defi ned ( modus ponens , C2,
-P5).
-The Open Question Argument is a very infl uential argument. It has
-motivated very diverse metaethical theories, such as noncognitivism, intuitionism,
-and anti - realist theories. It still fi gures prominently in virtually all
-textbooks on metaethics. However, the general opinion by now is that the
-argument does not work against naturalism. First, this is because it insuffi
-ciently distinguishes between conceptual or semantic naturalism (where
-“ good ” is defi ned in natural terms) and metaphysical naturalism
-(where “ good ” is analyzed as a natural kind, much as “ water ” is analyzed
-as H 2 O).
-The Open Question Argument works perhaps against the fi rst kind of
-naturalism but not the second kind of naturalism, and this is the kind
-of naturalism that most moral naturalists defend. Second, it is by no means
-obvious that somebody who rephrases a defi nition as a question is conceptually
-confused. Some correct defi nitions are extremely complex; for
-example, ‘ knowledge is justifi ed true belief ’ . Suppose this were correct; it
-still is not dead obvious to any competent speaker of English (Miller). Third,
-the argument in a deep sense begs the question against the naturalist
-(Frankena).
-61
-Wolff ’ s Argument for the
-Rejection of State Authority
-Ben Saunders
-Wolff , Robert Paul. In Defense of Anarchism . New York : Harper & Row ,
-1970 .
-Graham , Gordon. The Case against the Democratic State: An Essay in
-Cultural Criticism . Thorverton : Imprint Academic , 2002 .
-Reiman , Jeffrey H. In Defense of Political Philosophy: A Reply to Robert
-Paul Wolff ’ s In Defense of Anarchism . New York : Harper & Row , 1972 .
-Anarchism is traditionally associated with statelessness or resistance to
-coercive laws. Robert Paul Wolff defends what is sometimes known as
-“ philosophical anarchism. ” This is not a view about political arrangements
-as such but, rather, an argument about the duties of the individual. Wolff,
-drawing on a Kantian idea of self - legislation, argues that each individual
-has a duty to be autonomous (#55). From this, it follows that no one ought
-to accept the authority of others, including that of the state.
-This does not mean that one must disobey all laws – indeed, one may
-well conform to all laws – but one must never comply. (To conform is
-merely to do what the law says, for any reason, whereas to comply is to
-do so because that is what the law says.) That is, one must not unquestioningly
-obey the law because it is law but must always decide what to do for
-oneself. A just state ’ s laws may well accord with what one ought to do
-anyway, for reasons of morality or prudence, while the threat of punishment
-will give one further reasons to do what the law requires. There is, however,
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-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Wolff’s Argument for the Rejection of State Authority 241
-no fundamental difference between being told not to steal by the state and
-being told that by a friend – neither actually gives you the reason in
-question.
-The argument appears valid, but there are some problems with the
-premises; in particular, specifying exactly what Wolff means by autonomy.
-It is not easy to fi nd a consistent interpretation that explains both why it
-is so important as to be the individual ’ s primary obligation and incompatible
-with accepting authority. Even if something is in our interests, we do
-not ordinarily suppose it to be a duty for us.
-The defi ning mark of the state is authority, the right to rule. The primary
-obligation of man is autonomy, the refusal to be ruled. [ … ] Insofar as a man
-fulfi ls his obligation to make himself the author of his decisions, he will resist
-the state ’ s claim to have authority over him. That is to say, he will deny that
-he has a duty to obey the laws of the state simply because they are the laws.
-(Wolff, 18)
-P1. We have a higher - order interest in autonomy.
-P2. If something promotes our higher - order interests, we have a duty to
-do it.
-C1. We have a duty to be autonomous ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
-P3. If we have a duty to be autonomous, then autonomy requires that we
-decide what to do for ourselves.
-C2. We should decide what to do for ourselves ( modus ponens , C1, P3).
-P4. If we accept the authority of others, then we are not autonomous.
-C3. We should not accept the authority of others ( modus tollens , C1,
-P4).
-P5. If we accept the authority of the law, then we accept the authority of
-others.
-C4. We should not accept the authority of the law ( modus tollens, C3,
-P5).
-62
-Nozick ’ s Taxation Is Forced
-Labor Argument
-Jason Waller
-Nozick , Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia . New York : Basic Books , 1974 .
-One of the most contentious issues in contemporary debates about distributive
-justice concerns the redistribution of wealth. Should the state tax richer
-citizens in order to provide various benefi ts (schools, medical care, job
-training, cash payments, housing subsidies, etc.) to poorer citizens? The
-traditional distinction between the political “ right ” and “ left ” turns largely
-(although, not exclusively) on this question. One of the most infl uential
-libertarian arguments concerning the redistribution of wealth is offered by
-Robert Nozick, who argues that all forms of redistribution are morally
-wrong. His general strategy is to show that taxation is a kind of forced
-labor (i.e., slavery). The argument has been infl uential because it seems to
-turn on an uncontroversial defi nition of forced labor and the seemingly
-undeniable claim that all forms of forced labor are immoral. Nozick concludes
-that when the state redistributes wealth from the rich to the poor,
-the poor are in fact unjustly enslaving the rich. This form of slavery is, of
-course, quite mild by comparison to past forms, but (at least according to
-Nozick) it is immoral just the same.
-Taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor. Some
-persons fi nd this claim obviously true: taking the earnings of n hours of labor
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-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Nozick’s Taxation Is Forced Labor Argument 243
-is like taking n hours from the person; it is like forcing the person to work n
-hours for another ’ s purpose. Others fi nd the claim absurd. But even these, if
-they object to forced labor, would oppose forcing unemployed hippies to work
-for the benefi t of the needy. And they would also object to forcing each person
-to work fi ve extra hours each week for the benefi t of the needy. (Nozick, 169)
-P1. Forced labor (i.e., slavery) occurs anytime one (i) must perform some
-labor under threat of severe punishment (pain, prison, death, etc.) and
-yet (ii) the benefi ts of one ’ s labor go to someone else.
-P2. All forms of forced labor are immoral.
-P3. The state requires all working citizens to pay certain taxes in order to
-benefi t the needy or face severe punishment (i.e., prison time).
-P4. A is a working citizen.
-C1. If citizen A does not pay taxes, then the citizen will receive severe
-punishment; that is, she will go to prison (material implication, P3).
-P5. If citizen A does not work extra hours, then the citizen will not be able
-to pay her taxes.
-C2. If citizen A does not work extra hours at her job, then she will receive
-severe punishment; that is, she will go to prison (hypothetical syllogism,
-C1, P5).
-P6. Citizen A receives no benefi ts for the extra hours spent earning the
-money to pay her taxes because this money goes to the needy.
-C3. During the time when citizen A is earning the money needed to pay
-her taxes, the citizen is (i) performing some labor under threat of
-severe punishment [by C2] and (ii) the benefi ts of her labor go to
-someone else, namely, the needy (conjunction, C2, P6).
-C4. During the time when citizen A is earning the money needed to pay
-her taxes, she is undergoing forced labor; that is, slavery ( modus
-ponens , P1, C3).
-C5. Taxing citizen A to help the needy is immoral (instantiation, P2, C4).
-P7. This same argument can be made for each taxpayer.
-C6. All instances of taxation are immoral (instantiation, C5, P7).
-63
-Charity is Obligatory
-Joakim Sandberg
-Singer , Peter. “ Famine, Affl uence, and Morality . ” Philosophy and Public
-Affairs 1 ( 1972 ): 229 – 43 .
-___. Practical Ethics , 2nd edn . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press ,
-1993 .
-Sidgwick , Henry. The Methods of Ethics . Indianapolis : Hackett , 1981 .
-Unger , Peter. Living High & Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence . New
-York : Oxford University Press , 1996 .
-Most people think that it is good or charitable to give money to humanitarian
-aid agencies that provide food or shelter to people in need, and hence
-such agencies are referred to as charities. But couldn ’ t it actually be a moral
-duty to give money to such agencies; that is, morally wrong not to do so?
-According to the present argument, most famously formulated by Peter
-Singer, relatively affl uent people of developed countries are indeed under a
-moral duty to give a signifi cant amount of their money to humanitarian aid
-agencies.
-The argument turns on the seemingly uncontroversial principle (which
-can be found already in Sidgwick, 253) that it is wrong not to help others
-when helping is easy and cheap. Singer sometimes defends this principle by
-way of an example: Wouldn ’ t it be wrong to refuse to save a child from
-drowning in a pond, say, simply because one is hesitant to get one ’ s clothes
-dirty? The argument can be taken to exemplify philosophical reasoning in
-its most interesting form: going from seemingly uncontroversial premises
-to a largely controversial or unexpected conclusion. The conclusion is controversial
-because it basically requires us to – instead of spending our money
-on things for ourselves that we don ’ t really need (nice clothes, coffee, beer,
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-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Charity is Obligatory 245
-CDs) – give most of it away to people in remote parts of the world. And
-we are not even allowed to feel good about doing so – what we normally
-perceive as charitable (and thus beyond the call of duty) is really just
-morally obligatory. A number of slightly different formulations of the argument
-can be found in the literature, but we present it in its original form.
-All of the premises below have been scrutinized by critics in attempts to
-defuse the argument.
-I begin with the assumption that suffering and death from lack of food,
-shelter, and medical care are bad. I think most people will agree about this,
-although one may reach the same view by different routes. [ . . . ] My next
-point is this: if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening,
-without thereby sacrifi cing anything of comparable moral importance, we
-ought, morally, to do it. By “ without sacrifi cing anything of comparable moral
-importance ” I mean without causing anything else comparably bad to happen,
-or doing something that is wrong in itself, or failing to promote some moral
-good, comparable in signifi cance to the bad thing that we can prevent. This
-principle seems almost as uncontroversial as the last one [ . . . but . . . ] The
-uncontroversial appearance of the principle just stated is deceptive. If it were
-acted upon [ . . . ] our lives, our society, and our world would be fundamentally
-changed. [ . . . ] The traditional distinction between duty and charity cannot
-be drawn, or at least, not in the place we normally draw it. [ . . . ] When we
-buy new clothes not to keep ourselves warm but to look “ well - dressed ” we
-are not providing for any important need. We would not be sacrifi cing anything
-signifi cant if we were to continue to wear our old clothes, and give the
-money to famine relief. By doing so, we would be preventing another person
-from starving. It follows from what I have said earlier that we ought to give
-money away, rather than spend it on clothes which we do not need to keep
-us warm. To do so is not charitable, or generous. Nor is it the kind of act
-which philosophers and theologians have called “ supererogatory ” – an act
-which it would be good to do, but not wrong not to do. On the contrary, we
-ought to give the money away, and it is wrong not to do so. (Singer “ Famine, ”
-231 – 5)
-P1. Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are
-bad.
-P2. If it is in one ’ s power to prevent something bad from happening, without
-thereby sacrifi cing anything of comparable moral importance, one ought,
-morally, to do it.
-C1. If it is in one ’ s power to prevent suffering and death from lack of
-food, shelter, and medical care, without thereby sacrifi cing anything
-of comparable moral importance, one ought, morally, to do it (instantiation
-& modus ponens , P1, P2).
-P3. By giving money to humanitarian aid agencies, one can prevent suffering
-and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care.
-246 Joakim Sandberg
-C2. If one can give money to humanitarian aid agencies without thereby
-sacrifi cing anything of comparable moral importance (to suffering and
-death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care) one ought, morally,
-to do it (instantiation and modus ponens , C1, P3).
-P4. We can give a substantial amount of our money away by simply giving
-up buying things that we do not really need; that is, without sacrifi cing
-anything of moral importance comparable to suffering and death from
-lack of food, shelter, and medical care.
-C3. We ought, morally, to give a substantial amount of our money to
-humanitarian aid agencies ( modus ponens , C2, P4).
-64
-The Repugnant Conclusion
-Joakim Sandberg
-Parfi t , Derek. Reasons and Persons . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1984 .
-Ryberg , Jesper , and Torbj ö rn T ä nnsj ö (eds.). The Repugnant Conclusion:
-Essays on Population Ethics . Dordrecht : Kluwer , 2004 .
-When philosophers think about future generations and what sort of world
-we should try to create, they sometimes ponder issues in so - called population
-ethics. For example, “ Would it be better if, in the future, a greater
-rather than fewer number of people lived? ” and “ Does the answer to this
-question depend further on who these people are and/or their quality of
-life? ” The seminal work in this fi eld is Derek Parfi t ’ s Reasons and Persons ,
-and the present argument is its undisputed highlight. The argument addresses
-the issue of what the relative values are of the quantity of lives lived versus
-the quality of these lives and a seemingly straightforward position on this
-issue – the position that classical utilitarians take – is that quantity and
-quality should be given equal value.
-Utilitarians typically compound these two factors into a measure of the
-overall utility, or “ quantity of whatever makes life worth living, ” in a population.
-Parfi t ’ s argument against this view, however, takes the form of a
-reductio ad absurdum : If any loss in the quality of lives can be compensated
-for by a suffi cient increase in the quantity of lives lived, then the best
-outcome could well be one in which an enormous amount of people lived
-lives that are barely worth living. This is what Parfi t calls the “ Repugnant
-Conclusion. ” Many ways of trying to get around the conclusion can be
-found in the literature. However, it may be noted that it has been surprisingly
-diffi cult to develop a theory that avoids this conclusion and at the
-same time doesn ’ t imply equally counterintuitive conclusions. The fi eld of
-population ethics thus continues to be challenging.
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-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-248 Joakim Sandberg
-In B there are twice as many people living as in A, and these people are
-all worse off than everyone in A. But the lives of those in B, compared with
-those in A, are more than half as much worth living. [ . . . ] Which would be
-the better outcome? [ . . . ] I can now state the [ . . . ] Impersonal Total Principle:
-If other things are equal, the best outcome is the one in which there would
-be the greatest quantity of whatever makes life worth living. [ . . . ] Z is some
-enormous population whose members have lives that are not much above the
-level where life ceases to be worth living. [ . . . ] In each of these lives there is
-very little happiness. But, if the numbers are large enough, this is the outcome
-with the greatest total sum of happiness. [ . . . ] The Impersonal Total Principle
-then implies The Repugnant Conclusion: For any possible population of at
-least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some
-much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal,
-would be better, even though its members have lives that are barely worth
-living. As my choice of name suggests, I fi nd this conclusion very hard to
-accept. [ . . . ] If we are convinced that Z is worse than A, we have strong
-grounds for resisting principles which imply that Z is better. We have strong
-grounds for resisting the Impersonal Total Principle. (Parfi t, 385 – 90)
-P1. The “ quantity of whatever makes life worth living ” in a given population
-is a function of the quantity of its members and their quality of life.
-P2. One can increase the quantity of whatever makes life worth living in a
-given population by simply adding people whose lives are worth living.
-P3. If in one of two outcomes the quality of lives in a population is lower,
-the quantity of whatever makes life worth living can still be higher if
-suffi ciently many people are added whose lives are worth living.
-C1. If A is a population of at least ten billion people with a very high
-quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population,
-Z, where the quantity of whatever makes life worth living would be
-greater even though its members have lives that are barely worth living
-(instantiation, P3).
-P4. If, other things being equal, the best outcome would be the one in which
-there is the greatest quantity of whatever makes life worth living, one
-outcome is better than another if the quantity of whatever makes life
-worth living is greater.
-C2. If, other things being equal, the best outcome would be the one in
-which there is the greatest quantity of whatever makes life worth
-living, Z would be better than A ( modus ponens , C1, P4).
-P5. Z is worse than A.
-C3. It is not the case that, other things being equal, the best outcome
-would be the one in which there is the greatest quantity of whatever
-makes life worth living ( modus tollens , C2, P5).
-65
-Taurek on Numbers Don ’ t Count
-Ben Saunders
-Taurek , John. “ Should the Numbers Count? ” Philosophy and Public Affairs
-6 ( 1977 ): 293 – 316 .
-Parfi t , Derek. “ Innumerate Ethics . ” Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 ( 1978 ):
-285 – 301 .
-Sidgwick , Henry. The Methods of Ethics . Indianapolis : Hackett , 1981 .
-Wasserman , David , and Alan Strudler . “ Can a Nonconsequentialist Count
-Lives? ” Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 ( 2003 ): 71 – 94 .
-Consequentialists think that we have a moral duty to bring about the best
-outcomes possible. The idea of the overall best outcome, however, typically
-involves summing good and bad effects distributed over different individuals.
-It is therefore frequently objected that consequentialism is indifferent
-to the separateness of persons, ignoring the distribution of good and bad
-consequences and implying that a great loss to one person could be justifi ed
-by smaller benefi ts to a great many others.
-Nonconsequentialists have often argued that we should not engage in
-this interpersonal aggregation – that it makes no sense to speak of what ’ s
-good or bad from “ the point of the view of the universe ” (Sidgwick, 382).
-Sometimes, however, rejecting consequentialism leads to positions that confl
-ict with common sense. In this much discussed article, Taurek rejects the
-idea that we have any obligation to save fi ve people rather than one other,
-whom he calls “ David. ” He argues that since there is no impersonal
-perspective from which we can judge either outcome better than the other,
-we are permitted to choose to bring about whichever outcome we prefer
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-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-250 Ben Saunders
-– though if we want to show equal concern to all involved, he suggests that
-we toss a coin so everyone has a 50 percent chance of survival.
-Not all aspects of Taurek ’ s argument are entirely clear. For example,
-interpreters differ as to whether he denies any notion of impersonal “ betterness
-” (even so - called Pareto improvements; i.e., those that are better for
-someone and worse for no one) or only denies the intelligibility of impersonal
-claims where there is a confl ict of interests between two parties.
-Nonetheless, much ink has been spilled attempting to show that nonconsequentialists
-can resist his conclusion and justify saving a larger group of
-people without engaging in morally suspect aggregation.
-The claim that one ought to save the many instead of the few was made
-to rest on the claim that, other things being equal, it is a worse thing that
-these fi ve persons should die than that this one should. It is this evaluative
-judgement that I cannot accept. I do not wish to say in this situation that it
-is a worse thing were these fi ve persons to die and David to live than it is or
-would be were David to die and these fi ve to continue living. I do not wish
-to say this unless I am prepared to qualify it by explaining to whom or for
-whom or relative to what purpose it is or would be a worse thing. (Taurek,
-303 – 4)
-P1. If we call one state of affairs (impersonally) better than another, then
-one ought (morally) to prefer it.
-P2. It is not the case that David ought (morally) to prefer that he die so
-fi ve others can be saved than the reverse (they die so he can be saved).
-C1. It is not the case that David ’ s dying so fi ve others can be saved is
-(impersonally) better than the reverse (they die so he can be saved)
-( modus tollens , P1, P2).
-P3. If one state of affairs is not better than another, one is not required to
-bring it about.
-C2. David is not required to bring it about that he dies so fi ve others
-can be saved ( modus ponens , C1, P3).
-P4. If it is permissible for David to choose to save himself, it is also permissible
-for a third party to save David.
-C3. It is permissible for a third party to save David ( modus ponens , C2,
-P4).
-P5. If it is permissible to save one rather than fi ve, there cannot be any
-general obligation to save the greater number (in confl ict cases).
-C4. There is no general obligation to save the greater number (in confl ict
-cases) ( modus ponens , C3, P5).
-66
-Parfi t ’ s Leveling Down Argument
-against Egalitarianism
-Ben Saunders
-Parfi t , Derek. “ Equality or Priority? ” Ratio 10 ( 1997 ): 202 – 21 . Originally
-published separately as “ The 1991 Lindley Lecture. ” Lawrence:
-Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, 1995. Reprinted in The
-Ideal of Equality , edited by M. Clayton and A. Williams . London :
-Palgrave Macmillan , 2002 .
-Frankfurt , Harry. “ Equality as a Moral Ideal ” Ethics 98 ( 1987 ): 21 – 42 .
-Jerome , Jerome K. “ The New Utopia , ” in Cultural Notes no. 14. London :
-Libertarian Alliance , 1987 .
-Temkin , Larry . Inequality . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1993 .
-Almost everyone these days affi rms the moral equality of persons.
-Egalitarians hold that this has implications for distributive justice – that
-people ’ s material conditions should be equalized, at least insofar as they are
-not themselves responsible for being better or worse off than others. Many
-philosophers have explored how best to interpret these egalitarian commitments;
-for instance, over what goods ought to be equalized and whether
-people ought to be made equal in outcomes or merely opportunities. Some,
-however, have rejected the idea that equality per se is of any moral signifi -
-cance. Harry Frankfurt, for instance, has argued that all that matters is that
-everyone has enough, citing the fact that we don ’ t feel the need to redistribute
-from billionaires to millionaires. He claims that our concern is not
-really with inequality, but only with poverty.
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-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
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-252 Ben Saunders
-Frankfurt shows that we do indeed care about suffi ciency, maybe more
-than about equality, but not that we do not care about equality as well.
-Derek Parfi t, however, has advanced a famous argument to show that a
-commitment to equality has perverse consequences and ought to be rejected.
-He argues that anyone committed to equality must think that it is – at least
-in this one respect – better to bring everyone down to the same level (something
-he calls “ leveling down ” ) than to accept an inequality. This, however,
-seems perverse if no one is made better off as a result.
-Suppose we think it unjust that some people are born with two healthy
-eyes and others with only one or none. In the absence of the technology
-required to perform eye transplants, there is nothing that we can do to make
-the blind better off. Thus, the only way to achieve equality between the
-blind and the sighted would be to blind those who can presently see (see
-Jerome ’ s short story, “ The New Utopia, ” which describes a dystopian future
-where such practices are carried out). Represented numerically, we could
-say that egalitarians think there is something better about a world where
-everyone has four units of good than a world where some have fi ve and
-some have seven since, although everyone is better off in the latter world,
-it is unequal.
-Note that Parfi t is not saying that egalitarians are committed to this
-course of action all things considered, since most subscribe to values other
-than equality and think it is better for people to be able to see than not.
-What he is saying, however, is that qua egalitarians they are committed to
-accepting that this would be in one way good – there is some reason to do
-it – and he fi nds even this absurd. How could it be in any way good if it
-is, by hypothesis, worse for some people and better for none? (Temkin calls
-this premise, numbered P5 below, that the world cannot be better or worse
-without being better or worse for any individual, “ the Slogan ” and argues
-powerfully against it.)
-While there are some who are completely untroubled by material inequalities
-between persons, no matter how large, Parfi t ’ s own positive view
-– which he calls the “ Priority View ” or prioritarianism, effectively a form
-of weighted utilitarianism – would be regarded by many as broadly egalitarian.
-Parfi t thinks that it is morally more important to benefi t someone the
-worse off he is. This view does not, however, require us to make comparisons
-between different people or posit that equality in itself has value, even
-if it will tend to have equalizing consequences in practice (because, where
-we can benefi t one of two people, we ought to benefi t the worse off until
-she becomes better off than the other).
-For true Egalitarians, equality has intrinsic value. [ . . . ] On the widest
-version of this view, any inequality is bad. It is bad, for example, that some
-people are sighted and others are blind. We would therefore have a reason,
-Parfi t’s Argument against Egalitarianism 253
-if we could, to take single eyes from some of the sighted and give them to the
-blind [ . . . ]. Suppose that those who are better off suffer some misfortune, so
-that they become as badly off as everyone else. Since these events would
-remove the inequality, they must be in one way welcome [ . . . ] even though
-they would be worse for some people, and better for no one. This implication
-seems to many to be quite absurd. I call this the Levelling Down Objection.
-(Parfi t Idea , 86, 97, 98)
-P1. Egalitarianism implies that it is pro tanto (in one way) good to eliminate
-inequality.
-P2. Inequality can be eliminated by bringing the worse - off up, and inequality
-can be eliminated by bringing the better - off down.
-C1. Egalitarianism implies that it is pro tanto good to bring the worse -
-off up and that it is pro tanto good to bring the better - off down
-(conjunction, P1, P2).
-C2. Egalitarianism implies that it is pro tanto good to bring the better - off
-down (simplifi cation, C1).
-P3. Simply bringing the better - off down does not make anyone better off.
-P4. If no one is made better off, one state of affairs cannot be pro tanto
-better than another.
-C3. Simply bringing the better - off down cannot be pro tanto better
-( modus ponens , P3, P4).
-P5. If Egalitarianism is true, then it is pro tanto good to bring the better - off
-down.
-C4. Egalitarianism is false ( modus tollens, P5, C3).
-67
-Nozick ’ s Wilt
-Chamberlain Argument
-Fabian Wendt 1
-Nozick , Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia . New York : Basic Books , 1974 .
-Cohen , Gerald. “ Robert Nozick and Wilt Chamberlain: How Patterns
-Preserve Liberty , ” in Self - Ownership, Freedom, and Equality . Cambridge,
-UK : Cambridge University Press , 1995 .
-Feser , Edward . On Nozick . Belmont, CA : Wadsworth , 2003 .
-Kymlicka , Will . Contemporary Political Philosophy . Oxford : Oxford
-University Press , 1990 / 2001 .
-Wolff , Jonathan. Robert Nozick: Property, Justice, and the Minimal State .
-Cambridge, UK : Polity Press , 1991 .
-Robert Nozick ’ s Wilt Chamberlain Argument is notorious. It is very simple,
-and its premises sound fairly reasonable, but its conclusion is perplexing:
-Egalitarian (and other patterned) theories of justice are supposedly not
-acceptable. Many philosophers are convinced that there is something wrong
-with the argument, but it is not so easy to fi nd a fl aw in it. Nozick presents
-the argument in Anarchy, State, and Utopia after having introduced his own
-theory of justice, the entitlement theory. According to this theory, every
-1 I would like to thank Ali Behboud and Thomas Schramme for helpful comments on earlier
-versions of this text.
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain Argument 255
-distribution of property that arose from voluntary, free transfers of justly
-acquired property is just. The entitlement theory is, in Nozick ’ s terminology,
-unpatterned; for a distribution of property to be just, it does not have to
-fi t any particular pattern. The entitlement theory leads to a libertarian position
-in political philosophy, condemning redistributive welfare states as
-unjust. In contrast, egalitarians hold that a just state has to redistribute
-property in order to achieve an egalitarian distributional pattern in society.
-The egalitarian pattern can take many different forms. An egalitarian theory
-of justice may, for example, aim for equality of opportunity for welfare or,
-as in John Rawls ’ theory of justice, aim for equality of resources except
-when inequalities are to the benefi t of the least advantaged.
-The Wilt Chamberlain Argument is designed to show that all patterned
-theories of justice, including egalitarian theories as the most prominent
-subclass, are intuitively not acceptable. The basic outline of the argument
-is as follows. Intuitively, it is morally unproblematic freely to transfer property
-to other persons, for example, to pay Wilt Chamberlain for watching
-him play basketball. But free transfers of property will inevitably upset any
-distributional pattern. Liberty upsets patterns, as the title of the corresponding
-chapter in Anarchy, State, and Utopia says. If this is right, how could
-justice demand preserving a patterned distribution of property?
-If patterned theories of justice are indeed not acceptable, then Nozick ’ s
-unpatterned entitlement theory of justice would constitute the obvious
-alternative. But maybe this is too hasty. It seems to me that the Wilt
-Chamberlain Argument is most appealing when directed against egalitarian
-theories only, not against any form of patterned theories. In particular,
-premise P2 in the formalized version below is less convincing if D 1 in
-premise P1 is not specifi ed as an egalitarian distributional pattern but as,
-for example, a distributional pattern prescribing that nobody should fall
-below a certain baseline of welfare. Nevertheless, a refutation of egalitarian
-theories of justice alone would still be a provocative result. Egalitarian
-critics of the argument will then probably have to reject either premise P3
-or P4. If one wants a less limited version of the argument, one can simply
-substitute “ egalitarian ” by “ patterned ” in P1 and call it “ patterned principle
-” instead of “ equality principle. ”
-It is not clear how those holding alternative conceptions of distributive
-justice can reject the entitlement conception of justice in holdings. For suppose
-a distribution favored by one of these non - entitlement conceptions is realized.
-Let us suppose it is your favorite one and let us call this distribution D 1 ;
-perhaps everyone has an equal share, perhaps shares vary in accordance with
-some dimension you treasure. Now suppose that Wilt Chamberlain is greatly
-in demand by basketball teams, being a great gate attraction. (Also suppose
-contracts run for a year, with players being free agents.) He signs the following
-sort of contract with a team: In each home game, twenty - fi ve cents from the
-256 Fabian Wendt
-price of each ticket of admission goes to him. (We ignore the question of
-whether he is “ gouging ” the owners, letting them look for themselves.) The
-season starts, and people cheerfully attend his team ’ s games; they buy their
-tickets, each time dropping a separate twenty - fi ve cents of their admission
-price into a special box with Chamberlain ’ s name on it. They are excited
-about seeing him play; it is worth the total admission price to them. Let us
-suppose that in one season one million persons attend his home games, and
-Wilt Chamberlain winds up with $250,000, a much larger sum than the
-average income and larger even than anyone else has. Is he entitled to this
-income? Is this new distribution D 2 unjust? If so, why? [ … ] If D 1 was a just
-distribution, and people voluntarily moved from it to D 2 , transferring parts
-of their shares they were given under D 1 (what was it for if not to do something
-with?), isn ’ t D 2 also just? (Nozick, 160 – 1)
-P1. A society is just if and only if the distribution of property in the society
-has a certain egalitarian distributional structure D 1 (Equality Principle
-assumption).
-P2. When people freely transfer their property to other persons, they change
-the distributional structure D 1 into a new distributional structure.
-P3. It is not unjust for people freely to transfer their property to other
-persons (Liberty Principle).
-P4. Whatever distributional structure results from a just distributional
-structure by not - unjust steps is itself just (Preservation Principle).
-C1. It is not unjust for people freely to transfer their property to other
-persons and whatever distributional structure results from a just distributional
-structure by not - unjust steps is itself just (conjunction, P3,
-P4).
-P5. If P2 is true, then the following concretion of P2 is true as well: If people
-start from a just distributional structure like, presumably, D 1 and then
-freely transfer their property to Wilt Chamberlain, then the distributional
-structure in the society will have changed to a new distributional structure
-D 2 .
-C2. If people start from a just distributional structure like, presumably,
-D 1 and then freely transfer their property to Wilt Chamberlain, then
-the distributional structure in the society will have changed to a new
-distributional structure D 2 ( modus ponens , P2, P5).
-P6. If C1 is true, then the following conditional is true as well: If people
-start from a just distributional structure like, presumably, D 1 and then
-freely transfer their property to Wilt Chamberlain, then the resulting
-distributional structure will be just.
-C3. If people start from a just distributional structure like, presumably,
-D 1 and then freely transfer their property to Wilt Chamberlain, then
-the resulting distributional structure will be just ( modus ponens ,
-C1, P6).
-Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain Argument 257
-C4. If people start from a just distributional structure like, presumably,
-D 1 and then freely transfer their property to Wilt Chamberlain, then
-the distributional structure in the society will have changed to a new
-distributional structure D 2 and if people start from a just distributional
-structure like, presumably, D 1 and then freely transfer their
-property to Wilt Chamberlain, then the resulting distributional structure
-will be just (conjunction, C2, C3).
-P7. If C4 is true, then D 2 is just.
-C5. D 2 is just ( modus ponens , C4, P7).
-P8. If P1 is true, then D 2 is not just.
-C6. D 2 is not just ( modus ponens , P1, P8).
-C7. D 2 is just and D 2 is not just (conjunction, C5, C6).
-C8. P1 (the Equality Principle) is false ( reductio , P1 – C7).
-68
-Liberal Feminism
-Julinna C. Oxley
-Okin , Susan Moller. Justice, Gender, and the Family . New York : Basic Books ,
-1989 .
-Mill , John Stuart. The Subjection of Women , edited by Susan M . Okin,
-Indianapolis : Hackett , 1869/1988 .
-Wollstonecraft , Mary. A Vindication of the Rights of Woman . London :
-Joseph Johnson , 1792 / London : Penguin , 2004 .
-First articulated in the late eighteenth century, liberal feminism is a political
-philosophy whose express aim is to free women from oppressive gender
-roles and achieve sexual equality (also called gender justice). Although
-women ’ s social situation changes from one generation to the next – due in
-large part to the infl uence of liberal feminists – the message of liberal feminism
-remains the same: women, as rational human beings, are deserving of
-the same social and political rights as men, and gender justice is best
-achieved by modifying existing social institutions and political systems. The
-political agenda of liberal feminism addresses present - day inequalities: early
-liberal feminists sought to gain the right to vote and equal access to education,
-while contemporary liberal feminists aim to secure equal social, political,
-and economic opportunities, equal civil liberties, and sexual freedoms.
-Perhaps the most controversial aspect of feminism is its claim that
-women are socially oppressed, especially since Western women in the
-twenty - fi rst century do not appear to be oppressed. Yet contemporary
-liberal feminists contend that society is structured in ways that favor men.
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Liberal Feminism 259
-Many liberal feminists (such as Mill in the nineteenth century and Okin in
-the twentieth) argue that the primary source of woman ’ s subordination is
-her social role in the family, not just her biological role in reproduction or
-the male tendency to sexual violence (other oft - cited explanations for why
-women are the “ weaker ” sex). Since liberal feminism is the oldest version
-of feminism, it is the target of much criticism, especially by other feminists
-who argue that liberal feminists overlook differences of race, socioeconomic
-status, and sexual orientation relevant to an accurate assessment of women ’ s
-situation.
-While liberal feminism is an active political movement with a variety of
-participants, all feminists agree that the aims of liberal feminism remain
-unfulfi lled worldwide. For this reason, liberal feminism will continue to
-attract zealous adherents as well as vocal detractors.
-Marriage continues the cycle of inequality set in motion by the anticipation
-of marriage and the related sex segregation of the workplace. Partly because
-of society ’ s assumptions about gender, but also because women, on entering
-marriage, tend already to be disadvantaged members of the work force,
-married women are likely to start out with less leverage in the relationship
-than their husbands [ . . . ] In many marriages, partly because of discrimination
-at work and the wage gap between the sexes, wives (despite initial personal
-ambitions and even when they are full - time wage workers) come to perceive
-themselves as benefi ting from giving priority to their husbands ’ careers. Hence
-they have little incentive to question the traditional division of labor in the
-household. This in turn limits their own commitment to wage work and their
-incentive and leverage to challenge the gender structure of the workplace.
-Experiencing frustration and lack of control at work, those who thus turn
-toward domesticity, while often resenting the lack of respect our society gives
-to full - time mothers, may see the benefi ts of domestic life as greater than the
-costs.
-Thus, the inequalities between the sexes in the workplace and at home
-reinforce and exacerbate each other. It is not necessary to choose between
-two alternative, competing explanations of the inequalities between men and
-women in the workplace [ . . . ]. When the pivotal importance of gender -
-structured marriage and the expectation of it are acknowledged, these explanations
-can be seen, rather, as complementary reasons for women ’ s inequality.
-A cycle of power relations and decisions pervades both family and workplace,
-and the inequalities of each reinforce those that already exist in the other.
-Only with the recognition of this truth will we be able to begin to confront
-the changes that need to occur if women are to have a real opportunity to be
-equal participants in either sphere [ . . . ].
-The family is the linchpin of gender, reproducing it from one generation
-to the next [ . . . ] family life as typically practiced in our society is not just,
-either to women or to children. Moreover, it is not conducive to the rearing
-of citizens with a strong sense of justice. In spite of all the rhetoric about
-260 Julinna C. Oxley
-equality between the sexes, the traditional or quasi - traditional division of
-family labor still prevails [ . . . ]. Any just and fair solution to the urgent
-problem of women ’ s and children ’ s vulnerability must encourage and facilitate
-the equal sharing by men and women of paid and unpaid work, of productive
-and reproductive labor [ . . . ]. A just future would be one without gender.
-(Okin, 146 – 71)
-P1. If a society is just and fair to women, then men and women will have
-equal social, political, and economic rights, liberties, and
-opportunities.
-P2. But in many Western societies, men and women do not have equal
-social, political, and economic rights, liberties, and opportunities.
-C1. Many Western societies are not just and fair to women ( modus
-tollens , P1, P2).
-P3. If a society is to be just and fair to women, then it ought not promote
-or engage in practices that contribute to women ’ s oppression.
-P4. If a society does not promote or engage in practices that contribute to
-women ’ s oppression, then its social, political, and legal institutions
-should be modifi ed so as to eradicate features that contribute to women ’ s
-oppression.
-C2. If a society is to be just and fair to women, then [Western] societies
-that seek gender justice should modify social, political, and legal
-institutions and eradicate features that contribute to women ’ s disadvantage
-(hypothetical syllogism, P3, P4).
-The Nature of Women ’ s Disadvantage and Oppression
-P1. If men and women do not spend the same amount of time performing
-domestic duties or doing unpaid labor in the home (including cooking,
-cleaning, raising children, etc.), then there will be an unequal distribution
-of labor in the family.
-P2. In a traditional family, men and women do not spend the same amount
-of time performing unpaid labor in the home – women perform most of
-the domestic duties.
-C1. There is an unequal distribution of unpaid labor in the traditional
-family ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
-P3. If there is an unequal distribution of unpaid labor in the family, then
-this situation is unjust to women because the work is assigned in virtue
-of individual innate characteristics, and has long - term repercussions that
-make the woman vulnerable.
-C2. The traditional family is unjust to women because the work is
-assigned in virtue of individual innate characteristics, and has long -
-Liberal Feminism 261
-term repercussions that make the woman vulnerable ( modus ponens ,
-P3, C1).
-The Source of Women ’ s Disadvantage and Oppression
-P2. (repeated): In a traditional family, men and women do not spend the
-same amount of time performing domestic duties – women perform most
-of the domestic duties.
-P5. Women perform the majority of domestic duties because men expect
-women to do most of the work in the home and are reluctant to contribute
-to household labor. These expectations inform the “ gendered
-structure ” of the family (causal reasoning for P2).
-P6. If women spend more time working in the home than men, then they
-have less time to take advantage of opportunities to advance in the
-workplace than men do.
-C3. Women have less time and thus fewer opportunities to advance in
-the workplace ( modus ponens , P6, P2).
-P7. If women have less time and thus fewer opportunities to advance in the
-workplace as men, they do not have equality of opportunity in social
-and political life.
-C4. Women do not have equality of opportunity in social and political
-life ( modus ponens , P7, C3).
-P8. Women will have equality of opportunity in social and political life only
-if they do not perform the majority of the unpaid labor in the home
-(implied by P5 – C4).
-P9. For women not to perform a majority of the unpaid labor in the home,
-then men will have to be responsible for at least half of domestic duties
-(by defi nition).
-C5. If domestic duties are defi ned by the “ gendered structure ” of the
-family, then men are not responsible for at least half of domestic duties
-(substitution, P5, P9).
-C6. When men are not responsible for at least half of the domestic duties
-(the “ gendered structure ” of the traditional family), then women
-cannot achieve equality of opportunity in social and political life
-( modus ponens , P5, C5).
-Achieving Gender Justice
-P10. Gender roles, including norms and expectations regarding men ’ s and
-women ’ s roles in the family and in society, are learned in the family.
-262 Julinna C. Oxley
-P11. If children are raised in traditional “ gender - structured ” families where
-women lack power and independence, then the children learn that inequalities
-between men and women are the norm and that they can be
-expected in social life (follows from P10).
-P12. Many children are now raised in traditional “ gender - structured ” families
-where women are vulnerable because they lack power and
-independence.
-C7. Many children will learn that inequalities between men and women
-are the norm, and that they can be expected in social life ( modus
-ponens , P11, P12).
-P13. If many children will learn that inequalities between men and women
-are the norm and that they can be expected in social life, then when they
-grow up and start their own families, many people will perpetuate the
-idea that inequalities between men and women are the norm and that
-this can be expected in social life (i.e., the cycle of inequality).
-C8. When they grow up and start their own families, many people will
-perpetuate the idea that inequalities between men and women are the
-norm and that this can be expected in social life (i.e., the cycle of
-inequality) ( modus ponens , P13, C7).
-P14. A just and fair society seeks to eradicate inequality in its existing
-institutions, especially ones that perpetuate inequality.
-P15. If the family is a social institution, then it should be an egalitarian
-structure.
-P16. If the family is to be an egalitarian structure, then men and women
-will share equally the paid and unpaid work, productive and reproductive
-labor.
-C9. If the family is a social institution, then men and women in the family
-will share equally the paid and unpaid work, productive and reproductive
-labor (hypothetical syllogism, P15, P16).
-P17. The family is a social institution.
-C10. A just society will encourage and facilitate the equal sharing by
-men and women of paid and unpaid work, of productive and reproductive
-labor ( modus ponens , C9, P17).
-P18. If a just society encourages and facilitates the equal sharing by men
-and women of paid and unpaid work, and of productive and reproductive
-labor, then it will do so by eliminating traditional gender roles and
-their corresponding expectations regarding work and family life.
-C11. A just society will eliminate traditional gender roles and their corresponding
-expectations regarding work and family life; for example,
-by passing social policies that facilitate equally shared parenting,
-reorganizing work life to make parenting a priority, and educating
-children regarding the problems with gender stereotyping ( modus
-ponens , P18, C10).
-69
-Moral Status of Animals from
-Marginal Cases
-Julia Tanner
-Bernstein , Mark . “ Marginal Cases and Moral Relevance . ” Journal of Social
-Philosophy 33 , 4 ( 2002 ): 523 – 39 .
-Narveson , Jan. “ Animal Rights . ” Canadian Journal of Philosophy VII
-( 1977 ): 161 – 78 .
-Porphyry . On Abstinence from Animal Food , translated by Thomas Taylor.
-London : Centaur Press , 1965 .
-Singer , Peter . Animal Liberation . London : Pimlico , 1995 .
-It matters a great deal whether animals have moral status. If animals have
-moral status, it may be wrong for us to use them as we currently do –
-hunting, farming, eating, and experimenting on them. The argument from
-marginal cases provides us with a reason to think that some animals have
-moral status that is equal to that of “ marginal ” humans.
-Many of those who deny that animals have moral status argue that moral
-status depends on rational agency or the ability to use language or some
-other capacity/capacities that only humans have. There are many such
-capacities, so I shall use capacity X to stand in for them all.
-But pinning moral status on X (rational agency or any capacity that is
-typical of normal adult humans) is problematic. Not all humans will have
-X (not all humans are normal adult humans). There are some humans,
-known as marginal humans, who do not possess, or do not fully possess,
-X. The reason that such humans are called “ marginal cases ” is that they
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-264 Julia Tanner
-are atypical insofar as they do not possess the all - important capacity X.
-There are, broadly speaking, three types of marginal humans: pre - X – they
-have yet to acquire X, such as children; post - X – they have permanently
-lost X due to illness, accident, or old age; and non - X – they do not, never
-have had, and never will have X.
-Those who argue that moral status depends on X are, therefore, faced
-with a dilemma. Either, they must admit that marginal humans lack moral
-status because they lack X, or they must concede that moral status depends
-on something other than X (I will call this “ Z ” ). But some animals will also
-have Z. Thus, it must be conceded that those animals (with Z) have moral
-status too. This is the argument from marginal cases.
-The argument from marginal cases has roots in ancient Greece. Porphyry
-was the fi rst to make it (III. 19). But the term “ argument from marginal
-cases ” was coined more recently by Narveson (an opponent of the argument)
-(164). Peter Singer gives one of the earliest contemporary formulations
-(see below). Following Singer ’ s version is a generic version of the
-argument.
-[H]uman beings are not equal [ . . . ] if we seek some characteristic that all
-of them possess [ . . . it] must be a kind of lowest common denominator,
-pitched so low that no human being lacks it. The catch is that any such
-characteristic [ . . . ] possessed by all human beings will not be possessed only
-by human beings. (Singer, 237)
-P1. If there is no morally relevant difference between marginal humans and
-some nonhuman animals, then if marginal humans have moral status, so
-do some nonhuman animals.
-P2. There is no morally relevant difference between marginal humans and
-some nonhuman animals.
-C1. If marginal humans have moral status, then so do some nonhuman
-animals ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
-P3. Marginal humans have moral status.
-C2. Some nonhuman animals have moral status ( modus ponens , C1, P3).
-70
-The Ethical Vegetarianism
-Argument
-Robert L. Muhlnickel
-Bentham , Jeremy. The Classical Utilitarians , edited by J. Troyer . Indianapolis :
-Hackett , 2003 .
-DeGrazia , David . Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status .
-Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 1996 .
-Rachels , James . “ The Basic Argument for Vegetarianism , ” in The Legacy of
-Socrates , edited by S. Rachels , 3 – 15 . New York : Columbia University
-Press , 2007 .
-Singer , Peter. “ All Animals Are Equal . ” Philosophical Exchange 1 , 5 ( 1974 ):
-103 – 16 . Reprinted in Unsanctifying Human Life , edited by H. Kuhse .
-Oxford : Blackwell , 2002 .
-___. Animal Liberation . New York : Harper Perennial , 2009 .
-The ethics of relations between human and nonhuman animals is a minor
-topic in the history of Western moral philosophy. Philosophers have given
-it more attention since the 1970s, when Peter Singer ’ s work prompted much
-thinking about the interests of nonhuman animals. Singer ’ s signature claim
-is that the same interests of nonhuman animals and humans deserve the
-same degree of moral consideration. At the time, he pressed the analogy
-with contemporary liberation movements, saying that nonhuman animals
-were unfairly denied moral status just as women and people of color had
-been unfairly denied moral status. However, Singer ’ s judgments of social
-status and claims of oppression contribute less to its philosophical merit
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-266 Robert L. Muhlnickel
-than the impetus he gave to re - thinking the criteria of basic moral status.
-The argument presented here makes claims about moral status explicit.
-This argument has had more infl uence among nonphilosophers than any
-philosophical argument of the past fi fty years, with the possible exceptions
-of John Rawls ’ A Theory of Justice and Thomas Kuhn ’ s The Structure of
-Scientifi c Revolutions (#90). Although the argument concludes that vegetarianism
-is morally required, the considerations adduced in its premises
-can be extended to moral judgments about using nonhuman animals in
-research, manufacturing, entertainment, and companionship.
-The argument for ethical vegetarianism starts by asserting that the ability
-to suffer is the ground of basic moral consideration. A being deserves basic
-moral consideration if it deserves consideration for its own sake. In contrast,
-something deserves derivative moral consideration if it deserves consideration
-for the sake of something else. The Ethical Vegetarianism
-Argument aims to show that nonhuman animals deserve basic moral
-consideration.
-A being deserves basic moral consideration just in case we are morally
-required to take its interests into account when deliberating about what to
-do. The ability to suffer is roughly co - extensive with sentience, the capacity
-to experience pain, pleasure, and frustration and satisfaction of desires.
-Anything that deserves basic moral consideration is said to have interests.
-If so, then any being that can suffer has an interest in avoiding suffering.
-Things that cannot suffer might merit derivative moral consideration even
-when they do not merit consideration for their own sakes.
-Knowing that a being deserves moral consideration is necessary but not
-suffi cient for moral judgment. In addition, we need to know how various
-beings ’ interests stand in relation to one another. The Equal Consideration
-of Interests Principle is an independent premise telling us that interests
-themselves are equal, regardless of the kind of being that has the interests.
-Thus, the Equal Consideration of Interests Principle asserts that the criterion
-of moral consideration, the ability to suffer, applies to both nonhuman
-and human animals. Thus, the same suffering ought to have the same weight
-in judging the rightness or wrongness of our actions, whether a human
-nonhuman animal experiences that suffering.
-The argument derives C3 from P4 and P5, concluding that causing a
-being to suffer without adequate justifi cation is morally wrong. P6 and P7
-apply the Equal Consideration of Interests Principle, stated in P3, and C3
-to eating meat, concluding that doing so is morally wrong. The premises
-introduce the factual claims that industrial production of meat involves
-confi ning, killing, and causing animals to experience pain and that by eating
-meat one participates in confi ning, killing, and causing pain.
-Singer ’ s earliest statement of the argument is his “ All Animals Are
-Equal, ” published in 1974 in Philosophical Exchange . The journal is not
-The Ethical Vegetarianism Argument 267
-widely available, but the article is frequently anthologized. The quotation
-below is from Singer ’ s Unsanctifying Human Life.
-If a being suffers, there can be no moral justifi cation for refusing to take
-that suffering into consideration. No matter what the nature of the being, the
-principle of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with the
-like suffering – insofar as rough comparisons can be made – of any other
-being. If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or
-happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account. This is why the limit of
-sentience (using the term as a convenient, if not strictly accurate, shorthand
-for the capacity to suffer or experience enjoyment or happiness) is the only
-defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others. To mark this
-boundary by some characteristic like intelligence or rationality would be to
-mark it in an arbitrary way. Why not choose some other characteristic, like
-skin color?
-The racist violates the principles of equality by giving greater weight to
-the interests of members of his own race, when there is a clash between their
-interests and the interests of those of another race. Similarly, the speciesist
-allows the interests of his own species to override the greater interests of
-members of other species. The pattern is the same in each case. Most humans
-are speciesists. I shall now briefl y describe some of the practices that show
-this.
-For the great majority of human beings, especially in urban, industrialized
-societies, the most direct form of contact with members of other species is at
-mealtimes: we eat them. In doing so we treat them purely as means to our
-ends. We regard their life and well - being as subordinate to our taste for a
-particular kind of dish. I say “ taste ” deliberately – this is purely a matter of
-pleasing our palate. There can be no defense of eating fl esh in terms of satisfying
-nutritional needs, since it has been established beyond doubt that we could
-satisfy our need for protein and other essential nutrients far more effi ciently
-with a diet that replaced animal fl esh by soy beans, or products derived from
-soy beans, and other high - protein vegetable products.
-It is not merely the act of killing that indicates what we are ready to do
-to other species in order to gratify our tastes. The suffering we infl ict on the
-animals while they are alive is perhaps an even clearer indication of our speciesism
-than the fact that we are prepared to kill them. (84 – 5)
-P1. If a being can suffer, then that being ’ s interests merit moral
-consideration.
-P2. If a being cannot suffer, then that being ’ s interests do not merit moral
-consideration.
-C1. If a being ’ s interests merit moral consideration, then that being can
-suffer (transposition, P2).
-C2. A being ’ s interests merit moral consideration if and only if that being
-can suffer (material equivalence, P1, C1).
-268 Robert L. Muhlnickel
-P3. The same interests merit the same moral consideration, regardless of
-what kind of being is the interest - bearer (equal consideration of interests
-principle).
-P4. If one causes a being to suffer without adequate justifi cation, then one
-violates that being ’ s interests.
-P5. If one violates a being ’ s interests, then one does what is morally wrong.
-C3. If one causes a being to suffer without adequate justifi cation, then
-one does what is morally wrong (hypothetical syllogism, P4, P5).
-P6. If P3, then if one kills, confi nes, or causes nonhuman animals to experience
-pain in order to use them as food, then one causes them to suffer
-without adequate justifi cation.
-P7. If one eats meat, then one participates in killing, confi ning, and causing
-nonhuman animals to experience pain in order to use them as food.
-C4. If one eats meat, then one causes nonhuman animals to suffer
-without adequate justifi cation (hypothetical syllogism, P6, P7).
-C5. If one eats meat, the one does what is morally wrong (hypothetical
-syllogism, C3, C4).
-71
-Thomson and the Famous
-Violinist
-Leslie Burkholder
-Thomson , Judith Jarvis . “ A Defense of Abortion . ” Philosophy and Public
-Affairs 1 ( 1971 ): 47 – 66 .
-“ A Defense of Abortion . ” Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_
-Defense_of_Abortion (accessed April 20, 2011 )
-There are many sources of opposition to abortion. Sometimes this opposition
-is based on thinking like the following: abortion results in the death
-of the fetus. But a fetus is a human being or person and all human beings,
-no matter what their age, have a moral right to continued life. So an abortion
-infringes on the right to continued life of a person, a human being. Of
-course the mother has rights too. She has a right to control what is done
-with and to her own body. Her having an abortion would be an exercise
-of this right. But the right to continued life is surely more important than
-anyone ’ s right to control what is done to his body. So, even though the
-mother has this right, its exercise or use to have an abortion wrongfully
-violates another person ’ s – the fetus ’ – right to continued life. This means
-that an abortion may not be done. It is ethically impermissible.
-According to Judith Thomson, if this argument is deductively sound – if
-it is deductively valid with all true premises – then in the following imaginary
-case it would be morally impermissible to detach yourself from the
-famous violinist.
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-270 Leslie Burkholder
-You wake up in the morning and fi nd yourself back to back in bed with
-an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found
-to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed
-all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right
-blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the
-violinist ’ s circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can
-be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director
-of the hospital now tells you, “ Look, we ’ re sorry the Society of Music Lovers
-did this to you – we would never have permitted it if we had known. But still,
-they did it, and the violinist is now plugged into you. To unplug you would
-be to kill him. But never mind, it ’ s only for nine months. By then he will have
-recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you. ” Is it
-morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation? No doubt it would be
-very nice of you if you did, a great kindness. But do you have to accede to
-it? What if it were not nine months, but nine years? Or longer still? What if
-the director of the hospital says, “ Tough luck. I agree, but now you ’ ve got to
-stay in bed, with the violinist plugged into you, for the rest of your life.
-Because remember this. All persons have a right to life, and violinists are
-persons. Granted you have a right to decide what happens in and to your
-body, but a person ’ s right to life outweighs your right to decide what happens
-in and to your body. So you cannot ever be unplugged from him. ” I imagine
-you would regard this as outrageous, which suggests that something really is
-wrong with that plausible - sounding argument I mentioned a moment ago.
-(Thomson, 48)
-Thomson further says that you obviously have no moral obligation to
-stay attached to the violinist. The violinist is a human, and so she has a
-right to continued life, just as the fetus does. But that is not enough to prove
-that you may not have yourself detached. You can volunteer to stay attached
-and save the life of the violinist, but you are not ethically required to do
-this.
-P1. All abortions are acts resulting in the death of some fetus.
-P2. All acts resulting in the death of some fetus result in the death of some
-human being, person.
-P3. Any act resulting in the death of some human being, person, is an
-infringement of the right to continued life of some person, human being.
-C1. If A is an abortion, then A results in the death of some fetus (universal
-instantiation, P1).
-C2. If A results in the death of some fetus, then A results in the death
-of some human being, a person (universal instantiation, P2).
-C3. If A results in the death of some human being, person, then A is an
-infringement of the right to continued life of some person, human
-being (universal instantiation, P3).
-Thomson and the Famous Violinist 271
-C4. If A is an abortion, then A results in the death of some human being,
-a person (hypothetical syllogism, C1, C2).
-C5. If A is an abortion, then A is an infringement of the right to continued
-life of some person, human being (hypothetical syllogism, C3,
-C4).
-C6. All abortions are infringement of the right to continued life of some
-person, human being (universal generalization, C5).
-P4. All abortions are exercises of the mother ’ s right to control of her own
-body.
-P5. All exercises of the mother ’ s right to control of her own body are exercises
-of some person ’ s right to control of her own body.
-C7. If A is an abortion, then A is an infringement of the right to continued
-life of some person, human being (universal instantiation, C6).
-C8. If A is an abortion, then A is an exercise of the mother ’ s right to
-control of her own body (universal instantiation, P4).
-C9. If A is an exercise of the mother ’ s right to control of her own body,
-then A is an exercise of some person ’ s right to control of her own
-body (universal instantiation, P5).
-C10. If A is an abortion, then A is an exercise of some person ’ s right to
-control of her own body (hypothetical syllogism, C8, C9).
-C11. Not A is an abortion or A is an infringement of the right to continued
-life of some person, human being (implication, C7).
-C12. Not A is an abortion or A is an exercise of some person ’ s right to
-control of her own body (material implication, C10).
-C13. Both not A is an abortion or A is an infringement of the right to
-continued life of some person, and not A is an abortion or A is an
-exercise of some person ’ s right to control of her own body (conjunction,
-C12, C11).
-C14. Not A is an abortion or both A is an infringement of the right to
-continued life of some person, human being and A is an exercise of
-some person ’ s right to control of her own body (distribution, C13).
-C15. If A is an abortion, then both A is an infringement of the right to
-continued life of some person, human being, and A is an exercise of some
-person ’ s right to control of her own body (material implication, C14)
-P6. All acts that are an infringement of the right to continued life of some
-person, human being, and exercise of some person ’ s right to control of
-her own body are wrongful infringements of the right to continued life
-of some person, human being, and may not be done.
-C16. If A is an infringement of the right to continued life of some person,
-human being, and A is an exercise of some person ’ s right to control
-of her own body, then A is wrongful infringement of the right to
-continued life of some person, human being, and may not be done
-(universal instantiation, P6).
-272 Leslie Burkholder
-C17. If A is an abortion, then A is wrongful infringement of the right to
-continued life of some person, human being, and may not be done
-(hypothetical syllogism, C15, C16).
-C18. No abortion may not be done. All abortions are ethically impermissible
-(universal generalization, C17).
-Thomson ’ s argument against the argument above is deductively valid. So
-if its premises are both true, then its conclusion must be true. That would
-mean that the reasoning against abortion – the reasoning that says abortion
-is immoral and may not be done – would be unsound. But that reasoning
-is deductively valid. So if both the premises in Thomson ’ s reasoning are
-true, at least one of the premises in the argument opposing abortion is false.
-It is pretty easy to see which one or ones that must be. It is premise P6.
-The fact that you may detach yourself in the imaginary case of the famous
-violinist shows that the rule stated in premise P6 is not true – someone else ’ s
-right to life does not always outweigh the right to control what is done to
-your own body.
-Not everyone accepts that the premises in Thomson ’ s argument are both
-true. Some writers think you cannot detach yourself. In that case, premise
-P2 in Thomson ’ s own argument would be false. Some others say that the
-conditional in premise P1 in her reasoning is false. The reasoning against
-abortion is sound, and yet you may detach yourself from the violinist. This
-is because there is some morally important difference between the case of
-a mother ’ s aborting a fetus inside her and your detaching the violinist.
-P1. If the reasoning opposing abortion is deductively sound, then you may
-not detach yourself from the famous violinist.
-P2. You are allowed to detach yourself from the violinist. You are not ethically
-required to stay attached.
-C. The reasoning opposing abortion is not deductively sound ( modus
-tollens , P1, P2).
-72
-Marquis and the Immorality
-of Abortion
-Leslie Burkholder
-Marquis , Don . “ Why Abortion Is Immoral . ” The Journal of Philosophy 86
-( 1989 ): 183 – 202 .
-Thomson , Judith Jarvis . “ A Defense of Abortion . ” Philosophy and Public
-Affairs 1 ( 1971 ): 47 – 66 .
-According to Don Marquis, abortions are impermissible because of the
-following line of reasoning. Surely, sometimes killing a particular adult or
-child is wrong, seriously wrong. Probably, for example, killing you or me
-or your little brother right now would be wrong. What makes the killing
-so wrong, what explains its wrongness, is that it causes the loss of all the
-future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments that would be had
-by you or me or your little brother, and this loss is one of the greatest losses
-that can be suffered. But if that explanation is correct, then anything that
-causes the loss of all future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments
-is seriously wrong. Abortions of a healthy fetus cause just this loss. They
-cause the loss of all future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments
-the fetus would have were it not aborted. So abortions are not just ethically
-wrong but seriously wrong.
-Marquis ’ argument is deductively valid. This means that if anything is
-wrong with the reasoning, one or more of its premises must be false. If they
-are all true, the conclusion would also have to be true. One premise that
-seems to be false is premise 3. It is a conditional. For it to be false, all that
-would need to happen is that the antecedent be true and the consequent be
-false. The antecedent in premise 3 is the consequent in premise 2. So it is
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-274 Leslie Burkholder
-easy to work out that it should be true. What about the consequent of
-premise 3? Look at the chapter in this volume examining Judy Thomson ’ s
-famous violinist imaginary case (#71). Detaching yourself from the violinist
-would end all that individual ’ s future experiences, activities, projects, and
-enjoyments. But would it be wrong for you to detach yourself? If not, then
-the consequent of premise 3 is false.
-What makes it wrong? Here ’ s one central thing: killing us deprives us of
-the value of our future. It deprives us not only of what we value now and
-would have, given our current predilections, valued later, but also of what we
-would have come to value. (190)
-P1. Killing this particular adult human being or child would be seriously
-wrong.
-P2. What makes it so wrong is that it causes the loss of all this individual ’ s
-future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments, and this loss is
-one of the greatest losses that can be suffered.
-C1. Killing this particular adult human being or child would be seriously
-wrong, and what makes it so wrong is that it causes the loss of all
-this individual ’ s future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments,
-and this loss is one of the greatest losses that can be suffered
-(conjunction, P1, P2).
-P3. If killing this particular adult human being or child would be seriously
-wrong and what makes it so wrong is that it causes the loss of all this
-individual ’ s future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments and
-this loss is one of the greatest losses that can be suffered, then anything
-that causes to any individual the loss of all future experiences, activities,
-projects, and enjoyments is seriously wrong.
-C2. Anything that causes to any individual the loss of all future experiences,
-activities, projects, and enjoyments is seriously wrong ( modus
-ponens , C1, P3).
-P4. All aborting of any healthy fetus would cause the loss to that individual
-of all its future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments.
-C3. If A causes to individual F the loss of all future experiences, activities,
-projects, and enjoyments, then A is seriously wrong (particular
-instantiation, C2).
-C4. If A is an abortion of healthy fetus F, then A causes to individual F
-the loss of all future experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments
-(particular instantiation, P4).
-C5. If A is an abortion of healthy fetus F, then A is seriously wrong
-(hypothetical syllogism, C3, C4).
-C6. All aborting of any healthy fetus is seriously wrong (universal generalization,
-C5).
-73
-Tooley on Abortion
-and Infanticide
-Ben Saunders
-Tooley , Michael . “ Abortion and Infanticide . ” Philosophy & Public Affairs 2
-( 1972 ): 37 – 65 .
-___. Abortion and Infanticide . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1983 .
-Thomson , Judith Jarvis . “ A Defence of Abortion . ” Philosophy & Public
-Affairs 1 ( 1971 ): 47 – 66 .
-Abortion is understandably one of the more controversial ethical questions
-facing philosophers. Most refuse to take a stance on whether the fetus is a
-person. Thompson, for example, grants to her opponent that the fetus is
-indeed a person, but argues that abortion is nonetheless permissible, since
-one shouldn ’ t be required to suffer great hardship for nine months in order
-to keep someone else alive.
-Tooley argues that the fetus is not a person and nor in fact is a young
-infant. The argument depends on distinguishing between “ human being ”
-(which is a merely descriptive biological category) and “ person ” (which
-depends on self - awareness and implies a right to life). It is possible that not
-all persons are human – for instance, chimpanzees or dolphins may have
-the right to life – and that not all humans are persons; for instance, those
-in a persistent vegetative state. While the fetus or infant is undeniably
-human, Tooley argues that it does not acquire a right to life until it becomes
-self - aware. Before this point, it is permissible to kill the infant, even after
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-276 Ben Saunders
-it is born. Tooley rejects the ideas that species membership or the mere fact
-of being born make any difference to an entity ’ s rights, and he also argues
-that the mere potentiality of personhood is not suffi cient to ground rights,
-since it would be permissible to kill a kitten that was going to become a
-person provided that one did so before it actually became a person.
-The argument is important because it has implications not only for abortion
-but other areas such as our treatment of animals. The conclusion is
-obviously controversial, but that makes it all the more interesting if it can
-be established from the premises. It is unclear that it can, however, since it
-could be questioned whether the capacity to desire an object is, as Tooley
-suggests, a necessary condition for having a right to that object. If not, then
-he only succeeds in showing that fetuses and young infants do not satisfy
-certain suffi cient conditions for a right to life (they are not persons and their
-mere potential for personhood is not itself suffi cient to ground a right to
-life), but not that fetuses and young infants cannot have a right to life for
-other reasons.
-An organism possesses a serious right to life only if it possesses the concept
-of a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and
-believes that it is itself such a continuing entity [ … ] [A] newborn baby does
-not possess the concept of a continuing self, any more than a newborn kitten
-possess such a concept. If so, infanticide during the time interval shortly after
-birth must be morally acceptable. (Tooley “ Abortion, ” 62 – 3)
-P1. If A has a morally serious right to X, then A must be able to want X.
-P2. If A is able to want X, then A must be able to conceive of X.
-C1. If A has a morally serious right to X, then A must be able to conceive
-of X (hypothetical syllogism, P1, P2).
-P3. Fetuses, young infants, and animals cannot conceive of their continuing
-as subjects of mental states.
-C2. Fetuses, young infants, and animals cannot want their continuing as
-subjects of mental states ( modus tollens , P2, P3).
-C3. Fetuses, young infants, and animals do not have morally serious
-rights to continue as subjects of mental states ( modus tollens , P1, C2).
-P4. If something does not have a morally serious right to life, then it is not
-wrong to kill it painlessly.
-C4. It is not wrong to kill fetuses, young infants, and animals painlessly
-( modus ponens , C3, P4).
-74
-Rachels on Euthanasia
-Leslie Burkholder
-Rachels , James . “ Active and Passive Euthanasia , ” New England Journal of
-Medicine 292 ( 1975 ): 78 – 80 .
-Beauchamp , Tom L. “ A Reply to Rachels on Active and Passive Euthanasia , ”
-in Medical Responsibility , edited by Wade L. Robison and Michael S.
-Pritchard , 182 – 94 . Clifton, NJ : The Humana Press , 1979 .
-Foot , Philippa . “ Killing and Letting Die , ” in Abortion: Moral and Legal
-Perspectives , edited by James L. Garfi eld and Paul Hennessey , 177 – 85 .
-Amherst, MA : University of Massachusetts Press , 1984 .
-Perrett , Roy W. “ Killing, Letting Die, and the Bare Difference Argument , ”
-Bioethics 10 ( 1996 ): 131 – 9 .
-Active euthanasia happens when a medical professional or another kind of
-person deliberately does something that causes a person to die. Passive
-euthanasia, on the other hand, occurs when someone dies because medical
-professionals or others don ’ t do something needed to keep the patient alive.
-This might include not starting a treatment that would prevent the person ’ s
-death or not continuing with a procedure or treatment that is keeping a
-person or animal alive.
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-278 Leslie Burkholder
-Many medical professionals and others think that active euthanasia, even
-when it is done at the request of the person who dies, is morally wrong.
-They also think that passive euthanasia is morally right, at least when it is
-done following the wishes of the person who dies. This idea that the two
-are ethically different is refl ected in the law in many countries. The law
-makes it a crime to commit active euthanasia but not a crime to perform
-passive euthanasia when the person who dies doesn ’ t want to be kept alive.
-Is this idea about the ethical difference between active and passive euthanasia
-sound? According to Rachels ’ argument, it isn ’ t.
-One reason why so many people think that there is an important moral
-difference between active and passive euthanasia is that they think killing
-someone is morally worse than letting someone die. But is it? Is killing, in
-itself, worse than letting die? To investigate this issue, two cases may be considered
-that are exactly alike except that one involves killing whereas the other
-involves letting someone die. Then, it can be asked whether this difference
-makes any difference to the moral assessments. It is important that the cases
-be exactly alike, except for this one difference, since otherwise one cannot be
-confi dent that it is this difference and not some other that accounts for any
-variation in the assessments of the two cases. So, let us consider this pair of
-cases:
-In the fi rst, Smith stands to gain a large inheritance if anything should
-happen to his six - year - old cousin. One evening while the child is taking his
-bath, Smith sneaks into the bathroom and drowns the child, and then arranges
-things so that it will look like an accident.
-In the second, Jones also stands to gain if anything should happen to his
-six - year - old cousin. Like Smith, Jones sneaks in planning to drown the child
-in his bath. However, just as he enters the bathroom Jones sees the child slip
-and hit his head, and fall face down in the water. Jones is delighted; he stands
-by, ready to push the child ’ s head back under if it is necessary, but it is not
-necessary. With only a little thrashing about, the child drowns all by himself,
-“ accidentally, ” as Jones watches and does nothing.
-Now Smith killed the child, whereas Jones “ merely ” let the child die. That
-is the only difference between them. Did either man behave better, from a
-moral point of view? If the difference between killing and letting die were in
-itself a morally important matter, one should say that Jones ’ s behavior was
-less reprehensible than Smith ’ s. But does one really want to say that? I think
-not. In the fi rst place, both men acted from the same motive, personal gain,
-and both had exactly the same end in view when they acted. It may be inferred
-from Smith ’ s conduct that he is a bad man, although that judgment may be
-withdrawn or modifi ed if certain further facts are learned about him – for
-example, that he is mentally deranged. But would not the very same thing be
-inferred about Jones from his conduct? And would not the same further
-considerations also be relevant to any, modifi cation of this judgment?
-Moreover, suppose Jones pleaded, in his own defense, “ After all, I didn ’ t do
-anything except just stand there and watch the child drown. I didn ’ t kill him;
-Rachels on Euthanasia 279
-I only let him die. ” Again, if letting die were in itself less bad than killing,
-this defense should have at least some weight. But it does not. Such a
-“ defense ” can only be regarded as a grotesque perversion of moral reasoning.
-Morally speaking, it is no defense at all. [ … ] I have argued that killing is not
-in itself any worse than letting die; if my contention is right, it follows that
-active euthanasia is not any worse than passive euthanasia. (Rachels,
-78 – 80)
-P1. Smith ’ s killing the child is exactly like Jones ’ s letting the child die except
-that Smith kills someone and Jones allows someone to die.
-P2. What Smith did is morally as bad as what Jones did.
-P3. If killing in itself is morally worse than letting die and Smith ’ s killing
-the child is exactly like Jones ’ letting the child die except that Smith kills
-someone and Jones allows someone to die, then Smith ’ s behavior should
-be more reprehensible than Jones ’ .
-C1. Not both killing in itself is morally worse than letting die and Smith ’ s
-killing the child is exactly like Jones ’ letting the child die except that
-Smith kills someone and Jones allows someone to die ( modus tollens ,
-P2, P3).
-C2. Not killing in itself is morally worse than letting die or not Smith ’ s
-killing the child is exactly like Jones ’ s letting the child die except that
-Smith kills someone and Jones allows someone to die (De Morgan ’ s,
-C1).
-C3. Not not Smith ’ s killing the child is exactly like Jones ’ letting the child
-die except that Smith kills someone and Jones allows someone to die
-(double negation, P1).
-C4. Killing is not in itself morally worse than letting die (disjunctive
-syllogism, C2, C3).
-P4. If there is an important moral difference between active and passive
-euthanasia, then killing someone is morally worse than letting someone
-die.
-C5. Active euthanasia is not any worse – ethically speaking – than passive
-euthanasia ( modus tollens , P4, C4).
-There is some ambiguity in the way some parts of the argument are
-stated. Formalizing the statements in a language for quantifi ed fi rst - order
-logic would bring out these ambiguities. For example, the fi nal conclusion
-could mean that active euthanasia is never ethically worse than passive
-euthanasia, or it could mean that active euthanasia is not always ethically
-worse than passive euthanasia. It is pretty clear that Rachels has in the mind
-the second of these two. Again, the intermediate conclusion C1 might mean
-that killing is never ethically worse than otherwise identical instances of
-letting die. But Rachels does not intend this. All that he means is that killing
-is not always worse, morally speaking, than similar cases of letting die.
-280 Leslie Burkholder
-So long as these ambiguities are removed in a consistent way, this argument
-is deductively valid. So if there is anything wrong with the reasoning,
-it must be that one or more of the premises are false. If the ambiguities are
-not cleared up in the same way, then the argument will turn out to be
-invalid.
-Part V
-Philosophy of Mind
-75
-Leibniz ’ Argument for
-Innate Ideas
-Byron Kaldis
-Leibniz , G. W. Discourse on Metaphysics and Other Essays , edited and
-translated by Daniel Garber and Roger Ariew. Indianapolis : Hackett ,
-1991 .
-___. New Essays on Human Understanding , edited and translated by Peter
-Remnant and Jonathan Bennett. Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University
-Press , 1996 .
-___. Philosophical Papers and Letters , edited and translated by L.E. Loemker,
-2nd edn . Kluwer : Dordrecht , 1969 .
-The importance of ideas, the cardinal building block in modern philosophy
-’ s theory of knowledge, can hardly be exaggerated. Equally important
-and vehement was the seventeenth - century debate over the status of certain
-principal ideas and special truths as either innate or not. Innatists and their
-opponents crisscross the dichotomy of rationalists/empiricists. A mental
-item can be innate in the sense of not acquired from extra - mental sources
-but also in the sense of discovered as stored in the mind since birth; obviously
-these two are not necessarily equivalent defi nitions. Nativists have
-standardly been distinguished between those who claim that the mind is
-actually aware of innate ideas and the more sophisticated ones, so - called
-dispositional innatists, such as Leibniz, who hold that the mind has the
-disposition or tendency to excavate certain ideas or principles it employs
-unconsciously or contains potentially.
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-284 Byron Kaldis
-Leibniz, even more than Descartes before him, redrafts the issue of
-innateness by removing it from its ancient preoccupation with psychological
-origins only and redirects its emphasis mainly on the question of what the
-mind must be furnished with, seen that it, and not the senses, can access
-with remarkable epistemic success the modal status of necessary and universal
-truths.
-Though not the only or the fi rst champion of innate ideas in particular
-or of innate knowledge in general, Leibniz is the most intriguing and most
-vociferous defender of nativism (or innatism), both on the basis of his deep
-metaphysics as well as in terms of an argumentative strategy containing
-syllogisms designed specifi cally at rebutting Locke ’ s well - known attack on
-nativism and the latter ’ s attempt to reinstate the doctrine of the mind as a
-tabula rasa . The former, the metaphysical theses, are primarily found in
-Leibniz ’ Discourse on Metaphysics (1686) and other early metaphysical
-writings, while the latter, the syllogisms, are found in his celebrated
-Nouveaux essais [ NE ] in dialogue format (published posthumously in 1765
-but composed around 1704 – 5), having Locke personally as their target and
-imaginary interlocutor. Leibniz ’ overall rationalist position aims at establishing
-that the validity of necessary truths in pure mathematics, metaphysics,
-logic, and even ethics, natural theology, and natural jurisprudence,
-cannot be proven in any other way but a priori or by means of reasoning
-only; that is, by what he calls the “ natural light. ” In fact, the latter, innate
-natural reason that distinguishes humans from beasts is equivalent to the
-power of the understanding innate to us, or what comes to the same thing,
-of the “ self. ” Hence, we have Leibniz ’ famed modifi cation of the classic
-scholastic motto, “ nihil est in intellectu quod prius fuerit in sensu , ” into
-“ There is nothing in the understanding which has not come from the senses,
-except the understanding itself, or the one who understands ” ( Philosophical
-Papers , 549; emphasis added). This rich sense of “ self ” structured as containing
-fundamental notions, the so - called “ intellectual ideas, ” of being,
-substance, unity, possibility, change, action, and so on, is deployed repeatedly
-by Leibniz in order to yield the innateness of these notions, being, after
-all, the ingredients of our self (hence “ we are innate to ourselves ” in this
-sense, too). So the possession of certain privileged intellectual ideas together
-with our epistemic access to the modal status of necessary truths, both
-unavailable by means of sense perception or induction, license belief in their
-innateness.
-In his purely metaphysical mood where Leibniz goes as far as to maintain
-that, strictly, all ideas must be innate, his principal aim is to safeguard the
-immateriality of the mind and its cognitive autonomy or self - suffi ciency.
-The mind, being a monad without any windows, cannot thereby receive
-any ideas from the outside by means of the senses. Infl ux of any sort is
-proscribed throughout Leibnizean metaphysics or physics, properly named
-Leibniz’ Argument for Innate Ideas 285
-“ dynamics ” ; in a strict metaphysical sense, no created substance has any
-real infl uence upon any other. Although in the case of material things,
-mechanistic explanations in terms of transmission of infl uence (causation)
-may be acceptable since the things involved in such a causal contact are not
-real substantial unities; metaphysically speaking, this cannot be admissible,
-for genuine substances are real (i.e., self - enclosed) unities. At the same time,
-metaphysical theses such as the one just presented or that all substance
-whatsoever that is a genuine unity is essentially characterized by an inherent
-primary force or entelechy constantly operating – that is, it is perpetually
-acting or never without originating activity or “ endeavor ” (and therefore
-never comes into existence by generation nor goes out of extinction completely)
-– all such theses are constantly at the background or foreground in
-Leibniz ’ argumentative tactics in the Nouveaux essais. It must therefore be
-underlined that the earlier strictly metaphysical theses are never deactivated
-in the later Nouveaux essais , even when Leibniz is advancing arguments
-only in an epistemic or psychological vein.
-Crucial to understanding Leibniz ’ nativism, avoiding making him sound
-unpalatable, is the particular manner in which he conceives of “ thinking, ”
-“ idea, ” and the unconscious in dispositional terms. For him, to learn something
-does not preclude it from being innate: Leibniz resists as invalid the
-entailment from “ something is learned ” to “ it is not innate. ” Following
-Descartes but going one step further, Leibniz is prepared to bite the bullet
-and answer charges against the triviality or emptiness of any explanation
-that takes recourse to potentialities or dispositions. First, Leibniz never
-admits scholastic “ bare faculties ” – that is, mere potentiality or possibility
-– dismissing them as fi ctions. By contrast, active force or entelechy, inherent
-in substance, contains in itself a certain effort, “ conatus, ” or “ endeavor, ”
-striving toward actualization. In the particular case of the activity of the
-mind, this generic thesis is translated into the specifi c one whereby there is
-always a mental tendency to actualize the awareness of innate notions. In
-other words, the mind is never idle in the sense of having a mere “ faculty ”
-or potentiality that could remain unactualized. It never fails to activate its
-tendency; that is, the dedicated effort to unearth, or be aware of, innate
-notions and truths contained in it. Such a Leibnizian force ( “ endeavor ” ) is
-predetermined never to fail to produce some actual activity, given the right
-conditions. By dint of attention or sense - probing, it acquires awareness of
-its otherwise unconscious innate mental contents. Second, and related to
-this, Leibniz never fails to emphasize well before the Nouveaux essais that
-by “ idea ” he does not understand an actualized occurrence or act of thought
-but a disposition to think in a certain way: “ an idea consists not in some
-act, but in the faculty of thinking, and we are said to have an idea of a
-thing even if we do not think of it, if only, on a given occasion, we can
-think of it ” ( Philosophical Papers , 207). Given all this, third, for Leibniz,
-286 Byron Kaldis
-thinking does not amount to a constantly conscious series of occurrent
-mental acts with clarity and distinctness, since the soul ’ s always being
-active qua substance can be said to still be active even during “ confused ”
-(i.e., less that fully clear) states, either as potentially striving toward such
-conscious attentive thinking episodes or as being most of the time at a
-steady - state attenuated potentiality only. But what safeguards such an attenuated
-state from being empty, thus threatening to undermine Leibniz ’ whole
-position, is that it contains one of his most innovative elements, what he
-famously called “ petites perceptions ” : innumerable minute imperceptible
-sensations, each one of which escapes our awareness yet contributes to the
-aggregate impression of which we are aware. The Leibnizean conception of
-the unconscious is used against Descartes ’ doctrine of constant or permanent
-thinking while at the same time avoiding on the other side Locke ’ s
-doctrine that the mind can be, at periods, blank or inactive. That the
-“ petites perceptions ” turn out to be the capital pillar of Leibniz ’ defence of
-innateness in the Nouveaux essais becomes quickly apparent as he puts his
-invention to work in almost the whole range of his philosophy.
-In the Preface to the Nouveaux essais , Leibniz advances three arguments
-corresponding to the following theses (suitably reconstructed in an organized
-form): (1) only innate principles ground our knowledge with demonstrative
-certainty of the modal status of specifi c truths as necessary and
-universally valid; (2) in self - refl ection we become aware of possessing
-certain intellectual ideas (see above) being (a) immediately related to, and
-(b) always present to, the understanding, although we do not normally pay
-constant attention to these, since our everyday distractions and needs
-prevent our always being aware of them; and (3) as in a block of marble
-its veins predetermine the shape it may take, similarly our soul contains in
-an unconscious state innate items which it has the predetermined potentiality,
-tendency, or disposition to unearth, that is, become aware of – in
-support of this, the thesis of petites perceptions is employed. All these can
-be seen to be replies directed at the three prongs of Locke ’ s attack on
-innatism: (1) together with (3) answer Locke ’ s contention that necessary
-truths do not receive universal assent as they ought to if they were truly
-innate to all mankind; (2) together with (3) answer Locke ’ s contention that
-our mind cannot possess something of which it is unaware; and (3) together
-with Leibniz ’ metaphysical theses about the nature of the mind (see above)
-answer Locke ’ s contention that since the mind does not think all the time,
-it is possible for the mind to be empty. In the fi rst chapter of Book I of the
-Nouveaux essais , Leibniz adds a new aspect to potentiality, this time regarding
-not just ideas but also our knowledge of truths and use of inferences:
-their enthymemic character.
-The signifi cance of Leibniz ’ argumentation cannot be overstated given
-the importance of the notion of the unconscious – something he did not
-Leibniz’ Argument for Innate Ideas 287
-invent but formulated in a novel and plausible manner, his infl uence on
-subsequent developments in German idealism, and, perhaps more importantly,
-its unnoticed relevance to recent discussions in the philosophy of
-mind and evolutionary psychology regarding nativism and concept - innatism,
-or current research in neurophysiology. It is worth pointing out that current
-neurobiological fi ndings regarding motor cognition corroborate his view of
-the unconscious petites perceptions as neural activity falling below a
-minimum level or duration required to emerge into awareness. Similarly, in
-“ subconcious pre - processing ” during sense perception, it has been shown
-that we are not aware, for example, of the hairs of our inner ear that actually
-hear sounds but of the resultant aggregate acoustic sensation.
-(1) [N]ecessary truths, such as we fi nd in pure mathematics [ . . . ] must
-have principles whose proof does not depend on instances nor [ . . . ] on the
-testimony of the senses, even though without the senses it would never occur
-to us to think of them [ . . . ]. [S]o the proof of them can only come from inner
-principles described as innate. It would indeed be wrong to think that we can
-easily read these eternal laws of reason in the soul, as the Praetor ’ s edict can
-be read on his notice - board, without effort or inquiry; but it is enough that
-they can be discovered within us by dint of attention [ . . . ] what shows the
-existence of inner sources of necessary truths is also what distinguishes man
-from beast. (2) [I]deas which do not originate in sensation come from refl ection.
-But refl ection is nothing but attention to what is within us, and the senses
-do not give us what we carry with us already [ . . . ] can it be denied that there
-is a great deal that is innate in our minds since we are innate to ourselves
-[ . . . ] and since we include Being, Unity, Substance [ . . . ] and hosts of other
-objects of our intellectual ideas? [ . . . ] (3) I have also used the analogy of the
-veined block of marble, as opposed to an entirely homogeneous block of
-marble, or to a blank tablet [ . . . ] if there were veins in the block which
-marked out the shape of Hercules rather than other shapes, then the block
-would be more determined to that shape and Hercules would be innate to it
-[ . . . ] even though labour would be required to expose the veins and to polish
-them to clarity, removing everything that prevents them from being seen. This
-is how ideas and truths are innate in us – as inclinations, dispositions, tendencies,
-or natural potentialities and not as action; although these potentialities
-are always accompanied by certain actions, often insensible ones, which correspond
-to them. (5) [ . . . A]t every moment there is in us an infi nity of
-perceptions unaccompanied by awareness or refl ection; that is alterations in
-the soul itself, of which we are unaware because these impressions are either
-too minute and too numerous or else too unvarying [ . . . ]. But when they are
-combined with others they do nevertheless have their effect and make themselves
-felt. (6) [A] special affi nity which the human mind has with [necessary
-truths . . . ] is what makes us call them innate. So it is not a bare faculty [ . . . ]
-a mere possibility of understanding those truths; it is rather a disposition [ . . . ]
-a preformation which determines our souls and brings it about that they are
-derivable from it. (7) [A] “ consideration of the nature of things ” is nothing
-288 Byron Kaldis
-but the knowledge of the nature of our mind and of those innate ideas, and
-there is no need to look for them outside oneself. ( New Essays , 50 – 84)
-Three Arguments
-P1. The mind knows both truths of matter of fact and truths of reason.
-P2. The mind knows truths of reason (simplifi cation, P1).
-P3. The truths of reason are necessary, universally valid (true in all possible
-words), and absolutely certain.
-C1. The mind knows necessary, universal, and absolutely certain truths
-(substitution, P2, P3).
-P4. Necessity, universality, and certainty can either be established by means
-of induction from external sensory data, or they may originate from the
-mind itself.
-P5. Induction is inadequate in yielding necessity, universal validity, and
-certainty.
-C2. Necessity, universal validity, and certainty of truths of reason can be
-original with the mind itself (disjunctive syllogism, C1, P4, P5).
-P6. If necessity and certainty are original with the mind, then they are
-contained within it.
-C3. The mind contains these originally in itself ( modus ponens , P6, C2).
-P7. If the mind contains originally an item of knowledge, then the mind is
-not empty ever.
-C4. The mind is not empty ever ( modus ponens , C3, P7).
-P1. The mind has ideas by means of refl ection.
-P2. Ideas of refl ection manifest the capacity of the mind to know itself.
-P3. The mind can know itself inwardly either by relying on the senses for
-assistance or it is itself endowed with this capacity.
-P4. The senses can deliver knowledge (ideas) regarding only the external
-world.
-C1. The mind ’ s capacity for refl ecting on itself is an endowed capacity
-(disjunctive syllogism, P3, P4).
-P5. If the mind possesses an endowed capacity, then it contains it in itself
-without having it acquired.
-C2. The mind contains an endowed capacity without acquiring the
-refl ecting capacity ( modus ponens , C1, P5).
-P6. If a mental item is contained in the mind without being acquired, then
-it is innate.
-C3. The mind ’ s refl ecting capacity is innate ( modus ponens , C2, P6).
-P7. If the mind has an innate item, then it cannot be empty at its
-inception.
-Leibniz’ Argument for Innate Ideas 289
-P8. If the mind contains something innately (from its inception), then it
-contains it continuously.
-C4. The mind is not empty ever (hypothetical syllogism, P7, P8).
-P1. Either a mental faculty is a bare faculty or it is a predetermined, dedicated,
-capacity to search for specifi c objects [truths] in the mind.
-P2. An epistemic faculty is a “ bare faculty ” if and only if it is merely an
-indeterminate disposition to receive truths (by defi nition).
-C1. A mental faculty is either an indeterminate disposition to receive
-truths or a predetermined, dedicated, capacity to search for specifi c
-truths in the mind (substitution, P1, P2).
-P3. The epistemic capacity of knowing necessary truths is a mental faculty.
-C2. The epistemic capacity of knowing necessary truths is either a bare
-faculty or a predetermined dedicated capacity to search for specifi c
-such truths (substitution, C1, P3).
-P4. If the epistemic capacity of knowing necessary truths is a bare faculty
-of receiving, then it is not the source of such truths.
-P5. The mind is the source of the validity (proof) of necessary truths (as
-per above: fi rst argument).
-C3. The epistemic capacity of knowing necessary truths is not a bare
-faculty ( modus tollens , P4, P5).
-C4. The epistemic capacity of knowing necessary truths is a predetermined
-dedicated capacity to search for specifi c objects in the mind
-(disjunctive syllogism, P1, C3).
-76
-Descartes ’ Arguments for the
-Mind – Body Distinction
-Dale Jacquette
-Descartes , Ren é . Meditations on First Philosophy , in The Philosophical
-Works of Descartes , translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T.
-Ross. Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 1931 .
-Almog , Joseph . What Am I? Descartes and the Mind – Body Problem . Oxford :
-Oxford University Press , 2001 .
-Beck , L. J. The Metaphysics of Descartes: A Study of the Meditations .
-Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1965 .
-Clarke , D. M. Descartes ’ s Theory of Mind . Oxford : Oxford University Press ,
-2003 .
-Emmet , Dorothy . “ Descartes on Body and Mind: After 300 Years . ” Cambridge
-Journal 4 ( 1950 ): 67 – 82 .
-Long , Douglas C. “ Descartes ’ Argument for Mind – Body Dualism . ” The
-Philosophical Forum 1 ( 1969 ): 259 – 73 .
-Rozemond , Marleen . Descartes ’ s Dualism . Cambridge, MA : Harvard
-University Press , 2002 .
-Ryle , Gilbert . The Concept of Mind . London : Hutchinson , 1949 .
-Ren é Descartes ’ fi rst argument in support of mind – body ontic nonidentity
-or substance dualism theory appears in Meditation 2 of his 1641 Meditations
-on First Philosophy . The argument is historically signifi cant, if not obviously
-incorrect, and has earned its place as a focus of philosophical controversy
-for almost four centuries. If Descartes ’ reasoning is sound, then it
-answers the long - standing problem of understanding the relation between
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Descartes’ Arguments for the Mind–Body Distinction 291
-mind and body. Descartes believes that he has solved the mind – body
-problem in metaphysics that he revived from the time of the ancient Greeks,
-in keeping with certain religious beliefs about the soul ’ s independence from
-material things, and especially from the physical human animal body it
-happens to inhabit.
-Descartes applies the equivalent of Leibniz ’ Law – in particular, that half
-of the equivalence that is the conditional principle now often referred to as
-the “ indiscernibility of identicals ” – in a widely imitated general strategy
-for demonstrating the nonidentity of two distinct things by arguing for a
-difference in their properties. What is ahistorically called “ Leibniz ’ indiscernibility
-of identicals principle ” holds that for any A and B, if A = B, then
-A and B have all of their properties in common. Certainly Descartes would
-not have known the principle by either of these names but takes it for
-granted that distinctions between objects are drawn on the basis of a distinction
-among their properties. Descartes has the same intuitive grasp of
-the idea that identicals must have identical properties, and that any discrepancy
-among the properties of distinctly designated objects implies that the
-objects themselves are not identical. In order to prove that mind ≠ body in
-Meditation 2, Descartes claims to have found a difference in the properties
-of his mind and body, a property that his mind has but his body does not
-have, or conversely.
-Descartes singles out the property that he argues distinguishes his body
-from his mind in two ways. He speaks of his mind as being “ better knowable
-” or “ more easily knowable ” than his body and of his body as being
-such that its existence can be rationally doubted under the assumptions of
-a methodological skepticism while his mind is such that its existence cannot
-be rationally doubted, since entertaining doubt is a conscious state and in
-some cases an act of mind. The conclusion that Descartes can rationally
-doubt the existence of his body but not of his mind is supported, in turn,
-by Descartes ’ consideration that there might be an evil demon who systematically
-deceives him concerning the reality of any of his sense impressions
-that appear to reveal the existence and nature of an external world outside
-of, but correctly representing, the contents of his thoughts (the evil demon
-hypothesis). Descartes on pain of contradiction cannot consistently doubt
-the existence of his mind, since the actual entertainment of doubt would
-necessarily be an event actually occurring in and hence presupposing the
-existence of his mind ( Cogito, sum , in Latin; or “ When I think [including
-when I doubt], I exist ” ) (#35, #36).
-Descartes motivates his discussion of mind – body nonidentity in
-Meditation 2 by considering the sensible properties of a piece of wax that
-he invites the reader to imagine him describing as he holds and observes it
-in his hand. Descartes believes that the wax is better known to the intellect
-than by the senses because when the sensible properties of the wax all
-292 Dale Jacquette
-undergo change as the wax is gradually introduced to the heat of a fl ame,
-the senses alone do not tell us that it was the same wax that has undergone
-changes to its shape, size, color, smell, and other empirically perceivable
-properties. From this, Descartes draws the general conclusion that things
-known by the mind, including the mind itself, are better knowable than
-things, such as the body, known primarily or only with the aid of the senses.
-Descartes ’ proposition that his body but not his mind has the property of
-being such that its existence can be rationally doubted by his mind reinforces
-the argument ’ s assumption that Descartes ’ mind is better knowable
-than his body, in the sense that he must infer the existence of his body from
-the evidence of the senses, while the existence of mind upon refl ection is
-immediately known to itself and knows itself self - refl ectively and introspectively,
-directly and without the intermediary of logical or inductive
-inference.
-Descartes ’ fi rst or Meditations 2 ’ s mind ≠ body argument has nevertheless
-been criticized as subject to a fatal dilemma. The kind of property
-Descartes maintains his mind has but his body does not have (better or
-easier knowability) or that his body has but his mind does not have (such
-that its existence is capable of being rationally doubted by his own mind)
-seems to involve a mistaken, excessively general, application of what with
-appropriate qualifi cations we shall continue to call “ Leibniz ’ principle of
-the indiscernibility of identicals. ” Descartes ’ fi rst or Meditation 2 ’ s argument
-for mind ≠ body depends on what is sometimes called a “ converse
-intentional property, ” a property that belongs to an object by virtue of the
-intentional attitude that a thinking subject adopts or might adopt toward
-it. If I love Lisbon, then I have the intentional property of loving Lisbon,
-and Lisbon has the converse intentional property of being loved by me. If
-I doubt the existence of my body, then I have the intentional property of
-doubting the existence of my body, and my body has the converse intentional
-property of being such that its existence is doubted by me. Entities
-are distinguished when they can be shown not to share all of their properties.
-If it is a property of Lisbon that it is loved by me, and if I do not
-equally love London, then, if converse intentional properties are included
-among the shared properties of identical objects prescribed by Leibniz ’ Law,
-it should follow in this case that Lisbon ≠ London. If I equally loved
-London and Lisbon, then fortunately there would still remain many differences
-between them by which their nonidentity could be established as a
-consequence of Leibniz ’ Law. Lisbon and London have many things in
-common despite being different cities, so why shouldn ’ t they have my equal
-love for each of them in common?
-Descartes ’ fi rst mind ≠ body (Meditation 2) argument makes a philosophically
-more unfortunate use of converse intentional properties in applying
-the indiscernibility of identicals principle. His argument is sometimes
-Descartes’ Arguments for the Mind–Body Distinction 293
-said to commit an “ intensional fallacy. ” The objection is that by defi nition
-converse intentional properties do not belong intrinsically to objects but
-only as a consequence of the extrinsic circumstance of being thought of
-in a certain way by certain thinking subjects. Changes in object A ’ s and
-object B ’ s converse intentional properties as a result would seem to leave
-the object itself completely untouched as to the satisfaction or not of its
-intrinsic identity conditions. We know that 1 + 1 = 2, for example, even
-though someone might doubt that 1 + 1 is a prime number despite not
-doubting that 2 is a prime number. We know that Mark Twain = Samuel
-Clemens, regardless of whether or not someone happens to believe that
-Mark Twain wrote Tom Sawyer while doubting that Samuel Clemens wrote
-Tom Sawyer . Converse intentional properties invalidate Leibniz ’ Law as a
-universal identity principle, which means that extrinsic converse intentional
-properties should be barred from its applications. Unfortunately, Descartes ’
-fi rst (Meditation 2) mind ≠ body argument commits precisely the “ intensional
-fallacy ” of deducing the nonidentity of body and mind on the basis
-of their failure to share certain converse intentional properties; in particular,
-the property of being better or more easily knowable, or of the mind ’ s but
-not the body ’ s being such that its existence cannot be rationally doubted
-by the same mind.
-The dilemma for Descartes ’ fi rst or Meditation 2 mind ≠ body argument
-is that it either relies on a false, unrestricted, or excessively general version
-of Leibniz ’ principle of the indiscernibility of identicals that allows nonidentity
-determinations on the basis of converse intentional properties, in
-which case the argument is unsound; or, in case a correct formulation of
-Leibniz ’ Law is imposed, excluding converse intentional properties from
-permitted applications of the indiscernibility of identicals, the argument is
-deductively invalid, in the sense that the truth of its conclusion that
-mind ≠ body is not guaranteed by the truth of the argument ’ s corrected
-assumptions containing the properly restricted form of Leibniz ’ Law that
-excludes converse intentional properties from its permissible applications,
-just as we must in the case where 1 + 1 = 2 and Mark Twain = Samuel
-Clemens.
-Descartes ’ argument, conspicuous weaknesses notwithstanding, represents
-a highly instructive effort to mark an essential difference between the
-properties of body and mind and to answer the mind – body problem in such
-a way as to hold out the prospect of contra - causal freedom of will and the
-soul ’ s immortality. Descartes ’ fascinating project of replacing Aristotle ’ s
-metaphysics in the Scholastic synthesis of Aristotle and Holy Scripture,
-refi ned during the medieval period especially by Thomas Aquinas, with a
-new metaphysics or “ fi rst philosophy ” of his own, remains a heroic episode
-in the history of early modern philosophy, with a more general moral concerning
-the attractions and limitations of rationalist attempts to argue
-294 Dale Jacquette
-philosophically for signifi cant metaphysical truths to whatever extent possible
-exclusively from phenomenology and the resources of ingenious pure
-reason.
-I know that I exist, and I inquire what I am, I whom know to exist [ . . . ].
-But I already know for certain that I am, and that it may be that all these
-images, and, speaking generally, all things that relate to the nature of body
-are nothing but dreams [and chimeras]. [ . . . ] For if I judge that the wax is
-or exists from the fact that I see it, it certainly follows much more clearly that
-I am or that I exist myself from the fact that I see it. For it may be that what
-I see is not really wax, it may also be that I do not possess eyes with which
-to see anything; but it cannot be that when I see, or [ . . . ] when I think I see,
-that I myself who think am nought. (Descartes, 152 – 6)
-P1. My body has the property of being such that its existence can rationally
-be doubted by me (evil demon hypothesis).
-P2. My mind does not have the property of being such that its existence
-can rationally be doubted by me ( cogito sum ).
-P3. For any objects A and B, if A = B, then A and B have all of their properties
-in common and there is no difference in their properties (Leibniz ’
-Law [na ï ve form] or principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals [na ï ve
-form]).
-C1. My body has a property that my mind does not have, namely, the
-property of being such that its existence can be rationally doubted by
-me (conjunction, P1, P2).
-C2. My body ≠ my mind ( modus tollens , P3, C1).
-(Premises (P1) and (P2) can be reformulated alternatively to the same
-effect in terms of the mind ’ s having the (converse intentional) property of
-being “ better knowable ” or “ more easily known ” than the body or the
-body ’ s existence, unlike the mind ’ s, being known only inferentially from the
-evidence of sensation or external empirical perception rather than immediately
-in consciousness by refl ection on the occurrence of consciousness.)
-In Meditation 6, Descartes returns to the mind – body problem and offers
-another argument for the distinction, different in substance while identical
-in basic logical structure to the fi rst argument of Meditation 2. Here, signifi
-cantly, Descartes, deliberately or not, avoids the “ intensional fallacy ” of
-his Meditation 2 proof. In Meditation 6, Descartes no longer attempts to
-apply Leibniz ’ Law of the indiscernibility of identicals by singling out a
-converse intentional property possessed by the body but not the mind, or
-the reverse, but instead fi xes on an evidently nonconverse intentional property.
-He invokes the property of the body ’ s divisibility and the mind ’ s
-indivisibility. He argues that the body, unlike the mind, can be separated
-into distinct parts that will still be bodies in the sense of continuing to be
-Descartes’ Arguments for the Mind–Body Distinction 295
-spatially extended though now scattered material things. The mind,
-Descartes claims, cannot be so divided, but in the relevant sense is indivisible,
-possessing an essential unity. It is implicit in Descartes ’ second argument,
-moreover, that the soul is immortal, on the grounds that only
-something capable of being broken down into component or parts can be
-destroyed. Descartes may believe that in this way he secures a new Cartesian
-rather than Aristotelian metaphysical foundation for religious belief in the
-soul ’ s survival of death and the body ’ s destruction.
-“ Nature, ” Descartes says, teaches him these things about extended
-bodies. It is noteworthy that Descartes believes after Meditation 3 that he
-has dispelled the systematic doubt by which he had previously motivated
-his project to tear down the old Aristotelian edifi ce of knowledge and
-rebuild natural philosophy or science in a more contemporary sense on the
-foundations of his demonstration that a perfectly good and therefore veracious
-God exists, who would not allow us to be deceived even by an evil
-demon when we clearly and distinctly perceive the properties of what we
-take to be the external world. The Meditation 6 proof of mind – body nonidentity
-based on the divisibility of body and indivisibility of mind into like
-parts could therefore not have been presented in Meditation 2, prior to
-Descartes ’ vouchsafi ng the certainty of clear and distinct perceptions with
-the insights into the natural properties of such things as the human body
-that the later argument requires.
-Descartes ’ thesis of the mind ’ s indivisibility is as interesting as it is controversial.
-The mind can of course be divided into such faculties as memory,
-imagination, calculation, emotion, and will, or into distinct thoughts.
-However, this is not the division of the mind into smaller component self -
-subsistent minds as its continuing scattered parts. If Descartes is right, then
-there is an essential difference in the way that the body is supposed to be
-capable of being divided into smaller component bodies, limbs, organs,
-cells, and so on, all of which are bodies in the sense of being potentially
-simultaneously existing spatiotemporally extended things belonging to the
-same metaphysical category – in this case, of material entities. Where psychological
-entities are concerned, Descartes is emphatic that the mind
-cannot be similarly divided. As to the problem of split personalities, or
-multiple personal disorder (MPD), Descartes, as we should expect, has
-nothing to say. He could presumably argue that in such circumstances there
-must be distinct independent minds occupying the same body, perhaps at
-different times, each of which, again, unlike the body, remains indivisible
-into independently existent minds as self - subsistent continuing minds,
-rather than being unifi ed distinct components of one and the same mind.
-In order to begin this examination, then, I here say, in the fi rst place, that
-there is a great difference between mind and body, inasmuch as body is by
-296 Dale Jacquette
-nature always divisible, and the mind is entirely indivisible. For, as a matter
-of fact, when I consider the mind, that is to say, myself inasmuch as I am only
-a thinking thing, I cannot distinguish in myself any parts, but apprehend
-myself to be clearly one and entire; and although the whole mind seems to
-be united to the whole body, yet if a foot, or an arm, or some other part, is
-separated from my body, I am aware that nothing has been taken away from
-my mind. And the faculties of willing, feeling, conceiving, etc. cannot be
-properly speaking said to be its parts, for it is one and the same mind which
-employs itself in willing and in feeling and understanding. But it is quite
-otherwise with corporeal or extended objects, for there is not one of these
-imaginable by me which my mind cannot divide into parts, and which consequently
-I do not recognise as being divisible; this would be suffi cient to
-teach me that the mind or soul of man is entirely different from the body, if
-I had not already learned it from other sources. (Descartes, 196)
-P1. My body has the property of being such that it is divisible, capable of
-being divided into like self - subsistent parts that are also component
-physical bodies (bodily divisibility).
-P2. My mind does not have the property of being such that it is divisible
-in the comparable sense as that above into self - subsistent parts that are
-also component minds (mental indivisibility).
-C1. My mind ≠ my body (Leibniz ’ Law, P1, P2).
-P3. Only entities constituted by like parts are capable of being destroyed
-(concept of destructibility).
-C2. My mind, unlike my body, is indestructible; from which it further
-follows that the mind or soul, unlike the body, as religion teaches as
-an article of faith, is immortal (P2, C1, P3).
-77
-Princess Elisabeth and the
-Mind – Body Problem
-Jen McWeeny
-Atherton , Margaret (ed.). “ Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia , ” in Women
-Philosophers of the Early Modern Period , 9 – 21 . Indianapolis : Hackett ,
-1994 .
-Descartes , Ren é . The Philosophical Writings of Descartes , 3 vols., translated
-by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch.
-Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 1984 – 91 .
-Descartes , Ren é . Oeuvres de Descartes , 5 vols., edited by Charles Adams and
-Paul Tannery . Paris : Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin , 1971 – 74 .
-Descartes , Ren é and Princess Elisabeth . “ Correspondence , ” in Descartes: His
-Moral Philosophy and Psychology , translated by John J. Blom, 105 – 17 .
-New York : New York University Press , 1978 .
-Gassendi , Pierre . “ Fifth Set of Objections , ” in The Philosophical Writings of
-Descartes , vol. 2 , translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and
-Dugald Murdoch, 179 – 240 . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University
-Press , 1984 .
-Kim , Jaegwon . Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind – Body
-Problem and Mental Causation . Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press , 1998 .
-McGinn , Colin . “ Can We Solve the Mind – Body Problem? ” Mind 98 ( 1989 ):
-349 – 66 .
-Montero , Barbara . “ Post - Physicalism . ” The Journal of Consciousness Studies
-8 , 2 ( 2001 ): 61 – 80 .
-Tollefson , Deborah . “ Princess Elisabeth and the Problem of Mind – Body
-Interaction . ” Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 14 , 3 ( 1999 ):
-59 – 77 .
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-298 Jen McWeeny
-The mind – body problem exposes the inconsistencies that arise when mind
-and body are conceived as ontologically distinct entities. Human experience
-clearly shows that our minds interact with our bodies. When we will to
-walk, our legs usually move in the intended direction; when we become ill,
-the sharpness of our cognitive capacities is often compromised; when we
-are sad, we are frequently moved to tears; and so on. Philosophers who
-reject the identity of mind and body or mind and brain face the task of
-explaining these relations by illuminating the precise manner in which the
-mind moves the body and the body affects the mind. It is unsurprising,
-then, that the mind – body problem was fi rst articulated as a response to
-Ren é Descartes ’ dualistic philosophy. For Descartes, mind 1 is res cogitans ,
-a nonextended, immaterial substance whose essential nature is to think, and
-body is its conceptual opposite – res extensa , a material substance with a
-particular shape that is extended and located in space. In its Cartesian form,
-the mind – body problem asks how an immaterial thing can move a material
-thing.
-Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618 – 80), also known as “ The Princess
-Palatine, ” was the fi rst philosopher to articulate the mind – body problem
-in the form of an argument and the fi rst to elicit Descartes ’ serious attention
-to the matter, although the mind – body problem is rarely attributed to her.
-Princess Elisabeth lived most of her life in Holland, after her father had lost
-the throne of Bohemia and her family was exiled from their Palatinate lands
-and residence in Heidelberg during the Thirty Years ’ War. She was renowned
-for her knowledge of classical languages and her intellectual precision. As
-Descartes writes in his dedication to Princess Elisabeth at the beginning of
-The Principles of Philosophy , “ You are the only person I have found so far
-who has completely understood all my previously published works ”
-(Descartes Philosophical Writings , 2: 192). For the last years of her life,
-Princess Elisabeth served as abbess at a convent in Herford, Westphalia,
-and had wide jurisdiction over the surrounding territories.
-A few scholars – most notably Pierre Gassendi – expressed their doubts
-about the possibility of mind – body interaction to Descartes shortly before
-Princess Elisabeth did (Gassendi, 1: 238). However, Gassendi ’ s criticism was
-raised through a series of questions rather than an argument, and Descartes
-did not think that these questions were enough to produce a true “ objection
-” to his philosophy (Descartes Philosophical Writings , 1: 266). Princess
-Elisabeth formulates the mind – body problem in her very fi rst letter to
-Descartes, which is dated May 16, 1643. The general strategy that she
-employs is to use Descartes ’ understanding of motion as expressed in his
-Optics to show the impossibility of the mind ’ s moving the body as long as
-1 In his discussion of the mind – body relation, Descartes makes no conceptual distinction
-between “ mind ” (French l ’ esprit , Latin mens ) and “ soul ” (French l ’ â me , Latin anima ).
-Princess Elisabeth and the Mind–Body Problem 299
-the mind is conceived of as nonextended and immaterial. 2 In response,
-Descartes admits that Princess Elisabeth ’ s criticism is justifi ed in light of his
-previous writings because he has said “ nearly nothing ” of the union between
-body and soul that enables the two to act and to suffer together (Descartes
-and Princess Elisabeth, 107). He thus sets about this task in his ensuing
-correspondence with her and even devotes his fi nal work, The Passions of
-the Soul , to devising a solution to Princess Elisabeth ’ s query. All three of
-his “ solutions ” – the question has been improperly posed, the union of the
-mind and body cannot be known by the intellect, and “ the seat of the soul ”
-is the brain ’ s pineal gland – have been deemed largely unsatisfying by the
-majority of commentators, including Princess Elisabeth.
-That Descartes himself was unable to produce a viable solution to the
-mind – body problem is indicative of its signifi cance to his own thinking and
-to that of those philosophers who would follow him. Indeed, many of
-modern philosophy ’ s innovations after Descartes, such as Spinoza ’ s monism,
-Malebranche ’ s occasionalism, Leibniz ’ monads, and Hume ’ s skepticism, can
-be read as responses to this seemingly intractable problem generated by the
-Cartesian system. Moreover, the persistence of the mind – body problem has
-given rise to the area of contemporary analytic philosophy known as “ philosophy
-of mind. ” Today, philosophers of mind most often frame the mind –
-body problem in terms of fi nding a physical explanation for mental
-phenomena, although some have preferred the term “ nonmental ” to “ physical,
-” because current physics makes it diffi cult to specify adequately what
-we mean by “ physical ” (see Kim and Montero). Still others have conceded
-that the problem cannot be solved (see McGinn). Whereas most contemporary
-philosophers of mind answer the mind – body problem by ascribing to
-some form of physicalism, they disagree as to what mental states actually
-are. In recent years, lively debates have developed as to whether mental
-states consist in behavioral dispositions, functional processes, neural states,
-or something else besides. Such disputes indicate that Princess Elisabeth ’ s
-call for an explication of the manner in which the mind moves the body is
-far from answered. The mind – body problem therefore remains one of the
-most infl uential and long - standing arguments in the history of Western
-philosophy.
-I beseech you tell me how the soul of man (since it is but a thinking substance)
-can determine the spirits of the body to produce voluntary actions.
-For it seems every determination of movement happens from an impulsion of
-2 Since Princess Elisabeth only refers to Descartes ’ Meditations in this early correspondence,
-there is some question as to whether she was indeed familiar with his physics when she wrote
-this letter. See Tollefson for an interpretation that indicates that Princess Elisabeth was referencing
-a passage in the Optics .
-300 Jen McWeeny
-the thing moved, according to the manner in which it is pushed by that which
-moves it, or else, depends on the qualifi cation and fi gure of the superfi cies of
-the latter. Contact is required for the fi rst two conditions, and extension for
-the third. You entirely exclude extension from your notion of the soul, and
-contact seems to me incompatible with an immaterial thing. That is why I
-ask of you a defi nition of the soul more particular than in your Metaphysic
-– that is to say, for a defi nition of the substance separate from its action,
-thought. (Elisabeth, qtd. in Blom, 106)
-P1. If movement of a thing occurs, it must have been caused by one of the
-following: (a) self - impulsion, (b) being pushed by something else, or (c)
-the quality and shape of its surface (e.g., a marble).
-P2. Descartes defi nes the soul as nonextended and immaterial.
-P3. If movement of a thing occurs and that movement is caused by self -
-impulsion or being pushed by something else, then contact is required.
-P4. Nonextended and immaterial things (souls) cannot make contact with
-other things.
-C1. Nonextended and immaterial things cannot move themselves by
-self - impulsion and cannot move a thing by pushing it ( modus tollens ,
-P3, P4).
-P5. If movement of a thing occurs by the quality and shape of its surface,
-then extension is required.
-P6. Nonextended and immaterial things (souls) do not have extension.
-C2. Nonextended and immaterial things cannot move themselves by the
-quality and shape of their surface ( modus tollens , P5, P6).
-P7. If (C1) and (C2), then the soul (as it is defi ned by Descartes) cannot
-cause the body to move.
-C3. Nonextended and immaterial things cannot move themselves by
-self - impulsion and the quality and shape of their surface and cannot
-move a thing by pushing it (conjunction, C1, C2).
-C4. The soul (as it is defi ned by Descartes) cannot cause the body to
-move ( modus ponens , P7, C3).
-Implication: If the soul does cause the body to move, then Descartes ’
-defi nition of the soul is incorrect.
-78
-Kripke ’ s Argument for
-Mind – Body Property Dualism
-Dale Jacquette
-Kripke , Saul . Naming and Necessity . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University
-Press , 1980 .
-Ahmed , Arif . Saul Kripke . New York : Continuum , 2007 .
-Bayne , Steven R. “ Kripke ’ s Cartesian Argument . ” Philosophia 18 ( 1988 ):
-265 – 9 .
-Feldman , Fred . “ Kripke on the Identity Theory . ” The Journal of Philosophy
-7 ( 1974 ): 665 – 76 .
-Fitch , G. W. Saul Kripke . London : Acumen , 2004 .
-Hughes , Christopher . Kripke: Names, Necessity, and Identity . Oxford :
-Oxford University Press , 2004 .
-Jacquette , Dale . Philosophy of Mind: The Metaphysics of Consciousness .
-New York : Continuum , 2010 .
-Preti , Consuelo . On Kripke . Cincinnati, OH : Wadsworth , 2002 .
-Saul A. Kripke offers a much - discussed argument against mind – body identity
-theory, supporting some type of property dualism, in his 1970 Princeton
-University lectures on Naming and Necessity . The argument purports to
-explain the relation between mind and body, solving the mind – body problem
-at a comparatively high level of abstraction within the context of a comprehensive
-philosophical treatment of the nature of transworld identity
-conditions and the theory of reference in logic, semantics, and philosophy
-of language. Kripke fashions an interesting argumentive methodology with
-important metaphysical conclusions based on independently defensible
-distinctions in modal logic and referential semantics. As such, Kripke ’ s
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-302 Dale Jacquette
-argument demonstrates unexpected connections between traditionally unrelated
-areas of inquiry in philosophy of language and the metaphysics of
-mind.
-Kripke introduces the concepts and explores some of the applications of
-a distinction between rigid versus nonrigid designation. A rigid designator
-designates the same object in every logically possible world in which the
-object exists. According to Kripke, proper names such as ‘ Plato ’ and ‘ Barack
-Obama ’ are rigid designators in this sense. Nonrigid designators, in contrast,
-potentially designate different individuals in different logically possible
-worlds. Defi nite descriptions, whose content may apply to different
-objects in different worlds, in contrast with rigidly designative proper
-names, are generally nonrigid designators under Kripke ’ s distinction. These
-standardly include such referring terms as ‘ The teacher of Aristotle ’ or ‘ The
-President of the United States in 2011 ’ , which could in principle refer to
-entirely different persons depending on with whom Aristotle happens to
-study or the logically contingent American election results as the election
-occurs in different logically possible worlds.
-Kripke maintains that questions of transworld identity, of identifying
-precisely the same individual from one logically possible world to another,
-cannot be made with high - powered telescopes and cannot be justifi ed on the
-basis of such superfi cial properties as external appearance, since these factors
-can differ radically across different logically possible worlds, obscuring the
-usual tests for identity and nonidentity that might be conducted in the actual
-world. Kripke proposes that transworld identity is a matter of stipulation,
-which is to say of decision rather than discovery. We do not look at alternative
-logically possible worlds and try to learn from our observations whether
-Aristotle exists in another logically possible world and what properties he
-might have there. We simply declare, laying it down as a kind of choice we
-have made, that there is a logically possible world in which Aristotle exists
-and has the following accidental properties different from those he possesses
-in the actual world. We must proceed by stipulation in order to make sense
-of transworld identities, according to Kripke, and we can only do so in
-thought and language by means of rigid designators.
-The appeal to rigid designators further enables Kripke to mount an argument
-in support of mind – body dualism. The core of the argument is to say
-that, since we can consider without internal contradiction that the
-mind ≠ body, at least in the sense that corpses presumably exist without
-minds, and we can imagine the mind existing without being associated with
-a body, it is logically possible that mind ≠ body. If we rigidly designate an
-individual body and mind or type of brain and psychological entity or event,
-then, since in that case there is at least one logically possible world in which
-(rigidly designated) mind ≠ (rigidly designated) body, it must be true that
-(rigidly designated) mind ≠ (rigidly designated) body in every logically posKripke’s
-Argument for Mind–Body Property Dualism 303
-sible world. It follows, then, that mind and body are distinct entities universally
-in every logically possible world. It is logically necessary, and
-therefore a fortiori actually the case, that mind ≠ body. The least objectionable
-mind – body dualism to be accepted as a result of Kripke ’ s argument is
-property dualism rather than substance or ontic (Cartesian) dualism, the
-latter of which has the additional burden of explaining causal interactions
-between the material body and the immaterial mind.
-Kripke ’ s argument delivers a powerful implication, supported by the
-general considerations that undergird his solution to the problem of understanding
-transworld identity and the considerable general utility of the
-distinction between rigid and nonrigid designation. Kripke ’ s attitude toward
-the argument appears somewhat ambivalent, as in footnote 17 he seems to
-step away from the conclusiveness of his own inference when he adds these
-qualifi cations: “ rejection of the [mind – body] identity thesis does not imply
-acceptance of Cartesian dualism [ . . . ] Descartes ’ notion seems to have been
-rendered dubious ever since [David] Hume ’ s critique of the notion of a
-Cartesian self. I regard the mind – body problem as wide open and extremely
-confusing ” (155).
-Descartes, and others following him, argued that a person or mind is
-distinct from his body, since the mind could exist without the body. He might
-equally well have argued the same conclusion from the premise that the body
-could have existed without the mind. Now the one response which I regard
-as plainly inadmissible is the response which cheerfully accepts the Cartesian
-premise while denying the Cartesian conclusion. Let ‘ Descartes ’ be a name,
-or rigid designator, of a certain person, and let ‘ B ’ be a rigid designator of his
-body. Then if Descartes were indeed identical to B, the supposed identity,
-being an identity between two rigid designators, would be necessary, and
-Descartes could not exist without B and B could not exist without Descartes.
-(Kripke, 144 – 5)
-P1. Mind – body dualism is logically possible.
-P2. If mind – body dualism is logically possible, then there is at least one
-logically possible world in which the mind is not identical to any material
-body, and mental events are not identical to any purely physical events.
-P3. The concept of rigid designation implies that rigidly designated
-bodies and minds or mental and physical events, if nonidentical in
-any logically possible world, are necessarily distinct or nonidentical in
-every logically possible world in which they exist, and therefore a fortiori
-actually distinct or nonidentical in the actual world.
-C1. Reductive mind – body physicalism or mind – body identity theory is
-therefore false, and some form of mind – body nonidentity, probably
-some type of property dualism, in particular, is true; (rigidly designated)
-mind ≠ (rigidly designated) body ( modus tollens , P1, P2).
-79
-The Argument from Mental
-Causation for Physicalism
-Amir Horowitz
-Armstrong , David . A Materialist Theory of the Mind . London : Routledge &
-Kegan Paul , 1963 .
-Lewis , David . “ An Argument for the Identity Theory . ” Journal of Philosophy
-66 ( 1966 ): 17 – 25 .
-Kim , Jaegwon . Mind in a Physical World . Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press ,
-1998 .
-Rey , Georges . Contemporary Philosophy of Mind . Oxford : Blackwell , 1997 .
-Attempts to establish mind – body physicalism – the view that mental events
-are identical with physical events – often appeal to considerations pertaining
-to mental causation. The basic idea underlying the argument from mental
-causation in favor of physicalism (hereafter, “ the argument from mental
-causation ” ) is that physicalism is the only plausible explanation for the
-existence of mental causation. The expression “ physical events ” as it is
-employed here refers to events whose all properties are such that their
-instantiations are logically determined by instantiations of physical
-properties.
-A similar idea served opponents of dualism ever since this thesis was
-offi cially launched by Descartes. These opponents of dualism argued that
-the interactions between nonphysical events and physical events cannot
-occur (due, e.g., to a confl ict with the law of momentum, or the law of the
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-The Argument from Mental Causation for Physicalism 305
-conservation of mass and energy, or the alleged causal closure of the physical
-world). Since mental events are supposed by the dualist to be nonphysical,
-and since mental – physical interactions cannot be denied, dualism
-must be rejected. Put slightly differently, since physical events can only
-interact with physical events, the fact that mental events causally interact
-with physical events can only be accounted for by assuming that mental
-events are themselves physical events. The contemporary argument from
-mental causation employs this reasoning. In its simplest form, it asserts
-that mental events cause our actions and that brain events cause our actions;
-therefore, it is argued, mental events are in fact physical events. But such a
-version of the argument cannot do, for there are options in logical space in
-which nonphysical mental events as well as physical events cause actions
-(the same actions) without being identical. Thus, for the argument to go
-through, these options have to be ruled out. Various versions of the argument
-indeed rule such options out.
-The argument has several versions. Some of them (e.g., Armstrong ’ s)
-replace premise P2 with the premise that the concepts of mental events are
-concepts of specifi c causal roles, and they adjust premise P1 accordingly.
-Defenders of the argument also differ with respect to the way they rule out
-the options specifi ed in (P3). Thus, option (3c) is sometimes ruled out by
-employing assumptions concerning the nature of the physical world (such
-as the causal closure principle), and sometimes by employing specifi c
-assumptions about our physiology. I believe that that sub - version of the
-version presented here that rules out option (3c) by employing specifi c
-assumptions about our physiology is superior to all alternatives. It employs
-neither controversial assumptions about the nature of mental concepts nor
-assumptions that are arguably biased concerning the nature of the physical
-world.
-Let us say a few words about the argument ’ s premises. P1 is a well -
-established scientifi c claim, one which no contemporary educated person
-would deny. P2 is a highly plausible claim, which everybody seems to know
-from personal experience: it is hard to deny (although there have been
-philosophers who do deny) that our actions are caused by our desires and
-our beliefs (regarding what would satisfy our desires). Now P1 and P2
-together clearly entail C1. Assuming that P3 takes into account all options
-in which both mental events and physical events in the brain can be causes
-of our actions without being identical, the argument is formally valid. Of
-course, in order to persuade us, a convincing case should also be made in
-favor of its premises and in particular – since this is what is mainly at stake
-– in favor of ruling out those options mentioned in P3.
-These options should be explained. In option (3a) – causal over -
-determination – actions are independently caused by both nonphysical
-mental events and by physical events; that is, they would have been caused
-306 Amir Horowitz
-by either. In option (3b) – “ mental – physical causal cooperation ” – nonphysical
-mental events and physical events cooperate to cause actions by
-means of two separate causal chains – a nonphysical mental one and a
-physical one; that is, in the absence of either, the actions would not have
-been caused. In option (3c) – “ mixed mental – physical causal chains ” –
-nonphysical mental events and physical events are links in the same chains
-of events which bring about actions. We shall immediately illustrate this
-option.
-So as said, all these options should be eliminated. Against option (3a)
-– that of causal over - determinism – it has been argued that nowhere in
-nature do we encounter such a phenomenon or that its occurrence is
-implausible from an evolutionary perspective. Option (3b) – that of mental –
-physical causal cooperation – is usually not taken seriously and is ignored.
-It is generally assumed that the question that lies at the heart of the argument
-from mental causation concerns the status of option (3c), that of
-mixed mental – physical causal chains. Armstrong describes this option thus,
-“ Let us now consider the situation where a physical stimulus of some sort,
-say the sounds of a human voice, brings about certain mental events, say
-perceptions and thoughts, which then issue in further physical action. On
-the ‘ way up ’ there must be a last physical event in the brain before the
-mental events ensue. The mental events must then bring about a fi rst physical
-event in the brain on the ‘ way down ’ ” (62). In this case, mental causes
-intervene in the physiological chain of events.
-The most promising way to rule this option out is along the following
-lines. First, it is argued that the idea that there is a mental intervention in
-the chain that leads to the action means that “ a physical break ” is involved
-in this chain. It means, that is, that the transition from the last brain event
-on the “ way up ” to the fi rst brain event on the “ way down ” is not dictated
-by the laws of physics. Second, it is argued that the obtaining of such a
-physical break in the chain which leads to the action is empirically
-implausible.
-[I]t seems to be a striking fact about people and animals that all of their
-non - tendentiously described behavior could be explained in principle by reference
-to physical properties alone. All the motions of their bodies [ . . . ] could
-be perfectly well explained by reference to the electrical impulses along nerve
-fi bers that precede them. These fi rings in turn could be explained by earlier
-neurological events, which in turn could be explained by earlier events. [ . . . ]
-We have absolutely no reason to believe that there is any break in the physical
-explanation of their motion. (Rey, 71)
-According to this line of thought, since many physiological processes can
-be fully accounted for in physical terms and are completely dictated by
-physical laws, we seem to have good reasons to assume that no physical
-The Argument from Mental Causation for Physicalism 307
-break obtains in the causal chains that lead to our actions. Both the way
-up (beginning with an external stimulus and ending with a mental event)
-and the way down (beginning with a mental event and ending with an
-action) are – it is hard to deny – purely physical. Is it plausible to assume
-that only in that short segment, which connects the last brain event on the
-way up and the fi rst brain event on the way down, there is nonphysical
-intervention? Wouldn ’ t it be plausible to infer from the complete control of
-physics over all other transitions that are involved in those processes that
-it controls this segment as well?
-Opponents of the argument from mental causation might insist that,
-appearance to the contrary notwithstanding, the inference from the complete
-control of physics over all other transitions that are involved in physiological
-processes to its control over that segment is illegitimate since that
-segment is signifi cantly different. It is signifi cantly different precisely in that
-it involves a mental event, and the unique character of mental events – in
-virtue of their phenomenality and/or intentionality, and/or various epistemic
-characteristics, and so on – is granted even by physicalists (physicalists
-standardly maintain that mental phenomena are special physical phenomena).
-Once the uniqueness of mental events is admitted, there is no good
-reason to resist ascribing further uniqueness to the causal chains that
-include them, and assuming that these causal chains involve nonphysical
-links (namely, that those unique mental events that are included in those
-chains are unique also in being nonphysical). We shall leave it to the reader
-to estimate the strength of this objection to the argument from mental
-causation.
-P1. Actions are caused by physical events in the brain.
-P2. Actions are caused by mental events.
-C1. Either mental events are identical with physical events in the brain,
-or actions are caused both by mental events and physical events in
-the brain (conjunction, P1, P2).
-P3. All of the options in which actions are caused both by mental events
-and by physical events in the brain while the mental events are not identical
-with brain events should be rejected:
-(a) causal over - determination;
-(b) “ mental – physical causal cooperation ” ;
-(c) “ mixed mental – physical causal chains. ”
-C2. Mental events are identical with physical events in the brain (disjunctive
-syllogism, C1, P3).
-80
-Davidson ’ s Argument for
-Anomalous Monism
-Amir Horowitz
-Davidson , Donald . “ Mental Events , ” in Essays on Actions and Events ,
-207 – 24 . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 1980 .
-How should one argue for a specifi c physicalist view of mentality such as
-token - physicalism – the view that mental events are physical events but
-what determines the mental type of a mental event (e.g., its being pain) is
-not its physical type? 1 The natural way for one to go, it seems, is fi rst to
-establish physicalism and then show that, given the truth of this general
-view, the specifi c version in question is the most plausible one. But Davidson ’ s
-argument for anomalous monism beautifully attempts to achieve both purposes
-in one stroke: his argument for physicalism assumes a rejection of
-strict mental – physical correlations, and thus the resulting physicalism is
-token - physicalism, or more specifi cally, Davidson ’ s specifi c version of it,
-anomalous monism.
-The general physicalist view that Davidson aims to establish (he refers
-to it as “ the identity of the mental and the physical ” ) is the view that mental
-events are identical with physical events. 2 A physical event, according to
-him, is an event that essentially has a physical description. Davidson avoids
-the jargon of properties, but it seems natural to take this characterization
-2 To be more precise, Davidson confi nes his argument to those mental events that interact
-with physical events. Of course, if all mental events interact with physical events, this doesn ’ t
-matter. In presenting Davidson ’ s argument, I will ignore this point.
-1 There is another use of “ token - physicalism, ” in which it refers to the thesis that takes
-mental events to be identical with physical events but is neutral with respect to the question
-of mental types.
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Davidson’s Argument for Anomalous Monism 309
-to imply that a physical event is an event that has a physical property. An
-event that essentially has a physical description might also satisfy nonphysical
-descriptions, but Davidson certainly does not allow for such an event
-to have properties that are instantiated apart from physical space (this might
-explain his characterization of a physical event as an event that has only
-one physical description). He thus takes the thesis he argues to be a robust
-physicalist thesis that excludes not only Cartesian substance dualism but
-also property dualism.
-One instructive way that Davidson presents the rationale of the argument
-concerns the reconciliation of the following three principles, all of which
-he takes to be true:
-(a) (At least some) mental events interact causally with physical events.
-(b) Causation is nomological: events related as cause and effect fall under
-strict deterministic laws.
-(c) The mental is anomalous: there are no strict deterministic laws on the
-basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained. And in
-particular, there are no strict deterministic laws that connect events
-under their physical descriptions with events under their mental
-descriptions.
-Principles (a) and (b) entail the obtaining of laws that connect mental
-events and physical events, but this seems to clash with (c), which seems to
-forbid mental – physical laws. How can this tension be resolved? Here is
-Davidson ’ s brief presentation of his reasoning:
-Suppose m , a mental event, caused p , a physical event; then, under some
-description m and p instantiate a strict law. This law can only be physical
-[ . . . ]. But if m falls under a physical law, it has a physical description; which
-is to say it is a physical event. (224)
-The basic idea is that there can be laws connecting mental events and
-physical events that do not mention the mental events as mental but rather
-as physical. We may call or refuse to call such laws “ mental – physical laws ” ;
-the point is that the possibility of such laws ensures the consistency of
-principles a – c.
-P1 and P2 (which express the above principles (a) and principle (b),
-respectively) straightforwardly entail C1, namely the claim that there must
-be strict deterministic laws that connect mental events with physical events.
-The crucial step of the argument comes next. P3 expresses principle (c) but
-also involves a generalization of it, namely the idea that all strict laws are
-physical laws – laws that employ physical descriptions of the events that
-they connect. So those laws that connect mental events with physical events
-310 Amir Horowitz
-also connect those events – the physical events as well as the mental events
-– under physical descriptions, and there are such laws (C2); a fortiori , these
-events have physical descriptions (C3) and so (if P5 is accepted) are physical.
-In short, it is the causal role of the mental that reveals its physical
-nature, for only the physical satisfi es the nomological requirement for
-causality.
-The argument ’ s offi cial conclusion is the physicalist thesis that mental
-events are physical events, but in fact the argument shows more. For the
-way to this conclusion goes through the assumption that the mental is
-anomalous – that it resists being predicted and explained by means of strict
-laws. Thus, according to this argument, the mental is both physical and
-anomalous, so the resulting view of the mental is anomalous physicalism,
-or as Davidson puts it, anomalous monism. Now, further, one aspect of the
-anomalous nature of the mental is that there can be no lawful connections
-between mental events with physical events. So anomalous monism excludes
-type - physicalism, which is committed to such lawful connections (it identifi
-es mental types with physical types), and is a form of token - physicalism.
-Since, as we saw, the conclusion of Davidson ’ s argument follows from
-the premises and the argument is a formally valid one, the only direct way
-to attack it is to attack its premises. Indeed, attacks against the argument ’ s
-premises have been launched, mainly against P2 and P3. The argument has
-also been attacked indirectly, by claiming that it has an arguably implausible
-implication, namely the “ type - epiphenomenalist ” view that the causal effi -
-cacy of mental events cannot be attributed to their mental properties.
-Whether or not this implication is to count as a reductio ad absurdum of
-the argument is a matter of dispute.
-P1. Mental events bear causal relations to physical events.
-P2. If there is a causal relation between events, then there is an implied
-existence of a strict deterministic law that connects those events.
-C1. There are strict laws that connect mental events with physical events
-( modus ponens , P1, P2).
-P3. Strict laws only connect events under physical descriptions with events
-under physical descriptions.
-C2. There are strict laws that connect mental events under their (nonmental)
-physical descriptions with physical events (instantiation, P3,
-C1).
-P4. If there are strict laws that connect mental events under their (nonmental)
-physical descriptions with physical events, then mental events have
-physical descriptions.
-C3. Mental events have physical descriptions ( modus ponens , C2, P4).
-P5. If a mental event has a physical description, then it is a physical event.
-C4. Mental events are physical events ( modus ponens , C3, P5).
-81
-Putnam ’ s Multiple Realization
-Argument against
-Type - Physicalism
-Amir Horowitz
-Putnam , Hilary. “ The Nature of Mental States , ” in Hilary Putnam, Mind,
-Language, Reality: Philosophical Papers , vol. II , 429 – 40 . Cambridge,
-UK : Cambridge University Press , 1975 .
-Fodor , Jerry . Psychological Explanations . New York : Random House , 1968 .
-Hilary Putnam ’ s multiple realization argument aims to undermine the view
-nowadays known as “ type - physicalism. ” According to type - physicalism,
-mental properties are physical properties; put differently, mental types are
-physical types, and what makes a mental state of a certain type belong to
-its type (e.g., its being a pain state) is its physical – chemical makeup. Putnam
-took this view, which he labeled “ the brain state theory, ” to be the (then)
-standard physicalist view of mentality.
-The argument is simple in structure. P1 exposes the real meaning of
-type - physicalism. This theory is committed to the claim that all pains share
-physical – chemical nature, one which only they have – this is what makes
-them states of pain; similarly all states of hunger share physical – chemical
-nature that only they have – this is what makes them states of hunger, and
-so on for other mental states. We may say that according to P1, type -
-physicalism is committed to the thesis of the single realization of mental
-properties. One might think that exposing this commitment of type -
-physicalism isn ’ t exciting, but we should bear in mind that at the time
-Putnam ’ s argument was fi rst published there was no offi cial statement of
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-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-312 Amir Horowitz
-this theory, and Putnam elicited this commitment from what the champions
-of the prevalent physicalist view asserted (thus, in fact, exposing that they
-are type - physicalists).
-According to P2, there are empirical reasons to doubt this hypothesis.
-P2 expresses the multiple realization thesis: it asserts that most likely mental
-properties such as being pain are multiply realizable, so that pain states do
-not share a unique physical nature. It is possible that my pain and the pain
-of another creature do not exclusively share any physical property whatsoever:
-mine is realized by the instantiation of one physical property; the other
-creature ’ s by a different physical property. Now if type - physicalism is committed
-to the single realizability of mental properties but mental properties
-are (most probably) multiply realizable, then type - physicalism is (most
-probably) false. That is, C seems straightforwardly to follow from P1 and
-P2. The argument is valid. The validity of the argument is not affected by
-the fact that the multiple realization thesis is assumed to be only highly
-plausible – indeed, it is suggested as an empirical hypothesis, and not simply
-true, because the conclusion also claims for no more than high plausibility.
-Putnam strengthens his case against type - physicalism by comparing this
-theory to the thesis that mental properties are functional properties and
-showing the superiority – in terms of empirical likelihood – of the latter.
-Due to length, it will not be discussed here.
-It is important to note that the multiple realization argument undermines
-only one (important as it is) physicalist thesis and does not undermine
-physicalist ontology. Its soundness is compatible with the idea that mental
-properties are realized physically, although they may be realized in different
-physical ways. Indeed, given the truth of physicalist ontology, the argument
-may be taken to establish that some nonreductive form of physicalism, such
-that endorses physicalist ontology but denies that mental types are – or are
-reducible to – physical types, is probably true. In fact, for many philosophers,
-this is the important import of the multiple realization argument.
-Some philosophers have tried to downplay the argument ’ s conclusion by
-saying that although Putnam ’ s examples (such as that of octopus) suggest
-that not all pains exclusively share physical nature, it is still plausible that
-all human pains do. These philosophers thus endorsed a weak version of
-type - physicalism – species - specifi c - type - physicalism. According to species -
-specifi c - type - physicalism, all pains of members of the same species exclusively
-share physical natures, and the same holds for all the other mental
-states, of course. This view, however, has been challenged by the empirical
-fi nding that some areas of the brains of people who have suffered from
-some brain damage managed to “ learn ” to perform mental functions that
-were previously performed by other, physically different, areas of the brain.
-If so, it seems, the multiple realizability of mental properties penetrates also
-at the intra - species level.
-Putnam’s Argument against Type-Physicalism 313
-In addition to undermining type - physicalism, Putnam ’ s argument paved
-the way for the functionalist view of the mind. According to functionalism,
-mental properties are functional properties of organisms, the relevant functions
-being ones that connect perceptual inputs, behavioral outputs, and
-mental states. In fact, Putnam attempts to show not only that type -
-physicalism is not a very plausible theory but also that functionalism is
-more plausible and has to be preferred. Many philosophers were persuaded
-by Putnam ’ s considerations, and as a result functionalism has acquired the
-status of the dominant theory of mind.
-Putnam refers in the following passages to “ brain states ” and “ mental
-states ” rather than to properties, but the text clearly indicates that he takes
-the hypothesis he wishes to reject (namely the hypothesis that “ every psychological
-state is a brain state ” ) to be the one according to which what
-makes a psychological state belong to its mental type (e.g., its being a pain
-state) is the type of brain state that it is. So he is indeed discussing – and
-aims at undermining – type - physicalism.
-Consider what the brain - state theorist has to do to make good his claims.
-He has to specify a physical – chemical state such that any organism (not just
-a mammal) is in pain if and only if (a) it possesses brain of suitable physical –
-chemical structure; and (b) its brain is in that physical – chemical state [ . . . ].
-At the same time, it must not be a possible (physically possible) state of any
-physically possible creature that cannot feel pain [ . . . ]. It is not altogether
-impossible that such a state will be found [ . . . ]. Thus it is at least possible
-that parallel evolution, all over the universe, might always lead to one and
-the same physical “ correlate ” of pain. But this is certainly an ambitious
-hypothesis.
-Finally, the hypothesis becomes still more ambitious when we realize that
-the brain state theorist is not just saying that pain is a brain state; he is, of
-course, maintained to concern that every psychological state is a brain state.
-Thus, if we can fi nd even one psychological predicate which can clearly be
-applied to both a mammal and an octopus (say, “ hungry ” ), but whose
-physical – chemical “ correlate ” is different in the two cases, the brain state
-theory has collapsed. It seems to me overwhelmingly probable that we can
-do this. (Putnam, 436)
-P1. If type - physicalism is true, then every mental property can be realized
-in exactly one physical way.
-P2. It is empirically highly plausible that mental properties are capable of
-multiple realizations.
-C1. It is (empirically) highly plausible that the view of type - physicalism
-is false ( modus tollens , P1, P2).
-82
-The Supervenience Argument
-against Non - Reductive Physicalism
-Andrew Russo
-Kim , Jaegwon . “ Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion . ”
-Philosophical Perspectives 3 ( 1989 ): 77 – 108 .
-___. Mind in a Physical World . Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press , 1998 .
-___. Physicalism, or Something Near Enough . Princeton, NJ : Princeton
-University Press , 2005 .
-Davidson , Donald . “ Mental Events ” in his Essays on Actions and Events ,
-207 – 25 . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1980 .
-Putnam , Hilary . “ The Nature of Mental States , ” in Philosophy of Mind:
-Classical and Contemporary Readings , edited by David Chalmers , 73 – 9 .
-Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2002 .
-“ Mental Causation . ” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . (Summer
-2008 edn.), edited by Edward N. Zalta, available at http://
-plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental - causation/
-How it is possible for the mind to be causally relevant to events in the
-physical world has been recognized as a serious philosophical problem at
-least since Descartes defended his unique form of substance dualism.
-Nevertheless, it has become ironically clear that the problem of mental
-causation is sticking around as a diffi cult problem in contemporary metaphysics
-of mind despite both Cartesian and non - Cartesian forms of substance
-dualism fi nding diminished proponents amongst most philosophical
-circles. “ Physicalism, ” the thesis that somehow or other everything is
-dependent on the physical (and not the other way around), is motivated in
-large part due to the inadequate explanations (or lack thereof) substance
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Supervenience and Non-Reductive Physicalism 315
-dualists offer for how the mind could be causally relevant in the physical
-world. It is thought that if the mind just were something physical, then the
-problem of mental causation would simply be dissolved.
-Various reasons against reductive versions of physicalism have led many
-to accept some form of “ nonreductive physicalism, ” the view that despite
-everything somehow or other being dependent on the physical, it is not the
-case that mental properties are identical to physical properties (see Putnam
-and Davidson). The two most infl uential forms of nonreductive physicalism
-have been anomalous monism and functionalism. The importance of the
-supervenience argument lies in its conclusion that fi nding a place for the
-mind amidst the causal workings of the physical world is not possible
-simply by embracing one or the other version of nonreductive physicalism.
-In other words, the problem of mental causation remains a problem for the
-nonreductive physicalist.
-If reductive physicalism no longer remains an option, then why not
-accept that the mind simply has no place amidst the causal workings of the
-physical world? One should admit this position is even more diffi cult to
-defend than reductive physicalism. Mental causation is crucial in our self -
-understanding as free, rational, morally responsible agents, and epistemically
-evaluable cognizers. So, if mental causation is not possible, then much
-of the picture of ourselves isn ’ t possible either. The supervenience argument,
-then, poses a dilemma for the physicalist: embrace some form of reductionism
-or concede that the scientifi c conception of the world really does
-threaten the distinctiveness we take ourselves to have. This dilemma reveals
-an important point: it would be a mistake to think that the supervenience
-argument is an argument against mental causation tout court . Instead, the
-argument should be understood as calling into question how the mind could
-be causally relevant in the physical world supposing the truth of nonreductive
-physicalist.
-P is a cause of P * , with M and M * supervening respectively on P and P * .
-There is a single underlying causal process in this picture, and this process
-connects two physical properties, P and P * . The correlations between M and
-M * and between M and P * are by no means accidental or coincidental; they
-are lawful and counterfactual - sustaining regularities arising out of M ’ s and
-M * ’ s supervenience in the causally linked P and P * . These observed correlations
-give us an impression of causation; however, that is only an appearance,
-and there is no more causation here than between two successive shadows
-cast by a moving car, or two successive symptoms of a developing pathology.
-This is a simple and elegant picture, metaphysically speaking, but it will
-prompt howls of protest from those who think that it has given away something
-very special and precious, namely the causally effi cacy of our minds.
-Thus is born the problem of mental causation. (Kim Mind in a Physical
-World , 21)
-316 Andrew Russo
-Kim presents his supervenience argument as a reductio ad absurdum of
-the assumption:
-(CR) Mental properties are causally relevant properties. 1 More specifi cally,
-it is the assumption that some mental property M causes some physical
-property P * . 2 The following are the further assumptions he uses along
-the way to justify his premises:
-(SS) The mental strongly supervenes on the physical; that is, for any object
-O and any time T, if O has a mental property M at T, then necessarily
-O has a physical property P at T and necessarily anything having P at T
-has M at T.
-(NR) Mental properties are not reducible to physical properties in a sense
-of ‘ reduction ’ such that mental properties cannot be identifi ed with
-physical properties.
-(CE) Except for cases of genuine causal over - determination, no single property
-can have more than one suffi cient cause at any given time (see Kim
-“ Mechanism ” ).
-(CC) If a physical property has a cause at T, then its cause at T is a physical
-property. 3
-P1. M causes P * (CR = assumption for reductio ).
-P2. M has a supervenient base, call it P (SS).
-C1. P causes P * (P1, P2). 4
-C2. M and P cause P * (conjunction, P1, C1).
-4 One might question the move from P1 and P2 to C1. In other words, why think that just
-because P is the supervenient base of M and M causes P * that P deserves to be considered a
-cause of P * ? Kim ’ s answer is twofold. First, if you take causation to be grounded in nomological
-suffi ciency, then P does deserve to be considered a cause of P * , since (a) any supervenient
-base is nomologically suffi cient for what supervenes on it, (b) M is nomologically suffi cient
-for P * by being a cause of P * , and (c) the relation of nomological suffi ciency is transitive.
-Second, if you take causation to be grounded in counterfactuals then, again, P deserves to be
-considered a cause of P * , since (d) if the supervenient base had not occurred, then what
-supervenes on it would not have occurred, (e) if M had not occurred, then P * would not have
-occurred in virtue of M ’ s causing P * , and (f) these particular counterfactuals are transitive.
-Either way you choose to ground causation results in P ’ s deserving to be considered a cause
-of P * (see Kim Mind in a Physical World , 43).
-3 Take note that CC by itself does not rule out mental causation, since it allows the possibility
-of some physical property being causally overdetermined by another physical property and
-some mental property.
-2 Nothing hangs on the fact that the assumption is a mental property causing a physical
-property . Kim ’ s argument can be given (with minimal changes) if we were to begin with the
-assumption that a mental property causes another mental property.
-1 For the sake of clarity, I shall speak of properties causing other properties (alternatively,
-we can talk of states causing other states). But, according to Kim, it is more accurate to say
-that it is the instantiation of a property that causes the instantiation of another property. This
-is, of course, skirting over important issues in the metaphysics of causation.
-Supervenience and Non-Reductive Physicalism 317
-P3. If M and P cause P * , then either (i) M and P are the same property or
-(ii) P * has more than one suffi cient cause (plausibly true).
-P4. M and P are not the same property (NR).
-P5. P * does not have more than one suffi cient cause, or P * is a genuine case
-of overdetermination (CE).
-P6. P * is not a genuine case of overdetermination (stipulation).
-C3. P * does not have more than one suffi cient cause (disjunctive syllogism,
-P5, P6).
-C4. M and P are not the same property and P * does not have more than
-one suffi cient cause (conjunction P4, C3).
-C5. It is not the case that either (i) M and P are the same property or
-(ii) P * has more than one suffi cient cause (DeMorgan ’ s, C4).
-C6. It is not the case that both M and P cause P * ( modus tollens , P3,
-C5).
-C7. M does not cause P * or P does not cause P * (DeMorgan ’ s, C6).
-P7. P does cause P * (CC and given that P * is caused).
-C8. M does not cause P * (disjunctive syllogism, C7, P7).
-C9. M does and does not cause P * (conjunction, P1, C8).
-C10. M does not cause P * ( reductio , P1 – C9).
-Another way to understand Kim ’ s supervenient argument is that the set
-of assumptions above is inconsistent; that is, (CR), (SS), (NR), (CE), and
-(CC) cannot all be true. In order to resolve the inconsistency, one must
-abandon one of the above assumptions. Many philosophers are committed
-to the truth of (CR) and at least some thesis on the dependence of the mind
-on the physical, for example, (SS). Presumably, no physicalist should fi nd
-a problem with (CC), and (CE) has independent support (see note 4).
-Therefore, Kim urges that the best way of resolving the inconsistency is by
-rejecting (NR); that is, in some sense of ‘ reduction ’ we must accept the
-thesis that mental properties are reducible to physical properties.
-83
-Ryle ’ s Argument against
-Cartesian Internalism
-Agustin Arrieta and Fernando Migura
-Ryle , Gilbert. The Concept of Mind . Chicago : University of Chicago Press ,
-2002 .
-Descartes , Ren é . Meditations on First Philosophy , translated by John
-Cottingham . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 1996 .
-Descartes put forward a conception of mind that has been sometimes
-described as “ internalist. ” Actually, Descartes ’ conception of mind is dualist,
-and internalism is just an aspect of it. Internalism ’ s main thesis claims that
-mental states are inner states. And, in Descartes ’ view, it goes on to claim
-that you alone have privileged access to your mental states: you are the only
-one who has authority about them.
-Internalism has been criticized from different points of view. Logical
-behaviorism has been one of them. Not without controversy, Ludwig
-Wittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle can be considered as fathers of logical behaviorism.
-Ryle ’ s criticism, in a nutshell, is that Cartesianism implies that there
-is an abyss between knowledge of my mind and knowledge of other minds.
-In other words, concerning knowledge of mind, the only authentic knowledge
-is self - knowledge. The problem is that, in Ryle ’ s view, this conclusion
-is false; hence, Cartesian internalism is false.
-Since the argument is valid, if someone wants to defend Cartesian internalism,
-he or she must reject some of the premises. It seems very diffi cult
-to regard as false the second and the third premises because they are just
-direct (or analytic) consequences of the defi nitions of the concepts we are
-using in such premises: privileged access, fi rst - person introspection. In
-defense of Cartesian internalism, one can reject the fourth premise and
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-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Ryle’s Argument against Cartesian Internalism 319
-assert that we do not have knowledge of the mental state of the others. As
-a Cartesian, one may defend the idea that (certain) knowledge is only possible
-concerning my own mental states (arguing in this way, one assumes a
-concept of knowledge linked to certainty). One accesses others ’ mental
-states just by analogy (or induction). But, actually, it seems diffi cult to
-accept as knowledge something which is justifi ed upon induction from one
-unique case (induction from one ’ s own case). In any case, Ryle defends the
-idea that that there is no such asymmetry between other minds and one ’ s
-own mind.
-It is important to distinguish between internalism and Cartesian internalism.
-The argument above does not apply to non - Cartesian internalism: the
-fi rst premise is (can be) false if Cartesian internalism is substituted for
-internalism. For instance, let us suppose that mental states are (internal)
-brain states. If so, one does not have privileged access to these states.
-Presumably, a brain - expert would have access to such states. In that case,
-fi rst - person privileges disappear.
-[Self - knowledge] is not attained by consciousness or introspection, as these
-supposed Privileged Accesses are normally described. [ . . . ] The sorts of things
-that I can fi nd out about myself are the same as the sorts of things that I can
-fi nd out about other people, and the methods of fi nding them out are much
-the same. A residual difference in degree between what I can know about
-myself and what I can know about you, but these differences are not all in
-favour of self - knowledge. In certain quite important respects it is easier for
-me to fi nd out what I want to know about you than it is for me to fi nd out
-the same sorts of things about myself. (Ryle, 155 – 6)
-P1. If Cartesian internalism is true, then one has privileged access to one ’ s
-mental states.
-P2. That each one has privileged access to one ’ s mental states means that
-fi rst - person introspection is the only way to know what a person ’ s mental
-states are. First - person introspection is the method to research the mind.
-P3. If fi rst - person introspection is the only way to know what a person ’ s
-mental states are, then we cannot know the mental states of others (or
-in other words, there is a strong qualitative difference between knowledge
-of one ’ s mind and knowledge of other minds).
-P4. One has knowledge of the mental states of others (or in other words,
-there is, at most, a residual difference in degree between knowledge of
-other minds and self - knowledge).
-P5. First - person introspection is not the only way to know what a person ’ s
-mental states are ( modus tollens , P3, P4).
-P6. One does not privileged access to one ’ s mental states ( modus tollens ,
-P2, P5).
-C1. Cartesian internalism is false ( modus tollens , P1, P6).
-84
-Jackson ’ s Knowledge Argument
-Amir Horowitz
-Jackson , Frank “ Epiphenomenal Qualia , ” Philosophical Quarterly 32
-( 1982 ): 127 – 36 .
-___. “ What Mary Didn ’ t Know , ” Journal of Philosophy 83 ( 1986 ):
-291 – 5 .
-Horgan , Terence. “ Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia , ”
-Philosophical Quarterly 34 ( 1084 ): 147 ��� 52 .
-Stoljar , D. and Y. Nagasawa (eds.). There is Something about Mary: Essays
-on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson ’ s Knowledge
-Argument . Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press , 2004 .
-Frank Jackson ’ s Knowledge Argument (sometimes referred to simply as
-“ the knowledge argument ” ) aims at refuting physicalism and establishing
-mind – body dualism. Roughly, physicalism is the thesis that everything in
-the concrete world is physical and possesses only physical properties. Mind –
-body dualism denies physicalism: according to all its versions, mental states
-have nonphysical properties. The knowledge argument attempts to show
-that conscious experiences have nonphysical properties, thus vindicating
-dualism. (The argument deals with visual experiences but its reasoning can
-be applied to experiences of other kinds; e.g., audible experiences, bodily
-sensations such as pain, etc.).
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Jackson’s Knowledge Argument 321
-The knowledge argument belongs to a family of epistemological arguments.
-Epistemological arguments purport to derive ontological conclusions
-(conclusions about what there is) from epistemological premises (premises
-about knowledge). Other important arguments that belong to this family
-are the “ zombie argument ” (#85) and the explanatory gap argument that
-also seek to establish mind – body dualism. Moving from epistemological
-premises to ontological conclusion is no mean feat, and ingenuity is necessary
-in order to perform such a move without committing a fallacy. As we
-shall see, the knowledge argument is indeed ingenious. Nevertheless, some
-critics have argued that it rests on a fallacy.
-The argument is based on a thought experiment: an (arguably) logically
-possible scenario is described in which a certain person knows everything
-there is to know about the physical properties of an experience yet lacks
-knowledge of another property of this experience. So experiences, it is
-inferred, have nonphysical properties.
-Let us briefl y review the steps of the argument. The assumption that
-upon her release, Mary acquires new information (P2) means that this
-information was not included in the information she had before her release.
-But since before her release she had all physical information (P1), it follows
-that she gains information that isn ’ t physical. So C1 follows from P1 and
-P2. Now, the expression “ physical information, ” as it is used in Jackson ’ s
-argument, refers to information about physical properties (indeed, P1 means
-that Mary had information about all physical properties of the experience
-in question); and similarly, “ nonphysical information ” refers to nonphysical
-properties. So the claim (C1) that Mary acquired nonphysical information
-about the experience in question entails (in fact, means) that Mary acquired
-information about a nonphysical property of this experience. C2 thus seems
-to be warranted by the argument ’ s premises. And if Mary acquires information
-about a nonphysical property of this experience, then a fortiori this
-experience has such a property, as C3 states. That, in turn, means that
-physicalism is false and dualism is true. As we see, the knowledge argument
-appears to be a formally valid argument.
-According to one prominent objection, this argument is only valid if P2
-is construed in a way in which it cannot be defended. This is the objection
-from the intentionality of knowledge and information (mainly due to
-Horgan). The intentionality of information consists in the fact that one can
-have the information that something has a property X without having the
-information that is has property Y even though (unbeknownst to one) X is
-identical with Y. For example, one can have the information that Superman
-can fl y without having the information that Clark Kent can fl y; this can
-happen when the property in question is presented via different modes of
-presentation (e.g., different concepts). Thus, it is possible that Mary ’ s “ new ”
-information is new in a limited sense – it is about a property she knew all
-322 Amir Horowitz
-along from her scientifi c study of vision; it is just that before her release
-this property was presented in her knowledge by a physical concept, and
-after her release it is also presented in her knowledge by a mental (phenomenal)
-concept. How does this possibility affect the argument? According to
-this objection, P2 should be understood so as to concern “ new ” information
-in this limited sense only, and then P1 and P2 do not entail C1; for if the
-new information may be about the same property as the old information,
-then it may be about a physical property and thus not be nonphysical
-information.
-It may be instructive to note that Mary ’ s newly gained information may
-be said to be nonphysical in some sense, in the sense that it involves concepts
-that do not belong to physical theory – phenomenal concepts. But if “ nonphysical
-information ” in C1 is defi ned in this way, then, of course, C2 does
-not follow. Indeed, we can understand the intentionality objection as claiming
-that the knowledge argument illegitimately moves from an epistemological
-claim – a claim regarding the way in which information is given – to
-an ontological claim – a claim regarding what this information is about. Is
-it plausible to maintain that upon having for the fi rst time the experience
-of seeing red (and shouting “ Oh, this is what it is like to see red ” ) Mary
-didn ’ t learn about a new property? I will leave it to the reader to answer
-this question and thus to assess the strength of this objection.
-Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate
-the world from a black and white room via a black and white television
-monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us
-suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on
-when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like ‘ red ’ , ‘ blue ’ , and
-so on. She discovers, for example, just which wavelength combinations from
-the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the central
-nervous system the contraction of the vocal cords and expulsion of air from
-the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence ‘ The sky is blue ’ . [ . . . ]
-What will happen when Mary is released from her black and white room or
-is given a color television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems
-just obvious that she will earn something about the world and our visual
-experience of it. But then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was
-incomplete. But she had all physical knowledge. Ergo there is more to have
-than that, and physicalism is false. (Jackson “ Epiphenomenal Qualia, ” 130)
-P1. Before her release from the black and white room, Mary had all physical
-information about the experience of seeing red.
-C1. If Mary acquired new information outside the room, then that information
-would be nonphysical (by defi nition of P1).
-P2. When released from the black and white room and having for the fi rst
-time the visual experience of seeing red, Mary acquired new information
-Jackson’s Knowledge Argument 323
-about such experiences – she acquired information about the ( “ phenomenal
-” ) property of what it is like to see red.
-C2. The information which Mary acquired about the experience of
-seeing red when released from the black and white room was nonphysical
-information ( modus ponens , C1, P2).
-P4. If Mary acquired nonphysical information, then that information is
-information about a nonphysical property of this experience.
-C3. The information which Mary acquired about the experience of
-seeing red when released from the black and white room is information
-about a nonphysical property of this experience; that is, the
-experience of seeing red has a property that is not physical ( modus
-ponens , C2, P4).
-P5. If the experience of seeing red has a property that is not physical, then
-physicalism is false and dualism is true.
-C4. Physicalism is false and dualism is true ( modus ponens , P5, C3).
-85
-Nagel ’ s “ What Is It Like
-to Be a Bat ” Argument
-against Physicalism
-Amy Kind
-Nagel , Thomas . “ What Is It Like to Be a Bat ? ” Philosophical Review 83
-( 1974 ): 435 – 50 .
-___. The View from Nowhere . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1986 .
-Physicalism – the claim that everything is physical – has been the dominant
-position in philosophy of mind since at least the middle of the twentieth
-century. Nonetheless, physicalism has long been accused of being unable to
-account satisfactorily for the qualitative or subjective aspect of experience,
-for example, the reddishness of one ’ s visual experience of a ripe tomato or
-the painfulness of one ’ s tactile experience of a sharp object. Many have
-charged that it is diffi cult to see how these aspects of experience could be
-accounted for in solely physical terms. Focusing specifi cally on the experience
-that a bat has when using its sonar, Thomas Nagel formulated this
-charge in a particularly powerful way. His argument is designed to show
-that subjective facts about experience, which are essential to it, cannot be
-captured in the objective language of physicalism. Although most philosophers
-assume that the argument, if successful, would show that physicalism
-is false, Nagel himself is careful to claim only that we currently lack the
-conceptual resources to see how physicalism could be true.
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Nagel’s “Bat” Argument against Physicalism 325
-I assume we all believe that bats have experience. After all, they are
-mammals, and there is no more doubt that they have experience than that
-mice or pigeons have experience. [ . . . ]
-[T]he essence of the belief that bats have experience is that there is something
-it is like to be a bat. Now we know that most bats (the microchiroptera,
-to be precise) perceive the external world primarily by sonar, or echolocation,
-detecting the refl ections, from objects within range, of their own rapid, subtly
-modulated, high frequency shrieks. Their brains are designed to correlate the
-outgoing impulses with the subsequent echoes, and the information thus
-acquired enables bats to make precise discriminations of distance, size, shape,
-motion, and texture comparable to those we make by vision. But bat sonar,
-though clearly a form of perception, is not similar in its operation to any
-sense that we possess, and there is no reason to suppose that it is subjectively
-like anything we can experience or imagine. This appears to create diffi culties
-for the notion of what it is like to be a bat. [ . . . ]
-Whatever may be the status of facts about what it is like to be a human
-being, or a bat, or a Martian, these appear to be facts that embody a particular
-point of view. [ . . . ]
-This bears directly on the mind – body problem. For if the facts of experience
-– facts about what it is like for the experiencing organism – are accessible
-only from one point of view, then it is a mystery how the true character of
-experiences could be revealed in the physical operation of that organism. The
-latter is a domain of objective facts par excellence – the kind that can be
-observed and understood from many points of view and by individuals with
-differing perceptual systems. (Nagel “ What Is It, ” 438, 441, 442)
-P1. Humans cannot experience anything like what it is like for a bat when
-it is using its sonar.
-P2. Humans cannot imagine anything like what it is like for a bat when it
-is using its sonar.
-P3. If P1 and P2, then what it is like to be a bat is fundamentally a subjective
-phenomenon, understood only from a single point a view (namely,
-the bat ’ s).
-P4. Humans cannot experience anything like what it is like for a bat when
-it is using its sonar and humans cannot imagine anything like what it is
-like for a bat when it is using its sonar (conjunction, P1, P2).
-C1. What it is like to be a bat is fundamentally a subjective phenomenon,
-understood only from a single point of view ( modus ponens , P3, P4).
-P5. Physicalism takes the objective point of view.
-P6. If physicalism takes the objective point of view, and what it is like to
-be a bat is a subjective phenomenon understood from only a single point
-of view, then physicalism cannot capture what it is like to be a bat.
-P7. Physicalism takes the objective point of view and what it is like to be
-a bat is fundamentally a subjective phenomenon, understood only from
-a single point of view (conjunction, C1, P5).
-326 Amy Kind
-C2. Physicalism cannot capture what it is like to be a bat ( modus ponens ,
-P6, P7).
-P8. The fact that experience is subjective is an essential fact about
-experience.
-C3. The subjectivity of what it is like to be a bat is an essential fact about
-it (semantic entailment, P8).
-C4. Physicalism cannot capture what it is like to be a bat, and the subjectivity
-of what it is like to be a bat is an essential fact about it
-(conjunction, C2, C3).
-P10. If physicalism cannot capture what it is like to be a bat, and that is
-an essential fact about it, then physicalism cannot capture all the essential
-facts about experiences.
-C5. Physicalism cannot capture all the essential facts about experiences
-( modus ponens , C4, P10).
-86
-Chalmers ’ Zombie Argument
-Amy Kind
-Chalmers , David. The Conscious Mind . Oxford : Oxford University Press ,
-1996 .
-___. “ Consciousness and Its Place in Nature , ” in Philosophy of Mind:
-Classical and Contemporary Readings , edited by David Chalmers , 247 –
-72 . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2002 .
-Kirk , Robert . “ Zombies versus Materialists . ” Proceedings of the Aristotelian
-Society , Supplement 66 ( 1974 ): 135 – 52 .
-In the late twentieth century, zombies began to play an important role in
-philosophical discussions about consciousness. But unlike the zombies of
-Hollywood, philosophical zombies are very much alive – or at least, they
-would be were they to exist. As philosophers use the term, a zombie is a
-creature that is microphysically identical to a human being – and thus
-produces behavior that is indistinguishable from that of a normal human
-being – but lacks any sort of consciousness in the phenomenal sense.
-Zombies behave as if they are in pain when you stick them with a pin, and
-they will report that they are in pain, but they don ’ t experience any painful
-sensations.
-Many philosophers have recently claimed that we can coherently imagine
-the existence of zombies. This claim is taken to imply the possibility of
-zombies, a claim that in turn is taken to imply the falsity of physicalism.
-The zombies, after all, are by defi nition exactly like us physically. But if
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-328 Amy Kind
-two creatures alike physically can differ with respect to consciousness, then
-it seems to show that consciousness is something over and above the physical.
-The zombie argument is one of a class of arguments in philosophy of
-mind often referred to as “ conceivability arguments. ” Such arguments start
-by claiming that some scenario is conceivable. The conceivability of the
-scenario is taken to imply that it is possible, and this is then supposed to
-show something about the actual nature of the mind. With respect to conceivability
-arguments in general, each of these moves is controversial, and
-the zombie argument is no exception. Some philosophers have questioned
-whether zombies are really conceivable. Others grant that zombies are
-conceivable but deny that it is appropriate to move from a claim about their
-conceivability to a claim about their possibility. Yet others grant that
-zombies are possible creatures but deny that this shows anything about
-physicalism.
-[I]t is conceivable that there be a system that is physically identical to a
-conscious being, but that lacks at least some of that being ’ s conscious states.
-Such a system might be a zombie : a system that is physically identical to a
-conscious being but that lacks consciousness entirely. It might also be an
-invert , with some of the original being ’ s experiences replaced by different
-experiences, or a partial zombie , with some experiences absent, or a combination
-thereof. These systems will look identical to a normal conscious being
-from the third - person perspective: in particular, their brain processes will be
-molecule - for - molecule identical with the original, and their behavior will be
-indistinguishable. But things will be different from the fi rst - person point of
-view. What it is like to be an invert or a partial zombie will differ from what
-it is like to be the original being. And there is nothing it is like to be a zombie.
-There is little reason to believe that zombies exist in the actual world. But
-many hold that they are at least conceivable: we can coherently imagine
-zombies, and there is no contradiction in the idea that reveals itself even on
-refl ection. As an extension of the idea, many hold that the same goes for a
-zombie world : a universe physically identical to ours, but in which there is
-no consciousness. Something similar applies to inverts and other duplicates.
-From the conceivability of zombies, proponents of the argument infer their
-metaphysical possibility . Zombies are probably not naturally possible: they
-probably cannot exist in our world, with its laws of nature. But the argument
-holds that zombies could have existed, perhaps in a very different sort of
-universe. For example, it is sometimes suggested that God could have created
-a zombie world, if he had so chosen. From here, it is inferred that consciousness
-must be nonphysical. If there is a metaphysically possible universe that
-is physically identical to ours but that lacks consciousness, then consciousness
-must be a further, nonphysical component of our universe. If God could have
-created a zombie world, then (as Kripke puts it) after creating the physical
-processes in our world, he had to do more work to ensure that it contained
-consciousness. (Chalmers “ Nature, ” 249)
-Chalmers’ Zombie Argument 329
-P1. I can conceive of zombies; that is, creatures that are microphysically
-identical to conscious beings but that lack consciousness entirely.
-P2. If zombies are conceivable, then they are metaphysically possible.
-C1. Zombies are metaphysically possible ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
-P3. If zombies are metaphysically possible, then consciousness is
-nonphysical.
-C2. Consciousness is nonphysical ( modus ponens , C1, P3).
-Alternatively:
-P1. I can conceive of a zombie world; that is, a world physically identical
-to ours but in which there is no consciousness.
-P2. If a zombie world is conceivable, then it is metaphysically possible.
-C1. A zombie world is metaphysically possible ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
-P3. If a zombie world is metaphysically possible, then facts about consciousness
-are facts over and above the physical facts.
-C2. Facts about consciousness are facts over and above the physical facts
-( modus ponens , C1, P3).
-P4. If physicalism is true, then there are no facts about consciousness over
-and above the physical facts.
-C3. Physicalism is false ( modus tollens , C2, P4).
-87
-The Argument from Revelation
-Carlos Mario Mu ñ oz - Su á rez
-Byrne , Alex and David Hilbert . “ Color Primitivism , ” Erkenntnis 66 ( 2007 ):
-73 – 105 .
-Campbell , John. “ A Simple View of Colour , ” in Reality, Representation and
-Projection , edited by John Haldane and Crispin Wright , 257 – 68 . Oxford :
-Oxford University Press , 1993 . Reprinted in Readings on Color : vol. 1,
-The Philosophy of Color , edited by Alex Byrne and David R. Hilbert,
-177 – 90. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997.
-___. “ Transparency vs. Revelation in Color Perception , ” Philosophical
-Topics 105 ( 2005 ): 105 – 15 .
-Harman , Gilbert. “ The Intrinsic Quality of Experience , ” in Action Theory
-and Philosophy of Mind , edited by James Tomberlin , 53 – 79 . Philosophical
-Perspectives, vol. 4. Atascadero, CA : Ridgeview , 1990 .
-Johnston , Mark. “ How to Speak of the Colors , ” Philosophical Studies 68
-( 1992 ): 221 – 63 . Reprinted in Readings on Color , vol. 1: The Philosophy
-of Color , edited by Alex Byrne and David Hilbert, 137 – 72. Cambridge,
-MA: The MIT Press, 1997.
-Loar , Brian. “ Phenomenal States (Revised Version) , ” in The Nature of
-Consciousness: Philosophical Debates , edited by Ned Joel Block , Owen
-J. Flanagan , and G ü ven G ü zeldere , 597 – 616 . Cambridge, MA : The MIT
-Press , 1997 .
-Russell , Bertrand. The Problems of Philosophy . London : Oxford University
-Press , 1912 .
-Strawson , Gallen . “ Red and ‘ Red ’ , ” Synth è se 78 ( 1989 ): 193 – 232 .
-Tye , Michael. Consciousness, Color and Content . Cambridge, MA : The MIT
-Press , 2000 .
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-The Argument from Revelation 331
-The argument from revelation is one of the most controversial arguments
-in the contemporary philosophy of mind and metaphysics. The terminology
-is due to Mark Johnston, in the context of the so - called “ philosophy of
-color. ” The argument tries to make explicit a basic conviction concerning
-our epistemic position with respect to what is known by having sensations,
-and it represents an effort to asking what knowledge our visual sensations
-of color provide us. Despite its apparent clarity, it is far from being an
-obviously sound argument with noncontroversial implications.
-According to Johnston, Strawson describes the idea behind the argument
-as follows: “ [C]olor words are words for properties which are of such a
-kind that their whole and essential nature as properties can be and is fully
-revealed in sensory - quality experience given only the qualitative character
-that that experience has ” (224). An earlier version of the argument was
-sketched by Russell (47). The Argument from Revelation (henceforth AR)
-is not an argument concluding that revelation is true but takes this as a
-premise. According to Johnston, revelation is often understood as a “ core
-belief ” of our conception of colors: “ [W]ere such beliefs to turn out not to
-be true we would then have trouble saying what they were false of, i.e., we
-would be deprived of a subject matter rather than having our views changed
-about a given subject matter ” (137).
-The AR is, in principle, an epistemological argument: it shows that the
-essential nature of that what sensations are about of is revealed to subjects
-merely by having such sensations. Hence, revelation concerns the relation
-between sensations and knowledge.
-[T]he nature of canary yellow is supposed to be fully revealed by visual
-experience so that once one has seen canary yellow there is no more to know
-about the way canary yellow is. Further investigation and experience simply
-tells us what further things have the property and how that property might
-be contingently related to other properties. (Johnston, 139 – 40)
-Thus, for example, subjects having visual sensations of colors are epistemically
-related to the essential features of those colors and, generalizing
-this, to have sensations suffi ces to know what they are about in themselves
-without acquiring any theoretical knowledge. The argument might be synthesized
-as follows:
-P1. If a subject, S, has the sensation, V, and V is a sensation as of X, then
-(by revelation) S will know the essential features of X.
-P2. S has such a sensation.
-C1. S will know the essential features of X ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
-This argument can also be applied to sensations other than merely visual
-– for example, to sensations of itches and pains – for revelation is not
-332 Carlos Mario Muñoz-Suárez
-thought to be a property of what sensations are about but a feature of the
-epistemic role of sensations.
-The AR has been defended against “ Type - type Physicalism ” (henceforth
-TP): the metaphysical thesis that mental entities of some type (say, sensations)
-are necessarily identical to physical entities of some type (say, neurobiological).
-TP is a version of ontological monism; that is, the thesis that
-reality is objectively constituted only by physical entities (say, events, states
-of affairs, processes, properties, and so on). Accordingly, some philosophers
-claim that if TP is true, then by knowing the latter (e.g., neurobiological
-states) we will know a priori the former (e.g., visual sensations). If we accept
-such inference, we will obtain a priori physicalism (AP), the epistemological
-thesis that by knowing physical entities of some type (say, neurobiological),
-we will know a priori mental entities of some type (say, visual sensations).
-In this sense, we can derive the AR against Type - type a priori physicalism
-(henceforth ARP).
-ARP simpliciter does not conclude that TP fails but that AP does. Thus,
-if someone defends a sort of TP dependent on the inference TP → AP, then
-this sort of physicalism will be denied by ARP. The AR is independent from
-ARP, for someone might accept TP to refute AP (Loar) or, for example, by
-accepting the thesis that the essential features of colors are a posteriori
-known as physical (Tye). The ARP might be synthesized as follows:
-P1. If sensations of certain type, V, are (necessarily metaphysically) identical
-to physical entities of certain type, N, then knowing N a priori entails
-knowing V; that is, TP → AP.
-P2. By merely knowing N, subjects will not know the essential features of
-V [Revelation].
-C1. TP is false ( modus tollens , P1, P2).
-The AR is often viewed as framing Realist Primitivism (RP) (Byrne and
-Hilbert § 2.2); that is, the thesis that properties – or example, colors – are
-sui generis external properties. RP agrees that “ objects often do have the
-colors we take them to, and colors of objects often fi gure in causal explanations,
-in particular, that they fi gure in causal explanations of why things
-look to have the colors they do ” (Campbell 178).
-The main problem with revelation lies on the meaning of “ essential
-features. ” This expression has, at least, two senses: (i) essential features of
-what sensations are about of and (ii) essential features of sensations as
-mental states. Sense (ii) should not be confused with sense (i) (Harman). In
-other words, essential features of contents of sensations cannot be confused
-with essential features of sensations as mental states. If one adopts the
-former, then AR favors a sort of infallibility of sensations in relation to
-properties appearing to be external ones (e.g., colors). Further on, if one
-The Argument from Revelation 333
-accepts the latter, then sensations are self - revelatory. “ Essential features ”
-can also be understood as phenomenal or perspectival features that cannot
-be reduced to physical entities. So, if one accepts, for example, TP, then one
-will accept that essential features, either of sensations or of contents of
-sensations, are physical themselves. In principle, in talking about revelation
-we are talking about features in a phenomenal sense or features essentially
-phenomenal.
-There is a version of the AR with the following conclusion: “ S will know
-the complete set of truths about X ” – call this version “ ART. ” ART implies
-that the complete set of linguistic knowledge about, for example, colors is
-revealed to subjects merely by having sensations. Some philosophers have
-criticized ART (Campbell ibid.). The main difference between the AR and
-ART is that the former is an argument from revelation of essential features
-as qualitative ones, and the latter is an argument from revelation of true
-propositions about essential features.
-88
-Searle and the Chinese
-Room Argument
-Leslie Burkholder
-Searle , John. “ Minds and Brains without Programs , ” in Mindwaves , edited
-by C. Blakemore and S. Greenfi eld , 209 – 33 . Oxford : Blackwell , 1988 .
-___. “ Minds, Brains, and Programs . ” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3
-( 1980 ): 417 – 57 .
-Copeland , Jack . Artifi cial Intelligence . Oxford : Blackwell , 1993 .
-Is it possible to make a computer intelligent or give one a thinking mind
-just by having it run the right computer program? Strong AI believes that
-by designing the right programs with the right inputs and outputs, minds
-can be created in computers. John Searle ’ s famous Chinese Room argument
-is intended to prove that this answer is wrong. Here are Searle ’ s own words:
-Suppose that I ’ m locked in a room and given a large batch of Chinese
-writing. I know no Chinese, either written or spoken. Now suppose further
-that after this fi rst batch of Chinese writing I am given a second batch of
-Chinese script together with a set of rules for correlating the second batch
-with the fi rst batch. The rules are in English, and I understand these rules.
-They enable me to correlate one set of formal symbols with another set of
-formal symbols, and all that “ formal ” means here is that I can identify the
-symbols entirely by their shapes. Unknown to me, the people who are giving
-me all of these symbols call the call the [fi rst] batch “ questions. ” Furthermore,
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Searle and the Chinese Room Argument 335
-they call the symbols I give them back in response to the [fi rst] batch “ answers
-to the questions, ” and the set of rules in English that they gave me, they call
-“ the program. ” Suppose also that after a while I get so good at following the
-instructions for manipulating the Chinese symbols and the programmers get
-so good at writing the programs that from the external points of view – that
-is, from the point of view of somebody outside the room in which I am locked
-– my answers to the questions are absolutely indistinguishable from those of
-native Chinese speakers. As regards the [claims of strong AI], it seems to me
-quite obvious in the example that I do not understand a word of Chinese. I
-have inputs and outputs that are indistinguishable from those of the native
-Chinese speaker, and I can have any formal program you like, but I still
-understand nothing. (Searle, 417 – 18)
-Searle continues by saying that if he doesn ’ t understand Chinese solely
-on the basis of running the right rules, then neither does a computer solely on
-the basis of running the right program. And what goes for Chinese goes
-for other forms of cognition as well. Just manipulating symbols according
-to a program is not enough by itself to guarantee cognition, perception,
-understanding, thinking, and so forth. So strong AI is decisively proved
-wrong.
-P1. All things or people who have a rule book or computer program that
-allows them to respond to questions and comments in Chinese in a way
-that can ’ t be distinguished from responses by someone who does understand
-Chinese satisfy the Turing test for having that ability.
-P2. Searle has a rule book that allows him to respond to questions and
-comments in Chinese in a way that can ’ t be distinguished from responses
-by someone who does understand Chinese.
-C1. If Searle has a rule book that allows him to respond to questions
-and comments in Chinese in a way that can ’ t be distinguished from
-responses by someone who does understand Chinese, then Searle satisfi
-es the Turing test for understanding Chinese (instantiation, P1).
-C2. Searle satisfi es the Turing test for understanding Chinese ( modus
-ponens , P2, C1).
-P3. All things or people that satisfy the Turing test for understanding
-Chinese are following the right rules or program for understanding
-Chinese.
-C3. If Searle satisfi es the Turing test for understanding Chinese, then
-Searle is following the right rules or program for understanding
-Chinese (instantiation, P3).
-C4. Searle is following the right rules or program for understanding
-Chinese ( modus ponens , C2, C3).
-P4. Searle doesn ’ t understand Chinese. Nothing about the situation changes
-this.
-336 Leslie Burkholder
-C5. Searle is following the right rules or program for understanding
-Chinese and not Searle does understands Chinese (conjunction, C4,
-P4).
-C6. Not either not Searle is following the right rules or program for
-understanding Chinese or Searle understands Chinese (De Morgan ’ s,
-C5).
-C7. It is not the case that if Searle is following the right rules or computer
-program for understanding Chinese then Searle understands Chinese
-(material implication, C6).
-P5. If Searle doesn ’ t understand Chinese solely on the basis of running the
-right rules, then neither does a computer solely on the basis of running
-the right program.
-C8. A computer doesn ’ t understand Chinese solely on the basis of running
-the right program ( modus tollens , C7, P4).
-P6. If no computer can understand Chinese solely on the basis of executing
-the right symbol - manipulating program or following the right symbol -
-manipulating rules, then no computer has any cognitive abilities just in
-virtue of executing the right program or following the right rules.
-C9. Just manipulating symbols according to a program is not enough by
-itself to guarantee cognition, perception, understanding, thinking, and
-so forth; that is, the creation of minds ( modus ponens , C8, P6).
-P7. If strong AI is true, then if there are the right programs with the right
-inputs and outputs, then there is creation of minds.
-C10. Strong AI is false. Strong AI is refuted ( modus tollens , C9, P7).
-Part VI
-Science and Language
-89
-Sir Karl Popper ’ s
-Demarcation Argument
-Liz Stillwaggon Swan
-Popper , Karl, R. “ Philosophy of Science: A Personal Report , ” in British
-Philosophy in Mid - Century , edited by C. A. Mace , 104 – 30 . London :
-George Allen & Unwin , 1957 .
-___. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientifi c Knowledge .
-New York : Routledge & Kegan Paul , 1963 .
-Karl Popper (1902 – 94) is considered one of the most infl uential philosophers
-of science of the twentieth century. He is perhaps best known for his
-criterion of demarcation between science and pseudo - science. Troubled by
-the presumed scientifi c status of some theories popular in his time – most
-notably, Marx ’ s theory of history, Freudian psychoanalysis, and Alfred
-Adler ’ s individual psychology – Popper was determined to identify some
-criterion by which to distinguish scientifi c theories from pseudo - scientifi c
-theories. This criterion, known as falsifi ability, was for Popper the mark of
-a scientifi c theory. According to Popper, a theory is scientifi c only if it makes
-predictions that can be tested and potentially shown to be false. If a theory
-is not falsifi able in this way and can only be confi rmed with cumulative
-supporting evidence, then it is pseudo - scientifi c. For example, Einstein ’ s
-theory of general relativity predicts that light rays from distant stars will
-be defl ected by the sun ’ s gravitational fi eld. During a solar eclipse in 1919,
-astrophysicists confi rmed that starlight was in fact defl ected by the sun, and
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-340 Liz Stillwaggon Swan
-by almost precisely the amount predicted by Einstein. Einstein ’ s theory of
-general relativity is a scientifi c theory, according to Popper ’ s criterion,
-because it made a falsifi able prediction (that in fact was not falsifi ed).
-The problem which troubled me at the time was neither, “ When is a theory
-true? ” nor, “ When is a theory acceptable? ” My problem was different. I
-wished to distinguish between science and pseudo - science ; knowing very well
-that science often errs, and that pseudo - science may happen to stumble on
-the truth. ( Conjectures , 44)
-As for Adler, I was much impressed by a personal experience. Once, in
-1919, I reported to him a case which to me did not seem particularly Adlerian,
-but which he found no diffi culty in analyzing in terms of his theory of inferiority
-feelings, although he had not even seen the child. Slightly shocked, I
-asked him how he could be so sure. “ Because of my thousandfold experience,
-” he replied; whereupon I could not help saying: “ And with this new
-case, I suppose, your experience has become thousand - and - one - fold. ”
-( Conjectures , 368)
-The history of science, like the history of all human ideas, is a history of
-irresponsible dreams, of obstinacy, and of error. But science is one of the very
-few human activities – perhaps the only one – in which errors are systematically
-criticized and fairly often, in time, corrected. This is why we can say
-that, in science, we often learn from our mistakes, and why we can speak
-clearly and sensibly about making progress there. ( Conjectures , 293)
-P1. If a theory is scientifi c, then it makes claims or predictions that could
-be shown to be false.
-P2. A theory that warrants only confi rmation (and ignores falsifying evidence)
-cannot be shown to be false.
-C1. A theory that can only be confi rmed and not falsifi ed is not scientifi c
-but pseudo - scientifi c ( modus tollens , P1, P2).
-90
-Kuhn ’ s Incommensurability
-Arguments
-Liz Stillwaggon Swan and Michael Bruce
-Kuhn , Thomas S. The Structure of Scientifi c Revolutions . Chicago : The
-University of Chicago Press , 1963 .
-___. “ Objectivity, Value Judgment and Theory Choice , ” in The Essential
-Tension , 320 – 39 . Chicago : The University of Chicago Press , 1977 .
-___. The Road since Structure . Chicago : The University of Chicago Press ,
-2000 .
-Thomas Kuhn (1922 – 96) was trained as a historian of science, but is best
-known for his contributions to the philosophy and sociology of science. His
-Structure of Scientifi c Revolutions was one of the most important and most
-controversial books of twentieth - century philosophy of science, mainly
-because it so compellingly questioned the objectivity of science, which had
-previously been taken for granted especially in the foregoing philosophical
-tradition of logical positivism. Among Kuhn ’ s many contributions to the
-philosophy of science, three of the most important are: (1) an analysis of
-scientifi c revolutions wherein a paradigm shift occurs that enables scientists
-to see the world in a new light; (2) the notion that science is not cumulative,
-as generally assumed, since newer paradigms are incommensurable with the
-old, and the methods employed in making observations and uncovering
-“ truth ” are relative to the reigning scientifi c paradigm; and (3) the insight
-that science is best understood as a socially and historically contextualized
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-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-342 Liz Stillwaggon Swan and Michael Bruce
-endeavor, which was in sharp contrast to the earlier positivist philosophy
-of science that saw science as divorced from the human narrative.
-Rationality and Paradigm Shifts
-[T]he choice [between paradigms] is not and cannot be determined merely
-by evaluative procedures characteristic of normal science, for these depend in
-part upon a particular paradigm, and that paradigm is at issue. ( Structure ,
-88)
-The competition between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can be
-resolved by proofs. ( Structure , 148)
-There must also be a basis, though it need be neither rational nor ultimately
-correct, for faith in the particular candidate chosen. Something must
-make at least a few scientists feel that the new proposal is on the right track,
-and sometimes it is only personal and inarticulate aesthetic considerations
-that can do that. ( Structure , 158)
-P1. If an emerging paradigm becomes the dominant one not by scientifi c
-proof but by majority acceptance or intuitive appeal, then the transition
-from one paradigm to another is not rationally decided.
-P2. An emerging paradigm becomes dominant by majority acceptance or
-intuitive appeal.
-C1. The transition from one paradigm to another is not rationally
-decided ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
-Incommensurable Paradigms and Holism
-The physical referents of these Einsteinian concepts are by no means identical
-with those of the Newtonian concepts that bear the same name. (Newtonian
-mass is conserved; Einsteinian is convertible with energy. Only at low relative
-velocities may the two be measured in the same way, and even then they must
-not be conceived to be the same). ( Structure , 102)
-Though subtler than the changes from geocentrism to heliocentrism, from
-phlogiston to oxygen, or from corpuscles to waves [as an account of the
-nature of light], the resulting conceptual transformation is no less decisively
-destructive of the preciously established paradigm. ( Structure , 94)
-Lavoisier [ … ] saw oxygen where Priestley had seen dephlogisticated air
-and others had seen nothing at all. ( Structure , 118)
-Kuhn’s Incommensurability Arguments 343
-P1. Scientifi c terms refer to things and have meaning through a network of
-meaning.
-P2. If paradigms were commensurable, then terms would still refer to the
-same things in new paradigms; for example, “ mass ” in Newton ’ s theories
-would be equivalent to “ mass ” in Einstein ’ s theories.
-P4. Terms do not refer to the same things in new paradigms; for example,
-“ mass ” is not equivalent in Newton ’ s and Einstein ’ s theories (and neither
-is a special case of the other), and some things (e.g., phlogiston) are
-eliminated outright.
-C1. Paradigms are incommensurable ( modus tollens , P2, P4).
-P5. If paradigms are incommensurable, then science does not more closely
-approximate the truth over time.
-C2. Science does not more closely approximate the truth over time
-( modus ponens , P5, C1).
-91
-Putnam ’ s No Miracles Argument
-Liz Stillwaggon Swan
-Putnam , Hilary . Mathematics, Matter and Method: Philosophical Papers ,
-vol. 1 . London : Cambridge University Press , 1975 .
-Boyd , Richard N. “ The Current Status of the Issue of Scientifi c Realism , ” in
-Erkenntnis 19 , 1 – 3 (May 1983 ): 45 – 90.
-Worrall , J. “ Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds ? ” Dialectica 43
-( 1989 ): 99 – 124 .
-Hilary Putnam (1926 – ) is a philosopher of language, mind, and science,
-who proposed the No Miracles argument in support of a realist understanding
-of the success of science. Realism holds that our best scientifi c practices
-and theories give us genuine knowledge about the world, and, in some cases,
-that the entities quantifi ed over in scientifi c theories, such as electrons, sub -
-particle strings, anti - matter, and mathematical laws, really do exist – or else
-our science would not be successful in teaching us about the world. The
-crux of the No Miracles argument is that the best explanation for the predictive
-and manipulative success of our scientifi c theories is that they are
-(at least approximately) true. (The opposing view – that of the anti - realist
-– is that the entities quantifi ed over in our scientifi c and mathematical theories
-need not exist for the theories to be useful; or, in other words, that our
-theories are useful but not necessarily empirically accurate.)
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-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Putnam’s No Miracles Argument 345
-The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that
-does not make the success of science a miracle. (Putnam, 73)
-It would be a miracle, a coincidence on a near cosmic scale, if a theory
-made as many correct empirical predictions as, say, the general theory of relativity
-or the photon theory of light without what that theory says about the
-fundamental structure of the universe being correct or “ essentially ” or “ basically
-” correct. But we shouldn ’ t accept miracles, not at any rate if there is a
-non - miraculous alternative. If what these theories say is going on “ behind ”
-the phenomena is indeed true or “ approximately true ” then it is no wonder
-that they get the phenomena right. So it is plausible to conclude that presently
-accepted theories are indeed “ essentially ” correct. (Worrall, 101)
-P1. If a scientifi c theory yields accurate observational predictions, then it
-must be (at least approximately) true.
-P2. Many of our scientifi c theories yield accurate observational
-predictions.
-C1. Many of our scientifi c theories must be (at least approximately) true;
-otherwise, the success of science would be miraculous ( modus ponens ,
-P1, P2).
-92
-Galileo ’ s Falling Bodies
-Liz Stillwaggon Swan
-Galileo . Discorsi e Dimostrazioni Matematiche, Intorno à Due Nuove
-Scienze 213, Leida, Appresso gli Elsevirii . Leiden: Louis Elsevier, 1638,
-or Mathematical Discourses and Demonstrations, Relating to Two New
-Sciences , translated by Henry Crew and Alfonso de Salvio. New York :
-Dover , 1914 .
-___. Dialogue concerning the Two Chief World Systems , translated from
-the Dialogo by S. Drake, 2nd rev. edn. Berkeley, CA : University of
-California Press , 1967 .
-Brown , James R. The Laboratory of the Mind: Thought Experiments in the
-Natural Sciences . New York : Routledge , 1991 .
-Galileo ’ s (1564 – 1642) famous thought experiment concerning falling bodies
-appeared in his fi nal work, Discorsi, which he wrote during his time under
-house arrest. It is generally considered to be one of the most compelling
-thought experiments from the natural sciences and exemplifi es a rarity in
-the history of science in that it doubles as a reductio ad absurdum argument.
-Relying on nothing but logical reasoning, Galileo demonstrated that
-Aristotle ’ s long - standing theory that heavy objects fall more quickly than
-light objects leads to a contradiction, so he supplanted it with his own
-theory that all objects fall at the same rate of speed regardless of their
-respective weights. Now demonstrable in the laboratory with vacuum tubes,
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-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Galileo’s Falling Bodies 347
-Galileo ’ s thought experimental insight is remarkable in that he used only
-logic to arrive at the correct solution hundreds of years before empirical
-proof was possible. Interesting to note is that in his time, Galileo was criticized
-for being overly confi dent in his a priori conclusion; yet, had he in
-fact carried out the experiments described in his Falling Bodies thought
-experiment, he would have confi rmed Aristotle ’ s, and not his own, insight,
-due to the natural effects of air resistance.
-S alviati : If we take two bodies whose natural speeds are different, it is
-clear that on uniting the two, the more rapid one will be partly
-retarded by the slower, and the slower will be somewhat
-hastened by the swifter. Do you not agree with me in this
-opinion?
-S implicio : You are unquestionably right.
-S alviati : But if this is true, and if a large stone moves with a speed of,
-say, eight, while a smaller stone moves with a speed of four,
-then when they are united, the system will move with a speed
-of less than eight. Yet the two stones tied together make a
-stone larger than that which before moved with a speed of
-eight: hence the heavier body now moves with less speed than
-the lighter, an effect which is contrary to your supposition.
-Thus you see how, from the assumption that the heavier body
-moves faster than the lighter one, I can infer that the heavier
-body moves more slowly. [ … ]
-And so, Simplicio, we must conclude therefore that large and small bodies
-move with the same speed, provided only that they are of the same specifi c
-gravity.
-(Galileo Dialogue , 108)
-P1. If the light ball falls more slowly than the heavy ball, then it acts as a
-drag on the combined system, causing it to fall more slowly than the
-heavy ball alone.
-P2. But the combined system is itself a new, even heavier object that falls
-more quickly than the heavy ball alone.
-C1. The light ball does not fall more slowly ( modus tollens , P1, P2).
-P3. If the light ball does not fall more slowly, then all objects fall at the
-same rate of speed regardless of their respective weights.
-C2. Galileo concludes that the only logical solution is for all objects to
-fall at the same rate of speed regardless of their respective weights
-( modus ponens , P3, C1).
-93
-Eliminative Materialism
-Charlotte Blease
-Churchland , Paul M. “ Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional
-Attitudes . ” Journal of Philosophy 78 , 2 ( 1981 ): 67 – 90 .
-___. “ Evaluating Our Self - Conception . ” Mind and Language 8 , 2 ( 1993 ):
-211 – 22 .
-Feyerabend , Paul. “ Materialism and the Mind – Body Problem . ” Journal of
-Metaphysics 17 ( 1963 ): 49 – 66 .
-In the philosophy of mind, “ eliminative materialism ” is perhaps the most
-radical thesis that has ever been proposed by philosophers. It is the provocative
-claim that our “ folk psychology ” – that is, our commonsense understanding
-of our own and other people ’ s behavior – is not only a theory but
-it is a false theory and will one day be eliminated in favor of a future,
-neuroscientifi c theory of the mind. The most recent and most vociferous
-eliminative materialist is Paul Churchland. Churchland argues that we need
-to overhaul our self - conception and eliminate such mental concepts as
-“ beliefs, ” “ desires, ” “ wishes, ” and so on. The thesis therefore has grave
-consequences for ethics and the social sciences (psychology, sociology,
-history, economics, and anthropology) and their applications (psychiatry,
-law, politics, etc.), since these fi elds employ such commonsense mental
-terms in their explanations. Eliminative materialism has been challenged on
-the grounds that it is self - refuting: the eliminative materialist, it is argued,
-cannot believe that “ beliefs ” are not true. Churchland argues that it merely
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-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Eliminative Materialism 349
-shows how deeply entrenched such terms as “ belief ” are in our self -
-understanding. Other objections to eliminative materialism include rejecting
-the claim that folk psychology is a theory or rejecting the view that it is
-false theory. In any case, successfully challenging or grappling with eliminative
-materialism can fundamentally change the way we think about
-ourselves.
-Eliminative materialism is the thesis that our commonsense conception of
-psychological phenomena constitutes a radically false theory, a theory so
-defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually
-be displaced, rather than smoothly reduced to a completed neuroscience.
-Our mutual understanding and even our introspection may then be reconstituted
-within the conceptual framework of completed neuroscience, a theory
-we may expect to be more powerful by far than the commonsense psychology
-which it displaces, and more substantially integrated within physical science
-generally. (Churchland “ Eliminative Materialism, ” 67)
-P1. Folk psychology is a theory.
-P2. If folk psychology is a theory, then folk psychology is fallible; that is,
-eliminable.
-C1. Folk psychology is fallible; that is, eliminable ( modus ponens , P1,
-P2).
-P3. There are good grounds for believing that folk psychology is false.
-P4. If (C1) and (P3), then folk psychology should be rejected as a false
-theory.
-P5. (C1) and (P3) (conjunction).
-C2. Folk psychology should be rejected as a false theory (and thereby
-eliminated) ( modus ponens , P4, P5).
-94
-Wittgenstein ’ s Private
-Language Argument
-George Wrisley
-Wittgenstein , Ludwig . Philosophical Investigations , translated by G. E. M.
-Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte, edited by P. M. S.
-Hacker and Joachim Schulte , rev. 4th edn. in German and English.
-Oxford : Wiley - Blackwell , 2009 .
-Candlish , Stewart , and George Wrisley . “ Private Language . ” The Stanford
-Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 edn.), edited by Edward N.
-Zalta , available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/
-private - language/
-Mulhall , Stephen . Wittgenstein ’ s Private Language: Grammar, Nonsense,
-and Imagination in Philosophical Investigations . Oxford : Clarendon
-Press , 2007 .
-Stern , David G. Wittgenstein ’ s Philosophical Investigations: An Introduction .
-Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 2004 .
-In section 243 of his Philosophical Investigations , Ludwig Wittgenstein
-(1889 – 1951) introduces the idea of a private language, a language that is
-supposed to refer to one ’ s own immediate, private sensations in such a way
-that no one else could understand the language. Such a language would not
-be private in the weak sense of a secret code, since a secret code could be
-shared. The idea that concerns Wittgenstein is whether a necessarily private
-language, one that could never be shared, is possible or even conceivable.
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument 351
-Often, section 258 is seen as a key remark in what is often called “ the
-private language argument. ” However, the variety and complexity of issues
-discussed in the remarks from sections 243 – 315 suggest that there is not
-one single argument that could be labeled “ the private language argument. ”
-Those remarks approach related issues from different directions rather than
-form a sustained critique of a single issue. Nevertheless, the argument contained
-in sections 256 – 258 is central to the overall consideration of the
-possibility of a private language, and it can be reconstructed.
-The general strategy of sections 256 – 258 is to show: (1) how different
-a private language of sensations would have to be from our ordinary public
-language since it would require disconnecting our sensations from their
-natural expressions – for example, the expression of pain through crying,
-joy through smiling, and so on; and (2) that the conditions needed to establish
-a private language are not possible, or that the very notion of a “ private
-language, ” one consisting of mere association of sign and private object,
-cannot be given meaning.
-The philosophical implications of the arguments in the private language
-sections of Philosophical Investigations , particularly of those in sections
-256 – 258, are many and varied, but two important ones concern:
-Epistemology: Wittgenstein criticizes the idea that there is a sharp epistemological
-divide between knowledge of one ’ s own “ inner ” states and
-knowledge of other ’ s “ inner ” states. Descartes held that even if all he
-believed about the world external to his mind might be false, he could
-nevertheless not fail to know that he had certain sensations and thoughts
-and that he was consciousness. This implies that while I can know that I
-am in pain, I cannot know for certain of another person that she is in pain.
-Much of what Wittgenstein says on privacy seeks to undermine such a
-position. He questions whether it ’ s not the other way around, namely, that
-we do very well know when others are in pain and it is questionable in
-what sense I can be said to know that I am in pain. His reasons for questioning
-knowledge claims about one ’ s own pain are not easily summarized.
-However, they stem, in part, from observations about the differences in
-context and use between such claims as “ I know my car is running; I just
-turned the key ” and “ I know my tooth hurts; I feel it. ”
-Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Language: Wittgenstein has a general
-criticism of what might seem like a commonsensical view of the relationship
-between language and world; that is, he challenges the view that the
-world divides naturally into objects to which we then simply attach labels
-(names). One consequence of his consideration of ostensive defi nitions
-(defi ning/explaining a word by pointing to what it refers) is that referring
-to the world is only possible when a language is in place to fi x the reference.
-Thus the foundation of a language cannot simply be a matter of
-352 George Wrisley
-looking around to see what there is and then attaching names to self -
-identifying objects.
-In considering our sensation language, Wittgenstein similarly criticizes
-the idea that sensations are “ self - identifying, ” providing their own criteria
-of identity, so that all that is required to talk about them meaningfully is
-to associate a name with a sensation. Because of how intimate we are with
-our sensations, we may believe that all it takes for the word pain to be
-meaningful is for us to associate the sign ‘ pain ’ with the sensation. The
-sensation is unique and self - identifying, so that the meaning of ‘ pain ’ is
-determined by the sensation. However, if Wittgenstein is right about naming
-and the way names and words refer, then objects and sensations do not
-pick themselves out as the objects and sensation that they are. Their identity
-is determinate only in relation to a language that can be used determinately
-to refer to them as conceived by the language. Sensation words are not
-meaningful because they refer to self - identifying, private sensations; rather,
-it is the public observable behavior that is the foundation for the use and
-meaning of sensation language.
-256. Now, what about the language which describes my inner experiences
-and which only I myself can understand? How do I use words to signify my
-sensations? – As we ordinarily do? Then are my words for sensations tied
-up with my natural expressions of sensation? In that case my language is not
-a “ private ” one. Someone else might understand it as well as I. – But suppose
-I didn ’ t have any natural expression of sensation, but only had sensations?
-And now I simply associate names with sensations, and use these names in
-descriptions. –
-257. [ . . . ] When one says “ He gave a name to his sensation ” one forgets
-that much must be prepared in the language for mere naming to make sense.
-And if we speak of someone ’ s giving a name to a pain, the grammar of the
-word “ pain ” is what has been prepared here; it indicates the post where the
-new word is stationed.
-258. Let ’ s imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the
-recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign “ S ”
-and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation.
-— I fi rst want to observe that a defi nition of the sign cannot be formulated.
-– But all the same, I can give one to myself as a kind of ostensive defi nition!
-– How? Can I point to the sensation? – Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak,
-or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on
-the sensation – and so, as it were, point to it inwardly. – But what is this
-ceremony for? For that is all it seems to be! A defi nition serves to lay down
-the meaning of a sign, doesn ’ t it? – Well, that is done precisely by concentratWittgenstein’s
-Private Language Argument 353
-ing my attention; for in this way I commit to memory the connection between
-the sign and the sensation. – But “ I commit it to memory ” can only mean:
-this process brings it about that I remember the connection correctly in the
-future. But in the present case, I have no criterion of correctness. One would
-like to say: whatever is going to seem correct to me is correct. And that only
-means that here we can ’ t talk about ‘ correct ’ . (Wittgenstein)
-P1. If a sensation is to be necessarily private, then it must not have a natural
-expression; for example, as pain is expressed through groans, screams,
-crying, and so on.
-P2. Suppose that one were to want to begin a private language and did so
-by making a sign, “ S, ” in a diary every time a particular sensation
-occurred.
-P3. If “ S ” is to be given a meaning and if there is to be a criterion of correctness
-for the correct application of “ S ” in the future, then a defi nition of
-“ S ” must be formulatable, or If “ S ” is to be given a meaning and if there
-is to be a criterion of correctness for the correct application of “ S ” in the
-future, then “ S ” must be given an ostensive defi nition (i.e., a defi nition
-through pointing to the thing named while saying/writing its name).
-P4. No defi nition for “ S ” can be formulated, for to do so would require
-the use of a public language, which would invalidate the language ’ s
-privacy.
-P5. Would it not be possible, nevertheless, ostensively to defi ne “ S ” by
-concentrating one ’ s attention on the sensation while writing the sign in
-the diary? No! Because:
-5a. As mentioned in section 257, and defended in sections 27 – 37 of
-Philosophical Investigations , if an ostensive defi nition is to function,
-then a conceptual – linguistic context to determine the “ object ” of the
-pointing, or in this case, the concentration of one ’ s attention, must
-exist.
-5ai. Ostensive defi nitions cannot be used to ground meaning but,
-rather, act as a fi nal step in making the already established meaning
-of a sign explicit.
-5aii. Without a conceptual – linguistic context with which to determine
-the “ object ” of concentration, there is no determinate “ pointing ”
-to the sensation. Is it the sensation that is concentrated on, its duration,
-its intensity, the body minus the sensation, and so on?
-C1. No ostensive defi nition is possible in the context of the private
-diarist ( modus tollens , P5, 5a – 5aii).
-5b. In the context of the private diarist, there is no existing conceptual –
-linguistic context.
-C2. The concentration of one ’ s attention on a sensation while writing
-a sign does not establish a meaning, private or otherwise, for the
-sign ( modus tollens 5a, 5b).
-354 George Wrisley
-There is controversy among Wittgenstein scholars regarding whether the
-above line of reasoning (together with other things Wittgenstein writes) is
-meant to show that the idea of establishing a private language by private
-ostension is false or nonsense. In order to refl ect that controversy, two different
-versions of this conclusion are given below.
-C3. No meaning has been given to “ S ” and there is no criterion for
-the correct application of “ S ” in the future (destructive dilemma,
-P3, P4, P5).
-P6. If (C3), then nothing meaningful will result.
-C4. Nothing meaningful will result from the mere association of a sign
-with a sensation ( modus ponens , C3, P6).
-C5. Since we do speak meaningfully about sensations, sensation talk does
-not get its meaningfulness from the mere association of sign with
-sensations (instantiation, C4).
-P7. Languages, even private ones, must be meaningful.
-C6 - Version 1 It is false that a private language consisting of mere association
-of sign and private object is possible (substitution, C5, P7).
-C6 - Version 2 Since we have failed to give any meaning to the notion of
-a necessarily private language, one consisting of mere association of
-sign and private object, it is not false that a private language consisting
-of mere association of sign and private object is possible; rather, it is
-not clear exactly what possibility is being ruled out. A necessarily
-private language is in effect nonsense (substitution, C5, P7).
-95
-Fodor ’ s Argument for
-Linguistic Nativism
-Majid Amini
-Fodor , Jerry . The Language of Thought . Hassocks, Sussex, UK : Harvester
-Press , 1976 .
-Chomsky , Noam. Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin, and Use . New
-York : Praeger , 1986 .
-Gopnik , Myran (ed.). The Inheritance and Innateness of Grammars . Oxford :
-Oxford University Press , 1997 .
-Bertrand Russell, one of the most infl uential philosophers of the twentieth
-century, is reputed to have remarked, “ How comes it that human beings,
-whose contacts with the world are brief and personal and limited, are nevertheless
-able to know as much as they do know? ” (qtd. in Chomsky xxv).
-This is what Noam Chomsky has canonized as “ Plato ’ s Problem, ” “ How
-we can know so much given that we have such limited evidence ” (Chomsky
-xxv). In a similar Russellian spirit, Myran Gopnik offers the following
-observation about language: “ One of the puzzles about language is the fact
-that children do not speak when they are born, but by the time they are
-two they are using language and by four they are fl uent speakers. How do
-they accomplish this amazing feat? ” (Gopnik 3).
-Historically speaking, the acquisition of language by human beings has
-been explained in terms of two contrasting and competing analogies. On
-the one hand, John Locke, in his classic work An Essay concerning Human
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-356 Majid Amini
-Understanding (1689), contends that the mind of a child is like a tabula
-rasa or “ blank slate, ” which passively receives the impressions of experience
-to form linguistic competence and performance. Basically, at birth, the mind
-is bereft of any understanding, and, subsequently, senses and experience
-inscribe linguistic marks on the empty tablet. Yet, on the other hand,
-Gottfried Leibniz, in his New Essays concerning Human Understanding
-(1703), explicitly inveighs against the Lockean blank slate analogy of language
-acquisition and argues that the mind of an infant is like a “ veined
-block of marble ” with its ingrained structure, whereby experience can only
-carve at certain pre - specifi ed forms and patterns (see #75). On the Leibnizian
-account, the conceptual wherewithal of the mind is innate and pre - confi gured
-and the senses and experience only provide the occasion for the knowledge
-of language to arise.
-Jerry Fodor has been one of the most prominent contemporary philosophers
-at the forefront of defending the innateness of language through a
-number of infl uential arguments that are rather less empirical in nature and
-more abstract in orientation. He attempts to argue for the existence of
-innate knowledge not only of the syntactic categories and structure of language
-but also of internal words in the following way:
-Learning a language (including, of course, a fi rst language) involves learning
-what the predicates of the language mean. Learning what the predicates
-of a language mean involves learning a determination of the extension of these
-predicates. Learning a determination of the extension of the predicates involving
-learning that they fall under certain rules (i.e. truth rules). But one cannot
-learn that P falls under R unless one has a language in which P and R can be
-represented. So one cannot learn a language unless one has a language. (Fodor,
-63 – 4)
-The fi rst premise lends itself to two readings, since there is an ambiguity
-in the premise.
-A sentence is considered ambiguous when it can be read in at least two
-different ways. In the case of Fodor ’ s argument, his fi rst premise could be
-rendered either strongly or weakly, and accordingly the two different readings
-can be presented as follows:
-(1) Strong Reading: There is a rule R such that one learns language L only
-if one learns R.
-(2) Weak Reading: One learns language L only if there is a rule R such
-that one learns R.
-The different readings of the fi rst premise could be represented schematically
-by using the symbol for existential quantifi er in modern logic – that
-is, ∃ R – in the following manner:
-Fodor’s Argument for Linguistic Nativism 357
-(1) ∃ R (one learns L only if one learns R).
-(2) One learns L only if ∃ R (one learns R).
-But, what is important to observe is that Fodor needs the strong version
-for sustaining his argument for nativism. What is required for the weak
-version is just to construe knowledge of language only as an ability to use
-language, that is, an ability to conform to some rules, which is not suffi cient
-to support a nativist conception of language. Therefore, a weak reading of
-the fi rst premise renders the argument invalid, unless one can show that an
-ability conception of language is untenable.
-The second premise is also susceptible to various interpretations. For one
-thing, in characterizing a behavioral pattern, one has to distinguish between
-(i) being guided by a rule and (ii) fi tting a rule. For instance, although a
-plant exhibits a regular behavior, it does not represent a rule. That is, a
-tree ’ s behavior fi ts a rule but is not guided by the rule. Therefore, in the
-case of language, it may be claimed that although a child ’ s speech pattern
-fi ts a certain rule, it does not follow that it is guided by it. The latter needs
-further justifi cation.
-However, what might be more damaging to the argument is an ambiguity
-in the premise. Again, there are two possible ways of reading the
-premise:
-(A) Strong Reading: Coming to know a rule requires a prior ability to
-represent it.
-(B) Weak Reading: If one has come to know a rule, one has to be able to
-represent it.
-The problem is that although the weak version appears plausible, it does
-not entail the strong one. In other words, one may hold the weak version
-without subscribing to the other one, and the premise required for the
-nativist argument has to be in the strong sense. Again, if Fodor intends to
-insist on the strong reading of the premise, he needs to offer some further
-argument to rule out the weak reading of his second premise.
-This premise is also in need of clarifi cation, specifi cally about the notion
-of language invoked. For, if the notion of language is broadly interpreted,
-then the claim verges on banality in the sense that it would be general
-enough such as no one would object to it. But, in that case, it will not have
-suffi cient strength to sustain innateness of language. However, Fodor ’ s
-invocation of language is more substantial, and he has a highly detailed and
-complex understanding of it. Consequently, in support of his third premise,
-Fodor resorts to a number of other arguments, including the controversial
-idea of impossibility of learning, to defend his claim about linguistic
-nativism.
-358 Majid Amini
-P1. If one is learning a language, then one is required to learn a rule.
-P2. If one is learning a rule, then one is required to represent a rule.
-P3. If one is learning a language, then one is required to represent a rule
-(hypothetical syllogism, P1, P2).
-P4. If one is required to represent a rule, then one is required to already
-know a language.
-C1. If one is learning a language, then one is required to already know
-a language (hypothetical syllogism, P3, P4).
-96
-Fodor and the Impossibility
-of Learning
-Majid Amini
-Fodor , Jerry . “ On the Impossibility of Acquiring ‘ More Powerful ’ Structures , ”
-in Language and Learning: The Debate between Jean Piaget and Noam
-Chomsky , edited by Massimo Piattelli - Palmarini, 142 – 62 . London :
-Routledge & Kegan Paul , 1980 .
-Piatteli - Palmarini , Massimo . “ Ever since Language and Learning:
-Afterthoughts on Piaget – Chomsky Debate , ” in Cognition on Cognition ,
-edited by Jacques Mehler and Susana Franck , 376 – 78 . Cambridge, MA :
-The MIT Press , 1995 .
-Since the middle of the twentieth century, there has been a steady stream
-of empirical research purporting to support the idea that much of our cognitive
-abilities rely on the existence of innate theories of some specifi c
-domain of knowledge (#75, #95). For example, it seems that children
-possess an innate basis of information about other minds whose disruption
-can ensue in states such as autism. Innate beliefs have also been invoked in
-the explanation of other domains of cognitive competence, such as our
-knowledge of basic properties of physical objects and of kinds of stuff:
-children ’ s ability at exploiting limited information about numbers, set, and
-basic algebraic operations; adults ’ conception of numbers; music perception;
-na ï ve conceptions of the physical world; certain facial expressions of
-emotions; deductive inferences and our reasoning concerning actions and
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-360 Majid Amini
-their practical consequences. Thus, without denying or diminishing the role
-of experience as input and environmental trigger, the picture presented by
-these empirical investigations is that much of our cognitive competencies is
-the result of native capacities rather than learning and acquisition.
-Jerry Fodor, as one of the leading contemporary proponents of cognitive
-nativism, has been arguing that the cause of nativism is further strengthened
-when one realizes that, strictly speaking, learning is impossible. The argument
-revolves around the impossibility of changes in the representational
-system of an organism. Fodor argues that a stronger representational system
-cannot arise from a weaker one by means of general learning. In fact, the
-argument is applicable to any theory of learning couched in terms of conceptual
-enrichment. Fodor contends that nothing new could be acquired
-during cognitive development. Basically, the insight is that theories purporting
-to explain such new acquisition can offer explanation on pain of presupposing
-the availability of the very concepts involved in the new
-acquisition. However, the Achilles heel of Fodor ’ s reasoning seems to be the
-argument ’ s major assumption that knowledge and learning involve representations
-– a doctrine known as the representational theory of mind. One
-can talk about the process of learning involving changes in the representational
-system, as the fi rst premise does, only if one has already assumed
-that learning cannot take place without representation. But, if one believes
-that knowledge and learning can happen without representations, then the
-fi rst premise of the argument becomes untenable and thereby the argument
-collapses. Yet, the doctrine of representationalism is a presumption that is
-widely shared by a signifi cant number of cognitive science practitioners and
-philosophers.
-Suppose we have a hypothetical organism for which, at the fi rst stage, the
-form of logic instantiated is propositional logic. Suppose that at stage 2 the
-form of logic instantiated is fi rst - order quantifi cation logic. [ . . . ] clearly a
-case of a weaker system at stage 1 followed by a stronger system at stage 2.
-And, of course, every theorem of a propositional logic is a theorem of fi rst -
-order quantifi cational logic, but not vice versa. Now we are going to get from
-stage 1 to stage 2 by a process of learning, that is, by a process of hypothesis
-formation and confi rmation. Patently, it can ’ t be done. Why? Because to learn
-quantifi cational logic we are going to have to learn the truth conditions on
-such expressions as “ ( X ) Fx . ” And, to learn those truth conditions, we are
-going to have to formulate, with the conceptual apparatus available at stage
-1, some such hypothesis as “ ( X ) Fx ” is true if and only if [ . . . ]. But of course,
-such a hypothesis can ’ t be formulated with the conceptual apparatus available
-at stage 1; that is precisely the respect in which propositional logic is weaker
-than quantifi cational logic. Since there isn ’ t any way of giving truth conditions
-on formulas such as all “ ( X ) Fx ” in propositional logic, all you can do is say:
-they include Fa and Fb and Fc , and so on. (Fodor, 148)
-Fodor and the Impossibility of Learning 361
-P1. If learning is possible, then it involves changes in the representational
-system of an organism.
-P2. If there are changes in the representational system of an organism, then
-the representational system already has the required conceptual apparatus
-for the change.
-P3. The representational system does not already have the required conceptual
-apparatus for the change.
-C1. There are not changes in the representational system of an organism
-( modus tollens , P3, P2).
-C2. Learning is impossible ( modus tollens , C1, P1).
-97
-Quine on the Indeterminacy
-of Translation
-Robert Sinclair
-Quine , W. V. Word and Object . Cambridge, MA : The MIT Press , 1960 .
-Hylton , Peter . Quine . New York : Routledge , 2007 .
-Kemp , Gary . Quine: A Guide for the Perplexed . New York : Continuum ,
-2006 .
-In Chapter 2 of his magnum opus Word and Object , W. V. Quine famously
-attacked the scientifi c credentials of the concept “ meaning ” with his controversial
-argument for the indeterminacy of translation. The argument is
-set up in what Quine takes to be scientifi cally and empirically adequate
-terms, where the evidence for the assignment of meaning is viewed as objective
-and public, which is then captured in terms of dispositions to respond
-overtly to socially observable stimulations. He further emphasizes that the
-criteria available for isolating meanings, which are used to distinguish one
-meaning clearly from another, should also to be evaluated in terms of this
-public conception of empirical evidence. With this as background, Quine ’ s
-critical argument against the empirical viability of “ meaning ” proceeds with
-his introduction of the thought experiment he calls “ radical translation. ”
-In this idealized scenario, a fi eld linguist seeks to translate an unknown
-language without the help of dictionaries or bilingual guides of any sort. It
-is within such a hypothetical situation, Quine suggests, that one can better
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Quine on the Indeterminacy of Translation 363
-focus on the raw empirical data available for the assignment of meanings
-to the language in question. He concludes that the available data can only
-take the linguist so far, and that the completion of the translation requires
-the linguist to use his own subjective preferences or intuitions concerning
-how to understand the language. As a result, the unscientifi c nature of the
-enterprise is fully exposed, since the assignment of meaning largely involves
-matters of practical convenience and preference rather than scientifi c matters
-of fact. Translation is then indeterminate for Quine; a consideration of the
-evidence and methods available leaves translation unfi nished, requiring the
-further introduction of the linguist ’ s own preferences for its completion. He
-more dramatically makes this point by claiming that two rival translation
-manuals could be constructed that do justice to all the evidence yet offer
-inconsistent translations, and there is no further “ fact of the matter ” to
-decide between them. Many have missed or misunderstood the ontological
-upshot of this conclusion. By showing that “ meaning ” is unfi t for philosophical
-and scientifi c purposes, Quine thinks he has given us reason to
-reject the idea that meanings are entities that somehow underlie the practice
-of translation and communication. This is because translation aims at
-establishing synonymy or sameness of meaning relationships between languages,
-which for Quine would provide us with criteria for the separate
-identifi cation of meanings. Given the indeterminacy found within radical
-translation, there remains no adequate empirical clarifi cation of this synonymy
-relation, so we lack identity criteria for meanings and then have no
-reason to suppose that “ meanings ” exist. Since some philosophers have
-claimed that meanings should be construed as propositions, Quine sometimes
-presents indeterminacy of translation as undermining this claim that
-meanings are propositions.
-Given his interest in addressing semantical issues from a critical, scientifi c
-perspective and his specifi c view of the relevant evidence, Quine introduces
-several technical terms within his argument. The “ stimulus meaning ” of a
-sentence is the ordered set of sensory stimulations that would cause the
-acceptance or rejection of a sentence by a speaker. Importantly, stimulus
-meaning serves as the objective evidence from which the linguist proceeds
-to develop a translation manual. An “ observation sentence ” is an utterance
-that all speakers of the language would assent to when stimulated by the
-same situations or circumstances. Further, two sentences are said to be
-“ stimulus - synonymous ” when they are assented to under the same circumstances.
-A sentence is “ stimulus - analytic ” for a speaker if she would assent
-to that sentence in any situation whatsoever. Lastly, “ analytical hypotheses ”
-consist of the linguist ’ s guesses concerning the meaning of elements of the
-native language and their correlation to English words and phrases. Quine ’ s
-introduction of these terms indicates the type of empirical clarity he wished
-to inject into the philosophical (i.e., scientifi c) study of semantics or meaning.
-364 Robert Sinclair
-For him, clarity is only achieved if our hypotheses, even the more abstract
-ones of philosophy, are described in terms of overt behavior and dispositions
-to such behavior. He takes the use of these terms as providing greater
-scientifi c and empirical clarity on these issues than mentalist approaches to
-mind and meaning, which he ultimately rejects as unexplanatory. Moreover,
-these terms help further to clarify the steps taken to complete the translation
-and to highlight in more explicit terms the exact ways in which the procedure
-falls short.
-Of the many critical responses to this argument, perhaps the most
-obvious would stress that Quine ignores relevant empirical facts that may
-help to rule out competing translations, perhaps even determining just one.
-So, for example, one might argue that relevant features of human brains,
-such as the innate genetic endowment central for language acquisition, help
-to determine translation. However, if one accepts that the data to be
-explained with regards to meaning is public and empirical in the way
-emphasized by Quine, then it remains unclear how an appeal to such neurological
-features of the brain will help with the detection of meaning or
-with language translation. Quine himself thought that the indeterminacy
-thesis was plausible. Few have agreed. While some have taken the indeterminacy
-thesis as central to Quine ’ s overall philosophy, at least one noted
-commentator questions this view. Even if translation was shown to be
-determinate along lines suggested by Quine, the notion of meaning that
-would emerge would be inadequate for the philosophical purposes usually
-assigned to propositions and meanings such as understanding a language.
-On this reading, Quine ’ s refl ections on indeterminacy would, at most, show
-the concepts of “ meaning ” and “ proposition ” as not empirically well
-grounded, but this by itself would have little impact on a view of propositions
-as nonempirical, abstract entities. For Quine ’ s criticism of this use of
-proposition, one has to look elsewhere in his philosophy, specifi cally at his
-genetic view of language learning and how this account reveals no need for
-an appeal to this philosophical conception of meaning (Hylton, 225 – 30).
-Quine ’ s recent rather agnostic description of indeterminacy as a conjecture
-would appear to offer some support for this interpretation.
-Known languages are known through unique systems of analytical hypotheses
-established in tradition or painfully arrived at by unique skilled linguists.
-To devise a contrasting system would require an entire duplicate enterprise
-of translation, unaided even by usual hints from interpreters. Yet one has only
-to refl ect on the nature of possible data and methods to appreciate the indeterminacy.
-Sentences translatable outright, translatable by independent evidence
-of stimulatory occasions, are sparse and must woefully under - determine
-the analytical hypotheses on which the translation of all further sentences
-depends. To project such hypotheses beyond the independently translatable
-sentences at all is in effect to impute our sense of linguistic analogy unverifi -
-Quine on the Indeterminacy of Translation 365
-ably to the native mind. Nor would the dictates even of our own sense of
-analogy tend to any intrinsic uniqueness; using what fi rst comes to mind
-engenders an air of determinacy though freedom reign. There can be no doubt
-that rival systems of analytical hypotheses can fi t the totality of speech behavior
-to perfection, and can fi t the totality of dispositions to speech behavior as
-well, and still specify mutually incompatible translations of countless sentences
-insusceptible of independent control. (Quine, 72)
-P1. Language is a social art. Acquiring it depends on intersubjective observable
-cues concerning what to say and when to say it; that is, it is here
-that we fi nd empirical evidence relevant for the determination of meaning.
-P2. If language is social in this specifi c sense, then understanding how
-“ meaning ” is acquired can only be clarifi ed by an appeal to dispositions
-to respond overtly to socially observable stimulations; that is, verbal
-dispositions to overt behavior.
-C1. The type of empirical evidence relevant for clarifying the determination
-of meaning consists of verbal dispositions to overt behavior
-( modus ponens , P1, P2).
-P3. To isolate better this data and the possible empirical limits of a scientifi c
-account of meaning, we can consider an account of translation called
-“ radical translation ” (RT), an idealized situation where we confront an
-unknown language and have no help from bilinguals or dictionaries. We
-then examine how far the evidence (i.e., verbal dispositions) preserves
-sameness of meaning across languages.
-P4. Using the stimulus meanings of native utterances, the fi eld linguist
-translates native utterances by observing interactions with the local environment.
-This method yields translations of observation sentences and
-logical connections between utterances. Even more generally, the linguist
-can judge whether two sentences are stimulus - synonymous – that is,
-when they share stimulus meanings – or stimulus - analytic; that is, when
-assented to following any stimulus.
-C2. At this point, translation can be more or less objectively determined,
-with most of the language in question still remaining untranslated.
-Further steps need to be taken to complete the translation (P4, detailed
-description of the steps in RT).
-P5. If translation is to proceed beyond this stage, then the linguist must
-break down sentences further into words and assign independent signifi -
-cance to them, thereby developing a system of analytical hypotheses; that
-is, provide a translation manual.
-C3. The linguist completes a manual of translation using these analytical
-hypotheses ( modus ponens , C2, P5).
-P6. These hypotheses go beyond the available evidence (i.e., stimulus
-meaning) and are not then directly answerable to this evidence.
-366 Robert Sinclair
-P7. If analytical hypotheses are not directly answerable to the data, then it
-is possible to construct rival systems of analytical hypotheses that are
-equally good translations of the language in question.
-C4. The result is translational indeterminacy: rival systems of analytical
-hypotheses are possible, each of which provides a translation manual
-that is equally successful in facilitating effective communication. There
-remains no further “ fact of the matter ” to distinguish one as the single
-best translation manual of the language. Synonymy or sameness of
-meaning across languages has not been empirically clarifi ed ( modus
-ponens , P6, P7).
-P8. If we have translational indeterminacy and unclear standards of synonymy,
-then there is no good scientifi c or philosophical reason to posit
-the existence of meanings or propositions underlying the practice of
-translation and communication.
-C5. There are then no propositions or sentence meanings ( modus ponens ,
-C4, P8).
-98
-Davidson ’ s Argument for the
-Principle of Charity
-Maria Caama ñ o
-Davidson , Donald . “ Radical Interpretation , ” in Inquiries into Truth and
-Interpretation , 125 – 39 . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1984 .
-___. “ On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme , ” in Inquiries into Truth
-and Interpretation , 183 – 98 . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1984 .
-Hahn , Ludwig E. (ed.). The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, The Library
-of Living Philosophers , vol. XXVII . Chicago and La Salle : Open Court ,
-1999 .
-McGinn , Colin . “ Charity, Interpretation and Belief . ” Journal of Philosophy
-74 ( 1977 ): 521 – 35 .
-Ramberg , Bjorn . Donald Davidson ’ s Philosophy of Language . Oxford :
-Blackwell , 1989 .
-Stich , Stephen . The Fragmentation of Reason . Cambridge, MA : The MIT
-Press , 1990 .
-Wilson , N. L. “ Substance without Substrata . ” Review of Metaphysics 12
-( 1959 ): 521 – 39 .
-Davidson develops his argument for the Principle of Charity as a way to
-avoid appealing to intentional entities in his semantic theory while, at the
-same time, ruling out also the Quinean problem regarding the indeterminacy
-of translation (#97). The six premises formulated below correspond
-to six Davidsonian theses. The fi rst establishes what evidence is available
-for interpreting. The second states that such evidence is insuffi cient, whereas
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-368 Maria Caamaño
-P3 points out a fi rst requirement for interpreting, namely, the attribution
-of beliefs. The fourth and fi fth premises point to a twofold problem arisen
-from the latter requirement, that is, the interdependence between belief and
-meaning and the inaccessibility of beliefs. In P6, a second condition is laid
-down in order to solve that problem: the application of the Principle of
-Charity. The conclusion makes reference to the consequence that follows
-from the fulfi llment of the second condition: the translatability between the
-interpreter ’ s language and the language of the person being interpreted. The
-dependence between the fulfi llment of the fi rst and the second requirements,
-being stated within Davidson ’ s philosophical framework, is what determines
-the dependence of interpretation on translation. The argument
-follows a syllogistic strategy hinging on three main assumptions: one concerning
-the need of belief attribution for interpretation to be possible, one
-related to the inaccessibility of other agents ’ beliefs, and another regarding
-the interdependence between beliefs and meanings. It must be pointed out
-that Davidson drastically changed the original formulation of the Principle
-of Charity by N. L. Wilson: “ We select as designatum [of a name] that
-individual which will make the largest possible number of [the speaker ’ s]
-statements true ” (532). Davidson introduces the Principle of Charity not
-only as a semantic rule to determine the referents of the nouns in the
-speaker ’ s language but also as a necessary condition for recognizing a linguistic
-agent as such, that is, for recognizing any intentional behavior. Three
-main kinds of objections have being raised to Davidson ’ s use of such principle:
-(1) the a priori character of the Principle of Charity, which lacks any
-empirical justifi cation (Ramberg); (2) the high probability that the necessary
-agreement to interpret be much less than Davidson thinks (Stich); and (3)
-the existence of different patterns of rational behavior that can evolve along
-history, and even a certain degree of irrationality also obeying certain patterns
-that are amenable to evolution (McGinn).
-If we cannot fi nd a way to interpret the utterances and other behaviour of
-a creature as revealing a set of beliefs largely consistent and true by our own
-standards, we have no reason to count that creature as rational, as having
-beliefs, or as saying anything. (Davidson “ Radical Interpretation, ” 137)
-The fi rst part has to do with coherence. Thoughts with a propositional
-content have logical properties; they entail and are entailed by other thoughts.
-Our actual reasonings or fi xed attitudes don ’ t always refl ect these logical
-relations. But since it is the logical relations of a thought that partly identify
-it as the thought it is, thoughts can ’ t be totally incoherent [ . . . ]. The principle
-of charity expresses this by saying: unless there is some coherence in a mind,
-there are no thoughts [ . . . ]. The second part of the argument has to do with
-the empirical content of perceptions, and of the observation sentences that
-express them. We learn how to apply our earliest observation sentences from
-Davidson’s Argument for the Principle of Charity 369
-others in the conspicuous (to us) presence of mutually sensed objects, events,
-and features of the world. It is this that anchors language and belief to the
-world, and guarantees that what we mean in using these sentences is usually
-true. [ . . . ] The principle of charity recognizes the way in which we must learn
-perceptual sentences. (Davidson, qtd. in Hahn, 343)
-P1. If something is evidence available for interpreting, then that is the
-agent ’ s behavior in publicly observable circumstances.
-P2. The only evidence available for interpreting is insuffi cient.
-P3. If there is interpretation, then there is attribution of beliefs to the agents
-being interpreted.
-P4. Belief and meaning are interdependent.
-P5. Beliefs are not agent ’ s behavior in publicly observable circumstances.
-C1. Beliefs are not evidence available for interpreting ( modus tollens , P1,
-P5).
-P6. If there is attribution of beliefs, then there is a maximization of the
-agreement between the interpreter ’ s beliefs and the beliefs of the agents
-being interpreted.
-C2. If there is interpretation, then there is a maximization of the agreement
-between the interpreter ’ s beliefs and the beliefs of the agents
-being interpreted (hypothetical syllogism, P3, P6).
-P7. There is a maximization of the agreement between the interpreter ’ s
-beliefs and the beliefs of the agents being interpreted (assumption).
-C3. There is maximization of agreement between the meaning of the
-interpreter ’ s language and the meaning of language used by the agents
-being interpreted (substitution, P4, P7).
-C4. If there is maximization of the agreement between the beliefs, then
-there is maximization of agreement between meanings, that is, translation
-(substitution P7, C3).
-C5. (Principle of Charity): If there is interpretation, then there is translation.
-(hypothetical syllogism, C2, C4).
-99
-Frege ’ s Argument for Platonism
-Ivan Kasa
-Frege , Gottlob . Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Eine logisch mathematische
-Untersuchung ü ber den Begriff der Zahl . Breslau : W. Koebner , 1884 .
-___. Begriffsschrift. Eine der arithmetischen Nachgebildete Formelsprache
-des reinen Denkens . Halle : Louis Nebert , 1879 .
-___. The Foundations of Arithmetic , translated by J. L. Austin. Evanston,
-IL : Northwestern University Press , 1994 .
-Hale , Bob , and Crispin Wright . The Reason ’ s Proper Study . Oxford : Oxford
-University Press , 2000 .
-Wright , Crispin. “ Field and Fregean Platonism , ” in Physicalism in
-Mathematics , edited by A. Irvine , 73 – 94 . Dordrecht : Kluwer , 1990 .
-Commonly, many mathematical statements are considered to be true. We
-learn to distinguish early on, for example, true arithmetical statements, such
-as “ 2 + 3 = 5, ” from false ones, such as “ 2 + 3 = 4. ” On a higher level of
-mathematical sophistication, but to a similar effect, professional mathematicians
-strongly appear to be in the business of articulating mathematical
-conjectures and proving their truth.
-On the other hand, on any account of informal reasoning it holds that,
-in order for it to be the case that something is so - and - so, the thing so characterized
-has to exist. In formal theories of logical consequence, this is
-captured by rules of existential generalization. Expressible in quantifi ed
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Frege’s Argument for Platonism 371
-predicate logic, existential generalization says that every formula of the
-form ∃ xP ( x ) (for P a predicate) is the logical consequence of any formula
-of the form Pa , where a is a constant term.
-Interestingly, these elementary and uncontroversial contentions constitute
-premises for an argument that has a very controversial effect. To ask
-whether abstract objects, such as numbers, sets, or properties, exist means
-stepping into a traditional battleground of Western philosophy that is still
-vigorously contested. At the same time, the claim that there is something
-that is a number can be inferred from any trivial truth of arithmetic.
-The following refi nement of this short but important argument makes
-explicit some of the central assumptions commonly associated with the
-concepts involved. These are assumptions about how language is structured
-and how it relates to the world that can be invoked to justify the rules of
-inference mentioned above and are refl ected in standard formal accounts
-of meaning. The development of such accounts began with Frege ’ s analysis
-of elementary predication in function - argument form, whereby singular
-terms constitute a syntactically determinable category of expressions the
-members of which have the function to refer to entities in the world (see
-Frege ’ s Begriffsschrift ).
-It is natural to suppose that reference is not successful if the entity purportedly
-referred to does not exist. Abstract singular terms are singular
-terms that purport to refer to abstract entities, that is, roughly entities that
-lack spatio - temporal location. On the traditional Fregean conception,
-objects are by defi nition precisely those entities we can refer to, that aspect
-of the world responsive to the syntactically characterizable category of
-singular terms. (Note that this makes the class of objects somewhat broad,
-including, for example, people ’ s whereabouts.) In particular, Frege has
-argued that numerals are singular terms and numbers therefore are abstract
-objects (see Frege ’ s Grundlagen ).
-In arithmetic we are not concerned with objects which we come to know
-as something alien from without through the medium of the senses, but with
-objects given directly to our reason and, as its nearest kin, utterly transparent
-to it. (Frege Foundations , § 105)
-Frege ’ s belief that numbers are objects [ . . . ] is the product of a deceptively
-simple train of thought. Objects are what singular terms, in their most basic
-use, are apt to stand for. And they succeed in doing so when, so used, they
-feature in true statements. Certain sorts of expression, for instance the standard
-decimal numerals, and expressions formed by applying the numerical
-operator ‘ the number of . . . ’ , to a predicate, are used as singular terms in
-the pure and applied arithmetical statements of identity and predication in
-which they feature. Many such statements are true. So such terms do have
-reference, and their reference is to objects. (Wright, 154)
-372 Ivan Kasa
-P1. If a sentence is true, all of its syntactic constituents have successfully
-discharged their semantic function.
-P2. The semantic function of (abstract) singular terms is to refer to (abstract)
-objects.
-C1. If a sentence is true, all of its singular terms (if there are any) successfully
-refer to objects (substitution, P1, P2).
-P3. If a singular term successfully refers, there is an object that it refers to.
-C2. If a sentence partly constituted by singular terms is true, there are
-objects that its singular terms refer to (hypothetical syllogism, C1, P3).
-P4. There are true sentences partly constituted by abstract singular terms.
-C3. There are abstract objects ( modus ponens , C2, P4).
-100
-Mathematical Platonism
-Nicolas Pain
-Benacerraf , Paul . “ Mathematical Truth , ” Journal of Philosophy 70 ( 1973 ):
-661 – 80 .
-Balaguer , Mark . Platonism and Antiplatonism in Mathematics . Oxford :
-Oxford University Press , 1998 .
-G ö del , Kurt . “ What is Cantor ’ s Continuum Hypothesis? ” in Kurt G ö del:
-Collected Works. Publications 1938 – 1974 , edited by Solomon Ferferman ,
-John W. Dawson Jr. , Stephen C. Kleene , Gregory H. Moore , Robert M.
-Soloway , and Jean van Heijenoort , vol. 2 , 254 – 70 . Oxford : Oxford
-University Press , 1995 . Originally published in Philosophy of
-Mathematics: Selected Readings , edited by Paul Benacerraf and Hilary
-Putnam. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice - Hall/Oxford: Blackwell, 1964.
-Parsons , Charles . “ Mathematical Intuition , ” Proceedings of the Aristotelian
-Society 80 ( 1979 – 80): 145 – 68 .
-Mathematical Platonism ’ s (MP) purpose is to justify mathematical knowledge
-and to explain why certain mathematical propositions are true and
-meaningful. It is the metaphysical and the epistemological claim: (1) that
-abstract objects exist, that is, objects that are neither spatio - temporal nor
-causal; (2) that true and meaningful mathematical propositions of high -
-order theory stand for or refer to abstract objects; (3) that we know when
-these propositions are true and meaningful because we have an access to
-abstract objects. Reference to abstract objects seems to appear in second - or
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-374 Nicolas Pain
-higher - order logical and mathematical theories, that is, in theories that do
-not quantify over individuals (e.g., “ If there is an x such that x ≥ y , then
-x + z ≥ y + z ” ), but over properties of logical and mathematical items (e.g.,
-in “ Any natural number that has only two distinct natural number divisors,
-1 and itself, is a prime, ” we quantify over the property ‘ to be a natural
-number ’ ), or properties of properties. Because of mathematical evidence
-(the fact that we know for sure that certain mathematical propositions of
-second or higher order, e.g., “ 3 is a prime, ” are true), MP argues that we
-can infer from the intuition of these propositions being true, fi rst, that we
-have an intuition that there are abstract objects that give them meaning,
-and, second, that we have, similarly to the perception of empirical objects,
-a specifi c cognitive faculty to perceive abstract objects, without which no
-intuition would be, cognitively speaking, likely to be possible (see G ö del
-and Parsons).
-Whereas the metaphysical argument (see Benacerraf) against MP
-addresses statement (1), the skeptical argument against MP addresses statements
-(2) and (3). The key point of the epistemological argument against
-MP is the causal theory of knowledge (Benacerraf), whose purpose is to
-deny, fi rst, the validity of the inference that goes from the intuition of to
-the intuition that , and, second, the existence of a specifi c cognitive faculty
-to perceive abstract objects. A human being X knows P (a proposition) if
-and only if X is, in an appropriate way, causally related to the fact that p .
-And from that premise, we infer, fi rst, that human beings cannot obtain the
-knowledge of abstract objects, and, second, that human beings cannot
-obtain knowledge of mathematical propositions of second - or higher - order
-theory grounded on abstract objects. Therefore, MP is not true. And since
-we know for sure that certain propositions of second or higher order are
-true, even if we suppose that we do not know abstract objects, MP fails to
-explain mathematical evidence. Therefore, MP is not the best way to explain
-mathematical knowledge.
-[If X knows that p , it] must be possible to establish an appropriate sort
-of connection between the truth conditions of p ( . . . ) and the grounds on
-which p is said to be known, at least for propositions that one must come to
-know – that are not innate. In the absence of this no connection has been
-established between having those grounds and believing a proposition which
-is true. [ . . . ] This second condition on an account of mathematical truth will
-not be satisfi ed, because we have no account of how we know that the truth
-conditions for mathematical propositions obtain. (Benacerraf, 667)
-P1. If Mathematical Platonism is true, then, if for any human being there
-is knowledge of mathematical propositions of second - or higher - order
-theory, then this knowledge is grounded on abstract objects.
-Mathematical Platonism 375
-P2. If S knows P (a proposition), then S ’ s grounds for P are relevantly connected
-to the fact that p .
-P3. For any X, if X is a spatio - temporal being, and for any Q (a proposition
-that describes a fact q about an abstract object), then X is not relevantly
-connected to the fact that q and, therefore, X does not know Q .
-P4. Human beings are spatio - temporal beings.
-C1. Human beings are not relevantly connected to abstract objects and
-do not have any knowledge of abstract objects ( modus ponens , P3,
-P4).
-C2. Human beings do not know any proposition grounded on abstract
-objects ( modus tollens , P2, C1).
-P5. If human beings have knowledge of mathematical propositions of
-second - or higher - order theory grounded on abstract objects, then human
-beings possess knowledge of abstract objects.
-C3. Human beings do not have any knowledge of mathematical propositions
-of second - or higher - order theory grounded on abstract objects
-( modus tollens , P5, C2).
-C4. Mathematical Platonism is not true ( modus tollens , P1, C3).
-Appendix A: Learning the
-Logical Lingo
-A statement or proposition is a sentence that can either be true or false.
-A conditional statement is a sentence that can be either true or false and
-has two parts: the antecedent and the consequent. A conditional statement
-generally has the form of an “ If . . . , then . . . ” statement.
-An argument is a set of statements with at least one premise and one
-conclusion. The premises provide reasons or evidence for the truth of the
-conclusion.
-A deductive argument has premises that guarantee the truth of the conclusion.
-An inductive argument is an argument where the premises provide
-reasons that the conclusion is probably true.
-An argument is a deductively valid argument if and only if it is impossible
-for the conclusion to be false if the premises are true. An argument is
-called “ sound ” when it is deductively valid and the premises are in fact
-true. An unsound argument is either invalid, or valid with at least one false
-premise.
-A strong argument is an inductive argument where the premises suffi -
-ciently support that the conclusion is probably true. The strength of an
-inductive argument is a matter of degree, and describing an argument as
-such does not imply that the premises are true.
-Inductive arguments that are not strong, having unlikely conclusions
-given the premises, are therefore called “ weak ” arguments.
-A cogent argument is a strong argument in which all the premises are in
-fact true. An uncogent argument is either weak or strong, with at least one
-false premise.
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Appendix B: Rules of Inference
-and Replacement
-Modus ponens p ⊃ q
-p
-=> q
-Modus tollens p ⊃ q
-∼ q
-=> ∼ p
-Hypothetical syllogism p ⊃ q
-q ⊃ r
-=> p ⊃ r
-Disjunctive syllogism p v q
-∼ p
-=> q
-Constructive dilemma ( p ⊃ q ) · ( r ⊃ s )
-p v r
-=> q v s
-Destructive dilemma ( p ⊃ q ) · ( r ⊃ s )
-∼ q v ∼ s
-=> ∼ p v ∼ r
-Absorption p ⊃ q
-=> p ⊃ ( p · q )
-Simplifi cation p · q
-=> p
-Conjunction p
-q
-=> p · q
-Addition p
-=> p v q
-Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
-First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
-© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
-Rules of Inference and Replacement 379
-Any of the following logically equivalent expressions can replace each
-other:
-De Morgan ’ s Theorem ∼ ( p · q ) ≡ ( ∼ p v ∼ q )
-∼ ( p v q ) ≡ ( ∼ p · ∼ q )
-Commutation ( p v q ) ≡ ( q v p )
-( p · q ) ≡ ( q · p )
-Association [ p v ( q v r )] ≡ [( p v q ) v r ]
-[ p · ( q · r )] ≡ [( p · q ) · r ]
-Distribution [ p · ( q v r )] ≡ [( p · q ) v ( p · r )]
-[ p v ( q · r )] ≡ [( p v q ) · ( p v r )]
-Double negation p ≡ ∼ ∼ p
-Transposition ( p ⊃ q ) ≡ ( ∼ q ⊃ ∼ p )
-Material implication ( p ⊃ q ) ≡ ( ∼ p v q )
-Material equivalence ( p ≡ q ) ≡ [( p ⊃ q ) · ( q ⊃ p )]
-( p ≡ q ) ≡ [( p · q ) v ( ∼ p · ∼ q )]
-Exportation [( p · q ) ⊃ r ] ≡ [ p ⊃ ( q ⊃ r )]
-Tautology p ≡ ( p v p )
-p ≡ ( p · p )
-Symmetry of identity: If a = b , then b = a (e.g., #21).
-Transitivity of identity: If a = b and b = c , then a = c.
-Substitution: If a = b , then a can replace b (e.g., #9).
-“ Instantiation ” reasons from the general to the particular: from “ All men
-are mortal ” to “ Mike is mortal, ” where “ Mike ” is an instance of “ men. ”
-Reductio ad absurdum is an indirect strategy of proving a proposition
-to be true by assuming its contradiction (opposite) and then showing that
-this leads to a conclusion that is false, contradictory, or absurd, and thereby
-justifying the original proposition. Note that, for any proposition, either
-that proposition is true, or its negation is true.
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