| ==Phrack Inc.== | |
| Volume Three, Issue 26, File 5 of 11 | |
| COSMOS | |
| COmputer System for Mainframe OperationS | |
| Part One | |
| by King Arthur | |
| Introduction | |
| %%%%%%%%%%%% | |
| Throughout the last decade, computers have played an ever growing role in | |
| information storage and retrieval. In most companies, computerized databases | |
| have replaced a majority of all paper records. Where in the past it would take | |
| 10 minutes for someone to search through stacks of paper for some data, the | |
| same information can now be retrieved from a computer in a fraction of a | |
| second. | |
| Previously, proprietary information could be considered "safe" in a file | |
| cabinet; the only way to see the data would be to have physical access to the | |
| files. Now, somebody with a computer terminal and a modem can make a quick | |
| phone call and access private records. It's unfortunate that there are | |
| "hackers" who try to gain unauthorized access to computers. Yet, it is just as | |
| unfortunate that most reported computer break-ins could have been prevented if | |
| more thought and common sense went into protecting computers. | |
| Hackers | |
| %%%%%%% | |
| There have been many cases of computer crime reported by the Bell | |
| Operating Companies (BOCs), but it is hard to say how many actual break-ins | |
| there are. Keep in mind that the only reported cases are those which are | |
| detected. In an interview with an anonymous hacker, I was told of one of the | |
| break-ins that may not have ever been reported. "My friend got the number when | |
| he misdialed his business office -- that's how we knew that it was the phone | |
| company's. It seems this Unix was part of some real big Bellcore computer | |
| network," says the hacker. | |
| The hacker explains that this system was one of many systems used by the | |
| various BOCs to allow large Centrex customers to rearrange their Centrex | |
| groups. It seems he found a text file on the system with telephone numbers and | |
| passwords for some of Bellcore's development systems. "On this Bellcore system | |
| in Jersey, called CCRS, we found a list of 20 some-odd COSMOS systems.... | |
| Numbers, passwords, and wire centers from all over the country!" He adds, | |
| "Five states to be exact." | |
| The hacker was able to gain access to the original Unix system because, as | |
| he says, "Those guys left all the default passwords working." He was able to | |
| login with a user name of "games" with the password being "games." "Once we | |
| were on we found that a large number of accounts didn't have passwords. Mary, | |
| John, test, banana, and system were some, to name a few." From there he was | |
| able to eventually access several COSMOS database systems -- with access to ALL | |
| system files and resources. | |
| COSMOS | |
| %%%%%% | |
| COSMOS, an acronym for the COmputer System for Mainframe OperationS, is a | |
| database package currently supported by Bellcore. COSMOS is presently being | |
| used by every BOC, as well as by Cincinnati Bell and Rochester Telephone. | |
| COSMOS replaces paper record-keeping and other mechanized record systems for | |
| plant administration. COSMOS' original purpose was to alleviate congestion in | |
| the Main Distributing Frame (MDF) by maintaining the shortest jumpers. | |
| It can now maintain load balance in a switch and assign office equipment, | |
| tie pairs, bridge lifters and the like. Additional applications allow COSMOS | |
| to aid in "cutting-over" a new switch, or even generate recent change messages | |
| to be input into electronic switches. COSMOS is most often used for | |
| provisioning new service and maintaining existing service, by the following | |
| departments: The frame room (MDF), the Loop Assignment Center (LAC), the | |
| Recent Change Memory Assistance Center (RCMAC), the network administration | |
| center, and the repair service. | |
| Next year COSMOS will celebrate its 15th birthday, which is quite an | |
| accomplishment for a computer program. The first version or "generic" of | |
| COSMOS was released by Bell Laboratories in 1974. In March 1974, New Jersey | |
| Bell was the first company to run COSMOS, in Passaic, New Jersey. Pacific | |
| Telesis, NYNEX, Southern Bell, and many of the other BOCs adopted COSMOS soon | |
| after. Whereas Southwestern Bell waited until 1977, the Passaic, NJ Wire | |
| Center is still running COSMOS today. | |
| Originally COSMOS ran on the DEC PDP 11/45 minicomputer. The package was | |
| written in Fortran, and ran the COSNIX operating system. Later it was adapted | |
| to run on the DEC PDP 11/70, a larger machine. Beverly Cruse, member of | |
| Technical Staff, COSMOS system design at Bellcore, says, "COSNIX is a | |
| derivation of Unix 1.0, it started out from the original Unix, but it was | |
| adapted for use on the COSMOS project. It bears many similarities to Unix, but | |
| more to the early versions of Unix than the current... The COSMOS application | |
| now runs on other hardware understandard Unix." | |
| "The newest version of COSMOS runs on the standard Unix System V operating | |
| system. We will certify it for use on particular processors, based on the | |
| needs of our clients," says Ed Pinnes, the District Manager of COSMOS system | |
| design at Bellcore. This Unix version of COSMOS was written in C language. | |
| Currently, COSMOS is available for use on the AT&T 3B20 supermini computer, | |
| running under the Unix System V operating system. "There are over 700 COSMOS | |
| systems total, of which a vast majority are DEC PDP 11/70's. The number | |
| fluctuates all the time, as companies are starting to replace 11/70's with the | |
| other machines," says Cruse. | |
| In 1981 Bell Laboratories introduced an integrated systems package for | |
| telephone companies called the Facility Assignment Control System (FACS). FACS | |
| is a network of systems that exchanges information on a regular basis. These | |
| are: COSMOS, Loop Facilities Assignment and Control System (LFACS), Service | |
| Order Analysis and Control (SOAC), and Work Manager (WM). A service order from | |
| the business office is input in to SOAC. SOAC analyzes the order and then | |
| sends an assignment request, via the WM, to LFACS. WM acts as a packet switch, | |
| sending messages between the other components of FACS. LFACS assigns | |
| distribution plant facilities (cables, terminals, etc.) and sends the order | |
| back to SOAC. After SOAC receives the information form LFACS, it sends an | |
| assignment request to COSMOS. COSMOS responds with data for assigning central | |
| office equipment: Switching equipment, transmission equipment, bridge lifters, | |
| and the like. SOAC takes all the information from LFACS and COSMOS and appends | |
| it to the service order, and sends the service order on its way. | |
| Computer Security | |
| %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% | |
| Telephone companies seem to take the brunt of unauthorized access | |
| attempts. The sheer number of employees and size of most telephone companies | |
| makes it very difficult to keep tabs on everyone and everything. While | |
| researching computer security, it has become evident that COSMOS is a large | |
| target for hackers. "The number of COSMOS systems around, with dial-ups on | |
| most of the machines... makes for a lot of possible break-ins," says Cruse. | |
| This is why it's all the more important for companies to learn how to protect | |
| themselves. | |
| "COSMOS is power, the whole thing is a big power trip, man. It's like Big | |
| Brother -- you see the number of some dude you don't like in the computer. You | |
| make a service order to disconnect it; COSMOS is too stupid to tell you from a | |
| real telco dude," says one hacker. "I think they get what they deserve: | |
| There's a serious dearth of security out there. If kids like us can get access | |
| this easily, think about the real enemy -- the Russians," jokes another. | |
| A majority of unauthorized access attempts can be traced back to an | |
| oversight on the part of the system operators; and just as many are the fault | |
| of the systems' users. If you can keep one step ahead of the hackers, | |
| recognize these problems now, and keep an eye out for similar weaknesses, you | |
| can save your company a lot of trouble. | |
| A hacker says, "In California, a friend of mine used to be able to find | |
| passwords in the garbage. The computer was supposed to print some garbled | |
| characters on top of the password. Instead the password would print out AFTER | |
| the garbled characters." Some COSMOS users have half duplex printing | |
| terminals. At the password prompt COSMOS is supposed to print a series of | |
| characters and then send backspaces. Then the user would enter his or her | |
| password. When the password is printed on top of the other characters, you | |
| can't see what it is. If the password is being printed after the other | |
| characters, then the printing terminal is not receiving the back space | |
| characters properly. | |
| Another big problem is lack of password security. As mentioned before, | |
| regarding CCRS, many accounts on some systems will lack passwords. "On COSMOS | |
| there are these standardized account names. It makes it easier for system | |
| operators to keep track of who's using the system. For instance: all accounts | |
| that belong to the frame room will have an MF in them. Like MF01, you can tell | |
| it belongs to the frame room. (MF stands for Main Frame.) Most of these names | |
| seem to be common to most COSMOS systems everywhere. In one city, none of | |
| these user accounts have passwords. All you need is the name of the account | |
| and you're in. In another city, which will remain unnamed, the passwords are | |
| the SAME AS THE DAMN NAMES! Like, MF01 has a password of MF01. These guys | |
| must not be very serious about security." | |
| One of the biggest and in my eyes one of the scariest problems around is | |
| what hackers refer to as "social engineering". Social engineering is basically | |
| the act of impersonating somebody else for the sake of gaining proprietary | |
| information. "I know this guy. He can trick anybody, does the best BS job | |
| I've ever seen. He'll call up a telco office, like the repair service bureau, | |
| that uses COSMOS. We found that most clerks at the repair service aren't too | |
| sharp." The hacker said the conversation would usually take the following | |
| course: | |
| Hacker: Hi, this is Frank, from the COSMOS computer center. We've had a | |
| problem with our records, and I'm wondering if you could help me? | |
| Telco: Oh, what seems to be the problem? | |
| H: We seem to have lost some user data. Hopefully, if I can correct the | |
| problem, you people won't lose any access time today. Could you tell me | |
| what your system login name is? | |
| T: Well, the one I use is RS01. | |
| H: Hmm, this could present a problem. Can you tell me what password and wire | |
| center you use that with? | |
| T: Well, I just type s-u-c-k-e-r for my password, and my wire centers are: TK, | |
| KL, GL, and PK. | |
| H: Do you call into the system, or do you only have direct connect terminals? | |
| T: Well, when I turn on my machine I get a direct hook up. It just tells me | |
| to login. But I know in the back they have to dial something. Hold on, | |
| let me check. (3 Minutes later...) Well, she says all she does is call | |
| 555-1212. | |
| H: OK, I think I have everything taken care of. Thanks, have a nice day. | |
| T: Good, so I'm not gonna have any problems? | |
| H: No, but if you do just give the computer center a call, and we'll take care | |
| of it. | |
| T: Oh, thank you honey. Have a nice day now. | |
| "It doesn't work all the time, but we get away with it a good part of the | |
| time. I guess they just don't expect a call from someone who isn't really part | |
| of their company," says the hacker. "I once social engineered the COSMOS | |
| control center. They gave me dial-ups for several systems, and even gave me | |
| one password. I told them I was calling from the RCMAC and I was having | |
| trouble logging into COSMOS," says another. | |
| This last problem illustrates a perfect example of what I mean when I say | |
| these problems can be prevented if more care and common sense went into | |
| computer security. "Sometimes, if we want to get in to COSMOS, but we don't | |
| have the password, we call a COSMOS dial-up at about 5 o'clock. To logoff of | |
| COSMOS you have to hit a CONTROL-Y. If you don't, the next person who calls | |
| will resume where you left off. A lot of the time, people forget to logoff. | |
| They just turn their terminals off, in the rush of going home." | |
| The past examples do not comprise the only way hackers get into systems, | |
| but most of the problems shown here can exist regardless of what types of | |
| systems your company has. The second article deals with solutions to these | |
| problems. | |
| _______________________________________________________________________________ | |