| #### PHRACK PRESENTS ISSUE 15 #### | |
| ^*^*^*^Phrack World News, Part 1^*^*^*^ | |
| **** File 8 of 10 **** | |
| SEARCH WARRANT ON WRITTEN AFFIDAVIT | |
| DATE: 7/17/87 | |
| TO: Special Agent Lewis F. Jackson II, U.S. Secret Service or any agent d use | |
| of access devices, and Title 18 USC 1030 - Computer related fraud. | |
| WHEN: On or before (10 days) at any time day or night | |
| ------------ | |
| AFFIDAVIT | |
| "I, Lewis F. Jackson II, first being duly sworn, do depose and state:..." | |
| [Here he goes on and on about his position in the San Jose Secret Service, | |
| classes he has taken (none of them having to do with computers)] | |
| "Other individuals involved in the investigation: | |
| Detective J. McMullen - Stanford Public Safety/Specialist in computers | |
| Steve Daugherty - Pacific Bell Telephone (sic)/ Specialist in fraud | |
| Stephen Hansen - Stanford Electrical Eng./ Director | |
| Brian Bales - Sprint Telecom./ Security Investigator | |
| M. Locker - ITT Communications/ Security Investigator | |
| Jerry Slaughter - MCI Communications/Security Investigator | |
| 4. On 11/14/86, I met with Detective Sgt. John McMullen, who related the | |
| following: | |
| a. Beginning on or about 9/1/86, an unknown suspect or group of | |
| suspects using the code name Pink Floyd repeatedly accessed the Unix and | |
| Portia computer systems at Stanford University without authorization. | |
| b. The suspects initially managed to decode the password of a computer | |
| user called "Laurent" and used the account without the permission or knowledge | |
| of the account holder. The true account holder was given a new account | |
| and a program was set up to print out all activity on the "Laurent" account. | |
| c & d. Mentions the systems that were accessed illegally, the most | |
| 'dangerous' being Arpanet (geeeee). | |
| e. Damage was estimated at $10,000 by Director of Stanford Computers. | |
| g. On 1/13/87, the suspect(s) resumed regular break-ins to the | |
| "Laurent" account, however traps and traces were initially unsuccessful in | |
| identifying the suspect(s) because the suspect(s) dialed into the Stanford | |
| Computer System via Sprint or MCI lines, which did not have immediate trap and | |
| trace capabilities. | |
| 6. On 2/19/87 I forwarded the details of my investigation and a request for | |
| collateral investigation to the New York Field Office of The U.S. Secret | |
| Service. (The USSS [I could say something dumb about USSR here]). SA Walter | |
| Burns was assigned the investigation. | |
| 7. SA Burns reported telephonically that comparison of the times at which | |
| Stanford suffered break ins [aahhh, poor Stanford] with that of DNR's on | |
| suspects in New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Maryland and California | |
| showed a correlation. | |
| 8. [Some stuff about Oryan QUEST engineering Cosmos numbers]. | |
| 9. On 4/2/87, I was telephoned again by Mr. Daugherty who reported that on | |
| 4/1/87, while checking a trouble signal on the above DNR's [on Oryan's lines], | |
| he overheard a call between the central figure in the New York investigation | |
| and [Oryan Quest's real name.] Mr. Daughtery was able to identify and | |
| distinguish between the three suspects because they addressed each other by | |
| there first name. During the conversation, [Oryan Quest] acknowledged being | |
| a member of L.O.D. (Legion Of Doom), a very private and exclusive group of | |
| computer hackers. [Oryan QUEST never was a member.] | |
| 10. [Mr. Daughtery continued to listen while QUEST tried to engineer some | |
| stuff. Gee what a coincidence that a security investigator was investigating | |
| a technical problem at the same time a conversation with 2 of the suspects was | |
| happening, and perhaps he just COULDN'T disconnect and so had to listen in for | |
| 20 minutes or so. What luck.] | |
| 11. SA Burns reported that the suspects in New York regularly called the | |
| suspects in California. | |
| 14. From 4/30/87 to 6/15/87 DNR's were on both California suspects and were | |
| monitored by me. | |
| [The data from the DNR's was 'analyzed' and sent to Sprint, MCI, and ITT to | |
| check on codes. Damages claimed by the various LDX's were: | |
| SPRINT : Oryan QUEST : 3 codes for losses totaling $4,694.72 | |
| Mark Of CA : 2 codes for losses totaling $1,912.57 | |
| ITT : Mark Of CA : 4 codes for losses totaling $639 | |
| MCI : Mark Of CA : 1 code for losses totaling $1,813.62 | |
| And the winner is....Oryan QUEST at $4,694.72 against Mark with $4,365.19.] | |
| 20. Through my training and investigation I have learned that people who | |
| break into computers ("hackers") and people who fraudulently obtain | |
| telecommunications services ("freakers") are a highly sophisticated and close | |
| knit group. They routinely communicate with each other directly or through | |
| electronic bulletin boards. | |
| [Note: When a Phrack reporter called Lewis Jackson and asked why after | |
| his no doubt extensive training he didn't spell "freakers" correctly with a | |
| 'ph' he reacted rather rudely.] | |
| 21. | |
| 22. [Jackson's in depth analysis of what hackers have ("Blue Boxes are | |
| 23. normally made from pocket calculators...") and their behavior] | |
| 24. | |
| 26. Through my training and investigations, I have learned that evidence | |
| stored in computers, floppy disks, and speed dialers is very fragile and can | |
| be destroyed in a matter of seconds by several methods including but not | |
| limited to: striking one or more keys on the computer keyboard to trigger a | |
| preset computer program to delete information stored within, passing a strong | |
| magnetic source in close proximity to a computer, throwing a light switch | |
| designed to either trigger a preset program or cut power in order to delete | |
| information stored in a computer or speed dialer or computer; or simply | |
| delivering a sharp blow to the computer. [Blunt blows don't cut it.] | |
| 27. Because of the ease with which evidence stored in computers can be | |
| destroyed or transferred, it is essential that search warrants be executed at | |
| a time when the suspect is least likely to be physically operating the target | |
| computer system and least likely to have access to methods of destroying or | |
| transferring evidence stored within the system. Because of the rapidity of | |
| modern communications and the ability to destroy or transfer evidence remotely | |
| by one computer to another, it is also essential that in cases involving | |
| multiple suspects, all search warrants must be executed simultaneously. | |